Memorandum

Status of Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals
Information available as of 1 September 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. The Memorandum was coordinated with representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency; coordination was chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces.
Status of Soviet
Unilateral Withdrawals

• Soviet reductions in Eastern Europe are proceeding in a manner consistent with Gorbachev's commitment; they will result in a significant reduction in the combat capability of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

• Current Soviet activities comprise four simultaneous processes: withdrawal, reduction, restructuring, and modernization.

• In Eastern Europe the Soviets, at roughly halfway through the period, have withdrawn about 50 percent of the equipment and units promised. Percentages are much lower for reductions in the overall Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone and for east of the Urals.

• Soviet restructuring and modernization activities will produce a smaller, more versatile, standing force optimized for defense, but still capable of smaller scale offensive operations.

This information is Secret-National.

305
Discussion

This paper presents the latest assessment of the ongoing unilateral Soviet withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe and reductions in the so-called Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) zone. It provides the latest figures of forces withdrawn and reduced, the current understanding of the restructuring of the forces remaining, and the best estimates of the factors affecting the combat capabilities and potential missions of those residual forces.

We have reached two bottom-line judgments. First, we believe that the Soviet withdrawal is real and that it will result in a reduction in the combat capability of the remaining Soviet forces in Eastern Europe; second, of all the changes we are seeing, and those we anticipate, are consistent with our understanding of General Secretary Gorbachev’s policy objectives—reducing Western perceptions of the Warsaw Pact threat, inducing a relaxation in NATO’s defense efforts, achieving an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and lowering the defense economic burden on the USSR.

Although “withdrawal” or “reduction” are the terms generally associated with the current Soviet activity, there are actually four processes occurring simultaneously: first, a withdrawal of Soviet units and equipment from the traditional “forward areas” in Eastern Europe; second, a reduction in the overall Soviet force posture, with a particular emphasis on those areas facing NATO; third, a restructuring of the remaining forces intended to bring their capabilities into line with anticipated missions, objectives, and conditions; and, fourth, a continuation of programmatic modernization intended to raise the combat effectiveness of Soviet forces. All of this activity is totally unilateral. The Soviets are under no formal obligation to carry through and are free to adjust the process as they proceed. Nevertheless, Gorbachev has a strong interest in demonstrating that he is fulfilling his promises.

In assessing what is going on, the best place to start is with the dramatic 7 December 1988 speech at the UN by Gorbachev. He made the following key statements of Soviet intentions, that over the next two years the Soviets would:

- **Reduce** the overall size of their armed forces by 500,000 personnel
- **Reduce** the size of their forces in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by 50,000 persons and 5,000 tanks. This was later increased to 5,300 tanks with the inclusion of reductions in Soviet forces in Poland.
- **Reduce** 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft from Eastern Europe and the Western USSR (the ATTU zone)
- **Withdraw and disband** six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary
- **Withdraw** assault landing formations and units and assault river crossing forces.
- **Restructure** the remaining forces to present an "unambiguously defensive" posture

He made additional promises concerning Asia.

Gorbachev’s speech was met with many questions and much skepticism in the West. Between late December and late February, official Soviet spokesmen asserted that the six Soviet divisions to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe would be withdrawn in their entirety, that all of their combat equipment would be destroyed, and that the other tanks removed from Eastern Europe would be destroyed or converted.
As the withdrawals and restructuring have progressed, it has become increasingly clear that, although the Soviets are generally moving toward meeting Gorbachev’s initial commitments, they are not being implemented in the manner described by some subsequent spokesmen. The tank regiments, other units, and all of the tanks of the three divisions scheduled for removal in 1989 have been withdrawn, along with many tanks from other divisions. Other units—and almost all of the artillery and armored troop carriers—however—are being used in the restructuring of the remaining divisions, each of which is losing two battalions of tanks as one tank regiment is converted to a motorized rifle regiment. Moreover, the tanks being removed from Eastern Europe are not being destroyed.

The Soviets are beginning to acknowledge deviations from some of their statements, but they have still not been entirely forthcoming about some of the consequences, notably:

- That the artillery in the remaining divisions is being increased by the addition of one artillery battalion in tank divisions and that artillery battalions in divisions are being expanded from 18 to 24 guns.
- That the restructuring of the remaining divisions may eventually require the introduction of some 2,000 additional armored troop carriers.

Most of what the Soviets are doing makes military sense. Indeed, it is generally what we would have expected until the Soviets began making additional statements. Despite these deviations, the overall result will still be a very significant reduction in the offensive combat power of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

How close have the Soviets come to meeting Gorbachev’s 7 December promises as we approach the midway point? Tables 1-3 illustrate our answer. Table 1 provides the scorecard for forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Column one gives the reportable items; column two, the total number of those items in that area as of 1 January 1989; column three, the specific reductions announced for each of the items; column four, the reductions the Soviets have announced as of 1 August 1989; column five, our assessment of reductions as of 1 September 1989; and, finally, column six provides the percentage that our assessment represents of the total announced reduction. At halfway through the period, the percentages are in the neighborhood of 50 percent complete. We believe that up to 2,800 tanks; 180 combat aircraft; four air assault units; and two assault crossing units have been withdrawn; and three tank divisions have been removed from the force structure. No percentage is offered for artillery because no specific withdrawal of artillery from the forward area was promised in Gorbachev’s speech.

Turning to table 2, we see a similar picture, although the percentages are somewhat reduced. For example, we have not detected that the Soviets have reduced the total number of tanks in the ATTU zone to the same degree that they have withdrawn the promised number of tanks from Eastern Europe. Finally, table 3 provides a picture of the status of the reductions from east of the Ural community. Overall, the Soviets, within the limits of our ability to observe and assess, seem to be proceeding with the unilateral withdrawals as outlined by Gorbachev.

Questions have arisen concerning the spirit and letter of their promise. Are they doing what they promised? Is the force size really changing? Even if it is, are the residual Soviet forces more capable? In short, is there less here than meets the eye?

Let us look at the tank issue first. Following Gorbachev’s 7 December speech, statements by Soviet officials indicated that most or all of the of the 5,300 tanks to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe would be destroyed and that most of the 4,700 others to be reduced in the western USSR would be converted to civilian use. Some subsequent statements have indicated that tanks would also be placed in storage or used to upgrade units. The inconsistency and ambiguity of these statements make it difficult to determine how many tanks the Soviets now intend to dismantle or destroy, but virtually all of them will be older models from within the USSR and not the relatively more modern tanks being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Moreover, some evidence indicates that Moscow is planning to store a significant number of the tanks removed from units in the ATTU zone east of
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total in USSR</th>
<th>Announced Withdrawals</th>
<th>Withdrawals Claimed</th>
<th>Assessed Withdrawals</th>
<th>Percent of Announced Withdrawals Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(as of 1 January 1988)</td>
<td>(as of 1 August 1989)</td>
<td>(as of 1 September 1989)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Armored Divisions</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Armored Divisions</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51 to 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>56 to 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery/Others</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery/Others</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>31,800</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table includes forces the Soviets are removing from Eastern Europe. It does not include the disposition of those forces in the Soviet Union.

- Aircraft totals are as of 1 January 1988.
- Major elements of the 25th Tank Division (TD) and 32nd Guards Tank Division (GTD)—including all tanks and the air defense regiment, reconnaissance battalion, and multiple rocket launcher battalion from each division—have departed from East Germany. Both divisions transferred their motorized rifle regiments to another division, but a tank regiment from these divisions was removed in their place. Most of the artillery and virtually all motorized rifle elements from the 25th TD and 32nd GTD probably have been retained in East Germany to facilitate the restructuring of the remaining Ground Forces units.
- Major elements—and perhaps all—of the 13th Guards Tank Division have departed from their garrison in Hungary. Only tanks from the division, however, have been identified at bases in the USSR.
- Some Soviet spokesmen have indicated that from 2,700 to 3,100 tanks are being or have been withdrawn from abroad. In each instance, their statements may include tanks removed from Eastern Europe and Mongolia. Most recently, another Soviet spokesman stated that some 2,700 tanks had departed from Eastern Europe.
- Tanks from as many as five maneuver regiments and a tank training regiment may have departed from Hungary.
- This total is for all Soviet artillery 100 mm and above, including mortars, multiple rocket launchers, and anti-tank guns.
- Soviet spokesmen have stated that from 690 to 700 “guns” or artillery pieces have been withdrawn from “abroad.” Their statements either specifically or probably include artillery removed from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.
- Because of force reconstruction requirements, mortars—perhaps self-propelled artillery pieces probably remain in Eastern Europe.
- Some BM-21 multiple rocket launchers were observed on railcars and apparently departed from East Germany.
- This table excludes helicopters and VUKS.
- Soviet spokesmen have stated that from 360 to 321 combat aircraft will be removed from Eastern Europe.
- Soviet spokesmen have stated that from 120 to 162 combat aircraft have been withdrawn from abroad. Their statements either specifically or probably include aircraft removed from Eastern Europe and Mongolia.
- In addition to the four air assault battalions apparently removed from Eastern Europe, the air assault brigade at Czernik in East Germany is in the process of withdrawing and probably has been eliminated from the structure of the Western Group of Forces.
- Some assets from withdrawn air assault battalions apparently have been reassigned to units remaining in East Germany.
- Soviet spokesmen have stated that 11,800 personnel have been withdrawn from abroad. Their statements probably include personnel removed from Eastern Europe and Mongolia. One spokesman said that 11,400 men had departed from East Germany.

Best of our knowledge, the Soviets are taking the opportunity created by this withdrawal to retain their most modern equipment in their residual forces. Thus, in East Germany, the residual force will be entirely equipped with T-80s. The withdrawn T-64s replace T-10s, T-55s, T-54s, and the oldest T-64s that had the Urals. There is also evidence that the Soviets will upgrade divisions in the USSR, including those in the ATTU zone, with more modern tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

In general, we believe that tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe are replacing older tanks that had been in cadre units or storage in the USSR. To the
Table 2
Soviet Force Reductions in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total in the Force (as of 1 January 1989)</th>
<th>Announced Reductions (to be implemented by 1 January 1991)</th>
<th>Assessed Reductions (as of September 1989)</th>
<th>Percent of Announced Reductions Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ground Forces divisions</strong></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>Up to 50% percent</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>52,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>2,424,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table includes equipment apparently removed from the force but much of which remains unaccounted for.

** Soviet spokesmen have stated that as many as half of Soviet Ground Forces divisions will be eliminated.

*** This total includes those divisions that have physically disbanded or deactivated to mobilization bases (2nd TOE divisions). An additional six divisions apparently are in the process of disbanning or deactivating.

† Some 3,700 to 3,800 tanks have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe (see Table 1, footnote 9). Most of these are T-64s, which have been accounted for in units or bases in the USSR. Some, 1,600 additional tanks—mostly T-72s and T-55s—were removed from army corps or divisions deactivating or disbanning in the western Soviet Union. Most of these tanks remain unaccounted for.

** This total includes antitank guns in units and artillery pieces stored in depots.

‡ Some aircraft have been removed from active units. A senior Soviet officer has indicated that some of these aircraft will be scrapped, some used for training or as flying targets, and some mothballed. To date, no scrapping has been confirmed.

† This total includes 1,309,000 in the Ground Forces; 358,000 in the Air Defense Forces; 263,000 in the Air Forces; 380,000 in the Navy; and 214,000 in the Strategic Rocket Forces. It does not include construction and railroad troops or civil defense and internal security forces.

been held for many years in cadre units or in long-term depot storage in the interior of the Soviet Union and east of the Urals.

What does this mean for Soviet capabilities? There has been no net increase in the number of T-72 and T-80 tanks in the forward area, and only modest increases are anticipated in the next few years. Therefore, the overall number of "most modern tanks" is not affected by the restructuring. In fact, the net number of tanks is being reduced by a significant number of older, yet fully capable T-64 tanks. Whereas the Soviets had 30 divisions with 120 maneuver regiments before the withdrawal began, after the withdrawals are concluded they will have 24 divisions with 96 maneuver regiments.

The manner in which the Soviets are carrying out their restructuring has, however, provoked serious questions that have not yet been answered. Clearly, although they have adhered to their promise to withdraw tanks and have removed three divisions from their force structure in Eastern Europe, equipment other than tanks from those units is being used to modernize and expand the equipment holdings of the remaining divisions.

The inconsistency of certain features of the reduction and restructuring programs with some Soviet descriptions of these activities probably reflects adjustments made by the General Staff as the programs have...
Table 3
Soviet Force Reductions East of the Ural.s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Forces army corps</th>
<th>Total Deployed (4s of 1 January 1989)</th>
<th>Announced Reductions (To be implemented by 1 January 1992)</th>
<th>Assessed Reductions (4s of 1 September 1992)</th>
<th>Percent of Announced Reductions Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground Forces divisions</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15 divisions in &quot;eastern&quot; USSR. 1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13 to 33% for divisions in &quot;eastern&quot; USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>15 regiments in &quot;eastern&quot; USSR. 1</td>
<td>115 aircraft 1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>967,000</td>
<td>250,000 k</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This table includes equipment apparently removed from the force but most of which remains unaccounted for.
2 Aircraft totals are as of 1 January 1988.
3 This total includes army corps headquarters that have been disbanded along with their divisional units. The divisions, however, remain in the figures for divisions. Additional army corps may exist. Additional army corps may be deactivated.
4 The Soviets have announced that 15 divisions will be eliminated in the "eastern" USSR. They have not specified how many of these divisions or what areas they are to be eliminated. A 15 division in the "southern" USSR. The Soviets have not specified which other regiments are to be eliminated. The number of aircraft to be reduced is not clear. The percentage of the total is of the total they plan to eliminate.
5 This total includes 491,000 in the Ground Forces, 157,000 in the Air Defense Forces, 94,000 in the Air Forces, 110,000 in the Navy, and 103,000 in the Strategic Rocket Forces. It does not include construction or railroad troops or civil defense and internal security forces.
6 This total includes 200,000 in the "eastern" USSR and 60,000 for the "southern" USSR. The latter probably being servicemen withdrawn from Afghanistan.

evolved. With the withdrawal program originally having been imposed from above, the General Staff probably has been given considerable flexibility in organizing remaining Soviet forces within the constraints imposed by "defensive" restructuring.

The character of the restructured residual forces, therefore, is a major question. To discuss that force, however, requires some explanation of the overall Soviet motivation for the process. We believe that the ongoing unilateral reductions and restructuring are intended largely to foster a perception of reduced threat in the West and to maintain the momentum toward a CFE agreement that would allow Gorbachev to reduce his forces further, reap potential economic benefits, and simultaneously reduce NATO force capability. We believe the Soviets remain committed to this end game and will not jeopardize it in an effort to obtain short-term military advantages that almost certainly would be quickly discovered by the West.

Gorbachev’s economic agenda is an overriding consideration as we assess the scope of the Soviet’s reductions and withdrawals. But what of the restructuring and modernization? As long ago as the middle to late 1970s, the Soviets recognized that the type of war that would probably be fought in Central Europe had
Key Statements on Soviet Tank Reductions

**22 December 1988**  
Major General Lebedev of the Soviet General Staff states that entire units with their materiel will be withdrawn from Eastern Europe. The units will be disbanded, and much of their equipment—including the latest model tanks—will be scrapped. Tank engines and auxiliary equipment will be turned over to the civilian economy. (Lebedev’s statement was referring specifically to the tanks in the six divisions to be withdrawn; however, the context of his remarks indicate he may have been referring to all tank units removed from Eastern Europe.)

**16 January 1989**  
Marshal Akhromeyev states that six tank divisions will be withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In addition, 3,300 tanks will be removed from Soviet motorized rifle divisions and other units in Eastern Europe. All 5,000 tanks to be withdrawn will be destroyed, and most of the tanks to be reduced west of the Urals will be dismantled.

**17 January 1989**  
Marshal Kulikov asserts that “withdrawn forces” will not be stationed in the western military districts, although some would be stationed east of the Urals.

**18 January 1989**  
General Secretary Gorbachev announces that half of the 10,000 tanks will be destroyed and half will be converted to civil use.

**24 January 1989**  
Deputy Foreign Minister Karpov says that, of the 10,000 tanks to be reduced, half would be scrapped and the other half converted to civil or training use. The reduction involved 5,300 of the “most modern” tanks and, of these, 3,300 would be from divisions remaining in Eastern Europe. The 2,000 tanks in the six tank divisions withdrawn from Eastern Europe would be “dismantled.”

**17 April 1989**  
Army General Smetnov, commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, states that the tanks removed from the GDR will be sent beyond the Urals; some will be “mothballed” and some modified for use in the national economy.

**5 May 1989**  
Lieutenant General Fursin, Chief of Staff of Soviet forces in East Germany, announces that 1,000 tanks are already beyond the Urals, where they will be turned into bulldozers.

**12 May 1989**  
Colonel General Chernov of the Soviet General Staff states that, of the 10,000 tanks to be eliminated, 5,000 will be destroyed and 5,000 will be used as towing vehicles or targets for firing practice.

**19 May 1989**  
Soviet General Staff Chief Moiseyev says that Moscow reserves the option to retain rather than destroy equipment withdrawn from Eastern Europe.

**23 May 1989**  
General Markelev, Chief of the General Staff Press Center, announces that older, wornout tanks will be smelted, and that newer tanks will be remodeled to serve as tractors for civilian purposes. He also states that a steel works at Chelyabinsk in the Urals is already smelting tanks.
Key Statements on Soviet Tank Reductions (continued)

23 May 1989  
Major General Shechepin, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, states that some of the T-72 tanks removed from Czechoslovakia will be scrapped or converted for civilian use at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk in the North Caucasus Military District.

3 June 1989  
General Staff spokesman Lieutenant General Petrov states that more than 2,750 tanks and artillery pieces have been dispatched to storage bases or for destruction.

30 June 1989  
Colonel General Omelichev, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, states that more than 3,000 tanks have been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Mongolia. He adds that units being withdrawn will be disbanded and some of their equipment will be destroyed, some transferred to storage bases, and some used in the national economy.

3 July 1989  
Defense Minister Yazov states that some tanks withdrawn from Eastern Europe are being used to upgrade units in the USSR, some are being mothballed, and “old” tanks made in the 1950s and 1960s are being destroyed.

3 July 1989  
Colonel General Krivosheiev of the General Staff states that the melting of tanks has begun and that their engines and other components are being used in the economy; other tanks are being converted for civilian use. In 1989, 5,000 will be scrapped and 2,000 will be converted. Those being scrapped are heavy tanks like the T-10, which are unsuitable for civilian use.

changed. Where once the use of nuclear weapons was expected, causing the Soviets to plan for rapid breakthrough and exploitation, the Soviets began to foresee a largely or wholly conventional war, where both sides’ nuclear arsenals might be checked by parity. At the same time, they saw changes in NATO conventional forces that made those forces more and more capable of withstanding a conventional Soviet breakthrough operation. With the advent of densely deployed, relatively cheap, and highly effective antitank weapons systems, the Soviets began to talk about “gnawing” rather than “slicing” through NATO defenses. As Soviet General Staff attention turned toward the demands of a high-tech conventional battlefield, the Soviets recognized an increasing need to train for defensive operations. They also saw that their heavy tank forces were becoming more vulnerable, but only after the December initiative did they alter the planned expansion of their tank forces. In general terms, the current Soviet military response to NATO conventional capabilities is more infantry and artillery up front, backed by tank forces.

It is the reduction in the force and the change in the missions it is structured to perform that reflect Gorbachev’s impact. Gorbachev has reasserted the Party’s leading role in determining the sociopolitical content of Soviet military doctrine. The Communist Party and its leaders decide matters of national security, determine the potential opponents, the strategic likelihood of war, and the resources to be allocated to defense. Gorbachev’s views of Soviet economic problems, and his assessment that near-to-midterm conflict with the West was unlikely, led him to conclude that reductions were a feasible method of contributing to his economic and political objectives.
The Soviet leadership's reductions and restructuring programs will produce over the next few years the most significant changes in Soviet general purpose forces opposite NATO since Khrushchev's drastic force reductions of the late 1950s and early 1960s:

- As a consequence of decisions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies to cut their general purpose forces over the next two years, the offensive capabilities of Pact theater forces will decline through the first half of the 1990s.

- The announced withdrawals of Soviet forces from Central Europe, when completed, will significantly reduce Soviet prospects for attacking from a less than fully prepared force posture and lengthen considerably the amount of time required for the Pact to prepare and position forces for sustained offensive operations against NATO.

- Residual forces would be sufficient to mount a hastily constituted but still effective defense against NATO forces until reinforcements could be mobilized and moved forward.

As the Soviets move to an infantry-heavy force structure through restructuring, there may be a dramatic increase in the number of BMP infantry fighting vehicles. Although effective in combat operations, BMPs are not tanks, and we judge:

- Regardless of how the Soviets choose to restructure their forces, the loss of half the tanks previously stationed in Eastern Europe will significantly degrade Pact offensive capabilities.

- Even a large addition of well-equipped infantry would not totally offset this loss of armored striking power.

The Soviets, nevertheless, have no intention of disarming themselves, nor do they intend to maintain obsolete forces. Quite the contrary, Gorbachev's economic reforms, if successful, would prevent such outcomes. It is consistent with stated objectives, therefore, simultaneously to withdraw tanks, reduce the size of forces overall, and restructure and modernize residual forces using existing equipment to maximize their potential effectiveness against NATO.

Although we have a pretty good perspective on the general impact of these changes, there are still some important uncertainties. We do not know the actual shape that Soviet forces will take. Will Soviet objectives for their restructured forces change? They seem unlikely to have a capability to conduct breakthrough operations without mobilization—will that change? Will the residual forces be maintained at a higher level of readiness? On all these questions, opinions will abound, but until evidence or trends appear, conclusions are premature.

We conclude that the Soviet withdrawals and reductions observed to date are generally consistent with Gorbachev's initial statement. We also conclude that Soviet restructuring and modernization activity—consistent with emerging Soviet military doctrinal views of war in Europe and the nature and capability of NATO—will result in a smaller standing force optimized for defense, but still capable of smaller scale offensive operations. Such a force would require a massive and lengthy mobilization in order to perform deep strategic offensive operations against NATO.
CONCEPTS: POLITICAL CRISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PHUM, PREL, GC, (HONECKER, ERICH)

PAGE 01 EMBBER 80141 01 OF 02 041606Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 DOD/E-00
H-01 MSC-01 TO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-31 062 W
-----------------------------------------15212 041809Z 48

90T7565Z OCT 89
FM AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1816
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECTION 01 OF 02 EMBBERLIN 80141

E.O. 12356: DECL-OADR
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM PREL GC
SUBJECT: THE GDR POLITICAL CRISIS: STILL DEEPENING

REF: EMBBERLIN 8123

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT SINCE RETURNING
FROM HIS SICK BED, HONECKER ADMITTED NO CRISIS AND
BLAMED THE GDR'S PROBLEMS ON THE DEVIL IN BONN. PRIME
MINISTER STOPLI PLEDGED CONTINUITY AT NEXT SPRING'S
PARTY CONGRESS. THE GAP BETWEEN THE OLD LEADERS
WHO ARE CIRCULATING THEIR WAGONS AND POLITICAL REALITY
CONTINUES TO GROW, HOWEVER. END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED
3. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HERE OF THE GDR'S SURPRISE DECISION OCTOBER 3 TO ALLOW THE FRG EMBASSY IN PRAGUE TO BE EMPTIED FOR THE SECOND TIME IN A HALF-WEEK OF EAST GERMANS SEEKING REFUGE IN THE WEST. THAT AND THE FACT THAT THE GDR REICHSBAHN TRAINS WHICH HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED TO BEGIN ARRIVING IN PRAGUE THE SAME EVENING HAD STILL NOT REACHED THE CZECH CAPITAL BY MIDNIGHT OCTOBER 4. STIRRED SPECULATION THAT THIS NEW CONCESSION MIGHT BE PROVOKING A SERIOUS FIGHT WITHIN THE POLITBÜRO.

4. THE LATEST INDICATION, BASED ON WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, IS THAT THE TRAINS WILL BEGIN TO TAKE THE REFUGEES OUT OF PRAGUE BY LATE AFTERNOON AND THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE NOT TO HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL OBSTRUCTION, BUT TO TROUBLE ON THE RAILS. ONE VERSION IS THAT SOME OF THE TRACKS WERE BLOCKED WITHIN THE GDR, PRESUMABLY BY ANGRY RAILROADERS OR AVERAGE CITIZENS. ANOTHER VERSION THAT THE SECURITY POLICE NEEDED ADDITIONAL TIME TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT PERSONS FROM JUMPING ABOARD WHEN THE TRAINS PASSED BACK THROUGH THE GDR ON THEIR WAY TO THE WEST GERMAN BORDER.

5. NONE OF THESE REPORTS AND RUMORS ARE CONFIRMED. THE DELAY COULD BE CAUSED BY NOTHING MORE MYSTERIOUS THAN THE DIFFICULTY OF CLEARING UP THE PERSONNEL AND ROLLING STOCK AT SHORT NOTICE ON A WORKDAY. THEIR APPEARANCE IS SYMPTOMATIC, HOWEVER, OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY THAT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AT LEAST THROUGH GORBACHEV'S VISIT FOR THE OCTOBER 6-7 FORTIETH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS.

6. NEVERTHELESS, THE RUMORS GAIN AT LEAST SOME PLAUSIBILITY FROM THE OMINOUS AND TANGIBLE DISTRESS WHICH YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF CURBS ON TRAVEL TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS PRODUCED. AT AN OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY RECEPTION AFTER THE NEWS CAME OUT OCTOBER 3, FOR EXAMPLE, NORMALLY DISCIPLINED PARTY MEMBERS, BOTH DIPLOMATS AND LOCAL JOURNALISTS, WERE MORE OUTSPOKEN THAN WE HAVE EVER EXPERIENCED THEM. ONE CALLED THE DECISION "DANGEROUS," IMPLYING
THAT IT COULD LEAD TO DEMONSTRATIONS. THE OTHERS,
OBVIOUSLY SHARING A CONSENSUS THAT THE PARADOCHBNQ DIRECTLY,
HE USED HIS SPEECH, PERHAPS SYMBOLICALLY TO EX-

NNNN

PAGE 01 EMBBER 08141 02 OF 02 041719Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG:00 ADS:16 INR:07 SS:00 CIAE:00 DODE:00 H:01
MSC:01 IO:19 NSCE:00 NSAE:00 SSO:00 HA:09 L:03
TRSE:00 PM:16 PA:01 OMB:01 INRE:00 USIE:00 SP:02
SNP:01 PRS:01 DS:01 PA:02 T.01 J900 W
------117555 041803Z 049
0 041558Z OCT 89
FM AMBASSADOR EMBRERLIN
TO SECSSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1017
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR BONN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOR VIENNA
USAFSB BERLIN GE
USSOC WASHDC
USDIL NST GENEVA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMBASSADOR LONDON
AMBASSADOR PARIS

SECTION 02 OF 02 EMBRERLIN 08141

E.O. 12356: DECL-QSR
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM, PREL QC
SUBJECT: THE GDR POLITICAL CRISIS: STILL DEEPENING

THIS STATE WOULD REMAIN A BULWARK OF SOCIALISM, ANTI-FASCISM, ANTI-REVANCHISM.

9. WILLI STOEPF WAS MORE EXPLICIT YET IN A SEPARATE

PAGE 02 EMBRER 08141 02 OF 02 041719Z

PRE-40TH BIRTHDAY PARTY OCCASION, WHEN HE PLEDGED THAT "WE WILL BE CONSEQUENT IN CARRYING FORWARD OUR GOOD POLICY, WHICH IS DIRECTED AT THE WELLBEING OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ASSURANCE OF PEACE."

10. FROM THE OTHER DIRECTION, SIGNS OF POPULAR INITIATIVES CONTINUE TO MULTIPLY. FOR EXAMPLE, DOZENS OF POPULAR ARTISTS, MANY OF THEM FROM THE ROCK SCENE MOST ATTRACTIVE TO YOUNG PEOPLE, ARE CIRCULATING AN OPEN LETTER CALLING FOR MORE OPENNESS AND RECOGNITION OF NEUES FORUM AND CONCLUDING THAT, "WE WANT TO LIVE IN THIS LAND, AND IT MAKES US SICK TO HAVE TO WATCH WITHOUT MEANS OF ACTING AS ATTEMPTS AT A DEMOCRATIZATION, ATTEMPTS AT SOCIAL ANALYSIS ARE CRIMINALIZED OR IGNRED."
11. COMMENT: A POWERFUL MIX OF CAUTION AND PRUDENCE STILL OVERLAYS THE ANGER AND FRUSTRATION. ONE CONTACT IN A SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE GAVE US AN EXAMPLE: HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DRAFTED A BOLD, STRAIGHTFORWARD LETTER CALLING FOR REFORMS THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE SENT TO THEIR NATIONAL TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES. IT PRODUCED VIGOROUS DEBATE AT THE MEETING AND DREW OUT COMMENT SHARPLY CRITICAL OF CURRENT POLICIES EVEN FROM PREVIOUS ONE HUNDRED PERCENTERS, BUT IN THE END CONCERN FOR CONSEQUENCES AND DOUBT WHETHER THE MOMENT WAS RIPE CAUSED MOST TO HOLD BACK. EVEN OUR CONTACT SAID HE AND HIS WIFE WERE IN DEEP DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER HE SHOULD SIGN. On OCTOBER 4, NEUES FORUM LEADERS PUT OUT APPEALS FOR ALL ITS SYMPATHIZERS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PUBLIC ACTIONS THAT COULD PROVOKE THE AUTHORITIES DURING THE WEEKEND FESTIVITIES.

PAGE 03 EMBBER 08141 02 OF 02 041719Z

12. THE SITUATION, IN SHORT, STILL SEEMS TO US TO BE BETTER CHARACTERIZED AS POLITICALLY PREGNANT, NOT PHYSICALLY EXPLOSIVE, BUT THE GAP BETWEEN POWER AND REALITY IS INCREASING DAILY.

BARKLEY
M.S. [Gorbachev] is flying to the GDR [to celebrate] its 40th anniversary. He is very reluctant. Called me two times. Today [he called and said]: I polished the text (of the speech) to the last letter—you know, they will scrutinize it under a microscope… I will not say a word in support of [East German leader Erich] Honecker. But I will support the Republic and the Revolution.

Today in Dresden—20,000 demonstrate. Yesterday there was a demonstration in Leipzig. Information is coming in that in the presence of Gorbachev people will storm the Wall. Awful scenes when a special train [with East German refugees] passed from Prague to the GDR via Dresden. West German television shot everything and now is broadcasting this all over the GDR. All Western media are full of articles about German reunification.


Not to mention Poland: the P[olish] U[nited] W[orkers’] P[arty] not only lost power—it will hardly survive till its next congress in February.

In a word, the total dismantling of socialism as a world phenomenon has been proceeding…Perhaps it is inevitable and good…For this is a reunification of mankind on the basis of common sense. And a common fellow from Stavropol [Gorbachev] set this process in motion.

[Source: Notes of Anatoly Chernyaev, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, f. 2, op. 2. Translated by Vladislav Zubok. (National Security Archive).]
CONCEPTS= POLITICAL CRISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE
TAGS= PGOV, PINS, PHUM, PREL, GC, (HONECKER, ERICH)

PAGE 01  EMBBER 08141 01 OF 02  041606Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  ENK-07  SS-00  OIC-02  CIAE-00  DODE-00
1401 MISC-01 10-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSQ-00 HA-69
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PES-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 862 W
--------------------------------------------- 115212 041800Z 488
090915SSZ OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY AMBGERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1016
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USAFB BERLIN GE
USDOD WASHDC
USDEL NIST GENEVA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECTION 01 OF 02 EMBBERLIN 08141

E.O. 12356 DECL-OADR
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM, PREL GC
SUBJECT: THE GDR POLITICAL CRISIS: STILL DEEPENING

REF: EMBBERLIN 8123

1. [redacted] ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT SINCE RETURNING
FROM HIS SICK BED, HONECKER ADMITTED NO CRISIS AND
BLAMED THE GDR'S PROBLEMS ON THE DEVIL IN BONN. PRIME
MINISTER STOHLEN PLUGGED CONTINUITY AT NEXT SPRING'S
PARTY CONGRESS. THE GAP BETWEEN THE OLD LEADERS
WHO ARE CICHLING THEIR WAGONS AND POLITICAL REALITY
CONTINUES TO GROW, HOWEVER, END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED
3. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HERE OF THE GDR'S SURPRISE DECISION OCTOBER 3 TO ALLOW THE FRG EMBASSY IN PRAGUE TO BE EMBATTLED FOR THE SECOND TIME IN A HALF-WEEK OF EAST GERMANS SEEKING REFUGE IN THE WEST. THAT AND THE FACT THAT THE GDR REICHSBAHN TRAINS WHICH HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED TO BEGIN ARRIVING IN PRAGUE THE SAME EVENING HAD STILL NOT REACHED THE CZECH CAPITAL BY MIDDAY OCTOBER 4 STIRRED SPECULATION THAT THIS NEW CONCESSION MIGHT BE PROVOKING A SERIOUS FIGHT WITHIN THE POLITIBURO.

