Record of Main Content of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and H. Kissinger. January 17, 1989.

Kissinger: In practical terms, as I understand, you implied to George Bush in your conversation on Governor's Island that you would like to establish a channel for a confidential exchange of ideas. He understands that on your end Anatoly Dobrynin would serve as the contact.

Gorbachev: Yes, that's correct.

Kissinger: President Bush is very interested in this method of communication. We have not worked out a specific mechanism yet, but it is clear that [Brent] Scowcroft will be an important figure on the President's side in such a dialogue.

We are ready to begin it at any time convenient for you. In the end of February the President will visit Japan with a short stop in China. Maybe the beginning of March could be a convenient moment? It would be a good opportunity if Anatoly Dobrynin could be in the United States at the time, or maybe some other way.

This confidential channel could be used without any harm to our dialogue through all other existing channels. It will give us an opportunity to open up somewhat the course of our internal discussions of certain problems for you, so that when we introduce a proposal, you would know what ideas and goals are behind it.

George Bush would appreciate an opportunity to receive similar information from you.

[...]

Gorbachev: Of course, the problem of coordinating our economies, the search of forms of cooperation—is a very real problem, and both sides should think about it. However, already today, the steps we took in our foreign economic policy—the creation of legal and economic bases, strengthening guarantees for our foreign partners—should be supported on your side by a repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. If you do not sweep it away with a broom, it would be difficult for us to enter your markets.

Kissinger: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment was directed against me in the first place, and only then—against the Soviet Union.

I agree with you. I always thought it was wrong. I believed that your emigration policy was your country's internal affair. One cannot make external demands about it. One could, probably, discuss it with you confidentially, but without pressing any demands.

Gorbachev: Those problems are now substantively resolved.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gorbachev: We only fight against the brain drain. As far as the dissidents are concerned, let them all go to your country.
Kissinger. I always believed that dissidents are very difficult to deal with even for those countries that receive them.

[...]

Gorbachev. We are waiting for a signal from the administration.

Kissinger. You will hear positive statements from the President from the very beginning of his term. An exchange of opinions, on which we agreed, could begin in the first days of March, if it is convenient for you. Our people are ready.

I already told Anatoly Dobrynin, that I considered the first part of your UN speech exceptionally important. We should discuss how to implement those propositions in solving concrete problems. If we could do that, we would be able to harmonize our policy and to improve our bilateral cooperation.

As far as the mechanism of such communication, Anatoly Dobrynin already has Scowcroft’s direct personal number, and on my part, I could help establish initial contact, so that it doesn’t have to go through the apparatus.

Gorbachev. I would also like you to tell President Bush that I appreciate his letter, and the fact that he sent it at such an early stage, even before his inauguration. We assign special importance to contacts and to confidential exchange of opinions.

Please give my regards to President Bush, and tell him that he can count not only on understanding, but also on cooperation on my part. I think that in the context of this conversation, which I would also ask you to pass on to him, it would be clear to him what meaning I am putting in these words.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya

for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Letter from Bush to Gorbachev, January 17, 1989.

Attachment
Handed by Henry Kissinger to Mikhail Gorbachev
January 17, 1989

Dear President Gorbachev,

I am using the opportunity of Henry Kissinger's visit to Moscow to send you a short personal letter.

First of all, I would like to tell you that I very much appreciate the attention given to my son and grandson during their recent trip to Armenia. They both are deeply shocked by this terrible tragedy, which they witnessed on the spot. They came back with the feeling of deep respect for the strength and devotion of the people who repair and rebuild all that was destroyed in the catastrophe.

Also, I would like to reiterate what I said to you last year, when you came to the United Nations. As I explained then, my advisors responsible for national security and myself will need some time to think through the entire range of issues, especially those concerning arms control, that occupy the central place in our bilateral relations, and to formulate our position in the interest of further development of these relations. Our goal is to formulate a solid and consistent American approach. We are not talking about slowing down or reversing the positive process that marked the last two years.

I am very serious about moving our relationship forward in the interest of our two countries and peace itself. I believe that we should elevate the dialogue, especially between you and me, above the details of arms control proposals, and discuss more general issues of more extensive political relations to which we should aspire.

I am ready to do everything possible in order to build and improve a reliable and solid relationship. I hope that we will continue personal contacts in the process of solving common problems that our countries are faced with.

Respectfully,

George Bush

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation. Notes of A.S. Cheremnyov

Translated by Svetlana Savranova

for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Dear Chief,

Since I have to stay in Warsaw on Saturday due to the ongoing state-church talks, I am taking this opportunity to convey to you (also for possible use at a KKW meeting) the following suggestions and conclusions:

1. I think that an important matter is to set up a not-too-large team to work out draft statutes for “Solidarity,” which would adapt our Union to the law on trade unions. Particularly important is to work out a pattern for work-place organizations, operating with uniform statutes at workplace levels that would allow one to preserve the unity of the Union. Of course, the drafts should also include higher bodies, including the central one. I think that Lech Kaczyński should be chairman of such team as a professional and also living on the spot in Gdansk.

2. I think it is high time to break away from the secrecy of the Union structure, particularly at workplace levels (except for publishing and financial matters). The Union should create open structures as much as possible.

3. I would also like to express my opinion on an unpopular and personally for you irritating matter. Namely, I think that in view of the chance of “Solidarity’s” legalization an attempt should be made to unite all “Solidarity members,” who still consider themselves members of the Union. Thus, I am in favor of the last year’s scheme of A. Celinski, i.e. to convene a “sejmik,” at which both members of the National Commission, remaining in the country, as well as members of structures created during the martial law period, and finally representatives of the newly-created structures (strike committees from 1988 and organizing committees, founding committees) should participate. Personally, I think that representatives of the newly-created structures should have at least half of the delegates.

4. I think that the CC resolution on union pluralism 100 provides a basis to undertake the “Roundtable” talks, but based on our experience from last fall I would advise against a large body. I think a small leading group (a sort of presidium) should be selected, which should participate in the meetings of particular teams with changing composition, depending on the questions under discussion.

5. I am informing you that on 17 January there was a hearing in the Main Administrative Court on the “Social Foundation for Workers’ Solidarity,” of which you are a benefactor. The NSA has annulled the decision of the Ministry of Health and Public Welfare, in which the Ministry had demanded unfounded statutory changes. I hope that...
after that verdict the Ministry will not resist approval of the statute. In the next few days I will resume new efforts in this matter.

With warm greetings,

[signed by A. Stelmachowski]

[Source: A. Stelmachowski Paper. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
Gorbachev is speaking about the Triilateral Commission, with which he met (Kissinger, Giscard d’Estaing, Nakasone). It is interested in everything that is going on, especially in our country. It is working on all issues of European world policy. I would emphasize two issues.

First is how you—meaning we, the Soviet Union—are going to integrate into the world economy? These issues are considered in the Triilateral Commission. If you are going to integrate, we should be ready for it—they said to me.

Giscard told me directly that for us (the USSR) this problem would be extremely difficult, but for them also.

Second issue. They are coming to the conclusion that the biggest fights of perestroika are still ahead of us. And in the international sphere the main problems for us will emerge in the Third World. They think that the West “let the Third World live,” and the Third World, in turn, “let the West live”. But how are we going to deal with the Third World? They believe that in 10-20 years we all will have to deal with a federation of states named Europe.

Kiss [Kissinger—Translated] just shrugged at this statement by Giscard, and asked me a direct question: How are you going to react if Eastern Europe wants to join the EC? It is not an accident that they asked me about it. They know that our friends are already knocking on the door. And we should also look at what processes are going on there now—the economic and the political—and where are they drifting.
What is going on in Hungary, for example? An opposition party led by [Miklos] Nemeth has emerged there. Hungary is on the eve of a serious choice. Of course, it will be different. And I think that every country should have, and has, its own face. And we will continue to be friends, because the socialist basis will be preserved in all of them. The roads of our development will be very diverse, while we will preserve our commonality. We need a mechanism that would ensure our mutual understanding and interaction. There will be a lot of political, economic, and military-political questions. We should consider them in the Central Committee's Commission on Eastern Europe. We should undertake situational analysis with scholars. For example, how would we react if Hungary was leaving for the EC? Comrades, we are on the eve of very serious things. Because we cannot give them more than we are giving them now. And they need new technologies. If we do not deal with that, there will be a split, and they will run away.

And then there is the question of what we should present to the working groups of the leaders of the socialist countries. By the way, let the Commission give us a substantiated answer whether we need this meeting at all. Before it, we should work this out—what can we give to our friends, and compare it with what the West can give them. The answer to this question, I am sure, lies with our perestroika, with its success. And we should try to involve our friends, to get them interested in our economic reforms. Let Yakovlev, with scholars, look at it. We are facing a serious problem there.
The peoples of those countries will ask: what about the CPSU, what kind of leash will it use to keep our countries in? They simply do not know that if they pulled this leash stronger, it would break.

It is time to transfer our relations to the forms that we practice in our relationship with China, but we can get to such forms only via the market, and, of course, via technological and scientific developments in our own country.

In that case, we would break the old rule that we keep them attached to us only by means of energy resources.

At the same time, we cannot just tell them that we would cut the deliveries. That would be a betrayal.

Kiss hinted at the idea of a USSR-USA condominium over Europe. He was hinting that Japan, Germany, Spain, and South Korea were on the rise, and so, let us make an agreement so that the "Europeans do not misbehave."

We should work on this range of issues also, but in such a way that it would not leak, because in Europe they are most afraid of that what they understand the Reykjavik summit to mean. And if you remember, in Reykjavik they saw an effort at conspiracy between the USSR and the USA over Europe.

My impression from the meeting with the Trilateral Commission is the following: they understood in the West that the world needs a peaceful breathing spell—from the arms race, from the nuclear psychosis—as much as we need it. However, we need to know it all in detail in order not to make mistakes. They want to channel the processes in such a way as to limit as much as possible our influence on the world situation, they are
trying to seize the initiative from us, present criteria of trust as tests: if the Soviet Union
would not want to agree to something, we would act in a way to gain more points.

That is why we have to keep the initiative. This is our main plus.

Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation
Moscow, Russian Federation

Translated by
Svetlana Savranskaya

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
CPSU CC Politburo Decision of 24 January 1989, with attached report of 23 January 1989

Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Central Committee

To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov

Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 24 January 1989

Question of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs USSR, Ministry of Defense USSR, Committee of State Security USSR

To agree with the understandings set forth in the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A., Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 January 1989 (attached)

Secretary CC

[attached] to article VI protocol #146

CC CPSU

On the measures pertaining to the impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan

In the difficult situation characterizing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can increasingly feel the inner tension stemming from the impending withdrawal of the remaining units of Soviet troops. The attention of the regime and the forces of the opposition is totally focused on 15 February, when, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the term of stay of our military contingent must end. In addition, the given timetable for Kabul is even more constraining, as the last Soviet military units must leave the Afghan capital in the beginning of February.

Practically throughout the entire country, military engagements between the government forces and the opposition continue to take place, in the course of which the government has essentially been able to maintain its positions, although with the help of Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus been unable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Kandahar. However, everyone understands that the main battle is still ahead. Currently the opposition has even decreased its military activity somewhat, saving up its forces for the coming period. Comr. Najibullah believes that it is intent on expanding its activities simultaneously in several key directions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

It should be emphasized that the Afghan comrades are seriously worried as to how the situation will turn out. In general, their resolve to resist the enemy is strengthening; they are taking a number of emergency measures and trying to arrange more rationally the forces that are available. To a certain extent, the Afghan comrades are counting on the continuation of their contacts with a fairly significant number of commanding officers within armed detachments of the enemy, on the strong disagreements which continue to exist within the opposition, and on the incompatibility of some of its leading political groups, in particular the “Islamic Association of Afghanistan” ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the “Islamic Party of Afghanistan” ([Jalaluddin] Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between detachments of these and other opposition groups are not just continuing, but are taking on wider proportions as well.

The president is even closely examining such a possibility as declaring martial law or taking other extraordinary measures in the country, thinking that this may facilitate the adoption and execution of difficult decisions in the critical period ahead. At first he was leaning towards implementing martial law in our presence, but in the course of the discussions with him that have taken place, he arrived at the conclusion that this would best be done after the Soviet forces have left Afghanistan.

The Afghan comrades express their understanding of the decision to withdraw Soviet forces and affirm it once again, but, in conjunction with this, having soberly assessed the situation, point out that they cannot manage completely without our military assistance. Such assistance, in their opinion, could be rendered in forms different from today’s and on a limited scale, but, nevertheless, would be a serious support both practically and psychologically. The Afghan comrades believe that if, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the opposition is unable to capture the principal centers in a swoop, then the Peshawar “alliance of seven” and the Teheran “union of eight” will have to enter into negotiations with Kabul to work out the future government arrangement in Afghanistan, which they steadfastly refuse to do at this time. The most important thing, emphasize the Afghan friends, is to hold out for at least the first three-four months after the departure of the Soviet forces, after which the situation may gradually begin to shift to their advantage. Such an opinion is borne out by some remarks made by representatives of the opposition, in the course of contacts with Soviet representatives in Islamabad. By these remarks it was implied that if the government of Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine their current position of not recognizing it in the capacity of a negotiating partner.
In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, our departure from decisions, which have been made and announced, to complete the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that, throughout the world, is associated with us. Especially since the opposition, during the decisive period, may well manage to coordinate its actions for a given time, which is what the American and Pakistani military circles have been persistently urging them to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due to the fact that there is still no real unity within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness and memories of past “injustices” are transparent in the thinking of some Afghan leaders. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many ministers in his cabinet.

A most serious factor remains the fact that violations of the Geneva accords by Islamabad have acquired not just an open, but a flagrant character. Pakistani borderguards are directly participating in military operations on Afghan territory. Bombardments of bordering regions of Afghanistan are taking place, arms flow continuously, and armed bands are crossing over from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters of the Afghan opposition parties, their training centers and bases continue to function unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All of this is done by inertia [concerning policies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is unlikely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position to change the situation in the near future.

Both we and Afghanistan have been continuously, in a decisive manner, and citing concrete facts, condemning and continue to condemn such actions of the Pakistani government. Such a line is meant to be continued also in the future, including in the UN Security Council as well as in contacts with the Pakistani government itself.

1. The chief question on which depends the continuing evolution of the situation boils down to this: will the government be able to maintain Kabul and other large cities in the country, though above all the capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult; indeed, the main problems are not even military, but economic. It is very clear that the opposition plans to organize an economic blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of foodstuffs and petroleum products, and provoke discontent and even direct insurgence of the populace. Already, such a blockade is virtually being carried out by the forces of the opposition in the form of highway robberies and intimidation and bribery of drivers of Afghan ground-based freight vehicles destined towards Kabul. It should be pointed out that the present complications with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul are to a significant degree related to the fact that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad Shah, whose detachments present the greatest threat to the road between Kabul and Hairaton, was not carried out when the time was ripe.

At the present time, just the monthly requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15 thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and air transport. However, it is imperative to have stored provisions for at least 2-3 months, which would be controlled by the President and which would give the Afghan friends the possibility of feeling secure in this matter.

Since such large stores can be created only with the help of motor transport, we are talking about getting flour and other foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul highway. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if the road remains functionally secured until May, the survival of the regime is guaranteed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not be able to secure the normal functioning of the road without our help. We must proceed from the fact that a break in the functioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway cannot be allowed. In addition, special attention will have to be paid to the most vulnerable section of the highway, which is the Salang pass with its more than three kilometer-long tunnel.

In preparation for the delivery of such assistance it is necessary, during the remaining time, to intensify through all channels the condemnation of the actions of the opposition, which is obstructing the delivery of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Afghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress not on the fate of the present government, but on the situation of the population of these cities, which is seriously suffering as a result of such barbarous actions.

In principle, it is possible to consider the following scenarios:

First scenario. Citing the difficult situation of the civilian population, leave one division, i.e. approximately 12 thou. people, on the Hairaton-Kabul highway. The given scenario is hardly desirable, as a question may arise at the UN that we did not completely withdraw our forces. Despite the fact that Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva accords, one may assume that the majority of countries in the UN would not support us because, for many, the question of the military is at the crux of the problem.

Second scenario. Citing the threat of starvation in Kabul and other cities, appeal to the UN to urgently provide a shipment of foodstuffs and petroleum products to the cities and send the UN troops to maintain the highway in operation. Until the arrival of the UN forces, leave our military subdivisions in these positions to carry out strictly humanitarian functions - provide the population with foodstuffs and petroleum products. In conjunction with this,
affirm that the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent has taken place. Announce that, after the arrival of the UN forces, our subdivisions will immediately return to the Soviet Union.

However, this scenario is practically unfeasible, since the deployment of UN forces requires a decision of the Security Council, on which we cannot depend.

Third scenario. Withdraw all troops by 15 February, as planned; affirm this in the international arena with pronouncements by the governments of USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan. Then, under the request of the Afghan government with which it will appeal to the countries of the world, begin the escort of convoys of civilian cargo with the apportionment of Soviet military units for their defense. The escort of such convoys could start within approximately two weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of convoys by our units would appear to be a naturally humanitarian step. In addition, under this scenario, a number of sections of the road would have to be surmounted with a fight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all Soviet troops by February 15. Officially affirm the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent in a corresponding statement. But, under the pretext of transferring some posts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton-Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in some of the more important points, including in the Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise, on our part, about this action; note only that this is but a small number of Soviet military personnel who were slightly delayed by the fact that the Afghan side has not yet taken over from them the stated posts. After some time, as in the third scenario, begin escorting convoys to Kabul under our military protection.

Under all these scenarios we can begin with the fact that these operations would be undertaken by our regular units, but they must be formed on a volunteer basis, primarily from among military personnel who are serving out their duties in Afghanistan or those that have served their term and are now in Soviet Union. In conjunction with this, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles per month, partially in Afghan currency, for the rank-and-file and significantly increase the officer’s salaries as well.

Give international observers the right - and announce this widely - to verify whether we are actually escorting civilian goods. In the nearest future, talks should be held with the UN Special coordinator of humanitarian and economic assistance programs Aga Khan with the aim of using these programs and the mechanism of the Special coordinator in order to counteract the extremists’ plans to stifle Kabul and other large Afghan cities with an economic blockade.

In all of the four enumerated scenarios it is intended that at least an insignificant number of Soviet troops is to be left behind after 15 February 1989.

There still remains to be examined yet another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are withdrawn completely before 15 February, but we give the Afghan Side additional assistance, including financial, in the organization of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul highway using their own forces, up to the point of completely providing for these Afghan units for a determined time-period, though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to considerable difficulties, especially in ensuring a dependable convoy escort.

As for the Kabul airport, keeping in mind its importance, it is expedient to have there, with the conclusion of corresponding agreements with the Afghan Side, our own control tower staff, numbering up to 100 people.

2. From the side of the Afghan government a question has been raised concerning the continuation of air assaults and bombardments of the armed opposition forces carried out by Soviet aviation from our territory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The difficulty of this question is being explained to the Afghan comrades; they are being advised to think about how to make better use of the capabilities of their own aviation under the new circumstances. On the whole, our explanations have been received with understanding, but, at the same time, they say that in some of the more critical situations, the use of Soviet aviation may be simply indispensable. It appears that this question cannot be examined without taking into account all the internal and external factors.

3. The Afghan Side assigns serious significance to having at its disposal such powerful types of weapons as the R-300 rockets and batteries of “Hurricane” multi-rocket launchers. These questions evidently require a differentiated approach to this or another type of weapon, but the general line should be directed, inasmuch as is possible, towards a more complete satisfaction of Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind that the very fact of possessing such types of weapons would strongly reinforce our friends psychologically and give them confidence in their forces. Taking this into account, batteries of “Hurricane” have already been set up in the Special Guards and the RA [Republic of
Afghanistan] army. The R-300 rocket batteries, which are currently with the Soviet military contingent, may also be transferred to the Afghan Side after modifying them to an export model and after the preparation of Afghan personnel for use and maintenance of these units, which should be quickly carried out on our territory.

4. It would be expedient to positively decide the question concerning the use of the USSR border force capacities in the Afghan border zone, keeping in mind, however that the Soviet mobile border groups currently stationed there will not remain.

5. Lately, we have been doing quite a bit to give the Afghan friends economic assistance in accordance with exactly those difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This assistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with which both we and the Afghans met during its shipment and distribution, has without a doubt averted numerous undesirable turns in the situation’s development.

Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty of the Afghan situation, we must once again very carefully re-examine the current economic processes which are of the utmost importance to its internal political situation. We must determine what can be done additionally to improve the Afghan economy which is in a critical state and, in effect, on the brink of ruin; we must give operational assistance to solve the acute problems which are arising, in particular through the shipments if foodstuffs and goods of first necessity to Kabul and various provinces of the country, including Badakhshan.

6. In conjunction with all these measures, it is necessary, as before, to continue giving the Afghan Side assistance in ironing out relations with the opposition in Pakistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We must pay attention to every nuance of the opposition’s mood to catch the more suitable moments when we can use the necessary influence to split it, separating the “moderates” from the extremists. In particular, right now it is important to support the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General of the UN B. Sevan who has agreed to work towards the creation of a consulting panel for resolving the future government structure of Afghanistan.

Through our diplomatic channels, it will be necessary to take continuing steps in our work with all countries which are in one way or another connected to the conflict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

[BEGIN CONVERSATION]

Bush. Secondly, I would like to mention with appreciation, that you were very generous to give so much time for your conversation with Henry Kissinger. In a couple of days my assistant [Brent] Scowcroft will invite him to the White House in order to be informed about that conversation in detail, although we already know some details. Even though Kissinger was on a personal, not on an official trip, we would like very much to hear his story. We do not always agree with him on everything, but he visited you as a friend, and we will listen to him carefully.

Gorbachev. Thank you. I hope you will find his story interesting.

(END CONVERSATION)

Conversation was recorded by V. Sukhodrev.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Minutes of the Meeting of the HSWP CC Political Committee

31 January 1989

[On 23 June 1988, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Central Committee established a committee to analyze Hungary’s political, economic and social development during the preceding thirty years. The panel, headed by Imre Pozsgay, a politburo member and minister of state, included party officials and social scientists. After several months of examining pertinent archival documents, the Historical Subcommittee (one of four working groups) completed and discussed its final report at its meeting on 27 January 1989. Most sensationally, the report described what occurred in 1956 in Hungary as not a “counterrevolution” (as Moscow and the regime it installed in Budapest headed by Janos Kadar had long insisted) but a people’s uprising. This very point was announced by Imre Pozsgay in an interview on both the morning news program and the next day, on the most popular political journal of Hungarian Radio, “168 hours,” without any prior consultation with the political leadership. The issue triggered a serious crisis in the Party and eventually served as a very important catalyst in the transition process. The following excerpt reflects the first reaction of the Politburo members.]

(EXCERPT)

Imre Pozsgay: With regard to the specific issue, the subcommittee, headed by Ivan T. Berend, had a debate Friday morning, on the basis of a 102-page report.

I had no chance to read the document before the debate because it has just been given to me. Nevertheless, let me point out only one aspect of the debate, namely that six members of the Central Committee were present, and the leaders of two Party institutions. There was no argument about the incriminating assessment; on the contrary, the conclusion was drawn that a minimal public consensus—I merely interpret this, as I have no right to borrow others’ words—so, a minimal public consensus does not harm the identity of the Party, nor does it shatter the personal identity of those who tied their lives, career and behavior specifically to this struggle. Nonetheless, it can lead to social reconciliation and national consensus on certain bitter and still all too distressing issues, such as the whole situation since 1948-49, and especially its peak—or nadir, as others believe—the crisis and tragedy of 1956. The committee unanimously agreed on this issue. And finally we also agreed that this document, even before it is discussed by the Central Committee, has to be publicized, so that scholarly opinion, supported by wide masses of the Party, can be used to create a political direction. These were the fundamentals and basic motives of the committee. In a way it is an answer to the numerous questions, in fact asked from many sides, as to why the Central Committee did not discuss the issue first. According to the earlier procedure, this would indeed have been the way of handling such questions. However, I am convinced that this procedure is the very reason why the Party has been hoisted on its own petard, when it came to discussing similar issues.

As regards further connections and problems that the issue raises: Certainly, or rather undoubtedly, the ensuing political effect—even if it has the minimal consensus I have just referred to—is expected to become a bone of contention within the Party,
something that divides people and induces political polemics, although it will not hurt
even those who have won the Honor for the Socialist Fatherland for their sacrifices. The
committee has been aware of this fact from the very beginning, knowing that we cannot
get around this debate, that it has to happen, so in a way the cup of sorrows must be drank.
(...)

Mihaly Jasso: The vast majority is dumbfounded, and not because they have
heard the results of the scholarly research from the Historical Subcommittee, but because
they feel that a pillar of the institutionalized political system is about to be uprooted.
Party members feel that our political system is somehow based on 1956. And now they
have the impression that this foundation is being pulled out from under them. They think
that this slice of the past—1956—has to be assessed with subtle differentiation. But now
this assessment shows no sign of differentiation either. Figuratively speaking, they used
to make a fine cabinet with an axe, and now they are trying to do the same. [sic] I don’t
intend to be too poetic but I’m coming from the office where I got phone calls and letters
today, asking what we are going to call the monument on Koztarsasag Square? Who
sacrificed their lives there? Defenders of the people’s power? Resistance fighters of the
people’s uprising, or their opponents? It is all confused. What shall we call the Mezo
Imre Street? And so on. Because perhaps it was a people’s uprising that started the whole
thing but it led to something else. Given that, we need at least a subtle, differentiated
assessment of the whole period. The present one is not differentiated at all. This is
another extreme assessment that sets people far apart. If we start a debate on the issue,
which is now, of course, unavoidable, I think it will only result in separating some of the
party membership. It is a crude simplification but if we segregate party members into two
groups on the basis of this, there would be “pro-uprising” and “procounter-revolution”
members. Obviously I refer to the underlying political content. Perhaps we cannot avoid
the debate, but I am not sure that it has to be induced so radically at once. (...)

Rezso Nyers: The problem is greater, and we have to widen its scope. Is 1956
really the foundation of the Hungarian communist movement? If 1956 is our foundation,
I will not expect the movement to hold out very long, because it is a weak foundation
indeed. Our decisions and historical assessment of 1956 were driven by the spirit of the
time and not without controversies. While things were going smoothly, people tolerated
all this, but when times are hard, the same people seem discontent with what they
tolerated before. Therefore we should not consider 1956 as a foundation. 1956 was a
tragic event, a moment that manifested the prevailing crisis, and today we have to
conclude that in fact 1956 signified a more serious crisis than we thought at the time, or
even in 1957. We belittled the problem, but now we all agree—and I think there is a
consensus about it in the Party—that it was the materialization of a historical mistake.
(...) 

Consequently, I have to point out that it would be a serious mistake—especially
for the future of the Party—to tie our policy to the 1956 bandwagon.

We have to conclude, having read the document—I have read the document and
the material of the Committee debate as well—that Pozsgay’s statement and the exposé
of the Committee show a unanimous approach. They are in accord. Which does not
justify how the statement was publicized. I am still of the opinion that it was
disadvantageous, hasty and inaccurate. I hold to my opinion, even though there is no
fundamental controversy between the standpoint of the Committee and that of Pozsgay.
As to whether it was a “people’s uprising” or “counter-revolution,” my opinion is that a definition without controversy is impossible on this issue. Personally, I think that it was a people’s uprising; our declaration in December 1956 acknowledged it in the first paragraph, labeling it as the rightful discontent of the people. I do maintain, though, that hostile enemies gradually joined in, and they could have turned the wheel of history backwards, so the danger of counter-revolution was imminent. As to our opinion on 1956, I argue against the far-fetched criticism of Imre Nagy and his circle, and the significance of revisionism. … I declare with communist honesty, it was a mistake. It is not true that the revisionist group around Imre Nagy had such a vital role in the events … At that time, I myself accepted this interpretation. However, we become smarter, and now we see what went on. We now realize that the mistakes were more serious. We realize that it was wrong to think that between 1953 and 1956 Rakosi was a dime and Imre Nagy was a dozen, so to speak. In that debate, well, Imre Nagy was right. It is a matter of honesty, if someone thinks it over and believes that it is so, one should speak out forthrightly. And I do speak out. Imre Nagy was not a counter-revolutionary, he was not. If a Party ever, with their own…[unintelligible—Ed.] One just has to read his speeches. Where the hell do we find counter-revolutionary ideas with Imre Nagy? Nowhere, absolutely nowhere! And these are matters of honor. Rather, he was a sectarian. If he was still among us now unchanged, he would be more of a Stalinist. His role in the 1956 events remains debatable, it cannot be clarified. The Soviets were mucking around, which we swept under the carpet. Even today we cannot see the truth. I already know, however, that the Soviets had a lion’s share in the decision. Janos Kadar and the Politburo of the time took full responsibility, for which I respect them. However, they are far from being the only ones to blame. Their responsibility is without question, because it cannot be accepted either that a decision was made in Moscow, or that it was executed here. Unfortunately, though, I have to emphasize again that we won’t be able to come to terms with the question of 1956. Legally Imre Nagy was culpable, because he breached the law. It is not too moral, at a time when everybody is breaching the law—I was breaching it, and so was Janos Kadar—the lawbreakers themselves accuse and convict the weaker one on the basis of the sectarian law. These are not righteous things. All the same, those who did not live in that situation are unable to imagine how it was—and this is the dramatic aspect. I think, if we leave it as the focus of political debates, it would result in the serious weakening and a crisis of values of the communist movement. Consequently, we have to put history right; it can be corrected. Roughly according to the opinion of the committee, it can be corrected, but let me emphasize that the word “counter-revolution” should not be replaced with a single term, and it has to be decided who makes the correction. I think it is now time for us to try and come to some kind of political consensus. We cannot let the undulations of political life shatter the tenuously forming unity and co-operation of the Party and its leadership, so that other players take over while we eventually fall apart. I also mean that Pozsgay should not become the victim of this affair either. Yet Pozsgay should show more discipline and more mutual responsibility as well.

All in all, we should not let ourselves confront each other to an extreme. What do I think the possible action to take is? I believe that the Central Committee should be summoned and presented the material of the committee. The Pozsgay affair should not be presented on its own; it would be an impossible trial that wouldn’t lead to anything. I think that the documents of the subcommittee have to be submitted for debate, and only
then could it be discussed whether what he did was wise or not, and what action has to be taken in order to settle the debate. At the same time, principle issues of daily politics should be presented to the Central Committee, such as what should be done now in the question of the single-party system and the multi-party system. Things have passed over our heads. I cannot see another option other than that we accept the multiparty system. But we need to debate all this. And if we decide against the multi-party system, then that will be our decision, and everybody decides according to his conscience whether he takes the political responsibility for his decision. I do admit sincerely, I would take responsibility for both, even if I do not agree with the decision. It can be done intelligently. Retreat, however, is the worst thing one can do, it can only lead to our defeat. We have to do it sooner or later, anyway. (…)

All in all, I say that we take seriously the compilation of the committee, and consider their report worthy of being presented to the Central Committee. We suggest to the Central Committee that we publicize the documents of the committee. We’ll see if the Central Committee will accept the suggestion. (…)

In fact, the most serious and sensitive issue of our policy is quite palpable here, namely how we relate to the Kadar era, to the Kadar regime. In my opinion, it would be a mistake for reformers to entirely do away with the Kadar regime. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to canonize the policy of the Kadar regime and battle to the last man standing in defense of what we have created since 1956. Some in the Party have a leaning towards the latter view, while others are ready to prove and expose the mistakes. Neither of these should be embraced. We have to try to solve the problem rationally. If relevant circles, or the dominant circle of the Central Committee put the issue on the agenda, a consensus is possible. We should start working on activity programs, preparing for the multiparty system. We need these projects for creating a stabilization program that addresses today’s conditions, as well as more specific government programs. (…)

[Source: Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (MOL) [Hungarian National Archives, Budapest], M-KS- 288-5/1050 o.e. Translated by Csaba Farkas.]
Memorandum to Alexander Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission
(Marina Sylvanskaya)

February 1989

CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE USSR

Societies in Eastern European countries are beginning to change their character. Attempts to build socialism with Stalinist and neo-Stalinist methods, the spread [tirazhirovaniye] of which occurred in the region under consideration not without the active involvement of the Soviet side, ended up in a stalemate. This situation was expressed in an aggravation of contradictions and a growth of crisis developments. The degree and scale of conflicts vary: from the more or less hidden social-political tension, fraught with sudden explosions, to chronic crisis without any visible ways out, signaling the beginning of disintegration of the social-political system not excluding cataclysms as well. Such processes are irreversible; they are the result of the long-term evolution of the regime, and in a majority of countries they accompany a transition to a new model of socialism but also can lead to a collapse of the socialist idea. In the last year or year and a half the development of events in Eastern Europe has sharply accelerated and has acquired elements of unpredictability.

General characterization of social-political processes in the countries of Eastern Europe

Crisis symptoms are visible in all spheres of public life inside the countries as well as in relations among them.

In the economy the intensity of these symptoms varies from a slowdown of economic growth, a widening social and technological gap with the West, a gradual worsening of shortages in domestic markets and the growth of external debt (GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) to a real threat of economic collapse (Yugoslavia, Poland). Particularly dangerous is open and hidden inflation that has become a common phenomenon and only varies by its rate: creeping and galloping inflation is predominant, but one cannot exclude its escalation into hyperinflation (Poland, Yugoslavia). A “shadow economy” and corruption are gaining in strength everywhere and periodically surface in the form of scandals and swindles that carry political connotations.

In the political sphere the crisis manifests itself first of all in the dramatic weakening of the positions of the ruling communist parties, in some cases so dramatic that one can speak about a crisis of confidence in them. Some of these parties undergo an internal crisis: their membership is decreasing since rank-and-file members do not want to bear responsibility for decisions which they could never influence. The old social base is eroding. Infighting in the leadership threatens division (most probably in Yugoslavia; there are obvious symptoms in Hungary, [but] obliterated in Poland and Czechoslovakia). Under pressure from multiplying and intensifying alternative political structures (the embryos of new parties, clubs, and movements) the HSWP [Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party] and PUWP [Polish United Workers’ Party] have become so weak that they have to share power and accept a coalition form of government, [have to] agree to a
transition to a genuine multi-party system, and to the legalization of dissenting opposition forces. In somewhat other forms this occurs in the UJC [League of Yugoslav Communists]. Alternative forces are developing an international character. Conservatives are acquiring international contacts (for instance, in GDR, —SSR [Czechoslovakia], SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania]).

The sphere of ideology is very much affected. Its old forms block the renewal of the social system or provide a rationale for resistance to reform (GDR, Romania, Czechoslovakia). Strongly dogmatic social sciences are incapable of working out a convincing ideological rationale for long-needed reforms. In the public consciousness—particularly among the youth—apathy, hopelessness, [a] nostalgia for pre-Revolutionary (i.e. pre-World War II and even earlier) times, [and] a lack of faith in the potential of socialism are spreading. Extreme manifestations of these sentiments can be seen in increasing emigration (Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania). The positions of individual social groups are becoming dangerously radicalized; there is a growing trend towards anarchy and violence (Poland, Hungary, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia). The spread of video equipment, satellite broadcasting, and personal computers with printers is bringing about the explosion of an independent culture (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia).

A degradation of common ties is taking place in various forms. Interest in present forms of integration is visibly weakening as well as hopes to substantially increase its effectiveness through direct ties and cooperation in technology. Due to profound structural problems and flaws in the mechanism of trade cooperation, bilateral trade with the USSR is decreasing, which produces very negative consequences for the national economies of our partners and creates additional obstacles in the path of economic reforms (underutilized capacities in most countries [and] clearing [kliringovyie] inflation). In some cases inter-ethnic relations have grown worse: the Hungarian-Romanian conflict became open; mutual antipathy between Germans and Poles, Poles and Czechs, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians has increased.

The countries can be divided into two groups by the degree to which they display crisis tendencies.

In Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia crisis processes are developing intensely and openly: having broken to the surface once they have acquired a certain inertia. The acuteness of the social-political situation in these countries stems first of all from the mass scale of workers’ protests. “A new workers movement” is being born. Its scope is such that it is impossible any longer to treat the strikes as sporadic excesses any longer or, as was the case of Poland, to write them off as the influence of anti-socialist forces inside the country and abroad. The strikes are obviously escalating into an ongoing social conflict between the workers and the party and state techno-bureaucracy. Rank-and-file communists often actively take the side of strikers. The trade union movements are getting rapidly politicized (some symptoms of this latter process can also be observed in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia). Official trade unions are beginning to play the role of a legal opposition; independent trade unions are proliferating; trade union pluralism is taking root.

In all three countries living standards of very substantial parts of the population are falling, their incomes are shrinking to the social minimum and even further.
Simultaneously differentiation in income is becoming more pronounced, and a black market organization is emerging.

Public consciousness is coming to realize processes heretofore hidden from it, such as the fact of the continuing exploitation of wage labor. Some leaders of the UJC have publicly admitted the existence of the struggle for the redistribution of added value produced by workers, and their exploitation (in particular, through inflation). A discussion about specific forms of exploitation has begun in Poland.

The public consciousness of the working class and other working people is increasingly being formed [by forces and factors] outside of the ruling communist parties. The pressure “from below” plays an ambiguous role: by pushing the leadership toward reforms, it simultaneously curbs and even sometimes blocks attempts to revitalize the economy, to modernize the structure of public production at the expense of income growth and a reduction of living standards. When an ongoing crisis erupts from time to time (“crisis inside crisis”) without getting a peaceful and constructive resolution, problematic and even deadlock-type situations emerge as a result. The probability of social explosions is increasing.

The social-class nature of the ruling parties that are undertaking the turn toward radical reforms is in question now, since it is very problematic that they will be able to rely on the entire working class, particularly on its largest groups employed in the coal industry, metallurgy, ship-building, and other traditional industries which are undergoing a crisis in the whole world. Besides, it is well known that Marxist-Leninist parties traditionally see their historic mission first of all in expressing the interests of workers as the most progressive class whose interests objectively coincide with the interests of the workers. In contemporary conditions this understanding has increasingly complicated taking practical steps towards the revitalization and modernization of the economy, since the short-term material interests of the working class (or at least a substantial part of it—workers employed in physical labor) clash with longer-term interests of society as a whole: a change of the structure of public production in accordance with the requirements of the scientific and technical revolution [NTR] requires a unique “secondary accumulation at the expense of internal sources, that is, a temporary self-limitation in the area of consumption.” The governments of Poland and Hungary are seeking to accelerate the changes in the structures of public production by carrying out the policy of “socialist Thatcherism.” Since such a policy hurts substantial segments of the working class and moreover lacks convincing ideological justification, the workers, including rank-and-file party members, rise in protest, quoting previous ideological formulas.

The ruling parties are chronically and badly late in [providing the] necessary reaction to the course of social-political developments. None of them has so far proved to be capable of seizing the initiative. Apparently this is due to the lack of clear prospects for renewal [and] there is a lack of a contemporary socialist vision. So far this problem has been alleviated because of the absence of constructive alternative programs. But today the opposition has most obviously been attracting the intellectual potential of the countries (Poland, Hungary), and has been developing its own ideology and policy.

The developing situations in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland touch on geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the Soviet Union to varying degrees. Whatever the outcome of the Yugoslav crisis, it would only marginally affect our society, without any serious direct ideological effect. On the other hand, the course of events in Hungary
and especially in Poland will affect us directly and very painfully by buttressing the position of [our] conservative forces and breeding doubts on the chances of the survival of *perestroika*.

In Czechoslovakia, GDR, Bulgaria and Romania (all the differences in economic position notwithstanding) analogous internal social-political conflicts are still implicit, even though they have not yet manifest themselves distinctly, nevertheless they have for now a hidden [latent] character. They tend, however, to worsen, and there are telling symptoms that demonstrate [to political scientists] real harbingers of tension:

- Underfulfillment of excessively optimistic plans and programs (particularly regarding consumption), unexpected growth of inflation, declining indicators of living standards, proliferation of uncontrollable spontaneous processes in the economy.
- Growing dissatisfaction with the existing situation in the sphere of distribution of material goods and with equality of opportunity, aggravation of the problem of social justice.
- Intensifying discussions at party forums, more frequent resignations of politicians, reshuffling of personnel.
- Fermentation in the intelligentsia, particularly in its creative components.
- Exacerbation of the generational conflict.
- A moral crisis, proliferation of social pathologies (crime, drug addiction, etc.).
- Accumulating feelings of social frustration [*obdelennost*] (deprivation) in large social groups, spilling over into “witch hunts,” sometimes into aggressive ethnic conflicts, anti-worker, or on the contrary, anti-intellectual sentiments.

These symptoms are manifesting themselves in various combinations and in varying force. Social-political conflicts remain hidden largely due to harsh controls exercised by repressive structures over public life and to strict limitations on the mass media. But in some cases [these factors] are no longer sufficient to prevent acts of protest (in Czechoslovakia, GDR, and even Romania). Further tightening of the controls and persecutions can either trigger an uncontrollable chain reaction—all the way to an explosion (it is quite possible in Czechoslovakia)—or encounter a negative reaction of world public opinion and the introduction of very painful economic and political sanctions. For instance, the repressive totalitarian regime in Romania is increasingly finding itself in international isolation, and amicable contacts with N. Ceaucescu, while promising no advantages in relations with the SRR today [and] even less in the longer term, can only compromise politicians [who engage in such contacts] in the eyes of world public opinion.

**Forecast of Developments in the Situation**

In the countries of the first group the crisis has acquired visible forms and the sides in the conflict are lined up, but the prospect of further developments is not clear; there are several alternatives. There are none among them that would presuppose the preservation of traditional forms of governance by the ruling parties and their full control over society. Despite all assurances and words, real chances to keep developments in the
framework of socialist renewal are shrinking. The existing model of socialism can be transformed only with enormous difficulty into a more effective and modern social structure. There are serious obstacles to a resolution of the crisis situation with the fewest losses. Furthermore, deadlock and catastrophic scenarios are coming to the fore.

Poland

1. **Most favorable scenario:** The conclusion of a so-called anti-crisis pact at “roundtable” talks, which could mean an unstable compromise between the PUWP (and its allied parties), Solidarity (and the forces of the opposition intelligentsia) and the official trade unions (VSPS). [There should be a] gradual transition to a mixed economy, de-centralization, and privatization of “the giants of postwar industrialization” using shareholding capital and a transition to one or another version of a market economy. Movement towards genuine party-political pluralism (free elections, redistribution of seats in the Parliament, bringing representatives of the present opposition into the government, [giving them] access to mass media) could increase the support on the part of the population of the country and the West. The latter could ameliorate the situation with payment of the external debt [and] opening channels for new credits, which could somewhat reduce internal economic tension. However, even in this case workers’ protests would hardly be neutralized, therefore political instability would continue for a long time, periodically producing micro-crises. This would complicate the decisive and energetic program of reforms. The weakening of the PUWP would inevitably continue as a result of the ideological crisis and internal struggle, but it would take a more gradual course, in a form which could permit an explosion to be avoided. Relations with the USSR would remain ideologized while Poland would remain a member of the Warsaw Pact.

   Conditions for realization: preservation and consolidation of the authority of the present party-state leadership (W. Jaruzelski); containment of the pressure “from below” in a framework that would preclude radicalization of both trade union confederations.

2. **Pessimistic scenario:** Failure of the anti-crisis pact resulting from a clash between the conservative forces in the PUWP, radicalized VSPS and the extremist wing of Solidarity, while minimal political contacts between the party-government leadership and the opposition survive. A protracted “deadlock” situation. Slow and ineffective changes in the economy, de facto pluralism in society without effective mechanisms of making and implementing decisions. Growing elements of spontaneity [and] anarchy. Transformation of Poland into a chronic “sick man of Europe.”

3. **Deadlock scenario:** Failure of the anti-crisis pact with an aggravation of relations with the opposition. Rapid escalation of the conflict to an explosion (the most probable time in this case – the spring of 1989). Renewal of martial law or a situation approximating a civil war – “Afghanistan in the middle of Europe.”

4. Recently, the first weak symptoms of yet another scenario have emerged. It is close to the first but is related to the formation of a Christian Democratic Party of Labor which, hypothetically, may grow into a big political force if supported by Solidarity (in a role of a Catholic trade union) and the oppositionist Catholic intelligentsia. The
PUWP would probably welcome such a scenario since it could promise cooperation with the Church which seeks to avoid an explosion. Yet the paucity of information provides no clues as to the change of the position of the Church which has so far preferred to stay in the role of arbiter [treteyskiy sud’ya].

This last month produced good chances for development of events according to the first scenario. There is no absolute guarantee that it will be realized, since there are no assurances that the traditionalist forces would not dispute the policy [kurs] of the 10th Plenum of the CC PUWP at the forthcoming party conference, and that Solidarity would and could contain the rising mass protest and observe the two-year armistice. The specific conditions of Poland do not exclude the first and especially the second scenarios sliding back into a deadlock. The chance for an explosion in Poland is far greater than in other countries of Eastern Europe.

In a longer-term perspective even the most favorable scenario does not ensure preservation of the socialist choice. An evolution towards a classic bourgeois society of the type of Italy or Greece is highly likely.

**Hungary**

1. **Most Probable Scenario:** Radical reforms in the state sector of the economy, partial reprivatization of industries and agriculture, transformation of the economy into a mixed one, functioning on the basis of market relations. Further strengthening of organizational ties with the European Economic Community [EEC] and perhaps with the European Free Trade Association [EFTA], growing cooperation with Austria. Step-by-step rebuilding of the parliamentary system on the foundations of party pluralism. Along with the inevitable decline of cooperation with COMECON and formal continuation of membership in the Warsaw Pact, there will come a strengthening tendency towards neutralism and possibly a movement towards some kind of Danube Federation if this idea takes shape and gains support among Hungary’s neighbors.

   Conditions for realization: the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, as a result of considerable strengthening of positions of its reformist wing in its leadership and in the party as a whole, seizes the initiative in transformation of the social-economic and political structures; gradual formation of a coalition with the Social Democratic movement (not excluding the transition of a considerable number of the party members to the Social Democrats or the peaceful split into two parties). Even if the influence of other parties increases in the short run, the course of events will probably become a modification of the first scenario, since none of the movements can compete in strength and influence with the reformist circles of the HSWP and the forces of Social Democratic orientation.

2. **Pessimistic scenario:** Concessions to the conservative wing of the party which retains strong positions in the middle and lower ranks. Attempts to minimize deviations from the traditional scheme. Inconsistency and compromises in carrying out reforms. The growth of economic and political tension. Further decline of living standards, the growth of a strike movement, politicization of trade unions. Possible declaration of inability to pay the external debt, aggravated relations with creditors, including
international monetary and financial institutions. Creation of obstacles on the path to the legal constitution of some oppositionist parties and movements. Postponement of parliamentary elections. Further fall of authority of the reformist wing in the present leadership of the HSWP and of the supporting forces in the party and government apparatus. Weakening electoral chances of the HSWP (even as far as electoral defeat). Transition of initiative to alternative political forces. As a result, a return to the necessity of radical reforms, but under new, economically and politically less propitious circumstances.

3. **Deadlock scenario:** Collision of extremist forces: the conservative, dogmatic, and lumpen proletariat, gravitating toward opposition. Anarchy, terror. Establishment of a harsh regime, introduction of a state of emergency.

The first scenario would provide Hungary with the financial and economic support of the West in a scale sufficient to escape the crisis without a social cataclysm. The next development would signify an evolution of the social structure in the direction of the socialist ideal, but in a form which Social Democrats imagine it (chiefly the Austrian [Social Democrats]).

The possibility of development along the first scenario is still not excluded, but more probable is a middle path between the first and the second. An unavoidable complication in this case could direct events to a channel of the first scenario or increase the probability of a complete switch to the second.

The third is the least probable, but it is impossible to completely exclude it. A catastrophic development of events unintentionally provoked, for example, the introduction of public security forces into some domestic conflict, is even unimportant and marginal. This scenario is most quickly possible not as the result of an intentional confrontation after political pluralism is formalized but as a consequence of a spontaneous development of events that got out of control.

**Yugoslavia**

1. **The Most Favorable Scenario:** The realization of the new economic strategy of the UJC: formation of an open economic system, creation within the framework of the Federation as a whole of an “internal market”, encompassing goods, services, capital, and the labor force, serving to remove internal barriers to the path of the free circulation of the principal factors of production. Support of more or less close organizational contacts with the “Common Market.”

   Conditions for realization: receiving credits from the West, support for reforms by broad sectors of the population, and political unity of the public. Development along this path would ensure an escape from the crisis, but the results which it would bring are described in Yugoslavia in different ways, namely:
   
   − a unique post-capitalist society, preserving a system of self-management;
   
   − a recapitalization, that is, the transformation of the present system into another, where mixed, private, and foreign-ownership predominates and market logic operates. In this case the population could in time attain a high level of living.
conditions and partial social security in the same measure that a highly-developed capitalist society provides it.

2. *Pessimistic scenario:* Reform reaches a certain level then begins to go into reverse. If in the next 2-3 years it does not manage to overcome the obstruction on the part of the conservative dogmatists and everything boils down to the next compromise the opportunity will be maintained for a choice between the first and third scenarios; the chances of the first will fall and of the third will grow.

3. *Deadlock scenario:* Adherents of preserving the status quo at any price, supported by the army and state security organs try to create a “Titoist Stalinism”, that is, a “firm hand” regime, a dictatorship.

   A weakening of the position of the UJC is unavoidable in any case, but in the first scenario it would be the least. Whether pluralism will take final party and political forms is not yet completely clear.

   The first scenario at the present time is not likely because of a lack of political unity in society [and] serious ideological and national differences. It will not receive the necessary support from the political governing elite and will hardly win a majority of workers to its side. A post-capitalist society with elements of Yugoslav self-management evidently is as illusionary as the system itself.

   For now the most probable is apparently the second scenario, for the reforms will be made by the professional management level which has been in power for 40 years and developed the mechanisms of self-management and uses them successfully. Thereby the opportunity is preserved both for the first and the third scenarios.

   Preconditions for the third scenario recently show up all the more distinctly: in the political arena a potential dictator [Slobodan Milosevic] arises [and] all the more often the army begins to declare its support for him.

   The first scenario’s implementation is not yet out of question, but the most probable seems to be some kind of middle way between the first and the second scenarios. Inevitable aggravation of the internal situation in this case may propel events towards the first scenario or raise the chances of complete slide-back towards the second scenario. […]

   In a long-term perspective the present situation in the countries of the second group appears to be more dangerous for the fate of socialism, and crisis phenomena there will inevitably move from hidden to open form. Czechoslovakia is the first candidate. In Bulgaria and Romania (probably, also in the GDR) changes will come with a change of leaders which will occur from natural causes. The character and tempo of subsequent events will depend on the degree to which the new generation of leadership, willing to defuse the accumulated tension and raise personal prestige, comes to relax the grip of the repressive apparatus over society. Much depends on the character and rate of the future development of events. The available data provides no evidence for a substantive forecast of alternatives, but it seems to be obvious that the more the tension is driven inside, the higher the chances for an explosion in one of these countries, with all the ensuring consequences.
Czechoslovakia

With high degree of probability one can except rapid escalation as soon as this coming spring or in the fall. Causes: combination of strong public discontent with an unjustifiably harsh crackdown on recent demonstrations, with the first unpopular results of economic reforms (absence of bonuses in many unprofitable enterprises, etc.). Preventing such a course of events is possible by undertaking, at M. Jakes initiative, a decisive replacement of a considerable part of the current party-government leadership, removal of all publicly compromised people, joining efforts with L. [Czechoslovak Prime Minister Ladislav] Adamec and a beginning of practical steps towards socialist renewal and broad democratization. However, since, first, the General Secretary of the CC CPCZ has already twice failed to live up to public expectations and to declare himself an advocate of a new course, and, second, there is too little time left 12 for preparation of such a step, the chances for such a favorable outcome are minimal. Extrapolation of the current situation points to a crisis, during which order would be restored by force and all problems would again be driven inside.

In the course of further events one may expect a consolidation in the political arena of the country of the positions of a new political force—the Club of Socialist perestroika, headed by well-known leaders of the “Prague Spring” C. Cisar and Cernik who adhere to socialist positions. This group has a solid constructive platform and can expect an influx of a large number of supporters: possibly up to 500-750 thousand. In a struggle with this political adversary, the leadership of the CPCz has minimal chances for a victory. However, the struggle against the politicians and ideas of 1968 will be acute and will lead to a quick and sharp escalation of the crisis.

Romania

1. Favorable scenario: Changes take place in the leadership of the country. As a result, N. Ceaucescu is replaced by reasonable politicians capable of understanding and putting into practice the ideas of radical reforms and a renewal of socialism. There are favorable preconditions in Romania for the use of market relations, a relatively dynamic restructuring, and modernization of the economy with a real liberation of economic initiative and the creation of a multi-sector competitive economy.

2. Middle-deadlock scenario: The present leadership of the country or continuity of policy remains. If the resources that are freed as the external debt gets paid off are used to reduce social tension, then it is possible to maintain general political stability for quite a while, while maintaining the political problems of the country and its further lagging behind in scientific and technical progress. If, however, the leadership chooses to ignore the task of improving the living standards of the population and diverts the liberated resources for the realization of new ambitious projects, then one cannot exclude a social explosion. In case the processes of renewal in other socialist countries by that time have not proven the feasibility of the policy of reform, there could be the danger of a decisive shift of the country in the direction of the West (including its exit from the Warsaw Pact) [as the] population has become disenchanted with socialist values and was traditionally brought up in the spirit of
community with the Latin [romanski] world. Financial and material support from the West, highly probable if there are real changes, may prove to be very effective for a country possessing a good deal of natural and economic resources.

Since the regime still has not exhausted its resources and has recently been accumulating the experience of combined repressive measures and social maneuvering to maintain social stability, the second scenario seems to be more likely. In its favor is a relatively low level of national self-consciousness and the absence of organized opposition in Romania. At the same time, an obvious irrationality of the policy of the current leadership produces growing dissatisfaction not only on the grass-roots level, but even among the ruling elite [verkhushka]. Therefore, a possibility of some kind of changes “from the top” cannot be excluded.

**German Democratic Republic**

The conservative nature of the party leadership, the sectarian and dogmatic character of its positions on ideological questions, authoritarianism and harsh control of the repressive apparatus over the society are weakening the authority of the party and heightening tensions in the country, as well as negativist sentiments among the population. Nevertheless the current policy may survive a change of the leadership for some time.

There is no formal center of opposition in the GDR, although non-conformist movements with more or less formalized platforms do exist. So far they do not represent any force capable of applying a palpable pressure from below or to destabilize the situation. With a degree of probability one can surmise that there are forces in the current ruling apparatus who not only can evaluate the situation soberly and analyze critically, but who can work out a constructive program of changes. Reformist sentiments most likely do not come to the surface because potential advocates of a new course do not have sufficient assurances that the process of renewal in the USSR is irreversible. Besides they understand that deep reforms in the GDR will hardly remain an internal affair and may trigger a change in the status quo in the center of Europe.

With this in mind, a perestroika in the GDR, if it occurs, will require from the USSR and other socialist countries a reevaluation of a number of established positions and perhaps a reappraisal of its interests in the center of Europe. Under conditions of democratization and glasnost’ this question will probably become the central one and its resolution will depend on the determination of the [GDR] leadership in carrying out reforms. In the long run one can foresee the proclamation of such goals as the creation of a unified neutral German state on the basis of confederation. An intermediate slogan “one state—two systems” may be also advanced.

**Bulgaria**

Latent ferment and differentiation of social-political forces are present. So far they manifest themselves in local, impulsive outbreaks of resistance to official ideology
and the concept of social development, without growing into any significant movements. Further behavior [dinamika] and the directions of social-political shifts will be determined primarily by economic trends.

The leadership of the country has worked out a concept of economic reform, but practical measures for its realization have not yet been sufficiently prepared, so real results ought not be expected in the immediate future. More likely is a deterioration of the economic situation, particularly because of growing indebtedness to the West and the threat of an inability to pay, which would inevitably bring about unwanted social, and then political consequences. Against this background, hotbeds of tensions might proliferate, including strikes, particularly among unskilled and low-skilled workers.

The ideological influence of the party on the society is declining. A mood of opposition is intensifying among intellectuals who resent the use of force against ecologists and the persecution of a number of scientists for critical speeches. There are seeds of alternative movements and extremist elements are becoming more active. Alternative political forces are still weak and not organized, but they can broaden their social base.

Withdrawal from the political scene of the present number one in the Party may provide an impetus for intra-party differentiation between the supporters of the old leadership and those who seek a genuine renewal. Forces capable of carrying out more balanced and reasonable policy do exist in the party, they enjoy enough authority, but they will face a difficult legacy.

The overall trend of social-economic and political development of the country tends toward the Hungarian scenario with certain differences, time disparities, national specifics and an eclectic stratification of experience of other countries. The fate of the latter [Hungarian] experiment may exercise a serious influence on future developments in Bulgaria.

**Possible consequences for the USSR**

The prospect of the weakening of the positions of the ruling parties including their removal from power, its transfer into the hands of other political forces, decline of Soviet influence on the countries of Eastern Europe, [and] drawing them into the orbit of economic and political interests of the West require the formulation of the most rational and reasonable reaction of the Soviet Union. We face a choice: to thwart the evolution described above or take it in stride and develop a policy accepting the probability and even inevitability of this process.

Attempts to thwart the emerging trends would be tantamount to fighting time itself, the objective course of history. In the long term these kind of steps would be doomed and in the short run would mean wasting means and resources for an obviously hopeless cause. Attempts to preserve the status quo in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, which has lost its objective foundations, as well as the support of conservative forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria will lay an excessive burden on our economy, for the price of maintaining existing relations will increase in time. The use of forceful pressure on our part will inevitably reinforce the conservative wing in the upper echelons of power, slowing reforms where they have begun, [and] worsening the crisis.
Social-political tension in the societies will increase, anti-Soviet sentiments will grow stronger, which might spill over into balancing on the brink of a very acute social-political conflict with an unforeseeable outcome. The direct forceful intervention of the USSR into the course of events on behalf of the conservative forces that are alienated from the people, most evidently signify the end of perestroika, the crumbling of trust of the world community in us, but will not prevent a disintegration of the social-economic and social-political systems in these countries, will not exclude mass outbreaks of protest, including armed clashes. In this, not only nationally isolated events, but mutually interacting, “detonating” explosions can be expected.

In the framework of possibilities opened by new thinking and cooperation between the USSR and the United States, East and West, “architects” of American foreign policy can be seen as changing their priorities. They prefer the support of perestroika in the USSR and the creation of an external environment favorable to its success. Serious Western politicians warn against playing on problems of the socialist community [or] its disintegration which, in their opinion, can bring about unforeseeable consequences for the Western world. Responsible Western circles are coming to the conclusion that by cooperating with reformist forces they can achieve more than by attempting to pull individual socialist countries from the sphere of influence of the USSR.

Working through [the options for] a future Western strategy towards Eastern Europe, bourgeois political scientists and some think tanks consider a scenario of “Finlandization” of a number of countries of the region.

What could be the possible consequences of such a scenario for the USSR? The following aspects should be considered: military, international political, internal political, economic, and ideological.

1. Poland will certainly not leave the Warsaw Pact, since this is against its national, state, and geopolitical interests. Hungary will also hardly raise this issue in the foreseeable future. The forthcoming withdrawal of a part of the Soviet troops stationed on the territories of both countries will significantly reduce the political acuteness of this problem. The GDR will also not raise the question of leaving the Warsaw Pact, since its party and state cadres consider this organization as one of its mainstays. Only in the distant future, if détente and the construction of a “common European home” progresses sufficiently far, might the issue of a unified German confederate state be put on the agenda. From the international angle this will most likely end up with the neutralization of both parts of Germany and the establishment of special relations of the FRG with NATO and the GDR with the Warsaw Pact. The positions of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia depend on many uncertain factors, but they will hardly leave the Warsaw Pact in the foreseeable future. If relations with us worsen, the Romanian leadership may take up this issue, but with skillful ideological orchestration of this step we will not really lose anything since geopolitical location will force self-isolated Romania to consider our interests. In the case of Yugoslavia, as it is well-known, the question of the Warsaw Pact does not figure at all.

So it is not necessary that the Warsaw Pact—at least in the foreseeable future—sustain significant losses, and the countries of Eastern Europe which are undergoing today serious transformations will stay in alliance with us.
2. As long as new foreign policy trends emerge in these countries of Eastern Europe with which the US and the West associated the special hopes of their differentiated policy, the new foreign policy tendencies taking shape [in] the USSR can consciously seize the initiative from the West, as well as from the oppositionist, social-reformist forces inside these countries (Poland, Hungary) by consciously adopting a certain degree of “Finlandization” of these countries. Such a policy will demonstrate the seriousness of our global aims to get involved in world economic, political, and cultural relations. Renunciation of the dikta with regard to socialist countries of Eastern Europe will nurture a more benevolent image of the USSR in the public opinion of these countries and around the world, and it will make the US seriously correct its foreign policy towards Eastern Europe.

   The very chance that European socialist countries may take an intermediary position on the continent will intensify the interest of Western Europe both in the maintenance of economic and political stability of Eastern Europe, and in the stimulation of the process of disarmament and détente on the continent and around the world. Inevitable consequences of this will be the growth of the independence and significance of the European factor in world politics and economics, which will help the efforts of the Soviet Union aimed at containing an anti-Soviet consolidation of the Western world and at developing a “common European home.” The economic burden of the USSR will be alleviated. Anti-Soviet and nationalist influences will operate on the shrunken ground, and the authority of the Soviet Union and its ideological-political influence on the broad strata of the population will grow— of course, if the political shift is viewed as a result of our conscious decision and not a result of the pressure of hostile forces. This will be a “revolution from above” in foreign policy which will prevent a “revolution from below.”

3. It cannot be excluded that in some countries of Eastern Europe the crisis has gone so far and reforms have come so late that the ruling parties will not be able to retain power or will have to share it in a coalition with other political forces. By itself the fact of a transfer of power to alternative forces does not mean an external and military threat to our country. On the contrary, history gives examples when the Soviet Union developed relations with the non-communist leadership of Eastern European countries that were not too bad. The normal political activity of communist parties (as one of several political parties) should not instill fear in non-communist governments that, under the guise of international aid there will be a violation of popular sovereignty with a possible violation of its wishes expressed through free elections. Guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries [and] respect for their political stability should be seen under present circumstances differently than in 1950s-1970s, for we ourselves have recognized the need for a different understanding of socialism in principle, have stopped trying to expand over the entire world the model that existed in our country, [and] we have begun to realize the need for accounting in the socialist model for some basic characteristics of the Western mode of development (market, competition, civil society, civil liberties, etc.).

   There is no question, of course, of renouncing the support of communist and workers’ parties, but an obligatory precondition for such a support should be voluntary recognition of their leadership by their people, their legitimation. They should pay as any other party in a normal democratic society for the loss of trust. The
same logic dictates to us the need for the support of business, civilized contacts not only with those political parties in the countries of Eastern Europe which are currently at the helm, but also with the internal opposition, constructive opposition in society—the same as our practice is toward non-socialist states. Unwillingness to accept contacts with alternative forces in these countries could be interpreted as a form of interference into internal affairs, i.e. something which we have rejected as a matter of principle.

4. The objective outcome of the natural development of the trend towards “Finlandization” could be a new, middle-of-the road position of the East European states, since they, according to their internal order, the nature of economic ties and real international position would pass from the sphere of monopolistic influence of the USSR into the sphere of mutual and joint influence of the Soviet Union and European “Common Market.” It is not excluded that in the foreseeable future the European Economic Union will provide the status of an associate member to some countries of Eastern Europe. They could in this case become the first trailblazers in the process of integration between East and West. This process not only poses no threat to the interests of the USSR, but, on the contrary, will allow [us] to multiply the benefits we receive today from our cooperation with Finland and Austria by linking with Western markets, the achievements of Western science, equipment, and technology. When a common market starts functioning in Western Europe in 1992, East European countries drawn into the orbit of the EU may facilitate access to this sphere for us.

5. In a new situation we will have to liberate ourselves from some persistent ideological stereotypes, for instance from the assumption that only a communist party in power can provide guarantees for the security of Soviet borders. We will have to rethink the notion of a “world socialist system.” But the utility of these [notions] was purely fictional; it existed only in a realm divorced from reality [zhizn’], in the didactic ideology which we have been striving to overcome. Consequently, the rejection of such categories and dogmas may only promote a new system of ideological coordinates that are emerging in the process of perestroika and the formation of a new political thinking.

An optimal reaction of the USSR to the evolutionary processes taking place in Eastern Europe would be, as it turns out, an active involvement which would put them [the processes] under control and would make them predictable. Even if some decline of Soviet influence in Eastern European affairs takes place, this would not cause us fatal damage, but, perhaps on the contrary, resulting from self-limitation, would put our goals in a rational harmony with our capabilities. For we speak about a voluntary abandonment of only those levers of influence that are incompatible with the principles of international relations proclaimed by the Soviet Union in the spirit of “new thinking.”

Of course, such a turn of events may produce collisions and conflicts, for instance if openly anti-Soviet, nationalistic groupings get legalized in this or that country. But their persecution and keeping [them] in the underground will only help them gain in popularity, but [their] surfacing, against the backdrop of our restrained policy and with thoughtful criticism of them from friends of the USSR will lay bare the lack of perspective and short-sightedness of anti-Soviet assumptions.
Favorable international conditions for the progress of reforms in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe will give a powerful side effect to the process of internal perestroika in the USSR. Structural modernization of their economies [and] the development of market relations will help to overcome the elements of parasitism in their economic relations with the USSR and to transfer them onto the healthy ground of mutual profitability.

Possible practical steps of the USSR

In the light of the aforementioned, the following measures seem to be advisable:

− Working out a strategic program to develop our relations with East European socialist countries in the framework of a new model of socialism and a proportional reflection of this program in official documents and speeches.

− Advancement of our proposals to reform the Warsaw Treaty Organization, stipulating a larger role for the fraternal countries in the leadership of the Warsaw Pact, creation of regional commands (the example of NATO) under the leadership of representatives of the appropriate countries. This would help to “tie” them into the Warsaw Pact, which in practice is still regarded as a predominantly Soviet formation.

− A further gradual reduction of our military presence in Eastern Europe taken at our own initiative and by agreement with the host countries, working out a schedule for the withdrawal of troops, the creation of the most propitious conditions for demilitarization of Central Europe (and its possible neutralization), [and] reduction of American presence on the European continent.

− Development of bilateral consultations on mutually beneficial measures permitting an alleviation of the consequences of restructuring in the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly where strong tensions might lead to an upheaval.

− In case appropriate proposals are made, we should agree to some form of continuous and periodic consultations with West European countries and the US on the issues of prevention of upheavals in one or another country of Central and Eastern Europe.

− Introducing the practice of genuine consultation on the issues of foreign policy with our allies instead of informing them about decisions that have already been adopted.

− Carrying out a serious analysis of the activities of Soviet embassies in Eastern European socialist countries, in some cases leading to replacement of ambassadors and leading officials of the embassies who act against the interests of our foreign policy in its new phase. Special attention should be paid to our cadres in the countries where potential escalation of tension and even upheaval is possible. During the replacement of cadres we should send to these countries those officials whose appointment will be taken as a sign of the attention [and] high priority the USSR has for relations with socialist countries.
When arranging summits in socialist countries, one should borrow the methods utilized in leading capitalist countries (organization of “assault landings” [desanty] of leading Soviet scientists, cultural figures, etc.).

It is necessary to work out without delay an integrated line of conduct on the issues of “blank pages” in relations with each East European country (We should not ignore the existing negative consequences that resulted from our postponement of the resolution of these problems with regard to Poland and Hungary).

It is highly important to radically change our information policy with regard to events in socialist countries of Eastern Europe, to cover events in an objective light and to explain the processes that are taking place there, since it is equivalent to the explanation and justification of measures that lay ahead for us in carrying out our economic and political reforms.

While covering events in fraternal countries, responding to the speeches of their leaders, we should express a manifest support to those pronouncements which signal their acceptance of reformist ideas (particularly with regard to the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania), thereby leading [them] to understand with which forces and trends the sympathies of the Soviet Union lie.

Any initiatives associated with the popularization of Soviet publications merits support. Proposals of our embassies in some countries to decline such support are clearly in contradiction with our interests.

Some conclusions

Overcoming the crisis process in the countries of Eastern Europe presupposes outright de-Stalinization. This should encompass both their internal life as well as their relations with the Soviet Union. The model of economic and political development imposed on these countries after 1948 has clearly exhausted its capabilities. The search for more auspicious ways and means of development is leading to the rethinking of the socialist ideal, including the revival of those assumptions which had formed in communist and workers’ parties of East European countries in 1945-1948 (mixed economy, parliamentary democracy, etc.). This means a return to a natural historical social progress that stems from national specifics of each country, instead of [one] deformed by external pressure. To a certain degree one can speak about the end of the postwar era, a partial overcoming [preodoleniye] of the Yalta legacy and the split of the world into two hostile camps, [and] about the gradual formation of a more varied and simultaneously more united Europe.

From the viewpoint of the world socialist perspective any attempt to stop this evolution by force could have the gravest consequences: the inevitable sliding back of Eastern European countries to the rank of poorly-developed countries (the so-called “fourth world”), the undercutting of the socialist idea in all its versions, including providing neo-conservatism in the West with new cards to attack social achievements of the workers. Besides, Eastern Europe will inevitably get “flashpoints” and paradiktatorial [paradiktatorskiye] regimes which would continuously draw off the material resources of the Soviet Union and would practically exclude the prospect of renewal of socialist
society in our country. However, the peaceful (without serious upheavals) evolution of East European states would improve to a great extent the situation in the world and broaden international relations. Chances would thereby grow for an accelerated development in Eastern Europe, the use of certain socialist elements that can be found in practice in highly-developed capitalist countries and, as a whole, the prospect of the formation of humanistic and democratic post-capitalist societies in accordance with the socialist ideals would be preserved.

[Source: Donation of Professor Jacques Levesque; copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translated by Vladislav Zubok and Gary Goldberg.]
Memorandum from the International Department of the Central Committee of the
CPSU to Alexander Yakovlev

February 1989

Soviet Union
Communist Party
Central Committee

THE STRATEGY OF RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

1. Our relations with socialist countries, including the allies of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization, entered a difficult critical, stage. The transition to the principle of
equality and mutual responsibility, which began in April 1985 and was affirmed
during the Working Meeting in Moscow in 1986, gave us an opportunity to remove
many layers and eliminate perceptions of our conservatism. Perestroika, the
development of democratization, [and] glasnost, confirmed the role of the Soviet
Union as the leader in the process of socialist renewal. More and more, we are
influencing our friends by our own example, by political means.

However, having broken with the previous type of relations, we have not yet
established a new type. And the problem is not only that the process of restructuring
the interactions between the socialist countries on the basis of “balance of interests,”
which we have proclaimed, is objectively difficult, but, subjectively, it creates an
impression in the eyes of our friends that we are abandoning them, retreating from the
priority character of relations with socialist countries. The problem is that the
transition to the “balance of interests” is seriously aggravated by the prolonged crisis
of the model of socialism which developed its main features in the Soviet Union in
Stalin’s time, and was then transferred to the countries that were liberated by us, or
with our decisive participation. Their political system still suffers from a lack of
legitimacy to this day, and the stability-oriented socio-economic system is incapable
of giving an adequate response to the challenge of the scientific and technological
revolution.

The relaxation of tensions, the diminishing of the threat of war, to which the
socialist countries contributed in a decisive way, caused deep changes in their
national security priorities. The economic factor, the ability of a country to join and to
assimilate into the world economy, moved to the top of their priorities, for not a
single country can overcome the growing gap individually, but socialist economic
integration is clearly in a stalemate, so that if the countries stay with it, they would
risk being left out of world development for the foreseeable future. This constitutes
the main national interest of the majority of the socialist countries right now, and it
should be primarily taken into account in our relations with them.

The European socialist countries found themselves in a powerful magnetic field
of the economic growth and social well-being of the Western European states.
Against this background, on the one hand, their own achievements grew dim, and on
the other hand, the real problems and difficulties that exist in the West are practically
imperceptible. The constant comparing and contrasting of the two worlds, of their
ways of life, production, intellectual cultures, entered our daily life thanks to the mass media, and there is no way around it. And we are speaking about the countries in which they still remember the times when they were close or on the same level of development with the Western European countries. The influence of this magnetic field will probably grow even stronger with the beginning of functioning of the European Common Market [in 1992].

As a consequence, in a number of socialist countries, the process of rejection of the existing political institutions and the ideological values by the societies is already underway now. Nonconformism is spreading more and more widely among the youth, and it is moving from a passive, kitchen level toward a civil and political one.

2. The difficult and transitional character of the present period is that the ruling parties cannot rule in the old way any more, and the new “rules of the game”—of reconciling the group interests that are pouring out, of finding a social consensus—have not been worked out yet. And to the extent that this process is postponed and prolonged, the parties could find themselves in more and more difficult situation.

Against the background of the general tendencies that are observable in all socialist countries, there are specific features of individual countries, [a fact] which requires a differentiated response from us.

In Poland and Hungary events are developing in the direction of pluralism, toward a creation of coalition, parliamentary forms of government. In these circumstances, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSPWP) and the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) can count on preserving their positions only in a framework of political alliances. A lot will depend on whether they are able to attract a part of the opposition to constructive cooperation. Taking into account the fact that a considerable part of the population of Poland is tired of crises, the probability of an evolutionary development here is higher. In Hungary, at the same time, notwithstanding their seemingly better living standards, the situation might unfold in most unexpected ways.

Some of the party activists in both the HSPWP and the PUWP expressed their willingness to use extremely forceful measures in case of a rapid deterioration of the situation. There is no unity of opinion on all of these issues in the leadership of the HSPWP and the PUWP, therefore we should expect the rise of factional fighting there.

In Czechoslovakia the tension has been rising considerably recently. Here the “1968 syndrome” is still present, which interferes with the party’s ability to define its position toward perestroika, especially in the sphere of democratization and glasnost.

A significant part of the leadership leans toward employing administrative measures in the struggle against opposition sentiments. In general, there is a tendency to begin changes in the economy and to postpone the reform in the sphere of democratization and glasnost’ to a later stage.

The stabilizing factor is that so far they managed to preserve a relatively high standard of living in the country, although they achieve it with more and more effort now.

In Bulgaria, there is, in essence, a simulation of perestroika, which is to a large extent a consequence of Todor Zhivkov’s personal ambitions. The loud declarations about a comprehensive reconsideration of Marxist-Leninist theory, and about the creation of a principally new model of socialism lead in practice to endless
reorganizations, shuffling of personnel, and to the further tightening of the screws. All this discredits the Party, socialism, and casts a shadow on our perestroika. Nonetheless, T. Zhivkov still controls the situation rather well by employing methods of political manipulation, and by relying on a well-developed administrative apparatus, even though discontent is growing in the Party and in the country.

In the GDR a particularly complex situation is developing against the background of seeming well-being. Even though the GDR can be distinguished from other socialist countries by the better state of the economy and standard of living, the economic situation of the country is deteriorating. There is the debt pressure and the growing dependence on the FRG. The party leadership, to a large extent under the influence of personal ambitions, is striving to avoid the problems of renewal. In giving critical assessments of the conservatism of the GDR leadership, one has to keep in mind that it has some objective basis. The GDR was founded not on a national, but on an ideological, on a class basis, and therefore a rapid transition to democratization, glasnost’, [and] openness might be accompanied by special problems in this country.

In Romania, there is still the oppressive atmosphere of the personality cult of Ceausescu’s authoritarian rule. Striving to isolate the country from our influence, he is now trying to dress in the robes of a “fighter for the purity of socialism,” and indirectly puts forth arguments against us. Some eruptions of discontent are possible in the country, but it is unlikely that they will become widespread at the present time. The situation will, most likely, change only with Ceausescu’s departure, which could be accompanied by quite painful developments.

Yugoslavia entered a phase of political crisis in the context of very deep economic problems and national contradictions; this could lead to a substantial weakening of the positions of the UJY [League of Yugoslav Communists], and even to a fracture of the federation.

3. Several possible scenarios for further development of socialist countries are distinguishable now. One of them is a smooth movement of society toward democratization and a new form of socialism under the leadership of the ruling parties. Under this scenario, some concessions regarding the issue of authority, significant growth of self-government, strengthening of the role of representative organs in political life, bringing the constructive opposition into running society, and even possibly its [the Party] turning into one of the forces contesting for power, cannot be excluded. This road toward a parliamentary, or a presidential socialist republic in some countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) would be preferable to us. If the initiative for democratic changes originates with the ruling party, the chances of preserving internal stability and obligations to allies are very high.

Another scenario—is a way of leaps and bounds, which would be a direct continuation of the preceding development, when the ruling party offers a new portion of political concessions after the next mini-crisis. This scenario lets us avoid the worst—a political eruption—but it moves the Party away, to the curbside of political life, and strengthens the pessimism and the skepticism of socialism, stimulates the demands of the opposition, and gradually prepares society for leaving the framework of socialism. The transition of a country to a traditional mixed economy and free play of political forces would not, in all cases, lead it to abandon its
obligations to the allies, but in such a case the foreign policy orientation of that country would become a subject of intense political struggle.

Finally, a third way is also possible—preservation of the existing power relations in society along with suppression of the social and political activity of the masses. Under this scenario, it would be characteristic to undertake an openly conservative course, limited reforms, mostly in the management of the economy, and active non-acceptance of Soviet perestroika. In the future, such a course does not exclude a spontaneous resolution of the crisis situation via a social explosion with unpredictable consequences for the country’s internal and foreign policy. The main catalyst of such a crisis could be an increase in the dissatisfaction of the population as a result of economic deterioration and worsening living standards.

4. In this critical, transitional period, our relations with socialist countries continue to remain our priority. But not in the sense which we implied before, when the Soviet Union and its allies were, in essence, in international isolation, and so the relations with each other considerably outweighed our ties with the rest of the world. Since then, the new political thinking, the energetic efforts undertaken by the USSR and its allies in recent years have rapidly changed the international situation. It is natural that the relative weight of our relations with the socialist countries in our foreign policy became different. However, that does not change the fundamental fact that the degree of our interdependence with the socialist countries remains higher than that with the rest of the world, and that the internal stability and the influence of socialism in world affairs depend on that.

From a geopolitical point of view, the importance of European socialist countries for the Soviet Union was determined by the fact that from the very beginning they played a unique role of a security belt, which created a strategic umbrella [prikrytiye] for the center of socialism. Today, notwithstanding all the changes in the international situation, this role of Eastern Europe, and especially of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, remains unchanged to a certain extent.

It is a complicated question—what could and should be the forms of our influence on the socialist countries under the new conditions?

Authoritarian methods [and] direct pressure have clearly outlived themselves. In the political sphere, even in the case of a sharp deterioration of the situation in one of the countries—and we cannot exclude such a possibility today—it is very unlikely that we would be able to employ the methods of 1956 and 1968, both as a matter of principle, but also because of unacceptable consequences. Use of force would be admissible only in one case—if there were a direct and clear armed interference of external forces in the internal developments of a socialist country. Therefore, essentially, our only methods of leverage could be our political and economic ties.

5. The state of economic relations is assuming growing political importance. Their role is evident for the majority of socialist countries. And for us they have a great importance as well also. We should decisively discard the stereotype of those countries as our parasites [nakhlebniki]. In contradistinction to routine perceptions, the economic effects of our trade with European COMECON countries is rather favorable for us. It can be seen from the following examples.

Share of goods imported from the COMECON countries in the overall volume of goods consumed in the USSR:
Metal rolling machinery—40-50%; food industry equipment—40%, textile industry equipment—50%, chemical industry equipment—35%; lumber and woodworking equipment—about 30%; printing industry equipment—more than 40%; meat, meat products, vegetables and other produce—up to 10%; non-food consumer products—10-15%.

According to our calculations, we get up to 4 rubles of profit for each ruble of the value of the oil sold in the COMECON countries (the effectiveness of oil exports to these countries in 1987 was 493%). Apart from that, by buying food products and consumer goods in those countries, we have a substantial budgetary profit when we sell them in the USSR at our retail prices. Thus in 1987, for each ruble of expense for the import of meat and meat products we had the following profit from domestic sales—96 kopecks, cotton textiles—1.76 rubles, coats and dresses—2.24 rubles, leather shoes—2 rubles, personal care items—2.92 rubles, china—2.81 rubles, furniture—89 kopecks, and so on.

The conditions for grain purchases, in particular, in the countries of COMECON (Hungary, Bulgaria) are more favorable for us than on the world market. For example, we need to sell approximately 1.45-1.5 tons of oil to buy a ton of wheat on the world market for convertible currency; to buy it in the COMECON countries mentioned above, we would need to sell approximately one ton of oil.

At the same time, the old forms of economic cooperation have been to a large extent exhausted. The volume of trade is decreasing. The USSR is already unable to satisfy the demand of the COMECON countries for increases of deliveries of fuel and raw materials; and on a number of vitally important resources—oil, for example—we are actually planning to decrease the deliveries in the coming five-year period. We are also unable to provide these countries with modern technology. As a result of drop in prices for energy resources (mostly oil), by the end of the next five-year period, the Soviet Union could end up with a negative trade balance with European COMECON countries of more than 7 billion rubles.

The issue of a transition to integration has already been raised. It is especially acute for our COMECON partners. Without actively joining the processes of international economic integration they are simply incapable of ensuring a radical renewal of their economies. It appears that the strategic goals established for this sphere earlier—the policy of creating a COMECON common market and appropriate instruments (convertibility of currencies, wholesale trade, and others) continue to be fully relevant. However, their realization has been unsatisfactory. A multitude of joint decisions notwithstanding, industrial cooperation is clearly stagnant. The comprehensive program of scientific and technological cooperation of the COMECON countries, which raised such hopes, has been practically wrecked.

Following the Working Summit in 1986 the joint work of COMECON countries picked up somewhat. Direct ties between enterprises were developed and joint enterprises were established. However, the new forms of interaction have not had any significant impact on the volume and structure of mutual interchange (direct ties represent less than 1% of trade).

The temptation to reorient the economies of the socialist countries toward the West grows stronger. Export of products of the best quality production to the West
has become the norm. Often COMECON countries compete with each other on the capital markets.

Experience shows that it is impossible to solve the problem of economic integration with the help of general, even the best programs. It is necessary to accumulate relevant material, organizational, legal, and other types of prerequisites in all the countries. Success here will depend, first of all, on cardinal changes in the Soviet economy, in its structure, in [its] administrative mechanism, and in expansion of its export potential, which would take at least several years.

What could we do in the existing situation? First of all, we should not allow our prestige as a reliable economic partner to weaken. Each breach of contract—and such cases are becoming more frequent—puts the socialist countries in a difficult, sometimes even hopeless situation. Accumulation of similar facts in the economic sphere unavoidably leads to unfavorable political consequences for us. We should overcome this illness, as far as reconsidering the proposals of our ministries on such a complicated issue as the volume of our oil deliveries for the next five-year period. This should be done in the spirit of our former agreements.

Coordination of efforts for the conversion of the military economy could become one of the new channels of economic influence on the socialist countries, especially because the military-industrial complex of the socialist countries is integrated to a higher degree than their civilian economies. One more opportunity would be to develop a common concept of alleviating foreign debt, which is extremely large in a number of socialist countries.

Lastly, when we intensify our economic ties with the West, it is important to actively try to bring our socialist partners into those [contacts], in order to overcome the impression, which some of them have, that we are lessening our attention to the fraternal countries. We probably should hold specific discussions with them to talk about a possibility of their joining in the realization of projects that are carried out with the help of Western credits, trying in the final account to work out a coordinated strategy of integrating the socialist commonwealth into global economic relations.

6. A number of new tasks have emerged in the sphere of political cooperation. Just several years ago we would have considered many of the developments that are underway now in the socialist countries as absolutely unacceptable for us. Today we need a deeper, more flexible, and differentiated approach to what is useful for us, to what is admissible and what is unacceptable. At the same time, it is important that we realistically assess our opportunities, carefully weighing where we can realistically have an influence, and where our interference could only aggravate the situation.

The measure of socialism in the transformations that are underway now in the socialist countries is a difficult question. Some of them are allowing not only the extensive development of market relations, but also forms of private property, and widespread inflow of foreign capital. And still, it appears that we should not exaggerate the danger of one of the countries simply switching to the capitalist way of development. The roots developed by socialism are very deep. Such a transition would mean a fast breakup of the entire economy [and] its structures, development of crises, [and] rapid deterioration of living standards for the majority of the population. And it is very unlikely that the West would be inclined to take on its balance sheet countries whose economy was marked by crisis elements and large foreign debts.
It is characteristic that the ideas that are presented from time to time about the “Marshallization” [i.e., a new “Marshall Plan”—ed.] of certain socialist countries (in particular, Hungary and Poland, for example in the form of a conversion of their debt into foreign capital investment) so far have not enjoyed any noticeable support in the West—due to the size of the expense and the unpredictability of economic and political consequences. Although we should not completely discard this possibility in the [future], we should be more concerned about the possibility of an economic collapse or anarchical explosions in the context of social tensions and hopelessness. This concerns the countries where the regimes continue to stay in power by further tightening the screws (Romania, North Korea).

We need to give special comprehensive consideration to the processes of formation of the structures of political pluralism, of the coalition and parliamentary type, [and] legalization of the opposition that are unfolding in a number of countries. Of course, this is an uncharted [and] risky road, which requires that the parties possess both the strength of principles and tactical flexibility; [they need] the ability to lead the process, and not to leave it up to the opposition forces.

The lessons of several crises have shown that the main danger posed by an opposition is not the fact of its existence in itself, but that it could unite all kinds of forces and movements in the society which are dissatisfied by the existing situation in a negative, destructive platform. Therefore, pulling apart of the opposition into the official structure, entrusting it with responsibility for constructive solutions to the problems that have accumulated, could play a stabilizing role.

In the existing difficult circumstances the processes of our perestroika have a special influence on internal processes in the socialist countries. In some sense, it has also created a new situation. Whereas before, any mass expressions of dissatisfaction with the existing situation which flared up from time to time in the socialist countries assumed an anti-Soviet character almost automatically, now there is no such harsh feature. A serious blow has been dealt to the idea of the impossibility of reforming uni-dimensional socialism that finds its basis in the experience and example of the Soviet Union.

Perestroika has brought us objectively closer to the countries which are trying to reform their economic and political systems (China, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary), but at the same time has created certain problems in relations with some of our traditionally close allies, whose leadership continues to rely on the command administrative methods.

In this situation we have to face the question of how to build our relations with parties and countries, whose leadership exhibits a restrained attitude toward our perestroika (the GDR, Romania, Cuba, North Korea). Here, clearly, we need restraint and tolerance, we need to understand the positions of such parties as the [SED] [and] the Communist Party of Cuba, which, due to their specific, and sometimes even front-like circumstances of development, experience particular problems in accepting and implementing the processes of economic restructuring and the democratization of society.

7. The general development of world politics and the increased differentiation of the national interests of socialist countries require that we make corrections to the approach to coordinate of our joint steps in the international arena.
Most importantly, the process of deconfrontation in the world, the decreasing weight of the military-strategic and the increasing weight of political factors of security, objectively increases the role of our friends. And it is not only because the reductions of conventional weapons in Europe moved to the forefront of the all-European process in its various dimensions, taking into account the new quality that was conferred on it by the Vienna meeting. Without the active and positive participation of our allies, progress in these directions is simply impossible. Therefore, we can speak about not just mutual information, about informing sometimes “at the last minute,” but about preliminary coordination of our actions.

However, the problem is much larger. Essentially, the period when the reduction of military threat was achieved primarily within the framework of Soviet-American relations is not that far from its logical conclusion. The internationalization of major international issues is growing. And if that is so, then friends’ advice [and] consultations with them should involve not only concrete topics under consideration where their interests are directly affected, but also the entire complex of the issues of world economy and politics. Only in this case can they have a real, not just superficial feeling of belonging to the development and implementation of a common socialist foreign policy. At the same time, our initiatives would assume a more weighty, and, considering the experience of our friends, in some ways a more substantive character. However, there is also another side to this. The pluralism of interests of different socialist countries is more and more noticeable. Reduction of military budgets in some of them is acquiring a rate that is ahead of our own, whereas in others it creates anxiety for the future of their own military industry [which is] rather developed and integrated with us. In a similar fashion, the humanization of international relations [and their] confirmation of human rights is perceived by the leadership of some governments as a threat to socialism; for others it serves as an additional impulse to enter the road to “openness” in their own countries.

The difference of interests sometimes leads to outbreaks of nationalist feelings that aggravate relations between the countries (Romania-Hungary). It could be anticipated that internal socio-economic and political difficulties would strengthen the desire of the leadership of certain countries to strengthen their authority and play on sensitive nationalistic strings.

Taking into account all these different interests, it is not at all necessary to try to achieve consensus for the sake of consensus during our discussions and consultations with our friends. We should not allow a situation where one of the countries would tie our hands based on their national ambitions. Each country should have a right to preserve its freedom of action, of course, along with explaining its position to the other allies and substantiating it. It is not in our interest either to transfer any kind of aggravated nationalist tensions between our friends to a multilateral basis, especially if such a “dispute” involves us directly. Of course, it is a different matter if we are faced with opposition to our steps by many, or even a majority, of the socialist countries—in such a case it would be a signal for us to have another look if that step was the right one.

8. Despite the fact that we have repeatedly stressed that we had discarded our command administrative approach to socialist countries, the syndrome of such an approach persists in the thinking of our friends. At the same time, the conservative part of the
leadership would like, in essence, for the Soviet Union to continue its role as some kind of “protector” of socialist countries. But a significant portion of the public, on the other hand, expresses its anxiety concerning the existing situation in which they see vestiges of such paternalism. This finds its expression in different attitudes toward the presence of the contingents of our troops in socialist countries, and it is linked with the influence on the internal processes, not with external threats to their security. There is continuing anxiety about how the Soviet Union would react in the situation of a political crisis in one of the countries, in which the ruling party’s control of the situation would be threatened. There is dissatisfaction with the still persistent inequality in the military mechanism of the Warsaw Pact, the leadership of which practically represents a Soviet military headquarters with the purely formal presence of representatives of other countries.

Here lies a significant reservoir of our possible steps for removing the above-mentioned “irritants”, including ensuring real participation of our friends in the military mechanism of control of the Warsaw Pact, eliminating the negative internal political aspect of the presence of our troops, possibly through “internationalization.” It would be advisable to direct our efforts to achieve a situation where in some countries, where it is necessary, they would have, instead of Soviet troops, joint formations of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries which agree to it.

It is most necessary to work out a balanced approach to the problem of the possibility of our interference in the event of a political crisis in one of the countries. It presupposes our affirmation of the principle of freedom of choice as a universal basis of the world order. But at the same time it should leave a certain vagueness as far as our concrete actions are concerned under various possible turns of events so that we do not stimulate the anti-socialist forces to try to “test” the fundamentals of socialism in a given country.

Finally, it is necessary to take into account the growing attention of our friends to the still remaining “white spots” in our relations; this interest will most probably become even more pronounced this year [1989] in connection with the approach of the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II and the signing of the Soviet-German pact. It would be expedient to work on our interpretation of the nature and the origins of World War II in advance, employing the newly-defined approaches to the assessment of our policy in the 1930-40s, and to discuss it with our friends.

9. In the present circumstance we could formulate the following “minimum program” for our relations with socialist countries in the transitional period:

First of all, we should have a balanced and unprejudiced analysis of the development of socialist countries, of their relations, and we should prepare scenarios of our reaction to possible complications or sharp turns in their policies ahead of time, at the same time decisively rejecting the old stereotypes, and avoiding willful improvisations which did us great harm in the past. We should step up our joint study of and efforts to find ways out of the existing crisis situation, of a new vision of socialism and modern capitalism, and of the possibilities and the limits of their interaction, mutual influence, and mutual assimilation.

Second, we should keep in mind that the significance of our contacts with the party and state leadership of the socialist countries is preserved and even increases in significance, especially because in the existing situation our friends could develop a
“complex of abandonment,” a suspicion that the priority of relations with friends proclaimed by us does not have real meaning. Inter-party contacts, if they are accompanied by an open analysis of problems, discussions, [and] exchange of information about intentions, would allow us to directly feel the pulse of the fraternal parties, to give them moral support.

Third, in explaining the essence of perestroika policy, we should carefully try to avoid any artificial transfer of our experience to the context of other countries, which could be perceived by them as a relapse to command administrative methods, restriction of their independence, and could eventually lead to undesirable circumstances.

Fourth, by strictly adhering to our obligations, we should preserve the existing ties that link the socialist countries to the USSR and try to ensure that the inevitable and for the common interests to a certain extent beneficial process of integrating the socialist economies with the West develops in a balanced, coordinated way, [and] is not accompanied by unacceptable economic and political costs, and would strengthen integration processes among socialist countries.

Fifth, taking into account the key role of the armed forces in the case of a possible deterioration of the situation, it is important to maintain genuine partnership between the armies of the socialist countries both on a bilateral basis and in the framework of the Warsaw Pact by eliminating all elements of inequality.

Sixth, We should continue the policy of decreasing our military presence in the socialist countries, including the future possibility of a complete withdrawal of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We should consider the scenario of “internationalization” of the remaining troops, of [the] creation of joint formations.

Seventh, It is certainly in our interest that the changes that are ready to happen in the socialist countries, with all the possible variations, develop as much as possible inherently without unnecessary shocks and crises, within the framework of socialist solutions. But we have to account for a possibility of a different turn of events. In such a situation, it is important that the ideological differences on the issues of the renewal of socialism, and finding ways out of the crisis situations that have manifested themselves in the socialist world, do not assume the character of conflict and do not have a negative influence on the relations between our states, and do not lead to antagonism toward the Soviet Union.

This presupposes making a distinction between the interests of an essential preservation of ruling communist parties at the helm of power and the interests of preserving allied relations with those countries.

Eighth. By making use of the favorable opportunities created by perestroika which overturned the stereotypes of “Moscow conservatism,” we should actively seek channels for contacts with all the forces in the socialist countries which compete for participation in acquiring power. Contacts [with] churches are becoming more important because the church’s influence is obviously on the rise in the socialist countries.

In general, at this stage it is particularly important to reject the old stereotypes in our approaches, which have outlived themselves. If a country disagrees with us, and sometimes even seriously—this still does not mean that it is turning to the West; if the role of the Party in one of the countries is questioned—this still does not
determine that it would definitely distance itself from us. The dialectics of the real processes, as our experience has shown, is much more complex. Yugoslavia and China “distanced” themselves from us some time ago, but they have hardly turned into capitalist states. In Poland, the Party can realistically become just one, and maybe not even the main [one] of the power structures; however, the geopolitical situation of the country is such that even in the opposition there is an understanding of the necessity of preserving some form of alliance with our country.

All this presupposes studying and forecasting specific scenarios of the development of the situation in individual countries, including the most extreme ones, making decisions as to what those scenarios could mean for our relations—and implementing them with practical actions on this basis.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow; on file at the National Security Archive, donated by Professor Jacques Levesque. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya and Gary Goldberg.]
SECRET

PAGE 01
MOSCOW 02962 01 OF 06 0318582

ACTION 55-00

INFO LOG-00 508-00 1000 M

# 001 11202 (FEB 89)

For: H. R. HAEBERLY MOSCOW
To: SECSTATE WITH 4/ON
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDIS

'S/S PLEASE PASS TO MSC FOR GEN. "SCOWCROFT"

E.J. 12356 DECL/0ABR
TAGS: POOV; ECON; UR

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT, WE CAN PLAN ON FOREIGN POLICY WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S PREDICTION WITH INTERNAL REFORM WILL CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE FIRST BUSH ADMINISTRATION. IT IS ALMOST AS CERTAIN THAT PERESTROIKA WILL NOT RPT NOT BRING MARKED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN THIS PERIOD AND THAT INTERNAL RESISTANCE TO MAJOR ASPECTS OF THE REFORM PROGRAMS WILL FORCE THOSE AT THE SOVIET LEVEL TO RACK AGAINST THE WIND MUCH OF THE TIME. THE POTENTIAL FOR SEVERE OUTBREAKS OF PUBLIC DISORDER WILL GROW. THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A SENSE OF ANXIETY IN THE SUPREME COUNCILS OF THE PARTY AND STATE; THOUGH I BELIEVE THAT THEY IN THE END WILL MAINTAIN ORDER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02
MOSCOW 02962 01 OF 06 0318582

3. MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IS LIKELY TO REMAIN THE TOP

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2110 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

SOVIET LEADER FOR AT LEAST FIVE (PROBABLY TEN) MORE YEARS. BUT MY CONFIDENCE IN THIS PROSPECT IS LOWER THAN THAT IN THE CONTINUATION OF A SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL REFORM. THAT PREOCCUPATION, COMBINED WITH THE MULTITUDE OF DIFFICULTIES OF FORCING THE SOVIET MACHINE TO ADAPT TO THE MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL WORLD, WILL BRING AN INEXORABLE PRESSURE TO CURTAIL THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE MILITARY SECTOR.

4. IN SUM, THE SOVIET UNION HAS, IN EFFECT, DECLARED THE BANKRUPTCY OF ITS SYSTEM, AND JUST AS WITH A CORPORATION WHICH HAS Sought THE PROTECTION OF CHAPTER XI, THERE IS NO TURNING BACK. END SUMMARY.

5. CRYSTAL BALLS ARE NEVER AS CLEAR AS ONE WOULD LIKE, AND THEY TEND TO CLOUD OVER DURING TIMES OF RAPID AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE CAN MAKE SOME ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET DOMESTIC SCENE OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE. THIS MESSAGE WILL ATTEMPT TO ENCAPSULATE MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MOST SALIENT TRENDS. SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES WILL LOOK AT PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

FOCUS ON INTERNAL AFFAIRS

6. I BELIEVE WE CAN STATE WITH NEAR CERTAINTY THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH INTERNAL REFORM WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST FOR ANOTHER FOUR YEARS -- AND PROBABLY MUCH LONGER. THIS PREOCCUPATION WILL NOT SECRET SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02962 01 OF 06 0318582

PRECLUDE AN ACTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY (AS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE) BUT WILL Mean THAT FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE HEAVILY -- AND OFTEN DECISIVELY -- INFLUENCED BY DOMESTIC NEEDS AND IMPERATIVES.

