EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Relations
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1. Introduction and scope of the paper

Both sides of the Atlantic have spent the better part of the past decade reassessing, reinventing, reconsidering, and revisiting the Transatlantic alliance, its relevance, its crisis, and its agenda. So, why continue examining Transatlantic relations? First, because regardless of the Iraq crisis that shook the foundations and questioned the fundamentals of this alliance, the scope and intensity of the Transatlantic partnership is probably as wide and relevant as it has ever been. European and American interests as liberal democracies and market economies remain more closely knit than between any other set of countries. Second, the inter-connected and inter-dependent nature of current affairs requires multilateral, coordinated actions and responses. There is much debate in Europe on how to manage the effects and challenges of globalization and although a large part of the answer lies in significant restructuring within the Member States and at the EU level of governance, a strong, flexible and forward looking alliance is just as necessary. Third, because it is not sufficient to simply attempt to repair the Alliance or take comfort in the gradual improvement of relations that has taken place since 2004. The changes that have taken place both outside and within the Alliance require efforts from all parties to rebuild it, but also to extend it and develop new vehicles for Transatlantic cooperation.

These changes require that Europeans and Americans engage in a pragmatic dialogue in order to redefine a common strategy and all that comes along with it. This involves a common agenda, common threat assessment, and common, policies, procedures and responses. To an extent, it also involves a common understanding of power and influence and ways through which to exert these.

The nature, scope and objectives of the Alliance have been inevitably altered with the structural changes that have taken place in international relations over the past two decades. The alliance has also been modified because its constituent parts have changed and have increased. The transformation of Europe has profoundly altered the ‘Euro’ side of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. As has been frequently pointed out, the last two enlargements have increased the number of actors and their heterogeneity in economic

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1 Working paper prepared in the context of the research project ‘The US- EU Partnership: Enlargement and Change’ at the Southeast Europe Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
2 See Tsoukalis 2007; Sapir 2007; Giddens 2006; Aherne, Pisani-Ferry et al 2006; the Luxembourg Group 2003. Also, the Policy Network has been active engaging academics from across the Transatlantic community in workshops and publications on social and political issues in a ‘global world.’ See website: http://www.progressive-governance.net/
3 In 2004, the EU underwent its commonly referred to ‘Big Bang’ enlargement with the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was complemented on 1st January 2007 with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the EU opened accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey in October 2005, and candidate status was granted to FYROM in November 2005.
and political terms and, they have created a Union of wider geographic scope, with deeper structural internal inequalities and new neighbours.

Obviously, this transformation is a dynamic process and, over the past four years, the EU member states have been trying to get to know one another within the Union, find common understandings and mutual interests. They have had to learn and in many cases re-learn how to deal with one another and achieve common positions, how to implement joint actions, how to adapt to their new position within the Union, let alone outside it.

This learning process, similar to any transition and transformation process, has not been without its crises and difficulties particularly as the learning and adjusting has not only been necessary for the new(er) Member States (NMS).\(^4\) It has been equally necessary for the older ones who have seen their relative influence diluted because of the number of actors, and who expect to see this influence weakened even further due to new voting systems that will soon be adopted regardless of whether they are founding members, or have stronger economies, or whatever other reason could be put forward as a basis for differentiation. These older Member States (OMS) had become accustomed to working together within informally entrenched alliances through which they were able to broker deals or launch European integration initiatives; they are now in stark need of new recruits if these alliances are to remain influential. And finally, new positions and new positioning is required of some OMS that face a backlash from their public against enlargement – enlargement both already completed and future enlargement.\(^5\)

Though there is much talk of enlargement fatigue and of the EU having reached the limits of the degree of diversity that it can integrate or its capacity to absorb, there is also a clear understanding that enlargement has not yet been completed. So, the expectation of further transformation and change may be considered a daunting challenge, particularly in the context of a difficult economic environment where international competition and the need for economic restructuring are placing a heavy burden on European societies and on European governments.

These changes have been taking place during a time where the US appears to have also undergone its own changes. Not just with regard to its role on the international scene, but also internally. Much of the literature has argued that there has been a change in perceptions on what is referred to as ‘values,’ leading to a ‘values gap’ between the US and the EU. It has also emphasized the differences in the ways through which the Transatlantic partners see their role in the world, world affairs and bilateral relations. The fast paced changes on the international scene have and continue to require a redefinition of Washington’s foreign policy priorities and its strategic objectives. In this context, a fair number of questions are necessarily raised. The Euro-Atlantic partnership was the

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\(^4\) For facility, the twelve Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 and 2007 are referred to with the initials NMS.

\(^5\) Public opinion in the OMS has been consistently below the EU average (49%) reaching as low as 25% in favour of future enlargement in Luxembourg, 32% in France and 34% in Germany. For detailed results, see Standard Eurobarometer n. 67, Spring 2007, [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf) [4/10/2007]
backbone for the 20th century in security, economic, trade, political, and societal terms; will it still be the case for the present century? Or, might certain American interests be better served through other alliances in the present, altered international system? Is America looking more in the direction of emerging powers in Asia and, would this imply a change in the importance attributed to the Transatlantic partnership? And, when we refer to the Transatlantic partnership – how inclusive in fact is it? Are there preferences on the part of policy makers in Washington for a special relationship with Europe writ large? Or, as recent practice has suggested, with specific European countries or groups of countries?

