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April 16, 1968

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Additional Korean Forces in Vietnam

Background

Following your December 21 luncheon meeting with Park in Canberra, Ambassador Porter worked out agreement that the Koreans would deploy an additional brigade (approximately 6,000 troops) and 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. The civilians would free 5,000 logistic troops now in Vietnam for combat duty, and the result would be an additional light division.

With the January raid and resulting tension, Park shelved this, with our tacit consent, and has never sought National Assembly approval.

Nonetheless, we have gone ahead with a substantial part of the commitments we offered in the negotiations. All told, we had offered direct support and equipment costs for the light division totaling approximately \$88 million, plus additional military assistance totaling about \$45 million. Of the latter, we have already gone ahead with virtually the whole, including the \$32 million counterinsurgency package described to you at this morning's briefing. As a matter of practical fact, all these items made sense and we would have found them reasonable in any case. However, you should note that the \$32 million has been funded from DOD funds under an authority that exists only where there is a relationship to Vietnam.

Thus, there is basic truth in what General Wheeler says -- that we have performed a lot already, while they have not moved on their side.

Park's problem is quite simply that he is not at all sure of getting Assembly approval, in the face of a general feeling that Korea needs its forces at home. Porter has reported hence that they might now ask for additional commitments. Moreover, as General Wheeler pointed out this morning, the \$12 million worth of equipment now set aside in Okinawa for the Korean light division contains many items of highest priority for South Vietnamese armed forces.

Suggested Talking Points

1. Suggest you start by feeling Park out on his Assembly problem, while making it absolutely clear to him that the additional forces would be most useful.
2. If he asks for additional commitments from us, you might point forcefully to the very large totals we are now providing under MAP and service funds this year, shown in Tab A attached. The total is about \$292 million. You could, of course, say that you would study additional requests within reason.

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority FRUS, Vol XXIX, # 192
 By LT NARA, Date 1-24-08

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3. If he takes the opposite tack -- saying that he simply cannot get Assembly approval unless things really cool down in Korea this summer -- suggest you at least point out clearly how much we have already done under our commitments, and note that this presents us with something of a Congressional problem -- particularly for the \$32 million. You might go on to explore the possibility suggested by Secretary Rusk -- that they increase their forces in Vietnam simply by delaying rotation or by "rounding out". While Park has a commitment to his Assembly to get specific authority for additional major units, he once before evaded this by a "rounding out" that amounted to about 2500 men. If he could use the same technique -- up to perhaps 5000 men -- it would be most useful.

General

Suggest strongly that you take up this topic privately with him. If he has his Ministers in the room, the price would go up, and he paint himself into a bad corner.

Finally, we have already agreed -- at his request -- that the subject will not be mentioned in the communique or in any press backgrounder. We stuck to this agreement this morning and told the press that so far as we knew, the topic would not come up. Obviously, he would be highly sensitive to any implication that he agreed to an increase at this meeting. However, he is also well aware of the need -- and he now has a general request for more forces direct from Thieu.

WPS
William P. Sundry

SECRET attachment - Tab A

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TAB A

FY 1968 Military and Service Fund Assistance to Korea

1968 MAP	\$160 million*
MAP 1968 Supplemental	\$100 million
Counterinsurgency package	32.3 million
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Total	\$292.3 million

*This \$160 million includes approximately \$12 million of items committed by us in connection with the light division. In effect, these items replaced other items that would otherwise have been included in the \$160 million total. To repeat, the new items would make sense from a military standpoint.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.4
 BY *[signature]* NARA Date *1-24-08*

Mr. President:

This Porter cable suggests why it may be useful to meet Park tonight.

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Bill Bundy strongly recommends. Courtesy may make it easier to be tough on the new demands and the light Division.

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR BUNDY, ASST SECSTATE, FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER

1. I AM SURE YOU HAVE IN MIND FACT THAT PARK REACTS SENSITIVELY TO SPECIAL ATTENTIONS SHOWN HIM ON SUCH OCCASIONS AS THE HONOLULU MEETING. IF IT IS INTENDED TO MOVE HIM FORWARD ON QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS, IT IS VITAL THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO GESTURES INDICATING PERSONAL ESTEEM OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR HIM.

2. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS IS AS DIFFICULT FOR HIM AS HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES PRETEND, BUT

THEIR ATTITUDE DOES LEND EMPHASIS TO PARA ONE ABOVE, AND THERE WILL OF COURSE BE SUBSTANTIAL, PERHAPS OUTLANDISH, PRICE TAG ATTACHED. PARK'S THINKING ON SUBJECT WILL ALSO BE CONDITIONED BY HIS ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE OUTCOME OF OUR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-7
By , NARA Date 1-10-00

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION **DECLASSIFIED**
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-268

By is, NARA Date 4-21-99

TIME AND PLACE:

1st Conference: 1010-1230 hours, April 17, 1968; Library of Kaiser Estate, Koko Head, Honolulu

2nd Conference: 1700-1830 hours, April 17, 1968; same as above

PARTICIPANTS:

- President Lyndon B. Johnson
- ROK President PARK Chung Hee
- ROK Blue House Protocol Secretary CHO Sang-ho (interpreter)
- Victor Lee of the American Embassy, Seoul (interpreter)

(A transcription of the remarks made by President PARK with President Johnson's remarks given in summary form for the sake of continuity.)

FIRST CONFERENCE

(President Johnson's greeting remarks)

President PARK: President Johnson has a number of other problems to cope with. I thank the President for worrying about the Korean problems.

President Johnson: President PARK is one of the most dependable, staunch allies we have. At this opportunity, I would like to hear his judgment on any steps we took in connection with the Viet-Nam

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war. If I have to support various requirements to pursue big policies in Asia, I must eliminate myself from the presidential campaign. In order to prevent the Viet-Nam war from becoming deteriorated and unmanageable and continue to fulfill our obligations in Asia, I would like to discuss with you how to use my remaining ten months in office. By transcending politics, I hope I can achieve what I have in mind during my remaining tenure.

President PARK: The U. S. has been confronted with many problems including domestic trouble and Viet-Nam. President Johnson's decision not to run for the presidency after a deep thought was a drastic measure, for which we have felt sorry. It was a shock for the Asians to hear the decision. The Communist threat in Europe has tended to be on the decrease, whereas in Asia the menace has increased with the Communists creating trouble in South Viet-Nam, South Korea and other areas. Since the time of his inauguration, President Johnson has adopted the policies of treating equally both Asia and Europe. The President's decision not to run for the presidency has led the Asians to be concerned that President Johnson's foreign policy toward Asia might "retreat" after he leaves office.

President Johnson: I believe your statement is accurate. For the purpose of saving this part of the world while I am in office, I will try to send capable commanders and more troops to Viet-Nam and spend more money for the war. If I cannot achieve this in the next ten months, Asia might be faced with the problems you have just stated.

President PARK: I am not making the following statements as an Asian. The fact that Your Excellency's policy toward Asia has been correct, and that the Democrat and Republican presidential candidates' positions, which oppose your policies for political reasons, are wrong, will be corroborated in history. I hope that President Johnson's policy will be further promoted. I have been encouraged by your statement that you will positively pursue this correct policy in your remaining tenure. At any rate, aren't you in a position to strongly push your policy?

President Johnson: I am trying to do so.

President PARK: When General Ridgeway called on me a couple of days ago, I asked him why the people in the U. S. oppose the Viet-Nam "problem." He replied that to his knowledge the majority of the Americans support President Johnson's policy, but it only appeared otherwise because various opposing statements

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come out conspicuously in the press. Ridgeway used a metaphor of the axle of a cart requiring grease when an unpleasant noise is heard.

President Johnson: General Ridgeway also opposes the war. He is of the opinion that our troops are spread too thin and too many of them are stationed in Asia.

President PARK: Yes, he does not agree with your war policy, but stated that the public opinion in the U. S. is not the same as what has been reported in the press.

President Johnson: I hope that the public opinion favors me during the next ten months. We will do everything we can in carrying out the war, but I don't know what will happen after January when I leave office.

President PARK: The real facts of the Viet-Nam situation are different from what has been reported in the domestic and foreign press. The press has been giving distorted news to the public. Several days ago, I summoned General CH'AE (CG, ROK Forces, Viet-Nam) to Seoul to hear detailed reports on the war until late at night with a map of Viet-Nam laid on the table. It is true that during the Tet offensive, the VC attacked some 30 South Vietnamese cities, but the press has reported that the Allies have no prospect of winning

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the war. According to the General, the situation is contrary to these reports. The Viet Cong were hit very badly, and their strength has been reduced from some 260,000 to 200,000. At present, 12 to 16-year-olds are in their ranks. Moreover, a large number of their cadres were killed; it takes 15 to 20 years to train men to be the cadres. The Viet Cong's underground organization has also been exposed and they lost great quantities of weapons and ammunition. General CH'AE stated that it will take some time before the VC can carry out such an offensive. The press in the U. S. and the Free World has been giving distorted reports.

President Johnson: I agree with your view 100 per cent. The major problem is what we can do until January to make the people in Asia independent and free and what we can do to wrap this thing up. It will be difficult to carry this out after my tenure. If we lose in Viet-Nam, the problems will become acute in Laos, Korea, Thailand and Singapore. The time for action is now. President Thieu will be coming to the U. S. in the future, and the Thais will be dispatching one division by mid-June. Prime Minister Gorton of Australia will come to see me in mid-May. President PARK's

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visit to the U. S. will be well received by the people, and I will send a plane for you any time you wish to do so. I am anxious to know what these leaders want to say so as to learn what we can do in the next ten months. Incidentally, an additional \$100 million for Korea has not been touched by Congress yet. Just think how tough the Congress could be if the Republicans held the majority. At Canberra, President PARK talked about the plan to send 8,000 more troops and 5,000 civilians to South Viet-Nam. Quantities of equipment for these troops expected to be sent to Viet-Nam are now in Okinawa. The equipment must be used for these soldiers going to Viet-Nam. You must give us the main strength to rout the enemy. By extending the period of service of ROK troops in Viet-Nam a little, you can have the effect of increasing ROK military strength in Viet-Nam by one division. President PARK is my real partner and I have my own responsibility to this part of the world. By the way, am I invited to a reception at the Korean Consulate tonight?

President PARK: Yes, if you have time. I would be honored if you could come.

President Johnson: I would like to make a five to ten-minute speech tonight at the reception. I have a plan to meet with General

Eisenhower in California tomorrow morning.

President PARK: Frankly speaking, I believe that the present Viet-Nam war method (strategy) should be changed. I do not think any conclusive results can be achieved by means of the present method. Our Allies' strength is some 1.3 million (interpreter CHO's misinterpretation of the figure as 130,000 was corrected by Lee), whereas the enemy has a force of about 200,000; in other words, we have a numerical advantage of about seven to one. If we cannot wipe out the enemy with this numerical superiority in Viet-Nam, it will become difficult for us to cope with a similar situation in other areas. Thus the method of executing the war must be changed. Moreover, this is a political war. The war is affected by domestic U.S. opinion, and the blind obedience to the opinion of those irresponsible people who are in the dark about the true situation should not be allowed. While on my way here aboard a plane yesterday, I saw some aerial photos taken over North Viet-Nam in a Life magazine (April 10, 1968 issue). They showed that even the bombing of concentrations of enemy supplies was prohibited by orders and a Communist Chinese destroyer unloading materials at Haiphong could not be attacked. If we stick to this method, it will be difficult to execute the war

I have heard about this type of war. During the Korean War, even with additional troops. This is actually the first time this type of war has ever been carried out. We have a numerical advantage of over six times and our supply of weapons is also superior. Frankly speaking, we have various restrictions, and it is difficult (to execute the war) even if additional troops are sent. I would like to have a personal talk with General Wheeler. (The following portions not interpreted.) We are not allowed to make an unrestricted bombing of enemy supply depots. Although there is a risk of 1/10 or 2/10, I do not believe that the Soviet Union or Communist China would intervene in the war if we carry out unrestricted bombings.

President Johnson: Why not meet with General Wheeler this afternoon?

As a matter of fact, we destroyed 70 enemy trucks yesterday at a point 50 miles from the DMZ.

President PARK (in an angry tone): Then why can't you hit enemy supplies coming into the Port of Haiphong?

President Johnson: We have hit both Hanoi and Haiphong frequently. Even if you hit them every day, it is impossible to completely cut off enemy supplies.

President PARK: We are not allowed to hit Soviet or Communist Chinese ships in (the waters of) North Viet-Nam. This is the first

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time I have heard about this type of war. During the Korean War, we hit every enemy target in North Korea.

President Johnson: I think that if we hit Soviet or Communist Chinese ships even after giving a warning, it might lead to a war. As far as the strategy is concerned, I would like you to have a talk with General Wheeler. But please note that we made 1,800 sorties near Khe Sanh, and that is where the enemy lost the 60,000 you were talking about. The problem is how to execute the war well in a short period of time.

President PARK: I believe that there should be no bombing restrictions. (Drawing a sketch) In the previously-mentioned Life magazine was a photo of 700 trucks on a road with the situation of pilots unable to attack them because of the orders not to attack civilian houses located by the road.

President Johnson: You should note that Life magazine is also against the war.

President PARK: The enemy could attack even the South Vietnamese presidential palace and the American Embassy. Why can't we attack all the enemy targets?

President Johnson: It is probable that out of the 700 trucks you mentioned, we destroyed 70 of them yesterday at a point about

200 miles south of Haiphong.

President PARK: How many troops do we have to send more to South Viet-Nam?

President Johnson: It depends on what the enemy does. After the Tet offensive, the enemy strength was augmented by 50,000 to 70,000, and we increased the troop level by 25,000 to 30,000. We expect that the Thais will move in one division in June. At Canberra on December 21, you told Ambassador Porter about the plan to send 11,000 men including 5,000 civilians. If you send this light division to South Viet-Nam, it will result in equipment assistance amounting to \$88 million and additional military assistance of about \$45 million. During the next ten months, you can do this by enhancing the strength of the divisions stationed in South Viet-Nam by extending the period of service of those soldiers to be rotated. With the troop increase and the continuation of bombings, I think we can take offensive action.

President PARK: Korea's tense situation was aggravated after the enemy invaded Seoul last January. North Korea is in a state of complete war preparedness, and we expect a considerable number of enemy guerrillas appearing in South Korea during the summer. In order to check these guerrillas, it is impossible for me to send more active soldiers to South Viet-Nam at present. As you know,

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we have completed the organization of the local defense corps for home defense purposes, and started giving them weapons. As I already told Ambassador Porter, it is possible for us to send one combat group (regimental combat team) from rear areas in South Viet-Nam and to have them replaced by civilians. Other than this, it is difficult to send active soldiers this year under the present circumstances.

President Johnson: In the expectation that your country will send more troops to South Viet-Nam, we have appropriated \$32 million from the DOD funds for counter-insurgency equipment, and \$12 million worth of equipment is awaiting at Okinawa for this light division. Many items of the equipment are those of the highest priority. If you cannot use them, I must ship them to South Vietnamese forces. I already told the Americans that the U. S., Thailand and South Korea are expected to dispatch more troops, but if you cannot do this, I must think of using some other methods.

President PARK: Frankly speaking, South Korea's national defense has not been sufficient. In every (phase of) military strength, ours is inferior to that of North Korea, as General Bonesteel admits. The South Korean problem is as important as the South Vietnamese problem.

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President Johnson: We are trying to make efforts in both countries. North Korea is creating tensions in Korea to assist the Viet-Nam war. You should not be trapped by the North Korean schemes. You should know that only two of us can take the initiative and work together. If you cannot send additional troops, the equipment stored in Okinawa should be sent to other places.

President PARK: You should give them to ROK forces. If South Korea's national defense is superior to North Korea's we can send more troops to Viet-Nam. (The following sentence by PARK was not interpreted due to President Johnson's statement.) Following the January 21 incident, the South Korean people have been feeling uneasy.

President Johnson: The equipment in Okinawa is destined for Thai and ROK troops who will be fighting in Viet-Nam. If you cannot send more troops, we must ship them to ARVN. The equipment was obtained from defense appropriations for Viet-Nam on the basis of the Canberra proposal. We sent an aid-to-Korea budget bill totaling some \$400 million to Congress--Mr. Vance recommended an extra \$100 million for Korea, which Congress has not acted on yet; and there is \$102 million in supporting assistance and PL-480 and \$192 million as a regular aid bill.

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President PARK: Your Excellency is giving priority consideration to the Viet-Nam problem. I can't help it if you send the Okinawa equipment to ARVN. But I can give you one combat group (regimental combat team) numbering 5,000 to 6,000 men. I know that North Korea will without fail aggravate the situation in South Korea, and it is necessary for us to be superior to North Korea in military strength. During the summer season, many of them (guerrillas) will come to South Korea. If no effect is made on our self-defense, there is a possibility that we might send (more troops) in the future, but under the present circumstances, I cannot send more. This does not mean that I am not willing to send more troops. If military strength of ROK forces is strengthened, it is possible for us to send one or two divisions. North Korea knows that whatever they do in South Korea, the U. S. will sit idly because of its troops committed to the Viet-Nam war, and thus there will be more incidents in Korea this year. At the time of the Canberra talks, the situation was different from this year's.

President Johnson: Without giving publicity, I want you to extend the period of service of ROK troops in Viet-Nam during the time I am in office. I need a rest because of heart trouble, so why don't you

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talk with Mr. Vance and General Wheeler on the war strategy at lunch? I have never lived in Asia and I am not an Asian. But during my remaining ten months, I will help the Korean, Thais, and Australians, and make efforts to check Communist expansion. If we are going to do anything, we had better have it done soon. If I tell the people that the ROK's and the Thais cannot send more troops because of their situation, I don't know what I am going to do. I recommend that they do everything they can.

President PARK: I fully understand your views. But there is a strong possibility that big trouble might erupt in South Korea. First of all, our country should not be subjected to Communist invasion.

President Johnson: That is why we requested an extra \$100 million for your country.

President PARK: I thank you for this money, but we cannot feel at ease with this amount. North Korea aims at creating the second Viet-Nam in South Korea.

President Johnson: He knows best what he can do. I will do my best.

SECOND CONFERENCE

President Johnson: During the rest period this afternoon, I called Secretary Rusk twice to discuss our joint communiqué. Do you agree with this portion of Paragraph 3 as proposed by your side?

President PARK: Yes.

President Johnson: I am of the opinion that the communiqué should be issued in the form of the original draft. As you know, the Congress gave us so much trouble concerning the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. With this revised communiqué, the Congress might obstruct the execution of the Defense Treaty and possibly the approval of \$100 million as suggested by Mr. Vance. But if you insist on the revised text, I agree to it reluctantly. I believe that the original draft is good for both sides. Incidentally, I plan to make an important speech for the Asian people tonight. Before next January arrives, we must take all the necessary measures to eliminate the Communist threat. I do not know what the next President will do. Now this is my last remark on the Canberra proposal. Since this is your fate, you must decide yourself.

1. If Communism succeeds in South Viet-Nam, trouble will be created in other parts of the region. The Thai and Australian leaders

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will come to see me next month. You are always welcome to see me anytime.

2. Can't you agree to my proposal of extending the term of service of soldiers in Viet-Nam who are to be rotated? If you cannot send more troops, I must send the Okinawa equipment to South Viet-Nam.

3. Since the amount of \$32 million for counter-insurgency is connected with the Viet-Nam war, I have to obtain the funds from other sources if you are not going to send additional troops.

4. I made a request for a total of \$400 million as your friend. But please note that our relations with Congress will be aggravated if you cannot send more troops because of your local problems. If I were the President of the Republic of Korea, I would send additional troops to Viet-Nam to help the remaining ten months of President Johnson's tenure.

President PARK: This is all because of the North Korean threat. It is possible to send one combat group (regimental combat team), and concerning the other problem, I will consider it when I return home. I hope that President Johnson will study and pay attention to the problem of South Korean national defense. I believe that Special

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Envoy Vance must have reported the current Korean situation to you. (To Lee in a whisper in Korean: Why can't he understand the true Korean situation?)

President Johnson: He is the best ally I have. He stands up when we need him. That is why I need his help now, especially when the Congress takes up the matter of helping Korea. General Wheeler studied the South Korean military capabilities in comparison with those of North Korea. All the five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were of the unanimous opinion that on the ground, South Korea is superior to North Korea--we will keep our 50,000 troops also; as for the Navy, we will be all right so far as the waters are concerned; in the air, we need some strength badly, and for this reason, I am asking that part of the \$100 million go to activate one air squadron. You should note that we sent to Korea some squadrons and called up reserves who should have been destined for Viet-Nam. With our increased air power in Korea, I think South Korea is superior to North Korea in all the services' military capabilities; I can give you this statement in writing. Furthermore, we are going to get as much in assistance as possible for you, although this is the worst year since the end of World War II as far as foreign aid is concerned. I do not think North Korea will stage a large-scale attack now.

President PARK: Our air power is superior because of an increase of 170 aircraft. Naval strength is about equally matched. Since North Korea now has tens of thousands of trained guerrillas, our army must strengthen defense in rear areas to carry on economic construction, although the bulk of army soldiers are stationed along the DMZ. If the situation were not so, we could have sent more men to Viet-Nam even before receiving such a request.

(President Johnson asked General Wheeler to come in, but he had already left.)

President PARK: At the time of the capture of the Pueblo, wasn't it due to your weakness (of military strength in Korea) that you could not give assistance to the ship?

President Johnson: I am of the opinion that North Korea provoked the Pueblo incident to prevent South Korea from sending more troops to Viet-Nam.

President PARK: It is necessary to strengthen our air force. Our army fire power is far inferior to North Korea's. I also need your assistance for the strengthening of the local reserve corps.

(President Johnson asked Mr. Vance to come in, but he was not available.)

President Johnson: I will do my utmost while I am in office. But the trouble is with the Congress.

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President PARK: I am going to relate a true story. In Seoul, pillboxes and bunkers will be built at intersections, places of work are being armed and even some women have volunteered to join the local reserve corps. We are determined to defend Seoul to the last this time. President Johnson should realize that our army is not "sufficient." At my official residence, a basement is being built, electric wire entanglements are being strung and dozens of pillboxes are being constructed. The Capitol Building will also have a basement, and an underground tunnel will be built under the Han River. The construction of underground facilities is being carried out in accordance with a three-year plan. We are determined to fight the Communists to the last. If you believe our army is sufficient, I think the reports to that effect were wrong. Please understand the threat of North Korean guerrillas. We will need a large sum of money for the local reserve corps, and thus we set up a three-year plan to have the National Assembly appropriate the money. Our forthcoming supplementary bill contains a large amount for this purpose.

President Johnson: According to my Secretary of Treasury, our debts in the balance of payments run to some four billion dollars. I wonder if Korea can make short-term investments in our bonds and securities

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in the amount of \$50 million to \$100 million. (This last portion was not interpreted by CHO at first.)

President PARK: I keep a carbine loaded with live bullets in my bedroom.

President Johnson: Did you translate my remarks on investments in bonds? (Lee translated the statement on behalf of President Johnson.)

President PARK: But our total national budget is only about \$1 billion, which I heard is equivalent to the yearly budget of Harvard University of some \$800 million, and we are making efforts this year to gain \$500 million in exports. My country is not as rich as the U.S.

President Johnson: You have stated that for Viet-Nam, 5,000 civilians are available and you will take the dispatch of 6,000 troops into consideration. Is this right?

President PARK: Yes.

President Johnson: When can you send these civilians to Viet-Nam?

President PARK: Since about 1,500 soldiers are rotated every month, it will be possible in about three months.

President Johnson: Is it all right to set July 1 as the target date?

President PARK: Yes.

President Johnson: I would like you to study the matter of extending the period of service of those troops in Viet-Nam who are to be rotated. If this cannot be done, it will adversely affect the Viet-Nam war. I would like to receive your reply on the matter by the time the Thai and Australian leaders arrive in the U. S. next month.

President PARK: I hope that you receive detailed reports on the Korean situation from General Wheeler and General Bonesteel.

(President Johnson called in General Bonesteel and explained what transpired.)

President PARK: Although we do not worry about (the defense along) the DMZ, don't you (to General Bonesteel) think that our present military strength lacks the capacity to cope with enemy disturbances in rear areas? This is the reason we have been pushing the organization of the local reserve corps. We can capture infiltrating guerrillas, but if they appear all over the country, it will disturb public security, lead to the people's unrest and obstruct economic construction. Under these circumstances, how can one send more troops to a foreign country? The defense along the DMZ, the defense in rear areas and the dispatch of additional troops should all be considered separately.

President Johnson: I will do my utmost to assist your local reserve corps. But if you cannot keep the Canberra promise, it will be difficult to support the corps. The best investment in security for the ROK is to send 6,000 more men to Viet-Nam. As the responsible leader, I would like President PARK to study the matter and give me its results. If you cannot send more troops, how can I explain it to the Congress?