7. WHILE THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ATTEMPTED SOME CHANGE IN SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRACTICE, TODAY'S PERESTROIKA IS POTENTIALLY THE MOST PROFOUND -- AND THEREFORE MOST DESTABILIZING

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2150 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

PREVIOUSLY, AN INITIAL ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO APPLY THE THROTTLE TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE REFORM PROCESS WHICH ARE CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY PAINFUL OR DESTABILIZING. MORE SEVERE LIMITS MIGHT BE PLACED ON THE EXPRESSION OF OPINION AND ON UNOFFICIAL GROUPS, NATIONALIST TENDENCIES MIGHT BE OPPRESSED MORE FORCEFULLY. IMPLEMENTATION OF A MARKET PRICE MECHANISM POSTPONED FURTHER, AND PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP ACTIVELY DISCOURAGED. SUCH SLOWDOWN OR REVERSALS OF POLICY COULD OCCUR, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THEY CAN OCCUR EVEN IF GORBACHEV STAYS IN POWER. BUT SUCH SLOWDOWN WOULD ONLY CAUSE THE ECONOMY TO SINK DEEPER INTO THE QUAGMIRE OF INEFFECTIVENESS, TECHNICAL BACKWARDNESS AND UNMET HUMAN NEEDS. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WOULD CONTINUE AND EVENTUALLY ANOTHER RADICAL REFORMER WOULD LIKELY EMERGE. THERE IS A LOT OF TRUTH IN GORBACHEV'S FREQUENT ASSERTION THAT PERESTROIKA IS CONDITIONED BY OBJECTIVE
SECRET

E.O. 12356: DECL: PPDV: ECON: UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

FUNDAMENTALLY, EARLIER ATTEMPTS AT "REFORM" TRIED TO
KEEP THE IDEOLOGY INTACT AND SIMPLY CHANGE THE WAY IT
WAS IMPLEMENTED. THIS SUFFICIENT TO ELIMINATE THE
GROSSER ASPECTS OF STALINIST TERROR, BUT NOT TO
IMPROVE THE MANAGERIAL EFFICIENCY OF THE ECONOMY.

9. WHEN GORBACHEV FIRST CAME TO POWER IT APPEARED
THAT HE, TOO, WAS GOING FOR SUPERFICIAL "FIXES" IN
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT. NEVERTHLESS, AS HIS PROGRAM
DEVELOPED, IT BEGAN MORE AND MORE TO CONFRONT THE
IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE OLD PRACTICES -- AND TO
CHANGE THE OLD ASSUMPTIONS.

10. THIS PROCESS FOLLOWED SEVERAL PATHS. ONE WAS AN
ALL-OUT ATTACK ON STALINISM, WHICH IMPLICITLY -- AND
SOMETIMES EXPLICITLY -- DENIED THAT THE STALINIST
SYSTEM OF STATE MONOPOLY WAS EVEN A LEGITIMATE FORM
OF SOCIALISM. CONCOMITANTLY, A GRADUALLY
SECRET

SECRET

REHABILITATION OF NON-STALINIST MARXIST THINKERS SUCH
AS BUKHARIY WAS OCCURRY, WITH THE OVEMENT INTENT OF
SECRET

PROVIDING VARIANT AND MORE CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF MARXIST PRINCIPLES.

11. LENIN HAS REMAINED SACROSANCT, BUT HIS
UTTERANCES ON TOPICS OF THE DAY WERE SO VARIED THAT
THE DILIGENT RESEARCHER CAN FIND A QUOTE TO BOLSTER
VIRTUALLY ANY PROPOSITION. "LENNINISM" IN EFFECT
BECOMES WHAT THE CURRENT LEADERS WANT IT TO BE --
EVEN IF THIS REQUIRES AN UNACKNOWLEDGED
TRANSFORMATION OF MARXISM ITSELF.

12. AMONG THE MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL POINTS WHICH THE
REFORMERS ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL
ROLE OF THE MARKET IN DETERMINING ECONOMIC VALUE (WE
DON'T SEE MUCH ON MARK'S LABOR THEORY OF VALUE
ANYMORE!); THE IMPORTANCE OF FOSTERING INDIVIDUAL
INITIATIVE AND TAPPING INDIVIDUAL CREATIVITY; THE
NECESSITY FOR MORE POWERFUL ECONOMIC INCENTIVES; THE
NEED TO SHIFT FROM "ADMINISTRATIVE" TO "ECONOMIC"
(MARKET) CONTROLS OF ECONOMIC LIFE; AND -- NOT
LEAST -- A DOWNPLAYING OF THE "CLASS STRUGGLE" TO A
POSITION SUBORDINATE TO THE "COMMON INTERESTS OF
MARKETING."

13. NONE OF THESE PROPOSITIONS HAS FIGURED
PROMINENTLY IN PAST MARXIST THINKING -- TO PUT IT
MILDLY -- AND AN INTENSE STRUGGLE IS STILL UNDERWAY
HERE OVER THEM. MANY (INCLUDING LIGACHEV) ARE OPENLY
SKEPTICAL ABOUT RISING SO MUCH ON MARKET FORCES; AND
THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION
(RISING PRICES) ARE FIERCELY RESISTED BY AN
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03

NOVEMBER 02 1982
02 OF 06 0318562

OVERWHELMING MAJORITY. STILL, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IF
PERESTROIKA EVER IS MADE TO WORK, ULTIMATE ADOPTION
OF THESE VERY UN-MARXIST PRINCIPLES WILL BE ESSENTIAL.

"DIVIDENDS" SLOW TO MATERIALIZE

14. GIVEN THE DEPTH OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PROBLEMS,
AND THE DIFFICULTY OF BREAKING THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL
AND ATTITUDINAL BARRIERS, IT SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISING
THAT CONCRETE ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS IN THE FORM OF FOOD
AND GOODS IN THE SHOPS HAVE BEEN SLOW IN COMING. BUT

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gorman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

While it should not be surprising, the Gorbachev leadership seems to have been surprised. They clearly have been required to stretch out their plans and adjust their interim targets downward, even as they were devising ever more ambitious final goals.

15. An objective look at the major economic initiatives launched under the banner of perestroika shows a recurrent flaw. Top Soviet leadership is having to revisit each initiative in order to sustain or rebuild momentum which is otherwise lost when the leadership itself is not focused on it. The political threats of each major economic initiative (e.g., land-leasing, consumer goods, free trade zones, financial autonomy, industrial policy, consumer good production) have far outdistanced economic substance, and provision of the specifics necessary for implementation and overcoming resistance to reform at all levels. Moreover, the
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 02962 03 OF 06 0318592

ACTION 55-00

INFO LOG-00 468-00 1000 H
---------------030105 041900Z 76
R 021862R FEB 79
FA AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECRETARY MAHNG 4166
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962

EXDOS

S/R: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356: DECL/HARP
TAGS: PDV, ECON, UR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

FAILURE TO ENGAGE ADEQUATELY ON KEY REFORM ISSUES
LIKE MONETARY AND PRICE REFORM, CREATION OF WHOLESALE
MARKETS, EXTERNAL COMPETITIVENESS AND CONVERTIBILITY
COMBINES WITH THE DEBT PROBLEM TO ENSURE THAT
THERE IS EFFECTIVELY NO INTEGRATED, MUTUALLY
REINFORCING, SEQUENTIALLY SENSITIVE ECONOMIC REFORM
PROGRAM.

16. AS THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
BECAME EVER MORE EVIDENT, LEADERSHIP ATTENTION
FOCUSED INCREASINGLY ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORM.
MOST SOVIET OBSERVERS TALK TO ATTRIBUTE THIS TO A
RECOGNITION THAT POLITICAL REFORM IS A PRECONDITION
FOR EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC REFORM. (SINCE ONE OF THE
ROOT PROBLEMS IN THE ECONOMY IS THE STALEMATE
EXERCISED BY THE RIGID PARTY BUREAUCRACY, ONE MUST
LIMIT THE POWERS OF PARTY OFFICIALS, MAKE DOWN THE
BUREAUCRACY, AND MAKE WHAT IS LEFT MORE RESPONSIVE TO
SECRET

PAGE 02

MOSCOW 02962 03 OF 06 0318592

PUBLIC OPINION IF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE TO BE
FEASIBLE.) IN ADDITION, ONE SUSPECTS THAT ANOTHER

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 K Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
MOTIVATION FOR SOME OF THE POLITICAL REFORMS WAS A DESIRE TO PROVIDE POPULAR BENEFITS TO THE PUBLIC AT A TIME WHEN ECONOMIC RESULTS WERE DISAPPOINTING. IF BREAD WAS SHORT, AT LEAST THERE COULD BE CIACHIES; LOCAL MEETINGS TO "NOMINATE" CANDIDATES TO A BRAND-NEW "PARLIAMENT," FOR EXAMPLE. BUT POLITICAL REFORM IS PROCEEDING NEITHER SMOOTHLY NOR AUTOMATICALLY. ITS ACHIEVEMENTS ARE PARTIAL AND QUALIFIED ONCE, AND THE INITIAL ENTHUSIASM OF MANY IS TURNING INTO FRUSTRATION AND EVEN DESPAIR AS THEY SENSE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TASK AHEAD.

STRUCTURAL AND ATTITUINAL BARRIERS

17. FUNDAMENTALLY, SOVIET REFORMERS HAVE TO CONTENT WITH MUCH MORE THAN THE FAMILIAR AND DAUNTING PROBLEMS OF OVER-Centralization, RED-TAPE, BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE, PARTY ARROGANCE, UNREALISTIC PLANS, CORRUPTION, AND ALL THE OTHER ILLS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED SO MUCH ATTENTION LATELY. THE (FOR THEM) BAD FACT IS THAT THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM HAD DESIGNED TO WORK ONLY FROM TOP DOWN, ON A Command BASIS, AND TO RESIST CHANGE AND IMPERTINENCY, MUCH AS THE BODY'S IMMUNE SYSTEM RESISTS INFECTIONS. MOVING TO A SYSTEM WITH THE OPPOSITE ORIENTATION -- CLEARLY IMPLYED BY PERESTROIKA -- MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF INCREMENTAL CHANGE. TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, EACH CHANGE TENDS EITHER TO BE SHOWERED BY THE SYSTEM ITSELF OR -- IF IT IS PRESS merit RELENTLESSLY -- TO THREATEN COLLAPSE OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM.

SECRET
SECRET

Page 03
MOSCOW 02182 03 OF 06 0314592

18. IF THE BULK OF THE POPULATION HAD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS REQUIRED TO GET OUT OF THE NESS ALL ACKNOWLEDGE THEY ARE IN, THE STRUCTURAL BARRIERS NOTED RIGHT NOW SEEM AGGRADABLE. ALAS, MOST PEOPLE HERE HAVE NOT THE POOKEST NOTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES MARKET ECONOMICS, NURTURED FOR DECADES ON THE MUTH THAT "THERE IS A "FREE LUNCH" (SOCIALIST "BENEFITS" OF "FREE" EDUCATION, "FREE" MEDICAL CARE, CHEAP FOOD AND HOUSING) AND THAT IT IS IMPERIAL TO LIVE JETTER THAN ONE'S NEIGHBOR. THERE IS FIERCE

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
RESISTANCE TO MARKET PRICES, IF THEY MEAN HIGHER PRICES — AS THEY INEVITABLY DO IN AN ECONOMY OF SCARCITY AND PRINTING-FRESH MONEY. THEN, WE NOW WITNESS THE PHENOMENON OF THE PUBLIC DEMANDING PRICE AND OTHER CONTROLS ON THE FLEDGLING COOPERATIVE (I.E., PRIVATE) SECTOR, WHICH WOULD AT BEST FORCE UPON THEM THE SAME INEFFICIENCIES AS THE STATE SECTOR AND MORE LIKELY KILL THEM OFF ALTOGETHER.

POPULAR EXPLOSIONS MAY OCCUR

15. DIFFICULT AS THE CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE, THEY ARE LIKELY TO GET WORSE. THE EXasperATION OF THE SOVIET CONSUMER IS ALMOST PAINABLE. THE COMBINATION OF SHORTAGES AND INFLATION, THE LATTER RAPIDLY BECOMING A MAJOR PROBLEM, ARE DRIVING THE SOVIET UNION TOWARDS A HARDER ECONOMY. SOVIETS, FROM TAX DRIVERS TO INTELLECTUALS, ARE NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING RUBLES INTO GOODS. LARGE-SCALE STRIKES AND RIOTS ARE CONCEIVABLE IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER AND THE LEGENDARY PATIENCE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE IS
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCON 02962 04 OF 06 0318592

ACTION S5-00

INFO LDG-00 ADD-00 /000 H

------------- --------------------- -------------
R 031826Z FEB 89
FN AMERASBY MOSCON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9107
INFO MOSCON POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 06 MOSCON 02962

EX005

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO HSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356: DECL:QDR
TAGS: PGY, ECON, UP
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

EXHAUSTED. MOST LIKELY, SUCH OUTBURSTS CAN'T BE
CONTROLLED -- BUT AT ENORMOUS COST TO THE FORWARD
MOMENTUM OF REFORM.

20. MORE SERIOUS IS THE POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR
ERUPTIONS OF NATIONALIST FEELING, AS THE BALTSICS AND
THE CAUCASUS HAVE SHOWN OVER THE PAST YEAR. INDEED,
DESPITE ALL OF THE CHANGES IN SOVIET SOCIETY OVER THE
PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE GLASNOB AND THE PERESTROIKA,
ONLY NATIONALISM HAS BEEN CAPABLE OF IGNITING POPULAR
PASSIONS. AND WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE UKRAINE AND
CENTRAL ASIA -- AREAS WHERE, BECAUSE OF POPULATION
SIZE, RESOURCES AND RELIGION, NATIONALISM COULD
REPRESENT A MAJOR DANGER TO THE SOVIET EMPIRE -- HAVE
REMAINED THUS FAR ALMOST GLIRLY QUIET: A CALL THAT
NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHOULD EXPECT TO
CONTINUE.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02

MOSCON 02962 04 OF 06 0318592

21. A BACKLASH OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM HAS ALREADY
BEGINN. WE CAN EXPECT IT TO INTENSIFY OVER THE NEXT...

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

SEVERAL YEARS AS THE MINORITY NATIONALITIES BECAME MORE ABSENTIVE; EITHER IN THE PRESS OR IN THE STREETS. NO MATTER WHAT THE DAMAGE TO HIS REFORM PROGRAM, THERE ARE LIMITS BEYOND WHICH NO SOVIET LEADER WILL BE ABLE TO GO, AND STILL RETAIN HIS JOB, IN TOLERATING NATIONALIST OUTBURSTS. FOR THAT VERY REASON, GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL INVEST GREAT ENERGY AND RESOURCES IN THE EFFORT TO DUE OFF OR PREVENT NATIONALIST EXPLOSIONS.

GORBACHEV'S POSITION

27. THE CLAMOR OUTLAW FOR TANGIBLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE HAS LED MANY TO QUESTION GORBACHEV'S STANDING POWER. HIS POPULARITY ESPECIALLY OF KHRUSHCHEV'S TASTE AND WLAD PERHAPS INFLUENCED BY THE LOGIC OF WESTERN POLITICAL PROCESSES, SOME OBSERVERS FEEL THAT WITHOUT AN UPTURN IN THE AVAILABILITY OF FOOD AND CONSUMER GOODS FAIRLY SOON, GORBACHEV COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED BY RIVALS.

28. THIS IS POSSIBLE, BUT I DO NOT CONSIDER IT LIKELY. MY GUESS IS THAT GORBACHEV WILL REMAIN THE SOVIET LEADER FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME TO COME, WHETHER OR NOT HIS DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE SUCCESSFUL. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE SOVIET UNION IS BY NO MEANS A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE VOTED OUT BY A PUBLIC IMPATIENT FOR TANGIBLE REWARDS. IF HE IS REMOVED, THE ONLY PLAUDBLE SCENARIO FOR HIS REMOVAL BY POLITICAL MEANS WOULD INVOLVE A CONSPIRACY AGAINST HIM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. ANY SUCCESSFUL CONSPIRACY WOULD INVOLVE A FAIRLY NICE CIRCLE, SO THAT THE ORGANIZERS COULD BE CONFIDENT OF OVERWHELMING SUPPORT ONCE THE ISSUE WERE JOINED. KHRUSHCHEV FELL VICTIM TO SUCH A CONSPIRACY, SO WE KNOW IT CAN HAPPEN. DO DOES GORBACHEV, OF COURSE, AND THAT IS PROBABLY WHY HE HAS PLACED THE KGB AND (LESS IMPORTANTLY) THE ARMY IN LOYAL HANDS. SO LONG AS THE KGB CHAIRMAN, THE COMMANDER OF THE KGB, IN QUAR AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARE LOYAL TO HIM, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW A CONSPIRACY COULD BE MOUNTED SUCCESSFULLY. SINCE HE WOULD BE HARD TO

SECRET PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02992 04 OF 06 0189552

CONSPIRACY WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE A FAIRLY NICE CIRCLE, SO THAT THE ORGANIZERS COULD BE CONFIDENT OF OVERWHELMING SUPPORT ONCE THE ISSUE WERE JOINED. KHRUSHCHEV FELL VICTIM TO SUCH A CONSPIRACY, SO WE KNOW IT CAN HAPPEN. DO DOES GORBACHEV, OF COURSE, AND THAT IS PROBABLY WHY HE HAS PLACED THE KGB AND (LESS IMPORTANTLY) THE ARMY IN LOYAL HANDS. SO LONG AS THE KGB CHAIRMAN, THE COMMANDER OF THE KGB, IN QUAR AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARE LOYAL TO HIM, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW A CONSPIRACY COULD BE MOUNTED SUCCESSFULLY. SINCE HE WOULD BE HARD TO

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelbin Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
TIME TO TAKE "PROPHYLACTIC" STEPS -- AND WOULD HAVE THE MEANS TO DO SO. EVEN THE FIRST TWO OF THE TRIG NAMED WOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE ADEQUATE INSURANCE.

2nd. IN ADDITION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES NOW PLANNED WILL CREATE AN ADDITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO A Sudden, CONSPIRATORIAL REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET LEADER. ONCE GORBACHEV OCCUPIES THE REVAMPED OFFICE OF PRESIDENT, THOSE WHO WOULD PLAN HIS REMOVAL BY OTHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS WOULD FACE A POSSIBLE HURDLE WHICH DOES NOT EXIST TODAY. SINCE STRICT ADHERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE HAS NEVER BEEN A NOTICEABLE SOVIET OR RUSSIAN TRAIT, ONE CANNOT SAY THAT HE COULD NOT BE REMOVED BY A CONSPIRATORIAL CLIQUE WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT IT WOULD BE A MORE COMPLICATED TASK THAN THAT. FACING BREZHNEV AND HIS ASSOCIATES WHEN THEY MOVED AGAINST KRUSHCHEV, THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT OF GORBACHEV'S MOTIVATIONS IN PRESSING SO HARD FOR THE CREATION OF A STRONGER PRESIDENCY WITH A FIXED TERM, TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE OFFICE
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 02962 05 OF 06 0319002
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00  ADDS-00 /000 W
---------050120 0415022 /56
R 0318262 FEB 89
FM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECRETARY WASHDC 4105
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

S C C E T SECTION 05 OF 06 MOSCOW 02962
EXB16

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO MSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECLINABLE
TAGS: PDDY, ECON, HR
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
OF PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY.

THE MILITARY BURDEN

25. AS PERESTROIKA FOUNDERS AND PRESSURES ON
GORBAChEV TO DELIVER INCREASE; ONE FACT LOOKS LARGER
AND LARGER: THE POLICY OF ALLOCATING
DISPROPORTIONATELY LARGE RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY
SECTOR HAS IMPOVERISHED THE CIVILIAN SECTOR AND IS
ONE OF THE ROOTS OF TODAY'S ECONOMIC DISEASE.
FURTHERMORE: GIVEN ITS SIZE AND TECHNICAL
SOPHISTICATION, THE MILITARY SECTOR PROVIDES A
TEMPING "RESERVE" WHICH CAN BE TAPPED TO ALLEVIATE
TODAY'S SHORTAGES. THUS, THE RECENT DECISION TO
PROCEED WITH THE UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTIONS -- AND
EVEN MORE SUBSTANTIAL CUTBACKS IN THE INDUSTRIAL
CAPACITY DEVOTED TO MILITARY PRODUCTION -- ARE A
REACTION TO WHAT THE GORBAChEV LEADERSHIP MUST VIEW
SECRET

SECRET

Page 02

MOSCOW 02962 05 OF 06 0319002

AS AN URGENT NECESSITY.

26. THE MILITARY: A SAD THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

COMPLETE AS A WHOLE -- CAN HARDLY BE ENTHUSIASTIC OVER
SUCH MOVES, AND WE CAN ASSUME THAT THOSE ELEMENTS OF
SOCIETY WILL PUT UP A STIFF RESISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IF
ATTEMPTS ARE MADE TO CONTINUE RETRENCHMENTS BEYOND
THOSE ALREADY ANNOUNCED. THIS WOULD NOT BE TRIVIAL
RESISTANCE, BUT IT MIGHT NOT AUTOMATICALLY CARRY THE
DAY.

27. THE SOVIET CONCENTRATION ON BUILDING UP THEIR
MILITARY MACHINE HAS LED MANY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE
SOVIET MILITARY IS AN INVINCIBLY POWERFUL POLITICAL
FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET
MILITARY BUILD-UP MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED MORE BY THE
MILITARIZED THINKING OF THE PREVIOUS PARTY LEADERSHIP
THAN BY THE DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET
HARNESS. THE POLITICAL LEADERS MOST LIKELY ORDERED
UP THE MILITARY HARDWARE BECAUSE IT SERVED THEIR
PERCEIVED POLITICAL NEEDS AND NOT BECAUSE THE GENERAL
STAFF FORCED THEM TO PROCURE MORE THAN THEY WANTED.

28. IF THIS IS THE CASE, THEN GORBACHEV IN FACT MAY
HAVE A FREER HAND TO SQUEEZE THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX THAN MANY HAVE SUPPOSED.

IS PEROSTROIKA IRREVERSIBLE?

29. I, OF COURSE, MAY BE GUESSING WRONG IN
PREDICTING GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL LONGEVITY -- AND IT
WILL BE JUST MY LUCK IF I WAKE UP THE DAY AFTER THIS
CABLE IS DISPATCHED TO LEARN THAT THE CC HAS ELECTED
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03

MOSCOW 02962 05 OF 06 0319402

A NEW GENERAL SECRETARY IN AN UNANNOUNCED SESSION AND
NIKHIL GORETSYEVICH HAS ASSUMED THE DUTIES OF KALININ.
CHAIRMAN AT SOME LOCATION TO THE EAST.

30. THOUGH I DOUBT THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN, LET US
ASSUME THAT THIS DOES -- IF NOT TOMORROW, THEN NEXT
YEAR OR THE YEAR AFTER, WHAT THEN? WOULD THAT BE
THE END OF PEROSTROIKA?

31. ESSENTIALLY, ANY SUCCESSOR OVER THE NEXT FOUR
YEARS WOULD FACE PRECISELY THE SAME PROBLEMS
GORBACHEV (THOSES -- POSSIBLY) IN MORE ACUTE FORM.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01
MOSCOW 02962 06 OF 06 0318552

ACTION 55-00
INFO DEPARTMENT A
ADD: 000
10015

0318552
PERS 00

AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4109
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

SECRET
SECRET
SEÇÃO 06 DE 06 MOSCOW 02962

ENDS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356; DECLINDR
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, US
SUBJECT: THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

NECESSITY AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON ANY INDIVIDUAL.
OVER THE LONG RUN, THIS IS PROBABLY RIGHT.

32. ONE THING A SUCCESSOR REGIME COULD NOT DO IS PUT
THINGS BACK LIKE THEY WERE; VINTAGE LATE 70'S OR
EARLY 80'S. THE SOVIET UNION HAD, IN EFFECT,
DECLARED THE BANKRUPTCY OF ITS SYSTEM, BUT IS
STICKING STRUGGLING TO MOST OF ITS PRIMARY SOCIAL
GOALS, AND LIKE A CORPORATION UNDER CHAPTER XI. IS
NOW SEEKING TO REORGANIZE ITS MODE OF OPERATION
IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES. THERE IS NO
TURNING BACK; HOWEVER, AND IN TIME, EVEN
IDEOLOGICALLY-BASED GUARANTEES OF SOCIAL EQUITY MAY
HAVE TO GIVE GROUND TO MARKET-BASED EFFICIENCIES.
WITH ALL THE IMPLICATIONS THAT CARRIES FOR A
REDETERMINATION OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY.

32. Lенинград MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02
MOSCOW 02962 06 OF 06 0318552

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20007
Letter from Andrzej Slowik to “Roundtable” Chair Wladyslaw Findeisen

12 February 1989

The Working Group of the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity”
Lodz, 12 February 1989

Mr. Professor
Wladyslaw Findeisen
Chairman of the “Roundtable”
Chairman of the Social Council of the Archbishop of Poland

Dear Professor,

We want to share with you the following remarks, concerns and anxieties:

As members of the National Commission elected by the First National Congress of Delegates of the NSZZ “Solidarity,” we feel responsible for the mandate entrusted to us by the electorate and voluntarily accepted by us.

This responsibility and honor has been forcing us to conduct social actions for the benefit of the Union, the working people and the Motherland, interrupted only by periods of arrests, internment or prison. We are conducting them with faith in the victory of good and [the belief] that sooner or later Poles will be able to overcome prejudices, anxieties, to forgive injustice, and to jointly begin building in our country law and order, based on truth, justice, freedom and love. We can be relieved of responsibility for the fate of the Union and its activity only by an act equivalent to the one that entrusted us with this responsibility. But of citizens’ responsibility toward Motherland— nobody can [be relieved]. Hence our concerns and anxieties.

The once great social hopes placed in the current talks of the “Roundtable” have now apparently faded— particularly among the working class—as the importance of these talks is not any longer a sufficient argument to stem the spontaneous eruption of strikes.

To some degree it is a result of uncertainty regarding intentions, arising for different reasons. The initial public enthusiasm following the announcement of the talks (in the beginning of September) burned out in an excessively long wait for their start.

Additional disappointments in some socially active circles is caused by an incomplete representation of the so-called social side, which cannot always be justified by categorical refusal of participation of that or another group or circle. The conviction prevails that not all significant groups or organizations have received such an offer.

Moreover, the NSZZ “Solidarity” delegation is not fully representative. It does not include many authentic activists of the Union (signatories of the August 1980 Agreements, 104 elected members of the National Commission and its Presidium, and still active leaders of the regional structures), who, not questioning either the need of reaching an understanding with or a statutory function for Lech Walesa, think that the Union is not someone’s private or group property, [but] that it had been created as a democratic and pluralistic organization, obeying its own voluntarily adopted rights—and it should stay as such.
The “Solidarity’s” delegation represents only one group, and even if it is now a group in control of the main spheres of the Union’s life, it is still only one group, and it is difficult to expect that other groups would feel bound by an agreement on which they will have (from the very beginning) no influence whatsoever.

An understanding which has a chance to be national, may be perceived in important public circles as being particularistic. If the PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] authorities were inclined toward a policy of confrontation, then controversies within the “Solidarity” would certainly be to their advantage. (However, experience is teaching us that in a confrontation the Union consolidates.) With regard to a course toward an understanding, matters look rather different. Will an additional secret agreement for the defense of a particularistic understanding be concluded, and will the parties to such agreement be co-sponsoring a policy of repression toward its opponents, whom they had not even heard earlier? For us it is hard to imagine, though such fears also exist.

Even more serious is another apprehension—a fear that incomplete representation at the “Table” and hence a limited focus on the [actual] situation will mean that particular arrangements (or even parts of them) will be so far below social aspirations that with a verbal acceptance they will, in fact, be rejected by the society.

Please, excuse this frankness. It is dictated by the sense of responsibility and concern about the future of our Fatherland. We trust we shall be properly understood. This is already the last moment when these and other dangers (not articulated here) can be prevented through supplementing the “Table.” But it needs to be done before the final decisions are taken. Perhaps an expansion and diversification of the delegation’s composition will cause greater difficulties in negotiations, perhaps even part of the common record will be questioned—but it is probably better that controversies take place at the Table before concluding the agreement than outside of the Table after its conclusion.

We are submitting to you the readiness of the Working Group of the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity” to send our delegation to the negotiations.

With the authorization of the
Working Group of National Commission

Andrzej Slowik
[signed]

[Source: A. Stelmachowski Papers, Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP]
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03850 01 OF 05 132321Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LCG-00 ADD-00 0000 H
--------- 253021 140400Z /70 36
R (1928052) FEB 89
FROM ANSBAEB: MOSCOW
TO DELEGATE: HABIBC 597
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 03850

SUBJ: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

F.O. 12256: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OR

SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

REF: MOSCOW 2962

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

BEGIN SUMMARY:

2. WHILE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY MAY SHOW A
   CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF UNPREDICTABILITY IN ITS
   DETAILS, ITS BROADER THREATS MUST WILLY-NILLY,
   CONFORM TO DOMESTIC DEMANDS AND DOMESTIC
   CAPABILITIES. THESE REQUIRE A REDUCTION OF
   INTERNATIONAL TENSION: SO THAT A GREATER MEASURE OF
   RESOURCES AND LEADERSHIP ATTENTION CAN BE DEVOTED TO
   SOLVING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. THIS SITUATION SUGGESTS
   THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE:

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03850 01 OF 05 132321Z

A -- CONTINUED EFFORT TO DOWNSIZE (PUT NOT

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
ELIMINATE ALL MILITARY COMMITMENTS.

I -- INCREASING USE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS OF EXERTING INFLUENCE -- BUT NO FLAGGING IN THE DETERMINATION TO BE A GLOBAL POWER.

C -- IDEOLOGICAL REVISIONISM TO PROVIDE A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR A SHIFT TO A LESS CONFRONTATIONAL STANCE VERSUS THE CAPITALIST WORLD.

D -- GROWING WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN JOINT BILATERAL OR INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH SPECIFIC GLOBAL PROBLEMS: E.G., CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; TERRORISM; TRAFFIC IN ILLICIT DRUGS.

E -- A MAJOR DRIVE TO BREAK INTO THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY THE FINANCIAL COUNCILS OF THE DEVELOPED WORLD.

F -- A CONTINUED CONCENTRATION ON THE SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONSHIP, COMBINED WITH ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, CHINA AND JAPAN AND TO DRIVE HEDGES WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

G -- NO LETUP IN ESPIONAGE AND NO END TO "DIRECT ACTION" WHEN ATTRACTION POSSIBLY SOME DECREASE IN OUTRIGHT DISINFORMATION.

3. IN THE SHORT TERM, SOVIET POLICY WILL NOT ONLY BE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD LESS AGGRESSIVE; IT WILL IN FACT BE LESS THREATENING MILITARILY -- AT LEAST IN THE SHORT-TERM.

SECRET
PAGE 03

MOSCOW 03/59 010 OF 05 123212

TO MEDIUM-TERM, YET, EVEN WITH PROJECTED CUTS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE POTENTIAL LONG-TERM SOVIET CAPACITY TO USE FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS WILL NOT DISAPPEAR. FURTHERMORE, DESPITE SOVIET ECONOMIC WEAKNESS AND POLITICAL CONFUSION AT HOME, SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOME AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE MAY ACTUALLY GROW AS THE REST OF THE WORLD RESPONDED TO PERCEIVED NON-THREATENING, "COOPERATIVE" BEHAVIOR. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 901, Washington, DC 20037
4. This message, the second in a series, contains my personal assessment of likely trends in Soviet foreign policy over the next four years. In my view, these years will be marked by political and diplomatic activism to cover a retreatment in Soviet armed forces and in Soviet military involvement abroad.

5. The extent and pace, as well as the concrete manifestations of increased reliance on political instruments of influence, will be determined by many factors, some unpredictable at this point: domestic developments in the Soviet Union, the policy of other countries — most importantly the United States — and the occurrence or absence of major events such as widespread public disorder in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I can predict with confidence that the tendency to shift from intimidation to persuasion in dealing with the
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 03850 02 DF 05 132322Z
ACTION SB-00

INFO 000-00 ADB-00 /000 W
------------------------253036 140350Z /38
R 132302Z FEB 89
IN AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO RESTATE WASHDC 5058
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 DF 05 MOSCOW 03850

EXDIB

S/5: PLEASE PASS TO NBC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O. 12356: DECL/ADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR YEARS: PERMIT NO OTHER COURSE.

AND IF PERESTROIKA FAILS?
--------------------------------

6. SOME WELL-INFORMED OBSERVERS HAVE EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT A "FAILED" PERESTROIKA COULD RESULT IN A SOVIET UNION EVEN MORE THREATENING TO OUR INTERESTS THAN THE USSR OF THE 1970'S. THE "SICK BEAR" COULD GO ON A RAMPAGE, LASHING OUT IN ALL DIRECTIONS IN A DESPERATE EFFORT TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM HIS ILLNESS THROUGH AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR.

7. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SCENARIO IS PLAUSIBLE. THE FAILURE OF PERESTROIKA MIGHT BE A TRAGEDY FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE, AND FOR THOSE OF US WHO CARE ABOUT THEM, BUT IT WOULD NOT IN ITSELF THREATEN THE WEST'S VITAL INTERESTS. THE MOST IMPORTANT

SECRET
SECRET

REASON FOR THIS IS THAT A SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WEAKENED BY AN ABORTIVE REFORM PROCESS, IS MOST UNLIKELY TO HAVE EITHER THE MEANS OR INCENTIVE TO TAKE SERIOUS TROUBLE AROSE. EVEN A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP TO ONE WHICH DISCARDED MANY OF TODAY'S POLICIES IS UNLIKELY TO BRING MORE threatening EXTERNAL ACTIVITY.

8. HISTORICALLY, RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN MOST THREATENING TO THEIR NEIGHBORS AND THE REST OF THE WORLD WHEN THE POLITICAL LEADERS FELT STRONG AND CONFIDENT. WHEN THEY FELT WEAK AND TROUBLED AT HOME, THEY TURNED INWARD. THEREFORE, WHILE ANOTHER RULING GROUP MIGHT WELL BE MORE TRUCULENT, MORE SECRETIVE, MORE GIVEN TO PROPAGANDA AND ADRENE, AND LESS INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION, ITS EXTERNAL POLICY IS LIKELY TO REMEMBER A RULE IN THE CORNER MORE THAN A RAMPAGE THROUGH THE NEIGHBORHOOD.

"NEW THINKING": HOW NEW?

9. FOR DECADES THE SOVIETS HAVE REPORTED UP CONSISTENTLY AND MISLEADING PROPAGANDA THAT ONE IN ENTITLED TO APPROACH BLOOMBY LIKE "NEW THINKING" WITH GREAT CIRCUMCISION, IF NOT OUTRIGHT CYCNIAN. THERE IS NO REASON AT ALL FOR US TO TAKE THE SOVIETS AT THEIR WORD UNTIL THEIR ACTIONS PROVIDE CONCRET STROOF. IN FACT, THERE IS EVERY REASON FOR US TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT WORCE AT FACE VALUE IN THE ABSENCE OF CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 03550 02 DF 05 132222

10. NEVERTHELESS, WE COULD BE NEGLECTIF IF WE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT MUCH OF THE "NEW THINKING" IS IN FACT SICKENLY NEW IN A SOVIET CONTEXT. TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS "NEW THINKING" BECOMES ESTABLISHED AS THE ACCEPTED Norm AND IMPLEMENTED IN CONCRETE POLICIES AND ACTIONS (A PROCESS WHICH IS FAR FROM COMPLETE), IT COULD SIGNAL A LARGELY AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANCE IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE REST OF THE WORLD, IF IT IS TRULY ACCEPTED THAT MAKING HAS INTERESTS WHICH TRANSCEND SUPERCLASS MARXIST CLASS INTERESTS, AND THAT SECURITY AND PROSPERITY CAN BE

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 501, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

ALTHOUGH COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN AN INDEPENDENT WORLD, THEN THIS COULD REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL BREAK WITH THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A ZERO-SUM STRUGGLE OF IRRECONCILABLE CLASSES, ONE OF WHICH IS DESTINED TO DEFEAT AND SUPPLANT THE OTHER.

"NEW THINKING" - HOW LONG?

II. "NEW THINKING" IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PROBABLY STARTED AS A TACTICAL SHIFT TO BUTTRESS A LIMITED REFORM OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. THE INTENT MOST LIKELY WAS TO PROVIDE A TEMPORARY BREATHING SPACE DURING WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD CONSOLIDATE ITS STRENGTH AND ASSUME ITS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES WITH ENHANCED PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. BUT, EVEN IF THIS WAS THE ORIGINAL INTENT, SOME UNEXPECTED THINGS HAPPENED ON THE ROAD TO THE QUICK FIX: THE QUICK FIX ITSELF DISAPPEARED LIKE A MIRAGE ON THE...
SECRET

Effort to push the economy, political system, and social structure into a new mold. Although many individual aspects of this effort can be stalled or even reversed enough of the old structure; the old habits and the old ideology have been so ingrained to make return to the status quo ante quite impossible. It is as if a delicate (but ill-functioning) machine has been partially dismantled before a new design has been developed; let alone tested and new parts fabricated. Many of the old parts have broken so the machine cannot be quickly restored even to its earlier inefficient condition. Such is the dilemma the Soviet leaders face and it will claim their priority attention for years. The Ideological Foundation

2. Perestroika, as it has developed, differs from past efforts to reform this or that Soviet practice (Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's terror) or this or that aspect of the system (the abortive "liberation reforms of the 60's) by its increasing attention to
SECRET

PAGE 01

SECRET

MOSCOW 03850 03 OF 05 198322Z

ACTION SS-00

INFO L00-00 A08-00 /060 H
----------2130V3 190502 /38

R 132205Z FEB 89
FN AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON 059
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 03850

EKDYS

S/S: PLEASE PASS TO USDA FOR GEN. BISCHOFF

E.D.12356: DECLARAT
TAGS: PREL, ECON,
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR

HORIZON, AND THE EFFORTS TO PRODUCE SOME LIMITED
CONTROLLED CHANGES BEGAN TO HAVE MITIGATION FOR
BESIDE THEIR PLANNED EFFECT, PERESTROIKA HAS ALREADY
PRODUCED EFFECTS IN THE BODY POLITIC WHICH WILL
IMPede EFFORTS TO REVERT TO PAST POLICIES.

12. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE EFFECTS IS A
FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUdINAL CHANGE IN REGARD TO THE WEST
OF THE WORLD. FOR DECADES AFTER WORLD WAR II THE
WORLD'S MOST PERSUADED PROPAGANDA MACHINE DRUMMED
INTO THE SOVIET POPULATION THE THEME OF THE EXTERNAL
THREAT, PARTICULARLY FROM THE U.S., THOUGH IT WAS
NEVER ACCEPTED A HUNDRED PERCENT BY THE SOVIET
PUBLIC. THIS HOSTILE PROPAGANDA HAD AN UNDEAD
EFFECT ON ATTITUDES. IT CAMOUFLAGED WITH THE ABSENCE
OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE RADICALITY OF THE SOVIET
MILITARY EFFORT; PERMITTED THE DIVERSION OF ENDANGEROUS
RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY WITHOUT ANY EFFECTIVE
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02

MOSCOW 03850 03 OF 05 198322Z

COMPLAINTS FROM THE CITIZENARY. AFTER ALL, EVEN THOSE
WHO WERE HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET RULERS AND MUCH OF

SECRET
SECRET
THEIR POLICY WAS USUALLY WILLING TO SACRIFICE THE DEFEND THEIR MOTHERLAND.

13. NOW, AFTER LITTLE MORE THAN THREE YEARS OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY, THESE OLD PROPAGANDA THEMES HAVE BEEN SHATTERED -- AND VERY LIKELY SHATTERED BEYOND REPAIR. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS NOT HOSTILE; WOULD THE U.S. AGREE TO ELIMINATE INF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES IF IT HAD SAVED THE WORLD HAVE RUSHED TO AID EARTHQUAKE VICTIMS IF IT HAD RONALD REAGAN BEES KISSING BABIES IN PENT
SQUARE IT IS HERE?

14. BUT THAT IS NOT ALL. IT ALSO TURNS OUT THAT IT WAS NOT WESTERN HOSTILITY WHICH CREATED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE SOVIET CITIZEN, BUT THE SOVIET SYSTEM ITSELF. IT HAS NOT THE WEST THAT CAUSED THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER OR FLAVOUR CONSTRUCTION IN SEISMIC ZONES, BUT THEIR OWN SYSTEM WHICH SOURCED SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS, IT WAS NOT WESTERN ECONOMIC BoyCotts WHICH DERIVED THEM OF CUSTOMER GOODS, BUT RATHER THEIR OWN LEADERS' PROPENSITY TO GIVE ALL THE GOODIES TOS THE MILITARY. THE DECISION TO REDUCE SOVIET MILITARY FORCES UNILATERALLY SUGGESTS UNINTENSIVELY TO THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY WAS BUILT UP BEYOND ANY OBJECTIVE NEEDS JUST AS THE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN MAKES CLEAR THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD HAS GOOD REASONS TO FEAR THE SOVIET UNION.

15. THESE 'REVELATIONS' ARE STILL REVERBERATING THROUGH THE SOVIET PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS; AND THEY SECRET SECRET

PAGE 03
MOSCOW 03850 03 OF 03 132322Z
WILL MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR A FUTURE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO OBTAIN AUTOMATIC PUBLIC ACQUIESCENCE TO A RENEWED MILITARY BUILDUP OR TO AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIONS ABROAD. ONCE FACTS AND ATTITUDES ARE OUT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, THEY CANNOT EASILY BE ROUNDED UP AND FORCED BACK INTO THE OLD STOCKADE -- PARTICULARLY IF THE STOCKADE FENCE ITSELF HAS TUMBE'D DOWN IN MANY PLACES.

16. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, WHAT WILL GIVE THE "NEW THINKING" ITS STAYING POWER IS ITS FUNDAMENTAL

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

ACCURACY: WE DO IN FACT LIVE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD; THERE ARE IN FACT SIMILAR INTERESTS OF MANKIND. AND THOUGH THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO ANY SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP REVERTING TO FALLACIOUS MARXIST SLOGANS AS A BASIS OF POLICY, THESE SLOGANS WILL NEVER REFLECT OBJECTIVE REALITY. THEY ARE SIMPLY WRONG, AND NO POLICY BASED ON THEM IS LIKELY TO WORK -- PARTICULARLY THE SECOND TIME AROUND, WHEN THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A FARCE THAN A TRAGEDY.

CONVERGING AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS

17. THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE NOW BEGINNING TO SEE AREAS WHERE THEIR AND WESTERN INTERESTS CONVERGE RATHER THAN CONFLICT, AND THESE GO BEYOND SUCH OBVIOUS AND TRADITIONAL ONES AS AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR WAR, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2150 H Street, NW, Suite 705, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03850 04 OF 05 1323222
ACTION 05-00

INFO LDG-00 ADS-00 /600 H
--------------------------253051 140350Z /38
R 132202J FEB 89
FM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASDRC 5060
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 03850

S/0: PLEASE PASS TO HRC FOR GEN. SCOWCRAFT

E.O.12356: DECL/ADP
TAGS: PREL; ECON; UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR

PROTECTION. THERE IS CLEARLY GROWING INTEREST
(THOUGH NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL APPROACHES) IN AREAS
SUCH AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION
OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, AND COMBATING
TERRORISM AND ILLEGIT DRUG TRAFFICKING. ALSO, AS THE
SOVIETS MOVE TO REDUCE THEIR OWN CONVENTIONAL
MILITARY FORCES, THEIR INTEREST IN FINDING POLITICAL
SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS IS GROWING.

18. THOUGH THEY TALK ABOUT IT MUCH LESS IN PUBLIC,
THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE DOUBTLESS AWARE THAT SOVIET
AND WESTERN AIMS REMAIN INCOMPATIBLE IN MANY KEY
AREAS. IN PARTICULAR, THE ANNONCED CUTS IN SOVIET
MILITARY FORCES WILL NOT ELIMINATE THE POTENTIAL
THREAT TO THE WEST FROM THAT QUARTER. THERE IS A
MANIFEST SOVIET INTEREST IN STIMULATING THE
DISARMAMENT OF THE WEST MORE RAPIDLY THAN THEIR OWN;
THE EROSION OF OUR ALLIANCES AND SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03850 04 OF 05 1323222

BASES, AND THE HOBBILING OF THE U.S. NAVY. THEY
CONTINUE TO BACK CLIENTS WHO ARE HOSTILE TO WESTERN

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

INTERESTS, AND TO PROVIDE MILITARY SUPPORT TO THEM.
THEIR EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE CONTINUES UNABATED, AND THERE IS NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THEY WILL BE LESS MINDING IN THE FUTURE TO PURSUE COVERT ACTION TO FURTHER THEIR GOALS, EVEN IN SOME AREAS WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED A NEED TO COOPERATE WITH THE WEST. THE OLD COMPETITIVE HABITS STILL DOMINATE THEIR PRACTICE. THE SOVIETS, THUS, STILL HAVE FAR TO GO BEFORE THEIR SEEDS WILL FULLY MATCH THE WORDS OF THEIR "NEW THINKING."

THE EAST EUROPEAN "WILD CARD"

19. A FUTURE SOVIET DECISION TO INTERVENE MILITARILY TO PUT DOWN DISORDERS IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD OF COURSE MEAN THE END OF REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION FOR A LONG PERIOD THEREAFTER... ONE CERTAINLY SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A RETROGRADE EVENT, GIVEN THE HISTORY OF THE AREA AND THE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE WHICH ARE MOUNTING THERE.

20. NEVERTHLESS, MY GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL MANAGE TO AVOID SUCH A TRAUMATIC EVENT -- AT LEAST OVER THE NEXT FOUR TO FIVE YEARS. THE FACT IS THAT THE "THRESHOLD OF PAIN" WHICH WOULD TRIGGER SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IS MUCH HIGHER TODAY THAN IT WAS IN THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES. THIS GIVES GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA CONSIDERABLE LEeway TO LIBERALIZE, IF THEY ARE SO INCLINED. IT IS CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT TRY TO BLOCK A SECRET

PAGE 03

LEGALIZATION OF SOLIDARITY IN POLAND, IF THAT SHOULD ERGE FROM THE CURRENT ROUNDTABLE. IF A "QUEER IT" HERE TO CREATE A PRAGUE SPRING THIS YEAR OR NEXT, MOSCOW WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT TOLERATE IT AND RIGHT EVEN CHECK IT ON.

21. THIS MEANS THAT IF MAJOR DISORDERS OCCUR IN EASTERN EUROPE, THEY MOST LIKELY WILL RESULT FROM THE RIGIDITY OF THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES, AND NOT FROM A SOVIET EFFORT TO BLOCK ALL INTERNAL CHANGE. EVEN IF CONFRONTED WITH WIDESPREAD DISORDERS, THE SOVIET

SECRET
SECRET

LEADERS MIGHT WELL REFRAIN FROM MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CDS-SOWJC INSTALLATIONS HERE-NEW ATTACKED AND THERE WAS NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO LEAVE THE NATION. FURTHERMORE, THE DEGREE OF SOVIET TOLERANCE, OF COURSE, VARIES WITH THE COUNTRY IN QUESTION. IT IS DUBIOUS WHETHER THE CDS, POLAND AND PERHAPS CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE POWER OF POSITIVE THINKING

2. If, as is likely, the Soviet Union will avoid a repeat of 1964, 1956 and 1968, its diplomacy is likely to feature THE SMILE, and its speech the language of compromise and conciliation. THE SMILING FACE DID NOT COME NATURALLY TO THIS REGIME, BUT THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE LEARNS TO ENJOY WEARING IT, BEING POPULAR IN THE WORLD IS SUCH A NOVEL EXPERIENCE.

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03850 05 OF 05 132323Z
ACTION S5-00

INFO LOG-00 ADB-00 /000 M
-------------------253062 140351Z /38
R 13220PZ FEB 69
FA AMBASSAD MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE HABSC 5061
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

SECRET SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 03850

ENDS

S/G: PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT

E.O.12356: DECL/GHR
TAGS: PREM: ECON: VR
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE NEXT FOUR
FIVE YEARS.

FOR A RUSSIAN THAT IT TENDS TO GO TO THE HEAD.
FURTHERMORE, THE CURRENT LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO
LEARN SOMETHING THEIR CYPRIOT PREDECESSORS HAD NOT
SEENED: AS WILLIAM CONN SANG, YOU CAN GO A LONG WAY
ON A SMILE AND A SHOE HINE.

23. OF COURSE, THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE NOT INTO
BARGAINING JUST FOR THE KICKS. THEY EXPECT THE SMILE TO
TRANSLATE INTO POLITICAL BENEFITS. THEIR CONSTANT
TALK OF THEIR DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE, THEIR ANNOUNCEMENTS
OF UNILATERAL MILITARY CUTS, THE PERIODIC
PROCLAMATION OF VARIOUS "PEACE" INITIATIVES, ARE
ELEMENTS OF AN OVERALL STRATEGY DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN
MOSCOW'S GREAT POWER STATUS AND INFLUENCE DURING A
PERIOD OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC RETRACEMENT. IF THEY
ARE LUCKY, THEY WILL INDUCE THE WEST TO DELAY AS
FAST AS OR FASTER THAN THEY DO, AND THIS REMAIN AT A
MILITARY DISADVANTAGE. IF THEY ARE DOUBLY LUCKY,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03850 05 OF 05 132233Z

THEY WILL CAJOLE THE WEST INTO PICKING UP THE TAB FOR
SOME OF THEIR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. BUT EVEN IF

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2110 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

THE WEST IS SUFFICIENTLY PRUDENT TO DENY THESE ADVANTAGES, THEIR TACTIC CREATE PRBLEMS FOR OUR ALLIANCES AND DRIVE HEDGES, AND EVEN WHEN THE WEST HOLDS FIRM AND THE SOVIETS ARE FORCED TO ACCEPT WESTERN TERMS, THEIR TACTIC ENSURE THAT MUCH OF THE WESTERN PUBLIC WILL CREDIT THEM FOR INITIATIVES THEY DID NOT IN FACT MAKE.

24. DOES THIS MAKE ALL THE DEFENSIVE TALK AND "NEW THINKING" A FAKE? I THINK NOT. IN MY VIEW, THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE MAKING A VIRTUE OF NECESsSity. THEY ARE COVERING THEIR RETRACEMENT WITH A HYPERACTIVE DIPLOMACY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRESCRIBE THEIR GREAT POWER POSITION (OR AT LEAST AS MUCH OF IT AS POSSIBLE) ON A DIMINISHED BASE OF MILITARY POWER.

25. VORONKOV'S FRENZIED DIPLOMACY IN THE LAST MONTHS OF SOVIET MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN EXEMPLIFIES THIS OVERALL TECHNIQUE. THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT OBTAIN HIS OSTEINSIBLE GOALS (A GENERAL, CIVILIAN, AND AN ACKNOWLEDGED FUTURE POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE POP) DOES NOT MEAN THAT HIS EFFORTS WILL BE JUDGED UNSUCCESSFUL IN SOVIET EYES. THE OSTEINSIBLE GOALS HERE WERE MARKING ONES AND NOBODY WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SURPRISED THAN THE SOVIET LEADERS IF THEY HAD BEEN REACHED. REAL SOVIET GOALS WERE PROBABLY MORE ASYMPTOTIC TO PREVENT THE HUMILIATION OF SOVIET FORCES DURING THEIR WITHDRAWAL (THE FALL OF MAJOR CITIES AS THEY LEFT?) TO STIMULATE DISPUTES AMONG THE AFGHAN OPPOSITION ARMIES) TO DRIVE HEDGES BETWEEN THE MUJAHEDIN FORCES AND OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY SECRET

SECRET

PAKISTAN AND THE U.S.; AND NOT LEAST -- TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH THEIR FRIENDS IN KABUL SO THAT THE LATTER WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN FUTURE COLLAPSE.

26. SUCH, IN MY ESTIMATION, WILL BE THE SOVIET APPROACH TO MANY OTHER ISSUES; MUTATIV MUTAMID (AND OF COURSE THE SPECIFICS VARY WIDELY). THE BOTTOM LINE FOR THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL BE WHETHER THEY CAN CLOAK -- AND THIS MAKE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AT HOME -- A DIMINISHED USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN THEIR

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 501, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

FOREIGN POLICY: IF THEY HANTED TO PICK UP A FEW EXTRAS DIVIDENDS ALONG THE WAY IN THE FORM OF GRATUITOUS WESTERN CONCESSIONS, THEY WOULD OF COURSE ACCEPT THEM WITH PLEASURE (THOUGH WITHOUT GRATITUDE). THE CHALLENGE FOR THE WEST IS TO DENY UNBALANCED CONCESSIONS AND THEREBY MAINTAIN THE PRESSURE FOR A FURTHER EVOLUTION OF SOVIET POLICY ALONG THE PATH THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE OBTENIBLY TAKEN. MATLOCK
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 04648 01 OF 07 221603Z

INFO LOG-00 NDS-00 221603Z

FM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5B87

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648

NODIS

F.O. 12356: DECL:GAR
TAGS: PREL, UR

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

REF: (A) MOSCOW 2362; (B) MOSCOW 3858

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

BEGIN SUMMARY:

2. WE HAVE AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THE DEGREE THE SOVIET UNION IS WILTING TO MOVE INTO A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND TO STRENGTHEN THOSE TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET UNION TO "CIVILIZE" THE ECONOMY AND "PLURALIZE" THE SOCIETY. U.S. LEVERAGE, WHILE CERTAINLY NOT UNLIMITED, HAS NEVER BEEN GREATER. THAT LEVERAGE SHOULD BE USED NOT TO "HELP" GORBACHEV OR THE SOVIET UNION, BUT TO PROMOTE U.S. INTERESTS. THE MOST CENTRAL OF SUCH INTERESTS IS THE LONG-TERM TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO A SOCIETY WITH EFFECTIVE ORGANIC CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS.

SECRET

PAGE 02

MOSCOW 04648 01 OF 07 221609Z

3. OUR TRADITIONAL FOUR-PART AGENDA REMAINS

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20057
SECRET RELEVANT, BUT WE SHOULD REVIEW CURRENT POLICY TO DETERMINE WHAT SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE REQUIRED BY RAPIDLY CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS FOR VERIFIABLE ARMS REDUCTIONS BUT REFUSE TO MAKE THESE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WE SHOULD INCREASE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON MOSCOW TO END, ONCE AND FOR ALL, ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND TO SCALE BACK SUBSTANTIALLY ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA.

4. IF MOMENTUM CAN BE SUSTAINED IN ALL OF THE AREAS OF OUR TRADITIONAL AGENDA, WE SHOULD GRADUALLY PUT MORE SUBSTANCE IN TWO ADDITIONAL AREAS, PERHAPS EVENTUALLY GIVING THEM THE STATUS OF POINTS FIVE AND SIX: MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS. NEITHER SHOULD INVOLVE Aid, BUT BE BASED STRICTLY ON MUTUAL PROFITABILITY AND RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS.

5. AS SOVIET POLICY CHANGES AND SOVIET DIPLOMACY BECOMES MORE ACTIVE, EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF OUR ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS WILL BECOME MORE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. THE CHALLENGE IN THIS AREA MAY IN FACT BE GREATER THAN THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, BUT A FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION WITH WELL DEFINED GOALS, SHOULD BE HELPFUL IN ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT.

EGOMNARY.

---------

6. THE CURRENT BISARRAY ON THE SOVIET DOMESTIC SCENE SECRET SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 04/98 01 OF 07 2216032

HAS GIVEN THE UNITED STATES AN UNPRECEDENTED POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY. OUR LEVERAGE IS BY NO MEANS UNLIMITED -- WE CANNOT FORCE THEM TO HANG OVER THE STORE -- BUT IT IS SUFFICIENT TO TIP THE BALANCE OF DECISION ON MANY KEY ISSUES, PROVIDED WE ARE WISE ENOUGH TO USE OUR LATENT INFLUENCE SKILLFULLY, CONSISTENTLY, AND PERSISTENTLY. THIS MESSAGE WILL SUGGEST A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR A POLICY TO TAP INTO OUR INFLUENCE OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS OF SOME OF THE POLICY
PROPOSALS MENTIONED ILLUSTRATIVELY IN THIS
PRESENTATION WILL FOLLOW IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.
THE WRONG QUESTION

7. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY OBSERVERS, GIDDY FROM THE
SURPRISE OF SEEING RAPID CHANGE IN A SOCIETY WHICH
WAS CLOSED AND SEEMINGLY STATIC FOR SO LONG, ARE
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION -- AND DRAWING THE WRONG
CONCLUSIONS. "PERESTROIKA!" THEY SAY, IS IN THE
U.S. INTEREST; GORBACHEV IS ESSENTIAL TO
"PERESTROIKA"; ERGO THE U.S. SHOULD DEVISE A STRATEGY
TO "HELP" GORBACHEV.

8. EVEN THOUGH THE FIRST OF THESE PROPOSITIONS IS
TRUE (IF ONLY BECAUSE PERESTROIKA TENDS TO DEMOBILIZE
THE SOVIET UNION WHILE IT IS UNDERWAY), THE OTHERS
ARE NOT. INDEED, THEY CONTAIN SEVERAL HIGHLY
QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS: THAT WE KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04648 02 OF 07 2216142
ACTION NODIS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 1000 H - 017912 2216182 147 P 2215182 FEB 89 ZFF4
FM AMBASSAD MOSCOW
to SECSSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5B8E
S C R E T SECTION 02 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: Odin
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

THE INS AND OUTS OF SOVIET POLITICS TO "HELP" INDIVIDUALS EFFECTIVELY; THAT WE SHOULD EVER IDENTIFY U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERS: THAT CONCESSIONARY POLICIES WOULD IN FACT BE OF ASSISTANCE IN STIMULATING RADICAL REFORM. EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, THESE OBSERVERS ARE POSING THE WRONG QUESTION. THE QUESTION SHOULD NOT BE HOW WE CAN HELP "PERESTROIKA" OR GORBACHEV, BUT RATHER HOW WE CAN PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IF THE PURSUIT OF OUR GOALS HAS THE COLLATERAL EFFECT OF STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF POLITICAL LEADERS WHO HAVE ESPoused POLICIES CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN, WELL AND GOOD. BUT WE SHOULD BE CLEAR IN OUR OWN MINDS THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO SERVE OUR INTERESTS, NOT THEIRS.

THE CENTRAL ISSUE

9. WE OF COURSE HAVE MANY SPECIFIC INTERESTS WHICH WE MUST PURSUE, BUT NO LONG-TERM GOALS ARE MORE SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04648 02 OF 07 2216142
IMPORTaNT THAN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM INTO ONE WITH EFFECTIVE STRUCTURAL

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE
SOVIET BORDERS, ALONG WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SOVIET MILITARY MACHINE INTO ONE SUITABLE PRIMARILY
FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, FOR LONG, MANY HAVE DOUBTED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD OR COULD MOVE IN THIS
DIRECTION EXCEPT AS THE RESULT OF A TOTAL COLLAPSE OF
THE SYSTEM. THE DOUBTERS MAY EVENTUALLY PROVE TO BE
RIGHT. NEVERTHELESS, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AT LEAST
SIXTY YEARS, THESE GOALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH AVOWED
SOVIET ASPIRATIONS. WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE DID NOT
REINFORCE INCENTIVES FOR SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THIS
DIRECTION.

10. REINFORCING INCENTIVES. HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEAN
"AID" IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE. THE DEPLOYMENT OF
PERSHING II'S AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE BEGINNING
IN 1983 PROVIDED POWERFUL INCENTIVES TO CONCLUDE AN
INF AGREEMENT ON WESTERN TERMS. IN CONTRAST, ALL THE
FINANCIAL AID GIVEN POLAND IN THE 1970'S ACTUALLY
REDUCED INCENTIVES TO CARRY OUT REFORMS NECESSARY FOR
THE VIABILITY OF THE ECONOMY. THESE EXAMPLES ARGUE,
FOR A POLICY WHICH SETS HIGH BUT FAIR STANDARDS FOR
AGREEMENTS AND COOPERATION AND REQUIRES FULL
RECIROCITY OF OBLIGATION AND BENEFIT.

OUR AGENDA

11. THE FOUR-PART AGENDA WHICH WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY
PURSUED OVER THE PAST SIX YEARS ADDRESSES BOTH THE
EXTERNAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT (SOVIET
SECRET
SECRET

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL CONFLICTS; ARMS
REDUCTION) AND ALSO ITS INTERNAL CAUSES (HUMAN,
RIGHTS; PUNCTURING THE IRON CURTAIN). IT HAS BEEN
SUCCESSFUL IN THE SENSE THAT IT HAS FINALLY PRODUCED
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN ALL THESE
AREAS. IT HAS NOT YET EXHAUSTED ITS FULL POTENTIAL;
HOWEVER, SINCE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN ALL FOUR
AREAS:

ARMS REDUCTION AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

12. WHILE THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW FORMALLY ACCEPTED OUR

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

FOUR-PART AGENDA AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSION AND NEGOTIATION. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY STILL GIVE ARMS CONTROL, AND PARTICULARLY THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON START, COUPLED WITH SOME "REINFORCEMENT" OF THE ABM TREATY, PRIDE OF PLACE. THERE IS NO REASON FOR US TO COPY THEM IN THIS RESPECT. THOUGH OF COURSE WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON START AND ABM WHEN OUR REVIEW OF THE ISSUES HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

'3. THE POINT IS NOT THAT A GOOD START AGREEMENT WOULD BE MORE IN THE SOVIET INTEREST THAN OURS -- IF IT IS A GOOD AGREEMENT, IT WILL SERVE U.S. OBJECTIVES EQUALLY AS WELL AS SOVIET ONES. THE POINT RATHER IS THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO AVOID AN UNBALANCED CONCENTRATION OF ATTENTION ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES TO THE RETRIMENT OF THOSE PARTS OF OUR AGENDA WHICH HAVE A MORE DIRECT IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2133 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01  MOSCOW 04648 03 OF 07 2216042
ACTION MODS-00

INFO LOC-00 A85-00 1/000 W
-------------------------- 017941 2216112 141
F 221518Z FEB 89 ZFFY
FM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHINGTON PRIORITY 5889
SECRET SECTION 03 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:ADR
TAGS: PREL, WP
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

SOCIETY IN A PLURALISTIC DIRECTION AND ON THE
CONVERSION OF SOVIET INDUSTRY TO A GREATER
CONCENTRATION ON CIVILIAN PRODUCTION.

14. FURTHERMORE, WHILE IT MAY BE DIFFICULT IN
PRACTICE TO ESTABLISH FORMAL DIPLOMATIC LINKAGES
BETWEEN THE ARMS REDUCTION ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN
OTHER AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP, WE SHOULD BE ALERT
TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING THE PACE OF ARMS
CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS TO MATCH PROGRESS ON OTHER
ISSUES IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

15. ONE EXAMPLE WHICH COMES TO MIND IS THE SOVIET
SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO NICARAGUA. WE SHOULD
PRESS HARD FOR AN IMMEDIATE END TO THIS PRACTICE
(INCLUDING PROVISION OF WHAT GORBACHEV HAS CALLED
"POLICE-TYPE" WEAPONS), AND IT WILL NOT HURT TO LEAVE
THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR REVIEW OF START ISSUES MAY BE
MORE RAPID IF THERE IS A RESOLUTION OF THIS IMPORTANT
PROBLEM. OUR PUSH FOR AN ABSOLUTE CESSION OF
SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
SECRET

PAGE 02  MOSCOW 04648 03 OF 07 2216042

(STARLIG S. SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY ACCOMPLISHED) IF WE DECIDE
NOT TO PRESS PROGRESS FOR A NEEP-TERM RESOLUTION OF
SECRET

APRIS SUPPLIES TO THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION. IF THAT IS TO BE OUR POLICY IN ANY CASE, THEN WE SHOULD CERTAINLY INVITE THE SOVIETS TO USE IT AS A "JUSTIFICATION" FOR THEIR ABSTENTION.

16. CONCOMITANTLY, WE SHOULD DEVELOP A STRATEGY FOR DIMINISHING GRADUALLY THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE ON CUBA. A GRADUAL APPROACH WHICH PROVIDES THE SOVIETS WITH SOME PRETEXTS FOR RETREATMENT IS LIKELY TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE OVER THE LONG RUN THAN PUBLIC THREATS WHICH ENCOURAGE MOSCOW TO PROVE THAT IT IS NOT ABANDONING FRIENDS OR bowING TO U.S. PRESSURE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

17. HUMAN RIGHTS MUST OF COURSE REMAIN A KEY ELEMENT IN U.S. POLICY. ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ARE BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN LIVING MEMORY. IN PURSUING OUR POLICY IN THIS AREA, WE HAVE AT OUR DISPOSAL BOTH NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE INCENTIVES, AND IN ADDITION A VERY EXTENSIVE MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION WHICH DID NOT EXIST EVEN TWO YEARS AGO. THE CSCE PROCESS PROVIDES BOTH LEVERAGE ON AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS; THEY MUST DEFEND THEIR PRACTICE AT THE UPCOMING PARIS AND COPENHAGEN MEETINGS, PLUS CONTINUE THEIR PROGRESS AT HOME IF THEY ARE TO HAVE U.S. AND BRITISH PARTICIPATION AT THE 1991 MEETING IN MOSCOW.

18. WE SHOULD USE OUR BILATERAL CONSULTATION
SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 04648 03 OF 07 2216047

MACHINERY TO CONTINUE TO PUSH VIGOROUSLY ON THE REMAINING ISSUES. IN REGARD TO EMIGRATION PRACTICES, THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT GIVES US A TOOL WHICH CAN BE USED MORE ACTIVELY -- AS I WILL DISCUSS SUBSEQUENTLY. IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WE HAVE ONE NEW ASSET: THE SOVIET AVOIDED POLICY TO IMPROVE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS. THIS ALLOWS US TO APPROACH MANY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES UNDER THE PUBLIC OF "COOPERATION" RATHER THAN CONFRONTATION.

ERODING THE IRON CURTAIN

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
19. PROGRESS IN ERODING THE IRON CURTAIN HAS BEEN RAPID OF LATE, WHAT WITH THE CESSATION OF JAMMING, GROWING U.S. ACCESS TO SOVIET MEDIA, THE RAPID GROWTH OF PRIVATE TRAVEL AND THE BEGINNINGS OF YOUTH EXCHANGES ON A SUBSTANTIAL SCALE. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE. WHILE NOBODY SHOULD EXPECT WIDER PERSONAL CONTACTS AND A BETTER FLOW OF INFORMATION TO TRANSLATE IMMEDIATELY INTO A NON-AGGRESSIVE POLICY OR DEMOCRACY INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THAT HANDFUL OF THE SOVIET ELITE WHICH HAS HAD RECENT AND EXTENSIVE EXPOSURE TO THE WEST ARE AMONG THE DRIVING FORCES FOR PLURALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE FORCE OF OUR EXAMPLE ON SOVIET MINDS AND IT WILL SERVE OUR INTEREST TO INCREASE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE TO SEE...
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01   MOSCOW 04648 04 OF 07  22160252
ACTION NODS-00
INFO LOG-00  ADR-00  /000 /
------------------------017055  22161212 /91
P 2215142 FEB 854
IN AMBASSADY MOSCOW
TO SECSER WASHDC PRIORITY 5890
S E C R E T  SECTION 04 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648

NODIS

I.O. 12356: DECL:QADR
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES
LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES.

20. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE SHOULD LOSE NO TIME IN
REVISITING INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS TO INFLUENCE SOVIET
THINKING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THEY MIGHT INCLUDE
SOME OF THE FOLLOWING:

---A SYSTEMATIC PLAN TO INVITE TO THE UNITED STATES,
UNDER ONE RUBRIC OR ANOTHER, THE REMAINING POLITBORG
AND SECRETSARIAT MEMBERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN THERE, PLUS
MANY PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN MAJOR REPUBLICS
AND OBLASTS.

---EXPANSION OF PRINTED MATERIALS IN RUSSIAN,
INCLUDING AN EXTENSIVE BOOK PROGRAM, IN THE FIELDS OF
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

---EXPANDED PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE U.S. SPEAKERS, TV
PANELISTS AND TV DOCUMENTARIES FOR BROADCAST IN THE
SOVIET UNION.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02   MOSCOW 04648 04 OF 07  2216022

---RAPID MOVEMENT TO ESTABLISH A MAJOR U.S. CULTURAL
SECRET
CENTER IN MOSCOW; NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO
ONE IN PRINCIPLE, FOLLOWING DECADES OF REFUSAL.
-- EXPANSION OF THE U.S. PRESENCE INTO MAJOR NON-
RUSSIAN REPUBLICS, WHERE THE POPULATION HAS BEEN
EXPOSED ONLY SPORADICALLY TO U.S. INFLUENCE. TO
MINIMIZE BUDGETARY COSTS, TECHNICAL DELAYS AND
COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN THE U.S.-- WE SHOULD
STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF SMALL UNCLASSIFIED POSTS
'6-8 EMPLOYEES WITH PERSONAL DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, BUT
WITHOUT IMMUNITY OF PREMISES).

EXPANDING THE AGENDA: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

21. THE MOST OBVIOUS CANDIDATE FOR AN EXPANDED
AGENDA IS IN JOINT PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL
COOPERATION TO SOLVE COMMON PROBLEMS. PREVIOUSLY,
WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS STILL IN THE GRIP OF A
"ZERO-SUM" PSYCHOLOGY, OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET
COOPERATION IN MOST INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS WERE
SEVERELY LIMITED. THE SOVIETS HAD A PROPENSITY TO
POLITICIZE EVEN THE MOST PURELY HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
AND TO MISUSE THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH THEM. THEY CONSIDERED THIS
A PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE FORM OF POLITICAL WARFARE
AGAINST THE WEST IN GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES IN
PARTICULAR. THE RESULTS WERE QUITE APPARENT IN
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE ILO AND UNESCO.

22. NOW THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRUMPETING THEIR
CONVERSION TO A MORE COOPERATIVE DOCTRINE, WE SHOULD
SECRET
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 94648 04 OI 07 2216052

PUT THEM TO THE TEST BY CHALLENGING THEM TO PLAY A
MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE
EFFORTS. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD REFUSE TO BEND THE
GROUND RULES OF EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE
THE SOVIETS; AND WE SHOULD INSIST THAT THE SOVIET
UNION PULL ITS FULL WEIGHT. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD
MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT USING
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS A COVER FOR
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IS UNACCEPTABLE, AND -- IF
THIS PRACTICE IS CONTINUED -- WILL MILITATE
AGAINST THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AS A

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

FORMAL PARTNER IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

23. AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT BE MORE ACTIVELY EXPLORED WITH THE SOVIETS (WITH THE CAVEATS SET FORTH ABOVE) INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

--ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ON A GLOBAL SCALE;

--COMBATTING TERRORISM;

--CHEMICAL WEAPONS NON-PROLIFERATION - AND ULTIMATELY A VERIFIABLE GLOBAL BAN;

--NON-PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES;

--PLANNING AND EVENTUALLY BUILDING A PROTOTYPE POWER PLANT BASED ON NUCLEAR FUSION;

--FAMINE AND OTHER DISASTER RELIEF;

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04648 05 OF 07 2216052
ACTION MODS-00

INFO LOG:00 ABS:901000 W
-------------------------017063 2216122 411
F 221518Z FEB 89 ZDF4
FM AMBASSADY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5891
SECRET SECTION 05 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648
MODIS

E.O. 12256: DECL:DADR
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

--NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

24. WE SHOULD: HOWEVER, PROCEED VERY SLOWLY IN ONE AREA IN WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL SHOW GREAT INTEREST, THAT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE INSTITUTIONS (E.G., GATT, IMF, WORLD BANK). OUR POLICY IN RESPECT TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR OVERALL ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE USSR. THE ECONOMIC AREA HAS SUFFICIENT POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCING SOVIET BEHAVIOR TO MAKE IT A STRONG CANDIDATE FOR A SIXTH POINT ON OUR OVERALL AGENDA.
EXPANDING THE AGENDA: ECONOMICS

-------------------------

25. UP TO NOW ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE FORMED A RARELY-MENTIONED SUBUNIT OF THE LATERAL AGENDA CATEGORY. WE HAVE HARDLY USED IT AS A TOOL IN THE RELATIONSHIP, DESPITE ITS IMPRINGE IMPORTANCE, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, MOST QUITE SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04648 05 OF 07 2216052

SOUND: WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, WHICH WE PROMISED QUITE VIGOROUSLY AND EVEN
SECRET

SUBSIDIZED. WE HAVE BEEN ARRIVALIST ABOUT EXPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY OF THOSE CAPITAL GOODS WHICH INTERESTED THE SOVIETS MOST. AN ATTITUDE WAS SHAPED BY A LEGITIMATE CONCERN OVER THE DANGER OF NEW TECHNOLOGY SLEEPING INTO THE SOVIET MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO PROHIBIT DAMAGING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE DESIRE TO PROMOTE U.S. EXPORT MARKETS OFTEN LED IN PRACTICE TO A TOTAL BUREAUCRATIC IMPASSE. ASIDE FROM PROHIBITING CERTAIN TYPES OF EXPORTS AND DELAYING PERMISSIBLE EXPORTS FOR MONTHS OR YEARS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REMAINED LARGELY PASSIVE:

OCCASIONAL RHETORIC TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING.

26. THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR US TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT A MORE VIGOROUS AND FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY IN REGARD TO EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND TO USE THE ECONOMIC LEVER TO PROMOTE THE SORT OF CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION WHICH ARE CONGENIAL TO OUR INTERESTS. OUR POLICY SHOULD STOP SHORT OF AID OR SUBSIDY AND SHOULD PROVIDE FOR STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF AGREED CCCP CONTROLS, BUT WITHIN THOSE BOUNDS IT SHOULD OFFER SIGNIFICANT INCENTIVES FOR THE SOVIET LEADERS TO DEVELOP A DECENTRALIZED, PLURALISTIC, CIVILIAN-ORIENTED ECONOMY.

27. THE KEY ELEMENT IN OUR ECONOMIC POLICY WOULD BE AN EFFORT TO DEFINE FOR SOVIET POLICY MAKERS THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD INDUCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO FACILITATE UNSUBSIDIZED TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AREAS NOT PROHIBITED BY CCCP. THIS COULD HAVE SOME EFFECT IN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

SECRET

PAGE 03

SECRET

WHICH WE FAVOR. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE SHOULD PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN FIRMS DOING

SECRET

LEGAL BUSINESS WITH THE USSR. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF SUCH POSSIBILITIES ARE:

A. JOINT VENTURES: WE SHOULD OFFER TO PROVIDE ENCOURAGEMENT TO U.S. FIRMS TO CONSIDER INVESTMENT IN LARGE-SCALE JOINT VENTURES, PROVIDED THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THESE WILL BE "REAL" FOR THE U.S. ENTERPRISES. THE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE DEFINED ON THE
SECRET

BASIS OF A CAREFUL STUDY, BUT MIGHT INCLUDE SUCH ELEMENTS AS MANAGEMENT RIGHTS FOR THE NON-SOVIET PARTNER, CURRENCY CONVERTIBILITY, OR AT LEAST PROTECTION AGAINST ARBITRARY EXCHANGE RATE SHIFTS, REASONABLE TAX AND TARIFF TREATMENT, REDUCTION OF BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR REASONABLE HEALTH, SAFETY AND OTHER GENERALLY RECOGNIZED STANDARDS, AND THE RIGHT OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES TO TRAVEL ABROAD FOR TRAINING AND OTHER BUSINESS PURPOSES. CRITERIA SUCH AS THESE TEND TO CONVERGE WITH THOSE DEFINING A MORE OPEN, DECENTRALIZED AND CIVILIZED ECONOMY SUCH AS WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

-- DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH CRITERIA WOULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SOME INCENTIVE TO THE SOVIETS TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION INDICATED, THEY COULD ALSO PROVIDE A VALUABLE SERVICE TO AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN WHO ARE NOW EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES WITHOUT

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 21st H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04648 06 OF 07 221606Z
ACTION NODIS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
---------- 017101 221612Z 01
P 221518Z FEB 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5892
SECRT SECTION 06 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:DAAPR
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD CRITERIA TO JUDGE THE VIABILITY OF PROPOSALS BEING MADE.

B. - JACkSON-VANIK: ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE IMPROVED THEIR EMIGRATION PRACTICES SUBSTANTIALLY OVER THE PAST YEAR, THEY STILL FALL SHORT OF QUALIFYING FOR A WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK SANCTIONS. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, WITHIN MAILING DISTANCE OF QUALIFICATION, AND WE SHOULD USE THIS FACT TO HASTEN THE RESOLUTION OF THE REMAINING REFUSAL CASES AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MORE LIBERAL PROCEDURES OVERALL.

-- THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS AND INTERESTED PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD DEFINING WHAT THEY MUST BE DONE TO QUALIFY FOR A WAIVER AND THUS ELIGIBILITY FOR MFN. WHEN WE HAVE DETERMINED WHAT CONDITIONS WILL BE ACCEPTABLE POLITICALLY TO JUSTIFY A WAIVER, WE SHOULD DESCRIBE THESE CONDITIONS TO THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY. (NEEDED TO SAY, IF THEY THEN SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 04648 06 OF 07 221606Z

MEET THE CONDITIONS; A WAIVER OR JACKSON-VANIK SHOULD BE GRANTED; AND MFN GRANTED ONE YEAR AT A TIME.

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelnet Library, 2150 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET
GOVERNMENT-FINANCED CREDITS AND GUARANTEES SHOULD
HOWEVER NOT BE RESUMED.

C. --TRAINING: WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE COOPERATIVE
PROJECTS TO TRAIN SOVIET ECONOMISTS, MANAGERS,
ENTREPRENEURS (FOR THE "COMP" SECTOR), AND
SPECIALISTS IN AREAS SUCH AS MARKETING WHICH ARE
LITTLE KNOWN HERE YET CRUCIAL FOR A DECENTRALIZED
ECONOMY WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRIVATE SECTOR.

D. --INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
ORGANIZATIONS: WE HAVE QUITE PROPERLY OPPOSED SOVIET
ASSOCIATION WITH ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS GATT. THE
SOVIETS, HOWEVER, ARE CERTAIN TO CONTINUE THEIR
CAMPAIGN TO ENTER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL COMMUNITY. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE USEFUL FOR
US TO REPLACE OUR CURRENT FLAT "NO" WITH AN "IF": IF
THEY MEET CERTAIN RIGOROUS BUT FAIR STANDARDS, WE
WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT THEIR MEMBERSHIP. FOR
EXAMPLE, THE CRITERIA FOR GATT MIGHT INVOLVE A REAL
DECENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE SOVIET
ECONOMY, INCLUDING CREATION OF A SUBSTANTIAL
PRIVATE/COOPERATIVE SECTOR. IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE
CLEAR THAT, IN ADDITION TO MEETING CERTAIN CRITERIA
OF SUITABILITY, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
ASSUME THE SAME OBLIGATIONS AS OTHER MEMBERS WITH
DEVELOPED ECONOMIES.

-- ESTABLISHING SUCH CRITERIA WOULD SERVE A
TWO-FOLD PURPOSE: IT WOULD INDICATE TO THE SOVIETS
WHAT THEY MUST DO TO QUALIFY FOR MEMBERSHIP, AND IT
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03

WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE RATIONALE TO RESIST ANY
FUTURE ATTEMPTS BY OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES TO BEND THE
RULES TO ACCOMMODATE THE USSR.

E. --SUPPORT FOR U.S. BUSINESS: WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO
REVIEW OUR EXPORT REGULATIONS AND LICENSING
PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE EFFECTIVE IN
IMPLEMENTING COCOA CONTROLS, BUT THAT THEY DO NOT
EXCEED COCOA RESTRICTIONS (WHICH ONLY SHIFTS TRADE TO
OTHER COUNTRIES). NOTING WE SHOULD EMERGENT THAT
RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS ARE CLEAR, EASILY UNDERSTOOD.

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

AND APPLIED CONSISTENTLY IN THE LICENSING PROCESS. A
METHANISM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT
INTERAGENCY DISPUTES ARE SETTLED PROMPTLY AND NOT
ALLOWED TO DRAG ON FOR MONTHS WITHOUT RESOLUTION.

PROBLEMS: ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

28. AS THE SOVIET UNION RETRENCHES IN RESPONSE TO
THE REQUIREMENTS OF PERESTROIKA -- OR IN CONSEQUENCE
OF PERESTROIKA'S FAILURE -- U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
WILL BECOME MORE "MANAGEABLE" THAN THEY WERE IN THE
1970'S AND EARLY 1980'S. WE MAY WELL FIND, HOWEVER,
THAT OUR ALLIANCES WILL BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO
MANAGE. IN THE PAST, ALLIANCE PROBLEMS HAVE OFTEN
BEEN SOLVED WHEN THE SOVIETS COMMITTED SOME
OUTRAGEOUS ACT THAT RALLIED THE ALLIES TO OUR SIDE.
WE CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON SUCH SOVIET "ASSISTANCE" IN
THE FUTURE: THE SMILING FACE WILL HAVE A MORE
DIVISIVE EFFECT THAN THE BELLIGERENT CROWL.
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 01

MOSCOW 04648 07 OF 07 2216062

INFO LOC-00 465-00 /000 U
--017105 2216122 /41
P 2215182 FEB 89 22F4
FM AMBASSAD MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5893

SECRET SECTION 67 OF 07 MOSCOW 04648

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 000
TAGS: PREL, UR
SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: POLICY OPPORTUNITIES

29. GENERAL ADVICE ON ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT IS OF COURSE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS MESSAGE. HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE USSR HAS A MAJOR AND OFTEN DECISIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SORT OF POLICY STANCE SUGGESTED IN THIS MESSAGE WOULD ASSIST IN MAINTAINING ALLIANCE COHESION IN THE FACE OF SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS. A LARGELY STATIC POLICY BURSTRESS MAINLY BY PERIODIC WARNINGS OF THE POTENTIAL THREAT THE SOVIETS STILL PRESENT IS LIKELY OVER TIME TO EXACERBATE STRAINS IN THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM, NO MATTER HOW VALID THE WARNINGS ARE IN FACT. WE ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO HOLD THE ALLIES TO A REASONABLE COURSE IF WE TAKE THE LEAD IN DEFINING THE FUTURE -- AND IN PRESSING THE SOVIET UNION TO LIVE UP TO ITS CURRENTLY AVOIDED ASPIRATIONS. MATLOCK

SECRET

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gellman Library, 21301 Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
“The Political Processes in the European Socialist Countries and the Proposals for Our Practical Steps Considering the Situation Which Has Arisen in Them”

24 February 1989

[MEMORANDUM OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

The socialist community is experiencing the most difficult period in its development in the entire postwar period. An extremely complex situation has arisen in Eastern Europe. We are talking about the fate of socialism in a number of countries of this region, the future of the Warsaw Pact, [and] the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union.

The serious difficulties which the European socialist countries have encountered are chiefly connected with a crisis of the administrative command model of socialism. This model has entered into obvious contradiction with the requirements of the development of society, has become a brake on the path of socio-economic and scientific-technical progress, and has created a real threat of a growing gap [otstaivaniye] between the socialist world and the West.

Cardinal political and economic changes have become an objective necessity in all the European socialist countries. However, the awareness of this necessity, the notions of the character and rates of change, [and] the approaches to the theory and practice of socialist construction at the present stage are far from [being] the same.

In some countries–Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia–the leadership is carrying out political and economic reforms extremely decisively, in others–Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria–[the leadership] actually remains a follower of the administrative command system.

Without question, the course of perestroika, in the Soviet Union is exercising and will exercise a decisive influence on the character of the processes in socialist countries. Our perestroika can either become a catalyst of the ongoing processes of renewal or, in case of slippage, [can] strengthen doubts in socialism as an effective social and political system.

The surmounting of a negative legacy and the renewal of socialism are occurring with difficulty and conflict. The ruling parties of a majority of countries have delayed carrying out reforms and several of them have lost confidence in the public and now are losing control over the course of events. This chiefly concerns Poland and Hungary.

The population associates existing problems and failures mainly with oversights and obvious distortions [deformatsii] in the policy of the ruling parties on which all the responsibility for the resulting crisis situation lies. All this has led to a fall of their authority among the population, including the working class. The situation in several ruling parties is aggravated by factional struggle [and] a split in the leadership.

In these conditions opposition forces have sharply stepped up their activity: “Solidarity” in Poland, “Democratic Forum” and other groups in Hungary, the “Chartists” in Czechoslovakia, etc. Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, and nationalist parties are forming. Opposition forces enjoy support in [a] broad [social] strata, including the working class. The opposition is striving to weaken the influence of the ruling parties in all spheres of social and political life and acquire access to power. The
question of power in such countries such as Poland and Hungary is coming to the surface all the more.

The ruling parties have been forced into concessions and compromises to preserve the socialist system and their influence in society, resorting to a policy of national accord, and starting on the path of recognizing political and labor union pluralism. This is most characteristic of the Polish United Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Political reality has put before them the need for cooperation with the opposition [and] drawing [the opposition] into participation in the functioning of government and public institutions. There is no little share of risk in the implementation of the measures by [our] friends.

A tendency toward political pluralism in the European socialist countries is being displayed everywhere and, judging from everything, will become more and more dominant. This will lead to a multi-party system (not obligatory on a coalition basis) [and] the “free play” of political forces. Having received access to parliamentary and government bodies, the opposition can completely or partially drive the ruling communist and workers’ parties from power. All this is a real prospect, even today, for several European socialist countries. Considering that forces hostile to socialism have stepped up their activity, this process could have serious political consequences.

In countries where authoritarian methods of leadership are being retained (Romania, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) the ruling parties are experiencing growing difficulties in resolving social economic, political, and ideological problems. Hidden dissatisfaction with their policy is intensifying [and it] could be displayed at any moment, but here and there it is already being displayed in the creation of alternative associations, in demonstrations, and strikes. In response, the authorities are intensifying their repressive measures [and] using harsher methods of regulating public political life. Such a practice provokes even more dissatisfaction in society, and a sharper negative reaction abroad. It comes into contradiction with the general tendency in the world community toward democratization and with the principles and provisions of the final documents of the all-European Conference [CSCE] and the Vienna meeting.

It ought to be supposed that [there is a] process of transition in these countries to democratization [and] a genuine renewal of socialism, but this is in the final account unavoidable, will occur more painfully, and be accompanied by deep political and social convulsions.

Perestroika has brought real changes to the character of our relations with the socialist countries. In practice we have switched to the principles of equal rights and mutual responsibility in cooperation [and] to a considerable degree have removed the stratification [nasloyeniye] of the past. Nevertheless, many problems remain undecided, especially in the sphere of economic cooperation, the development of a modern concept of socialism, [and] the development of relations between people. Moreover, new frictions have arisen in several areas. We have been confronted with facts when the leadership of Romania, the German Democratic Republic, [and] Czechoslovakia are trying to block the spread of the ideas of perestroika in their countries, resorting, in particular, to prohibitive measures. Sometimes unconsidered publications in our mass media serve as an excuse for this. This introduces a certain tension in our bilateral relations.
The problem of “white spots” has acquired a special bitterness in the history of our bilateral relations with a number of socialist countries. Among them are the questions connected with the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, the “Katyn Affair,” the events of 1956 in Hungary, the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, etc. The delay in the work of evaluating these events from positions of new thinking is causing irritation in certain circles of the socialist countries, and in certain strata of the population [this] gives rise to mistrust in our policy of glasnost. Aggravated national territorial problems have brought serious discord into the relationships among the socialist countries in recent years. This is the case in regard to Hungary and Romania, Romania and the USSR, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, etc.

As a whole, a growth of nationalism in all East European countries, and a strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in their policies has been observed.

The situation of affairs in the Warsaw Pact is developing in complex ways. Our policy for genuinely equal relations within the alliance, the development of the initiative of each member state, [and] the approval of the practice of co-creation in the development and advancement of large foreign policy initiatives has doubtless had some positive effect.

The further development of collective, democratic principles in the activity of the alliance is being hindered by the obstructionist position of the Romanian leadership, which has obviously taken a course of dismantling the existing organs of political and military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact framework. The allies are all the more prominently displaying an attempt to get more from the Warsaw Pact, mainly from the USSR (a guarantee of security, political information), than they contribute to it, [and] to display independence to the detriment of common interests [and] mutual responsibility. They are dissatisfied with the remaining inequality in the military mechanism of the Warsaw Pact leadership, which is practically a Soviet military headquarters with an especially formal presence in it of other countries. Some allied countries (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) are openly finding burdensome the Soviet troops on their territory and display an interest in the quickest possible reduction of their strength.

At the same time, it seems improbable that in the foreseeable future any of the allied countries will raise the question of leaving the Warsaw Pact. We have to deal with the attempt of individual countries, especially Romania and Hungary, to give their participation in the Warsaw Pact a formal character, [and to] avoid coordinated actions which could limit their freedom of maneuver in international affairs.

The US and their allies in NATO are right now placing reliance on an evolutionary path to change the social structure in the European socialist countries [and] a peaceful transition from socialism to bourgeois regimes, using a differentiated approach to each of them. Proceeding from this goal [ustanovka], judging from everything, the Western powers do not want confrontations with us on account of Eastern Europe. In the case of a worsening crisis situation in individual countries they [the Western powers] will most likely display restraint and not intervene in their [Eastern European countries] internal affairs, especially militarily, counting on their patience being rewarded with time.

Recently, both in the West and in the socialist countries, predictions have all the more been spread about a transformation of the existing regimes in Eastern Europe into “post-capitalist societies” and their “Finlandization.”
The extremely serious domestic political situation in a number of European socialist countries, [and] the deeply thought-out, long-range policy of the Western states regarding our allies and the socialist community as a whole require from us the greatest attention to the processes occurring in the fraternal countries, to the problems of our cooperation with them, [and] to the prospects for the development of world socialism. In doing so, [we] ought to keep in mind that recently [our] friends could have received the impression that, in conditions of an intense dialogue between the USSR and the US [and] the growth of our attention to global and regional international problems, [our] relations with socialist countries have become secondary for us.

1. In the conditions which have arisen the growth in practice of our attention to relations with the socialist countries [and] an approach to them as a genuinely high-priority main thrust of Soviet foreign policy have special significance.

   The most important problem at this stage is not to permit the erosion of socialism in Eastern Europe [and to] keep all the countries of this region on the socialist path of development.

2. In as much as at the present time our influence on the development of the European socialist countries with the aid of economic and scientific technical levers is limited, [we] need to strengthen the emphasis on work with friends in the political and ideological sphere [and] substantially increase comradely attention to the leaders of the fraternal countries. In the present situation even the simple exchange of opinions and experience with the leadership of friends has a significance of no small importance in resolving the problems confronting us. Meetings at the level of general secretaries and CC secretaries, heads of government, ministers, [and] leaders of public organizations are a matter of primary importance. It is necessary to simplify the procedure of these meetings, to give them a more business-like, working character.

   The time has come to hold a conference of leaders of fraternal parties in a narrow circle with the object of discussing the urgent problems of socialist construction and increasing the effectiveness of cooperation within the framework of the socialist community.

3. Work to prepare new treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid between the USSR and a number of allied states in connection with the expiration of current [treaties] would acquire great significance for the further development of relations with the European socialist countries in the spirit of equality, partnership, trust, [and] mutual responsibility. [The treaties] should reflect the new principles of relations between socialist countries [and] the available experience in rebuilding their cooperation, excluding conditions not appropriate for the present character of the mutual relations of socialist countries.

4. [We should] proceed from [the] fact that the use of forceful methods on our part in relations with socialist countries and especially the use of military force is completely excluded, even in the most extreme situation (except cases of external aggression against our allies). Military intervention not only would not prevent, but would worsen the social and political crisis, cause mass outbreaks of protest even as far as armed resistance and lead in the final account to the opposite effect, the reinforcement of anti-Sovietism. It would seriously undermine the authority of the Soviet Union in the foreign policy field, worsen our relations with leading Western powers and even
with other countries, [and] would lead to the isolation of the Soviet Union in the international arena.

At the same time, considering the present complex situation in the European socialist countries, we ought to keep our limited military presence in Eastern Europe as a stabilizing factor and maintain uncertainty as regards the possible role of our troops in a critical domestic political situation.

5. In connection with the ambiguous perception of Soviet perestroika by the leadership of the European socialist countries, our attitude toward those of them who have a restrained attitude toward the reforms in the USSR (the German Democratic Republic, Romania, [and] partially Czechoslovakia [and] Bulgaria) should be distinguished by self-restraint and calm.

Considering that the creation of new models of socialism is an objective process, in our relations with fraternal countries [we] ought to avoid any kind of attitude of exhortation [nazidatel’nost’] regarding various models, attempts at hanging labels, and more broadly share experience in the area of the theory and practice of socialism. The main thing should be mutual understanding with friends so that reforms be carried out on a socialist basis.

[If] the situation worsens in one or another socialist country, we ought to refrain if possible from giving public support to repressive actions of authorities which contradict international norms in the field of human rights.

6. Inasmuch as in a number of socialist countries there could be created state structures based on a coalition system of power with the participation and significant influence of the opposition, it is advisable now to make it [our] business to establish contacts with reemerging political parties, organizations, and associations, including trade unions acting in a constitutional framework.

7. Closing the remaining so-called “white spots” in the history of our relations with several of these countries would help in increasing trust in the USSR and other socialist countries. This especially concerns Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

[We] ought to accelerate the study of our position on such acute questions as the “Katyn Affair”, the events of 1956 in Hungary, [and] the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia in the light of new political thinking.

In this connection it is required that a political decision be made to open access to the appropriate archival materials.

8. In contrast to the majority of countries of the world participants. Strikes have become more prolonged [and] community, substantial restrictions continue to be maintained in the socialist community in the area of contacts between people [and] private trips of citizens. In the political area this does not serve our interests [and] has an adverse effect on the development of trade and economic, scientific, cultural, athletic, and other ties. At the present time, the question of the maximum removal of restrictions on trips of citizens of socialist countries to the USSR and of Soviet citizens to these countries and the creation of corresponding facilities for this has become unavoidable.

9. An important goal should be the preservation of the military-political alliance of European socialist states—the Warsaw Pact.

In accordance with the proposals advanced by us to improve the mechanism of cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, it is necessary to follow a line of maximum politicization of the activity of the alliance, democratization of the forms
of its operation, an increase of the contribution and interest of each of the member states. This would be aided by an atmosphere of a genuine comradely, free, and unstructured exchange of opinions at meetings of the PCC [Political Consultative Committee], KMID [Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs], and KMO [Committee of Ministers of Defense] (in doing so, it is not obligatory [that] they come to a consensus at any price on all questions—each state has the right to preserve its freedom of action, explaining and justifying its position to the other allies); obligatory rotation [of officials] in all bodies and structures of the Warsaw Pact; and the simultaneous increase in the effectiveness of its mechanism—the creation of a permanent political working body, giving the General Secretary of the PCC the role of coordinator within the framework of the alliance. [We] ought to simplify the procedure for preparing and holding conferences and meetings of Warsaw Pact bodies [and] try to ensure continuous working contact of the allied states.

10. All the more pressing has become the problem of establishing a close coordination of the actions of allied socialist states with respect to the East European policy of the US and its partners in NATO and working out coordinated strategy and tactics in this direction.

5-yesh/GG
24.2.89

[Source: Donation of Professor Jacques Levesque; copy on file at the National Security Archive. Translated by Vladislav Zubok and Gary Goldberg.]
Professor
Andrzej Stelmachowski

Dear Professor,

I would like to kindly ask you to act as an intermediary in passing the enclosed documents to Lech Walesa. I am compelled to turn to you as I want to be sure that they will reach him and will be treated seriously. Experiences of sending [documents] by other methods are not encouraging.

I would also like you to know their content.
I apologize for this unusual request.

With best regards,

J. Kropiwnicki
[signed]
[Attachment No. 1]

Working Group Lodz, 25 February 1989
of the National Commission
of NSZZ “Solidarnosc…”

A Statement on the “re-legalization” and [versus] “legalization” of the NSZZ “Solidarity”

1. The Working Group of the National Commission of the NSZZ “Solidarity” states with satisfaction, that during the past few months a far-reaching rapprochement between the advisory bodies to Lech Walesa, which have a dominating influence on the policy of Chairman of the National Committee and aspire to a leadership role of “Solidarity” by the National Commission on the one hand, and the Working Group of the Commission on the other, has taken place.

In the fall of 1987 and still in spring 1988 (before the outbreak of the April-May strikes), leading representatives of that political orientation, Jacek Kuron (see, e.g. “The landscape after a battle”) and Andrzej Celinski (see an interview for “Newsweek” of 23 November 1987) have clearly stated that they consider the history of “Solidarity” as a trade union over.
The strikes of 1988 have proved that the Working Group of the National Commission was right to maintain consistently, from the beginning (i.e. from 1985) the position that “Solidarity” is first of all and has to remain a trade union.

In the fall of 1988, Lech Walesa’s advisers and the National Executive Commission (KKW) adopted a position close to that of the Working Group (GR KK).

In December of that year, a significant political event—the preliminary institutionalization of the socio-political movement in the form of the Citizens’ Committee as a separate institution—took place. The creation of the Citizens’ Committee, which all leading representatives of the same political orientation as Lech Walesa and the KKW joined as members, will undoubtedly facilitate the realization of their political ambitions on a more suitable platform for this purpose than the trade union one. At the same time, it offers a chance to restore the pluralistic character of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”

Still controversial is the question of [the] relationship [of Solidarity] to the law of 8 October 1982, which Lech Walesa’s advisers adopted as a basis for negotiations with the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland.

The subsequent rapprochement to the GR KK took place when the negotiators on behalf of Lech Walesa and KKW adopted the position that:

1. The Union has to be registered as a whole (and with its original name), and as one set up separately in each work place.
2. It has to have a territorial, and not a branch structure.

It remains controversial as to whether it is to be registered as a new Union, or restored as a legal entity existing continuously since 1980.

It appears, based on the pronouncements of Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki to the mass media, that the “social-solidarity side” at the “Roundtable” had assumed that it ought to be registered as a new union (so-called legalization).

The Working Group of the National Commission is of the opinion that the indispensable condition of both a lasting understanding (or a lasting compromise) with the PRL authorities and the restoration of unity in “Solidarity” is [based on] the restoration of registration to the existing union (its “re-legalization”).

2. The Working Group of the National Commission is of the opinion that “forming the Union anew” will come in conflict with social aspirations, and may even lead to a breakdown of the Union.

a) Many Union activists and members have experienced all sorts of repression—prison, arrest, physical violence (some lost their life), dismissal from a job, unemployment, monetary penalties, constraints in their professional career, all for their struggle in defense of the existing Union. For them it is inadmissible to [consider] giving away at the table all that they [had] defended and suffered for, and without even asking for their opinion.

b) For many, the adoption of the law of 8 October 1982 as a basis for restoring normal Union activity would mean some sort of legitimization of martial law. It is different to avoid this question “for the benefit of the cause” than to prejudge it (even indirectly) in a way inconsistent with convictions of a great majority of society.

c) A “renewed formation” of the Union closes the possibility of revindication of the property taken over by the PRL authorities. Many people think that the Union may give up on its claims, but those rights have to be recognized.
d) Founding the Union as a “new one” will make it difficult or simply impossible to rehabilitate the members who were sentenced or to restore to work those who were dismissed for their defense of “Solidarity.” Many of them are ready to give up on seeking someone else’s guilt, but not from recognition of their own innocence.

3. “Legalization,” that is a renewed formation of the Union (even on the basis of the previous Statute of 1981) would mean recognition that the NSZZ “Solidarity” was really disbanded on 8 October 1982. This “dissolution” has been recognized neither by the Union, nor by the MOP, nor by trade unions in the democratic countries. The World Federation of Labor and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, guided by the principles of international law, have carried out the affiliation of the NSZZ “Solidarity” as an existing trade union (though deprived of domestic registration). In this way they have confirmed a universal norm that the union exists based on the will of its members, and not by the grace of the authorities.

