Section I

US-Soviet Bilateral Relations
1969 - 1972
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

SUMMIT

1969

11 June HAK and Dobrynin discuss US-Soviet relations, linkage, and Vietnam. HAK suggests possibility of a summit, once war is settled, as a way to improve relations. It would have to be carefully prepared. Dobrynin seems intrigued by the suggestion. (Memcon excerpts at Tab 1.)

22 Dec Dobrynin, in tour d'horizon, tells HAK that Soviets are willing in principle to consider a summit. He denies that Soviets are pleading for one, but complains that USG does not seem interested. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 2.)

1970

20 Jan Dobrynin asks HAK about report that HAK had mentioned summit plans to Japanese Ambassador. HAK reassures him that this report is false and that the question of a summit will be kept strictly within the HAK-Dobrynin channel. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 3.)

7 Apr Dobrynin, at dinner at his residence, expresses great Soviet interest in a summit and suggests October 1970 UNGA session as a possible occasion. HAK notes that US is willing in principle if it would lead to some practical result. Dobrynin suggests SALT and Mideast as agenda items; HAK suggests Vietnam; Dobrynin says Vietnam could be discussed, but could not be put on the agenda. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 4.)

9 Apr HAK indicates, in response to suggestion by Dobrynin on April 7, that if a summit is to take place in 1970, the US would prefer to handle it outside the UN and as a separate initiative. HAK suggests that President and Kosygin might break SALT deadlock and meet to ratify it at a summit; Dobrynin says he will have an answer when he returns from Moscow. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 5.)
1970

10 Jun  
On *Sequoia*, Dobrynin and HAK discuss US-Soviet relations in general, but Dobrynin does not raise summit as such. HAK emphasizes that USSR faces the choice whether to continue approach of tactical maneuvering or to make an effort at fundamental improvement in relations. (Memcon excerpt, and HAK memo to President prior to meeting, at Tab 6.)

23 Jun  
HAK sees Dobrynin to find out Soviet intentions on SALT deadlock and summit. Dobrynin says USSR genuinely wants a SALT agreement, but he is without instructions on question of breaking deadlock via summit. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 7.)

9 Jul  
HAK raises question of summit again, and states that USG had made a specific proposal believing it is early enough in the Administration to make a fundamental departure in US-Soviet relations and carry it through. In response to Dobrynin's question, HAK mentions SALT, Mideast, and European security as possible agenda items. Dobrynin promises to seek guidance from Moscow. (Memcon excerpts at Tab 8.)

13 Aug  
Vorontsov reports to HAK that question of summit is under very active discussion in Moscow at the moment, and that this is one of the reasons Dobrynin is in Moscow. HAK indicates importance of hearing from Soviets soon. Vorontsov points to Brandt visit to Moscow (for signing of Treaty) as evidence that Soviet leadership appreciates advantages of high-level meetings. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 9.)

19 Aug  
Vorontsov hands HAK a note in reply to our queries on summit; Soviets declare their "positive approach" to a summit, provided that such meetings are duly prepared, and promise to "study attentively" any concrete suggestions which President may put forward. (HAK report to President, and Soviet note, at Tab 10.)
24 Aug
Haig hands Vorontsov a written reply on summit suggesting agenda items, possible outcomes, and possible dates (November and December ruled out). Haig also delivers oral message from HAK to the effect that it might be of value to fix date during UNGA anniversary session in October, pending progress in HAK-Dobrynin channel. Vorontsov says he anticipates early response from Moscow. (Memcon and US note at Tab 11.)

25 Sep
Dobrynin informs HAK at 10:00 a.m. that Soviet Government is ready to proceed in principle with summit and is agreed in general to agenda outlined in US note. Soviets agree that HAK and Dobrynin should proceed with exploratory talks. They also suggest Moscow as site, and June, July, and September 1971 as best times. Dobrynin informs HAK that Kosygin will not be at 25th UNGA in October 1970. HAK tells Dobrynin he will consult with President. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 12.)

In late afternoon of same day (after Cienfuegos story breaks), HAK conveys President's answer on summit: President is willing to consider either June or September 1971 as appropriate date and Moscow as site. Dobrynin calls this good news. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 13.)

9 Oct
HAK emphasizes to Dobrynin that we are asking same questions about Soviet intentions that Soviet leaders are asking about ours. HAK points out that Soviets had not replied formally to our two offers of a summit during the summer; Suez missiles and Cienfuegos seemed to be the Soviet response. HAK also cautions Dobrynin against anyone's raising subject of a summit during forthcoming Gromyko visit before HAK is able to put this into formal channels. (Memcon excerpts at Tab 14.)

17 Oct
In discussion of forthcoming Gromyko visit, Dobrynin tells HAK that Gromyko will express Soviets' positive attitude toward a Moscow summit. HAK indicates President will accept in principle. HAK and Dobrynin agree that President should tell Gromyko privately that basic principles will be handled in HAK-Dobrynin channel. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 15.)
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1970

22 Oct President and Gromyko affirm agreement on summit in 1971 in Moscow. President emphasizes desirability of early announcement in order to avert leaks, but Gromyko suggests delay announcement until a week or so after his return to Moscow on October 29. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 16.)

23 Oct HAK tells Dobrynin that President is thinking of a summit announcement for October 30 in California and that US sees no need to wait for Gromyko's return to Moscow for final word. Dobrynin says he hopes to have reply by first half of following week. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 17.)

27 Oct Dobrynin conveys Soviet reply. Soviets strongly reaffirm their desire for summit and state need for careful preparation. They propose that agenda, timing, and announcement be discussed in HAK-Dobrynin channel. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 18.)

5 Nov Dobrynin asks HAK when preparatory talks for summit could begin. HAK says he will not be ready for another 3-4 weeks. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 19.)

16 Nov After sharp exchanges on press leaks on Cienfuegos HAK tells Dobrynin he would rather talk about constructive things, such as agenda for summit. Dobrynin replies he, too, would not be ready for 3-4 weeks. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 20.)

22 Dec In lengthy discussion, HAK cautions Dobrynin against leaks on Soviet side on summit. HAK also tells him that Soviets' 6-week failure to reply to U.S. summit proposal during the summer had made an extremely painful impression; Dobrynin claims that USSR did not grasp that U.S. had made concrete proposal. (Memcon excerpts at Tab 21.)

1971

23 Jan In another lengthy discussion, following Dobrynin's return from consultations, Dobrynin indicates that the Soviets prefer July 1971 for a summit meeting and reiterate their acceptance
of the agenda the U.S. proposed in August 1970. They are interested in concrete achievement, not just general goodwill, Dobrynin states, but both sides should show restraint publicly in the media and briefings in the interim. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 22.)

28 Jan HAK informs Dobrynin that President finds Dobrynin's presentation on summit positive. President agrees in principle to a summit either in late July or early September; the agenda would be as discussed between Gromyko and the President; and preliminary details are to be worked out in HAK-Dobrynin channel. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 23.)

4 Feb Dobrynin reports to HAK that Kremlin is pleased with seriousness of latest conversation in HAK-Dobrynin channel, (Feb 2, on Berlin negotiating procedures) and considers it a positive contribution to the summit being planned. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 24.)

10 Feb Dobrynin suggests to HAK that summit could be occasion for signing of SALT agreement, and asks HAK for our preference on date. HAK replies that we have no fixed idea of precise date, but late July or early August still seems best to us. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 25.)

23 Apr HAK asks Dobrynin about prospects for a summit; Dobrynin repeats Soviet invitation and reiterates that September would be reasonable date. HAK reacts sharply to Dobrynin's suggestion that a summit is unlikely until after Berlin is settled. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 26.)

26 Apr HAK emphasizes to Dobrynin that the next time the Soviets raise subject of summit they should be prepared to announce it; they should also understand that linkage to any preconditions is unacceptable. President is not prepared to discuss it further. (Memcon excerpt at Tab 27.)
1971

8 June  At Camp David with Dobrynin, HAK asks for Soviet answer on summit by end of June, or else no summit this year. U.S. much prefers September from substantive viewpoint, though next spring OK from political viewpoint. HAK again objects to suggestion that it await Berlin settlement. (MemCon excerpt at Tab 28)

21 June  HAK again presses Dobrynin for answer. U.S. prefers September, but HAK acquiesces in Dobrynin's report to Moscow that next spring is not ruled out. (MemCon excerpt at Tab 29)

5 July  Vorontsov delivers reply suggesting delay until end of 1971 and conditioning summit on further substantive progress. President, in response, gives go-ahead to early Peking summit. (Soviet note, Haig memo to President, and cables between HAK and Haig at Tab 30.)

15 July  U.S. oral note handed to Dobrynin before President's China announcement affirms U.S. willingness to continue and accelerate positive developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. (Text at Tab 31.)

19 July  Dobrynin asks HAK whether Moscow summit will have to await Peking summit. HAK says yes, adding (after checking with President) that Moscow announcement should follow setting of Peking date but can precede actual Peking trip. Dobrynin asks whether Soviet response of July 5 affected Peking decision. (Memcon and follow-up telcon at Tab 32.)

29 July  Dobrynin tells HAK Summit invitation would have been issued in 5 days after preliminary Berlin accord, but for Peking announcement. HAK objects to such petty pressures. Dobrynin admits Soviet clumsiness, but Soviets are concerned that U.S. prefers to visit Mao. (MemCon excerpt, Tab 33)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 August</td>
<td>HAK gives Dobrynin letter from President to Brezhnev on US-Soviet relations. Dobrynin foresees formal Soviet suggestion on summit within 2 weeks. HAK assures him US is receptive. (MemCon, Tab 34.)</td>
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<td>10 August</td>
<td>Dobrynin delivers note to HAK reporting that he is instructed by Moscow to reaffirm summit understanding and to offer May-June 1972. (Dobrynin's note, Tab 35.)</td>
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<td>17 August</td>
<td>HAK gives Dobrynin US draft of announcement (&quot;Soviet Gov't has invited Pres. Nixon to visit Moscow . . . Pres. Nixon has accepted with pleasure.&quot;) HAK suggests 15-16 Sept. for announcement. (U.S. draft, MemCon excerpt, Tab 36.)</td>
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<td>30 August</td>
<td>Dobrynin phones to HAK and delivers to Haig Soviet draft of announcement (&quot;now it has been agreed upon that Pres. Nixon will visit Moscow&quot;). HAK offers US counterproposal (&quot;upon the invitation of the Soviet Gov't.&quot;). Dobrynin suggests Gromyko visit (around Oct. 10) as occasion for announcement. (Soviet draft, U.S. counterproposal, telcon, Tab 37.)</td>
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<td>3 Sept.</td>
<td>HAK phones compromise language to Dobrynin (&quot;it has been agreed that such a meeting will take place . . . Pres. Nixon and Soviet leaders will review all major issues&quot;). US accepts 12 Oct. for announcement. (U.S. draft, telcons, Tab 38.)</td>
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<td>7 Sept.</td>
<td>Vorontsov phones to say Moscow accepts compromise language suggested by HAK on 3 Sept., for announcement 12 Oct. Our text sent to Vorontsov for double-checking; Vorontsov confirms by phone. (Telcons, U.S. note, Tab 39.)</td>
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<td>12 Oct.</td>
<td>President announces Moscow Summit at press briefing; TASS releases announcement in Moscow. (Transcript, TASS statement, scenario and other backup materials, Tab 40.)</td>
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*Authority: EO 12958*

*By: NARA Date:* 7/1/12
SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Analysis of Dobrynin Message

1. I am attaching the memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin (Tab A) as well as the analysis of the note-taker and a member of my staff (Tab B). They did not see the note.

2. My reaction to the note is as follows:

   a. The tone of the document is extraordinarily forthright. The Soviet approach is, as far as I can see, totally non-ideological — even anti-ideological. The arguments are posed strictly in terms of national interests and mutually perceived threats, without even the usual ritual obeisance to Marxist-Leninist jargon.

   b. The document advances the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States beyond mere detente and into the realm of overt Soviet-American cooperation in the solution of outstanding international problems and the maintenance of peace.

3. The gist of the paper is that the Soviets are prepared to move forward on a whole range of topics: Middle East, Central Europe, Vietnam, Arms Control (strategic arms talks), cultural exchange. In other words, we have the "linkage." Our problem is how to play it.

4. The document is vague about specific proposals. However, the following aspects deserve mention:

   Vietnam: There is no reference to the usual Soviet claims of American aggression. They ask for "equal position" for all parties in the negotiating. We could probe what they mean.

   Middle East: The document links Israeli withdrawal to a guaranteed existence for Israel. These are not posed as successive actions; rather they appear parts of a negotiated settlement, to be enforced by the sanctions of the Great Powers. Of course the Soviet statement leaves many loose ends, such as navigation rights in Suez, freedom of the Straits of Tiran, refugee problems, etc., but if one wishes to place the most generous
possible construction on the Soviet statement, one could conclude that these points would follow agreement on the two basic tenets. Here, as in the case of Vietnam, there is great vagueness on specifics, but a positive tone of accommodation and mutual interest. It also offers specific negotiations.

European Settlement. Here the statement comes close to offering a deal recognizing the status quo. There is not the slightest mention of the Brezhnev doctrine of "Socialist sovereignty" -- presumably because the Soviets reason it applies only within their half of Europe, which we would agree must not be disturbed. They add a particularly clear expression of Soviet disinterest in further expansion in Europe and hope for detente. They add that we were close to agreement in 1959-63. We might probe what they have in mind.

SALT. The line of seeking limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic arms, both defensive and offensive, has been used before, but not, so far as I know, advanced so strongly in the context of "mutual assurance that our security will be maintained." As they have repeated often before, the Soviets here reiterate their readiness to sit down to talk as soon as we wish.

5. The question then is what the Soviets are up to. There are two schools of thought.

The first is based on the notion that while the US-Soviet relationship is basically antagonistic and competitive, there are many areas where our interests overlap and where there is opportunity for at least tacit cooperation. The main common interest is in survival and, hence, in the prevention of war. This common interest, in turn, is held to make arms control a central issue in US-Soviet relations since the arms race is seen as a major source of potential conflict. Consequently, in this approach every effort should be made to engage the Soviets in negotiations wherever common interests occur, and especially on arms control. Moreover, every effort must be made to insulate these areas of common interests from those areas where our interests clash. It is argued, indeed, that arms control talks, even if they are not immediately successful, can serve as a firebreak to prevent confrontations from getting out of hand and spilling over into our whole relationship. It is fair to say that these are the principles on which the last Administration sought to operate, though it recognized, of course, there are limits beyond which a compartmentalization of our relations with the USSR became infeasible and counter-productive. (The invasion of Czechoslovakia was one of the limiting points.)
A rather different approach is one that holds that an excessively selective policy runs into the danger that the Soviets will use the bait of progress in one area in order to neutralize our resistance to pressure elsewhere. It holds that precisely because we remain in an antagonistic relationship the erection of firebreaks may encourage the Soviets to be more adventurous. Moreover, in this view, there is an essential connection between crises and confrontations; unless there is progress on a fairly broad front to mitigate confrontations, there is little prospect of real reduction in tensions. This view also holds that arms per se rarely cause wars (at least as long as they are kept in relative balance) and that the arms control agreements that have been reached have had singularly little effect in reducing areas of conflict and confrontation.

My own view tends toward the latter approach, and I might add that the Soviets, with their Marxist training, have little difficulty in grasping its meaning — although they have become quite skilled in conducting a policy of selective tension and selective accommodation.

I believe the current Soviet line of conciliation and interest in negotiations, especially on arms control but also on the Middle East, stems in large measure from their uncertainty about the plans of this Administration. They are clearly concerned that you may elect to undertake new weapons programs which would require new and costly decisions in Moscow; they hope that early negotiations would at least counteract such tendencies in Washington. (I doubt that there is much division on this point in the Kremlin, though there may well be substantial ones over the actual terms of an agreement with us.) In a nutshell, I think that at this moment of uncertainty about our intentions (the Soviets see it as a moment of contention between "reasonable" and "adventurous" forces here), Moscow wants to engage us. Some would argue that regardless of motive, we should not let this moment of Soviet interest pass, lest Moscow swing back to total hostility. My own view is that we should seek to utilize this Soviet interest, stemming as I think it does from anxiety, to induce them to come to grips with the real sources of tension, notably in the Middle East, but also in Vietnam. This approach also would require continued firmness on our part in Berlin.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 17, 1969
President's Office
White House
11:45 a.m. to
12:45 p.m.

SUNZOR: Ambassador Dobrynin's Initial Call
on the President

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Side:
The President
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Asst. to the President
for National Security Aff.
Mr. Malcolm Toon, Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Soviet Side:
H.E. Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador

The President greeted Ambassador Dobrynin in the Fish Room and
escorted him into his office for a brief private chat. Ambassador
Dobrynin told the President privately that, before his departure from
Moscow last week, he had spent two days at a government dacha outside
Moscow with Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny and the message that he
carried was based on his talks with the leadership. The President
should understand therefore, that what he had to say on substantive
issues was an accurate reflection of the views of the leadership.

After Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Toon joined the President, the
President gave the floor to Ambassador Dobrynin.

Dobrynin said that his government had noted with interest
President Nixon's statement that his Administration looked forward
to an era of negotiations, not confrontation. He could assure the
President that the Soviet Government shared this view and was prepared
to do its part to see to it that the period that lies ahead was

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truly
truly one of negotiations and not confrontation. This was on the understanding, of course, that the issues to be negotiated and the subjects to be discussed would be by mutual agreement, that negotiations would not be pursued simply for their own sake but for the purpose of bringing about constructive results. Past experience indicated the importance of beginning negotiations as soon as possible. Delay could be harmful, and it was important therefore to recognize the desirability of moving ahead at an early date. The Ambassador had been instructed by his government to ascertain precisely what the President had in mind by negotiations—specifically what issues the President felt should be the subject of negotiations and when, where, and at what level these should take place. So far as the Soviet Government was concerned, negotiations and an exchange of views on various subjects and at various levels could take place simultaneously. It was not excluded that at an appropriate time discussions could be carried on at the Summit level.

The President asked Ambassador Dobrynin what he meant by his statement that negotiations on various issues could be carried on simultaneously.

Dobrynin referred to the President's remarks at his first press conference concerning the Middle East situation and the arms race. The Soviet Government was prepared to use its influence on parties directly involved in the Middle East situation to help arrive at a solution of the problem. Depending on the President's views, talks on the Middle East problem could take place in New York or Washington and also in Moscow, either with the American Embassy there or with a special emissary, if the President desired to send one. With regard to the so-called arms race, the Soviet Government was prepared to reach agreement on limitation and subsequent reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic missiles. As the President was aware, certain aspects of this question had already been discussed with the previous Administration.
Both sides had agreed on the desirability of early initiation of talks on the missile problem, although there had not been full agreement on a procedural aspect, which Ambassador Dobrynin understood related to the level at which the talks should begin. In any case, he was instructed by his government to inform the President that the Soviet side was prepared to begin talks now and to ascertain from the President his ideas on where, when, and at what level talks might begin. The Soviet Government was not pressing for an early reply but, in its view, discussions of the arms control problem as well as the Middle East problem were worth pursuing and could be carried on simultaneously. Certainly, the Soviet Government was under no illusion that the solutions to either problem could be achieved overnight, but it felt that a beginning should be made. While other subjects might be discussed, and in this respect Ambassador Dobrynin was prepared to hear our own suggestions either through Mr. Kissinger or the State Department, it was his government's view that the two subjects he had mentioned -- the Middle East and the arms control -- were among the most important which should engage our early attention.

The President thanked Ambassador Dobrynin for his forthright statement of the Soviet Government's position. The President wished to make clear that his Administration began its tasks with a fresh viewpoint and with an eye to the future. Since Ambassador Dobrynin referred to a possible Summit meeting, the President wished to make clear that he shared the view that at some point a meeting of Heads of Government might be useful. The President felt, however, that such meetings must be based on a carefully prepared agenda and be preceded by adequate preparatory work on the issues to be discussed and possibly on which agreements might be reached. Without adequate preparations, Summit meetings could be harmful, since expectations of results might not be met. The President did not believe in a Summit meeting simply for the sake of bringing together the Heads of Government. Some specific purpose must be served, and the President felt
felt strongly that we should now discuss at lower levels the principal issues before us so that ultimately when there should be a Summit meeting it would have constructive results.

Secondly, the President wished to set forth in a completely candid way his view of the relationship between the two super powers, as they are now commonly referred to. We must recognize that there are basic differences between us. This has been true historically of the relationship between great powers, and it is equally true now. We both have a responsibility to moderate these differences, to see to it that they do not result in a sharp confrontation, and in the President's view the most effective way of doing this was to keep the lines of communication open. This is the task of diplomacy -- to recognize that great powers will differ and to insure that differences be resolved by peaceful means.

Finally, the President wished to stress the importance of eliminating those areas of friction where our own fundamental interests are not involved. We know from history that great powers can be drawn into a confrontation with each other as a result of actions by other nations. The President felt, for example, that it would be the height of folly to let the parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict bring about a confrontation between Moscow and Washington. It is particularly for this reason that the President attached great importance to an exchange of views, either bilaterally or in a multilateral forum on the Middle East situation.

The strategic arms problem involves primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, although both sides, of course, must consult, as necessary, with their Allies. The President wished to make clear his views on the relationship between strategic arms talks and progress on political issues. It was not his view that the initiation of such talks must be conditioned on the settlement of larger political issues. We both recognize that the principal purpose of strategic

arms
arms talks is peace, but there is no guarantee that freezing strategic weapons at the present level alone would bring about peace. History makes clear that wars result from political differences and political problems. It is incumbent upon us, therefore, when we begin strategic arms talks to do what we can in a parallel way to defuse critical political situations such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if his understanding was correct that the President favored simultaneous discussion of the problems which the President had mentioned. The Ambassador recognized, of course, that it might not be possible to discuss all problems at the same time, and he was not pressing the President to set the exact time for beginning arms talks. He wanted simply to clarify his own understanding of the linkage between arms talks and negotiations on political issues. His government, of course, would be interested in having a more precise idea as to when the President would be prepared to begin an exchange of views on the missile problem, even if preliminary and at the level of experts.

The President replied that it was his hope that we would soon be able to decide the question of timing. First, of course, the Administration would wish thoroughly to examine the whole problem and our position on it. This would probably have to await his return from Europe. In any case, as Ambassador Dobrynin was aware, Mr. Gérard Smith had just recently been appointed Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and he was now engaged in reviewing our entire position on arms control issues.

With regard to the Middle East situation, the President wished to review the question of modalities for our bilateral discussions with Ambassador Yost and others. The President is gratified to learn that the Soviets are prepared to do what they can to cool the situation, and certainly the President himself would do everything in his power to bring this about.
On Viet-Nam the President recognized that the Soviet position was somewhat more delicate than our own since the Soviets were not directly involved in the problem. The President knew, however, that the Soviet Government has an interest in terminating the conflict and had played a helpful role in getting the Paris talks started. For our part, we are prepared to go "the extra mile" in Paris; but the Soviets should understand clearly that the American public will not tolerate endless discussions there. The Administration's determination is to bring the conflict to an end, one way or another. We hope that the Soviets will do what they can to get the Paris talks off dead-center.

Dobrynin said he would like to speak briefly of the Soviet position on the Paris talks. The Soviet Government had welcomed their initiation and it was their view that if all participants in the Paris talks would face realities and treat each other on an equal basis, then the Soviets might be in a position to play a constructive role.

Dobrynin said that he agreed generally with the President's statement that progress in one area is bound to affect progress in other areas. He thought, however, that it was useful to make a beginning and it would be wise not to begin with the most difficult issues. Often small steps can have influence.

The President said that he wished to make clear that it was not his view that agreement on one issue must be conditioned by settlement of other issues. The President wished to express his conviction, however, that progress in one area is bound to have an influence on progress in all other areas. The current situation in Berlin is a case in point. If the Berlin situation should deteriorate, Senate approval of the Non-proliferation Treaty would be much more difficult. The President wished to make clear that he favored early ratification of the treaty and he is optimistic that the Senate will act favorably in the near future. We should bear...
bear in mind, however, that just as the situation in Czechoslovakia had influenced the outlook for the treaty last fall, so would the situation in Berlin now have an important bearing on the Senate's attitude. Ambassador Dobrynin had mentioned the desirability of making progress on some issues, even if settlement of other issues should not be feasible. The Non-proliferation Treaty is just such an issue. If we can move ahead on this, it would be helpful in our efforts on other issues. The only cloud on the horizon is Berlin and the President hoped that the Soviets would make every effort to avoid trouble there.

Dobrynin said that the situation in Berlin did not stem from any action taken by the Soviets. The President would recall that a meeting was scheduled in Berlin last fall and the Secretary of State had discussed the problem with the Ambassador, urging him to persuade his government to avoid any action in connection with this meeting which might possibly result in unpleasantness in and around Berlin. The Ambassador said he would not wish his remarks to be recorded but he felt the President should know that his Government had used its influence to ensure that the situation remained calm. There was no confrontation then, and Ambassador Dobrynin saw no need for a confrontation between us in the present situation.

The President hoped that there would be no trouble in Berlin and he welcomed Ambassador Dobrynin's assurances on this point. The Soviets should understand that we are solidly behind the integrity of West Berlin, and we will do whatever is necessary to protect it. He had noted in the press references to the "provocative nature" of his visit to Berlin. The President wished to assure Ambassador Dobrynin that these stories were totally without foundation and that his visit to Berlin was a perfectly normal action for any United States President to take in connection with a visit to Europe.
The President concluded the discussion by pointing out to Dobrynin that the United States and the Soviet Union have all the power necessary to maintain peace in the world. If we play our role effectively, peace will be maintained. We do ourselves and others disservice, however, if we pretend that we agree on all the basic issues. We should rather insure that our differences do not lead to confrontation, that we are not drawn into confrontation by actions of others. We should recognize that diplomacy can play a vital role in insuring that this does not happen.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Subject: Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin, Lunch, March 3.

Ambassador Dobrynin opened the conversation by saying that the Soviet Union noted the President's trip to Europe with interest. Except for some phrases in Berlin, it had found nothing objectionable. He asked whether these phrases indicated any new commitment to German unification. I replied that the purpose of the Berlin speech was to emphasize existing American commitments, not to undertake new ones. I also told him that we viewed any harassment of Berlin with the utmost gravity. Dobrynin replied that the only concern of the Soviet Union was to prevent a change in the status quo in Berlin and elsewhere in Europe. The Bonn government had deliberately created a provocation. I replied that a clear precedent existed so that one could hardly talk of provocation.

Dobrynin then said that Moscow had noted his conversation with the President as well as the lunch with me with "much satisfaction." Moscow was ready to engage in a "strictly confidential exchange on delicate and important matters" with the President using the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel. The exchange will be kept very secret. Moscow "welcomes an informal exchange."

Moscow had noted "with due attention" my comment at the previous meeting that the United States had no interest in undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. He was authorized to assure me that in its turn, the Soviet Union had no intention of undermining the status quo in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was interested that the United

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States acted on the basis of the actual conditions in Europe. I asked
whether that meant that the Soviet Union did not care about formal
recognition of Eastern Germany. Dobrynin replied that this was
correct. I added that for us it was essential to get the access procedures
to Berlin regularized. Dobrynin suggested that there had been many
positive developments in the negotiations of 1963 to 1969 crisis that
might be re-examined. He refused to specify what those were but said
he would go over the record and give me some indication later.
He urged me to do the same, indicating that Moscow's attitude was "positive."
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET
May 23, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals

A member of my staff in analyzing preliminary results from
the current study of strategic arms limitation proposals has
tentatively concluded that:

-- some of the options that have gained the greatest
popularity within the government would appear to give the
Soviet Union significant improvements in its retaliatory
capability;

-- the most comprehensive proposal, one that bans both
MIRVs and ABMs, would leave U.S. retaliatory capability
unchanged but would improve Soviet retaliatory capability by
over 70 percent. It would leave them in a position where they
could kill more than half of the American people in a second
strike;

-- the option that looks good to us in terms of retaliatory
measures, one that retains at least 500 ABM launchers, MIRVs,
and a large U.S. bomber force, may well not be acceptable to
the Soviet Union.

Proponents of the comprehensive proposals will argue that
we should not be concerned that an agreement increases Soviet
retaliatory capability. We will be deterred from attacking them
without an agreement, they point out, and improvements in the
Soviet deterrent cannot increase the threat to us. In fact, they
argue, allowing the Soviet deterrent to improve is a reasonable
price to pay to get an agreement, since our own retaliatory
capability would not be impaired. Also, other aspects of our

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strategic capabilities, such as how well we can limit damage to ourselves if the Soviets strike first, are unchanged even with a comprehensive agreement, and these are more important yardsticks for evaluating an agreement than Soviet retaliatory capability.

My staff is still analyzing these results, because there are some important problems with the underlying analysis. In summary, my very tentative judgments would be:

1. Agreements which ban MIRVs may mean a significant decline in our second strike capability or increases in Soviet second strike capability or both.

2. Soviet second strike capability increases in all but one option, and the increases are greatest when ABMs are banned. Thus, an ABM ban would appear to be much more in the Soviet interest than in ours. In fact, it is probably not in our interest.

3. All agreements except one would increase the number of deaths we would suffer if we struck first and reduce any advantage we might gain by striking first. On the other hand, Soviet deaths in wars they start are relatively unchanged by any of the agreements, and they acquire no advantage from striking first as a result of agreements.

There is a paradox underlying these results, however. The Soviets are assumed to develop a much more effective strategic posture under an agreement than they would in the absence of an agreement. In part, this reflects the fact that Soviet forces in the absence of an agreement are based on intelligence projections made months ago, whereas Soviet forces under the agreements are recent judgments of the worst the Soviets could do and still be within the agreement. There is a real question, however, as to whether both sides might feel compelled by meanness and caution to go to the limits under an agreement and do more than they would have done otherwise. The same phenomenon occurs when rationing is in effect in wartime; people buy everything they are allowed to buy even though they have no urgent need for it all.

I question whether the strength of an American President's resolve in a crisis will be unaffected by the magnitude of Soviet nuclear retaliatory
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capability. The prospect of reaching an agreement which would "legitimize" significant increases in their capabilities may explain why the Soviets are so interested in proceeding with arms control talks. It also confirms the requirement that our own preparations be measured, orderly and thorough.

I suggest that you read the brief paper my staff prepared, which is at Tab A. The numbers in the table are taken directly from the current interagency study of strategic arms control options and have been agreed to by the agencies involved.

Enclosure

Tab A - Comments on Strategic Exchange Analysis
Dobrynin and Kissinger, 1969 - Opening the Back Channel

Send to members of the Politburo, CC CPSU and to candidate members of the Politburo, CC CPSU

July 12, 1969
A. Gromyko Secret, Copy No. 1

Memorandum of conversation
of the Ambassador of the USSR to the USA A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger, Aide to President Nixon

On the eve of my July 12 departure to Moscow, Kissinger, aide to the President, called me and expressed his wish to meet with me before I left. I agreed and the meeting took place in Kissinger's White House office (like all previous meetings with him, this meeting was unannounced). Kissinger began the conversation with a comment to the effect that President Nixon knows about my departure to the USSR and that this meeting was organized with the President's knowledge, so that, while in Moscow, the Soviet Ambassador in his report to his government could, if necessary, provide "first hand" knowledge of the President's point of view on various international questions and especially on Soviet-American relations. Kissinger said that he can with full responsibility declare, that in foreign policy--besides the settlement of the Vietnam question (on which he intended to dwell a little later)--President Nixon feels that the other basic area which demands his attention is Soviet-American relations. He poses his main goal in this area as the necessity of avoiding situations which could lead to direct confrontation between the USA and USSR. He, the President, feels that such a task is entirely feasible. In any case, he, Kissinger, according to instructions from the President, can assure me, that Nixon will not allow any third countries or any situation to develop in this or any other region of the world, which could pull him along a path fraught with the threat of direct confrontation between our countries. The President hopes and believes that the Soviet government has the same point of view on this question.

Nevertheless, went on Kissinger, this is only one side of the question. Nixon would like very much that during his Presidency--until 1972, or maybe even until 1976 in case he's re-elected--Soviet-American relations would enter a constructive phase, different from those relations which existed during the "cold war" and unfortunately continue to make themselves apparent even now. Although ideological disagreements, undoubtedly, will remain, and since they are very deep will make themselves known, the President nonetheless thinks that the above-mentioned turn in relations between our countries is entirely possible and desirable, although time and mutually tolerant work, taking into account the interests of both sides, is required.

President Nixon assigns the question of a meeting with the Soviet leaders an extremely important place in all this, continued Kissinger. He, however, approaches this question with a certain degree of caution, mainly because of the domestic political considerations and the corresponding reaction around the world. The thing is that such meetings are accompanied by an unavoidable ruckus and various sensations and ill-considered prognoses, leading to initial "great expectations" and then disappointments of the same magnitude, although, properly speaking, it is difficult to expect great results from a two- or three- day summit meeting, especially since the most complicated international problems can hardly be decided quickly, since it is necessary to clear the corresponding obstacles and long-term blockages step by step. Unfortunately, mass public opinion expects "miracles" from such meetings, and insofar as these are difficult to achieve, various speculations of "misfortune" and "failure" begin, and these cannot help the process of searching for a resolution, since they put negative psychological pressure on the
summit participants, who from the very beginning begin to think about the fact that at the end of the summit they will have to present the results to the press.

And that is why, said Kissinger further, President Nixon is convinced that the organization of only one such meeting with the Soviet leaders during his entire Presidency (as was the case with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson) is not the correct path to follow. It would be preferable to conduct a series of meetings, at predetermined intervals, say, once a year. Then the meetings will be less of a sensation, and will have a more business-like character. In the course of such meetings it would not be strictly necessary to search for an externally stream-lined formula, which would in a way satisfy society but in reality do little to move the process forward. Instead of this it will be possible to make an efficient periodic survey of the most important problems, and to search out a mutually acceptable approach, not fearing consequent labels imposed by the press, to the effect that the leaders of the USSR and USA "did not agree" or that a misfortune befell them, since everyone will know that in a while there will be another meeting, at which the consideration of the issues will continue, and that during the interval between the meetings correspondence efforts will be undertaken via diplomatic channels.

At such meetings, continued Kissinger, it will be important not only to strive toward settlement of the most difficult issues (which it will not be possible to always do immediately), but also to conduct mutual consultations, an exchange of opinions on potentially explosive situations which could draw both sides into conflict; even if their points of view on such situations will not coincide, the sides will better understand each other's motives and not overstep dangerous borders in their actions. It goes without saying that it will be necessary to prepare carefully and in good time for every summit, keeping in mind the necessity to get from them the maximum beneficial payoff in these or any other concrete conditions.

Kissinger was interested in my opinion on the idea of periodically holding such meetings. I answered that in my personal opinion, the idea deserves consideration.

Moving on further to concrete problems and regions, Kissinger said that in Europe Nixon agreed that it is not appropriate to undertake any sort of attempts to change the situation which developed there as a result of the Second World War. The USA, as is well known, in principle favors the unification of Germany, but this is still a question, taking everything into account, realistically speaking, of the very very distant future. The current administration does not intend to push or force events in this direction. On the contrary, it is interested in achieving a certain degree of stability around West Berlin, so that events there do not from time to time inflame Soviet-American relations. We are waiting, Kissinger added, for any possible more concrete proposals on this issue from the Soviet side, taking into account that this was mentioned in the first note of the Soviet government to President Nixon in February of this year.

To my counter-question about what the American side could suggest on this question, Kissinger answered in such a way so as to assert that they would like first to receive more concrete Soviet thoughts. From his rejoinder it would be possible to understand that in exchange for "calm" on the access routes to West Berlin, they would consider measures to "neutralize" those actions of the FRG in that city which are a cause of "frictions" between the DDR [East Germany] and its allies, particularly the USSR, and the FRG and its allies, including the USA. It was at the same time possible to understand that Washington however is not now ready to accept for West Berlin the status of a "free city."

In the course of the conversation on European affairs Kissinger repeated that President Nixon takes into account the special interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and does not intend to do anything there which could be evaluated in Moscow as a "challenge" to her position
in that region. This is Nixon's basic approach to this question, and it is not necessary, asserted Kissinger, to pay much attention "to isolated critical public comments about some East European country, because that is only a tribute to the mood of certain sub-strata of the American population which play a role in American elections."

Kissinger, like Secretary of State [William P.] Rogers earlier, brought up the issue of joint ratification of the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as President Nixon proposed to us several months ago. Kissinger underlined that Nixon as before has two reasons for ascribing great importance to the simultaneous ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States. First, this would be the first important joint Soviet-American act since the beginning of his Presidency, giving it, in his opinion, a significance beyond the limits of the act itself. Second, joint Soviet-American ratification, Nixon is convinced, would strengthen the pressure on those countries which so far have not signed that agreement.

I expressed our position on this question. I reminded him that, as the American side had already been informed, this agreement is now under review by the international commissions of the Supreme Soviet, which is a constituent step in the ratification process according to Soviet law. I also expressed my personal opinion, that the USA is not now putting the necessary influence and pressure on the government of the FRG, which is openly inclined against signing the agreement, which could make the agreement basically purposeless. I further expressed the hope that the Nixon government would act much more actively towards Bonn in order to achieve their early signing of the agreement.

Kissinger in fact did not deny that at the present time they are not putting in this sense any sort of serious pressure on Bonn. He tried to justify it as a response to the "dragging out of our answer" to Nixon's proposal as to the simultaneous ratification of the agreement by the USSR and the USA. In Kissinger's words, the leaders in Bonn, besides referring to the election campaign in the FRG, assert to the Americans that they, the West Germans, feel no need to hurry so long as the USSR itself has not ratified the agreement.

Overall from the conversation on this question arises the impression that Nixon, apparently, detects in our leaning against his proposal for simultaneous ratification more our disinclination in the present situation (the CPSU plenum, the sharpening of Soviet-Chinese disagreements) to demonstrate by taking such an act unity of actions with him, Nixon, than the conviction on our part that the absence of our ratification puts any sort of pressure on the FRG. (Kissinger in various ways asserted that the failure of the USSR and the USA to ratify the agreement actually helps those powers in the FRG who are against the agreement.)

Overall, judging by our observations, it is evidently possible with a sufficient degree of confidence to say, that the USA itself will not in the near future conclusively ratify the agreement or put strong pressure on the FRG, as long as we have not agreed with Nixon's above-mentioned proposal or have not reacted to it in a more concrete manner than we have up until now. (In the opinion of the Embassy, it is not advisable to drag out the review of this agreement by the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. In an extreme case, the agreement could be ratified with a special proviso regarding the necessity that the FRG adhere to it.)

Speaking about other areas where, in Nixon's opinion, Soviet-American contacts and bilateral exchange of opinions should develop, Kissinger cited the problem of a Near Eastern settlement, questions of strategic nuclear arms control, and, in the long-term, the gradual development of our trade relations.

Touching on the Near East, Kissinger said that Nixon thinks that if in general it is possible to do anything now, in order to bring this tangled and extremely complex problem closer to a decision,
then this can be accomplished only through an unpublicized exchange of opinions between the USSR and USA, who know what their "clients" want and to some extent share their views, but need not be under the thumb of their clients.

In Kissinger's words, in the near future (he has recently finished working out his "plan of action" on the Vietnam question and hopes soon to review and approve directives to the prospective Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations) Nixon intends personally to make a more detailed study of the concrete possibilities for a Near Eastern settlement. Besides the recent meeting with the King of Jordan, a meeting with the Israeli Premier Golda Meir is planned for this month.

With her, the American government intends, in particular, to consider the developing situation, especially in light of the on-going bilateral Soviet-American exchange of opinions and taking into account the Soviet answer, which is eagerly awaited in Washington and which soon should be received, after Soviet minister A.A. Gromyko returns to Moscow from his visit to Cairo (the conversation with Kissinger took place during this visit).

During the ensuing discussion of Near Eastern affairs, Kissinger shied away from consideration of concrete questions which I raised, saying that he himself had not yet studied these questions deeply because he had been occupied with Vietnam, but that he will be ready, if necessary, in about a month or a month and a half, to become "personally involved" in the Soviet-American relations on these questions, but that he will not substitute for [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph] Sisco on the details. He, Kissinger, can secretly meet with me for the all-sided consideration of "key questions" which we might raise, and then present his personal report and recommendations to the President. This report, in Kissinger's words, might serve, depending on the development of the situation and other circumstances, as the basis for supplemental Presidential instructions to the State Department for the long-term exchange of opinions with the Soviet side, without any reference to the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. He added that in his opinion, for success it would be necessary for both sides (the Arabs and Israel) to "swallow the bitter pill of certain compromises." But Kissinger did not broach the details.

He also said that the President expects that all these questions relating to a Near Eastern settlement will be the subject of detailed consideration by A.A. Gromyko and Secretary of State Rogers during the U.N. General Assembly session.

After all these statements Kissinger moved on to the Vietnam question, which as was evident from everything, occupies the main place in the minds of the President and his most important advisors.

In the course of a detailed exposition of their positions on the Vietnam question, Kissinger in essence repeated all the basic thoughts and arguments which Nixon expressed to me during my last meeting with him, at the White House in May, as well as that which Kissinger set forth earlier on the President's instructions for transmission to the Soviet government.

A more direct call to us to cooperate in overcoming the existing dead end in Paris sounded somewhat new, however.

Noting that the U.S. government as before highly values the positive things that the Soviet Union has already done in support of the Paris negotiations, Kissinger said further that, speaking frankly, the impression was growing, however, that Moscow in recent months had less actively been involved in the negotiations, leaving them, evidently, almost entirely to the discretion of the leaders from Hanoi, and that Soviet influence at the negotiations had in any case become noticeably less than the influence over Hanoi and the NLF [National Liberation Front] of South Vietnam which the Soviet Union should have at its disposal, since it is the main supplier of
military and economic aid to them. We, of course, know well Moscow's basic position, that it
does not conduct negotiations for the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] and NLF. But all
the same, he noted in passing, what he had said raises among several aides to Nixon a question
which is asked more and more often at meetings in the White House: "Doesn't Moscow think
that in the final analysis the continuation of war in Vietnam benefits them in a variety of ways,
and that therefore it is not worth it to them to hurry to settle the conflict?"
According to Kissinger neither he nor President Nixon shares this point of view. They think that
Moscow is interested in finishing the war, for it costs a lot and also because the Vietnam conflict
is a serious stumbling block, which, if not removed, will make it impossible to think about a
really serious improvement in Soviet-American relations.
Obviously in the same context Kissinger touched here on the question of China. Recalling
Nixon's idea, which had been told to us before, that they were not going to interfere in the
present-day Soviet-Chinese conflict in any way, and once more confirming the stability of this
principle, Kissinger said that they of course don't mind improving relations with China and are
ready to take "reasonable steps" forward in this direction, but this process must have a bilateral
character. Nevertheless a thorough analysis of the last CPC [Communist Party of China]
decisions and of the ensuing events, according to Kissinger, didn't in any way prove to
Americans that Beijing leaders were ready to carry out a more peaceful policy towards the USA.
Though, he added in a more ironical manner, the USSR now occupies our place as the main
object of Chinese attacks, and we have come to take as if second place, in every other respect the
Beijing attitude toward us remains the same. The Chinese still insist on the return of Taiwan to
them. The USA can't accept this, though they have no objections to Beijing and Taiwan
discussing this problem, but the latter doesn't express such a desire and the Nixon administration
will not urge it to do this. Taiwan still occupies an important place in the chain of bases for
restraint of Beijing's expansionist aspirations.
But all this is not really important, asserted Kissinger. We are realists. The main force of the
countries of the socialist camp in both military and industrial respects is not China but the Soviet
Union. This will be true not only now but also during the whole period of Nixon's Presidency.
From this point of view, frankly speaking, our main rival is the Soviet Union, if we speak in
global terms and about possible consequences for the US in case of a nuclear war. That's why
Nixon considers it important first of all to maintain good or at least more or less normal correct
relations with the USSR, not to bring them to a dangerous precipice.
We understand, he went on, that in Moscow, evidently, there are people who think that the USA
and China can somehow come to an understanding in opposition to the USSR. In its world
historical aspect and taking into consideration different countries' past experience, this concept
can sound convincing enough. Nevertheless in this concrete situation, if we speak on behalf of
the US government, putting the question this way, asserted Kissinger, would not satisfy the
interests of the US itself.
Of course it would be hypocritical, went on Kissinger, to assert--and you wouldn't believe us all
the same--that your growing disagreements with the Chinese upset us. But there is here one
significant circumstance, which Nixon considers very important. The president is sure that his
best course is to not openly take the side of either the USSR or the PRC, and to be very careful
not to give the Soviet government any grounds to think that the US somehow supports China's
anti-Soviet course or seeks agreement with Beijing on the basis of such a course. Nixon's logic as
a realist is very simple: the Soviet Union is much more capable than present-day China to
confront the USA in different parts of the world, and that can create dangerous situations,
possibly leading to conflicts in which the very existence of the US as a nation may be at stake if the big war breaks out. As for its military-economic potential, China for several more years won't be able to present such a threat to the USA, but the USSR can.

Besides, added Kissinger, Mao Tse-Tung's actions can't be evaluated using rational logic. Anything can be expected from him, though until now he obviously avoided anything that could cause a direct military collision between China and the USA (this doesn't refer to confrontations in third-world countries). Another thing is that the Soviet Union is governed by realistically thinking politicians who are interested in their people's and their country's well-being. It is possible to conclude concrete agreements with them, which satisfy the interests of both countries and not only these countries. That's why President Nixon once expressed to the Soviet leader his idea that if our countries manage within the next 10-15 years to unite their efforts or at least follow appropriate parallel courses in the most important and dangerous questions, then it will be possible to prevent dragging the world into major military conflicts, until China "grows up" and more responsible leaders come to power in Beijing.

But for this, according to Kissinger, it's necessary to stop the Vietnam conflict as soon as possible, and the Soviet Union must play a more active part in reaching a settlement, "without trusting everything to Hanoi, which evaluates the international situation only from its own, specific and narrow point of view, which often satisfies first of all the interests of China."

All Kissinger's subsequent and repeated speculations were centered on this basic thesis. One could feel that he had instructions from Nixon to give us precisely this kind of argument, though Kissinger expressed it as in his own words.

The basic Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict was expounded to Kissinger again. It was stressed that we are really striving to put an end to the Vietnam war, but only provided that all lawful rights, interests and expectations of the Vietnamese people are taken into consideration. It was also stated that the unrealistic course of American policy in Vietnam only benefits Mao Tse-Tung and his group and interferes with the creation of a really independent and neutral South Vietnam, as suggested in the NLF of South Vietnam's well-known 10 points. The sooner they understand it in Washington, the better it will be both for Vietnam and for the US itself, and for relations between our countries.

Kissinger, however, still defended Nixon's program to settle the Vietnam conflict, constantly stressing, that they are ready to discuss "any suggestions and to look for compromises," if Hanoi and the NLF finally begin serious negotiations and "don't just repeat their ultimatums." Having mentioned "compromises," Kissinger noted that there can be "different variants, which can be discussed secretly," but added, that they "can't, nevertheless, reject [South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van] Thieu, because that would represent for Vietnam a political capitulation."

In the course of these discussions, Kissinger again (as Nixon had earlier) threw out a comment to the effect that if Hanoi will endlessly "obstruct" the negotiations, then after a few months it will be necessary for the government to think about "other alternatives in order to convince Hanoi."

I said firmly that there are not and there cannot be any other alternatives to peaceful negotiations and a peaceful settlement, if the current administration does not want to repeat the mistakes of the preceding administration, and the consequences to which they led, [which were made] sufficiently clear by the example of the previous owner of the White House.

Kissinger, obviously not wanting to sharpen the conversation, changed the topic. However, this sufficiently firm sounding theme of "other alternatives" in talks with both Nixon and Kissinger cannot but be noted. Although at the current stage these comments carry, evidently, more the
character of attempts to blackmail the Vietnamese and in part the USSR with hints that upon expiration of a certain period of time Nixon might renew the bombing of the DRV or take other military measures, it is not possible to entirely exclude the possibility of such actions by the current administration if the situation, in Nixon's opinion, will justify it.

All the same, it is necessary to be ready for such a development of events, especially if Beijing's provocative course against the USSR will gather strength, and, if in Washington they start to believe that the situation in this sense may be unfavorable for Hanoi. In one place Kissinger, apparently not by chance, threw out a comment to the effect that if it nonetheless becomes necessary for them to turn to "other alternatives" then they hope that Soviet-American relations do not fall any further than a "dangerous minimum," for they from their own side will not do anything which could inflict any sort of a loss to the Soviet Union itself or its authority.