President PARK: The situation was different last December compared with last January.

(President Johnson then read a recommendation made by the Secretary of Treasury for Korea's investment in U. S. Government bonds and securities.)

President Johnson: I am asking the matter to other Asian and European countries also. As a matter of fact, the Secretary is discussing it with your Deputy Prime Minister today. The purchase of our securities will be of help in having a \$230 million military aid bill approved.

President PARK: I would like to send 6,000 men, but we have just barely organized the local reserve corps whose members must undergo training. I must wait until the summer to see how the situation develops.

President Johnson: You must expedite your decision on the dispatch of additional troops. Next summer some Senator might become the next President.

President PARK: First of all, the National Assembly will not approve the troop dispatch proposal. When I feel relieved at a certain stage, I will send them to Viet-Nam.

President Johnson: Only the dispatch of 6,000 more men is a guarantee of security for the defense of South Korea. (To interpreter CHO) I will give you a typed copy of this recommendation tonight. On the details of the matters discussed today, I would like to have General Bonesteel discuss with the President on a return trip to Seoul.

Reported by Victor Lee

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: 1315-1615 hours, April 17, 1968; Library of Kaiser Estate, Koko Head, Honolulu

PARTICIPANTS:

- ROK SIDE: PARK Chung Hee, President
- CH'OE Yong-hui, Minister of National Defense
- Gen. IM Ch'ung-sik, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- CHO Sang-ho, Blue House Protocol Secretary (interpreter)
- U. S. SIDE: Cyrus Vance, Special Consultant to the President
- Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Victor Lee, American Embassy, Seoul (interpreter)

(A transcription of the notes taken by Victor Lee on the remarks made by the ROK participants.)

President PARK: During the talks with President Johnson this morning, it was suggested that I get together with Special Envoy Vance and General Wheeler to discuss the matters involving the additional South Korean troop dispatch to South Viet-Nam.

(General Wheeler's briefing on the Viet-Nam war situation followed.)

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President PARK: I know that General Westmoreland is an excellent General and that he has carried out war operations well. It is, of course, natural for him to ask for more troops. But our immediate concern at present is whether it would be possible for us to use our present troop strength in South Viet-Nam more effectively through such means as a decrease in the number of our rear area troops, although I do not know in detail the exact number of rear area troops which can be sent to frontline areas. As you know, the situation in Korea is tense since this spring, and we have been strengthening our frontline combat strength by decreasing the number of military administrative personnel serving in rear areas. However, I understand that such a method will not satisfy General Westmoreland's need for additional troops in South Viet-Nam.

President PARK (in answer to Mr. Vance's questions): In rear areas, either the number of soldiers assigned to certain fields can be decreased or some of the jobs heretofore assigned to military personnel can be done by civilians. Frankly speaking, the Viet-Nam war itself must be a military war, but it has been greatly influenced by politics... Out of some 10,000 rear area personnel of ROK forces in Viet-Nam, I believe about 5,000 or more can be replaced by

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civilians. This method can also be applied to the U. S. forces in Viet-Nam.

(General Wheeler explained the status of the use of civilians in Viet-Nam and various problems and limitations arising from the use of civilian work force.)

President PARK: Discharged soldiers can be hired as drivers or in other types of work such as maintenance and the laying of pipelines. Speaking of the war in Viet-Nam, our side has too many restricted areas in bombing; this is like leaving open a rear door while fighting at the front door. As I saw some aerial photos in a Life magazine (April 10, 1968 issue) aboard a plane on my way here, how can you conduct a war if you cannot hit enemy supplies even after detecting them? Furthermore, the Viet Cong has no restrictions in its activities in South Viet-Nam, attacking even the South Vietnamese presidential palace and the American Embassy.

(General Wheeler spoke about U. S. foreign policy, the effect of bombing in North Viet-Nam and inclement weather prevailing in the north at present.)

President PARK: During this morning's talks with President Johnson, we touched on the subject of the additional troop dispatch. It is true

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that in view of the Korean situation at that time (December 1967), I made a pledge to send a light division to South Viet-Nam at Canberra. As General Bonesteel understands, however, we ourselves have been threatened (by the North Korean Communists) and a tense situation has prevailed since last January. It might be possible to replace our rear area troops stationed in South Viet-Nam with civilians. It appears to me that President Johnson has not been able to understand the seriousness of the Korean situation. It should be noted that South Korean defensive strength is not sufficient to cope with North Korean puppets' provocations, and for this reason, we have been organizing local defense corps. In view of the present Korea situation, it is difficult to persuade the people to accept the idea of dispatching another division to South Viet-Nam. I think that Special Envoy Vance must have realized this when he visited Seoul recently. ~~has said, the President~~

President PARK (after listening to the remarks made by General Wheeler and Mr. Vance): The dispatch of additional troops to South Viet-Nam should be taken into consideration after we observe the (Korean) situation this year. At present, our urgent task is (to strengthen) self-defense.

Minister CH'OE: We have a 600,000-man force. But, General Wheeler, in the equipment and performance aspect of fire power, communications and mobility, do you believe that we (ROK forces) are superior to North Korea?

(After listening to the remarks of General Wheeler and Mr. Vance, President PARK left the room, asking Minister CH'OE and General IM to continue discussions. Mr. CHO followed the President.)

Minister CH'OE: I know that with our 600,000 men, there is no problem in defeating North Korea. What worries us is Communist Chinese troops stationed in Manchuria as in the case of the Viet Cong being supported by North Viet-Nam and Communist China... Our lack of equipment, mobility and fire power must be noted. Speaking of local reserve corps, I think it will take a considerable period of time to equip its members. The other day, the President was thoughtful enough to supply the corps with 500 bicycles. Now we have been thinking of obtaining sidecars for them.

(General IM made remarks to the effect that despite the current ideological discord, the Communists can unite in case of emergency,

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and then complained of a six per cent yearly rise in commodity prices in Korea although the same level of U. S. military aid has been maintained.)

Minister CH'OE (after listening to General Wheeler's remarks):

During the Korean War, the Korean Service Corps served its role excellently, carrying ammunition, food, etc. to the troops and even evacuating the wounded, while following frontline troops. . . What the local reserve corps is in need of is its mobility. At present, divisional commanders have no means of fast transportation such as helicopters which will take them to the coast to command their troops immediately after agent appearances.

(Then the statements on a number of subjects were made by both sides until the end of the meeting.)

Reported by Victor Lee

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 17, 1968

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Honolulu, Hawaii)THE WHITE HOUSE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, President Chung Hee Park of the Republic of Korea visited Honolulu on April 17 and 18 to exchange views on the current international situation and matters of common interest and mutual concern.

KOREAN SITUATION

The two Presidents reviewed in detail the serious threat to the security of the Republic of Korea and to peace in East Asia resulting from the increasingly belligerent and aggressive actions of the north Korean communists during the past eighteen months, including the attack directed at the official residence of the President of the Republic of Korea and the seizure of USS PUEBLO in international waters in January. They reviewed the plans of their two governments for dealing with the grave situation created by these north Korean acts of aggression. President Park expressed his deep sympathy for the families and relatives of the crew of the USS PUEBLO and sincerely hoped that they will soon regain their freedom from the hands of the north Korean communists.

The two Presidents agreed that further aggressive actions by the north Korean communists would constitute a most grave threat to peace. In that event, their two governments would immediately determine the action to be taken to meet this threat under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. In accordance with this Treaty President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attacks against the Republic of Korea.

President Johnson reaffirmed the adherence of his government to the Joint Policy Declaration which was signed on July 27, 1953 by the sixteen nations which supported the Republic of Korea during the Korean War.

The two Presidents reviewed the extraordinary measures which have been taken to strengthen Korean and American forces in the Republic of Korea. They agreed that these efforts should be continued in order that the Armed Forces of their countries would be able to deal effectively and swiftly with all contingencies in Korea.

The two Presidents recognized the need for strengthening security of the Republic of Korea as important not only for Korea but for the security of the general area. President Johnson recognized the need for continuing modernization of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the two Presidents reviewed the contribution which U. S. military assistance would make to such modernization and to the strengthening of the effective counter-infiltration programs which have already been developed by the Republic of Korea. They agreed that the first meeting between their respective Defense Ministries at ministerial level should be held in Washington in May to discuss and deliberate these matters further.

President Park outlined and discussed the various measures being taken by his government to ensure public safety and to thwart north Korean attempts at infiltration and sabotage. President Johnson expressed his satisfaction with and support for those measures, including the organization of the Homeland Reserve Force, which he felt were wise and far-seeing.

President Johnson expressed his admiration for the rapid economic progress of the Republic of Korea, which has continued without pause despite the attempts of the north Korean regime to disrupt public order and confidence in the South. The two Presidents agreed that continued private investment from the United States and other friendly countries was desirable, and should be encouraged.

VIETNAM

The two Presidents reviewed in detail the situation in South Vietnam where Korean and American forces are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder to assist the Republic of Vietnam to defend against aggression and to assure the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without external interference or terrorist pressure.

The two Presidents noted the vigorous actions taken by the South Vietnamese Government to strengthen and increase its armed forces and to improve government effectiveness.


The two Presidents agreed that the common goal of an honorable and secure peace required the earnest pursuit of a diplomatic solution coupled with continued resolution and military firmness. They expressed the policy of their governments to sustain their efforts to meet the requirements of the struggle in all respects until peace is attained.

President Johnson reviewed the developments in the past two weeks, initiated by his decision -- in consultation with the Republic of Vietnam and with the nations contributing military forces to its support -- to reduce the area of bombing in North Vietnam. President Park expressed his satisfaction with these developments.

President Johnson explained in detail the current status of efforts to set a time and place for early contacts between American and North Vietnamese representatives. He reviewed with President Park the position that American representatives would take in contacts, reaffirming that the United States Government would continue to consult fully with the Republic of Korea and other allies concerning negotiating developments and positions to be taken on the allied side at each stage.

Looking forward to their common hope that serious talks on the substance of peace could begin in the near future, the two Presidents reaffirmed that the allied position would continue to be based on the Manila Communique of 1966.

The two Presidents also reaffirmed the position stated in the Seven-Nation Foreign Ministers Meeting of April 1967 -- that a settlement in Vietnam, to be enduring, must respect the wishes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full participant in any negotiations designed to bring about a settlement of the conflict; and that the allied nations which have helped to defend the Republic of Vietnam should participate in any settlement of the conflict.



ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

President Park highly commended the great role and persistent efforts of the United States to bring about freedom, peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific. He expressed his conviction that a continued United States presence in this region is essential to a just and lasting peace.

President Johnson expressed determination that the United States should continue its efforts for stability and security in the region, in accordance with the desires and aspirations of Asian peoples themselves.

In this regard, the two Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the "Declaration on Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific" issued at the Summit Conference in Manila in October, 1966.

CONCLUSION

President Park expressed his deep appreciation to President Johnson and to the Governor and citizens of Hawaii for the warmth of their reception and for the many courtesies extended to him during the visit.

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25X1A DIST 19 APRIL 1968

25X1X COUNTRY NORTH KOREA/CHINA

DOI [REDACTED]

SUBJECT RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND CHINA

ACQ [REDACTED]
SOURCE [REDACTED]

25X1X

25X1X 1. [REDACTED] COMMUNIST CHINA HAS

PROMISED MILITARY AID TO NORTH KOREA IF THE UNITED STATES
USES FORCE TO RECOVER THE PUEBLO. THE KIND AND LEVEL OF
ASSISTANCE HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFIED.

2. SOVIET SOURCES IN PYONGYANG STATE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY
IS NOT AS WELL ARMED AS THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AND NORTH
KOREA HAS RESERVES OF FOOD, POL PRODUCTS, ETC., FOR ONLY
25 DAYS. THUS THE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITIES IS DISCOUNTED.

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3. CHINESE/NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS SHOWED MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN 1967. TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS ON THE LEVEL OF 480 MILLION AS COMPARED WITH ONLY 120 TO 140 MILLION IN 1966. [REDACTED]

25X1X

COMMENT: THE CURRENCY WAS NOT SPECIFIED.) IN ADDITION, THE CHINESE HAD DELIVERED 80 PERCENT OF MATERIALS CONTRACTED FOR IN THEIR TRADE AGREEMENT WITH NORTH KOREA. THEY WERE UNABLE TO EXPORT GASOLINE, FUEL OIL, OR COAL.

4. TWENTY-FOUR SENIOR CHINESE MILITARY OFFICERS ARRIVED IN PYONGYANG ON 28 MARCH 1968 AND ANOTHER 24 ARE EXPECTED WHICH WILL MAKE A TOTAL PARTY OF ABOUT 50 OFFICERS. PRESUMABLY THEY ARE IN PYONGYANG TO DISCUSS CHINESE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA. BECAUSE OF THEIR ARRIVAL, THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY DELEGATION SCHEDULED TO PAY A VISIT TO HUNGARY DELAYED ITS DEPARTURE.

25X1A

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: LIMDIS FOR CINCPAC CINCPACFLT

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231520 Z

25X1A

DIST 23 APRIL 1968

25X1X

COUNTRY: SOUTH KOREA

DOI : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PAK'S CRITICAL REACTION TO THE HONOLULU
CONFERENCE

ACQ : [REDACTED]
SOURCE : [REDACTED]

25X1X

1. ON 20 APRIL 1968, PAK CHONG-KYU, CHIEF OF THE ROK
PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTIVE FORCE, SAID THAT PRESIDENT PAK
CHONG-HUI WAS DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED BY, AND CRITICAL OF HIS
MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE.
PRESIDENT PAK, DURING A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH CHIEF
PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK AND DEFENSE MINISTER CH'OE
YONG-HUI ON 19 APRIL, SAID HE FELT PRESIDENT JOHNSON ATTEMPTED

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TO EVADE THE KEY ISSUES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO KOREA AND A FORMAL REVISION OF THE ROK-U.S. MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY. PRESIDENT PAK SAID HE SENSED PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS LOST CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE SINCE HIS ANNOUNCED INTENTION NOT SEEK RE-ELECTION. HE SAID PRESIDENT JOHNSON NO LONGER EXERCISES EFFECTIVE AUTHORITY OVER CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS ON FOREIGN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

2. AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, PRESIDENT PAK SAID HE COULD NOT CONSIDER SENDING ADDITIONAL ROK COMBAT TROOPS TO VIETNAM IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: PAK CHONG-KYU IMPLIED THAT PRESIDENT PAK MADE THIS DECISION AFTER IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS UNWILLING TO OFFER SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IN ADDITION TO THE \$100 MILLION PLEDGED BY THE CYRUS VANCE MISSION IN FEBRUARY 1968.)

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PAK IS KNOWN TO BE PRESENT AT MANY OF THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS CARRIED ON BY PRESIDENT PAK. HOWEVER, PAK WAS NOT PRESENT DURING PRESIDENT PAK'S PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN HONOLULU AND THERE IS REASON TO DOUBT PAK WOULD BE PRIVY TO THE DETAILS OR SUBSTANCE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.

4. YI HU-PAK WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL AND OUTSPOKEN AGAINST

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PRESIDENT JOHNSON AFTER PRESIDENT PAK BRIEFED HIM ON THE RESULTS OF THE TWO MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. YI SAID THE ROK CAN NO LONGER RELY ON THE U.S. FOR LONG-RANGE MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

25X1A

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

25X1X

[REDACTED], A BLUE HOUSE OFFICIAL CLOSE TO YI HU-RAK SAID ON 11 APRIL, PRIOR TO THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE, THAT PRESIDENT PAK WAS WILLING TO DISPATCH ANOTHER ROK DIVISION TO VIETNAM PROVIDED NORTH VIETNAM SHOWED CLEAR EVIDENCE OF DISINTEREST IN REAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND PROVIDED THE U.S. GAVE SPECIFIC ASSURANCE OF PROVISION FOR WEAPONS ADEQUATE TO MODERNIZE THE ROK ARMY AND DETAILED PROCEDURES REMOVING DOMESTIC "REDTAPE" AND OPPOSITION TO ROK MILITARY AID.

25X1A

25X1A

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE [REDACTED]

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BT

Memorandum

On the Visit of the Party and Government Delegation of the GDR, led by Comrade Prof. Dr. Kurt Hager, with the General Secretary of the KWP and Prime Minister of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung, on 16 April 1968, 5:00 p.m. to 6:50 p.m.

[Source: MfAA, C 159/75; translated by Karen Riechert]

SED Central Committee, Department of International Relations

23 April 1968

Highly Confidential (handwritten)

At the beginning, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked about the well-being of the delegation and the health of Comrade Walter Ulbricht and the other leading comrades of the SED and the government of the GDR. Comrade Hager conveyed the greetings of Comrade Walter Ulbricht and congratulations on the 56th birthday of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Then Kim Il Sung stated:

We welcome the visit of your delegation to our country and want to thank the GDR government, the Central Committee of the SED, and Comrade Walter Ulbricht in person for sending the delegation. Kim emphasized that the visit of the delegation will contribute to further consolidation of the relations between our parties and states, since there are many commonalities between our two countries. You live in a divided country and we do as well. Like our country, yours is threatened by imperialism. Both of our countries fight against imperialism, we support the national liberation movement and both countries are building socialism. Although we are quite distant geographically, the relationship between our two countries is a good one. Therefore both of our parties can also work closely together. Our country received great support from you in its most difficult period. Already during the war you accepted orphans and students from our country and you gave us material and moral support of all kinds. In the city of Hamhung you built many residences and a lot of factories. This was an expression of truly internationalist solidarity. Our people will never forget that. I want to seize the opportunity to ask you again to express our thanks for all that to the SED and the government and people of the GDR.

Comrade Hager stressed the commonalities between our two countries as we belong to the socialist camp and are building socialism. He thanked them for their support of the policy of our party and government.

Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed in return his thanks for their support for the struggle of the Korean people for the reunification of the fatherland, against American imperialism and resurgent Japanese militarism. In the negotiations between our delegations, opinions were exchanged and I think you were informed about the situation in our country and our struggle. I only want to emphasize that our countries and parties have many things in common because of our joint membership in the socialist camp. I am convinced we can cooperate well starting from that base. Concerning the development of the Korean revolution, we see the only way to reunify our country as speeding up the development of the North and the strength of revolutionary forces in South Korea, in close conjunction with all socialist countries and anti-imperialist forces. We particularly must consolidate the ties with the GDR, since the GDR defends socialism at its Western outpost, and we do so at the Eastern outpost.

We talk much about self-reliance, and many people misunderstand that. We don't ask, however, for self-reliance outside the socialist camp. We ask for self-reliance in the interests of consolidating the unity of the socialist camp. The self-reliance we stand for lies within the interests of the international alliance and is in accordance with the principles of the declarations of the Moscow meeting. We ask for self-reliance in the interests of the education of our people. Some countries want us to follow them blindly, but we cannot do that. The line of our party on self-reliance reflects the conditions in our country and is not related to nationalism or national egotism. We must strive to win the middle class in South Korea to achieve unification. Therefore we have to devote special attention to the reeducation of the middle class in our republic. Thus we cannot follow one country and have a cultural revolution here. If we want to bring about unification, we cannot fight against the old professors and intellectuals. We have to transform and unite them in order to have them participate in the revolutionary movement. When we ask for self-reliance, we argue against blind followership of other countries and not against the unity of the socialist camp.

We have quite a few peculiarities, therefore we cannot eliminate the old intellectuals. In South Korea many intellectuals support us. If we suppress them in the North, the intellectuals in South Korea will turn against us. I don't know whether there has been a plot between the Park Chung Hee clique and Bonn, but many South Korean intellectuals have been deported. They support us, and we cannot follow one country and make a cultural revolution. So the emphasis on self reliance is an action of self-defense. It does not aim at slandering others or coming out against them.

When our neighbor started the Cultural Revolution, the South Korean intellectuals asked us: What will happen to us after reunification? For us there was only one response, namely we will cooperate with the intellectuals. We want to revolutionize them and move together towards communism. Our self-reliance is not directed against the Cultural Revolution. The latter is an internal matter of our neighbor. We will not promote that. Self-reliance is an action of self defense for the education of the party and the people. Therefore we published the article "Let's Protect Self-Reliance" and talked about it during our party conference in October 1966. Self reliance is important for the education of the intellectuals and the people in South Korea. In South Korea there are many intellectuals, capitalists and public servants who have not yet given up their illusions about U.S. imperialism. They are also afraid, however, of the USA and thus want to lean on Japan.

We are for self-reliance. It is not directed against the unity of the socialist camp and doesn't mean any interference in the internal matters of other countries. We are in favor of it because it is necessary for the Korean revolution, for the unification of our country, and for the education of our people. We do not want to impose self-reliance on others. We opt for self-reliance because we want to strengthen solidarity with the socialist camp and the national liberation movement. The Korean revolution faces the strongest enemy, namely U.S. imperialism. We want to further solidarity with all revolutionary forces. That is very important for the Korean revolution. I hope you will well understand our position. Self-reliance is no obstacle to unity between our two parties. To the contrary, it will strengthen it.

We fully support your struggle against the resurgence of West German imperialism, against American imperialism and against all imperialists, for the construction of socialism and the overtaking of West Germany. We thank you for supporting our struggle. We will always support you and hope for your support. Under these conditions our relations will develop further.

Therefore we are glad you came to visit us. Last year your military delegation led by Comrade Verner was here. This year we will send a military delegation to the GDR, led by the Chief of the Main Political Administration [of the Korean People's Army]. The exchange of delegations between both countries will increase in the future. This will contribute to a deepening of mutual understanding and of knowing the policy of both parties. So we welcome an exchange of many delegations to consolidate friendship between both [our] parties and countries. Our country is not a big country. Therefore we don't want isolation, but unity. We wish the relations between both parties to develop further. Please forward that also to Comrade Walter Ulbricht and Comrade Willi Stoph.

Comrade Hager expressed thanks for the remarks of Comrade Kim Il Sung and briefly mentioned the creative policy of our party, for instance with regard to the middle class. He thanked him for the explanations on questions concerning the reunification of Korea. He expressed his full agreement with the remarks on the development of bilateral relations. He emphasized how, in addition to our own creative policy, we particularly pay attention to close cooperation with the Soviet Union and the states of the Warsaw Pact as the cornerstone of our policy. Finally

Comrade Hager sketched again our position on the convocation of a new communist world conference. He said that we agreed with Comrade Pak Song Ch'ol on the necessity of unity. But we have different opinions about the next steps needed to achieve it. These differences of opinion, however, are not an obstacle to the development of mutual relations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said:

This is correct. We are not at all against your position, but understand it very well. We, too, are for the unity of the international communist and workers' movement and the socialist countries.

If the socialist camp were really united, we would be a strong power. With the exception of the island of Cuba, all countries are linked geographically. We are one billion people. If the socialist camp were united, it could unfold its power in all areas, not just in political but also in economic terms. The socialist world market could be developed and the socialist camp could display its strength. If the socialist camp were united, it could not only demonstrate its power, but also rally all the young nation states behind it and influence them. We know from our own experience that the unity of the socialist camp and the entire communist worldwide movement is by all means necessary, because there are many problems for us that arise from division. So it is correct that your country is securing peace within the Warsaw Pact. The NATO alliance is in dissolution, which is not bad. But if we weaken the Warsaw Pact, that would be very dangerous for unity. In this respect we fully agree with you. For geographical reasons we cannot participate in the Warsaw Pact, but by our friendship treaties with the Soviet Union and China we are mutually tied. We think our alliances with the Soviet Union and China are very important for us. Therefore one must not destroy them, despite existing differences of opinion. There may be differences, but one has to come together nonetheless. There are big differences of opinion with China, but we want to maintain the alliance with the PRC because it is important for securing peace.

Comrade Pak Song Ch'ol has already talked about our position on the convocation of a world conference. We are not against your participation in the preparation and the conference itself. Looking at our situation, however, we cannot participate yet. The concrete conditions in our country demand cooperation with the Soviet Union and China. However, this does not mean we will follow China even if the Chinese speak out against a conference forever.

More than one million hostile troops face us directly. Therefore we don't want to end the alliance with China since it would mean we would also have enemies at our back. We have reached the conclusion [that we will] participate in a conference only if everyone participates, but if one country won't be there, we won't either. We have to wait to see how the situation in China develops. Moreover, Vietnam is fighting against U.S. imperialism and we don't want to obstruct its struggle. If there were to be an open split, this wouldn't have a positive impact on the Vietnamese comrades. That not only depends on the Soviet Union and other European socialist

countries, but also on China's position. The Chinese and some others want the split now. For them the conference would be a proper opportunity to officially seal the split. With a conference we only display to the enemy the internal situation in our camp. Our party thinks that unity and also discussions between the parties are needed. We ask ourselves, however, whether the time for a conference has already come. We are not against a conference, but think a convocation this year would be too early. We are not against the parties joining in the preparation and participating in the conference itself. Among the socialist countries there are some who have a different opinion about the convocation of the conference in the current year. We think this year is too early for the conference, but we will not slander the participants. We ask you also not to insult us for not participating. There are many common things between us. In some respects our positions differ, but this is no obstacle to the development of our relations.

