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COLD WAR CRISES

POLAND, 1956
Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October"

by L.W. Gluchowski

Eastern Europe was central to Soviet foreign and defence policy throughout the Cold War. After World War II, and especially from 1947 onward, the Soviet military and security forces, together with local communist elites, constructed the most integrated alliance system of the Cold War period. Soviet state institutions of control also helped to reconstruct the military and security forces of states devastated by World War II. Their aim was to secure communist regimes in postwar Eastern Europe dedicated to defend the Soviet Union's western frontier. To ensure loyalty, uniformity, and quality, Soviet military and security officers were recruited to staff or to advise the East European military and security forces.[1] This pattern applied in particular to

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SUDOPLATOV RESPONDS:
The Authors of *Special Tasks*
Reply to Critics— see page 155

HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956
Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956

Introduction, Translation, and Annotation by Mark Kramer

The document below has been translated from a 19-page Czech manuscript entitled "*Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku*" ("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary"). The manuscript, which is stored in Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, at the Central State Archive in Prague (Statni ustredni archiv, or SUA), is one of many items in the Czech archives that shed valuable new light on the Soviet Union's response to the crises in Poland and Hungary in

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POLAND, 1980-81
Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis

by Mark Kramer

The prolonged crisis in Poland in 1980-81 was one of the most intriguing episodes of the Cold War, but until very recently almost no primary sources relating to the crisis were available. That problem has greatly diminished over the past few years. This article will draw on new archival materials and memoirs from Russia, Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia to provide a reassessment of the Soviet Union's role in the Polish crisis. The article will begin with a brief review of some of the most important new sources, and will then analyze the decision-making calculus in Moscow in 1980-81. The third part will take up the controversial question of whether, and under what circumstances, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies might have invaded Poland in December 1981.

The discussion here is based in part on a longer chapter about the Polish crisis in my forthcoming book on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, 1945-1991. Further coverage of the

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KOREA, 1949-50
To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War

by Kathryn Weathersby

The historical record of the Korean War has recently been greatly enriched by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's presentation to President Kim Young-Sam of South Korea, during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994, of 216 previously classified high level Soviet documents on the war from Russian archives. The collection totals 548 pages and includes documents from the period 1949-1953. Most of the documents are ciphered telegrams between

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CUBA, 1962
The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech

by Philip Brenner and James G. Blight

On 25 and 26 January 1968, Cuban leader Fidel Castro gave an extraordinary 12-hour speech before the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party on the history of Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. It is well known that the relationship in the six years after the Cuban Missile Crisis was turbulent. But the disclosure of this speech, kept secret at the time, helps clarify how important the Missile Crisis was in setting the stage for the turbulence.

The Cuban government recently declassified

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Moscow and Pyongyang, and between Moscow and Beijing. The collection also includes notes of conversations among key figures in North Korea, the USSR, and China; letters from Kim Il Sung to Stalin; and resolutions of the Soviet Politburo and Council of Ministers. All of the documents are from either the Presidential Archive or the Foreign Ministry archives and, with a few exceptions,[1] were unavailable to scholars prior to their presentation to South Korea. In July 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea released Korean translations of these documents and in November 1994 the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) began granting permission to scholars to read photocopies of the collection.[2]

Unfortunately, these records represent only a portion of the top level documents on the war in Soviet archives, several of which (such as the KGB and Defense Ministry archives) remain largely inaccessible to scholars. The narrative of events we can construct from these materials still has significant gaps, especially for the several months immediately preceding the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950. Nonetheless, these new sources reveal a great deal more than has previously been known about the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea, the decision-making surrounding the attack on South Korea, the role of Mao Zedong in all stages of the war, the formulation of the communist positions at the armistice negotiations, and the role of Stalin's death in bringing the war to an end.

These documents, when examined together with the larger body of records declassified in recent years by Russian archives, thus shed light on several questions central to the history of the Cold War (e.g., the efficacy of American threats to use nuclear weapons in Korea) and a full analysis of them requires a full-length study. This essay will offer a small sample of these new sources, presenting translations of and brief commentaries on seven documents from 1949 and 1950 that illuminate with significantly greater specificity than the 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry background report presented in an earlier *Bulletin*[3] the question of when, how, and by whom the decision was made to launch a military assault on South Korea.

Document #1, the minutes of a conversation between Stalin and Kim Il Sung in Moscow on 5 March 1949, sets the stage, revealing in a most intimate way the nature of the relationship between Kim's newly created state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and its Soviet patron. The conversation recorded in this report was the first and only formal discussion between Stalin and the official North Korean delegation that travelled to Moscow in March 1949 to conclude the DPRK's initial agreements with the USSR.[4] This rare and intriguing glimpse of Stalin handling a petitioning vassal shows, above all, the importance to both leaders of matters of economic development and material supply. As is shown in exhaustive detail in the thousands of pages of documents on post-war Korea in the Russian Foreign Ministry archive, in the years prior to and during the Korean War, North Korea was utterly dependent economically on the Soviet Union. As a result of the collapse of the Japanese empire, Soviet occupation policy, and the civil war in China, North Korea was cut off from its former economic ties with southern Korea, Japan and Manchuria. Except for very limited trade with Hong Kong and two Manchurian ports, in the period prior to and during the Korean War the Soviet Union was the only source of supply and the only market for North Korean goods.

Furthermore, to an unusual degree, North Korea was dependent on the Soviet Union for technical expertise.[5] Japanese colonial policy had permitted only a small number of Koreans to gain higher education or management experience, and the politics of the occupation from 1945-48 prompted most northerners who possessed such skills to flee to the South. With regard to questions of the origin of the Korean War, these economic and demographic circumstances meant that, for the most basic and profound reasons, in the years prior to and during the 1950-53 war, North Korea was simply unable to take any significant action without Soviet approval, regardless of the nationalist inclinations of the DPRK leadership.[6]

Document #1 also reveals that in March 1949 Stalin had a strong interest in the balance of military forces between North and South Korea, but was far from approving a military campaign against the South. The North Korean military was still quite undeveloped; the discussion was instead on basic questions of military formation and supply. From Kim's statement in Document #6 presented below, recording a conversation in Pyongyang nine months later, it appears that during another conversation between Stalin and Kim in March 1949, which may have occurred during a dinner or reception, Kim asked Stalin about the possibility of attacking South Korea and was rebuffed. According to Kim's account in January 1950, Stalin had said that it was "not necessary" to attack the South, that North Korean forces could cross the 38th parallel only as a counterattack to an assault by South Korean forces. In March 1949, American troops were still in South Korea and the Chinese civil war was still not resolved, which led Stalin to reject for the time being any military adventure on the Korean peninsula.

Document #3 (a ciphered telegram from then-Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang on 11 September 1949) indicates that on 12 August 1949, Kim Il Sung again raised the question of a military campaign against South Korea, this time in conversation with a Soviet official in Pyongyang, most likely Ambassador Shtykov. Document #2 (a ciphered telegram of 3 September 1949 from the Soviet ambassador to North Korea to Soviet Foreign Minister A. Vyshinsky) reveals that on September 3 Kim again requested permission to attack, this time claiming that South Korea was preparing to attack DPRK territory. He requested permission to make a roughly equivalent counterattack and then added that "if the international situation permits," which was no doubt a reference to possible American reactions, they could easily seize control of the remainder of the peninsula.

It is interesting that the Soviet ambassador confirms the interception of South Korean attack orders but notes that no attack occurred. Other documents in this collection show that through June 1950, North Korean leaders repeatedly claimed to have intercepted offensive orders from the South, even though the attacks did not materialize. Some of these interceptions could well have been genuine, since South Korean leaders in the months before the war often expressed their desire and intention to reunify the country through military means. However, if Stalin had made an attack from the South a necessary precondition for a North Korean military action, the steady stream of such

reports is more easily understood.

Document #3 also suggests that by 11 September 1949, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in June, Stalin had warmed to the idea of a military campaign in Korea, at least on a limited scale. The Soviet leadership was now ready to entertain Kim's request and asked him for specific military and political information with which to make a decision. Document #4 (a ciphered telegram to Moscow from the Soviet charge d'affaires in Pyongyang dated 14 September 1949) reports Kim Il Sung's rather unconvincing response to the Kremlin's questions. It also conveys the opinion of the USSR embassy in Pyongyang that the limited offensive operation outlined by Kim was inadvisable at that time. Since the DPRK army was not sufficiently strong, such an operation would probably turn into a prolonged civil war, which would be disadvantageous both militarily and politically. Moreover, as the embassy quite correctly forecast, a "drawn out civil war" initiated by an attack from the North would give the United States an opportunity to intervene effectively, "more decisively than they did in China," and in general to agitate against the Soviet Union. Under existing conditions, the embassy concluded, an attack on the South would be "correct" only if the North Koreans could be certain that the war would end quickly.

Although the record of deliberations in April, May, and June 1950 is still quite fragmentary, it appears that the idea that the war must be won quickly became the basis for planning the eventual attack of June 25. It is tragically ironic that Soviet insistence on a quick victory led them to devise a strategy which, by giving the appearance of the kind of massive tank-led assault the Western allies so feared would happen in Europe, prompted the United States to respond with precisely the intervention in Korea that Moscow wanted above all to avoid.

Document #5, the Politburo decision of 24 September 1949, confirmed the response Shtykov was ordered to make to Kim Il Sung's reply for an offensive military action. One should note that the Soviet leadership did not question the goal of bringing the rest of Korea under DPRK control; the issue was only whether the attempt to do so would bring disadvantageous results. They concluded that at present the North Koreans should devote their efforts to strengthening the partisan movement in the South in order to prepare to unify the country through an armed uprising in South Korea. Had this strategy been followed skillfully, given the extreme unpopularity of the Syngman Rhee regime, it may well have succeeded.[7]

On 4 October 1949, Shtykov reported to Stalin that he had fulfilled the Politburo directive of September 24 and that Kim and Pak Hon-yong had received his report "in a reserved manner." Kim was clearly disappointed, responding only "very well," but Pak was more expressive, stating that the decision was correct, that they must develop the partisan movement more widely. Shtykov added that Kim and Pak had subsequently reported to him that they had sent around 800 persons to the South to lead the partisans and the movement was growing.[8]

The Politburo decision of September 24 ended the discussion of a military campaign in Korea for the remainder of 1949, but as Document #6 (a ciphered telegram from the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang dated 19 January 1950) vividly records, on 17 January 1950, Kim again raised the issue, this time with increased urgency. The communist victory in the Chinese civil war had made it intolerable to Kim that Korean communists were not allowed similarly to liberate the rest of their country. Referring to Mao's promise of May 1949 to help the Koreans once the fighting in China ended, Kim fervently entreated Shtykov to allow him to go to Moscow to discuss with Stalin the possibility of launching an attack on South Korea. This account of Kim's conversation with Soviet and Chinese representatives in Pyongyang makes it perfectly clear that Kim Il Sung considered himself unable to take such action without Stalin's approval.

The final document presented below is Stalin's telegram to Shtykov on 30 January 1950, giving his reply to Kim Il Sung's latest entreaties. This is one of the most interesting documents of the entire collection because it reveals so bluntly Stalin's strategic thinking and his mode of operation with subordinate rulers. Stalin cautiously stated that he was "ready to help" Kim but that the matter "needs large preparation" and "must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk." He then, in perfect mafioso style, "requested" that Kim provide the Soviet Union with at least 25,000 tons of lead per year, maintaining the fiction of Kim's independence by stating that he hopes "Kim Il Sung will not refuse us in this." Stalin's crude calculation of material advantage to the Soviet Union was characteristic of his dealings with the Chinese communists as well and it produced bitter resentment among both Korean and Chinese communist leaders, just as it had earlier helped provoke the split with Yugoslavia.

The approval Stalin communicated on January 30 paved the way for Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong to go to Moscow in April 1950 to make specific preparations for the attack on South Korea, and to argue their case to Stalin in person. Following those deliberations in Moscow, a new group of Soviet military advisors was sent to Pyongyang to plan the campaign and huge shipments of weapons and supplies were sent to North Korea. Stalin insisted that Kim secure the approval of Mao Zedong before the final preparations could be made. Kim accordingly travelled to Beijing in mid-May and obtained Mao's consent.[9]

To conclude this brief discussion, the documents presented to South Korea flesh out and substantiate the account given in the 1966 report published earlier in the CWIHP *Bulletin*. They show that the initiative for the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950 was clearly Kim Il Sung's. Kim requested Stalin's approval several times in 1949 before the Soviet leader finally agreed in early 1950 to support a North Korean offensive. These documents vividly reveal Kim Il Sung's dependence on the Soviet Union and at the same time his ability to propose actions that he desired. They raise questions about the idea some have advanced that Soviet officials formulated all of Kim's statements, saying through him whatever they thought Stalin wanted to hear.[10] Instead, it appears that despite the significant restrictions on his ability to act, and the considerable doubts that were sometimes expressed by Soviet officials regarding his proposals, Kim was nonetheless an important, if not entirely independent, historical actor in his own right.

Of course, Stalin did not approve Kim's plan in 1950 simply because Kim was persistent and fervent in his appeals. Stalin based his decision on his own calculations of relative cost and benefit to the Soviet Union, as he did in 1949 when he rejected Kim's appeals. The question that then remains is what made Stalin change his mind in Janu-

ary 1950 about the advisability of a military offensive on the Korean peninsula. Unfortunately, the documentary record available thus far does not answer that question clearly; it reveals only that Stalin considered it possible in early 1950 to support Kim's plan because of the "changed international situation."[11]

We have then to deduce from the mass of evidence what Stalin meant by "changed international situation." We can note first of all from the documents presented here that calculations of the likelihood of U.S. intervention were at every point a key factor in Soviet deliberations about whether to approve a military campaign against South Korea. The timing of Stalin's approval—late January 1950—must therefore have been at least in part a response to the new defense policy announced by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12, that placed South Korea outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific. The documents presented below, when combined with the record of Stalin's actions in June 1950,[12] suggest the conclusion that if the United States had made it clear that it would defend South Korea, Stalin would never have approved the North Korean attack.

The second most salient component of the "changed international situation" in January 1950 was the formation, then underway in Moscow, of an alliance between the Soviet Union and the newly established People's Republic of China. As Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue Litai have shown so convincingly,[13] Stalin's relations with Mao Zedong were extremely delicate and fraught with potential disasters for the Soviet leader. Given the close ties between North Korea and China, Stalin's concerns about the new communist regime in Beijing must have figured prominently in his decision to approve a military campaign against South Korea. We see from the documents released thus far that Stalin was careful to draw Mao into the final decision-making on the Korean venture. New Chinese sources also indicate that Stalin and Mao discussed the proposed Korean campaign while Mao was in Moscow.[14] It may well be that Stalin calculated that a war in Korea would be beneficial to the Soviet Union because it would tie the PRC more firmly to Moscow by making it less likely that the Chinese communists would be able to turn to the United States for the economic support they so badly needed. In terms of the Cold War, Stalin's reasoning in approving the attack is the most intriguing question about the outbreak of the Korean War. To answer this question definitively, however, we must wait for the release of the remainder of the top level Soviet documents from 1950.

Document I:
Stalin's Meeting with Kim Il Sung,
Moscow, 5 March 1949

5 March 1949. Notes of the conversation between Stalin and a governmental delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il Sung. The meeting began at 8:00 p.m. Present were A.Ia. Vyshinsky,[15] T.F. Shtykov,[16] Kim I.M. (Translator). On the Korean side: Pak Hon-yong,[17] Hong Myong-hui,[18] Chong Chun-taek,[19] Chang Shi-u,[20] Paek Nam Un,[21] Kim Chong-ju,[22] the Korean ambassador to the USSR Chu Yong-ha, Mun Il (Translator).

Stalin asks the members of the delegation how their trip was, was it difficult on the journey?

Kim Il Sung thanks the Soviet Government for its attention to them and says that they arrived safely.

Stalin asks how they travelled—by railroad or by air.

Kim Il Sung answers that they came by railroad.

Stalin asks whether they became ill on the way.

Kim Il Sung answers that they were healthy.

Stalin suggests that they proceed to business and asks what will be the questions.

Kim Il Sung says that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the matter of economic development, in the matter of the development of Korea along the democratic path, and that the Korean government understands that without further economic and cultural aid from the Soviet Union it will be difficult for the DPRK to restore and develop its national economy and culture. The assistance of the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean economy and culture.

Stalin asks what kind of aid.

Kim Il Sung answers—economic and cultural.

Stalin asks what precisely is needed.

Kim Il Sung says that they have confirmed a two year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy. They need economic assistance to fulfill this plan and to strengthen the foundation of the economy. They need machines, equipment and spare parts for industry, communications, transport and also for other branches of the national economy. They also need technical assistance: sending Soviet specialists to Korea, drafting plans for the construction of new objects (factories and plants), conducting geological exploratory work.

Stalin asks what kind of objects?

Kim answers, e.g., irrigation structures [at] Anju, the construction of which they have now moved toward, but they do not have enough specialists, and also the restoration and completion of the Seisin metallurgical plant, repair of the Sufun hydroelectric plant and others.

Stalin asks if there is iron ore in Korea.

Kim answers that there is very much iron ore in Korea.

Stalin says that it is possible to render this assistance, and it is also possible to provide specialists.

Kim indicates that until now trade between the two countries has been conducted successfully, but in the future, for the fulfillment of the two year plan, they need to import from the Soviet Union equipment, steam engines, electric locomotives, spare parts and equipment for the textile industry. But exports from Korea will not cover the imports, therefore they need credit from the Soviet government.

Stalin says "Fine" and asks in what amount they need credit.

Kim answers from 40 to 50 million American dollars.

Stalin—fine, what else?

Kim Il Sung answers that for convenient transport and for strengthening the economic ties between our countries it is necessary to build a railroad from Aoji to Kraskino.

Stalin asks where this is and how many kilometers is the distance of this railroad.

Shtykov reports that this railroad should be built from the station at Kraskino (Soviet territory) to the station at Aoji (Korean territory) for a total distance of 58 km, of which 10 km is on the territory of Korea and 48 km is on the territory of the USSR.

Stalin says that we will think about it and asks if there are some more questions.

Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of establishing air communications between Korea and USSR and says that they do not yet have their own transport planes and no pilots, but an air link is needed.

Stalin asks aren't there Russian planes in Korea.

Kim answers that after the withdrawal of Soviet troops Soviet aviation units and planes were not left in Korea. He indicates that they now have begun the preparation of their own pilots.

Stalin asks if they have their own planes.

Shtykov reports that they have their own training aviation regiment and they have training and military planes, but they do not have transport planes.

Stalin asks how many planes they have.

Shtykov answers that they have 48 military and 19 training planes.

Stalin indicates that we now have fewer planes in a regiment, that we have lowered the number of planes in a regiment and asks what other questions they have.

Kim Il Sung indicates the necessity of cultural ties with the USSR. It is hoped, for example, that Soviet teachers could be sent to Korea for work in Korean institutions of higher education, that Korean students could be sent to the Soviet Union for study, that Korean specialists could be sent to the USSR for practical work in production technology, that teaching programs and literature for institutions of higher education and technical schools could be sent to Korea and that there be exchanges of cultural and artistic figures.

Stalin asks if there is an agreement with the Soviet Union on these questions.

Kim indicates that earlier there was such an agreement. Now, after the formation of the government, there is no such agreement.

Stalin indicates that it is possible to do this, but [sending] specialists and students will be difficult, since they do not know the language.

Kim Il Sung says that instruction in Russian language has been organized in all schools and institutions of higher education in Korea. It is necessary to send teachers to Korea from the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that it will be difficult for them because of not knowing the Korean language.

Kim Il Sung indicates that there is not a sufficient number of qualified teachers in Korea, that Soviet teachers are already working in Korea and that they have translators, through whom it is possible to conduct pedagogical work.

Stalin answers that it is possible to send teachers.

Kim says that it is necessary to conclude an agreement on all the above-indicated questions, specifically about economic cooperation and the broadening of trade, a trade agreement, an agreement about technical assitance from the Soviet Union and about cultural ties.

Stalin asks if Kim has thought about credit or a loan.

Kim answers that he has thought about it and that they want to receive credit.

Stalin answers that it is possible to do that and asks for what period they wish to receive credit.

Kim answers that if credit will be given in the amount of 50 million dollars, then it will be paid back from 1951 until 1954.

Stalin asks when will credit be paid.

Kim answers that [it will be paid] beginning with 1951 to 1954.

Stalin asks how they want to receive credit, at one time or in installments over the course of 1949, 1950, 1951.

Kim answers that they wish to receive credit in 1949. If this is not possible for some reason, then in the course of 1949 and the first half of 1950.

Stalin indicates that we cannot do this. You need machines, but machines must be ordered and manufactured. This requires time.

Kim indicates that they need automobiles, steam engines, equipment for the textile industry, and oil, and that it is hoped that they would receive this during this year.

Stalin answers that in one year it is not possible to do this and asks in what currency they wish to receive credit.

Kim answers in American dollars.

Stalin answers that we do not now calculate in dollars but we calculate in rubles and indicated that soon one dollar will equal 5 rubles. Stalin proposed to present equipment and machines in credit in the course of three years in equal portions and indicated that during these three years they will not pay credit, but in the course of the following three years they must produce payment, also in equal portions. For example: credit is given in 1949, 1950, 1951, and perhaps 1952, and payment of credit will begin from the fourth year in equal portions. In such a way, credit will be given out over 6 years. We render assistance to the countries of the peoples' democracies according to these principles. We take the following percentages for the credit received: 2% yearly, if the state has recovered [from the war], and 1% if the state has still not recovered. Moreover, close trade in goods between the countries will be continued without credit. This order will be established by agreement. Stalin asked if they have any people who can begin work on drafting these agreements.

Kim answers that they have such people.

Stalin indicates that we can give credit in the sum of 200 million rubles, i.e. 40 million dollars. We would give more, but now we are not able.

Kim says that they agree.

Stalin asks if they have any automobiles.

Kim answers that they do not have their own cars, they would like to acquire them in the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that it is possible to provide cars. It is possible also to provide planes.

Shtykov says that the Korean Government wants to receive not only planes, but also to have a joint share aviation society and to build a railroad.

Stalin answers that it is possible to do this. As concerns the construction of the railroad, we will review this question, but there is not a sufficient work force in the Soviet Union for the construction of a railroad, and asks if they have a work force among Koreans.

Kim answers that they do have a work force among Koreans.

Kim says that in the south of Korea there are still American troops and that intrigues against North Korea by the reactionaries are increasing, that they have infantry troops but sea defense almost does not exist. The help of the Soviet Union is needed in this.

Stalin asks how many American troops are in South Korea.

Kim answers that there are up to 20,000 men.

Shtykov—approximately 15-20 thousand men.

Stalin asks if there is a national Korean army in the south.

Kim answers that there is, the number is around 60,000 men.

Stalin asks if this number includes only regular army or also police.

Kim answers that it includes only regular army.

Stalin (joking) asks, and you are afraid of them?

Kim—No, we are not afraid, but we would like to have naval units.

Stalin asks which army is stronger—north or south.

Pak Hon-yong answers that the northern army is stronger.

Stalin asks if there are dry docks in Korea left by the Japanese, for example, in Seisin or in other places of Korea.

Kim answers that there are none.

Shtykov reports that there are dry docks, but only small ones.

Stalin says that it is possible to render assistance in this, and that Korea needs to have military planes.

Stalin asks are they penetrating into the South Korean army, do they have their own people there?

Pak Hon-yong answers that they are penetrating, but so far they are not revealing themselves there.

Stalin says that this is correct, that it is not necessary to reveal themselves now and indicates that the southerners also, apparently, are sending their people into the army of the north and that they need [to exercise] caution.

Stalin asks what has happened along the 38th parallel. Is it true that several points have fallen to the southerners and have been seized, and then these points were taken back?

Kim answers that they are taking into account that the southerners can send their own people into the [North Korean] army, and that they are taking the necessary measures. Kim reported that there was a clash with the southerners in Kangwon province at the 38th parallel. Their police were not sufficiently armed at that time. When regular units approached, the southerners retreated.

Stalin asks—did they drive away the southerners or did they leave themselves.

Kim answers that as a result of the battle they drove away the southerners, threw them across the border of the country.

Stalin asks if they have a military school.

Kim answers that they do.

Stalin asks if there is a pilot school.

Shtykov reports that they have a training-military aviation regiment.

Stalin remembers that the last time two came to Moscow, and asks, appealing to Pak Hon-yong, if he was the second.

Pak Hon-yong confirms this.

Stalin says that Kim and Pak have both filled out and that it is difficult to recognize them now.

Kim says that they have a military school, but no military academy and that among the officer corps of the Korean army there is no one who has completed a military academy. He asks permission to send Korean officers to the Military Academy of the USSR for training.

Stalin asks wasn't there such permission.

Kim answers that there was not.

Stalin says that it is possible to permit it.

Kim says that they do not have any more questions.

Chong Chun-taek asks if it will be possible to send Soviet specialists to Korea and Korean specialists for practical training in production technology to the USSR.

Stalin answers that they have already spoken on that question. Soviet specialists may be sent to Korea and Korean specialists may be received in the USSR.

Stalin asks where the Koreans get cotton.

Kim answers that they want to receive cotton from the Soviet Union. Last year they received already 3,000 tons.

Stalin says, joking, that we ourselves want to receive cotton from Korea.

Stalin asks if they have trade relations with other countries: with Japan, China, Philippines.

Kim answers that they have such relations with China, but China is at war and therefore they cannot conduct regular trade [with China].

Stalin asks—and what about with other countries?

Kim answers that they have not traded with other countries. They conduct trade with Hong Kong, but unofficially and on a case by case basis.

Stalin asks aren't there trading societies among them of their own traders.

Kim Il Sung answers that such a society exists. This society conducts trade in the main with Hong Kong, with the city of Dalny[23] and with China.

Stalin says that it is necessary to have such a society, there is nothing wrong with it. The national bourgeoisie exists; among the bourgeoisie there are, apparently, also good people, it is necessary to help them. Let them trade and deliver goods, there is nothing bad in this. I do not have questions.

Stalin, turning to Vyshinsky, asks if he has questions.

Vyshinsky answers that he doesn't have any.

Hong Myong-hui thanks Comrade Stalin for the reception.

Stalin in his turn thanks the delegation for coming and for the conversation. The conversation lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. Shtykov and translator Kim I.M. took notes.

[Source: Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, (hereafter AVP RF), Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 10-20; all translations by Kathryn Weathersby.]

Document II:
Ciphered Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 3 September 1949

On September 3 the personal secretary of Kim Il Sung, Mun Il (a Soviet Korean[24]), came to me and at the commission of Kim Il Sung reported that they had received reliable information that in the near future the southerners intend to seize the part of the Ongjin peninsula[25] which is located to the north of the 38th parallel, and also to bombard the cement plant in the city of Kaisiu.[26]

In connection with this, Mun Il said, Kim Il Sung asks permission to begin military operations against the south, with the goal of seizing the Ongjin peninsula and part of the territory of South Korea to the east of the Ongjin peninsula, approximately to Kaesong, so as to shorten the line of defense.

Kim Il Sung considers, Mun said, that if the international situation permits, they are ready to move further to the south. Kim Il Sung is convinced that they are in a position to seize South Korea in the course of two weeks, maximum 2 months.

I asked [Mun] to transmit to Kim Il Sung that this question is very large and serious, it is necessary to think it through carefully and that I therefore urgently recommend to Kim Il Sung not to be in a hurry and not to take [any measures] while there is no decision on this question.

Kim Il Sung will probably raise this question again soon.

It has been established that the [North] Koreans truly did seize an order to the commander of troops on the Ongjin peninsula to begin artillery fire on the cement plant in Kaisiu on September 2 at 8:00 and to destroy it. From the order it is clear that the southerners consider this plant to be military. The period indicated in the order has past but so far there has been no shelling. The northerners have taken the necessary measures in case of firing on the plant.

Regarding the intentions of the southerners to seize part of the Ongjin peninsula to the north of the 38th parallel, we have only indications [of this] from deserters from the south.

There have not been any serious incidents at the 38th parallel since August 15. Small exchanges of fire have taken place, [there have been] instances of artillery firing on the territory of North Korea on the Ongjin peninsula, tresspassing of the parallel. The southerners are carrying out defensive work at the 38th parallel at a faster tempo. I ask your order. Tunkin.[27]

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, papka 11, listy 136-138.]

Document III:
Ciphered telegram from Gromyko[28] to Tunkin at the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, 11 September 1949

You must meet with Kim Il Sung as soon as possible and try to illuminate from him the following additional questions:

1. How do they evaluate the South Korean army, [its] numbers, arms and fighting capacity?

2. The condition of the partisan movement in the south of Korea and what real help they think they will receive from the partisans.

3. How do the society and people regard the fact that northerners will be the first to begin an attack? What kind of real aid can be given by the population of the south to the army of the north?

4. Are there American troops in the south of Korea? What kind of measures, in the opinion of Kim Il Sung, can the Americans take in case of an attack by the northerners?

5. How do the northerners evaluate their possibilities, i.e. the condition of the army, its supplies and fighting capacity?

6. Give your evaluation of the situation and of how real and advisable is the proposal of our friends.

Clarifications are demanded in connection with the questions they raised in conversations on August 12 and September 3, 1949.

Immediately telegraph the results of the conversation.

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, list 45.]

Document IV:
Ciphered telegram from Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry (in reply to telegram of September 11), 14 September 1949

[He reports that he had meetings with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong on September 12 and 13 about the questions raised in the telegram of September 11 and gives their response--K.W.]

1. [Information about South Korean army, providing many figures--K.W.]

2. [Information about partisan units in South Korea, numbering 1,500-2,000 men--K.W.] Kim thinks they should not count on substantial help from the partisans, but Pak Hon-yong has a different opinion. He thinks the help [from partisans] will be significant. At any rate, they hope that the partisans will help in actions against the communications of the enemy and that they will occupy the main ports of South Korea, though

they will not be able to do this at the beginning of the campaign, maybe later.

3. With regard to the question of how the population will regard the fact that the northerners will begin a civil war, Kim Il Sung oscillates. During the conversation on September 12 he definitely stated that if the northerners begin military actions, this will produce a negative impression in the people and that it is politically disadvantageous to them to begin it. In connection with this he recollected that during the conversation between Mao Zedong and the Korean representative Kim Il[29] in the spring of this year Mao stated that in his opinion the northerners should not begin military action now, since in the first place, it is politically disadvantageous and in the second place, the Chinese friends are occupied at home and cannnot give them serious help. The thinking of Kim Il Sung amounts to waiting until the conclusion of the main [military] operations in China.

In the conversation on September 13 Kim Il Sung, under the clear influence of Ho Ka-i (a Soviet Korean, secretary of the Central Committee of the Labor Party,[30] who participated in the second conversation in order to translate), declared that the people will welcome an armed attack by the northerners and that if they begin military actions they will not lose politically because of this. Later in the course of the conversation Kim Il Sung stated that if a civil war is drawn out, then they will be in a politically disadvantageous position.[31] And since under present conditions it is impossible to count on a rapid victory, he does not propose to begin a civil war, but only to secure the Ongjin peninsula and a portion of the territory of South Korea to the east of this peninsula, for example to Kaidzio.

They consider that in case of a civil war the population of South Korea will be sympathetic toward the northern army and will help it. In the case of successful military actions they hope to organize a number of uprisings in South Korea.

4. According to official data, there are 500 American military advisers and instructors in South Korea. According to secret service information, which needs confirmation, there are 900 American military advisers and instructors and 1500 soldiers and security officers in South Korea. In case of a civil war in Korea, the Americans, in the opinion of Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong, can: send Japanese and Chinese [soldiers] to the aid of the southerners[32]; support [the South Koreans] from the sea and air with their own means; American instructors will take immediate part in organizing military actions.

5. The North Korean army numbers 97,500 men (including the air force and coastal defense units). The army has 64 tanks, 59 armored cars, 75 airplanes. The police force in the north numbers 23,200 men. Kim considers that the northern army is superior to the southern army in its technical equipment (tanks, artillery, planes), its discipline, the training of the officers and troops, and also in its moral-political relations.

In the northern army there are a number of insufficiencies: insufficient number and weak preparation of pilots, insufficient number of ships, large caliber arms are unprepared for military operations, insufficient military supplies.

The proposal of Kim Il Sung amounts to the following: at the beginning to strike the South Korean army on the Ongjin peninsula, to destroy the two regiments located there, to occupy the territory of the peninsula and the territory to the east of it, for example to Kaidzio, and then to see what to do further. After this blow the South Korean army may become demoralized. In this case move further to the south. If the South Korean army is not demoralized as a result of the Ongjin operation, to seal the borders seized, to shorten in that way the line of defense approximately by one third.

It is not possible to hurry with the operation on the Ongjin peninsula. [It is necessary] to wait until additional arms arrive from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile [we must] consolidate the defenses on the remaining portions of the 38th parallel.

Kim Il Sung admits the possibility of the Ongjin operation turning into a civil war, but he hopes that this does not happen, since the southerners, in his opinion, do not dare to attack other portions of the 38th parallel.

Our formulations.

The partial operation outlined by Kim Il Sung can and will probably turn into a civil war between north and south. There are more than a few supporters of civil war in the leading circles of both the north and the south. Therefore, in beginning this partial operation it is necessary to calculate that it might be the beginning of a civil war. Is it advisable to the north to begin a civil war now? We propose that this is not advisable.

The northern army is insufficiently strong to carry out successful and rapid operations against the south. Even taking into account the help which will be rendered to the northern army by the partisans and the population of South Korea it is impossible to count on a rapid victory. Moreover, a drawn out civil war is disadvantageous for the north both militarily and politically. In the first place, a drawn out war gives the possibility to the Americans to render corresponding aid to Syngmann Rhee. After their lack of success in China, the Americans probably will intervene in Korean affairs more decisively than they did in China and, it goes without saying, apply all their strength to save Syngmann Rhee.[33] Further, in case of a drawn out civil war the military casualties, suffering and adversity may elicit in the population a negative mood toward the one who began the war.

Moreover, a drawn out war in Korea could be used by the Americans for purposes of agitation against the Soviet Union and for further inflaming war hysteria. Therefore, it is inadvisable that the north begin a civil war now. Given the present internal and external situation a decision about an attack on the south would be correct only in such case as the northerners could count on ending the war quickly; the preconditions for it are not there.

But if the indicated partial operation were crowned with success and did not lead to civil war, then in this case the northerners, while having won strategically, would lose politically in many regards. Such an operation would be used to accuse the northerners of trying to inflame a fratricidal war. It would also be used for the purpose of further increasing American and international interference in Korean affairs in the interests of the south.

We propose that under the indicated conditions to begin the partial operation conceived by Kim Il Sung is inadvisable.

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 46-53.]

Document V:
Politburo decision to confirm the following directive to the Soviet ambassador in Korea, 24 September 1949

Copies to Malenkov,[34] Molotov,[35] Gromyko, Shtykov, Beria,[36] Mikoyan,[37] Kaganovich,[38] Bulganin[39].

Commission Comrade Shtykov to meet with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-yong and, strictly adhering to the text given below, to declare the following:

In connection with the questions raised by you in conversation with me on August 12 of this year, I received an order to transmit to you the opinion of Moscow on the questions touched on by you. Your proposal to begin an attack by the Korean Peoples' Army on the south calls forth the necessity of giving a precise evaluation of the military as well as the political sides of this question.

From the military side it is impossible to consider that the Peoples' Army is prepared for such an attack. If not prepared for in the necessary manner, the attack can turn into a prolonged military operation, which not only will not lead to the defeat of the enemy but will also create significant political and economic difficulties for North Korea, which, finally, cannot be permitted. Since at present North Korea does not have the necessary superiority of military forces in comparison with South Korea, it is impossible to acknowledge that a military attack on the south is now completely prepared for and therefore from the military point of view it is not allowed.

From the political side, a military attack on the south by you is also not prepared for. We, of course, agree with you that the people are waiting for the unification of the country and in the south they, moreover, are waiting for liberation from

the yoke of the reactionary regime. However, until now very little has been done to raise the broad masses of South Korea to an active struggle, to develop the partisan movement in all of South Korea, to create there liberated regions and to organize forces for a general uprising. Meanwhile, only in conditions of a peoples' uprising which has begun and is truly developing, which is undermining the foundations of the reactionary regime, could a military attack on the south play a decisive role in the overthrow of the South Korean reactionaries and provide the realization of the task of the unification of all Korea into a single democratic state. Since at present very little has been done to develop the partisan movement and prepare for a general uprising in South Korea, it is also impossible to acknowledge that from a political side an attack by you on the south has been prepared.

As concerns a partial operation to seize Ongjin peninsula and the region of Kaesong, as a result of which the borders of North Korea would be moved almost to Seoul itself, it is impossible to view this operation other than as the beginning of a war between North and South Korea, for which North Korea is not prepared either militarily or politically, as has been indicated above.

Moreover, it is necessary to consider that if military actions begin at the initiative of the North and acquire a prolonged character, then this can give to the Americans cause for any kind of interference in Korean affairs.

In view of all that has been stated it is necessary to acknowledge that at present the tasks of the struggle for the unification of Korea demand a concentration of maximum effort, in the first place, to the development of the partisan movement, the creation of liberated regions and the preparation of a general armed uprising in South Korea in order to overthrow the reactionary regime and successfully resolve the task of unifying all Korea, and secondly, to further strengthen in every way the Peoples' Army of Korea.

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 75-77.]

Document VI:
Ciphered Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950

Strictly secret. I report about the frame of mind expressed by Kim Il Sung during a luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. On January 17 the minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK Pak Hon-yong held a lunch attended by a small circle of persons, on the occasion of the departure of the Korean ambassador Yi Chu-Yon to the Chinese Peoples Republic. At the luncheon from the Korean side were Kim Tu-bong, Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong, deputy minister of foreign affairs Pak Chong-jo,[40] Yi Chu-Yon. The trade representative of the PRC Vyn Shi Chzhen[41] attended the luncheon. On our side in attendance were myself and the advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko. The luncheon took place in a friendly, warm atmosphere. Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong and also the Chinese trade representative in their toasts expressed a feeling of love and gratitude toward the Soviet Union and personally toward Comrade Stalin for the liberation [of Korea from Japanese rule] and for the selfless assistance to both the Korean and Chinese people.

Kim Tu-bong shared his impressions of his trip to the USSR for the 70th birthday of Comrade Stalin. In his account he repeatedly underscored the great interest of the Soviet people in Korea and the numerous wishes for quick unification of the country.

During the luncheon Kim Il Sung and the Chinese trade representative, who was sitting next to him, many times enthusiastically conversed with each other in Chinese. From individual phrases it was possible to understand that they were speaking about the victory in China and about the situation in Korea. After the luncheon, in the reception room Kim Il Sung gave advice and orders to his ambassador to China Yi Chu-Yon about his work in China, and moreover, while speaking in Korean, Kim several times said phrases in Russian about how Yi would act boldly in China, since Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.

Then, after Yi Chu-Yon left, Kim, addressing the advisers Ignatiev and Pelishenko in an excited manner, began to speak about how now, when China is completing its liberation, the liberation of the Korean people in the south of the country is next in line. In connection with this he said:

"The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed might. Partisans will not decide the question. The people of the south know that we have a good army. Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I can lose the trust of the people of Korea." Further Kim stated that when he was in Moscow, Comrade Stalin said to him that it was not necessary to attack the south, in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Rhee Syngmann, then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. But since Rhee Syngmann is still not instigating an attack, it means that the liberation of the people of the southern part of the country and the unification of the country are being drawn out, that he (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action by the Peoples' Army for the purpose of the liberation of the people of Southern Korea. Further Kim said that he himself cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law. Then he stated that if it is now possible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he will try to meet with Mao Zedong, after his return from Moscow. Kim underscored that Mao Zedong promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China. (Apparently Kim Il Sung has in mind the conversation of his representative Kim Il with Mao Zedong in June 1949, about which I reported by ciphered telegram.) Kim said that he also has other questions for Mao Zedong, in particular the question of the possibility of the creation of an eastern bureau of the Cominform. He further stated that on all these questions he will try to meet with Comrade Shtykov and to secure through him a meeting with Comrade Stalin.

The advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko, avoiding discussing these questions, tried to switch the discussion to a general theme, then Kim Il Sung came toward me, took me aside and began the following conversation: can he meet with Comrade Stalin and discuss the question of the position in the south and the question of aggressive actions against the army of Rhee Syngmann, that their people's army now is significantly stronger than the army of Rhee Syngmann. Here he stated that if it is impossible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he wants to meet with Mao Zedong, since Mao after his visit to Moscow will have orders on all questions.

Then Kim Il Sung placed before me the question, why don't I allow him to attack the Ongjin peninsula, which the People's Army could take in three days, and with a general attack the People's Army could be in Seoul in several days.

I answered Kim that he has not raised the question of a meeting with Comrade Stalin and if he raises such a question, then it is possible that Comrade Stalin will receive him. On the question of an attack on the Ongjin peninsula I answered him that it is impossible to do this. Then I tried to conclude the conversation on these questions and, alluding to a later time, proposed to go home. With that the conversation was concluded.

After the luncheon Kim Il Sung was in a mood of some intoxication. It was obvious that he began this conversation not accidentally, but had thought it out earlier, with the goal of laying out his frame of mind and elucidating our attitude to these questions.

In the process of this conversation Kim Il Sung repeatedly underscored his wish to get the advice of Comrade Stalin on the question of the situation in the south of Korea, since [Kim Il Sung] is constantly nurturing his idea about an attack.

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, listy 87-91.]

Document VII:
Ciphered telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 30 January 1950

1. I received your report. I understand the dissatisfaction of Comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be ready to receive him and discuss with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter.

2. I have a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung. The Soviet Union is experiencing a great insufficiency in lead. We would like to receive from Korea a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. Korea would render us a great assistance if it could yearly send to the Soviet Union the indicated amount of lead. I hope that Kim Il Sung will not refuse us in this. It is possible that Kim Il Sung needs our technical assistance and some number of Soviet specialists. We are ready to render this assistance. Transmit this request of mine to comrade Kim Il Sung and ask him for me, to communicate to me his consideration on this matter.

[Source: AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, list 92.]

1. Gen. Dmitrii Volkogonov published excerpts from several of these documents in "Sleduyet li etogo boyat'sia?" (Should we fear this?"), *Ogonyok* (Small Flame) 26 (June 1993), 28-29. A portion of this collection was also released in the spring of 1993 for publication in the Russian journal *Istochnik*, with commentary by the present author. *Istochnik* has not yet published the intended article, but some of the documents were presented in full translation in K. Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-458.
2. At the Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow these documents are catalogued as Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, Dela 3,4 and 5.
3. Foreign Ministry report, "On the Korean War, 1950-1953, and the Armistice Negotiations," 9 August 1966, Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD), Moscow, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, Listy 122-131, in Kathryn Weathersby, trans. and intro., "New Findings on the Korean War," CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-18.
4. Eleven agreements were signed in March 1949. They concerned economic and cultural cooperation, technical assistance and extension of credit to the DPRK, commodity exchange and payments, the establishment of a Soviet trade representative in the DPRK, conditions for the work of Soviet specialists sent to North Korea and North Korean specialists sent to the USSR for practical training in industrial/technical work, the temporary stationing of a Soviet naval unit at a North Korean port, the construction of a railway line linking a Soviet rail line to North Korean railroads, and the establishment of regular air links between the USSR and DPRK.
5. A major portion of the records on Korea in the Foreign Ministry archive in Moscow are requests from North Korea for assistance in training workers in virtually every branch of economic and cultural activity and Soviet arrangements for fulfilling these requests. The level of technological dependency of North Korea is one of the most significant ways in which DPRK relations with Moscow differed from Soviet relations with its satellite states in Eastern Europe.
6. One of the main arguments of "revisionist" accounts of the war is that North Korea could have acted on its own in attacking South Korea because it was only loosely tied to the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 325-349, 445-448.
7. As a former senior South Korean officer remarked many years after the war, "if Kim really wanted to get the South, by far his best course would have been to do nothing. His biggest mistake was to attack us." Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 56. For a detailed account of politics in the South, see Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vols. 1 and 2.
8. Ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 4 October 1949, AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, list 78.
9. The documents in this collection include the itinerary for Kim Il Sung's trip to Moscow in April 1950 but not notes of the conversations. They do, however, include a report of Kim's conversation with Mao Zedong in May, and communications between Mao and Stalin at the time of Kim's visit to Beijing, in which Mao asked for and received confirmation of Kim's report of Stalin's position with regard to the proposed offensive action. See the exchange of 13-14 May 1950 published in CWIHP *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 60-61.
10. This is the interpretation of the Russian military historian Gavrill Korotkov. See, e.g., "Secrets of the Korean War," *U.S.News & World Report*, 9 August 1993, and his statements in the documentary recently aired on PBS, "Messengers from Moscow," Part II ("The East is Red"). Since Korotkov has not made public the documents on which he bases his analysis, it is impossible to evaluate their contents.
11. Ciphered telegram from Vyshinsky to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, sending the text of a message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 14 May 1950 (AVP RF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Papka 11, Delo 3, list 106), translation in CWIHP *Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 61.
12. See Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence."
13. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
14. See the account of Mao's interpreter cited in Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 85-91.
15. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
16. Soviet Ambassador to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
17. Foreign Minister of the DPRK.
18. Vice Premier of the DPRK.
19. Chairman of the National Planning Commission of the DPRK.
20. Minister of Commerce of the DPRK.
21. Minister of Education of the DPRK.
22. Minister of Communications of the DPRK.
23. The major trading port in Manchuria northeast of Port Arthur, also called by its Japanese name, Dairen.
24. A Soviet citizen of Korean nationality. Over a hundred "Soviet Koreans" were sent to North Korea 1945-47 to assist the Soviet occupation command. In addition to serving as translators, several occupied high positions in the government of the newly created North Korean state.
25. A peninsula on the western coast of Korea, the southernmost portion of which lies below the 38th parallel and consequently was part of the Republic of Korea in 1949.
26. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the Korean place name.
27. Grigorii Ivanovich Tunkin, charge d'affaires of the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, formerly chief of the 1st Far Eastern Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
28. In 1949 A.A. Gromyko was first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.
29. Kim Il was Chief of the Political Administration of the North Korean army. He travelled to Beijing in May 1949 as a representative of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea (the communist party) for the purpose of establishing contact with the Central Committee of the Chinese communist party and conducting negotiations about the possible return to North Korea of Korean divisions in the People's Liberation Army.
30. The communist party of North Korea.
31. Echoing the words of Mao to Kim Il in May 1949.
32. Japanese military forces were completely demobilized following World War II, but in 1947 the U.S. Department of Defense began to consider rearming Japan in order to buttress the military forces arrayed against the Soviet Pacific border. The Soviet Union was aware of these discussions and did everything possible to obstruct the adoption of such policies through its representative in the Far Eastern Commission. Two weeks after the North Korean attack on South Korea MacArthur ordered the Japanese prime minister to create a "National Police Reserve" of 75,000 men, some of whom were, in fact, deployed to Korea. Between October 2 and December 10, 1950, forty-six minesweepers with 1,200 Japanese military personnel were dispatched to the eastern coast of North Korea to clear the way for an amphibious assault by UN forces. See Meirion and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarization of Japan* (London: Hamish Hamilton), 228-42.
33. President of the Republic of Korea.
34. In 1949 G.M. Malenkov was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and in party matters second in importance only to Stalin.
35. In 1949 V.M. Molotov was removed from his post as minister of foreign affairs of the USSR but remained a member of the Politburo and was Stalin's deputy in the Council of Ministers.
36. L.A. Beria was chairman of the Council of Ministers.
37. A.I. Mikoyan was minister of foreign trade and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
38. L.M. Kaganovich was deputy premier of the USSR.
39. N.A. Bulganin was deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.
40. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the name.
41. Transliteration of the Russian spelling of the name.

Kathryn Weathersby, currently a visiting scholar at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is writing a study of Soviet policy and the Korean War. An assistant professor at Florida State University in Tallahassee, she previously presented new Russian archival evidence on that subject in CWIHP Bulletin *3 (Fall 1993) and Working Paper 8.*

NEW DOCUMENTS ON THE EAST GERMAN UPRISING OF 1953

Introduction and commentary by Christian Ostermann

The two documents excerpted below, recently found in the archives of, respectively, the Russian Foreign Ministry and the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED)—a 24 June 1953 report[1] by senior Soviet officials V. Sokolovskii,[2] V. Semyenov,[3] and P. Yudin[4] to USSR Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov and Defense Minister N. A. Bulganin, and a 20 July 1953 report[5] by the SED Central Committee Department "Principal Organs of the Party and Mass Organizations"—provide glimpses at the internal Soviet and East German evaluations of the 16-17 June 1953 uprising in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

This article presents background and context helpful for understanding these two reports, as well as additional findings on the 1953 uprising in the GDR based on recent research by the author and others in the SED archives. The origins of the 1953 uprising date back to July 1952, when the SED Second Party Convention adopted a policy of forced socialization and militarization of the GDR. In the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union had managed to install and consolidate in power in its occupation zone in Germany a brutal communist dictatorship which denied political liberty and the most basic civil rights to its citizens. By 1952, the SED had won over most of the governmental, political, and economic "commanding heights" including a rapidly expanding and pervasive apparatus of repression.[6] At the same time the Soviets and their East German client regime had maintained an appearance of moderation out of consideration for their all-German objectives.

Following the Western rejection of the March 1952 "Stalin note" and the signing of the Bonn and European Defense Community (Paris) Treaties in May 1952, the SED regime closed off the zonal border ("demarcation line") to Western Germany. The establishment of a "prohibited zone" along the hitherto permeable demarcation line—"Operation Ungeziefer" [Operation Weed]—which entailed the brutal deportation of hundreds of zonal residents and put a halt to the growing flow of refugees, foreshadowed an end to the priority that all-German concerns had enjoyed.[7]

Abandoning any pretense of moderation and claiming that "the political and economic conditions as well as the consciousness of the working-class and the majority of workers [had] developed far enough," the Second SED Party Convention affirmed the Soviet-decreed "Construction of Socialism" as the "main task" of party and government in the GDR.[8] Economically, the policy of "Construction of Socialism" in the GDR, closely identified with the leadership of SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, called for the construction and expansion of heavy industry at the expense of the production of consumer goods and for a hike in productivity through increased work norms. The SED regime also inaugurated a ruthless collectivization drive, coercing independent farmers into so-called "agricultural production cooperatives" (LPGs). Those who refused to join were subjected to exorbitant state-enforced delivery quotas, causing many to leave for the West. As a result of the disruption of the agricultural system, severe food shortages occurred throughout East Germany in the spring of 1953. Finally, the forced "Construction of Socialism" prescribed a campaign against the private sector in trade and industry, spearheaded by prohibitive taxes for private enterprises. By April 1953, small business owners had been precluded from receiving

The Report to the Soviet Leadership

Top Secret
Copy no. 1

To Comrade V.M. Molotov
To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

On the events of 17-19 June 1953 in Berlin and GDR and certain conclusions from these events.

The following memorandum is a preliminary report on the events of 17-19 June in eastern Berlin and the GDR, on the reasons behind the disorders, and on several practical conclusions that can be drawn from the given events. As of yet, we have not been able to come to a thorough understanding of the underlying problems, since the investigation of the arrested participants of the disturbances is still at the beginning stage. The question of the events of 17 June, which constitute a great international provocation, prepared in advance by three Western states and their accomplices within the West German monopolistic capital, has not been thoroughly analyzed in this memorandum, partly as a result of a lack of factual material at the current time, and also due to the fact that the given issues have been already widely publicized in general terms in the Soviet press.

In any case, it is clear that 17 June was the so-called "X-day", that is, the day of open aggression against the democratic sector in GDR, by fascist and other organizations, working primarily under the leadership of American intelligence.

The setting of "X-day" for 17 June as the day of aggression by the fascist elements was, it seems, due to the following reasons: a/the announcement by the CC SEPG [Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, known by the German acronym SED; hereafter, SED] Politburo on 9 June of this year, of the new political and economic direction of GDR, the enactment of which would have foiled any chances of the somewhat significant support for the fascist aggression by the populace of the GDR; b/ the American effort to stave off further growth, within a broad range of social circles in Western Europe, of opposition to the aggressive policies of USA, and its effort to stem the rise in Western Europe of a consensus with the Soviet Union and the accompanying movement towards peace on the basis of recognizing the Soviet Union's dominating influence in countries of people's democracy, including in the GDR. This is demonstrated by the coinciding aggression in both Czechoslovakia and GDR on the eve of the Bermuda conference of three Western states; c/ the Americans and the Adenauer-Ollenhauer clique took into account the disenchantment among the workers and other laborers with the situation in GDR, stemming from the errors made by the CC SED and the SCC [Soviet Control Commission] during their implementation of the policy of so-called "accelerated construction of socialism." Adenauer intended to exploit this disenchantment to strengthen his position before the upcoming Bundestag elections in August-September of this year; d/ clearly, the provocation of June 17 by the Western states and the government of Adenauer was intended to turn the Soviet Union away from its present course in its relations with GDR.

This memorandum contains three main parts: I. The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June; II. The Economic problems facing the GDR in light of the events of 17-19 June; III. A few conclusions and recommendations.

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ration cards, forcing them to buy food at the overpriced state stores. Adding to the strains on the socio-economic fabric of the GDR, reparations and Soviet-decreed militarization put a heavy financial burden on the East German economy.[9]

"The power of the State," Ulbricht had triumphantly declared at the convention, would be the main instrument in enforcing the "Construction of Socialism."[10] In particular, an extremely brutal system of criminal justice—climaxing in the "Law for the Protection of People's Property" in October 1952—intensified the "class struggle" to an unprecedented degree. Even minor violations of the law, such as anti-regime statements ("agitation for boycott") or economic "crimes" like black market purchases, were punished with prolonged imprisonment and led to 7,775 arrests just in the first three months of 1953.[11] Even several prominent SED members fell victim to the regime's search for scapegoats for the mounting economic crisis. In December 1952, Dr. Karl Hamann, minister for Trade and Procurement, was arrested, followed by Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger a month later; purges within the SED also led to the arrest of politburo member Paul Merker and other prominent East German communists. Concurrently with an increase of political repression, the regime embarked on an intensified battle against the churches which by and large had remained bastions of oppositional thinking.

By early 1953, the situation within the GDR was in many ways approaching a state of "civil war." Despite sealing off the demarcation line, East Germans were fleeing the country by the tens of thousands, 15,000 to 25,000 per month. All over the country, symptoms of dissatisfaction, protests and strikes were apparent in larger industrial plans as well as in the "bourgeois" parties.[12] Yet the SED leadership remained obstinately committed to the "Construction of Socialism," reacting to the growing crisis by self-delusion and fanaticism: a politburo commission on the refugee problem, established in September 1952, argued that the problem could be overcome by "measures in the ideological field."[13] Economic sabotage and, "enemy operations" were blamed for the increasing economic difficulties, and if anything, prompted even harsher repression on the part of the regime. By February 1953, a SED Central Committee working group which had reviewed the policy of "Construction of Socialism" acknowledged certain difficulties but called for an intensification of existing policies.[14] Underestimating the growing crisis, the Government heightened its confrontation with the churches and, on May 28, decreed a raise in industrial work norms by 10 percent.

The deteriorating political and economic situation and the ruthless repression in East Germany, however, ran counter to the "peace offensive" propagated by the new Soviet leadership in the wake of Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 and occasioned an intense internal debate in Moscow over German policy in late April and May 1953. Disagreements came to the fore at the May 27 session of the Presidium of the Soviet Council of Ministers, which attempted to "analyze the causes which had led to the mass exodus of Germans from the GDR to West Germany and to discuss measures to correct the unfavorable political and economic situation existing in the GDR."[15] At the meeting, according to still fragmentary evidence, secret police chief Lavrenti Beria, seconded by Premier Georgi M. Malenkov, is said to have opposed the further development of socialism in the GDR, which was reportedly favored by Nikita S. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Possibly better informed through intelligence channels on the grave situation in East Germany, and most certainly with an eye to challenge Molotov in his own domain, Beria appears to have argued in favor of a united, neutral,

The Report to the SED Central Committee

ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATION,THE OUTBREAK AND THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 'FASCIST ADVENTURE' FROM 16.-22.6.53

I. Short Summary Estimate

In order to prevent the implementation of the "New Course" of the Party and Government and to counter the relaxation of the international situation, and in order to make Berlin and the German Democratic Republic the starting point of war in Europe, hostile forces, with direct support and under the leadership of American agencies and the peoples' enemy and the warmongers in Bonn, organized an attempt for a fascist coup in the GDR in the period from 16 June 1953 to 22 June 1953. Besides the long-standing efforts of their agencies and contacts in the GDR and their daily propaganda attacks by radio, leaflets and printed press, etc., [these hostile forces] increased their subversive activities following the death of Comrade Stalin and they especially attempted to shatter the confidence in the Soviet Union and in the correctness of their policy and to revive again the anti-Soviet feelings among the population. With the publication of the politburo communique of 9 June 1953, the enemies multiplied their subversive efforts and they succeeded in developing the opinion among broad segments of the workers that the communiqué was a sign of weakness or even bankruptcy of Party and Government, and in winning quite a few adherents for the demand for the punishment of the regime.

Supported by their spy centers existing in the GDR and by those groups of agents smuggled in during the uprising, and under the pretext of dissatisfaction among the population resulting from the mistakes of the Party and regime, they temporarily managed to engage broad segments of workers and employees, in particular in Berlin and Central Germany, for their criminal objectives. On 17 and 18 June 1953 it was frequently possible only after the intervention of Soviet units to reestablish law and order and to resume work. In a number of cases, strikes and demonstrations in some plants could be prevented by the decisive appearance of party members and officials in agreement, and, in part, workers' defense units were established.

Generally, however, the Party, which was completely taken by surprise by the provocation, failed to mobilize broad segments of the working class for a unified and offensive appearance against the provocation and for suppression of the coup on the 17th and 18th. Because the mass of plants already resumed work on the 19th, the strikes, especially in the construction industry, where many workers simply went home, continued until 22 June 1953.

II. Scope, Expansion, and Main Points of the Coup Attempt

1. The hostile action in Berlin as the Catalyst of the Actions in the Republic

The hostile action in Berlin began on 6/16 with the strike of the construction workers and their demonstration march to the "House of Ministries".

The rallying points were the construction sites: Friedrichshain Hospital and Stalinallee.

The strike and the ensuing provocations were finally organized during a steam ship cruise on 13 June 1953. Hostile organizers of the action on June 16th and 17th from the Greater Berlin

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democratic and bourgeois German state, although evidence on his precise views at this point remains sketchy. [16]

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership was united in its concern over the deteriorating situation in the GDR. A June 2 communiqué by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, entitled "On measures for the recovery of the political situation in the German Democratic Republic," acknowledged that the mass exodus to the West of East Germans of all professions and backgrounds created "a serious danger for the continued political existence of the German Democratic Republic," and called for an end to forced collectivization and the war on private enterprise, for the revision of the heavy industry plan, and for the relaxation of political-judicial controls and regimentation. It ordered the termination of the coercive measures against the Protestant Church and denounced the "cold exercise of power" by the Ulbricht regime. Significantly, though, it did not explicitly demand an abrogation of the controversial raised work norms. Reflecting the influence of KGB head Beria, who had apparently favored a more drastic reversal in Moscow's German policy, the resolution expressed the necessity to "put the tasks of the political battle for national reunification and the conclusion of a peace treaty at the center of attention of the German people," and stipulated that "in the future the determination of the entire political situation for this or that time period has to take into consideration the real conditions within the GDR as well as the situation in Germany as a whole and the international situation."[17]

The resolution was handed to SED leaders Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl during a three-day trip to Moscow (2-4 June 1953) where, as Grotewohl noted, the Soviet leaders expressed their "grave concern about the situation in the GDR."[18] At the same time, they received promises of substantial aid and relief in reparation payments which complemented the replacement of the old Soviet Central Commission (SCC) by a new Soviet High Commission for German affairs. After having made "a bad impression in Moscow"[19] (Grotewohl), and following several days of intense discussion with the East German leadership in Berlin (5-9 June 1953), the SED politburo, on 11 June, published the famous communiqué announcing the "New Course."[20] In addition to the changes indicated in the 2 June 1953 resolution, the New Course included a general amnesty for all East German refugees, assistance to small and medium-size private enterprises, more liberal policies on interzonal travel and residence permits, an easing of the campaign against the Protestant Church, and the re-issuance of ration cards to the middle classes. Paradoxically, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the concessions of the "New Course" was the working class: the arbitrarily-imposed higher work norms remained in force.

The sudden announcement of the "New Course" shocked party members and the East German population. Reports from local party officials to the SED Central Committee Department "Principal Organs of Party and Mass Organizations" under Karl Schirdewan reveal with great candor the widespread disappointment and disbelief, the utter confusion and unrest, among both party members and the public. Contrary to the politburo's expectations, to many in and out of the party, the communiqué signaled the SED's final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise.[21] Many party functionaries who had committed themselves to the "Construction of Socialism" could "not comprehend that the party leadership had made such decisive mistakes which necessitated this decision,"[22] felt betrayed and "panicky;"[23] others called for Ulbricht's resignation; many simply left the party. [24]

The popular reaction, as it shines through these reports, was even less ambiguous. Thus, for example, local SED officials from the township Seehausen reported that "the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer."[25] Many East Germans viewed the communiqué not only as a defeat for the Ulbricht regime, but clearly as a result of Western pressure.[26] With the regime's authority eroding by the hour, the SED leadership was particularly alarmed by the precarious situation in the rural areas. Expecting the return of large landowners who had fled to the West and misinterpreting the halt to the most extreme excesses of collectivization, collectivized farmers displayed "signs of unrest," and many felt that "the LPGs would be abandoned and hence their work would serve no purpose."[27] Within a few days, the LPG system was on the verge of complete collapse, causing the party headquarters to focus attention on the countryside, crucially neglecting the worsening situation in the large industrial cities.

The most revealing aspect of the reaction among urban labor as reflected in the newly accessible SED documents is the unequivocal and almost immediate politicization of the workers' demands. The new documents bear out an integral connection between political and economic demands: Reporting the reception of the New Course among workers, the SED-dominated "Free German Federation of Unions" confidentially informed the politburo three days before the uprising that the "negative discussions" [i.e. the workers' demands] were not limited to a revocation of the norm increase; they included demands for the resignation and punishment of those responsible for the mistakes; to many, the SED had gone bankrupt and the Central Committee and regime had proved incapable of leadership. Many discussions evidenced such slogans as "Get rid of the SED bosses" and "Get rid of socialism." [28]

Despite signs of unrest and sporadic strikes in early June, SED headquarters remained steadfast. Underestimating the resentment throughout the country, the SED politburo confirmed the controversial norm increases on 13 June 1953, fueling labor dissatisfaction. By then, however, the protests had developed their own dynamic. As a report from the files of the former Ministry for State Security (Stasi) details, that same day, during a routine plant retreat cruise on the Müggel lakes in the southeast of Berlin, workers of the construction site "Bettenhaus Friedrichshain" discussed their grievances and decided to get together within a couple of days with representatives of other construction sites in order take the unusual step of putting forward a resolution to Grotewohl, a fact alluded to in the July 20 SED report. The resolution (which can be found in the Grotewohl Papers) decried the 10 percent norm increase as "a great hardship" for the workers. Comparing themselves to the large-estate farmers and private entrepreneurs whose possessions would be restored, the workers called for a repeal of the norm increase on the construction site. Ending on a threatening note, the workers demanded that "in view of the highly charged mood of the entire workforce [Belegschaft]" Grotewohl was "to respond to these grave issues immediately in a satisfactory man-

ner" and they "expected your statement no later than at noon tomorrow."[29]

Headed by the plant's union representative, Feltling, the four-man delegation marched to Grotewohl's office where they handed the resolution to Grotewohl aides Ambreé and Plaschke who, while accommodating some of their grievances, tried their best to convince the workers that the norm increase was necessary. Later, informing Grotewohl's personal aides, Tzschorn and Eisermann, they pointed out that some responsibility lay with the "dictatorial enforcement" of the norm increase by SED Berlin district official Baum, a well-known hard-liner who "underestimated the situation" and "merely portrayed it as work of the enemy, without recognizing that his not acknowledging the workers' justified demands only amplified the enemy's opportunities for action." Tzschorn related to Grotewohl that the workers would go on strike if he did not respond satisfactorily, by 7 a.m. Adding in short-hand to his memo to Grotewohl, Tzschorn, however, noted that according to Baum, "this was a larger operation apparently controlled from West-Berlin. Strikes have taken place today already on several construction sites. In doing so, they again and again demand a decision by prime minister Grotewohl." Underestimating the explosiveness of the situation and misleading Grotewohl on the true origins of the workers' dissatisfaction, Tzschorn advised Grotewohl against personally speaking to the workers.[30]

Instead of a high government official, a union leader and fifteen agitators appeared at the Friedrichshain construction site in the early hours of 16 June 1953, apparently sent to persuade the workers to accept the norm increase. In this highly charged atmosphere, the hospital director ordered the gates closed, leading the workers to believe—probably mistakenly—that they would be arrested. Within a short time, the news had spread to the Block 40 construction site in the Stalin allee (a major avenue in the heart of East Berlin), where workers organized a demonstration in support of their fellow workers. After breaking down the hospital gates, a few hundred workers marched downtown, picking up in number as they passed through the streets of Berlin. Apparently, the marchers managed to take over two soundtrucks on the way, allowing them to disseminate their calls for a general strike and a demonstration at the Strausberger Platz at 7 a.m. the next day. Just a few hours later, several thousand demonstrators were protesting in front of the "Haus der Ministerien," the GDR government headquarters in the Wilhelmsstraße. Posing a more immediate threat to the regime, others headed for the party headquarters in the Wilhelm-Pieck Street.[31]

There the politburo had gathered for its regular Tuesday meeting. It is still unclear how well-informed the politburo was about the developments in the streets of Berlin. Under pressure from the marchers, the politburo, after hours of deliberations, decided to revoke the forced norm increase, blaming the developments on the cold-blooded manner in which individual ministries had implemented the measure and on hostile provocateurs who had sowed confusion into the ranks of the workers. An increase in productivity was to be only voluntary. The revocation of the forced norm increase, however, came too late to satisfy the protesters' demands. So did the earlier appearance of Minister Fritz Selbmann and Professor Robert Havemann, who had tried in vain to calm the crowds in front of the government headquarters. Only in the early afternoon did the demonstration slowly disperse, with a large crowd heading back to the Stalinallee. Clashes and demonstrations, however, persisted until late evening.[32]

Later that night, the Berlin "Parteiaktiv" (the most trusted Berlin SED party members and activists) met in the Friedrichsstadtpalast. Demonstrating unity and determination, the entire politburo, headed by Grotewohl and Ulbricht, appeared before the group of nearly 3,000 people. Responding to the day's events, Grotewohl and Ulbricht acknowledged mistakes by the party leadership and criticized the "cold administering" and police measures. Despite these insights, the SED leadership continued to gravely miscalculate the situation: "Yes, mistakes were made," Ulbricht told the Berlin party members, but now the task was to "take to heart correctly and draw the right conclusions from the lesson which we received today. Tomorrow even deeper into the masses! (...) we are moving to the mobilization of the entire party, up to the last member! (...) We are now getting to the point that tomorrow morning all party organizations in the plants, in the residential areas, in the institutions will start to work in time and that one is watchful everywhere: Where are the West Berlin provocateurs?"[33] Based on the myth of an external provocation, the SED leadership expected that a massive propaganda drive was enough to cope with the crisis.

Throughout the night of June 16 and the early morning of June 17, the news of the Berlin strikes and demonstrations spread like a wildfire throughout the GDR. Early in the morning of June 17, workers' assemblies in most East Berlin workshops decided to go on strike and march downtown. From all East Berlin districts and surrounding suburbs, crowds were marching on the "Haus der Ministerien." By 8 a.m., the number of protesters in front of the building had apparently reached 15,000; by 9 a.m., the number had increased to more than 25,000. According to estimates by West Berlin police, by 9:40 a.m. 60,000 people were crowding the streets, headed in the direction of the ministries. The few People's Police officers which the regime had ordered to the scene were soon overcome. Between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., 80 to 100 demonstrators apparently managed to break the security barriers for the first time and enter the government buildings, visibly demonstrating that the People's Police, State Security, and army had been overpowered and put on the defensive. Events in East Berlin were mirrored by developments throughout the GDR: According to a recent estimate, more than 500,000 people in over 350 East German cities and towns marched in defiance of the regime, in some cases raiding prisons and party offices.[34]

The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin and SED reports provide interesting numbers for the June 17 demonstrations. Generally coinciding with the numbers in the SED report and Western accounts, the Soviets estimated that by 9 a.m. about 30,000 people (SED report: 25,000) were demonstrating outside the GDR government buildings. Overall participation in the demonstrations was estimated at 66,000 people. According to Soviet accounts, 80,000 out of 200,000 workers went on strike that day.

Despite the growing signs of unrest, the SED leadership was completely taken by surprise by the degree of opposition apparent throughout the GDR. Faced by the threat of a general strike, (East) Berlin police head Waldemar Schmidt had asked, in vain, for Soviet military support as early as June 16. Ulbricht apparently secretly conferred with State Security (Stasi) chief Wilhelm Zaisser

and the head of the East German military forces (Kasernierte Volkspolizei [KVP]), Heinz Hoffman, in the early morning hours of June 17 about the deployment of KVP units. Since their reliability and preparation was questionable, this was held out as a last resort. About 10 a.m., the politburo met in the party headquarters "House of Unity" but were, by 10:30 a.m. ordered by Soviet High Commissioner Semyenov, who had effectively assumed control of government power, to proceed to the Soviet headquarters in Karlshorst. Precluded from the decision-making process, politburo members were finally sent out to major cities in an effort to restore political control. Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Zaisser, and Herrnstadt remained in the Soviet High Commission headquarters. According to the Herrnstadt papers, Semyenov at one point confronted them with the news that "RIAS is broadcasting that there is no government any more within the GDR." Sitting down with his Soviet comrades, Semyenov allegedly remarked that "well, it is almost true." A few hours later, the SED leaders were informed that Moscow had ordered the declaration of martial law in East Berlin as of 1 p.m. Eventually, martial law was declared in about 167 (of 217) urban and rural districts.[35]

According to eyewitness accounts, Soviet tanks had entered East Berlin's outskirts in the early morning hours of June 17, initially without making any moves to protect government buildings. Not until shortly before noon did Soviet military vehicles close in on government headquarters. Within an hour, the Soviet tanks managed to reestablish control around the government headquarters, not without committing a massacre among the demonstrators on the nearby Potsdamer Platz. Despite the declaration of martial law, the demonstrations and riots continued into the night, and, in fact, for several days.

The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin report of June 24 reflects the Soviets' sense of exasperation and frustration with the SED leadership, which they severely blamed for misreading and mishandling the situation. The report confirms that GDR state security organs had been informed as early as June 14 of plans for strikes against the norm increases. Despite warnings by the Soviets about the "seemingly serious nature of the disorders that had taken place in the city" and the necessity "to be highly prepared" during a meeting with politburo members on the evening of June 16, the SED leadership "did not believe the situation to be so serious" as to warrant serious measures and "evaluated the situation in the GDR rather optimistically." While Karlshorst had allegedly alerted its regional military authorities during the day, Ulbricht "could not think of anything better" than to call the first regional party secretaries to Berlin "for instruction," leaving the regional party organization without leadership in the critical hours of June 17. According to the Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin report, the Soviets also informed Ulbricht, Grotewohl, Herrnstadt and Zaisser during the June 16 meeting of their decision to send troops into Berlin which, however, they opposed. This ac-

COLD WAR "FLASHPOINTS": THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE

One of the more unusual resources available to scholars of the Cold War is the National Security Archive, a non-governmental, non-profit library and publisher of declassified documents based in Washington. Now in its 10th year, the Archive has built a reputation as the world's largest repository of declassified records obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These materials, covering topics in contemporary U.S. foreign and national security policy ranging from the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises to the Iran-Contra Affair to non-proliferation and intelligence policies, are published on microfiche and other formats, and are also available in the Archive's reading room.

With the end of the Cold War, the Archive initiated the Openness in Russia and Eastern Europe project to provide assistance on issues of documentary access in the former Soviet bloc countries. A subset of the project, the "Flashpoints" collection, is currently gathering new materials on several crises of the Cold War in Eastern Europe: the East German uprising of 1953, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, in 1956 and 1968, respectively, the rise of and crackdown on Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81, and the revolutions of 1989.

Each of these topics will be the focus of an international conference organized in collaboration with local institutions. The first of these, looking back at the Prague Spring, took place in the Czech capital in April 1994. Co-sponsored by the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Prague and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), the conference drew over 90 scholars and former officials from a dozen countries. One of the key publications emerging from the conference will be an English-language documentary reader featuring a number of the most important documents compiled and edited by members and associates of the former Czechoslovak government commission originally appointed in 1990 to analyze the events of 1967-1970, and published by The New Press/W.W. Norton. (Previous NSA/New Press anthologies of declassified documents and interpretive essays have examined the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iran-Contra Affair, and U.S. policy toward Southern Africa.) Two of the editors, Drs. Vaclav Kural and Jaromir Navratil, both of the IIR, were major organizers of the conference and are the authors of a volume in Czech on the Prague Spring. NSA, working closely with CWIHP, plans similar conferences in Germany, Poland and Hungary in 1995-1996.

The Archive, in a project supported by CWIHP, is also overseeing the creation of an electronic database of declassified documents released from the former Soviet bloc. Incorporating bibliographic data and brief synopses in English of each document, the database is intended to keep researchers up-to-date on what is currently available from the "other side" of the Cold War. Information from the database, as well as other NSA and CWIHP materials, will soon be featured on the Archive's World Wide Web site on the Internet, due to go on-line later this year.

For further information on the Archive and its projects, contact:

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count contradicts evidence according to which the East Germans had asked for Soviet military support earlier that day—a request which the Soviets initially refused.[36] Sokolovskii and Semyenov might have been trying to cover up their own inadequacies in handling the situation.

To a lesser extent, naturally, the criticism of Berlin's handling of the demonstrations is also reflected in the July 20 SED report. The SED, the report argued, was "completely taken by surprise by the provocation," a circumstance which was ascribed to the "widespread euphemistic reporting" on popular dissatisfaction by local party officials and the fact that "the Central Committee did not immediately react to the events on June 16 and thus left the Party unprepared." Consequently, "until the afternoon hours of the 17th, the district leadership was by and large left to its own devices."

Given the initial perception by Grotewohl and his advisers that the strikes and demonstration had been "controlled from the West," it is not surprising that the Soviet representatives in Germany (who were largely dependent on their SED sources) and the politburo suspected that the popular uprising was a "counter-revolutionary coup" inspired by the West. Ulbricht had announced the line in his speech before the "Parteiaktiv" on the night of June 16, and certainly the almost parallel flaring up of riots and demonstrations throughout the country tended to create the impression (or confirm SED-leaders in their ideological preconceptions) that this could only be a systematically prepared action by the West. There is evidence that Semyenov and Marshall Sokolovskii, Chairman of the Soviet Chiefs of Staff and deputy defense minister who had been sent to the Soviet army headquarters in Karlshorst on June 17, accepted (and passed on to Moscow) GDR Interior Ministry reports which alleged a "very active organizational role of the American military in the disorders in Berlin." As Semyenov and Sokolovskii put it in a June 19 cable to Moscow, "[t]he people arrested testify that American officers personally selected and gathered residents of West Berlin in large groups and gave them instructions to organize disorders in East Berlin, the arson of buildings etc. As a reward, the American officers promised money, and for the people who were the most active—a three month vacation in a vacation home, etc. American military people personally gave instructions from cars with loudspeakers to the participants in the disorders near the home of the GDR government on the border of the Soviet sector. There is also information from the GDR provinces of American agents from West Berlin and West Germany sent there."[37]

This perception is reflected in the report Semyenov, Sokolovskii and Yudin sent to Molotov and Bulganin on June 24. According to the report, the uprising was "prepared by [the] three Western states and their accomplices within the West German monopolcapitalistic capital," by "fascist" and other organizations "working primarily under the leadership of American intelligence." On June 17, it stated, "American planes appeared over various parts of the Soviet sector of Berlin, from which leaflets were dropped calling on the population to participate in the strikes and the unrest, and to work to overthrow the Government of the GDR." In the same vein, the SED report argued that the uprising "under the direct participation and leadership of American agencies" was an attempt at a "fascist" coup d'etat.

Yet the Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin report, written only a few days after the height of the demonstrations, reveals that the Soviet representatives realized that the SED's policy of "accelerating the construction of Socialism" as adopted at the Second Party Conference and the ensuing supply shortages had caused growing dissatisfaction among the working middle class and constituted the "prime causes of the disorders." Even the SED report acknowledged, in conformity with the "New Course," that dissatisfaction among the population had resulted from the "mistakes of Party and Government."

No evidence, indeed, has so far emerged which would support the allegation of Western instigation of the uprising. Contrary to the Eisenhower Administration's "roll-back" rhetoric and its interest in "psychological warfare," neither the United States nor any other western government was prepared for or actively working toward an uprising in East Germany or a major intervention behind the Iron Curtain. Although the American radio station in Berlin, Radio In the American Sector (RIAS), was waging an effective propaganda campaign against the SED regime and was later credited with helping to spread the uprising from East Berlin throughout the country, U.S. officials remained cautious when developments came to a head in Berlin on June 16-17. While generally supportive of the popular demands and reporting on the protests in a very sympathetic manner, RIAS did not issue a call for a general strike as demanded by a workers' delegation. Indeed, the Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin report confirmed that "RIAS in its broadcasts recommended that the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet officials and not to clash with Soviet forces." According to internal SED analyses at the height of the uprising, RIAS broadcasts during the first days of the crisis were "very general," and SED officials took satisfaction in the fact that "the enemy is still lacking detailed information."[38] The radio station's initial emphasis on caution and restraint, contributing to a large degree to the relaxation of the tense situation in the city, was clearly recognized by GDR authorities.[39] Only later did an internal SED study on "The Role of the Hostile Broadcasting during the Events in Berlin" blame RIAS broadcasts for creating the "impression" that "the strikes of the construction workers [in East Berlin] were becoming a broad movement among the entire population."[40]

RIAS' cautious policy during the uprising was indicative of the overall response by the Eisenhower Administration. At a meeting of the National Security Council on June 18, CIA director Allen W. Dulles pointed out that, "the United States had nothing whatsoever to do with inciting these riots."[41] While acknowledging that the brutal suppression of the popular uprising by Soviet military might afforded the United States an "excellent propaganda opportunity"[42] and could be viewed as a "sign of real promise," the Eisenhower Administration initially took no steps to escalate the crisis. Faced with disappointment and resentment throughout Germany about the weak western response, the U.S. government later, in July and August, initiated a large western aid program which exacerbated tensions in the GDR and displayed Western sympathy for the plight of the East Germans.[43] The uprising, an internal U.S. government memorandum later judged, "began as spontaneous manifestations of dissatisfaction... [I]t is generally agreed that the American-controlled radio station RIAS played an important role in spreading the riots from East Berlin into the zone and that these riots were then further stimulated by the American food pro-

gram."[44]

Charges of Western involvement notwithstanding, within the SED the party politburo, and especially Ulbricht, were widely blamed for misreading the depth of the crisis and the popular reaction to the policy of the "Construction of Socialism." The self-criticism and the climate of openness which accompanied the SED espousal of the "New Course" and which had many East Germans demanding the resignation of the government, also inspired challenges to Ulbricht's leadership within the Central Committee. At the 14th Central Committee Plenum, quickly summoned for a midnight session on June 21, criticism of Ulbricht's leadership erupted. "In some ways, what we have let happen is worse than some severe defeats which the working-class has suffered at the hands of its enemies," Central Committee member Anton Ackermann lamented. Led by Stasi head Zaisser and Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ "Neues Deutschland," the opposition group sought to oust Ulbricht from his position as head of the powerful party secretariat. The opposition to Ulbricht within the politburo took the form of a commission, formally established to prepare the basic documents for the 15th CC Plenum. In its report, the commission called for a restructuring of the leadership.

The Sokolovskii-Semyenov-Yudin report reveals the degree to which Ulbricht's position was challenged between mid-June and mid-July, not only by his intra-party rivals but also by his Soviet protectors. It is possible, yet still uncertain, that their indictment of the SED leader reflected the balance of power in Moscow at that moment or at least the strong influence of those forces around Beria who opposed Ulbricht and the policy he represented. Ulbricht, the report explicitly stated, was the "initiator and the primary author" of the policy of "the construction of socialism, regardless of any difficulties," which, as the reports observes, was implemented "without the accompaniment of corresponding organizational and technical measures and political work among [the] workers." By implication, it was Ulbricht who was blamed by the Soviets for failing to pay attention to the dissatisfaction and sporadic strikes, for "sloppily" and reluctantly implementing the Soviet-decreed course reversal, thereby causing the announcement of the New Course to fall "on deaf ears." Consequently, Sokolovskii, Semyenov, and Yudin recommended "to relieve comr. Ulbricht of his duties as deputy prime minister of the GDR" and "to liquidate the currently existing position of General Secretary of the CC SED, replacing it with several CC secretariat posts."

Developments within the SED politburo came to a head on July 8 when the final draft commission report was considered. By now, politburo members Heinrich Rau, Elli Schmidt, Ackermann and East Berlin mayor Friedrich Ebert had joined the ranks of Herrnstadt and Zaisser. During the controversial session, Zaisser supported a replacement of Ulbricht by Herrnstadt. According to the handwritten minutes of the meeting in the Grotewohl papers, Zaisser argued that Ulbricht "had to be kept out of the party apparatus. The apparatus in the hands of W.U. is a catastrophe for the party." Ulbricht apparently managed to avoid immediate steps against him. Arguing that "I don't think I have to be the first secretary," Ulbricht promised to reveal his views at the next CC Plenum. Crucially, the final adoption of the commission report was postponed.[45]

The next day, Grotewohl flew to Moscow at Soviet orders. There, he and other Communist party leaders were informed of Beria's arrest, signaling a shift in the correlation of forces in favor of the hard-liners around Molotov and Gromyko. This proved to be of momentous significance for the German situation, for Beria's fall undermined the position of Zaisser, Ulbricht's most powerful challenger. Once again assured of Soviet support, Ulbricht went on the offensive at the July 14 politburo meeting when he fired the Minister of Justice, Max Fechner, who had advocated a more lenient treatment of the popular opposition. On July 18, Ulbricht forced Zaisser to resign as head of the Stasi. Five days later, Herrnstadt and Ackermann were expelled from the politburo. Signifying his increasing power, Ulbricht had the 15th CC Plenum restore him to the position of "First Secretary" of the SED a few days later. By mid-July, as the SED report indicates, Ulbricht had survived the leadership crisis.

Both documents thus constitute significant new evidence on the Soviet and East German perspective of the 1953 crisis, and, given their different origins and dates, illuminate the evolution of the crisis which clearly—as both documents show—was not limited to June 17 or to East Berlin.[46]

1. The report is located in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; it was obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Security Archive and translated by Danny Rozas. The archival reference is Fund 06, Opis 12a, Papka 51, Delo 301, Listy 1-51.
2. Marshall V.D. Sokolovskii, since 1949 Chief of the Soviet General Staff and since 1952 Deputy Defense Minister, had arrived in Berlin at the height of the June 1953 crisis.
3. Vladimir Semyonovich Semyenov, since 1946 Political Adviser to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany; since 1953 head of the Soviet High Commission in Germany, located in Berlin-Karlshorst.
4. Pavel A. Yudin had replaced Semyenov as Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) on 21 April 1953; named Deputy Soviet High Commissioner in June 1953.
5. Abt. Leitende Organe der Partei und der Massenorganisationen, "Analyse über die Vorbereitung, den Ausbruch und die Niederschlagung des faschistischen Abenteuers vom 16.-22.6. 1953" [Study of the Instigation, Outbreak and Crushing of the Fascist Adventure of 16-22 June 1953], 20 July 1953, Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR" im Bundesarchiv [Foundation "Archives of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR], henceforth SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 J IV 2/202/15. Obtained from the SED archives in Berlin by Christian Ostermann and translated by Helen Christakos.
6. On the establishment of the security apparatus in the GDR see now Norman M. Naimark, *'To Know Everything and To Report Everything Worth Knowing': Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 10, 1994).
7. Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle, *Untergang auf Raten. Unbekannte Kapitel der DDR-Geschichte* [Decline in Installments. Unknown Chapters of GDR History] (München: Bertelsmann, 1993), 30.
8. Beschluß der 2. Parteikonferenz [Decision of the Second Party Conference], *Dokumente der sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* [Documents of the Socialist Unity Party], vol. 4 (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1954), 73.
9. On the latter point, see Torsten Diedrich, *Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR. Bewaffnete Gewalt gegen das Volk* [The 17 June 1953 in the GDR. Military Might Against the Populace] (Berlin: Dietz, 1991)
10. See footnote 8.
11. Mitter and Wolle, *Untergang*, 47.
12. The best account of the refugee problem is Helge Heidemeyer, *Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945/1949-1961. Die Flüchtlingspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis zum Bau der Berliner Mauer* [Flight and Immigration from the Soviet Zone/GDR 1945/1949-1961] (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1993); but also see Valur Ingimundarson, "Cold War Misperceptions: The Communist and Western Responses to the East German Refugee Crisis in 1953," *Journal of Contemporary History* 29:3 (1994), 463-81
13. Quoted in Mitter and Wolle, *Untergang*, 35.
14. Ibid., 42.
15. Editor's note 12, stenographic protocol, CPSU CC Plenum, 2-7 July 1953, "Delo Beria," *Izvestia TsK KPSS* 2 (1991), 144, quoted in Hope M. Harrison, *The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Rela-*

tions, 1953-1961 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1994), 48.

16. Harrison, *The Bargaining Power*, 48-52, James Richter, *Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum*, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992), 13-22; Vladislav M. Zubok, *Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The "Small" Committee of Information, 1952-53*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992), 16-17; Gerhard Wettig, "Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemühungen im ausgehenden Frühjahr 1953? Neue Aufschlüsse über ein altes Problem" [Soviet Reunification Efforts in Late Spring 1953? New Evidence on an Old Problem], *Deutschland Archiv* 25:9 (1992), 943-58; Gerhard Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschlandpolitik im Frühjahr 1953" [On the State of Research on Beria's German Policy in the Spring of 1953], *Deutschland Archiv* 26:6 (1993), 674-82.

17. The decree, "Über die Maßnahmen zur Gesundung der politischen Lage in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," released in 1989, is printed in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 32:5 (1990), 651-54.

18. Quoted in Rolf Stöckigt, "Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953" [A Document of Great Historical Importance of May 1953], *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 32:5 (1990), 649.

19. Ibid.

20. Wilfriede Ott, "Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED 1953," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* 32:5 (1990), 655-67; Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt, ed., *Rudolf Herrnstadt. Das Herrnstadt-Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953* [Rudolf Herrnstadt: The Herrnstadt File. The SED Politburo and the History of 17 June 1953] (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), 62-81. See also Helmut Müller-Enbergs, *Der Fall Rudolf Herrnstadt. Tauwetterpolitik vor dem 17. Juni* [The Herrnstadt Case. Thaw Policy before 17 June] (Berlin: Linksdwuck, 1991); Wettig, "Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemühungen," 947-50; Wilfried Loth, *Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte* [Stalin's Unwanted Child. Why Moscow Did Not Want the GDR] (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994), 209ff.

21. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen [Department "Principal Organs of Party and Mass Organizations"], Stellungnahmen der Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Analyse der SED Kreisleitung Wernigerode, 11.6.1953 [Reports of Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Analysis of the SED District Leadership, 6 June 1953], SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526.

22. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen [Department "Principal Organs of Party and Mass Organizations"], Stellungnahmen der Parteorgrane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: [Bericht]: K[reis]L[eitung]Wanzleben, 12.6.1953 [Reports of the Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report, District leadership Wanzleben, 12 June 1953], SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526.

23. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der Parteorgrane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Stimmungsbericht aus Magdeburg, 12.6.1953, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526.

24. See, e.g., Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Tagesbericht Nr. VI [Daily Re

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SOVIET REPORT

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I. The course of events in the GDR on 17-19 June.

1. On the eve of aggression.

Soon after the SED Party conference /July 1952/ and as a result of the new direction adopted at this conference towards "accelerating the construction of socialism" in the GDR, there began to arise in GDR serious and ever-increasing interruptions in the supply of goods of basic necessity, and in particular fat, meat, and sugar; in winter 1952-53 there were also serious interruptions in the supply of heat and electricity to the cities. This led to the rise of dissatisfaction, most notably within the less well-to-do sectors of the populace. In December and January-February 1952 there were isolated incidents of small and short-lived workers' strikes within a few enterprises; these, however, did not catch the attention of CC SED and SCC organs. In January-March 1953, as a part of the new "austerity regime" a number of privileges and preferential treatments, enjoyed by German workers since 1945, and in many cases earlier, were revoked with the active participation of SCC /the revocation of railroad passes, the changes in sick leave policy; the revocation of additional vacation time for sanatorium stays; the cut-backs in disability insurance for working women turned housewives and so on/. Further decreases in prices of consumer goods did not take place since spring of 1952. On the contrary, ration coupon prices for meat were increased by 10-15% under the pretext that the quality of meat products had increased. All this, as well as the increase in the price of jam and artificial honey /a product used widely by low-paid workers/, brought about dissatisfaction among workers, which was further aggravated by the party's and government's failure, following the 2nd SED conference, to take any steps to improve the situation of the bulk of workers, with the exception of the July 1952 wage increases for ITR, as well as for qualified workers in the five main branches of industry.

This was joined by the measures taken by the CC SED, as part of their mistaken policy of liquidating the petit and middle bourgeoisie of both city and country, which in some places took the rather ugly forms of insular administrative planning and mass repressions directed also at workers. In addition, the petit-bourgeoisie's deprivation of ration coupons for fat, meat and sugar was particularly hurtful, given the absence of these products in the consumer market.

Functionaries of the SED and of the State apparatus, under the influence of the decision that emerged from the 2nd conference of the SED "on the construction of socialism, regardless of any difficulties," started to lose contact with the bulk of the populace and increasingly often to rely on management and administrative methods vis-a-vis members of SED, using the harmful methods widely employed within the CC SED Secretariat as a guide. In a number of instances, SED district and regional committees completely supplanted government organs, bringing under their authority police operations, arrests, the day-to-day administration of enterprises, etc.

All these, as well as other unhealthy developments, mentioned in the Soviet Government resolution of 6 June, were the prime causes of the disorders and agitations that took place in the GDR on 17-19 June.

Already, long before 17 June, in certain areas in the GDR there were sporadic worker strikes within a few enterprises, directed against increases in output norms, which were being instituted in accordance with government and isolated GDR ministries' directives, without the accompaniment of corresponding organizational and technical measures and political work among workers. The initiator and the primary author of the policy to increase output norms was [SED General Secretary Walter] Ulbricht, who, in a number of public speeches, rather actively stressed the importance of these measures. The CC SED did not pay attention to these short-lived strikes and only under heavy pressure from SCC announced, on 8 June, sloppily formulated directives on the inadmissibility of overreaching during the course of the campaign to raise output norms; this, however, was not accompanied by any organizational measures on the part of the party CC, and the announcement, for the most part, fell on deaf ears.

2. Events in Berlin on 16-19 June

On 14 June the state security organs of the GDR and the SED city committee of Berlin received information on plans to strike against the increase of productivity norms for construction workers in Berlin, in particular, on the Stalinallee construction site. However, they did not deem this information to be of any importance and did not report of this to the leadership of CC SED and SCC. The events that followed were completely unexpected to the leadership of GDR.

In the evening of 15 June the construction workers in Berlin announced categorical demands to repeal the increase in the productivity norms, of which they [the workers] were informed without any prior explanations through a withholding of corresponding sums from their paychecks. The Berlin organization of SED and the magistrate of East Berlin did not react in any way to these demands.

As came to be known later, agents from West Berlin and as yet unknown traitors from the GDR trade unions were actively involved in inciting the ranks of the workers.

In the morning of 16 June, two thousand out

of a total of 35-40 thousand construction workers in Berlin struck in the city centre. They had a strike committee, which maintained ties with West Berlin. The construction workers decided to march to the GDR Statehouse, located on Leipzigerstrasse, right on the border between the Soviet sector and the Western sector of Berlin. The construction workers were joined on the way by large groups of West Berlin provocateurs, carrying placards directed against the government, with demands for the resignation of the GDR government that had made mistakes, as well as with demands for the lowering of prices by 40% in the commercial stores of KhO [Konsum-Handels-Organisation]. Crowds of onlookers also joined the demonstration, so that there were gathered some 5 thousand people at the GDR Statehouse.

Having learned of the demonstration and of the workers' demands, the CC SED Politburo decided, at a session that was taking place at the time, to repeal the increase in the productivity norms and sent the CC Politburo member [Heinrich] Rau to meet with the workers. However, Rau and other government members were not allowed to speak by the provocateurs, who drowned them out with shouts that [GDR Premier Otto] Grotewohl or [GDR President Wilhelm] Pieck should speak to the workers. The announcement concerning the repeal of the productivity norm increase was made over a loudspeaker. Upon hearing this announcement, the construction workers began to disperse, but the West Berlin provocateurs began to agitate them that they should not settle for simply a repeal of the increase in norms, but should demand a decrease in the old norms, as well as lower of prices in KhO, the resignation of the GDR government and the holding of all-German elections. The majority of construction workers were not taken up by these provocations and, after a short period of time, dispersed from the Statehouse. A small number of construction workers was led by the West Berlin provocateurs to nearby pubs and restaurants where they were served vodka while being encouraged towards new actions.

During the day of 16 June, there was a marked increase in the activity of small groups of provocateurs in various parts of East Berlin, carrying out anti-democratic agitation amongst the populace. In a number of enterprises in East Berlin and in GDR a slogan was sent forth from West Berlin calling for an immediate strike in solidarity with the construction workers of Berlin, as well as a slogan calling for a general strike on 17 June. In the evening of 16 June an extra edition of the evening paper "Dernbend" was published in West Berlin, with calls for a general strike in the Eastern zone of Germany. Solidarity strikes started to spread throughout a number of enterprises towards the day's end on 16 June.

In the evening of 16 June the situation in Berlin became more difficult. At 20.00 an extraordinary session of the most active members of the Berlin SED organizations was held, where, in the presence of the entire CC SED Politburo, Ulbricht and Grotewohl gave speeches on the new political course of the party and government. The mood of the active party members, according to members of the Politburo, was good. However, the GDR leadership said not a word of the strikes that were taking place in the city, and gave no indication as to what course the active party members ought to take in the near future. During this time crowds of West Berliners, consisting mostly of youth, began to arrive on city railcars and other means of transportation as well as on foot. A crowd of some 4-5 thousand people moved in the direction of the Friedrichstadtpalast where a session of the active members of the party was taking place, thus creating a possible danger that the members of the CC SED Politburo could become hostages. At the same time, in the centre of the city at Stalinallee, a crowd of West Berliners numbering some 2 thousand began throwing rocks at the monument of comr. Stalin, and calling for the overthrow of the GDR government. The were also shouts by isolated provocateurs, calling for the killing of Russians.

The GDR police, acting on their instructions, did not actively intervene in these events. The measures that we undertook (the dispatch of police reserves to the Friedrichstadtpalast), were enough to disperse the crowd that was moving in the direction of Friedrichstadtpalast, as well as the mob at Stalinallee. Following this, various groups of provocateurs and bandits, principally from West Berlin, took to rioting in various places in the Soviet sector of Berlin, overturning automobiles, looting shops and apartments of SED activists on Stalinallee, stopping street traffic, trying to break into the [natural] gas plant and other important city enterprises. These acts of outrage were carried out by groups that together numbered approximately 1.5-2 thousand people.

Late in the evening of 16 June, we met with the leadership of CC SED (Grotewohl, Ulbricht, [secret police chief Wilhelm] Zaisser, [SED Politburo member Rudolf] Herrnstadt). We turned their attention to the seemingly serious nature of the disorders that had taken place in the city, pointing out that the slogans thrown out by the provocateurs at the end of the day calling for a general strike were finding a positive response within the enterprises of East Berlin and in some other places in GDR, and also pointing out that it is necessary to take the most decisive measures to maintain order in the city on 17 June, since one could expect a massive influx into East Berlin of provocateur bands from West Berlin. We informed our friends of our decision to send Soviet forces into Berlin. Our friends announced that they did not believe the situation so serious as to warrant such extraordinary measures, and that, in their opinion, one should not expect serious unrest in the city on 17 June, though they did not rule out the possibility of a slight increase in unrest as compared to 16 June. They evaluated the situation in GDR rather optimistically. We pointed out to the GDR leadership that it is necessary to be highly prepared and we proposed that detachments of German barracks-based police from Potsdam and Oranienburg be called out, which they did by the morning of 17 June.

During the day of 16 June we sent a warning telegram to our regional representatives informing them of the unrest in Berlin and recommending that they take urgent preventive and preparatory steps to tackle unrest in the regions of GDR. We advised the friends /Ulbricht/ to also warn the regions about this through CC SED channels, but they could not think of anything better than to call the first secretaries of regional committees to Berlin on 17 June "for instruction," and as a result, during the unrest of 17 June the regions were left with practically no top party leaders.

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of 17 June, in East Berlin and in many cities in the western and southern parts of GDR, there took place simultaneous mass strikes that turned into demonstrations, which, in a number of cities / Berlin, Magdeburg, Herlitz, and others/, in turn became riots.

The provocateurs were not able to call out a general strike in Berlin. However, according to preliminary figures, on 17 June 80 thousand workers, out of a total number of 200 thousand, did strike. In addition, the largest enterprises participated in the strike: the Stalin electrical machinery factory, the "Bergman-Borzig" factory, the Soviet enterprises of "Siemens-Planya," cable factories, and others.

After stopping work, many workers proceeded in columns towards the city centre to Straussbergerplatz, where, the day before, the provocateurs called a general city meeting. At 7:30 about 10 thousand people gathered at this plaza, who proceeded in separate columns towards the GDR Statehouse, carrying banners "Down with the government," "We demand a decrease of norms," "We demand a decrease of prices at KhO by 40%," "We demand free elections."

At 9 in the morning a crowd of 30 thousand people gathered outside the GDR Statehouse, a significant part of which was made up of West Berlin residents, who were the main organizers of the provocations.

The insurgents were able to break through the line of steadfast policemen, who did not use weapons during this time, and after throwing rocks at them, they broke into the Statehouse where a pogrom was committed. The police security force of the Statehouse was reinforced, and at the time of the attack numbered 500 men. The Statehouse was recaptured only upon the arrival of the Soviet forces, in concert with which, by the way, the German police, having been

partially beaten by the crowd, actively participated in the reestablishment of order.

At the same time, in the region of Aleksandrplatz (the centre of Berlin) large columns of demonstrators came together from the regions of Pankov, Vaisenzee, and Köpenich (the Soviet sector of Berlin).

The crowds of demonstrators, with the active participation of provocateurs, besieged the CC SED building, the Berlin Polizeipresidium, the main telegraph, the city trade-union administration and other buildings. At the Aleksandrplatz and in the Pankow region, the demonstrators built barricades and obstructions. Windows were smashed in a number of GDR government buildings.

At Potsdammerplatz, on the sector border, the insurgents had an exchange of fire with the people's police and 7 policemen were disarmed.

The provocateurs also organized a pogrom of the bookstore "International book" and of the central department store "KhO" on Aleksandrplatz, set fire to the already half-empty department store Kolumbushaus on Potsdamerplatz, looted the cinema "Defa" and a number of other public buildings. There was also looting of stores in other parts of the city.

The crowds of insurgents moved through the city, chanting hostile slogans and singing fascist songs. Numerous groups of provocateurs penetrated through to the city enterprises, to call workers to strike. Most importantly, they tried to stop the main city electrostation Klingenberg, as well as a second large electrostation Rummelsburg and a [natural] gas plant. However, the workers of these enterprises showed a high degree of consciousness and organization, having established their picket lines around the plant buildings, thus not allowing the provocateurs through.

Detachments of the people's police tried everywhere to put up resistance against the bandits and the hooligans, however, as a result of their small numbers and inadequate weapons, they were to a great extent overrun and dispersed.

The number of police in Berlin on hand was completely inadequate for putting down more or less serious unrest (a total of 4,940 men, not counting the border police). An analogous situation took place in other large cities in GDR.

During the course of the day, reinforcements from Potsdam, Frankfurt-on-Oder and other population centers of the Republic, numbering two thousand men in total, were brought into Berlin. In addition, certain units of the German barracks-based police, numbering 2,200 men, were also brought in. Of all of these, 3,660 were stationed along the border with West Berlin, the crossing of which was prohibited for both vehicles and pedestrians by the order of Soviet military commanders.

While our forces were not undertaking any active steps to stop the unrest, the demonstrators were able to resist the people's and the barracks-based police, which created a threat of a takeover of government buildings and other important places by the insurgents. In view of this, at around 10:30 a.m. we evacuated the members of the CC SED Politburo and several members of the GDR government to the buildings of the Supreme Commissar of the USSR in Germany, located in Karlshorst.

In view of the unrest that had taken place in Berlin, in the morning of 17 June the city committee of SED showed confusion. The city committee showed practically no leadership to the regional committees. At 10 o'clock in the morning the members of the SED city committee secretariat, including the first secretary Endretsky, headed for the most important city enterprises so as to prevent any strikes from taking place there. The staff of the Central Soviet of the SNM [Union of German Youth], the regional party committees and 200 members of the city party school were also sent to the city enterprises. Although the active members were able to avert strikes in a number of enterprises, their expedition to the enterprises during the time of the unfolding of street unrest, as well as their failure to call on the party members to go to the streets in order to defend the democratic government, resulted in [a situation such] that the central streets of the city were esentially in the hands of the better organized opposition. While, it is true that in a number of places SED activists bravely joined in hand-to-hand skirmishes with the insurgents, they were beaten by the mob.

Due to these reasons, the control of the situation in the city was essentially passed to the hands of Soviet organs. The second-rank members remaining in the SED city committee were, for the most part, occupied in gathering information by request of the CC.

In the SED city committee, the channels of receiving communiqués from places were badly organized, as a result of which, the city committee was not informed of the actual situation in the enterprises. At 12 o'clock the members of the secretariat of the city committee returned to the city committee building and until 3 o'clock were busy with "formulating arguments" of propaganda for the populace. In addition, the city committee took the necessary measures to insure the continuous operation of the electrostation, water supply, city transport, [natural] gas plants, and the trade network.

The Presidium of the people's police of Berlin (V. Schmidt) managed rather effectively the people's police, which functioned smoothly.

The main role in the dispersion of the demonstrations and in the liquidation of street unrest in Berlin was played by the Soviet forces. It should be noted that in the beginning the insurgents acted rather provocatively against our troops—they climbed on top of tanks, threw rocks at the troops, and so on. At the Polizeipresidium building our forces opened fire against the insurgents. This seemed to have a highly sobering effect, after which unrest in the city quickly abated. By the evening order was established in the city.

Overall, approximately 66 thousand people, including some 10 thousand West Berliners, took part in the street demonstrations in East Berlin on 17 June. In addition to the workers, the demonstration included artisans, merchants, and other members of the petit bourgeoisie.

During the course of the day on 17 June, there appeared over various parts of the Soviet sector of Berlin American planes, from which were dropped leaflets containing calls to the population to participate in the strikes and the unrest, and to work to overthrow the Government of GDR. On the sector border mobile loudspeakers appeared on several occasions over which the insurgents were given orders. After the deployment of guards on the sector border, several large groups of provocateurs and hooligans from West Berlin broke through to the Soviet sector. In the streets Braunekstrasse and Bernauerstrasse, these bands started an exchange of fire with the German police, as a result of which there were casualties.

In the evening of 17 June, the American radio station RIAS in its transmissions recommended that the insurgents submit to the orders of Soviet officials, and not clash with Soviet forces.

On 18 June in Berlin, under the presence of the military situation, many factories continued to strike. In a number of places there were attempts to resume the demonstrations and to form picket lines of strikers, which were suppressed by the decisive actions of the German police and, in part, by the Soviet forces, which secured all points of importance in the eastern part of the city. In the relations between the populace and the Soviet military there was [a] significant feeling of alienation; in fact, not until 22 June did the party organize any campaign to reestablish friendly ties between the populace and our military.

By 19-20 June the strikes in Berlin began to decline sharply and normalcy was established. However, amidst the striking workers in the enterprises there could be observed a feeling of bitterness. There were numerous instances of enemy agents and provocateurs working in the enterprises. SED and SNM continued to act irresolutely and weakly, mostly making use of lower functionaries. The SED city committee, as well as the CC SED, began to send its staff to the factories on a large scale on 19 June, though even on that day, in accordance with the directives of Ulbricht, they limited themselves to holding small meetings, afraid that in large worker meetings the party functionaries would encounter opposition and would be whistled [booed]. On 19 June we called the entire SED city committee of Berlin to meet with us, and in no uncertain terms made clear to them that there must be an immediate and

unswerving move to send all party forces on hand in Berlin to the factories, so as to assure a corresponding change in the mood of the workers.

[Ed. note: Other sections of Part I of the report examined "The situation in other cities in GDR on 17-19 June"; "The demonstrators' and strikers' slogans and demands"; "The workers' mood"; "The behavior of other groups of people. The Intelligentsia. The Rural Areas. The Church"; and "The Party. Party apparatus. Party bloc. Social Organizations." Part II examined "The Economic Problems Facing the GDR in Light of the Events of 17-19 June."]

III. A few conclusions and recommendations

With regard to the above-stated, we think it appropriate to undertake the following measures in order to correct the situation in the GDR:

1. To firmly and consistently carry out the new political course, as outlined in the Soviet Government Resolutions of 6 June 1953 on the normalization of the political situation in the GDR.

2. To undertake immediate steps to radically improve the food supply for the population of the GDR by providing it with corresponding aid from Soviet Union and other people's democratic countries. With regard to this, one should bear in mind that so far the forms of assistance, including the additional shipments ordered by the Soviet Government on 24 June, have been limited to food rations and to minimal commercial trade in the "KhO" stores during the 3rd quarter of this year.

3. In order to create a stable economy in the Republic and to improve the standard of living of the citizens of the GDR so as to match that of the citizens of West Germany, to examine the question of discontinuing the shipment of goods in the form of reparations to the Soviet Union and Poland and discontinuing the shipment of goods to USSR as payment for currently operating Soviet enterprises in the GDR, as of the second half of 1953, so as to use these goods to improve GDR foreign trade and to provide for the domestic needs of the Republic.

To continue the reparation payments in [deutch]marks, in amounts that would ensure a normal activity of A/O "Vismut".

4. To examine the question of sharply reducing the GDR's financial responsibility in the maintenance of Soviet occupation forces in Germany.

5. To transfer, on favorable terms, the ownership of all remaining Soviet industrial, trade and transport enterprises, including the bank and the Black Sea-Baltic Insurance Company, to the GDR, using the payment received for these enterprises primarily as future expenditures made by the Soviet Union through A/O "Vismut".

6. To determine the exchange rate between the GDR mark and the ruble in financial dealings between the USSR and GDR, so as to reflect the actual buying power of the mark and the ruble.

7. To make it the primary goal of CC SED and the Government of the GDR to seriously improve the living standards of workers in public and private enterprises of the GDR, as well as to undertake wide-ranging political action among workers, focusing on improving their relations with the party.

8. In light of the recent misdirection of CC SED in their methods of governing by taking over government and administrative organs, [it is necessary] clearly to separate the functions of the Government of the GDR and the CC SED, giving the CC SED the power of oversight on solely the most important questions of the State and its citizenry. To focus the attention of CC SED on carrying out political campaigns among the populace and on smoothening out intra-party operations by introducing broader intra-party democracy, criticism, and self-criticism from top to bottom.

Correspondingly, it is necessary:

a) to reorganize the Government of the GDR with the goal of strengthening and reducing the size of government apparatus both centrally and at its branches, by consolidating a number of scattered ministries and departments into larger ministries and departments;

b) to liquidate the Ministry of State Security [KGB] of the the GDR, by merging into the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR;

c) to relieve comr. Ulbricht of his duties as deputy prime minister of the GDR, so as to enable him to concentrate his attention on work within the CC SED;

d) to elevate the role of the Chamber of the People to that of an active Parliament of the Republic, that would debate and legislate the laws of the Republic, establish commissions, debate inquiries and demands voiced by its deputies, etc.

To forbid the passage of any resolutions, that are in effect laws, bypassing the Chamber of the People of the GDR;

e) to call an extraordinary session of the Chamber of the People of the GDR, as a vehicle for the Government of the GDR to report on its work as well as on its past mistakes, and afterward reorganizing the ranks of the Government, letting go the less capable and less popular ministers, and bringing in the more popular persons to ministerial positions, drawing more widely from among representatives of other parties.

9. To restrict the functions of the Secretariat of CC SED to tasks such as the supervision of the execution of CC Politburo decisions, organizational questions, selection of personnel, placement and education of personnel, as well as to questions of party related political campaigns among the masses. To reorganize the Secretariat CC with the goal of bringing into its ranks new personnel, including the intelligentsia. To reduce the number of Secretariat members from 11 persons to 5 persons.