Kissinger was told that any attempt of the USA to solve the Vietnam question by forceful means unavoidably is destined to fail and that such a course of action undoubtedly will bring in its train a general increase in international tension, which could not but touch on our relations with the USA.

Overall from the conversation a certain impression was formed that for Nixon foreign policy problem No. 1 remains the question of how to find an exit from the Vietnam War under acceptable conditions, which would guarantee him reelection as President of the USA. Judging from everything, his attempts to "convince" the USSR to help settle the conflict will continue and this will to some extent make itself known in the course of our negotiations with this Administration on other international questions, if not directly, then at least as a definite slowing of the tempo of these negotiations or settlement of other problems.

Kissinger expressed a wish to talk again, after my return, about a broad set of questions in our relations and the general international situation. I agreed to this.

Several words about Kissinger himself. Observing the activities of Nixon and his main foreign policy advisors (and now I am acquainted with practically all of them), it is possible to state with sufficient confidence that at the present time Kissinger has basic, in fact dominant influence on the President in the area of foreign policy. In his hands is concentrated the collection and presentation to the President of all material on foreign policy (including intelligence data) which comes to the White House. He, along with a personally selected staff of 25 experts on various questions, prepares the agenda and materials for consideration by the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the President (this organ under Nixon began to work regularly, meeting no more rarely than once or twice a week). As recognized by Nixon himself, at my last meeting with him, Kissinger every week "pesters" him (that is, meets with him) significantly more often than any other aide.

Judging by my personal observations and compared with, for example, the relation of President Johnson with his aide [Walt] Rostow, I can say that Kissinger conducts himself much more freely than his predecessors in the presence of the President: one feels the certain confidence of a man who has won for himself a solid position at the White House (at the State Department they say directly that if "Henry"--Kissinger's first name--speaks against that or some other proposal, then Nixon will most probably reject it).

Kissinger himself, though he is a smart and erudite person, is at the same time extremely vain and in conversations with me, especially during a private lunch (we have established a pretty good personal relationship), not averse to boasting about his influence. During our last conversation he, for example, without any excessive humility, announced that in all of Washington "only two people can answer precisely at any given moment about the position of
the USA on this or that question: these are President Nixon and he, Kissinger." Regarding this he suggested to me that if it is necessary to precisely define something really important "for the correct understanding in Moscow of Nixon's policy on a concrete question," I should quietly appeal directly to him.

I should say that he himself readily welcomes the Soviet Ambassador or visits us in the Embassy for a private conversation immediately following a request from our side. He himself often takes the initiative to arrange such meetings. Evidently, he also cites all this as a confidential channel of communication with the Soviet side in order to strengthen his own personal position with Nixon. In this connection I should mention that Kissinger holds under his own personal control all communication of members of his staff with our Embassy personnel, and sternly requires that all such conversations are reported directly to him, and if he considers it necessary, that he himself report to the President. Most recently, his tendency to limit the number of such communications and subsume them all into the flow of his personal contacts with the Soviet Ambassador has been noticeable.

Evidently, it would be expedient over time to more and more actively develop and use the channel with Kissinger in order to influence and through him drive home directly to President Nixon our points of view on various important questions, especially in situations where a certain delicacy is called for or where any sort of publicity is undesirable, which is often not possible to achieve when acting through the State Department. It goes without saying that we will as always have to handle routine and official matters, especially those where it is necessary to fix our position, through ordinary diplomatic channels. Secretary of State Rogers has noticeably begun to gather strength and operate more actively in the area of American foreign policy, leaning on the wide apparat of the State Department and Foreign Service. And all the same, it is necessary to take into account that Kissinger's influence on the formulation of Nixon's foreign policy course, judging by all our observations and information in our possession, for now remains commanding.

A. DOBRYNIN
(Source: SCCD. F. 5, Op. 61, D. 558, LI. 92-105.)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

December 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

After an exchange of pleasantries, Dobrynin opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to speak to me on a frank and open basis. He had missed the opportunity to talk to me for a long time, and he hoped that our meetings would be more frequent. I said that it was always a pleasure to talk to him.

Dobrynin then turned to other issues. He began with a familiar catalogue. He said that the Soviet Government was approaching relations with the United States with an open mind and with good will, but a number of very strange things had happened. They had made a formal proposal to Secretary Rogers about European security. They had never received a reply; instead, the Secretary had made a very anti-Soviet speech in Brussels.

We managed to convey the idea that we were making everything conditional on something else. For example, we were asking them to show their good intentions in Berlin before we agreed to a European Security Conference.

With respect to summits, we gave the impression that they were pleading with us where, in fact, they had not -- though they were, of course, certainly willing to consider it in principle. There was one place on which one could make quick progress and that was at the summit, but we didn't seem to be interested in it. And therefore he wanted to know how I visualized the possibility of progress.

I told Dobrynin that we remained interested in good relations with the Soviet Union. We were the two great powers, and we had to avoid conflict; we should speak while we were still in a position to make definitive decisions. At the same time, as the President had repeatedly pointed out, we wanted to have concrete, detailed negotiations. Until he told me just what he was aiming at, it was very hard for me to comment on his points, since I did not know what he understood by progress. For example, we had heard a great deal about the European Security Conference, but I did not know just exactly what the Soviet Union hoped to achieve there. Dobrynin said, "Well, why don't you ask us. We would be glad to tell you at any level." I said, "Well, maybe we should ask you, but why don't you tell me now." Dobrynin said, "We want existing frontiers recognized." I said, "No one is challenging the existing frontiers." Dobrynin said that he had the impression we were challenging the status quo in Germany. I told him we were not challenging the status quo in Germany, but there was a big difference between challenging it and giving juridical recognition to East Germany.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFORMATION
May 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: The New Phase of SALT

In the past two weeks there has been some interesting movement in the Soviet SALT position, which suggests that a phase of bargaining is beginning.

--- On May 4, Semyonov made a tough speech rejecting our two proposals as the basis for negotiations;

--- This was followed by a private conversation between Garthoff and a Soviet official, who suggested it was time for both sides to move away from their package proposals and look for areas of agreement; the NCA ABM level was cited as an example;

--- At the first private session between Smith and Semyonov, the latter took a similar line; he rejected our proposals and suggested that we return to the work program, i.e., to proceed by categories, offensive, defensive, etc.; agreement on "all" problems would not be necessary;

--- At the formal session on May 19, Semyonov claimed agreement to proceed in this fashion, and began to discuss the composition of offensive weapons (with the same old Soviet definition, however);

--- At a second private discussion between Garthoff and his Soviet counterparts, the latter began to sketch a "narrow" agreement that backed away from the Soviet formal positions.

The Soviet Bargain

The first step in this tentative Soviet scheme would be some "understanding" on the question of our forward based aircraft. Such an understanding would indicate no augmentation by our side of present deployments; the "understanding" need not be specific, but should be reached before tackling specific limitations on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.
SECRET

- In other words, we would make the first concession, accepting the principle behind the Soviet proposal that our forward based aircraft are indeed part of the strategic balance and thus subject to some kind of limitations;

-- Implicit but apparent from the remainder of the Soviet disquisition, is that in return for an understanding on a freeze, we would also drop our effort to control Soviet MRBM/IRBMs, and cruise missile submarines;

-- The Soviets should be aware that one logical counter on our part would be an understanding not to augment these forces.

2. As for the main package, there are two variants:

-- First, there could be an agreement limited only to ABMs; the Soviets recalled that we had broached this when we first proposed SALT some years ago; they cited you as telling Dobrynin that a "limited agreement" is possible;

-- Second might be an ABM agreement plus some agreement on controlling the "central offensive systems" (our phrase picked up by the Soviets to mean ICBMs, SLEMs, and heavy bombers);

-- Under this approach we would look at areas of agreement and would narrow differences and seek what the Soviets called a "balance of differences".

3. The Soviets underlined the importance of an agreement at Vienna. If there were no agreement at Vienna, there was not much use in going back to Helsinki. Even if the agreements could not be final or formal, an agreed basis for a subsequent treaty could be drafted and signed by Kosygin and President Nixon.

4. In addition, the Soviets indicated that their proposals for controlling accidental attacks had no particular priority and should not divert attention from the effort outlined above.

5. Finally, on MIRVs, after a long haggle over on-site inspection, and the claim that the Soviets had no MIRVs, the Soviet side said that in a limited agreement they did not believe MIRV could be included.

* * * *
All of this is not especially surprising. As everyone expected, the Soviets did not intend to stick to their formal package, but will not negotiate on the basis of ours. Apparently, they are more interested in the approach of Option C than Option D. Moreover, it is tactically expedient for the Soviets to untie our package and pick what they want to talk about.

However, this general move toward a possible "narrow" agreement, is going to raise important policy questions about our future course. We can expect to receive shortly a plea from the delegation to be granted some bargaining power and flexibility.

The Soviet bargain is, of course, not a firm offer and there are serious pitfalls. For example, the Soviets are simply walking around the SAM upgrade issues, flatly rejecting any on-site inspections, and, as of now sticking to the idea of three way mix for missiles, submarines, and bombers. As some expected, however, they are not very seriously worried about MIRVs and probably want to develop their own; hence the lack of interest in a flight test ban or a moratorium.

As indicated above, the Soviets seem to be moving toward our Option B. And they are implying urgency, with the warning that if we do not agree now, all may be lost. This will have a powerful appeal to some in Washington and our delegation (Viz. your talk with Harold Brown).

All of this suggests that it would be well worth convening the Verification Panel and reviewing the status of the talks and possible future courses. While we may not necessarily have to change our position, there is going to be growing pressure to begin what will amount to private negotiations on a step by step approach as Semyonov has proposed.

Finally, any suggestion of an "understanding" on our aircraft in Europe raises the most serious problems of relations with our Allies. While they have been well briefed on the formal Soviet proposals to remove these aircraft, they are unaware of these recent private suggestions about an "understanding".

In sum, we are at the first important crossroads in Vienna, and it is time to review our next steps.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: June 23, 1970 -- 6:45 p.m.

Place: The Map Room, The White House

Participants: Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

The conversation came about in the following way. First, there were indications that the Soviet delegation wanted to wind up the SALT talks in Vienna. Secondly, Gerry Smith was pressing for new instructions authorizing him to offer a more limited option. Third, the President did not want the settlement to be arrived at in Vienna but, if possible, at a summit meeting. He asked me to find out from Dobrynin what the Soviet real intentions were, especially with respect to the conversations we had had in April prior to Dobrynin's departure for Moscow where it was agreed that, if possible, if there should be a deadlock in Vienna, we would break it at a summit.

I saw Dobrynin in the Map Room of the White House and said to him that we were at a point where some decisions had to be made with respect to instructions for the Vienna delegation and that it would help us to understand Soviet intentions properly. I said Semyonov's suggestion of an early end of the Vienna phase could lead to three interpretations: (1) the Soviet Union did not want an agreement on SALT this year at all; (2) the Soviet Union wanted an agreement at Vienna and was using this device in order to elicit a different American proposal; and (3) the Soviet Union wanted an agreement but not at Vienna and was stalemating the talks there in order to permit the other leaders to settle the issue. I would appreciate Dobrynin's guidance.

Dobrynin, who was noticeably more businesslike and less cordial than at previous meetings, said the first interpretation was clearly
out of the question. The Soviet Union did want an agreement on SALT even though our two positions were not yet close enough to set a definite date. As for Vienna, it was the Soviet Union's judgment that an agreement, including offensive and defensive weapons, could not be negotiated in the time available at Vienna. As for the third interpretation, he was without instructions and he would have to inquire in Moscow.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION
October 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,
October 22, 1970

Gromyko will be the highest-ranking Soviet official with whom you will
have met since assuming office, although you saw his deputy, Kuzentsov,
at the Eisenhower funeral last year, a man who is actually Gromyko’s
senior in Party terms. You failed to see Gromyko when he was here for
the UN last year, because the Soviets, while probing for an appointment,
failed technically to ask for it. They later claimed to have been snubbed.

This memorandum discusses

--- the setting of your meeting, which is perhaps the most important
US-Soviet encounter since you entered office;

--- Gromyko’s probable purposes and line; and

--- your purposes and general exposition.

Tabs with more detailed status reports and talking points on the subjects
that are most likely to come up are attached in the order in which they
would probably arise. There is also a sketch of Gromyko’s career and
personality.

The Setting

The meeting occurs at a moment of unusual uncertainty in both capitals
concerning the intentions and purposes of the other side.

On our side we have been asking ourselves whether there is in process
some turn to the hard side in Moscow’s relations with us, based on Soviet
performances in the Middle East, their military foray into the (to us)
sensitive area of Cuba, their probe of our resolve in the Berlin airlanes,
their continuing strategic military build-up, the generally hostile tone of their propaganda, their apparent effort to divide us from the Europeans, their continued failure to play a constructive role in Vietnam, etc.

Contrasting this, we have continued to see an interest on their part in certain aspects of SALT, including a rather striking if obscure overture for a deal involving joint actions against "provocative" third countries; continued willingness to move ahead on a treaty dealing with the seabed, and on at least certain limited forms of cooperation in the areas of science and space. Whatever their precise motives, there is no doubt that the Soviets are interested in a summit meeting.

As usual our analysis of Soviet policy and its purposes has been complicated by ambiguity or lack of good evidence concerning the attitudes of Soviet leaders, the jockeying that must be going on among them in this pre-Party Congress period and, generally, the distribution of power and influence within the Soviet oligarchy.

Recent events may be part of a deliberate pattern of testing our resolve and your personal mettle and of determining to what degree the Nixon Doctrine, our domestic problems, and the emergence of strategic parity may be affecting our foreign policies.

In part at least, the Soviets may have thought from our handling of the Middle East cease-fire and from our failure to react to increased military activity on their part in and around Cuba that they had acquired some increased freedom of maneuver.

By the same token, however, many recent Soviet actions may have their principal explanation and motivation in the particular situation involved and their more or less simultaneous timing may be fortuitous. (Of course, even if the latter hypothesis were the more valid, Soviet conduct could quickly develop into a pattern if it were sensed in Moscow that US resolve and power were in process of retracting and for this reason our actions regarding Cambodia, Jordan, Cuba and Berlin, as well as your trip may have a sobering effect.) In any event, we must examine our future policies toward the USSR in the coming period with more than routine attention.

In Moscow, at the same time, there appears to be uncertainty concerning our policies and our evolution. It is of interest that apart from Gromyko, there are currently in the US two other high-ranking Soviet officials: one, Zimyanin, the chief editor of Pravda, outranks Gromyko in the leadership
(where Gromyko still remains essentially a technician on the fringes of power); the other, Zamiatin, a former diplomat and subordinate of Gromyko's, is now the head of TASS, which, apart from being something like a Western news agency, is also the most far-flung Soviet intelligence gathering machine and the regime's transmission belt for information, guidance and indoctrination to the Soviet population and Communists abroad. Each of these three officials (and they were preceded in the last several months by a score of well-connected scientists, scholars and America experts), is undoubtedly part of a major Soviet reconnaissance, the results of which could have considerable bearing on the important pending Soviet decisions for the Party Congress, especially those relating to the next five-year plan. In short, this may be a moment of fundamental decision-making in Moscow, too.

For the Soviets, the question of what our policies in major areas like the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and in the military competition are likely to be, are crucial questions because, given the Chinese challenge and its costs, the obvious problems of the maturing but lagging Soviet economy and the continuing instability in Eastern Europe requiring periodic use of actual Soviet power and maintenance of potential power must all somehow be brought into rational framework in the next five-year plan. In addition to the normal jostling for position among Soviet leaders (possibly more serious right now since all the top men are in their late sixties and must sooner or later give way to younger men), the substantive issues involved are bound to involve differences of opinion and assessment and may, indeed, be highly controversial.

Experience has shown that in the whole we do best

-- if we consult our own interests and not attempt to influence the domestic trends in the Kremlin,

-- that we recognize that for outsiders Kremlin infighting is a highly opaque matter which we can do little, at least by deliberate action, to influence anyway (even if the outcome is undoubtedly a matter of great concern to us; and

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-- that we will serve our interests most successfully by getting our purposes and policies across to the Soviets as clearly as possible.

Gromyko’s Purposes and Line

Gromyko will have a dual purpose when he sees you:

-- to gauge you personally and your attitudes; and

-- to attempt to influence US policies in ways desired by his masters in Moscow.

His reports (and those which may be separately sent back to Moscow by the other Soviets present), as well as the reports of the other high-level Soviets currently here will be read by all members of the Politburo and hence by all factions, if factions there be, in the Kremlin. They could thus be of great importance at this particular point in Moscow’s decision-making and political maneuvering.

I understand from Dobrynin that Gromyko’s general attitude will be to put the past behind us and to see where we go from here. He will stress that to the Soviet leaders the events of the summer look like a deliberate turning towards a tougher line by us. He will inquire whether this is a settled policy and indicate a willingness to improve relations while at the same time being prepared to stick out a hard line.

It will almost certainly be part of Gromyko’s tactic to put you on the defensive by reciting an indictment of your policies. He will do this (1) to get a debating advantage, (2) to test your reaction, (3) to draw from you denials or modifications in our policies, and (4) to influence your decisions after his departure.

But while using this tactic, incidentally almost certainly in a fairly conciliatory manner, he may also try to test your interest in certain agreements and deals. This effort is partly related to Moscow’s own interest, right now, in attempting to decide on whether certain beneficial arrangements can be made with the US and partly to its effort to determine whether you are looking for agreements as a means of cutting back on overseas involvements.

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His major points are likely to be the following:

-- the Soviets were favorably impressed by your initial statements about entering an era of negotiation and by several aspects of your letter to Kosygin of April 1969 detailing the elements of your approach;

-- but they soon began to feel that your deeds failed to match your words (he may go so far as to suggest that this was due to the influence of "forces," like the "military-industrial complex," interested in keeping the cold war alive and in making profits from armaments.

Uppermost in the indictment that Gromyko may attempt to put forth will be

-- the allegation that we mounted a deliberate campaign this summer to discredit Soviet credibility and trustworthiness by our charges that they violated the Suez standstill agreement and, more recently, were attempting to violate the 1962 Cuban understandings.

Other points that may come up in his critical remarks about us might include

-- the charge that we are holding Germans back in their Eastern policy;

-- the claim that we are sabotaging the Soviet proposal for a European security conference which, Moscow claims, almost all Europeans want;

-- our one-sided support of Israel;

-- our "saber-rattling" in the Mediterranean;

-- our decisions to proceed with Safeguard Phase II and our MIRV program.

(NOTE: The Soviet press and other high, medium and low-ranking officials have also complained of the following which Gromyko, however, probably would not raise:

-- our China policy, which allegedly encourages Chinese hostility toward the USSR;

-- your trip to Romania which allegedly gave heart to unsavory "nationalist" elements in Romania and elsewhere in Eastern Europe;
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-- our discriminatory trade policies toward the USSR;

-- our Vietnamization policy, which the Soviets claim prolongs the war while saving us casualties;

-- our alleged role in the overthrow of Sihanouk and subsequent "invasion" of Cambodia, which the Soviets claim played into Chinese hands.

The point about this catalogue, which in one form or another has appeared in the Soviet press or has been rehearsed in private is that it is a mixture of actual Soviet perceptions and of typical Soviet hypocrisy. Indeed, in some respects it reflects the fact that some of your signals may have been unclear while others have in fact gotten through to the Kremlin leaders, unpalatable though they may have been to them.

As noted, Gromyko will probably also display interest in certain kinds of collaboration with us. The areas involved (and discussed in greater detail in the Tabs) may be the Middle East, Berlin, certain aspects of SALT and summitry.

In sum, while trying to put you on the defensive and testing your reactions that way, he will want to get a more precise measure of your commitments and your view towards negotiations.

(NOTE: The Soviets not only see the US as subject to numerous contradictory cross currents but they are uncertain whether to regard you personally as favorable or unfavorable -- "unrealistic" or "realistic" in their terms -- to a modus vivendi, by which they mean not only certain mutually beneficial agreements but our acceptance of them as a world power and of their hegemonial position in Eastern Europe.)

Your Purposes and Basic Message

Your overriding purpose in this conversation is -- to put across the points --

-- that you make the fundamental decisions concerning foreign policy,

-- that your purposes are clear,

-- that you are precise, careful and thoughtful,

-- that you are prepared for serious progress in US-Soviet relations but only on the basis of strict reciprocity.

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Beyond that, you should make the following points:

-- that you meant what you said about entering an era of negotiation and that at this stage in your Presidency you may have the greatest flexibility to negotiate.

-- You are in a better position to make basic settlements than your immediate predecessors because you don't have to worry about attacks from the right.

-- This is early enough in your tenure so that a course set now can have effect in either direction of conciliation or, if you are driven to it, resistance to encroachment.

-- that there does, however, remain a strong latent anti-Communism in our population which could be aroused if the impression grew that the Soviets were "testing" you and attempting to take unilateral advantage of our effort to reorder some of our priorities in line with the needs of the seventies;

-- that we did not mount any organized campaign to cast doubt on Soviet trustworthiness and credibility but that whatever the legal technicalities may have been, you, your Administration, and our people did get the clear impression that at Suez the Soviets had deliberately abetted and participated in the violation of a clear understanding that there be a military standstill;

-- that, in addition, we cannot help but view with concern the continued growth of Soviet strategic power, not because we think we have a God-given right to superiority but because the Soviet programs are taking a form (SS-9s especially) that are hard to consider with defensive intent;

-- that you firmly believe that negotiations will be successful and yield viable results only if conducted with a sense of security and that you are quite prepared to see the Soviets approach this matter in the same way; but that an effort on their part to gain unilateral advantage or military pre-eminence will inevitably produce countermeasures and set back the prospect for negotiation;

-- that you believe firmly that an orderly structure of world peace must rest on mutual respect of the interests of all concerned and that the disregard of the legitimate interests of one side by the other will merely postpone the advent of an era of genuine negotiation;
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-- that while our two countries obviously carry special responsibilities by virtue of our power, size and influence, you consider notions of condominium unacceptable and incongruous.

Attached are the following:

Tab A -- Middle East
Tab B -- Berlin, German Eastern Policy
Tab C -- European Security Conference
Tab D -- SALT
Tab E -- Vietnam
Tab F -- China (Contingency)
Tab G -- Trade Contacts (Contingency)
Tab H -- Cuba, Latin America (Contingency)
Tab I -- Summit (Contingency)
Tab J -- Biographic Notes on Gromyko
Berlin, German Eastern Policy

Where the Situation Now Stands

We originally took the initiative following your first European trip to suggest that if there is to be an era of negotiation, Berlin should be removed or at least reduced as a source of recurrent crises. Consequently, we and our Western allies, including the FRG, worked out a series of measures which we felt would enhance the viability of West Berlin, make crises less likely but leave the basic four-power responsibility for the city untouched. We did not have in mind any new arrangements concerning the military garrisons since these are already covered by agreements and understandings.

We always recognized that any agreement about Berlin would be vulnerable to sudden Soviet and/or East German violation because geography simply could not be altered. Consequently, we were always reluctant to consider concessions in the present status but aimed at its improvement. We did not know whether the Soviets might have a similar interest but thought it worth testing them.

Then Brandt came into office and activated his Ostpolitik. As it turned out, its center-piece, as distinct from past German efforts to reach agreements with the East, was an agreement with Moscow on renunciation of force and recognition of borders. The Germans hoped by this to allay Soviet fears that they were trying to disaffect the Soviet satellites by dealing only with them but not with the USSR.

Under pressure from the opposition CDU, and coming from Berlin himself, Brandt recognized that he could never claim success in his Eastern policy if it did not include an improved arrangement for Berlin. As a result, the Berlin negotiations became intimately entangled in the Ostpolitik to the point that the Germans said they would not ratify their treaty with the Soviets (in which the FRG made all the concessions, which the Soviets gladly pocketed) unless there were first a new agreement on Berlin.

In agreement with the FRG, the allies worked out a proposal that would (1) regularize civilian access to the city, (2) confirm and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between West Berlin and the FRG, and (3) maintain an FRG political presence in West Berlin. In return, the FRG was willing to curtail certain activities the Soviets found especially obnoxious, like meetings of FRG constitutional organs.
The Germans argued that the Soviets were so interested in getting the Moscow treaty ratified (because of their concern with China and their desire to get German economic assistance -- which the Soviets were already getting anyway), that skillful negotiating tactics by the Western allies would induce the Soviets to accept the Western list even though most of the concessions would be Soviet.

There has never been any evidence to support this. In several ambassadorial meetings, the Soviets proceeded to put forward a series of proposals which, in effect, would make of West Berlin a third German state (somewhat like their old "free city" proposal minus any demands for our military pullout). They would agree to various economic and cultural ties between the city and the outside world, including the FRG; to safeguards for civilian access; but not to any political ties between the city and the FRG. In addition, the Soviets demanded termination of a whole series of "subversive" activities, like radio broadcasts and rejected any discussion of East Berlin, although they do not reject the continuation of four-power (US, UK, French, Soviet) responsibilities for the city as a whole, mainly because they do not want to be excluded from a role in the Western sectors. In fact, the Soviet proposals have aggravated the Berlin problem, not eased it.

Gromyko's Probable Line

In discussing this subject, which is now deadlocked over the issues described above, Gromyko may

--- reiterate Soviet readiness to safeguard the economic life of West Berlin and civilian access to it;

--- reaffirm the continued validity of four-power responsibility for the city as a whole;

--- but reject any political ties between the FRG and West Berlin;

--- in effect enunciate the idea of West Berlin as a third German state with membership in the UN but without any change in the Western military/civilian presence;

--- reject the idea that there can be any discussion of East Berlin which the Soviets regard as the capital of the GDR and a closed subject.

(Note: There have recently been some indications that the Soviets might consider some low-key FRG political representation in West Berlin. This has aroused interest in Brandt's entourage (Bahr) who has frequent}
surreptitious contacts with Soviet officials. We may at some point be faced with German schemes for reducing or transforming the FRG's political presence in West Berlin in an effort to get an agreement which would then permit Brandt to claim success and submit his Moscow treaty for ratification. But as a quid pro quo for such an arrangement the situation may evolve in which the Germans pay twice, on Ostpolitik and on Berlin.

In Response to Gromyko, You Should

-- avoid details;

-- avoid leaving the impression that you are willing to scale down the Western position since the Soviets will immediately carry this back to the Germans (and the French, who, if anything, have been the most reluctant to negotiate about Berlin at all because they want to keep their position in Berlin unimpaired as leverage vis-a-vis the Germans);

-- reiterate your basic view that there can be little hope of peace and quiet in Europe if Berlin boils up into crisis periodically;

-- state your conviction that there ought to be improvements in the life of the West Berliners, if only on humanitarian grounds;

-- note the basic reality that the FRG feels intimate ties with the city and that there can be no thought of making it a third German state;

-- express the hope that the Ambassadors will continue their work and reach a mutually acceptable agreement which would be bound to have beneficial effects beyond Berlin itself.
Current Situation

The Soviets have long proposed a conference designed to ratify the status quo in Europe, including the permanent division of Germany and Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Until recently, however, their proposed agenda has avoided all concrete issues and dealt with such matters as economic cooperation and renunciation of force.

We and the NATO allies have taken the view that a conference at some point may have a role but that it is pointless and dangerous if it is held and results in failure. NATO in Brussels with our participation has been attempting to identify concrete issues that might be dealt with. The problem is that the real issues between East and West in Europe relate to Germany and these are being negotiated separately. Lately, the idea has gained ground that the question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) might be a subject to be discussed and the Soviets in their latest proposals suggested that a conference might set up a commission which could negotiate the reduction or withdrawal of foreign forces from Europe (an old Soviet staple). Our own studies are still in process and it is proving extremely complex to come up with options or packages that would be (1) realistic given Soviet geographic proximity and our remoteness, (2) negotiable, and (3) leave NATO with forces with which to conduct a rational strategy.

(Note: The idea of a conference has also been advocated by Romania which believes that the mere existence of an ongoing negotiating forum would afford it additional protection against Soviet pressure or attack; the Romanians also have the idea that somehow the conference could be used to vitiate the Brezhnev Doctrine. Tito, as you recall, was rather cool to the idea [though Yugoslav diplomats have also advocated it strongly] unless there was careful preparation and a very concrete agenda.)

Gromyko may

-- start by accusing us of dragging our feet;

-- note that the Soviets of course would have no objection if we and Canada participated;

-- claim that the very holding of a conference would improve the atmosphere;

-- note that the Soviets have no objection to eventual talks about mutual reductions in foreign forces.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE
You may wish to say that

-- you have no objection in principle to a conference and we have not made special efforts to prevent it;

-- you do believe that conferences of this kind should not be held for their own sake but deal with concrete issues and have some promise of success;

-- simply to talk about more trade and exchanges seems unnecessary because other forums already exist for that;

-- each of us should take a careful look at the question of mutual force reductions and then determine whether some negotiating effort is worthwhile.

(You may wish to refer to Tito's comments to you.)
SAULT

It is doubtful that Gromyko will have a detailed response to our last Helsinki proposals (overall limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers, limit on bombers, ABMs confined to capital city protection or eliminated, no MIRV ban).

He may, however, seek to test your reaction to an ABM only agreement. Despite the difficulties you have had in the Congress with Safeguard the Soviets seem concerned about the ultimate expansion of Safeguard in a way that would erode their deterrent.

Gromyko may allude to the rather vague but potentially quite far-reaching Soviet proposal for a U.S.-Soviet agreement to act jointly against "provocative" attacks on reactors from third countries. (They seem mainly to have China in mind.)

Gromyko may also raise again the question of our forward-based aircraft and short-range missiles and assert a Soviet right to have "compensation" for these weapons in any agreement since they can reach Soviet territory.

The Soviets in Vienna appeared to display less interest in a MIRV ban than we had assumed. They rejected our proposal for a flight-test ban (on the ground that it would leave them at a technological disadvantage) and for a deployment ban (on the ground that it would involve on-site inspection). Their own proposal for an uninspected deployment and production ban was unacceptable to us because of its unenforceability.

Gromyko may make some critical comments about our Safeguard and MIRV programs and may also charge that our "campaign" to impugn Soviet credibility was complicating the SALT talks.

The principal Soviet interest in testing our position on SALT is that they probably are attempting to settle on their military outlays in the next five-year plan and want to determine whether and what kind of deal might be negotiable.

In your own comments you may wish to make these points:

-- despite the disappointments of the summer, and especially the problem over the Suez standstill violations, you intend to pursue the SALT talks when they resume in Helsinki on November 2;
-- an ABM-only agreement is of no interest to us, even assuming the technical issues involved (protection against secret SAM upgrading and a definition of what radars will and will not be permitted) can be settled.

-- any agreement must provide us with assurance that the Soviet program that threatens our deterrent (whatever Soviet intentions may be) is contained; this means limits on the SS-9; (NOTE: The Soviets have displayed great sensitivity to statements that they are planning a first-strike.)

-- we think our proposals, while not perhaps perfect and not as far-reaching as you would have liked, should be a good basis for negotiation and we await with interest the considered Soviet response;

-- on the question of joint measures against countries launching, planning or threatening a "provocative" attack we can consider

-- technical measures such as improved communications and means of identification so as to avoid any misunderstandings that might then embroil the two of us against our will;

-- but we do not believe SALT is the proper context for negotiating the type of political understanding at which the Soviets have been hinting; this should in any case be the product of the general evolution of our relations;
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers' Conversations with Gromyko in New York

The two conversations between Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko concentrated mostly on the Middle East; Berlin, Vietnam and Cuba were also discussed. No substantive change in the Soviet position emerged from these conversations. Gromyko was inflexible on the Middle East, made a small procedural concession on the Berlin talks, and reaffirmed the Cuban understanding of 1962. The atmosphere was not acrimonious; Gromyko seemed subdued, perhaps reflecting concern over our reactions to recent events.
(The reports available to us are attached in full as Tabs to this summary.)

The Middle East (Tabs A and B) -- The Secretary made it clear that we held the Soviets responsible for the complicity in cease-fire violations, that we were interested in resuming the talks under Jarrings' auspices, but that this could not occur without some rectification of the situation created by the violations. In both conversations Gromyko took the same position: the USSR was not a party to the agreements, was therefore not responsible, and that no rectifications were possible. He proposed to extend the cease-fire for a "limited period," to resume the Jarring talks, as well as the bilateral and four power talks. On this basis he suggested a debate in the General Assembly could be avoided.

Secretary Rogers concludes that no compromise is presently possible between us and the USSR on the Middle East and that the next stage is a General Assembly debate.

Berlin (Tabs C and D) -- Gromyko complained over the lack of progress in the four power talks. He said we would have to clarify our position. Most of his presentation was an attack on the political activities of the West German government in West Berlin. Any understanding, Gromyko asserted, would have to include prohibition on such activities.

The Secretary responded that the recent Soviet proposals were full of difficulties, but that we also sought to reduce tensions provided there was no unilateral interference with our rights. Ambassador Rush emphasized the importance of West Berlin's economic ties to West Germany. Gromyko replies that the Soviets accepted economic links between West Berlin and West Germany, but not political ties.

SECRET/NODIS
In the second conversation, the Secretary said that the Soviets were impatient for progress in the talks by their rigid position and Gromyko then agreed that proposals for practical improvements could be discussed simultaneously with the matters of Soviet concern. Previously they had wanted their concerns before discussing practical improvements. The Secretary suggested a review of the situation after two more Ambassadorial meetings.

Vietnam (Tab E) -- The Secretary stressed the seriousness of your new proposals and our belief that a cease-fire was now feasible. Gromyko said he could add nothing to the North Vietnamese and PRG reaction. In reply to the Secretary's explanation of our willingness to abide by free elections, Gromyko said elections under the present "clique" would be biased.

Gromyko spent some time probing our attitude on a coalition government. He wanted to know if we held the principle of coalition government "in reserve." If we wanted the USSR's aid, he would have to have room to be helpful. The Secretary said we did not rule out any solution acceptable to South Vietnam and the PRG. Gromyko concluded, however, that we did not accept a coalition government. The Secretary replied he did not propose to say anything on that one way or another.

At the end of the talk Gromyko said he had thought we might agree that he could inform the PRG we were agreeable to a coalition government. The Secretary concluded that he could inform the PRG we would accept any solution they could work out with the South Vietnamese government.

Cuba (No detailed report available.) Gromyko expressed surprise over our comments on Cienfuegos, and gave assurances that the Soviet Union had no intention of violating the 1962 understandings.

* * * * * * *

Under Secretary Irwin has sent you a briefing memorandum for your meeting with Gromyko which essentially parallels the memorandum I sent to you on October 19.

The Under Secretary makes the additional points that you

-- reiterate your long-standing interest in the USSR's permitting emigration to the US for the purpose of reuniting families; and

-- note that the Soviets have joined the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) effective November 14 and that you hope we can now cooperate more effectively on civil aviation matters including the hijacking problem.
SECRET/NODIS

Secretary Rogers, Foreign Minister Gromyko, October 19, 1970, New York

SUBJECT: Middle East

(State Telegram SECTO 33, New York)

1. On Middle East, which again took up some considerable time, Secretary Rogers and Gromyko did not break any new ground. Gromyko continued to adhere basically to the position which he took on Friday evening contending that USSR was not a party to the agreement, was not responsible, and that no rectifications were possible. The Soviets took parallel view to that of Egyptians, indicating willingness to see cease-fire continued provided talks between the parties under Jarring's auspices have been brought in train. The Secretary continued to hold that rectification required, that cease-fire should be extended, and that General Assembly debate unlikely to be helpful. He said again that four powers can only be useful in context of negotiation between parties under Jarring's auspices.

2. Based on foregoing, Secretary has concluded that no compromise presently possible between US and USSR and that next stage is General Assembly debate, which both the UAR and USSR have decided to pursue.

3. It will be interesting to see, particularly in light of the upcoming Gromyko meeting with the President, tenor of Gromyko's General Assembly speech on Wednesday.
SECRET/LIMDIS

Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko, Oct. 16, 1970, New Yo:

SUBJECT: Berlin

(State Telegram 172337)

Gromyko recalled the meeting which he had had with the Secretary nearly
a year ago at which it had been suggested that an exchange of views take
place aimed at normalizing the situation in the Berlin area. The objective
was to rule out unexpected developments and to ease tension. The US
had promised to study the matter and the Soviets had thereafter received
the US position. Discussions had begun between the four Ambassadors in
March. The Soviets felt that these discussions were not having much success.
They seemed to be moving one step forward and one step backward or simply
marking time. He did not want to cast aspersions on the participants,
but asked that all parties approach the question as statesmen.

If the United States wants to promote normalization of the situation, then
it will have to clarify where it stands. The Soviets want to have productive
results. He wished to emphasize that the Soviets have no intention of under-
mining the status of West Berlin or the role of the Western powers. In fact,
it sometimes seemed to him that the Soviets held the status of West Berlin
in greater regard than the Western powers, or at least some of them.

The fact that West Berlin did not belong to the FRG was known to all. This
had been confirmed by the Secretary of State and spokesmen for the other
Western Allies. The question, however, is what is the actual practice in
West Berlin. Officials of the FRG carry out their activities in West Berlin.
The Soviets have brought this fact to the attention of the Federal authorities
who could not deny the special status of West Berlin. Given these activities,
the situation there cannot be normal. Therefore, the question of terminating
such activities in West Berlin arises. Any understanding on West Berlin
must include what is not allowed in West Berlin. Bundestag meetings and
other such activities run counter to Allied agreements of the past. The
Soviets also invoke these agreements and no one can say that they do not
respect them.

From this, Gromyko continued, it should not be concluded that the Soviets
want to strangle West Berlin or harbor any pernicious intentions. The
Soviets were aware that economic and other ties have come into being and
are facts of life, but these are no reason to negate the special status of
West Berlin. On the other hand, the Soviets were aware that there are
questions that should be resolved. The Soviets were prepared to assist
as far as the GDR is concerned to solve questions of transit and access,
taking into account the interests of West Berlin and the FRG.

SECRET/LIMDIS
SECRET/LIMDIS

Such in general terms is the Soviet position, Gromyko noted, and nothing in it affects legitimate interests stemming from past Allied agreements. The Soviets are certain that achievement of an understanding is in line with the legitimate issues of all concerned and the lessening of tensions. The Soviets had put forward certain concrete suggestions for consideration by the Ambassadors. He felt that these provided a basis for agreement that had been formulated with due regard for the existing situation and should be assessed on their merits.

The Secretary said we had been disappointed at the last meeting of the Ambassadors. We were anxious to reduce tensions in the city. We do not believe that the rights and responsibilities of the four should be altered. We hoped we would reduce tensions, but if one side tries to alter these rights and responsibilities an increase in tensions will result.

Ambassador Rush observed that the viability of West Berlin was an essential ingredient in the reduction of tension. This was necessarily related to close ties between the FRG and West Berlin. If these ties were destroyed, a source of conflict would arise.

Gromyko stated such general expressions did not clarify the issues. Economic ties were acceptable, but political ties were not. What does the political presence of the FRG in West Berlin have to do with viability? If the FRG stated, for example that the activities of official bodies should be continued there, would the Western powers take the position that such meetings should be held?

In view of the lateness of the hour, the Secretary suggested that further discussion of Berlin continue at the working dinner scheduled for October 19. Perhaps tensions could not be reduced in the Berlin area, he added. They had existed for a long time. We would soon know. The Soviet proposals of October 9 were full of difficulties for us.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: US: The President
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, Department of State

USSR: A. A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DATE & PLACE: October 22, 1970, 11:00 a.m. -1:30 p.m.
The Oval Office

The President welcomed Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington and said that he appreciated the opportunity to have a talk with him. He had been informed that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Gromyko had held useful conversations in New York. It would be helpful if today they could discuss the questions of the general relationship between their two countries. The President said he was prepared to take up any items that the Minister wanted to bring up. Specific problem areas, in his view, which could be usefully discussed concern the Middle East, the Berlin negotiations between the Four Powers, SALT, a most important issue, Western Hemisphere problems, specifically Cuba, and problems in Asia, specifically Vietnam.

Mr. Gromyko suggested that each problem be discussed in turn and as one was finished the next problem be taken up. This procedure was agreeable to the President.

Mr. Gromyko appreciated the opportunity to hold this exchange of views and to express the point of view of the Soviet leadership on a number of problems. These problems included the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as a number of international problems. The first thing that the Government of the Soviet Union was interested in
was to find out what direction the foreign policy of the United States would take with respect to the Soviet Union. What policy did the United States and the President as head of state, personally intend to pursue? Naturally, he and his government were interested in the President's appraisal of the present state of relations between our two countries, but to an even greater extent they were interested in the future prospects for the development of relations between us. In what direction did the U.S. Government intend to lead its foreign policy? Was it in the direction of developing and expanding relations with the Soviet Union, or was its policy directed toward increasing tensions? He and his Government were well acquainted with the President's formula which he had put forward some time ago, that is, his announced intention to proceed from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The President must be aware of the fact that that formula had met with a positive response in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately he had to say that the way relations between the two countries had developed and the concrete foreign policy steps taken by the U.S. Government appeared to him to be in conflict with the formula the President had announced. This applied both to the bilateral relations between the two countries and to the outstanding international issues. He came to this conclusion by noting certain recent events and facts.

Speaking quite frankly and directly, the Soviet Government was puzzled by a number of campaigns which flared up in the United States from time to time. In some cases these campaigns were more than unfriendly, they were even hostile to the Soviet Union. He would not be speaking frankly if he did not tell the President that the question was being asked in Moscow: What was the reason for these campaigns and what purpose were they pursuing? The sad thing was that the impetus for these campaigns appeared to be provided by statements of high officials and by encouragement on the part of the official circles of the United States. He repeated that this question was puzzling to the Soviet leadership. He thought that it would have long since become quite clear that any attempts to influence the Soviet position by such methods could not possibly be successful. If there were some internal political motives which gave rise to these campaigns, he could only say categorically that it was the Soviet view that the relations between our two countries should never be affected by any temporary internal considerations and should not be burdened by them. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were major world powers and it was the Soviet view that the interests of both countries required peace and an approach to foreign
policy that would not escalate tensions, but, on the contrary, lead to international detente. This should certainly be clear to all. Temporary considerations of an internal nature, transitory situations, should not be permitted to affect our relations; these should rather be based upon the vital fundamental interests of the peoples of our two countries, in whose interests it was to strengthen peace rather than increase tensions. Should the President ask him what the basic position of the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership was in regard to relations with the United States, he could state officially on behalf of the Soviet leadership that they would like to see an improvement and expansion of the relations between our countries and a lessening of tensions between us. It seemed to him that if both sides were to take a realistic view, such a state of affairs was clearly in the interests of not only the Soviet Union but also of the United States. Of course, all problems could not be solved at one go. Some of them were far too complex to be susceptible of easy solutions.

The President replied that with respect to the bilateral relations between our two countries, Mr. Gromyko had indeed described his policy correctly, the policy of moving from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation. The President also agreed with Mr. Gromyko's comments to the effect that the internal situation of a country should not be allowed to influence its foreign relations. However, since both countries were great powers, he was enough of a realist to know that when great powers are involved there were inevitably bound to be some differences and misunderstandings. He thought Mr. Gromyko would agree that the President had been extremely careful to try and limit differences between our countries to private discussions rather than discussions in public. Mr. Gromyko, being a realist, would know that in our country whenever elections approached, political leaders were tempted to take a belligerent anti-Communist line. As for the President personally, he did not consider such an approach to be in the interests of world peace or of Soviet-American relations. For this reason, he had personally tried to avoid any statement that might make the situation worse.

The President continued that he felt very strongly that both sides, allies during World War II, who were instrumental in bringing into being the United Nations, must realize on this 25th anniversary of the UN that the relations and the interests of the two great powers could hardly be submitted to the United Nations where their differences would be publicly aired. Mr. Gromyko had spoken before the General Assembly yesterday, and the President intended to do so tomorrow. However, in
the next 25 years, world peace in general and, more precisely, even the avoidance of smaller wars would depend to a much greater extent on the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union than on anything else. For this reason, he felt unhappy that the relations between our countries were now described as the coolest since the Cold War began. He had been very careful not to contribute to the difficult situation by rhetoric. He thought it was of greatest importance now to give a signal to the world that the United States and the Soviet Union were not looking for areas in which to confront each other. To be honest, we had to realize that our interests in many parts of the world differed and that on some questions it would be most difficult to reach agreed positions. However, it was clearly in the common interests of both great powers to limit the burden of armaments, to increase trade and communications between them. It was in this spirit that he was resolved to view our bilateral relations.

Mr. Gromyko replied that he found the President's appraisal of the situation to be a reasonable one. He asked the President's permission to summarize what had been said to the effect that the policy of the United States would be directed at reducing the tensions which were bound to arise from time to time and that the President's formula of negotiation rather than confrontation remained in effect; also that the President personally intended to work for an improvement and deepening of the relations between the two countries and the international situation in general.

The President agreed that this was correct and added the further point that in the past we had been reasonably successful and it was his hope that we would be even more successful in the future whenever difficulties arose to keep them in private channels rather than expose them in public. In the past we may have been at fault to some extent, and so was the Soviet Union, in publicizing our differences. This was in the past, however, and it would be important to avoid that in the future.

Mr. Gromyko said this was correct. Articles in the Soviet press in the past, reporting what was being said in the United States in regard to the Soviet Union, had been but a small fraction of unfavorable American statements about the Soviet Union. After all, when hostile statements appeared in the U.S., what was there left for the Soviet Union to do but to react accordingly? The Soviet side would not remain indebted when it came to hostile statements. This was not the right path, however. He noted that the President had mentioned the development of trade relations between the two countries. In this respect, we were faced
by almost a vacuum. Was this indeed the policy of the United States
Government? He simply would like to know the President's attitude
to this question.

The President said that there were possibilities in this field. He
thought one would have to be realistic and say that some of the other
problems come into play when it comes to considering the possibility
of increasing trade between the two countries. For example, the
Vietnam war, which involved our primary and basic interests, was
bound to have an inhibiting influence upon trade. It was a fact that
under our legislative arrangements some items which could be used
to aid North Vietnam could not be exported to the Soviet Union. We
were indeed prepared to explore ways in which trade between our two
countries could be increased. He did not like to use the word "linkage",
but it was true nevertheless that a settlement of these other matters
would lead to increasing economic exchanges between us. He therefore
felt that if our political relations improved, increased trade would
follow naturally. This was in our interest as well as in the interest
of the Soviet Union.

Middle East

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had had a good exchange of
views with Secretary Rogers in New York on the subject of the Middle
East. To restate the Soviet position briefly, the Soviets were for
peace in the Middle East. They would not like to see a new military
clash in this area. The independent existence of all states needed to
be assured and secured, and saying this, he included the existence of
Israel as a sovereign independent state. If someone ever told the
President that the Soviet Union had some other objective in the Middle
East, or if it was alleged that it had some idea of subverting the
independent existence of Israel, the President should not believe any
such allegations. What was required today was a withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Arab territories they were occupying and a formal,
detailed agreement insuring a stable peace in this area. To accomplish
these purposes, the role of the two great powers was far from being
the least important. It was the Soviet position that peace in this area
should be secured by a most solemn act, if necessary involving the
participation of the UN Security Council, an act stating that troops are
to be withdrawn, that peace is established, and that no one needs to be
apprehensive for the security of any of the independent states of the
Middle East.
It would be good if some work could be performed in the direction of a solution now. It was important that these efforts not be discontinued at the present time. As to the Soviet view of what needed to be done now, he had already told Secretary Rogers that the first thing required was a resumption of the Jarring mission. Let there be exchanges of views between the Israelis and the Arab states. Such exchanges could certainly not be harmful to any of the parties involved. Secondly, agreement must be reached on extending the ceasefire. The present situation must be formalized in the form of an appropriate agreement to the effect that firing between the sides will not be resumed and this was to be without any preconditions. Attempts to impose conditions on the extension of the ceasefire could only complicate the situation. After all, a ceasefire was a ceasefire, meaning that the two opposing sides had agreed not to shoot at each other.

Third, the bilateral contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States on this question should perhaps be renewed. They had been suspended for some time now and should be reactivated. It would be good to resume these contacts, and not only from the point of view of attempting to facilitate a solution for the Middle East. So far, the American side had not yet responded to the Soviet proposal on the substance of the matter even though that proposal had been submitted in response to the expressed wishes of the American side. Fourth, Four Power consultations should be continued. This would be a step creating more favorable conditions for consideration of various possibilities to solve the problem.

As for Israel, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was prepared to give the most solemn guarantees of its existence.

Secretary Rogers said that he and Mr. Gromyko had discussed this question at some length in New York and seemed to agree on many aspects of the problem, but differed on how to get started. He asked Mr. Gromyko if, assuming that agreement would be reached, the Soviet Union would be willing to undertake peacekeeping activities together with the United States, specifically whether the Soviet Union was prepared to send troops for that purpose.