4. THE LATEST INDICATION, BASED ON WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, IS THAT THE TRAINS WILL BEGIN TO TAKE THE REFUGEES OUT OF PRAGUE BY LATE AFTERNOON AND THAT THE DELAY WAS DUE NOT TO HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL OBSTRUCTION, BUT TO TROUBLE ON THE RAILS. ONE VERSION IS THAT SOME OF THE TRACKS WERE BLOCKED WITHIN THE GDR, PRESUMABLY BY ANGRY RAILROADERS OR AVERAGE CITIZENS, ANOTHER VERSION THAT THE SECURITY POLICE NEEDED ADDITIONAL TIME TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT PERSONS FROM JUMPING ABOARD WHEN THE TRAINS PASSED BACK THROUGH THE GDR ON THEIR WAY TO THE WEST GERMAN BORDER.

5. NONE OF THESE REPORTS, AND RUMORS ARE CONFIRMED. THE DELAY COULD BE CAUSED BY NOTHING MORE MYSTERIOUS THAN THE DIFFICULTY OF FREEING THE PERSONNEL AND ROLLING STOCK AT SHORT NOTICE ON A WEEKDAY. THEIR APPEARANCE IS SYMPTOMATIC, HOWEVER, OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY THAT IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE AT LEAST THROUGH GORBACHEV'S VISIT FOR THE OCTOBER 6-7 FORTIETH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATIONS.

6. NEVERTHELESS, THE RUMORS GAIN AT LEAST SOME PLAUSIBILITY FROM THE OBVIOUS AND TANGIBLE DISTRESS WHICH YESTERDAY'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF CUBAN ON TRAVEL TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS PRODUCED. AT AN OFFICIAL FOREIGN MINISTRY RECEPTION AFTER THE NEWS CAME OUT OCTOBER 3, FOR EXAMPLE, NORMALLY DISCIPLINED PARTY MEMBERS, BOTH DIPLOMATS AND LOCAL JOURNALISTS, WERE MORE OUTSPOKEN THAN WE HAVE EVER EXPERIENCED THEM. ONE CALLED THE DECISION 'DANGEROUS,' IMPLYING
THAT IT COULD LEAD TO DEMONSTRATIONS. THE OTHERS,
OBVIOUSLY SHARING A CONSENSUS THAT THE PARISH CHURCH
DIRECTLY, HE USED HIS SPEECH, PERHAPS SYMBOLICALLY TO EX-
FM AMBASSAY EMBERLIN
TO SECESTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 10/17
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADY VIENNA
USAFS FB BERLIN GE
USDOC WASHDC
USDEL NST GENEVA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMBASSADY LONDON
AMBASSADY PARIS

SECTION 02 OF 02 EMBERLIN 06141

E.O. 12356: DECL.GADR
TAGS: PG0V PHM PHLIM, PREGOC
SUBJECT: THE GDR POLITICAL CRISIS: STILL DEEPENING

UNDERGROUND FIGHTERS AND "ACTIVISTS OF THE GDR'S
FIRST HOURS," -- PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP IN THE
COUNTRY WITH A HIGHER AVERAGE AGE THAN HIS
POLITBURO -- TO REPEAT STANDARD THEMES ABOUT THE
GDR'S RISE FROM THE RUINS OF THE WAR. THE MORE
OTHERS PROPHESIED DOOM, AND THE MORE THE WEST
GERMANS TRIED TO DESTABILIZE THE GDR, HE SAID.
THIS STATE WOULD REMAIN A BULWARK OF SOCIALISM,
ANTI-FASCISM, ANTI REVANCHISM.

9. WILL STOPH WAS MORE EXPLICIT YET IN A SEPARATE

PAGE 02 EMBERL 08141 02 OF 02 041719Z

PRE-40TH BIRTHDAY PARTY OCCASION, WHEN HE PLEDGED
THAT "WE WILL BE CONSEQUENT IN CARRYING FORWARD
OUR GOOD POLICY, WHICH IS DIRECTED AT THE WELLBEING
OF THE PEOPLE AND THE ASSURANCE OF PEACE."

10. FROM THE OTHER DIRECTION, SIGNS OF POPULAR
INITIATIVES CONTINUE TO MULTIPLY. FOR EXAMPLE,
DOZENS OF POPULAR ARTISTS, MANY OF THEM FROM THE
ROCK SCENE MOST ATTRACTIVE TO YOUNG PEOPLE, ARE
CIRCULATING AN OPEN LETTER CALLING FOR MORE
OPENNESS AND RECOGNITION OF NEUES FORUM AND
CONCLUDING THAT, "WE WANT TO LIVE IN THIS LAND, AND
IT MAKES US SICK TO HAVE TO WATCH WITHOUT MEANS
OF ACTING AS ATTEMPTS AT A DEMOCRATIZATION,
ATTEMPTS AT SOCIAL ANALYSIS ARE CRIMINALIZED
OR IGNORED."
11. COMMENT: A POWERFUL MIX OF CAUTION AND PRUDENCE STILL OVERLAYS THE ANGER AND FRUSTRATION. ONE CONTACT IN A SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTE GAVE US AN EXAMPLE: HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DRAFTED A BOLD, STRAIGHTFORWARD LETTER CALLING FOR REFORMS THAT WAS INTENDED TO BE SENT TO THEIR NATIONAL TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES. IT PRODUCED VIGOROUS DEBATE AT THE MEETING AND DREW OUT COMMENT SHARPLY CRITICAL OF CURRENT POLICIES EVEN FROM PREVIOUS ONE HUNDRED PERCENTERS, BUT IN THE END CONCERN FOR CONSEQUENCES AND DOUBT WHETHER THE MOMENT WAS RIPE CAUSED MOST TO HOLD BACK. EVEN OUR CONTACT SAID HE AND HIS WIFE WERE IN DEEP DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER HE SHOULD SIGN. ON OCTOBER 4, NEUES FORUM LEADERS PUT OUT APPEALS FOR ALL ITS SYMPATHIZERS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY PUBLIC ACTIONS THAT COULD PROVOKE THE AUTHORITIES DURING THE WEEKEND FESTIVITIES.

PAGE 03 EMBBER 08141 02 OF 02 04179Z

12. THE SITUATION, IN SHORT, STILL SEEMS TO US TO BE BETTER CHARACTERIZED AS POLITICALLY PREGNANT, NOT PHYSICALLY EXPLOSIVE, BUT THE GAP BETWEEN POWER AND REALITY IS INCREASING DAILY.

BARKLEY
2. GORBACHEV WILL VISIT THE GDR ON OCTOBER 6-7 TO UNDERSCORE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR "SOCIALIST" GERMANY AND TO ASSESS FIRSTHAND THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN WHAT HAD BEEN THOUGHT TO BE ONE OF THE MOST ECONOMICALLY HEALTHY AND POLITICALLY STABLE WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS REFUSE TO USE THE TERM "CRISIS" TO DESCRIBE WHAT IS
HAPPENING IN THE GDR, BUT THREE SOVIET POLITICAL MEMBERS WILL HAVE VISITED EAST BERLIN IN JUST THREE WEEKS' TIME. WE DO NOT BELIEVE GORBACHEV HAD ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO ATTEND THE GDR'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY, WHICH HIGHLIGHTS JUST HOW CONCERNED THE SOVIETS HAVE BECOME ABOUT EVENTS THERE, WHILE OFFICIALS REMAIN PUBLICLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE GDR'S FUTURE, MANY SOVIET ACADEMICS ARE PREDICTING LONG-TERM DISASTER.

3. AT THE JULY WARSAW TREATY MEETING IN BUCHAREST, GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THAT EACH PACT MEMBER HAS FREE TO CHOOSE ITS OWN INTERNAL PATH OF DEVELOPMENT, WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THE GDR, THEREFORE, HAS CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE IN CHARTING ITS OWN COURSE. IN FOREIGN POLICY, HOWEVER, THE BOTTOM LINE REMAINS THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE MUST REMAIN INTACT. THE SOVIETS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDR HAVE PLACED IN JEOPARDY ITS CONTINUED PACT PARTICIPATION, BUT TREMORS IN THE GDR CONTINUE TO PRODUCE NERVOUSNESS IN MOSCOW. IN FACT, GORBACHEV IS EXPECTED TO GIVE A SPEECH WHICH WILL EMPHASIZE THE VITAL ROLE THE GDR PLAYS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. ON INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS, THE SOVIETS BELIEVE GERMAN REUNIFICATION REMAINS AN ISSUE FOR THE MORE DISTANT FUTURE AND THAT THE HFG SHOULD AVOID TAKING ANY STEPS WHICH COULD FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE GDR.

4. GORBACHEV IS EXPECTED TO AVOID ANY DETAILED PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM OR THE GDR'S LACK OF REFORMS. HE MAY PRIVATELY SUGGEST LIMITED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES, BUT RUMORS ABOUND...
5. There is no question that the process of transition to a new leadership is beginning and that Gorbachev will make the rounds with potential successors to Honecker. The expectation is that he will not unearth a reformer among the Padykersms on the SED's Brezhnevite Politburo, but that he may find a “Chernenko” or even an “Andropov.”

6. Many believe that the GDR's 40th anniversary ceremonies have already been marred by this week's dramatic events—the continuing flood of refugees, particularly the vivid image of “freedom trains” headed for the West as East Germans try to jump on board. This has raised questions about what the GDR is celebrating. Finally, East German diplomats have expressed concerns about Honecker's health, as well as worries that pro-reform demonstrations during Gorbachev's visit could get out of hand.

END SUMMARY

----------

7. When Gorbachev arrives today in the German Democratic Republic, he will face a serious illness.

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 28008 01 OF 07 061039Z
RELATIVE WHOSE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS ARE NOT VERY GOOD. HE WILL SHOW COMPASSION AND OFFER EMOTIONAL SUPPORT, BUT IN REALITY THERE IS LITTLE THAT HE CAN DO. THE PROBLEM IS AN INTERNAL ONE AND THE AFFLICTED PARTY HAS YET TO COME TO TERMS WITH ITS OWN ILLNESS. FOR MANY WEEKS NOW THE GDR HAS SUFFERED A MASSIVE HEMORRHAGING OF ITS CITIZENS, WITH MORE THAN 30,000 EAST GERMANS FLEETING TO FREEDOM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. SIMILARLY, CONFIDENCE IN THE GDR LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS OF THE DAY HAS BEEN SHAKEN. FINALLY, THE POLITICAL AND THE PHYSICAL HEALTH OF THE TOP SED LEADERS HAVE COME INTO QUESTION.

---

Dramatic events demand highest-level attention.

8. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDR CAUGHT THE SOVIETS LARGELY UNAWARE. THE GDR HAD BEEN REGARDED AS A REASONABLE ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND A BEDROCK OF STABILITY IN THE WARSAW PACT. WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH UNPRECEDEDENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY, THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD COUNT ON THE GDR TO REMAIN LARGELY TROUBLE-FREE TO THEIR DISMAY. THIS SUMMER'S EVENTS PROVED OTHERWISE.

9. ALTHOUGH WORKING-LEVEL PARTY VISITS TO EAST BERLIN APPEAR TO HAVE REMAINED STEADY THIS PAST YEAR, TOP PARTY OFFICIALS WERE LARGELY ABSENT. THIS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY AS THE REFUGEE CRISIS TOOK OFF AND HONECKER'S FRAILITY BECAME APPARENT TO ALL. IN THE SPACE OF A LITTLE MORE THAN THREE WEEKS, THREE SOVIET POLITBuro MEMBERS WILL HAVE VISITED EAST BERLIN: YEGOR LIGACHEV, VADIM MEDVEDEV AND MIKHAIL GORBACHEV.

10. LIGACHEV ARRIVED IN THE GDR ON SEPTEMBER 12, OFFICIALLY FOR A FOUR-DAY AGRICULTURAL VISIT. WE WERE TOLD THAT PLANS FOR SUCH A VISIT WERE ACTUALLY IN THE WORKS, BUT THAT A DATE WOULD QUICKLY AGREE UPON BY BOTH PARTIES WHEN THE NEED BECAME APPARENT. WHILE LIGACHEV DID VISIT AGRICULTURAL SITES, IT WAS OBVIOUS...
THAT THE TRIP WAS PRINCIPALLY USED TO DEMONSTRATE STRONG SOVIET-GDR TIES. HE CONDEMNED "CERTAIN CIRCLES" IN THE FRG FOR ENTICING EAST GERMANS TO LEAVE THE GDR ILLEGALLY AND DECLARED THAT THE GDR WAS A TRUE FRIEND AND ALLY OF THE USSR. IN ADDITION,

LIGACHEV BROUGHT WITH HIM A MAJOR GIFT FORSED LEADERHONECKER—A COMMITMENT THATGORBACHEV WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE GDR’S 40TH ANNIVERSARY. THE GERMAN PRESS AGENCY ADN REPORTED THAT THIS WAS RECEIVED “WITH THANKS AND JOY.”

11. VADIM MEDVEDEV FOLLOWED ON SEPTEMBER 21-22 TO PARTICIPATE IN A CONFERENCE OF CHIEF IDEOLOGUES, WHICH HAD ACTUALLY BEEN SCHEDULED FOR THIS TIME. THE VISIT DID NOT RECEIVE A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLIC ATTENTION, BUT IT PROVIDED A SECOND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO GET A FIRST-HAND VIEW FROM THE TOP OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN THE GDR. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS SENT LIGACHEV, THE CONSERVATIVE FIRST, IT WILL BE GORBACHEV, THE REFORMER, WHO WILL HAVE THE LAST WORD.

12. THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED THAT IT IS NOT UNUSUAL THAT GORBACHEV WOULD ATTEND THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION OF THE GDR AND THAT THE TRIP SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS RELATED TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THERE. VIKTOR KOZLIKIN, HEAD OF THE GDR SECTION AT THE MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRY ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT SAY THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN PLANNED FAR IN ADVANCE BUT STRESSED TO POLOFF THAT SUCH A VISIT WAS NORMAL. HE DID ADMIT THAT IN LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS IT CAME AT A PARTICULARLY FORTUITOUS TIME.

NO PRIOR PLANS FOR VISITS TO EASTERN EUROPE

13. NEVERTHELESS, CONTACTS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY MADE CLEAR TO US IN MID-SUMMER THAT, AS REGARDS GORBACHEV’S TRAVEL PLANS, 1989 WAS SLATED TO BE A DAZZLING POLITICAL BLITZ OF WESTERN EUROPE TO LAY THE
FOUR FOUNDATION FOR THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME. SINCE MARCH, GORBACHEV HAS VISITED THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY AND IRELAND, DATES HAVE ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED FOR VISITS TO FINLAND AND ITALY. TO THE BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, THERE WERE NO PLANS IN THE WORKS FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ANY EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRY. IN FACT, THE SOVIETS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO STRESS THAT THE JULY 7 STOP IN BUCHAREST WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO ROMANIA, BUT ATTENDANCE AT A WARSAW PACT POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.

14. SEVERAL SOVIET INSTITUTEKS AND EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS HAVE ARGUED THAT GORBACHEV HAD AVOIDED VISITING A SOCIALIST COUNTRY THIS YEAR, BECAUSE IT CONFIDENTIAL.

COULD BE MISINTERPRETED AS A SIGNAL REGARDING "THE CORRECT APPROACH TO REFORM." THIS CONCERN, THEY though, HAD PUT A DAMPER ON HIS TRAVELING ANYWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE EVOLVING CRISIS IN EAST GERMANY, HOWEVER, DEMANDED A CHANGE IN PLANS.
KEY FOREIGN POLICY GOAL: WARSAW PACT STABILITY

15. THE KEY SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS FOR EASTERN EUROPE SOUND A BIT LIKE A REALTOR’S REFRAIN: STABILITY, STABILITY, STABILITY. IN JULY, AT THE BUCHAREST POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING, GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THAT EACH WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION MEMBER WAS FREE TO CHOOSE ITS OWN INTERNAL PATH OF DEVELOPMENT, WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE (THE DRAMATIC CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN POLAND AND HUNGARY HAVE BORNE THIS OUT). THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS CAN BE INTRODUCED INTERNALLY WITHOUT UNDERMINING WARSAW PACT STABILITY, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE REMAINS THAT THE EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE MUST REMAIN INTACT.


PAGE 03  MOSCOW 28008  07 OF 07  06/04/0Z

THE SOVIET VIEW OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS

17. THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE FRG TO AVOID TAKING ANY STEPS WHICH COULD FURTHER DISTABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE GDR. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN CONVEYED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE FRG. SHEVARDNADZE’S SEPTEMBER 26 STATEMENT AT THE U.N. ON “THE FORCES OFhevanchism” WHICH WERE SEEKING TO REVISE AND DESTROY THE POST-WAR REALITIES IN EUROPE WAS DIRECTED AT THE WEST GERMANS. IN ADDITION, SHEVARDNADZE MILDLY CHASTIZED FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER DURING A PRIVATE MEETING IN NEW YORK. GENSCHER’S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE PROBLEM WAS GDR INFLEXIBILITY, NOT PROVOCATIONS FROM THE FRG. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY BELIEVES THAT BOTH GERMAN STATES SEEK STABILITY—ABOVE ALL ELSE—in CENTRAL EUROPE.

NNNN

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 28008 04 OF 07 0610412Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-06 SFR-07 SS-00 CIAF-40 DOD-00 H-01
MSC-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-01 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 MMP-01
SIP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /041 W

C Q/600954Z OCT 89
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0589
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
SECTION 14 OF 07 MOSCOW 28008

E.O. 12356: DECL-OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPRP, GC, UR
SUBJECT: THE GORBACHEV-HONECKER SUMMIT:

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

19. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KARPOV RECENTLY STATED THAT HE SAW NO REASON WHY GERMAN REUNIFICATION COULD NOT EVENTUALLY COME ABOUT THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME (SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE RECENTLY MADE BY CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT VALENTIN FALIN IN AUSTRIA). THE KEY WORD HERE, WE NOTE, IS "EVENTUALLY." THE MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THIS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO DEBATE REUNIFICATION. KOZLOVIN STRESSED THAT AMERICA'S EUROPEAN PARTNERS WERE ALSO NOT IN FAVOR OF...

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 28008 04 OF 07 061041Z

REUNIFICATION AND IMPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT TROUBLED BY CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT FOR REUNIFICATION.

20. DASHICHEV OF THE BOGOMOLOV INSTITUTE HAS ARGUED SIMILARLY THAT GERMAN REUNIFICATION SHOULD NOT BE ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGENDA. HIS POSITION IS THAT THE GERMAN QUESTION IS EMBEDDED IN THE OVERALL EUROPEAN SITUATION AND THAT AT SOME FUTURE POINT, WHEN THE DIVISION OF EUROPE INTO TWO BLOCS IS DISAPPEARING, THE GERMAN STATES COULD EVOLVE AND COME TOGETHER VERY CLOSELY IN TERMS OF THEIR POLITICS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

GORBACHEV'S EAST BERLIN AGENDA

21. GORBACHEV'S AGENDA IS EXPECTED TO HAVE A DISTINCT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIDE. PUBLICLY, HE WILL USE THE VISIT TO EMPHASIZE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE GDR AS A LOYAL ALLEY AND FRIEND. HE IS EXPECTED TO GIVE A SPEECH WHICH WILL STRESS THE VALUABLE ROLE THAT THE GDR HAS PLAYED IN THE EAST BLOC, WHILE AVOIDING ANY DETAILED COMMENTARY ON THE CONTINUING REFUGEE PROBLEM.
OR THE GDR'S RESISTANCE TO ADOPT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

22. IN PRIVATE, GORBACHEV WILL ASSESS FIRSTHAND THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN WHAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE THE MOST ECONOMICALLY HEALTHY AND POLITICALLY STABLE WARSAW PACT MEMBER. HE MAY PRIVATELY SUSPECT THAT THE GDR ADOPT REFORMS, BUT RUMORS ABOUND HERE THAT

THE SOVIET'S HAVE NOT MADE UP THEIR OWN MINDS ABOUT WHAT THE NEXT COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR EAST GERMANY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE PROCESS OF TRANSITION TO A NEW LEADERSHIP IS BEGINNING AND THAT GORBACHEV WILL MAKE THE rounds WITH POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS TO HONECKER.

---

23. THERE ARE RUMORS IN MOSCOW THAT TWO POLICY ANALYSES WERE COMMISSIONED TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING REFORMS IN THE GDR, AND THAT THE TWO ANALYSES RETURNED VERY CONFLICTING RESULTS. ONE SUPPOSEDLY CONCLUDED THAT IF THE EAST GERMANS IMPLEMENTED REFORMS, THEY WOULD BEGIN ERODING THE STATE'S RATION DE'TRE. THEREBY INVITING TURMOIL. IN CONTRAST, THE OTHER ARGUED THAT IF THE EAST GERMANS DID NOT IMPLEMENT REFORMS, THEY WOULD SIMILARLY FAN DISSENT, BECAUSE OF INCREASING DEMANDS FROM YOUNG PEOPLE FOR A GREATER LIBERALIZATION OF THEapolitical AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM. WHILE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT SUCH ANALYSIS ACTUALLY WERE PRODUCED, THE REPORTED RESULTS BASICALLY TRACK WITH THE MIXED OPINIONS PUT FORTH BY INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIKNS.

NATURAL STATE, BUT AN IDEOLOGICAL STATE. ACCORDINGLY, HE ARGUED THAT IF THE GDR EVER GRASPED GLASNOST', PERESTROIKA AND DEMOCRATIZATION IT WOULD DISAPPEAR, AS IT WOULD NO LONGER BE SUFFICIENTLY DISTINCT FROM THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS, HE BELIEVED THAT MANY IN THE GDR UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR SOME DEMOCRATIZATION AND THAT THIS WOULD LIKELY COME WITH A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS.

25. IN CONTRAST, SERGEY KARAGANOVS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE HAS STRESSED THE NEED FOR THE GDR TO UNTAKE GREATER REFORMS TO DIFFUSE DISCONTENT AMONG THE POPULACE, PARTICULARLY POLITICAL REFORM. THIS VIEW IS ALSO HELD BY SOME CENTRAL...
CAREFULLY CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT. THIS IS THE MOST COMMON POSITION HEARD IN MOSCOW.

STOPPING THE GREAT EXODUS OF YOUNG EAST GERMANS

26. THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE THIS SUMMER'S "VOTING WITH THEIR FEET" BY MORE THAN 30,009 EAST GERMAN CITIZENS. THIS IS A PARTICULARLY HARD-HITTING PHENOMENON IN MOSCOW, AS THE ABUNDANCE OF CONSUMER GOODS IN THE GDR AND THE RELATIVE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY -- FAR BEYOND THAT OF THE USSR -- MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE PROBLEM IS PRINCIPALLY POLITICAL AND NOT ECONOMIC. FURTHERMORE, THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEES HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY YOUNG WORKERS WHO SPENT THEIR ENTIRE LIVES UNDER THE SOCIALIST STATE.

27. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT IF THIS INCREDIBLE HEMORRHAGING OF EAST GERMAN CITIZENS WERE TO CONTINUE, IT WOULD DO IRREPARABLE HARM TO THE GDR. DAVYDOW SAID THAT THE SIMPLIST SOLUTION TO STOP GDR CITIZENS FROM ABANDONING THEIR HOMELAND WOULD BE TO IMMEDIATELY REMOVE RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR ABILITY TO TRAVEL FREELY. HE ADMITTED THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OFFERED FOR SOME AN IRRESISTABLE ATTRACTION, BUT FEEL CERTAIN THAT MOST EAST GERMANS REGARDE THE GDR AS HOME AND WOULD EVENTUALLY RETURN.

PAGE 93 MOSCOW 28006 05 OF 07 061041Z

28. CONTACTS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE WARNED THAT THE SOLUTION CANNOT BE TO PRECLUDE TRAVEL TO OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. THE OCTOBER 2ND DECISION TO STOP TRAVEL BY EAST GERMANS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA SET A BAD PRECEDENT HERE. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN THAT SUCH MOVES COULD BEGIN TO SERIOUSLY TEAR THE FABRIC WHICH BINDS THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES TOGETHER.

THE SEDS "BREZHNEVITE" POLITBURE

29. GORBACHEV IS NOT EXPECTED TO FIND A COUNTERPART REFORMER WHEN HE EXAMINES THE FIELD OF POTENTIAL HONIBERGER SUCCESSORS. ACADEMIC AND DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT AT BEST HE MAY UNEARTH AN
"ANDROPOV" OR A "CHERNENKO" ON THE SED POLITBUREO.
THE PHYSICAL FRAILTY OF THE LEADERSHIP -- EGON KRENZ
AND GUENTER MITTAG, AMONG OTHERS -- IS REMINISCENT
HERE OF THE BREZHNEV ERA. PARTY LEADERS LIKE
SEVENTY-SEVEN YEAR-OLD KURT HAGER, BORN THE SAME YEAR
AS HONECKER, ARE NOT EXPECTED TO PRODUCE ANY BOLD NEW
IDEAS. DAVIDOV STRESSED THAT THE PROBLEM OF
SUCCESSION IN THE GDR WAS BECOMING PARTICULARLY ACUTE
AS THERE SEEMED TO BE A DESIRE AMONG POTENTIAL
HONECKER REPLACEMENTS TO BE "HOLIER THAN THE POPE."

30. WHETHER THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION BEGINS SHORTLY,
OR ONLY AFTER NEXT MAY'S PARTY CONGRESS, ACADEMICS
HERE HAVE ARGUED THAT SOME BOLDER THINKERS WILL HAVE
TO MOVE UP IF THE SED IS TO EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH THE
PROBLEMS IT NOW FACED (AS ALWAYS, OUR FOREIGN
MINISTRY CONTACTS ARE SILENT ON QUESTIONS OF
LEADERSHIP CHANGE). DAVIDOV THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN
HINTS OF REFORM COMING OUT OF THE SED'S SOCIAL
INFO LOG-00 OS-00 INR-07 NSC-00 CIA-00 DOD-00 H-01
MCC-01 NSC-00 NSC-00 NSC-00 HA-09 L-03 TRS-00
PM-01 PA-01 OMB-01 INR-06 USE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 P-02 T-01 840 W

--------------------------256346 061059Z 21
O:060554Z OCT 89
PM AMBASSADOR MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0591
INFO AMBASSAD EMBASSY IMMEDIATE
AMBASSAD BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USERNIMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

SECTION 06 OF 97 MOSCOW 28008
E.O. 12356: DECLASS
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPRP, GC, UP
SUBJECT: THE GORBACHEV-HONECKER SUMMIT:

SCIENCE RESEARCH ACADEMY, BUT ACADEMY CHIEF OTTO
REINHOLD IS STILL REGARDED AS ORTHODOX AND ATTACKS
AGAINST WOULD-BE REFORMERS (SUCH AS HANS MODROW).
DRESDEN) HAVE NOT GONE UNNOTICED IN MOSCOW. SOME DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS HAVE ARGUED THAT DURING HIS VISIT, GORBACHEV MAY SEEK TO NIP IN THE BUD ANY CONSIDERATION OF A PURGING OF YOUNGER REFORM-MINDED INTELLECTUALS AT THE FORTHCOMING SED CONGRESS.

CONCERNS ABOUT ATMOSPHERICS

31. CONTACTS AT THE EAST GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW

STRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT HONECKER'S HEALTH AND EXHIBITED SOME ANXIETY ABOUT GORBACHEV'S UPCOMING VISIT, WHILE THEY SAW THE GORBACHEV-HONECKER SUMMIT AS PROVIDING A NEEDED BOOST TO THE REGIME. THEY WERE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE GORBACHEV STATEMENTS ON THE NEED FOR REFORMS, AS WELL AS THE POTENTIAL THAT HIS VISIT COULD SPARK PRO-REFORM DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

32. WE NOTE THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION ON OCTOBER 3 IN LEIPZIG CALLED FOR INTERNAL REFORM AND AT ONE POINT BEGAN CHANTING "GORBY-GORBY." WHEN A GROUP OF EAST GERMAN YOUNG PEOPLE GATHERED BY THE BERLIN WALL DURING A DAVID BOWIE CONCERT AT THE REICHSTAG, AND ALSO CHANTED "GORBY-GORBY," THEY WERE PROMPTLY DISPERSED BY THE POLICE. OUR CONTACTS THOUGHT THIS COULD BE A CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION TO HANDLE WERE SUCH A DEMONSTRATION TO TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF GORBACHEV HIMSELF, WITH PARTICIPANTS CALLING FOR PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST: NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PRESUMED THE SECURITY FORCES WILL DO THEIR BEST TO MAKE CERTAIN THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN.

IT'S HARD TO PEDDLE SOVIET REFORMS IN EAST GERMANY

33. COMMENT: HONECKER AND HIS ASSOCIATES MAY WELL BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE GORBACHEV'S ADVICE SHOULD HE DECIDE TO OFFER IT. THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS IN DISASTROUS SHAPE, PUBLIC UNREST HAS BECOME ENDEMIC THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE IS RISING, ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV FIRMLY BELIEVES IN HIS
VISION OF PERESTROIKA, GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION, HE CANNOT YET HOLD UP THE SOVIET EXAMPLE AS A SUCCESS.

34. OTTO REINHOLD NOTED LAST MONTH THAT AN ATTEMPT TO USE GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION ALONE TO PROMOTE THE GDR ECONOMY WOULD FAIL, JUST AS IT HAD IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN A SIMILAR FASHION, HE STRESSED THAT THE ECONOMIC REFORMS ENVISIONED IN HUNGARY AND POLAND WOULD ELIMINATE SOCIALISM AND WOULD HAVE NO PLACE IN THE GDR. UNTIL ONE OF THE REFORMER STATES CATCHES UP WITH THE GDR'S LIVING STANDARD, IT WILL REMAIN HARD TO CONVINCE THE EAST GERMANS THAT THEY SHOULD MOVE TOWARD A MORE SIGNIFICANT MARKET ORIENTATION. DAVYDOV TOO NOTED THAT IF NOTHING ELSE, THE EAST GERMANS HAD SHOWN THAT THEY COULD MAKE A COMMAND ECONOMY WORK.

35. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GORBACHEV DOES NOT WANT TO CALL THE SHOTS IN THE GDR. HE HAS ENOUGH TROUBLE OF HIS OWN TO HANDLE AT HOME. INSTEAD, HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SED PUT ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER AND IF THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY RETRENCHMENT AND A RETURN TO THE "BUNKER MENTALITY" THAN SO BE IT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS THINK THE LONG-TERM PATH FOR THE GDR LIES IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. GORBACHEV'S PRINCIPAL AIM IN HIS EUROPEAN POLICY HAS BEEN TO PROMOTE A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME -- NOT TO MAINTAIN, RESTORE OR CONSTRUCT NEW BARRIERS.

NEEDED: COURAGE, VISION AND NOVELTY

36. DASHICHEV STRESSED THAT HE SEES NO ONE IN THE
CURRENT LEADERSHIP AS HAVING THE VISION OR THE WILL TO LOOK AHEAD. IN HIS ADDRESS THIS WEEK TO THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNAZE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR "COURAGE" IN TODAY'S POLITICS. HE ARGUED THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO BE A REALIST WHO SEES LIFE AS IT IS, BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR VISION, IDEALISM AND "A KEEN SENSE OF NOVELTY," TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE FUTURE RATHER THAN TURNING BACK TO THE PAST. THIS MAY WELL BE THE GIST OF GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE TO HONECKER AND THE EAST GERMANS. END COMMENT.

37. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. JOYCE
Gorbachev. In this connection, I would like to return to the 1970s. Then everybody in the world acutely felt the challenges of the scientific and technological revolution. We all remember how energetic were the West’s actions in adjusting to it. By the way, they did it without taking the interests of the working class into account. At that time we had a sharp discussion of those urgent issues in the CPSU. It was then that the thesis appeared that if we did not saddle [sic- master, trans.] scientific and technological progress, then Socialism would lose. The processes causing us to lag behind became as apparent to L. I. Brezhnev as it was necessary to hold a special Plenum of the CC CPSU devoted to the problems of acceleration of scientific and technological progress in the USSR. We are not going to talk about specific reasons why that Plenum was never held. It was a miscalculation. It was a strategic miscalculation, and we are still feeling the consequences of that. You approached those problems differently in the GDR. I could see it myself when I studied your experience of the economic reform in 1966 here.

In the 1970s you understood the challenge of the times, and actively responded to it. And that was correct, it allowed you to do many things. These are two examples of different reactions to the needs of social development, which require transformation in the party’s practical policy.

