Section VI

Multilateral Negotiations
MBFR, CSCE
DATE: January 31, 1962
TO: The Vice President
FROM: Colonel Burris
RE: Nuclear Program in France

On January 24, a statement of the British position on nuclear weapons was furnished you. Two essential aspects of that country's position were that additional nuclear forces in Europe are not a military necessity and the creation of NATO nuclear forces was discounted.

Ambassador Gavin has more recently reported that France has become progressively less interested in cooperating with the U.S. and NATO as its own nuclear program develops. Significantly, France is on the threshold of achieving important results in nuclear delivery. Gavin believes that certainly while De Gaulle is in power France will not cooperate in the creation of a NATO missile program unless it helps France achieve a national capability at the same time.

Nevertheless, Gavin recommends that the U.S. attempt to establish a NATO missile program even if France is unwilling to join. (You will recall that the British also discount the establishment of such a program.) Gavin believes that if the program becomes effective the French will eventually participate in some form.

Gavin has renewed his plea that the United States provide France with missiles or with information which will hasten the French production of missiles. He also makes the curious suggestion that the U.S. retain custody of U.S. nuclear warheads while observing that the French could mount their own warheads on the same missiles. This is doubly in conflict with our present policy. He feels nevertheless that the U.S. cannot afford to permit France to further alienate itself from this country and from NATO and that this kind of action is necessary for the creation of a NATO missile program with substantial European control.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Notes on the National Security Council Meeting, June 16, 1964

The Council met at 12:12 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. The list of attendees has already been given you.

(1) The President noted the presentation by representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense based on the written "Briefing for the President - Underground Test Program FY 1965" dated June 1964 (Part I, Text and Part II, Charts).

(2) The President was interested in knowing why more tests were being recommended for FY 1965 than had actually been conducted in 1964. He was informed that it was largely due to the lack of any testing whatsoever by the Department of Defense and the cessation of testing during the summer of 1963 while the test ban treaty negotiations were underway. He also asked about the Soviet underground test program.

(3) Both Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara urged Presidential approval of the underground test program. Rusk urged that the rate of testing be maintained at about the same level as had been followed in the last months of FY 1964.

(4) The memorandum for the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from Bundy dated June 22, 1964, "FY 1965 Underground Nuclear Test Program," is a record of the substantive decisions by the President at and following the NSC Meeting.

Charles E. Johnson

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NI 86-179
By 4-10-87, NARA, Date 4-10-87
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Atlantic Nuclear Problem

I. Tactics

1. It is evident that the problem of how to organize European nuclear sharing persists. German concerns over this issue were evident in the election - albeit in ways that were exaggerated by domestic political needs.

2. This issue will arise in discussions with the FRG, when Erhard visits Washington. This will presumably be sometime in November, after he has formed a new government.

3. It will not then be desirable to surface a new "made in USA" proposal or intimate that such a proposal is on the way. This is not the time (EEC and NATO crises) to shake the Germans with changes in the US position on major issues of common concern. Any US shift which seemed to involve moving away from a collective force would, furthermore, probably be attributed by the Germans to recent non-proliferation negotiations, which cause them considerable concern.

4. Rather our position vis-à-vis the Germans should reflect the fact that we still believe that it important to work out a nuclear sharing arrangement.

The Germans will undoubtedly suggest that we should not move on this front until after de Gaulle has made his expected move against NATO early next year, on the grounds that otherwise, we will simply be providing him with a convenient pretext for that move.

We should fall in with this view and suggest that the balance of the year should be spent in having the Select DefMin Committee and the Paris ANF/MLF Working Group study various aspects of nuclear sharing and consultation during the balance of the year. Then the five member countries
countries should, perhaps through a Wise Men's exercise, review the whole problem of nuclear sharing, in the light of these groups' work and of wider political considerations. This would permit whatever approach then commends itself to be surfaced in a way that did not make it seem a "made in USA" proposal and at a time that would make it a response to, rather than provocation of, de Gaulle's attacks against NATO.

The communique, at the end of Erhard's visit, might then record the two government's determination to move ahead toward nuclear sharing arrangements whose details would be worked out with other interested countries, in light of current studies.

5. We may have to talk to the question in more specific terms if wide-ranging US-UK-FRG talks are held later this year.

The British will then be reviewing their Polaris submarine program, as part of defense budget planning. They may want to know if they can count on any contribution from other countries to the submarines' costs. (They have underlined this point of submarine-cost-sharing in the ANF/MLF Working Group.)

The Germans will probably be asked, in such talks, to play a major role in long-term lending to the UK. They may well be concerned over the prospect of subsidizing the present degree of UK-German nuclear inequality.

It may be useful, therefore, to seek agreement in principle, in these talks, to "internationalizing (to use PM Wilson's term) the British submarines. The details and timing would be for resolution in later studies referred to in para 4, but there would be a clear implication that it was at least a long-term objective to work toward greater sharing of the costs and responsibilities involved.
involved in the UK deterrent and thus toward greater UK-German equality in this respect.

The US, UK, and FRG would agree to stay close to each other informally on this nuclear issue, while participating in larger groups (Select Committee, ANF/MLF Working Group) which studied the matter.

II. Substance

6. The tactics suggested above would allow us to defer choosing between alternative nuclear solutions until early in 1966. Indeed, it would be unwise to make that choice before we have a much clearer idea of German attitudes and the unfolding NATO situation. Possible new approaches could be considered at that time.

7. The paper that follows suggests such a possible new approach, with three variants. It is not advanced as a plan we should now fasten on, but rather as something which may warrant further study when we have a better idea of German attitudes.

8. This new approach seeks to meet German and European concerns in this field in ways that will reinforce our broader political purposes:

   (a) closer US-UK-FRG concert and a German feeling that they are moving toward equality with the UK within this concert;

   (b) non-proliferation;

   (c) Atlantic partnership and European unity.

Obviously the initial actions that are proposed will not, at one fell swoop, resolve the nuclear issue; but they point in the right direction and leave room for later progress.
9. This new approach seeks to take account of the objections which the MLF ran into, on the Hill and elsewhere:

(a) It seemed like a military gimmick, rather than a broad-guaged political approach to the underlying problem.

(b) Surface ships, as a new weapons system, were considered a stimulant to the arms race, and thus bad for detente, as well as being viewed skeptically on grounds of military effectiveness.

(c) Superficially, the venture seemed to conflict with, rather than reinforce, non-proliferation.

(d) The MLF appeared divisive within the alliance, because of French hostility to it. (This argument has been less in evidence, since the French have shown that they were going to be hostile to NATO, even without an MLF.)

In assessing Congressional attitudes, we should bear in mind that no effective presentation of the collective force concept was made on the Hill. When individual members of the Congress were exposed to this sort of discussion, some headway was made. No definitive judgment of likely Congressional attitudes to full exposition of an administration position is feasible, in light of present evidence.

10. Broad Purposes. Under this new approach — regardless of which of the three variants was chosen — we would propose that a Group of interested countries be organized, to pursue these two main purposes:

First: It would try to develop Atlantic nuclear defense, production, and consultation arrangements which offer a viable alternative to national deterrence by the European
European members. The object would be to give them as many as possible of the advantages of national deterrence, except the ability to fire off weapons nationally. To this end, the Group would have these functions:

(a) Consulting about a wide range of common nuclear defense problems, including those to be considered in the proposed DefMin Select Committee (which would become a part of the Group).

(b) Consulting about crises and circumstances which could give rise to use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world, as proposed by the UK in connection with ANF.

(c) Creating and managing a collective force.

(d) Sharing peaceful technological know-how derived from US missile and nuclear production.

Second: It would concert about non-proliferation and disarmament policy. To fulfill this purpose, the Consortium would:

(a) Consult regarding actions that member countries might take to help meet the threat of national proliferation in other free world areas (e.g., guarantees to nuclear capable countries, agreement that aid should not be given to countries which develop new national nuclear programs, etc.)

(b) Seek to develop proposals to be made to the USSR about the reduction of armaments (particularly those types of armaments to which it might contribute via any collective force); consult about disarmament proposals received from the USSR; and carry out joint disarmament studies as needed to this end. (Any nuclear sharing arrangement should deal with disarmament - because it is closely related and because this would help meet the problem)
problem posed by the fact that Germany, not being a party to the Geneva negotiations, is now only a bystander in the development of western disarmament positions until the last minute. It would also dramatize the fact that the object of the whole exercise is to control, not build up, nuclear arms.

The fact that one of the Group's stated purposes was creation of a collective force would probably limit membership to the US, UK, Germany, Italy and Netherlands - the five countries now prepared to join such a force (who also happen to be the presumptive members of the Select Committee).

If creating such a force was not one of the Group's stated purposes, the membership question would probably become unmanageable. We only succeeded in getting most NATO countries to swear off the Select Committee on the grounds that it was ad-hoc, temporary, etc. A more wide-ranging and lasting sharing arrangement would attract them like flies. We would be in a hopeless position trying to decide who should be included unless the stated purposes of the Group automatically limited its membership.

11. Functioning of the Group

(a) Committee. Given the wide scope of the Group's functions, member countries would be represented on its governing Committee by whichever Ministers or officials had competence in the subject under discussion: Defense Ministers, Foreign Ministers, disarmament agency heads, and their respective subordinates, depending on the agenda.

(b) Executive. To ensure that its deliberations amount to something more than a NATO-type confrontation of national viewpoints, there should be provision in the Group for responsible officials, not representing governments, to make proposals to its governing Committee regarding
regarding future actions and policies. One way to do this would be to provide that the Executive, which ran the day-to-day functioning of the Group in accordance with the governing Committee's decisions, should have the right of direct proposal to the Committee and should be composed of men of some political stature. It might be a two-man executive: one appointed by the US, and one by the European members. This Executive and its small staff might be located in Washington, The Hague, or London, as the members preferred. The governing Committee would rotate its meetings among member capitals.

(c) Voting. The Committee should take decisions on matters of import by two affirmative votes: one cast by the US and one cast by the European members collectively (under whatever formula they agreed among themselves). This arrangement would help to fend off Gaullist attacks that the venture was a scheme for US hegemony; it would be welcomed by "European-minded" types on the Continent, and was originally suggested by the UK for ANF.

12. Hardware. The hardware issues could be handled in one of three ways:

(a) Alternative A: No Immediate Force. The modalities of creating a collective force would be left for long-term consideration by the Group. The ANF/MLF Working Group would be dissolved and its functions assigned to the Group. The fact that this purpose had not been overtly abandoned would help to make the Germans that we were not going to change our position so as to negotiate a non-proliferation pact which would exclude any collective force. On the other hand, there would be no commitment to early action. The members would be left free to "play it by ear." They could decide whether, and if so when, to proceed in the light of the developing situation (the NATO and EEC crises, German attitudes toward France, whether progress in the Soviet submarine and ASW programs abated security objections to inclusion of Germans in submarine mixed manning, etc.).
(b) Alternative B: European Contribution. The US could offer to place its three SACEUR-assigned subs (which might be increased to four) under political control of the Group. In so doing it might indicate (i) its belief that this constituted the full contribution to the collective force that it was reasonable to expect from the Atlantic half of the Group, and (ii) its hope that there would also eventually be a matching European contribution, in which all the European member countries could play a part. Then the US would leave it to the European members to see if they could work out mixed ownership and, eventually, mixed manning of the UK subs. The Group would go ahead with its other functions in the meantime, with a vacant slot for the European contribution, since the Europeans would probably need several years - at least - to work out the modalities of any European contribution. Any such European contribution would, like the US submarines, be placed under political control of the Group, which is to say that their firing would require both a US and a European vote. There would, however, be a "European clause", consistent with the terms of our draft non-proliferation treaty. This clause would be more credible in the case of a force in which US personnel thus did not take part than in the case of a force which included US personnel.

(c) Alternative C: Atlantic Collective Force. This force would be made up initially of mixed manned V-Bombers (with study of follow-on systems) and four UK Polaris submarines, with UK or US/UK crews if wider mixed manning is not considered presently feasible. In this event, there would be periodic technical review to see if progress toward wider mixed manning has become feasible, in light of technological developments. These weapons systems would be owned and financed by the Group and under its political control, as the UK has proposed.
for ANF. Thus the UK national strategic deterrent in Europe would cease to exist, from the non-proliferation standpoint. In this, as in Alternative B, the three US submarines in the Mediterranean now committed to SACEUR (and any other US strategic forces which might be assigned to SACEUR) could be placed under political control of the Group—though not under common ownership and mixed
manning.

13. In setting up the Group, we should seek to avoid giving the impression that we were creating a rival institution to take over NATO's functions.

Any collective force which the Group might create would be committed to SACEUR. There is some precedent (ACE Mobile Force) for interested NATO countries deciding to contribute to NATO a force in which others do not take part.

Joint production arrangements among a few interested NATO countries also find precedent, e.g., the F-104 G Consortium.

Similarly with disarmament, which is now handled by the Western Five (the 5 NATO countries at Geneva) with only limited NATO consultation.

And consultation about nuclear defense is now planned as a function of the Select Committee, which would not be a NATO-wide organ.

The Group would report to the NAC and appropriate NATO committees about its work. It would be under the NATO umbrella, even though not a part of NATO.

14. Congressional Reaction. The Congress should not find too much objectionable in the proposed arrangements, regardless of which of the alternative ways of handling the hardware issue is adopted:

(a) There would be no surface ships or other new weapons system.
(b) There would be no commitment to mixed manning involving US personnel (except possibly for US/UK manning, which would avoid both the security problems and the "language" problem). There would be provision for periodic review of possible progress toward wider mixed manning, but any decision to move in this direction would require unanimous (i.e., US) approval.

(c) Even if there were an Atlantic collective force, the expenditure involved would not be large. The US contribution to the costs of constructing and operating the UK submarines could be justified as the price of "buying out" one of the five existing national deterrents.

(d) The venture would reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament, because the UK deterrent would be eliminated, and because one of the Agency's major functions would be to develop a common approach by member countries both to the non-proliferation problem in other free world areas and to disarmament negotiations with the Soviets. (Each member country would, of course, continue to develop its national positions through present institutions and to consult in existing forums, i.e., the Western Five and NAC. This would, however, create another forum, having the advantage both of being small and of including Germany, for joint consultation and effort in certain disarmament issues of particular importance to these countries.)

15. The USSR. The Soviets would attack this venture, as they have attacked MLF and ANF (and are beginning to attack the Select Committee). But their attacks would be less plausible because a new Western weapons system was not being created.

16. UK. This is close enough to ANF, so that the present UK Government (if it were not paralyzed by an approaching election) would probably go along with this proposal.
proposal, either with or without a collective force. Labor would certainly want any collective force to be an Atlantic one; a Conservative government might look with somewhat more favor on the "European" option. Any British government would like the wide-ranging purposes of the venture and the fact that it omitted surface ships. Since this omission would be a signal UK victory, it would be important, if there is to be a collective force, not to signal willingness to drop the concept of surface ships until it was clear that an acceptable submarine deal could be gotten from the UK in return.

17. FRG. The Germans would:

(a) like the wide purposes;

(b) be aggrieved at disappearance of the surface ships;

(c) be somewhat mollified if they could get a collective submarine force to replace the surface ships (their initial preference was for subs) - particularly if there was also to be a follow-on collective weapons systems to replace the V-Bombers, so that it was clear there would eventually be a larger mixed manned force;

(d) vastly prefer an Atlantic to a European collective force;

(e) take a dim view of helping to pay for submarines without mixed manning. (This would undoubtedly be a key point. Although von Hassell was the first to suggest US/UK manning of submarines, his and other German reactions to this concept would depend largely on how confident he was that the periodic review would inevitably lead to wider mixed manning, i.e., he might conclude that German money would sooner or later be followed by German men.)
This estimate of German reactions suggests that Alternative C is preferable, with Alternative A next in line, if C is not feasible - either for US reasons or because the Germans consider the submarine deal unattractive. This estimate is, however, highly conjectural. It only underlines the need for avoiding a decision about alternative ways of handling the hardware issue, and about the larger approach of which they are a part, until we get a clear view of post-election FRG attitudes.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Under Secretary of State;

Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
Ambassador Thompson  
Mr. Tyler  
Ambassador Bruce  
Ambassador Finletter  
Ambassador McGhee  
Mr. McNaughton  
Mr. Spiers  
Mr. Read  

December 14, 1954

The attached revision of the U.S. paper of December 8 commenting on the U.K. ANF proposals is identical, except for paragraph 9, to the version initially given Prime Minister Wilson in Washington.  

The attached should be regarded as the authoritative version and is being given to the U.K., FRG, Netherlands and Italy.

Richard M. Hoouse
S/3
U.S. Comments on the UK Proposal of a Project for an Atlantic Nuclear Force

1. Preamble

After review of our own views and those of our allies, and after particular consideration of the proposals of HMG for an Atlantic nuclear force, we offer the following comments relating to the establishment of such a force. These comments are designed to take account both of the extended discussions which have occurred since 1962 and of the new proposals of HMG.

We believe that any successful plan must be responsive to the real requirements of as many members of the Alliance as possible. In this spirit, we emphasize that these suggestions are subject to discussion and revision in the light of the comments which will be sought from other interested governments.

As the President and the Prime Minister have agreed from the beginning of these discussions, no agreements or commitments are being made in this first exchange of views. Moreover, the issues before us extend far beyond the interests of our two nations alone, and any future agreement must be acceptable to the Alliance.

2. Objectives

We believe that any new arrangement of nuclear forces of NATO must meet the following objectives:

a. To deter nuclear proliferation by making it possible for non-nuclear members of the Atlantic Alliance to participate in the ownership, management and control of NATO's nuclear forces through collective action and without the creation of new independent national nuclear systems.

b. To strengthen the unity of the Alliance by providing for systematic and greatly increased co-operation and consultation in the nuclear field.

3. Specific Comments on the UK's proposed force

We believe that it would be appropriate to have discussions with other interested NATO governments of a concept of an
1. Atlantic nuclear force which might have the following components:

a. Transfer four POLARIS submarines to be transferred to the force by the British government.

b. Such elements of the British V-bomber force as HMG is prepared to contribute.

c. A POLARIS surface fleet having substantially the characteristics — if not the size — of that contemplated in the discussions of the working group in Paris. This force should have a size adequate to the needs and interests of non-nuclear powers which wish to participate in it, but we are prepared to discuss reductions from the initial proposals in the light of other contributions now in contemplation.

d. Such strategic nuclear forces as the United States or France might be prepared to subscribe.

4. Characteristics of the Force

a. We consider it essential that all elements of the force be under a common command and control arrangement, including permissive action links. While the POLARIS submarines could be orgnalized at least initially on a basis of national manning, the eventual mixed-manning of submarines should not be precluded if subsequent studies indicate its feasibility and desirability.

b. We also consider it essential to the success of this proposal that there should be a substantial UK contribution of manpower for the operation of the mixed-manned surface force, in order to insure that this arrangement commands the confidence of other participants.

c. Creation of this force should be conceived not as an addition to strategic forces that would otherwise be provided, but as a partial substitute, since it is the current expectation that presently programmed US forces will be appropriately reduced as the new force comes into being.

d. We believe that the new force, whatever its eventual components, should have a strength of not less than 200 missiles.

e. All the weapons systems transferred to the ANF would be committed for the life of the force. In the event of dissolution of the force, submarines and bombers would revert to
4. National Retention of the respective contributing states. Missiles and warheads in the surface fleet would also be returned to the supplying country.

5. Contribution of the United States Forces

...Should the concept discussed above prove acceptable to other allies, we would be prepared to consider a contribution to this new force of certain U.S. strategic weapons provided that discussions with other allies indicate a general desire for such a contribution, and provided that it can be made on terms which are practicable for the United States.

6. Non-Dissemination

The treaty establishing the new arrangements should include undertakings whereby nuclear members would agree not to disseminate nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear members would undertake not to acquire, or obtain control over, them.

7. Command Arrangements in Relation to NATO

We take note of the suggestion that the Atlantic missile force described above might be assigned to a separate commander. We are also familiar with the strongly expressed view of other allies that this force should be under the command of SACEUR. We think that this question of command should be left open for discussion among all interested parties.

8. Voting Arrangements

The agreement of the United States would be required in order to fire the force. The votes of the European members should be cast in a manner agreed to by them. The voting procedure could be revised only with the agreement of all of the participating nations.

9. Periodic Meetings of the Ministers of Defense

In order to make more effective the present procedures for consultation among the Western Powers, we suggest periodic meetings of the Ministers of Defense. These meetings would

We believe any agreement should contain provisions for review of the arrangements if (a) Germany is reunified; (b) a unified Europe is established; or (c) there is a major movement toward arms control or disarmament.

As stated in 8 above, any new agreement would require the approval of all participants, and we note that in the case of the US any change in control arrangements would be subject to full Constitutional approval.

The agreement should be so drafted that termination of the Force would not result in the creation of new national nuclear systems.

11. Future Procedure

a. A meeting of representatives of interested governments should be held early in 1956. They should be asked to review these matters and to prepare recommendations for their respective governments.

b. At an early stage in the development of these recommendations, and well before any final agreements are reached among interested parties, arrangements should be made for discussions with the Government of France.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 16, 1965, 3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Talking points with Prime Minister Wilson

With two exceptions, I think the basic talking points for this afternoon are covered in the memorandum we had before us this morning, which I attach at Tab A.

The first exception is the European nuclear problem. On this one, Ball, Bruce, McNamara and I had a talk after our session with you this morning, and we all agree on the approach which is sketched in George Ball's memorandum at Tab B. In essence, what we hope is that you could talk quite privately with Wilson and draw him out on his own present attitude towards moving away from an independent nuclear deterrent. The further he is willing to move, the better for us, and this is the best way of getting a real map of his own personal intentions. We all agree that any British step in this direction will help us, and that the steps we might take can best be decided after you know Wilson's view -- and then Erhard's.

The second point worth recalling is the Asian Development Bank. I attach at Tab C a memorandum on the British contribution which was prepared some time back. Their position has not changed. In essence, we are trying to get them to move from a paid contribution of $1 million a year to one of $3 million a year. Gene Black has just told me that he personally saved the British from being wholly excluded by angry Asians in Manila because of the very low level of their contribution. Wilson can surely do this for you if he tries, and it is the one specific item that we have to press upon him.

McG. B.

P. S. I attach at Tab D a bootleg copy of the report on Wilson's performance this morning at the UN. The original may be coming over at any minute from George Ball.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We had a session of the heads of all the agencies concerned with disarmament this afternoon, and I think the recommendations for our Geneva position are now in order for your approval. In essence they are as follows:

1. We do not recommend an extended substantive Presidential statement. Instead we will draft a short, general, and emphatic endorsement of the cause of disarmament, with special emphasis upon finding means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This is consistent with your previous positions and does not create too much of an ironic contrast between our effort in Geneva and the other activities that are in prospect.

2. Foster will develop our position at greater length and will use existing US positions and proposals, at least in his opening statement. He will, however, indicate our readiness to discuss additional possibilities and will take every opportunity to show how serious we are about this matter. As the discussion develops, if there is any sign of seriousness on the Russian side, he may come back to us for guidance on possible new positions. This is in line with a position strongly urged in the Committee by the Vice President, Rusk and McCloy -- namely, that there is no point in getting into a fight with ourselves or with our allies on controversial proposals if there is no sign of serious interest or activity on the Soviet side.

3. One further special aspect of the plan is worth noting: back in 1964 you trumped a Khrushchev ace by making good, strong proposals about agreements to prevent indirect or direct aggression across recognized boundaries. I attach a copy of the letter you sent Khrushchev. We have agreed that Foster will use this document as a basis for a strong counterpunch if the Soviets -- as we expect -- try to inject Vietnam into the discussions.
SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

CONTROL: 5148
RECD: MARCH 5, 1966 8:41 P.M.

