Section VII

European Integration and The Year of Europe
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States

FROM: Representative Paul Findley

DATE: February 20, 1969

SUBJECT: Proposals on European Security

Based on my numerous conversations the past few months with European
leaders (Strauss, Debre, Duckwitz, Healey, Brozio, etc.), I see a grim outlook
in Europe:

De Gaulle is widely considered the main roadblock to a united Europe.
Germany, still very insecure, will not risk a confrontation with France.
Britain is unable to exert effective leadership.
Middle East and monetary crises sputter ominously.
Fragmentation of NATO (in part de Gaulle, NPT) is already substantial and
likely to be much worse in 1972 when post-de Gaulle era begins.

At expense of Paris-Washington relations, France is drawing closer to
Soviet Union in scientific, military, and economic matters. France is strong in
Third World where our influence is limited.

Your trip, at the very least, will help, dramatizing a renewed U.S. interest
in western Europe and NATO.

It can do much more. It can open a new era of U.S.-French cooperation and
see in motion a longterm initiative which can break the dangerous ten-year stale-
mate over European security, integration, and political settlement.

My suggestions for your meeting with de Gaulle:

1. Declare that the United States wishes France to be militarily strong.
2. Offer France the same nuclear relationship long extended only to
   Britain. (Your authority to do so is clear.)
3. Ask French cooperation in exploring federation (in various forms) as
   the longterm solution to the military and economic needs of Europe; this through
participation in a citizens convention of NATO nations (similar to Atlantic
Union resolution you so eloquently endorsed in August, 1966) where federal union
(with and without U.S.) can be considered.

A. Avoid bids to get Britain in EEC and France back to integrated NATO
command. (Both, I feel, are presently unsustainable.)

These, hopefully justifying a more progressive course by de Gaulle in his
decreasing years, could be the key to intermediate levels of cooperation. The
long-festering irritant, Britain's "exclusive U.S. relationship," would be gone.

The arrangement accords France no more and no less than a faithful allied
nuclear power deserves, and seeks in return something de Gaulle can gracefully
provide.

The convention, consisting of citizen delegates (not government-instructed),
would make possible a new start on security and economic problems without risking
an immediate confrontation with France—even if de Gaulle does not cooperate.
U.S. participation would break present leader-less stalemate but the format would
be such as to minimise possible complacency of U.S. domination.

It would give Germany (now suffering deeply from frustrations and dis-
crimination) and Britain (embarrassed by repeated EEC rebuffs) something promising
and substantial to work toward.

For the United States it would open a peaceful and effective way to deal
with massive problems like nuclear proliferation, monetary crisis, worldwide
policing and the arms race.

Initiated at the very outset of your term, it holds the promise of sub-
stantial progress well ahead of 1972.
November 25, 1970

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

TOP SECRET/NOFORN

National Security Decision Memorandum 95

TO: The Secretary of State
    The Secretary of Defense
    The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
    The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
    The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO

On the basis of the discussion at the NSC meeting on November 19, 1970, concerning U.S. Forces and Strategy for NATO, the President has decided that U.S. policy will be guided by the following principles:

-- In view of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it is vital that NATO have a credible conventional defense posture to deter and, if necessary, defend against conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces.

-- Increased emphasis should be given to defense by conventional forces.

-- Accordingly, Allied forces, including U.S. forces in Europe and reinforcements from the U.S., must be capable of a strong and credible initial conventional defense against a full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning and of mobilization by both sides. The immediate combat capability of NATO forces, both U.S. and Allied, should also be enhanced to provide greater assurance of defending against attacks made after the Pact gains a lead in mobilization.

TOP SECRET/NOFORN
The President has directed that the following specific steps be taken to give effect to his decisions:

1. **U. S. Force Planning**

   The President directs that the size and structure of U. S. ground, air, and naval forces maintained in support of NATO commitments, both in Europe and elsewhere, should be consistent with the strategy of initial conventional defense for a period of 90 days against a full-scale Warsaw Pact attack assuming a period of warning and mobilization by both sides. This strategy shall apply to all aspects of U. S. force and resource planning.

   In particular, U. S. forces for NATO should be developed so as to enhance the immediate combat capability of U. S. forces in Europe and elsewhere to provide maximum assurance that an initial conventional defense would be successful.

   Consistent with this overall strategy, the President directs that the end FY 71 authorized level of U. S. forces in Western Europe (319,000) shall be maintained and the actual strength of these forces kept as close to this level as possible. Any proposed changes to this level should be referred to the President for his consideration.

2. **U. S. and Allied Force Improvements**

   The President reaffirms the principle established in NSDM 88 that priority emphasis should be given to Allied and U. S. force improvements. Illustrations of areas where our ongoing studies have identified the need for force improvements are: NATO's armor and anti-armor capabilities, NATO's aircraft and logistic systems vulnerability, Allied war reserve stock levels, U. S. and Allied mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, and Allied deployments.

   By March 1, 1971, the Defense Program Review Committee will prepare for consideration by the National Security Council: (a) a comprehensive program of the U. S. measures, relating to all U. S. forces committed to the support of NATO, necessary to implement the conventional defense strategy directed in this memorandum, providing for a 90-day initial defense, and (b) a five-year program of U. S. and Allied force improvements to be used as the basis for internal U. S. planning and consultations with our Allies.
Nuclear Strategy and Forces

While tactical and theater nuclear weapons contribute to deterrence of an attack, the President is concerned that we have not yet developed an adequate understanding of their role or strategic implications. He has directed, therefore, that our concepts for using tactical nuclear weapons as well as the level and mix of tactical nuclear weapons systems in our force structure be thoroughly re-examined in the light of the emphasis on conventional force defense. The Defense Program Review Committee should develop alternative doctrines and force structures for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and submit a report to the National Security Council by April 1, 1971.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The President also has decided that the United States should continue to give general support to the concept of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. Further studies of MBFR, both within the U.S. Government and in NATO, will be necessary to provide a realistic evaluation of approaches (particularly asymmetrical force package approaches) to MBFR which would operate to maintain or enhance NATO's military security relative to the Warsaw Pact. Until these studies have been completed by the Verification Panel and reviewed by the President, the U.S. shall assume no commitments as to specific elements of a formal MBFR proposal or agreement.

Allied Consultations

The President has directed that the U.S. position at the NATO Ministerial meetings in December 1970 shall be based on this memorandum. This memorandum will also be the basis for renewed offset agreements and other financial arrangements with the FRG, and for consultations with our Allies. All consultations should stress the importance the United States places on a strong and credible conventional defense for NATO, our willingness to maintain and improve our own forces to implement such a strategy, and our view, therefore, that it is essential that the Allies improve their forces, in order to effectively implement this strategy. Every effort should be made to enhance the role of conventional force planning in NATO organizations.
In addition, the President has noted recent Soviet efforts to influence our Allies by claims of Soviet superiority in numbers and characteristics of strategic weapons. We should continue to provide our Allies with the facts, as we know them, concerning Soviet strategic capabilities and reject Soviet claims of "superiority." We should continue to emphasize the sufficiency of our strategic forces to meet the objectives and on our intention to maintain that sufficiency in the face of any strategic weapons programs the USSR may undertake.

The President wishes to review positions to be taken by the United States at the December 1970 NATO Ministerial Meetings and thereafter of the approaches being developed for consultations with our Allies to implement the terms of this memorandum.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Attorney General
    The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    The Director, Office of Management and Budget
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

ACTION
March 24, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeld

SUBJECT: Soviet Party Congress

Bill Hyland and I have had a series of discussions over the last few weeks with the best Sovietologists in the Government. Without necessarily attributing all our views of the CPSU Congress and Soviet developments generally to any of them, attached are two memoranda on the Party Congress. The first (Tab A) is for the President, and reflects what seems to be a consensus around Washington of what the Congress may produce, plus some ideas of our own. The second memorandum (Tab B) is much longer and only for you. It is a hypothesis of sorts and quite speculative. At Tab C there is the recent Soviet discussion of the Nixon Doctrine, which is definitely worth reading, when you have some time.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum to the President (Tab A).

2. That you read the second memorandum at your leisure (Tab B).

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

INFORMATION
March 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Soviet Party Congress

There seems to be a consensus that the 24th Soviet Party Congress, which opens on March 30, will be a rather dull affair. In part, this is because much of the business will be devoted to a discussion of the next five year economic plan. It also may seem routine because some of the real business is done behind the scenes. Moreover, shifts in policy that do occur are often not apparent on the surface. In historical terms, Soviet Congresses have in fact often marked major milestones in policy, but this has only become apparent to outside observers much later.

It is thus possible that this Congress, too, will usher in a new period of domestic or foreign policy.

The Internal Situation. Of immediate interest, of course, is whether the top leadership will undergo any important changes.

-- Brezhnev's position does not seem to be in any danger; at this Congress, however, he may try to break out of the confines of collective leadership by promoting some of his closest colleagues, or stating some new policy positions.

-- Some turnover at the top is almost inevitable because of the age of the Politburo. This will provide us some indication of the balance of forces; the more important changes, such as a new Premier, might come later, but might be reflected in the Congress promotions and demotions.

Many observers have the impression that Brezhnev is a man in a hurry. They are impressed with the fact that he personally signed the new draft Five Year Plan, rather than going through the normal Central Committee approval (which only came this week). Thus, it is possible that his main report to the Congress will have a programmatic character, since he may feel this is his last Party Congress (he would be 68-69 at the next Congress four or five years hence).
-- He will have to emphasize that our policies in some respects are dangerous and the Soviet-American relations have not changed basically.

-- At the same time, Brezhnev will want to demonstrate that unlike his predecessors, he is dealing with the US on the basis of equal status and as a world power. He will probably make the classical dialectical point that while acting more dangerously the US in fact is being forced by "realities" to retrench.

-- Thus, he is likely to want to point to some tangible gains from the Soviet position of at least co-equal status — agreements on SALT and perhaps Berlin and the Middle East would be such evidence.

Continuing Problems. What Brezhnev will not dwell on will be some of the longer term problems that still face his leadership and indeed the Soviet system as such:

-- While there can be further economic advance at home, longer term problems become aggravated by granting shorter term benefits; attempting to impose social discipline runs counter to the initiative that must be permitted to provide the incentive for greater individual productivity and innovation called for in a period of growth through intensive development.

-- The situation in Eastern Europe will remain inherently unstable and could grow worse in a period of detente, initiated by the Soviets as an effort to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe.

-- China remains an unpredictable factor, especially in a period when our relations with Peking offer the Chinese more room for maneuver.

-- Finally, as Brezhnev improves his power position he actually becomes more vulnerable to hostile coalitions, as Khrushchev did. (This seems to be a "law" of the post-Stalin dictatorship.) To the extent policies reflect his personal views, his age and political vulnerability make longer-range analysis more uncertain.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Foreign Policy and the 24th Party Congress

Party Congresses, at least since the 17th in 1934, have usually marked a significant turn in Soviet policy. The implications, however, were only dimly perceived at the time: few foresaw the massive purges that would follow the 17th Party Congress, the Nazi-Soviet pact signaled at the 18th Congress, the abortive Stalinist purge following the 19th, de-Stalinization and its repercussions after the 20th, etc.

Now, on the eve of the 24th Party Congress, the consensus seems to be that it will not initiate shifts in major policies. The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, after all, is awfully gray, rather unimaginative. But "history teaches" we ought to be ready for some doses of change along with continuity.

The thesis of this memorandum is that the longer term evolution is likely to be in a direction unfavorable to our general relations with the USSR.

What follows is an examination of some of the major factors that determine Soviet foreign policy.

Part I.

A. Sino-Soviet

It is appropriate to begin with an appraisal of Sino-Soviet relations for two reasons: (1) Americans have grown accustomed to the Sino-Soviet conflict as one of the "permanent operating factors" of international politics; and (2) of the many aspects of Soviet foreign relations, this is one in which change has been distinct since the 23rd Congress and perhaps least appreciated in the West.

The change has been in great part the result of the new, more effective tactics adopted by the Brezhnev regime soon after taking office. Whereas Khrushchev had led Soviet policy into a dead-end, and in the process lost influence in the communist movement, this regime set out to repair their position among other communist parties and states, to soften the worst aspects of polemics, and, most important, to strengthen their military position in the Far East. This last, the military component, has been
extremely costly and spread over four or five years, but in the end it paid off.

Whether by choice or chance the USSR's new military strength was the decisive element in the border crisis of 1969. The Chinese chose to back down and negotiate. Thus far the Soviets have won tactical points in the negotiations. The Chinese have conceded for now that the Soviets do not have to acknowledge that the old border treaties are unequal. The initial Soviet demand that state relations be normalized before any border settlement has also been met. Ambassadors have returned to their posts and trade will increase.

The basic conflict of course continues and the Soviets cannot help but be worried about their ability to cope with an increasingly powerful Chinese military posture. And the situation is fragile enough that new outside developments, especially in Sino-American relations or in Indochina, can easily ignite a new period of Sino-Soviet tensions.

Nevertheless, from Moscow's standpoint, the China challenge is not as immediately urgent as it used to be.

What this means for us, is:

-- That pressures on Moscow to stabilize its "Western front" because of China have been reduced; to the extent that Moscow felt compelled to make important concessions to the West is less likely now.

-- Since Mao's statement of May 20, 1970 (in the wake of the Cambodian intervention), there has also been some shift in Chinese policy toward a more anti-US stance and a less anti-Soviet one.

-- Once Mao departs, the conditions for a rapprochement with Moscow may ripen.

-- Our position in the triangular relationship, however, will grow in importance: we can expect private overtures from both sides, depending in part on the future course of the Indochina war.

B. Eastern Europe

Second in importance to this evolution of relations with China is the dangerous demonstration in Eastern Europe that the Soviet empire is rotting from within. Czechoslovakia was sufficient proof of this, but in view of the
drastic Soviet suppression and the proclamation of an ominous interventionist doctrine, many observers thought that the fire had been extinguished, perhaps for another decade. Poland exploded this myth.

The Polish crisis, at bottom, only marginally concerned price increases. It was and is a crisis of the "Stalinist conception" of the organization of society. Throughout East Europe the state and the social order is structured along the lines of the famous communist pyramid, in which all power and policy passes from the top downward. In practice, Djilas long ago warned, this must lead to bureaucratization, and eventually to the separation of the party from the masses. In Poland the unique element was that the alienated segment, entirely cut off from the process of decision making, was not the intelligentsia or the youth, but the workers -- the very element of society that the system is intended to serve.

The most impressive fact about the current situation is that the workers have succeeded in terrorizing the leaders. Gierek has been forced to sacrifice up more and more cadres to the crowd, and to offer a series of economic concessions that confound the whole effort to stabilize the situation on any rational basis. The net effect is that whatever Gierek himself may believe or desire, the imperatives of the situation will impel him into further concessions to popular demands and to reformist positions in order to achieve an illusive stability.

To deal with the economy he will inevitably dilute the "leading role of the party" -- the first criterion by which Moscow judges a regime's legitimacy. The alternative for Gierek, to deter Soviet intervention, would be to seek an alliance with the conservatives which could only rip the party apart once again, and perhaps ignite a new popular rising.

In short, the chances of Soviet military intervention in Poland will remain high.

Even if this terrible day is postponed, the Polish crisis has probably already had its sobering effect on Soviet policy:

-- In early December, at the Warsaw Pact summit, Brezhnev and Gomulka pressured Ulbricht into accepting a conciliatory line on the German and Berlin questions.

-- The events in Poland provided the basis for an East German counter-attack.

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-- By the time of the Warsaw Pact meeting of mid-February, the Soviet position had hardened; the East German role in talks with Bahr and the Berlin Senate has grown while the four power talks are stalled.

If Sino-Soviet developments have eased the pressures on Moscow to make major concessions in the West, the situation in Eastern Europe has made such concessions seem dangerous in any case.

The result, however, is ambiguous. There is still the objective of consolidating the status quo in East Europe, but the price that the Soviets would pay has probably been reduced.

C. External Economics

A third factor often cited as a reason that the Soviets must seek some accommodation in the West is the need to obtain Western technology on credit.

Yet, a careful analysis of the USSR's economic position indicates that regardless of the importance attached to buying technology in the West, the means to do so are limited not by Western reluctance to grant the necessary credits, but by Moscow's inability to absorb more credit repayments without mortgaging future exports to a degree no prudent government could afford.*

The irony of this is that at the very time when the notion is most prevalent in Western Europe that détente can be purchased, the Soviets are no longer actively in the market.

This means that the Soviets will have to be more selective in their economic deals with the West, but can pick and choose their partners. The West, in turn, will be all the more eager to share in the shrinking exports to Russia.

It is also worth noting how the Soviets manage to buy American technology by the back door:

"The value of Soviet orders for Free World chemical equipment and technology placed during 1970 ($200 million) was more than twice the value of such orders in 1969... Japan was the largest single Free World seller of chemical plants to the USSR with sales of more than 70% of the total value. Six of the plants sold to the USSR by Japan in

*A CIA analysis concludes that in 1973 Soviet repayments on debts will exceed drawings, and this crossover point might be reached in 1972. "With a marked slowdown in the growth of exports, the USSR will have to slow the growth of its indebtedness to the West in order to hold the ratio of debt service to exports within reasonable bounds."
1970 will use US process technology. The sale of technology for the Japanese plants made the US a major source of process technology for the USSR. ... In terms of size and efficiency these plants represent a great advance over plants now operating in the USSR." (Quoted from CIA study.)

What this means is that in one important field the US is in fact subsidizing the Soviet economy (eight year credits at 5.5% interest), but our policy is based on the assumption that by holding back from official Soviet trade and credits we hold out an incentive for a political amelioration so that the USSR can gain access to our technology.

The economic motive in Soviet foreign policy is thus not growing. The West will obtain less rather than more leverage. In this way, Soviet external economic circumstances reinforce the conservatism that is the byproduct of developments in Chinese and Eastern European policy.

Part II.

Before turning to relations with the US and a survey of specific issues, it is necessary to touch on some internal factors to the extent that they may or may not influence foreign policy.