To liquidate the currently existing position of General Secretary of CC SED, replacing it with several CC Secretarial posts.

10. To hold the IV Party Convention of SED in the next 3-4 months, in which the questions of the party's role in the establishment of the new direction would be discussed. During this convention to seriously renew the ranks of the CC, so as to include a greater number of younger personnel, who have excelled in their work with the working classes, working peasants, as well as the intelligencia. To radically renew the ranks of the CC SED Politburo, purging it of members who do not demonstrate the necessary capabilities required of leaders of the party and of the State in these times.

11. To carry out a special investigation of the work of the professional unions and to make decisive changes in the ranks of the leaders of corresponding organs, as well as to introduce new regulations that would radically change the role of the professional unions in step with the requirements of the new direction.

12. To reexamine the ranks, the organization and the distribution of the people's police of the GDR, to arm it with modern weapons, including armored transports and armored vehicles, and with communications equipment, as well as to create, drawing from the ranks of current detachments of barracks-based police, mobile detachments of sufficient readiness and strength as to be able to maintain order and peace in the Republic without the help of the Soviet military.

To reorganize the currently existing army corpus of the GDR into a national guard-type army, along the lines of the one existing in Western Germany.

13. To give the SNM organization the character of a broad-based non-party organization of youth, using the experience of earlier German youth organizations. To make changes in the leadership ranks of the Central Soviet of the Union of German Youth (SNM).

14. To change the character of the diplomatic delegation in the Soviet Union from the GDR, and their assignments. To strengthen cultural and technical ties between the GDR and the Soviet Union. To reduce vacations and sanatorium trips of SED functionaries to the Soviet Union and other countries, and increase the vacations and sanatorium trips of prominent members of German intelligencia, workers, members of other parties, as well as tourists.

15. In order to raise the international prestige of the GDR and the authority of the GDR government in the eyes of the German populace, to have the new government, chosen by the Chamber of the People, make an official visit to Moscow.

16. After the changes in the military situation in East Berlin, to hold it unwise to continue to maintain the border of East Berlin with West Berlin open, until the commandants of West Berlin take the necessary steps to guarantee that agents and provocateurs, who carry out subversive activities against GDR in East Berlin, are no longer sent from West Berlin.

With regard to this, to establish, in the immediate future, a system of permanent and temporary visas to allow the crossing of the border between East and West Berlin, however, making sure not to create unnecessary difficulties and, in general, considering the interests of the German population.

17. To entrust the Commanding Group of Soviet occupational forces in Germany to improve the distribution of Soviet forces, keeping in mind the lessons learned during the events of 17 June, and, in particular, to see that the necessary number of tank detachments are quartered in Berlin.

[signature] (V.Sokolovskii) [signature] (V.Semyenov) [signature] (P.Yudin)

24 June 1953
iskh st-0024

[Source: Fund 06, Opis 12a, Papka 5, Delo 301, Listy 1-51, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; document obtained and provided by Vladislav M. Zubok, National Security Archive; translated by Danny Rozas.]

SED REPORT

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construction sites, especially from the Stalinallee, participated in it. The Party and labor union organizations did not know anything about this. The agitation for the strike built on the dissatisfaction existing among the workers (schematic, administrative norm increase, bad organization of work, shortages in professional uniforms, tools, etc.).

The signal given on 6/15 for the planned strikes was underestimated by the Party and the union, and was not responded to with sufficient determination. Thus, on 6/16, developed the strike of the construction workers, beginning at the hospital construction site, and quickly spreading to other construction sites by the sending out of delegations and groups of provocateurs.

The hostile slogans: "Resignation of the Government", "General Strike", "Free Elections", (so-called "Berlin demands") were carried into the demonstration by West Berlin instigation groups which were coming in by large numbers; in many plants, however, the strike and the demonstrations on the 17th had already begun with these slogans. At the same time, the instigators organized delegations to the other plants which appealed to the workers' solidarity and called for the support of the strikers. The riots on Tuesday 6/16 by fascist rowdy groups on the Stalinallee, on the Alexanderplatz, and in front of the government buildings and the clashes between participants of party conventions [*Parteiaktiv-tagungen*] in Friedrichstadtpalast with these groups, at the intersection of Friedrichs Street—"Unter den Linden" and at the other places, were not recognized as signals for the prepared fascist riots on Wednesday [June 17], and their spreading throughout the Republic.

In a number of Berlin districts, certain plants operated as organizational centers of the strike. In Lichtenberg, it was "Fortschritt I," in Köpenich the dockyard and the cable-manufacturing plant, in Weissensee the plant "7 October," and in Treptow the EAW. These centers drew in the other plants into the movement, by sending delegations there and threatening the workers who were willing to keep on working.

In KWO [Kraftwerk ost], the strike emanated from the copper press shop. What elements took on the leadership in the action, is proven by an example from the H7 Köpenich, where the former SS-Obersturnmbannfuehrer Hülse stood out.

A part of the plants went on strike under the pressure of the fascist provocateurs. Thus, West Berlin provocateurs invaded the RFT Stern and terrorized the workers.

Already by 8:20 am on 17.6 [17 June], 8,000 demonstrators were in front of the House of Ministries, and broke through the barriers of the VP [Peoples' Police]. Because of the continuous incoming flow from the districts, the number grew to 25,000 by 8:40 am. By 10:45 am, parts of the VP were disarmed at the Potsdamer Platz. On the Marx-Engels Platz various figures revolted, calling for fascist violence. Nothing was done by even those participants in the demonstration, who had gone along in the belief that they had to put pressure behind their economic demands, to the burning of red flags, the raiding of HO-shops [state-owned Handels-Organisation shops—ed.], and the destruction of cars as well as the beating up of FDJ members [Free Democratic Youth—ed.]. The resolute action by the Soviet units suppressed the fascist provocation and brought the people off the streets. A part of the demonstrators realized the great danger for peace [that] had been caused by the fascist provocation. With the declaration of martial law, panic-buying, provoked by the enemy, began in all districts of Berlin.

While in almost all large plants, with few exceptions, at least a part of the workers had set down their work, the administrations continued to work. Serious occurrences only happened in the requisition office. Thus, for example, the entire requisition office in Friedrichshain went on strike on 6/17 and 6/18. The strike leadership consisted of seven workers. In the center district of the city, 121 people at the city council did not go to work on 6/18, 87 alone from the requisition office. In a number of plants, the workers refused to start working on 6/18, unless the arrested had been set free, and the Soviet tanks had been withdrawn. The resumption of work in many plants was made dependent on whether those plants were working again which had initiated the strike. This was particularly evident in Weissensee, in the plant "October 7"; this also became evident in the queries of a number of plants about the situation in the Stalinallee.

[Ed. note: Additional sections of Part II of the report discuss events in other regions and cities of the GDR, outside Berlin, during the revolt. Part III covers statistical evidence on the strike's impact in various areas of the economy. Part IV examines the causes of the revolt, and the conduct of various organizations, classes, and government and party organs during the events.]

[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR" im Bundesarchiv (Foundation "Archives of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the Former GDR), Berlin, DY 30 J IV 2/202/15; document obtained and provided by Christian Ostermann, Hamburg University and National Security Archive; translation by Helen Christakos.]

THE YELTSIN DOSSIER: SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON HUNGARY, 1956

by Janos M. Rainer

During a November 1992 visit to Budapest, Russian President Boris Yeltsin handed to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz a dossier of Soviet archival materials related to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The documents contained in the file, consisting of 299 pages, have now been published in Hungarian translation in two volumes,[1] and also made available in Russian archives.[2]

For Hungarians as well as for scholars worldwide, these materials have tremendous significance—quite aside from their political import as a Russian gesture toward creating a new relationship between Moscow and Budapest after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Until the 1990s, Soviet political history could be studied only with the sophisticated analytical tools of Kremlinology and oral history. Now, however, at least a minor, and perhaps a growing, portion of this history can be analyzed using traditional historical methods.

Still, one must acknowledge that although these materials answer many questions posed by historians and the interested public over the years, they have not radically altered the general picture of 1956; none of the documents contains anything that could be called a sensation. The Yeltsin dossier does, however, provide some new information, enhance our understanding of several important aspects of the events, confirm some earlier unverified assumptions or hypotheses, and help to clarify a number of details. Certainly they are significantly more useful than the previously published documentation in providing a window into the minds of key Soviet officials, and insights into how they functioned, in the midst of a serious crisis.

Since the Soviet documents transferred by Yeltsin were chosen in an unclear manner, in the absence of thorough research in and full access to the Moscow archives there is no way of knowing whether the selection contains the most important ones. The quantity is unquestionably considerable—115 documents—as they cover events of only one-and-a-half years, from April 1956 until July 1957, and also high-level, with the majority originating from the top leadership, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU). About one-fifth are resolutions passed by the party Presidium, and about a third are reports, recommendations, and memoranda, made by the members of the Presidium and the Secretariat; more than two-thirds of the documents actually reached the Presidium. Close to 40 percent of the Soviet documents emanated from the Foreign Ministry, and three-fourths of these consist of reports from the Soviet embassy in Budapest.

One striking feature of the documents is that they hint at how conspicuously concentrated power and decision-making were, especially in some key areas, at the highest levels of the Soviet system during the crisis. It is quite characteristic that a discussion between the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Budapest and a vacationing head of department of the Hungarian Communist Party appeared on the agenda of a Presidium meeting in Moscow. (True, it was agenda item 32 only and also, the head of department in question was a personal friend of Kadar's.)

Among the Soviet documents are eight reports sent by the head of the KGB, General Ivan Serov, to Presidium of the CPSU CC after the revolt erupted on October 23, and 11 accounts on the crushing of the Revolution and the fighting after the Soviet invasion on November 4 transmitted by the Minister of Defense, Marshal Gyorgi Zhukov. Perhaps because of their urgency and because they were prepared for the Presidium on short notice, they are very short.

This review of the types of materials contained in the Yeltsin package points, alas, to one of their shortcomings: the lack of documentation of the process of decision-making at the highest level in Moscow. Two basic features of the documents emerge when one seeks to use them to decipher the Soviet political-military decision making process. Usually, models of decision-making processes distinguish between senior and junior actors: lower-level actors collect information, make recommendations, prepare analyses, implement decisions, while authority rests at the higher level, where decision-makers ostensibly have an overview over often conflicting information and interests.[3]

The 1956 Soviet documents primarily concern the functioning of the higher level (party presidium, secretariat, government), but rather one-sidedly. Some 80 percent of the documents are inputs: primary, to a large extent "unprocessed" information—local reports, analyses made on the lower level or outside the decision-making mechanism. Consequently, the direct mechanism of higher level decision-making cannot be evaluated. The collections contain the major party Presidium resolutions on Hungary, but these resolutions, unfortunately, are merely authoritative instructions given to subordinate executive organs. Not one docu

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SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON 24 OCTOBER -

1. Report from Soviet Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Perevertkin, 24 October 1956

SPECIAL FOLDER
Top Secret

The Ministry of Internal Affairs reports on the situation on the Soviet-Hungarian border as of 8:00 a.m. In accordance with the decision of the Minster of Defense Marshal Zhukov, Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border. In all there were 128 rifle divisions and 39 mechanized divisions, which began to enter Hungary at 2:15 at the points Csop, Beregovo, and Vylok. Separate units gave necessary help to the Soviet Army. The whole border was guarded in order to permit us to violate state borders with impunity. The crossing of troops over the border continues. There have been no incidents on the border. [...]

(Signed) Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Perevertkin

(Source: Fond 89, Perechen 45, Dokument 7, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation by Johanna Granville.)

* * * * *

2. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 24 October 1956

Top secret
Making Copies Prohibited

IMRE NAGY, HESITANT REVOLUTIONARY

by Johanna Granville

In the beginning stages of the Hungarian revolt of 23 October-4 November 1956, Imre Nagy's behavior was oddly hesitant. Having written several times to Moscow in the summer and early fall of 1956 to be readmitted into the Hungarian Workers' Party, he was loathe at first to break ranks completely with the Soviet Communist Party and to declare Hungary's neutrality. The documents below have been selected to convey the confusion of the time, particularly from the perspective of Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Georgii Zhukov and KGB Chief Ivan Serov in trying to restore order under firm communist control. Fighting, begun on the night of 23-24 October 1956, continued until October 30, two days after Nagy announced a cease-fire. At 6:15 a.m. on November 4, the second, more massive, Soviet intervention was launched. The pace of events seems to have prodded Imre Nagy forward. He did not immediately go over to the side of the revolution.

There were several key moments of hesitation on Nagy's part. Why, for example, did Nagy forbid the Hungarian Army to resist the Soviet tanks on October 23-24? Why wasn't Nagy as bold as Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka, who days earlier had told Khrushchev frankly: Turn your tanks around now, or we'll fight you. Even when Nagy finally confronted Andropov on November 1 at a 7 p.m. session of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, he was jittery and unsure of his own authority. In a telegram to Moscow, Andropov wrote: "Nagy in a rather nervous tone informed all those present that earlier that morning he asked the Soviet Ambassador why Soviet troops had crossed the Hungarian border and were penetrating Hungarian territory. Nagy 'demanded' an explanation of this. He spoke as if he were calling me to witness the fact that he was registering a protest. During this time he kept looking at Zoltan Tildy as if wishing to receive his support."[1] Indeed, three days earlier, as the second document reprinted below reveals, Nagy actually had a slight heart attack from nervous exhaustion; Suslov gave him some medicine.[2]

And why, on October 23, did Nagy wait so long to go out and address the crowds who were calling his name? Why couldn't he give a more stirring speech on that critical night of October 23-24? He had no microphone, it's true, but the words themselves were hopelessly out of touch with the temper of the rowdy crowd. "Elvtarsak!" [Comrades!] he called them.[3] We will continue "the June way" (the "New Course" reforms promulgated by the communist government in 1953).[4]

Why didn't Nagy protest when Erno Gero, then First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, invited in Soviet troops (the "Special Corps" ["Osobii Korpus"]) already stationed in Hungary under General Lashchenko) on October 23? To be sure, he didn't sign the actual letter of invitation, but two days later (October 25), Nagy himself was reported to have "requested an increase in Soviet troops operating in Budapest."[5]

One possible explanation is that Nagy was still dependent on Soviet tutelage. He didn't want to upset the Russians again, after they had readmitted him into the party and the Politburo. His friend Imre Mezo, the Budapest Party Secretary who was killed on October 25, had told him that Erno Gero, still First Secretary, wanted to goad him into some premature move, and then slap him down for good.[6] He didn't really start to break away until October 28, the day he issued an amnesty to any street fighters who would peacefully surrender their weapons.[7] In the document below, Serov describes with some relief on October 29: "After the announcement of the government declaration on the radio, about amnesty to the students who had participated in the demonstration, the armed started to lay down their weapons."[8]

Nagy also edged only cautiously to expand the government to include non-communists. On October 26, Malenkov asked Nagy, "What kinds of parties do you want to have participate in the new government?" Nagy replied, "We are not talking about parties as such; we are talking about individual candidates to represent the People's Democracy." And he presented the proposal of bringing in non-Comunists as the "only alternative"; any other policy would result in a "loss of contact with the workers and students."[9]

In fact, Khrushchev actually thought it possible that he and Tito (supposedly the national communist independent of Soviet influence) could "work on" Nagy, and persuade him to support the new Kadar government after the November 4 intervention. Perhaps if everything had gone according to the plan worked out between Khrushchev and Tito at Brioni on November 2, from 7 p.m. to 5 a.m., the Soviet leadership would never have felt compelled to deport Nagy to Rumania, put him on trial, and eventually execute him (in June 1958). This secret agreement between Khrushchev and Tito was not known until the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Party archives were opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union in

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THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION, 4 NOVEMBER 1956

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

FROM BUDAPEST

OUT OF SEQUENCE

We arrived at the scene after some delay; due to weather conditions, we were unable to land at the airport near Budapest. We landed 90 kilometers to the north. We stopped by the corps headquarters for orientation, and from there, in an armored personnel carrier with comrades [KGB chief Ivan] Serov and [Gen. Mikhail S.] Malinin, we set off for the city. We were accompanied by tanks, because there was shooting in Budapest at this time and casualties on both sides, including Soviet soldiers and officers.

In Buda small groups of people watched the movement of our column calmly; some looked anxious, others greeted it with a smile. The roads approaching the city and in the city were full of Soviet tanks and other materiel.

On the streets together with the Soviet troops were Hungarian patrols. In contrast to Buda, where it was calm, there was continuous shooting in Pest between isolated groups of provocators and individuals and our machine-gunners, beginning at the bridge and extending to the Ministry of Defense building, as well as toward the Central Committee building. Our men did more of the shooting; to solitary shots we replied with salvos.

In the Ministry of Defense we met the ministers of defense and state security, as well as a group of Central Committee members—[Istvan] Kovacs, Zoltan Vas, and others, who were authorized to

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YELTSIN DOSSIER

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ment describes the discussions, participants, contributors, and differences of opinion at the Presidium meetings. Instead, one repeatedly encounters such euphemistic phraseology as "V szootvetsztvii sz obmenom mnyenyijami", "sz ucsotom obmena mnyenyijami", "na osznove szosztojascsevoszja obmena mnyenyijami" —"in accordance with," "in regard to," and "based on" the discussion.[4] Yet we have no real data on debates, no minutes of the deliberations of the top Soviet leaders.[5]

By contrast, among the declassified U.S. government records on the Hungarian crisis, both published and in archives, researchers readily find numerous documents describing policy debates, including detailed minutes of National Security Council discussions, as well as serious analytical papers prepared by the NSC and various intelligence agencies.[6] Whether comparable documentation exists on the Soviet side, but remains off-limits, or whether such items of Presidium transcripts on the crisis do not exist, was not clarified in the materials delivered by Yeltsin. In any event, the result is that the crucial factors which determine top-level decision-making can be analyzed only by inference.

An additional problem is that the Soviet documents only treat the Hungarian issue in a very narrow sense—the context of the international situation makes but a dim appearence. Important issues like the Suez crisis, U.S. behavior, the problems of the East-Central European allies, barely receive mention.

Still, while all these issues require further thorough research, even the selected documents permit an illuminating exploration of the thinking, terminology, priorities, and particular style of conduct between the leadership of the Soviet empire and Moscow's East European satellites at this juncture of the Cold War, as well as of the Soviet style of information gathering and crisis management. In "normal circumstances," the Soviet leadership gathered information on the satellites through two inner official channels:

a. The higher level, represented by the ambassador, whose scope of authority included keeping in touch with top local party leaders. The Soviet ambassador was at the same time the local representative of the CPSU CC from the mid-'50s. Beside gathering information he occasionally made recommendations too, and in crisis situations his reports reached the party Presidium. Between 29 April 1956 and 14 October 1956 only four out of Ambassador Andropov's ten known reports got there. At the end of September 1956, Andrei Gromyko, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, had to summarize Andropov's communications to the Presidium, when the crisis was becoming apparent.[7] Otherwise, Andropov prepared his reports for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the "Department" of the Central Committee (meaning the division responsible for contact with the foreign Communist parties).[8]

b. Other embassy personnel worked on the lower level, gathering information on special areas of interest to the leadership and maintaining personal contacts with other sources (primarily with party figures who had been in Moscow but were not part of the top leadership), and their reports usually reached the medium level only.

In crisis situations intelligence was elevated to a special level, and on such occasions the party Presidium sent its own members as plenipotentiary envoys to the place of crisis to conduct personal inspections, assessments, and, on occasion, negotiations. Usually they attempted to maintain secrecy. The envoys contacted local leaders first and collected information. Then they made recommendations for decision to Moscow and sometimes had the right to take local action, evidently on the basis of consultation with the center. Four such extraordinary delegations visited Hungary between the summer of 1956 and the end of that year:

1. Mikhail Suslov, 7-14 June 1956 (1 report);
2. Anastas Mikoyan, 13-21 July 1956 (6 reports);
3. Mikoyan, Suslov, Serov, and Gen. Mikhail Malinin (Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army, who might have arrived earlier), 24-31 October 1956 (10 reports);
4. Suslov, Boris Aristov, Georgi Malenkov and Serov (who was probably on location continuously from October 24), and Marshal I.S. Koniev (Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, who commanded the invasion force from November 1) (11 reports).

These are the most important of the Soviet documents: 28 reports in which the members of the party's top leadership or their "special subordinates" observe, analyze, act, and negotiate. True, they did so "only" in Budapest, but at least they are shown in action. Moreover, some key aspects of the second and third missions can be cross-checked with the wealth of Hungarian party and state documents released in recent years.[9]

The normal and extraordinary political decision-making levels of the party leadership received supplementary information from other parts of the intertwined party-state organs, most importantly autonomous organs of force such as the army and KGB.

The reports of the extraordinary level contain numerous errors, mistakes, and faults, especially during and immediately after the Revolution. Persons and locations cropped up which remained in obscurity for the Soviet leaders. They received the biased and/or panic stricken information above all on street atrocities written by the usual Hungarian informants, especially Hungarian state security officers.[10] On the other hand the Soviets also manipulated the news, Andropov, Serov, and Zhukov in particular. The last-named, for example, made no distinction between the fighting civilian insurgents and the Hungarian army—which never fought in mass—when describing resistance to the second Soviet intervention after November 4. This exaggeration of the true proportions of resistance was used to justify the immense scale of the Soviet intervention.

Thus, the Soviet documents must be handled with great circumspection as far as facts are concerned. Contemporary readers will be astounded by the raw, coarse nature of the reports, which were frequently written in primitive party jargon. Hardly camouflaged orders and instructions are confusingly intermingled with niceties, "comradely" good advice, and partylike statements. Mikoyan obviously differed in this sense from Malenkov and Serov, not to mention Andropov. One finds hardly any trace of contrary opinions from the Hungarian side concerning important questions, with the exception of Imre Nagy during the Revolution. While differing Hungarian views were noted in the phase of Soviet informa-

tion gathering, once decisons were taken Moscow's representatives paid little attention to them.

The above caveats and limitations notwithstanding, the following observations can be offered regarding Soviet decisions and the Hungarian Revolution, based on the documents provided by Yeltsin:

1. Since the summer of 1956, as the anti-Stalinist opposition gained strength, the Soviet leadership observed the Hungarian crisis with great worry. They saw the solution to the crisis in leadership changes (Rakosi's dismissal) and reserved forceful oppressive measures as a last resort only. In July 1956, Soviet representative Mikoyan reported that "as a result of the Hungarian situation there is an atmosphere of uneasiness prevailing in our Central Committee and in the ranks of the Socialist camp, which is due to the fact, that it cannot be permitted for something unexpected, unpleasant to happen in Hungary. If the Hungarian comrades need it, our Central Committee is ready to give them a helping hand by giving advice or else, in order to put things right."[11]

2. Although the Soviet leaders received serious signals about the further exacerbation of tensions in Hungary, they were distracted by crises in other locations (Poland, Suez). Evidently, in assessing the Hungarian situation, they did not think in terms of social movements, but only in the context of more or less narrow political factions (party leadership vs. enemy/opposition). A Political Committee, authorized on the highest level, was functioning in Budapest, and it was expected to "resist" any threat to communist rule. Khrushchev's comments on the Hungarian events at the October 24 Presidium meeting in Moscow reflect this attitude. The day before, there had been a mass demonstration of hundreds of thousands in the streets of Budapest and an armed uprising had broken out. But Khrushchev said he "does not understand what comrade Gero, comrade Hegedus and the others are doing."[12]

3. The first extraordinary Soviet on-site report during the decisive stage of the crisis gave a remarkably optimistic evaluation of the situation, judging that the size of the October 23 demonstration and the armed uprising which erupted that night had been "overestimated" by the Hungarians. In Moscow, where attention was still focused on resolving the Polish party crisis, the situation initially appeared manageable. It was obvious from the Mikoyan group's report that Erno Gero, the Stalinist Hungarian party leader, was at odds with the reformer Imre Nagy, who had been recently included in the leadership. Yet on October 24, Khruschev informed the leaders of other Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe that there was a "total unity of opinion" within the Hungarian leadership.[13]

4. The Soviets looked upon the Hungarian leadership, especially Imre Nagy, with distrust from the very beginning of the crisis. The Hungarian party leaders simply did not wait for Moscow when they reshuffled personnel on October 23, even though there was an expressed demand for this. This is how Imre Nagy became prime minister. Later, party leader Gero was dismissed by the Soviets, but the new government list was compiled by the Nagy group, although Suslov and Mikoyan were present. The Soviets demanded adherence to the "norms of the empire" even in crisis situations.

5. The Soviet documents suggest that October 26 was a turning point. On one hand, this is when Imre Nagy's policy of searching for a political solution was formulated. Earlier, it was thought that Nagy "hesitated" right until October 28, when he declared the armistice. He decided that a new political, conciliatory line was needed by October 26. He gained support for this from popular pressure coming from below and the actions of the party opposition. This change was supported by Kadar with some reservations.[14]

6. Mikoyan and Suslov recommended that the Presidium accept the Imre Nagy line. Instead of military measures, they thought that concessions were needed to "win over the workers' masses" and approved reshuffling the government by including "a certain number of petty bourgois democrat" ministers (meaning persons from the previous coalition parties). The only thing they reported on the Hungarian leadership was that the "majority" of it was solid and "non-capitulationist." However, they reported on "Imre Nagy's vacillations who because of his opportunistic nature doesn't know where to stop in giving concessions."[15]

Although there is no direct evidence for this conclusion, it is conceivable that this analysis might have triggered the preparations in Moscow for a second military intervention. A final, unambiguous political decision however, could hardly have been made by this point. Yet, Mikoyan signaled the limits of compromise: "From our part we warned them that no further concessions can be made, otherwise it will lead to the fall of the system...the withdrawal of Soviet army will lead inevitably to the American troops marching in. Just like earlier we still think it possible that the Soviet soldiers will return to their bases shortly after law and order will have been restored."[16]

7. The Soviets' short-term interest was to quell the exceedingly tense Hungarian situation. So long as they saw a hope for this, they countenanced political concessions which were earlier considered to be serious right wing deviations. Perhaps they feared unintended or unclear consequences of an outright invasion, or an escalation of fighting that might lead to the involvement of American troops. On October 28, the Soviets agreed to an armistice and the withdrawal of their military units from Budapest without the military elimination of the centers of armed insurgents. They accepted a sentence in Imre Nagy's draft program which proposed negotiations for the later withdrawal of Soviet troops, contingent upon "the Soviet Union's exclusive decision."[17] Yet, no far-reaching formal agreement was concluded with Imre Nagy. At the most, there was an informal accord along the lines of the October 26 "principles." There was no mention in them about a multi-party system (only the inclusion of politicians from other parties in the government), no mention about the troop withdrawal or about Hungary's renunciation of the Warsaw Pact.

8. The Soviet Union's readiness for compromise was related to long-term interests as well. After 1945, and particularly after the outbreak of Cold War tensions, it was Moscow's fundamental interest to have politically and militarily loyal and stable leaderships in the neighboring countries. The limits of these alignments were sometimes wider, sometimes tighter. In 1956, at the time of de-Stalinization, they momentarily seemed to expand. The Soviets saw their long-range interests secured in three institutions: First, an undivided, potent Communist party leadership or other political centre; second, a strong and firm state security service; and third, a loyal and disciplined military leadership. The shaking of even one of the three could provoke Soviet political meddling, and if the symptoms ap-

peared simultaneously this could produce Moscow's radical military intervention. The October 26-28 compromise did not directly contradict Moscow's long-range interests (only the initiation of negotiations was mentioned rather than actual Soviet troop withdrawal), which could momentarily reinforce structures in charge of securing Soviet interests (especially the most important one from the Soviet perspective, the party leadership).

9. Nagy probably well understood this. But he could not and did not want to think entirely in the terms of the neighboring superpower. Thus he tried to consolidate the aforementioned institutions on the basis of popular demands, but the pressure of the revolutionary masses and his own personality made him transgress this boundary. On October 29 and 30 the Soviet envoys saw a Hungarian party leadership which appeared to be falling apart and losing control of events. The other functioning center, the government, did not interest them. Nagy had a key position there and he was not trusted unconditionally, and the inclusion (on October 27) of "petty bourgeois elements" (i.e., a multiparty coalition) in the government only strengthened this impression.[18]

Though popular demands and sentiments were of basic interest for Nagy, they did not fit into the thinking of the empire. On October 29 and 30, the reports of Moscow's observers implied the collapse of the institutional system in Hungary vital to Soviet interests.[19] Simultaneously, the outbreak of the Suez war and the fact that the Americans gave clear signals of non-intervention[20] gave the preparation of a second intervention an external green light. On October 30, the Mikoyan group explicitly referred to a political and military decision to be taken soon, in relation to which "comrade Konev"—the Soviet Marshal who commanded the Warsaw Pact unified forces—"will have to proceed to Hungary without delay."[21] The following day Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow.

10. The Moscow evaluation is shown clearly by the CPSU CC Presidium's telegram to the Italian communist party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, on October 31: "We agree with your assessment that the Hungarian situation is moving towards a reactionary direction. We are informed that Nagy is playing a double game and is under the increasing influence of reactionary forces. For the time being we shall not make an open move against Nagy, but the reactionary turn will not receive our acquiescence."[22]

11. Although the CPSU CC Presidium's resolutions are very terse, the three-fold method of implementing the basic political decision is clearly outlined.[23] Military measures were above all Zhukov's responsibility, and then the task of Marshal Konev, who came to Hungary after November 1. International preparation, such as informing the allies was undertaken by Khrushchev himself, as well as by Malenkov and Molotov (the details of these consultations, including the negotiations with the Chinese in Moscow, with the Poles in Brest, and with Tito in Brioni, are available[24]).

And finally, the establishment of a new political center in Hungary required the most participants. Four members of the Secretariat began to draft and assemble the necessary documents on October 31, most importantly, a declaration of the new Hungarian government (prepared in Moscow).[25] Only Brezhnev remained of this team at the November 1 meeting of the Presidium, but there is a mention of Serov, who stayed in Budapest.[26] It was his job (along with Andropov) to secure the personnel for the new local political center and to deliver the key people to Moscow. The key person was Janos Kadar, but this is an entirely different story.

1. The following two volumes published the Soviet documents related to 1956: Eva Gal, Andras B. Hegedus, Gyorgy Litvan, and Janos M. Rainer, eds., *A "Jelcin dosszie." Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-rol.* (Budapest: Szazadveg Kiado-1956-os Intezet, 1993). [*"The Yeltsin Dossier". Soviet documents on 1956*; hereafter: *The Yeltsin Dossier*]; and Vjacseszlav Szereda and Alekszandr Sztikalin, eds., *Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB Leveltarabol* (Budapest: Mora Ferenc Konyvkiado, 1993). (Zenit konyvek) [*Missing pages from the history of 1956. Documents from the archives of the old Central Committee of the Communist Party*; hereafter: *Missing pages*]. See also Janos M. Rainer, "1956—The Other Side of the Story. Five Documents From the Yeltsin File," *The Hungarian Quarterly* 34:129 (Spring 1993), 100-114. The *Bulletin* thanks Rainer for granting permission to draw on that article.

For further information on new publications and sources related to the events in question, contact the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which publishes an annual compendium/yearbook (*1956: Evkonyv*) and serves as a center for scholarly research activities in Budapest:

As 1956-os Magyar Forradalom
Tortenetenek Dokumentacios es Kutatointezete
H-1074 Budapest, Dohany u. 74.
Hungary
Tel.: 322-3620, 322-4026, 322-5228
Fax: 322-3084

2. [Ed. note: See documents in Fond 89 in the Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents] and Fund 059a in the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation] in Moscow.]

3. Arthur J. Alexander, "Modeling Soviet Decisionmaking," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 9-22.

4. E.g., the 31 October 1956 Resolution of the CC CPSU, document no. II/12., *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 70, 72.

5. Based on the experience and documents of the Hungarian leadership it is possible that records like minutes were not made. According to Soviet experts, the head of Department of the General Department of the CC CPSU prepared short summaries about the participants, contributors and the opinion voiced at Presidium meetings.

6. For a representative collection of declassified U.S. government documents on the 1956 crisis, see U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957*, vol. 25, *Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), esp. 259-581.

7. Gromyko summary of 17 September 1956, attached to CPSU CC protocol P43 of 27 September 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 42-44.

8. *Missing pages*, 28-29, n. 7.

9. From the time of the second mission, see Mikoyan's speech at the meeting of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) Central Committee, 18 July 1956. Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (Hungarian National Archives - Mol) MDP-MSZMP Iratok Gyujtemenye (Collection of Papers of the HWP and the HSWP) 276/52/35 o.e. pp. 17-28; and Mikoyan's report, 18 July 1956, *Missing pages*, 59-65. From the time of the third mission see the records of the October 26 meeting of the HWP Central Committee (excerpt) and the record of the October 27-28 meeting of the HWP Political Committee, "From the documents of the leading organs of the party and the government 23 October 1956-4 November 1956," published by Ferenc Glatz, *Historia* 4-5 (1989), 32-40. Mikoyan and Suslov were not present at the Central Committee meeting, but reported about it. See Mikoyan to CC CPSU, n.d., and Mikoyan and Suslov to CC CPSU, 26 October 1956, *Missing pages*, 106-113. Mikoyan took part in the Political Committee meeting, but there are no such documents among those we received.

10. See, e.g., Serov's reports of 28 and 29 October 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 54-55, 62-64, or the discussion of lieutenant-colonel Strarovtoi with AV (State Security) Major Vig, report dated 31 October 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 76-81.

11. See Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 14 July 1956, *Missing pages*, 40.

12. The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting, published by Tibor Hajdu in *Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom Tortenetenek Akademiai Dokumentacios es Kutatointezete Evkonyv I. 1992.* [*The Yearbook of the Documentation and History Institute of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*] (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1992), 153. [Ed. note: See the English translation by Mark Kramer in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.]

13. The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting, ibid., 155.

14. Mikoyan-Suslov to CC CPSU, 26 October 1956, *Missing pages*, 109-110.

15. Ibid., 112-13.

16. Ibid., 112.

17. *Historia* 4-5 (1989), 37.

18. Mikoyan-Suslov report, 29 October 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 60-61; Mikoyan-Suslov report, 30 October 1956, *Missing pages*, 125-126.
19. Serov to Mikoyan and Suslov, 29 October 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 62-64.
20. See telegram from State Department to U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 29 October 1956, *FRUS, 1955-57*, vol 25, 328.
21. Mikoyan-Suslov report, 30 October 1956, *Missing pages*, 126.
22. Telegram to Soviet ambassador in Rome for Togliatti, 31 October 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 69.
23. 31 October 1956 resolution, CC CPSU, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 70, 72.
24. See Janos Tischler, "Reports by the Polish Ambassador and the telegrams to the Polish Embassy in Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution," in *Tortenelmi Szemle* 10 (1992), 73; *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 461-64; see also Veljko Micunovic, *Tito kovete voltam, Moszkva 1956-58* [I was Tito's Ambassador. Moscow, 1956-1958] (Budapest: Interart, 1990), 128-37.
25. Kadar government declaration, 4 November 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 87-93, esp. editor's note on 92-93.
26. CPSU CC resolution, protocol P50/I, 1 November 1956, *The Yeltsin Dossier*, 76.

Janos M. Rainer, a scholar at the Institute for the History and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest, has published numerous works on the 1956 events and is working on a biography of Imre Nagy.

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1991. On November 4, after Nagy and twelve other Hungarian leaders took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, N. P. Firiubin, sent a telegram to Moscow at 4:30 p.m.:

> Kaldelj [a reference to Yugoslav Vice Premier and leading official of the Yugoslav CP Eduard Kardelj] reported that they contacted Imre Nagy *as it had been agreed with Khrushchev* ... It is still not clear whether or not Imre Nagy made the declaration [about Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact] in the name of the government in Budapest. If he made this declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs, will try to have him announce publicly that he made this declaration under the pressure of the reaction. They also intend to *negotiate with Nagy, to get him to make an announcement that he supports the government headed by Kadar in Szolnok.*[10] [emphases added]

(Szolnok is a city 65 miles southeast of Budapest, where Kadar's "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government" was temporarily located. It was from Szolnok that Kadar's associate Ferenc Munnich announced the establishment of the new government at 5 a.m. on November 4. This was the final clue to Imre Nagy that he had been betrayed; he fled to the Yugoslav Embassy an hour later. Kadar did not actually return to Budapest until November 7 at 6:10 a.m.)[11]

Two months later, on 11 January 1957, Tito told Firiubin that during the Hungarian "events" the "reaction raised its head" in Yugoslavia, "especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly incited members of Yugoslav security organs to violence." He said, "I didn't want to complicate our [Yugoslav-Soviet] relations in any way."[12] And Kadar told Andropov on 8 November 1956, "I noticed that the Yugoslavs are trying to save Nagy not because they need him, but because of their fear that through Nagy some undesirable things for them can occur."[13]

Moreover, the writer and Nagy supporter, Tamas Aczel, wrote that Nagy, after conversations with the Yugoslavs in their embassy, apparently sketched out a declaration of his resignation as prime minister and his pledge to support the Kadar government, but the other members of his entourage would not support his intentions.[14]

This suggests that the Soviet leaders thought Nagy was basically malleable, and could be persuaded to support them. The documents from the CPSU Central Committee archive are full of statements about Nagy's essential loyalty to Moscow and the communist cause. Erno Gero told Ambassador Andropov on 12 October 1956 that he was "firmly convinced that Nagy was not exploiting those forces which sought to rip Hungary away from the USSR and from the entire socialist camp," since he was not an "enemy of the people"; he simply had "dangerous ideas."[15] Zoltan Vas, Rakosi's close friend and Politburo member, said: "Nagy is not an anti-Soviet person, but he wants to build socialism in his own way, the Hungarian way."[16]

Khrushchev's decision—with Kadar's full support—to execute Nagy came only later, as Nagy's obstinacy in captivity grew, and as Malenkov joined forces with Molotov and other Stalinists to try to oust Khrushchev in 1957.

Perhaps as a credit to Soviet propaganda, many people, some scholars included, mistakenly believe it was Nagy's bold declaration that he would withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact that caused the Soviet Union to intervene for the second time, on 4 November 1956. But Imre Nagy was too hesitant to make such a bold move without warrant. Clearly, Nagy only broke ranks with the USSR in this way after it was obvious that additional Soviet troops were entering Hungary, not just departing.[17]

Furthermore, the documents suggest that Soviet leaders most familiar with the Hungarian situation (e.g. Mikoyan, Suslov, Zhukov, Aristov) had begun to conclude that Nagy—however loyal he was to them—was losing control of the population. As early as October 27, KGB chief Ivan Serov wrote to Moscow from Budapest: "It is significant that proclamations have appeared around town, in which *Imre Nagy is declared a traitor* and [rehabilitated non-communist politician] Bela Kovacs named as a candidate for Prime Minister. It is being suggested that demonstrations be organized in Kovacs' honor."[18] [emphasis added]

Three days later, Mikoyan and Suslov sent a telegram to Moscow which reveals their doubt in Nagy's ability even to control his own armed forces. They wrote: "the peaceful liquidation of this hotbed [of insurgents] is almost out of the question [*pochti iskliuchena*]. We are going to achieve the liquidation of it by the Hungarian armed forces. There is only one fear: the Hungarian army has taken on a wait-and-see attitude. [*zanimala vyzhidatel'nyiu pozitsiiu*] Our military advisers say that relations of the Hungarian officers and generals with Soviet officers in the past few days has deteriorated further. There isn't the same kind of trust as there used to be. It might happen that Hungarian units sent to put down the insurgents will unite with them, and then it will be necessary for Soviet armed forces to once again undertake military operations...."[19]

Later in this same telegram, Mikoyan and Suslov disclose their assumption that they could deceive Nagy as to their own wait-and-see attitude: "We intend to declare [*predpologaem zaiavit'*] today to Imre Nagy that the troops are leaving according to our agreement, that for now we do not intend to bring in any more troops on account of the fact that the Nagy government is dealing with the situation in Hungary. We intend to give instructions to the Minister of Defense to cease sending troops into Hungary, continuing to concentrate them on Soviet territory. As long as the Hungarian troops occupy a nonhostile position, these troops will

be sufficient. If the situation further deteriorates, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety. We do not have yet a final opinion of the situation—how sharply it has deteriorated. After the session today at 11 o'clock Moscow time, the situation in the Central Committee will become clear and we will inform you. We think the swift arrival of Comrade Konev is essential."[20] Marshal I.S. Konev was the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces, who would lead the invasion of Hungary days after that message was sent.

Once Imre Nagy realized the Soviet leaders' deception, he did break ranks entirely, declaring Hungary's neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact—something no other East European leader had the courage to do.

1. Ciphered telegram from Yu. V. Andropov in Budapest, 1 November 1956, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation], fond [f.] 059a, opis [op.]. 4, papka [p.]. 6, delo [d.] 5, list [l.] 17-19. Later, it is true, on October 28, at 5:30 a.m. Nagy called off an attack on the street fighters that had been planned by the Hungarian Defense Ministry and the military sub-committee of the Hungarian Central Committee. Daniel F. Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 331. Zoltan Tildy, formerly President of the Hungarian Republic and Secretary General of the Smallholders Party, had been named deputy prime minister by Nagy on October 27 after Tildy was released after eight years of detention in May 1956.
2. Information from Mikoyan in Budapest, 27 October 1956, Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents], f. 89, per. 45, dok 9, l. 3.
3. Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez, 1956*, 229.
4. Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 141.
5. Information of Mikoyan and Suslov from Budapest, 25 October 1956, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 9.
6. Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez*, 229.
7. Aleksander Stykalin and Elena Orekhova, "Vengerskie Sobytiia 1956 Goda I Pozitsiia SSSR (Po Materialam TsKhSD)" Slavianovedenie: Otdelnyi Ottisk (Moscow, Russia, 1994). Charles Gati also pinpoints October 28 as "Nagy's first turning point." *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc*, 128.
8. Information of Serov about the situation in Hungary on 29 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 1.
9. Information of Mikoyan from Budapest to the CC CPSU, 26 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 98.
10. Telegram from Firiubin in Belgrade, 4 November 1956, #1059-1060, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 25.
11. Information from Zhukov to the CC CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, l. 27.
12. Information from Fiubin in Belgrade, 11 January 1957, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4, l. 43.
13. Information from Andropov in Budapest, 8 November 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, ll. 1-3.
14. Valerii Musatov, "SSSR I Vengerskie Sobytiia 1956 g.: Novye Akhivnye Materialy," *Novaia Noveishaia Istorii* 1 (Jan. 1993), 18.
15. Information from Andropov in Budapest, 12 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 76.
16. Information of Andropov from Budapest, 14 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 89.
17. Ciphered telegram from Yu. V. Andropov in Budapest, 1 November 1956, AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5 , ll. 17-19.
18. Information fom Serov in Budapest, 27 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 132. Kovacs, the former Secretary General of the Smallholder Party, had been rehabilitated in August 1956 and appointed Minister of Agriculture by Nagy on October 27.
19. Information of Mikoyan and Suslov, 30 October 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89. per. 45, dok. 12, l. 3.
20. Ibid.

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IMRE NAGY, aka "VOLODYA"— A DENT IN THE MARTYR'S HALO?

by Johanna Granville

When Nikita Khrushchev dropped the other shoe with his "Secret Speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, not only did he expose Stalin's crimes, he also created a public image of himself as a patron of "different paths to socialism" that would later prove hard to uphold.[1] All over Eastern Europe, the "little Stalins"—Matyas Rakosi in Hungary, Antonin Novotny in Czechoslovakia, Boleslaw Bierut in Poland, and their like[2]—watched fearfully, wondering how far de-Stalinization would go. Meanwhile, their opponents, who had criticized Stalinist policies, suddenly rose in popularity and stature.

The Hungarian leader Imre Nagy was one such critic. Having served briefly as Hungary's prime minister (July 1953-March 1955), Imre Nagy had become famous for his censure of the pace of collectivization, his expertise in agrarian reform, and advocacy of greater producton of consumer goods. These were, of course, the same policies that Khrushchev advocated, having adopted them from Malenkov, after the latter was safely ousted from the prime ministership. Nagy, author of the 1953 "New Course," was Khrushchev's political kinsman, the epitome of communist new thinking for his time.

In Western history texts, Nagy has become a genuine hero and tragic figure. As former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov wrote bitterly, Nagy acquired in death a "martyr's halo." A professor of agricultural economy and long-time member of the Hungarian Academy of Science, Nagy, we know, was something of a "bookworm," an idealist mixed up with ruthless politicians of Matyas Rakosi's ilk. Although ostensibly a harmless theorist, Nagy was repeatedly the victim of Moscow power plays.[3] In 1955, in connection with the new anti-Malenkov coalition, he lost the prime ministership and was accused of "right-wing deviationism." His shining moment came when he led a reformist communist surge to power and regained the prime minister's post, and still more briefly, after some hesitation, became the leader of a doomed popular nationalist revolt against the Soviet Union, during the two-week span of the Hungarian Revolution, from October 23 to November 4, 1956. On 4 November 1956, Nagy was forced out of power by a massive Soviet intervention, and ultimately, at 5 a.m. on 16 June 1958, after a secretly-staged show trial, Khrushchev had him executed, to show other East European leaders just how far he would permit liberal reforms in the Soviet bloc to go. But Imre Nagy, it was said, despite the political setbacks it would bring him, was always ready to speak the truth, to refuse to perform self-criticism ("*samokritika*").

Indeed, Machiavelli's admonition seemed to address Nagy perfectly: "The man who neglects the real to study the ideal will learn how to accomplish his ruin, not his salvation. Any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good."[4]

To be sure, Nagy's refusal to recant did not always bring him ruin—not at first. It earned him the respect of his people, especially the members of the Petofi Circle, a literary-intellectual group with strong nationalist leanings.[5] As KGB Chairman Ivan Serov reported to Moscow from Budapest three months before the Hungarian revolt, "The young people in the Petofi Circle say that Petofisti are also communists, but they

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lead the operation for liquidating the riots in the city. There is a field headquarters there, which works in contact with the Hungarians. It should be noted that during a telephone conversation with Gero from the corps headquarters, in reply to our question about the situation, he answered that there is both an improvement and deterioration in the situation, and that the arrival of Soviet troops in the city has a negative effect on the disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers.

After a conversation with military personnel, during which we heard the preliminary reports of the Soviet military command and the command of the Hungarian armed forces, which—after closer familiarization—turned out to be rather exaggerated in a pessimistic way, we stopped by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, where we conversed with [Erno] Gero, Imre Nagy, Zoltan Santo, and [Andras] Hegedus, who informed us about the situation in the city and the measures they had taken to liquidate the riots.

We had the impression that Gero especially, but the other comrades as well, are exaggerating the strength of the opponent and underestimating their own strength. At five o'clock Moscow time the situation in the city was as follows:

All the hotbeds of the insurgents have been crushed; liquidation of the main hotbed, at the radio station, where about 4,000 people are concentrated, is still going on. They raised a white flag, but when the representatives of the Hungarian authorities appeared, they presented as a condition of surrender the removal of Gero from his post, which of course was rejected. Our command is setting for itself the task of liquidating this hotbed tonight. It is significant that the Hungarian workers here, above all the state security personnel, put up a violent resistance to the insurgents and tolerated defeat here only due to the exhaustion of ammunition and the attack on them by a fresh battalion of Hungarian troops who mutinied.

The comrades express the opinion that the Hungarian army conducted itself poorly, although the Debrecen division performed well. The Hungarian sailors, who patrolled the banks of the Dunai [Danube] River, also performed well, especially, as already noted, state security troops and employees.

Arrests of the instigators and organizers of the disturbances, more than 450 people, are being carried out. The exposure and arrest of the instigators continues.

The task has been set to complete the liquidation of the remaining individual groups hiding in buildings. Due to the fact that a turning point in the events has occurred, it has been decided to use more boldly the Hungarian units for patrolling, for detaining suspicious elements and people violating the introduction of a state of emergency, and for guarding important installations (railroad stations, roads, etc).

The Hungarian comrades, especially Imre Nagy, approved of the use of more Hungarian military units, militia, and state security units for the purpose of lightening the burden of the Soviet troops and to emphasize the role of the Hungarians themselves in the liquidation of the riots. The majority of the workers did not participate in the riots, and it is even said that the workers in Chepel, who had no weapons, drove off the provocators, who wanted to incite them to riot. However, some of the workers, especially young ones, did take part in the disturbances.

One of the most serious mistakes of the Hungarian comrades was the fact that that, before 12 midnight last night, they did not permit anyone to shoot at the participants in the riots.

The Hungarians themselves are taking measures, and we gave them additional advice with respect to the organization of workers' fighting squads at the factories and in the regional committees of the party and about the arming of such squads.

They had already made such a decision, but they didn't carry it out, because they couldn't deliver weapons at the factories, fearing that the opponent would intercept them. Measures were taken to provide for the delivery of weapons today with the help of our armored personnel carriers. Radio addresses by prominent party and government leaders, as well as other public leaders, were organized. Gero, Imre Nagy, and Zoltan Tildy have already spoken. Istvan Dobi, Hegedus, Sakasics, Kadar, Zoltan Santo, Marosan, and Ronai will be speaking. Appeals by the Womens', Youth, and Trades Unions will be published.

Today not a single newspaper was published, only a bulletin. It has been arranged to have at least one newspaper published tomorrow. It has also been arranged to announce to the public that all citizens who fail to surrender weapons within the next 24 hours will be accused of a criminal offense.

We are not broadcasting the information about the changes in the leadership of the party and government, since the embassy has already reported it. While conversing with the Hungarian comrades, we did not touch on that issue. One gets the feeling that these events are facilitating the unity of the Central Committee and Politburo. When we asked Imre Nagy when and how he joined in the struggle with the opponents of the party, he replied that he started to take action in the struggle yesterday at six o'clock in the evening, not by the summons of the Central Committee, but because the youth in the meeting demanded that he go there and speak to them, which he did.

He thinks the majority of the crowd of almost a hundred thousand people approved of his appeals, but many groups of fascist elements hollered, whistled, and screamed, when he said that it was necessary to work together with the party. Fights took place in the square between the fascist and democratic elements. The whole crowd dispersed peaceably, but then began to regroup in various places in the city and the events well-known to you began.

During Imre Nagy's reply, Gero retorted that they were looking for Imre Nagy before the meeting and couldn't find him. Nagy said that if they had appeared before the crowd earlier and announced the changes in the leadership before or during the meeting, then the events would not grown complicated. The other comrades met this assertion of Imre Nagy's with silence.

To our question: is there unity in the Central Committee and Politburo in the face of the events that have taken place? Everyone answered in the affirmative, however Gero made a remark that more voices are being heard against his election as first secretary of the Central Committee, thinking that he is responsible for this whole thing. To this remark, Imre Nagy said that it is necessary to make a correction; this concerns neither the Politburo, neither the Central Committee members. Such voices, rather, are being heard from below. He cited the letter received from the secretary of one of the factory party committees, protesting the choice of Gero as first secretary. To our question, may we report to our Central Committee that the Hungarian comrades are mastering the situation and are confident that they will deal with it, they answered in the affirmative.

Gero announced that he hadn't slept for two nights; the other comrades: one night. We prearranged to meet with these same comrades at eight o'clock in the evening. We have the impression that all the Central Committee members with whom we met related well, in a friendly manner, to our appearance at such a time. We said the purpose of our arrival was to lend assistance to the Hungarian leadership in such a way as to be without friction and for the public benefit, referring especially to the participation of Soviet troops in liquidating the riots. The Hungarian citizens, esepcially Imre Nagy, related to this with approval.

A. MIKOYAN
M. SUSLOV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF) F. 059a, Opis 4, Papka 6, Delo 5, Listy 1-7; translation by Johanna Granville.]

* * * * *

3. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 27 October 1956

Today we participated for more than three hours in a Politburo meeting, where we discussed government appointments and the present situation. [Antal] Apro was chosen to be the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and, in

actuality, he will be the first chairman because all the rest of the deputies are "non-party people" and less strong. Apro was a member of the Directory, a member of the Military Commission, and has behaved himself very well these past few days.

The candidacy of [Iosef] Siladi for the post of Minister of Internal Affairs was turned down, because politically he was not very reliable, and Munnich was chosen instead. For the post of Minister of Defense the former deputy minister of rear units Janza Karoi was chosen. He is a communist, reliable, and a worker.

The candidacy of Laszlo Kardas for the post of Minister of Culture was also turned down. Chosen instead was [Gyorgy] Lukacs, who is a famous philosopher, and although he makes a lot of mistakes in philosophy, is very reliable politically and authoritative among the intelligentsia.

In order to strengthen the government from anti-party elements, Zoltan Tildy was chosen to be Minister without Portfolio. Zoltan is a famous public leader. Comrade Imre Nagy suggested that Zoltan Tildy not be selected because he doesn't get along well with Bela Kovacs. However, that was not acceptable.

Characteristically, at night there appeared proclamations in the city, in which Nagy was declared the chairman and Bela Kovacs was recommended as Premier. There was a summons to hold a demonstration in their honor.

As instructed by the Central Committee, Nagy called Bela Kovacs who lives outside the city, and asked him: would he join the government? Kovacs accepted, and said that he was invited to the meeting, but if he attended, he would speak out against the demonstrators for the government.

The Minister of State Farms is the non-party specialist Ryabinskii.

Characteristically all of these candidates were voted on unanimously and Nagy did not object to the repacement of individual candidates.

The Hungarian comrades in conversations with us declared, that they consider the new government appropriate and politically capable of working. Imre Nagy especially emphasized this.

The formation of this government was announced on local radio at 12 noon Hungarian time.

We had the impression that as a whole the new government is reliable and in the social sense more authoritative.

Comrade [Antal] Apro gave a paper about the military situation in assured tones. He informed everyone, by the way, that in the hospital are about three thousand injured Hungarians, and of those 250 people died. The figure of others killed or wounded is unknown.

In connection to the unpeaceful situation in the provinces, comrade Kadar asked the question: can we increase the number of Soviet troops?

We declared that we had reserves, and however many troops were needed, we would provide them. The Hungarian comrades were very glad to hear this.

Apro suggested taking a number of actions in order to organize the further struggle and for bringing the city back to order. Apro informed us, that a significant "surrender" of weapons had begun; "700 rifles have been accepted." Apro also informed us that on the periphery, the situation was already stabilizing, but Kadar and Hegedus looked skeptical.

The Hungarian comrades started to arm the party core [*aktiv*]. It was decided to draw the armed party members into the staff of the city police. It was also decided to assign the military censors to the radios and newspapers. It was suggested to the ministers that they ensure that the ministries and enterprises function smoothly.

Comrade Kadar informed us that the new candidate to the Politburo [Geza] Losonczy and the new secretary to the Central Committee, [Ferenc] Donath, who spoke yesterday in a capitulationist manner at the Politburo meeting, announced his disagreement with the Central Committee's policies and announced his resignation. Several members of the Central Committee [CC] called Donath a traitor of the working class.

Imre Nagy was not at this meeting, because he was busy with negotiations with the assigned ministers, and also because of "acute overexertion" he had a heart attack. Nagy was in a faint state in his office, and the Hungarian doctor didn't know what to do, so Suslov gave him medicine ["validol"] which brought Nagy back to normal. Nagy thanked him.

Considering that Losonczy and Donath were closely associated with Nagy, and since Nagy was not at the meeting, the Politburo decided to postpone making a final decision, and for the time being move on to work outside of the CC.

We invited Kadar and Nagy to have a heart-to-heart talk with us this evening in an unofficial capacity.

(Signed) Mikoyan and Suslov

Oct. 27, 1956

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 9; translation by Johanna Granville.]

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4. Andropov Report, 28 October 1956:

Budapest, October 28, 1956

In code — Top Secret

Not to be copied

Sent from Budapest — Urgent

I hereby forward a letter from the Hungarian Government to:

"The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Moscow

On behalf of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Hungary I appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to send Soviet troops in order to put an end to the riots that have broken out in Budapest, to restore order as soon as possible, and to guarantee the conditions for peaceful and creative work.

24 October 1956

Budapest

Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Hungary Andras Hegedus"

28.X.56 [28 October 1956] Andropov

[Source: AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 12; translation from The Hungarian Quarterly *34 (Spring 1993), 104.]*

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5. KGB Chief Serov Report, 28 October 1956

Send to the CC CPSU
A. Mikoyan

To Comrade Mikoyan, A.I.

I am reporting about the situation on 28 October 1956.

1. From the network of agents, which has contact with the insurgents, doubt is arising about whether to continue the struggle. The more active part of the opposition wants to continue fighting, but says, however: if we do stop for a while, we must still keep our weapons in order to attack again at an auspicious moment.

2. On 27 October, an agent of friends of the writer [Ivan] Boldizsar [a journalist member of the democratic opposition—J.G.] met with the leaders of the opposition group. The agent sounded the alarm about the meeting that was going on in connection with the street fighting. The other participants at the meeting decided to support the new government and expressed their intention of calling the insurgents and persuading them to stop the fighting.

3. In many regions local organs and party workers dispersed, and then established various "revolutionary" national and other committees, which are beginning their "activities" disarming the security organs. For example, the revolution-

ary committee in Miskolc organized a meeting in front of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and they forced the workers to lay down their arms and they tortured those who protested. On the same day, a battalion of internal troops was disbanded and spread out among the buildings by this revolutionary committee. In the town of Zalaegerseg, the revolutionary committee disarmed the security organs, and the officials were driven out of the regional limits. These facts apply to other regions as well. There are also examples of actions to the contrary. For example, in some regions, a national militia comprised of students, youth, and private soldiers of the national army are restoring back order in the cities.

4. In the city of Budapest after yesterday's meeting of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs, regional apparatuses of security and police began to renew their work. To avoid provocation the employees of the security organs are dressed in police uniforms.

5. An organized observation of the American embassy confirms that the employees of the embassy are leaving the city with their things. The Americans Olivart and West in a conversation with one of the agents of our friends said if the uprising is not liquidated in the shortest possible time, the UN troops will move in at the proposal of the USA and a second Korea will take place.

6. This morning on Budapest radio there was a speech by an active participant in [Joseph] Ertovi's group of criminals, who was arrested in the military editorial board who said that he is summoning the youth to lay down their weapons, since the new government under Nagy is a guarantee of the fulfillment of the people's demands. They asked Ertovi why he wrote on a leaflet "Temporary Revolutionary Government"? To that Ertovi replied that it was because at that time they had not recognized the government, but that now he wouldn't sign it that way, because the present government is legitimate.

In the city of Budapest today everything is peaceful, except isolated strongholds of streetfighters. However, there are three hotbeds, where insurgents have dug in positions.

SEROV

Transmitted by special line
28.X.56 [28 October 1956]

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok 10; translation by Johanna Granville with Mark Doctoroff.]

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6. KGB Chief Serov,Report, 29 October 1956

Send to CC CPSU
A. Mikoyan
M. Suslov
29.X-1956

To Comrade MIKOYAN, A.I.
To Comrade SUSLOV, M.A.

I am reporting about the situation according to the circumstances on 29 October.

1. There were negotiations during the night with the groups fighting in the region round the Corwin theater, Zsigmund street, Sen Square and Moscow Square to surrender their weapons. Toward evening agreement was reached.

Some small armed groups that had come to Budapest from other cities were identified.

The Soviet military command is taking action to liquidate them.

2. According to information from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], on 27-28 October in several cities prisoners were freed from prisons, including criminals, around 8,000 people in all. Some of these prisoners are armed with weapons taken from the security guards. The ammunition was obtained by attacking military depots.

After the government declaration was made on the radio about amnesty to students who participated in the demonstration, the armed groups started to lay down their weapons.

3. The situation in several cities can be characterized in the following way: the population is stimulated against the communists. In several regions the armed people search in the apartments of communists and shoot them down.

In the factory town of Csepel (near Budapest) there were 18 communists killed. When in buses travelling between cities, the bandits do checks and prominent communists are taken out and shot.

In the town of Debrecen the regional committee went underground, contacted the military unit and asked for support. This data is confirmed by telegrams that arrived at the Council of Ministers from the leaders of the "revolutionary committees." The workers' council in Miskolc suggested that the employees of the security organs lay down their weapons and go away. Three employees, including the Deputy Director of the department, Mayor Gati, would not comply with the demands. The employees of the security organs were all hanged as a group. In the town of Keskemet, a crowd decided to punish a communist in the square. The commander of the Hungarian military unit went up in an airplane and with a machine gun dispersed the crowd.

The commander of the Hungarian troops stationed in the town of Gyor alerted a regiment in order to restore order in the city. When order was restored he moved to the neighboring city with the same objective. When he returned to Dier, he had to restore order once again.

4. In connection with the decision of the government to abolish the state security organs, the morale of the operative staff declined.

On the evening, 28.X [28 October], the MVD held a meeting. [Ferenc] Munnich called the anti-government demonstration "a meeting of workers for the satisfaction of their justified demands." Fascist elements joined this movement and tried to use it for the overthrow of the government. He said the employees of the security organs honestly did their duty in the stuggle with the hostile elements. Then he informed them that an extraordinary court would be organized, whereby those responsible for hanging communists and attacking government and social institutions would be tried.

After this meeting morale declined drastically. Several employees left work and never came back.

In the city a leaflet apeared of names of the "revolutionary committee of students" with a summons to kill the employees of the security organs.

The police on duty are stimulating this mood, declaring that there are traitors in the security organs, and they are angry that the employees of the security organs have started to wear police uniforms.

The Dep[uty]. Minister of Internal Affairs Hars came to our adviser, wept, and stated that the employees of the security organs are considered traitors, and the insurgents are considered revolutionaries. He conversed with Comrade Kadar on this issue. However, he did not get a comforting answer.

The leader of the internal troops of the MVD Orban told our adviser that he will collect the officers and will break through to the USSR. The former deputy of the MVD Dekan stated that the provocateurs are arranging the massacre of the employees of the security organs and their families. The bandits are ascertaining the addresses of the employees. Dekan intends to create a brigade composed of the employees and with weapons advance to the Soviet border. If they don't get that far, then they will fight underground as partisans and beat the enemies.

The employees of the central apparatus stopped work and went home, declaring that they are undisciplined and do not have the right to meet with the agency. On the periphery the security organs also stopped working, since the local powers dismissed them.

The regional administration in the city of Sobolcs (40 employees) left for Rumania. The employees of the Debrecen regional administration went to the Soviet border in the region of Uzhgorod and asked the border guards to let them into the USSR. On the border with Czechoslovakia a large group of employees have gathered, waiting for a permit to enter that country.

In connection with the situation created in the MVD in the evening, I intend to call a meeting with Munnich to elucidate his opinion in relation to the further sojourn of our employees, in the

light of the dispersal of the security organs and the further coordination of our work.

SEROV

29.X.56

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 11; translation by Johanna Granville.]

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7. Mikoyan-Suslov Report, 30 October 1956

The political situation in the country is not getting better; it is getting worse. This is expressed in the following: in the leading organs of the party organs there is a feeling of helplessness. The party organizations are in the process of collapse. Hooligan elements have become more insolent, seizing regional party committees, killing communists. The organization of party volunteer squads is going slowly. The factories are stalled. The people are sitting at home. The railroads are not working. The hooligan students and other resistance elements have changed their tactics and are displaying greater activity. Now not all them are shooting, but instead are seizing institutions. For example, last night the printing office of the central party newspaper was seized.

The new Minister of Internal Affairs sent 100 fighters who accosted more than 200 people, but did not open fire, because the CC advised not to spill blood. That was late at night. Imre Nagy was sleeping in his apartment, and they, apparently did not want complications with Nagy, fearing that opening fire without his knowledge would be an occasion for the weakening of the leadership.

They [the "hooligan elements"—J.G.] occupied the regional telephone station. The radio station is working, but it does not reflect the opinion of the CC, since in fact it is located in other peoples' hands.

The anti-revolutionary newspaper did not come out, because there were counterrevolutionary articles in it and the printing office refused to print it.

An opposition group in the region around the Corwin theater had negotiations with Nagy for the peaceful surrendering of their weapons. However, as of the present moment the weapons have not been surrendered, except for a few hundred rifles. The insurgents declare that they will not give them up until the Soviet troops leave Hungary. Thus the peaceful liquidation of this hotbed is impossible. We will achieve the liquidation of these armed Hungarian forces. But there is just one fear: the Hungarian army has occupied a wait-and-see position. Our military advisors say that relations between the Hungarian officers and generals and Soviet officers in the past few days has deteriorated. There is no trust as there was earlier. It could happen, that the Hungarian units sent against the insurgents could join these other Hungarians, and then it will be necessary for the Soviet forces to once more undertake military operations.

Last night by the instructions of Imre Nagy, Andropov was summoned. Nagy asked him: is it true that new Soviet military units are continuing to enter Hungary from the USSR. If yes, then what is their goal? We did not negotiate this.

Our opinion on this issue: we suspect that this could be a turning point in the change in Hungarian policy in the [UN] Security Council. We intend to declare today to Imre Nagy that the troops are leaving acording to our agreement, that for now we do not intend to bring in any more troops on account of the fact that the Nagy government is dealing with the situation in Hungary.

We intend to give instructions to the Minister of Defense to cease sending troops into Hungary, continuing to concentrate them on Soviet territory. As long as the Hungarian troops occupy a nonhostile position, these troops will be sufficient. If the situation further deteriorates, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the whole issue in its entirety. We do not yet have a final opinion of the situation—how sharply it has deteriorated. After the session today at 11 o'clock Moscow time, the situation in the Central Committee will become clear and we will inform you. We think it is essential that Comrade Konev come to Hungary immediately.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok. 12; translation by Johanna Granville.]

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8. "Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee About the Situation in Hungary" (Protocol 49) of 31 October 1956

Workers of the World, Unite! Strictly secret
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Extract from Minutes No. 49/VI taken on the October 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of the CC

About the situation in Hungary

1. In accord with the exchange of opinions at the session of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, Comrs. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov are empowered to conduct negotiations with the representatives of the CC of the U[nited] W[orkers'] P[arty] of P[oland].

2. Confirmed is the text of the telegram to the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade for Comr. Tito (Enclosed). In the event of an affirmative reply, Comrs. Khrushchev and Malenkov are authorized to conduct negotiations with Comr. Tito.

3. Provide Comr. Zhukov with an account of the exchange of opinions at the Presidium of the CC CPSU session, [instruct him] to prepare a plan of measures [*plan meropriatii*], in connection to the events in Hungary, and to inform the CC CPSU.

4. Inform Comrs. Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the CC Presidium to prepare essential documents and submit them to the CC CPSU for review.

SECRETARY OF THE CC

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To point VI of protocol 49
Top Secret
Special Folder, Extraordinary

To the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade

Quickly visit Comrade Tito and relay the following:

"In connection with the created situation in Hungary we would like to have a meeting with you incognito on the night of November 1 or on the morning of November 2. We agree to come to Belgrade for this purpose or another point in Yugoslavia or Soviet territory according to your wishes. Our delegation will consist of Comrs. Khrushchev and Malenkov. We await your reply via Comr. Firiubin.

N. KHRUSHCHEV"

If Tito is not in Belgrade, then give Comr. [Eduard] Kardelj [Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Government] or [Aleksandar] Rankovic [Yugoslav Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister] the original text for immediate transferral.

Send a report on the carrying out of your task.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 15; translation by Johanna Granville.]

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Draft telegram to Italian Communist Leader Palmiro Togliatti on the question of the situation in Hungary," 31 October 1956, CPSU CC Protocol 49

Workers of the World, Unite!
Top Secret
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
No P 49/69

To Comrade Shepilov (M[inistry] of F[oreign] A[ffairs]) and to Comrade Vinogradov
Extract from Minutes No. 49, taken at the October 31, 1956 meeting of the Presidium of the CC

Draft of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti

The CC approves the attached text of a telegram to be sent to Comrade Togliatti in connection with the Hungarian situation.

Secretary of the CC

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To Paragraph 69 of Minutes No. 49
Top Secret

ROME

For Comrade TOGLIATTI

In your evaluation of the situation in Hungary and of the tendencies of development of the Hungarian Government toward a reactionary development, we are in agreement with you. According to our information, Nagy is occupying a two-faced position and is falling more and more under the influence of the reactionary forces. For the time being we are not speaking out openly against Nagy, but we will not reconcile ourselves with the turn of events toward a reactionary debauche.

Your friendly warnings regarding the possibility of the weakening of the unity of the collective leadership of our party have no basis. We can firmly assure you that in the complex international situation our collective leadership unanimously [*yedinodushno*] evaluates the situation and unanimously takes appropriate decisions.

CC CPSU

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 14; translation by Johanna Granville, Mark Doctoroff, and in The Hungarian Quarterly *34 (Spring 1993), 107.]*

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9. Andropov Report, 1 November 1956

CODED TELEGRAM

Top Secret
Not to be copied

From Budapest
Priority

Today, on November 1, at 7 p.m. I received an invitation to the inner cabinet meeting of the Council of Ministers of the H[ungarian] P[eople's] R[epublic]. Imre Nagy, who chaired the meeting, informed the participants in a rather nervous tone that in the morning he had addressed the Soviet Ambassador in connection with the Soviet troops crossing the Hungarian border and advancing towards the heart of the country. Nagy "demanded" an explanation in that matter. The way Nagy said all this suggested that he expected me to affirm that he had really expressed his protests to me. Also, he kept looking at Zoltan Tildy all along, as if expecting support.

Tildy behaved with dignity. He spoke immediately after Imre Nagy, in a tone that was much friendlier and calmer. He said that if the Soviet troops continued their advance on Budapest, there would be a scandal and the Government would be forced to resign. Tildy would like to prevent the workers' anger turning against the Soviet Union.

Tildy said that he insisted that the Soviet troops—at least those which are not stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Pact—be withdrawn without delay.

Kadar supported Nagy; Haraszti and Ferenc Erdei spoke very nervously and in a manner unfriendly to us. Dobi remained silent.

After they spoke I offered my views—in keeping with the instructions I had received. Nagy immediately replied that although he accepted that my statement was good, it did not answer the Hungarian Government's question.

Nagy proposed that, since the Soviet Government had not stopped the advance of the Soviet troops, nor had it given a satisfactory explanation of its actions, they confirm the motion passed that morning regarding Hungary's giving notice of cessation of Warsaw Pact membership, a declaration of neutrality, and an appeal to the United Nations for the guarantee of Hungary's neutrality by the Four Great Powers. In the event that the Soviet Government stopped the advance of the Soviet troops and withdrew them beyond its own borders with immediate effect, (the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic will form a judgment on compliance on the basis of the reports of its own armed forces) the Hungarian Government would withdraw its request to the United Nations, but Hungary would still remain neutral. Erdei and Losonczy strongly supported this reply by Nagy. Tildy's reponse was affirmative but more reserved, while Kadar's reaction was reluctant. Dobi remained silent.

One hour later the Embassy received the note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declaring that since a strong Soviet Army force had crossed the border that day and had entered Hungarian territory against the firm protest of the Hungarian Government, the Government was leaving the Warsaw Pact with immediate effect. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Embassy to notify the Soviet Government of this decision immediately. They sent notes with a similar content to every embassy and diplomatic mission in Budapest.

Note: we have information that, at the instigation of the Social Democrats, the workers of all the enterprises in Hungary have declared a two-week strike, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. 1.11.56

Andropov

[Source: AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, ll. 17-19, translation from The Hungarian Quarterly 34 *(Spring 1993), 108-110.]*

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10. Zhukov report on the situation in Hungary as of 12 noon, 4 November 1956

At 6:15 on Nov 4, Soviet troops began to conduct the operation for restoring order and rehabilitating the government of the People's Democracy of Hungary. Acting according to an earlier thought-out plan, our units mastered the most stubborn points of the reaction in the provinces, as they existed in Dier, Miskolc, Debrecen, and even in other regional centers in Hungary.

In the course of the operation Soviet troops occupied the most important communication centers, including the powerful, radio broadcasting station in Solnok, the depots of military supplies and weapons, and other important military objectives.

The Soviet troops operating in Budapest, having broken the resistance of the insurgents, occupied the Parliament building, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party, and even the radio station in the region near the Parliament building. Also seized were three bridges across the Dunai [Danube] River, joining the eastern and western parts of the city, and the arsenal of weapons and military supplies.

The whole staff of the counterrevolutionary government of Imre Nagy was in hiding. Searches are being conducted.

One large hotbed of resistance of the insurgents remains in Budapest around the Corwin Theater in the southern-eastern part of the city. The insurgents defending this stubborn point were presented with an ultimatum to capitulate. In connection with the refusal of the resisters to surrender, the troops began an assault on them.

The main garrisons of the Hungarian troops were blockaded. Many of them gave up their weapons without a serious fight. Instructions were given to our troops to return the captured insurgents to the command of Hungarian officers and to arrest the officers who were assigned to replace the captured ones.

With the objective of not allowing the penetration of Hungary by the hostile agency and the

escape of the resistance leaders from Hungary, our troops have occupied the Hungarian airports and solidly closed off all the roads on the Austro-Hungarian border. The troops, continuing to fulfill the assignment, are purging the territory of Hungary of insurgents.

G. ZHUKOV

4 November 1956

Sent to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov, Suslov, etc.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 23; translation by Johanna Granville.]

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
"ANNALS OF COMMUNISM" SERIES
PUBLISHES FIRST TWO BOOKS

The first two books in a Yale University Press series ("Annals of Communism") based on newly-accessible Russian archives have appeared: Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); and Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

The series is based in large measure on documents from the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), headed by K.M. Anderson, formerly known as the Central Party Archives and site of most records of the CPSU CC through 1952. According to Yale University Press (where the executive editor of the project is Jonathan Brent), the series is currently envisioned to run at least 18 volumes, including the following titles (and authors/editors): *Anti-Government Opposition under Khrushchev and Brezhnev* (Sheila Fitzpatrick, V.A. Kozlov); *History of the Soviet GULAG System, 1920-1989* (S.V. Mironenko, V.A. Kozlov, American editor to be announced); *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949* (Ivo Banac, F.I. Firsov); *The Katyn Massacre (*Anna M. Cienciala, N.S. Lebedeva); *Georgi Dimitrov's Letters to Stalin, 1933-1945* (F.I. Firsov, American editor to be announced); *Lenin's "Secret" Archive* (Richard Pipes, Y.I. Buranov); *The Assassination of Sergei Kirov* (V.P. Naumov, American editor to be announced); *Soviet Politics and Repression in the 1930s* (J. Arch Getty, O.V. Naumov); *The Communist International during the Repression of the 1930s* (William Chase, F.I. Firsov); *Soviet Social Life in the 1930s* (Lewis Siegelbaum, A.K. Sokolov); *Voice of the People: Peasants, Workers, and the Soviet State, 1918-1932* (Jeffrey Burds, A.K. Sokolov); *The Church, the People, and the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia, 1917-1932* (Gregory Freeze, Leonid Vaintraub); *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1918* (Mark Steinberg, Daniel Orlovsky, G.Z. Ioffe); *The Last Days of the Romanovs* (Mark Steinberg, V.M. Khrustalyov); *The Last Diary of Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna* (Robert Massie, V.A. Kozlov).

For further information contact Yale University Press, POB 209040, New Haven, CT 06520-9040.

"VOLODYA"

continued from page 28

don't want to copy Russian methods....If we Petofists are 'Martovtsists' [March people] (of the 1848 revolution), then Imre Nagy is our new Lajos Kossuth."[6] Even Rakosi, who was shipped off to Moscow for "treatment" in July 1956 (he remained in the USSR until his death in 1971), acknowledged Nagy's popularity. Intending to discredit him after his arrest by Soviet forces, Rakosi wrote to the CPSU Politburo: "Nagy at the present time is undoubtedly the most popular [figure]. The whole imperialist camp supports him, as well as the influential Yugoslavians. All the Hungarian anti-socialist forces stand behind him."[7]

And yet, certain puzzles in the history of Nagy's career have remained. For one thing, Matyas Rakosi, who was the most powerful man in postwar Hungary, could not stand him. Rakosi was responsible for Nagy's complete expulsion from the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) in November 1955—not the Russians (an example of the East European "tail" wagging the Soviet "dog").[8] Rakosi, dubbed "Stalin's best disciple," and by others the "Bald Murderer," or even less reverently, "Asshead," had so effectively created his own cult of personality in Hungary that he could shake his little finger and that person would be no more.

Given Rakosi's hatred of Nagy, why wasn't Nagy—rather than Laszlo Rajk—branded the first Hungarian "Titoist agent" in Stalin's sanguinary witch-hunt that swept Eastern Europe from 1949 to 1952, and cost the lives of Traicho Kostov (Bulgaria), Rudolf Slansky and V. Clementis (Czechoslovakia), and the freedom of Wladislaw Gomulka (Poland)? Why was Nagy not chosen, who was too gentle for the post of Minister of the Interior, rather than Rajk, who did occupy that post?

Or why, for that matter, was Imre Nagy, whom Rakosi called a milquetoast ("*miagkotelyi*"), even offered such plum jobs as Minister of the Interior or Minister of Administrative Organs?

Obviously, it appears, someone was protecting him "at the center" (in Moscow). The translated Russian archival documents printed below suggest one possible explanation—that Imre Nagy, codename "Volodya," had actually volunteered to become an informer for the Soviet secret police—the OGPU (Unified State Political Directorate)—NKVD (Commissariat of Internal Affairs)—in 1933 and continued in that capacity until 1941. Having emigrated to the USSR in 1929, Nagy established contacts among the Hungarian émigré community, encouraging them to speak candidly with him. One of the documents below states that in 1939 Nagy provided the names of 38 Hungarian political émigrés for "cultivation" ("*razrabotka*"), and in another document, he listed 150 names—not just Hungarians, but also Austrians, Germans, Poles, Bulgarians, and Russians. Of the total number of people upon whom Nagy is reported to have informed, 15 were "liquidated" (shot) or died in prison, according to KGB archivists' calculations.[9] "Volodya," his NKVD superiors wrote, is a "qualified agent" who shows great "initiative" and "an ability to approach people."

The story of how these materials came to light is a story that has more to do with Soviet, Hungarian, and communist party politics amidst the revolutionary upheavals of the late 1980s and early 1990s than with historical or scholarly investigation.

Three of the documents printed below were found in late 1988 in the KGB archives. Of course, as in many cases when KGB materials are released, it was for a concrete, political purpose. KGB head Kryuchkov had sent the incriminating Nagy dossier to Gorbachev on Friday, 16 June 1989—a date that is, as party ideologues were wont to say, no coincidence. On that same day, several hundred thousand Hungarians gathered in Heroes' Square in downtown Budapest, and many more watched on nationwide television, as Nagy and several other leaders of the 1956 revolt who had been tried and executed by Moscow were praised (and the 1956 revolution, previously branded officially as a "counterrevolutionary uprising," lauded as a whole) and given a martyrs' reburial in a daylong ceremony that was the highpoint of what would turn out to be Hungary's rush away from communist rule.

In his letter, Kryuchkov made his intentions clear: Let's publish these documents about Nagy's sordid NKVD intrigues—it might defuse the Nagy rehabilitation campaign and the Hungarian reform movement in general. In fact, the hardline Kryuchkov, who was later one of the soberer and shrewder of the August 1991 coup plotters, correctly perceived the developments in Hungary as a threat to communist rule and to Hungary's status as a Warsaw Pact ally. (And there is

another, more personal twist: Kryuchkov had himself served as Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest in October-November 1956, and had personally witnessed what he undoubtedly considered Nagy's treachery to the Soviet and communist cause—perhaps he still carried a grudge, or at least a vivid sense of Nagy's importance as a historical symbol.)

Since these archival documents, albeit authentic, were selected specifically to discredit Nagy and undermine political trends in Hungary in 1989, scholars should certainly be cautious in evaluating them, and it is possible that with fuller access to the archives additional research by scholars—not archivists or bureaucrats—may yield a more balanced assessment of Nagy's NKVD activities.

Ironically, the initial search for Soviet archival materials on Nagy may have been triggered by a 1988 inquiry from Hungarian reformist political figures, who had requested that all documents pertaining to Nagy's sentence and his activities while in the Soviet Union be declassified. But it was a complicated endeavor; Imre Nagy was a Soviet citizen. There is no sign in the archives that he ever lost his Soviet citizenship, although, of course, he had to have had Hungarian citizenship as well.

Evidently Gorbachev opted not to unilaterally disclose the Nagy file, and just as Kryuchkov and other Soviet hardliners expected, the Hungarian leaders were loathe to disclose the explosive information. When the documents were unveiled during an inter-party consultation in the summer of 1989, and the topic of Nagy's NKVD connections was raised, R. Nyers, then the chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), demanded that the issue be dropped.[10] Meanwhile, Karoly Grosz, the HSWP General Secretary, broke the news to a plenum of the HWSP Central Committee, which endorsed Grosz's proposal that the facts not be published.

Only in February 1993, when Kryuchkov's secret 1989 letter to Gorbachev was published in the Italian paper *La Stampa*, did Gros agree to give an interview to the Hungarian newspaper *Nepszabadsag* the following month, confirming the authenticity of the documents, that Nagy did indeed inform on his comrades in the 1930s and early 1940s.[11]

Additional damaging materials on Nagy were declassified in Moscow in May 1992, in particular a comprehensive "reference" ("spravka") on Nagy compiled by I. Zamchevskii (Director of the 5th European Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs) a month after the Hungarian "events," perhaps partly in preparation for a probable trial of Nagy, although at the time efforts continued—through Yugoslav, and later Rumanian officials, among others—to persuade Nagy to support the Kadar government. This material contains further details about Nagy's actions that were considered compromising or dubious. To give one example, when Nagy left Hungary in late 1929 for the USSR to attend the Second Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party as a delegate, he brought with him his assistant, identified as an agent-provocateur named Tirier. He introduced Tirier to his Russian colleagues as "the most trustworthy party man" ("*parttiets*"). But upon his return to Hungary, Tirier betrayed to the Hungarian police all the Hungarian delegates who had attended that Congress (except for Nagy, who—luckily in this case—ended up staying in Moscow for fifteen years). When Tirier was caught, Nagy tried to defend him, taking his side against the other Hungarian communists.[12]

Other compromises Nagy made tend to be forgotten. In 1949, Nagy twice appealed to the Hungarian Central Committee, criticizing the party's position on the "peasant question" and advocating the delay ("*zatiagivanie*") of collectivization. For this Nagy was expelled from the Politburo temporarily, until early 1951. This time he did not hesitate to perform "*samokritika*" in order to be readmitted. He was also placed in charge of crop collection briefly, thus agreeing to carry out the exact policies to which he objected.[13] Also in 1951, Nagy—along with other Politburo members—with others—signed the note proposing Janos Kadar's arrest, thus authorizing extremely brutal beatings.[14]

So, Imre Nagy, "Agent Volodya," also had "his hands soaked in blood," to some extent, had "given false information," and [helped to] "sentence innocent men to death," as Tito had said of Matyas Rakosi and his henchmen.

While the extent of Nagy's past activities as a "chekist" is surprising, given the "martyr's halo" he acquired after his deposing and death, one must interpret this new information in historical context. Rumors had circulated about Imre Nagy among the émigré community even in the 1930s and '40s. V.N. Merkulov, the deputy director of the People's Committee of State Security (Zamnarkom GB), who was shot in 1953 in connection with the Beria affair, had sent information about Nagy's NKVD work to Malenkov in 1941 (see document below). In 1985, Janos Kadar told Gorbachev that Nagy had been "Beria's man." Someone in Hungary must have known of Nagy's connections.[15]

Moreover, given the "*kto koro*?" [who from whom?; who wins, who loses?--ed.] atmosphere of the 1930s in the Soviet bloc, with arrests and executions occurring in concentric spirals, one was almost compelled to inform on others for survival, although even that didn't guarantee one's safety. Foreigners were especially vulnerable, because they were, as Russians say, "not ours" ("*ne nashi*"). So for a foreign Comintern member, to be an NKVD agent was a mark of prestige and trustworthiness. One's loyalty to communism was measured by the number of people one either recruited ("*zaverboval*") or informed on ("*donosil*"). Many Comintern members had close ties with the NKVD or the GRU ("Glavrazvedupr," or Main Intelligence Administration) of the General Staff of the Comintern. At the time, there was nothing unusual in this; it was almost a given.

Twenty years later, East European leaders, even in their home countries, were still vulnerable, especially as the de-Stalinization process came to an end. When he did shift his loyalties and struggled on the same side as the Hungarian insurgents in October-November 1956, Imre Nagy took a heroic step indeed. In the end, in June 1958, Nagy did not compromise. He died for his beliefs. As two of his countrymen, Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, put it: "If his life was a question mark, his death was an answer."[16]

1. Stalin's death in March 1953, of course, was the beginning of "de-Stalinization." Khrushchev's February 1956 Secret Speech to the 20th CPSU Congress was, in a sense, the beginning of the end of that process. Expression drawn from Adam Ulam, *The Rivals* (NY: Penguin Books, 1971), 245.

2. The Polish Communist leader Bierut dropped dead from a heart attack soon after Khrushchev's "Secret Speech."

3. One Soviet diplomat called Nagy a "malicious muddlehead" ("*zlonamerennyi putanik*"). I. Zamchevskii, "About Imre Nagy and his Politics with

the Yugoslav Leaders," Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVP RF) [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation], fond [f.] 077, opis [op.] 37, papka [p.] 191, delo [d.] 39, list [l.] 86. Also Daniel F. Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 57.

4. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chap. 15.

5. The Petofi Circle was an organization of Hungarian communist intellectuals founded in 1955. Sandor Petofi was a revolutionary poet during the 1848 revolt against Austria. (Lajos Kossuth was the Hungarian revolutionary leader in the 1848 uprising.)

6. "Notes of Ivan Serov," 26 July 1956, Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) [Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents], f. 89, per. 45, dok. 4, l. 2.

7. Letter of Rakosi to Khrushchev, 15 December 1956, TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, l. 80.

8. "Expressed opinions at the Hungarian Politburo Session, July 13, 1956," TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 3. "There were 13 Hungarian comrades present—Politburo members and candidate members, as well as comrade Mikoyan A. N. On July 13, 1956 at 3 p.m...he participated in the Politburo session, which continued for four hours....About Nagy, Mikoyan said it was a mistake to expel him from the party, even though he deserved it, given his behavior. If he were in the party, he could be forced to be expedient. *The Hungarian comrades made their work harder on themselves*...."[emphasis added]

9. Most of these documents are still classified. They are located in the personal files for Imre Nagy in the KGB archive and among the Comintern documents kept at RTsKhIDNI (Russian Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documents). See Valerii Musatov, "Tragediia Nadia," *Novaiia Noveishaia Istorii* 1 (Jan. 1994), 167. Also Kuz'minev, "If We Do Not Close Our Eyes" ["Yesli Ne Zakryvat' Glaza"], *Literaturnaia Rossiia* 51:1507 (20 December 1991), 22-23.

10. Musatov, "Tragediia," op. cit., 166.

11. Ibid.

12. I. Zamchevskii, "About Imre Nagy and his Politics with the Yugoslav Leaders," 4 December 1956, AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, p. 191, d. 39, l. 82.

13. Ibid.; also Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez*, 62, and Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 129.

14. Musatov, "Tragediia Nadia," 169; also Calhoun, *Hungary and Suez*, 61-2.

15. Valerii Musatov, "SSSR I Vengerskie Sobytiia 1956 g.: Novye Akhivnye Materialy," *Novaia Noveishaia Istorii* 1 (Jan. 1993), 5.

16. Miklos Molnar and Laszlo Nagy, *Imre Nagy: Reformateur ou Revolutionnaire* (Geneva: Librarie E. Droz, 1959), 217-18.

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REPORTS ON AGENT "VOLODYA": RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON IMRE NAGY

Documents provided and translated by Johanna Granville

KGB Chief Kryuchkov's Report, 16 June 1989

SPECIAL FILE
Of Special Importance

To the CC CPSU
Committee of State Security KGB of the USSR
June 16, 1989

"About the Archive Materials Pertaining to Imre Nagy's Activities in the USSR"

The data we received show that the full-scale campaign of the opposition forces in Hungary connected with the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, the former leader of the Hungarian government during the period of the 1956 events, is aimed at discrediting the whole path traversed by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), undermining the party's authority and present leadership, and stirring up unfriendly feelings toward the USSR among the Hungarian people.

The opposition organizations demand a full rehabilitation of Imre Nagy. He has acquired the halo of a martyr, of an exceptionally honest and principled person. Special emphasis in all this uproar about Imre Nagy is placed on the fact that he was a "consistent champion against Stalinism," "an advocate of democracy and the fundamental restoration of socialism."In a whole series of publications in the Hungarian press, one is made to think that Nagy, [solely] as a result of Soviet pressure, was accused of counterrevolutionary activities, sentenced to death, and executed. The opposition is trying to raise Nagy on a pedestal and make him a symbol of the "struggle for democracy, progress, and the genuine independence of Hungary."

In the HSWP leadership, there is no united opinion as to the extent Imre Nagy should be rehabilitated. Deciding above all to strengthen their influence in the party and society, I. Pozsgai, M. Sjures, and I. Horvat sometimes openly flirt with the opposition in praising the services and dignity of Imre Nagy. K. Grosz, R. Nyers, M. Jasso and others, in advocating his legal rehabilitation, believe that this full-scale campaign of unrestrained praise for Nagy will strike at the HSWP and at Soviet-Hungarian relations. There are many mid-level and especially senior Hungarian communists who are very critical of such a campaign. Widespread among them is the opinion, founded on the stories of several party veterans, that the behavior of Imre Nagy in the 1920-30s in Hungary and the USSR was not as irreproachable, as is being suggested to the Hungarian population, which is under the control of the opposition's press.

In the course of the KGB's work on archival materials dealing with the repression in the USSR in the second half of the thirties to the beginning of the 1950s, documents were uncovered that shed a light on the earlier, not well-known activities of Nagy in our country. From the indicated documents it follows that, having emigrated to the USSR in 1929, Nagy from the very beginning, of his own initiative, sought out contact with the security organs and in 1933 volunteered to become an agent (a secret informer) of the Main Administration of the security organs of the NKVD. He worked under the pseudnym "Volodya." He actively used Hungarian and other political emigres—as well as Soviet citizens—for the purpose of collecting data about the people who, for one reason or another, came to the attention of the NKVD. We have the document that proves that in 1939 Nagy offered to the NKVD for "cultivation" 38 Hungarian political emigres, including Ferenc Munnich. In another list he named 150 Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Germans, and Italians that he knew personally, and with whom in case of necessity, he could "work." On the basis of the reports by Nagy—"Volodya"—several groups of political émigrés, consisting of members of Hungarian, German, and other Communist parties, were sentenced. They were all accused of "anti-communist," "terrorist," and "counterrevolutionary" activities (the cases of the "Agrarians," "Incorrigibles," "The Agony of the Doomed," and so on). In one of the documents (June 1940) it is indicated that Nagy "gave material" on 15 arrested "enemies of the people," who had worked in the International Agrarian Institute, the Comintern, and the All-Union Radio Committee. The activities of "Volodya" led to the arrest of the well-known scholar E. Varga, and of a whole series of Hungarian Communist Party leaders (B. Varga-Vago, G. Farkas, E. Neiman, F. Gabor, and others). A part of these were shot, a part were sentenced to various terms in prison and exile. Many in 1954-1963 were rehabilitated.

From the archival materials it does not follow that Nagy was an employee of the NKVD by force. Moreover, in the documents it is directly indicated that "Volodya" displayed considerable "interest and initiative in his work and was a qualified agent."

Taking into account the nature and direction of the wide-scale propagandistic campaign in Hungary, it would probably be expedient to report to the General Secretary of the Hungarian HSWP and K. Gros about the documents that we have and advise them about their possible use.

Chairman of the KGB V. KRYUCHKOV

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 82.]

* * * * *

Nagy's OGPU Enlistment, 4 September 1930

OBLIGATIONS

I, the undersigned, employee of the Department of the OGPU (last name) Nagy (first name) Imre (patronymic) Iosofovich in the course of service, or after being discharged, presently commit myself to keep in the strictest secret all information and data about the work of the OGPU and its organs, not to divulge it in any form nor to share it even with my closest relatives and friends. I will be held accountable for any failure to carry out my responsibilities according to Article 121 of the Criminal Code.
Order of the OGPU of April 3, 1923, No. 133, etc. RVS USSR of July 19, 1927 has been declared to me.

Signature: Nagy Imre Iosofovich
4 September 1930

NOTE: The present document must be kept in the personal file of the employee.

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok 79.]

* * * * *

Report on Nagy's Arrest by the NKVD, 10 March 1938

REFERENCE

About the intelligence work of the agent of the 1st division of the 4th Department of the First Administration.

"VOLODYA"

"Volodya" Nagy Vladimir Iosofovich, born in Hungary in 1896, by nationality Hungarian was excluded from the HCP (Hungarian Communist Party) (Imre Nagy); the case under investigation at KPK and KPV has been in service since 1918, works as a non-salaried employee of the Hungarian journal "Uj Hang" [New Sound]. He was recruited on January 17, 1933. He has cultivated mostly Hungarian political émigrés.

1. According to "Volodya's" data, a group of 4 people was exposed and liquidated. MANUEL, BAROS, KRAMMER, and others who underwent the case of the "Incorrigibles."

2. At the present time he is cultivating a counterrevolutionary group of Hungarians, composed of: VARGA E., GABOR F.I, SLOSSER K., BOLGAR E., VARGA S.E., GERREL, LUKACS and others who underwent the intelligence case of the "Restorers."

In his work "Volodya" shows great interest and initiative, a qualified agent. Through "Volodya" the counterrevolutionary group the "Agrarians" was exposed and liquidated.

(Signed) MATUSOV,
Deputy Director of the 1st Dept, 4th Dept, 1st Administration, Captain of State Security

II.

From the Deputy Director of the 4th Dept GUGB of the NKVD
USSR
to the Commissar of State Security 3 rank, Comrade Karutskii

REPORT

I report that on the night of the 4-5th of March of 1938 the agent of the second division "Volodya" Nagy, Vladimir Iosifovich was arrested by the 11th Dept of the UNKVD of the Moscow region.

"Volodya" was recruited on 17 January 1933 and during all that time gave valuable material about the anti-Soviet activities of a number of people from the Hungarian political émigré community.

Recently "Volodya" actively cultivated the fundamental objective of the intelligence case "The Incorrigibles" including: BAROS V., MANUEL S., MADZSAR, TEGDAS, and a number of others.

Volodya was recruited without a preliminary check in the 8th department of the GUGB, and remained under arrest for 4 days. When we asked on what grounds was "Volodya" arrested, they freed him on 8 March of this year.

I report this information by your orders.

Director of the 2nd Division of the 4th Department of the GUGB
Captain of State Security
Signed) ALTMAN
10 March 1938

[Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per 45, Dok 80, 2.]

* * * * *

Information on Agent "Volodya," June 1941

To the CC Hungarian Communist Party (HCP)
To Comrade Malenkov

Upon the inquiry of the Administration of Cadres of the CC of the (HCP) of 19 April 1940, No. 275/c we are sending reference material about Nagy Vladimir Iosifovich.

Enclosed: the abovementioned

Deputy of the People's Committee of Internal Affairs of the USSR

(Signed) MERKULOV

II.

REFERENCE

about the agent of the 1st Division of the 3rd Administration of the NKGB USSR "Volodya"

_____, born in 1896, in the town of Kaposvar (Hungary), Hungarian by nationality, a citizen of the USSR, member of the HCP (b) since 1918. At present he works in the All Union Radio Committee. He was recruited as an agent in 1933. In 1936 during the inspection of his party documents "Volodya" was expelled from the HCP, and in 1939 again readmitted. In readmitting him to the party by the Party Board KPK of the CC HCP, he was reprimanded for the fact that he did not get the Comintern's consent for his wife's trip to Hungary in 1935.

In the journal "Uj Hang" [New Sound] in Hungarian" No. 2 for the year 1939, "Volodya" in his article expressed doubt that the Hungarian proletariat at the present time was faithful to the socialist cause.

In 1937-1938 "Volodya" gave a number of materials about the anti-Soviet activities of FARKAS and VAGO. In subsequent materials about "Volodya" the following people were arrested and convicted: MANUEL, LUBARSZKII, DUBROVSZKII, BARON, KRAMER, and MADZSAR.

"Volodya" also informed us about the anti-Soviet activities of the people presently arrested: STEINBERG, STUKKE, SUGAR, POLLACSEK, KARISKAS, FRIEDMAN.

At present "Volodya" is cultivating a group of anti-Soviet-minded former Hungarian political emigres.

Director of the 1st Division of the 3rd Administration ofthe USSR First Lieutenant of State Security

(Signed) Sverdlov
" " June 1941 [day of the month left blank]

[Source: TsKhSD, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 81,.]

POLISH OCTOBER

contnued from page 1

Poland, a critical link in the Kremlin's post-war security scheme in Europe. By October 1956, Soviet cadres, many chosen because of their Polish background, dominated the senior levels of the Polish Armed Forces.[2]

The transformation of the Soviet system after Stalin's death affected the satellite states of East Europe in different ways. The Kremlin, Nikita S. Khrushchev in particular, followed and attempted to influence the pace and nature of the changes throughout the region with varying degrees of success. By October 1956, the de-Stalinization debate in Poland focused on the potential return of Wladyslaw Gomulka[3] to the leadership of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP). However, Gomulka, who had spent the summer of 1956 securing his place on the Politburo by gaining the confidence of almost all the Central Committee members, as well as the Soviets, made his return to the PUWP conditional. He stubbornly insisted that Khrushchev complete what he had begun in 1954: the withdrawal of Soviet officers and advisers from the Polish Armed Forces and security apparatus. Gomulka also demanded the removal of Soviet Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski[4] from the PUWP Politburo.

Three days in October 1956 resolved four outstanding and interrelated conflicts of the de-Stalinization period in Poland. First, the bitter and divisive struggle for political power within the PUWP Central Committee was settled. The fractured Central Committee was nearly unanimous in selecting Gomulka First Secretary of the PUWP. Second, the Soviet threat to intervene militarily in the affairs of the Polish Party ended with a compromise agreement on the part of the CPSU leadership and the PUWP leadership. Third, the new PUWP leadership managed to mobilize significant elements of Polish society to rally in support of Gomulka, if not the PUWP, and thus frustrate the growing animosity directed by segments of Polish society against the party-state. Finally, all the factions in the PUWP used the Soviet threat to rally their supporters and Polish society. The discourse of nationalism thus confirmed the demographic transformation of the PUWP throughout Poland and ended the tight grip on the leadership of the PUWP held by the former Communist Party of Poland (CPP) cadres.

The PUWP leadership reassessed the political situation in the country at the Politburo meeting of 1 and 2 October 1956, shortly after the First Secretary, Edward Ochab,[5] returned from a visit to China.[6] The agenda of this meeting included concerns about Gomulka's views on the developing crisis. The leadership asked First Secretary Ochab to meet with Gomulka and to invite the former leader of the wartime Polish Workers Party (PWP) to a Politburo meeting.[7] The decision had been unavoidable and the logical continuation of Gomulka's long series of official and secret talks with individual Politburo members since April 1956.

At the Politburo meeting of October 8 and 10, in preparation for Gomulka's appearance at the next Politburo meeting, the leadership outlined four reasons for the crisis in the PUWP: 1) "a lack of unity in the Politburo"; 2) "a lack of connections between the leadership and the Party activists"; 3) "a lack of authority among the leadership"; and 4) "With regard to the spreading of anti-Soviet tendencies there is, aside from the propaganda of the enemy, an unfair situation in the relations between the PPR [Polish People's Republic] and USSR (such as the question concerning the price of coal, the highest officer cadres in the army often do not know the Polish language, do not have Polish citizenship, and the Soviet ambassador[8] interferes in the internal affairs of the country)." The leadership also decided: "To turn to the USSR and to the relevant generals who hold positions in the army with a proposition that they adopt Polish citizenship. Soviet officers who do not speak Polish [are] to become advisers, and in their place promote Polish officers. Comrade Rokossowski will conduct talks with them and announce the result."[9]

Gomulka decided to attend the next Politburo meeting, which was held on October 12. It was his first Politburo meeting since the campaign against the "rightist-nationalist deviation" of 1948-1949. He told the leadership, among other things, that the Party continued to experience difficulties because of "errors committed in the past" and as a result of the "strong pressure exerted by hostile and alien tendencies" in the PUWP. Gomulka stressed that the problem of Soviet advisers in Poland's security apparatus needed to be "untangled" and that the Soviet control of the Polish military was "not an example of normal relations." He argued that "Polish-Soviet relations is a great problem" which had to be "normalized" in order to "forestall anti-Soviet manifestations." Gomulka stressed that the "Polish *raison d'être* as well as the fact that we are also building socialism demanded that...future relations [with the Kremlin] be devoid of conflicts."

At this point, Gomulka clashed with Rokossowski over the Soviet-Polish relationship under Stalin. Gomulka added that, "today no one questions that in the past these relations were unfair...Why did we in fact pay reparations for the Germans[?] It was explained that a certain section of German territory went to Poland, but we were not in fact allies of the Germans during the war...Our government representatives at the time signed such an agreement. I would never have signed such an agreement and I would never have agreed to this...Comrade Rokossowski knows about this...(Comrade Rokossowski: No one has returned to this matter, except you)."

Gomulka also called for the majority of the Politburo to unite under his leadership. On the existence of factions in the Party, Gomulka stated: "I do not see these factions or splinter groups. Party members and, above all, those in the leadership simply cannot voice their views, especially if those views differ with other Party leaders. A 'group' must have its own distinctive platform...Where are those anonymous groups? Since when have Communists adopted such a stance? If you want to lead a Party of one and a half million members...[you must realize that] there comes a time when the differences within the leadership may divide the Party. We must approach the Party organizations with our differences and have a genuine debate about them."

Gomulka concluded his remarks to the Politburo with the following admonition: "Comrades, you have failed to notice the climate prevailing among the working class and the nation...Everything that has so far been done...was wrong...It is possible to rule a nation without enjoying its trust, but such rule can only be maintained with bayonets. Whoever chooses that option also chooses the path of universal calamity. We cannot return to the old methods. Our current difficulties stem from the Party's weakness, from our inconsistency."

He invited the leadership to recommend

to the Central Committee his appointment to the PUWP Politburo: "I do not have enough strength to take up the challenges of active work and present conditions do not encourage one to do so. However, a peculiar political situation has arisen and one simply cannot escape its consequences. This is why I shall not refrain from political activities...Until now you have prevented me from doing so, but should you change your minds today I will not say no. I would like to emphasize that...I consider my views to be correct and I will not retreat. I will be appealing to the Party leadership and even to Party organizations throughout the country. I will make my doubts known. I am a stubborn person. I would like you to know this."[10] Ochab agreed to nominate Gomulka as well as some of his closest political allies for membership in the Politburo at the 8th PUWP Plenum, which was set to take place on October 17.

The debate over the 8th Plenum continued at the Politburo meeting of October 15. The leadership concluded that "there would be no keynote speech and Comrade Ochab's introductory remarks would merely present the situation within the Politburo." They also decided to hold another Politburo meeting and to postpone the 8th Plenum until October 19. More important, the Politburo agreed to add Gomulka and his allies, Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, to the leadership.

The Politburo then ordered that a press release be issued for October 16 to announce publicly the planned return of Gomulka to the leadership, and October 19 as the date for the 8th Plenum. Finally, the Politburo decided to hold elections at the next meeting to decide the Politburo and Secretariat membership that would be presented to the 8th Plenum. The debate in the Politburo was heated. Rokossowski and three of his allies in the Politburo—Witold Józwiak,[11] Zenon Nowak,[12] and Wladyslaw Dworakowski[13]—attacked the other voting members of the Politburo for trying to exclude them from the leadership. Shortly before the meeting ended, Rokossowski warned: "I view the holding of elections in this situation as desertion."[14]

At the Politburo meeting on October 17, a "leadership-search" commission was established. It included Gomulka and three other senior Politburo members: Józef Cyrankiewicz,[15] Aleksander Zawadzki,[16] and Ochab. The mandate of the special commission, which excluded the leading hardliners, was to prepare a list of candidates for the new PUWP Politburo, Secretariat, and Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The special commission met during the break.

When the Politburo meeting resumed, Ochab announced the decisions that had been taken: 1) the Politburo would be limited to nine members; 2) the new Politburo would include Gomulka, Zawadzki, Cyrankiewicz, Loga-Sowinski, Roman Zambrowski,[17] Adam Rapacki, Jerzy Morawski, Stefan Jedrychowski, and Ochab; 3) the Secretariat would include Gomulka, Zambrowski (who was removed from the Secretariat by Khrushchev at the 6th PUWP Plenum of March 1956,[18]) Edward Gierek, Witold Jarosinski, and Ochab. Fourteen members voted for the first proposal, with only Rokossowski and Józwiak opposed. Thirteen members voted on the second proposal, which was opposed by Rokossowski, Józwiak, and Zenon Nowak. During the discussions concerning the elections to the Secretariat, it was also decided to add Jerzy Albrecht and Wladyslaw Matwin to the list of candidates. Józwiak opposed Matwin, and Rokossowski opposed Matwin and Albrecht. The commission excluded from the Politburo and Secretariat those persons most closely associated with the Soviets, namely, Józwiak, Franciszek Mazur,[19] Zenon Nowak, and Rokossowski.[20]

Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko, the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, informed Ochab on the evening of October 18 that the CPSU Politburo had decided to send a delegation to Warsaw in order to discuss the situation in the PUWP and the country. Ponomarenko added that Moscow was alarmed by the growing anti-Soviet manifestations in Poland. Ochab immediately gathered the Politburo to meet with Ponomarenko at the Central Committee. They suggested to Ponomarenko that the Soviet delegation arrive during the second or the third day of the Plenum. Only Rokossowski was of the opinion that the Soviet delegation should be met before the Plenum. Ponomarenko agreed with Rokossowski and informed the Polish leaders that a Soviet delegation, headed by Khrushchev, would arrive in Warsaw shortly before the 8th Plenum was to begin on the morning of October 19.[21]

The CPSU delegation, which included Khrushchev, Lazar Kaganovich, AnastasMikoyan, Molotov, Defense Minister, Marshal I.S. Zhukov, the commander of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Konev, and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Antonov, arrived in Warsaw at about 7 a.m. on the 19th. Khrushchev later recalled in his memoirs: "We learned from our ambassador [in Warsaw] that the tensions which had been building up had boiled over...Some Poles were criticizing Soviet policy toward Poland, saying that the treaty signed was unequal and that the Soviet Union was taking unfair advantage of Poland...We had further reason to worry when certain elements began to protest the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Polish Army was Marshal Rokossowski...The situation was such [that] we had to be ready to resort to arms." The Soviet leader added: "the Soviet Union was being reviled with abusive language and the [Polish] government was close to being overthrown. The people rising to the top were those whose mood was anti-Soviet. This might threaten our lines of communication and access to Germany through Poland. Therefore, we decided to take certain measures to maintain contact with our troops in the German Democratic Republic...We decided to send a delegation to Poland and have a talk with the Polish leadership. They recommended that we not come. Their reluctance to meet with us heightened our concern even more. So we decided to go there in a large delegation."[22]

Khrushchev's dramatic encounter with Ochab, Cyrankiewicz, Zawadzki, Zambrowski, and Gomulka at Warsaw airport, began on an angry note. Document No. 1 below provides the fullest and earliest account to date of the events that transpired on the tarmac of Warsaw's military airport: Gomulka's briefing to the PUWP Politburo some two hours after the CPSU and PUWP delegations met. The first meeting with the Soviets had lasted until about 9 a.m. The Poles and the Soviets agreed that the 8th Plenum would begin that morning in order for Gomulka and the others to be elected to the Central Committee, but that no further decisions would be taken by the Plenum until the meeting with the Soviets had ended.

DOCUMENT NO. 1

Protocol No. 129
Meeting of the Politburo on 19, 20 and 21 October 1956
(during a pause in proceedings at the VIII

Plenum)

The Politburo agrees to the following press communiqué:

On 19 October at 10:00 am the proceedings of the VIII Plenum began. After the meeting was opened by comrade Ochab, and the agenda accepted, comrades Wladyslaw Gomulka, Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, and Loga-Sowinski were added to the Central Committee so that they could take part in the discussions as fully fledged members.

Comrade Wieslaw [Wladyslaw Gomulka's wartime pseudonym] informed the Politburo about the meeting at the airport with the Soviet delegation. "Talks like this I have never held with party comrades. It was beyond comprehension. How can you take such a tone and, with such epitaphs, turn on people who in good faith turned to you? Khrushchev first greeted, above all, comrade Rokossowski and the generals; underlining—these are people on whom I depend. Turning to us, he said [in Russian]: 'The treacherous activity of Comrade Ochab has become evident, this number won't pass here!' You needed a lot of patience not to react to such talk. The entire discussion was carried out in this loud tone, such that everyone at the airport, even the chauffeurs, heard it.