FROM: LONDON

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 4191

SECTION ONE OF TWO

SECRET MARCH 05

NODIS

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM GOLDBERG

I MET FOR OVER AN HOUR MARCH 3 WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BRUCE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS IN A RELAXED, CHEERFUL, AND CONFIDENT MOOD AS ELECTION PERIOD OPENS. HE WAS PLEASED WITH GREETINGS I CONVEYED FROM SECRETARY AND SAID HE HAD HAD TWO "VERY NICE" MESSAGES THIS WEEK FROM THE PRESIDENT.

THE PM BEGAN, STRESSING SENSITIVITY OF THE MATTER, WITH STATEMENT THAT THERE MAY BE A "FLURRY" OVER STERLING DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD, THERE HAD BEEN, HE SAID, A LITTLE TROUBLE ON TUESDAY BUT "I THINK WE WENT AT IT". STOCK MARKET ACTION AND OTHER INDICATORS SUGGEST FOREIGN CONCERN AND HEDGING AGAINST POSSIBILITY OF DEVALUATION IF TORIES SHOULD WIN. WILSON WAS OBVIOUSLY IRRITATED BY HEATH'S RECENT REMARK ABOUT A POSSIBLE POST ELECTION DEVALUATION BY LABOR AND NOTED THAT WHEN WILSON CHALLENGED HIM HEATH WAS COMPelled TO COMMIT THE TORIES NOT TO DEVALUE IF THEY SHOULD WIN. IF A "STERLING FLURRY" DOES DEVELOP, HE SAID, THE BRITISH WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH FOWLER AND MARTIN. AND, IN ANY EVENT, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ONCE THE CAMPAIGN IS OVER.

WILSON THEN TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS MOSCOW TRIP. HE SAID THAT, FACED WITH THEIR UPCOMING CONGRESS, THE RUSSIANS EXHIBITED SOMETHING OF AN ELECTION ATMOSPHERE WHICH CONSTRAINED CONVERSATION AND MADE THEM SENSITIVE TO ANY APPARENT SHOW OF WEAKNESS. WILSON BELIEVES THEY WOULD "LOVE TO" DO SOMETHING ABOUT VIETNAM BUT DON'T FEEL THEY CAN IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WAS IMPRESSED BY SOVIET

SECRET
SECRET

-2- 4191 Section One of Two, March 5, From LONDON

LEADERSHIP, AND FIGT POLANSKY AND SHELEPIN WERE CLEARLY NEXT IN LINE OF SUCCESSION, RESPECTIVELY, TO KOSYGIN AND BREZHNEV. THE SOVIETS, HE FEELS, CLEARLY WANT TO DEVELOP THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY WITH THE UK since THEY ARE PRESENTLY INHIBITED IN TALKING WITH THE AMERICANS. HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE BRITISH WILL TALK TO THE SOVIETS ALWAYS FROM A POSITION "FOUR-SQUARE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE." IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, THE PM SAID KOSYGIN WILL COME TO UK THIS YEAR PROBABLY IN JUNE OR JULY.

WILSON SAID HE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT HE APPRECIATED THEIR FEELINGS ABOUT THE GERMANS WHICH "TO SOME EXTENT HE SHARED." BUT HE TOLD THEM HE KNEW NO RESPONSIBLE GERMAN LEADER WHO WISHES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, AND HE POINTED OUT THE PRESIDENT IS FULLY AS CONCERNED AS THEY TO PREVENT ANY GERMAN POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHILE THE SOVIETS AGAIN EXPRESSED THEIR DISTASTE FOR ANY GERMAN NUCLEAR ROLE, WILSON THINKS AFN IS LESS OBJECTIONABLE TO THEM THAN MLF.

"THE PRESIDENT," WILSON SAID, "KNOWS THAT I'M NOT THE GREATEST ADMIRER OF THE GERMANS." HE REFERRED TO THE GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT ATTACKS ON THE BRITISH LABOR GOVERNMENT DURING THE GERMAN ELECTION AND SAID THAT HE WAS "SURE AT THE TIME BUT DECIDED NOT TO REACT THEN. "BUT TELL THE PRESIDENT," HE WENT ON, "NOT TO GET UPSET IF I MAKE ANTI-GERMAN STATEMENTS IN THE ELECTION." HE WILL DO SO IF IT IS USEFUL TO HIM AND WITH NO CONFLICTIONS IN VIEW OF "WHAT THEY DID TO US."

I THEN GAVE THE PRIME MINISTER AN EXTENSIVE REPORT ON THE VIETNAM PEACE INITIATIVE. CAUTIONING THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION IS VERY SENSITIVE AND HAS BEEN HELD ALMOST ENTIRELY AMONG A FEW TOP LEVEL US OFFICIALS. I SAID THAT WILSON'S ASSESSMENT OF THE HO CHI MINH LETTER HAD BEEN CORRECT AND THAT CHALFONT'S REPORT ON HIS MOSCOW CONVERSATION BORE THIS OUT. THE PM AGREED THAT THE NVA CHARGE IN MOSCOW WAS CLEARLY SPEAKING UNDER CAREFUL INSSTRUCTIONS.

I NOTED THAT WHEN HE HAD ASKED FEDERENKO WHAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE RECENT US SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE, FEDERENKO HAD AGAIN MADE CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DO WHATEVER HANOI WANTS. I SAID THE CURRENT UN PHASE IS OVER AND HAS SERVED SOME USEFUL PURPOSES. IT HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO IMPRESSING DOMESTIC US OPINION AND (ON THE BASIS OF MY MEETING WITH 80 MPS AT PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY) TO SOME EXTENT UK OPINION WITH THE EFFORT WE HAVE MADE TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THE US HAD SUCCEEDED IN ITS PURPOSE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS "DECENT RESPECT FOR THE OPINION OF MANKIND" AND TO STIMULATE ENGAGEMENT AND GREATER CONCERN OF UN MEMBERS RE VIETNAM PROBLEM.

THE US IS CONTINUING EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE OPENINGS
SECRET

-3- 4191 Section One of Two, March 5, From LONDON

AND THE UK SHOULD CONTINUE TO DO LIKEWISE. I LISTED SOME OF THE MORE OR LESS CURRENT EFFORTS:

1) I REPORTED ON THE POPE’S CONTINUED INTEREST AS MEDIATOR. I TOLD HIM OF OUR REPORTS THAT THE POPE HELD OFF ANY FURTHER INITIATIVE PENDING THE RESULTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION. NOW THAT THIS UN PHASE HAS BEEN WOUND UP, WE CAN EXPECT A RENEWAL OF PAPAL INTEREST, THOUGH WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT FORM IT WILL TAKE. IF THE BRITISH GET ANY INTIMATION OF WHAT THE POPE MAY BE PLANNING, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR IT.

2) I REPORTED EVIDENCE FROM SEYDOUX AND FROM PARIS THAT THE FRENCH HAVE HAD UNSPECIFIED INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NAMO INTEREST IN NEGOTIATION APPARENTLY BASED ON FRENCH-VN CONVERSATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME I POINTED OUT THAT THE SIGNS WE GET ARE NEGATIVE FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THOUGH I DID NOT PRECLUDE A FRENCH ROLE, I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD MUCH PREFER PM WILSON AS INTERMEDIARY.

I THEN TOLD THE PM THAT THE RECENT DEBATE ON VIETNAM IN THE UNITED STATES, THOUGH IT HAD STARTED AS GREAT DEBATE, HAD CONCLUDED ALMOST IN CONSENSUS. I CITED YENHAN, POINTING OUT HE HAD ENDED UP IN A POSITION NOT TOO DIFFERENT FROM THE PRESIDENT’S. AFTER THE HEAVY MARGIN IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT IN THIS WEEK’S CONGRESSIONAL VOTES, I SAID I BELIEVE THE IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL PHASE IS PROBABLY ENDED THOUGH CONCERN WITH THE VIETNAM PROBLEM AROUND THE COUNTRY WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE.

BR

NOTE: Passed White House 9:30p.m. by OC/T
SECRET MARCH 05

NODIS

FOR PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM GOLDBERG

THE PM WAS WARM IN HIS PRAISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS’ HANDLING
OF THE DEBATE. HE THEN TALKED ABOUT HIS OWN DEBATE IN COMMONS
THREE WEEKS AGO, PRECIPITATED BY STEWART’S FORTHRIGHT STATEMENT
IN SUPPORT OF THE US RESUMPTION OF BOMBING. THE PRIME MINISTER
SAID HE HAD BEEN WORRIED FOR THE FIRST TIME ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO
CONTROL THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION AND HAD ONLY SUCCEEDED IN MAN-
AGING HIS OWN PARTY BY "ROUGHING IT UP" WITH HIS LEFT WING CRITICS.
LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, HE SAID, HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW HE GOT
BY WITH HIS MAJORITY OF THREE.

THE PM THANKED ME FOR MY PRESS CONFERENCE HERE ON WEDNESDAY,
PARTICULARLY ON RHODESIA, WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL.
(I REITERATED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE OUR SUPPORT OF UK POLICY,
POINTING OUT ITS THEIR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY). I NOTED THAT
OUT OF A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THERE
HAD BEEN VERY FEW ON VIETNAM WHICH WILSON THOUGHT REFLECTED PRESENT
BRITISH PREOCCUPATION WITH TOPICS MORE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE
BRITISH ELECTION. PM SAID VIETNAM WILL NOT BE A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE
ELECTION AND THE CHALFONT INITIATIVE IN MOSCOW HAD HELPED THE LABOUR
GOVERNMENT.

I THEN REPORTED ON PAUL MARTIN'S INITIATIVE BASED ON THE
ICC POSTSCRIPT TO HO CHI MINH'S LETTER. I SAID THAT MARTIN, HAVING
HAD A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM THE INDIA'S AND A NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM
THE POLES, CONTEMPLATES EXPLORING FURTHER THE IDEA OF AN ICC INITIATIVE
AFTER THE COMMUNIST CONGRESS. WILSON AGREED EMOTIONALLY THAT FOR ANY
USEFUL INITIATIVE IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE CONGRESS

I THEN ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD BE TO A PROPOSAL
FOR A HIGH LEVEL EXPLORATION OF A BROAD AGENDA OF TOPICS. WILSON SAID

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE -2- 4191, MARCH 3, FROM: LONDON

HIS PROPOSAL FOR A THREE-POWER MINISTERIAL MEETING ON NON-PROLIFERATION HAD BEEN INTENDED TO PROVIDE THE OPENING FOR SUCH A BROADER DISCUSSION. REVEALING THE SIGNS OF RUSSIAN INTEREST IN HIS PROPOSAL, HE SPECCULATED THAT THE PRESIDENT MEETING ON THE LAST MORNING OF WILSON'S MOSCOW VISIT WAS IN FACT PARTLY TO CONSIDER ITS RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL. WHILE THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTRAINED FROM RESPONDING NOW BY THE PROSPECTIVE CRISIS, HE EXPECTS AN ANSWER IN 15 OR 20 DAYS AND IS HOPEFUL IT MAY BE ENCOURAGING. QUITE FRANKLY, WILSON SAID, HE HAD HOPED FOR SOMETHING HE COULD MAKE PUBLIC NOW FOR HIS OWN CAMPAIGN BENEFIT.

WILSON THEN ADDED, EMPHASIZING THAT THIS WAS PURELY SPECULATION, THAT WHEN HE TALKED TO BREZHNEV, HE HAD THE FEELING HE MAY HAVE "SIX WEEKS OF DYNAMIC, UNSTOPPABLE PATRIARCHY AHEAD." FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, THE SOVIETS MIGHT EVEN TRADE A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT FOR CRESCENT OF A GERMAN NUCLEAR ROLE.

I THEN ASKED HOW WILSON NOW APPRAISES GERMAN INTEREST IN THE NUCLEAR UNDERGROUND ISSUE. WILSON REPLIED THAT THOUGH THE BRITISH HAD BEEN HOPING IT WOULD RESURFACE BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS SO HIGH DURING THE GENERAL ELECTION, THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED TO SEE EISENHOWER'S RESURGENCE INTEREST ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

THEN HE SAID VERY DELICATELY "I AM TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE GERMANS HAVING ACCESS TO HARDWARE. I HAVE BEEN HAVING THIS WORRY CONSCIOUSLY AND IT IS NOW BECOMING QUITE CLEAR TO ME. I WISH EVERY ONE TO SING IT IN THE ELECTION PERIOD. IF EVER THERE WERE AN ISSUE ON WHICH I HAD TO DEFINE THE TACTICS, I WOULD DO IT ON THIS ONE, THINGS ALWAYS BECOME MUCH CLEARER TO HIM DURING AN ELECTION, WILSON SAID. WE HAD THOUGHT OF ANY DURING THE LAST CAMPAIGN (WHILE TAKING A BATH, HE SAID), AND HE MIGHT GET A NEW IDEA ON THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM DURING THIS ONE.

THE PRIME MINISTER PLANS TO DO LITTLE CAMPAIGNING, EXCEPT TO STICK TO THE ROLE OF OS. EXPECT A FEW KEY SPEECHES UP TO THE LAST WEEK, THEN THEY WILL RESPOND IN THE LAST FEW DAYS TO WHAT WE REGARD AS A "VERY SWEARY" OPPOSITION CAMPAIGN. HE IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PUBLIC DOESN'T WANT AN ELECTION AND THINKS APATHY WOULD BE A THREAT TO A LABOR VICTORY. HE THINKS LABOR'S PRESENT EDGE IN THE POLLS WILL SHRINK OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS BUT THEY KEY TO THE ELECTION WILL BE WHETHER LABOR CAN EITHER MAINTAIN THE SHIFT AND HOLD AN ADEQUATE LEAD OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS OF THE CAMPAIGN. HE SEEMS REASONABLY CONFIDENT, BUT APPARENTLY REMEMBERING THE NARROW MARGIN THE LAST TIME, HE ENDED BY SAYING, "YOU CAN NEVER TELL ABOUT ELECTIONS."

THE PM LOOKED HEALTHY, FIT AND VIGOROUS -- LUCID AS EVER, AND A MAN OBVIOUSLY RELISHING LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL CONTEST.
Trilateral Talks

Background Paper

Attached is a Background Paper, "West European Analysis of the Soviet Threat," prepared by Mr. David Mark, INR, with the advice of Mr. Zaring of CIA and Mr. Weiss of G/PM.

Mr. Mark is now seeking individual comments and suggested improvements in this paper from:

EUR - Mr. Vest

Attachment:
As stated above.
Trilateral Talks
(US-UK-FRG)

BACKGROUND PAPER

West European Analysis of the Soviet Threat

NATIONAL SECURITY IS MORE THAN JUST MILITARY DEFENSE

West Europeans are by no means indifferent about their national security. They want to preserve their national identities, domestic institutions, and self-government. No one has forgotten the degradation which most suffered during World War II -- occupation and puppet regimes or military administrations. To them, however, security is not derived only from military measures; it also depends on political and economic vigor. The political element comes from each country's need for a reasonably healthy international atmosphere, for tolerable East-West relations in Europe, and for stability in the European region. The economic element requires that each try to ensure prosperity at home and in the region, as a prerequisite for the pursuit of relatively calm and rational domestic politics. The crucial nature of political and economic factors is illustrated by conditions in Germany in 1930, when that country's existence as a viable nation, i.e., its security, was greatly endangered by internal political and economic turmoil, even though no external military forces threatened hostile action.

ATTENTION Focuses ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Although West European intellectuals, businessmen, and professional people closely follow world developments, domestic political pressures within each West European country -- both from opinion leaders and from the masses -- to the extent that mass moods influence governments -- are largely channeled into internal problems, mostly economic, with some additional attention allotted to regional economic issues. Domestic budgets are strained almost everywhere, and, since no one wants to spend more than the unavoidable minimum

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
automatically declassified
on defense, the temptation to balance budgetary accounts at the expense of military appropriations, and to rationalize the results as compatible with national security is very strong. Conscription is unpopular, and the length of service has been reduced in many countries, with the draft abolished altogether in a few. With rare exceptions, force goals, either NATO-inspired or nationally fixed, have not been met for years.

BELIEF IN A GROWING EAST-WEST DETENTE IN EUROPE

These dominant inward-looking or, at most, regional-oriented, political and economic pressures in each West European country are reinforced by a pervading sense of an East-West military stand-off, which, for several years, has been evolving towards a perceptible detente. Governments would deny that they are being overly optimistic when they generally foresee a steady disappearance of cold-war remnants in their relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Most of them are convinced that real possibilities exist for a gradual and long-term political reconciliation of both parts of Europe, and all are anxious to pursue mutually profitable ventures immediately, particularly in the economic sphere. Admittedly, the wishes of all West European populations flow in this direction; they are basking increasingly in the sunshine of democratic welfare states, and they want nothing to interfere with their constantly improving, and already high, living standards, least of all military hostilities. Yet, leaders would undoubtedly insist that it is only a happy coincidence that their own analyses of the probably calm course of East-West relations jibe with current mass moods and aspirations.

THE ROLE OF FORCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS IS UNDERSTOOD

Since West European governments are all experienced, quite reasonable, and mostly sober, they are all well aware of the continuing role of military force in international affairs. They entirely understand the constituent elements of a power position on the world stage. Indeed, they know that any great power, however non-threatening or even benevolent, still inevitably operates in certain ego-centric and often domineering ways, and that, consequently, smaller powers must always be on the alert to protect their interests.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMIN

This view is especially true for them in the case of the Soviet Union. They accept fully almost all intelligence on the nature and size of Soviet strategic and general purpose forces, on
the continuing modernization and, in some respects, expansion of those forces, and on the great capability of the USSR to launch massive military attacks. Moreover, they have neither
forgotten evidence of past Soviet hostility toward the West, nor do they assume that the USSR has lost the traditional great power ambitions of the Russian state. In fact, plenty of suspicions remain about Soviet motives, objectives, and policies. However, the key factor is that there is no longer
the fear of armed attack that prevailed 10 to 15 years ago.

LITTLE WEST EUROPEAN FEAR OF THE USSR ISEOLOGICALLY AND MILITARY

Side by side with this mood is a similar one that Moscow
no longer poses a worrisome ideological threat to Western
Europe. The Soviet economic model attracts ever fewer people
in the West now that prosperity has become so widespread in
the latter area, and no West European nation is really concerned any more about a takeover of power, even through the ballot box, by a domestic Communist Party. Except for Finland, Italy, and France, Communist Parties in Western Europe get
minimal votes, and in those three states, the parties are felt
to be becoming domesticated fairly rapidly and to offer no
long-term challenge. To be sure, West European governments
are aware that the Soviet Union continues to maintain special
links with the Communist Party in each country, but almost no
one believes that Moscow could, even if it so desired, effect-
ively inspire any party to major subversive action or contribute significantly to make any party into an effective local
political machine.

THE USSR IS NOW CONSIDERED A STATUS QUO POWER USING POLITICAL
NOT MILITARY ACTION

All in all, the general view in Western Europe is that,
compared with what predilections the USSR may have had 15 or
20 years ago, the variance of Soviet preference today as to
the means to be used to attain Moscow's international objectives has shifted drastically from the military to the political side of the scales. Furthermore, the USSR is not seen as being primarily interested just now in upsetting the European status quo, even by political means, to say nothing of by military action.

POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON ANY AGGRESSIVE SOVIET PROPENSITIES

According to this line of reasoning, the political constraints on Soviet military adventurism are powerful, and although many West Germans argue that Soviet intentions can shift suddenly, most other West Europeans seem to believe that the freedom of action of the leaders in the Kremlin is substantially limited by the objective circumstances in which they — and presumably any successors — find themselves. First, these men are thought to have their hands full with a heavy burden of domestic economic and political problems which absorb much national energy and a large proportion of available resources. Second, Moscow is still in a muddle in working out new types of relationships that would promise mutually satisfactory and smooth long-term ties with its erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe. Third, rather than finding itself with a favorable opportunity to strive seriously for political advances in and against Western Europe (other than merely exploiting NATO disarray in a limited tactical way), the Soviet Union is still defensively preoccupied with the imperative of stabilizing domestically and consolidating internationally the position of the key regime in its own sphere of influence in Europe, the "German Democratic Republic." Fourth, Soviet leaders have to secure a peaceful tear in Europe so that they can be freer to cope with the Chinese Communist threat, both on the world scene and in the international Communist movement.

Fifth, no military adventure in Western Europe — either large-scale conventional attack or a limited lunge against a vulnerable Western objective (e.g., Hamburg or Northern Norway) — would make any real sense in terms of the USSR's present objectives. Both (but especially a major conventional attack) would run the risk of a global war, which makes no sense at all in terms of Soviet goals; and even if a minor lunge were successful without global war, it would transform the international atmosphere in the worst way for the USSR. Against its
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5

prestige gain, with some psychological "bandwagon" effect, such a move would probably be to reunify the West, to poison all East-West relations, to upset Soviet economic reform, to demoralize Eastern Europe, to confuse totally the non-aligned and underdeveloped nations, to arouse the United Nations to unprecedented military efforts, and to mark an ideological cave-in to Communist China by adopting precepts of conduct preached (if not practiced) by Peking.

A US-SOVIET NUCLEAR EQUILIBRIUM IS ASSUMED

It should be emphasized that the conclusions of the foregoing political analysis by West Europeans that the Soviet Union has every reason to avoid military hostilities in Europe, poses no political threat to the West, and must concentrate more on its own problems all presuppose in their minds one constant environmental factor, viz., a nuclear equilibrium between the US and USSR. Whatever the details of the US and Soviet strategic force structures, about which few West Europeans are well informed, they have almost no doubts about the present and prospective stability of reciprocal US-Soviet deterrence. Moreover, since all believe both Soviet and US leaders to be relatively rational in their behavior, they virtually foreclose the chance of a premeditated attack by either side, whether it be a major nuclear onslaught or some sort of conventional assault which, in their view, would in all likelihood rapidly escalate to the nuclear level.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR DETERRENCE

This is not to say that everyone takes as 100% certain the assurances given by the US that it will invite massive self-destruction by involving itself in a total nuclear exchange with the USSR, if necessary, to protect Western Europe from a Soviet invasion -- de Gaulle has voiced his doubts, and others share them. However, there is felt to be such a good chance that the US means what it says and may act accordingly in any crunch that West European leaders undoubtedly believe this to be sufficient to deter the relatively rational Soviet leaders, whom they postulate. Thus, in sum, the experience of West European leaders over the last decade suggests to them that
the danger of deliberate war in Europe at any level is small, so long as the Soviet Union believes that its aggression may lead to a nuclear response, and so long as the availability to Western Europe of the American nuclear force appears credible to the USSR. If these two conditions are met, Western Europeans believe that this US force will deter aggression effectively, and the existence of supplementary conventional forces in Western Europe becomes logically and psychologically irrelevant for purposes of deterrence.