This has a direct relevance to our perestroika. Where the party is behind the times in theoretical and practical terms, there we have to harvest bitter fruit. You all know how inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions have flared up in our country recently. Inter-ethnic problems are very complex. There are many issues interwoven there: the economics, the demographics, the problems of sovereignty, history, traditions of separate peoples. We had to present the society with thoroughly developed approaches to these problems. But while we were intensively working on those problems, which, of course, took some time, other forces were planting poisonous seeds in the soil of inter-ethnic relations. And only when we passed the platform of inter-ethnic policy at the September [19-20] Plenum of the CC CPSU the society calmed down in a certain way. The people got clear arguments that allowed them to consolidate the social forces.

[...] You know, it was important for me to hear about it here. Because our perestroika is also a response to the challenge of the time. In the end we, Communists, think about what we leave behind, what we prepare for the generations to come.

I did say to Erich, however, that it seems that it would be much easier for you than for us. You do not experience such tensions in the socio-economic sphere. But to make a decision to undertake political reforms is also not an easy thing to do. In the future you will have to make courageous decisions. I am speaking about it from our own experience. Remember, Lenin used to say that in turbulent revolutionary years people get more experience in weeks and months than sometimes in decades of normality.

Our perestroika led us to the conclusion that the revolutionary course would not receive the support of the working class if [sic] living standards were not improving. But it turned out that the problem of sausage and bread is not the only one. The people demand a new social atmosphere, more oxygen in the society, especially because we are
talking about the socialist regime. I am saying this to remind you of the problems that we are facing at home. Figuratively speaking, people want not only bread but the entertainment also. If you take it in a general sense, we are talking about the necessity to build not only the material but also the socio-spiritual atmosphere for the development of the society. I think it is a lesson for us. It is important not to miss our chance here. The party should have its own position on these issues, its own clear policy in this respect also. Life itself will punish us if we are late. By the way, in this connection, we moved up the dates of the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU [to 2 July 1990].

There is an understanding in the society—the state of affairs in the society will determine [...] 

From our own experience, from the experience of Poland and Hungary, we saw that if the party pretends that nothing special is going on, if it does not react to the demands of the reality, it is doomed. We are concerned about the fate of the healthy forces in Hungary and Poland, but it is not easy to help them. There they gave up their positions. The positions had been given up because they could not give a timely response to the demands of reality, and the processes took a painful turn. The Polish comrades did not use the opportunities that opened up for them in the beginning of the 1980s. And in Hungary, already in the end of his life, Kadar deeply regretted that he did not do what he could and should have done in time. So, we have only one choice—to move decisively ahead, otherwise we will be defeated.

It is even more true, if you keep in mind, as we have already mentioned, Erich, they already rub their hands waiting for a social revenge on a global scale, for constraining the socialist sphere. It makes it even more important—not to slow down—it would mean a defeat.

The CPSU and the Socialist United Party of Germany, as the most powerful of the fraternal parties, have an opportunity for not only strengthening of its authority, but to widen it on the basis of the original principles from which they were created, and in the name of our ideals, the ideals of the October. Now is a good moment to act for you. And what could more important for Communists than the future of our movement! We, on our part, are ready to be with you in the future, to cooperate closely and constructively. In this we are open to you without any reservations.

[...] Gorbachev: Miners gave a good lesson to the Secretary of the Donetsk Regional Party Committee. At the enterprises workers were saying right in the shop; why [was it that] the leaders of the country, of the party, care about the workers, are interested in their feelings—there was the new minister with a visit recently—but they had no water in the workers' town for two weeks, and they could not get the Chairman of the local Executive Committee to come[?]. It is no surprise that the workers actively supported some communists, and demanded that others were immediately replaced. And we often see that some of the leaders cannot pull the cart any more, but we don't dare replace him—we are afraid to offend him. Meanwhile, the problems grow and become very painful. In short, there are many "bells" for the party.

From the Soviet side present were: V. Fulin, G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, I. P. Aboimov, V. I. Kochmasov, G. I. Gerasimov, V. A. Koptelteev.

The conversation was recorded by G. S. Ostroumov on October 7, 1989.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive

11 October, Wednesday, 1989

I have read the record of conversation of M.S. [Gorbachev] with Honecker in Berlin. I spoke with him [Gorbachev] about this. Shakhnazarov was present. M.S. called Honecker an "asshole" [mutak]. He, Gorbachev added, could have said to his [East German] lieutenants: I have undergone four operations, I am 78 year old, the stormy time requires too much strength, let me go, I have done my job. Then he might have kept his place in history.

Shakh[nazarov] and I voiced our doubts that even if he had done so he would have kept his place in history. 2-3 years ago it might have been possible. Today he has already been cursed by his people... The Politburo [of the SED] is in session for the second day in Berlin. [future Honecker’s successor Egon] Krenz has promised "to raise a question" about changes to our Ambassador [Vyacheslav Kochemasov] for transmittal to Gorbachev). Honecker warned him: [if you do it] you will become my enemy. However, Krenz seems to have taken the step. What is about to happen?

Source: Notes of Anatoly Chernyaev. The Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation
Fond 2, Opis 2

Translated by Vladislav Zubok
The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Memorandum regarding a Conversation between Vadim Medvedev and Kurt Hager in the CC of the CPSU in Moscow, 13 October 1989

At the beginning Comrade Medvedev expressed his delight to be able to greet Comrade Hager in the CC of the CPSU as an old, trusted friend. He deemed the GDR Cultural Days in the USSR as a great, memorable event in the realm of cooperation between both countries. This cooperation is meaningful particularly in the present circumstances where the situation in both countries is marked by important events. For the CPSU, support for the GDR is very important to the CPSU, as well as their understanding of the process of reorganization and its problems. This aspect is also important to the Cultural Days.

Important processes are also taking place in the GDR, most of all positive, to which the 40th anniversary of the GDR is included, for it means the forty-year existence of a socialist state on German soil.

The CPSU is equally aware that the SED is confronted with problems today. The Soviet comrades hope very much that they will be overcome.

Comrade Hager on his behalf gave thanks for a friendly reception. He conveyed greetings to Comrade Mikhail Gorbatchev and the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU from Comrade Erich Honecker and of the Politburo of the CC of the SED.

The visit by Comrade Gorbatchev in Berlin, his encounters with the citizens and youth, particularly at the FDJ's torch-light procession, revealed the great amount of support towards Comrade Gorbatchev.

Especially important was the meeting with Comrade Erich Honecker and the entire Politburo. In these discussions the problems of both countries were named openly and candidly, and the deepening of cooperation was stressed as absolutely necessary, both in the areas of economy and technology and the realm of social sciences and culture as well.

The "Long Term Conception" just signed is an important document and offers a good foundation for both countries, for the cultural and artistic creators, and for the ministries, to raise cooperation to a qualitatively higher level and develop new forms. The Cultural Days have begun successfully andverify once again that culture makes a contribution, as only it can — namely an emotional one which has an effect on the feelings. In this spirit the Party has resolved single-mindedly to realize this Conception. Comrade Hager proposed that the departments of both central committees act in combination in that aim, and make the corresponding proposals for the conversion of the Conception.

Proceeding onto the matter of the present situation in the GDR, Comrade Hager informed (him) of a two-day Politburo session, in which all the issues and faults in the work of the Party and State were spoken about openly. Altogether it was a very

1 CPSU Member of the Politburo and CC-Secretary Vadim Medvedev along with Kurt Hager before their talk signed a "Long Term Conception for the Development of Cooperation between the GDR and the USSR in the sphere of Culture until the year 2000."

2 The "Days of GDR Culture" in the USSR were pronounced open on the 12 October 1989 in Moscow in the presence of Kurt Hager and the CC-Secretary of the CPSU, Lev Saikov, with a concert by the Leipziger Gewandhausorchester under the direction of Kurt Masur.

3 As the head of a Party and government delegation, Mikhail Gorbatchev visited Berlin on the 6-7 October 1989, on the occasion of the festivities for the 40th anniversary of the GDR.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
critical discussion. Problems on the role of worker-and-farmer-power, the Party, and
also the cooperation between the fraternal parties were handled. To that effect, there
was unanimous agreement to throw out everything which was unproven, to give up
the routine, and to carry out changes both in the Party work as well as in the state
organizations, people's representatives, and in the media and information policies. As a result
of the discussions, the Politburo adopted a declaration which will be published.
Excerpts can also be found in "Pravda."

Comrade Medvedev made the point that the possibility of a verbatim
publication is being looked into.

Comrade Hager informed [here] further that the artists and cultural-creators
have spoken increasingly critically, having nothing to do with cultural or social
problems, but rather most of all about the emerging general situation. The statements
by the Academy of Arts and by the Cultural League were published.4 On the general
situation and its origins Comrade Hager said the following:

1. The emigration of tens of thousands of citizens to the FRG creates great
anxiety and raises the question as to the causes.

2. The GDR is at the mercy of a massive campaign by the enemy — a
psychological warfare against the GDR, the SED, and socialism — which was a
complete failure.

3. An array of opposition groups have emerged, which are trying to organize
themselves, among others a Social Democratic Party as well, of which 7 of 14
founders are clergymen.5 A group of church dignitaries plays a negative role and
incites the atmosphere. Others are opposed to this search for a way of agreement with
state organs.

4. Cultural and artistic-creators, scientists, and other members of the
intelligentsia, workers, and farmers feel there is an inconsistency between word and
deed, that their everyday experiences do not correspond to official reporting.

Consequently a justifiable discontent forms.

On this basis the Politburo adopted the above-mentioned declaration, which
contains all these aspects and opens up new paths for the development of the Party
and for life in the GDR.

Presently consultations are taking place with the district and municipality
leaderships as well as the friendly parties. A plenary session of the CC of the SED is
being prepared for, which will comment on the situation and which will present a
platform on the tasks for the further development of socialism in the GDR for
discussion of the preparatory for the 19th Party Congress. All these steps and plans
mean the introduction of a great dialogue with all circles of the population which
support in the majority the strengthening of socialism.

4 The declaration of the Presidency of the Academy of the Arts in the GDR and the Communist of the
Presidential Session of the GDR Cultural League were already published in Neues Deutschland on 4
October 1989 and 11 October 1989, respectively.

5 The "Social Democratic Party in the GDR" (SDP) was founded on the 7. October 1989 in Schwante
(Municipality Oranienburg). The founding appeal "For a ecological socialist democracy" was first published

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
There are also forces, however, which support anti-socialist positions and choose other forms of discussion, namely that of the demonstration, of attacks on armed [state] organs. In this respect heightened vigilance is required to prevent counterrevolutionary actions. An adjustment in media policy is also important to proceeding further.

In all, a great change is occurring in life in the GDR, in the spirit of the motto of continuity and change, where the stress is placed on change. In this stormy time it is necessary to hold course, to allow no pessimism, and to defend the value of socialism—all tasks of ideological work, in which culture does not have an unimportant role.

Comrade Medvedev was thankful for the detailed statement and on his part informed [Comrade Hager] of the Politburo session of the CC of the CPSU in the previous days. In these deliberations the outcome of Comrade Gorbachev’s visit to the GDR was discussed. Comrade Gorbachev gave a detailed report on the jubilation, the festivities, his talks with people on the sidelines, and on the meetings with the Party leadership and with Comrade Honecker. There was complete agreement on the view that the CPSU will always support the GDR. In the past they always provided aid and support and that will also be so in the future:

- towards the workers’ and farmers’ state on German soil;
- towards the Party leadership;
- and always aid as well [to withstand] attacks from outside.

At the same time the Politburo expressed hope and confidence that the Party leadership of the SED will solve these problems on the basis of a far-reaching analysis and find ways with which they can continue the building of socialism. Above all, steadfastness to the tenets of socialism is the most important by far for both states and equally for all other socialist states.

Comrade Medvedev expressed determination to deepen the cooperation between both states, Parties, and peoples. It is necessary in the fields of science and the economy—just as his talk with Professor Scheler had stressed—and similarly in the cultural realm. In this respect, the “Long Term Conception” has great importance, which will also have repercussions on ideological and theoretical work. Therefore, the coordination must take into account the present conditions of socialism and those in the world. In the Party spheres both Parties should see that the cooperation gains in speed and strength, so that concrete goals may be achieved. In conclusion, Comrade Medvedev reported that Comrade Gorbachev was informed of this meeting and conveyed his warmest greetings. He likewise gives his regards to Comrade Honecker and the entire Politburo leadership, that there is much sympathy for the present problems and will follow attentively what is happening in the GDR. One hopes that the Party leadership can cope with the situation and the position of socialism is strengthened.

Comrade Hager expressed his thanks for the discussion and that the positions of socialism will never be surrendered. However, what was achieved could not have

---

1 Vasily Medvedev had beforehand met with the President of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR, Prof. Dr. Werner Scheler.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Ortman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
been, and that remains so. The GDR is always closely bound to the Soviet Union, and
knows what it obtained in friendship and solidarity, without which it would not have
been able to survive. That points to the responsibility that the GDR has at this point in
Europe and in view of the tones heard already once from the FRG.

Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR
-Bundesarchiv, SED, ZK, IV2/2039/283

Translated by Christiann Hetzner
The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 USBERL 02824 01 OF 04 131120Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAЕ-00
EAP-00 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS 01 SDEL-01 0013 W
324324 131122Z /38
O 131107Z OCT 89
FM USMISION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 03393
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5245
AMMBASSY BONN
INFO AMMBASSY EMBBERLIN
USMISSION USNATO
AMMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USBERLIN 02824

DEPT FOR EUR/CE, BONN FOR WALTER ANDRUSYSZYN/LYNN
GURIAN, DAN THAL/BIMO

USNATO FOR KORNBLUM

TOKYO FOR GLASS

E.0. 12356: N/A
TAGS: WSB, BQG, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF BERLIN PRESS

THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE SUMMARY OF PRESS
REPORTS AND COMMENTARY PREPARED EACH DAY BY U.S.
MISSION BERLIN. IT INCLUDES REPORTS FROM NEWSPAPERS
PUBLISHED IN WEST BERLIN AND FROM THE MAJOR EAST GERMAN
NEWSPAPERS. MISSION BERLIN TRANSMITS THIS SUMMARY FOR
THE SPECIAL USE OF EMBASSY BONN AND WASHINGTON AGENCIES
WHO ARE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS IN BERLIN ON A
DAILY BASIS. IT IS NOT PART OF THE DAILY MEDIA REPORT
SERIES WHICH IS PRODUCED BY EMBASSY BONN FOR ALL OF
WEST GERMANY, INCLUDING WEST BERLIN.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USBERL 02824 01 OF 04 131120Z

REVIEW

TOP NEWS TODAY: SED CHIEF IDEOLOGIST HAGER VISITS

UNCLASSIFIED
MOSCOW; MOSCOW DEMANDS SED COMPROMISE.

BERLIN HEADLINES

TGS: KARLSRUHE (CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) STOPS FOREIGN RESIDENT SUFFRAGE
BMP: SED CHIEF IDEOLOGIST: DIALOGUE. YES -- BUT NOT WITH ALL

VB: FOREIGN RESIDENT SUFFRAGE SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING

TAZ: TINY CRACKS AMONG THE SED HARDLINERS

BZ: YES, MY CHILD, THE LITTLE BLUE STAR IS OUR MIRACLE

D: HONECKER. WEDNESDAY WILL BE HIS LAST WORK DAY

WH: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE

ND: WE WORK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE ENTIRE POPULACE WITH MANY IDEAS AND MUCH ENERGY

OTHER FRONT PAGE NEWS INCLUDES UNCERTAINTY ABOUT POLISH BORDER GUARDS' APPROACH TO GDR REFUGEES (TGS), EXTENDED SHOPPING HOURS IN THE FRG BEYOND THE NORMAL 18:30 DEADLINE (TGS), THE NOMINATION OF BONN PROFESSOR WOLFGANG PAUL AS NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (MOST PAPERS), THE SWEDISH COURT DECISION UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 USBERRL 02824 01 OF 04 131120Z

REVOKING THE COURT SENTENCE ON CHRISTER PETTERSSON, SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME'S CONVICTED ASSASSIN (TGS, ET AL.), WARSAW'S PLAN TO COPE WITH ITS ECONOMIC CRISIS BY ADOPTING THE WEST'S MARKET SYSTEM (BMP), AND UNEXPLAINABLE SKIN DISEASES IN THE VICINITY OF RAMSTEIN AFB, THE SCENE OF LAST YEAR'S AIRSHOW DISASTER (TAZ).

MOMPER ON GDR: COMMENTING IN A SPEECH AT THE ABGEORDNETENHAUS ON RECENT SIGNS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR GOVERNMENT, GOVEMING MAYOR WALTER MOMPER SAID THE TIME OF FEAR IN THE-GDR IS OVER. THE GOVERNMENT IS BREAKING UP OLD PATTERNS OF THOUGHT, BUT THIS IS NOT YET THE EXPECTED BREAKTHROUGH TOWARD DEMOCRACY, HE SAID.

RECENT REJECTIONS OF WESTERN VISITORS AT BERLIN CROSSING POINTS BY EAST BERLIN GUARDS CONSTITUTE A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE VISITORS AGREEMENT AND OF THE
FOUR power agreement, he stated, but he announced that
the Senat will continue talks with the GDR government
to achieve good neighborly relations in all areas (vb.
TGS, BMP, TAZ, Faz).

GDR reinforces sector border installations. East
Berlin border guards have begun ramming poles into the
river bank at arm's length distance from the Spree,
next to the Reichstag. There is speculation that they
are building an underwater fence to prevent their
people from swimming to the west (TGS).

Neues Forum West: An assembly of about 70 people
in west Berlin failed yesterday to create a
constitution for a Neues Forum West. To act as a
SUPPORT ORGANIZATION OF THE EAST GERMAN NEUES FORUM OPPOSITION MOVEMENT. THE GROUP WAS UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT EXACTLY COULD BE DONE TO HELP (BMP, TAZ).

HOUSING SHORTAGE: WITH THE HOUSING SHORTAGE IN THE CITY GETTING ACUTE, THE SENAT IS NOW CONSIDERING PLANS TO USE STILL-EXISTING WW II BOMB SHELTERS AND OTHER AIR SHELTERS IN THE CITY FOR PROVISIONAL HOUSING PURPOSES. SENAT SPOKESMAN WERNER KOLHOFF SAID THESE INSTALLATIONS CAN HOUSE UP TO 21,000 PEOPLE (BMP).


COMPROMISE ON ELECTRICITY GRID: SUPPORTERS OF A COMPROMISE ON THE PLANNED ELECTRICITY GRID HAVE GAINED THE UPPER HAND IN THE AL CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES. THE CONFERENCE AGREED TO CREATE A STUDY GROUP TO DISCUSS WITH SPD REPRESENTATIVES WHAT OPTIONS FOR AN ELECTRICITY GRID ARE IN CONSONANCE WITH THE CURRENT EFFORTS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENERGY CONSERVATION (TGS, VB, BMP, TAZ).

FLIGHT NOISE RECORDS TO BE PUBLISHED: THE SENAT ENVIRONMENT OFFICE (SENAATSUMWELTVERWALTUNG) ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY AT THE ABGEORDNETENHAUS COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL AFFAIRS THAT RECORDS ON FLIGHT NOISE WILL BE MADE.
PUBLIC FROM NOW ON, CHAIRMAN REINHARD FUEHRER INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT THE ALLIES HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO THE PROJECT. SIXTY (60) PERCENT OF THE AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY USED BELONG TO THE NOISY CLASS 2, AND 40 PERCENT BELONG TO THE NOISE-REDUCED CLASS 3 OF THE MEASURING SCALE. BERLINER MORGENPOST SAYS (BMP).

FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE: FIRST RESPONSES TO THE FEDERAL COURT DECISION AGAINST FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE SHOW SPD AND AL REPRESENTATIVES TO BE UNIMPRESSIONED. SPD CAUCUS LEADER DITMAR STAFFELT SAID THE DECISION WAS UNCLASSIFIED.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 USBERL 02824 02 OF 04 131122Z

CLEARLY OF A FORMAL NATURE, AND THAT HE CAN SEE HIS PARTY SUPPORTING THE RESPECTIVE DRAFT IN THE CITY JUST THE SAME (TGS, BMP, TAZ).


NO LONGER A REPUBLIKANER CAUCUS IN SPANDAU: SINCE FORMER REPUBLIKANER CHIEF BERNHARD ANDRES' WIFE MONIKA HAS LEFT THE PARTY AS WELL, ONLY ONE MEMBER OF THE PARTY REMAINS IN SPANDAU'S DISTRICT ASSEMBLY, AND THEREFORE A CAUCUS CANNOT BE FORMED (VB).

NATIONAL NEWS:


EC PARLIAMENT DEMANDS REFORMS IN THE GDR: AN UNUSUALLY LARGE MAJORITY OF THE EC PARLIAMENT PLENUM ENDORSED AN EC RESOLUTION YESTERDAY RECOGNIZING HUNGARY'S ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXODUS, AND UNDERSCORING THE BURDENS FOR POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 USBERL 02824 03 OF 04 131123Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00
EAP-00 PA-02 INRE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 SDEL-01 /013 W

324466 131128Z /10 37

O 131107Z OCT 89
FM USMISSION USBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0341
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5247
AMBASSAD BONN
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 04 USBERLIN 02824

DEPT FOR EUR/CE, BONN FOR WALTER ANDRUSYSZYN/LYNN
GURIAN, DAN THAL/BBMO

USNATO FOR KORNBLUM

TOKYO FOR GLASS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: WSB, BQG, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF BERLIN PRESS

CAUSED BY THE EXODUS. THE RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS
OPPOSED BY ONLY ONE PARLIAMENT MEMBER, DEMANDS THAT THE
EC SUMMIT MEETING OF HEADS OF STATE IN DECEMBER FOCUS
ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE GDR AND ON THE
REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE ENTIRE EAST (TGS).
(WEST PRESS: TGS-DER TAGESSPIEGEL, BMP-BERLINER MORGENPOST, VD-VOLKSBLATT, DW-DIE WELT, B-BILDZEITUNG, BZ-BERLINER ZEITUNG, WH-DIE WAHRHEIT, TAZ-DIE)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02  USBERL 02824 03 OF 04 131123Z

SZ-SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG; FR-FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU; EAST PRESS: BRL-BERLINER ZEITUNG; NAT-NATIONAL ZEITUNG; NZ-NEUE ZEIT; ND-NEUES DEUTSCHLAND)

COMMENTARIES

MOST PAPERS INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON THE FRG CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISION OPPOSING, FOR THE TIME BEING, NEW LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD GRANT FOREIGN RESIDENTS THE RIGHT TO VOTE. OTHER EDITORIALS DISCUSS GDR DEVELOPMENTS (TAZ, BERLINER MORGENPOST, DIE WAHRHEIT), THE "Celle HOLE" INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SCANDAL OF 1978 IN LOWER SAXONY (DER TAGESSPIEGEL), AND THE "COURAGEOUS" SWEDISH COURT DECISION REVOKE A PREVIOUS COURT SENTENCE ON CHRISTER PETTERSSON, WHO HAD BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF ASSASSINATING PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME (VOLKSBLETT)

THE GDR

THE INDEPENDENT-CONSERVATIVE BERLINER MORGENPOST, UNDER THE HEADLINE "THE SED STICKS TO ITS POWER," FEATURES AN EDITORIAL BY RUDOLF STIEGE WHO SAYS: "ONE SHOULD REALLY NOT BELIEVE THAT THE OVERDUE REFORMS IN THE GDR DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT GDR LEADER HONECKER IS AT THE HELM...ONE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT HONECKER, IN THE CIRCLE OF OLD ORTHODOX HARDLINERS SUCH AS HAGER, AXEN AND MIELKE, APPEARS LIKE A LIBERAL. WESTERN GDR EXPERTS KEPT ON WHISPERING AMONG THEMSELVES FOR A LONG TIME THAT SOMEDAY, EVERYBODY WILL LONG FOR THE GOOD OLD TIMES UNDER HONECKER.

"IS ALL THIS SUPPOSED TO BE DIFFERENT NOW? TO BE SURE, THE SED POLITBURO OBVIOUSLY DEMANDED, IN A RATHER UNCLASSIFIED...

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03  USBERL 02824 03 OF 04 131123Z

RUDE TONE, THAT HONECKER SWIFTLY PREPARE A REPORT ON
THE SITUATION, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS CANCELLED A TRIP TO DENMARK, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN AT ALL THAT HONECKER WILL BE TOPPLED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME HARDLINERS IN EAST BERLIN HAVE PICKED HONECKER AS A SCAPEGOAT AND WANT TO SACRIFICE HIM TO SOOTHE THE SITUATION IN THE GDR, ONLY TO GET BACK TO THE CONTROLS AFTER THIS STRATEGIC MANEUVER.

"ONE THING IS ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN: THE CURRENT SED IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT REAL REFORMS - WITH OR WITHOUT HONECKER. THE SED DOES NOT WANT TO SHARE ITS POWER."

(MP)

FAR-LEFT TAZ, UNDER THE HEADLINE "APPEASMENT WITHOUT REFORMS," INCLUDES A GUEST COMMENTARY BY LUTZ RATHENOW, EAST GERMAN WRITER FROM EAST BERLIN, WHO SAYS: "WHILE THE BORDERS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND ARE MADE INCREASINGLY LESS CROSSABLE, THE POLITBURO WANTS TO TALK WITH US ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF TRAVELING ABROAD. WE ARE SUPPOSED TO LEARN ABOUT OUR INABILITY TO TRAVEL. IF THEY UP THERE (THE POLITICAL LEADERS) REALLY WANTED A DIALOGUE. THEY WOULD AT LEAST TRY TO CORRECT THE MISTAKES MADE IN THE RECENT PAST: THEY WOULD, FOR INSTANCE, PERMIT THE SOVIET 'SPUTNIK' MAGAZINE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE AGAIN. THEY WOULD RELEASE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND WOULD APOLOGIZE TO THOSE WHO WERE ARRESTED AND BEATEN UP FOR NO REASON ON OCTOBER 7 AND 9.

"IN COMPARISON WITH WHAT GDR CITIZENS SAY, THE
WESTERN MEDIA COMMENTARIES ARE CAUTIOUS. THE PICTURES OF THE EVENTS ARE MINCING THE MATTER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHAT PICTURES WOULD SHOW IF CAMERAS WERE PERMITTED EVERYWHERE IN THE COUNTRY.

"NO, THE WEST IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS IN THE GDR. THE WEST POSSIBLY EVEN DAMPENS IT." (MP)

FAR-LEFT TAZ ALSO INCLUDES A COMMENTARY BY KLAUS HARTUNG WHO CRITICALLY REVIEWS THE RECENT SED POLITBURO UNCLASSIFIED
THAWING. THE OPPOSITION GROUP WILL UNDERSTAND FROM THE PAPER THAT CURRENTLY NOTHING COULD BE MORE WRONG AND USELESS THAN WORKING AGAINST THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES. AN ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN MOVEMENT IS FORMING FOR THOSE WHOM IT IS NO LONGER ENOUGH THAT THE LEADERS, FOR FEAR OF LOSING THEIR POWER, NOW WANT TO SPEAK. THEY MUST ALSO NOW BE ABLE TO SPEAK." (MP)

FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE

THE INDEPENDENT-CONSERVATIVE BERLINER MORGENPOST UNDER THE HEADLINE "FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE." SAYS: "THE DISPUTE ON THE FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE HAS FOUND ITS PROVISIONAL END WITH THE KARLSRUHE FEDERAL COURT DECISION YESTERDAY: A PROVISIONAL ENACTMENT TO UNDERSTAND THE ONGOING DISPUTE AS WELL AS THE COURT DECISION, READERS SHOULD KNOW THE FOLLOWING:

"1. THE DISPUTE OVER THE COMMUNAL SUFFRAGE FOR FOREIGNERS IS BASICALLY OF POLITICAL NATURE. DIFFERENT GROUPS ARE DEFENDING THEIR PARTICULAR INTERESTS. CDU REPRESENTATIVES, ABOVE ALL, BELIEVE THAT FOREIGN VOTERS WOULD BRING GREAT ADVANTAGES TO SPD AND AL. THIS IS REASON ENOUGH FOR THE CDU TO TAKE THE MATTER TO KARLSRUHE (FEDERAL COURT).

"2. THE COURT DECISION OF YESTERDAY DID NOT SAY A SINGLE WORD ON WHETHER FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE ON THE COMMUNAL LEVEL IS LEGALLY POSSIBLE OR NOT. IT IS A STRICTLY FORMAL DECISION ON THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. THE KARLSRUHE JUDGES NEED SEVERAL MORE MONTHS TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER, THEY SAY, AND THERE IS SIMPLY NOT ENOUGH TIME TO SETTLE THE CASE BEFORE THE UPCOMING SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN ELECTIONS (WITH WHICH THE DECISION IS CONCERNED). THEREFORE, THESE ELECTIONS ARE TO BE RUN ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING REGULATIONS, WHICH DO NOT PROVIDE FOR FOREIGN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION.

"3. THE STILL-OUTSTANDING DECISION ON THE ISSUE WILL HAVE SOME BEARING ON BERLIN AS WELL. FOR THE SPD AND, ABOVE ALL, THE AL INTEND TO INTRODUCE FOREIGN CITIZEN SUFFRAGE ON THE BERLIN DISTRICT LEVEL AS WELL. THE AL HAS EVEN TAKEN THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL."
"BUT BOTH PARTIES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT THE KARLSRUHE JUDGES' DECISION WILL BE. IN A YEAR OR SO, WE ALL WILL KNOW MORE.

"AND SINCE THE NEXT ELECTIONS IN BERLIN WILL NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL THREE-AND-A-HALF YEARS FROM NOW, THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT TIME THEN FOR A TIMELY SUBMISSION OF A DRAFT ON THE MATTER. IF THE KARLSRUHE JUDGES SHOULD IN FACT PASS A DECISION IN FAVOR OF FOREIGN CITIZENS' PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNAL ELECTIONS...." (HFH)
GILMORE
Excerpts from Chernyaev’s Theses Prepared for Gorbachev’s Report to the Defense Council

October 17, 1989

(…) It has been necessary to take a fresh look at the practice of military build-up as it established itself during the decades of the Cold War. As we only touched on this subject, we saw a “big overkill.” The tempo and scale of growth of the military-industrial complex added little to security of the country from the purely military viewpoint. And they badly affected the state of the economy, weighed heavily on all our social structures.

(…) Without the utilization of [the resources of the military-industrial complex], without their application to the solution of public social tasks, we cannot carry out perestroika. Such a gap between non-military and military potentials was absolutely unacceptable, all the more so since in NATO countries, especially in the United States, these [military and civilian] industries are concentrated in the same corporations and spill-over from one into another ensuring powerful economic growth up to the modern level.

Still, the governments of NATO countries have not ceased to be our potential adversaries, have not renounced their intention “to roll back communism,” to undermine the role of the Soviet Union as a world power. Emerging positive trends have not yet become irreversible. The restructuring of international relations is a long-term business and will require colossal endeavors.

Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Anatoly Chernyaev papers, Fond 2, Opis 1

Translated by Vladislav Zubok

National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2150 H Street, NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20037
After the unsuccessful acts of the internal enemies for the 21 August anniversary, pressure in the enemy camp was stepped up to perfect the organizational structures of individual enemy groups and to elaborate a common platform. At the same time the opponent is concentrating his energies, besides the coordinated distribution of various declarations, on the elaboration of a common strategic plan of the opposition in the CSSR and the preparation of a joint political party—the so-called Party of the United Opposition. This was also established at the meeting of the consultative group of the independent initiatives (the representatives of the Movement for Civic Freedom (HOS), the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiatives and KSP Renewal) on 2 October 1989 in Prague. The aim of the opponent to form a so-called Civic Committee also persists. The purpose of these efforts is the creation of a representative organ of the opposition and to bring the state and party organs to a “round-table” discussion following the Polish and Hungarian models.

Besides the efforts for integration, the tendency of the internal enemy to engage official organizations in their activity, with the intent of gaining their own legalization and achieving a dialog between official and so-called independent organizations, is becoming more pronounced. It is possible to introduce as an example the efforts of the “Independent World Association—initiatives for the demilitarization of society” to
engage the Czechoslovak World Organization in the preparation of the so-called Helsinki Assembly for Peace and Democracy with a seat in Prague (the origin of which is prepared in the first half 1990) and the efforts of the preparatory committee “Society for the study of democratic socialism” to organize an international seminar on Socialist Internationales in cooperation with Committee of the Czechoslovak Public for Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation in November of this year.

The internal enemy is also trying to penetrate into the superstructures of the society. This can especially be seen in the areas of scientific and cultural intelligence, and not only in forced petition signings, but also in the creation of other so-called independent initiatives. An example of this is the establishment of the initiative “MOST”,14 made up of cultural workers which should also become the mediator of dialog between the enemy environment and official organizations, and also establish the so-called Circle of the Independent Intelligence (KNI), whose goal is to create a platform uniting scientific workers who are opposed to the politics of the CPCz. Its efforts are concentrated on the discrediting and disbanding of the SSM [youth union], and the creation of a series of independent youth initiatives. The evidence for this is the creation of the new “politically independent youth union” in the central Bohemian region and other places.