A. The Leadership

Rather than try to read the Kremlinological tea leaves, the following seem to be the pertinent observations to bear in mind when reflecting on the last six years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime:

-- The main character of this leadership both at the top and at the second echelons is that they are by and large the generation raised by Stalin. Almost without exception they are the product of the Stalinist purges; they rose to fame and fortune in a period when loyalty to Stalin was virtually the only criterion for advancement. They are, collectively, "morally crippled," and, intellectually, a generation "far more constricted in imagination, in the ability to look at the world and conceive new policies." (Robert Conquest, "Stalin's Successors," Foreign Affairs).

-- There is no prospect for a distinctly different generation to come to power for at least another decade.

-- Despite the apparent "permanence of collectivity," the struggle for power continues, and will be evident at the Party Congress and after. Its influence on policy is virtually unpredictable, but it generates an atmosphere
in which major issues requiring decision tend to become institutionalized in the form of personal contests and ultimate decisions and compromises rather than real resolutions.

-- The prospects for Brezhnev's dominance are growing stronger.

B. The Economy

For much too long Westerners have held as an article of faith that Soviet economic problems would lead the USSR inevitably into a prolonged detente with the West. Yet it has never been demonstrated that there is a direct correlation between the state of the internal Soviet economy and foreign policy.

At this particular point in Soviet development, there is probably less reason to conclude that internal economics will force foreign policy in a given direction.

-- To be sure the pressure of the Soviet consumer is growing.

-- In the past five years, however, consumer goods availability, especially consumer durables, has increased.

-- This has been accomplished in a period of major strategic build-up and reinforcement of the Far East.

-- Moscow has thus managed to avoid the guns or butter choice.

Of course this does not mean that all will be well. Even the Soviet leaders admit they have exhausted the potential for "extensive" economic development, and must now concentrate on "intensive" growth. This is, of course, a far more difficult task than confronted Stalin or even Khrushchev.

The present five-year plan, however, is a sober one. It does not appear from any reading of economic targets, growth rates, etc., that the USSR intends to rely on foreign sources more than in the past. Rather the new plan suggests an intention to obtain growth through Soviet resources in the main.

In short, they have made a prudent decision not to mortgage their economic development to outside factors.

C. Brezhnev

Even in the era of collective leadership, most Sovietologists acknowledge that Brezhnev occupies a position above the others. How strong he is can
be debated. But in the last year his emergence has been more marked than in any period.

What is intriguing now is the possibility that Brezhnev is falling under the spell of his "place in history."

His behavior since last summer seems to be one of a man in a hurry.

-- For some reason he seized the lion's share of the credit for the German treaty even before negotiations were completed. We know (from special sources) that he was highly pleased last June that the United States and West German press highlighted his conciliatory remarks about peaceful coexistence. He told Gromyko that this was just as "planned."

-- Last fall he again claimed a major foreign policy role by personally endorsing the SALT talks, breaking down Ulbricht's resistance to the Berlin negotiations.

-- He has openly suppressed, unsuccessfully as it turned out, for an early Party Congress.

-- He made an unprecedented televised New Year's Day speech to the nation.

-- He personally signed the new five-year plan, a unique occurrence in Soviet history, and pushed it through without a Central Committee meeting.

-- He is thus personally identified with the shift in investment priorities from heavy industry to consumer goods, for the first time in Soviet history.

-- He has been willing to accept this role, even at the cost of some military grumbling.

In short, Brezhnev may believe this is his last Party Congress to control (he would be over 68-69 for the 25th Congress, four or five years hence), and that he must have an appealing platform to distinguish him in the annals of the Soviet state. Stalinist or exclusively cold war themes are not likely to have much appeal as a platform. A better way may be a display of internal and external success, based on a better standard of living, detente and peace.

This, of course, runs counter to the conservative tendencies created by other factors, but it would not be the first time that personal politics played a dominant role in Soviet history.
Social Discipline

If in fact Brezhnev does try to break out of the confines of collectivity it must be noted that his internal social policies are likely to become more repressive, more disciplinarian. Though he often tries to remain in the middle of the road, his inclinations in the end are toward the conservatives and reactionaries. It was, after all, under his regime that the police terror against the dissenting intelligentsia was revived.

Thus, it is possible that Brezhnev and his colleagues, foreseeing growing problems of social discipline, not only with intellectuals but the youth and the non-Russian nationalities, will not want a period of acute tensions abroad. It is conceivable that "success" in foreign policy will be prerequisite for an internal tightening, just as more consumer goods divert popular unrest from the increasingly totalitarian aspects of this regime. (The regime's dilemma of course is that any detente combined with improved material life tend to generate more spontaneity.)

If this is the course Brezhnev intends to follow, one signal could be anti-Khrushchevism, and at the same time, a further effort to restore Stalin's historical role. Indeed, in some respects, coming to terms with Stalin is one of the major ideological and political issues of the Congress. If Brezhnev tries to increase his power position through the Stalin or Khrushchev issues, however, he may overreach himself and initiate a major political crisis. His record, however, suggests he is too prudent to launch a major frontal attack. The resolution of the Stalin issue is more likely to come in nuances.

Part III.

A. The United States

There is obviously still uncertainty of what to make of present day American foreign policy. Some recent sophisticated discussion suggests that the Soviets have made an estimate of our prospects that is distorted in a potentially dangerous manner. They seem to dwell on the following main points in describing and evaluating the United States at this juncture:

- The war in Vietnam, plus domestic factors, have forced the US into a political retreat, which is manifested in the Nixon Doctrine:

- The Nixon Doctrine is, on the one hand, a new and more sober perception of America's role, but it is also an attempt to gain flexibility in a period when US capabilities are reduced.
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-- The trend of adapting American foreign policy to the "changing ratio of forces" will continue.

-- Domestic factors in the future will act to force further reductions in commitments, but will be offset by a new effort to shift responsibilities to allies.

-- America's "weight" in the various alliances and in the capitalist world will remain formidable and sufficient to block major shifts, but US friends and allies will inevitably have to act more independently and with less reliance on the US.

(The above is based on a long Moscow symposium on the Nixon Doctrine, printed in the Soviet journal USA. The full text is at Tab C.)

In short, what the Soviets seem to be saying more seriously rather than propagandistically, is that the balance of forces in the world is indeed changing, and this presents an important decision point for the USSR: is it a time for an advance? or, is it a time to seek stability and strike bargains with the more "sober elements" of the bourgeois?

On the one hand, there must be arguments (like the armed forces day speech of General Sokolov, a First Deputy Defense Minister) that the USSR can and should develop a position of military superiority over the US. On the other hand, one can read arguments in public literature that it is impractical and dangerous to aim for military advantages which could provoke the US into renewed military efforts, but, most important, would in the end lead to only marginal military gains.

This has been the underlying debate in SALT on the Soviet side. The ABM-only approach suggests that, as usual, the Soviets are seeking to compromise their own differences on a plan that the military could tolerate, and that the "doves" could also live with. In effect, they are willing to accept some increase in strategic stability, but largely as a holding action, in order to see if the US does, in fact, continue to decline in power and influence as their analysis suggests.

B. Europe

It follows from Soviet analysis of the position of the United States, that American prospects in Europe (as Gromyko's son has recently argued in a long analysis) are declining.
-- In the long run, the Soviets argue, we will be unable to stand the expense of a major military commitment to Europe and trying to shift the burden to our allies we enhance their own freedom of political action and create apprehension over our reliability.

-- In this context, Soviet diplomacy will have new opportunities. The spearhead of that diplomacy will be directed at Bonn, which is still the lynchpin in the West European structure.

-- If West Germany can be detached, even in part, from the European economic and political structures, the competitive nationalism of the other Europeans will revive, and the old goal of dividing hostile coalitions will be advanced.

This is why the Berlin negotiations are in many respects the key to Soviet policy (perhaps even more so than SALT).

-- The Soviets are likely to pay a price for the ratification of the treaties, not only because of the intrinsic political value of the treaties themselves, but because the consequences, as Moscow interprets them, will be important to the continuing forward movement of Soviet policy.

-- A European Conference will symbolize the triumph of almost two decades of striving to ratify the territorial and political status quo in Europe.

-- From that point Moscow can advance to the next stage of dismantling the Western Alliance (or so they believe).

(There is of course another side to this coin: the destabilizing effect on Eastern Europe of the new fluidity in East-West relations which a successful completion of the German/Berlin negotiations will have. This may be compounded by progress in the European Communities and their attraction to the East Europeans. Ironically perhaps we may see an evolution in Europe which in the Western half poses serious challenges to our interests and, simultaneously, in the Eastern half poses new dangers for the Soviets. The difference of course is the proximity of Soviet physical power, which in the short run at least, can be applied directly or indirectly to contain instabilities in Eastern Europe.)

C. Middle East

Finally, there is the nagging problems of the Middle East and the conflicting and agonizing Soviet choices in that area. The situation is probably
too fluid even for the Soviets to see much beyond each tactical phase. But certain trends must be apparent to all in the Kremlin.

-- The Soviets are firmly and probably irrevocably entrenched in the Near East. In an age when there is a secular trend of Western "imperialism" withdrawing from this and adjacent areas (the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean), it is of first importance that the Soviets protect their power position as a base for expansion.

-- Only secondarily, does it matter how the Israeli-Arab contest is resolved, as long as the Arabs are not totally defeated.

This is not to say that the Soviets are unmindful of the dangers in this area, or the underlying instability of alliances with Arab governments. But their calculations of the risks must be less disturbing now than last year. They successfully defied the US in the test over the cease-fire violations. They must have recognized that despite their aggressive behavior the Israelis have been reluctant to reopen the fighting, and the United States has exerted increasing pressure on Israel.

Thus, the Soviets probably now foresee that the risk in the Middle East can be contained, and that the outcome is likely to be more and more unfavorable to Israel. If, in fact, the Soviets in the end deliver back to the Arabs most of their losses in the war, they can count on a long term entrenchment in this area from which to expand.

Part IV.

Prospects

In considering the prospects for Soviet policy following the 24th Congress, it is worth recalling the characteristics of the post-Khrushchev period thus far.

In a sense it has been an interregnum. The transition from Stalinism to Khrushchevism was characterized by the emergence of the USSR from a narrow-based European power to a global one. Yet, Khrushchev did not possess the means to carry on such a policy effectively in direct competition with the US; or he could only do so indirectly in various areas of the world.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has created the means for a more vigorous competition through a vast increase in strategic power, a better economic base, and a more realistic evaluation of the complexities and uncertainties of political involvement abroad.
Thus, the following seems likely to be the main features of Soviet policy in the post-Congress period:

-- At home an emphasis on steady though unspectacular economic advance with some more tangible benefits to the Soviet people. The present leadership will be less concerned about the longer term, since they are not going to be in power to face the consequences of or the failure to make adequate investments to cope with growing demands in the period beyond the present five-year plan.

-- Domestically, policies will become more conservative and repressive to cope with social and national dissidence that the present Soviet leaders are incapable of dealing with or understanding.

-- Within the Communist world the Soviets will have to work for consolidation in light of Czechoslovakia and Poland; less tolerance of independence in Eastern Europe is likely, but, on the other hand, the Soviets will try to hold open the prospect of some modus vivendi with China.

-- In relations with the United States negotiations and agreements of a limited character will be entertained and concluded. The motive will in part be to demonstrate that the USSR can deal with the US on equal terms for the first time in history, and has gained recognition of co-equal status as a superpower. Their longer term motive will be to encourage trends they perceive in the United States that will lead to further retreatment on the world scene.

Their major problems will be:

-- The intractability of the Soviet economy in the long run, which will be aggravated by the conflict between social discipline, which the party must enforce, and the need to permit more initiative and freedom to provide the incentive for increased productivity in a period when growth must come through intensive economic development.

-- The inherent instability of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and the chance that in a period of detente, initiated for purposes of consolidation in Eastern Europe and disruption in the West, one effect will be to make it more difficult to discipline the Eastern European satrapies.

-- The unpredictability of the Chinese, especially in a period when American policy toward China may be thawing and presenting the Chinese with more room for diplomatic and political maneuvers.
--- Finally, there is the problem of the Soviet leadership: if Brezhnev does in fact enhance his power and put through a program, he becomes very vulnerable to hostile coalitions. If Soviet policy comes to reflect more and more of his personal prejudices and predilections, his abrupt removal or departure makes longer term prognosis more uncertain.
European Defence Co-operation

As you will be talking to Helmut Schmidt when you see him on 24 March about European defence co-operation you may like to have some thoughts on the subject in the light of the latest developments on the European front as a whole. I have in mind in particular the possible implications of paragraph 15 of the Six's Hague communiqué which was discussed at the meeting of our Heads of Mission from E.E.C. capitals earlier this week.

2. Our officials have been working closely together in our combined efforts to develop and speed up defence co-operation among the European allies. I think we are fully agreed on the urgent need for carrying European defence co-operation forward as far and as fast as we can in the simultaneous interest of European unification; of optimising the European contribution to Western defence within the resources available; and of convincing the Americans that the Europeans are serious about the Alliance. We have greatly valued what you have done

/yourselves

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yourself to bring this about.

3. Like yourselves, we have been giving a lot of thought recently to how to give a fresh political impetus to European defence co-operation, given that the common-sense arguments are insufficient on their own to overcome the combination of inertial forces and political apprehensions which inhibit progress. In deciding on the content and timing of any initiative it seems to me that we have a variety of factors to balance off against one another.

4. For a start there is the threat of substantial American force withdrawals which provides both a reason and an occasion to get European defence co-operation on the move. It is quite essential if we are to influence American plans from 1971 onward and to avoid humiliating and dangerous disarray that the collective European voice in NATO should be made to function properly.

5. Second, there are the, as yet, unpredictable consequences of the work which was commissioned among the Six under paragraph 15 of the Hague communiqué. Prospects for early agreement on the future forms of European political (and defence) co-operation
co-operation "in the perspective of the enlargement of the Common Market" should not be overrated. At the same time these are early days and we hope to take part on equal terms with the rest in any work done under paragraph 15 once negotiations on our application have started. While we cannot forecast the direction it will take it is obvious that European political unification must in the nature of things include unification in the field of defence. (This has been a theme common to all proposals for pursuing European political unity from the Fouchet plans to the latest German and Italian proposals prepared in response to paragraph 15 of The Hague communiqué. Moreover it was specifically recognised in our 1967 statement.) There are also strong arguments for the enlarged Communities in the economic, political and defence fields being coterminous in their membership. M. Herval showed that he sympathised with this point of view in his talk with George Thomson in Brussels on 12 March. All this suggests that any initiative which we may take, be it of a political or of a pragmatic character, should as far as possible be geared to and in any case compatible with the sort of arrangements which might emerge out of paragraph 15 discussions. While, as I have just
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mentioned, it is hard to predict exactly what part we shall play either in drawing up the new arrangements or in their implementation between now and our final accession to the E.E.C., we shall be - and indeed already are being - consulted informally about them.

6. Another problem is how to bring France back into the Western defence system, and if we cannot do this in the shorter term, how to reduce the risk that France will frustrate our efforts to make progress with European defence co-operation. Ideally we should want to see France associated with any new initiative in European defence co-operation. But failing this we should do our best to arrange things so as to avoid unnecessary antagonism and to avoid making it harder in the longer term for France to enter. We cannot of course afford to wait indefinitely for France to come round to a more constructive attitude: indeed this may take a long time. But we should at least give her a chance to look at the general proposition for a new initiative in the light of the new factors (threatened American withdrawal and paragraph 15 of the Hague communiqué). You will doubtless be taking the temperature when you see Debre next month.
7. To sum up, I think that this leads to the conclusions that:

(a) what we are seeking to achieve in NATO on the one hand and in a narrower "European" context on the other are complementary;

(b) there is nevertheless a certain problem of co-ordination between the two as regards timing as well as content and participation. We must be particularly careful not to get off on the wrong foot in this critical period while we await the opening of negotiations in the Community;

(c) we should therefore not attempt to take too firm a position about the form which any new European defence initiative should take. We should concentrate for the present on first selling the need for a quantum jump in European defence co-operation and on exploring the available options. These could range from a public redefinition in some form of collective European objectives to comparatively modest practical multilateral experiments such as a
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European Defence Centre;

(d) Clearly if we are to achieve anything worthwhile, we must work closely with the Germans. I understand that officials from our two Departments have had useful exploratory talks on 17 March. You will be taking matters further with Helmut Schmidt next week. I suggest that in these discussions and in those which you will having in April with Debre, bearing in mind the number of problems, as yet unresolved, about the relationship between practical work on defence co-operation within NATO and our European policies generally, you should restrict yourself to sounding out German (and French) thinking without committing us to any specific initiatives.

(MICHAEL STEWART)
19 March, 1976
VISIT BY DR KISSINGER
Brief No. 8 - EEC

As Dr. Kissinger's visit will be taking place immediately after what we hope will have been the decisive Ministerial meeting with the Six in Luxembourg, it will be natural to give him an account of recent developments in the negotiations and to tell him how we now see the way ahead. The present US Administration, like its predecessors, has given its full support for broad political and economic reasons to our efforts to join the EEC and throughout the negotiations its attitude has been consistently helpful, despite growing domestic pressures from groups who believe they will be damaged by enlargement of the Community. There have been one or two relatively minor matters (eg association for the Caribbean Commonwealth) which have at times threatened to cause some disagreement between us and the Americans and on these more detailed notes are given in paras 7 - 8 below. But the present US position on them appears to be satisfactory and although they could be mentioned in passing, there is no need to draw them specifically to Dr Kissinger's attention.

Recent developments in the negotiations

2. Dr Kissinger will presumably have seen a copy of the personal message which the Prime Minister sent to President Nixon following his meeting in Paris with President Pompidou.
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(Copy attached, together with a copy of President Nixon's reply). He will therefore know that the rapprochement in our relations with France which the meeting brought about was based on the close identity of views established concerning the future of Europe after enlargement of the Community. President Pompidou was reassured about British intentions and the traditional Gaullist suspicions that we were an American "Trojan Horse", seeking to enter the Community only to destroy its European character, were dispelled. Equally, we were reassured that the French saw a more united Europe as developing a proper partnership with the United States and not setting itself up as an anti-American third force in the world.