Currently there are big differences of opinion with the Chinese, but they still say they will fight together with us against U.S. imperialism if that proves necessary. They say our deep differences are of a tactical and not a strategic nature. They slander us as revisionists but we always stay calm. When the Red Guards insult us, the Chinese tell us that the party and government are not responsible. Only if e.g. *People's Daily* [Renmin Ribao] attacks us would they be responsible. Some comrades in the politburo have suggested that we should also organize Red Guards to insult the Chinese, but should not write articles. I am against that. It doesn't work that way. There are big differences of opinion with the Chinese, but unity in actions against U.S. imperialism is maintained. The [friendship] treaty is still valid and in spite of these differences, we wait. The PRC has issued a government declaration on the *Pueblo* case and supported our position. This shows how they stand by the treaty as well as for a united front against imperialism. There are many complicated questions and we are directly confronted by the enemy. So we don't have the option to participate in the conference. China and some others constitute one side, the Soviet Union and all the others the other side. We don't want to participate in a conference where only one side is represented. There are still many against such a conference, therefore we think the time hasn't yet come. China will not participate, others will do likewise. We cannot participate. Certainly the majority will participate, but if some, who directly fight against U.S. imperialism, are not present, what will be the importance of such a conference? Comrade Ponomarev was here and we told him our opinion. Concerning this question, the many

difficulties faced by the Asian parties must be taken into consideration. We are not against your being in favor of this conference, and we will not insult you.

The differences of opinion with China came along with different positions towards the Soviet Union. In March 1965 there was a conference in Moscow. Back then the Chinese comrades said that all participants must be denounced as revisionists. Articles bearing the character of declarations were written, slandering all participants as revisionists. We came out against that. There are also other differences of opinion with China. The Chinese said that the Soviet Union is a policeman just like the USA. We couldn't agree with that, as the Soviet Union will always remain the Soviet Union. The fundamental difference between the Soviet Union and the USA, between socialist and capitalist society, remains, even when the Soviet Union maintains relations with the USA. As you see, there are differences of opinion about the relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese say that Soviet support for Vietnam just seems to be support. But only the Vietnamese comrades can assess that. A third party is not entitled to make judgments. Vietnamese questions have to be solved by the Vietnamese comrades themselves. The Vietnamese party is an autonomous party that has extensive experience in the fight against imperialism. It has developed its own strategy and tactics. They are capable of judging the real character of support. The Vietnamese comrades are very grateful towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for their support.

There have been differences of opinion with the Chinese previously, when they propagated the theory of the "intermediate zone." Certainly one can define the young nation states as an intermediate zone, but when the Chinese declare all capitalist countries except the USA as part of the intermediate zone, even West Germany, we cannot agree with that. On that question they didn't communicate directly with us, but sent Grippa. We cannot understand this Chinese position and don't know according to which Marxist-Leninist principles they reached that position.

Comrade Hager said that such Marxist-Leninist principles do not exist.

Comrade Kim Il Sung replied: That is correct. There are also other questions, e.g. the question of revolution. We will support every revolution if conditions have matured. However, a revolution without pre-existing conditions is just damaging for the cause of revolution. There are many more questions where we don't agree with them, e.g. India and Indonesia. Therefore they say they have tactical differences of opinion with us, but they want to fight with us against imperialism. We will not destroy our alliance with the Chinese by our own initiative. Relations between China and us, between Vietnam and China are an important question in Asia. We therefore hold the opinion that the European comrades should understand well the conditions we have in Asia and reflect on them thoroughly. You may want to consider all of that when making your decisions. We haven't insulted the Moscow conference and didn't say a word about the Budapest [meeting], and we don't regard it as bad when the comrades come together and have conferences. We ask you to report to Comrade Walter Ulbricht that from Asia maybe only the Indian party might join, though it cannot represent Asia. It is possible the conference will be a European conference, because the Asian parties won't join.

Nevertheless we will continuously strive for the consolidation of the friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, in particular for the friendship between our two parties and countries.

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27 April 1968. Appendix II. Information Report, „Conversation with Comrade Pak Song-ch'ol During the Dinner of April 9, 1968.”

[...]

4.) He [Bak Seongcheol] described the capture of the ship *Pueblo*. He enumerated the events which had taken place from the capture up to now. The action was allegedly carried out by [only] 5 Korean soldiers. He spoke about the military steps of the USA. Then he informed us [a HSWP CC delegation headed by Árpád Pullai] about the course of the secret negotiations. At present the negotiations have gotten stuck, for the Americans do not want to apologize, it is difficult for them to do so. They bring up various pretexts, and they keep threatening [the DPRK] with reprisals. For the time being they (the Koreans) stick rigidly to their conditions.

5.) The subject of the support and economic assistance given to the Third World also cropped up. At first he made critical remarks, saying that [the aid] provided by the socialist countries was not sufficient. He criticized that credit was insufficient, commercial prices were high, and the quality of goods was poor. „True, this is an idealist and unfeasible [idea],” he said, „but if the one billion people [living in the Communist countries] worked 1 hour more and one appropriated the value thus produced for the support of the Third World, it would be a great assistance.”

Following this, when [secretary of the HSWP CC] Comrade Pullai remarked that there were also other substantial problems – e.g., the insufficient use [of aid], our decentralized assistance and the efforts [of the Communist countries] to outbid each other, and so on –, he illustrated with examples of his own that there were indeed many other, real difficulties. He criticized the excessive and swaggering pretensions, the issue of the construction of stadiums and hotels, and [the fact] that in these countries people simply did not want to work. It is not only facilities that they ask for but also labor. As a consequence, in a certain country a porcelain factory that they (the Koreans) sold on credit cost £100,000 instead of £50,000. He agreed with that there were a lot of unreal demands, and in some countries one could also notice that the leaders had become corrupt. Finally he argued that some caution was absolutely justified and the opportunities of the socialist countries were not unlimited.

6.) He inquired about the Czechoslovak events. Comrade Pullai set forth some main characteristics. He expounded that anxiety was justified but the Czechoslovak party was an experienced [party] and it seemed that it had the situation under control. Our task is to trust it and provide it with support. A long discussion evolved, during which Bak Seongcheol harped on the same superficial aspects, and exasperatedly criticized the problems mentioned by the press organs and the other media. With the usual Korean self-assurance, he censured the absence of the leading role of the Party, the insufficient use of the coercive side of proletarian dictatorship, and the weakness of ideological educational work in Czechoslovakia. His argumentation then shifted toward the praise of ideological educational work and of human consciousness, [describing the latter as] the sole redeeming [power]. He cited known examples so as to demonstrate that a self-conscious man could overcome any obstacle. Both in this respect and in the entire conversation the simplification of questions, and the resulting Korean self-satisfaction with that in the

DPRK a right policy was pursued with regard to the basic issues, strongly manifested themselves. Due to the calm reasoning of Comrade Pullai and the description of the problems, Bak Seongcheol composed himself, and his final conclusion was that the Czechoslovak events were the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak comrades and hopefully they would straighten them out. [...]

István Kádas
(ambassador)

Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 2, 002374/1968.
Translated by Balázs Szalontai

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27 April 1968. Appendix V. Information Report, Comrade Pullai's Visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung."

Following the April 9-10 discussions between the delegations of the HSWP CC and the KWP CC, on the 10th [of April] at 5.30 p.m. Comrade Kim Il Sung, the General Secretary of the KWP CC, received the Hungarian party delegation in the building of the KWP CC.

The following persons were present: Árpád Pullai, a secretary of the HSWP CC; András Gyenes, the deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the HSWP CC; the members of the Hungarian party delegation; and Bak Seongcheol, a member of the Political Committee of the KWP CC; Kim Yeongnam, the deputy head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the KWP CC; the members of the Korean party delegation; and – at the invitation of the Koreans – Ambassador István Kádas, and embassy officials Lajos Karsai and Sándor Etre.

[...]

By way of introduction, Comrade Kim Il Sung said thanks for the visit of the Hungarian party delegation and the information it gave about the consultative meeting the fraternal parties had held in Budapest, and emphasized that he had nothing to add to what had already been expounded during the bilateral (Hungarian-Korean) discussions on that subject.

[...]

„Over here the internal situation is not bad but good,” Comrade Kim Il Sung went on.

Spring agricultural work has begun and it is coming on fine. However, it would come in useful if there was more rainfall. The lack of rainfall is an impediment for industry as well. There are not enough thermal power stations yet, and the power generation of hydroelectric power plants is influenced by the amount of water and waterfall. We have other difficulties too, but we reckon that we will be able to fulfill the economic plan we set ourselves. That is, in this respect our situation is not bad.

In every socialist country there are difficulties of this or that kind, and we are not exceptions to this rule either. We consider this natural, however. We think that these difficulties are the difficulties of development and growth, which can be solved and we will indeed solve them. That is, our situation is not bad in this respect either.

The American imperialists made a fuss and noise about the *Pueblo* incident, but this has also abated by now. They threatened [us] with that they would bomb Wonsan and they would either forcefully rescue the captured ship or destroy it. By now they have desisted from that, for we told them that we were not afraid of their threats and we would retaliate on them for their retaliations. And what was the result? It was that negotiations started in Panmunjeom. We are negotiating with the Americans about the way of the release of the ship, which violated our sovereignty and was captured by us, and its crew.

The DPRK has only one demand: the USA should apologize for the violation of law it committed. If it is unwilling to do so, it will not get back either the ship or its crew. We have been feeding and providing for the ship's crew for over two months. We will make them work off the expenses we appropriated for that. Of course, the negotiations are still going on. For the time being one cannot predict their final result. It seems that the USA sets a too high value on its Great Power prestige, and this is why it does not want to apologize to us. But our determination is just and firm: if the USA does not apologize, we will not give back anything. After all, it was not a ship of the DPRK that was spying along the coasts of the USA but the other way around. Now we are studying what sort of qualifications the various members of the crew of the captured ship have and what sort of useful work we can make them do, for we are treating them all too well.

[...]

We should never lose sight of one thing: the imperialists use tactics, they plot against us, against all of us, against every force of socialism, they mindlessly arm themselves. In Europe every country save Germany is united and unpartitioned. In Asia the situation is different. In Europe the imperialists attack with so-called peaceful, political methods, with Cold War methods, whereas in Asia they use mainly the tactic of open armed actions and threats. Of course, in Asia they also attack with political methods, not only with arms. They have only one aim all over the world, namely, to subjugate the peoples.

In our case (in Korea) the imperialists use the tactic of armed threats. The US troops are in South Korea, ready to fling themselves at us. An open armed imperialist aggression is going on against the Vietnamese people. Jiang Jieshi is also inciting [the Chinese population] from Taiwan, he is doing his best to take advantage of the chaotic state of affairs in China. Recently they [the Taiwanese] have dropped a very high number of agents behind [Chinese] lines, and it is very much to be feared that in China events will degenerate into an armed confrontation.

As for the anti-Mao Zedong forces in China, one should see that these forces are partly indeed local forces, but partly they are external forces sent there and hired by the [clique of] Jiang Jieshi [Chang Kai-shek], and they mix with each other. In our view, at present we [the Communist countries] cannot afford to harp on the mistakes or faults of each other. On the contrary, we are obliged to help each other with every available means and in every form, and to reinforce the anti-imperialist fighting spirit in each other. On the basis of this opinion, we do our best to reinforce the strength, cooperation, and unity of the socialist camp.

[...]

István

Kádas

(ambassador)

Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 2, 002374/1968.

Translated by Balázs Szalontai



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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E X D I S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *pn* NARA, Date 10-13-98

FOR BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. TWO WEEKS AFTER THE HONOLULU MEETING OF THE TWO PRESIDENTS, IT IS POSSIBLE TO ASSESS ITS EFFECT IN KOREA. IF THERE IS NO PRONOUNCED, OR EVEN NOTICEABLE CHANGE IN KOREAN THINKING AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING, IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE TOP ECHELON, ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT PARK, DERIVED A CONSIDERABLE SENSE OF ACHIEVEMENT FROM IT. DRAWING THEIR INSPIRATION FROM THE TOP LEVELS HERE AS USUAL, PRESS AND PUBLIC ALIKE SEEM TO FEEL CONSIDERABLY REASSURED IN THE EVER-VITAL MATTERS OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THIS COUNTRY, AND THE SENSITIVITY OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO THEIR PROBLEMS. AS THIS IS THE EFFECT WE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 6043E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WERE STRIVING TO ACHIEVE, SUCCESS OF THE MEETING SEEMS CLEAR.

2. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT SUCH SUCCESSES HAVE ANY PERMANENT CHARACTER. IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THIS PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS TO REQUIRE ASSURANCES AND GESTURES PERIODICALLY, AND THIS WILL BE ESPECIALLY TRUE WHILE NORTH KOREAN PRESSURE IS MAINTAINED, AND WHILE CANDIDATES FOR U.S. PRESIDENCY DISCUSS SOLUTIONS FOR VIET-NAM PROBLEM IN TERMS WHICH CAUSE UNEASINESS HERE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF FREE ASIA.

Authority *Group 4*
By *ax* NARA, Date 1-26-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State

600
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SEOUL 06043 020934Z

3. THE FACT OF A DAY-LONG MEETING OF AMERICAN AND KOREAN PRESIDENTS WOULD HAVE ITS OWN CONSIDERABLE IMPACT HERE, BUT THIS WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY A COMMUNIQUE AT HONOLULU WHICH PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR ROK GOVERNMENT IN MATTERS OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT--CERTAINLY THE AREAS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO THE KOREAN PRESIDENT. PARK IS SAID TO BE IN SOMETHING OF A GLOW ABOUT THIS, AND IF THAT IS TRUE IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE

PAGE 3 RUALOS 6043E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BECAUSE NO ONE ACCUSES HIM OF GIVING ANYTHING IN RETURN. EVEN THE OPPOSITION, NOT NOTED FOR ITS PERCEPTION OR OBJECTIVITY, FEELS REQUIRED TO STAND PUBLICLY ON THE POSITION THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED NOTHING NEW, OR WAS MORE OR LESS THE SAME AS PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS. THIS IS HARDLY POLITICAL FARE TO AROUSE THE INTEREST, OR THE FEARS, OF THE KOREAN PUBLIC.

4. IN ROKG EYES, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE COUNTRY, IE. FIFTY THOUSAND TROOPS TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM HAS FOUND CLEAR EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN APPRECIATION IN THIS BILATERAL MEETING, PLACING AMERICAN/ROK RELATIONS ON THE SPECIAL PLANE THE ROKS THINK THEY MERIT. WHAT THE OTHER ALLIES THINK OF THIS IS OF LITTLE CONCERN TO ROKS AS LONG AS PROPER INFERENCE IS DRAWN HERE--AND ROKG HAS SEEN TO THAT. THE VIETNAMESE, THAIS AND AUSTRALIANS MAY NOW PROCEED SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY TO WASHINGTON, BUT THE ROKS HAVE HAD THEIR DAY WITH OUR PRESIDENT AND THEY APPRECIATE IT.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 6043E ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GP-4.

PORTER

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Approved For Release 1999/10/22 : NLJ-001-256-1-15-3 PRIORITY

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Intelligence Information Cable IN-03501

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STATE/INR	DIA	NNCC/MC	ISSECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/DMC	NIC	NSA	DDI	ONE	CRS
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

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DIST 3 MAY 1968

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COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA


DDI: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA'S INTENTION TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREA AND THUS DIVERT AMERICAN POWER AWAY FROM VIETNAM

ACQ:

SOURCE:

25X1X



SUMMARY: NORTH KOREA CANNOT TRAIN ZAPU UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CANDIDATES AT THIS TIME BECAUSE IT EXPECTS TO BE IN A STATE OF WAR SOON. NORTH

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Authority NLJ-001-256-001/15

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

By yc, NARA, Date 5-7-01

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~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

KOREA INTENDS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH KOREA SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE OPENING OF "SERIOUS" NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. THE NORTH KOREANS BELIEVE THE AMERICANS WILL SHIFT A LARGE PORTION OF THEIR MILITARY POWER TO KOREA TO PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AND THUS WEAKEN ITS POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI. END OF SUMMARY.

25X1X

1. ETHAN DUBE, TOP ZAPU INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, TRAVELED TO NORTH KOREA IN MID-APRIL ON A NORTH KOREAN TRAVEL GRANT TO DISCUSS NORTH KOREAN TRAINING OF ZAPU UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CANDIDATES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ZAPU ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL EDWARD NDLOHUVU VISITED NORTH KOREA LAST MAY AND NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA TO TRAIN 18 ZAPU MEN. ZAPU ACTING PRESIDENT JAMES ROBERT CHIKEREMA HAD ASKED THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TRAINEES TO "40 OR 50".

2. DUBE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH A "HIGH-LEVEL OFFICER" IN THE NORTH KOREAN PREMIER'S OFFICE ON 22 APRIL.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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IN-03501

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COMMENT: THE NORTH KOREAN OFFICER WAS NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.)

3. THE NORTH KOREAN SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TRAIN THE ZAPU MEN AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTED VERY SOON TO BE IN A "STATE OF WAR". DUBE SAID HE PRESSED THIS POINT BY ASKING IF THE NORTH KOREANS EXPECTED WAR TO RESULT FROM THE PUEBLO AFFAIR. THE KOREAN OFFICER SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT FIGHT OVER THE PUEBLO. HOWEVER, HE SAID IT WAS A CERTAINTY THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FIGHT TO PROTECT SOUTH KOREA.

4. THE NORTH KOREAN THEN TOLD DUBE THAT NORTH KOREA INTENDED TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREA MILITARILY JUST AS "SERIOUS" NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES BEGIN. THIS MOVE WILL DIVERT AMERICAN MILITARY POWERS FROM VIETNAM, FRIGHTEN THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, AND STRENGTHEN NORTH VIETNAM'S NEGOTIATING POSITION.

THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO TRAIN THE

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IN-03501

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PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

ZAPU MEN AFTER CURRENT TENSIONS EASED.

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25X1A 6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE CINCPACAFSA (ALSO SENT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAIGON) CINPAC, ARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF..

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Approved For Release 1999/10/22 : NLJ-001-256-1-15-3

Record of conversation between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin with the ambassador of the DPRK in Moscow Ten Du Hwan.

[AVPRF, fond 102, opis 28, papka 25, delo 2. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko]

May 6, 1968

Ten Du Hwan passed greetings and the text of the reply telegram for L.I. Brezhnev and A.N.Kosygin with Kim Il Sung's thank you note for congratulations on his 56th birthday.

Then the ambassador said that he was glad to have been appointed for work in the Soviet Union, which is the liberator and the war friend of Korea, in the period when relations of friendship and co-operation between the 2 parties, governments and peoples are strengthening. This was to a great extent facilitated by the mutual visits of the heads of both countries. He remarked that Kim Il Sung, before the ambassador's departure for Moscow, gave him the instruction to work in the direction of all-around strengthening of the traditional Korean-Soviet friendship.

Ten Du Hwan briefly spoke about the situation in the DPRK. He emphasized that after the incident with the American spy ship *Pueblo* the situation in the Korean peninsula region had become rather tense, the US and the South Koreans are resorting to blackmail, provocations, they are hastily preparing for a new war.

Provocations became especially frequent after the talks between Johnson and Park Chung Hee. According the press reports, the people of South Korea, inspired by the successes of the DPRK, are conducting an energetic military struggle against the puppet regime of Park Chung Hee. In the beginning of this year, a group of South Korean guerrillas undertook an attempt to attack the residence of Park Chung Hee. This year on April 30 there was a raid of the Seoul Telegraph, as a result of which the work of the Telegraph was temporarily paralysed.

The Japanese militarists contribute to the heightening of tensions on the peninsula. Because of them, talks between the Red Crosses of DPRK and Japan regarding the repatriation of the Korean citizens resident in Japan broke up twice. The Japanese authorities are increasing their penetration of South Korea, they are entering into an ever closer conspiracy with the South Korean puppets: the Japanese militarists are preparing plans for war against the DPRK.

The main position of the DPRK government on the question of peaceful unification of the country remains unchanged. However, in light of the increasing danger of war, the DPRK is facing the task of defending the gains of socialism. That's why construction in the country is proceeding simultaneously in the economic and military fields. Successes in this regard are the result of wise leadership of the party and consistent implementation of the spirit of independence and self-reliance (juche).

The Korean people, fully and wholly supporting the political programme of the DPRK government, presented by comrade Kim Il Sung at the session of the Supreme People's Council of the DPRK in December of 1967, is achieving successes in the field of economic construction.

The plan of the first quarter of the current year has been successfully implemented. However, in the metallurgic industry, because of the shortage of coke, certain difficulties have emerged.

Considering the tense conditions in Korea and Asia, the government of the DPRK is striving to develop and strengthen co-operation between the DPRK and the USSR.

A.N. Kosygin thanked [the ambassador] for greetings conveyed from comrade Kim Il Sung, for his reply telegram and for the report made by the ambassador regarding the situation in Korea.

A.N. Kosygin remarked that the content of this report regarding the situation in Korea is accessible to all, we receive similar information from press reports. The difficulty of the situation on the Korean peninsula is understood in the Soviet Union, and developments are watched closely. However, we are not aware of the considerations and plans of the DPRK government with regard to the further development of events. This makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to provide the DPRK support in the international plane and, in particular, in international organizations. The Soviet comrades are compelled to only use materials published in the open press. Evidently, the Korean comrades have their own considerations on this account.

A.N. Kosygin asked the ambassador to tell comrade Kim Il Sung that we would like full trust and frankness in our relations. As far as we are concerned, we always acted like this before, and we are acting like this now. We do not have secrets from you, and we tell you everything frankly. In the Soviet Union we understand the difficulties, which arose in the DPRK as a result of the decrease in supplies from China, of coke in particular. The Soviet Union is doing the best it can to relieve the economic difficulties of the DPRK. For example, we send coke to the DPRK even from the Donbass basin, even though the cost of transportation in this case is greater than the cost of coal itself.

However, big difficulties arise when the Soviet coal is unloaded in the DPRK. Sometimes over 2000 train cars are stuck on the Soviet border, and they are stuck there because the Korean side cannot unload them on time.

The Soviet side is planning on continuing economic co-operation with the DPRK in the future. In the near future we will look into the question of sending [Deputy Head of Council of Ministers] V.N. Novikov to Pyongyang to participate in the work of the 2nd session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Korean consultative committee for economic, scientific and technological questions.

A.N. Kosygin asked to tell Kim Il Sung that we remember talks with him in the Soviet Union, when question of Soviet-Korean and inter-party relations were frankly discussed. A.N. Kosygin stressed that the spirit of frankness remains the main thing in the Soviet-Korean relations.

In conclusion, comrade A.N. Kosygin asked to convey greetings to Kim Il Sung, Tsoi En Gen, Kim Il and other Korean leaders from comrades L.I. Brezhnev and N.V. Podgorny.

Ten Du Hwan thanked for the greetings, said that they will be conveyed as addressed. [He] thanked for the understanding of difficulties, which the DPRK is going through. [He] expressed his confidence that during the period of his work in Moscow, the Soviet government will co-operate with him.

Member of the Kollegia of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR V.I. Likhachev, counsellor of the Korean embassy Kan Cher Gyn, 3rd secretary Kim Ze Rok were present at the meeting. The conversation was recorded by the attaché of the Department of Far Eastern Affairs of the Soviet Foreign Ministry V. Gorovoi.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET



TO : COLONEL LINDJORD
FROM : WINSTON LORD *W*
SUBJECT: Korean Policy

DATE: May 7, 1968

I have attempted in the attached paper to sketch what seems to me to be our best longer term policy for Korea. It is purposely in broad brush strokes so as to get at "the big picture." I have only touched upon specific US actions, which Steadman treats, and the details of other countries' roles, which Bleiman addresses. I agree with most of what they say and find their views generally consistent with my overall approach toward a reunified, neutral Korea. As Steadman rightly notes, we will have to play much of the tactics of Korean policy by ear. In doing so, however, we should continually keep in mind the strategic score.

Attachment
A/S

SECRET



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TOWARD A REUNIFIED, NEUTRAL KOREA

1. Introduction

In weighing our Korean policy for the next decade we can foresee three identifiable phases, the immediate, the short term culminating in the 1971 elections, and the longer term running through the remainder of the 1970s. Naturally these periods will overlap and US courses of action during the next ten years must develop coherently. Also there are several other countries with important stakes in Korea whose attitudes and policies will shape our own, thus making longer term projections of US policy hazardous. Nevertheless, given certain assumptions, we can lay out a broad strategic approach that would evolve consistently through each of the phases and lead toward liquidation of the remaining World War II Asian problem on a basis that would protect the interests of the US and the other countries principally involved.