I proposed that we drive with them to Belvedere Palace and speak calmly. I told them that above all else we had to open the Plenum. They would not agree to this. At Belvedere Palace the talks had a similar tone. They told us that we actually spat in their faces because we did not agree to meet with the delegation before the Plenum. They are upset with us because the Politburo Commission proposed a new list of members to the Politburo without a number of comrades who are supporters of a Polish-Soviet union; namely, comrades Rokossowski, [Zenon] Nowak, Mazur, Jozwiak. I explained to them that we don't have such tendencies. We do not want to break the alliance with the Soviet Union. It came to a clash. Comrade Khrushchev said [in Russian]: 'That number won't pass here. We are ready for active intervention.'

[Here Gomulka quotes his own remarks to Khrushchev:] I understand that it is possible to talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a revolver on the table you don't have an even-handed discussion. I cannot continue the discussions under these conditions. I am ill and I cannot fill such a function in my condition. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrades, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physical force I am not up to it. My first step in Party work, which I am taking after a long break, must be interrupted.

I don't want to break off Polish-Soviet friendship. I believe what we propose will strengthen the friendship. Any other form of resolution to these affairs will only strengthen the anti-Soviet campaign. I would like for the comrades to voice their views on this matter: intervention or the conditions under which to continue the talks."

Comrade Zawadzki: Comrade Wieslaw's position is correct. We do not see our situation, including the personnel decision taken by the Politburo, as a menacing upheaval in the country leading to a break in Polish-Soviet relations. Yet the decision not to change the position of the Politburo has to be taken with certain cautions in order not to intensify the situation. I also propose, in connection with the situation in Warsaw, to issue an appeal, signed by the Politburo and comrade Wieslaw, to the Enterprise Council, to students, about the arrival of the Soviet delegation in the common interest of the state and nation.

Comrade Zambrowski: The situation in the country is tense. I am on the side of what was said by comrade Wieslaw. Do not make any changes in the Politburo's propositions. I am opposed to the issuing of an appeal. Let the Plenum decide.

Comrade Rokossowski: Comrade Wieslaw gave us an objective assessment, but you can see that there are reasons why the Soviet comrades talk like this, and why comrade Khrushchev vehemently exploded. I am of the opinion that four comrades should go to the discussions and listen to the arguments of the Soviet comrades. More cold bloodedness. It is unnecessary to aggravate the situation.

Comrade Witold [Jozwiak]: I am of the opinion that we should leave the Politburo in its old composition and co-opt only comrades Wieslaw and Loga-Sowinski.

Comrade Gierek: I am of the opinion that the decisions of the Politburo are correct and we cannot overturn them. It is not pleasant to listen to such malicious language.

Comrade [Zenon] Nowak: I agree with comrade Gomulka. Let the Soviet comrades calmly explain what they want.

Comrades Nowak, Roman: I support in full the resolutions of the Politburo.

Comrade Rapacki: We cannot continue talks under the threat of intervention and under the charge that we are less worthy than those comrades from the old leadership who were not selected to form the new composition. I am for maintaining the decisions of the Politburo.

Comrade Dworakowski: We have to do everything so as not to disturb our friendship with the Soviet Union and we have to concede.

Comrade [Eugeniusz] Stawinski: We have always directed ourselves with great affection towards the Soviet Union, but to achieve a complete consolidation with the country we cannot accept concessions.

Comrade Jedrychowski: All concessions will be interpreted to mean that the CC [Central Committee] of our Party does not operate freely and that the changes are dictated by the Soviet delegation.

Comrade [Hilary] Chelchowski: I am of the opinion that it was incorrect for the Politburo to remove comrades [Zenon] Nowak and Rokossowski. Let us think of what we are doing.

Comrade Ochab: It was very painful to hear comrade Khrushchev. I did not deserve such treatment. I would also like comrade Rokossowski to explain the situation in the army.

Comrade Rokossowski: I feel that there are certain insinuations being directed at me. I do not feel any guilt. I did not give the army any alarm signals. I simply ordered, in any case with the agreement of comrade Ochab, that one military battalion from Legionowo be put on alert in order to ensure the security, from possible enemy provocation, for the unexpected arrival of the Soviet delegation.[23]

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 66-68; translated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowskii.]

The long-awaited 8th Plenum began at 10 a.m. Ochab opened the gathering with a brief statement and added: "I shall limit myself in this introduction to a report on the latest decisions of the Politburo." He announced that the Politburo had decided to include Gomulka, Spychalski, Kliszko, and Loga-Sowinski in the Central Committee. Ochab continued: "the Politburo proposes serious changes to its composition, for the number of its members to be limited to nine in order to secure unity and greater efficiency, and proposes the election of Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka for the post of First Secretary."[24]

Ochab appealed to the Plenum for "responsibility and wisdom" and declared: "We are meeting here in a difficult political situation." He told the delegates: "I would also like to inform you, Comrades, that a delegation of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, composed of Comrades Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov arrived in Warsaw this morning.

The delegation wishes to conduct talks with our Politburo." Ochab suggested that the Plenum accept Gomulka and his colleagues into the Central Committee and that the proceedings be delayed until 6 p.m.[25]

A number of the Central Committee members demanded to know more details. Helena Jaworska interjected and demanded to know why it was necessary to adjourn the Plenum. Ochab quickly explained: "It arises out of the necessity to conduct talks with the delegation of the Presidium of the CPSU, which is already in Warsaw." Michalina Tatarkówna-Majkowska wanted to know who would represent the Polish delegation during the discussions with the Soviets and proposed that a new Politburo be elected to take part in the talks. Her motion was rejected. Romana Granas asked Ochab to outline the agenda of the Politburo's meeting with the Soviets. Ochab abruptly replied, "Soviet-Polish relations," and called for an immediate vote on the Politburo's decision to readmit Gomulka and the others to the Central Committee.[26] The Plenum unanimously accepted Ochab's proposition. The old Politburo and Gomulka were also empowered to conduct talks with the CPSU delegation. The debate barely lasted half an hour before the Plenum was adjourned. The Polish delegation returned to the Belvedere Palace to meet again with the Soviets.[27]

While the 8th Plenum met to debate Gomulka's return to the Central Committee, Khrushchev held a meeting with his generals at the Soviet embassy. The CPSU First Secretary stated in his memoirs: "Marshal Konev and I held separate consultations with Comrade Rokossowski, who was more obedient to us but had less authority than the other Polish leaders.[28] He told us that anti-Soviet, nationalistic, and reactionary forces were growing in strength, and that if it were necessary to arrest the growth of these counterrevolutionary elements by force of arms, he was at our disposal; we could rely on him to do whatever was necessary to preserve Poland's socialist gains and to assure Poland's continuing fidelity and friendship. That was all very well and good, but as we began to analyze the problem in more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey Rokossowski, the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of our own troops."[29]

After the first Soviet encounter with Gomulka, Khrushchev must have been reassured that the newly proposed PUWP First Secretary was not hostile to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev used the occasion to gauge Gomulka's views on a variety of matters. As he later put it: "our embassy informed us that a genuine revolt was on the verge of breaking out in Warsaw. For the most part these demonstrations were being organized in support of the new leadership headed by Gomulka, which we too were prepared to support, but the demonstrations also had a dangerously anti-Soviet character." The Soviet leader added that Gomulka held "a position which was most advantageous for us. Here was a man who had come to power on the crest of an anti-Soviet wave, yet who could now speak forcefully about the need to preserve Poland's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party."[30]

Ochab confirmed that Khrushchev manifested a sympathetic attitude towards Gomulka: "Basically our Soviet friends wanted to make Gomulka First Secretary." He continued: "At one point Khrushchev said to [Gomulka]: we bring you greetings. Presumably they thought Gomulka would put the country in order and was the one to stake their bets on...But Gomulka...displayed considerable toughness of character during those difficult talks."[31]

The turning point came when "Gomulka made an anxious but sincere declaration," as Khrushchev characterized it. The CPSU First Secretary added that Gomulka acknowledged: "Poland needs friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs friendship with Poland. Can it be that we failed to understand our situation? Without the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the West. We are dealing with our internal problems, our relations with the Soviet Union will remain unchanged. We will still be friends and allies." According to Khrushchev, Gomulka "said all this with such intensity and such sincerity that I believed his words...I said to our delegation, 'I think there is no reason not to believe Comrade Gomulka.' "[32] The Soviet leader added: "We believed him when he said he realized we faced a common enemy, Western imperialism...We took his word as a promissory note from a man whose good faith we believed in."[33]

The next contentious point concerned Rokossowski's exclusion from the new Politburo. Gomulka continued to call for Rokossowski's return to the Soviet Union. The Soviets continued to press Gomulka on the Rokossowski issue, but the Poles would not budge. Khrushchev later argued: "The people of Warsaw had been prepared to defend themselves and resist Soviet troops entering the city... A clash would have been good for no one but our enemies. It would be a fatal conflict, with grave consequences that would have been felt for many years to come."[34] He added: "With Poland in particular, I always tried to be sympathetic to flare-ups of anti-Soviet sentiment. Sympathetic in the sense that you have to remember history and that czarist Russia was a party to Poland being carved up among the Germans, the Austrians, and the Russians. That left its stamp on the Polish soul."[35]

The Soviet-Polish talks at the Belvedere Palace began at about 11 a.m. on October 19 and ended at 3 a.m. on October 20. The talks included Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Kaganovich on the Soviet side, and Gomulka, with fourteen members of the PUWP Politburo, on the Polish side.[36] Three separate documentary accounts of the talks between the CPSU-PUWP delegates at the Belvedere Palace are presented here.

The first two accounts of the Soviet-Polish confrontation are extraordinary. Documents No. 2 and No. 3 below are the recently discovered notes of the October 19-20 meeting taken by two Polish participants: Gomulka and Zawadzki.[37] These are rough notes, but they give us the fullest account to date on the range of topics discussed by the Soviets and the Poles at the Belvedere Palace. Gomulka appears to have been interested in only keeping a short record of the Soviet comments. Zawadzki, on the other hand, made more detailed notes and endeavored to include comments made by a wider range of participants on both sides.

DOCUMENT NO. 2

Wladyslaw Gomulka's Notes[38]

1/ Ochab opens the meeting—[then] Gomulka—[then] Mikoyan [outlines Soviet concerns]. [Mikoyan speaks:] [Poland is a] neighbouring country—[there is] a tradition of meetings, [and Soviets are sensitive about the] international situation. Our [Polish] tone in rejecting a reception for the Soviet delegation. Sounded a great alarm for them. Alliance between states is a matter for their [Soviet] concern,

Warsaw Pact—NATO Pact. On what do they [Soviets] base the difficulty of our situation, they're not exactly sure. Ochab did not inform them about the situation in Poland. American radio: he [Mikoyan] cites [apparently from American news reports].[39] Well then [Mikoyan adds]: are these reports true [and] are there objective issues which could divide us?
Economic discussion. From Poland they need nothing. [On the] question of coal reparations. They [Soviets] agreed to decrease the quota of coal [from Poland]. From 1959, [they will] not take Polish coal for their commodities. Letter from [Otto] Grotewohl[40] regarding the quota of coal. Spring economic conference [in Soviet Union]—resolutions [were] not kept. They [Soviets] will not have enough ore and cotton for Poland.

Iron ore works in Poland.[41] They decided to deliver it to Poland, no reply as yet [from the Poles]. Factory—credits of 2,200 million rubles for the investment. They will deliver all their secret wartime production [methods], patents, licenses. [And] Brand new airplanes with Soviet licenses.[42]

They could come to an arrangement so that we did not have to supply ships. They would be satisfied. [On the Polish] Army—Soviet officers made it [a] high calibre [force]. [On the Polish] Press, [concerning] what it wrote about Khrushchev's meeting [with the PUWP Central Committee in March 1956]—Jewish matter.[43] Their [Soviet] appointments in the Republics. Cites my [Gomulka's] letter to Stalin.[44] What do they [Soviets] want—friendship.
1/ war—dangerous,
2/ to isolate Polish reactionaries,
3/ we belong to a common socialist camp—no one would forgive us if we broke apart.
[There is a] Wide-spread threat to the [Polish] government. [Stanislaw] Mikolajczyk.[45] We [Poles] do not appreciate the dangerousness of the situation. Reading from my [Gomulka's] article of 1948 [on Soviet-Polish unity].[46] Will a wedge not be forced between Poland and the Soviet Union today? Do we support this [wedge] in our [current] position? Why do we tolerate anti-Soviet propaganda [in Poland]?
In Yugoslavia there are no voices in the press against Soviet Union. [The] Voices from our press [read:]—Stalinism is fascism. Let the dogs bark.
What frightens them [Soviets]? It's not [about] insults, as much as the threat of us [Poles] losing power. The article by [Jerszy] Putrament[47] [for example] about the amoral position of the USSR.[48] The Poles are beginning what the Yugoslavs have repudiated. They [Soviets] have anxiety for these reasons. The slogan of the youth: away with Rokossowski, is a blow against the army. How are we to reconcile [Soviet-Polish] friendship with the demand to recall officers, Soviet officers[?] They can't be thrown out all of the sudden. Do Soviet officers imperil [Polish] sovereignty? If you consider the Warsaw Pact unnecessary—tell us. Anti-Soviet propaganda does not meet any resistance [in Poland].
People who are guilty of nothing continue to be removed from the [PUWP] leadership—how [are the Soviets] to understand this? Does this not mean that it [changes in the PUWP Politburo] is levelled against the Polish-Soviet friendship[?] How will the removal of Rokossowski be understood by the [Polish] nation, how will this be interpreted abroad? Everyone will understand it as a blow to the alliance.
Is what Comrade Gomulka says, true, or is it just words? I [Gomulka] am returning to work under an anti-Soviet slogan. They [Soviets] do not criticize us—[Jerzy] Morawski, [Wladyslaw] Matwin [are main targets].[49] [For the Soviets] The question is not about people, but what kind of politics is hiding [behind the proposed] personnel changes. The atmosphere [in Poland] is anti-Soviet and the organizational decisions are anti-Soviet. Poland is not a Bulgaria or Hungary—together with us [USSR] it's the most important [country in the region]. In what way does the Soviet Union infringe on [Poland's] sovereignty? In Khrushchev's discussions [with] Tito about the satellites [of Eastern Europe]—Tito banned the [Yugoslav] press from writing on the People's Democracies as [if they were] satellites. Without us [Poland] it is not possible to organize a defense against imperialism.

[Source: Gomulka Family Private Papers; translated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski]

DOCUMENT NO. 3

Aleksander Zawadzki's Notes[50]
Meeting with Comrades Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich on 19 X 56.

Comrade Mikoyan [says] that the [PUWP] Politburo has shown itself to be inhospitable in [its] dealings with the Soviet side. Standing issues include relations between the parties, about the boundaries of the [socialist] camp, and issues between our states.
Our countries are allies, against [whom]? NATO. From our [PUWP] Party they [Soviets] do not have the real information. Ochab says that the situation is complicated, but he does not say what the problem is. American Radio is providing details about the situation in the [PUWP] Party leadership—(Mikoyan reads [apparently from American radio reports]). What can separate us?
1) Economic issues. We [Soviets] need nothing from Poland. The Polish side is also unilaterally presenting [the arguments of] the Soviet side without the facts—[such as the] issue of coal quotas. From 1959, they [Soviets] are ending their orders for coal from Poland to the USSR. Issue of uranium mining—as of Spring we [Poles] have not responded.[51] The Soviet Union experienced [economic] losses no smaller than Poland. The Soviet Union passed on to Poland major military secrets, which included a lot of expenditures on education, and so on. [All] for the taking. He [Mikoyan] cites Comrade Gomulka's letter to Stalin from 1948.[52] About the excess amount of Jews in high positions, [and] that national nihilism characterizes some Jewish comrades. That he [Mikoyan] considers it correct to decrease the congestion [of Jews in the PUWP]. [Mikoyan adds] That now he [Gomulka] will be pulled to the top by the Jews and then again they will drop him.[53] He [Mikoyan] cites an article by Gomulka from September 1948 on the matter of the Polish-Soviet alliance.[54] Are we [Poles] holding to that [correct] line? No. Today anyone can write anything they want about the Soviet Union. Even in capitalist countries the government finds a way to ensure that the press does not offend a friendly state. Today, the Poles are starting what the Yugoslavs have finished. About the unrestricted [Polish press] campaign against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not deprive Poland of its sovereignty. Maybe the Warsaw defense pact is unnecessary? Then we [Poles] should discuss this matter.

Issue of the abrupt removal of a group of comrades from the [PUWP] Politburo, who are seen in the eyes of the [Polish] nation as supporters of the friendship with the Soviet Union. The issue of Comrade Rokossowski—[is a] major political issue.

[For the Soviets] There remain only some minor unresolved differences with Tito. With the Chinese, we [Soviets] have complete understanding on every issue. Comrade Ochab said that at this [Eighth] Plenum, Comrades Morawski and Matwin will be removed [from the PUWP Secretariat], but now they are being put forward [to join the leadership]. (Ochab interrupted and said that he too is being removed [from the post of First Secretary]). The NATO camp wants us [Poles] to argue with the Soviet Union, [to] divide [us]. Tell us [Soviets], where are the differences between us—what do you [Poles] want[?]

2) Comrade Ochab—that he believes Comrades Morawski and Matwin are good, etc. and is for keeping them [Zawadzki leaves space here, possibly to add something later].

3) Comrade Gomulka—He said to himself that he would never return to Party work. Now he sees that he must. The issue of [Poland's continued] friendship [with the Soviet Union] is [also] the opinion of the entire [PUWP] collective [leadership]. [But] that which now exists in the [PUWP] Politburo cannot continue. The [old] Politburo was not in the position to take control of the situation [in Poland]. The resolutions of the Seventh Plenum [of July 1956] were in fact correct — [but] a section of the Politburo mem-

bership understands it differently. [Especially] The issue of democratization.[55] Some [PUWP] comrades took the position to just wait [and do nothing].

He [Gomulka] believes that a Politburo composed of 9 persons will be sufficient. But, even with this new composition [it may not be enough]—Comrade Ochab represents opinion calling for harsh measures against the [Polish] press and this [too] will not help... The root of the problem [is] in the material condition of the working class, but there are other [causes as well]. As to Comrade Molotov's question [apparently about the attacks on Stalin in Poland], he [Gomulka] replies: and "you too"—[reminding Molotov of] Khrushchev's [secret] report [to the Twentieth CPSU Congress] on Stalin. [On] the issue of coal [Gomulka says]—there are many questions and we [the Poles] have not answered them all. Other matters [include]: irregularities in the [Polish] organs of security. Many innocent people were arrested, tormented. The issue of [Soviet] advisers attached to the [Polish] security [apparatus] and their recall [to the Soviet Union]. The issue of the [Soviet] Advisers and their responsibility [while in Poland]. And, that Zawadzki told me [Gomulka]: how can we [Poles] make them [Soviet advisers] accept responsibility [for their actions]. I [Zawadzki] had apparently told this to Comrade Gomulka this [past] May.[56] That the Soviet comrades should not fear that [our] planned changes would weaken the friendship [between the Soviet Union and Poland]... In their reply to the Soviet comrades, the Yugoslav comrades were right, in 1948, in answering to the letter by Stalin and Molotov, that they knew their [own] people well, and that experience has shown that they had, and they continue to have today, the support of the [Yugoslav] nation. In a letter they [Yugoslavs] stated... [again Zawadzki leaves some space]

4) Comrade Zambrowski. That the Soviet comrades have introduced discord among us in the Politburo.[57]

5) Zawadzki (attached points). [It is not clear what he means here]

6) Comrade Jozwiak—Here [in Poland] one can feel [the presence of] an enemy, who acts cunningly and [is] deeply [rooted]. That there is no one in the Politburo who is opposed to democracy. But that hostile elements are active [in the Party]. He agrees that our leadership was not leadership at all. The issue of Soviet officers—he [Jozwiak] told the First Secretary [Ochab] why we want to send them [Soviet officers] back. That at a Politburo meeting four comrades, O[chab], G[omulka], Z[awadzki], C[yrankiewicz], were asked [to select the new Politburo], they proposed the obvious Politburo members. He [Jozwiak] was opposed [to the new Politburo], and so was one more comrade. He mostly means Comrade Rokossowski.

7) Comrade Zenon Nowak—The nature of the situation—it is about a struggle for power [inside the PUWP]. The work [of those engaged in the struggle] went along the lines of a critique, to smear everything and everyone [opposed to them].[58] We excluded one person from the Party and there was uproar.[59] The mood in the country [Poland] is being organized. About the list with the composition of the new [PUWP] Politburo—it was made public without the Politburo's decision (Ochab explains that he gave permission...). He [Nowak] does not think that the new list of Politburo members will solve the situation.

8) Comrade Cyrankiewicz—He declares his position toward the USSR. —To remove everything that adversely impacts the issue of [the Soviet-Polish] friendship. —That the greeting today at the airport is contradictory to everything that was settled at the July [1955] Plenum of the CPSU[60] about the mutual relations between our countries. That we have to deal with the issue of strengthening the Party and the leadership. [Cyrankiewicz is] Against Comrade Rokossowski, for banging his fist on the table. —(Comrade Khrushchev: where are you headed with this? You are either naive, or you pretend to be...). At this point, 9:00 [p.m.], Comrade Gomulka vehemently protests against the movement of Soviet and Polish tanks—[which brings about] sharp clashes with the Soviet comrades. Comrade Khrushchev—that in Germany [there is] a huge Soviet army... Comrade Mikoyan—go ahead, do it, but you will assume a great responsibility in front of the Party, the nation and the brother countries! (directed at Gomulka).[61] Again, about the list of new Politburo [members]...[and its] distribution in Warsaw.

9) Comrade Khrushchev. 1) regarding the [Soviet] advisers—that rather reluctantly they will give it to us [Soviets will concede]. That he [Khrushchev] feels pained by the position of Comrade Gomulka on the issue of the advisers. That the Soviet Union saw it as its duty [to send advisers to Poland]. He [Khrushchev] admits that they [Soviets] travelled here with the purpose of telling us their views, interpretations, and to influence us... But we [the Poles] will not entertain anything. Very determined concerning the issue of Comrade Rokossowski. [Soviets concerned] That this is how Gomulka has come [to join] the leadership of the [Polish] Party, with such a position.

10) Comrade Molotov, that we [the Poles] of course have to take responsibility [for our problems], but that they [the Soviets] have to take responsibility for the larger issue of the [socialist] camp.

11) Rokossowski, what kind of circumstances do I find myself in.

12) Comrade Ochab. There are social forces, which are active...That all the comrades in the Politburo are good. [It's] just that we [in the Polish Party] did not want to hinder Comrade Gomulka [in his role] as the First Secretary.

Rejoinder by Soviet comrades, that the [PUWP] Politburo should not remove itself from the desires of the First Secretary.

[Source: Zawadzki Papers, AAN, KC PZPR; translated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski with Jan Grabowski]

Another account of the October 19-20 Soviet-Polish meeting was presented by Gomulka to the Chinese on 11 January 1957. It is a refined version of the Soviet-Polish confrontation of October 1956, exclusively from the Polish perspective. Document No. 4 below allowed Gomulka to make his case, albeit to a private audience, that the Soviet-Polish confrontation of October 1956 was his—and therefore a Polish—victory. This document also provides us with a glimpse of the Chinese reaction to the October events in Poland, especially to Zhou Enlai's understanding of the Soviet Union's place in the international communist movement.[62]

DOCUMENT NO. 4[63]

Secret [Handwritten]

NOTES

from the completed discussions of 11 and 12 January 1957 between the delegates of the Chinese People's Republic [ChPR] and Poland.

The Chinese side in the discussions included: Comrades Zhou Enlai, He Long, Wang Dongxing, and the ambassador of the ChPR in Poland, Wang Pinga.

From the Polish side participants included: Comrades Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Zawadzki, Ochab, Zambrowski, Rapacki, [Stefan] Naszkowski, and Poland's ambassador to the Chinese People's Republic, [Stanislaw] Kiryluk.

First sitting on day 11.I.1957 at 1500 hrs.

[Comrade Gomulka]

(...)

Fundamentally correct resolutions had been accepted at our VII Plenum [of July 1956], but they remained unfulfilled because our leadership and many lower structures in the Party were paralyzed. The primary deficiency of the VII Plenum, however, was its inability to steer the Polish-Soviet relationship back to a position of equality and sovereignty. This deeply preyed on the country. Many comrades in the Party leadership came to the conclusion, in order to avoid a dangerous situation in the country, that it was time to regulate Polish-Soviet relations. This situation was well known to the CPSU leadership, but the Soviet comrades decided firmly at the time to oppose actively this tendency. The result was

that on the day before the VIII Plenum opened, the Soviet embassy communicated to us that a delegation, which did in fact arrive, will present itself in Poland on the very day the Plenum opens. The Soviet comrades also turned to the then First Secretary, comrade Ochab, to comrade Cyrankiewicz, and to me, even though I was not a CC member at the time, to demand that we clearly state our views on his matter. With one voice we asked the Soviet comrades not to come and not to meet with us on the day the VIII Plenum opened; maybe later, on the next day, or even later, so that it would not make our work more difficult. Despite our position, the Soviet comrades told us through their ambassador that they will arrive on the day of the Plenum and that they expect Party and Government leaders to greet them at the airport. We understood this to be a dictate and a threat to us personally. Not wanting to aggravate this delicate situation, the whole PUWP Politburo decided to greet the CPSU delegation. And here came the incidents that weighed very heavily on the subsequent course of events and the work of the Plenum. The Soviet comrades, especially comrade Khrushchev, immediately caused a scene at the airport. There were many Soviet generals who served in the Polish Army, as well as Marshal Konev, at the airport. Khrushchev first greeted the Soviet generals and Marshal Rokossowski, completely ignoring members of the PUWP Politburo and the Government. Next, he approached the Polish delegation. He gestured his finger to comrade Ochab like a lout and began to threaten [in Russian]: "That number won't pass here." We accepted all of this very calmly. We did not want the Soviet generals and their chauffeurs to see any public display because we knew the harm that this could bring. The Soviet comrades, right there at the airport, demanded a postponement of the Plenum. This was exactly at the moment when every CC member waited for the Plenum to open. We asked the Soviet comrades if they would come to the Belvedere Palace, where we resumed the discussions.

Khrushchev's first words were as follows: "We have decided to intervene brutally in your affairs and we will not allow you to realize your plans." We immediately thought that if someone puts a revolver on the table we will not talk. We asked if they wanted to arrest us. Khrushchev explained that he did not say anything of the sort, only that the CPSU had decided to intervene. Since the comrades were waiting in the hall for the Plenum to begin, we explained that we cannot agree to postpone the Plenum, but after the official opening of the Plenum we will return to the talks with them. The Soviet comrades eventually agreed. After we opened the Plenum, and added certain members to the CC, we gave no indication about the atmosphere at the meeting, adding only that we are going to continue our talks with the Soviet comrades.

The subsequent talks were somewhat calmer. Comrade Mikoyan reported the perspective of the Soviet delegation. He said that the Soviet Union has certain military forces on GDR [German Democratic Republic] territory and is concerned that changes by us after the VIII Plenum might lead to a difficult situation, with a loss of communications to those military forces, especially if Poland wants to break away from the bloc uniting our states. We explained to the Soviet comrades that the changes would allow for the strengthening of our cooperation and not to its weakening (about which they were well informed; and that no one alive among us wants to break away). The Soviet comrades were threatening a brutal response because they concluded we should not make changes to the CC PUWP Politburo, except to include comrade Gomulka. The Soviet comrades pointed out that there are real communists in Poland, who take a correct position, and therefore we are obliged to support them. It was an attempt to split the Party leadership into groups.

At this time, we received reports that the Soviet army stationed in Poland began to march on Warsaw. As to our question about what this means, the Soviet comrades explained that it was part of some military exercise planned a long time ago. We explained to the Soviet comrades that, notwithstanding the facts, in the eyes of Polish society this military exercise will be understood as an attempt to put pressure on the Government and Party. We demanded the return of the Soviet armored units to their bases. The Soviet comrades told Marshal Rokossowski, who was taking part in the discussions, to transmit to Marshal Konev the wishes of the PUWP Politburo, to halt the military exercises, which of course did not happen. Smaller units of the Polish armed forces were also moved in the direction of Warsaw, on the orders of Marshal Rokossowski, who, when asked, admitted: "I wanted to secure selected positions in Warsaw." Of course, Rokossowski did not inform the PUWP Politburo about his orders, merely confirming, after we asked about it, that he had given the orders.

The talks with the Soviet delegation went on for the whole day. The atmosphere was very unpleasant, inhospitable. Our side was calm but determined. Near the end of the talks, now calmly, comrade Khrushchev explained: "It doesn't matter what you want, our view is such that we will have to restart the intervention." We again assured the Soviet comrades that their fears concerning Poland's departure from the bloc of socialist states was groundless. We will respect the wishes of the Party and we will build socialism according to our will.

We were given further information concerning the continued advance of the Soviet army in the direction of Warsaw; Soviet tanks ran over a number of people. Soviet warships also entered our territorial waters. Again, we tried to intervene, but the Soviet comrades did not listen.

On the next day, the Soviet delegation flew back to Moscow. This time, the farewell at the airport was more normal. The news of the Soviet delegation's visit to Poland, including the incident at the airport, spread throughout Warsaw with the speed of light. It was said that the Soviet comrades argued with our Politburo. This raised the level of tensions in an already tense atmosphere. Rumors also spread, even before the Soviet delegation had arrived, that there were plans to seize the state. Workers at their enterprises were mobilized and put on a state of readiness by the Warsaw Provincial Party Committee. Rumors spread to the effect that Rokossowski's army was planning, together with the Soviet army, to fight the Internal Security Corps, etc. The above examples weighed heavily on the subsequent resolution of the situation in the Party and in Poland. The PUWP Politburo decided to inform the Plenum about the better half of the results of the talks with the Soviet delegation. We put the whole affair this way: the Soviet comrades were very concerned to ensure that their communications with their army in the GDR were not damaged. The Politburo was able to convince the Soviet comrades that nothing will stand in the way of their cooperation with us and the GDR. In response to the many questions put to us by workers at different enterprises, we tried to justify the trip made by the Soviet comrades, we tried to defend their position, and we will continue to keep secret our talks. Shortly after this came the first incidents from Hungary, which added to the causes of our internal difficulties.
(...)

Comrade Zhou Enlai thanks comrade Gomulka for his extensive information about the situation in Poland. It appears that the position taken by the PUWP during the October events was correct. Its correctness is based on the fact that the Polish comrades resorted to Marxist-Leninist principles in their work. The Communist Party of China [CPCh] supported the decision of the Polish Party from the beginning, when the VIII Plenum made its decision. The main decision was taken by the Polish comrades. The CPCh simply played a stabilizing role. The relations between fraternal parties, Zhou Enlai said, ought to be based on Marxism-Leninism. Relations between socialist countries ought to be based on equal rights.

The Soviet Union, in its declaration of 30 October [1956], recognized that cooperation must be based on equality. The CPCh supported this position and we have always tried to work in support of it. As Marxists we ought to know how to learn from mistakes. In the Polish-Soviet relationship in the past there was a lot of inequality. Now this has been corrected. We are of the opinion that the PUWP should avoid public discussion of the situation which transpired with the CPSU because it could damage our camp. It is also correct that the PUWP did not ignite nation-

alist sentiments. Your tactics allowed for the regulation of difficult problems without a public discussion, of which the imperialists could have taken advantage. In our declaration of 29 December [1956] we underlined that antagonistic and non-antagonistic disputes should be resolved by various methods. I support the position of comrade Gomulka, Zhou Enlai said, about equality and sovereignty, but the leading role of the Soviet Union must be remembered. The leading role of the Soviet Union is the main point, while equality and errors are points of less value. Comrade Mao Zedong in his talks with comrade Kiryluk correctly underlined that relations between our countries ought to be like relations between brothers, and not like the relations between a father and a son, like the past the relations between the USSR and Poland. For our part, we told the CPSU that their position regarding the relations with fraternal parties is not always correct. But we do not believe this ought to be spoken of in public, so we do not weaken the USSR. It is not necessary to return to the errors. The main point at this time is the leading role of the CPSU and to unite again against our enemies.
(...)
Warsaw, 16.I.1957
Protocols by: Kiryluk St.
Krazarz K.
7 copies

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 107, tom 5, str. 83, 85-88, 93-95; translated from the Polish by L.W. Gluchowski.]

The Soviet delegation decided to let the PUWP Central Committee deal with Rokossowski and his future status in the Polish Party. The Soviet-Polish confrontation of October 1956 ended peacefully. The Polish delegation was given permission to continue with the 8th Plenum. The unity of Polish society against Soviet armed intervention, as well as its overwhelming support for a communist leader who gained Khrushchev's trust, ensured that sanity prevailed. The Poles had thereby managed to avoid the tragic fate that would soon befall the Hungarians. The joint Soviet-Polish communiqué of 20 October 1956 declared: "The debates were held in an atmosphere of Party-like and friendly sincerity. It was agreed that a delegation of the PUWP Politburo would go to Moscow in the nearest future to discuss with the Presidium of the CPSU problems of further strengthening the political and economic cooperation between the PPR and the Soviet Union, and to further consolidating the fraternal friendship and coexistence of the PUWP and the CPSU."[64] The entire Soviet delegation returned to Moscow at 6:45 a.m. on October 20.

The 8th Plenum resumed proceedings at 11 a.m. that same day. The details of the debates have been available since 1956 and it is not necessary to relate them here. Gomulka's long speech to the Plenum, broadcast to the nation on state radio, set the tone of the debate. He uncompromisingly condemned Stalinism and its political and economic consequences in Poland. The substance of Gomulka's speech was not significantly different from the programme he had outlined to the Politburo on October 12.[65] He attacked the attempts to blame imperialist forces for the Poznan revolt and demanded that the Party learn from the bitter lesson taught by the working class.[66] Gomulka also demanded an investigation into the illegal activities of the security apparatus. Gomulka's "Polish road to socialism" called for relations between the PUWP and CPSU to be based on equality, but also assumed that the Polish People's Republic could not weaken its formal ties to the Soviets.

The controversy over Rokossowski was the most animated part of the debate at the 8th Plenum. The Marshal explained his position thus: "The army has not received any decision from the leadership that there should be no movements of units and even if such a decision were received it would take several days to implement it. Comrades are aware that this is the time when the army conducts tactical exercises...Indeed Soviet forces were moving. They were conducting autumn maneuvers...They were moving in the direction of Lódz and Bydgoszcz...I asked Marshal Konev...that the eastward movement of the [Soviet] Northern [Army] Group should stop and the units return to their bases...That is all I know."[67] The Party leaders remained sensitive to Khrushchev's accusations of anti-Soviet passions in Poland and shielded Rokossowski from mounting attacks at the Plenum.

The elections to the Politburo at the 8th Plenum began at 5:30 p.m on October 20. Ochab attempted to soften the blow over Rokossowski's removal from the Politburo with the following statement: "I would just like to point out briefly that not to nominate someone does not by any means indicate a lack of confidence...Comrade Rokossowski's case is simply one of the many personnel matters."[68] The following were elected to the Politburo by the Central Committee in a secret ballot: Cyrankiewicz (73 votes of 75 votes); Gomulka (74); Jedrychowski (72); Loga-Sowinski (74); Morawski (56); Ochab (75); Rapacki (72); Zambrowski (56); and Zawadzki (68). Rokossowski only received 23 votes and failed to get elected. The following were elected to the Secretariat: Albrecht (73); Gierek (75); Gomulka (74); Jarosinski (74); Matwin (68); Ochab (75); and Zambrowski (57). In an open ballot, the CC unanimously, and without a show of hands, elected Gomulka to the post of First Secretary.[69]

Polish state radio ceased its normal programming on October 21 at 10:27 p.m. and broadcast the election results to the nation. The Warsaw press immediately issued an extra edition and distributed the announcement to the thousands of workers and students who waited in anticipation for the results of the 8th Plenum. The front page of *Trybuna Ludu* declared: "Today we have a leadership capable of implementing the programme worked out after the 7 and 8 Plenum. This leadership is capable of getting the support of the toiling masses of the whole country."[70] Within the next few days an almost endless stream of letters poured into the Central Committee from individual Party activists as well as from Party-directed institutions. The overwhelming majority of the Party rank-and-file approved of the decisions taken by the Plenum and wrote approvingly of Gomulka's election to the post of First Secretary.

On October 22 Ponomarenko handed Gomulka a short letter from the CPSU First Secretary. Document No. 5 below is Khrushchev's written response to Gomulka's request that Soviet officers be removed from the Polish Army. Khrushchev also agreed to found a new institution attached to the Polish Committee for Public Security to represent the KGB.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

SECRETARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
PUWP
Comrade W. GOMULKA

1. During comrade Ochab's stay in Moscow, on his way to China, comrade Ochab, in his 11 September [1956] conversation with the Central Committee of the CPSU, transmitted the view of the CC PUWP that it was now time to abolish the institution of Soviet advisers attached to the Committee for Public Security of the PPR.[71]

At the same time, comrade Mikoyan told comrade Ochab that the position of the Polish comrades corresponds with the main line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In connection with this, the Presidium of the CC CPSU has decided to recall all Soviet advisers that have been sent, at the time at the request of the Polish Government, to assist the work of the PPR organs of security.[72]

During the same conversation, comrade Ochab transmitted the view of the CC PUWP about the need, after the institution of Soviet advisers is abolished, to create new forms of collaboration between the organs of security of the USSR and Poland, with the aim to create a new representative office of the USSR Committee for State Security attached to the PPR Committee for Public Security.[73]

The CC CPSU, in principle, agrees with such a position and is ready to consider this question when concrete proposals are received from the CC PUWP.

2. According to the requests made by the Polish Government, and in accordance with agreements between our governments, there is a certain number of Soviet officers and general officers still posted together with personnel of the Polish Army.

The CC CPSU believes that if in the opinion of the CC PUWP there is no longer a need for the remaining Soviet officers and general officers on the staff of the Polish Army, then we agree in advance on their being recalled.[74] We ask you to prepare the proposals about how this could be solved when the delegation from the Politburo of the CC PUWP arrives in Moscow.[75]

SECRETARY CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU

N. KHRUSHCHEV

22 October 1956

[Unsigned. Above the date and handwritten in Polish it reads: *"Handed to me personally by C[omrade] Ponomarenko"* and initialled by Gomulka.]

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26, s. 176-177; translated from the Russian by L.W. Gluchowski.]

Gomulka held his victory speech on October 24 outside the Palace of Culture in Warsaw. Over 300,000 people gathered to hear the First Secretary, the largest meeting of its kind in Poland until the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1979. No other First Secretary in the history of the PUWP ever received such an outpouring of popular support. Gomulka appeared on the balcony, surrounded by the new Politburo.

More important, Khrushchev put the Polish question to rest in Europe for almost 25 years, until the rise of "Solidarity" in 1980-81. The significance of the "Polish October" for Soviet international politics, and for the Khrushchev years in particular, was overshadowed by the thaw in East-West relations following Stalin's death and eclipsed by the tragedy of Budapest in November 1956. The Soviet invasion of Hungary and the ruthless suppression of the popular uprising permanently stained Khrushchev's post-Stalin achievements. Previous research on Poland's de-Stalinization crisis tended to emphasize Polish domestic politics.[76] But Khrushchev's intervention in October 1956 may come to be viewed as the most significant foreign policy victory of the Khrushchev years. The PUWP was the first ruling Party in the former Soviet bloc to undergo an extensive de-Stalinization campaign. Khrushchev thus helped to guide the first transformation of the modern Polish state. In spite of the PUWP's subsequent neglect of ideological matters over the next thirty-three years, it was still able to implement some of the most extensive political reforms of any socialist state in the region. And Poland's negotiated transition to multi-party democracy in 1989 was one of the smoothest in central Europe. If the second and current transition succeeds in consolidating democratic governance in Poland, Khrushchev may have to be given some of the credit for the role he played in establishing the parameters for the consolidation of a stable, workable, and strategically secure Polish state between Germany and Russia. The "Polish October" was also "Khrushchev's October."

The most striking common feature of the documents presented here is the degree to which many issues of public policy are also articulated as conflicts between human beings.[77] There appears to have been little interest in the structural causes of conflict among the communist leaders of this period. Conflict between communist states, and especially conflict between fraternal communist parties, is often discussed as if it were a struggle between individual leaders, who made correct or incorrect policy choices. The discussions outlined in the these documents, about the need to reconstitute dramatically the exploitative relationship between the Soviet Union and its Soviet bloc allies, mirrored the style and the tone perfected by Stalin, who often personalized public policy disputes and presented their resolution in dramatic form.[78] The discussions, as reflected in the documents, either by the Polish, Soviet, or Chinese leaders, indicate that Stalin's influence over the international communist movement continued to resonate long after his death.

1. See the excellent study on the repression of the Polish officer corps by Jerzy Poksinski, *"TUN" Tatar-Utnik-Nowicki: Represje wobec oficerów Wojska Polskiego w latach 1949-1956 [Repression against officers of the Polish Army, 1949-1956]* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo 'Bellona' ['Bellona' Publishers], 1992). See also a collection of documents on the Polish military counter-intelligence agency: Zbigniew Palski, ed., *Agentura Informacji Wojskowej w latach 1945-1956 [The Military Information Agency, 1945-1956]* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk [Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences], 1992). On the Polish security apparatus see Andrzej Paczkowski, "Aparat bezpieczenstwa w latach odwilzy: causus Polski" [The Security Apparatus During the Thaw: Polish *Casus*]" (Mimeographed).

2. The total number of Soviet officers remaining in the Polish Army as of 1 May 1956 was 76, 28 of whom were generals, 32 colonels, 13 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, and 1 captain. This was a considerable decline from the 712 Soviet officers who served in the Polish Army between July 1952 and March 1953 (67% to 73% of the total number of colonels and lieutenant colonels respectively in the Polish Army, which included 41 general officers). Yet Soviet officers (excluding Rokossowski) continued to occupy many of the leading military positions, including deputy minister of defence and Chief of the General Staff. For details see the documentary study by Edward Jan Nalepa, *Oficerowie Radzieccy w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968 (studium historyczno-wojskowe), Czesc I i II (zalaczniki) [Soviet Officers in the Polish Army, 1943-1968 (A Military History Study), Part I and II (Appendices)]* (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny [Military History Institute], 1992). I am preparing a working paper on Soviet military policy in Poland between 1943-1959 for the Stalin Archives Project of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto.

3. Communist Party of Poland (CPP) member and union activist from 1926; thrice arrested and twice sentenced for communist activity. Studied at the Lenin International School in Moscow 1933-36; imprisoned in Poland 1936-39, thus escaping the Great Purge and the liquidation of the CPP by the Comintern in 1938; joined the Polish Workers Party (PWP) in 1942; PWP General Secretary 1943; deputy premier of the Provisional Government and of the Government of National Unity, and Minister of the Recovered Territories until January 1949. Dismissed from the Politburo at the August-September 1948 Plenum, when he was accused of "rightist-nationalist deviationism," but still elected to the CC at the First PUWP (Unification) Congress in December 1949; expelled from the PUWP in 1949; arrested in 1951; released in 1954; PUWP First Secretary from October 1956 to December 1970.

4. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Evacuated to Russia in 1915; took part in the Bolshevik revolution; military officer arrested during the Great Purge; released in 1941 and appointed to rank of general; promoted to Marshal in the Red Army during World War II; sent to Poland by Stalin after the war. On 5 November 1949 he

was made a citizen of Poland, Marshal of Poland, Minister of National Defense, and member of the CC PUWP; joined the Politburo in May 1950; deputy premier in 1952. Expelled from the Politburo and CC in October 1956; recalled to the USSR on 13 November 1956, where he served as a deputy minister of national defense.

5. 1949-50 first deputy defense minister and chief political officer of the Polish Armed Forces; 1950-56 Secretary PUWP; March-October 1956 First Secretary PUWP.

6. Ochab travelled to Beijing via Moscow in September to attend the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. In Moscow, Ochab informed Khrushchev that Gomulka would be joining the leadership. Ochab also told the Soviets that the PUWP Central Committee wanted the Soviet advisers attached to the Committee for Public Security to leave Poland. In China, Ochab sought Beijing's support in the event the CPSU and PUWP could not come to an agreement. For further details see his interview with Teresa Toranska, *Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets*, trans. by Agnieszka Kolakowska (London: Collins, Harvill, 1987), 66-72; and Andrzej Werblan, "Czy Chinczycy uratowali Gomulka? [Did the Chinese Rescue Gomulka?]" *Polityka* 26 October 1991.

7. "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 1 I2 X 1956 r., nr. 122," Archiwum Akt Nowych [Archive of Modern Records] (AAN), Warsaw, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 167-169.

8. Panteleimon Kondrat'evich Ponomarenko was Extraordinary Ambassador of the USSR to Poland from 7 May 1955 to 28 September 1957. He joined the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] in 1925; worked with Malenkov in the CC apparatus 1938; First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party; member CC VKP(b) and CC CPSU 1939-61.

9. "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 8 i 10 X 1956 r., nr. 124," AAN, KC PZPR [CC PUWP], paczka 15, tom 58, str. 172-174.

10. "Nieautoryzowane Wystapienie tow. Wieslawa na posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego w dniu 12 pazdziernika 1956 r.," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 29-36; and "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 12 X 1956 r., nr. 125," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 187-188. The full text of Gomulka's presentation to the Politburo on 12 October has been reprinted in an important collection of documents by Jakub Andrzejewski [Andrzej Paczkowski], ed., *Gomulka i inni: Dokumenty z archiwum KC 1948-1982 [Gomulka and Others: Documents from the CC Archives, 1948-1982]* [hereafter *Gomulka i inni*] (London: 'Aneks', 1987), 89-96.

11. CPP member before the war; during the war chief of staff of the People's Army. The People's Army was trained by the Soviets and modelled after the Soviet partisan brigades. 1945 commander of the Polish militia; 1945-48 member of the PWP Politburo; 1948-59 member of the PUWP Central Committee; 1948-56 member of the PUWP Politburo and head of the Central Commission of Party Control; 1955-56 deputy premier; 1949-52 president of the Chief Board of Supervision and member of the State Council; 1952-55 minister of State Control.

12. 1924-38 CPP functionary and Central Committee member from 1932; 1942 arrested by the Nazis and sent to a labour camp; 1945 liberated and joined the Soviet army. Returns to Poland in 1947; PWP Provincial Committee Second Secretary in Poznan then Provincial Committee First Secretary in Katowice; 1947-48 head of the PWP Central Committee cadres department; 1948-80 member PUWP Central Committee; 1950-54 PUWP Secretary; 1950-56 member of the PUWP Politburo; 1952-68 deputy premier; 1964-71 head of the Central Committee of Party Control; 1969-71 head of the Chief Board of Supervision; 1971-77 ambassador to Moscow.

13. 1948-59 member of the PUWP Central Committee; 1952-56 member of the PUWP Politburo; 7 July 1944 to 7 December 1954 Minister of Public Security; 1954-56 Minister of State Farms.

14. "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 15 X 1956 r., nr. 126," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, s. 37-56; and "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 12 X 1956 r., nr. 126," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 189.

15. Member of the Polish Socialist Party (PSP); during the war a member of the resistance movement supported by the London government-in-exile; arrested by the Nazis in 1941 and sent to Auschwitz. 1945-48 PSP general secretary; supported the union of PSP with PWP; 1948-75 member of PUWP Central Committee; 1948-71 member PUWP Politburo; 1947-52 Prime Minister; 1952-54 deputy premier; 1954-70 Prime Minister; 1971-72 head of the Council of State (head of state); 1972 until his death in 1989 head of the Polish National Peace Council.

16. CCCP member from 1922; in the USSR during the war, where he was one of the organizers of the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP). The UPP was founded in Moscow in 1943; it marked the beginning of the future communist government in Poland. 1943-44 deputy chief political officer in the Polish Army; member of the Politburo from 1943; 1949-51 head of the Central Council of Trade Unions; 1951-52 deputy premier; head of the Council of State from 1952 until his death in 1964.

17. Secretary of the Lódz CPP Committee before the war; spent the war in the USSR, where he was member of the UPP and a political officer in the Polish Army. 1944-48 Secretary of the PWP Central Committee; 1948-64 member of the PUWP Central Committee; 1948-63 member of the PUWP Politburo; 1947-54 and 1956-63 Secretary of the PUWP; 1947-55 member of the Council of State; 1955-56 minister of State Control; 1963-68 vice-president of the Chief Board of Supervision. Accused of revisionism in 1963 and removed from Party posts; expelled from the PUWP during the anti-Jewish and anti-intellectual purges of March 1968.

18. I am preparing a complete translation of the proceedings of the PUWP's Sixth Plenum of March 1956 (including Khrushchev's long presentation to the Plenum) for a discussion of Soviet cadre policies in Poland from 1954 to 1956. It will be the subject of a forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.

19. 1915-30 in Russia and the Soviet Union; took part in the Russian revolution and Civil War; VCP(b) member; 1930 sent to Poland, where he was arrested and sentenced to six years' imprisonment; spent World War II in the Soviet Union; 1945-59 member of the PWP and PUWP Central Committees; 1948-51 deputy member of the PUWP Politburo; 1950-56 PUWP Secretary; 1951-56 member of the PUWP Politburo; 1957-65 ambassador to Prague.

20. "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 17 X 1956 r., nr. 127," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 57-65; and "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 17 X 1956 r., nr. 127," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 190.

21. "Protokól z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego z dnia 18 X 1956 r., nr. 128," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 192.

22. Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* [hereafter *The Last Testament]*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 199-200.

23. The Soviet Northern Army Group was situation in some 35 garrisons in northern and western Poland. They were part of two armored and mechanized divisions located near Borno-Sulinowo in Western Pomerania and Swietoszów in Lower Silesia, and included a number of tactical air force groups stationed throughout Poland. In October 1956, the Northern Army Group was commanded by General S. Galicki (who had served in the Polish Army from 1943 to 1946) and, his chief of staff, General Stognev.

Information passed on to the PUWP Central Committee from October 19 to 26 indicated that on October 19 many units of the Northern Army Group had left their garrisons and were moving in several columns towards Warsaw. General Galicki had already moved his headquarters to Leczyca near the city of Lódz. Soviet air force units, spotted at various military airports in Poland, and Soviet naval units at their base in Swinojscie as well as those near Gdansk were put on alert. Furthermore, from October 18 to 21, the Polish coastline was patrolled by Soviet aircraft. General I. Turkiel, the Soviet commander of the Polish Air Force (returned to the Soviet Union in November 1956), also gave an order to halt all flights by Polish warplanes and the Aerial Club. The Soviets, on the other hand, were granted an unlimited right to conduct flights over Polish airspace. It was also reported that Soviet units in the Belorussian and Kiev regions were placed on a state of military readiness.

During the afternoon of October 19, Khrushchev, after he was pressed by Gomulka, gave Rokossowski the authority to issue instructions to Marshal Konev to halt the movement of the Northern Army Group toward Warsaw. However, Soviet units were reported moving as late as October 23. Smaller, more specialized units, were brought to Warsaw in secret to protect strategic installations. This included officer cadets from the Liaison Officer School in Zegrze, who were stationed on October 19 in the garages on Klonowa street, opposite the Belvedere Palace. These troops were probably part of the system set up by Rokossowski to protect the Soviet delegation in Warsaw.

For further details on the movement of Soviet military forces in Poland at this time see Jerzy Poksinski, "Wojsko Polskie w 1956 r. — problemy polityczne (1) i (2) [The Polish Army in 1956 — Political Problems (1) and (2)]" (Mimeographed); and "Wojskowe aspekty pazdziernika 1956 r. [Military aspects of October 1956]" P*olska Zbrojna [Armed Poland]*, 203 (18-20 October 1991).

24. Quotations from the 8th Plenum are taken from the extensive report of the proceedings published in a special issue of the PUWP's theoretical journal, *Nowe Drogi [New Roads]* 10 (October 1956), 14.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., 15-16.

27. Ochab again returned to the Plenum at 6 p.m. on October 19 and presented a brief report to the Central Committee: "I would like to inform you, Comrades, that conversations between our Politburo and the Soviets, which were conducted in a forthright manner, have lasted several hours. They concern the most fundamental problems of the relations between our countries and our Parties...Since our Soviet comrades unexpectedly had to take the decision to fly to Warsaw and they are anxious to return as soon as possible, we would like to continue our talks tonight and the Politburo recom-

mends that the Plenum be adjourned till tomorrow morning." Ibid., 16.

28. Molotov described Rokossowski's appointment thus: "Before appointing Rokossovsky to Poland I went there and told the Poles we would give them one of our experienced generals as minister of defense. And we decided to give them one of the best—Rokossowski. He was good-natured, polite, a tiny bit Polish, and a talented general. True, he spoke Polish badly, stressing the wrong syllables. He wasn't happy about going there, but it was very important for us that he be there, that he put everything in order. After all, we knew nothing about them." See Albert Resis, ed., *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 54.

29. Khrushchev, *The Last Testament*, 203.

30. Ibid., 205.

31. Ochab in Toranska, *Oni*, 77-78.

32. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* [hereafter *The Glasnost Tapes*], trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav W. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1990), 115.

33. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), 205.

34. Ibid., 203.

35. Khrushchev, *The Glasnost Tapes*, 116.

36. The following PUWP Politburo members missed the Soviet-Polish meeting: Hilary Minc, who resigned from the Politburo on 9 October 1956; Dworakowski, who was apparently ill; and Mazur, who was on vacation in the Soviet Union. Mazur flew to Moscow on October 13 and did not return to Poland until November 6. It has been suggested that Mazur went to the Soviet Union to play the role of Hungary's János Kádár in the event the Soviets decided to "invade" Poland. See also the comments by Jakub Berman (the second highest ranking member of the PUWP Politburo during the Stalin years who resigned his posts in May 1956 and was expelled from the Party in 1957) on Mazur in Toranska, *Oni*, 263-264; and the interview with Antoni Skulbaszewski (the second highest ranking Soviet officer in Polish military counter-intelligence until 1954) in Michal Komar and Krzysztof Lang, "Mysmy juz o tym mówili, prosze Pana... [We have already talked about this, sir...]," *Zeszyty Historyczne [Historical Papers]* 91 (1990), 182, fn. no. 5.

37. I would like to express my gratitude to Andrzej Werblan and the editorial board of *Dzis* [*Today*] for allowing me to include both documents in this article. The original Polish texts, with an introduction by Werblan, will be published in the April 1995 edition of *Dzis.* The Gomulka text was edited by Werblan and the Zawadzki text was edited by Józef Stepnia. The original texts used many abbreviations.

38. The commentaries in the text and the notes are mine. The original document was made available by Gomulka's son, Ryszard Strzelecki-Gomulka, and belongs to the family.

39. On the role of Radio Free Europe and the foreign correspondents in Warsaw who reported on the October events to the West see Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, *Wojna w Eterze* [*War on the Air*], Tom 1 [Vol. 1] (London: Odnowa [Restoration], 1986), ch. 15.

40. 1949-1964 President of the German Democratic Republic.

41. Gomulka is not clear, but he is probably referring to the Soviet offer to help build a factory in Poland to enrich uranium ore. See "Notatka z rozmowy polsko-radzieckich z 22 pazdziernika 1956 r w sprawie eksploatacji rudy uranowej — i Zalaczniki," AAN, KC PZPR paczka 112, tom 26, str. 643-661.

42. See [in Russian] "Pismo N. Chruszczowa do Wl. Gomulki z 13 kwietnia 1957 r. Dot. Uzbrojenia Wojsa Polskiego i produkcji nowoczesnej broni w Polsce oraz naruszenia tajemnej produkcji broni w Polsce," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26, str. 223-225.

43. This is a reference to articles by Leszek Kolakowski, "Antysemici—Piec tez nienowych I przestroga [Anti-Semitism—Five old theses and admonition]," *Po Prostu* [*Plain Speaking*], 22 (27 May 1956), and especially Edda Werfel (her husband, Roman Werfel, was editor-in-chief of *Nowe Drogi* [*New Paths*] from 1952 to 1959, the leading organ of the PUWP Central Committee; he was also editor of *Trybuna Ludu* [*People's Tribune*] for two months in March 1956), "Skad i dlaczego nastroje antyinteligenckie [From where and why the anti-intellectual mood]?" *Po Prostu*, 25 (17 June 1956). Edda Werfel attacked the call in the PUWP, supported by Khrushchev at the Sixth Plenum of March 1956, to "promote new [read: Polish] cadres" at the expense of Jews.

44. Gomulka's letter to Stalin was written on 14 December 1948, after his December 9 meeting with Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The letter was recently published in Poland. See "Ostatni spór Gomulki ze Stalinem [Gomulka's last dispute with Stalin]," ed. by Andrzej Werblan, *Dzis*, 6 (1993).

45. Reference to the "threat" posed by the former premier of the Polish government in London during the war. In 1945 he signed a pact with the communist government in Poland, resulting in the Provisional Government of National Unity. Faced with arrest after the rigged elections of 1947, he escaped to the West.

46. See Gomulka, "Na fundamentach jednosci stanie gmach socjalizmu" [On the foundations of unity stands the structure of socialism], *Glos Ludu* [*The People's Voice*] 328 (28 November 1948).

47. Writer and editor, prominent advocate of socialist realism in literature. 1945-50 Polish ambassador to Paris. In 1956 he was a member of the PUWP Central Committee and Secretary of the Party organization at the Polish Union of Writers. During the Sixth Plenum of March 1956 he made a passionate appeal against anti-Semitism.

48. Putrament wrote in Warsaw's largest daily, "Sedno sparwy" [The essence of the matter], *Zycie Warszawy [Warsaw Life]* (19 October 1956), that "the decisive, nodical problem for People's Poland" concerns the future of the self-governing workers' councils: "all those who will not agree in Poland either to counter-revolution, nor to a return to an 'exceptional state' [Stalinism], must know: socialism in Poland will be founded either by the working class or not at all." In *Pravda*, on October 20, the Soviet correspondent in Warsaw wrote, under the title "Anti-socialist performances in the columns of the Polish press," the following: "Over the last few days in the Polish press an ever increasing number of articles have been published which sound off about the repudiation of the road to socialism." Putrament's article is one of the two mentioned in the *Pravda* piece.

49. At the PUWP Secretariat meeting of 21 March 1956, Ochab took control of the Organization department and the central Party *aktiv*. Mazur retained control of the territorial *apparat*. Matwin acquired the Party's youth organization. Control of the industrial sector was transferred to Gierek. The departments of Education, Party History, and Social Services went to Albrecht, including responsibility for *Nowe Drogi*, *Trybuna Ludu*, and the Party commission which supervised the *Sejm* (Parliament). Morawski was to oversee the departments of Propaganda, Press and Radio, and Culture and Science. He also gained control of the All-Polish Committee of the National Unity Front, the Party commission responsible for education, and the editorial board of *Zycia Partii* [*Party Life*]. Matwin, Morawski and Albrecht—the so-called "Young Secretaries"—thus acquired the daily management of Party propaganda, ideology, culture, education, and the youth-wing of the Party. "Protokól z posiedzenia Sekretariatu KC w dn. 21 III 1956 r., nr. 96," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 58, str. 50-51.

50. The commentaries in the text and the notes are mine. The original document can be found among the Zawadzki papers, AAN, KC PZPR.

51. "Notatka z rozmowy polsko-radzieckich z 22 pazdziernika 1956 r w sprawie eksploatacji rudy uranowej — i Zalaczniki," AAN, KC PZPR paczka 112, tom 26, str. 643-661.

52. See "Ostatni spór Gomulki ze Stalinem [Gomulka's last dispute with Stalin]," ed. by Andrzej Werblan, *Dzis* 6 (1993).

53. Reference to Zambrowski, who, as a leading member of the so-called "Pulawy" group (the reformers) in the PUWP, is largely credited with ensuring Gomulka's entry into the Politburo by withdrawing his support for Ochab.

54. See "Ostatni spór Gomulki ze Stalinem," ed. by Werblan, *Dzis* 6 (1993).

55. For details see chapter eleven (on the Seventh Plenum) of my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Collapse of Stalinist Rule in Poland: The Polish United Worker's Party from the XX CPSU Congress to the VIII CC PUWP Plenum, February-October 1956" (McMaster University, 1994), especially the section on "The Democratization Campaign," pp. 150-152. See also "Stenogram VII Plenum KC PZPR z dni 18-20, 23-25 I 26-28 VIII 1956 r.," AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 70, tom. 25-27, str. 498-1471.

56. The PUWP Politburo delegated Zenon Nowak and Mazur to meet with Gomulka on 9 May 1956. On the next day, Gomulka held talks with Mazur and Zawadzki.

57. For further details see Zambrowski's account of the meeting in his "Dziennik [Journal]," ed. by Antoni Zambrowski, *Krytyka* [*Criticism*], 6 (1980), 72-73. Mikoyan and Kaganovich attempted to spit the PUWP leadership by focusing the blame for past "errors" during the Stalin years in Poland on the Jews in the Polish leadership.

58. Nowak, a leader of the so-called "Natolin" group (hardliners) in the PUWP, is making reference to the attacks against him at the Seventh Plenum, where some of his comments were struck from the record because they were deemed anti-Semitic.

59. This is a reference to the dismissal of Jakub Berman from the Politburo.

60. An account of the Soviet July Plenum of 1955 can be found in testimony of Seweryn Bialer, *Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Second Session, on the Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States*, pt. 29, pp. 1561-63 and 1573.

61. Dmitri Volkogonov recently wrote: "The Soviet ambassador to Poland, Ponomarenko, reported in May [1956] of that year that, since the Twentieth Party [CPSU] Congress of 1956, the Polish [United] Workers' Party had been 'seething'. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov and Kaganovic decide to fly to Warsaw on the eve of the Polish party's Central Committee plenum. Ochab, Gomulka and other Polish leaders protested, but Khrushchev and the others re-

solved to go nevertheless. According to the notes Mikoyan kept, the discussion at a meeting in the Belvedere Palace following the plenum was stormy. Gomulka and the other Polish leaders wanted non-interference in their party's affairs, a definition of the status of Soviet troops in Poland, a reduction in the number of Soviet advisers, and the recall of Soviet Marshal Rokossowski as Polish Minister of Defence.

Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov responded belligerently, shouting "you want to turn your faces to the West and your backs to us...you've forgotten that we have our enormous army in Germany." Emotions grew heated. Mikoyan's notes continue: 'During this conversation one of the Polish comrades handed Gomulka a note. Gomulka requested that they be ordered back to their stations. We exchanged glances and Khrushchev ordered Konev to stop the tanks and send them back to their stations'."

The citation for Mikoyan's notes reads: "APRF [Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii], 'Special File,' Notes of Khrushchev's conversation in Warsaw, May 1960, No. 233." See Volkogonov, *Lenin: A New Biography*, trans. and ed. by Harold Shukman (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 48-482 and 509 endnote no. 13.

62. Khrushchev met with leaders of the Soviet bloc (excluding Poland and Hungary) on 24 October 1956 to discuss the situation in Poland and Hungary. Khrushchev's report on the Polish events and the Soviet-Polish confrontation at the Belvedere Palace was recorded by Jan Svoboda, secretary to A. Novotny, First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. I am grateful to Professor Tibor Hajdu, Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, for sending me a copy of the document (written in Czech), which he found in the Prague archives (Archiv UV KSC, 07/16). According to Professor Hajdu (letter dated 10 March 1995), Svoboda accompanied Novotny because the Czech First Secretary did not understand Russian. The document does not mention who attended the meeting, but a former Russian diplomat who first wrote about this matter mentioned that Liu-Sao-Tsi of China was there, Hajdu wrote.

The Chinese thus heard both versions of the Belvedere Palace meeting. When Gomulka was presenting his version of events to the Chinese, however, he did not know that Khrushchev's version, which portrayed the Soviets as the victors, had already been reported to Beijing.

63. I would like to thank János Tischler, Research Fellow, Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest, for bringing this document to my attention.

64. Text of the communiqué in the PUWP daily, *Trybuna Ludu* (20 October 1956).

65. *Nowe Drogi* 10 (October 1956), 21-46.

66. On the Poznan revolt see Jaroslaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., *Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 [Poznan's June 1956]* (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie [Poznan Publishers], 1990); and Maciej Roman Bombicki, *Poznan '56* (Poznan: Polski Dom Wydawniczy "Lawica" [The Polish Publishing House "Lawica"], 1992).

67. *Nowe Drogi* 10 (October 1956) 20.

68. Ibid., 149.

69. Ibid., 157-158.

70. *Trybuna Ludu*, 21 October 1956.

71. Andrzej Paczkowski, Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences, who has conducted extensive research in the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs archives, provided me (in a letter dated 10 January 1995) with the following information concerning Soviet NKVD/KGB advisers in Poland in 1945-1959: NKVD officers worked with the Polish security apparatus from its inception in July 1944, but their official status at that time is still unclear. It is apparent that there had been connections between the NKVD (and SMERSH) and Poland's Bureau of Public Security (BPS).

On 10 January 1945 the PWP Politburo decided to ask Moscow to send advisors to Poland, which was the beginning of the preparations for the construction of a security apparatus west of the River Wisla. On 20 February 1945 the USSR State Defence Committee (GOKO) issued order no. 7558ss to comply with the request.

Gen. I.A. Serov was officially appointed on 1 March 1945 to be the NKVD advisor to the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The appointment was a formality since Serov had been the GOKO special plenipotentiary for the Polish territories since the summer of 1944 (working behind the front which was at the Wisla).

At the same time, an "Advisers Aparat" (Aparat Doradcy) was opened. This Aparat was made up of Soviet officers attached to the MBP, the Provincial Bureau(s) of Public Security (PBPS) and District Bureau(s) of Public Security (DBPS). Their exact numbers are not known, but it is likely that it exceeded 300 persons. Advisers at the MPS—called the Senior Adviser—were subordinated to the NKVD formations stationed in Poland. This included above all the 64th Rifle Division of the NKVD Internal Security Corps, established in October 1944 and stationed in Poland until spring 1947.

After 1947 the situation "normalized". The NKVD military units were withdrawn and only the Adviser with his officers and technical staff remained. Around 1950 the advisers at the DBPS levels were pulled out and only those at the MPS and PBPS (1 to 2 advisers each) levels remained. In 1953 there were a total of approximately 30 advisers at the MPS and about 25-30 at the PBPS levels. In September 1956 the CC PUWP Politburo decided to ask Moscow for the advisers to return to the Soviet Union, which occurred after Gomulka came to power.

Soviet Advisers (Head, at the Ministry of Public Security) after Serov were: Gen. N.N. Selivanovskii (27 April 1945 to 1946); Col. S.M. Davidov (1946 to 17 March 1950); Col. M.S. Bezborodov (17 March 1950 to 10 April 1953); Gen. N.K. Kovalchuk (10 April to 20 July 1953); Col. S.N. Lialin (20 July 1953 to September 1954); Col. G.S. Ievdokimenko (September 1954 to April 1959; Ievdokimenko became adviser to the Committee for Public Security after the MPS was dissolved on 7 December 1954 and finally disbanded on 13 November 1956). The preceding list of Soviet advisers in Poland comes from Nikita V. Petrov of the "Memorial" group in Moscow.

72. As of June 1956 six Soviet colonels remained in the Polish Committee for Public Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

73. Until October 1956 Soviet advisers in the Polish Army totalled about 50 (51 in May and 50 in July 1956). After October 1956 the Soviet advisers were renamed "Military Consultants". In January 1957 some 29 Soviet Military Consultants remained in the Polish Army. This figure was reduced to 12 by the end of the year. In 1958 the figure dropped to 6 Soviet Military Consultants (2 at the General Staff, 1 in the Artillery, 1 in the Air Force, and 2 at the Military Technical Academy). However, the Chief Soviet Military Adviser (Lieutenant General Sergei Chernisev) also continued to function in Poland until early 1959 with a staff of 3 Soviet officers.

74. In 1957 some 23 Soviet officers remained in the Polish Army, including 13 generals. This figure dropped to 9 in 1958 (5 generals) and to 2 in 1959, including a General and Brigadier General. Two Soviet officers remained in Poland until 1968: General Jerzy Bordzilowski, who was Chief of the General Staff and deputy minister of defense from 1954 to March 1968; and Lieutenant General Michal Owczynników, who commanded the Military Technical Academy from 1954 to 1957 until he became the deputy of the Main Inspectorate of Schools attached to the Higher Officer School until March 1958. Between November 1956 and November 1957 some 56 Soviet officers, including 28 generals, left the Polish Army.

75. The meeting took place on 18 November 1956.

76. A noteworthy exception is the study by Marcin Kula, *Paryz, Londyn, i Waszyngton patrza na Pazdziernik 1956 r. w Polsce* [*Paris, London, and Washington look at the Polish October*] (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1992), based on Western diplomatic archives. See also Robert Los, "Pazdziernik 1956 roku w perspektywie stosunków polsko-radzieckich [October 1956 From the Perspective of Polish-Soviet Relations]" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Lódz, 1993). Two important Polish language studies are Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, *Polska próba: Pazdziernik '56* [*The Polish Attempt: October '56*] (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie [Literary Publishers], 1989); and a splendid social history by Pawel Machcewicz, *Polski Rok 1956* [*The Polish Year 1956*] (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza 'Mówia Wieki' [The Printing House 'Mówia Wieki'], 1993), based on the archives of Poland's ministry of internal affairs.

77. Archival documents covering this period that have been published include *Gomulka i inni*; and Andrzej Garlicki, *Z Tajnych Archiwów* [*From the Secret Archives*] (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza 'BGW' [The Polish Printing House 'BGW'], 1993).

78. Cf. Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

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KHRUSHCHEV'S MEETING

continued from page 1

1956. A shorter version was originally discovered by Tibor Hajdu of the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest and published in Hungarian in 1992.[1] Although the document below is the most important item to emerge thus far, other materials in Prague are also well worth consulting. In addition to files left from the top organs of the former Czechoslovak Communist Party (*Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska*, or KSC), which are all now housed at the Central State Archive, numerous items pertaining to the military aspects of the 1956 crises can be found in the Czech Military-Historical Archive (*Vojensky historicky archiv*).[2]

The summary report below was presented by the KSC leader, Antonin Novotny, to the other members of the KSC Politburo on 25 October 1956.[3] The report is undated, but it must have been drafted and hastily revised in the late night/early morning hours of October 24-25 by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Novotny. Svoboda was responsible for composing many of Novotny's speeches and reports in the mid-1950s.

The document recounts a meeting of top Soviet officials who belonged to the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Presidium, as the Politburo was then known. The session was convened at Nikita Khrushchev's initiative on the evening of 24 October 1956, at a time of acute tension with (and within) both Poland and Hungary. Until a day or two before the meeting, Khrushchev's concerns about Eastern Europe focused primarily on Poland, where a series of events beginning with the June 1956 clashes in Poznan, which left 53 dead and hundreds wounded, had provoked anxiety in Moscow about growing instability and rebellion.[4] In early October one of the most prominent victims of the Stalinist purges in Poland in the late 1940s, Wladyslaw Gomulka, had triumphantly regained his membership in the Polish Communist party (PZPR) and seemed on the verge of reclaiming his position as party leader. Khrushchev and his colleagues feared that if Gomulka took control in Warsaw and removed the most orthodox (and pro-Soviet) members of the Polish leadership, Poland might then seek a more independent (i.e., Titoist) course in foreign policy.

At the Presidium meeting on October 24 (and later in his memoirs), Khrushchev described how the Soviet Union actively tried to prevent Gomulka from regaining his leadership post.[5] On October 19, as the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee was getting under way, a delegation of top Soviet officials paid a surprise visit to Warsaw. The delegation included Khrushchev, Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, and Anastas Mikoyan, as well as the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev, and 11 other high-ranking Soviet military officers. In a hastily-arranged meeting with Gomulka and other Polish leaders, the CPSU delegates expressed anxiety about upcoming personnel changes in the PZPR and urged the Poles to strengthen their political, economic, and military ties with the Soviet Union. For their part, Gomulka and his colleagues sought clarification of the status of Soviet troops in Poland and demanded that Soviet officials pledge not to interfere in Poland's internal affairs.[6] Gomulka repeatedly emphasized that Poland "will not permit its independence to be taken away." He called for the withdrawal of all or most of the Soviet Union's 50 "advisers" in Poland and insisted that Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskii, the Polish-born Soviet officer who had been installed as Poland's national defense minister in November 1949, be removed along with other top Soviet officers who were serving in the Polish army. The Soviet delegation responded by accusing the Poles of seeking to get rid of "old, trustworthy revolutionaries who are loyal to the cause of socialism" and of "turning toward the West against the Soviet Union."[7]

During the heated exchanges that ensued, Gomulka was suddenly informed by one of his aides that Soviet tank and infantry units were advancing toward Warsaw. The Polish leader immediately requested that the Soviet forces be pulled back, and Khrushchev, after some hesitation, complied with the request, ordering Konev to halt all troop movements. Although Khrushchev assured Gomulka that the deployments had simply been in preparation for upcoming military exercises, the intended message was plain enough, especially in light of other recent developments. The existence of Soviet "plans to protect the most important state facilities" in Poland, including military garrisons and lines of communication, had been deliberately leaked to Polish officials earlier in the day; and Soviet naval vessels had begun holding conspicuous maneuvers in waters near Gdansk.[8] Despite these various forms of pressure, the Polish authorities stood their ground, and the meeting ended without any firm agreement. The official communique merely indicated that talks had taken place and that Polish leaders would be visiting Moscow sometime "in the near future."[9] In every respect, then, the negotiations proved less than satisfactory from the Soviet standpoint.

After the Soviet delegation returned to Moscow on October 20, the PZPR Central Committee reconvened and promptly elected Gomulka first secretary and dropped Rokossovskii and several other neo-Stalinist officials from the PZPR Politburo. That same day, an editorial in the CPSU daily *Pravda* accused the Polish media of waging a "filthy anti-Soviet campaign" and of trying to "undermine socialism in Poland."[10] These charges prompted vigorous rebuttals from Polish commentators. Strains between the two countries increased still further as tens of thousands of Poles took part in pro-Gomulka rallies in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on October 22. Even larger demonstrations, involving up to 100,000 people each, were organized the following day in Poznan, Lublin, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and elsewhere. In the meantime, joint meetings of workers and students were being held all around Poland, culminating in a vast rally in Warsaw on October 24 attended by as many as 500,000 people. Although these events were intended mainly as a display of unified national support for the new Polish leadership in the face of external pressure, some of the speakers expressed open hostility toward the Soviet Union. The growing anti-Soviet mood was especially noticeable at a large rally in Wroclaw on October 23, which nearly spun out of control.

As tension continued to mount, Soviet leaders began to contemplate a variety of economic sanctions and military options. None of these options seemed the least bit attractive, however, as Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues during the meeting on October 24: "Finding a reason for an armed conflict [with Poland] now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard." Rokossovskii had warned Soviet leaders at

the outset of the crisis that the Polish army would almost certainly put up stiff resistance against outside intervention. Moreover, Khrushchev and his colleagues were aware that Polish officials had begun distributing firearms to "workers' militia" units who could help defend the capital, and that Gomulka had ordered troops from the Polish internal affairs ministry to seal off all areas in Warsaw that might be used as entry routes by Soviet forces.[11]

Khrushchev's reluctance to pursue a military solution under such inauspicious circumstances induced him to seek a *modus vivendi* with Gomulka whereby Poland would have greater leeway to follow its own "road to socialism." By the time the CPSU Presidium meeting opened on October 24, the prospects for a solution of this sort appeared much brighter than they had just a day or two earlier. At the mass rally in Warsaw on the 24th, as Novotny mentions in his report, Gomulka adopted a far more conciliatory tone in his keynote speech. The Polish leader emphasized the need for strengthened political and military ties with the Soviet Union, and he condemned those who were trying to steer Poland away from the Warsaw Pact.[12] He also urged Poles to return to their daily work and to refrain from holding any further rallies or demonstrations. This speech gave Khrushchev greater reason to hope that a lasting compromise with Gomulka would be feasible. Although no one in Moscow could yet be confident that the strains with Poland were over, the worst of the crisis evidently had passed.

Yet even as the situation in Poland finally seemed to be improving (from Moscow's perspective), events in Hungary had taken an unexpected and dramatic turn for the worse. On October 23, the day before the CPSU Presidium met, a huge demonstration was organized in downtown Budapest by students from the Budapest polytechnical university who wanted to express approval of the recent developments in Poland and to demand similar changes in their own country. By late afternoon the rally had turned violent, as the protesters and Hungarian security forces exchanged fire near the city's main radio station. The shootings precipitated a chaotic rebellion, which was much too large for the Hungarian state security organs to handle on their own. Soviet "advisers" and military commanders in Hungary had been trying since early October to convince Hungarian officials that far-reaching security precautions were needed to cope with growing unrest; but, as one of the top Soviet officers later reported, "the leaders of the [Hungarian] party and members of the [Hungarian] government did not adopt the measures called for by the urgency of the situation. Many of them were simply incapable of evaluating the state of things realistically."[13] As a result, the violent upheavals on October 23 quickly overwhelmed the Hungarian police and security forces and caused widespread panic and near-paralysis among senior Hungarian officials.

The subsequent course of events on the evening of October 23-24 has long been obscure, but the confusion is partly cleared up by Novotny's report and a few other new sources.[14] It is now known, for example, that despite the growing turmoil in Budapest, the Hungarian Communist party leader, Erno Gero, did not even mention what was going on when he spoke by phone with Khrushchev late in the afternoon on October 23. Gero's evasiveness during that conversation was especially peculiar because he had already transmitted an appeal for urgent military assistance to the military attache at the Soviet embassy. The Soviet ambassador, Yurii Andropov, immediately telephoned the commander of Soviet troops in Hungary, General Pyotr Lashchenko, and relayed the appeal; but Lashchenko responded that he could not comply with the request without explicit authorization from Moscow.[15] Andropov then cabled Gero's plea directly to Moscow and followed up with an emergency phone call warning that the situation had turned desperate. Andropov's intervention, as Novotny reports, prompted Khrushchev to contact Gero by phone for the second time that evening. Khrushchev urged Gero to send a written request for help to the CPSU Presidium, but the Soviet leader soon realized, after the brief conversation ended, that events in Budapest were moving too fast for him to wait until he received a formal Hungarian request (which, incidentally, did not arrive until five days later).[16] On behalf of the full CPSU Presidium and Soviet government, Khrushchev, according to Novotny, authorized the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, to "redeploy Soviet units into Budapest to assist Hungarian troops and state security forces in the restoration of public order." Khrushchev's directive was promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who specified that the bulk of the Soviet troops in Hungary were to be used in "establishing control over the most important sites in the capital and in restoring order," while others were to "seal off Hungary's border with Austria."[17]

Having finally received due authorization, Lashchenko was able to set to work almost immediately. The troops under his command had been preparing since early June to undertake large-scale operations aimed at "upholding and restoring public order" in Hungary.[18] In accordance with a plan code-named "Kompas," the Soviet forces in Hungary had been placed on increased alert in mid-October, and were brought to full combat alert on October 22-23 at the behest of the Soviet General Staff. Hence, when the mobilization orders arrived from Moscow on the night of the 23rd, the response on the ground was swift, despite dense fog that hampered troop movements. By the early morning hours of the 24th, thousands of soldiers from the USSR's two mechanized divisions in Hungary (the so-called "special corps") had entered Budapest, and they were soon joined by thousands more Soviet troops from a mechanized division based in Romania and two divisions (one mechanized, one rifle) from the Transcarpathian Military District in Ukraine.[19] All told, some 31,500 Soviet troops, 1,130 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 380 armored personnel carriers, 185 air defense guns, and numerous other weapons were redeployed at short notice to Budapest and other major cities as well as along the Austrian-Hungarian border. Two Soviet fighter divisions, totaling 159 planes, were ordered to perform close air-support missions for the ground forces; and two Soviet bomber divisions, with a total of 122 aircraft, were placed on full alert at airfields in Hungary and the Transcarpathian Military District.

For the task at hand, however, this array of firepower was inadequate. The intervention of the Soviet Army proved almost wholly ineffectual and even counterproductive. Gero himself acknowledged, in a phone conversation with Soviet leaders on October 24, that "the arrival of Soviet troops into the city has had a negative effect on the mood of the residents."[20] Soviet armored vehicles and artillery were sent into the clogged streets of Budapest without adequate infantry pro-

tection, and thus became easy targets for youths wielding grenades and Molotov cocktails. Although Hungarian soldiers were supposed to operate alongside Soviet units, troops from the Hungarian state security forces, police, and army proved incapable of offering necessary support, and some defected to the side of the rebels. As a result, the fighting merely escalated. By mid-afternoon on the 24th, at least 25 protesters had been killed and more than 200 had been wounded. The mounting violence, as Soviet observers in Budapest reported back to Moscow, "caused further panic among senior Hungarian officials, many of whom fled into underground bunkers that were unsuitable for any work."[21]

The events of October 23-24 were still very much under way as the CPSU Presidium convened. These events marked the start of a full-fledged revolution in Hungary that culminated in a much larger and more effective intervention by the Soviet Army on November 4.

* * * *

Not surprisingly, the turmoil in Eastern Europe dominated all other issues when Soviet leaders gathered on October 24. Unlike at regular meetings of the CPSU Presidium, which involved only Soviet participants, Khrushchev invited the leaders of the "fraternal" East European Communist parties (other than the Polish) to attend the session on October 24. As things turned out, only Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany were actually represented at the meeting. Along with Novotny, Viliam Siroky and Antonin Zapotocky attended from Czechoslovakia. A complete list of the Bulgarian and East German participants is provided in Novotny's report. The full and candidate members of the CPSU Presidium and members of the CPSU Secretariat who took part included Kaganovich, Molotov, Bulganin, Aleksei Kirichenko, Georgii Malenkov, Maksim Saburov, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Shvernik, Elena Furtseva, Dmitrii Shepilov, Pyotr Pospelov, and of course Khrushchev. They were later joined by the defense minister, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, by the Soviet ambassador to Poland, Pantaleimon Ponomarenko, by a leading CPSU ideologist, Pavel Yudin, and by a senior Chinese official, Liu Xiaoqui. The only members of the Soviet Presidium who were absent on October 24 were Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, both of whom had traveled to Budapest earlier that day to monitor the situation first-hand. Their top-secret dispatches from the scene, which were declassified by the Russian government in November 1992, make an invaluable complement to Novotny's report.[22]

The CPSU Presidium meeting, according to Novotny, provoked relatively little bickering or disagreement. Khrushchev used the occasion to inform his East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian counterparts about recent developments in both Poland and Hungary. Although the meeting initially was designed to forge a common position vis-a-vis Gomulka and other Polish leaders who had been defying Moscow, the pressure of events in Hungary forced Khrushchev to cover the situation there at even greater length than he did with Poland.

Novotny's report, as will become evident below, was composed hastily and was intended merely as a detailed summary of the meeting rather than a polished, minute-by-minute transcript. For clarity's sake, the translation in some places is slightly smoother than the original document, which is often rough and ungrammatical; but overall, the translation seeks to capture the flavor and style of the original. The original manuscript is full of misspelled surnames and titles, which have been corrected in the translated text. In the few instances in which these mistakes are especially glaring, they have been mentioned in the annotations. The annotations serve two more important functions as well: (1) to identify acronyms, terms, and proper names that may not be familiar to some readers, and (2) to elaborate on and provide greater context for certain issues to which Novotny adverts.

This introduction has already touched upon the most significant points in Novotny's report, but it is worth briefly mentioning a few other items in the document that are of particular interest.

First, the report implies that Khrushchev's order to use Soviet troops against the demonstrators in central Budapest on October 23-24, though issued on behalf of the whole CPSU Presidium, was made by Khrushchev himself, perhaps in consultation with one or two others. Nothing in Novotny's report suggests that the Presidium actually met on the 23rd to decide what to do. If Khrushchev did indeed feel free to act on behalf of the whole Presidium himself, this may suggest that his political authority was more firmly consolidated at the time than has usually been thought.

Second, the document reveals that Khrushchev recommended that the Hungarian authorities lie about the timing of the Hungarian Central Committee plenum on October 23-24. He urged them to claim that the plenum was held after Soviet troops entered Budapest, whereas of course the

Hungarian Scholar's Comments

Tibor Hajdu of the Institute of History in Budapest, who, like Mark Kramer, found the record of the 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting in the Prague archives, contributed the following comment to the CWIHP *Bulletin*:

Unfortunately, the official Soviet record of the meeting was not available—though it was first mentioned in a series of articles by retired Soviet ambassador V. Musatov—so I sought and located a copy in the Prague archives. The minutes by Jan Svoboda, Novotny's secretary (who accompanied his boss to Moscow as the latter didn't understand enough Russian to follow a conversation), focus on the long speech by Khrushchev and don't reveal whether the others were merely listening to him or made at least some signs of agreement. We may presume the lack of real debate as Khrushchev refers only to the sole dissenting opinion Ulbricht thought he could afford. (Notably Ulbricht was severely criticized not only by Khrushchev but at home also at the following session of the SED CC.)

What makes Khrushchev's speech particularly interesting is the sharp distinction between his commitment here to avoid if at all possible the use of Soviet military power in Poland and Hungary, and all his later public announcements, including his memoirs. He lays the blame on Gero and Andropov for the military intervention, citing their heavy responsibility. Yet, after only a few days, he became in full agreement with Ulbricht and Andropov about the necessity for a Soviet military crackdown—well-known events compelled him to change his mind.

opposite was the case. For unexplained reasons, however, the Hungarian leadership did not succeed in making this claim until several days later.

Third, the document indicates that leaders in Moscow were well aware that Mikoyan's and Suslov's views of the situation in Hungary were much less alarmist than the reports they had been receiving from Andropov. This divergence is obvious when one compares the recently declassified cables (see the reference above), but it is interesting that Soviet leaders themselves noticed this discrepancy from the outset.

Finally, it is worth reeemphasizing that the report confirms what has long been suspected about the Polish crisis, namely, that the likelihood of encountering widespread armed resistance was one of the major factors that deterred Soviet military intervention. Khrushchev acknowledged this in his memoirs, and Novotny's account amply bears it out.[23]

* * * *

Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC,
24 October 1956,
on the Situation in Poland and Hungary

On 24 Oct. 1956 I [Novotny] attended a meeting of the Presidium of the CC CPSU. Comrades from the MSP Central Committee, the SED Central Committee, the BKS Central Committee, and the RDS Central Committee also were invited to take part.[24] But the only ones who were actually present were the comrades from Germany, namely Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Stoph, and the comrades from Bulgaria—Zhivkov, Yugov, and Damyanov.[25]

Comrade Khrushchev began by informing everyone about the situation in Poland and Hungary. He said that originally the Presidium of the CC CPSU wanted to inform the fraternal parties about the situation in Poland and about the outcome of the negotiations between the CPSU CC and the PZPR CC.[26] But in the meantime important events had happened in Hungary. That is why he deemed it necessary to inform us about the situation there as well.

In essence, this is what he said:

When serious reports came in from Poland that far-reaching changes were expected in the top party posts of the PZPR, the CC CPSU decided to send a delegation to Poland.

The delegation negotiated mainly with Comrades Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Jedrychowski, Ochab, and the foreign minister.[27]

All these comrades, especially Gomulka, sought to defend everything that was happening in Poland. They assured the Soviet delegation that the measures being taken would not have an adverse effect on Poland's relations with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. On the question of why so many changes occurred in the [PZPR] Politburo, Comrade Gomulka said that the comrades who had not been reelected to the Politburo had lost the confidence of the party masses. The Soviet comrades are very worried because the [Polish] comrades who were removed from the Politburo were known to the Soviet party as old, trustworthy revolutionaries who were faithful to the cause of socialism. Among them is also Comrade Rokossovskii, who is of Polish origin but never gave up his Soviet citizenship.[28]

While the CPSU CC delegation was in Poland, certain maneuvers of the Soviet Army took place on Polish territory, which displeased Comrade Gomulka. The discussions between the delegations ranged from being very warm to rude. Gomulka several times emphasized that they would not permit their independence to be taken away and would not allow anyone to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. He said that if he were leader of the country, he could restore order very promptly. The representatives of the PZPR explained the arguments and factors that had led to the current situation in Poland. These were very unpersuasive and seemed to be outright fabrications. For example, Comrade Gomulka tried to convince the Soviet delegation that most of the blame should be placed on the presence of 50 Soviet security advisers in Poland and of many generals and other senior officers in the Polish army who still hold Soviet citizenship.

In addition, [Gomulka] said that Poland's obligation to supply coal to the USSR at excessively low prices had caused the difficult economic situation. Comrade Khrushchev emphasized to the Polish comrades, referring to several concrete examples, that on various occasions in the past, this had not been true.

After the CPSU CC delegation returned to Moscow, an official letter was dispatched to the PZPR CC from the CPSU CC saying that it was up to the Polish side to decide whether to send the Soviet advisers and the generals with Soviet citizenship immediately back to the USSR.

A delegation from the PZPR was invited to meetings in the USSR along party lines [*po stranicke linii*]. On 23 Oct. 1956 Comrade Gomulka told the CPSU CC that he would accept the invitation and that he would arrive after 11 Nov. 1956. Comrade Gomulka also asked Comrade Khrushchev to have the Soviet forces return to their camps, as he had been promised.[29] From the telephone conversation between Comrade Gomulka and Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Khrushchev got the impression that Comrade Gomulka was attempting to earn the confidence of the CPSU CC.

On this occasion the two sides arranged that a long-planned exchange of delegations between *Trybuna Ludu* and *Pravda* would take place in the near future.[30]

Typically, at plenary sessions of the PZPR CC the majority of speakers would express their wish for friendship with the USSR and other states of people's democracies.

The opinion of the CPSU CC is that in the case of Poland it is necessary to avoid nervousness and haste. It is necessary to help the Polish comrades straighten out the party line and do everything to reinforce the union among Poland, the USSR, and the other people's democracies.

Poland is in a catastrophic economic situation. There is a shortfall of 900,000 tons of grain. Coal mining is in very bad shape also. After the 20th CPSU Congress, Poland adopted the same social measures as in the USSR, but did not have sufficient means to carry them out. That is why Comrade Ochab turned to the CPSU CC delegation with a request for a loan. When Comrade Khrushchev remarked that perhaps the USA would give them a loan, [Ochab] answered that Poland would ask for a loan from the USA but he doubts that the USA would give them one. Comrade Khrushchev surmised that Comrade Ochab was answering hastily on the spur of the moment.

Comrade Khrushchev said that the GDR and CSR had asked the CPSU CC to resolve the problem with Polish coal at the highest level. But [Khrushchev] believes it would be inappropriate to do that at this time because it would unnecessarily exacerbate the affair and lead to disputes and polemics between fraternal parties about this matter, which the Poles, even with the best of intentions, cannot do much about.

Comrade Gomulka's speech will not be published in the USSR because it would have to be accompanied by commentaries that would lead, in turn, to further disputes and polemics, which would be highly undesirable. It is necessary to help Poland. The USSR is willing to provide the necessary grain. All possible measures will be taken to ensure that by 1958, or at the very latest by 1959, the USSR will no longer be dependent on Polish coal. Most likely the USSR will also agree to the loan request.

Later on, before the meeting ended and after the main discussions, Comrade Ponomarenko delivered a report about a political rally today by workers in Warsaw. Comrade Gomulka gave a speech there.[31] There were more than 150,000 people.

Among other things, Comrade Gomulka said that the PZPR CC had received a letter from the CPSU CC which stated that it was up to the Polish side how to resolve the matter of the Soviet security advisers. He expressed his view that the presence of the Soviet advisers in Poland at this time was in Poland's interests.[32] This was greeted with wide and loud applause.

He further emphasized that the presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory was necessary because of the existence of NATO and the presence of American troops in West Germany.[33]

And this view, too, was greeted with loud and long applause.

He condemned all those who want, by means of demagogic talk, to undermine trust in the Polish army, which is under the exclusive command of the Polish government and the PZPR CC.[34] He appealed to the crowd to finish the rally and commit themselves to work for the good of the Polish people.

It was the view of Comrade Khrushchev that this speech by Comrade Gomulka gives hope that Poland has now adopted a course that will eliminate the unpleasant state of affairs. He said that finding a reason for an armed conflict now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict would be very hard.

On the Situation in Hungary

Comrade Khrushchev said he does not understand what Comrades Gero, Hegedus, and others are doing.[35] There were signs that the situation in Hungary is extremely serious. That did not prevent Comrades Gero and Hegedus from continuing to spend time by the sea. And as soon as they returned home they left on a "trip" to Yugoslavia.

When Comrade Khrushchev talked by phone on 23 Oct. 1956 with Comrade Gero, whom he summoned for a consultation, Comrade Gero told him that the situation in Budapest is bad and for that reason he cannot come to Moscow.

As soon as the conversation was over, Comrade Zhukov informed [Khrushchev] that Gero had asked the military attaché at the Soviet embassy in Budapest to dispatch Soviet troops to suppress a demonstration that was reaching an ever greater and unprecedented scale. The Presidium of the CC CPSU did not give its approval for such an intervention because it was not requested by the highest Hungarian officials, even when Comrade Gero had been speaking earlier with Comrade Khrushchev.

Shortly thereafter, a call came through from the Soviet embassy in Budapest saying that the situation is extremely dangerous and that the intervention of Soviet troops is necessary. The Presidium authorized Comrade Khrushchev to discuss this matter by phone with Comrade Gero.[36]

As it turned out, Comrade Khrushchev informed Comrade Gero that his request will be met when the government of the HPR [Hungarian People's Republic] makes the request in writing. Gero responded that he is not able to convene a meeting of the government. Comrade Khrushchev then recommended that Hegedus call such a meeting in his capacity as chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although that had not happened as of today, the situation developed in such a way that Comrade Zhukov was given orders to occupy Budapest with Soviet military units located on Hungarian territory and in Uzhgorod.[37] The redeployment of the units was slow and difficult because of dense fog. In an effort to protect at least Comrade Gero, an armored car was sent to Budapest. The vehicle passed right through Budapest without the slightest resistance. The other troop formations of the Soviet army did not arrive until 24 Oct. 1956 at 4:00 a.m., when the sessions of the MSP CC plenum were already over in Budapest.

Comrade Khrushchev recommended to Comrade Gero that he tell everyone that the plenum of the MSP CC had not taken place before the demonstration was suppressed. It turned out that this did not happen. As was expected, a new politburo was elected at the plenum. It included some members from the previous politburo: Apro, Hegedus, Gero, and Kadar.[38] It also had new members: Imre Nagy, Kobol (the head of the 1st department of the CC MSP, who recently spoke out strongly and sharply against the politburo), Gaspar, Szanto (the head of the institute for cultural ties with foreigners), Marosan (a persecuted but good comrade), Kiss (the chairman of the KSK), and Kallai (the head of the department of culture of the CC MSP).[39] Selected as candidates were: Losonczy (a journalist who was very active in campaigning against the leadership of the party) and Ronai (chairman of the NS).[40]

In the new politburo there are three people who were persecuted in the past and have now been rehabilitated. Among the old members not elected [to the new body] are: Hidas, Szalai, Mekis, Kovacs, Revai, Acs, Bata (a candidate), and Piros (also a candidate).[41]

Those elected to the secretariat were: Gero (1st secretary), Kadar, Donath (director of the Institute of Economics), Kobol, and Kallai.[42] Among them are three persecuted comrades. Of the old members of the secretariat, those who were dismissed were: Szalai, Egri, Veg, and Kovacs.[43]

Within the government, Nagy has been selected as chairman of the Council of Ministers and Hegedus as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.

There were no longer any demonstrations in Budapest on the evening of 24 Oct. 1956. Near the Danube there were several groups of bandits. These consisted of groups of 15-20 people armed with pistols and weapons seized from soldiers. Resistance is still occurring on certain street corners, roofs, and balconies. On several streets there were barricades. The bandits temporarily occupied two railway stations and one of the two radio stations. The bandits wanted to tear down the statue of Stalin. But when they were unsuccessful in this task, they seized a welder's torch and cut the statue to pieces, and then disposed of the whole thing.

The Hungarian internal security forces performed very well, but suffered most of the casualties from among the 25 dead and 50 wounded.[44] Also, one Soviet officer was killed and 12 soldiers were wounded. The unrest has been confined to Budapest so far. Everywhere else, in the cities and the villages, there is calm. The workers from the Csepel factory defended themselves with bare hands against armed bandits.

In Hungary after a decision by the government, an "action group" of five [*akcni petka*] was set up to suppress the uprising. It consists of Bata, Piros, Kovacs, Emerich, and Zoltan Vas, who in the past spoke out very strongly against the MSP leadership and now is centrally involved in organizing the fight against the bandits.[45] The group consists entirely of people who were not elected to the [Hungarian] Politburo.

On the morning of 24 Oct. 1956, Nagy spoke on the radio.[46] He called for order, and he signed a decree establishing a military tribunal which is authorized to pass immediate sentence on anyone who puts up resistance. Generally, the bandits are spreading the word that Nagy has betrayed the uprising.

He spoke again later on in a similar vein. He also mentioned that the Hungarian government had asked Soviet troops to enter Budapest.

In his third speech on the radio today, he said that the positive thing the students had begun was being abused by the bandits to foment turmoil and shoot people. He appealed for order and urged people to give up their arms by 1:00 p.m.

A delegation from the CPSU CC Presidium was sent to Hungary this morning; it included Mikoyan, Suslov, and Serov.[47]

During the meeting of the [Soviet] Presidium, those comrades informed the Presidium by telephone about the situation [in Hungary]. They said that Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov had attended the [Hungarian] Central Committee meeting. The situation, in their view, is not as dire as the Hungarian comrades and the Soviet ambassador have portrayed it. Budapest itself is more or less calm. Resistance is limited to certain rooftops and house balconies, from which the enemy is shooting. The internal security forces respond quite freely to each of their shots, which creates the impression of a battle. One can expect that by morning there will be total calm. The Soviet embassy let itself be encircled and protected by 30 tanks.

Among the Hungarian leadership, both in the party and in the state, there is an absolute unity of views.

There is no doubt that Nagy is acting courageously, emphasizing at every opportunity the identity of his and Gero's views. Gero himself had told the Soviet comrades that protests against his election as 1st secretary were occurring. But Nagy had emphasized and reemphasized that those protesting against him did not include even a single member of the Central Committee. Only certain individuals were behaving that way.

In Budapest roughly 450 people have been arrested. In response to a question from Comrade Ulbricht about whether it is known who is leading

the uprising, Comrade Khrushchev said that according to reports the insurgents had set up their headquarters in the Hotel Astoria. This had been captured by Soviet troops. It appears that the groundwork for preparing a coup was organized by writers and was supported by students. The population as a whole has reacted passively to everything, but has not been hostile toward the USSR.

Comrade Khrushchev recommends that we not cover the situation in Hungary in our press until the causes of everything have been well clarified.

The representatives of the fraternal parties who were present joined the discussion. All of them expressed support for the stance of the CPSU CC Presidium.

Comrade Ulbricht emphasized in his speech that in his view the situation had arisen because we did not act in time to expose all the incorrect opinions that had emerged in Poland and Hungary. He assumed that it would behoove each party to give a response in the press to certain incorrect opinions.

Comrade Khrushchev recommended that they think about the problems in greater depth. We must realize that we are not living as we were during the CI [Communist International], when only one party was in power. If we wanted to operate by command today, we would inevitably create chaos. It is necessary to conduct propaganda work in each party, but we cannot permit this to turn into polemics between fraternal parties because this would lead to polemics between nations. The plenum of the CPSU CC in December will discuss ideological questions and, a bit later, the question of how to raise living standards, particularly the faster construction of apartments as one of the basic prerequisites for boosting living standards. The extent to which patience is required can be seen from the recent case in Zaporozhe.[48] Here 200 people refused to work because those responsible for guiding the work of the factories, including party functionaries, union leaders, and the top manager, did not do anything to induce the employees to work to the limit. Did they refuse to work because some ideological matters were unclear to them or because they were opposed to the Soviet regime? No, they refused because basic economic and social issues had not been resolved. Ideological work itself will be of no avail if we do not ensure that living standards rise. It is no accident that the unrest occurred in Hungary and Poland and not in Czechoslovakia. This is because the standard of living in Czechoslovakia is incomparably higher. In the USSR more than 10,000 members of the CPSU were rehabilitated and more than a million were released from prison. These people are not angry at us [in Czechoslovakia] because they see we have done a lot to raise the standard of living in our country. In our country they also listen to the BBC and Radio Free Europe. But when they have full stomachs, the listening is not so bad.

It is necessary to improve ideological and propaganda work and to bolster the quality of the work of the party and state apparatus geared toward managing the economy.

1. Tibor Hajdu, "Az 1956. oktober 24-i moszkvai ertekezlet" [The 24 October 1956 Moscow meeting], in *Az 1956-os Magyar Forradalom Tortenetenek Akademiai Dokumentacios es Kutatointezete Evkonyv I. 1992*. [*The Yearbook of the Institute for the History and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*] (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1992), 149-56.
2. Among many examples of the latter are "Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich hranic s Mad'arskem," Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top Secret), in VHA Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b; "Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu cs. armady," Notes from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b; "Zprava o opatrenich k zesileni bojove pohotovosti vojsk," Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate, to the MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8-49b; and "Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskych opatreni na hranicich s Mad'arskem," from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the 2nd Military District in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-2b. Another very useful document on military issues is "Stav Mad'arske lidove armady a priciny jejiho rozkladu," Report compiled by KSC CC Department No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9 April 1957, in SUA Praha, Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru (Arch. UV) KSC, Fond (F.) 100/3 — Mezinarodni oddeleni UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 110, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 371
3. "Projednani zpravy A. Novotneho o jednani na UV KSSS na mimoradne schuzi politickeho byra UV KSC," 25 October 1956, in SUA Praha, Arch. UV KSC, F. 02/2 — Politicke Byro UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 120, A.j. 150.
4. The events of 1956 in Poland have been covered extensively, though often unevenly, by Polish historians and scholars. For a sample of the literature as well as official reports, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, *Polska proba Pazdziernik '56* (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989); *Sprawozdanie z prac Komisii KC PZPR powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn i przebiegu konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski Ludowej*, special issue of *Nowe drogi* (Warsaw), September 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon Dymek, ed., *Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice historyczne* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan Hillebrandt, ed., *Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat 1956-1970* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, *Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy socjalizmu w Polsce Ludowej* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych PZPR, 1986); Jan Ptasinski, *Wydarzenia poznanskie czerwiec 1956* (Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1986); and Antoni Czubinski, "Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku w Polsce," in Antoni Czubinski, ed., *Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej* (Warsaw: Instytut Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1983), 80-114. For a brief but useful account of the crisis by a Russian historian, see Aleksandr Orekhov, "Obschestvenno-politicheskii krizis 1956 goda v Pol'she (genezis i razvitie sobytii)," in Yu. S. Novopashin, ed., Poli*ticheskie krizisy i konflikty 50-60-kh godov v Vostochnoi Evrope: Sbornik stat'ei* (Moscow: Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies, 1993), 10-55.
5. Further details about these efforts are available from numerous other sources in both Poland and Russia. See, e.g., Rykowsi and Wladyka, *Polska proba*, 232-234. Additional citations are provided below and in the article by Leo Gluchowski in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.
6. "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," No. 233 (Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii/Osobaya papka. The rest of this paragraph is based both on this source and on Novotny's report.
7. Ibid.
8. Comments by Stefan Staszewski, former PZPR CC Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., *Oni* (London: Aneks, 1985), 148.
9. "Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego KC PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1.
10. "Antisovetskaya kampaniya v pol'skoi presse," *Pravda* (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1.
11. Jacek Kuron, *Wiara i wina: Do i od komunizmu* (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), 119. See also Wlodzimierz Mus, "Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna? Spor generalow o Pazdziernik 1956," *Polityka* (Warsaw) 42 (20 October 1990), 14.
12. "Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 October 1956, 1, which appears under the banner headline "Ponad 300 tysiecy warszawiakow na spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem partii."
13. Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* 10 (October 1993), 24-25.
14. Two other new sources that help dispel some of the confusion about what happened on the night of 23-24 October are: Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 22-30; and "TsK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87.
15. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), p. 25.
16. The written request, dated 24 October 1956 and signed by then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, was transmitted by Andropov in a ciphered telegram on 28 October. See "Shifrtelegramma" (Strictly Secret — URGENT), 28 October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12.
17. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), 27.
18. Ibid., 24-25.
19. "TsK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memorandum lays out in detail the complexion and assignments of the Soviet ground and air forces.

20. "Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2.
21. "Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 25 October 1956 (STRICTLY SECRET), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8.
22. These documents have been published in both Hungarian and the original Russian. See the two-volume Hungarian collection *Jelcin-dosszie Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol*. (Budapest: Dohany, 1993); and *Hianyzo Lapok: 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KP Leveltarabol* (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek, 1993). A few of the documents had already been published in Russian in "O sobytiyakh 1956 goda v Vengrii," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* (Moscow) 19-20 (15-31 October 1992), 52-56. Subsequently, most of the others were published in Russian with detailed annotations in a three-part series: "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta"; "Vengriya, oktyabr'-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS"; and "Vengriya, noyabr' 1956-avgust 1957 g.," all in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow) 4, 5, and 6 (1993), 103-142, 132-160, and 131-144, respectively.
23. The relevant passage in Khrushchev's memoirs is N. S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, 5 vols. (typescript, Moscow, 1965-1970), Vol. IV: *Vzaimootnosheniya s sotsialisticheskimi stranami*, "O Pol'she," pp. 20-28.
24. MSP, SED, BKS, and RDS are the Czech acronyms (as of October 1956) of the Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian Communist parties, respectively. SED is the German acronym for the East German Communist party. It is interesting that Hungarian Communist leaders were invited, even though they did not end up taking part.
25. Svoboda here misspells the name of two of the East German officials: Willi Stoph, writing it as Stopf; and Otto Grotewohl, writing it as Grottewohl. Walter Ulbricht, the third East German official, was then head of the SED; Grotewohl was prime minister; and Stoph was defense minister. The three Bulgarian officials were: the Communist party leader, Todor Zhivkov; the prime minister, Anton Yugov; and the president, Georgi Damyanov.
26. PZPR is the Polish acronym for the Polish United Workers' Party.
27. Gomulka, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Stefan Jedrychowski, and Edward Ochab were top Polish Communist party officials; the Polish foreign minister at the time was Adam Rapacki, who later became known for the so-called Rapacki Plan for conventional arms control in central Europe. Here, as elsewhere, Svoboda misspells the names of both Jedrychowski and Cyrankiewicz, using a hybrid of Czech and Polish spellings.
28. The reference here is to Konstantin Rokossowski, who attained the rank of Marshal of the USSR in the Soviet Army. As noted in the introduction above, Rokossowski had been installed as defense minister and commander-in-chief in Poland in 1949 while retaining his status as a top Soviet officer. The resentment that many Poles felt toward Rokossowski (and toward other Soviet officers who served in high-level command posts in the Polish army) led to the Soviet marshal's ouster at the 8th PZPR plenum.
29. According to Gomulka's speech on October 24 ("Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki," 1), the pull-back of the Soviet forces was to be completed within two days, that is, by the 25th.
30. *Trybuna Ludu* was the main daily newspaper of the Polish Communist party, and of course *Pravda* was the main daily of the CPSU.
31. For the text of this speech, see "Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki," 1.
32. This is not quite what Gomulka said, though it is not inconsistent. He stated that "the question of whether we need Soviet specialists, and for how long we will need their help, will be for us to decide alone."
33. Actually, what Gomulka said was that the continued presence of Soviet troops on *East German* territory would be in accord with Poland's vital interests.
34. This statement was a reply by Gomulka to those in Poland and elsewhere who argued—accurately, as new evidence has confirmed—that real command of the Polish army at the time lay with Moscow not with Warsaw.
35. At the time Erno Gero was the first secretary of the Hungarian Communist party, and Andras Hegedus was the Hungarian prime minister.
36. At this point, the report begins misspelling Gero's name as Gore and continues to write it that way through the rest of the document.
37. Uzhgorod is the Ukrainian town along the border with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
38. Antal Apro was the deputy prime minister; Janos Kadar succeeded Gero a few days later as head of the Hungarian Workers' Party.
39. New names mentioned here include Jozsef Kobol, whose surname is misspelled in two different ways in this report; Sandor Gaspar, who was a close ally of Nagy; Zoltan Szanto, who was a close friend of, and senior official under, Nagy (Szanto fled with Nagy to the Yugoslav embassy in November 1956); Gyorgy Marosan, who was a close friend of Kadar (the two were in prison together) and a Party secretary; Karoly Kiss, who was the head of the Party Control Commission (KSK is the Czech acronym); and Gyula Kallai, who was foreign minister from 1949 to 1951, when he was arrested (and subsequently was in prison with Kadar).
40. The references here are to Geza Losonczy, a leading critic of the Rakosi regime; and Sandor Ronai, a former Social Democratic leader.
41. All those mentioned here had been close allies of Rakosi: Istvan Hidas was deputy prime minister; Bela Szalai was director of central planning; Jozsef Mekis was an economic policy adviser; Istvan Kovacs was the Budapest party secretary; Jozsef Revai was the chief party ideologist; Lajos Acs was a party functionary; Col.-General Istvan Bata was minister of national defense until October 27; and Laszlo Piros was minister of internal affairs. (Piros's surname is misspelled "Byros," and Mekis's is misspelled "Mikes.")
42. The only new name mentioned here is Ferenc Donath, a close friend of Nagy who had been persecuted under Rakosi.
43. The only new names mentioned here are Gyula Egri (misspelled as Egre) and Bela Veg, who had also been a candidate member of the politburo.
44. These casualty figures include only Hungarian troops and security forces; they do not refer to deaths and injuries among the protesters. See Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), p. 29.
45. Zoltan Vas (whose name is misspelled as Vess Zolt) was another close ally of Nagy; like Zoltan Szanto, Vas fled with Nagy to the Yugoslav embassy in November 1956.
46. For the text, see "Discours de Imre Nagy du 24 octobre 1956," in *La Revolution Hongroise vue par les Partis Communistes de l'Europe de l'Est: Presentation Quotidienne par les Organes Officiels (23 octobre-15 novembre 1956)* (Paris: Centre d'Etudes Avancees du College de l'Europe Libre, 1957), 265-266.
47. Unlike Mikoyan and Suslov, Ivan Serov was not a member of the CPSU Presidium. At the time he was the head of the State Security Service (KGB).
48. Zaporozhe is an industrial city on the Dniepr River in southeastern Ukraine.