3. But, as the Prime Minister made it clear in his message, the Paris meeting could not settle all the remaining issues in our negotiations with the Six, and there has remained a need for some tough bargaining in Luxembourg particularly on special arrangements for New Zealand. ["THIS PARAGRAPH WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN THE OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT MEETING IN LUXEMBOURG IS KNOWN"]

Future Prospects

4. The US Government is understandably hopeful that when we have joined the Community we will be able to use our influence to bring about changes in Community policies
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(eespecially the Common Agricultural Policy) which will benefit American trade interests. We entirely agree that one of our objectives as members of the Community will be to encourage it to become more outward-looking, but we are anxious that the Americans should not expect us to try to do too much too soon. It may therefore be worth pointing out to Dr Kissinger that even if the main issues in the negotiations are settled this month, there will still be a long process to be completed before we become fully effective members of the Community.

5. The first step will be to obtain Parliamentary approval of the terms negotiated for our entry. As the Prime Minister announced last week, there will be in two stages - a preliminary, exploratory debate before the Summer Recess, followed by the crucial vote in October. If, as the Government confidently expects, there is then a clear majority in favour of entry, the way will be open for signature of a Treaty of Accession at about the turn of the year. It will then be necessary to pass major legislation in the second half of the 1971-72 session, so that we can ratify the treaty in time for it to come into force on 1 January 1973.

6. It will only be at that point that we will have a full voice in Community decisions, though we expect to be closely consulted about decisions to be taken in the period between signature of the treaty and its coming into force. Moreover,
it will clearly take us some time to build up our influence in the Community and it will not be easy to make substantial changes in Community policies during the five-year transitional period, when the effects of enlargement will be working through and in themselves requiring the Six and the new members to make many adjustments to meet their new circumstances. Nevertheless, so far as US agricultural trade is concerned, the transitional arrangements agreed for our adoption of the CAP offer substantial reassurance. The Community have explicitly recognised that if circumstances arose during the transitional period in which significant volumes of trade risked serious disruption, then the enlarged Community would have to take action to deal with the position. We regard this assurance as being of particular importance for some Commonwealth countries (eg Australia) who will be losing their preferential access to our market, but it will also apply to other third countries, such as the United States.

Position of the EFTA Neutrals

7. One of the problems which will remain to be dealt with later in the year will be the negotiation of trade arrangements between the enlarged Community and the non-candidate EFTA countries. It remains uncertain what the form and content of these arrangements will be; while the Commission have proposed that they should cover industrial free trade but exclude agriculture almost entirely, it is doubtful
whether this proposal will prove acceptable either to the six (especially France) or to some of the EFTA neutrals. The US Government in the past has shown some disinclination to see preferential arrangements negotiated between the enlarged Community and the neutrals who would be unable to contribute to (and might even hinder) the development of closer political co-operation in Europe. There have, however, recently been some signs that the Americans may be coming round to our view that enlargement of the Community can and should be achieved without causing any barriers to trade to be re-erected in Europe. Dr Kissinger could be told that we continue to regard it as important to provide satisfactorily for the EFTA neutrals and that we do not foresee that it will be difficult to achieve this.

Caribbean Commonwealth

8. At one stage earlier in the year, it seemed possible that the US Government would make a serious attempt to prevent the independent Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean from being offered the opportunity to become associated with the enlarged Community when the Yaounde Agreements came to be re-negotiated in 1974. Fortunately, however, the Administration appears to have accepted our reservation argument that these countries have vulnerable economies and must be given an adequate substitute for the existing preferential arrangements which they enjoy in our market. The Community renewed their offer of
association to the Caribbean Commonwealth in mid-May and the US Government has not commented on this decision. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the Caribbean Commonwealth will decide to take up the offer of association when the time comes, or whether they will prefer to negotiate separate trade arrangements with the enlarged Community. It would, however, be appropriate to express our appreciation to Dr Kissinger for the helpful and restrained attitude which the US Government have taken on this question (and indeed towards our negotiations with the Six generally.)
SIGNOR MALFATTI'S VISIT TO THE US

1. There are two points which I should perhaps add to the savingram which we are sending you today about this visit.

2. First, Abe Katz told me "for my ears only" that during the framing of Signor Malfatti's instructions, the French had insisted that no negotiations with the US about trade questions should begin before the enlargement negotiations were completed, lest the latter should "foul" the former. Abe thought that the French were possibly right about this from their own point of view. But this fact had inhibited Malfatti from taking part himself in any exploration of a possible trade initiative at the OECD Meeting in June, though Higson had not felt so inhibited. This made Abe doubtful whether the Commission and the Six would in fact be able to agree on a formula which would enable one or both of them to take part in such discussions in the OECD. This, combined with the opposition in Washington, made him now rather pessimistic about the whole exercise, although he felt strongly that there was a real case for starting to talk together about the future. He felt, and EEC officials with whom he had been talking agreed, that the old ideas about GATT, Kennedy Round, etc were no longer really appropriate in a world split into three great trading blocks which were showing signs of dividing up the developing countries each into their own preferential areas. But in answer to my question, he agreed that there was little we in the UK could do about this at this moment except to push on with our enlargement negotiations.
THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES OF AN EEC ENLARGED TO INCLUDE GREAT BRITAIN

French suspicions that once inside the Community the UK would act as an American "trojan horse" are not dead. A recent example of their continuing influence appeared in the television exchange between M. Couve de Murville and Mr Roy Jenkins at the beginning of April. The same thought is implicit in repeated references in recent months by President Pompidou and the French Prime Minister to the need to create a European Europe, and the need for Great Britain to demonstrate her Europeanness unequivocally.

The long tradition of a "special relationship" between London and Washington is a disadvantage with a French audience. However, the events of the last ten years or so have shown increasingly that the "special relationship" has gradually ceased to be a factor of importance in world affairs. Great Britain has cut down on her former world-wide commitments, and no longer has the same identity of interest with the United States as she had in the early fifties. A parallel development has been our growing involvement in Europe. Despite the disappointment of two unsuccessful attempts to join the European Community the Government has persisted with its application, and the events of recent days suggest that their persistence is about to be crowned with success.

The enlarged Community will, however, have a relationship with the United States. As M. Couve said there is no question
of severing links with the United States. What Europe needs is to have an equal relationship, an independent relationship. The enlargement of the Community will bring about the creation of an integrated block of countries whose population exceeds that of the United States and that of the Soviet Union, whose combined economic strength will be second only to that of the United States, and which will be by far the largest single trading entity in the world. If as seems likely the enlargement of the Community will also give impetus to its growing integration the Community will find itself in a very strong position, and Western Europe will for the first time since the end of the Second World War be in a position to talk to the United States on terms approaching equality.

An enlarged Community will of course remain part of the Western world. Good relations between it and the United States will remain vital. Europe has been defended for 25 years by the overwhelming might of the United States. That will continue to be the case. Without the backing of American forces, and especially the American nuclear deterrent, Europe would not be able to resist pressures on her from the East. There are already signs of American dissatisfaction with the disproportionate burden which they have been bearing. As Europe grows in strength and cohesion, it would be reasonable to expect it to take on a greater share of the burden of defending itself.

The French Parliamentarians could be asked how they see the likely course of developments in this field. If the Americans reduce their commitment of ground troops to Europe, as urged by Senator Mansfield, we Europeans will have to devise means of plugging the gap. We shall have to devote resources to it.

On the other hand, one of the factors contributing to the
United States' balance of payments deficit would be reduced. It might be possible in view of Mr Brezhnev's recent remarks to make use of such developments to bring about a balanced reduction of ground forces overall in Europe, and hence a reduction of tension. Finally it should make the relationship between Europe and the United States one of greater equality.

As an enlarged EEC would be the largest trading group in the world, its trading relationships with the United States assume considerable importance. The entry of Great Britain will ultimately have the effect of closing, or at any rate severely reducing, one of the United States' traditional markets for agricultural exports. It would not be in either the Community's or the United States' interest to promote a trade war. There is a body of criticism in the United States of the EEC's preferential trading agreements, particularly around the Mediterranean, and of its requirement for reverse preferences from associates. There is a growing awareness within the EEC of the extent and sincerity of these U.S. fears and ideas have been floated both by the EEC Commission and by the US administration that there should be full scale trade talks between an enlarged Community and the United States once the enlargement has taken place. Although these ideas are still pretty embryonic, Signor Malfatti agreed with the Americans when he was in the USA in April, that such talks were necessary. The main point is the importance for Europe of not doing anything to encourage the growing move towards protectionism in the United States and, indeed co-operating wherever possible in the field of world trade.

On political co-operation, it may be useful to refer to
the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ten in Paris. This was a regular meeting in a series begun as a result of the Hague Summit of December 1969. (The Foreign Ministers of the Six meet every six months and then have a meeting with the four Foreign Ministers of the applicant countries as soon as possible afterwards. In an enlarged Community these two sets of meetings would presumably merge). So far they have discussed the Middle East and the proposal for a conference on European security. On both of these subjects a measure of agreement has been reached by the participants on a distinctively European line. This is partly because the interests of the countries of Europe are rather different from those of the United States. For example, European countries depend to a much greater extent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States does. Clearly we would expect this kind of co-operation and consultation to intensify in an enlarged Community. It would be worth seeking the views of the French Parliamentarians on the usefulness of these consultations in building up a distinctively European position.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The wide range of agreement you reached with President Pompidou in your recent talks in Paris was particularly encouraging to me, and I deeply appreciate your message recording your personal impressions. As you know, I share your view that a stronger political and economic identity in Europe is urgently needed, and that British accession would be a vital step toward that goal. I am also gratified by your assurance that Europe will take into account the economic difficulties which enlargement of the Community would create for us, as well as the continued importance of close cooperation across the Atlantic. As I have said before, I would also welcome increased European cooperation in the defense area, and I am hopeful that French policy will evolve constructively in that direction.

Your meeting with President Pompidou was clearly an historic occasion. While aware that some hard bargaining remains on the precise terms of British entry, I share your sense of excitement at the prospects for greater European cooperation opened up by your talks in Paris. You have our congratulations and warmest wishes for success in the negotiations that remain. A favorable conclusion along the lines you have described could, I agree, only be beneficial for Europe, and for the cause of peace and a strengthened world order.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Right Honorable
Edward Heath, M.B.E., M.P.
Prime Minister
London
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

April 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: France in Tomorrow's European Community

Attached at Tab A is a sensitive intelligence report about views on the European Community (EEC) given privately to Pompidou's staff by EEC Commissioner Deniau earlier this month. Deniau is, as you know, a Gaullist but also an activist Commission member. The talk occurred before France's referendum on the European Community.

Deniau made the following points:

(a) Quarrels over "supra-nationality" issues are démodé; for who can say whether new European institutions will take the form of a federation, confederation, etc.?

(b) Today, we must speak of political goals, prepare European public opinion to accept an European political structure.

(c) In 1973, Europe will face two offensives:

First, from the US, which wants to reduce Europe to a free trade zone dominated by American economic power. Europe must resist; the first battle to be won is that of bringing about monetary union.

Second, from the Soviet Union, which seeks to tie the EEC to COMECON and coordinate its offensive with plans for a European security conference. Europe must fight this offensive too, making no concessions that link EEC with COMECON and questioning the utility of the CSCE.

(d) To resist, Europe must conserve its common agricultural policy, oppose American economic demands, even though the American argument that Europe must make some concessions has validity.

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(e) For France, the UK is a more potent adversary within the Community than Germany. England is preparing itself to play an influential EEC role; drawing on its long experience it will attempt to control the European parliament.

(f) France must change its present view that the EEC Political Secretariat should be purely technical. If it concedes on this, it should be able to get the Secretariat located in Paris.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt

SUBJECT: A New Soviet Attitude Toward the EC?

In mid-August the Soviets, in dealings with the Austrians, Finns, and Swiss, gave indications of a policy switch toward the European Community (EC). Despite previous opposition, Moscow seems to have accepted, at least tacitly, free trade arrangements between the EC and these EFTA non-applicants.

--- Austria. On August 18 the Soviets sent an aide memoire raising no direct objection to Austria's recent agreements with the EC but calling for (a) Vienna's confirmation that these accords would not affect Austrian neutrality; and for (b) compensation for the damage to Soviet economic interests in Austria which might result from the agreements. Vienna breathed a sigh of relief at the moderate Soviet note.

--- Finland. In mid-August Kekkonen met Brezhnev et al. and discussed Finnish-EC relations. According to an intelligence report, he later told a Western ambassador that the Soviets' response was "practical," giving tacit approval to a Finnish-EC agreement. The communique issued at the end of the visit, like the aide memoire to Vienna, emphasized bilateral Finnish-Soviet economic relations (even ahead of the CSCE), thus implying perhaps that in the Finnish case too Moscow wants redress for eventual economic losses.

--- Switzerland. On August 22 a Soviet trade mission man inquired on instructions of the Swiss about the possible effects of the Swiss-EC agreement on Soviet-Swiss trade. When told that it would have none, the Soviet simply went away, apparently satisfied with this answer.

Previous Soviet Policy and Attitudes

The Soviets have never liked the EC. They have hitherto:

--- not recognized it formally;

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-- had no technician-level commercial contacts with the EC Commission (unlike the Poles, Hungarians and Romanians who have had);

-- tried to discourage potential entrants;

-- made it clear to the Eastern European CEMA countries that they should not try to establish closer ties to the EC. (This is particularly hard for the smaller CEMA countries since they are more dependent on trade with the Community than the Soviet Union is.)

Soviet propaganda has varied in intensity but been consistent in theme, attacking the EC:

-- on economic grounds, as a closed group discriminating against outsiders;

-- on ideological grounds, as a stronghold of big capitalists;

-- on politico-military grounds, as an underpinning of NATO.

Signs of Change

Despite these attacks, the Soviets have for many years accepted the Community as an economic reality in private discussions and have used its existence as an argument with their own allies for strengthening CEMA.

Brezhnev put this attitude on public record in a speech last March, saying that the USSR did not ignore the existence of the Common Market and would make its relations "with its members" (not, note, with the EC itself) depend on the extent to which they recognized realities in Eastern Europe, particularly the interests of the CEMA members. Subsequently Soviet attitudes and propaganda have reflected Brezhnev's line. (Pravda of August 25 called the EC and CEMA "...realities of our time...")

Policy Considerations for Moscow

It looks as if Moscow has now decided on a damage-limiting policy, seeing nothing to be gained by more frontal attacks on the EC and hoping to promote its anti-EC interests by more subtle, bilateral policies with Common Market outsiders and insiders.

The major Soviet objectives remain to (a) slow any momentum toward EC political integration and (b) protect its economic interests within EC members and associated countries. Other goals are:

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to avoid creating a new divisive factor in East-West relations that might jeopardize the CSCE. This dictates a soft line toward the EC before and during the Conference.

to avert the establishment of an EC common commercial policy (after January 1, 1973, if the EC Commission has its way, there will be no more bilateral agreements between EC countries and CEMA members and after January 1, 1974, all trade liberalization measures (export subsidies, external tariffs, etc.) will be fully common).

In pursuit of these goals, Moscow will tactically:

try to stress all-European economic policies and interests at a CSCE, probably hoping to have the Conference establish a permanent body that will deal with East-West European economic questions and may remodel East-West economic relations as a whole;

make maximum use of its present bilateral commercial agreements, many of them long-term (e.g. until 1981 with France), with the important Community countries, such as France and the FRG. It can make good use of the bilateral economic commissions established by these agreements;

establish firmly the principle that the Soviet Union (and its allies?) deserves economic compensation for the trade-diverting effects of the EC. It may demand of the Austrians and Finns for example, new commercial arrangements with CEMA to "balance" their EC agreements or simply insist on better bilateral trade deals;

seek common ground with EC outsiders, including the US (during the Peterson mission, Patoliehov and also the Poles several times stressed that the US and the USSR had common interests vis-à-vis the EC);

tighten up CEMA so that it can bargain more strongly with the EC. The East Europeans have traditionally worried about this and opposed it but they too may now be coming to feel that they need a stronger bargaining position with the EC than bilateralism can give them.

Future Moves

We should be alert to how the Soviets use the CSCE to these ends. Other possible policy moves to watch for as criteria by which to judge how far the Soviets have shifted are:

Will Moscow now accept participation by the EC as an institution in UN economic meetings and organizations (e.g. ECE).
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-- Will it now take up its own technician-level commercial contacts with the EC Commission?

-- Will it accept without protest the common commercial policy?

US-Soviet Relations

The Soviets think they see a common interest between us in protecting our economic interests against the EC. As noted, their commercial officials made references to this to our delegation during Secretary Peterson's trip to Moscow last month. They may have interpreted our strong opposition last November to a Finnish paper on export arrangement with the EC -- to which the Finns objected violently incidentally -- as a sign that we, like they, dislike EC arrangements with EFTA non-applicants that hurt our economic interests. They will certainly try to utilize their new bilateral relationship with us against the EC and may seek to broaden it to something like a common anti-EC platform in certain economic fields.

There is one very important difference between us and the Soviets, of course. Our chief policy focus is on current economic disadvantages to us of the EC, but still we favor European cohesion. The Soviets' chief focus is to prevent that cohesion. To achieve this they may be willing to pay a short-run economic price.
December 12, 1972

EC: SIGNS OF PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL UNION

Momentum toward political unification in the European Community (EC) picked up in the wake of the 1969 summit meeting in The Hague and more noticeably following the October 1972 summit in Paris. This paper examines this growing phenomenon, with specific attention to the ongoing development of political consultations in the Community on a variety of domestic and foreign policy issues.

ABSTRACT

The past decade and a half have seen the development in the EC of a customs union, a common agricultural policy, and the first stage of an economic/monetary union; yet, there has been little progress toward political union. With the departure of de Gaulle and the decision to proceed with enlargement, however, the goal of ultimate union of the member states has been reaffirmed. The EC summit conference at The Hague in late 1969 and its successor, held in Paris in October 1972, both pledged to work for this cause.