2. US Involvement

A brief listing of the important US interests is in order, especially in the current developing mood of American neo-isolationism. We have made substantial investments in South Korea for twenty years. The Korean War took a heavy toll of American lives, dollars, and emotions. We have made a determined post-war effort to protect and build up the country, with remarkable success. Our firm public commitments, continued stationing of combat troops, and ample military and economic assistance have combined to maintain the security of the ROK and help produce economic achievements that are as heartening to us as they are nettling to the North Koreans. We are looking toward the termination of economic assistance à la Taiwan. The ROK has been a steady, if occasionally prickly, ally. Its relative contribution to the Vietnam War effort is unexcelled, economic compensations notwithstanding.

In brief, our expenditures and successes in Korea cry out against the jeopardies of precipitate disengagement, a course that will be urged by some as part of a global retrenchment spinning out of our Vietnamese frustrations. This does not mean we should not attempt to disengage from Korea in the coming decade. It does mean that any such disengagement must be carefully structured, fully coordinated with the ROK, and constantly measured against the intentions and actions of the other influential powers.

3. Major Interested Countries

There are six countries with significant stakes in Korea, three on "each side." These countries pair off logically in terms of direct interest and national power. There are first of all North and South Korea, each secure defensively and impotent offensively on its own. Then there are the global powers, the USSR and US, who have played major supporting roles and share the desire to check provocative sallies by their clients which might lead to great

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power involvement. Finally there are the two leading Asian nations, China and Japan, who have the most direct outside interests and share a security need for a Korean buffer in the 1970s while they sort out their own crucial bilateral relationship.

4. Longer Term Korean Solution

In this six power context reunification on either sides' terms is out of the question politically and impossible militarily so long as the outside powers do not provide either Korea with a sustained offensive capability. We could therefore end up a decade from now with a continued partition of Korea: an amicable division with North and South Korea acquiescing seems improbable; a continued hostile division is more likely, but undesirable because it would represent open-ended tension and expense.

This leads us to the most desirable solution: a reunified, neutral Korea. The difficulties and dangers of reaching such an outcome by 1980 are manifest. However, the objective is not unrealistic if the following conditions are brought about.

North and South Korea must be made to realize that the peninsula will never be reunified on either sides' terms. They must be faced with the choice of either continued expensive partition or reunification on a strictly neutral basis, enjoying the political and economic strength of a united country. The latter option should be more attractive for the Koreans. Even today there are indications in both the North and South of independence and impatience with their patrons. Such signs could be forerunners of the type of forces presently at work in a divided Europe.

The US and USSR must first agree that continued military assistance to the Koreans is for defensive capabilities only and then work toward scaling down such assistance. This should make economic and security sense to us both. The big question mark would be Soviet competition with China for influence in the Communist world, but this problem is manageable if either North Korea pursues an Independent line and/or the post-Mao Chinese leadership is more cooperative with the USSR.

Japan and China have comparable stakes in Korea. The Chinese emphatically demonstrated their concern when they intervened in 1951 against UN forces pushing toward the Yalu. Japan must more fully recognize its own security interests in the peninsula; it must provide any needed counterweight in the South to Chinese influence in the North as we and the USSR scale down our roles. Geography and extensive economic links make Korea a natural priority for Japan as it plays a larger Asian role. One can count on the nationalistic distrust of North Korea for China and South Korea for Japan to prevent domination by either outside power. Indeed such forces might serve to impel the two halves of the country toward one another. Japan and China in turn, in their search for an overall modus vivendi in Asia and increased commercial exchanges, should be able to settle upon a neutral Korean pivot.

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5. Caveats

There are some obvious complications. The above pairing of countries is conveniently oversimplified, there being a host of other interacting bilateral and multilateral relationships among the six. Important factors include the nature of China's post-war leadership, Chinese relations with us and the USSR, US-USSR post-Vietnam cooperation, and Japan's view of its Asian role. Assumptions concerning these factors include the projections that China does not need to gobble up Korea and can be effectively dissuaded from trying by the other five powers; the USSR and US share a common interest in removing Korean tensions; and Japan will shoulder greater Asian and Korean responsibilities. These assumptions appear realistic.

These elements dictate caution on our part, but they do not obscure the basic facts that:

- a) maintenance of the status quo or a reunified, neutral Korea are the two most realistic objectives for the next decade; and
- b) working toward the latter is preferable to standing on the former.

6. US Actions

In heading for a reunified, neutral Korea we will have to move carefully through the three phases mentioned at the outset of this paper. In brief, our policy emphasis in the immediate stage should be one of reassurance; during the short term one of preparation, especially of the ROK and Japan, for movement toward a united, independent country; and during the longer term one of progress toward this objective, in conjunction with adversaries and allies alike.

This paper will happily avoid the details of American actions during these periods, but a few highlights can be noted. The immediate phase will probably be measured in months and therefore essentially falls outside the scope of the Korean study. It will be a period of continued ROK uneasiness because of North Korean belligerence and negotiations over Vietnam. This is no time to be talking of a neutral Korea or suggesting rapid US disengagement. It is a time for underlining our Korean commitments (without enlarging them and boxing ourselves in) and keeping the ROK as fully involved as possible in our Vietnamese negotiations. It may even call for more vigorous replies by the allies to North Korean provocations so as to avoid miscalculations about American will.

This phase will meld into the short term period which should witness a phasing down of the Vietnamese conflict and our involvement there, the return of ROK forces from Vietnam, and the 1971 Korean elections. Our preparatory actions in the next few years will be most delicate, perhaps even painful. They would include a reduction of US combat forces, coupled with a) wholehearted support for a ROK indigenous capability for defensive, but not offensive, operations against North Korea and b) a US nuclear posture that remains credible to the Chinese, though perhaps somewhat less provocatively deployed. During this phase we must urge Japan to take on much greater responsibilities in Korea. And we shall have to make clear to the ROK and Japan our long term objective.

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Thus to get ready for the longer term phase, we would strive to build a South Korean base that would include a sturdy defense, continued economic growth, post-election political stability, a larger Japanese role, and allied understanding of our longer term policy. From this base we could proceed with confidence to explore with our adversaries the possibilities of one, unaligned country. This will most tricky and we must avoid wishful thinking. However, it should be possible to convince the three other outside powers that such a solution would serve their national interests and to persuade the two Koreas that they have no better alternative.

7. Conclusion

The prospects for South Korean political stability and economic growth are basically good. The ROK defensive establishment is strong and will be bolstered by the return of well-equipped Vietnam veterans. We should have the means to compensate for reductions in the number of our combat troops stationed in the country. With sufficient reassurance during the immediate period of tension, and careful preparation of the ROK and Japan in the next few years, we should therefore have a solid foundation on which to discuss with the communists the goal of one independent Korea. If our adversaries are not interested in such a solution, this solid foundation will continue to underpin the integrity of the southern half of the divided peninsula.

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15 MAY 1968: South Korean Government's Position Regarding the Current Status of the Closed Panmunjum Meetings of the Military Armistice Commission's Chief Delegate Regarding the Pueblo Incident.

The government of the Republic of Korea wishes to make its position clear again with respect to the present situation of the close meeting between the chief delegates of the Military Armistice Commission about the USS Pueblo incident.

1. It is known that the North Korean Puppet Regime made a demand to the United States for a document of "apologies and definite promises" as a prerequisite for the generous treatment of the crew of the USS Pueblo. Moreover, it is known that the North Korean Puppet Regime presented the United States a document with a form of statement that they will accept as a document of "proper apologies and definite promises." What the North Korean Puppet Regime demanded to the United States in the previous meeting is the same as the document that the North Korean Puppet Regime demanded to the United States in the case of the "helicopter incident."
2. The impudent seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Korean Puppet Regime sharpened the sense of the Republic of Korea people to preserve the national glory of its closest sworn friend.
3. The augustness, dignity and glory of the Republic of Korea and those of the United States are inseparably related to each other when they come to the aggressive actions by the North Korean Puppet Regime.

Recognizing this, the government of the Republic of Korea reminds that the United States promised it definitely on April 26, 1968 that the United States would not sign a document of the kind of the "helicopter incident" case for the release of the American crew. The government of the Republic of Korea requests the United States government to maintain firm stand against the North Korean Puppet Regime, through close and successive consultations between the two governments, to release the USS Pueblo and her crew quickly in an honorable way.

Seoul

May 15, 1968

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16 May 1968

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.2-68

The Likelihood of Major Hostilities in Korea

Submitted by

[Signature]
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Created in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Authenticated on

16 May 1968

Authenticated

[Signature]
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY USIB

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THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN KOREA

CONCLUSIONS

A. We believe that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War.

B. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to apply its own version of the doctrine of "peoples' war": to provoke incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the South in hopes of creating a situation which would, in time, shake the ROK Government's control of the nation.

C. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ; e.g., it might attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

D. Hence, in the short term, the principal danger is that of miscalculation; i.e., that the North Koreans will press so hard that Seoul will order large-scale retaliation. In this case, Pyongyang would be likely to respond with commensurate force, and there would be an increasing chance of escalation into major hostilities.

DISCUSSION

1. The seizure of the *Pueblo* and the attack on the presidential mansion in Seoul, both in late January 1968, were followed by a period of relative quiet. Since mid-April, however, North Korean harassment and infiltration in the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has intensified, and it appears that saboteurs have again been active in Seoul. With the advent of favorable weather, we expect guerrilla teams to begin moving down the coasts of South Korea in a

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renewed effort to establish bases in the mountainous hinterland. On the propaganda front, the bellicose line adopted by North Korean Premier Kim Il-song at the October 1966 Korean Labor Party Conference has been maintained, with somewhat greater truculence since the *Pueblo* incident. It is apparent, therefore, that we are entering another cycle of North Korea's campaign of violence and intimidation against the ROK.

2. We have reviewed the available evidence and concluded once again that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War. This judgment rests in part on our view of how North Korea would assess its prospects in a new war. Despite the emphasis on modernizing its armed forces, on training reserves and increasing local militia, and on the protection of key installations against air attack, Pyongyang almost certainly would not expect to overrun South Korea or to escape serious damage in the North. The ROK Army is superior in numbers; Pyongyang would almost certainly consider that the presence of US forces virtually assured their participation and their reinforcement if necessary; and North Korea itself would require material support, and probably manpower, from China or the USSR.¹ Thus, any plans for a deliberate attack leading to a renewal of the Korean War would require the assurance of support from the USSR, China, or both. Under present circumstances, it is extremely doubtful that Pyongyang would receive any assurances in advance from either Communist power that the support required for a large-scale conflict in South Korea would be available.

3. More directly, we do not see indications of preparations of the nature and scope we would expect to see if North Korea were planning war or expected it in the near future. There is, for example, no evidence—in this nation of chronic shortages—of unusually large imports of food or medicines, or other unusual international transactions. There have been rumors of increased draft calls, mobilization of reserves, unusual troop movements and deployments, and the buildup of stockpiles near the DMZ, but none of these or similar indicators of impending large-scale action are supported by reliable evidence. The "war is coming" tone of letters from North Korea to Japan appears to reflect official propaganda; such letters almost certainly suit the regime's purposes since all outgoing mail is carefully censored. Finally, if North Korea were planning a surprise attack, it would seem unwise to foment tension and keep the ROK and the US on the alert.

4. Nor do we believe that the North Koreans are trying to provoke the ROK into a resumption of major hostilities. Pyongyang might hope thus to activate its defense treaties with China and the USSR, and also to avoid condemnation by world opinion. But we do not believe that the North Korean leaders would expect either the USSR or Communist China to cooperate in a "counterattack" that could overrun the South.

¹ See Annex: North and South Korean Forces.

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5. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to create the conditions for a "peoples' war" in South Korea. We also believe that Pyongyang currently rates the risks of this enterprise as not very high. The North Koreans probably view the US involvement in Vietnam and the resultant discord in the US as limiting the military capabilities and the will of the US to support any serious ROK retaliatory ventures against the North. US restraint in the *Pueblo* affair probably strengthened this view, and North Korean intelligence probably has a reasonably accurate picture of Washington's pressures on the ROK to forgo strong retaliatory measures in the Blue House and other affairs.

6. Thus, Pyongyang probably feels reasonably safe in creating incidents along the DMZ and in carrying out terrorist attacks throughout South Korea. These serve to give some credence at home to its claims of "imperialist aggression" and a developing resistance movement in the South. Pyongyang also intends them to embarrass and distract the ROK Government and to cause a loss of confidence in its leaders which could, in time, loosen their control of the nation. Meanwhile, these actions have caused some misunderstanding and strains between the ROK and the US.

7. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ. It might, for example, attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. We do not entirely rule out such actions. They would depend on how Pyongyang judged the probable reactions of the US and ROK. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves as too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory.

8. Kim's present course of action vis-a-vis South Korea dates from 1966, although some indications of long-range preparations for intensified action were visible earlier. After several years of economic difficulty at home and consistent failure to capitalize on political unrest in the South, the frustrated Kim attempted to inject some dynamism into his regime by securing tighter control over the government and driving the population to greater efforts in its behalf. He seems to have succeeded in pruning much of what he considered deadwood from the government, the party, the military, and the economy; a series of low-keyed purges has reduced his leadership group to a handful of trusted comrades; and Kim has demanded and is receiving personal adulation on an unprecedented scale.


9. Public participation in the regime's many new programs has been fostered (along with acceptance of hardships) by nationalistic exhortations to prepare for "the foremost revolutionary task"—i.e., a Communist takeover of the South and reunification on Pyongyang's terms. In Kim's doctrine, the success of the revolutionary struggle in the South requires parallel efforts to build up the revolutionary base in the North, to improve its economy so that it will impress the southerners, and to strengthen its defense against the day when reactionary forces in the South, in desperation, strike northward. It is apparent that to make this line credible requires, at a minimum, some evidence of revolutionary struggle in the South and a demonstrably aggressive enemy along the DMZ. War tensions

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
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is a relatively young man; he appears to be in firm control in the North; and his hard-line views are likely to hold sway there for many years. Of critical importance will be the ability of the ROK people over the years to stand united against Communist subversion, and the ability of ROK forces to cope effectively with North Korean harassments. ROK confidence in the face of these long-term threats will depend heavily on the US posture in the Far East.



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ANNEX

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES

1. The North Korean Army has a strength of about 345,000. It is probably at full strength, with a larger proportion in combat units than US/ROK forces have. North Korean troops are disciplined, highly trained, and alert. By their standards they are probably combat-ready. We do not know to what extent, if any, their heavy ground equipment is currently being replaced or augmented by the Soviets. With the exception of assault rifles and some new rockets, Soviet-designed weapons of World War II continue to predominate. Present stockpiles appear sufficient to support offensive action for at least a month.

2. The South Korean Army has some 532,000 personnel and the marine force numbers about 31,500. Of the total forces, some 50,000 are in Vietnam. ROK units are limited by old equipment, shortages of spare parts, and very austere supply levels. The two US divisions in Korea are under strength and not rated as having attained combat-ready status.

3. On balance, we estimate that neither side has the ability to conduct a sustained attack (i.e., for six months) or achieve a decisive advantage without substantial outside logistical support.

4. The North Korean Air Force could provide a strong defense against air attack. It has some 450 jet fighters—380 Mig-15/17s, 7 Mig-19s, and at least 60 Mig-21s. Almost all of the Mig-21s have probably been delivered over the past two years. Over the past three years, the number of surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites has increased from 2 to 20. There are also 80 IL-28 jet light bombers, which, with its fighters, provide North Korea an offensive capability unmatched by the ROK Air Force. The ROKs have about 200 fighter aircraft, predominantly F-86s, but about 60 F-5 supersonic fighters have been introduced. The ROK Air Force has been heavily reinforced since the *Pueblo* incident by the basing of some 150 US supersonic jet fighters in South Korea.

5. The North Korean Navy is essentially a coastal patrol and inshore defense force. Its main offensive strength includes at least 4 "W"-class submarines, at least 7 "Komar"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and 3 "Shershen"-class fast patrol boats. The "Komars" and "Shershens" have probably been provided by the USSR over the past two years or so. North Korea also has 39 other motor torpedo boats, and there are at least 2 cruise missile coastal defense complexes. The ROK Navy is also primarily a coastal patrol force; it has about 60 ships, including 4 destroyer types, 6 fast attack transports, 10 mine-sweepers, 20 patrol ships, and 20 amphibious ships.

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5. "1st U.S.-ROK National Defense Cabinet Member Meeting, Washington D.C. 27-28 MAY 1968"

(section #: 729.21US 1968, record #: 2634)

28 MAY 1968: 1st U.S.-ROK National Defense Cabinet Member Meeting Joint Declaration.

JOINT STATEMENT

May 28, 1968
Washington

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1. The First Annual Defense Ministerial Meeting between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America was held in Washington from 27th to 28th May 1968 in accordance with the decision made at the meeting between Presidents Park Chung Hee and Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu on 17th and 18th April 1968. Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea Choi Young-hi and Secretary of Defense of the United States of America Clark M. Clifford led delegations representing their respective countries. They reviewed in the most friendly and cooperative atmosphere military situation in Korea and exchanged a wide range of views on matters of common interest and mutual concern in East Asia and the Pacific, including Vietnam.

KOREAN SITUATION

2. The two military leaders made extensive and careful examination of the grave situation created by the continuous and increasing illegal and overt aggressive acts of north Korean communists. They noted with serious concern the mounting military threats of the communists surrounding Korea including those of the north Korean communists. They agreed that recent communist acts of provocation constitute serious menace to the peace and

security not only of the Republic of Korea but also of the whole of that area, which, if not checked, can lead to renewed hostilities.

3. They agreed that, in view of the past experiences since the Korean war, the primary and the most essential prerequisites to the maintenance of peace are:

A resolute stand that aggression of whatever forms shall be met with corresponding punitive response; and

A powerful defense capability which can forestall such aggressive scheme.

Accordingly, they made an extensive analysis and appraisal of the current communist threats and discussed on measures which may effectively counter such threats. Also, they agreed that only an overwhelming military supremacy over the north Korean communist forces can deter the present aggressive scheme of the communists.

4. The two military leaders agreed that the future Annual Defense Ministerial Meetings between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America shall review the existing threats and consult each other with a view to deciding a level of the defense capabilities of the Republic of Korea which will be sufficient for prompt and effective response to such threats.

5. They reviewed measures being taken by the Korean Government for further strengthening its defense capability and the United States military assistance to the Republic of Korea, including modernization of

the Korean Armed Forces, improvement of their fire-power and supply of arms to the Homeland Reserve Forces, in accordance with spirit of the recent Honolulu Conference between Heads of the two States.

6. They exchanged views on principles and methods for effectively countering infiltration and espionage activities which north Korean communists are employing as means for indirect aggression short of overall attacks, and decided to develop details of such counter-measures.

7. The two military leaders agreed that Defense Ministerial Meeting will also be held whenever important situation arises threatening the security of Korea and its surrounding area, or a substantial change in the deployment of forces in Korea may take place..

VIETNAM SITUATION

8. Taking note of the successful military campaign in Vietnam by Korean and American Armed Forces, the two military leaders made a detailed review of military operations in Vietnam. Particularly, they noted with satisfaction that the enemy's so-called Tet offensive and recent successive attacks against Vietnamese cities in desperate attempt to conceal their repeated military defeats have met with complete failure.

9. They carefully reviewed the progress of talks which are presently underway in Paris, and agreed that the current talks and the partial suspension of bombing in north Vietnam shall not be utilized by the enemy

as a respite for their military reinforcement. They also reaffirmed that close and full consultations concerning negotiating developments will be made between the Republic of Korea and the United States at every stage of the talks, in the spirit of mutual cooperations which is demonstrated in the battlefields.

NEXT ANNUAL MEETING

10. The two defense leaders agreed that the Second Annual Defense Ministerial Meeting will be held in Seoul in 1969.

CONCLUSION

11. Minister Choi expressed his deep appreciation to Secretary Clifford and his staff for their courtesy and efficient works which brought this meeting to a successful conclusion.

**Report,
Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry**

[Source: XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 57. doboz, 1, 002815/1968. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai]

[...]

In the last 2-3 weeks the Romanian Ambassador and he ([Second Secretary Isidor] Urian) met Vietnamese comrades as many as three times. The head of the local NLF [National Liberation Front of South Vietnam] representation and his deputy summarized their opinion of the situation in Korea roughly as follows: the DPRK had missed the opportune moment; it seems that now they once again shelved the issue of liberating South Korea through armed struggle for quite a while. In addition to having missed the opportune moment, the reason for this is either that they have become aware of the balance of power between South and North [Korea] or that the Korean comrades have realized that for the time being the USA really does not want a new Vietnam in Korea; in general, and particularly since the Pueblo incident, there are intense defense preparations in the DPRK, and they take all contingencies into consideration; the army of the DPRK is being modernized; they already manufacture automobiles, tanks, and various light and heavy arms, including missiles, during which the Korean comrades are greatly hindered by the fact that the Soviet comrades do not provide them with all the documents that they need; for instance, this is why Korean tank production is still unable to solve the technical questions related to [the manufacture of] stabilizers for tank guns.

[...]

István Kádas
(ambassador)

**Political Report No. 21:
“Military Political Situation in the DPRK”**

[Source: Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, SM-023846/68, Translated by Vojtech Mastny.]

Pyongyang 04.06.68

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague

Military Political Situation in the DPRK

Political Report No. 21

Re: No. 21 of the Work Plan Prepared by M. Holub

Following the temporary relative relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula, which became particularly evident in March, a renewed deterioration of the situation was generally expected during the spring months. It was assumed that the political activity of South Korea abroad, which was aimed above all at obtaining guarantees by the United States for immediate support of the South in case of a conflict with the DPRK, and which accelerated the importation of modern armaments and the arming of the territorial defense forces in the South, would result in the DPRK, as well, in an escalation of military preparations for the unification of the country, which remains the main goal of the leadership here. This would naturally lead to an overall deterioration of the situation in Korea.

Developments in the second half of April conformed to these expectations. From the 14th to the 28th of April several incidents took place in the area south of the demarcation line, which reportedly made the so-called United Nations forces suffer the casualties of 9 dead and 11 wounded. The North Korean side does not report its own casualties. Most incidents took place in the sector held by the 2nd US Infantry Division in the western part of the demilitarized zone. The most serious incident was an attack on a vehicle of the United Nations forces that was accompanying a patrol to Panmunjom and the Swedish-Swiss camp, which took place in the immediate vicinity of the camp of the

Western members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission,--at a spot that cannot be reached from the South.

In April, there was also a grenade explosion in the building of the International Telecommunications Exchange in Seoul [...] Soviet friends have been showing impatience in this question [the continued holding of the *Pueblo*]. All friends realize that the DPRK's handling of the *Pueblo* affair has been reverberating against the DPRK's own interest. Soviet representatives have reportedly expressed openly their position along these lines to the Koreans. [...]

In the course of April and at the beginning of May all propaganda means of the DPRK continued to strive to generate the conviction that the Americans were going to provoke war at any time. As part of this propaganda, reports about incidents, even ones involving human casualties, were published that never occurred and the propaganda did not even try to prove them. During briefings about the April incidents, even the Minister of Foreign Affairs tried to convince the diplomatic corps of the acute danger of war. The country continues to be kept in a state of combat readiness and the people are being systematically persuaded of the necessity of liberating South Korea. [...]

In May, however, all those who have been following developments in the DPRK noticed an extraordinary calming of the situation, something without parallel in the last years. Although demobilization down to the level of January of this year was not carried out, according to friends, specialists are being released for civilian assignments. [...]

[...] We have been trying to find the causes that have led and particularly forced the DPRK leadership to adopt the new tactics. It is a difficult task in the conditions here, but after thorough discussions with friends and our own reflections, we are convinced that the changes have been prompted by a whole complex of the following causes:

1. An important cause of the changes is an unfavorable economic situation [...]
2. In a country of such a profound and developed cult of personality, differences of opinion are usually accompanied by sharp intra-party struggle and personnel changes. In connection with the problems mentioned above, rumors have been circulated within the diplomatic corps about the removal of the Politburo members of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party Kim Kwang-hyop, who is at the same time Secretary of the Central

Committee of the KWP and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DPRK, Yi Chu-yon (at the same time Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers), and Kim Chang-bong, who is also simultaneously Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Ministers of National Defense. It is occasion of the visit by Deputy Chairman of the [Soviet] Council of Ministers Novikov, however, Yi Chu-yon was the partner of the Soviet guest; of course, it cannot be excluded that this was tactics. Kim Kwang-hyop and Kim Chang-bong, reportedly blamed for the failure of the January attempt to liquidate the South Korean president Park Chung-hee, are still missing. In the first half of May, the Minister of Defense was to take a trip to [illegible, perhaps China] at the head of a military delegation. At the same time, an extensive reshuffling of intermediate cadres has been taking place in the areas of the economy, ideology and national unification. On the other hand, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Song-ch'ol has been showing that he is on the rise and has become in effect the third highest-ranking person of the regime.