Mr. Gromyko inquired what the Secretary meant by peacekeeping activities. In the Soviet proposal they also mentioned the use of United Nations guarantees and personnel. He had thought this discussion was procedural; peacekeeping should be kept for substantive meetings. When
would negotiations on substance begin, however? In his view the matter was pressing and this should be the first order of business. The four points he had just made were intended as steps to be taken at the present time.

Secretary Rogers said that the reason he had asked the question was that it affected the security of the parties involved.

President Nixon remarked that Israel no longer had any confidence in the ability of the United Nations to keep the peace.

Mr. Gromyko replied that what he was proposing was procedural in nature. These were the first steps to be taken and he realized that they were procedural rather than substantive. However, Secretary Rogers' idea was not excluded.

Secretary Rogers inquired what steps the UAR intended to undertake in regard to a UN resolution on the Middle East.

Mr. Gromyko replied that they had this idea because there had been no forward movement toward a solution of the problem. Should the situation change, should the Jarring mission be resumed and the ceasefire continued, he thought the Arab position might change as well. Since he had not received an answer from the United States, he had not as yet contacted the Arabs in this regard. Secretary Rogers remarked that Mr. Gromyko should certainly be able to influence the Arabs.

President Nixon said that the Secretary had reported to him the conversations he had held with Mr. Gromyko about the Middle East. He was aware of the concern Mr. Gromyko had expressed regarding what he believed were misunderstandings which occurred at the time the ceasefire first went into effect. He was aware of Mr. Gromyko's position that (1) the Soviet Union had not been a party to the ceasefire agreement, and (2) it was unfair to say the Soviet Union had collaborated in violations of that agreement. He did not want to go into this question in detail, but as practical men we had to recognize that a problem did indeed exist. In fact, this was our problem with the Israelis and affected our ability to influence them.

Mr. Kissinger recapitulated the procedural steps mentioned by Mr. Gromyko, namely, (1) resumption of the Jarring mission, (2) resumption of bilateral contacts, and (3) resumption of Four Power contacts. He asked whether they could be separated or whether Mr. Gromyko was proposing a package.
Secretary Rogers remarked that it would be a mistake to go into bilateral and Four Power meetings prior to reactivating the Jarring mission. Mr. Gromyko agreed, but added that purely bilateral contacts could take place at any time.

The President remarked that in the Middle East our respective interests differed considerably and that it was logical for great powers to compete with each other in this area. It was in the paramount interest of both sides, however, to secure the peace in this area since we would be very foolish to allow conflicts between minor powers to lead to a collision between us.

Mr. Gromyko agreed that the President was right and said we should stress what unites us rather than what divides us.

Berlin

Mr. Gromyko said he was convinced that it was in the interests of both countries to achieve a reduction of tensions in Berlin and to create a situation there which would work for stability, detente, and general peace in Europe. The American side had many times referred to the status of West Berlin. He wanted to assure the President that the Soviet Union had no intention to weaken the status of the allied powers in West Berlin. In fact, at times he had the impression that the Soviet Union did more than anyone else to respect the special status of West Berlin. The principal question there was the political presence of the Federal Republic of Germany in the city. This presence affected the interests of the Soviet Union and undermined the special status that the American side had so frequently talked about. The Soviet Union advocated the inviolability of the inter-allied agreements concerning Berlin, which were in effect. The Soviets were against anything that would violate these agreements. In his view it was possible that the American side misunderstood the Soviet position to some extent. He sometimes felt that representatives of the United States, at least at the ambassadorial level, regularly meeting to discuss the Berlin question, misunderstood the Soviet position. The Soviet Union as well as the German Democratic Republic, were ready to find a favorable solution for the two principal problems affecting West Berlin, those of transit from West Berlin to West Germany and vice versa, and access to East Berlin. These solutions would certainly serve the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as those of the people of West Berlin. The major stumbling block at the moment
appeared to be the question of political ties (and he stressed the word "political") between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. He strongly felt that there was a real possibility of reaching agreement here and this would help ease the situation in the area.

Mr. Kissinger asked for clarification. He had heard Mr. Gromyko use the phrase that West German political activity in West Berlin must be "curtailed", rather than "eliminated." Was this a correct interpretation?

Mr. Gromyko [using the Russian word "svyortyvaiye"] said that in his view there was no need to continue the political activities of the Federal Republic, since they constantly created new disputes. It would be comparatively easy to list what activities of the Federal Republic in Berlin could be continued and which political functions it should not be permitted to exercise in West Berlin. Above all, this referred to such matters as meetings in Berlin of the West German Bundestag, meetings of various Bundestag committees, and activities of the West German Chancellor in West Berlin. It was entirely possible that some of the activities in West Berlin had not come to the attention of the Allied Powers; they might require close examination under a microscope, as it were. First and foremost, the West Berlin problem, from the Soviet point of view, consisted in the political presence of the Federal Republic as a state in that city.

Secretary Rogers also inquired whether the Russian word meant eliminate or curtail. He said that elimination was certainly out of the question and that the Government of the FRG would be unable to enlist the support of its people for complete elimination of all political ties with West Berlin.

The President said that the umbilical cord between the city and the FRG could not be cut. Looking back over the years at the numerous Berlin crises during the Eisenhower Administration, he saw the city as a central problem in Europe. It was precisely for this reason that we must have a clear understanding on West Berlin in order to reduce the frequency of these crises. Mr. Gromyko must be well aware of the fact that ratification of the Non-aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG depended upon substantial progress on the West Berlin problem. On this point he, too, said that all political ties
cannot be cut, this simply cannot happen. West Berlin cannot be allowed to become a third German state. But if he understood Mr. Gromyko correctly, a low profile of the federal authorities in West Berlin, as opposed to the high profile represented by meetings of the Bundestag, might be acceptable to the Soviet side. We could not agree to eliminating all political ties for the simple reason that we could not sell this to the FRG any more than the FRG could sell this to its own people.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it should be a matter for negotiation what lines and limits should be drawn for the FRG in West Berlin. If we were to continue negotiations on this issue some progress must be made.

Mr. Gromyko again said that it was a matter of bodies and sub-bodies of the Federal Republic in West Berlin. As for a method for achieving concrete progress on this question, we should list specific activities to be eliminated. Mr. Gromyko expressed his appreciation to the President for the fact that the United States had taken a positive view of the treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union. He considered this treaty to be an important step in the direction of creating détente in Europe. As for the list of activities in West Berlin, these could be considered in detail in the course of negotiations.

The President said that our reaction to the Soviet-German treaty was based upon the fact that we respected the independence of the FRG and that when it signed a treaty in its own interests, we approved of this action, of course. The treaty had been their idea, not ours. It was the Federal Republic that had taken the initiative to negotiate on the questions of borders and non-aggression. It should be realized, however, that this was only a first step. To complete it and obtain ratification of the treaty, it would be absolutely necessary that progress in the Berlin question be achieved. If we could cool down the Berlin problem, even apart from our bilateral relations over Germany, the whole situation in Europe would be affected positively.

Secretary Rogers said it was a simple fact of life that the Federal Republic could not ratify the treaty unless a satisfactory solution was found for West Berlin. He thought we might hold two more Ambassadors' meetings to see if we can make some progress, and also that all of these various matters, political presence, transit and access, should be negotiated at one and the same time.
Mr. Gromyko agreed and expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would work with the Soviet Union to find appropriate solutions.

Secretary Rogers added that in his view an agreement on West Berlin should also provide for negotiation of any possible disputes there that might arise in the future.

European Security Conference

Mr. Gromyko inquired about the attitude of the United States Government toward the idea of convening a European Security Conference. He did not know whether the President had had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Soviet proposal to call such a conference. The substance of that proposal was to call a conference of all European states, as well as Canada and the United States, in order to see if there was a chance of improving the relations between various states in Europe in the interests of a political detente. The United States had said that it favored such a detente, and so had the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he had the impression that the U.S. was somewhat apprehensive in regard to the ESC. It should be clear that any decisions adopted at such a conference would be joint decisions, taken in the interests of all the states concerned. There was no question of trying to impose a one-sided solution on any state during this conference. For this reason, he believed the U.S. apprehensiveness was quite unfounded. According to information he had received, the United States seemed to be bringing its influence to bear on some other countries, to discourage them from taking a positive attitude toward the ESC. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet Union had no intention of trying to claim the major credit for calling such a conference, that it was the position of the Soviet Government that a detente in Europe, which could result from the ESC, would benefit all interested parties and the world as a whole.

The President wanted to tell Mr. Gromyko quite directly that in our view the success of such a conference would depend primarily on the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko's impression that we were trying to discourage the convening of the conference was incorrect. We took the position that for the successful conduct of a conference it would be necessary to sit down and explore an appropriate agenda. By saying that the success would depend on our two countries primarily, he did not mean to speak of a condominium of the two powers in Europe.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Secretary Rogers remarked that there was no point in having a conferer unless we could foresee what results would likely be achieved. In this respect, our Berlin negotiations could serve as a good indicator. If we could make progress on the question of Berlin, the prospects for a European conference would improve. But, if no progress was achieved on Berlin, what would be the purpose of holding another conference?

Secondly, we were not too sure that the Communique of the Warsaw Pact Powers had indicated a willingness to discuss reduction of military forces in Europe. Was the Soviet Union suggesting that this question be included on the agenda of a European Conference? With respect to reduction of forces, what did the Soviet Union mean by foreign troops? Did this include Russian troops in Eastern Europe? Mr. Gromyko replied that in the Soviet view, it would be better not to consider military questions at the European Conference. We could agree, however, that if some kind of a body - perhaps even permanent - were created at the European Conference, this body could discuss the question of troops. The Soviet Union would be amenable to such a procedure. As for the term "foreign troops," it had been meant to include Soviet troops as well.

President Nixon remarked that a Soviet-American understanding on primary issues, such as SALT and Berlin, would have a beneficial influence upon any possible conference of European states.

Secretary Rogers said that if complex questions were to be excluded from discussion at a European Conference, it was difficult to see what could be accomplished. In brief, if we could foresee the achievement of positive results, we would be interested. If not, we would have doubts about the usefulness of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko said we could not ignore the fact that for 25 years the Soviet Union had discussed disarmament questions in the United Nations with the United States, and with other countries, without being able to find any solutions. For this reason, the question of disarmament and force reduction was not perhaps quite suitable for discussion at an ESC. Should a body be created by that conference, however, he would have no objection to force reduction being discussed in that body. The President said that in principle we were not opposed to the conference. We would be in favor of it if preliminary discussions showed that it would be helpful.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SALT

The President said that it was his impression our two sides were dealing seriously with substantive matters on Strategic Arms Limitation. We did think that it was a constructive phenomenon for the two sides to be discussing this major issue. On November 2, the conference would resume in Helsinki. We were prepared to enter these discussions in the same spirit as we had entered them last year. He was going to instruct the U.S. Delegation to SALT to explore all possibilities of agreement. He recognized that this would require some time because the vital interests of the two countries were involved here. He felt that hard bargaining on both sides would be involved, but that some agreement could result from this bargaining process.

Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Union approached these negotiations in all seriousness, fully aware that the questions under discussion were extremely difficult. His side would do all in its power to reach agreement. While in their view, a broad agreement would be the most desirable, if for some reason such broad agreement could not be reached at the present time, more limited agreements could be negotiated. In the future, such limited agreements could also serve as a basis for a broader understanding. His delegation would conduct the negotiations in Helsinki in this spirit.

The President said that the trouble with limited agreements was that they favored one side or the other. If the agreement dealt only with ABM we could not accept it. If it dealt only with defensive missiles, the Soviet Union would not accept it. Dr. Kissinger made much the same point. Secretary Rogers interjected that he, Mr. Gromyko and Gerard Smith had defined "limited" as the subject matter covered by our latest proposal rather than the earlier options. Mr. Gromyko was non-committal.

Vietnam

The President said that he would raise the subject of Vietnam only in passing, in view of the fact that Mr. Gromyko and Secretary Rogers had already discussed it in New York, and that it had been reported to him that Mr. Gromyko saw no prospects of North Vietnam or the Provisional Revolutionary Government engaging in a discussion of our proposal. Our position in this matter was as follows: we have made a proposal and this is as far as we would go. It had been suggested, for example, that unilateral withdrawals be made without discussion with
the other side. This was completely out of the question. The President said he had carefully considered the recent proposal advanced by the United States and if North Vietnam and the PRG declined to discuss our proposal in Paris, we would simply have to proceed down the other road our program of Vietnамization. That program also would end the war, although the road would be longer. We would much prefer to shorten the war by meaningful discussions with the other side. The problem of Vietnам, of course, involved the United States to a far greater degree than the Soviet Union, for the simple reason that so many U.S. soldiers had been killed there. If, in the future, we should have to undertake forceful moves to protect the interests of our men, we would do so resolutely, but would also inform the Soviet side as we had done at the time of Cambodia. The President hoped that Mr. Gromyko would understand our position, by putting himself in our place. Since we were in this area we must protect our interests. We had made our proposal and hoped that it would be a basis for negotiation. If this failed to stimulate an interested reaction on the other side, we would proceed down the other track as forcefully as we considered necessary.

Mr. Gromyko said that in his view there was no prospect of the other side engaging in discussions unless the United States was willing to work out the timing for withdrawal of its troops, and agreed to the establishment of a coalition government for South Vietnам. His statement was based upon his knowledge of the position of North Vietnам. The President had spoken of the possibilities open to the United States and had said that the recent proposals were as far as we could go. Of course, we would be able to judge the situation better than he, but it was his impression that if we were serious about wanting to put an end to the war, we would have to go along with the two conditions he had mentioned. He would be less than frank if he did not tell the President the same thing he had said to Secretary Rogers.

The President appreciated Mr. Gromyko's candor and said he knew that we disagreed on this subject. Regarding a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops, we were willing to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of forces. We were not going to indicate any date in advance on unilateral withdrawal, however, since to do so would mean to destroy our negotiating position. In regard to the coalition government, the opposition spoke of a coalition government as one that would be set up after removing all elected people in the present government. This was totally unacceptable to us. As he had said earlier, and as Secretary Rogers had told Mr. Gromyko in New York, whatever the leaders of North Vietnам and the PRG could arrange with South Vietnам would be acceptable to us.
If North Vietnam tried to step up military operations we would take strong actions. In that case, we would inform the Soviet leaders in advance. We had our interests in the area and we had our plan which was succeeding. We were confident that our plan would succeed. Time was now on our side, even though we regretted that it would take longer than the negotiating route. The President emphasized that we would do our best not to permit the Vietnam situation to interfere with our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

The President said he believed that he had covered most of the subjects that required discussion. Referring to earlier discussions, he said that as realists we knew, and Mr. Gromyko knew, that the question of the future of Europe, as well as the question of arms control, would depend upon whether the United States and the Soviet Union could work out solutions aimed at strengthening peace. We recognized that there were also a number of other factors threatening peace, but if the great powers worked together, the peace could be kept. As practical men, we knew that US-Soviet understanding was essential for the future of the world. He wanted to be sure that Mr. Gromyko would not leave with the impression that the internal political situation in the United States would lead the President to take a course opposite to the one he had followed until now. He noted that he would make a temperate speech before the United Nations tomorrow. Both Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin were well acquainted with U.S. politics. Both had been in this room before with President Johnson and President Kennedy. The President said that he was in an unusual position. When he was elected to office, it had been said that President Nixon would not be able to work with the Soviet leaders because of his past background of anti-Communism. He did not believe this to be so. More than any other President since World War II, he felt that he could be flexible for precisely this reason. He was prepared to be flexible in all negotiations with the Soviet Union and wanted Mr. Gromyko to realize that his approach would not be doctrinaire on any subject, but, rather, pragmatic in all cases.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said that the President had correctly emphasized the role of the Soviet Union and the United States as the two great powers responsible for keeping peace in the world. The Soviet leadership was in full agreement with the...
premise that the future of the world depended to an enormous extent upon the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If the U.S. Government worked in the direction of peace, if it respected the interests of the Soviet Union, it would find a vigorous, energetic and determined partner in its search for ways to improve relations. This policy of the Soviet Union was not new. It had been inviolable since the very inception of the Soviet State. It was important, however, to stress the concept of reciprocity. Mr. Gromyko repeated this statement for emphasis. As for what the President had said about the internal political situation influencing American foreign policy, it was not for him to offer any evaluation of this influence. He repeated however that his Government sometimes had the impression that the U.S. Government paid some tribute to the internal political situation in the U.S. in the conduct of its foreign affairs. If this was indeed so, it could only be harmful to the relations between our two countries. Mr. Gromyko said that he was gratified to learn that President Nixon's speech before the UN would be temperate. One should be able to rise above transitory phenomena and guide our two countries to work for the interests of peace.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko
Soviet Ambassador A. F. Dobrynin
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter, Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
William D. Krimer, Interpreter, State Department

DATE & PLACE:
October 22, 1970, 11:00 a.m. – 1:30 p.m.
The Oval Office

SUBJECT:
Summit Meeting

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that, of course, he was acquainted with the President's view in regard to a possible meeting at the summit level. He was convinced that certain important questions, including that of the bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States required consideration at that level. He was authorized by his Government to say that the idea of having a meeting of the top leaders of the two countries is acceptable to the Soviet Union. He was aware of the preliminary considerations of the American side with regard to the time for such a meeting. As for the Soviet views on this question: in March of 1971 the Party Congress will be in session in Moscow. Consequently, April also will be a very busy month and would not be quite suitable as a possible date for a summit meeting. It would have to be a date sometime after April which could be agreed upon subsequently. In general, the President's considerations on this question are not in conflict with the Soviet views and there should be no difficulty in reaching an understanding.

Taking the President's considerations into account, as for a place for a summit meeting, we think that it would be correct that such a meeting be held in the Soviet Union. That was the Soviet proposal. As for problems to be discussed at the summit, he did not think that it would be difficult to reach agreement on an agenda in the future. Of course,
in connection with the problems to be discussed and with the very idea of holding a meeting at the summit, it would be important for both sides to conduct their bilateral relations in such a way as to ensure that the summit meeting would be productive of positive results to a maximum extent. Mr. Gromyko felt there was no need to discuss in detail the impact that a Soviet-American summit meeting would have on the international situation. He thought that a positive outcome would have a tremendous effect upon the relations between his country and the United States and also would have a most important positive influence on the state of international affairs generally. He asked for the President's views on this question.

President Nixon replied that it was true he had said that a summit meeting would have a very dramatic effect. However, Mr. Gromyko, who had been at Camp David, must certainly also be aware that summit meetings could produce a very dramatic hangover in terms of the great expectations that people placed upon such meetings when not much agreement is produced in the result. He agreed that it would be good to hold this kind of a meeting. He had never met Mr. Kosygin in person and thought it was most important that they meet personally. He also thought it was important that we have enough time to prepare for this meeting in order to achieve concrete progress on basic important matters, such as SALT, for example, as well as on some collateral issues, such as the Middle East, if these issues were still active by the time of a summit meeting. He had discussed the idea of a summit meeting with Secretary Rogers and they both agreed that Moscow would be a suitable place. Mr. Khrushchev had come here about ten years ago. Mr. Kosygin and President Johnson had met in Glassboro and therefore it would be quite correct now for an American President to visit the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it would be important to give thought to the subjects to be discussed at the summit.

President Nixon said it seemed to him that we had basic agreement on setting the time for the meeting sometime next year in order to minimize any problems he might have with Congress, and he remarked that undoubtedly the Soviet side had similar problems with its own Parliament. It would be desirable to make a formal announcement of the intention of holding a summit meeting rather than risking the possibility that the information might leak out.
Mr. Gromyko replied that he would welcome the President's suggestion as for when an announcement of the intention to hold a summit meeting should be made. Of course, he did not think that this should be done today or tomorrow. He would be returning to his country on the 29th of October and would then be reporting to his Government. Perhaps then, or about a week later, the timing of the announcement could be coordinated between both sides.

The President repeated that it would be useful to announce it before there was any chance of a leak so that there would then be no need to deny the information and then confirm it at a later time. It would be better to do it formally.

Secretary Rogers remarked that it should also be announced that the summit level idea had come about by mutual agreement rather than detailing who had invited whom.

The President agreed that it would avoid embarrassment for either side if we were simply to announce that during the conversation between him and Mr. Gromyko both sides had agreed that it would be useful for the top leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to meet personally.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: My October 23 and 27 Discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin

November 2, 1970

Attached at Tabs A and B, respectively, are the full records of my conversations with Ambassador Dobrynin on October 23 and 27. Following are the highlights:

Summit

On October 23 I told Dobrynin that you were now thinking of a Summit announcement for October 30 in California, and I added that it seemed to me unnecessary to wait for final word until Gromyko returned to Moscow since I had every confidence that their communications system was adequate to getting a response. Dobrynin replied that the communications I referred to had indeed been used and that he hoped to have a reply by the first half of the following week. He asked the reason for the hurry, and I replied that it was to prevent leakage, adding that in any event if these things were done it was just as well that they be done quickly.

On October 26, I called Ambassador Dobrynin and again reminded him that we needed an early response on the Summit announcement. On the following day, October 27, I met with Dobrynin who had informed me that he had a message for me on the Summit. The message stated that the Soviet Government wished strongly to reaffirm its desire for a Summit meeting. Secondly, the Soviet Government agreed that such a meeting had to be carefully prepared. Third, the Soviet Government proposed the initiation of discussions about the agenda in the confidential channel of Dobrynin and myself. Fourth, in the course of these discussions, the timing of the visit and the announcement of it could naturally be discussed. Fifth, pending such discussion and agreement, and Soviet Government expected that there would be no leak.

Cuba

Dobrynin said that they were surprised this subject did not come up in your meeting with Gromyko and quoted the latter's instructions, as follows:

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
"We do not have a submarine base in Cuba, nor are we building a military naval facility. We do not intend to have a military naval facility, and we will abide strictly by our understandings of 1962. We are also making the exchanges from August onward part of the understanding of 1962."

Dobrynin added that the Soviets could not accept our list of definitions in my oral note of October 9, since there was no reciprocity; i.e., they had not given us a list of prohibited exile activities. However, the Soviets understood from our list what we considered a naval base and would take it into serious consideration in interpreting what constituted a base. In response to his insisting on their right to occasional ceremonial visits, I replied that the distinction was clear between such visits and those which augmented their nuclear submarine capabilities through use of facilities in Cuba. I specifically singled out the Soviet submarine tender which remained there. We could not consider a visit of six weeks ceremonial. Dobrynin said that it will probably leave. However, the principle of rare, ceremonial visits could not be given up.

Dobrynin called particular attention to the fact that the Soviets would strictly observe the 1962 agreements and that our exchange of views since August would be incorporated into the 1962 understandings.

Middle East

I told Dobrynin that we were prepared to try and move in the direction of substantive talks, but that this would take several weeks to accomplish and would require Soviet restraint. Dobrynin rejected my suggestion of calling off the General Assembly debate, saying that he could not ask the Arabs to do this on the basis of vague and confidential US-Soviet understandings. I emphasized that no effort should be made to drive a wedge between us and Israel or to push the two of us into a position of relative isolation. Dobrynin responded that his country would use its influence in the direction of moderation and would not exacerbate the situation.

I also said that the ceasefire would have to last six months this time if the talks proceeded, and Dobrynin said that this was being seriously studied in Moscow. Finally, if, in order to move Israel toward negotiations, we have to give it some military equipment, the Soviet Union should not use this to inflame Arab feelings.
Miscellaneous

I pressed for the release of our two Generals being held in Turkey and Dobrynin said he would transmit this to Moscow. He, in turn, raised the Ivanov case which he said was a matter of great concern to the Soviet leadership and they had been pressing us on it a long time. I said I would look into this and would communicate with him if there were anything to say about it. (Comment: We are holding Ivanov as a spy and hope in his case to get a Constitutional determination on wiretapping. We therefore do not wish to release him at this time, but this should not be a difficult problem once we have a ruling, probably in about a year.)
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Conversation With Ambassador Dobrynin

Attached at Tab A is a report of my lengthy discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin on December 22, 1970. The conversation took place in an extremely cordial atmosphere and covered a wide range of issues including the Middle East, Vietnam, SALT, Cuba and a Summit.

US-USSR Relations

In reviewing the general state of US-USSR relations, Dobrynin observed that:

-- When this Administration came in the Soviet Union had the profoundest suspicion of you. After six to nine months the idea grew that you had become more conciliatory. However, a number of issues have created a bad impression.

-- There was great eagerness in Moscow to come to an understanding and make progress somewhere. This was especially true of the Middle East, SALT and Berlin issues.

Middle East. Concerning Middle East issues Ambassador Dobrynin made a number of interesting comments.

-- Although negotiations with Sisco appeared to concentrate on legalistic quibbling and never seemed to come to a particular point, the Soviet Union accepted two American proposals in early June. Instead of a reply, the U.S. introduced its own plan and this created the impression that the U.S. was trying to push Moscow out of the Middle East.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MOSCOW could not be held responsible for ceasefire arrangements since it was only notified after the fact.

The violations had not been ordered from Moscow but involved execution of plans largely made by the military. Soviet leaders at first did not believe we were serious about violations and thought that in raising this issue we were deliberately provoking them.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if there was anything he could tell people in Moscow for use in current negotiations with the Egyptians.

Dobrynin indicated a preference for discussions in our channel and then shifting the technical points to the Sisco level. When reminded that a ceasefire had been nearly arranged in March but that at that point the Soviets had introduced SA-3 missiles, he claimed that the SA-3 deliveries were handled by the Defense Ministry and therefore were in a completely different channel.

Vietnam. On the subject of Vietnam Dobrynin read a statement (Tab B) which was conciliatory in tone and stated among other things that:

Events of the last few weeks indicated that the Nixon Administration was returning to its earlier course of settling the problem by political means.

Negotiations alone can put an end to the conflict and the Vietnamese share this view. No progress can be made if one side tries to impose its will with the help of military ultimatums.

The Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to attempts to implement threats against the fraternal socialist country.

During our discussion of Vietnam Dobrynin asked whether we would accept a coalition government in which we could nominate a third and the other side nominate a third. I stressed that:

Now was the time for the Soviet Union to use its influence for negotiations but that we would not sit by while the North Vietnamese were building for an offensive.

We were prepared to accept a solution that reflected the real balance of forces and not a subterfuge for a Communist takeover.

If the Soviet Union was prepared to enter the negotiating process seriously we would not embarrass them and would make serious replies to serious proposals.

SALT. Besides indicating a desire to make some progress in SALT,
Ambassador Dobrynin noted that the impression had been created that the Soviet offer on an ABM limitation alone had been turned down as a result of White House intervention.

Cuba. In cautioning Dobrynin on the gravity with which we would view the servicing of nuclear submarines in or from Cuban ports I also emphasized that constantly needling us with the tender and other ships could only complicate our relations without leading to anything productive. In response to my remark that I understood the visits would conclude on December 23, he replied, "Well we will see .... Why don't you wait till the 23rd and then we can talk again." (The frigate left Cienfuegos on December 23 and the tender and submarine departed on December 27.)

Summit. I cautioned Dobrynin that he must take special care that our discussions on the Summit were not played back into the American net, calling his attention particularly to a remark Semenov had made to Ambassador Smith. Dobrynin alleged that there had been no such references in Semenov's reporting cables and that if we could make some progress with SALT then the Summit meeting in September would make real sense.

In response to my comment that the six weeks delay in responding to our proposal had made a painful impression, Dobrynin claimed they had never grasped that we had made a concrete proposal. (This, of course, was absurd since he came back from the Soviet Union with an answer to the concrete proposal.)

Other Soviet Irritants. In discussing other irritants in our relations, Dobrynin noted that:

--Refusal of American personnel to attend the National Holiday celebrations had been a very emotional matter.

--U. S. handling of the Lithuanian defector case caused outrage in Moscow. If the sailor had been given asylum the matter, after a protest, would have been forgotten in 24 hours.

--The tough speech by Frank Shakespeare and increased Voice of America broadcasting into Poland caused concern.

--Both the French and the Germans consistently told the Soviet Ambassadors that the U. S. was holding up progress on Berlin. The Soviets thought they had recently made a major concession by speaking of preferential, unlimited access but our Ambassador seemed unprepared to discuss it.
Khrushchev's Memoirs. In a lighter vein Dobrynin commented about Khrushchev's Memoirs:

--it is probable that the memoirs were dictated in some form and were therefore quite authentic.

--The story that Robert Kennedy stressed the danger of a military coup in the U.S. during the Cuban missile crisis is incorrect. However Kennedy had said that if things continued military dominance would become so great that there would be no choice except to invade Cuba.

Future Meetings. In concluding his comments, Dobrynin made an eloquent plea for some progress in our bilateral channel and indicated readiness to meet frequently. He suggested that we review negotiating positions on the Middle East as well as SALT and Berlin and he invited me to dinner on January 7 at the Soviet Embassy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: January 23, 1971, 10:00 a.m.
The White House

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

The meeting took place at Ambassador Dobrynin's urgent request. He
called as soon as he had returned from consultations in Moscow on
January 21st but the session could not be scheduled due to my trip to
Chicago on the 22nd. This meeting was perhaps the most significant
that I have had with Dobrynin since our conversations began.

Dobrynin started the conversation by saying that he hoped we had noted
the treatment Senator Muskie had received. I said nothing. First, he
said Senator Muskie had spent four hours with Premier Kosygin, to be
sure, but that an hour of that was consumed with the introduction by
Governor Harriman of his grandchildren. Secondly, it must have been
noticed that Kosygin mentioned nothing to Muskie that could not be read
in the newspapers. I replied that it did seem to me that Kosygin had
not been too communicative but I made no further comment.

Dobrynin then said that he just returned from the most extensive
US-Soviet relations review that he could remember since he has been
Ambassador. He saw Kosygin for four hours and Brezhnev for five
hours. He spent all morning with the Politburo and long days with
Gromyko in the Foreign Office. He said he kept my schedule which is
reported in the newspapers, working 15 hours a day while he was in
Moscow. Having ended the unofficial part of our talk, he then said he
would get into the official part.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Summit

Dobrynin, who spoke almost uninterruptedly for the whole meeting, made the following points. He said he had been instructed to raise again the Summit meeting and to suggest a specific date, namely the second half of the summer. I asked what that meant, if that meant September. He replied that in the Soviet Union this meant July or August, but, of course, if we preferred September he was certain that this would be acceptable. He had the impression, however, that the Soviet leaders were leaning towards July without wanting to make an issue of it.

Dobrynin said that he had been instructed to reaffirm that the agenda submitted in our communication of August was acceptable and that this agenda should be prepared in private conversations between him and me prior to the meeting. The meeting should have as its purpose the positive improvement in US-Soviet relations and should not deal only with general expressions of goodwill. Therefore the Soviet leaders were interested in having some concrete achievement recorded at the meeting. Dobrynin said the meeting should also have as its purpose not only bilateral relations but issues of benefit to all the countries of the world. When I asked what that meant, Dobrynin said this was a ritualistic phrase which had to be put in order to avoid the charge that we were establishing a condominium. He said I should not pay any attention to it.

Dobrynin added that the Soviet Union would reduce its press campaign and that it expected that we would show great restraint about the Soviet Union in the media, insofar as we had any influence, and particularly in our briefings. He said both sides should show some restraint in the interval before the summit.

Dobrynin then turned to the specific topics that I had raised with him.

Berlin

He said first on the issue of Berlin the Soviet leaders wanted to reaffirm their readiness, already expressed in the January 6, 1971 communication which was delivered in San Clemente, to have Dobrynin and me conduct our conversations in this channel. This feeling had been reinforced by a conversation that Bahr had had with Falin (Soviet Ambassador-designate to Bonn) in which Bahr had said he was an old friend of mine; and secondly both Brandt and Bahr believed that I was the only person who understood German conditions well enough to break through the logjams created by our bureaucracy.
Dobrynin thought that we should not hold up a Berlin agreement until the Summit, but rather if possible achieve one before then. He wanted me to know that the Soviet Union would approach Berlin negotiations with the attitude of achieving an objective improvement of the situation and not of worsening our position. It expected, however, that we would pay some attention to their specific concern. Dobrynin said that he had been instructed to tell me that my concern that there had to be some appeal to the Soviet Union or some acknowledgment of Soviet responsibility and Four-Power responsibility for access to Berlin was being most carefully studied in Moscow. An attempt would be made to find some consultative four-power body that could play a useful role. Dobrynin said he was prepared to have an expert come from Moscow to help with these talks without, however, necessarily telling the expert what he was here for. I told Dobrynin that I would have to proceed by first talking to Bahr and then talking to Rush and that I would be in touch with him in two or three weeks after these consultations had been completed.

SALT

Dobrynin then turned to SALT. He said that my observations had been studied with the greatest attention in Moscow. While no final decision had been taken he could assure me that there was considerable sympathy for the approach. He had been instructed, however, to ask a number of questions first. First, when I spoke of a freeze on deployment, did I mean quantitative only or did I include qualitative? I replied that since it would be impossible to verify qualitative freeze I meant quantitative only.

Secondly, Dobrynin asked, when I had spoken of an ABM agreement had I meant the Washington-Moscow system only or had I included zero ABM or perhaps stopping at the existing sites as I had already mentioned to him? I responded that frankly we had not made a final decision on this but that we were openminded on those three approaches. We were prepared to negotiate a zero ABM agreement if they were prepared to tear down their existing installations. We had also proposed an NCA agreement and lately we had taken some interest in an agreement confined to three sites on our side and the Moscow system on their side. Dobrynin said that he had advanced this in Moscow. He had to tell me honestly that the political people found it easiest to have a Moscow-Washington agreement and that the military people had at first not understood the three site-Moscow agreement but had now begun to study it sympathetically. All he could tell me was that none of these three possibilities was excluded and that the Soviets were prepared to be very constructive.
Dobrynin continued that the major problem in fact was the issue of forward-based aircraft. I said it was obvious that we could not upset the strategic balance by forward deployments of aircraft. This might be handled more easily under a tacit arrangement pending negotiations, although we could not accept limitations on carrier deployment under those circumstances. Dobrynin replied that he did not have any firm instructions but the tentative thinking of Moscow was that a SALT agreement along the lines of what I had proposed to him should be concluded at the Summit; that preparatory work for it should be done by Dobrynin and myself; and that the Vienna negotiations, in order to show some progress, might conclude an agreement on accidental war. I told him that we did not want the provocative attack issue handled in this forum and he said he understood. However the question of accidental war was simple and could be handled in that forum. I told him I would have to check with the President.

The Middle East

Dobrynin then turned to the Middle East. He said the Soviet Union did not believe that our present procedure could lead anywhere. He said that a deadlock was inevitable in his view, and he wanted to assure me that the Soviet Union was prepared to make a realistic agreement. The Soviet leaders were extremely interested to have him discuss this with me. I replied that we might prefer to have it discussed between Sisco and him. He expressed extreme distaste at this prospect. He asked if I could at least give him some indication of what we thought on the issue of guarantees in order to avoid the danger that we might get into a confrontation situation at the Four-Power talks. I told him that I would see if I could talk to him about it during the week but I would have to check with the President.

Dobrynin in summing up said this could be the most important year in US-Soviet relations. He and his leaders were convinced that whatever progress was to be made had to be made this year: it was their experience with election years that nothing ever occurred of any significance and then the first year after the election, if there is a change of Administration, nothing occurs either. So they believed this is the best year to make significant progress.
European Security Conference

Dobrynin stressed Moscow's continuing interest in a European Security Conference. He said it would be helpful if we agreed to a meeting of Ambassadors as proposed by Finland in Helsinki before the summer. I replied that we should not bite off too much at once but that I would report to the President.

Vietnam

Dobrynin then turned to Vietnam briefly. He said he wanted me to know that the general observations about the possibility of separating military and political issues had been transmitted to Hanoi without comment and without recommendation, but they had been transmitted. It had occurred only a few days ago, however, and no answer had as yet been received. I said that I hoped he understood that the President was deadly serious when he said that we would protect our interests in Vietnam and that we would handle those matters separately. He responded that Soviet leaders understood this up to a certain point, but beyond that the Soviet leaders would have to react whether they liked it or not. I said I understood that if we landed troops in Haiphong the Soviet Union would have to protest. He responded that we could be sure they would have to protest. I said that they could be sure that we were not going to land U.S. troops in Haiphong. Dobrynin smiled and said that he hoped that Indochina would not be an obstacle. He implied strongly that in its present framework it would not be.

Conclusion

I then said to him that he must understand the extreme delicacy of the bureaucratic situation in which these matters were being handled. Total discretion was essential; if this failed we would simply have to interrupt this channel and he would have to take his chances through ordinary procedures. I said I had no illusions about his willingness to play various elements off against each other but this could not work. Dobrynin replied that he had never done that and he would not do that in his own self-interest. I told him to make sure that no matter what his diplomats picked up elsewhere it did not come from knowledge of our conversations, because I talked only to the President about them.

I asked Dobrynin when he thought a Summit should be announced. He said this was a very easy matter and could be settled anytime. I suggested that first we make some progress in these talks and then we would see.
When Dobrynin left he said, "So the future of Soviet-US relations is in our hands, and I want you to know we are going to make a big effort to improve them." On this note we parted.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY March 21, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Exchanges on SALT with Dobrynin

Following is a brief summary of the course of my discussions with Dobrynin and, in particular, of the evolution of the draft letter of agreement which the Soviets now have in hand in Moscow.

1. On February 17, after having had a prior oral discussion of the terms of an agreement on how to proceed in SALT, I handed Dobrynin a draft text of a letter from you to Kosygin. This presented in some detail the elements of an agreement which would serve as instructions for the SALT negotiators.

The essence of this document was that we would be prepared to proceed with an agreement on ABMs provided such an agreement included a commitment to negotiate by an agreed date (e.g., July 1, 1972) and agreement to limit offensive strategic weapons. In addition, and most important, there would be an associated understanding on an offensive weapons freeze under whose terms new construction of ICBM launchers would cease as of April 1, 1971 and no ICBM launchers under construction could be completed after January 1, 1972. The freeze would not affect modernization or replacement of missiles within the frozen number of ICBM launchers. On ABMs, the draft proposed that the agreement be based on the Soviets keeping the Moscow system and our keeping and finishing the three already authorized Safeguard sites around Minuteman fields.

Finally, this draft said we would inform the Soviets of the indicators by which we would judge Soviet strategic weapons activities and which would be of concern to us in terms of having to take countermeasures.

The formal agreement, the draft suggested, would have an initial duration of five years.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
Dobrynin made a number of comments on some of the formulations and, in particular, saw no need for a prohibition of new ICBM starts as of April 1 as long as there was a stoppage of completions as of January 1, 1972. He also thought that the commitment to complete an offensive weapons agreement should be for January 1, 1973 rather than July 1, 1972. His other comments concerned explanatory language included in my proposed draft which he did not think necessary but which I had deliberately included to provide the Soviets with the rationale of our proposal.

2. Dobrynin did not respond until March 12, when he handed me the Soviet version of a draft letter.

This document proposed a separate ABM limitation this year with each side defending its capital. Only after such an agreement were the Soviets ready "in principle" to "discuss the question" of freezing offensive strategic weapons, with the caveat that modernization and replacement of weapons would be permitted. The Soviet text also provided that the ABM agreement would have a clause obligating us to continue active negotiations on offensive weapons. It did not include a commitment to reach agreement. Apart from the call for a separate ABM agreement this year, no dates were mentioned in the Soviet document.

The Soviet paper in effect was a repetition of their formal SALT position and gave no ground on our requirement for an early offensive freeze. It did, however, broaden our freeze language to include strategic offensive weapons generally, not simply ICBMs. (We, of course, are mostly concerned about the SS-9 and possibly newer large missiles.)

I made clear to Dobrynin that the Soviet text did not advance matters. He indicated that a shorter version of our February 17 draft would be easier to handle in Moscow where the specific dates we proposed could not be readily focussed on before the Party Congress. We agreed that each of us would attempt to draft shorter and more generally phrased versions.

3. On March 15, Dobrynin gave me a one-page draft simply calling for instructions to the SALT delegations to draw up an ABM agreement which would also include an obligation to continue active negotiations on
offensive weapons. But there was still no reference to a freeze or to an eventual negotiated agreement covering offensive weapons. Again no dates were mentioned. However, the Soviet text dropped the definition of the ABM agreement as involving defense of capitals.

4. Meanwhile, I gave Dobrynin my shorter version. It provided for an ABM agreement, if possible, this year which would include the obligation to also reach an offensive weapons agreement by a fixed date to be agreed. (This removed the previously specific date of January 1, 1973.)

In addition, according to my text, there would be an understanding associated with the agreement under which no additional strategic offensive missile launchers could be brought to completion as of a fixed date to be agreed. This differed from my earlier version by not stipulating the effective date for the freeze as January 1, 1972. It also broadened the freeze to include not only ICBMs but other types as well, i.e. Soviet Y-Class submarines. As before, modernization and replacement would be permitted. The text also said that the freeze understanding would be superseded by a formal offensive weapons agreement as soon as one enters into force. The purpose of this was to make it harder for the Soviets to break out of the freeze, especially, of course, as regards SS-9s.

The text also included abbreviated language indicating that the ABM agreement would include radar limitations and that the geographic definition of where each side could maintain ABMs would be settled in the negotiations. In other words, I did not repeat the three Safeguard/Moscow formula. (In the meantime, Gerard Smith had been instructed to put a four Safeguard site/Moscow proposal to the Soviets in Vienna. This should give us some bargaining room while we seek to obtain further information on, and make additional analyses of the significance of the newly-discovered Soviet missile construction.

5. On March 16, in the light of further discussion, a still more abbreviated version of the US text was worked out.

The first point was that the SALT delegations would be instructed immediately to work out the text of an ABM agreement, with the precise nature of the limitation to be settled in the negotiations. The reference to an agreement "this year" was dropped in view of the "immediate" character of the instruction to the negotiators.
SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY

Secondly, the text provided that the ABM agreement would contain an obligation to continue negotiations and reach agreement on limiting strategic offensive weapons. This essentially met our point that the ABM agreement contain as an integral part the commitment to reach an offensive agreement. The reference to a fixed date was dropped but the Soviets know from the earlier texts that the absence of an agreement after a lapse of time could serve as cause for abrogation of the ABM agreement.

More important, however, the March 16 text included a provision that there would be an understanding that strategic offensive weapons would be frozen at the level of a fixed date to be agreed. Again, modernization and replacement would be permitted. But in this version, to avoid letting the Soviets "replace" old ICBMs with SS-9s, there was a stipulation that replacement could only be by weapons of the same category.

Before this final version of the freeze provision was agreed, I had proposed the formula that "no additional offensive strategic missile launchers would be brought to completion after a fixed date to be agreed". But Dobrynin preferred the broader reference to a freeze on "strategic offensive weapons". Since "freeze" is defined as applying to a level as of a fixed date, this change did not change the substance.

However, we still face in the negotiations the problem of how to define "strategic offensive weapons". The Soviets may seek to include bombers and forward-based systems in Europe, Asia and on carriers. We would continue to reject any such definition if its effect were to inhibit our present forward deployments and alliance commitments.

I am now awaiting Dobrynin's official response to this draft which we jointly worked out. If it is positive, I would propose to hand him an oral note making clear that the ABM agreement would not be initiated until the provisions for the offensive freeze, including the date on which it would take effect, were settled. This will mean, in effect that negotiations on defining the terms of the freeze will run essentially concurrently with the formal negotiations of the ABM agreement.

The text, as it now stands, is of course only an agreement in principle. The details of the ABM agreement will have to be worked out. But the present text meets our essential requirement for coupling an offensive freeze with any ABM agreement.

SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ALEXANDER M. HAIG

SUBJECT: Possible SALT Agreement with the Soviets

May 5, 1971

At dinner last night, the Soviet Ambassador to the SALT talks, Seminov, hinted to Gerard Smith that the Soviets might soon offer a proposal which would halt new starts on ICBMs in conjunction with a proposal for an agreement on ABMs/National Command Authorities.

I discussed this turn of events with Dr. Kissinger and at his direction, summoned Ambassador Dobrynin to Dr. Kissinger's office and confronted him with the question of why the Soviets would take such action in the Vienna forum when they were fully aware that we were awaiting a formal response from them on the final exchange of notes here in Washington.

Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that he was unaware that Seminov would be making such a statement and would take prompt action to prevent this kind of speculation within the Vienna forum. He added that he was awaiting word from Moscow and Dr. Kissinger's last proposal and anticipated that it would be forthcoming on Thursday or Friday of this week. He refused to comment one way or the other as to whether or not the U.S. proposal would be acceptable but the obvious acceptance of an offensive freeze with an ABM/NCA agreement hinted at by Seminov yesterday suggests the Soviet reply will be affirmative. If so, it is probable that we could move with an announcement as early as Thursday or Friday of next week.
Andropov Analyzes the ABM Negotiations, 1971

USSR

Top secret The Committee for State Security
19 April 1971
No. 983-A To Comrade USTINOV, D.F.
Moscow

The available data bears witness to the fact that the position of the USA on the problem of limiting the arms race remains the same. Nixon's government proceeds from the fact that the suggestions introduced by the American delegation last August in Vienna provide the basis for achieving an agreement advantageous to the United States. It will use all means to strive for the consolidation of the quantitative balance of strategic weapons between the USA and the USSR at the present-day level, trying to preserve definite advantages in the most important kinds of strategic weapons. In the course of the negotiations, at the end of February 1971, while talking to a diplomat from one of the U.S. allies, the head of the American delegation, Smith, announced that the USA intended to conduct the negotiations firmly, in order to obtain the agreement of the USSR on limitation of offensive strategic weapons. Experts, close to the U.S. government circles, state that the main goal of the USA in the negotiations remains the achievement of an agreement on limitation of the number of big Soviet offensive inter-continental ballistic missiles. According to information we have received, as far as the present stage of the negotiations is concerned, U.S. government bodies devote their main attention to studying the possibility of achieving a separate agreement on anti-missile defense systems. As noted by American experts, the USSR proposal on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to means necessary for the defense of Moscow and Washington D.C., introduced during the previous stage of the negotiations, put Nixon in a kind of difficult position. On the one hand, as for its contents, the Soviet proposal is very similar to the one on ABM introduced by the US before, together with other questions, and that's why it would have been difficult for Nixon to reject it completely. On the other hand, Nixon couldn't refuse to deploy the "Safeguard" ABM system, since it would have been difficult for him to explain this concession in his country. Some time ago he managed, with great difficulty, to get agreement on the allocation of the means needed for its deployment, having persuaded the Congress that ABM "Safeguard" could provide effective defense from a possible USSR first strike, and that its creation would save the USA further big new expenditures on a quantitative increase in offensive strategic weapons. The harshest objections to the Soviet proposal will come from Pentagon officials, who assert that if it is adopted without the simultaneous achievement of an agreement on strategic offensive weapons the Soviet Union will continue its unlimited increase in its fleet of missile-carrying nuclear submarines and big land-based IBM missiles ("SS-9") configured with MiRVed warheads, and as a result it will get an opportunity to make a "preventive strike," which could eliminate the majority of American "Minutemen" ICBMs. Pentagon representatives also express concern that a separate agreement on limiting the deployment of ABM systems to the defense of just the capitals of both states could inspire strong opposition to the MIRV-type warheads deployment program in Congress and U.S. political circles. Air Force representatives insist on continuing the intensive deployment of a broad system of "Safeguard" ABM.

The ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] attitude is more flexible. It introduced a proposal which provides an opportunity to conclude a separate agreement on ABM systems, under the condition that negotiations on the limitation of the number of offensive strategic
weapons will be carried out at the same time, and that during the negotiations the USSR and the USA will undertake the obligation to "freeze" the number of their strategic offensive weapons. Kissinger regarded this as the basic variant during a private channel exchange of opinions on ABM with a Soviet representative.

According to information from American sources, the USA National Security Council (NSC) is studying the proposal of a temporary agreement on the limitation of ABM systems deployment during the period of negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons along with a simultaneous "freeze" of offensive nuclear weapons at the present level. Nixon's comments about the negotiations in his message about USA foreign policy indicate that he, evidently moving away from the more flexible position which Kissinger expressed to us, is more inclined to accept the Pentagon's point of view.

Nevertheless, Nixon is not interested in aggravating relations between the USSR and the USA during the presidential campaign, and that is why, while holding to a really rigid position during the negotiations, including the ABM question, he at the same time will try to create an impression of constructivism and flexibility in his approach to Soviet proposals. Tough, uncompromising declarations in official propaganda, to the effect that in the negotiations the USA will firmly insist on its position that a separate agreement on ABM without a corresponding agreement on limitation of offensive nuclear weapons is unacceptable, should, in Nixon's conception, favorably highlight a possible American proposal to conclude a separate agreement on ABM limitation, which would include the preservation and even further development of the "Safeguard" ABM system in the USA, while at the same time limiting the ABM systems in the USSR to those necessary just for the protection of Moscow.