CONVENTIONAL FORCE MAINTENANCE HELPS TO ENSURE THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE

Despite the fact that West European leaders foresee almost no probability of a Soviet attack on their countries, and although a decision by them to disband the bulk of their troop units would rid them of domestic military troubles, they nonetheless maintain national armed forces. This is not as illogical as it might seem at first blush, and, in fact, the states involved have adopted this course of action for several reasons. The foremost of these is that they do not wish to risk causing the US to remove its protective nuclear umbrella and military shield, which would leave Western Europe virtually naked — with only small British and French nuclear forces facing the colossal Soviet military machine. To be sure, it has been said that the American interest in preventing a Soviet seizure of Western Europe is so great that the US would come to Europe's defense regardless of explicit American commitments beforehand, and regardless of any prior West European contributions to a joint defense. Indeed, American actions in World War II seem to confirm this view; but, except possibly for de Gaulle, West European leaders consider it entirely too risky a premise to allow it to underlie their policies. They can never quite get out of their minds the specter of a Soviet-US deal about Europe's fate, and they also worry about a loss of American interest in Europe in favor of other continents. Hence, they are almost all willing to go some distance on defense measures, i.e., on keeping in being respectable West European conventional forces, if that is what must be done in order both to ensure the continuing US commitment to Western Europe's defense and security, and to ensure some voice in their own fate.
CONVENTIONAL FORCES ALSO SERVE ADDITIONAL (SOMEWHAT LESSER) PURPOSES

As already noted, there are also other reasons for Western Europe to maintain some forces. One is to meet residual security concerns not covered by nuclear deterrence. For example, conventional forces in being might help to stabilize the situation if a war outside of Europe had the feedback effect of causing tensions to rise in Europe, or if there were another East German uprising or some other power shift in Eastern Europe. Another reason for at least a minimum level of indigenous forces is that most West European countries subscribe to the "tripwire" hypothesis, under which just enough of a conventional force obstacle should be available in countering any possible Soviet attack in Central Europe to ensure that the resulting hostilities would escalate to the nuclear level. The assurance of escalation, in turn, is held to be a guarantee that deterrence would operate to prevent the USSR from launching the attack in the first place. Still other grounds for keeping forces are primarily political -- the need to demonstrate serious national purpose; the projection for political purposes around the world of an image of national modernity and power; the political desirability of mollifying military bureaucracies and pro-army traditionalist groups at home; the wish, in some countries, to have forces available for United Nations duties; the yearning of Italy for equality of middle power status with Britain, France, and Germany; the United Kingdom's need to meet commitments "East of Suez"; and Germany's urge to overcome feelings of national insecurity and to show reacceptance as an equal by other West Europeans in all respects, including military standing.

OVERWHELMING DESIRE FOR U.S. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Influential as some of these reasons are in varying degree in different West European countries, none can compete with the concern to preserve the U.S. commitment. All (except France) want the US in Europe to counter the USSR militarily and politically, i.e., both to protect them and, while preserving the West's current position, to participate in helping to
achieve — at some future time — a viable East-West settlement on the continent, including the reunification of Germany on terms that they can live with. Of equal importance is the American role of furnishing a stabilizing weight of superior political power under which the West Europeans have been able to adjust amicably their own regional economic and political problems and to cope, in fruitful co-existence, with an ever troublesome Germany.

NATO: THE INSTRUMENTALITY FOR THE U.S. PRESENCE

Theoretically, the American commitment might take on life in a number of ways, but, in fact, for over 17 years, this commitment has been synonymous with NATO, the instrumentality through which the commitment is legally expressed and psychologically implemented. Most West Europeans are relatively indifferent to the use of NATO to provide an integrated military force structure, but they are quite enthusiastic about its stabilizing political function in Western Europe and about the opportunity which it gives them to exercise some influence over U.S. policies (as indicated by the interest in joint crisis management and nuclear consultation).

WESTERN EUROPE CONCEDES TO WASHINGTON SOMewhat ON MILITARY MATTERS

The West European countries have been willing to pay a price for the benefits which they derive from NATO, and the US has been successful in insisting that some of the price take the form of a West European military contribution to NATO. In spite of NATO's basically political functions at this stage of its existence, the rationale for the organization has traditionally been military, i.e., ensuring West European security against a Soviet armed threat, and the West Europeans will go to some lengths in order to make certain that Washington preserves its interest in NATO and its commitment to overall security, for which its forces will bear the ultimate responsibility. For this reason, therefore, experience has shown that the US impetus to strengthen NATO's military role will elicit the cooperation of the West Europeans to the extent of their joining in a common military effort on some terms tolerable to Washington, whatever they may think of the real extent of the Soviet threat at any given time.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMIN

9

All this implies that the European members of NATO, for years, have not been as concerned as Washington about issues of Alliance strategy, force levels, burden sharing, resource allocation, etc., which the US has constantly raised in NATO councils. In recent years, only West Germany has seconded Washington’s stress on military issues to any marked degree. The rest have dragged their feet on many problems, given lip service on others, failed to meet commitments in innumerable instances, and shown outright resistance in some cases. To be sure, the US has lately induced its allies to participate in a joint effort to plan defense forces on a five year forward basis; but progress is quite slow. Unresolved issues of strategy have been injected into the proceedings, and there is the sizable risk that even if common conclusions about necessary future force levels were reached, national cabinets and parliaments would, in most cases, not adopt policies ensuring the fulfillment of these goals.

THE DEBATE ON NATO STRATEGY

The fundamental conflict on strategy has been evident ever since the US, in 1961, enunciated the new doctrine of a “flexible response” to possible Soviet attack. Instead of massive nuclear retaliation, the revised American response called for an initial effort to deal with the aggression on a level of force commensurate with the attack, to avoid an immediate resort to nuclear weapons if the aggression was by conventionally armed forces, and to prevent escalation of the conflict if at all possible while political attempts were made to stop the fighting. West Europeans disliked this approach on two grounds: it seemed to involve an American pretext to get itself excused from its nuclear commitment to Western Europe, or at least to have the implementation of that commitment postponed (thus sparing American cities while Western Europe might be ravaged by conventional warfare); and it called for a sizable buildup of West European conventional forces to the point where they, together with the US armies stationed in Europe, could credibly counter a Soviet conventional attack by NATO conventional forces. Five years of debate on these matters have shown the West Europeans adamant in their refusal to invest in larger conventional forces and...
and insistent on a strategy of rapid nuclear escalation of all but minor hostilities (such as perhaps on the access routes to Berlin) as the only sure way of deterring a Soviet attack in the first place.

WESTERN EUROPE WILL STICK TO NATO BUT NOT AGREE TO A FORCE BUILDUP

Under present circumstances, given Western Europe's current estimate of the very low order of the Soviet threat, it is quite unlikely that the US will succeed in getting NATO members to contribute to anything like the force posture that Washington might consider to be optimal. To be sure, the US always had the lever of hinting that it might reduce or withdraw its commitment to Western Europe if the latter does not raise its military outlays. However, most West Europeans probably do not believe that Washington is free seriously to pursue this threat at present. Thus, the prospect is that West European NATO members (except France) will continue to support the organization as such and will go along with maintenance of an integrated military command structure. Although they will keep up some national forces, there is liable to be further downward slippage in force levels and equipment standards; and all NATO expenditures in common will be considered under very penny-pinching standards.
Following letter from Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson delivered White House March 18. FYI Text (English translation furnished by German Embassy):

QTE Dear Mr. President:

I thank you for your prompt reply of 2 March 1966 in which you consider my misgivings with regard to several amendments to the American draft treaty on non-proliferation.

I am especially grateful to you for the understanding you show for our concern in this matter. Your assurance that the American draft treaty, also in its amended form, is not intended to lessen the possibility of creating a joint nuclear force of NATO or of a future European development in this field is a source of great satisfaction to me.

Unfortunately, however, our misgivings regarding the prohibition of the co-operation between non-nuclear and nuclear states in the field of nuclear armaments have, in the view of possible future developments of NATO and of Europe, not been completely dispelled, nor have our apprehensions that the very detailed American draft might provide the Soviet Government, whether justified or not, with a [illeg] of doubting whether certain provisions of the non-
proliferation treaty are being observed, and thus of interfering with internal arrangements of NATO.

I therefore suggest that the still open questions should be clarified in further discussions at diplomatic level.

Meanwhile, I would be much obliged to you if the interpretations contained in your letter could also be given during the discussions of the new text at the Geneva conference.

In expressing my high esteem and kindest regards, I remain Sincerely Yours/Ludwig Erhard UNQT End.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1966

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am enclosing a draft reply for you to send to Prime Minister Wilson in response to the message he sent you today.

I think it important that you make clear to the Prime Minister that he must not back away from the line you laid out in your letter of December 23, 1965 regarding our nuclear relations with Germany. In that letter you emphasized "that the point of greatest importance was for the three of us to reach an agreement." There is an implication in the Prime Minister's note that he is suggesting a bilateral effort on the part of our two countries to impose a solution on the Germans. It seems to me necessary that we scotch the idea before the Prime Minister strays too far off the reservation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Nsc 3-2-78. letter
By NARS, Date 10-2-79
Dean Rusk

Attachment:

As stated.
DRAFT REPLY BY PRESIDENT TO NOTE OF
PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Thank you for your message. Referring to its numbered paragraphs:

1. I agree that the General's action both poses a threat and offers an opportunity. The former is all too plain. If the latter is to be seized ways and means must be found in London, Bonn and Washington. I look forward to your further suggestions.

2. Sounder organization of NATO's structure, forces and financial arrangements will be useful and important. Something more is necessary to add strength, purpose and cohesion after De Gaulle's assault.

3. As you have probably seen from Erhard's memorandum of December 20, 1965, a copy of which I sent you, he seems to be fully aware of the need to adapt his nuclear policy to the peaceful reunification of Germany. After all, as we both know, the problem of Germany lies at the heart of maintaining peace in Europe. I think it is imperative that Germany not only feel, but actually become, a full and equal member of the Western club.
4. A detente with the East and the strengthening of NATO seem to me two sides of the same coin. We in the West can make progress toward a settlement with the East only by maintaining and improving our collective strength both to deter and to bargain.

As I appraise French intentions they are in no rush and there should be time for thought and consultation in various ways. Unhappily, as you and I know, there is never enough time for thought. We shall press on but, as our Supreme Court once said, with all deliberate speed.
The attached Background Paper entitled "Political Significance of NATO" was prepared by Mr. David Mark, INR. The paper has had the benefit of comments from Mr. Muller of G/PM and Messrs. Vest and Myerson of EUR/RPM.

It has not yet received Mr. McCloy's approval.

Attachment:
As stated above.
Triatral Talks
(US-UK-FRG)

BACKGROUND PAPER

Political Significance of NATO

US PROTECTION OF AND POLITICAL PREDOMINANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE, EXERCISED THROUGH NATO

NATO is the institutional expression of the need which Western Europe has felt since 1945 for outside military support to counterbalance nearby Soviet power. Its essential ingredient is the United States commitment to devote its own political and military resources to the extent necessary to frustrate any Soviet use of force or threat to use force against Western Europe. NATO has allowed the countries of the area, behind the shield of American strength, to concentrate on economic recovery and growth, while devoting a smaller share of their resources to defense than they would logically have to do without US involvement.

Since 1945, the United States has been the dominant power in Western Europe, and NATO has legitimized this position. The other members of NATO have played an essentially subordinate role to the U.S., generally going along with American organizational proposals, and allowing U.S. officers to be appointed to the top command posts in NATO's integrated military structure. While NATO machinery has permitted the European members of NATO to present their views and to plead their preferences to the United States on a wide variety of issues both within and without the Alliance's direct sphere of interest, the same consultative machinery has also served Washington's efforts to line up maximum allied understanding -- and, on occasion, backing -- for American policies in general, and for those impinging on the North Atlantic region in particular.

Over the years there have been some challenges to this American leadership, most notably the Suez affair. Various Europeans have wanted their own countries or some combination of countries to play a more independent role in Alliance and world affairs. One of the motives underlying the European unity movement has no doubt been the hope that a politically united
Europe might have greater weight vis-a-vis the United States. The US has given its own support to this movement, in part for this very reason. Nevertheless, to date only de Gaulle has drastically challenged the Atlantic status quo head on, first by trying to build a Western Europe bloc around France and then by taking France out of NATO. But his effort to win support outside France has been largely unsuccessful and in a sense has actually consolidated the support of the other allies around US leadership as preferable to French hegemony in Western Europe.

EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 ON NATO

The root cause for this state of affairs was the economic, political, and military weakness of Western Europe after World War II, juxtaposed in Western Europe to a mighty Soviet military machine in the hands of rulers who were perceived to have hostile, and perhaps aggressive, intentions. But in two important respects this does not accurately describe the situation which now prevails.

1) Behind the shield of US power and of NATO, Western Europe has undergone a remarkable economic recovery since 1945 and has long since ceased to be dependent on the US for its material well-being. In the political sphere, too, the Western European countries have stabilized their internal affairs and scotched the possibility of Communist takeover from within. On the other hand, they have not regained their prewar weight in world political affairs, or anything like it. Whatever the potential importance of a politically united Europe, it remains the fact that even the most important European countries play only a marginal role in affairs outside Europe as compared to that of the superpowers, and even in Europe their basic security depends on the relations of those same superpowers. De Gaulle has tried to gloss over these facts and to operate within them with a freedom unparalleled in Europe since 1945, but his effort has had no support from other governments so far. In general, it seems that European aspirations to play a greater role in the world and to enjoy greater "independence" of the US may have been exaggerated.

2) The Soviet military machine is still formidable, is growing stronger year by year, and is more than a match even for any combination of West European nations by themselves. Nevertheless, in the general evaluation of the West European public and, more prudently, of most leaders too (except, to some extent, in West Germany), the Soviet-American nuclear standoff has basically changed the European security situation and the threat of direct Soviet aggression has sharply diminished. This does not mean that most Western Europeans are now indifferent to a substantial US military presence in Europe; on the contrary, they desire it as part of their insurance that the USSR remain "deterred" by US power.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMIN

It does mean, however, that in their view the USSR is now oriented primarily towards the maintenance of the European status quo in an atmosphere of growing East-West détente.

If the relationship between Western Europe and the U.S. had been based merely on common defense against the Soviet threat, it might be logical to conclude that the basic raison d'être of the alliance was rapidly being eroded, though the U.S. might retain indefinitely a residual function in the protection of the European status quo by continuing to keep up its share in preserving the Soviet-U.S. nuclear equilibrium which underlies the changed security atmosphere—a function in military matters which even General de Gaulle concedes (or assigns) to Washington.

Nevertheless, the North Atlantic Alliance clearly appears to involve much more for most of its members than this, and it is somewhat ironic that they have most specifically showed their attachment to NATO in their reaction to the French challenge to NATO's continued life. In spite of assertions from Paris that NATO is a vehicle for American domination of Europe that has now outlived its usefulness, other NATO governments have jointly decided that a decision to follow the French example of a "go it alone" policy is unattractive in itself and that the hazards of attempting such a course, however appealing in theory, are too great.

NATO'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL FUNCTIONS TODAY

Despite the changed perception in Western Europe of the Soviet threat since NATO was created, the Alliance thus still has, for most Europeans, a military-security function, if not strictly in itself, then at least insofar as it provides the instrumentality by which the U.S. manifests its interest in European affairs and maintains sizeable contingents of its forces in Europe as a warning to the USSR that, if unavoidably necessary, U.S. power would be invoked in Western Europe's defense.

Just as important for most of its members nowadays, however, are NATO's political functions which, in any case, have been significant from the beginning. Among these functions (not necessarily in order of importance) are the following:

1) The existence of the Alliance provides US protection for the members in a way which allows them to retain their self-respect as active participants in their own defense and to give a meaningful (and domestically defensible) role to their own military forces. The allies are not mere US protégés and they value the structure which gives them the status they have.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN

- 4 -

2) Western Europe (except France) continues to want the United States to exercise its political weight in the area for a number of reasons, and the Alliance provides an accustomed and discreet framework within which this can be done. The most important of these reasons is that the US presence sharply reduces the scope for traditional power politics among the West Europeans. The Europeans have looked to the US for support against de Gaulle's hegemonic drive. Even more important is the contribution that NATO — and the US presence — make to the "German problem." NATO has allowed West Germany to be integrated into the West European political fabric without upsetting the region's internal balance, in part because the US, as the leader of the Alliance, greatly overshadows the power even of the potentially most powerful European member, the Federal Republic. This factor contributing to NATO's strength seems to be growing more important as time passes.

3) The Alliance has provided an umbrella beneath which the institutions of West European economic (and eventually perhaps political) unity can grow.

4) In general, the Alliance provides an organized framework within which the many relationships between the European members and the United States are placed. It embodies a kind of "community" which, without abolishing all frictions among the members, does take the edge off them and incline the participants to work out their problems with each other on a give-and-take basis rather than by straight power confrontations.

5) NATO also encourages habits of joint international planning and consultation and stabilizes the foreign and domestic policies of its members. Its consultative machinery provides the members a certain valued leverage on US policy both inside and outside the Alliance area. One aspect of this function of NATO to its members is now coming more than in the past years. This concerns its utility in helping to bridge the differences between East and West in Europe in the effort to consolidate the fragile detente and to move towards a more durable East-West settlement. To be sure, there is neither much desire for nor belief in NATO's ability to unify the policies and tactics of the allies on these questions or to supplant their individual approaches to the USSR and East European states with a single and monolithic NATO approach. However, NATO affords every member the opportunity for consultation and some coordination, and it gives the European members some assurance that the US will give due attention to their interests in its own relations with the USSR.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN
In other words, without an effective U.S. presence in Europe, which can be most easily exercised through NATO or through some similar institution, the individual Western European states would find themselves with very little political weight in their dealings with the Communist states of Europe. Not only might Moscow pay them little heed, but they would be at least psychologically overawed in confronting the overwhelmingly most powerful state residing on the territory of Europe, the USSR. The opportunities for the USSR to apply pressures—indeed, the almost irresistible temptation to the Soviet Union to use some of its great power—in order to achieve Soviet objectives in Western Europe would, in fact, not only preclude a "dialogue" between Western and Eastern Europe but could hardly avoid having adverse effects on the whole, economic, political, and security position of the countries concerned. A drift to neutralism would probably be only the least evil of the outcomes of a withdrawal of the U.S. presence from Europe.

**BASIC U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE**

In World Wars I and II, the U.S. seemed to show its interest in Europe mainly in negative terms. It did not want to permit any one power (Germany) to dominate that continent because of the great potential threat of such a development to U.S. security and economic interests. The same consideration has, of course, applied to the American effort since 1945 to prevent Soviet hegemony over that continent. Nevertheless, the changing nature of technology, economics, and politics in today's world has added important positive reasons for a close and interdependent relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe, with some spillover in Eastern Europe as well.

Fundamentally, the U.S. wants a stable and prosperous West European area, which is growing internally towards greater unity of purpose and action, as well as towards greater understanding of its long-range similarity of interest with North America. Washington opposes any tendencies to a revival of internal dissensions within Western Europe, or to any resurgence of hostility between Eastern and Western Europe, whether because of any aspect of the German problem or of any other U.S.-Soviet differences. America also wants to safeguard its great economic, financial, monetary, and commercial interests in the area and to bring first Western Europe, and...
then all of Europe, to recognize the far-reaching community of global interests of the relative handful of industrialized, modernized, developed nations in the world (which all of them more or less are).

DIVERSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND WEST EUROPEAN INTERESTS

This is not to say that a prudent evaluation by Washington of Western Europe's interests, to say nothing of those of the Communist States of Europe, will not lead to the acknowledgement that some divergences of interest between them and the United States do exist. Some of this is based on geographic realities, some on the fact that the US is the only member of the alliance to have really worldwide interests. Thus, important as an eventual East-West settlement in Europe, including the reunification of Germany, may be in Washington's eyes, America must generally consider it in the still broader context of worldwide U.S.-Soviet relations -- which the West Europeans might not necessarily find in their advantage. Then again, the current situation in Vietnam is illustrative of another case in which America's global interests, although stated in terms that should interest West Europeans, in fact do not meet with much understanding for a variety of reasons, and indeed cause fears of repercussions damaging to the attainment of their aims. In addition, there are the inevitable differences of outlook, understanding, and interest between a nuclear superpower and all lesser allies, and, to top it off, there are the usual rivalries based on commercial and economic factors.

HOW DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. HAVE BEEN RESOLVED

Through one diplomatic device or another, most of the major difficulties arising between the U.S. and its NATO allies since NATO was founded in 1949 have either been resolved or swept under the rug or become moot. Often, the resolution has simply meant the imposition, in all essentials, of the American solution. (The most extreme example of this, perhaps, is the Suez crisis of 1956, though other factors were at play too.) Such outcomes have been a reflection of American power and political pre-dominance in Western Europe. Fortunately, there has been a great deal of velvet glove as well as iron fist in Washington's dealings over the years with its partners, and the soft approach has been increasingly practiced of late.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 7 -

At times, the U.S. will defer to the wishes of the Allies, and the mechanisms of consultation, much elaborated in the last decade, have contributed to this more equal give and take.

There is no doubt that a continuation and even extension of political consultative arrangements and of joint ventures among NATO members in many fields — military production, new common defense systems (such as military communications satellites), technological exchanges — will help to confirm NATO's sense of vitality and purposefulness. Not only can problems before the Alliance thus be handled more effectively, but Washington can hope to expand the horizon of West Europeans on global issues, and the latter can try to influence America's course of action here and there. Useful as all this is, it should nevertheless probably not be thought that such operations will be likely to meet the heart of NATO's troubles in the years immediately ahead.

AMERICAN-WEST EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

For better or worse, an Alliance forged above all to meet one threat to all of its members — the danger from the USSR — will inevitably have difficulty in surviving or adapting to fundamental changes in its environmental circumstances. It is not that Moscow's challenge has disappeared, but it is enough that, at least in West European eyes, the danger has become much less and quite different. It is not that the political weight of the U.S. in Western Europe is no longer wanted and accepted by most, but only that there is some question about whether the balance between the respective American and West European components of decision-making power may not still be struck at a point too favorable to the U.S. and also whether given US policies are acceptable to all the Allies.

Countless observers have enumerated the changes in Western Europe over the last 20 years. References have been made to Europe's political revival, to the wealth of national political institutions in most states, to general economic recovery and advance, to the relative restoration of self-confidence and morale throughout the area, to the important roles on the world stage that Britain, France and Germany are able to play, to the emergence of the first supranational institutions, and to the gradually growing sense of responsibility in the United

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Nations and towards the less-developed nations. All of these elements, and more, have inevitably affected West European relationships with the United States in the direction of greater equality of influence. This is most noticeable in the economic and commercial spheres and least in the military, because of the continuing American nuclear preponderance and large conventional forces in Europe. Nonetheless, the long-established connections and forms of collaboration have not yet undergone major modification.

Recently, however, there has seemed to be a trend to more fundamental shifts. At least, one can discern aspects of transition not present in the 20 years since 1945 which could have more marked effects on the nature of U.S. relations with Western Europe. For example, France is marching off on its own, nominally still a party to the North Atlantic Alliance, but, in fact, adopting positions in international affairs quite distant, on many matters, from those of any other West European state. West Germany is beginning to question the fixed benchmarks of policy which have guided Bonn since Adenauer's accession in 1949. Its ruling party is slipping badly, and new approaches floated mainly by the opposition to overall national problems are gaining increasing support, and even alienation on Washington is coming into question (though basic US-German ties are not). Everywhere, there is a new spirit of determination to seize the apparently favorable current opportunity to speak and deal with the USSR and Eastern Europe -- favorable not only because Western Europe is stronger than before, but also because Russia's many problems are thought to make Moscow more receptive to progress in consolidating the detente.

U.S. ADAPTATION TO THE TRANSITION

It is certainly not clear to what specific events the present transition in Europe will lead, and, in the end, the alterations may not be very drastic. On the other hand, they may be. One can envisage the possibility (if not yet the probability) of a broad spectrum of East-West agreements, of major dealings between the East and West German governments, of new regional political forms in Western Europe, of an amalgamation of the EEC and EFTA, or of a European nuclear force based on the French and UK forces (provided the US did not oppose such British action) or on the French force alone.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

If all or even a large part of this vision were to come to pass within the next 5 or 10 years, it would be extraordinary if it did not entail great strain on NATO, an Atlantic Community institution founded under such different conditions so long ago.