Throughout the EU’s construction and development, the US has been an ardent supporter of ‘an ever closer Union,’ it has strongly encouraged the EU to develop a CFSP and coordinate its common defence and has criticized it when it failed to do so. It has urged the Union to undertake a more active presence in its neighbourhood, and has pressured for enlargement as a way to consolidate the Central and Eastern European countries’ (CEEC) shift westward. It has been a keen proponent of Turkey’s (and eventually Ukraine’s) EU accession for strategic reasons. So far, so good. In parallel to this support for EU integration and enlargement, there has also been a school of thought that has tended to approach the EU’s development with caution and suspicion, seeing Europe as a potential rival (O’Sullivan 2001; Huntingdon 1999). These concerns seem to have gained some ground in Washington largely nurtured by conservative and neoconservative circles. This has led to questioning on whether a common EU defence is still seen as a way through which to further American interests globally? Or whether the US perceives Europe’s active role in its wider neighbourhood in a positive manner? Particularly when this neighbourhood is incrementally moving into regions where Washington may have direct national interests? Or, where Russia considers it has the leading say? Is the US prepared to continue supporting EU integration and enlargement and essentially accept a partner who may take a different stance on important issues? Finally, are EU-US tensions simply the result of problems that have been faced with the Bush administrations or do they go beyond this, reflecting more long-term and deeper-rooted differences?

In light of the above, the aim in this working paper is to present some aspects and issues that have affected Transatlantic relations as a result of EU enlargement. The scope of this paper is purposefully wide in order to serve as an exploratory tour d’horizon of the subject and will be followed by more focused articles on some of the issues referred to below. The main questions discussed here are the following: To what extent and in what ways have the past two EU enlargements affected Transatlantic relations? Has enlargement contributed to redefining, restructuring, regenerating or revitalising transatlantic relations? And what about future EU enlargements: what aspects of the EU’s foreign policy might NMS eventually influence?

A brief overview of US approaches to EU enlargement and US perceptions of the new, enlarged EU is presented in the next section. This is followed by a section on the EU’s most recent enlargements examining the factors that may determine the NMS’ input in EU foreign policy, and one on the future enlargements ahead and their potential impact on Transatlantic relations. The paper concludes with some remarks on a set of political
and institutional issues that need to be addressed in order to constructively manage the impact of EU enlargement on Transatlantic relations, maintain the relevance of the Alliance, and take it forward.

2. US approaches to enlargement and the enlarged EU

US positions on Europe can be grossly categorized in two camps: those in favour of EU integration as a means to achieve peace and create an empowered partner that can be active around the world; and those more sceptical of the direction that EU integration has taken.

Those in favour of an ever closer and larger Union have argued that a successful EU is preferable to its failure. Since the 1950s and 1960s Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, US policy has endorsed efforts towards integration within the Old Continent. In the post-Cold war system, the Clinton administration believed it was in the US interest to encourage a strong and unified EU to become an actor on the global stage (Asmus 2005: 95; see also Asmus 2003, 2005, 2006 and Calleo 2004). Although rather cautious with initiatives taken in the field of defence and security, overall the approach was one of principled support. Proponents of a stronger EU expressed frustration with the slow decision-making processes and the seeming inability of the EU to pull its weight politically and militarily on the world stage and particularly in its ‘back-yard’, i.e. the Balkans. And, they urged for enlargement to stop dragging its feet.

The second camp, Eurosceptic, has tended to view the EU with what could even be described as an element of disdain. The EU is regarded as possibly obstructing or challenging US power. The construction of a ‘United States of Europe’ has been approached with alarm as it raises the risk of a superpower with a worldview ‘fundamentally different’ from that of the US, working to spread its values and concept of governance on the international level thereby rivaling America. At the same time, its preference for multilateral action, negotiation and compromise, and its reluctance to use force have been viewed with frustration and impatience, and defined as an evident sign of weakness (Huntingdon 1999; Casey and Rivkin 2001; Kagan 2003).

EU enlargement received a fair amount of attention in the US over the past decade as it coincided with what has repeatedly been defined as one of the worse crises in Transatlantic relations since WWII, including the Suez crisis and Vietnam (see contributions in Zaborowski (ed) 2006). Interestingly, the assessment of the Transatlantic relationship after enlargement was viewed in positive terms by both camps. While the first camp identified enlargement as an historic achievement and success story for the West, the second saw enlargement as a way to impede the development of the EU, and perhaps more importantly as a way to attenuate the influence of countries such as France in a ‘new Europe’ where the US would hold greater sway.
Enlargement and the Iraq confrontation became associated with a series of binary characterizations and categorizations that many in Europe have since been copiously trying to prove, disprove, reject, or vilify:

- Europe ‘old’ and ‘new’ based on former Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld’s unfortunate and rather inaccurate grouping of those opposed and those in favour of the US position on Iraq;
- ‘Postmodernist’ EU15 less nation-state oriented and more cosmopolitan on the one side, and the ‘modernist’ NMS on the other, as argued by Robert Cooper (2003);
- ‘Mars’ and ‘Venus’ associations with the US’ hard power and Europe’s soft power following from Kagan’s 2002 argument.

Such distinctions are useful typologies and may facilitate understandings of what is going on in Europe, or what is going on between Europe and the US. They are also valuable in triggering European political elites, academics and theoreticians in exploring definitions of what European identity invokes, what kind of power Europe wishes to project, and which world-views and imaginings are in fact shared among European peoples. However, they do not show the nuances within the groups, they constitute static descriptions of Member States and, they dismiss the dynamic nature of the Europeanisation process. Some of these issues are discussed in the next section.