The Davignon Report. The outline for this increased European political cooperation was set forth in 1970 in a report by a committee headed by the Belgian Director General for Political Affairs, Etienne Davignon. The report, adopted by the EC foreign ministers, called for consultation by Community members on all
important questions of foreign policy; it provided for regular meetings of the Foreign Ministers, the Political Directors, and the EC Ambassadors accredited outside the Community.

The 1972 Paris summit determined that the frequency of these political consultations should be increased. It also called for the preparation of two different reports dealing with this subject: one, to update the Davignon Report; the other, to sketch the form of the "European Union by 1980" that the Paris summiters set as a goal.

Topics and Frequency of Meetings. The November 20-21 semi-annual EC Foreign Ministers session was the fifth such conference since these political consultations began. The Political Directors have held 12 meetings of their "Political Committee" in the meantime, while senior-level officials in the national governments have met nearly three dozen times in support of the Political Directors.

The principal topics at these various sessions, which have on occasion been described as "rambling and imprecise in nature," have been the Middle East, the CSCE,* and the Mediterranean. Reports on the November meetings of the EC Political Directors and of the Foreign Ministers reveal that most of the attention there was focused on the CSCE, with agreement being reached on the obligation to "consult" with one another at the Helsinki preparatory talks.

Major Determinants. Uncertainty as to the degree of EC political cooperation that will be possible on a given topic remains very dependent on President Pompidou's assessment of the desirability of

* Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
such action for France. The FRG Government, on the other hand, has been a consistently strong supporter of the development of political unification in the EC. German concern at the renewal of a Paris-London "entente cordiale" to the detriment of the other EC members has been replaced by the expectation in the FRG that the British will instead support intensified EC unification after they complete a run-in period.

**Effect on US-EC Relations.** It is too early to tell whether the developing EC political unification will lead to policies that could adversely affect US interests. Some of the consultations have already led to the formulation of EC common views not entirely consistent with ours. Yet, several of the member states, particularly the Netherlands and the FRG, have urged that the resultant European union solidify rather than weaken the bonds of the Atlantic Alliance.
Background

The Preambles of the Treaties of Paris (April 18, 1951) and Rome (March 25, 1957) reflect the desire of the original signatories ultimately to achieve a union of the member states of the EC (European Community). Looking forward to future enlargements in the membership of the Common Market, the Treaty of Rome also called on "the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their effort" in order to "establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples."

The 15-plus years since the Treaty of Rome was signed have seen the development in the EC of a customs union, a common agricultural policy (CAP), and the first stage of an economic/monetary union, which is scheduled to be completed by the end of the decade. Yet, there has been little progress toward political union or toward an EC foreign policy, reflecting the early prediction of former French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman that "Europe will not be built all at once, or through a single comprehensive plan."

The best-known attempt during the 1950's to establish a type of union was the 1953 European Defense Community (EDC) treaty, which would have placed the armed forces of the six governments, then united in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), under joint control. At the same time, a plan for a European Political Community was put together. The EDC treaty was killed by the French National Assembly, however, thus also blocking progress toward political union.

De Gaulle's idea of a Europe des Etats -- as expounded in the two Fouchet Plans -- limited advancement in this direction during the 1960's. These plans reflected de Gaulle's frank rejection of supranationalism, and his insistence that decisions on common policy were to be taken by unanimity. Despite Dutch-led opposition to the French effort to curb the scope of any political development under a Community aegis, the Court, the Parliament, and the Commission were all prevented from strengthening their powers during de Gaulle's rule.

With the departure of de Gaulle and with his successor's decision to proceed with enlargement, the objective of European union was revived. The EC summit conference at The Hague in December 1969, and its successor, held in Paris in October 1972, pledged the member states to work for such union.

The Davignon Report and Since

The structure for increased European political cooperation was initially outlined in 1970 in a report called for by the EC summit meeting held at The Hague in December 1969. The report was prepared by a committee headed by the Belgian Director General for Political Affairs, Etienne Davignon, and adopted by the EC Foreign Ministers. The Davignon Report, as it has come to be known, called for consultation on all important...
questions of foreign policy to promote the "harmonization of points of view, the concerting of attitudes, and, when it seems possible and desirable, common action." It provided for regular semiannual meetings of Foreign Ministers, quarterly meetings of Political Directors, and regular consultations of EC Ambassadors accredited outside the EC area.

Since then, consultations have multiplied. In 1971 the Political Directors increased their meetings to six a year. At the Paris EC summit in October 1972 it was decided that the Political Directors should raise that frequency to eight times a year and that the Foreign Ministers should double the frequency of their consultations to four times annually. The Paris summit conference also proposed that cabinet meetings in the EC capitals should ideally take place on the same day of the week, in view of the increase in the number of joint parleys throughout the Community. Regular Council sessions also provided, of course, the EC Foreign Ministers with additional opportunities for political interchanges. Dutch Foreign Minister Schmeltzer, currently the President of the EC Council, reported to the European Parliament in mid-November that representatives from the three acceding states -- Denmark, Ireland, and the UK -- are already participating in these consultations "on an equal footing."

The Paris summit communiqué called for the preparation of two different reports dealing with political cooperation: one, requested by mid-1973, will update the Davignon Report and will suggest procedures for further consultation; the other, due by late 1975, will outline the form of the "European Union by 1980" which the Paris summiters set as their ultimate goal.

The "second Davignon Report" on political cooperation will probably have to address itself to the thorny issue of the form and location of an EC Political Secretariat, since all the members recognize the need for such an institution, if purely for technical reasons. A Belgian Foreign Ministry official recently observed that the paper work of the political consultative process is an "overwhelming burden" for the Foreign Ministries of the smaller member states. The French are adamant, however, that such a Political Secretariat be established in Paris, their choice for the "capital of Europe." While the Dutch and the European Commission in particular are dead set against weakening the position of Brussels in the Community, the other members might acquiesce in the French demand in return for a substantial strengthening of the Community's other institutions.

Topics and Frequency of Political Consultations

The November 20-21 semiannual EC Foreign Ministers session marked the fifth such conference since EC political consultations began. The
Political Directors have met 12 times in what has come to be known as the "Political Committee."

The topics at the Political Director sessions (like those at the meetings of Foreign Ministers) have dealt with the Middle East, the Mediterranean, CSCE, aid to refugees, the Law of the Sea conference, Soviet proposals on TV satellites, the Uganda problem, terrorism, and the Simla summit conference. The question of outside participation, especially by Turkey, in these consultations has also frequently arisen.

In support of the Political Directors, senior-level officials in the national governments have also met together as working groups, sub-groups, committees, and ad hoc groups. The frequency of these latter sessions has varied, depending on the subject, from more than a dozen for consultations on both the Middle East and the CSCE, to about five for Mediterranean questions, and to two on Bangladesh.

The discussions of the Political Directors, as well as those of the senior-level officials, are considered to be indicative only. Major decisions are left to the Foreign Ministers. A Dutch observer at several of these meetings has described them as "rambling and imprecise" in nature, adding that "they suffered badly from...lack of a secretariat to record and expand on decisions."

Attention to Middle East. The initial efforts of the "Political Committee" concentrated on the Middle East. When this topic was subsequently considered by the EC Foreign Ministers in May 1971, individual views on the topic were so disparate that the chief result was a broad statement which papered over or omitted points of contention on fundamental issues and only served to irritate the Israelis. The Soviet expulsion from Egypt in July 1972 made the Middle East again topical in the EC in August. Since then, it has been determined, however, that the subject is to be the responsibility essentially of the EC's UN representatives, for the time being.

Spotlight on CSCE. For most of this year, CSCE has been center-stage. Reports on the November meetings of the Political Directors and of the Foreign Ministers reveal that most of the attention was focused on it, with agreement being reached on the obligation to "consult" with one another at the multilateral preparatory talks (MPT) at Helsinki. In his report to the European Parliament on EC political activities, Schmelzer singled out preparations for the MPT as the "most important" subject of EC political cooperation.
The Foreign Ministers have agreed that at the Helsinki talks the
delegate from the member state who is in the Council chair would speak
for the EC on matters "relevant to the competence of the Community."
Furthermore, the individual member states will coordinate national
positions on matters "touching the competence of the Community." This
latter "grey zone" may or may not include such topics as industrial and
environmental policies since EC policies in these areas are still only
in the planning stage. In any event, it has also been determined that
the presence at the MPT of a representative of the EC Commission would
be "desirable." No decision, however, has yet been taken regarding the
presence of a Commission representative at the CSCE itself.

Other Topics. FRG Political Director von Staden and some of the
other Political Directors reportedly intend in the future to attend EC
Council sessions on the EC's Mediterranean policy. Yet, French aware-
ness that EC political consultations probably would not support France's
commercial aspirations to obtain reciprocity in the proposed EC "global"
Mediterranean policy has thus far prompted a refusal by Paris to allow
the EC Political Directors to become involved in considering this con-
troversial topic.

Another subject, terrorism, which German Foreign Minister Scheel
had proposed for joint consultations, was shifted from EC sponsorship
to the Justice and Interior Ministries of the member countries, apparently
because all of the European nations are intimately involved.

The French Role

Uncertainty as to the degree of EC political cooperation that will
be possible on a given topic still remains, primarily because of the
French position.

France's attitude toward political unification in the EC is, of course,
very dependent on President Pompidou's assessment of the desirability of
such action. Pompidou sponsored the summit goal of a European Union by
1980 that was set forth in the communiqué of the Paris EC summit conference.
And French determination to go along with a broader role for the EC in the
future was demonstrated at the November 9 EC Council meeting that concerned
itself with social affairs. On the other hand, two other (non-EC) meetings
occurring at about the same time -- one concerned with scientific policy,
the other with pollution in the Rhine -- were marked by the old French
reluctance to work toward a common solution. Even here, however, there were
indications of a willingness to accept results consistent with a French
"minimalist" view.

It will be interesting to see what effect the incumbency of Francois-
Xavier Ortoli as the President of the EC Commission for the next two years
will have on the old mutual antagonism between Paris and the Commission.
Ortoli is a former close adviser of Pompidou.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/LIMDIS
The British Role

The UK's entry into the EC had occasioned some concern in the West German Foreign Office over the possible development of a Franco-British entente cordiale that would be detrimental to the EC members. But that concern has now been supplanted by the expectation that the British will support intensified EC unification after they complete a run-in period.

Prime Minister Heath expanded on his personal view of a unified EC in his annual Guildhall address on November 13, when he declared that a "new type of relationship between states" is being created in the Community. "Where the common policy operates," he stated, "the member states combine their resources and efforts in a new joint enterprise in the common interest of the people. Elsewhere, on matters where there is no common policy, the national identity remains unaltered." Heath is thus suggesting that the ultimate European Union will be neither a federation nor a confederation, but sui generis with a built-in respect for certain national prerogatives.

Community meetings do, of course, offer a welcome opportunity for Anglo-Irish discussions on the Ulster problem. Heath and Lynch took advantage of such an opportunity at the Paris summit.

British Labor, to be sure, has thus far demonstrated a reluctance to become involved in the Community. The Parliamentary Labor Party has decided not to participate in the European Parliament, and the Trades Union Congress has decided not to take part in the Economic and Social Committee during 1973. Still, there is growing pressure to seek to protect British Labor interests in the Community.

Other Determinants

Several other considerations should be borne in mind in evaluating the somewhat cloudy future of EC political cooperation. Progress in economic/monetary cooperation will be a factor. So will the feasibility of universal direct elections to the Strasbourg Parliament. Both will involve some sacrifice of national sovereignty.

The recently re-elected West German Chancellor will also be an important factor. During his first term in office, Brandt showed himself to be a consistent supporter of European unification, a cause which in any event is quite popular throughout his country.

Effect on US-EC Relations

It is too early to tell whether the political unification activities described above are the precursors of policies which will adversely affect US interests. The consultations on the CSCE that the Nine have held so far have led to the formulation of common views which have not been entirely consonant with those of the US. From time to time, the specter is raised of an "EC bloc" within NATO. Concern has recently been voiced by a Dutch
official at NATO that both Paris and London desire to formulate a "European position" outside the North Atlantic Council. On the other hand, particularly the West Germans and the Dutch would have the resultant European Union further solidify rather than weaken the bonds of the Atlantic relationship.

USUN has reported a reluctance on the part of the delegates of the EC countries to inform us of the results of their various joint consultations in New York. One small irritation thus far has been the "minor complications" that have reportedly resulted in our close relationship with the UK mission at the UN. Yet, one German observer has informed our UN Mission that "leadership and solidarity is lacking" at these sessions and that serious effort to achieve a common EC view on UN issues will be a "long time in coming."
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE

January 31, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Prime Minister Heath,
Thursday, February 1, 10:30-11:45 a.m.;
Friday, February 2, 3:00-6:00 p.m.,
at Camp David

Your meetings with the Prime Minister will in some ways be the most
important of your contacts with the European leaders this year because
they will set the tone and substantive framework for a dialogue with Europe
on the key economic and security issues shaping our relations.

There continues to be a special relationship (Heath strongly prefers the
term natural relationship) with the UK and in your talks with the Prime
Minister you can range over a number of issues more freely than with
other Europeans. You can expect that, within certain limits imposed by
the UK's entry into Europe, the UK will be our closest confidant and
supporter in the European-American dialogue.

Your basic talking points on the key issues are incorporated in this
memorandum and more detailed talking points are at Tabs A and B.

I. PURPOSE

This meeting comes at an important juncture in our relations with Europe.
We are, in effect, beginning a broad negotiation with Europe that revolves
around two overriding issues:

(1) Clarification of the security relationship between the United States
and Europe, including how to coordinate our bilateral and multilateral
efforts in such diverse negotiations as the European Security Conference,
force reduction talks, and SALT; and

(2) Clarification of the economic relationship between the expanded EC
and the US, and how to settle a series of concrete trade and monetary
problems that the growth of the EC raises for our international economic
position.
Your overall objective in these talks is to:

-- Persuade the Prime Minister that our common interests in Western security and the Western alliance are so overriding as to justify economic concessions to the US by the EC, so that the US can maintain the domestic support essential to a strong commitment to NATO and to Atlantic partnership.

-- Explain that we will bargain hard to protect our economic interests and expect from the Europeans the political maturity to make sacrifices in the interest of trans-Atlantic relationships. If economic issues are approached on purely technical grounds, the result will be a stalemate. Only by developing a political framework can we make progress.

-- Reassure him that we do not intend to put our contribution to Western defense on the bargaining table in order to force economic concessions.

-- Make clear that we need an agreed diplomatic framework for dealing with security issues. We are not engaged in arranging a bargain with the USSR at Europe's expense, but that the Europeans cannot expect commitments that tie our hands; we will have to play a key role in the development of detente, which rests to a great degree on US-Soviet relations; we need some room for maneuver but within the framework of agreed Western goals.

-- Offer the opportunity during his visit to work out broad principles that both countries could subscribe to in approaching political-security and economic issues over the coming year.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN

A. Background

We are at a point in our European policy where a new, programmatic and creative relationship must be developed. The older arrangements, assumptions, and objectives developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s have run their course and should be replaced with a new concept and common direction that can be sustained in the changing international environment of this decade. This is the ultimate outcome of the European-American dialogue that begins with your discussions with the Prime Minister.

We cannot expect the Europeans to enter this dialogue with much unity or clarity of purpose. The Europeans are apprehensive that political and economic issues will be related in a way that the US will bargain its security commitment against European economic concessions. The Europeans' view
of how political and economic issues should be taken up and resolved, however, is hazy in part because they are uncertain over the direction of US policy. They harbor exaggerated fears that the US is somehow going to subordinate its Alliance relationships to the emerging relationship with the USSR. They are concerned that the US may pose unreasonable economic demands that will either blunt the thrust of European unity, if European concessions are too great, or drive the US into an economic protectionist posture if the issues are not resolved.

There is a recognition in Europe (especially in the UK) that we have a mutual political interest in cooperating to resolve economic problems. In dealing with these problems, however, we do not have the luxury of time. If progress is not made soon, protectionist and/or isolationist pressures in the US will make it more difficult to secure a) trade legislation (which is itself the major vehicle for improving the world trading system and resolving economic problems) and b) domestic support for agreements made in the political and security areas. This in turn would be evidence to the Soviets and others of the fragility of our commitment to Western Europe, thereby weakening our position and Europe's as well.

In sum, there is no European identity and the Prime Minister is not negotiating on behalf of Europe. There are common concerns, however, and the Europeans, including Prime Minister Heath, look to Washington to take the initiative to explain our philosophy of detente and western defense and the relationship of economics and politics as they will bear on the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Within this broad framework the Prime Minister will expect you to set forth as precisely as possible what we expect of the Europeans and what we are willing to do in return.

Heath's Position. The Prime Minister comes to this meeting midway through the normal life of his Parliament and eager for these consultations at the beginning of your second term. The Prime Minister's philosophy of government continues: "Stand firm. Do what is right. Do what is necessary." Domestically, he has been waging a continuing battle against trade union opposition and against inflation, and in these efforts he has readily acknowledged his debt to your Phase II program. He also continues to press resolutely to find a solution to the Ulster crisis.

In foreign policy, Heath, almost alone among European leaders, has continued to support us on Vietnam and he knows you respect him for it.

In his vision of Western Europe's future he sees an urgent need for developing a "European foreign policy." He pays tribute to the United States for its consistent support of European unity, and he says that the EC must
build up its own strength and community of purpose so as to "emerge as a valid partner of the United States in strengthening the prospects for peace and prosperity across the world." His view is that we are engaged in a joint quest for both peace and prosperity and this is the key to US-European relations. The Prime Minister recognizes that the EC as a whole is not in a position to deal with the US, and that the initial phases of negotiations will be bilateral. In his talks with you he does not expect to negotiate technical economic issues or tactical political questions. He will want to consider an agreement on broad principles that the US and UK could use as the basis for developing concrete positions. These principles might be advanced by the UK to its European partners, with the ultimate aim of a multilateral declaration. Heath would expect that they would find some form of endorsement by Congress to underline their long-term character.