Undoubtedly, the emphasis in NATO on military affairs would, under such future circumstances, give way to predominant attention to political concerns. A major revamping of the organization might prove unavoidable, if it were felt desirable to keep it in being at all. Many might prefer some new organization to express the interrelationships between Western Europe and North America. Now, one can only be sure that there will inevitably be myriad transoceanic links, and that some organism or organisms will have to exist to provide coherence and meaning to the deep mutual interests.

Given the possibility of portentous events in Europe and the world in the next years, which may or may not make feasible NATO's retention in something like its present form, it would seem to be the better part of wisdom to husband carefully whatever arrangements and mechanisms are now in operational order. It is not always easier to revamp a going concern than to abandon it and to start a new one; but it may be. Thus, until the course of future events becomes ever so much clearer than it is at present, prudence dictates that the U.S. conserve such positions of influence and strength as it has in projecting its objectives and in defending its interests on the European scene. NATO is one such position, and it should be guarded.

This does not mean, of course, that a policy of standing pat will be the sensible way to implement a policy of conserving NATO. The defection of France has already shown the need for the alliance to develop flexibility, imaginativeness, and creativity. Changes in Germany, an expansion of Franco-German ties, a new British relationship to Europe, or the revival of a European defense nucleus (such as WEU might have been) without the U.S. might, if one or more such contingencies occurred, all pose challenges to NATO that could not be easily met. Great ingenuity would be called for to devise new approaches to new problems, to tailor proposals to conform to the tastes of potential European...
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

- 10 -

Supporters in NATO of the U.S. line, to avoid the exercise of excessive pressure, and to find attractive ways of cementing mutual interests between the U.S. and one or more other NATO members. The inauguration, operation, and, hopefully, institutionalization of the NATO Special Committee over the last 18 months is both an example of ingenuity and a lesson in the difficulties and pitfalls of implementing new approaches. All in all, however, it is quite evident that the more of its European non-military relationships - both inside and outside of NATO that the U.S. can preserve and expand, and the more the U.S. can develop military policies that respond as far as possible to the aspirations and concerns of the Allies, the better will Washington be able to guide the transition and profit from its outcome.
February 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Force Levels in Europe

Having read the memorandum to you from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on "Force Levels in Europe", I would like to restate my own position.

1. My view on troop withdrawals remains basically as it was set forth in my Report; namely, that considering the military capabilities of the Warsaw Powers and the European political situation I would recommend no withdrawals now. My belief is that NATO and the Alliance which have been the bulwark of Western defense since the war are in real danger of disintegration. The situation in my judgment demands acts of renewed faith and encouragement in respect of NATO. The situation transcends the mere problems of force levels.

I am also deeply impressed with the need to reestablish German confidence in the U.S. as a NATO Ally. The non-proliferation treaty, the rough treatment of Erhard, the increased emphasis on a detente with the Soviet Union, have all created fears that a Soviet-U.S. arrangement is emerging in substitution for the original NATO concept or an equal partnership Alliance. The stability of Germany and its firm adherence to NATO is a vital element of the security of the Alliance. Certainly this is so until an overall East-West adjustment is reached.

Any U.S. unilateral withdrawal would only stimulate the further loosening of U.S. ties to Europe, weaken the whole concept of collective Atlantic security and also further shake German confidence.

In my opinion, the next U.S. step towards NATO must seek to counteract this tendency. I believe one such measure would be an authoritative statement that the U.S. opposes any unilateral force withdrawals from NATO, that it does not intend itself to engage in any such withdrawals, and would only withdraw troops if it obtained the
consensus of Allied approval. Such commitment could be conditioned upon others taking the same position.

2. I vigorously oppose the proposal to withdraw two divisions plus six air wings in view of the state of NATO and the adverse effects on the whole relationship of the U.S. to Europe. Indeed, as already stated, I cannot recommend withdrawal of any U.S. forces under existing conditions.

3. However, I do believe that it would be reasonable to expect our Allies to agree that some reduction in forces could be effected without substantial impairment of the deterrent if they felt we could be convincing in regard to the matter of reinforcement and they did not feel that this was only the beginning of unilateral unravelling of NATO. I stated in my report that although I did not recommend such action now, if any withdrawals were to take place, we should withdraw the 24th Division from Bavaria, bring the dependents home and keep one brigade with Division Headquarters deployed north of Frankfurt with a real rotation system maintained for the regular replacement of brigades. Necessary equipment should be prepositioned without interfering with our M plus 30 commitments. I believe a commensurate reduction of air wings and by "commensurate" I mean three, rather than six, wings, could be made on the dual-basing concept. I believe we could achieve concurrence from our Allies -- including the Germans -- to such moves. We would gain experience and it might lead to further NATO acceptance of our improved strategic mobility. If the threat now posed by Warsaw Pact forces were reduced by some tangible action on their part, this demonstration of our modern reinforcing techniques could in time make further withdrawals acceptable to our NATO Allies without damaging the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the Alliance.

This step should be taken only after: (a) obtaining a consensus of the Allies that this was an appropriate move; (b) we were able to demonstrate our capacity to rotate and reinforce as represented; and (c) committing ourselves not to engage in any further withdrawals without an agreed Allied consensus and only if justified by balanced reciprocal Soviet reductions or other major changes in the security situation.
SECRET

-3-

Under these conditions, this form of limited withdrawal could be presented as compatible with our undiminished adherence to NATO and at the same time as a demonstration of our actual capacity to reinforce on a routine basis.

John J. McCloy
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

In the early fall of 1966, President Johnson was faced with the critical decision in the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- whether to seek a compromise agreement with the Soviet Union on the basic obligation of the NPT that would not permit the Multilateral Force/Atlantic Nuclear Force (MLF/ANF) concepts. The US and Soviet Union had reached an impasse on the formulation of the basic obligations of the treaty as a consequence of the special problems created by the MLF/ANF proposals. At the same time, it seemed clear that the Soviets wanted the treaty and would probably retreat from their own formal position that also brought into question existing US-NATO nuclear arrangements in order to obtain agreement. The issue evolved slowly during the summer and fall of 1966 in complex negotiations over treaty language so that one cannot point to a single crisis or to a specific Presidential decision that resolved the problem. Nevertheless, President Johnson's firm continuing desire to move ahead with the treaty provided the impetus that led to achieving compromise language without which further progress on the treaty would have been impossible.

Ever since the Baruch Plan in 1946, it had been US policy to oppose the spread of nuclear weapons. Various proposals to this end were advanced during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations. The 1961 UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Irish Resolution calling on all states to conclude a non-proliferation agreement. The proposal was not seriously pursued, however, until President Johnson in his message of January 21, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) called for a non-proliferation agreement based on the Irish Resolution. This set in motion one of the most complex negotiations in the history of diplomacy extending over a period of 4-1/2 years and involving most of the major countries in the world. A detailed chronological description of these negotiations is contained in Appendix A.

The first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 focussed new attention on the urgency of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, President Johnson appointed a special committee of distinguished citizens, under the chairmanship of Roswell Gilpatrick,
to study the problem presented by nuclear proliferation. In its report
to the President, Appendix B, the Committee called for an intensifica-
tion of efforts to achieve a non-proliferation agreement despite prob-
lems this might create with various allies and neutrals.

The negotiation of the NPT proved exceedingly difficult. From
the outset, the US faced a fundamental dilemma: how to meet the con-
flicting demands of, on the one hand, our policy to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, the requirements of our existing
nuclear arrangements with our NATO allies and future plans for nuclear
sharing with our NATO allies. This dilemma focused on the long-
standing US proposal to develop the MLF/ANF which would have in-
volved some form of joint ownership, manning, and command of a
NATO strategic nuclear force. Although the rationale for the MLF/ANF
centered on strengthening the NATO alliance and encouraging European
unity, it was also argued that it would in fact serve as a non-proliferation
measure itself by removing the incentive for the Germans and other
Europeans to develop independent nuclear forces.

The Soviets made it clear from the beginning of the negotiations
on the NPT that they were not interested in an undertaking that would
permit the MLF. In fact, their actions indicated that their principal
initial interest in the treaty was to deny such a capability to the Germans.
The NPT negotiations, therefore, started under particularly difficult
circumstances since the US effort to achieve an MLF agreement was
concurrently building to a climax. The confrontation on this issue
initially obscured the more general question as to whether or not the
Soviets would accept an agreement that was consistent with existing
US nuclear arrangements with its allies and future plans for broader
consultation within the alliance.

The United States submitted a draft Non-Proliferation Treaty
to the ENDC on August 17, 1965. This draft clearly left open the
possibility of MLF/ANF arrangements since these did not constitute
proliferation as defined in the draft treaty. The Soviet Union countered
by submitting its own draft treaty to the UNGA on September 24, 1965.
The Soviet draft treaty clearly prohibited MLF/ANF arrangements
since non-nuclear weapons states were not given "the right to partici-
pate in the ownership, control, or use of nuclear weapons." Moreover,
the Soviet draft raised questions as to the acceptability of existing
US-NATO nuclear arrangements as well as the possibility of joint US-NATO nuclear planning. Although the operative article in neither draft was acceptable to the other party, the drafts did begin to focus attention on the precise areas of difference and indicated the other considerations that would have to be covered in such a treaty. On March 21, 1966, the US submitted an amended formulation of the operative articles; however, these did not really narrow the fundamental difference with the Soviets over the issue of the MLF/ANF. In Appendix C, the original Soviet draft treaty and the US draft treaty, as amended March 21, 1966, are compared.

After Prime Minister Wilson’s visit in December 1964 and the issuance of NSAM 322, pressure within the US Government for the MLF/ANF proposal gradually declined during 1965. Although the plan was essentially moribund by the beginning of 1966, there continued to be strong reluctance to take any action that would formally foreclose the possibility of future development of this type of arrangement.

Concurrently, by the summer of 1966 there were increasing signs that the Soviets really wanted an NPT and might be willing to make some concessions in their previously adamant position. There was, however, still a widely held view in the US Government that the Soviets were really only interested in the NPT as a weapon to attack the NATO alliance in general and the FRG in particular. In this view, any concessions on our part with regard to the MLF/ANF would not be met by any Soviet concessions but would simply start us off on a slippery slope with increased Soviet attacks on existing US nuclear arrangements with NATO.

Despite reservations about the NPT within the US Government, there was strong and growing public interest and support for the concept of the NPT. This was best exemplified by the unanimous approval in the Senate on May 17, 1966, of the Pastore Resolution endorsing the Administration’s efforts to obtain the NPT.

In this atmosphere of mixed anticipation and apprehension in the summer of 1966, Ambassador Fisher began exploratory discussions with his opposite number, Ambassador Roshchin, to determine whether modifications in language or alternative formulations of the basic treaty
obligations were possible. As the talks progressed, it became increas-
ingly clear that the Soviets wanted agreement on the NPT but would not
accept a formulation that would legalize the MLF. The details of these
and other critical negotiations during the summer and fall of 1966,
when the future of the NPT was decided, are covered in Page 73-124 of
Appendix A, and the documentation covering this period of the negotia-
tions is contained in the Annex to Appendix A.

During this period, consideration was given within the US
Government to various reformulations of the basic obligations under
the treaty in an effort to avoid the issue of the MLF/ANF that divided
the negotiators. For example, reacting to a Soviet criticism of the
US position, Secretary Rusk suggested an alternative approach to the
treaty based on the concept of barring "physical access" to nuclear
weapons, rather than the concepts of 'transfer' or 'control.' How-
ever, given the existing nuclear arrangements with our NATO allies,
this proved to present more problems than it resolved, and it was not
pursued. Efforts were made to reassure the Soviets in terms of the
existing provisions of our Atomic Energy Act; however, this did not
resolve the question of treaty language.

By the end of the summer, it appeared that we could obtain a
 treaty based on a simple "no transfer" formula that would rule out an
MLF/ANF type arrangement but would protect our existing NATO
nuclear arrangements and future NATO nuclear consultations, and would
not bar the succession of a future European state to the nuclear status
of one of its former components. There was a clear division of opinion
within the US Government as to whether or not we should accept this
formulation as the basis for a treaty. Although the focus of attention
at this point of decision was almost exclusively on the NPT, there
were other approaches to the non-proliferation problem that found
support within the Government and were advanced as possible alterna-
tives. A summary of the status of alternative approaches to the non-
proliferation problem at this point is set forth in a memorandum,
dated August 30, 1966, in Appendix D.

On September 22 and again on September 24, Secretary Rusk
and Foreign Minister Gromyko had a frank discussion of the status
of the NPT negotiations. The desire of both parties to achieve agree-

---TOP-SECRET---
ment and the small margin of difference were clear. On instruction after each meeting, Ambassadors Foster and Roshchin attempted without success to find satisfactory compromise language.

In the meantime, on September 26 and 27, 1966, Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder met with the President and Secretaries of State and Defense to discuss nuclear sharing and non-proliferation. During the talks, the Germans indicated that they would not press at this time for a hardware solution and agreed in the public communiqué on the need to check the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the national control of non-nuclear weapons states.

On October 1, 1966, the President met at Camp David with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and other principal foreign policy advisors and discussed the status of the NPT negotiations. The conclusion of the meeting as reported by Secretary Rusk (Annex, Page 107, Item 81) was subject to varying interpretations and did not give any direct guidance as to whether we were prepared to accept compromise language. At the same time, the President’s statements made clear his strong belief in the policy of non-proliferation and his desire to obtain a treaty if possible.

On October 10, 1966, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk discussed the problem further without resolving the question of language. Gromyko also met with President Johnson after which both made optimistic public statements concerning the prospects for agreement.

In early November, 1966, the Foster-Roshchin working level negotiations resumed. After extended discussions of various formulations, the Soviets on December 5, 1966, formally proposed adoption of the specific language that was finally to appear in the treaty (Appendix E). Ambassador Foster recommended that the US accept this language. However, no formal decision was taken at that time. Instead, Secretary Rusk gave the proposed compromise language to the Foreign Ministers of the UK, Canada, France, FRG, and Italy at the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 12-14, 1966, for their consideration. Thus, although the US was not yet formally committed to the language, it had in effect been agreed upon, subject to consultation with our allies.
Another 1-1/2 years of complex negotiations were to take place with the Soviets, our allies, and the non-aligned in the development of the complete text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many extremely difficult issues would have to be faced, such as the safeguards provisions, peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, the handling of nuclear guarantees, the duration of the treaty, etc. Nevertheless, once an informal meeting of minds with the Soviets was achieved on the formulation of the basic treaty obligation, the way was finally cleared to move forward on the drafting and negotiation of the complete treaty.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1971

TOP SECRET

National Security Decision Memorandum 142

TO: The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Attorney General
    The Director of Central Intelligence
    The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a European Conference

As a result of the discussion at the December 1 NSC meeting, the President has directed that the following guidance be followed in consultations with our Allies on the issues related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and preparations for a European Conference.

After considering the discussions at the meeting, the President has concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be to proceed slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance on positions which clearly maintain our security.

It should be stressed to our Allies that the principal criterion for judging any MBFR proposals must be maintenance of Western military security. This will be the U.S. position in Alliance consultations on preferred MBFR models that would serve as the basis for negotiation. U.S. representatives should develop a maximum consensus on this principle.

At this time, the U.S. cannot support any single approach to reductions. We should urge the Allies to continue analysis of possible reductions.
models. Meanwhile, we should complete ongoing analysis and undertake further studies of asymmetrical models that emphasize limitations and reductions on Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities. We should also complete a study on options dealing with nuclear weapons and pursue further work on collateral constraints.

Our Allies should be told that the U.S. supports the concept of a sequential approach to negotiation similar to that proposed by the FRG. This approach should be applied to further analysis of MBFR models.

In Allied consultations, U.S. representatives should provide reassurance that we will not negotiate bilateral reductions with the USSR.

Until the Brosio mission to Moscow has been completed, the U.S. cannot support other efforts towards MBFR negotiations. While we would consider alternatives to the Brosio mission, if it proves unacceptable to the USSR, it remains essential that an exploratory phase similar to that authorized for Mr. Brosio be undertaken before any multilateral negotiations.

European Conference

We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before agreeing to any multilateral preparations for a European Conference. Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U.S. should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised by the other side before going into preparatory talks.

At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently developed to enter into multilateral East-West contacts. The U.S. will be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration. In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in a Conference will be given more emphasis.

The U.S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should be geared to this consideration.
The U.S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR and a European Conference separate.

Burdensharing

The U.S. should continue to stress to its Allies the importance of additional European force improvements meeting the objectives set by NSDM 133. MBFR should in no way conflict with the force improvements developed under the AD-70 programs; these two concepts must be complementary.

Henry A. Kissinger
MBFR: THE BROSIO MISSION AND ALTERNATIVES

I. Background

Recent Allied discussions with Soviet and other representatives of Warsaw Pact countries, as well as the failure of the January 26 Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Communique to mention the Brosio mission, have rendered it increasingly clear that Brosio will not be invited to Moscow for MBFR explorations, as proposed by the Allies in October 1971. Meanwhile, Soviet refusal to receive Brosio has been the subject of some Western press attention.

For his part, Brosio is somewhat uncomfortable about his current position, though he is prepared to continue to be available.

II. Allied Attitudes

There is a general consensus that explorations should precede negotiations, and that decisions are needed on the Brosio Mission and possible alternatives. A number of countries support a common demarche to the USSR, and possibly other Warsaw Pact states, expressing continuing Allied interest in MBFR and reiterating the offer of Brosio for explorations. As an alternative, there is also support for a statement by the NATO press spokesman covering the same ground as a demarche. Secretary General Luns has endorsed this view.

Other Allies have taken a different view. Several member states, including the FRG, Italy and Turkey have indicated that they see no need for the Allies to make any further signal until the May "decisive. The US has indicated that it would prefer not to see a demarche or a press statement at this time, and we have endorsed a suggestion that the text for a joint demarche developed in NATO be used as a basis for bilateral approaches to the USSR.

A number of Allies have stressed the need for an early decision on the future conduct of MBFR explorations,
and the Belgian Permanent Representative has stated that an Allied consensus on explorations is necessary as guidance for President Nixon's May visit to the USSR.

III. Possible Courses of Action.

This section outlines various possible approaches, some of which could be pursued in combination.

A. Utilizing Brosio

Theoretically, the Allies could indefinitely hold to their October proposal for a Brosio Mission. In practice, the May Ministerial meeting represents a point beyond which it is unlikely that either US or Allied public opinion would accept a continuation of the Brosio Mission as an earnest of interest in MBFR. Against this background, the following variants are possible.

1. Continue the Brosio Mission until the May Ministerial Meeting. While Brosio would be retained, the Allies would plan, in the absence of a Soviet invitation to Brosio, to announce in the May NATO Ministerial communiqué their disappointment that the Soviets are not prepared to proceed with explorations with Brosio, and to be prepared to proceed with an alternative either publicly or through diplomatic channels.

Advantages

-- would maintain the current Allied posture without requiring a new initiative before May.

-- would provide time to develop an alternative.

-- would defer a decision until after the President's visit to Moscow.

Disadvantages

-- in light of Pact attitudes, questions on Brosio's viability will persist, although this could be offset by pointing to the May
Ministerial meeting as the time when further Allied decisions would be taken.

2. Continue the Brosio Mission until May, but before then issue an Allied statement responding to the January 1972 Warsaw Pact statement. The Allied statement could note with interest the Warsaw Pact document, state the continuing interest of the Allies in MBFR, and reiterate that Mr. Brosio remains available for explorations. (A draft developed in NATO is appended at annex).

Advantages

--- would assert continuing Allied interest in MBFR.

--- would avoid backing down in the face of Soviet silence.

Disadvantages

--- would be unlikely to move the Soviets to receive Brosio.

--- would pose the question of next steps if the USSR does not react.

--- may not be persuasive with Western domestic opinion, including Congress, as evidence of movement toward MBFR.

3. Brosio Personally Contacts Nikolai P. Firyubin, Secretary-General of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. It is doubtful that Firyubin would accept, since this would tend to run counter to Moscow's professed opposition to bloc-to-bloc dealings. If he were to do so, he might seek to meet Brosio on a "personal" basis, although this could be complicated by the fact that he is a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in addition to his Warsaw Pact role.

Advantages

--- might make it possible for Brosio at least to convey Allied views, even if no discussion ensued.
SECRET

-- even if Firyubin did not accept, the
gesture would buy time, and reinforce the
onus on the Soviets.

Disadvantages

-- would represent a retreat by the Allies
sponsoring Brosio.

-- would undercut Allied public stance that
Brosio does not represent NATO but states
sponsoring him.

-- could appear to enhance status of the
Warsaw Pact as an institution, and Moscow's
dominant role therein.

4. Continue the Brosio Mission until May, but
in the meantime invite the Warsaw Pact to appoint a repre-
sentative to meet with him. It is doubtful that the
Warsaw Pact would accept, since to do so would be to
accept a bloc-to-bloc approach to explorations.

Advantages

-- would convey an impression of Allied
movement.

-- would reiterate continuing confidence in
Brosio, and place the onus for intransigence
on the other side.

Disadvantages

-- some Allies (e.g., Canada and the Scandi-
vianvians) might not like this variant because
of its bloc-to-bloc connotations.

-- If Warsaw Pact would accept, it might
nominate an East German for the job.

-- would undercut Allied public stance that
Brosio does not represent NATO but his sponsors.
b. Alternatives to Brosio

Prior to Ministerial consideration of alternatives to the Brosio Mission, the US could propose that individual Allies, including the US, take soundings concerning Eastern preferences on modalities for exploration. Assuming that a decision is taken to proceed with an alternative, the following are possible courses:

1. Continue the Brosio Mission until the May Ministerial meeting, then publish portions of the Explorer's Mandate in the Ministerial Communiqué. (The "Explorer's Mandate" is an Allied guidance paper for explorations, and includes Allied views on MBFR principles.)

Advantages

-- the West would issue the most comprehensive statement to date on MBFR, and thus would appear forthcoming.

-- would gain time for further development of Western MBFR studies.

-- if accompanied by cancellation of the Brosio Mission, issuance of such a declaration would tend to overshadow Brosio's withdrawal.

Disadvantages

-- there would be no appearance of Allied movement until late May.

-- modalities for explorations would remain to be determined.

2. Name another Explorer, such as Belgian Foreign Minister Mernal, or a NATO country ambassador in Moscow (e.g., the UN Ambassador).

Advantages

-- it would be more awkward for the Soviets to decline to see a foreign minister or ambassador than Brosio.
SECRET

-- would seem forthcoming to Western domestic opinion.

Disadvantages

-- would represent some loss of face for Brosio, and for his sponsors.

-- might be difficult for the Allies to exercise control over a minister, especially Harmel (if he were chosen).

-- Moscow might receive a Minister, or Ambassador, but refuse to address the substance of his mandate.

3. The US conducts explorations during the President's trip to Moscow. In this approach, the Brosio Mission might or might not formally be cancelled, and the Allies would be fully consulted in advance, as now envisaged.

Advantages

-- the Soviets would prefer this approach.

-- more substance could be covered more authoritatively than by other variants.

Disadvantages

-- some Allies would be suspicious that a US-Soviet "deal" would be struck.

-- despite consultations, some Allies might be resentful.

4. A group of several Western "Explorers" representing individual Allied states undertake discussions with the USSR and other Eastern states.

Advantages

-- would appear forthcoming.

-- would overcome "bloc-to-bloc" objections.
SECRET

Disadvantages

-- coordination could present problems, and nuances of disagreement could be voiced by the Western spokesmen.

-- if this step is made before the May Ministerial meeting, it could appear as a slight to Brosio, and a Western retreat in the face of Soviet silence.

-- selection by the Allies of the explorers could present difficulties.

-- if both Germanies were involved, could raise the FRG-GDR problem.

5. The FRG undertakes explorations on behalf of the Allies. Since Bonn will serve as host to the May Ministerial meeting, the FRG will likely be asked to disseminate the communiqué to Warsaw Pact and other states, and could undertake explorations on behalf of other Allied states.