Giving up the demand for restoring registration of the union existing continuously since 1980, the NSZZ “Solidarity” would probably be the first trade union in the world, associated in those bodies, which had recognized the right of state authorities to dissolve trade unions. It would be a dangerous precedent both in political and moral meaning. Dissolution of the NSZZ “Solidarity” could be done only by a National Conference of the existing Union, elected according to its Statute and Electoral Law of 1981—and not a “solidarity-social party,” the National Executive Committee (KKW), or even a founding conference of a new Union.

Let’s keep in mind that organizations that had been suspended or dissolved inconsistently with their own statutes (the last example: the Labor Party—SP, “dissolved” long ago by its own Head Council and “united” with the Democratic Party—SD), are being reclaimed today.

4. The Working Group of the National Commission appeals:
- to the “solidarity-social side” not to take decisions at the Roundtable, which are reserved for the statutory authorities of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”
- to the leaders and sympathizers of the Union not to give away at the table what thousands of Union activists and members did not give up during the martial law period and multiple repressions,
- and in particular to Lech Walesa, Zbigniew Bujak,111 Wladyslaw Frasyniuk 112 and Antoni Tokarczuk 113—as chairman of the KK 114 and members of [the] KK Pre-sidium— not to be unfaithful to their oath of loyalty to the Statute of the NSZZ “Solidarity.”
- to Lech Walesa, to remember that he has entrusted our Union to the protection of Our Lady of Czistochowa,
- to all others to be aware of their responsibility towards the society, the nation, God and history.

5. The Working Group is of the opinion that for the sake of our nation an understanding with the PRL authorities is indispensable; it will be real if it is based on respect for the inalienable and unalterable employee, citizen and human rights.

6. The Working Group is of the opinion that for the benefit of our nation, unity of the NSZZ “Solidarity” is indispensable. Its basis can only be respect for its Statute and union rights, a Statute [embodying the], democratic and pluralistic character of our Union.
Working Group Lodz, 25 February 1989
of the National Commission
of NSZZ “Solidarnosc…”
A Position on Workers’ Self-Government

1. The Working Group of the National Commission is warning the “solidarity-social” side against treating workers’ self-government as an objective, the only appropriate form of managing the so-called all-social or state property. The concept of replacing the state bureaucracy with workers’ self-government remains, within the socialist thought, as a postulate of “real socialization of the means of production.” For non-socialist political orientations this concept may be unacceptable.

2. Building the economic system based on workers’ self-government, the essence of which boils down to bestowing the right of management of productions assets to an imprecisely defined owner, toward whom the management, not being owners in any other sense than symbolic, should feel responsible, would be an experiment on an unheard of scale, a solution without any useful patterns and experiments whatsoever.

3. A self-governmental solution can be, at most, some form of temporary instrument in the elimination of the nomenklatura from the economy.

4. Target solutions ought to be sought in those areas where there is maximal connection between work and ownership. The first step ought to be the abolition of hitherto indivisible state property. The second one [ought to be] dissemination of property—that is bestowing the rights of property to particular work places, their conversion into joint-stock companies and enfranchisement of the nation through employees’ shareholding. The sphere of state management in industry should be limited to an absolute minimum. In the area of energy and communications, the scope of public ownership should be defined on the basis of the experiences of the developed countries of Western Europe. Commerce should be gradually privatized (both retail and wholesale).

5. Experience teaches that all forms of collective property, in which individual participation is not secured by the alleged owners, are being treated as “nobody’s property” and in the best case [scenarios] are becoming some form of bureaucratic property (in the case of communist countries—the nomenklatura’s property).

For conformity,

[signed]
J. Kropiwnicki

[Source: A. Stelmachowski Papers. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
Record of Conversation between President M. S. Gorbachev and Miklos Nemeth, Member of the HSWP CC Politburo, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Moscow

3 March 1989

[The meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Miklos Nemeth, one of the leading reformers and technocrats in the Hungarian leadership, was the first top-level personal consultation between the two countries’ leaders following the crucial decisions of the HSWP CC on 10-11 February 1989 to re-evaluate the events of 1956 as a people’s uprising and announce the introduction of the multiparty system in the country. The following part of the discussion reflects the determination and the hope of both leaders that the much needed transformation of the political structure and the economy could and should be realized within the framework of a reformed socialist system.]

(EXCERPT)

M. S. Gorbachev congratulates Nemeth on the occasion of his appointment as Prime Minister, and asks him how long he has been in office.

M. Nemeth: For almost a hundred days. I am often asked whether I am thinking about reviewing and sizing up what I have done so far. I usually answer that I have no time for that. Even if I make an assessment, it is for the Central Committee or the parliament. One has to be critical of one’s own activities.

M. S. Gorbachev: True enough. In the single-party system self-criticism, is supposed to be an important issue. Possibly the most significant condition is how successfully the leading role of the Party is achieved. On the other hand, our mistakes and shortcomings are all rooted in the lack of criticism. Naturally, I am not only talking about the management, the top layer of party leaders, but I mean it on a larger scale—the whole of the Party. During the Stalin regime, from 1934 to his death, there were only two party congresses.

M. Nemeth: In the days when Lenin was at the helm, there were endless debates and a clear political line was formed all the same.

M. S. Gorbachev: Yes, because there were entirely different conditions both in the Party and in the country. Now we are opening the way towards socialist pluralism. The multiplicity of opinions is not a tragedy for the society; on the contrary, it is a real advantage. Of course, there are some who want to exhibit democracy for their own selfish objectives, but it can be dealt with, it is merely a question of struggle. [Boris] Yeltsin has now a peculiar position in the Central Committee. His is a typically leftist, rather obnoxious position, which can nevertheless find a favorable reception among the public. We have to put up with several problems that directly concern people’s lives, and those who cry out loud enough about these can reap a dividend. The majority of people cannot be blamed for this, as they are hoping that a man like him will one day be able to do something for them. Besides, it is important that they learn on their own the difference between a demagogue and a serious politician. There is nothing flattering I can say about a member of the Central Committee who gambles at the expectations, while he knows
very well that the party program is aiming at the quickest possible way of satisfying these expectations.

M. Nemeth: It happens quite often with us. There are always a few members of parliament who rise to speak from such a demagogic position.

M. S. Gorbachev: The main thing is to be honest and truthful in the Central Committee, in the parliament, and among the people as well, and to have a clear conscience. Otherwise the personality will break down, and downfall is unavoidable.

M. Nemeth: What we consider the most important task for the time being is creating a majority within the Central Committee that can be joined around a unified program.

M. S. Gorbachev: This, of course does not rule out the possibility of the existence of some kind of left-wing or right-wing views.

M. Nemeth: Yes, the only important thing is that the center be strong.

M. S. Gorbachev: We are for a majority that relies on democratic development. We would like to revitalize the role of the councils, agitate the activity of MPs, and assure complete publicity. Without these, the real power of the workers does not exist. See what we had before in the past: masses of the people were alienated from property, politics, and culture. Yet the principal goal of socialism is overcoming alienation and putting man in the focus of attention.

M. Nemeth: I see no difference between pluralism in a single-party system and in a multi-party system. You are absolutely right: if there is freedom of thought and a unified program according to which people behave, everything goes on as it should. In May 1988 we laid the foundations for such a practice in the course of the Party Conference. Nonetheless, there were certain illusions.

M. S. Gorbachev: Experience showed us that nothing could be achieved at the first trial. We have to get back to the accepted agreements and decisions, polish them, make them more precise, and then move on.

M. Nemeth: Yes, the conditions are changing. Theoretically what you said in Kiev is important for us. Every socialist country is developing in its idiosyncratic way, and their leaders are above all accountable to their own people. Whether it be one party or more—life will show which solution is more effective. Within our conditions, state and party have become the same. This affected the development of the country in a most unfavorable way. We should not eradicate everything with one stroke, because what we achieved is worth noting.

M. S. Gorbachev: I believe that Pozsgay’s statements are quite extremist in this respect. The events of 1956 indeed started with the dissatisfaction of the people. Later, however, the events escalated into a counterrevolution and bloodshed. This cannot be overlooked.

M. Nemeth: Most important of all, these questions should not cause division in the society. Some say that we need to look at history in the same way, because otherwise there will be no unity in society at all. In reality, however, unity in interpreting the past does not exist. The main thing is that we have unity with regard to the present situation and in the policy to follow.

M. S. Gorbachev: Indeed, every generation is responsible for the present, first and foremost.
M. Nemeth: I am convinced that the organic interrelation and conformity of the economy and politics in fundamental issues is indispensable. A principal question is that of pace. We Hungarians started economic reform long ago, while leaving the political institutions intact. Since last May, we have witnessed a rapid development and transformation of the political system. A new election system, the reorganization of parliament, and other measures followed one another in such a rapid succession, the wheels of the machine are turning with such dizzying speed that it could pose a potential danger to society if this process interrupted economic development.

Nobody actually doubts that a democratic constitutional state is unavoidable for a successful people’s economy to function. Having only that, though, without a productive economy, then political transformations will happen in a void, l’art pour l’art. Pozsgay says that there is nothing wrong with politics superseding the economy. We, on the contrary, think that harmonization of the two is needed. We support and develop economic institutions, in parallel with changes in the political sphere. We will act with responsibility.

M. S. Gorbachev: You have touched upon an important issue. The process of renewal is gradually spreading over the entire socialist bloc, and adds to the political culture and historical experiences of all these countries according to the local conditions. The most important for all of them, however, is turning towards the people and revitalizing the socialist system. While listening to you, our own situation came to my mind. Of course, it is difficult to achieve total synchronicity between politics and the economy, but at least we have to try. You might remember what Lenin used to say: “We Bolsheviks have conquered Russia, so now we have to learn how to govern it.” They rushed ahead in politics, which was in itself normal at the time. But you are right: if we fail to utilize the political drives and motivations to create a healthy economy, the people will unavoidably become discontented.

Comrade Grósz informed the negotiators about the Hungarian situation. He said that the events in Hungary have lately accelerated. Their direction is according to our intentions, while their pace is somewhat disconcerting. Comrade Grósz emphasized that we wish to retain political power and find a solution to our problems by political means, avoiding armed conflict.

We have a good opportunity for reaching our goals. People are afraid of a possible armed conflict. Workers, peasants and professionals want to work and live in peace and security, safeguarding their property. [...]  

Another major concern is the history of the last thirty years. We have to face our past, hard and painful as it is, the acting participants still being alive. On the other hand, by drawing the necessary conclusions, we might dishearten certain layers of our policy's active supporters in the party. Lack of self-confidence is palpable enough in the party anyway. [...]  

Comrade Gorbachev agreed that the Western world does not want instability in Eastern Europe, including Hungary as well, because in the present situation it would be adverse to their interests. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that they intend to facilitate the realization and strengthening of a development which suits their own political ideas.
Comrade Gorbachev emphasized: "The assessment of the events of 1956 is entirely up to you." You have to stand on firm ground; you have to examine what really happened then and there. The Soviet leadership has recently analyzed the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and they continue to maintain that what happened there was a counterrevolution, with all the idiosyncratic traits of such an event. There were different periods within the Czechoslovak events, but the Dubcek regime was unable to prevent counter-revolutionary forces from gaining ground through them. [...]

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that we clearly have to draw boundaries, thinking about others and ourselves at the same time. Democracy is much needed, and interests have to be harmonized. The limit, however, is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability.

Comrade Grósz emphasized that when referring to 1956, we adhere to the original evaluation that the party endorsed in December 1956. The process is described in three consecutive words [sic]: student protest, uprising, and counter-revolution.

Comrade Gorbachev agreed with the above. He emphasized that today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention in the internal affairs of socialist countries. [...]


(From Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-1990; International Conference, June 12, 1999, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events)
Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution

An Intelligence Assessment
Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem and Prospects for Resolution

An Intelligence Assessment
Rising Political Instability
Under Gorbachev:
Understanding the Problem and
Prospects for Resolution

Key Judgments

The Soviet Union is less stable today than at any time since Stalin's great
purges in the 1930s. General Secretary Gorbachev clearly hopes that, by
shaking up the Soviet system, he can rouse the population out of its
lethargy and channel the forces he is releasing in a constructive direction.
Even Gorbachev realizes, however, that it is far from certain that he will be
able to control the process he has set in motion. That process could create
so much turmoil and unrest that it will be very difficult for him to achieve
his goals. In the extreme, his policies and political power could be
undermined, and the political stability of the Soviet system could be
fundamentally threatened.

Gorbachev's reforms—while yet to remedy existing problems—have
caused new challenges to surface. Having seen their quality of life stagnate
under Gorbachev, Soviet citizens are becoming increasingly skeptical of
reform, seeing it more and more as a threat to the secure existence they re-
call they enjoyed under Brezhnev. Moreover, the aspects of reform that are
potentially most destabilizing are only in their early stages. The political
reforms being introduced could further erode central authority and could
give disaffected groups new platforms to challenge the regime. Radical
economic reform appears further away because the kinds of market-
oriented measures required to meet economic objectives would heighten
social tensions by raising prices, creating unemployment, and increasing
economic inequality. Moreover, such a transition could create a period of
economic chaos and a sharp drop in production before the reforms began to
yield positive results.

Over the past two years, incidents of political unrest in the USSR, ranging
from benign small gatherings to major acts of political violence, have
sharply escalated. Under the banner of glasnost, Soviet citizens are
organizing groups that could form the basis of a political opposition and are
advancing a wide range of demands that challenge central authority. The
most dangerous of these are the nationalist movements that have blos-
somed in many republics, unleashing centrifugal forces that, if unchecked,
could threaten to tear the system apart. This increasing assertiveness by
national minorities is provoking a backlash among the Russians, embolden-
ing Russian nationalist groups and setting the stage for violent clashes in
the republics where the Russians are in danger of becoming second-rate
citizens.
The comprehensive nature of Gorbachev's reforms has polarized the Soviet elite, alienating many party members who stand to lose privileges and social stature and increasing the potential for a debilitating split in Party leadership. Party conservatives fear that the cure being offered by Gorbachev is worse than the disease, arguing that the reforms may undermine party rule and produce a crisis of their own. Although Gorbachev's opponents on the Politburo have been weakened, they have a strong base of support among members of the elite who feel threatened by his reforms, including sizable elements in the Central Committee, the party and state apparatus, the military, and the KGB.

There have also been growing signs of frustration among Soviet citizens. Reforms that are fueling expectations for improvements in the quality of life, but, from the standpoint of the Soviet workers, Gorbachev's economic program has been a near disaster, and there is a widespread perception that conditions have deteriorated. Moreover, the mere existence they came to take for granted under Brezhnev is being threatened by pressures to work harder and a fear that only the most productive workers will be rewarded. Glasnost and political liberalization have further eroded regime legitimacy among some elements of the population, especially the intelligentsia, by giving them hope that things can be improved by working through the system. At the same time, as the 26 March revision demonstrated, such reforms have released pressures for further changes that could undermine the party's monopoly on political power.

Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership has undertaken the treacherous path of radical reforms because it believes that the old system is failing and that, in the long run, it would have been more dangerous to do nothing. Particularly, while Gorbachev remains at the helm, the leadership will not be easily swayed from this path. It specifically recognizes that the highly centralized Stalinist economic model was increasingly ill suited to reversing the economic slide that began under Brezhnev and to closing the technological gap with the West. At the same time, Soviet political institutions were failing to provide social liberties and legitimate channels for airing concerns to a population that is increasingly well educated and informed. Corruption, abuses of privilege, and unfulfilled promises under Brezhnev have compounded these problems by increasing popular cynicism and alienation and helping to erode the legitimacy of the regime.
The Soviet leadership possesses tremendous capabilities for controlling unrest and preventing opposition from threatening the regime. Gorbachev himself is a major asset, demonstrating masterful political skills in building support for his radical agenda, keeping the opposition off balance, and maintaining cohesion in the leadership. He is also a risk taker, however, increasing the possibility he could miscalculate in a critical situation. Should political skill alone not be sufficient to control opposition, the regime still possesses the powerful coercive forces of the KGB, military, and militia. While it has already used these to deal with particular outbreaks of unrest, any broad-scale reliance on coercion to maintain stability would seriously undermine the reform process. Short of resorting to force, the considerable degree of centralized control the Soviet state exerts over key aspects of society—jobs, prices, wages, housing, transportation, media, and imports—gives it other important levers it can use to help maintain stability.

The next several years promise to be some of the most turbulent in Soviet history. Indeed, while the kind of turmoil now being created in the USSR has been effectively managed in many countries, in other countries it has contributed to the destabilization of the political system. There are too many unknowns to determine whether Gorbachev will be able to control the process he has started, or if it will increasingly come to control him, making a wide range of outcomes possible over the next five years:

- If Gorbachev’s reforms begin to produce tangible results and if he is lucky, he should remain in power and prevent any of the potential problems he faces from getting out of control, while continuing to move his reforms ahead.

- A growing perception within the leadership that reforms are threatening the stability of the regime could lead to a conservative reaction. This would probably, but not necessarily, involve a transfer of power—with a majority of the Politburo voting Gorbachev out, as happened with Khrushchev in 1964—and a repudiation of many aspects of reform.

- Those pressing for a maximalist agenda could gain control of the political system as a result of democratization and glasnost—as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968—and force Gorbachev out.
• Should a sharp polarization of the leadership prevent it from acting resolutely to deal with a growing crisis, the prospects would increase for a conservative coup involving a minority of Politburo members supported by elements of the military and KGB. The prospects of a unilateral military coup are much more remote.

• If ethnic problems mount, consumer and worker discontent grow, and divisions in the leadership prevent it from acting decisively, organized political opposition could threaten the regime. Under these conditions, opposition groups could come to share power, as Solidarity did in Poland in the early 1980s, or individual republics might win de facto independence.

To get through this difficult period, the Soviet leadership can be expected to continue to place a high premium on creating a stable and predictable environment—minimizing the possibility of threats to Soviet interests from abroad. East-West relations, especially with the United States, will be particularly important. To help ease the strain on the economy and improve the prospects for delivering on promises to the consumer, the Soviet leadership will continue to vigorously pursue arms control and seek ways to reduce military spending.

Gorbachev can be expected to seek more foreign policy successes to enhance his legitimacy, build his personal prestige, and distract attention from domestic problems. For this and other reasons, he can therefore be expected to maintain a very high profile in the international arena, continuing to advance major foreign policy initiatives. At times, however, domestic crises—some of which may not be visible on the surface—will probably distract the Soviet leadership from foreign policy. This could result in temporary reversals on specific issues, or unexplained periods of indecision—such as occurred during the US Secretary of State's October 1987 visit to Moscow in the midst of the Yeltsin crisis—when the Soviet leadership failed to set a date for a summit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope Note</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A System Under Stress</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Instability</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Discontent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortfalls in Regime Capabilities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Factors</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev's Reforms</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular and Elite Reaction to Gorbachev's Reforms</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization of the Elite</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Attitudes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Legitimacy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Factors</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality Problems</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Opposition</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Capabilities</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Skill</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive Capabilities</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Control</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Variables</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the United States</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The 26 March Soviet election again demonstrated that Gorbachev has released forces within the Soviet system that may prove very difficult to control and could destabilize the political system. This speculative paper examines the prospects for political instability in the Soviet Union, focusing on the next five years. It is intended to warn policymakers that, while current developments in the USSR need not lead to political instability, similar developments in other countries have sometimes done so. It analyzes the factors that make political systems unstable, the relevance of these to the current situation in the Soviet Union, and what will determine if it moves in the direction of greater or lesser stability. Various scenarios that would have major implications for the United States are presented. Some are of low probability but are offered to acknowledge the difficulty of predicting the long-term outcome of a situation highly in flux.

This paper does not make a systematic presentation of the evidence upon which its judgments are based but draws on a broad range of ongoing and finished research that has been done in the Office of Soviet Analysis and the Office of Global Issues. The study also draws on the findings of a two-day SOVA/OGI conference on the “Prospects for Instability in the Soviet Union” that brought together leading specialists on political instability and Soviet domestic affairs.
Figure 1
USSR: Distribution of Demonstrations, by Time and Size,
January 1987-December 1988

Number of demonstrations

1-100 Demonstrators
100-1,000 Demonstrators
1,000-10,000 Demonstrators
Over 10,000 Demonstrators

* Approximately 18 percent of the reports of demonstrations did not include the numbers of demonstrators involved. These have been grouped in this category.
Rising Political Instability
Under Gorbachev:
Understanding the Problem and
Prospects for Resolution

Nothing is more difficult to carry out, nor more
doubtful of success, more dangerous to handle, than
to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has
enemies in all those who profit by the old order.

Niccolo Machiavelli

A System Under Stress

By taking the Soviet Union down the road of radical
reform, General Secretary Gorbachev has opened
Pandora’s box. He clearly hopes that, by shaking up
the system, he can rouse the population out of its
lethargy and channel the forces he is releasing in a
constructive direction to build a more dynamic and
competitive system. So far, however, economic perfor-
ment has continued to stagnate, there is a wide-
spread perception that living conditions are deterio-
rating, and political turmoil and popular unrest have
sharply increased. As a result, the Soviet system is
less stable than it has been at any point since Stalin’s
great purges in the 1930s. There is little prospect of
relief in sight.

Over the past two years, incidents of political unrest
in the USSR, ranging from benign, small gatherings
to major acts of political violence, have sharply esca-
lated (see figure 1). Since January 1987, there have
been over 1,200 political and economic demonstra-
tions, strikes, and work stoppages. Half the incidents
were motivated by nationalism, involving up to 1
million people in Armenia, 800,000 in Azerbaijan,
and several hundred thousand in each of the Baltic
countries.

This new political activism is taking place largely
outside Communist party control. Emboldened by
glasnost, Soviet citizens are organizing groups that
could form the basis of a political opposition and
advancing a wide range of demands that essentially
run against the party’s interests. The most dangerous
of these are the nationalist movements that have
blossomed in many republics. Having seen their quali-
ty of life stagnate under Gorbachev, many Soviet
citizens are becoming increasingly skeptical of re-
form, seeing it more and more as a threat to the
secure existence they recall they enjoyed under Brezh-
nev. These developments are increasingly polarizing
the members of the elite over the future course of
reform—creating the danger of a divisive split in the
leadership and making Gorbachev’s continued hold on
power far from certain.

The Soviet leadership embarked on this potentially
hazardous course because it believes that the old
system was failing and that, in the long run, it would
have been more dangerous to do nothing. Frightened
by the specter of the workers revolt in Poland in the
eyear 1980s, even Brezhnev and his cronies began to
see the potential for similar upheavals in the USSR.
In early 1982, for example, then party Secretary
Chernenko said that the “harsh lesson” of Poland
shows that “crises” can develop in other Communist
countries if the party becomes divorced from the
masses. By the time Gorbachev came to power in
1985, there appeared to be a growing consensus in the
Politburo—including orthodoxy leaders such as Yegor
Ligachev—that the Soviet economic and political
system was becoming unstable. In mid-1987 Gorb-
achev explained the need for radical reform by arguing
that it had become increasingly clear over the past
two years that the failure to resolve “growing contra-
dictions” in the Soviet system was bringing it to the
verge of a “crisis.”

The Soviet leadership’s assumption that the system
was failing was based in part on the economic slide
that began under Brezhnev. The Stalinist economic
model of ever increasing inputs of labor and capital
with little concern for efficiency and productivity was
becoming increasingly less effective as labor supply
growth slowed, ever larger expenditures were required
to exploit natural resources, and the inefficiencies inherent in central planning became more acute as the economy grew. Probably even more alarming to the Soviet leadership was the system’s inability to encourage innovation and keep pace with increasingly rapid technological changes, leaving Soviet industry further and further behind the cutting edge of world standards. It became clear to the leadership that, unless these trends were reversed, the Soviet Union would become a second-rate power and that increasing economic stringencies could undermine political stability (see figure 2).

These economic difficulties were compounded by changes taking place within Soviet society that were weakening several props to the system, giving rise to increased public discontent about internal conditions and putting pressure on the system for change. The optimism Soviet citizens had in the 1960s had been replaced by an ever increasing sense of malaise:

- Corruption, abuses of privilege, and unfulfilled promises under Brezhnev increased popular cynicism, helped to erode the legitimacy of the regime, and increased alienation among the population.

- As a result of the information revolution and the general increase in the level of education, the Soviet leadership in effect lost its ability to shape public perceptions by controlling the flow of information. As a result, Soviet citizens became more aware of the greater freedoms and higher standards of living enjoyed elsewhere, fueling expectations for improvements in their quality of life.

- An increasingly large segment of the population had no personal memory of the Stalinist era, helping to make it less respectful and fearful of authority.

- A “youth bulge” (20 percent or more of the population are between the ages of 12 and 24) was occurring in the Caucasus and Central Asia, reducing opportunities for these young people, making many of them restless and dissatisfied. In the Baltic, the influx of Russians and the low birthrates for the indigenous nationalities were heightening concerns about national survival.

Sources of Instability

While the kinds of increased political turmoil and popular unrest now going on in the USSR have often been effectively managed elsewhere, they have also led to radical shifts in a regime’s policies, secessions of particular regions, or revolutions. There is no clear-cut formula for predicting whether unrest will lead to a change in a regime or government or force more radical policy changes by the incumbent government. The process by which observable challenges to government authorities and policies becomes an increasing threat to a regime’s survival is highly dynamic and depends on a variety of actors and country-specific circumstance. Nonetheless, academic studies and CIA research have identified a number of factors common to cross-national patterns of political change that have proved useful for monitoring the stability of specific countries. A closer look at these provides a useful framework for assessing the prospects for dramatic political change in the Soviet Union.

Popular Discontent

Discontent generally rises when popular expectations and a regime’s ability to satisfy them are far apart. Feelings of anger and frustration develop as people perceive a gap between what they get and what they think they should get. Although they are difficult to measure, these feelings of unmet expectations can be generated by a number of changing circumstances:

- A decline in the quality of life.
- Conditions that cause popular expectations to rise faster than a regime’s ability to satisfy them, such as unrealistic economic promises by the leadership.

*See DIA Intelligence Assessment 20 Apr 1986, Domestic Stresses in the USSR*
Figure 2
USSR: Economic Performance
Under Gorbachev and His Predecessors

Average annual growth rates (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brezhnev</th>
<th>Andropov</th>
<th>Gorbachev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- GNP
- Industry
- Agriculture

* Excludes farm products used within agriculture and purchases by agriculture from other sectors.
Unrest, Instability, or Dramatic Political Change?

In this paper a clear distinction is made between unrest, instability, and dramatic political change:

- Unrest. Strikes, demonstrations, and other manifestations of popular discontent are likely to be factors contributing to political instability, but the mere presence of unrest does not mean that a system is unstable or vulnerable to dramatic political change.

- Instability. A system is unstable when conditions exist that have the potential to result in a dramatic change in its political institutions, policies, or leadership. A political system becomes unstable as a result of a process in which significant demands and pressures are increasingly made on it and to which it fails to respond effectively.

- Dramatic political change. This is the end result of political instability. It could be change from below brought about by a revolution or the secession of a particular region. Members of the elite sometimes carry out dramatic change from above, such as political or military coups, or abrupt changes in the regime's policies to prevent such outcomes or to preserve their own interests. These outcomes are not mutually exclusive. For example, a reactionary coup could be a major factor ultimately contributing to the success of a revolution.

Although leaders frequently undertake reform to alleviate growing discontent and adapt political, economic, and social institutions to changing conditions, reform often exacerbates discontent and class conflict. As the rules are changed, new challenges arise from groups who perceive their interests are being threatened, including elites who have the resources to conspire against the government to preserve their own power. The longer changes have been put off and the greater the gap between the existing institutions and the needs of a society, the more comprehensive and traumatic those reforms need to be. If political structures do not adapt and provide legitimate channels through which demands can be made on the government, other unofficial organizations will probably arise, challenging the government.

The presence of minority ethnic groups in a society makes it more difficult to govern because such groups tend to see their interests as different from those of the central authorities. Such tension can be quickly aggravated when changes take place in the status quo, fueling competition among ethnic groups and heightening expectations for greater autonomy. Ethnic groups are easily mobilized because of their common identity that cuts across class and generational lines.

The skill of the leader is critical to the success of reform. A successful reformer must be a master politician because it is extremely difficult to control the process of change, achieving a gradual transformation that does not produce convulsive changes that get out of control. Moreover, a reformer must balance a wide variety of conflicting interests, waging a two-front war against conservatives defending the status quo and radicals pressing for even more sweeping reforms. Reform carried out simultaneously on all fronts, such as that Gorbachev is trying to bring about, has rarely succeeded because too many opponents are mobilized. To prevent this, successful reformers, such as Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, have dealt with only one aspect of reform at a time, without suggesting that further reforms might be down the road.

- Policies that violate "implicit bargains" between the government and population or specific groups, such as the freedom to retain cultural identity or job security.
- Elite actions that alienate the general populace, such as excessive corruption or disregard for traditional practices.
- Growing inequalities, especially when people see members of their own socioeconomic group gaining much more quickly than they are.
- Social mobilization produced by modernization, including urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure that increase demands for popular participation.
The Office of Global Issues and the Office of Soviet Analysis held a two-day conference last December that brought together leading academic experts on political instability and Soviet domestic affairs to explore the prospects for instability in the USSR. This issue was examined from various perspectives, including theories of social and political change, comparative case studies, the historical track record of instability in Communist countries, and alternative scenarios of dramatic political change in the USSR.

Although all participants expect continued unrest in the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future, they were sharply divided over whether this is likely to threaten the stability of the regime. Those who directly linked stability to the continued dominance of the party tended to be apocalyptic, arguing that the party will either contain unrest through divide-and-conquer tactics or an outright coercive crackdown or the system will collapse. Most of this group believe a prerevolutionary situation exists in the USSR because ethnic, economic, and intellectual instability poses a real threat to the party's monopoly, and they argue that, therefore, a coercive crackdown is only a matter of time. In contrast, those who see as possible an evolution away from a one-party monopoly believe the Soviet system's tolerance for unrest is much higher. They tended to see instability as a necessary condition for political, economic, and social reform and believe it is recognized as such by the Gorbachev reform coalition.

Collective Action
Regime-threatening instability requires that popular discontent be mobilized into action. Without organization, disaffected members of society usually remain passively alienated and overall system performance is likely to decline, but antiregime activity is not inevitable. If collective action is successful, a sort of "multiple sovereignty" can emerge, with the opposition in effect sharing power with the regime—similar to the role played by Solidarity and the Catholic Church in Poland before the imposition of martial law in 1981.

Several factors are particularly important for building an effective opposition that can establish its own legitimacy and effectively challenge a regime, including:

• A program that has broad popular appeal and is increasingly incompatible with the goals of the existing regime and has leaders who can articulate them.

Most agreed that ethnic unrest is the greatest threat to stability and the one most likely to force a response from the Soviet leadership in the near future. The nationalism of the Baltic peoples was often seen as raising prospects for the breakup of the Soviet empire. Many agreed that the spread of interethnic violence typified by that in Nagorno-Karabakh is likely to spur organized terror against the state. This could pose a grave threat to reform by uniting the elite and public in a conservative reaction.

Participants identified a number of indicators that would suggest that mass- or elite-based pressure in the USSR is becoming sufficient to make possible a major change in the regime, in leadership, or in policy:

• The emergence of multiple movements for autonomy, especially if this embraced the Ukraine or the large Central Asian republics.

• The near total breakdown of the economy, arising, perhaps, as a result of inflation induced by price reform, worsening shortages, and the breakdown of rationing and other distribution mechanisms.

• Class strife, as private property and visible class distinctions in both the city and countryside reappear.

• Gorbachev's loss of confidence and failure to provide a guiding vision, sparking a loss of credibility among the elite and populace.
• Coalition building with other influential groups in society. This can be facilitated by the emergence of a charismatic leader around whom they can rally.
• Acquisition of resources that can be applied to steadily increase pressure on the government to meet escalating demands.

Trigger events, such as natural disasters, assassinations, or sharp changes in the international environment, can sometimes compress the process of destabilization by highlighting performance problems of the government and rapidly mobilizing a discontents population. This can happen even if the opposition does not appear to be well organized and the government does not appear to be making mistakes. Mismanagement of earthquake relief in Nicaragua, for example, was decisive in bringing down the Somoza regime.

Shortfalls in Regime Capabilities
The success of collective action depends largely on the opportunities provided by the regime. A government that fails to make progress on stated policy goals, equivocates and postpones key decisions, splits over policy—including how to deal with opposition—and begins to question its own destiny sows the seeds of its demise. Polarization of the elite during times of mounting popular challenges increases the possibility that some members may withdraw their loyalty from the regime and join in a coup or make common cause with opposition groups.

Opposition can sometimes be defused by coercion or concessions, but force can also inflame unrest and concessions can spur further demands. Coercion applied inconsistently, brutally, or non-discriminately usually increases feelings of popular contempt. For coercion to be effective, the coercive forces must remain loyal to the regime and be strong enough to deal with potential challenges. The existence of coercive capabilities and a belief by the masses that the regime is willing to use them will often have a deterrent effect. However, if a regime hesitates in using its coercive forces—as with the Shah of Iran against the Islamic Revolution—the opposition will become emboldened.

If the legitimacy of a regime is increasingly called into question by the population or the elite, the prospects for instability are much greater. Exactly what constitutes legitimacy is unique to each situation. Nevertheless, there are some common elements that are often present, including a regime’s existence, its ability to withstand major crises, the legitimation of myths or ideologies, individuals’ personal stake in a regime’s existence, a regime’s ability to provide for the welfare of its citizens, or its ability to protect national security. In Poland, for example, extensive sociological studies of why the country has been in a state of crisis since 1980 have found the regime’s lack of legitimacy among most key groups in the population to be a critical factor.

Often a decline of legitimacy among the political elite—such as questioning its own political or ideological heritage—leads to a decline in popular legitimacy, helping to transform a lack of popular support for a regime into effective opposition. The regime’s loss of the intelligentsia’s support often sparks a rapid erosion of legitimacy among the masses and elite. The elite’s legitimacy is especially important in countries where the masses have played a minimal role in the political process, such as in Communist states. The elite’s questioning of the legitimacy of the Communist system was a key factor contributing to the crises in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

External Factors
By reinforcing the strengths and weaknesses of key actors in a political conflict, foreign states or institutions can have an impact on the internal stability of another country. Moral, financial, or military aid can enhance either the regime’s or opposition’s claims of legitimacy as well as their ability to defend their interests. A government’s concerns about international reaction to abuses of human rights or the use of force can limit its ability to deal with the opposition. Sometimes regimes use foreign policy initiatives to divert popular attention from domestic troubles. Successes can help bind societies together, but failures can hasten a regime’s loss of legitimacy and lead to its demise.
Gorbachev's Reforms

Gorbachev is effectively trying to destroy the Stalinist political, economic, and social system and replace it with one that is more competitive, dynamic, and efficient. The Stalinist system was forged out of a period of unprecedented turmoil, chaos, and suffering that lasted from the 1917 revolution until Stalin's death in 1953, during which political stability was maintained largely through terror. Transforming that system promises to be traumatic, particularly since change has been put off for so long. Although the terror was ended by Khrushchev, its legacy has endured, contributing to citizen resistance to speak out or overtly resist authority—although this situation is changing rapidly as Gorbachev relaxes repression.

Gorbachev has embarked on a comprehensive program of political and economic reform that leaves few aspects of the Soviet system untouched. As he has become more aware of the seriousness and the close interconnection among the diverse problems he faces, Gorbachev has broadened and radicalized his program. Although he is probably aware of the danger of trying to reform simultaneously on all fronts, he apparently sees this as the only hope of accomplishing his objectives. Most Soviets who have analyzed previous Soviet reforms—Khrushchev's as well as Kosygin's economic reforms of 1965—agree that they failed because they were not comprehensive and simultaneous.

Gorbachev is no doubt aware that he is playing with fire, even though he has publicly denied conservative charges that his reforms are "socially destabilizing" or will "lead to chaos." Instead, he clearly hopes that he can control the process of opening up and keep it within definite bounds to prevent it from getting out of hand—and in the long run improve the system and make it more stable. At the same time, he realizes that reform will also produce some undesirable consequences. The General Secretary told an informal meeting with Soviet writers in March 1988 that "various elements—from 'monarchist, to anarchistic'—are going to appear." His willingness to tolerate such consequences suggests that he is more confident than many of his colleagues of the system's ability to withstand stress and his own ability to manage change.

Although the net effect of the reform process in the short term is destabilizing, in some limited respects it is already beginning to enhance the long-term stability of the system by allowing pressures that built up during the stagnation of the Brezhnev years to be released and giving many Soviet citizens hope that things can improve by working through the system, increasing the regime's legitimacy. The stability of the Soviet system will face its severest test over the next several years as the leadership struggles to develop new institutions to replace the political, economic, and social foundations of the old Stalinist system, which are in the process of being destroyed. During this early period, the leadership will be confronted with a dangerous combination of the unresolved problems inherited from Brezhnev and the confusion and turmoil caused by the transition to a new system, with few of the benefits from the reforms. Moreover, the aspects of reform that are potentially most destabilizing—the economic and political—are only in their early stages. As they are put in place, not only is Gorbachev likely to face fierce resistance or even sabotage from those with a vested interest in the status quo, but there will be no doubt be some unanticipated negative consequences.

Economic

To create a dynamic economy, Gorbachev has been pushing a set of economic reforms that would dismantle the rigidly centralized economy and replace it with one more reliant on market forces. Although the reform program's full implementation is by no means certain, the transition is already proving to be highly disruptive and some Soviet specialists are warning that it could result in economic chaos and a sharp drop in production. Indeed, fear of such negative consequences appears to be causing hesitation on the part of the leadership about moving ahead. Gorbachev faces a clear dilemma: if economic reform becomes stalled, stagnation is likely to continue; if economic reform moves ahead, it will be highly destabilizing.
The reform program would almost certainly increase unrest in critical industrialized regions—such as in the Russian and Ukrainian Republics—where the population has so far been relatively passive, as the following factors come into play:

- **Shakedown period.** Problems encountered during the early stages of Gorbachev’s reforms suggest that serious disruptions would be unavoidable in shifting the entire economy to a more market-oriented basis. Economic managers would need time to learn how to operate under the new conditions, new economic relationships would need to be formed, bottlenecks would be created, mistakes would be made, and unanticipated problems would be encountered.

- **Price reform.** Decontrolling retail prices is a critical, but highly controversial, aspect of economic reform that now appears to be stalled. Price increases were critical factors precipitating crises in Poland and would almost certainly increase popular discontent in the USSR, particularly if there is no compensation for price hikes on food and other basic essentials. A Soviet scholar warned in the press that price reform could result in “uncontrollable inflation, chaos, and social excesses” and likened it to “carrying out heart surgery while wearing a blindfold.”

- **Unemployment.** To improve economic efficiency, plants will need to reduce the number of excess workers. Although Gorbachev has promised that no one will be without a job, many people may be required to take less attractive positions—at lower pay or in undesirable areas with labor shortages—increasing popular discontent.

- **Increased inequality.** Social tensions are likely to increase as some individuals “get rich”—by Soviet standards—through the private sector or increased rewards from the state. The presence of this wealthy group will increase feelings of relative deprivation among the rest of the population, spurring demands for wage increases and increasing discontent over price hikes. There has already been widespread resentment of those enriching themselves in the private sector. For example, a cooperative pig farm near Moscow was set afire by jealous neighbors accusing the owners of being “a new bourgeoisie, NEPmen and Kulaks.”

**Political**

The political reforms that are being introduced are intended in part to create official institutions that can channel the increased social mobilization produced by modernization in a constructive direction. At the same time, the reforms are also giving legitimacy to the grievances of disaffected groups and opening up to them political forums from which they can challenge regime authority.

Glasnost has helped to reengage intellectuals and has served as a safety valve, providing a vent for frustrations that had built up under Brezhnev. At the same time, it is also encouraging activities the regime finds undesirable, especially the mobilization of groups advancing ideas inimical to state interests—as in the Baltics and the Caucasus. Conservatives, such as party secretaries Yegor Ligachev and Viktor Chebrikov, have warned that glasnost is undermining the stability of the system by encouraging such political activity and damaging the regime’s legitimacy by calling into question the entire direction of past Soviet policies. Speaking to Soviet writers in July 1987, Ligachev charged that the reforms “have washed up scum and debris.” Gorbachev and his allies counter that the political ferment released by glasnost is basically healthy and that the undesirable fallout can be managed.

The electoral reforms being introduced are intended to channel this new political activism into official institutions—in addition to providing Gorbachev with a vehicle to help break the power of the party and state apparatus and to enhance his own power as the new president. The potential exists, however, that the
reforms could provide legitimate platforms for political opposition, eroding central control. Already the republic soviets elected under the old system in the Baltics and in the Caucasus have openly defied Moscow—in Estonia by asserting their authority to veto national legislation and in Armenia by demanding the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region—and local officials in other regions are becoming increasingly assertive. As the reforms—multiple candidates, nominations from below, secret ballots—increasingly take hold, local party organizations and soviets (especially in the non-Russian areas) could become increasingly difficult for Moscow to control. There is some reason to believe this may happen:

- To the apparent surprise of the Politburo, many leading party officials were defeated in the 26 March election of delegates to the new Congress of People’s Deputies. The most stunning upset was that of Leningrad party boss Solovyev, a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo who ran unopposed but whose name was crossed off the ballot by a majority of voters.

- Some election meetings became sharply polarized and very confrontational. A meeting in Moscow in January deteriorated into chaos after it was suddenly canceled because of a technicality. Supporters of Vitaliy Korotich, the outspoken editor of a reformist Soviet weekly, cried foul but were shouted down by a well-organized group of self-described patriotic Russians who raised banners carrying anti-Semitic symbols and calling Korotich “the scum of perestroika.”

- The central leadership lost control over the electoral process as a result of similar, but short-lived, electoral reforms in Poland in the early 1980s. Many official candidates, including members of the Politburo, were rejected in party and state elections.

**Popular and Elite Reaction to Gorbachev’s Reforms**

**Polarization of the Elite**

The comprehensive nature of Gorbachev’s reforms has polarized the Soviet elite, alienating many of those who stand to lose as a result of the changes that are taking place as well as those who are afraid of their consequences. So far, these divisions have not limited Gorbachev’s ability to take bold action, but they could at some critical juncture in the future. They also increase the likelihood of a conservative coup—such as the one in 1964 against Khrushchev—aimed at protecting the interests of the elite being threatened by his policies. Gorbachev appears to be aware of this danger.

Party conservatives fear that the cure being offered by Gorbachev is worse than the disease, arguing that his reforms may produce a crisis of their own. In addition to their criticism of glasnost, Ligachev and Chebrikov appear to be uneasy about the pace and scope of the entire reform process. Conservatives are playing on fears of instability to weaken Gorbachev by raising the specter of runaway reforms leading to chaos. In July, Gorbachev complained of their efforts to depict perestroika as “socially destabilizing.” Some reformers even charge that conservatives are intentionally trying to promote unrest to undermine Gorbachev (see inset).

Gorbachev is also being pressured by a growing constituency for more radical reforms. Boris Yeltsin—the leading spokesman in this regard—has warned that the slow pace of change is the greatest danger to the system, arguing that, without more radical reforms, “there is a risk of losing the helm of government and political stability.” His overwhelming victory in the March election over a more traditional candidate—89 percent of the vote—has greatly increased his political stature and given him an official

9
Reformers' Fears of Conservative Provocations

"Gorbachev's enemies wanted blood to flow there [the Caucasus] in abundance, wanted to cause him a whole series of Budapests. . . . The only way to overthrow Gorbachev is to create serious disturbances in the country, to create a situation in which a 'strong man' becomes necessary. Pamyat acts as a destabilising factor. I am convinced that on their own they would not stage a coup d'état, but they could create a situation that has to be crushed by force. Unless we achieve tangible economic results, any kind of social demagoguery could influence people greatly. This is the real danger."—Vitaliy Korotich (La Vanguardia, 28 August 1988)

"The risk [that things will get out of control] does exist. I do not want to draw any parallels, but in my opinion the suppression of the Prague Spring was caused by Dubcek's loss of control over the situation. The conservative elements in Prague conjured up the danger of anarchy. Today, the conservatives in the Soviet Union want to intimidate us in the same way."—Yevgeniy Yevtushenko (Stern, 4 August 1988)

"Antirestructuring forces . . . are doing everything they can to destabilize the situation [in the Caucasus], not disdaining playing openly here on people's national feelings and speculating on real difficulties. Their aim is one: to halt restructuring, to hinder its implementation."—Mikhail Gorbachev (TASS, 3 December 1988)

"Many people feel (and it is hard to dispute it) that some person or persons have a hand in industry's unsatisfactory work, very skillfully building up the volume of negative emotions and simultaneously creating—at times artificially—the shortages which are for some people a source of power and economic prosperity. This 'suspicion' is based on examples from 'period of Khrushchev's ouster from power.'"—Mark Zakharov (Izvestiya, 3 February 1989)

Gorbachev has made significant progress in consolidating power, but the potential still exists for a debilitating split in the leadership. He has tried to depict himself as shunning both extremes, lashing out in a January speech at the "cavalier" attitude of "ultraleftists" as well as conservatives who fear the reforms will "destroy everything and everyone," but his sympathies clearly lie with the former. Within the Politburo, Gorbachev and his closest ally, party secretary Yakovlev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, make up the reform wing. Party secretaries Ligachev and Chebrikov—the two chief critics of reform—along with Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitsky make up the Politburo's conservative faction. Other members of the Politburo have not clearly aligned themselves with either group (see inset).

While the influence of the conservatives on the Politburo was weakened as a result of the September 1988 plenum, Gorbachev's opponents have a strong base of support within the party, many of whose members feel that his reforms threaten prerogatives they long considered sacrosanct:

- Privileges that have come to be taken for granted by party members are being curtailed. Access to special stores and services is being reduced sharply, and party members' immunity from prosecution has been ended. Gorbachev called for opening up highly desirable jobs traditionally reserved for the nomenklatura to people outside the party.

- Many party officials no doubt resent having to participate in contested elections and having to listen to criticism from below. They are also concerned that their influence and prerogatives will be reduced by Gorbachev's efforts to limit party interference in the management of the economy and to revitalize the soviets.
Yakovlev: Came into leadership as Gorbachev protege... strong proponent of radical reform.

Shevardnadze: One of Gorbachev's strongest supporters on both domestic and foreign policy... unorthodox statements on ideological underpinnings of foreign policy have aroused objections from Ligachev.

Ryzhkov: Has played leading role in economic reform... may be more orthodox on political and social issues... clashes with Ligachev reported... personal stature enhanced by prominent role in dealing with Armenian earthquake.

Medvedev: New ideology Secretary in forefront of "new thinking" on foreign policy... views on domestic reform are not as radical as those of Yakovlev... vigorously asserts regime's line on limits to glasnost and dangers of political extremism.

Slyun'kov: Economics Secretary who apparently supports radical restructuring.

Nikonov: Keeps to narrow focus on agriculture... strongly supports Gorbachev line on family contracts and land leasing.

Zaykov: Secretary and Moscow party chief who has staked out centrist position on key reform issues... may have some industry oversight.

Vorotnikov: One of three Politburo members appointed before Gorbachev took power... moderate on reform... lost some authority in shift to Russian Republic "presidency" in October.

Shcherbitskiy: In Politburo since 1971... Ukrainian leader voices support for reform, but his past record is much more orthodox.

Chebrikov: As KGB chief, expressed strong reservations about democratization and openness... as party Secretary for legal policy, may now be in position to hamper legal reform program... raised hackles in Estonia with derogatory remarks about nationalist movement.

Ligachev: With "second secretary" powers removed, less able to hinder Gorbachev's programs... still views political reform as dangerous, disruptive, unnecessary... opponents of reform may still look to him as spokesman.

- Many party members are clearly alarmed at increasing talk of the possibility of a multiparty system that could end the monopoly of power by the CPSU.

Bureaucratic foot-dragging and outright resistance to change—most recently evident in the March plenum on agriculture—have been key factors hampering the success of the reforms. Large segments of influential groups within the elite, while not monolithic, have good reasons to oppose reform:

- As a whole the current Central Committee appears to be fairly conservative. About 60 percent of its members gained their positions under Brezhnev, and
over 20 percent are "dead souls" who have lost their jobs under Gorbachev but will retain their vote until the next party congress in 1991.

- Many military officers appear to resent Gorbachev's reduction in the military's status and planned cutbacks in its size and budget. Not only do they see their career opportunities and privileges being limited, but some appear to be concerned that these changes will jeopardize Soviet national security.

However, some military officers believe that, by strengthening the economy, Gorbachev's reforms will benefit the military in the long run.

- There appear to be strong concerns within the KGB about the destabilizing effects of Gorbachev's reforms, especially in the directorates responsible for internal security. Many senior KGB officials fear that glasnost, greater toleration of dissent, and proposals for a more law-based society could sharply reduce their ability to guarantee the stability of Soviet society. Many also apparently believe that Gorbachev wants a reduced role for the KGB and are concerned that this will threaten their jobs and privileged positions. Elements in the KGB concerned with gathering foreign intelligence may welcome the additional opportunities created by Gorbachev's foreign policy successes.1

- Economic managers accustomed to operating strictly within the plan are uneasy about having to rely on the market and show a profit. A Soviet economist indicated publicly in December that "managers wouldn't be surprised if the reform program were discarded overnight."2

Popular Attitudes
There is widespread and growing frustration among Soviet citizens except for those in the Baltics and the Caucasus, but so far there is not the kind of outrage that is likely to mobilize large segments of the population. In many parts of the country workers and peasants have greeted the changes that are taking place with indifference. Most workers and managers have been unenthusiastic about new opportunities for enterprising individuals in the economic area, acting instead in a conservative manner and as a brake on radical reform. A fundamental problem for Gorbachev is that the population seems to be more interested in political than economic activism, and he needs the reverse.

Reform has fueled expectations for improvements in the quality of life, but, from the standpoint of the Soviet worker, Gorbachev's economic program has been a near disaster. People are having to work harder but so far have gotten few material benefits for their efforts, and there are growing signs of popular frustration with reform:

- In January, Gorbachev acknowledged that many people believe that restructuring has not produced any economic or social benefits, and "in many respects the situation has even deteriorated."

- A poll of 6,000 in Leningrad, published in December 1988, found that only 5 percent thought perestroika had improved economic conditions, 33 percent thought it made them worse off, and 30 percent said they were "frightened" by it.

- A letter in a Moscow paper recently complained that, "as regards the products in the shops, the era of stagnation seems by comparison with today a time when things bloomed."

- Many Soviet citizens equate greater democracy with greater license for antisocial behavior, and the crime rate was up by 18 percent in 1988. In February, Soviet legal scholars told US counterparts that terrorism in the USSR had caused 60 deaths in the past four years.
The problem of rising, but unfulfilled, expectations is likely to get worse, at least over the short run. There are increasing reports of shortages and consumer discontent throughout the USSR. A deputy editor recently told Embassy officials that experience shows that, if the agricultural situation does not improve, there will be chaos, a "crash," and "blood." Recognizing this problem, the Soviet leadership has begun to increase the priority of the consumer sector, but this new emphasis will further spur expectations, making improvements even more imperative. Gorbachev has ruled out massive imports of consumer goods from the West, which would provide some relief in the short term, but this issue is still being debated by Soviet economists.

Gorbachev’s reforms are, in effect, rescinding implicit promises made by the regime to the population. As a result of the increasing economic stringencies at the end of the Brezhnev era, the “social contract”—job security, lax workplace discipline, and expectations of a rising standard of living in return for political passivity—formed with the population was beginning to fray. Gorbachev wants a new “contract” that promises an improved quality of life only to industrious Soviet workers. As a result, many Soviet citizens may not fare as well in the near term. The workers and peasants have developed a negative attitude toward work and would prefer the security of a marginal standard of living guaranteed by the state to the uncertainties of the market. If plant closings, wage cuts, price hikes, and greater economic inequality become the norm, industrial unrest is almost surely going to increase. Former party secretary Anatoly Dobrynin revealed to an Embassy official in 1987 that the party’s best political officers were being sent to problem enterprises to “educate” increasingly dissatisfied workers and to avert strikes.

Although Soviet workers have so far been relatively passive, growing frustration over economic conditions is making fertile ground for serious industrial unrest. Since January 1987, 56 strikes over purely economic demands have been reported. Increasing discussion of the right to strike in the Soviet press and the results of other groups—most notably ethnic minorities—are achieving by social protest are likely to increase the prospects for unrest among Soviet workers. Soviet party officials told Westerners in September that the unions are worried about the prospect of workers’ strikes, especially if there are price hikes. Even in less permissive times, Soviet workers have taken to the streets en masse over economic issues: in 1962, price increases on meat and butter spurred massive riots in Novocherkask, during which hundreds of people were killed; in 1977 there were widespread disorders throughout the USSR over food shortages, including a major work stoppage in the city of Tula.

The suppression of dissent of all kinds under Brezhnev increases the possibility that pent-up emotions and frustrations among the population could suddenly explode and get out of control, as is happening in the Baltics and the Caucasus. One Soviet sociologist expressed concern about this in a 1987 article, writing, “I am afraid [the mob will take over]. Afraid because, as a sociologist, I see a growing mood of hostility and intolerance in our social psychology, a readiness to persecute in defiance of legal norms. I know very well—fortunately from literature—how inexorably and suddenly rampant ‘democracy’ with an admixture of crude legal procedures, turns into tyranny and political terror.”

Regime Legitimacy
In some sense, the Soviet elite is going through a crisis of legitimacy. In breaking with its Stalinist legacy, many of the values and goals that provided the raison d’etre of the regime for generations are now being declared bankrupt. Soviets are openly asking whether the changes proposed amount to a rejection of Communism and a return to capitalism. The famous letter
last year by Nina Andreyeva charged that this is producing "nihilistic sentiments," "ideological confusion," and a loss of "political bearings." So far, the regime has not developed an effective legitimizing myth to replace the one it is destroying.

Although, under Brezhnev, the popular legitimacy of the regime suffered as a result of stagnation and corruption, under Gorbachev the recognition of problems and admission of past mistakes have enhanced the regime's legitimacy among some elements of Soviet society, especially the intelligensia. The regime has done a good job protecting national security interests, achieving superpower parity with the United States under Brezhnev and now enhancing its image abroad under Gorbachev. The Soviet leadership's inability to perceptibly improve the quality of life of its citizens—particularly when they compare themselves to citizens of capitalist countries—continues to seriously damage the legitimacy of the Communist system.

Cultural Factors
The degree of legitimacy enjoyed by the regime varies greatly among the diverse nationalities of the Soviet Union. While there is widespread popular cynicism, the Soviet population—especially in the Slavic areas—has been basically apolitical, making it less likely that this cynicism can be readily translated into political opposition. The regime's legitimacy is strongest among Russians because of their domination of the political system, history, and culture of the USSR. It is also stronger among the other Slavic groups—the Ukrainians and Belorussians, who have a closer cultural affinity with the Russians—than it is in the non-Slavic republics, especially the Baltics. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were forcibly annexed during World War II, and some natives continue to view the Russians as a colonial presence. The Soviet regime has gained some legitimacy by its longevity, and, except for the Baltics, very few Soviet citizens can remember any other system.

Even among the Russians, cultural traditions suggest there is a potential for a violent upheaval. The Russian elite traditionally has had a great fear of instability and has been suspicious of change, equating it with disorder. Although the Russian population has been passive for long periods of history, it has sometimes responded emotionally and erupted into violence when it perceived its interests as being threatened. Russian history is marked by major eruptions of peasant and urban violence, including the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 and major peasant revolts in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Nationality Problems
So far, nationality problems have posed the most visible threat to the stability of the Soviet system. Encouraged by glasnost and democratization, minority nationalities have become increasingly defiant of Moscow, articulating demands for greater political, cultural, and economic autonomy. Incidents of nationality-related unrest have increased sharply and show little sign of abating. The Caucasus has been in a state of turmoil since February 1988, with over 1,500 casualties, including 83 deaths: Armenians are getting financial and moral support from coethnics abroad; Azeris are making clear their anti-Russian sentiments by carrying portraits of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini and Islamic banners; arms are readily available in both republics despite efforts to confiscate them, increasing the prospects for insurgency; and there are over 300,000 refugees as a result of the turmoil. The pre-Soviet flags of independence are now flying in the three Baltic republics, and Popular Front organizations there have gained broad support and are advancing programs that promote de facto independence from Moscow.

To help gain legitimacy for Soviet rule, Moscow has responded with major concessions, particularly in the Baltic republics, where it has sanctioned the activities of the Popular Fronts. By allowing national groups greater autonomy, Gorbachev clearly hopes he can satisfy their grievances while engaging them in the reform process. Developments in the Baltics, however, are encouraging other minorities to press for similar rights, and in recent months Popular Fronts have emerged on a smaller scale in all the other republics. Already, demands of different nationality groups appear to be reinforcing each other, making it extremely dangerous for the regime to make concessions to one
The growing assertiveness by non-Russians is stimulating a backlash among Russians, increasing the possibility that nationality problems could undermine political stability. There are sizable Russian populations in all of the republics and, by accommodating nationalists' demands, Moscow is courting increased tensions between native populations and Russians that could spark communal violence with much broader ramifications than the simmering conflict between Armenians and Azeris. Russian nationalist groups, including radical ones such as Pamyat, are growing bolder and gaining support in response to the assertiveness of non-Russian minorities.

Russian nationalist sentiments appear to be particularly strong in the military, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Party secretary Ligachev has been openly appealing to these sentiments and would clearly prefer to keep non-Russian national groups on a much tighter leash. Gorbachev appears to be aware of these dangers.

Gorbachev believes that unrest in these republics may destroy the reform process if he is forced to send troops in to restore order. Apparently reflecting such concerns, Gorbachev ally Aleksander Yakovlev warned in Latvia, it is “very important not to give the conservatives an excuse to say: ‘Look at the nationalists, they are getting out of hand.’” If nationality unrest spreads, especially to the Ukraine, the largest non-Russian republic, it could be the catalyst for a serious political crisis.

Political Opposition

Outside of the Baltics and Caucasus, organized opposition capable of challenging the regime is still very weak. Nevertheless, groups are being formed in other areas that could grow into an organized political opposition. Over the past two years, political activism outside the Communist party and other official organizations has increased sharply. According to Pravda, over 60,000 unofficial groups have sprung up, ranging from innocuous hobby clubs to groups of activists pressing for radical political reforms. Groups with political agendas are springing up and gaining strength outside the Baltics. A coalition of dissidents and reformers has come together to form a “Democratic Union,” which seeks to become a legal opposition. Over the past year, popular fronts have been created in many Russian industrial cities, where they reportedly have stronger support among workers than they do in Moscow and Leningrad because of the poorer living and working conditions.

These activities are being tolerated by the regime because it hopes to use them to help build popular support for change. As the experience of the Baltics...
has shown, however, it is far from certain that their activities can be channeled in a direction that the regime considers to be constructive. Many of them are becoming increasingly political, and some are openly calling for a multiparty system. Popular fronts are increasingly assuming the role of an opposition party, and they are trying to use the new election laws to advance their own candidates for state positions. Moreover, they are increasingly working together to pursue common objectives, helping new groups get started and holding joint meetings. According to a member of the Moscow Popular Front, for example, the Estonian Front has printed leaflets for the Moscow group since it does not have access to a press.

So far, these groups are only in the early stages of organization that could lead to collective actions threatening to the regime. Outside the Baltics and the Caucasus, none of them has attracted a massive following or is able to mobilize the resources needed to mount a serious challenge. While the efforts of the popular fronts to work together is an important step, each unofficial group is still basically pursuing its own agenda. Nevertheless, developments over the past year have moved in the direction of increasing the fronts' potential for collective action, and these capabilities are continuing to grow.

Regime Capabilities

The Soviet leadership possesses tremendous capabilities for controlling unrest and preventing instability from threatening the regime. Before the opposition could pose a serious challenge, it would need to become much more organized and widespread. The regime's capabilities could be neutralized, however, if it became polarized or if it miscalculated.

Leadership Skill

Gorbachev appears to have the kinds of political skills that are needed to steer the Soviet Union through this turbulent period. He has shown himself to be a masterful politician and demonstrated the ability to build political support for a much more radical agenda than anyone thought possible. He has proved to be extremely effective at keeping his opponents off balance, finding their weaknesses, and building up his own political power. Unlike Khrushchev, he appears to have kept his colleagues directly involved in making decisions, giving them a personal stake in their successful implementation and reducing his own exposure. These skills will be a major asset for maintaining cohesion in the leadership.

At the same time, Gorbachev is a risk taker and could seriously miscalculate in a critical situation. He is strongly committed to his vision of change, and his past record suggests that, if he perceives that his program is not meeting his expectations, he will persist or even escalate his efforts, pushing for even more radical solutions. While he will almost certainly change tactics, he is unlikely to back away from his fundamental goals or settle for the status quo. His apparent impatience and determination to push reform simultaneously on many fronts could alienate so many groups that even Gorbachev's political skills will not be able to prevent a coalition from forming against him.

Coercive Capabilities

The traditional instruments by which the Soviet state has controlled most aspects of its citizens' lives since the days of Stalin are still largely intact. As it demonstrated last year in the Caucasus, even in the era of glasnost the Soviet leadership is willing to resort to force to maintain order when other means have been exhausted. Not only does this give the regime an effective means for controlling society and restoring order, but the potential threat of such intervention also serves to help deter the population from joining in radical antiregime activities. While the leadership can rely on these coercive capabilities to deal with isolated outbreaks of unrest, any broad-scale reliance on repressive methods to maintain stability would seriously undermine the reform process.
More than any other single institution, the KGB is charged with maintaining the political stability of the Soviet system. It does this by closely monitoring activities that could harm the interests of the state, thwarting opposition groups that could threaten state security, and providing the regime with intelligence. Although Gorbachev's reforms have made the KGB's job more difficult by curbing its extralegal activities, its extensive capabilities are still basically untouched.

The MVD has the primary responsibility for maintaining order through its Internal Troops and local police forces. It is on the front lines in controlling strikes, demonstrations, and other social disorders. Its authority was reaffirmed in a July 1988 decree that gives the Internal Troops broad rights to make arrests, search homes without warrants, perform spot identity checks, and cordon off areas of unrest.

The MVD uses politically reliable, specially trained and equipped security troops to augment KGB and local police forces to control unrest. MVD troops have played a large role maintaining order in the Caucasus over the past year. They are a more effective and reliable security force than the local police, who are more likely to collaborate with rioters from their own communities—as events in the Caucasus have shown. Only a small number of MVD troops are equipped to deal with popular unrest, however. To enhance this capability, special police squads were established last year in Moscow for deployment during "mass events." If faced with simultaneous riots in different regions, Moscow would probably need to reinforce MVD forces with paratroops from the Ministry of Defense (MOD), as the leadership did during the 1988 riots in the Caucasus.

Although the Soviet military has played a secondary role in controlling unrest, it is potentially the most important source of coercive power available to the regime. Only it has the massive armed force that would be needed to control widespread, simultaneous outbreaks of unrest. Faced with such a crisis, the Soviet armed forces could probably help the security forces restore some semblance of order through the imposition of martial law. If the Soviet military became widely involved in maintaining domestic order, however, it would jeopardize its ability to carry out its mission abroad. Such duty, too, would be unpopular with the military leadership because it reduces readiness, hurts morale, and damages the military's image. Most military leaders would probably agree that widespread unrest that requires the ongoing intervention of the armed forces would be a highly undesirable consequence of reform that would threaten Soviet national security.

Dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's program by significant elements within the military and KGB could undermine the Soviet leader's ability to use these institutions to prevent instability. Well-placed members of the KGB hostile to Gorbachev could allow or even encourage increased turmoil that would be politically damaging to him, or fail to warn him of potentially negative consequences of his actions. In the event of a sharp division in the leadership, the military and KGB might side with conservative forces committed to restoring stability. While both institutions have been thoroughly conditioned to accept the primacy of the party and it is highly unlikely that they would intervene in domestic politics without the support of members of the leadership, they played a critical role in the ousting of Khrushchev.

State Control
Short of resorting to force, the Soviet state's highly centralized control over all aspects of society gives the regime important levers it can use to help maintain stability. While the private sector is growing, the state still controls the vast majority of jobs, prices, wages, housing, supplies of food and consumer goods, and most other key aspects of the economy. This gives the state potential to move quickly and decisively to change economic policies or conditions that may be contributing to unrest. Similarly, its control over the social, cultural, and political spheres allows it to offer concessions in these areas to try to placate disaffected groups.
The state’s virtual monopoly of the mass media, transportation, and the communication system also enhances its ability to maintain stability. Even without explicit censorship, editors serve at the discretion of the regime and place limits on what can be published, and the state can limit the circulation of unorthodox literature by controlling access to copying machines and printing presses. Sergey Gregoryants, for example, has been repeatedly harassed for trying to publish his independent journal Glasnost and has been unable to reach a mass audience. Given the vast size of the Soviet Union, the regime could severely restrict the flow of information from one region to another—by resuming the jamming of Western radio broadcasts and tightly reins in glasnost—reducing the possibility of organized widespread unrest in the absence of elite participation.

**Outcomes**

All of the social, political, economic, and ethnic challenges faced by the Soviet leadership are closely interconnected. Problems, or even the solutions to the problems, in one area are likely to exacerbate those in others—for example, both economic stringencies and economic reform would put greater stress on Soviet society. Ultimately, the greatest threat to Soviet political stability would be if problems in different areas began to play off each other, spiraled out of control, and created a situation from which the leadership could find no easy way of extricating itself without seriously compromising the reform process. The prospects of such a challenge would greatly increase if the regime were simultaneously confronted with crises on multiple fronts.

The next several years promise to be turbulent. There are too many variables and unforeseen events to predict whether Gorbachev will be able to control the process he has started, if it will increasingly come to control him, or if fears of where it is leading will result in a conservative retrenchment. Clearly, a wide range of outcomes is possible:

- **Continuing Gorbachev’s course.** If Gorbachev’s reforms begin to produce tangible results and, if he is lucky, he will remain in power and prevent any of the potential problems he faces from getting out of control, while continuing to move his reforms ahead. As Soviet reformers are recognizing, however, it will probably take generations before his program can hope to succeed.

- **Conservative retrenchment.** A growing perception within the leadership that reforms are producing undesirable consequences that are seriously endangering the stability of the regime could lead to a conservative reaction. This would probably involve a transfer of power, with a majority of the Politburo turning against Gorbachev—similar to the ousting of Khrushchev in 1964. If Gorbachev perceived this danger and were willing to lead a conservative retrenchment, however, it is possible he could remain.

- **Reactionary coup.** Should a sharp polarization of the leadership prevent it from acting resolutely to deal with a growing crisis, the prospects of a conservative coup would increase. This would probably involve a conspiracy of conservative leaders, the military, and the KGB and could result in the imposition of some form of martial law to help restore order. The perpetrators would probably justify their actions by claiming that “counterrevolutionary forces” were undermining the leading role of the party—the excuse used to intervene in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Although the possibility of the military acting on its own is remote, should it come to believe that the Politburo were no longer capable of controlling the situation—because it lacks the political will or is too polarized to reach agreement—it could carry out a coup in conjunction with a small group of conservative political leaders.

- **A radical takeover.** As a result of democratization and glasnost, those pressing a maximalist agenda could gain control of the political system—as happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968—and force Gorbachev out. This would be most likely if pressure for change from below increases sharply and Gorbachev is increasingly perceived as a moderate.
• Change from bel. If ethnic problems go unsolved, consumer and worker discontent continue to grow, and divisions in the leadership prevent it from acting decisively, organized political opposition would probably increase. Such opposition could become a serious threat to the regime if the leadership failed to use its coercive capabilities to crack down or seriously miscalculated, or if isolated groups with different agendas join in support against the regime. Under these conditions, a well-organized political opposition with a broad and solid base of support might effectively come to share power with the Communist party—as happened with Solidarity and the Polish Communist Party before the imposition of martial law. If the political climate were sufficiently volatile and opposition groups developed a mass following, a leader, or faction within the leadership, might join forces with the non-party opposition and try to take power. If power became sufficiently fragmented, for a period no organized political force might be capable of running the Soviet state, resulting in anarchy and chaos, not unlike that which preceded the 1917 Russian revolution. As part of this process, Moscow might lose control of the periphery, and the Soviet Union could become some sort of loose federation.

Critical Variables
There are a number of critical factors that will help determine whether the Soviet Union becomes more or less stable:

• To combat alienation and engage the population in the reform process, Gorbachev needs success in revitalizing party and state institutions, especially creating institutionalized mechanisms for resolving political and social conflict to preclude the development of viable alternative “parties” or political action groups.

• Gorbachev needs to maintain a strong working coalition in the Politburo and prevent divisions from impairing its ability to deal decisively with difficult issues. He also needs to maintain the loyalty of the KGB and the military, particularly among the leadership of those institutions.

• To allow potentially destabilizing changes to move ahead, the leadership must feel that it is operating in a secure international environment and that other countries will not take advantage of the Soviets’ potential vulnerabilities.

While the Soviet Union could slowly become less stable if conditions in these critical areas deteriorate, it is also possible that some sudden trigger event could quickly precipitate a crisis and undermine stability. The latter could be the result of a miscalculation on the part of the leadership—such as misjudging popular reaction to a price hike—or the result of some chance event beyond its control—such as shootings at a demonstration or a major ecological disaster that could be blamed on the leadership.

The sudden death of Gorbachev, whether by assassination or natural causes, could also greatly increase the prospects for instability. His strong personality and political skills appear to be key factors holding his program together, and there does not appear to be anyone in the wings who could easily take his place. His demise would probably further polarize reformers and conservatives, resulting in a weak compromise leader or a prolonged succession struggle. The resulting paralysis at the top could create the opportunity for political opposition to organize and gain strength or for a reactionary group to seize power.
If political ferment in the USSR continues to grow and fundamental economic, social, and ethnic problems are not resolved, it may only be a matter of time until Gorbachev is simultaneously faced with multiple serious challenges. Extrapolating on current trends produces several hypothetical scenarios that could lead to dramatic political changes over the next several years:

- The regime is faced with a need both to address massive budget deficits and brake the economic cycle, which precludes meaningful change. On the advice of the KGB that popular reaction can be contained, the regime moves ahead with selective price hikes on food products that economists believe are necessary. A major factory in the Urals, where there are rumors of impending layoffs, goes on strike, and soon other workers in the city join in, effectively bringing the city to a standstill. Word spreads quickly via Western broadcasts and unofficial networks, and soon the strike spreads to diverse regions of the country. In many regions, strike committees are supported by the local Popular Fronts, which use their network to help form a national strike committee. The regime is reluctant to use force against the workers, and, as industrial production plummets, the country enters a vicious cycle of negotiations and strikes, resulting in an unmanageable situation, not unlike Poland before the imposition of martial law.

- Having won a seat in the Congress of Deputies, Boris Yeltsin gains increased legitimacy among the Soviet population on his platform of antielitism and consumer rights. He is increasingly looked to as an antiestablishment symbol by a diverse range of groups pressing for greater autonomy. These groups have been growing in strength, both in terms of their popular support and their organizational capabilities. At a nationally televised Congress session, Yeltsin demands that the leadership turn its rhetoric about reducing the role of the party into action and allow elective bodies to vote on critical resource issues, including defense spending, but the speech is taken off the air before he finishes. The full speech is printed within days by a reformist weekly and widely circulated. The 1917 slogan "All power to the soviets!" is revived, as demonstrations take place in major cities through the USSR calling for an end to party manipulation of the soviets. In several republics and key provinces, party leaders are voted out, as chairmen of the local soviets and members of the party elite are demanding a reassessment of central control before this practice goes any further. There is a growing fear in party circles that a movement to recall Gorbachev as President and replace him with a nonparty candidate might succeed at the next meeting of the Congress.

- Nationalist movements in the republics continue to gain strength, especially outside the Baltics and Caucasus. Indigenous nationalities are increasingly making life difficult for Russians in their republics by restrictive language requirements. Russians, in turn, have begun to organize on a broad scale, both in the Russian and other republics. Ligachev, who has become increasingly outspoken as a defender of Russian interests, is assassinated by a non-Russian, culminating a series of terrorist attacks against Russian officials. Russian groups demand a crackdown against nationalist movements and a reassessment of central authority, staging demonstrations in several republic capitals. Violent clashes break out in several cities between Russians and non-Russians. Discipline breaks down in one city, and Russian troops fire into a crowd, killing several dozen non-Russian students and wounding many others. Terrorist attacks on Russians sharply increase, and nationalist groups in all of the republics are demanding an end to Russian colonialism and
de facto independence. Their ongoing protests and strikes have brought the country to a virtual standstill.

- The size of the Soviet armed forces has been cut, and troop strength has been reduced in Eastern Europe. Reform movements have gained strength throughout the Bloc, and the multiparty systems that have been introduced in Poland and Hungary have put the Communists on the defensive, forcing them to make major concessions to public opinion or risk being eclipsed by other parties. In Hungary, the Parliament approves the Social Democratic Party's call for a neutral foreign policy and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Within days similar measures are introduced in the Polish Parliament and are taken up by opposition groups in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, where large, well-organized demonstrations are held demanding neutrality and a diversion of defense expenditures to civilian needs. In Moscow, conservatives are calling for intervention to restore order and protect the gains of socialism, and the governments of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania have made a joint request to Moscow to intervene, offering military support. Large rallies in support of East European autonomy organized by Soviet peace groups and Popular Fronts are taking place in Moscow and other major Soviet cities. The military and KGB are not confident they can restore control in Eastern Europe and control the demonstrations they expect back in the USSR protesting such an action. The Politburo is sharply divided over how to respond and continues to argue as the situation deteriorates at home and abroad.

Implications for the United States

The next several years promise to be turbulent ones in Soviet domestic affairs, regardless of the path followed. There will almost certainly be continued turmoil within both Soviet society and the leadership. Such ferment is not only a natural byproduct of the reform process, but it would also result from any effort to turn that process back. Consequently, continued or even increased turmoil in itself cannot be taken as an indication that Gorbachev or the political stability of the Soviet Union is in jeopardy. Indeed, it could be an indication that the reform process is moving ahead and tackling the difficult issues that need to be addressed to build a more effective system (see table).

In the near term, Gorbachev can be expected to continue a foreign policy line that will create the most favorable international climate for the changes he is trying to bring about in the Soviet Union. Consequently, he will continue to place a high premium on creating a stable and predictable international environment, minimizing the possibility of threats from abroad to Soviet interests. To this end, the leadership is likely to continue to take a more flexible approach in most areas of foreign policy, and the prospects for the USSR becoming engaged in regional conflicts will remain relatively small.

East-West relations, especially with the United States, will be particularly important. To help ease the strain on the economy and improve the prospects for delivering on promises to the consumer, the Soviet leadership will continue to vigorously pursue arms control and seek ways to reduce military spending. More important, the Soviet leadership will need to feel confident that other nations will not try to exploit the USSR's internal weaknesses during this vulnerable period. A perception that the West was actively trying to do this—particularly in the field of military competition—would undercut Gorbachev's arguments
Sources of Instability: A Scorecard for the USSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not Evident</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Popular discontent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased inequality</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broken promises</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic failure</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic tensions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic republics</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasus</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian Republic</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collective action against the regime</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for discontent</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of organizations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization of resources</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of activities by diverse groups</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gorbachev can also be expected to seek more foreign policy successes to enhance his legitimacy, build up his personal prestige, and distract attention from domestic problems. As long as his reforms continue to produce results, he can be expected to continue to seek these successes by the conciliatory route. Gorbachev can therefore be expected to maintain a very high profile in the international arena, continuing to advance major foreign policy initiatives. At times, however, domestic crises—some of which may not be visible on the surface—will probably distract the Soviet leadership from foreign policy. This could result in temporary reversals on specific issues or unexplained periods of indecision—such as occurred during the US Secretary of State’s visit to Moscow in October 1987 in the midst of the Yeltsin crisis, when the Soviet leadership failed to set a date for a summit.
Soviet Policy Toward the West:
The Gorbachev Challenge

National Intelligence Estimate

This Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-4-89

Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge (U)

Information available as of 17 April 1989 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Key Judgments

Dramatic changes in approach to the West under Soviet leader Gorbachev are driven by economic and social decay at home, a widening technological gap with the West, and a growing realism about trends in the outside world. For the foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the West's principal adversary. But the process Gorbachev has set in motion is likely to change the nature of the Soviet challenge over the next five years or so:

- New Soviet policies will threaten the security consensus developed in the West to combat Soviet expansionism.
- The Soviets are likely to succeed to a degree in undercutting support abroad for defense programs and in reducing political barriers to Western participation in their economic development.
- At the same time new policies will make Moscow more flexible on regional issues and human rights and pave the way for a potentially significant reduction of the military threat.
- Alliance cohesion will decline faster in the Warsaw Pact than in NATO, giving the East Europeans much greater scope for change.

We believe Moscow wants to shift competition with the West to a largely political and economic plane. In order to prepare the ground for such a shift, Soviet leaders are making major policy changes and promoting a broad reassessment of the West.

These new policies serve domestic as well as foreign policy needs:

- They aim to create an international environment more conducive to domestic reform and to undermine the rationale for high defense budgets and repressive political controls.
- They are seen as more effective than past policies in advancing Soviet foreign interests.

There are limits on how far the new Soviet leadership wants to go in the direction of a less confrontational East-West relationship:

- Vigorous efforts to protect and advance Soviet geopolitical interests and selective support for Communist regimes and revolutionary movements will continue.
- Moscow will continue to employ active measures and covert efforts to advance its objectives. Foreign intelligence activity is likely to increase.
Given the turmoil unleashed by the reform process, we cannot predict policy trends during the period of the Estimate with high confidence. Nevertheless, we believe that Gorbachev is likely to stay in power and that the reform effort is more likely than not to continue. If so, we believe the following developments are probable:

- **Military power.** While increasing so far under Gorbachev, Soviet defense spending will decline significantly in real terms. Moscow will maintain vigorous force modernization programs andather strength R&D effort in key areas, but production and procurement of many major weapons will decline. Gorbachev is likely to make further concessions to achieve a START agreement, show flexibility on chemical weapons, and take further steps to trim and redeploy Soviet conventional forces—moving unilaterally if necessary.

- **The Western Alliance.** Moscow will attempt to translate its more benign image into expanded credits, trade, and technology sales and reduced support for defense spending and force modernization in Western Europe. While trying to reduce US influence and military presence, Moscow does not see an abrupt unraveling of current Alliance arrangements as serving Soviet interests.

- **Third World competition.** The Soviets will seek to expand their influence and continue support to leftist causes deemed to have some future. But they will be more careful to consider how such moves affect broader Soviet interests, including relations with the West. They will encourage their clients to make economic and political reforms and seek Western aid. It is highly unlikely that Moscow will become directly involved in military support to another leftist seizure of power in the Third World as it did in the 1970s.

**Alternative Scenarios**

We see a number of developments that—while unlikely—could disrupt current trends and push Gorbachev onto a different course:

- A widespread crackdown on unrest at home or in Eastern Europe would probably trigger a reescalation of East-West tensions, causing Gorbachev to tack in a conservative direction. A shift of this sort would limit Gorbachev’s freedom of maneuver in negotiations and his ability to transfer resources away from defense.

- Were nationality unrest to threaten central control or the territorial integrity of the country, we see a risk that the leadership would revert to more hostile rhetoric and policies toward the West in an attempt to reunify the country.
Gorbachev's removal—unlikely but not to be ruled out—would have a significant impact:

- A more orthodox regime would slow the pace of change, be more supportive of military interests and leftist allies abroad, and eschew unilateral arms control concessions.
- We see little chance that a successor leadership would completely roll back Gorbachev's policies or revert to a major military buildup and aggressive policies in the Third World.

**Disagreements**

There is general agreement in the Intelligence Community over the outlook for the next five to seven years, but differing views over the longer term prospects for fundamental and enduring change toward less competitive Soviet behavior:

- Some analysts see current policy changes as largely tactical, driven by the need for breathing space from the competition. They believe the ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and its hostility toward capitalist countries are enduring. They point to previous failures of reform and the transient nature of past "detentes." They judge that there is a serious risk of Moscow returning to traditionally combative behavior when the hoped for gains in economic performance are achieved.

- Other analysts believe Gorbachev's policies reflect a fundamental rethinking of national interests and ideology as well as more tactical considerations. They argue that ideological tenets of Marxism-Leninism such as class conflict and capitalist-socialist enmity are being revised. They consider the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift toward tolerance of power sharing in Eastern Europe to be historic shifts in the Soviet definition of national interest. They judge that Gorbachev's changes are likely to have sufficient momentum to produce lasting shifts in Soviet behavior.

**Indicators**

As evidence of Moscow's progress over the next two to three years toward fulfilling the promise of more responsible behavior, we will be watching for:

- Soviet acceptance of real liberalization in Eastern Europe.
- Full implementation of announced force reductions.
- A substantial conversion in the defense industry to production for the civilian economy.
The Soviet World View in Flux

From the days of Lenin, Soviet policy toward the West has been shaped by a body of ideological dogma centered around negative images of the West and the necessity of a long-term struggle by the "socialist camp" against the West. These tenets have pictured the West as in an inevitable state of decline and forced relentlessly toward militarization to shore up its position. They have depicted East-West relations as based on unremitting class struggle, leaving little or no common ground for cooperation.

Tensions in Moscow over how far to go in seeking accommodation with the West have been reflected in disputes over how much change is called for in this traditional world view:

- Gorbachev and his reform-minded allies believe that significant revisions are required to provide a long-term basis for a less conflictual relationship with the West—a shift they believe is essential to their efforts to modernize the country. They argue that capitalism remains in a robust state of health, that it is not inherently militaristic, and that the West can rise above a narrow class-based approach to relations with the Communist Bloc. While reaffirming the continuing relevance of class analysis, they are seeking to diminish the centrality of class conflict to East-West relations and assert the overriding importance of "universal human values."

- More orthodox leaders, such as senior party secretary Ligachev, accept the need for reduced tensions with the West and for some ideological adjustments. But they are skeptical about the feasibility of seeking a fundamentally less conflictual relationship and believe a more limited accommodation will suffice. They believe the reformers are going too far in tampering with fundamental tenets of socialism and are resisting the effort to revise traditional notions about class struggle, capitalism and the threat it poses, and the nature of the East-West relationship.

We believe that, over the longer term, the most reliable guarantees of enduring change will be in the institutionalization of a more open society and relationship with the outside world:

- The establishment of a more pluralistic and open decisionmaking process on foreign policy and defense issues.
- Progress toward the rule of law and a significant relaxation of barriers to free travel and emigration.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives Under Gorbachev</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Moscow Views Its Current Predicament</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing Strategy Toward the West</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power and Arms Control</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Toward the Western Alliance</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition in the Third World</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for Gains and Losses</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Western Policy</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicators of Enduring Change</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Soviet Objectives Under Gorbachev

The dramatic changes in approach to the West under General Secretary Gorbachev are driven by reinforcing domestic and foreign objectives:

- Domestically, Soviet leaders appreciate that, for decades if not generations, the main goal will be reforming and modernizing the Soviet political and economic system. They want to create an era of reduced tensions and expanded relations with the Western powers that will facilitate this task.

- Equally important, these changes are viewed as essential in their own right for strengthening Moscow’s international position, advancing its claim to a global superpower role, and—ultimately—reviving the credibility of socialism as a model of development.

Traditional objectives continue to influence Soviet policy toward the West. Moscow remains committed to:

- Eroding NATO cohesion and US influence in Western Europe.

- Undermining support for the US military presence overseas.

- Selectively backing Communist and other leftist causes around the globe.

But under Gorbachev, more clearly than before, Soviet leaders recognize that in pursuing such objectives they have often done more harm than good for broader Soviet interests by antagonizing adversaries and drawing them closer together, by encouraging military buildup, and, in some respects, by reducing Soviet security. Moreover, the Soviets appreciate that, in the current situation, maintaining good relations with the West assumes an even higher priority:

- Reduced tensions will promote trends abroad that diminish Western defense efforts and reduce the cohesion of opposing alliances.

- Formal or informal limitations on the arms competition will enable Moscow to maintain an acceptable military balance while reducing defense spending and diverting resources to the civilian economy.

- Expanded trade and economic ties, in the long run at least, will be important to the success of economic revival.

We believe there is a broad consensus in the Soviet leadership in support of these objectives that will persist through the time frame of this Estimate. Nevertheless, the relaxed constraints on political expression under Gorbachev have revealed even more clearly than before the sharp divisions and wide-ranging debate that persist over the extent of the accommodation with the West that Moscow should seek:

- At one end of the spectrum, reformers appear to believe that only a decisive break with the confrontational mentality of the past and a much more extensive engagement on arms control, economics, and global political issues will avert impending crisis and ensure the renewed competitiveness of the country.

- At the other end, many orthodox members of the elite agree that the USSR needs “breathing space” but believe that a more limited and tactical accommodation would suffice. These officials represent a coalition of Russian nationalists, old-line Marxist-Leninist internacionalists, and conservative bureaucrats alarmed by Gorbachev’s rejection of traditional principles.

The extent to which Moscow shifts toward an accommodation with the West will depend in part on how this debate is resolved. Nevertheless, most analysts believe that the process Gorbachev has set in motion—if it continues—is likely to lead to lasting changes in Soviet international behavior whether or not that is the current leadership’s intention.
Is Gorbachev's "Detente" Different?

This is not the first time that a Soviet leader has attempted to introduce liberalizing reforms at home or move toward detente abroad. The limited impact of these previous attempts at reform and the strong cultural barriers to change in the USSR suggest caution in predicting success for the current round of reforms. But we believe Gorbachev's efforts are far more comprehensive than those attempted by Khrushchev or Brezhnev. At the same time, the domestic and international factors compelling the process forward are now more substantial:

- Khrushchev ended mass terror, exposed Stalin's excesses, and periodically reorganized the Soviet bureaucracy. But—with the economy growing at the fastest rate in Soviet history—he saw no need to alter the fundamentals of the command economy or the political system. Gorbachev and his allies—faced with domestic crisis—are challenging the ideology and institutions of the Stalinist system itself and groping toward something radically different to replace them.

- Khrushchev made some dramatic initiatives in foreign and defense policy (agreeing to a peace treaty with Austria and slashing Soviet ground forces by over 2 million men) and modified traditional doctrine in some areas (discarding Stalinist dogma on the inevitability of war). But with optimism on the rise about the USSR's ability to overtake the United States and the advance of Communism in the Third World, the pressures for change were limited. Khrushchev introduced a new competitiveness in East-West relations and indirectly challenged US security interests in West Berlin and Cuba. Gorbachev's ideological revisions—by questioning traditional notions about the West's inherently militaristic nature and the centrality of class struggle to East-West relations—go well beyond those of Khrushchev.

- Efforts to reform the economy under Brezhnev were more shallow and narrower in scope, lacking in particular any serious effort to address necessary political and social reforms. In the 1970s, Brezhnev saw detente as permitting a more assertive thrust in the Third World while easing pressure for fundamental domestic reform. Gorbachev, on the other hand, seeks reduced tensions to facilitate thoroughgoing and probably wrenching changes at home.

- Gorbachev faces very different pressures from Soviet society than his predecessors—a population better educated, more demanding, and more knowledgeable about the outside world. Global trends—the information and technological revolution—are also impelling the leadership toward change more strongly now than in the 1950s and 1960s. Gorbachev's reforms have accentuated these trends by reducing the barriers that have inhibited political expression and sealed Soviet society off from Western influence.

How Moscow Views Its Current Predicament

Moscow's willingness to undertake potentially wrenching changes derives from a growing appreciation that the USSR faces a looming systemic crisis and the prospect of falling further behind the major Western powers economically and technologically:

- Gorbachev himself has consistently underscored the gravity of the problem the USSR faces and used it to justify his increasingly radical reforms.

In May 1986, Gorbachev asserted that the USSR needed perestroika simply to survive—if it failed, the USSR would become a third-rate power and the cause of socialism would be imperiled.

- Economic stagnation has frayed the social fabric at home and undermined Moscow's claims to superpower status abroad.
Figure 1
Soviet Economic Performance Under Gorbachev and His Predecessors

Average annual percent growth

- The Soviet leadership is increasingly doubtful about the military's ability over the long run to keep pace with Western technological advances, in particular the long-term impact that the US SDI program and its spinoffs could have on Soviet military strategy.

- The technological dilemma also inhibits the USSR's ability to become a global economic player at a time when the Soviet Bloc is less able to sustain itself with its own resources and Soviet industry is finding it increasingly difficult to provide goods in sufficient quantities and of competitive quality.
New approaches to the West are also fueled by international factors quite independent of the USSR’s internal weakness:

- Recognition of Moscow’s responsibility for a series of foreign policy failures and a growing realism about trends in the outside world.
- The irrelevance of traditional Marxist dogma to current global trends.
- The continuing vitality of the Western economies, the hollow ring of Moscow’s former talk about the “growing crisis of capitalism,” and the need to borrow from the Western experience.
- China’s growing ties to the capitalist world and increased use of market principles in its economy.
- The burden of empire; states that have emulated the Soviet model (Cuba, Vietnam, East European countries) are expensive to support and suffer from endemic economic malaise similar to the USSR.
- The declining appeal of Communist ideology in the West as well as the Third World.

Soviet leaders have launched a wide-ranging reassessment of the West and the prospects for improving East-West relations:

- They are redefining the USSR’s national security calculus, linking security with long-term modernization of the Soviet industrial base and playing down the perceived military threat from the West.
- They have substituted new doctrinal precepts to govern Soviet foreign and defense policy, diminishing the centrality of class conflict to East-West relations, abjuring the notion that Moscow could win a nuclear war, and challenging the high-priority claim that the military has had on resources.
- In order to justify such an approach to the domestic audience, reformers in the foreign policy establishment have launched a systematic attack in the Soviet media on stereotypical thinking that has exaggerated the military threat, ignored the nonmilitary dimensions of national security, and obscured Soviet backwardness by minimizing economic and social progress in the West.

Although this shift in strategy toward the West is borne in large measure out of weakness, it also has an offensive intent:

- It is seen in Moscow as an effective means to eliminate the USSR’s “enemy image” that has cemented Western unity, fueled support for defense programs, and sustained resistance to expanded cooperation with the East.
- Given the likelihood that solving the USSR’s domestic problems will take decades if not generations, Soviet leaders appreciate that they can score gains far more quickly on the foreign policy front. In effect, new strategies toward the West are a means for Moscow to improve its competitive position in the short run through political means while waiting for domestic reforms to take effect.
Attitude Toward International Organizations

Moscow's new international strategy has led it to attach growing political importance to the United Nations and other international organizations beyond the traditional emphasis on propaganda and intelligence collection:

- The Soviets have adopted a more businesslike, less polemical stance toward participation in UN bodies; for example, accepting compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in implementing international human rights agreements.

- Moscow has adopted a philosophy toward the United Nations that places more emphasis on substantive proposals. Where it formerly sought to keep the United Nations at arm's length on serious questions, Moscow is now advocating an increased role for the world body in resolving regional conflicts and monitoring international agreements.

- Soviet leaders calculate that, through a more extensive UN role, they can expand their global involvement and constrain US unilateral actions, thus compensating in part for inherent political and economic weaknesses that continue to limit their ability to play a global superpower role.

International Economic Strategy

The far-reaching campaign to reorganize the foreign trade and financial sectors and increase the USSR's role in world economic affairs is an integral part of Moscow's changing global strategy. Gorbachev sees this campaign as important to the success of perestroika over the longer term. Nonetheless, he is aware of the risks of overindebtedness and exposing the Soviet economy to the vagaries of the international market. He remains determined to find indigenous solutions to Moscow's problems:

- We expect Moscow to continue taking incremental steps to create conditions for more extensive involvement in the global economy and to open the Soviet economy to some foreign participation and competition.

- We believe Soviet leaders want eventually to make the ruble convertible with Western currencies and are beginning to take some steps in this direction. They see full convertibility as the culmination of the reform process, however, and are unlikely to complete the process until at least the late 1990s.

Soviet interest in international organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) signals Moscow's hope to become fully involved in the international economic and financial community:

- Moscow is probably most interested in becoming a party to GATT rules and negotiations as part of its long-term effort to expand foreign trade and reduce barriers to the export of Soviet products.

- Discussions with the IMF and the World Bank will remain more exploratory in nature.

Continuing Traditional Behavior

Soviet leaders want to move away from strategies that led to and fueled the Cold War. But there are limits on how far Soviet policy is likely to evolve toward a less confrontational relationship. Even the reformers in the leadership continue to see the East-West relationship as adversarial:

- Despite the changes in Soviet thinking, ideological and geopolitical differences will remain a major obstacle to improved East-West relations. Moscow remains committed to supporting Communist and "socialist-oriented" regimes, still actively seeks to enhance its involvement in Europe, Asia, and the Third World, and continues to back selected revolutionary movements.

Moscow still employs unsavory practices to advance its objectives. Active measures campaigns against US interests continue. There is no evidence that even the reformers in the leadership would reject these practices altogether, although the Gorbachev leadership is likely to take steps to constrain excesses and will be more responsive to Western pressure on these issues:

- Moscow has during the last year reduced the amount of blatant disinformation in its own press.
and has begun to participate in bilateral talks in which US complaints about disinformation are conveyed directly to Soviet political leaders. Nonetheless, stories accusing the United States of developing ethnic weapons, inventing the AIDS virus, and trafficking in body organs have continued overseas via covert press placements. We have seen no evidence that Moscow is prepared to exert influence on its allies and clients abroad—especially in the Third World—to curtail such activities.

- In an effort to bring its network of front groups—led by the World Peace Council—in line with new policies, Moscow has replaced individuals in senior leadership positions and pushed for measures that would allow diverse opinions to be voiced. While Soviet leaders are giving less priority to front groups, they and their bloc allies continue to finance an agenda of front activities designed to promote Soviet positions on key issues such as arms control and human rights.

- Intelligence operations against the West are undiminished. Some key areas, such as illegal acquisition of technology, are receiving increased emphasis. Intelligence activities are likely to increase further as the Soviet presence abroad grows.

Military Power and Arms Control

Moscow's strategic reassessment extends to the core of its national security posture—the size, composition, and configuration of its armed forces. In the past, Moscow worked hard to build offensively oriented forces and conventional forces that would give it a preponderance of power. The Soviet Union now appears to believe such efforts were often too costly, politically counterproductive, and militarily ineffective—and that Soviet national security can be ensured with smaller, less threatening military forces.

Changes in this sphere are driven by a variety of factors:

- Growing concern about the costs of maintaining, equipping, and modernizing a large standing army and the need to divert scarce resources to rebuild the civilian economy.

- A recognition that the military buildup in the past was excessive and undermined NATO cohesion, triggered a Western buildup, increased tensions on Soviet borders, and in some respects eroded Soviet security.

- A growing awareness of the role of economic power and international diplomacy in national security calculations.

Evidence that the leadership is serious about taking steps to act on this reassessment and reduce resources devoted to defense has been accumulating steadily:

- Gorbachev's pronouncement of "reasonable sufficiency" as the guiding concept for the future size and structure of Soviet forces has opened a wide-ranging debate over military policy. While still ill defined, the concept has been used by reform spokesmen to argue that more modest force levels than Moscow has maintained in the past are sufficient for Soviet security. The unilateral cuts in conventional forces Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988 suggest that the reformers' arguments have prevailed.

- Since last summer political and military leaders have begun to speak with increasing frankness about Moscow's determination to base future improvements in military capability on qualitative rather than quantitative factors, to prepare for an era in which ground and naval forces will be receiving less arms and equipment, and to shift a growing proportion of defense industry production to civilian needs.

- The political leadership has taken steps to reassert its control of decisionmaking on national security issues in order to implement "new thinking." Gorbachev has challenged the privileged status enjoyed by the military under Brezhnev. Competing centers of defense and security analysis and more civilian involvement are being encouraged. The foreign ministry and the Central Committee apparatus are playing a more assertive role.

Not all Soviet officials share the new national security calculus on which Gorbachev's initiatives are based. Most military leaders probably support perestroika in
principle, but many are troubled by Gorbachev's dramatic unilateral gestures and shifts in negotiating posture and probably question his more benign depiction of the Western threat. We have little direct evidence, but we believe some political leaders share concerns about what they see as Gorbachev's excessively conciliatory posture. These concerns are likely to play a role if Gorbachev's critics ever mount a political challenge. We believe, however, that Gorbachev is likely to retain the initiative on national security issues for the foreseeable future. (over)
Arms Control
To create a propitious political climate for such reductions in defense spending, Gorbachev is taking steps to ensure that Western arms programs are similarly constrained, making arms control central to his policy and agenda.

Arms control has been vital to the Soviets' efforts to shape the arms competition in their favor since the 1950s, but we believe it plays a more important role in Gorbachev's national security calculus:

- Gorbachev's innovations in doctrine and ideology, and his willingness to open the USSR to intrusive on-site inspections, remove key barriers that have traditionally limited Moscow's flexibility. At the same time, a looming domestic crisis gives him a far stronger economic incentive than his predecessors.

- Like other Soviet leaders before him, Gorbachev sees arms control as a means of limiting Western arms programs, but to achieve that objective he is willing to negotiate reductions in Soviet forces that go far beyond what his predecessors were prepared to contemplate.

Unilateral reductions are both a sign of Gorbachev's determination not to have his program held hostage by the negotiation process and a way of pressuring the West to be more forthcoming. Unilateral initiatives in a variety of areas are likely as a means to undermine support in the West for defense programs, "kick-start" arms control negotiations, and save resources at home. We believe Moscow prefers to achieve reductions primarily through negotiated agreements or reciprocal measures that maintain at least a rough parity with the West.

The Soviet approach to arms control also retains propagandistic elements. Many Gorbachev proposals are obviously self-serving or quixotic (nuclear-weapons-free zones, reductions in naval exercises, withdrawal from foreign bases, abolition of nuclear weapons). Nevertheless, Moscow is more willing than in the past to translate vague arms control concepts into specific negotiating proposals.

Outlook
There is agreement in the Intelligence Community that this reassessment of military requirements is only now beginning to have an effect on Soviet forces.

The Soviet Defense Modernization Program

Despite changes in military doctrine under Gorbachev and the promise of significant reductions in the Soviet defense effort, the USSR has continued to field and modernize a potent military force:

- Since 1987, the Soviet Union has begun to deploy:
  - Two improved variants of silo-based ICBMs.
  - A rail-mobile ICBM.
  - The Blackjack supersonic strategic bomber.

- The Soviets also continue to deploy:
  - Road-mobile ICBMs.
  - Two new classes of submarines carrying ballistic missiles.
  - More modern air defense weapons.

- Tank production levels in 1988 reached their highest level in the postwar period.

- The Soviets will:
  - Probably deploy a Stealth bomber by the year 2000.
  - Extensively modernize their strategic nuclear forces so that by the late 1990s about half of their ICBMs will be mobile.
  - Field a variety of new high-technology conventional weapons.

Modernization has proceeded apace under Gorbachev, and new highs in spending on military R&D as well as on hardware have been reached in his first four years. Our preliminary estimates suggest that the value of military procurement grew in real terms by about 3 to 4 percent per year during this period. But, despite these initial trends, we believe — on the basis of private and public comments and the regime's recent initiatives — that the leadership now intends to take steps over the next several years that will affect virtually all areas of the Soviet defense effort.
Gorbachev's success in consolidating power in a leadership shakeup last fall and the reduction in East-West tensions have improved his ability to move ahead forcefully with his defense agenda. Given the current ferment and flux in Soviet policy, we cannot predict the future with high confidence. But, if current policy trends in Moscow continue—and, in our view, they are likely to for at least the next few years—we believe the following developments are likely.