3. The enlarged EU and Transatlantic relations

There is a stereotypical perception, probably on both sides of the Atlantic, that the NMS tend to be more pro-American and Atlanticists in their approach to security. The ‘Letter of the Eight’ followed by the ‘Vilnius Letter’ tend to be identified as the most telling

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6 Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida’s article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on May 31, 2003 was followed by a number of articles and editorials by European intellectuals who stressed the need to define Europe and the European model; Tzvetan Todorov has defined Europe as a ‘puissance tranquille’ guided by process (*Le Nouveau Désordre mondial. Réflexions d’un Européen.* Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 2003); Etienne Balibar has approached Europe in more abstract terms as a ‘borderland’ and a ‘vanishing mediator’ (*We, The People of Europe? – Reflections on Transnational Citizenship.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Michael Emerson et al for their part have focused on the project that Europe seeks to project outside its borders and have described the EU as a ‘reluctant debutante’ (‘The Reluctant Debutante: the European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood’ CEPS Working Documents, n.223, Brussels, 2005); and Joschka Fisher as ‘a power in the making’ (2005). For a discussion on definitions and metaphors used in describing Europe and European identity see Bialasiewicz and Minca 2005.

7 ‘Europeanisation’ implies a process of change and adaptation. Since the 1980s, it is a wide concept that has been used to explain the dynamics of the evolving European polity. It encompasses five dimensions: (1) changing boundaries and territorial expansion of the EU’s borders, aka enlargement; (2) the institutionalization of a system of governance with common institutions at the European level and with the authority to implement/enforce Europe-wide policies; (3) the export or diffusion of European forms of political organisation/governance (structures, actions and ideas) beyond the EU; (4) a political project aiming to construct a unified and politically strong Europe; and (5) the penetration of EU level institutions into national and sub-national levels of governance. For more and for relevant bibliography on ‘Europeanisation’ see Olsen 2001.

8 In January and February 2003, these two letters offered a signed statement of support towards Washington and demonstrated the deep division within the EU on the eve of the Iraq war. The first was signed by the
pieces of evidence of this pro-Americanism. This has led many, especially within western European countries to express rather critical accusations of the central, eastern and southeastern member states describing them as ‘Trojan horses’ (see Ilves 2005), representing American interests on the ‘inside’ and intending to destabilize a fragile, emerging attempt at formulating and pursuing a European approach to foreign policy matters. These voices consider the NMS as more appreciative of hard-power, eager pro-Atlanticists, and with a preference for NATO over a European defence. The ensuing concern is that the two recent enlargements have made the ‘Atlanticists’ vs. ‘Europeanists’ split run deeper, increasing internal fractionalization and thus eliminating the risk or hope (depending on one’s standpoint), of a meaningful CFSP/ESDP. Following this line of thought, and drawing from numerous explicit efforts by Washington to this effect, the realist might add that internal division is in the interest of the US if viewed from a divide and rule perspective. It would permit to pick and choose among its European allies depending on issues or regions while also playing them off against one another and significantly reduce coordinated action on issues that could potentially raise opposition.

This line of argument, however, may be challenged on a number of issues. First, this depiction does not necessarily correspond to how things actually are within the Union nor does it represent the full picture. Second, a fragmented, incoherent EU would not automatically be in the interests of Washington. In effect, as has been argued by a member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, both the ‘fears and hopes of a more pro-American European Union are misplaced’ (Ilves 2005: 191; see also Král 2005).

For one, pro-Atlanticism and pro-Americanism must be dissociated. The former consists of a clear strategic foreign policy orientation based on the position that NATO is an international structure of primary importance and must be accorded priority. This perspective is shared by many Member States who have acceded to EU membership at very different stages of EU integration (thereby including both older and newer). Distinctions within the group have even been pointed out illustrating that this is far from being a monolithic bloc (see Menon and Lipkin 2003). There are ‘traditional Atlanticists’ (the UK, Denmark and Portugal), ‘conjunctural Atlanticists’ (Italy and Spain), and ‘reflex Atlanticists’ (CEECs). As far as the NMS are concerned, this strategic choice has offered security, independence, and a platform towards further democratic consolidation. Moreover, it is seen as a means through which to contain the resurgence of old powers in Europe and powers to their East.

The latter evokes a certain affinity with US values and a support for the US’s approach to foreign policy making. True, there is little base for anti-Americanism in the NMS thereby making them more reticent to criticize or disagree with Washington and naturally more eager to demonstrate their ‘credentials’ as members of the Atlantic community architecture. The pro-American and pro-Atlanticist attitude that appears to be prevalent...
across the NMS is, however, to be expected and should not be presented as being in opposition to that of the older member states (OMS). In fact, it has been argued that it is on some accounts similar to the Transatlanticism of Western Europe in an earlier era (i.e. after World War II) where the debt towards the US on the one hand, and the rising threat of the Soviet bloc on the other cemented the Transatlantic alliance through institutions (mainly NATO) and through a same understanding of international relations, security challenges and ways of responding to these challenges. In the case of the NMS, the ‘positive image’ of the US was created in CEE during the Cold War, during the times of Soviet rule and persistent American anti-communist activities, particularly when compared with Western Europe’s more restrained involvement in what was happening on the other side of the Berlin Wall. It was subsequently reinforced by the US administrations’ strong push for NATO enlargement that brought the CEECs into the West’s security community. Here too, this can be easily, though unjustly, compared to the longer and more structurally painful process of EU accession. So, yes, the NMS are more positively predisposed towards the US, not least because the anti-capitalist left has been discredited from the Soviet times, leaving the political debate free from ‘anti-American’ populist rhetoric of the kind that has been witnessed in various forms across much of Western Europe.\(^9\)