Advantages

-- the FRG is fully capable of conducting substantive explorations.

Disadvantages

-- would likely be unacceptable to most Allies, and would raise the possibility of divisive NATO debate.

-- the FRG's own views on the MBFR process would almost certainly be interjected into explorations.

-- unless signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol (FQP) on Berlin is clearly in sight well before May, and FRG-GDR issues are further resolved, the FRG would find it difficult to deal with the GDR, if required, on this issue.
SECRET

6. Depending on the results of any further bilateral discussions and the US talks in Moscow, the NATO states most directly concerned with reductions could propose a time and place for multilateral explorations. If the Berlin FDP were not yet signed, meetings could be held in a neutral capital at the "expert" level (e.g., in Geneva, where the GDR has an observer mission to the ECE).

Advantages

-- would represent a serious Western initiative, responsive to Congressional interest.
-- would involve from the outset those states directly involved in force reductions.
-- would get around stated Soviet objections to a bloc-to-bloc approach.

Disadvantages

-- would set us on a course which might be hard to reverse.
-- might be resented by some non-participating states which feel they have at least an indirect interest in MBFR.
-- might force the issue of French participation or non-participation prematurely.
-- might be opposed by the FRG as representing a step toward de facto recognition of the GDR, and could be utilized to this end by the USSR and the GDR by raising the level of GDR representation.

7. Conduct explorations in a CSCE framework. Were it clear that CSCE preparations would start before MBFR explorations, the two processes could be linked. For example, a special body could be established in initial CSCE discussions to deal with MBFR in tandem with preparations for CSCE, possibly followed by the establishment by the Ministerial CSCE of a continuing
MBFR body. The MBFR subgroup would consist of the states directly concerned. (The issue of MBFR-CSCE linkage is discussed in more detail in the paper CSCE and MBFR: The Alternative Relationships.)

Advantages

-- would be consistent with Pact indications that it would be prepared to envisage MBFR talks parallel to CSCE preparations.

-- would deal with MBFR in a manner highly visible to Allied publics and parliaments.

-- would provide a measure of control over the pace of MBFR explorations.

-- would leave open the possibility of linking progress in the other CSCE sub-groups and toward a CSCE Ministerial meeting to progress in the MBFR sub-group.

-- while allowing general CSCE discussion of MBFR, would provide all states participating in CSCE with a role in MBFR, but could also establish at the outset a separation between states participating in CSCE and those directly concerned with MBFR.

Disadvantages

-- unless this approach were made public prior to the initiation of multilateral CSCE talks, it would not serve as an earnest of Allied movement toward MBFR.

-- by forcing the Allies to decide on the composition of an MBFR forum, could lead to wrangling in CSCE preparations over the participation in concurrent preparatory talks on MBFR, perhaps opening the door to participation by states not directly concerned.

-- may not satisfy some Allies and other countries not directly involved in MBFR that probably would
prefer to have more MBFR discussion, particularly of MBFR principles and stabilizing measures in a full CSCE, where they would have a voice.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

TOP SECRET

National Security Decision Memorandum 162

TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe

The following guidance has been approved by the President.

The contents of NSDM 142 remain valid, except as affected by the directives in this memorandum.

Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)

The United States' position should be to proceed in preparing an Allied position for CSCE that reflects a maximum consensus. It would be preferable, however, that the East-West multilateral preparatory phase not begin until after the US Presidential elections. The possibility of a high level Allied meeting prior to the beginning of the multilateral preparatory talks should be kept open, though such a meeting is not a condition for US participation in CSCE.

In dealing with both CSCE issues and procedures, Allied unity should take precedence. US policy is that a careful multilateral exploration should precede the opening of a Conference. These preparatory explorations should be substantive rather than purely procedural. Allied interest in curtailing the multilateral preparatory phase may be taken into account, provided there is an understanding in the Alliance that during this phase some substantive discussions will be conducted on each of the agenda items proposed by the Alliance.

As noted above the US would not object to a general discussion on Military Security issues in CSCE, but it would not be acceptable to aim
TOP SECRET

An interagency paper on collateral constraints that might be appropriate for discussion at a CSCE should be developed and forwarded to NATO as soon as possible. A separate paper on constraints suitable to MBFR should also be prepared for submission to NATO.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc:  Director, Central Intelligence Agency
     Acting Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

ACTION
April 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Phil Odesen/Heinmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Use of MBFR Principles at the Summit

In connection with NSDM 162 on MBFR and CSCE, you directed that a contingency study be done by the Verification Panel on MBFR Principles for possible use at the Moscow Summit. State has prepared a first draft which is attached. We are sending you this draft, along with our initial views, so you can have it available for possible use in planning the Moscow trip. We will have a revised version incorporating agency comments in a week or so. I am also attaching Brosio's MBFR Explorers Mandate, the MBFR Criteria in the Rome (May 1970) NATO Communiqué, the recent Warsaw Pact Communiqué, and NSDM 162.

This memo provides some background on the MBFR Principles, our general reaction to the issues in the State draft and an outline of the approach we recommend in using MBFR Principles in discussions with the Soviets.

Background

The agreed NATO MBFR Principles are contained in the Brosio MBFR Explorers Mandate developed at the October 1971 NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers' Meeting. They are essentially an elaboration of the basic MBFR criteria contained in the 1970 Rome NATO Ministerial Communiqué. The Principles in Brosio's Mandate were to provide the substantive basis for probing the Soviet position on MBFR. These Principles hold that reductions should be:

- consistent with the principles of undiminished security for all parties;
- mutual and balanced;

SECRET
SECRET

-- phased in their scope and timing, where appropriate;

-- adequately verified;

-- substantial and significant;

-- related to certain specified types of forces;

-- preceded possibly by an agreed freeze in force levels;

-- concerned with a certain specified geographic area.

The instructions to Brosio elaborating these Principles are substantively quite thin. A good part of his instructions were contained in Confidential Guidelines which he could not give the Soviets but only draw upon. The Principles were tough to negotiate, and they paper over many unresolved issues in the Alliance. The basic unresolved issues are:

-- the need for on-site inspection;

-- the degree stationed force's should be emphasized;

-- the precise geographic area;

-- the types of forces which should be addressed;

-- the initial objectives of MBFR -- whether this should be a freeze, simple reductions, or deeper cuts.

Since the Soviets have failed to receive Brosic efforts are being made in NATO (principally by the FRG) to turn the MBFR Principles into a declaration which would be negotiated at a CSCE. We have tried to head this off on the grounds that negotiating such principles with thirty or more countries could result in a declaration that is either meaningless or harmful.

In the absence of the Brosio Mission, it is accepted in NATO that the agreed MBFR Principles can be used as a basis for bilateral probing of the Soviet position on MBFR.

SECRET
State Draft of Contingency Study

The State paper starts from the premise that at Moscow the U.S. will be acting as a surrogate to the Brosio Mission. It generally follows the structure of Brosio's Mandate. The State draft also includes several "procedural" points not covered in Brosio Mandate. These do not quite track with the approach in NSDM 162, but the main thrust is to seek agreement to open MBFR negotiations by late '72 or early '73, to settle the question of participation and to make development of a work program the first item of business in MBFR.

Issues in the State Draft

Substantively the paper makes the following recommendations on the basic outstanding issues in NATO identified above:

Geographic Area: It suggests we decide on the NATO Guidelines Area plus Hungary (GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, FRG and Benelux) as the reduction area. The U.S. has had no preference on this issue, although most of our studies are based on the NATO Guidelines Area. The Allies favor this area and the Agencies are willing to accept it. We agree. It means that all Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe would be covered in MBFR and that equal percentage cuts would result in proportionately larger Pact reductions. Resolving this issue will provide a basis for settling the question of participation in MBFR. This is needed to move toward the multilateral MBFR explorations envisaged in NSDM 162. At the Summit we recommend that at a minimum we tell the Soviets that the area we have in mind in Central Europe and that neutrals (i.e., Austrians, Swiss) would not be included.

Initial MBFR Negotiating Objectives: The State draft proposes that MBFR initially focus on relatively simple reductions. By contrast the NATO Principles call attention to a freeze as a first step. The U.S. has reserved on the freeze idea, primarily because this might hamper NATO force improvements and bog down MBFR. The Allies favor a freeze because it could imply a floor under NATO force levels. This has some merit. The idea that a freeze would hamper force improvements is questionable and needs further study. Since this issue is unresolved and the State proposal could foreshadow U.S. support for 10% symmetrical reductions, we recommend not addressing the issue of initial negotiating objectives with the Soviets.
Stationed vs. Indigenous Forces: This is very sensitive in NATO. The U.S. position in NATO is that stationed forces "should be emphasized" in the scope or timing of reductions, or both. The State paper would have us continue with the NATO waffle on this point. We believe that in the Summit talks we should use the simple Rome "criteria" that MBFR "should include stationed and indigenous forces." We could add to this position that the U.S. preference is to emphasize stationed forces.

Types of Forces: There is no NATO agreement on the categories of forces or weapon systems (e.g., tanks, aircraft, nuclear weapons) to be addressed in MBFR. The trend, however, is to focus on ground forces and associated weapon systems. State recommends staying with Brosio's Mandate -- that the Alliance has an open mind on categories of force and weapons. We believe we could go further and make the point contained in the President's Report of 1971 that we are examining the possibility of trades of different weapon systems which the sides may view as destabilizing. This supports our view that MBFR should seek to enhance stability. It also is the basis for our mixed package and some asymmetric options.

Verification: NATO agreed in the Brosio Mandate that MBFR should be verifiable. The type of verification would be dependent on the size and nature of reductions. However, the Allies are split over the role of on-site inspection. The U.S., Canada and the Scandinavians favor national means. The UK and Belgium want on-site inspection; the former to impede MBFR and the latter to give smaller countries a role in verification. The acceptability of on-site inspection to NATO has not been seriously studied. State recommends we stick with the Brosio language which basically dodges this issue. We agree.

Using MBFR Principles at the Summit

We believe that the President and his party should not act as a substitute for Brosio. His job was to explore the Soviet position substantively by making certain assertions (i.e., the Principles) and listening to the Soviet response. We believe the U.S. objective at the Summit should be to break the current procedural impasse and get Soviet agreement to open MBFR explorations and negotiations along the lines of NSDM 162.

In this context, it is not necessary or desirable to cover all the Principles in the Brosio Mandate; the Soviets will not expect a point by point discussion. What are considered "MBFR Principles" in NATO are, in fact, a potpourri of procedural steps, negotiating objectives and reductions criteria. Thus,
SECRET

The NATO Principles primarily should be used to illustrate the issues to be resolved in MBFR as part of our effort to urge exploratory discussions. If there is Soviet interest, we could discuss some of these issues more substantively. This two-level approach coincides with your request for a "minimum" and a "more extensive" discussion of MBFR Principles.

The following outline indicates the subjects that might be addressed in this two level approach. The first level could cover:

-- The overall objectives of MBFR - a more stable defensive relationship at lower levels of forces and cost.

-- The procedural steps to get MBFR moving - with emphasis on timing and the relationship of MBFR explorations to CSCE.

-- A description of the issues we see in MBFR - reiterating the broad criteria of the Rome Communiqué and drawing attention to the problem of asymmetries and of achieving balanced reductions.

The second level could cover these issues in somewhat greater detail. It would provide guidance on:

-- The elements of "balanced" reductions including relative force levels, geography, reinforcement and redeployment capabilities.

-- Verification and the role of collateral constraints.

-- The types of forces to be included in MBFR.

-- The geographic area for reductions.

If you find this approach to be right, we could flesh it out as talking points drawing on the material in the State paper. Relevant agency views will be incorporated as available and appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

----------------- Flesh out this approach.

----------------- Develop only the first level "minimal approach.

----------------- Let's discuss.
SECRET

Contingency Study of MBFR Principles for Use at the Moscow Summit

Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Allied Views</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. Soviet Attitudes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The US Role as Interlocutor</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Procedural Issues</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Agreement to Open Explorations and Negotiations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation in Negotiations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The East-West Program for Negotiations</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. MBFR Principles in the Brosio Mandate</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Undiminished Security for all Parties</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mutual and Balanced</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Phased</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Verification</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Substantial and Significant</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Agreed Freeze in Force Levels</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Types of Forces to be Reduced</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Geographic Area</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex A - NATO Ministerial Communique on MBFR (not attached)

Annex B - The Explorer's Mandate (CM(71)49) (not attached)
SECRET

Contingency Study of MBFR Principles
for Use at the Moscow Summit

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe have been an objective of Allied policy since 1968, and a major East-West issue related to European security. Against the contingency that MBFR is discussed at the summit, this paper addresses the central MBFR issues that have emerged from Allied consultations on MBFR criteria, examines Allied and Soviet attitudes toward MBFR principles, and provides recommendations concerning their role in US-USSR talks.

I. Allied Views.

As the President's trip to Moscow approaches, Allied concerns are emerging on the manner in which the US will deal with MBFR in the US-Soviet talks. The Allies are generally apprehensive about reductions, fearing their effect on Allied security, but all recognize that MBFR has been an important counter in dealing with US Congressional pressures favoring unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe. At the same time the Allies are anxious to include aspects of MBFR on the agenda of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in
maneuvers -- to provide a basis for CSCE discussion of military security matters.

Above all, however, the Allies fear that the US may make a bilateral MBFR arrangement with the USSR. They thus will be seeking reassurance in pre-summit consultations that the US will honor its pledge to conduct MBFR negotiations only on a multilateral basis, which takes fully into account Allied desires to be involved in East-West discussions of matters affecting their security. At the same time, they will be prepared for the US to probe Soviet attitudes toward MBFR, and to deal with MBFR principles that have been developed by the Allies, published in NATO Ministerial communiques (Annex A), and refined in the mandate developed for discussions initially between the Western MBFR explorer, Manlio Brosio, and the USSR (Annex B).

The Brosio Mandate. In October, 1971, the Allies, responding to the first real Soviet indications of interest in MBFR, expressed in Brezhnev's speeches in March and May, named former NATO Secretary General Brosio to serve as Allied explorer on MBFR. While the Soviets have been unwilling to receive Brosio, his mandate remains the best expression to date of Allied agreement on MBFR principles.

Developed at a meeting of NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers, the mandate, while reflecting a degree of consensus on elaborated MBFR principles, also conceals continuing disagreements among the Allies on many aspects. Embodied in the mandate, however, are the basic criteria developed initially in the
There are also differences on which states should participate in the actual MBFR negotiations. Turkey, Italy, and Greece favor the participation of all states while the FRG, UK, US and Portugal oppose neutral participants, and the US specifically favors negotiations involving only the states directly concerned. These issues are addressed below.

CSCE and MBFR. The failure of the Brosio Mission, and progress toward a Berlin settlement have heightened Allied interest in a CSCE and raised the question of identifying a security item to include on the CSCE agenda.

The Pact suggested in 1969 that a CSCE adopt a declaration on renunciation of the use of force, which was met by a NATO proposal that CSCE address principles governing relations between states, including renunciation of the use of force. The major purpose of this Allied suggestion was an attempt to rebut the Brezhnev Doctrine.
SECRET

5.

In response, however, to the wishes of some Allies that NATO address concrete issues of security, and their concern that there might be adverse results if CSCE were to avoid addressing issues of military security, NATO Ministers agreed in December 1971 to continue the study of "questions of security, including . . . certain military aspects of security", looking toward discussion of these issues at CSCE. Subsequent Allied efforts to identify appropriate issues of security for CSCE discussions have resulted in

-- an Allied desire to address in CSCE security issues;

-- some support for, at minimum, CSCE discussion and possible agreement on stabilizing measures, such as advance notification of military movements and maneuvers, heretofore associated with MBFR as "collateral constraints" complementing an agreement on forced reductions. This proposed approach represents a departure from the position taken by the Allies in the December 1971 declaration, when Allied Ministers directed further studies of measures which could accompany or follow agreement on MBFR.

-- some also viewing favorably CSCE discussion of principles governing MBFR, along the lines of Allied statements on MBFR guidelines in recent Ministerial
SECRET

Faced with the absence of a clear US preference for a security agenda item and the opposition of France to linking MBFR to a CSCE, more recently the Allies have insisted, mainly at FRG insistence, that agreement be reached on including on the CSCE agenda, under the security rubric, discussion of stabilizing measures and MBFR principles. While there is a general agreement that stabilizing measures usefully could be addressed at CSCE, there is no agreement on specific measures which might be suitable. Moreover, there are wide differences of opinion on a declaration of MBFR principles and on its role in CSCE.
II. Soviet Attitudes

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were slow to react to NATO's signals on MBFR. Moreover, the major benchmarks in the development of the Soviet position have been very brief and general statements. The USSR, in general, has sought to keep the subject of mutual force reductions from becoming an obstacle to the development of its detente politics and the promotion of CSCE.

Responding to NATO Signals. By the Spring of 1970, Soviet unresponsiveness to signals of NATO interest in MBFR was becoming an embarrassment to Moscow's European diplomacy. Once the proponents of force reductions in Europe, the Soviets were in the awkward position of appearing to oppose them, and thus to block progress toward detente. In June 1970 the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers turned a corner when they went on record as favoring in principle the reduction of foreign forces in Europe. They indicated that the subject might be negotiated in an organ to be established by a European security conference, but they avoided any appearance of demanding that force reductions be put off until after a conference. They left open the alternative of possible negotiations in some other mutually agreed forum.

Brezhnev elaborated the Soviet position further in two
Congress in March, he spoke of the desirability of reducing armed forces and armaments in areas of tension, particularly in Central Europe -- a formulation which was more specific on the area of reduction and which allowed for reduction of indigenous as well as stationed forces. Speaking at Tbilisi in May, Brezhnev sought to claim the initiative in this field when he taunted the West for failing to take up his proposal. He called upon the West to "taste the wine" -- that is to decide to enter into negotiations -- and he deferred Soviet responses to specific points of detail until after the West had agreed to negotiate. In the ensuing year, the Soviet position on mutual force reductions has remained without major elaboration.

Brosio Uninvited. The Soviets never formally rejected the Brosio mission. To do so would have elicited adverse publicity in the West, and Moscow chose merely not to invite him to come. The USSR also has indicated its distaste for the bloc-to-bloc character of the Brosio mission. This catchword -- bloc-to-bloc -- seems to reflect a variety of considerations. One is a desire to avoid appearing to accept NATO as an institution with a role in promotion of detente in Europe, and in this connection Soviet distaste for Brosio's past political views may have played some role. More important, however, were political considerations in the two alliances. The Soviets may not have been ready in terms of coordination
in the Warsaw Pact, and probably are reluctant to engage the Warsaw Pact as an institution in force-reduction negotiations (for that would mean, inter alia, having to clear every step with the Romanians). In addition, the Soviets have used French distaste for MBFR in explaining their reluctance.

Moscow evidently saw the West as moving toward CSCE, and tending to down-play MBFR. In this circumstance, the Soviets apparently concluded that there was no need to get into the complexities of MBFR, and the USSR seems to have reckoned that Western reaction to failure to receive Brosio would be limited.

Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in January 1972 reiterated interest in force reductions, and, in effect, put the Pact on record as agreeing with the Soviet position espoused by Brezhnev on possible inclusion of both indigenous and stationed forces. Moreover, the Pact asserted support of the Soviet attitude toward the Brosio mission by stating that force reductions could not be the prerogative of the two blocs.

Summit Discussions. More likely than not, the Soviet leaders will want to do more listening than talking on MBFR when they receive the President. Soviet officials have from time to time indicated a continuing interest in developing consultations with the US on this topic, and they thus may well raise it. The Soviets probably believe that, while NATO politics or Congressional
pressures will have their effects, the ultimate decisions on Western positions will be largely made by the President. And the Soviet leaders will want to form their own impression of his objectives in this field.

For their part, the Soviet leaders will almost certainly indicate a generally favorable disposition in principle to reducing forces in Europe. Moscow’s willingness in recent years to let the subject drift for long periods suggests that the Soviet leaders do not see economic considerations or the buildup against China as forcing them to make rapid progress in this field. Rather, the Soviet leaders will be more concerned with the political implications of MBFR.

In principle, the Soviets are interested in MBFR, and in any case they will want to avoid having force reductions become an impediment to their detente policies in Europe and the movement toward a CSCE. How they handle specifics will probably be a function of their reading of American and Western attitudes. If some movement on force reductions -- for instance, discussion of some related issue such as principles or stabilization -- is, in effect, the price for going ahead in CSCE, the Soviets may choose to pay it, as they did in the June 1970 Pact statement. On the other hand, if the West does not press force reductions, the Soviets will likely be disposed to let the matter drift and concentrate instead on CSCE preparations.

As a general matter, the USSR has been slow to develop
SECRET 11.

and it seems unlikely that the Soviet leaders will be prepared to get deeply into substance of the subject. As a matter of tactics, the Soviets seem to prefer to appear forthcoming toward NATO by declaring their favorable disposition toward force reductions, and leaving the hard details aside. For instance, Moscow would evidently prefer to let the US take the initiative in defining an area for reductions and thus for stating concepts which might exclude Italy and Romania. About the only issue on which the Soviets have registered a rejection of views held in NATO has been on interpretations of the word "balanced" in MBFR to mean larger reductions on the Pact side. At the same time, the Soviets have evidently been slow in coordination with their allies on force-reduction issues, and it would appear that the Soviets prefer to avoid potential arguments with the Pact until specific questions have to be addressed.
SECRET

CSCE TASK FORCE
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

In anticipation of the May 30-31 NATO Ministerial Meeting, this report summarizes the current status of issues related to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and recommends US positions to serve as a basis for future US participation in NATO consultations.

I. Current Allied Attitudes Toward CSCE

In general, the Allies are flexible in their approach but increasingly they are tending to polarize around two views of the objectives of CSCE:

- - a conference for the sake of detente;
- - a conference yielding meaningful, concrete results.

Both approaches assume that the public reaction to the conference is as important as the provisions of agreed texts that may emerge.

A. A Conference for the Sake of Detente

Many Allies believe CSCE should primarily seek to improve the general climate of East-West relations, leading to beneficial results over the longer run. These Allies would prefer to avoid raising contentious issues at CSCE and to take essentially conciliatory positions toward the Soviets. While professing to seek concrete results, they would be content with general declarations.
SECRET

-2-

The outcome of this approach would be bland discussions, leading to general declarations of good intentions, meeting Soviet goals, and conveying an image of broad East-West understanding; specific problems would be remanded to bilateral or other multilateral fora for further discussion.

B. A Conference Yielding Meaningful Results

We have argued, with support from others, that the Allies should press for specific, significant results at CSCE. We have stated that discussions of difficult issues would expose basic East-West differences, and thus avoid exaggerated public optimism.

In conformity with this approach, we have tabled in NATO several specific proposals that western public opinion would regard as reasonable and which, if adopted, would bring some concrete progress. Most, if not all, of these suggestions, however, would likely be resisted by the Warsaw Pact states and could lead to contentious discussions, if pressed. We have argued that these proposals should nevertheless be put forward if our interests are to be served and that this can be done in a manner that need not be provocative to the other side.

The most controversial proposals relate to the "freer movement" topic, which some Allies (such as France and the FRG) consider provocative, but others (Dutch and UK) believe warrants discussion. There may also be problems on "principles governing relations between states, including renunciation of force", where efforts may be made to paper over the Brezhnev Doctrine issue.
II. Principal Issues

A. General

Issue - Whether we should:

- continue to urge the Allies to take positive positions, thus keeping open the option of beginning the multilateral talks with a generally firm line, similar to the second alternative outlined above; or

- acquiesce in the more conciliatory positions likely to find increasing favor among the Allies, leading to a conference largely for the sake of detente atmospherics.