Heath's position is still delicate, however, in terms of how far he can go in acting as the bridge between the EC and the US. We cannot expect the UK to assume the role of US advocate in the councils of the EC, lest the old suspicions of the "Trojan Horse" be revived. This is particularly true in the coming months when Pompidou must protect his left flank, and refurbish his Gaullist image.

You can thus expect Heath to be sympathetic to our concerns about economic problems, and to be understanding of our global responsibilities. He will be ready to undertake some behind-the-scenes lobbying for the US position, as long as he has the assurance that you will approach negotiations with Europe with a willingness to make some concessions in the interest of our larger common goals as Allies.

B. Participants

You and the Prime Minister will have a private meeting from 10:30 - 11:45 a.m. on Thursday, February 1 (Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the British Cabinet, and I will join you). At the outset of the meeting, you and the Prime Minister should agree on the agenda items you wish to discuss. Considering that your meeting is scheduled for one hour and 15 minutes, you may wish to concentrate on US-European security and economic relations, East-West relations and Vietnam. Secretary Rogers and Sir Alec Douglas-Home will hold parallel talks in the Cabinet Room.

At present, Thursday afternoon is open should you want another meeting. You and the Prime Minister will meet again for further talks on Friday afternoon, February 2, at Camp David from 3:00 - 6:00 p.m. (Sir Burke Trend and I will join you.) Secretary Rogers, Sir Alec and Lord Cromer will come to Camp David for a working dinner.
C. Press Plan

Prime Minister Heath's visit has been announced. There will be media coverage of the arrival ceremony, and a photo opportunity at the start of your talks on Thursday morning. Prime Minister Heath plans to address the National Press Club at 12:30 p.m., Thursday, and he is tentatively planning a meeting with British press representatives on Friday morning. No official communiqué is planned at the conclusion of your talks.

III. ACTION SEQUENCE

You will welcome Prime Minister Heath at the official South Lawn arrival ceremony at 10:00 a.m. Thursday morning. Major events during the visit will include:

-- Your Oval Office meeting with Heath Thursday morning;

-- Heath's address to the press club Thursday noon;

-- You dinner for Heath Thursday evening;

-- Heath's luncheon for you at the British Embassy Friday;

-- Your meeting with Heath Friday afternoon, to be followed by a dinner, at Camp David.

Detailed scheduling for the visit is provided in a separate memorandum. Texts of your welcoming statement and your toast for the dinner are also being provided separately.

IV. YOUR BASIC TALKING POINTS

You may wish to begin by setting forth your general approach to US-European relations:

-- You believe that our common interest in the Western Alliance and in Western security are paramount. This is the framework for approaching our economic conflicts. The US expects the Europeans to cooperate in an equitable settlement of these problems, so that the US can maintain the domestic support essential to a strong commitment to NATO and to Atlantic partnership.

-- We do not intend to use our defense commitments as a bargaining chip, or as pressure on our Allies.
-- We do need to examine our security relationships to develop a
common strategy to deal with several key East-West issues. We need to
know what the general pattern of East-West relations will be in light of
SALT, mutual force reductions in Central Europe and the European Security
Conference. We do not want a race to Moscow and competition among the
Allies in the name of détente.

-- The Europeans will naturally be apprehensive in a period of active
Soviet-American negotiations. They cannot expect to tie our hands by
precise commitments. We need some freedom of maneuver in dealing
with Moscow. The answer to their apprehensions is not American reassurance;
but agreement on a common set of goals.

-- As for the economic relationship, we want to approach the issues
bearing in mind our overall political security ties. If economic issues are
taken up on purely economic or technical grounds, all parties will have to
protect their interests and there will be a deadlock. Only by proceeding
within a political framework can we expect both sides to make concessions
and reach a fair settlement.

-- During the Prime Minister's visit, we could work out some broad
principles that both countries should subscribe to in approaching both the
political-security issues, and the economic issues over the coming year.

A. Political and Security Issues

1. US Troops in Europe

-- Reaffirm your commitment to maintain troops at roughly
present levels, provided the Europeans are making a vigorous defense
effort on their own behalf.

-- We need to achieve a satisfactory agreement to offset
our balance of payments costs arising from stationing of troops in
Europe.

-- The German offset agreement expires this year, and
the Europeans should take the initiative in developing new arrange-
ments.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (Central Europe)

-- Our objective is not to seek a quick reduction with the USSR; we want to maintain forces in Europe.

-- In dealing with Congressional pressures for unilateral cuts, we want to create the impression of steady progress in negotiations with the East, the initial talks this month in Vienna and the formal negotiations beginning next fall will gain us at least a year.

-- As far as the USSR is concerned we want to develop with the Allies some proposals that will force the Soviets to address concrete issues, such as how to compensate NATO for the advantages the USSR has in geography.

-- We will conduct the entire exercise as a military security question rather than a search for atmospherics.

-- In the end a US-Soviet reduction may make the most military sense, but this conclusion should come from the Europeans.

3. Conference on Security and Cooperation

-- We are skeptical about the prospects of any breakthroughs in this Conference, but do not find it a place to harass the Soviets.

-- The most we can expect is to loosen up the Soviet Bloc structure by some greater exchanges, and perhaps issue a declaration of principles that will inhibit Soviet freedom of action in dealing with the East Europeans.

-- We are prepared to start the Conference in June.

4. SALT

There are three areas of British concern: (1) they fear that we may be forced into meeting Soviet demands to restrict or withdraw our aircraft based in Europe or our carriers in the Mediterranean, the so-called forward based systems (FBS), (2) they are concerned that a permanent agreement on offensive weapons may involve a "non-transfer" clause, wherein we would be barred from supplying technical assistance to the UK nuclear weapons program or transferring to the UK the Poseidon missile (similar to the non-transfer clause in the ABM treaty), and (3) they are concerned about how to deal with the Soviet claim, in SALT I, that an increase in the British or French ballistic submarine forces would give the Soviets an automatic right to increase the USSR's forces. (We rejected this in SALT I).
You may wish to say:

-- On the major areas of concern to the UK and the Allies we will consult closely.

-- As far as our forward based aircraft in Europe and our carriers are concerned, we will try to defer the issue and concentrate on an agreement that limits the central weapons systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.

-- If we have to, we might consider some general understanding that our deployments of these forward based systems would not be such that we would circumvent or undermine a SALT agreement.

-- Similarly, we will have to reach some understanding that a SALT agreement will not cancel out our special arrangements with the UK on weapons assistance; submarine missiles are the only real issue, and these might be exempted from SALT.

-- As for the general outlook, it looks as if we may face a deadlock between our preference for a long term agreement dealing with ICBMs, SLBM and heavy bombers, and the Soviet approach of only adding-on to the existing agreement such questions as our forward based systems. This would leave us with the unequal level in the permanent agreement.

-- You do not exclude another agreement similar to May 1971 that would tie a permanent agreement to some further Interim Arrangements.

5. Nuclear Relationships

The British are concerned about the long term viability of their Polaris submarine force (4 submarines). As we shift over to the Poseidon missile (with MIRVs) and eventually to the Trident system, they fear that they may not be able to maintain the necessary parts and replacement program for their Polaris. Accordingly, they have been engaged in a research and development program to improve their own Polaris warheads and we have been assisting them. Now, however, as an alternative to this program (which they call Super Antelope) they are giving serious consideration to buying the Poseidon missile and converting their Polaris boats.

The Prime Minister may raise this with you; we have given them some information about Poseidon to assist in their analysis, but no firm commitments.
You may wish to:

-- Reassure the Prime Minister that we will give them full assistance if they choose to go ahead with their Polaris improvement package; we will also see to it that their Polaris fleet can be maintained after we phase out.

-- Tell him that if they choose the Poseidon, we will give it serious consideration, but you cannot make a firm commitment.

B. Economic Issues

You may wish to stress the following points:

-- In US-European economic relations we have two choices: (1) we can deal with our problems at the technical, economic level; this will cause all sides to protect their self-interests and will lead to deadlock and negotiations will terminate in disaster; or (2) we can negotiate our differences in the context of the broader political framework in which all can justify mutual concessions in pursuit of trans-Atlantic interests.

-- We strongly support the principle and essential elements of European integration, and Europe's efforts toward greater unity. (This would strengthen the credibility of your personal commitment to European unity and strengthen Heath's and our position vis-a-vis those who will oppose concessions to us on the ground that the specific objectives we seek are part of an overall effort to undermine European integration.)

-- We have problems with the Community, but in our view these do not relate so much to the essentials of European integration but to unfortunate by-products which damage our interests.

-- A substantial portion of US-European problems and the problems of the world economic system can be solved in multilateral-trade negotiations, and we shall endeavor to do so.

-- But progress on a few issues must be made in the near future if we are to get legislation which allows us to meaningfully negotiate on trade and if we are to prevent present problems from worsening. Britain is in a unique position to help on these problems since, for the most part, such problems result from EC enlargement in general and British entry in particular; and we believe Britain shares a number of our objectives.

-- Moreover, we must reach agreement soon at the highest levels on certain objectives for EC-US relations. Such agreement can reverse the negative drift in our relationship and allow us to better resolve specific trade problems and cooperate in the broader trade and monetary negotiations.
On energy policy, to review the need for the United States, Europe and Japan to engage in high-level discussions aimed at developing a coordinated approach to the energy problem: identifying Western needs, identifying energy sources, considering how best to prevent the producer nations from playing off the consumer nations against each other, and considering possible machinery needed to mesh the policies of the oil companies and Western governments.

** * * * * *

In sum, the Prime Minister should carry away from your meeting two essential points:

-- The United States is willing to work out a common approach to the range of East-West security issues and to reinforce its commitment to a strong Western defense and a strong European Community.

-- We can sustain this position to the degree that the Europeans are willing to make reasonable economic concessions and sacrifices that will enable the US to mobilize the domestic support for strong links to Europe.

-- We all agree that our security and political relationships transcend technical economic considerations, but economic interests can become divisive if we do not resolve our conflicts.

Additional Talking Points and Background Material attached to this memorandum -- reflecting the points made in the memoranda from your Principals in the accompanying briefing book:

Tab A - Political and Security Issues

A-1: US Troops in Europe  
A-2: MBFR Negotiations  
A-3: SALT  
A-4: US-UK Nuclear Cooperation  
A-5: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)  
A-6: Middle East  
A-7: South Asia  
A-8: Energy Policy  
A-9: Contacts with the GDR

Tab B - Economic Issues

B-1: US Views Toward the EC  
B-2: The Nature of US Trade Legislation

SECRET/SENSITIVE
B-3: Negotiations on EC Enlargement
B-4: EC Mediterranean Policy
B-5: EC-EFTA Agreements
B-6: EC Mandate for Trade Negotiations
   (Tariffs, Non-Tariff Barriers, Agriculture, Safeguards)
B-7: Monetary Negotiations
B-8: Japan
B-10: Concorde

The contents of the briefing book are as follows:

Tab A: Memorandum from Secretary Rogers

Tab B: Memorandum from Secretary Shultz on Economic and Trade Issues

Tab C: Memorandum from Peter Flanigan on Economic and Trade Issues

Tab D: Memorandum from Arthur Burns on Economic and Trade Issues

Tab E: Memorandum from Herbert Stein on US and British Price and Wage Control Experiments

Tab F: Issues and Talking Points Provided by the Department of State

Tab G: Biographical Material
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Chou En-lai, Premier, State Council
Chi P'eng-fei, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ch'i-iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
T'ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Shen Jo-yun, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

PLACE: Villa #3, Peking, China

DATE AND TIME: February 16, 1973, 2:15 - 6:00 p.m.

PM Chou: Mr. Kennedy has a sprained waist. How is it now?

Mr. Kennedy: Much better through the help of your doctors.

Dr. Kissinger: He hasn't had so much attention since he joined my
staff. You're spoiling him.

PM Chou: I have read your draft. I received your draft of the Act of
Paris. We haven't received the views of our Vietnamese friends yet.

Dr. Kissinger: We haven't either. They were going to give them to
us either today or tomorrow.

PM Chou: Yes.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET - XCONS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Now the present situation is that they have again proposed this treaty and they have again -- they have said they would like to sign it when Brezhnev visits the United States. And I have told them we would consider it and let them know.

Now it is perfectly clear that we cannot accept this intention and this policy, so there is no possibility whatever that we will agree to a treaty that contains an obligation not to use nuclear weapons. The only question is a tactical question for us -- whether we should reject it completely or whether we should reject it evasively. For example, as we have told Ambassador Huang Hua, we were considering last fall the possibility of a draft in which we would agree to create conditions in which nuclear weapons would not be used and then to define these conditions in such a way that they would amount to the renunciation of force altogether, or to create a commission to study when these conditions will be realized. This is what we are now considering, but to assess that I would be very anxious to have your views. But to make a final judgment one must I think assess the basic strategy towards the Soviet Union because only then can the judgment be made.

So I don't know whether the Prime Minister would like to talk about this immediately or whether we should discuss the basic strategy and then come back to this, or whether he would like to express a preliminary view and then go back to it.

PM Chou: Let us continue our discussion on the strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: Should I? [Chou indicates to go ahead.]

Let me make a few observations which were suggested to me by a half-facetious question of the Prime Minister about whether we intend to stand on the shoulders of China to come closer to the Soviet Union. But since I have learned in five meetings that the Prime Minister never says anything without an intention and perhaps it is a good question, I would like to discuss it while we are discussing strategy.

It just occurred to me. We have had a very unequal relationship in one respect in that your interpreters have had to carry the entire load at every meeting. We are very grateful. [Chou laughs]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Now on the strategy with the Soviet Union - and I think we might begin with your question. There is no doubt that our relations with the Soviet Union accelerated after my visit to Peking in 1971. We expected the opposite actually. So our judgment was wrong. And therefore obviously there is merit in the fact, in the Prime Minister's suggestion that our relations with the PRC have given the Soviet Union an incentive to improve their relations with us. This is not our purpose but this has been a result. But then that in itself is irrelevant because the question is why? What are they trying to accomplish?

Now there are two theoretical possibilities. One is they generally want to bring about a relaxation of tensions in the world. If that is true, it is in our common interest and it will not be against the interests of either -- I don't believe it is their intention but if they really want to bring about a relaxation of tension in the world, we would welcome it.

The second possibility is, and the evidence seems to point more in that direction, that the Soviet Union has decided that it should pursue a more flexible strategy for the following objectives: To demoralize Western Europe by creating the illusion of peace; to use American technology to overcome the imbalance between its military and economic capability; to make it more difficult for the U.S. to maintain its military capability by creating an atmosphere of detente and isolate those adversaries who are not fooled by this relaxation policy.

PM Chow: Such as China.

Dr. Kissinger: I was trying to be delicate. [Laughter] Five, to gain time to accelerate its own military preparations.

If all of this succeeds, then eventually the U.S. will be totally isolated. If they can demoralize Europe, improve their military situation, neutralize those countries which are politically opposed but are militarily too weak, then sooner or later the U.S. will be completely isolated and become the ultimate victim.

Now what is our strategy? Because I think that is important for the Prime Minister to understand so that he can separate appearance and reality. He can do it anyway, but so that he understands it more fully.
We believe that the second interpretation of Soviet intentions is by far the most probable one. Now first, very candidly, as you must know from your own reports, we have had a very difficult period domestically as a result of the war in Vietnam. So on many occasions we have had to maneuver rather than to have a frontal confrontation. But now the war in Vietnam has ended, especially if the settlement does not turn into a constant source of conflict for the U.S., we can return to the fundamental problems of our foreign policy. Even during this period, which the Prime Minister must have noticed, we have always reacted with extreme violence to direct challenges by the Soviet Union. I don't know whether the Prime Minister followed in 1970 -- that was before our meetings -- the attempt by the Soviet Union to establish a submarine base in Cuba, and we reacted very strongly; less theatrically than President Kennedy, but very strongly, and that submarine base has never been completed. And in September 1970 during the Jordanian crisis we also reacted very sharply. And during the crisis on Berlin. I am just giving them as an example of our basic method. Our experience has been that the Soviet Union has always shied away from a military confrontation with the U.S.

But then what is our strategy? First we had to rally our own people by some conspicuous successes in foreign policy, to establish a reputation for thoughtful action. Secondly, we had to end the Vietnam war under conditions that were not considered an American disgrace. Thirdly, we want to modernize our military establishment, particularly in the strategic forces. We will talk more about this if you want to in a separate meeting. Ultimately we want to maneuver the Soviet Union into a position where it clearly is the provoker. Fifthly, we have to get our people used to some propositions that are entirely new to them.

Now in Europe right now there is a paradox. In Europe the psychological situation is very poor, but the moral basis as far as U.S. action is concerned is very good.

In Asia the psychological situation is very strong. I speak frankly, in China there is no problem about the willingness of defense. But for Americans to understand that maneuvers such as Czechoslovakia and China, leaving aside the much greater strength of China, affects America directly is a new idea and requires time for preparation. You haven't asked us for any of this. This is our own judgment of the situation. Our interests are determined by our own necessities.
Therefore we have to some extent cooperated in these Soviet maneuvers. But up to now we have made only two kinds of agreements with them, or three kinds: One, those that we thought were on balance unilaterally to our advantage, such as Berlin - we paid nothing for that. So, of course, we did make that agreement.

PM Chou: We don't quite understand that.

Dr. Kissinger: The Berlin Agreement improved the situation for us, and it cost us nothing and those are the best agreements to make. [laughter] No one ever gets them from your Vice Minister. [laughter] Second -- but that was really -- they did not make that for us -- that agreement was made to keep Brandt in office. The Soviet Union made this agreement for Berlin's domestic policies. It is not an international agreement.

The second type of agreement we would be prepared to make...

PM Chou: [Interrupting] But it can also be said that this is consistent with the Soviet policy which is meant to lull, to demoralize Western Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: It is consistent. It is very consistent.

The second kind of agreement we would make, of which there is perhaps only one, is an agreement that would be in the interest of all countries such as the limitation on strategic arms. The difficulty with that agreement is that it establishes quantitative limitations at a time when the real dangers come from qualitative improvements.

PM Chou: That is why when you were signing the agreement in Moscow where Mr. Laird said quite a lot in Washington, that is why I was very interested in him. You said that he had talked too much, but I think there is a good point in doing it.