This is not, however, the end of the story. It is pertinent to consider here the Europeanisation process and how in fact membership, and the dynamic nature of EU integration, may affect perceptions, understandings and formulations of foreign policy on the part of NMS. As Member States become accustomed to the experience of membership and mainly with the community method (or in other words, the need to find a common basis for negotiation and mediation with exchanges and trade-offs across very different issues in order to achieve package deals that essentially make common policies possible, while also providing access to financial, structural and technical assistance), changes tend to be discerned in their rhetoric, their understanding of national interest and how it is best promoted. This Europeanisation process that has been at the centre of much scholarly work may be expected to gradually, though increasingly, influence the NMS’

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\(^9\) Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane have edited a book on *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2007) in which they distinguish between types of anti-Americanism. *Liberal anti-Americanism* tends to be found in advanced industrialized societies and is based on a criticism of US policies not ‘living’ up to its ideals and being self-interested and power hungry (for instance supporting dictatorships, or its approach to the war on terror, etc). *Social anti-Americanism* is a second type that is based on value conflicts and is characteristic in countries where social welfare, the involvement of the state on health and social protection issues, and preference for multilateral approaches are important. *Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism* is a shield against unwanted intrusions from the US and can be based on positive identifications of national identity, or on an emphasis of sovereignty from countries that fought hard for their independence, or finally, can be found in countries with strong state traditions that resent intrusions in their domestic affairs or restrictions on their (potential) role in world affairs. *Radical anti-Americanism* inherently considers US politics, values and institutions as hostile. This type has been characteristic in countries with Marxist-Leninist regimes for politico-economic reasons and is also typical among radical Muslim communities for religiously inspired reasons. The first two types of anti-Americanism are relevant in the case of European countries in addition to two other forms of anti-Americanism that Katzenstein and Keohane describe as: *elitist anti-Americanism* (in the case of France) and *legacy anti-Americanism* stemming from resentment of past wrongs committed by the US (as in the case of Spain and Greece).
behaviour and positions within the EU. Finding common ground with other MS will be essential in order to reap the benefits of membership and in order to further own national interests and foreign policy priorities within the Union, particularly regarding their eastern borders.

To a large extent, NMS have developed a perception of Western Europeans generally tending to appease Russia and to be critical towards the US (for instance regarding its policies in Latin America, or the Middle East, or on environmental matters). And, indeed, the behaviour of most of the OMS has, more frequently than not, suggested that bilateral interests in relations with Russia outweigh common EU interests and fundamental concerns of human rights. Similarly, on the Western European side, there is a perception that NMS tend to be overtly hostile towards Russia and unnecessarily supportive of US interventionism. ‘Americo-philia’ can thus be perceived as a threat to a CFSP and ESDP, whereas ‘Russo-phobia’ as a threat to bilateral economic opportunities (Ilves 2006: 200; Kempe 2007a and 2007b). All sides are trying to convince one another of their concerns. So, it may be fair to assume that both sides hold a chance: of rubbing off on one another; or of reassessing (part of) their behaviour; or most likely to find a middle ground relatively comfortable and considerate for all sides. Such a middle ground will undoubtedly have its tensions and will at times lean more to one side and other times to the other, but it will be as close as possible to a middle ground. In short, the essence of EU compromise and multilateralism.

Some of the more uncomfortable questions that may be relevant to consider with regard to US expectations from the EU’s NMS are: How far does moral debt go? Is it actually possible that some of the NMS may develop into the kind of strategic partners that the UK or Germany have been for the US? To what extent might NMS be prepared to continue to back the US in defending the right to pre-emptive attack as a security doctrine if this raises the risk of Russia claiming this right as well in their common neighbourhood? Or, to what extent might the way that the US decides to develop its bilateral relation with Russia, impact on the NMS’ perceptions and feelings towards Washington?

Furthermore, none of the Member States, not even the traditional champions of either side, are interested in escalating the transatlantic divide within the EU (Lang et al 2004). It would be neither in the interest of the British or the Danes, nor of the French and the Belgians for instance to take this dichotomy to extremes, and in fact, the efforts of all sides to find compromises, to work with and within NATO while developing and deploying EU-led operations in Afghanistan or Africa or the Balkans testify to this. In addition, not all EU Member States fall neatly into two groups. The majority of the Member States are somewhere ‘in between’ on the Atlantic vs. European approaches to

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10 The St-Malo declaration [that opened the way to improving European military capabilities and the intention to take up Petersberg missions], is illustrative of the compromise between on the one side, the British and their pragmatic approach to seeing value in setting up a European defence, and French concessions to Atlantic legitimacy in order to maintain their ambitions for a meaningful ESDP in the long-term on the other. For more see “ESDP: an overview” by Jean-Yves Haine, available at [http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf](http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf)
security and power. And, there are Member states with a tradition of neutrality and non-alignment (such as Austria, Ireland, Finland, or Sweden) and therefore, with a different approach towards security and defence.