**Defense Spending.** In light of Gorbachev's recent actions and the public commitment of the defense industries to step up drastically their support for consumer programs, we now judge it likely that—barring a dramatic escalation of East-West tensions—Soviet defense spending in real terms will decline over the next couple of years, while efforts to reduce the defense burden will continue during the 1991-95 Five-Year Plan:

- The unilateral reductions Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the elimination of missiles and equipment under the INF Treaty could yield annual savings equivalent to about 6 percent of estimated Soviet defense spending in 1988 (7.5 billion rubles).

- Gorbachev's recent assertion that defense spending will be trimmed by 14.2 percent over the next two years—we estimate a 124-billion-ruble 1988 defense budget—implies that further cuts beyond those already announced are in the offing.

- To implement this pledge, we believe the Soviets are likely to reduce procurement in most areas. R&D may also be reduced, but we believe they are likely to sustain a strong R&D effort in the areas of space- and ground-based strategic defense systems, directed-energy and radiofrequency weapons, and advanced conventional munitions.

- To implement Gorbachev's companion promise to cut procurement by 19.5 percent, the Soviets are likely to stretch out procurement rates, phase out older weapons more rapidly, cancel some programs, and use greater selectivity in choosing weapon programs to develop. We believe this will especially affect tank and military aircraft production, where the potential savings are substantial and the resources readily convertible to civilian needs.

**Strategic Arms.** Achieving reductions in strategic arms—for military and political more than economic reasons—will remain high on the Gorbachev regime's agenda. 

- Completing work on a START agreement and constraining SDI will be top priorities in 1989. We believe the Soviets are likely to show further flexibility:

  - They will continue to insist on a simultaneous reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, but will settle for language that establishes a less explicit link to START reductions than does their current position.
  - They may agree to defer the sea-launched cruise missile issue or accept a simple declaratory statement of limits.
  - Gorbachev will dismantle the Krasnovarsk radar if necessary to achieve a START agreement.
  - The Soviets will not let verification become an obstacle.
  - Should negotiations stall, Gorbachev may take unilateral steps—implementing some of the prospective START agreement’s provisions—to generate additional pressure on US negotiators and capture the economic savings in the near term.

Follow-on strategic arms talks will raise additional complications, such as the need to factor other nations' forces into the equation. Moscow may well

---

3 A successful diversion of resources from the defense sector to the civilian economy could do much to increase worker incentives and ease inflationary pressures, thereby paving the way for the eventual implementation of key economic reforms. Effecting such a diversion, however, will be no easy task given the inefficiencies that plague the Soviet economy.

4 The outlook for Soviet strategic forces is discussed in greater detail in NIE 11-1/88, Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1990s, December 1988 (1).
pursue further reductions in strategic systems, but will insist on maintaining at least a rough parity with the West. Despite Gorbachev's call for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century, the Soviets will want to retain sufficient strategic forces for deterrent purposes and to buttress their superpower status, and we do not believe they see a total ban on nuclear weapons as a realistic objective.  

Conventional Arms. The impact of new thinking on conventional forces is likely to be greater than on strategic arms.*

- Conventional forces are large and expensive to maintain and modernize. Without cuts here, the increased allocation of resources toward civilian use that Gorbachev wants would be impossible.

- Initiatives to reduce the USSR's conventional force preponderance have the greatest potential to undercut support in NATO for increases in defense spending and weapon modernization programs.

The reductions Gorbachev announced at the United Nations in December 1988—when implemented—will cut substantially into Soviet force structure in Central Europe and will significantly reduce the prospect of a short warning theater offensive. Moscow will retain the capability to conduct a major offensive into NATO territory after a period of mobilization. As Moscow implements these cuts over the next two years, it seems likely that the Soviets will argue the ball is now in NATO's court. Any new unilateral initiatives in the time frame of this Estimate may be addressed to other defense sector elements.

Over the longer term, we believe the leadership's recent statements and the ongoing ferment in military doctrine indicate Moscow will go much further:

- A majority of analysts believe that, over the next few years, Moscow will take additional steps to address remaining asymmetries that favor the Warsaw Pact and restructure and redeploy its forces into a more defensive posture. Moscow will prefer that any steps on this scale be part of negotiated arrangements with the West that also limit perceived Western advantages in air and naval forces. But, given the prospects for protracted negotiations, the potential for further unilateral initiatives remains high.

  - By pointing approvingly to Khrushchev's announced demobilization of 1.2 million troops in January 1960, some Soviet officials are clearly arguing for substantial cuts beyond what Gorbachev promised at the United Nations.

  - There has been some discussion at lower levels in the USSR of truly radical initiatives, including an abolition of universal service and a shift to a much smaller professional army manned by volunteers and supported by a large territorial reserve army structure. Such a force could reduce the costs associated with a large standing force and allow diversion of significant resources to the civilian economy and to high-technology conventional weapons. This discussion has provoked sharp rejoinders from senior military officials. We believe initiatives on this scale are unlikely during the time frame of this Estimate but we do not rule them out.

Chemical Weapons. The Soviet leadership will give a high priority during this period to reaching some kind of global CW convention that would stop the United States from modernizing its CW stockpile. How far to go in putting the Soviet arsenal on the negotiating table has probably been a subject of some controversy within the senior military and political leadership:

- On the one hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has spoken out forcefully against chemical weapons to Soviet audiences, arguing that geographic considerations make chemical weapons a much greater threat to the USSR than to NATO; that Soviet CW stockpiles are "barbaric" and harm the USSR's reputation abroad; and that they represent a colossal waste of resources.

* The outlook for Soviet conventional forces is discussed in greater detail in NIE 11-14-89, Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1980s, February 1989. (10)
• On the other hand, on the basis of our own estimates, we believe official Soviet statements continue to obscure the scope of Moscow's CW stockpile.

President Bush's strong statements of his own interest in a chemical accord probably add to Moscow's interest in exploring the prospects, despite the difficult verification issues remaining. Further initiatives from Moscow are certain, and—given the uncertain prospects for a negotiated agreement—unilateral steps are likely. We believe Moscow will probably:

• Seek to undercut Western skepticism about Soviet sincerity by agreeing to intrusive on-site monitoring of some Soviet facilities, putting pressure on the United States to reciprocate.

• Clarify its willingness to go beyond the destruction of old CW stockpiles and address the issues of research and development of new CW agents and of CW proliferation in the developing countries.

Despite the changes in size and posture we believe are possible over the next five years or so, Soviet military forces will remain large, diverse, and increasingly modern, and will continue to pose a formidable threat to the West. Moscow will retain forces sufficient to launch large-scale offensive operations should war occur. The specific dimensions of the military threat that Soviet forces will present to the West over time remain to be determined and are beyond the scope of this Estimate.

Policy Toward the Western Alliance

Moscow is giving greater priority than in the past to relations with Western Europe. Moscow’s increased interest in the region reflects domestic as well as foreign policy considerations:

• The Soviets expect that Western Europe’s global clout will grow and that non-US members of NATO will acquire greater influence within the Alliance.

Gorbachev protege Aleksandr Yakovlev, now in charge of the Central Committee Foreign Policy Commission, has underscored these trends in his writings and public remarks and argued that Moscow should take the potentially divergent interests of the United States and Western Europe into account as it pursues its national security agenda in the region.

• Moscow does not want to be left out as the European Community (EC) heads toward closer economic integration and growing economic power.

• Western Europe is a critical source of the foreign technology, investment, and trade that over the long run will be important to the success of perestroika. The West Europeans are seen in Moscow as more willing and reliable suppliers than the United States.

A series of new initiatives aimed at the West Europeans have shifted from heavyhanded military intimidation toward more sophisticated political approaches. Gorbachev is scheduled to visit the key West European capitals in the first half of 1989:

• Soviet leaders acknowledge that past policies toward the Alliance—such as the deployment of SS-20s and withdrawal from the INF talks in December 1983—triggered counterproductive Western responses.

• After years of criticizing the EC, the Soviets have decided that the potential benefits of relations—symbolized by the signing of an EC-CEMA cooperation agreement in June 1988—outweigh any risks to Warsaw Pact cohesion.

• Moscow’s emphasis on the theme of a “common European home” symbolizes its shift from the stick to the carrot as it seeks to expand its influence while limiting that of the United States.

• Moscow’s credentials in Western Europe will be enhanced by its willingness to give its East European allies substantial new room for maneuver. The Soviets will allow the East Europeans wide latitude...
for expanded economic ties to Western Europe short of leaving the CEMA framework or taking steps that leave them excessively vulnerable to Western leverage. While Gorbachev has spoken of a united Europe free of alliances and divisions and wants to reduce US presence and influence on the Continent, Moscow almost certainly accepts current alignments as a reality for the foreseeable future. Although concerned about NATO’s military capabilities, the Soviet leadership sees NATO as providing certain benefits: helping to preserve European stability, managing the German question, inhibiting the development of an independent European military organization, and influencing and even restraining the United States. Taking steps to end the political division of Europe for the foreseeable future would also run serious risks in Eastern Europe. Soviet accounts of an important foreign ministry conference in Moscow last summer reported a consensus view that attempting to decouple the United States from Western Europe would at least for now be counterproductive.

Outlook
While Moscow’s ultimate goal is a Western Europe closer to the USSR and more distant from the United States, we believe that, for the time frame of this Estimate and indeed well beyond, Soviet objectives are more modest:

- Moscow will attempt to translate its more benign image under Gorbachev into tangible gains—expanding economic ties and technology sales, slowing modernization of NATO’s conventional forces, and undercutting support for defense spending in Western Europe—and more generally into an expansion of Soviet influence on the Continent.

- Blocking modernization of NATO’s short-range nuclear weapons will be a top priority. Gorbachev is likely to announce some unilateral reductions in Moscow’s arsenal of short-range nuclear forces as early as this year as NATO approaches a decision on modernization of the Lance missile.

- Moscow’s interest in maintaining stability on the Continent will limit its initiatives on West Germany and Berlin. The Soviets hope that West German concerns about becoming the battlefield in a future war can assist them in impeding NATO’s plans to modernize its nuclear and conventional arsenal. Gorbachev will attempt to cultivate a separate relationship with West Germany that covers security as well as economic issues. Soviet initiatives that play to Bonn’s interest in improving relations with East Germany are likely; there are even hints of flexibility concerning the Berlin Wall. Soviet and East European sensitivities about a resurgent Germany, however, will, in our view, prevent Moscow from condoning any serious steps toward reunification or from launching any other initiatives that would raise questions about the basic postwar framework.

Competition in the Third World
The Soviets are engaged in a broad-range review of their objectives and strategy in the Third World that directly affects their relations with the West. They now believe that their past policies failed to achieve what they had hoped in terms of lasting gain and redressing the East-West balance. At the same time, they incurred some significant economic and diplomatic costs:

- Soviet leaders have ceased to see the Third World as ripe for leftist revolution or adding to the socialist camp.

- Current Soviet policy is more pragmatic and less encumbered by ideological blinders.

- Given the importance of reduced East-West tensions to Gorbachev’s agenda, Moscow is more careful to consider how its actions affect broader Soviet interests, including relations with the West.

Under Gorbachev the accent is on political rather than military competition and on finding political solutions to regional conflicts. Moreover, the Soviets emphasize there are limits to Soviet largess and that leftist Third World regimes must bear greater responsibility for their own revolutions.
The Soviets, nevertheless, continue to see the Third World as a region of rivalry with the West:

- They continue attempts to reduce US influence and especially the US military presence. Moscow expects that its initiatives to assume a less threatening and more cooperative image will create an international atmosphere less tolerant of a major US military presence.

- Moscow continues to back Communist allies and to selectively support client states and some revolutionary movements (notably the African National Congress, the South-West African People's Organization, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador).

Under Gorbachev, Moscow is assigning a much more important role in carrying out its strategy in the Third World to international organizations, and particularly to the United Nations. Moscow is probing for ways to exploit UN peacekeeping mechanisms as a means to constrain unilateral US initiatives and enlarge its own role.

**Looking Ahead**

Moscow will continue low-profile support when feasible to leftist insurgencies and groups that are deemed to have some future, mainly those that will not require massive Soviet assistance. The Soviets will press their allies and clients to be sensitive to broader Soviet interests and to eschew behavior that could excessively antagonize the Western powers:

- Soviet clients in the Third World will also be encouraged to undertake economic and political reforms and to accept and even seek Western economic assistance.

- Soviet economic and military assistance to Third World clients will in many cases be scaled back as agreements are renegotiated. Even allies of special importance (Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan) are likely to feel the pinch, although they will continue to receive substantial aid.

- Given Moscow's limited economic capacities, the Soviets will continue to push arms sales for barter or hard currency. Military assistance will remain the primary feature of Soviet relations with many Third World countries and may be offered at favorable terms in order to help expand Soviet influence in countries of special importance to Moscow.

- It is highly unlikely that Moscow will become directly involved in military support to a leftist seizure of power in the Third World as it did in the 1970s.

- Moscow will give greater priority to relations with the newly industrializing countries and traditionally pro-Western states.

- Soviet military forces (primarily naval and naval air) will remain deployed to several Third World locations, particularly the eastern Mediterranean Sea. We believe there is a good chance, however, that Moscow may draw down its forces in some areas. We see some chance that Soviet naval forces will withdraw from Cam Ranh Bay during the time frame of this Estimate. Although the Soviets may in some cases seek to expand existing military access arrangements, we believe they are unlikely to seek any new foreign basing arrangements.

Moscow will be more supportive than in the past of negotiated settlements in regional conflicts, although its behavior will depend on the potential impact on relations with the West or other key regional powers and also on the economic cost to Moscow of supporting such a conflict:

- In the Middle East, the policy of "neither peace nor war" no longer suits Soviet interests. The potential threat that a conflict poses to Soviet security and to relations with the Western powers ensures that Moscow will support a peace process in which it has a role, while leaning on its Arab clients and the PLO to be more cooperative in the process.

- In Central America, Moscow will counsel Nicaragua's President Ortega to take advantage of regional peace initiatives, limit support for regional leftist insurgencies, move toward more pragmatic economic policies, and seek economic aid from a variety of sources.
Figure 3
Soviet Economic Aid Disbursements to Selected LDCs

Billion US 

Communist LDCs

Marxist clients

Other

Vietnam

Cuba

Note: The numbers for Communist countries have been revised as a result of recent study.
donors. While encouraging internal reforms, the Soviets will work to keep Nicaragua a Marxist-Leninist state.

- Moscow sees the Horn of Africa as another potential arena for joint US-Soviet efforts to encourage a political settlement. (CMM)

Prospects for Gains and Losses

These changes in Soviet approach have already produced some important successes for Moscow. To a substantial degree, Gorbachev has already undercut the fundamental mistrust that has sustained resistance in the West and most of the Third World to expansion of Soviet political, economic, and military influence. If current trends continue—and we believe they will—he is likely to make substantial progress toward the objectives that drive this change in approach:

- Building on the gains he has already made, Gorbachev will succeed in creating an extended respite from East-West tensions and a more stable international environment conducive to undertaking disruptive internal reforms.
Existing pressures within the Western Alliance to slow the pace of defense modernization, reduce standing military forces, and end defense spending will be further strengthened—with or without arms control agreements—thus facilitating Moscow's effort to reduce the defense burden, make additional troop cuts, and concentrate on rebuilding the Soviet economy.

Western interest in broadening trade, technology sales, and financial and other economic ties to the USSR will increase as a result of a more lenient political attitude toward involvement in perestroika. (Serious economic constraints, such as the difficulty of repatriating profits and Moscow's lack of hard currency, will remain.)

But Moscow is playing from a weak hand as it attempts to translate an improving image abroad into tangible, lasting benefits. Its use of military power as a lever of influence is likely to decline further, while it will face persistent economic and political weaknesses that perestroika will do little to alleviate in the time frame of this Estimate. In particular, even if Gorbachev's reforms begin to take hold, the USSR is not likely to be a major global economic player until well into the next century, if then.

The Western Alliance. New incentives will be created for individual Alliance members to pursue parochial agendas with Moscow. Changing attitudes toward the USSR in Western Europe will complicate Alliance management. Alliance unity on some key security issues will be seriously tested, but West European support for a US military presence on the Continent will not, in our view, be significantly eroded.

The Third World. Many Third World countries will welcome the USSR's new international respectability as an opportunity to improve ties to Moscow—aiming to advance their own regional agendas and to gain some leverage on the United States. Moscow is likely to be able to capitalize by playing a larger role on regional issues—such as a Middle East peace settlement—where it has long been odd man out. Local opponents of US military facilities in the Third World will be emboldened to press their case as perceptions of a Soviet threat decline. Soviet activity and presence will increase, affording Moscow new opportunities for influence and intelligence operations. But the fundamental geopolitical interests of developing countries will incline them to continue good relations with the West, while economic weakness will significantly limit Moscow's relevance to the main issues confronting them.

Moscow may well suffer losses that will offset some of its potential gains—losses that could ultimately serve to discredit the course Gorbachev has set and give support to those who are arguing for a more cautious course.

In a more relaxed climate, there is a significant chance that some East European countries—or populations—will try to move beyond even the expanded leeway for political and social change that Gorbachev seems to be allowing. Moscow's alliance structure and cohesion may be challenged even sooner than ours.

Moscow's unorthodox foreign policy departures and its reductions of material support will lead some Soviet Third World clients to explore improved ties to the West.

Gorbachev and his allies in the leadership can nevertheless more easily point to the successes of their reform agenda in the international arena than they can at home, where political reforms have produced turmoil and economic reforms have yet to produce significant results. Successes on the foreign front will continue to strengthen their hand during the time frame of this Estimate, but will by no means ensure their survival or the success of the reforms.

The Future of Soviet Strategy: With and Without Gorbachev

Our reporting suggests that Gorbachev's radical departures from past policy have been and probably will continue to be controversial with elements of the elite. The radicalization of his agenda over the past year or so has evidently deepened the controversy:

- Public statements of Politburo members Ligachev and Chebrikov suggest that they are less enthusiastic supporters of "new thinking" than other members of the Politburo.
• Party conservatives and members of the military and security elites have criticized specific decisions such as the unilateral nuclear testing moratorium, the acceptance of asymmetrical reductions in the INF Treaty, and unilateral force reductions.

Scenarios Under Gorbachev

Nevertheless, Gorbachev has continued to outmaneuver his critics and to improve his ability to carry out his foreign policy and defense agenda. We believe a continuation and consolidation of current trends is the most likely scenario in the next few years:

• It is widely recognized in Moscow that the Gorbachev foreign policy has contributed to a dramatic improvement in the USSR's international image and to its security.

• Gorbachev will continue to move cautiously to prepare the groundwork for potentially controversial initiatives.

• He will continue to gradually remove defenders of the old order. With his downgrading of leading conservative critic Ligachev last fall, he put naysayers on notice that they will pay a price for resisting his program.

• Gorbachev is shaking up the entire foreign policy and national security apparatus so that it will better serve his agenda. The foreign ministry and party foreign policy apparatus have already undergone substantial reorganization and the military, intelligence, and security services reportedly will soon do so as well.

Potentially Disruptive Developments

Gorbachev’s reform agenda has so far produced considerable economic disruption and political turmoil, with few positive results to show for it. The situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. Short of the overthrow of Gorbachev, we believe the new leadership’s strategy toward the West is relatively invulnerable to such bad news on the home front.

Up to a point, the prospect of continuing domestic turmoil is likely to reinforce sentiment in favor of a respite from East-West tensions. Continued economic decline could push Moscow to move more quickly to reduce trade barriers and seek assistance from the West, especially on the consumer front. Political instability, on the other hand—particularly if it was nationality based—could lead Moscow on a selective basis to reimpose constraints on contacts between Soviet citizens and the West, limit travel opportunities, resume some jammings of Western radios, and tighten the constraints on glasnost.

Severe instability in Eastern Europe would probably pose the greatest risk to Gorbachev’s approach to the West. Moscow is tolerating and even encouraging significant steps in the bloc toward greater independence in domestic and foreign policy. Moscow’s tolerance has fueled new and rapidly growing pressures for change in the region, especially in Poland and Hungary. Precipitous steps toward greater independence by an East European regime—raising the prospect of a loss of party dominance or a challenge to the integrity of the Pact—would raise alarms in Moscow and strengthen sentiment in favor of a crackdown in the region and the reimposition of tighter controls on East-West contacts.

Aescalation of US-Soviet tensions—perhaps provoked by a crackdown at home or in Eastern Europe—could also throw Gorbachev’s strategy off track. There is already some sentiment in the leadership that Gorbachev has moved too quickly in his drive to improve relations with the Western powers and given away too much. A shift in Washington toward a harshly anti-Soviet policy could reinforce these concerns and lead Gorbachev to tack in a conservative direction.

This development would probably not lead the leadership to roll back initiatives already taken, but it would almost certainly strengthen those arguing that
Moscow should "pause" in its efforts to forge better ties to the United States and place more priority on cultivating the West Europeans. It could also limit Gorbachev's freedom on maneuver in negotiations and his ability to transfer additional resources from defense to the civilian economy.

Scenarios Without Gorbachev
How Soviet policy would change without Gorbachev would depend on the timing and the circumstances surrounding his departure. We do not believe a return to the confrontational policies of the past is likely. But there could be some significant retreatment from Gorbachev's more forthcoming approach to the West and a resulting increase in East-West tensions:

- If Gorbachev were to die in office, we believe his policies would survive him at least in the short run. Gorbachev would most likely be replaced by a moderate reformer or by one of several allies on the Politburo who seem as radical or more so than he is. Either would attempt to maintain the current course, although the removal of Gorbachev's forceful personality and political skills would be bound to slow the pace of change. Because Gorbachev probably will continue to remove opponents of his policies from the Politburo, over time the probability that Gorbachev's course would persist is likely to increase.

- If Gorbachev were to be ousted from office in the next few years, he most likely would be replaced by a more orthodox figure favoring a distinctly more cautious course on domestic and foreign policy. Such a leadership would probably voice support for perestroika in general, while in practice moving to gut some of Gorbachev's most controversial initiatives to liberalize the political system and introduce market elements into the economy. It would be difficult for any regime to improve Soviet economic performance without constraining defense spending, but a more orthodox leadership would almost certainly be more supportive of military and defense industry interests. It would probably eschew meaningful unilateral arms control concessions or force cuts, be more supportive of leftist allies abroad, and take a more conservative approach to the reorganization of the military and security services. Such a regime would not necessarily pursue more confrontational policies, but its harder line on a range of foreign and domestic issues would probably lead to an increase in East-West tensions.

- We see little chance that any alternative regime would find it in the Soviet interest to resort to an openly confrontational strategy toward the West that would entail a major new military buildup or aggressive policies in the Third World. Political instability serious enough to threaten central control—while unlikely in our view—would increase the chances that a xenophobic leadership advocating such a course could come to power.

- We see even less chance of a leadership coming to power that attempts to pursue a more radical effort than Gorbachev to engage the West and integrate the USSR into the international community.

Implications for Western Policy
Under almost any scenario, the USSR will remain the West's principal military and political adversary. Perestroika, however, is changing the nature of the Soviet challenge. Soviet policies that mute Cold War rhetoric and reduce the West's perception of hostility and danger threaten to undermine the philosophical and institutional framework the West has developed over the last 40 years for containing and combating Soviet and Communist expansionism. It will become increasingly difficult for the West to approach East-West relations from the same perspective, rhetoric, and policies as in the past. Western policies will have to sell in a more challenging market where the perception of threat is significantly reduced while competition remains strong.

At the same time, the processes Gorbachev has set in motion create new opportunities to realize objectives Western policy has long sought. These processes will continue to:

- Erode the xenophobia and two-camp mentality that have traditionally driven Soviet hegemonic ambitions.
The Long-Term Outlook

There is general agreement in the Intelligence Community over the outlook for the next five to seven years, but differing views on the longer term prospects for fundamental and enduring change toward less competitive Soviet behavior:

- Some analysts stress Gorbachev's political vulnerability, the opposition to real change in the party, military, and security elites, and the unpredictable consequences of the turmoil he has fostered in the system. They point to a history of failed attempts to reform the Soviet system and are reluctant to make long-range predictions about the future. In any event, they see Gorbachev's changes as largely tactical, driven by the need for a respite from the competition. They suspect that less confrontational policies may last only as long as necessary to achieve the expected gains in economic performance—albeit into the next century—and see a serious risk of a return to traditionally assertive behavior when that time arrives.

- Other analysts stress Gorbachev's political strength and cunning and the strong forces—societal pressures and global trends—behind the reform process. They view the current effort at reform as far deeper and more comprehensive than past attempts and see current changes as driven by a fundamental rethinking of national interests and ideology as well as by more tactical considerations. They see temporary retreatments as possible and even likely, but believe Gorbachev's changes will more likely than not have sufficient momentum to endure, producing lasting shifts in Moscow toward a more open society, more cooperative behavior in the Third World, and a significantly reduced emphasis on military competition.

- Undercut support for radical leftists in the Third World.

- Further weaken the claims of the military on the Soviet budget.

- Facilitate movement toward institutional guarantees for individual liberties in the USSR.

There are limits on the West's ability to influence this process:

- Gorbachev and his colleagues have made clear that they plan to proceed in current directions whether or not the West reciprocates.

- Western assistance can affect Soviet economic performance only at the margins.

- In the long run, Gorbachev's fortunes and the fate of his policies will rest more on domestic factors—the ability to control domestic disorder and to improve economic performance—than on foreign policy successes.

Nevertheless, Western influence over Soviet foreign, defense, and domestic policies is probably greater than ever before:

- While Gorbachev has the initiative and the ability to make foreign policy innovations more quickly than the Western democracies, the USSR's domestic troubles give him the weaker hand and the greater need for a less confrontational relationship.

- Gorbachev recognizes that successes abroad help bolster his position at home. His ability to claim success will be dependent on how the West responds to his initiatives.

Gorbachev will not endanger Soviet security or give in to what he perceives as blackmail, but he has already shown that he is prepared to force through dramatic changes in past Soviet policies—even at some risk to his political position—in order to address longstanding Western concerns.

- Pave the way for the significant reduction of forward-based Soviet military power in Europe.

- Weaken Soviet hegemony and expand individual liberties in Eastern Europe.
Origins of “New Thinking”

"New thinking" has come to stand for a number of theoretical tenets—from deemphasis on military struggle and class warfare to "reasonable sufficiency" in defense to a reassessment of the costs and benefits of Third World involvement—that Gorbachev has set forth as guiding principles of his foreign policy.

While Gorbachev has brought these new concepts to the fore, many of them have a long history. Some got their start under Khrushchev, in the thaw that followed Stalin’s death:

- Although he never used the term, Khrushchev made a number of basic theoretical alterations—discarding Stalin’s dogma on the inevitability of war and resurrecting peaceful coexistence.

- Many current “new thinkers,” including Gorbachev, began their political and academic careers during the Khrushchev years.

The Brezhnev years were marked by a more conservative political tone. But the regime tolerated a broadening discussion in academic circles of many of the components of new thinking—such as the risks of regional conflicts, the changing nature of capitalist societies, and the meager prospects for Communist gains in the Third World.

The formation and growing prominence in the postwar years of a number of foreign policy think tanks under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences played a key role in the dissemination of new thinking. Most of the well-known proponents of new thinking have their origins in or still work in a handful of these institutes.

Most of the ideas that Gorbachev has touted under the rubric of new thinking in fact have their origins in the West. Well before new thinking, Western concepts such as “interdependence,” balance of interests, and mutual security were appearing in Soviet academic journals and unofficial remarks.

Gorbachev has sought to institutionalize new thinking by promoting its proponents at every opportunity to positions of prominence in the party apparatus and the media. New thinkers are noticeably prominent in the major academic institutes and the foreign ministry. Were the political climate in Moscow to shift, however, proponents of more orthodox approaches to international affairs could again assume more influential positions.

Indicators of Enduring Change

As evidence of Moscow’s progress over the next two to three years toward fulfilling the promise of more responsible behavior, we will be watching for:

- Soviet acceptance of real liberalization in Eastern Europe.

- Full implementation of announced force reductions.

- A substantial conversion in the defense industry to production for the civilian economy.

Over the longer term, we believe the most reliable indications of progress toward—or retrogression from—enduring change in the USSR will not be in any specific list of policy changes but in evidence of a more open society and relationship with the outside world:

- Institutional changes that implement a more pluralistic decisionmaking process on national security issues, such as establishing an effective mechanism for oversight of foreign policy and defense issues by the USSR Supreme Soviet (legislature).
- The institutionalization of glasnost in the national security realm, providing for release of significant data about the Soviet defense budget and sanctioning a vigorous debate about foreign and defense policy options.

- Playing a responsible, nonconfrontational role on transnational issues (such as terrorism, narcotics, and the environment) and in international bodies such as the United Nations.

- Significant steps toward greater interdependence with the global economy, making the ruble a convertible currency (not likely in the period of this Estimate) and exposing the Soviet economy to foreign competition.

- Progress toward the rule of law, including sharp curtailment of the security organs' extralegal activities.

- A significant relaxation of the barriers to free travel and emigration.
Report of Vadin Zagladin on his conversation with Chairman of the Czechoslovak Association for U.N., Deputy Chairman of the Committee for European Security, Jan Pudilak, 1 April 1989.

[According to him Czechoslovakia] is in a "deep moral and political crisis." This crisis can be compared with the one that had preceded 1968. One difference today is that the living standards of masses are considerably higher than in 1967. This means a loss for the Czechs... However, these positive factors are about to disappear... On the mass level, in all groups of the society, but first of all in the working class, among intellectuals and in the youth, there is a time-bomb of discontent.

Gradually a broad opposition is being formed. But it is a diverse phenomenon. It would be not all that bad, if there were only hostile groups like "Chart 77" or "Renewal." But along with them there is a considerable (up to half a million) group of former party members who, without joining the opposition...voice their active dissatisfaction, both with their own position and the situation in the country. Simultaneously the mood of discontent has spread among a great number of party members, members of the Communist Youth. And non-party members are not calm as well... The youth is comparing the activities of the authorities to the actions of "fascists."

[Vaclav] Havel's arrest [and], his imprisonment has converted this mediocre writer into a martyr, and for the discontented people he has become a national hero. This is a priceless gift for the West. In all truth, he could have been gagged up [prevent from speaking] with softer, political means... The leadership failed to demonstrate the skill "to think several moves ahead." Today it is most important to operate by political means, to "cage" discontent into discussions...

[It is necessary to reassess 1968 and the role of Alexander Dubcek.] However, it is difficult so far to do, one part of the leadership was totally involved in those events, another fears by inertia a repetition of 1968 (although if the party became a true political leader of perestroika, this would not happen). Cautiously, gradually we must approach it...

Source: Archive of Gorbachev Foundation

Translated by Vladislav Zubok
The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Record of Conversation between President M. S. Gorbachev and Miklos Nemeth, Member of the HSWP CC Politburo, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary,

Moscow, 3 March 1989

[The meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and Miklos Nemeth, one of the leading reformers and technocrats in the Hungarian leadership, was the first top-level personal consultation between the two countries’ leaders following the crucial decisions of the HSWP CC on 10-11 February 1989 to re-evaluate the events of 1956 as a people’s uprising and announce the introduction of the multiparty system in the country. The following part of the discussion reflects the determination and the hope of both leaders that the much needed transformation of the political structure and the economy could and should be realized within the framework of a reformed socialist system.]

(Excerpt)

M. S. Gorbachev congratulates Nemeth on the occasion of his appointment as Prime Minister, and asks him how long he has been in office.

M. Nemeth: For almost a hundred days. I am often asked whether I am thinking about reviewing and sizing up what I have done so far. I usually answer that I have no time for that. Even if I make an assessment, it is for the Central Committee or the parliament. One has to be critical of one’s own activities.

M. S. Gorbachev: True enough. In the single-party system self-criticism, is supposed to be an important issue. Possibly the most significant condition is how successfully the leading role of the Party is achieved. On the other hand, our mistakes and shortcomings are all rooted in the lack of criticism. Naturally, I am not only talking about the management, the top layer of party leaders, but I mean it on a larger scale—the whole of the Party. During the Stalin regime, from 1934 to his death, there were only two party congresses.

M. Nemeth: In the days when Lenin was at the helm, there were endless debates and a clear political line was formed all the same.

M. S. Gorbachev: Yes, because there were entirely different conditions both in the Party and in the country. Now we are opening the way towards socialist pluralism. The multiplicity of opinions is not a tragedy for the society; on the contrary, it is a real advantage. Of course, there are some who want to exhibit democracy for their own selfish objectives, but it can be dealt with, it is merely a question of struggle. [Boris] Yeltsin has now a peculiar position in the Central Committee. His is a typically leftist, rather obnoxious position, which can nevertheless find a favorable reception among the public. We have to put up with several problems that directly concern people’s lives, and those who cry out loud enough about these can reap a dividend. The majority of people cannot be blamed for this, as they are hoping that a man like him will one day be able to do something for them. Besides, it is important that they learn on their own the difference between a demagogue and a serious politician. There is nothing flattering I can say about a member of the Central Committee who gambles at the expectations, while he knows
very well that the party program is aiming at the quickest possible way of satisfying these expectations.

M. Nemeth: It happens quite often with us. There are always a few members of parliament who rise to speak from such a demagogic position.

M. S. Gorbachev: The main thing is to be honest and truthful in the Central Committee, in the parliament, and among the people as well, and to have a clear conscience. Otherwise the personality will break down, and downfall is unavoidable.

M. Nemeth: What we consider the most important task for the time being is creating a majority within the Central Committee that can be joined around a unified program.

M. S. Gorbachev: This, of course does not rule out the possibility of the existence of some kind of left-wing or right-wing views.

M. Nemeth: Yes, the only important thing is that the center be strong.

M. S. Gorbachev: We are for a majority that relies on democratic development. We would like to revitalize the role of the councils, agitate the activity of MPs, and assure complete publicity. Without these, the real power of the workers does not exist. See what we had before in the past: masses of the people were alienated from property, politics, and culture. Yet the principal goal of socialism is overcoming alienation and putting man in the focus of attention.

M. Nemeth: I see no difference between pluralism in a single-party system and in a multi-party system. You are absolutely right: if there is freedom of thought and a unified program according to which people behave, everything goes on as it should. In May 1988 we laid the foundations for such a practice in the course of the Party Conference. Nonetheless, there were certain illusions.

M. S. Gorbachev: Experience showed us that nothing could be achieved at the first trial. We have to get back to the accepted agreements and decisions, polish them, make them more precise, and then move on.

M. Nemeth: Yes, the conditions are changing. Theoretically what you said in Kiev is important for us. Every socialist country is developing in its idiosyncratic way, and their leaders are above all accountable to their own people. Whether it be one party or more—life will show which solution is more effective. Within our conditions, state and party have become the same. This affected the development of the country in a most unfavorable way. We should not eradicate everything with one stroke, because what we achieved is worth noting.

M. S. Gorbachev: I believe that Pozsgay’s statements are quite extremist in this respect. The events of 1956 indeed started with the dissatisfaction of the people. Later, however, the events escalated into a counterrevolution and bloodshed. This cannot be overlooked.

M. Nemeth: Most important of all, these questions should not cause division in the society. Some say that we need to look at history in the same way, because otherwise there will be no unity in society at all. In reality, however, unity in interpreting the past does not exist. The main thing is that we have unity with regard to the present situation and in the policy to follow.

M. S. Gorbachev: Indeed, every generation is responsible for the present, first and foremost.
M. Nemeth: I am convinced that the organic interrelation and conformity of the economy and politics in fundamental issues is indispensable. A principal question is that of pace. We Hungarians started economic reform long ago, while leaving the political institutions intact. Since last May, we have witnessed a rapid development and transformation of the political system. A new election system, the reorganization of parliament, and other measures followed one another in such a rapid succession, the wheels of the machine are turning with such dizzying speed that it could pose a potential danger to society if this process interrupted economic development.

Nobody actually doubts that a democratic constitutional state is unavoidable for a successful people’s economy to function. Having only that, though, without a productive economy, then political transformations will happen in a void, l’art pour l’art. Pozsgay says that there is nothing wrong with politics superseding the economy. We, on the contrary, think that harmonization of the two is needed. We support and develop economic institutions, in parallel with changes in the political sphere. We will act with responsibility.

M. S. Gorbachev: You have touched upon an important issue. The process of renewal is gradually spreading over the entire socialist bloc, and adds to the political culture and historical experiences of all these countries according to the local conditions. The most important for all of them, however, is turning towards the people and revitalizing the socialist system. While listening to you, our own situation came to my mind. Of course, it is difficult to achieve total synchronicity between politics and the economy, but at least we have to try. You might remember what Lenin used to say: “We Bolsheviks have conquered Russia, so now we have to learn how to govern it.” They rushed ahead in politics, which was in itself normal at the time. But you are right: if we fail to utilize the political drives and motivations to create a healthy economy, the people will unavoidably become discontented.

(...)
Record of Negotiations between M.S. Gorbachev and Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher, London. April 6, 1989.

[...]

Gorbachev. On the one hand, there is a point of view emerging in the White House that the success of our perestroika, the development of the new image of the Soviet Union, is not beneficial for the West. Secretary of State James Baker returned from his trip to Western Europe on the verge of panic. Europe, according to him, is ready to respond to our invitation to build new relations in Europe and in the entire world. The West Germans, in this sense, simply lost their minds. And so they begin to think about how to stop the influence of our policy, of our initiatives on the minds of the West.

Of course, these processes go through a struggle in the United States. There are a lot of people there who sympathize with our policy, who think that the continuation of perestroika is good for American interests, because it would allow us to ensure security, development of the economy, cultural and other kinds of exchanges. These forces are sufficiently large and influential. However, there is also another wing, which thinks in the tradition of the known statements by Kissinger, Brezhnev, and other right-wing individuals, who have now got closer to the new American administration, and are trying their best. We receive letters from George Bush and we see entire passages there that are copied from known public statements by Kissinger. In short, there is a clear concern there that the West is losing public opinion. And so they are trying to dilute the mood of cooperation with us.

On the other hand, as we see from the negotiations that George Bush and James Baker had in Western Europe, the process of working out a response to our proposals is slowing down in the West. And from this fact comes the desire to undermine the interest in perestroika, in our initiatives, and to present it all under the cover of general considerations—let’s see where perestroika will lead, how will it end, whether it is associated with the person of Gorbachev only, and if so, whether we should make the future of the West dependent on it. I am telling you frankly, we are concerned about it.

Even you, Mrs. Thatcher, as we can see, exhibit more reservations recently. We are informed that you are being advised, especially by the banking circles, not to rush, to be careful. And this shows, both in your statements, and in your practical policy.

Thatcher. If anybody made such a recommendation, it has not reached me. How did it reach you?

Gorbachev. That’s how it happens. What an interesting world, isn’t it?

[...]

Thatcher. That is why we are concerned about the immensity of your tasks. It is one thing to tell people what to do and where to work, and a quite different one to make it so that they would work properly in the conditions of large production and complex technology. People start feeling less confident of themselves and of their future. I saw it during my trip to the Soviet Union in 1987. The old order is being broken, and the
people do not know what will come in its place. And how is it - to rely on one's own labor and entrepreneurship, whether it would bring a better life. This is what we are concerned about in your perestroika.

Gorbachev. Why are you so scared for our perestroika?

Thatcher. Precisely because I was the first to start an analogous perestroika in my country. And also because I was the first to say that your success is in our interest. It is in our interest that the Soviet Union would become more peaceful, more affluent, more open to change. So that it would go together with personal freedoms, with more openness, and exchanges. Continue your course, and we will support your life. The prize will be enormous. But you have to see the economic difficulties. Not too long ago I discussed these issues in detail with one Soviet Academician. He said that Gorbachev would need our common support for ten years. I do not know the exact length of time, but in principle it is right.

We are glad to see the political changes in the Soviet Union. Your recent elections [on 26 March, 1989] to the Congress of People's Deputies were a real watershed. They showed that the people are not afraid of using political power. But in addition to this, you need finances, you need a strong economy, educated and capable managers. I know that you have enough talent, but it is not yet as clear as in the political sphere. And in the international sphere - I am thinking about your allies in Eastern Europe - promising changes are taking place. I visited Hungary, and I saw that that country is experiencing a stage of new freedom in politics, and in the economy. But they have already been moving two or three steps ahead of you in terms of introducing new economic forms and the freedom of enterprise for some time. Most interesting developments are under way in Poland. I met with Wojciech Jaruzelski. He is a prominent and honest politician who does everything he can for his country at a very difficult stage in its development. Let's take the latest events - the recognition of Solidarity. In my view, this is the beginning of political pluralism, because Solidarity is a political movement, not just a labor union. Young people, and the retired, take part in it, not only workers. I met with Solidarity leadership, and I repeatedly advised them to seek a dialogue with the government, not limit themselves to the confrontation. I said to them that you can never leave the negotiating chair empty, it would not lead to anything, and I can see that they have listened to my advice.

More complicated developments are under way in Czechoslovakia. In our analysis, everything is unclear there. And there is some evil in this, because Czechoslovakia was one of the most affluent and democratic states in Europe.

In the more general international context I can see the first fruit of our joint effort and the new approaches. The Agreement on Independence of Namibia has been signed. We are working together in the United Nations, in the Security Council, in such a spirit of cooperation which was unimaginable only recently. It led to the cease-fires between Iran and Iraq, and to the positive changes in the Middle East peace process. There are fewer positive signs in Central America. The United States is very concerned about the situation in this region. Everything began there from the fact that when the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza, they did not deliver on their promise to restore democracy in Nicaragua. The rebels in El Salvador receive weapons above and beyond any reasonable
limit. All in all, there are reasons to be concerned there, as well as in the situation in the Horn of Africa.

The world represents a calico picture. In some regions, there are more positive signs than in others. But we all want international access that would make the world safer, would stop the bloodshed in the hot spots.

You touched upon the policy of the new American administration. I know George Bush and James Baker very well. I do not see how they could make policy that would contradict President Reagan's course. Of course, Bush is a very different person from Reagan. Reagan was an idealist who firmly defended his convictions. But at the same time, it was very pleasant to deal with him, to have dialogue, and to negotiate. Bush is a more balanced person, he gives more attention to detail than Reagan did. But as a whole, he will continue the Reagan's line, including the Soviet-American relations. He will strive to achieve agreements that would be in our common interest.

Gorbachev. That is the question -- in our common interests or in your Western interests?

Thatcher. I am convinced that in the common interest.

Gorbachev. Here you need a super-persuasion.

[...]

For example, we now have an imbalanced financial system, budget deficit. There is a large volume of free money in the country, that is not supported by consumer products. People's incomes grow faster than the production of consumer goods. This is where the deficit is coming from. I remember that only 15 years ago the shelves of these stores were overstocked with butter, milk, meat, and then we consumed 1/3 or even 1/2 less of those products than we do now. The demand was limited because the incomes were unlimited [sic - limited - trans.]. Now we have a new problem -- not only to produce more goods of a better quality, but also to balance the incomes with the volume of production. We think that this is a task of primary importance; if this is not done, it is hard to hope for an economic improvement in general. That is why we are trying to regulate incomes under the control of the economic mechanism, and at the same time to stimulate entrepreneurship and initiative, self-financing. We cannot change the entire economic mechanism at once, it would simply blow up the economy. We could, of course, undertake some temporary measures in order to alleviate the situation for the people, for example, we could get foreign loans, and saturate the market with goods purchased with that money. Some people here advocate that.

Thatcher. But this is not a solution for your problem. This is not policy.

Gorbachev. Exactly. And in the situation of our budget deficit, it would be simply a violation of our obligations to our country. That is why we are developing a policy for building an economic, industrial base for the production of consumer goods so that later we would be able to eliminate the deficit with our own goods.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive
Telegram from First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Dzhumbar I. Patiashvili, to the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

7 April 1989

Incoming enciphered message No. 217/sh
From Tbilisi
Received 7 April 1989
8:40 p.m.

The situation in the Republic has recently worsened and is practically getting out of control. A gathering in the village of Lykhny of the Abkhazian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] on 18 March of this year which raised the question of the secession of the Autonomous Republic from the GSSR [Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic] served as the pretext. However, events have gone beyond these bounds.

Extremist elements are whipping up nationalist sentiments; calling for strikes and disobedience to authority, are organizing disturbances, and are discrediting Party and government [sovetskiye] bodies. Emergency measures need to be taken in the existing situation.

We consider it necessary:

1. To immediately bring to criminal and administrative responsibility the extremists who are expressing anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and anti-Party slogans and appeals (there are legal justifications for this);

2. Introduce a special situation [curfew] in Tbilisi with the involvement of additional forces of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the ZAKVO [ZakVO, Transcaucasian Military District];

3. To carry out a number of political, organizational, and administrative measures to stabilize the situation, using Party, government, and administrative activists [aktiv];

4. Not to permit publications which aggravate the situation access to national and Republic mass media.

We request your consent for points 1, 2, and 4.

Secretary of the CC of the Georgian CP
D. Patiashvili

Telegram from D. I. Patiashvili to the CC CPSU

8 April 1989

Incoming enciphered message No. 219/sh
From Tbilisi
Received 8 April 1989
8:50 p.m.

I report that the situation in Tbilisi continues to remain tense.
A gathering of many thousands of people is taking place at Government House whose main slogans remain as before: “Secession from the USSR, the creation of an independent Georgia”, “Liquidation of autonomies”, etc.
A 3,500-person rally in the Abkhazian ASSR [Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic] of people of Georgian nationality directed against the secession of Abkhaziya from the GSSR has taken place.
In a number of higher educational institutions parts of the student body have declared a hunger strike in support of the demonstrators. As a whole the CP [Communist Party] CC, the government, and local Party and government authorities have a grip on the situation and are taking the necessary measures to stabilize the situation.
Yesterday, 7 April, a meeting of the Bureau of the CC Georgian CP [GCP] took place and today there was a meeting of the Party activists of the Republic at which measures of Party, government, and law enforcement agencies were approved to strengthen political, organizational, and indoctrination work in labor collectives and places of residence; also, an appeal of the CC of the Communist Party, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of Georgia to the Party members and workers of Georgia has been adopted.
In particular, it was planned to hold meetings of activists in all regions of the Republic and meetings of primary Party organizations with the participation of members of the Bureau and the CC GCP where practical plans of action were worked out for the development of projected measures. A series of speeches of eminent figures of science and culture of the Republic and representatives of the working class and peasantry have been organized on television and radio and in the press. “Roundtables” and youth meetings are being held in higher educational institutions on current issues of the public life of Georgia, the destructiveness of illegal activities, the measures of responsibility for what has been done, and the need to strengthen discipline and order for the further development of democracy and glasnost.
After the activists’ meeting everyone fanned out and went to workplaces to explain its materials and the Party policy in present conditions and the unity of the Party and the people in carrying out the tasks of perestroika.
Workers’ groups [druzhiny] consisting of 4,685 people have been created at Tbilisi enterprises and institutions to maintain discipline and orderliness. Specific plans have been developed and are being carried out together with the MVD and ZAKVO [sic] to maintain law and order and adopt, if necessary, exhaustive measures to prevent disorders and illegal acts. The entire staff of the CC, the Supreme Soviet, the GSSR Council of Ministers, the Tbilisi City Party Committee and City Executive Committee are
efficiently performing their functions and actively working among the population and
demonstrators.

No more additional measures on the part of the CC CPSU or the USSR
government are required at the present time besides those adopted earlier.

This is reported for your information.

Secretary of the CC GCP, D. Patiashvili

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89. Collection of documents, Xerox copy, published in Istoricheskiy
Arkhir 3 (1993), pp. 95- 96. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]
In Tbilisi after 9:00 p.m. on the night of 8 April 1989, in spite of all measures being taken by the Party, government, and the forces of law and order, the situation at a demonstration of about 15,000 people at the Republic Government House and also in other parts of the city began to be inflamed by extremists and got out of control. Besides anti-Soviet, anti-socialist, and anti-Russian exhortations, appeals began to be spread by extremists for physical violence against Communists, leaders of the Republic, and members of their families. The demonstrators, among whom were many drunks and drug users, were called upon to organize the entire population of the Republic to strike, commit civil disobedience, and violence against those who did not support them. Groups of extremists began to be delegated together with demonstrators to nearby cities and rayons of the Republic. An attempt was made in the city of Rustavi to seize a metallurgical works.

The leaders of the so-called “National Liberation Movement” have begun to publicize their plans to seize power in the Republic. In order to ensure public order and prevent unforeseeable consequences in this situation, a decision was made at 4:00 a.m. to use force to clear the square and Government House of the demonstrators. Subunits of the Republic MVD and the Transcaucasian Military District were used in accordance with a plan developed earlier by competent authorities. As they approached the place where the demonstration was being held, its participants were called upon by leaders of the Republic, members of the CP CC, Party and government activists, and also the Catholicos of Georgia Ilya II to stop the demonstration and peacefully disperse. However, the demonstrators did not react to this. In turn, the organizers of the demonstration inflamed passions to hysteria, calling upon them not to spare their blood or their lives to confront the forces of law and order.

The MVD subunits and ZAKVO [sic] troops did not use small arms or silent weapons [kholodnoye oruzhiye]. Instructions about the cautious treatment of women and adolescents were strictly observed. As the first ranks of the demonstrators were driven back, accompanied by fierce resistance by extremists using sticks and stones, the crowd began to become disorderly and moved toward a youth lying on a sidewalk who had declared a hunger strike. Moreover, there were quite a few provocateurs in the crowd who were using silent weapons. As a result of the crush which had formed, 16 people died (13 young women and 3 [young] men) and more than 100 received injuries of varying severity, among whom were 22 servicemen (13 of them were hospitalized). First aid was given to the victims.

At the present time the square at Government House has been cleared of demonstrators and has been taken under guard by troops. The necessary measures are being taken to detain and arrest the ringleaders of the disorders and prevent new
demonstrations. A governmental commission has been formed headed by the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, Cde. Z.A. Chkheidze in connection with the tragic consequences of the measures which were taken.

A plenum of the CC GCP is planned for today to review the current situation and identify the measures ensuing from it.

We request your agreement to introduce a curfew in the city of Tbilisi beginning today in order to prevent mass disorders and to stabilize the situation.

Secretary of the CC GCP, D. Patiashvili

Findings of the Commission of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies to Investigate the Events which Occurred in the City of Tbilisi

9 April 1989

1. Introduction

The Commission to investigate the events which took place in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 was created by the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and composed of 24 persons, among whom were representatives of 9 union republics, state and public figures, well-known scientists and writers, and representatives of the army and church. A.A. Sobchak was elected Chairman of the Commission; Kh. Yu. Aasmyaeh, A.I. Golyakov and V. P. Tomkus were chosen as Deputy Chairmen and S.B. Stankevich was chosen as the Secretary.

In accordance with the assignment of the Congress, the Commission considered its mission to be to explain the actual nature of the events which took place on the night of 9 April in the city of Tbilisi, the reasons for the tragedy, the legality of the decisions adopted at various levels of the Party, state, and military leadership associated with them [the events], and to evaluate a number of the consequences of these events. In the process of the Commission’s work the need was uncovered to respond to a more general issue: the conditions and permissible limits of using Soviet Army sub-units to maintain public order.

The members of the Commission familiarized themselves with documents received from the commissions which investigated these events under the chairmanship of G.S. Tarazevich, the USSR Ministry of Defense; Chairman, General-Major of the Medical Service G.A. Sofronov; and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman, Professor T.G. Shavgulidze; and also with materials (cipher messages, notes, written reports, stenographic records of meetings, etc.) received from the CC CPSU and CC GCP, the Presidiums of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the command of the ZakVO, the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the Georgian SSR, the USSR Procuracy, and other state and public organizations.

The Commission met with the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Cde. M.S. Gorbachev.

The Commission heard the Politburo members who are CC Secretaries: Cdes. Ye.K. Ligachev, and V.M. Chebrikov; USSR Foreign Minister Eh.A. Shevardnadze; Candidate members of the Politburo: First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.I. Luk’yanov; CC CPSU Secretary G.P. Razumovskiy; USSR Minister of Defense, D.T. Yazov; USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, V.V. Bakatin; several senior officials of the CC CPSU staff; the leaders of the CC GCP; the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, MVD, the Georgian SSR MVD, the USSR KGB, and the Georgian KGB; representatives of the Main Military Procuracy and the Procuracy of the Georgian SSR; and also the commands of ZakVO, units, and subunits of the Soviet Army, Internal Troops, and militia who took part in the 9 April 1989 operation. Conversations were held with eyewitnesses to the events: militia members [rabotniki]; Georgian SSR Ministry of Health and first aid workers; servicemen of the Soviet Army and Internal Troops;
representatives of the public; veterans of Afghanistan [voiny-internatsionalisty]; clergy (including the Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church, Catholicos of Georgia Ilya II); representatives of the Popular Front and the unofficial organizations of Georgia; and individual citizens, in particular, those victims who were treated in medical institutions in the city of Tbilisi.

Materials were studied which had been published in the periodic press and also the numerous letters and telegrams which had been sent to the Commission from citizens who live in various regions of our country.

In the process of their work, members of the Commission travelled to the city of Tbilisi and met with representatives of the Georgian public and ZakVO, and visited hospitals and the military units which participated in the events.

To gain a correct evaluation of the events which occurred in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989 it is necessary to proceed from the idea that the country has entered upon an irrevocably democratic path of development which is meaningless without the constant exercise of the most diverse forms of popular social activity. The main substance of this is the aspiration to express one’s own interests and take a realistic, constructive part in democratic development by legal means, within the bounds of a strict observance of public order. And in these conditions the duty of state authority and law enforcement bodies is to afford realistic guarantees and protection for such activity.

But of course actions of an anti-social, illegal, and violent nature are possible in the course of these processes. And here the duty of state authority is to display firmness and use force within necessary limits.

The principal significance in this connection is an objective evaluation of the situation. Inaction by the authorities against violence and violations of law would be unforgivable. But the use of force against a peaceful meeting or demonstration which results in casualties is also unforgivable. In both cases this is a blow against perestroika and democracy.

Evaluating what took place, the Commission found that perestroika has caused an awakening of national consciousness and an attempt to achieve genuine economic independence and state sovereignty, which today characterize the social and political situation not only in Georgia but in other union republics. The conditions for the tragic events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi developed over a long [period of] time. Signs of a crisis were displayed in them which involved many areas of government administration and public life in the Republic and in the country as a whole.

The Commission notes that in the process of democratization unavoidable differences and extremes appeared in the views and appeals expressed, in the evaluations of trends, and the paths and forms of future political development of the Republic and the entire country. Together with public movements and organizations striving for democratic renewal of the economic and political system of socialism, unofficial organizations appeared in the Republic whose program also contained positions of an anti-socialist and nationalistic nature. Their activity ran counter to perestroika and seriously inflamed the political situation in the Republic.

In these conditions, the most important task for the government and Party leadership of the Republic was to justify its role as the political and ideological vanguard, to act in the spirit of perestroika with the conviction [that it could] influence the mood of people and not permit its own estrangement from the actual development of the political
processes of the Republic. However the leadership of the CC GCP did not manage to find contact and establish dialogue with the public. Subsequently, as social processes developed the popularity of unofficial groups increased and the leadership embarked on a course of confrontation. It is this which in particular could explain the circumstance in which petitions to hold demonstrations were greeted with refusal, as a rule, with few exceptions, as a result of which illegal meetings began to be held in practice without previous notification to the authorities. Thus the leadership of the Republic gradually lost control over political processes, Party influence over the masses waned, and its authority fell among the broad strata of the population. This occurred back during the events of 1988, when only an active political position of the Georgian intelligentsia and an appeal by M. S. Gorbachev to the Georgian people helped relieve the situation. But the leaders of the Republic themselves were already inclined to use force by then.

Unfortunately the necessary changes in the position and actions of the Georgian leadership did not subsequently occur.

The Commission thinks that such facts as the self-isolation of the leadership of the Republic and the inadequate, at times panicky, evaluation of specific situations, and the inability to positively influence the situation with political methods were some of the main causes which led, in the final account, to the tragic consequences of the events of 9 April in the city of Tbilisi.

2. The Situation in the Republic on the Eve of the Events of 9 April and the Mechanism of the Decisionmaking to Halt the Demonstration

At the end of March and the beginning of April 1989, a serious worsening of the political situation occurred in connection with events in Abkhazia, which served as a direct pretext for the unofficial organizations to hold an unauthorized multi-day demonstration in front of Government House in Tbilisi. However by 6 April, the anti-Abkhazian nature of the demonstration had sharply changed, in connection with the replacement of the leadership of the Abkhazian Oblast’ of the GCP, and an extremist demand was advanced for the withdrawal of Georgia from the USSR. At the same time, many urgent issues troubling the public were discussed at the demonstration. Thousands of citizens participated in it (from morning to late evening). Hundreds of demonstrators remained at Government House at night. All this led to the disruption of the operation of transportation and of several government institutions in the center of the city and to breaches of the peace in the capital. The appeal of the CC GCP, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the Georgian SSR broadcast on republic radio and television had no positive effect on the demonstrators. [The] organizers [of the demonstrations] sent their representatives to work groups, higher educational institutions, and schools with a call to begin a strike and join with the demonstrators, and they resorted to picketing. Many higher educational institutions and schools suspended classes.

However, it is necessary to stress that a majority of workers and employees of the capital of Georgia did not support these calls and continued to work.

In the course of the demonstration, irresponsible calls to disobey the legal instructions of authorities were spread, and slogans of a nationalistic, anti-socialist, and anti-Soviet nature were advanced, in particular: “Down with the Communist regime!”; “Down with Russian imperialism!”; “USSR the prison of peoples!”; “Down with Soviet
power!”, “Liquidate Abkhazian autonomy!”, etc. The organizers of the demonstration continued to inflame the situation and called for the demonstrations, strikes, and hunger strikes to continue until 14 April.

Thus, the political situation in Tbilisi on the eve of the events of 9 April was characterized as an emergency and demanded the adoption of urgent and crucial decisions from the leadership of the GCP and the government of the Republic.

The Commission notes, however, that in the course of the investigation no terrorist acts were identified and no facts were established indicating that there was a real attempt to seize power or that there were politically motivated incidents of violence or assaults [pokusheniya] against workers of government and Party organizations, Party members, or citizens of non-Georgian nationality.

It is typical that the demonstration was accompanied by such a passive form of protest as the declaration of a mass multi-day hunger strike (more than 100 [people] at Government House took part in a hunger strike).

It was necessary to stop the unauthorized demonstration during this period, but this task should have and could have been carried out by the authorities who were entrusted by law with ensuring public order, the authorities of the Republic MVD. The Commission notes that the MVD of the Georgian SSR and the Directorate of Internal Affairs of the city of Tbilisi did not perform the responsibilities entrusted to them to stop the unauthorized demonstration, although, according to a statement of the Georgian MVD, they repeatedly raised with the leadership of the Republic the issue of stopping the demonstration that was underway in front of Government House and restoring the normal situation in the capital with the aid of the forces at their disposal. However, this suggestion was not approved by the leadership of the Republic for fear of complications in the form of mass demonstrations by the population which, in their opinion, the available forces of the Internal Troops and militia could not handle.

The leadership of the Republic considered that this measure could have been implemented on condition that a curfew was introduced, for which additional military subunits needed to be brought in.

Therefore they decided to appeal for help to the Soviet authorities. At 8:35 p.m. on 7 April, a well-known telegram, prepared by the Second Secretary of the CC GCP, B.V. Nikol’skiy, was sent to the CC CPSU over the signature of the First Secretary of the CC GCP, D.I. Patiashvili. In the opinion of the Commission, the evaluation of the political situation in the Republic contained in this telegram did not completely correspond to the real state of affairs and was not a sufficient justification for concentrating military subunits in the city of Tbilisi and introducing a state of emergency (curfew).

The Commission notes the existence of serious oversights and violations of law committed by both Soviet as well as Republic authorities in the process of preparing and implementing measures to stop the demonstration at Government House in Tbilisi on the night of 9 April.

A meeting was held in the CC CPSU on 7 April 1989 under the leadership of Politburo member and CC CPSU Secretary Cde. Ye. K. Ligachev in which the following took part: Politburo members Cdes. V.A. Medvedev, N.N. Slyun’kov, V.M. Chebrikov; Candidate members of the Politburo Cdes. A.I. Luk’yanov, G.P. Razumovskiy, D.T. Yazov; Chairman of the USSR KGB, V.A. Cde. Kryuchkov; Deputy USSR Minister of...
Internal Affairs Cde. V.P. Trushin., and a number of senior officials of the CC CPSU staff. The issue of the situation in Georgia was examined.

The work of the meeting was not recorded and its conclusions were not documented. One can judge the content of the decisions worked out only from the explanations of the participants of the meeting. At the meeting consent was actually given to granting the verbal requests of the leadership of the Republic to make Internal Troops and Soviet Army subunits available. A directive of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense and an order of the USSR MVD were issued on this basis to send the corresponding military subunits to Georgia.

It was recommended that the leadership of the Republic collectively discuss the situation which had arisen and find a way out of the current situation using political means.

A warning was made about the need to observe extreme caution and to use troops only in an exceptional situation. The leadership of the Republic was informed by telephone that, in view of the current situation, it should make specific decisions about the use of the troops being sent to Georgia jointly with the command of ZakVO. Thus it was not recommended at that moment that a state of emergency be introduced and a curfew be declared in the city of Tbilisi.

The Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, M. S. Gorbachev, returned to Moscow from a foreign trip on 7 April 1989 at 11:00 p.m. and was informed about the situation in Georgia. He then made a suggestion to send Cdes. Eh. A. Shevardnadze and G.P. Razumovskiy to Georgia.

The next day a second meeting was held in the CC CPSU devoted to the situation in Georgia. It was led by Politburo member and CC Secretary Cde. V. M. Chebrikov, The participants were the same as on 7 April 1989 with the exception of Cde. Ye. K. Ligachev, who had gone on leave. Politburo member Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Cde. V.V. Bakatin were also present at the meeting. As [had occurred] the day before, the work of the meeting was not recorded and the decisions made were not documented. By this time an enciphered message of 8 April 1989 had been received signed by D.I. Patiashvili, saying that the situation in the city was stabilizing and was under control. Cdes. Eh. A. Shevardnadze and D.I. Patiashvili had an exchange of opinions by telephone. Referring to the stabilization of the situation on the night of 7-8 April, Cde. D.I. Patiashvili considered the arrival of Cdes. Eh. A. Shevardnadze and G.P. Razumovskiy to be unnecessary and the participants of the meeting agreed.

Thus the dispatch to Georgia of subunits of the Internal Troops, special militia subunits, and troops of the Soviet Army was done by agreement of the above meetings in the CC CPSU on 7 and 8 April. This was in contradiction to existing legislation according to which the right to make such decisions belonged not to Party, but to the appropriate government agencies. Such a decision-making procedure leads to virtual inaction of the constitutional agencies of Soviet power, as happened in this case.

At the Republic level the plan of measures to normalize the situation in the Republic, including measures to introduce a state of emergency and bring in troops from the Transcaucasian Military District, was first adopted by the Bureau of the CC GCP and then approved by a meeting of Party activists of the Republic held on 8 April 1989. At this meeting of activists an evaluation of the situation was given, a plan of measures to
normalize the situation was approved, and a decision was made for all of the activists to
go to the demonstration, take part in it, and try to convince the participants to stop the
demonstration and normalize the situation. However, this most important decision was
not carried out by the Party activists.

The issue of halting the unauthorized demonstration was repeatedly discussed by
the Bureau of the CC GCP. The decision to halt the meeting was adopted by the Bureau
of the CC GCP on 8 April. At a meeting of the Defense Council of the Republic held the
same day, the issues associated with this were discussed, in spite of the fact that it had no
authority to do this. The time to carry out the operation was determined later by a narrow
circle of people (Cdes. D.I. Patiashvili, B.V. Nikol’skiy, K.A. Kochetov, and I.N.
Rodionov) considering that toward morning the fewest number of people remained in the
square, as a rule, no more than 200 hunger strikers and their relatives.

The Commission notes that the decisions made at the meetings of the Bureau of
the CC GCP and the Defense Council of the Republic were not documented properly or
in a timely manner, which gave a number of participants at the meeting an opportunity to
deny their participation in the adoption of the decision to halt the demonstration in front
of Government House.

The supervision of the preparation and the conduct of the operation to halt the
meeting and to develop a plan of operations was entrusted to the Commanding General of
the ZakVO, General [-Colonel] I.N. Rodionov, as the one senior in rank and on the basis
of the authorization given to him by a decision of the Bureau of the CC GCP,
subordinating to him all the men and equipment made available to bring order to the city.

The Commission thinks that the senior officials of the CC CPSU staff present at
this time in Tbilisi (V.N. Lobko, V.S. Buyanov, and A.Ye. Selivanov) could have helped
the Party leadership of the Republic both in a correct evaluation of the existing situation
and in stabilizing and improving the situation by political means.

On the evening of 8 April 1989, an instruction of the Georgian SSR Council of
Ministers was issued, signed by the Chairman of the GSSR Council of Ministers, Cde.
Z.A. Chkheidze, by which the Georgian SSR MVD was directed to enlist servicemen of
the Internal Troops and the Soviet Army in taking measures to remove the demonstrators
from the area adjacent to Government House. This is the only document about halting the
unauthorized demonstration in Tbilisi not adopted by a Party, but by a government body.
However, the order contained in the instruction to involve servicemen in carrying out this
task is illegal since the government of the Republic had not provided such authority.

At the same time the Commission notes that the Presidium of the Georgian SSR
Supreme Soviet (Chairman Cde. O.Ye. Cherkeziya) removed itself from making the
necessary constitutional decisions in the developing situation.

The marshalling of troops and the preparation for the operation to halt the
unauthorized demonstration occurred in the following manner:

Right after the meeting in the CC CPSU on 7 April 1989, a verbal instruction
followed from the USSR Minister of Defense, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, to
Generals K.A. Kochetov and I.N. Rodionov to go to Tbilisi, where they were to act in
accordance with the situation as they saw fit. On the same day (7 April 1989 at 4:50 p.m.)
the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army M.A. Moiseyev, issued a directive on
behalf of the Minister of Defense to send an airborne regiment to the Tbilisi area to place
the most important facilities under guard and organize monitoring of the main roads
leading in and out of Tbilisi. At the same time three military units of the Tbilisi garrison were brought to full combat readiness.

On order of Deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs I.F. Shilov subunits of the Internal Troops and special militia subunits (OMON), totalling more than 2,000 men, were also sent to Tbilisi from various regions of the country.

After their arrival in Tbilisi on the evening of the same day, Generals K.A. Kochetov and I.N. Rodionov met with the First and Second Secretaries of the CC GCP, D.I. Patiashvili and B.V. Nikol’skiy. At this meeting the Party leaders of Georgia again insistently requested that a curfew be introduced, referring to the lack of a sufficient number of troops. Only then was the illegal decision made to make a show of military force.

On the morning of 8 April 1989, three squadrons of combat helicopters overflew the city at low altitude and about noon combat equipment with armed soldiers proceeded through the streets of Tbilisi along three routes and past the demonstrators.

This action played a provocative role. In reply, individual groups of demonstrators resorted to further violation of the law: they began to seize transport equipment and used it to close off both the exits from Rustaveli Avenue and the exits to the streets adjacent to the Avenue (29 buses, trolleys, and heavy duty vehicles were used in all; six of the vehicles had their tires deflated). At the same time people began to gather in the square. Toward evening a demonstration by women was held around the residence of D.I. Patiashvili, demanding that troops be withdrawn from Tbilisi. No one talked with them; subsequently the women (numbering about 700) went to the square and joined the demonstrators. Thus the show of military force directly resulted in a sharp increase in the numbers of demonstrators. In this complicated situation it would have been more advisable to hold off with a decision to forcibly stop the demonstration, but having lost the capability by that time to realistically evaluate and manage the processes which were occurring, the Party leadership of the Republic did not see any way out of the given situation other than to use force.

General I.N. Rodionov charged the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the USSR MVD Internal Troops Staff, General Yu. T. Yefimov, who had arrived in Tbilisi on 7 April 1989, with developing a specific plan of operations to force the demonstrators out of the square in front of the Government House.

The plan of operations and the schedule of troop operations were signed by General Yu. T. Yefimov and Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Sh. V. Gorgodze, and then approved by General I.N. Rodionov.

An order with the assignment of missions to individual subunits was given verbally. No reconnoitering with subunit commanders took place.

The operation to stop the demonstration began on 9 April at 4:00 a.m. and ended tragically. The Commission notes that violations of both the procedure for making such a decision and its realization were committed while introducing the curfew in Tbilisi on the evening of 9 April on the basis of a resolution of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet.

3. The Actual Course of the Operation to Stop the Demonstration
According to the decision approved by the leader of the operation, General-Colonel I.N. Rodionov, by 3:30 a.m. on 9 April troops were concentrated on Lenin Square; they were charged with the mission of forcing the demonstrators from the square in front of Government House along Rustaveli Avenue to Republic Square. They consisted of the 4th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Independent Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Division (4-y MSP OMSDON), Moscow City-650 men; a special purpose militia detachment (OMON), Perm'-120 men; OMON, Voronezh City-40 men; the Higher Militia School (VShM), Gor’ky City-450 men; the 8th Motorized Rifle Regiment (8-y MSP), Tbilisi-650 men; the Georgian SSR MVD-250 men; and an airborne regiment (VDP)-440 men.

The following took part in the operation: 2,550 men, 6 armored personnel carriers (BTR), 8 airborne combat vehicles (BMD), 4 fire trucks, and 2 ambulances.

Before the start of the operation General-Major Yu. T. Yefimov verbally assigned the following missions to the commanders of the subunits:

The 4th MSP is to move slowly along Rustaveli Avenue from Lenin Square to Republic Square to force the demonstrators to the line—the “Iveriya” Hotel [sic].

According to the written explanation by Yu.T. Yefimov, approved by an MVD Commission under the chairmanship of Deputy Minister V.P. Trushin, the mission assigned to the 8th MSP was described otherwise than it was written in the decision, namely:

The 8th MSP is to move at the start of the operation with two battalions to the square in front of Government House along Chitadze and Chichinadze Streets, where they are to cut off a group of hunger strikers from the main mass of demonstrators in the square.

VShM (Gor’ky City)—moving behind the 4th MSP is to close the exits to Rustaveli Avenue from adjacent streets.

A similar mission was given the OMON units. The commander of the firefighting unit was assigned the mission of extinguishing any fires that broke out and with instructions to pay special attention to the armored vehicles accompanying the troops. The mission to disperse the demonstrators using water was mentioned in the decision but it was cancelled afterwards by Yu.T. Yefimov and Sh.V. Gorgodze.

VDP (consisting of two battalions)—moved in a line behind the 4th MSP with the mission to take the square in front of Government House, Rustaveli Avenue, and the streets adjacent to it under guard. Be ready in case of need to help the 4th MSP.

The Internal Troops were equipped and armed with the following to carry out the missions entrusted to them: helmets, bulletproof vests, rubber truncheons; 50% of the personnel had shields, the officers had their personal weapons with them (“PM” pistols) with two clips. A crew to use the “Cheremukha” special agent and directly subordinate to the acting commander of this regiment, Lt. Col. A.M. Baklanov, moved in the 4th MSP.

At 2:50 a.m. on 9 April 1989, the Chief of the Directorate of Internal Affairs of Tbilisi City, Col. R.L. Gventsadze, spoke to the demonstrators, calling on them to disperse before the troops used force. In his words, the demonstrators did not let him speak in front of a microphone and he was forced to use a portable megaphone. Forty-five minutes before the start of the operation, the Catholicos of Georgia, Iliya II, appealed to the demonstrators. The speech of the Catholicos was heard in deep silence; after his call to reason a 7-minute silence settled in and then a common prayer, “Otche nash”,
followed. The demonstrators maintained order and calm and there were no visible signs of fear: many sang and danced. Then one of the leaders of the unofficial groups, I. Tsereteli, spoke out with a call to not disperse, to not offer resistance, to maintain calm, but best of all to sit (“they don’t beat sitters!”), which many of them then did, mainly in the area of the stairs of Government House. He concluded his appeal at 3:59 a.m. At 4:00 a.m. General-Colonel I.N. Rodionov, gave the order to begin the expulsion operation.

The Commission notes that the actual situation in the square by that time (the presence of 10,000 people), and the readiness with which the participants of the demonstration intended to continue it, required especially deliberate and cautious decisions in conducting the operation. But none of these circumstances were taken into consideration in an exchange of opinions by telephone between D.I. Patashvili and I.N. Rodionov. These officials displayed flagrant irresponsibility in unquestioningly confirming the earlier adopted decision.

At 4:05 a.m. four BTRs [armed personnel carriers] appeared on Rustaveli Avenue in the area of the Government House. They crossed the entire width of the avenue, and people let them them do so without hindrance, withdrawing in part toward Government House and in part toward the Artist’s House and the Kashveti Church [khram, literally “temple” or “shrine”, but later referred to correctly as a church]. The armored vehicles were followed by extended lines of troops, which at 4:07 a.m. stopped at the line from the entrance to Artist’s House to the right lawn in front of Government House. Thus the main mass of demonstrators were left at the stairs of Government House.

Lt. Col A.M. Baklanov suggested to the demonstrators by megaphone that they vacate Rustaveli Avenue and warned them that force would be used if they refused. It should be noted that many did not hear these warnings due to the noise in the square.

When the troops arrived at their forming-up positions, the demonstrators started to leave the square; however, they were not given sufficient time to disperse. Thus it was also not taken into consideration that almost all the exits from the square were closed off by transport vehicles, that is, the evacuation routes were sharply restricted. Three minutes later the operation to force people from the square continued.

The troop lines of the 4th MSP began to hem in the demonstrators both toward Government House and along Rustaveli Avenue. Thus the majority of the demonstrators located to the left of Government House continued to remain in place, involuntarily preventing the free exit of those people hemmed in from the front. The situation was seriously aggravated by the fact that at this time the 1st Battalion of the 8th MSP, following the verbal order of General-Major Yu.T. Yefimov, began to move to the square from Chichinadze Street. As a result of the movement of the line of servicemen on one side and the increasing density of the mass of people provoking resistance from the demonstrators on the other, a crush began in the area of the right lawn. It is here that most of the dead and victims [sic] of the civilian population were found. Among those who received injuries were also many militia workers and servicemen.

At this stage, some of the demonstrators actually ended up surrounded, that is, squeezed between servicemen and demonstrators who had been unable to leave. A frantic confrontation occurred. The use of rubber truncheons and toxic substances with the grossest violation of instructions and the use of small entrenching tools in dispersing the demonstrators actually turned into savage treatment of Soviet people.
Having studied all the documentary materials available to it, the Commission has come to the firm conclusion that there are no convincing arguments justifying the advisability of bringing a company of a Soviet Army airborne regiment into an operation to force people from the square.

According to the explanation of General Yu.T. Yefimov, when the line of troops was moving forward along Rustaveli Avenue, because of a widening of the avenue in the area of Government House the left flank allegedly was exposed which created, in Yu.T. Yefimov’s words, a real threat not only of a penetration into the rear of the servicemen by the demonstrators, but their encirclement.

To close this gap, at General Yu.T. Yefimov’s request, General I.N. Rodionov allocated a company of paratroopers and thereby allowed Soviet Army servicemen to get involved in performing functions uncharacteristic for them, grossly violating the General Staff directive about entrusting army subunits only with missions to guard especially selected facilities. In the opinion of the Commission there was no real threat of a disruption of the operation to expel the demonstrators in this situation, hence there was no need to bring in a company of paratroopers.

By 4:21 a.m. the clearing of the square in front of Government House had been concluded. The 1st Battalion of the 8th MSP joined up with the 4th MSP, which continued the expulsion of the demonstrators.

At this stage of the operation, the Internal Troops, overcoming the active resistance of the demonstrators squeezed along Rustaveli Avenue, used the “Cheremukha” special agent. According to the reports of the leadership of the Internal Troops, the special agent was used by: the first line—Dzhordzhiashvili Street to L. Ukrainka Street; the second line: Lunacharskiy Street to Chavchadze Street; the third line—in front of the Communications Building.

Because of increased resistance on their approach to Republic Square (the exit was blocked by trolleys and buses), Lt. Col. A.M. Baklanov independently gave an order to use the non-standard product K-51 containing a toxic agent, CS. Four grenades were used, one of which did not work.

The unauthorized decision by Lt. Col. A.M. Baklanov to use product K-51, who later concealed the fact of the use of this product, ought to be specially noted.

The accuracy of the description of the lines of use of toxic agents provokes doubt. According to copious testimony of the victims, they were poisoned at earlier approaches (right at Government House and the Kashveti Church).

An incident of a rifle wound to the head of one of the demonstrators took place at the completion of the expulsion operation.

The Commission notes that the special agent was used by the 4th MSP in violation of a current regulation (see Attachment No. 1 to USSR MVD Order No. 0507 1970*). There are residences from the first line of the use of the special agent to the end of Rustaveli Avenue (beginning with the “Tbilisi” Hotel). In Point 23 of Section III of the regulation it mentions warning the civilian population before using a special agent and even evacuating them. However, General Yu.T. Yefimov, ignoring this requirement, gave the order to use “Cheremukha” in a residential area. The same occurred at the next lines. There is information that individual servicemen entered living quarters, where they used the “Cheremukha” special agent.

* - The Attachment is not being published.
The Commission notes with special alarm the premeditated attempts by the Internal Troops leadership to hide the fact itself of the use of toxic agents.

The use of the “Cheremukha” special agent was officially admitted on 13 April, but under pressure of incontrovertible evidence.

Next there was a gradual admission of the use of various modifications of “Cheremukha” and CS gas (product K-51).

For a long time representatives of the Soviet Army also denied the fact of the use of small entrenching tools.

It is appropriate to mention that information about the demonstrators and their intentions was reported by commanders and political workers in distorted form when instructing the servicemen who had been enlisted in the operation.

Thus, a combined analysis of the actual progress of the operation to expel the demonstrators permits us to reliably state that only as a result of the grossest violations of current law, regulations, and instructions, bordering on criminal negligence, on the one hand, and the illegal actions of the organizers and some of the demonstrators, on the other, did it end tragically. The business of the investigation is to look into the degree of culpability both of the conduct of the leaders who approved it and the direct agents [ispolniteli] as well as those demonstrators who committed illegal acts.


The Commission has familiarized itself with the initial medical documentation (the medical history, the outpatient records, the forensic medical examination reports, etc.) of various institutions and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Health, a report of a USSR Ministry of Defense commission, the findings of the Medical Subcommission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, the findings of the USSR Ministry of Health Institute of Forensic Medicine, the report of the International Red Cross medical mission to the Georgian SSR, and a number of other documents regarding the medical consequences of the events which took place in Tbilisi on 9 April of this year.

Members of the Commission conducted additional scientific research and consultations with specialists enlisted for this purpose.

An analysis of available information permits a determination of the scale and nature of the medical casualties associated with the operation to expel the demonstrators.

The total number of demonstrators in the confined area at Government House and the television studio building has not been established, but according to estimates it was 8-10,000. The number of women apparently was close to 50%. It is also known that among those who took part in the demonstrations were many adolescents and elderly people. The weather was described as moderately warm (+9 °C), high humidity (90%), and the wind was calm.

The location of the events was well lit by street lights. The density of the demonstrators grew from the periphery of the square by degrees to Government House where the hunger strikers (more than 100 people) and the leaders of the demonstration were located.

A medical aid station of the city health department had been operating in the Artist’s House as of 4 April.
The “expulsion” operation was carried out at night (4:00 a.m.-5:00 a.m. local time). This circumstance needs to be specially noted inasmuch as at nighttime a person’s reactions and immunity to harmful factors is sharply reduced in accordance with the nature of biological rhythms.

It has been established that rubber truncheons, “special agents”—toxic irritants—small entrenching tools, and in one case (according to a finding of the forensic medical commission) firearms were used against the demonstrators by the “expulsion forces.” For their part, the demonstrators used makeshift objects against the “expulsion forces” as resistance grew.

According to data from the medical aid station personnel, the arrival of the first wounded demonstrators—women, adolescents, and men—was noted five minutes after the start of contact with the “expulsion forces.” The influx of the injured in the next 5 minutes became massive. The medical aid station spaces were soon completely filled. Therefore many people were given medical aid in the street. In view of this, additional first aid teams and ambulances were called in.

Testimony has been recorded of cases in which servicemen impeded medical workers rendering aid to the victims. The documents of the first aid vehicle depot of Tbilisi city note six cases of attacks on ambulances with damage to them.

Many participants in the event—civilians, militia workers, and civilians—received injuries of different kinds and severity. The tragic result was that 16 demonstrators died at the site of the incident and three died soon after in a hospital. There were no cases of deaths among servicemen and militia workers.

Some difficulty is being encountered [in trying to make an] exact determination of the number of victims, both of demonstrators as well as of servicemen and militia workers. Nevertheless the Commission has sufficient material to characterize the medical consequences of the events of 9 April as a whole.

According to information of the Georgian SSR Ministry of Health, during the expulsion operation and for several hours afterwards, 251 people visited hospitals in Tbilisi, of which 183 were hospitalized. In succeeding days, an undulating growth in the number of those who turned for medical aid (13, 21, 27 April, and 5 May) occurred. During the period from 9 April through 9 May, the total number of those who came to medical institutions was from three to four thousand. About 500 in all were hospitalized, and at the present time about 1000 people are on the dispensary registry and undergoing treatment.

According to information of the Georgian MVD, in the course of the events 37 militia workers of Tbilisi City were injured; 22 of them were injured from the actions of servicemen. According to information of the USSR MVD, the number of servicemen who were injured was 69, but the report of the USSR MOD commission produced data that a total 152 servicemen were injured (132 Internal Troops, 22 Soviet Army), of which 26 were hospitalized (22 Internal Troops, 4 Soviet Army). According to a report of the USSR Procuracy, 189 servicemen were injured in these events.

The Commission established that of the 20 Soviet Army servicemen mentioned in the Ministry of Defense report in fact only three received injuries in the course of the events under examination.

The damage to the health of those who took part in the events of 9 April was expressed both in the form of injuries, poisoning by toxic substances, or a combination of
both, and in various psychological and emotional disorders of the “mass catastrophe syndrome.”

The demonstrators suffered 290 casualties: contusions—40%, closed head injuries—30%, wounds—20%, and various fractures—10%.

A selective analysis of the medical histories and a poll of a part of victims permits us to establish that the majority of injuries (including head injuries) were inflicted by rubber truncheons; in 21 cases the injuries were associated with the use of a small entrenching tool. It was often noted that people with serious injuries also had been poisoned by toxic substances (combined injuries).

An analysis of the course of the illnesses of people who turned for medical aid due to poisoning presents great difficulties.

The Commission especially notes that the concealment of the use of toxic substances on 9 April and then incomplete information about this issue (the use of CN—on 13 April, the use of CS—on 3 May), and the belated and insufficiently systematized testing for the presence of toxic substances at the site impeded the diagnosis and treatment of those affected and created an extremely unfavorable and tense social situation.

This circumstance, as well as the panic rumors, the concealment of the use of toxic substances, the uncertainty in the diagnosis, and also the published calls to go for medical help—all this and several other circumstances promoted the undulating nature of the number of treatments for medical aid during the succeeding month.

Cases of the “secondary effects of poisoning” occupy a special place in a number of these phenomena, for example the outbreak of doctor’s visits [obrashcheniya] on 28 April after flowers were moved from Government House to the church. The circumstances connected with this event have not been sufficiently identified up to now.

The Commission thinks that even in such cases, when based on complaints of a worsening of health, there were indications only from the victims themselves of contact with toxic substances, these cases could have been classed on a sufficient basis as a display of a “syndrome of a reaction to a mass catastrophe.”

In all, about 300 victims of toxic substances were recorded (including 19 servicemen and 9 militia workers). The main mass of them involve people who had been poisoned on 9 April in the square in front of Government House and in several other places along Rustaveli Avenue. In the clinical severity of injury they (according to the evidence of the USSR Ministry of Health commission) were distributed in the following manner: serious—2%, medium severity—7%, slight—91%.

Data about the place, type of toxic substances used, and the nature of the injury suffered was contradictory. However, thanks to the results of detailed research testing of the air, soil, vegetation, clothing, and tissue of the corpses, and also a survey of the victims and eyewitnesses, the Commission was able to clear up these questions to a considerable degree. According to the testimony of victims on the special dispensary registry, [the following] were poisoned by chemical substances: immediately in front of Government House—49%; in the area of Rustaveli Avenue-Chitadze Street—15%; near the First Middle School—9%; at the “Rustaveli” movie theater—3%; and in the area of the Kashveti church—24%. A comparatively small part of the demonstrators were poisoned on Rustaveli Avenue adjacent to Republic Square and also on several neighboring streets.
From this information it ensues that the main places where toxic substances were employed were the square in front of Government House and in the area of the Kashveti church, which does not coincide with areas of toxic substance use referred to by the leaders of the operation.

As follows from the report of the USSR Ministry of Defense commission, three weeks after the events on Rustaveli Avenue in the sector from Pioneers House to the Communications Building the presence of CN and CS was observed in the soil and in two tests even in the atmosphere (in an underpass), which can indirectly confirm the use of a considerable quantity of toxic substances.

The use of chloroacetophenone (KhAF, CN) is indisputably admitted in the form of “Cheremukha” products and the substance CS in K-51 grenades (a toxic irritant substance).

In four tests of the soil taken in the area of Rustaveli Avenue around Government House and the Kashveti church, the research of the Tbilisi State University Chromato-Mass Spectrometry Center also found chloropicrin (a toxic asphyxiant). No explanation has yet been found for its appearance in these tests.

The experience of the use of so-called “police toxic substances” both in our country and abroad shows that the use of these substances within established rules does not lead to serious consequences. Cases of serious poisoning are extremely rare, and fatal outcomes are unique. The picture of the intoxication of the demonstrators in Tbilisi differs remarkably from the usual cases of the use of such types of toxic substances.

It is characterized by its massive nature, a considerable number of poisonings of medium and great severity, and with specific features of a clinical manifestation in the form of signs of “neurotropic” activity.

The Commission thinks that it could have appeared as a result of a combination of a number of circumstances and factors:

1. The circumstances of the weather situation—high humidity and calm wind, which impeded the dispersal of the gas cloud and created a high concentration.
2. The use of toxic substances in a dense mass of people deprived of the opportunity to leave the afflicted location.
3. The use, from the testimony of eyewitnesses and victims, of toxic substances in the form of an aerosol at a distance close enough to perhaps have created a critical concentration of toxic substances.
4. The combination of toxins with physical injuries and psychological stress, which aggravated the clinical finding of injury (a “neurotropic effect”).
5. The increase of the degree of toxic activity of toxic substances on an organism at nighttime in connection with the reduction of the organism’s resistance.

It ought to be noted that the factual data and the ideas presented are not sufficient to completely exclude the probability that some of the victims were poisoned by some other unidentified toxic substance.

The question of identifying the direct causes of the deaths of the 19 demonstrators occupied a special place in the Commission’s work.

The materials and findings of various groups of experts received by the Commission gave an unambiguous explanation of the factors which led to the deaths of the victims.
In this regard the Commission brought in a group of scientists, and specialists in the field of pathological anatomy and forensic medicine who studied all the available material and came to the conclusion the direct cause of death of all those who died, with the exception of one case of serious skull and brain injury, was suffocation (asphyxia). In the opinion of specialists in the field of asphyxia two simultaneously operating factors played a role—both the compression of the body and the inhalation of chemical substances, which the corresponding macroscopic and microscopic data point to. The combination of the inhalation of chemical substances and the compression of the body mutually intensified their negative effect and served, in the opinion of the specialists, as the reason for the deaths of the victims. In two cases there were additional circumstances in the form of concomitant illnesses.

Nevertheless, it is not possible in each specific case to precisely determine from the available materials the predominance of one or the other factor in the development of asphyxia. The findings of the specialists have been sent to the USSR Procuracy.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The tragedy which occurred on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, the deaths of innocent people, caused deep pain in the hearts and consciousness of the Soviet people.

The members of the Commission of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies share these feelings and express sincere condolences to the families, relatives, and friends of the victims and also to all who suffered on that bitter April morning.

The events of 9 April inflicted a significant blow to perestroika and shook our entire society. The show of force, the damage to the health, and the deprivation of people’s sacred gift—life—are incompatible with common human moral principles and values.

The Commission turns to all citizens of the country with an appeal—the most acute problems which life puts before us, conflicts, and misunderstandings can only be resolved by political methods, dialogue, and persuasion.

The Commission calls upon all Soviet people not to allow the sad events of 9 April in Tbilisi to be used to incite mistrust and hostile attitudes toward the Soviet Army.

The Commission calls upon the Congress of People’s Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet to draw up and adopt laws strictly regulating the use of force within the country as a top priority.

On the basis of the available materials, the Commission of the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies comes to the following conclusions:

1. The reasons for the tragic events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi were that under the conditions of democratization of the entire public and political life of our society, the leadership of the Republic did not manage to direct the acute and dynamically developing processes of perestroika in Georgia, properly evaluate the situation in the Republic, and make adequate political decisions.

The former Secretaries of the CC GCP, D.I. Patiashvili and B.V. Nikol’skiy, bear responsibility for the political and other consequences of the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

2. The organizers of the unauthorized demonstration at Government House (I. Tsereteli, Z. Gamsakhurdia, G. Chanturiya, and other leaders of unofficial organizations)
should bear criminal, political, moral, and other responsibility for their actions. In the
course of their actions they committed various breaches of the peace, issued appeals to
disobey legal demands of the authorities, and when a real threat of the use of armed force
was created, did not take measures to stop it [the demonstration] and thus did not try to
prevent the tragic outcome of the events.

3. The decision to sent sub-units of the Internal Troops, the Soviet Army, and
special sub-units of the militia were formalized by a directive of the USSR Ministry of
Defense General Staff (Cde. M.A. Moiseyev) and by an order of the USSR Minister of
Internal Affairs (Cde. I.F. Shilov) after a meeting in the CC CPSU on 7 April 1989
(chaired by Cde. Ye. K. Ligachev). Inasmuch as the subject was not simply about troop
redeployment but was actually about carrying out operations, introducing individual
elements of a state of emergency in the city of Tbilisi, establishing control of entrances to
and exits from the city, and taking the most important public and govern- ment buildings
and other facilities under guard, it ought to be recognized that these decisions were made
in gross violation of the law.

4. The instruction of the Georgian Council of Ministers (Cde. Z.A. Chkheidze) of
8 April 1989 to clear the square in front of Government House of demonstrators and to
carry out other measures to preserve public order involving the participation of Internal
Troops and subunits of the Soviet Army was illegal since existing legislation does not
provide the government of the Republic with such authority.

5. Serious violations were committed during the preparation and execution of the
operation to clear the square, manifested in the fact that the operations plan was not
corrected in accordance with the actual situation. It was insufficiently studied by the
commanders of the sub-units, reconnoitering was not done, and the men and equipment
of the Tbilisi city government Directorate of Internal Affairs were not brought into the
operation in due measure. In spite of the USSR Minister of Defense’s order, paratroop
subunits were used not to guard facilities but to expel demonstrators. Gross violations of
public order were committed by the use of special agents; in particular, non-standard
special agents (product K-51) were used, and rubber truncheons and small entrenching
tools were used illegally.

Generals K.A. Kochetov, I.N. Rodionov and Yu. T. Yefimov bear personal
responsibility for these violations and oversights which led to the tragic consequences.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Sh.V. Gorgodze, who removed
himself from execution of his direct responsibilities, also bears responsibility in due
measure.

6. In the opinion of the Commission, the officials, who issued the order to use
special agents and [heavy] equipment on the demonstrators on 9 April in Tbilisi, should
be called to official and other forms of account. According to current regulations these
“are used in exceptional situations to stop mass unrest accompanied by pogroms,
brutality, destruction, arson, and to repel mass attacks on official and administrative
buildings, the premises of public organizations and other important facilities, and also in
cases when the violent actions of violators of public order threaten the lives and health of
citizens, the members of Internal Forces units, and the civilian militia.” The Commission
has established that on 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi, no grounds to take such measures existed.

7. During the operation to halt the demonstration by clearing the square in front of
Government House and Rustaveli Avenue, bodily injuries of varying degrees of severity
(including injuries from the use of special agents—tear gases) were inflicted on the
demonstrators, servicemen of the Internal Troops and the Soviet Army, and militia
workers. Nineteen demonstrators died (mainly women). The Commission perceives the
need for criminal liability of the specific individuals guilty of the deaths of people and the
infliction of serious bodily injuries.

8. It is also necessary to resolve the issue of the senior officials who:
   — violated Point 59 of the Internal Troops Combat Duty Regulations, which
   prohibits the use of the “Cheremukha” special agent against women, adolescents,
   children, and in other specifically mentioned instances;
   — violated current regulations according to which it is categorically prohibited to
   use a rubber truncheon against women, children, the aged, invalids with obvious signs of
   disability, and also to hit people in the face and head;
   — used articles with CS tear gas, which is not approved for use in the Internal
   Troops, at the concluding stage of the operation to expel the demonstrators.

9. The Commission raises the question of the responsibility of those people who
   permitted the violation of the guaranteed rights and legal interests of citizens when
   introducing and implementing the curfew in the city of Tbilisi.

10. Political, moral, and in necessary cases, legal responsibility should be borne
    by any official of both Party and government bodies who permits the concealment of the
    fact of use of special agents of the “Cheremukha” and article K-51 types containing CS
    gas.

11. The Commission notes that in the periodical press many items have appeared
    based on rumors, conjecture, false reports, and a distorted picture of the real course of
    events. Thus, the Commission has not found evidence of the existence or operation in the
    square of specially formed groups of guerilla extremists, or the allegation that the first
    wounded and killed supposedly appeared even before the troops came in contact with the
    demonstrators.

    The widely spread information about the multitudes of people who reportedly
    were missing after 9 April and the use by demonstrators of specially prepared silent
    [kholodnoye] weapons and firearms has also not been confirmed.

    The Commission notes the lack of facts behind the statement by General I.N.
    Rodionov at the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies that “a real threat of the seizure of
    vitally important facilities of the Republic had been created” by 9 April. Neither the
    reports of KGB organizations, nor the official reports of the Republic MVD, nor any
    other document contain any specific facts of this kind.

    The Commission notes that a positive aspect in settling the conflicts between the
    civilians and military during the curfew in effect in Tbilisi was the organized actions of
    the veterans of the war in Afghanistan, which facilitated the normalization of the situation.
    The Commission also notes that, while performing their official duties in difficult
    extraordinary conditions, many militia workers not only helped medical personnel in the
    evacuation of the victims but they gave medical aid themselves to the injured civilians
    and hunger strikers.

    In conclusion the Commission submits the following suggestions for the
    consideration of competent government bodies:

    1. Party organizations which accordingly consented or made decisions at the
       federal or Republic level about sending troops and conducting this operation acted
according to a long-held procedure and in the face of the decisions of the XIX Party Conference about the need to delimit the functions of Party and government institutions. In a state committed to the rule of law, the decisions of Party organizations at any level can have obligatory significance for institutions of state power and administration, including the Army, only after they are embodied in a legal act of a competent state institution, a law or a government decree.

In this regard an urgent need has occurred for an acceleration of the practical division of functions of Party and government institutions by making the necessary changes in existing legislation and corresponding Party documents.

2. The events of 9 April in Tbilisi pointed out obvious flaws in existing legislation and the practice of making the most important state decisions about introducing a special situation [osoboye polozhenie] or state of emergency using subunits of the Soviet Army to maintain and restore public order inside the country, in particular the possibility of using the armed forces to resolve internal conflicts directly on the basis of decisions adopted by Party, not government organizations.

A clear and exhaustive legislative regulation of the substance and the procedure for introducing martial law (in the case of the armed conflicts) a special situation (in the case of internal unrest) or a state of emergency (in the case of disasters) is required, excluding the situation which developed in Tbilisi when the introduction of a curfew assigned a subunit of the Soviet Army the mission of maintaining public order, which should only be handled by MVD personnel.

3. It seems advisable to review the question of increasing the strength of the Internal Troops and manning them on a mainly professional basis. It is necessary to determine legislatively the procedure and mechanism for using federal and Republic subunits of the Internal Troops.

4. It is necessary to prohibit legislatively the use of the Soviet Army to put down mass unrest, stipulating the possibility of using Army subunits for these purposes only in exceptional cases directly stipulated by law— by a decision in each individual case by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet with a subsequent report to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5. The rights and responsibilities of militia and Internal Troops personnel need to be spelled out legislatively as to when they perform their responsibilities which are associated with halting illegal activities and mass disorder.

6. The Commission directs attention to the need to strengthen the investigatory group on this case by bringing in workers from the Georgian SSR Procuracy and taking additional measures for the quickest possible conclusion of the preliminary investigation of the case which was brought in connection with the events of 9 April 1989 in Tbilisi.

7. The powers of parliamentary commissions created by the Congress of People’s Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet need to be spelled out legislatively, in particular the need to provide for the responsibility of officials for giving Commissions knowingly false testimony.

The Commission expresses gratitude to the governmental and public organizations and also to all citizens and officials who gave assistance in its work and helped establish the truth.

Chairman of the Commission A. Sobchak
Executive Secretary of the Commission S. B. Stankevich
Members of the Commission: S. A. Andronati, N. P. Bekhtereva, G. A. Borovik, B. L.
Vasil’yev, O. G. Gazenko, V. L. Govorov, D. S. Likhachev, V. P. Lukin, V. A. Martirosyan,
Tolpezhnikov, V. I. Fedotova, E. N. Shengelaya, P. V. Pet’ko, A. M. Yakovlev
Resolution of the CC CPSU Politburo
“Measures to Normalize the Situation in Tbilisi”

10 April 1989

1. Approve the text of the Appeal of the CC CPSU General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Cde. M.S. Gorbachev, to Communists and all workers of the Georgian SSR.

2. Be guided by the views expressed at the meeting of the CC Politburo when taking measures to normalize the situation in the city of Tbilisi.