3. In the course of the January events and immediately afterwards, during the mobilization and evacuation, serious deficiencies and difficulties became apparent. Lack of air defense weapons and limited railroad capacity connecting the DPRK with the USSR.
4. The developments in South Korea resulting from the attempted liquidation of Park Chung-hee and the *Pueblo* affair have been a serious warning for our Korean friends. The situation before January proved that the United States, as well as its South Korean partner, underestimated to some extent the development in the DPRK. The Americans considered the tenfold increase of incidents in the demilitarized zone in the last year in comparison with 1966 as a temporary phenomenon, which could be contained by the installation of electronic detection equipment along the whole demilitarized zone. [...]
5. Some political events abroad have inevitably influenced the situation in this area. The DPRK is undoubtedly concerned about China's efforts to improve relations with Japan, but especially by ongoing US/Vietnamese negotiations in Paris, which contradict the thesis according to which the forces of imperialism

should be tied down anywhere in the world, as well as the thesis about the unification of the country by military force. Forcible unification can only be realized in conditions of international tension and escalation of war anywhere in the world.

6. Finally, in view of the abovementioned factors, the influence of the USSR has been increasing, which has been made possible by, among others, the high level of economic and military assistance. The content of this assistance can be and in fact is manipulated (only defensive military technology is being supplied), quite apart from the fact that Soviet comrades have recently been looking more critically at the developments in the DPRK than was the case during the January events, which undoubtedly leads to direct, albeit extremely cautious, interventions.

Among diplomats, there has also been the view that the present situation is the calm before the tempest, this being justified by the fact that the high military preparedness has been continuing as has the propaganda campaign aimed at the population and that the changes have concerned phenomena that have visually most impressed the observers here. The embassy is nevertheless convinced that the "postponement" of the deadlines for the reunification of the county has been imposed on the Korean leadership by the objective situation and that a removal of the objective causes of the tactical changes will require a longer period of time. The calming down is also confirmed by the fact that Ministry of Foreign Affairs here, which in March urgently demanded that foreign missions build air raid shelters, currently shows no initiative whatsoever on this issue. [...] It is also not to be neglected that the question of national unification or "liberation of the South" has been recently posed more conditionally, emphasizing the necessity of action by patriots in the South.

[...]

Ambassador Holub

Note on a Conversation with the Director of the 1st Department of the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, Comrade Ri In-gyu, on 15 June 1968, from 4:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

[Source: MfAA C 1091/70; translated by Karen Riechert]

Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK, Pyongyang

18 June 1968

Comrade Ri In-gyu had invited to this conversation.

(Information to Berlin by FS on 17 June 1968)

He handed over a detailed information [informational report] on the "Month of Joint Actions for the Expulsion of the American Occupants from South Korea, 25 June to 25 July 1968"

This month has to be realized in an atmosphere of readiness to fight in order to achieve a new huge upswing of the socialist revolution and socialist construction and in an atmosphere of fighting for the reunification of the country.

The situation after "Pueblo" is such that an outbreak of war is possible at any time. The month is of great importance for fighting for the expulsion of the occupiers and reunification of the homeland.

The U.S. imperialists are the enemies of the entire Korean people, with whom one cannot live under one sky. This was the same a century ago. Then they prepared a long-term plan for the attack of 18 years ago, together with 15 allies and the South Korean clique. We faced more than two million men and huge amounts of material. Under the leadership of Kim Il Sung and with unprecedented heroic deeds the enemy was defeated.

U.S. imperialism did not learn from that and now tried to provoke another war. The armistice was already permanently broken in the past. It was broken more than 55,000 times by February 1968. Modern weapons were shipped to South Korea and the Park Chong Hee clique and the American imperialists together place it to a wartime footing. The Johnson visit to South Korea in October 1967 was of particular importance. In order to avoid defeat in Vietnam, U.S.A. imperialism wants to unleash a new war in Asia.

There are permanent provocations along the demarcation line. Between October 1966 and January 1968 more than 145,000 shots were fired on us. This is 1.7 as much as in the 13 years following the armistice. *Pueblo* was part of the methodical preparation for war. Large amounts of weapons were shipped to South Korea and the personnel was increased; more than 200 aircrafts from Okinawa, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and the 3rd strategic U.S. fleet. During the three months after *Pueblo*, our area was fired upon more than the 380 times and with more than 288,000 shots. Dozens of times armed soldiers, among them groups of more than 100 soldiers, invaded our territory. In the past there had been only invasions by individual soldiers. More than 180 times the enemy's navy was employed against us in the East and the West Sea. During the three months of 1968, the number of provocations in the air was 330 times as large as during the first three months of 1967.

The South Korean clique negotiates permanently about military support, sends out special envoys, the meeting in Honolulu took place and the South Korean "defense minister" visited the USA. The South Korean clique wants to speed up the timing of a new war. The USA seeks to organize support through its allies and the UN.

Supportive facts:

1. The USA wants to request that soldiers be sent to South Korea in the UN Security Council;
2. The joint political manifest of the 16 countries of 27 July 1953 is supposed to go into effect immediately.
3. Measures of "mutual defense" of South Korea and the USA should go into effect immediately.
4. There should be an increased participation of those countries in the war in Vietnam.
5. The military and non-military support by the Aspac countries is organized

This means that the aggressive forces should be united, the war plans are ready and are supposed to be accelerated.

The USA wants to shift the blame for the escalation to the DPRK, but they will make nobody afraid. The people stand like one line behind the party and Kim Il Sung. The fighting spirit of the anti-Japanese partisans and the experiences during the struggle against the USA are alive.

The DPRK has a stable socialist basic and a strong defense. She enjoys strong support by the fraternal socialist countries and the revolutionary countries of the world. The struggle of the South Korean people against the Park Chong Hee clique increases everyday. Where there is suppression, there is also resistance.

The extensive armed action of the South Korean people in Seoul and the *Pueblo* [incident] encourages them to fight. The South Korean press is under strong censorship, therefore we do not know everything about the resistance struggle.

Between 21 and 30 of January, however, more than 187 armed persons were in action at 66 locations, more than 33 fights took place and over 100 enemies (Americans Park Chong Hee officers and policemen) were eliminated and four military trains destroyed.

The fights took place up to a distance of 500 meters from the president's palace. There was a hand grenade fight in the telegraph office in Seoul just before the first of May. On 9 May 600 telephone lines were destroyed in Wonju.

Weapons are being captured frequently and South Korean soldiers leave their units with their arms.

The South Korean people display increasing trust in Kim Il Sung. 94 fights took place between January and March 1968; this amounts to 1.8 times as many as in the previous year. There are strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, increased fights by peasants, railway men, and long-shore men, mine workers get actively involved in fights. Members of the intelligentsia fight against national discrimination.

The USA and Park Chong-Hee clique distance themselves daily more and more from the people. Reunification comes closer every day. The USA is more and more isolated everywhere in the world.

The DPRK will fight against U.S. imperialism in close alliance with the revolutionary people of the world. U.S.A. imperialism can be beaten. The victory of the revolution

in Cuba and the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people inflicted irreparable damage on U.S. imperialism. If U.S. imperialism is fought everywhere, we will finally eliminate it. It is not invincible. During the "month of action" more strikes will be mounted and the revolutionary people of the world have to be called to arms.

The following steps are planned:

On 24 June: A mass meeting and mass demonstration will be held in Pyongyang. Afterwards demonstrations all over the country. A joint declaration of the social organizations will be published. A memorandum by the government against the USA provocations will be published.

On 27 June, the 15th anniversary of the victory over U.S. imperialism, mass events will take place. "Many state and party officials from all over the world used to send letters of congratulation to Kim Il Sung on this day. We expect the number of these letters will increase even more on the occasion of the 15th anniversary."

[...]

Signed:

Henke (Ambassador)

Copies:

1x Central Committee, International Relations

2x Foreign Ministry – Far East

1x Embassy – Comrade Jarck

1x Embassy – Department of protocol

1x Embassy – Office

Pyongyang, 29 July 1968

Stamped: Confidential Matter 22/68

Stamped: Declassified 5 June 1987

Memorandum

on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR in the DPRK, Comrade Zvetkov, and Comrade Jarck on 26 July 1968 between 14.30 and 16.15 in the USSR Embassy.

At the latest meeting with Comrade Zvetkov, I inquired whether there had been a top-level meeting during the visit of Soviet delegation that participated in the meeting of the joint Korean-Soviet consultative economic committee. Comrade Zvetkov confirmed that [there had been] and promised to inform us about the relevant contents of this conversation.

At the beginning I informed Comrade Zvetkov about the meeting with the DPRK Foreign Minister, Comrade Pak Song-ch'ol (see memorandum VD Nr. 54/68).

Continuing, Comrade Zvetkov made the following remarks: Comrade Novikov was received by Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1968. Comrade N. forwarded the greetings of the leading comrades from the USSR and made brief statements about the domestic situation of the USSR.

Then Kim Il Sung made the following statements on the domestic situation of the DPRK: In 1967 the plan was fulfilled in industry and agriculture. Industrial production increased by 17 percent (in value). Construction was lagging behind, this has become already notorious. It constitutes a very serious question. Harvest would not have been bad last year. Without the flood, one would have been able to stock up on reserves. Damages caused by the flood totaled nearly one billion won. By now they have been overcome. In this context Kim Il Sung thanked us for the support [we gave] to overcome the effects of this flood. Here he mentioned in particular the aid for the reconstruction of the textile factory [in] Pyongyang and the speedy completion of the thermo-electric power plant [in] Pyongyang.

[...]

On the foreign policy of the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated the following: Relations with the USSR and the European socialist countries are developing well, also relations with the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam]. Concerning the relations with the PRC, there was a complete standstill; notwithstanding trade, which was going badly, though. Although there had been a protocol signed about foreign trade between the DPRK and the PRC in 1968, it was foreseen that the PRC's obligations would not be met. In many cases, according to Comrade Kim Il Sung, they do not have what they agreed to deliver. The Chinese side met their commitments on deliveries of coke and coal by only 50 percent.

There would be no contacts and exchanges of delegations between the DPRK and the PRC.

Concerning the case of the Pueblo, the position of the DPRK is clear, Kim Il Sung stated. The DPRK would extradite the Pueblo crew if the American side would issue an apology. Apparently the USA is not in a hurry to do that, so the DPRK would likewise not speed up in the extradition of the crew. Comrade Kim Il Sung added that he thinks there will be no aggravation of the situation because of the Pueblo.

The remarks Comrade Kim Il Sung made on the situation in South Korea, according to Comrade Zvetkov, could be summarized with the conclusion that South Korea had exploited the Pueblo incident to receive major aid from the U.S., particularly in military terms. Now and in the nearest future, South Korea would receive modern fighter jets and other modern weapons and equipment. Comrade Zvetkov added that the Pueblo incident doubtlessly had an impact, but one should not overlook the fact that the events in Seoul, which occurred before the Pueblo incident, would also have constituted a major reason for the U.S. to concede to South Korean pressure for the delivery of modern weapons and equipment.

[...]

Comrade Kim Il Sung continued that he would like to ask Comrade Novikov to forward the following request to the leading comrades of the USSR: The Government of the DPRK is requesting the government of the USSR for permission to use an air route for special flights by members of the party leadership or the government [of the DPRK],

which would fly over the mainland straight from the DPRK into the USSR. In this way, any contact with Chinese territory or flight over the open sea would be avoided.

Explaining this request, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that a forced landing might happen on flights over Chinese territory and insults by Red Guards might occur. The flight route over the sea would be dangerous, especially after the Pueblo incident. Comrade Zvetkov remarked that Kim added: "We do not fear death, but we have to live in order to finish the revolution."

[...]

I thanked Comrade Zvetkov for this extensive information. There was a subsequent exchange of opinions on the subject that recently in various publications, speeches and similar things, new codes were used pertaining to DPRK national policy. Whereas in previous times, and since the Pueblo incident almost exclusively, they talked about the expulsion of U.S. troops from South Korea, they now use the term withdrawal. They have also begun again to say that the basic line of DPRK policy for solving the national question is the peaceful reunification of the country without interference from outside. The Soviet comrades have also noted that change of argumentation. Comrade Zvetkov opined, however, that it certainly would be premature to decide at this point whether this is a tactical move or where there are certain real modifications in the DPRK positions on these problems. Comrade Zvetkov emphasized that one should not forget that at the same time there are publications which continuously print to an armed liberation of South Korea.

[...]

[signed]

Jarck

Acting Ambassador

Copies:

1 x State Secretary Comrade Hegen

1 x Central Committee, IV. Department, Comrade Markowshi

1 x Embassy, Secretariat



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Department of State

69
TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-178

By *us*, NARA Date 4-7-99

NODIS/CACTUS

REF: A. SEOUL 9247 B. STATE 225227

1. I BRIEFED PRESIDENT PARK AUGUST 27 ALONG LINES PROPOSED AND AUTHORIZED BY REFTELS. I HAD DONE SO TO LIMITED EXTENT WITH PRIME MINISTER AUGUST 27 AS PRESIDENT NOT AVAILABLE. I TOLD CHUNG THAT, AS THEY KNOW, WE ALWAYS CAREFUL TO INSURE THAT THEY KEPT INFORMED OF STATUS OF PUEBLO MATTER. PRIMIN LISTENED BUT THEN SAID THIS WAS ONE I HAD TO HANDLE WITH PRESIDENT PERSONALLY IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT'S DEEP INTEREST IN MATTER.
2. PRESIDENT LISTENED CAREFULLY AND SEEMED PUZZLED AS TO HOW WE WOULD LIMIT COGNIZANCE OF OUR ACTION TO STATEMENT IN WOODWARD'S HANDWRITING IF THERE IS NK LANGUAGE ON SAME PAGE. I MADE IT CLEAR TO HIM THAT THIS WAS NEVERTHELESS OUR INTENTION IF WE GET TO THAT POINT.
3. HE STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST SIGNING ANYTHING RESEMBLING APOLOGY. HE SAID THAT TO DO SO WOULD BE HUMILIATING IN VIEW OF OUR ORIGINAL INSISTENCE THAT SHIP WAS SEIZED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. MOREOVER, PRESIDENT WENT ON, IF USG COMES AROUND TO APOLOGY, QUESTION WILL AT ONCE ARISE AS TO WHY IT DID NOT DO SO IN EARLY DAYS OF PUEBLO AFFAIR AND THUS SPARE CREW THESE MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT. I REMINDED HIM THAT ONE OF THE DIFFICULT MATTERS IN THIS BUSINESS IS DETERMINING WHETHER NORTH KOREANS WOULD RETURN CREW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH SIGNATURE OF ANY KIND OF DOCUMENT. PRESIDENT SAID THEY WOULD PROBABLY NOT DO SO, AS DESIRE FOR HUMILIATION OF UNITED STATES AND ROK GOVERNMENT IS BASIC PART OF THEIR OUTLOOK. I SAID WE HAD THIS POINT VERY MUCH IN MIND.
4. I DESCRIBED OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO BRING NK'S TO MEETING. PARK INQUIRED WHY WE ARE SHOWING SUCH EAGERNESS. I REPLIED THAT WE MUST TAKE CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION INTO ACCOUNT AND DEMONSTRATE WE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO EFFECT RELEASE OF MEN. IT NOT PRACTICAL FOR US TO REMAIN MOTIONLESS IN THIS MATTER.

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PAGE 2 SEOUL 9415, August 27, 1968, NODIS/CACTUS

5. PRESIDENT ASKED WHY WE DON'T SEIZE NORTH KOREAN SHIPPING. I SAID THIS RAISED LEGAL PROBLEMS AND IN ANY CASE THERE IS VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREAN MARITIME ACTIVITY THESE DAYS. I HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT THEIR FISHING INDUSTRY WAS IN DIFFICULTY BECAUSE THEY FEAR WE WOULD SEIZE THEIR SHIPS ON HIGH SEAS AS THEY DID OURS.

6. PRESIDENT PARK THEN SAID WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND THAT COMMUNISTS RESPECT ONLY FORCE AND USE FORCE WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THEIR OBJECTIVES. THEY HAVE NOT CHANGED AND WILL NOT CHANGE IN SLIGHTEST DEGREE, AS CZECHOSLOVAK INVASION PROVED. HE EXPRESSED OPINION THAT PUEBLO AFFAIR WILL NOT BE SETTLED THIS YEAR, IMPLYING THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS POSITION AND NORTH KOREANS WILL WAIT AND SEE UNTIL AFTER OUR ELECTIONS.

GP-1 PORTER

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29 AUG 1968: Contents of Meeting Between Councilor Thomas M. Judd and Director Yoon Ha-jung.

A summary of the talks between H.J. Yoon, Director of Bureau of Europe and America, and Councilor Thomas M. Judd of the U.S. Embassy in Korea

Date: 11:05AM, August 29, 1968

Venue: Office of the Director

(Contents):

Director Yoon: Why did the United States propose to hold a closed meeting on August 25?

Councilor Judd: There was no particular reason. It was just because too many days have passed since the 19th meeting on October 10, because there was strong pressure from the public, and because there was need to show the outside that there were progresses in the Panmunjum meetings. However, the United States did not make a new proposal nor does it expect a progress regarding this issue.

Director Yoon: Didn't you consider its effect on the domestic election?

Councilor Judd: You can say that.

Director Yoon: Do you have any idea why the North Korean Puppet Regime, who rejected on August 27 the United States' proposal to open a meeting, suddenly made a proposal to open a meeting?

Councilor Judd: That is a point the United States also wonders. We may see it when we meet them.

Director Yoon: In my personal opinion, because it was the North Korean Puppet Regime's turn to make a proposal but the United States proposed first, they rejected the United States' proposal to save face, but they may have called for this meeting, expecting new proposals from the United States, given that it made an exceptional proposal to open a meeting.

~~III CONFIDENTIAL~~

TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS

FROM : Counselor Thomas M. Judd, American Embassy.
TO : Director H.J. Yoon, Foreign Ministry
TIME: 0945, August 29, 1968

Handwritten notes in Korean, including the characters '외무부' (Foreign Ministry).

JUDD : A meeting at Panmunjom between the chief delegates of the Military Armistice Commission will be held at the request by the north Korean side. The meeting is scheduled at 11:00a.m. today (August 29).

In view of the fact that this meeting was proposed by them almost right after their refusal of the American proposal (August 25, north Korean refusal on August 27), a considerable curiosity has been aroused as to the proceeding of today's meeting.

I will inform you tomorrow of the contents

Handwritten notes in Korean: '국비안임' and '1.8.29.8.29'.

~~III CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~III CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the talk at this meeting.

Remarks:

- 1. words added between parenthesis.
- 2. Today's meeting will be the 20th, after the 19th meeting was held on July 10, 1968.

1968. 7. 17

일반공익로 재분류 (19. 12. 31)

~~III CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pueblo 72a
Memorandum 3126

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 29 #317

By yc NARA. Date 2-12-01

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NODIS/CACTUS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: PUEBLO - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The Problem:

The fundamental issue at Panmunjom has been that the North Koreans have insisted on our signing an admission of espionage and intrusion into their territorial waters, apologies for both, and a promise of no further intrusion.

We have refused to admit espionage or to apologize for acts we do not believe were committed. Various forms of conditional apology (e.g., we regret any intrusion that may have occurred) have been rejected.

The "Overwrite" Solution:

To break this impasse, we have, with your authorization on May 18, been exploring the possibility of General Woodward writing the following sentence on the "document of apology and assurance" presented on May 8 by the North Koreans: "There have been turned over to me today at Panmunjom 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS PUEBLO and the body of Seaman Duane D. Hodges." He would sign this inscription. If the North Koreans accepted this, they would presumably claim that we had signed their piece of paper. We would say that we had signed only what Woodward had written.

Recent Progress:

For the last four months we have been pressing for a firm commitment by the North Koreans that if we were to "acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to them" they would simultaneously release the whole crew. At the 21st meeting (September 17) the North Koreans for the first time said unambiguously that if we would sign their document, they would return the crew. At the 22nd meeting (September 30), they were even more explicit, saying that the entire crew would be released simultaneous with our signing their document.

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The "Overwrite" Not a Deception:

In the negotiations since May we have on a number of occasions noted that the North Korean document of May 8 does not correspond to what we believe are the facts. Moreover, we have been scrupulous in using the words "acknowledge receipt on" in describing what we might be prepared to do, and when Pak has interpreted this to mean that we were "willing to sign" General Woodward has replied, "You are using words I did not use." Our Korean language experts tell us the difference between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on" is even clearer in Korean than in English. Moreover, we have sent a message to the North Koreans through an Australian contact in Tokyo spelling out in more detail what we had in mind. We are not absolutely sure that this message got through to Pyongyang, but our Australian contact and his Korean friend are confident that it did.

Moreover, at the last (22nd) meeting, General Pak presented a slightly modified draft of his paper of May 8 with this additional paragraph at the bottom:

"Simultaneously with the signing of this document the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse." (The entire document is at Tab A.)

This added paragraph tends to undercut our overwrite and confirms our feeling that Pak knows what we have in mind. If in the end he accepts the overwrite, we will not have misled or duped the North Koreans; rather they will have accepted an ambiguous act as meeting their requirements. They have been as consistent as we: they never speak of acknowledging receipt, only of "signing our document". We are not at all sure that they will in fact accept the overwrite ploy.

The following courses of action appear open:

Track A: Attempt to negotiate a satisfactory receipt.

We do not believe that the North Koreans would accept any draft which did not contain an admission of espionage and intrusion and an apology for both. Yet a negotiation which reduced but did not eliminate these unacceptable elements would have succeeded only in making the draft our own as well as theirs and therefore more difficult to repudiate. The more extreme the document the easier the repudiation.

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Track B: Sign, with an explanatory statement.

At the last Closed Meeting before the signing we could make a further statement for the record that it contains many assertions which we believe to be false, that we do not admit any crime, that the seizure was wholly illegal, and that we are signing the document only for humanitarian reasons to get back the crew. Our public statement at the time of signature and release would probably have to be limited to making clear that our signature was based entirely on the North Korean "evidence" as anything stronger might result in refusal to deliver the crew. Repudiation would follow, of course, immediately upon the crew's coming into our possession. (A draft of such a statement of repudiation is attached as Tab C.)

Track C: Try a last-minute overwrite.

We would move ahead to negotiate with Pak the technical arrangements for the release, leaving unresolved the ambiguity between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on". We would then attempt the overwrite at the time of the actual delivery of the crew.

This might work, but if Pak rejected it we would be in a difficult position. He will probably insist on the press being present for the signature and release. For us to attempt the overwrite without a clear understanding and acceptance in advance might seem to the world to be sharp practice, and to stand firm on it would seem to many a heartless legalism. Rather than see the crew return to North Korea, Woodward would have to sign their form of receipt. And we could hardly argue that he had signed without instructions when faced by an unforeseen situation. If we proceed along this track we must be prepared to end up on Track B -- signature, with a statement for the record that takes some of the bite out of the document.

Track D: Clarify the overwrite.

We would firm up the detailed arrangements for a release and tell Pak precisely what we plan to do in the overwrite.

Pak will probably reject this, at least for a meeting or two, perhaps finally. But he may accept it if convinced that this is as far as we are prepared to go. If he does agree, we have an impeccable record of disclosure and there is no legitimate basis for any accusations of sharp practice. If he finally does not agree, Track B is not foreclosed.

RECOMMENDATION.

I prefer alternative D. Track A is a dead end which will lose time without taking us anywhere. Track C is probably only a round-about way of getting to B -- the outright signature. Though a public statement at the time of signing would help, the arguments against Track B are still strong. It would be demeaning to the United States to sign under blackmail imposed by an illegal act an apology for something we did not do and an admission that perfectly legal actions are illegal. We would not, for example, sign an admission that our actions in Viet-Nam constituted aggression and apologize for them even if this would insure release of 82 captured pilots. The repudiation of our signature would also be demeaning and could not wholly erase the stigma of the signature. The apology would confirm the belief of many in the United States and elsewhere that despite our denials and repudiation we were in fact engaged in improper acts, thus further tarnishing our reputation at home and abroad. Our men are dying and being captured in Viet-Nam and are risking their lives along the DMZ in Korea. The Pueblo crew are no different. Finally, there is no need to consider alternative B unless it becomes quite clear that the overwrite (Track D) will not work.

I recommend that we proceed with alternative D. If it works it would result in the release of the crew on a basis with which we can live and if it should fail would not foreclose other alternatives, should we later ever wish to use them. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford concur.