It is argued here, that the NMS will certainly influence EU foreign policy. Given the history of their relations with Russia, the NMS are most concerned with what lies East and, it is likely that they will progressively seek to influence the Eastern front of the EU’s foreign policy in the future. If we accept that the main foreign policy goals and national interests of the NMS are found to the east of their borders, then we can assume that the NMS will seek to upgrade the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and get their neighbours to the west and to the south more engaged and aligned with their concerns. In addition, Poland and the Baltic states mainly will not wish to see the EU develop a relationship with Russia that would enable the latter to exercise political leverage not just over the EU, but also over the common neighbours in between (Drosdiak 2006: 97; Král 2005; Lang et al 2004). This line of thought could lead to the conclusion that the NMS may eventually seek a more enhanced CFSP, not one stuck in an impasse, with which to deal with Russia.

Interestingly, recent articles and research papers published across the EU, and particularly in Germany, indicate an increasing consideration for EU-Russia relations. Attention is gearing on whether the EU needs to develop or revisit its Ostpolitik and the need to determine the EU’s future role in the post-Soviet space (see Bauer 2007; Fisher 2007; Kempe 2007a and 2007b).

So, perhaps enlargement is indeed, as the Commission has vehemently been trying to convince public opinion across the Union, more about new opportunities than the cynics and the pessimists suggest. Given that the EU and Russia are deeply inter-dependent on energy and security matters and in the context of growing concerns with Russia’s anti-democratic tendencies, illiberal governance and rising authoritarianism, a new Eastern policy is being called for. If one of the main criticisms directed against Brussels has been that it lacks strategic thinking in terms of what role it wants in its wider neighbourhood, the NMS might work in the direction of filling this gap.

Indirectly, filling this gap will in the mid- and longer-term certainly influence relations with the US. The breadth of EU-Russia relations and its potential for further development is so wide (spilling over from the economic, trade and energy areas to environmental security, migration and health matters, etc.), that it will gradually have knock-on effects on relations with the US. If the ENP indeed develops into something more substantial, then a constructive dialogue between the Transatlantic partners leading to a common framework for an eastern policy would be useful. Elaborating a shared understanding within which the EU and the US, either individually and/or together, will be able to deal and communicate with Russia, negotiate, manage tensions, compete on commercial matters, address common security challenges, ought to be a priority on the Transatlantic partners’ agenda.
To turn to some of the older Member States that were at the epicenter of the Transatlantic rift. Significant changes can be noted here too that have in turn influenced Transatlantic relations since enlargement. There has been a rapprochement and a broad convergence of perspectives within the Alliance. Present conditions indicate improved cooperation and mutual efforts to seek middle grounds and compromises (for instance regarding EU policy on China or President Bush’s acknowledgement of the challenge of climate change in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2007) rather than confrontation. More importantly perhaps, there is growing optimism on both sides on the future of the alliance (see also Brown 2004). 11 Three factors can be singled out as having contributed to this improvement.

First, the importance of personalities. On the US side, Secretary Rice’s efforts to overcome some of the Iraq-related bitterness with Europe and to underline a commitment on the part of the second Bush administration towards the Alliance have been eagerly welcomed by the EU side. At the same time, the arrival into office of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy in France has changed the approach of some of the largest EU member states’ towards the Alliance. It will be interesting to see in what direction Sarkozy, seemingly the most pro-American and pro-Atlanticist President in the history of the Fifth Republic, will take relations with the US, the UK, Germany and the newer Member States. It will be equally interesting to see whether Sarkozy will have the anticipated effect on EU enlargement given his pre-election rhetoric regarding the Union’s institutional future and especially relations with Turkey (Sarkozy 2006). The Anglo-American relationship is also bound to be altered in the next couple of years, at least in the public realm. Gordon Brown, though evidently Atlanticist is trying to shed some of the unpopularity associated with Tony Blair’s handling of this special relationship. Second, there seems to be a convergence in perceptions of threats. Europeans have attributed attention to threats that have been prioritized by the US such as terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. The adoption of the European Security Strategy12 contributed to this, while Iran’s nuclear ambitions have pooled EU and US concerns around common objectives (Fischer 2005). Third, the difficulties encountered in Iraq have affected the way the US has worked towards rebuilding bridges with Europe. As Jentleson has argued, the US stumbled on a gap between power, influence and ensuring the outcomes that it wishes (2007).

Lastly, regarding the second point mentioned above, namely that a fragmented EU would not automatically be in the interests of Washington: this has been amply demonstrated by the Iraq case. Developments in Iraq over the past four years seem to suggest that in spite of the unquestionable strength of American power, ‘coalitions of the willing’ are insufficient to provide the US with the material and financial resources, and perhaps more importantly, with the moral support and legitimacy that are needed for large-scale operations or for responses to real or perceived global security challenges. For the

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11 This point was underlined by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Mr. Kurt Volker, during his speech at the European Institute Annual Meeting hosted at the Greek Embassy in Washington DC, 10th September 2007.