Dr. Kissinger: He talked too much. That doesn't mean there wasn't a good point in it.

PM Chou: This is a good point because it shows that on this point an American must speak from trust.

Dr. Kissinger: We have accelerated it. In fact, Laird said it all. We have, since the Agreement, greatly accelerated the qualitative improvements of our strategic forces.
PM Chou: On this one he has also spoken out.

Dr. Kissinger: Who has?

PM Chou: Mr. Laird. Although the Soviet Union didn't say anything about that, but Mr. Suslov as the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he said something about it.

Dr. Kissinger: About Laird?

PM Chou: No, about the position of strength to increase the military budget. Of course, the figure of the budget is furnished, but what he said, those words are true.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't pay any attention to the budget because we have very good photography of the Soviet Union.

PM Chou: But Suslov's words are true by saying they depart from the position of strength.

Dr. Kissinger: They depart?

PM Chou: They proceed.

Dr. Kissinger: They are making very major efforts in every military category. Actually the Prime Minister -- one amusing anecdote on a personal basis. When we were in the Soviet Union we were discussing the problem of putting -- we were putting limitations on the holes in the silos. And I also pointed to Mr. Brezhnev that even with limitations on the holes of the silos it was possible to put larger missiles into the existing holes, and Mr. Brezhnev said it was totally untrue and started drawing diagrams. He said that there were three ways of doing it, all of which are entirely impossible. In fact there are four ways of doing it, and they are using the fourth, and they are putting larger missiles into the holes. [Chou laughs]

So in almost every significant military category there are major preparations going on. I am not saying for what, but that is a fact. But we learned many things during these negotiations also because in the process of preparing for them we had to study many things in particular detail, and they're being implemented now in our new preparations.
The third type of agreement we are making is on matters that are generally useful but of no major political significance, such as environment, scientific exchange, trade within certain limitations. I admit both sides are gambling on certain trends. The Soviet Union believes that it can demoralize Western Europe and paralyze us. We believe as far as Western Europe is concerned that as long as we are present there is a wide fluctuation possible in their actual attitudes without enabling the Soviet Union to bring military pressure. And we believe that through this policy we are gaining the freedom of maneuver we need to resist in those places which are the most likely points of attack or pressure. And our judgment of the Soviet leaders is that they are brutal, but not necessarily farsighted.

Now to apply this to the nuclear treaty -- our tendency therefore is not to have a direct confrontation, but to play for time. But not to give away anything of substance while we are playing for time.

Now this is our general assessment, and that is our general strategy and therefore it is in this context that we have to understand whether we are standing on your shoulders. It would be suicidal for us to participate in a policy whose ultimate objective is to isolate us. We will use certain tendencies or fears as they develop, but that will be for the objectives that I have described to the Prime Minister or the goals that I have described to the Prime Minister.

Now I have given you a more candid exposition of our views than we ever have to any foreign leader or for that matter to any of our own people.

PM Chou: The European Security Conference and Mutual Balance Force Reduction Conference moved toward this direction too.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we have a five-minute break? I want to talk to you about this because here we have a problem with the short-sightedness of our European allies. I want to discuss with you our strategy.

[The group broke briefly at 3:45 p.m., and the meeting resumed at 3:53 p.m.]
Dr. Kissinger: Now about the European Security Conference and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. First a few words about the history.

You have to remember that the European leaders have dealt with both of these conferences entirely from the point of view of their domestic politics. When the Soviet Union first proposed the European Security Conference many years ago, the Europeans said that they were more for it than the US so that they could blame us for its not coming into being vis-a-vis their own domestic opposition. So that the principle of it became established. Then when there were some pressures in the American Congress, Senator Mansfield, who incidentally wants to come back here -- we will be glad . . .

PM Chou: [Interrupting] And during the conclusion of the general elections you said he would like to come the day after the votes were cast.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be glad to send him if your promise to keep him. [Laughter] No, but it is up to you. It may be a good idea. But that is a different question.

But when Senator Mansfield proposed the reduction of American forces then the Europeans developed the thought of a force reduction conference in order to prevent us from withdrawing forces unilaterally. When we then accepted this proposition they became nervous. [Chou laughs] Then they started pushing the European Security Conference in order to kill the Mutual Balance Force Reduction Conference, and then we decided that we were getting into a never-never-land of demoralization, confusion and maneuvering and that we should tackle it head on and bring it to some concrete conclusion because it was more demoralizing to talk about it than to deal with it. It is perfectly clear what the Soviet Union wants with the European Security Conference. They want to create an impression that there is no longer any danger in Europe, and therefore they want to create an atmosphere in which the military relationships are replaced by some general European security order. Therefore, it is in our interest, one, that the Conference is as short as possible and as meaningless as possible so that nobody can claim a tremendous result was achieved. It is in the Soviet interest to give the impression that it is a great historic event. It is in our interest to have a meeting that affirms some generally desirable objectives like free travel and cultural exchange, but that cannot be used as a basis for historic transformation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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With Mutual Balanced Force Reductions the problem is exactly the opposite. If one analyses the problem of force reduction seriously one has to study the actual relationship of forces. Now any study of the actual relationship of forces seriously conducted must lead the Europeans to the realization of the extent of their danger. We are in the strange situation where if we discuss military defense with the Europeans directly they will always reject the reality of the danger and our conclusions, because they are afraid we will ask them for more money. But when we discuss force reductions they are so afraid that we will reduce our forces that they have an interest to study the danger. [Chou laughs]

When I was in Moscow last September I made a condition with Brezhnev that we would attend the European Security Conference only if they would attend the Conference on Force Reduction. And therefore whatever marginal benefit they can gain from European Security Conference we can substitute by the kind of investigation that will be produced by the Force Reduction Conference.

Now let me say a word about the actual state of these negotiations. Our biggest problem right now, to be very honest with you, is not the Soviet Union but the Europeans. What we want is a brief description of the agenda items, the European Security Conference to be as meaningless as possible, a short Conference and an exalted but meaningless conclusion. The Europeans... every European Foreign Minister is already rehearsing the speech he is going to give at that Conference. Every European Foreign Office has submitted an endless agenda for each session. And so that produces a certain confusion, but we can manage that.

Now with respect to the force reductions, we will work very seriously with our European allies and the real problem for that is the temptation is to have some general conclusion quickly. The reality is that we must have a very careful study of the actual balance of forces so that we do not make the situation worse as a result. If we do not make this study the Soviet Union someday is going to make a very plausible sounding proposal which for whatever reason everyone will want to accept. But if we have a study of the actual balance of forces we can resist on the grounds of this. This is how we handled the SALT negotiations. If we use these negotiations intelligently, we can use them to strengthen the defense of the West rather than to weaken it. In any event any foreseeable reductions will not exceed 10 to 15 percent and will not occur before 1975. They will be marginal to

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the global geopolitical balance. They will be on the Soviet side -- two divisions maybe [Chou laughs] and they have now . . .

**PM Chou:** [Interrupting] They even want to leave out the two words "mutual balanced."

**Dr. Kissinger:** They want to leave out the word "mutual."

**PM Chou:** No, they want to leave out the word "balanced."

**Dr. Kissinger:** Yes, "balanced," they want to leave out the word "balanced."

**PM Chou:** They want to leave these words out from the name of the Conference.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Yes, because they have larger numbers so that if you have equal reductions the relative importance of the gap becomes greater. They also want to leave out Czechoslovakia now. They have already said they want to leave out Hungary, but we also got information they also want to leave out Czechoslovakia. [Laughter]

**PM Chou:** And to start with, Belgium and Rumania will not come to the . . .

**Dr. Kissinger:** [Interrupting] But there are no Soviet troops in Rumania. So this is our general approach to those two conferences. And we will keep you informed. If we have some easier means of communication, if for example, you do get some sort of office in Washington, we can let you see our study. But we can also do it via New York and while we are here we have some material here which, if your technical experts are interested, we could discuss with you on mutual force reductions. Just to give you a feeling of how we approach it.

**PM Chou:** What is the possibility for the Western European countries to strengthen their own military capabilities?

**Dr. Kissinger:** This is not the heroic period of European leadership. We are working with the British right now to improve their nuclear capability. And there may be some possibility of the Germans improving their capability, their conventional not nuclear, and actually the German army is now certainly the largest in Europe, conventional army in Western Europe. In France, a great deal depends on the outcome of the election.
PM Chou: Has Mr. Schumann told you that Chairman Mao advised him to dig tunnels?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Perhaps he doesn't believe it altogether.

Dr. Kissinger: This is too epic for him. [Chou laughs]

PM Chou: Perhaps the Maginot line wouldn't work so they think it wasn't good for him to do so. Because they don't understand that during the time when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union the underground did play a part.

Dr. Kissinger: The French are making an effort in the nuclear field, and they have actually modernized their army fairly well. What the Europeans lack is political vision and conviction that what they do makes a difference. So they pursue very cautious policies.

PM Chou: They are nearsighted.

Dr. Kissinger: Very.

PM Chou: Let us come back to the East. Not long ago you mentioned that it would take a long time to settle the questions in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Don't you waste your energies in this region?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is important, however, that the transition between the present and what will work in Southeast Asia occur gradually.

PM Chou: And the same applies to Indochina -- that is a gradual...

Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about Indochina. When the Prime Minister talked about Southeast Asia what did he mean?

PM Chou: Including Indochina. Because when we refer to Southeast Asia we speak about it in the context of Dulles' policy, because your commitments came from his policies.

Dr. Kissinger: Our objectives in Southeast Asia are quite different from the Dulles' objective. Our policy in Southeast Asia is not directed against the PRC obviously.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Jean Monnet's Ideas on US-West European Relations

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) summarizing Jean Monnet's views expressed to Deputy Secretary Irwin and others on how we should proceed to revitalize our dialogue with the West Europeans on economic matters.

Monnet believes that:

-- the US and Western Europe can and should be knitted into a more coherent system in the economic field, dealing with each other as equals;

-- eventually a more meaningful political/security dialogue will develop;

-- to ascertain what their common economic problems are, the European Community and the US should each appoint three or four distinguished men to conduct a quick examination of issues requiring negotiation.

Monnet also believes that if you make a trip to Europe you should cap it by calling on the EC Council of Ministers (with the Commission present), and issuing a joint US-Community declaration of common goals and objectives. This meeting could be at the heads of state or government level. Finally, the Secretary reports, Monnet is convinced that Prime Minister Heath and Chancellor Brandt favor a revitalized dialogue with the United States and also believe that Western Europe should have a common position in discussing economic issues with you. He believes they can bring Pompidou around to this view, and if you make it clear you favor dealing with Western Europe as a unit on economic matters a scenario can be worked out.

Monnet's approach is thoughtful and forward-looking as we might expect coming from the architect of the European Community. Still his proposal

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is only one option among many for establishing a new relationship with the Community and for dealing with the issues, economic, political, and security, that we have with the Europeans. We are currently in the process of developing policy options for your consideration within the framework of the agencies' response to NSSM 164. Your decisions on these options together with the views which Prime Minister Heath will be giving you during his visit will provide a basis for our policies.

Meanwhile I believe all that needs to be done is to express thanks to the Secretary for transmitting Monnet's views to us, and I have done this by memorandum.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet of France
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Staff
Kathleen Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 26, 1973
4:40 - 4:55 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Dr. Kissinger: What did your fellow say? That they did not get a copy of my speech?

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: It is not true.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You saw the story in the newspaper.

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: It was not in any French newspaper.

Dr. Kissinger: Our paper said since the French Foreign Office hadn't received any official text they could not make any comment.

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: But we did receive it.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and I gave you a summary in substance of my speech.

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: It is the imagination of the Washington Post, which likes you very much.

Dr. Kissinger: They like some others better.

Tell me what is on your mind.

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: I have a message from Jobert. The President...
agrees to the date President Nixon proposes--the 31st of May and the 1st of June.

Dr. Kissinger: When should we announce it?

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet: First, both of us have to approach Iceland.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We can do that. And you are not going to get the best villa on the island. Remember the Azores?

Is it (Iceland) a lovely place?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Nice and warm.

Dr. Kissinger: Then why is it called Iceland? You never saw the President's place on the Azores.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think, if I may, that we should not assume that Iceland will agree to this. They have their own governmental problems.

Dr. Kissinger: When should we approach Iceland, Monday?

Amb. K-M: Yes, Paris will want to make it. As soon as we get an answer we have to agree on a communiqué published in Washington and Paris.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's aim for an announcement on Thursday.

Amb. K-M: It is very important that the announcement is made at the same time.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely, what is a good time for you?

Amb. K-M: Maybe Wednesday after the Council of Ministers meet.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It depends on Iceland.

Amb. K-M: Maybe Thursday is better.

Dr. Kissinger: What time?

Amb. K-M: It could be 10 a.m. in Paris and 4 p.m. here.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It is earlier in Paris.

Amb. K-M: Is 9 a.m. convenient here for you?
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Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but 10 a.m. is better.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There is the time change this weekend.

Dr. Kissinger: 4 p.m. for you will be better for us, alright 11 a.m. on Thursday. Wednesday Brandt will be here and we will have some sort of pronouncement afterwards. Let's plan on Thursday.

Amb. K-M: Meanwhile we can think of a short text.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I will talk to Stoessel and he will make the approach to Iceland.

Dr. Kissinger: Does State already know about this?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Not unless you told them.

Amb. K-M: The approach will be made from Paris also.

Dr. Kissinger: And from here.

Sonnenfeldt: This will be the 31st and the 1st. The arrival and departure times will be discussed later.

Dr. Kissinger: We may get there on the evening of the 30th, so the talks can start the morning of May 31.

Amb. K-M: Jobert has no answer; he is just beginning his job.

Dr. Kissinger: I have told you I will go to the Soviet Union from about the 5th to the 9th of May. Then I am coming back here and I am going to Paris on the 15th to meet with my darling from North Vietnam, and I will be glad to spend an afternoon at the Quai d'Orsay. I think that is the best.


Dr. Kissinger: I will be there depending on my friends from Hanoi, some time between the 15th and the 18th. I could see the Foreign Minister; we could plan the meeting between the two Presidents and how to proceed in these discussions.

I have read in the press about French concern that we will repeat the tactics of '62. We will not do anything in the Atlantic relationship without consulting the French. We will not ask you to join integrated commands, or anything like that. We would welcome your joining, but we are not asking you to. And we will leave your attitude towards Europe up to you.
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Amb. K-M: I don't think the comments have been bad.

Sonnenfeld: Le Figaro had a long thing.

Amb. K-M: I sent my comments on the "Year of Europe".

Dr. Kissinger: What did you say?

Amb. K-M: That it is very hard in Europe to be able to make such a speech with one voice in the present state of Europe. We have to discuss the problems. That doesn't mean we will exchange American troops in Europe; and we cannot but agree to the fact that technical questions must be overcome by a political solution, as a labor of the Presidents. Your speech is a coup d'envoi for the European year.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it reflects what I discussed with your President and with you at lunch the other day.

We will take no initiatives until the two Presidents have met.

I may stop in London on the way back from Moscow, but that doesn't mean anything.

Amb. K-M: There may be a problem on the role of Europe--it appears that you consider a world-wide role for the United States and a regional role for Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no objection if Europe wants to play a global role. But until now we haven't found any desire on their part to do so.

Amb. K-M: In regard to the problem of defense, we have to reconsider a flexible answer.

Dr. Kissinger: The partners in Europe don't want a flexible answer.

Amb. K-M: You know our position. We already share the burden.

Dr. Kissinger: This is not addressed to France.

Amb. K-M: Our problem is with NATO. We would like to share the burden and the responsibility of nuclear power.

Dr. Kissinger: I have talked to you about the problem. When the two Presidents meet they might talk about this.

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Amb. K-M: I think after all, your speech is already an agenda.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we can use it as a basic agenda. My meeting with the North Vietnamese is now scheduled for the 16th. Maybe I can come the 14th and meet with you on the 15th, and my emotional equilibrium will be better than after meeting with the North Vietnamese.


Dr. Kissinger: The 15th or the 16th. It will be a great reunion, Le Duc Tho and I.

Amb. K-M: One day I would like to speak about Cambodia. Madame has good information about the trip of Sihanouk. He thinks Sihanouk has the backing of the Khmer Rouge. And after all, we think maybe, Sihanouk is the man able to keep the Cambodians independent and neutral. Sullivan who does not like Sihanouk at all, says that the North Vietnamese do not like him either.

Dr. Kissinger: It is one more reason for him.

We have an open mind on Cambodia, as long as the fighting stops.

Amb. K-M: We are not convinced that the North Vietnamese give help to the Cambodians.

Dr. Kissinger: We have pretty good evidence that they do.


Dr. Kissinger: Maybe given the kind of army Lon Nol has, the others don't need a lot of help. But they are getting logistic support from the North Vietnamese.

Amb. K-M: The Khmer Rouge are complaining about the lack of support from the North Vietnamese. You can talk about this with the Chinese.

Dr. Kissinger: We will discuss it with the Chinese.

Amb. K-M: One last point, some time ago I mentioned the problem of control data computers.

Dr. Kissinger: We will get you an answer next week.
Amb K-M: We have already bought a computer from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. They stated that it was for pacific, peaceful use only, and that is the reason why we bought the computer. We are not authorized to use it for military research. We already have it or it has been ordered.

Dr. Kissinger: You want authority to use it. I know exactly what it is. In fact a while ago, I even knew the numbers. May I see you alone without my staff?
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Berendt von Staden of the Federal Republic of Germany
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff
Kathleen Anne Ryan, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Saturday, May 12, 1973
12:40 - 1:25 p.m.

PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office
The White House

Kissinger: German matters did not come up all that much [in the recent trip to Moscow]. They were mentioned in two contexts. With respect to your Foreign Minister's concern that we mention the inviolability issue in relation to the use of force. They totally deny there is such a relationship and Gromyko spoke in great lengths that your treaty has no implications. And this is a view they don't accept. I told him we support the German view. They say that inviolability was mentioned first; renunciation of force is second and they are not linked together.

With respect to the Germanies, they wanted us to say we would recognize the East German Government right after the Bundestag had acted. We said we would recognize East Germany after the process of ratification had been completed.