Discussion:

A conference for the sake of detente would have the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages:

- A benign climate of East-West relations would foster efforts gradually to overcome some of the basic East-West differences (and particularly, the FRG hopes, in inner-German relations);

- give limited additional freedom of maneuver to some of the smaller Warsaw Pact states; and

- increase internal pressure for liberalization in the Soviet Union and some other Pact countries.

With respect to the last two points, however, the Soviets doubtless also calculate that a relaxation of East-West tension would have the indicated side-effects but th-
the potential problems are manageable. Thus, any gains in these areas will probably be slight, at least in the short and medium term.

Disadvantages:
-- By failing to underline unresolved East-West issues, would increase pressure in the U.S. Congress and public opinion for unilateral troop withdrawals; and
-- would undercut public support for necessary Allied force improvements.

On the other hand, an effort to obtain meaningful concrete results at CSCE, entailing difficult discussions with the Warsaw Pact states, would have the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages:
-- by exposing basic East-West differences, it would mitigate the risk of declining Allied public and parliamentary support for necessary defense efforts;
-- would exploit the bargaining leverage inherent in Moscow's desire for a "successful" CSCE, and particularly for formal pledges to "respect" existing frontiers, to obtain specific understandings advantageous to the Allies.

Disadvantages: If pursued too aggressively, this approach could:
-- fail the Allies
SECRET

-5-

damage the prospects of other negotiations
on matters of interest to us or our Allies; and
-- lead some in the West to conclude that the
Allies were attempting deliberately to sabotage
the conference, thereby undermining public support
for NATO.

With respect to tactics, if we are to hold open the option
of seeking concrete results at the conference, entailing some
difficult discussions with the Soviets, we will need to remain
the advocates of firmness during inter-Allied discussions. The
final US position at the conference, however, will depend upon
various factors impossible to assess at this time.

Recommendation:

That we continue to support a firm line on the possibly
difficult issues in further discussions with the Allies.

B. The Borders Problem

Issue - Whether to persist in the position that the Allies
should not accede to Warsaw Pact pressures for formal pledges
of respect for existing frontiers unless the Pact states make
major concessions in other areas of the negotiations.

Discussion -

This problem, also addressed under the general rubric of
principles governing interstate relations (below), is treated
separately here because pledges of respect (if not recognition)
for existing frontiers
will be a major Soviet goal, though they would serve no
direct Western interests. Thus, the issue offers strong
potential negotiating leverage. To date, we have argued that
the Allies should not accommodate Soviet wishes on this issue
unless Moscow offers significant counter-concessions in other
areas of the negotiations -- for example, in freer movement,
or possibly with respect to stabilization measures. (In no
event, however, should a CSCE text entail "recognition" of
frontiers).

Many Allies, however, have been reluctant to commit
themselves to use this issue for bargaining leverage outside
the context of principles governing interstate relations.

Recommendation:
That we continue to seek an Allied consensus on our
preference.

C. Freer Movement

Issue -- Whether we should:
- - continue to urge the Allies to take a positive
approach, seeking both pro-agenda advantages and
concrete improvements; or
- - acquiesce in the desire of many to focus the dis-
cussions on uncontentious issues of East-West
cultural exchanges.

Discussion -- We have taken the leadership within NATO
to develop this topic as a major western proposal, designed
D. Security Issues: The Relationship Between CSCE and MBFR

These issues, summarized below, are currently under study and are the subject of a separate paper that can serve as a basis for US decisions.

Issues:

-- the degree of linkage between CSCE and MBFR, and specifically whether to limit CSCE discussion to stabilizing measures, or broaden the CSCE discussion to include MBFR principles.

-- steps to be taken to gain Allied agreement on the participants in a special MBFR body established to conduct MBFR explorations simultaneously with initial multilateral CSCE talks.

Discussion:

In the course of recent consultations, the Allies welcomed the US view that, should CSCE preparatory multilateral discussions begin before MBFR explorations, the fact of CSCE preparation should be used to establish contacts for the simultaneous exploration of MBFR. The Allies also support efforts to reach agreement on stabilizing measures -- such as advance notification of movements and maneuvers -- in CSCE. Contrary to the US view, however, most Allies want some visible link between CSCE and MBFR, so that all CSCE participants can appear to have at least an indirect role in MBFR. Thus, all but the US and France, which opposes MBFR, favor CSCE efforts
to reach agreement on MBFR principles, seeing this as a way to assure greater participation in the MBFR process for states not involved in actual negotiations. Finally, a number of Allies are not yet ready to accept the US view that MBFR should be limited in this context to states whose forces and territories would be directly involved in this area of reductions. The US believes no useful purpose is served by having neutrals and others not directly concerned in reductions participate in the negotiating process. No consensus exists on the area of reductions, and there is no prospect that agreement will be reached before the May 30-31 NATO Ministerial meeting. However, it may be possible to trade US support for a declaration of MBFR principles at a CSCE for Allied agreement to the US view on the area of reduction and the participation in explorations.

E. Principles Governing Interstate Relations

Issue - Whether we should persist in our present course of playing down the likely benefit of any agreed CSCE text on this subject.

Discussion

The Allies have held that any CSCE text on this topic must assert the application of agreed principles regardless of social and political systems. However, we assume that the Soviets, regardless of the precise formulations used, would argue that its terms do not conflict with the "higher law" of "socialist internationalism" and thus with the concept of limited sovereignty within the "socialist commonwealth."
SECRET

Several important substantive issues are also in dispute. There is thus some advantage in trying to settle most of the outstanding issues in a package deal, rather than to concede on some while hoping thereafter to persuade the Allies to move nearer our position on others.

Recommendation:

That we hold to our current position on procedures, looking toward a general interallied settlement of major points at issue on the full range of CSCE issues. In short, decision on this procedural issue should be deferred until the fall Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting (see below).

F. Further Development of an Allied Consensus

Issue - Whether we should:

- attempt to settle outstanding issues at the Bonn Ministerial; or

- argue for further intensive study, after the Ministerial, by the Council in Permanent Session, looking toward a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting this fall.

Discussion

Some Allies, especially those favoring an early opening of multilateral talks, will prefer to attempt to reach agreement at Bonn, perhaps by means of a ministerial declaration, on the general joint Allied approach to CSCE. However, ministers may wish to devote considerable attention at Bonn to a review of international developments, particularly the results of the US-Soviet summit, leaving little time for treatment in...
SECRET
-12-

This suggests that communique formulations agreed among ministers at Bonn should be general in nature, leaving to later resolution interallied differences. These should receive further intensive study before and resolution at a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers, perhaps in early October. This would also provide a further rationale for delaying the multilateral East-West talks, which we do not wish to begin until after the US elections.

Recommendation:
That we make no effort to settle major interallied differences at Bonn, but argue instead for a fall Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting as the best means of resolving them.

III. Internal US Preparations

Issue - How should internal US preparations for a CSCE be handled?

Discussion -
The Interagency Task Force and its constituent working groups have, to date, proven useful in elaborating detailed US positions and providing our Mission to NATO with fully cleared guidance to enable it to take a leading role in interallied consultations. Involving all relevant US departments and agencies, including the NSC, it has proved itself as a workable forum for expeditious consideration of instructions to our repre- sentatives.
SECRET
-13-

Recommendation:

That US preparations for CSCE continue in the Interagency Task Force, under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION
July 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Heimut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Gromyko's Views on MBFR and CSCE

Cable reports on Gromyko's talks with the Luxembourg, Dutch, and Belgian foreign ministers during his early July visits there throw some new light on Soviet positions:

MBFR

In his July 8 conversation with the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Thorn (cable at Tab A), Gromyko rejected Thorn's suggestion that there should be some discussion of MBFR at the European Security Conference (CSCE), perhaps a statement of agreed principles. He said inclusion of MBFR in the Conference would not be possible.

He told the Dutch something slightly different, (cable at Tab B): MBFR had no connection with a CSCE, no explanation of force reductions should take place at a CSCE and eventual MBFR preparatory talks could start after the conference -- but these preparatory talks might run parallel with it.

Explorations

Gromyko told the Dutch that bilateral consultations, perhaps between one NATO and one Warsaw Pact country, might be an acceptable form of exploration -- from which it was clear to the Dutch that he meant US-Soviet bilaterals, each acting on behalf of its allies.

Site of Preparations

Gromyko told the Dutch (cable at Tab C) too that even MBFR preparations should be held elsewhere than at the CSCE site.
(COMMENT: This is the clearest semi-public statement yet of the Soviet wish to lay the basis for MBFR bilaterally with us. From Gromyko's remarks, the Soviets seem to have accepted the idea of separateness of MBFR and CSCE, reinforcing it by wanting to have the troop negotiations follow the Conference but catering to some West Europeans' views by endorsing the idea that the preparations for them could be simultaneous with a CSCE.)

CSCE

Gromyko's discussion in the Hague and Luxembourg give the broadest elaboration yet of the Soviet CSCE position, although substantively there is little new.

Speaking to Thorn, he:

-- urged Helsinki as the site of both CSCE preparatory talks and the CSCE itself;

-- acknowledged that because of our elections the US had to wait with the CSCE preparations until at least mid-November, felt that the conference itself should take place as soon as possible in late 1972 or early 1973;

-- proposed that preparatory talks should first establish an order of business, then a conference date, then a location, and finally a procedure;

-- envisaged a procedure that would begin with a ministers meeting, followed by committee meetings and conclusions to be finalized by heads of government -- apparently a multi-national Summit. (It came out slightly different with the Dutch: (a) foreign ministers meeting; (b) committee meetings lasting three weeks to draft agreements and resolutions; (c) heads of state or government meeting to approve documents; and (d) possibly a permanent organ and later a second CSCE.);

-- proposed the following agenda: a) confirmation of the inviolability of frontiers; b) non-use of force; c) non-interference and sovereign equality of states; and d) economic, cultural, and scientific problems. (In a slightly different version again, he reportedly told the Dutch (cable at Tab C), that the CSCE should deal (a) with "political security," (b) with economic, technical and cultural relations; and (c) "possibly" with a permanent organ, on which the Soviet Union has an "open mind."
vigorously supported the idea of a "consultative organ" to continue CSCE activities;

insisted on "concrete steps" at the conference and principles in "concrete language" so that all Europeans would have the feeling that there was no danger of war.

Drafting sessions in the Hague on the Dutch-Soviet communique issued after Gromyko's visit, as reported to us by the Dutch, gave some further hints as to what the Soviets have in mind for CSCE principles. The Soviet drafters resisted a Dutch demand that the communique passage on principles of cooperation should be placed in a general rather than a European context, saying that the US had agreed at the Summit to a statement of principles in the European context. They also opposed any reference to "self-determination of nations," pointing to the last NATO communique's language on eventual German reunification for their opposition.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

August 19, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Attached are papers and, where pertinent, talking points, for your Moscow trip, as follows:

Opening Statement
Economic Issues
SALT
MBFR
CSCE

Leningrad
Communique

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeld

SUBJECT: MBFR

There has been no serious discussion with the Soviets on this issue, even at a working level. If you intend to engage this issue, you will be traveling uncharted waters -- we know very little of what the Soviets are thinking about MBFR, other than that they have been far from enthusiastic. Indeed, CPSU Secretary, and new politburo candidate-member Ponomarev told some visiting British laborites, that they should not press him on MBFR because the politburo had made no decisions on the question.

Since Brezhnev's speech of May 1971, a few bits and pieces have appeared:

-- Brezhnev is on public record that both foreign and indigenous forces should be included in MBFR.

-- He told you privately in April that perhaps a small reduction to create confidence should be the first step.

-- In the Soviet-American communique it was agreed that the "goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe;" in NATO we define the reductions area to mean the two Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Benelux, but the Soviets have not agreed on any particular area.

-- Recently, some Soviet academics, charged with preparing studies on MBFR, talked about a 10-15 percent cut which would be meaningless in real terms but would have some symbolic value and should not be too difficult to negotiate. The same source spoke of asymmetrical reductions -- a tank unit for an air unit. He suggested an approach of agreeing in principle on a percentage reductions, and allowing "experts" to negotiate the makeup of the actual reductions.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
It is likely, as some observers have suggested, that the Soviets are in fact not well prepared for this subject. Considering how difficult our own efforts have been it would not be surprising if the Soviets are encountering some of the same problems.

In any case, basic Soviet motives are clearer. They do not want military issues to become entangled with their political effort in CSCE. They want the political situation clarified and confirmed before considering any change in the military balance. When they do accept negotiations or explorations, we can be certain that they will demand strict equality of treatment. Moreover, there is no objective reason for them to negotiate away their strong military position in Central Europe, even for some American reductions; And even allowing for some considerable margin for reductions on purely military grounds, the Soviets will not want to create any impression that they are beginning to disengage from Eastern Europe.

If neither side wants to run the risks that large reductions would entail, then the real issue may be whether there is a mutual interest in small "symbolic" reductions. Judging from the little the Soviets have said, something on the order of 10-15 percent is what they are thinking about. Such a gesture, especially if only applied to foreign forces, might be useful Soviet psychological warfare against China. (A ten percent reduction happens also to be about where our analysis points out for a common ceiling.) Ironically, therefore, we may already have more common ground on MBFR than we imagine. The key issue, however, is that we suffer under a symmetrical cut of ten percent, and probably could not verify cuts this small in national forces. The second irony, therefore, is that Soviet-American reductions are probably the most feasible.

In sum, though we have reassured our Allies against the possibility of a Soviet-American bargain, this is likely to be exactly what will confront us in actual negotiations, or even in your Moscow conversations.

YOUR POSITION

A certain amount of US-Soviet bilateral discussion on MBFR is legitimate but the issue is so volatile in NATO that there is very little we can say, unless it is well within the scriptures of NATO positions. Unfortunately, NATO is at sea until we tell them what our position is. And we are reluctant to take too firm a stand until we explore with the Soviets. Hence, the need for some preliminary talks.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
If this is discussed in any detail in Moscow, since it is our initiative and we are pressing for explorations, you will probably have to take the lead in spelling out some of our thinking.

--- You probably should not mention numbers, but talk about some of the general concepts, with emphasis on the problems that geography creates and the advantages to the USSR.

--- You should allude to the idea of an equal balance, if only to test the Soviet reaction.

--- Since the Soviets have been wary of discussing substance, we might be ahead of the game, if they are willing to respond.

You will be receiving more MBFR material through the Verification Panel for a planned meeting. This will be an evaluation report that synthesizes all our outstanding options and discusses some of the underlying problems.

At Tab A are some talking points that you might draw on if MBFR is discussed as a discrete topic.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

**TALKING POINTS**

**MBFR**

**US Concerns and Objectives**

As we analyze the military situation in Central Europe, we are naturally preoccupied with those elements in the Warsaw Pact's posture that appear most threatening; this may be subjective on our part, but there is some basis in fact for apprehension — for example, we are concerned by the large concentration of armor in forward areas:

- our second concern relates to Soviet capabilities to bring large forces into Central Europe in a short period of time;
- presumably the Soviets have concerns about NATO's posture;
- as in SALT, an MBFR agreement is only feasible if it deals with central concerns of both sides;
- our general objective, therefore, is to improve *mutual* security and we see MBFR as a process that will accomplish this end through reductions to a new more viable military balance and the establishment of constraints that add to security by precluding covert buildups or surprise attacks.

**Possible Approaches**

Since MBFR will be a complicated discussion that must take into account diverse interests of more than a dozen states, there is something to be said for building confidence by reaching a rather limited agreement at an early date.

- we have noted that the General Secretary alluded to this in his April conversations, i.e., token reduction as a measure of confidence building;
- in this context perhaps MBFR should be viewed in phases somewhat like SALT; initial agreements followed by further negotiations.

**Inherent Problems of Reductions**

Comparing MBFR with SALT, we see many differences:

- the security interests of many states are involved;
SECRET/SENSITIVE

-- the arms and forces of the several states concerned are at differing levels, with differing equipment;

-- the geography of Central Europe is a controlling factor, especially since two of the Western Allies -- the US and the UK -- withdraw across the seas, while the USSR borders on the reductions areas.

These and other factors lead us to believe that the primary purposes of initial contacts and explorations will be to establish some commonly accepted criteria for making reductions:

-- our thinking is that a balance should be created in which neither coalition has a significant offensive advantage, but which allows for some asymmetries;

-- for example, the stationed forces (foreign forces) in the area might be roughly equal, and the indigenous forces roughly equal;

-- the same principles might be applied to key weapons systems -- tanks or aircraft.

Verification will present a particularly difficult problem:

-- whereas in SALT, national means were suitable and adequate, they cannot be applied with the same confidence in MBFR;

-- this will affect both the size of any reductions and the manner that they are carried out.

Special Aspects of US-Soviet Relations

-- We are both in positions of leadership in our alliances, but are bound by obligations to our allies;

-- both of our forces are critical elements in the defense posture of our respective alliances;

-- thus, a Soviet-American consensus is important, but, at the same time, we both operate within limits on how far each can go in molding the position of the alliances.
Soviet Views

We are somewhat disabled in analyzing the issue because there has been little input from the Soviet side:

-- on several key issues we would benefit from knowing how the Soviet leaders see the problem, whether they have defined their objectives, or alternative approaches;

-- we cannot negotiate for the alliance, but Soviet views could influence our attitude.

Summing Up

-- We would hope to treat MBFR explorations like the first round of SALT;

-- thus, we would elaborate some of our security concerns, some principles underlying possible agreements, the requirements of verification, and perhaps an illustration of how to deal with the specifics of reductions;

-- if the USSR would follow a parallel course, we could, in the exploratory talks, agree on a work program plus the modalities of actual negotiations;

-- we proceed on the assumption that once explorations are launched, timing and other aspects of MBFR will go forward independently of CSCE, though we hope the two sets of talks can begin about the same time.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

August 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: Relaunching MBFR

The problem of launching or relaunching MBFR explorations is not only an issue with the Soviets but, more immediately, within the Alliance. What the Soviets do not seem to appreciate is that the more they stall the greater the pressures in NATO (and even among neutrals and their own Warsaw Pact Allies) to put the entire MBFR issue into the CSCE.

We have been able to resist these pressures, with tacit French support, but only by having in the foreground some prospect for MBFR. Parallelism was essentially a procedural gambit to extract us from the moribund Brodie mission. (Of course, linkage also gives us leverage which the Soviets recognize.)

Now that Kuznetsov has cast doubt on parallelism, we are going to be under more pressure to (a) accept a CSCE invitation without reservation, and (b) agree that a declaration of principles on MBFR ought to be negotiated at CSCE. It is quite possible that the Soviets may acquiesce in an MBFR declaration with the intention of placing MBFR under the permanent security organ they have proposed as the outcome of CSCE. On balance, however, it would seem that the Soviets and the French should want to maintain maximum separation between CSCE and MBFR.

All of this simply means that we need from the Soviets, before your visit to Moscow, some sign that they will enter into MBFR exploration. This is the minimum necessary to allow us to go forward on CSCE and still keep the issues separate.

We also need an indication of Soviet timing and the modalities of the MBFR explorations.

-- Since the Soviets fear that MBFR will overshadow CSCE, they want it to be deferred until after CSCE is completely finished. A possible
compromise, that should be acceptable to us, would be to start the MBFR explorations at a fairly low level either (a) in late October, before CSCE, or (b) in January when the CSCE preparatory talks will probably be finished, and before the first CSCE Ministerial session.

-- A problem is that, for domestic reasons, we cannot afford too long an interval between explorations and negotiations. Thus if the MBFR talks are delayed until January, we would probably need to start negotiations by no later than July 1973, so as not to conflict with the CSCE final phase of CSCE or with Brezhnev's return visit.

We have briefed the Allies on the Beam-Kuznetsov conversation and taken the line that the Soviet reply was preliminary, did not rule out parallelism, and that we should now wait for their considered reply. Ambassador Beam suggests that we temporarily ease up on parallelism, and make a straight proposal for an exploratory session in a given timeframe, without specific reference to CSCE, and indicate that the exploration would have a modest agenda.

All things considered, the following is a scenario that should satisfy the Soviets, our Allies and our own interests.


-- Agreement to maintain "contacts" afterward, through the US on the one hand, and the USSR on the other, or some "working group."

-- Tentative agreement to reconvene around July 1973.

This leaves the question of French participation. There is no way to force the French to participate. They may be mollified by the above scenario, especially if we make a point of talking to them privately.

-- Frankly, we need the French in MBFR because they can be counted on to bring a healthy skepticism to the whole process, whether or not their forces are actually included in the agreement.

-- The French interest is in completing the CSCE, which they view more optimistically than we do, but which also strengthens their own lines to Moscow. They will do nothing to help us promote MBFR at this point.
A compromise is to invite the French to associate themselves with the MBFR talks in a form of their choosing -- i.e., observer, technical expert, without commitment to a reduction of their forces.

The association of the French might be facilitated if we begin to downgrade the profile of the first MBFR talks. Since they are already designated as exploratory, we could, in talking to the Soviets and to our Allies, emphasize that we view them as convening at the level of experts, that is, no high-level US representative.

Finally, we need to stand fast on convening MBFR exploration at a site other than Helsinki, which is sure to be the permanent CSCE locale. This is our position in NATO, which is under strong attack, and if the Soviets want to separate MBFR and CSCE they should come out for separate sites, as they did in their conversations with the French.

In sum, to relaunch MBFR we need the following understanding:

-- As a minimum, a positive sounding reply from the Soviets to Beam's demarche; at least an indication that they are studying it, and, preferably, a stated willingness to receive invitations, and negotiate about the timing, participants and site.

-- If possible, a Soviet suggestion on timing -- either October, or not later than mid-January.

In turn, we would:

-- Accept the Finnish invitation to CSCE on November 22;

-- Send formal notes to the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR, proposing to meet for explorations at Geneva, the timing to be negotiated, if the Soviets do not propose a time.

-- We and the Soviets would try to influence the French to attend in an "expert" capacity or as observer.

-- We could tell the French privately -- as you already did to Debre -- that we anticipate a long-drawn out technical discussion to which we feel they could make a sound contribution.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeld

SUBJECT: (CSCE) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

This memorandum includes a review of CSCE, a talking paper for your use in Moscow (Tab A), and a longer analytical summary (Tab B).

I. Where We Stand

The Conference will begin its preparations about November 22 in Helsinki. More than thirty nations will appear. The time, place and agenda for the actual conference will be agreed. In the Soviet scenario the Foreign Ministers will then convene the actual conference, make speeches, commission working groups, and go home. The working groups will work out some sort of agreed statement on each topic, the heads of State will then convene, make more speeches, and ratify the results. They will go home, and perhaps some hapless committee will remain in permanent session until another conference is held.

The results are almost foreordained:

-- There will be a declaration of principles of European security and cooperation; it will be an amalgam of platitudes, but will confirm that no European state is going to challenge the status quo. It will imply, but certainly no more than imply, that the Brezhnev doctrine is illegitimate. It will renounce force, confirm territorial integrity, promise arms control, and greater contacts among people.

-- Some minimal restraints may be adopted on military movement, e.g. advance notification of maneuvers.

-- The West will press for freer movement of people and information. The East will parry with a general promise not to interfere with movement of people and information. This will be hailed as an important beginning. Nothing much will change.

-- Highly technical debates will occur in the economic subcommittees. All will pledge a greater effort to facilitate trade. Some practical improvements for Western businessmen may result.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

-- A grab bag of other issues -- cultural exchange, scientific cooperation, environmental protection, will be discussed and declarations issued. Nothing much will change.

This is by way of saying that the fact of the gathering probably far exceeds its substance.

From the Soviet viewpoint, a long cherished objective will finally be realized when the conference convenes.

-- There will be an immediate upgrading of East Germany.

-- Boundaries in Europe will be confirmed, force renounced, and the spirit of detente advanced.