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RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with students at the Research Center "Archival Conversion" at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov
Historical Archives Institute (HAI)
Russian State University for the Humanities
FAX: (7-095) 432-2506 or
(7-095) 964-3534
Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or
(7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to the:

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Leninsky prospekt 32-a
117334, Moscow, Russia
FAX: (7-095) 938-2288
Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009

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port No. 6], 14 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, NL 90/435.
25. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Tagesbericht Nr. VI [Daily Report No. 6], 14 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch], DY30 IV 2/5/526.
26. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Beriocht über die Aufnahme des Kommuniques der Sitzung des Politbüros des ZK der SED v. 9.6.1953" [Reports of the Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report on the reception of the communiqué of the politburo session of the SED CC of 9 June 1953], SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/5/526.
27. Abteilung Leitende Organe der Partei und Massenorganisationen, Stellungnahmen der Parteiorgane nach dem 9. bzw. 11. 6. 1953: Durchsage der Kreisleitung Seehausen [Reports of the Party Organs after June 9 resp. 11 June 1953: Report of the District Leadership in Seehausen, 11 June 1953,] SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/5/526.
28. FDGB-Bundesvorstand, Vertrauliche Information Nr. 21, 13.6.1953, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/5/543.
29. [Resolution], VEB.-Industriebau, Baustelle: Bettenhaus Friedrichshain, SAPMO-BArch NL 90/437
30. "Notiz" [Memorandum] by Tzschorn, 15 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch NL 90/437; "Betrifft: Empfang einer Delegation von Bauarbietern aus der Stalinallee durch die Genossen Plaschke und Tzschorn" [Re: Reception of a Delegation of the Construction Workers from the Stalinallee by the Comrades Plaschke and Comrade Ambreé on 15 June 1953], 25 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch NL 90/437.
31. Mitter and Wolle, *Untergang*, 90-91.
32. Hagen, *DDR*, 53.
33. Hagen, *DDR*, 55-56.
34. Mitter and Wolle, *Untergang*, 105.
35. Hagen, *DDR*, 772-73; Mitter and Wolle, *Untergang*, 104.
36. Hagen, *DDR*, 106.
37. Semyenov and Sololovskii, telegram to Molotov and Bulganin, 19 June 1953, quoted in Harrison, *The Bargaining Power*, 85.
38. Abteilung Presse und Rundfunk, "Zweite Analyse über die Sendungen von RIAS und NWDR am 18. 6. 1953" [Second Analysis of the Broadcasts of RIAS and NWDR], 18 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/202/14.
39. "Über die Lage am 17.6.1953 in Groß-Berlin und der DDR," 17 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, J IV 2/202/14.
40. "Die Rolle des feindlichen Rundfunks bei den Ereignissen in Berlin" [The Role of Hostile Broadcasts During the Events in Berlin], 21 June 1953, SAPMO-BArch, NL 90/437.
41. Memorandum of Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, VII, 1587. This view is corroborated by a telegram from HICOG Berlin to the Secretary of State, 17 June 1953. Reporting on the day's events the cable concluded that "to best our knowledge, no American involved." 762B.00/6-1753, Record Group 59, National Archives. "American observers," however, "mingled freely" among the rioters. See CIA "Comment on East Berlin Uprising," 17 June 1953, Box 3, C.D. Jackson Records, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Officers of HICOG Berlin's Eastern Affairs Division "mingled with groups" of demonstrators and "talked to bystanders" during a brief visit (3-4:30 PM). No attempt was made by East German police to "keep persons obviously American away from discussion groups." HICOG Berlin to Secretary of State, 16 June 1953, 762B.00/6-1653, RG59, NA. One of these observers was the sister of CIA chief Allen Dulles, Eleanor Dulles, who was officially visiting Berlin at the time. See Eleanor L. Dulles, *Berlin: The Wall is Not Forever* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 14-17.
42. State Department to HICOG Bonn, 17 June 1953, 762B.00/6-1753, RG 59, NA.
43. See Christian Ostermann, *The United States, The East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback*, Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 11.
44. Lewis Merchant, 9 November 1953, NA, RG 59, Lot 55D371, Box 8.
45. Handschriftliche Aufzeichnungen in Anlage zum Sitzungsprotokoll 49/53 [Handwritten notes enclosed with minutes of Politburo session No. 49/53], 8 July 1953, SAMPO-Barch DY 30J IV 2/2/303.
46. Indeed, one of the most interesting findings is the fact that riots, demonstrations and strikes continued for at least four weeks following June 17.

Christian F. Ostermann (National Security Archive), recipient of the 1995 Harry S. Truman Institute Dissertaion Year Fellowship, has done research in U.S. and German archives and is currently completing a dissertation on U.S.-GDR relations. *The author thanks Norbert Finzsch, Thomas A. Schwartz and John L. Gaddis for their support.*

ADDENDUM

The previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin *(Issue #4, Fall 1994), inadvertently omitted the name of the translator of the KGB documents concerning Niels Bohr published on pages 50-51, 57-59. It was Mark H. Doctoroff. The* Bulletin *regrets the omission.*

YELTSIN DECREE ON DECLASSIFICATION OF SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY DOCUMENTS

Ukaz of the President of the Russian Federation:

On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Collection of Archival Documents on the History of the Creation of Nuclear Arms in the USSR

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With the goal of recreating an objective picture of the establishment of a domestic atomic industry and of the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR, I DECREE:

1. The acceptance of the suggestion of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the State Archival Service of Russia, supported by the Russian Federation's Ministry for Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, Federal Counter-Intelligence Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation, on the publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear arms in the USSR over the period up to 1954 and the declassification of the corresponding archival documents.

2. That the Government of the Russian Federation is:

—within one month to form a working group of the Governmental Commission for the Joint [kompleksnomu] Solution of Problems of Nuclear Arms for the study of archival documents connected with the history of the creation of nuclear arms in the USSR, and the development of a proposal for their declassification.

—to provide for the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear arms in the USSR over the period up to 1954.

3. Control over the fulfillment of the present ukaz is entrusted to the Governmental Commission for the Joint Solution of Problems of Nuclear Arms.

4. The current ukaz comes into effect from the day of its publication.

President of the Russian Federation B. Yel'tsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
17 February 1995
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[From *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 1 March 1995, p. 14; item provided and translated by David Russel Stone, Yale University]

USING KGB DOCUMENTS: THE SCALI-FEKLISOV CHANNEL IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali

From the time that former State Department official Roger Hilsman revealed in 1964 that ABC News television correspondent John Scali had served as an intermediary between the U.S. and Soviet governments at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role that Scali and his contact, Aleksandr Feklisov (alias Fomin), played in the resolution of the conflict.[1] Until 1989, it was generally assumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis because meaningful communication between the two governments had ground to a halt.

But at a conference of scholars and former officials in Moscow in January 1989, Feklisov argued that Western historians had gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into negotiations. The famous proposal for ending the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later recalled as having made his brother "for the first time hopeful that our efforts might possibly be successful," had not come from him, but rather had come out of the blue from Scali. Scali, who was also present in Moscow, vigorously disputed Feklisov's account.[2]

Feklisov's surprising assertion[3] and Scali's immediate rejection of this revisionist history posed three questions for students of the crisis:

a) Did the Soviet government use the KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 October 1962?

b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did Scali suggest a settlement for his own government to consider?

c) What effect, if any, did the Scali-Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Materials consulted in the archives of the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the new name for the First Chief Directorate of the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of these questions. Documents on the Scali-Feklisov meetings have been opened as part of a multi-book project on the history of the superpower intelligence services sponsored by Crown Publishers, Inc.[4]

To understand better what can be learned from these documents, it is helpful to revisit the standard account of the role of the Scali-Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

According to the traditional version, Scali received a call at his Washington office from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali had been meeting off and on with this Soviet Embassy official for over a year. From the FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset about his meetings with Feklisov, the journalist learned that this man was no ordinary diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov ("Fomin") was the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in Washington. On this particular Friday, with the likelihood of US military action against Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali suggested the Occidental Restaurant near the Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 p.m.

"When I arrived he was already sitting at the table as usual, facing the door. He seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in contrast to the usual calm, low-key appearance

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Russian Foreign Ministry Documents On the Cuban Missile Crisis

Introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff

Among the new archival materials on the Cuban Missile Crisis recently made available by the Russian government are the first batch of diplomatic documents, a selection of 21 documents totaling 147 pages; extensive translations of these materials (as well as of two other documents released from the former CPSU Central Committee archives) follow this introduction. While certainly welcome, this represents only about twenty percent of a file of 734 pages of Foreign Ministry (MID) documents declassified in the fall of 1991 and in early 1992. Moreover, many documents remain classified. Still, it is an important step forward.

The documents were acquired through the efforts of the author and of the National Security Archive (NSA), a non-governmental, privately-funded research institute based at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. [Ed. note: Shortly before presstime, a second group of declassified Foreign Ministry documents reached NSA; however, these consisted mostly of previously-published Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and other materials that were not previously published but were of lesser import than those already obtained.]

The 21 documents initially released comprise selections from six categories of material. First are three cables from, and one message to, Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev in Havana sent shortly prior to or during the crisis; second are seven cables sent from Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington and one to him, also all prior to or during the crisis, and one from Soviet official Georgii Zhukov, also sent from Washington; third are one message from Ambassador Valerian Zorin, Soviet representative to the United Nations in New York, and one to him (and to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov) from Moscow; fourth are two messages from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Moscow just before the crisis broke; fifth are three messages from Havana to Moscow reporting on First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan's negotiations with Prime Minister Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders as the crisis was being ended; and finally, the sixth is a single message from Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov after his meeting with President Kennedy on 9 January 1963, in effect closing the post-crisis diplomatic negotiations. A few of these have been released earlier, in particular one on Mikoyan's talks with Castro. Nonetheless, they are all of interest and together they make a substantial addition to our documentary base and some contribution to our understanding of the crisis.

These materials expand on the earlier released messages between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Khrushchev. There are, however, no materials on Foreign Ministry evaluations or other interagency deliberations in Moscow, in contrast to the extensive releases of comparable materials by the United States.

Some of the Foreign Ministry documents have been lightly sanitized, and a number of them are only excerpts, but excisions are not noted except where there is an internal blank space in a paragraph. Documents are not identified by their original designators (such as telegram numbers), nor by their Foreign Ministry archive file locations.

The precrisis reports of Ambassadors Alekseev and Dobrynin help to set the stage, but they do not add much to what has been known. Gromyko's cabled report of his meeting with President Kennedy (detailed in his memoir) is not included, but his account of the discussion of Cuba in his meeting that same evening with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a message giving Gromyko's evaluation of the situation on October 19, are included. Both are quite reveal-

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"DISMAYED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION": Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962

by Vladislav M. Zubok

The talks between Anastas I. Mikoyan, member of the CC CPSU Presidium, and the revolutionary leadership of Cuba in Havana on 3-12 November 1962, were a lesser known, but nonetheless dramatic episode in the story of the Cuban missile crisis, and also marked a watershed in the history of relations between the Soviet superpower and one of its closest non-European allies.

Thanks to declassified documents from U.S. archives, researchers have begun to appreciate the significance and nuances of U.S.-West German, U.S.-Iranian, and other key patron-client relationships that were vital to American conduct during the Cold War. But until very recently, the existence and importance of parallel commitments and influences on Soviet foreign policy were often grossly underestimated. New East-bloc archival evidence, however, has corroborated suspicions that, to take one key example, Walter Ulbricht, the East German communist leader from 1953 to 1971, was not merely a Soviet puppet, but, since the late 1950s, made his needs and agendas increasingly present in the minds of the Kremlin policy-makers. As Hope Harrison has convincingly shown, there are substantial reasons to analyze Soviet-GDR ties not only as a relationship of submission and subservience, but also as a relationship in which at times "the tail wagged the dog far more than the West realized."[1] Similarly, new Russian archival documents presented by Kathryn Weathersby have disclosed in new detail how North Korean leader Kim Il Sung was also able to press his militant agenda on an even stronger Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, with disastrous consequences, in the run-up to the Korean War.[2]

The documents on the Mikoyan-Castro talks from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF) in Moscow, published in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, reveal that for Nikita Khrushchev and his colleagues in the CC CPSU Presidium (Politburo), the Soviet-Cuban "axis" also acquired a life of its own, beyond the bipolar dimensions of the Cold War. This alliance influenced Kremlin decision-making processes far more than the needs and requirements of Soviet domestic constituents and forces (elites, bureaucratic services, propaganda and ideology, latent public opinion). In the events leading to the Cuban missile crisis, the considerations stemming from this axis had a part at least as important as the interests and concerns flowing from the dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations.[3]

The Historic-Documentary Department of the Foreign Ministry had declassified documents on the Soviet-Cuban talks, like many others related to the Cuban missile crisis, in late 1991. But officials of the Department withheld them (in a manner that unfortunately has become a recent pattern), allowing only a few to have a peek at them at their discretion. One of them, Sergei Khrushchev, gives a dramatic, albeit short description of Mikoyan's visit in his Russian-language book, *Nikita Khrushchev: Crises and Missiles*.[4] Some were also made available to the makers of television documentaries, or published in Russian. Now they have become available to scholars, with copies available for research at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and translations of the minutes of the post-crisis Soviet-Cuban talks follow this article.

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THE "LESSONS" OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS FOR WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

by Mark Kramer

The role of the Warsaw Pact in the Cuban Missile Crisis was negligible. All evidence suggests that the Soviet Union neither consulted nor even informed its East European allies about the installation of medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba before the deployments were revealed by the U.S. government.[1] Nor did the Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact allies about the removal of the missiles. Although the Pact declared a joint military alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after President John F. Kennedy's televised revelation of the Soviet missile deployments), the alert had no more than a symbolic impact and was carried out solely at Moscow's behest.[2] The joint alert was formally cancelled on 21 November 1962, the same day that the Soviet Union ended its own unilateral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba was lifted).[3] So peripheral was the alliance to the Soviet Union's handling of the crisis that it was not until long after the matter had been resolved that the Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, bothered to inform the East European governments about the Soviet Union's motives for deploying and withdrawing the missiles.[4]

That the Warsaw Pact was of only marginal significance during the Cuban Missile Crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In 1962 the Pact was still little more than a paper organization and had not yet acquired a meaningful role in Soviet military strategy.[5] Moreover, the crisis was far outside the European theater, and East European leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend the alliance's purview beyond the continent. Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Berlin, the situation in Germany remained calm throughout the crisis.[6] Hence, the standoff in the Caribbean was a matter for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, not a matter for the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the near-irrelevance of the Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of October 1962 did have important effects on the alliance, particularly on the nuclear command-and-control arrangements that were established in the mid-1960s. This article will draw on recent disclosures from the East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian archives to show how the Cuban missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact nuclear operations. No definitive judgments about this matter are yet possible because the most crucial documents are all in Moscow, and the archival situation in Russia is still highly unsatisfactory.[7] Nevertheless, enough evidence has emerged from East-Central Europe to permit several tentative conclusions.

The article will begin by briefly reviewing the "lessons" that the Cuban Missile Crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weapons deployments abroad. It will then delineate the command-and-control arrangements that were set up in the mid-1960s for Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, and examine the East European states' unsuccessful efforts to alter those arrangements. The article

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that he presented." Thus Scali described in a 1964 television broadcast how this meeting opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared that war would begin soon, and was so concerned that he volunteered a way out of the stalemate.[5]

He asked, according to Scali's notes, what Scali "thought" of a three-point proposition:

a) The Soviet missiles bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision.

b) Fidel Castro would promise never to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever.

c) In return for the above, the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba.[6]

Feklisov was confident that if U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson "pursued this line," Soviet UN ambassador Valerian Zorin "would be interested." As if to give some weight to his proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban delegate to the UN had already made a similar proposal in a session of the Security Council but that it had been met with silence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this proposal by his contacts at the State Department and then gave the journalist his home telephone number, to be sure he could be reached at any time.[7]

Scali rushed this proposal to the State Department. Roger Hilsman, State's director of Intelligence and Research, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were extremely interested in it. Rusk considered this to be the first concrete offer from the Soviet leadership for ending the crisis. The letters already exchanged by Khrushchev and Kennedy had only brought about a hardening of each side's position. So long as the Soviets refused to discuss removing the missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful way out of the deepening crisis.[8]

Transcripts of the ExComm [Executive Committee of the National Security Council] meeting of October 27[9] confirm that the Kennedy administration interpreted the "offer" from the KGB representative as an elaboration of a more general proposal contained in a private letter from Khrushchev that arrived late in the afternoon of October 26, in which the Soviet leader had written:

> We, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists will be obviated.[10]

By itself the Khrushchev letter did not promise anything except that future Soviet ships would carry non-military cargoes. But when the letter was coupled with what Scali had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy administration believed it had received an acceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk instructed Scali to contact Feklisov to make clear that the U.S. found a basis for agreement in his offer.

Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his message: He was authorized by the highest authority to say that there were "real possibilities in this [proposal]" and that "the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with [UN Secretary General] U Thant and with each other." Feklisov listened carefully, then repeated the proposal to be sure that he understood the White House's offer correctly. Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for confirmation that Scali spoke for the White House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was not enough for there to be inspection of the dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be necessary for UN observers to observe the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern United States. This idea went beyond Scali's instructions, so he demurred.

The situation changed the next day, October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Missile Crisis describe as "Black Saturday." Just as the ExComm was discussing a formal response to the Khrushchev letter and the Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived from Moscow, which this time immediately publicized the communication. Khrushchev had upped the ante. Now he demanded that the U.S. dismantle its Jupiter missile bases in Turkey before he went ahead with any deal that would strip Cuba of Soviet missiles. Scali was sent to see Feklisov to register the U.S. government's strong disapproval of the new terms. Although Feklisov defended his government's new position, the KGB Resident remained hopeful that the Kremlin would ultimately accept the October 26 proposal as the basis for a resolution of the crisis. Indeed, Kennedy's response to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit terms of October 26 and ignored the Turkish issue raised in Khrushchev's letter of the 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin's public announcement of a deal—a withdrawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba—that seemed to incorporate much of what John Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. Both men were proud of their accomplishment.

KGB records suggest that neither the traditional version nor Feklisov's revision is entirely accurate. Feklisov's cables to Moscow from October 26 and October 27 and evidence of how the KGB handled them suggest strongly that the Soviet government did not initiate the proposals that Scali presented to Rusk on the afternoon of October 26.

Feklisov's cables, moreover, paint a different picture of his relationship with the American journalist. The KGB Resident considered him an intelligence contact, with whom he could exchange political information. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the KGB. "We have been meeting for over a year," he wrote. This statement, of course, would not have been necessary had Moscow already considered Scali a channel to the U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov had referred to Scali only using a codename. This was the first time he introduced him and mentioned his position with ABC News.

Feklisov's cable describing his first meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost a mirror image of the account that Scali gave Rusk. In Feklisov's version, Scali is the one who is fearful of war. After assuring Feklisov that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 hours, Scali asked if the United States attacked Cuba, "would West Berlin be occupied?" Feklisov reported that he had replied defiantly that all heaven and earth might fall upon NATO if the U.S. were to attack Cuba. "At the very least," he said, "the Soviet Union would occupy West Berlin." Feklisov added that given the size of Soviet conventional forces on the line dividing East and West Germany, the situation would be very

difficult for the West. And to make matters worse, he expected the crisis to unify the entire Socialist bloc, including China. Perhaps for dramatic effect, Feklisov assured his American interlocutor that the Cubans, and especially Castro, were ready to die like heroes.[11]

Feklisov's report to the KGB Center creates the impression that the direction taken by the discussion depressed Scali even further. "A horrible conflict lies ahead," Scali said after hearing what the Soviet response would be to the use of American military force against Cuba. According to Feklisov, Scali fell into such a state of anxiety that he began to muse about possible ways out of the conflict. "Why couldn't Fidel Castro give a speech saying that he was prepared to dismantle and to remove the missile installations if President Kennedy gave a guarantee not to attack Cuba?" Scali is reported to have asked.[12]

What is most significant about the version that Feklisov cabled to Moscow is that the KGB resident did not take Scali's musings as a formal U.S. offer. Instead of grasping this as a proposal, Feklisov told Scali that what he was saying sounded a lot like something already proposed by the Cubans in the Security Council, which had been ignored by U.S. Ambassador Stevenson. Although Scali responded that he could not recall any American rejection of a similar Cuban proposal, he said he was convinced that such a demarche at this time by Castro would meet with a positive reaction from U.S. civilian and military circles.

Scali's confidence surprised Feklisov, who began to wonder whether indeed Scali might know something about the White House's negotiating strategy. When Feklisov inquired as to exactly who might be interested in this kind of proposal, Scali avoided giving any names. This was as far as he would go. As Scali and Feklisov parted, the KGB officer concluded that despite having taken an interesting turn, the meeting itself had been inconclusive.

It is also significant that in his memoirs, Feklisov does not mention anything about having discussed a political solution with Scali at the first October 26 meeting. In fact, Feklisov categorically denies that he or Scali made any attempts to formulate a way out of the crisis at that time. Here the evidence from the SVR archives contradicts Feklisov's memoirs and suggests that Feklisov has, for whatever reason, forgotten the balance of his historic conversation with Scali.[13]

The SVR record on the second Scali-Feklisov meeting of October 26 is less controversial. The account that Feklisov cabled to Moscow differs little from what the American journalist reported to the State Department. Feklisov reported that Scali, who had initiated the meeting, laid out a formula that could be the basis for negotiations between Stevenson and Zorin at the UN. The only difference between the Feklisov and Scali accounts is that whereas Feklisov described this as a new American proposal, Scali relayed to the State Department that Feklisov had responded energetically to word of formal U.S. interest in the Soviet proposal first mentioned at the Occidental Restaurant.[14]

After this second meeting with Scali, Feklisov sent a long cable to Moscow, detailing both of his conversations with Scali. In retrospect, it seems odd that at a time when the Kremlin was hungry for any news about U.S. intentions, Feklisov would have waited so long to inform Moscow as to what John Scali was telling him. Feklisov was accustomed to cabling his superiors at all hours. And he had approximately five hours between the end of the lunch and his next discussion with Scali to tell KGB Center that something was going on. In his memoirs, Feklisov has explained this gap by saying that he did not expect anything to come of his discussion with Scali. Indeed, he writes that he did not even bother to mention the meeting to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin, until 4 p.m. Then, just as he was in the midst of giving this report to Dobrynin, Feklisov received Scali's request for a second meeting. Not only did Feklisov have to leave the embassy before completing his briefing for Dobrynin but he had to put off cabling Moscow until returning from the Statler Hotel.[15]

There was soon to be as much confusion in Moscow over what Feklisov was doing as in Dobrynin's embassy. The KGB had no warning that its representative in Washington had established, albeit unwittingly, a channel to the Kennedys. When Feklisov's long cable arrived in Moscow at 2:20 p.m., Saturday, October 27 (Moscow time was eight hours ahead of EST), the chief of the First Chief Directorate (FCD), the foreign intelligence division of the KGB, forwarded this telegram directly to the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Semichastny.[16]

In following the course taken by this important telegram, we see that it could not have played any role in shaping Khrushchev's letter of October 26, which proposed a U.S. guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba as a means of resolving the crisis, or even in influencing the letter of October 27 that asserted a parallel between U.S. bases in Turkey and the Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

Feklisov's telegram arrived in Moscow well after (nearly a full day) Khrushchev had sent his letter of October 26 to Kennedy. Because it was not expected that Feklisov would act as a channel for resolving the crisis, this telegram was not given priority treatment. After deciphering and summarizing the telegram, which took the usual hour, the FCD sent the telegram to the Secretariat of the KGB, which was the headquarters staff of the Chairman, Semichastny. Inexplicably, the telegram sat in Semichastny's office for another four hours before the Chairman decided to send it to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. This delay was so long that by the time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a copy of the Feklisov cable, Khrushchev had already sent his second, October 27 letter to Kennedy referring to the Jupiters in Turkey.[17]

The Scali-Feklisov meeting on October 27 looms even less significant in Russian records. Again Khrushchev could not have seen it in time to affect his strategy toward the Americans. Feklisov sent a short report after Scali scolded him for Khrushchev's new position on resolving the missile crisis. This cable did not reach the Chairman of the KGB until 4:40 p.m. on October 28. Semichastny's reaction was to forward the letter to the Foreign Ministry, where it arrived at 7 p.m. Moscow time, an hour after Khrushchev had publicly accepted the Kennedy administration's terms for ending the crisis.[18]

The KGB materials substantiate claims that for the Kremlin the Scali-Feklisov meetings were a sideshow that played no part in the U.S.-Soviet endgame of October 26-28. Although of less consequence in light of this information, it is nevertheless interesting to consider the contradiction between the contemporaneous accounts by Feklisov and Scali of their meetings on October 26. Did Feklisov violate KGB procedure and present a completely unauthorized settlement formula? Or, at the other extreme, did Scali use the KGB

resident to test some ideas that had occurred to him as perhaps the best way of averting nuclear disaster?

The KGB documents suggest that in the heat of discussion, with the fear of war hanging over their heads, Scali and Feklisov fastened on a revival of a formula for ending the crisis that, among others, UN Secretary General U Thant had been suggesting since October 24.[19] Because of the possibility that Feklisov and/or Scali mischaracterized their first meeting on October 26, it may never be possible to resolve the central contradiction between their respective claims. However, the determination of which man actually proposed this plan is less important than the fact that, although the Kremlin was completely in the dark, John F. Kennedy was convinced that Feklisov spoke for the Soviet government, and indeed for Khrushchev personally.

As we now know, President Kennedy decided not to use the Scali-Feklisov channel to settle the crisis. On the night of October 27, JFK sent his brother Robert to Dobrynin to offer a face-saving deal to Khrushchev. In addition to pledging not to invade Cuba, Kennedy offered a secret undertaking to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Nevertheless, the story of the Scali-Feklisov backchannel remains significant as a prime example of how governments can misinterpret each other, especially in the grip of a crisis.

1. *The New York Times* broke the story of John Scali's role in the Cuban missile crisis on 4 August 1964. It was reported that *Look* magazine was about to publish an excerpt from Roger Hilsman's forthcoming book on foreign policymaking in the Kennedy years that named Scali as an intermediary between the U.S. and Soviet governments at the climax of the missile crisis. Just as Hilsman's piece was to appear in print, John Scali discussed his meetings with the Soviet KGB official, "Mr. X," on an ABC news special of 13 August 1964. Transcript, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. *U.S. News & World Report* carried an article about Hilsman's revelation in its 17 August 1964 issue. Hilsman's excerpt finally appeared in the 25 August 1964 issue of *Look*. A few months later, in its 25 October 1964 edition, *Family Weekly* published Scali's "I Was the Secret Go-Between in the Cuban Crisis." Pierre Salinger, Hilsman and Robert Kennedy all attested to the importance of the Scali channel in autobiographical books: *With Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 274-280; *To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 217-223; and *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), 90-91. Salinger's *With Kennedy* quoted directly from notes that John Scali had made after each of his meetings with the KGB officer.

2. The Moscow conference was one of a series of five conferences between 1987 and 1992 involving, at first, U.S. scholars and former officials, who were later joined by Soviet and then Cuban counterparts. The conferences were organized by James G. Blight, initially at Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs and later at Brown University's Center for Foreign Policy Development. For the Feklisov-Scali exchange, see Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989* (Lantham, MD: University Press of America, 1992), 112-14; 117-18. Feklisov elaborated on his testimony in his memoirs, *Za Okeanom i Na Ostrovye* (Moscow: DEM, 1994), 222-40.

3. It appears that Feklisov first made this assertion to a Russian scholar in 1987. A year later, Georgi Kornienko, who had been the Counsellor in the Soviet Embassy at the time of the Missile Crisis, told Raymond Garthoff that on 26 October 1962 the Embassy had been confused by Feklisov's account of his first meeting with Scali. Neither Kornienko nor the ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin, was sure whether it had been Scali or Feklisov who had made the proposal. See Garthoff's revised edition of *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1989), 80-81. A 1988 article by Garthoff was the first published account of the Scali-Feklisov channel to raise doubts as to whether Feklisov had been authorized by the Kremlin to make his proposal. See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story," *Foreign Policy* 72 (Fall 1988).

4. Thus far, Crown has four books under contract. Each book will be written by a team. The Fursenko/Naftali study of the superpowers and Cuba, 1958-1963, will be the first book in the series. It will be followed by a history of Soviet intelligence penetration of the British government by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev; a study of KGB-CIA operations in Berlin by George Bailey, Sergei Kondrashev, and David Murphy; and a history of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States by Alexander Vassiliev and Allen Weinstein.

5. ABC news special of 13 August 1964. Transcript, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security Archive.

6. Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1966), 177-79. In their first public accounts, both Scali and Hilsman misremembered the details of the proposal. They had Khrushchev giving the pledge to keep Cuba free of offensive weapons, not Fidel Castro. This flawed version of the "Soviet" proposal gained wide currency when Graham T. Allison featured it in his influential *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 260, 263. For Scali's confidential description on 26 October 1962 of what he had just heard from Feklisov, which confirms Abel's and Salinger's accounts, see "John Scali's notes of first meeting with Soviet embassy counselor and KGB officer Alexandr Fomin, October 26, 1962," Document 43 in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*, (New York: New Press, 1992), 184.

7. Ibid.

8. Hilsman, *To Move A Nation*, 217-19.

9. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, *Presidential Recordings*, Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, 27 October 1962, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.

10. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 26 October 1962, in Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, 185-88.

11. Feklisov to KGB Center, 26 October 1962, Delo 116, T.1, SVR Archives, Moscow.

12. Ibid.

13. Feklisov, *Za Okeanom u Na Ostrovye*, 223-25.

14. Feklisov to KGB Center, 27 October 1962, Delo 116, T.1., SVR Archives; John Scali, Report of 27 October 1962 Meeting, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security Archive.

15. Feklisov, *Za Okeanom u Na Octrove*, 225. There is a problem with Feklisov's chronology. Scali's call actually came later than 4 or 5 p.m.. Unless his meeting with Dobrynin actually occurred three hours later than he said, Feklisov should have had enough time to brief the Soviet ambassador and to send a cable to Moscow. After returning from the second meeting, Feklisov continued to wait before sending Moscow any word on his meetings with Scali. The long cable was not sent until approximately midnight, four hours after Feklisov and Scali parted. At a September 1994 conference in Moscow, entitled "The Caribbean Crisis in the Archives of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Cuba and the United States," Dobrynin and Feklisov argued over the reasons for the delays in sending a KGB cable on the Scali meetings. Feklisov alleged that he waited to give Dobrynin the opportunity to sign the cable; but when the latter stubbornly refused to do so, he sent it anyway. The former Soviet ambassador rejected this account, saying that Feklisov had not needed his signature to send a KGB cable.

16. Spravka on Feklisov's October 26 telegram on Scali, Delo 116, T. 1., SVR Archives.

17. Ibid.

18. Spravka on Delivery of Scali report of 27 October 1962, ibid.

19. U Thant, "Statement in the Security Council," 24 October 1962, in Andrew W. Cordier and Max Harrelson, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, VI: U Thant, 1961-1964* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 237-240.

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ing. Gromyko not only had obtained no hint of the American discovery of the missiles, he reported that from all available information, including Soviet intelligence (referred to by the usual circumlocation as information received "through unofficial channels") and from other countries (which would include Cuba), "the acuteness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the United States has somewhat abated," and that under prevailing conditions "a military adventure against Cuba is almost inconceivable." Notwithstanding his own knowledge of the secret missile deployment underway, he even said, "Everything that we know about the position of the USA government on the Cuban question permits the conclusion that the situation in general is completely satisfactory." How did he think the United States would react when it found out about the missiles? And this evaluation followed his meetings with Kennedy and Rusk.

Dobrynin's cables on his meetings with Robert Kennedy on October 23, 27, and 28—or, rather, the excerpts that have been released—help to clarify these important exchanges. Among other things, they make clear that there *was* not merely a statement by Kennedy, but "an understanding" on withdrawing the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey, but also that it had to be kept in "strict secrecy." The material released does not, however, include the reports on Dobrynin's delivery to Robert Kennedy on October 29 of a draft *written* agreement, and its sharp rejection in another meeting on October 30.

The reporting on Mikoyan's talks in Cuba, while not complete, does give the main discussions in considerable detail. Incidentally, apart from Mikoyan's efforts to persuade Castro to agree to the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba and his reassurances on Soviet support on other matters, both Mikoyan and Castro discussed aspects of the crisis itself that shed light on earlier Soviet and Cuban thinking and actions. Both, for example, had clearly concluded by October 27 that an American attack on Cuba was imminent—although they drew different conclusions on what the Soviet Union should do about it. While not all statements made in that exchange were necessarily accurate, it is of interest to note that Mikoyan said, in answer to a Cuban question, "speaking frankly, we [the Soviet leaders] had not thought at all about the bases in Turkey" as a tradeoff until the Americans, specifically Walter Lippmann in a newspaper column on October 25, had raised the matter. He also did not disclose to Castro—who had found the idea of a tradeoff repugnant—the secret understanding reached with Kennedy on the withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey.

The reporting on the extensive U.S.-Soviet negotiations in New York from 29 October 1962 to 7 January 1963, by contrast, is completely omitted, apart from Kuznetsov's subsequent final meeting with the president on 9 January 1963. This negotiation settled the issues of dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles, bombers, and warheads, and verification of the withdrawal of missiles and bombers by cooperative measures, but was unable to formulate agreed terms for assurances against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and eventually left it to rest on the presidential statements. Kuznetsov's account of his meeting with Kennedy not only deals with Cuba (including the question of the Soviet military presence remaining there, a diplomatic dialogue on which continued into April 1963) but also with the subject of a nuclear test ban. A test ban was then being discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges, some of which (those messages in November and December 1962 that also dealt with the Cuban crisis) have been declassified and released by the two governments.

It is not my purpose here to try to summarize or even note the many interesting matters on which these documents throw light. The specific points I have raised, as well as my references to some aspects of the subject not dealt with, are only illustrative. These documents, and others that should follow, will undoubtedly add to our understanding. So, too, will the long overdue forthcoming two volumes of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series dealing with Cuba in 1962-63.

Telegram of Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 7 September 1962

Recently, the ruling circles of the USA have noticeably activated a policy of provocation against Cuba; military preparations and its political isolation. Nearly every day, the air space and territorial waters of Cuba are violated by American airplanes, submarines and ships trying to establish permanent control over the territory of Cuba and diverting passenger and transport ships bound for Cuba. The landing of counter-revolutionary bands of spies and arms has been increased.

The constant acts of provocation are carried out from the territory of the USA base at Guantanamo, most often in the form of shooting at Cuban patrols. Especially noteworthy among all these provocations are far reaching acts like the August 24 shelling of the hotel in which mainly live Soviet specialists, and also the lies published by the Kennedy Administration about the alleged August 30 attack, in international waters, on an American airplane from two small Cuban ships. In the USA government's announcement, it is noted that in the event of a repeat of "an incident of this type," the armed forces of the United States "will take all necessary retaliatory measures. It is entirely evident that this carries a great danger for Cuba, since it gives the most reactionary anti-Cuban authorities in the USA an opening at any moment to organize a provocation and unleash aggressive actions against Cuba.

In regard to the above two last actions undertaken by the USA, the government of Cuba came forward with corresponding official declarations signed by Fidel Castro. Both of these declarations were circulated as official documents to the UN. The goal of these declarations is to attract the attention of the appropriate international organizations and all of world public opinion to the provocational and far-reaching acts of the USA, to unmask the aggressive schemes of the United States in relation to Cuba, and to ward them off. In these declarations the government of Cuba precisely makes the point that the anti-Cuban actions and schemes of the USA presents a threat not only to Cuba, but to the whole world.

The series of provocations is now accompanied by a whipped up, broad anti-Cuba campaign in the USA press, striving with all its might to convince the population of the United States of the alleged presence in Cuba of large contingents of Soviet troops and of the fact that Cuba has turned into a military base of "world Communism" which presents a grave threat to the USA and all Latin American countries. Under this pretext, the press, certain American senators and other public figures demand of the Kennedy administration the revival of the Monroe Doctrine, establishment of a sea and air blockade of Cuba, the bringing into force of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, and the military occupation of Cuba.

Following the signing in Moscow of the Soviet-Cuban communique in which the agreement of the Soviet government to provide assistance in strengthening its armed forces is noted, Kennedy in a public statement on September 4 pointed to the defensive nature of Cuba's military preparations and noted that Soviet military specialists are in Cuba to teach the Cubans how to use defensive equipment presented by the Soviet Union. Several USA press agencies, commenting on that part of Kennedy's statement, underline the evidence of that the fact the president of the USA obviously preferred an attempt to calm down those circles in the USA which are supporting quick, decisive actions against Cuba. Along with this, in Kennedy's statement there are contained insinuations of purported aggressive Cuban schemes regarding influence on the American continent and a threat to use "all necessary means" to "defend" the continent.

According to certain information, the USA State Department through its ambassadors notified the governments of Latin American countries that they can expect changes in the situationiin

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FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS
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in the Caribbean basin "if Castro's government does not come to its senses." More probably, in the near future the USA, using the pretext of an allegedly growing threat to the Western hemisphere, will embark on a long process of increasing the pressure on governments of the Latin-American countries and will probably convene a meeting of foreign ministers of the member-countries of the OAS to work out supplementary sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume that the most wildly aggressive powers in the USA (the Pentagon, the Cuban external counter-revolution, and others) will continue to exert pressure on Kennedy in order to realize the most decisive actions against Cuba.

The campaign of anti-Cuban hysteria has been conveyed via American propaganda to Latin American countries too. There the publication of articles and transmissions of radio programs of anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet content is constantly encouraged, while the external Cuban counter-revolution and local reaction put constant pressure on the governments of those countries, conduct loud demonstrations and terrorize individuals and organizations which speak out in defense of the Cuban revolution, and by means of bribery and blackmail get a range of people who have visited Cuba to make anti-Cuban statements, and so forth.

Simultaneously, the USA continues actively to conduct purely military preparations, aimed at repressing possible centers of the national-liberation movement in Latin American, and, given the appropriate circumstances, the Cuban revolution itself. This is shown by such facts as the organization by the United States of schools for instruction in methods of street-fighting and anti-partisan struggle in many Latin American countries (in Panama, Peru, Colombia, Equador, Bolivia, and others); continuing intensive instruction of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in camps located on the territory of the USA, in Puerto Rico and in several Central American countries; many inspection trips to these bases, schools, and camps by responsible American military officials and the heads of the Cuban counter-revolution, including Miro Cardon; unflagging efforts of the USA aimed at strengthening the unity of the external Cuban counterrevolution and unity in the action of counter-revolutionary organizations active in Cuba itself, etc.

At the same time, the USA is actively continuing to conduct its efforts towards the political isolation of Cuba, particularly in Latin America. The USA is concentrating on putting pressure on the governments of Mexico and Brazil, which continue to express their support for the principle of non-interference and self-determination of peoples. This pressure is applied through economic means, and also by exploiting the domestic reaction. The realization of Kennedy's visit to Mexico, following which he was to have quickly visited Brazil too (this visit was put off to the last months of the year), served the goals of determining the likelihood of attracting these two countries to the anti-Cuban plans of the USA.

Until now none of the attempts of the USA to attract Brazil and Mexico to its anti-Cuban adventures has had any success.

Under pressure from the USA, in a majority of Latin American countries the local authorities are applying the harshest measures aimed at forbidding or tightly limiting visits of any groups or individuals to Cuba, and also their contacts with Cuban delegations in third countries. People who visit Cuba or make contact with Cuban delegations in third countries are subject to arrest, repression, investigations upon return to their homeland. The USA does not lack means for organizing broad and loud provocations against Cuban delegations taking part in international quorums, as took place recently in Finland and Jamaica.

Referring to the decision taken at the meeting at Punta-del-Este about the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS, the USA is undertaking all measures to deny Cuba participation in any organizations connected with the inter-American system. In particular, they recently undertook an attempt to secure the exclusion of Cuba from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). The unlawful denial of Cuba's application to join the so-called Latin American Free Trade Association is another example. In response to the American policy towards Cuba of provocation, military threats, and political isolation, the Cuban government is intensifying its efforts on strengthening its own armed forces, struggling with the internal counter-revolution, unmasking before world public opinion the aggressive designs of the USA, and broadening its anti-American propaganda in Latin America. At the end of August, taking into account the activization of provocative actions by the USA and the possible increase in the unleashing of counter-revolutionary bands and manifestations of domestic counter-revolution, preventive arrests were carried out in the country and strengthened control was established over many registered [known] counter-revolutionary elements and the places where they gather.

The Cuban leaders are paying serious attention to the question of strengthening the devotion to the revolution of the cadres of its diplomatic missions, particularly in Latin American countries; they are taking every opportunity, as was the case with their presentation at the Latin American Free Trade Association, to widen the sphere of their activity in Latin America; they are strengthening their connections with the Latin American peoples by inviting to Cuba society delegations and individual Latin American officials; in timely fashion and aggressively, they speak at international organizations, unmasking the aggressive schemes and actions of the USA; they are striving to take part in any international forums at which there is a possibility to expose the aggressive character of American imperialism; they are strengthening Cuba's ties with African and Asian countries, etc.

The Cuban leadership believes, however, that the main guarantee of the development of the Cuban Revolution under conditions of possible direct American aggression is the readiness of the Soviet government to provide military assistance to Cuba and simultaneously to warn the USA of that fact. From this position, the joint Soviet-Cuban communique about [Ernesto "Che"] Guevara's visit to Moscow was greeted by the Cuban leaders and the vast majority of the Cuban people with great enthusiasm and gratitude. The Cuban leadership and Fidel Castro himself suggest that these warnings will help to prevail those forces in the USA which are warning of the outbreak now of a world conflict, and are staving off a direct attack American attack on Cuba in the near future.

In our opinion, in the near future the ruling circles of the USA will continue to expand the attacks on Cuba by all the above-mentioned means: provocations, the propaganda campaign, military preparations, actions of the domestic counter-revolution, political isolation, and so forth. Their success in drawing the Latin American countries into their aggressive actions will most depend on the positions of the governments of Mexico and Brazil.

We also suggest that the question of direct American actions against Cuba will be decided by the correlation of forces in American ruling circles which have differing approaches to questions of war and peace in the present period, and the struggle between them on these issues.

The mood of the overwhelming majority of the Cuban people is defiant, and regardless of the reality of the threat of intervention, no panic or fear before the threat which is hanging over Cuba is observed in the masses of the people. The American provocations make possible an ever-tighter unity of the Cuban workers and raise the political consciousness of the masses.

Regarding the provocations, the influence of the Soviet Union in Cuba has grown as never before, and our cooperation with the Cuban leaders has been strengthened even more.

In the interest of future productive work with our Cuban friends it would be desirable to receive from you for dispatch to the Cuban leaders information which we have about the plans of the USA government toward Cuba.

7.IX.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, copy courtesy of National Security Archive (NSA), Washington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 11 September 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

In a conversation with me on September 11 of this year, [Cuban Defense Minister] Raoul Castro, noting the publication in the Soviet press of the TASS report, announced that it had been met with great enthusiasm by the Cuban leadership as timely and well-argued. Castro said that this report will be regarded by the whole Cuban people and supporters of the Cuban Revolution in other countries as a reliable shield against the aggressive intrigues of the American imperialists.

Castro also asserts that the thesis put forth in the report allows opponents of direct intervention in the United States itself—including Kennedy—to put up more decisive resistance to pressure from the aggressive forces. Regarding this, he, nonetheless, is allowing a sharp increase in anti-Soviet propaganda in the USA and in countries under its influence.

Raoul Castro believes that N.S. Khrushchev's conversation with [U.S. Secretary of the Interior Stewart] Udall on the Cuban question, during which the government of the USA was warned without any hint of propaganda about all the consequences which could result from its treacherous actions towards Cuba, is even more important. In Castro's opinion, the public announcement, as a consequence of this warning, will force the USA ruling circles to search for new means of strangling the Cuban revolution.

Castro considers as very important the part of the announcement which deals with the American bases around the USSR, and also the USA's Sixth and Seventh fleets in foreign waters and its effort to convince public opinion that this is the inalienable right of the USA.

The use of this line of argument to explain Soviet assistance to Cuba will be very easy for ordinary Latin Americans and for the people of the USA itself to understand.

Raoul Castro asserts that in the course of the developing situation the Americans are trying to isolate Cuba from the Latin American countries and to intensify the small-scale provocations against Cuba allegedly carried out by irresponsible elements of the Cuban counter-revolution, the apparent shelling of populated areas and foreign ships bound for Cuban ports from the sea.

Today's pirate attack on Cuban and English ships in the Caribbean area, in Castro's opinion, is aimed at frightening certain capitalist countries and to give the governments of NATO a pretext to forbid its ships to visit Cuban ports.

According to a dispatch by the Chairman of the Institute for Agricultural Reform C.R. [Carlos Rafael] Rodriguez, the crews of Japanese fishing boats who are now in Cuba, citing the danger, posed the question of leaving for their homeland right after the first attack on Havana.

C.R. Rodriguez announced that he had just spoken with Fidel Castro, who optimistically evaluates the developing situation and asserts that the Americans, following N.S. Khrushchev's conversation with Udall and the publication of the TASS dispatch, will have to reject attempts to organize direct aggression against Cuba.

F. Castro, according to Rodriguez, with great enthusiasm greeted these acts as a manifestation of genuine friendship for Cuba from the Soviet government and personally from N.S. Khrushchev, and expressed for this his sincere thanks.

Rodriguez recounted that the TASS declaration had been received with great enthusiasm in the factories, in peoples' estates, establishments and military units, where demonstrations and meetings are spontaneously conducted as a sign of gratitude to the Soviet Union.

Rodriguez believes that the publication of the TASS dispatch increases the authority of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Cuban and other Latin American peoples and helps those not insignificant elements which are attracted to the unruliness of the revolutionism of our Chinese friends understand the difference between a truly revolutionary policy and a policy of revolutionary phrases.

In Rodriguez' opinion, in Cuba for a long time already Chinese representatives have had no opportunities to cultivate any Cuban leaders, but the publication of the Soviet-Cuban communique and the TASS dispatch once and for all undermines the ground beneath their feet and guarantees the unshakability of Cuban-Soviet friendship.

11.IX.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 4 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

The meeting in Washington on the question of Cuba between the Foreign Ministers of the countries of Latin America and [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk which concluded yesterday proceeded, according to information which we received, amidst sharp disagreements. A particularly big conflict arose around the text of the communique. The reception which was scheduled for 6 p.m. yesterday in honor of the participants in the meeting ended in confusion—most of the guests had left, when at 11 p.m. the ministers finally appeared, having been unable to agree on the text of the communique.

The draft of the communique which Rusk proposed was subjected to significant changes, primarily as a result of the criticism from the Mexican, Brazilian and Chilean representatives. There were changes along three main lines, despite the fact that the USA got the "tough measures" it was after.

First, on trade—the USA did not manage to secure recommendations for a total cut-off of trade with Cuba. The three countries mentioned above put up strong resistance to that recommendation, warning, by way of objection, that this would create a precedent which could be used in the future by the USA—in particular against those countries' trade with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Chile, which has the most intensive trade with Cuba, was noteworthy for its insistence on its right to trade with Cuba.

Second, regarding so-called measures of security. The USA tried in the communique to single out the Caribbean Basin region as the most "threatened" by Cuba and in need therefore of its own separate organizational measures. As is known, even on the eve of the meeting plans were put forth for the creation inside the OAS of an independent regional organization for the Caribbean Basin with a membership of 10 countries. However, at the meeting Colombia and Venezuela, in particular, came out against such an organization, even though they were mentioned among the members of such an organization; seeing the opposition to the idea from Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia, [they] feared being isolated from the rest of the countries of South America if they had agreed to be included in an organization of the countries of Central America, the governments of which had long before recommended themselves as lackeys of the USA. For the same reason Mexico refused to participate in such an organization. For a general understanding of Mexico's position, we should note that precisely at her insistence the phrase (the end of the second paragraph of the communique, as transmitted by TASS) about recognition of the principle of non-interference in relations between Latin American countries.

Third, the USA attempt to formulate a point expressing a hope for a quick establishment of a Cuban government in exile also did not receive the necessary support from the biggest Latin American countries.

According to information received from sev-

eral participants in the meeting, Rusk put much pressure on the meeting. The point of the communique about trade with Cuba, which elicited the most disagreement, was accepted only after Rusk, referring to the mood in the USA Congress, threatened to cut off all American assistance to countries which would refuse to accept that point. In addition to this, Rusk and Kennedy informed the participants in the meeting about the unilateral measures which the government of the USA itself is now considering regarding a maximum limitation on the use of ships of various countries in trade with Cuba.

As indicated by certain information which we are now reconfirming, the following measures were named:

1. American ports will be closed to ships of those countries of which even a single ship would bring arms to Cuba. In essence, this is directed entirely against the USSR and socialist countries.

2. Ships of all countries will not be allowed into ports of the USA and will not be allowed to take on any cargo for the return voyage, if in the past they carried goods to Cuba from the countries of the "Soviet-Chinese" bloc. This refers equally to cargos of military supplies and those of consumer goods.

3. No cargo belonging to the government of the USA (for example, big shipments for "assistance programs) may be carried on foreign ships, if ships of the same owners are used for the shipment of goods to Cuba. This point is directed against "non-communist" countries and allies of the USA, many of whom have now reluctantly given in to American pressure.

4. No American-flag ships or ships the owners of which are American citizens (although ships may sail under a different flag, as is often done) are allowed to ship goods to or from Cuba.

Overall, this is a continuation of the prior unyielding line of the Kennedy Administration towards the tightening up of the economic blockade of Cuba, which is viewed here as one of the most effective means in the struggle with the Castro government and the increase in assistance to him from the Soviet Union.

The first reaction to the meeting in Washington diplomatic circles is summarized as follows: although the USA didn't get everything it wanted, the decisions of the meeting will be used by the Kennedy Administration to the maximum degree for the long-term isolation of Cuba from the countries of Latin America; for the strengthening of all aspects of the struggle against the Castro government. It is revealing that Kennedy today signed a declaration, accepted by the American Congress, to the effect that the USA can use troops in order to "prevent the spread of Cuban Communism to the American continent." At the same time he signed a Congressional bill, giving him the right to call up 150,000 reserves.

4.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 18 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

On October 15-16 a closed briefing (i.e. "instructional meeting") for editors and leading observers of American newspapers, radio, and television was held at the State Department. According to information which we received, the USA policy toward Cuba occupied a major place in the work of the meeting. The essence of the statements of Kennedy, Rusk, Taylor, and Martin (aide to the Secretary of State) on this topic is summarized as follows:

I. "Don't joke about the idea of American intervention in Cuba," because such intervention would unavoidably prompt serious counter-measures from the USSR, if not directly aimed at the USA, then in other regions of the world, particularly in West Berlin; for many years [intervention] would complicate the mutual relations of the USA with the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and overall would create more problems than it solved.

2. At present Cuba is a political problem, and not a problem of security of the USA; thus, political, economic and other means are needed to solve it, rather than military.

Proceeding from this, the USA intends to achieve the greatest possible political, economic, and moral isolation of Cuba from other Latin American countries and other countries of the "free world," and also hinder the provision of assistance to Cuba from Socialist countries in all possible ways (short of, however, a sea blockade).

All this, in the calculations of the USA government, should cause serious economic and political complications for Cuba and ultimately (not in the coming weeks and months but in the next year or two) lead to the outbreak there of mass dissatisfaction and to huge anti-government demonstrations. The USA's concrete course in this case will depend on the situation.

3. At the present time the USA has no plans to create "a provisional Cuban government in exile," since in view of the mixed nature of the Cuban emigration it would be hardly possible to form a sufficiently authoritative government and in any case such a government, created on foreign territory, could not count on broad popularity among the population of Cuba itself; in the same way the recognition of an exile government by the United States "would confuse" the issue of the American base at Guantanamo, depriving the USA of the formal right to demand of Castro's government recognition of Cuba's obligations re: the agreement about that base.

4. In spite of all the importance of the Cuba issue, it is not the main issue for the USA. The West Berlin issue at present remains sharpest and most fraught with dangers.

18/X-62 A.DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 19 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

To the CC CPSU

Everything which we know about the position of the USA government on the Cuban question allows us to conclude that the overall situation is completely satisfactory. This is confirmed by official announcements of American officials, including Kennedy, in his discussion with us on October 18, and all information which reaches us via unofficial channels and from representatives of other countries.

There is reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention in Cuba and has put its money on obstructing Cuba's economic relations with the USSR and other countries, so as to destroy its economy and to cause hunger in the country, and in this way creating dissatisfaction among the population and prompting an uprising against the regime. This is based on a belief that the Soviet Union will not over a long period be able to provide Cuba with everything it needs.

The main reason for this American position is that the Administration and the overall American ruling circles are amazed by the Soviet Union's courage in assisting Cuba. Their reasoning is thus: The Soviet government recognizes the great importance which the Americans place on Cuba and its situation, and how painful that issue is to the USA. But the fact that the USSR, even knowing all that, still provides such aid to Cuba, means that it is fully committed to repulsing any American intervention in Cuba. There is no single opinion as to how and where that rebuff will be given, but that it will be given—they do not doubt.

In these last days the sharpness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided somewhat, while the sharpness of the West Berlin question has stood out all the more. Newspapers bleat about the approaching crisis vis a vis West Berlin, the impending in the very near future signing of the agreement with the GDR, and so on. The goal of such a change in the work of the propaganda machine is to divert somewhat public attention from the Cuba issue. All this is not without the participation of the White House.

Even the rumor to the effect that the Soviet Union has made it known that it can soften its position on the Cuban issue if the West will soften its own position in West Berlin was basically intended to mollify the public vis a vis Cuba.

The wide publication of the results of an election survey conducted here by the Gallup (sic) Institute showing that the vast majority of Americans are against an American intervention in Cuba serves this same goal. In this regard, we have to note that the leadership of the institute in the past traditionally were more sympathetic to Republicans. Therefore, its publication in this case deserves special attention. This was not done without the encouragement of the White House either; in this way a nudge was given to the extremist groups in Congress which support extreme measures.

Also deserving of attention is the fact that Congress has now "gone on recess." This suggests that the pressure on Kennedy from the extreme groups in Congress will be less during the recess.

The position of the USA allies, particularly the British, also played a role. They did not support calls for the unleashing of aggression against Cuba, although they equally approved of other anti-Cuban steps of the USA.

It is not possible, of course, to be completely insured against USA surprises and adventures, even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into account the undeniable objective facts and the corresponding official public statements, and also the assurances given to us that the USA has no plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably commits them in many respects), it is possible to say that in these conditions a USA military adventure against Cuba is almost impossible to imagine.

19/X-62 A. GROMYKO

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 20 October 1962

On October 18 a conversation with Rusk took place.

Rusk, continuing my conversation with Kennedy, touched on the Cuba issue. He said, that President Kennedy considers that issue very important, that it carries great significance for the USA, since it concerns the security of the Western hemisphere. As the President said, the USA has no intention of intervening with its own armed forces in Cuba. But the USA proceeds from the fact that everything that is happening in Cuba is of a defensive nature and will not turn Cuba into an attack platform against the USA and the countries of Latin America.

Besides this, Rusk announced, the USA, in defining its position on the Cuban issue, as announced by the President in his conversation with us, proceeds also from the fact that Cuba will not undertake actions aimed at foisting its system and regime on the other countries of Latin America.

The government of the USA places extremely high significance on these two conditions. It would be hoped that neither the first, nor the second, would take place.

As far as the domestic regime on Cuba is concerned, the USA decisively views it as a regime which contradicts the interests of security in the Western hemisphere.

Having heard Rusk out, I said that the Cuban issue had been caused by the hostile policy of the USA towards Cuba. The USA for some reason believes that it must dictate to the Cubans the sort of domestic regime that should exist in Cuba, and the social structure under which the Cubans should live. But on what basis is the USA trying to appropriate for itself the right to dictate to the Cubans how to conduct their internal affairs? There is no such basis, and such a basis cannot be. Cuba belongs to the Cubans, not to Americans.

Perhaps, I declared, Rusk can tell me, whither the principles of the UN Charter in American policy towards Cuba? They're not there. The actions of the USA are in flagrant contradiction with these principles. The USA is undertaking steps to cause hunger in Cuba. The actions which it is undertaking towards this end unmask the USA policy even more clearly. The Cubans, with ever more decisiveness, are speaking out and will continue to speak out in defense of their country and will strengthen its defenses.

The Soviet Union is helping Cuba. It is trying to provide the Cubans with grain, and help to put its economy on a sound footing. This can not present any danger to the USA. Soviet specialists are helping Cuban soldiers to master certain types of defensive weapons. This can't present any threat to the USA either. Overall, so far as the declaration that Cuba may present a threat to the security of the USA and countries of Latin America is concerned, such declarations are evidently intended for naive people. Even Americans themselves don't believe it.

Rusk said that he does not agree that Cuba cannot present a threat to the USA. Cuba without the Soviet Union, he declared, is one thing; a Cuba where "Soviet operators" run things is something different.

The USA government and he, Rusk, are baselessly scaring the American people with "Soviet operators," I answered. The Soviet Union is providing assistance to Cuba in only a few areas, including whatever we can do to strengthen its defensive capability. The Cuban themselves are running everything on Cuba, and the USA knows that perfectly well.

The situation has rapidly worsened, declared Rusk, since July of this year. Before July the situation caused no alarm. But from July, Soviet weapons have flowed into Cuba. So far it seems, according to U.S. Government data, that these are defensive weapons. But it is unclear how the situation will develop in the future.

Besides this, declared Rusk, according to precise data in American possession, the Cuban regime continues to actively carry out subversive work against a number of Latin American countries.

I said that the Cubans should have come to conclusions about their own defense from the intervention on Cuba by the immigrant riff-raff organized by the Americans and financed by them. They came to such a conclusion, deciding to strengthen their own defense capability. July has no significance here. Cuba represented no threat to the USA either before July, or after July.

As far as the declarations regarding subversive work by the Cubans is concerned, I can only say that these declarations are in contradiction with the information which we possess.

All the same, declared Rusk, in July some kind of sudden change took place. And that sudden change significantly complicated the situation.

Regarding the issue of the Cubans' subversive activities, said Rusk, the USA government has irrefutable proof of the assistance provided by them to various subversive groups in Latin America, up until the present day. For the government of the USA there is nothing to discuss. It knows for sure that the Cubans provide such help and are carrying out subversive work against a number of Latin American countries.

Rusk expansively spoke of the "community of interests" of the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Not mentioning the "Monroe Doctrine," he essentially tried to defend it, stressing the solidarity of the countries of the Western Hemisphere and the community of interests of their security.

I said that in the policy of the USA and in Rusk's considerations regarding Cuba the countries somehow get lost, while the discussion is about the hemisphere. But in this hemisphere there are sovereign countries. Each one of them has a right to decide its own internal affairs upon

consideration by its people. Cuba is one of these sovereign states.

Besides that, I declared, if Rusk's reasoning and the entire conception which the USA government defends were to be applied to Europe and to Asia, then no doubt the conclusions which would flow from that would not please the USA. It comes out that the Americans consider themselves to have a right to be in a number of countries of Europe, Asia, and other regions of the world, if sometimes they don't even ask them about this, while certain others can not even respond to an appeal for assistance in providing its own people with bread and strengthening its security in the face of a threat of intervention. With such a conception the Soviet Union cannot agree. It is hoped that the USA government too will more soberly approach the entire Cuban issue and will reject a hostile policy toward Cuba.

If the USA government has some sort of claims toward Cuba, for instance, financial, then it can bring them up with the Cubans at negotiations aimed at settling them, and the Cubans, as is known, are prepared for this.

Yes, declared Rusk, but nonetheless Cuba has violated the peace on the continent, nonetheless, beginning in July, the situation has taken a dangerous turn. The Soviet Union appeared in Cuba. A large quantity of Soviet weapons appeared in Cuba. All this has complicated the situation.

No matter how often Rusk repeats, I declared, the assertion about some sort of turn of events in July, about the danger allegedly emanating from Cuba, in actuality, the situation remains simpler. The Cubans want Cuba to belong to them, and not to the USA.

Maybe Rusk will reject the presence of the USA, the presence of American military bases and numerous military advisers in such countries like Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, not even speaking about such countries as England, Italy, and a number of other countries of Western Europe, and also Asia and Africa. It appears that the USA can have military bases in these countries, conclude with them military agreements, while the Soviet Union can not even provide assistance in support of the Cuban economy and for the strengthening of the defense capability of Cuba.

Rusk said that the Soviet Union is exaggerating the significance of American foreign military bases, believing that the USA has bases even in Pakistan, and practically in Iran. In many countries, on the territory of which, in your opinion, there are American military bases, in actuality there are none. Iran, for example, recently took a big step forward towards the Soviet Union. Overall, the significance of our bases is inflated.

To this statement I answered in such a way, that the USA foreign military bases—this is a subject which is pretty well known, practically every day American generals and several ministers speak about it.

Regarding Iran, I said to Rusk that we positively view the agreement between the Soviet Union and Iran that foreign missile bases will not be built on Iranian territory. But Rusk will not, apparently, deny that the Iranian Army is led by American military advisers, that Turkey has had such bases for a long time, that the territory of Japan has become an American military base, the territory of England and a number of other countries have been military springboards of the USA for a long time. About the same could be said about many other countries.

Rusk declared that—whether I believe him or not—that's something else, but he categorically asserts that besides the territory of the USA itself, American missiles and atomic weapons are in only three countries.

Here I said: without a doubt, of course, England is among those countries?

Yes, declared Rusk, England is one of them. He didn't name the others.

As far as Japan is concerned, declared Rusk, I categorically assert that neither missiles, nor nuclear weapons of the USA are in Japan. They don't have any of those weapons in South Korea either, if, of course, the actions of North Korea will not make it necessary to change that situation.

In general, declared Rusk, the significance of American foreign military bases is greatly exaggerated, and they don't deserve it. In several countries, in actual fact there are not such bases, while you, Rusk said, believe that there are. In particular, the Scandinavian countries are among those countries.

Responding to that, I said, that in certain countries maybe there are not today, physically, those or other types of weapons. You, Americans, know better. But the USA has military agreements with those countries which include an obligation to let these types of American weapons into the country at any time. This is hardly different from the practical existence of American military bases in such countries, especially considering that certain types of weapons may at the present time be delivered very quickly.

Rusk did not respond to that statement, and overall it was evident that precisely that is the situation in several of the participants in the military blocs of the Western powers.

And so, I declared, the Americans have no grounds to reproach Cuba and the Cubans for steps of a purely defensive character, and, moreover, to conduct toward Cuba a hostile and aggressive policy. Cuba simply wants to be independent. That which the Cubans do to strengthen their country and its independence—that doesn't present a danger to anyone, all the more to such a great power like the USA. Any assertions about the existence of such a danger are just absurd.

Rusk said that the USA is interested in Cuba just as the Soviet Union was interested in Hungary in 1956.

I deflected this effort to introduce an analogy and I briefly pointed out the groundlessness of such an analogy.

Rusk said that he did not agree with our interpretation of the question and rejection of the analogy.

He then began to speak on the subject of the policy of the Soviet Union after the Second World War, partly trying to tie these musings with the Cuban issue and partly with the issue of American foreign military bases.

He said that "in the Stalinist period" the Soviet Union conducted a foreign policy which forced the USA to create its bases overseas and to deploy its forces there. He gave an alleged example—Korea and the Korean peninsula. He said, that before the events in Korea the USA in fact did not have a single division up to strength. At that time the USA practically did not have a battleworthy army available. But the situation changed because of the Korean War. Before this there was such a thing as the Berlin Blockade, which also played a definite role in the change in the American policy. All this is reflected, said Rusk, in the armament program.

He again began to speak about the influence of the "Stalinist policy" on the policy and actions of the Western powers. The Western powers, including the USA, cannot but take that into account even now.

Responding to these statements of Rusk, I stressed that the Secretary of State of the USA had drawn an extremely depressing and one-sided picture of the foreign policy of the USSR in the postwar period, including during the Stalin period. No doubt Rusk, like other U.S. officials, will not deny a great historical fact: besides the fact that the army of the Soviet Union routed the Hitlerite army and as a powerful avalanche moved into Western Europe, it was not used contrary to the alliance agreements and had stopped following the defeat of Hitler's Germany. And in that situation, if the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, had had expansionist intentions, it could have occupied all of Western Europe. But the Soviet Union had not done that and had not started to do it. That already by itself is an eloquent answer to the attempt to cast doubt on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and on its actions in the postwar period.

You know, I declared to Rusk, that our CC and the Soviet government, at the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, have taken a number of foreign policy steps which earlier had not been taken. You are familiar, no doubt, with that which has been done in the foreign policy of the USSR regarding the condemnation of Stalin's Cult of Personality. You know, in particular, about the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which was evaluated positively throughout the world and which helped to make possible an improvement of the situation in central Europe. But we cat-

egorically reject any attempts to generalize or to draw conclusions about Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period, which USA government officials make with the intent, apparently, of whitewashing its own policy, in this case towards Cuba.

Rusk did not challenge the declaration regarding the capability of the Soviet army to occupy all of Europe, if the Soviet Union had striven for that after the rout of Hitler's Germany. Nor did he challenge the significance of the foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union introduced after the condemnation of the cult of personality of Stalin. More to the point, he let it be understood that in general he shares these thoughts, although he did not make any direct comments.

However, he at this point started to talk about the fact that the USA, at the end of the war, and also in the first postwar period to the greatest extent conducted itself well. It, declared Rusk, had not tried to use the advantage which it had at that time vis a vis its monopoly possession of the atomic bomb.

I let him know that that, apparently, had not been so much because the United States had wanted to conduct itself well, as that the atomic bomb at that time could not play a decisive role in the serious standoff of the leading powers.

Rusk did not challenge this declaration, but all the same expressed the thought that the USA had had an advantage at that time in its possession of the atomic bomb and that it had not even tried to use it politically.

In this connection he brought up the Baruch Plan, saying that he was wondering why the Soviet Union had not associated itself with the Baruch Plan.

I gave an appropriate answer and briefly set forth our position. I stressed the point that the Baruch Plan was a one-sided plan, advantageous only to the USA, that it had not even envisioned the destruction of nuclear weapons, rather, under a screen of allegedly international control had left this weapon at the practical disposal of the USA, and even on the territory of the USA.

Rusk did not go into details and limited himself to the above comments about the Baruch Plan.

Suddenly Rusk jumped to the issue of the Communist ideology and the influence of the Soviet Union on other countries. He tried to assert that the main reason of all the complications in international affairs is that the Soviet Union by some or other means influences the situation in other countries, inspires dissatisfaction with the existing regimes and so on. He also complained because the USA does not assert such influence and cannot assert it, since it does not enter into its political plans. Vis a vis this reasoning he again returned to Cuba, but basically repeated what he had said earlier. He ended his argument by commenting again that July had brought a change for the worse to the events in Cuba, and that that greatly alarms the USA government and Americans.

Rusk further said, wouldn't it be possible to consider the issue of increasing the number of Security Council member-countries from 11 to 13, that is, in other words, increasing the number of non-permanent members from six to eight. From his comments it was clear that he was talking about a change in the membership of the UN and introducing into the membership corresponding changes.

I said that the step Rusk had mentioned was impossible to implement, simply because the PRC—one of the permanent members of the Security Council—is not participating in the work of the UN because of the policy of the U.S. Government. Without the PRC, I declared, we will not agree even to consider that issue.

Rusk in fact did not challenge our declaration, understanding that the step he had recommended was not realistic in view of our objections. Here he noted that China, evidently has more than a few problems, including internal, economic ones.

In response I said that they have certain difficulties, but the food situation had now significantly improved and was not as difficult as it was portrayed by certain organs of the American press.

Rusk touched on the question of the Chinese-Indian border conflict. He asked what is going on there and why did the argument arise?

I said, that the argument, as is well known to Rusk, was caused by mutual territorial claims in the border region. The Soviet government believes that the sooner the sides come to an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis, the better. I let Rusk know that our discussion of this issue apparently would hardly help the matter.

Rusk agreed that yes, of course, this was an issue between the two countries—the PRC and India—but that nonetheless there is some old agreed boundary, which, considering everything, is the correct border line.

Evidently, Rusk's own goal was to let us know that the government of the USA looks favorably on the Indian position. But he spoke about that as if offhandedly, obviously not wanting to create the impression that the USA was greatly interested in that issue. He also jokingly observed that the Chinese-Indian border conflict is, excuse me, the only issue on which the positions of the PRC and Taiwan correspond.

With this, the conversation, which had continued with some difficulty for about two hours, ended. Further there was a conversation on the German Question, the contents of which are submitted separately.

A short general evaluation of this conversation with Rusk: Rusk tried again to stress, obviously at Kennedy's behest, that the USA gives great importance to the Cuban issue and considers it the most painful for the USA. He only in passing touched on Kennedy's declaration, made in the conversation with us, about the fact that the USA has no intentions to intervene in Cuba (with a reservation regarding the threat to the security of the USA and the countries of Latin America). Rusk's reasoning revolved mostly around a circle of questions related to Soviet assistance to Cuba, primarily arms.

By Rusk's behavior it was possible to observe how painfully the American leaders are suffering the fact that the Soviet Union decisively has stood on the side of Cuba, and that the Cubans are conducting themselves bravely and confidently. Kennedy managed to hide his feelings better. But he too, when he spoke about Cuba, formulated his ideas with emphasis, slowly, obviously weighing every word. It is characteristic that Rusk, during our entire conversation with Kennedy, sat absolutely silently, and red "like a crab." In the conversation with him later he couldn't hide his feelings very well.

20.X.62 A. GROMYKO

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 22 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

TOP PRIORITY

At 6 in the evening Washington time Secretary of State Rusk invited me to his place.

Rusk said that he had a commission from the president to send via me a personal presidential message to N.S. Khrushchev /to be sent separately/, and also to provide for information the text of the president's address to the American people, which he intends to deliver at 7 this evening on radio and television /transmitted by TASS/.

Rusk warned then that at this time he has instructions not to answer any questions on the text of both documents and not to comment on them.

"These documents, he added, speak for themselves."

Rusk was told that the actions of the USA government cannot be justified by the absolutely unconvincing motives which are not grounded in the factual situation and to which the president refers, and that these actions have a downright

provocative character, and that all responsibility for possible grave consequences of the aforementioned actions of the United States will be entirely on the American administration.

I also expressed surprise that neither the president nor Rusk found it necessary to have an open talk on all the questions raised in the address, with A.A. Gromyko, with whom they met only a few days ago, while now the USA administration is seeking with artificial means to create a grave crisis. The Soviet Union fears no threats and is prepared to meet them in an appropriate way, if the voice of reason would not triumph in the governing circles of the USA.

Rusk did not respond. He was clearly in a nervous and agitated mood, even though he tried to conceal it. At that the meeting came to an end. Then almost all ambassadors /except socialist/ were summoned to the State Department, and they have been given, by groups, the text of the president's address with corresponding commentaries by the senior officials of the State Department.

Before I left, Rusk noted that there is no plan, so far, to publish the personal letter of Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev, but overall this cannot be excluded.

22.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 22 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Regarding the threats of the USA toward Cuba, we remain in constant contact with Fidel Castro and Raoul Castro.

The Cuban command gave an order for full mobilization of the army and occupation of defensive positions. Besides telegraphic dispatches of information agencies and Kennedy's speeches, our friends have no other information.

We will quickly inform you of all new facts.

We are taking steps to ensure security and the organization of a duty roster in Soviet institutions.

Please issue an order to the radio center to listen to us around the clock.

22.X.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 23 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Following Kennedy's speech on the Cuban issue yesterday, a broad campaign was deployed here, called forth in order to impart to the developing situation even more extraordinariness and seriousness than was done in Kennedy's speech itself.

In a briefing conducted by the USA Ministry of Defense yesterday evening, [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara categorically declared that the USA will not stop short of sinking Soviet ships which are bringing "offensive types" of weapons to Cuba, if those ships will refuse to obey the demands of American warships.

It is reported that the President's official proclamation about the introduction into force of measures to assert a quarantine on the delivery to Cuba of offensive types of weapons will be published before the end of the day today or tomorrow morning after the formal agreement with other members of the Organization of American States. For the practical implementation of the quarantine in the area of Cuba, there has been assembled, according to the reports of military observers, around 450 military ships, more than 1,200 airplanes and around 200 thousand soldiers.

Almost without interruption, the commentaries which are broadcast on radio and television—and also the commentaries which appeared in today's morning newspapers—are directed towards supercharging the atmosphere and predictions of an early "test of force," as soon as the first Soviet ship approaches Cuba (we broadcast similar commentaries via TASS).

An analysis of the public statements which Kennedy has made, his message to N.S. Khrushchev, and also the statements of officials who are close to the White House and the State allow us to make, as it is presented to us, a preliminary conclusion that the measures which have been undertaken by the Kennedy Administration in regard to Cuba are the product of a range of domestic and foreign policy considerations, the most important of which, apparently, are the following.

I. To try to "take up the gauntlet" of that challenge which Kennedy believes has been thrown down by the Soviet Union to the USA in the form of military deliveries to Cuba. Regarding this, insofar as up to now a direct military attack by the USA on Cuba is not on the table (the President, as is known, also persistently stressed this during the meeting with A.A. Gromyko), Kennedy evidently is counting on the Soviet Union in this case not responding with military actions directly against the USA itself or by delivering a blow to their positions in West Berlin. As a result, in Kennedy's thinking, the United States will succeed in establishing at least in part the correlation of forces which existed in the world before July, that is before the announcement of our military deliveries to Cuba, which delivered a serious blow to the USA's positions as the leader of the capitalist world and even more constrained their freedom of action on issues like the one in West Berlin.

Kennedy apparently believes that a further demonstration by the United States of indecisiveness and lack of will to risk a war with the Soviet Union for the sake of its positions would unavoidably lead to an even quicker and more serious undermining of their positions around the globe.

2. That which Kennedy said yesterday in his appeal to the American people and the complex of measures which were announced in this connection by the USA government in fact touch not only upon Cuba alone or our deliveries of weapons to it, or even our missiles for Cuba. More to the point, it is a decision connected with a certain risk and determined by a whiff of adventurism, to try to bring to a stop now the development of events in the whole world, which are generally disadvantageous to the USA.

In this regard, some information which we have just received by confidential means and which we are now reconfirming, may be interesting. According to this information, prior to the President's decision a hot discussion was conducted recently in the government regarding the future foreign policy course of the USA following the appearance of information about the deliveries of Soviet missiles to Cuba. [Attorney General] R. Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Chief of the CIA [John] McCone, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that since Vienna the status quo in the world had changed, and had changed not to the benefit of the USA, as a result of the well-known development of the Cuban events, in particular the open deliveries of Soviet weapons to Cuba. The issue is not the weapons themselves, insofar as they do not have much significance from a purely military point of view, rather it is that great political loss which the Kennedy government suffered in the eyes of the whole world and particularly of its American allies and neighbors when it (the USA government) turned out to be not in a position—for the first time in the history of the USA—to prevent "the penetration and establishment of influence" by another great power, the USSR, in the Western

Hemisphere itself. What then of the obligations of the USA in other parts of the world? And all this is happening at a moment—as asserted by representatives of the military brass—when America for the time being still has an advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear missiles, an advantage which is gradually being liquidated by the successes of Soviet weapons, and now also by the creation of a missile base in Cuba in direct proximity with the USA. This means, the American chiefs of staff maintain, that time is not waiting, if the Kennedy government really intends to prevent a further disadvantageous development of events.

In Berlin also, the USA is constantly on the defensive, which does not add to the Administration's prestige. The latest meetings with A.A. Gromyko (this argument was attributed to Rusk) strengthened the President's and Rusk's belief that the Soviet Union seriously intends to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, with all the consequences that will flow from that for the USA. This, almost unavoidably will bring about a crisis at the end of the year, since the USA will not withdraw its forces from West Berlin. Wouldn't it be better then to try to force the Soviet Union to retreat by "striking a blow on the Cuban issue ["—no close quotation mark—ed.], which gives more benefits to the USA than the Berlin question, if the moods of public opinion and geographic and military-strategic factors are taken into account[?] Precisely on the Cuban issue it is best for President Kennedy to take a firm position and to "demonstrate his character." This approximately was the basic argument of those government representatives who support a more hard-line course of action (several of them speculated also that the President maintains the opinion that the Soviet government apparently does not particularly believe in the President's steadfastness following the failure of last year's incursion in Cuba). It follows, evidently, to recognize that the supporters of this course for the time being have taken the upper hand in the USA government.

3. Having created the extraordinary situation around Cuba, the Kennedy administration is hoping that in that situation it will be able quickly to get from its NATO allies and from the Latin American countries support for its course towards the full isolation of Cuba from the "free world," and the ultimate overthrow of the current government of Cuba. In this regard it should be noted that although the West European and Latin American diplomats express alarm about the possible consequences of realizing in practice the announced "quarantine" of Cuba, they express, as a rule, confidence that their governments under current conditions will not be able to deviate from support for the USA. In particular, it became known to us that the Chilean representative in the Organization of American States received an instruction to support the USA proposals this time. Brazil and Mexico are also departing from their previous positions after having been subject to strong pressure from the USA, which is asserting that the Soviet missiles now threaten the Latin American countries too. The decision of the Organization of American States which was just accepted (transmitted via TASS) in fact in support of the course of action of the USA shows that the Kennedy administration is succeeding in binding the governments of these countries to its will under conditions of the prewar psychosis which has now been created in the USA. We should, it's true, note that Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia abstained from the vote on the paragraph which envisaged the application of force.

4. On the domestic political plane, Kennedy obviously is counting on his last step to pull the rug out from under the legs of the Republicans, whose leadership in recent days officially announced that they consider the Cuban issue a fundamental issue of the election campaign, having in essence accused the administration of inactivity on that issue.

However, it is necessary to stress that the events connected with Kennedy's announcement yesterday obviously have overtaken the significance of electoral considerations and that these considerations now are moving to the background.

Overall, the impression is being created that, reserving a certain possibility not to let the matter lead to an open military confrontation—this can be seen in his proclamation in general form by the readiness which he expressed to continue "peace negotiations" with the Soviet side on settling controversial issues, including the Cuban issue and several other questions—Kennedy at the same time consciously and sufficiently provocatively is aiming towards an abrupt aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union in accord with the above-mentioned considerations.

In this regard it is as if this time he is ready to go pretty far in a test of strength with the Soviet Union, hoping that in the location of the conflict (Cuba) which was chosen by him, the President, the USA has a greater chance than the USSR, and that in the final analysis the Soviet government will refuse to increase the military power of Cuba, not wishing to let a major war break out. Under these conditions it is seen as expedient, while observing the necessary precautions, to at the same time review certain steps which would demonstrate the resolve of the USSR to give an appropriate rebuff to the USA and which would make the USA vulnerable to the possibility of actions which we may take in response. In particular, as it seems to us, it would be possible to review the question of hinting to Kennedy in no uncertain terms about the possibility of repressions against the Western powers in West Berlin (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of ground routes, leaving out for the time being air routes so as not to give grounds for a quick confrontation).

Besides this, taking into account the future development of events and as a means of putting extra pressure on the USA government, it is possible that it would make sense to undertake such measures as, for instance, calling back from the USA Soviet theatrical collectives and Soviet students (sending for them a special airplane), which should show to the Americans the seriousness of our intentions in regard to the events in Cuba.

However, in our opinion it is not necessary to hurry on all the above measures, since an extreme aggravation of the situation, it goes without saying, would not be in our interests. It would make sense to use also the desire of neutral states, and not only them, to find a way to settle the current conflict. Such moods are clearly felt not only at the UN, but also among the diplomatic corps here.

Overall, here in Washington the tension around this situation continues to grow. It seems as if the Americans themselves are beginning to worry a lot, anticipating the arrival in Cuba of the first Soviet ship (many people are expressing this question directly to the Embassy) and how this first "test of strength" will end. This atmosphere of tense waiting entered a new phase with the publication just now of the President's official proclamation which announces the entering into force of the ban on delivering "offensive weapons" to Cuba as of 14 hours [2 p.m.] (Greenwich Mean Time) on 24 October.

23.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 24 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Late in the evening of October 23, R. Kennedy came to visit me. He was in an obviously excited condition and his speech was rich in repetitions and digressions. R. Kennedy said approximately the following.

I came on my own personal initiative without any assignment from the President. I considered it necessary to do this in order to clarify what exactly led to the current, extremely serious development of events. Most important is the fact that the personal relations between the President and the Soviet premier have suffered heavy damage. President Kennedy feels deceived and these

feelings found their own reflection in his appeal to the American people.

From the very beginning, continued R. Kennedy, the Soviet side—N.S. Khrushchev, the Soviet government in its pronouncements and the Soviet ambassador during confidential meetings - have stressed the defensive nature of the weapons which are being delivered to Cuba. You, for instance, said R. Kennedy to me, told me about the exclusively defensive goals of the delivery of Soviet weapons, in particular, the missile weapons, during our meeting at the beginning of September. I understood you then as saying that we were talking only about /and in the future, too/ missiles of a relatively small range of action for the defense of Cuba itself and the approaches to it, but not about long range missiles which could strike practically the entire territory of the USA. I told this to the President, who accepted it with satisfaction as the position of the Soviet government. There was a TASS declaration in the name of the Soviet government in which it was clearly stated that all military deliveries to Cuba are intended exclusively for defensive goals. The President and the government of the USA understood this as the true position of the USSR.

With even greater feelings of trust we took the corresponding declarations /public and confidential/ of the head of the Soviet government, who, despite the big disagreements and frequent aggravations in relations between our countries, the President has always trusted on a personal level. The message which had been sent by N.S. Khrushchev via the Soviet ambassador and [Kennedy adviser Theodore] Sorensen, about the fact that during the election campaign in the USA the Soviet side would not do anything to complicate the international situation and worsen relations between our countries, had made a great impression on the President.

All this led to the fact that the President believed everything which was said from the Soviet side, and in essence staked on that card his own political fate, having publicly announced to the USA, that the arms deliveries to Cuba carry a purely defensive character, although a number of Republicans have asserted to the contrary. And then the President suddenly receives trustworthy information to the effect that in Cuba, contrary to everything which had been said by the Soviet representatives, including the latest assurances, made very recently by A. A. Gromyko during his meeting with the President, there had appeared Soviet missiles with a range of action which cover almost the entire territory of the USA. Is this weapon really for the defensive purposes about which you, Mr. Ambassador, A. A. Gromyko, the Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev had spoken?

The President felt himself deceived, and deceived intentionally. He is convinced of that even now. It was for him a great disappointment, or, speaking directly, a heavy blow to everything in which he had believed and which he had strived to preserve in personal relations with the head of the Soviet government: mutual trust in each other's personal assurances. As a result, the reaction which had found its reflection in the President's declaration and the extremely serious current events which are connected with it and which can still lead no one knows where.

Stressing with great determination that I reject his assertions about some sort of "deception" as entirely not corresponding to reality and as presenting the actions and motives of the Soviet side in a perverted light, I asked R. Kennedy why the President - if he had some sort of doubts - had not negotiated directly and openly with A. A. Gromyko, with whom there had been a meeting just a few days ago, but rather had begun actions, the seriousness of the consequences of which for the entire world are entirely unforeseeable. Before setting off on that dangerous path, fraught with a direct military confrontation between our countries, why not use, for instance, the confidential channels which we have and appeal directly to the head of the Soviet government.

R. Kennedy said the President had decided not to address A. A. Gromyko about this for the following two reasons: first, everything which the Soviet minister had set forth had, evidently according to the instructions of the Soviet government, been expressed in very harsh tones, so a discussion with him hardly could have been of much use; second, he had once again asserted the defensive character of the deliveries of Soviet weapons, although the President at that moment knew that this is not so, that they had deceived him again. As far as the confidential channel is concerned, what sense would that have made, if on the highest level - the level of the Minister of Foreign Affairs - precisely the same is said, although the facts are directly contradictory[?] To that same point, added R. Kennedy, long ago I myself in fact received the same sort of assurances from the Soviet ambassador, however, all that subsequently turned out to be entirely not so.

- Tell me, - R. Kennedy said to me further - [do] you, as the Soviet ambassador, have from your government information about the presence now in Cuba of around half a dozen (here he corrected himself, saying that that number may not be entirely accurate, but the fact remains a fact) missiles, capable of reaching almost any point in the United States?

In my turn I asked R. Kennedy why I should believe his information, when he himself does not want to recognize or respect that which the other side is saying to him. To that same point, even the President himself in his speech in fact had spoken only about some emplacements for missiles, which they allegedly had "observed," but not about the missiles themselves.

- There, you see - R. Kennedy quickly put forth, - what would have been the point of us contacting you via the confidential channel, if, as it appears, even the Ambassador, who has, as far as we know, the full trust of his government, does not know that long-range missiles which can strike the USA, rather than defensive missiles which are capable of defending Cuba from any sort of attack on the approaches to it, have already been provided to Cuba[?] It comes out that when you and I spoke earlier, you also did not have reliable information, although the conversation was about the defensive character of those weapons deliveries, including the future deliveries to Cuba, and everything about this was passed on to the President.

I categorically responded to R. Kennedy's thoughts about the information which I had received from the government, stressing that this was exclusively within the competence of the Soviet government. Simultaneously, his thoughts of "deception" were rejected again. Further, in calm but firm tones I set forth in detail our position on the Cuban issue, taking into account the Soviet government's latest announcement on Cuba, N.S. Khrushchev's letter in response to the President, and also other speeches and conversations of N.S. Khrushchev.

I particularly stressed the circumstance that, as far as is known to me, the head of the Soviet government values the warm relations with the President. N.S. Khrushchev recently spoke about that in particular in a conversation with [U.S.] Ambassador [to Moscow Foy] Kohler. I hope that the President also maintains the same point of view, - I added. On the relationships between the heads of our governments, on which history has placed special responsibility for the fate of the world, a lot really does depend; in particular, whether there will be peace or war. The Soviet government acts only in the interests of preserving and strengthening peace and calls on the United States government to act this way too. Stressing again the basic principles of our policy on which we will insist without any compromises (in the spirit of our declaration and N.S. Khrushchev's response letter), I simultaneously expressed the hope that the USA government show prudence and refrain from taking any actions which can lead to catastrophic consequences for peace in the whole world.

R. Kennedy, after repeating what he had already said about the President's moods (around this time he cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer tones), said that the President also values his relations with N.S. Khrushchev. As far as the future course of actions is concerned, then he, R. Kennedy, can not add anything to that which had been said by the President himself, who stressed all the seriousness of the situation and understands with what sort of dangerous consequences all this may be connected, but he can not act in any other way.

I once again set forth to him our position in the above-mentioned spirit.

Saying goodbye, already at the door of the Embassy, R. Kennedy as if by the way asked what sorts of orders the captains of the Soviet ships bound for Cuba have, in light of President Kennedy's speech yesterday and the declaration which he had just signed about the inadmissability of bringing offensive weapons to Cuba.

I answered R. Kennedy with what I knew about the instructions which had been given earlier to the captains: not to obey any unlawful demands to stop or be searched on the open sea, as a violation of international norms of freedom of navigation. This order, as far as I know, has not been changed.

R. Kennedy, having waved his hand, said: I don't know how all this will end, for we intend to stop your ships. He left right after this.

Overall, his visit left a somewhat strange impression. He had not spoken about the future and paths toward a settlement of the conflict, making instead a "psychological" excursion, as if he was trying to justify the actions of his brother, the President, and put the responsibility for his hasty decision, in the correctness of which they and he, evidently, are not entirely confident, on us.

We think that in the interests of the affair it would be useful, using this opportunity to pass on to the President, through R. Kennedy, with whom I could meet again, in confidential form N.S. Khrushchev's thoughts on this matter, concerning not only the issues which R. Kennedy had touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of the events which are going on now.

24.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Report to CPSU Central Committee From Department of Agitation and Propaganda, 24 October 1962

CC CPSU

The State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of the Council of Ministers of the USSR asks permission, in light of the aggressive American actions against Cuba, to increase from October 25 of this year the amount of radio broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba up to 10 hours per day. At the present time these transmissions are conducted every day for two hours.

On questions relating to the strengthening of radio broadcasting to Cuba, the State Committee consulted with Comrade Puerta, the leader of Cuban Radio, who is now present in Moscow.

The State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting also reports that the USA, starting October 23 of this year, organized round-the-clock broadcasts to Cuba—24 hours in Spanish and 12 hours in Russian.

We support the suggestion of the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of the Council of Ministers about increasing the radio transmissions from Moscow to Cuba.

It is possible to increase Soviet radio transmission to Cuba partly on the basis of a redistribution of radio transmitters, which relay programs from Moscow to foreign countries, and also by using certain radio stations, which work on the jamming of foreign radio transmissions. At the present time, one third of the entire Soviet radio transmitting capability is used to jam foreign broadcasts to the USSR. The Ministry of Communications of the USSR has no reserve radio stations.

We request agreement.

Deputy Head, Department of Agitation and Propaganda for Allied Republics, CC CPSU

(signed) (A. Egorov)

Instructor of the Department

(signed) (V. Murav'ev)

24 October 1962

Handwritten at bottom of page:

I report to the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting (Comrade Kharlamov) Nov. 24 that from Nov. 25 the amount of radio broadcasts to Cuba will be increased.

(signed) A. Egorov
(signed) Murav'ev

[Source:F. 5, Op. 33, D. 206, L. 133, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), the former CPSU CC archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Report to CPSU Central Committee From Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and A. Epishev, 24 October 1962

Secret
Copy No. 1

CC CPSU

We report on work undertaken in connection with the announcement of the Soviet government about the aggressive actions of American imperialism against the Cuban republic.

The Ministry of Defense, fulfilling the Council of Ministers decision of 23 October 1962, has taken supplementary measures to support the Armed Forces at the highest state of military readiness. Commanders and military councils of military regions, groups of troops, Air Defense districts and fleets are ordered to delay the discharge of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the last year of service, troops of the strategic rocket forces, Air Defense forces, and the submarine fleet; to cancel all leaves, and to increase military readiness and vigilance in all units and on every ship.

At the present time commanders of the Armed Forces together with local party organs work on explaining to military men the Declaration of the Soviet government. In detachments, on ships, in military schools and in military institutions the Declaration of the USSR government was listened to collectively on the radio, talks, meetings and gatherings are taking place, where members of military councils, commanders and heads of political organs speak. In the country's Air Defense units, Secretaries of the Sakhalin regional CPSU committee (comrade Evstratov), the Khabarovsk provincial committee (comrade comrade Klepikov), Berezovsk City Party Committee (comrade Uglov) spoke. In the military regions special leaflets with the text of the Declaration of the Soviet government were published and transfered by air to far-away detachments and garrisons.

All servicemen passionately approve of the policies of the USSR government, support additional measures which it has undertaken and which are aimed at maintaining the troops in the state of maximum military readiness. At the same time Soviet soldiers express readiness to fulfill without delay every order of the Motherland aimed at the crushing defeat of the American aggressors.

Captain Padalko and Captain Sorkov, pilots of the Second Independent Air Defense Army, and senior technical lieutenants Aziamov and Ovcharov declared: "At this alarming hour we are at the highest state of military readiness. If the American adventurists unleash a war, they will be dealt the most powerful crippling blow. In response to the ugly provcation of the warmonger, we will strengthen even more our vigilence and military preparedness, we will fulfill without delay any order of the Soviet government."

The announcement of the Soviet Government received broad support among soldiers, sergeants and sailors due to be discharged from the Armed Forces. They all declare that they will serve as much as required in the interests of the strengthening of the preparedness of the troops.

Private Kovalenko (415th Air Force Combat Air Wing), prematurely released into the reserves, returned to his base, gave back his documents and announced, "At such a troubling time, my responsibility is to be at my military post, and to defend the interests of the Motherland with a weapon in my hands."

Many senior soldiers, striving with all their

strength and knowledge to the increase in military readiness, declare their willingness to remain for additional service. After a meeting of the 15th Division of the Moscow District Air Defense Forces 20 soldiers reported with a request to enlist for addional service. Following the example of Communists Sergeant Kaplin and Junior Sergeant Afanas'ev, 18 soldiers who had been discharged from the 345th anti-aircraft detachment of the Bakinsk District Air Defense Forces requested permission to remain in the army.

After the declaration of the Soviet government, at the bases and on the ships there was a strengthened desire of individual soldiers to defend Cuba as volunteers. On just one day in the 78th motorized infantry training division of the Ural Military District, 1240 requests to be sent to the Cuban Republic were received. At a meeting of the 300 and 302nd detachment (sic) of the Second Independent Air Defense Army of the Air Defense Forces the decision was made about the readiness of the entire unit to leave for Cuba.

In response to the directions of the Soviet government relating to the aggressive actions of the American government, military personnel heighten their vigilence and increase their personal responsibility for the maintenance of military readiness. In the 3rd Corps of the Air Defense Forces of the Moscow Military District, soldiers work at night in fulfillment of daytime norms. In the 201st anti-aircraft detachment of the Ural Military District there has been a significant reduction in the time required for maintenance work on military equipment.

As an expression of the unprecedented trust of the individuals of the Armed Forces in the CPSU there is a strengthened desire among frontline soldiers to join the ranks of the Party and the Komsomol. Following the declaration of the Government of the USSR, the number of applications to join the Party and the Komsomol grew.

During the explanation of the declaration of the Soviet Government, no sorts of negative manifestations were noted.

We are reporting for your information.

(signed) R. MALINOVSKII
(signed) A. EPISHEV

24 October 1962

[Source: F. 5, Op. 47, D. 400, Ll. 69-71, TsKhSD; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Telegram from the Soviet representative to the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the USSR MFA, 25 October 1962

Top Secret
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Copy No. 1

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

On 25 October in the Security Council, Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy's answer to U Thant's appeal, in which Kennedy welcomes U Thant's initiative and directs Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settlement to the situation which has been created in the Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy's response was transmitted via teletype/.

From our side we made public Comr. N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant on his appeal, which was transmitted to U Thant before the opening of the session.

During the meeting and after it, representatives of many African and Asian countries approached us, noting the exceedingly important significance for the preservation of peace in the Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of the message from the head of the Soviet government.

Stevenson's speech at today's session, regardless of his attempts to assert once again that Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and that this creates a danger for the Western hemisphere, had in essence a defensive character. He made a declaration as if the USA had not sought a pretext to raise the Cuban issue, that the USA did not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive weapon, and that everything which they are trying so hard to do is to implement "limited" actions. Being in no position to disprove our accusations of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow down implementation of the planned measures in expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Council. He said further that the USA had come to the Security Council even before the Organization of the American States had started to work and had given its approval for the "quarantine" measures. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was talking not about unilateral measures of the USA, but about the agreed actions of the Organization of American States.

In our speech we showed the lack of foundation of all of these assertions by Stevenson, stressing that, as the discussion in the Security Council had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifications for the aggressive actions which it had undertaken, which had created a threat of thermonuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff from the side of the peoples and the majority of UN members. Precisely this has now prompted the USA to give its agreement to enter into negotiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which Stevenson had made at the session in showing the photographs which had been fabricated by American intelligence which had been assigned the role of "irrefutable" evidence of the presence in Cuba of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this maneuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Council away from the essence of the case, particularly from the aggressive actions of the USA, which had violated the UN Charter and which had created a threat to peace.

In response to Stevenson's attempts to pose to us questions about whether we are placing nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the corresponding situation in the TASS announcement of 11 September /the texts of our speeches were transmitted by teletype/.

The attempts of the USA representative to turn the Council into a tribune for base propaganda met no support from other members of the Council.

The representative of the UAR, [Gen. Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative of Ghana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important significance of U Thant's appeal and the responses of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, stressing that as a result of that exchange of messages a new situation had been created in the Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed suspending the session so as to allow all the interested sides, with the participation of U Thant, to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in mind that the Council sessions will be resumed depending on the result and process of the negotiations.

That proposal was supported by the Chilean representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer.

The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was accepted without objections by the Security Council. When the adopted decision was announced, I, as the Chairman of the Council, stressed that the Security Council could be convened by the Chairman of the Council depending on the course of the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken on any of the proposed resolutions /ours, the American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they remained in the Security Council file.

We received your x/ [word deleted—ed.] after it had already basically been decided that in relation to the start of negotiations between the interested sides consideration of the issue in the Security Council is not ending, and that the issue remains on the Security Council agenda, moreover, the Council sessions may be resume at any time depending on the course of the negotiations between the interested sides. At the present time, as we understand it, it would be premature to raise the issue at the XVIIth session of the General Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the Security Council agenda and we will always have the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Assembly if the possible new consideration by the Security Council will end without result.

After the session U Thant informed us that he intends to begin negotiations with us, the Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 October. He will meet with each delegation individu-

ally. We will report our thoughts about this meeting in supplementary fashion.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

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x/ Having in mind "Your telegram"

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 27 October 1962

TOP SECRET
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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

During the entire day of 26 October in broadcasts of American radio, television, and in press reports, in accord with instructions from above, it is being ever more firmly asserted that in Cuba the construction of missile bases is being continued under a forced tempo, and that the missiles themselves are being brought to operational readiness.

Toward the end of the day, the State Department representative White and the Secretary to the President for questions of the press, [Pierre] Salinger, made official declarations about that. / An analogous declaration was made in the name of the Organization of American States, which, evidently, is aimed at giving that fact extra "legal force"/. In their declarations there is made a pretty clear hint to the effect that the mentioned "fact" gives the USA government "a foundation" to take further, more serious measures against Cuba.

At the same time, among journalists who are close to the White House, State Department and Pentagon conversations about the possibility of implementing at the earliest possible time a mass overflight of American aviation in the area where the missile platforms are deployed, with a possible commando raid, have received wide circulation. Several of them in this regard express the opinion that an ultimatum to the Cuban government itself to disassemble the missile platforms in a very short time might precede such an overflight. As before, the real possibility of an imminent incursion in Cuba is being asserted, but the theme of a bombardment of the missile bases has now moved to the fore.

The wide circulation and the certain orientation of similar conversations under conditions when, practically speaking, censorship has been introduced on reports concerning Cuba, and when constant instruction of journalists is going on, leads to the thought that these conversations are inspired by the government itself.

Facilitating the circulation of these types of moods and rumors, the USA government, evidently, is trying to show its determination to achieve at any price the liquidation of the missile emplacements in Cuba with the aim of putting on that issue the maximum pressure on us and on Cuba.

At the same time it is not possible to exclude that the general American plan of actions really may include the implementation of such an overflight, especially if the adventurist moods of certain members of the circle which is close to the President are taken into account. In this regard we should note that judging by certain information, disagreements about participation in the negotiations in the UN are now growing in the USA government, since this is connected with dragging out the time and a weakening of the acuteness of the moment, and means that the difficulty of taking "decisive measures" against Cuba unavoidably would grow.

27.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff]

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For Dobyrnin's 27 October 1962 Cable of His Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, see accompanying box

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Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's Instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the USA, 28 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

ANATOMY OF A CONTROVERSY:

Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962

by Jim Hershberg

If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous passage of the Cold War, the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the evening of Saturday, 27 October 1962, when the resolution of the crisis—war or peace—appeared to hang in the balance. While Soviet ships had not attempted to break the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, Soviet nuclear missile bases remained on the island and were rapidly becoming operational, and pressure on President Kennedy to order an air strike or invasion was mounting, especially after an American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba that Saturday afternoon and its pilot killed. Hopes that a satisfactory resolution to the crisis could be reached between Washington and Moscow had dimmed, moreover, when a letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived Saturday morning demanding that the United States agree to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles from Cuba. The letter struck U.S. officials as an ominous hardening of the Soviet position from the previous day's letter from Khrushchev, which had omitted any mention of American missiles in Turkey but had instead implied that Washington's pledge not to invade Cuba would be sufficient to obviate the need for Soviet nuclear protection of Castro's revolution.

On Saturday evening, after a day of tense discussions within the "ExComm" or Executive Committee of senior advisers, President Kennedy decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to Khrushchev accepting the implicit terms of his October 26 letter (a U.S. non-invasion pledge in exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet nuclear missiles), coupled with private assurances to Khrushchev that the United States would speedily take out its missiles from Turkey, but only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as an open agreement that would appear to the public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to blackmail. The U.S. president elected to transmit this sensitive message through his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his office at the Justice Department with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

That meeting has long been recognized as a turning point in the crisis, but several aspects of it have been shrouded in mystery and confusion. One concerned the issue of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither John nor Robert Kennedy promised to withdraw the Jupiters as a quid pro quo, or concession, in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, or as part of an explicit agreement, deal, or pledge, but had merely informed Dobrynin that Kennedy had planned to take out the American missiles in any event. This was the version of events depicted in the first published account of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting by one of the participants, in Robert F. Kennedy's *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, posthumously published in 1969, a year after he was assassinated while seeking the Democratic nomination for president. While *Thirteen Days* depicted RFK as rejecting any firm agreement to

continued on page 77

EXTRAORDINARY

WASHINGTON

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Quickly get in touch with R. Kennedy and tell him that you passed on to N.S. Khrushchev the contents of your conversation with him. N.S. Khrushchev sent the following urgent response.

The thoughts which R. Kennedy expressed at the instruction of the President finds understanding in Moscow. Today, an answer will be given by radio to the President's message of October 27, and that response will be the most favorable. The main thing which disturbs the President, precisely the issue of the dismantling under international control of the rocket bases in Cuba—meets no objection and will be explained in detail in N.S. Khrushchev's message.

Telegraph upon implementation.

[handwritten]
(A. Gromyko)

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff]

* * * * *

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR MFA, 28 October 1962

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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

R. Kennedy, with whom I met, listened very attentively to N.S. Khrushchev's response. Expressing thanks for the report, he said that he would quickly return to the White House in order to inform the President about the "important response" of the head of the Soviet government. "This is a great relief," R. Kennedy added further, and it was evident that he expressed his words somehow involuntarily. "I," said R. Kennedy, "today will finally be able to see my kids, for I have been entirely absent from home."

According to everything it was evident that R. Kennedy with satisfaction, it is necessary to say, really with great relief met the report about N.S. Khrushchev's response.

In parting, R. Kennedy once again requested that strict secrecy be maintained about the agreement with Turkey. "Especially so that the correspondents don't find out. At our place for the time being even Salinger does not know about it" (It was not entirely clear why he considered it necessary to mention his name, but he did it).

I responded that in the Embassy no one besides me knows about the conversation with him yesterday. R. Kennedy said that in addition to the current correspondence and future exchange of opinions via diplomatic channels, on important questions he will maintain contact with me directly, avoiding any intermediaries.

Before departing, R. Kennedy once again gave thanks for N.S. Khrushchev's quick and effective response.

Your instructions arrived here 1.5 hours after the announcement via radio about the essence of N.S. Khrushchev's response. I explained to R. Kennedy that the tardiness was caused by a delay of telegrams at the telegraph station.

28.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's Instructions to the USSR representative at the United Nations, 28 October 1962

In relation to the information which you received about U Thant's conversations with the Cuban representative [Garcia] Inchaustegi, you must be guided by the following:

First. You must declare to U Thant that orders have been given to the Soviet officers in Cuba to take down the emplacements which the Americans characterize as offensive weapons. Declare also that by itself, it goes without saying that any type of work related to the creation of such emplacements has already ceased.

Second. Also inform U Thant about the Soviet government's agreement to his proposal that representatives of the International Red Cross be allowed to visit the Soviet ships bound for Cuba in order to confirm that on them there are none of the types of weapons about which the President and government of the USA show concern, calling them offensive weapons. In this regard it is intended that the stated representatives will be conveyed to both Soviet ships and to the ships of neutral countries. You must inform U Thant, for his personal information, that on those Soviet ships which at the present time are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all.

Stress that the Soviet government has taken all these steps so as not to step on the negotiations, which have begun on U Thant's initiative, between him and the representatives of the USSR, USA, and Cuba, aimed at liquidating the dangerous situation which has developed.

As far as the issue of the possibility of U Thant's journey to Cuba with a group of aides and experts is concerned, it goes without saying that the answer should be given by the Government of Cuba.

Tell U Thant that in our opinion, his journey to Cuba with a group of accompanying officials would have a positive significance.

Telegraph upon implementation.

[handwritten]
28. X [illegible initials, presumably Gromyko's]

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy Zhukov, 1 November 1962

TOP SECRET
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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

I am reporting about a meeting with [White House press secretary Pierre] Salinger on 31 October.

I. Salinger requested that I pass on to N.S. Khrushchev that Kennedy is thankful to him for the decision which he made to dismantle and remove the missiles, and expresses his confidence that the agreement which was reached, built on mutual trust, will open the way to the resolution of other ripe problems. "The President does not want to portray the matter as if we won a victory over the USSR," said Salinger. His version for the press is exactly reflected in [*New York Times* correspondent James] Reston's article of 29 October. Kennedy declared to the members of the government that it makes no sense to try to use the situation that developed to Khrushchev's detriment. In this spirit, Rusk conducted talks with 50 of the most prominent and trusted observers in the USA and allied countries.

2. Kennedy, in Salinger's words, is now extremely preoccupied with somehow disarming his adversaries, who are asserting that he has once again "fallen into a trap..." "We must, he said, no matter what, publish evidence that the missiles have been dismantled and taken away. Let it be representatives of the UN or of the Red Cross, let it be observation photos taken from the air, it is all the same to us. In this regard we are not demanding access to the missiles themselves, they really are secret. We must publish evidence that they are no longer on the launching pads and that they have been taken away.

3. Kennedy, in Salinger's words, as in the past is under strong pressure from the "right-wingers," who are condemning him for the fact that he, for the first time in the history of the

Western hemisphere has given a guarantee for the permanent preservation of a "Communist preserve" by the shores of the USA. In order to deflect these attacks, Kennedy must receive evidence to the effect that Castro has no "offensive" weapons.

4. Kennedy, as Salinger asserts, believes that achieving a resolution to the Cuban crisis "will open a completely new epoch in Soviet-American relations," when mutual trust will become the "basis of everything." One of the first issues to be resolved can and must be the issue of a test ban.

5. Regarding a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, before the Cuban crisis a majority of members of the government spoke out against such a contact, although it had been publicly stated that Kennedy will meet with Khrushchev if he comes to the General Assembly. Kennedy himself had doubted that this meeting will bring any sort of positive results.

"Now, - said Salinger - the situation has changed. The Cuban crisis showed that the issues on which the improvement of Soviet-American relations depends must be resolved urgently. Therefore, it is will be necessary to review the position in relation to a meeting in light of the results of the settlement of the crisis. We were too close to war for it to be possible to forget about this and to allow ourselves to delay even longer in reaching a resolution to the problems which have become urgent. However, the President still does not have a prepared decision about the expediency of a meeting and about the issues which should be considered. We still have to think about that."

6. Salinger, like other interlocutors in Washington, avoided touching on the German question. He mentioned in passing only that "even in respect to Berlin we have always stressed our respect for the opposing point of view."

7. Salinger stressed that even with all the "shortcomings" of Kennedy and Khrushchev's Vienna meeting, it had given a positive result, at least insofar as on the basis of the agreement that had been achieved there the Laos problem had been settled, which prompted confidence that it is possible to develop our relations on the basis of trust. For precisely this reason Kennedy had withdrawn the forces from Thailand.

"The Cuban crisis undermined this development of relations, but Khrushchev's wise decision may put the development of Soviet-American relations onto a basis of mutual trust," said Salinger.

8. Salinger asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev his personal thanks for the hospitality which had been given to him in Moscow.

XI.I.62 G. ZHUKOV

[Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

NEW RUSSIAN LAW AND THE ARCHIVAL SITUATION

On 25 January 1995 the Russian parliament passed a "Federal Law on Information, Information Systems, and the Protection of Information." It was signed into law by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 20 February 1995 and was published in *Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiskoi Federatsii* 8 (20 February 1995), pp. 1213-1225.

The lengthy, 25-article law covers a wide range of topics, and much of it has no direct bearing on the archives. In a few places, however, especially Article 13 ("Guarantees of the Provision of Information"), the law does have a direct--and, unfortunately, highly negative--bearing on the archives. Points 1 and 2 of Article 13, which entitle "organs of state authority" to restrict access to "information resources pertaining to the activities of these organs," effectively leave the individual state ministries and agencies with full discretion over their own archives.