Judging by information in our possession, the NSC, while preparing recommendations for the American delegation to the negotiations in Vienna, again strongly opposed the inclusion of American means of forward basing on the agenda, motivated in its position by the fact that otherwise the whole structure of NATO would have to be changed, and the USA would lose an important military advantage, as a result of which the general strategic balance would be changed to the advantage of the USSR. The NSC pointed out that the means of forward basing could be a subject for discussion during negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries on the question of balanced limitation of armed forces in Europe.

According to certain information, one of the variants studied by the NSC provides for the American side to put forward a proposal to simultaneously "freeze" the existing number of Soviet intermediate and medium range missiles and the American means of forward basing if, due to great differences in points of view on means of forward basing, the negotiations will come to a dead end and appear to be under threat of breakdown.

Through unofficial channels the Americans inform us that Nixon's government, while "sincerely wishing" to achieve concrete results during the negotiations, at the same time "can't wait endlessly" and is interested in achieving an agreement with the USSR by the end of 1971, because the beginning of the electoral campaign will make it difficult for him to bargain with the USSR. But the intent of these statements, it seems, is to influence the position of the USSR during the negotiations. According to existing information, Kissinger in a private talk said that from a political point of view it may be more beneficial for Nixon if the agreement with the USSR were to be achieved closer to the presidential elections. According to a statement by the American representative to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the USA is ready to conduct at least three more rounds (the present one included) of negotiations, striving first of all to get the agreement of the USSR on limitation of strategic offensive weapons.
At the same time, not being sure that they will manage to obtain the agreement of the USSR on a complex accord on the limitation of ABM systems and strategic offensive weapons on terms acceptable to the U.S., the Americans might put forward a proposal for partial agreement. Most probably it would be a proposal to limit ABM deployment to the "Safeguard" system for the USA and an ABM system around Moscow for the USSR. And if American attempts to obtain a separate, favorable to them, agreement on ABM systems fail, they would prefer just to conclude a treaty on measures for reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and USSR.

CC CPSU is informed.

Commentary by Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University; document provided by the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Moscow.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Outside System) INFORMATION

May 10, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt/K. Wayne Smith

SUBJECT: Your breakfast Meeting with Gerard Smith, Tuesday, May 11.

From the grapevine we understand that the delegation as a whole is returning for the Washington review in a state of near euphoria, believing that an important breakthrough has virtually been achieved and that the deliberations this week and next must produce a new American proposal. Indeed, in the followon conversations, below the Smith-Semyonov level, Garthoff has been exploring the new Soviet proposal and some important nuances and clarifications seem to be emerging.

The Soviet Freeze Proposal

As reported in official channels Semyonov proposed a "common mutual understanding on the possibility of a temporary cessation of construction of new ICBMs," with the details to be discussed only after achievement of a separate agreement on limiting ABMs to defense of the National Capitals. Such cessation would not affect modernization or replacement.

-- Subsequently, Soviet officials did not flatly rule out simultaneous agreement on a ICBM freeze and an ABM agreement. For example, they said cessation of new construction of ICBMs might be "coterminal" with an ABM agreement. And they have said that stopping current construction might even be considered.

-- On several occasions, the Soviets have said that they assume that NCA for our side is now dead and that the problem is to work out a compromise of Safeguard and NCA. They have said that one-for-one is acceptable of two-for-two sites, but always assuming equality of interceptors.

In other words, in private the Soviets are paring down Semyonov's more or less formal proposition and making it appear more inviting.

Presumably, you will only want to go over this in general with Ambassador Smith, rather than in any detail, which should await the Verification Panel.

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You might ask what he believes a maximum bargain on our side would be.

-- What chance is there for retaining more than 2 Safeguard sites?

-- What chance is there for agreeing on a suspension or cessation of ICBMs currently under construction?

-- Is there any prospect of adding SLBMs to the freeze, or is this the price of getting any freeze at all?

Obviously, Smith will be eager to learn from you the general state of mind here, how you see his role in the process of negotiating the new proposals, whether there will be a new Presidential instruction, and whether to adjourn soon etc.

Accidents and Hot Line

As you know, the negotiations on the Soviet draft of a separate agreement preventing accidental war have reached an impasse because we (i.e., your staff, on your instruction) have refused to approve a general paragraph proposed by the Soviets to cover "other situations." All of the bureaucracy (and the delegation, wants to proceed on this paragraph, as well as to discuss the vague preambular paragraphs proposed by the Soviets. We have blocked this because it smacks of willingness to consider a separate agreement. Presumably, Smith will plead for authority for Parsons (who is still in Vienna) to be given a general go ahead, and he will argue that we will be committed to nothing because it is all ad referendum. (In short, they have not even tried to exclude the troublesome language, but this may be of lesser importance in view of the new freeze proposal.)

On the hot line, this is virtually wrapped up on the basis of using two satellite circuits: Molniya II for the USSR and Intelsat for us. The technical details could be completed by next week and the work of the technical group ended, with a report of agreement to the delegation. The issue will then be whether to publicize a separate agreement or fold it into SALT. This can be taken up at the Verification Panel.
MEMORANDUM

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeld

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations in Light of the President's Visit to China

July 20, 1971

Over the past two and a half years the Soviets have been highly sensitive about the warming trend in US-PRC relations. As with our Romanian policy, they have seen our basic motives as hostile to themselves. Our more immediate purposes, in their view, have been to bring the USSR under pressure in various negotiations and to delimit the "legitimate" Soviet role in Asia and the Pacific. These suspicions, powerfully reinforced by deepseated antagonism toward the Chinese, will obviously have been drastically raised further by the latest turn of events.

Yet the fact remains that in spite -- or more likely because -- of their anxieties the Soviets have staked much on improved relations with the US. Brezhnev personally is closely identified with this policy and the calculus underlying it. That calculus involves the recognition that US and Soviet interests are uniquely intertwined in numerous areas and on numerous issues and the belief that the time is propitious for achieving certain advantageous arrangements with the US at a tolerable price. Brezhnev has not been without opposition and in dealing with it he has no doubt argued that domestic trends in the US and other Western countries and the fact that Chinese power is as yet only incipient make the present period in US-Soviet relations one of unusual opportunity for the Soviets.

The question now is whether the anxieties that have accompanied and to some extent impelled recent Soviet policy toward us will become so overwhelming as to throw that policy off the present line. This could occur either because the dominant Soviet leadership group feels compelled to demonstrate that it will not be dealt with under pressure of the new US-Chinese rapprochement or because opposition forces manage to use this rapprochement to undermine Brezhnev's room for maneuver or even his power position.

It has long been a tendency in the US to view whichever Soviet leader or leadership group happens to be in power as preferable to any alternative. In fact, the fortunes of individual Soviet leaders should be of less concern to us than how the Soviets perceive and structure their interests and how
we can best pursue our own with respect to the USSR. Thus, whether
Brezhnev personally is damaged in his position is of less concern than
whether we can continue to develop our relationship with the USSR along
lines we desire. To the extent that the nature of the Sino-Soviet
relationship and our policy toward China to date have exerted a beneficial
influence on the US-Soviet relationship, this influence should over time be
reinforced by what has happened. The immediate sense of shock and even
outrage in Moscow may cloud the situation at the moment; and it could
produce a political convulsion in the Kremlin. But it seems probable
that when faced again with the prospect of open hostility on two fronts
any foreseeable Kremlin leadership will seek relief on one of them. For
the time being, and after the shock has worn off, the Western front will
still seem the most promising to the Soviets.

General US Stance

We obviously have no interest in stimulating the anxieties of the Soviets
to the point of irrationality. While nothing that we can say will remove
Soviet suspicions it is clearly desirable to keep our rhetoric moderate and
to avoid public or, for that matter, private diplomatic speculation that the
Soviets must now choose between conflict on two fronts and concessions
toward us.

By the same token, the Soviets are past masters at playing the aggrieved
party and demanding compensation for injuries allegedly done them. If we are to benefit from our Chinese move in our Soviet relationship we should clearly
not be drawn into excessive conciliation of the Soviets. Reciprocity and
equity should remain the standards in our dealings with them.

Third Areas

Among foreign communist parties and in various radical movements the
Soviets may well manage to turn the US-Chinese rapprochement to some
advantage. The Soviets have always been able, where they chose, to outdo the
Chinese in giving material support to these groups. They may now also
be able to compete on more nearly even ideological terms. At the same
time, the Chinese will be eager to prove that their own fidelity to revo-
lutionary goals is undiminished. As regards the Soviets, we will need
to be particularly alert to any enivigation of their activities in Latin
America and in other regions of strategic interest to us (e.g. West and
East Africa). This problem is not fundamentally different from what it
has been but may be more intense now. There may once again be a
Soviet impulse to test the limits of our tolerance to their military
activities in the Caribbean. We should keep the limits clearly where we
have previously drawn them; it may indeed be desirable to define them
more firmly if the occasion arises.
More dangerous and incalculable is the impact on the Indian subcontinent. Although the objective Soviet interest in the absence of open conflict there cannot have changed, the Soviets may see the region as offering the most tempting opportunities for rekindling US-Chinese difficulties and for achieving unilateral advantages. In addition, Indian and Pakistani actions are unpredictable. While some in Moscow undoubtedly continue even in the new circumstances to flirt with finding a pretext for taking drastic military action against China, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would pursue this as a calculated policy. Moscow's basic disadvantage is that in any open fighting it cannot rely on India to hold its own against Chinese intervention on Pakistan's side. Consequently, the Soviets are not likely to encourage the Indians to start major operations. But they may continue to give lesser kinds of support to Indian clandestine activities, hoping in this way to build their position in India while the Indians are resentful of us and more than ever frightened by the Chinese. In this complex situation, little can probably be achieved by direct US talks with the Soviets, though this option should be held open. Our efforts are probably best devoted to influencing the Pakistanis and the Indians.

There probably is little direct effect on the Middle East from our Chinese move. As in the subcontinent, some in Moscow might be tempted to raise the temperature between Arabs and Israelis, believing even apart from the "provocation" of our China policy -- that the extent of actual US support for Israel may be worth testing. But the preponderant view in Moscow is likely to remain that (1) the Arabs cannot yet be relied upon to fight even a moderately successful campaign and (2) the risk of some US intervention if the Soviets intervene actively is still high. At the same time, the Soviets are not likely in the short run to counsel greater negotiating flexibility in Cairo lest they appear to be reacting defensively to our China initiative.

Rightly or wrongly the Russians have suspected us of trying to exclude them from the diplomatic action. As long as we judge that any settlement will require Soviet involvement in some form, it seems pointless to feed these Soviet suspicions. This is mostly a matter of style which is worth handling with some care under present circumstances.

There may be some Soviet temptation to stimulate hostile North Korean actions against the South or us on the grounds that our reaction will complicate the President's trip to Peking. The North Koreans themselves, worried about a US-Chinese rapprochement, may consider such actions. We should obviously provide no pretext but if the contingency arises we ought to act rapidly against the source of the trouble and make clear to both Moscow and Peking what we are doing.

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There may be some new warmth in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations in the period ahead but it is unlikely to have any new impact on the course of either the war or the negotiations. Clearly, however, if we can trace new Communist military actions to increased Soviet support we should go slow in bilateral economic relations with the USSR which have long been tied to the situation in Vietnam. This should be made clear to Moscow at the time.

SALT

SALT has always had major Chinese implications, though for the most part they have remained inexplicit. The basic interests of the two sides have not changed but the Soviets will be more sensitive in some respects and we should exercise greater care on certain points. Recent US revival of the zero-ABM option may now appear in a different light in Moscow than it did when Smith mentioned it. Almost certainly, one of the basic reasons for Soviet reluctance to consider it has been concern for maintaining some defense against the Chinese. But our own approach should continue to be based on our evaluation of the implications of a complete ban for us. We should make clear to the Soviets that we can accept either of the broad ABM options we have presented and assume that Moscow will make its own judgment of its interests.

The Soviets may also be sensitive to our counting the SS-11s deployed in the Western USSR (MR/IRBM fields) in a ceiling on ICBMs if these SS-11s can be targeted against China. We cannot tell one way or the other; but in terms of our own concerns we have no alternative but to count these SS-11s.

The Soviets have consistently pressed for "third country" clauses in a SALT agreement and in an agreement on measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Apart from problems this poses for us in our relationship with the British and French, we should avoid appearing (1) to collude with the Soviets against China and (2) to be holding open the option of a side-deal with the Chinese at Soviet expense. In practice, we can accept the somewhat redundant general proposition that any agreement between ourselves and the Soviets should not be circumvented via third countries (though there is room for substantial disagreement on how to define "circumvention").

In the accidents agreement, we should, at most, reach a tacit understanding that each side should seek whatever arrangements it wishes with other nuclear powers. It is now unwise to enter into a commitment to do this. Likewise, Chinese attitudes probably make it undesirable to open the US-Soviet agreement for accession by other nuclear powers. Indeed not only the Chinese but also the UK and France could well have reservations about acceding to an agreement which they did not negotiate and on the terms of which, especially in the case of the Chinese, they were not consulted. In

SECRET/SENSITIVE
any event, the Soviets for reasons of geography should have a much more acute interest than we in making some arrangement with the Chinese on accidents and we should leave this up to them.

In the likely event that agreements on accident prevention and the Hot Line are completed and the defensive and offensive agreements, there may be virtue in promulgating them promptly. This would be only for the benefit of certain domestic US audiences (although some of these may also assert that the Administration is seeking credit in SALT when in fact it has nothing of substance to show.) But it will give the Soviets something and perhaps demonstrate to the Chinese that our negotiations have not been detrimental to their interests.

Test Ban

The Soviets may well try to engage us more vigorously in renewed negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This may be attractive to them in any case because of the growing pressures to which we will be subjected domestically on this subject; under the new circumstances it could be even more attractive because of the potential for isolating the Chinese if some new agreement were reached. We should deal with this issue on its merits when our internal studies are complete. In considering whether a broader ban than now exists, or even a complete one, may be in our interest, we clearly have to weigh the effect of continued Chinese testing and weapons development. Undoubtedly, the Soviets will do so too and the negotiating positions of both sides would reflect these assessments. The principal guideline for our dealings with the Soviets should be that we should not get drawn into schemes for joint pressure on the Chinese. Peking will address this issue when it is ready to do so and not before -- just as the other nuclear powers.

Five Power Nuclear Conference

We still owe the Soviets a response to their proposal. In advancing this old idea, the Soviets no doubt expected the Chinese to reject it. Whether the Soviets had any concrete propositions in mind that could usefully be negotiated in such a forum is hard to tell. In any event, subject to consideration of our NSSM study now in progress, our best posture is one of (1) giving priority for now to SALT, (2) leaving a larger conference to the future, and (3) leaving the other nuclear powers the option to join the US-Soviet dialogue at a time and under conditions of their own choosing. Conceptually, arms control agreements between grossly unequal nuclear powers are hard to envisage in any case.

Europe

There is no obvious reason why our position in the Berlin negotiations should be affected by Chinese developments. The Soviets may, however, have a
more complex problem. To the extent that there position has encountered East German resistance the Soviets may now be more cautious. Moreover, any general, even if only temporary toughening in Soviet attitudes toward us could be reflected in a more demanding posture on the remaining disagreed issues on Berlin and in dilatory tactics. In addition, to the extent that Soviet tactics so far have been controversial within the Soviet leadership, Brezhnev may consider it expedient to apply the brakes. Sooner or later, however, the interests that have led the Soviets this far in the Berlin negotiations will reassert themselves. The issues themselves have not changed and the negotiations should therefore proceed essentially along the existing lines.

MBFR may also assume some added complexity. For us, a factor of greater weight will be the possibility that the Chinese may view an arms control arrangement in Europe as freeing additional Soviet forces for Central Asia and the Far East. This factor has undoubtedly already colored Soviet attitudes, both for economic and political reasons. At the same time, Chinese dealings with us have been powerfully influenced by their worries about the Soviet military build-up against them. On balance, these complex and opaque interrelationships are extremely difficult to evaluate with precision and we should continue to develop our position in terms of security considerations directly relevant to Europe, the US/Soviet politico/military balance and the various domestic pressures which led us to embark on the MBFR venture in the first place.

Our East European policy, especially with respect to Romania, will probably require even more careful handling. Soviet-Romanian relations are currently again in a rather tense phase. As Chinese policy in Eastern Europe again becomes more active, as the Ceausescu and Tepavac visits to Peking strongly indicate it will, the Soviets are bound to see a concerted US-Chinese effort to injure their interests in a region vital to them. Our general approach in this potentially explosive situation should be to pursue a measured policy of developing contacts, but including some gestures toward countries, e.g. Poland and Hungary, that we have so far treated with reserve. This is not a good moment for us to move toward diplomatic relations with Albania, although at some point in the next year or two we should do so.

Bilateral Relations

Our bilateral relations with the Soviets offer the best opportunity for some therapeutically useful moves to keep relations with the Soviets on a relatively even keel. We should not depart from the essential principle of reciprocity and we should not set aside the merits solely in order to assuage Soviet anxieties. Moreover, excessive generosity is likely on the one hand to
stimulate Moscow's suspicions and sense of injury and, on the other, its appetite for "compensation". Within these limits, the question of port security regulations and the issuance of export licenses are probably the areas where we can best afford to show movement. Such matters as the implementation of the cultural exchange agreement and the consular convention (site for the Soviet consulate general in San Francisco) should continue to be treated on their merit. More far-reaching economic concessions--credit and credit guarantees if the Fino Amendment is repealed; MFN etc. -- should be held open for later decision in the light of overall political progress. The problem of Jews in the USSR should continue to be treated cautiously.

Over the coming months it will be highly desirable to keep VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts dealing with China policy and its implications under close control. VOA especially should be confined mainly to news reporting and should exercise special restraint in selecting US press comments for rebroadcasting.

The prospects for cooperative US-Soviet space projects have recently improved; our efforts in this field should continue.

The UN

Apart from the Chinese seating issue, on which there is no special reason for contact with the Soviets, the main problem on the horizon is the replacement of U Thant as Secretary General. This is a matter on which a decision can only be reached by prior US-Soviet agreement. We presumably will also want to bear in mind the acceptability to Peking of the new appointee. Although it is too early now to talk about specific candidacies with the Soviets, we should, when the time arrives, take the initiative in consultations and avoid backing candidates we know to be unacceptable to Moscow. The Jacobson candidacy is probably the most attractive for us among the various possibilities; the real Soviet view of him remains uncertain but is likely to be negative because of the Arab attitude. We should avoid becoming identified with any one individual but should rather react to names as they emerge. We should not go so far as to accept an East European except perhaps a Yugoslav; but no Yugoslav is likely to be acceptable to the Soviets.

Summit

The Soviets have probably been operating on the premise that a summit is of greater direct interest to the President than to Brezhnev. (In fact, however, Brezhnev, has considerable personal interest in one himself in terms of his own political problems.) They have probably felt that the President's interest can be turned to advantage in ongoing major substantive negotiations on SALT and Berlin. The Peking trip probably makes Soviet interest in a summit greater than it was before but, psychologically, the
Soviets (and Brezhnev personally) would be reluctant to disclose this under present circumstances. In any case, a summit in which some useful substantive business can be transacted remains desirable for us; with our China policy moving ahead the implication of US-Soviet collusion against Peking will be reduced. Our own allies, who have been manifesting some disquiet about US-Soviet bilateralism would probably remain uneasy if they felt that we were under some compulsion to propitiate the Soviets. All of this argues for (1) proceeding with ongoing negotiations on their merit, (2) giving close new attention to Alliance consultations on East-West questions, (3) proceeding with the preparations of the Peking meeting and (4) holding open a US-Soviet summit after completion of the Peking trip and, preferably, another round of highest level contacts with the Europeans.
I have received instructions from Moscow to tell you for President Nixon the following.

1. The Soviet leadership on its part also reaffirms the earlier principle agreement (understanding) with President Nixon concerning his visit to Moscow for discussion of questions of mutual interest with the aim of finding their mutually acceptable solutions.

Taking into account the wishes of the President, such visit of his could take place in May - June 1972, having in mind that a concrete date of this visit would be clarified in the nearest time and that an appropriate public announcement to that effect would be agreed upon.

A great importance is being attached in Moscow to the mutual understanding, reached in the course of the previous exchange of opinion, about the necessity of creating the most favourable conditions for preparation and carrying out of the Soviet-American summit meeting.
2. As to the remarks of President Nixon, received through Mr. Kissinger on July 15, about the Soviet-American relations in the light of his decision to make a trip to Pekin, Moscow proceeds from the premises that the President is well aware of the importance which the Soviet leadership has attached to the questions of relationship between our two nations in view of their real position in the world.

This, of course, shall not hinder the maintenance by each of our countries of normal relations with any other state. To the contrary, we have always standing on the position that the existence of normal relations among all states would be in the best of interests of world peace and international security.

From this point of view a common normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China in principle could only be welcomed.
The main thing here is on what basis the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will be built and where all this will lead to. This is apparently being realized by the President himself when he raises the question whether such his decision could lead to "an accelerating reappraisal" of our relations. The answer to this question will depend naturally on what the President is being guided by while taking such a step.

The Soviet Union in its relations with the United States, as well as with other states, is being guided by considerations of principle and not by any merely tactical calculations or short-term interests. The Inner party sees the point of view of the moment. This gives us, of course, the grounds to expect that the other side will also maintain a similar approach.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

September 17, 1971

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's Reply to Your Letter of August 5, 1971

Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev's letter to you (Tab A) is generally constructive in tone, looks to further progress in US-Soviet relations and is clearly intended to maintain the personal dialogue opened in your original letter.

At the same time, Brezhnev's treatment of China and, to a lesser degree, Eastern Europe reflects Soviet suspicions of our motives. He reiterates Moscow's criticism of our Middle Eastern and Vietnam policies. Overall, he again strikes the theme that our foreign policies are uneven and in some respects "puzzling." Not unnaturally, Brezhnev contrasts this with the constancy of Soviet peace policies. This aspect of the letter is the only one with much ideological content.

Following are Brezhnev's more significant points:

-- He repeats the Soviet view that an ABM agreement should be the first order of business in SALT. He stresses the "principle of complete equivalence" which in practice has been reflected in Soviet proposals in Helsinki for precise identity of what is to be defended and of levels of missiles to be retained, etc. Brezhnev fails to mention the offensive side of the May 20 understanding to which you had referred in your letter. This difference, too, has been reflected in Helsinki where progress has consequently been rather slow.

-- As regards both the Middle East and Vietnam, Brezhnev asserts a direct Soviet interest in settlements based on the proposition that "the consequences of [foreign] intrusions should be eliminated," -- in Vietnam because it is a Socialist country, and in the Middle East because the USSR has friends there and the region is close to it geographically. He denies any intent to infringe on someone else's (i.e., our) interests. While on Vietnam, Brezhnev in effect says we should accept the other side's position, on the Middle East he makes no particular proposal but expresses dismay...
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

that we broke off earlier direct dealings with the USSR. He leaves the
Middle East with the somewhat ominous point that it would be extremely
sad if developments there led to another aggravation or explosion.

--- On China, as noted, he is cautious and suspicious, taking a wait-
and-see attitude.

--- On Eastern Europe, he asserts a mild but unmistakable form of
the Brezhnev Doctrine -- that it is of principal importance for the USSR
to "ensure" that no one threatens the security and political systems of the
countries in the area.

--- Brezhnev echoes your interest in improved direct bilateral cooperation
in trade and various scientific-technical areas, although making it somewhat
dependent on prior progress in disarmament. With respect to the latter he
stresses paramount US/Soviet responsibility and urges that efforts in this
field should be multiplied.

--- As a general approach to negotiations between us, he urges that basic
understandings be first reached with you personally (he cites Berlin and SALT)
so that practical details can then be more easily solved.

In sum, this letter is a further direct expression of the line with which
Brezhnev personally has become identified since the last Soviet Party Congress:
emphasis on negotiations and better bilateral relations with us, and a general
posture of conciliation toward the West. On specifics, not surprisingly for
this type of letter, Brezhnev foreshadows no particular Soviet move; indeed,
he generally holds the line on existing positions, and where he does get into
more detail puts the onus of movement on us (e.g., SALT, Middle East,
Vietnam).

The letter itself sheds no new light on the motives of current Soviet policy.
But Brezhnev's personal identification with this policy suggests that in his
judgment dealings with us can be profitable to the USSR and thus to him
personally. This judgment originally was undoubtedly based on the premise
that the balance of power is moving favorably for the Soviets. But it is now
reinforced by more defensive calculations stemming from our China policy.

* * * *

Brezhnev's letter is at Tab A; yours of August 5 at Tab B.

No written response is required for now.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Wednesday, September 29, at 3:00 p.m.

Ninety minutes have been set aside for your conversation with Gromyko. The first part will include Secretary Rogers and the interpreters. For the last twenty minutes or so, you will want to talk to Gromyko alone without other participants. I am sending you a separate memo on this private session.

While the other participants are present you should avoid referring to the recent exchange of letters with Brezhnev, in order to preserve the strict confidentiality of this channel.

You may wish to adopt the same procedure as last year's meeting with Gromyko:

1) a general review of Soviet-American relations and the prospects;

2) followed by a discussion of specific issues -- primarily SALT, European questions, the Middle East, South Asia and Vietnam;

3) any discussion of China could be reserved for the end; Gromyko is not likely to mention it, but you may want to bring it up.

The Setting

The circumstances of this meeting contrast with those surrounding your meeting with him last October. At that time our relations with the USSR were beclouded and uncertain. We had passed through the Middle East cease-fire crisis; there had been the flare-up over the missile submarines in Cuba; the issues under negotiation seemed to be stalled; bilateral relations were aggravated by small irritating matters. All of this was reflected to some degree in your discussion with the Foreign Minister.
Since then

-- We have concluded the Berlin agreement.

-- There has been a breakthrough in SALT in the May 20 announcement.

-- The Middle East cease-fire has held, even if the prospects for a settlement are not bright.

-- In our bilateral relations there has been some clearing of secondary issues (e.g., the question of regulations on Soviet shipping, and recent trade decisions).

-- We will hold bilateral discussions on incidents at sea.

-- In Geneva we have agreed with the USSR on a treaty banning biological warfare.

-- In SALT the issues have been sharpened for major decision.

In short, in the interval since you last saw Gromyko there has been encouraging movement. Looking back on this period, we can see an apparent pattern of offer and acceptance beginning with your UN speech of last year and the Foreign Policy message, and the favorable response made by Brezhnev in his address to the Party Congress in late March. Thus, it seems that we are dealing with a commitment by Brezhnev to an active "peace program" as his Party Congress performance is now described by the Soviets -- a commitment to better relations with the West in general, and the US in particular. There is no doubt that our China policy has provided an additional incentive for Brezhnev to demonstrate that he, too, can do business with the US, and that your visit to Peking is not, in fact, a setback to his policies.

Unfortunately, it cannot be said that a decisive qualitative change in relations has occurred. This remains the major political decision to be taken in the Kremlin. There are aspects of Soviet policy that are cause for concern. Their military programs continue to move forward at a pace that is disturbing if contrasted with the pace of SALT. They have started about 90 new ICBMs since late last year; they are filling out the Moscow ABM system, and enlarging ballistic submarine production. Tensions within Eastern Europe are rising because of Soviet policies. You are aware of the concern of the Romanians. It is quite conceivable that the Soviets will use European "detente" to settle scores with their Romanian, and even Yugoslav, adversaries.
In sum, we still do not know whether the Soviet leaders have been engaged in some tactical maneuvers to regulate their Western flanks while they prepare to deal with their dissident allies and with China, or whether a deeper trend in East-West relations is evolving.

Gromyko's Purpose and Line

Gromyko's most important task will be to take back to the top leaders a personal assessment of the prospects for further movement in Soviet-American relations in light of our China policy. There is bound to be some apprehension in Moscow over your visit to Peking and uncertainties over our intentions toward the USSR. Gromyko's line, judging from the recent letter from Brezhnev will be that it is up to us, not the USSR, to demonstrate a continuing interest in constructive bilateral relations.

-- His position will be that both the Middle East and Vietnam are tests for our policies, and as long as they remain unsettled they will cast a shadow over US-Soviet relations.

-- In addition, he will probably exert some mild pressure on European issues -- a European Conference and force reductions -- as further tests in the wake of the Berlin settlement.

-- Finally, he may complain of some disappointment over progress in SALT because of our alleged unwillingness to accept their definition of equality.

Your Purpose and Basic Message

Your basic aim will be to impress on Gromyko that now -- the next several months -- is the time to take another major step to turn our relations clearly onto a new course.

-- The achievements of the past year, since you last saw him are impressive: Berlin and the May 20 SALT agreement, and clearing away some of the irritants in bilateral relations.

-- We should not allow this momentum to be lost, and we can continue to reinforce the progress already achieved only if we continue to take account of each other's interest in a spirit of reciprocity.

-- In your view the areas for further progress are those where the US and USSR are most immediately involved and this means first of all the SALT talks.
SALT

Our offer at Helsinki is still on the table: we are proposing that (1) we retain our two Safeguard ABM sites (Grand Forks and Malmstrom) that are under construction (200 missiles total), (2) the Soviets can retain their Moscow ABM system and add to it to the level of 100 missiles, (3) a general freeze on ICBMs, allowing them to complete missiles under construction, except for the 25 new SS-9 silos, and (4) a freeze on submarine-launched missiles, again, however, allowing the Soviets to complete those under construction. The net result would be that the Soviets would have about a 500 edge in number of ICBMs, we would have the same number of nuclear ballistic submarines (41), but the Soviets would have a slight advantage in older models that they could retain, and we both retain ABMs at current locations.

Gromyko will argue that the May 20 agreement meant strict equality in ABMs -- which they translate to mean identical systems and the same numbers. Thus, we would be forced either to build a system around Washington, or, alternatively, allow the Soviets to build ABM defenses of ICBM sites while retaining the Moscow defense, thus giving them the advantage.

You may wish to stress the following points:

-- We are offering, in essence, that both sides stay where they are on both offensive and defensive forces.

-- But the Soviets argue for absolute homogeneity in ABM sites, while at the very same time propose an ICBM freeze based not on equality but the status quo, where they have an advantage in numbers.

-- We are saying let us freeze the rough status quo on both sides of the equation -- we keep our two ABM sites, they keep the Moscow ABM system, and both sides freeze on ICBMs and the new class of ballistic nuclear submarines.

-- This approach cannot possibly damage the USSR, and seems eminently fair. It is in fact what both sides are living with without an agreement.

-- We have little bargaining room left -- especially on the ABMs.
EUROPEAN ISSUES

You may wish to say:

-- You are encouraged by the Berlin agreement, particularly if one considers the role Berlin has played in tensions between the US and the USSR. It is a good example of what the US and USSR can achieve when they work cooperatively. We want to see the process completed. It would be unfortunate if what we have already achieved is degraded by squabbling over marginal issues.

-- We have favored mutual force reductions as an issue that deals specifically with areas of tension. We will want to discuss some broad principles and issues before moving to translate them into more concrete propositions. We have studied this question and we find it quite complex, perhaps even more so than SALT because of the number of countries involved, the differences in armaments, the geography, and so forth.

-- We have never opposed a European conference in principle. Our problem has always been what a conference would deal with in concrete terms. This is the subject to which we should now give attention.

MIDDLE EAST

Since the US initiative to reestablish the cease-fire last summer, the Soviets have seemed uneasy that the US might produce Egyptian-Israeli agreement. The US-USSR contest for position is still finely enough balanced that they would not want us to appear able single-handedly to arrange the area's affairs.

We have no evidence of Soviet inclination to contribute to diplomatic efforts on the present track. They may have urged the Egyptians to restrain their military activity, but at the price of building up the Egyptian forces. So far, they have not been brought into the exchanges on an interim settlement. Secretary Rogers tentatively plans to say only that we would expect Moscow to become involved at an appropriate time. The Soviets may feel that Sadat has been led to hope for more than the US could sell Israel.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

You may wish to make the following points:

-- You continue to give very serious personal attention to starting a process which could lead to an Arab-Israeli peace. This remains a major danger zone for the US and USSR.

-- Discussion of a first step toward a settlement through an interim disengagement on the Suez Canal has seemed worth pursuing because both Israel and the UAR suggested it. This has promise because it would set the settlement process in motion without prejudicing final positions. Secretary Rogers in his talks in New York will hope to produce further movement on an interim agreement.

-- Should Gromyko respond that the US is trying to do everything itself, you might respond that the Administration negotiated through 1969 in good faith. The US launched out alone only after five months of Soviet rejection and silence in our bilateral talks during which the USSR introduced its own combat forces into Egypt.

-- You are concerned that the USSR continues to build Egyptian hopes for a military solution. Egyptian military adventurism would only produce another setback.

SOUTH ASIA

In signing the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty, the Soviets seem to have taken advantage of the situation to consolidate their position in India, but without seriously trying to lessen basic dangers. The USSR reportedly restrained India from recognizing the exile government from East Pakistan then. But it may be giving tacit support to the Indian help for the East Bengali guerrillas. Although they too might face difficult decisions if China intervened, they could reason that India would win easily and both China and the US, as friends of Pakistan, would suffer a setback.

They have told Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Beam that the Soviet government is giving no encouragement to a separatist movement in East Pakistan and that the Soviets "do not like to be involved in such things" as the guerrilla movement. Their protestations are not fully convincing.

The pace of high-level consultations between the Indians and Soviets has increased markedly, and Mrs. Gandhi will be in Moscow September 27-30. Pressures on her to take military action are mounting and the degree of Soviet support will affect her calculations.
You may wish to make the following points:

--- The US is concentrating on averting famine. Food shortages would generate a new flood of refugees. That could increase chances of war.

--- It will take time for the necessary political process to work itself out in East Pakistan. A prolonged guerrilla war in East Pakistan would delay rather than speed up that political process. That cannot serve India's interests or anybody else's.

--- A prolonged guerrillas war would also accelerate the refugee flow.

--- A war between India and Pakistan would have unpredictable consequences with a significant risk of spreading to other countries. The US and USSR have an obligation to prevent this.

--- The USSR has a responsibility not to take actions, or encourage others, in a direction that could cause hostilities. A war in South Asia would only produce greater tragedy there and would dislocate broader efforts to enhance international stability. The Soviets have played a peacemaking role in the past. What is the Soviet position now?

VIETNAM

In Vietnam the Soviets find themselves for the first time in a tactically strong position in Hanoi. Buttressing their posture as the Great Power protector of Hanoi -- in contrast to alleged Chinese betrayal -- is important to the Soviet image. At the same time, the Soviets fear that they may be dealt out of the Indochina settlement and out of Southeast Asia altogether. While they cannot go beyond the current line in Hanoi, they clearly want to be kept in the diplomatic game.

You may say:

--- There is no doubt that Vietnam continues to cause distortions in our relations with the USSR.

--- We are disappointed in the Paris talks, and also disappointed with the role of the USSR.

--- The Soviets have often said that they want the "speediest political settlement," that we must withdraw, accept the seven points of the PRG, etc. The Soviet Government exerts great influence in Hanoi, perhaps more now than in previous periods. It is in a position to use that influence.

--- But the Paris talks cannot be merely a process in which we accept the terms of the other side. Our willingness to negotiate is quite clear. This is the message that the Soviet leaders should hear.
-- If the negotiating option remains closed, we will continue to move unilaterally. The choice is not ours, but Hanoi's.

CHINA

Gromyko will probably avoid the subject, but you may wish to close the conversation by noting your visit.

You could say:

-- You are realistic enough to know that the USSR is a Great Power and that it would be fruitless to try to create pressures on the Soviet leaders. This is not your intention in visiting China, whatever interpretation may be put on the visit by others including the Chinese.

-- Your aim is to end the hostility that has existed between the two countries for over twenty years and to lay the basis for relations which will be mutually beneficial and contribute to international stability.

-- The Soviet leaders should appreciate our motives and share our aims. You have reason to believe that this message has been received and understood in Moscow.

(NOTE: You should not discuss the Chinese representation issue with Gromyko; he might try to claim to Peking that we sought Soviet support and that they rebuffed us.)

* * * * * * * * *

In summary, your basic points to Gromyko should be:

-- Our relations have taken a favorable turn in the past year.

-- We cannot rest on past accomplishment; we should capitalize on the momentum and achieve a qualitative change in our relationship.

-- SALT shapes up as a test for both sides; you remain committed to the May 20 agreement.

-- The other issues may not be ripe for a breakthrough, but the chance for progress will continue to be influenced by a mutual willingness to respect each other's interest.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1971

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILE

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: President Nixon's Meeting with USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 29, 1971 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:40 p.m. in the Oval Office of the White House (List of participants is attached)

The President opened the conversation by noting that it had been one year since he had last met with the Foreign Minister. Since that time some progress had been achieved in a number of fields, notably in the Berlin problem and in some aspects of arms control. The President thought it would be very useful to get Mr. Gromyko's evaluation of where we stood and what needed to be done now. He would also give the Minister his ideas in order to see how we could get things moving.

Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested that the discussion follow the lines of their talk last year, i.e., that one question after another be taken up with each side expressing their respective views and positions on that question before going on to the next. President Nixon agreed to this procedure.

Mr. Gromyko said that first of all he wanted to carry out the pleasant task of conveying to the President the personal regards of the Soviet leadership, Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Podgorny.

Bilateral Relations

The first question he proposed to touch upon was that of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although the Soviet Government had repeatedly set forth its views and positions, Mr. Gromyko believed it would be useful to restate them at this time in a general manner. The Soviet Government understood that the relations between our two countries were of a very complex nature. There were a number of issues on which the two countries did not see eye to eye. These were related to bilateral relations proper, but also included many others which, in fact, could not be separated from bilateral relations. The main thing he wanted to emphasize in this talk was that the leadership of his country and the Soviet
Government were ready to seek for ways of overcoming these difficulties in our relations, wherever they could be overcome. His government was ready to build its relations with the United States on the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence, at the same time being fully aware that on certain issues it would be very difficult indeed to find common language and an identity of views. However, even where this would prove to be impossible, the Soviet Government would like to avoid a collision between our countries or, as the President had frequently called it, a confrontation. Our relations should be conducted in such a way that the absence of agreement on certain issues not create obstacles for agreement on those issues which could be resolved between us. Referring to the present state of relations between our countries, Mr. Gromyko said that the President was surely aware that there were differences between our respective positions in regard to a number of problems. However, he could see that during the year since their last meeting certain signs of a softening in our relations had appeared and the Soviet Government considered this to be a positive factor, although this was true with respect to certain specific problems only. Speaking concretely on this score, he wanted to note the agreement between the four powers in regard to West Berlin. He well remembered his conversation with the President on this subject last year, when the President had expressed certain ideas on West Berlin. He wanted to say that the Soviet leadership was gratified to note that the United States, the U. S. Government and the President personally had made positive contributions to make it possible to reach agreement on this question. There were also certain signs, and some of them were perhaps only barely discernible, that the economic ties between our two countries were also developing favorably. On this topic, however, Gromyko preferred not to go into detail, except to state plainly that the position of the U. S. Government in this regard was not quite clear to the Soviet side. It would be a good thing if the President could make some comments on this subject, being aware, Mr. Gromyko hoped, of its full significance for the relations between our two countries.

In summary Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to restate on behalf of his leadership and his government that his country had been and was in favor of peace, including peace with the United States. The Soviet Union did not want a war since war was alien to its short-term and long-term interests and was incompatible with the basic principles on which the Soviet system was founded. They wanted relations with the United States to be peaceful relations and understood completely how important it was for world peace that the United States and the Soviet Union reach as many common positions on outstanding world problems as possible. This was a great responsibility which our two countries shared with each other and with other countries, but his government was resolute in advocating cooperation in the interests of a
more lasting peace. It would be good if the time were to come, and the sooner the better, when our two sides could truly say that the relations between our countries were friendly in the fullest meaning of this word. This would require, however, that both countries conduct a policy leading in this direction. Mr. Gronyko ended by saying that he would be pleased to hear the President's view on U. S. relations with the Soviet Union as he saw them, as well as his assessment of future prospects for these bilateral relations.

Referring to the specific matter of Berlin, the President said that this was perhaps the most significant development that had occurred, particularly in view of the fact that this was such a delicate and sensitive issue to both powers, to the other European countries and to the Germans themselves. He believed that the fact that this problem could be worked out was an indication that difficulties in other areas could also be reduced. Regarding the Foreign Minister's remarks on the need for peaceful relations between our two countries, we were always expected to say that and the President noted with great interest the statements on that subject made by Mr. Brezhnev. However, it was the reality of what we were doing that was important. On the importance of peace between our countries we could, by way of an example, say that we wanted peace with Bolivia, but whether or not our relations with Bolivia were peaceful would not affect world peace. We were not likely to say so outside of this room, but we did believe that world peace depended primarily upon the relations between our two countries. Therefore, the President would give the highest priority to conversations such as this and to others, with Ambassador Dobrynin for example, in which we tried to resolve differences between us. With reference to trade, the Foreign Minister would recall that last year the President had said this was an area where there were great possibilities for progress. Just this week he had approved the $200 million Kama River project, a sum that brought the total up to $400 million. It was his view that trade was in the interests of both our countries and when we made efforts to expand it, we were really acting in our own selfish interest. American businessmen were interested in greater trade between us and indeed, this was an area where reduced tensions between us would pay the greatest dividends. It was something that the Soviet side wanted and so did we. The Minister would find us receptive to any initiative in this respect.

SALT

Naturally, there were other outstanding problems between us. A matter coming to mind immediately was the SALT negotiation, where we had taken
a significant step which, however, did not represent the major resolution we were looking for. The President said that we believed that our joint announcement of May 20 had been received everywhere as a hopeful sign that the leadership of our two countries had resolved to reach agreement on a freeze of both offensive and defensive weapons. We recognized that this was a most important matter for both of us since the negotiations dealt with basic questions of our respective security. Without going into detail, the President wanted to say that it was our position on the defensive side that we had presented what we believed to be a fair proposition. Without going into intricacies, as we saw things, on the offensive side the Soviet Union would have an advantage of about 500 land-based missiles. Thus it could be seen that what we were proposing on the defensive side was a reasonable proposal. It would not be reasonable for the United States to agree that we freeze an offensive advantage for the Soviet Union while achieving equality only on the defensive side. This would be severely criticized by our public and in Congress. He did not expect the Foreign Minister to respond at this time, but he wanted to say that this was the very heart of the problem and he hoped that it could be explored. We still felt that progress at SALT was most important. The Soviet Union had continued to build up offensive armaments and we were not objecting to that, recognizing that we would do the same in a similar situation. On the other hand, if we could not work out an agreement, as Ambassador Dobrynin could confirm, there were many people in this country, many in the President's own party, who would advocate resuming a build-up of offensive armaments on our side. Thus it was in our interests and in the interests of the Soviet Union to seek an agreement that would not give a decisive advantage to either of us. Both of us should consider reaching an agreement that would provide sufficiency for each. These were the general comments he wanted to make in regard to this question.

Mr. Gromyko wanted to emphasize great importance that the Soviet Union attached to the negotiations on limitation of both offensive and defensive armaments. In this connection, he also wanted to note that the strategic arms limitation talks had provided the impetus for those agreements which were going to be signed tomorrow as a byproduct of SALT. Without SALT these agreements would not have been possible except at a much later date perhaps. On the real subject matter of the negotiations he wanted to emphasize the seriousness of the position and intentions of the Soviet side. Mr. Gromyko wanted to draw the President's attention to the last proposal on ABM's which had been tabled by the Soviet Government. He did not know whether it had been studied in great detail by the U. S. Government and by the President himself, but it seemed to him that it should provide a basis for agreement. The Soviet proposal was not bad as proposals go.
It provided for the defense of national capitals and one ICBM location for each side, with the proviso that the United States would choose its ICBM location to be defended and the Soviet Union would defend a commensurate number of ICBM silos in the Soviet Union. As for offensive strategic armaments, not only did the Soviet Union not oppose their limitation; the President had been right when he had said that we should proceed to consider certain steps towards their limitation, and at the next phase of SALT it will be necessary to enter upon concrete discussion of this problem. The Soviet Union wanted both sides to continue negotiations and the Soviet side was no less resolved now and would remain resolved to bring about their success to the extent possible. In this connection, Mr. Gromyko had noted the statement of Mr. Schumann, Foreign Minister of France, at the General Assembly yesterday. As he understood this statement, it meant that France would support the objectives pursued by our two countries in regard to limitation of strategic offensive and defensive armaments. It had sounded to him as if France would join in at least as to the substance of the tasks and objectives pursued at the negotiations.

Unless the President had something further on bilateral arrangements, Mr. Gromyko said he would like to say a few words regarding problems in Europe.

On the subject of SALT, the President wanted to add that what Mr. Gromyko had said demonstrated the reason why we must look at the whole package. If we were to separate out defensive armaments only, that would be fine if that were all we were talking about. However, if we found inequality on the offensive side, this would make the whole agreement difficult. The President emphasized that we needed to come up with a solution that could not be viewed as freezing inequality on one side and equality on the other.

Mr. Gromyko said he could only repeat that the Soviet Union was not making such a distinction. At the next phase of SALT we would be able to discuss both sides more completely in the interests of finding a solution in this field.

The President said that the interest of both our countries in reaching agreement on strategic armaments was demonstrated by the fact that the United States had frozen the number of its offensive weapons some time ago, yet hardly a day went by that we did not receive reports of an increasing buildup in the Soviet Union. He did not mean to raise objections in this regard since the Soviet actions were based upon evaluations of its own security, but it was necessary to realize that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would let either side get an advantage. Thus the time now was ripe for reaching an appropriate agreement.
SECRET/NODIS

Secretary Rogers explained that one difficulty we had with the latest Soviet proposal was the fact that it provided for an additional build-up of armaments on each side. Since our objective was limitation, such a proposal would not be viewed as limitation in fact.

Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out that the last Soviet proposal was designed to provide a compromise acceptable to both sides. The Soviet Union was basically in favor of limiting ABM defenses to protection of national capitals, but since the United States had considered it important to defend ICBM’s, the latest proposal had been designed to find a solution acceptable to both sides.

The President said we could not decide this issue here, but we believe that we have presented a position as forthcoming as we could be and, in view of the high stakes involved, we would continue negotiations.

Mr. Gromyko said that evidently both sides would have to take stock and analyze the results of the negotiations to date, and also map out their respective positions for the next phase of the negotiations. He repeated that it was his government's belief that at the next phase of SALT it would be necessary thoroughly to discuss the second aspect of limitation as well, in order to try and find mutually acceptable common language.

European Security Conference

On the subject of the situation in Europe, Mr. Gromyko said that he could speak a great deal and at great length. Above all he wanted to emphasize the utmost importance his government attached to the situation in Europe. The Soviet Union wanted conditions there to improve rather than deteriorate and wanted tensions reduced rather than increased. He believed that the agreement on Berlin signed recently created better conditions for such improvement. He stressed the need to convene an all-European conference on security. He recalled that last year when he and the President had exchanged views on this subject, the President’s attitude had not been negative; however, he also recalled that the President and some other people had taken the point of view that progress on the West Berlin problem was what was needed as a first step. In this connection he had taken note of Secretary Rogers’ remarks the other day that more favorable conditions had now appeared for convening an all-European security conference. He hoped that the Government of the United States would not take a more definite stand in favor of this conference, and just as he had done last year, he would like to emphasize again that in calling for such an all-European conference the Soviet Union was not looking for any unilateral advantage. His government believes that a conference of that type would be useful for all European countries as well as for the United States and Canada as prospective participants.
of tensions throughout the world in general and in Europe in particular.
He would like to hear the President's views on this score.

The President said that the Foreign Minister had been correct in indicating
that now that we had made progress on the Berlin problem, we could look
more favorably upon consideration of other European questions on which we
might make some progress. He believed that once the Berlin situation had
been completely resolved, and he understood that there were still some
actions that needed to be taken for that purpose, then exploration of a
conference could proceed. He felt that on this subject it would be very
important for the two major powers to have preliminary discussions before
confering with our respective friends in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact.
By this he did not mean that we would not consult with our friends, but for
the two powers to participate in a conference without knowing how we would
come out of it would not be realistic. He believed that after the Berlin
matter had been settled completely we should on a very confidential basis
discuss between us what such a conference would mean and what we expected
to come out of it. Of course, neither one of us should act without consulting
and agreeing with our friends, but if we were simply to proceed to hold a
big conference, it might turn out to be something like a United Nations
gathering.