In addition to a copy of the North Korean document (Tab A), I attach at Tab B a draft statement such as might be used if we succeed with the overwrite and at Tab C a draft statement such as might be used if we signed the North Korean document under protest.

Richard L. K. [Signature]
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. North Korean document presented at 22nd meeting.
2. Draft press statement (acknowledge receipt).
3. Draft press statement (signature).

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Special Report

25X1A

COUNTRY Rumania/North Korea/United Nations/USSR

[Redacted]

DATE OF INFO.

DATE 24 October 1968

25X1X

SUBJECT

Comments of Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister Malita Concerning North Korea

SOURCE

[Redacted]

25X1X

Summary

In comments to an American official concerning North Korea, Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister Malita described circumstances related to a memorandum on the Korean question which revealed a Soviet effort to worsen relations between Rumania and Pyongyang. He said the North Koreans had shown increased interest in the UN and that he believed they were moving away from Communist China, were seeking to decrease Soviet influence, and wanted a more independent position in international affairs. He also discussed situations which might allow for a change in course for Pyongyang, suggesting a possible "signal" from the United States.

End of Summary

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1. [Redacted] Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister Mircea Malita stated that since the current North Korean ambassador to Bucharest, Kim Tao-Hui, was formerly a deputy foreign minister, he possesses a unique insight into North Korean attitudes which compensates for the

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By JCS, NARA, Date 3-22-02

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-2-

traditional lack of communication between Pyongyang and some of its emissaries abroad. Malita said that he had been able to establish good personal relations with the North Korean ambassador even though official relations between their two countries had been clouded by a Rumanian "mistake" a year or so ago when a top Rumanian official visited Japan but did not take up a long-standing invitation to visit Pyongyang. This omission made the North Koreans feel slighted and rendered them vulnerable to Soviet arguments that Rumania could not be trusted.

2. Having broached the topic of the Soviet efforts to sow distrust and discord between Rumania and North Korea, Malita went on to cite a recent example of Soviet maneuvering: In the course of preparing for the 23rd United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) the Soviets gave the Rumanians the text of a proposed letter supporting inscription on the agenda of the 23rd UNGA of the item "withdrawal of the United States and all other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations (UN)", subsequently circulated as UN Document A/7184, 24 August 1968. Rumania was invited to join the other Socialist states in submitting this item. However, in the text of the "explanatory memorandum" to the agenda request there was a reference to "continuing aggression of Israel, supported by imperialist powers, against Arab peoples..." The Rumanians explained to the Soviets that it was impossible for them to sign such a memorandum, given their well-known policy with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviets replied that the North Koreans particularly wished to have the expression concerning Israel included in the memorandum in order to demonstrate their solidarity with their Arab friends. Rumania stated, however, that she could not sign the memorandum as it was phrased. The memorandum was submitted to the UN on 23 August 1968, signed by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR. In order to show her agreement with the thrust of the memorandum but not to alter her policy regarding Israel, Rumania on the same day submitted a separate memorandum, listed as A/7184/ADD 1, in which she informed the General Assembly that she favored the inclusion of the Korean item on the agenda but in which

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there was no reference to the Middle East, Israel or Vietnam.

3. Subsequently Malita learned from the North Korean ambassador in Bucharest that the Soviets had cited Rumania's "refusal" to sign the original memorandum as evidence that Rumania was untrustworthy and could not be relied on to support North Korea's position at the UN. The North Korean ambassador confirmed what Malita had suspected; namely, that the reference to Israel had not been placed in the text at the insistence of Pyongyang but had been inserted by the Soviet Union in order to trap the Rumanians and worsen relations between North Korea and Rumania.

4. Malita stated that from his discussion with the North Korean ambassador and from other sources he had reached the conclusion that the North Koreans accept the Soviet Union as representing their interests at the UN only because they have no alternative possibility. The North Koreans have become increasingly suspicious, however, of Soviet motives. Malita asserted that one of the reasons which has led North Korea to wish to participate at the UN has been her desire to disengage from a dependency on the USSR in this respect and thus to move farther in the direction of a foreign policy independent of that of the USSR. Malita said that it seemed to him that the United States could draw some profit from the situation by allowing North Korea to "establish a presence" at the UN. Malita stated that the North Koreans are intensely curious about the internal operations of the UN, notably the UNGA and its committees, especially Committee I (Political). Malita added that he believes that North Korea has moved away from Communist China, is also interested in decreasing Soviet influence, and is strongly desirous of establishing its own independent position on the international scene.

5. When the source commented that the PUEBLO situation, the increase in the terrorist attacks mounted from North Korea, and the general circumstances related to the United States Presidential elections made it most unlikely that the United States would undertake any "positive" action to change its position with respect

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-4-

to North Korea and the UN, the discussion moved in the direction of an "inadvertent" situation which might offer a chance for a change to occur. Malita was intrigued by the possibility that the United States might have to accept a situation which the North Koreans long have sought, namely, the existence of a gap in the time between the decision on the "conditional invitation" to North Korea by Committee I of the UNGA and the beginning of the substantive debate regarding the Korean item. Although Malita indicated he did not believe that Pyongyang was yet ready to accept the conditional invitation, it did appear to him that the timing of events might offer the chance that the North Koreans would give a reply other than an outright rejection of the invitation. Malita speculated, too, that some form of "signal" from the United States to North Korea might alter the North Korean attitude.

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Classification No.: 54

Title: The Atrocity of the North Korean Puppet Regime

Date: November 8th 1968

TO: Director of the Ministry of Information and Culture

FROM: Director of the Bureau of Europe and America

Please take a reference of the attached paper, received from the Ministry of Defense and translated in English, regarding the issue of the recent North Korean puppet regime's provocative activities along the armistice line, in Seosan and Uljin Counties.

Attachment: Announcement from the Headquarters of Strategy-Building towards North Korean Communist Spies. No. 36

/End/

Announcement # 36 from the Headquarters of Strategy-building towards North Korean Communist Spies

The Headquarters of Strategy-building towards North Korean Communist Spies has made an announcement on the 5th that approximately 30 North Korean armed agents illegally infiltrated on the night of the 2nd to Uljin County's East Coast and slaughtered innocent people, and that the police and local defense force are now jointly investigating.

Here is the strategy prepared up to today, 5th of November:

1. On the night of November 2nd, 1968, approximately 30 armed-agents infiltrated Uljin County, North Gyeongsang Province through the sea. They collected local people under the pretext of taking photographs for identification cards and spread the propaganda of the North Korean puppet regime and forced them to align themselves with it. The North Korean armed agents, by choosing one person to make an example of for the local people, bayoneted the person, struck him on the head with a stone and killed him.
2. They invaded a local home and locked the family up so as to take meals and rest. They spread counterfeit money and mercilessly shot a farmer who was passing by with the loads of rice straw and they ran away. They also kidnapped three local people by coming into their houses as if strangers asking the way, but all of the three kidnapped escaped from them and returned home.
3. The military has detected the North Korean armed agents' path from the point of early infiltration. With the close cooperation with policemen and the local defense force, they are carrying out a 'Spy Sweeping Strategy' and have declared a 'Grade Two Situation' in a certain number of places in Gyeongsang and Gangwon Provinces from the midnight of November 4th. Currently, the Spy Sweeping Team has been blocking the agents' return path and surrounding their radius of action for encirclement. So far, three of the agents were killed and a lot of belongings including food have been captured. 3 civilians were killed and 1 injured.
4. The objective of the armed agents are thought to be as follows:
 - (1) Investigation on the level of guarding along the coastal lines
 - (2) Establishment of secret places in the deep mountain
 - (3) Deployment of hit-and-run attack and homicide
 - (4) Disturbing people and economy, destruction of major industrial complexes

(5) Promotion of the sense of anti-government among South Koreans

5. It turned out to be reckless and imprudent provocative acts of the North Korean puppet regime, as it stems from their anxiousness to restore their honor, which was completely sunk by the successive failure of the mass-infiltration operation against the Republic of Korea this year. The South Korean military has mostly responded immediately by predicting their infiltration plans prior to the events. We expect the absolute trust and generous support from the people towards the Spy Sweeping Team by recalling the event of January 21st, when the mutual cooperation of the military, government and local people led to the complete eradication of the North Korean armed agents. The counterfeit money scattered by the North Korean armed agents were new 100 won notes and they were all collected. However, in case anybody acquired one or finds someone else using one within the territory under the Grade Two condition, he or she has to report it immediately to the local government. /End/

Report on the numbers of guerillas and damage (between 1 to 5 November)

1. North Korean Armed Agents

Location	Shot to death
Seo-San	2
Front	7
Ul-Jin	2
Total	11

2. Damage

Location	Soldiers	Injured	Kidnapped
Seo-San	1 Major		
Front	5 Soldiers	3 Soldiers	
Ul-Jin	2 Soldiers 3 Civilians	1 Civilian	1 Civilian
Total	5 people	4 people	1 person

3. As of November 4th 1968

Occurrence

---- Total 288 times with 1,010 guerrillas

Arrested and killed

---- 65 arrested , 207 shot to death

---- total: 272

An Analysis of Infiltrations of Armed Agents from the North Korean Communists in
Uljin, etc.

1. Outline
2. The North Korean Communists' intentions
3. Peculiarities of the infiltrations

13 November 1968

1. Outline

A. In addition to approximately 30 North Korean armed communist agents who appeared in Gopo-dong, Buk Township, Uljin County, North Gyeongsang Province, at 06:10 on 3 November 1968, small and large groups of North Korean armed communist agents have successively appeared around Taehwa County, Uljin County, and Samcheok County, up to now (08:15 of 5 November 1968).

B. The North Korean armed agents infiltrated twice through the sea and appeared in Chookcheonri, Samcheok County and nearby Gopori, Uljin County at 2:00 on October 30th and 31st 1968, and November 2nd. These events received much attention as these armed agents used significantly public tactics for infiltration and operations.

C. The North Korean communists' adoption of massive infiltration tactics appears to stem from its anxiousness to achieve the so-called 'Great Revolutionary Reforms' by 1970, the target year of the red unification, by recovering from the successive failures of operations against the Republic of Korea by intensifying the annual autumn offensive in the front and rear areas.

D. Moreover, these massive infiltration tactics were implemented under the objective circumstances of the suspension of bombing in North Vietnam, the U.S. presidential election, and domestically, the return of a large number of fishermen kidnapped by the North Korean communists. In this regard, the North Korean communists appear to have conducted massive infiltration operations based on strategic and tactical calculations. Thus, it is necessary to keep a strict watch over the North Korean communists' future movements and the operational direction of North Korean communist infiltration agents.

2. The North Korean Communists' Intentions

The unprecedented massive infiltration operations by armed agents appear to be carried out under the North Korean communists' strategic and tactical objectives based on its calculation of the current situation.

A. Strategic objectives:

- (1) to restrain by violence the conciliatory tide between the United States and Soviet Union which has been caused in part by the new development of peace talks following the suspension of bombing in North Vietnam;
- (2) to take the initiative, by carrying out armed campaigns, in supporting North Vietnam through peace talks and in urging joint actions for international anti-United States military campaigns by communist countries;
- (3) to acquire support from communist-friendly neutral states in the on-going United Nations General Assembly by carrying out guerilla activities in the Republic of Korea;
- (4) to prompt the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from the Republic of Korea by raising the risk of war in the country and, as a result, strengthening the new isolationism of the United States, with the presidential election as momentum;
- (5) to obtain more aid from the Soviet Union under the pretext of the tensions around the truce line; and
- (6) to strengthen control over North Koreans and to divert their attention to the outside, excusing the domestic economic and political instability within North Korea.

B. Tactical objectives:

- A. to restore the successively failed operations against the Republic of Korea;
- B. to find a pretext for provoking war by developing a full-scale guerilla operation and scheming a mass struggle acting in concert with these guerillas by stirring up divisions in the Republic of Korea through the efforts of underground organizations and rebellious groups;
- C. to provide direct and indirect support for underground organizations in order to improve their morale, while preventing them from becoming demoralized and breaking away from the North Korean Communists;
- D. to broaden an ideologically-neutral class by raising fears through ruthless terror activities and hinder those from this class from cooperating with the authorities of the Republic of Korea;
- E. to cause the decentralization of the military and the police and exhaust their forces by using front-line and rear guard Maoist tactics of pretending to attack an area but actually attacking a different one;
- F. to destabilize the circulation of currency by bringing in and passing a

massive amount of counterfeit notes, and

- G. to carry out a strategy of mounting a military campaign in the both front and rear by infiltrating a large number of armed agents into the Republic of Korea through the annual autumn offensive.

3. Peculiarities of the infiltrations

These infiltration strategies of armed agents were rather different from before in the following ways:

- A. Approximately sixty armed agents were collectively amassed, and this means that North Korea adopted a rather semi-public infiltration strategy, which was different from the past secret infiltrations.
- B. From the beginning, they displayed such public political maneuvering and killed a large number of people under an accusation of betrayal.
- C. They were grouped in various ways – from a group of 3 to that of 15. In particular, the group of 15 went ahead of collective actions that would damage their collective safety.
- D. They disguised themselves with a variety of outfits – as militants, gentlemen, laborers and other civilians.
- E. They lavished large amounts of counterfeit money.

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Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, and Gentlemen:

It is, indeed, a great privilege and honor for me to have this opportunity to brief you on the North Korean Communist Guerrilla infiltration and our counter-operations.

I am Major Hahn from the Ministry of National Defense. My presentation, will be given in the following sequence, after a few brief remarks on background information related to the Uljin incident:

- Terrian Features and Characteristics of the Infiltrated area.
- North Korean Communist Armed Guerrilla infiltration and counter-operations.
- Characteristics of Uljin Sea-infiltration
- Operational Outlook.
- and the Guerrilla Warfare capability of the North Korean Communist Puppet Regime.

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1. INTRODUCTION:

a. In the past few years, the North Korean Communist Puppet Regime has been impatient and disgusted with the success of the anti-Communist structure of the Republic of Korea and the international standing of the ROK Government.

The achievement of rapid economic development and dispatch of Republic of Korea Armed Forces to Vietnam to aid in their struggle against the Communists has agitated North Korea's animosity. The north Korean Communist have converted, since 1966, their basic policy of so-called, "peaceful unification of the country under Communist domination" to "unification through the use of force."

Therefore, because of this change in policy, the north Korean political, economic and social instruments of national power have completely converted to a wartime structure.

The north Korean Communist Regime is preparing for war by placing special emphasis on national defense policy that strengthens their military power. They have equipped the Red Guard Militia Force, consisting of 1.2 million, with heavy armament and they are ready to be deployed in the event of a renewal of hostilities.

b. In March 1967 at the Central Labor Party Convention, Kim Il Sung, the warmonger of the north Korean Puppet Regime, stressed accomplishment of unification of the fatherland in this generation. He further stated, that for the accomplishment of this goal at the earliest possible time, we must strengthen and expand underground cells and create political chaos within the Republic. Since then, during public rallies he repeated and made it clear that the time table for unification, by using armed force, should not be prolonged.

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c. To meet their requirement, they have established basic policies to militarize the entire population; fortify north Korea; and they are training military cadres to assume higher positions of leadership. Further, they have forced government and civil agencies to convert all of their activities to a wartime posture.

d. Simultaneously, the north Korean Communists have reorganized into a single system for anti-ROK subversive operations and have expanded their activity through special task-forces such as 124th and 183rd Army units. They have, also, trained a large number of hard-core communists to increase infiltration and the capability to accomplish their objectives of hindering ROK economic development; degrading ROK international standing and creating social and public disorder and chaos within the Republic.

e. Fifteen years after the Armistice was signed, the Communist north Koreans continue to fortify and construct artillery positions within the Demilitarized Zone, disregarding their international agreements. Their barbaric and vicious Communist ideology has caused them to miscalculate the possibility that they can unify the country under Communist domination.

They have constantly increased irresponsible provocative activities such as frequent raids, ambushes, murders, and kidnapping the DMZ military guard posts. In addition, they infiltrated armed guerrillas into the peaceful Republic through sea-borne infiltration. The following are some of the major incidents of provocative Communist activities: The abortive incident of Kim Sin Jo's group in Seoul; incidents of Daengjin-Susan and Inja-island of the Judo Province and the most recent Uljin and Samchok infiltrations. The latest infiltration incident, in view of its characteristics and size of force employed, can be considered as a military maneuver.



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In regards to the method of operations for this particular band of armed guerrillas, they were primarily infiltrating the secluded villages in the mountainous areas where the administrative control of the ROK Government would be the least effective.


The infiltrators forced the villagers to support their activities and to follow Communist ideology, saying that they were there to revolutionize the villages. They committed savage acts by indiscriminate massacre of those who opposed or refused to cooperate with them.

Unlike incidents, this particular band of armed guerrillas carried and distributed large amounts of counterfeit ^{CURRENCY} ROK, ^{to} create economic chaos and disruption within the Republic. Reports, this year, show that more than 1,000 armed guerrillas were involved in 300 incidents of infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone and sea approaches. This figure represents a 40% increase over last year's report. Of the total intruders reported, 320 were killed or captured.

These illegal infiltration by the north Korean Regime armed guerrillas can be considered as exceptionally provocative activity because of their use of armed force and guerrilla warfare and complete disregard for the Armistice Agreement.

The untiring infiltration efforts of the north Korean Communist armed guerrillas clearly proves that their basic party line is to occupy the Republic by using armed force at the earliest possible time.

To counter Kim Il Sung's nightmare of communization of the Republic, we, the Government and people of the Republic of Korea offer with one accord total resistance to and rejection of the Communist ideology.



I hope that this brief introduction will help you to better understand the Uljin/ Samchok infiltration and counter-infiltration events that I will describe to you.

However, before we discuss the operational activity I wish to outline the Terrain Features and Characteristics of the Infiltrated Area.



2. Terrain Features and Characteristics of the Infiltrated Area:

The area of operation which the North Korean Armed Guerrillas chose is comprised of highlands over 800 - 1,500 meters high, running south to north.

The area includes part of the Taebak mountains; adjacent valleys; and other steep and rugged mountains along the coastline.


The area is inconvenient to transportation and communications nets. The population density is less than 100 per square kilometer. A notable disparity of 4 to 10 degrees in temperature exists between highland and lowland and the area experiences heavy snowfall.

Isolated hillside farming villages are vulnerable to guerrilla activity and they also afford them safe havens and agitating points. The industrial facilities in the area, such as coal refining, thermo-power plant, and cement plants, could become targets for sabotage.

The standard of living in isolated hillside farming villages in this area is low and the administrative control of the ROK Government over these particular areas is ineffective, at best.

It is estimated that this area presents the following advantages for the infiltration of a large-scale armed guerrilla team:

- a. Relatively easy to infiltrate and to accomplish necessary re-supply.
- b. Terrain features favor guerrilla activities.
- c. Natural obstacles hamper the mobility and communications capability of ROK anti-guerrilla forces.





Apparently these advantages were recognized by north Korean Communist Planners or at least their most recent effort would indicate their recognition.





3. North Korean Armed Guerrilla Infiltration and Operations.

The armed guerrillas that infiltrated into the Republic through the Uijin coastal area consisted of four teams of 15 men each and a command group. They departed Wonsan and landed on a team basis at different times from 30 October to 2 November. These guerrillas were selected from the 124th Army Unit of the Reconnaissance Bureau, Supreme Headquarters/Ministry of Defense and trained for several months to perform special tasks. Their mission was to:

- a. Instigate a revolution through activity in isolated mountain villages.
- b. Abduct the people that may be useful to future activities or that may provide information of intelligence value.
- c. Create social disorder and incite a peoples uprising.
- d. Collect information concerning military, political, economic, and social fields.
- e. Kill counter-revolutionaries and others that refuse to cooperate.

The primary mission of these armed guerrillas was to revolutionize isolated villages in the rugged mountainous areas where administrative control of the Government could be exercised least effectively, and to establish a guerrilla base for future operations. They encountered immediate unforeseen opposition, and indiscriminately murdered innocent people in an effort to accomplish the mission given to them by ^{Kim} Il Sung. The seven innocent people killed includes a man of 80 years old, a 15 year-old boy, a mailman, and a dumb mute. They even cut the ears from a dead body to use as evidence of their efforts upon return to North Korea.

The armed guerrillas plundered food grains and livestock from the poor hillside farmers. In addition, they were in possession of Republic of Korea Bank counterfeit notes, and distributed to the farmers, thereby, extending a false kindness. Disorganized, they are discarding equipment and striving to break through our envelopment and return to the North by mountain routes.

It was learned from a captured guerrilla that the originally planned length of the operation was one month. No matter how well suited, their selected infiltration area might have been for guerrilla activities, they failed to receive support from our people. The anti-communist spirit of the people is so strong that some ~~ran~~ walked 6 or 7 hours to report the presence of the guerrillas even though ~~it~~ meant risking their lives. Therefore, the Communists were soon ~~being~~ ^{being} hunted by active military units, national police, and homeland reserve forces.



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Counter-Operations:

(1) In order to seize and annihilate the North Korean communist armed guerrillas within a confined area in the shortest possible ^{time} it requires the joint effort of the military, national police, and the local Homeland Reserve Force. Condition "B" was declared in the vicinity of Mt. Taebak and six Kuns (Counties) of Kangwon-Do and Kyungsang Buk-Do (Provinces) effective 1200 hours, 4 November 1968.

Under military control, operations were launched by military troops and the National Police force. The military troops had been airlifted to the operational area. In addition, 15,500 Homeland Reserve Force personnel were mobilized to help the military and police troops to insure the security of their respective local communities and to envelope the area of military operations.

As the North Korean armed guerrilla area of activity was enlarged, an additional Homeland Reserve Force of 20,000 was mobilized in the area contiguous to the area where Condition "B" had been declared. Thus, in terms of personnel strength, the Homeland Reserve Force became the main force.

(2) In Uljin and Samchok areas where the North Korean armed guerrillas landed, sweep operations are drawing to a close. In an effort to seize annihilate dispersed guerrillas that were fleeing northward, additional troops were deployed along the Kangneung line to block the exfiltration route and to engage in search operations in their respective areas of tactical responsibility.

Further, north of the current military operational area, several blocking lines have been formed to mop up these infiltrators while they are still south of DMZ.





(3) Combat results as of 18 November are:

- 37 North Korea armed guerrillas - killed.
- 2 North Korea armed guerrillas - captured.
- major items captured are:
- 29 sub-machine guns
- 5 pistols
- 5 radios
- 124 hand grenades
- 13,871 rounds of small arms ammunition.
- 820,000 won in counterfeit ROK currency.

ROK Casualties:

- 9 military personnel - killed.
- 4 Homeland Reserve Force personnel - killed.
- 7 civilians massacred.

Certainly, especially when terrain features and communication capability are considered, these results are impressive but we will not relax our efforts until all infiltrators have been accounted for.

Now I will discuss some of the facts learned from questioning intruders and ROK personnel that came into contact with them.



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A. Characteristics of Uljin Sea-Infiltration.

The sea-infiltration conducted by the North Korean armed guerrillas through the port city of Uljin has been characterized first by the attempt to revolutionize secluded mountain villages. Such an attempt was apparently intended to probe the possibility of establishing guerrilla warfare in the Republic of Korea. Secondly, these armed guerrillas used forcible means including unprecedented barbarous acts, such as the indiscriminate massacre of local populace who refused to cooperate. Third, they distributed a substantial amount of counterfeit ROK currency with apparent and obvious intention to create economic and social chaos in the Republic of Korea. Some of the examples are presented as follows:

a. These North Korean armed guerrillas chose secluded mountain villages around the Taibak Mountain, where terrain features are rugged, the population is thinly scattered, and the administrative control of the ROK Government is least effective in combating attempts of the North Korean guerrillas to revolutionize such areas as footholds for more extensive guerrilla warfare in the future. To this end, these intruders assembled the local populace in various places to obtain their support, propagandized them along the North Korean Party line, and forced them to join the Communist organization of North Korea.

b. These unlawful infiltrators committed indiscriminate massacre of peaceful, innocent villagers forcing them to follow the North Korean Communist line, or intimidating them with violence so as to preclude their cooperation with the ROK military and police authorities.

(1) Examples to this effect are as follows: On 3 November 1968, the North Korean armed guerrillas, in the presence of all villagers, stabbed a man named Jun Byong Doo, 36, and crushed him with stones until his death.

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and shouted, "this is the reward for a counter-revolutionary."
Mr. Jun had opposed the Communist propaganda.

(2) On 4 November 1968, these communist intruders fired sub-machine guns at a man named Kim Yong Shik, 42 returning from his farmland with a bundle of rice-straw on his back for fear that he might report their presence to ROK authorities. Mr. Kim was seriously wounded.

(3) On 2 November 1968, the intruders abducted and killed an innocent seaman by the name of Kim Tai Hee, 39.