Alliance to continue to be relevant, however, serious efforts on the part of the EU Member States to develop a consequential CFSP are required. Inability on the part of the EU to put forward and implement common positions is bound to further frustrate transatlantic relations and even to damage the Alliance’s weight on the international scene. In effect, it is important in terms of what the Alliance wishes to project to the rest of the world. During the Cold war period, the Transatlantic Alliance projected attachment and commitment to the construction of a common security community and a specific set of values. This may have caused the resentment and hostility of some, yet it just as much inspired others, led and contributed to the development of regional and international mechanisms and institutions promoting cooperation and integration. The EU and the US have a valuable background and platform from which to continue to work together in shaping the present world order on the basis of democratic peace principles and multilateral governance.

4. Future enlargements and their impact on Transatlantic relations

The second issue examined in this paper involves the future enlargements of the European Union. How might the forthcoming, envisaged, potential, expected, hoped for or disconcerting enlargements (to cover the entire scope of positions on the subject) impact Transatlantic relations? Essentially, this involves the Western Balkans and Turkey, followed eventually by Ukraine and in the longer term, perhaps other countries in Eastern Europe.

As far as the Western Balkans are concerned, further enlargement in this direction will lead to the eventual admission of another six or seven countries. Countries with small populations, difficult political relations within and between them, and fragile economies. Small or micro states will be the majority in the Union: countries with rather restricted political clout on the world scene, and countries that will most likely continue to be net receivers than net contributors to the EU budget and to the EU economic growth.

Throughout the course of European integration, smaller Member States have seen positive results in developing common economic policies while on political matters the EU has provided them with a platform for a wider exposure, presence and participation on the international scene. In short, until recently, smaller sized member states have been the proponents of ‘more Europe’ and have demonstrated an aptitude for pushing integration initiatives further. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and their preparedness to launch the euro, or the Schengen agreement, among other initiatives are the examples that spring to mind. Will future smaller member states be able to continue fulfilling such a role? Will future smaller sized countries whose recent state-building process has been difficult and in many cases bloody be able to give up aspects of their sovereignty just as they will have found it? To what extent will the political elites be able to transcend cleavages that continue to hamper regional cooperation in the Balkans to engage in, formulate and implement common EU integration policies? How long might this development take and how will the in-between period be managed?
There is already significant frustration by some in the EU with the egalitarian principle that puts all member states on a par regardless of size and power. This equality is frequently considered as a factor rendering EU institutions inflexible and reform necessary (Grant and Leonard 2007). With more countries the size of Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus joining the Union, the extent to which they will further enhance and contribute to the EU’s regional and global role is an open question. While the large-small size categorization of Member States is rejected as politically incorrect, and the hegemony of larger member states behaving as ‘directories’ is rejected, the Lilliput syndrome is a reality.

Efforts are made at addressing these issues with rotational membership of the Commission and other voting compromises. However, experience has so far suggested that each Member State values its sovereignty and equality regardless of size and is very reluctant to take a back-bench seat.

Though important, the challenge that the Western Balkans will bring is not all about size. Regarding the content of the EU’s foreign policy and relations towards the US it is not an easy task to discern their potential impact. Some will be similar cases to the NMS in terms of their loyalty and positive inclination towards the US – FYROM, Kosovo and Albania could probably be put in this camp. Others may be more cautious regarding America and the Transatlantic partnership though it is equally plausible that they may zealously embrace it in an effort to make up for lost time and exclusion from the Transatlantic community. The trends of the newer generations are not yet clear and will probably be formed as the Kosovo situation evolves, and if economic growth that has been picking up in pockets around the Balkans develops. The impact that their accession to the EU will have on EU-US relations is likely to be relatively restricted. However, the speed at which they will join the EU and the importance that they will accord to the Transatlantic partnership will be substantially, if not totally, dependent on how effective and successful EU-US collaboration in this region will be (mainly concerning the region’s economic development, and political developments in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia and Kosovo). The Western Balkans are definitely one of the regions where continued US-EU cooperation around common goals is of the essence at present and for the next few years.

The case of enlargement to Turkey is a different matter. When it has come to debates about the EU and Turkey, the US position has been strong in favour, arguing that if Europe were to reject Turkey and Turkey were to be destabilised as a result of that rejection, that would directly affect American security interests in the wider region. The US has lobbied hard for Turkey’s EU integration underlining that further anchoring this strategic ally in the Western democratic community was important. Like Britain, Turkey has a very strong defence relationship with the U.S. Its military is heavily dependent on American equipment and the U.S. provides Turkey with its biggest external support.

With Turkey, the EU’s borders will touch Syria, Iran, and whatever form Iraq eventually develops into. Turkey’s national priorities will have to naturally be expressed and reflected in common EU policies towards these countries. Thus, an increasingly active role can be expected from the EU and its Member States in the Middle East. So far, EU-

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13 See Magnette and Nicolaïdis 2005.
US positions on the Middle East have probably been the hardest to bridge. The inclusion of Turkey as a constituent part of the bilateral relationship would certainly impact this item on the Transatlantic agenda. It will influence common EU positions regarding the future of Iraq and the Kurdish dimension, and it would be very surprising to not expect Turkey to have very clearly defined positions concerning Iran. Finally, given the size of Turkey’s military and its key role within NATO, which direction Ankara will decide to pursue – a more Atlanticist or a more Europeanist defence policy, will be a determining factor for the way in which the Transatlantic security community will develop.