A dangerous phenomenon related to the coming anniversary of the origin of the CSR and the effort to activate high school youth, is the distribution of anonymous anti-communist letters from Prague addressed to high schools. For now, this has been proven in eastern, southern and northern regions. They summon the directors, pedagogical counsels and SSM groups [youth unions] to “a dignified celebration of the 28 October” and to the elevation of the work of T. G. Masaryk. They condemn the document “Lesson from the crisis development…” and rate positively the intentions of the so-called Prague spring 1968. It is possible to assume that they will be gradually distributed on the entire territory of the CSSR and broad-cast in the transmissions of the inflammatory stations Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, with the aim of sending out their message to the widest Czechoslovak society.

The internal structure of individual initiatives is also gradually being strengthened with the aim of increasing their ability to act on the entire territory. For example, during the so-called conference of Democratic Initiatives on 10-16 September 1989, the group was further politicized, reflected in the newly approved title “Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, Political and Social Movement” (CSDI), the organizational policies and program contents. The immediate goal was the expansion of the member base, the strengthening of the organizational structure, the establishing of local and provincial groups, and the development of activity in thematic units and consumer clubs. The realization of these goals is tied to the creation of satellite organizations, working as sections of CSDI (e.g. the student, ecological and others) with their own program, making possible for them the future transition to their own political organization. Proof of this are the intentions to change, for example, the so-called ecological section into the Green Party.

Several negative political manifestations in the activity of non-communist parties in the CSSR are multiplying. Right-wing and religious-oriented functionaries in centers and regions are trying to bring about changes in the positions of these parties in the political system independent of the CPCz line and establish political pluralism. These
tendencies are especially marked in the functionaries and member bases of —SL and —

SS.15

During the realization of his goals, the internal enemy is also counting on increased support for his activity from the Polish Solidarity party as government and parliamentary powers and the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the youth organization FIDESZ as an organization directly connected to the politics of the state with a decisive influence in parliament, but also with the support of the official institutions and personages of Hungary. The contacts with several individuals and groups from the USSR, especially journalistic and historic-theoretical circles, with the representatives of so-called independent initiatives are becoming especially important for the moral support of the enemy.

The cooperation of the internal enemy with Western political structures and official institutions is on a qualitatively higher level. The official actors of the Austrian SPÖ and the West German SPD are expressing their support for the activity of the so-called Society for the Study of Democratic Socialism, which should gradually change into assistance during the organizing of a party of the social democratic type. Honorable awards from various Western foundations have been given to the head representatives of the so-called independent initiatives in the CSSR, as an expression of appreciation of their “fight” for human rights. An example of this is the award of “German Publishers” with a grant of 25,000 DM given to Vaclav Havel, which is supposed to be used for the founding and anti-social activity of the so-called publishing cooperative ATLANTIS.

Besides the activity of the internal enemy, Western ideological centers and emigrant groups are trying to influence the Czechoslovak public and organize provocative acts even on the territory of socialist countries. Polish Solidarity together with the Czechoslovak emigration is organizing a seminar in the beginning of November this year in Vratislav 16 devoted to the problems of culture in Central Europe, a part of which will be an overview of “Czechoslovak independent and emigre literature.” Underground concerts of Czechoslovak emigrants and meetings with the representatives of so-called independent initiatives are organized in Hungary by ideological centers.

The simultaneous activity of the internal enemy nevertheless does not fulfill the expectations of the Western ideological centers about the ability of the opposing forces in the CSSR to act. There is pressure from abroad on the Charter-77 and other initiatives to present themselves in public more conspicuously and to “come out of illegality” and politicize their activity, under threat of ending their financial support. The nearest convenient occasion for this is the anniversary of the origin of the CSR [Czechoslovak Republic]. A concrete example is the pressure on the representatives of CSDI to announce their formation of a political party at the above-mentioned anniversary.

The meeting of the speakers of Charter-77 on 23 September 1989 was supposed to prepare concrete acts, but it was prevented. Vaclav Havel prepared the so-called pronouncement for the 28 October 17 for this occasion, in which the conditions of the first republic are idealized and the legalization of the opposition, the end of the applicability of the temporary agreement on the stay of Soviet troops in CSSR, and the destruction of barricades on the borders are demanded. Other groups are to prepare analogous pronouncements. The endeavor of the opponent is to establish from of these declarations a common position of the so-called independent initiatives for the anniversary of the origin of the CSSR.
A meeting of the representatives of illegal organizations The Independent World Coalition, The Movement for Civic Freedom and the Czechoslovak Independent Initiatives on 3 October 1989 in Prague had the same purpose. Among other things, it was agreed that if they were not allowed to use any spaces for their “celebrations”, they would arrange a gathering in the pedestrian zone in Prague.

The speakers of “Charter-77” sent a letter on 26 September 1989 to the National Committee of the capital Prague, in which they proposed allowing “Charter-77” to organize their own “independent reminder of this state holiday”, and for its implementation they recommended the lease of a hall of the Radio Palace or Lucerna type.

The coordinating committee, made up of representatives of from HOS, CSDI and Renewal, are organizing the demonstration. On 2 October 1989 Rudolf Battek and Ladislav Lis met with Dr. Martin Houska of the National Committee of Prague, and they requested in the name of HOS, CSDI and Renewal a permit for a demonstration on 28 October 1989 at 3 p.m. or 6 p.m. on an open space (Letna plain, Hvezda park, in front of the park of culture and the vacation house of Julius Fucik or the memorial at Vitkov). In connection with this request, during a meeting at the department of internal affairs of the ONV Prague 7 on 3 October 1989, they probed the possibility of obtaining a permit for a demonstration on Letna plain. This program is proposed at the gathering: after the opening ceremony, several main Czechoslovak actors will read quotations from Capek, followed by the main declaration probably by V. Havel with a demand for a dialog with the opposition and free elections.

It is evident from the context of the activity of the opposition, that through these requests it is trying to rid itself of responsibility for eventual consequences of the anti-social gathering, which they are striving for, and blame the state and party organs.

The climax of the acts motivated by the anniversary of the origin of the CSR is supposed to be a common demonstration of so-called independent initiatives in the center of Prague on 28 October 1989. For now there are various opinions as to its concrete shape.

Just as in August of last year the enemy environment is counting on the presence of representatives of Solidarity and the Hungarian opposition at the demonstration. A meeting of the delegates of CSDI, “Charter-77”, Renewal and HOS with the delegates of the Hungarian Democratic Forum is also planned for this day to establish a common committee.

Despite the efforts of the radical part of the opposition, represented by T. Hradlik, to concentrate enemy powers in Prague, it can be expected that the acts of 28 October 1989 will cross over to other parts of the republic. Evidence has been ascertained of the efforts of the representatives of HOS and the T. G. Masaryk society to organize a demonstration in Brno on Victory Boulevard and Place of Peace for the renaming of Victory Boulevard to Masaryk street.

As evidenced from the above-mentioned facts, despite the organizational measures and the continuing efforts for integration, diversity of opinion and disunity on how to organize the anti-social gathering persists in the enemy camp. Especially prevalent are the fears of counter measures by state organs and the subsequent “crash” of the prepared acts, as was in August. The moderate wing of the opposition is apprehensive of the radicalization of a growing part of the group, especially young members and
adherents, which could lead them to a direct clash with the state powers and even impede the long-term goals and plans of the opposition.

On the other hand they are well aware that the current international and internal political conditions provide them with a suitable space for such a gathering, and to not take advantage of them could result in isolation and loss of support not only from abroad, but also from the politicized part of their followers, especially the young.

For these reasons with 28 August nearing, it is possible to expect increased activity on the part of the internal enemy trying to correct the “bad impression” from August of this year.

The situation regarding the safe-guarding of the state border of the CSSR was to some extent complicated by the decisions of the Hungarian government on 11 September 1989 to enable citizens from the GDR to travel to any country. As a result of this, the CSSR has practically become a transit stop for them before emigrating to capitalist countries. In total 3,288 trespassers were caught on state borders in September 1989, 3,082 of them were citizens from GDR. In September there were 9 [incidents of] violent border crossings at passport control booths from the CSSR to Hungary. In this period the attitude of the Hungarian passport and border organs toward cooperation with Czechoslovakia has worsened, since they refuse to extradite the citizens from the GDR who illegally crossed the border between the CSSR and Hungary.

After the state organs of the GDR decided on 3 October 1989, to put an end to GDR citizens’ [ability to] travel without a visa or passport to the CSSR, the number of individuals arriving from the GDR dramatically decreased. At the same time, however, the number of attempts to illegally cross the borders into the CSSR have risen abruptly. For example, just between 3 and 5 of October 1989, 726 GDR citizens who had penetrated into the CSSR in order to emigrate were detained. The situation calmed down after measures were implemented by the organs of the CSSR and GDR.

A difficult situation came about at the end of September and beginning of August 1989, on the border with Poland, where it was not possible to secure safe transit for overfull international trains from Poland. The delays frequently exceeded 10 hours. There were also problems in clearing Polish citizens at the Czechoslovak-Austrian border, where the waiting period exceeded 8 hours. The reason for this was the unusually high number of traveling Polish nationals and their strict clearance by Austrian customs officials. More attention is being paid to the situation on the state borders with Poland, Hungary and the GDR, and necessary measures will be taken according to its concrete development.

There is unrest among Czechoslovak citizens because citizens of Poland, Hungary and in part the USSR buy up consumer goods during their stay, especially the ones imported from capitalist countries, mostly foodstuffs of all kinds, but also clothes, footwear, sporting goods, installation and building materials, etc. Purchases of foodstuffs reaching 1,500 Kcs are not exceptional. In some areas, especially those close to the borders, it is becoming more difficult to maintain fuel supplies and even certain essential foods. As a result, our citizens are criticizing party and state organs.

The public security situation in the CSSR in 1989 was basically stabilized, and peace and order were secured. Disciplinary units were dispatched only in the event of provocative gatherings of anti-socialist forces in January, May and August in Prague. Decisive cooperative measures between other units of the security apparatus and the
People’s Militias brought the gatherings under control. Several instances of disturbing the peace also arose during sporting and cultural events. These, however, never went beyond the city limits and did not require special forces or measures.

Since the beginning of the year (especially in the first quarter and before 21 August), a significant increase in anonymous phone calls and letters was noted (in the end of September the number exceeded 520), in which the culprits threatened terrorist acts. There is a clear shift in their intentions. In the beginning of the year in almost all cases the destruction of objects or means of transportation was threatened. Recently there have been a growing number of individual death threats, above all [aimed at] those who publicly denounced the enemy acts of anti-socialist elements.

The anonymous threats were proven to be false through effected measures. Finding the culprits has not been successful, with only around 15% of cases closed. More than 2.5 thousand flyers and 500 harmful letters were recorded. They were largely aimed at party and state functionaries.

The number of recorded criminal acts and felonies increased slightly to a total of 135,234, with a constant level of 80% of cases closed. Damages due to by the crime rate rose by more that 64 million Kcs and exceeded 511 million Kcs. The slight increase in the crime rate was caused by the greater number of general criminal acts (2.3% more). The biggest gain in the crime rate was noted in property crimes, rising by 3.2%, with 62% of all such cases closed. Property crime represented about half of all crimes committed in the CSSR. Breaking and entering sustained the most striking growth, climbing by 8%. Breaking and entering into apartments is increasing ominously, the number of incidents up by 1,641 from last year, while the rate of cases closed remains at 55%.

The number of violent acts remains at the same level of the previous period, with 95% of cases closed. The number of the most serious violent crimes has gone up, 2 murders added to a total of 89 cases (with 96.6% of them closed), and 54 cases of burglary added to 651 (with 87.6% of them closed).

Out of the specific and key problems in the fight against crime, the criminal relapse and violent crime committed by Gypsies are rising, constituting almost two thirds of all crime and more than one third of white-collar crime. The slight increase in crime among young people continues. They commit 16% of all crimes in general and one third of all white-collar crime. Most disturbing is the high rate of criminality among young Gypsies, representing 25% of crimes committed by young people, exceeding 40% in Slovakia.

There is a very negative situation in the area of non-alcoholic addiction. The number of addicts recorded by the organs of the VB (Public Security) is close to 7,000. About half are individuals 18-25 years of age, and some addicts are even children 15 and younger, with 200 such cases recorded. As a result of abuse of dangerous substances 21 people have died in an estimated period.

In total 21,877 cases of white-collar crimes and felonies have been solved, but the documented damages grew by 79 million Kcs. and exceeded 250 million Kcs. The investigative organs and economic organizations share slightly less than 9% of crimes solved, although for the most part they are infractions in the work-place. The most frequent white-collar crime remains burglary of property in socialist possession. The
growing delinquency of work bosses in the economic sector is evidenced in the uncovering of 1,924 crimes against economic order (a growth of 829).

The numerous extraordinary events are causing not insignificant damage to the national economy. They outweighed fires, traffic break-downs and accidents, and mishaps of public rail transportation. The most frequent cause of the extraordinary events is still the disturbance of work procedures, not respecting technical safety, gross violation of policies and regulations on work safety.

The number of traffic accidents have also increased. There have been 48,912 traffic accidents, which is basically at the same level as last year. The consequences are in all indications the most dire. In all 589 people have died (up by 50), 2,619 were heavily injured (up by 401), and serious damages have also increased. There have occurred 3,122 accidents induced by alcohol, an increase of 111.

Preventive and destructive measures are undertaken in order to suppress the enemy’s activity, frustrate the efforts to unite individual groups and impede the enemy’s ability to act, especially that of the organizers of enemy acts.

In the places of the assumed origin of mass anti-social gatherings and in places with a concentration of enemy individuals, especially in Prague, Brno and Bratislava, the patrol units of the VB will be strengthened, with the aim of preventing the distribution of flyers and stopping enemy elements from participating in anti-social gatherings.

In all regions of the CSSR measure have been taken to prevent the participation of the main enemies at anti-social gatherings, especially in Prague. Analogous measures are also undertaken with respect to enemies from abroad.

In the event of mass anti-social gatherings VB and LM units will be ready to intervene for the use of more peaceful means.

INFO LOG-09 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 QC-02 CIAE-08 EB-01 DOD-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-09 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 INRE-00 CIR-01 ACDA-12 SP-02 SN2-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-02 (AS-01 ACDA-12) 986 W

02 1703 OCT 89
EM AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1317
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USAISF BERLIN GE
USDEL NST GENEVA
USDOC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 7380

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 EMBBERLIN 08466

CORRECTED COPY - TEXT

VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBMS DEL

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL

F.O. 12356: DECL.OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PHEM, PREL, GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: THE HONECKER ERA FADES QUICKLY

REFS: EMBBERLIN 8447 AND PREVIOUS

1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EMBBER 08466 01 OF 06 211325Z

2. SUMMARY AND COMMENT: TWO WEEKS AGO THE GDR WAS EASTERN EUROPE'S MOST PROMINENT HOLDOUT AGAINST
REFORM. IN DAY TWO OF THE KREUZERLA IT IS EMBARRASSED ON REFORMS, BOTH OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED AND DEVELOPING SPONTANEOUSLY. THE MIX IS UNCERTAIN AND SHIFTING.

3. THE NEW LEADER USES OCTOBER 19 TO TALK CANDIDLY WITH BERLIN WORKERS ABOUT PROBLEMS -- NOT LEAST THAT THE PARTY HAD NOT BEEN LISTENING TO THEIR COMPLAINTS -- AND TO MEET WITH THE SENIOR GDR PROTESTANT CLERGYMAN, BISHOP LECH, IN AN OBVIOUS GESTURE OF RECONCILIATION.

4. MEANWHILE, INDEPENDENT ACTIVISTS, WHO ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF KREUZER INTENTIONS, CONTINUE THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY. ESTABLISHMENT INSTITUTIONS ARE SHOWING INDEPENDENCE, AND SMALL-SCALE, PEACEFUL STREET DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE MADE THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE NORTH (GREIFSWALD AND NEUBRANDENBURG). END SUMMAR Y AND COMMENT

KREUZER REACHES OUT TO A FORGOTTEN CONSTITUENCY...

5. KREUZER WENT TO A BERLIN FACTORY IN EFFECT TO SHOW THAT HE COULD TALK FACE-TO-FACE WITH WORKERS AND TO APOLOGIZE THAT THE PARTY HAD BEEN IGNORING A FUNDAMENTAL PILLAR OF THE STATE. GDR TELEVISION CARRIED LONG SEGMENTS OF APPARENTLY SPONTANEOUS DEBATE WITH WORKERS WHO LOOKED AND SOUNDED AS IF THEY HAD NOT
BEEN COACHED BY PARTY HACKS

6. WHAT PARTICULARLY STRUCK US, IN ADDITION TO THE
OVERALL IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS A SKILLED DEBATER
WHO BELIEVES HE HAS NO REASON TO SHY FROM UNSTRUCT-
TURED INTERACTION, AS HONECKER SO CLEARLY DID IN
HIS LAST YEARS, WERE A FEW ISOLATED MOMENTS:

-- A WORKER TOLD KRENZ THAT MANY FLEED THE GDR IN
RECENT MONTHS BECAUSE THEY HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT
NO ONE IN THE PARTY WAS PAYING ATTENTION TO THEIR
PROBLEMS, OR EVEN THAT THE PRESS TALKED ABOUT THEM.
THIS HAS BEGIN TO CHANGE, HASN'T IT, ASKED KRENZ,
AND THE WORKER AGREED THAT IT APPEARED TO BE DOING
SO IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS.

-- TO KRENZ' PLEA THAT SURELY THERE WERE COMMON
INTERESTS BETWEEN WORKERS AND PARTY LEADERS, CAME
THE ANSWER THAT THE POLITBURO DIDN'T KNOW WHAT IT
WAS LIKE TO RUN ABOUT TRYING TO FIND SPARE PARTS
FOR THE CAR AFTER WORK.

CONFIDENTIAL
A worker told Krenz to his face that he found his October 18 speech too full of generalities. The answer: "I thank you for telling me that I didn't confidential.

...and to an ignored constituency.

7. Perhaps the day's biggest news was that Krenz put discussion with the church leadership so high on his agenda. In doing so, he seemed to be saying that the party, which had shunned dialogue for two years, was now eager to use the bishops to help it communicate with the discontented activists who are a growing political factor.

8. The meeting with Bishop Leich and his lay deputy, Manfred Stolpe, our contacts say, was a surprise. A previously requested meeting with Honecker to discuss the church's view of the looming crisis had been firmed up only last week. The church leadership was convinced that it would be cancelled or postponed. Instead, they were told that the new leader would be happy to keep the appointment.

9. The 3-hour meeting at a hunting lodge near Berlin produced little specific, but Krenz went out of his way to be open and forthcoming. Leich said that Kren had spoken clearly and effectively in the small circle and was a better communicator than his
THE CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES URGED KRENZ TO TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF THE CHURCH'S POSITION ON SOCIETAL PROBLEMS. THE CHURCH WAS NOT A FLATTERER OR KNOW-IT-ALL, BUT A RESPONSIBLE ENTITY. IT URGED QUICK CLEAR SIGNALS OF A NEW BEGINNING. KRENZ HAD AGREED THAT TO REDUCE TENSIONS IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET THINGS MOVING. HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD GONE PERSONALLY TO LEIPZIG OCTOBER 9 TO PREVENT A POLICE-DEMONSTRATOR CONFRONTATION.

THE BISHOP STRESSED THE NEED FOR OPEN DIALOGUE WITH EVERYONE -- INCLUDING UNOFFICIAL GROUPS. A DISCUSSION OF THEIR PLATFORMS IN GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED FACILITIES WOULD REDUCE PRESSURE FOR PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS. KRENZ NEITHER AGREED NOR DISAGreed. THE CHURCH LEADERS ALSO URGED TRAVEL EXPANSION, INCLUDING ISSUANCE OF A PASSPORT TO EVERYONE; CLEAR ELECTORAL PROCEDURES; DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. ALSO, THEY SAID, SIMPLER PROCEDURES SHOULD BE DEVELOPED TO REINTEGRATE ANY RETURNING EMIGRES. KRENZ TOOK CAREFUL NOTES BUT GAVE no PROMISES.

CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES TOLD US, HOWEVER.
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 QIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00 DOD-00 H-01 IN-19 NSCE-00 NSA-00 SS-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-02 PA-01 OMB-01 NRE-00 COR-01 ACDA-12 SJ-02 NSF-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 074 W

O 22176/12 OCT 89

FW AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7219
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USAFSR BERLIN GE
USDRL NST GENEVA
USDRC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 3782

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 EMBERLIN 08466

VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBMS DEL

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL

COPY (FOR TEXT)

E.O. 12336: DECL-GADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINNS, PHUM, PREL, UC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS. THE HONECKER ERA FADES QUICKLY

THAT THEY BELIEVED THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING CHANGES, INCLUDING EXPANSION OF THE SYSTEM OF LAWS (RECHTSSTAATLICHKEIT). CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EMBERLIN 08466 03 OF 06 22:311Z
INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DRAFTING LEGISLATION AND RELAXING TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. KRENZ TOLD THEM THAT, CONTRARY TO RUMORS, THE 1986 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WERE NOT GOING TO BE ADVANCED. THE CHURCH PEOPLE TOOK THAT AS A POSITIVE SIGN THAT THE TIME WOULD BE USEFUL TO DRAFT NEW ELECTORAL REGULATIONS AND PREPARE A DIALOGUE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENS ON THE LOCAL LEVELS -- COUNTY AND TOWN.

13. CHURCH LEADERS DO NOT TILT TOWARD EUPHORIA AND HAVE MORE THAN ENOUGH REASONS TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT KRENZ. HOWEVER, THEIR OPINION IS THAT KRENZ IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN GETTING THE GDR OUT OF A CRISIS THROUGH MANAGED CHANGE. THERE IS, OF COURSE, A POSSIBILITY THAT HE MAY PUT OUT VERBIAGE AND LITTLE ELSE, CHURCH CONTACTS SAY. BUT FOR THE TIME BEING THEY ARE WILLING TO GIVE HIM THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT.

GLASNOST COMES TO NEUES DEUTSCHLAND...

14. KRENZ SIGNALED IN HIS SPEECH THAT EVEN NEUES DEUTSCHLAND HAD TO BECOME WORTH READING, AND THE PARTY DAILY BEGAN TO COMPLY OCTOBER 20 WITH A REPORT THAT MADE CLEAR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLenum HAD SOME CONTROVERSY DESPITE THE "UNANIMOUS" DECISION TO RETIRE HONECKER.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  EMBBER 08466 03 OF 06 2213112

15. MANFRED EWALD, THE EX-SENIOR SPORTS FUNCTIONARY, CRITICIZED THAT THE PARTY WAS NOT PREPARED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN TELLING PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY ITS PLANS TO DEVELOP CONCRETE NEW POLICIES. HE SAID IT WAS TIME FOR THE SED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND NOT LEAVE THIS TO THE Bloc PARTIES IF IT WAS TO REGAIN LOST CONFIDENCE.

16. HANS MODROW, THE DRESDEN MODERATE WHO HAS SO LONG BEEN TREATED AS A BLACK SHEEP BY THE POLITIBURO INNER CIRCLE, NEXT CALLED FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO HOLD
A real debate, the new youth said. "Must be searched for in dialogue and not proclaimed from above."

17. Modrow's proposal to expand the debate was blocked first by the culture minister, Hoffmann, who said "we have no time. Egon Krenz must go before the cameras." Then by putative Krenz rival and Berlin boss Scharowski who supported the motion to break off the debate but claimed that he favored it being resumed soon.

18. Most intriguing, for what it suggests about Modrow's potential support in the central committee if not the Kolitbuero. Neues Deutschland reported that he proposed that the text of Krenz' speech to the nation (a form of the report which he had just read to the central committee) be expanded to deal more with criticism and self-criticism. ADN. The official news agency is running today a special note to the effect that this amendment was in fact adopted by the central committee.

Confidential

Confidential

Page 04  EMDBER 06/466 03 09 06 221212Z
E.O. 12356: DECL-OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PHUM, PREL, GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: THE HONECKER ERA FADES QUICKLY

19. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND ALSO Sought TO UNDERLINE CHANGE IN AN EDITORIAL WHICH CONTAINED SCARCELY VEILED SHARP CRITICISM OF HONECKER: "THE PARTY..IS INITIATING A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EMB946 04 OF 06 221320Z

TURN IT HAS BEGUN THEREBY TO ASSESS SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT REALISTICALLY AND TO DRAW FROM THAT CONCLUSIONS THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT IN ORDER FOR PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE TO BE RECOGNIZED IN A TIMELY WAY AND ERRORS TO BE AVOIDED. OUR PARTY IS SHOWING ITS COURAGE TO FACED TRUTH. IT IS MAKING AN END TO OPTIMISTIC WHITEN ASHES AND BRAGADOCIO "

...AND TO TELEVISION

********************

20. THE EVENING NEWS HAD JUST FINISHED KREUZ AT THE FACTORY WHEN IT MOVED TO FULLY NEW TERRITORY. IT OFFERED FOR NEARLY AN HOUR A ROW OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND INSTITUTE LEADERS WHO SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM LISTENERS. THE MEN ON THE HOT SEAT INCLUDED OTTO REINHOLD, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IDEOLOGUE WHO HAD BECOME SOMETHING OF A POINT MAN IN DEFENDING HONECKER POLICIES IN THE PAST YEAR, MAYOR BERGHOFER, THE 46-YEAR OLD MODROW PROTEGE WHO HAS TURNED INTO AN OVERNIGHT NATIONAL FIGURE BY ENTERING INTO AN INCREASINGLY PUBLICIZED DIALOGUE WITH YOUNG ACTIVISTS, AND MAX SCHMIDT, THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. KARL-EDUARD VON SCHNETZLER, FOR DECADENT A NOTORIOUS TELEVISION PROPAGANDIST, WAS THERE BUT SAID SCARCELY A WORD. THE EVENING BELONGED TO THOSE WITH A CHANCE OF ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY IN THE AUDIENCE.
HEADLINES BY INDICATING THAT THE NEW TRAVEL LAW WHICH KRENZ SAYS IS BEING CONSIDERED, MAY AUTHORIZE EVERY GDR CITIZEN TO HAVE A PASSPORT AS A MATTER OF RIGHT. HE MUDDIED THE WATERS, HOWEVER, WITH THE ADVERTISEMENT THAT THEY WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO APPLY FOR VISAS. IF HE MEANT EXIT VISAS, THE MERE POSSESSION OF A PASSPORT WOULD ADD LITTLE TO THE EXISTING SITUATION. THOSE INCLUDING CHURCH CONTACTS WHO BELIEVE THAT KRENZ INTENDS AN EARLY DRAMATIC FEATURE ON TRAVEL BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME CONSIDERABLE LIBERALIZATION WILL BE INVOLVED.

22. THE SPEAKERS TOOK A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT PRICE SUBSIDIES, UNTIL NOW A HOLY COW. BERGHOFER, AN IMPRESSIVE, HANDSOME, SELF-possessed YOUNG-GENERATION POLITICIAN WHO OBVIOUSLY FEELS COMFORTABLE IN FRONT OF A CAMERA, SAID THAT DRESDEN HAD MORE APARTMENTS THAN IT NEEDED - BUT MANY WERE UNLIVABLE, AND THE CITY COULD NOT AFFORD TO RENOVATE THEM WITH THE RENT INCOME AVAILABLE IF RENTS WENT UP. HE SAID, LIVING CONDITIONS WOULD IMPROVE.

23. REINHOLD, WHO HAD BRUSHED OFF A SIMILAR SUGGESTION LAST MAY WHEN IT WAS MADE TO HIM IN A SEMINAR ATTENDED BY EMBASSY OFFICERS, SPOKE POSITIVELY OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SAVING ENERGY AND GAINING NEW FUNDS FOR THE STATE BY HIKING HEAVILY SUBSIDIZED ELECTRICITY PRICES.

24. THE MODERATOR SAID THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF CALLS HAD BEEN RECEIVED ABOUT THE "OPPOSITION." THE TYPICAL QUESTION, HE SAID, WAS "SHOULD WE NOT LEGALIZE OPPOSITION PARTIES BECAUSE THEY WOULD HELP US ACCOMPLISH OUR REFORMS QUICKER BY DRAWING ATTENTION TO PROB-
QUESTION WOULD BECOME SUPERFLUOUS, BUT ONLY IF THE
SED SOLVED THE REAL PROBLEMS THAT CRITICS WERE INDENTI-
FYING.

25. AT THE END, THE MODERATOR APOLOGIZED FOR THE
SOMewhat DISORGANIZED NATURE OF THE PROGRAM. IT
WAS A FIRST TRY, HE SAID, BUT IT WOULD BECOME A
REGULAR FEATURE, EVERY SECOND WEEK, WITH ADDITIONAL
POLITICIANS BEING DRAWN IN.

INDEPENDENT ACTIVISM

26. AN ESTIMATED 6,000 STUDENTS INVITED BY THE FDI
(PARTY YOUTH ORGANIZATION) SPILLED OVER INTO NINE
AUDITORIA AT BERLIN'S HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY OCTOBER 17
TO DISCUS THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FDI AS STUDENT
REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSIDER THE ROLE THE STUDENTS
WANT TO PLAY WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY.

27. WE TALKED WITH A FACULTY MEMBER AND A STUDENT
WHO BELONGS TO AN INDEPENDENT ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP.
THEY SAID THE MOST HEATED DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON
THE FDI'S LEGITIMACY AS STUDENT REPRESENTATIVES
AND WHETHER THE STUDENTS SHOULD FORM AN INDEPENDENT
ORGANIZATION. NO DECISIONS WERE REACHED BUT ACTIVITY
CONTINUES. OTHER ITEMS RAISED INCLUDED: SHOULD
THE UNIVERSITY BE "OFF LIMITS" TO POLICE, MAKING
IT A PLACE WHERE ALL CAN COME AND SPEAK THEIR MIND.
OPENING THE ARCHIVES AND LIBRARIES FOR FULL RESEARCH,
A STUDENT VOICE IN THE CURRICULA: ALTERING THE STRUCTURE
OF MARXISM/LENINISM TEACHING AND REDUCING THE WEIGHT
ACCORDED IT IN AWARDING MERIT SCHOLARSHIPS. INSUFFICIENT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HOUSING, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A STUDENT NEWSPAPER.

28. REPORTEDLY THE STUDENTS IN THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS
HAVE UNTIL OCTOBER 29 TO COLLECT SUGGESTIONS, AND A
DECISION ON THE FORM OF REPRESENTATION WILL BE MADE
BY OCTOBER 31. THE UNIVERSITY'S VICE PRESIDENT ALSO
OFFERED TO MEET WITH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
VARIOUS FACULTIES TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION.

30. ON A DIFFERENT FRONT, THE ARTIST'S ASSOCIATION HAS APPLIED FOR PERMISSION TO DEMONSTRATE IN BERLIN NOVEMBER 19 FOR PRESS FREEDOM (30 DAYS ADVANCE APPLICATION IS REQUIRED BY THE LAW). JOURNALISTS, ESPECIALLY AT THE LIBERAL PARTY PAPER DER MORGEN, ARE AGITATING FOR THEIR ASSOCIATION TO JOIN. NOW THAT KRENZ HAS ANNOUNCED THAT AT LEAST A MORE OPEN PRESS IS OFFICIAL POLICY, THE CHANCES OF THE DEMONSTRATION BEING APPROVED HAVE GONE UP, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW A FINAL DECISION.

31. SOME ACTIVISTS ARE TRYING TO TAKE THE PRESS ISSUE INTO THEIR OWN HANDS IN OTHER WAYS. HOWEVER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LIBRARY, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS ALREADY PUBLISHED SEVERAL ISSUES OF A NEWSLETTER CALLED "TELEGRAPH," INTENDED TO REACT QUICKLY TO EVENTS. THE MOST RECENT 10-PAGE ISSUE WAS PUT TO BED AT MIDNIGHT OCTOBER 18 WITH SKEPTICAL REACTION TO THE LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND KRENZ' SPEECH, AS WELL AS REPORTS ON THE STUDENT MEETINGS AT THE UNIVERSITY, THE NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND A FEW SMALL WILDCAT STRIKES.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04  EMBBER 08466  05 OF 06  221318Z
CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  EMBBER 08466 06 OF 06 221316Z
ACTION EUR 00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 HO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSQ-00 HA-09
L-08 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 COR-07
ACDA-12 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01
J74 W

203975 213120Z 14747

O 201703Z OCT 89
FM AMEMBASSY EMBBR LIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1322
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USAFSB BERLIN GE
USDEL NST GENEVA
32. THE LARGEST OF THE NEW INDEPENDENT GROUPS, NEUES FORUM, WHICH CLAIMS THAT ITS MEMBERSHIP HAS PASSED
CONFIDENTIAL

30,000 IS ALSO MAKING AN EFFORT TO DEVISE A FORM OF REGULAR INTERNAL COMMUNICATION. REPORTS IN THE WESTERN PRESS THAT IT IS PLANNING A NEWSPAPER OF ITS OWN ARE EXAGGERATED. HOWEVER, A SPOKESMAN TELLS US, IT HOPES TO PUT OUT ABOUT 10 PAGES ONCE EVERY TWO MONTHS DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN NEWS OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND OF THE ACTIVITIES OF LOCAL CHAPTERS. IT FACES CONSIDERABLE PRODUCTION DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, SINCE IT HAS NO REPRODUCTION FACILITIES OF ITS OWN AND DEPENDS ON THE ACCESS OF MEMBERS TO INSTITUTE OR FACTORY COMPUTER TERMINALS.

33. DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE ON A SMALL SCALE. FIRST WORD OF STREET ACTIVITY IN THE HITHERTO QUIET NORTH HAS COME IN IN NEUBRANDENBURG AND GREIFSWALD, WITH 1500 IN THE LATTER CALLING FOR REFORM. DISCUSSION BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF DEMONSTRATORS IS BEING INCREASINGLY INSTITUTIONALIZED IN DRESDEN AND LEIPZIG. IN THE FORMER, THE MAYOR HAS PROPOSED THAT WORKING GROUPS BE ESTABLISHED THAT WOULD MAKE USE OF THE EXISTING TOWN COUNCIL COMMITTEE STRUCTURE.

34. SIMILAR CONTACTS ARE ALSO BEING DEVELOPED IN HALLE, NEUBRANDENBURG AND PÖTSDAM. IN THE LATTER CITY, NEUES FORUM REPRESENTATIVES HAVE TAKEN PART AND EVEN SAID THEY WOULD CONSIDER A SUGGESTION FROM
A LOCAL PARTY OFFICIAL TO JOIN IN THE DISTRICT'S NATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATION. NEUES FORUM LEADERS IN BERLIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SAY THEY WILL NOT JOIN CHURCH AND OTHER ACTIVISTS' TALKS WITH THE MAYOR UNTIL THEY ARE ASSURED THAT ALL THOSE ARRESTED IN RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS -- INCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 EMBRER 08466 06 OF 06 221316Z

POLICEMEN WHO REFUSED ORDERS TO ATTACK PROTESTORS -- ARE OUT OF JAIL.

COMMENT

35. KRENZ HAS A LONG WAY TO GO TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE OF THE NARROW PARTY CIRCLE THAT SELECTED HIM AND GDR REFORM HAS A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE ITS CONTOURS CAN BE DETERMINED MUCH LESS BEFORE IT CAN BE CONSIDERED IRREVERSIBLE. BUT FOR NOW AT LEAST, HE IS MAKING GESTURES TO BLUR HIS HARD LINE IMAGE, AND EACH DAY'S KALEIDOSCOPE OF EVENTS IS CHALLENGING THE OLD ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THIS SOCIETY'S PASSIVITY.

BINDERAGEL

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 23, 1989, 9:02 - 9:26 a.m. EDT
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. I am glad to hear your voice. I saw pictures of your visit to San Francisco and hope you will be able to give as much support as possible for that tragedy. (U)

The President: It is terrible, but the authorities there are doing well. We will help at this end in any way we can. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I wanted to tell you briefly how I see events in Hungary, Poland, and the GDR. In Hungary, things are going the best. The people are incredibly courageous, and very determined. The present government is taking an enormous risk: the changes have their origin with the reform movement in the Communist Party, but it is not at all certain that the reformers will be able to get credit in the course of the election. It is quite possible that the Party will come in only second, and there might be a coalition. We have supported the Hungarians quite vigorously. In December I will go over for two days to give further support, also optically. (C)

The President: Where will you go? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will go to Budapest and perhaps also to a second city, but that is not certain. The economic situation is relatively good there. They can make it, though the next two years will be decisive. On November 9 I will go to Poland for four days. Our negotiations have been essentially concluded. I will do all I can to support the new government, especially in the economic area. With the EC, I intend to give assistance in human resources. This seems to be the problem, if I may put it bluntly: there is a lot of good will and many good ideas, but the Poles do
not know how to put them into practice. They have to introduce currency reforms, a new banking system, and other steps to open up a new market-oriented economy. I will be doing what I can, and I will also take into account and work on what you have suggested, so that Western activities can be homogeneous. My feeling is that our Western friends and partners should be doing more. There is a difference between words and deeds. I also want to enter into a new phase with the Poles, 50 years after the outbreak of war. (C)

In the GDR, changes are quite dramatic. None of us can give a prognosis. It is not clear whether the new man will have the determination and the strength to carry out reform. Gorbachev told me that he had encouraged reform during his visit, but I am not sure how courageous he [new Party and state leader Egon Krenz] is. There is an enormous unrest among the population. Things will become incalculable if there are no reforms. My interest is not to see so many flee the GDR, because the consequences there would be catastrophic. Our estimates are that by Christmas we will have reached a total of 150,000 refugees, with an average age of under 30. (C)

My last point concerns the climate among the media in New York, the coast, London, the Hague, Rome, and Paris that, crudely speaking, holds that the Germans are now committed to Ostpolitik and discussions about reunification and that they are less interested in the EC and the West. This is absolute nonsense! I will again and again explain and declare my position. At the beginning of January, I will go to Paris to deliver a speech at a major conference. I will say publicly -- also to the left wing in the FRG -- that without a strong NATO, without the necessary development of the EC, none of these developments in the Warsaw Pact would have occurred. I am firmly convinced of that, and that will be my message. It would also be good for you, as soon as you can, to deliver a public message that progress in disarmament and changes in the east are possible only if we stand together. (C)

The President: I couldn't agree more. I have seen some of those stories, but I know your position and think I know the heartbeat of Germany. The strength of NATO has made possible these changes in Eastern Europe. We are seeing a spate of stories about German reunification resulting in a neutralist Germany and a threat to Western security. We do not believe that. We are trying to react very cautiously and carefully to change in the GDR. We have great respect for the way the FRG under your leadership has been handling this situation. You have done a great job. (C)

I understand that Horst [Teltschik, the Chancellor’s security advisor] is coming soon. We are very anxious to talk with him on this subject and also about Poland and Hungary. We are getting criticism in the Congress from liberal Democrats that we ought to be doing more to foster change, but I am not going to go
so fast as to be reckless. On Poland, the Congress is pushing us to put forward more money, but we are moving forward. I asked our Congress to approve a $200 million grant, which would be our contribution to the $1 billion stabilization fund the Polish government has requested. I consider it vitally important that we help Poland as it implements its economic reform program in the context of an IMF agreement. I am also sending a high level team from the public and private sectors to consult with the Poles and help them as they decide how to implement these reforms. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I consider that a very important step, especially to have people from the public and private sectors. Let me ask you to have one of your collaborators call Horst Teltschik to talk this over. We have a similar approach, which we discussed with Mr. Delors. We want the EC to do the same. After my trip to Poland, I will send Horst to discuss these matters. (C)

The President: Is Horst here now? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: He was in New York a couple of days ago. The next time I will have him come down. (C)

The President: I thought he was coming to Washington. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: No. He is back now. (C)

The President: I will ask General Scowcroft to call him. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Any time. (C)

The President: We ought to get together for an informal session, perhaps a few hours at Camp David. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will think it over and find out when I can make it. It would have to fit into one day. (C)

The President: We can do that. It is important to talk things over about Eastern Europe. I will see Thatcher around the time of our Thanksgiving. It is important to signal the importance I attach to U.S. relations with the FRG, especially when we see some of these mischievous stories around. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I understand and think it is a very good idea. (C)

The President: Let's stay in touch. General Scowcroft will call Horst and tell you more about our approach toward Poland and our support for the stabilization fund. Let me also say that I appreciate this call very much. (C)
Chancellor Kohl: Thank you. I will call again before I go to Poland, around the 6th or 7th of November. (C)

-- End of Conversation --
Letter from Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov to the BCP CC,

24 October 1989

On 23 October 1989, I was scheduled to meet with the US ambassador [Sol Polansky] for a working lunch. Comrade Todor Zhivkov knew about this meeting, just as he knew about all my meetings and activities. The purpose of this session was to analyze the state of bilateral relations as they stood after the talks between [Deputy Foreign Minister Lyuben] Gotzev and First Deputy Secretary of State [Lawrence S.] Eagleberger and between Secretary of State [James] Baker and myself. That day—October 23—I had a meeting with the Swedish Minister of Foreign Trade at 11:30 p.m. When I reached my office at 12:30 p.m. —that is, just 10 minutes before my appointment with Ambassador Polansky—I was told that Todor Zhivkov had been trying to reach me by telephone. [Deputy Foreign Minister] Ivan Ganev was waiting in my secretary’s office to see me. I asked him to come into my office and told my secretary to put me through to comrade Todor Zhivkov.

Comrade Ivan Ganev, without waiting for me to talk to comrade Zhivkov, told me that, at my meeting with US Ambassador Polansky, I had to protest against the gross US interference in our internal affairs. I had to say that this was unacceptable and that Perestroika could advance in Bulgaria only under Todor Zhivkov’s leadership. I do not know who had instructed [Ganev] to speak to me in such an abrupt manner or what basis there might be for thinking that I was unclear how Perestroika should proceed in Bulgaria. Then comrade Todor Zhivkov called. He told me in an irritated tone that the US was grossly interfering in our internal affairs and that I had to express that bluntly—in other words, I had to repeat what Ganev had said. [Zhivkov] said that he knew about my appointment with the US ambassador and that such sessions, where we talked [only] gibberish, were unnecessary. I replied that it was not my intention to “talk gibberish” and that this meeting, which had been under preparation for a long time, was necessary for our country. I told him that I regretted his attitude but that I had always tried, in my work, to avoid damaging and irrelevant discussions. The extent to which I was permitted to do this was quite a different matter. Following my reply Todor Zhivkov adopted an altogether more respectful tone.

In connection with the episode I have just outlined, I request that the CC of the BCP and the Politburo take a position on this rude, indecorous, and totally unwarranted attack on me. I feel that, in view of the attitude of comrade Zhivkov—who is Secretary General of the CC of the BCP and Chairman of the State Council—I cannot continue to discharge my duties either as a member of the CC of the BCP and the Politburo or as Bulgaria’s minister of foreign affairs. I request that this letter be taken to mean that I am resigning from these posts.

On analyzing my experience further, I have come to the conclusion that the real reason for comrade Zhivkov’s irritation and rudeness is that he realizes that he has lead our country into a deep economic, financial, and political crisis. He knows that his political agenda, which consists of deviousness and petty intrigues and is intended to keep himself and his family in power at all costs and for as long as possible, has succeeded in isolating Bulgaria from the rest of the world. We have even reached the point where we are estranged from the Soviet Union and we find ourselves entirely on
our own, in the same pigs’ trough as the rotten dictatorial family regime of Ceausescu. In a word, with his policies Zhivkov has forced Bulgaria outside the currents of our age.

Do you think that it is easy to be the foreign minister of such a state, headed by such a leader? I believe that it is finally time for the Politburo, Central Committee, and Party to take up these questions. One fact that we should all be aware of is that the Bulgarian public took up these questions long ago and now discusses them openly. I think that we all understand that the world has changed and that, if Bulgaria wants to be in tune with the rest of the world, it will have to conduct its political affairs in a modern way. If we do not believe in anything else, we should at least believe in the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Comrades, like all of you, I think I have a realistic picture of Zhivkov’s moral character. I know that he will stop at nothing, not even the most outrageous crimes, when what he holds most sacred—his power—is impinged upon. I know that he will fabricate a mass of lies and insults against me. He has already done this [with others]. I do not even rule out his trying to take physical retribution against me or members of my family. If this does happen, the responsibility will be yours, my comrades, with whom I have worked so long, whom I respect, and for whom I have great esteem and affection. I wish to offer my sincere thanks to all the comrades that I have worked with.

[Source: Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIA-00 EB-00 DOD-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSA-00 SSA-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
SP-02 M-01 SR-96 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDEL-01 SART-01
E-01 P-02 T-01 J972 W

O 251753Z OCT 89 FM AMEMBASSY BONN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9533
INFO FRG COLLECTIVE CSCE COLLECTIVE USIA WASHDC 1611

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356 DECL OADR
TAGS: PPEL, PGOV, GE

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

REFS: (A) BONN 26793 (NOTAL); (B) BONN 29785

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SURGE IN EAST GERMANS DEPARTING THE GDR TO FIND FREEDOM IN THE FRG, RAPID CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND PROSPECTS FOR GREATER INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE HAVE SPARKED A PUBLIC DEBATE IN THE FRG ON THE CHANCES FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. THE QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION, WE BELIEVE, CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED IN THE LARGER CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF REUNIFICATION IS VERY MUCH ON GERMANS' MINDS, VIRTUALLY NO ONE BELIEVES REUNIFICATION IS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS ON THE GERMAN-GERMAN AGENDA. IN FACT, SOME LEADING WEST GERMANS ARE CALLING FOR LESS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 01 OF 06 251756Z

RHETORIC ON REUNIFICATION TO ALLAY ANXIETIES AMONG GERMANY'S WESTERN AND EASTERN NEIGHBORS. END SUMMARY.
3. AS LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST GERMANS WERE BEGINNING TO STREAM TO WEST GERMAN MISSIONS IN EAST BERLIN, BUDAPEST, PRAGUE, AND WARSAW IN MID-SUMMER, CHANCELLOR KOHL, IN AN AUGUST 22 PRESS CONFERENCE ANNOUNCED THAT THE REJECTION BY THESE EAST GERMANS OF THE GDR STATE HAD CLEARLY SHOWN THAT "THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS STILL ON THE AGENDA" (REFT11).


THE ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION

4. THE CREATION OF THE FRG AND GDR, BOTH OF WHICH CELEBRATED THEIR FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY THIS YEAR, SYMBOLIZED THE DIVERGENT WESTERN AND SOVIET VIEWS OF HOW TO STRUCTURE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DIVISION OF GERMANY, WHICH IN EFFECT MARKED THE DIVISION OF EUROPE, WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF COLD WAR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SOVIETS, WHO AS A RESULT OF WORLD WAR II HAD ESTABLISHED A FOOTHOLD IN CENTRAL EUROPE, PLACED AND CONTINUE TO PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DURABILITY OF A COMMUNIST GERMAN CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 01 OF 06 25/7756Z

STATE

5. THE WESTERN POWERS FORESAW A PEACEFUL CENTRAL EUROPE AS AN OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FIRM DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY. IN PART, THEY SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF A WESTERN-ORIENTED REUNITED GERMANY BECAUSE IT WOULD ALSO LEAD TO THE EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ENORMOUS SOVIET FORCES FROM THE EASTERN ZONE OF GERMANY, THEREBY WEAKENING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE. THE WESTERN POWERS CODEFIED THIS CONNECTION BETWEEN REUNIFICATION AND THE GERMAN QUESTION IN THE 1952 RELATIONS CONVENTION, WHICH IN 1955 BECAME THE BASIS FOR RETURNING SOVEREIGNTY TO THE FRG. SIGNED BY THE THREE WESTERN POWERS AND THE FRG, ARTICLE 7(C) OF THE CONVENTION STATES "PENDING THE PEACE SETTLEMENT, THE SIGNATORY STATES
WILL COOPERATE TO ACHIEVE, BY PEACEFUL MEANS, THEIR COMMON
AIM OF A REUNITED GERMANY ENJOYING A LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION, LIKE THAT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AND
INTEGRATED WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. *
6. WEST GERMANY'S ANCHORING IN THE WEST, NOT LEAST OF ALL BY A STATED COMMITMENT TO NATO, HAS BEEN A PRIMARY FOCUS OF FRG POLICY SINCE THE EARLY FIFTIES. THE FRG'S WESTERN, INDEED EUROPEAN, IDENTITY HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF WEST GERMAN SENSITIVITY THROUGHOUT THE YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS SPRING, WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS INTERPRETED ALLIED STANCES ON SFOR AS A "LOYALTY TEST" FOR THE FRG. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OUTSIDE OF THE FRG ON REUNIFICATION SIMILARLY GENERATES SENSITIVITY AMONG LEADING WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS ON HOW THE WEST (AND THE EAST) VIEWS THE FRG'S POLITICAL ATTACHMENTS. IN RECENT WEEKS THIS HAS LED A NUMBER OF FRG LEADERS (FROM THE SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, AND GREENS) TO ARGUE THAT EVERYONE WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF LESS WERE SAID IN PUBLIC ABOUT REUNIFICATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BONN 34271 02 OF 06 251757Z

7. REUNIFICATION IS, HOWEVER, A HOTLY DEBATED ISSUE IN THE FRG. IT IS ALSO AN EMOTIONAL ONE. ALTHOUGH MOST WEST GERMANS STILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER REUNIFICATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS ON THE GERMAN-GERMAN AGENDA, SEVERAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE QUESTION ARE CHANGING RAPIDLY. THE PACE OF REFORM IN POLAND AND HUNGARY SHOWS NO SIGN OF SLOWING. CHANGE IN GDR LEADERSHIP HAS, IF ANYTHING, ONLY ENHANCED THE SENSE THAT THAT COUNTRY IS IN CRISIS. EUROPE 1992 HOLDS OUT THE PROSPECT FOR GREATER POLITICAL INTEGRATION AND DIMINISHMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL BORDERS. AND THE EMERGENCE OF GORBACHEV IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS UNLEASHED A HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY THE SOVIET UNION MAY LEARN TO LIVE WITH A WESTERN-ORIENTED DEMOCRATIC GERMANY THAT POSES NO THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

IN THE BEGINNING

8. THE GOAL OF A UNITED GERMANY IS EMBEDDED IN THE
PREAMBLE OF THE FRG BASIC LAW (CONSTITUTION) -- "THE ENTIRE GERMAN PEOPLE ARE CALLED UPON TO ACHIEVE IN FREE SELF-DETERMINATION THE UNITY AND FREEDOM OF GERMANY." LEGALLY, BONN REMAINS THE PROVISIONAL CAPITAL OF THE FRG UNTIL BERLIN AGAIN BECOMES THE CAPITAL OF A REUNIFIED GERMANY. IN A LANDMARK DECISION ON JULY 31, 1975, THE FRG CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ALSO RULED THAT EVERY FRG GOVERNMENT HAD TO REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE GOAL OF REUNIFICATION.

9. SUCCESSIVE FRG GOVERNMENTS HAVE PURSUED A POLICY OF PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE EC IN PART AS A MEANS TOWARD NATIONAL UNIFICATION. THERE IS CONFIDENTIAL.

A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE FRG THAT REUNIFICATION CANNOT BE PURSUED AS AN OPERATIONAL GOAL UNTIL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS A REALITY. IT IS THE FIRM BELIEF OF MOST GERMANS THAT SUCH INTEGRATION IS A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE RETURN OF THE TYPES OF CONFLICTS THAT PLAGUED THE REGION IN THE PAST.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. IN A
PRACTICAL SENSE, MANY LEADING WEST GERMANS ALSO PERCEIVE
THE EC AS ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE TO THE WEAK ECONOMIES OF
EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH CURRENTLY ARE IN NEED OF FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE. BUT IN THE FUTURE WILL WANT STABLE AND
PROFITABLE TRADING RELATIONS WITH THE STRONG ECONOMIES IN
WESTERN EUROPE. GENSCHER AND OTHERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE
EC SHOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION AND
PERHAPS EVEN INTEGRATION WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
IN THE FUTURE.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BONN 34271 05 OF 06  251758Z

1. ADHERENCE TO THE OBJECTIVE OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION IS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH AMONG WEST GERMANS. ONLY A SMALL FRINGE ELEMENT ON THE EXTREME LEFT HAS ABANDONED THE IDEA, AND WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS WHO DARE TO EXPRESS OPPOSITION TO REUNIFICATION ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE PUBLIC CRITICISM AND THE LIKELY PROSPECT OF A SHORT POLITICAL CAREER.

12. THE BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS SUPPORTING THE AIM OF REUNIFICATION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, TRANSLATE INTO A CONSENSUS ON HOW TO GET THERE OR EVEN WHETHER IT IS ACHIEVABLE. POLLS CONSISTENTLY INDICATE THAT MORE THAN 80 PERCENT OF ALL WEST GERMANS FAVOR EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, BUT LESS THAN 15 PERCENT BELIEVE THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THEIR LIFETIME. WEST GERMANS ARE VISCERALLY DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE ELUSIVENESS OF REUNIFICATION WHILE CONVINCED THAT MOST OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBORS (WHETHER FRIEND OR FOE) WOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE DEEP RESERVATIONS IF THERE WERE AN IMMINENT PROSPECT OF A REUNITED GERMANY.

EVENTS IN THE GDR

13. THE OUTPOURING OF EAST GERMANS FROM THE GDR TO THE FRG AND THE INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS UP TO NOW OF THE GDR LEADERSHIP TO COPE WITH POPULAR DISAFFECTION, ECONOMIC STAGNATION, AND PUBLIC PROTEST HAVE BEEN THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES FOR THE REAPPEARANCE OF REUNIFICATION AS A PUBLIC ISSUE IN THE FRG. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, FRG LEADERS HAVE STATED THAT THE LAST THING THEY WANT IN THE GDR IS INSTABILITY. NEVERTHELESS, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WHETHER OR NOT THE SED PURSUES REFORMS VOLUNTARILY, THE GDR IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE AND IS LIKELY TO BE FORCED TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  BONN 34271 05 OF 06  251758Z
DECLASSIFIED

ADOPT REFORMS WHICH WOULD TRANSFORM THE SOCIETY (HOWEVER GLACIALLY) INTO A PLURALISTIC AND EVENTUALLY MORE WESTERN-ORIENTED STATE.


CONFIDENTIAL

XNNN

CONFIDENTIAL
DeclasSified

INFO LO-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-60 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-61 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
SP-02 MA-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SDRL-01 SART-01
E-01 P-02 T-01 0757 W

251825Z 406464 251825Z 746

OCT 89
FM ANEEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9336
INFO FRG COLLECTIVE
CNSCE COLLECTIVE
USIA WASHDC 1614

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECLASS
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GE
SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

REUNIFICATION DEBATE IS BASED

THE SOVIET CARD

15. Although West Germans recognize that the Soviets have no desire to promote a reunified Germany on the basis of self-determination, they are equally aware that reunification could not come about without at least Soviet acquiescence. The unanswered question for most West Germans who think about ways to achieve reunification is under what circumstances the Soviets would be willing to relinquish their position in the GDR.

16. The Soviet presence in the GDR is manifested by its confidential.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 34271 04 OF 06 251813Z

400,000 OR SO TROOPS THERE. IN THE GORBACHEV ERA, FEW WEST GERMANS BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ENTERTAIN AS AN OPTION A RETENTION OF JUNE 1955. WHEN SOVIET TROOPS HELPED QUASH PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE STATE. NEVERTHELESS, WEST GERMAN LEADERS ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS A FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST SOME WEST GERMANS HAVE NOTED IN THIS REGARD
SOVIET INTEREST IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSAL FOR A
REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND U.S. TROOP STRENGTHS IN EUROPE
OUTSIDE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY TO 275,000 EACH. IF THIS
PROPOSAL IS ULTIMATELY ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, THE
CONSEQUENCE WOULD BE A SIZEABLE REDUCTION IN SOVIET TROOP
STRENGTH IN THE GDR, PROBABLY TO A LEVEL BELOW 200,000.
SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL IMPACT
IN THE GDR.

17. WEST GERMANS HAVE CLOSELY FOLLOWED STATEMENTS BY
LEADING SOVIET OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY GORBACHEV, TO
DETECT ANY SOVIET "NEW THINKING" ON POSSIBLE
REUNIFICATION. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV, MOST RECENTLY IN HIS
SPEECH IN EAST BERLIN, HAS GIVEN THE WEST GERMANS LITTLE
HOPE IN THIS AREA, FRG LEADERS WERE EXHILARATED WHEN
GORBACHEV DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO BONN AGREED TO A
REFERENCE TO "SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES" IN THE JOINT
FRG-SOViet POLITICAL DECLARATION. OPERATIONALLY, FRG
LEADERS SIMPLY DO NOT FORESEE IN THE SHORT-TERM SOVIET
ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER INTEGRATION BETWEEN
THE FRG AND GDR, LET ALONE A UNITED GERMANY. THEY
BELIEVE INSTEAD THAT HISTORICAL PRESSURES WILL CONTINUE TO
DRIVE THE TWO GERMANIES CLOSER TOGETHER, AND THAT EVENTUAL
REUNIFICATION WILL BE THE RESULT OF AS YET UNPREDICTABLE
EVENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE GDR.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 34271 04 OF 06 251813Z

EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE

18. WEST GERMANY HAS BEEN FASCINATED BY THE RAPID PACE OF
CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SOVIET
UNION, POLAND, AND HUNGARY. THE CHANGES THERE ARE VIEWED
AS THE BEGINNING OF AN UNCHARTED PROCESS WHICH COULD LEAD
TO A REALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE, EVENTUALLY
MAKING REUNIFICATION ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY'S EASTERN
NEIGHBORS. IF THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT GREATER
INTEGRATION BETWEEN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE
WEST, SO THE THINKING HERE GOES, THEN THE SOVIETS MIGHT
ALSO ALLOW FOR GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
GERMANY -- A PRELIMINARY CONCESSION ON THE WAY TO
REUNIFICATION.

19. A NUMBER OF WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE POINTED OUT TO
HEARS MORE AND MORE THE ANALYSIS THAT POLAND'S CURRENT INTEREST IS TO ATTACH ITSELF INCREASINGLY TO THE WESTERN COMMUNITY OF STATES. IT WOULD, THIS ANALYSIS GOES ON, BE IN POLAND'S INTEREST TO HAVE A WESTERN COUNTRY AS ITS NEIGHBOR TO THE WEST. SOME WEST GERMANS ALSO INTERPRETED HUNGARY'S DECISION TO ALLOW THOUSANDS OF EAST GERMANS TO CROSS THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN BORDER ON THEIR WAY TO THE FRG AS A MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF REUNIFICATION.

20. THE FRG'S OSTPOLITIK HAS TO BE VIEWED THROUGH THE PRISM OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. WEST GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES ARE CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVED AS PROMOTING ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE GDR AND ULTIMATELY DRAWING THE TWO CONFIDENTIAL STATES CLOSER TOGETHER. IN THIS RESPECT, INNER-GERMAN POLICY HAS DEFINED AND CONTINUES TO DEFINE THE FRG'S OSTPOLITIK. GIVEN ITS CURRENT ECONOMIC PROWESS, THE FRG HAS CONSCIOUSLY TRIED TO ADOPT A LEADERSHIP ROLE AMONG EUROPEAN STATES TO FURTHER REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, TO FURTHER ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND TO PRESSURE THE GDR.

ON THE ROAD TO REUNIFICATION

21. FACED WITH THE OPERATIONAL DILEMMA OF HOW TO PROMOTE EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION, A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL WEST GERMAN LEADERS SUCH AS PRESIDING VON WEIZSAECHE, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND SPD CHAIRMAN VOGL, HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FRAME A CONCEPT FOR DEFINING THE PROCESS. THEY HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO PROVIDE A BLUEPRINT FOR REUNIFICATION. ALTHOUGH THE TERMINOLOGY USED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES IS SOMETIMES DIFFERENT, THE PROCESS THEY HAVE DEFINED IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. THIS MODEL LOOKS FORWARD TO "NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A THICK NETWORK OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THE INITIAL STEPS OF "NORMALIZATION" COULD INCLUDE INTEGRATED POSTAL AND PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, AN EXPANSION OF CUSTOMS-FREE TRADE, AND POSSIBLY EVEN A UNIFORM CURRENCY ON THE BASIS OF THIS COOPERATION, WEST AND EAST GERMANY COULD PURSUE A FEDERALIST STRUCTURE — TWO DIFFERENT STATES BUT INTEGRATED TO SOME EXTENT.

22. THE INTERNAL HANDWRINKING OVER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A POLICY OF NORMALIZATION OR ONE AIMED MORE ACTIVELY AT REUNIFICATION IS IN PART BASED ON ANXIETIES ABOUT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  RONN  34271  05 OF 06  252031Z

ATTITUDES OF THE FRG'S ALLIES: THE POINT THAT VON WEIZSÄCKER, GENSCHER, AND VOGEL CONTINUE TO REITERATE IS THAT IT IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR GERMANS TO SPEAK IN PUBLIC ABOUT REUNIFICATION. IF IN THE END WESTERN EUROPE ACHIEVES EXTENSIVE INTEGRATION, GERMAN REUNIFICATION MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT MUCH OF THE TRAUMA MANY TODAY ASSOCIATE WITH THE CONCEPT.

-----------------------------
REUNIFICATION VIEWED FROM ABROAD
-----------------------------

23. THE FRG MEDIA GAVE WIDE COVERAGE TO THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 18 AND THE AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 3 COMMENTS IN SUPPORT OF REUNIFICATION. SOME DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HERE (PARTICULARLY FRANCE AND UK) WONDERED WHETHER THE U.S. WAS CHANGING ITS POLICY ON REUNIFICATION AND WAS PREPARING TO ENGAGE IN A MORE ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO PROMOTE REUNIFICATION. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW'S REPORTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE REACTED NEGATIVELY TO
E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BONN 34271 06 OF 06 25/81LZ
ACTION EUR/00

INFO LOG-00 ADD-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 FB-06 DOD-00 D-60
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 H-09 L-00 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-00 NRRC-01 INRE-00 RP-10 ACDA-12
SP-02 M-01 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 SFDE-01 SART-01
E-02 P-02 T-01 6/72 W

O 25175Z OCT 89
PM AMEMASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9538
INFO FSG COLLECTIVE
CSCE-COLLECTIVE
USTA WASH DC 1616

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 06 BONN 34271

E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED

TAGS: PREL, PGov, GF

SUBJECT: THE GERMAN QUESTION AND REUNIFICATION

GREATER PUBLIC ATTENTION TO REUNIFICATION.

24 MANY OF THE SAME HIGH-RANKING WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS
WHO HAVE CALLED FOR LESS PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT
REUNIFICATION HAVE ALSO TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY
WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S AND AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS, NOT SO
MUCH FOR RETIRING USG SUPPORT FOR REUNIFICATION (WHICH
AFTER ALL HAS BEEN U.S. POLICY SINCE THE EARLY FIFTIES)
BUT BECAUSE THEY ARE AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE
FGR'S FIRM ANCHORING IN THE WEST. THIS IS PARTICULARLY
WELCOMED AT A TIME WHEN GERMANY'S EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS TO
THE WEST AND EAST ARE RUMBLING IN LESS ENTHUSIASTIC TERMS
ABOUT POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BONN 34271 06 OF 06 251811Z

THE REUNIFICATION DEBATE TODAY

25. THE PERCEPTION IN THE FRG IS THAT RAPID CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE GDR WILL PROMOTE THE PROCESS OF BRINGING THE TWO GERMANIES CLOSER. PERHAPS EVENTUALLY TO A REUNIFIED STATE. BUT EVEN WITH RAPID CHANGE OCCURING IN BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, MOST WEST GERMANS STILL CONSIDER REUNIFICATION NOT TO BE AN IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITY.

26. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GERMANS (BOTH EAST AND WEST) ARE IN FAVOR OF REUNIFICATION AND ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OPPOSE IT. THE CONSENSUS ON THE GRADUAL STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH OF WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A PRECURSOR TO POSSIBLE GERMAN REUNIFICATION CONTINUES TO HOLD. BUT WEST GERMANS KNOW IN THEIR HEARTS THAT REUNIFICATION CAN ONLY COME ABOUT WHEN THE FRG'S EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY GO ALONG WITH THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION, BUT ALSO ACTIVELY SUPPORT IT. WEST GERMAN LEADERS DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS YET THE CASE.


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  BONN 34271 06 OF 06 251811Z

ORIGINAL RIGHTS THROUGH THE MANAGEMENT OF BERLIN POLICY, AS THE FRG IS ACUTELY AWARE, BERLIN OFFERS THE FOUR POWERS THE MECHANISM WITH WHICH TO IMPLEMENT ANY POLITICAL
DECLASSIFIED

DECISION WHICH HAS AS ITS GOAL A FURTHER INTEGRATION OR POSSIBLE UNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES.

28. FOR THE PRESENT, WEST GERMANS HAVE COME TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THERE ARE TWO GERMAN STATES WITH GRADUALLY IMPROVING RELATIONS. THE INFLUX OF LARGE NUMBERS OF EAST GERMANS AND ETHNIC GERMANS FROM EASTERN EUROPE HAS NOT ONLY REPRESENTED A POINT OF PRIDE AMONG WEST GERMANS THAT THEIR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY ARE FAR AND AWAY SUPERIOR TO THE EAST GERMAN MODEL, BUT IT HAS REKINDLED THE EMOTIONAL DESIRE FOR A GERMANY THAT WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE NO BARRIED WIRE AND WALLS IN THE MIDDLE. WALTERS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL
Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior Memorandum, “The Security Situation in the CSSR in the Period Before 28 October,”

25 October 1989

Supplement #1 to #OV-00138/S-89

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy #: 24
Number of pages: 6
The Security Situation in the CSSR in the period before 28 October

Characteristic of the developments of the security situation in the CSSR are the increasing tendencies of the internal enemy to bring out anti-socialist moods in the public by means of anonymous letters and flyers, particularly in Bohemia, in connection with the 71st anniversary of the CSR. The organizers wish to ensure the widest participation of citizens (most of all youth) in prepared provocative gatherings during which the celebration of 28 October will be used to glorify T. G. Masaryk and the bourgeois state.