(4) On 14 November 1968, the North Korean communist guerrillas entered an isolated mountain house and, in fear of the tenant's possible report of their presence to ROK authorities, beat the entire household of three with rifle butt until death. The family included an 80 year-old man, Choi An Suh; a 56 year-old woman, Kim Young Un; and a 15 year-old boy, Choi Young Hwan. The savagery of the guerrillas was culminated by cutting the ears off the dead bodies.

c. In addition, for the purpose of creating economical chaos and public disorder within the Republic, they distributed large amounts of counterfeit ROK currency has been reported to the authorities concerned. It was chiefly used for payment of items they had forcibly taken from the villagers.

d. Kim Il Sung's North Korean Communist Regime, under the misconception that their activities will be supported by isolated villagers scattered in the mountainous areas, have dispatched a large number guerrilla forces by water to conduct infiltration operations against the Republic. This is the largest group infiltrated since the Armistice was signed.

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Without the confirmed information that there is not a single foot of space for the communist within the Republic, and without proper preparation made by the underground cells infiltrated in advance, they attempted to use force, so-called guerrilla type, to organize Anti-ROK government guerrilla forces.

These intruders, untruthfully, reported to their headquarters that they are successfully carrying out their revolutionary tasks. In view of the inflexible characteristics of the Communist organization, Kim, Il Sung has no choice, but to believe such false and groundless reports disseminated by the guerrillas. This is cause for expectation of dangerous future activity. Therefore, we must be thoroughly prepared and alert to combat any barbarous and inhumane acts initiated by the North Korean Communist Puppet Regime.

This MAP Shows the starting point of NK guerrilla and routes of their Movement.

We fully intend to do everything possible to be prepared for any eventuality.

The following operational forecast represents our evaluation of the facts, as we know, and our estimate of what is likely to happen.



the Republic of Korea is stronger today than ever before despite
despite the intimidations and propaganda of the enemy.

As an example:

a. Since the current operations began, the villagers in
the operational area have volunteered information on a timely basis
as to enemy activities at the risk of their lives. Without exception,
they have provided support both material, and morally to the military
and national police operations.

b. The homeland Reserve Force, that was formed in Spring
1968, has maintained a high state of morale and demonstrated gallantry
in action against the Armed Guerrillas. Operating in close coordination
with the military and national police forces, they killed 9 guerrillas
and captured 1 through search and blocking operations against
villages and major roads.

c. Mopping-up operation capability of the military and national
police has also sharply increased. As a result, this difficult
operation covering a large area is being prosecuted most efficiently.
Progress is far better in this popping-up operation than in any
other past operation.

d. The enemy has suffered 39 confirmed casualties: 37 killed
and 2 captured. It is expected that the enemy losses will reach
at least two thirds of the total infiltrated, if unconfirmed losses
are taken into consideration.

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e. Strong patriotism and anti-communist spirit of people coupled with the increased operational capability of the military and national police and outstanding improvement of the homeland reserve force will undoubtedly contribute to undermining any further enemy plots to initiate further large scale infiltrations. The North Korean armed guerrillas now operating in the Republic will soon be totally destroyed. It is anticipated that not a single one will exfiltrate to the North.

But what does the loss of these 60 guerrillas mean to North Korean warmongers? How will it effect their capability?

We can get idea of the answers to these questions by examining their organizational structure, strength and the emphasis placed on guerrilla operations.

6. GUERRILLA WARFARE CAPABILITY OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME:

In 1964, the organization of subversive operations against the Republic of Korea was integrated under control of the General Bureau of Anti-ROK Subversion Activity. Other subordinate agencies are: the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Supreme Headquarters or Ministry of Defense, Liaison Department of North Korea Labor Party and the Anti-detection Bureau of the Ministry of Social Security. These subordinate agencies were augmented and expanded between 1965 and 1967. Particularly notable in these organizations was activation of two (2) special mission units, 124th and 283rd Army Units, consisting of selected elite military personnel trained for subversive operations using armed force. The armed guerrillas that entered Seoul on 21 January this year and the ones infiltrated along the eastern coastal area belong to the 124th Army Unit of the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Supreme Headquarters.

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Communist North Korea presently maintains about 11,300 personnel well trained in unconventional warfare. In addition, there are about 20,000 personnel who have been trained as reinforcements. North Korea also maintains more than 46 high-speed escort and operational boats for water-borne infiltrations.

Their Air-borne capability consists of over 30 Light Aircraft (AN-2 type) that are capable of dropping guerrilla forces. We certainly should not neglect this potential threat.

As mentioned, the North Korean Communist Regime maintains complete readiness in guerrilla warfare. They have a well trained force of more than 10,000 immediately available for infiltration efforts. They are, regardless of time and terrain features, capable of conducting warfare through land, sea, and air operations against the Republic of Korea.

As you have seen, the guerrilla warfare activity clearly proves that their basic policy is to constantly enlarge and demonstrate their determination to use armed force.

7. CONCLUSION: IN CONCLUSION I HOPE THAT

Through this briefing, your excellencies have learned that a primary objective of the North Korean Puppet Regime is forceful occupation of the Korean peninsula by using military power.

The North Koreans are making preparations for conventional warfare while constantly strengthening their guerrilla warfare capability.

As stressed and pledged by Kim, Il Sung, the war-monger of the North Korean Communist Puppet Regime, armed force will be used to shorten their time table for unification of the Korean Peninsula. For this purpose, they have used armed guerrilla infiltrations for the past 3 years.





This provocative activity is not only a threat to us but also a dangerous challenge to all of the Free-world.

In spite of repeated strong warnings by the Republic of Korea Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, to Kim, Il Sung's Puppet Regime after the abortive incident of 21 January this year, they infiltrated a large group in the Uljin area. Therefore, it is estimated that their vicious and savage guerrilla activities will be continued and intensified. Kim, Il Sung has miscalculated the developments accomplished by Korea and the present state of international affairs. He should be taught that there is not a single foot of space for communist within the Republic of Korea and that his effort is contrary to the Free-world's efforts for the preservation of peace and freedom.

The Free-world should be fully aware of the nightmares and misconception of the dogmatic communist dictator, Kim, Il Sung who is full of self-righteousness because of being confined to a secluded environment.

The Republic of Korea Government and its people are firmly united to annihilate any form of challenge or invasion by the Communist. We gain moral and material support from our free world allies based on their clear understanding and appreciation of such provocative acts by the North Korean Communist Puppet Regime.

This concludes my presentation.

If there is no question, I would like to invite you to witness some of the scene of major operation ^{in the field} these pictures and to see you weapons and other items captured during the counter-infiltration operation.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-347

By scs, NARA Date 9-22-98

15630

December 3, 1968

7-1365
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[Handwritten initials]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: USS PUEBLO - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The Problem

The North Koreans have continued to insist that we sign their document admitting espionage and repeated intrusions, apologizing for these "crimes," and promising not to intrude again. They have denounced us for proposing an "overwrite" solution in which General Woodward would add in his own hand a phrase acknowledging receipt of the crew. They have not categorically rejected our proposal; rather they have refused to accept it, they have attacked us for putting it forward, and they have shown no sign of moderating their demand.

Recent Developments

The meetings in September made it clear to us that the North Koreans are willing to give us back the crew at the moment (or almost the moment) we sign their document. There would still be some procedural problems but they seem manageable.

The meetings in October made clear to the North Koreans what they may not have understood: that we are not prepared to sign their document but only to acknowledge receipt on it. We have not explained to them in so many words that we intend, after the release, to denounce the document, hanging our repudiation on this distinction between "signing" and "acknowledging receipt on," and saying that we had signed only what Woodward

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GROUP 1

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had himself written. But there is no doubt that they now understand this intent. They have denounced our proposal as a "potty strategem" designed to "evade your responsibilities," and at present they appear determined not to leave this loophole open.

We called the last meeting (October 31) very quickly on the heels of the preceding one in order to appear firm in our stand. They hesitated for three days before agreeing to meet, but their position at the meeting was unyielding and they may merely have been taken a bit off balance by the unusual speed of our move. It is now their turn to call and they have made no move since October 31 to convene a session.

Our Choices

We can (1) stand on the overwrite proposal, perhaps with minor variations; or (2) sign their document, prefacing our signature with an explanatory statement and repudiating the document as soon as the crew are free.

Time for a Squeeze Play

The fact that Christmas is approaching and that the Administration will soon change offers us an opportunity to give the North Koreans an ultimatum without grave risk of breaking off the talks. We can call a meeting, give them a package of proposals, and say: "Take your choice; these offers are good only if you accept one of them in time to get the men home for Christmas. This Administration will then withdraw them and will make no further proposals." If this ploy failed, the new Administration would be free to resume the negotiations on whatever lines it chose.

Variations on Standing Pat

We can simply offer to the North Koreans our present overwrite proposal, giving them the Christmas deadline to take it or leave it.

We can also revive the alternative of a conditional apology ("if we intruded, we are sorry") which we made last Spring and which was bluntly rejected then. We

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would dress it up in new language so that it might on the surface seem a new element but we would not include the unacceptable North Korean demands: the flat admission of "espionage" and of repeated intrusions. If the North Koreans are minded to settle the issue, this might satisfy their need for a piece of paper with General Woodward's name at the bottom.

A Repudiated Apology

It is reasonably clear that if we simply sign their document we will promptly get the men back. The pros and cons of this course make an intricate argument which is summarized at Tab A. We do not recommend an outright apology, since it would be costly in foreign policy terms, but we recognize that the argument for an apology appeals to many reasonable men.

We could mitigate some, though not all, of the evil in an outright apology by coupling our signature with a simultaneous or perhaps even prior repudiation of the content of the North Korean document. We could, for example, have General Woodward say into the cameras and tape recorders just before he signs that, as has been made clear in the negotiations, the United States Government does not believe the Pueblo committed espionage or intruded, and that he is signing for the purely humanitarian reasons of getting the crew back. We are far from certain that the North Koreans would accept this procedure if warned about it in advance, and if not warned, they might at the last minute refuse to transfer the crew. And even such a "repudiated apology" would have demeaning elements from our viewpoint. Nevertheless, some variation on this ploy deserves serious consideration for inclusion in our take-it-or-leave-it package.

We would tell the North Koreans that we are now prepared to sign their document but will have to make a statement, before we actually sign, that their document contains statements which we consider false, and that our signature does not alter these facts. Release of the crew and publication of the signed North Korean document would follow. Our repudiation would be released to the press simultaneously with their document. We would have settled the problem through mutual acceptance of two wholly inconsistent statements.

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We doubt that the North Koreans would accept this alternative, but they might. If they did, we would have paid a substantial but not exorbitant price to close out the problem.

The most dangerous aspect of such a proposal is that it places on the negotiating record an offer by us to sign their document. The North Koreans are certain to regard this as an indication that we are gradually knuckling under and they will simply press us to remove our attached condition--the repudiation. The "squeeze play" described above does much to meet this danger, but perhaps not enough. The North Koreans may well feel that if they disregard our ultimatum we will come back after Christmas or after January 20 with an unconditional offer to apologize.

We believe that this additional offer of a "repudiated apology" has a better chance of success than the others, but the costs to us in foreign policy terms would still be serious. We therefore are inclined to adopt the following more limited package, despite its relatively small chance of success, i.e., to say to the North Koreans that we are prepared to accept either of the following alternatives provided that it will result in the release of the crew before Christmas. If neither of these offers is accepted, they will both be withdrawn after Christmas and the North Koreans will then have to deal with the new Administration. The proposals would be:

- a. Our present overwrite proposal.
- b. A conditional apology similar to that offered last May, but in new language.

You may wish to discuss this problem with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford.

Under Secretary

Enclosure:
1. Tab A - "Should We Apologize?"

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TAB A

SHOULD WE APOLOGIZE?

Nature of the Case

The arguments in favor of signing the North Korean document come down to two propositions:

a. It is the only humane thing to do since it is clear that unless we sign the North Koreans will not release the crew--certainly not for a long time.

b. It is disadvantageous politically for us to let the affair drag on.

The argument against signing comes down to the single proposition that this Government should not solemnly place its authorized signature on a document it knows to be false, particularly if acting under blackmail and duress.

Apart from these, there are many secondary arguments--about the credibility gap, about the effects in South Korea and on our commitments in general, etc. In our judgment, these arguments tend to balance each other off or to fall in the category "an apology wouldn't really be so bad because..." They thus should not be decisive in determining whether we apologize or not.

The Argument for Apologizing

Only when we sign their document will we get the crew back. If only because the North Korean charges are lies, they will insist on a piece of paper from us validating their lies. They have been and will remain wholly inflexible on this point. We have no means of pressure which look promising. All reasonable people know the North Korean charges are false and that we would be signing purely from humanitarian considerations. We would not be seriously damaged by a signature and we owe it to the crew and their families to pay this price for their release.

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Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 29 #324.

SECRET/NO DIS
GROUP 1

By JC NARA, Date 2-12-01

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Moreover, there are political problems in allowing the matter to stagnate. It reminds people of our impotence and generates pressure for unwise actions, such as seizing North Korean ships. Better to cut the knot, even at some cost.

Assessing the case. It is probably true that the North Koreans will not soon accept any compromise, such as our overwrite proposal. And we do not seem to have any effective pressures against them. The humanitarian argument is the most valid argument for signature.

We do not believe the political argument is valid. If we resolve neither to apologize nor to do anything that might risk war or violate our basic principles, the political pressures can be contained.

The Argument Against Apologizing

The evil effects of signing a false document under pressure would be widespread, insidious, and long-lasting. Most foreign governments and even many Americans are puzzled by our reluctance to utter untruths but they respect us for this eccentricity. The Communist doctrine that truth is relative and can legitimately be manipulated is a major difference between them and us. If we sign we will have seriously damaged our good name.

Assessing the case. Many reasonable people find this argument vague and idealistic. We find it profoundly true. If we were to apologize, the price paid for freeing the men would be substantial, though hard to define. It would not be costly in the short run since the general relief and gratification that they were free would combine with their own revelations to override the negative elements. Nor would it impair faith in our security commitments which are on quite another level of solemnity and gravity. But over the long run the fact that in this case we had bent our principles for tactical, even though humanitarian, considerations would have to be counted, a serious cost. Whether we owe it to the men to pay this price, or should look on them as on other prisoners of war, is a question to which individual consciences and political philosophies will give varying answers. The price in international political terms would be considerable.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INFO: Amembassy SEOUL

NODIS/CACTUS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

BY 93-295

By JW NARA, Date 3894

2122

1. Twenty-sixth private meeting convened at Panmunjom December 17 at 1100 hours Korean time.
2. General Pak opened meeting by stating there was no alternative to signing North Korean document if crew is to be released. General Woodward then made following proposal: (A) We are prepared to make North Korean Draft Document of Apology and Assurance the basis for solution and he will be authorized to sign his name on that document provided that he writes above his name the phrase "I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew." (B) If this is not acceptable to the North Koreans, then he will be authorized simply to sign his name, making a formal statement before signature along the following lines: (1) the US Government does not consider that the Pueblo was engaged in illegal activities, (2) the USG has not seen convincing evidence that the ship intruded into the waters claimed by Pak's authorities, and (3) the USG cannot apologize for an action unless that action actually took place.

Drafted by: <i>WAS</i>	Tel. Ext. 5029	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>WAF</i> EA - Winthrop G. Brown
Clearances: EA/K - JFLeonard <i>[Signature]</i>		S/S - Mr. Walsh <i>[Signature]</i>

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3. Following recess, Pak indicated North Korean acceptance proposal (B). Woodward agreed to sign to the right of signature block in accordance with Korean custom. Pak then said that agreement in principle had been reached on signing and questions of procedure could be considered. Woodward read statement he would make on signing in accordance with proposal (B) and passed copy to Pak, who made no comment. After discussion of procedures, Pak said he would comment on our proposals re procedures and on administrative questions at next meeting.
4. General Woodward strongly urged that next meeting be held December 18. Pak did not agree and said he would let us know when ready. He appeared to understand urgency as well as need for secrecy which Woodward emphasized.
5. Meeting recessed at 1342 hours Korean time. Twenty-seventh private ^{now} meeting/scheduled for December 19 at 1100 hours Korean time.
6. Although there is possibility that North Korean side may not maintain secrecy, we consider it of the utmost importance that there are no leaks prior to next private meeting. Accordingly we are not briefing any embassies on substance contained above. We will refuse to comment in response to press inquiries and not repeat not indicate whether progress made or breakthrough near. You should be guided accordingly. We will keep you informed on further progress and any announcements that may be made.

RUSK

End.

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Pueblo - M. Sullivan
papers S/S

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E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-155

By ju NARA, Date 9-10-92

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SECRET/NODIS

December 18, 1968

TO : The Secretary
 FROM : The Under Secretary
 SUBJECT : Pueblo Negotiations - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The North Koreans have agreed to a meeting tonight at 9:00 p.m. Washington time. This meeting should tell us whether our latest offer to them is really accepted in detail as well as "in principle." There might be some serious hitch or there may be some hard bargaining over secondary points. We tend to believe, however, that it is a real possibility that we will have firm agreement after tonight and we may have a time designated for actual release, perhaps tomorrow night.

If agreement is reached tonight, we plan to announce simply that fact and the scheduled time of release. Our announcement would read:

"Agreement has been reached at Panmunjon that the crew of the USS Pueblo will be freed there at _____ hours local time on December _____."

We will hope that the North Koreans in their more or less simultaneous announcement will confine themselves to the above, plus (perhaps) a statement that an appropriate document will be signed.

If they do so confine themselves, we plan to make absolutely no further comment until the time of signature and release.

If, on the other hand, the North Korean radio begins to say that we have agreed to apologize, we will probably

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have to supplement our bare-bones announcement. We may feel that a low-key reaction will be adequate -- for example, a statement by "a high official" that the North Korean propaganda is wrong or misleading. Or at the other extreme, we might (as we have threatened in the negotiations) release formally the full text of the statement General Woodward is to make before signing (Tab A). The North Korean document is at Tab B.

As soon as the crew is freed, we plan to release both Woodward's statement and the North Korean document. The texts of a press release and of a possible Presidential statement at that moment are being prepared.

EA/K:JLeonard -(on EA copies only)

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18 DEC 1968: Contents of the 26th Closed Panmunjum Meeting. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Report

December 18, 1968

Recipient: Prime Minister
Subject: Contents of the 26th Closed Panmunjum Meeting
I hereby report as follows:

The U.S. Embassy in South Korea informed us on December 17, 1968 in the afternoon of the contents of the 26th closed Panmunjum meetings as follows;

1. The 26th closed Panmunjum meeting was held on December 17 from 11:00 to 13:45.
2. At this meeting, they did not come to any conclusion and decided that they would hold another meeting next time. /End/

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Reclassified as common document

**A summary of the talks between Yoon, Director of Bureau of Europe and America,
and Councilor Judd of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea(section #: 729.55, record
#: 2663)**

p.328

Date: 10:00 ~ 10:30, December 19, 1968

Venue: Office of the Director, Bureau of Europe and Asia

Councilor Judd: The U.S. Minister-Counselor to South Korea (Restan?) is going to visit Vice Minister Jin and there will detailed talks regarding the Panmunjum meetings.

Director Yoon: (1) If it is the case, I will not ask you about the Closed Panmunjum Meetings here. In this present situation that hostility toward the North Korean puppet regime being extremely heightened, I would like to emphasize, in particular, that the closed meeting regarding the release of the PUEBLO crew is a subject of unusual interest, regardless of its contents.

(2) In addition, with respect to the negotiation at Panmunjum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy in South Korea are the official route for the exchange of information and mutual discussion, which I feel, to be honest, has been overlooked lately. I hope you carry out further discussions in a normal route, mutually set by both countries. As you may know well, when this issue was placed to Panmunjum, as our government repeatedly requested, both parties are supposed to be sufficiently informed mutually of this closed meeting and discuss it in advance, aren't we?

Our greatest concern is what happens if the crew of the PUEBLO is released all of sudden, without knowing any actual details and any guideline for the public opinion in South Korea and, if it happened right now, you can possibly imagine how difficult the position of our government will be.

If we, as a person in charge of actual matters, suddenly face these things without any time given for prior arrangement, there will be huge troubles in the following operation for the practical actions.

(3) I stress, in particular, that the PR afterwards is extremely important

in this issue, and we should collaborate in advance since South Korean people are informed that this issue will be settled in an honorable way, so it will be awkward if both of the United States and South Korea make public announcements in opposite and inconsistent ways, furthermore, due to this, we should not give such impressions that there are some conflicts between the U.S. and South Korean governments.

(4) If we have seen the announcements made with respect to this issue up to now, always after the Department of State made statements, our newspapers found out the facts through the foreign press, so the South Korean press has become discontent with this problem already. So I think it will be nice if, at least, an announcement regarding the meeting to be held can be made here in South Korea.

Councilor Judd: I agree on the point that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy had close contact. And I hope we will do so in the future. I agree to make a press announcement in Seoul after the meeting is held. As long as you consider that the spokesman of the Department of State usually makes a public announcement on the following day at noon (2:00AM on the previous day in Korean time), the announcement is fine.

(It is decided that both parties will mutually discuss the particulars of announcement on every occasion and make announcement in Seoul as well.)

Councilor Judd: When it comes that the crew of the PUEBLO will be released, we will hold sufficient discussions in advance with the South Korean government to discuss a number of issues to be followed, so you need not worry.

(During the phone conversation that Director Yoon made to the Councilor Judd at 12:20PM)

Councilor Judd: The 27th meeting began at 11 o'clock and it is still going on at present.

At 5:00PM, Councilor Judd agreed that both governments of the United States and South Korea will make a joint public announcement with respect to the 27th Closed Meeting as follows.

- 1) The 27th meeting was held on December 19, from 11:00AM to 15:50PM.
- 2) It is agreed to hold the next meeting in the near future.

20 DEC 1968: Beginning of the 27th Closed Panmunjum Meeting.

Title: The 28th Closed Panmunjum Meeting

December 22, 1968

10:30: (Councilor Judd reported to Director Yoon by telephone) The 28th meeting is going to be held at 11:00AM today.

13:00: (Councilor Judd reported to Director Yoon by telephone) The 28th meeting ended at 12:29PM. There will be no more meeting. Arrangements for release have been made. Ambassador Porter will visit the Prime Minister and discuss this.

14:30: (Councilor Judd reported to Director Yoon by telephone) Ambassador Porter sent the Prime Minister a message in document.

17:00: (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Jin Peel Sik received it from the Prime Minister) The contents of the message Ambassador Porter delivered to the Prime Minister are as follows:

Those notified verbally during the meeting: General Woodward made a statement as he came to sign. Its content is that, since the document was drafted and completed by the North Korean Puppet Regime, the United States has no reason to apologize to them, and to sign it is only to release the crew.

Those notified by a document: I am informed from Washington that the Republic of Korea government will be free to issue a statement, but that it is requested to be careful about the timing. Washington will issue states at 10:00PM. Seoul time to the effect that the "there was a meeting at Panmunjum today and arrangements have been made to receive the crew of the USS Pueblo at 11:00AM on December 23, 1968; the further comments will not be made until that time.

21:00: (Vice Minister Jin phoned Ambassador Porter for the confirmation as a matter of procedure in the official resident of the Minister of Foreign Affairs)

Vice Minister: How did the release of the crew of the USS Pueblo go? I would like to confirm those you reported to Prime Minister Chung to be sure.

Porter: I reported that there was a meeting for arrangements to release the crew of the USS Pueblo tomorrow.

Vice Minister: I heard that it would be tomorrow at 11:00AM?

Porter: Oh, Yes. Tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. It's all the same anyway. 11 o'clock, that's correct.

Vice Minister: Then, I'll give a press release tonight at 10:00PM that the government was reported that the crew of the USS Pueblo would be released tomorrow at 11:00AM.

Porter: No objection.

22:00: (A press release was given as above)

*목록에 없는 서류

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Urgent

Number: USW-12127

Date: 221200

Recipient: Minister (the Blue House, Prime Minister Office, Korea Central National Intelligence, National Defense)

Addressor: Ambassador to the United States

1. The U.S. Department of State announced at 8:00AM on December 22 that the crew of the PUEBLO would be released at 9:00 PM (local time) on December 22.
2. According to the contact from Leonard, Korean Desk Director, the U.S. Department of State gave instructions to the U.S. Ambassador to Korea at 2:00AM on December 22 to contact the Korean government concerning the announcement of the release.
3. After the take over of the crew, a statement of the President Johnson and the long announcement regarding true aspects and negotiation process of the secretary Rusk are scheduled, therefore, this announcement will be conducted after it is confirmed that all crew are taken over to the U.S. side in Panmunjum.
4. With respect to the recent negotiation of the release, Ambassador Porter is telling the Prime Minister. (미일, Information, 방인)

Previous notice: reclassified as common documents (after the take over of the crew)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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N O D I S/CACTUS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION THERE FOLLOWS A STATEMENT BY SECRETARY
 RUSK TO ALL NEWS MEDIA ON PRISONER RELEASE EMBARGOED FOR AFTER
 9:00 P.M., EST.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND I ARE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THE UNITED
 STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT PANMUNJOM HAS JUST OBTAINED THE
 RELEASE OF THE 82 OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE USS PUEBLO WHO LAST
 JANUARY WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED WITH THEIR SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS.