In this context, current trends within public opinion may be disconcerting and need to be addressed. A recent Pew Global Attitudes Project survey indicates that 64% of Turkish respondents identify the US – their strategic ally – as the country posing the greatest threat to them. Turkey is also the country in the wider Middle East region, where public opinion towards the US has slipped the furthest – from an already high 54% in 2002 unfavourable opinion of the US, it has peaked to 83% in 2007. Public opinion surveys fluctuate and trends can certainly be reversed but given that the main cause of the fall in US popularity is Iraq, and that what will end up qualifying as a success in Iraq for the US may not be perceived as such by Turkey; the way to reverse this trend is not straightforward. The Pew survey in fact shows a growing rejection in Turkey not just with regard to President Bush and the fight against terrorism, but an emerging antipathy towards American life style with 81% of the respondents saying they dislike American ideas about democracy, 83% the American way of doing business and 68% even disliking US movies, music, etc.

The way that Turkey will impact the rest of the EU as well is unavoidably a challenge that still fuels many debates. The arguments for and against have put forward the economic, strategic, symbolic dimensions on endless occasions. The issue is not just about relative population size, or economic prosperity or identity, religion and values. It is about how willing the various constituent parts of the EU, and also how capable they are to manage these. So far, not so well it seems and it is not just the case of France or Austria or Germany and Belgium; these Member States are among those who have been more vocal about their concerns. Most other Member States have been attempting to dodge the question by discussing the transformative influence of the EU accession process or the need to ultimately define the finalité politique of the European project. In any case, that EU enlargement to Turkey would have a significant impact the EU-US relationship is unquestionable, just as is the fact that the inclusion of Turkey will impact the nature of the EU and vice versa.

The challenge on the EU side, therefore, is not just about how it will manage the next enlargements but also how it will manage the time from now to accession. The debate in Europe at present is concentrating on how Brussels can make the candidate and accession periods more interesting, rewarding and attractive for the candidate countries. Essentially, how this can be done in a way that does not delegitimise the Union and its promises, and that does not compromise the transformative influence that EU conditionality has proved to have thus far. Alternatives and options are not apparent at the moment. EU creativity

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has not yet produced the right recipe that can urge candidate countries through a long pre-accession and accession period, or that can make so-called special or privileged relations meaningful and not insulting to those who are hearing this option being discussed more and more.

Necessary ingredients to this recipe are preparedness to substantially reform the EU institutions and open access to EU markets, EU programmes and EU funding for candidate and accession countries. This of course requires increased contributions into the EU budget on behalf of the Member States that can only come from sustained and sustainable economic growth. Growth in short, that is dependant on deep restructuring of most European economies and on balancing out policy disagreements on how to manage globalization at the EU level (i.e. the traditional quarrel between protective measures or further lowering barriers to encourage competition). Equally necessary is the effective dissemination of information convincing public opinion of the benefits of future enlargements. As is a democratic discussion on the nature, form and ultimate composition of the European Union so that democratic deficits and political gaps can be tackled. And, this is just on the EU side. The candidate and potential candidate Member States will be expected to come an even farther way after the recent experiences of enlargement during which we have seen conditionality criteria be more strictly and extensively applied.

5. Concluding remarks

The priorities outlined above alone are not sufficient to constructively manage the impact of EU enlargement on Transatlantic relations. Three deeper issues need to be tackled in a more substantial and comprehensive manner. The first has to do with the Transatlantic institutions, their efficiency and their suitability. The second has to with the EU’s ability to put together a CFSP and ESDP. The third is intricately connected with the second and concerns the new kind of balance that will have to be achieved within the Alliance.

To turn to the first item mentioned above, a more appropriate venue or forum may be required for a wider Transatlantic dialogue. NATO is the par excellence Transatlantic institution and has proved successful in expanding and consolidating the Euro-Atlantic security community, in integrating part of the former Soviet space, in its operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, while also promoting interoperability among allied armed forces. But, it is insufficient and in part unsuitable to really respond to the need to ‘do strategy’ as it were on a range of wider security-related issues. Taking into consideration the way the security agenda has developed, and the expanded definition of (human) security and of what constitutes a security challenge, it follows that a military-based

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15 Moreover, not all EU Member States are NATO members and there are some NATO Members who are not EU member states (Canada, Turkey and Norway). This differentiated membership means that it is much more than an EU-US institution while it is also not fully representative of all the EU Members (given that only 21 of the current 27 are NATO members, excluding Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden).

16 See Kaldor et al 2007; Gropas 2006.
institution is not adequate to consider a range of socio-economic, health, environmental, socio-cultural issues. Nor is it a suited forum in which to discuss the growth of authoritarianism in Russia, or China, or how to constructively contribute to developments in the Middle East.

The other core Transatlantic institution is the EU-US Annual Summit.\textsuperscript{17} These receive some media attention, but essentially, so far they have been little more than polite diplomatic events. To a large extent this has much to do with EU side of things and its ability to put forward a single voice on foreign policy matters and talk directly with Washington. The revised Treaty that is expected to be agreed upon by the EU Heads of State and Government at the end of 2007 will go a small way in the direction of enhancing the EU’s CFSP and ESDP. But the road is still long, especially after the failed attempt at adopting a Constitutional Treaty, and even the most optimistic and Euro-enthusiastic of assessments hardly dare refer to the EU as a relevant actor in ‘high politics’ on the international scene.