This provision may be consistent with legislation passed in the spring of 1994, but it runs counter to suggestions that the archival holdings of the various ministries and state agencies be gradually transferred to the auspices of the State Archival Service of Russia (Rosarkhiv). It also seems to run counter to the decree that Yeltsin issued last September, which was published in the previous issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin* (Fall 1994, pp. 89, 100).

It is difficult to say how strictly the law will be enforced, but it seems to be one further indication that the proponents of archival openness are losing ground, at least for now.

--Mark Kramer

CONTROVERSY

continued from page 75

withdraw the Jupiters, this was also the first *public* indication that the issue had even been privately discussed.

With Dobrynin obviously unable to publish his own version—he remained Moscow's ambassador in Washington until 1986, and Soviet diplomats were not in the habit of publishing tell-all exposés prior to glasnost—the first important Soviet account of the event to emerge was contained in the tape-recorded memoirs of deposed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which were smuggled to the West and published in 1970 (after Khrushchev's death, additional installments saw print in the West in 1974 and 1990). The account of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting in *Khrushchev Remembers*, in the form of a paraphrase from memory of Dobrynin's report, did not directly touch upon the secret discussions concerning the Jupiters, but did raise eyebrows with its claim that Robert F. Kennedy had fretted to Dobrynin that if his brother did not approve an attack on Cuba soon, the American military might "overthrow him and seize power." The second volume of Khrushchev's memoirs (*Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*), published posthumously in 1974, touched only briefly on the Robert Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, but included the flat statement (on p. 512) that "President Kennedy said that in exchange for the withdrawl of our missiles, he would remove American missiles from Turkey and Italy," although he described this "pledge" as "symbolic" since the rockets "were already obsolete."

Over the years, many scholars of the Cuban Missile Crisis came strongly to suspect that Robert Kennedy had, in fact, relayed a pledge from his brother to take out the Jupiters from Turkey in exchange for the Soviet removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba, so long as Moscow kept the swap secret; yet senior former Kennedy Administration officials, such as then-National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, continued to insist that RFK had passed on no more than an informal assurance rather than an explicit promise or agreement.

The first authoritative admission on the U.S. side that the Jupiters had actually been part of a "deal" came at a conference in Moscow in January 1989, after glasnost had led Soviet (and then Cuban) former officials to participate in international scholarly efforts to reconstruct and assess the history of the crisis. At that meeting, former Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen (and the uncredited editor of *Thirteen Days*) admitted, after prodding from Dobrynin, that he had taken it upon himself to edit out a "very explicit" reference to the inclusion of the Jupiters in the final deal to settle the crisis.

Now Dobrynin's original, contemporaneous, and dramatic cable of the meeting, alluded to

in some accounts by Soviets (such as Anatoly Gromyko, son of the late foreign minister) with special access, has been declassified and is available at the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It is reprinted in translation below, along with relevant excerpts from the other publications mentioned above. The Dobrynin cable's first publication in English, a copy obtained by the Japanese television network NHK, came last year in an appendix to *We All Lost the Cold War*, a study by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, whose commentary is also excerpted.

* * * * *

Robert F. Kennedy's (edited) Description

I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about 7:15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Department of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I told him first that we knew that work was continuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that in the last few hours we had learned that our reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2s had been shot down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most serious turn of events.

President Kennedy did not want a military conflict. He had done everything possible to avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to shoot back. This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave indeed.

He said the Cubans resented the fact that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not violated Cuban air space, we would still be believing what Khrushchev had said—that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. In any case, I said, this matter was far more serious than the air space of Cuba—it involved the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, people all over the globe.

The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming privately and publicly that this would never be done. We had to have a commitment by tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I was not giving them an ultimatum but a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them. President Kennedy had great respect for the Ambassador's country and the courage of its people. Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians as well.

He asked me what offer the United States was making, and I told him of the letter that President Kennedy had just transmitted to Khrushchev. He raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those missiles would be gone.

I said President Kennedy wished to have peaceful relations between our two countries. He wished to resolve the problems that confronted us in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move forward on the control of nuclear weapons. However, we could make progress on these matters only when the crisis was behind us. Time was running out. We had only a few more hours—we needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Union. I said we must have it the next day.

I returned to the White House....

[Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: New American Library, 1969), 107-109.]

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Khrushchev's Description

The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this:

"Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights. 'The President is in a grave situation,' Robert Kennedy said, 'and does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control.'"

[*Khrushchev Remembers*, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971), pp. 551-52]

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Sorensen's "Confession":

...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, for Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, it would be undoubtedly helpful to him if he could say at the same time to his colleagues on the Presidium, "And we have been assured that the missiles will be coming out of Turkey." And so, after the ExComm meeting [on the evening of 27 October 1962], as I'm sure almost all of you know, a small group met in President Kennedy's office, and he instructed Robert Kennedy—at the suggestion of Secretary of State [Dean] Rusk—to deliver the letter to Ambassador Dobrynin for referral to Chairman Khrushchev, but to add orally what was not in the letter: that the missiles would come out of Turkey.

Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy's book did not adequately express that the "deal" on the Turkish missiles was part of the resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confession to make to my colleagues on the American side, as well as to others who are present. I was the editor of Robert Kennedy's book. It was, in fact, a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that meeting. So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.

[Sorensen comments, in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992), pp. 92-93]

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Accounts of Former U.S. Officials:

McGeorge Bundy:

... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from Dean Rusk, [John F.] Kennedy instructed his brother to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that while

there could be no bargain over the missiles that had been supplied to Turkey, the president himself was determined to have them removed and would attend to the matter once the present crisis was resolved—as long as no one in Moscow called that action part of a bargain. [p. 406]

...The other part of the oral message [to Dobrynin] was proposed by Dean Rusk; that we should tell Khrushchev that while there could be no deal over the Turkish missiles, the president was determined to get them out and would do so once the Cuban crisis was resolved. The proposal was quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition to Bundy and Rusk, those present included President Kennedy, McNamara, RFK, George Ball, Roswell Gilpatrick, Llewellyn Thompson, and Theodore Sorensen]. Concerned as we all were by the cost of a public bargain struck under pressure at the apparent expense of the Turks, and aware as we were from the day's discussion that for some, even in our own closest councils, even this unilateral private assurance might appear to betray an ally, we agreed without hesitation that no one not in the room was to be informed of this additional message. Robert Kennedy was instructed to make it plain to Dobrynin that the same secrecy must be observed on the other side, and that any Soviet reference to our assurance would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44]

...There was no leak. As far as as I know, none of the nine of us told anyone else what had happened. We denied in every forum that there was any deal, and in the narrowest sense what we said was usually true, as far as it went. When the orders were passed that the Jupiters must come out, we gave the plausible and accurate—if incomplete—explanation that the missile crisis had convinced the president once and for all that he did not want those missiles there.... [p. 434]

[from McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988]

Dean Rusk:

Even though Soviet ships had turned around, time was running out. We made this very clear to Khrushchev. Earlier in the week Bobby Kennedy told Ambassador Dobrynin that if the missile were not withdrawn immediately, the crisis would move into a different and dangerous military phase. In his book *Khrushchev Remembers*, Khrushchev states that Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the military might take over. Khrushchev either genuinely misunderstood or deliberately misused Bobby's statement. Obviously there was never any threat of a military takeover in this country. We wondered about Khrushchev's situation, even whether some Soviet general or member of the Politburo would put a pistol to Khrushchev's head and say, "Mr. Chairman, launch those missiles or we'll blow your head off!"

...In framing a response [to Khrushchev's second letter of Saturday, October 27], the president, Bundy, McNamara, Bobby Kennedy, and I met in the Oval Office, where after some discussion I suggested that since the Jupiters in Turkey were coming out in any event, we should inform the Russians of this so that this irrelevant question would not complicate the solution of the missile sites in Cuba. We agreed that Bobby should inform Ambassador Dobrynin orally. Shortly after we returned to our offices, I telephoned Bobby to underline that he should pass this along to Dobrynin only as information, not a public pledge. Bobby told me that he was then sitting with Dobrynin and had already talked with him. Bobby later told me that Dobrynin called this message "very important information."

[Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, *As I Saw It* (New York: Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 238-240]

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Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
27 October 1962:

TOP SECRET
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CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone.

The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The military is demanding that the President arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to do this.

I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and accepted international norms? How would the USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory?

"We have a resolution of the Organization of American states that gives us the right to such overflights," R. Kennedy quickly replied.

I told him that the Soviet Union, like all peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a "right" or, to be more exact, this kind of true lawlessness, when people who don't like the social-political situation in a country try to impose their will on it—a small state where the people themselves established and maintained [their system]. "The OAS resolution is a direct violation of the UN Charter," I added, "and you, as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest American legal entity, should certainly know that."

R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had different approaches to these problems and it was not likely that we could convince each other. But now the matter is not in these differences, since time is of the essence. "I want," R. Kennedy stressed, "to lay out the current alarming situation the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust of the situation now."

"Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba. The USA can't stop these flights, because this is the only way we can quickly get information about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a very serious threat to our national security. But if we start to fire in response—a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government is determined to get rid of those bases—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of the USA. But in response to the bombing of these bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists might suffer, the Soviet government will undoubtedly respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die. We want to avoid that any way we can, I'm sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish. However, taking time to find a way out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy mentioned as if in passing that there are many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are 'itching for a fight'). The situation might get out of control, with irreversible consequences."

"In this regard," R. Kennedy said, "the president considers that a suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response from the President, which was sent off today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Embassy in Moscow. The most important thing for us," R. Kennedy stressed, "is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in addition to repealing all measures on the "quarantine," to give the assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the

Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurances—the US government is certain of this."

"And what about Turkey?" I asked R. Kennedy.

"If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey—this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very well, there are many arguments. In short, if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO."

"However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need 4-5 months. This is the minimal amount of time necessary for the US government to do this, taking into account the procedures that exist within the NATO framework. On the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president, using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. "However, the president can't say anything public in this regard about Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

"That's all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy said in conclusion. "The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might drag things out. The current serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. Kennedy, "is just that—a request, and not an ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly."

I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American government realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. Khrushchev's appeal in his last letter to the president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolving this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the president's thoughts would be brought to the attention of the head of the Soviet government. I also said that I would contact him as soon as there was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me a number of a direct telephone line to the White House.

In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy noted that he knew about the conversation that television commentator Scali had yesterday with an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate the Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited out]

I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of "deception," (that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn't even try to get into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the essence and we shouldn't miss the chance.

After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends almost all his time now.

27/X-62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, translation from copy provided by NHK, in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War *(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526, with minor revisions.]*

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Lebow and Stein comment,
***We All Lost the Cold War* (excerpt):**

The cable testifies to the concern of John and Robert Kennedy that military action would trigger runaway escalation. Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin of his government's determination to ensure the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and his belief that the Soviet Union "will undoubtedly respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe." Such an admission seems illogical if the administration was using the threat of force to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba. It significantly raised the expected cost to the United States of an attack against the missiles, thereby weakening the credibility of the American threat. To maintain or enhance that credibility, Kennedy would have had to discount the probability of Soviet retaliation to Dobrynin. That nobody in the government was certain of Khrushchev's reponse makes Kennedy's statement all the more remarkable.

It is possible that Dobrynin misquoted Robert Kennedy. However, the Soviet ambassador was a careful and responsible diplomat. At the very least, Kennedy suggested that he thought that Soviet retaliation was likely. Such an admission was still damaging to compellence. It seems likely that Kennedy was trying to establish the basis for a more cooperative approach to crisis resolution. His brother, he made clear, was under enormous pressure from a coterie of generals and civilian officials who were "itching for a fight." This also was a remarkable admission for the attorney general to make. The pressure on the president to attack Cuba, as Kennedy explained at the beginning of the meeting, had been greatly intensified by the destruction of an unarmed American reconnaissance plane. The president did not want to use force, in part because he recognized the terrible consequences of escalation, and was therefore requesting Soviet assistance to make it unnecessary.

This interpretation is supported by the president's willingness to remove the Jupiter missiles as a *quid pro quo* for the withdrawal of missiles in Cuba, and his brother's frank confession that the only obstacle to dismantling the Jupiters were political. "Public discussion" of a missile exchange would damage the United States' position in NATO. For this reason, Kennedy revealed, "besides himself and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington." Khrushchev would have to cooperate with the administration to keep the American concession a secret.

Most extraordinary of all is the apparent agreement between Dobrynin and Kennedy to treat Kennedy's de facto ultimatum as "a request, and not an ultimatum." This was a deliberate attempt to defuse as much as possible the hostility that Kennedy's request for an answer by the next day was likely to provoke in Moscow. So too was Dobrynin's next sentence: "I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatum and it was good that the American government realized that."

Prior meetings between Dobrynin and Kennedy had sometimes degenerated into shouting matches. On this occasion, Dobrynin indicates, the attorney general kept his emotions in check and took the ambassador into his confidence in an attempt to cooperate on the resolution of the crisis. This two-pronged strategy succeeded where compellence alone might have failed. It gave Khrushchev positive incentives to remove the Soviet missiles and reduced the emotional cost to him of the withdrawal. He responded as Kennedy and Dobrynin had hoped.

CASTRO'S SPEECH

continued from page 1

a portion of the speech, and made it available to us for publication.[1] That portion concerns the Missile Crisis, which Cubans call the October Crisis. The statement not only constitutes President Castro's most extensive remarks about the 1962 confrontation, but also provides his reflection on the episode only five years after it occurred.[2] This document is usefully read in conjunction with notes taken by the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Aleksandr Alekseev, during meetings immediately after the crisis between Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan and Cuba's principal leaders. Translated excerpts from both documents are printed below. Taken together, the documents provide a deeper understanding of the nature and roots of the Cuban-Soviet relationship between the crisis and the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Those six years were the defining moments of both the Cuban revolution and the remaining 23 years of the Cuban-Soviet relationship. It is notable, then, that just eight months prior to the 1968 invasion, Castro provided his party's leadership with such an extensive review of Cuban-Soviet ties, starting with the Missile Crisis. To appreciate the significance of this speech, it is necessary first to review Cuba's perspective on the Missile Crisis.

Cuba's Perspective on the Crisis

Until recent years, Cuba had been largely excluded from or marginalized in analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was seen as no more than the stage on which the U.S.-Soviet confrontation brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. But new information about Cuba's role indicates that a full appreciation of the event can only be gained by examining Cuba's goals and fears prior to the crisis and its actions during the crisis.[3]

Early in his speech, Castro asserted that when a Soviet delegation (headed by the Uzbek party chief Sharif Rashidov) proposed the installation of ballistic missiles in Cuba in May 1962,

> We saw it as a means of strengthening the socialist community...and if we were proposing that the entire socialist community be prepared to go to war to defend any socialist country, then we had absolutely no right to raise any questions about something that could represent a potential danger.

Subsequently (and earlier, in his meetings with Mikoyan), the Cuban leader has said that he understood the missiles also could be an immediate deterrent to a U.S. invasion. But here he presented the idea that Cuba would be on the front line of the struggle between East and West.[4]

Prior to 1962, Cuba had sought admission to the Warsaw Pact, but had been rebuffed. Castro's rationale for accepting the missiles provided a formulation that would enable Cuba to claim *de facto* membership in the Pact. It was placing itself in harm's way for the benefit of socialist countries, and so it had the right to expect reciprocal protection from the Pact in the event of an attack.

By May 1962, Cuba expected and feared a U.S. military invasion. Cuban leaders reasoned first that the Kennedy Administration would not be content to accept blithely the outcome of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. They viewed Cuba's January 1962 suspension from the Organization of American States as a justification for and prelude to an invasion.[5] Importantly, their fears were reinforced by the development of a major U.S. covert action, codenamed Operation Mongoose, and other American military preparations.[6] Approved by President John Kennedy at the end of November 1961, Operation Mongoose became the largest CIA operation until Afghanistan. Though the program was never fully implemented, the United States did train and support thousands of Cuban exiles, many of whom engaged in repeated acts of sabotage on the island, including the destruction of factories, the burning of fields, the contamination of sugar exports, and the re-supply of counter-revolutionaries in the Escambray Mountains.[7] Cuban intelligence had infiltrated the exile groups and had captured several of the saboteurs. While Cuba was not privy to the closely held Mongoose planning documents, it had a reasonably accurate picture of the extent of the operation.[8]

This was the context in which the Cuban leaders accepted the Soviet proposal to install missiles. Castro acknowledged that he placed great faith in what he perceived to be the Soviet's sophisticated knowledge of military matters. Still, he quarreled with the Soviet leaders over the political aspects of Operation Anadyr (the Soviet code name for the missile emplacement). He sought a public announcement of the decision prior to the completed installation of missiles for two reasons. First, he judged that such a statement would itself have a deterrent effect against a U.S. invasion, by effectively committing the Soviet Union to Cuba's defense. Second, publication of the Cuban-Soviet agreement would strengthen Cuba's "moral" defense in the United Nations and in the forum of international public opinion. Keeping the operation secret, he argued in 1968, required

> the resort to lies which in effect meant to waive a basic right and a principle.... Cuba is a sovereign, independent country, and has a right to own the weapons that it deems necessary, and the USSR to send them there, in the same light that the United States has felt that it has the right to make agreements with dozens of countries and to send them weapons that they see fit, without the Soviet Union ever considering that it had a right to intercede. From the very outset it was a capitulation, an erosion of our sovereignty....[9]

While the world breathed a sigh of relief when Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced on 28 October 1962 that the Soviets would dismantle and remove the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba, Castro was enraged. "We were profoundly incensed," he reported to the Central Committee in 1968. The basis and acuteness of Cuba's anger are evident in the conversations Castro had with Mikoyan in early November 1962, immediately after Khrushchev's decision.

First, there was the matter of consultation. Cuba learned about the Soviet decision at the same moment the United States did, by hearing Khrushchev's announcement on Radio Moscow on the morning of October 28. Mikoyan argued to Castro on November 3 that there had been no time to consult with the Cuban leader, especially in light of a letter Castro had sent to Khrushchev on October 27 (it was written on October 26, completed in the early hours of October 27, and was received in the Kremlin very late on

the 27th). In that letter, the Cuban leader predicted that U.S. military strikes, and conceivably an invasion, were likely to occur in the next 24 to 72 hours (that is, possibly 10-12 hours after the Kremlin received the letter). In order to protect Cuba, Mikoyan contended, the Soviet Union had to act swiftly, without consulting Cuba. But, Castro retorted, the formula worked out between Kennedy and Khrushchev seemed to be based on a secret letter the Soviet leader had sent to the U.S. president on October 26, prior to receiving the Cuban leader's assessment.[10] Cuba thus felt aggrieved at being ignored.

Second, Castro was angry over the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement itself. Why, he demanded of Mikoyan, did the Soviets not extract anything more substantial from the United States that would increase Cuban security and defend Cuba's honor? On October 28, the Cuban leader had articulated five points that he stated should have been the basis of an agreement, including a cessation of U.S. overflights and a withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base.[11] At a minimum he expected that the Soviets could have forced the United States to meet with Cuba to discuss the five points face to face. That would have at least recognized Cuban sovereignty. Instead, the Soviets seemed oblivious to Cuban sovereignty, even agreeing to an internationally sponsored inspection of the dismantling of the missiles on Cuban soil without first asking Cuba's permission.

Third, there was the issue of Cuba's vulnerability, which had several elements. The Cuban leadership interpreted the agreement as a Soviet capitulation to U.S. threats, and correctly understood at the time what was made explicit only twenty years later: that the Soviet Union was unwilling ultimately to put itself at risk to protect Cuba.[12] "We realized," Castro said to the Central Committee, "how alone we would be in the event of a war." In the same vein, he described the Soviet decision to remove all but 3,000 of its 42,000 military personnel from Cuba as "a freely granted concession to top off the concession of the withdrawal of the strategic missiles."

The Cubans saw the Soviet soldiers more as a deterrent to potential U.S. aggression—a kind of tripwire that would involve the Soviet Union in a Cuban-U.S. conflict—than as a necessary military support. Cuba had more than 100,000 soldiers under arms and an even greater number in militias. But Cuban leaders did want to retain other weaponry that the United States was demanding the Soviet Union withdraw. Most important were IL-28 bombers, which were obsolete but capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Castro explained in 1968 that

> they were useful planes; it is possible that had we possessed IL-28s, the Central American bases [from which Cuban exiles were launching Mongoose attacks] might not have been organized, not because we would have bombed the bases, but because of their fear that we might.

Mikoyan recognized their importance. On November 5, Mikoyan told the Cuban leadership that "Americans are trying to make broader the list of weapons for evacuation. Such attempts have already been made, but we'll not allow them to do so."[13]

"To hell with the imperialists!" Castro approvingly recalled Mikoyan saying, if they added more demands. Nevertheless, Castro lamented in 1968, "some 24, or at most 48 hours later...Mikoyan arrived bearing the sad news that the IL-28 planes would also have to be returned."[14] (Castro's memory may be in error here: according to the declassified Soviet records of the Mikoyan-Castro conversations, Mikoyan conveyed Moscow's decision to withdraw the bomber's, to Castro's evident fury, in a meeting on November 12.[15]) From the Cuban perspective, Cuba was even more vulnerable than before the Missile Crisis because the hollowness of Soviet protection was exposed and key weaponry was being taken away.

Castro also was concerned that the U.S.-Soviet accord would weaken Cuba internally and encourage counter-revolution and perhaps challenges to his leadership. He remarked to Mikoyan on 3 November 1962:

> All of this seemed to our people to be a step backward, a retreat. It turns out that we must accept inspections, accept the U.S. right to determine what kinds of weapons we can use....Cuba is a young developing country. Our people are very impulsive. The moral factor has a special significance in our country. We were afraid that these decisions could provoke a breach in the people's unity....

Finally, Cuba perceived it was nothing more than a pawn in Soviet calculations. Castro's comments to Mikoyan about this confuse the sequence of events, but the source of the anger and disillusionment is clear. He said on November 3:

> And suddenly came the report of the American agency UPI that "the Soviet premier has given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantle missile launchers and return them to the USSR." Our people could not believe that report. It caused deep confusion. People didn't understand the way that the issue was structured—the possibility of removing missile armaments from Cuba if the U.S. liquidated its bases in Turkey.

In 1992, the Cuban leader intimated that this initial confusion hardened into anger during his six-week trip to the Soviet Union, in early 1963, after Khrushchev inadvertently informed Castro that there had been a secret understanding between the United States and Soviet Union for the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. This seemed to confirm his suspicion that the protection of Cuba was merely a pretext for the Soviet goal of enhancing its own security.[16] Here were the seeds of true discontent.

The lessons were clear to Castro, and these were what he attempted to convey to the Central Committee in 1968. The Soviet Union, which casually trampled on Cuban sovereignty and negotiated away Cuba's security, could not be trusted to look after Cuba's "national interests." Consequently, Cuba had to be vigilant in protecting itself and in maintaining its independence.

Significance of the January 1968 Speech

Castro's 12-hour speech came at the conclusion of the first meeting of the Central Committee since the Cuban Communist Party was founded in October 1965. The main purpose of the session was to conduct a "trial" of 37 members of the party, who were labelled the "micro-faction." Though the designation "micro" was intended to diminish their importance, there was little doubt that the attack against them was filled with high drama and potentially high stakes for the Cuban revolution.

The meeting began on January 23, and

was presided over by Raoul Castro, the Minister of the Armed Forces and the party's second secretary. All of the proceedings, except Fidel Castro's speech, were prominently reprinted in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma*.[17]

Most prominent among the 37 was Anibal Escalante, who was well known in Cuba. The leader of the Popular Socialist Party (which was the communist party) before 1959, he also headed the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations in 1961, which was the party created to mesh Castro's July 26th Movement, the Revolutionary Directorate, and the Popular Socialist Party into one unit. What made the attack on Escalante and his cohorts especially dramatic was that they were charged with adhering to criticisms of the Cuban Communist Party that had been voiced by Moscow-oriented communist parties in Latin America. Moreover, they were accused of meeting with officials of the Soviet embassy in Havana, of providing these officials (one of whom was allegedly the KGB station chief) with false information about Cuba, and of encouraging the Soviet Union to apply economic sanctions against Cuba. In effect, their purge could be interpreted as a direct rebuff to the Soviet Union.

Why, then, would Fidel Castro's speech on the history of Cuban-Soviet relations, which was quite critical of the Soviet Union, be kept secret when the micro-faction trial itself had been made so public? (Indeed, despite our repeated requests, the bulk of the speech is still secret, and the only portion that has been declassified is the portion pertaining to the missile crisis.) Recent interviews we conducted in Havana with former officials make clear that there were three motives for keeping the speech from the public.

First, there was a concern that the United States would interpret such direct Cuban criticism of the Soviet Union as a visible sign of rupture between Cuba and its benefactor. Cuban leaders, quite mindful of the 1965 Dominican Republic invasion, did not want to encourage U.S. hawks to attempt military attacks against the island. The micro-faction trial, after all, focused on allegedly errant individuals and avoided implicating the Soviet Union directly.

Cuban leaders were also worried about internal disunity. On the one hand, they did not want to encourage the Cuban public to seize on the speech as a sign that Cuba disavowed all aspects of Soviet socialism. There was considerable cultural ferment in Cuba at the time, and Cuban leaders were feeling besieged by increasing criticism from the artistic community.[18] This was also a period when Havana was awash in graffiti and juvenile vandalism, which leaders associated with a growing "hippie" movement.

On the other hand, Castro apparently believed he had to "educate" the Central Committee about the errors of the micro-faction, and demonstrate to party leaders that the purge was warranted. He could not be certain how popular Escalante was with the members of the Central Committee, because it was such a nascent and diverse group. He thus sought to avoid party disunity by convincing the leaders that the purge was necessary to protect Cuban nationalism, which was the ultimate source of legitimacy. Castro did this, one former official remarked, by explaining that "the platform of the micro-faction would in fact turn us into a Soviet satellite." This not only would have subverted Cuban national identity, but would have been a grave error, because—as he argues in the section of the speech on the Missile Crisis—the Soviet Union was untrustworthy.

Third, by keeping the speech secret, Castro sent a message to the Soviet Union that while Cuba profoundly disagreed with it over several issues, there was still the possibility of accommodation. Had the Cuban head of state made his criticisms public, it

FIDEL CASTRO, GLASNOST, AND THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS

by Georgy Shakhnazarov

In October 1987, Harvard University hosted a symposium on the Caribbean Crisis (or Cuban Missile Crisis) in which Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Sorensen, and other prominent veterans of the Kennedy Administration took part; I was one of three Soviets who also participated, along with Fyodor Burlatsky and Sergo Mikoyan. At the conclusion of that interesting discussion it was agreed to advance a step further the historical study that had been jointly launched.[1]

The next "round" of this study was held in Moscow in January 1989.[2] The Soviet Political Science Association and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations invited U.S. former officials and scholars, and on the Soviet side A. Gromyko, A. Dobrynin, A. Alexeev, O. Troyanovsky, S. Khrushchev, E. Primakov and many other people who were involved in the events of 1962 to attend the conference.

The Moscow conference turned out to be particularly interesting thanks to the participation of an authoritative Cuban delegation led by Sergio del Valle, a member of the Cuban government who in 1962 had been the Cuban army chief of staff. This article describes how this unprecedented Cuban involvement in an East-West historical investigation became possible, and Fidel Castro's personal role in that decision. On 7 November 1987, only a few weeks after the Harvard discussions, the Soviet Union celebrated the 70th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. Foreign delegations were led by the "first persons," and Fidel Castro was among them. At that time I was a deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee department responsible for relations with Cuba, and I had an opportunity to talk with the Cuban leader several times in his residence, the mansion at the Leninskie Gory. During our meetings, I told him about our discussions with the Americans, and asked him if he thought it would be a good idea for the Cubans to join the process in order to present the maximum amount of reliable information about this dramatic episode in Cuban and world history.

Fidel thought for a moment, stroking his beard with a familiar gesture. Then he said: "It is not only a good idea, but it is a necessity. There are so many myths and puzzles about those events. We would be able to help, to give information about the events in which we were immediate participants. But nobody has invited us."

Then I requested an invitation for the Cubans to the Moscow conference. Fidel promised to send a delegation and he delivered on his word. More than that. He positively responded to the idea to hold a "third round" in Cuba, and indeed a conference was held, with Fidel's active participation, in Havana in January 1992.[3]

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would have been far more difficult to overcome the tensions with the Soviet Union.

These tensions were reaching their peak in January 1968. In a public speech on January 2, the Cuban leader blamed the Soviet Union for an inadequate delivery of fuel that he asserted would require a stricter rationing of gasoline.[19] What the Soviets had done was to increase supplies only modestly from the previous year, and well below what the Cubans needed to pursue their ambitious plan of producing a ten million ton sugar harvest by 1970. This plan was an element in their goal of achieving some independence from the Soviet Union.

The Soviet action came after Premier Alexsei Kosygin visited Cuba in July 1967, on his way back to Moscow from a summit meeting in New Jersey with President Lyndon Johnson. The Castro-Kosygin meeting reportedly was quite tense, in part because Cuba disagreed with Soviet aspirations for a detente with the United States. It is likely, also, that Kosygin approvingly conveyed a U.S. message that Cuba should desist from supporting revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin America.[20]

Cuba's support for these movements had been a source of friction between the two countries for most of the period after the Missile Crisis. It raised several problems for the Soviet Union. One was ideological, and in this context it is worth noting that Cuban affairs in the CPSU Central Committee were handled in part by the department responsible for ideology. The Soviet Union believed that socialism could evolve peacefully in Latin America, and would come about through united front alliances spearheaded by the established communist parties. It was critical in their view to appreciate that Latin America was not ripe for revolution, because it had an underdeveloped proletariat. To be sure, there were some differences within the Soviet leadership about whether any support should be given to guerrilla movements, and there were differences even among the Latin American communist parties about the support that should be granted to movements within their respective countries. In the mid-1960s, for example, the Venezuelan Communist Party developed a close alliance with the main guerrilla movement there. The Argentine Party, in contrast, was firmly opposed to support for any guerrilla movements.

Still, Cuba posed a frontal ideological challenge because it claimed to be the model for developing socialism in Latin America, and the Cuban proletariat was less advanced than that in some other countries. Moreover, the Cuban revolution had succeeded largely without the support of the Popular Socialist Party. To some extent the ideological problem could be obscured by treating Cuba as an exception, especially during the period that it was not ruled by a communist party. But the issue became more critical after October 1965, when the Cuban Communist Party was formally established as the ruling party.

That came three months before a major international meeting of revolutionaries in Havana, the Tricontinental Conference. Until then, Soviets believed they had papered over its differences with Cuba on the matter of armed struggle by resolving at a December 1964 meeting of Latin American communist parties that while armed struggle was a valid means of achieving socialism, the appropriate means were to be assessed by each communist party. Cuba, moreover, agreed to deal only with the established communist parties in Latin America.[21]

Then the Tricontinental Conference upset the fragile peace. While it was fully endorsed by the Soviet Union, which hoped the conference would undermine China's influence with revolutionary movements (and which it apparently did), the Soviets were taken aback by the barely veiled criticisms of its allegedly weak support for North Vietnam. The conference also created a new organization, headquartered in Havana, to support armed revolutionary activity throughout the world, and the organization's executive secretariat had only three representatives from communist parties—Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea, all of whom were critical of the Soviet Union.[22] In a call for armed struggle in every Latin American country, Castro concluded the conference by fervently criticizing the Latin American communist parties:

> if there is less of resolutions and possibilities and dilemmas and it is understood once and for all that sooner or later all or almost all people will have to take up arms to liberate themselves, then the hour of liberation for this continent will be advanced.[23]

Castro reinforced these views in subsequent months, in speeches critical of the Soviet model of socialism and world revolution, and supporting Ché Guevara's November 1966 expedition to Bolivia, which was opposed by the Bolivian Communist Party.[24] Guevara had left Cuba in 1965, but he sent a message to the Tricontinental Conference in which he declared that through "liberation struggles" in Latin America, "the Cuban Revolution will today have a task of much greater relevance: creating a Second or a Third Vietnam...."[25] In August 1967, at the first meeting of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity—which was created by the Tricontinental Conference—Cuba arranged for nearly all of the delegations to be dominated by non-communist revolutionary movements. Later in the year, it pointedly chose to absent itself from a Soviet-organized preparatory meeting of world communist parties in Budapest.[26]

The trial of the micro-faction thus came at what seemed to be a critical juncture for Cuba in its relationship with the Soviet Union. In March 1968, Castro focused his revolutionary fervor on Cuba itself, and asserted that the masses had become complacent, believing "that we were defended." But "the only truly revolutionary attitude," he exhorted, "was always to depend on ourselves." He then announced that he was eliminating the private ownership of small businesses: "we did not make a Revolution here to establish the right to trade."[27]

Was this a prelude to a fundamental break with the Soviet Union? In fact, by May 1968 Cuba had actually begun a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which was evident in a softer tone in Castro's speeches about international affairs. Then in August, Cuba refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While communist parties in many countries roundly criticized the Soviet Union, Castro excoriated the Czech Communist Party for moving its country "toward a counterrevolutionary situation, toward capitalism and into the arms of imperialism."[28] Though it came several days after the invasion, and carefully avoided endorsing the invasion, Castro's speech was viewed in Moscow as a welcome contrast to the widespread reproach the Soviet Union was receiving. In 1969, Soviet trade with Cuba began to increase dramatically, and within four years Cuba became a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet-domi-

nated trading bloc of socialist countries.

The January 1968 speech, then, appears to have given the Cuban leadership the freedom to choose a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. By asserting Cuban independence, Castro could accept the kind of ties that would have appeared to make Cuba less independent.

It is impossible to know whether this sort of calculation prompted his speech. In January 1968, the Cuban leadership may not have had a clear sense of where they were taking their country. The internal debate during the following two or three months—which undoubtedly engendered the March closure of small businesses—proved to be critical for the future direction of the Cuban revolution.

With hindsight, it seems that Cuba had few options left. It had experienced a major rift with China by 1966. The October 1967 death of Guevara in Bolivia convinced several Cuban leaders that armed struggle was not going to be a viable means of building revolutionary alliances in Latin America. While the Soviet Union continued to trade with Cuba despite its fierce independence, Kosygin's visit may have been a warning to Castro that the Soviet Union would not give Cuba any more rope with which to wander away from the fold. Indeed, Soviet technicians were recalled during the spring of 1968.[29]

These factors thus impelled Cuba toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and the decision to do so coincided with the micro-faction trial and Castro's speech. In choosing to join the fold, Cuba would try to do it on its own terms, determined to protect its sovereignty and to be the principal guardian of its national interest. That determination clearly grew out of its experiences during the Missile Crisis and in the prior five years of tense relations with the Soviet Union. It is in understanding these terms with which Cuba established its ties to the Soviet Union that the January 1968 speech makes an important contribution to the history of the Cold War.

1. The full text of the Missile Crisis portion of the speech will be published in James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, *The October Crisis: Fidel Castro, Nuclear Missiles, and Cuban-Soviet Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).

2. At the time, Castro was First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces. He was referred to as Commander Castro. Today he is also President of Cuba.

3. Much of the information has been derived from two major conferences—held in Moscow in 1989 and in Havana in 1992—which brought together former policymakers and scholars from the United States, Soviet Union and Cuba, and included President Castro, as well as from documents declassified through the efforts of the National Security Archive. See James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. (New York: Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1990). James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink* (New York: Pantheon, 1993); *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989*, eds., Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David A. Welch, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 9 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992); Philip Brenner, "Thirteen Days: Cuba's Perspective on the Missile Crisis," in James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: The New Press, 1992).

4. This formulation was the same he provided in an interview five months after the crisis. See Claude Julien, "Sept Heures avec M. Fidel Castro," *Le Monde*, 22 and 23 March 1963.

5. Indeed, the Soviets similarly assessed the suspension. See Blight and Welch, *On the Brink* (2d ed.), 238.

6. On pre-crisis U.S. military planning and covert actions against Cuba, see James G. Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" in Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, 237-80. Notably, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara observed in 1989 that were he a Cuban leader in 1962, he would likely have assessed that U.S. actions portended an invasion. See Allyn, Blight, and Welch, *Back to the Brink*, 7. McNamara argued, though, that despite Cuba's reasonable conclusion, the United States never intended a military invasion.

7. Operation Mongoose was devised as a total plan for low intensity conflict. It also included propaganda operations through an off-shore radio station and economic pressure that was implemented through the formal establishment of the U.S. embargo in February 1962. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the operational chief of the project, had proposed a very detailed plan of action that foresaw U.S. pressure leading to a general uprising that would ultimately require a direct U.S. military invasion. See Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, Documents 5 and 7.

8. Fabian Escalante Font, *Cuba: la guerra secreta de la CIA* (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993).

9. Castro made a similar case in 1992. See Blight, Allyn and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 205-210. Notably, President Kennedy understood the matter of secrecy in the same light, asserting that whoever revealed the missiles first would be able to set the terms of debate. See Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 382. Also see McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen's comments in Allyn, Blight and Welch, *Back to the Brink*, 20-21.

10. The Castro-Khrushchev correspondence was reprinted in *Problems of Communism*, Special Edition, Spring 1992, 37-45, and in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 474-491.

11. *Revolucion*, 29 October 1962.

12. Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make the World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 108; Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 126.

13. See record of Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 5 November 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.

14. The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev over the removal of the IL-28s is reprinted in *Problems of Communism*, Special Edition, Spring 1992, 77-96. Also in this issue see: Philip Brenner, "Kennedy and Khrushchev on Cuba: Two Stages, Three Parties."

15. For an English translation of the November 12 minutes, and of Mikoyan's ciphered telegram to Moscow summarizing it, see Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 189-99.

16. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 224-225.

17. *Granma*, International Edition (English), 4 and 11 February 1968.

18. Lourdes Casal, "Cultural Policy and Writers in Cuba," in Philip Brenner, William M. LeoGrande, Donna Rich, and Daniel Siegel, eds., *The Cuba Reader: The Making of a Revolutionary Society*, (New York: Grove Press, 1989), 508-509.

19. *Granma*, International Edition (English), 7 January 1968, 2-3.

20. Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 88.

21. D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin and Communism in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 28-29; Jacques Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategical Perspectives, 1959-77*, trans. Deanna Drendel Leboeuf (New York: Praeger, 1978), 102-104.

22. Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 119-121.

23. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, "The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Peoples," A Staff Study, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 7 June 1966, p. 93.

24. For exemplary speeches, see Martin Kenner and James Petras, eds. *Fidel Castro Speaks* (New York: Grove Press, 1969), 171-213. On Guevara's problems with the Bolivian Communist Party, see *El Diario del Ché en Bolivia* (Havana: Editora Politica, 1987), esp. the introduction by Fidel Castro, xvii-xviii, and 47, 51, 53, 337.

25. John Gerassi, ed., *Venceremos! The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 420.

26. Lévesque, *The USSR and the Cuban Revolution*, 130-131.

27. Kenner and Petras, eds., *Fidel Castro Speaks*, 233, 277.

28. *Granma* International Edition (English), 25 August 1968.

29. Domínguez, *To Make the World Safe for Revolution*, 75.

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The October Crisis:
Excerpts of a Speech by Fidel Castro
[Translated from Spanish by the Cuban Council of State]

MEETING OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA
PALACE OF THE REVOLUTION
HAVANA
JANUARY 26, 1968
YEAR OF THE HEROIC GUERRILLA

MORNING SESSION

COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: In the early hours of [this] morning we stopped while on the topic of the reply sent to the Soviet Government in response to their letter attempting to find justifications in alleged alarms, and purporting insinuations of a nuclear strike in the sense that we had advised the USSR to attack the United States.[1]

These issues were made perfectly clear in that letter. Later there was another long letter containing the same points of view, and though couched in more diplomatic terms, so to speak, answering each of the items in Khrushchev's letter one by one.[2]

At that time, we also received Mikoyan's visit. Mikoyan's visit was also taken down....No, Mikoyan's visit was not taken down in shorthand; there were notes on Mikoyan's visit. U Thant's visit was the one that was taken down in shorthand. It is a real pity that the discussions with Mikoyan were not taken down in shorthand, because they were bitter; some of the incidents in the meeting were anecdotal.

Initially, after we explained to him our standpoints, we had him clarify what was going to happen with the IL-28 planes, and he vouched that no, the IL-28s would not leave Cuba. Then, if I remember correctly, I asked him, "But what if they demand their withdrawal, what will you do?" He answered, "then to hell with the imperialists, to hell with the imperialists!"

Then some 24, or at most 48 hours later, he arrived at the meeting—those famous meetings at the Palace of the Revolution—Mikoyan arrived bearing the sad news that the IL-28 planes would also have to be returned.[3]

That was really unpleasant, but the situation was such that, with the missiles withdrawn, we were on the verge of another problem over the planes. It would have made sense to have had it out over the missiles, but not over the IL-28 planes—they were useful planes: it is possible that had we possessed IL-28s, the Central American bases might not have been organized, not because we would have bombed the bases, but of their fear that we might. What we were most concerned about then was avoiding a new impact on public opinion as regards a new blow, a new concession.

We recall perfectly well how we assumed the always unpleasant initiative of making a statement—at my suggestion—that would create the right atmosphere, trying to justify the action by saying that the planes were obsolete, etc. All of which was done in consideration for public opinion, to protect the people from the trauma of another blow of that nature, since we were seriously concerned—and, in our view, rightly so given those circumstances—over the pernicious effects of a chain of such blows on the confidence and the consciousness of the people. And, I repeat, given that under the circumstances we were profoundly incensed, we saw that action as a mistake, in our opinion there had been a series of mistakes, but the extent of our overall confidence, and that deposited in the Soviet Union and its policies, was still considerable.

So the planes went too. Together with the planes—and that is something that they had requested, the issue of the missiles—they requested the withdrawal of the Soviet mechanized infantry brigades stationed in Cuba. Let me add here, in case anyone is unaware of it, that at the time of the missile issue, there were over 40,000 Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. The imperialists must also have known that, but they never declared the amount, they limited themselves to speculative figures, which revealed their interest in reducing the amount, perhaps due to possible effects on public opinion.

In fact, anyone who reads Kennedy's statements, his demands, will notice that he did not include those divisions, which were not offensive or strategic weapons, or anything of the sort. We must note that the withdrawal of the mechanized brigades was a freely granted concession to top off the concession of the withdrawal of the strategic missiles.

We argued heatedly, firmly, were against this. He said that it would not be carried out immediately but gradually, and we reiterated that we were against it and insisted on our opposition. I am explaining all this for the sake of subsequent issues, so that you can understand how all this fits into the history of our relations with the Soviet Union. We flatly rejected the inspection issue. That was something we would never agree to. We told him what we thought about that gross, insolent arbitrary measure, contrary to all principles, of taking upon themselves the faculty of deciding on matters under our jurisdiction. And when it was remarked that the agreement would fall flat—an agreement that we were completely at odds with—we said that we could not care less and that there would simply be no inspection.

That gave rise to endless arguing and counterarguing, and they actually found themselves in a very difficult situation. I think that at this point Raul made a joke that caused quite a commotion in the atmosphere of that meeting. I think it was when we were discussing expedients. Do you remember exactly? Was it the Red Cross thing?

CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ: He went to the extreme of proposing that the international vessel be brought to Mariel, saying that because it was an international vessel it would no longer be Cuban territory, and the UN supervisors could be on board the vessel and could supervise the operation. It was then that Raul woke up and said, "Look, why don't you dress them up in sailor suits?" (LAUGHTER), referring to the international supervisors.

COMMANDER RAUL CASTRO: These people think that I said that because I had been dozing; I actually woke up at that point and came out with that, have them bring those people on their vessel, dressed up as Soviet sailors, but leaving us out of the whole mess. It is true that I was falling asleep, but I was not that far gone.

COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: That was it.

COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: We had problems with the translators and there were occasions when some of the things we said were badly translated and there was even one point when poor Mikoyan got furious. It was over some phrase or other.

Anyway, those deliberations—as well as some of the others—were characterized by total and complete disagreement. Needless to say, we have the highest opinion of Mikoyan as an individual, as a person, and he was always favorably inclined toward Cuba, he was Cuba's friend, and I think he still is a friend of Cuba; I mean, he did quite a bit for us. That is why he always received from us a certain deferential treatment.

It was during those days that it gradually became evident that we were totally correct—as was, unfortunately, so often the case throughout that whole process—about the imperialists' attitude vis-a-vis the concessions. This could be seen as low-flying aircraft increased their constant and unnecessary daily flights over our bases, military facilities, airports, anti-aircraft batteries, more and more frequently; they harbored the hope, after the October [Cuban Missile] Crisis, of demoralizing the Revolution and they fell on us, hammer and tongs, with all their arsenal of propaganda and with everything that might demoralize our people and our army.

We had agreed not to shoot; we agreed to revoke the order to fire on the planes while the talks were under way; but made it clear that we did not consider those talks conclusive at all. I believe we were totally right on that; had we acted differently, we would still have their aircraft flying low over us and—as we would sometimes say—we would not even be able to play baseball here.

The demoralizing effect began to manifest itself in the fact that the anti-aircraft gunners and the crews at the air bases had begun to draw caricatures reflecting their mood and their situa-

tion, in which they depicted the planes flying above them, the Yanquis sticking their tongues out at them, and their planes and guns covered with cobwebs. And we realized once again to what extent the men who were supposed to be very experienced in struggling against the imperialists were actually totally oblivious to imperialist mentality, revolutionary mentality, our people's mentality, and the ultra-demoralizing effects of such a passive—more than passive, cowardly—attitude.

So we warned Mikoyan that we were going to open fire on the low-flying planes. We even did him that favor, since they still had the ground-to-air missiles and we were interested in preserving them. We visited some emplacements and asked that they be moved given that they were not going to shoot and we did not want them destroyed, because we were planning to open fire on the planes.

We recall those days because of the bitter decisions that had to be made.

1. [Ed. note: Castro is here alluding to his exchange of correspondence with Khrushchev of 26-31 October 1962 (esp. Castro's letters of October 26 and 31 and Khrushchev's letter of October 30), first released by the Cuban government and published in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma* on 23 November 1990, and published as an appendix to James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993, 474-91.]
2. [Ed. note: It is not clear what lengthy letter Castro is referring to here, or whether it has been made available to researchers: a lengthy letter reviewing the crisis and its impact on Soviet-Cuban relations, dated 31 January 1963, from Khrushchev *to* Castro was released at the 1992 Havana conference.]
3. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan arrived in Havana on 2 November 1962. The first meeting with the Cuban leader was on November 3. By the account here, Mikoyan notified the Cubans on about November 5 or 6 that the IL-28s would be removed. Declassified contemporary documents, however, including Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and Castro-Mikoyan conversation minutes, suggest that Mikoyan informed Castro about Moscow's acquiescence to Kennedy's demand to remove the IL-28s only on November 12.
4. It is not clear to what Castro is referring. Central American bases were used for training Cuban exiles in 1960 and 1961, and for launching the Bay of Pigs invasion. There is evidence that plans also were made for creating a Nicaraguan and Costa Rican base, but there is not clear evidence on whether they were used. See Fabian Escalante Font, *Cuba: la guerra secreta de la CIA* (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993), 180; Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *Deadly Secrets* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992), 165-166.
5. In fact, U.S. estimates were never more than half of that number. See Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1991), 308. Also see "'Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba,' 21 October, 1962," in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992; HRP 92-9), 258.
6. In 1968, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had ministerial rank and was involved in foreign commerce. He had been an official of the Cuban communist party (which was called the Popular Socialist Party) before the 1959 revolution, and had served in the government of Fulgencio Batista (as part of a popular front) in 1944, and headed the Institute for Agrarian Reform from 1962-64. In the 1970s he became a Vice President of Cuba and a member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party.

CASTRO AND GLASNOST

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After discussing all the logistical and organizational problems related to the project, the Cuban leader began to recall those troubled days of October 1962 when the fate of the humanity was played out in the game between Moscow, Washington, and Havana. And even though Castro repeatedly spoke on this topic later, that conversation contained a series of statements and judgments that shed some light on the development and outcome of the 1962 crisis, and on Fidel Castro's perspective on it:

"I Know Something About The Caribbean Crisis"

(Notes from a conversation with Fidel Castro, 5 November 1987)

Some Details and Specifics of the Crisis Situation.

In October [1962] the American planes began low flights above the Soviet launching sites for the nuclear intermediate range missiles and the anti-aircraft launchers. At that time the anti-aircraft missiles had the range of more than 1,000 meters. Paired ground-to-air launchers were used for protection of those anti-aircraft launchers, but they could not provide effective protection. We gave an order to add hundreds of additional anti-aircraft launchers to protect those launchers. Additional launchers were in the Cuban hands. That way we wanted to protect the Soviet nuclear and anti-aircraft missiles that were deployed in Cuba. Low overflights by the American planes represented a real threat of an unexpected attack on those objects. At my meeting with the Commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Cuba [Gen. I. A. Pliyev] I raised the question of the serious danger that the American overflights represented. That meeting occurred on the 25th or the 26th. I told him that the Cuban side could not allow the American planes to fly at such low altitudes over the Cuban territory any more. I even sent a letter [dated October 26] to Khrushchev about that. In that letter I told the Soviet leader about my concern with the situation that had developed. I said that we should not allow the Americans to deliver a first strike at the Soviet objects in the Cuban territory, we should not allow the repetition of the events that led to the World War II. At that time the crisis situation already existed.

On the day when the American planes appeared again, we gave orders to all Cuban anti-aircraft batteries to fire. The planes were driven off by the defensive fire. However, not a single plane had been shot down. Later on the same day

[October 27] a spying plane, U-2, appeared in the air above the island. We don't know any details, but it happened so that the plane was shot down by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile over the eastern part of the country.

I don't know in what manner they reported that to Khrushchev and to the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, however, I doubt that the order to shoot down the plane was given by the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in Cuba [Pliyev]; that decision was most probably made by the commander of the anti-aircraft missiles, or even by a commander of one of the batteries. Khrushchev, however, accused us of shooting down that plane in his letter.

To be sincere, it was possible that we were to blame since we opened fire at the American planes first, because we were so decisively against the American overflights. But the biggest mistake probably was that you, having installed those missiles, still allowed the Americans to fly over the launching sites. Those overflights were nothing else but preparation for a sudden American invasion of Cuba. I cannot blame the Soviet comrade who shot the U-2 for what he did because I understand his psychological condition very well. He saw that the Cubans opened fire at the American planes, and he decided to fire a missile at the U-2. I heard that many years later he was decorated for that act.

It is interesting that the former Soviet Ambassador in Cuba, [Aleksandr] Alekseev, wrote in his memoirs that I was trying to avoid the collision. For the sake of historical objectivity I must say that that was not so. In my letter to Khrushchev after we had deployed the anti-aircraft batteries and mobilized our people to repel the aggression I expressed my hope that we would be able to preserve peace. I wanted to show Khrushchev that I was not in an aggressive mood. At the same time I wanted to inform him about my concern with the possibility of an American first strike, not even excluding a possibility of a nuclear strike against Cuba.

At the same time I suggested to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Cuba [Pliyev] to disperse the nuclear warheads, so that they would not have been completely destroyed in case of an American attack. And he agreed with me.

One more question concerned the public statements made by the Soviet leadership and the coverage of the events in the organs of mass media. I sent two emissaries to Moscow [on 27 August-2 September 1962—ed.]—I think they were Che Gevara and [Emilio] Aragones—who had to propose that Khrushchev make public the military agreement between the USSR and Cuba. Publicly the Soviet leaders claimed that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. I insisted that we should not allow the Americans to speculate with the public opinion, that we should make the agreement public. However, Khrushchev declined.

The American leaders, Kennedy in particular, reacted to the Soviet statements very negatively. They thought they were deceived.

We, however, never denied the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In all their public statements Cuban representatives stated that the question of presence of weapons in Cuba was a sovereign business of the Cuban people, that we had the right to use any kind of weapons for the defense of the revolution. We believed that those statements of the Soviet leaders did harm to the prestige of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the general public, since at the same time you allowed U-2 flights over the Cuban territory that took pictures of the missiles stationed there.

At that time the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles had not been raised yet. However, the aggravation of the situation forced Khrushchev to make that decision. We, on our part, thought that Khrushchev had rushed, having made that decision without any consultation with us. We believe that the inclusion of the Cuban side in the negotiations would have made it possible to get bigger concessions from the Americans, possibly including the issue of the American base in Guantanamo. Such rush resulted in the fact that we found out about the Soviet-American agreement from the radio. Moreover, the first statement said that American missiles would be withdrawn only from Turkey; in the second the mentioning of Turkey was dropped.

When I visited the Soviet Union in 1963, Khrushchev read several letters to me. The American letters were signed by Thompson, but the real author was Robert Kennedy. In Khrushchev's response he spoke about the missiles in Turkey and Italy. There were certain threats in Kennedy's letter. In particular, he wrote that if the Russians did not accept their proposals, something would have happened. In response to that Khrushchev stated that something would have happened indeed if the Americans undertook any actions against Cuba in disregard of the agreement, and that that something would have been incredible in its scale. That meant that if the Americans had dared to violate the agreement, a war would have begun.

Probably Khrushchev did not anticipate that the interpreter who read the originals would have mentioned Italy, but the original letter mentioned the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and Italy. Later I asked the Soviet side to give explanations of that issue, but they told me that the agreement mentioned only Turkey.

We couldn't help being disappointed by the fact that even though the Soviet part of the agreement talked only about the missiles in Cuba and did not mention other types of weapons, particularly IL-28 planes, subsequently they had been withdrawn on the American demand. When Mikoyan came to Cuba, he confirmed to us that the agreement only provided for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. I asked him what would happen if the Americans demanded a withdrawal of the planes and the Soviet troops. He told me then: "To hell with Americans!"

However, in 24 hours the Soviet planes and the majority of the troops were withdrawn from Cuba. We asked why that had been done. The troops had been withdrawn without any compensation from the American side! If the Soviet Union was willing to give us assistance in our defense, why did they agree to withdraw the troops, we were asking. At that time there were six regiments with 42,000 military personnel in Cuba. Khrushchev had withdrawn the troops from Cuba even though it was not required by the Soviet-American agreement. We disagreed with such a decision. In the end, as a concession to us the decision was made to keep one brigade in Cuba. The Americans knew about that brigade from the very beginning, but they did not discuss it.

Many years later, in 1979, before the Non-aligned Conference [in Havana in September 1979] American Senator [Frank] Church announced that a Soviet brigade was deployed in Cuba. Then our Soviet comrades suggested that we rename it into a training center. We were against it. However, before we had a chance to send our response, a [Soviet] statement had been made that denied the American Senator's claim and said that there was a Soviet military training center in Cuba.

At the time of the crisis President Kennedy was under a great pressure, but he defended the official Soviet position. However, when he was shown the photos of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, he had to agree that the Soviets lied to him.

On the question of nuclear warheads in Cuba I can tell you that one day during the crisis I was invited to a meeting at the quarters of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Cuba at which all the commanders of different units reported on their readiness. Among them was the commander of the missile forces, who reported that the missiles had been in full combat readiness.

Soon after the Reagan administration came to power an American emissary, Vernon Walters, came to Cuba. We talked extensively about all aspects of our relations, and in particular, he raised the question of the October crisis. Trying to show how informed he was, he said that, according to his sources, nuclear warheads had not yet reached Cuba by the time of the crisis. I don't know why he said that, but according to the Soviet military, the nuclear missiles were ready for a fight.

I don't know what Khrushchev was striving for, but it seems to me that his assurances about the defense of Cuba being his main goal notwithstanding, Khrushchev was setting strategic goals for himself. I asked Soviet comrades about that many times, but nobody could give me an answer. Personally, I believe that along with his love for Cuba Khrushchev wanted to fix the strategic

parity in the cheapest way. When the Soviet comrades proposed to us to deploy the nuclear missiles in Cuba I did not like the idea, but not because of the military risk; because from the political point of view we would have been seen as a Soviet military base in Latin America. We were ready to accept the risk of an American military invasion of Cuba in order to avoid the political harm to the prestige of the Cuban revolution. But at the same time we understood that the Soviet Union needed that measure to ensure their own security. We knew that we had suffered a big political damage at the very time when we were dreaming about a revolution in all Latin America, but we were ready to make sacrifices for the Soviet Union.

I cannot take the credit for the resolution of the crisis. More likely, I believe, the major role belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by his stubbornness, and then resolved it. I did not know what was the real correlation of forces at that time, how many missiles did Khrushchev have. Khrushchev told me that after the missiles would have been deployed in Cuba, Kennedy would have to swallow it, and that later the Soviet leader was going to introduce the Fleet in the Baltic Sea (probably a mistake in the notes—should say "introduce the Baltic Sea Fleet"). I thought that Khrushchev's actions were too risky. I believe that it was possible to achieve the same goals without deploying the missiles in Cuba. To defend Cuba it would have been sufficient to send six regiments of Soviet troops there, because the Americans would have never dared to open military activities against the Soviet troops.

Now I understand that the actions undertaken by Khrushchev were risky, if not to say irresponsible. Khrushchev should have carried out a policy like the one Gorbachev is carrying out now. However, we understand that at that time the Soviet Union did not reach the parity which it has now. I am not criticizing Khrushchev for pursuing strategic goals, but the choice of the timing and the means for achieving the goals was not good.

When I [Shakhnazarov] said that Americans had to and did abide by the agreement reached during the Caribbean crisis throughout the whole period after the crisis, Castro responded: yes, indeed, it was so. That is why I don't think I have a right to criticize Khrushchev. He had his own considerations. And it really doesn't make much sense to replay the history guessing what could have happened if...

Fidel Castro supported the idea of publishing memoirs of the participants of those events and added that he would be willing to take part in the discussions of the subject himself. "I know something about the Cuban crisis," he said with a smile.

1. The organization and results of the 1987 Cambridge conference are described in James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989; Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1990).
2. On the 1989 Moscow conference, see Blight and Welch, *On the Brink* (1990 ed.).
3. On the 1992 Havana conference, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993).

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MIKOYAN'S TALKS

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The documents lend credence to the reminiscences of the historic participants—Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, former Soviet Ambassador in Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev.[5] They reveal that the fraternity between Cuba and the USSR was badly fractured. While the Kremlin leadership, faced with a severe danger, preferred geostrategic pragmatism to ideological commitments, the Cuban revolutionaries sprung up in fierce defense of their national sovereignty and revolutionary "legitimacy." From the Soviet perspective, that of a superpower, the most important fact was that Castro had, in his letter to Khrushchev of October 26, advocated a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States if it invaded Cuba.[6] This notion, considered dangerous and irresponsible in Moscow, became an excuse completely to exclude Cuba from the U.S.-Soviet secret talks to resolve the crisis. Some of the Soviet leaders, gathered at the height of the crisis on 27 October 1962 at Novo-Ogarevo governmental dacha near Moscow, may even have feared that the Cubans, like Ulbricht, could push them all over the brink.[7] John J. McCloy, a representative of the Kennedy Administration, told Mikoyan, in New York on November 1, that "he was reassured by the presence of Russian officers [in Cuba during the crisis]. The Cubans could open fire without thinking ... But the Russians would think first."[8] Khrushchev himself was forced to explain to Kennedy that the Cuban leaders were "young, expansive people—in a word, Spaniards."[9]

Mikoyan's trip was triggered by Alekseev's cables from Havana. The Soviet ambassador alerted the Soviet leadership that Moscow's actions had endangered Soviet-Cuban friendship. Khrushchev was particularly upset to learn that a rapprochment was in progress between Cuba and the People's Republic of China.[10] The continuing pressure of the United States for more Soviet concessions indeed corroborated this impression.

Mikoyan was Khrushchev's closest friend and most loyal ally. As had his predecessor—Stalin dispatched Mikoyan on a delicate mission to Mao in January 1949—Khrushchev frequently used Mikoyan as a troubleshooter and personal diplomatic emissary: to Hungary (October 1956), to West Germany (March 1958), to the United States (January 1959), and to talk to the anti-Khrushchev demonstrators during the Novocherkassk riots in south Russia (June 1962). Important from the Cuban viewpoint, Mikoyan had been the last in the Soviet leadership who belonged to the "old guard" of the Bolshevik revolutionaries. He had known all great revolutionaries of the century, from Lenin to Mao Zedong. And he was the first to embrace the Cuban revolution after his trip to Cuba in February 1960, at a time when the Kremlin still felt ambiguous about the Cuban revolution and its young, non-Marxist leaders. Castro, for all his anger, let Mikoyan know on November 3 that he remembered his role. Khrushchev sometimes said, Castro joked, that "there is a Cuban in the CC CPSU. And that this Cuban is Mikoyan."

What both sides felt and understood during the talks was no less important than their "formal" written content. For the third time, since the Stalin-Tito split (1948) and the Sino-Soviet quarrel (since October 1959), there was an open conflict of perspectives and interests between the USSR and another communist regime. And both sides were fully aware of this. Fidel Castro said (as quoted to Mikoyan by Ernesto "Che" Guevara): "The United States wanted to destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union has destroyed us de jure [*iuridicheskii*; juridically, legally] with Khrushchev's letter"[11] it is not clear whether this comment referred to Khrushchev's letter of October 27, with its offer to swap Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, or his letter to Kennedy of October 28, agreeing without consulting Castro beforehand to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba under UN inspection. But in any case, both actions enraged and offended Castro, who reminded Mikoyan, on November 4, that after the Spanish-American war (1898), when

the United States "liberated" Cuba from colonial rule, Washington also did not invite Cubans to a peace conference and Congress passed the Platt Amendment (1901), which denied Cuba an independent foreign policy.[12]

On November 3, in a one-to-one meeting with Fidel (Alekseev interpreted), Mikoyan absorbed Castro's first angry assault and lived up to his thankless mission. When he left Moscow, Ashkhen Tumanian, his wife of forty years, was dying in the Kremlin hospital. He learned about her death during the first, tensest conversation with Castro.[13]

Only on the second day of talks, November 4, did Mikoyan fully present the Soviet side's arguments. He defended Khrushchev's claim that the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was not a surrender to Washington's demands, but a Soviet-Cuban "victory," because a military attack against Cuba was prevented without slipping into a nuclear war. To win over the furious Castro, Moscow's messenger was ready to stay in Cuba for an indefinite time. "If my arguments would seem insufficiently convincing for you," he said, "tell me about it, I will think how to get my point across to you, I will try to bring new arguments." Mikoyan's lengthy arguments and explanations on November 4 and the afternoon of November 5 finally elicited an expression of gratitude from Castro and an emotional, if grudging, declaration of "unshakeable" respect for and "complete trust" in the Soviet Union.

But the Cuban leader and his comrades were soon infuriated anew when, only minutes later, Mikoyan tried to convince them to accept a United Nations inspection of the dismantling of the strategic missiles based in Cuba—or at least their loading onto Soviet ships in Cuban ports—arguing that such a process would strengthen the sympathetic position of UN Secretary-General U Thant and remove any pretext to continue the American blockade. Castro, acutely aware that Khrushchev had accepted the principle of a UN inspection without informing him, bought none of it. "A unilateral inspection," he told Mikoyan, "would affect monstrously the moral spirit of our people." Saying he spoke for the whole Cuban people, Castro firmly rejected any international inspection of Cuba—unless a comparable inspection took place in the United States—and told Mikoyan that if such a position endangered peace, Cuba could defend itself without the Soviet Union's help. "Come what may," he concluded. "We have the right to defend our dignity." Mikoyan could only plead plaintively that he didn't "understand such a sharp reaction," and failed to convince Castro or his colleagues to soften their adamant rejection of inspection then or in a second meeting that evening which Castro skipped, leaving others in the leadership, notably Ché, to denounce bitterly the Soviet stand.

Still another tense moment in the talks came on November 12 after Khrushchev, yielding to Kennedy's pressure, made a new concession to the United States—agreeing to withdraw from Cuba Soviet-made IL-28 medium-range bombers in exchange for the lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba. Unlike the missiles, the bombers had been transferred into Cuban ownership, and Khrushchev took pains to "clear" this new deal with Castro before expessing his "great satisfaction" to Kennedy.[14] For Mikoyan, this second mission was no less difficult than the previous one. Castro interrupted the Soviet interlocutor with questions full of scorn and skepticism or just stopped listening altogether. At one point, after hearing Mikoyan's lengthy defense of the IL-28 concession, he agitatedly cut off his visitor's speech with the words: "Why are these arguments being cited? You should say outright what the Soviet government wants."[15]

The sequence of Mikoyan's arguments allows us to look into mentality of the Kremlin leaders. Beneath the veneer of ideological phraseology lay the hard core pragmatism of superpower statesmen who had tested the waters of globalism and reached its limits. Argument number one was that the survival of the Cuban regime in an area where the correlation of forces was so adverse constituted "a great success of Marxist-Leninist theory."[16] Mikoyan stopped short of telling the Cubans that understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev was the *sine qua non* for the survival of the Cuban revolution. But he admitted that the American proximity to Cuba and the U.S. Navy's huge preponderance otherwise would have ensured Cuba's subservient place within Washington's sphere of influence. "Communications between us and Cuba are overextended. We cannot use our Air Force and Navy in case of [a U.S.] blockade of Cuba." [November 4] "If Cuba were located in place of Greece, we would have shown them." [November 5] "You were born like heroes, before a revolutionary situation in Latin America became ripe, and the camp of socialism has not yet grown to full capabilities to come to your rescue." [November 5]

In spite of the U.S. geostrategic preponderance, Mikoyan said that Kennedy "took a step in our direction," because his pledge of non-intervention against Cuba "is a concession on their part."[17] Until this episode, the Kennedy Administration had argued that Cuba for the United States was analagous to Hungary for the USSR—part of its security zone.[18] Mikoyan's words make one think that this comparison had also been important in Kremlin thinking: while the USSR crushed the Hungarian revolt in 1956, defending its zone, the United States had not *yet* managed to do the same to the Cuban revolution.

Mikoyan's next argument revealed Moscow's fervent desire to preserve its credentials as the center of the world revolutionary movement, particularly in the face of the challenge from Beijing. Mikoyan pressed the analogy between Khrushchev's settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Lenin's defense of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), "an infamous peace" between revolutionary Russia and Kaiser Germany aimed at saving the Bolshevik regime at all costs. In fact, the dialogue between Mikoyan and the Cuban leaders revealed two starkly different perspectives: between the Kremlin's unwillingness to challenge frontally American hegemony in the Western hemisphere, and Havana's determination to blow this hegemony to pieces through a revolutionary offensive.

Castro and particularly Ché Guevara linked the future of the Cuban revolution to the growth of the international revolutionary movement in Latin America. In a passionate outburst on November 5, with Fidel Castro absent, Ché told Mikoyan that Latin American communists and revolutionaries were "baffled by the actions of the Soviet Union." The developments especially frustrated Ché, he explained, because, "We are deeply convinced in the possibility of seizing power in a number of Latin American countries, and practice shows that it is possible not only to seize, but to maintain power in a number of countries, given specific [Cuban] experience and the assistance of socialist countries, first of all the Soviet Union." But, he lamented, the Soviet "bargaining" with the United States and its "open retreat" before American demands had led to de facto rec-

ognition of all Latin America as a U.S. sphere of influence, and discouraged nationalistic "petit bourgeoisie" from allying with radical forces against the omnipotent Gringos from *El Norte*. "It seems to me," concluded Che, "... that one should expect a decline of the revolutionary movement in Latin America." He also stressed that in the Soviet handling of the missile crisis had already produced "a crack" in the "unity of the socialist camp." Both he and Mikoyan knew that this meant factional splits in many radical groupings in Latin America and a shift of some of them to the PRC's wing.

In response, Mikoyan reminded the Cubans of Nikolai Bukharin, a young Bolshevik ("although he was repressed, I think he was a good person") who in 1918 also preferred to promote world revolution even at a risk of sacrificing Soviet power in Russia. "We practically had no armed forces, but those comrades [like Bukharin] wanted to die heroically, reject Soviet power." "Study Lenin," he lectured the Cubans. "One cannot live in shame, but one should not allow the enemy to destroy oneself. There is an outcome in the art of diplomacy." Kremlin apparatchiks would repeat this same litany of prudence time and again, when they had to deal with radical regimes in the Third World later in the 1960s and 1970s.

Mikoyan reminded the Cubans that since 1961, Soviet-Cuban economic relations were trade in name only: the Cubans were getting everything, including weapons, free of charge. "We do not pursue any commercial or national interests in Cuba," he told Castro. "We are guided exclusively by the interests of internationalism."[19] He pointed out to Castro that the Kremlin, aware of the American "plan to strangle Cuba economically," had "without any requests from your side" decided "to supply to you armaments, and in part military equipment for free." The Soviets had also covered the Cuban balance of payment ($100 million) "in order to foil the Kennedy plan, designed to detonate Cuba from within."[20] If the American blockade of Cuba continued, Mikoyan warned, "then the Soviet Union would not have enough strength to render assistance, and the Cuban government would fall."[21]

Mikoyan and Khrushchev evidently expected that these pragmatic arguments would carry the day with the Cuban leadership, and that the danger of a pro-Beijing reorientation of Latin American revolutionary movement could be stemmed by generous Soviet assistance.

For historians of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most interesting parts of the documents are where Mikoyan gave the Cubans his version of the recent dramatic events. Though this version was obviously tailored to Cuban sentiments and to Mikoyan's specific tasks, there is considerable overlap, sometimes almost verbatim, between Mikoyan's story and the story later told by Khrushchev in his memoirs.[22] So all the more intriguing and credible are details that are missing in the Khrushchev's version. First, the documents hint at what possible countermeasures the Kremlin contemplated against the U.S. attack against Cuba. The conclusions must have been bleak, as he explained to Castro on November 4. "We could not retaliate by a blockade of an American base, for instance, in Turkey, since we do not have another outlet into the Mediterranean. We could not undertake similar steps in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We do not have sufficient capabilities for a counter-blockade."

Mikoyan and Khrushchev (in his letters to Castro before and after the visit) sang the same tune when they explained to the Cubans the reasons for Soviet secrecy and their misplaced hopes to camouflage the missiles. The most eyebrow-raising aspect of Mikoyan's explanation deals with the question of what the Kremlin believed Kennedy knew and was about to do before the breakout of the crisis. Of course, the standard version of events in most accounts has it that Kennedy and his advisers did not obtain hard evidence of the missile deployment until a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane photographed sites in Cuba under construction on 14 October 1962—but Mikoyan told a different story. U.S. intelligence, said Mikoyan, "worked badly," but "in mid-September [1962] the Americans seemed to receive information about the transfer of Soviet troops and strategic missiles to Cuba." In Mikoyan's version, presented on November 4, the initial source of this scoop was not the U-2 flights but West German intelligence [Bundesnachrichtendienst]. Only then, he said, "the American government sent planes to the air space of Cuba to carry out the aerial-photo-reconnaissance and establish the sites of missile deployment." Kennedy, said Mikoyan, spoke nothing about Soviet troops which made people in the Kremlin think "that he spoke not all that he knew." "Until the end of [mid-term] Congressional elections," on November 6, asserted the Soviet messenger, "Kennedy did not want to speak about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. He did not want to aggravate [U.S.-Soviet relations]. But two senators from the Republican party"—clearly alluding to Kenneth Keating of New York and Everett Dirksen of Illinois—"learned about the fact of deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba, therefore Kennedy hastened to take initiative in his hands...We did not have information with respect to how he was going to act."

A book on the hidden intelligence aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis is being co-authored now by American and Russian historians, and I hope they will comment on Mikoyan's assertions.[23] It has become known that CIA Director John McCone had concluded by the late summer of 1962 that Soviets had decided to transport nuclear-capable missiles to Cuba, though most CIA analysts discounted the likelihood of this possibility.[24] Yet, the Kremlin almost certainly erred in conflating the suspicions of some U.S. intelligence officials with Kennedy's awareness of the missiles. In this case, it seems, Khrushchev's belief that the U.S. president knew about the Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba but for domestic tactical reasons preferred to wait until after the elections to deal with them stands out as one of the most remarkable example of wishful thinking in the entire history of the Cold War.

In another interesting sidelight, the transcripts of the Mikoyan-Cuban talks indicate that the issue of Berlin was not the main cause for the Soviet gamble in Cuba, but a sideshow. Berlin was also the most serious bargaining chip the Soviets had, but they hesitated to use it during the brinkmanship and bargaining in late October. Mikoyan mentioned only in passing to the Cubans on November 4 that "countermeasures were possible in Berlin," adding that the Soviets used the Berlin asset in a disinformation campaign in September-October, to distract American attention from Cuba. In fact, one passage from that conversation suggests that this disinformation backfired, making the Kremlin believe that the Kennedy administration was interested to postpone not only the discussion on Berlin, but also secret talks on the Soviet strategic buildup in Cuba, until

after the Congressional elections. As Mikoyan related to the Cubans, "Through confidential channels Kennedy addressed a request to N.S. Khrushchev that he would not aggravate the situation until after the Congressional elections and would not set out [immediately] then to solve the Berlin issue. We responded that we were ready to wait until the end of the elections, but right afterwards would proceed to the solution of the Berlin quesion. When the Americans learned about the transportation of strategic weapons into Cuba, they themselves began to get loud about Berlin. Both sides were talking about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously believed that the crux of their policy in the present moment was in Cuba."

Did Mikoyan's mission prevent a Soviet-Cuban split? There is no categorical answer to this question. Castro had accepted Soviet assistance, but not Soviet arguments. The Cuban leader and his comrades thought primarily of the revolutionary "legitimacy" of their regime in Latin America. After the Cuban missile crisis, the "honeymoon" in Soviet-Cuban relations ended and was transformed into a marriage of convenience. This had both immediate and long-term consequences. For instance, Mikoyan's trip had a direct impact on Khrushchev's ongoing correspondence with Kennedy. In his letter of November 22, the Chairman admonished the U.S. president to put himself into Castro's shoes, "to assess and understand correctly the situation, and if you like psychological state, of the leaders of Cuba... and this striving [for independence] must be respected."[25] In all probability, Khrushchev addressed these words not so much to Kennedy (who had not the slightest desire to heed them), but to Castro, who on November 3 received copies of all previous Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondence on the settlement of the crisis. From then on the Soviet leadership, in order to placate their "friends," had to forgive and overlook much in Castro's international behavior, and also had to carry the burden of this behavior. In immediate implication, because the Cubans rejected inspections in any form on their territory, Soviet military and naval personnel had to comply with humiliating procedures of aerial inspection imposed on them by the Americans, something for which they could not forgive Khrushchev even decades later. For the next three decades, the Soviet economy was burdened with a multi-billion Cuban aid program, including food, equipment, consumer goods, and weapons. Castro, when his dreams of Latin American revolutions were shattered, sought to fulfill his "internationalist duty" in other lands, and found pretexts to restore the revolutionary dignity of Cuba, tarnished during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977-78). Even then the Brezhnev leadership, who remembered Castro's outbursts in 1962, was reluctant to make full use of the Soviet leverage on the Cuban regime.

1 See Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), *passim*, quotation on 4.

2. For illustrations, see Weathersby's article in the current CWIHP *Bulletin* as well as her CWIHP Working Paper and article in CWIHP *Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), as well as her documentary essay, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase in the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58.

3. This factor has begun to impress even those scholars who had previously analyzed the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis through the prism of the bipolar confrontation and the dynamics of the balance of strategic forces, and who firmly believed that "the factor of the Cuban revolution" was of no importance in Khrushchev's decision to deploy Soviet medium-range missiles in Cuba.

4. Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i raketi. Vzgliad iznutri*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), 388-90.

5. "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khruscheva: Karibskii Krizis," *Voprosii Istorii* 7 (1993), 89-110; Castro and Alekseev comments quoted in James G Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 88-99.

6. See Castro to Khrushchev, 26 October 1962, in *Granma* (Havana), 23 November 1990, English translation reprinted in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 481-82.

7. Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i raketi*, vol. 2, 355-357, 360-362, 364; Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* (Boston: Little. Brown, and Co., 1990), 170-183; "Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha...," 108; Brezhnev, according to his aide, Andrei M. Alexandrov-Agentov, was "trembling" at the thought of a nuclear exchange, A.M. Alexandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva* [From Kollontai to Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, 1994), 174.

8. Quoted by Mikoyan in his meeting with Cuban leaders, 5 November 1962.

9. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 22 November 1962, published in *Problems of Communism* 42 (Spring 1992), 108.

10. See Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, 378.

11. Castro was quoted to this effect by Ernesto "Ché" Guevara during Mikoyan's meeting with Cuban leaders on 5 November 1962.

12. The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment in March 1901, as an attachment to the Army Appropriations Bill. It authorized the U.S. President to occupy Cuba until a Cuban constitution would provide guarantees that no "foreign power" would be ever permitted to gain a foothold on Cuban soil. Castro referred to this particular clause of the Platt Amendment as a constraint on Cuban sovereignty. He referred to it at the conference in Havana in January 1992: "We were told: either you accept the Platt Amendment, or there is no independence. No country in the world would accept that kind of amendment in its constitution, because it gives the right to another country to intervene to establish peace..." *Cuba on the Brink*, 331, 341.

13. Sergei Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev*, 378-79.

14. The text of Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondence regarding this thorny issue on 6, 11, 12, and 13 November 1962 is in *Problems of Communism* 42 (Spring 1992), 77-92.

15. Transcript of conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, 12 November 1962, translation in Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition q, 1994), 191-99; see also ciphered telegram, A. Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 12 November 1962, in ibid., 189-90.

16. Castro-Mikoyan talks, 4 November 1962.

17. Mikoyan-Castro talks, November 4 and 5.

18. See, e.g., the Rusk-Gromyko meeting of 18 October 1962 published elsewhere in this issue.

19. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962.

20. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 4 November 1962.

21. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962.

22. For Khrushchev's recollections of the crisis, in English, see Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 488-505; Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1974), 509-514; *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glastnost Tapes*, 170-83.

23. Timothy Naftali from the University of Hawaii and Alexander Fursenko from the Russian Academy of Sciences are on a contract of Crown publishers to write this story. Fursenko has a first-time access to the materials from the Archive of the President of Russian Federation and the archives of the KGB [not Federal Counterintelligence Service or FSK] that are being declassified specifically for this project.

24. McCone's predictions are documented in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1992), esp. 51-52, 59-60, 67-68, 77-79, reproducing McCone cables of 7, 10, 13, and 16 September 1962; see also comments of Ray Cline, *Cuba on the Brink*, 125-26.

25. *Problems of Communism* 42 (Spring 1992), 108

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Mikoyan's Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962

[Ed. note: To preserve the flavor of the Russian documents, the original grammar and punctuation have been retained in some cases where they conflict with normal English practice.]

Document I:
"And suddenly — concessions...." —
The First Castro-Mikoyan Conversation,
3 November 1962

NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN
A.I. MIKOYAN and FIDEL CASTRO

This morning a two-hour conversation took place between comrade A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, where I [Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Aleksandr Alekseev] was also present.

3 November 1962

...

Unfortunately, A.I. Mikoyan said, some differences of opinion have arisen between the leadership of the Republic of Cuba and our leadership. Ambassador Alekseev has informed us about these differences, and about the speech by Fidel Castro on 1 November 1962, in which the latter explained to the Cuban people the position of the revolutionary government.

The CC CPSU, Mikoyan emphasized, had sent me to Cuba to discuss in the most frank way all the unclear questions with the Cuban comrades. Judging by the welcome at the airport, the Cuban leaders consider this a useful meeting. I came here to speak to you sincerely and openly. And now it seems to me that it would be useful if you, comrade Fidel Castro, tell me frankly what the questions are that worry you. Only by speaking frankly is it possible to assure complete confidence and mutual understanding. As we agreed before, after this conversation a meeting will be organized with the secretaries of the National CDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revolution] leadership in order to discuss all the issues in detail.

In response Fidel Castro said that the Cuban leadership was glad to see A.I. Mikoyan in Cuba once again, and to speak with him about questions that are important for both sides. We are aware, joked Fidel Castro, that N.S. Khrushchev once said: "there is a Cuban in the CC CPSU and this Cuban is A.I. Mikoyan." We can speak to you, Fidel Castro continued, very frankly. We profoundly trust the Soviet Union.

Regarding the questions that caused some differences, as we explained it to our people, I [Castro] would like to say the following.

These questions are motivated, first of all, by psychological factors. I would like to stress that in those days when a serious danger arose, our whole people sensed a great responsibility for the fate of the motherland. Every nerve of the people was strained. There was a feeling that the people were united in their resolve to defend Cuba. Every Cuban was ready to repel the aggressors with arms in hand, and ready to devote their lives to the defense of their country. The whole country was united by a deep hatred of USA imperialism. In those days we did not even arrest anyone, because the unity of the people was so staggering. That unity was the result of considerable ideological work carried out by us in order to explain the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba, to explain the purity of the principles in the policy of the USSR.

We spoke with the people about the high patriotic objectives we were pursuing in obtaining arms to defend the country from aggression. We said that the strategic weapons were a guarantee of firmness for our defense. We did not classify the arms as defensive and offensive, insofar as everything depends on the objectives for which they are used... [Ellipsis in original.]

Speaking of psychological questions, we would like to underline that the Cuban people did understand us. They understood that we had received Soviet weapons, that Cuban defense capacities had increased immeasurably. Thus, when Kennedy attempted to frighten us, the Cuban people reacted very resolutely, very patriotically. It is hard to imagine the enthusiasm, the belief in victory with which the Cubans voluntarily enlisted themselves into the army. The people sensed enormous forces inside themselves. Aware of the real solidarity of the Soviet government and people, Cubans psychologically felt themselves to be strong. The Soviet Union's solidarity found its material embodiment, became the banner around which the forces and courage of our people closely united.

In observing Soviet strategic arms on their territory, the people of Cuba sensed an enormous responsibility to the countries of the socialist camp. They were conscious that these mighty weapons had to be preserved in the interests of the whole socialist camp. Therefore, regardless of the fact that USA planes were continuously violating our air space, we decided to weaken the anti-aircraft defense of Havana, but at the same time strengthen the defense of the missile locations. Our people proudly sensed their role as a defender of the socialist countries' interests. Anti-aircraft gunners and the soldiers protecting the missile locations were full of enthusiasm, and ready to defend these at the price of their own lives.

The tension of the situation was growing, and the psychological tension was growing also. The whole of Cuba was ready for defense...[Ellipsis in original.]

And suddenly—concessions...[Ellipsis in original.]

Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union produced a sense of oppressiveness. Psychologically our people were not prepared for that. A feeling of deep disappointment, bitterness and pain has appeared, as if we were deprived of not only the missiles, but of the very symbol of solidarity. Reports of missile launchers being dismantled and returned to the USSR at first seemed to our people to be an insolent lie. You know, the Cuban people were not aware of the agreement, were not aware that the missiles still belonged to the Soviet side. The Cuban people did not conceive of the juridical status of these weapons. They had become accustomed to the fact that the Soviet Union gave us weapons and that they became our property.

And suddenly came the report of the American [news] agency UPI that "the Soviet premier has given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantle missile launchers and return them to the USSR." Our people could not believe that report. It caused deep confusion. People didn't understand the way that the issue was structured—the possibility of removing missile armaments from Cuba if the USA liquidated its bases in Turkey.

I was saying, Fidel Castro continued, that in the post-revolutionary years we have carried out much ideological work to prepare people for understanding socialist ideas, marxist ideas. These ideas today are deeply rooted. Our people admire the policies of the Soviet government, learn from the Soviet people to whom they are deeply thankful for invaluable help and support. But at that difficult moment our people felt as if they had lost their way. Reports on 28 October that N.S. Khrushchev had given orders to dismantle missile launchers, that such instructions had been given to Soviet officers and there was not a word in the message about the consent of the Cuban government, that report shocked people.

Cubans were consumed by a sense of disappointment, confusion and bitterness. In walking along the street, driving to armed units, I observed that people did not understand that decision.

Why was that decision made unilaterally, why are the missiles being taken away from us? And will all the weapons be taken back? — these were the questions disturbing all the people.

In some 48 hours that feeling of bitterness and pain spread among all the people. Events were rapidly following one another. The offer to withdraw weapons from Cuba under the condition of liquidating bases in Turkey was advanced on 27 October. On 28 October there came the order to dismantle the missiles and the consent to an inspection.

We were very worried by the fact that the moral spirit of our people had declined sharply. That affected their fighting spirit too. At the same time the insolent flights of American planes into Cuban airspace became more frequent, and we were asked not to open fire on them. All of this generated a strong demoralizing influence. The feeling of disappointment, pain and bitterness that enveloped people could have been used by counter-revolutionaries to instigate anti-soviet elements. Enemies could have profitted because the legal rules about which we had been speaking with the people were being forgotten. The decision was made without consultation, without coordinating it with our government.

Nobody had the slightest wish to believe it, everyone thought it was a lie.

...

Since then our people began to address very sensitively the matter of sovereignty. Besides, after the current crisis the situation remained juridically constant, as the "status quo" did not change:

1. The blockade organized by the USA administration is still in place. The USA continues to violate the freedom of the sea.

2. The Americans seek to determine what weapons we can possess. Verification is being organized. The situation is developing in the same direction as it is or was in Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, Ceylon and Yemen.

3. The USA continues to violate Cuban airspace and we must bear it. And moreover, the consent for inspections has been given without asking us.

All of this seemed to our people to be a step backward, a retreat. It turns out that we must accept inspections, accept the right of the USA to determine what kinds of weapons we can use.

Our revolution rests firmly on the people. A drop in moral spirit can be dangerous for the cause of revolution.

The Soviet Union consolidated itself as a state a long time ago and it can carry out a flexible policy, it can afford maneuvering. The Soviet people readily understand their government, trust it wholeheartedly.

Cuba is a young developing country. Our people are very impulsive. The moral factor has a special significance in our country.

We were afraid that these decisions could provoke a breach in the people's unity, undermine the prestige of the revolution in the eyes of Latin American peoples, in the eyes of the whole world.

...

It was very difficult for us to explain the situation to the people. If the decisions had been taken in another way, it would have been easier. If a truce were suggested first and then the issues were coordinated, we would have been in a better position.

Comrade A.I. Mikoyan made an observation that the threat of aggression was so critical, that there was no time for consultations.

...

Then for half an hour A.I. Mikoyan discussed the issues about which Fidel Castro had talked, but these explanations were interrupted by an incoming report about the death of Mikoyan's wife. The transcript of this part of the conversation will be transmitted with the notes of the next conversation.

3.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, obtained and translated by NHK television, copy provided by Philip Brenner; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

* * * * *

Document II:
"It was necessary to use the art of diplomacy" — The Second Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, 4 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, [Cuban President] Oswaldo DORTICOS TORRADO, [Defense Minister] Raul CASTRO, Ernesto GUEVARA, Emilio ARAGONES and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

4 November 1962

A.I. MIKOYAN transmitted to the Cuban leaders cordial fraternal regards on behalf of the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev. He said that the Central Committee of the CPSU feels admiration and respect toward Cuban leaders, who from the very beginning of their struggle demonstrated courage and fearlessness, confidence in revolutionary victory in Cuba, readiness to devote all their forces to the struggle. We are proud of the victory achieved by the Cuban revolution against interventionists on Playa Giron [Giron Beach, Bay of Pigs]. Cuban revolutionaries demonstrated such a potent spirit of resistance that it inspires admiration and proves that the Cubans are always ready to fight until victory is achieved. Cuban leaders have shown great courage, intrepidity, and firmness in dangerous days. The CC CPSU admires the readiness of the Cuban people to stand up. We trust Cuban leaders as we do ourselves.

In the course of the Cuban events our party and government were acting having in mind to do whatever was necessary to make [the situation] better for Cuba. When Ambassador Alekseev informed [us] about the opinion of comrade Fidel Castro, that there are some differences between our parties, we were very pained. Immediately all the leadership held a meeting. For the question of Cuba worries us a lot. We felt it necessary to re-establish mutual trust because trust is the basis of everything, the basis of really fraternal relations. We understood that no correspondence can suffice to explain completely the misunderstanding of those days. Therefore the CC CPSU decided to send me to Cuba in order to explain to our friends the Soviet position and to inform them on other subjects that may be of interest to them. We know, - Mikoyan continued, - that if we explain everything frankly then you, our brothers, will understand us. Comrade Mikoyan made the observation that he, naturally, had no intention to put pressure [on Cuba], that his task was to explain our position. Being acquainted with the Cuban comrades, - A.I. Mikoyan said, - I'm confident that they will agree with it. It is certainly possible that even after our explanations there will remain some issues about which we shall still have different points of view. Our task is to preserve mutual trust which is needed for really friendly relations with Cuba, for the future of Cuba and the USSR and the whole world revolutionary movement.

Yesterday comrade Fidel Castro explained very frankly and in detail that the Cuban people had not understood everything regarding the most recent actions of the Soviet government. Comrade Fidel Castro also spoke on the issues which worry the Cuban leadership. He underlined the role of the psychological factor which has special significance in Cuba. Several particularities of the psychological mold of Cubans have formed as a result of the historical development of the country. And, as comrade Fidel Castro was saying, it is very important to take this into account.

In New York, said Mikoyan, I learned the substance of the speech by comrade Fidel Castro on 1 November. Certainly I could not perceive completely the speech insofar as the American press frequently distorts the substance of the statements made by Cuban leaders. But even on the basis of the American press interpretation I understood that it was a friendly speech pronounced by comrade Fidel Castro underlining the great significance of friendship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, mentioning the broad aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Revolutionary Cuba. He also said that there were some differences in views between us, but those differences had to be discussed on the level of parties and governments, not massive rallies. Those words of Fidel Castro, testifying sentiments of friendship and trust toward our country, were reaffirmed by the welcome reception on my arrival to Havana. The very tone of the conversation with comrade Fidel Castro was imbued with a sense of fellowship and trust.

I'm confident, continued Mikoyan, that the existing mutual trust between us will always be there notwithstanding some differences of opin-

ion. The American press spreads a lot of conjectures regarding the aim of my trip to Cuba. They are writing that I went to Havana allegedly in order to apply pressure on Cuban leaders, in order to "pacify" them, as [U.S. negotiator John] McCloy had stated to the American newspapers. About my conversation with McCloy I can tell you in detail afterward, but first of all I would like to answer the main questions.

As I have already stated before my departure from New York, the Soviet government was supporting the five points put forward by comrade Fidel Castro. The demand on liquidation of the US Guantanamo base is a just and correct demand. I had no plans to speak publicly in New York, but when I read in the American press the speculation about the objectives of my trip, I decided to voice that statement in order to make my position completely clear. Using radio, American propaganda is trying to embroil Cuba [in conflict] with the Soviet Union, is trying to sting Cubans to the quick. It's natural. Because the enemy can't behave differently. He always acts like this. But the enemy must be repulsed.

By decision of the CC CPSU, my task includes explaining our position to Cuban leaders within my abilities and capacities, so that no doubts are left. We also want to discuss new problems that arise in front of our two countries. It is not a part of my task at all to put pressure on Cuban leaders. That is an impudent conjecture of American propaganda. Our interests are united. We are marxist-leninists and we are trying to achieve common objectives. We discussed the current situation at the CC CPSU and came to a decision that there was no complete relaxation of tensions yet.

On the military side we can observe a considerable decrease in danger. I can add for myself that in essence currently the danger has abated. But the diplomatic tension still exists. Plans for military assault have been frustrated.

A victory was gained regarding prevention of a military assault. But still we are facing even larger tasks on the diplomatic field. We must achieve a victory over the diplomatic tension, too.

What does that victory mean? How do we understand it? I'll explain later.

I would like to do whatever is necessary to ensure that you understand us correctly. I'm not in a hurry and if you don't object, I'll stay in Cuba as long as necessary to explain all the aspects of our position. I think, first of all, we must consider those issues where some differences have appeared. I'll do my best to help you understand us. We must consider all these questions and decide what can be done jointly to ensure the success of the further development and future of the Cuban revolution.

At the moment of critical military danger we had no opportunity for mutual consultations, but now we have good possibilities for thorough consultations on diplomatic forms of struggle in order to determine how to act in common.

Comrades, I would like to begin by asking you to say, what steps of the Soviet government have caused misunderstanding and differences, in order to give you the necessary explanations. True, yesterday comrade Fidel Castro already narrated much about this. But I would like to ask both comrade Fidel Castro and all of you to raise all those questions that you are interested in.

F.CASTRO. My colleagues are aware of the substance of our conversation yesterday, but in order to summarize the questions which are important for us let me repeat them briefly. As comrade Mikoyan has already said, recent events have considerably influenced the moral spirit of our people. They were regarded as a retreat at the very moment when every nerve of our country had been strained. Our people is brought up in the spirit of trust in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, many people do not understand the linkage between the Cuban events and the issue of the liquidation of American bases in Turkey. The unexpected withdrawal of Soviet missiles without consultations with the Cuban government has produced a negative impression upon our people. The Soviet Union gave its consent for inspections also without sending a notification to the Cuban leadership. It is necessary to take into account the special delicacy of our people which has been created as a result of several historic developments. The "Platt amendment," imposed by the Americans upon Cuba, played a particular role in this regard. Using the Platt amendment the United States of America prohibited the Cuban government from deciding by itself questions of foreign policy. The decisions were made by the Americans behind the back of the Cuban people. During the current crisis there was also an impression that important issues, concerning all of us, were discussed and resolved in the absence of Cuban representatives, without consultations with the Cuban government. The USA imperialists undertook a series of aggressive measures against the Republic of Cuba. They set up a naval blockade of our country, they try to determine what kind of armament we can have and use. Systematically they violate Cuban air space and elevate these violations of the sovereignty of the Cuban Republic into a prerogative of the USA administration.

There is the question of inspections. True, inspections are a sore subject for us. We cannot take that step. If we agree to an inspection, then it is as if we permit the United States of America to determine what we can or cannot do in foreign policy. That hurts our sovereignty.

In conclusion I said that we are a young country, where a revolution has recently triumphed, so we can't carry out such a flexible policy as does the Soviet Union because they are a consolidated state and on that ground they have possibilities for maneuvering, for flexibility in foreign policy. The Soviet people easily understands similar decisions of its government.

The mentioned facts represent a danger for the revolutionary process, for the Cuban revolution itself.

Here is the summary of the questions elucidated by me in the conversation yesterday with comrade Mikoyan. We didn't touch on the issue of the assessment of the international situation. I made the observation that at the most critical moment it had appeared that we had no understanding of preceding steps. For example, the objective of placing strategic armaments in Cuba was not clear enough for us. We could not understand where is the exit from that complicated situation. By no means were we thinking that the result could be a withdrawal of strategic armaments from Cuban territory.

Yesterday comrade Mikoyan partly explained some issues but the conversation was interrupted by the tragic news of the spouse of A.I. Mikoyan.

A.I. MIKOYAN asks: Perhaps the Cuban comrades want some other questions to be answered?

DORTICOS makes the observation that in the summary offered by Fidel Castro there have been generalized all the questions that have caused differences, but he asks [Mikoyan] to explain, why N.S. Khrushchev has accepted Kennedy's offer to make a statement of nonaggression against Cuba under the condition of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba, though the Cuban government had not yet given its view in this regard.

A.I. MIKOYAN asks if there are more questions.

C.R. RODRIGUEZ says that his question is related to that formulated by Dorticos. It is not clear what does the Soviet Union regard as a victory, whether its substance consists in the military success or the diplomatic one. We were considering that for the time being it is impossible to speak about victory insofar as the guarantees on the part of the USA are ephemeral.

A.I. MIKOYAN says that he will give the most detailed answer to all the questions raised by comrade Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders in order to make the Cuban comrades understand us completely. Therefore I will have to speak for a long time. Later, when you bring forward your opinions and perhaps ask some other questions, I would like to say some more words. If my arguments seem to you not convincing, please notify me, I will think over what to do in order to make you understand me, I will try to put forward new arguments.

The main issue, the issue of prime impor-

tance, is why have we decided to withdraw the strategic missiles from the Cuban territory. Apparently you agree that this is the main question. If there is no understanding over this issue, it is difficult to comprehend other questions.

Being in Moscow I did not realize that this question would be asked. Previously it had not arisen.

The fate of the Cuban revolution has always been important for us, especially beginning from the moment when Fidel Castro declared the objective of constructing socialism in Cuba. Socialist revolution in Latin America should develop and strengthen. When we received the news that had defeated the counter-revolutionary landing on Playa Giron it naturally made us happy, but to some extent it worried us, too. Certainly, it was foolish on the part of the Americans to organize such an invasion. But that fact indicated that they would try again to organize an aggression against Cuba, that they would not tolerate the further development and strengthening of socialist Cuba. It is difficult for them to reconcile with the existence of Cuba which is constructing socialism in the immediate proximity of their borders.

This event worries us, as we were realizing that the Americans would not give up their attempts to suffocate the Cuban revolution. And indeed, the American imperialists began elaborating two parallel plans. The first one consisted of an attempt at the economic suffocation of the Republic of Cuba in order to provoke discontent inside the country, to provoke famine and to achieve the collapse of the new regime due to pressure from within, without military intervention. The second plan foresaw preparation of an intervention with the participation of Latinamerican mercenaries and with the support of the United States of America. This plan envisaged invasion as the means to deal the final blow and to kill the revolutionary regime, if the economic hardships weaken it from inside. After the defeat on Playa Giron the American imperialists proceeded to the execution of those plans.

The victory of the revolution in Cuba is a great success of marxist-leninist theory, and a defeat of the Cuban revolution would mean a two or three times larger defeat of the whole socialist camp. Such a defeat would throw back the revolutionary movement in many countries. Such a defeat would bear witness to the supremacy of imperialist forces in the entire world. That would be an incredible blow which would change the correlation of forces between the two systems, would hamper the development of the international revolutionary movement. We were and are considering to be our duty, a duty of communists, to do everything necessary to defend the Cuban revolution, to frustrate the imperialist plans.

Some time ago our comrades informed us that the economic situation in the country [Cuba] had worsened. This deterioration was caused by pressure on the part of the Americans and large expenses for defensive needs. We were afraid that the worsening of the situation could be the result of the implementation of the [American] plan for the economic suffocation of Cuba. The CC CPSU discussed the situation in Cuba and decided, without your request—you are very modest and try not to disturb us by requests—to undertake some measures in order to strengthen our help to Cuba. If before you were receiving part of the weapons on credit and only a portion of armaments free of charge, now we decided to supply you gratis with weapons and partly with military uniforms—100 thousand sets in two years—and equipment. We saw that the Cuban trade representatives, who were participating in the negotiations, were feeling themselves somewhat uneasy. They were short of more than 100 million dollars to somehow balance the budget. Therefore we accepted all their proposals in order to frustrate the plan of Kennedy designed for [causing] an internal explosion in Cuba.

The same thing can be said regarding food and manufactured goods. In order to alleviate the economic situation in Cuba we sent there articles and food worth 198 million rubles. Speaking very frankly, we have been giving to you everything without counting.

According to my point of view, we have entered a new stage of relations which nowadays has a different character. Indeed, during the first stage there was some semblance of mutually beneficial trade. Currently those supplies are part of clearly fraternal aid.

I recall, that after his trip to trip to Bulgaria [14-20 May 1962—ed.], that, N.S. Khrushchev told us that while staying in that country he was thinking all the time of Cuba, he was worried that the Americans would organize an intervention in Cuba with the aid of reactionary governments of Latin America or would carry out a direct aggression. They do not want to permit the strengthening of Cuba, and the defeat of Cuba, N.S. Khrushchev said to us, would deliver a very powerful blow upon the whole world revolutionary movement. We must frustrate the plans of the American imperialists.

It was at that time when there appeared a plan that carried great risk. This plan placed huge responsibility on the Soviet government insofar as it contained within it the risk of a war which the imperialists could unleash against the Soviet Union. But we decided that it was necessary to save Cuba. At one time N.S. Khrushchev related that plan to us and asked us to think it through very seriously in order to make a decision in three days. We had to think over both the consequences of its implementation, what to do during different stages of its execution, and how to achieve Cuba's salvation without unleashing a nuclear war. It was decided to entrust our military with elaborating their considerations and to discuss it with the Cuban leadership.

The main condition for the success of this plan was to carry it out secretly. In this case the Americans would find themselves in a very difficult position. Our military people said that four months were necessary to implement that plan. We foresaw that the delivery of armaments and Soviet troops to Cuban territory would take a half of the preparatory period. Measures were also thought out in order to prevent the unleashing of global nuclear war. We decided to work through the UN, to mobilize international public opinion, to do everything in order to avoid a world collision. We understood that the Americans could use a blockade. It appeared to be the most dangerous thing if the USA imperialists blockaded the supplies of fuel to Cuba. They could abstain from limiting food deliveries to Cuba, while demagogically declaring that they do not want to doom the Cuban people to famine, and at the same time prevent supplies of weapons and fuel to Cuba. And Cuba, who doesn't have her own energy resources, can't survive without fuel. Our communications with Cuba are very stretched. We are separated by enormous distances. Therefore transportation to Cuba is very difficult. We can't use our Air Force or Navy forces in case of a blockade of Cuba. Therefore we had to use such means as political maneuvering, diplomacy, we had to utilize the UN. For example, we could not blockade American bases in Turkey in response because we have no other exit to the Mediterranean. We could not undertake such steps neither in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We do not have enough possibilities for counter-blockade. Counter-measures could be undertaken in Berlin.

Our plans did not include creation of our base here, on the American continent. In general, the policy of constructing bases on foreign territories is not a correct one. Such a policy was carried out in the time of Stalin. There was our base in Germany which was created on the ground of our right as conqueror. Currently our troops in Germany are quartered there according to the Warsaw Pact. Under treaty there was our naval base in Finland. We also had a base in Port Arthur in order to defend our eastern borders from Japan. All these bases were liquidated. Right now we don't have any bases on foreign territories. Nevertheless there are our troops in Poland in order to ensure communications with our forces in Germany, and Soviet troops are quartered in Hungary in order to protect us from the side of Austria. We do not need bases in Cuba for the destruction of the United States of America. We have long-range missiles which can be used directly from our territory. We do not have plans to conquer the territory of the USA. The working class of that country is stupefied by capitalist propaganda. Besides, such a plan would contradict our theory. We can use the long-range missiles only to deliver a retaliatory blow, with-

out landing troops on USA territory.

The objective of bringing Soviet troops and strategic weapons to Cuba consisted only in strengthening your defense potential. It was a deterrence plan, a plan designed to stop the imperialist play with fire regarding Cuba. If the strategic armaments were deployed under conditions of secrecy and if the Americans were not aware of their presence in Cuba, then it would have been a powerful means of deterrence. We proceeded from that assumption. Our military specialists informed us that strategic missiles can be reliably camouflaged in the palm forests of Cuba.

We were following very intently the transportation of troops and strategic weapons to Cuba. Those sea shipments were successful in July and August. And only in September the Americans learned about the transport of those forces and means. The USA intelligence worked badly. We were surprised that Kennedy in his speeches was speaking only about Soviet military specialists, but not Soviet troops. At the very beginning he really was thinking so. Then we understood that he was not saying everything he knew, and that he was holding back in order not to complicate the [Congressional—ed.] election campaign for himself. We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time. If, comrades, the question of Berlin is of interest to you, I can give you the necessary information.

Kennedy addressed N.S. Khrushchev through confidential channels and made a request not to aggravate the situation until the end of the elections to Congress [on 6 November 1962—ed.], and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. We responded that we could wait until the end of the elections [campaign], but immediately after them we should proceed to the Berlin issue. When the Americans learned about the transport of strategic weapons to Cuba they themselves began crying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talking about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously believed that at that given moment the essence of their policy was located in Cuba.

By mid-September the Americans apparently received data regarding the transport to Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. I have already spoken about this fact with comrade Fidel Castro. The American intelligence was not the first in obtaining that information, it was West German intelligence who gave that information to the Americans. The American administration sent planes to the air space of Cuba for aerial photography and the ascertainment of the deployment areas of the strategic missiles. N.S. Khrushchev gave the order to place the missiles into vertical position only at night, but to maintain them in a lying-down position in the daytime. Nevertheless, the Americans managed to take a photo of the missiles in the firing position. Kennedy didn't want to speak about Soviet missiles in Cuba until the end of the Congressional elections. He did not want to strain relations. But two Republican senators [a clear reference to Sens. Kenneth Keating of New York and Everett Dirksen of Illinois—ed.] learned about the fact of the strategic missiles placed in Cuba and therefore Kennedy hastened to take the initiative into his hands, or else he would be hardpressed. We had no information on how he intended to act.

The United States of America organized maneuvers in the area of Vieques Island [in the Caribbean], naming them "Ortsac," i.e., Castro, if you read it backwards. But those maneuvers could appear to be not an exercise, but a sea cover for a strong blow against Cuba. At that moment, when Kennedy made a statement and announced [on October 22—ed.] the decision of declaring a blockade against Cuba, we didn't know if the Americans were really carrying out maneuvers or were preparing for a direct attack upon Cuba.

On 28 October in the morning [presumably this refers to Moscow time, which would mean the evening of 27 October in Washington—ed.] we received reliable reports of preparations for an attack against Cuba. Indeed we were aware of the fact that the Americans had interrupted their maneuvers because of a hurricane. The maneuvers did not resume when the hurricane went away but the American combatant ships remained in the same area in direct proximity to Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev rebuked Kennedy for declaring a blockade around Cuba. We strongly opposed the American attempts to assume the right to determine what weapons Cuba can use and what armaments it may not possess. And then the Americans decided to carry out a direct aggression. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishing to free themselves from the threat of a blow from the strategic missiles, they decided to liquidate the launchers in Cuba with the help of conventional warhead missiles and immediately after that land troops on Cuban territory in order to liquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible.

It would have been impossible for us in these circumstances not to repulse the aggression of the USA. This assault would mean an assault upon you and us, as far as in Cuba there were situated Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably, nuclear war would be unleashed as a result of such a collision. Certainly we would destroy America, our country would be strongly damaged too, but we have a larger territory. Cuba would have been destroyed first. Imperialists would do their best to liquidate Cuba.

The objective of all the measures undertaken by the Soviet Union was the defense of Cuba. It was necessary to determine our line of conduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a serious blow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly at the moment when we were pondering the question of what to do in the created situation we received the communication from comrade Castro, it was on Sunday, that an aggression against Cuba would be unleashed in the next 24 hours. From other sources we were in possession of information that the USA aggression would begin in 10-12 hours. Despite the fact that these were separate sources, the information corresponded. Until the moment of the start of the USA aggression against Cuba remained 10-12 hours. It was necessary to use the art of diplomacy. Had we not been successful in this regard there would have been unleashed a war. We had to use diplomatic means.

Kennedy was making statements that he had nothing against the stationing in Cuba of Soviet weapons, even troops, but that placing strategic weapons in Cuba was evidence of preparations for an assault against the USA. Therefore the USA would defend itself. Considering that the missiles had been discovered and were no longer a means of deterrence we decided that for the sake of saving Cuba it was necessary to give an order to dismantle and return the strategic missiles to the Soviet Union and to inform Kennedy of this. You agreed with the withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba while leaving there all the other kinds of armaments. We managed to preserve all the forces and means which are necessary for the defense of the Cuban revolution even without strategic missiles which had been a means of deterrence, but they were discovered and therefore lost their significance. We have enough powerful missiles that can be used from our territory. Since Kennedy agreed with the retaining of Soviet troops in Cuba, the Cubans kept powerful armaments and anti-aircraft missiles, so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made a concession.

The statement of Kennedy about non-aggression against Cuba on the part of the USA and latinamerican countries also represents a concession. If we take into account these reciprocal concessions and all other factors, we will see that a big victory has been gained. Never before have the Americans made such a statement. That is why we decided that the main objective—salvation of Cuba—had been achieved. There would not be an assault against Cuba. There would not be a war. We are gaining more favorable positions.

Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft of our decision to Cuba in order to have consultations with you, to receive your consent and only then announce it. It would have been done in this way if there were normal conditions. In his letter Fidel Castro informed us that an inevitable aggression was expected in 24 hours. By the moment when we received it and were discussing the situation, only 10-12 hours were left before aggression. If we had tried to send you our draft we would have had to encode the document, transmit it by radio, decipher it, translate it into Spanish.

All of this could take more than 10 hours and such a consultation would not have made sense by that time. It would be too late. It could happen in such a way, that the answer would be received, but Cuba itself would have ceased to exist, a war would have been unleashed. It was a critical moment. We thought our Cuban friends would understand us. Moreover we knew from the cable from Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was aware of the direct threat of assault. At that moment the main objective consisted of preventing an attack. We thought, the Cuban comrades would understand us. Therefore, we made the decision to act immediately, but without paying due attention to the psychological factor, about which comrade Fidel Castro spoke here.

Regarding the possibility of a truce at that moment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, the Americans would not take such a step in those conditions. There are a lot of revanchists in the Pentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent element with respect to them. The Americans would have burst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it was a decision that created some difficulties for you, the Cuban people.

Let us compare the situation at the present time and the situation before the crisis. Before the crisis the Americans were preparing an intervention against Cuba. Now they have committed themselves not to attack Cuba. It is a great success. Certainly, the events also had negative consequences, especially as American propaganda was trying suit their own ends by using some facts and distorting them. But that is inevitable. These are the costs of events that have crucial importance. Our task is to eliminate the negative consequences of the recent events.