CC CPSU Politburo

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

WARSAW 05247 01 OF 08 191528Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSA-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 SIL-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /065 W

CONFDENTIAL

O 191510Z APR 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3102
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 08 WARSAW 05247

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

REP: A) WARSAW 4698, B) WARSAW 5154, C) WARSAW 4171

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE ELECTIONS IN JUNE ARE, FOR THE REGIME, AN UNPREDICTABLE DANGER AND, FOR THE OPPOSITION, AN ENORMOUS OPPORTUNITY. THE AUTHORITIES, HAVING STAKED A GREAT DEAL, ARE HOPING FOR SOME MODEST SUCCESS, BUT THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO MEET TOTAL DEFEAT AND GREAT EMBARRASSMENT. THE PARTY, DESPITE ITS TOUTED SUPERIOR ORGANIZATION, IS VASTLY DISLIKED AND NEARLY INCAPABLE OF PERSUADING AN ELECTORATE THROUGH TRADITIONAL CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES, WITH WHICH IT HAS HAD NO EXPERIENCE. COMMUNIST-STYLE TRADITIONAL PROPAGANDA WILL NOT BE ENOUGH IN THIS NEW GAME. UNDER THE RULES IMPOSED BY SOLIDARITY AT THE ROUND-TABLE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE PARTY'S CORE SUPPORT WILL BE ABLE TO ELECT MANY...
OR ANY -- CANDIDATES TO THE SENATE. APPARENTLY
STILL SEEING THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME IN A DIFFERENT
WAY, THE REGIME MAY HAVE COMMITTED THE SIN OF MANY
CRUMBLING POWER ELITES IN SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATING
THE STRENGTH AND DEPTH OF ITS OPPOSITION. CONVERSELY

THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SOLIDARITY'S INEXPERIENCE AND
DISORGANIZATION ARE BEING OVERCOME; PREPARATIONS
FOR FULL AND UNIFIED SOLIDARITY PARTICIPATION IN THE
ELECTIONS ARE WELL ADVANCED. AS A CORE OF ACTIVITY -
AND VOTERS -- THE NEWLY-LEGALIZED UNION WILL SIGN UP
SEVERAL MILLION MEMBERS BY ELECTION DAY. ALTHOUGH
THE PUBLIC MOOD IS FAR FROM EUPHORIC, BOTH AWARENESS
AND SOME ENTHUSIASM ARE GROWING. BY ELECTION TIME,
THE APPEAL OF A GENUINELY FREE ELECTORAL PROCESS
WILL BE COMPELLING AND THE TURNOUT WILL BE LARGE.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SOLIDARITY SWEEP IN THE SENATE
ELECTIONS WILL CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A
LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS. THIS, IN
TURN, WILL FORCE A RESOLUTION OF THE PROFOUND ISSUES
OF POWER SHARING AND POLAND'S POLITICAL FUTURE;
EXACTLY THE OBJECTIVE OF THOSE WHO FORCED THE REGIME
TO ACCEPT THIS EXTRAORDINARY ELECTION. END SUMMARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 05247 01 OF 08 191528Z

3. AMONG THE UNPRECEDENTED PRODUCTS OF THE
ROUND-TABLE, THE MOST HUGELY PREGNANT OF THEM
ALL IS THE LARGELY FREE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
TO BE DELIVERED IN SIX WEEKS TIME. THE IMPORTANCE
OF THIS EVENT EVEN OVERTOWSHADOWS THE RELEGALIZATION
OF SOLIDARITY, WHICH HAS FOR YEARS BEEN THE PRE-
EMINENT OBJECTIVE OF BOTH THE POLISH OPPOSITION
AND U.S. POLICY. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE
LIVES OF NEARLY ALL POLES, THEY WILL HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC
ELECTORAL PROCESS, CHOOSING FREELY FROM AMONG
CANDIDATES OF WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS. THEY WILL
CREATE A REAL REPRESENTATIVE PARLIAMENTARY BODY
WITH FULL LEGISLATIVE POWERS. THROUGH THEIR
ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, THE POLISH PEOPLE
WILL PLAY AN ACTIVE AND ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE
FORMATION OF NEARLY ALL GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES,
INCLUDING ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF THE COUNTRY.
ALL OF THIS IS AT STAKE ON JUNE 4 AND 18.
EVEN THE HIGHEST PARTY AUTHORITIES SEE THE EVENT
AS UNPREDICTABLE AND DANGEROUS; A CRAP SHOOT
WITH AN ENORMOUS WAGER. THAT THEY COULD HAVE
ACCEPTED SUCH UNCERTAINLY, SUCH GREAT RISK,
REVEALS HOW FRIGHTENING THE ALTERNATIVE
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS MUST HAVE SEEMED TO
THIS EMBATTLED REGIME.
4. IN AN APRIL 14 CONVERSATION, POLITBURO MEMBER JANUSZ REYKOWSKI, CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE ROUND-TABLE'S POLITICAL GROUP AND PERHAPS THE REGIME'S PREMIER INTELLECTUAL, DESCRIBED THE UNCERTAINTY -- AND THE RISKS -- THIS WAY: THERE ARE TWO OPPOSING "VECTORS" OPERATING IN THE "CONFRONTATIONAL" SENATE ELECTIONS; BOTH ARE NEGATIVE FORCES. ONE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  WARSZAWA 05247 02 OF 08 191529Z

THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

IS THE OPPOSITION’S DISORGANIZATION, UNPREPAREDNESS, AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE, ALL OF WHICH MAKES ENTIRELY EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION UNLIKELY.

THE OTHER VECTOR IS THE DEEP-SEATED DISTRUST, DISLIKE, "EVEN HATRED" MOST POLES FEEL FOR THE LEADERS OF A FAILED SYSTEM. REYKOWSKI FOUND IT COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE TO SPECULATE HOW THESE OPPOSING VECTORS WOULD DETERMINE THE FINAL RESULT OF THE FREE SENATE ELECTIONS. HE SAID THERE WAS NO EXPERIENCE IN POLAND OR ELSEWHERE CONFIDENTIAL.

UNCLASSIFIED
CANDIDATES WILL BE ELECTED ARE UNPRECEDENTED IN PEOPLE'S POLAND. THERE IS NO BASIS ON WHICH ONE CAN PREDICT VOTER ATTITUDES TOWARD EITHER THE CANDIDATES OR THE PROCESS, AND NO WAY TO PREDICT VOTER TURNOUT.


6. IN VIEW OF REYKOWSKI'S CONTENTION THAT THE WAGER REALLY IS THAT GREAT, WE MUST MAKE SOME EFFORT TO ASSESS THE OPPOSING "VECTORS" AND OTHER FACTORS THAT WILL DETERMINE THE FIRST ROLL OF THESE NEW DICE, AND TO GUESS WHAT REALLY IS AT STAKE.

THE PARTY'S POSITION

ABSENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY IS EVEN MORE PROFOUND THAN WE SUPPOSE, AND THE PARTY'S ABILITY TO PERSUADE, THROUGH AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN, WILL BE MINIMAL INDEED.

8. THERE ARE SOME, HOWEVER, ON THE FAR SIDE OF THE BARRICADES ALREADY. THERE ARE SLIGHTLY MORE THAN TWO MILLION PARTY MEMBERS IN POLAND, OR ABOUT TEN PERCENT OF THE VOTING POPULATION. IN ADDITION, THERE IS AN ILL-DEFINED NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHOSE STATUS, ECONOMIC WELFARE, OR PERCEIVED INTEREST IN STABILITY WILL PERSUADE THEM TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME. MANY OBSERVERS,
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

Both official and independent, have long maintained that the total support for the party could amount to 20 to 25 percent of the voting population. However, this percentage, which is probably high, is widely dispersed throughout the country, with no real pockets of stronger support. The traditional party "strongholds" of Silesia, for instance, are also strongholds of opposition activity. Thus, Silesia is characterized by politicization and polarization, rather than simply a center of greater party support. There is no voivodeship in which the percentage of party supporters is significantly higher than the assumed national average.

9. In a different kind of electoral system, 25 percent of the electorate might be expected to elect 25 percent of the senators. But, under rules forced by Solidarity on the reluctant, but ultimately accommodating regime at the round-table, it is difficult to see how the 25 percent -- or even a bit more -- could succeed in electing any party candidate to the Senate. From the moment the Senate idea was introduced into the Round-Table discussions, the regime moved steadily backwards in negotiations, giving up virtually all electoral advantages. Most importantly, they agreed to two-stage elections.

10. In the original proposal, the winner in each province's Senate election -- widely expected to be the opposition candidate in nearly every case -- would win one seat, and the runner-up would win the second. It was assumed that, in at least some cases, the runner-up would be a party candidate with perhaps 20-30 percent of the vote. Giving this scheme up, however, the regime was forced to accept a second round of elections in cases where both seats in a province were not filled by candidates with 50 percent of the vote (each voter

CONFIDENTIAL
GETS TWO VOTES FOR THE SENATE). IT IS VERY NEARLY INCONCEIVABLE THAT ANY PARTY CANDIDATE WILL OBTAIN 50 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN THE FIRST ROUND. THUS, EVERYONE ELECTED IN THAT ROUND WILL BE EITHER SOLIDARITY OR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES. IN THE SECOND ROUND, WHERE ONLY A PLURALITY IS REQUIRED TO ELECT, WE CAN ASSUME THAT THE PARTY CANDIDATE, IF HE MAKES IT THAT FAR, WILL BE RUNNING AGAINST THE SECOND MOST POPULAR OPPOSITION CANDIDATE. THE OPPOSITION VOTE WILL NOT BE DIVIDED, BECAUSE THE FIRST ELECTION WILL HAVE ELIMINATED OTHER INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES. (THE ALTERNATIVE IS THAT THE PARTY CANDIDATE WILL NOT HAVE MADE IT INTO THE SECOND ROUND, WHICH WILL THEN PRESENT A CHOICE BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD MOST POPULAR OPPOSITION OR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.) IN THIS SCENARIO, EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC PARTY OBSERVERS SHOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPECT A PARTY VICTORY IN MORE THAN A FEW CASES, IF AT ALL. THE POINT OF THIS EXPLANATION IS THAT THE OBJECTIVE MECHANICS OF THE SENATE ELECTION, COMBINED WITH THE PARTY'S ACKNOWLEDGED UNPOPULARITY, THREATEN TO PRODUCE A SERIOUS DEFEAT FOR POSSIBLY ALL PARTY CANDIDATES.

11. SEARCHING FOR AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE PARTY WOULD HAVE PLACED ITSELF IN SUCH A THREAT-ENED POSITION, WE MUST NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF VAST MISCALCULATION. AFTER ALL, THE REGIME HAS HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN ASSESSING ELECTORAL MOODS AND VOTER RESPONSES, JUST AS IT HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN JUDGING THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF PUTTING LECH WALESA ON
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

NATIONAL TELEVISION IN FRONT OF 28 MILLION POLES. THIS EVENT, WHICH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 30, ESSENTIALLY LED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND, WITH A RELEGALIZED SOLIDARITY AND A THREATENED OPPOSITION VICTORY IN A FREE ELECTION. JUST AS REYKOWSKI SPOKE ABOUT A MASSIVE OPPOSITION VICTORY BEING A "COMPLETE DISASTER" FOR PARTY REFORMERS, LOWER LEVEL PARTY MEMBERS ALSO APPEAR TO BE COUNTING ON SOMETHING SHORT OF DISASTER. ONE LOCAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

WARSAW 05247 04 OF 08 191530Z

SEJM CANDIDATE SUGGESTED IN ALL SERIOUSNESS THAT THE PARTY MIGHT WIN 40 PERCENT OF THE SENATE BECAUSE PEOPLE WOULD VOTE FOR STABILITY IN THE RURAL PROVINCES. WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THIS POWER ELITE, LIKE OTHERS BEFORE IT IN OTHER COUNTRIES, HAS VASTLY UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH OF ITS OPPOSITION.

12. ONE FACTOR THAT IS OFTEN MENTIONED IN THE PARTY'S FAVOR IS THE FACT THAT IT IS WELL ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND ITS SUPPORTERS, ALTHOUGH RELATIVELY FEW, CAN BE EASILY MOBILIZED; THEY WILL ALL CAMPAIGN AND VOTE.
EVEN SOME OPPOSITIONISTS (INCLUDING WOJCIECH LAMENTOWICZ, WARSAW4295) CLAIM THAT THIS ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANTAGE CAN BE TELLING IF USED PROPERLY. HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE PARTY IS WELL ORGANIZED, WE MUST ASK, ORGANIZED FOR WHAT? FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNING? FOR PERSUADING A VASTLY CYTICAL PUBLIC THAT THE PARTY CANDIDATES SHOULD BE GIVEN A MANDATE TO EXERCISE THE PARTY'S CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY FOR SEVERAL MORE YEARS? CERTAINLY THIS IS NOT THE CASE. THE PARTY IS ORGANIZED FOR MORE INSIDIOUS FORMS OF POLITICAL CONTROL, BUT THE PROPAGANDISTIC OBFUSCATION OF ITS NATURE AND METHODS HASN'T FOOLEO ANYONE FOR MANY YEARS. A NEWLY-FREE ELECTORATE WILL NOT BE TAKEN IN BY THIS FALSE COVER, NO MATTER HOW NEATLY ORGANIZED ITS MANY LAYERS. IN THIS CASE, IT IS NOT THAT THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES; IT IS THAT BENEATH THE RAIMENT, THERE IS NO EMPEROR.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  WARSAW 05247  04 OF 08 191530Z

SOLIDARITY'S POSITION

13. THE OPPOSITE "VECTOR" IN REYKOWSKI'S EXPLANATION IS THE OPPOSITION'S INEXPERIENCE, DISORGANIZATION AND LACK OF TIME. AT THE OUTSET OF THIS EXTRAORDINARY ELECTORAL EXERCISE, THIS ARGUMENT WAS PERSUASIVE, COMPULSIVE BY THE SEEMINGLY OVERWHELMING TASKS THAT CONFRONTED THE OPPOSITION AND REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED BY SOLIDARITY'S OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATE HAND-WRINGING. THE IMAGE OF A DISORGANIZED AND FRACTIONATED SOLIDARITY WAS ENHANCED BY THE APRIL 9 MEETING OF THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE (REFTEL), WHICH WAS MARKED BY A FRACIOUS DEBATE OVER THE FLAWED PROCESS OF SELECTING CANDIDATES. SUBSEQUENTLY, AS THE COMMITTEE SOUGHT TO FORM PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES TO GUIDE THE CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCESS, MULTIPLE COMMITTEES FORMED SPONTANEOUSLY IN SOME PROVINCES, SUGGESTING THAT MULTIPLE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES WLL BE COMPETING IN SOME DISTRICTS, SPLITTING THE OPPOSITION VOTE AND WEAKENING ITS ELECTION PROSPECTS.

14. NOW, TWO WEEKS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ROUND-TABLE AGREEMENTS, WE ARE STRUCK NOT BY THE DISPUTES OVER METHODS, WHICH REMAIN, BUT
BY THE DETERMINED AND COHESIVE EFFORTS SOLIDARITY IS MAKING TO PRESENT A UNITED FRONT. ONCE AGAIN, LECH WALESÁ’S ULTIMATELY PRACTICAL AND APPEALING ARGUMENT IS CUTTING THROUGH THE DISPUTES AND

CONFIDENTIAL

O 191510Z APR 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3106
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
U.S.MISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 08 WARSAW 05247

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

PERSONAL RIVALS: HÉ "LOVES VICTORY," WHICH CAN ONLY BE ATTAINED BY CONFRONTING THE ENORMOUS TASKS WITH UNITY — WITH "SOLIDARITY." IN REFTEL, WE DESCRIBE THE PROCESS WHEREBY THE WARSAW-REGION OPPOSITION HAS ORGANIZED ITSELF TO MEET THE ELECTORAL CHALLENGE, PRESENTING
CANDIDATES WITH OVERWHELMING AUTHORITY AND POPULARITY. IN COMING DAYS AND WEEKS WE WILL BE REPORTING ON CORRESPONDING ACTIVITIES IN OTHER REGIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 05247 05 OF 08 1915312

15. AN OPPOSITION JOURNALIST AND INTELLECTUAL, KAZIMIERZ DZIEWANOWSKI, EXPLAINED FOR US RECENTLY THAT POLES, ALTHOUGH TENDING TOWARD MULTIPLE, DIVERSE, CONFLICTING POLITICAL OPINIONS, NEVERTHELESS ARE CAPABLE OF PRESENTING A UNITED FRONT WHEN FACED WITH ADVERSITY OR OPPORTUNITY. AS EVIDENCE, HE POINTS TO THE CHURCH, A COMMON GROUND ON WHICH GENERATIONS OF POLES HAVE FOUND TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE CHURCH’S VIEWS. MORE TO THE POINT, SOLIDARITY ITSELF -- THE COMMON LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION -- HAS UNITED A WIDE SPECTRUM OF POLITICAL ACTIVISTS AND PROVIDED A SINGLE, BROAD CHANNEL FOR POLITICAL EXPRESSION. NOW, AT THE MOMENT OF VICTORY, DZIEWANOWSKI BELIEVES, THIS UNITY WILL NOT BE ABANDONED IN FAVOR OF MORE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS, NO MATTER HOW STRONGLY FELT. HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE IMPREMATUR OF WALESA ON THE SINGLE LIST OF SOLIDARITY CANDIDATES WILL BE ENOUGH, ALL BY ITSELF, TO ASSURE OVERWHELMING SUCCESS, NOT BECAUSE WALESA'S JUDGEMENT IS UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED, BUT BECAUSE THERE IS CLEAR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN UNITY AT THIS IMPORTANT MOMENT.

16. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SOLIDARITY HAS NOT CEASED PUTTING A PESSIMISTIC CAST ON ITS ELECTORAL PROSPECTS. AS RECENTLY AS APRIL 17, SOLIDARITY SPOKESMAN JANUSZ ONYSKIEWICZ TOLD THE PRESS THAT SOLIDARITY WAS NOT PREPARED TO MEET THE ENORMOUS CHALLENGES. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS WILL REMAIN A CONSTANT THEME IN PUBLIC, EVEN WHILE ACTIVITY AND ENTHUSIASM GROW IN PRIVATE. SOLIDARITY DOES NOT WANT TO APPEAR OVERCONFIDENT OR THREATENING. SOME OBSERVERS, FOR A TIME, MAY REMAIN MISLED BY SOLIDARITY’S TACTICS OF SELF-DEPRECATION.
PUBLIC MOOD

17. IT IS TRUE THAT, THROUGHOUT THE AGONIZINGLY PROTRACTED ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSIONS, THE PUBLIC’S ATTENTION HAS WANDERED. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET INSIDE THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE POLISH ELECTORATE, BUT OUR SENSE IS THAT RELATIVELY FEW POLES UNDERSTOOD WHAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT THE ROUND-TABLE, AT LEAST IN THE DAYS FOLLOWING ITS CONCLUSION. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, DISCUSSION IN THE MEDIA AND ELSEWHERE HAS PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION, AND THE GENERAL LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST IS RISING AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FACTORY AND CHURCH MEETINGS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE ACCORDS, AND THEY REPORT A GROWING ENTHUSIASM. A MAJOR BOOST TO THIS PROCESS TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 17 WITH THE REGISTRATION OF SOLIDARITY. AFTER A SEVEN-YEAR STRUGGLE, THE UNION IS ABOUT TO BECOME THE MASS ORGANIZATION IT ONCE WAS, AND HAS THE EXPERIENCE AND MACHINERY TO ACCOMPLISH IT QUICKLY. WALESA HAS ALREADY CALLED UPON UNION ORGANIZERS TO ACCUMULATE MEMBERS IN ALL OF POLAND’S ENTERPRISES. ALTHOUGH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 WARSAW 05247 05 OF 08 191531Z
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 05247 06 OF 08 191532Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 TO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 SIL-01
INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 C-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /065 W

O 191510Z APR 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3107
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 08 WARSAW 05247
BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY
FEW EXPECT THE UNION TO GATHER ITS EARLIER MEMBERSHIP, SOME TEN MILLION STRONG, EVERYONE ASSUMES THAT THE UNION QUICKLY WILL FAR SURPASS THE PZPR'S 2 MILLION MEMBERS; MOST EXPECTATIONS ARE FOR SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 4 AND 6 MILLION SOLIDARITY MEMBERS. THESE ARE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN WAITING IN THE WINGS, OR ORGANIZING SECRETLY, AND THEY WILL EMERGE IN NEW LEGAL UNION CHAPTERS VERY RAPIDLY -- CERTAINLY WELL IN TIME FOR THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS CONFIDENTIAL

ENORMOUS GROUP OF VOTERS, THEN, WILL BECOME THE CORE OF AN INCREASINGLY ENTHUSIASTIC PUBLIC WHOSE ONE OVERWHELMING OBJECTIVE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS IS GOING TO BE "THROW THE BUMS OUT."  

18. COMPLIMENTING THE RISING ENTHUSIASM, TALK OF AN ELECTION BOYCOTT HAS SUBSIDED. THE CONFEDERATION FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLAND (KPN), FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO BE PREPARING A CANDIDATE LIST COVERING PERHAPS AS MANY AS ONE HUNDRED CONSTITUENCIES. ALTHOUGH WE GIVE THEM LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESSFULLY COMPETING (SEE REFTEL C), THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN THE PROCESS WILL BOTH DECREASE THE THREAT OF AN EFFECTIVE BOYCOTT, AND BRING PEOPLE TO THE POLLS WHO CERTAINLY WILL NOT VOTE FOR COMMUNIST CANDIDATES. POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FROM OTHER INDEPENDENT GROUPS WOULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME RESULTS, WITH VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT SUCH CANDIDATES WILL BE ABLE TO CHALLENGE THE UNION CHARTERS VERY RAPIDLY -- CERTAINLY WILL NOT VOTE FOR COMMUNIST SANCTIONED LIST.

AND HAD THE FEELING THAT THEY DEFINED THE RESULTING ACCORDS; IT WAS A MANAGEABLE, TANGIBLE PROCESS. THE ROUND-TABLE PROCESS, OF COURSE, WENT FAR BEYOND THE 1980 EVENTS BOTH IN SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH SOLIDARITY CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THAT IT IS A UNION, THE DIALOGUE PROCESS IT HAS DIRECTED HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH WORKER PARTICIPATION. THIS DIFFERENCE IN MOOD, REFLECTING THE PROFONDLY DIFFERENT POLITICAL PROCESSES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE, MUST NOT BE CONFUSED WITH DISINTEREST OR UNCONCERN. ONCE THE TERMS OF THE ROUND-TABLE AGREEMENT ARE WIDELY KNOWN, AND ONCE THE STARK CHOICE PRESENTED BY THE COMING ELECTION IS UNIVERSALLY ADVERTISED, PEOPLE WILL PARTICIPATE, EUPHORIC OR NOT.

20. IT IS IN FACT ON THE ISSUE OF VOTER TURNOUT THAT THE PARTY MUST HANG WHATEVER MEAGER HOPES IT HAS. THE PARTY FAITHFUL -- PERHAPS 25 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE -- WILL VOTE. IF DISGRUNTLED OPPOSITIONISTS AND AN EMBITTERED AND DESPONDENT PUBLIC REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE, THE COMPARATIVELY LARGER PARTY VOTE MAY TURN UP A SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE HERE OR THERE. AN ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY TURNOUT, HOWEVER, MUST BE BASED LITERALLY ON A LEAP OF FAITH. HAVING LONG EVANGELIZED THE GOSPEL OF DEMOCRACY, WE MUST BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST EVER OPPORTUNITY TO VOTE FREELY IN A STARKLY COMPETITIVE ELECTION WILL BE COMPPELLING. A FREE ELECTION SHOULD HAVE THE APPEAL OF PROMISED POLITICAL SALVATION. HOW CAN THE POLISH ELECTORATE TURN ITS' BACK ON THAT?
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: THE YEAR OF SOLIDARITY

21. IN THE LAST PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, IN WHICH COMMUNISTS RAN EITHER AGAINST COMMUNISTS OR NO ONE, FOR SEATS IN A PARLIAMENT THAT HAD NO MEANING, PERHAPS 65 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE VOTED. IS IT UNREASONABLE THEN TO ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER TURNOUT IN THESE EXTRAORDINARY ELECTIONS? WE THINK NOT. AN 85 OR 90 PERCENT TURNOUT SEEMS LIKELY; PERHAPS MORE. ONE OF THE MOST

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 05247 07 OF 08 1915332

SKEPTICAL OPPOSITION FIGURES, JACEK CZAPUTOWICZ, WHO STRONGLY CRITICIZED SOLIDARITY'S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC METHODS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION, RECENTLY DECLARED WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION THAT AN 80 PERCENT TURNOUT WOULD GUARANTEE "FOR SURE" 100 PERCENT OF THE SENATE SEATS FOR THE OPPOSITION.

---

CONSEQUENCES

---

22. ALTHOUGH THIS MESSAGE IS MEANT TO ESTABLISH SOME EXPECTATIONS FOR EVENTS IN SIX WEEKS TIME, OUR CONCLUSION COMPELS ANOTHER QUESTION. IF THE OPPOSITION DOES WIN NEARLY ALL OF THE
SENATE SEATS -- IF REYKOWSKI'S "COMPLETE DISASTER" DOES OCCUR -- WHAT ARE THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES? WE, AND PERHAPS REYKOWSKI ALSO, CANNOT ACCURATELY FORESEE HOW THE PARTY'S CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION WILL RESPOND. WHETHER THROUGH VAST MISCALCULATION OR WISHFUL THINKING, SUCH AN OVERWHELMING SOLIDARITY VICTORY APPEARS NOT TO HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED. THE IMPACT OF SUCH AN EVENT WILL THEN BE SHOCKING AS WELL AS UNEQUIVOCAL.

23. INSTEAD OF SOME SORT OF PREEMPTIVE REACTION FROM THE CONServatives, HOWEVER, WE ASSUME THAT EVENTS WILL BE PERMITTED TO RUN THEIR COURSE. THIS MEANS THAT A SEJM WILL CONVENE, THE ELECTION AND COMPOSITION OF WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY DISCREDITED BY THE VERY DIFFERENT RESULT IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 05247 07 OF 08 1915332

THE FREE ELECTION TO THE SENATE. THE SEJM WILL HAVE LOST ALL ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THE ILLUSION OF AN AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATIVE BODY. IN THE MEANTIME, AND WITH GREAT CONTRAST, THE OPPOSITION SENATE WILL FORM, ELECT ITS OFFICERS, AND BEGIN DRAWING UP ITS OWN LEGISLATIVE AGENDA. HIGH ON THE LIST, WE EXPECT TO SEE SOME PROPOSALS TO CLARIFY THE AMBIGUOUS ISSUE OF POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE LATTER WILL BEGIN FORMING IN ANTICIPATION.


25. WITH ALL OF POLAND'S PRESSING PROBLEMS, CAN A LEGISLATIVE CRISIS BE LONG DELAYED? AN OPPOSITION SENATE AND A REGIME-DOMINATED SEJM WILL RAPIDLY COME TO AN IMPASSE. TO OVERRIDE A SENATE VETO OF ANY LEGISLATION, THE SEJM WOULD HAVE TO COME UP WITH 320 VOTES. THE PZPR WILL HAVE ONLY 144; TOGETHER WITH ALL OF ITS "COALITION" PARTNERS, INCLUDING THE INCREASINGLY-INDEPENDENT PEASANTS' PARTY, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND THE INDEPENDENT CATHOLICS, IT WILL HAVE NO
MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MORE THAN 319, ALMOST CERTAINLY LESS. WITH
THESE NUMBERS, A LEGISLATIVE AND THEN CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FOR SEEKING RESOLUTION. IT WILL BE THE EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSOR OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 05247 08 OF 08 191533Z

ROUND-TABLE ITSELF, COMPOSED OF MANY OF THE MAJOR FIGURES OF THE "MAGDALENKA GROUP." THE COM-
MISSION WILL BE PERHAPS THE REAL POWER CENTER IN THE NEW SCHEME OF THINGS. HOWEVER IT
FUNCTIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CHALLENGES WILL BECOME MORE ACUTE, RATHER THAN LESS, AND
THE APPROACHING ELECTIONS WILL ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FORCING ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THESE
PROFOUND POWER-SHARING ISSUES. THIS IS EX-
ACTLY THE HISTORICAL PROCESS BRONISLAW GEREMEK,
LECZ WALESJA AND THE REST OF SOLIDARITY'S
LEADERSHIP INTENDED TO SET IN MOTION.

DAVIS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

Gorbachev. The crisis in Georgia was not a bolt from the blue. The whole country suspected that something was brewing there. Shevardnadze many times drew our attention to this. (Georgian First Party Secretary) Pashiavili, as far as we know him, is not deaf to national interests, but he shares with other comrades the estimations of panic-mongering, suspicion and, even more, reliance on force. He lacked guts to conduct political work. (...) 

I have long kept saying - let us learn how to work in conditions of democracy. And now events confirm it. Our cadres regard the political method as a manifestation of weakness. Force - this is the real thing! In Georgia they could not transform themselves [prolomit seabia] in democratic way, to lead genuine advocates of perestroika, to attract people even with extreme views. (...) 

Regarding this, I would touch on another theme, information that is necessary for decision-making. When I receive ciphered telegrams, for instance, I immediately see the handwriting of the GRU or the KGB or any other ministry. When they analyze the situation in the Baltics, I can see right away what is true and what is packaged as truth. (He turns to [KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov] - Vladimir Alexandrovich, I am looking at you! It is important to what extent one should attribute [nationalist] disturbances to trouble-makers - teenagers, and to what extent it is about profound undercurrents in the nation... 

In Georgia CC members should have walked out to the people. And they, as it turned out, sat in a bunker. And relied only on force. Only later we began to receive truthful information from Tbilisi. Perhaps someone from the KGB should have gone there to obtain information. In a word, if we don't have truthful and timely information, objective data, we cannot take correct decisions. And in these matters one should think seven times, one hundred times, and only then act - take a decision.

Ryabkov. We were in Moscow in those days, and what did we know? I am a Chairman of the government and what did I know, I read about the deaths of people in "Pravda." CC Secretaries knew what happened. And we, Politburo members, in the Government, knew nothing. And why Shevardnadze's trip [to Georgia] was canceled - I also do not know.

True, we were not in the Politburo. But we must have timely and truthful information. How could this have happened? The army was used against the people. The military district commander was acting there, and we in Moscow were not aware of it. And if he comes and arrests all the Politburo of Georgia? Will we also learn about it from the newspapers? And Mikhail Sergeyevich [Gorbachev] seems to not have known... So what is actually going on here? Armed forces are used, and the General Secretary learns about it only the next morning. How then do we appear before Soviet society.
before the whole world? In general, wherever you turn, things go on without the Politburo knowing about them. This is even worse than if the Politburo had taken bad decisions.

Gorbachev turns to Yazov. Dmitry Timofeevich, from now on the army cannot take part in such actions without Politburo decisions.

Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Fond 2, Opis 3. Notes of A.S. Chernyaev
Published: "The Union Could Be Preserved. " White Book. Documents and Facts about Policy of M.S. Gorbachev to Reform and Preserve Multi-National State. Moscow: "April " Publisher, 1993

Translated by Vladislav Zubok
The National Security Archive
Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and HSWP General Secretary Karoly Grosz

Moscow, 23-24 March 1989

[On 22 March 1989, the parties and organizations of the emerging non-communist Hungarian opposition established a consultative forum, called the “Opposition Roundtable.” Up to this point, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party had used the tactic of dealing separately with “alternative” organizations. Now the danger of having to negotiate with a unified opposition became increasingly likely. The Party’s leadership also worried about an impending economic crisis possibly resulting in the destabilization of the political scene. These concerns were infused in Károly Grósz’s presentation on the internal political situation.

Gorbachev’s “dialectic” approach to the issue of how to evaluate 1956 is remarkable: while stressing that this must be decided by the Hungarian leadership alone by examining the facts, he declared that a recent thorough investigation of the past by the Soviet leadership had undoubtedly proven that what had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was a counter-revolution. Similarly ambiguous were the warnings of the Soviet leader concerning the tolerable scope of the political transition in Hungary. He emphasized that “the limit […] is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability,” however, he also clearly declared that “today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention into the internal affairs of socialist countries.”

The timing of the conversation is also noteworthy from Gorbachev’s perspective; it occurred on the eve of the legislative elections in the Soviet Union—the freest since the 1917 Revolution. The 26 March vote would elevate reformers (such as Yeltsin) and nationalists (especially in the Baltics) to a strong position to challenge the communist order, and Gorbachev may already have felt pressured by the impending balloting.]

(EXCERPT)

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS’ PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TOP SECRET
Made in 2 copies
Inf/1371/1989
REPORT
for members of the Political Committee
[29 March 1989]
(...)

Comrade Grosz informed the negotiators about the Hungarian situation. He said that the events in Hungary have accelerated lately. Their direction is according to our intentions, while their pace is somewhat disconcerting. Comrade Grosz emphasized that we wish to retain political power and find a solution to our problems by political means, avoiding armed conflict.
We have a good chance for reaching our goals. People are afraid of a possible armed conflict. Workers, peasants and professionals want to work and live in peace and security, safeguarding their property. (...

Another major concern is the history of the last thirty years. We have to face our past, hard and painful as it is, as the acting participants are still alive. On the other hand, by drawing the necessary conclusions, we might dishearten certain layers of our policy’s active supporters from the Party. Lack of self-confidence is palpable enough in the Party anyway. (...

Comrade Gorbachev agreed that the Western world does not want instability in Eastern Europe, including Hungary as well, because in the present situation it would be adverse to its interests. Nonetheless, it is quite apparent that they [the Western countries] intend to facilitate the realization and strengthening of a development that suits their own political ideas.

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized: “The estimation of the 1956 events is entirely up to you.” You have to stand on a firm ground; you have to examine what really happened then and there. The Soviet leadership has recently analyzed the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, and they continue to maintain that what happened there was a counter-revolution, with all the idiosyncratic traits of such an event. There were different periods within the Czechoslovak events, but the Dubcek regime was unable to prevent openly counter-revolutionary forces from gaining ground through them. (...

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that we clearly have to draw boundaries, thinking about others and ourselves at the same time. Democracy is much needed, and interests have to be harmonized. The limit, however, is the safekeeping of socialism and assurance of stability.

Comrade Grosz emphasized that when referring to 1956, we adhere to the original evaluation that the Party endorsed in December 1956. The process is described in three consecutive words: student protest, [people’s] uprising, and counter-revolution.

Comrade Gorbachev agreed with the above. He emphasized that today we have to preclude the possibility of repeated foreign intervention into the internal affairs of socialist countries. (...

[Source: MOL M-KS-288-11/4458 o.e.. Translated by Csaba Farkas.]
Note from A. S. Pavlov, Chief of the CC CPSU State and Legal Department, to the CC CPSU

29 April 1989

Secret

CC CPSU

On the Issue of the Events in the City of Tbilisi

In connection with numerous appeals by citizens and statements in the mass media regarding the events in the city of Tbilisi which were provoked by groups of extremists and led on 9 April to the deaths of people, we consider it advisable to form a commission to study the reasons and circumstances of these events for a report to the CC CPSU. It is advisable to bring comrades into this work who have had no prior association with an investigation of this extraordinary incident.

The commission could include Cdes. G.S. Tarazevich, Chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium (Chairman); G.V. Sergeyev, First Deputy USSR Minister of Health; V.L. Govorov, Chief of USSR Civil Defense and Deputy USSR Minister of Defense; V.P. Pirozhkov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR KGB; N.I. Demidov, Deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs; and O.V. Kvilitaya, First Deputy Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

The candidacy of O.V. Kvilitaya as a member of the commission was per the suggestion of Cde. G.G. Gumbaridze.

A draft CC CPSU Decree is attached.

Chief of the CC CPSU State and Legal Department A. Pavlov

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Leave blank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Note from A. S. Pavlov, Chief of the CC CPSU State and Legal Department, to the CC CPSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>29 April 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creator</td>
<td>A.S. Pavlov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributor</td>
<td>Leave blank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Tbilisi Massacre Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Pavlov calls for an investigation of the massacre at Tbilisi on April 9th by those who have not had prior knowledge of the incident in order to divulge thorough knowledge of the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage (Geographic Location)</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>TsKhSD. f. 5, op. 34, d. 796, p. 121. Original, published in Istoricheskiy Arkhiv 3 (1993), pp. 100. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>CWIHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>CWIHP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Format</td>
<td>Translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation</td>
<td>End of the Cold War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Decree of the CC CPSU Secretariat
“The Issue of the Events in the City of Tbilisi”

29 April 1989

No. ST 100/1051
Top Secret

The Commission consisting of Cdes. G.S. Tarazевич (Chairman); G.V. Sergeyев; V.L. Govorов; V.P. Pirozhkov; N.I. Demидов; and O.V. Kvilitауа is charged with studying the circumstances of the events which took place on 9 April in the city of Tbilisi and reporting to the CC CPSU.

Results of the voting: V. Chebrikov for
  A. Yakovlev for
  V. Medvedev for
  N. Nikonov for
  M. Gorbachev for
  Ye. Ligachev for
  L. Zaykov for
  E. Shevardnadze for
  O. Baklanov for
  N. Slyun’kov for

Excerpt from Anatoly Chernyaev’s Diary

2 May 1989

Inside me, depression and alarm are growing, the sense of crisis of the Gorbachevian idea. He is prepared to go far. But what does it mean? His favorite catchword is “unpredictability.” And most likely we will come to a collapse of the state and something like chaos. He feels that he is losing the levers of power irreversibly, and this realization prevents him from “going far.” For this reason he holds to conventional methods but acts with “velvet gloves.” He has no concept of where we are going. His declaration about socialist values, the ideals of October, as he begins to tick them off, sound like irony to the cognoscenti. Behind them—emptiness.

[Source: Published in Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991: The Diary of an Assistant to the President of the USSR (Moscow: TERRA, 1997). Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive).]
NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE - 9

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Actions to Respond to Polish Roundtable Agreement (U)

I hereby direct that the eight measures listed below be taken in response to the Polish Roundtable agreement. (U)

The United States will indicate to its allies willingness to consider substantial rescheduling of Poland's official debt within the Paris Club. (C)

The United States will inform its allies and IMF management that the United States supports negotiations between Poland and the IMF on a stand-by arrangement subject to normal IMF conditions. (U)

The United States will publicly indicate willingness to support viable private sector loans by the International Finance Corporation. (U)

Legislation will be sought to accord Generalized System of Preferences to Poland. GSP treatment eliminates tariffs on a variety of products. (C)

Legislation will be sought to make Poland eligible for OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) insurance. (C)

Private Sector Involvement

The United States will offer to negotiate a government-to-government Small/medium Business Agreement to facilitate direct contacts with Poland's private business sector. (C)
The United States will expand training and exchange programs, targeted at the emerging private sector, in Poland. (U)

The United States will signal support for voluntary private sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity in Polish enterprises, or environmental, educational or other humanitarian programs. (U)
Report on a Working Visit of Wojciech Jaruzelski to Moscow

9 May 1989

For a Politburo meeting
Sent out to Politburo members, associate members and CC secretaries
9 May 1989
9.V.1989 L.dz. KS/619/89 to point “3”

Confidential

On 28 April 1989, the First Secretary of the CC PUWP, Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People’s Republic, Wojciech Jaruzelski, paid a working visit to Moscow at the invitation of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Gorbachev.

In the course of the talk, lasting over three and a half hours, both leaders devoted their utmost attention to the problems of the transformation being conducted broadly in both countries.

Wojciech Jaruzelski gave information on the measures undertaken by the PUWP in the realization of socialist renewal in Poland, including the significance of the X Plenum of the Central Committee, [and] on the preparations to the National Conference of Delegates to the X Party Congress. He also informed [Gorbachev] about the significance and results of the “Roundtable,” which have opened up prospects for an understanding of different social and political forces in Poland. He explained difficult problems of the country and the means to their solution. He emphasized the significance of the further development of Polish-Soviet relations in all areas.

Mikhail Gorbachev stated that despite a variety of forms and methods of renewal of the socialist system used by the fraternal parties, this process has a common guiding principle—democratization, aspirations to create conditions for real participation of working people in running the economy and in solving political questions.

He also stated that perestroika in the USSR has reached such a stage, and transformations in all spheres of life have reached such depth, that the Party is expected to double its effort in the realization of these unusually difficult tasks. As was said at the last CC CPSU Plenum, the Soviet people have spoken once again in the recently-held elections [26 March 1989] for perestroika and have demanded its steadfast, consistent introduction.

Mikhail Gorbachev also stated that the Soviet economy is coping with complicated problems related to the shift to new methods of economic activity, monetary regulations, [and] shortages in inventories of goods.

Despite these difficulties, they did not give a thought—Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized—to hampering changes. That is why it is so important to ensure the widest possible democracy and at the same time discipline, openness and responsibility, pluralism of outlooks and consistency in activity, solving of urgent current problems and activity designed for the future.
Wojciech Jaruzelski and Mikhail Gorbachev expressed satisfaction about the development of relations between the two parties and states. They stressed mutual interest in the promotion of economic contacts, the need to work out a complex model based on sound economic considerations, and the principle of economic accounting of enterprises with a view to creating a joint socialist market.

Both leaders praised very highly the realization of tasks defined in the Polish-Soviet declaration on cooperation in the field of ideology, and also in the joint Polish-Soviet statement and stipulations adopted during last year’s visit of Mikhail Gorbachev in Poland.

As a result of these stipulations, among others, an agreement on an exchange of youth between Poland and the Soviet Union has been prepared, and the work of a joint group of scholars, researching the so-called “white spots” in the history of Polish-Soviet relations, is being continued.

It has been acknowledged that in the near future a joint document will be published in the Polish and Soviet press, prepared by scholars, dealing with the period preceding the outbreak and beginnings of World War II. Research on other problems is coming to an end. It has been stated that these efforts should be sped up, so that the bilateral commission of scholars and other respective organizations can present their assessments and conclusions regarding all the “white spots,” and particularly with regard to Katyn.

In the course of the conversation the questions of international policy were brought up and views were exchanged on other areas of world policy.

At the end of the talk Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized the invariable faithfulness of the CPSU and the Soviet people to Soviet-Polish friendship and also sent to Wojciech Jaruzelski, the communists and all people of Poland best wishes for success in solving the tasks of socialist renewal.

[Source: Hoover Institution Archive. Translated by Jan Chowniec for CWIHP.]
Meeting of the Politburo on 11 May 1989. Discussion of the Memorandum of Six Politburo members on the situation in the Baltic Republics.

(...)

Medvedev. Formal data on the outcome of elections of the people's deputies of the USSR in the Baltic republics (participation in elections, percentage of communists among deputies, etc.) should not create illusions. Most of the elected deputies are members and active participants of Popular Fronts, they share a separatist and nationalistic mood, and the Popular Fronts themselves act as a force opposing the CPSU, opposing interests of their nation to all-Union interests... Terrors of so-called flexible tactics [avtrovozvuky] by the leadership of the Republics have been leading so far to continuous concessions, affecting negatively the unity and combat readiness of the Party... In the emerging situation the party and state leaders of the Republics need political will, determination to fulfill the course of the CPSU towards the renewal and consolidation of socialism. At the same time the republican leadership badly needs our assistance and moral-political support.

(...)

Gorbachev. We should look into the roots of the situation. Without them we will not figure it out. In the framework of perestroika there goes a stormy process of growing national self-consciousness in those Republics. And a very serious issue arises - about a more modern and complete interpretation of the notion of "sovereignty." This is a real issue. When a people has intelligentsia, it digs in history and bares roots. By itself this is a multi-faceted [bogati] process, but it has negative repercussions...

The roots of the situation is in the specifics of history. In particular of the history of 1930-1940s. And this requires precise ideological characterization. But we are lagging behind. Meanwhile newer and newer anthills of wood are being thrown into the fire. And we are not giving answers to the people.

Perestroika has demonstrated how many deformations had accumulated in everything - in culture, in language, in productive forces. Earlier we could somehow muscle through [okhoditse], but now we will not. And force does not help in this business. We have accepted that even in foreign policy force does not help [nichego ne date]. But especially internally - we cannot resort and will not resort to force...

[The leaders of communist parties of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia who were present at the Politburo meeting. After they left]

We trust all three of them, there is no question... Well, our comrades are at the end of their patience! Omissions [upushcheniya] had been made at the stage when their predecessors ruled. Let us consider that not everything is lost. And we should be careful in our assessments. So as not to push them into despair, into the open break.

Voices from the Politburo members: Maybe we should really agree to hold referenda in these Republics? None of them will accrue.
...Gorbachev concludes. We cannot equal the Popular Fronts which are supported by 50% of the population of the Republics, with extremists. And we should learn how to talk with them...Trust the people's common sense...Do not be afraid of experiments with full economic self-accounting [khozraschet] of the Republics...Do not be afraid of differentiation among the Republics according to the level of practiced sovereignty...And after all: think, think how in practice to transform our federation. Otherwise everything would really collapse...The use of force is out of the question. We excluded it from foreign policy, and especially against our people [force] is out of question..."
The 1989 “Vltava” exercise in Czechoslovakia differed significantly from previous such maneuvers. It showed that the Warsaw Pact had already begun to implement the transformation from an offensive to a defensive strategy introduced by Gorbachev. It exposed a number of practical implications that resulted from this important change. For example, there were difficulties in timing the retaliatory measures that were anticipated in the event of a NATO attack. Exercise directors also found it hard to simulate the release of nuclear weapons because their staffs no longer knew how to do so—one of several signs at the time that the Warsaw Pact’s elaborate planning had been slipping.

In connection with the plan for joint measures to prepare the Unified Armed Forces in the 1988–1989 training year, from May 22–26, 1989, a joint frontal command-staff exercise of the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the Central Group of Forces “Vltava-89” was carried out. Its theme was “The preparation of a defensive operation with the front of the coalition. Driving back aggression by the adversary in the face of incomplete mobilization and deployment of forces. Conduct of combat operations to keep control of the tactical defense zone, and execution of a counter-strike by the front.”

The exercise was based on the requirements of the military doctrine of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact as a defensive doctrine, on the decisions of the meeting of the Political Consultative Council and of the sessions of the Committee of Defense Ministers and the Military Council of the Unified Armed Forces. What was new in the exercise was […] that the Czechoslovak People’s Army and the Central Group of Forces were integrated within a new organizational […] structure. Austria retained her neutrality.

[...] At the first stage, the participants noted difficulties in organizing and supplying the counter-engagement operations, especially those by the air forces, and those of the illumination support on the battlefield. The exercise confirmed our lagging behind the NATO armies in terms of air force equipment with means enabling combat operations at night, and also showed that such equipment in other branches of the armed forces required further perfection.

[...]

The experience of “Vltava-89” revealed the difficulties the participants in the exercise had in choosing the time period for carrying out counter-engagements in conformity with the principles of our defensive military doctrine.

[...]

634
At the second stage, in the course of 2 days and 4 hours (after an operational leap to D-7), the participants practiced the destruction of enemy forces that had penetrated into [our] defenses with the use of nuclear weapons. They made decisions on the restoration of the fighting capabilities of the troops, the development of combat operations, and the elimination of the effects of nuclear strikes by the enemy. Headquarters of the territorial military districts throughout the exercise solved problems connected with the protection and defense of territory, the evacuation of the population, the elimination of the consequences of the destruction of the nuclear power stations, and the formation of reserves and compensation for troop losses of the front.

[...]

The shift to nuclear weapons by both sides at the second stage of the exercise allowed the commanders and staff to resurrect somewhat lost practical skills in solving tasks [related to] directing the delivery of nuclear strikes and restoring the fighting capacity of the troops.

[Source: VS, KaMO, 1989, č.j. 60060/29, VÚA. Translated by Malcolm Byrne for the National Security Archive.]
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 07400 01 OF 07 050949Z

ACTION BUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 HA-09 L-03
LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-13 NRR-01
STL-01 INR-00 BIB-01 OPM-01 OES-09 UST-00 SF-02
SNP-01 FAIN-01 PRS-01 SCT-02 P-02 T-01 /096 W

R 0214322 JUN 89
PM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECESTTE WASHDC 4794
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 07 WARSAW 07400

CORRECTED COPY (REF LINE)

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PNR, ELAB, PHUM, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S COMING VICTORY: BIG OR TOO BIG?

REF: WARSAW 05247

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE FIRST ESSENTIALLY FREE ELECTION IN THE SOCIALIST BLOC WILL GIVE THE POLISH NATION A CLEAR AND UNHINDERED CHANCE TO VOTE FOR OR AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CURRENT REGIME. THE ONE-SIDED CAMPAIGN, IN WHICH SOLIDARITY HAS EMERGED AS A GENUINE AND CAPABLE POLITICAL PARTY, HAS DEFINED THE ELECTION IN TERMS OF A PLEBISCITE. THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS. ANXIETIES AND UNCERTAINTY DOMINATE EXPECTATIONS, WHILE THE ABSENCE OF EITHER OBJECTIVE DATA OR PRECEDENT MAKE CONFIDENTIAL PREDICTIONS IMPOSSIBLE. AS A MATTER OF FAITH, HOWEVER, WE ASSUME NEARLY-TOTAL SOLIDARITY VICTORY. THOSE SEATS DENIED SOLIDARITY WILL LIKELY GO TO OTHER INDEPENDENT OR OPPOSITION CANDIDATES, RATHER THAN THE PARTY, WHICH WILL PROBABLY CAPTURE ONLY 2 OR 3 SENATE
SEATS. A MORE MODEST -- BUT NEVERTHELESS SOLID -- VICTORY FOR SOLIDARITY WOULD ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR A STABLE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION. TOTAL VICTORY OR SOMETHING CLOSE TO IT, INCLUDING POSSIBLE REJECTION OF THE NATIONAL LIST, WILL THREATEN A SHARP DEFENSIVE REACTION FROM THE REGIME. THE POSITION OF THE LEADING PARTY REFORMERS WOULD BE ENDANGERED. SHARPER, AND EVEN POSSIBLY MILITARY RESPONSES CANNOT BE ENTIRELY RULED OUT. EVEN IN THE MODERATE SCENARIOS OF POST-ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE PARTY IS BOUND TO BE TRANSFORMED BY ITS FAILURES. THE DEGREE OF THAT TRANSFORMATION DEPENDS UPON THE SCOPE OF THE FAILURE THE PARTY WILL FACE. ONE SENSES THAT THE HISTORICAL FORCE OF A VAST AND POWERFUL CURRENT IS ABOUT TO TRANSFORM POLAND'S TOPOGRAPHY FOREVER. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JUNE 4, THE POLISH PEOPLE WILL HAVE THEIR FIRST OPPORTUNITY IN MANY DECADES TO PARTICIPATE IN AN ESSENTIALLY FREE ELECTION. DESPITE A PARTIALLY-CONTRIVED OUTCOME, THE REMAINING FREE CHOICE IS STARK AND ITS HISTORIC IMPORTANCE IS VIVIDLY CLEAR. WITHOUT AMBIGUITY, THE POLISH VOTERS WILL BE ABLE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF A DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION AND THOSE WHO REPRESENT FOUR DECADES OF SOCIALIST RULE. THE ONE-SIDED CAMPAIGN, WHICH IS MORE AKIN TO THAT OF A PLEBISCITE THAN OF AN ELECTION, HAS ACCENTED THE VIVID CHOICE. THE STAKES HAVE THEREFORE BECOME ENORMOUS, PERHAPS GREATER THAN MOST PERCEIVE. WITH SUCH AN AMOUNT ON THE TABLE, IT IS ALL THE MORE AMAZING THAT VIRTUALLY NO ONE WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH IS PREPARED TO OFFER CONCRETE, CONFIDENT PREDICTIONS OF THE ELECTION'S OUTCOME OR ITS EVENTUAL IMPACT ON POLAND'S FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE RETAINED OUR OWN CONVICTIONS OF NEAR-TOTAL SOLIDARITY VICTORY (SEE REFTEL), AND IRONICALLY THE FRIGHTENING INSTABILITY THAT COULD ENSUE, RELYING MORE ON DEMOCRATIC THEOLOGY THAN ON OBJECTIVE DATA. OTHER OBSERVERS ALSO ARE HINDERED BY THE ABSENCE OF THE LATTER AND THE MYSTERY OF AN ENTIRELY UNPRECEDENTED EVENT. WISHFUL OR FEARFUL THINKING DOMINATES THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE POLISH NATION.
4. Even now, two days before the election, it is virtually impossible to obtain a list of all candidates for the new parliament. Solidarity selected and presented its comprehensive list six weeks ago, and the candidates have been campaigning in a frenzy of high-profile activity ever since. The party has not published any complete candidate list, only referring to confidential individual candidates in far from comprehensive press coverage. Partial lists have been published in some provincial papers, but in order to draw...
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL

Date Printed: 08/26/1997  DOC_NUMBER: 89WARSAW07400  CHANNEL: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  WARSAW 07400 02 OF 07 021742Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO
LOG-00  ADS-00  INR-07  SS-00  CIAE-00  EB-00  DODE-00
H-01  IO-19  NSCE-00  NSAE-00  COME-00  HA-09  L-03
LAB-04  TRSE-00  PM-10  PA-01  OMB-01  STR-18  NRRC-01
SIL-01  INRE-00  BIB-01  OPM-01  OES-09  USIE-00  SP-02
SNP-01  PRS-01  SCT-02  P-02  T-01  /095 W

R 021432Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4795
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 07 WARSAW 07400

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ELAB, PHUM, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY’S COMING

UP A COMPLETE CANDIDATE LIST, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TRAVEL TO EACH CONSTITUENCY TO LOOK AT THE LISTS WHICH, BY LAW, WERE TO BE POSTED BY MAY 20. EVEN SOLIDARITY’S CITIZENS’ COMMITTEE, THE HUB OF THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN, HAS NOT YET MANAGED TO ASSEMBLE A WHOLE LIST OF ITS PARTY OPPONENTS. THIS NEARLY SECRETIVE AND CHAOTIC CAMPAIGNING IS WHAT SOME ANALYSTS CALL THE PARTY’S "CAMPAIGN STRATEGY."

5. AT THE SAME TIME, OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA HAS LOUDLY CRITICIZED SOLIDARITY FOR FOCUSING ITS CAMPAIGN ON INDIVIDUALS AND ISSUES, BUT ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF A FULL SLATE OF CANDIDATES AS SOLIDARITY’S OWN. THE REGIME CLAIMS IT DOESN’T WANT TO COMPETE IN A "CONFRONTATIONAL" WAY AGAINST SOLIDARITY AS
A body; it would prefer to measure individual candidates against individual candidates. If the electorate perceives the candidates according to their "party" identification, the regime fears, the bald choice between Solidarity's slate and the regime slate (as shadowy as that is) would spell certain defeat for the latter. Thus the party is in the incredibly awkward position of trying to contest seats individually -- rather than slate vs. slate -- while keeping its individual candidates practically secret. Surely no exercise in participatory democracy has ever been attempted in this way.

6. Those official candidates actually out on the hustings are eager to obfuscate their party connections. Even major regime figures on the national list are identified there according to absurdly artificial labels in some cases, rather than as a PZPR candidate. Some non-Solidarity candidates are downright fearful the party will ruin them with its public embrace. PZPR member, but "independent" Senate candidate Longin Pastusiak, was genuinely distressed on May 30 when he heard that the party daily, "Trybuna Ludu," had published an endorsement of his candidacy. He called the endorsement the "kiss of death," a phrase heard with increasing frequency these days. Less harmful and more meaningful contributions of support from the party -- such as campaign funds -- have been conspicuously denied him. The party, crippled by chaos and dissention, in Pastusiak's view, has actually hindered his campaign and harmed its own interests. One of the lessons of this campaign is that, however the PZPR evolves as a result of this extraordinary challenge, in the new political reality it will have to become what it has always claimed to be -- a political party.

7. The PZPR is, in fact, performing none of the traditional functions of a political party facing an electoral challenge. To understand the dramatically new reality, one must see that the concept of party has been reversed by democratization of the process. The one "party" in Poland, the PZPR, has confirmed itself as a political bureaucracy of a decaying power elite wholly incapable of performing the classical functions of a political party in electoral competition. Solidarity, on the other hand, despite years of handwringing over its political evolution and the not-so-crafty illusion...
OF SETTING UP THE CITIZENS' COMMITTEE TO PERFORM
THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS WHILE THE "TRADE UNION"
MAINTAINED ITS IDENTITY, HAS EMERGED FULLY GROWN
AS THE ONLY REAL POLITICAL PARTY IN POLAND, IF NOT
EASTERN EUROPE. ALL THE SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS ARE
OBVIOUS AND HAVE BEEN REPORTED EXTENSIVELY IN
SEPTELS. BUT BENEATH THE SURFACE TOO, THE ESSENCE
OF POLITICAL PARTY HAS CRYSTALLIZED. THE MECHANISM
JUDGES THE CAPACITY OF INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES TO
COMPETE AND
APPORTIONS OR DIRECTS THEM ACCORDINGLY.
IT CREATES CONSISTENT PARTY POLICY AND IMPOSES
DISCIPLINE. AT THE ROUND-TABLE, THE SOLIDARITY SIDE
WAS FAR MORE COHERENT AND DISCIPLINED THAN THE REGIME

CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S COMING

SIDE. ONE INDEPENDENT SOCIOLOGIST HAS REPORTED TO US THAT A RESEARCH PROJECT IN SILESIA REVEALED THAT PARTY DISCIPLINE IN THE PZPR STRUCTURES THERE ACHIEVED A RESEARCH-DEFINED QUOTIENT OF 20 PERCENT, WHILE THE FACTOR FOR SOLIDARITY'S ORGANIZATION IN SILESIA WAS 80 PERCENT.

8. NONE OF THIS HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH A LABOR UNION. INDEED, WHEN WE ASK SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN WORKERS ABOUT LOCAL SOLIDARITY MEMBERSHIP IN FACTORIES, THEY NOT ONLY HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT, BUT ARE A BIT SURPRISED BY THE QUESTION. THERE IS A DIFFERENT FOCUS NOW. SOLIDARITY WILL, OF COURSE, ALWAYS BE A LABOR UNION AND AFTER THE ELECTION MUCH ENERGY WILL BE DEVOTED TO RESTRUCTURING IT. BUT SURELY THE DAYS IN WHICH POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN POLAND WAS FIRMLY IDENTIFIED WITH TRADE UNIONISM ARE OVER. THE MOVEMENT HAS EMERGED CLEARLY AS SOMETHING FAR MORE EXPLICITLY POLITICAL.

-----------------
POSSIBLE RESULTS
-----------------


CONFIDENTIAL
EVEN INSTABILITY. SOCIOLOGIST AND SEJM CANDIDATE JACEK SZYMANDERSKI, WHO IS AN EXPERIENCED OPINION RESEARCHER, TOLD US THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE A PARTICULAR RESPONSE OR ACTION ARE NOW FAR TOO CHANGEABLE TO PERMIT ANY ISOLATED RESEARCH TO BE PREDICTIVE. SZYMANDERSKI SUSPECTS THAT THE REGIME MAY BE RELYING ON SUCH FAULTY DATA AND IT MAY BE THE REASON WHY IT EXPECTED -- AT LEAST AT FIRST -- ONLY MODERATE DEFEAT. IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION, POLITBURO MEMBER AND RESPECTED PSYCHOLOGIST JANUSZ REYKOWSKI EXPLAINED THAT "NORMATIVE ANCHORS" WERE NOW MISSING THROUGHOUT POLISH POLITICAL LIFE AND THE NATION'S POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS WAS ADRIFT. HE SAID THAT HUMAN BEHAVIOR -- INCLUDING VOTING BEHAVIOR -- AT SUCH TIMES WAS UNPREDICTABLE. HISTORIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, EXPLAIN EVERYONE'S INABILITY TO ARRIVE AT WELL-FOUNDED EXPECTATIONS, BY SIMPLY POINTING TO THE UTTER ABSENCE OF PRECEDENT. JACEK KURON PROVIDED THE MOST APPROPRIATE PHRASE: THE ELECTION IS A GIANT LEAP INTO THE DARK.

10. ONE OF THE MOST OBJECTIVE AND EXPERIENCED RESEARCHERS IN POLISH PUBLIC OPINION IS WARSAW UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR STANISLAW GEBETHNER. HE HAS CONDUCTED THE MAJOR ELECTION BEHAVIOR RESEARCH PROJECTS IN POLAND FOR YEARS, AND AUTHORED "DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS: A REPORT ON OPINION RESEARCH IN THE FALL OF 1985", BASED ON VOTER BEHAVIOR IN THE SEJM ELECTIONS OF THAT YEAR. GEBETHNER TOLD US ON MAY 31 THAT HE HAD NO FAITH IN THE PREDICTIVE ABILITY OF POLLS HE HIMSELF WAS CONDUCTING AT THE MOMENT; RATHER THEY WERE AIMED AT THE ACCUMULATION OF DATA OVER TIME TO GIVE RESEARCHERS THE ABILITY TO ANALYZE THE
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Date Printed:** 08/26/1997  **DOC_NUMBER:** 89WARSAW07400  **CHANNEL:** n/a 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>EUR-00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFO</td>
<td>LOG-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-01</td>
<td>IO-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAB-04</td>
<td>TRSE-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIL-01</td>
<td>INRE-00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP-01</td>
<td>PRS-01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R 0214322 JUN 89
PM AMBASSADYS WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4797
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADYS PARIS
AMBASSADYS VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMBASSADYS BRUSSELS

**CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 07 WARSAW 07400**

**BRUSSELS FOR USEC**

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ELAB, PHUM, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S COMING PROCESS AFTER THE FACT. GEBETHNER CONFIRMED THAT THERE ARE FAR TOO MANY UNKNOWN FACTORS TO PERMIT RATIONAL PREDICTION. NEVERTHELESS, HE PROVIDED US WITH A CONVENIENT OUTLINE OF THE FULL BREADTH OF POSSIBILITIES FOR THE ELECTION RESULTS, ALBEIT WITH HIS PERHAPS EXCESSIVE ACADEMIC THOROUGHNESS.

11. GEBETHNER SEES FIVE DIFFERENT POSSIBILITIES: FIRST, SOLIDARITY COULD SIMPLY FAIL TO MOBILIZE SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT AND WOULD WIN FEWER THAN HALF OF THE SEATS FOR WHICH ITS CANDIDATES ARE CONTENDING; SECOND, THE DISTRUSTFUL AND SKEPTICAL POPULATION WOULD SIMPLY STAY HOME AND THE TURNOUT WOULD PROVIDE A MIXED RESULT, BUT WITH NO MANDATE FOR EITHER SIDE. EITHER OF THESE TWO POSSIBILITIES, GEBETHNER SAID, WOULD BE A SERIOUS FAILURE FOR BOTH SIDES AND WOULD MARK THE FAILURE OF THE ROUND-TABLE ITSELF. LUCKILY, HE SEES LITTLE CHANCE THAT EITHER WILL OCCUR.

12. THE THIRD POSSIBLE SCENARIO IS THAT SOLIDARITY WILL RECEIVE A MODEST POSITIVE RESULT, PERHAPS ONLY AROUND 60 PERCENT OF THE VOTE AND A SIMILAR PERCENTAGE OF THE AVAILABLE SEATS. THIS RESULT ALSO WOULD NOT BE THE BEST FOR EITHER SOLIDARITY OR THE REGIME; SOLIDARITY FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, AND...
THE REGIME BECAUSE ITS HOPED-FOR PARTNER WILL HAVE BEEN PROVEN TOO WEAK TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY SOCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE HARD CHOICES AHEAD. THE REGIME'S HIGH-STAKES GAMBLE WOULD NOT HAVE FAILED, BUT ALSO WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WORTH THE EFFORT.

13. THE FOURTH POSSIBLE OUTCOME IS THAT SOLIDARITY WILL ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY, DEFINED BY GEBETHNER AS ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE SENATE AND MOST, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE SEJM SEATS AVAILABLE TO IT. NEARLY ALL OF THE NATIONAL LIST WOULD BE ACCEPTED, WITH PERHAPS A FEW REJECTS. IN GEBETHNER'S VIEW, WHO IT MUST BE NOTED WAS ON THE REGIME SIDE AT THE ROUND-TABLE ON POLITICAL REFORM, THIS FOURTH SCENARIO IS BY FAR THE MOST PREFERABLE. SOLIDARITY WOULD HAVE PROVEN ITS BROAD SOCIAL SUPPORT -- ENOUGH TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO ITS SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE ROLE, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO THREATEN THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME. BOTH SIDES WOULD WIN BECAUSE THE REFORMERS IN BOTH CAMPS WOULD HAVE BEEN CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 07400 04 OF 07 0217442

CONFIRMED AND STRENGTHENED.

14. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, PZPR LIBERAL PROFESSOR JERZY WIATR EXPLAINED THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NATIONAL LIST IN THIS SCENARIO WOULD HAVE POSITIVE REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE REGIME FAR BEYOND THE OBJECTIVE ELECTORAL RESULTS. WIATR SAID THAT THE ELECTION HAD BECOME A PLEBISCITE -- DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO THE OPPOSITION'S CYNICAL "MANIPULATION" OF THE ROUND-TABLE ACCORDS -- AND THAT THIS PERSPECTIVE HAD FOCUSED THE EXERCISE ON THE NATIONAL LIST. HOWEVER, HE ARGUED, SOLIDARITY HAD ACTUALLY DONE THE REGIME A "FAVOR" BY CASTING THE ELECTION IN THESE TERMS. WIATR CLAIMED TO BE CONFIDENT THAT NEARLY EVERYONE ON THE NATIONAL LIST WOULD SUCCEED IN BEING ELECTED. (SZYMANDERSKI EXPLAINED THAT VOTING FOR THE NATIONAL LIST WILL BE A MECHANICAL ACT OF "PASSIVE SUPPORT" CONSISTENT WITH YEARS OF ELECTORAL HABIT. VOTING AGAINST IT WOULD BE A MORE DELIBERATE ACT OF AGGRESSIVE REJECTION. PSYCHOLOGY FAVORED THE FORMER ACTION, HE CLAIMED.) IF THE LIST IS ACCEPTED, WIATR SAID, IT WOULD BE LOUDLY TRUMPETED AS CONFIRMATION OF THE REGIME'S LEGITIMACY; CONFIRMATION WHICH THE COMMUNISTS HAD LONG Sought, AND ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ENTIRE ROUND-TABLE PROCESS.

15. (IN A LAST MINUTE BRIEFING OF AMBASSADORS ON JUNE 2, POLITBURO MEMBER JOZEF CZYREK STRONGLY IMPLIED THAT THE PARTY WILL APPEAL THE RESULT IF
THE NATIONAL LIST OF 35 CANDIDATES IS NOT ELECTED. HE WOULD REGARD THIS OUTCOME AS A VIOLATION OF THE ROUND-TABLE AGREEMENT WHICH SPECIFICALLY

ALLOCATED 65 PERCENT OF THE SEJM SEATS TO THE GOVERNMENT COALITION. IT WOULD ALSO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, IN THE PARTY’S VIEW, SINCE THE CONSTITUTION CLEARLY SPECIFIES THAT THE SEJM SHALL HAVE 460 MEMBERS AND THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS IN THE ELECTORAL LAW FOR HOLDING BYELECTIONS FOR THE 35 SEATS WHICH DEFEAT OF THE NATIONAL LIST
WOULD LEAVE VACANT. THE GOVERNMENT COULD THEREFORE
APPEAL SUCH AN OUTCOME EITHER TO THE SUPREME COURT
OR THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL.)

16. THE FIFTH AND MOST DANGEROUS SCENARIO IN
CONFIDENTIAL

THIS ANALYSIS IS NEARLY TOTAL SOLIDARITY VICTORY.
THIS GEBETHNER DEFINES AS 85 PERCENT OF THE SENATE
OR MORE, NEARLY ALL OF THE 161 SEJM SEATS RESERVED
FOR INDEPENDENTS, AND THE REJECTION OF ALL OR MOST
OF THE NATIONAL LIST. THIS POSSIBILITY, HE SAID,
WAS "REAL." WE COULD PROVIDE QUOTES FROM OTHER
THOUGHTFUL AND AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES WHO JUDGE THE
LIKELIHOOD OF THIS SCENARIO ANYWHERE FROM IMPOSSIBLE
TO CERTAIN. NONE OF THESE GUESSES WOULD BE ANY MORE
VALID, WE ASSUME, THAN THE OTHERS. HOWEVER, SINCE
THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS, IT IS USEFUL TO EXAMINE
IN DETAILED TERMS WHAT SUCH A RESULT COULD REALLY
MEAN IN THE NEW LEGISLATURE:

17. A SENATE HEAVILY DOMINATED BY THE OPPOSITION
PREASSUMABLY WOULD ASSURE CONSISTENT VETO OF ALL
LEGISLATION THAT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO SOLIDARITY
(GUIDED BY ITS NEW PARTY DISCIPLINE.) SOLIDARITY'S
35 PERCENT IN THE SEJM WOULD BECOME 38 PERCENT
BECAUSE THE REJECTION OF THE NATIONAL LIST WOULD
MEAN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS AT THAT POINT WOULD
BE FEWER. THAT THE REGIME "COALITION", ALREADY
INCAPABLE OF DELIVERING THE TWO/THIRDS MAJORITY
NECESSARY TO OVERRIDE A SENATE VETO, WOULD BE IN
AN EVEN WEAKER POSITION. EVEN MORE SERIOUSLY,
THE ADDITION OF A HANDBUL OF VOTES FROM RENEGADE
COALITION PARTY DEPUTIES -- WHICH WE REGARD AS
A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY NO MATTER WHAT THE ELECTION
OUTCOME -- WOULD PERMIT A NEW "OPPOSITION
COALITION" IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO BLOCK THE
ELECTION OF JARUZELSKI AS PRESIDENT. THIS IN FACT
IS THE TRUE SCOPE OF WHAT IS AT STAKE IN THESE
ELECTIONS.

18. THERE IS A SIXTH POSSIBLE OUTCOME THAT
FALLS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH
OUTLINED ABOVE. THAT IS THAT SOLIDARITY WILL
ACHIEVE A SIGNIFICANT BUT LESS THAN TOTAL VICTORY,
BUT THAT THOSE SEATS DENIED SOLIDARITY WOULD NOT
BE FILLED BY REGIME-BACKED CANDIDATES. THERE ARE SOME CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH GENUINELY INDEPENDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED CANDIDATES MIGHT TAKE A SEAT FROM THE SOLIDARITY SLATE. IN RADOM, FOR INSTANCE, THE CHURCH IS STRONGLY BACKING A SENATE CANDIDATE IN OPPOSITION TO JAN JOZEF LIPSKI, THE SOLIDARITY CANDIDATE. SOME ARE ALSO PREDICTING THAT WŁADYSŁAW SILA-Nowicki MIGHT WIN IN HIS CONTEST AGAINST JACEK KURON. ALSO, WE CANNOT RULE OUT THAT KRAKOW WILL ELECT LESZEK MOczulski OVER ONE OF THE SOLIDARITY CANDIDATES. ALTHOUGH THESE AND OTHER POSSIBLE LOSSES TO SOLIDARITY WOULD BE COUNTED AS A DEFEAT FOR THE UNIFIED OPPOSITION SLATE, THE REGIME WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE SCANT COMFORT FROM THE FACT. FOR EACH OF THE SEATS IN THE SENATE AND SEJM DENIED SOLIDARITY, WE WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE JUST HOW INDEPENDENT THE VICTORS ARE. IN MANY OF THESE HYPOTHETICAL CASES, WE EXPECT THE EFFECT ON THE REGIME'S POSITION WILL BE ABOUT THE SAME AS IF SOLIDARITY'S VICTORY HAD BEEN TOTAL.

19. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT OPENLY-AVOWED PZPR CANDIDATES WILL WIN ANY OF THE CONTESTED SENATE SEATS? AS DIFFICULT AS IT IS TO SEE WHERE 50 PERCENT OF THE VOTING POPULATION WOULD ACTUALLY VOTE FOR A COMMUNIST, WE SEE AT LEAST TWO POSSIBILITIES: YOUNG, LIBERAL PARTY REFORMER ALEKSANDER Kwasniewski MIGHT WIN IN HIS HOME INDEPENDENT, COMMUNITY-BASED CANDIDATES MIGHT -
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 07 WARSAW 07400

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ELAB, PHUM, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY’S COMING

PROVINCE OF KOSZALIN; AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE
SECRETARY LESZEK MILLER MIGHT WIN IN HIS HOME
PROVINCE OF SKIERNEWICE. THERE MIGHT BE OTHER
PZPR SENATE CANDIDATES OUT THERE WITH A CHANCE TOO,
BUT WE WAIT TO BE SURPRISED.

- ------------
REPERCUSSIONS
- ------------

20. THE REFORM FACTION IN THE PARTY HAS EMBARKED ON
ITS HIGHLY RISKY VOYAGE PRECISELY BECAUSE IT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REALIZED AT LAST THE NECESSITY OF ENLISTING THE
OPPOSITION’S ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IF THE DIFFICULT
REFORM PROCESSES WERE TO SUCCEED. THE FACTION
NEEDED FROM SOLIDARITY THE PRESTIGE OF ITS
POPULAR STATURE AND THE STRENGTH OF ITS BROAD
SUPPORT. ALSO, THE REGIME NEEDED TO GAIN SOME
CREDIBILITY OF ITS OWN BY ACCEPTING BROAD
PARTICIPATION IN AN ELECTORAL CONTEST. LASTLY,
THE POLISH AUTHORITIES NEEDED TO CONVINCE THE WEST
THAT REFORM WAS REAL AND THE NATION AT LAST HAD BEEN
MADE PART OF THE PROCESS. ALL THIS WOULD FAIL OR
BE ENDANGERED IF SOLIDARITY FAILS TO ACHIEVE A
MODERATE VICTORY OR IF THE POPULATION STAYS HOME.
THE FIRST THREE SCENARIOS OUTLINED ABOVE WOULD
WEaken THE FOUNDATION OF THE ROUND-TABLE AND
POLAND’SPRESSING PROBLEMS WOULD BE NO NEARER
SOLUTION. WE ARE RELIEVED THAT NONE OF THESE
THREE SEEMS LIKELY TO OCCUR.

21. THE FOURTH SCENARIO, ONE IN WHICH SOLIDARITY
ACHIEVES A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS WHILE NOT THREATENING
IMMEDIATELY FUNDAMENTAL REGIME INTERESTS, IS
PREPARED BY ALMOST EVERYONE IN THE HIERARCHIES OF BOTH SOLIDARITY AND THE REGIME. UNFORTUNATELY, NOT ALL OPPOSITION CANDIDATES AGREE. MANY HAVE BEEN SWEPT UP BY THE MOMENTUM OF AN EXHILARATING ELECTORAL BATTLE IN WHICH IT IS SIMPLY NOT POSSIBLE TO CAMPAIGN HALF-HEARTEDLY, EVEN IF THEY INTELLECTUALLY ACCEPT THAT A LESS THAN TOTAL VICTORY WOULD BE PREFERABLE. OTHERS, LIKE SZYMANDERSKI, SIMPLY DENY THAT THIS IS A TIME FOR MODERATION. HE BELIEVES THE OPPOSITION HAS THE COMMUNISTS BY THE THROAT AND SHOULD SLIT IT "WITH A LONG, SHARP KNIFE." ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AS BRUTAL AS HIS GRAPHIC METAPHOR IMPLIES, SZYMANDERSKI -- AND OTHER CANDIDATES TOO -- ARE CONVINCED THAT TOTAL VICTORY MUST BE PURSUED WITH TOTAL ENERGY. THIS VIGOR BEGS A SERIOUS QUESTION. IS SOLIDARITY PREPARED OR ABLE TO GOVERN ON ITS OWN EVEN IF IT ACHIEVED -- AND WAS PERMITTED TO RETAIN -- THAT DEGREE OF TOTAL VICTORY? MANY IN THE OPPOSITION BELIEVE IT IS NOT CAPABLE OF SUCH A TASK. SOLIDARITY NEEDS THE REGIME, OR PART OF IT, AS DESPERATELY AS THE REGIME NOW NEEDS SOLIDARITY. THE ENORMOUSLY CHALLENGING TASKS AHEAD AND THE GREAT PAIN THAT MUST BE IMPOSED ON THE POPULATION DURING A TIME OF REFORM AND TRANSITION SIMPLY REQUIRE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION AND THE GREATEST POSSIBLE EXPERTISE AT THE TOP.

22. WITHOUT DOUBT THE STRONGEST MOTIVATION FOR SUPPORTING THE FOURTH SCENARIO IS THE SPECTER OF UTTER CATASTROPHE THAT HAUNTS THE FIFTH. FOR SOME, THIS FIFTH VISION RIDES A PALE HORSE INDEED. SOME RATIONAL, SOLID PARTY LIBERALS EVEN SOUND SOMEWHAT HYSTERICAL WHEN DISCUSSING IT. REYKOWSKI SAID IT WOULD BE "A COMPLETE DISASTER FOR THE NATION." WIATR SAID THIS SCENARIO WOULD POSE A MORTAL THREAT TO THE AUTHORITIES AND THE RESULT COULD BE "A MILITARY COUP D'ETAT, CIVIL WAR, OR BOTH." OTHERS HAVE ALSO SPOKEN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MARTIAL LAW, OR OVERT MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

23. OTHER OBSERVERS ARE MORE MODEST IN THEIR WARNINGS OF DISASTER, ARGUING THAT THE REAL CHAOS WOULD BE IN THE PARTY ITSELF. SOME PREDICT THAT JARUZELSKI AND THE REFORM FACTION
RRR 0214322 JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SEOSTATE WASHDC 4800
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 07 OF 07 WARSAW 07400

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, ELAB, PHUM, PL

SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S COMING

WOULD BE THROWN OUT, AND RESURGENT HARDLINERS WOULD
GENERATE A MORE TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST RESPONSE,
SHORT OF MILITARY FORCE, BUT NEVERTHELESS HEAVY
HANDED. OTHERS BELIEVE THE PARTY WOULD SPLIT INTO
2, 3, OR 4 PARTS. GEBETHNER, FOR EXAMPLE, TOLD
US THAT THE GROUNDWORK HAD ALREADY BEEN LAID FOR
A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO EMERGE FROM THE PZPR

AFTER THE ELECTION, NO MATTER WHAT THE RESULT;
ONLY THE SPEED OF ITS EMERGENCE TO BE DETERMINED BY
THE SIZE OF THE PARTY'S FAILURE. JOURNALISTS TELL
US THAT THEIR HIGH-LEVEL PARTY SOURCES PREDICT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, COMMUNISTS, SOCIALISTS AND EVEN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TO EMERGE EVENTUALLY FROM A PARTY SPLINTERED BY UTTER ELECTORAL FAILURE. INDEED, THERE ARE AMPLE SIGNS THAT THE PZPR, LIKE RIVER ICE BREAKING UP IN SPRING, IS GROANING UNDER THE STRAIN. THE HISTORICAL FORCE OF A VAST AND POWERFUL CURRENT IS ABOUT TO TRANSFORM THE TOPOGRAPHY FOREVER.

DAVIS

CONFIDENTIAL

++++

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL
Minutes No. 64
from an expanded meeting of the PZPR CC Secretariat of
held on June 5, 1989

Secret

Comrades present: W. Jaruzelski, J. Czyrek, W. Baka, S. Ciosek, Z. Michalek, M.
Orzechowski, Z. Czarzasty, L. Miller, M. Stepien, B. Kolodziejczak.

Asent com. K. Cypryniak.

Invited:
Com. M.F. Rakowski – Politburo member, Prime Minister
Com. K. Barcikowski – Politburo member, Deputy Chairman of the Council of State
Com. Cz. Kiszczak – Politburo member, minister of internal affairs
Com. A. Miodowicz – Politburo member, Chairman of OPZZ (Trade Unions)
Com. J. Reykowski – Politburo Member
Com. F. Siwicki – Politburo member – minister of national defense
Com. J. Kubasiewicz – associate Politburo member, first secretary of the Warsaw PZPR

Committee
Com. Z. Sobotka – associate Politburo member

Com. I. Sekula – Deputy Prime Minister

Com. A. Gdula – division chief, secretary of the Law and Order Commission
Com. M. Lubczynski – division chief, secretary of the Commission of Party Work
Com. E. Szymanski – division chief, secretary of the Commission of Representative

Bodies
Com. A. Kwasniewski – minister, chairman of the Social-Political Committee of
The Council of Ministers
Com. J. Urban – minister, president of the Radion Committee

Com. J. Bisztyga – press spokesman of the CC PZPR

The Agenda:
An exchange of views on the first round of elections to the Sejm and Senate.

Com. W. Jaruzelski stated at the beginning that the election results are very bad for the coalition. What should be done right away in the nearest days?

- in today’s TV newscast a statement preceding the official election results-decide who will speak;
- today a meeting with the allies;
- on June 6 hold a Politburo meeting and a conference with first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees;
- consider different dates for a CC meeting (in an extraordinary procedure before June 18, after June 18), take decision at the Politburo, set dates for consultations with CC members;
- get in touch and hold talks with the Church hierarchy, consider a meeting with primate J. Glemp. The Church is the major culprit in the situation that has arisen;
- hold informational meetings with the Ambassadors accredited to Warsaw;
- consider the advisability of going ahead or postponing the planned visits of the chairman of the Council of State in London and Brussels and President Mitterrand’s visit to Poland.

Com. Czarzasty said the analysis of the election shows that they had had the character of a plebiscite, a referendum, which we had not been assuming. So far full results of voting for the national list are not available.

The Voivodship committees are signaling that the clergy, particularly on election day, were calling to vote for "S". Youth participation in the election was very small.

Com. J. Czyrek assessed that electoral assumptions could not be met. The personal formula turned out to be ineffective. The result has been decided in the first round. The opposition is not interested in the second round. Forecasts of election turnouts also were not on target. The coalition side, the party itself has proven ineffective in its campaigning and propaganda effort. The majority of voters had decided earlier who to vote for.

Now the most important thing is to master moods in the party and in the whole coalition. The allies are uneasy, "Solidarity" has already shown support for some of their candidates and it can still do it in the second round.

Establish urgently contacts with the Church, but also with the leadership of the opposition (decide on the forms and levels). Hold urgently a meeting of the Commission on Understanding.

Realize visits in London and Belgium, but postpone Mitterrand’s visit to our country.

Com. S. Ciosek – Today someone from the leadership or com. Urban should appear on TV. He is signaling a mood of depression among the engaged journalists.
Com. Cz. Kiszczak – The adversary has been fighting acutely from beginning to the end, using different means. We have been acting with "white gloves", without taking advantage of even obvious opportunities. Election results have exceeded the opposition’s expectations. They are shocked, don’t know how to behave. Elections to the Senate are a total disaster for us. The general had warned, we were saying that 65% of mandates in the Sejm would not provide sufficient protection for the coalition, as it is known that "S" stands behind some of our candidates (e.g. Fiszbach in Gdansk). This is true not only of party members, but also SD and ZSL members. This needs to be taken into consideration.

Com. Kiszczak acknowledged that the visits planned earlier should be realized.

Com. F. Siwicki explained that in all closed military districts the military (not the staff) had voted on the average 52-62% for the national list. Com. Kiszczak added that similar indicators, or even higher, up to 70-72% was true of the on-the-Vistula units, WOP and ZOMO.

Com. J. Urban was of the opinion that there should be a statement on the TV news of a commentary nature and not a communiqué from the Secretariat meeting, which can be given separately. The statement should emphasize that independently of the results we are for accepting a broad reform coalition, that all extreme attempts would be dangerous.

Geremek stated at a press conference that they are not interested in a coalition with the present system of government.

Com. J. Czyrek – A statement on TV should be agreed on with the allies and made on behalf of the coalition. Com. Reykowski shared this point of view. He thought that in that statement it should be pointed out that: the elections were democratic in preparation and implementation. Our electorate amounts to about 30%, which proves that we are not altogether in isolation. Warn the opposition against the possibility of destabilization under the influence of success.

Com. W. Baka proposed to emphasize in the statement that we had taken into account the unfavorable result. We are consistent, we have no other alternative. Warn against attempts at destabilization, pointing at the situation in China.

Hold the XIII CC plenary meeting at the turn of June and July and present there the party’s strategy.


Com. A. Kwasniewski emphasized that a matter extremely important after announcing the election results is to prevent spontaneous demonstrations, which neither side might be able to control. The opposition is also afraid of this. Get in touch with "S", so that any appearances should have peaceful character, without triumphalism.
Com. J. Urban proposed that com. Kiszczyk should appear on TV as a host of the "round table".

Com. Kiszczyk suggested that com. Urban might appear, that on this matter it’s appropriate to consult with Onyszkiewicz.

Com. M.F. Rakowski – Com. Kwasniewski might also appear as chairman of the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers, or com. J. Bisztyga as a press spokesman of the CC PZPR.

Com. A. Gdula – It’s enough if com. Bisztyga appears. He informed that Kuron in telephone conversation had expressed concern about the central list. He mentioned that it would be advisable to convene the Commission on Understanding. He stressed the necessity to secure peace.

Com. W. Jaruzelski – We don’t know how the "Solidarity" base will behave. Consider a simultaneous speech by spokesmen for the PZPR, ZSL and SD.

Com. K. Barcikowski thinks that from the "S" side there will be high-level spokesmen, so he proposes com. Kwasniewski or Urban from our side.

Com. J. Bisztyga – We can propose to Onyszkiewicz to appear with me, or with the participation of spokesmen for the ZSL and SD.


Com. Kwasniewski thought that if from the "S" side will come up Onyszkiewicz, then from our side J. Bisztyga should appear. The most important matter are talks with "S" on joint efforts to prevent loosen public feelings to the extent that neither side will be able to control. Let’s not disregard the moods in small centers, in very modern plants.

He thought it advisable to hold urgently a meeting of the Prime Minister with the chief of "Solidarity".

Com. Z. Sobotka – He favors a TV appearance by com. Kwasniewski.

Com. J. Bisztyga – Some youth groups may behave like after a victorious match. No appearance is going to silence euphoria. It would be good if com. Kwasniewski would appear.

Com. S. Ciosek – It would be best if Bisztyga and Onyszkiewicz would appear simultaneously. Inform our allies of this and obtain their authorization.

Com. M.F. Rakowski recognized that a plenary meeting should be called for urgently, still this week. Election results and in particular the results of voting for the national list will
hit the party strongly. Consider how we are going to react to the loss of the party and state leadership. What may be the consequences of this defeat?

Talks with the opposition are necessary. My meeting with Walesa should be considered. Geremek is talking about a change in the system of exercising power.

_Com. J. Reykowski_ – Absolutely hold a talk of the party leadership with the OPZZ. Geremek mentioned in a conversation they would be willing to enter into the Presidential Council with people from the national list (he said so before the elections). If it is possible from the legal point of view, negotiate with the opposition to turn to the Supreme Court for the introduction of an amendment to the electoral law, which would enable candidates from the national list to run in the second round.

_Com. J. Kubasiewicz_ – Hold talks with the opposition on the national list. Take into consideration that in the second round the opposition may support some candidates from our mandates.

_Com. J. Czyrek_ – It has been considered with Kuron how to resolve the situation if candidates from the national list won’t get elected. Then, based on a legal act, those 35 candidates would run again within that 65% pool.

_Com. K. Barcikowski_ - The main argument is a political agreement on the distribution of mandates. There is no possibility of repeating the national list in the second round, because, if they fail once again, it’s going to be a total discredit.

_Com. A. Kwasniewski_ – Repetition of the national list in the second round is unacceptable. It was crossed out also by our people. There is no guarantee it would pass [the second time]. We need to agree with the opposition that within the 65% pool we will transfer one mandate to each electoral district. This is the only chance. The national list has been a mistake and it should not be repeated. An important matter is to conduct an analysis on who are those who didn’t participate in the elections and by what motives they were guided. Is it a passive resistance? It’s well known that also party members were crossing out our candidates.

The plenary meeting should be called in fast. Consider convening a party congress.

_Com. Cz. Kiszczak_ – An important and urgent matter is to ensure attendance in the second round. Hold the plenary meeting later.

_Com. J. Kubasiewicz_ – In the first place hold consultations with CC members, then the plenum.

_Com. A. Gdula_ – Hold consultations with CC members very soon and the plenary meeting towards the end of the month. Present at it a penetrating assessment of the domestic situation and motions for the party work.
There is little we can do about the national list. We cannot annul the elections. It is possible for the new Sejm to adopt an amendment to the electoral law and hold new elections, or issue a statement that the Sejm has 425 deputies. Also examine whether it might be possible to make a new distribution of mandates on the basis of an understanding between the parties.

*Com. L. Miller* expressed anxiety over the condition of the party. Part of it didn’t support their own candidates. In the second round attendance may be weak. Also our trade unions and social organizations didn’t support us. We have to keep in mind that as triumphalism of the opposition rises, frustration in the party will be rising too. Any effort which we put into the campaign is disproportional to the results.

*Com. J. Urban* – Don’t renew the national list as we would ridicule ourselves before our own base. Negotiate with the opposition over supplemental elections and the composition of the Sejm defined in the Constitution. The opposition should accept this proposal. Start these talks right away. An example that part of the apparatus (party, state) voted for "S" are results of voting in Ulan-Bator, Pyongyang and Tirana. He recognized that meetings of the party leadership with the military circles, security apparatus and the mass media are urgently needed to calm down moods and present further perspectives.

The CC plenum should be held soon despite some risk. Postponing it would be evidence of paralysis of the party structures, of a crisis. Election results prove that the party in its present form has outlived itself. It needs an innovative political, ideological and organizational concept, otherwise there will be disintegration.

*Com. Cz. Kiszczak* – We are faced with the campaign to elect a president. Examine if the plenum can help or hurt us in this. It’s worth pondering on this, it’s very important.

*Com. Z. Michalek* – The election result is a crisis of confidence in us. Initiate talks with the opposition to save the names on the national list. Hold consultations with CC members fast. Postpone the plenum. Define the tasks for party members in the second round of elections. Conduct an assessment of efficiency of the regional apparatus on the basis of the election campaign.

*Com. M. Stepień* - Postpone discussion on the reasons for the present situation to another time. Today the most important question is to master the moods in the party by direct contacts by the leadership members. He proposed that the Politburo turns to all party members with a letter announcing a plenum and a congress.

*Com. E. Szymanski* – Negotiate with the opposition a legal procedure which would enable candidates from the national list to run in the second round of elections.

*Com. I. Sekula* – The election results prove that the society wants changes. The party has started the process of changes, but is conducting them very slowly, not radically. We have not fulfilled expectations; that is why "S" has won.
Com. Z. Czarzasty – We need to strive for a renewed voting for the national list, with different names, through a decree by the Council of State. 

At the plenary meeting tell about a congress (towards the year’s end or March 1990), initiate discussion on a program, statute, the name of the party, a vision for changes.

Com. A. Kwasniewski – A plenum within a short period is necessary. Losing the national list is putting the party leadership in a dramatic situation. Resume urgently negotiations with the opposition relating to the national list, president, government. Hold talks on these matters with the Church. Only after negotiating and working out a position on these major questions set the date for the plenum, talks about congress.

Com. B. Kolodziejczak – We cannot convene the plenum without having a position on the president and government, and an assessment of the situation. If the plenum is going to be prepared as the election campaign was, its result can be foreseen. We have to draw conclusions with the mistakes made by us, present to CC members a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the situation that has arisen. Talks with the opposition regarding a president must be conducted reliably.

Com. F. Siwicki – Convene the plenum when we have a thorough analysis of the reasons for the defeat and a concept of the functioning of the state within a new configuration of political forces. Resume urgently consultations with the opposition on the selection of the national list by a simple majority of votes. Start an evaluation of the situation in the basic cells of the party. Square up with the youth organizations for their participation in the election campaign, with conclusions. The most urgent questions are consultations with the opposition regarding the national list, government, president.

Com. J. Reykowski – The party turned out to be weak. What has happened is a result of a joint mistake in assessing the situation. Now the most important thing is the security of the state, president.

Com. Z. Sobotka – Very urgently turn to party members. Triumphing [sic] by "S" has already started. Soon pressure will mount for removing the party from the workplaces. Let’s not count too much on an understanding with the opposition. They have already got what they wanted and are not interested in the second round. Let’s not create a plenum without preparations, recently we have not been seeking their advice on important decisions. Urgently hold consultations with CC members, and have the plenum at a later date.

Com S. Ciosek – I don’t understand the reasons for the defeat. The party has to pay for it, it didn’t follow us. It’s a bitter lesson. Those responsible will have to bear the consequences. Now the most important question is the election of the president, for which we need 35 mandates – which were lost. On this we need to talk with the opposition, as the president is a protection for the whole system, it’s not only our internal matter, it’s a matter of the whole socialist commonwealth, even of Europe. On this matter seek urgent talks with the opposition (Commission for an Understanding) and with the
Church. Guilt is on our side. We trusted the Church, and they have turned out to be Jesuits. We overestimated our possibilities and have turned out to be deprived of the base. We have to keep in mind that very soon various claims and pressures will be rising like an avalanche – e.g. against the mass media. Radical changes must take place in the party.

*Com. Z. Michalek* – What does it mean -- radical changes in the party?

*Com. M.F. Rakowski* – We had a false assessment of the situation. The first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees had estimated our chances better. And the conclusion is that the perception of the moods, of what people think, is weak, that the aktiv, the party are not connected with the masses. We cannot use the thesis that the party has not backed us up. It’s false. The fact is that the party has not proved to be a mobile force. There was a lack of awareness that crossing out of their own people would cause self-destruction.

There is a fear that there may be strikes, wage pressures, demonstrations, which will complicate the economic situation even more.

One may agree with the notion that the plenum should not be held right now. But one needs to be aware that the party in its present structure is not in a position to stand up to current challenges. At the X plenum of the CC we proposed another model of the party, but this has not been noticed. And we need to go even further.

Talks with the opposition are necessary. It has proven to be trustworthy. It has called all along for crossing out the national list. What has happened in Poland is going to have tremendous impact outside (USSR, Hungary, other countries). This may lead to upheavals in the whole camp, this must be driven to social awareness. We need to draw all conclusions from the fact that considerable part of the society said "no".

*Com. K. Barcikowski* – In the analyses point out the reasons for the relatively low election turnout. Who are those who have not voted, by what were they motivated? In part they were also party members. One of the reasons was the personal formula of the elections.

Do we now have the right to take offense at the party? We have been managing it for the past 10 years. To whom should we then direct our claims? The same relates to the youth and social organizations. Examine this matter quietly, draw conclusions, ponder what to do to regain trust and how to do it. What to expect from the opposition now? It will make an assault – at national councils, at territorial self-government. Seek urgently talks on the question of the 35 mandates, president and the government. They are also afraid of the power falling apart.

*Com. W. Jaruzelski* suggested to adopt the following findings:

- on June 6th hold a Politburo meeting, and in the afternoon a conference with the first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees and division heads of the CC, jointly with the Politburo,
urgently seek talks with the opposition leadership, including a meeting of the Prime Minister with Walesa,
urgently hold a meeting of the Commission on an Understanding of the "round table",
hold talks with the Church (modo privato), possibly a meeting with Primate Glemp,
set the date for the XIII plenum in consultation with the first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees,
submit for decision by the Politburo and consultations with the first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees the matters of visits to Belgium and England and president Mitterand in Poland,
send out to all party members a letter of the Politburo (submit the draft to the first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees).

50% of our party now consists of all sorts of managers and retirees. Therefore it must be disquieting that just such a party (clerical) has not shown a self-protective instinct in the elections. This problem needs to be worked out in particular, draw conclusions. A considerable portion of the party is state administration, employees of the justice system – how to reach them? (staffing quickly vacant positions in the Supreme Court – com. Gdula). Think what to do to uplift in spirit the people engaged on our side, working in the mass media, to convince them that they are not lost. Hold meetings with those groups at the central level (W. Jaruzelski, M. Rakowski) and in the regions.

Comrades: Reykowski, Stepień, Czarzasty, Tabkowski will prepare tomorrow a draft letter from the Politburo to party members (encl. No. 1) [Omitted]

Recorded by: Bozena Łopatniuk

Urgent decisions of the CC PZPR Secretariat of June 5, 1989

• Work out a formula preceding the announcement of the official results of elections to the Sejm and Senate, e.g. by presenting in today’s TV newscast a signal – a preliminary political commentary on the expected results of the first round of elections. Responsible: J. Urban, J. Bisztyga.
• A calendar of the nearest political measures and initiatives: on June 5 – meeting of the working Secretariat of the Central Election Commission, on June 6 – a Politburo meeting (at 10 a.m.);

  a) work out a draft letter to the party – responsible: J. Reykowski, Z. Czarzasty, M. Stepień, S. Tabkowski, K. Barcikowski;
b) a conference with first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees (at 3 p.m.)
c) a meeting of the Prime Minister with Walesa;

- a meeting of the Central Commission on Cooperation of PZPR, ZSL and SD (possibly soon);
- a CC PZPR plenum (the date to be decided after the Politburo and conference with the first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees), preceded by a possible information-consultative meeting with CC members;
- Working contacts with Church representatives (correlated with a meeting of com. General with J. Glemp);
- Appropriate "contacts" preceding a possible meeting of the Commission for an understanding of the "round table" (among others to negotiate – determine the manner of supplemental elections in the second round of voting, 35 coalition deputies as an equivalent of the "national list");
- Information for the Ambassadors of states – accredited in Warsaw;
- Analyze all aspects of the planned visits by the General in Belgium and Great Britain and a visit by F. Mitterand.
- Urgently propose the selection of judges to the Supreme Court (for vacant positions). Responsible: A. Gdula.
- For consideration: what measures to take to enhance and keep in good shape the workers of the information-propaganda front (the press, radio, TV). Responsible: M.F. Rakowski, S. Ciosek, S. Tabkowski, J. Urban, first secretaries of the Voivodship Committees.

Translated by Jan Chowaniec for The National Security Archive, George Washington University

SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S VICTORY - RAISES QUESTIONS,

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: THE POLISH ELECTION HAS DEALT A STUNNING BLOW TO THE REGIME, WHICH HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ITS DEFEAT EVEN BEFORE THE FIGURES ARE IN. ALL OF SOLIDARITY'S CANDIDATES WILL WIN. ALTHOUGH THE REGIME'S "COALITION" TECHNICALLY WILL HAVE A TWO-VOTE MAJORITY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY -- BARRING SOME QUICK AND CREATIVE RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL LIST ISSUE -- CERTAIN DEFECTIONS WILL GIVE SOLIDARITY THE MAJORITY.

IF JARUZELSKI IS STILL TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT, IT WILL ONLY BE WITH SOLIDARITY ACQUIESCENCE IF NOT MORE ACTIVE SUPPORT. SOME IN THE OPPOSITION WILL NOW ARGUE THAT THIS EARLIER AGREEMENT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY; BUT THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP WILL SEARCH FOR SOME WAY TO IMPLEMENT IT. ALSO OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOW VOTER TURNOUT AND THE REJECTION OF THE NATIONAL LIST, DESPITE WALESA'S TELEvised APPEAL FOR MODERATION. A THIRD OF THE ELECTORATE HAS
REJECTED BOTH SIDES.

END SUMMARY

3. THE REGIME'S CRUSHING ELECTORAL DEFEAT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED BY PZPR SPOKESMAN JAN BISZTYGA ON TELEVISION MONDAY NIGHT (JUNE 5), ALTHOUGH NO OFFICIAL RESULTS HAVE BEEN RELEASED. WHEN THE OFFICIAL NUMBERS ARE IN, SOLIDARITY WILL HAVE ELECTED ITS CANDIDATES TO ALL OF THE SEJM SEATS FOR WHICH IT WAS FREE TO COMPETE, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY TO ALL 100 SEATS IN THE NEW SENATE. (PERHAPS SIX OR SEVEN WILL BE ELECTED ONLY IN THE SECOND ROUND). IN ADDITION, THE NATIONAL LIST OF THE REGIME'S MAJOR FIGURES, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CHIEF ARCHITECTS OF THE ROUND-TABLE, WILL BE THOROUGHLY REJECTED. PROBABLY ONLY A HANDFUL ON THE LIST WILL POLL OVER 40 PERCENT; THE REST WILL RUN IN THE 20'S AND 30'S. ALSO, VERY FEW, IF ANY, "COALITION" CANDIDATES WILL BE ELECTED TO THE SEJM SEATS RESERVED FOR THEM. MOST OF THE REGIME'S LIST WILL SUFFER THE IGNOMINY OF GOING TO THE SECOND ROUND OF ELECTIONS HAVING ACHIEVED ONLY PERHAPS 30 PERCENT OR LESS -- IN MANY CASES MUCH LESS -- OF THE VOTE IN THE FIRST. THE DEMONSTRATION OF MASSIVE PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE PZPR AND ITS COHORTS -- OF 45 YEARS OF SOCIALIST RULE -- IS STUNNING IN ITS DIMENSIONS.