Numerous suggestions have been put forward to set up additional vehicles for Euro-Atlantic cooperation. From 2001, Henry Kissinger has advocated in favour of setting up an Atlantic Steering Group with regular meetings and a secretariat that will allow the development of parallel approaches to world affairs between the US, the EU and its Member States, European states not (yet) part of the EU, and the NATO Secretary General (2001: 80-82). A Steering Group within which Europe would be active and where differences would be managed. Other suggestions have concentrated on the economic and financial dimensions of the partnership (such as the Economic Policy Program of the German Marshall Fund of the US, see Wissman 2007) or on the advantages of a common missile defence shield (Asmus 2007b). More recently, on the EU side too, there is more and more talk of ‘contact groups’ on regional or thematic issues as the way forward (Grant and Leonard 2007; Rudolf 2007). Informal institutions set up to facilitate policy coordination are already in place for the Balkans and the Middle East, so suggestions currently being put forward revolve around setting up multilateral contact groups in order to support regular EU-US policy coordination. These informal groups have of course no decision-making authority. For these informal institutions to be more than an elaborate version of Brussels’ committology phenomenon, strategic thinking is required on the part of the EU, while on the part of the US it requires that Washington is prepared to operate, negotiate and deal multilaterally.

There is no doubt that the EU and its Member States consider the Alliance as their key, strategic, indispensable partnership. The intention, in principle, to improve, facilitate and simplify EU-US contact is there. As is the acknowledgement that EU concerns and interests have to be funneled and expressed in more common positions that will enable bilateral exchanges of opinion and negotiations between the EU and the US. For now,\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{17} This consists of the US President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Commerce, the National Security Advisor and occasionally other senior officials. On the EU side, the President of the Commission participates along with the High Representative for CFSP and the head of state holding the EU rotating Council Presidency.
unfortunately, the way through which to translate this into something digestible for all sides is not evident, and it is far from being simple. In this context, the keen welcome of the deployment of a US missile shield and radar on the part of Poland and the Czech Republic does not contribute to this effort in a constructive manner. The pursuit of bilateral negotiations between Washington on the one side and Warsaw and Prague on the other rather than routing the deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system through NATO undermines the core Transatlantic security institution, it undermines European common defence efforts, and it also undermines efforts to avoid alienating Russia.

The future challenges of Transatlantic relations are about how the two sides will be able to act as partners in confronting what seems to be an ‘identical roster of international challenges’ (Niblett 2007: 633). The objective ahead will be to develop coordinated approaches and responses to security and development related issues in South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, Russia or how to manage climate change for instance. These efforts will have to be undertaken with the understanding that there may well be differences in assessments, outlooks and perspectives on how to deal with these issues. There is an underlying consensus within the EU that the current world order must continue to be based on multilateralism and solutions must be negotiated within global and regional institutions. This requires that certain ‘checks and balances’ be respected and upheld within a system of global governance (Hendrickson 2006), and consequently also within the partnership. Naturally, given the exceptional power status that the US enjoys in the international system, defiance and opposition on the part of the Europeans is expected to annoy Washington. At the same time, however, if the EU Member States wish to meet the expectations that they have raised among European public opinion regarding a common European foreign policy, then they have substantial ground to cover. Within the Alliance, this implies curtailing dependency on American security and diligently pursuing a partnership based on cooperation and a two-way consultation. As German Ambassador Dieter Kastrap simply put it however: “The price of consultation is capacity. Without capacity, one is not in the game” (in Brown 2004: 64).

It would be useful to move the discussion away from the real or imagined values gap debate. It has provided an easy platform – both politically and academically – to present things in over-simplified terms and more disturbingly, to evade accountability and responsibility for the breakdown that occurred in Transatlantic cooperation and the sometimes cavalier and populist rhetoric that both sides engaged in during the period 2002-2004. Rather, it would be necessary for the EU to take confidence in the distinctive model it has developed in managing divisions and difference and creating a democratic peace space, avoid becoming introspective and become more engaged on international matters of ‘high politics’ through common positions and actions. Given the extent to which European and American interests are entangled, Europeans will continue to try to

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18 According to Eurobarometer surveys, European public opinion is strongly in favour of joint decisions at the EU level on fighting terrorism (81%), protecting the environment (69%) and in defence and foreign policy affairs (69%). In addition, over 69% express optimism about the future of the EU and 61% expect the EU to become a leading diplomatic power and even develop its own army (56%). Standard Eurobarometer 67, [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb_67_first_en.pdf); June 2007: 13, 41, 42 [3/10/2007].
influence Washington and should also be prepared to defy objectionable elements of US foreign policy and problematic US practices, such as Guantanamo or rendition practices. The test will be to see to what extent EU influence will be coordinated in the form of common positions. Here, efforts on the part of both newer and older, smaller and larger Member States are equally essential. On the US side, the issue at stake is not about giving up its international leadership role, or its power, or being altruistic and ‘caving’ in to EU demands for conditional cooperation. It is about having a more candid examination of the fundamental assumptions underpinning American foreign policy and projections of power over the past decade. It is about how its ‘role can be secured in the longer term and politically legitimated as a liberal hegemony’ (Rudolf 2007: 6). These matters are even more important if the constituent members of the Transatlantic Alliance wish that other rising powers continue to take it into consideration as a core regional and international actor.
6. References and relevant bibliography


The Luxembourg Group, Transatlantic Relations and the Challenges of Globalization (Transcript of the conference held in Schengen, Luxembourg, 24-25 October 2003), http://www.luxembourggroup.org/reports/01.html [2/10/2007]


7. Annex: Map of EU 27, candidate and potential candidate Member States