From the Western point of view some debating points may be scored; the Eastern bloc will be exposed as a closed society; the Brezhnev doctrine will be indirectly challenged, and, hopefully, a feckless exercise will be finished without serious splits in the Western camp or significant damage to real security.

II. The Issues

Some years ago a European Conference might have been a serious East-West debate or confrontation. Now, the key aspects of European security are being or have been handled independently through bilateral arrangements (Germany) or specialized forums (SALT, MBFR). The conference has been reduced to a symbolic act, more important for its psychological atmospherics than its content.

As a reflection of this change in the conference character, the West has no grand strategic options -- our approach is almost purely damage limiting, with some marginal positive goals in the realm of "freer movement." Moreover, we, the United States, do not have great tactical flexibility. The conference is of more immediate importance to our Allies than to us. In a coalition of '4, we can only lead so far, without dictating on issues that are of secondary importance to us.

The main issue for the United States, therefore, is one of Alliance management rather than East-West bargaining or debating:

-- We must come out of this exercise with a minimum of illusion and a maximum of Allied unity.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE

-- This means being willing to defer to a European consensus in NATO.

-- It also means carefully resisting the natural temptation to cook the results of the conference with the Soviet Union, privately behind the backs of our friends. On some matters this might be justified but certainly not the miserable European Conference.

This perspective is justified if we consider what the Soviets see in the conference.

-- It may be that the Soviets have lost some of their original enthusiasm for this project -- since much of its substance is already subsumed in their bilateral dealing with us and with the Germans. But it is still important to their general European strategy.

-- They still want an atmosphere of political relaxation in the West that will erode any collective sense of concern over the predominant Soviet power position. They want to spin a web of overlapping interests in maintaining this relaxation for their own national aims: to prevent a growth of a strong, unified Western camp that can challenge the USSR in Eastern Europe, and to gain the time and political freedom to deal with the threat of communist China.

-- The European Conference, played out on a grand stage of foreign ministers conferences and meetings of heads of State will evoke images of the great 19th Century Congress of the concert of Europe, détente, and so forth. This imagery is irresistible to the Russian leaders, and if only for this reason they will pursue the conference with tenacity.

There are four main areas of substance in the conference:

-- Principles Governing European States
-- Military Confidence Building
-- Freer Movement
-- Economic Cooperation
-- Post-conference Machinery

A. Principles

As the longer paper (Tab B) indicates there is considerable common ground in so far as the language of a declaration of principles is concerned.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
The real issue is one of conflicting political objectives. At the risk of overworking an old cliche, the Soviet objective is to confirm the results of WW II -- the inviolability of frontiers, the renunciation of force, territorial integrity -- in a document that has a binding legal status. Over the years, and especially in the last three years, the West has conceded most of the Soviet formula, mainly because West Germany, the potential revisionist power has adopted a strategy that builds on rather than challenges the status quo.

All that remains to be settled, and it is by no means an insignificant aspect, is the validity of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty, which the Soviets consider part of the status quo. In other words, the West is asked to concede spheres of influence by the device of agreeing to principles that do not in specific terms challenge the limited sovereignty doctrine.

It is the Western notion, however, that the declaration can lay some inhibitions on the practice of the doctrine. The tactical issue is how far the West can press this without jeopardizing the conference itself, which almost certainly the Western Europeans do not want to do.

-- For the US, the issue is whether, in light of our relations with the USSR, we want to appear as the leading advocate and champion of the anti-Brezhnev doctrine thrust, or begin now to retreat from any untenable positions.

B. Confidence Building -- Stabilizing Measures

Everyone agrees that a Conference on Security ought to deal with military problems. But in practice none of the major powers want to subject their military dispositions to the whims of 30 nations. Therefore, there is a sort of tacit understanding that military issues will be given an optical polish, but will not be negotiated.

The result is a Western scheme that calls for all countries to adopt certain very limited obligations (a) to announce in advance their maneuvers, and (b) to permit some observers at the maneuvers. The theory is that if all states renounce force they should take these measures as an earnest of good intentions.

The issue is whether the Soviet agree. Our intelligence suggest they may be willing to adopt something along the lines of confidence building measures. Certainly the East Europeans have an interest.
The tactical issue for the US is not to allow this slight opening to be enlarged into a full scale negotiation on MBFR principles, which some Allies still want and which may appeal to neutrals as well.

C. Freer Movement

This may be the crunch. The underlying Western philosophy which we have subscribed to and promoted is that "liberalization" of the Eastern bloc is the only road to the reconciliation of Europe and that liberalization flourishes when exposed to the nourishing influence of Western societies. There is something to this theory. But we are not likely to trick the USSR into opening its doors to a free flow of people, in or out, or to an inundation of Western literature and broadcasts.

In fact, the Western approach is cynical. No one expects to achieve much, but in pursuing the issues the East is to be exposed as the obstacle to European "cooperation."

In sum, this takes on the character of psychological warfare and the issue, therefore, is whether the state of East-West relations justifies such an approach.

-- Do we really want to "expose" the USSR, or one of its allies?

-- Do we want to drive wedges between Romania and the USSR?

-- Do we want to lay out broad schemes and ambitious projects, and then abandon them while pointing the finger of blame on the other side?

Our Allies are becoming very skeptical of this exercise and are leaning on us to scale down the terms. (We are the main supporters; through bureaucratic inertia we have not really re-examined this since 1969, when it might have been tactically justified as a measure to badger the Soviets.)

In short, we can achieve some very limited practical improvement in freer movement -- which might be feasible in light of the loosening up in Eastern Europe -- but not if our aim is polemics.

D. Economic Cooperation

The subject matter is too technical to develop any real basic issues but this is what is lacking -- an agreed Western philosophy. At this stage no one knows what would be the outcome of the economic issues. There is
Procedures.

There are two scenarios: ours and the Soviets.

-- We assume "careful preparations," and by this we mean that the substantive issues for the agenda be resolved beforehand at the preparatory level. The French and Soviets disagree and view the preparations as mostly procedural. The British are not enthusiastic about our approach on the grounds that they cannot preempt the position of their foreign minister!

-- Nevertheless, we do have Soviet agreement, in the US-Soviet communique, that the conference should be "carefully prepared."

-- After "careful preparations," the next step should be to convene the actual conference at the Foreign Minister level. Our concept is that this would be the last step that the Ministers would agree to the outcome of the conference. The French foresee two Ministerial level meetings, and the Soviet variation is for the last meeting to be at the heads of state level.

-- We are isolated on restricting the CSCE to one Ministerial level meeting: our choice is between another foreign minister meeting, or a summit gathering.

-- Finally, we have to decide, fairly soon, how to respond to the Finnish invitation for November 22, but we cannot accept the date until we have a firmer commitment to MBFR.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

TALKING POINTS

CSCE

PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION

The Soviets will probably make a presentation along the following lines:

-- The preparatory talks should begin on November 22 as the Finns have proposed.

-- This could be a brief phase to agree on an agenda, and the time and place for the actual conference. The Ministers will convene and turn the work over to subcommittees.

-- The agenda might be (1) political-security issues and (2) economic, technical, and scientific cooperation.

-- Under the security rubric there should be a document of legal and binding force, it should include renunciation of force, recognition of the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs.

-- Military questions must remain separate (though some confidence building measures could be examined).

-- The Conference should conclude with a summit meeting and establish a permanent body.

-- The permanent body would provide a mechanism to implement the work of the conference, to allow members to remain in contact, and to prepare for another conference in two or three years.

(It is possible that the Soviets will hand over a document on security principles; they have hinted from time to time that they want to discuss it in advance of the conference.)

YOUR POSITION

(Since this is their project and initiative, you do not have to take the lead in discussing substance. Indeed, there is not much to discuss, except in a very general way.)

Procedures

If there is not agreement on November 22 in Helsinki, it will be because we have not obtained satisfaction on pararallelism with MBFR. While we

SECRET/SENSITIVE
have stopped short of making this a precondition, we cannot afford to agree to the time and place for CSCE preparations, if the MBFR is not pinned down.)

-- We regard MBFR-CSCE as a summit understanding that the two will begin in parallel, but separately.

-- Thereafter each project will follow its own logic and timing. As a practical matter, MBFR will go on well after the CSCE. The preparatory phase for CSCE may run longer than the Soviets anticipate: we want to make the most careful preparations, examine all the agenda items, and narrow differences on substance, before the Ministers meet.

-- We have to have some idea of what the conference would accomplish before actually convening it, especially in view of the participation of 34 foreign ministers.

-- In terms of documents that might be agreed to, it would be useful to see any Soviet drafts well in advance.

Security Principles

-- We have examined rather closely the Warsaw Pact statements, the NATO documentation, and the various bilateral agreements.

-- There is a great deal of common ground.

-- None of the differences seem to be of a principled nature.

-- As a practical matter, of course, we must defer to our Allies, especially since there is feeling in our Alliance that the United States and the Soviet Union have preempted the work of the conference by agreeing to the Soviet-American Basic Principles.

-- A European consensus is particularly important on the border questions; the US has no territorial claims or disputes in Europe; we can accept that the existing borders are permanent, but we cannot do so in defiance or on behalf of the countries who are concerned.

-- Respect for territorial integrity is an acceptable formulation.
On the issues of renunciation of force, we have agreed in the Soviet-American principles:

-- In the CSCE we should be prepared to take a small step forward.

-- If all the participating states renounce the threat or use of force, then to provide tangible evidence of such obligation we could to two things in the military field: (a) agree to announce major maneuvers in advance, and (b) agree on an exchange of observers at such maneuvers. This would be confidence building, and provide an earnest of good intentions.

-- We would not propose to deal with any other military aspects in CSCE.

-- On all the other issues, we foresee no major areas of disagreement, though the experts will have to look at the technical subjects -- cultural exchange, environmental cooperation.

Freer Movement

There is one issue that should be raised in advance at this meeting.

-- Without going into the reasons, it is a fact of life that contacts among Europeans have not flourished in the post-war period.

-- Since we are going to meet on issues of both security and “cooperation,” we think it worthwhile to consider what practical measures might be adopted to increase contacts among people and to increase the flow of information exchange.

-- We are aware that there are problems and sensitivities in these questions, and we have no desire to begin polemics or ideological debates.

-- The USSR could think this over and perhaps suggest in advance how this interest of the Western countries might be dealt with.

Finally,

we cannot at this time make a commitment that the final meetings would be a summit.

-- We could not commit the President at this time.

-- Basically we want to proceed with each step, and examine where the conference is heading.
IN CONCLUSION

-- We have been skeptical of the value of a conference.

-- Our view has been that most of the key issues have been dealt with in other forums -- bilaterally in the German treaty, the Berlin agreements, in SALT, and in separate MBFR talks.

-- So the conference now appears to us to be more or less symbolic.

-- As you know, our attitude is not to engage in projects that have as their main purposes creating a better atmosphere.

-- We hope, therefore, that the conference can deal with some practical measures -- we have mentioned two (confidence building in military exchanges and free flow of people) and in this way we can, as we did at the summit demonstrate that we are laying a foundation for improving relations in Europe.
January 16, 1973

Dear Henry,

Enclosed are the materials we have just talked about.

Warm regards

A. Dobrynin

Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The White House
Evaluating positively the course of the multilateral consultations in Helsinki on the whole, we believe that there exist real possibilities for finding mutually acceptable solutions regarding the questions of preparing and holding the all-European conference that are being discussed at the consultations. In this connection we intend to take at the consultations certain additional steps about which we are confidentially informing the US side.

1. With due regard for Dr. Kissinger's observations, we would be prepared to consider, within the framework of the first point on the agenda, certain measures aimed at strengthening stability and confidence in Europe. By those measures we mean mutual notification of major military maneuvers in stipulated areas and of the exchange, by invitation, of observers at the maneuvers of that kind. The first point of the agenda of the all-European conference that we propose could be formulated as follows: "On ensuring European security and principles of relations between states in Europe, including certain measures of strengthening stability and confidence".

2. We agree to single out questions of cultural cooperation, contacts among people and of increased information as a separate point of the agenda of the all-European conference and we suggest the following language: "On the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts between organizations and people and on dissemination of information". It goes without saying that all that should be conditioned by strict respect for sovereignty, laws and customs of each country.
All mentioned above provides, in our view, a way out of the difficulties that arose in the course of the consultations in Helsinki. Thus, given a good mutual understanding between the USSR and the US, the work of the multilateral consultation can be completed within a short period of time. We hope that those our steps will be supported by President Nixon.

We talked with President Pompidou along the same lines during the recent meeting with him and we intend to forward those our considerations on the questions of preparing the all-European conference to Chancellor Brandt.
Within a few days the US Government will officially receive a reply to its note of November 15, 1972 on the questions concerning the organization of the forthcoming preparatory consultations related to negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

The Soviet side would like to exchange views on the organization of those consultations in a confidential manner.

Agreement has already been achieved as to the fact that those consultations will start on January 31, 1973. We also proceed from the fact that we have mutual understanding with the US side regarding the tasks of the preparatory consultations: it would be necessary to agree there on questions of procedure and organization of the forthcoming negotiations, including the working out of proposals on the agenda.

It is now necessary to agree upon the body of participants of the preparatory consultations, on their site and upon who will undertake the role of an organizer of such consultations. In our opinion, it would be important, already now, to exchange views also with regard to the body of participants of the negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

1. As to the question of what states should be invited to the preparatory consultations, we have no objections to the participation in them of all the states listed in the US note. At the same time we believe that other European countries, wishing to do so, should be given an opportunity to participate, on an equal basis, in the preparatory consultations. We take note meanwhile of the fact that only the
questions of organization and procedure of the forthcoming negotiations will be considered and decided at such consultations. There will be no objections on our part if these or those NATO countries prefer to attend the consultations as observers on rotating basis.

2. As for the site of holding the preparatory consultations we are of the opinion that it is advisable to conduct such consultations in Vienna - the capital of neutral Austria. The Austrian Government, as far as we know, is ready for that and even takes an interest in having Vienna chosen as a place of holding the preparatory consultations for talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. It will also correspond to our agreement that the above consultations will be held elsewhere rather than in Helsinki where multilateral preparatory meetings regarding the all-European conference are in progress.

If the preparatory consultations are held in Vienna it is logical that organizational and technical preparation for them (dispatch of official invitations included) is carried out by the Government of Austria. It will reflect a non-block approach to the forthcoming talks on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe regarding which, as we understand, there is also agreement between us.

3. In our opinion, all European countries which would so desire should be also invited for tactical reasons to the negotiations themselves. These countries could be given an opportunity to express their views on major directions of solving the problem of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. However, the decisions with regard to the substance
of that problem should be taken only by those states which
themselves will carry out the reductions.

For that aim it would evidently be advisable — and we
agree with Dr. Kissinger's considerations to that effect —
to create a working body (or committee) which would be com-
posed only of those states, which perform the reduction. It
is in this body that coordination of all specific questions
of force and arms reduction would take place. After a concrete
agreement or agreements would have been achieved in the working
body, something like a plenary session might be held where
other European states would be informed of the decisions
adopted.

We also agree with the US Government's consideration
that participation of these or those states in the preparatory
consultations would not prejudice future agreements which
could be achieved. It is absolutely obvious, that the parti-
cipation of states in the preparatory consultations should
not predetermine the question of which countries of Central
Europe are to be participants of an agreement or agreements
concerning armed forces and armaments. It is necessary to be
guided in this matter by the basic principle, as stated in the
joint Soviet-American Communiqué on the results of the talks
of the USSR and the USA leaders in Moscow in May of 1972, that
any agreement on a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and
armaments first of all in Central Europe should not diminish
the security of any of the sides.

With this in mind, the Soviet side believes that the
following states should take part in the force and arms re-
duction — Belgium, Great Britain, the GDR, Canada, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Poland, the USSR, the USA, the FRG and
Czechoslovakia. It is those countries that will form the
working body of negotiations to which we should strive at the very first stage of these negotiations. Though France, as is known, does not express a desire at the present stage to reduce its armed forces in the FRG, nevertheless, in our opinion, the possibility for its membership in the working body should be forseen, since France is a party to the Potsdam Agreements and its troops are stationed on the territory of the FRG.
The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the achievement of agreement on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe since it would meet the interests of further relaxation of tension on the European continent, and would answer the task of strengthening world peace. At the same time the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that the question of reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, both national and foreign, should be solved in such a way that no damage is done to security of the countries which will participate in such a reduction. We believe that the consideration and determination of the ways of solving that question should not be a prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe.

Guided by this consistent position, the Soviet Government declares its readiness to begin preparatory consultations with regard to negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe on January 31, 1973.

As for the site of the preparatory consultations, we suggest that they should take place in Vienna (Austria). We understand that the Austrian Government is prepared to provide appropriate hospitality.

The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that a reduction of armed forces and armaments will affect Central Europe in the first place.

We have no objections to the U.S. Government's proposal contained in its note of November 15, 1972, regarding participation in the preparatory consultations of Belgium, Great Britain, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Greece,
Denmark, Italy, Canada, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the USSR, the USA, Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia. At the same time the Soviet Government believes that other European countries, which will display appropriate interest, should also have the right to participate in such consultations on an equal basis.

If certain NATO countries prefer to take part in the consultations as observers and on rotating basis as follows from their proposals of November 15, 1972, there will be no objections to that.

As to the consideration contained in the US Government’s note that the participation of these or those states in the preparatory consultations should not preclude future agreements the Soviet Government adheres to the same point of view. Thus, in our opinion, the participation of states in the conduct of preparatory consultations does not predetermine the question of what countries of Central Europe will be parties to an agreement or agreements concerning reduction of armed forces and armaments.

As to the tasks of the preparatory consultations, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that the participants of such consultations could consider and decide organizational and procedural questions connected with the conduct of negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, namely: determination of the body of participants of such negotiations, time and site of the negotiations, the working out of proposals regarding the agenda and procedure of the negotiations.
In connection with the reference to the so-called "special situation in Germany" the USSR Government deems it necessary to state that the existence of two sovereign independent German states - the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, equal subjects of international law, - is an invariable fact of our time.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

URGENT INFORMATION
February 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: MBFR Status

As a result of the NATO meeting on Monday, the Alliance has inched forward on the question of Hungarian-Italian participation.

It is agreed that within the next day or two the Allies will put forward a proposal to lay aside the Hungarian question, but press for a private Soviet commitment that Hungary will in fact be included in the reduction zone without Italy. This will almost certainly be rejected, but the way will then be open for the US to gain support for its compromise: namely that Hungary's status be specifically designated as unresolved, but the status of all other participants will be defined. (For us this compromise will be a way station to Hungary's exclusion. For many Allies, thus far, it will still remain a step toward its eventual inclusion. So we obviously won't be out of the woods.)

-- If the Soviets want to get on with MBFR business, they should accommodate us on this.

-- If they want to be tough, they can insist on designating Italy as undefined, or insist that Hungary be dropped. In this latter case, the Alliance will have to face the consequences of the exclusion of Hungary -- which all of the Allies are reluctant to do.

We have had extraordinary difficulty in persuading the Allies to be flexible on the Hungarian question.

-- The Allies strenuously object to being "stampeded."

-- None of them believe the Soviets are determined, and all of them believe there is give in the Soviet position.

-- The Benelux do not want to be committed to full participation if Hungary's status is undefined, but in the end they will not leave the Germans alone.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

-- The UK has been the toughest in all the discussions: they refuse to take the Soviets seriously, and are insistent that the Allies not start the entire exercise by making a substantive concession. (Rush's efforts have not convinced them otherwise though he made a very effective presentation. I can't tell whether this is again just Foreign Office working level or all of Whitehall. Cromer told me he would make sure Downing St. understood our position.

-- None understand why we are in a hurry.

While complaining to you about our bad faith in not supporting the Soviet position as agreed privately, the Soviet representatives in Vienna as well as others in the Soviet bloc are going out of their way to convince our Allies that they will bargain about Hungary. For example, they have suggested to Dean various compromises, such as including Denmark or dropping Luxembourg. Only a few days ago, the Soviet representative told the Belgians (of all people) that the West should be "patient" since Moscow takes a while to make up its mind. The Hungarians have made it clear that they are outraged about the Soviet position and have even urged the West to be tough. Similar noises have come from the Poles and even the East Germans.

All of this suggests that the Soviets are deliberately prolonging the Hungarian affair and driving wedges between us and our Allies. Indeed, by raising the Hungarian-Italian issues so early they have made it impossible even to open the conference -- which was not my understanding of how they would play the question.

It may also be that the actual Soviet aim is to include Italy. Gromyko has just emphasized this in Moscow to the departing Italian Ambassador, and as I pointed out in my message to you in Peking there is some suggestion in Vorontsov's complaint that you agreed to include Italy, rather than drop Hungary. This could explain the strange Soviet behavior on whether Hungary should be in or not.

Since Italian inclusion is clearly not in our interest and the Allies are even more adamantly opposed to Italian inclusion than Hungarian exclusion, you may want to remind Vorontsov that we have not agreed to make an effort to have Italy included, but only to drop Hungary.

Finally, whatever we agree on, the Allies will not agree to exclude Hungarian territory entirely. They (and we) will want to have some constraints on Soviet forces in Hungary. But this can wait till the negotiations really start next fall.

Attached at Tab A is a telegram from Strausz-Hupe which gives you the flavor of the problem we have with the Allies.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
U.S. APPROACH TO MBFR

1. ALLIED SECURITY AND MBFR

In determining an approach to the negotiation of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe our point of departure is the present situation confronting the Allies and how this impacts on the problem of providing an adequate security posture.

There are four fundamental trends that we believe will influence our considerations of MBFR:

First, we have already embarked on a period of active negotiations -- SALT, CSCE and MBFR -- each of which individually has a direct bearing on Alliance security. We have to bear in mind, however, that they form part of a general undertaking to create a more normal relationship between East and West in Europe. In this sense they are linked, even if in practice they proceed on separate paths.

Second, these negotiations occur at a time when in each Allied country, including the United States, there are growing pressures to divert resources to domestic needs. Defense spending is a natural candidate for reductions, or at least limitation in each country.

Third, there has been in the past two years an improvement in overall relations with the East. This is perceived by the public as evidence that the military threats to the Alliance are diminishing.
Finally, we face a strategic nuclear situation in which the predominance of the United States vis-a-vis the USSR has given way to a rough balance.

In sum, we are in fact involved in the process of redefining Alliance security and in circumstances of conflicting pressures on our decisions.

The overriding problem confronting the Alliance—therefore is how to maintain an adequate defense posture that will protect our security interests, advance the Allies' political objectives in negotiations with the East, and contain pressures for unilateral reductions in our defense efforts. In a period of detente there is a temptation to forego the necessary modernization and improvement efforts required to maintain a strong defense posture. This however not only can lead to degradation in Alliance security but can undermine the basis for negotiation itself.

Therefore, the United States believes that an essential element in this period of negotiation, and indeed a prerequisite for success negotiations, is a commitment from its European Allies to continuing emphasis on modernization and improvement of Alliance military capabilities. This should include a more efficient use of existing resources and improved arrangements for mutually supporting defense capabilities. U.S. proposals for continued improvement in the defense posture of the Alliance will be presented soon in the appropriate NATO forums.
SECRET/EXDIS

This is the basis of the President's policy to maintain U.S. force levels in Europe: that the Allies continue to make the necessary efforts to maintain and to improve their forces and to enhance the overall effectiveness of Allied resources devoted to defense, while we make every effort to maintain the U.S. troop commitment and improve U.S. military capabilities in support of NATO.

Nonetheless it is clear that the United States is under considerable pressure to reduce its forces abroad and especially in Europe. This issue will not go away. Indeed other Allied nations face similar problems in different degrees.