4. FAR FROM CROWING ABOUT ITS SUCCESS, THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO SOFTEN THIS BLOW, WHICH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE IS EXCESSIVE VICTORY. NEVERTHELESS, THE LEADERSHIP'S GENTLE WORDS AND SUBDUED CELEBRATION CAN DO LITTLE TO DISGUISE THE THREATS AND ANXieties THE ELECTION RESULTS EVOKE. ELSEWHERE, AMONG SOLIDARITY'S CAMPAIGN WORKERS AND, WE SUSPECT, MANY OF THE CANDIDATES, THERE IS PALPABLE EXALTATION. WARNINGS ABOUT EXCESSIVE SUCCESS, JUST AS CAUTIONS ABOUT TOO VIGOROUS CAMPAIGNING, FELL ON DEAF EARS OUTSIDE SOLIDARITY'S INNER CIRCLE.

5. AMONG THE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW WORLD CREATED BY THIS ELECTION IS THE ISSUE OF ELECTING A PRESIDENT. THE REJECTION OF THE NATIONAL LIST MEANS THAT A MAJORITY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (THE SEJM AND SENATE TOGETHER) IS 263. ON SUNDAY, SOLIDARITY JUST ELECTED 261. IN ADDITION, THE ORGANIZATION QUIETLY CLAIMS TO
HAVE AT EAST 10 PROSPECTIVE PEASANTS' PARTY (ZSL) DEPUTIES IN ITS POCKET. THE GLUE THAT HAS HELD THE RULING COALITION TOGETHER -- THE PERMANENCE AND INEVITABILITY OF PZPR RULE -- HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. ZSL RENEGADE DEPUTY (AND RECENTLY REJECTED NATIONAL LIST CANDIDATE) MIKOLAJ KOZAKIEWICZ, SAID ON JUNE 1 THAT THE "MARRIAGE" WAS NOT INDISSOLUBLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

---

SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S VICTORY

"COALITION IS A CERTAINTY. EVEN A MAJORITY IN THE SEJM ALONE WILL BECOME A POSSIBILITY AS THE RULING COALITION CRUMBLES. IN THIS NEW REALITY,
The assumed election of Wojciech Jaruzelski as President will be re-examined by many.

6. The most reasonable assumption is that Solidarity's leadership, acknowledging that the unwritten portion of the Round-Table agreement obligated them to assume election of Jaruzelski as President, will seek to avoid adding more threat to present tenuous political stability and live up to that understanding. Hopefully, they could apply Solidarity's newly-forged party discipline to provide the necessary vote or, if the present coalition manages to hold onto its two-vote majority, simply abstain while Jaruzelski is elected. However, we must consider that the Solidarity leadership is not entirely unconstrained by its more radical base. Any active, and perhaps passive, Solidarity support for Jaruzelski as President will play badly among Solidarity constituents. These are people who voted overwhelmingly to reject the National List, contrary to repeated and televised appeals from Lech Walesa. How would they react to Solidarity's support of Jaruzelski once it was known that the electoral victory actually provided a real alternative? Also, would a disciplined attempt to bring all Solidarity deputies and senators into line on this issue threaten the new group's unity at such an early moment? Many, perhaps most, Solidarity candidates told their constituents repeatedly throughout the campaign that they would never vote for Jaruzelski. Now to sit quietly when an alternative strategy was available might not be acceptable to many of those newly elected representatives.

7. An important element that will affect this issue is the expected regime attempt to challenge the National List results in the courts, or to seek some agreed solution in negotiations with Solidarity leaders. As explained in Septels, the Round-Table agreement specifies the percentage divisions of the Sejm; the Constitution specifies 460 members for the Sejm; and there is no legal provision for a byelection.
A legal challenge might result in a method of filling those seats with regime people, perhaps by appointment or by elections contested only by the coalition partners. However, either method is sure to go over badly with perhaps all of Solidarity's voters and many of its newly-elected representatives. Any other electoral solution, such as a contested byelection, would result in an even stronger Solidarity position and an absolute majority in both houses of parliament. (Bronislaw Geremek discussed this issue during his June 6 press conference. See SepTel.)

8. Even at this early stage of preliminary evaluation of the election results, we must view the low voter turnout as genuinely disturbing. Geremek, in his June 5 press conference, acknowledged that 37 percent of the electorate apparently had no faith in the reform process and no confidence that the election could improve their situation. These people have rejected both sides. Any mandate which Solidarity feels its clean sweep has provided is limited by the sizeable dimensions of this segment of the electorate. One of the principal objectives of the entire round-table process, including these extraordinary elections, was to engage the population in the political process, thus making the anticipated sacrifices imposed by reform more tolerable. With more than a third of the electorate rejecting this gambit, the eventual results of the opening must be in some doubt.

9. We assume that many of the nonparticipants...
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  WARSAW 07552 03 OF 03 061525Z
ACTION EUR-00

INF
O LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01
SIL-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01
DS-01 P-02 T-01 /079 W

O 061505Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4915
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL T•A L SECTION 03 OF 03 WARSAW 07552

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: ELECTION '89: SOLIDARITY'S VICTORY

ARE MORE RADICALLY ANTI-SYSTEMIC THAN THOSE WHO VOTED FOR SOLIDARITY; AMONG THESE ARE MOST OF THE YOUNGER VOTERS. ACCORDING TO "FREEDOM AND PEACE" (WIP) FOUNDER JACEK CZAPUTOWICZ, WIP ESTIMATES INDICATE THAT PERHAPS ONLY 20 PERCENT OF THE 18-25-YEAR-OLDS PARTICIPATED IN THE ELECTION. CZAPUTOWICZ SAID THAT HIS PEOPLE HAD ESTIMATED THE TURNOUT IN UNIVERSITY STUDENT AREAS WAS ONLY ABOUT 10 OR 15 PERCENT. THIS AGE GROUP REPRESENTS ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE VOTING POPULATION AND ITS MASSIVE NONPARTICIPATION BROUGHT DOWN THE OVERALL AVERAGE CONSIDERABLY.

Eduard Shevardnadze. Our friends in the GDR need not worry. The Party will remain the leading force in society. It exercises control over all important processes, despite great difficulties. The most important decisions which the Politburo or the Central Committee has put before the Congress, meet with the consent of the Congress. The development of the situation at the Congress is being followed very attentively. In the first days ambitious and demagogic speeches received support. As the Congress proceeded, the ability of the deputies to differentiate between the truth lies and demagoguery has grown. A similar learning process is taking place among the people as well. In the beginning there were threats of strikes in certain representatives would not be elected to the Supreme Soviet. The publishing of everything from Congress has proved to be correct. The CPSU must in the future adapt itself in its style of work to the new conditions.

Altogether one can be content with the results of the People's Congress. The Party has passed a difficult test. Henceforth the task is to solve urgent sociopolitical matters. Here the Soviet Union can learn much from the GDR. A compelling example of this was the recent exhibition in Moscow on "Berlin Days," in which the mastery of social problems was vividly shown. Millions of Soviet citizens live in poverty. 28 million pensioners receive less than 76 rubles a month. In spite of great financial difficulties the Congress decided to raise the minimum pension to 80 rubles, for which the State must spend in all 4 to 5 billion rubles per year. This happens (despite) the awareness of the fact, that buying power has already considerably exceeded the supply of goods as it is. A further task of greater political importance is to increase the production of consumer goods. In addition it is necessary to solve the issue of housing. The GDR has correctly and in a timely manner focused on. A third difficulty is the extremely complicated national question. The assessment found earlier that the national question was forever solved was a big mistake. These problems existed long ago and have built up over the years. During the course of democratization they have been revealed. Special problems exist in the Transcaucuses, in the Baltic republics, and recently in Uzbekistan as well. One cannot be sure whether tomorrow will see new conflicts erupting in other regions. The Party requires a new nationality policy. In this respect, the CPSU is preparing itself for a corresponding plenary session. The writing of a new constitution is also a pressing matter.

"One knows that our friends in the GDR are well informed on the developments in the GDR, and are compassionate. Your valuable support would be highly appreciated in the Soviet Union."

Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze stated that Comrade Yakovlev will be received on Saturday by Comrade Czayek at the request of Comrade Jaruzelski, to receive information on the domestic developments in Poland. At the moment it is still difficult to guess how the situation in Poland will continue to develop. The most recent events have
serious consequences. A profound analysis is necessary. It should be taken into account that "Solidarity" represents a real force. The PUWP must accept a real defeat and finds itself in a very difficult position. In Hungary as well an unsettling development is taking place.

Comrade Erich Honecker emphasized that he shares fully the evaluation made of Poland. At a meeting with Comrade Jaruzelski, (Jaruzelski) still gave an optimistic evaluation of the expected election results, although the defeat was already becoming apparent.

It is well known that Poland lies between the GDR and the USSR. Socialism cannot be lost in Poland.

In Hungary the processes are most probably unstoppable. Many Hungarian comrades fear that in connection with the planned reburial of the Prime Minister of 1956, Nagy, counterrevolution will break out again. What Pozsgay proclaimed has nothing at all to do with socialism. The question is whether it is possible to prevent the splitting of the Hungarian working class. If not, Hungary will slip further into the bourgeois camp. Comrade Erich Honecker remarked that he remembers quite well the events of 1956 and the role Imre Nagy played.

Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR-Bundesarchiv, SED, ZK, JIV2/24/3225

Translated by Christiana Hetzner
The National Security Archive

---

2 In the 4 and 18 June 1989 elections to the Sejm in Poland, candidates from the opposition "Solidarity" achieved an overwhelming victory. In the Senat they won 99 of 100 seats, in the House of Representatives all 161 contested seats. (65% of these seats were reserved in advance for the ruling coalition).

3 The discussion between Erich Honecker and Wojciech Jaruzelski took place on 22 May 1989 in Berlin.

4 On the 16 June 1989 in Budapest, former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, executed in 1958, together with four other colleagues (Pal Malater, Geza Losonczy, Milos Gimes, Jenosef Szilagyi) similarly executed, were cemeteriiously reburied.

5 Imre Pozsgay, elected to the HSWP Politburo in March 1988, had for example, in a ZDF (West German) television program airing 3 June 1989, called "What now, Mr. Pozsgay?", described the Prague Spring of 1968 as a reform attempt, whose outcome must be awaited.
Agreement about the Commencement of Substantial Political Negotiations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Members of the Opposition Roundtable and the Organizations of the Third Side

10 June 1989

[Between March and June the crucial question of the transition was whether the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party [HSWP] was willing to accept eventually the fact that it would have to negotiate with a unified opposition represented by the Opposition Roundtable [ORT]. Although the HSWP leadership tried to do everything it could to prevent this, by the beginning of June it gave up its previous position. However, the opposition parties had to make a serious concession too, since it was a precondition of the HSWP in agreeing to start official negotiations on the political transition with the ORT that the talks should be tripartite. The “third side” included mass organizations and civil associations, all of which were supporters of the HSWP and/or represented left-wing political ideas.

The agreement published below was signed at the first plenary meeting of the National Roundtable talks. The document, which put on record the legal framework and the conditions of the subsequent tripartite negotiations which lasted until 18 September. At the next meeting, on 21 June, two intermediate-level committees were established for political and for social-economic issues, each having six working subcommittees in which the bulk of the legal work leading to the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Hungary was carried out.]

AGREEMENT

About the Commencement of Substantial Political Negotiations between the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Members of the Opposition Roundtable and the Organizations of the Third Side, 10 June 1989

I.

The necessity to help the nation out of a serious political and economic crisis, and the democratic transformation of the conditions of power appropriate the dialogue between all the political circles that feel responsible for the future. Handling the crisis and creating a multiparty system is only possible with the agreement of the democratic forces. It presupposes that mutual objectives and aims are taken into account, that all participants are willing to make an agreement, and it necessitates trust and self-restraint.

The fate of the nation can be improved by respecting the requirements of the constitution and firmly rejecting violence. It is in our mutual interest that social conflicts are solved according to the generally agreed norms of European political culture: with public consent. The transition from a single-party system to representational democracy and constitutional government can only be realized by free elections. Well-functioning representative bodies and a firm, consistent government that is trusted by the people are needed to stop the worsening social and economic crisis. The peaceful political transition and the relief of aggravated economic and social tension can only be realized by mutual
agreement. An array of historical examples warn us that common problems can only be solved with consensus. All civil organizations and movements have to take part side by side in the hard and contradictory process of transition.

On the basis of these facts and conditions, organizations of the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People’s Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Munnich Society; and the National Council of Trade Unions express their wish to commence substantial political negotiations. The equal negotiators accept the following governing principles for the talks:

— the basis of power is the sovereignty of the people; none of the political forces can monopolize it and declare themselves the sole repository of the people’s will, and none can aspire to unconstitutionally curtail political rights;
— the will of the public has to be expressed without preceding limitations, in the course of free elections, the result of which is binding for everyone, and from which no political organization that complies with the requirements of the constitution can be excluded;
— handling the crisis, ensuring a democratic transition and resolving political conflicts is only possible in a peaceful way, avoiding violence; none of the civil organizations can have direct control over military forces;
— an important condition of the successful and constructive political negotiations is that the nation and [the parties’] interests are considered and respected; a further condition is mutual and anticipatory confidence;
— only mutually acceptable conditions can be the basis of co-operation and agreement;
— when determining the participants of negotiations and their legal standing, exclusion of a political nature is unacceptable, although the functioning of the negotiation process must be considered;
— the objective of negotiations is the formation of political agreements that can be accompanied by the necessary government measures and bills, together with the deadline for their realization; the negotiations themselves, however, do not directly exercise functions of constitutional law;
— during the course of negotiations the parties refrain from all unilateral steps that would obliterate the goal of negotiations; legislation cannot precede political agreement;
— all negotiating partners will have the political agreements accepted in their own organizations, and represent them in public as well, while assisting the enforcement of the agreements by every possible political means.

II.

Three parties take part in the political conciliation talks, with the intent of reaching political agreements.

a) The Opposition Roundtable (Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society; Alliance of Young Democrats; Independent Smallholders’ and Farmers’ Civic Party; Christian Democratic People’s Party; Hungarian Democratic Forum; Hungarian People’s
All three negotiating partners are endowed with equal rights in forming a consensus. A speaker represents each of the three parties, who [will] express the opinions of the negotiating parties. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above, whose participation in substantial negotiations was agreed by the Opposition Roundtable as a compromise during preparatory talks, do express that they support the intention of both the Hungarian Social Workers’ Party and the Opposition Roundtable to conduct a constructive dialogue and reach an agreement. They intend to take an active part in the negotiation process.

The Opposition Roundtable determines the number and composition of their delegates. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above decide among themselves about the method of reconciliation and the method of joint representation of their disputable issues.

1. Representatives of the participating organizations are endowed with a written mandate, which contains their right to make agreements. They present their mandate to the president of the plenary session.

2. The fourth side of the negotiating table can be reserved for observers. Observers have the right to submit their proposed remarks in writing to the president of the meeting, who informs the negotiating parties about the observation.

3. The negotiating parties put on the agenda of conciliatory talks the following issues:

- defining the rules and principles of realizing a democratic political transition;
- strategic tasks for overcoming the impending economic and social crisis.

Final definition of individual issues, based on specific interests, is the task of substantial negotiations.

1. The statutes and working order of the political conciliatory talks are as follows:

a) Substantial negotiations are conducted in plenary sessions and in committees. The opening plenary session is scheduled on 13 June 1989 (Tuesday) in the Hunters’ Hall of Parliament. The Speaker of the House presides over the whole meeting. Representatives of all three negotiating parties are given equal time to speak. In the course of the opening plenary session, negotiating partners issue a declaration of intent. Then they form working committees.

b) Agreements are prepared by working committees, according to specific issues on the agenda. Statutes of the plenary session logically refer to committee sessions as well. Working committees can form sub-committees—with the participation of experts. Preparing bills for legislation must involve governmental bodies as well. In the course of political conciliatory talks, some propositions may be opened to public debate. Final documents are ratified by the plenary session. Propositions of the working committees can only be submitted to the plenary session when heads of delegations have
signed them. The approved documents are signed by the heads of the delegations who then take care of their publication. Every session is recorded in the minutes, which have to be publicized in case the negotiations are interrupted.

c) Coming to an agreement is our mutual interest, based on the principle of consensus. Should discord persist in a particular detail, consensus can be reached nevertheless, provided that the dissenting negotiating partner admits that it does not concern the general principle of the agreement.

d) Plenary sessions are open to the press. Working committees, however, will operate behind closed doors. It has to be assured that [the public] receives regular and substantial information about the negotiation process. From time to time, negotiating parties will issue a joint communiqué to the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency. Separate statements can only be issued if negotiations break off or a common declaration cannot be agreed on. Nevertheless, this does not concern the right of the parties to express their opinions about the content of certain issues on the agenda.

e) The parties think it necessary that expenses of the negotiations are covered by the state budget. Handling of documents, photocopying, postage, the costs of organizing meetings, and the wages of possible experts are included in the expenses.

Representing the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party:
Gyorgy Fejti
Secretary of the Central Committee

Representing the Opposition Roundtable:
Dr. Zsolt Zetenyi
Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society
Dr. Laszlo Kover
Alliance of Young Democrats
Peter Hardi
Independent Smallholders’ and Farmers’ Civic Party
Gyorgy Szakolczai
Christian Democratic Party
Dr. Laszlo Solyom
Hungarian Democratic Forum
Csaba Varga
Hungarian People’s Party
Tibor Baranyai
Hungarian Social Democratic Party
Dr. Peter Tolgyessy
Alliance of Free Democrats
Imre Kerenyi
Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, as observer

Representing the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People’s Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions:
Csaba Kemeny
Left Wing Alternative Union
Dr. Istvan Kukorelli
People’s Patriotic Front
Ferenc Gyurcsány
Hungarian Democratic Youth Association
Imre Kerekes
Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists
Mrs. Soos Dr. Maria Dobos
National Council of Hungarian Women
Ferenc Berényi
Ferenc Munnich Society
Mrs. Kosa & Dr. Magda Kovacs
National Council of Trade Unions

Record of the First Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and FRG President Richard von Weizsäcker. Bonn, June 12, 1989.

Chancellor H. Kohl, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher, State Secretary of the Department of the Federal President K. Blech, FRG Ambassador to the USSR A. Mayer-Landrut were present during the first part of the conversation. From the Soviet side attended: Eduard Shevardnadze, Alexander Yakovlev, Ivan Silin, Voly Kvitinsky, Anatoly Chernenkov.

Weizsäcker. [...] Kissinger told me about your conversation, and he emphasized the importance of keeping up the confidential contacts. Such conversations should be held not just between Gorbachev and Bush. They could be conducted by specially authorized representatives as well.

In any case, I can say that the atmosphere in the United States now is much less conservative than three months ago. And the numerous conversations that the Chancellor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other representatives of the FRG had with the American leadership made a significant contribution to the change in the atmosphere.

Gorbachev. Since we touched upon President Bush's line, I would like to emphasize that we enjoyed a confidential, positive atmosphere during our personal conversations. In order to preserve that atmosphere, even though the administration took such a long time to clarify its line regarding further development of Soviet-American relations, we pulled our patience together and did not criticize Bush and his government. We did not get pulled into the polemics even when the criticism about such a long pause began to grow exponentially among the public in the United States and Western Europe. Now we can see that we made the right decision.

Speaking about American foreign policy, I should point out that it has a number of inherent permanent weaknesses. First of all, when President Bush speaks one-on-one, he exhibits both pragmatism and the desire not to get stuck on ideological principles. However, when he makes public appearances, he makes statements that sound like what we used to call "Reagan's crusade against communism." We believe that such returns to the past do not help to establish an atmosphere for a long period of peaceful interaction and cooperation, which we propose to the Bush administration. Those are some things that the American President needs to think about.

And secondly, the position of waiting out and taking their time in their approach to the issue of developing relations with the USSR is characteristic of the Bush administration as well as of its predecessors. Again and again they are making efforts to see if the Soviet Union, because of various difficulties that it is experiencing now, would move toward more concessionary positions, which would give an advantage to the United States. We repeatedly told them about the illusory nature of such an approach, and about the fact that one cannot build policy on the basis of misconceptions. But they still continue to cling to such an approach.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20037
Kohl. [...] I know George Bush for a long time, we have a very good friendly relationship. In giving him an evaluation as a President, after just several months on the job, we have to take into account his previous career.

George Bush was Vice President under President Reagan for eight years. He was always a loyal person, in this respect we probably have a common point of view, we perceive such qualities as positive. However, for George Bush personally, such an assessment had a negative aspect, hurt him, because everybody was constantly asking whether he would be able to come out of Reagan's shadow, and to acquire his own political face, or whether he would always remain in the position of loyalty.

In terms of public relations, Bush has a long way to go to compete with Reagan: he has neither the actor charisma, nor the art to communicate with people via TV, nor any other similar qualities. He is an intellectual. In America they distinguish between people from the West coast and from the East coast. People from California are very different from people from Western United States [sic - should be: Eastern United States - trans.].

In this sense Bush, as a politician, is very important for Europe—he has a more European vision of things than Reagan had. By the way, Reagan, as a politician, grew literally in front of my eyes. I know him since 1979 when he still was the leader of the opposition. Once he came to Bonn, I received him, and we talked for 3 hours. Helmut Schmidt, who was Chancellor then, did not receive him, stating that he did not have time. I had a depressing impression from that conversation with Reagan. It came out that he did not understand anything in European affairs. My assistant [Horst] Telchik was present at that conversation, and he can tell you even now how discouraged we were then. But later Reagan became President, and you, Mr. Gorbachev, were able to find a common language with him.

Bush is a completely different person. Do not forget that he inherited a difficult domestic political situation, first of all in terms of the economy. Now the ghost of the united European market, which will be created in 1992, is knocking on the U.S. door. Japanese entrepreneurs are working in the United States, and they are capturing new positions all the time. The living standards of the U.S. population, and first of all of the disadvantaged strata, continue to stagnate.

Recently I had a chance to see it with my own eyes. Last week I flew to America on a personal, unofficial trip, to visit my son, who took exams at Harvard University. I spoke with students and with professors—and I did not hear any positive assessments of how the American people now live from anybody. Bush has an overwhelming load of things to do in the social sphere, which could become his Achilles heel. At the same time, in Congress his situation is more favorable than the one that Reagan had. I would say that dramatic changes have happened there. The current [Democratic] leader of Congress [i.e. House of Representatives], [Rep.] Tom Foley, represents a politician of a quiet, non-aggressive type. He is oriented toward cooperation, not confrontation, he wants to build a positive political capital for himself, so that in the future he could become a presidential candidate from the Democrats. In short, it is important to follow
American domestic developments, and to account for them in formulating your own political line.

Gorbachev. I had many meetings with Bush, including personal meetings. Last time we talked in [New York City in] December of last year [1988], when he had already been elected President. We agreed on a confidential basis, that we would develop Soviet-American relations on the basis of the following formula: continuity, plus what we should supplement it with. There are a lot of sensitive issues in our relations, that is why it is important to improve the trust between Moscow and Washington. So far, I have not noticed any significant deviations from the agreement on Bush's part. However, as I have already mentioned, his last speeches gave us grounds for concern.

Kohl. Are you talking about his statements on arms control? What speeches do you have in mind?

Gorbachev. The speech at the University of Texas on May 12, and the speech at the Coast Guard Academy [on 24 May]. Also, he made quite unpleasant statements concerning Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the [6 March] conference "Veterans of Foreign Wars" before Americans of Polish origin, and so on. This is what comes to mind. However, there were other statements of this kind in the last months too. I don't see either a realism or a constructive line in those statements. Frankly speaking, those statements reminded us of Reagan's statements about the "crusade" against socialism. He appealed to the forces of freedom, called for the end to the "status quo," and for "pushing socialism back." And all this at a time when we are calling for de-ideologization of the relations. Unwillingly, the questions comes to mind—where is genuine Bush, and where is Bush rhetorical? Where does he just play up the rhetoric, and where does he lay down the state line?

Kohl. We will wait and see. I am convinced that everything will take its course, and with a good speed. There will be progress in disarmament also. Here everything depends on the two great powers.

If we achieve a decisive progress in Vienna in the next 12-15 months, it would change the situation on all arms control issues in a crucial way. Now there are no taboos or irresolvable problems any more.

[...] We are watching the developments in Hungary with a great interest. The United States, and of course you, Mr. General Secretary, are following them too. I told Bush that as far as Hungary is concerned, we are acting on the basis of an old German proverb: let the church remain in the village. It means that the Hungarians should decide themselves what they want, but nobody should interfere in their affairs.

Gorbachev. We have a similar proverb: you do not go to somebody's monastery with your charter.
Kohl. Beautiful folk wisdom. Both sides adhere to it. And if so, there could be no talk about any "crusades".

Gorbachev. I am telling you honestly--there are serious shifts underway in the socialist countries. Their direction originates from concrete situations in each country. The West should not be concerned about it. Everything moves in the direction of strengthening the democratic basis. Every country decides on its own how it does it. It is their internal affair. I think you would agree with me that you should not jerk a pole into an ant hill. Consequences of such an act could be absolutely unpredictable.

Kohl. There is an opinion of one side, there is an opinion of another side, but there is also a third opinion--a common opinion. This is a common opinion of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of the FRG, and of other countries. In short, we should not interfere with anybody's development.

Gorbachev. There is a very tense situation in a number of countries. If someone was going to try to destabilize the situation, it would disrupt the process of building trust between the West and the East, and destroy everything that has been achieved so far. We want a rapprochement, not a return to the positions of confrontation.

Kohl. However, it is not a secret to anybody, that Erich Honecker is not inclined to undertake any changes or reforms, and thus be himself destabilizes the situation.

I have problems because of that in the GDR. I say all the time that I am not interested in destabilizing the situation in the GDR. However, the people ask me all the time, why does the GDR remain on frozen positions? I am told that we should do something if, order to let the people there experience the same freedom that now characterizes Hungary, Poland, and, of course, the Soviet Union.

You cannot imagine what was going on here when the GDR banned the distribution of Soviet magazine "Sputnik". Everybody was laughing. But I did not. Because they demanded that I, as Chancellor, take new steps for the improvement of relations with the GDR, and I could not do anything about it.

Gorbachev. As far as our friends are concerned, we have a firm principle: everyone is responsible for his own country. We are not going to teach anybody, but we are not asking anybody to teach us either. I think that what I have just said makes it clear whether there is any "Brezhnev Doctrine." We are in favor of positive changes in all spheres; in favor of political normalization, of strengthening of the economy, but at the same time also in favor of preserving the special features and traditions of the socialist states.

Kohl. I support your ideas. To tell you honestly, we understand Moscow much better, and we feel much closer to it than to [East] Berlin now. 90% of the population in the GDR watch our television. They are informed about everything, but afraid to speak publicly. I just feel sorry for the people. But let me reiterate that I am not doing anything.
to destabilize the situation. This applies to Hungary, and Poland, as well. To interfere with anybody’s internal political development now would mean to take a destructive line which would throw Europe back to the times of caution and mistrust.

Gorbachev. This is a very important statement, it fits the spirit of the time.

Kohl. [...] As far as the conventional weapons are concerned, the key to this issue is in your hands. We have a real opportunity to reach an agreement, and in a fundamental sense, on conventional weapons in the next 12, or if not, then in the next 14-15 months. An agreement on conventional weapons would put all the arms control agenda on a qualitatively new level. I will be one of those who will make a clear and sound statement about it.

I would like to propose to you, Mr. General Secretary, that in the next several months we should stay in direct contact—not via departments—on the issues of negotiations in Vienna. And in general, I believe that we should intensify our contacts, call each other more often, even if there is no concrete business to discuss. If we talk regularly, hear each other’s voices, all problems would be easier to solve.

As far as special representatives are concerned, as I have already told you, I will send my closest assistant Telchik who is present here. And you can send Chernyaev to me.

Gorbachev. I agree.

Kohl. We are not exaggerating our role, but we are not underestimating it either. Others will listen to our opinion more and more. I can already feel it.

Gorbachev. We need to cooperate more closely, because our cooperation can produce very effective impulses and lead to positive changes on still unresolved issues.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya

for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Information on a Meeting of the Chairmen of the Regional Citizens’ Committees held in the Citizens’ Committee in Warsaw, at 6 Fredra St.

12 June 1989

Participating in the meeting were chairmen or representatives of 46 regional committees and Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, editor Andrzej Wielowieyski, Jacek Kuron, Jaroslaw Dleszynski. The meeting was chaired by Henryk Wujec.

The debates concentrated on three basic issues:

1. Preparations for the second round of elections. Professor Geremek, in his brief introduction, and the chairmen of the Citizens’ Committees, in their speeches, have raised the following issues:

   The elections were a huge, startling success, particularly if one considers the conditions under which the election campaign had been run. Even in places where victory in the first round has not been achieved, there is a great chance that in the second round all of [our] candidates will squeeze in.

   Fears were expressed that in the second round electoral attendance may be very low, which is dangerous, because electoral attendance of the coalition may be relatively high.

   The voivodships have declared assistance to their neighboring regions, in which our candidates will be fighting for mandates in the second round. Thus, Poznan will be helping Pila (delegating two people from its staff, printing 20 thousand posters and leaflets). Pila will also be helped by Wloclawek and Szczecin. Piotrkow, Kielce and Lublin came up with an initiative to help Radom.

   Some voivodships had already successfully supported candidates from outside of the Citizens’ Committee in the first round. In others, decisions regarding possible support for the coalition’s candidates varied: some of them have already decided for which candidate they will vote, others are hesitating, afraid of being suspected of collaboration, in some cases one cannot find any suitable candidate. H. Wujec stated that the Committee leaves it up to the regions to support particular candidates, provided that it is done from the bottom and cautiously, without concluding contracts, supporting people who guarantee reliability.

2. The question of a national list.

   The participants raised the issue that in their regions there had been numerous voices of anxiety and resentment due to “delegating” to the government side the decision regarding the re-election of candidates from the national list. Concern by our side about the fate of that list was premature, clumsy, it was stated point-blank that it had been a political mistake.

   Explanations have been submitted by B. Geremek, A. Wielowieyski and Jacek Kuron. It looks as if the situation which has arisen—the necessity to keep the contract on the distribution of mandates that was concluded at the Roundtable—from the legal point of view had no clean solution. In the meantime the huge electoral success has resulted in other, more radical demands [being made] by society as well as growing impatience due to a gradual realization of the democratic process.

3. The future of the Citizens’ Committees
The participants drew attention to the fact that during the elections a huge amount of human capital had been created, which numbered in the hundreds of thousands, organized spontaneously and from the bottom up, verified in action. What is more, these masses of activists have organized themselves on their own in the areas that had been void in this respect earlier—in small towns and communities.

This capital must not be wasted. It has been noted that [these people] are potential activists for the regional self-governing bodies, in the future members of the Sejm senatorial teams, now in the process of organization, keeping communication offices of deputies and senators [in contact with] the voters.

Regional delegates expressed anxiety over potential strains between the Citizens’ Committees and regional Solidarity bodies. Voices were heard that creation of the committees had weakened Solidarity, depriving it of some of its leaders. In the union movement mostly workers are gathered, while the intelligentsia has crossed over to the citizens’ committees (a voice from Katowice). On the other hand the citizens’ movement is enriching Solidarity ideologically and expands its tasks. Citizens’ Committees form a platform for cooperation of different groupings: Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia, Dziekania, workers’ “S,” and “S’” of individual peasants, youth movements. It has been noted that this constitutes their strength, creating an integrated platform for the opposition, at the same time, their variety would be an obstacle to a possible transformation of that movement into an association or a party.

An overwhelming majority of the participants was in favor of keeping the Citizens’ Committees. In this connection attention was drawn to the necessity of working out a legal framework for their existence, their organizational structure after the elections and, most importantly, their financial basis.

It has been decided not to take any hasty organizational decisions in the near future, instead, keeping a form of understanding of organizations, initiating talks with the authorities regarding an extension of activities of the Citizens’ Committees (officially they are to end their activity on 18 June 1989), and coming up immediately with various territorial initiatives of the National Councils. The shape of the Committees in the future need not be the same. [...]

[Source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
Opening Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations

June 13, 1989

(Transcript of the video recording. Excerpts.)

[. .]

Károly Grósz: Ladies and Gentlemen, my Honorable Compatriots, there are few positive events going on in our hectic world nowadays. A lot of people face the future with anxiety and uncertainty. Against this background, let me greet with confidence and optimism the participants of this meeting and those who are going to follow the beginning of real political negotiations in front of the TV screens in Hungary and abroad. [...] Just a few months ago, at the February meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, we arrived at the conclusion that we have to find a peaceful transition to representative democracy based on party pluralism and presupposing a competition between the parties. Our resolution met with the political goals of all those, whose representatives are sitting at this table together. We are responsible for the success of this undertaking not only to the Hungarian people, but also to the community of nations. The public is looking forward to, and is concerned about, the outcome of this attempt at the same time. [...] Let me stress that we do not intend to exaggerate or appropriate the results of the building of the democratic constitutional state that have been attained so far. In our opinion, apart from the political realism of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, these results were due to the social organizations and movements present and the constructive efforts of the evolving parties. It is our solid determination to separate ourselves from the remnants of the Stalinist model. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, together with other political forces, strives to build a democratic and socialist constitutional state which asserts the intention of the people. We expect the economic and political reforms based on public consensus to help us overcome the economic crisis and to enable us to approach the most developed regions of the world, instead of being irreversibly pushed to the periphery. Apart from the universal values of peace and humanism, we are trying to find socialist solutions that are particularly Hungarian. We observe our obligations towards our allies; at the same time, we are striving to create a Europe without blocs. [...] The stakes are high. The negotiations entering a new phase should provide programs based on a consensus on as many issues as possible. This is the precondition for the forming of a viable coalition and for avoiding the paralyzing of party pluralism in Hungary by the petty disputes of the parties. For this reason we must concentrate on the common points instead of the differences between us. I am convinced that these negotiations can foster the development of a viable coalition and of future political alliances. It would be too early to predict the content of these. Reviewing interests and programs properly, however, can guarantee a lucrative political cooperation.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party has started to transform from a bureaucratic state-party into a left-wing socialist reform party. It urges, for example, differentiation
based on performance; at the same time it also aims to reduce social differences that can not be accounted for by performance. It strives for economic efficiency, without disregarding social solidarity. Its goal is to achieve ensure that private property foments economic performance, while it insists on the determining role of efficiently operating public property.

[...]

**Imre Kónya:** Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Hungary has belonged to the Hungarian people de jure for a thousand years. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that during its history the people could hardly dispose of their property as owners or free citizens, in spite of trying to take possession of it from time to time.

Assuming our historical responsibility and in accordance with our agreement with the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, we, the delegates of the Opposition Roundtable organizations, have appeared today at the Parliament in order to start negotiations with the representatives of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the delegates of other organizations it invited. We wish to put it on record that the goal of the negotiations is to assure peaceful transition from the existing dictatorial ruling system into a representative democracy that really asserts the will of the people. In the course of the negotiations we do not wish to divide power between ourselves and those who are holding it now. We do not wish to exercise power above the people's head, without being entitled to it by the people. Our aim is to enable Hungarian citizens to decide who, which political forces they commission to exercise power during the periods extending from elections to elections. [...]

After thirty years of numbness, our society has finally risen. The formation of independent organizations and of large-scale demonstrations indicate that it wants to control its own fate. It is not only our moral obligation to facilitate that, but also our common interest, moreover, many of us believe that it has already become the precondition for our nation's survival. A reliable and already tested form of the continuous assertion of the will of the people is the representative democracy. The peaceful method of its creation is free elections.

We are convinced that free elections will not only lead to the significant revival of public life and policy-making, but it can also affect the fate and history of our nation. We must be aware that free elections can only be held in a society which has been freed from its fears and suspicions. And fears and suspicions take time to fade out.

Burying the martyrs of the Revolution and commencing these talks can mark the beginning of national reconciliation. Real reconciliation, however, can only be achieved by burying the existing dictatorial power system. That can only be done by depoliticising repressive organizations and through free elections.

Therefore, we wish to enter into negotiations with the power-holders on the basis of the following principles. The basis of power is the sovereignty of the people. None of the
political forces can appropriate sovereignty and declare itself the only representative of the will of the people. The will of the people must be expressed at free elections with open outcome, not allowing the exclusion of any party or political organization that accepts the principles of democracy and rejects the use of repressive instruments. Until the political will of the society is expressed by the election of the members of parliament, no other nation-wide elections, for example election of the president of the republic or election of local authorities, should take place. The power-holders should also accept the result of the free elections and should not try to change it by any means afterwards. A strong opposition in parliament is a basic institution of democracy, counterbalancing the operation of the government. No political party or organization can have its own armed forces. Parties and political organizations can not exert influence on the operation of armed forces through their members. Armed forces can not be used for solving political conflicts under any circumstances. It is constitutionally legitimate to react to violence only to the extent that is necessary for abating violence. It is not enough to resign using instruments of oppression, the possibility of using them must be excluded. Workers' militia should be disbanded, the operation of political police should be contained within well-defined limits, public security police should be subordinated to local governments and the use of guns should be controlled publicly.

This is the only way people can stop being afraid, this is the only way for - not the silent but for the silenced - majority to participate in politics. We, the organizations constituting the Opposition Roundtable, see the goal of the negotiations as regulating the way political forces are going to act and be compared publicly.

At the same time, we are ready to do anything within our own range of competence, anything that is necessary to solve the conflicts brought about by the crisis, we can, however, not take responsibility for liquidating the economic bankruptcy until the elections, since opposition organizations - being in opposition - can and would only monitor those who have governed this country for forty years and have caused this situation. We are aware that the economy is about to collapse and is burying under itself the lives of several thousand people every day. There, that is to say, our situation will not be improved by any political demagogy. The precondition for stopping economic decline is to change the political system.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable did not sit down to the negotiating table in order to acquire their share of power, but in order to give rise to a situation where the people itself can acquire power without using violence, with the help of peaceful means. Hungary is the property of the people, therefore it is not necessary for the people to take by force what is its own property. The people only has to lift its head up, organize itself and take possession of the country, of its own homeland with due self-consciousness.

[---]

István Kukorelli: Mr. Chairman, our Honored Political Partners, we have initiated today's roundtable talks and we are ready to take responsibility for it, though the table,
let's face it, has turned out to be rather square. It is still very significant for peaceful social development.

The agreement we also signed is the result of mutual and realistic compromises. These compromises, the arrangement of the seats, will not give rise to illusions, will not deceive the public. These three sides express a lot of things and conceal a lot of other things as well. Placing the power-holders and the opposition opposite each other can not be disputed. Democracy can hardly be imagined without an opposition protected by minority rights in the future. There is no doubt that the opposition and some other civil organizations still lack an economic infrastructure, the creation of which is a task of our negotiations and of the government.

We also have to admit, however, that the way we are seated can not represent all the major break lines in society. To mention just a few of them: the country has started to break into two along lines separating public figures who organize themselves into parties and become the so called elite and people who reject the formation of parties; separating the capital from the countryside; separating the haves and the have nots. And other dividing lines also appear in the structure of society. All those tensions shall be tackled by us here - we are able to do it since around the table we represent a horizontal cross-section of society as well.

Organizations that make up the third side do not pretend to appear as a unified force. They are present as independent political organizations representing the interests of their membership and their policies are formed independently on the basis of the agenda along the way. I am well aware of the fact that few people are able to find a common characteristic in this heterogeneous group intending to participate in the negotiations as an independent force. We do not make a secret of the fact that we are not a homogeneous delegation, but we possess, we will possess a great amount of tolerance within our group. We wish the same to the unified delegations as well. We are drawn together through having a common interest in tackling the social and economic crisis. [...] 

In the case of most organizations of the third side the role of being the formal partner of the old power structure is a common burden. That is why a lot of people wanted our delegation to take seats on the side of the MSZMP. But they do not take into account the recent developments of our accelerating times, that is, the significant modifications that have happened in the structure of the sphere of power.

[...]

It could determine the success of our roundtable if we refrain from questioning the legitimacy of each other, since the legitimacy of all of us is debatable. It is a question which belongs to the future - who will be given credit by history and who will be forgotten. On our part, we do not intend to apply such arguments during the negotiations and we accept that all of us are negotiating partners of full rights representing smaller or bigger segments of society. [...]

We are in the year of the creation of the constitutional state; reliable professional workshops are offering us to "buy" various significant draft bills, and the government is working hard, it does what it has to. We should also pick up speed, because the sociopolitical foundations of laws, that is, the political consensus is still missing. We have stated in our agreement that the work of legislation can not precede the political agreements. We agree with this and also suggest that the Parliament should only include in its agenda the draft bills made public already - such as the party law - after the agreements are completed. Instead of being governed by decree Hungary needs consensus law; the rule of law is the most important feature of the constitutional state. [...] 

The third side agrees that two main topics should be included in our agendas, namely, the definition of principles and roles that support the execution of the democratic political transition, and the strategic tasks in tackling the economic and social crisis. It would be a misunderstanding of our role to pull a government-level economic and political strategy out of the hat. It can not be the goal of the opening full session; its goal is that we declare to the public our intention to cooperate and to negotiate. [...] 


(From Political Transition in Hungary, 1989-1990; International Conference, June 12, 1999, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; A Compendium of Declassified Documents and Chronology of Events)
Second Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl. June 13, 1989, Bonn (one-on-one).

[...]

Kohl. I am in favor of progress in all negotiations, in all spheres of arms control. I took 1992 as a benchmark. And the "Lances" are not the only ones that matter, the point is that in 1992 there will be a year left until the elections in the U.S. We should take that into account in all respects. We have to work in all directions.

Gorbachev. We have a common destiny. Why should we be anybody’s hostages?

Kohl. We have not only a common destiny, but also a common history. Now, as we are talking, our wives are visiting the memorial in Stichenbrück—the place where the Soviet citizens who were killed in the war were buried. There is not a single family in both the USSR and in the FRG that the war did not touch. My two sons are officers of the Bundeswehr, and my brother was killed in the war.

Gorbachev. Policy without morality cannot be considered serious policy; immoral politicians cannot be trusted.

Kohl. At a recent NATO meeting at the highest level I told my colleagues directly that I was the only one among them whose both sons served in the army integrated into NATO. I also stressed, that I was not a coward, of course, but that I was a German, and knew history and geography very well.

Gorbachev. I very much appreciate your honest and sincere judgments. And I value the trust that is growing between us with every meeting.

Kohl. Let us communicate more often, let’s call each other on the phone. I think that we could accomplish many things ourselves, without delegating them to the bureaucracies that can drag their consideration or and on.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya

for The National Security Archive

[...] Kohl. We would like to see your visit, Mr. Gorbachev, as the end of the hostility between the Russians and the Germans, as the beginning of a period of genuinely friendly, good neighborhood relations. You understand that these are the words supported by the will of all people, by the will of the people who greet you in the streets and the squares. As a Chancellor I am joining this expression of people's will with pleasure, and I am telling you once again that I like your policy, and I like you as a person.

Gorbachev. Thank you for such warm words. They are very touching. I will respond with reciprocity, and I will try not to disappoint you.

I would like to tell you the following with all sincerity. According to our information, there is a special group charged with the discrediting of perestroika and me personally that was created in the National Security Council of the United States. When Baker was in Moscow, we openly asked him about that. He and his colleagues were somewhat confused, but did not give us any clear answer, they were just trying to convince us that it was not so. However, I have some evidence that such a group does, in fact, exist. I think, you understand me well, Mr. Federal Chancellor, you understand how I feel about it.

Kohl. Thank you for your openness. I heard nothing about such a group. Even if it does exist, I do not think it was created on George Bush's initiative, or that it was charged with the tasks that you have just formulated. Maybe if it exists, it has some kind of monitoring, but no subversive tasks. [...] Kohl. I would appreciate it, seeing this to the end will strengthen your international prestige even more.

Now a couple of words about our common friends. I will tell you directly that Erich Honecker does concern me a lot. His wife has just made a statement in which she called on the GDR youth to take up arms, and defend the achievements of socialism from external enemies if necessary. It is clear that she implied that the socialist countries which implement reforms, stimulate democratic processes, follow their original road, were the enemies. First of all she had Poland and Hungary in mind. This is certainly a strange statement.

Gorbachev. What are your relations with Poland like?

Kohl. The country is in a difficult situation right now. But we want to help it to get out of the crisis. As well as in the case with the GDR, we do not want any destabilization.

Tomorrow Francois Mitterrand will travel to Poland. We agreed that France will be the first to extend aid to Poland, to give them financial assistance in the form of credits. Then George Bush will visit Poland. As for me, I consciously decided to be the third to visit Poland—after the French and the American. The Germans and the Poles are connected by something else. This year will mark the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. I will probably visit Poland on those dates. Anyway, I would like my
visit to contribute to the improvement of relations between the Germans and the Poles, even though I realize that it would be very very difficult.

Gorbachev. We need to support the Poles, they do not have anybody who has more authority and respect than Wojciech Jaruzelski now.

Kohl. We also plan to give Poland financial support. I understand your words, Mr. Gorbachev.

We have rather good relations with the Hungarians. However, we also do not want destabilization there. That is why when I meet with the Hungarians, I tell them: we consider the reforms that are underway in your country your internal affair, we are sympathetic. However, if you would like to hear our advice, we recommend that you do not accelerate too much, because you might lose control over your mechanism, and it will start to work to destroy itself.

In all the socialist countries we have the most hopeless relations with Romania. There is no movement at all, just complete darkness and stagnation. I do not understand Ceausescu. How does he not see what a ridiculous cult he created in his own country? I cannot believe that he can seriously think that he made the Romanians the happiest people on Earth.

Gorbachev. It is certainly strange that this kind of family clan would be established in the center of civilized Europe, in a state with rich historical traditions. I could imagine something like that to emerge somewhere else, like it has in Korea, but here, right next to us—it is such a primitive phenomenon.

Kohl. I like the Bulgarians. If you compare Bulgaria in the first post-war years and now—the progress is impressive—like day and night. Bulgarian representatives—leaders as well as simple professionals—often visit my country. They think and operate with very modern concepts, and they avidly absorb our economic experience. They also, as we can observe, implement it in their economic life quite effectively. I really like Todor Zhivkov. He has been in power for a very long time, I think, since 1956, when I was still taking final exams in high school. He is a very flexible politician. I met with him several times, and every time we met, he criticized those leaders of various branches of the Bulgarian economy who could not manage their responsibilities. It is curious that he speaks about it in such a way as if those individuals were not members of his own circle, and as if he did not give them any directives, just observed them from a distance.

I am mostly concerned by the situation in Yugoslavia. The economy there is choking, and nobody knows how to help it. We need to think about how to prevent the Balkans from becoming the source of destabilization.

I have already said that in our policy toward the Socialist countries, toward the Soviet Union, we are staying on the clear course of non-interference in their internal affairs. However, a policy of non-interference could be of two sorts. It is one thing to sit in a theater seat, to watch what is unfolding on the stage, and, when the play is almost over, to rise and say that we have foreseen all that happened, and that it could not have been otherwise. How smart we are.
Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Sretlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET

PAGE 01 WARSAW 08512 01 OF 02 231740Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W

R 231701Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5720
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 08512

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DELC:OADR
TAGS: FG0V, FL
SUBJECT: HOW TO ELECT JARUZELSKI WITHOUT VOTING FOR HIM, AND WILL HE RUN?

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

1A. SUMMARY: MOST SOLIDARITY LEADERS ARE APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT JARUZELSKI MUST BE ELECTED PRESIDENT IF THE COUNTRY IS TO AVOID CIVIL WAR. HOWEVER, THEY ARE VERY RELUCTANT TO VOTE FOR HIM AND ARE RECEPTIVE TO SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THE TASK MIGHT BE MANAGED WITHOUT THEM HAVING TO DO SO. JARUZELSKI WILL NOT ACCEPT NOMINATION UNLESS HE CAN SEE THAT THE VOTES ARE THERE TO ASSURE HIS ELECTION DESPITE LIKELY DEFECTIONS FROM THE RANKS OF COMMUNIST AND ALLIED DEPUTIES. ON THE EVE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT, THE SITUATION REMAINS FLUID AND VERY DELICATE. END SUMMARY.

2. MOST OF THE SOLIDARITY LEADERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN IN RECENT DAYS ARE CONVINCED (IN VARYING DEGREES) OF THE FOLLOWING FACTS:

- A. IF JARUZELSKI IS NOT ELECTED PRESIDENT, THERE IS A GENUINE DANGER OF CIVIL WAR ENDING, IN MOST SCENARIOS, WITH A RELUCTANT BUT BRUTAL SOVIET INTERVENTION;

- B. ALL SOLIDARITY CANDIDATES WERE FORCED DURING THEIR CAMPAIGNING TO PROMISE PUBLICLY NOT TO VOTE FOR
JARUZELSKI FOR PRESIDENT;

- C. THE GOVERNMENT COALITION HAS THE NUMBERS FOR HIM. AS MANY AS FORTY OR FIFTY FROM THE ZSL AND SD, AND HARD-LINERS FROM THE PARTY ON THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM, WILL PROBABLY VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN TO PUNISH HIM FOR THE PARTY’S ELECTORAL HUMILIATION.

- D. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NEVER PUT IN WRITING, THE IMPLICIT DEAL AT THE ROUNDTABLE WAS THAT SOLIDARITY SHOULD HAVE THE SENATE IN A FREE VOTE AND JARUZELSKI WOULD BE PRESIDENT FOR THE NEXT SIX YEARS.

3. THERE IS MUCH HAND-WRINGING GOING ON, WITH SOME SOLIDARITY SENATORS SAYING THEY WILL VOTE FOR JARUZELSKI IF THEY MUST TO SAVE THE COUNTRY, EVEN IF IT MEANS ENDING THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS VIRTUALLY BEFORE THEY HAVE BEGUN.

4. I HAD DINNER LAST NIGHT WITH SOME LEADING SOLIDARITY LEGISLATORS, WHO HAD BETTER REMAIN NAME-LESS, AND JOTTED DOWN A FEW NUMBERS FOR THEM ON THE SECRET PAGE BACK OF AN EMBASSY MATCHBOOK. I ALSO REVIEWED FOR THEM AN ARCANE WESTERN POLITICAL PRACTICE KNOWN AS HEAD-COUNTING. WHAT THE MATCHBOOK CALCULATION REVEALED IS THAT THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 560 SEATS IN THE COMBINED SEJM AND SENATE. THE GOVERNMENT COALITION HAS 299, SOLIDARITY 260 AND THERE IS ONE INDEPENDENT. THE REQUIRED QUORUM FOR A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS TWO-THIRDS OF THE COMBINED MEMBERSHIP OF THE TWO HOUSES. OF THOSE PRESENT, A MAJORITY OF VOTES IS NEEDED TO ELECT. ERGO, IF A LARGE NUMBER (UP TO 185) OF SOLIDARITY SENATORS AND SEJM DEPUTIES ARE ILL OR OTHERWISE UNABLE TO ATTEND THE ELECTION SESSION, THERE WILL STILL BE A QUORUM AND ONE IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COALITION MAJORITY IS SO GREAT THAT ONLY A TRULY MAJOR DEFECTION FROM PARTY DISCIPLINE COULD PREVENT JARUZELSKI’S ELECTION. THE SOLIDARITY DEPUTIES AND SENATORS WHO WERE PRESENT COULD SAFELY ABSTAIN.

5. MY INTERLOCUTORS LEFT FOR HOME SAYING THAT THE NUMBERS WERE INDEED INTERESTING BUT THERE WOULD STILL BE A PROBLEM IN PERSUADING ENOUGH PEOPLE TO STAY AWAY FROM THE VOTE.

6. THERE IS ALSO A FURTHER COMPLICATION. ONE OF JARUZELSKI’S CLOSE ADVISERS YESTERDAY TOLD ME THAT THE GENERAL IS DETERMINED THAT HE WILL NOT “CREEP”
INTO THE PRESIDENCY. HE IS UNDERSTANDABLY RELUCTANT
TO FACE ANOTHER PUBLIC HUMILIATION AFTER THE DEFEAT
OF PARTY REFORMERS ON THE NATIONAL LIST IN ROUND ONE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 01  WARSAW  08512  02 OF 02  231740Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  /000 W
R 231701Z JUN 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5721
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
SECRET  SECTION 02  OF  02  WARSAW  08512
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DELC:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PL
SUBJECT: HOW TO ELECT JARUZELSKI WITHOUT VOTING FOR
OF THE ELECTIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, JARUZELSKI IS DOING
HIS OWN HEAD-COUNTING AND, IF THE NUMBERS DON’T COME
OUT RIGHT, MIGHT WELL DECLINE THE NOMINATION.

7. THE WHOLE SITUATION IS MADE MORE COMPLEX
BY THE TIME PRESSURES ARISING FROM PRESIDENT
BUSH’S VISIT. THE PLAN HAS BEEN TO HOLD THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON JULY 5, BUT IT MAY NOT
PROVE POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE NEWLY-ELECTED DEPUTIES
ARE DISPUTING HOTLY THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMITTEE

Page - 3
UNCLASSIFIED
CHAIRMANSHIPS IN THE NEW SEjm, OF WHICH SOLIDARITY IS APPARENTLY DEMANDING A SHARE DESPITE ITS MINORITY STATUS. THE FOLLOWING TWO DAYS JARUZELSKI AND RAKOWSKI MUST ATTEND A WARSAW PACT SUMMIT IN, "OF ALL PLACES", BUCHAREST. JARUZELSKI HAS CALLED GORBACHEV TO ASK WHETHER THE SUMMIT COULD NOT BE POSTPONED BUT GORBACHEV ALLEGEDLY SAID IT SECRET.

SECRET

PAGE 02 WARSAW 08512 02 OF 02 231740Z

WAS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE TENSIONS WITHIN THE PACT BETWEEN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY. JARUZELSKI FEELS HE MUST MAKE AN APPEARANCE TO REASSURE HIS WARSAW PACT PARTNERS THAT THINGS ARE NOT OUT OF CONTROL IN POLAND. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE IS A DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT JARUZELSKI COULD EITHER BE ELECTED ON THE VERY DAY OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL (UNLIKELY, SINCE IT IS A SUNDAY), OR POSTPONE THE ELECTION AND RECEIVE HIM IN HIS OLD CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE.

8. COMMENT: THERE HAVE PROBABLY BEEN FEW OCCASIONS WHEN AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAS ARRIVED FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT IN A MORE FLUID AND FAST-MOVING POLITICAL SITUATION THAN THE PRESENT ONE IN POLAND. DAVIS
STATE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WHITE HOUSE FOR JOHN KELLER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), PL
SUBJECT: POLAND LOOKS TO PRESIDENT BUSH

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).


3. NOW POLAND IS EMBARKED ON YET ANOTHER REVOLUTION, THIS TIME A PEACEFUL AND CAREFUL ONE, INSPIRED BY THE MORAL AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF LECH WAŁEŚA AND JOHN PAUL II, AND WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE ENIGMATIC, UNPOPULAR, BUT INDISPENSABLE GENERAL JARUZELSKI, THE POLES ARE EXPLOITING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF PERESTROIKA AND STRIDING INTO UNEXPLORRED TERRITORY AS THEY SEEK TO MAKE THE TRANSITION...
FROM A LENINIST DICTATORSHIP TO PARTIAL, AND
LATER COMPLETE, DEMOCRACY. THIS COUNTRY, WHERE
WORLD WAR TWO BEGAN, IS NOW IN THE FOREFRONT
OF EFFORTS TO DISSOLVE THE DIVISION OF EUROPE.
BOTH SIDES IN THE POLITICAL EQUATION HERE ARE
CONSCIOUS OF HAVING TAKEN A MAJOR AND UNCERTAIN
GAMBLE AND ARE LOOKING TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
BOTH INSPIRATION AND MATERIAL HELP.

4. THE PRESIDENT’S MAIN OBJECTIVES, AS SEEN
FROM HERE, ARE TO WELCOME THE DRAMATIC STEPS
THE POLES HAVE ALREADY TAKEN TOWARD POLITICAL
REFORM, TO ENCOURAGE NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND
THE PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE, AND TO
RESPOND TO POLISH HOPES FOR WESTERN ECONOMIC
HELP AND COOPERATION. OUR GENUINE CONCERNS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ARE SERVED BY A POLAND WHICH HAS
BECOME MORE OPEN AND TOLERANT OF POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC DIVERSITY. OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS
ARE SERVED BY A POLAND WHICH IS ACHIEVING A GREATER
DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR AND WHICH
IS UNLIKELY EVER TO BECOME AN ADVERSARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OR OUR ALLIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

END SUMMARY.

5. THE PRESIDENT’S VISIT WILL BE AN ACTION-
FORCING EVENT FOR THE POLISH LEADERSHIP. HIS
OFFICIAL HOST WILL BE WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI,
WHO SEES HIMSELF AS A TRUE POLISH PATRIOT,
A LATTER-DAY PILSUDSKI. HE KNOWS HOW
UNPOPULAR HE NOW IS BUT HAS HIS EYE FIRMLY
FIXED ON WHAT FUTURE HISTORIANS WILL SAY OF
HIM. JARUZELSKI SHOULD BE INVITED TO VISIT
THE U.S. IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE, BOTH AS A
SYMBOL OF THE NEW U.S.-POLISH RELATIONSHIP
WHICH HAS EVOLVED SINCE YOUR LAST VISIT, AND
AS A SIGN OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL
REFORM PROCESS WHICH HE HAS GUIDED. (HIS VISIT,
WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY BE LOW KEY, SHOULD PROBABLY
PRECEDE WALESA’S NOVEMBER VISIT, AN EVENT
CERTAIN TO EVOKE A BIG POPULAR RESPONSE.)

6. JARUZELSKI’S OFFICIAL AUTHORITY IS MORE THAN
MATCHED BY THE UNOFFICIAL AUTHORITY OF LECH
WALESKA, WHOSE STATURE AS POLITICAL LEADER NOW
MATCHES THE STATURE AS MORAL LEADER WHICH HE
EARNED AS THE VISIBLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
POLISH WORKERS OVER THE PAST DECADE. WALESA’S
ROLE HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY OVER THE PAST
YEAR, TO THE POINT WHERE HE AND THE REGIME
PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE HIM AS VIRTUAL CO-RULER. HE HAS MANAGED TO DRAW THE ALLEGIANCE OF MANY DIVERSE ELEMENTS IN THIS SOCIETY WHOSE COMMON

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE HIM AS VIRTUAL CO-RULER. HE HAS MANAGED TO DRAW THE ALLEGIANCE OF MANY DIVERSE ELEMENTS IN THIS SOCIETY WHOSE COMMON

CONFIDENTIAL
DAYS BEFORE YOUR ARRIVAL. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN MADE FAR MORE COMPLICATED BY SOLIDARITY'S LANDSLIDE ELECTORAL VICTORY -- 99 OF 100 SEATS IN THE NEW SENATE, ALL 161 OF THE ALLOTTED SEATS IN THE LOWER HOUSE (SEJM) OF 460 MEMBERS, AND THE DEFEAT OF VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE "NATIONAL LIST" OF PARTY-COALITION CANDIDATES, MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEEN LEADERS OF THE PARTY'S REFORM WING. THE IMMEDIATE DANGER IS THAT THE PARTY WILL SIMPLY BECOME PARALYZED UNDER THIS PRESSURE, THAT IT WILL BE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO GOVERN. A LONGER-TERM DANGER IS OF LEGISLATIVE DEADLOCK, PARTICULARLY ON THE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF ECONOMIC POLICY.

8. OVER BOTH CAMPS HOVERS THE OMNIPRESENCE OF THE POLISH CATHOLIC CHURCH, THE ONE INSTITUTION TO WHICH VIRTUALLY ALL POLES GIVE WILLING OBEDIENCE. THE CHURCH TOOK PART AS AN OBSERVER IN THE ROUND-TABLE TALKS AND, IN THE PERSON OF GDANSK BISHOP GOCLOWSKI, IN THE SMALL SUBGROUP SET UP TO RESOLVE CONTENTIONS ISSUES. THE CHURCH'S STATUS WAS RECENTLY ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL LAW -- ANOTHER FIRST AMONG COMINIST-RULED COUNTRIES -- AND POLAND WILL ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN BEFORE LONG. THE POPE TAKES A VERY ACTIVE AND PERSONAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN HIS MOTHER-LAND, AND HIS INFLUENCE HERE IS BEYOND DESCRIPTION.

9. SOVIET PERESTROIKA HAS HAD ITS EFFECTS HERE. POLES OF ALL STRIPES HOPE THAT GORBACHEV'S POLICIES WILL PREVAIL AGAINST THE TWIN THREATS OF HARD-LINE OPPOSITION AND NATIONALIST PRESSURES WITHIN THE USSR. NEVERTHELESS, POLES CONTINUE TO VIEW THE SOVIET SYSTEM WITH ANTIPATHY AND THE RUSSIAN/SOVIET EMPIRE WITH DEEP HISTORICAL DISTRUST.

BUT SOLIDARITY LEADERS ARE ACUTELY CONSCIOUS THAT POLAND'S GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION MAKES IT A VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED
ANTI-SOVIE RTHORIC AND HAVE ENDORSED POLAND'S CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE WARSAW PACT. WALESA MAY VISIT MOSCOW WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS -- PROBABLY AFTER HE VISITS THE U.S. IN NOVEMBER. JARUZELSKI WILL HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM BUCHAREST AND THE ANNUAL WARSAW PACT SUMMIT (JULY 7-8) WHEN HE GREETED THE PRESIDENT, SO HE MAY HAVE SOME POINTS TO CONVEY FROM GORBACHEV AND OTHERS. (INCIDENTALLY, THE POLES ARE VERY PLEASED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO POLAND IS NOT PART OF A VISIT TO MOSCOW, BUT IS LINKED INSTEAD TO BUDAPEST AND PARIS.)

10. WHAT POLAND NEEDS NOW ARE CREDITS AND SOCIAL PEACE. FOR CREDITS THEY ARE LOOKING FOR A U.S. LEAD. JUST AS THE U.S. LED THE WAY ON SANCTIONS AFTPE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, SO WE NOW HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY -- AND A DEGREE OF OBLIGATION -- TO LEAD WITH CONCRETE STEPS TO REINFORCE OUR VALUES AND OUR INTERESTS. THE REGIME POINTS OUT THAT IT HAS MET EVERY CONDITION LAID DOWN BY THE WEST FOR POLITICAL CHANGE, AND NOW HOPES FOR ACTION ON PAST PROMISES OF ECONOMIC REWARD FOR POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. SOLIDARITY MAKES A SIMILAR APPEAL,
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 WARSAW 08679

EXDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WHITE HOUSE
FOR JOHN KELLER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE), PL
SUBJECT: POLAND LOOKS TO PRESIDENT BUSH

PHRASING IT IN TERMS OF ITS OWN NEED TO SHOW
ECONOMIC RESULTS FROM ITS NEW POLITICAL SUCCESS.

11. UNLESS THERE IS AN IMF STANDBY AND A DEBT
RESCHEDULING, POLAND CANNOT HOPE TO ATTRACT NEW
INVESTMENT AND JOINT VENTURES. THEY ARE OPEN
TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND EAGER TO MOVE AHEAD
BUT NEED TO REGAIN A DEGREE OF FINANCIAL
RESPECTABILITY. WITHOUT ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT,
SOCIAL PEACE WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN.
INFLATION AND SHORTAGES HAVE NERVES STRETCHED
TAUT, AS THE RECURRENT ROCK AND BOMB-THROWING
INCIDENTS OF RECENT DAYS SHOW. IT IS EVIDENTLY
POSSIBLE TO GATHER 200-300 YOUNG PEOPLE TO PELT
THE COPS ON A MOMENT’S NOTICE, EVEN WITHOUT
MUCH CAUSE. A SICK ECONOMY COMBINED WITH A
WEAKENED CENTRAL AUTHORITY MAKES IT MUCH EASIER.
THE TANKS IN BEIJING BRING EVEN GREATER ANXIETY

TO THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE RESPONSIBLE
OPPOSITION. MOST ECONOMISTS ARGUE THAT THE ONLY
RATIONAL SOLUTION IS TO MOVE TO "MARKETIZATION"
AND THE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION OF SUBSIDIES. THEY
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH STEPS WOULD LEAD TO HUGE
PRICE INCREASES BUT SAY THAT WITHOUT THEM BOTH
PRODUCTIVITY AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES WILL
CONTINUE TO BE SEVERELY DISTORTED. MANY TRADE
UNIONISTS FEAR THAT SUCH PRICE INCREASES WOULD
PROVOKE MASSIVE SOCIAL DISORDER, AS THEY HAVE
IN THE PAST. IF THE FIRST VISIBLE RESULT OF
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IS HUGE PRICE INCREASES,
SOLIDARITY WILL HAVE UNDERMINED ITS MANDATE.

12. POLAND ALSO NEEDS EXTERNAL PEACE. POLES
RECOGNIZE THAT DETERRENCE HAS KEPT THE PEACE
IN EUROPE FOR 44 YEARS -- A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT,
BUT ONE WHICH HAS ALSO DISTORTED POLAND’S
ECONOMY TOWARDS MORE MILITARY SPENDING AND
MORE DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR. THEY ARE EAGER TO MOVE BEYOND CONFRONTATION AND COMPETITION TO BROAD COOPERATION AND REINTEGRATION. FOR THIS REASON THEY WELCOME EVERY STEP TOWARD EAST-WEST DETENTE AND HAVE TRIED TO NUDGE FORWARD THE DIALOGUE ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CUTS THROUGH THEIR JARUZELSKI PLAN. THEY HAVE WELcomed THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE A WEAKENING OF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM ON BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE. THE POLES DISTRUST GERMAN INTENTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND SAY OPENLY THAT THEY WANT THE U.S. TO REMAIN A CENTRAL ACTOR ON THE EUROPEAN STAGE INCLUDING MILITARY/SECURITY AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFLICTED

PAGE 03

WARSAW 08679 03 OF 04 271709Z

13. THE UNITED STATES OCCUPIES SUCH AN EXAGGERATED PLACE OF HONOR IN THE MINDS OF MOST POLES THAT IT GOES BEYOND RATIONAL DESCRIPTION. ONE OPPOSITION LEADER DESCRIBED IT APTLY AS "BLIND LOVE." THIS IMAGE DERIVES FROM AMERICA'S HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ROLE AS THE LAND OF THE FREE; IT DERIVES FROM OUR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND LIFESTYLE, ENJOYED BY 10 MILLION POLISH-AMERICANS AND ENVIED BY THEIR SIBLINGS AND COUSINS LEFT BEHIND; IT DERIVES FROM OUR GEOPOLITICAL ROLE AS THE BALANCING GREAT POWER AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND AS THE CONTROLLING GREAT POWER OVER MOST OF THE GERMANS.

14. BECAUSE THE U.S. IS SO IMPORTANT AND SO ADMIRE BY POLES, THEY EXAGGERATE WHAT THE U.S. CAN AND SHOULD DO FOR POLAND. POLES OF ALL STRIPES BELIEVE THAT THE U.S., IF IT WISHED, COULD SOLVE MOST OF POLAND'S PROBLEMS. THUS, THEIR HOPES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT ARE CERTAIN TO EXCEED OUR CAPACITY TO DELIVER. BUT OUR INABILITY TO MEET THE HIGH END OF THEIR EXPECTATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT MODERATE STEPS WOULD CAUSE DISAPPOINTMENT. CONSISTENCY OF PERFORMANCE ON A WIDENING RANGE OF PROGRAMS WILL SERVE OUR INTEREST IN DRAWING POLAND MORE FIRMLY INTO THE MAINSTREAM OF WESTERN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CULTURE -- A STREAM WHICH HAS DEPOSITED SOVIET-STYLE CENTRALISM IN HISTORY'S
The Polish Government is hoping for major U.S. and Western economic assistance and concrete follow-up to the points the President made in his Hanrahamck speech in April. The Poles believe they have done everything the President asked of them on his last visit and hope for some words of praise and encouragement.

CONFIDENTIAL
16. I have also spelled out separately the idea of a "Friends of Poland" initiative which I think would make a real difference to the Poles, would put us clearly in the lead in such efforts, and would not require major new funding (Warsaw 2981). And I think we should have at least one splashy new proposal, for example, on the environment.

17. The President's visit will be a success. It may even be one of those events where the convergence of historic trends, of national interests and of decisive individuals can bring about a moment in time which changes the direction of history. The ingredients are all there and Poland is ready.

DAVIS

[...]Mitterrand. So, you are going to Romania tomorrow. I appreciated the answer about Romania that you gave during your TV interview to the TV show "Ammae-2" and to the radio station "Europe-1" (The interview took place after the press conference at the Elysee Palace on July 5). But at the same time, we all understand that Romania is a real dictatorship. The only unclear moment is whose dictatorship is it--Ceausescu's himself or his wife's?

Gorbachev. Still, we should make a realistic assessment of the situation. Romania used to be a backward agrarian country, and now it is an industrialized developed state. The challenge is to complete the economic and social base that has been created with a fitting political establishment. For example, Romania has completely solved the housing problem. This is a big victory.

But Ceausescu is scared of democracy. By the way, he told me that the measures that we are now undertaking in the USSR in the framework of perestroika, he had already implemented in Romania 10 years ago.

Mitterrand. He told you that? Romania, of course, could use a perestroika. I visited Romania several years ago. After that I never came back.

Gorbachev. Ceausescu probably "wrote out" a whole plan of actions for you.

Mitterrand. Precisely. Since what year is he the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party?

Gorbachev. Since 1965.

Mitterrand. Every power is seeking a way to find its place in history. Besides, and I have already quoted these words by Tacitus yesterday, "every man always reaches the limit of his own power." That is why democracy must have a mechanism of political balances.

Contrary to Ceausescu, who is cracking down, Todor Zhivkov is acting in a smarter, I would even say, more canning, way. For how many years has he been in power?

Gorbachev. He has lead the Bulgarian Communist Party for 35 years now. I recall how I was at his meeting with students of the University of Sofia. They criticized him quite harshly, and he kept responding "They are right about everything."

Mitterrand. 35 years!

Gorbacheva. And you thought that two presidential terms in France--14 years--is too long for you.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Mitterrand. (Laughing). It is also long. Zhirkov is about eighty years old now.

Gorbachev. He is not in complete control of his legs, and facial muscles. When I see him, I remember Brezhnev.

[...] Gorbachev. We discussed with him, in particular, the difficulties of the political process in the United States, the situation, in which the President always has to keep Congress in mind, and therefore sometimes he has to act timidly, or not to respond to Soviet initiatives.

Mitterrand. In the past, U.S. Presidents used to be the masters of the game. Roosevelt, and Truman made their own independent foreign policies. By impeaching Nixon, the Congress took its revenge. However, George Bush would make very moderate policy even without the congressional constraint because he is a conservative. Not all conservatives are alike. Bush, as a President, has a very big drawback—he lacks original thinking altogether.

Gorbachev. The question about the American internal political process interests me also in terms of building relations between the Parliament and the President. In Italy, for example, the complicated relations between various democratic institutions, lead sometimes to the incompleteness, to the disruption of political process. In our country we have to concentrate on the implementation of radical reforms. Therefore it is undesirable that the center initiative was compromised by disorderly relations with regions, with other democratic institutions. We need to find some gold medium here.

[...] Mitterrand. For a revolution you need a new class that could take power in its hands. The Decembrists were able to use a powerful popular burst of discontent, but they were not ready to take the power, and nothing came out of it.

Gorbachev. There was a lot of violence during the French revolution. Names of such heroes as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat are associated with revolutionary terror. I think that there is such a situation in the world now that when people want to change their regime, their government, it is not by the way of revolution any more.

Gorbachev. In Poland, for example, people want to avoid the repetition of the events of 1980 more than anything else. By the way, this is the reason why Jaruzelski’s course for a dialogue with “Solidarity”. Lech Walesa, and all of Poland’s political forces is gaining a wide support among the Poles.

Mitterrand. By employing the cruel methods, the leaders of the French revolution were able to unite the population against the foreign threat. They were very effective in this. Just as Stalin was in his time.
Memorandum from Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party

12 July 1989

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
No. 01-05-20/ 12 July 1989
TO THE POLITBURO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (THE CC OF THE BCP)

INFORMATION

by Petar Mladenov, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Comrades,

The routine session of the Political Consultative Committee of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact was held on 7 and 8 July in Bucharest [...] The most pressing problems of socialism and the present day were analyzed in a business-like, constructive, and on some issues, critical and self-critical spirit; the paths were mapped out for accelerating the positive processes leading to a more stable and democratic world. Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech set the tone for this atmosphere. It was emphasized during the exchange of experience and information about the course of the renewal processes in the allied countries that, despite the diversity in national conditions, practically all socialist countries were struggling to resolve a series of similar problems. [These problems] had sprung from the necessity to overcome the negative tendencies in [these countries’] internal development and to stimulate and fully utilize the potentials of socialism.

The allied countries have lagged behind, especially in the field of new technology [and] in growth rates; the currency debts are perceived by the West as the “sunset of socialism.” With regards to [these facts], the necessity to prove the advantages of the new order through both strong arguments and real actions was emphasized. The further influence of the socialist countries on positive changes in the world will depend to a crucial degree on the ability of socialism to renew itself [...] In the future, the socialist countries’ political philosophy in the field of international relations should be a combination of active struggle for transition toward a new international order and a reliable defense of our countries.

In the process of exchanging opinions on the cardinal problems of disarmament, the leaders of the allied countries stressed the importance of signing a Soviet-American agreement on a 50% reduction in both countries’ strategic offensive weapons, providing a strict adherence to the 1972 Agreement on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense [i.e., the ABM Treaty]. The universal and complete ban on chemical arms and the liquidation of [chemical arms] stockpiles continue to be issues on the agenda of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The meeting paid special attention to the process of building a “pan-European home.” It analyzed the results of the recently held forums in the framework of the
Helsinki process. Emphasis was placed on the interests and values common for the European peoples, on the need for equal dialogue and an enhancement of contacts in various areas. The unity of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is possible and necessary in the conditions of preserving each country’s identity and its social, economic and cultural diversity, which should be viewed as a treasure of European civilization. The meeting confirmed that every attempt to destabilize the situation in any socialist country will have an impact on the balance in Europe, and on the confidence building process between the two halves of the continent. Such an attempt will destroy what has been already achieved.

The Soviet leader informed the meeting about new developments in the relations and policies of the USSR towards the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] and France. [...]

Cde. Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed the readiness of the USSR to coordinate the size of the Soviet contingents and the order of their withdrawal from Eastern Europe with the leaderships of the allied countries. The combination of political, military and geographical factors should be taken into consideration during the discussion of the above-mentioned possibility because it would influence the European situation after the realization of such a withdrawal. It was emphasized that the US proposal for equal ceilings on Soviet and American military contingents in Eastern Europe and Western Europe respectively, should be considered in a broader context. An optimal position should be prepared for counting the military contingents of the other NATO countries in the FRG as well.

The process of conventional military disarmament should be started in the shortest possible time. The Soviet leadership considers that real steps in this respect should be made around 1992-1993. At that time the question about NATO modernization is going to be worked out, a United Europe will be created, and new elections for the American presidency are going to be held.

The importance of the allied [Warsaw Pact] countries’ efforts and pragmatic steps in realizing regional initiatives was stressed unanimously [at the meeting]. At the same time, cde. Gorbachev criticized the passivity of the Warsaw Pact countries in realizing a number of collective and individual proposals. There is a compelling necessity to unite our initiatives in order to strengthen the purposeful-ness and efficiency of the coordinated activities in the area of disarmament.

The need to pay more attention to the questions in the “second basket” of the pan-European process was stressed [at the meeting]. The time has come for developing joint programs with Western Europe in areas such as transport, environment, technology, nuclear power safety, and so on. This cooperation should be pursued based on the mutual respect of interests, the strict observation of the principles of international behavior. There was a common view that the process of integration in the West and in the East should not lead to a perpetuation of the division on the continent. During an analysis of West European integration, it was determined that the allied countries should: first, derive all the benefits from their cooperation with the EEU [European Economic Union] including also [cooperation between the EEU] and the COMECON [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], and second, they should prepare themselves for the emergence of the united West European market.
This means that there is a need for stimulating the processes of integration between the fraternal countries in the economic area, and the development of elements of an united socialist market. Simultaneously, the allied countries should strengthen their relations in the areas of culture and science, between the highest representatives of the organs of power, between public organizations, youth unions, etc.

The leaders of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact analyzed the achievements and the problems in the area of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. It was stressed that the most recent pan-European fora have put forward the idea of “pan-European legal space,” based on the commonwealth of law-abiding states. As a whole, however, the differences in the positions of the allied countries became most obvious on this question, in particular those between the PRH [People’s Republic of Hungary], the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] and the GDR.

During the discussion of the Soviet proposal for convening a second Helsinki (1975)-type meeting it was stressed that its realization could culminate in the first stage of the Vienna negotiations. In case the negotiations are prolonged, the convening of such a meeting at the beginning of 1992 will provide [us] with the opportunity to make the relevant conclusions on all “baskets” of the Helsinki process and to speed up the process [of building] a more secure Europe.

In his statement, the leader of the Bulgarian delegation, Todor Zhivkov, laid out the arguments for the strategic need to realize the new historic content of world development and to realize the opportunities, which appear as a result of the unavoidable effect of qualitatively new positive tendencies that reflect objective developments.

The theoretical conclusion was drawn that the new line of “opening” the US and the West toward the socialist countries is an expression of the objective need of new global economic redistribution, which will allow the developed capitalist countries to solve their own socio-economic problems. Therefore, it is possible to develop sufficiently wide cooperation between East and West without concessions on our part, which could lead to a “step by step transformation” of socialism.

The questions regarding the necessity of strengthening the positions of socialism occupied an important place in [Todor Zhivkov’s] speech. He stressed the international responsibility of our parties and states to combine the renewal of socialism with upholding its fundamental principles and ideals. He warned about the danger of destabilization and disintegration of some of our countries as units of the Warsaw Pact and the socialist community; this requires joint political decisions. Comrade Todor Zhivkov convincingly spoke in support of the necessity to renew the [allied countries’] economic and political cooperation in the framework of the COMECON and the [Warsaw Pact].

[Todor Zhivkov] set forth the position of the PRB [People’s Republic of Bulgaria] on the question of Turkey’s destructive actions in the Balkans and [its] unprecedented anti-Bulgarian campaign which is a part of broader plans aimed against socialism as a ruling system. Simultaneously, [he] affirmed our readiness for a dialogue with Turkey and for developing positive tendencies in the Balkans.

In the coordination of the final documents, difficulties were caused by: the exaggerated pretensions of the HPR with regard to human rights and the minorities question; the peculiar positions of the representative of the SRR on a number of important issues concerning international relations and reconstruction in the socialist
countries; and the intensifying contradictions between the HPR and the SRR which already encompass opinions on a broad set of questions and assume differences in principles. Cde. N[icolae] Ceausescu emphasized in his speech the negative factors in international life, expressed doubt in the concept of “pan-European home,” and ridiculed the significance of the renewal processes.

Some changes in the SRR’s position provoked definite interest regarding the question of the Warsaw Pact’s role in the present situation, and the unity and cooperation of the allied socialist countries. Cde. N. Ceausescu opposed in his speech the one-sided disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and pointed out that our countries would have to continue to cooperate [in various areas], including the military field, even after the removal of all European military alliances. [He] underlined the need to jointly analyze the problems of socialist construction and to [undertake] joint measures for overcoming the crisis.

In connection with this, Cde. Ceausescu suggested that a meeting be held between the Secretary Generals and the First Secretaries of the Parties, or among the Party and Heads of State of the allied countries, no later than October this year. [The goals of this meeting should be] to make a joint analysis of the problems of socio-economic development and socialism construction and to work out a realistic program for joint measures. [Ceausescu] demonstrated his efforts to achieve a greater flexibility on the questions of perfecting the mechanisms of cooperation in the framework of the Warsaw Pact. [He] invited [us] to participate in the XIV Congress of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] in October this year, at the highest level.

In this context the expressed opinion of N. Ceausescu about the necessity of discussing the question of how to overcome the present problems outlined in cde. Todor Zhivkov’s speech as well as for ensuring further cooperation on the Balkans should also be viewed. These questions should be considered at least among the Balkan socialist countries and possibly with the participation of other socialist countries. […]

In general, the meeting proceeded in a open, friendly and constructive spirit.

During the meeting of the PCC [Political Consultative Council] a separate meeting between the delegation leaders took place (an additional report was prepared) as well as two meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs.

The first joint meeting of the Committee of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Committee of the Ministers of Defense took place. It discussed the question of perfecting the mechanisms of cooperation between the allied countries.

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Opis 46-10, File 29, p. 4-12. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]
Minutes from a Meeting of the Presidium of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club

15 July 1989


The agenda:
1. A report by A. Stelmachowski on his visit with Gen. Jaruzelski
2. The Club’s meeting of 10 July
3. Preparations for a meeting with Gen. Jaruzelski
4. A Statute of the National Assembly and election of a president
5. Structure and composition of Commissions

A. Stelmachowski: On Thursday, Gen. Jaruzelski paid me a visit, and later on, Minister Czyrek. The talk with Jaruzelski lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes. We raised the following:
- The question of presidency: the thing is that despite his personal unwillingness, he feels obliged to run for it. He is referring to three elements:
  - A clear stand by the body of generals, the MON and the Council for National Defense.
  - Some outside reactions are unmistakable: statements at the [Warsaw Pact] Political Committee at Bucharest, and some wordings by President Bush.
  - The position of the majority of colleagues at the Plenum. Due to these pressures he has been forced to revise his position. An obstacle—Solidarity is explicitly in favor of Kiszczak. It would be good if support for Kiszczak could be revised. To meet Solidarity half-way—he is proposing a different solution than a hearing in a Sejm debate—he will appear in different Clubs with Kiszczak. Since it is rather unusual, he will ask for the formula that he comes at the invitation of the OKP. And also that it should be without the presence of journalists.

- In Bucharest, Gorbachev asked Jaruzelski if it would not be proper for Walesa to come to Moscow. If we would oppose it, he would not pursue it further.
  - He showed anxiety over the agricultural situation. He asked if the situation is so dire. Would a transition to the market economy improve this situation? The meeting with Czyrek headed in a similar direction. He said that the question of the presidency is becoming more and more urgent, that one must keep in mind the possibility of provocations. In this context he informed me about the death of Rev. Zych. He asked about [...] words missing] of the government. A great coalition is desirable. We exchanged views [...] words missing] conclusions. Walesa is saying in public statements that he would like to go to Moscow. Gorbachev said in Paris [...] words missing] arrival is fine, but he does not want to see him come under a formula of union invitation—could Walesa come as a social leader, a Noble Prize laureate. It would be a mixed invitation by the Parliament and the Peace Council.
A. Wielowieyski: Has Jacek Kuron given a report about his talk with Prof. Orzechowski? The two of us [Wielowieyski and Kuron] gave him a formal invitation for Jaruzelski. He argued they had agreed that voting in other Clubs is going to be open. ZSL will be voting for Jaruzelski, and so will SD. However, they can obtain only a slight majority, thus there is some anxiety.

J. Slisz: According to my information, 9 SL deputies will be voting for neither candidate.

A. Stelmachowski: Kozakiewicz is predicting that 25 SD deputies will be voting against.

Wende: Can we afford not to take a position?

Ziolkowski: Orzechowski said he would like to meet on state matters.

J.M. Rokita: I spoke with Janowski—he cannot imagine that his party might be against it. He has 6 “rebels.”

B. Geremek: This has been a brief overview of the situation, tomorrow is the Club meeting at 10 a.m. What is the agenda?

A. Wielowieyski: The Commission matters—at least information on the work of the Extraordinary Commission. Item 2, the National Assembly:

1. Statute of the National Assembly.
2. Matters relating to the election of a president.
3. A meeting with the General [Jaruzelski] at 3 p.m.

We have not received a response as to whether Walesa will be coming; the General asked for a meeting with him half an hour earlier.

How do we imagine that meeting will take place? For how long is he coming?

J. Kuron: As long as necessary, he is at our disposal. At the meeting there are going to be only parliamentary deputies and a recording clerk.

E. Wende: If absence of the press is required by the guest, we are not going to vote on this in the Club.

Z. Kuratowska: We have the right to present our position: the guest does not wish to have the press, we have invited him.

B. Geremek: If there are protests from the floor about the press, we will vote on it.

E. Wende: There may be a surprise given that the deputies will demand openness and the press.

J. Slisz: We have invited him, he just asked to have it without the press, as is the case in other Clubs, we have agreed to it.

B. Geremek: We should ask if the Club wishes to meet with the General. […]

B. Geremek: We are asking whether to invite Gen. Jaruzelski, assuming that a press conference will follow the meeting, but no journalists at the meeting. Will questions be asked from the floor, or handed over on a slip of paper and signed?

K. Kozlowski: A few questions should be prepared at the beginning.

B. Geremek: A few words of welcome should be in order. Next we expect answers from the candidate to several basic questions. We give him a chance with the first question: Stalinism, with the second one—martial law—we deprive him of such a chance. The third question relates to an agenda of democratic reforms. I would set such agenda pragmatically: 1. access to TV, 2. territorial self-government, 3. the courts, 4. on his model of the state running in the transition period. The opposition is demanding an
Extraordinary Commission, which would have an insight into the workings of the government.

A. Wielowieyski: Confirmation of democratic elections after four years!
E. Wende: Should the questions from the floor not be given on a slip of paper to the chairman?

Then, it would be possible to look at them and request withdrawal. There might be a question—how many AK [Armia Krajowa- Polish “Home Army” during World War II] members has he murdered?

J. Slisz: Questions should be asked from the floor.
J. Kuron: Questions from the floor are better. Even that question about AK members can be put, provided that the form of the question is proper. This should be said clearly.

G. Janowski: What do we want to achieve by a question on the Economic Council—he is open for anything anyway.
B. Geremek: In our conversations, the words were used that this is a takeover of the government. The thing is that he is a candidate who should be engaged.

G. Janowski: Questions from the floor should be with only a brief explanation, and not some sort of historical-political reports.
A. Stelmachowski: This is the reason why I think questions should be put on paper, otherwise they will talk and talk.
G. Janowski: He has time for us, it is not an every-day opportunity, let them talk.
A. Wielowieyski: That is nonsense, it is Jaruzelski who is to talk.
J.M. Rokita: If the questions are to be on paper, then the burden of selection and ordering will rest with the Presidium.
B. Geremek: Then there will be resentment, as each type of selection will stir up suspicions.

J. Slisz: In the ZSL there were direct questions, then selection is automatic.
J.M. Rokita: When he gets questions from the floor, it gives him an opportunity to better present himself to the people asking questions.
G. Janowski: Do you want to facilitate him?
J.M. Rokita: Yes, I do this time!
J. Ziolkowski: On the agenda there are no questions about the nomenklatura. Such questions should necessarily be raised. An interaction is important—face to face. The culture of formulating questions is very important. In this circle there is great sensitivity for admonition. To depend on their responsibility!

A voice from the floor: That is too much!
B. Geremek: Should we limit [time] to 1 minute. It is enough—1 to 2 minutes.
J. Ziolkowski: We may appeal to ask factual questions.
O. Krzyzanowska: There will be a question on how he sees the role of the Party.
E. Wende: In what form will Kiszczak be there?
J. Kuron: Orzechowski said that there would be only one candidate—Jaruzelski. Thus, can we ask him questions?
— [unidentified speaker:] Only if he would be a candidate.
J. Kuron: It’s not obvious that such a meeting is a man-to-man fight. […] Here it is not so, as 260 are besetting a single one. We absolutely need to talk about culture.
B. Geremek: There are things about which the Presidium cannot talk. I think in the first part of the meeting there will be a discussion and this problem will emerge. It has been decided that questions will be asked directly. We are not saying how long the meeting is going to last, we do not set any time limit, unless the meeting starts dragging on.

The Statute of the National Assembly and Election of the President

B. Geremek: We assume that we have to have a discussion:
- on the form of voting;
- on the statute of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly will most likely meet on Wednesday.

A. Stelmachowski: Kozakiewicz says it will certainly be on Wednesday, but it will probably be necessary to call the National Assembly on Tuesday afternoon to discuss the statute. The question is whether the voting should be open or secret. The General was inclined to recognize a secret vote, but Czyrek vehemently opposed it.

B. Geremek: Discussion on the statute—how awful. Urban will exploit it, as there is a clear tendency toward deprecating parliamentary institutions. A statute of the National Assembly is going to be proposed by the Coalition, we will introduce amendments. Only a vote for or against. Then comes voting, either they accept or reject it.

J.M. Rokita: But there is going to be a polemic from the Coalition’s side.

B. Geremek: The Speaker of the Sejm doesn’t have the right to refuse to give the floor to someone. In our Club we will submit for a vote the proposed statute.

A. Celinski: The Extraordinary Commission hasn’t come to an understanding, it decided there would be a discussion on this problem; a debate or so, open—not open. It’s about to meet tomorrow and will present positions to the Clubs.

A. Stelmachowski: We give up on the debate.

O. Krzyzanowska: That question was to be taken up at the Seniors’ Convent on Monday.

Z. Kuratowska: Let’s have a discussion on the statute on Tuesday morning.

A. Stelmachowski: Or tomorrow, time permitting.

B. Geremek: Let’s vote on it tomorrow:
- secret or open
- debate or no debate.

K. Kozlowski: There must be a discussion in the Club on where a secret vote leads us, and where the open one does.

J. Kuron: Nobody will agree to a debate. If there is a debate, we will denigrate him [the President]. Are we anxious to have the President denigrated?

E. Wende: The question of behaving on the floor. Are we supposed to save Jaruzelski’s presidency?

K. Kozlowski: I would go even further, for an open vote, without debate, without leaving and without demonstration—we are serious people.

A. Wielowieyski: Should I present the numbers? They may be short 15 to 21 votes—they are “in a flap,” they are stretched to the limit. Everyone who doesn’t do anything is giving Jaruzelski half a vote.
J. Kuron: We have to be aware of what the President’s case means—the peasants won’t get markets [for their goods], physicians won’t get a raise, the government stays on, we are entering into a terrible mess. Consequences of demonstrating our morality are falling upon the society.

B. Geremek: Not electing a PUWP member would settle the question of physicians. The election can be repeated. General Jaruzelski wants to be elected in the first round and probably this will happen. If it doesn’t happen, it’s not a drama. All will reflect [on the situation], and it will be repeated.

A. Balazs: The Club has decided it will not vote for Gen Jaruzelski. If Jaruzelski convinces us at that meeting, will we be voting for him?

J. Kuron: Everybody votes as he likes, consistent with the will of the electorate. That’s what has been decided.

O. Krzyzanowska: The behavior of the SD and ZSL is new. We thought that they would elect him. But right now our position begins to be decisive.

J.M. Rokita: There may be a statutory crisis if there is only one candidate, as the statute says that the candidate who gets the least [number of votes]—drops out. There has to be either a recess in the debates, or new candidates need to be submitted.

J. Kuron: That discussion will start in the National Assembly.

J. Slisz: He won’t pass the first time, he won’t pass the second time. One needs to be prepared for a new situation.

E. Wende: Can we change that provision?

B. Geremek: First we need to introduce statutory changes to avoid changing them in the process.

G. Janowski: We have to submit our own candidate.

J. Kuron: Then we would enter into a war with them.

G. Janowski: People have placed great confidence in us. At pre-election meetings they were telling me “a spanking from a parent’s hand isn’t painful.” We are handing everything over to bureaucrats’ hands. We say: we are not ready. Why not?—there is Geremek, Trzeciakowski ... Let’s keep in mind that in the third voting we will have to submit our candidate.

J. Kuron: I argued in the Club in favor of taking over the government. A set-up in which [we] have the presidency but not the government would be fatal. It would mean taking responsibility for their government. For me a prerequisite of a functioning government, which sooner or later we will get, is their having the presidency. Our president is not going to have such prerogatives, he will be a figurehead. Besides, it’s a total, confrontational change.

A. Celinski: We need to close this discussion. This is not the place for it.

A. Wielowieyski: We are not going to say anything more during this discussion.

J. Slisz: And what if a candidate drops out in the third voting?

A. Wielowieyski: Then the coalition will put forward someone new, I don’t imagine that someone from our side would agree to run.

J. M. Rokita: We may talk with members at the Club on what to do in case of such a crisis.

E. Wende: The presidential crisis may be much more serious than was the case with the national electoral list. We have to be aware of it. In my heart I am with Mr. Gabriel’s voters, but we have to make decisions thinking occasionally for them.
G. Janowski: People think better than we do.
A. Wielowieyski: We have decided that we have to inform Club members rather clearly of what may happen and how they should behave.
B. Geremek: Lech Walesa is pondering if he should meet with Jaruzelski. He wants to come for the National Assembly, but in what role? He should be in Warsaw, but probably not in the Sejm.
A. Stelmachowski: He may play his role tomorrow, but not on Wednesday.
B. Geremek: The Sejm session will probably take place on the 20th. The question of retiring the government—will there be a debate on this? Bugaj has submitted a motion for a report—will there be a discussion then?
O. Krzyzanowska: If the government is resigning there is no reason for a debate. There will be a discussion at the Senior Convent if that decision is subjected to a vote.
B. Geremek: When a new prime minister presents his cabinet there will be an occasion to evaluate the resigning government. In other words, we are against the report and against the debate.

*The Structure and Composition of the [Sejm] Commissions.*
J. Ambroziak: He is reporting on their proposals, which are at variance with ours.
1. Creation of a Commission on Trade and Services.
2. Taking forestry away from the Environmental Protection [Commission] and placing it in the Commission for Agriculture.
3. Economic policy, including budget and finance.
4. Combining social policy, health and physical culture.
5. Creating a separate Commission for Economic Cooperation with Abroad (we wanted to have it in the industry).

They didn’t want minorities—they may submit it for a general debate.
A. Wielowieyski: What has been gained is progress. We need to fight for the separation of health and social policy, give up on minorities (as it will become anyway a question of German minorities—the Silesians). Housing construction has been omitted, it should be added to the Commission on Industry.
B. Geremek: There is no reason to return back to that discussion, we will defend [our position] at the plenary session. On matters of divergences there will be brief statements of our deputies. […]

*[Source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]*
Minutes of the Meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party [HSWP] CC Political Executive Committee

24 July 1989

[The end of July brought a definite hardening in the position of the HSWP at the National Roundtable talks. This was obvious in the Communists unexpected refusal to sign an agreement on party law, although it had already been accepted by the experts. The opposition attributed the harder line to a change in personnel at the top of the HSWP delegation, when Imre Pozsgay’s position was taken over by the less flexible Gyogy Fejti. At the 27 July meeting of the National Roundtable, Fejti made it clear that the HSWP was not willing to give a full account of all of its property, emphasizing that the greater part of it had been acquired legitimately and therefore this issue should not be discussed at the tripartite talks. The HSWP’s uncompromising stand on reaching agreement on the de-politicization of the armed services, and concerning the withdrawal of party organizations from work places, finally led to the suspension of the tripartite negotiations. The talks were not resumed until 24 August, when the HSWP delegation was headed again by Pozsgay. Fejti’s speech at the 24 July meeting of the HSWP Political Executive Committee, published below, provides insight into the making of this new, less flexible and more intransigent policy towards the opposition.]

(EXCERPT)

Gyorgy Fejti: We are in a complicated situation now, but still, we have to make up our minds. In many questions, especially when it comes to specific details, we have made quite some progress. However, in a series of fundamental and cardinal questions the antagonism seems irreconcilable; apparently the date of the general elections is one of these controversial issues. So, with a flexible negotiating strategy, namely that we give in to certain demands but stand our ground firmly in other issues, we cannot resolve the prevailing antagonism for the time being. Yet time is pushing us. Technically, we have some three or four weeks left to work out the legal conditions of the parliamentary elections in late autumn. Three or four weeks, that’s all we have. On the other hand, this more or less open, hesitant, obstructive behavior is physically impeding the process of calling elections. That’s why we have to come to a decision, on the basis of the previous issue on the agenda, as to what to do in the face of the present economic situation and the international financial conditions. Because either we accept the fact that we cannot make a compromise in this case, while emphasizing that the ongoing negotiation process should not be jeopardized—it is another question, though, whether the danger holds only for the elections—or, alternatively, we come up with overt reasoning and publicize in due time what the rationale is behind advancing the date of elections. In the latter case we should look to make compromises on other issues instead of this one. Undoubtedly, we jeopardize the success of negotiations; what is more, we even risk their termination. The later we express our intention to call earlier elections, the bigger the danger is.
**Rezso Nyers**: The only reason to hasten negotiations is to advance the elections? I believe that even if we called elections for next spring, we should speed things up all the same, shouldn’t we?

**Gyorgy Fejti**: It is a markedly different situation if we want to submit the fundamental laws to parliament in mid-September rather than in December. The meaning of hastening things now depends on whether we show the magnanimous gesture of government—abolishing these laws—in a very broad sense, or the government makes it clear that, even though they are curious how political negotiations will end, they want to submit the bills at the next session anyway, so that nothing can change the date of election.

**Rezso Nyers**: I have one question—otherwise I completely agree that we hasten the process and the government keep to their schedule, with the one compromise of September. But why does it have to be connected with elections in November?

**Gyorgy Fejti**: Because we have no other plausible reason for speeding things up.

(...)

**Gyorgy Fejti**: Yes, but we have to get back to the unfortunately irrevocable question, that we should decide in a very short time, to what extent the elections of this year are important for us. As long as there is no decision on this issue, we cannot follow a clear and unequivocal line in the negotiations. I can imagine that we might lose this, so let me point out that despite all appearances there is no covert reason that would make it important for me. Yet we cannot carry on the negotiations under such pressure without knowing how important this issue is for our own Party.

**Rezso Nyers**: Comrade Fejti, it is very important for us. Under one condition, that is if they pass these fundamental laws in September, then the November elections are 100 percent to our advantage. If they do not vote for the bill in September, then nothing is good enough for us. Absolutely nothing. This is the decisive factor. So, I am totally and immediately for the November elections, if these three issues are accepted. Or at least two of the three. Three would be most expedient, though.

**Gyorgy Fejti**: You mean if they accept it? It is still a bone of contention. There are and will be several disputable issues.

It is definite that the documents can only be submitted in September with much controversy. This is part of the negotiation strategy. We shouldered responsibility for negotiating these bills. However, the HSWP cannot take responsibility for striking a deal with those powers. We will not be able to come to terms; it is the Parliament’s task to ask for a decision, making known and objectively presenting the opposing views. In the present state of negotiations it is an illusion that in these questions—whether it be the party law or election law—a total agreement and final consensus can be reached. An illusion. Possibly we should reduce the number of points that induce confrontation—and there are a lot, at the moment. Just to mention one example: so far, when it came to the party law, the opposition has put in the minutes at every single meeting that the HSWP is not willing to give consent to proposing the bill to parliament if either the assessment or the redistribution of their total property is on the agenda. I think it is absolutely impossible that such a position would be acceptable for us right before the elections. I can’t tell when they might take a U-turn on this issue. They will only relinquish if there is a final deadline, by which the negotiations should be completed, otherwise we can stand up, wash our hands and say that the agreement has fallen through but we are not the ones
to blame. So that’s why entirely clear statements are needed, saying that there is a set schedule and deadline for negotiations; the delegates of the HSWP are unable to do this. (...)