Kissinger: That is the next thing. Then there was a discussion on how that should take place. We said at a regular session of the UN; they said at a special session.

von Staden: Did they press the point?

Kissinger: Not passionately, but they want it.

von Staden: Did Soviet representation in Berlin come up?

Kissinger: No.

On the timing of MBFR, they proposed that it should take place one month
after the completion of the European Security Conference. We said that was all right, as long as it was no later than October 30. They said that is academic. I don't think this is true. Thus we will have to say that this point is disagreed.

von Staden: That means they want the third stage to end 30 days before, they still want a Summit.

Kissinger: Yes, we didn't commit ourselves. We took the position that you did.

von Staden: In the Soviet's view, the second stage will start immediately after the Foreign Ministers' meeting?

Kissinger: Yes. The European attitude on the Security Conference is beyond my comprehension. What the advantage to any State is of dragging the process out, I don't understand.

von Staden: We don't want to, but we are under the time pressure of the second phase.

Kissinger: It won't be from us.

von Staden: The Soviets are trying to put us under pressure.

Kissinger: They never rejected it.

von Staden: They are making the link. This is their attitude.

Kissinger: Their interest is that the change be settled before MBFR. That is their definition of linkage.

von Staden: The United States' interests are to have MBFR begin before October 30?

Kissinger: By the end of October.

von Staden: What is the particular meaning?

Kissinger: None, Just to have a date. It should be before Congress adjourns.

Now, this is really all that happened on the subjects in Moscow.

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von Staden: May I add some more questions?

The Berlin question didn't come up at all?

Kissinger: No.

von Staden: That is pretty much the center of our concern. Then there are two other points. The CSCE -- the continuing organizational institutions of the conference and the other third basket cultural exchanges, etc.

Kissinger: On culture they are very much for it. They want to avoid that which is a means of undermining their system.

In regard to continuing organizations, they want something that has no vote, that does act by a majority vote. That is a continuing clearing house for contact. They use Bahr's view that it is a continuing way of being related there.

von Staden: There is in my country and in Europe a school of thought which assures that the Soviets are interested in an American presence. I have never been sure to what extent this is true, but some people feel that way.

Your attitude is unchanged?

Kissinger: Our attitude is... I didn't make any comment to him, I just listened to him. I just listened to what he had to say. So I made no comment to him at all. Our attitude is that we are willing to consider some sort of a purely administrative security type of thing, but we have not reached that point in any NATO discussion, much less than with them.

von Staden: It is something we like very much and are always pressing. [Do] you have any suggestions as to what we might raise with the Soviets in Berlin?

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Do you Hal? I don't have any. I would try to avoid giving them the impression that you are very nationalistic and semi-neutralistic, which I know you won't.

von Staden: How was the general mood?

Kissinger: Effusively hospitable. Brezhnev took me boar hunting and on his boat. I don't think any Westerner has ever been there.
Sonnenfeldt: Ayub Khan.

Kissinger: Khan is not a Westerner.

von Staden: He once received

Kissinger: Tito, Khad and Kekkonen are the only ones.

He was a little nervous about what public reception he would get in the Federal Republic. He didn't ask my opinion. He said he didn't care what reception he received; he was tough enough.

von Staden: Did you get the impression that we have, that he is clearly in command.

Kissinger: Yes.

von Staden: And did Gromyko participate?

Kissinger: Totally, and with greater self-assurance than before.

von Staden: And the others, Kornienko or Podgorny?

Kissinger: Gromyko, Dobrynin and Kornienko were there.

von Staden: A last question, are there any prospects to make progress in SALT?

Kissinger: I don't think there will be any concrete agreements, but I think some general guidelines are possible.

von Staden: I think that is very useful to us. As far as I can see we may have a quite successful visit with him. If we can solve the Berlin question and other different agreements, then we can sign four or five agreements. That is what it looks like. Do you have any agreements you might sign with him?

Kissinger: Yes, of the same type.

Here [Dr. Kissinger shows the Ambassador the Spiegel article] is one of those things that has infuriated us. I talked to the President and I can assure you that he is not amused either. Most is total nonsense; it didn't even happen. It is a total lie.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
von Staden: As a lawyer, that is proof of innoence.

Kissinger: Yes, but they wouldn't write anything unless somebody gave them some background. The subjects that were discussed appeared in too many newspapers to be a total accident. It will make confidential talks with us nearly impossible.

von Staden: I have had my own experience, all in all they have quoted me about six times, and all these six times are completely wrong. Unfortunately these people are rather cynical and don't care if they cause damage or not. So when I say this I was startled myself.

That is the kind of thing that almost always happens and I am talking quite frankly. I cannot imagine that these alleged quotations are correct. If you really sort out the quotations it is much less than what you have underlined. And the assessment of your attitude which is given here, I think is correct. It says that there is no change in American policy. I think this is a statement where the form does not reflect American thinking in all details, that compromise does change the policy.

Kissinger: You know that these conversations took place the day after the President's speech on Watergate.

The Atlantic Charter was not even mentioned. Brandt mentioned it to me when the President was out of the room. Brandt said not to insist on the world charter.

The talks were on general agreement more than on form. And we understood the Chancellor preferred NATO. Thus we didn't believe he was fighting for European identity. We are not against European identity. It was more fundamental; there was a meeting that had no big controversy. I figured it was a nothing Communiqué. If I had known, you would have had known you would use it as an exegesis between the United State and the Federal Republic...

[A few words are spoken in German]

If it is important it will not be michelos [German for to weasel something out of us "effortlessly" -- is impossible]. Our original intention was not to agree to a Communiqué. Then Bahr and Scheel said you attach great importance to it. Sonnenfeldt said it was unobjectionable, so I said to
hell with it. I criticized our people for not having sat on you more. It never occurred to me that it would be used to show how you thwarted American policy. This is the sort of victory that is not worth having. You will be treated like Gromyko.

Von Staden: As a representative of a super power I hate to take your time.

Kissinger: It has nothing to do with being a super power.

Von Staden: As this piece was in der Spiegel that caused this reaction, I have to go into the details of what has happened.

Kissinger: It is also how the press timed it. How did Brandt secure a victory?

Von Staden: These press people are sometimes rather cynical. At the time of the Chancellor's visit they had practically no knowledge of what was going on in Washington. They were suddenly confronted with a situation and the coincidence in timing was perhaps not the most fortunate. I think these noises which the press has made are for reasons I will never understand. These things develop highly within this group of correspondents. It is very significant that in the German press all the reports that came from the Washington correspondents are quite different.

Kissinger: I could conclude from this that these are people who did not get background from your senior office.

Von Staden: Yes. The Washington correspondents knew how to handle this thing. The others were unprepared and reacted in a way which does not suit us either.

Kissinger: The difficulty is that the next meeting we have with you, you will find us much more difficult on the Communiqué. We didn't think we had an adversary relationship, where one party afterwards would create a victory.

Von Staden: We agree.

Kissinger: Not just in Spiegel, but in other German newspapers there was the story that Brandt thwarted an American attempt. What do we want?
To create European solidarity and progress in trade negotiations. If we wanted to blackmail you, we would turn you over the Commercial agency. They won't make any concessions. This linkage is an asset to Europe.

von Staden: I hope you don't think we said blackmail?

Kissinger: No, the word was not used. But I have heard it too often to make me believe there was not some inspiration.

We can exist without the Atlantic Declaration. We have three and one-half more years in this administration. We want to have successes in foreign policy that are not always dealing with our adversaries.

von Staden: I was present when the Chancellor briefed Scheel and Bahr, and I was present when Bahr gave a brief on talks with you and the other press conference when the Chancellor was here. The only one which I was not present at was the briefing for 15 - 20 American colleagues. Not in a single one of these briefings was there a single word spoken in this tune. So I must tell you that in my view this was made up by the people themselves in the course of the systematic briefing, unless you have information yourself.

Kissinger: No. The only thing that I hope is that Bonn doesn't believe it has achieved the so-called success. If we are in official disagreement, we better find out.

von Staden: I have two points. The first point is the importance of substance. Secondly, we say as you do, that all these problems are in one political context, but I did not feel that I could make what Scheel called chapeau. But we should have a dialogue between the United States and Europe to check the progress. There is a difference between chapeau and the accompanying dialogue.

Kissinger: We are not in disagreement.

von Staden: Exactly. In regard to our responsibilities, Scheel and the Chancellor say that it is true that we are not yet in a position in Europe to act with the same global responsibilities as a great power could. But we do have global interests.

Kissinger: That is a point Brandt did not make to the President. We have never wanted to confine Europe in Europe. Whenever Britain has asked our opinion about the withdrawal of forces, we have always urged her to stay.
Our interest is that there is no glory to be exclusively responsible outside of Europe.

**von Staden:** You yourself have made a discussion between military and economic power only and it seems quite obvious that Europe does not have power in a global capacity.

**Kissinger:** Yes, but we don't quarrel with that either.

**von Staden:** In the economic field we have done quite a lot.

**Kissinger:** We make no effort to limit it.

**von Staden:** This was a reaction to what you said in regard to the interests of the community. You have in the economic field a global action.

**Kissinger:** That would be welcome.

Europe has two options; they can engage us in an endless guerrilla war about particulars on my speech, and given skill in the Foreign Office that will be easy and successful. That is one approach. In that case we will pursue our own interests. The second is at the fundamentals, to see if we can start a new positive relationship that takes into account the new international situation and that gives both sides of the Atlantic a stake in the relationship. That is our basic intention.

We don't agree on everything. If we approach it with the attitude there is a meeting of minds... Take the MBFR debates if there is anything more stupid...it shows a total lack of analysis. We are going to consume each other in a model level several ways. Gradually the substance will be consumed. In America after 1977 there will be a new group. We cannot carry Atlantic relations with the demagoguery of the 1950's. If every Western country thinks it has to be , soon we will be dominated. That is our approach.

**von Staden:** I think to that extent we would agree. The problem is to transform this approach to the operational level.

**Kissinger:** That is right.

**von Staden:** In trade more reform and in defense. As far as Hungary is concerned, I find it very interesting what you say. I don't consider this a great success for the West.
Kissinger: The European attitude is ridiculous. If we have a common ceiling, we need a reduction of 6 to 1 in our favor. The maximum study is 15 percent, about 8,000 troops in Hungary. Do these 8,000 troops upset the total?

von Staden: I have never seen that argument in all my reading.

Kissinger: If you have a common ceiling without Hungary you have a one and one-half to one ratio. If you introduce Hungary you have 60,000 to 90,000 more troops. This transforms the ratio to five and one-half to one. That they will never accept. You will get fewer troops out of Europe and you prevent the most sensible approach.

Sonnenfeldt: You keep Hungary in the area, and if you keep Hungary out you can have a non-circumvention clause.

Kissinger: Our assessment is based on military not political considerations.

von Staden: I was never quite convinced that the Hungary case was of wide importance. My considerations were not on these data.

Kissinger: The idea of a private deal to exclude Hungary is ridiculous. Our analysis was what we really needed was a non-circumvention clause and to have Hungary and Italy out. We were better off without Hungary than with it.

von Staden: Ambassador Roth and his staff are both fine.

Kissinger: Roth is a first-class man. I am using it as an example. This sort of debate should be about how to improve. We are trying to reduce by our approach.

I wish you the best success for the Brezhnev visit. You will let us know?
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
              PFIAB
              Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE & TIME: Friday, August 3, 1973
             12:30 p.m. (Luncheon)

PLACE: The Sequoia

Kissinger: Jack Anderson writes implying that not everything the Board does goes to the President. Every report of the Board does go to the President. Don't judge your influence by the frequency of meeting with us.

* * * * *

I think what is going on is an unmitigated disaster in foreign policy. In April our foreign policy was in excellent shape. The Chinese-Soviet triangle was operating for us. Everyone wanted to be associated with us. Now people are holding off. It is nothing bad yet, but sometimes someone will make a run at us. We have established a reputation for hard and unpredictable action.

There are two choices -- use force or don't. If we use it, use enough to succeed. In the India crisis, we move things -- carriers -- around so people would say "If they do this over Bangladesh, what would they do over the Middle East?"

In 1970 we were to the brink of war over Jordan without a complaint from Congress.

It's in this way that Watergate is a disaster. Everything is a little harder now and takes a little longer now -- Europe, China, etc. All but the USSR. It is a national obligation to get Watergate behind us so we can be seen as an operating government. Nothing yet has really gone wrong -- I am talking about the potential.
We must get over Watergate. I speak without prejudice to the facts of it.

Internationally, the big fact is the Sino-Soviet involvement. We have so far pushed the Chinese as a sentimental thing, but let's not kid ourselves: China wants us as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. It is a pleasure to do business with them. They are tough, they're our best NATO ally! But if they think we are going through our cultural resolution, they won't even run the ideological risk of being tied up with us. They are not sentimental.

A successful Soviet attack on China would overturn the world balance of power. If it is a disarming attack to which we don't respond, if they couple it with seizing Manchuria, the effect on Europe and Japan would be disastrous. We will try to avert this.

It is alleged we have antagonized Japan by neglect, etc. It would be easy if that were so, because we could correct it. They are hard to deal with. They leak everything. You must assume that a country which (through intelligence) fears the most diabolical things of others, must be capable of diabolical things themselves. The Japanese are a potentially corrosive role internationally. Take energy. They are international scavengers. It is a narrow, cold-blooded, etc. But they are tuned to survival, so as long as the international structure is favorable, they are okay. Only if things go wrong will they desert.

Europe: They accuse us of condominium, of hegemony, of weakening the deterrent, of asking for their buildup.

The danger is that relations with adversaries become easy and those with friends scrimmous.

Also the emergence of the EC is creating some problems. There is a danger they'll push themselves into confrontation with the US.

The Middle East: Israel is so much stronger that the dilemma is on the Arabs. Right now Israel is asking for their immediate surrender, and the Arabs are asking for a miracle. We want to help, but we will not put out a plan for both to shoot at. We are trying to get both sides, or one side, to put out something which will get negotiations going.

A: What is the Soviet attitude toward China?

Land: If we are out, would Japan jump to the Soviet Union or to China?
Kissinger: A year ago I would have said China, now perhaps the Soviet Union. It depends on the timing.

Teller: What will happen after August 15?

Kissinger: We had a negotiation going. The Chinese and Sihanouk must be as upset with the bombing halt as we are. (Gave pitch on the situation.)

I came out in January thinking we had won the war. In June, it was very different. We only had to keep Cambodia confused, so nothing could crystallize.

If China does nothing after a Soviet surgical strike, China is irrelevant; if they attack Russia, they will lose several armies.

I have given you the problems we face. On the other hand, we can make it tough on the Soviet Union and make them hesitate on China. We are pushing them in the Middle East; in Europe there may be confrontation but it will come out all right.

A______: Why has Europe not supported us in the Middle East?

Kissinger: The maximum we can get out of Israel will be less than the radical Arabs want, so we should make Syria sign it. Don't bring Saudi Arabia in.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

September 26, 1973
1:15 p.m.
Secretary’s Apartment
Waldorf Towers
New York City

SUBJECT: Secretary's Lunch with French Foreign Minister Jobert

PARTICIPANTS: French Side
Foreign Minister Jobert
M. Puaux

U.S. Side
The Secretary
Mr. Stoessel
Mr. Sonnenfeldt

DISTRIBUTION:
(When the Foreign Minister arrived, the Secretary was on the telephone with Senator Kennedy discussing the vote that morning in the Senate approving the Mansfield Amendment for troop cuts. After the phone call, there was a brief conversation about the parliamentary situation in the Senate.)

The Secretary

We really have a great system. People in the Congress want to completely reform the Soviet system; at the same time, they want to cut our forces.

M. Jobert

When I talked with Gromyko, I told him I had seen people in the Soviet Union in blue jeans. I said the Soviets had lost the battle of the blue jeans and the Western Hemisphere was gradually creeping into the Eastern Hemisphere. He did not seem to know about blue jeans.

(The group then moved into the dining room.)

M. Jobert

You are always complaining that we come with empty hands, so this time, we brought a lot.

I will speak in English, although it is difficult for me.

The Secretary

You do not need to know much English to say "no".

M. Jobert

Oh, I never say no.
The Secretary

It is true. I think you have conducted a very clever campaign this past six months.

M. Jobert

It was no campaign. I am like a leaf in the wind. I am passive. First, I am blown to the West, then to the East.

The Secretary

Many people want me to see you because they feel you are the only person who can get the better of me.

M. Jobert

But we are good friends personally.

The Secretary

This is quite true. And also we are friends officially. We do not have a problem solving serious questions. Only the procedural questions are difficult.

M. Jobert

I saw James Reston this morning. He called Brandt a personalite endouyante. I don't know what that means in English.

The Secretary

Perhaps someone with a kaleidoscopic nature, a personality who changes a lot.

Someone once said about an American politician, "There is much less there than meets the eye."

M. Jobert

Reston likes you.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
The Secretary

And I like him. He is a decent man.

M. Jobert

We agreed that you would have to change your position on some things.

The Secretary

What things?

M. Jobert

For example, think of poor Andersen (the Danish Foreign Minister); he is very unhappy following his talk with you.

The Secretary

I really did not start out to try to make him happy. Of course, I was just defending your position.

M. Jobert

In any case, he is very unhappy.

The Secretary

Well, why should we hide our real views?

M. Jobert

Are you really annoyed with the European Community draft?

The Secretary

May I be direct with you?

It would not be right to say that I am "annoyed". There are two problems: First, of procedure, and, second, of substance. On the first, we have two objections. We thought we had an understanding with your President and that there should be bilateral...
talks. Out of deference to the French point of view, we did not insist on a multilateral meeting in July. While you might have refused to come along on this, it would have been difficult for you to do so, since the others would have come.

M. Jobert

They agree to everything you want.

The Secretary

Anyway, we did not press for a multilateral meeting out of respect for you. We also talked bilaterally with the Germans, the British, and somewhat with the Italians. We had an understanding with you that after this process, there might be a multilateral meeting. All of you promised to produce drafts, and you said that yours would be the best of all.

M. Jobert

You said that it would be, since it would represent the views of France.