The evidence for this lies in the continuing distribution of anonymous letters in high schools in which authors summon the people to the “dignified celebration of 28 October” and give prominence to the work of T. G. Masaryk. Letters are gradually being distributed on the majority of the territory of the CSR. In northern, western, southern and eastern Bohemia and Prague flyers of the coordinating board of the so-called Movement for Civic Freedom (HOS) and the Czechoslovak Democratic Initiatives (CSDI) are being circulated. They call for participation in the “celebrations” on 28 October for example in Chomutov (on K. Gottwald Square), in Plzen (on the Square of the Republic), in Karlovy Vary (at the main post office), in Susice (at the monument to T.G.M.), in Rumburk (in the park of the Rumburk Revolt) and in Cerveny Kostelec (in the park at the square). The organizers of the acts sent letters to the National Committees in Susice, Nachod and Chomutov with a request for permission for a “ceremonial gathering,” referring to article 28 of the constitution of the CSSR. The “Declaration of the Charter 77 on 28 October”, signed by its speakers and Havel, is being distributed at the same time (this has been proven, for example, in Kladno). 7

On 18 October R. Battek and L. Lis introduced in the name of the illegal organizations CSDI, HOS and Renewal a “communication on the event of a public gathering” in the ONV in Praha 7. In it they inform [people] that on 28 October at 3:00 p.m. they are arranging a “ceremonial gathering of their members and followers for the anniversary of the origin the CSR” on the Letna plain. After the commencement Capek’s “Prayer for Truth” will be recited, followed by the “ceremonial address” and finally the national anthem will be sung. Afterwards, when the stations Radio Free Europe (from 23 October 1989) and Voice of America (from 24 October 1989) were broadcasting announcements of the event the “independent gathering” on the anniversary of the origin of the CSR on Wenceslas Square in Prague from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., they revoked their announcement for alleged technical difficulties connected with such a public gathering under the “given social situation.”
The exponents of illegal organizations in Brno M. Jelinek (HOS and TGM Society member), J. Mezník (prepared for the function of speaker of CH-77) and D. Slavík (TGM Society member) are developing an analogous action. They sent a letter to the department of internal affairs of the MNV in Brno, in which they announce that they intend to call a public gathering in front of the Janacek theater in Brno on 28 October. Serving not only as a reminder of the anniversary of the origin of the CSR, the gathering is also supposed to vote on a resolution which would change the name of the Place of Peace to Masaryk Place and to begin preparations for the erection of a monument to T.G. Masaryk.

Even the activist Milan Vlk of the illegal group Peace Club of J. Lennon called on his fellow activists for a “silent demonstrations” in Decin on 28 October. He is simultaneously organizing the distribution of a protest petition against the imprisonment of “political prisoners.”

The plans of the anti-socialist forces from Hungary— the Hungarian Democratic Forum which is in contact with CSDI since last year—to take part in the “celebrations” of 28 October have been proven. On this day they plan to effectuate a meeting of the “Commission for Hungarian-Czechoslovak Cooperation” (established on 26 August 1989 in Prague by representatives of both organizations), which will devote itself to questions of Czechoslovak-Hungarian “reconciliation and cooperation.”

An anti-Czechoslovak activity aimed at discrediting the CSSR for the disrespect of the plans of the CSCE is the conclusion of an informal agreement between Hungarian television and the American television company ABC. At its core is their collaboration during the reporting of the actions of the so-called independent initiatives in Prague on various opportune occasions. The first act of collaboration of both television companies is supposed to be the participation in the anticipated demonstration on 28 October 1989, in Prague.

The leadership of the Hungarian Federation of Young Citizens (FIDESZ) is pushing its members to “help” the Czechoslovak independent initiatives on 28 October during the organization of a gathering of citizens in Prague and other cities. During a meeting of FIDESZ on 16 October, it was decided to send their members to Prague as tourists in the same number as on 21 August of this year. A group of about 12 people is supposed to be created which would join up with several prominent representatives of “Charter-77.” They plan to organize a swift and conspiratorial courier service between Prague and Budapest to secure prompt information about the course of the “celebrations” for Hungarian media. Analogous activity should be anticipated from anti-socialist forces in Poland.

In relation to the up-coming anniversary of the origin of the CSR and the internal enemies’ preparations of its misuse, even the staffs of foreign broadcast stations are being reinforced. The arrivals of other categorized individuals are being registered, for example employees of Swedish, French and West German television, journalists from Great Britain, USA, Austria, West Germany and others, with intent to gain information on the anticipated anti-social gatherings in CSSR in connection to the 28 October anniversary.

In the above-mentioned period two American television companies CBS NEWS and NBC NEWS will be working in Prague. They want to capture the events around 28 October and inform the American public about the “troubles” in CSSR with the aim of presenting them as the continuation of the disintegration of the eastern bloc and the
unwillingness of the Czechoslovak leadership to agree to a dialog with the opposition. They also plan to interview the representatives of illegal structures. The West German television company ZDF has identical plans.

Through effected security measures, a meeting of the delegates of the so-called independent initiatives (Renewal, Movement for Civic Freedom, Czechoslovak Democratic Initiatives and NMS) on 12 October was successfully impeded. The meeting was supposed to prepare a common declaration of illegal organizations on the 28 October anniversary. During the measures for the prevention of a nation-wide meeting of CSDI activists on 14 October 1989, a declaration drawn up by the illegal “T. G. Masaryk Association” and “DTSV – the southern Czech group of the CSDI” for the 28 Oct. anniversary was uncovered.

Furthermore, in order to prevent the enemy’s ability to plan acts before the 71st anniversary of the CSR, security measures were carried out to:

- prevented a meeting of the leadership of the so-called Organization of Eastern Czech Opposition, whereby the founding of a regional organization of the “CS public organization” as a basis for a new opposition party was to have been discussed,
- prevented the plenary session of the “CS Helsinki organization” (CSHV) in Prague,
- impeded the meeting of more than 50 people from the Southern Czech region inclined to various illegal groups,
- prevented the mass distribution of the flyers “HOS Manifesto” (five distributors were prosecuted with respect to this),
- prevented the arrival into CSSR of Polish nationals connected with the so-called Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity – J. Janas, W. Maziarski, Jasinski and Borusewitz on 19 October,
- impeded the protest gathering of “young radicals” from so-called independent groups against the issue of a new 100-crown bill with a portrait of Klement Gottwald in the pedestrian zone in Prague on 25 October 1989, and assured peace and order in this area. The gathering was filmed by the television crews of ARD and ZDF.

In the effected security measures, in total 43 exponents of illegal organizations were detained and brought in, several of them repeatedly. Out of this number 23 individuals were given a warning by the organs of the SNB, 3 were given a warning by the head of HS KR and 5 a warning by the investigative organs of the StB.

In cooperation with the prosecutor’s office warnings will also be given to other main organizers of enemy acts and activists of illegal organizations (planned for 23 people). In the period directly before the anniversary these individuals will be under the control of the organs of the SNB with the aim of preventing their participation and contribution in the organization and coordination of confrontational acts.

For the prevention of wider distribution of flyers and the recurrence of anti-socialist signs, an operational investigation will be organized and the output of disciplinary services will be strengthened.

In the future any meetings of the so-called independent initiatives will be stopped to prevent their unification. In order to prevent the transmission of tendentious reports by telephone, technical measures will be carried out against the known informers of the editorial board of RFE and VA.19
Necessary measures will be taken to prevent the participation of known organizers and participants of anti-Czechoslovak campaigns in the West, active members of anti-socialist movements and groups from socialist countries in acts prepared by Czechoslovak illegal organizations. In view of the anticipated arrival of a larger number of these individuals, they will be searched at the border crossings and will not be admitted onto our territory. The individuals who, despite the measures, penetrate onto the Czechoslovak territory with intent to participate in enemy acts, will have their stay shortened by administrative means. In the event that the individuals’ participation in anti-social acts in the CSSR is proven, charges will be brought against them in accordance with valid Czechoslovak laws.

In cooperation with Czechoslovak media, particularly those operating nationwide, evidence of their resolute offensive propagandist influence is prepared with intent to discourage adherents and those sympathizing with illegal organizations from engaging in anti-socialist acts.

In the event of a so-called “silent march” papers will be checked and actively participating individuals will be brought in to SNB departments. If it should come to petitions, verbal attacks or spontaneous demonstrations of opposition to the party and state leadership and politics of the CPCz, disciplinary units will be called in to drive the crowd out of the area and disperse it.

If despite the effected measures it should come to a mass anti-social gathering, disciplinary forces will be called in to carry out necessary decisive intervention and to restore order through technical means.

The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years

National Intelligence Estimate

This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-18-89

The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years

Information available as of 21 November 1989 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
The Soviet System in Crisis: Prospects for the Next Two Years (C NF)

• The Soviet domestic crisis will continue beyond the two years of this Estimate regardless of the policies the regime pursues. The regime will be preoccupied with domestic problems for years to come, will want to keep tensions with the United States low, and will probably still pursue agreements that reduce military competition and make resource trade-offs easier.

• Despite the enormous problems he faces, Gorbachev's position in the leadership appears relatively secure, and he has increased power and political room to cope with the crisis.

• There will be greater effort to define the limits of political change, a tougher approach on ethnic issues, and some retrenchment in media policy; but the process of political liberalization will expand with the legislature and independent political groups increasing in power at party expense.

• The regime will concentrate on stabilizing the economy and, while pulling back on some reforms, will push for others designed to enlarge the role of the market and private enterprise.

• Despite these efforts, we expect little improvement—and possibly a decline—in economic performance as well as further increase in domestic turmoil. Of several conceivable scenarios:

  — Community analysts consider it most likely that the regime will maintain the present course, intensifying reform while making some retreats.

  — In a less likely scenario that all analysts believe is a possibility, the political turmoil and economic decline will become unmanageable and lead to a repressive crackdown, effectively ending any serious reform effort. (The CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence disagrees with both scenarios. See pages vii and 18.)

---

51
Figure 1. President Gorbachev: trying to cope with the crisis.
Key Judgments

The crisis, precipitated by long-simmering problems and Gorbachev's policies to address them, will continue over the next two years and beyond and could threaten the system's viability:

- Ethnic problems are endemic: conflict between the center and regions will increase as will interethnic strife, and the regime can at best hope to manage and cope with these problems, not resolve them.
- Economic ills are deeply rooted in the system, and efforts to reform it will be slowed by the priority given to stabilizing the economy.

At the same time changes in the Soviet leadership during the last year have made Gorbachev's position relatively secure over the next two years and portend a more radical approach to addressing the nation's daunting problems. We believe:

- Gorbachev's power has been significantly enhanced with the weakening of the leadership's orthodox wing and the development of a second power base in the legislature.
- The coming local and republic legislative elections and the party congress next October will probably further undermine the role of the party apparatus, increase the power of the legislature in decisionmaking, and bring a de facto multiparty system to some republics.
- More stringent measures—possibly including some retail price increases and a domestic currency devaluation—are likely to be imposed as part of the current economic stabilization program. Although the need to stabilize the economy has slowed the economic reform effort, we expect to see the introduction of a number of controversial measures—including a redefinition of property rights, a new taxation system, and antitrust legislation—that are designed to enlarge the role of the free market and private enterprise.
- To pursue this course and arrest the growing fear of anarchy in the country, Gorbachev will try to rein in somewhat the now freewheeling Soviet press and be tougher in defining the boundaries of the political and economic autonomy for the country's minority nationalities; he already has and will continue to use repressive measures if necessary to control communal violence or prevent secession.

---

53
In view of the continuing turmoil, whether Gorbachev can maintain a reformist course with some tactical retrenchment is uncertain and open to considerable debate. The next two years will undoubtedly be one of the most tumultuous periods in Soviet history.

Tangible benefits from perestroika will be relatively few, although intangibles (greater freedom and religious toleration) will be more apparent. Overly ambitious targets for the production of consumer goods are unlikely to be met. Labor strikes are certain. The enhanced role of the legislature will make needed austerity measures more difficult to pursue and likely compromises will reduce economic effectiveness.

Under these conditions, several scenarios are in the realm of possibility, but two are considered to be much more likely than the others. Most Community analysts hold the view that a continuation and intensification of the current course is most likely and believe that, despite the obvious difficulties, the turmoil will be manageable without the need for repressive measures so pervasive that the reform process is derailed:

- The politicization of the populace along with the expanding authority of the legislature are changing the system, giving political reform a broader and deeper base, and making it much more difficult and costly to turn back the clock.

- Although ethnic assertiveness will continue and Baltic peoples will strive for self-determination, the drive for secession will probably be blunted in this period by the regime's more sophisticated use of concessions and warnings and the desire of Baltic leaders to negotiate rather than confront.

- As difficult as the economic situation will be, the regime probably can prevent the supplies of food and consumer goods from declining to the point of provoking large-scale unrest.

In a less likely scenario that all accept as a possibility, the ongoing turmoil will get only worse and lead the regime, with or without Gorbachev, to use massive force to hold the country together and save the regime:

- Democratization will accelerate system fragmentation and make it impossible to take necessary austerity and economic reform measures.

- An exacerbation of supply problems—by an upsurge in strike activity, transportation bottlenecks, or severe weather—could increase shortages and lead to social upheaval.
• While trying to avoid confrontation, the interests of the Baltic peoples and Moscow are bound to clash dramatically, leading to much harsher measures by the center to regain control. (6-337)

Events in Eastern Europe are certain to play a role in determining which scenario the USSR follows in the next two years. As long as the transformations in Eastern Europe do not spiral out of control, they will reinforce the trend toward radical reform in the Soviet Union. In the unlikely event that Moscow deems it necessary to use Soviet troops to restore order and prevent the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, perestroika in the USSR would be dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow. (6-337)

Either scenario points toward the continuation of current foreign and security policies, at least for the two years of this Estimate. Gorbachev will still push hard for various arms control agreements. Eastern Europe will continue to have heretofore unthinkable leeway to democratize, effectively changing the Warsaw Pact into more of a political alliance than a military one. Even if a crackdown occurred under Gorbachev or another leader, the preoccupation with internal problems would be paramount, the desire to avoid increased tensions high, and the effort to shift resources toward consumption strong. A different regime would not, however, be as inclined to make major concessions to achieve various arms control agreements or be as accommodating to centrifugal trends in Eastern Europe. (6-337)

Alternative View
The CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence believes that the Estimate does not adequately capture the likely scope of change in the USSR over the next two years. (6-337)

Assuming Gorbachev holds on to power and refrains from repression, the next two years are likely to bring a significant progression toward a pluralist—albeit chaotic—democratic system, accompanied by a higher degree of political instability, social upheaval, and interethnic conflict than this Estimate judges probable. In these circumstances, we believe there is a significant chance that Gorbachev, during the period of this Estimate, will progressively lose control of events. The personal political strength he has accumulated is likely to erode, and his political position will be severely tested. (6-337)

The essence of the Soviet crisis is that neither the political system that Gorbachev is attempting to change nor the emergent system he is fostering is likely to cope effectively with newly mobilized popular demands and the deepening economic crisis. (6-337)
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Showdown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can the Turmoil Be Managed?</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying the Course</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Reform on Soviet Society</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Repressive Crackdown: A Less Likely Scenario</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Alternative View</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the Future of the System</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Gorbachev’s International Agenda and US Policy</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev Stays the Course</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrenchment</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gorbachev's Politburo Today

Yakovlev. Gorbachev protege ... strong proponent of radical reform. Frequent target of criticism by party conservatives.

Shestakoeva. One of Gorbachev's strongest supporters on both domestic and foreign policy ... unorthodox statements challenging ideological underpinnings of foreign policy have aroused objections from Ligachev.

Rykov. Has played a leading role in economic reform ... more moderate on political and social issues ... criticized Gorbachev in July for neglecting party duties but appears to be personally close ... clashes with Ligachev reported.

Medvedev. Ideology secretary in forefront of "new thinking" on foreign policy and radical economic reform ... more cautious on cultural issues ... also target of orthodox critics.

Slyun'kov. Economics secretary who has been hedging on radical restructuring ... some reports suggest not completely in Gorbachev's camp.

Maslyukov. First Deputy Premier and Gosplan chairman—a moderate on reform ... like his patron Rykov, has better appreciation than Gorbachev of difficulties of translating economic theory into practice.

Zaykov. Secretary and, since 21 November 1989, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council ... takes a traditionalist stand on some key reform issues ... may have lost close when failed to derail Yeltsin election.

Vorontsov. Only other Politburo member appointed before Gorbachev took power ... increasingly critical of political pluralism and radical economic measures ... only other full member in Supreme Soviet.

Kryuchkov. KGB chief who reportedly has close personal ties to Gorbachev ... echoed perestroika themes in 1989 Revolution Day speech but urged restraint ... has publicly called for legislative oversight of KGB.

Ligachev. With "second secretary" powers now removed, less able to hinder Gorbachev's programs ... views political reform as dangerous, disruptive, unnecessary ... opponents of reform may look to him as spokesman ... questions about corruption still alive.
Discussion

The Soviet system is in crisis. While noting the potential for turmoil in the Soviet Union, we underestimated how quickly it would develop. The roots of the crisis run deep into the nature of the Soviet state and Russian history and have been nourished by decades of official neglect, corruption, and ineptitude. But the public manifestations—the strikes, demonstrations, and other challenges to authority—are a direct result of Gorbachev’s effort to restructure the system. The turmoil that these developments have brought to the fore will continue and probably deepen.

This increased popular assertiveness is in one sense a measure of Gorbachev’s success in destroying elements of the Stalinist system. The pace and extent of this change have exceeded even our relatively bullish forecast of two years ago; indeed, the new legislature is the beginning of systemic change. His political reforms have brought a reduction in regime repression, an expansion of civil liberties, greater tolerance of religious beliefs, a broader range of permissible public discussion, and an opportunity for previously unrepresented groups to become a part of the system.

Gorbachev’s policies are breaking the management and control mechanisms of the old regime, however, before new ones are ready to assume these tasks. The effort to create a new political culture and institutions—capable of handling the flood of demands unleashed by Gorbachev—is still in its infancy.

His policies, moreover, have yet to alleviate—and in some respects have worsened—many of the social and economic problems he inherited. His efforts to manage the USSR’s restive ethnic minorities have not halted their demands for greater independence from Moscow; indeed, the effort to accommodate them has led to a strong push for independence in the Baltics—a step that Moscow will not allow but may not be able to stop without repression. And his economic policies have exacerbated serious shortages of consumer goods and services, guaranteeing a continuation of popular discontent. Not surprisingly, there is widespread pessimism in the country about the ability of the regime to overcome these problems.

Leadership Showdown

During the past year this turmoil led to an increasingly open conflict within the Politburo:

- Party secretaries Ligachev and Chebrikov among others seemed convinced that glasnost and political reform in general had promoted disorder in the country and were destroying the leadership role of the Communist Party. These leaders made it increasingly clear that significant retrenchment was required to save the party and the country.

That conflict led Gorbachev to move decisively against the Politburo’s orthodox wing at the Central Committee plenum in September 1989, removing five full and candidate Politburo members and replacing them with moderate and reformist supporters of perestroika. These changes have significantly altered the balance of power in the Politburo and effectively shattered its orthodox faction (see inset). The plenum’s approval of Gorbachev’s proposal to convene the 28th Party Congress in October 1990—four months
earlier than mandated—also allowed him to accelerate his plans to bring new blood into the Central Committee, which has been another source of resistance to his reforms.

Gorbachev's success at the plenum was the latest in a series of moves that have significantly strengthened his political position in the leadership, including:

- The Central Committee plenum in September 1988, when he launched a personnel and organizational shakeup of a magnitude not seen since Khrushchev's time.

- The April 1989 plenum, when he succeeded in purging about 20 percent of the Central Committee's members—"dead souls" who no longer held the jobs entitled them to membership—and promoting 24 candidates, mostly of a reformist stripe.

- His acquisition of a newly strengthened presidency in May 1989 followed by a streamlining of the government bureaucracy that had been resisting his economic reforms (see inset).

The cumulative effect of these moves has been to sharply reduce the threat posed by Gorbachev's opponents. As a result, we believe his position in the leadership is relatively secure for the next two years, although an assassination attempt by an individual against him cannot be ruled out.

Can the Turmoil Be Managed?

Even with his power and authority enhanced, however, Gorbachev has not yet shown that he has a strategy for dealing with a host of daunting problems his policies have created that defy easy solution and that by his own admission threaten perestroika. On the one hand, he faces powerful pressures for more far-reaching changes:

- The March 1989 elections revealed previously unsuspected grassroots support for political reform and a rejection of the party establishment that came as a shock to entrenched party bureaucrats as well as foreign analysts; an even greater repudiation is likely in the coming legislative elections at the republic and local levels, shifting authority further from party control toward the new legislative system.

An Upgraded Presidency

Gorbachev's clearest personal political gain from the reform of the state system is a strengthened presidency. Under the previous arrangement, the post was largely ceremonial. Gorbachev's scheme makes the president an executive leader of the full Supreme Soviet with constitutional authority in both domestic and foreign affairs and gives him power to:

- Nominate appointees to top-level government jobs, including the posts of premier, prosecutor general, and Supreme Court chairman.
- Recommend appointments to the new Constitutional Oversight Committee.
- Chair the Defense Council.
- Conduct negotiations and sign international treaties. (§ II)

The new president is accountable to both the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, although only the Congress can recall him. There is no legal requirement that the general secretary serve as president, so Gorbachev's removal from the top party spot would not automatically cost him the leading state position. Although the Politburo undoubtedly would try to deprive him of that power base as well, the Supreme Soviet could prevent such a move. (§ II)

As the new legislature has gained authority and become increasingly active in formulating policy, the presidency has taken on added importance and given Gorbachev a substantial advantage over most of his Politburo colleagues who have minimal formal legislative responsibility. Both orthodox party members and reformers fear that this upgrading of the presidency could lead to one-man rule. Party traditionalists fear this will violate the tradition of collective leadership that gives them at least a limited ability to keep Gorbachev's reforms in check, and the reformers are more concerned about what might happen if someone other than Gorbachev held the job.
## Interlocking Directorate of the Soviet Leadership,  
November 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Other Post</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politburo</td>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorbachev (elected October 1980)</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td>Chairman (president)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligachov (elected April 1983)</td>
<td>Chairman, Agriculture Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryzhkov (elected April 1983)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman (prime minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maslyukov (elected September 1989)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gosplan chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshturov (elected July 1985)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melvoden (elected September 1988)</td>
<td>Chairman, Ideological Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorotnikov (elected December 1983)</td>
<td>President, RSFSR</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaykov (elected March 1986)</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>First Deputy Chairman, Defense Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kryuchkov (elected September 1989)</td>
<td></td>
<td>KGB chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slyunov (elected June 1989)</td>
<td>Chairman, Socioeconomic Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vahnov (elected June 1989)</td>
<td>Chairman, International Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate member</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lukasnev (elected September 1988)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlasov (elected September 1988)</td>
<td>Premier, RSFSR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brizhkov (elected September 1988)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primakov (elected September 1989)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Council of Union Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razumovsky (elected February 1988)</td>
<td>Chief, Cadeas Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasyev (elected June 1987)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pugs (elected September 1989)</td>
<td>Party Control Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Secretaries only**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baikalov (elected February 1988)</td>
<td>Defense Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surotv (elected September 1989)</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manayevskov (elected September 1989)</td>
<td>RSFSR Cadeas and Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usanov (elected September 1989)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girens (elected September 1989)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is Unclassified.
• The level of ethnic mobilization in the Baltic and Caucasian has significantly increased the pressures for independence and promoted articulation of ethnic demands that are often irreconcilable with one another. Managing these centrifugal threats to the state is now much more difficult and the political and social costs of returning to the old ways of maintaining order much greater.

• The worsening economic situation has produced mounting popular dissatisfaction and a wave of strikes, intensifying the pressure on the regime to give workers greater control over their enterprises, to reduce the shortages of necessities and adopt more decisive economic policies. The regime so far has not been able to respond effectively to this pressure.

At the same time, he must deal with a number of strong barriers to change:

• Although reduced in power, an entrenched party and government bureaucracy continues to resist reforms that would lead to increased political accountability, greater "marketization" of the economy, or other changes that would undermine its status and autonomy.

• Many Soviet citizens regard economic reforms that widen differentiations in wages, increase retail prices, and threaten unemployment as violations of the "social contract." This has been an important factor in delaying economic reforms that for all their promise would have such unpopular consequences.
Gorbachev's Reform Agenda and the KGB

General Secretary Gorbachev needs the KGB in a period of political change to ensure his political survival, to monitor the compliance of local elites, and to control burgeoning societal unrest. During the past year, Gorbachev has strengthened his hold on the security service first by transferring then KGB boss Viktor Chebrikov to the Central Committee Secretariat and a year later retiring him. Current KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov—a political ally of the General Secretary and has been an outspoken advocate of reform—including parliamentary oversight of the KGB. Chief of the KGB Border Guard Directorate General Matrosov recently discussed his component's budget at a hearing of the Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee, and later this fall Kryuchkov will submit the security service's budget to the Supreme Soviet for the first time.

Some KGB officials are concerned about the effect of perestroika and glasnost on KGB prestige and on the organization's ability to carry out its mission at a time of growing unrest.

The KGB on the whole, however, is apparently satisfied that Gorbachev's reforms do not threaten its prominent position. Despite some "KGB bashing" in the Supreme Soviet and the press, Kryuchkov has been successful in defending many of the KGB's vested interests. Thus far, the KGB has taken fewer cuts in its personnel and prerogatives than either the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Defense. For example, although the FSB (Antidissident) Directorate has been abolished and the Third Chief (Military Counterintelligence) Directorate has been trimmed, many of their personnel have been assigned to a new department formed to fight organized crime. Moreover, KGB departments in the Caucasus and Central, Asia remain active in investigating nationalist extremists—reflecting the leadership's continuing need for the KGB's domestic role to maintain control.

- The disorder that accompanies reform—corruption, strikes, civil unrest, inflation, and increased crime—is anathema not only to institutions like the KGB and the military but also to large segments of the general population (see foldout map, figure 10, at the back). An authoritarian and paternalistic culture has instilled in many the belief that the only alternative to a strong hand at the center is anarchy (see inset).

- As a result of these pressures and the greater latitude for action he has achieved within the Soviet elite, Community analysts now expect Gorbachev to press ahead with a domestic agenda that combines an intensification of political reform and economic stabilization with a tougher approach to party discipline, ethnic extremism, and media policy. Whether he can maintain such a course given the turmoil and pressures is uncertain and the subject of strong debate in and out of the Intelligence Community. This situation could move in several different directions, but most analysts believe two are much more likely than others: "staying the course" and "a repressive crackdown" (see inset, page 7).

Staying the Course

The most likely scenario in the view of Community analysts is that Gorbachev will be able to keep the reform process going and avoid resorting to draconian measures that would roll back the trend toward greater pluralism and democratization.
This judgment rests in part on our assessment of Gorbachev, his agenda and his ability. Although lacking a detailed blueprint, he has been enormously successful in using and defining the sense of crisis in the system—indeed since 1985 and now—to drive increasingly radical solutions to Soviet ills. His policies call into question, whether intentionally or not, the role of the Communist Party, its ideology, the Stalinist economic system, and the center's dominance of the regions. As the sense of crisis has mounted, only he in the leadership appears to have the ability to manage the turmoil his own policies have stimulated. At the same time, he is flexible and clever at not getting too far ahead of what his colleagues can tolerate at a given moment; he has made tactical adjustments and occasional retreats to cope with both political and policy consequences of reform. (Sec. 3)

Our assessment of the likelihood of this scenario also reflects judgments about the manageability of the reform process and the turmoil it has created. Forces have now been unleashed in the USSR that have a life of their own, weakening the regime's control over events. The turmoil will continue under this or any other scenario. Most Community analysts believe the
### Other Possible Outcomes

Although the Intelligence Community considers the two scenarios presented in this Estimate to be the most likely, three other general scenarios—while far less likely—are at least conceivable:

- **Success story.** The regime could move much more quickly and skillfully on economic stabilization than we anticipate, be far more accommodating on demands for ethnic autonomy, and more receptive to sharing political power with forces outside the Communist Party. Such a scenario would see the economy revive, the “union” enhanced by genuine devolution of substantial political and economic power to national minorities, and a stable transition toward political democracy that did not threaten—as in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany—the continued viability of the Communist Party.

- **Social revolution.** At the opposite end of the spectrum, Gorbachev’s concessions to the population, severe weakening of all major regime institutions, and incompetence in managing the economy could lead to his losing control of the situation. Ethnic violence and separatist demands, increasingly potent challenges to Communist Party rule, and catastrophic economic deterioration could lead to large-scale instability and perhaps social revolution. This could include the breakaway of many non-Russian republics and a prolonged period of civil war.

- **Return to neo-Stalinism.** The threat of imminent social revolution could prompt a coup against Gorbachev that would not only lead to retribution but also to the imposition of political repression more severe than during the Brezhnev years. This scenario would involve the massive use of military force to reimpose order. The effort would certainly be bloody and would only postpone—and over time deepen—the systemic crisis not resolve it.

---

regime can cope with it and press ahead, haltingly and unevenly at times, with the reform process:

- A more open legislative process with real elections, debate, and votes is becoming institutionalized. The population is becoming more involved and interested, enlarging the constituency favoring change and making it much more difficult to alter course.

- Although strikes and shortages will continue, the regime will be able to maintain supplies, particularly food, at a level sufficient to avoid widespread social disruptions; the population, as it has in the past will grudgingly endure the privations, giving the regime more time to get its economic strategy implemented.

- The combination of regime concessions and warnings have blunted somewhat nationalist demands for outright independence, while the Baltic peoples appear disinclined to force a confrontation over the issue any time soon.

**Political Reform.** Analysts expect Gorbachev will intensify his reform of political institutions even further over the next two years, as he attempts to improve their capacity to deal with the demands perestroika has created. The political reforms mapped out in the summer of 1988 will soon be nearing completion in structural terms. A new Congress of People’s Deputies and Supreme Soviet already have been elected. Elections to the republic
congresses of deputies and local soviets are being held late this year and early next, further drawing the populace into the political process and increasing the pressure on the system to respond. The party congress already set for October 1990 will complete the revamping of the party and its Central Committee, shifting the political balance strongly toward a reformist course.

Despite this progress, the reformers recognize that they have far to go to build a political culture and institutions capable of dealing with the demands reforms have unleashed. They are trying to ensure that the new legislative institutions have a genuine measure of power and that the Soviet people have some real influence in selecting their representatives.

At the same time they want to achieve these objectives while preserving a national single-party system in which much power remains concentrated at the top. Gorbachev seems prepared to give these new institutions a substantial degree of independence and to permit considerable pluralism within them, however, in order to obtain his larger reform objectives. As is already evident, achieving such a balance will be difficult, requiring consistent effort to make the party more inclusive of diverse opinions while reining in those who exceed the limits.