Comrade Dorticos is correct when he asks why did we give our consent to Kennedy's message on non-aggression against Cuba without the concordance of the Cuban government. But it was exactly our consent (and nothing else) that ensured some truce for a certain time.

One cannot perceive nihilistically all agreements and commitments, although sometimes these agreements and commitments are important only during a certain time, until conditions change. So they keep their importance until the situation changes.

We were asked about our demand on the liquidation of American bases in Turkey.

Speaking frankly, we were not thinking about bases in Turkey at all. But during discussion of the dangerous situation we received information from the United States of America, including an article by [columnist Walter] Lippmann [in the *Washington Post* on October 25], where it was said that the Russians could raise the question of liquidating the USA bases in Turkey. They were speaking about the possibility of such a demand inside American circles. This question was discussed in the USA. Turkish bases do not have great importance for us. They will be eliminated in case of war. True, they have certain political significance but we don't pay them special importance, though we will seek their liquidation.

From your statements I see now that the Cubans were regarding this demand as if it was some sort of exchange. There are USA bases not only in Turkey, but also in England and other European countries. But nowadays these bases do not have decisive importance insofar as the long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe, can quickly destroy them.

F. CASTRO. There is a question, on which we are insufficiently informed.

On 26 October the Soviet government sent Kennedy a letter without a word about Turkey. On 27 October we learned about Turkey from the broadcasts of Soviet radio. The American media expressed some surprise because this problem had not been raised in the message of the 26th. What is it, a false communication or were there two letters of 26 and 27 October? We have received one letter that coincided with the document transmitted by Moscow radio.

A.I. MIKOYAN. There were two letters. The letter of the 26th was not published. The letter of 27 October was published. But the content of the letter of 27 October covers the questions raised in the letter of the 26th. The question of Turkey was not raised at the beginning. Later this issue was included. You have all the correspondence on this issue. If there is such a necessity, we can check it.

F. CASTRO. Here is the letter of 26 October, whose text, as it seemed to me, is identical to the other letter at my disposal, which was received from the transmission of radio Moscow and TASS. It seemed to me that one letter has not been published.

A.I. MIKOYAN. If you want, we can check.

F. CASTRO. For all that, when did Kennedy accept the proposal of N.S. Khrushchev and promise guarantees not to attack Cuba? Wasn't it in response to the letter of 26 October? What did he say then?

C.R. RODRIGUEZ. There were secret letters.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Comrades, all the documents have been given to you.

F. CASTRO. On 27 October Kennedy gave guarantees not to attack Cuba, if the Soviet government removed its offensive weapons. The impression is growing that it was in response to [Khrushchev's] letter of 26 October. That is an important question. It was decided urgently, without consultations. Apparently, before my letter to Khrushchev, N.S. Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy and simultaneously with my letter an answer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived. After all, why is Kennedy already speaking about the Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in his response of 27 October to Khrushchev's message of 26 October, if it was not directly said in the confidential message from Khrushchev of 26 October? Negotiations began at night, after the message from Kennedy. Consequently, it was not possible to consider inevitable an attack against us. When I was writing to N.S. Khrushchev I didn't know that Khrushchev was writing to Kennedy and Kennedy—to Khrushchev. It seems to me that on 27 October, at that time, there was no unavoidable threat of attack. The principle of agreement had already been found. It seems to me that there was available time for consultations.

A.I. MIKOYAN. In his answer of 27 October Kennedy was formally responding as if only to the confidential message of the 26th, but practically he was answering both this one and chiefly the message from Khrushchev of the 27th, openly transmitted by radio, though there was no direct reference in Kennedy's message. All the messages between Khrushchev and Kennedy and everything received from him confidentially were given to comrade Fidel. I'm a participant of all the meetings, I'm aware of everything, but if you want me to do it, I'll check all the documents that I have with me and tomorrow I'll complement my information.

F. CASTRO. I agree with comrade Mikoyan's suggestion.

A.I. MIKOYAN. So, let's pass to the next question.

To many Cubans it seems that instead of our demand for the liquidation of American bases in Turkey it would be better to put the question of the liquidation of the base in Guantanamo. Such a demand seems tempting from the Cuban political and practical points of view. But from the point of view of military and practical interests of Cuba we could not put the question in this way. If the question were raised about withdrawal from Cuba of all kinds of armaments, then the [Guantanamo] question would be raised. There are no nuclear weapons at Guantanamo. But we did not have intentions of taking away all the armaments from Cuba. The Guantanamo base does not have a huge real significance insofar as the Americans can transfer their forces to Cuba without difficulties due to the geographical situation of the USA and Cuba. Indeed, it was not possible to lose all our armaments in Cuba. If we were to raise the question of Guantanamo base liquidation in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuban territory in general, that would undermine Cuba's defense capability. We

can't do that. You know that in the message from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy there was said that "we want to create confidence among Cubans, confirming that we are with them and we do not relieve responsibility for rendering help to the Cuban people."

F. CASTRO. But we are speaking only about strategic missiles. Such an act would have political rather than military significance. We were looking for an exit from that situation. It seems to us that it was possible to create a more difficult atmosphere for the Americans by raising such a question as the liquidation of the Guantanamo base.

A.I. MIKOYAN. If the Americans had accepted such an offer, and they could do so, we would have had to leave Cuba. We could not afford it.

Now I'll pass to the issue of inspections. If we had made a statement declining inspections, the Americans would have taken it for our desire to swindle them and their intervention would have become a reality. We declared that we agree to inspections. What we are speaking about is not a broad inspection, but a verification of the sites, known to the Americans due to aerial photography and which have been locations of the strategic missile launchers. The objective would have been to verify if the missiles had really been dismantled and their embarkation really accomplished; verification of the areas where the missiles had been assembled could be carried out in one day and verification of loading—in several days. It was not a question of any permanent or general inspection. It was said that representatives of neutral countries would carry out a verification only once. We were not deciding this question instead of you. Cuban issues are solved by the Cuban leadership only. But, being owners of that kind of weapon, we stated our consent for verification of dismantling and loading. We believed that after coordinating with you, you would accept this suggestion. But we could not decide it instead of you.

We were assuming that it was possible to give consent to verification by representatives of neutral countries of the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles — doing all of this without hurting Cuba's sovereignty. Certainly, no state would bear violation of its sovereignty. But in particular cases sovereign governments also permit some limitation of their actions, owing to voluntary agreements. Now we are not speaking about those cases when foreign powers impose their will over other countries.

I can give examples how our state and other countries voluntarily limit their actions while preserving their sovereign rights. For example, sovereignty of a host-country does not apply to the territory of foreign embassies. In this case we see a limitation of actions without limitation of sovereignty.

Another example. An agreement to create an international verification commission was achieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discussion of the Indochina issue. The proposal was made by representatives of the Soviet Union, China, and other countries. The proposal was also supported by the leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was directly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minh and the king of Cambodia ask to preserve that international verification commission. In this case there is no question of limiting the sovereign rights neither of Vietnam nor Cambodia.

Further. Between India and Pakistan in the area of Kashmir is working an international verification commission without infringing on their sovereign rights.

Several years ago we proposed [in May 1955—ed.] to the Americans and English to create jointly international verification posts on railway junctions, in large ports, and along highways. In due time [in the 1957 Rapacki Plan—ed.] we also suggested to organize international verification in the zone covering 800 kilometers on both sides along the demarcation line in Germany. In the event of the acceptance of this suggestion, a part of our territory, Poland, and Hungary would have been controlled. And such an act, under the condition of voluntary acceptance of the commitments, would not have undermined the sovereign rights of the states.

A similar example is the creation of an international commission in Laos in order to verify compliance of the 1962 agreement, in particular, to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and a ban on the introduction of weapons. [Laotian Prince] Souvanna Phouma did not object to such a verification. Communists of Laos and Vietnam allowed international control, communists of India didn't object to international verification. Poland agreed to verify the withdrawal of American troops and the troops of Ho Chi Minh. And it was done with the consent of comrade Ho Chi Minh and the Laotian communists.

I'm giving you all these examples because when we, on the basis of the above mentioned experience, were thinking about you, we didn't pay due attention to that psychological factor, about which we learned here from comrade Fidel Castro. In principle everything is correct, but not all that looks good in principle can be applied to a concrete situation.

Everything I'm talking about I'm saying not to gain a change of the international stand of Cuba, but in order to explain to you the motives which guided us. It is unthinkable that I might try to exercise any pressure.

During the conversation with McCloy in New York I touched on the question of verification of the dismantling of our missiles. McCloy said that insofar as Cuba was objecting to verification organized with the help of neutral countries, the USA did not insist on this form of control and it was necessary to seek other measures so that the Americans could be convinced that it had been done. He said that they were aware of dismantling work, but they were afraid that the missiles could be hidden in Cuban forests. They need to be sure that those weapons are removed from Cuban territory. I asked him about other forms of verification that he had in mind. McCloy answered that, in their opinion, an aerial inspection could be used for this aim, but that it was necessary for Cuba to agree to verification from airspace. I resolutely said in response that such a method is out of the question because it was damaging Cuban sovereign rights. I added that it wasn't worth going on with the discussion of that issue—we categorically rejected such a method and stressed our reluctance even to convey that proposal to the Cubans.

We knew that the American planes had been flying over the territory of Cuba and had carried out air photography. I told McCloy that on the basis of that aerial photography Americans could be convinced of the fact that work on the dismantling of the missiles had already begun. He answered me that air photography reflected the process of dismantling work, but that was not all, because in their view there were delays in dismantling. McCloy underlined that for Americans it was very important to be sure of the removal of the missiles from Cuban territory. Then they would not have doubts of missiles being hidden in the forests. He added that the information is needed to be convinced of the missiles' withdrawal. Meanwhile the Americans do not seek any secret information, they are worried by the question of whether the missiles have been withdrawn.

I could not, continued A.I. Mikoyan, go on discussing that issue with McCloy, but I was aware that military consultants, a general and a colonel, had been sent from the Soviet Union to [Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov. I hope, the issue will be further examined.

There is another method which I didn't mention to the Americans, but I can explain it to you. The process of dismantling and loading of the strategic weapons can be photographed and these documents can be used in order to achieve the declared objective.

How is the verification at sea carried out? It is done at a considerable distance from territorial waters. Observers examine vessels and give their consent for further travel.

On 1 November, during my conversation with McCloy, I said nothing to the Americans regarding the fact that we were looking for ways to keep our promise and give the Americans the opportunity to be certain that the dismantling and carrying away of the missiles had really been done. We are doing that in order not to contradict your statement objecting to control on Cuban territory. During the conversation McCloy told

me that the Cubans could try to prevent the withdrawal from Cuba of the strategic missiles. He added that the Cubans had 140 thousand soldiers and Soviet troops are only 10 thousand. Regarding the first remark I told him that it was nonsense, because Fidel Castro himself had announced that he was not objecting to the withdrawal of the Soviet strategic missiles. Certainly, I didn't dispute his data on the numbers of the troops.

By the way, he said that the U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuban territory [on 27 October —ed.] by Russian missiles, though anti-aircraft launchers, in his opinion, could be operated by the Cubans. I neither confirmed, nor disputed, this observation of McCloy.

F. CASTRO. These planes are flying at the altitude of 22 thousand meters and the limit of our artillery is lower. Therefore it's understandable that in this case the anti-aircraft missiles were used.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I didn't engage in further discussion with him of this issue.

We insist on immediate lifting of the quarantine. If you want us to finish the withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba as soon as possible, I said to McCloy, then give the vessels access to Cuba because there are not enough steamships in Cuba right now to withdraw the equipment and personnel. It could be done before the official agreement, in order to accelerate the evacuation. McCloy responded that he was ready to give orders in practice not to carry out examination of the vessels. The verification will be completely formal, as happened during the encounter of the tanker "Bucharest" with American ships. A question was asked by radio about the character of the cargo and the "Bucharest" without examination continued its journey to Cuba. Nobody stopped the ship, nobody came on its deck.

I objected to this kind of verification also. Then we passed to other issues. [U.S. delegate to the United Nations Adlai] Stevenson told me that the Americans had accepted [UN Secretary General] U Thant's proposal. I reproached them and made the observation that U Thant was suggesting not to withdraw weapons and to lift the blockade. We accepted U Thant's suggestion about verification on the part of the Red Cross.

In general it is necessary to note that the cargo transportation to Cuba represent an interest for you, not us. You are receiving the goods. We incur considerable losses. Steamships are obliged to wait at sea. We were forced to agree to the Red Cross verification in order to reduce our losses. Such a verification is better than the American one. This organization does not have any political or state character. Vessels that can be used for such verification, are not American but neutral and Soviet.

U Thant suggested two options for verification: in port and at sea. We didn't want to hurt your sentiments and therefore responded that we agree to verification at sea, but not in port. This issue, chiefly, has importance for you. But seeking to make your situation easier, we agreed to Red Cross verification at sea.

Having returned from Havana, U Thant told me in New York that you do not agree to verification in port although, in his opinion, it was more comfortable to do it in port. U Thant is ready to choose the corresponding staff. He has available two ships. On other details of this issue I lack information. Comrade Kuznetsov is in charge of them.

It's still necessary to dwell on the issue concerning U Thant's plan and verification.

During the crisis U Thant behaved himself decently, even well. It's hard to demand anything more from him. He treated both us and Cuba with sympathy, but his situation is not easy at all. We have received the "U Thant plan," of guarantees, that had been sent to everybody. This plan seemed interesting to us and useful for Cuba. What do we see positive in it?

If the UN observation posts are created in Cuba, the southern seacoast of the USA and in the Central American countries then attempts of preparation for aggression against Cuba would be quickly unmasked. In this way it will be possible to suppress rapidly any aggression attempts against Cuba. I'm assessing this issue from the point of view of international law. It's not excluded that a similar agreement can be violated, but it must not happen under normal conditions.

This issue is also interesting from another point of view. There is the Organization of American States (OAS). The Americans try to use the OAS as a cover in order not to allow a UN inspection. If the Americans had accepted UN inspection it would mean that Latin American issues are resolved at the UN bypassing the OAS. Briefly, we positively assess U Thant's plan. He said that Fidel Castro also had a positive attitude toward his plan, but I don't know if comrade Fidel Castro really has such an opinion.

U Thant told me that representatives of Latin-American countries, to whom he had spoken, took a favorable view of his plan. I asked what was the USA position and U Thant informed [me] that the Americans had called it an OAS issue without outlining their own attitude. But I managed to clear up this question during the conversation with McCloy. At first McCloy and Stevenson said that there was not a "U Thant plan." Then they admitted their knowledge of the plan, but declared that the USA opposes any verification procedures on their territory.

McCloy said they could pledge their word that all the camps for mercenary training in Central America had been liquidated or were in the process of liquidation. I asked McCloy if it had been done in all countries. McCloy answered that it was necessary to check it. I asked why the USA recruits Cuban counter-revolutionaries to their armed forces. He prevaricated for a long time trying to explain it by the necessity of teaching those people English. He was cunning and evasive. Then he declared that Cuba represents "a source of revolutionary infection." Stevenson said that the USA would like to find a possibility for settling the Cuban issue, but Cuba is afraid of the USA and the USA is afraid of Cuba. We didn't discuss this question any more. But there is an impression that a possibility exists to reach an agreement—in the form of a declaration or some other form—between Cuba and Central American countries pledging not to carry out subversive work and not to attack each other.

Comrade Fidel Castro was right saying that it was necessary to maneuver on the issues of international policy. It is easier for the Soviet Union than for Cuba to do so, especially when American propaganda complicates your possibilities for maneuvers. Firmness should be combined with flexibility while you carry out a policy. Nowadays it is a necessary thing for marxist-diplomats. It is wrong to say that we are more liberal than others. We are firm, but we display flexibility when it is necessary.

The revolution in Cuba has enormous importance not only for the Cuban people, but for the countries of Latin America and the whole world. The revolution in Cuba must develop and strengthen. Therefore it is necessary to use maneuvers, to display flexibility in order to ensure victory.

Really, a victory has been gained over Americans and here is why. If we have a look at the whole thing retrospectively, the question is being raised—if it has been a mistake to send strategic missiles to Cuba and to return them to the Soviet Union. The CC CPSU considers that there was no mistake. The strategic missiles have done their part. Cuba found itself at the center of international politics and now when their job is done, when they have been discovered, they can't serve any more as means of deterrence. They are withdrawn. But the Cuban people keep powerful arms in their hands. There is no other country in Latin America which is so strong militarily, which has such a high defense potential as Cuba. If there is no direct aggression on the part of the USA, no group of Latinamerican countries has the possibility to overpower Cuba.

Let us try to understand, of what does our victory consist. Let's compare situations in June and now, in November. The Americans have virtually forgotten the Monroe doctrine. Kennedy does not mention it any more and, you know, the Monroe doctrine has been the basis of American imperialism in Latin America. Previously Americans were declaring that they would not tolerate a Marxist regime on the American continent. Now they are committing themselves not to attack Cuba. They were saying that foreign powers

could not be present on the American continent in whatever form. They know about the Soviet military in Cuba, but do not speak of the Monroe doctrine.

Cuba found itself in the center of international political events. The United Nations Organization is engaged in the Cuban issue. U Thant practically backs Cuba and comes out against the USA policy. And you remember that previously it was not possible to obtain support for Cuba at the UN. World public opinion has been mobilized and even some nations who were previously against Cuba.

In the USA there are hysterics, but in their souls many people understand the fairness of the Cuban demands.

In the end, the prestige of the socialist camp has strengthened. It defended peace, though the USA was rapidly sliding down toward war.

People have united in order to resist American plans aimed at unleashing a war, and simultaneously the Soviet policy was carried out in the framework of settling the issues by peaceful means.

The immediate threat of military attack against Cuba is gone. I believe it is moved aside for several years.

It is necessary now to fix that success on the diplomatic field, so that Cuba—a beacon of Latin American revolution—could develop more rapidly in every respect and give a decisive example for mobilizing other peoples for struggle.

Our support becomes more and more active. We are helping you as our brothers. More possibilities have been created.

Americans are obliged to take Cuba into account, to solve issues, regarding Cuba, with our participation. We are not speaking about Russia [sic—ed.] as such, but as a country of socialism. Socialism, which you are also meritoriously representing, became a decisive factor of international policy. American propaganda is repeating over and over again about a diminishing of Cuba's prestige. Just to the contrary Cuba's prestige has been undoubtedly strengthened as a result of recent events.

In conclusion A.I. Mikoyan apologized to the Cuban comrades for having tired them out. Joking he adds that the only compensation is that he is worn out too. So there is complete equality.

He suggests to set the time of the next meeting.

F. CASTRO asked, if it was possible, to discuss Soviet policy regarding the Berlin issue.

A.I. MIKOYAN answered that he would do so, and also would discuss the exchange of letters between the CPSU and communist parties of India and China on the issue of conflict between India and China. He can explain our plans in the sphere of disarmament, on the ceasing of tests of hydrogen weapons, and answer all other questions including economic issues.

It was decided to have another meeting in the Presidential Palace at 14 hours [2 pm—ed.] on 5 November.

Ambassador Alekseev was also present on the Soviet side.

Recorded by V. Tikhmenev

[signature]

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, obtained and translated by NHK television, copy provided by Philip Brenner; translation by Aleksandr Zaemsky slightly revised.]

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Document III:
"I don't understand such a sharp reaction" —The Third Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, 5 November 1962 (afternoon)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, Oswaldo PORTICOS, Raul CASTRO, Ernesto GUEVARA and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ

5 November 1962

A conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and the same composition of the Cuban leadership, as on the previous occasion, took place on 5 November, at the Presidential palace. The conversation lasted 2 hours 30 minutes.

During the previous meeting F. Castro asked comrade Mikoyan a question which showed his doubts as if we had not given him all the messages from N.S. Khrushchev to president Kennedy. He asked how the statement of Kennedy of 27 October could be explained, insofar as there was already a reference to our consent to dismantle ground launchers for special equipment.

Comrade Mikoyan answered Castro that all confidential letters from N.S. Khrushchev had been given to the Cuban comrades and the open messages are known to them from the media. No other letters have been sent from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy, said Mikoyan.

In order to render the trend of developments more precisely, A.I. MIKOYAN suggested, to answer that question during consecutive conversation, that is on 5 November, after looking through the whole correspondence on this issue once more.

In the conversation [on 5 November], A.I. MIKOYAN said that the correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy had been looked through again, and the motives, which had prompted Kennedy to refer to our consent about the dismantling of the missiles, had been determined. You are aware of the content of all the messages from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy and I would like to say that Kennedy in his letter of 27 October, which attracted your attention, formally is answering the confidential message of N.S. Khrushchev of 26/X [26 October], but in essence he is simultaneously responding to Khrushchev's letter of 27/X [27 October], which had been published even before the aforementioned response from Kennedy and in which we had raised the question of dismantling the ground launchers in Cuba under the condition of liquidating the American base in Turkey. You have been given all the correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy except for one confidential message from Kennedy of 25 October, which is not connected to the issue of dismantling and only accuses us of denying the fact of the construction of ground launchers for special equipment in Cuba. We can read it out and then give you the translation. (The letter is read out.)

FIDEL CASTRO. Thank you. Now this issue is clear to me.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I'll continue. Having received that message we answered it on 26 October through confidential channels. In that letter there were no concrete proposals yet. We were speaking only about the necessity to eliminate the threat of an assault against Cuba. The letter included only the idea of seeking an agreement. We didn't receive an answer from Kennedy on the 26th. There was no answer on the morning of 27 October either. We came to the conclusion that the Americans were actively preparing for an attack, but were preferring not to disclose their plans before world public opinion. Therefore, in order to tie the Americans' hands, we decided to send Kennedy a new letter and publish it in the press. That was the letter of 27 October, known to you, where the demand for the liquidation of the American bases in Turkey was advanced. We published this letter very quickly, even before the American ambassador received its text. Our objective was to forestall the Americans and frustrate their plans. Only then we received a message from Kennedy. It was sent on the evening of 27 October. We received it on 28 October toward the morning (the time difference [between Washington and Moscow—ed.] must be taken into consideration). This letter by its form seemed to be an answer to the confidential message from N.S. Khrushchev of 26 October, but in effect it was the response to the letter of 27 October. On 28 October in the morning, having received the letter from comrade Fidel Castro, and having at our disposal other data about preparations for an attack literally in the nearest hours, N.S. Khrushchev made an open radio statement that the Soviet officers had received orders to dismantle and evacuate the strategic missiles. As you understand, there was no time for consultations with the Cuban government. By publishing

the messages we had the possibility to send them quickly to Cuba, but we could not wait for an answer because it would take a lot of time to encode, decipher, translate, and transmit them.

Acting in this way, we were proceeding from our conviction that the most important objective in that situation was to prevent an attack against Cuba. I would like to underline that our proposals to dismantle the strategic missiles and to liquidate the American bases in Turkey had been advanced before receiving the letter from comrade Fidel Castro of 27 October. The order for the dismantling of the strategic missiles and their evacuation was given after we had received the letter from Kennedy of 27 October and the letter from Fidel Castro. In our message of 28 October, as you have noted, the demand for the liquidation of bases in Turkey was no longer suggested. We did this because we were afraid that in spite of our proposal of 27 October the American imperialists could assault Cuba. We had nothing else to do but to work on the main task—to prevent an attack against Cuba, believing that our Cuban friends would understand the correctness of our actions, although the normal procedure of coordination had not been observed.

The question was that there were 24 hours left before an assault against Cuba. It must be taken into consideration that we had only a few [literally, "counted"—ed.] hours at our disposal and we could not act other than we did. And there are results: an attack against Cuba is prevented, the peace is preserved. However you are right that the procedure of consultations, which is possible under normal circumstances, was not followed.

F. CASTRO. I would like to respond to comrade Mikoyan.

We have listened with great attention to the information and explanations offered by comrade Mikoyan. Undoubtedly all those explanations are very valuable because they help us to understand better the course of events. We are thankful for the desire to explain everything to us, for the efforts undertaken in this regard. The arguments, that the strategic missiles after being discovered by the enemy practically lost whatever military significance or their significance becomes extremely small, also cause no doubts among us.

We are grateful for all these explanations and do understand, that the intentions of the Soviet government cannot be assessed only on the grounds of an analysis of the most recent developments, especially as the atmosphere is rapidly changing and new situations are created. The totality of adopted decisions, which became the basis for supplying strategic weapons and the signing of [the Soviet-Cuban—ed.] agreement, must be taken into consideration. It was supposed to publish that agreement after the installation of the strategic missiles and after the elections in the USA. These decisions are testimony to the firm resolution of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba. They help to understand correctly the policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I repeat, an analysis of the USSR position can be correct only with due regard for all the events and decisions both before and during the crisis.

We do not doubt that if all the works on the assembly of the strategic weapons had been completed in conditions of secrecy then we would have received a strong means of deterrence against American plans for attacking our country. In this way objectives would have been achieved which are pursued both by the Soviet government and the government of the Republic of Cuba. However, we consider that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba was significant for the interests of the whole socialist camp. Even if we consider it to be a military advantage, it was politically and psychologically important in the struggle for the deterrence of imperialism and the prevention of its aggressive plans. Thus, the installation of the strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not only in the interests of the defense of Cuba, but of the whole socialist camp. It was done with our complete consent.

We understood perfectly well the significance of this action and we considered it to be a correct step.

We also completely agree that war must be prevented. We do not object that the measures undertaken were in pursuit of two objectives, that is—to prevent an attack against Cuba and to avoid starting a world war. We completely agree with these aims pursued by the Soviet Union.

Misunderstanding arose in connection with the form of discussion of this issue. However, we understand that the circumstances were demanding urgent actions and the situation was abnormal. Assessing past events, we come to the conclusion that the discussion of these sharp questions could be carried out in another form. For example, the issue, which we have already discussed here, in regard to my letter in connection with the decision of the Soviet government and the publication of the Soviet government statement of 28 October. True, my letter bore no relation to issues mentioned in the messages of 26 and 27 October between the Soviet government and the USA Administration. Such a letter [from Castro to Khrushchev—ed.] pursued one objective—to inform the Soviet government about the inevitability of an assault against Cuba. There was not a word about any minor hesitation on our side. We clearly declared our resolve to fight. Besides, we didn't say that we were expecting an invasion. We wrote that it was possible, but not so likely. In our opinion, more probable was an air attack with the sole aim of destroying the strategic weapons in Cuba. The basis of the Soviet government decision of 28 October had already been reflected in the message to Kennedy of 26 October and clearly manifested itself in the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy of 27 October. In those two documents there is the real basis for the decision announced in the letter of 28 October. So, Kennedy's letter of 27 October meant acceptance of proposals by N.S. Khrushchev of 26 October consisting of his consent to evacuate from Cuba not only strategic armaments, but all the weapons if the USA stops threatening Cuba with an attack. Because the threat on the part of the USA had been the only reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When Kennedy accepted this proposal (we didn't know that he was accepting it), the conditions were created to develop the Soviet proposals and prepare a declaration regarding the agreement of the parties. The USA could have been told that the USSR was ready to dismantle the equipment but would like to discuss it with the Cuban government. In our opinion the issue should have been solved in this way instead of giving immediately an order to evacuate the strategic weapons. Such a procedure would have lessened international tension and secured the possibility to discuss the issue with the Americans in more favorable conditions. In this way it could have been possible not only to achieve a lessening of international tension and to discuss the issue in better conditions, but also to achieve the signing of a declaration.

It is only a simple analysis of previous events that does not have special importance right now.

Nowadays it is important for us to know what to do under the new conditions. In what way shall we seek to achieve our main goals and at the same time fight to prevent an aggression and preserve peace. Certainly, if in due course we manage to secure a lasting peace, then we'll have an opportunity to better assess the undertaken steps in light of new facts. Future results of our struggle will demonstrate the importance of today's events. Certainly, only a little bit in this struggle depends on us personally.

We are very grateful for all the explanations given to us by comrade Mikoyan, for all the efforts undertaken by him in order to make us understand the recent events. We take into consideration the special conditions under which it was necessary to act. We have no doubts regarding the friendly character of our relations, based on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet Union is unshakeable. We know that it respects our sovereignty and is ready to defend us from an aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore, the most important thing now is to determine our joint steps.

I would like to assure you, comrade Mikoyan, of our complete trust.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I'm deeply satisfied by the statement of comrade Fidel Castro. We have always been confident of our sincere friendship which nothing can disrupt. I'll transmit word by

word your statement to the CC CPSU and I'm sure that it will produce gladness on the part of the Central Committee.

I would like to make a small explanation, very briefly.

I agree completely with the assessment, made by comrade Fidel Castro of his own letter. He is interpreting it correctly. It's a legitimate question raised by him—could we have made another decision instead of [sending] instructions for dismantling the strategic weapons[?] But we had been informed that an attack against Cuba would begin within the next few hours. Perhaps it was really intended to deliver a blow first of all against the strategic missile sites, but it would be followed by a strike against Cuba. We had to act resolutely in order to frustrate the plan of attack on Cuba. We realize that by doing this we had to sacrifice the necessity of consultations with the Cuban government.

Regarding comrade Fidel Castro's opinion that in the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy of 26 October, there was a promise to withdraw from Cuba all the weapons and all military specialists. The Americans did not demand from us such a step. The issue was the offensive weapons. Perhaps comrade Fidel Castro made such a conclusion on the basis of the phrase where a withdrawal of technical specialists was mentioned. But this implied specialists who operate strategic missiles. The fact that it regarded only them is confirmed by all the letters, by the totality of their context. They were about offensive weapons only.

FIDEL CASTRO confirms, that his understanding was just the same.

A.I. MIKOYAN. It is no coincidence that in his answer to this letter Kennedy does not raise the question of removing from Cuba all the weapons. If such a proposal had been present in our letter, Kennedy would undoubtedly have taken advantage of it. Therefore the opinion, outlined by comrade Fidel Castro regarding this part, is incorrect. There is nothing of the kind in the letters of 27 and 28 October.

I would like to mention, that the Americans are trying to broaden the list of weapons for evacuation. Such attempts have already been made, but we will not allow them to do so. On our part, we gave our consent only to withdraw strategic weapons. When I was speaking to McCloy he told me with a smile that it would be good if we removed from Cuba the anti-aircraft missiles, too. But those are defensive weapons, not offensive.

Half an hour before my departure from New York, those pilferers (now we are speaking about Stevenson) sent a letter to comrade Kuznetsov, saying that they supposedly had forgotten to raise questions about some kinds of weapons. They were referring to the IL-28 bombers and "Komar" ["Mosquito"] patrol boats. Stevenson wrote that it would be necessary to discuss that issue. Immediately I told comrade Kuznetsov that this issue was not a subject for discussion. These bombers have low speed and low altitude limits. Nor can the "Komar" patrol boats operate at great distance. Therefore those weapons are clearly defensive.

In the first Kennedy message [possibly an allusion to Kennedy's October 22 speech, which included a reference to the bombers—ed.] the American administration spoke about the bombers, later this question fell away. Now they want to raise again this question. We have resolutely rejected such a discussion. Comrade Kuznetsov received corresponding instructions from Moscow. This is nothing more than attempts to complicate the whole matter in order to create once again a tense atmosphere and dangerous situation.

Let me specify the list sent by Stevenson. Here it is. There are mentioned: bombers, "Komar" patrol boats, "air-to-surface" bombs and missiles, "sea-to-surface" and "surface-to-surface" projectiles [cruise missiles—ed.]. The Americans are impertinently continuing their attempts to complicate the situation.

It is very important to have a document of agreement, which one can use at the UN. It can be carried through the UN with the help of U Thant. But for that it is necessary to have evidence proving the dismantling and evacuation of weapons. Then the situation would improve. The earlier it is done, the more advantageous it will be for us.

For the Americans it is better to postpone the solution of this question. In this case they have the possibility to continue the quarantine and other aggressive actions. We would rather help U Thant in order to give him a chance to report to the UN that the Soviet side has carried out the dismantling and evacuation of offensive weapons from Cuba. We should talk about it.

We have resolutely rejected the American demand for aerial inspection. Nevertheless, with the help of air photography the Americans collected data that the dismantling of the strategic weapons had concluded and published that information by themselves. U Thant could have informed the UN, but he needs evidence, proving the evacuation of the weapons. UN representatives must see how the evacuation is carried out and inform U Thant on the results of their observation mission. Then the situation will become significantly simpler. The issue will be sent to the Security Council where the decisions are taken not only by the USA representatives.

I'm not insisting that you answer this question right now. Maybe you can do it tomorrow. If it would be acceptable for you, why, for example, not give consent for U Thant's representatives to verify how the weapons' loading onto Soviet ships is carried out. You know that different international commissions or representatives of foreign powers often operate at sea ports and that fact does not limit the sovereignty of the host country in the slightest measure. Such a possibility would allow U Thant to consider accomplished the decision to withdraw the strategic missiles from Cuba. These observers would be given the opportunity to visit Soviet ships, anchored at the ports, to verify the fact of the armaments' removal. From my point of view that would not represent any infringement of national sovereignty.

Socialist countries, insofar as we are marxist-leninists, have to find a way of securing a unity of actions even in those cases when our opinions are somewhat different. Moreover, I believe, it would be taken into consideration that there are Soviet troops on Cuban territory. Therefore, our cooperation in the fight against imperialism must be especially effective. You may respond to this proposal [of mine] maybe not today, but tomorrow; in general, it seems to me that it is a minimum concession which would allow U Thant to present a report to the Security Council about the evacuation of the missiles. In the contrary case we will inevitably hear at the Security Council that the Cubans do not permit verification to be conducted, and that the Russians are only talking about control. But if the Security Council is given the opportunity to establish compliance of the promise of N.S. Khrushchev, then the quarantine may be lifted. The stage of diplomatic negotiations will begin. Roughly such an appeal was put forth by U Thant during his conversation with me. I ask you to discuss this proposal. I believe that the solution of this problem will help create definite conditions to settle the crisis situation which had developed in the Caribbean sea.

The Americans would like to delay the solution of this issue. Dragging it out gives them the opportunity to prolong the term of the quarantine. We told the Americans that we would be able to evacuate the weapons in 10 days. They are not in a hurry and say that it could take even a month. It is advantageous for the USA to preserve tension in this area. And we are standing for a lessening of tension, in order to solve this question at the Security Council. In our view, it's difficult for the Security Council to discuss this issue until the end of the USA elections. The elections will be held tomorrow and so it would be appropriate to think about its solution. It's very important to keep U Thant on our side. It seemed to me that he was very satisfied by his meeting with comrade Fidel Castro. But if we delay the solution, the Americans will seize the opportunity for their benefit.

C.R. RODRIGUEZ. So, if I understand you correctly, the question is about verification of loading at the Cuban ports as a minimum demand and the Americans would consider such a control a sufficient guarantee? Won't they later demand

an on-site verification, in the forests? I'm afraid if we go along such route we can even reach an inspection on site, where the strategic missiles previously have been located.

A.I. MIKOYAN. The imperialists are not the point. Such a verification is necessary for us. If the imperialists protest we can send them to hell. But it's necessary to take into consideration that the support of U Thant is very important for us, and the imperialists can say what they want. We'll send them to hell, the more so as they have already been convinced of the dismantling of the missiles with the help of air photography. If we manage to come to an agreement over verifications on ships, then the UN representatives will be able to control the process of loading also. We will not accept any more. Indeed, appetite comes with eating, but we will resolutely oppose such a rise of appetite, we'll do a step forward and that's enough for them. We rejected inspection, we didn't allow surface verification, we won't permit control over dismantling. But in order to strengthen our position at the UN, the representatives of this organization should be given the facts. Otherwise it will be difficult to restrain revanchists at the Security Council. But if the evacuation of weapons would be carried out and verified, then we'll obtain the lifting of the quarantine. I think, we should not put the sign of equality between the UN and the American imperialists. The matter is that the UN cannot exceed the limits settled by the two messages. If we manage to receive support from the UN, then the Americans would go to hell. We promised to allow verification of the evacuation. That verification can be organized by means of the UN. We didn't pledge anything else. But if we do not fulfill our promise, the situation may become considerably complicated. Perhaps you will discuss this issue without our presence and at the same time consider the possibilities of our further joint actions. If you find the opportunity we can meet today. However the meeting can be held tomorrow.

F. CASTRO. And what will the inspection look like?

A.I. MIKOYAN. Representatives of U Thant will arrive at the port of loading. Currently there are 4-5 ships assigned for that purpose. Then they'll climb on board. They will be shown the cargo and given corresponding information. In this way they will be convinced that we are fulfilling our promise and will go away. That is my understanding of this form of verification. If we come to an agreement regarding this proposal, I'll inform our representative to the UN and then we'll have the opportunity to settle the technique and procedure of this work.

I would be able to inform Moscow that we agreed to give both U Thant and the UN information necessary to declare the verification to be carried out.

F. CASTRO. Isn't it possible to do the same on open sea?

A.I. MIKOYAN. The form of loading verification is more suitable for U Thant. It is not hurting your sovereignty either, because the verification will be carried out not on your territory, but aboard our ship.

F. CASTRO. I understand very well the interest in keeping U Thant on our side. But such an inspection will undoubtedly have a painful effect on the moral condition of our people. The Americans are insisting that the agreement on verification has been achieved by the exchange of messages. And, indeed, in the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy of 28 October, it is said: "As I informed you in the letter of 27 October, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations representatives to verify the dismantling of these means."

Therefore it implies representatives of the Security Council for the mission of verification of dismantling on the site.

In the message of N.S. Khrushchev it is said, that consent would obviously be needed on the part of the governments of Cuba and Turkey in order to organize control of compliance of undertaken commitments. That means that N.S. Khrushchev in his letter of 28 October, is making reference to the message of the 27th. The necessity of obtaining consent on the part of Cuba is mentioned there, but that is not a responsibility of the Soviet Union, insofar as the USSR has already warned in the letter of 27 October, that the permission of the Cuban government is needed.

Comrade Mikoyan is saying that the imperialists could be sent to hell.

On 23 October I received a very clear letter where the precise position of the Soviet government is explained. Kennedy's statement is characterized therein as an unprecedented interference into internal affairs, as a violation of international law and as a provocative act. The Republic of Cuba, like all sovereign states, has the right to reject control and decide by itself what kinds of weapons it requires. No sovereign state must give an account of such actions. These concepts of the letter of 23 October are very precise and correctly reflected our position.

One more question. The formula that foresees UN observers in Cuba, in the USA, Guatemala and other countries seems to me a more reasonable verification. A unilateral inspection would affect monstrously the moral spirit of our people. We made big concessions. The American imperialists are carrying out aerial photography freely and we do not impede them due to the appeal of the Soviet government. It is necessary to look for some other formula. I would like to explain to comrade Mikoyan that what I'm saying reflects the decision of the whole Cuban people. We will not give our consent for inspection. We don't want to compromise Soviet troops and endanger peace in the whole world. If our position imperils peace in the whole world, then we would rather consider the Soviet side to be free of its commitments and we would defend ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity.

O. DORTICOS. The statement voiced by comrade Fidel Castro reflects our common resoluteness and we consider that this issue does not deserve further discussion.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I don't understand such a sharp reaction to my proposal. What we were speaking about was not an inspection of Cuban territory, but a verification procedure in the ports. Foreign representatives can be found in any port. It does not have anything to do with aerial or surface inspection. I'm saying that not to call into question your statement, but in order to explain.

Besides the issue we have just finished discussing, we were going—according to your proposal—to talk over a plan of joint actions. We can have such a discussion not now, but at a time convenient for you.

F. CASTRO. On the basis of yesterday's meeting we came to the conclusion that the Soviet government understood the reasons for our resoluteness not to allow a verification of Cuban territory. That resoluteness is a starting-point for us. We proceeding from the same point regarding joint actions as well. It's difficult to talk about them, if we have not come to an agreement on the previous issue.

That issue is the most important from Cuba now from a political point of view. The guarantees are very problematic. It is not peace that we are speaking about. But inspection is a component of their strategy in the struggle against the Cuban revolution. The American position is weaker. The journal "Time" wrote that the dismantling was proceeding rapidly. Verification in the ports and at sea is just the same. But verification in the ports is very insulting for us from the political point of view and we cannot fulfill this demand of the USA administration.

A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal was regarding not the Cuban territory, but only the Soviet ships, vessels are considered to be territory of that state, whom they belong to. Such a proposal I put forward on my personal behalf. Moscow did not entrust me to suggest it. Speaking frankly, I considered that insofar as such a verification did not regard Cuban territory, but Soviet ships, it could be accepted. I was saying that although we understand the Cuban position, the verification procedures were not dangerous. I don't under-

stand your reaction to my proposal.

Our Central Committee entrusted me to explain in detail the Soviet position on all the issues that are of interest to the Cuban comrades, entrusted me neither to impose our opinion, nor pressure you in order to obtain consent for inspection of the Cuban territory.

F. CASTRO. But verification would be carried out from the Cuban territory.

A.I. MIKOYAN. No, it could be carried out only aboard the ships. For that purpose Soviet and neutral country ships could be used. The UN representatives could live and sleep aboard those steamers.

F. CASTRO. Such a verification in the ports does not differ from control on ships on open sea.

A.I. MIKOYAN. There is no doubt that a verification can be carried out on open sea too, but does not bear relation to Cuba.

O. DORTICOS. It seems to me that now we should interrupt our work. We can agree upon further meetings through Ambassador Alekseev.

Ambassador Alekseev was also present on the Soviet side.

Recorded by V. Tikhmenev
[signature]

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, obtained and translated by NHK television, copy provided by Philip Brenner; translation (by Aleksandr Zaemsky) has been slightly revised.]

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Document IV:
"The USA wanted to destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union with Khrushchev's letter destroyed us legally"—
Mikoyan's Meeting with Cuban Leaders, 5 November 1962 (evening)

Copy

Top Secret

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

A.I. Mikoyan with Oswaldo Dorticos, Ernesto Guevara, and
Carlos Rafael Rodriquez

Evening 5 November 1962

After mutual greetings, Com. Dorticos said that Fidel Castro had not been able to come because he is feeling poorly.

A.I. MIKOYAN expressed his sympathy in regard to the fact that F. Castro is feeling under the weather.

O. DORTICOS. We have analyzed Comrade Mikoyan's latest proposals regarding verification of the loading of the strategic missiles on the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our opinion is thus: keeping in mind chiefly the maintenance of the high moral spirit of our people and, besides that, wishing not to allow the outbreak of legal arguments in relation to the issue of the extraterritoriality of the ships, we want to give a conclusive answer to Comrade Mikoyan. We believe that it is impossible to accept that proposal. We must refuse it, since in principle we do not allow inspections, not on Cuban territory, nor in our airspace, nor in our ports.

After we have finished our consideration of the issues which concern us, we could move to a consideration of our tasks in the near future. We would like for the new steps which stand before us to be agreed with the Soviet government. We believe that after the elections in the USA it will be possible to make a joint statement of the Soviet government and the government of Cuba or to make separate, but simultaneous statements.

The Cuban government unilaterally will declare that it opposes any surveillance of its territory, airspace and ports aimed at inspection of the dismantling and removal of "offensive" weapons. However, we are ready to consider U Thant's proposal about the possibility of inspection or verification on Cuban territory under the condition of a simultaneous inspection on the territory of the USA, Guatemala and in other countries of the Caribbean basin upon the coming into force of an agreement on the liquidation of the conflict in this region. Of course, we have no right to oppose inspection on the open seas. That is not in our competence. We would like Comrade Mikoyan to understand why we oppose inspections in Cuba. It is not just a matter of thoughts of legal procedure. The political side of the issue also has great significance. Such is our position.

The are other issues of concern to us, but we would not want to mix them up with the current question. Therefore we would be glad to hear Comrade Mikoyan's opinion.

A.I. MIKOYAN. The variant which includes inspection on ships which are being loaded—that is my initiative. I have already told you that I had no authority to put forth that proposal. We understand your position. It seems to me that we have made our position clear to you. We are informing the CC CPSU and the Soviet government about your position on this issue. As far as a declaration is concerned, then I don't see the point for either you or we to make a declaration on the first point, especially since that has already been loudly declared by the Cuban leadership. Second, the publication of separate declarations would reveal the disagreements between us on this question, and that would be disadvantageous for both sides.

When I spoke about the necessity of thinking through our joint positions, I did not have inspections in mind. We must think about the entire complex of measures, both in the sphere of diplomacy and in all other spheres, so as to satisfy our common interests. Whether it will be in the form of a protocol or a declaration is not so important. The main thing is not the form, not the points, rather it is the position from which we can speak to U Thant and the UN. It follows that we should come to an agreement on our position, so as to make possible unity of actions. Concerning disagreements on the control issue, I don't see the point of making a declaration on that issue and continuing its consideration after the speech of comrade Fidel Castro. However, I have already spoken about that. I think that we will not make a declaration on that topic and we will respect each other's position, maintaining our own opinions on this issue.

Concerning the proposals about inspections in the USA and other countries of the Caribbean Sea, this proposals accords with the plans of U Thant, we support it, and we can envisage it in the draft of the protocol which we will propose to the Americans. To this point it is mentioned there in a somewhat general form. I spoke about it with U Thant, since this question seemed interesting to us. Although the Americans may support such a proposal regarding to other countries, they will not allow observers at home. If you agree with this point in the draft of the protocol, then it could occupy a place in our joint proposals.

On the basis of a conversation with U Thant I came to the conclusion that a coordinated declaration will not satisfy the Americans and that they will call for declarations from each of the sides. However, form is not the main thing. It is necessary to coordinate our positions so that both our and your representatives in New York could act in a coordinated manner.

The draft of the document with which you are familiar is not limited to U Thant's plan, but it would still be possible to revise it. U Thant has said that it would be possible to make more concrete the part of the document in which the plan for the presence of the UN in the Caribbean Sea region is noted. U Thant, referring to such states like the USA, Cuba, and a range of other states of Central America, believes it would be possible to do this. This could be done in the text. This issue of coordinated observation by representatives of the UN on the territory of the USA, Cuba, and other countries of Central America could be reflected in the protocol. In this case we would be starting from a common position. However, thus far we do not know your attitude to the

given document.

Comrade Kuznetsov, who is located in New York, asked me to find out the opinion of the Cuban comrades. Not knowing your opinion, Comrade Kuznetsov has been deprived of opportunities to speak with U Thant and the Americans.

A.I. ALEKSEEV. This would give us the possibility to work out a common position in regard to other articles of the protocol as well.

O. DORTICOS. We reviewed the text of the protocol immediately after it was given to us, i.e., even before the conversation with Comrade Mikoyan. We have no fundamental objections. It seems to me that in the protocol there is one article about an inspection in Cuba. It would make sense to work out the issue of the conduct of a one-time observation both in Cuba and in the United States and in other countries of Central America. In view of the information which was given by Com. Mikoyan yesterday, we believe that we will not have any major objections to the document.

C.R. RODRIGUEZ. I have doubts whether the proposed formula regarding the fact that the USA is obliged to secure inspections in Central American countries is lawful.

E. GUEVARA. That formula really causes doubts.

A.I. MIKOYAN. It is still possible to do some serious editing work.

Despite the fact that the Americans may not accept the proposals contained in the document, it will be advantageous for us to have a common position and to link it with U Thant's plan. Even if the Americans will be against it. The inspection will not be unilateral, it will be multilateral, so it evidently doesn't bother you. Whether or not the document will be accepted, it can still have great significance.

The idea belongs to U Thant. It is possible to specify the list of countries which will be listed in this document. For example, Cuba, the USA, Guatemala and others. It seems to me that it makes sense to think over this issue. It would be an advantageous position. The Americans will be opponents of such a proposal, since they do not want to allow inspections on the territory of the USA. However, even our posing of this issue will have great political significance. It is difficult to say how this will end, but the struggle for acceptance of these proposals should bring us a victory.

In this way we see that the protocol does not prompt objections if does not speak about the necessity of striking articles about inspections of the dismantled weapons as applied to Cuba. There, where it speaks about multilateral inspection, it seems to me that it would be necessary to name the countries. And what is your opinion, Comrades?

O. DORTICOS. I agree. Consequently we should strike article 13.

[Ed. note: Article 13 of the draft protocol read: "The Government of the Republic of Cuba agrees to allow onto the territory of Cuba confidential agents of the U.N. Security Council from the ranks of representatives of neutral states in order so that they can attest to the fulfillment of obligations vis-a-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the weapons mentioned in article 9 of the present Protocol." Draft Soviet-American-Cuban protocol (unoffical translation), 31 October 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.]

C.R. RODRIGUEZ. And change article 10.

[Ed. note: Article 10 of the draft protocol read: "The Government of the USSR, taking into account the agreement of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, from its side agrees that confidential agents of the [UN] Security Council from the ranks of representatives of neutral states have attested to the fulfillment of obligations vis-a-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the weapons mentioned in Article 9 of the present Protocol." Draft Soviet-American-Cuban protocol (unofficial translation), 31 October 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.]

A.I. MIKOYAN. In the 10th article something is said about Cuba?

E. GUEVARA. Yes. I would like to add that it seems to me that it makes sense to take into account the points which we made about the form. The document signed by the representatives of three countries cannot determine the list of countries in which observers from the UN or the Security Council should be present.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Maybe in this article references should be limited to the USA and Cuba, and stipulate that other countries can be included upon the agreement of their governments. So, for instance, from the direction of Guatemala they constantly will be threatening aggression. It would be advisable to point out that fact. It would be possible to ask the Security Council to set the list of countries. It could do this in article 15, there where U Thant's plan is mentioned. We could leave the article without changes or note that the countries are to be determined by the Security Council. It seems to me that it is important to preserve the reference to U Thant's plan.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be possible to make many editorial changes here. So, for example, in the 3rd article it is said that "the Government of the USA will restrain those who intend to undertake aggression against Cuba both from the territory of the USA and from the territory of the neighboring states of Cuba." This type of formulation seems to give the USA the right to determine the actions of other states.

A.I. MIKOYAN What are you going to do about that? They are satellites. Maybe another editing will tie them even more. So far we have no other version, but it is possible to think about it. The 5th article contains clauses which have a similar nature. However, international law allows similar formulations.

[Ed. note: Article 5 of the draft protocol read: "The Government of the USA declares that the necessary measures will be taken to stop, both on the territory of the USA and on the territory of other countries of the Western hemisphere, any sort of underground activity against the Republic of Cuba, [including] shipments of weapons and explosive materials by air or sea, invasions by mercenaries, sending of spies and diversionists." Draft Soviet-American-Cuban protocol (unofficial translation), 31 October 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.]

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. That is so, if the governments of those countries will not object. However, Guatemala will oppose this proposal. The situation will change, and the USA will refuse its obligations.

A.I. MIKOYAN. In Kennedy's message pretty much the same thought is expressed, but the use of a phrase like "I am sure, that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will not undertake aggressive actions..." Approximately in such a form. Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez's observation is just. But it is necessary to think up something. The Americans may say that this is an issue for each of these countries. Let's take a look at the formulation in Kennedy's message.

ALEKSEEV. In this message it is said that "I am sure that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will be ready to proceed in a similar manner."

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be possible to propose approximately this formulation: "The Security Council will undertake measures so as not to allow aggression against Cuba from the countries of the Caribbean, and also the use of weapons and the territory of these countries for the preparation of such aggression." It also would make sense to note that the "USA will take upon itself the obligation that no preparations will be conducted on its territory or with the assistance of its weapons..." It would be possible to work out this variant.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. This variant really is interesting. It is important to note that the USA

acts not only from its own territory. This is a very important point for Cuba.

DORTICOS. It is necessary to work on the editing of this document. We are not prepared for this today. Here, it is necessary to think about the form, and also to work on the editing of this document, although we are essentially in agreement with this document and understand how important it is to achieve success. We can work a little bit together, significantly improving the formulation, but it makes sense to do it quicker.

ERNESTO GUEVARA. In essence we are in agreement with this document.

DORTICOS. Naturally, we have to overcome certain language difficulties, too. A more careful editing of the document evidently is necessary in both languages.

A.I. MIKOYAN. That is good. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is waiting for a communication about your attitude towards this document. Com. Kuznetsov also requested a clarification of your position on this issue. Now we could report about the principal agreement, excluding article 13, thoroughly editing article 5, and bearing changes in article 3 regarding the USA's position in respect to the countries of Central America. After our report about your fundamental agreement, but the MFA and also our representative at the UN will be able to begin work. Maybe we could present our variant tomorrow.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. The formulation of article 5 bothers me.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. It encroaches on the sovereignty of the countries of Central America, but the governments of those countries are conducting a very bad policy.

DORTICOS. We will try to prepare our variant by tomorrow.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Working out this document, we are thinking about providing for the security of Cuba. It seems to me that it is not possible to limit the declaration about non-aggression to the United States only. The United States of America can push other countries towards aggression and provide help to them in aggression, while remaining on the sidelines itself. We have to oblige the United States to fulfill Kennedy's promise. Com. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is entirely right. It is not of course a matter of these governments, rather, the important thing is in the essence of this issue. Kennedy on this issue came to meet us. We demanded that not only the USA would give its word about non-aggression, but its allies too. This is a compromise for them. We should use this compromise. It was not easy for the United States to make it.

ALEKSEEV. We should not miss this opportunity.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I am trying to evaluate the situation which flows from your positions. McCloy said that he gives his word that the camps will be liquidated, that there will be no preparations for aggression. This type of declaration has significance even in oral form. When the world knows, it will be uncomfortable for them not to fulfill their promises I think, that it would be useful for you, comrades, to think about issues of mutual tactics. Let's say that the USA will not agree to inspection on its territory. However, as it seems to me, it would be important to organize observation on the territory of Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and certain other territories with the assistance of the UN representatives.

It seems to me that it would be important to arrange for inspection in the countries of Central America. Is Cuba interested in this? What are the positive and negative sides of this type of proposal? I am in no way an authority on issues of Central American policy, but it seems to me that it would be important to secure the presence of the UN there, in order to mitigate the significance in this region of the OAS and the Organization of Central American States. Comrades, have you thought about this issue? It will be easier for you to decide, than for us. Could the following situation come to pass? They will say to us, that inspections of the Central American countries are possible, but they cannot be realized on the territory of the United States of America. Would you agree to that or, in your opinion, is that type of a resolution not interesting to you, if it does not extend to the USA? This would be important for us to know in order to work out a joint tactic. It is clear that the USA will figure on the list. Or perhaps an agreement can be reached on inspection in Central American countries, while the USA will be limited only by the declaration. You could give your answer to my questions not today, but tomorrow.

DORTICOS. If inspections of the USA will be excluded, then in the same way inspections of Cuban territory will be excluded too.

A.I. MIKOYAN. You could thoroughly consider this issue, and then inform us of your decision.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would make sense to specify the terms of the multilateral inspections as they apply to Cuba. It should spell out the fulfillment of the obligation which the Soviet Union has accepted on itself, i.e. verification of the dismantling and evacuation of the Soviet missiles. As far as the rest of the countries are concerned, this inspection would refer to the areas where camps for the training of counter-revolutionary mercenaries for aggression against Cuba are set up. The inspection could be extended to part of Florida, not touching, naturally, Cape Canaveral. It is also necessary to organize an inspection of camps in Puerto Rico, on the island of Vieques and in certain other territories, i.e., the inspection will touch not the entire territory of the mentioned countries, but rather those regions where these camps exist.

A.I. MIKOYAN. It is immediately evident that Carlos Rafael Rodriquez is a great specialist on these issues. In this way we could drive the aggressors into a corner. It is important to find an appropriate formulation. This variation represents a big step forward. Maybe tomorrow [Soviet officials] Bazykin and Alekseev will meet with some of you and confer on editorial issues. It will be important to have this document immediately following the elections in the USA. We will take the initiative, and we will not allow the Americans to capture it. Perhaps the Security Council can be convened on the 7th or 8th of November.

ALEKSEEV. According to my information this will be done on the 6th.

DORTICOS objects.

GUEVARA objects.

A.I. MIKOYAN. U Thant told me that on 6 November the Security Council cannot be convened: we will argue. There are protocol issues here, and declarations, and procedures. We mustn't underestimate the importance of the struggle in the UN and the opinions of the member states.

DORTICOS. We believe that it is possible to act in the following way. Let us undertake a thorough revision of the document, and we will try to do it quicker. Right after we have prepared it, Comrades Bazykin and Alekseev can meet with our representatives in order to consider editorial issues.

There is information from Comrade [Carlos M.] Lechuga [Hevia], our new representative at the UN, regarding the fact that U Thant is inclined to put off the convening of the Security Council. It is possible that his session won't even be this week. U Thant is interested in holding bilateral meetings before convening the Security Council. Besides this, now we are entering a pretty complicated time: in the recent hours the USA has begun to create even more tension, not only in relation to the IL-28 bombers, but has also announced unlimited airborne surveillence.

This is dangerous. We will consider what to do under conditions of a renewal of provocations

from the air.

A.I. MIKOYAN. You, Comrade Dorticos, possess trustworthy information. We told U Thant that it would be good if the Security Council were convened after the elections. I already said that when we withdraw the strategic missiles and present evidence of that fact, we will be able to begin to speak about something else.

Maybe tomorrow in the first half of the day the comrades will work on editing the document, and after lunch we will organize an exchange of opinions.

I would also like to propose that we not publish a report about every meeting. It seems to me that there is no point in doing this today, and in general it would make sense for us to come to an agreement about this.

DORTICOS agrees with Comrade Mikoyan's proposal.

A.I. MIKOYAN. When we complete the evacuation of the missiles, many issues will be seen in a different light. While we still have not withdrawn them, we must maintain a different line. For that, 5-6 days are necessary. It is necessary to hold the line; otherwise they will accuse us of treachery. After we complete the evacuation, we will be able to adamantly oppose overflights, the quarantine, verification by the Red Cross, violations of airspace. At that moment the correlation of forces will change.

It is necessary to get the UN on our side. We must achieve more than was promised in Kennedy's letter. We mustn't underestimate the value of diplomatic means of struggle. They are very important in periods when there is no war. It is important to know how to use the diplomatic arts, displaying at the same time both firmness and flexibility.

E. GUEVARA. I would like to tell you, Comrade Mikoyan, that, sincerely speaking, as a consequence of the most recent events an extremely complicated situation has been created in Latin America. Many communists who represent other Latin American parties, and also revolutionary divisions like the Front for People's Action in Chile, are wavering. They are dismayed [*obeskurazheni*] by the actions of the Soviet Union. A number of divisions have broken up. New groups are springing up, fractions are springing up. The thing is, we are deeply convinced of the possibility of seizing power in a number of Latin American countries, and practice shows that it is possible not only to seize it, but also to hold power in a range of countries, taking into account practical experience. Unfortunately, many Latin American groups believe that in the political acts of the Soviet Union during the recent events there are contained two serious errors. First, the exchange [the proposal to swap Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey—ed.], and second, the open concession. It seems to me that this bears objective witness to the fact that we can now expect the decline of the revolutionary movement in Latin America, which in the recent period had been greatly strengthened. I have expressed my personal opinion, but I have spoken entirely sincerely.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Of course, it is necessary to speak sincerely. It is better to go to sleep than to hear insincere speeches.

E. GUEVARA. I also think so. Cuba is a country in which the interests of both camps meet head on. Cuba is a peace-loving country. However, during the recent events the USA managed to present itself in the eyes of public opinion as a peace-loving country which was exposing aggression from the USSR, demonstrating courage and achieving the liquidation of the Soviet base in Cuba. The Americans managed to portray the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a manifestation of aggressive intentions from the Soviet Union. The USA, by achieving the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, in a way received the right to forbid other countries from making bases available. Not only many revolutionaries think this way, but also representatives of the Front of People's Action in Chile and the representatives of several democratic movements.

In this, in my opinion, lies the crux of the recent events. Even in the context of all our respect for the Soviet Union, we believe that the decisions made by the Soviet Union were a mistake. I am saying this not for discussion's sake, but so that you, Comrade Mikoyan, would be conversant with this point of view.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. Even before your arrival, Comrade Mikoyan, immediately after the famous decision of the Soviet government was made, comrades from the editorial board of the newspaper "Popular" phoned me and requested an interview. They wanted urgently to receive our declaration regarding the situation which had developed, since the representatives of the "third force" were actively opposing Soviet policy. You know that group, it is deputy Trias. I gave an interview, not very long, since though I had been informed about the basic points in the speech of Fidel Castro which should have taken place on November 1, I could not use them, and in conclusion I observed that the development of events in the coming days would show the significance of the decisions that had been made.

A.I. MIKOYAN. The meetings and conversations with Comrade Fidel Castro had for me very great significance. They helped me to understand more deeply the role of the psychological factor for the peoples of these countries.

E. GUEVARA. I think that the Soviet policy had two weak sides. You didn't understand the significance of the psychological factor for Cuban conditions. This thought was expressed in an original way by Fidel Castro: "The USA wanted to destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union with Khrushchev's letter destroyed us legally [*iuridicheskii*]."

A.I. MIKOYAN. But we thought that you would be satisfied by our act. We did everything so that Cuba would not be destroyed. We see your readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it isn't work dying beautifully.

E. GUEVARA. To a certain extent you are right. You offended our feelings by not consulting us. But the main danger is in the second weak side of the Soviet policy. The thing is, you as if recognized the right of the USA to violate international law. This is great damage done to your policy. This fact really worries us. It may cause difficulties for maintaining the unity of the socialist countries. It seems to us that there already are cracks in the unity of the socialist camp.

A.I. MIKOYAN. That issue worries us too. We are doing a lot to strengthen our unity, and with you, comrades, we will always be with you despite all the difficulties.

E. GUEVARA. To the last day?

A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes, let our enemies die. We must live and live. Live like communists. We are convinced of our victory. A maneuver is not the same as a defeat. Compare the situation of a year ago, and today. A year ago the presence of Soviet soldiers in Cuba would have provoked an explosion of indignation. Now, it is as if the right of Russians to be on this continent also is recognized. That is good. McCloy even told me jokingly during a conversation that the presence of Russian officers [in Cuba—ed.] calms him down. The Cubans could open fire without thinking, he observed. But Russians will think. Of course, there could be objections to this remark, but the psychological aspect is taken into consideration.

Sometimes, in order to take two steps forward, it is necessary to take a step back. I will not in any way teach you, though I am older. You may say: it is time to consign it to the archive, request that we resign.

Recently, I read Lenin. I want to tell you about this not for some sort of an analogy, but as an example of Leninist logic. When the Brest peace treaty was signed, Bukharin was working in the International Committee of the Party. Although he was repressed, I consider him a good person. He tried, it happens, mistakenly, emotions had great significance for him. We were friends (not in 1918, at that time I was working in

the Caucasus, but much later). And so the International Committee accepted a resolution in which it was stated that the concession in Brest was shameful. The point of Soviet power is lost. The comrades accepted the resolution as if rejecting Soviet power itself. Lenin wrote about this resolution: monstrous. How is it possible for such a thought even to occur to a communist? But you know, at that time we practically had no armed forces, but those comrades wanted to die heroically, rejecting Soviet power.

E. GUEVARA. Yes. I see that there is no analogy here, but great similarities.

A.I. MIKOYAN. There really is no analogy in this example. Imagine, Russia at that time was alone. We had no forces. There was some sympathy from the working class of other countries, but sympathy alone doesn't help much. Cuba is powerful. You have no war. You have the support of the socialist camp. It is true, your geographic situation is disadvantageous, communications are far extended. This is a weak position. The Americans can disrupt communications and not allow the delivery of fuel to Cuba. We could have brought 200 million people into the streets as a demonstration of protest. But this would not have garnered any fuel for you.

How can the blockade be disrupted? How can it be broken? We have at our disposal global rockets. Using them would lead to nuclear war. What do you say to this? Shall we die heroically? That is romance. Why should revolutionaries die[?] It is necessary to maneuver, develop the economy, culture, serve as an example of other peoples of the countries of Latin America and lead them to revolution. Lenin, in a complex situation even agreed to the conduct of the conference in the Prince Isles. Study Lenin. To die heroically—that's not enough. To live in shame is not permitted, but nor is it permitted to give to the enemy your own destruction. It is necessary to seek a way out in the art of diplomacy.

A barber comes to me in the residence with a pistol, and I ask him: "You want to shave me with a pistol? No, with a razor." Or, a correspondent from the newspaper "Oy" interviewed me, what a pleasant young man, also with a pistol. He has to take notes, but he lost his pencil. What can he write with a pistol? Do you understand me? If Kennedy maneuvers, dissimulates, conducts a flexible policy, why don't the Cuban comrades use that weapon[?] You won't manage to knock off the reaction with a pistol, the diplomatic art is necessary too.

I was very satisfied by the conversation with comrade Fidel Castro, but today I didn't even know what to say regarding his reaction. But I repeat that it was amazing. Maybe I spoke foolishly, but before that I thought for a long time. For me it has been morally difficult during these days. And today it was difficult for me to understand his reaction. Perhaps I let some clumsiness show, spoke in some kind of tone? No, I, it seems, gave no grounds. I said that it is necessary to help U Thant. It is necessary to keep U Thant on our side. Comrade Fidel asked an appropriate question, why not conduct the verification on the open sea. But U Thant won't gain anything with the assistance of this type of verification. Today I became a victim of Fidel's good speech, evidently because I extemporaneously put forth my idea. An old man, I have the shortcomings of the young.

E. GUEVARA. One day before that we said that there would be no inspections. Comrade Mikoyan said that he had told McCloy that airborne inspections are inadmissible.

A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal did not concern even the shore. The subject was verification of our ships. Ships are sovereign territory. The waters are yours, therefore we were trying to elucidate your point of view. We didn't touch the land. We were talking about the waters. The land had nothing to do with it. Evidently I was naive. I thought that this variant was possible. Our ambassador, a young person, told me secretly: "I think that the Cubans will accept this proposal." (To Alekseev): Don't you speak for them. You are not a Cuban.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. I have been reading Lenin's works for a long time. In the present situation we need evaluations which correctly reflect the situation. It is not a matter of feelings. These are the objective conditions in Latin America.

In the first day of our conversations Comrade Mikoyan spoke about two types of struggle. I think that in certain conditions the last word belongs to the political struggle. In Latin America after these events a feeling of demoralization arose among the people. The nationalistic petit bourgeoisie lost their faith in the possibility of confronting imperialism. Diplomacy may change the situation. Many people believe that if Kennedy affirms his promises only orally, that will be equivalent to a defeat. But if pressure will be applied by the Soviet Union, if Cuba will act decisively, if we use U Thant and the neutral states to the necessary extent, if we insist on the acceptance of the demand re: verification of the enemy's territory, if we achieve acceptance of Fidel's five points, we will gain a significant victory.

An oral declaration of non-aggression definitely will create a feeling of a defeat.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree with Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Comrade Guevara evaluated the past events in a pessimistic tone. I respect his opinion, but I do not agree with him. I will try during the next meeting to convince him, though I doubt my ability to do that. Comrade Carlos Rafael Rodriguez pointed out the directions of the future struggle. I like this way of framing the issue. Of course, it is foolish simply to believe Kennedy, it is necessary to bind him with obligations.

C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. And with strategic missiles?

A.I. MIKOYAN. We cannot defend you with these missiles. I received the possibility to visit you, while others could not do that. We had to request the agreement of Canada, the USA to the overflight, and to overcome other difficulties. They told us, for example, that we could not fly to Canada without lead [escort?—ed.] planes. We had to receive visas. What could we do? That is their right. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs phoned the State Department and asked: Will you give a visa to Mikoyan or not? Canada delayed giving an answer, the Canadian minister was absent, he was in New York. Other officials could not resolve that issue. Approval was granted at 1:30 a.m., and at 3 a.m. we took off. But somehow we started talking about me. If Cuba was located in Greece's place, we would have shown them.

I am satisfied by my meetings with you. The business side is important. Basically, we have come to an agreement on the protocol. Besides that, I must say that I thought that I understood the Cubans, and then I listened to Comrade Ché and understood that no, I still don't know them.

ALEKSEEV: But Ché is an Argentinean.

A.I. MIKOYAN, to Ché: Let's meet and talk a little. I would like to exchange some thoughts with you. It is not a matter of who will be victorious over whom. We must try to help each other. I understood a lot. I understood how important the psychological factor is in Latin America. I am at your disposal. Every meeting is very useful for me. However you want it: one on one, two on each side, and so on. When I return to Moscow, I should have the right to say that I understood the Cubans, but I am afraid that when I return I will say that I don't know them, and in fact I will not know them.

Our stake in Cuba is huge in both a material and moral [sense], and also in a military regard. Think about it, are we really helping you out of [our] overabundance? Do we have something extra? We don't have enough for ourselves. No, we want to preserve the base of socialism in Latin America. You were born as heroes, before a revolutionary situation ripened in Latin America, but the camp of socialism still has not grown into its full capability to come to your assistance. We give you ships, weapons, people, fruits and vegetables. China is big, but for the time being it is

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WARSAW PACT "LESSONS"
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will conclude with some observations about the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy that endured until the Pact itself collapsed in 1990-91.

"Lessons" of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Several features of the Cuban missile crisis were of direct relevance to subsequent Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Europe. The "lessons" that Soviet officials derived from the crisis were of course not the only factor (or even the most important factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact's nuclear command structure, but they seem to have been of considerable influence, at least implicitly. Although Soviet leaders had been concerned well before the Cuban Missile Crisis about the difficulty of retaining secure control over nuclear weapons and about the danger of unauthorized actions, the crisis put these risks into a whole new light.[8] By underscoring how easily control could be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered Moscow's determination to ensure strict centralized command over all nuclear operations, including nuclear operations conducted by the Warsaw Pact.

One of the most disconcerting lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective was the potential for nuclear weapons to be misused if the aims of local actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It is now known that at the height of the crisis Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Moscow urging the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear strike against the United States if U.S. forces invaded Cuba.[9] Castro apparently had been led to believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to go to war—and risk its own destruction—in defense of Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev's response to Castro's plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no intention of ordering the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of what happened to Cuba.

For Khrushchev, this episode was especially unnerving because he initially had given serious consideration to providing Castro with direct command over Soviet forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-capable Frog ("Luna") missiles and Il-28 aircraft.[10] (Only the medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles would have been left under Moscow's command.) As it turned out, Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any direct jurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba, which was due to take effect once the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was publicly revealed at the end of October, would have left the "military units of the two states under the command of their respective governments."[11] Even so, the Cuban leader's message on 26 October 1962 still struck a raw nerve in Moscow.[12] It was a vivid reminder of the dangers that might have resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated any responsibility for nuclear operations.

A related lesson about the dangers posed by local actors pertained to the role of the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the post because of his long-standing and very close friendship with both Khrushchev and the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii.[13] At no time during the crisis did Pliev have authority to order the use of either medium-range or tactical nuclear missiles, but it is now known that several weeks before the crisis—in the late summer of 1962—Malinovskii had considered the possibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated authority to order the use of tactical missiles against invading U.S. troops if Pliev's lines of communication with Moscow had been severed and all other means of defense against an invasion had proven insufficient. A written order to this effect was prepared on 8 September 1962, but in the end Malinovskii declined to sign it. Thus, at the time of the crisis Pliev had no independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons or even to order that nuclear warheads, which were stored separately from the missiles, be released for possible employment. The limitations on Pliev's scope of action during the crisis were reinforced by two cables transmitted by Malinovskii on October 22 and 25, which "categorically" prohibited any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances without explicit authorization from Moscow.[14]

The strictures imposed by the Soviet leadership held up well during the crisis, as the procedural safeguards for nuclear operations proved sufficient to forestall any untoward incidents.[15] For the most part, Khrushchev's and Malinovskii's faith in Pliev was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear that Pliev wanted to ease some of the procedural restrictions—at least for tactical missiles—even after he received the two telegrams "categorically" forbidding him to order the issuance or use of nuclear weapons without express authorization. On October 26 he sent a cable to Moscow in which he apparently mentioned that Castro wanted him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, as a result, he had decided it was time to move nuclear warheads closer to the missiles (though without actually issuing them to the missile units). Pliev then requested that his decision be approved and that he be given due authority to order the preparation of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island. Soviet leaders immediately turned down both of his requests and reemphasized that no actions involving nuclear weapons were to be undertaken without direct authorization from Moscow.[16]

Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary, provided a sobering indication of the risks entailed in giving discretion to local commanders. The risks would have been especially acute in this instance because there were no technical safeguards on the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) attempted to circumvent the procedural safeguards.[17] This is not to say that it would have been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural limits—to do so he would have had to obtain cooperation from troops all along the chain of command—but there was no technical barrier per se to unauthorized actions.

Thus, one of the clear lessons of the crisis was the need not only to maintain stringent procedural safeguards for all Soviet nuclear forces, but also to equip those forces with elaborate technical devices that would prevent unauthorized or accidental launches. This applied above all to nuclear weapons deployed abroad, where the lines of communication were more vulnerable to being severed or disrupted.[18]

One further lesson from the Cuban Missile Crisis, which reinforced the perceived need for strict, centralized control over all nuclear operations, was the role that accidents played. The most conspicuous instance came on October 27 when an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba.[19] The rules of engagement for Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the

WHEN AND WHY ROMANIA DISTANCED ITSELF FROM THE WARSAW PACT

by Raymond L. Garthoff

In April 1964, the Romanian leadership issued a declaration in which it first expressed public dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Pact. Georghiu Dej, and after 1965 his successor Nicolae Ceausescu, increasingly distanced themselves from the Pact and Moscow's leadership, although without challenging the Soviet Union. Romania ceased to participate actively in the military command of the Warsaw Pact after 1969. All of this small slice of history has, of course, been well known. It has not been known why Romania launched itself on that path at that particular time. Above all, it has not heretofore been known that even earlier Romania essentially repudiated its allegiance obligations in a secret approach to the United States government in October 1963, promising neutrality in case of the outbreak of war. This was a stunning, unilateral breach of the central obligation of Warsaw Pact alliance membership, which Romania nominally maintained until the very end, when the Pact dissolved in 1991.

What precisely happened, and why? The precipitating event was the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The tensions generated by that crisis had reverberations throughout Europe. No country wanted to be brought into a war over the issue of Soviet missiles in Cuba. But while members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact dutifully gave public support to the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, some did so with considerable trepidation. And in Bucharest, the leadership decided after that crisis that it would seek to disengage itself from any automatic involvement if their superpower alliance leader, the Soviet Union, again assumed such risks.

Romanian-American relations at that time were minimal. Nonetheless, when Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu asked to meet with the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, when both were in New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly in the fall of 1963, a routine meeting was arranged for October 4. Manescu then arranged a private meeting with Rusk, attended only by an interpreter. It was the first opportunity after the crisis nearly a year earlier for the Romanian leadership to approach the United States government at this level.

Manescu told Rusk that Romania had not been consulted over the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, and was not therefore a party to the dispute. The Romanian government wanted the United States to understand that Romania would remain neutral in any conflict generated by such actions as the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assurances that in the event of hostilities arising from such a situation, the Unites States would not strike Romania on the mistaken assumption that it would be allied with the Soviet Union in such a war.

Secretary Rusk in response indicated that the United States would take into account any country that did not participate in or permit its territory to be used in military actions against the United States or its allies. In this connection, he said that it would be important for the United States to know whether there were nuclear weapons on Romanian soil, and that if the United States were given assurance that there were none, that fact would be taken into account in U.S. targeting. The Romanians subsequently responded that there were no nuclear weapons in Romania and offered the United States any opportunity it wished to verify that fact. (The absence of nuclear weapons accorded with U.S. intelligence, and the United States did not pursue the verification offer.)

In view of the sensitivity of the matter, any knowledge of this exchange was very closely held in Washington, and no doubt in Bucharest. It was not divulged to NATO governments. So far as is known, the Soviet leadership did not learn of it—although that remains to be determined from the Soviet archives. It did not "leak" in thirty years. I do not know if there is today any written account in either American or Romanian archives.

I was told about the exchange by Dean Rusk soon after it occurred, and I reconfirmed this account of it with him in 1990. It seemed to me that with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the overthrow of the Romanian government, and the reunification of Europe, the matter is now safely history, and should become a footnote to the historical record.

It may be instructive, as well as interesting, history. For example, as far as I am aware no one has ever speculated on a relationship between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Romanian actions in distancing themselves from the Warsaw Pact. It is also interesting to reflect that despite that crisis and other severe trials, the two alliances did hold together throughout the Cold War, and with relatively little evident concern over the risks involved, even in other countries hosting nuclear weapons of the superpowers. Thus, remarkable as was the Romanian case, it was the sole exception to alliance solidarity—assuming the archives or informed officials do not have any other case, on one side or the other, to reveal.

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downing of American planes except those carrying out an attack.[20] When the U-2 was shot down, no one in Moscow was quite sure what had happened—Khrushchev and most others mistakenly thought that Castro had ordered Soviet troops to fire at the plane—but everyone was certain that further incidents of this sort might cause the crisis to spin out of control. The risks posed by accidents would have been especially great if the local commander (i.e., Pliev) had been given independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. After all, Pliev and other officers based in Cuba, whose lives were directly at risk during the crisis, were naturally inclined to overreact to unintended "provocations" from the opposing side. To the extent that such overreactions could not be avoided in future crises, it was essential that the consequences be minimized and that further escalation be prevented. Obviously, it would be vastly more difficult to regain any semblance of control if local actors "accidentally" resorted to the use of nuclear weapons.

Hence, the accidents that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored the need for rigid safeguards, both procedural and technical, to preclude the use of Soviet nuclear weapons except in the most dire emergency. This lesson, like the others that Khrushchev and his colleagues derived from the crisis, survived the change of leadership in Moscow in October 1964. Although Leonid Brezhnev altered many aspects of Khrushchev's military policies, he was just as determined as his predecessor to retain stringent political control over Soviet nuclear forces.

Nuclear Operations and the Warsaw Pact

Nuclear weapons first became an issue for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958 when, allegedly in response to deployments by NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact would be "compelled by force of circumstance to consider stationing [tactical nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia."[21] Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from the Soviet Union.[22] The Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deployment of these delivery vehicles was well under way by the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The new East European weapons were officially described as components of the "Warsaw Pact's joint nuclear forces" and were later used for simulated nuclear strikes during Pact exercises, but all nuclear warheads for the delivery systems remained under exclusive Soviet control, and the delivery vehicles themselves would have come under direct Soviet command if they had ever been equipped with warheads during a crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces on East European territory were not subject to any sort of "dual-key" arrangement along the lines that NATO established in the mid-1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises included combat techniques for nuclear warfare (as they routinely did from early 1962 on), the decision on when to "go nuclear" was left entirely to the Soviet High Command.[23] In every respect, then, the East European governments had no say in the use of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal.

The exclusivity of Soviet command was reinforced by secret agreements that the Soviet Union concluded in the early to mid-1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage of nuclear warheads in those countries. Although all the agreements were bilateral, they were described as coming "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact." The first such agreements were signed with East Germany and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet-East German agreements, signed at various intervals in the early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, all of which were controlled exclusively by special troops assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.[24] The East German authorities had no say at all in the location or maintenance of these facilities, not to mention the use of the munitions stored there. Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were somewhat more complicated because no Soviet troops had been present on Czechoslovak territory since the end of 1945. Two preliminary agreements were signed in August 1961 and February 1962 entitling the Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of an emergency.[25] After the Cuban Missile Crisis, those two agreements were supplanted by a much more far-reaching "Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readiness of Missile Forces," which was signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, in December 1965.[26] The treaty provided for the permanent stationing of Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in western Czechoslovakia.

This third agreement with Czechoslovakia was concluded just after the Soviet Union had worked out a similar arrangement with Hungary.[27] The Soviet-Hungarian agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was kept secret from almost all other Hungarian officials. Much the same was true of an agreement that the Soviet Union concluded with Poland in early 1967.[28] Only a few top Polish officials were permitted to find out about the document. The Soviet agreements with all four countries covered nuclear warheads slated for use on delivery vehicles belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those countries. Some of the warheads were also intended for weapons deployed by the local armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles would have been transferred to direct Soviet command. Under the new agreements East European officials had no role in the use of the Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal, nor any control over the reinforced storage bunkers for nuclear warheads (or even the housing for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). A senior East European military official later confirmed that "the procedures for the defense and protection of these special-purpose storage centers for nuclear warheads were such that no one from our side had permission to enter, and even Soviet officials who were not directly responsible for guarding and operating the buildings were not allowed in."[29]

Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and East European governments had forged a nuclear command-and-control structure for the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders had been inclined to move in this direction, but the crisis greatly accelerated the trend and effectively ruled out anything less than complete control in Moscow.

Intra-Pact Debate about Nuclear "Sharing"

The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis could also be felt, if only implicitly, when the Soviet Union had to deal with complaints from its allies about the Pact's nuclear arrangements. The lack of East European input proved unsatisfactory to several of the allied governments, who urged that they be given some kind of role in nuclear-release authorization. Their concerns were prompted in part by changes in Soviet military doctrine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to open the way for a nuclear or conventional war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, Soviet military doctrine had long been predicated on the assumption that any war in Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers; but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Soviet military theorists had already begun to imply that a European conflict need not escalate to the level of strategic nuclear war.[30] Under Brezhnev, Soviet military analyses of limited warfare in Europe, including the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more explicit and elaborate.[31] Although this doctrinal shift made sense from the Soviet perspective, it stirred unease among East European leaders, who feared that their countries might be used as tactical nuclear battlegrounds without their having the slightest say in it.

The issue became a source of contention at the January 1965 meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, where the assembled leaders discussed NATO's plans to create a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly give West Germany access to nuclear-armed missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF were formed and the West Germans were included, the Warsaw Pact would have to resort to "defensive measures and *corresponding steps*."[32] The nature of these "corresponding steps" was never specified, but Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the meeting maintained that the obvious solution was for the Soviet Union to grant its Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nuclear weapons stationed on East European soil.[33] The Romanians were especially insistent on having responsibility shared for *all* Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including those deployed with the various Groups of Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his colleagues, however, were averse to any steps that would even marginally erode the Soviet Union's exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, and it soon became clear during the meeting that Soviet views on such matters would prevail. As a result, the PCC communiqué simply called for both German states to forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear stockpiles.[34] The implication was that arrangements within the Warsaw Pact were best left unchanged.

That stance was reaffirmed over the next few months in a series of conspicuous Soviet declarations that "the Warsaw Pact is dependent on the *Soviet* strategic missile forces" and that "the security of all socialist countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear missile strength of *the Soviet Union*."[35] The same message was conveyed later in the year by the joint "October Storm" military exercises in East Germany, which featured simulated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the USSR.[36] In the meantime, the Soviet monopoly over allied nuclear weapons procedures was being reinforced by the series of agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as discussed above. The codification of exclusive Soviet control over nuclear weapons deployed in the other Warsaw Pact countries all but eliminated any basis for the East European governments to seek a role in the alliance's nuclear command structure.

Yet even after the Soviet Union tried to put the matter to rest, controversy persisted within the Warsaw Pact about the allocation of responsibility for tactical nuclear weapons. At a closed meeting of Pact leaders in East Berlin in February 1966, Romania again pressed for greater East European participation in all aspects of allied military planning, and was again rebuffed.[37] A few months later, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly declared that the East European states should be given increased responsibility for the full range of issues confronting the Warsaw Pact.[38] That same week, a detailed Romanian proposal for modifications to the alliance was leaked to the French Communist newspaper, *L'Humanite*; the document called for, among other things, an East European role in any decisions involving the potential use of nuclear weapons.[39] Subsequently, at the July 1966 session of the PCC in Bucharest, officials from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary renewed their bid for "greater rights of co-determination in planning and implementing common coalition matters," including (by implication) the use of nuclear weapons.[40]

As on previous occasions, however, the Soviet Union resisted whatever pressure was exerted for the sharing of nuclear-release authority. In September 1966, a few months after the Bucharest conference, the Warsaw Pact conducted huge "Vltava" exercises, which included simulated nuclear strikes under exclusive Soviet control.[41] The same arrangement was preserved in all subsequent Pact maneuvers involving simulated nuclear exchanges. Thus, well before the signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear-sharing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly established its exclusive, centralized control over the Warsaw Pact's "joint" nuclear forces and operations.

The Lessons of the Crisis and Allied Nuclear Arrangements

The legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis helped ensure that the intra-Warsaw Pact debate in the mid-1960s did not bring about any change in the alliance's nuclear command-and-control structure. Had it not been for the dangers that were so clearly revealed by the events of October 1962, Soviet leaders might have been willing to consider an arrangement for the Warsaw Pact similar to the "dual-key" system that NATO adopted. When Operation "Anadyr" was first being planned in the late spring of 1962, Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of giving Fidel Castro broad command over Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well as over all non-nuclear forces on the island. Ultimately, Khrushchev decided not to share or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear-capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very fact that the issue was considered at all suggests that if the Cuban Missile Crisis had not intervened, the Soviet Union might have been receptive to some form of nuclear "sharing" with its East European allies. Indeed, a "dual-key" arrangement for the Warsaw Pact, which would not have provided any independent authority to the East European countries, could easily have been justified as a response to NATO's policy and as a useful means of strengthening allied cohesion. But after October 1962, when Soviet leaders

drew a number of lessons about the risks of even sharing, much less delegating, nuclear authority, the prospects of adopting a "dual-key" system for the Warsaw Pact essentially vanished.

Although Moscow's willingness to share control over the Warsaw Pact's "joint" nuclear arsenal would have been sharply constrained even before October 1962 by the lack of permissive-action links (PALs) and other use-denial mechanisms on Soviet nuclear weapons, that factor alone would not have been decisive if the Cuban Missile Crisis had not occurred. After all, when Soviet officials seriously contemplated allotting partial nuclear authority to Castro in 1962, that was long before Soviet tactical weapons were equipped with PALs. The physical separation of warheads from delivery vehicles, as had been planned for the missiles based in Cuba, was regarded at the time as a sufficient (if cumbersome) barrier against unauthorized actions. That approach had long been used for tactical weapons deployed by Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and it would have been just as efficacious if a "dual-key" system had been adopted—that is, if the East European armies had been given control over the Pact's nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis was the option of relying solely on the physical separation of warheads and delivery vehicles deemed inadequate. In the latter half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began incorporating electronic use-denial features into its strategic missiles, and the same was true of Soviet tactical weapons by the early to mid-1970s. Concerns in Moscow about the physical security of nuclear weapons were hardly negligible before October 1962—in part because of the possibility that requisite procedures might not be followed—but it was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis that Soviet leaders fully appreciated the magnitude of this risk.

The Cuban Missile Crisis also heightened Soviet concerns about the particular dangers posed by crises. To be sure, Soviet leaders were hardly complacent before October 1962 about the need to maintain tight political control over nuclear operations; indeed, the stringent centralization of nuclear command was a consistent theme in Soviet military planning. Even so, it was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis—and especially in light of the unexpected interventions by Fidel Castro—that this factor became a paramount reason to deny any share of nuclear-release authorization to the East European governments. Although East European officials could not have ordered the use of nuclear weapons on their own, they might have inadvertently (or deliberately) taken steps in a crisis that would have caused NATO governments to believe that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strike was forthcoming (regardless of what actual Soviet intentions were). That, in turn, might have triggered a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO. Only by excluding the East European states altogether from the nuclear-release process could the Soviet Union avoid the unintended escalation of a crisis.

The risks posed by a "dual-key" arrangement could have been mitigated if the Soviet Union had built in extra procedural and technical safeguards, but this in turn would have created operational problems for Soviet troops who might one day have been ordered to use the weapons. If a future conflict had become so dire that Soviet leaders had decided to authorize the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, they would have wanted their orders to be carried out as fast as possible, before the situation on the battlefield had changed. By contrast, East European political and military officials might have been hesitant about ordering the nuclear destruction of a site in Western Europe, not least because the launch of nuclear weapons against West European targets might well have provoked retaliatory strikes by NATO against East European sites. The problem would have been especially salient in the case of East German officials who would have been asked to go along with nuclear strikes against targets in West Germany. Thus, even though Soviet officials could have developed a hedge against the risks that emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the safeguards needed for this purpose would have been extremely burdensome, depriving the Pact of the ability to respond in a timely manner. From the Soviet perspective, it made far more sense to circumvent the problem entirely by eschewing any form of shared authority.

It is ironic that the Cuban Missile Crisis, which barely involved the Warsaw Pact at all, would have had such an important long-term effect on the alliance. It is also ironic that the actions of a third party, Fidel Castro, posed one of the greatest dangers during an event that has traditionally been depicted as a bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not only must the Cuban Missile Crisis be thought of as a "triangular" showdown; its repercussions can now be seen to have been at least as great for Soviet allies, notably Cuba and Eastern Europe, as for the Soviet Union itself.

1. This statement is based on a perusal of documents from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish archives. See, e.g., "Odvolanie opatreni v zavislosti s usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 (Karibska krize)," 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), in Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25.
2. "V shtabe Ob"edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil stran Varshavskogo Dogovora," *Pravda* (Moscow), 23 October 1962, p. 1. For the effects of the alert from 27 October through 23 November, see the series of top-secret memoranda to the CPSU CC Presidium from Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 November 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 November 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), F. 89, Opis' (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy (Ll.) 1-8.
3. "V shtabe Ob"edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran Varshavskogo Dogovora," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1.
4. See the account by the Hungarian charge d'affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 137.
5. "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. Listy (L.) 352-353, 411-412, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with a copy of this document.
6. This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced in note 2 *supra*.
7. On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *CWIHP Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-39.
8. "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 332-333.
9. "Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow) 24 (31 December 1990), 67-80, esp. 71-73.
10. Ibid., 73-75. This point was reemphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations in November 1962. See "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem'er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel'stva Kuby F. Kastro," 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and "O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro," 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow) 11-12 (November-December 1992), 143-147 and 147-150, respectively. See esp. 149.
11. It should be noted, however, that a decision to send

901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and Il-28s was not finalized until 8 September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may already have changed his mind about the command-and-control arrangements. See "Nachal'niku 12 glavnogo upravleniya Ministerstva oborony," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. Zakharov, in TsAMO, "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the nuclear-capable weapons would not have been equipped with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under Castro's command.

12. "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvom Respubliki Kuby i pravitel'stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi oborone," undated, Article 10.

13. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya* (Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev's son, Sergei, for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page transcript of his father's memoirs. For an English translation of most of the account about the Cuban Missile Crisis, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), 170-183.

14. Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, "O prem'ere N. S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. Zhukove i generale I. A. Plieve," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (Moscow) 8-9 (August-September 1994), 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev's command. Pliev's close friendship with Khrushchev and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assessment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 25-26.

15. "Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh voisk na o. Kuba," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant citations, see Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *CWIHP Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), 40-46, esp. 42-43, 46.

16. "Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 4/389 (Top Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 October 1962, reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, 181. This directive was reaffirmed three days later after a request for clarification from Pliev; see Lieut.-Col. Anatolii Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," Krasnaya zvezda, 6 November 1992, 2. See also Sergei Pavlenko, "Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu 'stoyat' nasmert'," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 December 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and relevant citations, see Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 45-46.

17. In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had actually issued orders to that effect without authorization from Moscow. See *Operation ANADYR*, 63, and Gribkov comments at a 5 April 1994 meeting at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., organized by the Cold War International History Project. However, Gribkov produced no evidence to back up his assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in a lengthy interview with the present author in Moscow on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov's initial claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet officer who was in charge of the "central nuclear base" (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who testified in late 1992 that "nuclear weapons could have been used only if the missile officers had received orders via their own chain-of-command from the General Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for storing and operating warheads, had received our own special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or the tactical weapons." See Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2. Beloborodov reemphasized this point several times during an interview with the author in Moscow on 28 September 1994: "No nuclear munitions of any type, whether for the medium-range or the tactical weapons, were ever moved (*byly dostavleny*) out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have been moved without my knowledge." Beloborodov's account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the deputy commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in an interview that same day in Moscow.

18. The exact contents of Pliev's telegram on the 26th are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams that *are* available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, the second of which is the one in question. (His first telegram on the 26th, which was declassified in October 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet leadership's response to Pliev's second cable *is* available (see next note), and, combined with retrospective comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev referred to Castro's efforts and requested authority to move the warheads (though not yet authority for actual use).

19. "Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 76639 (Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, 182. See also Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," 46; and Pavlenko, "Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu," 4.

20. Marshal V. F. Tolubko, "Glavnaya raketnaya sila strany," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 19 November 1963, 1.

21. See Khrushchev's comments on this point in *Vospominaniya*, Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," p. 18.

22. Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds., *Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voenno-istoricheskii trud* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 109-110. Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are available in "Voina ozhidalas's rassvetom," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 May 1993, 2.

23. The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly in the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2. More elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in the Russian General Staff archive; see "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," in GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573.

24. Krushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," pp. 17-18.

25. "Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda," *Pravda*, 27 May 1958, p. 3.

26. Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 150-151, 487-489.

27. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie*, February 1992, p. 5; for an English translation, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 1, 13-19..

28. Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA-Strausberg/29555/Box 155.

29. "Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnych dodavkach vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963-1965," in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 26/2.

30. "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvami SSSR i ChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk," 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16.

31. See the reports on "Hungary: USSR Nuclear Weapons Formerly Stored in Country," translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, *Nuclear Proliferation*, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, pp. 14-16.

32. "O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie gotowsci bojowej wojska," 25 February 1967, in Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy, Paczka 6, Tom 234.

33. Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, "Jaderna munice: Asi tady byla," *Ceske a moravskoslezske zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. 1.

34. See, for example, Col.-General I. Glebov, "Razvitie operativnogo iskusstva," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 2 April 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, "Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya podgotovka," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 3 January 1963, 2-3. See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., *Voennaya strategiya*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), 373-374. This theme is also evident in "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," *passim.*

35. See, for example, Col.-General N. Lomov, "Vliyanie Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo iskusstva," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil* 21 (November 1965), 16-24.

36. Cited in "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," *Pravda*, 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added).

37. "Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages," January 1965 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130.

38. "O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul'tativnogo komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 January 1965, 1. See also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, *Osnova boevogo soyuza: Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), 259.

39. See, for example, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, "Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 May 1965, 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil* , No. 9 (May 1965), 13; and Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Boevoi soyuz bratskikh narodov," *Pravda*, 13 May 1965, 1. (emphases added)

40. "Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia 'Oktobrova Burka'," 16-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava (HPS), 1965, HPS 1/2.

41. "Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages:

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POLISH CRISIS

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1980-81 crisis, though from a quite different angle, will be included in my Working Paper on "The Soviet Union, Jaruzelski, and the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981," which is scheduled to be issued by the Cold War International History Project later this year. Appendices to the Working Paper will feature many other documents I have translated from the Russian, Polish, Czech, and German archives. Soon thereafter, I will be putting together a book-length study and collection of new materials pertaining to the Polish crisis.

Overview of New Sources

Since 1989, a huge quantity of documents and memoirs about the Soviet Union's role in the 1980-81 crisis have become available. An invaluable account, which appeared even before the Communist regime in Warsaw had collapsed, is the interview with the former Polish colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-57. Kuklinski was one of five senior officers on the Polish General Staff who were responsible for drawing up plans for martial law in 1980-81. During that time he was also a spy for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and he was able to provide the United States with unparalleled access to all the military secrets of the Warsaw Pact until November 1981, when he was forced to flee. He now lives under an assumed name in the United States. Other indispensable memoirs and first-hand accounts include Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991); *General Kiszczak mowie . . .: Prawie wszystko* . . ., ed. by Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); Mieczylaw Rakowski, *Jak to sie stalo* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); the first interview with Rakowski in *Zanim stane przed Truybunalem: Z Mieczyslawem Rakowskim rozmawie Dariusz Szymczycha* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Army-General A. I. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow) 9 (September 1992), 46-57; and Vitalii Pavlov, *Wspomnienia rezydenta KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). Jaruzelski, Kania, Kiszczak, and Rakowski were all top officials in Poland in 1980-81; Gribkov was the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact; and Pavlov was the KGB station chief in Warsaw. Gribkov's and Pavlov's accounts make an intriguing contrast with the views offered by Jaruzelski, Kania, *et al.*, as will be discussed below.

A plethora of shorter first-hand accounts and interviews with key participants have appeared as well. For a sample of the countless interviews with and commentaries by General Jaruzelski, see *Novoe vremya* (Moscow) 38 (September 1991), 26-30; "Jaruzelski obrazony: Wyrok w mojej sprawie juz zapadl—napisal general w liscie do przewodniczacego komisji, posla Rzepki," Zyc*ie Warszawy* (Warsaw), 13 January 1993, 5; "Katastrofa byla nieuchronna," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 3 December 1992, 13; "Rozmawiac bez nienawisci: Wywiad generala Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z Adamem Michnikem," *Gazeta wyborcza* , 25-26 April 1992, 8-11; "Oswiadczenia i przeskody formalne: Rozliczanie stanu wojennego," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 25 November 1992, 2; "Ironiczny prymas historii," *Prawo i zycie* (Warsaw), 49 (December 1992), 11; Stephen Engelberg, "Jaruzelski, Defending Record, Says His Rule Saved Poland," *The New York Times*, 20 May 1992, A-9; and John Darnton, "Jaruzelski Is Now Sorry He Ordered Martial Law," *The New York Times*, 4 March 1993, A-12. For two key interviews with Mikhail Gorbachev, who was a full member of the CPSU Politburo in 1980-81, see "Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil prawidlowo," *Trybuna* (Warsaw), 9 November 1992, 2; and "Wywiad z Michailem Gorbaczowem: 'Jestem inny, niz probuja mnie przedstawic'," *Rzeczpospolita*, 23 October 1992, 9. Shorter interviews with Vitalii Pavlov, whose memoirs are cited above, include "Dostep do wszystkiego," *Polityka* (Warsaw), 8 (20 February 1993), 15; "Byly rezydent KGB w Warszawie: ZSRR nie chcial interwencji," *Rzeczpospolita*, 10 February 1993, 7; and Leon Bojko, "A wejsc nie chcieli?" *Gazeta wyborcza*, 10 February 1993, 6.

Most of the top Polish officials from 1980-1981, including Jaruzelski and Kiszczak, have given testimony before the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Polish Sejm (Parliament). The hearings

DECLASSIFIED SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON THE POLISH CRISIS

Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer

CPSU CC Politburo Decision Setting Up Suslov Commission, 25 August 1980

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P210/P

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Zimyanin, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Kornienko, Zamyatin, Rakhmanin.

Extract from Protocol No. 210 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 25 August 1980

In regard to the situation in the Polish People's Republic.

1. To endorse Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's information about the situation unfolding in the Polish People's Republic.

2. To establish a CC Politburo Commission composed of:
Comrades M. A. Suslov (chairman), A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, M. V. Zimyanin, I. V. Arkhipov, L. M. Zamyatin, O. B. Rakhmanin.

To instruct the Commission to pay close attention to the situation unfolding in the PPR and to keep the Politburo systematically informed about the state of affairs in the PPR and about possible measures on our part. Suggestions in the event of necessity are to be brought before the CPSU CC Politburo.

CPSU CC POLITBURO

* * * * *

CPSU CC Politburo Report "On Theses for the discussion with representatives of the

began in September 1992, and six sessions were convened in 1992 and the first half of 1993. The transcripts of these initial hearings were published, along with supporting documentation, in *Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993), Vol. 1: *Oskarzenia wyjasnienia obrona*. Additional volumes cover the subsequent hearings, which for the most part went over similar ground. Especially valuable are the documents collected and released by the Commission.

Important interviews with, and articles by, high-ranking Soviet and East European military officers who were involved in the preparations for an invasion of Poland include "Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka rozmawia Leszek Mazan," *Polityka* 37 (15 September 1990), 13; "Generalmajor S. Prochazka z vojenske obrody rika: 'Meli jsme okupovat Polsko'," *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1; "Misja skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR w Polsce," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 14-15 March 1992, 8-9; Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, "Tainy 'temnoi komnaty'," *Moskovskie novosti* 14 (5 April 1992), 17; and "Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7. References to other items of this sort can be found in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.

Of the vast number of Soviet and East European documents that have been released, including many transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings during the crisis, only a relatively small number have been published, but these have been of great importance. Two of the most valuable sets of documents, including selected transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings, top-secret communications between Brezhnev and Jaruzelski, internal CPSU CC documents, and other items, were published in Polish in 1992 and 1993: "Dokumenty 'Komisji Suslowa'," *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 August 1993, 1, 19-20; and "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 12-13 December 1992, 10-11.[1] Another source of comparable significance is the 660-page collection of transcripts of all the relevant Polish Politburo meetings during the crisis: Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992). Yet another invaluable source is a multi-volume collection of documents culled from the former East German Communist party and Stasi archives, which is being put out by a team led by Manfred Wilke at the Free University of Berlin under the title *SED-Politburo und polnische Krise 1980/1982*. The first volume, *Band 1: 1980*, Working Paper No. 3 (Berlin: Forschungsverbund SED-Staat, 1993) covers events through the end of 1980.[2] Another extremely useful volume, *Die SED contra Polen: Die Planung der SED-Fuhrung zur Vorbereitung einer Invasion in Polen 1980/81*, was published by Akademie Verlag for the same research institute in 1994. Valuable citations from Bulgarian documents can be found in "Eventualna interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e mozhela da stane 'vtori kurvav Afganistan'," *Duma* (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3.

Unpublished Soviet and East European documents pertaining to the 1980-81 crisis vastly outnumber the ones that have been published. In Warsaw, some of the most valuable unpublished materials are readily available in the main Archive of Modern Records (*Archiwum Akt Nowych*), which contains both Party and governmental documents. Many other items, however, are still in the possession of the Commission to Investigate Documents Pertaining to Martial Law (*Komisja resortowej badajacej dokumentacje zwiazana ze stanem wojennym*). Unfortunately, almost all the files of the Polish Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry from 1980-81 are still sealed off. In Moscow, many vital unpublished items, including numerous CPSU Politburo transcripts that were not published in either of the two Polish-language collections cited above, are available in Fond 89 at the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (*Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii*, or TsKhSD). Many of these transcripts are cited below. Other items at TsKhSD, in *Fond* 5, *Opis'* 84, as well as at the Presidential Archive (*Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, or APRF), the foreign intelligence archive, and the military archives, are now off-limits. The documents in the Presidential Archive, foreign intelligence archive, and military archives have never been accessible to the public, but at TsKhSD I did have an opportunity to pore through many items

Polish leadership," 3 September 1980

To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL DOSSIER
EYES ONLY

No. P/213/38

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Rakhmanin

Extract from Protocol No. 213 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 3 September 1980

On theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership.

To endorse the theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 38 of Prot. No. 213

To be transmitted by the KGB in encrypted form to the designated point.

1. To give a precise evaluation of and take a clear position on the agreement with the so-called "United Strike Committees" (ZKS) in Gdansk and Szczecin.

The agreement concluded by the PPR government, and endorsed by the plenum of the PZPR CC, exacts a high political and economic price for the "regulation" it achieves. We, of course, understand the circumstances in which you had to make this onerous decision. The agreement, in essence, signifies the legalization of the anti-socialist opposition. An organization has emerged that aims to spread its political influence through the entire

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in *Fond* 5, *Opis'* 84 in late 1992 and early 1993. (Unfortunately, that access was abruptly terminated in April 1993 for reasons discussed in my article on archival research in CWIHP *Bulletin* No. 3.) Although I was not able to receive photocopies of materials from *Fond* 5, *Opis'* 84 (because of a bureaucratic glitch), I translated verbatim or took extensive notes on all items I consulted.

In Germany, the most important documents from the former East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) archives (the *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED*), the former GDR State Security Ministry (Stasi) archives (*Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv*), and the military archive in Potsdam (*Militarisches Zwischenarchiv*), are being published in the series mentioned above. In addition, a large number of unpublished documents are worth consulting at all three of these archives, especially the first two. In the Czech Republic, two major archives hold numerous documents relevant to the 1980-81 crisis: the Central State Archive (*Statni ustredni archiv*), which houses a vast collection of items left from the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and from the Czechoslovak government, and the Military Historical Archive (*Vojensky historicky archiv*), which contains files from the Czechoslovak General Staff and Ministry of Defense. The Czech/Czechoslovak foreign ministry archive also contains some pertinent documents, but access for now is more sporadic. The materials in Berlin and Prague amply confirm that the top East German and Czechoslovak leaders in 1980-81—Gustav Husak and Erich Honecker—both hoped to bring a prompt and decisive end to the crisis through external military intervention.

As even this brief review shows, the quantity and quality of new East-bloc sources on the 1980-81 crisis are remarkable. Highly sensitive items are more readily available in this case than for any of the earlier Soviet-East European confrontations. This is not to say, however, that the task of analyzing the Polish crisis is easy. Many aspects of the crisis are still obscure because of insufficient documentation; and even if all the relevant archives were opened, major differences of interpretation would persist. Nevertheless, it is clear that the profusion of documents and memoirs since 1989 has shed far greater light on the Polish crisis than one ever could have hoped for just five to six years ago.

The Crisis and the Soviet Response

The Polish crisis started out modestly enough, as a wave of protests against higher meat prices announced in July 1980; but it soon posed graver complications for Soviet policy than any event had since the late 1940s. The formation of Solidarity, an independent and popularly-based trade union that soon rivaled the Communist party for political power and that represented the interests of the very same working class in whose name the party had always purported to rule, posed a fundamental challenge to Poland's Communist system. Once the magnitude of that challenge had become apparent to Soviet officials, they reacted with unremitting hostility toward Solidarity. Soviet leaders were equally dismayed by the growing political influence of Poland's Catholic church, which they regarded as "one of the most dangerous forces in Polish society" and a fount of "anti-socialist" and "hostile" elements.[3]

As the crisis intensified and Solidarity's strength continued to grow, Moscow's condemnations of the Polish trade union became more strident, both publicly and in behind-the-scenes deliberations. The thrust of the Soviet criticisms was that Solidarity and the church had joined ranks with "like-minded counterrevolutionary forces" to wage "an openly counterrevolutionary struggle for the liquidation of socialism" in Poland.[4] Soviet officials also accused Solidarity of attempting to "seize power from the PZPR" by fomenting "economic chaos" in the country and by embarking on a wide range of other "provocative and counterrevolutionary actions." The whole course of events, they warned, was leading toward "the collapse of Polish socialism and the headlong disintegration of the PZPR," an outcome that would leave "Solidarity extremists in full control."

Throughout the crisis, Soviet leaders were concerned not only about the internal situation in Poland, but also about the effects the turmoil was having on Polish foreign policy and Poland's role in the Warsaw Pact. Brezhnev and his colleagues repeatedly condemned Solidarity for allegedly "inflaming malevolent nationalist passions" and spurring a "dangerous rise in anti-Sovietism in Poland."[5] A report prepared for the CPSU Politburo in mid-1981 by the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, Boris Aristov, warned that the "powerful streams of anti-Soviet rhetoric" in Poland and the "increasing efforts by the West to subvert Polish socialism" would inevitably induce major changes in Poland's foreign alignments.[6] Aristov acknowledged that "the anti-socialist forces backing Solidarity claim they do not want to change Poland's international obligations and alliances," but he insisted that such changes would be carried out nonetheless, albeit "subtly, without a frontal attack." He emphasized that "the mood of anti-Sovietism is growing, especially in the ranks of Solidarity," and that the "hostile, anti-Soviet forces" both inside and outside Solidarity "are arguing that democratization in Poland is incompatible with membership in the Warsaw Pact."[7] Aristov's prediction that the crisis in Poland would bring "fundamental changes in Polish-Soviet relations" gained wider and wider acceptance among Soviet leaders as time wore on.

Because of Poland's location in the heart of Europe, its communications and logistical links with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, its projected contributions to the "first strategic echelon" of the Warsaw Pact, and its numerous storage sites for Soviet tactical nuclear warheads, the prospect of having a non-Communist government come to power in Warsaw or of a drastic change in Polish foreign policy generated alarm in Moscow. Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko spoke for all his colleagues when he declared at a CPSU Politburo meeting in October 1980 that "we simply cannot and must not lose Poland" under any circumstances.[8] Although Nikita Khrushchev had been willing in October 1956 to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, the situation in 1980-81 was totally different. Gomulka, despite all his heterodoxies, was a devoted Communist, and Khrushchev could be confident that socialism in Poland and the Polish-Soviet "fraternal relationship" would continue and even thrive under Gomulka's leadership. Brezhnev and his colleagues had no such

assurances about Poland in 1980-81.