MBFR has become one way to try to deal with this problem. But the concept of mutual reductions cannot be looked at solely in the context of a response to the pressure for unilateral reductions. Our forces must contribute to a viable Alliance strategy backed by a sound defense posture. Otherwise, there is no fundamental reason for any given level of U.S. and Allied forces. If MBFR is not geared to these real security objectives, any level of reduction could be justified. Therefore, the steps we take in MBFR towards mutual reductions must be made within the context of our objective of maintaining a strong Alliance defense posture including a substantial U.S. deployment in Europe.

SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS

Together with modernization and defense capability improvement efforts, adequate burdensharing arrangements will also be an important ingredient in enabling the United States to maintain its troop commitment in Europe, and both problems must be taken into account as we proceed to develop a common Allied position.

If we are to contain pressures for unilateral reductions, MBFR must be seen as a credible effort to achieve a reasonable outcome consistent with our basic security requirements. Thus the Alliance position must come to grips with the fundamental military issues and must put forward concrete measures which would justify the risks of entering negotiations with the East on force reductions.

The United States approach to the question of mutual and balanced force reductions is:

-- To achieve a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces.

-- To maintain and improve Alliance military capabilities throughout the process, and to undertake reductions only in the context of negotiated agreements with the East.

-- To obtain Alliance agreement on what constitutes the essential military requirements of any outcome for MBFR.

-- To put forward a concrete approach that forces the East side to address the issues that concern us and demonstrates we are in earnest.
This will enable us to stand the test of difficult negotiation, to contain the pressures for unilateral reductions, and to emerge from the entire process with Western security firmly intact.

II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR MBFR

With these broad considerations in mind, we also have to address several basic MBFR issues which shape our objectives and purposes in MBFR and provide the framework for the development of a concrete approach to these negotiations.

1. What is our concept for MBFR? This involves two questions: what are our short-term objectives in MBFR, and over the longer term, is there a role for MBFR as a continuing process?

The United States believes that the objective of MBFR should be to maintain and if possible enhance the security posture of the Alliance. This is how we interpret the phrase "undiminished security." It means that an improvement in the political climate cannot compensate for a reduction in relative Alliance defense capabilities. To advance relations with the East, MBFR must contribute to mutual security. Thus, one principal criterion for judging an Allied approach to MBFR must be how it affects the NATO/Pact military relationship. Otherwise, any scale and type of reduction could be justified in the name of reducing tensions.
It is for this reason that the U.S. has devoted considerable effort to military evaluation of MBFR and has presented extensive U.S. analytical material in NATO before proposing any preferred positions.

In the short run MBFR must have finite objectives and cannot be open ended. MBFR cannot become a vehicle for piecemeal dismantling of NATO defense. The finite objectives we see would comprise a careful, and limited adjustment in the forces on the Allied side in return for reductions and other concrete measures on the Pact side which would provide "undiminished security" at lower levels of forces. If this can be achieved we will have made a contribution to a lasting improvement in relations. At that point we can consider whether MBFR should be a continuing element in the process of East-West reconciliation. Until it is evident that such an outcome is possible, we should avoid either excluding or making any commitments to MBFR as an open-ended process.

2. How can we reconcile reductions with "undiminished security."

We believe the following factors are critical to maintaining undiminished security in MBFR:

--- Warsaw Pact reductions and other MBFR obligations should make as significant a contribution as is possible to mitigating the asymmetries in the military balance which threaten NATO. This includes the size, offensive orientation and geographic advantages of the Pact.
SECRET/EXDIS

There should be appropriate constraints to increase confidence of verification and strategic warning, and to demonstrate Pact willingness to forego the use of force for political purposes.

Reductions on the Allied side should not be of such magnitude or scope as to impair the ability of the Allies to take the necessary military steps to fulfill agreed NATO strategy of forward defense, flexible response and nuclear deterrence.

Any proposals must confront the USSR with our concerns, but be reasonable enough to convince our own public that we are negotiating seriously.

We believe that there should be a consensus within the Alliance on these general principles of undiminished security to guide the preparation of an Allied position and the conduct of the negotiations.

3. What should be the scope of MBFR? This involves several questions including what scale of reductions we should consider on the Allied side, what type and nationality of forces should be reduced, and what the ultimate geographic extent of MBFR should be?

The United States believes maximum possible reduction in Soviet forces should be an Alliance objective. This will inevitably require reductions in stationed ground forces on the Allied side; we think the scale of reductions proposed for Alliance stationed forces as a whole should be limited to ten percent.

SECRET/EXDIS
On the basis of our military analysis we do not believe it is desirable to begin MBFR with a reduction of indigenous forces. The quality of NATO's indigenous ground forces is judged superior to that of the Warsaw Pact. Reductions in indigenous NATO forces may inhibit the flexibility required for maintaining an adequate security posture and inhibit the growth of European defense cooperation. Whereas reductions in stationed forces without disbandment constitute a redeployment, reductions in indigenous forces necessarily constitute disarmament. A serious question is whether such disarmament is a prudent step. Moreover, reductions in Pact indigenous forces will not contribute to NATO security as significantly as Soviet reductions, because Pact indigenous forces are generally of lesser readiness and reliability.

This, however, is not an issue on which U.S. views are closed. We appreciate that pressures for unilateral reductions also exist in Allied countries and we recognize that each country has an interest in participating in MBFR. If the Allies should choose to introduce indigenous forces into MBFR, it would preferably be at a later stage. In any event, we do not believe that we should consider reductions beyond ten percent in Allied indigenous forces.

We have agreed that the geographic extent of MBFR should be confined to Central Europe. We do not see MBFR as a prelude to wider European reductions or additional reduction areas such as the

SECRET/EXDIS
Balkans. The security issues on the flanks in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans are significantly different from those in Central Europe and involve a quite different set of political issues as well. We therefore believe it is important to avoid either procedural or substantive approaches to MBFR which would threaten to open up these other areas for consideration in MBFR or involve commitments to address these areas at a subsequent stage in the negotiations.

4. **What is the role of NATO in the MBFR negotiations?** The ultimate responsibility for security decisions lies with the individual Governments in the Alliance. At the same time, it is clear that MBFR will impose a requirement for a higher degree of coordination among the Allies than any previous negotiations with the East, if we are to maintain the Alliance cohesion which is so crucial for the common security. In order to accomplish the critical task of developing common Allied positions on basic issues, we should consider together what institutional arrangements for consultation and coordination may be necessary.

The United States has no blueprint for new arrangements and it may well be that existing arrangements... prove adequate to the task, but this is an issue that deserves careful consideration in the Alliance. One point is clear to us, the process of agreeing on an acceptable outcome and developing a negotiating position for MBFR should be so handled as to strengthen the Alliance politically and not weaken it.

SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS

This will require discipline and determination on the part of all governments as well as a willingness to respond expeditiously to the tactical and substantive demands of the negotiations.

5. A final question that must be faced squarely is whether the interests of the United States and the Allies will diverge in MBFR.

We do not believe that this will occur. We believe that through a basic agreement on the key issues all the Allies can be confident that in whatever forum security questions are pursued we will be seeking an agreed outcome that will enhance our common security. There is no question that the United States may have unique pressures regarding its force levels that may from time to time require a measure of tactical flexibility in the Allied approach that might not be required if these pressures did not exist. But agreement on our fundamental purposes should lay to rest any apprehensions about intentions, and allow us to resolve questions of timing and tactics on their merits.

These are the issues that we believe provide the framework for evaluating any particular approach to MBFR. The options we have developed derive from the views that have been expressed on these issues. Our views are not of course final. There may be additional concerns and perspectives that need to be addressed. We welcome the views of the Allies on these questions and would be prepared to
consider an appropriate means of expressing an Allied consensus on basic principles as a guide to the development of a common position and negotiating strategy for MBFR.

III. ALTERNATIVE REDUCTION CONCEPTS

Within the framework of these basic considerations the United States has developed three alternative reduction approaches for MBFR. Each provides a different outcome for MBFR, and embodies a somewhat different reduction concept. All three are aimed at providing undiminished security by reducing in varying degrees those aspects of the Warsaw Pact force posture which threaten NATO.

The three reduction concepts are:

1. Phased ten percent reductions in NATO stationed and then indigenous ground forces together with Soviet and Pact indigenous reductions, respectively, to common ceilings for both sides.

2. Reduction to parity in overall NATO/Pact ground force levels in the Center Region by means of U.S. and Soviet reductions of one-sixth of their forces.

3. A mixed package illustrating an approximate 20 percent reduction of U.S. nuclear systems for 20 percent reduction in Soviet armored attack capability resulting in more defensively oriented postures and approximate stationed ground force parity on both sides.
Each of these alternatives have been examined as possible outcomes of the negotiation. As such they would yield an outcome for MBFR that would be acceptable to the United States. The third option should, however, be regarded in a somewhat different category from the first two alternatives, since it would not result in any sizable manpower reductions on the NATO side. It therefore might be considered as a possible additional feature of the other approaches.

The details of these reduction options are described in Annex ___.

The essential aspects and implications of these approaches are discussed below.

**Phased Common Ceiling Reductions of Stationed and Indigenous Forces**

This approach would involve an effort to negotiate reductions of stationed and indigenous forces in distinct but integral phases. The stated objective at the outset would be common ceilings on both stationed and indigenous ground forces, and thus an overall common ceiling on ground forces would be reached.

This program would consist of three phases:

1. A phase in which we would seek to negotiate, if possible, appropriate prereduction constraints.

2. A phase in which a ten percent reduction in Allied stationed forces and a Soviet reduction to the resulting Allied level would be negotiated along with any further appropriate collateral measures.
regarding stationed forces. A total of 34,000 Allied stationed ground forces (U.S., U.K., Canada, Belgium and Netherlands) would be withdrawn as mutually agreed, for example, on a proportional basis. The Soviet Union would withdraw 83,000 ground personnel from the NATO Guidelines Area.

3. A phase in which there would be a ten percent reduction in indigenous Allied ground forces and a reduction in indigenous Warsaw Pact ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area to the resulting Allied level. This would be accompanied by appropriate collateral measures relating to indigenous forces. The FRG, Belgium and Netherlands would reduce 46,000 ground personnel as mutually agreed. The GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia would reduce 29,000 ground personnel.

This outcome implies a long-term approach to the negotiations. It would maintain the current composition and posture of Allied forces at a moderately reduced level. It would be negotiated and implemented in phases enabling the Allies to test Soviet intentions. However, it would in all likelihood require that the Allies outline the overall program in general terms near the outset of the negotiations. The outcome of the initial reduction phase would be a disproportionate reduction in Soviet forces, but subsequently it would require disproportionate indigenous Allied reductions. For this reason, it could lead to tight linkage between the stationed and indigenous reduction phases.
Agreement on constraints would be preferable prior to stationed force reductions but must not be a precondition. At a minimum, negotiated constraints on Soviet forces would accompany stationed force reductions. Therefore, they would precede agreement on indigenous force reductions.

An advantage of this approach is that it would establish a process for regulating the pace and content of improving security relationships with the East. However, this can also be a disadvantage. The "open-ended" aspects of such a phased approach may lend itself to exploitation by the Soviet Union in pursuit of its objective of "dismantling" the two Alliances. At the minimum, we must recognize the risk of opening up Allied defense efforts to Soviet interference. Finally, our analysis indicates that reducing indigenous forces is to NATO's disadvantage.

**Parity in NATO/Pact Ground Force Levels Through One-Sixth Reduction in U.S. and Soviet Ground Forces**

This approach would emphasize stationed force reductions. In terms of the total of stationed forces on the Allied side the reduction would be about ten percent of stationed ground forces (or four percent of overall NATO manpower in the reduction area). An emphasis on U.S. forces would make it possible to satisfy U.S. domestic pressures for reductions without adversely affecting the NATO defense posture, in particular the integrity of other Allied stationed forces.

SECRET/EXDIS
The result would be parity in overall NATO and Pact ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area. Establishing parity in overall NATO and Pact ground forces in the reduction area through multilateral agreement would provide a firm basis for both maintenance of the resulting NATO force level and further negotiations on other elements of the Central European military confrontation, if desired.

A basic question we addressed is whether NATO's security could tolerate this size reduction. It would amount to a U.S. cut of 32,000 and 64,000 man Soviet reduction. This is less than a ten percent cut in NATO stationed forces and less than five percent cut in total NATO forces in the area. Our analysis indicates that it would not result in significant degradation of NATO's military capabilities, but because forces would be withdrawn from only one sector of the front, it would require that we and the Allies make some adjustments in our forces.

There would be appropriate collateral constraints on stationed forces either preceding or at a minimum accompanying such reductions, and the implementation of reductions would be in two phases to permit assessment of the results of the first phase.

This approach would neither require nor necessarily exclude subsequent negotiations on indigenous force limitations or further reductions. However, these negotiations would take place within a framework of overall parity of ground force levels.
Mixed Package Reduction of Offensive Force Elements of 20 Percent

This approach illustrates how we might seek a greater degree of stability in the military balance by making a 20 percent reduction in those forces which each side may perceive as threatening. It attempts to deal directly with major asymmetries favoring the Pact -- in particular the size and offensive orientation of Soviet stationed armored capability.

On the Pact side, one GSFG tank army would be withdrawn (60,000 troops, 1,547 tanks). This represents about 20 percent of Soviet tank forces.

On the Allied side, there would be a reduction in 1,000 nuclear warheads. In association with this, there would be a reduction of 36 U.S. Pershing launchers, three air squadrons containing a total of 54 U.S. F-4 fighter/bombers along with related ground and air personnel. This agreement would be preceded or at a minimum accompanied by appropriate collateral constraints.

Conceptually, this option would reduce that aspect of Soviet forces most threatening to NATO and would reduce as well those U.S. forces which, in the past, have been of expressed concern to the Pact. Since it focuses principally on equipment and involves only small U.S. manpower reductions, it is in a somewhat different category from the other options.

SECRET/EXDIS
As an outcome it would make a major change in the peacetime balance of forces along the central front in the direction of more defensive postures, greater stability and rough parity in stationed manpower.

By itself it would not meet internal pressures for manpower reductions though it would provide a more equal and stable basis for further negotiated reductions.

Therefore, this approach may be regarded in two ways:

-- As an illustration of a mixed package element which might be added to the other options at an appropriate stage. Or

-- As an illustration of an initial approach establishing the basic objectives of reducing Soviet armored capability and establishing approximate parity.

U.S. analysis of the nuclear aspects of MBFR is attached at Annex ___.

IV. OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR

The Allied examination of MBFR has identified several other elements which need to be considered in connection with our overall negotiating strategy but which are not of themselves functionally related to the specifics of the reduction approach we select. These elements are:

-- Force limitation agreements.
-- Possible prereduction collateral constraints.
-- Verification measures.
The U.S. analysis of these issues is contained in Annexes _, _, and _ respectively. The basic views of the United States on these issues are as follows.

**Force Limitation Agreements**

The United States believes it is not desirable to seek a force limitation agreement as an initial stage in MBFR preceding reductions. We would be prepared to consider with the Allies an appropriate force limitation agreement to accompany or follow stationed force reductions.

The reasons for United States opposition to a prereduction are as follows:

-- It would run a high risk of interfering with necessary force improvement and modernization efforts in the Alliance.

-- It would give the Warsaw Pact a voice in Allied defense policy with no gain in Allied security. Pact forces are not increasing significantly and if they should do so, this would create a major issue in European security going far beyond geh question of MBFR.

-- It would divert the negotiations into an area that would not reinforce efforts to hold the line against pressures for unilateral reductions.

-- It would impair Allied negotiating leverage by granting the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact what may be one of their major objectives -- a ceiling on indigenous NATO forces and a handle on the future evolution of European defense cooperation.
Prereduction Constraints

The United States would be prepared to seek to negotiate some constraints prior to reductions. However, to meet the need for flexibility, agreement on such constraints cannot be made a precondition to the negotiation of stationed force reductions.

The constraints we would be prepared to advance are:

-- Pre-announcement of movements of stationed forces into the area, including rotations.

-- Pre-announcement of major exercises.

-- Limits on size, location, number, and duration of major exercises.

-- Exchange of observers at major exercises.

The United States does not believe it would be desirable to negotiate constraints prior to reductions which would effect a de facto Force Limitation Agreement (FLA) on either stationed or indigenous forces. Within this context we would be prepared to consider with the Allies limitations on movements into the area, and limitations on movements across national boundaries within the area.
Verification Measures

In addition to reductions and constraints, any MBFR agreement must contain appropriate verification provisions, among which agreement on non-interference with national technical means is perhaps the most essential. The Allies should therefore ascertain at some early stage the extent to which the Soviets will be willing to agree to this and other verification provisions. At the same time, the Allies must carefully consider the acceptability of any verification provisions to NATO, since we must assume that any negotiated verification measures will be applied symmetrically, and should keep in mind that the specifics of such provisions will necessarily depend upon the specifics of eventual reductions agreements.

In this context, the United States would be prepared to consider with the Allies the possibility of proposing at an early point in the negotiations agreement in principle to the following verification provisions, in addition to non-interference with national technical means:

-- Fewer restrictions on national military attaches and MLMs.

-- Observation of agreed withdrawals by national attaches and/or special ground observation teams constituted for this purpose.

-- Special mobile inspection teams in the reductions area in the post MBFR period.

-- Light air capability (helicopters) for mobile inspection teams.
SECRET/EXDIS

To be realistic we must recognize the likely difficulty of negotiating such measures and also we must assume that any negotiated verification measures will be applied symmetrically. Therefore in assessing possible proposals, the Allies will have to consider the following questions:

-- What loss of technology or classified operational information will occur as a result of any proposed verification measure?

-- Will any resulting disadvantages from verification be equal in their effects on both sides?

-- To what extent should NATO forego improved verifiability in order to structure its own reductions in a way least damaging to its military capabilities?

U.S. analysis of these verification measures indicates that they could increase intelligence collection and thus contribute to monitoring post-reduction force levels and to improving strategic warning capabilities. Because strategic warning is a primary security concern for NATO, it should be borne in mind as a major Allied objective in seeking negotiated measures.

SECRET/EXDIS
The United States believes that we cannot accept any proposal for MBFR which would depend critically on the achievement of negotiated verification measures to maintain undiminished security. We must be prepared to rely on national means of verification for any proposals we advance or accept. This must, however, be accompanied by agreement with the Warsaw Pact not to interfere with national means of verification.

V. NEXT STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLIED POSITION

The United States believes it is necessary to be in a position to put forward a concrete program for mutual and balanced force reductions when the negotiations commence in the fall. The precise tactical approach to the negotiations should be derived from this concrete program.

The approaches put forward in this paper are not final views of the United States Government but represent outcomes from the negotiations that we would be prepared to accept. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and elements of them might be combined depending upon their military effect. The views of the Allies on these outcomes and on the concrete approach we should adopt in the fall would be welcome.

Between now and the NATO Spring Ministerial meeting we do not believe it is practical to attempt to develop a fully elaborated Allied negotiating position for Ministerial approval. Instead the Allies should consider...
the specific options which the United States has put forward and address the fundamental question of the outcome the Allies seek in these negotiations. On the basis of such a discussion the Allies should endeavor to develop basic guidelines for the detailed development over the course of the summer of the preferred Allied position which should be available for consideration prior to the start of negotiations.

The United States believes these guidelines should cover the following specific points:

1. The Allied position on MBFR should be aimed at an outcome that will maintain and if possible enhance the military security posture of the Alliance. This is what is meant by "undiminished security."

2. To do so the Allied approach should be aimed at reducing the asymmetries in the military balance favoring the Warsaw Pact -- this includes the size, composition, and offensive orientation of Pact forces and mitigation of the geographic advantages of the Soviet Union in reinforcement. Thus, the Allied objectives in MBFR should include approximate parity in ground forces and the reduction of elements in the Warsaw Pact posture threatening to NATO security.

3. Allied proposals for MBFR should at least initially focus on stationed force reductions, since the nature of the present confrontation is such that reduction of Soviet military strength in the Center Region must be a primary aim and cannot be obtained without reductions in Western stationed forces.

4. Reductions on the Allied side should be limited to approximately ten
measures should not be of such scope and magnitude as to impair the ability of the Allies to take the necessary military steps to fulfill NATO strategy: forward defense, flexible response and nuclear deterrence.

5. The Allied position should include an effort to achieve appropriate prereduction constraints. However this should not be a precondition to the negotiation of reductions. Such constraints should accompany any initial reductions and precede any indigenous force reductions. The purpose of any constraints should be to increase confidence in verification and strategic warning and to demonstrate Pact willingness to forego the use of force for political purposes.

6. Reductions should be negotiated and implemented in phases. The relationship between these proposed phases should be spelled out for Ministers consideration. However, the Allies must be prepared to put forward concrete proposals including reductions in the fall and the overall Allied approach should take into account the requirement to proceed with flexibility in the negotiations.

7. The Allies continue to maintain and improve their forces and to take further steps to enhance Alliance defensive capabilities during the MBFR process. The appropriate bodies of the North Atlantic
SECRET/EXDIS

Alliance should consider the proposals of the United States with a view to establishing a program for such improvements to accompany our negotiating efforts.

The United States believes that guidance along these lines will facilitate the work of the Allies in developing a detailed approach for the fall negotiations.
April 16, 1973

National Security Decision Memorandum 211

TO: Secretary of State
    Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

The President has approved the attached paper setting forth the approach of the United States to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe. It should be provided to the Allies before the end of this month. The supporting annexes called for in the paper should also be made available to the Allies by that time.

The objective of our consultations with the Allies should be to get them to focus on the outcome the Alliance should seek for MBFR before turning to the tactical problem of developing an Allied position for the negotiations in the fall. U.S. representatives should bear in mind that our analysis makes clear that indigenous reductions are disadvantageous to NATO and that stationed reductions including U.S./Soviet reductions are more advantageous.

Once the views of the Allies are available on the outcomes that would be acceptable, we will consider these views and provide the Allies with our preferences regarding the initial approach to be taken in the negotiations, including concrete proposals on reductions that should be developed jointly by the Allies.

United States representatives should make clear to the Allies the importance of reaching agreement on concrete reduction proposals before the negotiations begin in the fall. This does not necessarily
imply that such proposals would be made at an early point in the negotiations. However, it is necessary in order to ensure that Allied negotiating tactics and presentations on substantive MBFR issues are consistent with the proposals the Allies will eventually advance.

The President wishes to emphasize the importance of an Allied commitment to further improvements in Allied forces in connection with MBFR. The Secretary of Defense should prepare a presentation on a program for U.S. and Allied force improvements to be delivered at the upcoming NATO Defense Ministers meeting. A draft of this presentation should be made available for review by May 15, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

Copies to:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Central Intelligence
Acting Director, ACDA
April 24, 1973

Dear Henry,

Enclosed is the material I mentioned to you on Saturday (just to remind).

Warm regards

A. Dobrynin

P.S. Thanks for the text of your speech. Most illuminating.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Confidence building measures at the
All-European conference on Security and Cooperation

The question of confidence building measures has been already agreed upon through this confidential channel.

On January 17 Dr. Kissinger stated the following position of the US which, as he said at that time, was approved by the President for transmitting to Moscow:

"The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observer to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation".

Precisely in such terms we formulated our proposal to include in the agenda of the All-European conference the question on some measures for strengthening stability and trust in Europe.

That is why we have naturally counted upon cooperation between our delegations at the multinational consultations in Helsinki towards limiting the measures for strengthening trust and stability by the two provisions which were named to us by the White House and accepted by the Soviet leadership.

Meanwhile in Helsinki the US delegation stands for also including among the measures aimed at strengthening trust and
stability of a provision, concerning prior notification about large movements of forces.

May be there is a misunderstanding here, and we hope that the position of the US delegation in Helsinki will be brought to conformity with our confidential agreement.