Secretary Rogers said that Mr. Gromyko had the other day suggested con-
vening a preliminary meeting for the purpose of planning a conference on
European security. The Secretary had replied that such a preliminary
meeting was likely itself to take on the character of a conference. If we
were to do any preliminary preparatory work, it would have to be done on
a private basis between our two countries. As the President had said, we
needed to have some idea of the possible outcome of such a conference.

Mr. Gromyko inquired whether he had understood correctly that what the
President had in mind were bilateral consultations on a bloc basis between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. The Soviet Union was ready to enter
upon consultations of some aspects of this conference, its preparation and
its possible outcome. He asked whether upon his return to Moscow he could
report to his government that the U.S. Government was, in principle, in
favor of convening a European conference. If so, the Soviet Union would
be ready to proceed to discuss the questions of procedures, agenda, place
and time, and this could be done without any further delay. He had in mind
that preliminary consultations would be held for these purposes in the
immediate future and that the conference would be convened next year. He
asked whether he could report this as being the President's view when he
returned to Moscow or whether the President would care to clarify the
U. S. position further.

The President said that he would prefer for the Foreign Minister to report
the following: The United States would be willing to discuss the setting up
of a European security conference provided that our discussions would
indicate that such a conference would serve a useful purpose which we would
proceed to implement. When he had spoken of bilateral consultations, he
was not referring to anything formal -- he had had in mind some private
conversations between our two countries that would answer some questions
in our mind and some in the mind of the Soviet side. He believed Mr. Gromyko
could report to Moscow that now, that we had moved on Berlin, we should
begin some preliminary discussions of this matter with the purpose of holding
a conference that both sides would agree would serve a useful purpose. He
was certain that neither side wanted to hold a conference just for the sake
of the conference itself.

Secretary Rogers remarked that the discussions between the two Germanies
were not as yet complete. The President noted that he had intended to
qualify his remarks by saying "When the Berlin thing was wrapped up." "
Secretary Rogers expressed the hope that the German negotiations would
proceed without difficulty.

Mr. Gromyko said that, in principle, he believed that the fewer conditions
were set for convening the conference, the better. It was his feeling that if
everything was lumped into one knot, this would complicate matters and
lead us astray. Was he correct in understanding that the President had
said that the United States would be ready to proceed to preliminary
consultations without publicity and in the near future?

The President believed that in terms of preliminary private talks that was
something we could do. However, he believed it important that in no
circumstances any indication be given of a fait accompli. He did not want
to create the impression that today, at this meeting, we had decided that
such a conference would be convened. We should rather confine ourselves
to saying that discussions could take place that would lead to a conference.
As Secretary Rogers had said, getting the rest of the German question out
of the way was most important before anything surfaced. It was this
surfacing problem that was predominant. Mr. Gromyko inquired again
whether the U. S. would be ready for a private exchange of views in the
near future. The President said that would not concern him. After all,
we had already had some private exchanges on this subject. He would
emphasize that we were not trying to pressure the Soviet Union in regard
to the German treaty. We did have a problem while the German talks were in progress, but if preliminary talks were kept strictly private, this might be possible.

Middle East

Mr. Gromyko said that if the President had nothing further on this subject, he would like to touch upon the Middle East problem and briefly state the Soviet Government's views and position. The Soviet Government was concerned over the situation in the Middle East because from their point of view, all sorts of unexpected events could occur in that area, events that neither the Soviet Union or the United States would want to happen. The situation there was very complex as long as Israel was still occupying the Arab territories it had seized in 1967. He could not see any realistic possibility for settling this problem on the basis of Israeli demands or even on the basis of the U.S. proposal that had been submitted to the Arab Republic of Egypt. He did not want to enter into a detailed discussion of this situation, but would like to emphasize the basic fact that any proposal which bypassed the question of withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied territories did not create favorable conditions for a settlement that would really meet the interests of peace. He believed that the interests of defense, the interests of peace and the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union and other powers in the area, large and small, would best be served by a settlement on the basis of complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories. If this were done, all other questions could be resolved without any great difficulty and resolved at one and the same time. These included such questions as a guarantee for Israel, a guarantee for security, passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and an end to the state of war, etc., etc. He would like to hear the President's views on how he saw the further development of this problem.

The President replied that the Foreign Minister must be aware of the fact that, while a proposal for total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories might solve the problem, it was clear that Israel would not agree to such a solution. Proceeding from this fact, we were in a position of working very hard toward an acceptable solution for the problem. We realize as did the Soviet Union that this was an area where small countries could drag us into a confrontation that neither of us wanted. One factor in this danger was the arms build-up in the Middle East. Surely, the Foreign Minister was aware that there was a big drive on in the Congress, in the Senate, to send more arms to Israel because more arms had been sent to the UAR. We were exercising restraint and restraint was also needed on the other side. Having said this, we believe that it was best to approach
the problem now from the point of view of an interim settlement as had been proposed by Secretary Rogers. The President would be less than candid if he did not say that on both sides not as much progress had been achieved as we would like to see. What we could do from this point on would hinge on the following: first, we would have to keep the truce and that meant restraining our associates. Second, we would need to avoid an arms build-up, a build-up that cost a lot of money and entailed the risk of breaking the truce. Third, we would need to continue negotiations, bearing in mind that while substantial withdrawal of Israeli troops was possible, total withdrawal from all occupied territory was not possible.

Secretary Rogers noted that the 1967 UN resolution had been carefully drafted leaving out these words because of their complete unacceptability. We would be kidding ourselves if we continued speaking of total withdrawal from all territories. On the other hand, we could agree with a more moderate position.

The President pointed out that we were not taking an extreme Israeli position as guidance for our policy. We believed that our proposal was reasonable and, in fact, we were catching hell for it in some quarters.

Secretary Rogers pointed out that the idea of an interim agreement had initially been proposed by President Sadat. Today he had talked to UAR Foreign Minister Riad and had pointed out to him that the Arabs would be better off if a partial step was taken first which would eventually lead to final agreement. If such a partial step were not taken, the status quo would continue and that was fraught with trouble.

Mr. Gromyko said it would be one thing if this interim arrangement could be related to the overall task of reaching a final settlement as the next step. If this were not done, it would look like reinforcement of Israeli occupation plans. As far as he knew, this is where the Arabs saw the main difficulty.

Mr. Gromyko inquired why agreement could not be reached on the following basis: a temporary agreement which provided for implementation of certain measures, with the proviso that this interim agreement constituted part of a general plan to be carried out in stages -- a plan that would provide for withdrawal of Israeli forces by a specified time. It could also be agreed at the same time that if an Arab state, and here he meant Jordan and Jordan only, were to agree to an adjustment of its borders with Israel on a basis of free negotiations, it would be free to do so. Why would such a solution not be suitable for the United States? The Soviet Union believes that the United States was influential enough with Israel to convince the Israelis that this would serve their best interests. At the same time the strictest possible guarantees could be given at the first stage of the settlement not
guarantees could be specified and enter into force at the same time as an interim agreement was concluded.

The President said that we were open to any suggestions that would break the impasse in which we found ourselves. When Mr. Gromyko had said that we ought to be able to influence Israel, the President would remind him of an old Hebrew proverb which, in discussing the question of which sex was stronger, pointed out that God had created Adam out of soft earth and had then created Eve out of Adam's hard rib. If the Minister had ever met Golda Meir he would recognize the truth of this saying. In any case, we were as one in one respect and this had been proved during the Jordanian crisis last year, and that was that we must do all we can to avoid a build-up of tensions in the area.

India-Pakistan

The President raised one other subject which was of serious concern to us now. He believed that Mrs. Indira Gandhi was presently visiting Moscow and she would be visiting here later. He wanted to strongly emphasize his concern over the possibility that the situation involving East Pakistan, the refugees and Indians, could explode into a conflict. He believed it was in our mutual interest to discourage the Indian Government in every possible way from taking action that could explode into war in that area. Having said that, he would point out that he was aware of the fact that Pakistan was in no position to fight a successful war with India, because it was outnumbered. However, the situation in that area was so fraught with historical hatreds that if the Indians pushed too hard, the other nation might willingly commit suicide. He believed that the Soviet Union had played an important role in keeping the peace in that area in the past and hoped the Soviet Government would do all it could to prevent an outbreak of war in this crisis.

Mr. Gromyko said he had understood what the President had said in regard to American interests in the area and moreover he would say that he was gratified to learn that the U.S. did not want to see a clash between India and Pakistan. He could assure the President that the Soviet Government also did not want the conflict to break out into war. Moreover, perhaps the President knew that the Soviet Union had taken steps in the present situation to rule out the possibility of a confrontation. Of course, Pakistan was by far the smaller country, but he would point out that to provoke a conflict one did not necessarily have to have superior size and strength. To do so it would be enough if there was a lack of restraint and insufficient understanding of one's responsibilities. For these reasons, it was Soviet policy to do
everything possible to prevent a confrontation and the Soviet Government had said so in its conversations with Mrs. Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister. Mrs. Gandhi had assured the Soviet Government that India would do nothing to precipitate a clash with Pakistan. It was true the Pakistani leaders were conveying the same thoughts to the Soviet Government, but here the Soviets did not have as much confidence as in the case of the Indian leadership. Once again, he was gratified to know that the U. S. was interested in averting a war between those two countries and that it stood on the position of counseling both sides to exercise restraint. If this was so, this was one policy that our two countries had in common. On the whole, he would sum it, that the country that should be restrained first of all was Pakistan, at least this was the conclusion the Soviet Government had come to on the basis of what they had observed. The President said he we would need to keep in close touch with each other on this situation.

Economic Relations

Mr. Gromyko referred to the President's remarks concerning economic relations between our countries and the President's statement that he had some ideas to express in this regard. The Foreign Minister wanted to propose that the President send some representative he considers appropriate to Moscow for the purpose of exchanging views on this subject. The President replied that we did have this in mind, but he would want to discuss this possibility with Secretary Rogers. There were several men who wanted to go, but he would want to be sure to send the right man. He would further point out that one of the major obstacles to the possibility of expanding trade was, of course, the war in Southeast Asia. That was now winding down. As it ended, some of the technical and political objections to expanded trade with the Soviet Union which were being raised in this country would be removed. Once the war ended, all sorts of doors would be opened. He did not expect Mr. Gromyko to comment at this time, but wanted him to know the U. S. position.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION

March 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt/W. Hyland

SUBJECT: Brezhnev and Soviet Foreign Policy

Before we are overwhelmed by pre-summit Sovietology, attached is a speculative piece on how events of recent times, back to your first China trip, may have affected or will affect Brezhnev's position, the thrust of Soviet policy, and our own bargaining position.
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy

Brezhnev and Collective Leadership

If there was one common denominator in the anti-Khrushchev coalition, it was a weariness with the capricious and arbitrary decisions of one man. It was inherent in his overthrow that his successors would form an oligarchy. At the same time, no major government can be without a central decision point, and inevitably in the USSR that is the Party leader. Until last year, at least, this potential contradiction and conflict seems to have been managed fairly well. Leadership crises were handled without major upheavals and seemed to affect the ranking of lesser Politburo members rather than the authority of the main leaders. This is no small accomplishment, considering that the regime maintained an essential unity through the June war and the Czech invasion. Indeed, the Politburo at the 24th Congress was almost identical to the one that threw out Khrushchev. Even the expansion by four new members merely involved the promotion of three candidates.

Evidence began to accumulate in 1970, and since the 24th Party Congress of March 1971 of more friction over the role of Brezhnev. This took the form of periodic rumors of Kosygin's retirement, speculation that there was some trouble over choosing his successor, and that both issues were somehow related to the postponement of the Party Congress. At one point — in July 1970 — Brezhnev even seemed to have been humiliated when his prediction of the date for the Congress was publicly contradicted in a matter of a few days.

Since then the trend, until recently, was all in Brezhnev's favor. The publicity for him personally grew out of reasonable proportion. He has managed to pick the new Politburo members from among his entourage of old acquaintances and subordinates. He has usurped, as Khrushchev did, the de facto role of chief of state in foreign visits, and he has seen to it that his role as statesman has been given great prominence. (For example, the lengthy and adulatory Politburo statement approving his visit to France; praise almost worthy of Stalin.)

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The Peace Offensive

From a policy standpoint, and of most interest to us, was the growing personal identification and implicit commitment of Brezhnev to the policy of detente in the West. The first major move in this direction was his association with the German treaty; his personal emergence at that time was certainly gratuitous, and thus a calculated decision to share in the glory. But he has gone beyond that to make it clear that he and Brandt enjoy a special relationship---through their shirtsleeves diplomacy and communal swimming in Oresund last September. Moreover, Brezhnev must have played a major role in the decision to remove Ulbricht and beyond that to pressure Honecker into the Berlin agreement. There is simply no doubt that the Brezhnev visit to East Berlin on October 30-November 1 represented an intervention in the inner German negotiations.

There is some evidence that he may have been criticized or opposed for his German policy. It is not persuasive evidence but the defensive tone in some of the Soviet press suggests that, as the game has become more complex with linkage and reverse linkage, Brezhnev's power position is more on the line than that of any of the other leaders. With the Bundestag majority shrinking to one vote, one can imagine the nightmares in the Kremlin should the entire line of German policy collapse. (Gromyko is also involved and openly worried over the treaty in his recent conversation with Herve Alphand.)

Brezhnev also is clearly and publicly identified with the "peace offensive." It was he who inaugurated it at the Congress. And he did so, by claiming that the correlation of force was favorable for detente since "sober" elements in the West were coming to the fore and should be encouraged. Indeed, his main pitch at the Congress was on foreign policy that seemed linked to a highly misleading and euphoric treatment of the benefits for the Soviet consumer of peace abroad. Of course, he knew by then that he was going to have some kind of SALT "breakthrough" to announce and that there would also be a Berlin agreement. He was on fairly safe ground. What he did not know, of course, was that there would be a massive break in US-China relations.

The China Factor

Brezhnev's association with the China problem is an interesting one. He has never had the reputation as one of the leading China baiters. In the days of vigorous polemics, Brezhnev was not one of the leading 

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spokesmen for Khrushchev. This may have been one reason that immediately after Khrushchev's fall, Chou En-lai chose to go to Moscow, perhaps believing that Brezhnev might offer some better hope for a reconciliation.

Even in recent years, it is not possible to document a vigorous anti-Chinese position on Brezhnev's part. He has, of course, been vicious and mean at the appropriate times, and in private he might be far worse, but from the public record he seems more of a centerist.

In the tensions leading up to the Kosygin-Chou meeting of September 11, 1969, Brezhnev seemed clearly to be counseling moderation and patience. If there was any real chance of a military conflict at that time, one would probably have to conclude that Brezhnev threw his weight on the side of a political settlement.

This could be important because it seems reasonable to speculate that while gradually developing an active Western policy, Brezhnev may have argued that patience in dealing with the Chinese, securing the Western flank, and the buildup of military power in the East would bring the Chinese to a more accommodating position -- especially after Mao died.

Brezhnev was thus vulnerable on two counts: (1) that he neglected the China issue, and allowed it to slide to the point that the Chinese overcame their internal problem and resumed an active diplomacy, and (2) that he underrated the US and its willingness to take a major step toward Peking.

Brezhnev's errors could have been further compounded by the events in China last summer and fall. If there is any truth at all in the accusations that Lin Piao was tilting toward Moscow, then his political demise, the strengthening of Chou En-lai and his close identification with the President's trip could be more of a setback for Moscow than we imagine. The general speculation has been that Lin, as Mao's heir, must have been a dedicated anti-Russian. But if there was some pro-Soviet strain of prudence in the Chinese military (historically this is suggested by the charges against Peng Teh Huai, and Lo Jui Ching, both former Chiefs of Staff), then the domination of the Chinese army may have been some cause for optimism in Moscow.

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Signs of Trouble

Some of these accumulated uncertainties seemed to press in on Brezhnev by last November. At that time a Central Committee meeting was held. Brezhnev made a major "report" on foreign policy that was never published. The meeting issued a Resolution on foreign policy, and shortly afterward the entire politburo began traveling around the country to participate in various local meetings. The plenum confirmed the promotion of Mikhail Solomentsev to candidate member of the politburo. The man he had already replaced as Premier of the Russian Republic, Gennadiy Voronov, had been critical of agricultural policies, but he was not removed from the politburo. In Kremlinological terms, Voronov's retention could be read as a slight check to Brezhnev and a reassertion of collectivity.

Examining the text of this Resolution one sees some small clues:

-- Soviet policy in the Middle East, Vietnam and India-Pakistan is "fully" supported, but European policy is "highly appraised," a small but possibly significant differentiation, if we consider that Brezhnev himself claimed he was handling Europe and the US and Kosygin and Podgorny were dividing the other areas.

-- Brezhnev's visit to France is only a "tangible contribution" to solving the problem of developing Soviet-French relations (i.e., of no broader significance).

-- The China policy of the Politburo (not the Central Committee) is only "noted" and "complete agreement" is expressed with the "stand taken by the Political Bureau in solving practical problems in this connection."

-- One can speculate that the high probability of an Indian attack was estimated by the party leaders at that time, and this was in effect the riposte to the US-Chinese rapprochement.

-- There is no mention whatsoever of the US; this, despite the fact that in the period under review since the Party Congress there had been the Berlin agreement, the SALT announcement of May 20 and, most important, the summit agreement. Stans was actually in Moscow at the time of the CC meeting.

-- There is no treatment of the "sober" forces in the US or the West -- one of Brezhnev's justifications for his peace offensive.
The Ideological Factor

Perhaps of major importance, there is this passage at the end of the resolution:

"The Plenary stresses that ideological struggle in the international arena is playing a steadily growing role in the Party's continued struggle to carry out the 24th Congress' foreign policy program... the Plenary Meeting deems it necessary to continue the resolute struggle against bourgeois ideology..."

This could have been merely the pro forma rhetoric, but since that meeting of November 23, the Party has in fact organized a new ideological campaign, featuring several major conclaves. The point is that in the resurgence of ideological struggle the rhetoric is in some conflict with the line of detente and peaceful coexistence. The Soviet leaders who have participated in these meetings seem to be saying that Soviet policy has been too pragmatic, too benign, etc.*

The Chinese Enemy

A fairly clear aspect of this emphasis on ideology is the growing attack on China. This is not merely a matter of the President's visit, but an ideological turn toward the position that China is the main enemy for all Marxists-Leninists, and a military danger to the USSR.

Nevertheless, there seems still to be two views on the China question; one advocates continuing patience, the other a more active anti-Chinese policy. Izvestia on February 17, for example, concluded a review of all the assistance the Soviets had given the Chinese with this optimistic assessment that Soviet policy:

*Suslov, for example, made a long speech in December on ideology and the social sciences; his point was that the party must pay "paramount attention to the theory and the creative development of Marxism-Leninsim" and struggle against "narrow practicalness, spontaneity, and the process of lagging behind events."
SECRET

"Corresponds to the fundamental, long-term interests of both our countries and the interest of socialism and strengthening peace. The Soviet people... express confidence, as was stressed at the 24th Party Congress, that the good neighborliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and China will eventually be restored.

By attributing this "confidence" to the Party Congress and the recent Central Committee plenum where Brezhnev made the unpublished report, Izvestia suggests that it is the predominant line, and therefore, Brezhnev's position.

But on the next day, Pravda published a much tougher position. This article extols "socialist internationalism" (the Brezhnev doctrine) and points favorably to Soviet intervention in Hungary, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia. It states:

"For over 10 years the Soviet communists... have been struggling against the theory and practice of Maoism -- one of the most dangerous, opportunist, anti-Leninist trends that the history of the revolutionary movement has known..."

Pravda concludes that while the USSR is pursuing a course toward normalization with the PRC, this course is running into "stubborn resistance" from the Peking leaders who stand on positions of "anti-Soviet great power chauvinism and nationalism..." As for future policy, the article calls for "defense of the interests of our socialist motherland..."

Thus, Pravda finds no basis for optimism at all but suggests some reasons for believing that Soviet state interests are in jeopardy. (In addition, of course, there is a growing body of articles and broadcasts about dangers to the Soviet borders.)

* * * * *

Summing up, one can see evidence that Brezhnev policies are in some jeopardy. He is vulnerable to a major setback in Germany (and so are we) and he has already suffered a reversal in China. He is subject to the more general critique that as Khrushchev, he has mortgaged too much of the USSR's freedom of action to the good will or policies of opponents.
More speculatively, Brezhnev might be in some trouble because of developments in the US and relations with Washington. Critics could point to the Indo-Pak crisis, Chinese-American "collusion", and perhaps Soviet yielding to American pressure. More recently, they could point to the decision on ULMS as pressure to make an unfavorable SALT agreement, and they could use the Foreign Policy Report and the Defense Report as evidence that Brezhnev misjudged the alignment of forces in the US. Such an attack, of course, would be more serious if Brezhnev had in fact argued earlier that he could do business with the US and the Soviet's power position was such that the USSR could do so from a position of strength. (He came close to such an argument last June in a speech.)

This is not to say that he is in any real danger of losing his position or under the kind of serious attack that would force him into positions he firmly opposed. Indeed, despite the criticisms that may have been leveled at him, the main lines of his policy still seem intact. It will be after the next phase, centering around the summit, that his course could become open to major change.

In short, as he moves toward the summit meeting with the President, Brezhnev has lost some of his flexibility but also some of his leverage over US. At bottom, he needs a successful summit, at least as much as we do, and perhaps a shade more.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: General Haig

SUBJECT: Comment on Brezhnev's Foreign Policy Speech

General Secretary Brezhnev used an address to the Soviet Trade Union Congress on Monday to clarify the Soviet position on your visit to Peking, Sino-Soviet relations, your visit to the USSR and several other issues. In view of the many uncertainties in Moscow over the US relationship to China, its effect on Soviet policy, and apprehensions over the fate of the Moscow treaty with West Germany, Brezhnev probably believed that a definitive line had to be laid down for the party faithful.

In general, he was rather moderate in assessing recent events, and went out of his way to put your visit to the USSR in an optimistic context and to play down concern over the China problem. He made some concessions on the German problem to support Chancellor Brandt's position in the internal German debate.

1. Relations with the US

In the concluding part of his foreign policy section Brezhnev addressed the Soviet-American summit. He said that your visit would occupy an "important place" in developing relations with states of "opposite social systems," and that the Soviet leaders would approach the talks in a "businesslike, realistic position." He stressed the importance of Soviet-American relations for the "entire international" situation, and said the Soviet leaders consider it their "duty" (an unusually strong term) to find a field of "mutually advantageous cooperation."

An improvement in relations with the US was not only possible, he stated, "but desirable." This was the "invariable Soviet position." (Dobrynin recently used the same formula with Henry.)

CONFIDENTIAL
2. The China Issue

Brezhnev's obvious attempt to put a positive construction on Soviet-American relations carried over -- though somewhat less so -- into his discussion of relations with China and your visit.

For example, he went well beyond current Soviet propaganda in saying that US-PRC contacts were "quite natural," and he "welcomed," the confirmation of the principles of "peaceful coexistence." There was only mild criticism of the US. He claimed that since little was revealed of the actual talks, more than bilateral relations were taken up in Peking, but that only "subsequent deeds" could demonstrate the significance of the visit.

He cautioned his Soviet listeners against drawing hasty conclusions from "diverse views and conjectures." The USSR would make a "final assessment" in the future -- "perhaps the near future" -- when conclusions could be drawn from "actual deeds." He made it clear that the burden was on the Chinese to prove their good intentions, since the USSR had made "proposals" on non-aggression, the settlement of the border issues, and improvement of relations.

Brezhnev was critical of your remark in Shanghai that the Chinese and American people hold the future of the world in their hands, but he did not hesitate to assert that the state of Soviet-American relations affects the entire international situation. COMMENT: Brezhnev's line is much less strident than the ordinary Soviet propaganda, and apparently meant to be of some reassurance that the USSR had not been badly damaged by the Peking visit. This line, coupled with a fairly positive evaluation of the prospects for Soviet-American relations, seems designed to tell the Soviet audience that the USSR can effectively compete in a triangular relationship.

3. Asian Security

Indeed much of the speech seemed to buttress the position that the USSR was not being outmaneuvered either by the US or China. He listed the various countries enjoying good relations with the USSR in Asia -- with special emphasis on Japan. For the first time, he added some detail to his old proposal for an Asian collective security system to be based on the principles of coexistence. In other words, Brezhnev is trying to turn the Shanghai communique around and use it against Peking.
4. European Issues

Most of the foreign policy portion was devoted to Europe. Brezhnev obviously is concerned about the German vote on the Soviet treaty, and he not only rebutted some of the arguments of West German opposition, but also made some concessions intended to help Chancellor Brandt. He was very strong in saying that the Germans must choose between a "policy of peace or a policy of war." He almost ruled out any further negotiations, as called for by the Christian Democrats. He went on to refute Rainer Barzel's contention that the USSR refuses to accept the Common Market: "The Soviet Union is far from ignoring the actual existing situation in Western Europe including the existence of.... the Common Market." In effect, he called for establishing a relationship between the EEC and CEMA, the Warsaw Pact's counterpart to the EEC.

This is an almost complete reversal of Kosygin's line to Barzel in January when Kosygin denounced the EEC as a "Chinese wall" directed against the USSR -- which Moscow would never accept. Moreover, the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn had advised Brandt that he could expect this concession from Moscow. In addition, the Ambassador told Brandt he could inform the Bundestag that the USSR would accept the unilateral West German statement that the treaties did not close the door to German unification -- another accusation by the opposition.

* * * * * *

This speech is fairly good evidence that despite many concerns of the past several months the Soviets intend to at least go through the summit meeting in Moscow before considering any major changes. Brezhnev was, in effect, calming the waters, and denying suggestions of a crisis on Soviet policy, while saying that if the German treaty failed or Chinese problems got worse, it was not the fault of his policies. At the same time, this speech is some confirmation that pressures may be growing on Brezhnev to vindicate himself, and his first reaction is to offer some concessions, rather than turn to a much tougher line.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

ACTION
March 28, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeld

SUBJECT: Secretary Rogers Reports on his March 22 Meeting with Dobrynin

In accordance with your instructions, I have revised the memorandum for your signature to the President (at Tab A) forwarding Secretary Rogers' report. I am not certain from your comments whether or not you wish to sign the memorandum of acknowledgement to Secretary Rogers; if you do, it still is at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.

2. If you think it necessary, that you sign the memorandum to Secretary Rogers at Tab B.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION
March 30, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Status of US-Soviet Bilateral Issues

Secretary Rogers met with Ambassador Dobrynin on March 22 to review the status of US-Soviet bilateral negotiations. He has sent you the memorandum at Tab A summarizing the substance of his conversation. In effect the conversation implements what had been agreed to in the special channel three weeks ago.

Briefly, the status of the issues is as follows:

-- Lend-Lease: The Soviets have agreed to send a delegation to Washington for lend-lease negotiations, and we have proposed that the talks begin on April 7. (State's Assistant Secretary Armstrong will head the US Delegation. The negotiations may run into difficulty if the Soviets insist on a linkage between their willingness to settle their lend-lease debt and our willingness to grant them export-import and most favored nation treatment.)

-- Feed Grains: Secretary Rogers informed Dobrynin that you have asked Secretary Butz to participate in the grain talks, and the Soviets have agreed to receive a US delegation. Details are being worked out.

-- Maritime Talks: We have informed the Soviets that we are willing to enter a second round of talks on outstanding maritime issues provided that the Soviets indicate a willingness to discuss port entry for both commercial and non-commercial vessels. Dobrynin told Secretary Rogers that a reply on this question would be forthcoming but that it would take a week or more in that it will require Politburo approval.

-- Space Cooperation. Technical talks on a joint space docking mission will resume in Houston on March 27. The US also plans to send a NASA delegation (probably headed by Dr. Low) to the USSR in early April to see if it will be possible to reach agreement on several very important aspects of a joint space mission that have not yet been agreed to with the Soviets.

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issues such as joint training, detailed contingency planning for the mission and communications during the mission. Dobrynin informed Secretary Rogers that his government expects an agreement to be reached on space cooperation.

--- Trade Delegation: Secretary Rogers asked Dobrynin to clarify an earlier Dobrynin suggestion that the US send a trade delegation to Moscow for another round of pre-Summit trade talks -- including MFN, tariff treatment, credits, trade offices, joint development projects and a joint committee on science and technology. Secretary Rogers informs you that no commitment will be made to Dobrynin until Rogers receives a directive from you. (As you know, we have since clarified this issue with Dobrynin. He understands that we prefer to have a Soviet delegation come to the US during the pre-Summit period. Peter Peterson is handling this under guidance from here. Accordingly, no directive to Secretary Rogers is required.)

--- Other Bilateral Issues:

(a) Health Agreement: Following up on Secretary Richardson's February 11 exchange of letters with the Soviet Ministry of Health, the first meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Committee for Health Cooperation will take place in Moscow beginning March 27.

(b) Environment: CEQ Chairman Train, working with State, is exploring the possibilities of an environmental agreement with the Soviets and has had two productive meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin.

(c) Incidents at Sea: Secretary Rogers states that the United States will enter a second round of talks with the Soviets, probably in April. (It should be noted that no date has as yet been set for a second round. Defense wishes to proceed with care in these talks.)

SALT: In response to Dobrynin's question on how the US views prospects for a SALT agreement, Secretary Rogers told him that we think progress has been made but that we attach great importance to an offensive weapons freeze which would include SLBMs.

Bilateral Irritants: Secretary Rogers informed Dobrynin that the atmosphere for your visit would be improved if the Soviets were to reduce travel restrictions, cease jamming the Voice of America, and allow any persons wishing to do so to leave the Soviet Union to join their families in the United States.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Next Meeting with Dobrynin

Vietnam/Summit. There is no evidence so far that the Soviets are actively considering dropping the summit. On the contrary, while Soviet propaganda and Brezhnev himself (publicly in a communiqué with Honecker and privately to Butz and of course directly to the President) are critical of US bombing in Vietnam, they clearly talk of the summit as a fact. Arrangements for the advance are proceeding; Brezhnev was quite fulsome to Butz about the "big welcome" the President would get and the "new big step" the visit would represent. In other respects, too, the Soviets are proceeding in their dealings with us as before.

On our side the picture is of course a bit different. The Soviets will assume that columns like those by Kraft and Evans and Novack were officially inspired. And they have no doubt hoisted in what the President said at the BW ceremony together with the press play about it and the earlier public statements by Laird and McCloskey. (Only Secretary Rogers has been slightly off this pattern in making a broadly positive public statement on the new US-Soviet Exchange Agreement yesterday.)

With the Canadian Parliament speech coming up, it is probably best for us to hold our fire now as regards the Vietnam/summit interrelationship. While we want to keep the pressure on the Soviets to do something in Vietnam, we don't want to build pressure on ourselves to do something about the summit. We should remember (1) that Brezhnev obviously wants the summit and that he now knows we make a connection and (2) that if by the time of the summit the DRV has been fought anywhere near a standstill the President will go to Moscow in a strong position. We can now afford to wait.

SALT. My reading of latest developments on SLBM is that the most that is obtainable now is some assurance that they will be taken up as the first order of business in the next SALT phase. Soviets at all levels have referred to the "complicated" problems involved and I would judge that this relates to the fact that the Soviets are busy bringing in a follow-on boat and the SS-NX-8. There may be genuine perplexity in the Politburo.

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If you do pursue the idea of a follow-on negotiation you should nail down that this will not be tied to FBS. An agreement to SLBM follow-on negotiations may well be suitable for summit promulgation.

(NOTE: I personally have reservations about this course, but if we cannot get anything on SLBMs in this phase, it may be a lesser evil.)

At the same time you may want to go one more round with Dobrynin before in effect dropping SLBM for now.

As regards ABM, you and Smith have rejected the latest Soviet proposal. This ought to be made definitive so no more time is wasted on it.

Smith as you know has gone forward with our two for two proposal conditioned on SLBM inclusion. The delegation has also told the Soviets that we have no ABM position for the case that the Soviets do not agree to include SLBMs. This is strictly speaking true and it is tactically sound since we don't yet want to give up on SLBMs. But you and Dobrynin have already in effect begun to talk around this possibility and you have, I think, made clear that if SLBMs are not included we need some advantage on ABMs. (You have Odeen's and my paper on how to do this; see Tab A.)

The situation is going to be complicated when Smith makes his "personal" inquiry about substituting NCA for the second US/ICBM site. (Incidentally, is this with SLBMs included or excluded? If the latter it would provide us with an advantage only by Soviet definition, i.e., that our ICBM site defense would "protect" more ICBMs than a single site Soviet ICBM defense.)

I think you should today establish the principle that if SLBMs are excluded we will need an ABM advantage. Next time you should make him a specific proposal. (NOTE: If Dobrynin is going to be in Moscow for an extended period, this may have to be done by Smith.)

Other Issues

Bilateral matters seem to be under control.

Grain talks, despite some unnecessary public statements by Butz in Moscow, will probably deadlock on the credit issue. The Soviets want concessionary terms -- up to ten years at low interest rates. We cannot, by law, go above three years at commercial rates. (Brezhnev told Butz he can survive without a deal.) I suggest you stay away from this one for now.
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Lend-Lease begins here this week.

Commercial Shipping. The Soviets have given us a forthcoming counter-proposal but a good deal of work still needs to be done. The talks are scheduled for Monday April 17 in Moscow (Nat Samuels, Gibson, etc.) I got your word to postpone for a week too late to hold up on this. But I will tell Samuels to cool the rhetoric. Again, I think you can stay away from this one for now.

Incidents at Sea. Nothing needs to be said to Dobrynin.

Patolichev. You may want to hint that this visit may have to be postponed if Vietnam gets worse. (You may recall that this was to be the occasion when we would intimate that EXIM may be in the cards at the summit.)
The precise state of play is that Dobrynin owes Peterson an answer to the invitation for the period between April 27 and May 10. Pete thinks he may get a response at a Valenti/Dobrynin affair Thursday night. (Incidentally, I told Peterson's man that if Pete goes he should keep it cool and correct.)

Exchanges Agreement. Signed.

Science: David has his marching orders and will be getting back to Dobrynin in the next several days.

Environment. Dobrynin told Hillenbrand he will be contacting Train with a Soviet reaction to our illustrative proposal.

Space Docking. NASA says all issues are under control as directed by the SRG.

Summit Preparations. The advance is to leave early April 17. Practical arrangements for the group are in train. We will have a problem with Soviet insistence that the President fly in Soviet aircraft inside the USSR. Scowcroft is appalled at sloppy Soviet flight and safety practices, even for their VIP's. The Soviets maintain that if their top leaders are to accompany the President, as they did de Gaulle and others, it will have to be in one of their own planes. (They also refer to what happened in China.) We may have to consider a compromise by using a Soviet plane to Leningrad and ours to Baku.

(NOTE: I have the impression Chapin is not fully aware of your discussion of arrangements with Dobrynin. You should fill him in, if necessary.)
The Soviets are apparently being tough on the press question (100 man limit). Unless this has already been settled it is worth trying to improve on.

MBFR. My recollection is that you owe some sort of a response. We now have a paper on principles which you will get shortly. It is based on what is already common ground with the allies. You may want to indicate that the President will be prepared to discuss principles in Moscow. (The other two possibilities -- an effort to agree on a "quick and dirty" reduction, and an understanding on negotiating procedures -- have many problems and pitfalls.)
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Mr. Samoteykin, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Mr. John Negroponte, NSC Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE & TIME:
Saturday, April 22, 1972; 11:00 a.m. - 4:05 p.m.

PLACE:
Guest House, Vorobyevskii Road
Moscow

SUBJECTS:
Basic Principles; Vietnam; SALT; European Security; Bilateral Relations; Announcement of Visit; Summit Arrangements; China

[When Dr. Kissinger's car arrived at 11:00 a.m. at the front door of the Guest House reserved for the meetings, the General-Secretary and the Foreign Minister came down the steps and welcomed him. Brezhnev was wearing a stylish dark blue suit, dark blue shirt, dark tie, gold watch chain and two Orders of Lenin. Before entering the building, Brezhnev led Mr. Kissinger on a walk around the building to the garden in the back, and onto a small covered platform overlooking the Moscow River. They exchanged informal pleasantries.]

Brezhnev: They tell me you've been working on the draft of the Principles and strengthening it. That's what I had suggested. You're a good man. If I were you and I were an evil man, I'd have just kept quiet about the draft as it was. But you are a generous man.

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Kissinger: Now the General-Secretary is obligated to me to mention me in a speech of his -- favorably.

Brezhnev: I will do so. You and I can accomplish much together between the two of us. Maybe we should just abolish our Foreign Offices.

Kissinger: We on our side have already taken steps in that direction. Now we need a reduction of Gromyko.

[The group then left the platform, walked through the garden and through a fence into the next compound. This was the Reception House (Dom Priyoma) which housed a tennis court, swimming pool, and many meeting rooms. The group went upstairs and out onto the balcony overlooking the river.]

Brezhnev: The President will see many things. Will he go up Ostankino Tower (the radio-TV tower)? We will make the ground soft for him, in case anything goes wrong. I may not go with him; I'll send Gromyko.

Kissinger: We're prepared for all contingencies.

[The group then returned to the guest house and convened at a long table in a room on the ground floor. The talks began at 11:40 a.m.]

Brezhnev: We meet once again. I would be pleased if you had a good rest, and if so, that you reported back to Washington that you did. If you did not, it's the Foreign Office's fault.

The meat pies had a beneficial effect on us yesterday. Have some more.

Kissinger: I haven't eaten for at least an hour.

Brezhnev: Impossible. I had my last cup of tea one hour and 20 minutes ago -- this gives you an advantage over me. I feel I'm getting thin.

I have one request. If we conduct talks at this pace, you'd better ask the President to allow you one more week in Moscow. We're both so loquacious and like each other's company. Both of us have responsible instructions to solve all problems. My feeling is that you have such instructions, too.

So I think perhaps we come today to concrete issues. We do not rule out general issues but should concentrate on the concrete. Since I was the last speaker yesterday, it is fair if you speak first today. This is another TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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piece of evidence that our country wants no advantage and no superiority. That is the truth.

[The General-Secretary then served some more food.]

Kissinger: That is your secret weapon.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Gromyko: A conventional weapon. [laughter]

Kissinger: I will make a few observations. First, I want to thank you again for the warmth with which we have been received. Secondly, the President is pleased and thinks this is a positive sign for the Summit.

Brezhnev: I am pleased to hear that.

Kissinger: After our discussions and the reception we have received, I have no doubt that our discussions will be extremely fruitful and of great benefit to our two countries and to the peace of the world.

Last night, Mr. General-Secretary, my colleagues and I studied the draft you handed us at the close of yesterday's meeting. Quite frankly, I haven't sent it to Washington because I do not consider it useful to have too many bureaucratic comments at this point. I'm sure I speak for the President when I say that in principle and in basic outline it will be acceptable to us. I think it was drafted by your side in a large and generous spirit, and it reflects the attitude that we too bring to our relationship.

Brezhnev: We did in drafting try to take all circumstances into account. We felt it should be a document in keeping with the general spirit of both ourselves and yourselves. We did not inject any bargaining points, but tried to do it in a balanced way.

Kissinger: That was our impression. We have redrafted it and it is being typed. It includes all of your points. I have taken seriously the General-Secretary's suggestion that we strengthen it, in the hope that he will mention me favorably in one of his speeches.

Brezhnev: I told you I would do that.

Kissinger: It will ruin you with your ally in the East.

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Brezhnev: What ally is that?

Kissinger: I think the Foreign Minister has an idea.

Gromyko: I ask the same question.

Dobrynin: Try and guess.

Brezhnev: After that remark, I'm tempted to try to get to the bottom of this. There must be some catch there, perhaps a delayed-action mine or bomb (to use a popular American term).

Kissinger: A conventional bomb.

Brezhnev: If Dobrynin had an atomic bomb with him [in Washington] he he wouldn't be here. He can stand conventional bombs, though.

Kissinger: We propose the following procedure: We are typing the draft now. At an appropriate moment today or tomorrow, or whenever it fits our program, we will show it. I really think we can come to an agreement while I'm here that is substantially complete.

[Mr. Samoteykin, an aide to Brezhnev, entered the room.]

Brezhnev: I've brought reinforcements, too. I had to because you did. I've been talking so much I didn't notice how many you have here today. When Americans bring reinforcements, they do it on the quiet, but when they withdraw they do it with big fanfare! [laughter]

I too feel it highly desirable if we can avoid additional detailed communications later on this document, and can reach agreement here.

Kissinger: I'm sure we can do this. I've explained to your Ambassador the somewhat Byzantine requirements of our bureaucracy. The President may have some comments, but I know his views. They will not be substantial because I know his views. We may have some details to discuss at the Summit, but then only minor suggestions. Our lawyers will have to look at it.

Brezhnev: If you have bureaucratic departments, they have to have something to do. One professor has proved that if you have a department of 1000 employees, they can do nothing except serve their own needs.

Gromyko: [in English] Busy, busy.

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Brezhnev: Therefore I try my best to keep my departments down to 999!
[laughter]

You'd certainly be mistaken to show it to lawyers. As soon as you
ask the lawyers, then you are finished.

Kissinger: We will finish it here. We will keep it in the White House until
we come to Moscow, and then give it to the lawyers here, for 24 hours to
work on it.

Brezhnev: Twenty-four minutes.

Kissinger: There will be no leaks this way, and we can have it as final.

Brezhnev: There is in it a clause that protects both sides. It says "nothing
in this is prejudicial to third countries or to the interests of third countries."

Kissinger: It is really a final document, with only some possible minor
technical modifications. We can consider that a result of this visit.

Gromyko: [in English] Good, good.

Kissinger: We will show you our version as soon as it is typed. It is
really very close to yours.

Brezhnev: I believe you. My colleagues will welcome this, too. If the
basis we put forward turns out acceptable, that is good.

Kissinger: The basis is OK, just minor strengthening as you suggested.
For example, where you spoke of "ensuring that their ties are on a firm
and long-term basis," we added a line about joint commissions to give it
more concreteness.

Brezhnev: I would say that would be acceptable.

Of course, it is important not to make errors in making these concrete
specifications. There is an anecdote about the Tsar who had before him
a case of an arrested man. The question was, would he be executed or
pardoned? The Tsar wrote out a piece of paper with only three words on
it (kaznit' nyelzya pomilovat'), but the commas were misplaced. He
should have read it as "execution impossible, pardon." But he instead
read it as "execution, impossible [to] pardon." No, that wasn't quite it:
actually the Tsar wrote it without commas and then the lawyers had to
decide which he meant.

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Kissinger: What happened to the man?

Brezhnev: I will tell you that at the end of our discussions, before you go. My answer will depend on how our talks go.

Gromyko: Maybe the answer should be given only at the Summit.

Brezhnev: No, Dr. Kissinger has to leave Moscow with clear answers to all his questions. Because you might want to tell the President this story. He will want to know the ending. If you don't know it, he will wonder what you were talking about here.

Kissinger: From my experience with bureaucracies, they probably did both.

Brezhnev: I have another story before we go on. There was a very poor man who wanted to get rich quick. He thought and thought of how to do it. He realized that many people like to drink and drink, and their noses get red. He thought he could exploit this. [To notetaker]: This is only a joke. You don't need to write it down. Don't write it. [Resuming:] So he put advertisements in the paper that all who wanted to get rid of red noses should send money to him for the remedy. He was flooded with letters and money. There were too many to answer, so he put an ad in the paper to reply to them all: "If you want to get rid of red noses, just keep drinking and your noses will turn blue." [laughter]

We'll be waiting for your draft.

Kissinger: Better to wait. It is close to yours. I am sure we can settle it. Our draft follows yours very closely.

Brezhnev: I think we're all very friendly here. If anyone wants to take his coat off, go ahead. (All did.) Now you see how constructive the Soviet side is.

Gromyko: When I was in the White House, no one asked me to take my coat off.

Vietnam

Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary, if I can return to the subject we raised at the end of the day -- which is the only one which could cause problems for
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the Summit meeting. I promised you yesterday that I would present a concrete suggestion on how we might proceed, on Vietnam, if you are willing.

Brezhnev: Please. It is indeed a very complicated issue.

Kissinger: There are two parts of the issue: the procedural part and the substantive part. The first is how to get talks started. The second is what will happen when talks do get started. As you know, we proposed a private meeting first, to be followed by a plenary meeting; the DRV has proposed a plenary to be followed by a private meeting. They have told us it would take a week for Le Duc Tho to come to Paris after we have announced the plenary session. This is a rather absurd statement, but we will not play these children's games. So we are disposed to notify Hanoi privately tomorrow of the following proposition: If they agree to a private meeting on May 2, we will announce on April 25 (Tuesday afternoon) that we will attend the next plenary on Thursday, April 27.

We think this is a fair proposition.

Brezhnev: I think it is constructive. Particularly since they have said the U.S. can put forward its own date with regard to their proposal of May 6.

Kissinger: We've put forward a suggestion which is consistent with their messages to us. It is really the last practicable date that week for me -- particularly in view of other decisions that will have to be made, as I have told your Ambassador.

I would think it would be very helpful if the DRV could restrain itself from its usual practice of claiming this is a tremendous victory. Because, if they do, it will have consequences for our future discussions. Also, in the spirit of my discussions here, until the meeting on May 2, we are disposed not to take any actions in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

Now, the important issue is the meeting on May 2, because we are not interested in a meeting just for a meeting; we are interested in the result.

Brezhnev: Yes, in this situation, there is probably no sense in having an empty meeting.

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Kissinger: Exactly. Therefore, as I said, I would like to tell the General-Secretary our ideas for what should be done.

Brezhnev: On substance? At the private talks?

Kissinger: Yes, at the private talks. The plenaries are a waste of time.

Brezhnev: I was just considering whether or not to ask that question. I wish to add; if you want to communicate this to us in strict confidence, we'll do whatever you wish in this respect and will not communicate it to them.

Kissinger: You can communicate it to them if you feel it useful, because we don't have too much time.

Brezhnev: Let's hear you out first, so we can tell.

Kissinger: The Plenary Session will be a waste of time, as I said. All we will learn then will be some new adjectives. But the private session should be constructive and productive.

Brezhnev: How do you do those? Just you, Le Duc Tho and interpreters?

Kissinger: Him and Xuan Thuy and two or three aides, and me and two or three on our side. But usually he and I do most of the talking.

What we will demand on May 2 is a return to the situation of March 29, that is, the situation before the beginning of the offensive. We shall propose a declaration that the two sides will make a serious effort this year to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam. And in order to create favorable conditions for this, that both sides will reduce the level of violence. We shall ask that the North Vietnamese withdraw the divisions that entered South Vietnam after March 29, that is to say, the three divisions in Military Region 1 and the three divisions in Military Region 3. We will then withdraw the air and naval forces which we have introduced since March 29. We shall ask that the North Vietnamese respect the Demilitarized Zone. We shall then stop the bombing of North Vietnam completely.

Because of the suffering that has been caused, and as a symbol of progress, we shall propose that all prisoners who have been held more than four years be released immediately by both sides.
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And we shall ask for guarantees that these conditions will be observed during the period of negotiations this year.

In other words, we are not asking for a unilateral advantage for us. We shall ask that both sides review their negotiating positions. And we shall promise that we shall review ours to see if both can be brought closer, in a generous spirit.

If I can add a personal observation. If the North Vietnamese would talk to us in the spirit of our discussions here, I believe we could settle this in a reasonable way, and fairly quickly.

I do not think you want to be involved in all the details of the political proposals, but I can tell you that our eight points of January 25 are not presented as an ultimatum, and we are prepared to listen to counterproposals.

In short, we envisage two stages: (1) an immediate reduction of the violence, which is guaranteed to last a reasonable period, for example, a year, and (2) a serious effort at negotiation.

This would end the threat of war, and of course would end the bombing of North Vietnam.

Brezhnev: One question which the Vietnamese are bound to ask, and probably will be bound to ask is, when will the U.S. withdraw all its troops? That is very important, within this complex of discussions.

Kissinger: We are prepared to withdraw all our forces and military installations within six months of a final settlement, and are prepared to begin this immediately once agreement in principle is reached, while the details are being worked out -- which is a major concession.

Brezhnev: I of course do not want to raise any conditions or anything, because you know our general line on this matter and we are not changing it at all. But just by listening by ear, I wonder if, don't you think it would perhaps ease a solution and soften the situation if you perhaps exclude the condition about withdrawal of divisions and substitute that they should stop at their present lines and that there be no more acts of war? And then you don't have to withdraw your air and naval forces. That change should be of no consequence, because the important thing is to end the fighting.

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In your proposal, it sounds a bit tough, a bit much. The important thing is to get hostilities ended, to end the violence. The whole thing would sound more conciliatory.

Gromyko: You say you will withdraw your forces that you have deployed since March 29. But the bombing that has taken place cannot be removed. You cannot return what has been destroyed.