[Source: MOL M-KS-288-5/1072 o.e. Translated by Csaba Farkas.]

I.

Comrade Nyers described the situation of Hungary and the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. He said that the party is preparing for a working congress.¹ A decision has not been made on every issue yet but it is quite definite that internal issues of the party will be on the agenda. A set task of the congress is to render the unity of the party. Comrade Nyers pointed out that the party is already getting active, new platforms are being formed. The basic concept of the congress is democratic socialism, self-government, parliamentary democracy, and economic democracy. Comrade Nyers emphasized that property reform is considered the primary element of reforms. We wish to democratize public property, indeed making it available for the public. We are considering a new system that utilizes the available capital more efficiently. We are planning to increase the ratio of private capital in the economy, and the investment of foreign capital.

Comrade Nyers mentioned the experiences of parliamentary by-elections.² He emphasized that one should not jump to immediate conclusions from the results. We consider the elections neither a success nor a complete failure. The present state of paralysis within the party, however, has become apparent. He referred to the fact that in one constituency the opposition united their forces in the campaign against the MSZMP,
but this is not expected to be a general tendency when it comes to the general elections. Comrade Nyers stressed that there are three factors that can defeat the party. First: the past, if we let ourselves get smeared with it. Second: the disintegration of the party. The third factor that can defeat us is the paralysis of party membership.

Talking about Hungary, comrade Gorbachev said that Hungarian events are followed with much interest in the Soviet Union. The leadership of the Soviet Communist Party refers to our policy with understanding. In the course of negotiations they understood our intention to find our way on the path of democratic socialism. At the same time, comrade Gorbachev posed several questions relating to the situation of Hungary and the policy of the MSZMP. Among other things, he inquired about our orientation in foreign policy, the role of private property and foreign capital, the experiences of by-elections, the goals of the party congress, and about the unity of the party. Comrade Gorbachev put special emphasis on the fact that Soviet leaders interpret the mass sympathy towards the MSZMP demonstrated at the funeral of János Kádár as an important political resource to rely upon.

[...]

IV.

In the course of the visit, several issues of the bilateral relationship were discussed. Negotiators mutually agreed that we should widen the scope of relations between the MSZMP and the CPSU, and increase the exchange of experiences. In this way the recently aggravated laxity that has been hindering the co-operation of Soviet and Hungarian party organizations can be effectively eradicated. Hungarian negotiators suggested that the CPSU and other Soviet social organizations begin collaborating with Hungarian democratic organizations and newly forming parties as well.

The negotiations proved that it is our mutual intention to maintain the friendship of the Hungarian and Soviet nations, create a new basis for reinforcing the friendship movement, winning over the best professionals and the youth for the friendship of the two nations.

In the course of negotiations, Hungarian and Soviet leaders examined the most urgent issues regarding the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary. Comrade Nyers reminded the negotiators that at the meeting between comrades Grósz and Gorbachev in Moscow in March, they agreed in principle that troops would continue to be withdrawn. At that time Soviet negotiators asked that this agreement not be publicized. This time comrade Nyers suggested that the March agreement be reinforced, the question of withdrawing Soviet troops further considered and publicized in one way or another. Speaking for the Soviet leadership, comrade Gorbachev agreed with the idea. His suggestion was that when dealing with the issue, one should start from what the Soviet press release says about the subject: "In the course of negotiations, the issue of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary was brought up, and the parties decided that steps will be made to further reduce the number of Soviet troops, in accordance with the European disarmament process and with
the continuation of the Vienna talks." Comrades Nyers and Grósz agreed with the suggestion.

In the course of negotiations we reaffirmed our mutual political intent to seek the possibility of establishing a new basis for Hungarian-Soviet economic co-operation. Comrade Nyers indicated that the Hungarian government is presently working on the new fiscal system, and possibly the propositions will be submitted this autumn.

The president of the MSZMP emphasized that the situation of Hungarian minorities in the Sub-Carpathian region is improving, which is of great importance for us in terms of internal and foreign affairs alike. Comrade Gorbachev indicated that they are determined to head in this direction.

Another subject was raised: many Hungarian soldiers died in action on the Soviet front or in POW camps in World War II. Hungarian public opinion is exerting pressure so that the memory of these victims is preserved in due fashion. Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union is ready to co-operate in this field as well. They said that mass graves on battlefields are virtually impossible to find now. However, they are ready to specify those cemeteries where Hungarian prisoners of war were buried. They would preserve the tombs, memorial monuments could be installed, and Hungarian citizens could visit these sites. The same practice is working well with the Federal Republic of Germany.

[...]

i The 14th congress of the MSZMP was held on 6-10 October, 1989. During the congress the party dissolved itself and on 7 October a new party, the Hungarian Socialist Party was formed.

ii On 22 July, 1989 parliamentary by-elections were held in four constituencies but the first round brought a final result only in one of them, where the parties of the opposition formed a coalition and won. The second round of the elections was held on 5 August when candidates of the Hungarian Democratic Forum acquired two of the seats while in one constituency the election was void.

iii The aging János Kádár, since the party conference in May, 1988 having the honorary title president of the party died on 6 July; his funeral was held on 14 July, 1989 with the participation of several tens of thousand people.

iv It is more than interesting that just a few days after the return of the two MSZMP leaders from Moscow, on 27 July József Antall, representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum made a proposal at the meeting of the Opposition Roundtable to invite the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest and inform him about the ideas of the opposition. This move strengthens the probability of secret communications having existed between
the MSZMP and some representatives of the opposition as it was commonly believed (but never proved) at the time.


Memorandum of Conversation between President Mikhail Gorbachev, President Rezso Nyers, and General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP), Karoly Grosz

Moscow, 24-25 July 1989

(This Hungarian-Soviet summit was the last such meeting preceding the important events of the fall of 1989: the free exit of the East Germans via Hungary to the West in September, the dissolution of the HSWP, the declaration of the Hungarian Republic, and the plans for free elections. While both sides were still intent on stressing that what was occurring in Hungary was aimed at working out a framework of democratic socialism, it is clear from the memorandum that both sides already had serious doubts about the possible outcome of the process.

The treatment of the issue of Soviet troop withdrawal deserves special attention. During the March visit of Karoly Grosz to Moscow it had been the Soviets’ condition that such an agreement should be kept secret. Now Gorbachev easily agreed to make such a deal public, obviously hoping that such a concession would strengthen the eroding position of the HSWP.)

(EXCERPT)

Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
TOP SECRET!
Central Committee
Inf/1451/1989
REPORT
to the Political Executive Committee


I.

Comrade Nyers described the situation of Hungary and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. He said that the party is preparing for a working congress. 20 Decisions have not yet been made on every issue but is quite definite that internal issues of the Party will be on the agenda. The set task of the congress is to achieve the unity of the Party. Comrade Nyers pointed out that the Party is already getting spirited, [and] new platforms are being formed. The basic concept of the congress is democratic socialism, self-government, parliamentary democracy, and economic democracy. Comrade Nyers
emphasized that property reform was considered the primary element of reform. We wish to democratize public property, indeed making it available for the public. We are considering a new system that utilizes the available capital more efficiently. We are planning to increase the ratio of private capital in the economy, and the introduction of foreign capital.

Comrade Nyers mentioned the experiences of parliamentary by-elections. He emphasized that one should not jump to immediate conclusions from the results. We consider the elections neither a success nor a complete failure. The present state of paralysis within the Party, however, has become apparent. He referred to the fact that in one constituency the opposition united their forces in the campaign against the HSWP, but this is not expected to be a general trend when it comes to the general elections. Comrade Nyers stressed that there are three factors that can defeat the Party. First: the past, if we let ourselves be smeared with it. Secondly: the disintegration of the Party. The third factor that can defeat us is the paralysis of the Party rank-and-file.

Talking about Hungary, Comrade Gorbachev said that the Hungarian events were being followed with much interest in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Communist Party leadership refers to our policy with understanding. In the course of the negotiations, they understood our intention to find our way on the road to democratic socialism. At the same time, Comrade Gorbachev posed several questions with regard to the situation in Hungary and the policy of the HSWP. Among other things, he inquired about our orientation in foreign policy, the role of private property and foreign capital, the experiences with by-elections, the goals of the Party Congress, and the unity of the Party. Comrade Gorbachev put special emphasis on the fact that the Soviet leaders interpreted the mass sympathy towards the HSWP evident at the 14 July 1989 funeral of Janos Kadar as an important political resource to rely on.

(...)
another. Speaking for the Soviet leadership, comrade Gorbachev agreed with the idea. His suggestion was that, when dealing with the issue, one should start from what the Soviet press release says about the subject: “In the course of negotiations, the issue of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary came up, and the parties decided that steps will be made to reduce further the number of Soviet troops in accordance with the European disarmament process and with the progress of the Vienna talks.” Comrades Nyers and Grosz agreed with the suggestion.

In the course of negotiations we reaffirmed our mutual political intent to seek out opportunities for establishing a new basis for Hungarian-Soviet economic cooperation. Comrade Nyers indicated that the Hungarian government was presently working on a new fiscal system, and it was possible that the proposals would be submitted [as early as] this autumn.

The HSWP leader emphasized that the situation of the Hungarian minority in the Sub-Carpathian region was improving, which was of great importance for us in terms of both domestic and foreign affairs. Comrade Gorbachev indicated that they [the Soviet government] were determined to head in this direction.

Another subject raised [in the discussion] were the many Hungarian soldiers who died in action on the Soviet front or in POW 26 camps in World War II. Hungarian public opinion was exerting pressure for the memory of these victims to be preserved in due fashion. Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in this field as well. [He] said that it was virtually impossible to find mass graves on battlefields now. However, they [the Soviets] were ready to specify those cemeteries where Hungarian prisoners of war were buried. They would preserve the tombs; memorial monuments could be installed, and Hungarian citizens could visit these sites. The same practice was working well with the Federal Republic of Germany.

(...)

[Source: MOL, M-KS 288 - 11/4461. o.e. Translated by Csaba Farkas.]
Minutes of the Meeting of the Presidium of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club

1 August 1989, 8 p.m.


B. Geremek: I will remind you of the things that have taken place within the last few days and hours. I had a meeting with Gen. Kiszczak at 2 p.m. It turns out that, at a Politburo meeting, out of four candidates submitted for the position of prime minister only one is left—Rakowski. Baka and Malinowski have declined. Kiszczak is not willing either, but he thinks it’s his duty. He asked about the position of our Club. The Club decided to vote against [him] or to abstain. Walesa took the position: “I supported Gen. Kiszczak for president of the Polish People’s Republic, I refuse to support him for prime minister.” He asked me to inform the OKP about it.

Kiszczak had a very difficult meeting with the PUWP Club yesterday, when it was deciding about the discipline [in party line bloc] voting. Today only 120 members showed up, which means that 50 have deserted [the PUWP Club].

From the other Clubs the figures are changing. At one point, half of the ZSL and half of SD were against. Today it’s even worse—the whole ZSL is against [him], and from the SD only 4 persons [are in favor of him]. He lacks 80-70 [sic] people to ensure his [Kiszczak’s] election.

Meetings of all three Clubs are going on, debating separately. The leaders have arrived, debates are stormy.

ZSL has come up with a proposal to form a government with the OKP. They think that the opposition should form the government. Bentkowski argues that the ZSL is decidedly against the candidacy of Kiszczak. He has contacts with the PUWP—there is a group of young PUWP parliamentary delegates who would like to meet jointly with [me], B. Geremek. If I meet with them, it would be an attempt to interfere with the coalition. They have to ask for it themselves.

Today it is to be decided whether General Jaruzelski will withdraw the letter proposing Kiszczak [for Prime Minister].

Bentkowski says [ZSL] cannot form a government with the PUWP. They are ready to do it with us.

[ZSL] is asking if we would leave the three main ministries with the PUWP if we were to form a government. This is an indispensable guarantee of a peaceful transfer of power.

When PUWP proposed a coalition with them, ZSL was offered 4 ministries and a vice premier. They were not expecting this from the opposition. They put forward their proposal not for the sake of bargaining, but because there is no other way out of the crisis in the country. If we would recognize this, they [ZSL] would be satisfied with 2 ministries. At 6 p.m. there was a meeting with Orzechowski. Based on that conversation, the situation is at a critical point, the President’s motion is suspended.

On the other hand Bentkowski was still presenting doubts as to whether to enter into coalition with the PUWP. I admitted he was right—we know what cooperation with
the PUWP did to the ZSL. They didn’t perceive it as arrogance. To be sure, after that
conversation Jacek Kuron critically summed it up for me: we will take power if PUWP
makes better conditions in the country for us.

We have to take into consideration quite unexpected solutions. Our whole Club is
opposed, and yet they have to have a majority.

If Kiszczak won’t get through, then [perhaps] another candidate—Sekula. Club
meetings are stormy, sharp with mutual accusations. Party leaders are convincing their
Clubs to [decide in favor of] the coalition with PUWP.

We may very well dream that this is a parliamentary democracy and that the
majority decides. But the dream may be cut off and reality will let us know where we are.
We have to see the situation clearly.

J. Kuron: Is it true that the Senate has issued some sort of statement relating to the
annulment of the President’s election?

A. Stelmachowski: Such motion has come in from Senator Leszek Piotrowski—I
sent it out to the proper commission.

A. Wielowieyski: What is the motive of those 41 PUWP [members] who have not
come to the meeting with Kiszczak?

J. Slisz: I spoke with Bak—a peasant, for them a membership card is not
important, they want Bronislaw [Geremek]. As far as Bentkowski is concerned, they
would like to have Olesiak in the government. Approximately 40 deputies are not going
to vote for Kiszczak.

A. Balazs: Bentkowski said that Sekula’s candidacy also won’t get through.

J. Slisz: From a talk with Switka—we would have support of SD deputies.

J. Ambroziak: As of 8 p.m. the information is as follows:

PUWP—12 deputies are against Kiszczak
ZSL—60 deputies are against [Kiszczak]
SD—the whole is in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].
Pax, UChS—in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].

A. Michnik: Will the Club be in favor of not being involved in it?

J. Slisz: The ZSL was asking if we would be ready to propose a prime minister.

We need to think about this.

A. Balazs - If we put forward our candidate for prime minister, the whole ZSL
will be for him.

A. Stelmachowski: To sum it up, the situation is as follows:
- some consensus is emerging to vote against Kiszczak.
- are we to vote negatively against each PUWP candidate?
- do we see the possibility of forming our own government with small
concessions?

T. Mazowiecki: My position is known to all of you. When I was invited to the
Council, I went, putting aside any other considerations. Since the moment I have learned
about Kiszczak’s candidacy, I have been trying to form an opinion on this matter.

- I think that the Club’s decision to vote against Kiszczak is not good. I do not
share the position of our Chairman, who is sending out this news by telex. SIS 162
communicated this news yesterday evening.

- My political assessment is the following: if such a strong man is being proposed,
then the power is being shifted towards the line of the parliament-government. It’s going
to be a strong government, a situation will emerge, which will stabilize the process which has already begun. There is no need for the Club to vote against, it may abstain. I am afraid that the situation with the national list may repeat itself—first we are booming radicals, but then we withdraw. If we are not reaching for power ourselves, we should permit the other side to do it.

- As far as the ZSL proposal is concerned, one ought to remember that the ZSL doesn’t have access to the proper centers of power. I would not bet on this combination. There are other centers of power, which will let themselves be known. We are not at a stage, at which parliamentary relations decide.

I am opposed to Adam’s concept also for the reason that on the opposition-Solidarity side there is no program and within three months that would become dramatically clear.

I think that the most proper position on the question of prime minister is a neutral one. But if we were faced with a situation of the state crisis, then some talks about a great coalition might be possible, but not us in coalition with the ZSL.

I think that the moment is very serious. The public would not tolerate a situation in which first they see advances, and then withdrawals.

A. Celinski: [...] I exclude the possibility of a great coalition.

The nearest option is something that took place in Spain—a government stands somewhere aside, it gains support from the ZSL, part of the Party, our Club can be convinced.

J. M. Rokita: I get the impression that a Kiszczak government, after all, would not be strong in a situation where it wouldn’t have support of a strong majority in the Sejm.

It would be a government in which we would constantly have to be hypocrites. In the long run it would be a trap for us.

Coalition with the ZSL is absurd. It would mean a clash of opinions from the beginning—that reforms are being introduced with a strong power center, the PUWP. Technically such coalition cannot be realized in defiance of the power centers.

In case there is a government of a purely communist coalition, the reforms will be coming from them, they will be throwing them upon us, but they will not strike at the system, as markets would do. They will be lumping together various ideas and we would think there is no other alternative. It will be a consolidation of the system.

It is necessary that we have at least part of the political initiatives. Something that is called a great coalition is a matter of time. It will come, it may be delayed, or accelerated. So, we should not be confusing people.

E. Wende: (to Mazowiecki) Do you take into consideration a situation in which the President will not recommend Kiszczak but Geremek?

T. Mazowiecki: It is possible, but we don’t have such a situation. At this moment there are back-corner talks with the ZSL.

There are two ways out:

A better one—a Kiszczak government, the strongest one from the other side. A big offensive, execution of legal reforms, great stability.

The second one—a great coalition with the PUWP.

A. Balazs: It’s a pity that such a discussion was not held prior to the presidential election. The situation that arose was the fault of both the Presidium and the Club. It would be very unfortunate if it were to repeat itself.
We have no chance for a coalition government, it would be short-lived and tragic for us because of the economic situation and the fact that we don’t have the people. But the opposition certainly has a candidate for prime minister, as people from other parties see it. There are also people on the other side whom we might be able to put forward, e.g. Kwasniewski.

A. Wielowieyski: Two arguments can be added against the coalition:
- We should not be wasting our social capital by entering into a small coalition. I see no gain from it.
- The Big Brother has other methods of conducting politics. Depriving the PUWP of power would be a blow to Gorbachev. The result—a mortal poisoning of our life, impossibility of realizing anything.

It is apparent that we will have to support one government or the other. We must get them to understand that another candidate would get our support. Though Kiszczak is not bad.

[Break]

J. Ziolkowski: We are observing a great acceleration of the political process. *Pacta sunt servanda*—this has been our principle. The fact that Jaruzelski is president is good, it is a stabilizing factor. There is a great weakness of power, a rebellion with the Party itself. There is a dissention within the coalition, the ZSL is bending over backward, in the SD [the situation] must be likewise—as it is improbable to have complete silence after those noisy declarations about a crown in the eagle, etc. There are two possibilities:
- a great coalition-us and the PUWP.
- a small coalition-us, the ZSL and other smaller groups.

One of the elements of the situation is tremendous social impatience. Adam [Michnik] has had a sense of this impatience—[they say] so much is in your hands, and you don’t react.

The new configuration means a strong triumvirate, unusually tight. A strong Kiszczak, about whom there was talk here, is too strong. […]

We have to approach Kiszczak negatively. […] This is a configuration in which we have a minimal possibility of maneuver.

What can we do? Coalition with the ZSL is dangerous, as we cannot steer this process. A small coalition is on their good grace or the lack of it. In the end there are not too many of those contestants.

Only a great coalition is acceptable—a Government of National Salvation.

J. Kuron: That triangle is not a solution under any circumstance. Abstaining from voting—impossible, in any case we would lose the steering wheel, the Club would kick us out through the window.

The first variant: the strikes take off, which will start costing money. Anarchy will follow. Someone will have to bring stability. When a fire bursts, Jaruzelski will call on us to form a government.

With each day our situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Empty shelves are being played out against us, as it was in 1981. And our statements are in the Sejm.
If they [PUWP] are battered in the ZSL, SD—then in which groups do they find support? In the SD they are still trying to steer, but are saying that this cannot go on.

Stabilization is an illusion. If we remain passive, we will lose—then we will have to take it over in a worse situation and with less social confidence [then even currently exists]. As long as we don’t make a decision— we are not going to have a program.

Could it be a government of a great coalition? Initially it was supposed to be such a government: for us two, three ministries. What “Solidarity” has to give social confidence, less likely [perhaps the] possibility of obtaining a moratorium on debts.

The government should be ours, i.e. formed by us. We should vote against all of Kiszczak’s candidates.

H. Wujec: a PUWP government means a continuing crisis, waiting for a change. Now those price increases, people see it clearly. We are delaying solutions.

The only chance is a broadly based Government of National Salvation. It would have to represent a new line, new spirit, have a different social perception. Can we do it? We have to search already for programs, people. We have to keep in mind that everything moves quickly.

J. Slisz: We need to form a government that is a great coalition—in which we should be the dominant force. How do we let the other side know that they should propose letting us have the position of prime minister? The coming 24 hours have to decide.

J. Stelmachowski: I agree with the diagnoses, but I don’t agree with the conclusions. The strategy is to wait until an auspicious moment. If the economic diagnosis is bad, it would be a folly to take over the government until such time as the “Solidarity” is the only way out. If we are expecting a deterioration [of the situation], we should not assume responsibility for it. They are not so weak and it’s not the parliament that decides. We need to be against Kiszczak; a strong PUWP government is not in our interest. It would be ill-perceived abroad—two generals in top positions. It was rightly pointed out as a jamming phenomenon. We should be voting against, but I would not vote against any candidate put forward by the General.

A. Michnik: I have been listening with some surprise to what the Senate Marshal was telling us. It’s something from the area of games, we don’t have time for it. I am afraid that in a little while we will have to leave that parliament, called off by people from the queues.

From my point of view, neither Kiszczak nor anyone else will change anything. This configuration is sentenced to death. Do you know what will be left of the PUWP—only trash will be left. There is a 60 percent probability that our talk is an academic discussion, but if Kiszczak doesn’t get through—I propose Mazowiecki, Stelmachowski and others. We have such an international constellation, a historical moment, when we can catch something. We should not use an argument that there is no program—as no one in the world has that recipe, e.g. what should Russia or Yugoslavia do?

We are doomed for one [program]—a sharp, sudden entrance into the market. To say this a year ago would have been a lot, we need to keep this in mind when we say that something is impossible.

There is no one who would defend a coalition with the ZSL. It’s falling apart. We are not attacking frontally, rather we propose something, e.g. Kwasniewski for vice premier, someone who will pull over the reformist elements.
O. Krzyzanowska: Tomorrow we need to vote almost ostentatiously. Our government will be in a much worse situation, as the Union is inclined to press demands and we will be calling for belt-tightening. If we don’t preserve the ethos of the Union and the opposition—the future election will be lost. Our hands are tied by the Union. Perhaps it will be our prime minister, but not our government.

K. Kozlowski: The situation is difficult, we should speak up strongly against Kiszczak and Sekuła. Maybe in the end they will come up with something that will be acceptable and we will abstain from the vote. Perhaps in a few weeks they may desperately seize upon some combination, which will be acceptable. If they cannot come up with anything, then a government of National Salvation will appear to be a solution. If this happens, we will not join into a coalition but we salvage Poland: we then must have prime minister and demand tolerable names. A crisis situation, a Geremek or Lech government. The first thing that our new prime minister would have to do is to talk with the MON. History teaches that invasions, martial laws are threatening when the power structure is falling apart. We are close to this. I don’t know which general, but one of them will do it.

Tomorrow vote against [Kiszczak for prime minister], press ahead, see what can come out of it. Do not reject the option of a tolerable government, [if it is] partly a non-party one. Otherwise, press for hard terms into the government.

E. Wende: If this government fails the country, will there be an economic chance to get out of it? We must clearly say—no, it won’t be better. So, will our prime minister have better or worse chances of rescuing the country?

Z. Kuratowska: We have to vote against. Sekuła doesn’t have a chance. We cannot wait any longer. What kind of professionals are they? It’s very hard to find them. Are we supposed to leave the country? The ovation at Powazki was a kind of an opinion poll[!] They were telling Brzezinski—we are ready to wait out this situation if you [the US government] are going to decide.

J. Slisz: In the corridor there are gentlemen from the ZSL and PUWP, they want to come here and talk.

(A brief consultation and the conclusion that this should not be discussed at the meeting. B. Geremek and A. Michnik are going for talks). [Recess]

B. Geremek: According to the latest news the situation is as follows:
PUWP—12 against [Kiszczak ] (despite party discipline and threats)
ZSL—21 against
SD —?
It looks as though the solution is still that Kiszczak will form the government.

In justifying our position we will argue that we are against the continuation of the present rule. We are not in a position to extend credit to the teams which have been in power so far. We are accepting a diagnosis that under the present international situation our taking over the government is impossible. But potentially we are ready to do it.

A government of a great coalition came out of Jaruzelski’s mouth: “you are coming into our government.” If we are taking over, we form the government, we see in it a place for representatives of different social forces. It is a government formed by the opposition. It is an anti-nomenklatura government. That is how our position can be presented.
We reject a government [of] General Kiszczak plus Solidarity. If there is a chance to form a Government of National Salvation, which would have a chance of gaining public trust. If such a possibility doesn’t exist, then we will perform a controlling function to see that aspirations expressed in the election are met.

T. Mazowiecki: I don’t see a difference between the conceptions of government; from the general point of view each of them is a coalition government.

B. Geremek: It is a government formed by the “S” on the basis of a coalition. We are leaving the undemocratic system and the main problem is the structure of power.

A. Stelmachowski: It is the model that Hitler gave to Hindenburg—he just wanted the ministry of internal affairs and the chancellery.

T. Mazowiecki: This is a government proposed by us, but it still is a great coalition government.

B. Geremek: Lech Wałęmsa has two possibilities:
- he will form that government
- or someone else will.

If we would get to the next stage (a 1 percent probability), if the president would talk with us, that is how I would present the proposal of Walesa’s government.

A. Balasz: We need to allow the possibility that they will form a government and wait for their overthrow. Within three months they will be completely finished in terms of propaganda. They are in the ultimate situation. This is a very difficult situation for us, too. We need to find some alternative solution.

B. Geremek: I told Kiszczak that his candidacy is not good, that someone else would be better. He has recognized this argument.

B. Geremek: The motion on an Extraordinary Commission has not passed. It has the backing of half of the ZSL, half of SD and a little in the PUWP, it has a chance of passage.

The following team will be needed: 1. R. Bugaj
  2. J. Osiatynski
  3. G. Staniszewska
  4. the Peasants will fill in
  5. the Peasants will fill in
  6. K. Dowgallo
  7. J. Lopuszanski

M. Rokita: Najder is thanking [us], asking to take care of his dispossession of Polish citizenship.

A. Ballazs: a 10 day vacation break is needed, right now it’s a harvest time.

[Source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 10780 01 OF 03 111549Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
------007073 111551Z /38
O 111541Z AUG 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7459
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ROME

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 10780

EXDIS

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PL
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KISZCZAK

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. GENERAL KISZCZAK ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM TODAY AND GAVE A RATHER ALARMING REVIEW OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. HE EXPLAINED THAT SOLIDARITY'S LATEST PROPOSAL THAT IT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN COALITION WITH THE PEASANT PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY (WHICH ARE FORMALLY ALLIED WITH THE COMMUNISTS) WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE ARMY AND POLICE AND TO THE CZECHS, EAST GERMANS AND SOVIETS. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO SUBJECT HIS PROPOSED NEW GOVERNMENT TO INTENSE MONTHS IF ECONOMIC REFORMS WERE NOT BEING CARRIED OUT TO THE FULL SATISFACTION OF THE OPPOSITION. HE NOTED THAT WALESA HAD FORMALLY AND REPEATEDLY PROMISED HIM SOLIDARITY SUPPORT WHEN HE WAS A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT BUT NOW WAS SUDDENLY OPPOSING HIS CANDIDATURE FOR THE PREMIERSHIP. HE STRONGLY HINTED THAT "EVERYONE IN POLAND" ASSUMES SOLIDARITY IS ACTING UNDER WESTERN ORDERS OR INFLUENCE.

I RESPONDED BY RESTATING OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ROUND TABLE AGREEMENTS AND DENYING THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD INSPIRED SOLIDARITY'S LATEST TACTICAL MOVE. WE REGARDED THE COMPOSITION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 2 APR 1999  199702122
KISZCZAK also offered some startlingly gloomy views on Gorbachev's prospects in the Soviet Union. I left with the clear impression that Poland is entering a period of very serious crisis.

3. General Kiszczak asked me to call today at noon for a private conversation lasting an hour and a quarter, which he said was the first of its kind he has held with a NATO ambassador. He expressed pleasure at the opportunity he had to meet the President and General Scowcroft and noted somewhat ruefully that General Scowcroft had at dinner half-jokingly urged him to accept the responsibility of the premiership if it were offered to him. He had done so and was not finding the task easy.

4. Kiszczak said he took on the formation of a government at Jaruzelski's urging after Malinowski and Baka had refused unless an all-party coalition could be formed. Kiszczak described his own role in the round table and the preparations for it and said Walesa had three times in front of witnesses promised him the support for the presidency of 60 to 80 percent of the Solidarity deputies and senators. He had not been able to make good his promise. Now Walesa had not responded to Kiszczak's telephone invitation to talk and had suddenly declared himself against his premiership and for a new coalition of Solidarity, the ZSL and the SD.

5. Kiszczak said pointedly that he was surprised by the current position of the opposition which he regarded as breaking the deal made at the round table. The opposition is full of euphoria and he fears they are making a mistake which will upset the delicate, in fact very delicate, balance in Poland. He knows for a fact that 100 senior officers of the interior ministry and ministry of defense have been meeting and have expressed deep fears concerning future developments. Right now any rapid changes would be deeply detrimental to the round table agreements. It will take six months to two years for party veterans to get used to having a vocal and critical opposition in being.
KISZCZAK IS VERY CONCERNED OVER THE WAVE OF POLITICAL STRIKES NOW THREATENING. IT IS ONLY A SHORT STEP TO BRINGING PEOPLE INTO THE STREETS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 10780 02 OF 03 111550Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----------------------007117 111552Z /38
0 111541Z AUG 89
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7460
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ROME

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 WARSAW 10780

EXDIS

ROME FOR VATICAN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PL
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KISZCZAK

WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS. A REPETITION OF THE CHINESE EVENTS WOULD BE A TRUE DISASTER IN POLAND. HE, KISZCZAK HAS BEEN IN POSITIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR 44 YEARS AND KNOWS WHAT TRAGEDIES CAN RESULT AND WHAT SUCH ANOTHER SERIES OF EVENTS WOULD MEAN FOR POLAND.

6. THE CZECHS, EAST GERMANS AND ABOVE ALL THE SOVIETS ARE VERY CONCERNED WITH THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN POLAND. THEIR VIEWS MUST BE CONSI-
DERED. MILITARY INTERVENTION IS NOT THE PROBLEM. POLAND IS A NATION OF 40 MILLION WITH A FRAGILE ECONOMY. A REDUCTION IN SOVIET DELIVERIES OF 2 MILLION TONS OF OIL OR 100,000 TONS OF COTTON OR EVEN IRON ORE WOULD EXERT INTOLERABLE PRESSURE. KISZCZAK STRONGLY FAVORS PRIVATIZATION AND WORKER SHARE HOLDINGS IN ENTERPRISES BUT TIME IS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 10780 02 OF 03 111550Z

REQUIRED TO RESTORE THE POLISH ECONOMY. EVEN WITH GOODWILL, THE WEST COULD NOT FEED 40 MILLION POLES. HE ESTIMATES THAT ONLY ABOUT SEVEN PERCENT OF POLISH PRODUCTION IS FULLY COMPETITIVE TODAY ON WORLD MARKETS. NOW THE NEW PARLIAMENT HAS PASSED BAD LEGISLATION ON INDEXATION WHICH THREATENS HYPER-INFLATION. A GRAND COALITION IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO REFORM. IF KISZCZAK’S GOVERNMENT FAILS TO BRING ABOUT REFORM IT WOULD BE READY TO STEP DOWN AND WOULD WELCOME THE PROPOSED EIGHT-MAN PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMY.

7. POLAND MUST MOVE AHEAD, KISZCZAK CONTINUED, AND THE TASK IS EVEN MORE URGENT BECAUSE OF THE GROWING EVIDENCE THAT GORBACHEV IS IN TROUBLE. KISZCZAK RECENTLY VISITED THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAYS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION THERE IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY. PERESTROIKA IS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED AS A FAILURE. VOICES ARE NOW BEING HEARD THAT STALIN WON WW II AND Turned THE SOVIET UNION INTO A FEARED AND RESPECTED SUPERPOWER. NOW THEY HAVE GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA BUT NOTHING TO EAT. IF GORBACHEV FALLS, THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE MORE LIBERAL. POLAND’S NEW INSTITUTIONS MUST BE PUT INTO PLACE RAPIDLY.

8. KISZCZAK ENDED HIS LENGTHY EXPOSITION WITH WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE "OFF THE RECORD" REMARK THAT THE OPINION IS WIDESPREAD IN POLAND, ALMOST UNIVERSAL, THAT THE OPPOSITION RECEIVES ITS PRINCIPAL SUPPORT AND FINANCING AND ITS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 10780 02 OF 03 111550Z

ORDERS FROM THE WEST. HE SAID HE DIDN’T WISH TO COMMENT ON THIS VIEW BUT ONLY TO NOTE THAT IT EXISTED IN MANY QUARTERS.
9. I responded that I appreciated the General's frank exposition and his courtesy in receiving me. I said that the President had stated our position very openly during his visit: the U.S. supported the Round Table Agreement and was moving to demonstrate its support in concrete ways. I reviewed the steps we have already taken on food aid in response to General Jaruzelski's appeal and the leadership on the question of assistance to Poland which the President exerted during the Paris G-7 meeting. I said we were very aware of the destabilizing effect that price rises had always had in Poland and the resultant pressure on the opposition from its political base to produce visible improvements. However, I told him that no one in the U.S. government was advising the opposition on its tactics or, as far as I was aware, had known in advance of the latest position Walesa had adopted. It was not for us to judge whether that position was in accord with the Round Table Agreements. The government coalition had its 65 percent majority as agreed but a new situation was seemingly created if a part of that majority shifted its allegiance. I had not spoken with Walesa since...

10. KISZCZAK SAID THAT SOLIDARITY WAS NOW PROPOSING THAT WALESA BECOME PREMIER AND GEREMEK VICE PREMIER WITH SWEEPING POWERS OVER THE ECONOMY. HE SAID THE COUNTRY AND ITS NEIGHBORS WERE NOT READY FOR THIS AT THE MOMENT AND IT WOULD UPSET A VERY DELICATE BALANCE. THE CHURCH, HE ADDED, WAS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO THIS IDEA AS HE HAD LEARNED IN OPEN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIMATE AND A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT BISHOPS AND CARDINALS. I ASKED ABOUT THE RESULT OF GEREMEK’S AND MICHLNIK’S CONVERSATION WITH THE POPE AND KISZCZAK SAID HE WAS TOLD IT WAS A FORMAL CALL WHICH DID NOT TOUCH ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. (MICHLNIK AND GEREMEK BOTH GAVE STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING THE VISIT WHICH LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE HAD INDEED BEEN DISCUSSED.)

11. IN PARTING, KISZCZAK SAID HE WOULD BE ONLY
TOO HAPPY TO RETIRE IF HIS EFFORTS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT FAIL AND INVITED MY WIFE AND ME FOR A WEEKEND OF FISHING AND MUSHROOM PICKING IN THE LAKE DISTRICT.

12. COMMENT: THE CLEAR MESSAGE CONVEYED WAS THAT A SOLIDARITY GOVERNMENT IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH THEY ARE MORE THAN WELCOME TO TAKE OVER A NUMBER OF MINISTRIES. THERE WAS ALSO THE VERY THINLY-VEILED APPEAL TO THE U.S. TO RESTRAN THE OPPOSITION'S THRUST FOR POWER, SOMETHING WHICH IS PROBABLY BEYOND OUR CAPACITY NOW EVEN IF WE CHOSE TO TRY. I FEAR THAT FOOD SHORTAGES AND PRICE INCREASES CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 WARSAW 10780 03 OF 03 111551Z

HERE HAVE TAKEN THE SITUATION RIGHT TO THE BRINK AND IT WILL TAKE ALL OF THE EFFORTS OF COOLER HEADS ON BOTH SIDES TO AVOID A CRISIS WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

DAVIS
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE NOTED IN REFTEL REPORTING ON YOUR CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KISZCAK HIS ASSERTION THAT WALESA HAD NOT RESPONDED TO KISZCAK'S INVITATION TO TALK.

3. OUR VIEW IS THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT DURING THE PRESENT CRISIS ATMOSPHERE TO KEEP ALL LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN.

4. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO WHAT YOU CAN WITH THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING WALESA, TO EMPHASIZE TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 258826

THEM OUR VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A DIALOGUE WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE UPCOMING WAVE OF CODELS, ALL OF WHOM WILL BE SEEING WALESA, SHOULD PROVIDE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONVEYING THIS MESSAGE.

BAKER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 1 APR 1999 199702122
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 161750Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
---------317034 1617532 /38

O 161736Z AUG 89
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4514
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 22357
DECAPTIONED

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PIRN, PL, US, UR
SUBJECT: IF SOLIDARITY TAKES CHARGE,
- WHAT WILL THE SOVIETS DO?

REFS: A. STATE 257706, B. STATE 258832,
- C. WARSAW 108546

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
-------

2. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE POLISH POLITICAL
CRISIS HAS BEEN RESTRAINED. OVER THE PAST WEEK,
SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE POLISH CABINET
CRISIS HAVE BEEN SPARING AND SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS. MFA
SOURCES STRESS THE DOMESTIC NATURE OF THE ISSUE AND
THE USSR'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION. SOVIET PRESS
COMMENTARY HAS PRESENTED A MIXED PICTURE. STRAIGHT
REPORTING OF THE UNFOLDING EVENTS IN WARSAW HAS
ALTERNATED WITH HEAVY CRITICISM OF SOLIDARITY AND
WALESA (PRAVDA, AUGUST 14), AS WELL AS MODERATE
PRAISE (NOVOYE VREMYA, ISSUE NUMBER 34). ONE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 161750Z

IZVESTIYA ARTICLE HAS ALSO HIGHLIGHTED CURRENT POLISH
ECONOMIC VULNERABILITIES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION.
SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS WE HAVE
TALKED WITH BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACQUIESCE
TO A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT. THIS OPINION IS
SHARED BY THE OUTGOING POLISH AMBASSADOR.

3. ON BALANCE, WE AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT,
BARRING A MAJOR MISSTEP BY SOLIDARITY. IN KEEPING
WITH SOVIET "NEW THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY, A
STRONG REACTION TO POLISH EVENTS, WHETHER POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY, IS SIMPLY NOT APPROPRIATE.
FOR MORE OLD-LINE THINKERS, THE PROSPECT OF A
SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER IS NOT SOMETHING THEY ARE
COMFORTABLE THINKING ABOUT, OR COMMENTING ON. MOST
OF THE LATTER APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THEIR BREATH, OR
AT LEAST THEIR RHETORIC, IN HOPES THAT SOMEHOW A
SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND INTERNALLY THAT WILL ALLOW THE
PZPR TO CONTINUE AS THE LEADING MEMBER OF THE NEXT
COALITION GOVERNMENT. WHAT THE SOVIETS MOST WANT TO
PROMOTE IN POLAND IS STABILITY AND WHAT THEY MOST
WANT TO AVOID IS AN OUTBURST OF ANTI-SOVIET EMOTION.
IF SOLIDARITY CAN DELIVER ON THESE ISSUES, THE
SOVIETS UNDER GORBACHEV WILL ADAPT, ALBEIT PERHAPS
WITH RELUCTANCE, TO THE NEW ORDER.

END SUMMARY

SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENTS: SPARING AND AMBIGUOUS

4. THE CLOSEST THING TO AN OFFICIAL SOVIET STATEMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 22357 01 OF 03 161750Z

ON THE CURRENT CABINET CRISIS IN POLAND WAS GIVEN AT
THE FRIDAY, AUGUST 14, MFA PRESS BRIEFING BY DEPUTY
SPOKESMAN VADIM PERFIL’YEV, WHO SAID THAT "ATTEMPTS
TO USE THE PROCESS OF FORMING A POLISH GOVERNMENT TO
DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND DAMAGE ITS ALLIED
OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE WARSAW TREATY
AND SOVIET-POLISH COOPERATION, WOULD UNDERMINE
EUROPEAN STABILITY." THIS LINE WAS REPEATED BY
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN ON AUGUST 13
DURING HIS APPEARANCE ON THE "INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS'
ROUNDTABLE".

5. GORAL’D NIKOLAYEVICH GORINOVICH, CHIEF OF THE
MFA’S SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE ADMINISTRATION,
EVINCE QUET CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION IN POLAND
IN MEETING WITH POLCONS ON AUGUST 16 -- AND DUCKED A
DIRECT QUESTION ABOUT HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD VIEW A
WALESKA GOVERNMENT. GORINOVICH INDICATED THE SOVIETS
WERE NOT AWARE YET OF ANY REACTION ON ZSL LEADER
ROMAN MALINOWSKI’S PART TO GENERAL KISZCZAK’S REQUEST
THAT HE FORM A GOVERNMENT. NEITHER THE PZPR NOR
SOLIDARITY HAD THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO UNILATERALLY
FORM A GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, AND IN THIS SITUATION
MALINOWSKI WAS "NOT A BAD CANDIDATE". THE SOVIET
UNION’S "CARDINAL PREMISE" IN THE POLISH SITUATION,
GORINOVICH ASSERTED, WAS THAT THE MATTER WAS POLAND’S
INTERNAL AFFAIR. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED
THE FORMATION OF A "WIDE COALITION" GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD INCLUDE ALL THE PARTIES REPRESENTED IN THE SEJM. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, HAD LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR

EFFECTS TO PUT FORWARD "ULTIMATUMS", OR FOR "POLITICAL STRIKES" WHICH WERE NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE ROUNDTABLE AGREEMENT AND ONLY LED TO CONFRONTATION. A "REASONABLE COMPROMISE" WAS NEEDED THAT COULD INCLUDE ALL THE POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY. ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LECH WALESA GOVERNMENT, GORINOVICH PAUSED. THE SOVIETS COULD NOT DENY THAT SOLIDARITY HAD BROAD SUPPORT, HE SAID, BUT HE WENT ON TO QUESTION SOLIDARITY'S QUALIFICATIONS TO RULE AFTER HAVING ONLY SERVED AS AN OPPOSITION FORCE. HE TOOK THE LINE THAT IT WAS EASY TO CRITICIZE, MUCH HARDER TO ACTUALLY GOVERN "GIVEN SOLIDARITY'S LACK OF A CONCRETE PROGRAM". THE
6. SOVIET PRESS REPORTING ON THE POLISH EVENTS HAS CONFIDENTIAL

BY AND LARGE BEEN STRAIGHT, TO THE POINT AND FACTUAL. THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECULATION WHATSOEVER CONCERNING SOVIET REACTIONS SHOULD A SOLIDARITY-LED COALITION COME TO POWER IN WARSAW, ALTHOUGH POLISH VULNERABILITIES AND SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCERNS HAVE BEEN OUTLINED. THE MOST CRITICAL ARTICLE ON WALESA AND SOLIDARITY APPEARED IN THE MONDAY, AUGUST 14, EDITION OF PRAVDA. AUTHORING BY TASS CORRESPONDENT "V. VOLKOV" THE ARTICLE LABELLED WALESA'S RECENT ACTIONS AS "AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND POSSIBLY LEADING TO "A PROLONGED POLITICAL CRISIS" IN POLAND. VOLKOV ALSO STATED THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE POLISH ECONOMY WAS BESET WITH PROBLEMS AND IT WAS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT THAT "A GOVERNMENT BE CREATED WHICH HAD AUTHORITY"...."THE OPPOSITION HAS CHANGED ITS STRATEGY AND ADOPTED A COURSE AIMED AT QUICKLY TAKING POWER". THIS ARTICLE HAS GENERALLY BEEN INTERPRETED BY WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS AS PERHAPS MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN IS WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. AT THE OTHER END OF THE SPECTRUM IS AN AS YET UNPUBLISHED ARTICLE (IT WILL APPEAR IN ISSUE NUMBER 34 OF NOVOYE VREMIA), WHICH FEATURES AN INTERVIEW OF WALESA IN GDANSK ON AUGUST 15. IN THE ARTICLE, REPORTER VLADIMIR KULISTIKOV QUOTES WALESA AS SAYING "I AM NOT AGAINST THE PARTY (PZRP). I AM AGAINST ANY SORT OF MONOPOLY ON POWER." ACCORDING TO KULISTIKOV, WALESA CONTENDS THAT THE PZRP FIRST BROKE THE SPIRIT OF THE ROUND TABLE AGREEMENT BY ATTEMPTING TO NAME ONLY COMMUNISTS TO RULING POSTS. KULISTIKOV CONCLUDES THAT "IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE (WALESA) HAS MADE A CHOICE IN FAVOR OF NON-VIOLENCE AND STABILITY."

8. AS THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO USED THE PRESS TO POINT OUT POLAND'S
CRITICAL ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.
Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov, who carries responsibility in the MFA for relations with Eastern Europe, gave a long interview in the August 12 Edition of Izvestiya on Polish-Soviet Economic Cooperation, in which he stressed Poland's heavy reliance on the USSR for raw materials and easy credit terms. For example, he noted, the Soviet Union supplies 85 percent of Poland's oil imports, 65 percent of its iron ore imports, and 50 percent of cotton imports. Aboimov added that the Soviet Union had relaxed the payment schedule on Poland's six billion ruble debt, and noted in passing that during the period of U.S. sanctions, which had cost Poland 13-15 billion dollars, the Soviet Union had been Poland's economic mainstay.

PERSONAL OPINIONS: THE SOVIETS WILL NOT INTERVENE

9. SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN JOURNALISTS WE HAVE CONTACTED ARE OF THE OPINION THAT, SHOULD A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT COME TO POWER, SOVIET REACTIONS WILL BE MODERATE. RISO RAJALSKI, A LONGTIME OBSERVER OF THE SOVIET SCENE AND CORRESPONDENT FOR THE YUGOSLAV DAILY "POLITIKA",

CONFIDENTIAL
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22357

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, PL, US, UR
SUBJECT: IF SOLIDARITY TAKES CHARGE,

FLATLY RULED OUT ANY HAM-HANDED SOVIET INTERVENTION
IN POLISH AFFAIRS. BASED ON HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH
SOVIET OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS, HE BELIEVES
THAT THE SOVIETS ESTIMATE THAT TAKING ON WALESA WILL
ULTIMATELY CAUSE THEM MORE TROUBLE THAN TRYING TO
WORK WITH HIM. ALEKSEY BUKALOV, AN OTVETSVENNY
SEKRETAR' (RESPONSIBLE SECRETARY) AT NOVOYE VREMYA
AGREES, SAYING THAT MOSCOW WOULD REACT "SPOKOYNO"
(CALMLY) TO A SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER. THERE WOULD BE NO
OTHER CHOICE, NO MATTER HOW MUCH DISPLEASURE SUCH AN
EVENT MIGHT CAUSE IN MOSCOW. IN ANY CASE, BUKALOV
BELIEVES, WALESA WOULD BE TOO SMART TO PROVOKE A
CONFRONTATION. HE WOULD BE SURE TO INCLUDE
COMMUNISTS IN HIS CABINET, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO HOLD ECONOMIC PORTFOLIOS.

ONE POLE'S PERSPECTIVE: IT CAN'T HAPPEN HERE

----------------------------------

10. ON AUGUST 16, THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH OUTGOING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 22357 03 OF 03 161750Z

POLISH AMBASSADOR WLODZIMIERZ NATORF TO DISCUSS THE
CURRENT SITUATION IN POLAND (NATORF IS RETURNING TO
WARSAW TO BECOME THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY IN
CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS). DURING THE
DISCUSSION, AMBASSADOR NATORF EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF
THAT PEOPLE WHO FEAR A SHARP SOVIET REACTION TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND "ARE STILL THINKING IN THE
CATEGORIES OF THE PAST -- THE BREZHNEV
DOCTRINE...OBSERVERS ARE CORRECT IN THE ASSUMPTION
THAT IF THE SITUATION CHANGED (I.E., SOLIDARITY CAME
to POWER), THERE WOULD BE BIG PROBLEMS FOR ALL OF
POLAND'S NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, THE REACTION WOULD NOT
BE THE SAME AS IN 1956 OR 1968." NATORF WENT ON TO
EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT A WAY WOULD BE FOUND
OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND THAT A SOLIDARITY-LED
GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT COME TO PASS. "THE ROUND TABLE
AGREEMENT IS STILL VALID, AND EVEN IN A 'GRAND
COALITION' OUR PARTY WILL STILL HAVE THE DECISIVE
VOICE WITH REGARD TO RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS."
11. THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE POLISH POLITICAL CRISIS HAS THUS FAR BEEN RESTRAINED, AND BARRING A MAJOR MISSTEP BY SOLIDARITY IS LIKELY TO REMAIN SO. IN KEEPING WITH SOVIET "NEW THINKING" IN FOREIGN POLICY, A STRONG REACTION TO POLISH EVENTS DOES NOT SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE. FOR MORE OLD-LINE THINKERS, THE PROSPECT OF A SOLIDARITY TAKEOVER IS NOT SOMETHING THEY ARE COMFORTABLE THINKING ABOUT, OR COMMENTING ON. MOST OF THE LATTER APPEAR TO BE HOLDING THEIR BREATH, OR AT LEAST THEIR RHETORIC, IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  MOSCOW 22357 03 OF 03 161750Z

HOPES THAT SOMEHOW A SOLUTION WILL BE FOUND INTERNALLY THAT WILL ALLOW THE PZPR TO CONTINUE AS THE LEADING MEMBER OF THE NEXT COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ALTHOUGH SOLIDARITY MAY BE A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW, OUR BEST GUESS IS THAT THE SOVIETS WILL DO SO, IF IT COMES TO THAT, AFTER MUCH GAGGING AND GULPING. THEIR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS IN POLAND WILL BE SATISFIED BY ANY REGIME, SOLIDARITY-LED OR NOT, THAT CAN PROMOTE DOMESTIC STABILITY AND AVOID ANTI-SOVIET OUTBURSTS. MATLOCK
Minutes of a Meeting of the Presidium of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club

16 August 1989, 11:30 p.m.


B. Geremek: Today I received an invitation to have a conversation with Gen. Jaruzelski. I responded that first I wanted to meet with Chairman Walesa, whom I had not seen for a few days. There have been important meetings recently: a meeting of Primate Glemp with [Soviet] Ambassador Vladimir Borovikov and the second meeting of Glemp with Jaruzelski.

The time-table for the next few days [is:] today or tomorrow the Sejm is to vote on a resolution on the [1968] intervention in Czechoslovakia. It’s a controversial matter. Tomorrow L. Walesa is meeting: at 9 a.m. with Malinowski at 10 a.m. with Jozwiak at 12 with Jaruzelski

K. Kozlowski: The PUWP wants to do everything to eliminate Lech Walesa. There will be a compromise candidate—Kwasniewski.

B. Geremek: Is it possible that they will appoint Walesa?

E. Wende: Orzechowski has very clear plans regarding two ministries.

A. Stelmachowski: With bargaining there will be more!

L. Walesa: Generally we are reporting that a new coalition has been set up. It will select the most suitable candidate for prime minister. For the time being we don’t say who that will be.

E. Wende: He is referring to information from the PUWP circles, we should not exaggerate, there are warnings.

J. Kaczynski: The question of two ministries has been stated clearly in talks. With the preservation of the president’s prerogatives, this needs to be stated once again. The compromise has to be reached on their side.

A. Stelmachowski: The government here in Poland has never had the position of a true government, the disposition centers have always been somewhere aside (Pilsudski—the Chief Inspectorate). We need to return back to the main political decisions reached at Magdalenka.

L. Walesa: We have learned that there is always someone above the authorities and above the law.

A. Michnik: How do you perceive the position of the PUWP?

L. Walesa: We need to create a new coalition, which will stand up to the PUWP. How to form a government to secure both freedom and be tolerant.

B. Geremek: The main thing is that the PUWP doesn’t form the government.

L. Walesa: ...... and doesn’t impose it!

A. Balazs: I have a suggestion that the “S” RI should not be treated by PUWP like ZSL is.

B. Geremek: Do you foresee a meeting with our Club after your meetings tomorrow?
L. Walesa: It’s not me who wants to be prime minister. I have my three candidates. If this proposition doesn’t break down, I will be asking you to form the government.

B. Geremek: Does anyone have any comments?

A. Michnik: I think that if you listen to their argument, it means that you are going into their paws. Krolewski and Malinowski were stubbornly sticking to this coalition, which means they were doing it with Jaruzelski’s approval. We need to form a government with the masters, not with the lackeys.

T. Mazowiecki: This would lead to a series of talks of the type of a new Magdalenka with the masters, talks with the actual disposers of power, i.e. with the military and the police.

A. Michnik: You are not going to make a real government with the ZSL and the SD. The PUWP can be broken down.

B. Geremek: The present phase—with the assistance of the ZSL and SD—is an attempt to break down PUWP’s monopoly.

[Source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation; translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
Record of Conversation between Representatives of the Opposition Roundtable and Boris Stukalin, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest

18 August 1989

[At their meeting on 27 July, the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable (ORT) decided—at the initiative of Jozsef Antall—to widen the scope of the ORT’s negotiating partners and initiate meetings with the chairmen and the secretaries of the parliamentary committees, Deputy Prime Minister Peter Meggyesi and Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, Boris Stukalin.

Fidesz Press, the organ of the Young Democrats, gave the following account of the meeting and of Viktor Orban’s presentation (the AYD leader who had given a speech at Imre Nagy’s reburial in June and who in 1998 would become Hungary’s prime minister) calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops form Hungary: “Since 1956 we have known that the Soviet ambassador in Budapest plays a key role in Moscow’s assessment of the situation in Hungary, yet at the meeting no really important issues were discussed, it was rather of exploratory character. The different organizations presented their position tactfully, giving broad outlines only, taking the liberty to deal with foreign policy only cautiously. The atmosphere became hot, however, when one of the Fidesz representatives took the floor: the Soviet side ‘eyed the game,’ the famous political opponent for several minutes. Nevertheless, they listened with poker face to Orban who stated that he was pessimistic concerning the National Roundtable talks because the HSWP had renewed itself only in words, remaining uncompromising on concrete issue (workers militia, Party organs at working places, the property of the Party).”]

(EXCERPT: Speech by Viktor Orban, Representative of the Alliance of Young Democrats [AYD])

(...)

Viktor Orban: Allow me to add just a few remarks to the question of what we think about the possibility of the negotiations eventually ending with success. We believe that the very opportunity of meeting you here today precipitates the prospect of making a successful agreement with the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Our organization, inasmuch as it is primarily comprised of young people, considers it a particular privilege to have the chance of meeting representatives of Soviet diplomatic bodies. We intend to utilize this opportunity, which has never been granted to us before, to hand over a memorandum next week that informs representatives of the Soviet Union about the political ideas of the Alliance of Young Democrats.

Certainly you are familiar with the fact that the issue of revealing the so-called historical white spots is just as important in Hungary as it is in the Soviet Union. Questions and views concerning our past and relations with the Soviet Union, or rather their sudden change, concerns our generation most of all. This is due to the fact that not long ago we were taught exactly the opposite of what even the Soviet Union has lately—and repeatedly—expressed in this respect.
Perhaps this experience explains the skepticism of our generation when it comes to the possible outcome of the negotiations, as compared to the attitude of the previous speakers. Consequently, our generation—that is we, who represent our organization at the Roundtable in the negotiations with the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party—we are of the opinion that one should only look at the facts when assessing the intentions of the Party and the political prospects. That is why we observe with considerable apprehension that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party has made hardly any progress on the most important concrete issues.

Let me mention a few examples. Naturally, similarly to the previous speakers, I speak with the hope that this opinion will change over time. I must note, however, that the Party, among other things, has not yet made any concessions on the issue of ending party organizations at workplaces. Neither has the HSWP conceded on the question of abolishing the workers’ militia that all representatives at the Roundtable consider unconstitutional. No progress was made to guarantee that the political monopoly of the Party in the army and the police force is eliminated once and for all, so that politics and state service are separated within the armed forces. The Opposition Roundtable made specific suggestions on the issue, which have all been rejected so far. I appeal to you: what else could people of my generation and members of my organization think other than that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party aims at preserving these armed corps and armed forces, the last resort of power in Eastern Europe, intact and unaffected by the opposition. We, Young Democrats, are much worried about this intent. For according to our political assessment, the main issue is not the elections here; we are quite optimistic about the elections. The question for us Young Democrats, though, is rather what will happen afterwards? What will happen if the HSWP, which, in our estimation and according to the analysis of the recent results, will lose the general elections, still retains authority over all the armed forces, and is the only one to have political bodies at workplaces.

Consequently, we believe that the question of stability, the stability of the transition, and the solution of that issue is in the hands of the HSWP. Should the Party act according to their purportedly democratic conviction on the questions I have raised, the period of transition after the elections will not suffer from instability whatsoever. The ultimate cause of our pessimism is that the HSWP has shown no sign during the last month of heading in that direction.

Thank you.

Boris Stukalin: May I ask you about something that you mentioned in your speech: the memorandum that you wish to present to us next week? What is it about, what are the main issues that it is concerned with?

Viktor Orban: We think that the Alliance of Young Democrats has often been branded by the Hungarian press as an anti-Soviet organization. We had the opportunity to express our opinion on the issue, and we repeatedly stated that we do not consider ourselves anti-Soviet but that we have principled views. We have never encouraged aggression towards the Soviet Union, never incited people to any kind of rebellion against the Soviet people, [and] never invited anyone to infringe on the rights of the
Soviet state. We think that this opportunity—sitting at the negotiating table with a representative of the Soviet diplomatic corps—gives us the chance of informing you in an articulate written memorandum about our principled opinions on all these issues—which basically determine the general and foreign policy of the Alliance of Young Democrats. In the memorandum we wish to state our standing and suggestions in terms of what changes we think necessary in Hungarian foreign policy.

Let me point out, though, that this is strictly our opinion, bearing in mind that the Opposition Roundtable never intended to form an unanimous consensus in issues of foreign policy, therefore the organizations around this table represent a considerably wide range of [ideas about] foreign policy. Some of them hold opinions that are closer to yours, while others have views that diverge much further—ours is probably among the latter. Nonetheless, we strongly hope that these issues will be clarified in the memorandum. 32

(...)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 WARSAW 11056 01 OF 05 191617Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 MSC-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 FM-10 PA-01 CCO-00 OMB-01
STL-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 AS-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /078 W

0 191605Z AUG 89 DF4 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASDC NIAC IMMEDIATE 7684
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 05 WARSAW 11056

BRUSSELS FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: BRONISLAW GEREMEK EXPLAINS NEXT STEPS
- TOWARD A SOLIDARITY GOVERNMENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: BRONISLAW GEREMEK HAS TOLD US THAT
TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI WILL BE ELECTED PRIME MINISTER ON
AUGUST 23. HE WILL PRESENT HIS LIST OF MINISTERS
PROBABLY ON AUGUST 30; THE SEJM COMMISSIONS WILL
BEGIN THEIR HEARINGS ON SEPTEMBER 2; AND THE SEJM WILL
VOTE ON THE NEW GOVERNMENT PROBABLY NOT BEFORE
MID-SEPTEMBER. THE LIST OF MINISTERS ALLEGEDLY WILL
INCLUDE FIVE COMMUNISTS, RATHER THAN THE TWO OR THREE
WIDELY ANTICIPATED. GEREMEK WANTS TO MAKE ROOM FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 WARSAW 11056 01 OF 05 191617Z

THE PZPR IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE SUCCESS
OF THIS NEW GOVERNMENT IS ALSO IN THEIR INTERESTS
WALES'A INFLUENCE AND SUPPORT FOR THE SCHEME SHOULD
BE ENOUGH TO WIN OVER MOST OF SOLIDARITY. GEREMEK
HIMSELF HAD NOT SOUGHT THE PREMIERSHIP
BECAUSE HE WAS NEEDED IN THE PARLIAMENT; THE OKP
WOULD NOT SURVIVE TEN MINUTES WITHOUT HIM, HE CLAIMED.
GEREMEK' OPINION ABOUT FORMING A SOLIDARITY Govern-
MENT NOW HAD ALTERED, HE SAID, BECAUSE OF THE SPEED
WITH WHICH BOTH THE OLD COALITION AND THE PZPR

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELLIN
DATE/CASE ID: 2 APR 1999 199702122

JARUZELSKI'S "PRESIDENTIAL" BEHAVIOR, FIRM DETERMINATION IN THE FACE OF PARTY RESISTANCE, AND HIS APPARENT EFFORTS TO "DEPOLITICIZE" BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND THE ARMY HAVE HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT ON SOLIDARITY LEADERS, INCLUDING SOME WHO HAD BEEN STRONGLY CRITICAL OF JARUZELSKI EVEN RECENTLY. HOWEVER, SOME WITHIN THE SOLIDARITY UNION WILL CONTINUE TO OBJECT THAT THE NEW ARRANGEMENT WILL WEAKEN UNION ACTIVITIES. GEREMEK TOLD Codel CRANSTON THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD GONE TOO FAR, STOPPED, AND RETREATD TO A MORE DEFENSIBLE POSITION. BY NOW AGREEING TO INCLUDE COMMUNISTS -- MORE THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED -- IN A SOLIDARITY-LED GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS A CHANCE TO BUILD A REAL COALITION, THE SURVIVAL OF WHICH COULD SERVE EVERYONE'S INTERESTS.

3. SENIOR SOLIDARITY ADVISER AND LEADER OF THE "OPPOSITION" BRONISLAW GEREMEK SKETCHED OUT FOR US ON AUGUST 18 THE LIKELY TIMETABLE FOR THE SELECTION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI, THE PRIME MINISTER CANDIDATE TO BE FORMALLY NOMINATED ON AUGUST 19 BY PRESIDENT WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI, WOULD BE ELECTED ON AUGUST 23. THE FIRST ITEM OF SEJM BUSINESS THAT DAY, HE SAID, WOULD BE A VOTE ON AN INTERIM BUDGET. AFTER THIS PRESUMABLY TIME-CONSUMING EVENT, MAZOWIECKI'S CANDIDACY WOULD BE PRESENTED. SINCE THE NEW COALITION HAS A CLEAR MAJORITY IN THE SEJM AND SOME PZPR DEPUTIES CAN BE EXPECTED TO VOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINEE AS WELL, THE ELECTION SHOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE.

4. GEREMEK CLAIMED THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN AGREED BY LECH WALESA AND JARUZELSKI HOW MANY MINISTERIAL POSITIONS WOULD GO TO EACH PARTY IN THE NEW COALITION. THERE WOULD BE TWENTY-ONE MINISTERS, HE SAID (PRESUMABLY IN ADDITION TO PROBABLY THREE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, I.E., THE TOTAL NUMBER REMAINS THE SAME AS AT PRESENT.) OF THESE TWENTY-ONE MINISTRIES, THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT IS FOR SEVEN TO GO TO SOLIDARITY:
SIX FOR THE PEASANTS’ PARTY (ZSL); THREE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SD); AND FIVE FOR THE PZPR.

IT HAD BEEN WIDELY EXPECTED THAT THE PZPR WOULD RETAIN ONLY TWO, POSSIBLY THREE MINISTRIES.
GEREMEK SAID IT HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

GEREMEK AGREED THAT SO MANY PZPR CANDIDATES ON THE LIST COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR SOME
SOLIDARITY ACTIVISTS AND DEPUTIES. HOWEVER,
GEREMEK, AND SEJM DEPUTY JAN LITYNSKI WHO WAS
ALSO PRESENT IN THIS CONVERSATION, MAINTAINED
THAT THE DRAMATIC FACT OF A SOLIDARITY PREMIER
WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SMOOTH OVER THESE OTHER OBJEC-
TIONS. ALSO, THE SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP COUNTS
ON WALESÁ’S GREAT INFLUENCE TO CARRY THE DAY ON

6. GEREMEK ADMITTED THAT THERE REMAINED CONSIDERABLE
CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE NEW COALITION CONCERNING WHICH
PARTY WILL BE GIVEN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
HE SAID THAT THE SD WAS REQUESTING THAT IMPORTANT
PORTFOLIO AS ONE OF ITS THREE MINISTRIES. IF THE SD
GETS THE MFA, WHICH GEREMEK CLAIMS TO BE RESISTING,
THE RECTOR OF KRAKOW’S ACADEMY OF MINING AND METALLURGY.
IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH SEJM MARSHAL MIKOLAJ
KOZAKIEWICZ ON AUGUST 19, THE MARSHAL, A ZSL MEMBER,
SAID THERE WAS STILL A MOVE IN THE ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS TO GIVE THE MFA TO THE ZSL. (KOZAKIEWICZ
SAID THERE WAS NO ONE IN HIS PARTY CAPABLE OF FILLING
SUCH A POST; ("BELIEVE ME, I KNOW THESE PEOPLE."))
GEREMEK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE MANY IN THE
SOLIDARITY LEADERSHIP NOW ENGAGED IN THE SELECTION
OF POTENTIAL MINISTERS WHO WERE PERFECTLY SATISFIED
WITH THE PRESENT FOREIGN MINISTER, TADEUSZ OLECHOWSKI.
GEREMEK AND OTHERS RECOGNIZED HIM AS A VALUABLE
PROFESSIONAL WELL RESPECTED BY WESTERN -- INCLUDING

7. GEREMEK WAS NOT WILLING TO SPECULATE ABOUT
WHO MIGHT BE ON THE LIST FOR THE OTHER MINISTRIES,
Except to confirm that they would try to find ministers from outside the parliament. Most of ministerial material were valuable to that body, and Solidarity would like to keep them there. Geremek would not say, however, that there would be no ministers chosen from among the Sejm deputies and senators.

8. Once the list is assembled, it will be presented to the Sejm, probably not before August 30, according to Geremek. The Sejm commissions will then begin to review the various ministerial candidates about September 2. In Geremek's view, the process will not be completed, and a new government installed, until mid-September. He sees little likelihood of speeding up that timetable. Geremek acknowledged that the round-table agreement and the ensuing constitutional changes required that the new government be in place within three months of the second round of parliamentary elections, i.e., by September 18. He said he had discussed this issue with President Jaruzelski. The President reportedly assured Geremek that, even if the deadline is passed, the parliament of the President's in such a situation, not a requirement. Geremek said that the government formation process would probably press closely against that deadline, if not exceed it.

9. The Solidarity leader also discussed, with some
CANDOR, HIS OWN DECISION NOT TO SEEK THE PREMIERSHIP. ALTHOUGH HIS NAME WAS ON THE SHORT LIST PRESENTED BY WALESA TO JARUZELSKI ON AUGUST 17, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT WALESA WOULD MORE STRONGLY SUPPORT MAZOWIECKI FOR THE JOB. GEREMEK CLAIMED THAT THE MAIN REASON WAS THAT HE WAS NEEDED RIGHT WHERE HE WAS -- IN THE SEJM. HE SAID THAT THE CITIZENS' PARLIAMENTARY CLUB (OKP) "WOULD NOT LAST TEN MINUTES" IF HE WERE TO LEAVE. GEREMEK FREELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE DIVERSE INTERESTS WITHIN THE OPK, COUPLED WITH THE NAIVETE AND IMMATURE UNCONTROLLABILITY OF MANY OF THE MEMBERS, POSED CONFIDENTIAL THREAT TO UNITY AND PARTY DISCIPLINE. (IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH CODEL CRANSTON, GEREMEK SAID THAT MANY OF THE YOUNG AND RADICAL MEMBERS BEHAVED IN A WAY THAT WAS NOT ONLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR, BUT ALSO FOR HUMAN BEHAVIOR.) FINALLY, REFERRING TO THE FACT THAT THE CHURCH HAD CHosen MAZOWIECKI AS THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE, GEREMEK SAID "IT IS THE CORRECT DECISION."

10. ALL OF THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD EVOLVED WITH INCREDIBLE AND UNANTICIPATED SPEED, GEREMEK AGREED. WHEN ASKED TO EXPLAIN HOW HIS AND THE OKP'S OPINION ABOUT THE WISDOM OF A SOLIDARITY GOVERNMENT HAD CHANGED SO RAPIDLY, GEREMEK DID NOT REPEAT THE CONTENTION HEARD ELSEWHERE IN THE SOLIDARITY CAMP THAT THE NATIONAL MOOD HAD ALTERED. INSTEAD, GEREMEK FOCUSED ON THE CHANGES WITHIN THE RULING COALITION IN GENERAL, AND WITHIN THE PZPR IN
PARTICULAR. HE SAID THAT THE PARTY HAD "DISINTEGRATED" MUCH FASTER THAN ANYONE HAD EXPECTED AND THAT IT CLEARLY WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY POWERLESS TO ACT. THIS WILL BE DEMONSTRATED, HE SUGGESTED, AT THE AUGUST 19 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. HE AND JARUZELSKI HAD AGREED, GEREMEAK SAID, THAT THE PLENUM WOULD BE EXTREMELY "STORMY" AND THAT THE OUTCOME COULD NOT BE FORESEEN. THIS EXPECTATION OF A FIGHT WAS PROBABLY BEHIND JARUZELSKI'S COMMENT TO CODEL CRANSTON EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT HIS DECISION ON THE PREMIERSHIP WAS FIRM; THAT THE PARTY'S RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CHANGE IT; "THE PRESIDENT HAS HIS PREROGATIVES," HE TOLD THE SENATORS. GEREMEK ALSO SAID THAT HE COULD NOT CONFIDENTIAL

SEE HOW THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE COULD PUT A HALT TO THE PROCESS THAT HAD NOW BEGUN.

11. THIS VIEW OF THE PARTY'S GROWING IMPOTENCE WAS ALSO SUPPORTED BY KOZAKIEWICZ ON AUGUST 19. THE PARTY HAS NO OPTION BUT TO ACCEPT WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, HE TOLD CODEL CRANSTON, NO MATTER HOW MUCH THEY DISLIKE IT. KOZAKIEWICZ CLAIMED THAT THE PARTY HAD "NO OPPORTUNITY TO REACT VIOLENTLY, SUCH AS IMPOSING MARTIAL LAW AGAIN. THEY HAVE NO REASON FOR IT AND NO FORCE FOR IT." NEVER THELESS, KOZAKIEWICZ AGREED THAT THE REACTION IN THE PLENUM WOULD BE "VERY STRONG." THE MEMBERS WOULD ATTACK JARUZELSKI PERSONALLY AND ALL THOSE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ROUND-TABLE AGREEMENTS THAT HAD BROUGHT THE PARTY TO SUCH DISASTER.

12. FOR HIS PART, GEREMEK WAS SOMEWHAT LESS OPTIMISTIC THAT THE PARTY HAD "NO FORCE" FOR IMPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT, "AS LONG AS JARUZELSKI RETAINS CONTROL OF THE ARMY," THE PLENUM'S AGONY WOULD BE IN VAIN. A MAJOR PART OF THAT AGONY NO DOUBT BELONGS TO FIRST SECRETARY MIECZYSLAW RAKOWSKI WHO HAS TAKEN OVER THE PARTY JUST IN TIME TO WITNESS ITS DISINTEGRATION. GEREMEK SAID THAT RAKOWSKI HAD REFUSED TO MEET WITH MAZOWIECKI ON AUGUST 18, EVEN THOUGH THE POLISH PAPERS WERE REPORTING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY THAT THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE.

13. GEREMEK'S COMMENT ABOUT JARUZELSKI AND THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO FORCE THIS NEW POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT THROUGH DESPITE THE PARTY'S ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS REVEALS AN ENTIRELY NEW
"OPPOSITION" VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT. THIS VIEW WAS MOST CLEARLY EXPLAINED BY GEREMEK AND LITYNSKI IN THEIR AUGUST 18 MEETING WITH CODEL CRANSTON. TOGETHER, THEY EXPLAINED THAT THEY HAD BEEN STRUCK WITH JARUZELSKI'S DECLARATION THAT HE WANTED TO BE A "PRESIDENT OF ALL POLES" AND NOT JUST OF ONE PARTY. GEREMEK SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD BEHAVED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THIS STATEMENT AND HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD "DEPOLITICIZING" THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. ALSO, GEREMEK WAS CONVINCED THAT JARUZELSKI WAS TRYING TO DEPOLITICIZE THE ARMY AS WELL, IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THE ARMY THAT IT SERVED THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND NOT THE PARTY.

14. WE REGARD IT AS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT THAT LITYNSKI CLEARLY AGREED WITH THIS VIEW AND FOUND JARUZELSKI'S RECENT BEHAVIOR TO BE ONE OF THE MOST POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE UNSTABLE SITUATION. LITYNSKI, ONE OF THE MORE RADICAL OPPOSITIONISTS WITHIN SOLIDARITY'S MAINSTREAM, HAD BEEN A CONSTANT CRITIC OF JARUZELSKI PRIOR TO THE ROUND-TABLE AND HIS CRITICISM SOFTENED SLOWLY AND BEGRUDGINGLY. TEN MONTHS AGO HE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT NO
MEANINGFUL REFORMS COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER JARUZELSKI; JUST WEEKS AGO HE WAS TELLING US THAT ELECTING JARUZELSKI HAD BEEN A "VERY GREAT MISTAKE." WE ASSUME THAT LITYNSKI'S VIEWS ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF AN IMPORTANT SEGMENT OF SOLIDARITY. HIS ALTERATION OF THOSE VIEWS IN JARUZELSKI'S FAVOR IS THEREFORE SIGNIFICANT.


16. WHEN GEREMEK SPOKE WITH CODEL CRANSTON IN THE MEETING REFERRED TO ABOVE, ONE OF HIS MAIN THEMES WAS THAT THE OPPOSITION HAD RECENTLY GONE TOO FAR, HAD STOPPED, AND RETREATED TO A MORE DEFENSIBLE POSITION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT LECH WALESJA'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE PZPR HAD BEEN TOO AGGRESSIVE AND DANGEROUSLY THREATENING. "WE MUST GIVE THE COMMUNISTS A CHANCE FOR SURVIVAL," HE SAID. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS A "SITUATION LIKE AFGHANISTAN" WHERE THE
Insurgents had declared their intention in advance to liquidate entirely representatives.

Confidential

Page 01  Warsaw 11056  05 of 05  191619Z

Action EUR-00

Info Log-00  Ads-00  INR-07  SS-00  CIAE-00  E9-00  DODE-00
H-01  MSC-01  IO-19  NSCE-00  NSAE-00  SSO-00  HA-09
L-03  LAB-04  TRSE-00  PM-10  PA-01  CCO-00  OMB-01
SIL-01  INRE-00  ACD-12  AS-01  USIE-00  SP-02  SNP-01
PR5-01  DS-01  P-02  T-01  /078 W

0 191605Z Aug 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY WARSZAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHCN IMMEDIATE 7688
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA

Confidential Section 05 of 05 Warsaw 11056

Brussels for USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, ELAB, PL
SUBJECT: BRONISLAW GEREMEK EXPLAINS NEXT STEPS

Of the previous regime. The result was a protracted and bloody fight for survival. By creating a genuine "grand coalition", albeit "through the back door", Solidarity hoped to satisfy the nation while reassuring an unpopular and dispirited party. In the midst of Poland's unprecedented economic and
POlITICAL CRISIS, THIS WILL BE NO SMALL FEAT.

DAVIS

CONFIDENTIAL

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL
Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) Memorandum, “Information Regarding the Situation in the CSSR up to 20 August 1989”

20 August 1989

In recent days (Friday and Saturday) the so-called protest marches, organized by the so-called Independent Peace Association, have continued in the pedestrian zones in Prague. Approximately 100 individuals attended these activities. Saturday’s marches were video-recorded by accredited employees of the British and Austrian television company “V.”

Internally, “Charter-77” has been somewhat divided over questions of policy and tactics in preparation for a confrontational rally. The older “charter-77” signatories are determined to stop any activities on 21 August while the more radically oriented youth groups are contemplating an open clash with state authority, even at the cost of provocation. They have declared they are even willing to allow themselves to be shot for their cause. Within the internal enemy groups, a strong moderate center exists which has been pushing for a peaceful demonstration in the form of a procession around the pedestrian zone.

There are confirmed efforts by employees of Western media organizations to incite [Charter 77 activists and other to give] a confrontational character to the anti-socialist rally of 21 August. To this end, they have been spending time with and emphatically [trying to] convince individual prominent “Charter-77” activists. The editors of the BBC are particularly active in doing this.

Further, information has been confirmed regarding preparations for the anti-socialist rally on 21 August, organized by activists of the so-called Independent Initiatives in certain cities in the western Bohemian, southern Bohemian, southern Moravian, northern Moravian, central Slovakian, and eastern Slovakian regions. From the perspective of the internal enemy, this has the effect of enlisting additional supporters for demonstrations in Prague and in other cities. Their common goal, among other things, is to aggravate as much as possible [attempts by] security to intervene—for instance, by organizing a scattered march through Prague. The effort of the enemy will be to draw the attention of security services away from Prague to other regions or, as the case may be, district cities.

Appreciable activity in support of the so-called Czechoslovak Independent Initiatives is being generated by Polish and Hungarian opposition groups, which are encouraging large-scale participation at the anti-socialist rally, particularly in Prague. Their intentions have been confirmed by the arrival of Polish opposition groups in Prague on 15 August, which ensures that the activated Polish groups can remain through 21 August. The delegation even visited J. HAJEK 13 who familiarized them with the “Charter-77” provision requiring signatories to distance themselves from open confrontational acts and reminded them that if they chose to remain until 21 August, they were under no circumstances to portray themselves as guests invited by “Charter-77.”
The Hungarian contingent has similarly organized the arrival of their members in Prague to participate in the anti-socialist rallies of the FIDESZ (Young Democrats’ League) organization, whose activists are preparing a demonstration on August 21 in front of the Czechoslovak embassy in Budapest, where they intend to hold the protest. On 19 August, Hungarian radio broadcast an interview with a FIDESZ representative who indicated that a large number of members of the organization would be leaving for the CSSR to support activities through 21 August.

In an effort to prevent the arrival of individuals with such intentions from Poland and Hungary, the necessary precautions have been put in place at the state borders. Thus far, 15 suspicious individuals have been turned back at the rail station on the Hungarian border, of whom 14 were Hungarians and one was French. At the Polish border crossings there has thus far been a total of 13 Solidarity activists and [other] suspicious Polish citizens turned back.

In order to expose the aims of the Hungarian opposition groups to organize specific unfriendly acts on Czechoslovak territory, cooperation has been established with Consul TABA at the Hungarian embassy.

In connection with 21 August, the Polish Solidarity movement is making preparations at certain Polish-Czechoslovak border crossings, for instance, at Vysny Komarnik (district of Svidnik), Palota (district of Humenny), for a so-called quiet, passive sit-in demonstration using banners and signs with slogans. Participants are to sign a written declaration calling for mutual cooperation with the Independent Initiatives, the denunciation of international aid from Warsaw Pact troops, and a declaration of support for the anti-socialist forces in the CSSR. On 21 August at 4:00 p.m., on the town square of the Polish border town of Cieszyna, a protest demonstration has been planned, at which time a declaration from the Polish [Sejm] is to be read denouncing the entry of Polish troops into Czechoslovakia (according to Polish border guard intelligence organs, security will be intensified in the above stated areas to prevent Polish citizens from crossing illegally into Czechoslovakia).

According to routinely gathered intelligence, one may assume, as a consequence of the anti-Czechoslovak campaign in the West and the anti-government demonstrations announced in Prague, that there will be an influx of tourists from the West. Within only the past few days there has been an enormous volume of visas granted to Italian citizens (totaling more than 440), at a time when there was no reason to deny their applications.

According to intelligence gathered, members of the Italian Radical Party plan to arrive soon in Prague with the typical aim, as has been the case in the past, to elicit anti-socialist provocation through the use of banners and leaflets. This intention was even confirmed by the president of this party, STANCERI, at their rally.

In the effort to thwart these aims, the appropriate measures have been taken at border crossings as well as general security measures for the territory of Czechoslovakia. Each case of provocation by Italian or other foreigners [who have been] granted visas will be documented and will incur the appropriate legal measures.

Currently there are noteworthy efforts by certain individuals to obtain weapons and bomb-making materials. Nine cases with a total of 250 CZ parabellum 9 mm semi-automatic pistols were distributed through PZO Merkuria to Britain V. Upon carrying out an inspection of the contents of the shipment it was discovered that a total of 30 pistols had been stolen prior to distribution to Britain V. On 12 August, there was a break-in at
the —SPA [Czechoslovak People’s Army] ammunition depot in the community of Cakov (district of Ceske Budejovice), from which a significant amount of plastic explosives, charges, detonators, and other bomb-making materials was taken. The perpetrators were discovered to be basic service recruits L[...] Michal (born 1969) and N[...] Milan (born 1968), both from Military Unit 4445 of Ceske Budejovice[,] and a civilian named K[...] Radek (born 1971) from Ceske Budejovice. The motive behind the act is under investigation.

Within the last two days on state territory there have been more than 150 leaflets discovered, which have made a particular call for participation in the protest rally on 21 August and the denouncement of the international assistance provided in 1968; the majority were discovered in the cities of Prague (33), Brno (26), Cesky Krumlov (20) and Gottwaldov (19). This involves only those cases discovered by NSC [National Security Committee] organs and informers; the actual number is likely much higher. During the same period, 15 opprobrious signs were discovered at public locations and promptly removed. In Brno, an unknown perpetrator made a telephone call threatening the destruction of the MC CPCz building (Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia).

Today, during the hours between 9:15 a.m. and 11:00 p.m., Mass was held at St. Vitus Cathedral. It was officiated by cleric KORINEK and was not misused for anti-socialist provocation. The departure of members of the congregation was recorded by the staffs of ARD [television] (German Federal Republic) and ABC [television] (United States of America), with the above mentioned staffs conducting no interviews with our citizens. Attendance at the first Mass celebration fluctuated around 1,300 individuals and the second around 2,000 individuals.

Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) Memorandum, “Information on the Security Situation and Further Tasks in the Struggle Against the Internal Enemy” in the Period Preceding

21 August 1989

Information
On the security situation and further tasks in the struggle against the internal enemy

In the period from the end of July to the present day, information has established increased activity of the internal and external enemy in the preparations of provocative and confrontational acts on the occasion of the anniversary of 21 August 1968. The evident goal is to compromise the leading position on the events of 21 August years ago and the politics of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and through a public demonstration of [the enemy’s] own strength to manifest themselves as an essential socio-political factor. The enemy’s actions demonstrate increasingly pronounced tendencies toward a transition from criticism to political activity aimed against the principles of a socialist state. The actions of the 20-21 August should, according to the expectations of the adversary, accelerate the fall and development of events in the country with the aim of achieving their purpose.

One of the chief means of fulfilling [the opposition’s] plan is the campaign centered around the pamphlet “A Few Sentences,” which is being spread over the territory of the entire country and which 16,500 citizens are supposed to have signed. The activity of the adversary necessitated undertaking extensive measures. Legal proceedings were taken against the criminal act of sedition according to paragraph 100 of the criminal code. With the agreement of the municipal prosecutor in Prague, house searches of the main organizers S. DEVATY, A. VONDRA, J. URBAN and J. KRIZAN were conducted. It was proven that Vaclav Havel was the chief organizer and author of the pamphlets. Documentation was obtained on the criminal activity of the main organizers of the enemy campaign. Prosecution of these individuals can be successfully carried out only in the event that all of the organizers, including Vaclav HAVEL, about whom there is also incriminating material, be tried. It is necessary to consider the leveling of accusations and imprisonment through the perspective of the developing security situation and decide whether to proceed to trial immediately on the 21 August 1989. Measures taken against the distributors confirm that in most cases these individuals do not have any ties to the organizers and that they gather signatures at the instigation of Western media (RADIO FREE EUROPE, VOICE OF AMERICA).

Measures were undertaken on the entire territory of the CSSR with respect to the distribution of pamphlets and preparation for anti-socialist actions. In total 211 interrogations were carried out, 10 people were charged with crimes according to paragraph 100 of the criminal code, 76 people were charged with felonies according to paragraph 6 of law #150/69 Sb., 13 were charged with misdemeanors, and 15 were given a warning.

An analogous action, which was supposed to intensify the atmosphere and bring about a split in the ranks of the CPCz, was in the form of a letter from the leadership of the so-called RENEWAL (OBRODA) to all members of the party. The plan of the
antagonist was nipped in the bud and its spread was successfully stopped. The original letter along with copying equipment was confiscated and house searches of main organizers M. HAJKA, V. SILHAN and V. KOLMISTR were conducted after the opening criminal prosecutions for the criminal act of dishonoring the Republic and its representatives. A warning was given to all those named by the municipal prosecutor in Prague.

On the territory of the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR), CARNOGURSKY, KUSY, SELECKY, PONIKA and MANAK in particular are perpetrating enemy acts, consisting of organizing anti-social appearances, instigating citizens to participate in them, and distribution of materials abroad for enemy purposes, where they are used in anti-Czechoslovak campaigns. Criminal prosecution for crimes of sedition, specifically injuring the interests of the Republic abroad, was initiated by an investigator of the SNB (National Security Force) on 14 August 1989, and the above-mentioned individuals were indicted. A proposal was brought forth for the imprisonment of CARNOGURSKY and KUSY. This measure was approved by the general prosecutor of the SSR.

Within the framework of the preparations for the August gathering, the so-called Independent Peaceful Coalition began to organize a so-called silent march in pedestrian zones daily, starting on 1 August 1989. Several dozen people are participating in these marches, and their numbers increase daily. Besides provoking the state powers, the antagonist wants to activate the public, confirm his own ability to act and disclose eventual counter-measures.

The fundamental issue in the activity of the opponent is the preparation for public appearances on 20-21 August, 1989. As the result of security measures carried out (for example, prevention of a meeting of the Coordinating Committee of Independent Initiatives—OBRODA, HOS, CH-77, NMS, Ecological Section of CH-77—on 2/2, during which forms of protest and the publication of a common declaration were supposed to be discussed; prevention of a meeting of the members of an HOS branch in Prague 4, during which the concrete events for the anniversary in August were supposed to be discussed; impairment of the public acts of NMS, etc.), the opponents’ opinions about the character of these acts significantly differ and are divided. From the marginal (demonstrations on Wenceslas Square with a clash with police—asserted for example by the speaker of Charter-77 HRADLIK) through the “restrained” to the opinion not to hold any public events (for example Jan Urban advises instead to concentrate on the establishment of independent committees and penetrate into enterprises and territories). A group of former communists united in the so-called RENEWAL [group] who refuse to take part in eventual public appearances, likewise endorses this last opinion, under the influence of under-taken measures.

At the present time, the “silent march” variation of demonstrating in the pedestrian zone in Prague on 20-21 August 1989, dominates in the enemy camp. CH-77 together with other initiatives are inclined toward this.

Analogous acts are to take place in other towns, such as Brno, Plzen, Tabor, Usti nad Labem, Litomence, Olomouc, Chomutov, Hradec Kralove, Zilin, Bratislava and Kostice. It is possible to envision provocative demonstrations also in other parts of the Republic. We are dealing with the tactics of an opponent who does not call directly for open enemy manifestations, but tries to create the appearance of a peaceful gathering of citizens. The opponent is counting on the creation of a tense situation during a greater...
gathering of people, which will then easily lead to a demonstration of spontaneous protest against the politics of the CPCz.

Several other forms of provocative acts are also being assessed, such as the distribution of the declaration by Charter 77 and [the laying of] flowers to honor the memory of those who fell at the embassy of the USSR in Prague, the laying of a bouquet on 20 August at the statue of St. Wenceslas, the laying of flowers where Czech citizens died during the Warsaw Pact army invasion, the hoisting of a red flag on Pradeda in Jeseníky 6 and the ringing of the bells of St. Tomas in Brno.

The internationalization of the acts of the internal enemy and the cooperation with its counterparts from PLR (People’s Republic of Poland) and MLR (People’s Republic of Hungary) is clearly increasing, and is constantly acquiring more concrete shapes, from instruction and consultation to organizing common concrete acts. From the experience of MICHIŃI 7, BUJAK and others’ impact on the representatives of opposing forces during their stay in the CSSR in the beginning of August 1989, measures will be taken to prevent their announced arrival in CSSR and the prevention of their participation in provocative acts. Analogous measures are also being taken against the representatives of Hungarian opposition groups. Polish Solidarity is preparing provocative acts on the borders with the CSSR in support of acts in the CSSR.

In recent times the danger of the impact of the so-called Democratic Initiative (MANDLER and co.) is growing, and unlike CH-77, is principally oriented towards penetrating into working-class youth and into the country-side in order to try and create so-called alternative organizations.

The so-called Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee sent a letter to the Prime Minister and the general prosecutor of the CSSR on 12 August 1989, in which it completely [and] unequivocally accused the government of the CSSR and the Ministry of the Interior of trying to incite a confrontation with citizens demanding democratic renewal. They allege that for example the campaign against the appeal “A Few Sentences” developed into a direct “criminalization” of this legal petitional act.

They further accuse the organs of state power of trying to fabricate proof of a connection between a group of saboteurs who commit arson in northern Bohemia and “independent initiatives,” of which there supposedly is no proof. Hitherto investigations unequivocally prove, through witness statements and house searches, a connection between one of the main defendants Jan GREGOR and representatives UHL 8 and CIBULKA of CH-77. Witnesses have proven that GREGOR also visited the representative of CH-77 Vaclav BENDA 9 many times in Prague. In his established correspondence GREGOR expresses his resolve to fight by any means against the rising socialist leadership and the CPCz, and his decision to influence youth in this spirit. Despite the defendants’ denial of the charges against them and their refusal to testify, there is further proof of the their criminal act of sabotage, especially concerning the four main defendants.

From the contents of the above-mentioned letter it is evident that it is the endeavor of anti-socialist forces to shift the blame for the confrontational nature of the acts and for the eventual decisive intervention of the power apparatus against them, onto the Czechoslovak departments Public Security (VB) and Peoples’ Militia (LM). Through this they wish to show the “illegitimacy” of the present leadership of the CSSR on the August platform and to create an atmosphere which they expect will result in the
resignation of the political and state leadership and in the installment of “temporary state organs.” The foremost exponents of illegal structures have decided to establish the so-called Czechoslovak civic forum for coordination and [to create a] unified plan of action, as a guarantee for the “creation of a democratic and legal state.” Proposals are being prepared detailing the nature of the activity of a “united” opposition aimed at the factual assumption of power, in which they anticipate the dissolution of the Federal Assembly and the establishment in its place of a “temporary legislative assembly” which will prepare and negotiate a new constitution for the CSSR. According to the expectations of the antagonist, a new government would subsequently be created, which would consequently realize their idea of a legal state. Parallel to this a plan is being worked out to create a new “independent youth union,” in which independent unions would be brought together, for example university youth, working youth, etc. A set of complex measures in preventive and repressive areas is being carried out to frustrate the plans and goals of the opponent.

Technical measures were carried out to prevent the communication of news abroad by telephone by known informers of the editorial staff of Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. All meetings of the so-called initiatives are being stopped with the aim of not allowing them to unite.

In order to strengthen the effectiveness of security measures carried out on the territory of the CSSR, the FMZV [Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs] took steps toward the prevention of the arrival of visa-holding foreigners who are presumed to partake in enemy activities and for the prevention of the arrival of individuals with enemy intentions from ZSS [Socialist Countries] (specifically from Poland and Hungary). On the border crossings measures [are being implemented] to prevent the arrival of known exponents of Solidarity and the so-called independent initiative from Hungary, who have come to the CSSR in the past.

In the area of counter-propaganda, materials are being distributed which document the enemy activity of the main organizers, in order to discredit them to the public-at-large.

The chief exponents of the so-called independent initiatives and known individuals from the enemy environment will be under the control of the organs of the SNB [National Security Force] so that they will not be able to participate in enemy activities.

The course of action of the security organs in collaboration with the LM [People’s Militia] in the event of organized antisocial appearances is being elaborated in several variations.

In the event that the so-called “silent march” takes place, documents will be checked and individuals actively participating in the organization of the SNB [National Security Force] will be summoned. If petitions, verbal attacks or spontaneous declarations of opposition against the party and state leadership and the police of the CSSR should come to pass, security units will be called in to force out and disperse the crowd from the area.

If, despite these measures, a massive antisocial demonstration takes place, disciplinary powers will be brought in to carry out necessary decisive intervention and restore peace and order through the use of technical equipment.
The Emergency Regiment VB CSR [Public Security of the Czech Socialist Republic] (1,200 informers and 400 members of the permanent establishment) and the Emergency Department VB SSR [Public Security of the Slovak Socialist Republic] in Bratislava (565 informers and 190 members of the permanent establishment) are the decisive force of the SNB to be dispatched in the event of mass anti-social gatherings in Prague. The technical equipment of these organizations includes armored carriers, water-cannons and other emergency instruments.

Emergency units of the VB are being created and prepared according to the possibilities and needs of any given section in every SNB organization at the county and district level. Within the framework of the CSR, the leaders of KS SNB (including the administration of SNB Prague) have at their disposal school emergency departments which function as their reserves to be brought in as a compact unit. All the mentioned emergency units are thoroughly prepared to perform tasks and their preparedness is good. During their preparation they collaborated with the units of the LM in their exercises.

From the Border Guards a reserve of 720 soldiers from the basic service and career soldiers with the necessary technology has been created, of these 460 members of the Border Guards are intended for Prague.

In individual counties and districts, [possible] locations for anticipated mass anti-social gatherings are being identified and intervention plans are being practiced there.

Extraordinary attention in the preparation for the protection of law and order is devoted to the capital, Prague. Mass anti-social gatherings are anticipated specifically within the confines of Wenceslas Square, Peace Square, Old Town Square, on Letna [plain], Stromovka [park] and Kampa [island]. Intervention actions are practiced in these locations, but forces are ready to strike in other places as well.

The operational staff of the FMV [Federal Interior Ministry] was created for the leadership and coordination of security measures. The responsibility for the preparation and completion of tasks to protect the peace from attempts to stage anti-social gatherings has been to the responsible deputies of MV ZP CSR and SSR. Emphasis was placed on the universal preparedness of the security forces and technologies, preparations of individual variations and placement and leadership.

The head of the administration of LM CSSR announced extraordinary measures for the days of 17-22 August 1989. The focus of the tasks lies in the acquisition of information and assurance of uninterrupted activity in the factories. Heightened attention is being given to the protection of stockpiles of weapons and ammunition.

Regional LM staffs have cooperated with SNB organizations and are prepared for combined security patrols during the above-mentioned period and incorporation into security units with forces and equipment determined in the plans for cooperation.

For the capital Prague, 10 troops will be prepared specifically on bases destined for the local SNB administrations, and 1 LM company for MS VB Prague. In addition to this, 300 members of the LM will be prepared as reserves.

The chief of the General Staff of the MNO [Ministry of National Defense] released a “guideline” for securing the tasks in which he ordered the troops to prepare and detail forces and equipment for the SNB in the calculations determined in the agreement between the FMV and CSLA [Czechoslovak People’s Army] before the redeployment of the army.
The third degree of extraordinary security measures [which has been] announced [MBO], 12 does not yet presuppose the deployment of forces and equipment of the — SLA. Their usage is possible only under higher degrees of MBO. Under the fourth degree, MBO soldiers are brought in for combined patrols and part of the technology is used. Under the fifth degree of the MBO, the guarding of designated objects is added and the CSLA arranges the planned security forces and special technology, which will be brought in during the sixth degree (MBO). The law #40/74 Sb. makes it possible for CSLA troops to be brought in, according to which the minister of the interior of the CSSR has the authority to enlist the members of the CSLA to fulfill the tasks of the SNB after an agreement with the minister of national defense.

The detailed technology of the CSLA include trucks, connecting appliances, armored transports for infantry and water canons.

For the capital Prague, 2,300 soldiers of the basic service and career soldiers with the necessary technology [already] have been prepared for service in the combined security patrols and the security units. Furthermore a regiment of tanks of the minister of national defense is prepared to serve as a reserve (1,160 members of the CSLA with necessary technology).

Conclusion:
It has been proven that the internal and external enemy considers the anniversary of 21 August as an opportunity to confront the state powers and to discredit the present leadership of the party and the state.

The western media provides the necessary framework for this. They try to draw a picture in the public’s mind of a deepening crisis in our society which, according to their prognosis, should result in its end, and, at the latest by next year’s end, develop into a struggle for political power, the removal of the CPCz from the leading role in society and a complete dismantling of the principles of socialism.

They clearly, at the same time, count on developments in neighboring socialist countries, especially in Poland and Hungary to influence the minds of our people. They concentrate primarily on the support and propagation of the activity of illegal organizations and their members, and simultaneously strive to prove that the party is not able to lead the society and secure its progress any longer.

The activity of internal and external enemies is aimed at bringing about the legalization of the operation of opposing groups and their assertion as real political powers in the societies, which, following the Polish model forced the state leadership to a round-table dialogue. At the same time one must not underestimate the influence and long-term plans of the Roman Catholic Church. Its political ambition was explicitly expressed by Cardinal Tomasek in an open letter to the government functionaries and citizens of the CSSR.

The existence and activity of illegal organizations and the prolonged and increasing influence of the western media, especially the broadcast stations RADIO FREE EUROPE and VOICE OF AMERICA, impacts in a negative way on a segment of our population. Cases of anonymous threats addressed to functionaries of party and state organs and the National Front organization, of disrespect for the SNB, CSLA and LM, and of verbal attacks on their members are on the rise.
With regard to these realities it is impossible to rule out the possibility that during the so-called silent demonstration on the 20-21 August 1989, an atmosphere will be created among the participants that could grow into an open display of enmity toward the state and the party as a start of a series of further acts planned during the course of this year and the beginning of the next, aimed at destabilizing the society.

This is the reason for the preparation of necessary security measures for the frustration of their confrontational plans.

I have the honor to report that Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a leading member of Solidarity, was today confirmed by a vote of the Polish Sejm in the position of Prime Minister of Poland and commissioned to form a government. I believe that this development constitutes essential fulfillment of the political tasks assigned to me in my current letter of instructions and await further orders.

Davis
1. (C) DEPARTMENT NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THE ESSENTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE POLITICAL TASKS ASSIGNED IN YOUR LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS.

2. (C) YOUR NEXT TASK IS TO PROMOTE AND ENSURE THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY IN POLAND, TO INCLUDE STABLE GROWTH, FULL EMPLOYMENT, LOW INFLATION, HIGH PRODUCTIVITY AND A MERCEDES (OR EQUIVALENT) IN EVERY GARAGE.

3. (U) BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS.

EAGLEBURGER
Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by Grey Hodnett, Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Director of Soviet Analysis on 482-7170 or secure.

Reverse Blank

Secret

SOV 89-10077X
September 1989

27
Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles
and Instability in the USSR (1)

Key Judgments

Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders are concerned about serious future breakdowns of public order in the USSR. This concern is well justified. The unrest that has punctuated Gorbachev's rule is not a transient phenomenon. Conditions are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to continuing crises and instability on an even larger scale—in the form of mass demonstrations, strikes, violence, and perhaps even the localized emergence of parallel centers of power. This instability is most likely to occur on a regional basis, not nationwide—although overlapping crises and a linking together of centers of unrest could occur.