In addition to strengthening the role of the legislature, we believe Gorbachev will attempt to restore the party’s deteriorating position. His speeches and
actions indicate that he wants the party to shape the reform process rather than be pulled along by it. To do this he intends to use the coming local and republic elections and the party congress to discredit further the opponents of reform and bring more new blood into the apparatus. (444)

This reform process will weaken an already beleaguered nomenklatura and could destroy it if allowed to continue for much longer. The new blood will align the party more clearly with reform efforts, as it already has in the Baltic, and perhaps give it greater credibility. Such a party would be vastly different from its Leninist predecessor, however, less responsive to Moscow’s edicts and more closely tied to its local constituency. Its distinctive claim to rule would be eroded even further as it faced strong competition at the local level from groups (de facto political parties) urging support for their own agendas. Whether intended or not, the reform will, in our view, hasten the ongoing shift of power, legitimacy, and action away from the party to other institutions, particularly the legislatures. (454)

We also expect Gorbachev to give new emphasis to his call for a society based on law as part of his effort to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy. Actually establishing the rule of law would require steps the regime so far has been reluctant to take: codification and implementation of such ideas as the independence of the judiciary, the subordination of the government to the law, and an emphasis on the freedom of the individual, rather than the individual’s obligations to the state. In the “halfway house” Gorbachev is trying to create, we expect coming legal reforms—including new criminal legislation and laws on economic activity and the press—to make steps in those directions but continue to stress the regime’s rights over those of its citizens. (444)

**Nationality Policy.** Initially, Gorbachev paid little attention to nationality problems; indeed, he appears to have assumed that reform would not encounter obstacles on this front. As a result, the regime has been struggling ever since to get ahead of the problem. Nationalism has flourished in the more open atmosphere of glasnost and public debate. The regime has allowed changes that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, but this accommodation has encouraged more demands rather than limited them (see foldout map, figure 11 at the back). (455)

The nationality policy adopted at the September 1989 plenum indicates that Gorbachev’s willingness to give the republics greater political and economic autonomy has certain clearly defined limits (see inset). In his speech he affirmed that each nationality had the right of self-determination but noted that this concept was not a “one-time act connected with secession” but the right to develop culturally and economically within the existing state structure. Gorbachev also has ruled out any shifting of borders and rejected the splitting of the Communist Party along ethnic or republic lines. Moreover, his stress on an integrated market and the

---

**Gorbachev’s Nationalities Policy**

To help ease the Soviet Union’s nationalities problem, Gorbachev envisions a program that would include:

- **The transition of the USSR from a de facto unitary empire to a union with real federative content.**

- **Constitutional delimitation of the functions of the center and the republics, with a significant increase in the authority allocated to the republics.**

- **Removal of discriminatory and provocative obstacles to the development of non-Russian languages and cultures.**

- **Equalization of the rights of all nationalities.**

- **Integration of the republics within a single unionwide economy, in which the “socialist market” harmonizes the interests of the multiethnic whole with those of its ethnic parts.**

---
3. (Continued)

The political challenge to Soviet rule is the greatest in the Baltics, where actions in support of eventual secession will continue to test Moscow's patience and tolerance. Most analysts believe there is a decent prospect that the regime's willingness to concede a degree of autonomy unthinkable in the past along with warnings of what is not now possible will blunt immediate demands for secession. Some Baltic nationalists are aware of the dangers of going too far, are looking for compromise, and seem inclined to avoid confrontation. This approach could well postpone a pitched battle over independence for some time.
Even if this fails, we believe the leadership would first exhaust all its political and economic leverage to encourage a nationalist retreat from unacceptable demands before turning to military intervention. For example:

- Central ministries could be directed to exert economic pressure by bargaining over delivery prices or even delaying the delivery of fuel, and blocking foreign financial ventures.

- Moscow might emphasize its disapproval by heightening the visibility of security (MVD and KGB) personnel or military units already present in the Baltics and seal the borders, hoping to cow dissenters and forestall a major bloodletting.

- Advocacy of secession could be criminalized and its advocates prevented from seeking elective office or even arrested.

- The Russian minority in the Baltic could be spurred to use strikes or work stoppages to tie up the local economies.

- Gorbachev undoubtedly recognizes that these options carry the risk of provoking demonstrations and escalating into a situation that could ultimately trap the leadership into sending in troops. The risk would be less, however, than that associated with a general crackdown in the Baltic republics, which most believe would be used only as a last resort. Even this latter course would be less risky for him and the system than letting the Baltic republics go. This move would encourage other much larger nationalities, such as Ukrainians, to seek similar goals and make regime survival problematic at best.

**The Economy.** The USSR’s swelling budget deficit, spiraling inflation rate, and continuing shortages of consumer goods threaten not only the country’s economic well-being but perestroika itself. Because of this, we expect Gorbachev to give special emphasis to a new economic stabilization program designed to slash the budget deficit, reduce the ruble “overhang,” and provide some immediate relief to the consumer. Specifically:

- The plan for 1990 is to cut the budget deficit in half by reducing spending for investment and defense and by increasing revenues through various means.

- Bonds and state housing will be offered to enterprises and individual citizens to soak up excess liquidity.

- Stiff taxes have been imposed on wage hikes of more than 3 percent unless related to increased output of consumer goods.

- Production of consumer goods is programmed to grow by 12 percent in 1990 over the planned level for 1989, and imports of industrial consumer goods are scheduled to rise by 15 percent per year this year and next.

This stabilization program, however, will not achieve the desired objectives. The regime apparently recognizes this and is reportedly considering more stringent measures to help stabilize the economy. This could include a currency reform—the conversion of old rubles into new ones at different rates depending on the size or form of holdings. Price increases on heavily subsidized basic goods and services, which we believe are necessary to get a hold on the monetary imbalance, are apparently not imminent. A draft blueprint for economic reform that is currently under discussion calls for a deregulation of retail prices only on luxury items, most imported goods, and high-quality foods and delicacies beginning in 1991. The rising tide of consumer dissatisfaction, combined with the legislature’s increased authority and responsiveness to public opinion, will make it difficult for the leadership to adopt the tougher austerity measures needed to improve the economy’s health.
3. (Continued)

-SECRET-

Figure 6
USSR: Summary of Selected Indicators of Consumer Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Performance measures (^{a})</th>
<th>Popular perceptions (^{b})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall consumption per capita</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable goods</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home electronics</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care and repair services</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure and recreation</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationing (^{d})</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working conditions</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of the environment</td>
<td>⬤</td>
<td>⬤</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) Performance is measured by comparing an indicator's rate of growth with the growth rate achieved during 1981-85, the five-year period that preceded the Gorbachev era.

\(^{b}\) Based on CIA analysts' judgments of the perception of citizens in the USSR as to how living standards have changed under Gorbachev—through August 1989—in comparison with the first half of the 1980s.

\(^{c}\) Projections based on data for January-June 1989 compared to the same period in 1988.

\(^{d}\) No performance measures are included for this indicator because we lack sufficient data on performance during the baseline period, 1981-85.
The severity of the economic situation has forced the regime to backtrack on those economic reforms that would exacerbate the fiscal dilemmas, hurt the consumer, and undermine popular support for perestroika (see inset, page 14). Gorbachev regards this as a temporary retreat, however, and we expect him to continue his efforts to develop a more coherent plan for enlarging the role of the free market and private enterprise that will lay the groundwork for the introduction of more far-reaching measures when the economy is more stable. These measures include:

- A new corporate and individual income tax system.
- Antitrust legislation designed to break up the country’s massive production conglomerates and encourage competition.
- A redefinition of property rights that puts the socialist and cooperative/private sectors on a more equal footing.
- An overhaul of the monetary/financial system to increase the ability of central authorities to employ economic rather than administrative levers. (S NF)

In a move driven more by politics than economics, Gorbachev will continue to provide strong support for efforts to give the republics greater economic autonomy under a system known as regional self-financing. This decentralization of economic authority is designed to assuage some of the republics’ demands for

---

*The CIA estimates for 1989 and 1990 are based on plan data. The range in the estimates for those years reflects uncertainty about the success of announced Soviet measures to reduce the deficit.*

---

---

---
### Pulling Back on Reform

- Both wholesale and retail price reform, scheduled for implementation in 1990 and 1991, were delayed. At first postponed indefinitely, plans now under discussion would return to the original schedule but make the revision of wholesale prices more gradual and the deregulation of retail prices more limited.

- To control inflationary pressures, enterprises no longer have the right to raise the prices of certain categories of products.

- Mandatory output targets, which were to be sharply reduced, have been reinstated in several sectors.

- Decisions on wage increases, which were to be the preserve of the enterprise, are now to be controlled by centrally imposed taxes on the growth of the enterprise wage fund.

### Regional Self-Financing

The Law on Regional Self-Financing, scheduled for nationwide implementation in 1991, will give the republics more authority over and responsibility for the production of food, consumer goods, services, and local construction. According to preliminary Soviet calculations, the overall output of industrial production under the jurisdiction of the republics is expected to increase, on the average, from the current level of 5 percent to 36 percent of the USSR's total production. To involve the republics more directly in the effort to increase productivity, each republic's budget will be made more dependent on the profits of its enterprises. The republics' economic plans, however, will continue to be dominated by state orders and "control figures" established by Moscow, and key sectors of the economy, strategic planning, and control over resources and financial policies will be left in Moscow's hands.

### Impact of Reform on Soviet Society

The Soviet system clearly is changing dramatically. Unlike the leaders in China, Gorbachev appears to believe that the new order must be built on foundations of political and social legitimacy if it is to succeed. But reform is often more difficult than revolution, and the genie he has released will defy the boundaries the system tries to place around them.

Although Gorbachev's economic policies point in the right direction, we believe they are unlikely to bring any substantial improvement in economic performance during the next two years and the situation could get worse, particularly this winter when food supplies will decline and spot fuel shortages may increase:

- The deficit will remain high, there will be little economic growth, and the demand for goods and services will greatly exceed their supply.
• Overly ambitious targets for the production of consumer goods are unlikely to be met. Some modest improvements are possible, but—even with the cuts in defense spending—any gains will come slowly because of the long leadtimes involved in shifting production capacity toward consumer goods and be restricted to relief in a few areas. Rationing and periodic runs on scarce goods will continue.

• Gorbachev’s reforms will put increased financial pressure on the enterprises and should help reduce redundant labor and some waste of materials. But these benefits too will be slow in coming and probably outweighed by dislocations, such as unemployment, and other disruptions resulting from the conflicting signals that piecemeal implementation of reforms will continue to create.

• Increased regional autonomy could eventually make the distribution of food more efficient by reducing Moscow’s role as the chief bottleneck in an overly centralized system. Thus far, however, local officials are introducing protectionist measures that are causing even more disruption and disequilibrium in national balances.

• Antimonopoly legislation and other reforms now under consideration hold some promise for the future but will only begin to take root during the period under consideration.

• If Gorbachev adopts a more radical approach on monetary stabilization, the economic and political environment for reforms could improve, allowing him to at least push ahead rather than delay further.

Gorbachev’s political reforms have more potential to produce results that would make any effort to turn back the clock more difficult and costly:

• His electoral reforms appear to be mobilizing the population, creating channels through which its interests can be expressed, and making officials more accountable to their constituencies.

• The boundaries of intraparty dialogue will probably expand even further, making any return to “democratic centralism” less likely.

• Although the new Supreme Soviet will not achieve the role of a Western legislature in the next two years, it is no longer the rubberstamp organization it once was, and the leadership will have to take it increasingly into account. This will provide a channel for citizen involvement in decisionmaking, give the leadership a more accurate barometer of grassroots opinion, and have an impact on important legislation.

• The challenge of contested elections—whether to party or state posts—also will force the party to engage in a genuine dialogue with other organizations, including informal political groups. Although official opposition to a multiparty system will remain, these new groups are already operating like parties and in many regions could become the governing authority, replacing the Communist Party.

The radical transformations under way in Eastern Europe are likely to have a major impact on the fate of perestroika in the USSR. As long as widespread domestic violence is avoided, anti-Sovietism held in check, and Warsaw Pact membership maintained, Gorbachev appears willing to tolerate almost any political change in East European countries—including the demise of the Communist parties. A continuation of such fundamental reform in Eastern Europe will reinforce the trend toward the thus far much less radical reform in the Soviet Union. Although the stakes are far greater at home, Gorbachev’s willingness to accept multiparty systems in Eastern Europe will over time make it more difficult for him to reject such a course for the USSR.

Perestroika in the Soviet Union and Gorbachev’s own political survival would be threatened, however, if events in Eastern Europe were to spiral completely out of control or take on an aggressively anti-Soviet character. Such a scenario—particularly if it occurred in East Germany or Poland and threatened the security of Soviet troops stationed there—would put tremendous pressure on Gorbachev to use Soviet forces to restore order and prevent the breakup of the alliance. An attempt to do so would lead to bloody repression, freeze relations with the West, and halt...
liberalization in the USSR. If Gorbachev resisted using Soviet forces in this scenario, orthodox elements in the party, the military, and the security services would almost certainly attempt to oust him. Their success, which would be followed by a violent crackdown on Eastern Europe, would set back perestroika for years, if not kill it entirely.

A Repressive Crackdown: A Less Likely Scenario

There is a less likely scenario for the course of events in the USSR over the next two years that all analysts acknowledge is a possibility. In this scenario the turmoil becomes unmanageable and so threatening to the system that the requirements of survival lead to a massive crackdown, ending reform efforts for some time to come. Several developments could lead to such an outcome:

- The virtual certainty of continuing instability on all fronts could drive the leadership in an ever more orthodox direction that Gorbachev will be unable to resist if he wants to stay in office. Current attempts to rein in the media and draw clearer lines on nationality policy may portend such a course.

- The economy could decline much further over the next two years. Severe shortages of food and fuel this winter would be especially dangerous for the regime. This situation would substantially increase the prospect of regime-threatening labor strife and make the likelihood of a repressive crackdown much greater.
Baltic nationalists could push so hard for independence that a confrontation over this issue cannot be avoided and would force the regime to use substantial force to maintain Soviet rule. Less repressive measures may not prevent secession.

Such a crackdown would not be so easy now. The politicization of society has gone quite far. Ethnic minorities will not readily give up their gains and hopes for the future. The longer the current reform process is allowed to continue, the more difficult and probably bloody would be any attempt to repress it. The institutional support for repression, nonetheless, remains and would in the view of most analysts still be able to regain some control over society if ordered into action.

Such a repressive regime would retreat to policies that would be less disruptive than the present brand of perestroika. While perhaps pursuing nominally reformist policies, the assault on the fundamentals of the Stalinist system would stop, and the reforms that threaten the party and Moscow's control of the empire would be reversed. This path would increase order at the expense of decentralization, democratization, and human rights. It might in the short run improve government performance by returning to well-known principles of management. It would not address the fundamental economic and social problems now plaguing the Soviet Union. It may be only able to re impose calm for a relatively short period, making the eventual storm far greater than the one facing the regime now.

In the economic sphere, retrenchment would mean adoption of a more orthodox approach, deviating less markedly from the traditional Soviet model. Such an approach would place less emphasis on market forces, strengthen ministerial controls, and give the enterprises less decisionmaking discretion. It would also impose stricter limitations on private businesses (cooperatives), individual labor, and leasing arrangements by reducing the scope of such activities, introducing stricter eligibility requirements for those engaging in them, and revising the tax structure in ways to make the private sector less attractive. Soviet advocates of this approach still believe economic gains are possible through stricter discipline, the introduction of high technology, and a crackdown on flagrant official corruption.

There would be an even greater retrenchment on glasnost and the liberalization process. Efforts would be made to increase central control over the electoral process and to restrict the Supreme Soviet's newfound authority. This would quite likely require measures now judged to be unconstitutional in the USSR (arrests of Supreme Soviet and Congress deputies, rule by decree, perhaps shutting down the Supreme Soviet) and use of force:

- Within the party, emphasis would be placed on unity rather than a plurality of views; the formation of unofficial groups would also be prohibited.
- The range of permissible public and media discussion would be significantly narrowed, overt censorship would return, access to information from the West would be reduced, and opportunities for Soviet citizens to travel abroad would become more limited.
- Human rights generally would be much more vulnerable than now; the security services would once again have relatively free rein to deal with dissidents, nationalists, and strikers.

Under such a retrenchment, the regime also over time would become much less willing to make significant concessions to ethnic demands, fearing this would strengthen the hand of those who want nothing less than complete political independence. There would be less reluctance to use draconian measures to put down ethnic strikes and demonstrations that threatened central authority or damaged the national economy. And the planned experiments in regional economic autonomy—designed to assuage the demands for increased political independence—would likely be canceled or sharply curtailed.
An Alternative View

The CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence believes that the first of the two main scenarios presented in the Estimate does not adequately capture the likely scope of change in the USSR over the next two years and that the second is not at all the inevitable alternative. Assuming Gorbachev holds on to power and refrains from repression, the next two years are likely to bring a significant progression toward a pluralist—albeit chaotic—democratic system, accompanied by a higher degree of political instability, social upheaval, and interethnicic conflict than this Estimate judges probable. In these circumstances, we believe there is a significant chance that Gorbachev will progressively lose control of the situation. During the period of this Estimate, the personal political strength he has accumulated is likely to erode and his political position will be severely tested.

The essence of the Soviet crisis is that neither the political system that Gorbachev is attempting to change nor the emergent system he is fostering is likely to cope effectively with newly mobilized popular demands and the deepening economic crisis.

Gorbachev and the Soviet regime will increasingly be confronted by the choice of acceding to a substantial loss of political and economic control or attempting to enforce harsh limits—both economic and political. Such limits are not acceptable to nationality groups that want meaningful autonomy, to new political organizations and individuals who want full political freedom, or to the general citizenry who, as workers and consumers, want immediate improvement in what they know to be a deteriorating standard of living. Indeed, a program that could stabilize the economy and prepare the way for serious economic reforms would require reductions in consumer subsidies and other measures painful to the populace. The regime's hopes of producing more consumer goods, including the conversion of defense industries, are unlikely to yield substantial results during the period of this Estimate.

Facing this dilemma, Gorbachev will press for political reforms that propel the process forward, and try to keep change within bounds. To do the latter, he will use political and economic pressures and resort to coercion periodically. This approach is unlikely to work. The upshot for Gorbachev personally will be to drive him to either give up his still authoritarian vision in favor of a truly democratic one, or recognize his vision as unreachable and try to backtrack from democratization. Gorbachev is unlikely to choose clearly either of these positions, thereby intensifying the crisis and increasing the prospect of a resort to force and repression.

Massive repression, as the second scenario of the Estimate suggests, is possible. However, this is less likely to be led by Gorbachev than by a political and military coalition that managed to outmaneuver him. Gorbachev is more likely, in CIA's view, to use coercive measures in an unstructured ad hoc ways that do not stop the ongoing systemic change and destruction of the one-party state.

Implications for the Future of the System

The Intelligence Community believes that Gorbachev's political reforms are designed to strengthen the regime's legitimacy by giving Soviet citizens the ability to improve their lives by working through the system. To achieve that legitimacy, however, the system must be able to produce the desired results—namely, real improvement in the quality of Soviet life. The modest improvements we expect in consumer goods and services over the next few years are likely to fall far short of that goal but may be sufficient to buy the regime additional time for its policies to take hold.

The same reforms required to strengthen the system's legitimacy, however, are also certain to make the next few years some of the most turbulent and destabilizing in Soviet history. Even though Gorbachev's concern about potential consumer backlash has caused
him to pull back on some of his economic reforms, his attempt to revitalize the Soviet economy will prove highly disruptive:

- The Stalinist economic mechanism is broken, but the failure to create a new one to do its job has resulted in confusion and contributed to the economic stagnation.

- His effort to improve economic efficiency by reducing the number of excess workers may require many of them to take less attractive positions—at lower pay or in less desirable locations.

- Social tensions also will be exacerbated by his attempt to make wages more dependent on productivity—a move that workers accustomed to the traditional “free lunch” find threatening.

- Resentment of those enriching themselves in the private sector already has led to outbursts of violence and retribution and is likely to increase as the gap in the incomes of productive and unproductive workers widens. [410]

We believe Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost will help to reengage a disaffected populace and provide a vent for the frustrations that built up under Brezhnev. But it will also encourage the regime finds undesirable—notably, the mobilization of groups advancing ideas inimical to state interests, such as the separatist movements of minority nationalities. The modest retraction on this front will reduce the damage but not eliminate the problem. Gorbachev’s electoral reforms are intended to channel this new political activism into official institutions, but under the banner of glasnost, groups are issuing demands that challenge central authority and could eventually form the basis of a political opposition. Such a course can ultimately work only if there is at least broad acceptance of the Soviet state. [411]

In our view, the growing assertiveness of the Soviet Union’s minority nationalities will pose a significant challenge to the stability of the Soviet system during this period. It also is increasing the tensions between the republics’ native and Russian populations. As a result Russian nationalist organizations, including the more hardline groups such as Pamyat, are likely to grow bolder and gain increased support. [413]

The regime’s more repressive approach since last year in the Caucasus—the continued martial law in Armenia and Azerbaijan and harsh suppression of demonstrations in Georgia—will be accompanied by some concessions, including legislation designed to give republics in this region and elsewhere greater economic independence and protect the rights of scattered nationalities. Gorbachev also is attempting to establish new mechanisms to deal with constitutional disputes between Moscow and the republics as a way of keeping such grievances within official channels. [414]

The USSR will be plagued by serious labor unrest over the next two years. Strikes will continue as economic conditions fail to meet popular demands. Gorbachev’s conciliatory handling of the nationwide coal miners’ walkout last summer has legitimized strikes in the minds of Soviet workers, who no longer fear that the regime will use force to break strikes. Moscow is likely to face several strikes at any given time; most will probably be small, but some might involve tens or hundreds of thousands of workers at large enterprises or throughout a city. Although no general strikes over economic problems appear imminent, the possibility cannot be ruled out, especially if distress over rationing spreads and intensifies. [415]

We believe Gorbachev will continue to rely on negotiation, rather than violent suppression, to end any strikes that break out. In some cases, he probably will insist on strict enforcement of the new law on labor disputes, which went into effect in late October and requires several weeks of collective bargaining before workers may legally declare a strike. The law bans strikes outright in strategic sectors of the economy, such as energy, transportation, public works and utilities, as well as law and order agencies, and violators may be fined or even fired. Strikers may attempt to thwart application of these sanctions, however, by walking out in large numbers.
3. (Continued)

Whose Perestroika: The Political Spectrum in the USSR

Issues like the creation of a multiparty system, economic reform, preservation of the Soviet federation, and the limits of glasnost have brought the political spectrum in society and the regime into sharp focus. Both have fractured into general groups, from party traditionalists on the right to radical reformers on the left. There are also small factions on the extreme left and right of this spectrum.

Party traditionalists support perestroika in general terms, but have little tolerance for what they perceive as the step-by-step dismantling of Marxist-Leninist ideology. They believe that political and economic centralization, under the leadership of the Communist Party, is one of the chief reasons that the Soviet Union has achieved superpower status. As a result, they are loath to accept criticism of the Soviet past—the trials and repri- sions of the Stalin era or the "stagnation" of the Brezhnev years—and prefer to emphasize the positive accomplishments of Soviet power. They strenuously oppose political pluralism and private economic activity. Many in this group have a xenophobic mistrust of foreign influences and institutions, assuming that closer ties to the West will subvert socialist values. Within society at large, groups like the United Workers' Front support these positions; among Politburo members, only Ligachev represents this view.

"Establishment" radicals seek to reform society by transforming society's institutions, beginning with the party. They seek to preserve single-party rule, but through a revamped Communist Party. They support greater republic economic autonomy and some concessions to a free market system, but they insist on the preservation of a strong, united Soviet Union. Glasnost to this group is a means of opening up society to the changes that are necessary to revive political life and awaken economic reform; theirs is a glasnost with distinct, albeit liberal, boundaries. Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Medvedev, and Shevardnadze are the Politburo members most identified with this mindset.

"Antiestablishment" radicals in general draw their inspiration from Western nonsocialist models and support fundamental changes in the political system and the injection of market forces in the economy. They believe strongly in political pluralism, some stressing genuine competition among rival parties. Some, including Yeltsin, emphasize social justice and the abolition of nomenklatura privileges. Many, like Sakharov, believe that the CPSU should be legally responsible to the Supreme Soviet.

Another potential threat to the stability of the system is the growing openness in questioning the necessity for one-party rule—a development that is likely to escalate with the formation of a non-Communist government in Poland and eventually in Hungary. We believe most of the newly formed groups, with their highly parochial agendas, will find it difficult to coalesce into a nationwide alternative to the Communist Party. If the pressure for political pluralism grows, Gorbachev might eventually have to contemplate a system that allowed nominal organized opposition to the party to build regime credibility. For the near term, however, we believe his strategy of enlarging the scope of intraparty debate and allowing some nonparty criticism of government decisions may obviate the need for such a move (see inset).

These threats will not go away and could lead to Gorbachev's downfall and the demise of reform. His program of allowing greater pluralism of expression and expanded popular participation in the political
Gorbachev and the Military: Living With Perestroika

Since becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev has challenged the military's priority status and tightened party control over it. Gorbachev purged the Defense Ministry's senior leadership and tapped a comparative outsider, Gen. Dmitry Yazov, as Defense Minister, who was mandated to accelerate perestroika in the armed forces. Since then Gorbachev has kept up the heat on the military. He pushed the General Staff to help him work out the unilateral conventional force cuts announced in December 1988 and to formulate conventional and strategic arms reduction proposals that, if implemented, would mean large reductions in military manpower and capabilities. Simultaneously, Gorbachev has initiated a program converting defense industrial capabilities to support the civil economy. Working through the newly empowered Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev has forced the military to open its books and to submit its budget and some personnel policies to parliamentary oversight.

It has been difficult for the military to assimilate all this. The manpower reductions, for example, are testing the armed forces' ability to efficiently select officers for discharge and resettle their families. Nationalism has become another serious problem as non-Russian refuse to serve outside their home regions and hazing and bullying increasingly take on an ethnic cast. Because the government has frequently used army troops to backstop overextended Interior Ministry assets, the military has become the focus of blame for excesses incurred during police actions against battling ethnic groups. This has added to the surprisingly virulent antimilitarism that has emerged in response to media criticism of military problems. Several Soviet officers have complained to Americans that all these changes have combined to lower the prestige of the military.

Gorbachev has firm control over the military. He has reduced military influence in national security decisionmaking and made cuts to the defense budget. He has created a more malleable high command, led by officers, such as Yazov and General Staff chief Molotsev, who are more personally beholden to the General Secretary. Various sources indicate that Yazov, who is only a candidate Politburo member, does not play a dominant role in national decisionmaking. The military is continuing to voice its opinion and speak out against reforms that it considers unreasonable—such as the creation of an all-volunteer armed forces—but there is little it can do if the government and parliament insist on the changes.

Implications for Gorbachev's International Agenda and US Policy

Gorbachev Stays the Course

If Gorbachev remains in power and avoids having to retrench significantly, we expect little change in the direction of his foreign policy. He will still have a pressing need for a stable international atmosphere that will allow him to concentrate on perestroika and to shift funds from defense to the domestic economy. Up to a point, the prospect of continuing turmoil at home will reinforce sentiment in favor of a respite from East-West tensions (see inset).
We expect Gorbachev to:

- Push hard for conclusion of arms control agreements with the West.
- Broaden the base of the improvement in relations with the United States and Western Europe and seek to shape the evolution of the European security order.
- Go further to defuse human rights as a contentious issue in US-Soviet relations.
- Remain tolerant of changes in Eastern Europe that reduce Soviet influence.
- Consolidate the rapprochement with China.
- Seek to reduce military commitments in the Third World and avoid confrontation with the United States.
- Step up efforts to make the USSR into a more credible player in the international economic system.

Retrenchment

The retrenchment scenario sketched out above would make Moscow:

- More supportive of leftist allies abroad.
- More reluctant to undertake any radical reorganization of the Soviet military and security services.

A more orthodox Communist regime’s harder line on a range of foreign and domestic issues would certainly increase East-West tensions, but the new regime would try to limit the damage. We see little chance that such a regime would find it in the Soviet interest to revert to an openly confrontational strategy toward the West that would entail a major new military buildup or significant risk-taking in the Third World. In fact, its preoccupation with the problems of domestic order and consumer discontent would place some limits on its ability to shift resources back to the defense sector. It would probably implement arms control agreements already reached but be less inclined to make concessions to complete those still being negotiated.
Figure 10
Reported Incidents of Economic Unrest, January 1987-September 1989

Soviet Union
Soviet Theater Forces in 1991: The Impact of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities
Soviet Theater Forces in 1991: The Impact of the Unilateral Withdrawals on Structure and Capabilities

Information available as of 22 November 1989 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, which was prepared by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. The Memorandum was coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces.

November 1989
Implementation of the two-year program of unilateral troop reductions announced by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1988 appears to be roughly on schedule. To date, the Soviets have withdrawn almost 2,000 tanks from the German Democratic Republic; however, reorganization and modernization in the Western Group of Forces (WGF) will partially offset the resulting reduction in force capabilities.

At the end of 1990, the WGF will consist of five armies and 15 divisions (seven tank and eight motorized rifle). It appears that the divisions will consist of four maneuver regiments: tank divisions will have two tank and two motorized rifle regiments, while motorized rifle divisions will have four motorized rifle regiments. Regiments apparently will not have combined arms battalions. It is not yet clear whether motorized rifle regiments in tank divisions will have two or three motorized rifle battalions (along with one tank battalion).

Complete reorganization of units in the WGF will require the Soviets to introduce approximately 1,800 armored troop carriers (ATCs), 400 artillery pieces (122 mm and 152 mm) and 200 antitank guns. Only about 450 ATCs, about 100 artillery pieces, and about 100 antitank guns have been introduced. Therefore, although the reorganization could be completed by the end of 1990, the current pace of equipment introduction would need to be increased significantly.

The restructuring of WGF tank and motorized rifle divisions will result in greater changes in their capabilities than are apparent from the changes in their aggregate combat potential scores. The divisions—and the WGF—will have substantially less armored striking power. Moreover, the new division organization makes it more difficult to concentrate tank forces.

Manpower reductions, coupled with the requirements of the reorganization, will not allow division-level readiness to be increased in the foreseeable future. Divisions will probably continue to be manned at about 85-percent strength.
The unilateral air reductions and restructuring will, when completed, result in a Soviet aircraft mix weighted toward air-to-air fighters over ground attack aircraft in East Germany. The aircraft force mix in the Western Theater of Military Operations as a whole, however, will be weighted more heavily than before toward ground attack aircraft. The number of deep attack aircraft remains unchanged. Although this new force structure will be more capable of defending against a surprise NATO air offensive, it will not further impair the Soviets' ability to conduct offensive air operations.

The unilateral reductions are consistent with the announced Soviet shift toward a more defensive doctrine. Pursuant to the new doctrine's "War Prevention" tenet, the reductions will virtually eliminate the Soviets' already limited short warning attack capability. By lengthening Soviet timelines to transition to war, the reductions increase the prospects for successful crisis management.

We believe the General Staff would have mid-to-high-level confidence in its ability to prosecute deep offensive operations against NATO forces in the Central Region, given sufficient time for force generation. However, the need to draw substantially on forces in the western USSR would severely constrain Soviet options in a multitheater war.

This information is Secret-NoForeign
Memorandum of Conversation Between Egon Krenz, Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

1 November 1989

Top Secret
To all members and candidates of the Politburo
[1 December 1989]
signed Egon Krenz

Berlin, 1 November 1989

After the extremely friendly welcome, Comrade Egon Krenz pointed out that he had read in Pravda about the slogans by the CC CPSU on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the October Revolution. He had been touched in particular by the slogan “Greetings to October, greetings to the socialist countries”.

Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his pleasure about the fact that Comrade Krenz had come to Moscow even before the October [Revolution] festivities. This symbolized that both parties and countries were striving to implement the ideals of the October Revolution.

He sincerely welcomed Comrade Krenz to Moscow on behalf of all comrades of the Politburo of the CC CPSU and of the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as in his own name. Despite an extremely tight schedule, they had tried to make arrangements in order to free up this day for extensive conversations with Comrade Krenz. He [Gorbachev] was hoping in particular for vivid information on developments in the GDR. Although information about them had come in, the report by Comrade Krenz would be of extraordinary importance for him. Even the most extensive information needed to be evaluated thoroughly, and who could do this more precisely than the comrades from the GDR?

Presently, the entire world was witnessing that the SED had embarked on a course of fast changes. But the events were moving very fast as well, and one should not fall behind. This had been the long-standing experience of the Soviet Union. Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that he had already said in Berlin [on 7 October 1989] that one must not miss the time for changes. A dialogue with society was necessary. There was no other way for a leading party to act. On the one hand, it [the Party] had to take the time to analyze the situation thoroughly and work out its political orientation. On the other hand, life was developing with its own dynamism, and one had to prevent a knot of problems from being created that could not be sorted out.

Comrade Gorbachev recommended not to be deterred by the complicated problems. From his own experience he knew that comrades were at times depressed because even after several years of perestroika in the Soviet Union there were still such great problems to resolve. He then always told them that the Party itself had wanted perestroika. It had involved the mass of people in politics. If now some processes were not running as expected, if there were stormy and emotionally charged arguments, then one would had to cope with that, too, and not become afraid of one’s own people.
He did not mean to say that perestroika had been fully achieved in the Soviet Union. The horse was saddled but the ride was not over. One could still be thrown off. On the other hand, much experience had already been gained, which had great significance. Now the phase of intensified work for the continuation of perestroika was beginning in the Soviet Union.

The people and the Party in the GDR were presently also facing profound changes. He wished Comrade Krenz success for this. The Soviet Union would, of course, stand at the side of the comrades in the GDR in this process. This had never been in question, not even as problems emerged which should actually have been discussed openly. There had never been any doubt for the Soviet Union and the CPSU that the German Democratic Republic was its closest friend and ally. Second to the people of the GDR, the Soviet people were probably the one wishing the GDR the most success in its endeavor. In this vein he wished to welcome Comrade Krenz to his visit in Moscow.

Comrade Egon Krenz expressed his thanks for the welcome and communicated cordial greetings from the comrades of the Politburo of the CC SED. He appreciated that Comrade Gorbachev had so quickly found time for this talk. He also thanked him for his visit to Berlin on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR, and in particular for his conversation with the entire Politburo of the CC SED, which had moved ahead many things. This applied above all to the remark that one cannot be late [in adapting to changes], otherwise one will punished by life [dass man nicht zu spaet kommen darf, sonst werde man vom Leben bestraft werden].

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that he had actually been speaking about himself. Comrade Krenz explained that this remark by Comrade Gorbachev and his entire appearance had met great resonance within the Politburo. It had initiated the process of discussing the future policy of the Party.