Brezhnev: Nothing would change if you could incorporate this in your proposals. The important thing is to end the war. But the flat demand to withdraw complicates matters a bit, in my opinion. The only condition should be that the fighting be stopped, and talks begin. Otherwise, they will say that you ask them to withdraw their forces and the aggressive forces would retake the land [they vacated].

At the outset we did agree to be very frank in our talks and to keep them confidential. I believe that, apart from practical matters, there are two permanent and really major issues. Certainly it is a fact that the Vietnamese are fighting for what they see as a just and sacred cause. Of course, it was not President Nixon who started the war. But of course it's up to the United States to extricate itself somehow from it. And I am sure President Nixon is aware of this. Of course, certain prestige considerations are brought to bear on the U.S. Administration, and are impeding a quick solution. But there is a need for the U.S. to rid itself of this shameful war. The U.S. will have to do it; whether it is President Nixon or someone else, is not for me to say, but the U.S. will have to do it. That is the only way. Otherwise, the fighting will go on. You know their determination, and the support they are getting is public opinion throughout the world.

I cannot vouch for the Vietnamese, but perhaps some amendments to your proposal can be made. Of course, the Vietnamese have to negotiate themselves. But even the smallest unacceptable proposals will do harm to the general prospects, and you'll be farther away from a solution.

A halt to the bombing, withdrawals, and an end to bases, etc. -- all these are constructive proposals. With regard to an end to fighting, this could happen even before a formal agreement has been arrived at. If this method is adopted, I see no harm being done to the interests of the U.S. On the contrary, a solution along these lines would be welcomed everywhere, and welcomed here as well, and be a good basis for our discussions here.
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This is only my personal view. I'll discuss it with my colleagues and report to you any additional comments.

I have one more comment. Regardless of whatever method we choose for our subsequent actions -- that is, whether you think we should communicate with them or not -- the mere fact of these positive steps coming out of our talks here (it will probably leak eventually, probably in the American press), this tacitly elevates the significance of our discussions. At least to those in the know, this is a token of accord between us. Of course, I do not mean we are trying to reach agreement by us on behalf of the North Vietnamese side. I thought therefore I would suggest these amendments. We of course would want a radical solution to the entire problem. But I won't go into that, or into details, because time does not permit, and surely you know the details of our radical solution.

Now, if I might return to the question you yourself raised earlier, it is one thing to agree on dates for a meeting with the North Vietnamese -- as regards the plenary, you said it is a waste of time. The question then arises, what happens if the private meeting yields no success and doesn't produce something constructive or useful? It's hard to foresee. But it is a question of war going on. It is easy to unleash a war, but it is hard to put out the flames. The second question is how all this will look in the context of the forthcoming Summit. Will it be possible, or not? There are two reasons why it might not be possible. One factor is the objective state of the public opinion background, and secondly, it may prove impossible from President Nixon's standpoint. We don't want this. But these are the negative possibilities.

Kissinger: Whose public opinion?

Brezhnev: The general world political climate. Because, if the war goes on, with the bombing going on or increasing in intensity, that would cause a generally unfavorable political climate throughout the world.

Of course, I omit to make another analysis. I know President Nixon and you, Dr. Kissinger, know what the state of American society is over this problem. You know it is split, into hundreds of various groups, as a result of constantly fluctuating policies. This is why President Nixon has to move forward, right, downwards, this way and that. That's why I think there is a need for radical solutions. That's why I know the President is now looking for such a solution. All these are very acute.

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problems, and require drastic solutions. In any organization, the greater
the laxity of discipline, the greater the need for order -- especially in
a war.

It is for the U.S. side to find the method to extricate itself. We
discuss it here because we're having a free and frank discussion. This
may require some thinking. Maybe not now, but later, I would welcome
comments from you on what I have said here.

Kissinger: I know the President's views, and I can make some comments
now. And I will reflect, and if I have additional comments, I will make
them later.

Brezhnev: I'd be pleased to hear them.

Kissinger: First, in the spirit of personal confidence that I believe
characterizes our discussions, I must tell you the determination the
President has to bring about some solution, whatever price he has to pay.
I tell you this because it is my duty to be sure you understand his frame
of mind.

We had no intention two weeks ago to add any new element to the
North Vietnamese problem. We were prepared to discuss it with you in
a general way, but did not imagine it would reach these proportions. The
situation was forced upon us.

We consider that what North Vietnam is now doing goes beyond
Vietnam. It's an attack on the institution of the Presidency. And we
cannot tolerate this.

Three weeks ago we would have eagerly accepted the proposal that
hostilities be stopped or reduced. Indeed, we proposed it ourselves two
years ago. We would have accepted it at any moment -- until the offensive
started -- even a defacto ceasefire.

But now we have a situation where North Vietnam has violated the
understanding we had with them in 1968. You know very well in this room
that there was an understanding to respect the Demilitarized Zone.
Therefore, it is imperative, if we are to stop the bombing, that they
withdraw the divisions that crossed the DMZ, and that henceforth the
DMZ be respected.
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[General-Secretary offers cakes.

Kissinger: I can never refuse the General-Secretary.

Brezhnev: Delicious things.

Gromyko: Inspiring.]

Kissinger: With respect to other parts of the country, the problem is more complex, and we are prepared to discuss what exactly is meant by a reduction of military activity.

Another point that must be made is, if Hanoi in the interval between now and the private meeting increases its offensive activity, then of course the restraint I mentioned cannot be maintained. It cannot use the interval to seize even more territory.

Brezhnev: I think I can discern in the course of this conversation different approaches to these problems, though the final goal seems to be the same. You say, on the one hand, that the President is very anxious to find a positive way out and is willing to pay a price to find a solution... The question then arises, how is that to be understood? It could mean flexibility or concessions, or it could mean the price of all-out war. Perhaps there is some error of logic. I think the goal [of ending the war] should be clear. But what is to be subordinated to what? The way you have put it forward, a solution may be very difficult.

[Dr. Kissinger interrupted the translation of the above paragraph at the point marked by the ellipsis. He said: I may not have explained it fully. The President is willing to take any risk, not to make any concession. I meant price in terms of risk.

[The Russians at the table conferred among themselves and agreed that Brezhnev had in fact understood Dr. Kissinger correctly, as the rest of the translation then made clear. At the end of the translation, Brezhnev resumed.]


Kissinger: Let me be precise. The President is prepared to be very flexible but he will not be pushed into negotiations by military action. And he must have assurance that military actions will now stop so that there can be a climate for negotiations. As I explained to your Ambassador. (He always leaves town when things get hot.)

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Dobrynin: But this time I'm here with you.

Kissinger: The President would prefer a political solution, not a military solution. And his thinking is not too far from the position of the General-Secretary that first military activity should stop. Only there is a difference between us on how to interpret the stopping of military activity.

Brezhnev: The interpretation should be easy. Everybody stops shooting, stops where they are, and talks start.

Kissinger: We cannot accept that with respect to the forces that have crossed the Demilitarized Zone.

Brezhnev: That means war.

Kissinger: War between whom?

Brezhnev: It is just a statement of fact. It means continuation of war between you and the DRV. You want a political solution. And I believe that. What is needed is a complete stoppage, a ceasefire, without formal agreement, and then everything is placed on the table for negotiation.

Kissinger: For how long?

Brezhnev: That will be a subject for understanding between you and the DRV. It depends on how much time you think is necessary -- one month, two months -- and the two sides conduct negotiations on putting an end to the conflict as such. Then, let's say if there are five private meetings -- or plenaries (that's a purely technical question) -- this period can be used in an effort to do away with the problem and reach agreement.

Here there can be virtually dozens of ways of going about this. One can develop a whole timetable of measures by one side and by the other, to be done by one month, or by December, or by whatever period you want.

Kissinger: By when?

Brezhnev: By whatever period.

[The General-Secretary then launched into a long unrelated joke, which he forbade the notetakers to take down.]

Kissinger: The General-Secretary is so forceful a speaker that I think I understand him when he speaks even though I don't know a word he is saying.
Brezhnev: I am always forceful when I am sure of what I am saying. When I don't have conviction, I am silent or don't speak so forcefully.

Kissinger: I have not yet heard the General-Secretary on anything on which he does not speak with conviction.

Brezhnev: One thing surprises me. The U.S. cannot seem to understand that no bombing, on whatever scale, can end the conflict. The only result is to drag out the war for dozens of years more, and even worse consequences. Of course, really it's up to the President to find a way out. But it is an indubitable fact that if one side resorts to tough and harsh measures, this will only evoke equally harsh measures on the other side. And where is the way out?

I recall that deGaulle fought seven years in Algeria. After seven years he concluded he had to find a way out. It was the same thing with the French in Indochina. When I was recently in France, the French Minister of Industry (Cointin) accompanied me to Marseilles. He told me he had spent twenty years in Vietnam. Doing what?, I asked. Fighting, he said. It was simply a waste of time and effort, he said. You face the same prospect.

And none of the countries neighboring Vietnam will agree to stop fighting against the U.S. They will continue to fight. This is the inexorable logic of the situation as things stand today.

This reminds me of another story. I want this off the record too. It is a poem I learned 35 years ago about the force of logic, about the wonders of science. A farmer had a son who had been to college. The family had two chickens, but the son tried to show that there were really three. There's one chicken here, one there, and really a third inside one of the first two. The father said to the son, "For that I sent you to college? I'll tell you what. We'll divide up the chickens -- one for me, one for mother, and you can have the third!"

I learned the poem 35 years ago and declaimed it at school. This conversation just brought it back.

There is a lesson to be drawn from jokes. Maybe by logic you can make 3 out of 2. But it is not for me to prophesy what the outcome will be. The experience of the past is that the outcome of a war is often far from what the initiators had in mind who unleashed it. These are the hard facts of the case.
I certainly support President Nixon's idea of ending the war. Logic cannot lead to any other result. That is the end-goal of all of us. Certainly the Soviet Union has no axe to grind. Certainly we seek no advantage to us whatsoever.

Perhaps we can end the discussion of Vietnam at this point. You said you would give our comments some thought and perhaps come up with some variants. I would like to talk now about limitation of ABM's and the freeze on ICBM's.

Kissinger: I feel I have made sufficiently clear that our basic position on Vietnam is an extremely serious one. We are prepared to negotiate, and have sought since February 15 to start negotiations. We will negotiate in a generous spirit. But I cannot underestimate the seriousness and determination of the President not to be pushed by military action.

I will return to this briefly later. Could I ask now for a two-minute break?

I am prepared to see some of the concessions made de facto. But they should withdraw their divisions across the DMZ.

[It was 1:45 p.m. The meeting resumed at 1:50 p.m.]

SALT

Brezhnev: Now I would like to make some comments on ABM limitation and the freeze on ICBM's. This is an important measure, and we have been discussing it for two years now.

I want to show how the Soviet side solves problems in a constructive spirit. We have taken into account all the communications made to us by President Nixon. We have had quite a few over the past few months, and we have tried to take them all into account, particularly those in the most recent period.

[The General-Secretary then read the Soviet note on ABM's:]"It is recognized as expedient to limit ABM systems in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to covering the capitals and to one area each for the location of land-based ICBM silo launchers.
"The location of ABM facilities for the covering of the capitals would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center would be within the limits of the capital."

This is a reflection of your proposal to us.

Kissinger: One member of our delegation is an adviser to your delegation.

Brezhnev: [resumes reading ABM note:] "The location of ABM facilities for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center for the United States would be in the area of location of ICBM launchers where the deployment of ABM facilities is most advanced."

This also reflects your proposal.

"The quantity of ABMs and their launchers for each side should not exceed 100 units for covering the capitals and 100 units for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers."

That, too, reflects your proposal.

So now you have something to take back, a proposal from your confidential channel.

Kissinger: The only one which does not reflect our official thinking, but that of a member of our delegation, is the 150 km radius.

Mr. General-Secretary, let me say this is a constructive approach. I will reserve comment until I hear what you say about submarines.

Brezhnev: Nothing.

Kissinger: Nothing?

Brezhnev: Be patient. What can I say about them? They travel under water, we can't see them, they're silent --

Gromyko: [in English] Puzzle, puzzle!

Kissinger: You do have something on submarines?

Gromyko: You can't read it before Sukhodrev!

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[Sukhodrev then reads the text of the note on submarines:]

"We have thoroughly considered the state of affairs at the strategic arms limitations talks taking into account the considerations expressed by the US side through the confidential channel, relating to the freeze on ballistic-missile carrying submarines.

"In this connection we believe it appropriate to state the following:

"1. The question of the freeze on the number of modern ballistic-missile carrying submarines and the total number of launchers thereon is of very significant importance.

"Ballistic-missile carrying submarines occupy a special place in the composition of strategic offensive weapons and their consideration should not overlook differences in the geographies of the sides, the ballistic-missile carrying submarines at the disposal of the US NATO allies and the US forward submarine bases.

"As is known, that offers important strategic advantages to the American side, and under these conditions the number of submarines and ballistic missiles thereon at the disposal of the sides cannot be the same.

"2. In order to bring about relaxation of international tensions, normalization of relations between our two countries and cessation of the strategic arms race we agree to consider the question of including ballistic-missile carrying submarines in the suggested freeze agreement provided, naturally, that there should be established for the sides appropriate limits for such systems taking into account the considerations set forth above.

"The Soviet Union would agree that the US and their NATO allies should have, for the period of the freeze agreement, up to 50 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of up to 800, including 41 submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers thereon at the disposal of the United States. Over that period the Soviet Union could have 62 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of no more than 950.

"It is understood that over that period the sides will reduce the number of land-based ICBMs through dismantling older launchers. The sides would also be entitled to modernize and replace older submarines by new submarines but without increasing in the process the above-mentioned number of modern submarines and ballistic missile launchers thereon.
"However, since the above proposal would only be a partial compensa-
tion for the strategic disbalance in the location of missile carrying
nuclear submarines of the sides, the Soviet side proceeds from the
premise that the whole of this problem - and primarily the issue of dis-
mantling US missile submarine bases outside the territory of the United
States, should be appropriately resolved in the course of subsequent
negotiations.

"If over the period of the Interim agreement the US NATO allies
increase the number of ballistic-missile carrying submarines to the
excess of those operational or under construction, the Soviet Union reserves
the right to the corresponding increase in such submarines.

"2. Taking into account the proposals of the US side the Soviet Union
could agree to include in the suggested freeze agreement the obligation
not to start, in addition to ICBM silo launchers, new construction of
fixed soft land-based ICBM launchers as well.

"4. Moscow believes it possible to have the period of the Interim
freeze agreement - 5 years.

"5. Given understanding in principle on such an approach we would
be prepared to give necessary instructions to the Soviet delegation in
Helsinki to discuss practical matters related to the final elaboration of
the corresponding articles of the Interim agreement on certain measures
with respect to strategic offensive armaments having in mind that this
Agreement together with the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems
would be signed during the forthcoming meeting in Moscow."

Brezhnev: I think that is a very constructive proposal and it is in keeping
with the spirit of all those communications you made through Ambassador
Dobrynin. I would think President Nixon should think it very constructive.
Apart from the constructive nature of our proposals, that paper is another
sign of the spirit with which we approach the Summit meeting.

Kissinger: If the General-Secretary says as little on Vietnam as he said on
submarines, we will make enormous progress today.

Brezhnev: I'd have been pleased to say less on Vietnam, but Dr. Kissinger
took so much time.
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Kissinger: That was meant as a compliment. You had said you'd say nothing on submarines.

It's a very constructive approach. I recognize that it incorporates many of the points we made in the confidential channel. It is a serious effort to address many of our concerns.

May I ask a practical question, simply for my understanding?

When you say, "Over the period the sides will reduce the number of land-based ICBM's," does this mean you accept the obligation I mentioned to Dobyinin to dismantle older land-based missiles once we grant you the right to build more submarines?

Brezhnev: That is what is implied. We have accepted that principle. We won't build new ones to replace the ones removed. We will build submarines according to the terms allowed, and we are prepared to inform you of the exact month and date we will dismantle the ICBM facilities.

Kissinger: We will have a problem in explaining to our Congress why you have a greater number of missiles in both categories. If we have an understanding that you will dismantle some of the older missiles, we will instruct our delegation to work out the precise numbers. Semenov can work this out with our delegation. We needn't do it here, at this level.

Gromyko: We will instruct accordingly.

Brezhnev: It is very easy. Of course we will be dismantling.

Kissinger: I only want to fix this so we can make this instruction to our delegation and make this part of the negotiation.

Brezhnev: We will give similar instructions.

Kissinger: No problem. But I have one other point. It is difficult for us to discuss limitations on British and French submarines. It would be easier if you make a unilateral declaration. We agree to 41, then if the British and French build more than 9 and if the total number reaches more than 50, then you can respond accordingly. This will be easier, because we have no right to tell the British and French what to do. You will make unilateral deal. We have no right to negotiate the total number.
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Brezhnev: Of course. We shall certainly give thought to a unilateral declaration. But the figures are agreed.

Kissinger: The figures are agreed. There is no problem about figures. I will show you what a bad diplomat I am. Gromyko wouldn't do this, but I think the submarine matter is acceptable in principle.

Brezhnev: This shows what a strong diplomat you are. I agree our Foreign Ministry would never do that, but that's an example of how bad it is.

Gromyko: It's your advantage. I would never have said this outright. I would have waited at least three minutes.

Brezhnev: I don't want to raise the question at this time, but I do want to mention the serious matter of the U.S. military bases ringing the Soviet Union. This relates to your air force and intermediate range missiles.

Sonnenfeldt: We have no IRBM's.

Kissinger: We are going to ground Sonnenfeldt.

Brezhnev: We mean forward-based missiles. It doesn't make any difference what kind of rocket you die from.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt is right. We have no forward-based missiles that can reach the USSR, but I understand the General-Secretary's point.

Brezhnev: Of course it's useless to deploy intermediate range missiles in the U.S., so you deploy them abroad.

Kissinger: We have airplanes that can reach the USSR. As it happens, we have no missiles in Europe that can reach the USSR, but we have airplanes that can. But we understand the General-Secretary's point and we take it seriously.

Brezhnev: As we see it, this could be the start of an important future process. It could be the start of the strengthening of confidence; this should be followed by further measure of goodwill to strengthen normal relations between our two countries.

Kissinger: Agreed.

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Brezhnev: ... measures that would be in no way prejudicial to obligations each of us has to other countries, and would be at the same time encouraging to the Allies of us both. Therein lies the greatness and noble purpose of our two countries.

Kissinger: This attitude can be a principal result of the Summit.

Brezhnev: These are indeed problems of great importance. First, the statement of principles yesterday, then this, -- all this carries great significance. It will last the commentators and analysts about 2 years, until the next Summit. I could write a good commentary. I could write a good article for the U.S. press. How much do you pay for a good article?

Kissinger: My only hope is that the next meeting is sooner than 2 years, and I hope the General Secretary can visit us next year.

Brezhnev: I don't think I have an invitation or visa yet.

Kissinger: You will have an invitation when President Nixon comes here. We hope to have that in the final communiqué.

Brezhnev: Thank you. In the coming 4 years, the United States and Soviet Union should take even more important steps to increase the spirit of good will.

Kissinger: As for ABMs, Mr. General Secretary, we have proposed using 2 ICBM fields, rather than Washington and 1 ICBM field, but I consider your proposal constructive.

Brezhnev: Then you said 2 and 2.

Kissinger: I will have to discuss this in Washington, but we will do so in very positive attitude.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger -- I would not want this on the record -- this has the advantage for you, which your military are aware of, that yours covers more ICBM's than ours does.

Kissinger: I understand, but not necessarily if there are 150 km radius. It depends on where you put your fields.
Brezhnev: This won't be the case. The area will be clearly defined. It is a secret now, but not for long. Your military will photograph it anyway.

Kissinger: If you can give me informally some idea of the number of ICBMs you will put in this field, it would help persuade some of my people. You don't have to tell me the field, just an idea of the number, to tell the President.

Brezhnev: I will tell you that later.

Kissinger: It's just for the President.

Brezhnev: But I can say beforehand that we will have fewer than you have.

Kissinger: May I make a suggestion?

Brezhnev: It is not to be made public. Because it is really to your advantage and it would be bad if it came out.

Kissinger: I must be honest with you. Anything in the White House we can keep totally secret. Once it leaves the White House, as your Ambassador can tell you, I can't completely control it.

Brezhnev: That's why I say I should have invited Rogers in the first place!

Kissinger: You would have gotten more publicity. Therefore what you tell me here will not become public. Once agreement is completed, I can't guarantee that numbers won't become public, but what the General Secretary says here will not.

Brezhnev: In nature of speculation, but not officially.

Kissinger: But once we have a treaty, our people will have to testify before Congressional committees. We will try to control it, but the testimony will only happen several months after an agreement.

Brezhnev: That's a procedural matter. If we agree on this principle, procedural matters won't be a problem.

Kissinger: The submarine matter is certainly acceptable. The ABM matter I will have to discuss in Washington but it is certainly in the direction...
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Brezhnev: I feel it incorporates your latest suggestion and incorporates the principle of equality, and I don't foresee changes.

Kissinger: I don't see any problems. Let me suggest the following procedure. I will take this up with the President as soon as I return Monday or Tuesday. We'll then call back our negotiator from Helsinki and simultaneously get together our military people. All of this will take about a week. We'll then instruct our negotiator. If you can send your Ambassador back. . . .

If in the meantime Semenov can be kept under restraint so he doesn't reveal this, it would speed this matter.

Brezhnev: We have given him instructions. But if you think this is easier, we can send him a telegram to keep it back for a time.

Kissinger: Let me think about it.

Brezhnev: We have enough time to cable him to hold up.

Kissinger: When will he propose it? Monday?

Gromyko: At his discretion. He met with Smith yesterday and said nothing.

Kissinger: He hinted at it.

Brezhnev: On submarines, Semenov knows nothing.

Kissinger: Let him propose it. Let me on second thought talk to the President. I'll tell Vorontsov.

Gromyko: We'll hold Semenov up.

Brezhnev: We have a closed phone link, so we will phone him immediately.

[Aide goes out to do so.]

Kissinger: How should we do it in Helsinki? Should they conclude the whole thing in Helsinki, or should we leave something for the Summit? We can settle certain things privately but not in Helsinki.

Brezhnev: The signing should be on a high level. The final decision and signing should be at the Summit level.

Kissinger: The signing and final decisions should be at the highest level, yes.

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Gromyko: Since this matter relates to a text, it may be best for our delegations to finalize as much as is possible. Because it is a text, the lawyers should look at it. If all is done here, there is a risk of not having enough time. But the final decision and signing should be here.

Kissinger: I agree with the Foreign Minister that perhaps we should pick some issues, perhaps one or two -- I don't want to take the time of the General Secretary on this -- on which the delegations should write the text, but then, the President and the General Secretary can settle them here.

Gromyko: Deliberately you mean?

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: But to have reached confidential agreement beforehand?

Kissinger: Confidentially.

Brezhnev: So there will be a special signing ceremony in the Kremlin.

Kissinger: We will have a SALT agreement, there is no question.

Brezhnev: I think so too.

Kissinger: I will let your Ambassador know by the end of the coming week when we can proceed in Helsinki, but it will be very soon.

Brezhnev: Good, because there is not so much time left.

Kissinger: Let them talk about radars this week. They have a lot to talk about.

Brezhnev: Yes. That's my view. I don't think they're in any hurry. They don't have much to talk about, but let them talk. Let them talk about the nature of the universe. The Delegations should be locked in a room for the final 3 days without food and told they must get an agreement or not get food for another 3 days.
Kissinger: We've reached the point where despite all the efforts of our delegations we will still reach an agreement.

Brezhnev: No matter how hard they try! That's our success.

Kissinger: Our delegation is so complex we don't understand them anymore.

Brezhnev: You want an example of how to make something very complex? I can pose one or two questions that neither you nor the President can solve for months. So we can consider this closed.

European Security

Brezhnev: I would like to say a few words on another important question, that is, the problem of Europe. I won't go over old ground on the importance of this issue not only for the Soviet Union, the FRG, the GDR, and France, but for all European nations generally, and I would say for world affairs and from the standpoint of our joint desire to direct matters toward a general detente in the world. As I see it, both your efforts and ours are directed at that goal.

I would like to ask you to tell President Nixon that we value highly the President's position on this matter, the support he is giving to ratification of the treaties and the agreement on Berlin. I would like you to bear in mind this is not [just] a compliment to the President, this is the truth. At the same time, I don't want to be too reticent or shy in speaking my mind on other aspects. I want to express the wish that at this decisive stage for Chancellor Brandt and the FRG the President should say a still more weighty word in favor of ratification. This would have a considerable significance and would be much appreciated in the Soviet Union and throughout the world. I would like to ask you Dr. Kissinger to draw President Nixon's attention to this.

Kissinger: You can be sure I will.

Brezhnev: President Nixon does have an unlimited capacity in this respect. It would be a very important step toward very successful negotiations.

Kissinger: In what respect "unlimited?"

Brezhnev: If I were elected President, I would show you. It would be good if I were elected President, but I don't seek the nomination!
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Kissinger: With respect to influencing the Germans?

Brezhnev: The President has unlimited capacity with respect to ratification. We do highly appreciate his position. The point I make is that we would appreciate any further efforts he could make in favor of it. Intuition is sometimes a good guide, and I have the impression President Nixon will respond favorably.

Kissinger: As you know, there are elections tomorrow in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. If these go badly, that is, if the Free Democrats get wiped out or get reduced substantially, or if the Social Democrats don't do well, then I don't think anything we do can make any difference. I think the Brandt Government will fall. I give you my honest judgment.

Brezhnev: Would that be to our advantage for the Brandt Government to fall?

Kissinger: No, we don't want this, but I state it as an objective fact.

Brezhnev: The U.S. President still has 24 hours to act. I know you sometimes put out surprise press conferences. Well, the President knows better how to do it.

Kissinger: No, we cannot influence a State election in Germany. It is too difficult. I don't think it will happen, but I wanted to say it would be difficult.

Brezhnev: You are a difficult man to come to terms with. We came to agreement immediately before, and we have already notified Semenov immediately.

Kissinger: But can you influence elections for us?

Brezhnev: Isn't all this understanding we have reached in favor of that? On SALT, ABM, European issues, long-term credits, the whole radical improvement in the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations?

[The Russians conferred among themselves briefly, at which Dr. Kissinger remarked: Everytime I say something, there is a brawl on the Russian side.]

Brezhnev: Because, afterall, the President is a politician, not a merchant. Politics covers all questions. The important thing is for us to reach agreement.

Kissinger: Realistically, what I would like to do is to claim credit when the elections go well tomorrow and then ask you for concessions.

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Brezhnev: What concessions?

Kissinger: I'll think of one.

Brezhnev: I'll be prepared to give you credit if it goes well, but if things go badly, I'll say it was your fault.

Kissinger: You must have read in the Ambassador's cables that I am vain.

Brezhnev: I have never read that.

Dobrynin: I have told them you are modest.

Kissinger: I will have revolution on my hands. Realistically, it is too late to do anything. If the elections go as expected without radical change in Bonn, we will see what can be done.

Brezhnev: What is your general forecast?

Kissinger: My forecast is that tomorrow's election will not affect the parliamentary situation in Bonn. Perhaps some minor parliamentary changes, but it will not affect the situation. Confidentially, we have attempted to be helpful. We invited Bahr to Washington and let it be known, and we have not received anyone from the Opposition. This is a fairly clear signal in Germany. We have not seen Barzel since the ratification debate started. He wanted to come in April and we did not receive him.

Brezhnev: I know you received Bahr.

Kissinger: And when Barzel came in January, your Ambassador in Bonn can confirm we did not encourage him.

I want to be honest with you. I had arranged with Bahr to send a memo that perhaps he could use confidentially in early April. But this became impossible because of the Vietnam situation. Our domestic situation became more complicated. We will review what can be done between now and May 4.

Brezhnev: This is a very important component of the general package of problems we will be having discussions on and hoping to resolve. We feel that on all the issues, agreements should be reached that will be worthy of our two countries.
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have invested so much in the Berlin agreement that we are in favor of ratification of these agreements. In light of these discussions, we will see what additional steps we can take to assist ratification.

Brezhnev: We know that, and that is why we said we value President Nixon's position regarding European matters very highly. I have said so publicly, too, in our Central Committee. My feeling is that European problems will be discussed in a favorable spirit.

Kissinger: We expect it too.

Brezhnev: We feel sure that when President Nixon hears what we have to say he will see that we are not trying to inject any "underwater rocks" in our European policy. We are not self-centered.

Kissinger: Will you be introducing new European matters at the Summit?

Brezhnev: We would like perhaps to have something to say on the European Conference. The general position and attitude of the U.S. Administration is known to us, that is to say, agreement in principle. What is needed is just a few specifics. By that time we may have ready in written form how to conclude a European Conference, that is to say the basic principles for a European Conference. Possibly even before the May meeting, we could agree on or discuss certain additional points bilaterally.

Kissinger: You will find it easier to discuss with President if there have been prior exchanges, so he's not confronted with entirely new matters when he gets here.

Brezhnev: We will follow the channel.

Kissinger: May I raise in this connection the problem of mutual force reductions? In your considerations regarding the European Security Conference, has your thinking reached the point where you would be willing to have parallel discussions on force reductions?

Brezhnev: Just to return to European affairs generally, there will be discussed the ratification of the treaties, the Berlin agreement, agreement on principles of convening a conference, and the relation of the GDR to the FRG. Then on a purely confidential basis we would certainly like to know the answers to such
questions as when the U.S. would support the admission of both Germanies to the U.N.

With respect to force reductions, that question is one that we do not intend to withdraw from the agenda, but perhaps it is one that should not be linked too closely to the Summit so as not to impede matters of top priority. But at some stage we would be ready in the future to discuss it on a confidential basis bilaterally. Of course, the general portent of our proposals on this score is to have the least possible number of troops in Europe, reducing to a minimum the risk of war in Europe. At some stage, we will certainly start to talk to you on this. Even if at first there is only a very slight reduction, the mere fact of a reduction will have a tremendous significance. It will be a token of our desire for a reduction of tensions and a token of goodwill and spirit of confidence. No one is implying that we will have 3 million and you will have 600. There can be no unacceptable proposals made in this field. Mutually acceptable principles will have to be found. There can be no unilateral advantage.

**Kissinger:** How about if side by side with preparations for a European Security Conference we begin discussions on reductions, directed at basic principles?

**Brezhnev:** In general, that would be a very good thing. But what we both have to bear in mind is that the merging of these 2 issues would divert attention from the main issues. Because it is to be foreseen that with respect to a European Security Conference hundreds of questions will come up. Luxemburg, Switzerland, Denmark can all raise questions.

**Kissinger:** You like chaos.

**Brezhnev:** On the contrary. So let's get this question out of the way first.

**Kissinger:** We do not think force reductions should be discussed at a European Security Conference, because a European Security Conference is a much larger forum. We think a force reduction should be discussed in a parallel body among the countries whose forces would be reduced.

**Brezhnev:** Mr. Kissinger, of course it is certainly possible that the Conference itself could say something favorable on approaching it. Perhaps the Conference could set up a special body or another organization with the necessary diplomats and military personnel -- naturally with the participation of countries concerned. On this question, we could use our bilateral channel to conduct quiet and steady discussions on this. But at the forthcoming meeting, we should register our general attitude and desire to advance to a European Security Conference.
Kissinger: Assuming that ratification goes through, which we expect, we are prepared to do this. But our attitude is that side by side, we would have discussions on this subject in a separate forum.

Brezhnev: We are certainly in agreement to start in the confidential channel. As soon as we feel we have come to a common approach, we can then involve more openly the others who are concerned. Because of course attitudes and positions of states in this are different. Brandt at the Crimea asked me, should we also discuss Luxembourg and its 94 policemen? Should this be covered?

Kissinger: That is consistent with his practice of always getting to the fundamentals of an issue.

Brezhnev: But as on the subject of the admission of the 2 German states to the U.N., you know when we signed the treaty with the FRG, there was a clause in the statement on efforts of the sides to secure the admission of the 2 Germanies. Since at the Summit we will be discussing important issues, it would not be understood by the public in the USSR or the GDR or also in the U.S. if nothing was said on that subject.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister knows the sequence. It is possible that the treaties won't be ratified by the Summit. They may pass on May 4 and then be rejected by the Bundesrat, then go back to parliament for a full majority in June.

If this is the sequence, then a successful Summit would be a guarantee of ratification. It would be impossible that a German Parliament could reject them after a successful U.S. and Soviet meeting. Secondly as regards the GDR, I don't want to raise the wrong expectations as regards what we can say at the meeting. I don't think we can go much beyond the Berlin Agreement. With respect to admission of the 2 Germanies to the U.N., we frankly have not yet taken a position. My informal view is that we will back whatever Chancellor Brandt wants to do. If he proposes it, we will be prepared to support these steps.

Brezhnev: Brandt did register in a document his readiness to support entry.

Kissinger: We will check with Brandt before the Summit. We will not be an obstacle. If he is willing, we have no American interest to oppose it.

Brezhnev: Good.
Bilateral Relations

Brezhnev: Yesterday after a meeting devoted to the memory of Lenin I briefly informed my colleagues of my meeting with you. Naturally I touched on the main points and general questions which came up, and the questions you are prepared to settle at the Summit: Europe, bilateral relations, (for example, MFN, credits, broad commercial cooperation, increased cultural ties, environmental, etc.) and I could see that generally my colleagues were favorably disposed. Of course, there is a lot to be specified here, with respect to MFN, the scale of credits, etc. As we see it, the specifics could be gone into through the channel, and then discussed finally at the Summit. As we understand it, broad prospects are opening up in the field of commerce. You commercial circles are interested in it, for example, in Soviet natural gas. This could be done by a long-term contract, e.g. for 20-25 years. This could be good for both sides. I won't go into details, but perhaps at our next meeting you could agree on the broad outlines. I welcome at the next meeting your readiness to give your general views and your readiness to go into these matters.

Vietnam

I must add, in all frankness, that when I informed my colleagues, they did all voice concern over our discussion of Vietnam. That is only too natural, and you should correctly understand. But we did come to an understanding today that we would discuss it again after you think things over.

Kissinger: After we both think things over.

Brezhnev: Certainly there is never any harm in thinking things over. It can get tiring sometimes, but I'm a man who is always thinking things over. Perhaps it is dictated by the post I hold. Like all of us, I get such a torrent of information every day, on problems both international and domestic, that are difficult to manage. With a planned economy, 15 Republics and autonomous regions, all of this has to be plugged into my computer [points to his head]. So by 1:00 a.m. when I get to sleep I still dream of these problems. Some are difficult; others aren't but are interesting. It's a question of logic again. One tries to bring them to some kind of useful resolution. Without being personal, just abstract, we Russians have different kinds of logic. One kind is horses'
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logic. It is difficult to face the prospect of that. We have a Proverb: A teacher asked a student a difficult question. The student did not know, and he said, "Let the horse answer it, he has a big head." That is an old story.

Gromyko: Horses should be put to the task of conducting foreign policy. I wonder what would happen then?

Brezhnev: The back page of our newspaper Literaturnaya Gazeta is called "Horns and Hoofs." It is devoted to jokes. My jokes of course are just meant to be a "luring," or a little respite from the seriousness of our discussions. There can be curious results from translations of jokes.

I have another story. This one is fact. Two years ago, we were appointing an able man to be Ambassador to a certain country. He was well known, positively, in the host country. Fortunately, its leader was on good terms with me, and could speak freely. He told me, "He's a fine man, - but his name translated into our language sounds very rude and rather indecent. It would be okay in a male society but not in our country."

I hope my jokes aren't misunderstood. It is not consistent with my character. I know Americans like humor. If I see a glum look on President Nixon's face, I will tell him a couple of stories to cheer him up.

Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister looks a bit like the President.

Gromyko: The President said that to me himself. But I don't know whether he looks like me or I look like him. Next time in Washington I will pick a dark night and try to walk into the White House.

Kissinger: I will take you to dinner and we will go in together.

Brezhnev: If President Nixon will be like Gromyko, I am horror-stricken. It is impossible to talk to Gromyko. It will mean a lot of grief. The word "grief" reminds me of a joke. A foreign visitor to the Soviet Union wanted to buy flour for baking. But the word "flour" in Russian [muka] is the same as the word "grief" [muka], except that the stress is different. So after looking up the word quickly in a dictionary, she went into a shop and asked for two pounds of grief!

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It has been a good say. Useful. Of course, the Vietnam issue is still there. It is complex, but we have agreed to think things over and return to it. You are now armed with sufficient material to report to President Nixon.

I have one request and wish: I would like to say something privately to you and directly for the President when we take a walk. That is the end for today. We will resume Monday morning. Time is an important factor in these matters. As for tomorrow, certain urgent matters have just come up -- not related to these discussions. I think it is possible for you to stay until Monday. Perhaps you can meet tomorrow with Gromyko, at 10:00 a.m.

Kissinger: I will do my best. The President is getting restless in my absence and has expressed the hope that I will return tomorrow. I will suggest to him that we have unfinished business, but I think we will be able to do it.

Brezhnev: Okay.

Kissinger: I must in all events leave by 6:00 p.m. Monday.

Brezhnev: Okay.

Announcement of Visit

Kissinger: I have another point to raise, and it would be useful to communicate your view to Washington. I believe that after my return we should make a brief public announcement that I have been here. Otherwise it could leak out. If it leaks, it would look very mysterious. Hanoi already knows, probably, but would be confused. We could work out the text tomorrow with your Foreign Minister.

Brezhnev: I give my consent in advance, although I have not discussed it with my colleagues and they understand this as a confidential visit.

Kissinger: It will remain confidential while I am here.

Brezhnev: I will discuss it with my colleagues, but I will not stand in the way.

I have another story, not related to anything. A man was seen carrying two TV sets over his shoulder, and he was asked why he needed two. He said, one is for myself. As for the other, my mother-in-law told me she would give her life for a TV set!
[The meeting then broke up, at 4:05 p.m. General Secretary Brezhnev took Dr. Kissinger aside for a private conversation, standing, in a corner of the same room.]
We have thoroughly considered the state of affairs at the strategic arms limitations talks taking into account the considerations expressed by the US side through the confidential channel, relating to the freeze on ballistic-missile carrying submarines.

In this connection we believe it appropriate to state the following:

1. The question of the freeze on the number of modern ballistic-missile carrying submarines and the total number of launchers thereon is of very significant importance.

Ballistic-missile carrying submarines occupy a special place in the composition of strategic offensive weapons and their consideration should not overlook differences in the geographies of the sides, the ballistic-missile carrying submarines at the disposal of the US NATO allies and the US forward submarine bases.

As is known, that offers important strategic advantages to the American side, and under these conditions the number of submarines and ballistic missiles thereon at the disposal of the sides cannot be the same.

2. In order to bring about relaxation of international tensions, normalization of relations between our two countries and cessation of the strategic arms race we agree to consider the question of including ballistic-missile carrying submarines in the suggested freeze agreement provided, naturally, that there should be established for the sides appropriate limits
for such systems taking into account the considerations set forth above.

The Soviet Union would agree that the US and their NATO allies should have, for the period of the freeze agreement, up to 50 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of up to 800, including 41 submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers thereon at the disposal of the United States. Over that period the Soviet Union could have 62 modern submarines with the total number of ballistic missile launchers thereon of no more than 950.

It is implied that over that period the sides will reduce the number of land-based ICBMs through dismantling older launchers. The sides would also be entitled to modernize and replace older submarines by new submarines but without increasing in the process the above-mentioned number of modern submarines and ballistic missile launchers thereon.

However, since the above proposal would only be a partial compensation for the strategic disbalance in the location of missile carrying nuclear submarines of the sides, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the whole of this problem - and primarily the issue of dismantling US missile submarine bases outside the territory of the United States, should be appropriately resolved in the course of subsequent negotiations.

If over the period of the Interim agreement the US NATO allies increase the number of ballistic-missile carrying submarines to the excess of those operational or under construction, the Soviet Union reserves the right to the corresponding increase in such submarines.
3. Taking into account the proposals of the US side the Soviet Union could agree to include in the suggested freeze agreement the obligation not to start, in addition to ICBM silo launchers, new construction of fixed soft land-based ICBM launchers as well.

4. Moscow believes it possible to have the period of the Interim freeze agreement - 5 years.

5. Given understanding in principle on such an approach we would be prepared to give necessary instructions to the Soviet delegation in Helsinki to discuss practical matters related to the final elaboration of the corresponding articles of the Interim agreement on certain measures with respect to strategic offensive armaments having in mind that this Agreement together with the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems would be signed during the forthcoming meeting in Moscow.
It is recognized as expedient to limit ABM systems in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to covering the capitals and to one area each for the location of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

The location of ABM facilities for the covering of the capitals would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center would be within the limits of the capital. The location of ABM facilities for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers would be limited to an area in the form of a circle with a radius of 150 km whose center for the United States would be in the area of location of ICBM launchers where the deployment of ABM facilities is most advanced.

The quantity of ABMs and their launchers for each side should not exceed 100 units for covering the capitals and 100 units for covering land-based ICBM silo launchers.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Saturday, April 22, 1972, 4:05-4:45 p.m.
Guest House, Vorobyevski Road, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Summit Preparations; Vietnam, China; Economic Relations

[After the formal meeting broke up, General Secretary Brezhnev took Dr. Kissinger aside for a private conversation. They stood by the window in the same room where the formal meeting had taken place.]

Summit Preparations

Brezhnev: I want you to tell the President of our serious intention. He can count on an unlimited number of personal conversations with me, at any time. The program we have is a very good one. I have several additional pleasant suggestions, for example, a visit to the Ostankino TV tower. There will be the least possible attention to protocol. We could put aside all second-rank and petty matters.

Everything will have been prepared, so that we do not burden ourselves with all the arguments. Of course, it will be impossible to pass over certain questions in silence. But we will be able to deal with them in a tranquil way. There should be nothing unexpected.
In the future, there should be further steps to reduce arms and reduce tensions and improve relations. In fact, it will be envisaged in the SALT agreement itself. In this connection, your bases with your air force will have to come up.

Kissinger: This was always foreseen.

Brezhnev: There are some enterprises we want to show President Nixon that are not far from Moscow. Your advance group has not given a definite answer; they fear overburdening the President. This is a restricted enterprise, which is the most modern we have.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, if there is something you are particularly interested in and recommend, tell your Ambassador about it.

Brezhnev: This is a new satellite town we have recently built. We want with an open heart to show him the best we have.

Kissinger: I will take care of it. Our advance people are rather complicated.

Brezhnev: Our people have been instructed not to object to any reasonable request. We will generate an appropriate atmosphere for the correspondents. The program for Mrs. Nixon will also be suitable. There will be a visit to a chocolate factory — there will be women workers there; chocolate seems to be a female weakness. Also the Palace of the Pioneers, the Osipov Ensemble, and "Swan Lake."

[The General Secretary then handed Dr. Kissinger the attached note on the Middle East.]

Kissinger: Do you want to discuss that subject [the Middle East] tomorrow?

Brezhnev: Monday is better.

Are your communications all right?

Kissinger: They broke down last night for a while. The President nearly had a heart attack.
Vietnam

Kissinger: I have to tell you frankly, Mr. General Secretary, that we will have a difficult four weeks coming up. The President genuinely believes that the dignity of America and the dignity of his office is involved.

Brezhnev: Every question has two sides, like a medallion. One side of a medallion has an image of a soldier or a general, etc., but if you look at the other side sometimes there is something like "rest in peace."

Kissinger: When you and the President meet, I know the spirit in which I had the privilege of seeing you work and speak.

Brezhnev: There are times in negotiation when I feel compelled to raise acute matters. But in these forthcoming meetings there will be no such talk. We have now to overcome the forces in the world which are doing their level best to prevent our meeting. There is opposition in America. The way I see it, they are preparing to do battle. I don't know in what terms they can become your allies.

Kissinger: Let me give you my honest judgment, unofficially. If it had not been for the North Vietnamese offensive, the President could have mobilized the center and the moderate left, and he would have been certain to be reelected this way.

Brezhnev: I have said many things on this offensive. So I do not want to repeat myself. It has to be borne in mind that the next 3-4 weeks should generate a background conducive to the Summit. You still have time to generate this favorable background. We are doing what we can.

Kissinger: If the North Vietnamese do not stop this offensive, I can foresee only bad consequences.

Brezhnev: If you really do, there will be serious consequences. But the American bombers and the proposals you make are not in my hands. I did make the reservation at the outset that I am in no position to negotiate for the North Vietnamese. But I made a few suggestions which in my personal view could be useful, in order to help. If ever the Vietnamese found out that I was making these suggestions to you that could only worsen matters for you.
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Kissinger: You can be sure we will not disclose it.

China

Brezhnev: I do not know how and in what way the Chinese could find out, but they would put a definite interpretation on all this. There is a lot I do not know about the Chinese philosophy, just as the President does not.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: I realize there are certain reasons and motives behind the President's visit to China, but I am certain he does not have the full picture.

Kissinger: One related point. There have been rumors spread by Soviet personnel that there were discussions between us and the Chinese on military matters. I don't care about your propaganda, but I want to assure you that there were no military discussions.

Brezhnev: There was only the one occasion when the Ambassador on instructions dead reports received from Chinese sources.

Kissinger: Governmental sources?

Brezhnev: We don't want to be more specific.

Kissinger: It is a provocation anyway.

Brezhnev: It was related to that speech of the President's in Peking, when he made the remark that the U.S. and China were holding the fate of the world in their hands. This remark circled the world. It gave us concern.

Kissinger: Let me give you our view. The People's Republic of China is very important in the Asian area, and in 10-15 years it will perhaps have a role in other regions. Peace in the world now depends on relations between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. We can settle things concretely; with others we can settle only theoretically.

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Brezhnev: The Chinese general tendency for world hegemony is an obsession with them. It is something they will not give up. It is important not to encourage it, but to localize it.

Once they made an enormous effort to gain hegemony in the world Communist movement. I can give you an example. A Soviet diplomat was in Algeria on business, and he happened to visit an outlying district where there were oil refineries and a workers' settlement. Many tourists and delegations go there. Right there, in the middle of the desert, was a Chinese restaurant! The diplomat was interested in this. Anyone who came into the restaurant for a meal left with a bundle of free Chinese propaganda. This was the period when they tried to split the world Communist movement. They would throw bundles of Chinese literature at the Peking-Moscow train. Well, when they lost in their attempt at hegemony over the movement and lost their foothold, they closed up this restaurant in Algeria.

This presents a very big question: What tendencies does one want to encourage? Although, as we have said, we believe it quite natural for two countries to improve relations, provided that it is not done in a way that is harmful to third countries. Short-run considerations do not always yield benefits in the long run. Do you understand me?

Kissinger: Yes I do.

Brezhnev: I am just philosophizing. It may help us both to delve deeper into this matter.

Kissinger: We have no interest in encouraging anti-Soviet policies on the part of the PRC.

Brezhnev: There is enough of that already without you. If I am shot 150 times and buried with a cross on my grave, what more can you do? I have resigned myself to my Chinese death, though not to my natural death.

Kissinger: You seem very much alive to me.

Brezhnev: My wife asked me at breakfast yesterday how I feel. About 40-45 years old, I said. Have you been feeling this way for long? she asked. For the last 5 years, I said. She understood my answer!

We have had fruitful talks, you and I. If we left it to Gromyko and Rogers, they would be talking for two months.
[The General Secretary and Dr. Kissinger then walked out of the meeting room together. Outside the door, before going down the few steps toward the lobby, the conversation resumed.]

**Economic Relations**

**Brezhnev:** Monday we will want to discuss trade, credits, exchanges, and so forth. There is a Presidential decision involved.

**Kissinger:** There are two different things. One involves a Presidential decision; the other involves a Congressional decision.

**Brezhnev:** But you yourselves write the laws. It is for you to change them. It is to the U.S.'s advantage to extend us credits. Certainly something can be done. We have vast resources of gas. There will be a crisis in that respect in the U.S. in a few years' time. We could have said to ourselves, to hell with them, let the Americans have a crisis. But instead we say, let us build a pipeline and let you have millions of barrels of gas.

That is the purport of our policy.

**Kissinger:** Mr. General Secretary, in principle we are prepared. We have concrete schemes. Your Minister is coming on May 7. I have instructed Secretary Peterson -- who is a very intelligent man -- to deal with him with a constructive approach.

**Brezhnev:** We once had an arrangement with the Japanese. We could revitalize that.

**Kissinger:** Our conception is that if our relations go during the Summit the way we hope, then during the Summit we can work out a complete project and make it concrete in the summer.

**Brezhnev:** As I see it as a politician, if business circles in the U.S. see government support for this they will support the President in the campaign.

**Kissinger:** It may be tactless for me to say this on Lenin's birthday, but frankly Lenin was wrong in one respect -- when he said businessmen understand their political interests. Most businessmen I know are political idiots!
Brezhnev: I have no comment on that! You know the best!