Instability in the USSR is not exclusively a product of glasnost, and some of it is indeed a sign—as Gorbachev asserts—that reforms are taking hold. But Gorbachev's claim that instability otherwise merely reflects the surfacing of problems that were latent or repressed under Brezhnev is only partly true. The current budget deficit and consumption crisis is largely due to policies Gorbachev himself has pursued since 1985. And the prospects for further crises and expanded turmoil in the future are enhanced by key policy gambles he is taking now:

• In the nationality arena, Gorbachev is gambling on defusing ethnic grievances and achieving a more consensual federative union through unrestrained dialogue, some concessions to local demands aimed at eliminating past "mistakes," a constitutionalization of union/republic and ethnic group rights, and management of ethnic conflict to a substantial degree through the newly democratized soviets.

• In the economic arena, Gorbachev is gambling that, by putting marketization on hold through the postponement of price reform, and by pursuing a short-term "stabilization" program, he can avoid confrontation with the public and reengage in serious economic reform without steep costs at a later date.

• In the political arena, Gorbachev is gambling that, by transforming the Communist Party from an instrument of universal political, social, and economic management into a brain trust and authoritative steering organ, while empowering popularly elected soviets, he can create a more effective mechanism for integrating Soviet society and handling social tensions.
Gorbachev has no easy choices, and other approaches would not necessarily be safer or more successful. But these gambles, understandable and even desirable from a democratic standpoint, are based on questionable premises and wishful thinking:

- The aspirations of many non-Russians will never be satisfied within the framework of maximum rights the Soviet leadership could grant union republics or so-called autonomous ethnic formations within national republics while still preserving a strong federative USSR. Allowing these people freedom to protest without being able to redress their basic grievances is a recipe for escalating crises.

- Because the deficit reduction plan is likely to fall far short of planned targets and because it is unlikely that supply can catch up with consumer "needs" without a price-induced change on the demand side, Gorbachev's emergency financial "stabilization" program more likely than not will fail. In the meantime, circumstances for introducing marketization of the economy will have become even less propitious than they were when this program was introduced, setting the stage for continued corruption, protracted economic crisis, and retreat to the old "command-edict" methods.

- Gorbachev's attempt to reform the Communist Party is based on a visionary notion of what it could become, and is in practice undermining its ability to integrate Soviet society before new political institutions are capable of coping with mounting popular demands unleashed by glasnost and failing economic performance.

As Gorbachev's various critics correctly contend, his gambles are likely to generate instability over both the near and the longer term.

The odds are high that labor unrest or ethnic strife will—perhaps even within the next six months—create strong pressures within the Soviet leadership to crack down much harder than it has to date. Soviet leaders have a broad range of instrumentalities they can employ to dampen instability, ranging from stronger threats, to new restrictions on human rights, to police intimidation, to imposition of martial law. We have evidence in at least one case of sharp disagreement within the Politburo over the use of violence. Gorbachev has sought to avoid widespread use of
physical force, probably calculating that the fallout from repression would endanger his entire program of perestroika as well as his foreign policy, while perhaps provoking more serious disorders that could lead to loss of control. Almost certainly he would be willing to escalate coercion somewhat to maintain order and isolate nationalist or other “extremists,” as he threatened to do in his report on nationality policy to the Central Committee plenum on 19 September 1989. Yet beyond a certain point, repression would mean abandonment by Gorbachev of his natural constituency and his entire political program. There is some evidence that he might choose to resign rather than assume responsibility for a crackdown involving a major imposition of martial law. Alternatively, the imposition of harsh measures could be associated with a coup d’etat or legal removal of Gorbachev.

Provided he manages to hold onto power, two outcomes of Gorbachev’s rule are possible, depending on how successfully the economy is marketized. In both scenarios, Gorbachev’s retention of power depends upon avoidance of acute polarization of political forces and progress in reinstitutionalizing means of political integration. This process would be reflected in further democratization of the political order, the emergence of some form of multiparty competition, and a loosening of the Soviet multinational empire. If political reform were complemented by effective financial stabilization and marketization, there might be high instability in the near term (two to five years), but a course could be set toward long-term (10 to 25 years) social equilibrium. Without financial stabilization and marketization, on the contrary, there would be rising instability in the near-to-medium term, high instability in the long term, and likely movement of the Soviet system toward revolution, a hard-right takeover, or “Ottomanization”—growing relative backwardness of the USSR and a piecemeal breakup of the national republics.

Gorbachev’s gambles and the centrifugal trends they have set in motion are already viewed with extreme alarm and anger by many members of the Soviet political elite. But Gorbachev’s major gains in the Politburo at the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee demonstrated once again how difficult it is to translate conservative sentiment in the ranks into effective opposition to Gorbachev’s rule at the top. For the time being, his power looks secure. If, somehow, a successful challenge were mounted against him over the next year or so, the most likely outcome would be a
traditionalist restoration that would attempt to "draw the line" in various areas—especially with respect to democratization of the party and soviets, glasnost in the media, the conduct of informal groups, and expression of "nationalist" views—but would accept the need for significant change, including reduction in military spending and decentralization of management. Unless such a regime chose to move ahead vigorously with marketization (not impossible, but highly unlikely) it would obtain possible stability in the near term but suffer high medium- to long-term instability, leading toward Ottomanization or upheaval from below. If Gorbachev were not overthrown in the near term, an attempt to turn the clock back would become more difficult—given the reaction of increasingly well-entrenched pluralistic forces—and could thus also be nastier, possibly involving the armed forces and taking on a xenophobic Russian nationalist coloration.

Whether or not Gorbachev retains office, the United States for the foreseeable future will confront a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular unrest and that, on a regional basis at least, will have to employ emergency measures and increased use of force to retain domestic control. This instability is likely to preoccupy Moscow for some time to come and—regardless of other factors—prevent a return to the arsenal state economy that generated the fundamental military threat to the West in the period since World War II. Moscow's focus on internal order in the USSR is likely to accelerate the decay of Communist systems and growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe, pointing to the need for post-Yalta arrangements of some kind and confronting the United States with severe foreign policy and strategic challenges. Instability in the USSR will increase uncertainty in the West about proper policies to pursue toward Moscow, reflecting nervousness about Soviet developments but nonchalance about defense, and will strain domestic and Alliance decisionmaking.

Domestic policy successes or failures will be the paramount factor ultimately determining Gorbachev's retention of office, but foreign policy achievements that allow him to justify further cuts in military spending on the basis of a reduction in the external "threat" would give him more room for maneuver. Western actions that could be presented by his opponents as attempts to "take advantage" of Soviet internal instability could hurt Gorbachev.
By putting economic reform on hold and pursuing an inadequate financial stabilization program, Gorbachev has brought Soviet internal policy to a fateful crossroads, seriously reducing the chances that his rule—if it survives—will take the path toward long-term stability. Over the short haul, there appears to be lack of competence among his advisers in the area of monetary and fiscal policy. A more fundamental weakness in Gorbachev's strategy that will perpetuate instability is its hesitant approach to marketization and unwillingness to face up to the necessity of real privatization of ownership of capital stock and land. He and his advisers need help with economic theory. Reduction of instability over the long haul requires the steady extension of a law-based private sector.

Harsh repression of labor unrest or of food riots in Russian cities are certainly contingency that could require a response from US policymakers. But instability provoked by Gorbachev's gambles is likely to present its severest challenge to US policymaking through a crackdown in the ethnic arena—probably not in response to communal violence, but in the context of a move by Moscow to intervene in Russian-native clashes or to repress the drive for greater national autonomy. Such a crackdown is most likely in the Baltic region, but could also come in the Caucasus, Moldavia, or—down the road—even in the Ukraine.

Gorbachev has said he wants to create a constitutionally structured federative union, and movement toward such a system would certainly be a positive development from the US perspective. Gorbachev, however, is not interested in greasing the skids for dissolution of the USSR, and this is precisely what acceptance of the more radical Baltic demands would imply. Unless Gorbachev is prepared to broker a special status for the Baltic republics, and is able to win necessary political support for such an arrangement, a direct and violent confrontation between Moscow and the Baltic peoples seems likely.
Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope Note</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality Policy Gamble: Concessions Within Limits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Reform Gambles</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postponement of Price Reform</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crash Budget Deficit Reduction, Resource Reallocation, and Consumption Program</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Structural Reform</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Reform Gambles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation of the Communist Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowering Democratized Soviets</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Outcomes</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the United States</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report offers a broad look at Gorbachev's domestic strategy and its implications for stability in the USSR. Descriptive sections of the report take into account the full range of classified and open-source information available, especially that dealing with Gorbachev's views, and are consistent with more detailed analysis produced by the Directorate of Intelligence. No systematic attempt is made to source the various judgments which, in the projective sections of the report, are based—as they are in all estimative writing—on a combination of extrapolation and logical inference.

The report is a speculative paper drafted by a senior analyst in the Office of Soviet Analysis. In a period of epochal change in the USSR, anticipating the future is a hazardous undertaking, and the issues dealt with in the report hardly invite unanimity of judgment. Although there are differences among analysts on specific issues, the report's conclusions do reflect our sense of the problems and challenges that confront Gorbachev's revolution and the general direction in which it is now heading.
Gorbachev’s Domestic Gambles
and Instability in the USSR

Introduction

Despite the increasingly pessimistic tenor of recent assessments in Moscow of Gorbachev’s popularity and prospects, and rumors of coups or military intervention, his major gains in the Politburo at the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee demonstrate once again great tactical political skill in transforming attacks against his line into movement forward. For the time being, at least, the future of perestroika would appear to be less dependent on political struggle in the Politburo than on faltering regime performance.

Many factors will affect this longer term performance. A key one, however, is Gorbachev’s broad sense of where he wants the Soviet Union to go and how he seeks to get there—which is the focus of this paper. Western analysts disagree over the extent to which Gorbachev has a set of stable long-term objectives. Like Soviet observers, they are also uncertain whether Gorbachev’s stated objectives are always necessarily his “real” objectives. The premise of this paper is that, while his positions have evolved over time, Gorbachev does have a fairly coherent “vision” (but not a “blueprint”) of the future that is revealed in both classified and unclassified sources. The existence of such a vision does not, of course, preclude tactical dissembling and ad hoc adjustment to circumstances.

Gorbachev has insisted that the domestic revolution that he has launched in the USSR—which involves radically dismantling an existing system of more or less stable, if stagnant and poorly performing institutions—is the only path open. In fact, perestroika, glasnost, and demokratizatsiya were not and are not the only options open to the Soviet Union: they represent the ultimate gamble on Gorbachev’s part that a liberal, reformed Communism is possible and that the destabilization brought by change is containable. While denying his own fundamental responsibility for instability, Gorbachev has claimed that some measure of it is a necessary corollary of reform. And, in fact, instability arising from certain types of change undoubtedly is a sign of progress. Yet glasnost has accelerated the delegitimization of the present system. It has irrevocably destroyed the regime’s capacity to use Marxist-Leninist doctrine as an instrument of political control. And it has weakened popular obedience to authority.

Gorbachev is now embarked on a set of related gambles as he seeks to reform ethnic relations, the economy, and the general political system. These too are producing crises, on which Gorbachev hopes to capitalize to provide further momentum for perestroika. From these crises new instability will arise, with the key questions being: how serious will manifestations of this instability be, and what types of crackdown is it likely to inspire? To call Gorbachev’s choices gambles, of course, does not imply that other approaches would necessarily be safer or more successful; in each case, the trade-offs are not easy.

Nationality Policy Gamble: Concessions Within Limits

Establishing a framework for dissolution of the USSR is not on Gorbachev’s agenda. Yet he does seek solutions to the nationality problem that enjoy legitimacy, are not simply imposed by Moscow, and obviate levels of repression that would wreck his overall policy of perestroika. The vision he has articulated over the past year or so—most recently at the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee—encompasses:

• Transition of the USSR from a de facto unitary empire tempered by toleration of local boss rule to a more consensual union with real federative content.
• Constitutional delimitation of the functions of the Center and the national republics, with an increase in the authority allocated to the republics and some decentralization of operational powers within the Communist Party.
• Removal of discriminatory and provocative obstacles to the development of non-Russian languages and cultures, while preserving a strategic role for Russian as the language of interethnic communication.

• Equalization of the rights of all nations (including minor nationalities and Russians), balanced by equalization of the rights of individuals regardless of their place of residence.

• Integration of the national republics within a single unionwide economy, in which the "socialist market" harmonizes the interests of the multiethnic whole with the interests of the ethnic parts, but in which there is also some devolution of power to the republics.

The Soviet leadership confronts two quite different types of ethnic crises: the assertion of traditional nationalist demands for greater cultural, political, and economic autonomy from the Center; and rage generated by economic and social grievances that finds an outlet in communal violence. In principle, the first type of crisis can possibly be resolved, if not through political dialogue (there are many forms of autonomy and even "independence"), then at least through a type of crackdown that does not involve physical force; whereas the second type requires physical repression—utilized in a context, of course, that invites more sympathy on the part of outside observers.

In nationality policy, Gorbachev's gamble lies in the scope he has permitted for public expression of ethnic grievances and demands. He has acquiesced in a mushrooming of "informal" organizations in the non-Russian republics that, by any standard, are articulating "nationalist" views. He has tolerated substantial absorption of ethnic platforms by republican Communist Party organizations. With some exceptions, he has sought to resolve nationality problems through dialogue and has generally exercised restraint in represencing communal violence or prounational ethnic demonstrations. Indeed, there is some evidence that Moscow may be willing to go very far to meet Baltic demands, provided there is no deviation from the Center's line on foreign policy, defense policy, and—perhaps less categorically—financial-monetary policy.

Gorbachev is evidently convinced that the potential exists for the emergence of a broadly shared sense of genuine unionwide community among most Soviet citizens. Ethnic instability, he seems to believe, arises basically from past policy mistakes and mismanagement. Thus, ethnic unrest can eventually be moderated if these errors are corrected and legitimate ethnic grievances addressed. He has issued several stern warnings against "nationalism." At the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee he observed that "the time has... come to talk with the clear and forcible language of law about conditions under which nationalist, chauvinist, and other extremist organizations can and should be banned and disbanded by the court." But he probably believes that attempts to "draw the line" through coercion are likely to trigger still higher levels of ethnic tension and play into the hands of opponents of perestroika. And he seems to be counting heavily on the reconstituted political institutions of the USSR—especially the empowered Supreme Soviet and local soviets—to provide a mechanism through which ethnic interests and demands can be accommodated. He may hope to promote a coalition between reformers in Moscow and moderates in the non-Russian republics. In the Baltic area, he appears to have gambled that prudence will triumph over passion; that republican party leaders will be able to convince the population that Moscow will ultimately resort to force if compelled to do so, and that the republics should not—in a reckless lurch toward secession—risk what they now stand to gain.

However, the radicalization of ethnic demands and expansion of the mass popular base for ethnic assertiveness we see occurring, as well as the entrenchment of communal violence, suggest how tenuous the prospects are for Gorbachev's strategy. Lifting the lid on the nationalities has energized anti-Russian sentiments among the titular nationalities after whom the republics are named, created great anxiety among the Russian settlers who constitute large fractions of the population in major cities in these republics, and opened a path for cross-republic ethnic strife. It has also activated latent conflict between titular and small
nationalities, produced a flow of more than 340,000 internal refugees since 1987, and set the stage for a potentially sharp Russian backlash against Gorbachev's "permissiveness." In at least one case, Lithuania, it is possible that the republic party organization may proclaim its independence of the CPSU. While security and economic interests probably will constrain some of the titular nationalities from seeking to secede from the USSR, these inhibitions may not apply to Belts, Belorussians, and Ukrainians.

Economic Reform Gambles

In the economic reform area, Gorbachev's vision postulates creation of a self-regulating "socialist market" system in which central physical planning has been largely eliminated and enterprises make decisions essentially by responding to market forces. Decision cues are provided by prices set largely by supply and demand, and inputs are acquired through direct contracts and wholesale trade. In this system the state plays a coordinating role, sets the "overall normative framework," and takes the lead in promoting science and technology, infrastructure development, environmental protection, establishment of a financial-banking-tax system, enactment of antimonopoly measures, and institutionalization of the entire system within a structure of law. Operational control would pass from middle levels of the bureaucracy to the basic production unit, reflected in (a) a breakup of large economic conglomerates and a transfer of control from the economic bureaucracy to production collectives (especially through leasing), and (b) democratization of enterprise management, in which workers' collectives elect their managers and oversee key production decisions. The "socialist" aspect of this postulated system would apparently consist of two features: retention and expansion of a strong welfare state component (Sweden is mentioned as an example to emulate); and continued public ownership of at least most land and capital stock, although leasing and other arrangements would substantially modify the concept of property.

Gorbachev's own policies, however—including the steep reduction of revenues from state alcohol sales, the financing from the budget of the crash machine-building program, wage boosts for some categories of workers, increased spending for social programs, and escalating food subsidies—generated a rapidly rising budgetary deficit and shortage of consumer goods sufficiently ominous to persuade him in 1988-89 to agree to a "stabilization" strategy for the next several years. The main elements of this strategy are (a) postponement of retail and wholesale price reform; (b) the adoption of a crash budget deficit reduction, resource reallocation, and consumption program; and (c) continued pursuit of selected elements of structural reform. This change of course has brought Soviet domestic policy to a fateful crossroads.

Postponement of Price Reform

Gorbachev's statements through mid-1988 strongly favoring price reform make it abundantly clear he understands that full transition to an economy in which financial calculations effectively determine decisionmaking depends on price reform. Nevertheless, he has publicly and repeatedly committed himself since then to postpone retail price reform "two or three years," to discuss it with the public before doing anything, and not to change prices without public consent. In the absence of retail price reform, planned hikes in wholesale prices would require increased state subsidies that would add to the financial imbalance Moscow is fighting to bring under control, and Gorbachev has also delayed these increases indefinitely. There is no mystery why he has agreed to this critical policy position: to proceed with price reform at this point would also have been a difficult gamble. Gorbachev and his advisers were deterred by the prospect of having to cope with a possibly violent popular response to price increases, hoped to buy social peace, and convinced themselves that conditions to move on prices would be more propitious later once financial "stabilization" had been achieved and hyperinflation averted, the monopoly factor dealt with, and other steps taken.

The costs of this gamble are likely to be enormous. By largely postponing the establishment of the indispensable prerequisite for economically rational decisionmaking, the gamble blocks workable decentralization, the introduction of genuine wholesale trade, and
reliance on financial levers—thus effectively putting marketization on hold irrespective of other important constraints. Failure to deal with wholesale prices will intensify the problems and costs in the future of currently underpriced nonrenewable resources (especially energy and minerals). It will also build further irrationality into investment and the stock of fixed capital, imposing still higher economic and social costs downstream for corrective actions. Subsidies to agriculture will also have to rise.

On the retail side, Gorbachev’s talk about price reform has been an invitation to the population to increase hoarding of consumer goods. The longer retail prices are frozen, the more the pattern of consumer demand is distorted, as faulty signals mislead producers and consumers. If food sales increase, so will food subsidies. Most important, delay may make the ultimate problem of dealing with retail prices that much more intractable: prices that might only have had to be doubled, let us say, may—with delay—have to be quadrupled. Meanwhile, the postponement of retail and wholesale price reform will expand corruption throughout the economy, producing an adverse effect on popular morale and public tolerance for perestroika.

The Crash Budget Deficit Reduction, Resource Reallocation, and Consumption Program

In the period 1981-85 the average annual budget deficit was 16.7 billion rubles. This figure rose to 58.7 billion rubles in 1986, 72.9 billion in 1987, 90.2 billion in 1988, and a CIA-projected 126 billion in 1989. Alarmed by the growing financial imbalance in the country, the Soviet leadership has approved an “emergency” program to reduce expenditures on investment, defense, subsidies to unprofitable enterprises, administrative costs, and social programs, and to increase revenues from imports of consumer goods, turnover taxes on increased production of consumer goods, and social insurance payments. There is discussion of financing the deficit, in part at least, through the sale of state securities and bonds bearing an interest rate of 5 percent. The strategy has also accelerated conversion of defense industry for civilian production, mandated a crash expansion of consumer goods production by all branches of industry, and reversed signals by accepting the recommendation to initiate increased imports of consumer goods. Gorbachev’s hope is that he can “saturate” the consumer market, mop up some of the huge cash savings of the population, eliminate shortages, avert hyperinflation or “barterization” of the economy, head off popular unrest, and create equilibrium conditions under which it will be possible later to initiate full marketization.

Yet it is highly likely that deficit reduction will fall far short of planned targets. It will be hard to impose investment cuts on ministries and republics, and there is pressure—expressed already through the Supreme Soviet—to block delays in the implementation of social programs. Inflation itself will begin feeding back to raise the level of government spending. Moreover, gains in projected revenues from turnover taxes are based on unrealistically high targets for the production of consumer goods, and subsidies for agriculture and other consumer goods will remain a major drain on the budget.

There are other problems with the “stabilization” formula. Without a price-imposed change on the demand side, it is unrealistic to hope that supply can catch up with consumer “needs.” The across-the-board campaign approach—implemented through the very “command-edict” methods that Gorbachev says he deplores—is likely to result in inferior products, high costs, and waste. Expansion of consumer-goods imports will impose still greater stress on Soviet hard currency reserves, force acceptance of higher levels of indebtedness, and defer imports for other sectors of the economy. At the same time, fear of the economic and political consequences of a higher hard currency debt, and recognition that imports would have to be far greater to substantially diminish the savings “overhang,” are likely to inhibit consumer-goods imports as a central component of financial stabilization. On the investment side, radical, abrupt shifts in proportions historically have—by ignoring the interdependence of different economic sectors—wasted

1 State centralized investment for “productive” uses in 1990 is to be 30 percent less than the target for 1989, and for some sectors of heavy industry the reduction is to be 40 percent.
resources and thrown the losers into a tailspin. It is not inconceivable that the magnitude of cuts projected in heavy industry could generate a chain reaction of producer-good supply shortages, leading to a spiraling downturn in production in the economy.

Selective Structural Reform

Gorbachev has by no means acknowledged that his decision on prices and macroeconomic "stabilization" puts economic reform on hold. He talks as if he wishes to move ahead. At the September 1989 plenum of the Central Committee he called attention to forthcoming discussion by the Supreme Soviet of draft fundamental laws on ownership, land, leasing, republic economic rights, the local economy, self-management, and taxation. And, in fact, there is momentum to press forward with implementation of the 1987 Law on the State Enterprise and elements of reform that are preconditions of marketization, such as expansion of enterprise rights in setting prices, wages, and output levels; partial derationing of industrial supplies; and reduction in the number of plan indicators. In the absence of rational prices and other essential conditions, however, these steps have the perverse effect of promoting arbitrary or monopolistic price increases rather than cost reduction, wasting "cheap" energy and raw materials, encouraging wage increases not matched by productivity gains, and motivating enterprises to produce the wrong output mix. The devolution of some economic decision making authority from the Center to the republic and regional levels, which is also being conducted under the rubric of economic "reform," can have some beneficial effects, but risks simply transferring "command" methods from the State Planning Committee to local bureaucrats and strengthening autarkic tendencies that weaken overall marketization.

A Gorbachev initiative with serious long-term implications has been the fostering of new forms of "ownership" and management of production units. Gorbachev believes that the establishment of proprietary interest is a basic key to economic revitalization and that this condition cannot be achieved under the present depersonalized state ownership of the means of production. Thus he is pushing strongly for acceptance of the proposition that "various" forms of ownership are legitimate under "socialism." Yet, at the same time, he has sharply attacked Western-style private ownership of the means of production, equating this with "exploitation." Although he supports cooperatives, the solution to this ideological dilemma, he emphasizes over and over, is the leasing of capital stock and land to production collectives. He has in mind not just agriculture and services, but large chunks of industry. He clearly hopes that leasehold property "ownership" will engender proprietary interest, combat monopoly, and defeat bureaucratic sabotage of "perestroika"—while avoiding the supposed adverse social consequences of real privatization. In the not too distant future it is quite possible that Gorbachev will unleash a big campaign to shift the economy to leaseholding, despite resistance to it by Yegor Ligachev and perhaps other members of the Politburo.

The difficulty with Gorbachev's calculation is that experience in both Eastern Europe and the West suggests that leaseholding does not produce the same positive benefits as private ownership, although in certain limited situations the results may be useful. Leaseholding does not provide the basis for creation of a true capital market, with the sale and purchase of production assets. Thus market prices for capital and land cannot emerge. Prices for these resources would still have to be set by planners and could not reflect particular circumstances or changes in values over time. Nor does leaseholding create the same interest or empowerment of specific individuals to seek to increase the value of enterprise assets. On the contrary, it may well make required investment and structural rationalization decisions more difficult by encouraging leaseholders of state-owned property simply to "mine" their assets—diminishing the economy's production capacity over time.

Possibly Gorbachev recognizes these problems and sees leaseholding as an ideologically defensible "cover" for a longer term transition from collective to private ownership. Reporting suggests, however, that he really does reject large-scale private ownership on ideological grounds and believes that leaseholding provides a workable "socialist" alternative. His attacks on private ownership

---

---

---

---
have been complemented by hedging in his defense of cooperatives. By making these politically convenient accommodations to the dominant collectivist preferences of Soviet elites and the population, at a time in which the absence of legally regulated markets is spawning growing corruption throughout the decentralized sector of the economy, Gorbachev is reinforcing strong impulses that exist to reassert "administrative" controls over the economy.

The collectivist predicament carries over into the sphere of management. Gorbachev has vigorously supported workplace democratization, including the election of managers, as a means of breaking resistance to perestroika within the bureaucracy and overcoming alienation and apathy among the workforce. The principle of electivity of managers was codified in the Law on State Enterprises, adopted in July 1987. In combination with collective leaseholding, however, workplace democratization would appear—potentially at least—to be setting the Soviet Union on the Yugoslav path. It will probably discourage investment by enterprises, encourage unjustified wage increases, make it harder to broaden wage differentials, strengthen pressures to continue subsidizing enterprises operating at a loss, and promote inflation.

Political Reform Gambles

Drawing on the experience of earlier economic reform efforts, Gorbachev has argued that economic reform will fail unless it is underpinned by political reform. Since 1987 he has promoted political reform as the key to perestroika. His aim is to replace the traditional Stalinist system of political power with an entirely new structure that is less centralized, more democratic, more open to the unrestricted flow of political ideas and information, more "constitutionalized" through fundamental law, and more proactive of the citizen's civil liberties. The key changes are those affecting the demarcation of functions and power between the party apparatus and the popularly elected soviets.

Transformation of the Communist Party

In the existing Soviet system the Communist Party has provided the central mechanism of political integration. Under its aegis, acting more or less collegially through bureaus selected co-optatively at all levels of the party, representatives of the system's key institutions (the economic hierarchy, the soviets, the security organs, and—especially—the party's own bureaucracy) have decided policy. In this system the party bureaucracy—the "apparatus"—has itself routinely exercised the right to issue binding orders to officials in all other bureaucracies. It has also controlled the process of personnel appointments to all leadership posts in all institutions, whether those posts are appointive or nominally "elective," through the nomenklatura system. Below the central level, the key function actually performed by the party apparatus has been to implement rather than make or win converts for policy. Its most important role in this respect has been to cope with inconsistencies between enterprise production targets and available inputs caused by incoherent economic plans. (This is why top positions in the party apparatus, at least in the Russian Republic, have generally been staffed with engineers.) The real role of the army of "ideological" functionaries in the party has been not so much to argue the party's position and build party "legitimacy," as to communicate what the party leadership's position is on various issues. The problem of party "authority" until recently was not particularly germane, because there was no political competition; few people were prepared to challenge the party line, and those who did were handled by a different bureaucracy—-the KGB--(censored).

Gorbachev appears to believe that the party should continue to integrate the entire Soviet system ("perform its vanguard role"). He has an altogether different vision, however, of how this function is to be performed. In his view, the party should abandon its de facto executive and legislative activity. It should:

- Cede rulemaking power to the soviets and other state or public organizations.
- Stop issuing binding orders to all other organizations.
- Curtail dictation of personnel appointments through the nomenklatura system.
- Remove itself from day-to-day involvement in the implementation of economic plans.
At the same time, the party should strengthen its "political" role by:

- Serving as a brain trust at all levels to generate appropriate macropolicies.
- Winning authority for the party and its line by force of persuasion in the emerging competitive political arena.
- Influencing elections and personnel appointments in all institutions by cultivating and presenting the "best" candidates.
- Incorporating the interests of all strata of the population through broad external dialogue and internal party democratization.

Gorbachev is, in fact, attempting to implement this model. He has weakened the Central Committee Secretariat and may be reaching policy decisions in an informal group outside the Politburo. He has eliminated the branch economic departments in the apparatus—the organizational base for day-to-day party intervention in the economy. He has ordered party officials to exert influence through persuasion rather than command. He has attacked the nomenklatura system as prone to error and the perpetuation of mediocrity. He is urging party leaders at all levels not to wait for instructions from above but to develop their own "action programs." He is demanding that all party officials emulate his own example and carry the case for perestroika to the population through the mass media. He is promoting competitive elections within the party. And he is instigating personnel cuts in the party apparatus and a large-scale turnover of party cadres, to which he attaches great significance.

Essentially, Gorbachev’s program implies the liquidation of the CPSU as it has existed and the creation of an organization that is new in its functions, structure, personnel, and relationships with other parts of the Soviet system. Through this transformation the party is to regain both the will and the legitimacy to rule. Were such a metamorphosis to succeed, it could in principle create an integrating vehicle compatible with democratized Soviets and other elective organizations. It would also clear away resistance in the party apparatus to perestroika.

The odds against the desired transformation of the party, nonetheless, are formidable. Exhortation to exert influence through persuasion is unlikely to give the party enough moral authority to compensate for loss of the operational power to issue orders and dictate personnel appointments. It is questionable whether purging the party apparatus will increase its ability to operate in a competitive political environment as much as Gorbachev seems to hope. Pravda complained editorially in June that "a considerable part of the party apparatus is in total disarray and is unable to find its bearings in the new situation." And it is difficult to identify, beyond presumed psychic rewards, what the payoffs are to be that will motivate party officials. Rather, the odds seem much higher that Gorbachev’s strategy will simply undermine the real-life CPSU, weaken its ability to bring order to a still nonmarketized economy, increase uncertainty as to its role, further demoralize both cadres and rank-and-file members, and intensify the already high level of anger of the apparatus toward Gorbachev.

**Empowering Democratized Soviets**

Gorbachev is banking heavily on the Soviets being able in a timely and effective manner to fill the vacuum created by his redefinition of the party’s role. What he seeks is a mechanism that enjoys legitimacy, is sensitive to pressures from below, is able to reconcile conflicting popular interests and demands, is capable of controlling officialdom, and is nevertheless responsive at least in general terms to party guidance. With the election of the new Congress of People’s Deputies and formation of the Supreme Soviet, the first meeting of the Congress in June and subsequent session of the Supreme Soviet, and the upcoming elections to local Soviets in the fall, Gorbachev has launched Soviet politics on a promising but perilous path.

We should not exclude the possibility that this venture will eventually succeed. Much of the brief experience of the Congress and new Supreme Soviet—especially
the emergence of a new corps of middle-class politicians, the frank discussion of formerly taboo topics, the role of deputies in helping to solve the miners’ strikes, and the rejection of some nominees to the Council of Ministers—provides grounds for hope. But the politicization of the Soviet population, the urgency of public needs, and the radicalization of demands made by the rapidly growing number of “informal” groups will impose severe strains on these new institutions. Tolerance and compromise are not yet part of the political culture of either the new Soviet electorate or the new deputies. Political competition in this arena, contrary to Gorbachev’s calculations, may work against the establishment of market socialism. Conflicts generated over ethnic issues will be bitter. A “hardhat workers” politics of unpredictable orientation may emerge. The new institutions currently lack most of the operational attributes of functioning democratic parliaments that help them to conduct business and deal with such pressures, and these can develop only with time.

Whether multiparty political competition will emerge as the new soviets evolve is a critical issue. With the formation of the “Interregional Group” of deputies, the collective action of Baltic deputies, and the caucusing of “workers’ deputies,” organized opposition has already arrived in the Supreme Soviet. Some participants in these groups visualize the rapid emergence of multiparty politics. And several groups outside the Supreme Soviet—for example, the Christian Democratic Union, the Social Democratic Association, the Democratic Perestroika Club, and the various ethnic fronts—are already organizing as political parties, or plan to do so. Whether or not this is actually the case.

It is conceivable that Gorbachev privately welcomes the prospective emergence of multiparty competition as a long-term stabilizer of the USSR’s new mass politics. In this scenario, he might hope simply to preserve the Communist Party’s de jure monopoly long enough to effect the transfer of real power from the CPSU to the Supreme Soviet, at which point traditionalists in the party would be unable to prevent recognition of a multiparty fait accompli. It is more likely, however, that—as he told Hungarian leaders Nyers and Grosz in July—he is prepared to accept multiparty politics in Hungary but does not wish such a system established in the USSR. Publicly, he has repeatedly criticized advocacy of multipartyism in the Soviet Union—arguing that this would multiply cleavages in an already “complex” society and, most important, would promote ethnic strife. In this scenario, he would be aware that his invitation to informal groups to participate in parliamentary politics could lead to the formation of other parties, as Nikolay Ryzhkov and others have warned, but planned to maintain the CPSU’s preponderant role by somehow taming or co-opting the main opposition groups.

In the meantime, as Ryzhkov has also observed, the creation of the new activist Supreme Soviet headed by Gorbachev introduces an element of profound ambiguity in the distribution of power and authority between the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo, the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers at the very top of the Soviet system. When local elections are held and empowered Soviets formed at all lower levels, this ambiguity will spread throughout the system, potentially setting the stage for a generalized “constitutional” crisis. Large numbers of party secretaries are likely to be defeated in these elections. To the extent that election by the populace to the respective soviet is seen to be a necessary validation of a party secretary’s tenure of office, political reform will sharply heighten anxiety and promote cleavage within the party apparatus. Gorbachev probably hopes to use the crisis resulting from elections to the soviets to redefine formally, both constitutionally and through revision of the party rules, the division of labor and respective powers of party, state, and government organs.

Implications

Stability

Gorbachev’s vision of a liberal Communist future seeks to reconcile satisfaction of ethnic demands with preservation of the Soviet multinational state, piecemeal introduction of marketization with “socialism,” and democratization with maintenance of the Communist Party’s “vanguard role.” Minimizing bloodshed has been central to his tactics. His desire to avoid
2. (Continued)

major confrontation with the population and to find “political” solutions to problems is reflected in his encouragement of politicization of the population and tolerance of social turbulence; his readiness to interpret hostility toward the Communist Party and the Soviet system as a product simply of failure by the regime to eradicate past “mistakes”; his propensity to ignore ideological “provocation”; his optimism about reaching the “correct” solutions to problems through rational calculation, dialogue, and compromise; and his disinclination to use force or administrative pressure.

These qualities are reflected in the gambles discussed in this paper, which in turn are generating major problems:

- In the nationality arena, glasnost and Gorbachev's gamble on defusing ethnic grievances and achieving a more voluntary federative union through dialogue is activating passions on all sides, stimulating a serious secessionist challenge, and fueling an imperial backlash.

- In the economic arena, Gorbachev's gamble on postponement of price reform, a crash consumption program, and selective pursuit of certain structural changes has placed real marketization on hold, mortgaged its introduction to a financial stabilization program that is more likely than not to fail, possibly compromised its eventual success with structures against private economic activity, and set the stage for continued corruption and protracted economic crisis.

- In the political arena, Gorbachev's gamble on reconstituting the Communist Party along lines that have no parallel in single-party (or multiparty) systems elsewhere is seriously weakening the central existing mechanism for societal integration in the USSR, while the gamble on instituting guided democracy through the soviets is likely to impose large new strains on the regime sooner than it provides an effective means for dealing with them.

Gorbachev has no easy options, and other gambles would have produced other problems. Wherever those problems might have led, the set of problems Gorbachev has in fact fostered is likely to lead in the foreseeable future to major instability in the USSR.

So far, neither the rioting, nor the communal violence, nor the demonstrations that have occurred in the non-Russian republics have compelled Gorbachev to resort to more than limited doses of armed repression. The most violent conflicts have largely not involved natives versus Russians. However, with the escalation of ethnic assertiveness generally since 1988, the radicalization of Baltic demands, and the growth of Russian nationalist sentiment, the stage is being set for major Russian/non-Russian conflict. Potentially, the most explosive near-term source of such combustion is the backlash of large numbers of Russians living in the borderlands to native attempts to assure priority of the local language, residency requirements for political participation, and progress toward autonomy or even independence. The fears now displayed among Russians in the Baltic republics and Moldavia could lead spontaneously to confrontations that would require large-scale intervention by Moscow. But they also provide fertile soil for provocation by Gorbachev's opponents designed to force broad intervention that would undermine perestroika. At some point, even in the absence of settler-instigated conflict, native assertiveness is likely to precipitate confrontation with the Center, however self-disciplined the non-Russians may be. One factor that could lead to such a clash might be Moscow's determination not to allow relaxation of controls in the Baltic republics to set a precedent for the Ukraine.

Gorbachev has sought to replace Brezhnev's tacit understanding with the population, which essentially provided a guaranteed minimum living standard and social security benefits in return for political passivity, with a new "social contract" that would provide greater economic opportunity and political participation in exchange for harder work and less economic security. But his economic gamble is unlikely to generate the sustained growth in material rewards necessary to support such a transition. At best, the policy will stabilize a deteriorating situation; if it fails, the result could be hyperinflation and the emergence of a barter economy. And the policy still leaves the economy in a state of protracted vulnerability to at least three generators of an economic downturn that...
would further enhance the likelihood of street politics: the incoherent current blend of “plan” and “market”; the possible chain reaction of producer-good supply shortages noted above; and—not least—major strike activity. (C-14)

Gorbachev was able in July to deflect blame for the miners’ strikes and turn them to his own immediate advantage, but only by granting major concessions to the miners that will increase the deficit and may well encourage more groups to use ultimatum politics. (C-14)

Headed from their success, organized miners are spearheading formation of a mass labor movement, which might develop widespread support among workers who want the security of the old social contract as well as the improved quality of life perestroyka promises. (S-25, A-6, 6C)

Glasnost, the evaporation of fear of authority, and Gorbachev’s attempt to mobilize popular pressure against bureaucratic vested interests have—in combination with consumer dissatisfaction and diffuse public anger toward the Establishment—tapped latent impulses and energized political moods at the base of Soviet society. The old “transmission belts”—especially the trade unions and Komsomol—that integrated the “masses” with the regime have, in the new competitive environment, become increasingly irrelevant. Elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies revealed how little confidence the party apparatus itself enjoys among the population at large. Gorbachev’s gambit on radically restructuring Soviet political institutions is further weakening the old mechanisms that repressed popular unhappiness. (C-14)

Opinion polls and abundant evidence from other sources suggest that the public’s priority concern is improving the standard of living. To the extent that the new Supreme Soviet and local sovietas act as vehicles for absorbing mass unrest, they are likely to press for welfare spending, wage increases, subsidies for unprofitable enterprises, delay of price reform, and other measures that will increase the difficulty of moving toward effective marketization. In this sense, the phasing in of political reform before economic reform may have severe long-term costs. (C-14)

But political competition encouraged by reform is giving voice to other concerns as well: about public order, crime, loss of control in the borderlands, environmental destruction, erosion of traditional values, elite corruption, and profiteering by cooperatives. This volatile mixture of grievances could, under conditions of continuing consumer deprivation, lead to outbreaks of anarchic violence or provide a social base for attempts by political elites to reverse Gorbachev’s policies. (C-14)

Political Outcomes

Gorbachev’s gamble on a protracted transition to marketization, unless modified, is likely to delay serious economic revitalization indefinitely and create conditions of chronic instability irrespective of the destabilizing impact of ethnic conflict. Under these conditions, governing the Soviet Union will become progressively more difficult. Yet the fragmentation of political power currently under way will probably continue. Within the party, divisions now visible pitting natives against Russians within the republics, republic party organizations against other republic party organizations and against the Center, RSFSR oblast party organizations against the Central Committee apparatus, and liberal against traditionalist factions, will expand. And Gorbachev’s personal authority within the party and among the population at large will probably continue to decline, despite his political victory at the September plenum of the Central Committee. (C-17)

Some observers have speculated that anarchy will be the end result of these developments. This is a highly unlikely outcome: if “anarchy” does occur, it will simply mark the transition from one set of political arrangements to another. What is likely is that instability will force the Soviet leadership to choose from an array of crackdown measures, ranging from stronger threats, to new restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, to bans on strikes, to personnel purges, to exertion of economic pressures, to police or military intimidation, to deployment of larger and more aggressive security forces, to declaration of states of emergency, to imposition of martial law. Choices here
will hinge partly on how threatening to regime surviv-
al conditions of instability are judged to be, partly on
how effective in suppressing disorder given types of
crackdown are predicted to be, and partly on how
counterproductive the crackdown measures are held
to be in terms of frustrating attainment of other key
objectives. (LTL)

The record suggests that Gorbachev has a high
tolerance for disorder, will seek as long as possible to
find compromise solutions, and, when decisive action
becomes necessary, will attempt to select measures at
the lower end of the crackdown scale. He seems to
fear that bloodshed resulting from a crackdown would
seriously exacerbate conflict situations; he probably
has not been impressed by the efficacy of force
applied in Central Asia and the Caucasus; and he
must fear the consequences for perestroika and his
foreign policy of a broad and extended resort to armed
might. (LTM)

Yet it is highly doubtful that Gorbachev would
abandon his reform program and his natural constitu-
ency by sanctioning indiscriminate violence, or engage
in a bid to seize dictatorial power through an alliance
with his political enemies. It is possible, however, that
he might choose to resign rather than assume respon-
sibility for a crackdown involving a major imposition
of martial law. In his conversation with the Hungar-
ians noted above, Gorbachev seemed to imply that he
would have resigned rather than order force to be
used against the strikers. And he appeared to be
dropping a similar hint in a speech he delivered more
recently in Leningrad. Naturally, he could also justify
retaining office (if he were indeed inclined to resign)
on “lesser evil” grounds. (LTM)

In the event that Gorbachev remains in power, his
resort to force is likely to be limited, and instability
will not easily deflect processes that appear to be
heading toward further democratization of the politi-
cal order, some form of multipartyism, and a loosen-
ing (or, in the Baltic case, even a breakup) of the
Soviet multinational empire—provided Gorbachev
can avoid sharp political polarization and achieve
some reinstitutionalization of political integration
through the soviets. If there is financial stabilization
and marketization, there might be high instability in
the near term (two to five years) but a course could be
set toward long-term (10 to 25 years) social equilibri-
um. Without financial stabilization and marketization
(which are now in serious jeopardy), there would be
rising instability in the near-to-medium term, high
instability in the long term, and likely movement of
the Soviet system toward revolution, a hard-right
takeover, or what has been termed “Ottomana-
tion” — a slow process of imperial decline with un-
planned piecemeal emancipation of constituent enti-
ties in a context of growing relative backwardness of
the whole in relation to the capitalist West. (LTM)
The trend toward liberalization and imperial dissolution is perceived as a clear and present danger by some members of the Soviet political elite, who are shocked by what they perceive as a breakdown of social discipline and loss of regime control. Their anxiety, fear, and anger could still crystallize in an attempted coup, legal removal of Gorbachev, or even assassination. Judging by what is being said publicly by Gorbachev's critics in the apparatus, as well as in intelligence reporting, a traditionalist restoration would not be simply a throwback to the Brezhnev regime. It would accept the need for significant change, including reductions in defense spending and decentralization of management, but would attempt to "draw the line" in many areas—especially democratization of the party and government, the media, the conduct of "informal" groups, and expression of "nationalist" views—in which Gorbachev's liberalism is seen as outrageous. Although the odds are high that a traditionalist regime would increase restrictions on private entrepreneurial activity and marketization, it is not altogether inconceivable—depending on who was in charge—that such a leadership might take advantage of limits on public expression to move forward vigorously with marketization. Barric this slim possibility, the prognosis for such a regime would be near-term stability but high medium- to long-term instability, leading to Ottomanization or upheaval from below.

The length of Gorbachev's tenure is an important variable. In the event that he is not soon overthrown, his gambles on ethnic and political reform are likely to increase the social forces of resistance to an orthodox reaction. Such a development would correspondingly increase the degree of coercion required to "restore order." Those intent on such a course of action might seek to gain support from the military or KGB, or to mobilize elements of the working-class population to back their cause. Political maneuvering to develop and define a mass "workers'" movement is already underway. Gorbachev is seeking to enlist the "workers" as a force for perestroika. Populist figures such as Boris Yeltsin may seek to appeal to the welfare-state preferences of the working class. Reactionaries would espouse neo-fascist slogans designed to tap into the anti-intellectual, anti-Semitic, anticapitalist, xenophobic, Russian nationalist moods that also exist among many "workers." A successful traditionalist or reactionary restoration, however, would solve neither the economic problems nor the nationality problems, and thus would perpetuate instability—repressed if not open.

Implications for the United States
Under any scenario, economic tensions, acute consumer dissatisfaction, labor unrest, and ethnic strife virtually guarantee that the United States will have to deal with a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular instability. The chances that economic reform will significantly reduce the potential for instability in the foreseeable future are low, and are certainly less than the chances that Gorbachev's own gambles will foster continuing economic stagnation or decline. Gorbachev will maneuver to dampen instability through compromise and to avoid armed confrontation and bloodshed. He may muddle through more successfully than appears likely. But the odds are great nevertheless that labor unrest or ethnic conflict will—perhaps even within the next six months—create strong pressures within the leadership to crack down much harder than it has to date. Gorbachev may well agree to more repression in order to retain power. It is likely, in this context, that an alternative leader would not only initiate more brutal repression than Gorbachev might, but would cite instability as the pretext for a general attack on Gorbachev's political reforms.

Moscow's preoccupation with instability is likely for the foreseeable future—regardless of other factors—to prevent a return to the arsenal state economy that generated the fundamental military threat to the West in the period since World War II. The Soviet leadership's focus on internal order in the USSR will probably accelerate the decay of Communist systems and growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe, pointing to the need for post-Yalta arrangements of some kind and confronting the United States with severe foreign policy and strategic challenges. Instability in the USSR will increase uncertainty in the West about proper policies to pursue toward Moscow, reflecting nervousness about Soviet developments but nonchalance about defense, and will impose stress on domestic and alliance decisionmaking.
To cope with the crises that promote instability, Gorbachev needs to transfer more resources from military to consumer needs. From a personal standpoint, he needs to defend himself against charges that he is selling out Soviet security interests and has been seduced by praise from the "class" enemy. Thus, he needs demonstrable results from the arms talks that will permit him to argue that the external "threat" has receded even further. Likewise, he needs trade and technology transfer from the West to overcome bottlenecks in the Soviet economy. Obviously, he does not need Western actions that call into question the efficacy of "NewThinking" in foreign policy, or that could be interpreted as challenging Soviet security interests globally, in Eastern Europe, or internally, or of "taking advantage" of Soviet internal instability.

The chances that Gorbachev will successfully overcome the dilemmas (many of his own making) that confront him are—over the long term—doubtful at best. But the process of pluralistic forces taking root in Soviet society strengthens the rule of law, builds constraints on the exercise of power, and fosters resistance to any turnaround in military spending and to reinvigoration of an expansionist foreign policy—which, as argued above, will be strongly inhibited in any event by the insistent demands of consumption and the civilian sector. This process, and the deterrence of a militantly reactionary restoration that might attempt to bring about a basic shift in the Soviet Union's foreign posture, benefits greatly from each year's prolongation of Gorbachev's rule.

A key weakness in Gorbachev's strategy that will perpetuate instability is its hesitant approach to marketization and its unwillingness to face up to the necessity of real privatization of ownership of capital stock and land. Soviet leaders from Gorbachev down are, at the moment, uniquely open to contact with the West. Serious private Western dialogue with them and their advisers on economic theory could influence their thinking. Reduction of instability over the long term requires the steady extension of a law-based private sector in the Soviet economy.

Harsh repression of labor unrest or of food riots in Russian cities are certainly contingencies that could confront US policymakers with the need to respond. But instability provoked by Gorbachev's gambles is likely to present its severest challenge to US policymaking through a crackdown of some sort in the ethnic arena—probably not in response to communal violence, but in the form of intervention to suppress Russian/native clashes or the drive of non-Russians for greater autonomy. Such a crackdown is most likely in the Baltic region but could also come in the Caucasus, Moldavia, or—down the road—even the Ukraine.

Gorbachev has said he wants to create a constitutionally structured federation based on the consent of the constituent republics. Movement away from the heretofore existing situation toward such a goal would in general be positive from the US standpoint. However, Gorbachev is not interested in creating a framework for weak confederation or dissolution of the USSR, nor would he be able to marshal political support within the elite for such an outcome; yet this is precisely what acceptance of the more radical Baltic demands would imply. The new draft CPSU platform on nationality policy hints at the acceptability of a regionally differentiated approach to Soviet federalism. It is possible that Gorbachev may be prepared to broker a special status for the Baltic republics, and this could incorporate a potential for evolution toward still greater autonomy. A wide range of configurations of "autonomy" or "independence" is conceivable. In such a context the Soviets might be interested at some point in discussing with Washington their regional security concerns, which would probably bear heavily on such a decision.
Warning of War in Europe:
Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces

National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders.

This Memorandum to Holders represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 4-1-84

Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forces

Information available as of 28 September 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum to Holders.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters,
Marine Corps

This Memorandum was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

September 1989
Warning of War in Europe:
Changing Warsaw Pact
Planning and Forces (u)

- The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in 1984. (S.N.E.)

- Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon. We should be able to provide about four to five weeks of warning of such an attack. (S.N.E.)

- We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement, but before completing the postmobilization training necessary for minimum offensive proficiency. The warning times would be shorter, but the Soviets would judge such an attack as highly risky. (S.N.E.)

- Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral reductions, if completed, and given no reduction in NATO capabilities, should significantly extend preparation time because of the greater need in the first echelon for currently low-strength divisions from the western USSR. (S.N.E.)
Figure 1
Projected Warsaw Pact Echelons
in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO)—Four-Front Attack
Key Judgments

The warning times we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in NIE 4-1-84. These changes are a direct consequence of Soviet assessments of improved NATO military capability, our improved understanding of the Soviet process of transitioning to war, and changes in Soviet peacetime readiness. Accordingly, before unilateral force reductions, we assess that:

- Pact military planners would prefer and are most likely to attempt to conduct a well-prepared attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon. We should be able to provide about four to five weeks of warning of such an attack. The increased time needed to prepare this attack option results from increased reliance in the first echelon on “hot ready” divisions from the western USSR.

- An attack with three fronts in the first echelon remains a possibility in some circumstances. We should be able to provide about two to three weeks of warning of such an attack. Our assessment of the increased time needed to prepare these fronts for sustained offensive operations results from new judgments about the time required to prepare Soviet forces based in Eastern Europe.

- We recognize that circumstances could cause the Pact to commit its forces to an attack after the completion of mobilization and movement but before completing postmobilization training necessary for minimum proficiency for offensive operations. If so, we could provide at least two weeks of warning of a four-front attack or at least one week warning of a less likely three-front attack. We believe, however, the Soviets would judge attacks before completion of postmobilization training as highly risky because of the reliance on reserves lacking such training.
Figure 2
Announced Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions in the Western Theater of Military Operations
Announced Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact unilateral force reductions, if completed, should significantly extend preparation time because of the greater need in the first echelon for currently low-strength divisions from the western USSR. Warning of our assessed most likely attack option—four fronts in the first echelon—would increase by about two weeks If the Soviets elected to attack after only mobilization and movement, warning times would increase by almost a week.

These preparations and warning times after unilateral reductions assume that NATO capabilities remain at current levels. Unilateral NATO reductions could diminish Pact perception of their requirements for success and, therefore, reduce warning time.

The ongoing Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks are likely to result in an agreement establishing numerical parity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces below current NATO levels within the Atlantic-to-the-Ural's zone. From peacetime parity, the Soviets would have to reestablish major forces in order to generate the capability to attack successfully and sustain the offensive to the depth of the theater. This requirement would increase preparation time considerably over what we have assessed in this Memorandum. Alternatively, the Soviets could increase the readiness and combat power of residual forces through higher manning levels and acquisition of modern equipment. This would require reinvesting the savings achieved by reducing their forces under CFE into defense and restructuring their forces and redistributing their equipment. These smaller forces would be capable of launching attacks for limited objectives with warning times more like we are accustomed to today. We do not believe such attacks for limited objectives would be attractive to Pact planners because the risks, to include escalation to nuclear war, would far outweigh any potential short-term gains.

We are confident that for the period of this Estimate we will be able to detect and report significant disruptions or a reversal of present political, social, and economic trends in the Warsaw Pact countries. Although these indicators will remain ambiguous with regard to actual national war preparations, they will continue to signal that the potential for a crisis had increased.
The Post-CFE Environment in Europe
NIC M 89-10002

The Post-CFE Environment in Europe (U)

Information available as of 1 September 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was prepared by the National Intelligence Officers for General Purpose Forces, USSR, and Europe.
Key Judgments

- The era following the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Talks will be a transitional period in Europe, marked by the reevaluation and redefinition of longstanding economic, political, and military relationships between and within the existing alliances.  

- The overall threat to NATO will diminish in a post-CFE environment, and barring a precipitous decline in NATO, the currently unfavorable balance of forces will be largely eliminated. Remaining Warsaw Pact forces will need even longer and more massive mobilization to be able to carry out deep strategic operations in Central Europe.  

- West European publics and leaders already perceive a reduced military threat from the Warsaw Pact and will expect continued attempts by the Soviet Union and its East European allies to focus on political and economic relationships with the West, reduce the size of their military forces, and shift resources from defense to civil production.  

- Continued US leadership of NATO will be challenged by the emergence of a stronger Eurocentric approach emphasizing the importance of political and economic over military matters as West European concerns about the Warsaw Pact threat diminish, and domestic pressures for reallocating defense budgets to civilian needs, such as the environment, and emphasis on East-West cooperation rather than confrontation increase.  

- There will be an increased prospect of instability in some East European countries if their economies fail to improve significantly—a likely prospect if they are unable to profitably exploit their greater access to the West.
Discussion

Intelligence Community analysts believe that the next decade—following the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks—will likely see long-established military, political, and economic relationships between and among European nations and their superpower partners reevaluated and redefined. CFE is an important element in a larger process of enhanced West European economic integration, the assertion of independent European political interests, and the political and economic reforms and reallocations under way in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Excepting upheaval in Eastern Europe, Community analysts foresee more direct policy concerns for the United States emerging from the changes in Western Europe than from those in either Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.

Post-CFE Warsaw Pact military forces will be incapable, without significant, costly, and time-consuming mobilization, of carrying out the deep strategic operations in Central Europe that have been characteristic of Soviet military planning for several decades. Both the East and the West will be forced to revise their views of war in Europe; current Soviet military reductions and restructuring probably reflect the early stages of such a reevaluation process. Although Soviet strategy and doctrine are clearly changing in reaction to new political instructions and economic imperatives, their final shape is not yet discernible. Nevertheless, Soviet military objectives against NATO would be likely to be much more limited, replacing those of the traditional Theater Strategic Operation, which projects Soviet military operations throughout Western Europe.

Post-CFE Soviet forces—although smaller—may be on average better equipped, depending on the Soviet's willingness to reinvest potential savings into the military. Some analysts believe that through this modernization and restructuring the Soviet's readiness posture is likely to improve. Despite potential improvements, however, the overall military threat to NATO will diminish, and, unless there is a precipitous decline in NATO forces, the currently unfavorable balance of forces would be largely eliminated. Under the Warsaw Pact's proposal, a CFE agreement would force the Pact to give up nearly half of its reinforcement capability in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone; NATO's reinforcement capability, however, would be significantly less affected. Further, the Soviet Union will not likely be able to regenerate rapidly the force structure required for deep offensive operations. Strategic surprise in Europe, therefore, will be even less likely, although tactical surprise would remain possible, for example, to obtain limited objectives.

Overall, there will be a continued shift in Soviet emphasis away from military power and toward political and economic interaction with the West. Through CFE, Gorbachev apparently intends to validate the basic assumption of his "new" foreign policy line: that national security will no longer be founded primarily on military strength but on a broader based combination of diplomacy, negotiation, economic power, and military strength.

On the NATO side, political and budgetary constraints together with perceptions of a reduced Soviet threat will result in a decreasing commitment by European nations to the maintenance of large standing forces, leading to continued force reductions, beyond those agreed to at the CFE Talks. Depending on where such additional cuts were taken, and how far they went in relation to Pact forces, such reductions...
would probably force major changes in NATO’s defense strategy. Simultaneously, a CFE agreement would contribute to the political momentum toward demilitarization in Europe and lead to changes in Alliance nuclear use policies. In general, the post-CFE situation will be dynamic as both military alliances develop new objectives and strategies and design and field forces to implement them.

In a post-CFE Europe, the Soviet Union’s dominant role in most of Eastern Europe will decline significantly and depend primarily on formal adherence to the Warsaw Pact and economic ties. East European countries will also become increasingly independent. This could weaken the military rationale for the Warsaw Pact and precipitate increased East European pressure to reorient the Pact toward more of a political alliance.

Moscow’s East European allies, lacking strong Bloc identity, will probably prefer to establish individual bilateral relations with West European nations. With Soviet military presence and political influence in Eastern Europe reduced, the reliability of the political underpinnings to the current military and economic relationships such as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA will be called into question. Traditional national animosities and historical grievances among the East European countries—already reemerging as the imposed Bloc identity recedes—will worsen in the post-CFE era. If military drawdowns through CFE proceed too quickly—contributing to mounting internal and external pressures for reform—this could lead to social and political unrest in one or more of the East European regimes and result in a regime crackdown that could stall East-West relations.

In contrast, events within the European Community (EC)—notably 1992 market integration and significant progress toward European political cooperation—are bolstering and broadening the West European sense of common purpose and community. As West European countries move away from their dependence on a US-led Atlantic Alliance and toward a more intra-European perspective, they will become increasingly parochial in their security concerns and less prone to take a US view. They may attempt to craft a “Common European House” built to EC rather than Soviet or US specifications. EC member states’ vested interests in an economically strong, politically cohesive EC would prevent the admission of any current CEMA state during the next decade. The Council of Europe is the more likely venue for trans-European policy dialogue and cooperation.

CFE will strengthen widely held perceptions among West Europeans of a diminished threat. In the aftermath of a CFE agreement, there will be an increased number of politically powerful voices in the West calling into question the need for military alliances. But as long as there remains a substantial—even though reduced—US military presence in Europe, however, the broad foundations of NATO will essentially remain intact. Even in countries where anti-nuclear sentiments and pro-arms-control views are strongest, the majority of the public today still favors membership in NATO.

On the economic side, CFE will contribute to a more positive environment for East-West trade, although the continued presence of cumbersome bureaucracies and trade barriers will hinder prospects for significantly increased trade. The East Europeans are anxious to expand economic relationships, singly and in groups, with the European Community. They are unlikely, however, either to increase trade rapidly or to take advantage of technology transfer to offset adverse economic conditions. Some analysts feel that the West European nations are already beginning to
determine what they could do to improve the East European economies and would continue to do so. Most believe, however, that the EC nations, though conscious of East European need for economic assistance and outside investment, now appear unwilling and unable to provide investment or economic assistance in large enough quantities to achieve long-term fundamental changes in the economic relationship. 

Despite some interest on the part of the West Europeans, most believe that they are unlikely to make the massive investment needed to assist East European economies. Individual East European nations will also have to contend with the unified decision apparatus represented by the EC with no counterpart economic coalition to represent their interests. Indeed, CEMA will become increasingly ineffective in the projected environment, as individual East European nations seek to expand their own relations based on economic needs and potential.

The likely effects of CFE on the Soviet Union's economy are less clear. CFE could have enormous implications over time for the Soviet economy, particularly in terms of reduced resources devoted to defense production. Because the Soviet Union spends more than three times more on conventional forces than it does on strategic offensive nuclear forces, a CFE accord offers the potential for much greater resource savings and industrial reorientation than the INF and START agreements combined. Savings can be realized in procurement, force structure, operations and maintenance expenditures, and manpower utilization. Overall, a CFE agreement could allow the Soviets to save up to 15-18 billion rubles per year, or about 15 percent of total investment and operating expenditures. To put such savings into perspective, the amount is almost equal to Soviet investment in the critical machine-building sector and over half the amount invested in housing.

At the same time, problems in the Soviet economy and the requirements of future forces will probably prevent the Soviets from realizing the full economic benefits of CFE. There is considerable doubt about the ability of the Soviets to effectively redistribute resources from defense to civilian uses. Factors inhibiting conversion include reluctance to reorient military research and development programs; difficulties in transferring skilled workers from military industries and absorbing released military manpower into the already inefficient and underemployed Soviet industrial labor pool; and the technical problems involved in converting specialized industrial processes. Moreover, an unknown percentage of these savings, in the early years, would have to be spent on modernization and restructuring stemming from shifts in Soviet strategy and weapons requirements. For example, some Soviet officials have stated that, in keeping with the new defensive doctrine, greater emphasis will be placed on "defensive" weapons. Other modernization and potential increases in the costs of maintaining residual forces at higher levels of readiness—should the Soviets do so—could also cut into the projected savings.
Minutes of the Meeting of the Presidium of the Citizens’ Parliamentary Club

1 August 1989, 8 p.m.


B. Geremek: I will remind you of the things that have taken place within the last few days and hours. I had a meeting with Gen. Kiszczak at 2 p.m. It turns out that, at a Politburo meeting, out of four candidates submitted for the position of prime minister only one is left—Rakowski. Baka and Malinowski have declined. Kiszczak is not willing either, but he thinks it’s his duty. He asked about the position of our Club. The Club decided to vote against [him] or to abstain. Walesa took the position: “I supported Gen. Kiszczak for president of the Polish People’s Republic, I refuse to support him for prime minister.” He asked me to inform the OKP about it.

Kiszczak had a very difficult meeting with the PUWP Club yesterday, when it was deciding about the discipline [in party line bloc] voting. Today only 120 members showed up, which means that 50 have deserted [the PUWP Club].

From the other Clubs the figures are changing. At one point, half of the ZSL and half of SD were against. Today it’s even worse—the whole ZSL is against [him], and from the SD only 4 persons [are in favor of him]. He lacks 80-70 [sic] people to ensure his [Kiszczak’s] election.

Meetings of all three Clubs are going on, debating separately. The leaders have arrived, debates are stormy.

ZSL has come up with a proposal to form a government with the OKP. They think that the opposition should form the government. Bentkowski argues that the ZSL is decidedly against the candidacy of Kiszczak. He has contacts with the PUWP—there is a group of young PUWP parliamentary delegates who would like to meet jointly with [me], B. Geremek. If I meet with them, it would be an attempt to interfere with the coalition. They have to ask for it themselves.

Today it is to be decided whether General Jaruzelski will withdraw the letter proposing Kiszczak [for Prime Minister].

Bentkowski says [ZSL] cannot form a government with the PUWP. They are ready to do it with us.

[ZSL] is asking if we would leave the three main ministries with the PUWP if we were to form a government. This is an indispensable guarantee of a peaceful transfer of power.

When PUWP proposed a coalition with them, ZSL was offered 4 ministries and a vice premier. They were not expecting this from the opposition. They put forward their proposal not for the sake of bargaining, but because there is no other way out of the crisis in the country. If we would recognize this, they [ZSL] would be satisfied with 2 ministries. At 6 p.m. there was a meeting with Orzechowski. Based on that conversation, the situation is at a critical point, the President’s motion is suspended.

On the other hand Bentkowski was still presenting doubts as to whether to enter into coalition with the PUWP. I admitted he was right—we know what cooperation with
the PUWP did to the ZSL. They didn’t perceive it as arrogance. To be sure, after that conversation Jacek Kuron critically summed it up for me: we will take power if PUWP makes better conditions in the country for us.

We have to take into consideration quite unexpected solutions. Our whole Club is opposed, and yet they have to have a majority.

If Kiszczak won’t get through, then [perhaps] another candidate—Sekula. Club meetings are stormy, sharp with mutual accusations. Party leaders are convincing their Clubs to [decide in favor of] the coalition with PUWP.

We may very well dream that this is a parliamentary democracy and that the majority decides. But the dream may be cut off and reality will let us know where we are. We have to see the situation clearly.

J. Kuron: Is it true that the Senate has issued some sort of statement relating to the annulment of the President’s election?

A. Stelmachowski: Such motion has come in from Senator Leszek Piotrowski—I sent it out to the proper commission.

A. Wielowieyski: What is the motive of those 41 PUWP [members] who have not come to the meeting with Kiszczak?

J. Slisz: I spoke with Bak—a peasant, for them a membership card is not important, they want Bronislaw [Geremek]. As far as Bentkowski is concerned, they would like to have Olesiak in the government. Approximately 40 deputies are not going to vote for Kiszczak.

A. Balazs: Bentkowski said that Sekula’s candidacy also won’t get through.

J. Slisz: From a talk with Switka—we would have support of SD deputies.

J. Ambroziak: As of 8 p.m. the information is as follows:

PUWP—12 deputies are against Kiszczak
ZSL—60 deputies are against [Kiszczak]
SD—the whole is in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].
Pax, UChS—in favor [of Kiszczak for Prime Minister].

A. Michnik: Will the Club be in favor of not being involved in it?

J. Slisz: The ZSL was asking if we would be ready to propose a prime minister. We need to think about this.

A. Balazs - If we put forward our candidate for prime minister, the whole ZSL will be for him.

A. Stelmachowski: To sum it up, the situation is as follows:

- some consensus is emerging to vote against Kiszczak.
- are we to vote negatively against each PUWP candidate?
- do we see the possibility of forming our own government with small concessions?

T. Mazowiecki: My position is known to all of you. When I was invited to the Council, I went, putting aside any other considerations. Since the moment I have learned about Kiszczak’s candidacy, I have been trying to form an opinion on this matter.

- I think that the Club’s decision to vote against Kiszczak is not good. I do not share the position of our Chairman, who is sending out this news by telex. SIS 162 communicated this news yesterday evening.

- My political assessment is the following: if such a strong man is being proposed, then the power is being shifted towards the line of the parliament-government. It’s going
to be a strong government, a situation will emerge, which will stabilize the process which has already begun. There is no need for the Club to vote against, it may abstain. I am afraid that the situation with the national list may repeat itself—first we are booming radicals, but then we withdraw. If we are not reaching for power ourselves, we should permit the other side to do it.

- As far as the ZSL proposal is concerned, one ought to remember that the ZSL doesn’t have access to the proper centers of power. I would not bet on this combination. There are other centers of power, which will let themselves be known. We are not at a stage, at which parliamentary relations decide.

I am opposed to Adam’s concept also for the reason that on the opposition-Solidarity side there is no program and within three months that would become dramatically clear.

I think that the most proper position on the question of prime minister is a neutral one. But if we were faced with a situation of the state crisis, then some talks about a great coalition might be possible, but not us in coalition with the ZSL.

I think that the moment is very serious. The public would not tolerate a situation in which first they see advances, and then withdrawals.

A. Celinski: [...] I exclude the possibility of a great coalition.

The nearest option is something that took place in Spain—a government stands somewhere aside, it gains support from the ZSL, part of the Party, our Club can be convinced.

J. M. Rokita: I get the impression that a Kiszczak government, after all, would not be strong in a situation where it wouldn’t have support of a strong majority in the Sejm.

It would be a government in which we would constantly have to be hypocrites. In the long run it would be a trap for us.

Coalition with the ZSL is absurd. It would mean a clash of opinions from the beginning—that reforms are being introduced with a strong power center, the PUWP. Technically such coalition cannot be realized in defiance of the power centers.

In case there is a government of a purely communist coalition, the reforms will be coming from them, they will be throwing them upon us, but they will not strike at the system, as markets would do. They will be lumping together various ideas and we would think there is no other alternative. It will be a consolidation of the system.

It is necessary that we have at least part of the political initiatives. Something that is called a great coalition is a matter of time. It will come, it may be delayed, or accelerated. So, we should not be confusing people.

E. Wende: (to Mazowiecki) Do you take into consideration a situation in which the President will not recommend Kiszczak but Geremek?

T. Mazowiecki: It is possible, but we don’t have such a situation. At this moment there are back-corner talks with the ZSL.

There are two ways out:

A better one—a Kiszczak government, the strongest one from the other side. A big offensive, execution of legal reforms, great stability.

The second one—a great coalition with the PUWP.

A. Balazs: It’s a pity that such a discussion was not held prior to the presidential election. The situation that arose was the fault of both the Presidium and the Club. It would be very unfortunate if it were to repeat itself.
We have no chance for a coalition government, it would be short-lived and tragic for us because of the economic situation and the fact that we don’t have the people. But the opposition certainly has a candidate for prime minister, as people from other parties see it. There are also people on the other side whom we might be able to put forward, e.g. Kwasniewski.

A. Wielowieyski: Two arguments can be added against the coalition:
- We should not be wasting our social capital by entering into a small coalition. I see no gain from it.
- The Big Brother has other methods of conducting politics. Depriving the PUWP of power would be a blow to Gorbachev. The result—a mortal poisoning of our life, impossibility of realizing anything.

It is apparent that we will have to support one government or the other. We must get them to understand that another candidate would get our support. Though Kiszczak is not bad.

[Break]

J. Ziolkowski: We are observing a great acceleration of the political process. *Pacta sunt servanda*—this has been our principle. The fact that Jaruzelski is president is good, it is a stabilizing factor. There is a great weakness of power, a rebellion with the Party itself. There is a dissention within the coalition, the ZSL is bending over backward, in the SD [the situation] must be likewise—as it is improbable to have complete silence after those noisy declarations about a crown in the eagle, etc. There are two possibilities:
- a great coalition-us and the PUWP.
- a small coalition-us, the ZSL and other smaller groups.

One of the elements of the situation is tremendous social impatience. Adam [Michnik] has had a sense of this impatience—[they say] so much is in your hands, and you don’t react.

The new configuration means a strong triumvirate, unusually tight. A strong Kiszczak, about whom there was talk here, is too strong. […]

We have to approach Kiszczak negatively. […] This is a configuration in which we have a minimal possibility of maneuver.

What can we do? Coalition with the ZSL is dangerous, as we cannot steer this process. A small coalition is on their good grace or the lack of it. In the end there are not too many of those contestants.

Only a great coalition is acceptable—a Government of National Salvation.

J. Kuron: That triangle is not a solution under any circumstance. Abstaining from voting—impossible, in any case we would lose the steering wheel, the Club would kick us out through the window.

The first variant: the strikes take off, which will start costing money. Anarchy will follow. Someone will have to bring stability. When a fire bursts, Jaruzelski will call on us to form a government.

With each day our situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Empty shelves are being played out against us, as it was in 1981. And our statements are in the Sejm.
If they [PUWP] are battered in the ZSL, SD—then in which groups do they find support? In the SD they are still trying to steer, but are saying that this cannot go on.

Stabilization is an illusion. If we remain passive, we will lose—then we will have to take it over in a worse situation and with less social confidence [then even currently exists]. As long as we don’t make a decision— we are not going to have a program.

Could it be a government of a great coalition? Initially it was supposed to be such a government: for us two, three ministries. What “Solidarity” has to give social confidence, less likely [perhaps the] possibility of obtaining a moratorium on debts.

The government should be ours, i.e. formed by us. We should vote against all of Kiszczak’s candidates.

H. Wujec: a PUWP government means a continuing crisis, waiting for a change. Now those price increases, people see it clearly. We are delaying solutions.

The only chance is a broadly based Government of National Salvation. It would have to represent a new line, new spirit, have a different social perception. Can we do it? We have to search already for programs, people. We have to keep in mind that everything moves quickly.

J. Slisz: We need to form a government that is a great coalition—in which we should be the dominant force. How do we let the other side know that they should propose letting us have the position of prime minister? The coming 24 hours have to decide.

J. Stelmachowski: I agree with the diagnoses, but I don’t agree with the conclusions. The strategy is to wait until an auspicious moment. If the economic diagnosis is bad, it would be a folly to take over the government until such time as the “Solidarity” is the only way out. If we are expecting a deterioration [of the situation], we should not assume responsibility for it. They are not so weak and it’s not the parliament that decides. We need to be against Kiszczak; a strong PUWP government is not in our interest. It would be ill-perceived abroad—two generals in top positions. It was rightly pointed out as a jamming phenomenon. We should be voting against, but I would not vote against any candidate put forward by the General.

A. Michnik: I have been listening with some surprise to what the Senate Marshal was telling us. It’s something from the area of games, we don’t have time for it. I am afraid that in a little while we will have to leave that parliament, called off by people from the queues.

From my point of view, neither Kiszczak nor anyone else will change anything. This configuration is sentenced to death. Do you know what will be left of the PUWP—only trash will be left. There is a 60 percent probability that our talk is an academic discussion, but if Kiszczak doesn’t get through—I propose Mazowiecki, Stelmachowski and others. We have such an international constellation, a historical moment, when we can catch something. We should not use an argument that there is no program—as no one in the world has that recipe, e.g. what should Russia or Yugoslavia do?

We are doomed for one [program]—a sharp, sudden entrance into the market. To say this a year ago would have been a lot, we need to keep this in mind when we say that something is impossible.

There is no one who would defend a coalition with the ZSL. It’s falling apart. We are not attacking frontally, rather we propose something, e.g. Kwasniewski for vice premier, someone who will pull over the reformist elements.
O. Krzyzanowska: Tomorrow we need to vote almost ostentatiously. Our government will be in a much worse situation, as the Union is inclined to press demands and we will be calling for belt-tightening. If we don’t preserve the ethos of the Union and the opposition—the future election will be lost. Our hands are tied by the Union. Perhaps it will be our prime minister, but not our government.

K. Kozlowski: The situation is difficult, we should speak up strongly against Kiszczak and Sekula. Maybe in the end they will come up with something that will be acceptable and we will abstain from the vote. Perhaps in a few weeks they may desperately seize upon some combination, which will be acceptable. If they cannot come up with anything, then a government of National Salvation will appear to be a solution. If this happens, we will not join into a coalition but we salvage Poland: we then must have prime minister and demand tolerable names. A crisis situation, a Geremek or Lech government. The first thing that our new prime minister would have to do is to talk with the MON. History teaches that invasions, martial laws are threatening when the power structure is falling apart. We are close to this. I don’t know which general, but one of them will do it.

Tomorrow vote against [Kiszczak for prime minister], press ahead, see what can come out of it. Do not reject the option of a tolerable government, [if it is] partly a non-party one. Otherwise, press for hard terms into the government.

E. Wende: If this government fails the country, will there be an economic chance to get out of it? We must clearly say—no, it won’t be better. So, will our prime minister have better or worse chances of rescuing the country?

Z. Kuratowska: We have to vote against. Sekula doesn’t have a chance. We cannot wait any longer. What kind of professionals are they? It’s very hard to find them. Are we supposed to leave the country? The ovation at Powazki was a kind of an opinion poll[!] They were telling Brzezinski—we are ready to wait out this situation if you [the US government] are going to decide.

J. Slisz: In the corridor there are gentlemen from the ZSL and PUWP, they want to come here and talk.

(A brief consultation and the conclusion that this should not be discussed at the meeting. B. Geremek and A. Michnik are going for talks). [Recess]

B. Geremek: According to the latest news the situation is as follows:

- PUWP—12 against [Kiszczak ] (despite party discipline and threats)
- ZSL—21 against SD —?

It looks as though the solution is still that Kiszczak will form the government.

In justifying our position we will argue that we are against the continuation of the present rule. We are not in a position to extend credit to the teams which have been in power so far. We are accepting a diagnosis that under the present international situation our taking over the government is impossible. But potentially we are ready to do it.

A government of a great coalition came out of Jaruzelski’s mouth: “you are coming into our government.” If we are taking over, we form the government, we see in it a place for representatives of different social forces. It is a government formed by the opposition. It is an anti-nomenklatura government. That is how our position can be presented.
We reject a government [of] General Kiszczak plus Solidarity. If there is a chance to form a Government of National Salvation, which would have a chance of gaining public trust. If such a possibility doesn’t exist, then we will perform a controlling function to see that aspirations expressed in the election are met.

T. Mazowiecki: I don’t see a difference between the conceptions of government; from the general point of view each of them is a coalition government.

B. Geremek: It is a government formed by the “S” on the basis of a coalition. We are leaving the undemocratic system and the main problem is the structure of power.

A. Stelmachowski: It is the model that Hitler gave to Hindenburg—he just wanted the ministry of internal affairs and the chancellery.

T. Mazowiecki: This is a government proposed by us, but it still is a great coalition government.

B. Geremek: Lech Wańimsa has two possibilities:
- he will form that government
- or someone else will.

If we would get to the next stage (a 1 percent probability), if the president would talk with us, that is how I would present the proposal of Walesa’s government.

A. Balazs: We need to allow the possibility that they will form a government and wait for their overthrow. Within three months they will be completely finished in terms of propaganda. They are in the ultimate situation. This is a very difficult situation for us, too. We need to find some alternative solution.

B. Geremek: I told Kiszczak that his candidacy is not good, that someone else would be better. He has recognized this argument.

B. Geremek: The motion on an Extraordinary Commission has not passed. It has the backing of half of the ZSL, half of SD and a little in the PUWP, it has a chance of passage.

The following team will be needed: 1. R. Bugaj
2. J. Osiatynski
3. G. Staniszewska
4. the Peasants will fill in
5. the Peasants will fill in
6. K. Dowgallo
7. J. Lopuszanski

M. Rokita: Najder is thanking [us], asking to take care of his dispossession of Polish citizenship.

A. Ballazs: a 10 day vacation break is needed, right now it’s a harvest time.

[Source: Archives of the Bureau of Senate Information and Documentation. Translated by Jan Chowaniec for CWIHP.]
Oskař Fischer. The letter from Comrade Shevardnadze was forwarded by Comrade Gorinovich. He emphasized for concern of the Soviet Union for the further escalation of the campaign against the GDR. Kvitsinsky will speak with Genscher’s representative to cool or sober feelings in the FRG. Fischer told Gorinovich that the article in “Pravda” was indeed good, but the Soviet side has far more possibilities. O. Fischer’s proposal for convening the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states met with misgivings from Gorinovich. That did not materialize too quickly. One must take into consideration the deviating viewpoints in Poland and Hungary as well. Fischer stuck to the proposal, but Shevardnadze’s representative Abkhazov had reservations too. It seems clear that Hungary will be yielding to the pressure from the FRG. Nemes, Pozgay, and Horn are not playing with their cards openly. The Minister of the Interior Horváth views the situation better. A change in the Hungarian position, beginning with the emigration of GDR citizens from September 11, should not be expected.

William Steph. The West wants to continually raise the stakes. Hungary supports this in actuality, particularly with the open borders. That goes against all treaties. The FRG’s campaign also goes against the agreements between Erich Honecker and Kohl. We must present our situation more aggressively to our allies and other countries. . . .

Kurt Hager. Hungary is playing a double game. Their meeting in Bonn is further kept in secret.3 The Hungarian gate remains open. It is therefore necessary that the Warsaw Pact states present our point of view to Hungary. In the long run such a negative position by Hungary does not bode well for friendly discussions between the two of us. What they are doing is a breach in hitherto normal relations. We are faced with the question how we should continue to conduct ourselves with Hungary. That is for me still an open question. But the Hungarian position worsens with respect to us — in favor of Bonn. They will obey the orders of Bonn.

Werner Krölitzkowksi. I am in agreement with the letter by Erich Honecker,4 the newscast declaration, and the other materials. We must continue unwaveringly:
1. The strengthening of the GDR.
2. The strengthening of the alliance system, particularly with the Soviet Union.
3. The expelling of the FRG campaign.

1 Standing in for Edgar Krenz at the session again was Wolfgang Herzog, who took down the minutes.
2 Under the headline “Voice of the Hypocrite.” “Pravda” ran an article by M. Podkrypelnikov. The West German media was made responsible above all for the situation in Hungary. See Neues Deutschland 7. September 1989.
3 In a surprise visit, Hungarian Prime Minister Majol Nemeth and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn came to Bonn for discussions with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. There it was agreed to open the Hungarian border to the West to those GDR citizens wishing to emigrate. See Gyula Horn: Freiheit, die ich meine. Erinnerungen des ungarischen Auswärtigen Minister, der das Eisernen Vorhang Delias (Bonn: Bimberg, 1991), 314 pp.
4 On 5 September Neues Deutschland first published an article by Erich Honecker titled “40 Years of the German Democratic Republic,” which was originally written for the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the SED, “Unity.” See Ender. 1989 Volume 9/90, p. 786.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gorbman Library, 2140 K Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
One must fundamentally assess the entire campaign of the enemy and present it to the Politburo. We should use Shevardnadze's letter as an opportunity to make the first proposals. We must also continue to work with Hungary, so that what is planned does not occur...

[Erich] Mielke, Hungary is betraying socialism. The proposal by Fischer for a meeting of the foreign ministers is very important. It concerns the power relationships in socialism in general. If Hungary continues to proceed with this, we are risking Hungary becoming a transit country. We must however support our comrades in Hungary too. We provide our comrades with theoretical articles, which are read and studied. What matters though is to clarify on the practical questions in the spirit of these good, theoretical articles...

Translated by Christian Hetzner
The National Security Archive
Letter from GDR Ambassador to Hungary, Gerd Vehres, to Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer dated 10 September 1989

Dear Comrade Minister:

In addition to my CT 385 from September 10, I would like to inform you of some further aspects of my conversation with Comrade [Redacted] Nyers.

After I had given an initial position on the decision by the Hungarian government and the following recognition by the Party Presidium, Comrade Nyers replied:

1. Comrade Nyers does not wish the events named to be viewed in the GDR as an anti-GDR campaign.

2. Comrade Nyers believes that a great part of the original problem was caused by the sudden opening of the border with Austria. This fact strengthened the existing intentions among a number of GDR tourists to illegally leave the country. The quickly increasing number of people willing to leave under these existing circumstances makes it impossible to convince such a huge number of people by words or declarations. Were the Hungarian organs to have been placed deep in the affair, that is, in the situation themselves, there would be many large conflicts being started, undesired by both Hungary and the GDR.

The political victim in this case is only the FRG. Comrade Nyers expressed his conviction that in the future the Hungarian side must deal with us on a more mutual level. He believes that the present wave of emigration is unique and that later will start to abate, and consequently the problem will become manageable. Related to this, he emphasized once again that the Hungarian decision is only a temporary measure, valid for just a short time. Afterwards the Hungarians will again apply our existing bilateral agreement.

Comrade Nyers stated that the Hungarian leadership had examined up until last month whether the Berlin Formula would make a solution possible. “We wanted very much to proceed, but unfortunately had to find out that with such a number of people willing to leave the country under these concrete conditions in Hungary, success is unfortunately not a possibility.”

In judging the Hungarian actions one must observe that “Hungary is in a dilemma, we have fallen into a political trap.” Hungary could not choose between good and bad, but rather between only bad and worse (I refrained from remarking that with that statement, the GDR is the lesser evil). Comrade Nyers lastly referred to the exceptional nature of the present situation, namely that it was now rushed into a defensive position politically, and he can only hope that it will once again be able to go back on the offensive...

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gillingham Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037

1 Oskar Fischer (letter relayed the letter to Géza Némessy and then to all members and candidate members of the SED-Politbüro as well on the 11 September 1989.)
Thus far, the course of today’s discussion in the Central Committee of the HSWP permits me to draw attention to still some further things in connection with the entire event....

2. In spite of the verbally declared willingness on behalf of the Hungarians to solve the problem facing the GDR, the discussions with the GDR (Foreign Minister, Head of the Consular Affairs Department, MIS, DRK) represent an attempt at stalling and deliberately misleading the GDR. The Hungarian organs undertook no serious attempts of their own to persuade those GDR citizens wishing to emigrate to return to the GDR. The efforts by our embassy’s consular section to contact the GDR citizens in these [refugee] camps and explain the GDR’s point of view, were both delayed and impeded. Simultaneously the Hungarian media provoked and supported a campaign directed against the GDR, which, upon seeing it, encouraged the GDR citizens staying in the camps. Battle groups, which were temporarily placed at the border as reinforcements, were defamed by opposition groups, anti-socialist forces, and the majority of the press.

3. The campaign is judged at the same time to be a coordinated and successful attempt by imperialist states, in particular the FRG, to take advantage of the political and economic position of the HPR to exert pressure on the Hungarian leadership to solve the problem of those GDR citizens wishing to leave with the aim of looking out after all Germans. The imperialist policy of discriminating was here consciously directed to foil, via purposeful insertion of extensive economic means into Hungary, the already initiated solutions in accordance with the Berlin formula for the FRG representation in Berlin and Prague with regard to the HPR. With the massive scale of the migration [Ausschleusung] of thousands of GDR citizens, a socialist country will establish a publicly-effective precedent supporting the FRG position, which is not in favor of international laws. That follows the initiated process of expelling Hungary from the socialist state community.

Characteristic for the preparation and implementation of the [Ausschleusung] was that the FRG always more openly and directly conducted the maintenance and care of the camp “the consular responsibility for GDR citizens” and the deliberate preparation of the [Ausschleusung] campaign. The Hungarian organs tolerated and covered up these acts by the FRG.

Translated by Christian Hetzner
The National Security Archive

7 Ministry for State Security, or Stasi, and the [East] German Red Cross, respectively.
NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: United States Relations with the Soviet Union

For forty years the United States has committed its power and will to containing the military and ideological threat of Soviet communism. Containment was never an end in itself; it was a strategy born of the conditions of the postwar world. The United States recognized that, while Soviet military power was not the only threat to international stability, it was the most immediate and grave one. The U.S. challenge was to prevent the spread of Soviet communism while rebuilding the economic, political, and social strength of the world's long-standing and new democracies. Those who crafted the strategy of Containment also believed that the Soviet Union, denied the course of external expansion, would ultimately have to face and react to the internal contradictions of its own inefficient, repressive, and inhumane system.

This strategy provided an enduring pillar for the growth of Western democracy and free enterprise. While the most important goal of containment has been met -- the development of free and prosperous societies in Western Europe and in other parts of the world -- the Soviet military threat has not diminished. Rather, in the last two decades, the Soviet Union has increased its...
military power across the spectrum of capabilities, drawing on that power to exacerbate local conflicts and to conduct a global foreign policy opposed to Western interests. The Soviet Union has stood apart from the international order and often worked to undermine it.

The character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union leads to the possibility that a new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move beyond containment to a U.S. posture that actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the existing international system. The U.S.S.R. has indicated an interest in rapprochement with the international order and criticized major tenets of its own postwar political-military policy.

These are words that we can only applaud. But a new relationship with the international system can not simply be declared by Moscow. Nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned through the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and reinforced by behavior consistent with the principles of world order to which the Soviet Union subscribed in 1945 but has repeatedly violated since. The Soviet Union cannot enjoy the fruits of membership in the community of states while holding ideological principles and engaging in conduct that promote the overthrow of that community.

The transformation of the Soviet Union from a source of instability to a productive force within the family of nations is a long-term goal that can only be pursued from a position of American strength and with patience and creativity. Our policy is not designed to help a particular leader or set of leaders in the Soviet Union. We seek, instead, fundamental alterations in Soviet military force structure, institutions, and practices which can only be reversed at great cost, economically and politically, to the Soviet Union. If we succeed, the ground for cooperation will widen, while that for conflict narrows. The U.S.-Soviet relationship may still be fundamentally competitive, but it will be less militarized and safer.

We are in a period of transition and uncertainty. We will not react to reforms and changes in the Soviet Union that have not yet taken place, nor will we respond to every Soviet initiative. We will be vigilant, recognizing that the Soviet Union is still governed by authoritarian methods and that its powerful armed forces remain a threat to our security and that of our allies. But the United States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue and institution by institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that the Soviet leadership itself has enunciated. Moscow will find the United States a willing partner in building a better relationship. The foundation of that relationship will grow firmer if Soviet reforms lead to conditions that will support a new cooperative relationship between Moscow and the West. Those conditions would be:

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Deployment of a Soviet force posture that is smaller and much less threatening. The United States believes that the Soviet Union has legitimate security interests but Soviet military power is far greater than that needed to defend those interests.

Renunciation of the principle that class conflict is a source of international tension and establishment of a record of conduct consistent with that pledge.

Adherence to the obligation that it undertook at the end of World War II to permit self-determination for the countries of East-Central Europe. Moscow must authoritatively renounce the "Brezhnev Doctrine" and reaffirm the pledge of signatories to the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

Demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in other regions of the world and serious participation in efforts to ameliorate conflict, including bringing pressure to bear on Soviet clients who do not recognize the legitimate security interests of their neighbors.

Participation in cooperative efforts to stop the proliferation of ballistic missile technology as well as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Willingness to cooperate with the United States to address pressing global problems, including the international trade in drugs and narcotics, terrorism, and dangers to the environment.

Institutionalization of democratic internal laws and human rights practices, political pluralism, and a more market-oriented economic structure, which will establish a firm Soviet domestic base for a more productive and cooperative relationship with the free nations of the world.

Strategic-Military Objectives

The United States must maintain modern military forces that strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of our allies and friends. The United States will seek to protect and sustain its military-technological advantages. The purpose of our forces is not to put pressure on a weak Soviet economy or to seek military superiority. Rather, U.S. policy recognizes the need to provide a hedge against uncertain long-term developments in the Soviet Union and to impress upon the Soviet leadership the wisdom of pursuing a responsible course. Moscow must be convinced that nothing can be gained by turning back to a more militaristic approach.
policy. Most importantly, American forces are a reliable and credible guarantee of our safety and of our commitment to the security of our allies in the face of Soviet forces that, even if restructured, will be large and modern.

At the same time, the United States will seek verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. Arms control is not an end in itself and cannot take the place of robust military forces. The United States Government will ensure that our arms control proposals are consistent with our overall defense strategy. We seek agreements that:

Contribute to stability at lower numerical levels, where desirable, and encourage restructuring of Soviet forces to a less threatening force posture.

Emphasize transparency in our military relationship with the Soviet Union. The goal of greater transparency will be served through verification and confidence building measures, including increased contacts between the military officers of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the problem of ballistic missile proliferation are increasingly threatening to our security.

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Lead an interagency effort, in coordination with the review of U.S. proliferation policy, to develop a detailed plan for non-proliferation cooperation with the Soviet Union, including the boundaries of such cooperation.

**Political-Diplomatic Objectives**

**Regional Issues**

U.S. policy will encourage fundamental political and economic reform, including freely contested elections, in East-Central Europe, so that states in that region may once again be productive members of a prosperous, peaceful, and democratic Europe, whole and free from fear of Soviet intervention. Our policy of differentiating among East European states based on their internal political and economic processes, and our support for the CEEC process, will help in the achievement of this goal.

We will engage the Soviet Union on a variety of regional issues not only to seek their resolution, but also in order to test the reality of new Soviet thinking and whether Soviet behavior matches rhetoric in key areas around the world. We also shall seek to limit the expansion of Soviet power through arms...
transfers, force projection, and proxy forces by continued U.S. political, economic and military support for friends and allies, and for freedom fighters. (x)

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Consider the most appropriate ways to engage the Soviets in discussions on resolving regional conflicts and eliminating threatening soviet positions of influence around the world. (x)

Transnational

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in reversing the spread of drugs and narcotics. The United States must challenge the Soviet Union to refrain from directly or indirectly supporting or training terrorists and insist that its allies do the same. (x)

I direct the Secretary of State to:

Lead an interagency effort to develop a detailed plan for cooperating with the Soviet Union on these matters, including the boundaries of such cooperation given security and intelligence constraints. (x)

I also direct the Secretary of State to:

Examine ways in which the Soviet Union and the United States might cooperate on environmental issues. (x)

The Vice President should:

Explore through the National Space Council ways that the United States and the Soviet Union might jointly use space to advance our mutual interests. A particularly promising area might be research on the environment in support of multilateral efforts to protect our planet. (x)

Bilateral Issues

We will encourage an expansion of contacts between the Soviet and American peoples at all levels as a means of promoting Western ideas of democracy and free enterprise. We will insist on full reciprocity in all areas of bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union and in the treatment of U.S. and Soviet official representatives. (x)

The United States supports the expansion of mutually beneficial non-strategic trade on strictly commercial terms. At the same time, our economic policy toward Moscow must be considered within the context of our overall approach to the Soviet Union. In the short run, we are prepared to streamline, in conjunction with our allies, the COCOM list. In the longer run, as the Soviet Union meets appropriate political and economic criteria, the United States will remove or reduce the legislative, administrative and other obstacles to non-
strategic trade and normal commercial and financial ties. The U.S. private sector would then have wider opportunities to pursue expanded commercial relations with the Soviet Union, except where COCOM controls on strategic trade remain in place. Increased cooperation will be revocable in the event of a reversal in Soviet policy. (X)

The Secretary of State, drawing on other departments and agencies, is directed to:

Encourage public debate on Jackson-Vanik and consult closely with Congress and the relevant public groups. With the requisite support, we will ensure that the Senate approves the Jackson-Vanik amendment if the Soviet Union codifies emigration laws that meet international standards and demonstrates its intent to implement them faithfully. (X)

**Democratization**

The United States is encouraged by emerging trends in the internal political processes in the Soviet Union. Our concern about the character of the Soviet system, which denies its people basic political and economic liberties and pursues a policy of expansion abroad, is at the heart of our differences with Moscow. Let no one doubt the sincerity of the American people and their government in our desire to see reform succeed inside the Soviet Union. We welcome the positive changes that have taken place and we will continue to encourage greater recognition of human rights, market incentives, and free elections. To the extent that Soviet practices are modified and institutions are built based on popular will, we may find that the nature of the threat itself has changed, though any such transformation could take decades. (X)

Where possible, the United States should promote Western values and ideas within the Soviet Union, not in the spirit of provocation or destabilization, but as a means to lay a firm foundation for a cooperative relationship. I direct the United States Information Agency, within budgetary limitations, to find new ways to promote the flow of information about American institutions and ideals to the Soviet Union. A special effort should be made to encourage private sector initiatives in support of this objective. (X)

The Secretary of State is directed to:

Review carefully Soviet compliance with the commitments that led to our conditional agreement to attend the 1991 Moscow human rights conference.

Develop new initiatives in the area of U.S.-Soviet exchanges designed to promote Soviet understanding of the rule of law, free-market economic principles, U.S. business management concepts, and other principles of free Western societies. (X)
Public Diplomacy

The United States should make every effort clearly and responsibly to communicate our message about U.S.-Soviet relations at home and abroad. Our goal is a consistent, responsible and sustainable policy toward Moscow. We must stress the comprehensiveness of our agenda as well as the fact that the relationship is moving forward on the basis of long-supported Western objectives to which the Soviet Union is now adapting.

Conclusion

The goal of restructuring the relationship of the Soviet Union to the international system is an ambitious task. The responsibility for creating the conditions to move beyond containment to integrate the Soviet Union into the family of nations lies first and foremost with Moscow. But the United States will do its part, together with our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while maintaining our strength, to work to place Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more cooperative course than has heretofore been possible. (U)
Thatcher. [...] I know that it is not easy to carry out a political reform. You began to implement the reform from the above, and it would be impossible otherwise. Here, as I understand, you are in full control of the situation. But to carry out an economic reform is even more difficult, I know this from my own experience. [...] You have now reached the stage where every new step is more difficult than the previous one. It is important for people to see results, even though it is a politically ungratifying task. For instance, I had to wait for two years before the first results. All this time I was criticized, and when the success came, it was received as something natural, and nobody thanked me. How much time would you need to get the first results? Two years or less? [...]"

 [...] Thatcher. But you need to teach the people to live day by day, not on future credits.

Gorbachev. We are teaching, teaching with life.

If you add to what we have just said the fact that these processes are unfolding in the country with 120 nationalities and ethnicities, you can imagine what a tight knot all the problems present together. As you know, the Plenum of the CC CPSU that has just ended, analyzed the issues of inter-ethnic relations in depth. The Plenum’s resolutions are very important. Their essence is to balance the nationalities policy, to rejuvenate the Soviet federation and to fill it with a real meaning. I will tell you honestly, so far our state was considered federal only formally, and in reality everything worked like in a typical unitary state - from the top to the bottom. The decisions of this Plenum are supposed to change that, to create mechanisms which in practice would help to remove the tensions from the inter-ethnic relations without interfering with basic interests of individuals, of the nationalities, and of the society in the economic, cultural, and other spheres. Otherwise, the inter-ethnic tensions could bury perestroika. This is how the issue stands now.

I would also like to state openly the following thought. Sometimes I hear, even here in the West, why do we have to open up so many fronts simultaneously? But how can you reform the economy without a reform of the political system? It will not work. And we already have the sad experiences with Khushchev, and Kosygin with Brezhnev. How can you reform both the economy and the politics without democratization of the society, without glasnost, which incorporate individuals into an active socio-political life? It will not work either. How can you make progress and form healthy inter-ethnic relations separately from the economic, political, and democratic reforms in the society as a whole? How can you carry out perestroika itself without rejuvenating the party?

All these issues are inseparably linked, and that is why we are saying that perestroika is not just a reform, it is a genuine revolution, our second socialist revolution. And we are making great efforts to carry it out.

 [...] Thatcher. I would like to raise the issue of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe. I was very impressed by the courage and patriotism of General Jaruzelski in Poland. Of course, for you, the future of Poland and its alliance with you have a big
significance. I noted that you calmly accepted the results of the elections in Poland, and, in general, the processes in that country and in other East European countries. I understand your position in the following way: you are in favor of each country choosing its own road of development as long as the Warsaw Treaty is intact. I perfectly understand this position.

Now I would like to say something in a very confidential manner, and I would ask you not to record this part of the conversation.

Gorbachev. As you would like.

(The following part of the conversation is recorded from recollections)

Thatcher. We are very concerned with the processes that are underway in East Germany. It is on the verge of big changes, which are caused by the situation in the society and to some extent by Erich Honecker's illness. The thousands of people who escape from the GDR to the FRG are the primary example. All that is the external side of things, and it is important for us, but another issue is even more important.

Britain and Western Europe are not interested in the unification of Germany. The words written in the NATO communiqué may sound different, but disregard them. We do not want the unification of Germany. It would lead to changes in the post-war borders, and we cannot allow that because such a development would undermine the stability of the entire international situation, and could lead to threats to our security.

We are not interested in the denazification of Eastern Europe or the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty either. Of course, the internal changes are ripe in all the countries of Eastern Europe, but in some countries they are more pronounced, in some countries not yet. However, we are in favor of those processes remaining strictly internal, we will not interfere in them and spur the decomunization of Eastern Europe. I can tell you that this is also the position of the U.S. President. He sent a telegram to me in Tokyo, in which he asked me to tell you that the United States would not undertake anything that could threaten the security interests of the Soviet Union, or that could be perceived by the Soviet society as a threat. I am fulfilling his request.

Gorbachev. Thank you for the information. In general, you formulated our position correctly. We think that the socialist countries should make their own decisions about their internal affairs, they should be able to choose which road and which tempo to take in the implementation of their socialist choice. We do not want to, and we will not, interfere in these processes, but, of course, we were helping, and we will be helping our friends and allies.

As far as Erich Honecker's health is concerned, he is planning to participate in all the events commemorating the 40th anniversary of the GDR. I can inform you that I am planning to visit the GDR on the 6th and 7th of October for the celebration of the anniversary.

Thatcher. Thank you.

The confidential part of my talk is over, now you can resume recording.