THE MEN WILL STOP FIRST AT AN AMERICAN ARMY HOSPITAL NEAR
 SEOUL AND WILL FLY FROM THERE TO SAN DIEGO AFTER ANY IMMEDIATE
 MEDICAL NEEDS HAVE BEEN MET. THE BODY OF SEAMAN DUANE D. HODGES,
 WHO LOST HIS LIFE AT THE TIME THE SHIP WAS CAPTURED, HAS ALSO
 BEEN RETURNED.

THE MEN WERE RELEASED AFTER LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS.
 THE NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATOR INSISTED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT
 THE MEN WOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS THE UNITED STATES FALSELY
 CONFESSED TO ESPIONAGE AND TO VIOLATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN
 TERRITORY AND APOLOGIZED FOR SUCH ALLEGED ACTIONS.

WE NECESSARILY REFUSED THESE DEMANDS. WE REPEATEDLY OFFERED
 TO EXPRESS OUR REGRETS IF SHOWN VALID EVIDENCE OF A TRANS-
 GRESSION. BUT THIS GOVERNMENT HAD -- AND HAS NOW -- NO RELIABLE
 EVIDENCE THAT THE PUEBLO IN ANY WAY VIOLATED HER SAILING ORDERS
 AND INTRUDED INTO WATERS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA.

AFTER TEN MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS, DURING WHICH WE MADE EVERY
 SORT OF REASONABLE OFFER, ALL OF WHICH WERE HARSELY REJECTED,
 WE HAD COME SQUARELY UP AGAINST A MOST PAINFUL PROBLEM:
 HOW TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE CREW WITHOUT HAVING THIS GOVERN-
 MENT SEEM TO ATTEST TO STATEMENTS WHICH SIMPLY ARE NOT TRUE. THEN,
 WITHIN HE PAST WEEK, A WAY WHICH DOES JUST THAT WAS FOUND,
 AND A STRANGE PROCEDURE WAS ACCEPTED BY THE NORKTH
 KOREANS. APPARENTLY THE NORTH KOREANS BELIEVE THERE
 IS PROPAGANDA VALUE EVEN IN A WORTHLESS DOCUMENT

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WHICH GENERAL WOODWARD PUBLICLY LABELED FALSE BEFORE HE SIGNED IT.

GENERAL WOODWARD SAID:

"THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE PEUBLO, AS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PANMUNJOM AND IN PUBLIC, HAS BEEN THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, THAT THERE IS NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE SHIP AT ANY TIME INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA, AND THAT WE COULD NOT APOLOGIZE FOR ACTIONS WHICH WE DID NOT BELIEVE TOOK PLACE. THE DOCUMENT WHICH I AM GOING TO SIGN WAS PREPARED BY THE NORTH KOREANS AND IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE ABOVE POSITION BUT MY SIGNATURE WILL NOT AND CANNOT ALTER THE FACTS. I WILL SIGN THE DOCUMENT TO FREE THE CREW AND ONLY TO FREE THE CREW."

IF YOU ASK ME WHY THESE TWO CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS PROVED TO BE THE KEY TO EFFECT THE RELEASE OF OUR MEN, THE NORTH KOREANS WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN IT. I KNOW OF NO PRECEDENT IN MY 19 YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE. THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT THE MEN ARE FREE AND OUR POSITION ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE IS UNCHANGED.

WE REGRET THAT THE SHIP ITSELF, USS PUEBLO, HAS NOT YET BEEN RETURNED; THAT WILL HAVE TO BE PURSUED FURTHER.

DURING THESE PAINFUL MONTHS, I MET WITH THE FAMILIES OF A NUMBER OF THE CREW. I WANT TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH RELATIVES HAVE SHOWN TOWARD OUR EFFORTS TO FREE THE MEN, EVEN AT TIMES WHEN IT SEEMED THAT THESE EFFORTS WERE GETTING NOWHERE.

AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DESERVE A WORD OF THANKS. THIS HAS BEEN A MOST FRUSTRATING EPISODE. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW AMONG US WHO COUNSELLED EITHER VIOLENT REPRISALS, WHICH COULD NOT SAVE THE MEN, OR ABJECT SURRENDER TO NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS. BUT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE HAVE KEPT THEIR HEADS. AND THE CREW HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED IN TIME TO HAVE CHRISTMAS WITH THEIR LOVED ONES.

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SENDS				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS			
SUBJECT: VUNC POLICY GUIDANCE, 23 DECEMBER 1968				DIST: DJS CJCS			
1. (C) PUEBLO: DRAW ON MAIN ELEMENTS OF VOA				SJCS CSA			
COMMENTARY AND STATEMENTS BY RUSK, GENERAL				OSD/ISA			
WOODWARD, CMDR. BUCHER, AND MCCLOSKEY TO				STATE			
HIGHLIGHT FOLLOWING: A. RUSK'S STATEMENT THAT				USIA			
THE NK APPARENTLY BELIEVE THERE IS PROPAGANDA				J-5			
VALUE IN WORTHLESS DOCUMENT WHICH GENERAL				SACSA			
WOODWARD PUBLICLY LABELED FALSE BEFORE SIGNING.				WHITE HOUSE			
B. NK WAS FULLY INFORMED IN ADVANCE - DEC 17 -				(10)			
THAT GENERAL WOODWARD WOULD REPUDIATE PUBLICLY				COORD: USIA/IOP/G			
BEFORE NEWSMEN AND WITNESSES ANY DOCUMENT HE				MILTON CHASE			
DECLASSIFIED				182-4879			
Authority <u>Group 4</u>				USIA/IAF			
P. X. NARA. Date <u>3660</u>				IVAN IZENBERG			
				182-3440			
				8249			
DATE		TIME		DATE		TIME	
23		1655		23		1655	
MONTH		YEAR		MONTH		YEAR	
DEC		1968		DEC		1968	
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES		PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES	
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D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE			SIGNATURE			
	G. A. WILTSE MAJOR, USAF SACSA/RD DIV/PSYOPS BR.			<i>Frederic J Brown</i>			
PHONE 74047			TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE				
			FREDERIC J BROWN				
			LTC USA				
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				
CONFIDENTIAL							

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and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

SIGNED; NK ACCEPTED THIS PLAN ALTHOUGH TOLD
 WOODWARD'S DISCLAIMER WOULD EMPHASZE: (1) THE
 PERSISTENT US POSITION THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
 THAT THE PUEBLO HAD AT ANY TIME INTRUDED INTO
 TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMED BY NK. (2) THE US
 COULD NOT APOLOGIZE FOR ACTIONS WHICH THE US
 BELIEVES NEVER TOOK PLACE.

C. CMDR. BUCHER'S STATEMENT THAT AT NO TIME DID
 THE PUEBLO ENTER WATERS WITHIN 13 MILES OF THE
 NK COASTLINE OR OF THE NK OFFSHORE ISLANDS; HE
 CONFESSED TO A VIOLATION OF NK WATERS SOLELY TO
 SAVE HIS CREWMEN FROM PHYSICAL HARM. D. THE
 EMPHASES OF ALL TOP US SPOKESMEN THAT THE FACTS
 OF THE CASE CALL NEITHER FOR AN ADMISSION OF
 GUILT NOR AN APOLOGY. E. ROK WAS KEPT FULLY
 INFORMED THROUGHOUT ALL NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS
 BEEN EXTREMELY UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATIVE.

2. (C) US BASES IN JAPAN: AT NINTH MEETING
 OF US-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
 MEETING HELD IN TOKYO MONDAY US PRESENTED PLAN
 FOR RETURN, JOINT USE OR RELOCATION OF ABOUT 50

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3	6249	
REGRAIDING INSTRUCTIONS			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

FACILITIES AND AREAS. JAPAN WELCOMED PLAN AS CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD. ANY COVERAGE SHOULD STRESS THAT PLAN IS PROPOSAL ONLY AND THAT US-JAPAN JOINT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ASKED TO WORK OUT CONCRETE STEPS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FACILITIES AND AREAS CONCERNED. GP-4

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO. 3	NO. OF PAGES 3	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION 6249	INITIALS
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL	

78a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1968

16377

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Review of United States Policy
Toward Korea: Status Report

Last February, upon his return from Seoul, Mr. Vance recommended to you that we reassess our policy toward Korea. You asked me to take responsibility for this task. This assessment has been going forward under the direction and supervision of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

As a result of the work, the issues are now well understood. A considerable amount of highly technical analysis--economic, military and political--remains to be completed but these studies, too, are now well under way. Thus, we should be able to present your successor with incisive, well-grounded policy options and with detailed program recommendations to carry out these options.

This memorandum is in the nature of an interim report--to tell you what we have accomplished to date and what remains to be done.

Importance of Korea

I need not dwell on the extent of our Korean involvement and its dangers. Our intelligence both as to intent and capability needs improvement, but it does seem clear that North Korea remains aggres-

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-103

By sj, NARA Date 7-2-01

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sively bent on swallowing the South. Over the past year Pyong Yang has significantly stepped up its provocative actions. South Korean patience is running thin. We are tied to South Korea's defense by treaty commitments and perhaps even more by history. Our military presence in Korea still numbers over 50,000. [REDACTED]

34(b)(5)(b)

[REDACTED] Last year we provided some \$350 million in military and economic assistance (plus the special \$100 million military assistance appropriation you sought of the Congress).

We should be proud of our efforts in Korea. The Koreans have used our assistance well. Their economy is growing at near fantastic rates and the prospects for ultimate viability are excellent. Korean military forces are among the best in the world, as their 50,000 troops in Viet-Nam more than attest.

Our Objectives in Korea

Our objectives in Korea are:

- To keep South Korea out of hostile hands;
- To reduce the probability of large-scale North-South hostilities;
- To maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea;
- To increase ROK ability to defend itself;
- To promote South Korean economic and political development;
- To encourage a greater Japanese contribution to ROK security and prosperity.

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Some Tentative Conclusions

The conclusion which I and the other members of the SIG draw from this record is this:

There must be no question about the strength and importance of our commitment to the security of South Korea in the face of an aggressive adversary. But, as time goes by, it is appropriate to reconsider the question of whether our present posture decided many years ago is still an optimal one for meeting our commitment.

The answer could well turn out to be that it is. But the SIG believes that there is here a real and pressing question of national policy and strategy which will bear further examination by the next Administration.

-- The Republic of Korea (ROK) has made great progress in all areas. Increasingly, she has the strength--and should be encouraged--to stand on her own two feet.

-- Our knowledge about North Korean military capabilities is limited and may not be altogether reliable. This raises questions about what the military balance--with and without United States forces--actually is and how, if necessary, it should be improved.

-- Our present policy effectively ties down in Korea two United States divisions, which are not available for use elsewhere. They require substantial expenditures for support both in Korea and the United States.

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-- Our present posture leaves us little choice as to whether and how to become involved on the ground in the event large-scale hostilities reoccur on the Peninsula.

Whether or not we consciously change our strategy, the United States will face important decisions in Korea over the next few years. Sooner or later, the ROK divisions in Viet-Nam will return home. We will have to make choices on the kinds of force structures--both ROK and U.S.--we should maintain. The prospects for the Korean MAP--so essential to our defense policy toward Korea--are uncertain and we need to consider whether to try to transfer this program completely to the Defense Department budget. Some of our policy options require considerable lead time (e.g. MAP), and the new Administration will have to act soon if the United States wants to maintain these options.

Uncertainties

There are a number of uncertainties which hinder reaching definitive conclusions on any changes in policy:

-- First, as already indicated, our limited intelligence makes it difficult to estimate the precise nature of the threat to South Korea.

-- Second, there is the even greater difficulty of determining the likely effect on North Korean, USSR, and Communist Chinese attitudes, intentions, and policies, of any change in our military posture.

-- Third, the outcome in Viet-Nam may affect the general climate in East Asia including Korea.

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-- Fourth, the 1971 Korean Presidential election raises serious questions about the continuation of political stability in Korea.

-- Fifth, our position in Japan or Okinawa-- now essential to Korea's defense--could well be eroded in coming years.

Some Key Issues

The critical problem to resolve is whether it is possible to substitute improved Korean combat forces in whole or in part for our forces now in Korea and still maintain a combined ROK-U.S. strength adequate to provide deterrence and, if necessary, deal with the likely military threats. This question in turn raises a host of subsidiary questions.

-- Is the United States combat presence, 15 years after the Korean War, an irreplaceable element of deterrence against North Korean attack?

-- If our forces are reduced or withdrawn, will we be politically able in the United States to reintroduce them should hostilities again break out?

-- How much of a South Korean defense is needed to replace United States forces and what will it cost? What kind of United States force capabilities would we want to keep in readiness against certain major military contingencies such as a combined Chicom-North Korean attack? [redacted]

3.4(b)(5)(6)

[redacted]

-- Is it feasible to reduce the margin of uncertainty about North Korean military capabilities by a stepped-up intelligence effort?

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-- What would be the effect of a United States troop withdrawal from Korea on our position in Asia?

In addition, there are several subsidiary questions:

-- To what extent is a "trade-off" between US and ROK forces compatible with our objectives for Korean political stability and development?

-- Similarly, what share of the cost of its own military needs can we ask the ROK to assume without impairing her now very favorable economic prospects?

-- And, finally, how can we obtain the necessary funds to assist the ROK in a multi-year program for the improvement of her forces?

Remaining Efforts

I have listed only some of the more fundamental problems involved in any policy change. They are not easy to resolve. To deal with them in an orderly manner we need a more detailed look at these and similar problems. The SIG has commissioned an inter-agency group to assess them and to determine, as precisely as the subject allows, the technical and political feasibility, requirements, costs, advantages and disadvantages, of various policy options in Korea.

The end-product of our whole review effort will be alternative five-year programs for ROK and United States forces and for United States economic and military assistance programs which can serve as the basis for decision-making by the new Administration.


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Parenthetically, I am hopeful that the inter-agency study effort will also shed light on how to improve our whole approach to integrated country planning and programming in areas where security, economic, and political considerations so greatly overlap.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence concur in this memorandum.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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Previous notice: reclassified as common document (after the take over of the crew)

26 DEC 1968: Contents of Meeting Between Councilor Thomas M. Judd and Director Yoon Ha-jung. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

A summary of the talks between H.J. Yoon, Director of Bureau of Europe and America, and Councilor Thomas M. Judd of the U.S. Embassy in Korea

Date: 11:30-12:05, December 26, 1968

Venue: Office of the Director

Director Yoon: I received well the explanatory document sent with your initials on it about the North Korean Puppet Regime's document, and used it adequately in the National Assembly. By the way, as I said a few times by phone, this document needs more formality. I told you several times as I received such an instruction from the superior office. If Ambassador Porter lodges an objection, the Republic of Korea government intends to call for an explanation from the United States government officially in document.

Councilor Judd: It's all right. Once the document has been delivered, I can deliver it to Washington and give a reply after I receive instructions from Washington. As legal issues are involved, I should inquire to Washington.

Director Yoon: The reasons why the Republic of Korea wants to add more formality to this document are largely as follow;

First, at present, opposition party members are debating about this issue in the National Assembly. Therefore, to prepare for it, after the Republic of Korea government received a clear explanation about the position of the United State government, the Republic fo Korea government has to explain its own position and the United States' position clearly. Under these circumstances, a clear explanatory document from the United States will strengthen the position of the

Republic of Korea government.

Second, as the North Korean Puppet Regime is propagandizing everyday with the document General Woodward signed, the Republic of Korea government should be equipped with a clear document from the United States to show to its people.

Third, everything arrives at an understanding between your government and my government at the moment. But when someone sees the document of the North Korean Puppet Regime in five or ten years after the current situation become vague, there is a worry that the United States government may appear to have actually recognized the North Korean Puppet Regime. To cope with the situation, a clear explanatory document by the United States government should be possessed.

But, this does not mean that the Republic of Korea government doubts the United States government. I hope you believe that the Republic of Korea government always acts based on the basic trust between the two governments.

Councilor Judd: I understand well.

Director Yoon: I sensed such mutual trust and thanked you when you immediately sent me notes on 23rd and 24th and gave me an explanation on my oral demand. As I requested by phone:

- (1) The signing of the document does not mean to recognize the North Korean Puppet Regime or to approve their "territorial waters"; and
- (2) The document is invalid.

To confirm the above two points clearly will be enough. How about meeting up tomorrow and making a draft together in a way you wants, not to embarrass you or your embassy as the Republic of Korea government issues a note of demand?

Councilor Judd: It will be good. Let's do it at 9:40 tomorrow.

(In addition, Director Yoon explained the National Assembly's response to the release of the crew of the USS Pueblo according to the questions in the Committee of Foreign Affairs on December 24)

27 DEC 1968: Contents of Meeting Between Councilor Thomas M. Judd and Director Yoon Ha-jung. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

A summary of the talks between Yoon, Director of Bureau of Europe and America, and Councilor Judd of the U.S. Embassy in Korea

Date: 10:00 ~ 10:30, December 27, 1968

Venue: Office of the Director, Bureau of Europe and Asia

Director Yoon: There was much debate related to the release of the PUEBLO crew in the national press, as well as the National Assembly, for a few days lately. Especially, the effect of the document of the North Korea puppet regime signed by General Woodward was aggressively questioned, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is answering with the same logic as the U.S. side and putting forth intensive efforts so that South Korean people are not suspicious, as your Embassy may know well.

Councilor Judd: We are grateful that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister are working hard on this issue, and the position of the U.S. government has been made public by a variety of information through the United States Information Service.

Director Yoon: To be honest, the situation is that our Minister and Prime Minister are answering the questions based that information and those newspaper articles, and because we do not possess any document clearly explaining the position of the U.S. government given to our government [this is difficult]. Due to the lack of information, the same situation is faced regarding questions on delicate issues, in particular, such as "ransom" as well as the effect of the document of the North Korea puppet regime and, if the U.S. government presents an explicit position to the South Korean government in the form of documents, other than what the U.S. government had announced in public, it will strengthen the position of our government to publicize toward the National Assembly and South Korean people.

Councilor Judd: As I presented to you earlier, we have not paid any ransom for the release of the PUEBLO crew. The press and the National Assembly are paying great attention to this issue, but I believe that it will calm down soon.

Director Yoon: We hope so, too.

I want you to discuss the contents of the verbal note of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formally inquiring the position of the U.S. government with respect to the effect of the document of the North Korean puppet regime, signed by the General Woodward.

(We agreed to send a verbal note dated on the December 23, 1968 such as an attachment)

Reclassified as common document

30 DEC 1968: Contents of Meeting Between Councilor Thomas M. Judd and Director Yoon Ha-jung. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

A summary of the talks between Yoon, Director of Bureau of Europe and America, and Councilor Judd of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea

Date: 11:30 ~ 12:00, December 30, 1968
Venue: Office of the Director, Bureau of Europe and America

Director Yoon: With respect to the verbal note dated December 23, 1968 inquiring about the document of the North Korean puppet regime that we discussed last weekend, we decided not to send it to your Embassy, as the interpellation in the National Assembly last weekend went well, with no trouble.

Councilor Judd: I understand. I appreciate it that the South Korean administration fully supported the position of the U.S. government regarding the PUEBLO Incident this time.

Director Yoon: Do you think that there will be further Closed Panmunjum Meetings?

Councilor Judd: I am not sure, but I do not think that Closed Panmunjum Meetings will be held anymore. However, since we have this issue of the PUEBLO's release, it is necessary to raise this subject even for the record to the North Korean puppet regime, and I do not know yet in which way Washington will deal with it. Even if, on our side, we offer to hold a closed meeting, I doubt if the North Korean puppet regime will respond at this stage.

Today, a Military Armistice Commission meeting will be held. This is what the North Korean puppet regime suggested earlier, on the 26th, and has been put off till today.

I suppose the issue regarding the PUEBLO will be mentioned in this meeting. On our side, the repatriation of the vessel is still pending, and as a related issue, being cautious of the fact that a ship of the North Korea puppet regime is under construction in the Netherlands, Washington is considering measures to solve overall issues.

Director Yoon: How did it go with the additional military support that we suggested in the memorandum, dated December 10?

Councilor Judd: It is difficult to predict how it will be in the present situation, but

supposedly, there will be lots of difficulties expanding the budget for military support.

On the other hand, now General Bonesteel is making utmost efforts to hit revenues from budgets assigned to each force, as far as I know.

Reclassified as common document (December 31, 1969)

30 DEC 1968: Release of the Pueblo Crew. (section #: 729.55, record #: 2663)

Drafting Paper

Drafter: Director of the First North American Division

Approval: Minister

December 30, 1968

Recipient: the heads of embassies and overseas legations

Title: The Release of the Crew for the USS Pueblo

1. On December 23, 1968, the crew of the USS Pueblo was released to the United Nations Forces in Panmunjum 11 months after they were seized. For the measure taken following the release of the crew, please refer to the documents such as the appendix.
2. From a humanitarian point of view, the Republic of Korea government faithfully cooperated with the United States government's efforts for the release of the crew of the USS Pueblo after it was seized by the North Korean Puppet Regime in international waters on January 23, 1968. For the details for this matter, please refer to the "Diplomatic Measures of the Republic of Korea Government to the Incidents of the Infiltration of the North Korean Communist Armed Agents into the Republic of Korea and the Seizure of the USS Pueblo," which was sent to your institution several times.
3. As shown in my statement on December 23, 1968, the official position of the Republic of Korea government about the release of the crew is as follows:
The release of the crew, who suffered an extreme affront, should be blessed from a humanitarian point of view;
The government commiserates with them on their hardships;
The brutal aggressive acts and provocative activities of North Korean Puppet Regime against the Republic of Korea are under severe accusation from the international society; and
The cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States to increase their defense capacities will be continuously strengthened in order to cope with the invasion by the North Korean Puppet Regime, which will be

augmented in the future.

- 4. The Republic of Korea government, as well as the United States government, declared invalid the document that the North Korean Puppet Regime unilaterally presented before the receipt of the Pueblo crew and that Chief Delegate of the United Nations General Woodward signed (henceforth, the document of the North Korean Puppet Regime).
- 5. On the invalidity of the document of the North Korean Puppet Regime, please refer to the followings;

Ga. Considering the circumstances under which the document of the North Korean Puppet Regime was signed, it is apparent that, having kidnapped the crew and held them hostage, the North Korean Puppet Regime unilaterally drew up the document with false statements for their propaganda and threatened not to release the crew unless the document was signed. Therefore, a document signed under such circumstances is clearly invalid in the legal terms usually adopted in a civilized country.

Na. Before Chief Delegate General Woodward signed the document, the United States government repeatedly made clear the followings;

- (1) That the USS Pueblo did not commit an unlawful activity;
- (2) That there is no evident that the USS Pueblo violated the so-called "territorial waters" of the North Korean Puppet Regime; and
- (3) That the United States government cannot apologize for what did not happen.

The fact that the United States government clearly declared to the North Korean Puppet Regime that signing the document they unilaterally drew up with false statements conflicting with the above facts would not change the undeniable facts and the signing was solely in the interest of rescuing the lives of the crews made it clear that the government did never admit the false statements in the document and that the document had no effect at all.

Da. Moreover, the fact that the North Korean Puppet Regime accepted such a declaration by the Chief Delegate together with his signing of the document demonstrates the fact that they acknowledged the falsehood of the document.

Ra. The declaration by the Chief Delegate before his signing of the document presented by the North Korean Puppet Regime is a behavior similar with the so-called "reservation," which "limits or denies part of a treaty or its effect" in an international treaty or an international conference, and is therefore a valid behavior in terms of international law.

Thus, the document of December 23, 1968 that the North Korean Puppet Regime unilaterally presented and the United States government signed has no validity.

Ma. At its beginning, the document mentions the validity of the confession of the Pueblo crew as evidence and the legal effects of the document. However, regarding the latter, because the document was unilaterally drawn up by the North Korean puppet Regime, its legal effect cannot be authorized. Regarding the former, as the Pueblo Captain, Commander Bucher, made it clear that the confession itself was a false representation due to compulsion. Thus, the confession loses its legal effect.

6. Your organization is expected to proclaim the exact facts whenever possible or when the Communists, including the North Korean Puppet Regime, make false propaganda about the incident and to refute false propaganda by the Communists, taking into consideration of the above.

Attachment: a series of the documents about the measures taken on December 23, 1968

The End.