Moreover, quite apart from the situation in Poland itself, Soviet officials suspected—with good reason—that the crisis would have destabilizing repercussions in other Warsaw Pact countries. Soon after the historic Gdansk accords were signed in August 1980, senior commentators in Moscow began asserting that Solidarity's "strategy of permanent chaos" would inspire similar developments elsewhere that would "threaten not just Poland but the whole of peace and stability in Europe."[9] Equally stern pronouncements emanated from the chief Soviet ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, who claimed that "any deviation from our revolutionary teachings" in one socialist country "will entail ruinous consequences for the whole socialist world."[10] Much as Soviet and hard-line East European leaders in 1968 had feared that the Prague Spring would be "contagious," so now they believed that Solidarity's rise would set a crucial precedent and spark "anti-socialist" ferment elsewhere, most notably in the Soviet Union itself. In response, officials in Moscow and most of the other Warsaw Pact capitals promptly took steps to control and even halt the dissemination of Polish newspapers and journals in their countries. Such steps had been recommended in a top-secret report approved by the CPSU Secretariat in December 1980, which warned that "undesirable materials" of an "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet nature" were streaming into the Soviet Union from Poland.[11]

Even more worrisome from Moscow's perspective was the growing evidence that turmoil in Poland was spilling over into the union republics of the USSR, especially the three Baltic states and Ukraine, where protests and demonstrations in support of Solidarity had begun as early as August 1980.[12] In the Russian Republic, too, there were disturbing indications of a surge of labor unrest inspired—directly or indirectly—by the crisis in Poland. The KGB had harshly suppressed three separate attempts by labor activists to set up an independent trade union in Russia in the late 1970s, and ever since then the CPSU leadership had been inordinately sensitive and hostile to anything that might give renewed impetus to an unofficial workers' movement.[13] For that reason, the members of the CPSU Secretariat expressed "utter dismay" when they received a top-secret report in late 1980 which found that "work stoppages and other negative incidents" had "substantially increased" since August both in frequency and in size at factories all around the Soviet Union, presumably as a direct result of the Polish events.[14] Similar reports continued flowing into Moscow throughout 1981. The implications of this spill-over from Poland seemed all the more dire after Solidarity publicly declared its support in September 1981 for other "working people of Eastern Europe" and "all the nations of the Soviet Union" who were seeking to establish their own independent trade unions.[15] Thus, it comes as little surprise that long before martial law was imposed on 13 December 1981, top Soviet officials were referring to the events in Poland both publicly and privately as "counterrevolution and anarchy" that not only "threatened the destruction of the country's socialist order and alliance obligations," but also posed "a direct threat to the security of the USSR and its allies."[16]

By stirring Soviet anxieties about the potential loss of a key member of the Warsaw Pact and about the spread of political instability throughout Eastern Europe, the Polish crisis demonstrated, as the events of 1953, 1956, and 1968 had previously, the degree of "acceptable" change in the Soviet bloc. The crisis in Poland was more protracted than those earlier upheavals, but the leeway for genuine change was, if anything, narrower than before. Plans for the imposition of martial law began almost from the very first day of the crisis.[17] Although the plans were drafted by the Polish General Staff, the whole process was supervised and moved along by the Soviet Union. The constant pressure that Soviet political and military leaders exerted on top Polish officials thwarted any hope that Stanislaw Kania, the PZPR first secretary until October 1981, might have had of reaching a genuine compromise with Solidarity and the Catholic church.[18] From the Soviet Politburo's perspective, any such compromise would have been, at best, a useless diversion or, at worst, a form of outright capitulation to "hostile" forces and a "sell-out to the enemies of socialism."[19] As Brezhnev emphasized to Kania's successor, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, in November 1981, the only thing the Soviet leadership wanted was for "decisive measures" to be implemented as soon as possible against the "blatantly anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary opposition" in Poland:

> It is now absolutely clear that without a vigorous struggle against the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in Poland. The question is not whether there will be a confrontation, but who will start it, what means will be used to wage it, and who will gain the initiative. . . . The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago emerged from underground into full public view and are now openly preparing to launch a decisive onslaught, are hoping to delay their final push until they have achieved overwhelming preponderance. . . . This means that if you fail to take tough measures right away against the counterrevolution, you will lose the only opportunity you still have.[20]

The extent of the Soviet Union's determination to crush Solidarity via the imposition of martial law is clearly evident from the newly released transcripts of nearly two dozen CPSU Politburo meetings in 1980-81. At those sessions, Brezhnev and his colleagues repeatedly complained that Kania and Jaruzelski were proving to be "weak," "indecisive," "insufficiently bold," "untrustworthy," and "unwilling to resort to extraordinary measures despite our recommendations."[21] The same theme emerges from other recently opened Soviet documents, in which Soviet officials castigated the Polish authorities for their "unconscionable vacillation and indecisiveness" in the face of "an open struggle for power by forces hostile to the PZPR."[22] Soviet officials were convinced that "the backers of Solidarity simply do not believe that the PZPR leadership will adopt harsh measures to put an end to their anti-socialist activity," and that this was enabling "the counterrevolutionary forces to operate with impunity in their plans to liquidate socialism in Poland." It comes as little surprise, then, that in private meetings with Polish leaders, Brezhnev and other top CPSU officials demanded that the Poles "put an end to the strikes and disorder once and for all" and "rebuff the counterrevolutionary elements with deeds, not just with words."[23]

Although the Soviet Union's overwhelming preference was to resolve the crisis through an "internal solution" rather than through direct Soviet military intervention,

the option of invading Poland was necessarily on the agenda in Moscow and most of the East European capitals. Elaborate plans for a large-scale military intervention were drafted by the Soviet General Staff, with input from Soviet officers on the Main Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command. The operation was to be spearheaded by an initial contingent of fifteen Soviet tank and motorized-infantry divisions moving in from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic, Carpathian, and Belorussian Military Districts.[24] These troops were to be accompanied by three Czechoslovak and East German divisions, with at least another dozen Soviet divisions as reinforcements. The Soviet Union wanted to provide a veneer of multilateralism for any prospective intervention in Poland, as was done with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The participation of two divisions from Czechoslovakia and one from East Germany was deemed sufficient for that purpose. The political complexities of involving troops from either Romania or Hungary would have been too great. Despite the harsh criticism that Romanian and Hungarian leaders had been expressing about Solidarity, neither country was likely to be enthusiastic about an invasion. In the case of Bulgaria, the difficulty was logistical rather than political. The authorities in Sofia strongly endorsed the plans for an invasion, but were not asked to contribute troops because "the northward movement [of Bulgarian forces] would have been too conspicuous," tipping off both the Poles and the West.[25]

The plans for an invasion soon gave rise to a number of concrete military preparations. As early as August 1980 the Soviet Army was ordered to "requisition up to 100,000 military reservists and 15,000 vehicles from the civilian economy" and to place all regular units in military districts and Groups of Forces adjoining Poland on "full combat alert."[26] Some units were taken off alert in February 1981, but most remained fully mobilized until the crisis was over. They were linked together by a vast communications network, which was secretly put into place during the "Comrade-in-Arms-80" and "Soyuz-81" exercises.[27] The exercises also permitted Soviet commanders and military intelligence officers to acquire detailed information about the routes and targets in Poland that would be most suitable for invading forces, especially for the Soviet airborne units that would have to seize major buildings, transportation networks, and communications facilities in Warsaw.[28] The reconnaissance they gathered proved crucial when the Soviet General Staff modified its plans in late 1980 and 1981. Most of the revisions began just after the "Soyuz-81" maneuvers in April 1981, when a comprehensive new "action plan" was drafted. The final adjustments were made by mid-November. From that point on, the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German forces simply "waited for a signal from Moscow to move in"—a signal that never arrived.[29]

The revised planning and preparations were thoroughly tested in fourteen joint military exercises held during the crisis, including seven bilateral maneuvers of Soviet and Polish troops. The maneuvers were designed in part to exert pressure on the Polish leadership and population and to divert Solidarity's attention from the buildup of the ZOMO security forces, but they also enabled Soviet commanders to gauge how quickly the Polish army could be "neutralized" by incoming Warsaw Pact troops.[30] The large number of bilateral exercises and meetings in 1980-81 was a notable contrast to 1968, when the Soviet Union tended to emphasize multilateral negotiations and maneuvers. This disparity was attributable in part to the greater confidence that Soviet leaders had when dealing with Jaruzelski than they ever had in their dealings with Alexander Dubcek. The "joint" leverage that was deemed necessary in 1968 was of much less relevance in 1980-81. Furthermore, in 1968 the Soviet Union did not yet have a permanent "Group of Soviet Forces" stationed on Czechoslovak territory, whereas in Poland in 1980-81 the Soviet Union already had a long-standing troop presence. The USSR's Northern Group of Forces in Poland provided a convenient focus during the crisis for both military planning and coercive diplomacy.

The Soviet Union's efforts to maintain close bilateral ties with the Polish army went only so far, however. Despite Jaruzelski's persistent requests that Polish troops be included as an integral part of an invading force (and that East German forces be excluded, for obvious historical reasons), officials in Moscow decided early on that the Polish army as a whole was too unpredictable to be used in a "joint" Warsaw Pact crackdown.[31] Soviet military planners took for granted that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces would have to intervene *against* the Polish army. Although Brezhnev and his colleagues trusted the highest-ranking Polish officers and were willing to rely on certain elite units of the Polish army, they were under no illusions that Polish conscripts would obey orders to shoot at their fellow citizens. The dominant view in Moscow was that Polish soldiers who had been drafted in 1980 or 1981 were already "under Solidarity's sway" and would "refuse to carry out their duties and even go over to the side of the anti-socialist forces if the situation deteriorates."[32] Soviet officials also assumed that the reliability of the Polish officer corps might itself be problematic:

> Some of the younger commanders and officers [in Poland] have discussed whether they should obey all combat orders, even those calling for mass actions, or should instead refuse to carry out orders that would "betray the whole Polish nation." In connection with this, it is clear that none of the members of the [Polish] command staff with whom we spoke can confidently say on whose side the [Polish] army and navy will be if tensions reach a climax.[33]

It is not surprising, then, that Soviet commanders regarded the Polish army as one of the first targets to be "neutralized" if an invasion proved necessary. Nor is it surprising that Soviet leaders wanted to minimize the Polish army's role in the imposition of martial law. Although top-ranking Polish officers were responsible for planning the martial-law operation, and although some elite units from the Polish army helped carry it out, most of the implementation was left to the ZOMO and other security units. The concerns that prompted Soviet leaders to exclude Polish troops from a prospective invading force also meant that the army was given only a very limited role in the martial-law crackdown.

Internal Versus External Options

The fact that detailed plans for an invasion existed does not conclusively mean that Soviet troops would have intervened if the Polish authorities had been unable or unwilling to impose martial law, but the evidence

suggests that at least some top officials in Moscow were willing to resort to force if necessary. As early as November 1980, Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov had become so disenchanted that he openly questioned whether "constant pressure on the Polish leadership" would ever be sufficient, and he urged that military exercises be increased "to make clear that we have forces ready" to move in at short notice.[34] Avid support of a military solution also came from Soviet allies in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Documents from the former East German and Czechoslovak archives attest to the vigorous efforts that hard-line East European leaders made to convince the Soviet Politburo of the necessity of military intervention in Poland. In particular, the East German Communist party leader, Erich Honecker, repeatedly drew parallels with the crises of 1953, 1956, and 1968, arguing that "the situation in Poland is much worse and more dangerous" than those earlier episodes.[35] Shortly before an emergency meeting in Moscow of Warsaw Pact leaders in early December 1980, he joined with his Czechoslovak and Bulgarian counterparts, Gustav Husak and Todor Zhivkov, in emphasizing that a failure to undertake decisive military action against the "counterrevolutionary forces in People's Poland" would lead to "the death of socialism in Poland" and pose a burgeoning threat to the whole socialist commonwealth.[36] At the meeting itself, Honecker offered further denunciations of the events in Poland, and Husak repeatedly likened the situation to the "counterrevolutionary intrigues" in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although these warnings had little effect on the Soviet participants—who still believed that the Polish authorities should be given more time "to rectify the situation on their own and to normalize it"—Honecker and Husak were hardly about to give in.[37] In February 1981 they persuaded the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, to support their calls for a joint military operation to "thwart the Polish counterrevolution once and for all," and they issued many similar appeals over the next several months.[38]

Despite this aggressive campaign by the East European proponents of military intervention, Brezhnev and the other members of the CPSU Politburo were well aware of how difficult and costly a prospective invasion would be. When the issue came up at a Soviet Politburo meeting in late October 1981, even hard-liners such as Ustinov and the KGB chairman, Yurii Andropov, had to concede that "it would be impossible now for us to send troops into Poland." They and their colleagues agreed that the Soviet Union "must steadfastly adhere to [its] line not to send in troops."[39] The same position was expressed by all the members of the Soviet Politburo on 10 December 1981, according to the available transcript of the meeting, just three days before martial law was imposed. Although Andropov and Ustinov affirmed that the Soviet Union "must fortify [its] military garrisons in Poland" and "do something to protect the lines of communication between the USSR and the GDR" if circumstances so warranted, no one at the meeting dissented from Mikhail Suslov's view that "there can be no consideration at all of sending in troops" because such a step "would be a catastrophe."[40] Suslov's position on this matter carried particular weight because he was the head of a special Politburo commission set up in late August 1980

THE SED POLITBURO AND THE POLISH CRISIS
by the SED-State Research Group
(translated by Mark Kramer)

Manfred Wilke, Peter Erier, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Hans-Peter Muller, *The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982*, Volume I: 1980. SED-State Research Group Working Paper No. 3/1993. Berlin, 1993.

During a state visit by the president of the Republic of Poland, Lech Walesa, to the Federal Republic of Germany in early 1992, federal [German] president Richard von Weizscker lauded the gains that the Polish people and the Polish head-of-state had made for the cause of freedom in Europe. "As the head of a trade union you overcame despotism, regained freedom for your own people, and made a decisive contribution to the European revolution of freedom." (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bulletin No. 34, Bonn, 2 April 1992, p. 325.) In retrospect, the Polish crisis at the beginning of the 1980s can be regarded as a prelude to the end of the whole Soviet empire. SED officials recognized this danger and did everything in their power to forestall such a development. *Moreover, they pushed for intervention by the Warsaw Pact states in the same way that step was taken during the Prague crisis of 1968*.

With the publication of "The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis, 1980/1982, Volume I: 1980," which Prof. Dr. Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Dr. Hans-Peter Muller compiled in 1992 at the Free University of Berlin under the auspices of the "SED-State Research Group," documents are now available showing how the SED Politburo wanted to suppress the Polish people's struggle for national self-determination and democratization. The materials, which have never been released before, come for the most part from holdings of the "Politburo" collection in the formerly secret archives of the SED Central Committee (CC).

For the SED, the drama of the "Polish crisis" began with the signing of the Gdansk Accords between the heads of the Inter-Factory Strike Committee and the Polish government on 30 August 1980. This agreement was regarded by the SED Politburo to be a product of counterrevolution. As seen by Honecker and his closest associates, the leadership of the PZPR had capitulated to the striking workers. The SED leaders began to question whether and and to what extent the PZPR could enforce its leading role in Poland (cf.: Central Party Archives [ZPA] J IV 2/2 A - 2346.) The decision to allow freer trade unions and the right to strike was unacceptable to the Politburo of the SED CC: "*To construe strikes as an expression of 'workers' genuine interests' is impermissible in our view. No one other than the Party itself, with the aid of scientific socialism, can express and realize the class interests of the Party*." (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.)

At the end of September 1980, the International Department of the SED CC carried out a detailed analysis of the situation in Poland, which included, among other things, a "comparative assessment of the programs and stated demands of the anti-socialist forces in the

continued on page 127

to "keep a close watch on the unfolding situation in Poland."[41]

The lack of any overt disagreement on the question of military intervention does not necessarily mean that the apparent consensus emerged easily or spontaneously. The transcript may not tell the full story. A number of former senior members of the CPSU Politburo—Egor Ligachev, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and Vadim Medvedev, among others—have recently disclosed that Soviet leaders sometimes gathered informally before Politburo sessions to iron out their different views of highly controversial issues.[42] As a rule, these informal meetings (referred to obliquely as "exchanges of opinions") were not included in the final transcripts of official Politburo sessions. Hence, it is eminently conceivable that an unrecorded preliminary meeting on 10 December 1981 featured at least some give-and-take regarding Soviet military options vis-a-vis Poland. Nevertheless, even if that is the case, it does not change the basic fact that the consensus by the time of the formal Politburo session on December 10 was in full accord with Suslov's non-interventionist stance. The outcome in this case is of greater interest than the process that may have led up to it.

Having set out all along to resolve the crisis through martial law rather than through direct military intervention, Soviet leaders did everything they could to ensure that an "internal solution" would succeed. The rapid expansion of Poland's ZOMO forces during the crisis went largely unnoticed thanks to the distractions provided by a long succession of Warsaw Pact military exercises and by the buildup of Soviet and allied troops along Poland's borders. Equally important, Soviet military officials carefully assessed the reliability of elite Polish army units who would eventually be responsible, along with the ZOMO and other security forces, for carrying out the martial-law operation. At one point, this involved a tour of the whole country by eighteen Soviet generals who asked detailed questions at each military garrison about the readiness of Polish commanders to perform their duty against "counterrevolution."[43] Similarly, diplomats at the Soviet embassy and consulates in Poland were ordered to monitor and report back on the reliability of Polish troops and security forces in their vicinity.[44] These constantly updated assessments, and similar information flowing into Moscow from Soviet intelligence agents, were crucial when Polish and Soviet leaders settled on the final options for martial law in November and early December 1981. By that point, the sentiment in Moscow was so strongly in favor of proceeding with the imposition of martial law, and the plans and preparations were so far advanced, that it is doubtful whether any gestures or concessions on Solidarity's part, no matter how dramatic, could have averted the crackdown.[45]

As elaborate as all these preparations were, there was always some risk that the "internal solution" would encounter unexpected problems. Had that been the case, it is far from clear what would have happened. There is no indication that the Soviet Politburo ever arrived at a final decision in 1981 on whether to invade Poland if "Operation X" (the code-name for the martial-law operation) collapsed. Most political leaders and collective bodies tend to put off onerous decisions until the last possible moment. That was certainly true of the CPSU Politburo under Brezhnev, and all evidence suggests that the members of that body were inclined to defer a final decision about military intervention in Poland as long as possible.[46] There is no doubt that the Soviet Union had serious contingency plans to "enter and occupy Polish territory" and "neutralize the Polish army" on 13 or 14 December 1981 if the martial-law operation went disastrously awry, but there is equal reason to believe that no decision was ever made on whether those plans should be implemented.[47]

The postponement of any final decision would have made perfect sense if Soviet leaders had been highly confident in December 1981 that Jaruzelski would successfully impose martial law and resolve the whole crisis without external help; but, interestingly enough, the transcript from the CPSU Politburo's meeting on 10 December 1981 suggests that no such confidence existed.[48] The outlook in Moscow just three days before "Operation X" began was far more somber than one might have expected. The problem was not that Soviet leaders doubted the soundness of the plans and preparations for martial law, which they had helped supervise. On the contrary, Gromyko assured his fellow Politburo members that "we can expect positive results if the measures that [the Polish authorities] intend to carry out are indeed implemented." The problem, instead, was that no one in Moscow was certain whether Jaruzelski would actually follow through in the end and, if so, "what direction the events in Poland will take." Andropov, for example, said there were "very disturbing signs" that Jaruzelski "is abandoning the idea of carrying out this step" and trying "to find some way to extricate himself." Gromyko likewise expressed dismay that "Jaruzelski is now vacillating again" and that "the Polish leadership . . . is continuing to relinquish its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures." Others at the meeting complained that Jaruzelski was in a "highly agitated state [and] has been transformed into a man who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities." These sorts of comments hardly imply great optimism.

At the same time, the transcript and other documents confirm that Soviet leaders had not given up all hope as of December 10; far from it. They were confident enough about the prospects for an "internal solution" that they saw no need to give Jaruzelski a direct military guarantee as a hedge against the possible collapse of "Operation X." There is ample evidence, both in the Politburo's documents and in recent first-hand accounts by senior participants, that Jaruzelski tried to obtain such a guarantee but was rebuffed.[49] Jaruzelski himself has now claimed that he did not ask for a Soviet military guarantee in the lead-up to "Operation X," but even if that is so, the evidence clearly suggests that the members of the CPSU Politburo *believed* he wanted a guarantee and that they felt they had to "dispel any notions that Jaruzelski and other top officials in Poland may have" about receiving military assistance.[50] The Soviet leadership's unwillingness to provide Jaruzelski with a military guarantee was due in part to concern that any such promise might become a crutch that would cause the Polish leader to refrain from implementing martial law as forcefully as he should. "If [the Polish authorities] show any sign of wavering during the struggle against the counterrevolution or afterwards," Gromyko warned, "nothing will remain of socialist Poland."[51] Even more important, however, was the Soviet Politburo's collective desire to avoid any decisions about military intervention unless events in Poland unexpectedly took a disastrous turn.

This collective desire to put off a decision outweighed whatever benefits the Soviet Union might have gained by extending

a military guarantee. Because serious doubts persisted about Jaruzelski's resolve, Soviet leaders might have tried to spur him into action by providing a guarantee. The fact that they declined to do so suggests that they did not yet want to consider how they should respond in a worst-case scenario. It also suggests that they had a fall-back option in case Jaruzelski let them down and failed to pursue "Operation X." The exact nature of this fall-back option was not specified at the meeting on December 10, but a top aide to Jaruzelski in 1980-81, Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, and the Polish defense minister at the time, Army-General Florian Siwicki, have both revealed that Soviet officials intended, if necessary, to remove Jaruzelski (just as they earlier removed Kania) and to replace him with Army-General Eugeniusz Molczyk, Army-General Wlodzimierz Sawczuk, a civilian like Tadeusz Grabski, or some other ultra-hardline figure who would have been willing to implement a full-scale crackdown.[52] Soviet leaders still preferred to rely on Jaruzelski, for it would have been very difficult to replace him, and a new regime under a hardline successor would probably have come under severe challenge at home. Gromyko, Suslov, and Andropov all expressed serious reservations about "forcing [the Poles] to adopt one course or another" or "pushing them too hard to adopt decisive measures."[53] Nevertheless, if Jaruzelski had continued to "vacillate and lose his nerve" indefinitely (as Gromyko put it), the Soviet authorities planned to bring in someone else who would implement "Operation X" once and for all.

The Soviet leadership's pursuit of an "internal solution" to the Polish crisis was by no means a departure from its responses to previous crises in Eastern Europe. In Hungary and Poland in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union applied pressures short of direct intervention and sought to work out an "internal solution" that would preclude the need for an invasion. In each case, Soviet officials viewed military action as a last-ditch option, to be used only after all other measures had failed. In Poland in 1956 an internal solution that left Gomulka in power did prove feasible, whereas in Hungary and later in Czechoslovakia all attempts to reassert Soviet control "from within" proved futile, leading in the end to direct Soviet military intervention. During the 1980-81 Polish crisis, Soviet officials drew up plans for a full-scale invasion (as discussed above), but these plans were to be implemented only if the Polish authorities failed to restore order on their own. Preparations for the imposition of martial law began well before Soviet military officials started laying the groundwork for an invasion, and the "internal" option was deemed throughout to be vastly preferable to direct "fraternal assistance" from outside. Only in a worst-case scenario, in which the martial law operation collapsed and full-scale civil war erupted in Poland, does it seem at all likely that the Soviet Union would have shifted toward the "external" option.

In most respects, then, the Soviet Union's response to the 1980-81 Polish crisis was very much in line with its responses to previous East European crises. In each case Soviet leaders sought to effect an "internal solution" before taking the extreme step of ordering an invasion. What was *different* about the 1980-81 case is that the "internal" option proved successful and, moreover, that this success was so crucial to Soviet policy. After all, the resort to military force against Hungary and Czechoslovakia, though undertaken as a last-ditch measure after other options had failed, did permit the reestablishment and consolidation of Soviet control over those countries, paving the way for intensive periods of "normalization." By contrast, a Soviet invasion of Poland in December 1981 would most likely have exacerbated, rather than resolved, the crisis. Unlike in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where Soviet troops intervened primarily against wayward Communist party leaders, the top levels of the PZPR and the highest-ranking Polish military commanders remained loyal to Moscow throughout the 18-month crisis.[54] An invasion in 1981 would therefore have had to be directed against the whole Polish population, and not merely against a well-defined target at the top. The prospect of encountering armed resistance among the populace and among lower- and middle-ranking segments of the Polish military (*a la* Hungary in 1956) would have severely complicated any Soviet invasion plans. Poland's population in 1981 was four times the size of Hungary's in 1956 and 2.5 times the size of Czechoslovakia's in 1968; and the Poles, unlike the Czechs, had a long tradition of taking up arms against foreign invaders. Poland's ability to put up formidable resistance against Soviet troops had been enough to deter Khrushchev in 1956, and the same calculation would have bedeviled Soviet military commanders in 1981.

Furthermore, even if Soviet forces could have subdued the country and overcome all resistance, they would have been faced with the daunting task of reviving the Polish economy and political system. In the wake of a bloody invasion, it is inconceivable that the Polish population would have assisted or complied with attempts at "normalization." The likely result, instead, would have been an outright collapse of the formal Polish economy, with Soviet troops left to manage factories virtually on their own. The Soviet Union would have been forced to embark on a long-term military occupation of Poland, with no guarantee that stability would be restored in the end.

Nevertheless, despite all these problems and the overwhelming reluctance of Soviet leaders to undertake a costly invasion at a time when they were already bogged down in Afghanistan, it still seems hard to believe that the CPSU Politburo would have refrained from sending in troops if the Polish authorities had been unwilling or unable to sustain martial law.[55] Although Andropov claimed at the Politburo's meeting on 10 December 1981 that the Soviet Union would "not send in troops . . . even if Poland falls under the control of Solidarity," this statement was clearly an anomaly (and it is not apparent what Andropov's motivations were in making it).[56] At no other point during the crisis did Brezhnev or any top Soviet official display the slightest inclination to accept the permanent "loss" of Poland or to stand by if the martial-law operation collapsed and civil war broke out.[57] On the contrary, the statement by Gromyko cited above—that the Soviet Union must hold onto Poland no matter what the cost—summed up the prevailing mood in Moscow very well. As one of the other members of the CPSU Politburo in 1980-81 later recalled, "the Soviet leadership [during the crisis] believed that under no circumstances must Poland be allowed to leave the Warsaw Pact."[58] Brezhnev and his colleagues repeatedly affirmed that they would "not leave fraternal socialist Poland in the lurch" and that "the socialist commonwealth is indissoluble and its defense is a matter not only for individual states but for the socialist coalition as a whole."[59] The exact same phrases were used about Czecho-

THE WARSAW PACT AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-81:
Honecker's Call for Military Intervention

Translated and Introduced by Mark Kramer

The following letter, dated 26 November 1980, comes from the archive of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the former German Democratic Republic (DDR). It is one of many valuable documents pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis that have been collected from the East German archives by a group of researchers at the Free University of Berlin. These documents are now being published (in the original German) in a multi-volume collection entitled *SED-Politburo und polnische Krise 1980/1982*. The item translated below is included in the first volume (Band 1: 1980), which was published in January 1993. Volumes covering 1981 and 1982 are currently in preparation.

The letter below was sent by Erich Honecker, the SED General Secretary, to the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, during a tense phase of the 17-month crisis in Poland. At the time, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), Stanisaw Kania, was coming under intense pressure both at home and abroad as strikes escalated and the unofficial trade union Solidarity posed an ever greater political challenge to the PZPR. For the previous three months, Brezhnev and his colleagues had been urging the Polish authorities to take "extraordinary measures" against the "anti-socialist opposition forces," but Kania gave little indication that he could resort to such steps anytime soon. As the crisis deepened and the Polish authorities failed to act, frustration and alarm in Moscow and the other East-bloc capitals, especially East Berlin and Prague, steadily increased.

The extent of East Germany's concern about the situation in Poland is immediately apparent from both the tone and the content of Honecker's letter. The letter expresses "extraordinary fear" about the situation in Poland and urges the Soviet Union to convene an emergency meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders to consider the possibility of "fraternal" military intervention. Honecker declared that "counterrevolutionary" forces would gain an ever greater hold in Poland unless the "healthy" Polish comrades received "collective assistance" from their Warsaw Pact allies. Any delay in acting, he warned, would mean "the death of socialist Poland." Honecker indicated that his plea for an urgent meeting was supported by the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian Communist party leaders, Gustv Husk and Todor Zhivkov. Although Honecker expressed a willingness to intervene in support of Kania, he also seemed to have in mind the formation of an alternative group of Polish leaders who would be willing to carry out the harsh crackdown that Soviet officials had been demanding. No doubt, Honecker was aware that the Soviet Union had already begun encouraging the formation of just such an alternative, hard-line regime in Warsaw.

The sentiments expressed in the letter hardly come as a surprise. East German officials had been denouncing Solidarity from the moment it was formed, and Honecker had never tried to conceal his desire to see the PZPR reassert its authority by any means necessary. When the Polish authorities deferred taking harsh action against Solidarity, the East German leader resorted to conspicuous measures of his own to spur Kania into action and prevent a "spill-over" of the turmoil into the DDR. The East German media launched vehement attacks against Solidarity throughout the fall of 1980, and in late October the DDR imposed tight restrictions on travel to and from Poland. By the time Honecker sent his letter to Brezhnev in late November, he had ordered the whole East German border with Poland to be sealed off, a process that was completed by November 30. In addition, he had ordered East German army units and border guards to be put on high combat alert so they would be ready to take part in any "joint" actions that the Warsaw Pact might pursue. Honecker's unrelenting campaign to persuade the Soviet Union to lend "fraternal assistance" to Poland was reminiscent of the efforts that his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, had made in 1968 to promote armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. Unlike in 1968, however, an "internal solution" ultimately proved feasible in Poland and thus eliminated the need for external military action.

Enclosure # 2 to Protocol #49 from 28.11.1980

26 November 1980

To the General Secretary of the CPSU CC
Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev

Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich!

In the Politburo of the SED CC we have discussed the current situation in the People's Republic of Poland, and have unanimously concluded that there is an urgent necessity to convene a meeting of the General and First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of our community of states. We believe that the situation developing in the People's Republic of Poland should be discussed with Comrade S. Kania in order to work out collective measures to assist the Polish friends in overcoming the crisis, which, as you know, has been intensifying day after day.

Unfortunately, one can already say that the Polish comrades' stopover in Moscow, and the timely counsel that you gave, had no decisive influence on the situation in Poland, which we had all been hoping for.

According to information we have received through various channels, counterrevolutionary forces in the People's Republic of Poland are on the constant offensive, and any delay in acting against them would mean death — the death of socialist Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts may perhaps have been premature; today they are essential; and tomorrow they would already be too late.

It would obviously be appropriate if we meet together in Moscow for a day right after the plenum of the PZPR CC, the decisions of which, in our view, will not be able to change the course of events in Poland in any fundamental way.

So far as I know, Comrades Husak and Zhivkov also have been expressing their desire for us to convene on an urgent basis to discuss this question. It would be best to do so next week. We believe that offering collective advice and possible assistance from the fraternal countries to Comrade Kania would only be to his benefit.

We ask you, esteemed Leonid Ilyich, to understand our extraordinary fears about the situation in Poland. We know that you also share these fears.

With Communist greetings,

E. Honecker
General Secretary of the SED CC

slovakia in August 1968.

No one can ever be truly certain, however, what would have happened if "Operation X" had collapsed amid widespread violence and the Soviet Politburo had been forced to decide whether to send in troops. The difficulty of carrying out an invasion of Poland and of coping with its aftermath would have been so great that it would have changed the course of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe for many years to come. As it was, the success of Jaruzelski's "internal solution" precluded any test of Moscow's restraint and restored conformity to the Soviet bloc at relatively low cost. The surprisingly smooth imposition of martial law ("*stan wojenny*") in Poland also helped prevent any further disruption in Soviet-East European relations during the last year of Brezhnev's rule and the next two-and-a-half years under Andropov and Chernenko.

The lack of any major political turmoil in Eastern Europe between 1982 and 1985 seems especially surprising at first glance, for this was a period of great uncertainty not only because of the post-Brezhnev succession in Moscow, but also because of the impending successions in most of the other Warsaw Pact countries. The last time the Soviet Union had experienced a prolonged leadership transition, between 1953 and 1957, numerous crises arose in the Eastern bloc: in Plzen, Czechoslovakia and in East Germany in June 1953, in Poznan in June 1956, and in Poland and Hungary in October-November 1956. Moreover, during the 1953-56 period, all the East European countries underwent one or more changes in their Communist party leadership, just as the Soviet Union did. By contrast, no such upheavals or leadership changes occurred in Eastern Europe between 1982 and 1985. This unusual placidity cannot be attributed to any single factor, but the martial law crackdown of December 1981 and the invasions of 1956 and 1968 are probably a large part of the explanation. After Stalin's death in 1953, the limits of what could be changed in Eastern Europe were still unknown, but by the early 1980s the Soviet Union had evinced its willingness and ability to use extreme measures, when necessary, to prevent or reverse "deviations from socialism."

1. See my translations of these documents in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*. I have translated other published and unpublished documents for the appendices in my forthcoming Working Paper.

2. See my translation of a key November 1980 Honecker-to-Brezhnev letter and highlights from other East German documents gathered by the Free University group in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

3. "O prazdnovanii pervogo maya i godovshchiny so dnya prinyatiya konstitutsii 3 maya (Politicheskaya zapiska)," Cable No. 68 (SECRET), 4 May 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 6-12; "Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis'mo)," 9 July 1981, Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET) from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34; and "Ob ideino-politicheskikh kontseptsiyakh 'reformatorskogo kryla' v PORP (Spravka)," Cable No. 531 (SECRET) 22 June 1981, from V. Mutskii, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 116-121.

4. "Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S"ezda," Cable No. 596 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin Rusakov, head of the CPSU CC Department for intra-bloc affairs, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53.

5. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda: O prieme v SSSR partiino-gosudarstvennoi delegatsii PNR i ustnom poslanii t. Brezhneva L. I. t. V. Yaruzel'skomu," No. P37/21 (TOP SECRET), 21 November 1981, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 27, L. 3.

6. "Vneshnyaya politika PNR na nyneshnem etape (Politpis'mo)," Cable No. 595 (TOP SECRET), 9 July 1981, from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 21-34.

7. Ibid., l. 27. See also "Voprosy vneshnei politiki na IX S"ezde PORP (Informatsiya)," Cable No. 652 (SECRET), 10 August 1981, from Yu. Ivanov, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Poland, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 598, Ll. 170-176.

8. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1980 goda: Materialy k druzhestvennomu rabochemu vizitu v SSSR pol'skikh rukovoditelei," 29 October 1980 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 31, L. 3.

9. Vladimir Lomeiko, "Kto zhe dolbit dyry v pol'skoi lodke," *Literaturnaya gazeta* (Moscow) 3 (21 January 1981), 14.

10. "Rech' tovarishcha M. A. Suslova," *Pravda* (Moscow), 13 April 1981, 4.

11. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 242/61gs Sekretariata TsK: O nekotorykh dopolnitel'nykh merakh po kontrolyu za rasprostraneniem pol'skoi pechati v SSSR," No. St-242/61gs (TOP SECRET), 22 December 1980, with attached reports, in TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 46, D. 81, Ll. 1-26. Quoted passages are from ll. 1 and 6.

12. V. Stanley Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," *Problems of Communism* 33:4 (July-August 1983), 21-34, and Jean Pennar, "Demonstrations and Dissent in Estonia," *Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty* 384/80 (17 October 1980).

13. "K voprosu o t.n. 'nezavisimom profsoyuze'," Report No. 655-L (SECRET), 5 April 1978, from Yu. V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU CC Politburo, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 18, D. 73, L. 1. The first attempt, in January 1978, was made by a long-time activist and mining engineer, Vladimir Klebanov, whose "Association of Free Trade Unions of Workers" was forcefully disbanded less than two weeks after it was founded. The second attempt, in April 1978, was by Vsevolod Kuvakin, who set up a short-lived "Independent Trade Union of Workers." The third attempt, by a group known as the "Free Interprofessional Amalgamation of Workers," lasted longer than the other two, from October 1978 until it was crushed in the spring of 1980. For further details, see Betty Gidwitz, "Labor Unrest in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, 31:6 (November-December 1982), 25-42; "The Independent Trade-Union Movement in the Soviet Union," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 304/79 (11 October 1979); and Karl Schogel, *Opposition sowjetischer Arbeiter heute* (Koln: Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1981).

14. "Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: O nekotorykh negativnykh proyavleniyakh, svyazannykh s nedostatkami v organizatsii v oplate truda rabochikh i sluzhashchikh," St-233/8s (TOP SECRET), 24 October 1980, with attached documents, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 13, D. 37, Ll. 1-12. Quoted passages are from ll. 4 and 9.

15. "Poslanie do ludzi pracy w Europie Wschodniej," *Tygodnik Solidarnosc* (Warsaw) 25 (18 September 1981), 6.

16. See, e.g., Dmitrii Ustinov, "Protiv gonki vooruzhenii i ugrozy voiny," *Pravda*, 25 July 1981, p. 4; "Soveshchanie sekretarei tsentral'nykh komitetov kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran," *Pravda*, 5 November 1981, 4; and "Vysokoe prizvanie i otvetsvennost': Rech' tovarishcha M. A. Suslova," *Pravda*, 15 October 1981, 2.

17. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 6-7, 17-19.

18. For ample first-hand evidence of this pressure, see "Dokumenty 'Komisji Suslowa'," 19-20; "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," 10-11; "O nekotorykh momentakh po vnutripoliticheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovke v Pil'skom voevodstve (Politicheskaya zapiska)," Cable No. 18 (TOP SECRET), 20 January 1981, from N. P. Ponomarev, Soviet consul-general in Szczecin, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 1-5; Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," 53-55; Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego*, 102-107, 317-318, 451-454, and 497-511; and Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje*, esp. 73-118, 231-243.

19. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda," L. 5.

20. Ibid., Ll. 5-6.

21. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 9 aprelya 1981 goda: 3. Ob itogakh vstrechi t.t. Andropova Yu. V. i Ustinova, D. F. s pol'skimi druz'yami," 9 April 1981 (TOP SECRET), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 40, Ll. 2-9. See also a number of other transcripts in "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," 11.

22. "Polozhenie v PORP posle IX S"ezda," Cable No. 857 (TOP SECRET), 4 November 1981, from B. I. Aristov, Soviet ambassador in Poland, to Konstantin Rusakov of the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 596, Ll. 35-53.

23. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 goda: 2. O besede tov. Brezhneva L. I. s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP tov. S. Kanei (po telefonu)," 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 2-3.

24. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 21-22.

25. "Eventualna interventsiya sreshchu Polsha e mozhela da stane 'vtori kurvav Afganistan'," *Duma* (Sofia), 20 November 1990, 3.

26. "TsK KPSS," Memorandum No. 682-OP (SPECIAL DOSSIER—TOP SECRET), 28 August 1980, from M. A. Suslov, A. A. Gromyko, Yu. V. Andropov,

D. F. Ustinov, and K. Yu. Chernenko to the CPSU Politburo, in APRF/Osobaya Papka.
27. Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," 54.
28. "Vladislav Achalov: Takoe vpechatlenie, chto nikto nikogda nikogo nichemu ne uchil," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Moscow), 7 February 1995, 7.
29. Maj.-General Vladimir Dudnik, "Tainy 'temnoi komnaty'," *Moskovskie novosti* 14 (5 April 1992), 17; and "Juz siedzielismy w czolgach: Z generalem majorem Stanislawem Prochazka, rozmawia Leszek Mazan," *Polityka* (Warsaw) 37 (15 September 1990), 13. See also "Generalmajor S. Prochazka z vojenske obrody rika: 'Meli jsme okupovat Polsko'," *Zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 16 August 1990, 1.
30. "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Cable No. 183 (TOP SECRET), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19.
31. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 22-24.
32. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 37 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 noyabrya 1981 goda," L. 6; and "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," L. 18.
33. "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," L. 19.
34. "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," 10.
35. See, e.g., "Vermerk uber ein Gesprach des Generalsekretars des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR, Erich Honecker, mit Genossen Stefan Olszowski, Mitglied des Politburos und Sekretar des ZK der Polnischen Vereinigten Arbeiterpartei," 20 November 1980, in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2 A/2363.
36. "Anlage Nr. 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 48 vom 28.11.1980," in SAPMDB, ZPA, J, IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.
37. For the Soviet Politburo's assessment of the meeting, see "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 11 dekabrya 1980 goda: 1. Ob itogakh vstrechi rukovodyashchikh deyatelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora, sostoyavsheisya v Moskve 5 dekabrya 1980 goda," 11 December 1980, Rabochaya zapis' (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 59, Ll. 1-3.
38. "'Wir Bruderlander stehen fest'," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg) 42 (19 October 1992), 95, 97, 99.
39. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 goda: 2. Ob itogakh poezdki t. Rusakova K. V. v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i NRB," 22 October 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, esp. L. 5.
40. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, Ll. 1-11.
41. "Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respublike," No. P210/P (TOP SECRET), 25 August 1980, in TsKhSD, F. 89, F. 42, D. 22.
42. E. K. Ligachev, *Zagadka Gorbacheva* (Novosibirsk: Interbuk, 1992), 215; N. V. Ryzhkov, *Perestroika i istoriya predatel'stv* (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 78-79; V. A. Medvedev, *V komande Gorbacheva: Vzglyad iznutri* (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), 107-108; and V. A. Medvedev, *Raspad: Kak on nazreval v "mirovoi sisteme sotsializma"* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), 175, 312. In a typical comment on this matter, Ligachev reported (p. 215) that "it was a normal working practice of the highest Party leadership to hold special [ekst*rennye*] working meetings for the members of the Politburo and the CC Secretaries on different contentious matters that came up. Usually such meetings were convened by the General Secretary himself or by someone whom he authorized to do so. In the absence of the General Secretary, the meetings were led by whoever had been designated to 'mind the store.' Such meetings differed from official sessions of the Politburo in that they were not empowered to adopt decrees, but would only work out recommendations that would be affirmed later on. This practice began decades ago."
43. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 31.
44. "O nekotorykh aspektakh raboty Pol'skikh organov gosbezopasnosti po presecheniyu podryvnoi deyatel'nosti oppozitsii (Informatsiya na osnove besed s rabotnikami gosbezopasnosti PNR)," Cable No. 931 (TOP SECRET), 30 November 1981, from A. Kovalev, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 29-31; "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldatov i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Ll. 17-19; "O politicheskoi situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politpis'mo)," Cable No. 179 (TOP SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22; and "O trevozhnykh faktakh dal'neishego davleniya na organy Narodnoi militsii (MO)," Cable No. 94 (SECRET), 27 May 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 2-3.
45. Komisja resortowej badajacej dokumentacje zwiazana ze stanem wojennym, "O planach wprowadzenia stanu wojennego," (Warsaw: unpublished report, December 1990), pp. 15-47.
46. For a general discussion of Soviet decision-making during the Brezhnev era, see Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
47. On the contingency plans, see the comments of senior officers involved in the planning: Gribkov, "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," 54-55; Dudnik, "Tainy 'temnoi komnaty'," 17; and "Misja skonczona: Wywiad z generalem Wiktorem Dubyninem, dowodca wojsk bylego ZSRR w Polsce," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 14-15 March 1992, 8-9. Dubynin offered similar, though less detailed, comments in a subsequent interview with *Novoe vremya* 27 (July 1992), 26-27.
48. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, Ll. 1-11.
49. The highly controversial question of whether Jaruzelski sought a military guarantee in December 1981 is discussed in much greater detail in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper.
50. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 5.
51. Ibid.
52. Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 4-5; and Wojciech Zaluska, "Strach generalow: Siwicki przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej," *Gazeta wyborcza*, 13 May 1994, 2. Jaruzelski, too, has argued this point; see his *Stan wojenny*, 252.
53. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," Ll. 5-7.
54. Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Martial Law and the Reliability of the Polish Military," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984), 239-240. See also Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, *The Polish Drama: 1980-1982* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), esp. 109, 112-13, and 138-39.
55. Kuklinski is adamant on this point ("Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," 4), but it should be emphasized that he was no longer in Warsaw in December 1981, when Soviet leaders would have had to decide whether to intervene if martial law failed. Moreover, Kuklinski also believes that Jaruzelski (or some other leader) could have deterred a Soviet invasion by mobilizing the army and population as Gomulka did in 1956. The question of whether the Soviet Union would have invaded has been a source of intense controversy both inside and outside Poland; for sharply conflicting views, see the items cited in the first part of this essay pertaining to Jaruzelski, Kania, Rakowski, Pavlov, Gribkov, Dubynin, Prochazka, Gorbachev, Dudnik, and Achalov.
56. "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda," L. 4.
57. The emphasis here is on the permanency of the "loss." Even Andropov's statement suggests no more than a willingness to accept a temporary "loss."
58. Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev, in "Gorbaczow o stanie wojennym w Polsce: General Jaruzelski postapil prawidlowo," *Trybuna*, 9 November 1992, 2.
59. "Sovetsko-pol'skaya vstrecha," *Pravda*, 5 March 1981, 1.

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People's Republic of Poland and in the CSSR in 1968": "In both their essence and their goals, and also partly in their methods, there is a striking congruity. The only differences are in the priority of demands, the concrete plan of attack, and the timetable for the counterrevolutionary offensive." (ZPA J IV 2/2/1859, Bl. 56.) *The SED was convinced that the opposition in Poland was seeking not only reform, but the outright elimination of socialism.*

This direct comparison with Prague in 1968 was the basis on which the SED Politburo would act thereafter, both publicly and privately, in its policy toward its eastern neighbors. On 30 September 1980 the SED Politburo, backed by Brezhnev, urged the convocation of a meeting of the party leaders of the Warsaw Pact states to consider the Polish question. (*Ibid.*, Bl. 2.) In so doing the SED wanted to set in motion the Warsaw Pact's consultative mechanism according to the model of Prague 1968.

The Polish Supreme Court's decision on 11 November 1980 to accept the existence of the trade union "Solidarity" in Warsaw without requiring the "PZPR's leading role" to be upheld within the trade union was, for the SED leadership, the point at which the "capitulation" of the PZPR leadership had gone so far that intervention from outside could no longer be avoided. On 20 November Honecker expressed his disappointment regarding the weak behavior of the PZPR leadership to the acting Polish ambassador in the GDR, Olszowski, in the following way: "*Without a doubt this compromise was an immense setback for everyone who was still hoping that you could resolve your problems on your own.*" (ZPA J IV 2/2 A/2363.) From the SED Politburo's point of view, the situation in Poland in the fall of 1980 was already more dire than in the CSSR in 1968 under Dubcek. When speaking with Olszowski, Honecker left no doubt about the aggressive stance of the SED: "*We do not favor bloodshed. That is only a last resort. But even this last resort must be applied at certain times. . . . That was our experience in 1953, and it was also the case during the 1956 crisis in Hungary and again in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Our point of departure is that . . . we cannot be indifferent to the fate of the People's Republic of Poland. We will act accordingly. You can count on us, on our aid, on every form of assistance.*" (*Ibid.*)

On 25 November [1980] the SED Politburo decided to distribute "internal party materials" on the Polish crisis. This "information" for the district and county party leaders and for the heads of the SED CC departments was clearly intended to provide guidelines for agitation and propaganda in case intervention was decided upon. (ZPA J IV 2/2/1867, Bl. 6-16.) On 26 November, Honecker finally appealed to Brezhnev with the urgent request "*. . . to devise measures of collective assistance for the Polish friends to permit them to surmount the crisis.*" (ZPA J IV 2/2-1868, Bl. 5.) In the process, Honecker pleaded with Brezhnev for a solution to the Polish crisis from outside via the Warsaw Pact states: "*According to information we have received through various channels, counterrevolutionary forces in the People's Republic of Poland are on the constant offensive, and any delay in acting against them would mean death — the death of socialist Poland. Yesterday our collective efforts may perhaps have been premature; today they are essential; and tomorrow they would already be too late It would obviously be appropriate if we meet together in Moscow for a day right after the plenum of the PZPR CC, the decisions of which, in our view, will not be able to change the course of events in Poland in any fundamental way.*" (*Ibid.*)

After Brezhnev reacted positively to Honecker's proposal, the SED Politburo met on 28 November in a special session in Strausberg—the site of the GDR Defense Ministry—and authorized the sending of the letter and, hence, Honecker's suggestions. In a session on 2 December the same body decided on the composition of the SED delegation for the meeting: Erich Honecker, Willi Stoph, Hermann Axen, Heinz Hoffmann, and Erich Mielke. In addition, the outline of the General Secretary's speech was approved at this session, and Honecker was given general plenipotentiary authority. (ZPA J IV 2/2/1896, Bl. 2.)

Before the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states on 5 December in Moscow, the situation in and around Poland had come to a dramatic head. Western observers expected that an intervention by the Soviet Union or by the whole Warsaw Pact would take place on 8 December 1980. Massive troop movements and concentrations could be observed all around Poland. U.S. President Carter warned Brezhnev, in a personal letter on 3 December, to avoid "forcing a solution from outside on the Polish nation." Similar warnings came from other NATO governments and from the European Community. Even so, the press secretary for the PZPR CC, Josef Klasa, explained on 4 December that the ". . . Polish communists have the right and the duty to ask the Soviet Union and other countries for help in combatting counterrevolution." (Europa-Archiv. Series 1981, p. Z6.)

On 5 December the party and state leaders of the Eastern military coalition gathered for their conference in Moscow. They voted against intervention in Poland at that time. The Polish leadership's willingness to resort to martial law to overcome the "counterrevolution" played a crucial role in the avoidance of a military attack from outside. *The Polish party leader Kania suggested the imposition of a "state of war" as a solution to the Polish crisis*: ". . . a staff set up by the Politburo is working under the supervision of the premier, and this staff is preparing a full range of different measures. These include, among other things, the question of introducing a state of war in Poland. . . . Preparations are also under way for an operation to arrest the most active supporters of the counterrevolution. . . . We will set up special groups of the most reliable party members who will, if necessary, be equipped with firearms. We have already selected 19,000 such party members, and we believe that by the end of December there will be around 30,000. . . ." (ZPA J IV 2/2 A-2368.)

Even though the assembled party leaders agreed to pursue an internal Polish solution, the threat of intervention remained in place. As Bulgarian party leader [Todor] Zhivkov explained: ". . . Poland must act decisively and must rely on both peaceful and non-peaceful measures. . . . If that does not happen, . . . then the Polish comrades will have no alternative but to appeal for help from their allies. We, too, will have no alternative, neither they nor we. . . ." (*Ibid.*)

In his Moscow speech Erich Honecker reaffirmed the SED's willingness to cooperate in crushing the independent trade union and democratic movement in Poland: ". . . We also have a responsibility to our own people and to our friends all over the world. They count on us to give help to the Polish comrades in prevailing over the counterrevolution." (*Ibid.*) *In addition, he recom-*

mended the violent suppression of the Polish opposition analogous to the crises of 1953, 1956, and 1968.

Referring to economic and military interests, Brezhnev emphasized in his summary report that "*the situation in Poland and the danger hanging over Poland are not just Polish concerns. They are the concern of us all*." In accord with the doctrine named after him, he further declared that neither Poland's own communists nor the friends and allies of Poland would permit Poland to be torn from the socialist community. "Poland was and will remain an inviolable member of the . . . system of socialism." (*Ibid.*)

The decision of the Warsaw Pact states not to intervene in Poland in December 1980 was of course accepted by the SED leadership, but this decision did not correspond with the SED's appraisal of the situation in Poland. As is evident from documents that have been uncovered, the SED Politburo mistrusted the Polish communists and no longer believed the Polish leaders were capable of a forcible solution to the Polish crisis. The SED leaders favored a solution analogous to what was done in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and they did everything they could to gain support for that option in the CPSU, which retained final decision-making authority on whether to pursue such a step. *The option of having the Warsaw Pact states violently suppress the Polish opposition was what appealed to the SED leadership, who kept the option alive.*

Along with materials on the SED Politburo's position vis-a-vis the "Polish crisis," the documentation also contains extensive archives on intra-German relations, on the SED's policy toward the church, and on the mounting economic problems in the GDR.

The publication of corresponding documents from the years 1981/82 is currently being prepared by scholars from the "SED-State Research Group."

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country. The complexity of the struggle against it stems, in particular, from the fact that the members of the opposition disguise themselves as defenders of the working class and as laborers.

The agreement does not eliminate the underlying causes of the crisis events; and what is more, the urgent problems of the Polish economy and Polish society are now becoming more complicated.

Because the opposition intends to continue the struggle to achieve its aims, and the healthy forces of the party and society cannot acquiesce in regressive movement by Polish society, the compromise that has been achieved will be only temporary in nature. One must bear in mind that the opposition is expecting, not without reason, that help will be forthcoming from outside.

2. Under the pressure of anti-socialist forces, who have succeeded in leading astray a significant portion of the working class, the PZPR had to go on the defensive. Now the problem is how to prepare a counterattack and reclaim the positions that have been lost among the working class and the people.

In launching this counterattack, it would be advisable to use all the capabilities afforded by the ruling party and its strong, healthy core, by the state apparatus, and by mass social organizations, while showing political flexibility. These institutions will provide necessary support to the vanguard ranks of the working class. In the event of necessity, it would be advisable to use the contemplated administrative means.

The party must give a principled political evaluation of the August events and must also accelerate the formulation of its own program of action, which will include steps to improve the life of workers.

3. It is necessary to give overriding significance to the consolidation of the leading role of the party in society.

The current political crisis has sharply weakened the influence and authority of the party among the working class. In such circumstances one must adopt all necessary measures for its organizational and ideological cohesion and for the reestablishment of its influence and authority.

Among some concrete recommendations, one might list the following:

—On an urgent basis, carry out measures to raise the combativeness of all party organizations, taking account of the lessons of the political crisis. Act decisively in removing people who are clearly alien to the party, while conforming with the specific conditions existing right now in the country.

—Convene a plenum of the Central Committee as soon as possible in order to work out a detailed, positive program specifying the main policy directions. The program must, in particular, undercut the significance of the demands of the strike committees in Gdansk and Szczecin as much as possible in the eyes of the workers. In accordance with materials from the CC plenum, convene expanded plenary sessions of PZPR provincial, city, and county committees, sessions of the party aktiv [core members and activists—ed.], and party meetings at enterprises.

—Consider the possibility of convening a party congress, at which a full-scale program of action for the party would be worked out, new directives for the five-year plan would be affirmed, and necessary changes in the leading organs would be introduced.

—An increase in the combativeness of the party in rural locations will require the comprehensive organizational strengthening of the PZPR county committees, which since the administrative reforms of 1975 have been serving in the role of regional committees.

—Consider the direction for the leading work in party organs carried out by experienced political workers of the Polish Army.

4. The reestablishment of the severed link between the party and the working class will require a fundamental renewal of the activity of the trade unions. Do everything necessary to prevent the dissolution or disintegration of the existing trade unions (CRZZ) and their organizations. Convene as soon as possible the regular 9th Congress of the trade unions of Poland, where the foremost task will be to move the trade unions as close as possible to the workers and to earn their full confidence.

—Put up a defense of the basic principles of the trade union movement in the conditions of a socialist society. Abide by certain provisions in the agreement with the ZKS and at the same time adopt all measures to limit and neutralize the effect of the most dangerous articles in the agreement. Come forward with bold initiatives of a social character, which would bolster the authority of the trade unions.

—Raise the quality of personnel in trade union organizations by bringing in advanced, trustworthy workers. Carry out elections of trade union activists before this is done in the so-called "self-managed" trade unions.

—Seek to limit the activity and influence of the so-called "self-managed" trade unions among the masses, a task that will be accomplished predominantly by mobilizing public opinion. Move actively in infiltrating the so-called "self-managed" trade unions with people devoted to the party.

5. In light of the danger created by the activity of the anti-socialist forces, use state structures to carry out necessary measures for the strengthening of the socialist legal order.

—Pay greater attention to the army and devote special attention to the military-political preparation of soldiers. Use the opportunity to attract army command personnel to perform party-economic work as well.

—Adopt necessary measures to expose the political nature and designs of the ringleaders of the opposition.

6. In the sphere of the mass media and propaganda, concentrate efforts on the further strengthening of party leadership and supervision over these organs. This is especially necessary when in practice the question has arisen of the "limitation of censorship" and the expansion of access for the anti-socialist forces and the Church to the mass media.

—In these circumstances it is necessary to provide an elaborate definition of what is permissible, having openly declared that the law on the press forbids any statements against socialism.

—Adopt necessary measures to put an end to the wide circulation of anti-Communist publications, films, and television productions in the PPR, and to maintain strict control over the sources of information emanating from Poland, including the activity of bourgeois journalists.

Strengthen party control over the work of the central and local press, over the leaders of editorial collectives, and above all over the television and radio.

Using the mass media, show that the events in Poland have been caused not by any shortcomings of the socialist system per se, but by mistakes and oversights, and also by some objective factors (natural calamities, etc.). Through the mass media, actively and broadly counteract the anti-Polish and anti-Soviet attacks of hostile propaganda.

Objectively depict the economic advantages Poland derives from broad cooperation with the USSR and other fraternal countries. Refute the widely circulated slander that one of the reasons for the current difficulties in supplying the population of the PPR with consumer goods is the shipment of such goods to the countries of socialism.

* * * * *

After expressing a number of points about the critical situation that has emerged in the PPR, we would like once again to draw the attention of our Polish friends to the recommendations and suggestions that were offered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during the discussions in the Crimea with E. Gierek both in 1979 and especially on 31 July 1980, as well as to the letter of 21 August 1980 addressed to the PZPR CC.

Of particular importance in today's situation are the following suggestions offered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on 31 July 1980:

—carry out, along a wide front, work aimed at fostering socialist internationalism, while de-

cisively rebuffing all attempts to use nationalism in the propagation of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments, as well as all attempts to misrepresent the history of Soviet-Polish relations and the nature of cooperation between the USSR and the PPR;

—launch relentless counterpropaganda against the efforts to water down the class content of socialist patriotism under the slogan of "All Poles in the world are brothers," as well as the efforts to idealize the pre-revolutionary past of Poland; and

—in the political struggle against anti-socialist elements, carry out the appropriate attacks against them, rather than merely going on the defensive.

3 September 1980

* * * * *

CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), 23 April 1981; CPSU CC Politburo Commission Report, "On the Development of the Situation in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part," 16 April 1981; and CPSU CC-Approved Plan of "Measures to Assist the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] in the Organization and Ideological Strengthening of the Party"

To be returned within 3 days to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL DOSSIER

No. P7/VII

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Ponomarev, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Zamyatin, and Rakhmanin — whole package; Afanas'ev, V., Lapin, Losev, Pastukhov, Shibaev, Pegov, Tyazhel'nikov, and Shauro — pt. 2

Extract from Protocol No. 7 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 23 April 1981

On the development of the situation in Poland and certain steps on our part.

1. To approve the ideas put forth in the note of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on the Polish question (see attached).

2. To affirm a plan of measures to lend assistance to the PZPR leadership in the organizational and ideological strengthening of the party (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

On point VII of Prot. No. 7

Top Secret
SPECIAL DOSSIER

To the CPSU CC

On the Development of the Situation in Poland and Certain Steps on Our Part

The internal political crisis in Poland is of a prolonged nature. To a significant degree the PZPR has lost control over the processes under way in society. At the same time, "Solidarity" has been transformed into an organized political force, which is able to paralyze the activity of the party and state organs and take *de facto* power into its own hands. If the opposition has not yet done that, then that is primarily because of its fear that Soviet troops would be introduced and because of its hopes that it can achieve its aims without bloodshed and by means of a creeping counterrevolution.[1]

At the session of the Sejm [Parliament—ed.] on 10 April, the Polish leadership did not dare to raise the matter of decisive actions against the anti-socialist forces. The leadership clearly is unable and does not want to depart from the line adopted to overcome the crisis with the aid of political means.

True, in the report to the Sejm by Comrade Jaruzelski there were a number of provisions in the spirit of the recommendations continually expressed to the Polish comrades by our side. However, they were put forth not in the form of orders, but merely as appeals and suggestions. The compromise nature of the report is also abundantly evident from the fact that it was received calmly and did not provoke a confrontation of the sort that our friends had feared.

Looking upon the results of the Sejm as a modest but initial success, Comrade Kania and his colleagues now are somewhat stepping up their actions to bolster the authority of the party. They have given speeches at a number of large industrial enterprises and have held a meeting with workers and peasants and members of the PZPR CC. On 25 April a regular plenum of the CC is to be held. The preparation of documents is under way for the IX Congress of the PZPR, which must be held by 20 July of this year. Certain steps are being taken by the government with the aim of somehow rectifying the situation in the economy.

Despite this it is obvious to everyone that the lull following the session of the Sejm is ephemeral. The opponent has gone along with it purely out of tactical considerations, while continuing to mount his forces for the infliction of new strikes against the party.

"Solidarity" as a whole and its separate links are preparing their next attempt to blackmail the authorities by setting forth various demands of an overwhelmingly political nature. Signs of a stratification in the leadership of this trade union organization do not yet provide any basis for expecting fundamental changes in its general orientation. Even if there were to be a schism between Walesa and the extremists from KORKOS, Walesa himself and the Catholic clergy who back him have not the slightest intention of easing the pressure on the PZPR. One also cannot exclude the possibility that the extremists will seize control over "Solidarity," with all the consequences that would ensue.

Recently, a new tactical arrangement has been emerging ever more clearly, around which the diverse opposition forces are uniting. Despite realizing that Poland's geopolitical situation deprives them of the opportunity to obstruct the country's participation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization or to encroach on the principle of the leading role of the Communist party, these forces have clearly decided to undermine the PZPR from within, to bring about the party's rebirth, and thus to seize power "on a legal basis."

As the work of the IX plenum of the PZPR CC showed, the opportunistic elements have already succeeded in taking control of local party organizations of the PZPR and, with their help, beginning to apply pressure on the leadership of the party. They will undoubtedly be continuing this subversive work, having sought to transform the upcoming IX Congress into a central arena for their struggle for power.

In these circumstances, the need has arisen once again to assess our view of the Polish leadership's policy and to determine more precisely which forces we can rely on in the end to safeguard the gains of socialism in Poland.

On the right flank in the PZPR CC are officials of a revisionist bent: Fiszbach, Werblan, Rakowski, Jablonski, etc. Ideologically, they are close to some of the leaders of "Solidarity" in their support for a transformation of the socioeconomic structure of Poland along the lines of the Yugoslav model. In the political sphere they support a "partnership" of various political forces, a position coinciding with the "Eurocommunists" and the social-democratic ideas of pluralism.

These officials rely on the support of the party organizations that have fallen under the influence of "Solidarity." One cannot exclude the possibility that under present conditions they will be able to bring many of their supporters into the PZPR Congress and exert fundamental influence on the formation of the leading organs of the party. They, apparently, are trying to achieve conspicuous changes in the PZPR leadership even as soon as the PZPR CC plenum.

The left flank is represented by such Communists as Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, Kociolek, and others. The positions adopted by

these comrades in the ideological sphere are closest to our own. They express the sentiments of the members of the party who consistently support socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union, and who oppose revisionist excesses and demand resolute action against "Solidarity." Overall they are backed by the old members of the party, who were brought up in the school of war and in the class struggle that marked the first stages of the establishment of People's Poland.

Unfortunately, representatives of this point of view are now far from a majority. One gets the impression that they believe the solution to the crisis will come only through a frontal attack on "Solidarity," without taking account of the current correlation of forces. In espousing this view, they do not believe there is a possibility of rectifying the situation without the introduction of Soviet troops. Such a position is objectively leading them to become more and more isolated in both the party and the country. Substantial efforts will be required (if indeed they are still possible) to get them elected to the Congress and have them join the leading organs.

In effect, Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski occupy a centrist position. In the difficult situation that emerged after August of last year, they turned out to be proponents of the sentiments that gained sway in the party and the country in favor of resolving the ongoing acute problems by means of dialogue and an agreement with "Solidarity." The subsequent period showed that Kania and Jaruzelski, while referring to the necessity of protecting the gains of socialism in Poland, pursued this course passively and hesitantly, making numerous concessions in favor of "Solidarity." They have displayed insufficient firmness and steadfastness in the struggle against the counterrevolutionary forces. In their view, devotion to socialism is compatible with the nationalist idea that was circulated during Gierek's time, namely, that "a Pole can always reach agreement with other Poles." This has led not only to an unjustified policy of concessions to the demands of "Solidarity," but also to a panic-ridden fear of confronting "Solidarity" and a deep-rooted anxiety that Soviet troops will be sent in.

At the same time, Kania and Jaruzelski want to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union and to uphold Poland's obligations to the Warsaw Pact. Both of them, especially Jaruzelski, enjoy authority in the country. At present, there are in fact no other officials who might take over the party and state leadership.

In light of all that has just been said, it is imperative to pursue the following course of action in the immediate future:

—Continue to offer political support to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, who, despite their well-known waffling, are in favor of defending socialism. At the same time, constantly demand that they pursue more significant and decisive actions to overcome the crisis and preserve Poland as a socialist country friendly to the Soviet Union.

—Strongly recommend to our friends that in the first instance they must achieve unity and stability in the leadership of the PZPR, defending the comrades who have become the main targets of attack by the opposition and by the enemies of socialism (Grabski, Zabinski, Olszowski, Kociolek, *et al.*). In turn, help these comrades recognize the necessity of supporting Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, of behaving more flexibly, and of not openly opposing slogans of "socialist renewal." It is important that they strike at the enemies of socialism without implying that "Solidarity" as a whole is identical to the hostile forces that exist within the organization.

—Direct the attention of Polish leaders to the necessity of carefully preparing for the IX PZPR Congress. Get them to struggle for an ample contingent of healthy forces at the Congress and to take an active role in this regard with the party organizations of large state enterprises.

—Recommend to the Polish comrades that they bind "Solidarity" in every way possible to the resolution of productive matters, while limiting its political activity. To this end, they should accelerate the adoption of laws on economic reform and trade unions.

—Actively exploit the discernible fragmentation among the leaders of "Solidarity," disrupt the anti-socialist and anti-national activity of KOS-KOR and its leaders, and bring about the isolation of these counterrevolutionaries. Adopt decisive measures against attempts to stir up a wave of anti-Sovietism in the country.

Induce the Polish leadership to maintain constant watch over the state of the army and Internal Affairs Ministry organs, including their morale, political stability, and readiness to fulfill their duty in defense of socialism. It is essential to support the Internal Affairs Ministry leadership, and Milewski personally, and to avoid any let-up in the actions carried out by the police to preserve public order.

—As a deterrent to counterrevolution, maximally exploit the fears of internal reactionaries and international imperialism that the Soviet Union might send its troops into Poland. In foreign policy statements, emphasize what was said by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the XXVI CPSU Congress about our resolve to stick up for Poland and not to leave it in the lurch.

—Given the exceptionally difficult economic situation in the PPR, continue to extend timely assistance while simultaneously doing everything possible to step up propaganda about this matter so that every Pole will know how much his country depends on Soviet help and support.

Along with these general recommendations, we are, in accordance with our instructions (P1/VIII from 12 March 1981), presenting a plan of additional measures to assist the PZPR leadership in strengthening the party both organizationally and ideologically.

K. Chernenko
Yu. Andropov
A. Gromyko
D. Ustinov
K. Rusakov
I. Arkhipov
L. Zamyatin

16 April 1981

Regarding point VII of Prot. No. 7

Top Secret

SET OF MEASURES TO ASSIST THE PZPR LEADERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY

Dispatch a working group from the CPSU CC Department for Organizational-Party Work to the PPR in May and June 1981 for consultations on matters concerning preparations for the Extraordinary IX Congress of the PZPR.

The CPSU CC Department, and the departments for organizational-party work, propaganda, and foreign policy propaganda of the CPSU CC, are to analyze the draft theses for the PZPR Congress, the draft PZPR statutes, and the drafts of other documents, as well as the status of organizational preparations for the Congress, and should relay appropriate recommendations to the CPSU CC.

Receive a delegation from the PZPR CC Organizational Department in April-May 1981, as provided for under the plan for interparty ties in 1981.

Prepare invitations to working groups of top officials from PZPR CC departments to come to the USSR for consultations, which the Polish comrades are very interested in holding.

In accordance with the desire of the Polish leadership, party officials representing local party organs will be sent to Poland in May and June 1981. The initial delegations will be sent from the Leningrad, Ivanovo, Smolensk, Donetsk, Zaporozhe, Lvov, Kharkov, Cherkassk, Grodnensk, and Mogilev oblast party committees.

In the event of confirmation of an appropriate request from the PZPR CC, give further consideration to the question of accepting middle- and lower-ranking PZPR officials (up to 500 of them) at the CPSU CC Academy of Social Sciences and also at the Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Minsk higher party schools.

The CPSU CC Department for organiza-

tional-party work and the CPSU CC Department are to hold a conference in May-June 1981 for representatives from corresponding oblast and municipal committees of the CPSU to discuss urgent questions of ties between local party organs of the CPSU and PZPR.

By agreement with the PZPR CC, send to Poland in May-June 1981 a group of senior officials from the central council of the branch trade unions headed by the secretary of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, who will familiarize themselves with the state of affairs in the Polish trade union movement and make on-site studies of the opportunities for political support of the branch trade unions and for increased cooperation between them and the Soviet trade unions.

Instruct the CPSU Komsomol CC to present a set of measures by 5 May 1981 on ways to strengthen our influence within the youth movement in Poland.

The Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, the Soviet Veterans' Committee, and the Committee of Soviet Women are to continue pursuing the set of measures agreed on with the native Polish organizations and to offer them the necessary help.

Taking account of the complex situation in the creative unions of the PPR, the Unions of Writers, Journalists, Composers, Artists, and Filmmakers of the USSR are to carry out exchanges with them via party organizations.

Send a group from the USSR State Committee on Television and Radio (headed by the chairman of the committee, Comrade Lapin) to the PPR in May 1981 for consultations regarding Soviet broadcasts to the PPR and the refinement of plans for cooperation in 1981.

In April-May 1981 the editors of the newspapers "Pravda," "Izvestiya," and "Trud" are to send a group of publicists (1 or more) to Poland to prepare materials, including exposés and denunciations, about the activity of anti-socialist forces.

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Brezhnev-Jaruzelski Telephone Conversation, 19 October 1981

To be returned to the CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)	Distributed to the members of the CPSU CC Politburo, members of the CPSU CC Politburo, and CPSU CC secretaries
No. P1942	

To the CPSU CC

I am conveying notes from a telephone conversation with Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 19 October of this year.

L. BREZHNEV

19 October 1981

Secret

NOTES FROM A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Comrade W. Jaruzelski

19 October 1981

The Kremlin

L. I. BREZHNEV. Hello, Wojciech.

W. JARUZELSKI. Hello, my dear, deeply esteemed Leonid Ilyich.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Dear Wojciech, we already sent you an official greeting, but I wanted to congratulate you personally on your election to the post of First Secretary of the PZPR CC.

It was appropriate of you to give your consent to such a decision. In the PZPR right now there is no other individual whose authority is equal to yours; this is evident from the results of the vote at the plenum. We understand that very difficult tasks now stand before you. But we are convinced that you will cope with them and will do everything to overcome the severe ailments afflicting your country.

I think, right now, as it seems to me, the most important thing is for you to gather around yourself some reliable assistants from the ranks of committed and worthy Communists and to rally them, spurring the whole party into action and instilling it with the spirit of struggle. This, in the literal sense of the word, is the key to success.

And, of course, it is important, without wasting time, to take the decisive measures you intend to use against the counterrevolution. We hope that everyone now, both in Poland and abroad, will sense that things in your country will move along differently.

We wish you good health and success!

W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you very much, dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all for the confidence you have in me. I want to tell you frankly that I had some inner misgivings about accepting this post and agreed to do so only because I knew that you support me and that you were in favor of this decision. If this had not been so, I never would have agreed to it. This is a very burdensome and very difficult task in such a complicated situation in the country, in which I now find myself both as prime minister and as minister of defense. But I understand that this is proper and necessary if you personally believe so.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Wojciech, we long ago believed so. We long ago spoke about this to our friends.

W. JARUZELSKI. And for that reason I consented. I will do all I can, Leonid Ilyich, both as a Communist and as a soldier, to improve things and to achieve a turnaround in the situation in the country and in our party. I understand and fully agree with you that one of the crucial things right now is the selection of leadership both in the party and in the government. And for that reason I deferred any final resolution of personnel matters until the next plenum, which we will be holding within several days. This way, I can think carefully about these matters and consult with others, ending up with a comprehensive decision and not simply scattered personnel changes.

L. I. BREZHNEV. Personnel matters are very important both at the center and in the outlying regions.

W. JARUZELSKI. This issue will be resolved in the outlying regions as well. Of course this must occur in parallel with the strengthening of the party in the spirit of a stepped-up struggle. In the appropriate situation we must apply decisive actions in order to wage battle where we are confident of achieving success.

I'm now heading over to a session of the Military Council of the Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense. There I will also be putting forth appropriate tasks. We will broadly include the army in all spheres of the life of the country.

Yesterday, after the plenum, I held a meeting with the first secretaries of the provincial committees and said that they should not take umbrage at the fact that we will be including people from the armed forces in the implementation of certain processes and will be expanding meetings between the officer corps and the working class in order to exert direct influence on the workers and shield them from the influence of "Solidarity." Of course, we are not changing our general direction in the sense that we are struggling to win back to our side the healthy forces of the nation who have gone astray and joined "Solidarity," and simultaneously we will be combatting the adversary and, of course, doing so in such a way that it will produce results.

Today I am meeting with your ambassador. I will try to go over certain questions with him in greater detail and will be asking for your suggestions on some questions which he, no doubt, will convey to you.[2]

In keeping you informed of all the decisions we reach, we will simultaneously let you know what has motivated our decision-making in particular cases.

Right now the greatest complications in our country arise from the situation at the market. In connection with this we have been experiencing many strikes and protests, some organized by "Solidarity" and others that are simply elemental. This very much complicates efforts to carry out

measures that must be implemented and complicates our work, since the mood in society is indifferent. But we will be trying to do everything possible to improve the situation.

This is what I wanted initially to convey to you and to keep you informed about.

Once again I want to thank you very much for your kind words.

L. I. BREZHNEV. I again wish you, Wojciech, the best of health and the best of success.

W. JARUZELSKI. Thank you. Good-bye.

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CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract) and Text of Oral Message from Brezhnev to Jaruzelski, 21 November 1981

To be returned within 3 days to the
CPSU CC (General Department, 1st sector)

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P37/21

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromykov, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Baibakov, Zamyatin, and Smirtyukov.

Extract from Protocol No. 37 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 21 November 1981

On the reception in the USSR of a party-state delegation from the PPR and an oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade W. Jaruzelski.

1. To affirm the text of an oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, who instructed the Soviet ambassador in Poland to transmit it to Comrade W. Jaruzelski (see attached).

2. To acknowledge the desirability of receiving in the USSR a party-state delegation from the PPR headed by Comrade W. Jaruzelski on 14-15 December 1981.

To affirm the composition of the Soviet delegation at the talks with the Polish delegation: Comrades L. I. Brezhnev (head of the delegation), M. A. Suslov, Yu. V. Andropov, A. A. Gromyko, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, and K. V. Rusakov.

3. By 1 December the CPSU CC Department, the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the USSR KGB, and USSR Gosplan are to prepare all necessary materials for the talks with the Polish party-state delegations, including a draft communiqué for the press.

The CPSU CC Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry are to set forth recommendations concerning organizational measures connected with the reception of a Polish delegation in the USSR.

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 21 of Prot. No. 37

Secret

WARSAW

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to Comrade W. Jaruzelski and, citing your instructions, transmit to him the following oral message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev:

"Esteemed Comrade Jaruzelski!

"We have attentively considered your proposal to visit Moscow at the head of a party-state delegation that would include the heads of the parties allied with the PZPR, and we agree with it. As far as the timeframe is concerned, the visit might take place on 14-15 December, assuming of course that this is suitable for you.

"In the meantime, because several weeks still remain before the meeting, I decided to transmit to you through Comrade Aristov some thoughts about urgent matters pertaining to the situation in Poland, which remains a cause of serious anxiety for us.

"I am revealing no secrets when I say that we greeted your election as PZPR CC First Secretary with great hopes. We were aware that earlier in the struggle against the anti-socialist forces you, as the chairman of the Council of Ministers, were inhibited by the political indecisiveness of the party leadership. Now this obstacle has been eliminated. The 4th plenum of the PZPR CC directly linked the decision to change the First Secretary with the necessity for urgent measures to salvage socialism in Poland.

"When I congratulated you over the phone, I was pleased to hear that one of the reasons you had agreed to take on the responsible post of PZPR leader at such a critical juncture was the confidence you felt we had in you. I mentioned this to my comrades, and our hope strengthened even more that in you we had finally found someone who thinks as we do and who will be an ally in one of the most trying phases of the struggle against imperialism, as is now occurring in Poland.

"You'll recall that during the phone conversation I expressed my hope that people now, both in Poland and abroad, would sense that things in your country were finally headed on a different course. We spoke then about the essential preconditions for a turnabout in the situation, and you agreed that you needed to choose reliable assistants from among the ranks of staunch and devoted Communists and to spur the whole party into motion, having instilled it with the spirit of struggle and then, without losing any time, resorting to active measures against the counterrevolution.

"It's obvious that the fundamental question now is the struggle for the hearts and minds of the masses. However, one gets the impression that a turnaround on this matter has so far not been achieved. The anti-socialist forces not only are gaining sway in many large industrial enterprises, but are also continuing to spread their influence among ever wider segments of the population. Worse yet, the leaders of 'Solidarity' and the counterrevolutionaries are still appearing before various audiences and making openly inflammatory speeches aimed at stirring up nationalist passions and directed against the PZPR and against socialism. The direct consequence of this hostile activity is the dangerous growth of anti-Sovietism in Poland.

"It seems to us that you now must mobilize the entire party in the struggle to win the hearts and minds of people by coming forth with a precise and clear program for resolving the crisis, a program that will convince everyone of its appropriateness. In other words, you must seek anew to gain the confidence of ordinary workers, as was done by the Communists during the years of the founding of popular rule. Of great importance in this effort will be regular meetings by leading officials from the PZPR aktiv with labor collectives, especially collectives at large state enterprises, which the enemy has succeeded in transforming into its bastions. This is so not just in the capital. And, of course, the struggle for the hearts and minds of the masses will not achieve the necessary results if the current party leadership is not supported by the mass media and if the adversary, as before, is given unhindered opportunity to disseminate his hostile propaganda.

"I'd now like to broach another matter. Recently in Poland a lot has been written about your meeting with Glemp and Walesa. Some call it historic and see in it the beginning of a turn away from chaos toward social tranquility. As we know, the results of the meeting were positively evaluated by the Politburo and the PPR government.[3]

"We understand, of course, that by proposing at this meeting, in the form of a critical question, the creation of a 'Front of National Accord,' you are pursuing a number of tactical objectives, above all the widening of public support for the regime and the fragmentation of the top levels of 'Solidarity.' But how far can one really go with such agreements without the threat of losing control over the situation? Indeed, aren't the class enemies trying to instill the 'Front of National Accord' with political content that would bolster their idea of, at a minimum, attain-

ing a division of power among the PZPR, 'Solidarity,' and the church, with the result that socialism would collapse. It is also clear that they are exploiting their current influence among the masses to establish a huge advantage in the upcoming elections for the national councils, thus continuing their path toward the legal seizure of power in the country.

"This, it seems to me, implies that it will be fundamentally important for the leading role of the PZPR to be greatly strengthened in the 'Front of National Accord,' as well as for the participants in the Front to recognize the PPR Constitution, socialism, and Poland's international alliances. Will these things be done in the Statutes and other documents of the Front, and more important will they be guaranteed in practice? What do you propose to do about the elections for local organs of power, bearing in mind the risk of the party's destruction?

"In this connection another urgent matter arises. During many of our discussions we have emphasized the same theme over and over: We are not opposed to agreements. But such agreements must not make concessions to the enemies of socialism. And the key thing is that the agreements must not become ends in themselves. Along with measures you take to gain support among the popular masses and the different political forces, you must also take decisive actions against the sworn enemies of the popular order. You agreed with this way of framing the question and spoke yourself about your intention of struggling for the hearts and minds of the workers while at the same time attacking the class enemy.

"But now the impression emerges that you're focusing only on the first part of this two-part formula. We know that there are still people in the leadership of your party who are still pinning all their hopes on a continuation of the bankrupt course of Kania. It would be dangerous to succumb to their entreaties. It is now absolutely clear that without a resolute struggle against the class enemy, it will be impossible to save socialism in Poland. The essential question is not whether there will be a confrontation or not, but who will begin it and by what means it will be carried out, as well as who will seize the initiative.

"I'd like to emphasize that when we speak about a confrontation, we believe it is contingent on a struggle to lure back to the side of the PZPR the workers and toiling masses who have fallen under the influence of 'Solidarity' and who now occupy a passive position and bide their time, waiting for things to sort themselves out at the top.[4]

"You and I, Wojciech Wladyslawovich, have both experienced war and we know that the strategy of fighting is crucially dependent on the question of time. This is directly related to the adverse situation that has now emerged in Poland. The leaders of the anti-socialist forces, who long ago were already gradually, and in some places openly, preparing for a decisive onslaught, are now seeking to time it for the moment when they will have an overwhelming advantage. In particular, they are placing great stakes on the fact that a new group of recruits will be entering the army who have been worked on by 'Solidarity.'[5] Doesn't this suggest to you that a failure to take harsh measures against the counterrevolution right away will cost you invaluable time?

"The key question is how to isolate the sworn enemies of socialism. Until that is done, nothing will change. Moreover, such an overtly counterrevolutionary organization as the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland' (KPN) is enlisting new supporters and is able to function legally. It's obvious that this has been possible because the party is in fact losing control over the judicial organs, as is evident from the whole episode with the trial of Moczulski and the other leaders of KPN.

"I want to share with you some thoughts about one further matter of great urgency. It's obvious that any actions in defense of socialism demand in the first instance a vigorous struggle for the Marxist-Leninist character of the PZPR and an increase in its combat readiness. After the 4th plenum of the PZPR CC, signs began to appear that the party organizations were springing back to life. It is important to step up this work and to prevent the local Communists from falling back into their state of passivity and hopelessness. And for this what is needed most of all is for the members of the party to be able to believe that words and deeds will no longer diverge, and that the leadership is intent on firmly and consistently implementing decisions that have been adopted.

"The strengthening of the PZPR depends also on a clear-cut line with regard to different currents of thought among its ranks. In your country some have argued that there now exist three basic directions in the party—the left, the right, and the center—and they have recommended the severance of all ties with the leftists and rightists, leaving them completely isolated by the force of the blows. This is a dangerous recommendation. Who is it, after all, that is being branded "leftists" or "hardliners"? Why, the Communists who have long been supportive of Marxist-Leninist positions, while in no way dismissing the need to rectify mistakes and distortions that have been committed. And who are the so-called rightists? These are the people who espouse revisionist views and ultimately become members of 'Solidarity.' It is clear that any sort of actions against staunch Communists would be suicide for the PZPR as a Communist party. And it is just as clear that until you get rid of the revisionists, including the ones in the party leadership who are trying to uphold the previous capitulationist line, they will weigh on you like a heavy burden.

"I believe these considerations provide the key to a solution of the mounting problems with personnel. I am convinced that by working with your comrades who are oriented toward the "leftists," and by giving them your support, you will find that it is precisely these people who provide a sound basis for the struggle to overcome the crisis.

"Esteemed Wojciech Wladyslawovich! Having raised, for your benefit, several matters that are troubling us, and having offered you my views, I naturally have left aside a number of problems that can be considered during a face-to-face meeting.[6]

L. BREZHNEV"

Confirm transmittal by telegram.

* * * * *

CPSU CC Politburo transcript,
10 December 1981

Top Secret
Single Copy
(Working Notes)

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO

10 December 1981

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: Comrades Yu. V. Andropov, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V. I. Dolgikh, K. V. Rusakov.

I. On the question of the situation in Poland

BREZHNEV. This question is not listed on our agenda. But I think that the session of the Politburo should begin with this matter, since we have specially dispatched Comrades [Head of Gosplan Nikolai] Baibakov and [Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief Marshal Viktor] Kulikov to Poland to meet with the Polish comrades and go over certain matters of the utmost urgency. On 8 December, Comrade Kulikov provided us with information about the discussions he held in Warsaw, and yesterday, 9 December, Comrade Baibakov communicated from Warsaw that he had held a discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. From these meetings and subsequent discussions held by Comrade Baibakov, it is apparent that the Polish comrades hope to receive roughly 1.5 billion dollars' worth of additional supplies and materials from the USSR and other socialist countries in the first quarter of the coming year.[7] This will include iron ore, non-ferrous metals, fertilizer, oil, tires, grain, etc.

In making this request, as you see, the Polish

comrades have in mind that shipments of goods from the USSR to Poland in 1982 will be maintained at the level of 1981. Comrade Baibakov assured his interlocutors that all their requests would be considered in Moscow.

Perhaps it would behoove us now to instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Skachkov, and Arkhipov to continue studying this matter, taking account of the exchange of opinions, but without waiting for a final agreement.

And now let's hear what Comrade Baibakov has to say.

BAIBAKOV. In accordance with the Politburo's instructions, I traveled to Warsaw. I met there with all the comrades whom it was necessary for me to see about the matters specified in my instructions.

First of all I had a discussion with the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Obodowski. During this discussion, the Polish comrades raised the question of economic assistance. I sent an encrypted cable back here outlining the Polish request.

One must say that the list of goods included in the assistance from us to the PPR comes to 350 items worth some 1.4 billion rubles. This includes such goods as 2 million tons of grains, 25 thousand tons of meat, 625 thousand tons of iron ore, and many other goods. The requests made by the Polish comrades, combined with what we had already been thinking about giving Poland in 1982, means that the total assistance to the Polish People's Republic will be approximately 4.4 billion rubles.

The time is now approaching when Poland will have to pay for its credits from West European countries. For this, Poland will be required to pay a minimum of 2.8 million rubles' worth of hard currency. When I was told by the Polish comrades that they are requesting the amount that all this assistance comes to, I raised the question of how to establish mutual economic ties on a balanced basis. Moreover, I noticed that Polish industry is not even coming close to fulfilling its plan. The coal industry, which is the country's basic means of earning hard currency, has been severely disrupted, and remedial measures have not been implemented as strikes continue. And even now, when there are no strikes, the mining of coal remains at a very low level.

Or, for example, let's say that production is going on among the peasantry, with grain, meat products, vegetables, etc. But they aren't giving any of it to the state; they're just playing a waiting game. At the private markets the level of agricultural trade is sufficiently high and is being carried out at very inflated prices.

I said directly to the Polish comrades that they must adopt more decisive measures if such a situation has arisen. Perhaps they can launch something in the nature of a requisitioning of farm produce.[8]

If we speak, for example, about reserves of grain, then Poland this year has accumulated more than 2 million tons. The population is not going hungry. Urban dwellers ride out to the markets and buy up all they products they need. And there are ample supplies of them.

As is known, by the Politburo's decision and at the request of the Polish comrades, we are providing Poland with an aid shipment of 30 thousand tons of meat. Of these promised 30 thousand tons, 15 thousand have already been shipped abroad. It should be added that the produce, in this case meat, is being delivered in dirty, unsanitary freight cars normally used to transport iron ore, making for an unpleasant sight. During the transport of this produce to the Polish stations, genuine sabotage has been taking place. Poles have been expressing highly obscene comments about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, have refused to clean out the freight cars, etc. One couldn't even begin to keep count of all the insults that have been directed against us.

Viewing the situation from the standpoint of the balance of payments, the Poles want to introduce a moratorium on the payment of their debt to Western countries. If they declare a moratorium, then all Polish vessels in the waters of other states or in harbor, and all other Polish property in the countries to which Poland owes debts, will be seized. For this reason the Poles have given instructions to the captains of ships to refrain from entering ports and to stay in neutral waters.

Now I will offer several words about my discussion with Comrade Jaruzelski. He reaffirmed the request made earlier by Obodowski regarding the delivery of goods. Then in the evening I again went to Jaruzelski's office, accompanied by our ambassador and Comrade Kulikov. Also taking part in this discussion were Obodowski and the PZPR CC secretary who handles these matters. Jaruzelski was in a highly agitated state. It seemed that he had been deeply disturbed by the letter from the head of the Polish Catholic Church, Archbishop Glemp, who, as is known, promised to declare a holy war against the Polish authorities. True, Jaruzelski promptly responded that in the event of untoward activities by "Solidarity," they will detain all hostile elements.

As far as the party organizations are concerned, they are ruined and inactive in the outlying regions. And with regard to the party as a whole, Jaruzelski said that in essence it no longer exists. The country is being destroyed, and the outlying regions are not receiving any sort of reinforcement, because the Central Committee and government are not giving firm and clear-cut instructions. Jaruzelski himself has been transformed into a man who is extremely neurotic and diffident about his abilities.

RUSAKOV. Comrade Baibakov has correctly described the situation regarding the Polish economy. What, then, should we be doing now? It seems to me that we should deliver to Poland the goods provided for under the economic agreements, but that these deliveries should not exceed the quantity of goods we delivered in the first quarter of last year.

BREZHNEV. And are we able to give this much now?

BAIBAKOV. Leonid Ilyich, it can be given only by drawing on state reserves or at the expense of deliveries to the internal market.

RUSAKOV. The day before yesterday they had a conference of secretaries from the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov[9] reported, the secretaries of the provincial committees are completely baffled by Jaruzelski's speech, which did not present a clear, straightforward line. No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation about "Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of 12-13. And now they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th. What is envisaged is that the chairman of the State Council, Jablonski, will appear on radio and television and declare the introduction of martial law. At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law on the introduction of martial law can be implemented only after it is considered by the Sejm, and the next session of the Sejm is not scheduled until 15 December. Thus, everything has become very complicated. The agenda of the Sejm has already been published, and it makes no mention of the introduction of martial law. But even if the government does intend to introduce martial law, "Solidarity" knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing all necessary measures to cope with that.

Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to deliver an address to the Polish nation. But in his address he won't be speaking about the party. Instead he will appeal to Polish nationalist sentiments. Jaruzelski has talked about the need to proclaim a military dictatorship, of the sort that existed under Pilsudski.[10] He indicated that the Poles will accept this more readily than something else.

As far as officials like Olszowski are concerned, they recently have begun to act more decisively; and one might add that at the session of the Politburo where the decision was made to introduce martial law and adopt more resolute measures against extremist figures in "Solidarity," the vote was unanimous and no one expressed a word of opposition.[11] At the same time, Jaruzelski intends to keep in close touch about this matter with his allies. He says that if the Polish forces are unable to cope with the resistance put up by "Solidarity," the Polish comrades

hope to receive assistance from other countries, up to and including the introduction of armed forces on the territory of Poland. Jaruzelski is basing this hope on the speech by Comrade Kulikov, who reportedly said that the USSR and other socialist countries would indeed give assistance to Poland with their armed forces. However, as far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, but merely repeated the words voiced earlier by L. I. Brezhnev about our determination not to leave Poland in the lurch.

If we consider what is going on in the provinces, one must candidly say that the strength of the party organizations there has been completely dissipated. To a certain degree the administrative apparatus there is still functioning, but in effect all power has now been transferred to the hands of "Solidarity." In his recent statements, Jaruzelski is apparently trying to pull the wool over our eyes, because his words fail to reflect a proper analysis. If the Polish comrades don't quickly get organized, prepare themselves, and resist the onslaught of "Solidarity," they will have no success at all in improving the situation in Poland.

ANDROPOV. From the discussions with Jaruzelski it's clear that they have not yet reached a firm consensus about the introduction of martial law. Despite the unanimous vote by the PZPR CC Politburo on the need to introduce martial law, we still haven't seen concrete measures on the part of the leadership. The extremists in "Solidarity" are attacking the Polish leadership by the throat. The Church in recent days has also clearly expressed its position, which in essence is now completely supportive of "Solidarity."

Of course in these circumstances the Polish comrades must act swiftly in launching "Operation X" and carrying it out. At the same time, Jaruzelski declares that we will resort to "Operation X" when "Solidarity" forces us to do so. This is a very disturbing sign, particularly because the latest session of the PZPR CC Politburo and the decision it adopted to introduce martial law had suggested that the Politburo was beginning to act more decisively. All the members of the Politburo expressed support for decisive action. This decision put pressure on Jaruzelski, and he is now compelled to find some way of extricating himself. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what measures they intended and when it would be done. He replied that he simply doesn't know about "Operation X" and about the concrete timeframe in which it would be carried out. Thus, it would seem that either Jaruzelski is concealing from his comrades the plan of concrete action, or he is simply abandoning the idea of carrying out this step.

I'd now like to mention that Jaruzelski has been more than persistent in setting forth economic demands from us and has made the implementation of "Operation X" contingent on our willingness to offer economic assistance; and I would say even more than that, he is raising the question, albeit indirectly, of receiving military assistance as well.

Now, if you look at the list of goods we are providing to the Polish comrades, we can candidly say that serious doubts arise about the necessity of supplying these products. For example, what is the connection between the success of "Operation X" and the delivery of fertilizer and certain other goods? In connection with this I would say that our position, as it was formulated earlier during the previous session of the Politburo and was expressed even earlier on several occasions by Leonid Ilyich, is entirely correct, and we must not depart from it at all.[12] In other words, we support the position of internationalist assistance, and we are alarmed by the situation unfolding in Poland; but as far as "Operation X" is concerned, that must entirely and unequivocally be decided by the Polish comrades themselves. Whatever they decide is what will be. We will not insist on any specific course, and we will not dissuade them from pursuing what they decide.

As far as economic assistance is concerned, it will of course be difficult for us to undertake anything of the scale and nature of what has been proposed. No doubt, something will have to give. But again I want to say that the mere posing of the question of the apportionment of goods supplied as economic assistance is an insolent way to approach things, and it is being done purely so that if we refrain from delivering something or other, they'll be able to lay all the blame on us. If Comrade Kulikov actually did speak about the introduction of troops, then I believe he did this incorrectly. We can't risk such a step. We don't intend to introduce troops into Poland. That is the proper position, and we must adhere to it until the end. I don't know how things will turn out in Poland, but even if Poland falls under the control of "Solidarity," that's the way it will be. And if the capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Union, and you know they have already reached agreement on a variety of economic and political sanctions, that will be very burdensome for us. We must be concerned above all with our own country and about the strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.

In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in several of his speeches and in the resolutions adopted earlier. Today, a very thorough exchange of opinions has taken place during the session of the Politburo. All of this must serve as the basis of the policy we must uphold vis-a-vis Poland.

As concerns the lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the GDR that run through Poland, then we of course must do something to provide for their safekeeping.

GROMYKO. Today we've had a very spirited review of the situation in Poland. You might even say this review was more spirited than any we've had before. This is because at the moment we ourselves don't know what direction the events in Poland will take. The Polish leadership itself senses that power is slipping from its grasp. Kania and Jaruzelski, you know, counted on their ability to rely on the neutrals. But now there is no such opportunity, there are no longer any neutrals. The position is defined sufficiently clearly: "Solidarity" has proven to be a patently counterrevolutionary organization which aspires to come to power and which has openly declared its intention to seize power. The Polish leadership must decide the question: Either it relinquishes its positions by failing to adopt decisive measures, or it adopts decisive measures by introducing martial law, isolating the extremists of "Solidarity," and restoring public order. There is no other alternative.

What should our position be toward the Polish events? I fully agree with what was already said here by the comrades. We can say to the Poles that we view the Polish events with understanding. There is no basis whatsoever for us to alter this measured formulation in any way. At the same time we must somehow try to dispel the notions that Jaruzelski and other leaders in Poland have about the introduction of troops. There cannot be any introduction of troops into Poland. I think we can give instructions about this to our ambassador, asking him to visit Jaruzelski and communicate this to him.

Despite the sufficiently unanimous vote of the PZPR CC Politburo with regard to the introduction of martial law, Jaruzelski is now back to his vacillating position. At first he had somewhat stiffened his spine, but now, once again, he's begun to soften. Everything is still in force that was said to them previously. If in the struggle against counterrevolution and afterwards they show any sign of wavering, nothing of socialist Poland will remain. The introduction of martial law, of course, would be the best way to convey the steadfastness of the Polish leadership to the counterrevolutionaries. And if the measures they intend to carry out are indeed implemented, then I think we could expect positive results.

Now, with regard to the creation of a new party, as Jaruzelski proposed, I think we must directly say to Jaruzelski that there is no need to create any sort of new party, since this would merely signal a retreat on the part of the Polish leadership and an acknowledgment that the PZPR is in fact not a militant political organization, but simply an organization that has committed mistakes. It would underscore the very weakness of the party and would play into the hands of the "Solidarity" extremists. Then even the population of Poland, which retains definite sympathy for the PZPR as a guiding force, would be completely disabused of such sentiments.

I believe that we must not now permit any

sort of harsh instructions, which would force them to adopt one course or another. I think we have chosen the correct position here: The restoration of order in Poland is a matter for the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee, and its Politburo. We already said to our Polish friends and will say again in the future that they must pursue a steadfast course without slackening in the least.

Of course, if the Poles deliver a blow to "Solidarity," the West in all likelihood will not give them credits and will not offer any other kind of help. They are aware of this, and this obviously is something that we, too, have to bear in mind. For this reason, Leonid Ilyich was correct in proposing that we instruct a group of comrades to examine this question, taking account of our capabilities to extend substantial economic assistance to the PPR.

USTINOV. The situation in the PPR, of course, is very bad. The situation is worsening day by day. Among the leadership, especially in the Politburo, there is no firmness or unity. And all of this has taken its toll on the state of affairs. Only at the last session of the [Polish] Politburo was a decision unanimously approved to introduce martial law. And now all hopes are riding on Jaruzelski. How will he succeed in carrying out this decision? As yet, no one can openly speak about the actions of Jaruzelski. We just don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He candidly said that even we [the Poles] don't know what the general is thinking. Thus, the man who has been effectively responsible for discharging the duties of the Polish defense minister doesn't know what will happen and what sort of actions will be taken by the chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister.

With regard to what Comrade Kulikov allegedly said about the introduction of troops into Poland, I can say in full responsbility that Kulikov never said this. He simply repeated what was said by us and by Leonid Ilyich that we would not leave Poland in the lurch. And he perfectly well knows that the Poles themselves requested us not to introduce troops.

As far as our garrisons in Poland are concerned, we are fortifying them. I myself am also inclined to think that the Poles will not embark on a confrontation and only if, perhaps, "Solidarity" seizes them by the throat will they come forth.

The problem is that the Polish leaders do not appear resolute. As was rightly said here by the comrades, we must not force them to adopt any specific decisions; we will simply carry out the policy on which we have agreed. For our part, we must be ready ourselves and must not display any sort of actions not provided for by our decisions.

SUSLOV. I believe, as is evident from the other comrades' speeches, we all have the same view of the situation in Poland. During the whole prolonged stretch of events in Poland, we have displayed steadfastness and composure. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the plenum. We said this in public to our people, and our people supported the policy of the Communist Party.

We've done a great deal of work for peace, and it is now impossible for us to change our position. World public opinion will not permit us to do so. We have carried out via the UN such momentous diplomatic actions to consolidate peace. What a great effect we have had from the visit of L. I. Brezhnev to the FRG and from many other peaceful actions we have undertaken. This has enabled all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union staunchly and consistently upholds a policy of peace. That is why it is now impossible for us to change the position we have adopted vis-a-vis Poland since the very start of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves determine what actions they must pursue. It would be inappropriate for us to push them toward more decisive actions. But we will, as earlier, tell the Poles that we regard their actions with understanding.

As it seems to me, Jaruzelski is displaying a certain degree of slyness. He wants to make excuses for himself by coming forth with requests, which he presents to the Soviet Union. These requests, naturally, are beyond our physical capacity to fulfill, and Jaruzelski then says: well, look here, I turned to the Soviet Union and requested help, but didn't receive it.

At the same time, the Poles say directly that they are opposed to the introduction of troops. If troops are introduced, that will mean a catastrophe. I think we have reached a unanimous view here on this matter, and there can be no consideration at all of introducing troops.

As far as the provision of assistance to Poland is concerned, we have given that country more than a billion rubles. Not long ago we adopted a decision to ship 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, of which 16 thousand tons have already been delivered. I don't know whether we'll be able to ship the full 30 thousand tons, but in any event we apparently are obliged by this decision to give a further definite number of tons of meat as assistance.

With regard to the PZPR and the creation of a new party to replace it, I believe it would be inappropriate to disband the PZPR. Those who spoke here were correct in arguing that this would be a completely unhelpful action.

GRISHIN. The situation in Poland is getting steadily worse. The line of our party toward the Polish events is entirely correct. With respect to the proposal by Jaruzelski to disband the PZPR and create a new party, one cannot agree with that. There can be no talk at all of introducing troops. We will have to look at economic questions and at what can be given to the Poles.

SUSLOV. In the press we must expose the intrigues of "Solidarity" and other counterrevolutionary forces.

CHERNENKO. I fully agree with what the comrades have said here. It is clear that the line of our party and of the CC Politburo vis-a-vis the Polish events, as formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the decisions of the Politburo, is entirely correct and in no need of change.

I believe that today we could adopt the following decision:

1. Take under advisement the information provided by Comrade Baibakov.
2. In our relations with the PPR in the future, abide by the general political line on this matter laid down by the CPSU CC, and also abide by the instructions from the CPSU CC Politburo on 8 December 1981 and the exchange of opinions that occurred at the CC Politburo's session on 10 December 1981.
3. Instruct Comrades Tikhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov, and Baibakov to continue studying questions of economic assistance to Poland, taking account of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CC Politburo.

BREZHNEV. How do the comrades feel about this?

EVERYONE. Comrade Chernenko has very properly formulated all the proposals, and now it is time to adopt them.

The decree is adopted.

* * * * *

CPSU CC Politburo Protocol (extract), "On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal countries," 13 December 1981

Proletarians of all countries, unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P40/26

TO: Comrades Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamyatin

Extract from Protocol No. 40 of the session of the CPSU CC Politburo
on 13 December 1981

On Information about the Polish question for the leaders of the fraternal countries.

To affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassadors in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos (see attached).

CC SECRETARY

Regarding point 26 of Prot. No. 40

Secret

SOFIA, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, ULAN-BATOR, PRAGUE, HAVANA, HANOI, VIENTIANE

SOVIET AMBASSADOR

CC: WARSAW — SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a call on T. Zhivkov (J. Kadar, E. Honecker, Yu. Tsedenbal, G. Husak, F. Castro, Li Duan, K. Phomvihan) and, referring to the CPSU CC's instructions, transmit the following:

"As our friends know, the Polish leadership has introduced martial law in the country, announced the formation of a Military Council of National Salvation, and detained the most extremist elements of 'Solidarity,' the 'Confederation for an Independent Poland,' and other anti-socialist groups.

"A good impression has been created by W. Jaruzelski's address to the people, in which, in our view, all the basic questions were given appropriate emphasis. In particular, what is especially important is that the address reaffirmed the leading role of the PZPR and the commitment of the PPR to the socialist obligations stipulated by the Warsaw Pact.

"To ensure the success of the operation, the Polish comrades observed strict secrecy. Only a narrow circle around Jaruzelski knew about the action.[13] Thanks to this our friends have succeeded in catching the enemy completely unawares, and the operation so far has been implemented satisfactorily.

"On the very eve of implementation of the projected operation, W. Jaruzelski communicated about it to Moscow.[14] We informed him that the Soviet leadership looked with understanding upon the decision of the Polish comrades. In so doing we ensured that the Polish comrades would resolve these matters solely by internal means.

"In our preliminary evaluation, the measures taken by the Polish friends are an active step to repulse counterrevolution, and in this sense they correspond with the general line of all the fraternal countries.

"In these circumstances the question arises about offering political and moral support to the Polish friends and also about giving additional economic assistance. The Soviet leadership, as previously, will act on the Polish question in close contact with the fraternal countries."

Confirm transmittal by telegram.

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CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 14 January 1982

SESSION OF THE CPSU CC POLITBURO
14 January 1982

Presided over by Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV.

Also taking part: C[omra]des. Yu. V. Andropov, M. S. Gorbachev, V. V. Grishin, A. A. Gromyko, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, M. A. Suslov, N. A. Tikhonov, D. F. Ustinov, K. U. Chernenko, P. N. Demichev, V. V. Kuznetsov, B. N. Ponomarev, V. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, K. V. Rusakov

2. On the Results of the Negotiations with the PZPR CC Politburo Member and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic Cde. J. Czyrek

BREZHNEV. I think we all agree that Mikhail Andreevich [Suslov]'s and Andrei Andreevich [Gromyko]'s discussions with Cde. Czyrek were useful. Western officials, especially the Americans, are exerting enormous pressure on Poland. In such circumstances, it is important to offer constant political support for our friends and to bolster their spirits. One cannot permit their spirits to sag or to allow them to relinquish what they have achieved with such difficulty.

Martial law in the PPR has already lasted a month. As Jaruzelski says, the counterrevolution is now crushed. However, the tasks ahead are more complicated.

After introducing relative stability in the country, the Polish comrades must now, one might say, resolve the strategic problems of what to do with the trade unions, how to revive the economy, how to change the consciousness of the masses, etc.

The most important question is the situation in the PZPR. Our friends are trying to find a solution. No doubt, Jaruzelski does not intend to disband the party or to change its name, but he can exploit martial law to carry out a sweeping purge. This might yield good results.

In general one gets the impression that the general as a political actor is very strong and is able, on most occasions, to find proper solutions. Sometimes it seems that he is too cautious and acts more often than necessary with an eye to the West and the Church. But in the current situation such gestures will only ruin things. Along with firm, hardline measures on matters of principle, one also needs flexibility and circumspection. It's good that Jaruzelski is studying the Hungarian experience in struggling against counterrevolution.

All of us clearly understand that the decisive precondition for the full stabilization of things in Poland is a revival of the economy. In Czechoslovakia after 1968 political efforts made headway precisely because the counterrevolution had not affected the economic sphere. In Poland just the opposite is true.

In this connection a difficult question stands before us. We already are stretched to the limit in our capacity to help the Poles, and they are making still more requests. Perhaps we can do a bit more, but we certainly can't give a lot more.

Still, we must of course answer Jaruzelski's letter,[15] explaining in a comradely way what we can and cannot do. By all means we must precisely carry out our agreed deliveries in the first quarter, which for the Poles will be the most difficult winter months.

Quite another matter are projects for political prestige, which should not impose great strains on our economy. For example, we can lend assistance in building the Warsaw subway. We should meet this request, having made our participation a matter of public knowledge.

Incidentally, the food situation in Poland is not so bad. There is enough bread in the country, and they must find a way to motivate the peasasntry and to get them to work, arranging, as we sometimes say, a merger of the city and village.

The Polish leadership continues to count on help from the West. Well, in principle we can't be against that, although, to be honest, it's doubtful that Western countries are about to start providing material assistance to a military regime. They undoubtedly will try to extract concessions, which means we must be especially vigilant.

Jaruzelski is raising another question, of whether he should accept help from the Chinese. Well, why not? In the process China will be disassociating itself from the USA and its economic sanctions.

In conclusion, one might say that the Polish question will be at the center of international politics for a long time to come. That is why our Polish commission has continued to work as actively as it has been up to now.

* * * * *

CPSU CC Report on Economic Aid to Poland (1980-81), 23 September 1982

SPECIAL DOSSIER

Secret[16]

I N F O R M A T I O N

about Soviet assistance to Poland in freely convertible currency in 1980-1981*

I. Credits Provided	Millions of $
1. For the purchase of sugar By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 1 August 1980 No. 1518 rs (P207 from 1.8.1980)	30
2. For the settlement of accounts with capitalist countries. By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 23 August 1980, No. 1192-rs (P201/30 from 23.VI.80)	250
3. For the establishment of a consortium of banks to help the PPR. Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June 1980. No. P199/2	70
4. For the settlement of accounts with capitalist countries By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 11 November 1980 No. 1019-247 (P224/70 from 11.XI.1980)	150
5. For the purchase of grain and food stuffs. By order of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1019-347 (P224/70 from 11.XI.1980)	190
Total	690

II. Deferred Payments	
1. Deferral of payments to Soviet banks. Decision of the CPSU CC on 6 June 1980 (P199/II from 6.6.1980)	219
2. Deferral of payments to Soviet banks. By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 11 September 1980 No. 1840 rs (P214/XI from 11.XI.1980)	280
3. Deferral of payments to Soviet banks. By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 11 November 1980 No. 1019-347 (P224/70 from 11.XI.1980)	280
4. Deferral of payments on the basic debt up to 1,000 from all credits extended previously. By order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 16 August 1981. No. 1630 rs (P23/14 from 16.8.81)	
Total	1,779

III. Grant Aid	
1. Joint grant aid from the USSR, Hungary, Bulgaria, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia supplied via a reduction of oil deliveries to the CMEA countries. Decision of the CPSU CC on 28 November 1980 No. P227/21	465
Total	2,934

*) According to data from USSR Gosplan

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Translator's Note: The notion of a "creeping counterrevolution" was first devised by East German and Soviet officials during the 1968 crisis over the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.

2. Translator's Note: Notes from this meeting are available in both Russian and Polish archives; see, e.g., Fond (F.) No. 5, Opis' (Op.) No. 84, Delo (D.) No. 596, Listy (Ll.) 33-35, Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (TsKhSD).

3. Translator's Note: Brezhnev presumably refers here to the PZPR Politburo.

4. Translator's Note: A page was missing at this point in the documents originally supplied to the Polish government and published in Rzeczpospolita. Fortunately, the missing page (no. 5 in the document) was included in the copy of the document stored in the Moscow archives.