[There were some closing pleasantries and handshakes all around, and Dr. Kissinger departed.]
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to USA
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, Special Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE & TIME: Sunday, April 23, 1972, 10:15 a.m. - 1:12 p.m.

PLACE: Guest House, Vorobyevski Road, Moscow

SUBJECTS: Basic Principles; Middle East; Economic Relations; Announcement of Kissinger Visit

Basic Principles:

Dr. Kissinger: Our associates are going to work on the Principles. I would be interested in whether the Foreign Minister has any comments on our paper.

Gromyko: Yesterday evening I looked through them. My first impression is that it is all right. But it was not yet translated. Therefore today I will read it more thoroughly and then report to Mr. Brezhnev.

Dr. Kissinger: It accepts 95% of your formulations and adds one or two points.

Gromyko: Maybe very small ones.

Dr. Kissinger: I will wait for your suggestions. If you find it generally acceptable, we can work it out.

Gromyko: Maybe strengthen it. If it is OK, stand up and cry "Eureka!"

Dr. Kissinger: As far as we are concerned, we're prepared to leave with it agreed.

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Middle East

Gromyko: Did you have a chance to read our note on Middle East [Tab A]

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: I just wanted to say in addition that we are proceeding from the assumption that this is a continuation of that scheme we discussed when I visited Washington and talked with the President and you. It is a continuation of that exchange of opinions. You will recall that we then discussed several aspects of the situation and several provisions, including the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel and withdrawal of Israeli forces. It goes without saying that what we said then remains in force.

Dr. Kissinger: Your Ambassador and I have had several discussions on the Middle East. As I have told him, the Middle East negotiations have taken a weird direction. There has always been a frenzy of activity, and great excitement, and nothing ever happened. Therefore I have discussed it with your Ambassador not just to produce a paper but to get something done. This paper is just what the Ambassador has said to me.

To be honest, Joe Sisco may have been authorized, but there was no chance of anything happening. So I have had to inject realism into our discussion.

We cannot go to war with Israel. We cannot put someone else in the position to go to war with Israel and defeat it. Therefore we want to come to some understanding with you on measures we can persuade Israel to accept without war. Some pressures, financial and otherwise, we can exert without putting Israel in the position where it feels it has to go to war.

After our discussions, I told you I would see if there was any chance of coming up with a realistic conclusion, which I did. Then I told the Ambassador that I was prepared to start discussions. It had to be a practical, not a theoretical exercise.

Also, I have been talking to the Israelis, in more general terms: that this would be a topic of the Summit, that it was impossible to keep it off the Summit agenda, and I had to learn their views. In fact their Ambassador has a map for me, which I have not looked at because I did not want them to think I brought it here. It won't be acceptable.

Also, I have had enough discussion with the Israelis to know that this [the Soviet note] will not be do-able without war. I have tried to tell Anatol what
I thought was do-able even with a great domestic crisis in Israel and great pressure from our side. We have to find a formula . . .

It makes no difference to the U.S. whether they have one more or less airfield, nor to you.

This is the problem as I see it, Mr. Foreign Minister. It may turn out to be an insoluble problem. Within that framework, we are prepared to have discussions.

Gromyko: I should like to hear your views or comments on the major question which we feel predetermines all the rest, that is, the withdrawal of Israeli forces. You say you speak in terms of finding a realistic way of resolving the matter. I would like to know what you actually mean. We formed the impression last year that our views were a general basis for discussion, though not specific. You referred to certain difficulties in doing business with Israel. That is a subject we can talk about without reaching a conclusion. Our feeling is, it is doubtful that the U.S. could not bring effective pressure on Israel. I would like to hear some more concrete considerations, so I can report back to Comrade Brezhnev before he meets with you tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not mean to imply that the Arabs were an unmixed joy.

Gromyko: I have two additional comments. First, we are not too clear in our minds on your views on the following question. We have felt all along -- and were clear last year in Washington -- we are interested in reaching a complex solution, that is, withdrawal from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, in a complex. But one of your last conversations with our Ambassador [Dobrynin interjects: Third from the last] related only to Egypt; Jordan was touched upon, but not in a concrete way, and Syria was not touched upon at all. In our thinking, only a complex or package solution can help solve the problem.

My second comment is: You have already discussed with Comrade Brezhnev some questions with respect to a radical improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations. Let us assume the forthcoming meetings will open up great possibilities. What happens if the Middle East problem is still unresolved? Can we allow the situation in the Middle East to keep on shaking and enfevering relations between the Soviet Union and the United States?

In our view, it would serve the interests of both our countries to secure a lasting solution to this problem. Because while now the situation seems more favorable to reaching a solution, it is hard to predict what will happen tomorrow.
Dr. Kissinger: First, simply to clear my own mind, my impression is that this document contains nothing different from what Anatol has discussed with Sisco.

Dobrynin: Plus the addition that you and Gromyko discussed last year.

Dr. Kissinger: But they are not in the document.

Gromyko: Right. We can confirm it in written form if you wish.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't need that. We are serious people. The proposition you brought to Washington is one we are interested in, and it reflects a serious effort on your past. We recognize you have made an attempt to find a solution.

There may be a slight misunderstanding. My impression was that while an ultimate global solution is what you wanted, you were prepared in the immediate discussions to confine the discussions to Egypt. We agree that an ultimate solution must be global.

Gromyko: Global in Mideast terms? Complex.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: We can certainly discuss the question by phases, let's say, first take up for discussion the Egyptian angle, then the Syrian angle, then the Jordanian, but always having in mind that the general ultimate solution must be global.

Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that you won't withdraw all your troops until all the problems have been solved, or on the basis of an Egyptian solution?

Gromyko: We see the ultimate agreement as a global one.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but in practice, does that mean that you won't withdraw until all three agreements have been signed? Or [will you withdraw] when the Egyptian one is signed, while maintaining the principle that the others have to be agreed?

Gromyko: We believe that the solution as such should be a global one. Not necessarily one piece of paper, but the agreement in principle, the solution, should be complex. Withdrawal is one integral part of this single complex solution. We know the feelings of the Arabs, and we feel it is the most realistic way.
I want to add one thing. We do not exclude the possibility that a certain part of the agreement may be carried out, fulfilled, before the elections. Maybe it can even be made public. We talked about this.

Dr. Kissinger: The interim part, the Suez Canal settlement.

Gromyko: You may call it "interim." That is a popular word, part of Sisco's lexicon. But this part will be an integral part of the general, and our governments will proceed on that basis.

Dr. Kissinger: I was under the impression that you maintained the principle of a general solution but were principally interested in settling the Egyptian part as the first step, and that Syria was not interested but the Jordanian part would follow.

Gromyko: "Settle" is not the word. Maybe it would not be carried out yet, but settlement includes agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: There are ways to approach it: A Canal settlement, an Egyptian settlement, and a general settlement.

Gromyko: The settlement is general, global. Then the question arises, how to fulfill it, carry it out, in life. Here we could build a scheme that a certain part could be carried out as a first stage.

Dr. Kissinger: The Canal settlement.

Gromyko: Maybe the Canal settlement. Maybe publicly.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a genuine misunderstanding. I understood you were prepared to have a settlement on the Suez Canal if it was linked organically to a settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli problem. I also thought the withdrawal of Soviet forces was related to that part. I didn't know you wanted a settlement concurrently with Jordan and Syria.

As I told your Ambassador, I have started preliminary talks with Hussein so that I do not get it all third hand. I did not do this to see where we could go, but to see whether Jordan could be settled first, or concurrently, or after. I wanted to consult with you to see how you would want to proceed. So in principle, Jordan is something we are thinking about. But Syria involves extraordinary difficulties.
The more comprehensive the agreement, the more difficult it will be to get the Israelis to go along with it. Therefore, I am afraid if Syria is brought in, it will be the same as the process we've seen. Purely theoretical. Any one of the volatile Arab states could destroy what we have agreed to.

Gromyko: I do not think you objected in Washington to what we called a complex settlement. We must be specific and precise in our propositions. We did not say a settlement could be reached with Egypt alone, leaving Syria and Jordan suspeded, hanging in the air. All along we have been speaking in terms of a complex problem. But like any complex, it does contain component parts; they need not be carried out in a single time. They could be carried out in stages. We could take up and solve the Canal problem first. But if we were to attempt the entire Egyptian angle first while leaving aside Syria and Jordan, that would not be a viable approach.

Then again, if in discussions of this problem we do assume it is possible first to discuss matters relating to Egypt prior to signing an eventual agreement, of course it would be better to move forward on a broader front. But we are certainly aware of the difficulties the parties have even in sitting at one table. So discussions could proceed separately, having in mind an ultimate complex settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: There was a genuine misunderstanding on my part in September. I thought you were interested in an Egyptian settlement alone. Your Ambassador can confirm, I only talked with him on Egypt. I informed him of the Jordan part only out of openness, but we never exchanged ideas on Jordan, and Syria was never discussed at all.

Gromyko: But with both you and the President, I was concerned only with a complex settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: I had the impression that you maintained the principle of a complex solution but were prepared to settle Egypt first. In all my discussions with Anatol, we discussed Egypt alone. There was a misunderstanding about the degree of linkage and the relation of Soviet withdrawal to the rest.

Gromyko: Then do you see a link between Egypt and the others, or do you wish to separate them?

Dr. Kissinger: I recognize linkage in theory. But the important practical question is to get Israel to withdraw without a war. My belief is that once a settlement is reached between Egypt and Israel, a Jordanian settlement, at least, will follow easily. I don't understand the Syrians.
Let me be concrete. On a Jordanian settlement, I frankly think that what you have here [in the note] is behind events, in the sense that an Israeli-Jordanian settlement can be brought about (with some pressure, e.g., on Jerusalem). And to make it too overt a U.S.-Soviet arrangement would slow it down. Maybe it could even be done without an Egyptian-Israeli settlement. I thought maybe we could use certain principles of the Jordan-Israeli settlement to facilitate the Egypt-Israel one. On Syria, I have no judgment. They don't want to make peace, and Israel will never give up the Golan Heights.

Gromyko: I think it is very bad that you haven't given thought to this [Syrian] part of a settlement. As we see the position of the Arabs, it would be impossible to seek a settlement leaving aside an entire country. I am sure you're well familiar with the Arab position. You said we were behind events with respect to Jordan. But last year, we did not exclude the possibility that the Jordanian King, for instance, might agree with Israel to have certain corrections in his boundary with Israel. This would be free to do, provided it didn't look like a prize for Israel for war.

You mentioned the linkage of an Egyptian settlement with the general settlement. But how do you envisage it? We say we're in favor of linkage, and you say you are. May be we are talking of one and the same thing, maybe about different things.

Dr. Kissinger: I can see the same relation between the Egyptian and Syrian settlements as between the Canal settlement and the Egyptian settlement, that is, as steps toward a global solution. You would have a general formula in the Egyptian settlement that the solution is part of a more general approach. But I do not believe it is practical to negotiate all the details simultaneously, and I believe it will be more difficult to impose it on the Israelis depending of course on what the settlement is.

Gromyko: You said negotiations. We certainly allow of the possibility that negotiations could be carried out by stages, and first there could be negotiations relating only to Egypt. But what if agreement has been reached (but not put into force) with Egypt, but Syria has not yet been discussed? Is Syria then completely lost from view? Do you presume that an Egyptian-Israeli agreement in principle should then be signed? Or do you believe, as we do, that there could be these negotiations with Egypt, and there could be prepared an agreement between Egypt and Israel, which could be discussed with the responsible leaders, but then -- before it is signed or implemented -- we should pass over to the next stage, i.e. Syria? As regards Jordan,

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perhaps a Jordan-Israel agreement could be negotiated or at least con-
considered at the same time. And no one has conclusively proved that Syria
could be discussed simultaneously. But as for their embodiment and
implementation, we feel that the parts should be considered only as parts
of a whole.

Dr. Kissinger: It is an interesting philosophical problem. You're saying,
for example, first discuss an Egyptian settlement, then reach agreement,
then talk to the leaders. But before it is carried out -- your withdrawal
and Israeli withdrawal -- we then have to discuss Syria.

Gromyko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It is going to be a long effort. There are two catches to it
-- one favorable to you (you don't have to withdraw your troops) and one
favorable to Israel (they do not have to do anything until they do everything).
Since it is so hard to get them to do anything, this looks hard. We think
Egypt and Jordan could be done. Then the pressures would perhaps be
unavoidable for Syria to settle, too. It would be in your interest, I would
think, to do it in stages.

We recognize in principle the need to include Syria. You overestimate what
we can do with Israel. We can't do everything.

Gromyko: Let us differentiate between the negotiations for a settlement,
and the settlement itself. As I said, the negotiations could be done in
phases. But as for the eventual settlement itself, that we see only as a
complex one and we believe any other approach would be most unrealistic.
If Israel exploits that approach to frustrate a settlement, that only shows
that Israel will use either a complex or a phased one to frustrate settle-
ment. That raises a grave risk that neither of us would want to subject
our relationship to.

Dr. Kissinger: What is your view of the timing of how to bring this to a
conclusion?

Gromyko: It depends on what you mean -- achievement of a general all-
embracing settlement, or a time limit for implementation of an agreement.
If the former, the sooner the better. We would feel it best of all to discuss
it before the Summit, so during the Summit we could reach a formalized
understanding on all the issues and how they are to be resolved. And we could
also reach an understanding on when it is to be discussed and agreed with the
leaders in the countries concerned. The problem there is less on our side
than on yours; you said there are delicate points on your side. I do not mean to say we don't have delicate points, too.

Dr. Kissinger: But you don't have to run for reelection this year.

Gromyko: We could make the Canal settlement public. If you meant a time limit for implementation, the part that is confidential could be implemented after the U.S. elections -- but as soon as possible after the elections. Implementation should be completed at the very beginning of next year or at the end of this year. And all the countries of the Middle East have a sigh of relief.

Dr. Kissinger: You're becoming more optimistic the longer I know you. My understanding was within the first six months of next year.

Gromyko: If we assume that agreement is reached in May, at the Summit, this means that, at least in some part, its implementation will begin. Implementation can begin after May. Do you mean it takes another six months next year?

Dr. Kissinger: I thought I made it clear that implementation could not begin until after the election.

Gromyko: That's not what we have in mind.

Dr. Kissinger: I know what you have in mind. I'm telling you what is possible.

Gromyko: The Canal?

Dr. Kissinger: The Canal can be done now, and published and implemented. As a practical matter, after the election, everyone will be exhausted for a few months. Then the government has to be reorganized, etc. It cannot begin until January.

If we reach agreement -- and it is not yet demonstrated that we can -- we will have to carry it out our way. When we reach agreement, we will keep our word. But we may need indirect methods.

I told you in September we could not begin until January. I do not want to mislead you.

If we drew a line halfway thru Sinai, Israel would carry it out right away. The more comprehensive we try to make it, the more painful.
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Certainly the time limits could be the subject of discussion. Our feeling is that it should be done to begin next year. In any case, we agree on the general principle that a part can be started as soon as agreement is in force.

Dr. Kissinger: If you want to start withdrawing troops, we wouldn't insist you wait until next year.

Gromyko: Israel's troops?

Dr. Kissinger: No, yours.

Gromyko: At the same time.

Dr. Kissinger: I have one other procedural question. I have my doubts, quite frankly, that the President and Mr. Brezhnev will be able to get into all the details of the Middle East settlement in a realistic way at the Summit. Secondly, we have the absolute necessity of the President being able to come back from Moscow and say no secret agreements were made -- because there will be pressure from many in our country, especially Jewish groups. You and I will talk, and Anatol and I. General principles can then be addressed at the Summit. I suggest we then continue discussions during the summer. Conceivably, I could come back here in September, on which occasion we could reach agreement on an overall solution. We have four weeks, and I'm not sure the President -- I don't know about Mr. Brezhnev -- would want to be involved in all the complex issues of boundaries. This is just a suggestion. What do you think?

Gromyko: It depends on what you mean by principles. Some could be no more than the UN Security Council Resolutions, which would be of no use; other principles might be helpful for reaching a solution.

Kissinger: I would have in mind some concrete advance over the Security Council Resolutions. Otherwise there is no point.

Gromyko: Certainly let us lead matters so as to be as concrete as possible in our discussions. If it is not possible at this time to achieve and finalize a concrete agreement, at least let us agree on a basis for such an eventual agreement, or on some provisions that could be used as a basis.

Dr. Kissinger: That is possible.

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Gromyko: It is useless to discuss only what's in the Security Council Resolution, because the Resolution is there and is not being carried out and each side is interpreting it in its own way. In our discussions, we should agree on something more concrete and more conclusive than the Security Council Resolution.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you think we should proceed, Mr. Foreign Minister?

Gromyko: Let us endeavor to do the maximum possible during the May Summit to reach agreement on an eventual basic accord -- even if the accord is formalized on some later date, e.g., September. We might indeed after the Summit have another special meeting -- now that you have found your way to Moscow. But to insure the success of this process, let's do as much as we can even before the May summit, so the principles we are talking about won't be meaningless. The principles should be as content-filled as possible, so they can be used as a basis for an eventual agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: How do you envisage solution of the question of withdrawals? Because it is one thing to discuss in principle and another thing to get down to brass tacks.

Dr. Kissinger: In time, or ultimate destination?

Gromyko: The ultimate destination.

Dr. Kissinger: I have tried to formulate the issue to your Ambassador in what I take to be realistic terms. We have no differences on the issue of Egyptian sovereignty being restored back to the prewar border. The problem, as I have stated it frankly to your Ambassador, is that in order to persuade Israel to go along and to prevent a total explosion domestically, we have to show we can do better than the so-called Rogers Plan. I realize it is an unusual negotiating method to insist on more than we have offered.

Gromyko: Why 'so-called' Rogers Plan? It is the Rogers Plan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is called the Rogers Plan.

I have talked to the Israelis. We cannot go along with their proposal, but they consider presence -- not sovereignty -- as essential with respect to Sharm El-Sheikh and the airfield west of Eilat. If we could be ingenious on this and find a solution, we could face up to the domestic situation -- our newspapers and Congress -- and put pressure on Israel to return to the 1967
borders. This is what we have in mind on withdrawal. We also have some ideas on an interim settlement, but we both agree that is fairly easy.

**Dobrynin:** How far is the airfield from the border?

**Dr. Kissinger:** A nominal distance, eight miles or so.

**Dobrynin:** How far is Eilat from Sharm El-Sheikh?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Seventy-five/one hundred kilometers. If we can find a formula for that, we can settle everything without difficulty.

**Gromyko:** How much is the area with respect to the air base?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I don't think it is much. And it needn't be annexed either. It could be . . . .

**Gromyko:** We think it is impossible to agree on this. It is a question of principle. It would give a reward to the Israelis. Presence won't be accepted by the Arabs. Another thing could be considered -- some other foreign or UN personnel.

**Dr. Kissinger:** That is your plan. Can the UN personnel be Israeli?

**Gromyko:** No. A chicken can't be baptized a fish. (That is from a Dumas story.) The territory may not be large, but a principle is involved here. Probably Israel knows that a principle is involved here. It's their idea.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, how do you visualize the evolution if there is no agreement?

**Gromyko:** We do not think either you or we want to reach a situation where we cannot foresee what will happen. You yourself know full well what forces are operating in the Middle East and what moods are prevalent in the Arab world, and this should be borne in mind by both yourselves and ourselves.

How do we complete our discussions today?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I was going to ask you.

**Gromyko:** Our position briefly is this: We are in favor of a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. We cannot recognize any principle of Israel's being given any prize in the form of Arab territory. This applies to
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Egypt, to Syria, and to Jordan -- although as I said earlier, last year, if the Jordanians want to make some corrections in their border with Israel, it's their business, it's their border.

Secondly, all the states of the Middle East are entitled to their independent sovereign existence and development, and that includes Israel.

Thirdly, there could be the most effective guarantees. The Soviet Union and the United States could place their signature under any guarantee, adopted in the Security Council or some other way. There certainly could be no stronger guarantee than that in the modern world.

And provided there is a solution of these fundamental issues, we do not see any problem with such issues as continuation of the ceasefire or passage of Israeli ships through the Canal.

The question touched on in our discussions last autumn, that there be some understanding on arms shipments, is something we are prepared to discuss, and that too should be part of an agreement. Then also, some solution should be found with respect to the Palestinians. There is still a lack of absolute clarity on that score, and that has to be settled. With regard to Soviet military personnel, I have stated our position and I feel you now have complete clarity on that matter. As regards the nature of the agreement, I have nothing to add. We envisage it as complex or global in scale.

Dr. Kissinger: What level of forces do you envisage for yourselves?

Gromyko: We will leave behind only a certain quantity of advisors and military specialists. All the rest will be withdrawn, as I said in my discussions with you.

Dr. Kissinger: What number?

Gromyko: That is something we will tell you later, but I do not see any problem -- in fact we think you will applaud us when we tell you and perhaps tell us to leave some more!

Dr. Kissinger: I would not bet on the last.

Gromyko: Of course, we are assuming you will take appropriate steps with Israel, too. For instance, the question of arms supplies should relate to Israel as well as the Arabs. Whether it is enough to agree between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union is another matter. Maybe Britain and France should be included.

Dr. Kissinger: The same with Czechoslovakia.

Gromyko: You are right. The whole thing should be considered.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no intention of evading. Obviously, agreement should not be evaded by third countries.

Gromyko: On the principles, if we want to see to it that the May meeting approves the principles on the Middle East, they have to be elaborated on concretely as much as possible. Therefore, there should be intensive work through the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make sure it is clear. On Sharm El-Sheikh and the airfield, we are not talking about sovereignty or annexation, but some presence.

Gromyko: I would say, not only is there no difference, but it could be more of an irritant for the Arabs, because it will mean Israel getting a base on the territory of Arab states. We for our part will endeavor to draft these principles, and you should be too. It will be hard work.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. I think we should have intensive discussions. In fact, it is the principal unsolved issue for the Summit. We have solved all the others. As for SALT, I frankly think we will settle it next week. I will have to browbeat our military, but it will take a week.

Gromyko: Are you a three-star general?

Dr. Kissinger: At least. We will call Smith back Tuesday, and send him back Monday or Tuesday. They can spend the time drafting. So I agree, the Mideast is the big unsolved problem.

Gromyko: [In English] Big, big, twice big.

I tell you frankly, if it is not solved, it may poison the atmosphere.

Dr. Kissinger: After the Summit, or at the Summit?

Gromyko: At the Summit.
Economic Relations

Gromyko: Would you like to say anything additional on economic matters?

We certainly attach importance to these economic matters, but we do not raise it implying that something is grabbing us by the throat or that it's do-or-die for us or that it's top urgency for us.

Dr. Kissinger: We do not look at it this way.

Gromyko: I would put it as follows. We believe that the development of economic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union -- progress would be conducive to better political relations. The specifics have been mentioned: Most Favored Nation treatment, credits, and certain other issues. If you would like to say something more specific, I would appreciate it.

Let me say, by the way, that in the course of the talks on Lend-Lease in Washington, not everything is proceeding smoothly. In particular, because the Americans have been asking for an elephant of a price.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good method. We may catch you in a weak moment and you'll pay it.

Dobrynin: You asked for a billion.

Gromyko: We know you have inflation, but why should we suffer?

Dr. Kissinger: We do not think of it as a necessity for you. We see it as a natural result of your economic development. So it comes from equality, not necessity. We are two great industrial nations. We complement each other. As your Ambassador knows, if anything, we have looked at it in a political context, so that when our political relations reach a certain level, economic relations shouldn't lag behind. We will both have a stake in our political relations. It is a sign of confidence in our political relations, I tell you our philosophy. I have taken a personal interest, not because of the details -- which don't interest me -- but to see that it is done on a big scale.

As for Export-Import Bank facilities, which are a matter of Presidential discretion, if the evolution proceeds as we expect, a decision can be this year, possibly this Summit.

Most Favored Nation treatment is a matter for Congress. If our relations proceed along present lines (with nothing additional), we expect to ask for
it this year. It cannot be implemented this year. Because of the elections, Congress will be occupied with the elections after August. We will ask for it before the elections, but I do not anticipate action on it this year. In any event, by this time next year we will have both Export-Import Bank and Most Favored Nation.

The Lend-Lease negotiations are now being handled entirely as a technical matter of repayment of debts in the present framework. I told Anatol not much would happen, and I keep my word! We are using these present negotiations to establish some framework. When Patolichev comes, Peterson -- who is a good man, a thoughtful man -- these will be brought into relation to the natural gas. The Lend-Lease can be used to finance the gas, and would solve some problems with regard to what currency is issued and so on. We will have a comprehensive scheme when Patolichev comes.

Peterson will have it.

Gromyko: And the volume of credits?

Dr. Kissinger: We have some idea, but I don't have the precise figures. I will give Anatol the figures, on an informal basis, with some idea of the order of magnitude. It will be adequate for a substantial development.

We are taking it very seriously. My office is taking a direct interest in it. At the Summit, we could decide on some commission for a permanent relationship. We will send Peterson in July, prepared to work out a concrete long-term substantial arrangement, including credits.

Gromyko: To what extent will it be capable of finalization at the Summit? Amounts and conditions?

Dr. Kissinger: There can be an agreement in principle, including the order of magnitude, before the Summit. The amounts and conditions will be left for Peterson.

Gromyko: Most Favored Nation will come after the elections?

Dr. Kissinger: On Most Favored Nation, we will ask for it before the elections.

Gromyko: When will there be a decision?

Dr. Kissinger: By, say, April 1. A little depends on the state of our relations. If they are tense, many Congressmen will drag their feet. If our relations proceed as I expect, I foresee no problem.
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One consideration which will affect the situation in Congress is Vietnam. It is a little tough when the trucks carrying weapons in Vietnam are Russian. We will ask for it anyway, but this is a problem.

On agriculture, what you ask for is not possible on the credits. Ten years is not possible; we think in terms of, say, six years. We are looking for a reasonable compromise.

Gromyko: How do you envision the agreement on problems of the environment? In general terms or concretely?

Dr. Kissinger: We are somewhat flexible on this. We can either announce at the Summit that we are creating a commission, or we can do something concrete before the Summit. You have made a proposal to Train. We can create it at the Summit, or announce at the Summit that we are beginning negotiations.

Gromyko: We have not yet discussed this at the government level. We are still waiting for the outcome of the talks.

Dr. Kissinger: We will do whatever you prefer. As for the Commission on science, is it your thinking to set this up at the Summit, or after?

Dobrynin: I gave Dr. David a scheme five days before I left. He hasn't replied.

Dr. Kissinger: He won't reply until I approve. I want your preference.

Gromyko: To do it before the Summit.

Dr. Kissinger: We will announce it at the Summit, and then send David here.

At the Summit, if we announce everything at the end, the press will be insane in the meantime. Can we make partial agreements each day?

Gromyko: With most important ones at the end. That would be my opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Otherwise the press will have nothing to do but keep looking at your facial expressions.

Gromyko: Right. I will look gloomy one day and you will look cheerful, and Dobrynin will be gloomy. And it will all depend on the state of the back!
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Dr. Kissinger: Do you want a communique also, or just the Principles?

Gromyko: It is not enough just to have Principles. Though we believe the Principles are more important.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you have a draft of the communique?

Gromyko: Not for the time being.

Dr. Kissinger: You agree that we should have a communique substantially prepared before the Summit? There may be a bureaucratic problem for us about the drafting of it. I hope you will be patient.

Gromyko: As patient as possible.

Announcement of Kissinger Visit

Dr. Kissinger: Have you had a chance to look at the draft of the announce-

"ment? [The U.S. draft, at Tab B, read as follows:

"At the invitation of the Soviet Government, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was in Moscow from April 20 to April 24, 1972. While there he conferred with the General-Secretary of the CPSU, Mr. Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet officials. Their talks which were frank and friendly throughout dealt with the most important international questions of interest to both governments as well as with bilateral matters, preparatory to the discussions between President Nixon and the Soviet leaders in May."

Gromyko: Just briefly. It looks OK, except we prefer "by mutual agreement." Suppose also that we say "frank, businesslike, and useful." A three-story building.

Dr. Kissinger: If this is how you behave when you are businesslike, I don't know how you will be when you are friendly. I don't think I could endure it.

Dobrynin: When the President comes, we will escalate!

Sukhodrev: To "brotherly."

Gromyko: "Brotherly and on the basis of proletarian solidarity and socialist internationalism"!

Dr. Kissinger: That would have been good if Rockefeller was President!
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We don't really need "businesslike."

Gromyko: Everyone assumes he's businesslike.

[Dobrynin: Reads the text again, with the above agreed changes.]

Gromyko: We don't need "most" important, or "the."

Dr. Kissinger: Do you think we need the last clause about it being preparatory to summit?

Gromyko: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Do we need "mutual agreement" at the beginning? What's wrong with "by invitation of Soviet Government?"

Gromyko: You spoke in detail on the Vietnam issue on your side. There is another side to that issue. There are other forces that look at us from the other side. You too would have to take into account our position, just as we take into account your views.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not leave out the first phrase completely?

Gromyko: It is maybe a little bit angular....

Dr. Kissinger: So we will say to the press that you invited us, and you will say to the press that I insisted on coming and you were just being polite!

Gromyko: No, we won't go beyond the text. It is not a question of polemics.

Dr. Kissinger: As Anatol knows, when this announcement is made, the press will go crazy. I would like to have a briefing -- this may be tactless to say -- a briefing something like what I had when I came back from my first trip to Peking. No substance, just to give the atmosphere, and it will calm them down.

Gromyko: Don't use superlatives, like "excellent"....

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Dr. Kissinger: No, it is not in our interest either. They will ask what sort of man was Brezhnev. Can I say "warmhearted, energetic?" Frankly, I know that you do not want to leave the impression, when we are bombing North Vietnam, of great cordiality.

Gromyko: That's what I meant about superlatives.

Dr. Kissinger: If they ask about substantive matters, we will not discuss it.

Gromyko: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: If they ask about substance, I will say the communiqué speaks for itself. If I don't do it, they will all speculate. On-the-record. I will send a copy to Vorontsov. Nothing else, no inspired stories.

Gromyko: Good.

Dr. Kissinger: On SALT, when we reach agreement within our Government and send Smith back, can the President say when he sends Smith that on the basis of the discussions here he expects a settlement?

Gromyko: Through the channel we will have confirmation?

Dr. Kissinger: By next week.

Gromyko: Then we should instruct our delegations to embody it in an agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: No, that's a separate question, an easy one. The purpose of the send-off is to move it to the Presidential level.

Gromyko: Yes.

[The meeting then broke up.]
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: My Trip to Moscow

I spent thirteen hours with Brezhnev and Gromyko and five more hours with Gromyko only. Dobrynin was present at all sessions and other Soviet officials attended the Brezhnev sessions. The central results and conclusions are as follows.

Vietnam

-- The Soviets endorse and are transmitting to Hanoi our procedural proposal on resuming the private and plenary talks on Vietnam. This has already resulted in their acceptance of the May 2 date for a private meeting.

-- The Soviets are also forwarding our substantive proposal to Hanoi, despite an undoubtedly negative reaction.

-- Katsusov, the Central Committee member in charge of relations with other Communist parties, left for Hanoi at 5:25 a.m. 23 April while I was in Moscow.

-- Brezhnev countered with a proposal for a standstill ceasefire which I made clear was unacceptable with the presence of invading North Vietnamese divisions. It is nevertheless noteworthy that he put forward any proposal; and a ceasefire-in-place would not be very attractive to Hanoi either, when its forces have failed to capture a single major town and would have to see their major psychological and military efforts frozen short of major objectives.

-- The Soviets, on the other hand, gave no actual promise that they would lean on their friends, either for deescalation or a final settlement. They disavowed any responsibility for the North Vietnamese offensive.

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They hinted that they had not answered new requests but they also had the gall to maintain that they hadn't provided all that much offensive equipment in the first place.

-- I made very clear that we held Moscow to account for the escalation just prior to the summit and that we would prevent an allied defeat no matter what the risk to our other policies, including U.S.-Soviet relations and the summit. I emphasized that there had to be a private meeting by May 2 and that if there were not significant progress at that session, we would resolutely pursue our unilateral course.

-- Furthermore, you would have to turn to the right domestically and gain the support of precisely those elements who were not in favor of better U.S.-Soviet relations in any event. This would clearly inhibit your flexibility at a summit meeting, assuming there still was such a meeting.

-- This all took place against the background of our bombing of Haiphong (and damage to Soviet ships) and Hanoi, continued bombing up to the 20th parallel during this period, and the clear option of bombing wherever we like after May 2 if there is no movement at the conference table.

-- In short, we did not achieve a breakthrough on Vietnam. On the other hand, we got our message across; involved the Russians directly in transmitting our proposals to Hanoi; have certainly annoyed the North Vietnamese by just being in Moscow; will issue a joint announcement that, together with Le Duc Tho's return for a private session, will assuredly help us domestically by suggesting something is up; and have effectively positioned ourselves for whatever military actions we wish to pursue after first having once again demonstrated our reasonableness.

Other Issues

-- Brezhnev made effusively and redundantly clear the Soviet eagerness for, and his personal political stake in, a successful U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. On every issue, whether substantive or cosmetic, his emphasis was on the most comprehensive and concrete achievements possible.

-- He tabled a set of principles in American-Russian relations that closely followed the concepts we submitted through the private channel. His injunction was for us to strengthen it further if possible, and they accepted our modifications almost without exception. The result is a
statement of how relations between the two superpowers should be conducted that is solid and substantive without suggesting political cooperation (like the Franco-Russian document), or implying any condominium or negating any of our alliances or obligations. It should serve as a significant finale to the summit and should discipline the Chinese without alienating them. Moreover we can say that it rejects the Brezhnev doctrine.

-- Brezhnev also gave us a SALT proposal that is considerably more favorable than we expected. Moscow agrees to include SLBMs at a time when it looked almost certain that we would have to drop this aspect in order to get an agreement by the summit. And the Soviet margin in submarines (21) is partly accounted for by their adding UK and French boats to our total and compensated for by their commitment to phase out their older land-based missiles, as well as the basing advantages we have. Their ABM proposal is a variant of our compromise solution and leaves us with more ICBMs protected than they. They bought our position that the offensive freeze last five years instead of three. They agreed to freeze soft ICBMs. In short, if the summit meeting takes place, you will be able to sign the most important arms control agreement ever concluded.

-- Whether we would have gotten this SALT agreement without my trip is certainly a debatable question. They might have moved in Helsinki anyway, but the signs before my trip went in the opposite direction. What is not debatable is the fact that this agreement was produced by your intervention and use of the private channel, and that the specific commitments were delivered by the Soviets only in conjunction with my visit. Thus you deserve personal credit for this breakthrough.

-- On European issues Brezhnev and his colleagues displayed obvious uneasiness over the outcome of the German treaties and made repeated pitches for our direct intervention. The results of Sunday's election and the FDP defection have heightened their concern, and the situation gives us leverage. I made no commitment to bail them out and indeed pointed out that we had been prepared to assist them through Bahr but had not done so because of the North Vietnamese offensive. We will see to it that we give them no help on this matter so long as they don't help on Vietnam.

-- Brezhnev at least agreed to consider our concept of separate explorations on MBFR in parallel with those on a European Security Conference. We have no assurance he will actually carry this out, however.

-- The Soviets are anxious on the Middle East (Sadat is due in Moscow momentarily) and Gromyko pushed hard on this the last two days.
They tabled substantive proposals that represented nothing new and pressed for a timetable on negotiations that is considerably faster than what they outlined before. They went so far as to suggest that the summit atmosphere would be marred by lack of progress on this issue. I gave them no substantive satisfaction, confining myself to willingness to discuss this issue over the coming weeks, while making clear the difficulties involved.

--- On bilateral issues I sketched promising vistas, but always with the implied caveat of Vietnam's not getting in the way. Thus I indicated we would probably approve Export-Import Bank facilities during the summer and that you would consider asking Congress for MFN treatment, though implementation would be a year off and depend squarely on whether Soviet equipment was still killing our men in Vietnam. In such areas as science, the environment, and cultural exchange, they were in favor of the most concrete possible outcomes during and after the summit. Here too I indicated a reciprocal attitude, assuming that our overall relations developed favorably.

--- In short, these meetings confirmed that your Moscow summit -- if we go through with it and Vietnam is under control -- will dwarf all previous post-war summits in terms of concrete accomplishments and have a major international and domestic impact.

--- On these issues my instructions were to be forthcoming in order to get Russian help on Vietnam. Since I heard no assurance of their assistance, I primarily listened in these areas -- after first confining the talks to Vietnam. The upshot was a standoff (at least for now) on Vietnam while they made a series of moves on summit-related matters.

--- We have accordingly gotten a better summit if we want it while giving up no options on Vietnam and positioning ourselves better for whatever options we do choose to employ.

Brezhnev and the Soviet Dilemma

Brezhnev's performance suggests that he has much riding on the summit. He is tough, brutal, insecure, cunning and very pragmatic. His almost reverential references to you and his claims that he wants to do everything to help your re-election -- however disingenuous they may be -- suggest that he sees his relationship with you as legitimizing and strengthening his own position at home. We may have an election in November; he acts as if he has one next week and every week thereafter.
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He has undoubtedly had to sell his Western policy to doubters in the Politburo. I am sure he did so with a line of reasoning that has much that is inimical to our interests. But it has also given him a stake in a steady relationship with us. But now, with our forceful actions in Vietnam, all of this is in the balance (at the very time, incidentally, when his German policy is under a big question mark too). We will never know for sure whether Moscow colluded with Hanoi's offensive or whether Hanoi, having been given the capability by the Soviets, decided to move on its own. In either event our actions must have come as an enormous shock. Not only have we again put a "fraternal" ally under the gun, we have hit Soviet ships and threatened to do more to Haiphong. And the DRV offensive so far is moving neither fast nor decisively.

The Soviet leaders always have the knives out for each other and the lines of attack against Brezhnev under present conditions can be numerous and diverse. He is more vulnerable than any past Soviet leader, even Khrushchev in 1960, to the charge that comes most easily to the Soviets -- as Russians and Communists -- that he has staked too much on the foreign capitalists.

Meanwhile, Soviet options in the present situation are beset with dilemmas. If they stay passive vis-a-vis Hanoi while the offensive continues, they must now assume you will go all out against the North. To go forward with the summit in those circumstances is for them psychologically and politically an agonizing prospect. To cancel the Summit may, in their view, lead to your defeat in November, but not without our having meanwhile pulverized the DRV and Brezhnev's Western policy having collapsed. Much the same would happen if you cancelled the Summit or if you came but were hobbled by right-wing pressures. But the alternative to all this -- pressure on Hanoi to desist -- means the betrayal of a socialist ally, the loss of influence in Hanoi and no assurance that Hanoi will stop the offensive and we our retaliation.

In sum, I would have to conclude that Brezhnev personally, and the Soviets collectively, are in one of their toughest political corners in years. They must want the Vietnamese situation to subside and I would judge that there is just a chance that of all the distasteful courses open to them they will pick that of pressure on Hanoi -- not to help us but themselves. The dispatch of Brezhnev's confidant, Kuznetsov, to Hanoi tends to bear this out.

The stick of your determination and the carrot of the productive summit with which I went to Moscow, which I used there and which we must now maintain, give us our best leverage in Kremlin politics as well as the best position in our own.

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General-Secretary of
Central Committee of CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Council
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE & TIME:
Monday, April 24, 1972 - 11:15 a.m. - 1:45 p.m.

PLACE:
Guest House, Vorobyevski Road
Moscow

SUBJECTS:
Vietnam; Middle East; Nuclear Non-Aggression
Pact; Economic Relations; European Security;
Summit Preparations; Announcement of Kissinger
Visit

Dr. Kissinger: [Referring to the disparity of attendees on the two sides] You
trust more people than I do.

Brezhnev: I can send them out!

Let me say first, I think we have done most important work in the last few
days. Let us be as constructive as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Vietnam:

Brezhnev: I would like to ask you if you have anything new to communicate
to us.

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Dr. Kissinger: No, Mr. General-Secretary, I don't really have anything new. I have summed up my impressions to your Ambassador which I will report to the President. I am convinced that the Soviet side is sincerely interested in making the Summit a major departure in U.S.-Soviet relations, that it is not just a tactical move, but affects every aspect of your behavior, even personal. We've made very great progress in this visit which practically guarantees the success of the Summit. What has before been a political concern has now become a human concern.

I have told you and your Ambassador our concerns on Vietnam; I don't believe a useful purpose is served by repeating myself. It is the only obstacle on our side in the way. If the Vietnamese deal with us seriously, we will deal with them seriously. But not while we are being put under military pressure.

Brezhnev: How did the President react to all the communications you were able to send him from here?

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't given every detail, because I did not want too many experts to analyze every proposal before I got back. I have communicated just the spirit of our talks.

Brezhnev: So as not to squander all the baggage you're bringing back.

Dr. Kissinger: You understand me better than I thought.

Brezhnev: No, it's natural. You did all the negotiating.

Dr. Kissinger: The President sent me a cable, part of which I have read to your Ambassador, that he thinks the Moscow Summit can be much more significant than the Peking Summit. This reflects his attitude.

I am sure the President will consider the principles we have agreed to an historic achievement, and I am convinced that except for minor modifications, the SALT proposal will be considered a constructive one. I will confirm it to your Ambassador Friday. But I'm certain that will be the reaction.

Brezhnev: Thank you for your communication. I guess that now we should be endeavoring to sum up the results of our discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

Brezhnev: Summing up the results, we have said many things on the significance of the forthcoming meeting. We have emphasized that the meeting may be not only useful but also historic and perhaps epochal. On the other hand, we have
also talked of circumstances that make the Summit meeting impossible. This is not a way of attempting to bring pressure on you; understand me correctly on this point. The Summit after all was born not only with due regard for American wishes but also on the basis of reciprocity on our side. It is certainly understood on both sides that the possible results may prove to be important from the standpoint not only of our two countries but also world politics. If results are viewed from the point of view of what they can do to reduce international tensions, that would be a weighty political asset for both, and would be welcomed everywhere in the world.

In addition to what we have already discussed on Vietnam, I would add a couple of words more. Now it is the most acute question which may reverse the entire course of events. Both agree this is indeed the case and we've discussed many constructive things in this place.

As we see it, you have still not received a reply from Hanoi on your latest proposals, and we have not either.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Have you transmitted our proposals?

**Brezhnev:** No, since there was no direct request from your side. We would be prepared to if you express the wish.

I want to voice a thought that is constantly in my head. According to your proposals to Vietnam, there is to be a plenary on April 27, followed by a private session on May 2. I have no knowledge of their position, but what if the Vietnamese suddenly suggest May 6, or May 1, or May 5? Are there any reasons why an alternative between May 2 and 6 couldn't be accepted? I see it as a purely procedural matter, not to be elevated into a principle.

Success always depends on one's approach. Even a slight break in the clouds can be covered again. I merely wish to mention this again, not for the sake of further discussion. I do not think a procedural question should be turned into an obstacle to success.

On the general points, I see no need to repeat ourselves; all our views have been set and I have nothing further to add. That's all I have to say on Vietnam. This is the one remaining problem. I am sure you will faithfully communicate to President Nixon not only our formal proposals but also the general spirit of give and take, and I am sure he will react perspicaciously to all you have been saying.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Could I say something on Vietnam now?

**Brezhnev:** Please.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary, there are two things to be considered. First, the Vietnamese have now three times cancelled private meetings to which they have agreed. Considering our attitude to private meetings, this has to be considered. As your Ambassador can testify, for me to plan a trip is extremely complicated. It is a question of courtesy. It is also technically a problem. Secondly, substantively, we have made a major concession in agreeing to go to a plenary meeting, contrary to our public declarations, without assurances of progress or any stopping of the offensive. We agreed to this because as a great power we should not indulge in petty childish maneuvers. If we have a plenary on April 27, and a second is held on May 4, there will have been two plenaries without a private meeting. As I said, for technical reasons, a meeting after May 2 is impossible. A date earlier than May 2 would be possible, but a date later than May 2, no.

As for our proposals, if you were prepared to communicate them to Hanoi, it would be considered a great courtesy.

I showed the note we received from the North Vietnamese to your Ambassador, who sees more of these than our Foreign Ministry.

Brezhnev: Maybe Rogers' post should be abolished.

Dr. Kissinger: Or may be Dobrynin should be given an official function.

Brezhnev: He has a second post -- the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: Our policy is, anything that comes to the White House is never let out of the White House. All of your communications go only to President.

The North Vietnamese in their note said they could come to a private meeting one week after they were notified of a plenary. We gave them nine days. So we were accepting their proposal. I just wanted to explain to the General-Secretary that we were not giving an ultimatum.

Brezhnev: I was on no account speaking for the Vietnamese. I was just thinking what if, perhaps, they might suggest May 2nd, not May 4th. The point I was making was that this should not be a stumbling block to progress.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Brezhnev: I was speaking merely from the point of view of, let's say, you wanted to come to Moscow on 21 April and we wanted 22 April. If you insisted,
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we would have agreed. We would not treat it as a matter of principle.

Let's turn to other matters.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we understand each other's positions.

Middle East

Brezhnev: I'd like to give you additional text by way of explanation on the Middle East. As we see it, the gist of the conversations Gromyko had with the President and with Dr. Kissinger remains valid, and now the problem is to somehow formalize this in some kind of arrangement, without making public any of the provisions outlined in those conversations. I think we should formalize these provisions in some way.

Dr. Kissinger: Formalize where?

Brezhnev: In the form of some kind of closed agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: At the summit, or can it wait until September?

[Alexandrov enters]

Brezhnev: I had meant at the Summit, but in as narrow a circle as the President wants it to be, without the presence of the entire delegation.

Nuclear Non-Aggression Pact

Brezhnev: I have one other matter to pass on confidentially to the President. The form is not important, we would be ready to accept any form suggested by the President. It would be of immense significance if we could formalize, if not in this document, maybe in some special document, an understanding that our two countries will not use nuclear weapons against one another.

I feel that would be a "peaceful bomb" whose explosion would have a very positive effect and would be aimed at improving the general international situation and at lessening international tensions. As to form, we would be prepared to do it in a treaty or an agreement. The form is not important, but the principle is important. It would be of great interest to the governments and peoples of the U.S. and Soviet Union. If the President for some reason feels that this question should be discussed for the time being in the confidential channel, we would agree to that too.

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Economic Relations

Brezhnev: I'll not now burden you with remarks on other matters such as commercial matters, such as Most Favored Nation treatment. I have been informed by my comrades, and we accept them with satisfaction. Trade is a question of importance to our two countries. There would be no problem also with cultural ties or environmental cooperation. I am sure solutions to these will be reachable by both sides and will be appreciated by both sides. On the economic side, I have spoken of large-scale point ventures; we feel this would appeal not only to business circles but also to the people. It would be beneficial to both sides.

European Security

Brezhnev: I don't know if you have received the news of the Elections at Baden-Württemberg. [He has difficulty pronouncing the name.]

Dr. Kissinger: The Germans can make even the names of states sound like profound philosophical statements.

Brezhnev: Or make it sound as if one land is bigger than the Soviet Union! These elections have shown that no great sensations have taken place.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: I mention this just by way of information. Since that is the case, now is a decisive moment when our two countries should take the necessary steps to further ratification of the treaties and to sign a protocol on West Berlin. This is something we are duty bound to do. This is why we see it. We've exchanged views. I would merely like you to point this out to the President. Also, we should, we feel, take the necessary steps for the preparation and convening of a European Security Conference. I am sure you understand well, and can convey this to the President.

Summit Preparations

Brezhnev: I would also like to recall our arrangement at the start that we would be frank, and to make one small comment. We can't understand why, and for what reason, in the period of the most intensive preparatory work for the Summit, a campaign of anti-Sovietism has been fanned in the U.S. We know anti-Sovietism has been around for a long time in the U.S.,

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but the fanning and intensification now we do not understand. We could
reply, but I just wanted to mention it. Convey this, and the tone of my
remark, to the President. As we see it, this is an unnecessary business.

Let me now finally sum up the results of our work. You and I have done a
big job, a necessary and useful piece of work. I don't know about my
colleagues, but I know that the President will be pleased with what you have
done. I say that in all seriousness. But that isn't main note on which I
would like to end. I have been thinking of our past, our present and our
future.

I don't know in whose interests this is -- in the interests of what circles this
is being done -- but it is clear to us that in the years since the war, every-
thing in the U.S. has been geared to creating and spreading an impression
among lending circles and among the American people, a spirit of mistrust
of the Soviet Union, depicting the Soviet Union as a dangerous and menacing
state bringing war and promoting Communism. That has been the general
trend in the U.S. What it has yielded the U.S. and the Administration, I
don't know. But it certainly does not promote good will, and it hurts relations
between our two countries and world peace. No words can characterize the
false nature of these ideas.