The Secretary

Then we were told in July that we would receive a response through the Nine. You said you did not want this and you urged us not to press for a response from the Nine.

M. Jobert

It would be better not to speak of the Nine, but rather to say Eight against One. If you talk of the Nine, it is really Nine-with the U.S.-against France.
The Secretary

We felt some advantage had been taken of us, but this is all meaningless. What does it achieve? Then the Nine talked and we had no idea what they would come up with.

M. Jobert

But you saw the English text.

The Secretary

Definitely not. We received nothing.

Mr. Stoessel

That is true. We definitely did not receive a text.

The Secretary

Then we were confronted with the European Community text which, moreover, was published in full in the papers.

M. Jobert

Well, this was done by a delicious person called Flora Lewis.

The Secretary

Yes, she never has anything good to say about me.

M. Jobert

Nor about me.

The Secretary

Publicizing the document is unimportant. However, people now have a benchmark against which to compare subsequent texts. Then, the Dane comes to see me. He can't negotiate; he is really

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
only a messenger. Those who can talk can't negotiate, and those
who negotiate can't talk.

This will create an adversary relationship in the long run which could be very bad. We do not want to be present when you make your decisions in the Community, but we want to be present in the formative period.

Now about substance. The EC document is a collection of phrases from the EC Summit and from the Tokyo Declaration. There is no mention in it of Atlantic relationships. It asks us to recognize Europe. Of course, this is not difficult for us. I recall the endless quarrels with De Gaulle; we were more for Europe than he was.

M. Jobert

The Atlantic things should be in the other paper.

The Secretary

It is not that we object to points in the EC paper, but it is not complete as it stands.

M. Jobert

Today, the NAC postponed the consideration of the agenda point about working out a new Atlantic Declaration.

It is important that you have agreed to a meeting to consider the European Community draft.

They tried to say that we were against a common European position, but this is not true. We are together in the
mine, although there are some differences when we are with the Fifteen.

After the meeting with you and the Nine this week, then there could be another meeting later in Copenhagen. This shows that you can have a dialogue with us.

(There was a discussion about finger bowls and Jobert mentioned that there are no finger bowls used in China.)

The Secretary

Did you enjoy your trip to China?

M. Jobert

Yes. I must say they are very kind toward the Americans. Your Ambassador received a report about our trip.

In general, the Chinese have no idea of being antagonistic toward you. They want you to stay in Asia, perhaps not especially in a military sense, but actually in all respects. Their main problem seems to be Japan.

The Secretary

Yes, I don't think that relationship has worked out as well as they thought it would. They thought normalizing relations with Japan would relax things, but it hasn't, and they are very nervous.

M. Jobert

Chou En-lai told Pompidou that he would prefer the Japanese re-arm themselves so they could use up some of their energy and money on that.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
The Secretary

That's surprising.

M. Jobert

And disquieting. Also, the Chinese are concerned about your agreements with the Soviets. But when they speak of two hegemonies, it is clear there is a good one and a bad one.

The Secretary

Did you discuss our conversation in San Clemente?

M. Jobert

Not at all.

The Chinese appear to be a conservative power, although I may be wrong.

The Secretary

I agree. The question is, what will they do when they are more powerful and when younger men have come to the fore? What sort of shape did Chou En-lai seem to be in? Did he show his age?

M. Jobert

Mao referred to a remark attributed to De Gaulle in Adenauer's memoirs about "pride". This led to a discussion which went on for days. Chou said that China should not have pride. If it did have, this would be dangerous for the next generation, they might lose their heads. He wants them to be modest. He feels that in 50 years, China will be so powerful that it would be dangerous if it is not modest.
Chou seemed to be in good shape physically. His hands quivered a bit, but mentally he is perfect. He knows that he will have to quit in about five years. Then, he will be too old. So he is eager to put China on a good, modest, conservative, and prudent basis. He has an historic perspective and he will not try to settle the Formosa question too soon. He will be neutral in South-east Asia. He will encourage your friend Sihanouk, but not too much.

There was not one single word about South Viet-Nam, as if there were no problem there.

I could get nothing from the Chinese Foreign Minister. Whenever I asked him anything, he just laughed.

The Secretary

Yes, Chao Kuan-hua is the only good one in the Foreign Ministry.

M. Jobert

And he disappeared after we had been there for two days.

The Secretary

On European matters, how do you visualize the process continuing?

M. Jobert

If I may make one remark to you, I would say that you do not speak enough of Europe. You put Europe at the end of your speech and did not talk much about it. Also, you spoke of restrictive
trading blocs. This seems to be a reference to Ortoli's area.
If I could make a counsel, I would say that you should not attack Europeans as a whole. We will do much better in the future.

Secondly, about Japan. I am told that you gave a paper to the Japanese about relations between Europe, the United States and Japan. This had quite an effect on the other Europeans. They were horrified that you could seem to speak for the Europeans on this matter.

The Secretary

The Japanese have produced a paper themselves and they said they would discuss this with you in Europe. We didn't give them anything.

M. Jobert

I must make a speech tomorrow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I wondered if I shouldn't speak in French since it would be much easier.

The Secretary

I think it would be better for you to speak in English. With all respect, your French is so complex that the interpreter would never get the full flavor. Also, given the anti-French attitude of the Council, you should try to make some human contact and this would be easier in English.

M. Jobert

I will return to Paris to be there next week and then will come back to New York October 9 and 10.
I will be seeing Brandt today and will need an interpreter with him.

The Secretary

I thought he made a strange speech at the UN General Assembly today. It was really a hodgepodge of various things, but perhaps it was good for domestic consumption. On the other hand, maybe it reflects what he really thinks.

M. Jobert

Now, what will we do? We don't want to quarrel with you and we do want to have a real dialogue. Since your speech, we have had a great deal of discussion about what to do. You are really an agitator.

The Secretary

It is hard to have a dialogue when the Europeans don't produce anything until this week.

M. Jobert

But the Europeans have done something and please don't destroy it.

About the President's visit, what do you think? Are there domestic problems which would indicate that he could not come, or do you really want him to come?

The Secretary

I talked about this with the President last night. I can say that there are no domestic interests which would indicate that he should go or should not go.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
M. Jopert

This is my view as well.

The Secretary

Many Europeans seem to think that he wants to come to Europe to have a big dramatic scene and that this would help us domestically. Actually, if we are to be responsible about what we wish to achieve, what we do in Europe won't help us, but will only hurt us domestically.

Whether or not the President goes depends on two things. First, is that of substance. He does not want to go just to tour capitals. There would be no point in that. Secondly, under no circumstances will he sign a document with persons who are not at his level. He will not meet multilaterally with people below his level. If this is contemplated, then there can be no Declaration.

M. Jopert

You know our position and that in this we are not on the same ground. I haven't spoken with my President. However, you know I am a mischievous spirit. Why don't you wait until the end of 1974?

The Secretary

By then, it would seem to be senseless. But maybe yes, and maybe no. It should be remembered that by that time, the Presidential campaign will be beginning and we couldn't achieve what we want to do. Sometimes I really believe the Europeans are playing Russian roulette.
No. We are not devoted to bloody games.

The Secretary

You may not intend to do so, but this wouldn't be the first time in your history that you have made a mistake.

M. Jobert

That is true.

The Secretary

Thinking ahead, just look at the cast of characters on the U.S. scene. There is no one around who would be as sympathetic on European matters as the present Administration. No one would favor your nuclear deterrent--either the form or the symbolism of it. Also, some would favor a condominium.

Perhaps, we could wait until the spring of 1974.

M. Jobert

Do you understand why I say late 1974?

The Secretary

Because France will then be in the chair of the European Community?

M. Jobert

Yes. This could solve Pompidou's problem. We are a small country, but we do have our own public opinion problem. Without this, matters would be easy to solve. However, I can see that the timing I suggest would be late.
After all that has happened, it is difficult to wait until summer. This could be after a CSCE Summit and after a U.S.-Soviet Summit. It would also be after a full session of Congress. I do not know if we could hold the situation.

M. Jobert

It is important to fix a date in advance.

The Secretary

This idea can be considered.

M. Jobert

There are two declarations on the table. Perhaps there will be a third one.

The Secretary

The utility of the third is that it could include the Japanese.

M. Jobert

On that point, perhaps we could think of a two-stage rocket. We, the Europeans, could do something with Japan, and then you could come after that. If you try to do all three now, it might be difficult.

The Secretary

This is not impossible.

M. Jobert

And, please, don't put Australia in the third declaration. Let's leave them in their Pacific.
We will have to consider the question of a date for the President's visit. Also, there is the question of the forum and the way in which the President would participate.

M. Jobert

I am convinced, at least at present, that Pompidou would never wish to go to Brussels. As for Brussels II—the NATO meeting—then it might be possible for Messmer to go. I don't know if this would be satisfactory to you.

The Secretary

We would have to consider it. However, it would be an odd result. After all, our President has proved that he is the closest emotionally to the French point of view. It would be hard to explain why Pompidou would not meet with him to sign a Declaration, particularly a Declaration where we don't get anything very much, but the Europeans do.

What we will get is something which may help to mobilize public opinion in favor of the Atlantic Alliance and which could be useful over the next ten years. Of course, I understand your public opinion problem.

With regard to the European Community, we could accept that the President of the EC Council could meet with our President, provided that the Declaration to be signed was worth it and that both declarations were satisfactory.
This is a constructive idea. If your President is in the chair of the EC next July, then it is not excluded that we could agree to a visit then if, in the interim, we could do some concrete things. We might say that a meeting would take place on July 15 and that we are doing things in the meantime.

M. Jobert

Then we should stop talking about whether the President is coming, or he is not coming, etc.

The Secretary

And we should stop things coming out of Paris.

M. Jobert

What sort of things?

The Secretary

Well, I am thinking of the Newsweek article which was so critical about the "Year of Europe" and the President's visit. We think this came largely from your press spokesman, M. De Laye.

I think you have really out-maneuvered me.

M. Jobert

I am not so sure of that. On newspaper articles, we can complain, too--(Jobert showed the Secretary an AFP ticker which apparently said something about the Secretary agreeing to see Scheel in Bonn, but not Jobert.)

The Secretary

This is total nonsense. It probably comes from the Germans.
M. Jobert

I saw Scheel this morning and I asked him if is trying to knife me.

The Secretary

I do plan to go to London in October, and after that, I might meet Scheel there, but not in Bonn. If I have to go to Bonn, I certainly would go to Paris.

M. Jobert

Paris always will be ready to welcome you.

The Secretary

There is no possibility of my going to London and to Bonn and not to Paris. My original intention had been to go to London to make a speech and also to have a Chiefs of Mission meeting.

M. Jobert

That would be good for your Ambassadors.

The Secretary

Our Ambassadors are not so good.

M. Jobert

I don't know about that, but your Ambassador in Luxembourg—that woman—isn't so good.

The Secretary

In Paris, we have a good Ambassador. In Italy, ours won't change the course of history, nor will yours,

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M. Jobert

Only Togliatti can do that. And this with the help of his good friend, Brezhnev, who wants to make an official visit there. He will have to eat a lot of spaghetti.

The Secretary

Brezhnev is not so adept. The Chinese are.

On European matters, our effort must seem to be constructive to the public, not an adversary proceeding. At the end, it should not be that someone has won and someone has lost. Also, we should take care to try to influence the press in a helpful way. In this respect, Europe has been worse than the United States.

M. Jobert

Do you really think so?

The Secretary

Yes. We haven't begun to work on our press. It could easily turn against the whole thing. Europe is not very popular in the United States. Don't be confused by Reston—he represents nobody.

I think there has been a tendency in your Foreign Office to be critical. Your briefings in Reykjavik were brutal.

M. Jobert

Those were given by the Office of the Presidency, not by the Foreign Office. I was not Foreign Minister then. No, I guess I was Foreign Minister. I am like you. I don't know where I am.
The Secretary

You always do.

We should make a serious effort to avoid mutual criticism.

We can't make a decision now about the President's trip, but we will before I go to Europe. If the trip is delayed, we must think of concrete things which we could do in the meantime. I do not exclude a meeting in July, if the date could be firm and if the documents are adequate. But we can't agree to a date in July and then have this used against us. You could squeeze us.

M. Jobert.

No!

The Secretary

If we could agree on this and that there will be good results, then we could consider it.

M. Jobert

But it shouldn't be mentioned too soon.

The Secretary

No, I won't even say that the President won't be going to Europe soon. Of course, we don't want to leave ourselves to your mercy.

M. Jobert

The document will be on the table and you will know what you are dealing with.

The Secretary

Internally, we had thought of the timing for a trip as being in November or in February. February might be more likely than July.
On the question of the Fifteen, I said that we would be willing to write something and I can give you today something unofficial and then you could let me know unofficially what you think about it. Whether this is here or in Paris, will depend on you.

The Secretary

I don't want to mislead you. We may wish to press ahead with both declarations. And we may not be prepared to filibuster with you indefinitely.

If we agree with you on a date in July, then everyone will be furious at us.

M. Jobert

No, I don't think so.

The Secretary

Then you could tell us in May or June, just before the visit, that you have changed your position, and then we would be forced to yield to you.

M. Jobert

I will give you a paper now, you don't have to wait until May. There is a machinery in Brussels and a staff which is waiting for things. We have to make it go slowly.

The Secretary

But we may want it to go reasonably, at least.

M. Jobert

If so, there will be discussion for three months and no
prospect for a visit. If you press for something, then everyone will say that Dr. Kissinger is angry and they will do what you want.

The Secretary

Why not suggest a compromise, such as February?

M. Jobert

There would be no objection to preparing a paper. That is why I worked for you to prepare a paper.

The Secretary

Where are we left concretely?

M. Jobert

If you would be willing to work on our text unofficially, then we could have an exchange before putting it on the table in NATO as a French draft.

The Secretary

Stoessel and Sonnenfeldt can analyze it and will give you comments before you leave on Friday.

How do you compare your draft with the Canadian draft, is it stronger or weaker?

M. Jobert

We think it is more generous. I hope it is well translated. I can tell you that it was done by a hand which is friendly to you. (Francois De Rose)

The Secretary

We will let you know our view by Friday. We want to

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keep in the closest contact with you. However, this is difficult. We are told that you have proposed two main lines about us.

First, you said that we are like the pyromaniac who helps his victims put out the fire.

M. Jobert

That is really terrible. The Italians actually said that in Copenhagen. This shows that there are leaks from our meetings.

The Secretary

Secondly, you supposedly tell the Europeans not to be so conciliatory toward us because you are getting everything for them.

M. Jobert

No, that is not true. We said that we had good relations with you, although, of course, all of us have different problems.

(Jobert then told a story about a talk between Mirabeau and Cocteau and the telephone.)

The Secretary

What concrete decisions must we reach?

M. Jobert

I will give you our text and you will give us your reactions. We will then put it on the table as a French text. I do not know if it will be acceptable to you. Before I left, I talked with Pompidou and he asked if the draft would be acceptable to Nixon. I said I did not know.

About the other text, the EC text, that will be considered...
Saturday morning. Fuaux will be there. Then we will see if another meeting is necessary.

The Secretary

I don't want to mislead you. Perhaps we will also present our text.

M. Jobert

It would be better to present additions to our text. We don't want to give the impression of too much difference.

The Secretary

I agree. We will proceed that way. We won't raise the issue of whose text it is.

M. Jobert

And you will tell us your ideas about the President's visit?

The Secretary

The President will want to have bilateral talks in Paris, and this could take place whenever you want, at the beginning or at the end of his visit.

M. Jobert

And he will get a good reception from the French people. When I saw Frank of the German Foreign Office, he said that a visit by Nixon to Germany could give rise to immoderate events. Also, this could happen in the UK as well. But it won't be a problem in France.

It also facilitates the whole thing to think that the Soviets
will not say anything about the declaration or the visit. I am convinced this is the case.

The Secretary

I am positive about this too. For this reason, it would be good to have the declarations before the conclusion of the CSCE.

M. Jobert

The Soviets won't move before a SALT II Agreement. There won't be anything before then.

The Secretary

Our judgment is that there will be no Soviet agitation during the next six months on any of this.

M. Jobert

They have good contacts with you and they want better ones.

The Secretary

Our impression is that they are more interested in CSCE than in SALT. SALT II will be very difficult. It is not easy now to see how it could be concluded.

(There was discussion of the possibility of the Secretary and Jobert meeting as the Secretary comes to Europe.)

The Secretary

It would simplify my life and schedule if it were possible for us to meet in London; otherwise, I could come to Paris.

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Let's aim to meet in one place or another, perhaps on the 16th. I will be seeing Douglas-Home on the 14th, and he will also be seeing Scheel.

M. Jobert
There is a Council meeting in Brussels on the 15th and 16th.

The Secretary
We could perhaps meet before Brussels or after, if you wish.

M. Jobert
My only problem is that it not seem that I am responding to a directive from you.

The Secretary
In that case, I could try to come to Paris.

M. Jobert
No, I think I can make it to London somehow.

The Secretary
We could meet either on the 14th or the 16th, probably in London. But I will come to Paris if necessary.

M. Jobert
If we can do this without publicity, it would be good.

The Secretary
Let's be clear. I can't promise that if you see me.

M. Jobert
I don't know what Pompidou's reaction will be. My own reaction is that I will come to see you.
We will see each other then and we can make a decision on the approximate date for the President's trip.

I will be having a press conference this afternoon.

_M. Jobert_

You could say that it is the "Year of the World".

_The Secretary_

For Jobert, every year is the "Year of Europe".

There are a number of processes going on. European unity is developing and we support that. Also, there is the question of Transatlantic relations. I could say that we have to spend time on sorting these out.

_M. Jobert_

The impression is that you are angry at Europe and that you don't like the Community draft and want bilateral talks.

_The Secretary_

What we can't accept is a _fait accompli_. I will be constructive in my remarks to the press.

_M. Jobert_

If you could give us your impressions of our draft for NATO, this would be helpful. We would be pleased to have a French text on which all could agree. If you say you agree, this will do it.

_The Secretary_

Even so, we may want to present our own draft and then gradually work toward yours. We will see.