5. Translator's Note: Misgivings about the influence of Solidarity on the new group of Polish army draftees were expressed frequently in 1981 in top-secret Soviet assessments of the reliability of the Polish army. See, e.g., "O nastroeniyakh sredi soldat i ofitserov podrazdelenii Voiska Pol'skogo i VMF PNR, dislotsiruyushchikhsya na Gdan'skom poberezh'e," Cable No. 183 (Top Secret), 14 June 1981, from V. Zelenov, Soviet consul-general in Gdansk, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 611, Ll. 17-19; and also "O politicheskoi situatsii i nastroeniyakh v voevodstvakh yuzhnogo regiona PNR (Politpis'mo)," Cable No. 179 (TOP SECRET), 12 November 1981, from G. Rudov, Soviet consul-general in Krakow, to the CPSU Secretariat, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 84, D. 597, Ll. 13-22.

6. Translator's Note: It is not wholly clear what Brezhnev had in mind here, but he may have been alluding to some of the preparations for martial law.

7. Translator's Note: It is curious why in this secret forum Brezhnev used dollars (instead of, say, transferable rubles) as the unit for measuring the size of Poland's request.

8. Translator's Note: The term Baibakov uses here, prodrazverstka (a contraction of prodovol'stvennaya razverstka), refers to the policy introduced by Lenin during the period of "War Communism" to force peasants to turn over their produce to the state. The policy led to great bloodshed, upheaval, and starvation.

9. Translator's Note: Either because of a mistake by Rusakov or because of a typographical error, the Russian text gives Boris Aristov's surname as Arestov. The error was corrected in the Polish translation.

10. Translator's Note: Marshal Josef Pilsudski was the military ruler of Poland during the interwar period, presiding over a regime that became increasingly tyrannical.

11. Translator's Note: The Russian word Rusakov uses to describe a unanimous vote, *edinoglasno*, is stronger than another word, *edinodushno*, which also is translated as "unanimous." Rusakov's statement indicates that no abstentions or dissenting votes were cast. It should be noted, however, that most subsequent speakers (Andropov, Gromyko, etc.) used the word edinodushno when referring to the PZPR Politburo vote, though Ustinov used edinoglasno.

12. Translator's Note: The transcript of "the previous session of the Politburo" (apparently of 8 December) has not yet been released.

13. Translator's Note: This statement is confirmed by the lack of concrete discussion of the matter at PZPR Politburo meetings throughout the crisis; see the transcripts in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992). The extreme secrecy of the planning also is emphasized in the interview with Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," Kultura (Paris) 4/475 (April 1987), esp. 11-13, 33-35.

14. Translator's Note: The text of this communication (by most accountsa phone conversation Jaruzelski had with Suslov and/or Brezhnev) reportedly exists in the Russian Presidential Archive, but has not yet been released.

15. Translator's Note: Brezhnev later in the meeting described Jaruzelski's letter of 3 January 1982: "...Jaruzelski expresses deep gratitude for the fraternal help provided by the Soviet Union to the Polish People's Republic. At the same time, he requests that the Soviet side reaffirm the volume of deliveries for 1982 contained in the draft protocol on the coordination of both sides' plans for 1981-1985 for oil, gasoline, and oil products. The volume of oil deliveries in 1982 are being kept at the level of 13 million tons, and oil products at 2.94 million tons; and deliveries of combustibles are being retained at the maximum level in the first quarter of 1982.

"Further on Cde. Jaruzelski informs us that he appealed to the General Secretaries of the Communist Party Central Committees of Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia with a request to provide Poland with basic agricultural and industrial goods."

16. Translator's Note: The classification was upgraded to "top secret" (sovershenno sekretno) by a handwritten notation of sov. next to the original sekretno. A stamped imprint just under the classification said that this was CPSU CC Document No. 2931, prepared on 23 September 1982, and that it should be returned to the CPSU CC General Department.

THE CARTER-BREZHNEV PROJECT
U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Detente in the Late 1970s: What Went Wrong?

Ed. note: With this issue, the CWIHP Bulletin *begins to publish findings from the Carter-Brezhnev Project, an exploration of U.S.-Soviet relations and the collapse of superpower detente in the late 1970s. The project gathers former government officials, scholars, and newly-declassified documents at a series of conferences intended to produce a deeper understanding of the troubles that bedeviled relations between Washington and Moscow between 1976 and 1981, in the hope that the results will enhance public and scholarly analyses of those historical events and at the same time contribute to present and future U.S.-Russian relations. It has been organized by an international collaboration of institutions and individuals spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy Development (CFPD) of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. (Blight and his collaborators previously organized the series of five oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis between 1987 and 1992 that brought together U.S., Soviet (and then Russian), and Cuban former officials and scholars and resulted in a series of publications.) Other supporting institutions include the Carter Center of Emory University, the National Security Archive (NSA), the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and several Russian archival organizations, including Rosarkhiv, the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, and the Foreign Ministry archives.*

In the effort to support this historical enterprise and to open up new sources, former President Carter has lent his support to the project, as have such prominent former officials as, on the American side, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, and on the Soviet/Russian side, former First Deputy Foreign Ministry Georgy M. Kornienko, former ambassadors Anatoly Dobrynin and Oleg Troyanovsky, and former Warsaw Pact commander Gen. Anatoly Gribkov. Project activities so far have included a planning meeting, held at Pocantico, New York, in October 1992; a conference on "SALT II and the Growth of Mistrust," on 6-9 May 1994 at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia; a small oral history session on Soviet Policy in the Third World, in which Kornienko and former CPSU Central Committee (CC) International Department official Karen N. Brutents participated, held at Lysebu, Norway, in October 1994; and a conference on "Global Competition and the Deterioration of U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1977-1980," on 23-26 March 1995 in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; an additional conference, focussing on the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and the collapse of detente in 1979-80, is planned for Oslo, Norway. (A related workshop on the Polish Crisis, 1980-81, is being organized by NSA and CWIHP in conjunction with the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw.)

For each conference, an effort is made to open and declassify new U.S. and Russian archival documents for the dual purpose of contributing to the conference discussion--which is subsequently transcribed and published--and to scholarly research and publications. The declassified documents are generally available at the appropriate archival repository, and are also available at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C.

In the case of the Russian documents printed below beginning on page 144 (with one exception, the 18 February 1977 CPSU CC directive, which had been previously declassified in Moscow), all belong to a group specially declassified by the Russian Foreign Ministry in early 1994 for use at the Musgrove conference, which centered on the distrust and acrimony surrounding the March 1977 visit to Moscow of Secretary of State Vance. They include a complete set of the correspondence between President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev from the time of Carter's inauguration on 20 January 1977 until shortly before Vance's departure; cables from Dobrynin describing two important conversations, a 1 December 1976 meeting during the transition period with unofficial Carter emissary Averell Harriman and a 21 March 1977 discussion with Vance in which the U.S. proposals at Moscow were previewed (unfortunately, Dobrynin's record of his first conversation with Carter, on 1 February 1977, which appears to have had an important influence on Soviet perceptions of the new president, has not yet been made available); also included is the aforementioned CPSU CC Politburo directive as an illustration of the rising tensions between Washington and Moscow during this period on the human rights issue.

Georgy Markovich Kornienko, the former senior Soviet diplomat and CPSU CC Politburo member, contributes an introduction to and interpretation of the documents and the issues they illuminate, adapted and translated from his Russian-langauge memoirs, which have not as yet appeared in English. Introducing Kornienko's analysis, in turn, is Mark Garrison, who during the Carter Administration served as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and who, based at CFPD, has been actively involved in the Carter-Brezhnev Project.

The CWIHP Bulletin *plans to publish additional materials emerging from the Carter-Brezhnev Project and related research in future issues.*

Hopes Raised and Dashed— Carter, Brezhnev, and SALT II: An Introduction to G.M. Kornienko's Commentary

by Mark Garrison

For the last decade or more of the Brezhnev era, Georgy Markovich Kornienko was the principal Americanist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry (not counting Gromyko, who considered himself an expert in dealing with Americans), rising to the rank of First Deputy Minister and membership in the Party's Central Committee. Korniyenko's recollections about the hopes for U.S.-Soviet relations generated in Moscow by Jimmy Carter's election in 1976, and about the dashing of those hopes, explains the title of his article (and the chapter of the book from which it is drawn). Although not a document from the archives, it provides an insight into Soviet thinking, or at least thinking in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, not available in documents.

What mattered most in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, in Korniyenko's view, was the negotiation of a strategic nuclear arms treaty. He believes that the defining moments on that issue, and for relations between the two countries during the rest of the Carter Administration, came in February and March 1977. Brezhnev felt strongly that negotiations on SALT II should proceed within the framework he had agreed with Ford at Vladivostok in late 1974; he had overridden opposition from his own military to achieve that framework, and considered it a personal achievement. Early signals from Carter, conveyed through Averell Harriman prior to the inauguration, led the Soviet side to expect that Carter was prepared to start with Vladivostok before moving on to deeper cuts. (Contrary to the charge by some Carter Administration officials that the Soviets should have known better than to listen to an allegedly self-appointed intermediary, Harriman's papers in the Library of Congress contain clear evidence that prior to the election he was acting on explicit instructions from Carter.) Soviet hopes were encouraged by Carter's first letter to Brezhnev after taking office, dated January 26, 1977. But Carter's next letter, dated February 14, was a rude awakening in Moscow.

Korniyenko's commentary illuminates the dry texts of exchanges between the governments at the time, including the Carter-Brezhnev correspondence (which Russian Foreign Ministry released in 1994 for the Carter-Brezhnev project, organized by Brown University's Watson Institute). It is possible to see how the Soviets convinced themselves that Carter was signaling, without actually saying so, that he was willing to start from Vladivostok, and why they were therefore incensed by his February 14 letter that did not even mention Vladivostok but urged moving on immediately to a grander vision. The stage was thus set for a rude rebuff to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance when he came to Moscow at the end of March bearing Carter's deep-cuts proposal. Although SALT II was completed and signed over two years later, the hope on both sides that rapid progress on strategic arms might lead to a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations was frustrated. Korniyenko believes a deep-cuts SALT III could have been worked out by the end of Carter's term absent the opening contretemps over Vladivostok. Korniyenko places the blame squarely on the Carter administration; without saying so (he is not given to psychological interpretations), he implies that Brezhnev's attachment to Vladivostok was emotional as well as political and that the U.S. side should have taken that into account. He acknowledges no misgivings that at the crucial point in early 1977 the Soviet side did not summon up even that degree of flexibility that eventually led to the conclusion of SALT II.

A "MISSED OPPORTUNITY"—CARTER, BREZHNEV, SALT II, AND THE VANCE MISSION TO MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 1976-MARCH 1977

by G.M. Korniyenko

The fact that, toward the end of the Ford presidency, Soviet-American relations seemed to have been set back, meant that the Soviet leadership would be particularly interested in his opponent in the 1976 elections, Jimmy Carter. And although he was a political figure who was completely unknown in the USSR, and although his pre-election statements, as Moscow fully realized, did not necessarily reflect his real views, many of his statements favorably influenced the mood of the Soviet leadership. These included his critical view of Ford's refusal to use the term "détente," his criticism of Ford for putting on ice the negotiations to conclude SALT-2 on the basis of the 1974 Vladivostok accords, and his statements in favor of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a complete ban on testing, and supporting a reductions in nuclear weapons and their abolition. A positive impression on the Soviet leadership was produced by the fact that Carter not only publicly but also privately, through A. Harriman during a visit to Moscow in September 1976,[1] gave assurances that if elected President he would take steps toward the rapid conclusion and signing of the SALT-2 Treaty, and then would be ready to continue negotiations on an agreement on substantial reductions in strategic weapons.

Of course, not everything Carter said in the election campaign pleased Moscow, in particular the stress he put on human rights internationally, first of all regarding the Soviet Union. But with regard to his statements on arms control and disarmament, I repeat, they gave cause for hope.

In any case, there were no regrets in Moscow over Ford's defeat and Carter's victory in the elections on 2 November 1976. In congratulating the latter on his victory, L.I. Brezhnev immediately expressed the hope for an early meeting. Carter was not slow in replying. Already on November 4, Harriman sent through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington an oral communication for Brezhnev from Carter, saying that the newly elected President considered it important to have a personal meeting with Brezhnev "with the aim of preserving and supporting peace throughout the world," and also thought it useful to organize in the future such meetings "on a regular basis, perhaps once a year." Carter stipulated that he had also had requests from the leaders of England, the FRG and France, and expressed the hope that it would be understood in Moscow that a Soviet-American summit meeting would take place after his meeting with his allies.[2]

After a short time, on November 17, Harriman (whom Carter authorized to act as an unofficial channel between him and Brezhnev in the period before he took office), conveyed Carter's readiness for an exchange of views on matters of mutual interest even during the transition period. It was also stated that he could not yet enter into specific discussions. First, because he could not undercut the sitting President, and second, because he did not yet have his staff of advisers and he did not consider it possible to "improvise."[3] Nevertheless, the exchange of several oral communications between Brezhnev and Carter before 20 January 1977 promised a constructive development of the Soviet-American dialogue—at least on questions of limitations on strategic weapons—after Carter took office. It is true that we in Moscow were a little put on guard by the remark in Carter's message of 1 December 1976 that he "could not, of course, be bound by previous negotiations on limiting strategic weapons"; this was a bad omen, which was, unfortunately, soon to be more than borne out.[4] But at that time we wanted to hope for the best.

The Soviet side did not simply hope for the best, but for its part tried to create conditions as favorable as possible for the successful development of a dialogue with President Carter after his taking office. One of the important steps in this regard was the inclusion of a series of important formulations regarding Soviet military policy in a speech in Tula, on the occasion of its designation as Hero-city, given by Brezhnev on 18 January 1977, two days before Carter's inauguration. The essence was the following:

> —there is no basis whatsoever for attributing to the Soviet Union a striving for superiority in armaments with the aim of achieving the capability for a nuclear first strike;
>
> —the aim of the Soviet Union is only the creation of a defensive capability sufficient to deter aggression against it by any potential opponent.

In other words, in Brezhnev's speech at Tula in January 1977 the principle of military sufficiency, which was further developed ten years later, was formulated for the first time.

These positions were formulated by representatives of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (specifically by me and L.I. Mendelevich) in a group that prepared the draft Brezhnev speech. I cleared them with the then Chief of the General Staff of the USSR armed forces, V.G. Kulikov, without any difficulty, since these positions reflected the actual state of affairs, although the language sounded a little "American." For that reason alone, and not because of disagreement over their content, they evoked doubt, at a certain stage of work on the draft speech, on the part of the party internationalists headed by Boris Ponomarev, but their doubts disappeared after the draft was read to Brezhnev, who accepted them without hesitation. They did not evoke any opposition by other members of the Politburo, including Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, to whom the draft speech was sent for review in accordance with established procedure.

Since it was important that Washington correctly understand the signal from Moscow contained in Brezhnev's Tula speech, Mendelevich and I supplied TASS and APN in advance with an accurate English translation of the relevant section of the speech.

The first letter from President Carter after assuming office, dated 26 January 1977, was taken in Moscow as reinforcement of the hope for successful development of a Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament issues. [This letter, and the rest of the Carter-Brezhnev correspondence described here, are printed beginning on page 144--ed.] Carter first of all noted as extremely important Brezhnev's speech in Tula and specifically the position that the USSR does not strive for superiority in armaments and that it only needs defenses sufficient to deter any potential opponent. Reaffirming his cam-

paign statements that the final aim in disarmament must be the abolition of all nuclear weapons on our planet, Carter characterized as a "critically important first step" on the road to this aim the "achievement of the SALT-2 Treaty without delay" and agreement after that on movement toward further limitations and reductions of strategic weapons. In the context of previous public and private statements by Carter, these formulations were understood in Moscow as signifying his readiness first to quickly conclude and sign the SALT-2 Treaty, based on the Vladivostok accords of 1974 and made concrete in subsequent negotiations still under Ford. Such an approach was fully in accord with the intentions of the Soviet leadership, as was the proposal of the President to send Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow at an early date to discuss these questions. Consequently, Brezhnev's reply of February 4 to Carter maintained an extremely positive tone.

But the following letter from Carter dated February 14 not only puzzled Brezhnev and his colleagues but aroused their indignation. In his letter, while as before calling for the rapid conclusion of work on the SALT-2 Treaty, Carter at the same time made it clear that he did not at all have in mind that treaty whose framework was worked out at Vladivostok and in subsequent negotiations. In the first place, Carter proposed to anticipate already in this treaty, rather than in the next one, a "significant reduction" in strategic weapons, and secondly he proposed (also contrary to the Vladivostok accords) to leave out of the SALT-2 Treaty, for later negotiations, long-range cruise missiles, that is to give a free hand to a strategic arms race in those directions where the USA, as in most other cases, was at that time ahead of the USSR.

In Carter's letter there were also other elements that caused irritation among Soviet leaders, in particular his declared intent to take a public position on human rights in the USSR. Added to this was the public letter from Carter to A.D. Sakharov. But these irritating elements were not the main things that concerned Moscow. The principal disappointment was the clear departure by the new President from Vladivostok. In view of the internal collisions that Brezhnev had had to endure to achieve agreement with Ford in Vladivostok, such a turn by Carter was extremely painful to him not only because of the unacceptable nature of the new American proposals but also as an antagonistic act toward him personally. Consequently, Brezhnev's response was marked by a hard, and in places sharp, tone.

A similar tone was maintained in Carter's message to Brezhnev of March 4, which arrived in Moscow not through the usual diplomatic channels but via the "hot line" between the White House and the Kremlin, which was reserved for use in emergency situations. As Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in his memoirs,[5] this was done at his initiative, in order that the President's message would go immediately to Brezhnev, bypassing the Foreign Ministry. But the result turned out worse, since at the Moscow end of the "hot line," maintained by the KGB, translators were on duty who were far from highly qualified, and were moreover unfamiliar with the subject matter of the strategic arms negotiations. Therefore their translation of Carter's message was marred by many inaccuracies and rough spots, which did not exactly facilitate its good reception by Soviet leaders.

Brezhnev's response of March 15 was formulated in calmer tones. But the positions of the sides before Vance's visit to Moscow scheduled for the end of March were basically divergent. While the Soviet side firmly maintained the necessity of completing work on the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok accords, the American side was attempting to transform the Vladivostok accords into something completely different, unacceptable to the Soviet leadership from the purely military-strategic as well as the political and psychological point of view. And as the time for the Vance visit approached, it became more and more clear—from Carter's public statements, from controlled "leaks" in the American press, and then in Vance's conversations with Soviet Ambassador to Washington Dobrynin—that Vance was coming to Moscow with positions having nothing in common with Vladivostok, but instead with so-called "comprehensive proposals" envisaging "deep cuts" in offensive strategic weapons, with reductions advantageous for the USA. The very fact of publicizing the basic content of the American proposals before Vance presented them to the Soviet leadership was taken in Moscow as an indication that Carter's intentions were not serious, that he was merely trying to achieve a propaganda victory.

Therefore it could be foreseen that the Vance mission to Moscow at the end of March, as regards the SALT-2 Treaty, was destined for failure. And in fact the new American proposals presented by Vance signaled an obvious retreat from everything achieved in negotiations on SALT-2 under Nixon and Ford and were immediately rejected by the Soviet side without discussion and without putting forward counterproposals; our previous positions, based on the Vladivostok accords, were simply reaffirmed.

It should be noted that, unlike many other occasions, this time there was complete unanimity regarding the new American proposals not only at "the top" in the Soviet leadership, but also among professionals working on these problems. And not because we were all against significant reductions in offensive strategic weapons. Not at all. But we considered it absolutely illogical, lacking any common sense, to throw out the results of five years of joint work in a substantially already finished SALT-2 Treaty, and to begin what amounted to new negotiations requiring new conceptual decisions and prolonged working out of many practical, including technical, questions. The illogic of such a mode of action seemed so obvious that even if Carter's proposals for "deep cuts" were in their content more balanced and in the final analysis acceptable to the USSR, at that moment I nevertheless think they would not have met a positive response. The operating principle would have been "better a titmouse in hand than a crane in the sky." If you take into account that the new American proposals were clearly directed at attaining unilateral advantage for the USA, then they could not be accepted by the Soviet leadership as a serious initiative, and called for a sharply negative reaction.

It should be said that for Vance and Paul Warnke, the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who accompanied him, such a reaction by the Soviet side likewise appeared to be not unexpected. It was felt that they themselves were not convinced of the reasonableness of those positions with which they arrived in Moscow. This feeling was fully confirmed subsequently, with the appearance of the memoirs of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski and monographs of American scholars of this period, from which it is clear that inside the Administration including between Vance

and Brzezinski, there were noticeable differences regarding the American position on strategic offensive weapons. The transformation of Carter's position—from willingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok accords to ambitious "deep cuts"—can be explained by a series of factors. First, a sincere desire of the President himself to move as rapidly as possible to radical reductions in strategic weapons. Second, a desire by the Pentagon, supported by Brzezinski, to utilize this romantic breakthrough by Carter to significantly alter what was done in strategic arms limitations under Nixon and Ford, that is, to alter it for the unilateral advantage of the USA. Third, the influence on the President of Senator Henry Jackson and those who shared his views, who conditioned their support for a possible SALT-2 Treaty with demands regarding its content such that putting such demands forward by the American side could prevent the attainment of a treaty, which in fact is what they wanted. Fourth, although Vance, Warnke and those who shared their views considered it preferable to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of the Vladivostok accords, they apparently did not fully realize, and in any case did not succeed in making Carter aware, what a psychological shock for Brezhnev was his [Carter's] rejection of Vladivostok.

Incidentally, knowing well the mood of the Soviet leaders at that time, I can with confidence say that if Carter, as he originally promised, had in March 1977 shown a willingness to conclude the SALT-2 Treaty on the basis of Vladivostok, and his proposal regarding "deep cuts" had been presented as an aim for subsequent negotiations, then the SALT-2 Treaty, with approximately the same content as was signed in 1979, could have been completed at the end of 1977 or beginning of 1978. And it is not excluded that the following SALT-3 Treaty, encompassing significant reductions in strategic weapons, could have been worked out already before the end of Carter's term as President. However, the possibility for such a favorable development of events was lost and the process of preparing the SALT-2 Treaty was much longer and more difficult.

For Carter's March 1977 initiative on "deep cuts" meant not only the loss of two or three months in a mechanical sense. After the propaganda noise accompanying the March initiative, returning to the "Vladivostok track" for Carter himself was a very difficult matter because of prestige and political considerations, since it looked like a defeat and retreat. This caused many additional difficulties in the subsequent negotiations, without which the process of working out the SALT-2 Treaty probably would have been quicker and simpler. Therefore if you consider that the main motive of Carter in the rash decision in March 1977 was his sincere desire for quicker and more radical steps in disarmament, then this is one of those cases to which applies the Russian saying "the best is the enemy of the good." A good impulse led to an opposite result.

1. [Ed. note: Documentation of Harriman's 20 September 1976 conversation with Brezhnev can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.]
2. [Ed. note: For Harriman's version of this meeting, see "Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at my House in Washington on the Evening of November 4, 1976," Harriman Papers, LC.]
3. [Ed. note: See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation—WAH and President-Elect Jimmy Carter, Tuesday, November 16, 1976," Harriman, LC].
4. [Ed. note: Additional documentation on Carter-Brezhnev oral communications during the transition period can be found in the Harriman Papers, LC, including Harriman's record of the 1 December 1976 conversation. A translation of Dobrynin's declassified report of the meeting is reprinted below.]
5. [Ed. note: See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 161.]

Georgiy M. Kornienko was First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union; this article is drawn from a chapter of his Russian-language memoirs, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant *(Moscow: International Relations, 1994).*

CLINTON SIGNS FIRST POST-COLD WAR EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DECLASSIFICATION

[Ed. note: On 17 April 1995, after two years of public hearings, private lobbying, interagency wrangling, and several revised (and leaked) drafts, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the first post-Cold War presidential executive ordering modifying the country's declassification system.

Amid concerns by scholars that the order would be too restrictive and fears in some government quarters that the rules would be too lax, Clinton's order, replacing one signed by Ronald Reagan in April 1982 (E.O. 12356), stretched in an effort to satisfy both constituencies. The order pleased historians by instituting for the first time a system of bulk (rather than expensive and time-consuming page-by-page) declassification of most historical records more than 25 years old, and by mandating a mere ten-year classification status for most newly-created documents. But at the same time, the order responded to the concerns of secrecy-conscious government agencies by including a broad range of exemptions and grace periods through which information can be kept secret.

The full text of Executive Order (EO) 12958, "Classified National Security Information," runs 39 legal-sized, double-spaced pages. Excerpts from the introduction and some of the sections dealing with declassification of historical materials are reprinted below:]

EXECUTIVE ORDER
12958
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. Our democratic principles require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government. Also, our Nation's progress depends on the free flow of information. Nevertheless, throughout our history, the national interest has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, and our participation within the community of nations. Protecting information critical to our Nation's security remains a priority. In recent years, however, dramatic changes have altered, though not eliminated, the national security threats that we confront. These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open Government....

[omitted sections concern legal definitions and procedures for classification and declassification of current and future government-generated materials]

Sec. 3.4. Automatic Declassification. (a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25 yeras from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below.

(b) An agency may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a), above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;

(3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities;

(4) reveal information that would impair the appli-

continued on page 160

THE PATH TO DISAGREEMENT: U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS LEADING TO VANCE'S MARCH 1977 TRIP TO MOSCOW

Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin's Conversation with Averell Harriman, December 1, 1976

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Washington, D.C.

Top secret
Copy No. 1

From the Journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with A. HARRIMAN

December 1, 1976

On December 1 Harriman came to visit me.

I. He said that he had met with J. Carter on Monday, November 29, at his (i.e. Carter's) home in the city of Plains (state of Georgia). As had been agreed, he, Harriman, had brought to Carter's attention the messages which had been brought from Moscow on behalf of L.I. Brezhnev,[1] as well as other messages which the Soviet Ambassador had expressed to him, Harriman, in accordance with the instruction to bring this information to Carter's attention.

The "President-elect" (Carter's current title) has authorized Harriman to convey the following answer for transmission to L.I. Brezhnev (Harriman read further from the text which he was holding):

Carter received the message from General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev and was grateful for the sentiments expressed in it. Personally, he highly values the fact that he received an expression of the views of the General Secretary. Although he does not have the possibility to conduct negotiations before assuming his position, he would like to declare that he shares the aspiration of the General Secretary for an improvement in relations between our two countries. He also recognizes the importance of mutual limitations in nuclear weapons and of bringing the arms race to a halt.

Mr. Carter often expressed these sentiments during the recent presidential election campaign, and he thinks that the majority of Americans agree with his desire to limit the nuclear weapons in our two countries and to stop further proliferation of nuclear capability among other countries.

He notes with satisfaction that Mr. Brezhnev shares his point of view on the importance of cooperation between our two countries in the matter of taking measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

President-elect Carter expects as well the establishment of constructive relations in other areas to which Mr. Brezhnev had referred. With good will on both sides, President-elect Carter believes, progress can be made in the matter of cooperation between the USA and the USSR, which will strengthen peace in the whole world.

Harriman said further—continuing to read—that Carter is very satisfied with the tone of the General Secretary's message. Noting that before he assumes the post of President he is not in a position to conduct negotiations, Carter at the same time declared that when he receives the authority, he will quickly and insistently act to achieve an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons. Carter added that he would like to be sure that limitations will be mutually advantageous and that the relative power of the two sides will not be changed during the process of reductions. In addition he stressed that a means must be found to assure our peoples that the agreement will be fulfilled.

The current problems in the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons are too technical for him to comment on at the present time, and he, Carter, cannot, it goes without saying, be bound by the past negotiations. At the same time he fully will take into account the work that has been done over the past two years.

Further Harriman said that Carter hopes that the negotiations on limiting strategic weapons will be concluded at a summit meeting, i.e. at a personal meeting between him, Carter, and L.I. Brezhnev.

Carter thinks that the negotiations which will begin after he assumes the post of President would be accelerated if it would be possible to maintain the practice, which had justified itself in the past, of dispatching at the decisive moment in the negotiations a special trusted representative of the President to set forth the President's proposals and thoughts personally to General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev.

Harriman further reported in confidence that Carter had asked him whether L.I. Brezhnev would accept an invitation if he, Carter, invites the General Secretary to come to the United States for the final stage of the negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons.

Harriman, in his words, had expressed to Carter his own opinion to the effect that he hopes that L.I. Brezhnev will accept such an invitation, insofar as there is already established a definite order of visits of the countries' leaders to each other for summit meetings, and it was now the President's turn to invite the General Secretary to the United States.

2. During the conversation with Harriman, in relation to his comments about J. Carter's attitude about strategic arms limitation negotiations, I inquired of Harriman whether he could not in a more detailed way set forth Carter's position on that question. In particular, I asked him what, concretely, did Carter have in mind when he publicly offered a proposal for a "freeze" in strategic weapons: within what temporal, quantitative, or qualitative framework was he operating.

Harriman said that he had asked that type of question in his conversation with Carter. However, Carter had answered him that for the time being he had on that issue only ideas and convictions of a general character which seemed important to him, but he still had not precisely formulated comprehensive, integrated positions.

He intends to formulate such a position when he names his chosen candidates to the posts of Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Aide to the President for National Security Affairs, whom he would, as one of his highest priorities, instruct to work out this position, which would encompass the complex political and technical aspects of the entire problem.

I directed Harriman's attention to that point in the thoughts of Carter which he had transmitted today where (Carter) had said that he could not be bound by past strategic arms limitation negotiations. I said that an approach like that is incomprehensible, if it is fraught with serious complications for future negotiations. All previous negotiations had been conducted on behalf of the United States, of the country as a whole and the arrival of a new President should not mean breaking off everything positive that had been achieved before him. I reminded Harriman that I had pointed this out to him at our previous meeting, when, in accordance with instructions certain considerations from Moscow had been expounded to him for transmittal to Carter.

Harriman said that he had recalled this when he was speaking to Carter, and had specially directed his attention to that circumstance.

Carter had answered him, Harriman, that he understands this point, and that he had therefore included in his responding thoughts to L.I. Brezhnev the comment that he will take the work that has been done at the SALT negotiations over the last two years fully into account. However, at the same time, he, Carter, would like to reserve for himself the right to express certain possible new thoughts or correctives which might occur to him in the context of finishing up a final agreement, especially if they might promote the resolution of the remaining disputed issues. In principle he wants to reserve for himself such a possibility.

3. During the conversation Harriman underlined that Carter is very interested in the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which

along with the question of limitation of strategic arms will be a priority in his plans regarding negotiations with the Soviet Union after he assumes the post of President.

He, Carter, is very worried by the spread of nuclear technology around the world. And although many chances had already over the past years been missed, there is still, in his opinion, time to take certain joint measures to put a brake on this process. As on the question of limitation of strategic weapons, so far Carter has no more concrete thoughts on this issue. In Harriman's words, Carter himself said that the details of his position still need to be worked out.

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA
[signature]

/A. DOBRYNIN/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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President Carter's Letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, January 26, 1977

Top secret
Copy 1

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Washington, D.C.

From the diary
of DOBRYNIN A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with the USA Secretary of State

C. VANCE

January 26, 1977

Secretary of State Vance today transmitted the following letter of President Carter to L.I. Brezhnev:

"Confidential

To His Excellency
Leonid I. Brezhnev
The General Secretary
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

Having assumed the position of President of the United States, I want to share with you my views about relations between our two countries.

I want to express my gratitude for the unofficial letters which I recieved from you, and in this connection I want to confirm that my aim is to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and advantage. I will pay close personal attention to this goal, as will Secretary of State Vance.

I read your public statements with great interest and they make me believe that we share a common aspiration for strengthening and preserving the perspectives for stable peace.

As I understand your highly important speech in Tula, the Soviet Union will not strive for superiority in arms, it will stand against such a conception, and that it will require only a defense which is strong enough to deter any potential enemy. The United States does not want anything less or more for itself either. Therefore, our two countries, with consistency and wisdom, should be able to avoid a new arms race. I declared to the American people that the elimination of all nuclear weapons is my firm goal.

There are three areas in which progress can be made on the way to this goal. The most important first step must be the urgent achievement of an agreement on the second stage strategic weapons limitation, and also an agreement to move on in the direction of additional limitations and reductions in the sphere of strategic weapons. Moreover, I hope that we will soon be able to conclude a properly verifiable agreement on the universal banning of all nuclear tests, and that we also will strive to achieve more openness regarding the strategic policy of our countries. It is also important to renew the efforts to make progress at the negotiations on balanced reduction of military forces in Central Europe.

We also have a responsibility to carry out a policy directed at preventing explosions, which could lead to dangerous conflicts, in tense regions of the world. The United States will work to support a peaceful settlement in the Near East on the basis of the applicable resolutions of the United Nations. In the same way, in the South of Africa we encourage all sides to start negotiations toward a peaceful settlement which could lead to security and justice for all.

I believe that the USSR can assist in the achievement of progress toward peace in both of these critical regions.

My Administration gives much importance to improving of our bilateral economic relations on the basis of mutual and equal advantage for the peoples of both our two great countries. At the same time we can not be indifferent to the fate of freedom and individual human rights.

We represent different social systems, and our countries differ from each other in their history and experience. A competition in ideals and ideas is inevitable between our societies. Yet this must not interfere with common efforts towards formation of a more peaceful, just and humane world. We live in the world, which to a greater and greater extent demands collective answers to the main human questions, and I hope that our countries can cooperate more closely in order to promote the development, better diet and more substantive life for less advantaged part of mankind.

I look forward to a meeting with you and to discussing at this meeting both our different and our common interests. In the mean time I suggest both of us should do everything in our power to promote Soviet-American relations. I suggested to Secretary of State Vance to prepare for a meeting with you in the spring, if you wish, for a review of the progress we have made and to discuss the key problems which remain unsolved. Both of us at that time also would like to exchange opinions about the next meeting between you and me.

Any concrete ideas, on these or any other questions, which you might like to relate to me will be very welcomed and thoroughly studied.

With best regards,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

January 26, 1977
White House
Washington, D.C. [...]

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

[signature] A. Dobrynin

/A. DOBRYNIN/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Brezhnev's Letter to Carter, February 4, 1977

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1

The USSR Embassy in the USA
Washington, D.C.

From the journal
of DOBRYNIN A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with the U.S. Secretary of State
C. VANCE

February 4, 1977

I visited Secretary of State Vance and referring to my delegated task, handed him the text of

the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev to President J. Carter:

"To His Excellency
James E. Carter
The President of the United States of America

Dear Mister President,

I want on my own behalf and on behalf of my colleagues in the leadership to congratulate you once more on your assumption of the position of the President of the United States.

I attentively familiarized myself with your letter of January 26, and find it in general constructive and hope inspiring. We accepted with satisfaction confirmation of the fact that the goal of your policy is improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, and also your intention to pay attention to this. This coincides with our basic approach, which I expressed again in public not long ago. I want to stress now that we are ready to realize by mutual efforts a new major shift in the relations between two our countries.

As far as I understand we are establishing with you a business-like, trustful dialogue.

It is important, of course, that from the very beginning of our contact we have clarity and mutual understanding of principle questions.

The most important thing here—and it is confirmed by past experience—is the necessity to strictly observe the basic principles of equality, mutual consideration of lawful interests, mutual benefit and non-interference into the internal affairs of the other side. With this, and only this approach from both sides, in complete accord with the "Fundamentals of Mutual Relations" between our countries signed in 1972, can a stable, progressive development of relations between the USSR and the USA, and the potential to find mutually acceptable solutions to emerging issues, be provided.

For objective reasons, at the present time the central sphere of relations between the USA and USSR really is to ensure cooperation between our two countries with the goal of stopping the arms race and of disarmament. Only in this way can the main task of our peoples, as well as that of all other peoples—elimination of the threat of war, first of all, of course, nuclear-missile war—be completed.

As you also recognize, we have to finish the development of a new agreement on limitation of strategic offensive weapons without delays. We believe that this task is completely manageable. Because the main parameters of the agreement are, in fact, already determined on the basis of the agreement which was reached in Vladivostok. The successful conduct of this exclusively important and necessary affair to its conclusion would allow us to start hard work on more far-going measures in this area and, undoubtedly, would give a new impulse for a constructive development of Soviet-American relations in general.

We believe that it is these questions of limitation of strategic weapons that will occupy the main place in the conversations with Secretary of State C. Vance when he comes to Moscow.

In our opinion, without further delay we have to put into practice Soviet-American Treaties on limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons and on explosions for peaceful purposes. At the same time we have to—and we are ready to cooperate with the USA on this issue—intensify our efforts directed at a total and universal ban on nuclear weapons tests and at prevention of nuclear proliferation.

We want to bring about a shift in the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. We would like the new American government to treat with attention the proposals which were introduced there by the countries of the Warsaw Treaty last year.

There are other questions of limitation of weapons and of disarmament which are waiting to be solved. The Soviet Union has put forward concrete proposals on many of them, and we hope that your government approach this review constructively.

Of course, under conditions when it is still not possible yet to achieve a halt to the arms race in the world, we can not but take care about security of our country and our allies. Our defensive potential must be sufficient so that nobody will risk to attack us or threaten us with attack. In this respect, using your expression, we do not want anything more or less for ourselves.

Yet I want to stress once more with all determination that the Soviet Union does not strive for superiority in weapons. We are deeply convinced that genuine security for all countries and for each of them in particular is based not on competition in the sphere of weapons, but in the sphere of disarmament, and in the elimination of the material foundation for war. Our future efforts also will be directed at achieving this goal.

I will touch briefly on some other questions.

An important direction of joint or parallel efforts of our countries, because of their objective role and responsibility in world affairs, is assistance in solution of problems, which cause international tension. In our opinion the task here is to remove the original reasons which cause these problems.

The primary meaning in this respect, as you, Mr. President correctly note too, is the establishment of a strong and just peace in the Near East. Almost 10 years has passed since the war of 1967. This "jubilee" with all its sharpness reminds us not only of the time we have simply lost in the matter of settling the Near East conflict, but also of a possibility of new dangerous explosions—as happened in October 1973 and just recently in Lebanon.

Moreover, we are convinced that if in our approach to the Near East problem we soberly and objectively take into account all the lawful rights and interests of all sides—both Arabs, including the Palestinians, and Israel—then the reliable elimination of this permanent source of international conflicts is quite possible. Finding the necessary understanding between the USA and the USSR on this question, in particular relating to the reconvening of the Geneva conference, will undoubtedly make success possible on the great matter of achieving a political settlement in the Near East.

Cooperation between our two countries would also be vitally important, we believe, on other international questions—whether it is further steps toward strengthening European security on the basis of decisions adopted in Helsinki, strict observance of the Four-Power treaty on Western Berlin, or, say, a settlement on Cyprus.

In your letter you, Mr. President, mention the problem of the south of Africa. Our principled position on this question is very well known: we are united with the struggle of the South African peoples for their freedom and independence. We recognize the right of nobody but these peoples themselves to determine their fate. Despite what is sometimes said about this, the USSR does not look for any benefits for itself in this region, and the rivalry with the United States there does not interest it either.

Noting the great significance, which you, Mr. President, give to improving trade-economic relations, on my own behalf I would like to stress that we did and still do want our relations in this sphere to develop consistently and to acquire a more and more broad-scale character, leading to mutual—I stress, mutual benefit for both sides. But it is necessary for this that they be freed of all kinds of discriminatory limitations and artificially created obstacles. Without this, without rejection of attempts to somehow or other link trade with questions relating to the domestic competence of governments, not only will economic contacts suffer, but overall relations between our countries will also suffer a blow.

I hope, Mr. President, that with good will and sincere readiness for constructive cooperation between us you and I will be able to make a good contribution towards solving the problems that we have. Some of these, including the problem of strategic weapons limitation, apparently will be the subject of an exchange of opinions soon during Mr. Vance's visit to Moscow.

In conclusion, I want to stress that I, like you, place special emphasis on our personal meeting. I will be ready to consider questions relating to the conduct of such a meeting with Mr. Vance, who you wrote, will be entrusted with this task.

With my best wishes and respect.

L. BREZHNEV

February 4, 1977

In Vance's own opinion, it is a good letter. It will be given to the President today.

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA
[signature]

/A. DOBRYNIN/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Carter's Letter to Brezhnev, February 14, 1977

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1

THE USSR EMBASSY IN THE USA
Washington, D.C.

From the journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with Assistant to the President
Z. Brzezinski

February 15, 1977

Today Brzezinski, Assistant to the President, called me. He said that President Carter had just written a letter in response to L.I. Brezhnev.

Since the White House is preoccupied with meetings with the President of Mexico, he, Brzezinski, asked acting Secretary of State [Warren] Christopher, who was with him at the moment, to give me that letter.

Brzezinski said that he would be ready, should I have any questions, to discuss various aspects of this letter in a couple of days during our next unofficial meeting (we had a previous arrangement with Brzezinski to meet for breakfast this coming Friday, i.e. on February 18).

An hour later Christopher handed me a letter to L.I. Brezhnev, signed by President Carter:

"To his Excellency
Leonid I. Brezhnev,
the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

I am very pleased to note that our first exchange of letters has brought us at once to consideration of the central questions of universal peace. Our two great countries share a special responsibility not only for doing everything possible for the lessening of tension, but also for working out a series of mutual understandings which can lead to a more reliable and less dangerous political climate in the world.

I know the history of your country and admire it. As a child I developed my literary taste reading your classics. I also know how much suffering your people endure very recently, during the last war. I know about your own role in this war and about the losses suffered by each Soviet family. That is why I believe that we both are sincere in our declarations about our devotion to peace, and that gives me hope for the future.

The question is how we can turn this devotion into reality. How can we start a process which could widen our cooperation and simultaneously restrain and finally limit our rivalry. This rivalry—it is real, extremely expensive, and undeniable—can at any moment become very dangerous, which is why we must not allow it to develop without restraint. In my opinion, this demands, at least, first, work to widen where possible our coordinated efforts, especially in the area of limitation of nuclear weapons; and second, to demonstrate highly deliberate restraint towards those unstable regions of the world where direct confrontation could arise between us.

I especially welcome your desire to develop cooperation with the idea of stopping the arms race, and to achieve without delay concrete agreements on disarmament.

It is precisely in the sphere of arms limitation that we must, in my opinion, put the main emphasis. I will as always give it my personal attention and I can assure you that the officials in my administration who are responsible for these matters will consider any and all of your proposals in the most careful way and with the most positive attitude.

It goes without saying that we must have mutual security from successful attack, and we have to use our role as the most mighty states to start a significant reduction of the level of conventional and nuclear arms. We have no definite time limits as such, but it is really necessary for us to achieve some maximum progress without delay.

I agree that in our exchanges of opinion and in the conversations which Secretary of State Vance will have in Moscow at the end of March we must concentrate mainly on the question of achieving an agreement on the second stage of strategic arms limitation, possibly including some significant reductions of the level of forces. Maybe we could bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion if we agree that this is only the first step in the process which could lead to bigger reductions in our respective nuclear arsenals. Regarding this, I wonder if it wouldn't be useful to study the possibility of separating the questions on cruise missiles and "Backfire" from the second stage of the SALT negotiations. We could return to these questions right away during the following negotiations. If we have ambitious enough aims and in particular if we want to achieve real disarmament leaving only the minimum level of armaments sufficient to provide security to both sides, then, it evidently would be easier for us to deal with the technical problems, which now seem very significant and complicated, later.

I hope that our additional private exchanges of opinion and the negotiations of Secretary of State Vance in Moscow will cover the broadest possible range of possibilities. I can assure you that in the analysis of our arms control policy which I am carrying out at the present time, all applicable proposals will be considered. As I said during a conversation with your Ambassador, I hope that we can consider not only the question of possible sharp reductions of the total quantity of nuclear weapons, i.e. the question of the minimum number of missiles which would allow every country to feel secure from a first blow, but also the question of restrictions on throw weights, of the possibility of a ban on all mobile missiles, of refusal to take any long-term preparatory measures in the field of civil defense, and also of such additional confidence building measures as preliminary warning of all missile tests and achieving an agreement on the non-arming of satellites and an agreement to reject development of capability to destroy observation satellites. We also have to study practical means to satisfy our mutual desire that our agreements be observed. Such measures as on-site inspection and uninterrupted observation from space must the subject of incorrect interpretation. These are the means, which can be used to achieve progress, and to win society's support and understanding of our efforts.

In all these areas our final goal must be to do more than that, as our specialists in technology say, which is perhaps expedient now. If we bear this very far-reaching aim in mind, we will be able to change significantly the level of threat for us and for the rest of the world.

An attempt of one side to gain an advantage over the other during negotiations will yield the opposite result. We will be striving to carry out consultations without tricks or unnecessary delays, but also without pressure and unjustifiable haste.

I welcome your readiness to direct your efforts at achieving the agreement on a universal test ban. I realize that problems remain regarding other countries which continue to conduct testing programs and the possible use of peaceful nuclear explosions in mining industry or construction, but I believe that there are satisfactory ways to consider these problems. I intend to ask the Congress to ratify two agreements which have already been concluded between our two govern-

ments, but I treat them only as steps on the way to the common goal of bringing a total halt to nuclear testing. Until then our government will observe these unratified agreements.

As far as I know there were proposals in the past to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, and these proposals were not seriously studied. I asked my colleagues to study the the Indian Ocean question thoroughly, so that we will be ready to speak more specifically about the possibility of reaching an agreement, which could promote universal peace. I ask you to inform me of your concrete ideas on this matter. I presume that in such a situation it makes sense to pay particular attention to the military activity of both countries in this region. This, as it seems, is that obvious case where mutual profit calls for a balanced agreement leading to a general reduction of military efforts in the whole region.

As you know from my public statements, I intend energetically to continue attempts to reduce the sale and transfer of conventional weapons to countries of the third world and I hope that you will join these efforts. It seems to me a senseless competition and we, as the main suppliers, are particularly responsible for placing a limit to such transfers. Obviously other providers should also be involved in these efforts, and we will widen the discussion of the question to include them.

I also welcome your aspiration to move the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe forward more energetically until they are at the minimum acceptable levels. We are very concerned about what seems to be an extreme increase of your military power in East Europe. At the present time we are reviewing our positions on this issue and at the same time are instructing our delegation to continue to study the data which have been presented by both sides.

These are the questions, which, I hope, Mr. Vance will be able to discuss in more detail after we complete our own analysis. We will, of course, consult with our NATO allies about everything while we conduct this concrete analysis.

I would like to make one observation regarding the four-power agreement. As you know, we think that this agreement applies to all of Berlin, and not just to West Berlin. For us, the observation of both the letter and the spirit of this agreement is very important. We make every effort to avoid sensitive issues, but we must insist that this agreement, which is so vital to our ability to develop peaceful relations in Europe, is observed in full. Recently, it seems, there has been observed a growing inclination to create new aggravations and limits in Berlin, which could upset the delicate political balance which exists there. I hope that you will cooperate in eliminating these tense situations.

We expect cooperation in the realization of further steps toward the fulfillment of the agreements reached in Helsinki relating to human rights. As I said to Ambassador Dobrynin, we hope that all aspects of these agreements can be realized. It is not our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. We do not wish to create problems with the Soviet Union, but it will be necessary for our Administration from time to time to publicly express the sincere and deep feelings which our people and I feel. Our obligation to help promote human rights will not be expressed in an extreme form or by means not proportional to achieving reasonable results. We would also welcome, of course, personal, confidential exchanges of views on these delicate questions.

I noted your response to my previous observations relating to the importance of improving trade and economic relations. Your open remarks on this issue correspond to a spirit of directness which I admire, but we have to do something practical in order to remove barriers. From my side, I intend to do everything that I can to achieve mutually beneficial trade, but you are aware of certain restrictions improsed by Congress, which I must take into account.

Permit me to say a few words about our efforts to improve the situation in other areas, where there exists disagreements and potential conflicts. In the Near East, we intend to begin direct negotiations with the sides in that region, and I hope to energetically develop a process of achieving a fair and solid settlement. Mr. Vance will be happy to have the opportunity in his conversations at the end of March to learn your view on this question, including aspects which reflect our direct interest as co-sponsors of the Geneva conference.

In southern Africa, we believe that the Africans should solve their problems without outside interference. It is with this goal in mind that we support a peaceful solution, which corresponds to the will of the majority, and have limited actions whch could increase the potential for violence.

We took steps toward opening a dialogue with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with the goal of creating the foundation for normal relations with that country. In other regions as well we will be guided by our devotion to genuine freedom, self-determination, and economic progress.

I hope that we can continue these exchanges of letters in order to have a clear statement of our views and to undertake the broadest possible review of issues which have such fundamental importance for our two peoples and for peace on earth. From these candid letters we can build a clear and precise basis for the preparation of our personal meeting, which I anticipate with great hopes.

With the best personal wishes and respect,

Jimmy Carter

White House
Washington
February 14, 1977"

Christopher could not comment on this letter at all, referring to the fact that it was prepared in the White House by the President himself.

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

(signature)
A. Dobrynin

/A. Dobrynin/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

CPSU Central Committee Politbuto Decision "About the instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for his conversation with Vance on the question of 'human rights'" and text of instruction, February 18, 1977

Proletariats of the World unite!

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top secret

No P46/X

To: comrades Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ponomarev, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No 46 of the meeting of CC CPSU Politburo
on February 18, 1977

About the instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for his conversation with Vance on the question of "human rights".

The draft of the instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington this question is to be approved. (The draft is attached.)

SECRETARY OF THE CC

[Along left-hand margin]
Must be returned within 7 days to the
CC CPSU (General Department, 1st sector)

On the point X of the protocol No 46

Secret

WASHINGTON

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

FIRST. Meet with Vance and tell him that you have instructions to inform President Carter and his Secretary of State of the following:

Raising by the Americans in Moscow of the question of freeing [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, a Soviet citizen, convicted for his actions punishable by law in accordance with our criminal code, aroused the utmost bewilderment.[2]

The fact that such an interference into our domestic affairs is being done in the name of concern over "human rights" does not change the essence of the matter.

Obviously, everybody has a right to have one's own view on different issues including the liberties and rights of people in any country. And we too have our own view of these problems and their current situation in the USA.

But it is another matter to bring these views into the sphere of inter-state relations and thereby to complicate them. How else can one see the position of the representatives of the USA administration, when they are trying to make the questions, thoroughly under the jurisdiction of the Soviet state, a matter of discussion? It touches upon the basic principles of our mutual relations. It must be a complete clarity on this problem from the very beginning. Such a position of the USA is categorically unacceptable to us.

You and we are aware that we have different ideologies and social political systems. Certainly, due to this fact we have different approaches to different questions.

We, in the Soviet Union, are proud that the socialist revolution and our system not only proclaimed but also provided in reality the right for work, education, social security, free medical assistance, and retirement to all Soviet citizens. And we really guarantee these rights.

At the same time the Soviet laws guard our people from antisocial tendencies such as the propaganda of war in any form, the dissemination of the ideas of race inequality and national divisiveness or from the attempts of moral corruption of people. In our country nobody has the right to break the law that is equally obligatory to everybody.

We do not try to impose our understanding of rights and liberties of man on anybody, although much of what is going on under the conditions of another social system seems unacceptable to our people.

It is not difficult to imagine what would have happened if we, proceeding from our own moral principles, had tried to link the development of our inter-state relations with the USA or other capitalist countries with such actually existing problems in these countries as multi-million unemployment, deprivation of rights of ethnic minorities, race discrimination, unequal rights for women, the violation of citizens rights by the state organs, the persecution of people with progressive convictions and so on.

By the way, if one speaks about the concerns regarding human rights, how should one view the systematic support by the USA of dictatorial, anti-populist regimes in some countries, where constantly and violently the most basic human rights and liberties are violated.

If we had begun to raise all these questions as a part of our inter-state relations then, apparently, the result would have been the aggravation of all the relations between ourselves and other countries. It would have detracted us from the solution of those problems, which could and should be the goals of interactions and cooperation of our states. All the efforts for guaranteeing the rights of human beings to live in a world free from wars and burden of arms race, to live in the environment of security and friendly relations between the peoples would also have been jeopardized.

We firmly believe, therefore, that the questions of domestic development that reflect the differences in ideologies and social political systems should not be the subject of inter-state relations.

It is not accidental that precisely this principle, together with other fundamental principles, was clearly expressed in the "Fundamentals of mutual relations between the USSR and the USA" signed in 1972. One also should be reminded that during the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933 our countries obliged to absolutely respect unquestionable right of each other to build its own life as they see fit and refrain in any way from interference into the domestic affairs of the other partner.

Not always, however, and not in all respects are American statements and actions in agreement with this. In actuality, the statements about "concern" over "human rights in the USSR" serve the purpose of the support and even outright instigation for some persons, who separate themselves from the Soviet society. It is not just a demonstrative approving attitude of the (USA) administration toward the activity in the Soviet Union of some American journalists, whose only interest is to find and publicize the so-called "dissidents." Some people from the USA Embassy personnel in Moscow are directly involved in it. We could specifically name who we have in mind.

(For the Soviet Ambassador: If the interlocutor asks who exactly we are talking about, you could name the First secretary Pressel [sic])

And when, for the violation of the law by the USSR citizen, the Soviet authorities take actions in accordance with the Soviet law, actions which are the prerogative of any state, then this is used by the American side thereby harming our mutual relations.

Besides, it is known that the representatives of the American Embassy in Moscow secretly meet with [Andrei] Sakharov, who knows the state secrets related to the national defence. The last such meeting by the Embassy's initiative took place on February 8. This is an extremely unusual fact and no reference to the human rights cannot hide that this is a direct act of the American intelligence services against the USSR and against the Soviet social system. As for the references to American public opinion, the sentiments in the USA Congress, etc., one should not forget that in the Soviet Union there also is its own public opinion, and it decisively rejects all attempts to impose on us the values which are incongruent with social democracy and legality.

SECOND. After the conversation the following kind of announcement should be sent to Moscow via the TASS channel:

"On February" " the USSR Ambassador in the USA A.F. Dobrynin visited Secretary of State S. Vance and drew his attention to some statements and actions of the American side, which are in disagreement with the goals of positive development of the Soviet-American relations. In this regard it has been emphasized that the Soviet side resolutely rejects all the attempts to interfere in the Soviet domestic affairs, into the problems related to the prerogatives of other governments, using the pretext of "the protection of human rights."

The Soviet side could have also said - and it has firm grounds for it—some things regarding the guarantee of human rights in the USA, like unemployment of millions of people, race discrimination, unequal rights for women, violation of personal liberties of citizens, the rising wave of crimes, etc. It must be clear, however, that all the attempts to impose one's own views upon the other side, to bring such questions into inter-state relations, would only aggravate and make more difficult to resolve those problems which should be the subject of interaction and cooperation of both countries.

The relations of peaceful co-existence and constructive cooperation between the USSR and the USA in the interests of both peoples can fruitfully develop only when they are guided by the mutual respect of principles of sovereignty and non-interference into the domestic affairs of each other, as it is stated in the basic Soviet-American documents."

Telegraph the fulfillment.

[Source: Fond 89, Perechen 25, Dokument 44, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Docu-

mentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Brezhnev's Letter to Carter, February 25, 1977

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
TOP SECRET
Copy No. 1
Washington, D.C

From the Journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with the USA Secretary of State

C. VANCE

February 26, 1977

I met with Secretary of State Vance and asked him to pass on as directed the letter of L.I. Brezhnev of February 25, 1977 to President Carter.

"Dear Mr. President,

I attentively studied your letter of February 14 of this year. I want to talk sincerely about the impression and the ideas which it provoked here in our country. As I understand, you welcome such direct conversation.

The general remarks in favor of peace and curtailment of the arms race which were contained in the letter, of course, coincide with our own aspirations. We are definitely for the ultimate liquidation of nuclear weapons and, moreover, for universal and total disarmament under effective international control.

However, advancement forward toward these elevated goals will not be accelerated, but, on the contrary, will be slowed down, if we first of all do not value what we already managed to accomplish in this area over the last few years, and, second, if we abandon a responsible, realistic approach to determining further concrete steps in favor of introducing proposals which are known to be unacceptable.

Reviewing the ideas which you expressed from this particular angle, we unfortunately did not find in many of them a desire for a constructive approach, or readiness to look for mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which are the subject of exchanges of opinions between us.

As I already wrote to you, we firmly believe that in the first place it is necessary to complete the drafting of a new agreement on limitation of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of that which was agreed in Vladivostok. The basic parameters of the agreement which were fixed there, as well as additional explanatory statements which were agreed on during subsequent negotiations, were the result of tremendous work. In many cases it was necessary to make difficult decisions in order to find mutually acceptable solutions to an apparently deadlocked situation. And to the extent that this agreement has already been worked out, it is all interconnected—you can not withdraw one important element without destroying the whole foundation.

For example, it is enough to recall that—and you, Mr. President should know this from the documents from the negotiations—that the method of counting MIRVed missiles was precisely determined by the achievement of agreement on the whole complex of cruise missiles. The American side not only agreed to this in principle, but in January of last year a concrete formula for counting ALCM (trans. "air to ground") cruise missiles within the ceilings for strategic weapons was practically agreed. All that was left was to agree on concrete formulas for sea- and land-based cruise missiles. True, the American side later tried to propose the removal of the issue of sea- and land-based cruise missiles from the main agreement, [but] we categorically rejected such an attempt to break from an already-achieved agreement.

Now it is proposed to us to withdraw the whole question of cruise missiles from the agreement. How should we understand this return to a stage which we moved beyond long ago, and being forced to face this absolutely hopeless proposal? To agree to this proposal would have meant that blocking one channel of the strategic arms race we open another channel at the same time. And does it really matter to people the type of missile by which they will perish—a cruise or a non-cruise one? Nor are there grounds to believe that it will be easier to solve the question on cruise missiles later, when the sides start to deploy them, than now, while they are still being developed. We know from experience that it is not so.

The aspiration to maintain artificial urgency about the issue of the Soviet intermediate bomber called "Backfire" in the USA (which is still the case as we understand from your letter), is in no way consistent with an agreement. Let there be no doubts in this respect: we firmly reject such an approach as being inconsistent with the subject of the negotiations and having only one goal—to make the conclusion of the agreement more complicated or maybe even impossible.

Does the United States really have less of an interest in this agreement than the Soviet Union? We do not believe so, and if someone has a different opinion—it is a serious mistake.

In connection with the question you raised about the possibility of a significant reduction of the levels of strategic forces, which were agreed on in Vladivostok, I would like to remind you that we also did and do stand for stopping of the arms race, including the reduction of strategic forces. This can be proved by the agreement achieved in Vladivostok, which implies for the USSR a unilateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. This, not only in words by also in fact actually is a striving for arms reduction.

We are in favor of the results which were achieved in Vladivostok being consolidated in an agreement without further delays, and that we want to move further ahead. As already mentioned, we are ready to start negotiations on next steps, including the question of possible future reductions, straight after the current agreement will be concluded.

Yet, we want to make it clear: any steps of this kind must first of all completely satisfy the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. It seems to us, Mr. President, that nobody can argue with our right to pose the question this way.

How does the idea of a dramatic reduction in the nuclear-missile forces of the USA and the USSR look in this light? In your letter it is put forward in isolation from all other aspects of the present situation. At the same time it is evident that in this case the following factors would have immeasurably grown in importance to the unilateral advantage of the USA: the difference in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of American nuclear means of forward basing and missile-carrying aviation near the territory of the USSR, the fact that the USA NATO allies possess nuclear weapons and other circumstances, which can not but be taken into consideration.

The fact that it is impossible to ignore all these facts while considering the question of reduction of nuclear-missile forces of the USSR and the USA is so obvious that we can not but ask a question: what is the real purpose of putting forward such proposals, which may be superficially attractive to uninformed people, but in fact is directed at gaining unilateral advantages. You yourself justly pointed out that attempts of one side to gain advantage over the other can produce only negative results.

The same one-sidedness reveals itself in proposals on banning of all mobile missiles (i.e. including intermediate range missiles, which have nothing to do with the subject of Soviet-American negotiation), limits on throw weights, on-site inspection.

You of course know better why all these questions are put in such an unconstructive manner. We want to conduct the conversation in a business-like manner from the very beginning, to search for mutually acceptable—I stress, mutually acceptable agreements. The Soviet Union will continue to firmly protect its interests; at the same time a constructive and realistic approach of the American side will always find on our side support and readiness to achieve an agreement.

We hope to see exactly this kind of a responsible approach when the Secretary of State Vance comes to Moscow.

This refers to the problem of strategic weapons limitation as well as to other questions, connected with stopping the arms race. We definitely are counting on the American side supporting our proposals, including the proposal to ban creation of new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction, to ban chemical weapons, and to conclude a world treaty on non-use of force. Our proposals on this and some other questions, including that of the Indian Ocean, were presented many times and concretely, in particular, in the United Nations. Keeping in mind the interests of international security and strengthening of peace, we could also discuss questions raised in your letter, such as: warning of missile launch tests, reduction of selling and supply of conventional weapons to the "third world" countries, and others.

We give much importance to the agreement on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe without prejudice to the security of any of the sides.

Yet a one-sided approach is evident as far as your letter and negotiations in Vienna are concerned. This is the only way to treat, for example, the statements that the American side views its positions in regard to the Vienna negotiations with the air of some kind of "concern with excessive increase" of military power in East Europe. Not only is an objective evaluation of the real situation missing here, but also the constructive proposals, which were put forward by the USSR and other countries-participants in the negotiations and directed at achieving progress at the Vienna negotiations, are completely ignored. We are ready now and in the future for a search for solutions and outcomes, a search which does not imply that someone will receive unilateral advantages. But if we are expected to unilaterally reduce our defensive capabilities and thus put ourselves and our allies into an unequal position, such expectations will lead nowhere.

It is impossible to agree with the evaluation of the situation relating to fulfillment of the Four-power agreement which is given in the letter. The USSR never encroached and does not encroach now on the special status of Western Berlin, and the appeal for support in lifting tension in that region is directed to the wrong address. The fact that complications still arise there is connected with the completely definite policy carried out by the FRG with the connivance of three western states, and is which is practically directed at dissolving the Four-powers treaty and its cornerstone resolution—that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it. But the attempts to break this resolution are a very slippery path leading to aggravation of the situation. We believe that the Four-power treaty should be strictly and faultlessly observed by all interested sides, and we will in every way strive to avoid returning to the period when Western Berlin was a constant source of dangerous friction and conflicts.

Without going into details, I will say that your letter does not indicate any changes in the USA approach to such questions as settlement in the Near East or improvement in the sphere of trade-economic relations between our countries, which could bear witness to an intention to move to their successful settlement.

And finally. In the letter the question of so called "human rights" is raised again. Our qualification of the essence of this matter and of the behavior of American Administration in this respect has just been reported through our Ambassador. This is our principle position. We have no intention to enforce our customs on your country or other countries, but we will not allow interference in our internal affairs, no matter what kind of pseudo-humane pretence is used for the purpose. We will firmly react to any attempts of this kind.

And how should we treat such a situation, when the President of the USA sends a letter to the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and at the same time starts the correspondence with a renegade, who proclaimed himself to be an enemy of the Soviet State and who stands against normal, good relations between the USSR and the USA?[3] We would not like our patience to be tested while dealing with any matters of foreign policy, including the questions of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union must not be dealt with like that.

These are the thoughts, Mr.President, which my colleagues and I had in connection with your letter. I did not choose smooth phrases, though they might have been more pleasant. The things we talk about are too serious to leave space for any kind of ambiguity or reticence.

My letter is a product of sincere concern about the present and future of our relations, and it is this main idea that I want with all directness and trust to bring to you.

I hope that with an understanding of the elevated responsibility which is placed on the leadership of our two countries we will be able to provide the forward development of Soviet-American relations along the way of peace, in the interests of our and all other people.

With respect,

L. Brezhnev

February 25, 1977"

Vance read the text of the letter attentively twice and then said the following.

"Personally I welcome such direct, plain-speaking language of the General Secretary. Our President still approaches certain international problems too lightly. For example, I told him several times, referring to the conversation with you (the Soviet Ambassador) and to the history of negotiations on the whole, that the Soviet government gives very much importance to solving of the question on cruise missiles. He doesn't pay much attention, in his striving to conclude an agreement without long negotiations on remaining contradictory questions, thinking that these questions can be put off for "later." I told him that it is not so, but... (Vance waved his hands to indicate that he did not manage to persuade the President that he was right).

I hope that the direct letter from L.I. Brezhnev, Vance went on, will make the President look at the situation in a somewhat different way.

I, of course, do not fully agree with what is written in the letter, but I hope that it is this kind of letter that the President needs to receive now."[4](...)

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA
(signature)

/A. Dobrynin/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Carter's Letter to Brezhnev, March 4, 1977

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Top secret
Copy No. 1
Washington, D.C.

From the Journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with Z. BRZEZINSKI

March 5, 1977

This morning Brzezinski handed me (Vance was away) the text of President Carter's letter to L.I. Brezhnev of March 4, 1977.

"To His Excellency
Leonid I. Brezhnev
General Secretary
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
Moscow, Kremlin

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

Your letter of February 25 raised in me some concern because of its moderately sharp tone, because in it there was no recognition of my own good intentions, and because it did not contain any positive answer to the concrete proposals which were set forth in my previous letter. Differences between our countries are deep enough and I hope that you and I will never aggravate them with doubts regarding our respective personal motives.

The fact is that neither in Vladivostok, nor during the subsequent negotiations, was any final agreement achieved on the question of cruise missiles and the bomber "Backfire". I am sure that such agreements can be achieved in the future, and I am committed to achieving them. I understand your concern about postponing these questions until future negotiations, yet I believe that we will gain a definite benefit in that we will give an impulse toward a quicker resolution of an agreement, and I want to stress that postponement of these two controversial questions would be aimed only at expediting a quicker agreement, with all its positive political consequences. I am also sure that with a mutual demonstration of good will we should be able to reach an agreement on such questions as conventional weapons, tactical nuclear arms and throw weight.

Not for a minute do I allow myself to underestimate the difficulties which stand in our way. Solving these problems will demand determination, patience and decisiveness. Keeping precisely this in mind, I wanted to make two more suggestions, and both of which aim at resolving the disagreements between us.

First of all, I think it would be extremely useful, if you shared with us your own views on a significant reduction of strategic forces levels which we could achieve in the next four or five years. During previous negotiations on strategic weapons limitation, we were inclined to take small steps in the direction of a vague future; I propose that instead of this we now strive to define a concrete, longer-term goal, towards which we later could advance step by step with a greater guarantee of success.

Second, the quick conclusion of official agreement between us regarding the problems on which, as it seems, both sides are inclined to agree would facilitate our search for stable mutual understanding. We should use the fact that we have an agreement, or could achieve quick agreement on such questions as:

a) limiting the number of strategic delivery vehicles to 2400 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level);
b) limiting the number of launchers equipped with MIRV to the level of 1320 items (or a mutually acceptable lower level);
c) a resolution on mutually satisfactory verification;
d) advance warning of missile tests;
e) a universal test ban, including a temporary resolution regarding the completion of the current peaceful programs;
f) an agreement not to arm satellites and not to develop a capability to eliminate or damage the satellites;
g) demilitarization of the Indian ocean;
h) a limitation on civil defense measures;
i) mutual restraint in selling weapons to third world countries;
j) a ban on mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of course, the above list is not a complete one, and other relatively non-controversial questions could easily be added to it. The main thing is to move forward without delay on those questions on which we can reach an agreement, thus creating the impulse necessary to get down to work on the more intractable issues straight after that.

We are working on these problems with maximum energy, preparing for Secretary of State Vance's talks with you in Moscow.

I hope that you will not base our next correspondence on the mistaken belief that we lack sincerity, honesty or the willpower needed to achieve quick progress towards mutually beneficial agreements. I do not underestimate the difficulties connected with substantive problems or technical details, but I am firmly committed to achieving success in the process of creating a foundation for stable and peaceful relations between our two countries. We do not seek any sort of unilateral advantages.

I do not see our letters as official documents of negotiation, but if we exchange them in private and on a strictly confidential basis, they can very well help us both to gain the necessary understanding of the direction of historic development. It was in this spirit that this correspondence was started and I want you to know that adherence to weapons reduction is the matter of personal faith for me, which at the same time reflects the aspirations of the people of my country. I hope and believe that you and your people are devoted to the same idea.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

White House
Washington, D.C.
March 4, 1977".

Brzezinski said that the letter had been transmitted to Moscow at night over a direct line so that it would be received there during the day.[5]

Brzezinski remarked that they consider the letter to be "positive." "Is it not?"—he asked.

I answered, speaking for myself, that the first impression after a brief reading of such a letter is that it does not much move us forward towards solving that question, which, as L.I. Brezhnev has written to the President recently, is of primary significance, namely—concluding the working out of a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons limitation on the basis of Vladivostok agreement. In the President's letter, in fact, our positions on "Backfire" and on cruise missiles are left out; as far as the latter are concerned, the impression is that the USA wants to have a free hand in both their production and deployment, instead of making them a part of agreement. At the same time some issues are raised, which, though perhaps important, have no direct connection to the mentioned agreement, which thus acquires—in the President's letter—a vague outline, willfully or not leading away from the essence of the issue which is key at the present stage. I can not but mention also that a number of Soviet proposals in the sphere of disarmament are avoided by silence in the President's answer, as are some other questions which were raised in the letter of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU.

Brzezinski said in this regard that he was not ready at that moment to concretely consider the various proposals in the President's letter. [...]

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

(signature) A. Dobrynin

/A. DOBRYNIN/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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Brezhnev's Letter to Carter, March 15, 1977

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Secret
Copy No. 1
Washington, D.C.

From the Journal
of DOBRYNIN, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION

with the USA Secretary of State C. VANCE

March 16, 1977

I. I visited Vance and transmitted through him to President Carter the following letter from

L.I. Brezhnev.

Dear Mr. President,

Having become acquainted with your letter of March 4, I would like once again to set forth the essence of our understanding of the situation regarding the preparation of the agreement (for the period until 1985) on limitation of offensive strategic weapons and in more detail to explain our position on the concrete questions which so far remain unresolved.

Let me start with several general considerations. We, it goes without saying, are in favor of concluding an agreement as quickly as possible, without delay. But an effort to do that on the basis of some sort of artificial, simplified variant will hardly accelerate the matter, if we have in mind the goal which we have posed for ourselves, that is: to genuinely limit strategic weapons, guided by the principle of not inflicting any loss on either of the contracting sides. In exactly the same way, the preparation of an agreement would not be accelerated if while setting aside those questions on which a lot of work had been done, we took up some sort of new questions, particularly those which have no direct relation to the subject of the given agreement.

The conclusion of a new strategic arms limitation agreement between our countries, of course, would have great political significance both for Soviet-American relations and in a wider context. However, this will become possible only in the event that the agreement represents a genuine step towards limiting strategic weapons. In the contrary event, there would be an opposite effect.

And so it would be if the issue of cruise missiles was left outside the agreement. This question is not only tied to the heart of a new agreement, but, and this is vitally important, much has already been worked out. Even certain concrete formulas have already been agreed. To propose now to leave cruise missiles outside the framework of the agreement would not only mean returning to initial positions but would also leave open the path for the development of the arms race in a new and dangerous direction.

I don't think that this is in any way consonant with the goals of a quick conclusion of a strategic arms limitation agreement. Therefore we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole complex of cruise missiles, including:

—to view heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles with a range of 600 km. to 2500 km. as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRV with individual placements, and accordingly to count them under the ceiling (depending on the type of heavy bomber) established for that type of delivery vehicle—1320 items; cruise missiles ALCM (trans. i.e. "Air to Ground") with a range of more than 2500 km. will be banned completely; the equipping with cruise missiles with a range of between 600 km. and 2500 km. of other types of flying apparatus besides heavy bombers will likewise be forbidden.

—all cruise missiles based at sea or on land with a range of more than 600 km. also should be entirely banned.

Once again, I would like also to remind you that our agreement to count under the ceiling for MIRVed missiles (1320 items) all missiles of those types, of which at least one missile was tested with MIRV, was and remains conditional on achieving final agreement on the issues related to cruise missiles.

As for the Soviet intermediate bomber which you call "Backfire," we provided official data about the range of this plane (2200 km.) and expressed readiness to reflect in the negotiating record this data as well as our intention not to provide this plane with the capability to cover intercontinental distances—all this under the condition that the question of "Backfire" once and for ever will be completely withdrawn from further negotiations. We continue to maintain this position.

The question of mobile launchers for ballistic missiles of intercontinental range, naturally, must find its solution in the current agreement. Earlier we proposed an agreement by which during the period covered by this agreement the sides should restrain from deployment of mobile launchers for ground-based ICBMs. Our approach to the question of possible further strategic forces reductions by the USSR and the USA is laid out in my letter of February 25 of this year. I repeat, we will be ready to start discussing this question immediately following the signing of the agreement. Yet in that case we must take into consideration factors about which I have already written to you on February 25, such as: the difference in the geographic positions of the sides, presence of American means of nuclear forward basing and an operation of air-based delivery vehicles near the territory of the USSR, the fact that the USA NATO allies nuclear weapons and other circumstances, which must not be ignored.

Taking into consideration the facts and ideas laid out above regarding cruise missiles, it could be possible for the sides not only to limit the level of strategic nuclear means delivery vehicles (2400 and 1320), but also to discuss the number of such vehicles, which are subject to reduction even before expiration date of the current agreement.

Ideas, expressed above, represent our official position, which we intend to maintain during the coming negotiations with Secretary of State Vance. It goes without saying that the additional questions, which you, Mr. President, mentioned in your letter also demand attention. We will be ready to set forth our preliminary ideas on these questions. Special negotiations would be carried out on those questions where we note a chance of finding a mutually acceptable solution. Should we make some progress, corresponding agreements could be signed simultaneously with the agreement on strategic weapons limitation.

In conclusion, I would like to point out, Mr. President, that I do not quite understand the meaning of your statement about the tone of my letter of February 25. Its tone is usual —business-like and respectful. If you mean the directness and openness, with which our views are expressed in it, my reasons were and are that this very character of our dialogue coincides with the interests of the matter. But if you mean our principle attitude to the attempts to raise questions which go beyond the limits of interstate relations,—there can be no different reaction from our side.

I believe that our private correspondence will serve the interests of constructive development of relations between our countries.

With respect, L. Brezhnev, March 15, 1977".

Vance said that it [the letter] will be reported to the President.

The Ambassador of the USSR in the USA
(signature)

/A. DOBRYNIN/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff]

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Dobrynin's Conversation with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, March 21, 1977

Top Secret
Copy No. 1

Embassy of the USSR in the USA
Washington

From the Journal of
Dobrynin, A.F.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION
with the Secretary of State of the USA
C. Vance

March 21, 1977

I met with Vance on his invitation.

The Secretary of State said that in view of my forthcoming departure for Moscow on the eve of his arrival there he would like in the most general terms to describe their approach to a new agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons. In this regard he

underlined several times that the observations which he would make continue to be subject to review by the President, that they are still not set, and that they may be susceptible to certain changes. This applies also to numerical data, which also does not reflect the final position of the USA.

Vance said that in their opinion, two variants of an agreement on the second stage of SALT are possible: one is comprehensive, which they prefer, another is more limited and will be introduced in case the first one is not agreed on.

The first variant—the more complete agreement, according to Vance—could consist of the following parts.

1. The American side believes that it would be good already at this stage to agree on certain reductions from the levels of strategic arms established in Vladivostok. This would reflect the intention of the sides to begin real arms reduction, instead of merely adapting to the approximate actual levels of weapons which [the sides] have or plan to have. In this context, in their opinion, the limitation of the levels could have the following character:
— up to 2000 total strategic delivery vehicles;
— up to 1200 MIRVed launchers.

2. The Soviet side, taking into consideration its advantage in throw weight, must agree to a certain limit on launchers for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which it is building or reequipping to accommodate the kind of missiles called "SS-18" in the USA. (He commented in this regard that it would be desirable to have, say, 150 missiles of this kind instead of 300.)

3. Both sides agree to a freeze in the creation and deployment of new types of ICBM, with a corresponding limit on the number of atmospheric tests of missiles.

4. Creation and deployment of mobile ICBMs are prohibited. In this regard the United States would take an obligation to stop development and deployment of its mighty mobile ICBM "M-X".

5. All cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km are banned.

In the event that the Soviet side agrees to this proposal the American side will be ready to accept the Soviet position concerning the "Backfire" bomber, by agreeing not to ascribe intercontinental capability to this plane. The USA will be also ready to take into consideration Soviet data about the radius of operation of this bomber.

This, said Vance, is, in general, the structure of the possible first variant of the agreement.

As an alternative to this agreement (if it is not achieved), Vance continued, President Carter's already well-known proposal—to conclude a limited Vladivostok agreement, including into it all items on which the sides had reached agreement, but deferring unresolved questions (i.e. first of all the cruise missiles and "Backfire") to the next, third stage of SALT negotiations—could serve.

After I heard what Vance had to say, I told him that if I may speak frankly, none of these American proposals give a real basis for achieving a mutually acceptable agreement in Moscow.

I said further that upon first consideration the "comprehensive" variant actually looks even worse than the limited variant, the shortcoming of which was convincingly shown in L.I. Brezhnev's last letter to the President. The fact that American side is striving, judging by the expressed considerations, toward a one-sided advantage, is completely obvious. I asked Vance, what, in the opinion of the administration, the Soviet Union would get in exchange for all that.

If I may summarize, in the subsequent discussion Vance, justified the American position with the following:

> A decrease in the overall level of delivery vehicles from 2400 to 2000 would impact, in his words, not only the Soviet Union, but also the USA, which currently has 2150 strategic delivery vehicles. Although he had to recognize that the reduction would have a stronger impact on the Soviet side, he added that a reduction in MIRVed launchers would have more of an impact on the USA than on the USSR, since the USA had moved far ahead in the MIRVing of rockets.

The inclusion of their suggested limits on our heavy rockets—as a reflection of the problem of the Soviet advantage in throw-weight which has long worried them—Vance argued that the USA, in its turn will be prepared not to develop and not to manufacture M-X, its own new heavy mobile ICBM with increased accuracy. This, in his opinion, would be, from the point of view of the future, sufficient compensation for the Soviet side in the context of a compromise decision on the problem of throw-weight.

Speaking about the elimination of cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km, Vance asserted that the remaining missiles (i.e. those with a range of less than 2.5 thousand km) are medium range rather than intercontinental. In this regard, he tried to make an analogy with our Backfire, which has a range of 2200 km and is therefore characterized by the Soviet side as a tactical, rather than strategic type of weapon.

I made points consistent with our proposed agreement on the second stage of SALT, using arguments contained in the communications of L.I. Brezhnev and our position in previous negotiations with the Americans.

In reply to my observation that the preparation of an agreement cannot be accelerated if we set aside issues which had already been jointly worked out, and begin to consider some new questions which hinder the achievement of an agreement, Vance characteristically retorted that the new administration does not consider itself completely committed to the approach of the former administration and that the Carter government strives toward a real, and not just a superficial reduction in strategic weapons.

I noted in this regard in conducting such important negotiations we start from the fact that we are dealing with the government of the USA, and that the reevaluation by every new administration of agreements reached by its predecessor does not strengthen the basis for international agreements.

Overall, I said, in my personal opinion both of the proposed variants are not only not directed toward achieving a mutually advantageous SALT agreement, but to the contrary significantly weaken the chances for a quick conclusion of the second stage of negotiations. I appealed to Vance to take into account everything that had already been said by the Soviet side, especially the points made in the letters from the General Secretary of the CC CPSU about the possible paths to resolution of the problems of strategic arms limitation, during the final review of their positions.

Vance said that the position he had expressed is not final, but that their position "also must be understood"—the USA cannot consider accepting in full a Soviet approach according to which, in his words, the American side should accept in full the Soviet position on remaining questions instead of a search for mutual compromise.

I repeated to Vance that in my view the considerations he had expressed in no way can serve as a basis for the compromise he had mentioned.

Vance said that most probably the President will convene two more sessions of the National Security Council to work out the final American position for the negotiations in Moscow.

In conclusion, Vance requested that I convey to the Soviet leadership that he is coming to Moscow with a serious task from President Carter to try and come to an agreement on the central issue of his trips, and that if necessary he will be prepared, to stay over for a day or two to finish a detailed consideration of possibilities for the quickest conclusion of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons.

Ambassador of the USSR in the USA

(signature)
/A. Dobrynin/

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, Moscow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

* * * * *

[Ed. note: Despite Dobrynin's clear warning of the chilly reception it would receive, Vance

continued on page 160

THE SUDOPLATOV CONTROVERSY:

The Authors of *SPECIAL TASKS* Respond to Critics

[Ed. note: The previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin *(Issue 4, Fall 1994) contained several articles that expressed criticisms of a book by former KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov—*Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster, *by Pavel and Anatolii Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1994)—particularly its assertion that several leading scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, including Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr, knowingly and improperly provided secret atomic information to Soviet espionage. At the time, the* Bulletin *invited Sudoplatov or his co-authors to respond in the next issue, and they do so below, in letters from the Schecters, from Pavel Sudoplatov (for the paperback edition of* Special Tasks*), and from Stanford University professor Robert Conquest, who contributed the foreward to* Special Tasks. *As before, the* Bulletin *welcomes contributions from anyone wishing to contribute evidence to the debate, or to respond to statements contained in the letters below, in future issues.]*

April 21, 1995

TO THE EDITOR:

A year after the publication of SPECIAL TASKS by Pavel A. Sudoplatov, and the media uproar it evoked, not one of Sudoplatov's critics has shown him to be mistaken in any significant aspect of his revelation of how Soviet atomic espionage was conducted.

In the CWIHP *Bulletin*, fall 1994, three critics were given extensive space to attack the validity of Sudoplatov's account without providing any opportunity for opposing views to be stated examining the validity of their criticisms. There was no presentation from those who consider Sudoplatov's oral history a major contribution to understanding the Stalin period and atomic espionage. David Holloway, Yuri Smirnov and Vlad Zubok, each with their own unstated agenda, dismiss both Sudoplatov's account of Soviet atomic espionage and the Bohr documents that verify a part of it. Attacks on Sudoplatov's character are not substantive rebuttal. It is rather curious that David Holloway, who at great length explains the difficulties of meshing the sources of his scholarship, refuses to listen to the one living participant who, because of the senior role he played, has a unique perspective on how the parts of the story fit together.

The publication of SPECIAL TASKS brought forth a latent and angry battle in Moscow over who should take credit for the success of the Soviet atomic bomb. Lining up against Sudoplatov and his co-workers were scientists who feared that they would lose the honors and credit they received for their contribution. Yuri Smirnov is the leader of this group. Standing beside them are present day Russian intelligence officers, successors to the KGB, who had their own publishing contract to tell the atomic espionage story and were under pressure to produce documentation on their alleged superspy Perseus. On Sudoplatov's side, able to verify pieces of the story, were elderly intelligence veterans, fearful of coming forward because of threats to their pensions.

This angry debate spilled over into the American media. Writers like Holloway and Richard Rhodes, who had done significant research among scientists, but were unable to come up with primary sources on Soviet atomic espionage, acted as surrogates for the scientists and attacked Sudoplatov. Holloway relies heavily on the point of view of surviving scientist Yuli Khariton, whose interest is not to give credit to the contributions of the hated Soviet intelligence apparatus. Sudoplatov, contrary to claims by Smirnov and Zubok, has been evenhanded in giving credit to both scientists and intelligence officers.

We helped Sudoplatov tell his story by organizing the chronology and translating his words into readable English. We did not alter accounts of poisoning, terrorism, espionage and perversions of ideology that made him an unwanted witness in Russia and an NKVD monster in the West. He remains a Stalinist with few regrets. We did not soften his tone nor did we enhance his account.

It was professionally irresponsible for the *Bulletin* to print Smirnov's and Zubok's dismissal of the Bohr documents without an equal side-by-side explanation from physicists who have affirmed the intelligence value of the answers Bohr gave to the questions prepared by Soviet intelligence in November 1945. Holloway's contention that Bohr did not go beyond the Smythe report in his replies to Terletsky has been seriously contested by physicists who examined the documents (See *Sunday Times* [London], June 26, 1994). The claim that Bohr was only a theoretician and could not have commented on engineering problems is belied by Margaret Gowing, an author who wrote about the British bomb program and who is highly praised by Holloway.

Smirnov and Zubok can hardly be counted disinterested critics, since each is transmitting the position of his constituency.

A few of the recent affirmations of Sudoplatov's story are worthy of note:

According to Yuri I. Drozdov, former chief of KGB Illegal Operations 1980 to 1991, and who served in the New York residency of the KGB from 1975 to 1979, "Sudoplatov's information on the cooperation of outstanding American physicists with Soviet intelligence is quite reliable."

Drozdov's statement was solicited and quoted by the editorial board of *Juridical Gazette*, a Moscow publication, in a footnote to a book review of "Special Tasks" in March, 1995.

The review, written by Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, head of the First Chief Directorate (foreign operations) of the KGB from 1988 to 1991, reads in part:

"The book SPECIAL TASKS is very attractive and in its totality appears to be reliable. If there were legends in the intelligence service Pavel A. Sudoplatov would have been the hero, but the traditions of the intelligence service are not to reminisce. The more important the case the narrower the list of people who know about it, and these people are accustomed to keep silence.

"Now (fifty years later) the archives are stolen and the enemies of Russia exploit the secrets of the country in their interests. Here comes a remarkable and surprising event in the midst of these unjust judgments, where false witnesses dominate the scene and where

the judges pursue their own goals. Here comes a witness who is alive and tries to speak the truth about the events of many years ago."

The director of the Russian State Archives, Sergei Vladimirovich Mironenko, affirmed that Sudoplatov's account of Soviet atomic espionage was "correct in essential points" according to documents of the NKVD from 1944 to 1953, which were released in June 1994. (See *Moscow News* #23, 1994). They include the documents on Terletsky's mission to Niels Bohr and the formal establishment of the committee headed by Sudoplatov to coordinate atomic espionage. "The main sensation is not this but what we learned about the system. We therefore are confronted with the necessity of looking into other documents," said Mironenko, who urged that the Presidential archives and the security ministry archives open their files.

Former KGB officer Vladimir Barkovsky (who handled agents in England) has affirmed Sudoplatov's account that Donald Maclean was the first to warn the Soviets that the British were seriously investigating the possibility of constructing an atomic weapon. British critics of Sudoplatov were in error in attributing the early report to John Cairncross.

The presence of intelligence officer Kosoy, a TASS correspondent under cover in Sweden, confirmed a triangular link among Sweden, the U.S. and the Soviet Union as a path for espionage information.

Soviet intelligence officer Arkady Rylov, who handled incoming espionage documents for Sudoplatov, stated on Russian TV that Semyon (Sam) Semyonov, a Soviet intelligence officer instrumental in acquiring atomic secrets in the United States, told him the sources of the material were Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard.

Zoya Zarubin, who was a young translator working for Sudoplatov in the early 1940s, stated in a videotaped interview that she worked closely with Igor Kurchatov (director of the Soviet atomic bomb program) to translate the first espionage documents into workable Russian. She said that Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Rybkina, for whom she also worked, proudly told her that she was in contact with Niels Bohr on important information. Elizabeth Zarubin, the intelligence officer whom Sudoplatov said was successful in penetrating Oppenheimer's circle, was Zoya Zarubin's stepmother.

In his own letter, which will appear in the forthcoming paperback edition of SPECIAL TASKS, Pavel Sudoplatov offers more details on Soviet atomic espionage operations. He has requested that the *Bulletin* publish his letter.

Sincerely yours,
Jerrold L. Schecter
Leona P. Schecter

The following letter will appear in the paperback edition of SPECIAL TASKS to be published by Little, Brown and Company on June 1, 1995

Writing memoirs, especially for the unwanted witness, is always risky. The events one describes have already been interpreted by interests in power whose version influences prominent historians and scientists and becomes "history." I am reminded that Tacitus began his *Annals* by writing that "The histories of Tiberius, Caligula and Nero, while they were in power, were falsified through terror and after their death were written under a fresh hatred."

The tragic events of the period from the 1930s to 1953 covered in my book SPECIAL TASKS, including the beginning of the Cold War and the myth of Klaus Fuchs as the principal figure who passed atomic secrets to Soviet Intelligence, had already been told and established as the framework accepted by all interested parties. In fact, there were many more sources of atomic secrets besides Fuchs.

Harsh attacks on me and my book—without debating the principal facts—were concentrated in one direction: to discredit me by calling me a terrorist and to hide from public knowledge that two independent intelligence centers in which I worked—the Administration of Special Tasks and the Foreign Intelligence Directorate—existed in the Soviet state security system. The public relations office of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has alleged that there was no direct cooperation between intelligence and senior Soviet scientists in developing our first atomic bomb. This statement is incorrect and was made with the ulterior motive of discrediting my account. Department S of the Special Committee on Problem Number One, the intelligence arm of the Council of Ministers, which I formally headed from 1945 to 1946, had direct close cooperation with Academicians Kurchatov, Kapitsa, Kikoin, Alikhanov and Ioffe and contributed substantial material to speed up the solution of the atomic problem in the USSR.

Some journalists (Sergei Leskov and Vladimir Nadeine of *Izvestia*) and historians of science in Russia (Yuri Smirnov of the Kurchatov Institute) who, I was told by my former colleagues, rose in their careers through KGB connections, strongly supported those in the Russian scientific and intelligence establishment who found revelations in SPECIAL TASKS detrimental to their prestige. They deliberately distorted the material I presented. For example, I never wrote that Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard and Bohr were agents of Soviet intelligence. They cooperated, but we never recruited them. It is noteworthy that Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo never signed any formal recruitment obligations despite their regular clandestine contacts with Russian intelligence officers and agents in the USA and Britain.

One has to remember that all scientific giants had a different perspective in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s before the Cold War hardened their views. At the end of the 1930s and from 1940 to 1945, leading scientists of the international scientific community agreed to informally share nuclear secrets among all anti-fascist scientists. Initially they were driven by fear that Nazi Germany would get the bomb first; later they believed that sharing secrets would be the means of controlling nuclear weapons. Our intelligence officers in the United States, Gregory Kheifitz and Elizabeth Zarubin, encouraged this attitude of sharing in their contacts with Oppenheimer; Pontecorvo worked on Fermi.

Reluctantly, the Russian military newspaper, *Red Star*, on April 28, 1994 admitted that "Soviet intelligence agents took advantage of an international plot of scientists to share nuclear secrets with each other." The Western press, especially the American press, neglected to notice this statement by KGB historian E. Sharapov and R. Mustafin, which for the first time acknowledged the existence of the "atomic team headed by Sudoplatov" and its role in the Soviet Union's war effort.

Since my memoirs appeared I have met

with former colleagues who worked with me and they reminded me that in 1949 top level American nuclear scientists turned down the approach of our illegals in the United States, led by Colonel Rudolf Abel, to resume cooperation "with the international anti-fascist scientific community." By that time the Cold War was on and the Americans knew we had our own bomb.

Certainly, I do not pretend to know everything about Soviet intelligence operations during the period 1930 to 1953, but as chief of one of the main intelligence services I must stress that from 1941 atomic issues were discussed in my presence at the regular meetings of the four chiefs of Russian military and NKVD intelligence headed by Beria. At first the purpose was to assess the possibility that the Germans might develop a weapon similar to the British-American project. In 1944 I was assigned coordinating functions to gather atomic intelligence and in 1945 I took all formal responsibility for atomic intelligence in the USSR when I was appointed director of the second (intelligence) bureau of the special committee of the Soviet Union Council of Ministers. I am the only living witness from the Center to know how all top secret information was received and processed in 1941-46 from the USA, Great Britain and Canada.

We received top secret information on the atomic bomb from two directions. One line was to indoctrinate scientists to cooperate in open discussions and the other was to bring in top secret documents and information on the atomic bomb. Elizabeth (Liza) Zarubina and Sam Semyonov were the first to establish friendly contacts with the American scientific community and influence them to cooperate with anti-fascist scientists. Liza Zarubina and her colleague, the Soviet vice-counsel in New York, Pastelniak, (whose code name was Mikheev) handled our veteran agent Margareta Konenkova, (code name Lukas), the wife of the famous Russian sculptor Sergei Konenkov, who was working in Princeton on a bust of Einstein, to influence Oppenheimer and other prominent American scientists whom she frequently met in Princeton from 1943-1945. There are photographs of Margareta with Oppenheimer and Einstein in the Konenkov's family museum in Moscow. When they returned from the USA to Russia in December 1945 the Konenkovs were granted special privileges by a government enactment in reward for their services to the Soviet Union while abroad.

The other line was traditional espionage tradecraft, handled from 1944 to 1946 by officers such as Anatoli Yatskov and Aleksandr Feklisov.

The recently published documents of the meeting of Professor Yakov Terletsky with Neils Bohr in November 1945 not only confirm my account, but provide additional details. There were three meetings with Bohr in November 1945. Contrary to attacks by historians, Bohr did comment on the drawings (graphs) in the Smythe report. The operation was top secret and even the director of NKVD Foreign Intelligence Pavel M. Fitin was not informed. The British physicist Dr. John Hassard, of London's Imperial College confirmed the importance of the secret information revealed to Terletsky by Bohr (*Sunday Times* [London], June 26, 1994). This was not reported by either the American or Russian press. Bohr confirmed the validity of the Smythe report and resolved stormy debates among Russian scientists over how to approach construction of a nuclear reactor (whether to use heavy water or graphite) and the test of samples of uranium and plutonium provided by Soviet intelligence. Bohr's answers to Terletsky's carefully prepared questions helped to verify scientific papers of Oppenheimer, Szilard and Fermi and others which were obtained by our intelligence and made available for our scientists. In fact, before the State Archive of the Russian Federation released the Bohr documents, the Federal Intelligence Service asked me to help reconstruct the mission because it did not have the documents in its files.

We were aware of Bohr's contacts with British intelligence, but he played both with us and the Western special services. My colleagues reminded me that when Bohr escaped to Sweden in 1943 he asked the Swedish physicist H.Anfeld to approach Soviet representatives and inform them that the possibility of making an atomic bomb was being discussed in the German scientific community. Anfeld met the TASS correspondent in Sweden, M. Kosoy, a Soviet intelligence officer, who promptly informed Moscow. On the basis of this news the NKVD initiated the famous letter from Kapitsa to Bohr, inviting him to come and work in the Soviet Union.

In Sweden our intelligence officer, Zoya Ribkina, received the cooperation of Niels Bohr. Back in Moscow she told Zoya Zarubina, who translated atomic documents, that "this is a very important enterprise we're doing together with the biggest scientists in America and the world. We are trying to be as strong as any other country would be. I am happy I am instrumental in putting this together with Europe, with Niels Bohr." Ribkina spoke freely with Zoya because she is the stepdaughter of Liza Zarubina, the intelligence officer who performed so well for us in America working with Oppenheimer's wife. Zoya met in her office a number of times with Academician Kurchatov to clarify the meaning of the new vocabulary of atomic physics. Kurchatov urged her to probe the possible variants of meaning in the documents; he barely controlled his excitement over the new information. "Come on girl," Kurchatov told Zoya, then 25, "try that sentence another way. Remember your physics. Is there any other meaning we missed?"

The information that Enrico Fermi had put into operation the first nuclear reactor in December 1942 was initially provided in a very general form to Kurchatov in January 1943. Fermi's success was at first not fully understood by our scientists. Therefore it triggered Kurchatov's letter of March 22, 1943 to deputy prime minister Pervukhin asking him "to instruct intelligence bodies to find out about what has been done in America in regard to the direction in question," and naming seven American laboratories as targets. Several months later, in July 1943, Kurchatov again asked for clarification of the data in his memorandum.

Our scientists were at first skeptical of Fermi's accomplishment, and until February 1945, when full mobilization was ordered, only a few in influential scientific and government circles believed that the creation of a new super weapon was realistic.

The progress of the atomic project was retarded by the lack of resources during the early war years. In 1941 it was the intelligence reports from Donald Maclean of progress in the British program, recently confirmed by Vladimir Barkovsky, that pushed us to initiate our efforts in 1942.

Both the Soviet and the American governments did not fully believe in the possibility of nuclear weapons before the first explosive test in July 1945. My colleagues reminded me recently that apart from scien-

tific information provided by senior scientific personnel of the Manhattan Project we also channeled to our government reports about security rules in Los Alamos and code names used in internal U.S. government correspondence on the matter of atomic research. My colleagues recalled that in 1946, under direct orders from Beria and Vannikov, I transferred from Lefortovo and Lubyanka all technical intelligence information on the atomic problem to the administration of the Special Government Committee on Atomic Energy. The sources of that information were very closely held under Beria's direct personal control and when he was arrested in 1953 his files were moved to the Kremlin under Malenkov's orders. Beria's intelligence records, which contain the names of sources of secret atomic bomb information, have not been released and their location remains uncertain. Beria's atomic intelligence materials are not in the Enormous File of the Federal Intelligence Service. Perhaps the most secret parts of the Enormous file are in Beria's personal file in the Ministry of Security archives from that period. The Bohr documents were not found in the Enormous File, which contains the atomic espionage materials, but in the Russian State Archives files of the Interior Ministry.

My story is based on what I remember. I had no direct access to archives which in small details may be more or less correct than my memory. However, the thrust and important facts of my story are irrefutable and it was my duty to reveal the hidden motives of tragic events in Soviet history. I am glad that my explanation of the death of Raoul Wallenberg in *Special Tasks* will be included in the proceedings of the Russian-Swedish Commission on the Wallenberg Affair, which met in Moscow in 1994.

There are those in the former KGB and the scientific community who want to direct the public not to believe me because my story interferes with their book contracts or detracts from their scientific honors. Some would like to erase the record of combat and terrorist operations in the Stalin years. Today Russian and Western clandestine special operations continue in the Middle East against Syria, Iraq and Iran, described as criminal and terrorist governments, and against nationalities seeking their independence from Russia. These facts of international life still exist. Neither they nor the *Special Tasks* I have described can be denied simply because they have never before been revealed. That something has not been told before does not mean it is not true.

signed/ Pavel A.Sudoplatov

* * * * *

6 February 1995

To the Editor:

Your treatment of the Bohr document [in CWIHP *Bulletin* #4], highly interesting in many respects, nevertheless is peculiar in others. Most of your contributors are concerned to defend Niels Bohr's moral integrity. But this is not at issue, though his political attitudes may be. Whatever information he did or did not give was certainly in accord with his principles. The question is merely a factual one. Some of your contributors say he did not have any secrets, so could not give any to the Soviets; others that he had some, but would not have given them. And did he only say what was already in the Smythe Report? Yuri Smirnov puts it that "practically" everything he told was in the Report. Kurchatov's comment says that two points were of use. A British and an American physicist are lately on record to the effect that his replies were clearly helpful. A layman, while thus noting that professional opinion is by no means as one-sided as implied in your pages, is not in a position to judge. (Even a layman can indeed note remarks—for example on the vast number of spectrographs—which are not in the Report, though perhaps not of great use.) In any case, the NKVD feared it was being misled by the Smythe Report, as Feklisov (as quoted by Zubok) noted: so at least from an intelligence point of view, even mere confirmation was welcome. The question remains far less clear cut than your contributors imply.

The other concern of most of these contributors is to attack Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov certainly misunderstood, misremembered, or exaggerated, much of the significance of the Bohr interview. But some of the criticisms make no sense. David Holloway doubtless wrote in jest when he said that since Sudoplatov had co-authors it was impossible to know which wrote what. There are dozens of books of the same type. In any case, on the main point at issue, Bohr's providing of information, Sudoplatov was already on record in July 1982. Again, one comment, by Smirnov, faults Sudoplatov for "shoddy research" in getting wrong a highly peripheral detail (on the dates and reasons for Bohr's trip to Russia). But "research" is not the point of such memoirs. Look at, for example, *Khrushchev Remembers*, where the "original material" (Strobe Talbott tells us in his Editor-Translator's note) was "quite disorganized" when it came into his hands; and which is full of misremembered (and uncorrected) detail—muddling up different plenums, confusing Lominadze's suicide with that of Ordzhonikidze three years later, etc., etc., while remaining, in Talbott's words "devastating and authoritative." (As to such discrepancies, we may note them in highly reputable or accepted sources: for example, the very venue of the wartime Bohr-Heisenberg meeting is disputed. And incidentally it seems odd that the Bohr-Terletsky meeting is not referred to all at in Abraham Pais' massive biography of Bohr.)

With all its errors it seems clear that on the substance of the Bohr incident—the fact of and the organization of the physicist's meetings and discourse with a Soviet representative—Sudoplatov's previously much-challenged account has been confirmed by the document. There is more to be said. And, given a reasonably critical attitude, more remains to be discovered in support or refutation of our present imperfect understanding of this and similar matters.

Your "update" (p. 93) is also unsatisfactory, citing some but omitting other letters on the subject in leading U.S. journals, and failing to mention major reviews in *Le Monde*, *The* (London) *Times*, etc.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Conquest

March 19, 1995

To the Editor:

In the CWIHP *Bulletin*, Issue #4, 1994, one of the Soviet-era documents caught my eye because it appears to be an example of and raises questions about a more general issue that has been suggested in the writings of several former Soviet officials on other

occasions.

The document is the record of the Politburo meeting of October 22, 1986, which appears on page 85. The second item on the agenda of that meeting deals with the 1986 crash in South African territory of the aircraft, piloted by Soviet military personnel, carrying the Mozambican President Samora Machel. While sitting as Chairman, General Secretary Gorbachev states: "The last report of our pilot was: 'We have been shot down.'"

The event in question is certainly not a major one in Cold War political history, but the Gorbachev quotation raises the problem of the accuracy of Soviet documents, and in this case, at the very highest level: Was information that reached the most senior Soviet leadership "doctored" in some cases in advance? If so, at what level? By intelligence or administrative agencies? If it was not, was the Politburo nevertheless purposefully misinformed on certain occasions?

Following the aircraft crash which resulted in their President's death, the Mozambican government established a Board of Inquiry, which carried out an investigation of the crash. The possibility that the aircraft was shot down was eliminated in the very early days of their investigation. There was no mention of the plane being "shot down" on the tape of the aircraft's cockpit voice recorder. Instead, there was substantial evidence that the crash was accidental. The basic cause of the accident was a laxity in routine operational precautions at several points. In particular, the aircraft had taken off for a return flight to the Mozambican capital with the minimum fuel needed to reach its destination. It therefore had no leeway for any unexpected contingency. The aircraft was off-course at nighttime when fuel ran out, which the flight crew perceived, and it crashed when the fuel was exhausted.

It was impossible to resolve the question of whether a South African decoy beacon had contributed to the plane being off course, since the South African government did not make the records of its military, intelligence or air traffic control agencies available to Mozambique. The South African government instituted a National Board of Inquiry of its own, and closed it with a declaration that the cause of the crash was accidental. However, given the date—1986—substantial skepticism can be permitted as to whether South Africa would have disclosed the operation of a beacon if one had been in operation, and had contributed to the death of a president of a neighboring country.

There is of course no way to reconcile the assessment of the Mozambican Board of Inquiry with Gorbachev's statement to the Soviet Politburo that the aircraft was "...shot down." The latter now appears in an official Soviet *document* and becomes recorded for posterity in that form. If one accepts the conclusion of the Mozambican panel, then Gorbachev's statement in the text of an official Soviet document raises all the problems indicated above, either regarding the nature and accuracy of information that reached the Politburo's staff or its presentation to the Politburo's members, or some combination of both.

Sincerely yours,

Milton Leitenberg

* * * * *

January 9, 1995

To the Editor:

In the Fall 1994 issue of the *Bulletin* there is an exchange of letters between Adam Ulam and Kathryn Weathersby. Ulam's views, as an experienced Cold War Warrior, evince no surprise but Ms. Weathersby's comment, "This distinction does not negate Soviet responsibility for the bloodshed that followed," certainly does. Just whose army was it that napalm bombed the Koreans, or used delayed fused bombs and further, resorted to bombing the dams in order to starve the people? Was Stalin to be held responsible for the atomic bomb threats and plans directed against the Korean people by Truman, MacArthur, Ridgeway, and last but not least by Eisenhower?

Now that the Cold War is over (although one would never know it looking at the current military budget and the plans to *increase* it) it is time we get back to History, not as propaganda, not as political expediency.

Sincerely yours,

Ephraim Schulman

MIKOYAN-CUBAN TALKS

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still a poor country. There will come a time when we will show our enemies. But we do not want to die beautifully. Socialism must live. Excuse the rhetoric. If you are not against it, let us continue our conversation tomorrow.

DORTICOS. We can meet, but we would like to know the opinion of the Soviet government and Comrade Mikoyan about what we will do about the agreement on military assistance.

A.I. MIKOYAN. Let's consider that. Think about a program of future work. I am free. I am prepared to visit you.

DORTICOS. Thank you. Tomorrow we will set the conditions with the ambassador.

A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree.

Ambassador A. Alekseev attended the conversation.

Recorded by: [signature] V. Tikhmenev

Com. Mikoyan A.I. has not looked over the transcript of the conversation.

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, copy provided by National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

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[Ed. note: For an English translation of the meeting between Mikoyan and Castro on 12 November 1962, in which the Soviet envoy conveyed Moscow's decision to acquiesce to Kennedy's demand to withdraw the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba (provoking an angry response from Castro), see the Soviet minutes of the meeting (and Mikoyan's ciphered telegram reporting on it to the CC CPSU) in appendices to Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, OPERATION ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis *(Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 189-99.*

Shortly before this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin *went to press, the Cuban government declassified several of* its *memoranda of the Mikoyan-Cuban negotiations. A report on these materials, and the divergences between them and the Soviet records, will appear in a future issue.]*

WARSAW PACT "LESSONS"

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Stenografische Niederschrift," February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 27/208/85.

42. "Oplot mira i sotsializma," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 14 May 1966, 5.

43. "La Roumanie n'a formule aucune demande en ce qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest," *L'Humanite* (Paris), 19 May 1966, 3.

44. "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Reprasentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages," July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 2/202/431.

45. "Komplexny material: Cvicenie 'VLTAVA'," in VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and "Vyhodnotenie cvicenia 'VLTAVA'." VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2.

46. Maksimov et al., eds., *Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya*, 125-126.

47. See, e.g., ibid., 125-126. See also "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 325-334.

48. See ibid., 330-336 and *passim*.

Mark Kramer is a research associate at Brown University's Center for Foreign Policy Development and Harvard University's Russian Research Center. An earlier version of this article was presented at a conference on "The Cuban Missile Crisis in Light of New Archival Documents," co-sponsored by the Russian State Archival Service and the U.S. Naval Academy, in Moscow, 27-29 September 1994.

CLINTON EXECUTIVE ORDER

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cation of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system;

(5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect;

(6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States;

(7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, or other officials for whom protections services, in the interest of national security, are authorized;

(8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans; or

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement.

[Ed. note: For the full text of E.O. 12958, see the *Federal Register*, 20 April 1995 (60 *Federal Register*, pp. 19825-19843).]

CARTER-BREZHNEV

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presented the dual American proposal in his talks in Moscow with Soviet leaders, in particular Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, on 28-30 March 1977. The Soviet side flatly rejected both variants in the American initiative, insisting on strict adherence to the Vladivostok framework and refusing to table a counter-proposal.

The dispute quickly broke into public view in a series of dueling press conferences. On March 30, Vance told reporters in Moscow that "the Soviets told us they had examined our two proposals and did not find either acceptable. They proposed nothing new on their side." In Washington the same day, Carter defended the proposals as a "fair, balanced" route to a "substantial reduction" in nuclear arms. Next, in his own, unusual press conference, Gromyko angrily denounced the proposals Vance delivered as a "cheap and shady maneuver" to seek U.S. nuclear superiority, described as "basically false" Carter's claim that Vance had presented a "broad disarmament program," and complained, "One cannot talk about stability when a new leadership arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved before."

Those interested in additional information on this acrimonious episode in U.S.-Soviet relations and the SALT II negotiations may wish to consult, in addition to the memoirs of former officials (including Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Kornienko, et al.), the accounts by Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II *(New York: Harper & Row, 1979; Raymond L. Garthoff,* Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, *rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), esp. 883-94; and forthcoming publications emerging from the Carter-Brezhnev Project.]*

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1. [Ed. note: The texts of those messages, as well as Harriman's related records of conversation with Carter, can be found in the Harriman Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.]

2. [Ed. note: The State Department had protested the arrest on February 3 of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a prominent dissident, for alleged currency violations.]

3. [Ed. note: Evidently an allusion to Carter's supportive letter to Andrei Sakharov, disclosed on February 17, 1977.]

4. [Ed. note: When shown this translation by the editor of the CWIHP *Bulletin* during an informal discussion at the May 1977 Carter-Brezhnev conference in Georgia, Vance denied the accuracy of the comments attributed to him here by Dobrynin, saying that perhaps the Soviet Ambassador had exaggerated his response.]

5. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to the use of the "hot line" for this letter noted by G. M. Kornienko in his introduction.]

COLD WAR
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The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on " the other side"—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst C.) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (U. of Maryland/Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio U./Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington U.). Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak, and is directed by Dr. James G. Hershberg. Readers are invited to submit articles, letters, and Update items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP's endorsement of authors' views. Copies are available free upon request.

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