What we have achieved in preparation for the Summit has not been done for
the movement. I want to state here what I have said publicly. Without
forfeiting or sacrificing our principles, we are going forward to the Summit
with an open mind. Our attitude is one of principle, and not dictated by any
momentary considerations. We are interested. As a matter of principle in
cooperation and in lessening tensions, and that will be our attitude in the
future -- not only in relations with the U.S. but on a global scale. With each
passing year, we will be able to make step after step in improving peace,
advancing to our great goal that the two greatest nations in the world should
act in a way promoting peace, resolving all problems in the world by peace-
ful methods.

Tell the President that our actions are not and will not be dictated by
momentary considerations, both in relations between us and in global
policies.

That is the summary of the results. One very small comment on the nuclear
question. I would like that part of our conversation not to be registered in a
piece of paper but only in our oral conversation.

I have had a brief look at the announcement. Except for some minor altertions,
it is generally acceptable, with the understanding, that the content of our talks
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will not be public either in the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be absolutely certain.

Brezhnev: After this, I can shake your hand and wish you a safe return. I will hurry back to inform my colleagues, but you can be sure I won't go back on anything I have said here.

As regards further exchanges, I trust they will continue thru the Kissinger/Dobrynin channel. Such exchanges are necessary to bring all problems to the point where they are ripe for solution.

Though this is a secret visit, you have had a chance to see something of Moscow, and you will have seen that preparations for the Summit are under way not only in substance but also in other areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I have been very impressed.

Brezhnev: There is nothing artificial. This is the normal work of the day.

Dr. Kissinger: Even the most anti-Soviet person in the U.S. could not call the General-Secretary an artificial individual.

Brezhnev: There is nothing "synthetic" about me. I am living flesh.

Dr. Kissinger: That is obvious. Mr. General-Secretary, may I make a few observations on what you have said.

Vietnam

Dr. Kissinger: First, I cannot leave any misunderstanding on Vietnam. We have no flexibility on May 2. It can be earlier, but it cannot be later. But we have discussed that. It would be physically impossible. May 8 would be the next possible time.

European Security

Dr. Kissinger: As regards Germany, my analysis of the situation is the same as that of your Foreign Minister, if I understand him correctly. I have not seen our official analyses yet, but my personal analysis is that there has been a slight weakening of the Brandt Government but not a significant weakening of the Brandt Government. In my judgement -- again I am only speaking personally -- it means that the treaties will be rejected by the upper house and will therefore have to come back to Parliament to pass by an absolute majority in June. It is my judgment that they will still pass. We will use our influence where we can.
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Brezhnev: America can certainly speak in a loud voice when it wants to.

Dr. Kissinger: As I told the General Secretary, when I return I will discuss with the President what we can do. Having worked so long on the Berlin agreement, we want to see it achieved. It is one of the useful results of the exchanges between the President and the General-Secretary.

Brezhnev: I trust you will convey the general tenor and our tone to the President on our policy toward Europe, which contains nothing bad for Europe or the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure. We will see what we can do, possibly a letter to the Chancellor, or something else.

Brezhnev: This requires looking at things thru realistic eyes, and perhaps everything will fall into place. I'm not in any way suggesting any concrete steps, because I am sure the President knows better. To help your own ally, I already told Chancellor Brandt in the Crimea that we had nothing whatsoever against the allied relationship between the FRG and the U.S. I am sure Chancellor Brandt told the President this but I wanted to reassure you.

Dr. Kissinger: We will approach it in a constructive spirit. I will communicate thru the special channel. I will see your Ambassador Friday, but I can tell you now we will approach it in a constructive spirit, and with a desire to get the Treaties ratified.

Brezhnev: Good, thank you. I like living examples. Now the time it will take to achieve the results we want -- a true mutual understanding -- will depend on the speed and size of the steps we take. There is a story of a traveller who wants to go from one place to another village. He does not know the distance; he knows only the road and his goal. He sees a man along the road chopping wood, and asks him, How much time does it take to get to that village? The woodsman says he doesn't know. The traveller is somewhat offended at woodsman, because he is from there and surely must know. So the traveller heads off down the road. After he had taken a few strides, the woodsman calls out, "Stop. It will take you 15 minutes." "Why didn't you tell me the first time I asked?" the traveller asked. "Because then I didn't know the length of your stride."

I think this example applies also to foreign policy.

Dr. Kissinger: That is a good story. Certainly our intention is to take big strides.

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Brezhnev: Good. By the time we meet again, we will be able to tell whose stride is larger, the Soviet side or the American side.

Nuclear Non-Aggression Pact

Dr. Kissinger: On the renunciation of nuclear weapons, I agree with the General Secretary that we should exchange further communications thru the special channel, so that we can decide what is possible and how to handle it. Let's not do anything in other channels, because that will lead to a stalemate.

Middle East

Dr. Kissinger: As regards the Middle East, I have explained to the Foreign Minister yesterday and your Ambassador can confirm, the realities of what can be done in America with respect to any agreement that may be reached. As an objective reality, it will be impossible to complete any agreement before mid 1973. We cannot do it before the elections, and cannot do it immediately after the elections. November and December will be taken up with constituting a new government. And the agreement can be done only by the new government.

Brezhnev: I understand that. But I feel that an agreement in principle should be achieved and set down at the Summit.

Dr. Kissinger: Secondly, we have this problem. The President must be able to come back from the Summit and be able to say truthfully that no secret agreements were made. Therefore, I suggest we have a preliminary discussion at the Summit. Then when I come back in September, we could talk of completing an agreement. We will keep our word.

Brezhnev: We are not speaking in terms of a formal agreement at the Summit, but there has to be an understanding on the substance. Otherwise, it would go against what Gromyko and the President agreed in September.

Dr. Kissinger: Gromyko made a proposition. We listened to it. We agreed to discuss it; we did not accept it.

Gromyko: The President said we would seek agreement at Summit. It was said that if we reached understanding, the question would be solved.

Brezhnev: This is a question that requires complete clarity on our part. That is the way we responded to the report of the conversations Gromyko had with you. It is a difficult matter how to formalize what is agreed. I
want to make one substantive point. There is in Egypt today a vast army, nearly 100,000 strong. I tell you this only confidentially.

**Dr. Kissinger:** You can be absolutely sure.

**Brezhnev:** It is also necessary to bear in mind that the general situation in Egypt may unfortunately come to the point where they can get out of control. You know we steadfastly seek a solution. But there are processes at work. The Army is becoming excited. In fact an Army as big as that cannot stay tranquil all the time, especially in these conditions. Conditions such that at some stage it may get out of control, and the entire situation may take a different character.

When we part, I have to attend some meetings with my colleagues. We will discuss other matters, but they'll certainly ask questions on this: What can be achieved at the Summit or this, and what do we have to leave for the September phase?

**Dr. Kissinger:** We can begin immediately a discussion of principles in the special channels. At the Summit, these principles can be elaborated on, and we can show a positive direction. And we are prepared to make a public arrangement on what the Foreign Minister calls an interim solution. So, it is hard to predict which part will be left open. We can certainly indicate a general direction at the Summit.

I have told your Foreign Minister about the aspects of your proposals which present major difficulties for us. For two years, there were considerable theoretical discussions which were divorced from reality. What we promise, we will do. But I want to make sure we promise what we can deliver. If we use the same ingenuity we showed in negotiating the Berlin accord, and given the ingenuity your Foreign Minister possesses, we should be able to have agreement at the Summit. It depends on how hard we work in the interval. We will do it with a good will and intention to have major progress at the Summit. There are really only one or two points which need clarification.

**Brezhnev:** I'll tell you honestly. I certainly cannot say that satisfies me. As Gromyko told me clearly, -- I have complete confidence in him -- concrete things were discussed in Washington in September. Implementation could not begin until after the elections, but a principled agreement could be achieved at the Summit. That is what I understood.

**Dr. Kissinger:** That is right.
Brezhnev: I had thought that this matter had been in principle agreed on, and that we were now beginning to think along the lines of how to speak to the Arab leaders without divulging the origins. But as things stand now, I do not know how to talk to Sadat, in particular. If I'm deprived of this weapon, that is the agreement with you, I don't know how we can approach the Arab leaders without causing an explosion.

I certainly appreciate the fact that Dr. Kissinger may have certain justified problems and difficulties in giving a lucid answer just now, but I would like to agree that exchanges should begin without delay in the channel to clarify matters as agreed in the conversations between the President and Gromyko.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me briefly review the situation. When your Foreign Minister was in Washington, we were talking hypothetically, about how to handle an agreement if there was one. Then we studied for two months whether there was a possibility of fruitful discussions between us. We then started discussions and decided there was a possibility. These discussions have not yet yielded concrete results. If there are concrete results by the Summit, of course we will carry it out. We are not opposed to an agreement; we don't have an agreement. We have kept our word. What is left for September is a purely optical problem.

[At this point, the General-Secretary left the room for a moment.]

Gromyko: Do you have a record of my conversation with you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I did not accept your proposal. I said your proposal of withdrawal was positive, and a major concession. I didn't accept the details, but said I would talk with Dobrynin to try to work it out.

What did the President say to you?

Gromyko: He said, "I do see a good basis for a possible agreement," and suggested I talk it over with you. And you said that a final agreement of substance should be taken at the Summit. If we agreed, there would be no problem and you would bring pressure. And we'd divide it in two parts, one public and one confidential.

Dr. Kissinger: That part is not the problem.

[The General-Secretary then returned.]

Brezhnev: The situation is made complicated by the fact that you are using diplomatic language and I am just a realist politician. Therefore, I have
found a provisional way out. Don't look so glum.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no.

Brezhnev: To confirm what I said in my letter to the President. Agreement should be reached in the spirit of the conversations with Gromyko, and the President said he regarded with approval the ideas I put in the letter, and this I interpreted to mean we had an agreement. Since your thinking must be close if not identical to that of the President, the only way out is to have an agreement, leaving the details for the channel.

Dr. Kissinger: Your Foreign Minister has reported to you correctly. What he said here is correct. I think we are confusing two things -- the substance of an agreement and the mechanics of carrying it out. On substance, if we can reach substantial agreement before the Summit, we can confirm principles at the Summit. The problem here is that we don't have an agreement. Therefore we should work on the substance and not on what happens when. My position is identical to the President's. In fact I have a certain role in drafting these letters.

Brezhnev: I certainly know the part you play.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest we get to work to see what we can accomplish before the Summit. We certainly favor completing the maximum amount at the Summit, and perhaps all of it.

Announcement of Visit

Brezhnev: Can I say that I have certain doubts about the feasibility of announcing your visit? Because we did all we could to keep it confidential, and now the situation is that we will have to divulge the fact.

Do you think it is completely unavoidable in the United States?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: [Pause] OK [khorosho]

May I ask you to convey my best wishes to President Nixon and the hope that he will attentively and with a spirit of understanding attend to all we have discussed -- Vietnam, Middle East, Soviet-American Relations, and European matters. Tell him we will continue, as we have, our intensive work through the channel, in which on our side all our important people will be taking part, and on your side mainly the President and Dr. Kissinger. Some of those
asides I made to you when we were out walking. I hope you will recall and convey to President Nixon.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I will.

**Brezhnev:** I have to leave now, to chair an important internal meeting. We have discussed all substantive issues. May I wish you further success.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Mr. General-Secretary. Let me thank you for your courtesies. I return to Washington with even greater determination to make the Summit a success. I know from the cables the President has sent me that he feels we have an historic opportunity, and this is the spirit in which he comes here.

**Brezhnev:** I am pleased.

[The formal meeting broke up at 1:45 p.m. After a short break, an informal meeting began with Foreign Minister Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger on the text of the announcement of the Kissinger visit.]
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to USA
G. M. Kornienko, Chief of USA Division, Foreign Ministry
Viktor Sukhodrev, Soviet Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE & TIME:
Monday, April 24, 1972, 1:50-3:00 p.m.

PLACE:
Guest House, Vorobyevski Road, Moscow

SUBJECT:
Announcement of Kissinger Visit; Vietnam; SALT

[General-Secretary Brezhnev had commented in the morning meetings that "except for some minor alterations," the U.S. draft announcement of Dr. Kissinger's visit was "generally acceptable." When he departed at 1:45 p.m., he left a new Soviet draft with the Foreign Minister, who handed it over to Dr. Kissinger. The Soviet draft consisted of handwritten changes on a copy of the U.S. text which Dr. Kissinger had discussed and agreed with the Foreign Minister Sunday morning (Tab A). The Soviet text read as follows:

"By mutual agreement, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was in Moscow from April 20 to April 24, 1972. While there he conferred with the General-Secretary of the CPSU, Mr. Brezhnev, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Their talks, which were in preparation for the discussions between President Nixon and the Soviet leaders in May, dealt with bilateral matters and with important international problems."]
[What follows is a record of the highlights of the discussion.]

Dr. Kissinger: Why have you deleted the phrase "frank and useful throughout?" Weren't our talks frank and useful?

Gromyko: You know that in our lexicon "frank" implies disagreement. Everyone will read it that way.

Dr. Kissinger: [Referring to the second sentence of the Soviet draft.] We cannot accept it this way. Your Ambassador knows what our concerns are. The President prohibited me to come here for Summit preparations. For internal reasons, we have to say that other matters were discussed. And why are you reluctant to say that our talks were useful, when we settled SALT here?

Gromyko: I am not empowered to make any changes. It is his [Brezhnev's] decision.

It does no good to insist.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not insisting. I am pointing out that it is improper to do it without any discussion. If we had a discussion about it, that is something else. I have no authority to accept this. You know there are nuances important to our discussions here. We cannot have "bilateral" come first.

Gromyko: You prefer to have 'international' first? Okay.

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you quite honestly. It will make a bad impression on the President that you refuse to call useful a series of talks in which we settled SALT and the basic principles of our relations, and had useful talks on the Middle East.

More than this, I object to the method.

Gromyko: I will call the General-Secretary.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Dr. Kissinger: You still have "by mutual agreement" in here. I told Dobrynin why that is bad. He knows what my situation is. I will be under attack for coming in the first place. We will have internal problems in our Government. Yet you refuse to say that you invited me, even though it is true. And you refuse to say "useful." But the phrase "frank and useful" you agreed to yesterday.

[At that point, Ambassador Dobrynin and Mr. Kornienko entered the room.

Anatol, I have been telling the Foreign Minister what the situation is. What conclusion is the President to draw? He will conclude that you maneuvered him into getting me over here, which you wanted for whatever reasons of your own, while reserving the right to suggest publicly that it wasn't very significant.

Gromyko: What do you suggest?

Dr. Kissinger: I made my suggestion. I am not rigid. We could discuss it. To attempt it this way is unacceptable.

For my purposes it is essential to put the phrases about bilateral issues and Summit preparations second.

Where is the new draft I gave your Ambassador?

[Dr. Kissinger took out a carbon of the most recent U.S. draft, which read: "Between April 20 and April 24, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger was in Moscow to confer with the General-Secretary of the CPSU, Mr. Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and other Soviet officials. They discussed important international questions of interest to both governments as well as bilateral matters preparatory to the meeting between President Nixon and the Soviet leaders in May. The talks were frank and useful throughout."

This U.S. draft was used as the basis for the ensuing discussion, and some corrections and stylistic changes were made. The phrase 'of Central Committee' was added to Brezhnev's title. The phrase "and other Soviet officials" was deleted. The phrase "[questions] of interest to both governments" was dropped.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Gromyko: I will communicate this to the General-Secretary by phone.

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to you how you do it.

Gromyko: The President will attach importance to this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he will. Secondly, the President, you know, personally told Dobrynin he was opposed to my coming at all.

Sukhodrev: Having "international issues" first is a matter of principle?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Sukhodrev: And "frank and useful?"

Dr. Kissinger: That part would be extremely useful.

Your Ambassador can tell of the extraordinary difficulties this will cause in Washington. Any demonstrations of coolness on your part would have serious consequences.

Gromyko: We would like to omit the phrase "frank and useful throughout."

Dr. Kissinger: I can live without it. But I can tell you it makes a very bad impression. It would be extremely useful to have it.

Gromyko: Please do not insist on the last line [of your draft].

Dr. Kissinger: I won't. But you are paying a hell of a price for nothing. You are losing goodwill for this. This would be the sort of thing that would mean a hell of a lot. You know, you have the habit that when someone drops a nickel you will do anything to get the nickel, even if you lose a million dollars of goodwill in the process.

There are many in Washington who oppose this. As a friend, I can tell you I have been telling Washington that you have made significant concessions. Now you are telling me that you have tricked me. You are weakening my arguments.
Gromyko: I will call the General-Secretary.

[He takes the working text and goes out to call the General-Secretary, at about 2:25 p.m. Ten minutes later he returns.]

Gromyko: Mr. Brezhnev regrets that he had to leave. He accepts the new draft, except for the last line, "The talks were frank and useful throughout."

Dr. Kissinger: All right. I have pointed out what the consequences will be.

Gromyko: You can point out, if somebody asks, that the talks were useful. We will be positive, too. On the invitation, we will take care of that.

Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with the situation. I know it's not your fault. You have to do what you're told. The President -- and here I am speaking to you without authority -- already believes, first, that you got me here so you could say you matched the Chinese, and had me stay longer than I did there, and secondly that all this is a maneuver to keep us from pursuing the course we have chosen in Vietnam by stringing us along.

Gromyko: That is a most impossible interpretation.

Dr. Kissinger: If it were mine, I would not be here. And I would not tell you.

Gromyko: On Vietnam, we will communicate your proposals to Hanoi.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I believe it is not in your interest [to invite me here as a maneuver] because it would undermine what we have achieved. I will be telling the President when I return that I believe you have a major interest in a successful summit, and that it governs all your actions.

SALT

There is also a small problem on SALT. Semenov unfortunately said a little too much. This is another problem. The President himself sent me a message personally. Let me read part of it to you:

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
"As Al may have already messaged you, any SALT announcement by me now presents a serious problem. Rogers called me Saturday and told me that Semenov had given Smith exactly the same offer that you set forth in your message of April 22.

"I realize that we can point out that there is a shade of difference since you now have apparently an agreement with the Soviet to include SLBM's whereas we could say that Smith only had an agreement to discuss the inclusion of SLBM's. On the other hand, I fear that we have the problem in making any Presidential announcement that Smith and his colleagues will simply say that I was trying to point to your trip and my upcoming visit as having been responsible for accomplishing a breakthrough in SALT which Smith had already accomplished at lower levels. Perhaps we can find a way to handle this problem but I think in view of the call I received from Rogers we will find it pretty difficult."

And Anatol can tell you it is very very unusual for the President to write me at all.

Gromyko: This is a very improbable thing.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me propose this, Mr. Foreign Minister. The President can step out to the press when he sends Smith back to Helsinki and say that he had been in touch with Mr. Brezhnev and that a new proposal had been made to Dr. Kissinger here.

Gromyko: Certainly.

Dr. Kissinger: You should tell your number two guy to keep quiet. What is his name? Kishilev. He and Garthoff think they are running the negotiations themselves.

Could someone bring Ambassador Beam over here now?

[Kornienko goes out of the room to call Semenov in Helsinki. He returned a few minutes later, saying that Semenov was at the office and they would try again later.

[Dr. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko, who had been standing and walking back and forth through most of these discussions, then sat down in adjacent chairs by the table, and the discussion resumed.]"
Dr. Kissinger: I want to thank you again for your courtesy. We will work to make the Summit a success. We know you have problems here domestically, and we do as well.

This is not meant as a bluff or a threat, but I cannot overestimate what Vietnam has now come to mean with this offensive, and the lengths the President is prepared to go. If we can do for the next three-four years as we have been doing here, our two countries can have a totally new relationship. I am talking to you man to man. It would be a great tragedy if this were lost.

If there had been no offensive, that would be one thing. But now it is such a direct challenge that it has become a tremendous issue for us.

Gromyko: A great issue.

Dr. Kissinger: On the other hand, we will work with great dedication on what we have done here. And the visit has been enormously useful from my point of view.

Gromyko: What do these dates of meetings mean, except prestige?

Dr. Kissinger: But they have changed the dates three times.

Gromyko: Small countries may be more sensitive.

Dr. Kissinger: I cannot come on May 3, 4, or 5. On the 4th I have to talk to some people from LIFE magazine about the Moscow Summit. You don't want me to cancel that. On the 5th, there is a big dinner for me with people coming from many parts of the country. The earliest I could do it is the 7th.

We cannot accept that they continue the offensive until the 7th and then present us with a fait accompli. In fact, if there is a big offensive this week -- there is a new offensive already in the Central Highlands yesterday. Let me say this: Do not encourage them that we will be flexible, because you will confuse them.

Gromyko: Why should we take on the responsibility? Because, what do we really know of their position?

Tell the President that the man he will meet has broad views, and means what he says.
Dr. Kissinger: I will tell the President what an impressive man the General-Secretary is, and that he is sincere. This will be an enormous opportunity.

Gromyko: It remains for me to convey my best wishes to you and to the President.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

[The meeting broke up. Shortly thereafter, Ambassador Beam was brought in. Dr. Kissinger introduced him to everyone, told him that he had been in Moscow a few days, showed him the agreed draft announcement, and then took a walk with him around the garden.]
May 2, 1972

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Our Options with Moscow in Light of Vietnam

The deteriorating situation on the ground in Vietnam and the North Vietnamese intransigence on negotiations face us with some unpleasant choices with regard to the Moscow summit. Three weeks from now, when you are due in the Soviet Union, the South Vietnamese will be in a tenuous military situation at best; if they can hang on and turn the tide, this will take at least until later in June or July. On the other hand, the situation in South Vietnam could unravel seriously between now and May 22, with a collapse before or during your projected trip possible, though not likely.

These prospects clearly have major implications for the summit. I see three courses of action open to us:

(1) Go through with the summit, hanging on as well as we can in South Vietnam and applying all military pressures short of bombing Hanoi and Haiphong.

(2) Bomb Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as applying all other pressures, and leave it to the Russians whether or not to go through with the summit under these circumstances.

(3) Postpone the summit ourselves until the offensive has run its course, saying that the Vietnam situation makes your trip impossible at present, and delay bombing Hanoi and Haiphong until sometime after postponement, if at all.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Following are the arguments in favor and against each of these options.

(1) Go through with the Summit

Pro:

-- We would continue the momentum of your overall foreign policy of improving the prospects for peace through negotiations rather than confrontation.

-- The preparatory discussions make clear the Soviet eagerness for a productive meeting with agreements in many fields and the chance to set a new course in U.S.-Soviet relations.

-- Specifically, we would almost certainly conclude a major SALT agreement, the most significant arms control measure ever negotiated. In addition there would be an impressive set of U.S.-Soviet principles for bilateral relations and significant agreements or forward momentum in a variety of fields including economics, science, space, health, the environment, maritime matters and incidents at sea.

-- If the South Vietnamese can hang on and turn the tide with our strong support (short of bombing Haiphong-Hanoi) we will have the best of both worlds: a major summit success, capping a year of solid foreign policy achievements and the proven success of Vietnamization.

-- Domestically and internationally (e.g. in Peking) we would therefore be in a very strong position.

Con:

-- Almost all of the alluring vistas listed under the advantages above take on a completely different light if the situation in Vietnam does unravel seriously. Given recent trends in South Vietnam, it is only prudent to assume that this is a likely possibility.

-- You would be in an embarrassingly weak position for all your domestic and international audiences if you are seen toasting Soviet leaders, handing out credits, and signing bilateral agreements while we and our allies are being routed with the help of Soviet offensive weapons.
This would take place only months after India, backed by the Soviet Union, inflicted a defeat on our friend, Pakistan, and while Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean may be picking up again.

While Moscow never pledged to help us on Vietnam, they have been warned of the possible consequences of Hanoi's offensive, have disavowed themselves of responsibility, and transmitted messages. It would certainly be awkward to go to Moscow when after all this, North Vietnam increases its offensive and stonewalls in Paris.

(2) Bomb Hanoi and Haiphong

Pro:

- It would underline your determination to pursue a resolute course at whatever risk to other policies. This would be a strong signal abroad and evoke the right's approval at home.

- You have repeatedly warned that you would do what is necessary to respond to North Vietnam's invasion. The implication clearly includes hitting these areas. To refrain from doing so could smack of lack of nerve over the U.S. domestic scene or a secret deal with Moscow.

- This is the one action that gets Moscow's attention (for good or ill). It would give the Russians the onus of the decision whether or not to cancel the summit. If they are ever going to be helpful on Vietnam, this would maximize their incentives, given the stakes of Brezhnev and others in your trip.

- It would have some longer term military impact.

- It would given the South Vietnamese morale a boost.

Con:

- This type of bombing cannot be decisive with respect to the battlefield in South Vietnam over the next crucial couple of months. Furthermore, it diverts our assets away from more urgent tactical targets further south in North Vietnam and in South Vietnam.
-- There would inevitably be some civilian casualties.

-- It would fuel domestic criticism and opposition at home.

-- We cannot really expect Moscow to make North Vietnam desist in its offensive or be reasonable in Paris. Hanoi, having fully committed itself to this offensive and with the momentum currently in its favor, is just not going to halt its attacks or move in the negotiations until the ground situation clarifies. It has the necessary equipment and supplies and it seems impossible for Moscow to influence them in the next few weeks, even if it wanted to.

-- We run the real risk of the Soviet Union's cancelling the summit, recalling President Eisenhower and the U-2 incident. SALT and other agreements would be clearly jeopardised.

-- We thus could have the worst of all worlds: we bomb in areas that evoke the greatest domestic outcry and have no tactical military impact; the situation in South Vietnam continues to deteriorate; and the Russians call off the summit. We would have "lost" in South Vietnam and "lost" the summit because of South Vietnam.

(3) Postpone the Summit Ourselves

Pro:

-- We would not cancel the summit but instead say that your trip was not appropriate given the Vietnam situation; that we would be glad to reschedule it after the North Vietnamese offensive is over; and that we are prepared to pursue bilateral negotiations in such areas as SALT.

-- We would hold off bombing Hanoi/Haiphong at least until after the postponement so that it would flow as part of our overall policy and not be the cause of the summit break-off. We might decide not to bomb those areas at all, given the negative factors involved and the fact that postponement of your trip is sufficiently strong action by itself.
-- This would be the mark of a resolute leader, oblivious to domestic politics, refusing to go to Moscow while Russian weapons were killing our men, our friends, and our own domestic scene.

-- There is no objective reasons why bilateral negotiations with Moscow, including SALT, could not go forward. Technically you do not have to go to Moscow for these reasons.

-- We would avoid all the nightmares of option one. Assuming the South Vietnamese scene continues to look ominous, or actually collapses, you would go to Moscow with two unattractive choices. You could embrace the Soviets, which makes us look weak. Or you could stonewall purposely in all areas, which would make your visit thoroughly unproductive, indeed negative.

-- The favorable impact of your strong action on Peking should outweigh the possible risk of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Conversely, the Chinese would look with disdain at your going to Moscow in a weak position.

Con:

-- In taking this action we would have to assume that there would be no summit meeting during 1972. It would be almost impossible for Moscow to agree to reschedule it on our terms.

-- We would also have to assume that this will mark a major downturn in U.S.-Soviet relations. We would be accused of sacrificing all our national interests, and the world's interests, in improved U.S.-USSR relations because of Vietnam.

-- We would probably lose any SALT agreement. Although technically an agreement could be concluded by the negotiations, politically the driving force has been the prospect of the summit. It is difficult to envisage the two sides reaching agreement on remaining issues in the wake of a summit postponement or cancellation. A renewed arms race could ensue in which Moscow would have a decided advantage given our domestic mood on defense spending.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-- Other bilateral agreements and negotiations with Moscow in a variety of fields would be jeopardized, to say the least.

-- This action, while it might give the South Vietnamese a psychological lift, can hardly be expected to be decisive concerning the military or political situation in Vietnam.

Conclusion:

Obviously, none of the above choices is very attractive. If we could be confident that the South Vietnamese will hold and turn back the North Vietnamese offensive, the first option would clearly be the preferable one. The second option seems to me to gain us the worst of both worlds concerning the summit and Vietnam. Accordingly, given the present situation in South Vietnam and the fact that a decisive improvement could probably only take place after your Moscow trip, I lean towards option three.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

ACTION
May 11, 1972

CLASSIFIED BY
H. R. KISSINGER

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY: D-1 (S)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON: 12/31/72

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Your Next Meeting with Dobrynin

I.

Following is a rundown of all bilateral negotiations. The maritime talks are completed except for a complex problem on freight rates. You can do nothing with Dobrynin at this point. Incidents at sea is moving along, but will be hung up on the problem of specifying fixed distances for aircraft over ships. The Soviets are coming in with a face-saver but we will have to overrule Defense to accept it. Do not raise with Dobrynin at this meeting.

Environment is settled.

Space cooperation is settled between us and the Soviets; we require a Presidential commitment to the money involved ($250 million). Do not raise with Dobrynin.

Science and Technology. They owe us a reply to our revisions.

Health. They owe us a response.

On both these issues, as on environment before, the Soviets are trying to break out of the general framework of our overall exchange agreement. We cannot do this because we would lose all the ancillary benefits of that agreement in terms of getting to the Soviet public with such things as exhibits, literature, students, etc. We also have legal problems with Justice on issuing visas to Soviets (waiver requirements) since many technical Soviets are intelligence types. Do not make this point to Dobrynin, but stress that our cooperation on specific matters must continue to be within the general framework of the exchange program which is renewed every two years.

Details follow.

1. Maritime Talks. Ad referendum agreement was reached during the second round of talks in Moscow, April 17-21, with the understanding...
that the Soviets would come to Washington to work out a few remaining details to be included in the annexes of the agreement. The most recent round of talks, which concluded yesterday resulted in agreement on all issues except one -- freight rates. This issue is involved in the broader understanding on equal participation in cargo carriage. The Soviet negotiators have told Commerce's Assistant Secretary Gibson that they cannot have an agreement on this subject that would have US ships charging higher rates than the world freight/average. Gibson continues to insist that the agreement include the equal participation provision (this is essential to union support) but he has had to admit that US shippers will not always be able to ship at the going world freight rate average -- especially when that average is as low as it is now.

A possible solution, which neither side has ruled out, would be to reach agreement on equal participation by US and Soviet flags, but to let the Soviets decide -- based on the market average -- when it is in their interests to have US and Soviet flags carry the cargo (this would be when the world freight rate average is high) and when the cargo should be carried in third flag ships. Gibson is presently preparing his recommendations on this issue for submission to the Under Secretaries Committee, which is now scheduled to meet on Tuesday, May 16, to consider the problem. If we are to reach agreement along these lines, the Soviets may have to agree initially to have the cargos carried in US and Soviet ships whatever the freight rates -- so that we can demonstrate to our unions that US ships are participating in the new agreement. Do not raise.

2. Incidents at Sea Talks. The second round of talks began in Washington on May 4. The Soviets, as expected, have stated that the US-Soviet agreement on incidents at sea should include understandings fixing precise altitudes and minimum allowable horizontal distances for aircraft approaching ships and for aircraft approaching other aircraft. The US position permits us to agree to general wording understandings on these issues, not fixed distances.

The second round is scheduled to run through May 16; it is still too early to know if the Soviets will agree to our position. The talks to date have indicated flexibility on the Soviet side. They have said that they would be willing to have fixed distance formulations qualified by words such as "in general," or "As a rule, ..."

Do not raise yourself, but if Dobrynin does you should point out that it will be very difficult for us to accept fixed distances, and that good general wording understandings based on sound rules of the road principles make the best sense in this initial Navy-to-Navy agreement.
3. Environmental Cooperation. An referendum agreement was reached on the text of an environmental agreement in Moscow on May 6. State is now giving the text a final review, and we can expect their recommendations shortly as to the timing and level of signing. In any event, we are now in position to announce the agreement during the Moscow visit.

4. Science and Technology. On May 8, OST gave the Soviet Embassy our revisions to their proposed draft agreement establishing a US-Soviet Joint Commission on science and technology. The Soviets have not yet replied. The main points at issue in the drafts at this point involve the relationship of the science and technology agreement to the overall US-Soviet exchanges agreement, and the role of the US Government in the establishing and development of direct contacts between private US firms and Soviet enterprises. (Both of these issues have been satisfactorily dealt with in the environmental agreement.) The Soviets owe us a reply.

5. Space agreement. NASA and the Soviet Academy have reached ad referendum agreement on space cooperation that would include a 1975 joint manned space mission. The President has to decide if he wishes to go ahead with this agreement, taking into account the $250 million price tag on the joint mission. You have my memorandum of May 9 urging action on this subject; as noted in that memorandum OMB is on board and Congressional soundings have indicated that the joint space mission will be favorable received on the Hill. No need to raise.

6. Health Agreement. Following the first, March 27-31 meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Health Committee in Moscow, the Soviets gave us a draft US-USSR agreement on health cooperation. On May 10, having just received White House instructions to respond favorably to the Soviet proposal, State gave the Soviet Embassy our suggested revisions to their draft (again, revisions along the lines we are suggesting for science and technology, and which the Soviets have already agreed to on environment). We have informed the Soviets that we hope to conclude negotiations on the ad referendum health agreement by Friday, May 12. You can prod Dobrynin.

7. Economic Issues. This, as you know, is fluid because of Patoliachev. The only thing to raise right now is that we definitely want a Commercial Commission to come out of the summit. (Our other decisions, especially on credits, must await the end of the Patoliachev visit so that we know the precise context, particularly on lend-lease.)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: HELMUT SONNENFELDT
SUBJECT: SALT Status

Following has been tentatively agreed at Helsinki:

1. The Soviets will accept an agreed interpretive statement on Other Large Phased Array Radars (OLPARS) at our proposed cut off of three million (3 x 10 to the 6th power);

2. We will accept an agreed interpretive statement that destruction or dismantling of old launchers must proceed when sea trials of the new submarine begins and should be done expeditiously;

3. Both sides have shifted to accept an agreed interpretive statement that there will be no significant increase in external silo dimensions;

4. The U.S. reserved the right to make a unilateral statement on the definition of heavy ICBMs (after the Soviets indicated that they would not accept an agreed statement).

This represents considerable movement by the Soviets and resolves many of the remaining issues.

The SLBM issues and the location of the second Soviet ICBM defense site remain unresolved.

SLBMS

Following is current U.S. position already presented to the Soviets in Helsinki. It includes both G and H Classes.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Article III

The parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, except that under agreed procedures the parties may construct additional SLBM launchers on additional modern ballistic missile submarines as replacements for ICBM launchers of older types constructed prior to 1964 or for SLBM launchers.

Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms:

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

1. The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that agreement remains in force:

A. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (B.) of paragraph 1 of this Protocol, the U.S. shall have no more than seven hundred ten SLBM launchers on submarines operational and under construction and no more than forty-four modern ballistic missile submarines operational and under construction, and the USSR shall have no more than nine hundred fifty SLBM launchers on submarines operational and under construction and no more than sixty-two modern ballistic missile submarines operational and under construction.

B. The US and the USSR shall not exceed the above-mentioned limitations, except that in the process of modernization or replacement they may, under agreed procedures, have under construction additional SLBM launchers on additional modern ballistic missile submarines for replacement of equal numbers of ICBM launchers of older types constructed prior to 1964 or equal numbers of SLBM launchers.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

2. This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

Done at ______________________ on _______________________, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Comment: This protocol specifies only ceilings and leaves aside what numbers are operational or under construction. Numbers operational or under construction would thus have to be handled by agreed definitions.

-- Definition of "operational" would have to be framed to include only those that have completed fitting out trials and "under construction" would have to be defined to include only those submarines actually in sheds. Such a definition would mean about 41 - 42 Y-Class submarines.

-- Since we can make a good estimate of those submarines already launched, no definition of "operational" is necessary, if we can agree on the numbers "under construction." We would need a definition that excluded any boat not already in the sheds. Otherwise the Soviets will expand their base number to count parts of boats not yet in actual assembly halls.

-- This route of defining "operational" or "under construction" would force the Soviet hand on how they calculated the 48 they claimed are operational or under construction.

Ceilings

Specified ceilings for the Soviets (62 boats and 950 missiles) would be temporarily exceeded in our proposal, because both sides can have under construction extra boats as eventual replacements for older launchers and dismantling would not start until completion of sea trials. This allows US to start ULMs without dismantling or replacement.

Numbers

Assuming for the Soviets 41 Y-Class boats and about 624 SLBMs as of now, (36 Y-Class and 4 New Class), the dismantling of SS - 7 and 8s ICBMs would allow an additional 17 submarines and 209 missiles. At least half of C and H would then have to be converted to reach 62 boats.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Soviet Objections To Our Proposal:

--- Modern submarines do not by definition include G and H Class, because "modern" means built after 1965.

--- Soviets claim they now have operational and under construction 48 modern submarines. (Seven above our present estimate).

--- This would mean an additional 14 boats could be constructed, requiring only dismantling of 168 older ICBMs (assuming each new boat has only 12 submarines). This would still leave Soviets short of total of 950 launchers (i.e. a level of about 876).

Possible Compromise

1. To count as "modern" only H Class (i.e. only nuclear powered and with ballistic missiles.)

2. And to count G-Class if replaced with "modern" launchers.

Our Objectives:

1. To include in agreement some provision or definition so that Soviets cannot have at least H Class fleet in current total.

2. To include provision or understanding that if G and H fitted with "modern" missile (SS-N-6 or 8) that this will count in 950 total launchers.
We are now close to final agreement on almost all the major SALT issues. Some issues may be kept open for ostensible resolution in Moscow, but as discussed with Brezhnev, they will be settled in the confidential channel before hand, so that the final outcome will be arranged by the time you arrive in Moscow. The basic agreements are along the lines explored with Dobrynin before my trip to Moscow, and are essentially the proposals made by Brezhnev to you, and approved at the NSC meeting.

Brezhnev indicated strongly that he desired these agreements to be signed during your stay in the USSR, and we are planning on a signing ceremony on Friday, May 26 in the Kremlin.

Since the initial agreements will be completed in Moscow, the discussion of SALT will probably revolve around the next phase. Both sides are committed to this follow-on stage by the terms of the ABM treaty, and it is in our interest to pursue it. Little has been said, however, about the content of this phase. The Soviet Delegation has emphasized that it will be "comprehensive." Brezhnev raised with me the question of our forward-based aircraft and what he called "intermediate range" missiles (we have none), and implied that these systems would be the focal point of further negotiations. He also mentioned concluding a nuclear non-aggression treaty, which I diverted to a further private exchange. Dobrynin has given me a draft text, which I will deal with separately from this paper. This paper includes highlights of the agreements, background on the negotiations, unresolved issues, and issues for the next phase.

I. The Current Agreements

We will conclude an ABM treaty and an Interim Agreement on Limiting Offensive Weapons. The following are the highlights.

A. The ABM Treaty

--- Limits each side to one ABM site for defense of Moscow and Washington and one site for each side for the defense of an ICBM field.

--- There will be a total of 200 ABM interceptors, 100 at each site.
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES-ONLY

-- The Soviets will justify the unequal levels by counting 92 British and French submarines along with our 41, and reserving the right to increase their own level if this total is exceeded on the NATO side.

-- We cannot acknowledge in any agreement that the British and French boats are relevant to SALT; nor can we accept the Soviet contention that the SLBM matter is only temporarily resolved because of our forward bases.

-- The Interim Agreement will run for five years (compared to the original Soviet proposal of 18 months), and both sides are committed to replacing it with a permanent and more comprehensive agreement.

-- Both sides will abide by the obligations of the agreement once it is signed, though formally the implementation will await ratification of the ABM treaty.

II. Pre-Summit Background

We arrived at the present agreement in two stages: in the May 20 agreement, which broke the deadlock over a separate ABM treaty versus an offense-defense package, and the most recent private discussions, which resolved the ABM level and achieved the inclusion of submarine limitations.

A. The May 20 Understanding

By late 1970, the negotiations were grinding to a halt over two issues: (1) the Soviets wanted a separate agreement on ABMs only, which would mean leaving aside their most dangerous and dynamic programs; (2) if offensive weapons were to be included, however, the Soviets insisted on a strict definition of strategic that would include all our aircraft-based and on-carriers.

In these circumstances, if we were to resume progress, there had to be some compromise. The explorations with Dobrynin and your exchanges with Brezhnev gradually developed a new basis for discussions. On May 20 you announced the breakthrough that we would concentrate on an ABM agreement, but also, in parallel, negotiate for limitations on certain offensive weapons. This permitted the USSR to back away from its separate ABM proposals and drop the inclusion of forward-based systems since the offensive agreements would be limited and temporary.
With the summit in mind, and your trip to Peking approaching, Dobrynin began to explore in January that either the issue of SLBMs be set aside and resolved after the initial agreements, or that the limit be placed on the total number of missiles for submarines with freedom to dismantle older land-based ICBMs and replace them with submarine launched missiles. (This was originally an American idea introduced in our early proposal in 1970, but not pursued in the context of a limited agreement.)

I impressed on Dobrynin the need to include submarines, and told him that our ABM position would ultimately depend on the resolution of the SLBM question. When negotiations resumed in March of this year, we tied the ABM and SLBM issues together.

Dobrynin was told that we could introduce some flexibility in our ABM position if it appeared that the USSR could agree to the inclusion of SLBMs. Contrary to the general skepticism in Washington that this linkage would work, Brezhnev in his letter in late March indicated that they would study our position. In the formal negotiations, however, they continued to balk. I returned to the idea broached by Dobrynin that there could be a solution based on allowing both sides to replace older land-based ICBMs with new submarine launched missiles.

On the ABM impasse, it was clear that we either had to concede more Soviet sites for ICBM protection or reconsider deploying our own defense of Washington. On a purely personal basis, Gerard Smith discussed the latter with his counterpart, and there was an indication of a willingness to move in this direction, but without commitment on the SLBM package. The Soviets obviously hoped to achieve the compromise on ABMs without making a concession on SLBMs. I stressed to Dobrynin that this was not our position.

C. The Brezhnev Proposal

The Soviets had indicated through the confidential channel that they were anxious to sign a SALT agreement in Moscow during your visit. Thus, in my meetings with Brezhnev, he made two new proposals that reflected discussions with Dobrynin and moved close to our basic positions.
-- This is a highly technical problem. The measurement criteria used is the product of the area of the radar's antenna (i.e., the aperture) and the radar's power. The power-aperture of our MSR is just less than 3 million \(3 \times 10^6\) watt-meters squared.

-- The two exceptions -- verification or space tracking -- are because radars are needed in small numbers for such purposes and because radars for these purposes are the easiest to distinguish from ABM radars.

The Soviets apparently accepted this proposal on April 22. There was an ambiguity in their language, but there were indications that this would not be a problem.

About a week later, the Soviets discovered that there was a "small problem" of defining power-aperture levels. The Soviets claimed that they thought the MSR had a power-aperture of 50 million \(5 \times 10^7\) watt-meters squared, or about 15-20 times larger than it is. In fact, at least two Soviets had been told the MSR's correct size in January.

It is unclear whether the Soviets have changed their mind on accepting our proposal, or whether they had all the time intended to look conciliatory initially and then to claim a significant misunderstanding over levels.

We cannot accept the Soviet standard since it is so high as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, it implicitly accepts radars of a "smaller" size. If we are unable to achieve an acceptable compromise, we may drop the disputed provision on definitions and rely on the more general exclusion of large radars except for agreed purposes.

B. Location of the ICBM Defense Area.

There is some dispute, however, over where the Soviets can deploy their ICBM-defense areas. (The US site will obviously be at Grand Forks, where construction is already well along.)

The Soviets have ICBM fields scattered throughout much of their country. We have strongly insisted that the ICBM-defense area be...
SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

(1) Agree that there is no decision one way or another on banning mobiles, but obtain a parallel understanding that the Soviets would not deploy mobiles for a few years.

(2) Allow replacement of old ICBMs by mobile ICBMs. This would allow deployment, but halt an increase in the overall number of Soviet ICBMs.

(3) A unilateral statement by the US that we would expect both sides to consult on the number of mobiles, etc., before either side started deployments.

E. Definition of "Light" versus "Heavy" ICBMs.

While the Soviets have agreed not to convert "light" ICBMs to "heavy" ICBMs, they have balked at agreeing to a definition of the dividing line between the two. We proposed that the line be: no larger than the Soviet SS-11, or no larger than 70 cubic meters.

- The SS-11 is about 67 cubic meters and the SS-9 is about 220 m$^3$. Some definition is likely in the next few days.

IV. Follow-on SALT Negotiations

A. Soviet Perceptions.

If the first phase of SALT negotiations are successfully concluded, both sides have committed themselves "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms." (Article XI, ABM Treaty) However, there has been little discussion of what Phase II would entail.

Soviet objectives are likely to be: (1) to maintain their numerical lead in missile launchers, while being allowed to catch up with US in MIRVs and qualitative characteristics; and (2) to limit four Forward-Based Systems (FBS). The Soviets consider FBS a strategic threat to themselves, a way to loosen our ties with our Allies, and a good bargaining point. Given this general approach the second phase could confront us with some serious problems, including problems with our allies. Moreover, we cannot be sure that the Soviets will have any serious interest in an agreement.

SECRET/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
2. **Forward-Based Systems.**

**Soviet Position.** Brezhnev raised the question of our forward-based aircraft and our "intermediate range" missiles, and this may be the critical issue in the next phase. Their latest SLBM proposals refer to our bases as a matter for future discussion.

**Your Position.** We should resist a specific commitment to discuss forward-based systems. However, we should recognize that we cannot avoid the subject.

--- We should respond by noting that Soviet position involves Allies and we cannot negotiate on their behalf. We can only listen to the Soviets and consult: as we stated previously in the negotiations, if all other issues are disposed of, we can perhaps take into account the forward-based systems.

3. **Zero ABM.**

**Soviet Position.** The Soviets will probably not push for further limits on ABMs since they want to retain their deployments at Moscow.

**Your Position.** In Moscow our position should be that the treaties should be ratified and the second offensive phase begun before reopening ABM issues.

4. **Reductions: Especially of ICBMs.**

**Soviet Position.** The Soviets might want a commitment to seek reductions in offensive forces. However, the Soviets will avoid any commitments which suggest that they will give up their numerical edge in missiles.

**Your Position.** We should make it clear that an ultimate objective is reductions, especially of the increasingly vulnerable ICBMs.

--- Note that the powerful Soviet ICBMs make our Minuteman more vulnerable than the Soviet ICBMs, and we explored a reduction proposal in the early stages of SALT.

--- A promise of some reductions is implicit in the ABM agreement
-- In sum, you can foresee that MBFR could be even more complicated than SALT in defining comparability of forces, in creating a balance in reduced forces, and calculating the various factors of geography and reinforcement capabilities.

-- This is why you urge an early exploratory phase, similar to the first SALT discussions to discuss some underlying principles.

D. Collateral Constraints to Accompany Reductions

(We are studying some measures to restrict the movement of forces, exchange of observers at maneuvers, perhaps some observers at border crossing points. These might inhibit clandestine reintroduction of forces, or provide more early warning of a buildup.)

Soviet Position

There have been no public statements by the Soviets for or against stabilizing measures in addition to reductions. They would probably be reluctant to consider any such measures unless they accompany reductions. Intelligence sources indicate Brezhnev told the Sawasaw Pact that Moscow might consider constraints on military maneuvers, especially near the East-West border and other unspecified measures.

Your Position

This is a level of detail you may prefer to avoid. You might allude to the question:

-- We would want to consider limitations on massing of forces for "exercises" and advance notification of significant movements of forces so as to enhance confidence in early warning -- such measures are generally unfavorable to the "attacker," so they may be seen to provide benefits for both sides.

E. Scope of Reductions

Soviet Position

Until Brezhnev's March 1971 speech to the 24th CPSU Congress, the USSR had spoken only of the reduction of foreign forces. Since then, the possibility of indigenous force reductions has been admitted. The January 1972 Warsaw Pact statement mentions both "foreign and national forces."
outcome could include the following agreed US-Soviet communique:

"The US side presented for discussion certain principles related to the reduction of forces in Central Europe. The principles are: that reductions should be consistent with undiminished security of all parties, should be balanced and mutual, should be phased in their scope and timing where appropriate, should be subject to adequate verification, should include certain specified types of forces and should be accompanied in each phase by constraints on forces in order to enhance stability."

The Soviet side might "take note" of these principles and indicate that they could be the basis for exploratory discussions.

Attached is an outline of MBFR Principles generally acceptable to the Alliance. If the Soviets show interest in reaching some agreement on principles, the attached outline could be the basis.

I recommend you not pursue an agreed statement of principles in any detail, since we would be clearly acting as a surrogate for the Allies.