The SED could state rightfully that it had made great strides since its last party convention. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR, one could draw the balance that a lot of good and lasting things had been done for the people. One could also build upon a good foundation.

The population, however, resented the Party for having the mass media in particular create a world of illusion that did not coincide with the practical experience of the people and their everyday life. That caused a break of confidence between Party and people. This was actually the worst thing that could happen to a party.

Some say that the cause for this is to be found in the fact that the party leadership misjudged the domestic political situation in the last three months. It proved to be speechless when so many people left the GDR. This was a tough accusation. In addition, besides political mistakes, important psychological mistakes were also made in this difficult situation: In the newspapers it was stated that we did not weep any tears after these people left. This deeply hurt the feelings of many mothers and fathers, relatives, friends and comrades of these people whose leaving caused them great pains.

Despite these facts the Politburo of the CC of the SED agreed that the political crisis in which the GDR currently found itself had not just begun this summer. Many problems had been accumulating for a long time.

Today one can say that the main reason [for this situation] was the mistaken approach of the XI SED Party Congress, which was not based on a realistic estimate of the situation. The solution of economic questions was derived from subjective opinions
that failed to reflect the opinions prevalent in the Party and the population. Incorrect conclusions were drawn from important international developments—in the Soviet Union, in other socialist countries—as well as from the domestic developments in the GDR.

Comrade Krenz asked not to be misunderstood; if one had an ally and wanted to go through thick and thin with him, one could not just state this friendship in declarations and communiques and one should not distance oneself when it came to the solution of concrete economic and other questions. But one had to stand together as friends and solve the emerging problems together.

He saw a great problem in the fact that young as well as older people had reservations about the development of socialism in the GDR since they suddenly felt that, on the basic questions of the evolution of socialism, the Soviet Union and the GDR were not seeing eye to eye any longer. This was the GDR’s problem; the barriers had been build on its part. The people today, however, were educated and smart. They perceived very well that while the right words were used, the deeds did not follow suit.

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that the people in the GDR also received information from the Soviet Union which they evaluated independently. They were also informed from the West and drew their conclusions.

Comrade Krenz stated that they in the GDR had unfortunately left many questions regarding perestroika in the Soviet Union to the judgment of the enemy and failed to have a dialogue with the people about it. This happened despite the fact that Comrade Gorbachev had advised Comrade Erich Honecker at one of their first meetings to deal with the opinions which had appeared in Soviet publications and with which he disagreed.

Comrade Krenz pointed out that the prohibition of [the Soviet magazine] Sputnik in the GDR had led to a situation in which the enemy could raise questions about the GDR citizens’s right of access to information. The comrades and citizens outside the Party who complained about it were not primarily concerned about the contents of Sputnik. The problem was that the GDR leadership on the one hand was watching as the population was receiving broadcasts from the Western TV stations every evening for many hours, but, on the other hand, prohibited the reading of a Soviet newspaper. This was an important turning-point in the political thinking of GDR citizens. After the 9th Plenum of the CC of the SED [on 18 October 1989], one of the first steps to be ordered therefore was the return of Sputnik onto the list of permitted newspapers.

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that the GDR still has the right to criticize statements by Soviet news media with which it disagreed. You could read the most diverse things in Soviet newspapers nowadays; hardly anything could shock him in this regard. As an example he mentioned that a newspaper from a Baltic republic had recently cited a well-known Soviet economist to the effect that a conspiracy was being prepared in Moscow.

Comrade Krenz agreed that when the newspapers at home raise critical questions, one could quickly enter into a dialogue. Today one could hear among the GDR citizens that the [GDR TV show] “Aktuelle Kamera” was now already more interesting than Western TV [shows].

Comrade Krenz emphasized that despite all the imperfections and problems in the GDR and in face of the fact that there was still no coherent concept for the future
developments, one thing had been achieved after all: The problems of the GDR were now not being brought into the GDR from the West, but were discussed in our country [by ourselves].

This was very important, Comrade Gorbachev interjected.

Comrade Krenz explained that even though he knew that Comrade Gorbachev was well informed about the developments since he personally had had many extensive conversations with [Soviet] Ambassador [Vyacheslav] Kochemassov, he nevertheless wanted to say that the road to the 9th Plenum of the CC of the SED had been very complicated.

When Comrade Krenz returned from his trip to China, he decided to act. After consultation with Comrade Willi Stoph [Deputy Chairman of the Council of State] it was agreed that he would propose a declaration by the Politburo on the current problems of the situation in the GDR. The draft of this declaration was basically very watered-down, since it was initially intended just to overcome the situation of paralysis together with Comrade Erich Honecker. Therefore they were willing to agree to a number of compromises.

Comrade Krenz handed the draft resolution to Comrade Honecker who later called him and stated the following:

1. If Comrade Krenz introduced the resolution in the Politburo, he [Honecker] would consider this as a move against him personally. He himself had never undertaken anything against Comrades Wilhelm Pieck [former GDR president (1949-1960)] and Walter Ulbricht [former SED First Secretary (1953-1971)]. Comrade Krenz commented that this was not the truth but had been stated [by Honecker] in this way.

2. Comrade Honecker declared that if Comrade Krenz introduced the resolution in the Politburo, he would divide the leadership of the Party. Comrade Honecker would try to prevent this resolution from being adopted.

3. If Comrade Krenz introduced this resolution in the Politburo, he would have to expect that the cadre decisions, which would sooner or later be introduced in the Politburo, would look different from those that had been planned. He was thereby referring to Krenz personally.

Comrade Krenz introduced the draft resolution in the Politburo against the will of Comrade Honecker. Comrade Honecker, who chaired the session, stated this fact explicitly. After a long discussion all other members of the Politburo, with the exception of one comrade, spoke out in favor of the declaration. On the evening of the first day of this two-day Politburo session, the attempt was made to constitute a commission composed of Comrades Günter Mittag [SED CC Secretary for Economics] and Joachim Herrmann [SED CC Secretary for Propaganda], along with Comrade Krenz. The objective was to water down the resolution even more. At the demand of Comrade Krenz, Comrade Günter Schabowski was involved in the work of the commission. Both fought together for the adoption of the resolution, which was eventually achieved.

Comrade Gorbachev remarked in this regard that, politically, this was all clear to him. In human terms, however, he viewed this development as a great personal tragedy for Comrade Honecker. He had always had a good personal relationship with him, and there had been no problems in this area. He had, however, noticed with surprise certain
changes in Comrade Honecker within the last years. Had he [Honecker] made some basic policy changes two or three years ago at his own initiative, such deficits and difficulties as they currently existed would have been neither necessary nor possible. Comrade Erich Honecker obviously considered himself No. 1 in socialism, if not in the world. He did not really perceive any more what was actually going on.

Comrade Krenz explained that he had personally been very much affected by this development since he had been close to Comrade Erich Honecker throughout much of his life.

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that this had also caused a certain amount of speculation in the West. But they should not be afraid of this.

Comrade Krenz went on to say that the change of Comrade Honecker had occurred in 1985 when Comrade Gorbachev was elected as secretary general of the CC of the CPSU. Suddenly, Comrade Honecker saw himself confronted with a young dynamic leader who approached new questions in very unconventional ways. Until that time he had viewed himself in that role. Slowly he lost his sense of reality. The worst thing was that he relied less and less on the collective and more and more on Comrade Günter Mittag.

Comrade Gorbachev asked about the role of Comrade Joachim Herrmann.

Comrade Krenz explained that Comrade Herrmann had, for the most part, followed orders by Comrade Honecker without his own input. Comrade Mittag, by contrast, had manipulated Comrade Honecker, created mistrust toward other members of the Politburo, and influenced tactical as well as strategic decisions by Comrade Honecker in selfish ways.

Comrade Krenz reported that the Politburo had discussed an analysis of the economic situation yesterday. Prior to the meeting they had requested to get an untarnished picture of the real situation of the GDR economy. Such an analysis had never before been discussed in the Politburo.

Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that he had found himself in the same situation. He had also had no knowledge about the state budget when he became secretary general. As early as during the tenure of Comrade [Yuri] Andropov [CPSU General Secretary from 1982 to 1984], he and Comrade [Nikolay] Ryzhkov [President of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union (1985 to 1990)] had been tasked to analyze the situation of the economy since it was felt that something was rotten there. But when they tried to find out the full truth they were ordered to back off. Today it was clear to him why this had happened. Basically a national budget no longer existed. They were still coping with the consequences today.

Comrade Krenz explained that they had begun the 9th Plenum on the premise that they would face up to the truth. But if he stated the truth about the state of the economy before the CC, this could cause a shock with bad consequences.

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that they had known about the real state of the GDR economy in the Soviet Union. They also were informed about the relations with the FRG and about the problems that were arising in that respect. The Soviet Union had always tried to fulfill its obligations towards the GDR. Apart from the fact that 2 million tons of oil [deliveries] had to be canceled due to great domestic problems, they had always understood that the GDR could not function without the help of Soviet Union. This support was the internationalist responsibility of the Soviet Union. They had
wondered at the same time, however, why, given this situation, the GDR [leaders] was constantly lecturing about GDR successes. This was particularly hard to take since they knew about the real situation in the GDR. Comrade Gorbachev said that he once tried to talk to Comrade Honecker about the GDR debt. This had been curtly repudiated by him [Honecker] as such problems would not exist [in the GDR]. Comrade Honecker apparently thought he was the savior of his homeland. The entire development was a great personal tragedy for him.

Since he held such a high office, this [personal tragedy] turned into a political tragedy. Comrade Gorbachev emphasized he had tried to maintain a good personal relationship until the end. This had not been easy as he was aware of Comrade Honecker’s statements and real opinion. He had, however, tolerated this since other things were more important.

Comrade Krenz emphasized that one had to take into consideration that many comrades had been aware of the problems for a long time. They, however, remained silent to maintain the unity and cohesion of the Party. He had distinctly realized for the first time in the Politburo session on 31 October 1989, how much of an impediment the [otherwise] correct principle of unity and cohesion could become in certain situations when problems are not faced frankly and honestly.

Comrade Gorbachev expressed his conviction that if Comrade Honecker had not been so blind and had not relied exclusively on Comrade Mittag, but had also consulted with Comrade Krenz or Comrade Stoph, things might have developed differently. He had particularly felt badly for Comrade Stoph because he had effectively been very much humiliated by Comrade Honecker.

Comrade Gorbachev remarked that he had been struck particularly badly by the way Comrade [Hans] Modrow [SED leader in Saxony] had been treated.

Comrade Krenz related on this point that he had actually received an order as early as two years ago to depose Comrade Modrow. Back then the artists at two Dresden theaters had demanded to implement perestroika in the GDR, too. Comrade Honecker was on vacation during that time. He called Comrade Krenz on the phone and ordered him to go to Dresden. There he was to lead the discussion with the objective of deposing Comrade Modrow. Comrade Krenz went to Dresden and had a very frank talk with Comrade Modrow. They found a tactical solution to the effect that Comrade Modrow was to be criticized but not dismissed from his office.

Comrade Gorbachev said that Comrade Krenz had addressed a very deep and important issue, namely that a mere formal unity within the Party was to be avoided. Unity had to be created based on a variety of opinions [and] respect for the opinion of others. Problems always arose when a leader tried to maintain his position at any price and merely expected his [comrades] to agree. In the Soviet Union, they had watched Comrade Honecker enlisting the Politburo further in order to be able to play one comrade against another in this large committee. This had not been right.

Comrade Gorbachev reported that nowadays everybody was speaking their minds freely within the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU. If anybody would get to listen in, he would conclude that the Party was on the brink of collapse. But this was not the case. Even staffers of the comrades who participate in the sessions are at times allowed to speak up.

Comrade Krenz interjected that for such a procedure a lot of time was necessary.
Comrade Gorbachev explained that the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU took the time for this. Sometimes he would like to put an end to the long debates, but then would bite his tongue and made sure that the conclusions he drew would not offend the comrades. He would push through the line that he considered correct, but always in consideration of the opinions of the other comrades. This had created an entirely new situation. This way prevented them from making major mistakes.

Comrade [Georgy] Shakhnazarov, personal assistant of Comrade Gorbachev, who participated in the talks, added that policy would not be implemented by administrative means, but by argument and persuasion.

Comrade Krenz expressed his view that he had never experienced the Politburo of the CC of the SED [to be] as emotional as recently.

Comrade Gorbachev interjected that such controversial sessions, lasting for more than two days, had also taken place in the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU—once during a discussion on the letter of Nina Andreeva,98 and another time during the debate on the long-term economic orientation.

Comrade Krenz explained that while the Soviet comrades were well-informed about the political and economic situation, he still wanted to describe the current economic situation since it was strangling the hands of the SED leadership in making urgently necessary political decisions. [...] On the GDR balance of payments, Comrade Krenz provided the following information: Until the end of 1989, the foreign debt would grow to USD 26.5 billion, that is, 49 billion valuta [West German] mark.

The balance in convertible foreign exchange at the end of 1989 would look like this:

Income: USD 5.9 billion
Expenses: USD 18 billion

The deficit thus ran at about USD 12.1 billion. This meant that they had to take on new loans. It was likely that this imbalance would increase further.

Astonished, Comrade Gorbachev asked whether these numbers were exact. He had not imagined the situation to be so precarious.

Comrade Krenz explained that the GDR had to take on new loans in order to pay off old debts. Currently, they had to spend USD 4.5 billion on interest payments alone, which equaled 62 percent of the annual export profits in foreign currency.

Comrade Krenz emphasized that the high foreign debt was created above all because they had to take on loans at very high interests during the time of the Western financial blockade of the socialist countries. The situation grew particularly precarious due to simultaneously emerging new demands on the economy and new expectations by the population that could not be satisfied. The state of the balance of payments was currently not known in the GDR. If one would go on realistically and base the standard of living exclusively on the own production, one would have to lower it [the living standard] by 30 percent immediately. But this was not feasible politically.

Comrade Gorbachev gave the following advice on the issue based on his experience: Comrade Krenz and the SED leadership generally had to find a way to tell the population that it had lived beyond their means in the last few years. Comrade Krenz could not yet be held personally responsible for this. But is was increasingly necessary to tell the full truth. First one needed time for a comprehensive analysis. But later full
information [of the population] was unavoidable, since otherwise Comrade Krenz would be blamed himself for the growing difficulties. Slowly the population had to already get used to this idea today. [...]  

[Comrade Krenz] stated that he also agreed with the remarks by Comrade Gorbachev on the relationship with the FRG. He asked [Gorbachev] to explain more clearly what role the USSR ascribed to the FRG and the GDR in the all-European house. This was of great significance for the development of relations between the GDR and the FRG. He went on to explain that there was an important difference between the GDR and other socialist countries. The GDR was, in a certain sense, the child of the Soviet Union, and one had to acknowledge one’s paternity with regard to one’s children.  

Comrade Gorbachev agreed with this and made reference to a conversation between Comrade Yakovlev and [former US National Security Advisor to President Carter] Zbigniew Brzezinski. They had, among other things, discussed whether one could imagine a situation in which the reunification of Germany could become a reality. Brzezinski emphasized that to him this would be the collapse.  

Comrade Gorbachev welcomed Comrade Krenz bringing up this question. The GDR, the Soviet Union, and the other socialist countries had thus far followed a correct course on this question. This [course] had led to the recognition of the existence of two German states, to the international recognition of the GDR, to its active role in the world, to the conclusion of the [1970] Moscow Treaty, and other treaties, and ultimately to the [1975] Helsinki Conference.  

In recent talks with [British Prime Minister] Margaret Thatcher, [French President] François Mitterrand, [Polish leader Gen. Wojciech] Jaruzelski and [Italian Prime Minister Giulio] Andreotti, it had become clear that all these politicians presumed the preservation of the postwar realities, including the existence of two German states. They all viewed the question of German unity as extremely explosive in the current situation. Nor did they want the Warsaw Pact and NATO to dissolve, and therefore they favored Poland’s and Hungary’s remaining in the Warsaw Pact. The balance of power in Europe was not to be disturbed since nobody knew what repercussions this would have.  

Even the US had thus far taken a similar attitude. However, currently many discussions among the FRG’s allies were taking place. One sympathized in words with the FRG’s concerns about a divided Germany. There were some nuances in the USA in this regard which would still have to be analyzed.  

Comrade Shakhnazarov interjected that those statements were probably all made for domestic consumption.  

Comrade Gorbachev agreed and emphasized that in practice the US was continuing its old policy. To his mind, the best policy now was to continue the current line. [Former West German Chancellor] Willy Brandt was of the same opinion. He had declared that for him the disappearance of the GDR would be a spectacular defeat for Social Democracy since it considered the GDR as a great achievement of socialism. While he distanced himself from the communists, he nevertheless considered Social Democracy as a branch of the labor movement and continued to cling to the socialist idea. [Egon] Bahr [West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader] had expressed this openly [and] with much clarity.  

For the socialist countries, Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, the best thing was to emphasize that the current situation was a result of history. Nobody could ignore,
however, that manifold human contacts existed between the two German states. These [contacts] could not be prevented; one had to keep them under control and steer them in the right direction. For this reason it was necessary to make some changes in policy to gain the understanding of the populace. Comrade Gorbachev offered that they could consult with the Soviet comrades about this question.

It would be very damaging to reduce or even sever the relations between the GDR and the FRG. In this connection, he [Gorbachev] wanted to point out the following factors:

1. It was important to improve coordination of the relations in the triangle GDR—FRG—Soviet Union. He had also talked about this with Comrade Honecker. The Soviet Union knew from other sources how relations between the GDR and the FRG were developing. They even knew within three days what had been discussed in the National Security Council of the United States. On the other hand, the US was also well-informed about developments in the Soviet Union. Such after all was the situation. Therefore it was completely unnecessary to keep secrets from close allies.

Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that years ago there had been a joint office which coordinated the relations of the GDR and the Soviet Union with the FRG. At the time, it had been headed by Comrades Mittag and [Nikolai] Tikhonov [Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1980-85]. It had silently ceased its activities, but it had to be revived.

Comrade Krenz mentioned that Comrade Honecker had been pleased that he could decide on trips to the FRG or China on his own. He very much favored finding ways at the working level through which common policies towards the FRG and West Berlin would be better coordinated. Comrade Gorbachev recommended discussing this question in the Politburo of the SED CC or in an even smaller circle.

2. It was also important to consider the relationships within this triangle very carefully. The Soviet Union was trying to bring the FRG as a partner into a closer relationship. Then the GDR would also be in a more favorable position within this triangle. Efforts in this direction were being made in the FRG. [The FRG] was ready to cooperate with the Soviet Union on a broad set of issues, but expected that the Soviet Union would lend support with regard to reunification. There was talk that the key to this lay in Moscow. The Americans stated this as well. This was a very convenient excuse for them. In their talks with the FRG, they spoke of their support for reunification, but always pointed to Moscow’s key role. Moscow was to be handed the “black Peter.”99 On the other hand, the US was not pleased by the rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow in the economic and political field. In practical terms, not much had happened thus far. And one should not rush anything in this area either because the FRG representatives needed time.

For the GDR it was important to maintain and continually develop its relationship with the FRG. One had to be careful to prevent the ideological enemy from gaining positions—which he could exploit. Thus the GDR would continue to receive raw materials from the Soviet Union, and at the same time cautiously develop its relationship with the FRG, avoiding a total embrace by the FRG.

3. It was important for the GDR to develop its relations with other nations besides the FRG. Here, too, they could work closely with the Soviet Union. Hungary and Poland were already very active in this field. They, after all, had no choice in this matter. It was
often asked what the USSR would do in this situation. But it could do very little in economic terms. It was an absurdity to think that the Soviet Union could support 40 million Poles. The root of the problem lay with [former Polish leader Edward] Gierek who had taken on loans totaling US$ 48 billion. Meanwhile the Polish comrades had already paid back US$ 52 billion and still owed US$ 49 billion.

In 1987 Comrade [Hungarian leader Janos] Kadar was given an ultimatum by the [international] M[onetary] F[und]; in case of non-compliance with the numerous demands a suspension of the loans was threatened.

Comrade Krenz pointed out that this was not our way.

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that such problems also existed in the GDR-FRG relationship. One was aware in the Soviet Union that GDR microelectronics were based to a large degree on Western components. Comrade Krenz remarked that [State Security Chief] Comrade [Erich] Mielke and his department were partly responsible for this. Moreover, Soviet components were also used. As a result, one had to collaborate more closely today. But it had to be a balanced collaboration with clearly set priorities.

Summing up, Comrade Gorbachev remarked that one had to continue the current policy, which had brought about success. The GDR and its people could be proud of that.

There was no reason to speculate how the German Question would eventually be resolved. The current realities had to be taken into consideration. This was most important.

If the tendency of rapprochement in Europe would continue for several decades, if the processes of integration would develop regardless of social systems, but in recognition of independent developments of politics and culture, development, and traditions, and if the exchange of intellectual and material goods evolved further, then the issue might present itself in a different light some day. But today this was not a problem of actual policy. The established line had to be continued in the current political situation. Comrade Gorbachev asked Comrade Krenz to communicate this to the comrades in the Politburo. There was an understanding about this between the Soviet Union and its former partners from the era of the Anti-Hitler Coalition.

Comrade Krenz pointed out that this policy had to be secured in ideological terms. Comrade Honecker posed the well known five-demands of Gera in the early 1980s. On the one hand, the GDR had concluded numerous mutually beneficial treaties with the FRG since then; the FRG, on the other hand, had not shown any movement on any of these five demands. This had led to certain mistaken assumptions within the GDR. Since many prominent GDR representatives traveled to the FRG, average citizens were also demanding this right. There was a lot of talk about universal human values, but that had created a general German problem. Therefore the issue of de-ideologizing the FRG-GDR relationship was a very difficult question. The issue posed itself differently in relationships between other countries. De-ideologizing relations would mean abandoning the defense of socialism. Questions like the wall or the border regime with the GDR would arise anew. The GDR found itself in the difficult situation of having to defend these somehow anachronistic, but nevertheless necessary things.

Comrade Gorbachev expressed his opinion that this all had to be reconsidered. The time was ripe for this. If the GDR could not find a solution which allowed people to visit their relatives, then this would be a very dissatisfying state of affairs for GDR society. The GDR would be threatened by new ultimatums. It had to take the initiative in
its own hands. The Soviet Union was ready to talk about such measures. The GDR would have a better feel for what had to be done. It was certainly necessary to take some concrete steps which, however, had to be linked constantly with certain obligations and actions by the other side. It was time to exert greater pressure on Chancellor Kohl, now that he had established contacts with Comrade Gorbachev and Comrade Krenz. In the FRG, the national question was heavily exploited in politics. There were people in the government parties who wanted to get rid of Kohl. He, however, had put his bets on the nationalist issue. There were even more extreme demands from the right wing. The CDU \[Bundestag\] delegate \[Juergen\] Todenhoefer had issued a letter to the US and Soviet Union demanding the immediate reunification of Germany. There was wild speculation about this subject in the FRG.

Comrade Krenz explained the envisioned measures to be taken by the GDR with regard to this set of issues:

1. The GDR will try to prevent any use of firearms along the border. The border guards had been instructed accordingly. They would only fire if there was acute danger to the life and health of the border guards.

2. The draft of a new travel law had been adopted by the Politburo and had been sent to the Council of Ministers, which would put it up for public discussion. \[The draft law\] was to be adopted by the \textit{Volkskammer} \[GDR Parliament\] before Christmas.

According to this law, every GDR citizen had the opportunity to receive a passport and a visa for travel to all countries. The circle of those who would be excluded from this for security reasons would be kept very limited.

3. Unfortunately, the GDR was unable to provide travelers with sufficient foreign exchange. One could not continue to live over one’s means. The publication of the travel law would be accompanied by a commentary which would explain that the foreign exchange generated by the FRG citizens travelling to the GDR would not be sufficient to provide GDR travelers with foreign currency.

Comrade Gorbachev suggested that one option would be the gradual achievement of convertibility of the GDR mark. This would be an incentive for workers to work harder, to strive for higher productivity and quality, by means of which such goals would be obtained.

Comrade Krenz explained further steps by the SED leadership over the next few days and weeks. On 8 November 1989, the 10th Plenum of the CC would be convened. It was to find an answer to the question of the GDR’s future. If there was no serious answer to this question, the party leadership would continue to come under criticism by the CC.

Comrade Gorbachev repeated that the international reaction about the speech by Comrade Krenz before the \textit{Volkskammer} in particular had been very positive. Following his speech at the 9th Plenum of the SED CC, skepticism had been pervasive. The reaction had been very cautious. Now it was important to deepen the positive impression further.

Comrade Krenz pointed out that the instructions given to the Soviet ambassadors in various countries had contributed much in this regard.

Comrade Gorbachev informed \[Krenz\] that he had received positive responses from all the important statesmen to which he had turned.

Comrade Krenz reported that he had received con-gratulatory telegrams from them all, including Chancellor Kohl. He had had a brief phone conversation with the latter. Kohl pointed out his constant contact with Comrade Gorbachev and recommended
that this would also be done with Comrade Krenz. Comrade Krenz responded that it was always better to speak with each other than to talk about each other. Kohl immediately brought up concrete proposals with regard to transit traffic, environmental issues, relations with West Berlin, etc […] Comrade Krenz agreed to explore all concrete questions with the Chancellor’s representative. Kohl above all wanted to speak about questions on which agreement was possible, not about those on which both sides disagreed. Comrade Krenz pointed out to Kohl explicitly that both the GDR and the FRG had their own interests. He [Kohl] had to expect that he [Krenz] would represent GDR interests more consistently than had heretofore been the case. Kohl had been very excited during the conversation. He frequently did not finish his sentences.

Comrade Gorbachev stated that Kohl was not an intellectual heavyweight, but rather a petit-bourgeois type. It was these classes that understood him best. But he was nevertheless a talented and stubborn politician. After all, even Reagan had been popular and had stayed in power relatively long. This also applied to Kohl.

Comrade Krenz predicted that the 10th Plenum of the SED CC would be a very stormy session. Many comrades were preparing for it and wanted to take the floor. The discussion had not been officially prepared. The times of deference toward the Politburo were over. The question was sharply raised as to the responsibility of the Politburo collective for the current situation. This also concerned his own personal responsibility. He hoped that they would find a smart answer to the question.

The Plenum was to adopt an action program. The reason was that the 7th and 8th Plenums of the CC had been overtaken by the events. The envisioned action program was to briefly outline the direction of future work. They would try to answer the question as to what constituted a better, more modern and attractive socialism, which socialist values had to be defended and which ones were questionable.

The Plenum would discuss radical economic reforms. The government would obtain the task to formulate the main directions. It was clear that the answer had to be found in socialism, not in the free market.

The second question concerned the broad development of socialist democracy. A series of new laws were in preparation. Elections posed a big problem. It had already been stated that we would use all experiences of previous elections and wanted to prepare a new election law. One would deal with constitutional issues, such as freedom of the press, glasnost, and freedom and dignity of the individual. The issues of the leading role of the Party under the new conditions had to be discussed. They had to further develop criticism and self-criticism in order to avoid subjectivism. The changes ranged as far as the proposal to set a term limit on the official tenure of the office of general secretary and other high officials.

Comrade Gorbachev had a very high opinion of Comrade Stoph. He had been in a
difficult situation in recent years. He had maintained his dignity when he was forced into
a corner by Comrade Mittag. He had consistently taken a very principled position in
decisive situations. One must not throw all old comrades into one pot.

Comrade Krenz expressed his regret about the case of Comrade [Free German
Union League (FDGB) Harry] Tisch. He was now forced to resign. The reason was that
he had made a major political mistake during a TV broadcast. He had blamed
responsibility for the current situation above all on the lower functionaries. According to
him, the union officials had not fulfilled their duties because they had listened too much
to the party secretaries in the factories. This had evoked great outrage among the union
members. In the Politburo they agreed not to decide the matter here in order not to
diminish the independence of the unions. For now the FDGB leadership had postponed
its decision on this issue until 17 November. But even that was not accepted by many
union members. There was even talk about the possibility of a split of the union if
Comrade Tisch did not resign. Meanwhile Comrade Krenz had received a call to the
effect that Comrade Tisch would resign immediately.

On the subject of the still on-going demonstrations, Comrade Krenz stated that the
situation was not easy. The composition of the demonstrators was diverse. Some real
enemies were working among them. A large part were dissatisfied [citizens] or fellow-
travelers. The SED leadership was determined to resolve political problems by political
means. The demonstrations would be legalized, and there would be no police action
against them.

The situation, however, was developing according to its own dynamics. For the
weekend, a large demonstration with possibly half a million participants was planned in
Berlin. It had been initiated by artists and some of their associations.

Comrade Gorbachev provided the following information in this regard: Prior to
his visit, he had received a letter from the GDR League of Culture through Raissa
Maximovna Gorbachev in her function in the Soviet Culture Fond. [The letter] described
the situation in the GDR and pointed out that the League of Culture would address an
appeal to the GDR people if they had not received a response from the Party leadership
by the time of the anniversary of the [GDR].

Comrade Krenz confirmed that if Erich Honecker had given a different kind of
speech on the occasion of the anniversary [of the GDR], the situation might have taken a
different course. With regard to the demonstration, the Politburo had decided to call on
party members to participate. Comrade Schabowski would be among the 17 speakers in
order to prevent the opposition from remaining among itself at this demonstration. They
wanted to do everything to assure a peaceful event but had to take certain precautionary
measures. One measure was to prevent the masses from attempting to break through the
Wall. This would be bad because the police would have to be deployed and certain
elements of martial law would have to be introduced. But such a development was not
very likely, but one had to be prepared.

They expected the following slogans at the demonstration:
- Naming those responsible for the current situation
- Resignation of the senior Politburo members
- Changes in the composition of the government
- Travel opportunities
- Changes in the status of the union and the youth organization
- New electoral law
- Recognition of the opposition
- Abolishment of privileges
- Freedom of the press and thought
- Improvement of the living standard and continual production.

They were currently trying to avoid any criminalization of the demonstrators and to proceed very carefully. The question of recognizing the [opposition movement] “Neues Forum” had not yet been determined. So far they were unable to evaluate fully their political orientation. One had to avoid any developments similar to that of Solidarity in Poland.

Comrade Gorbachev shared Soviet experiences on these questions from the first phase of perestroika. Back then, many informal organizations and other movements were created. The leadership had watched them with skepticism. Good and bad [movements] were thrown into one pot. That way time was lost in certain republics. They failed to integrate these movements into the activities of the Party, which in turn created polarization. Some of these forces developed into an opposition against the policy of perestroika and represented separatist, nationalist and anti-socialist views.

One should not waste any time with regard to these questions. Anti-socialist and criminal elements were one thing. But one could not generally consider the people as the enemy. If it rose against [the political leadership], one had to consider what political changes had to be made so that it accorded with the interests of the people and socialism. One should not miss the [right] point in time so that such movements would get on the other side of the barricades. The Party should not shy away from such problems, it had to work with these forces. They were now doing this in the Soviet Union, but it was already very late. These organizations had brought about their own leaders and worked out their own principles.

Where anti-Sovietism was involved, communists had no business being there. But for the most part they [these opposition groups] were concerned workers who worried about numerous neglected questions.

Comrade Krenz confirmed that the SED would approach the problem in this manner. But this would be a long process.

With regard to the remarks by Comrade Gorbachev, Comrade Krenz asked to check if the exchange of experience with the CC departments of the CPSU on a number of questions, with regard to which the Soviet Union had already accumulated many years of experience, could be expanded. This related to the fields of party organizations, security questions, and others. Generally, the exchange of know-how between the departments of the Central Committee should be intensified again.

Comrade Gorbachev welcomed this suggestion.

Comrade Krenz stated that the SED would again send cadres from training to Soviet party schools in the near future.

Comrade Krenz pointed out some currently unresolved problems in the field of economic cooperation. They included:
- an improved usage of the ferry connection Mukran-Klaipeda, which was of great significance for imports and exports;
- mutual improvements in living up to contractual obligations;
- examination of the possibility of a further increase in natural gas deliveries from the USSR, which the GDR would greatly appreciate;
- an agreement on further deliveries of the “Lada” automobile to the GDR, given that at the moment questions about the supply of consumer goods for the population, among others with cars, play a crucial role in the debate. This was a result of the extraordinary high savings in the GDR and the enormous budget deficit. Liquidity among the population was very high. Add to this a systematic demand of goods, in particular by Polish citizens.

Comrade Gorbachev confirmed this in the case of the Soviet Union as well. Comrade Krenz emphasized that, for the SED, the decisive issue was to restore the harmony [of hearts] with the CPSU and the USSR which was vital for us. The Soviet side had always been ready for this, but on our side there had been certain impediments. He wanted to declare on behalf of the Politburo of the CC of the SED that both parties should return to the method of frankly and honestly raising all questions of concern. The calls for “Gorbi, Gorbi” during the demonstrations in Berlin had shown that it was impossible to destroy the good relationship of the young people and the GDR entire population with the Soviet Union, even if the leadership had failed in this respect.

Comrade Gorbachev reported that the greatest difficulty for him in participating in the 40th anniversary of the GDR had been that he had been aware of the mood, and that he had felt very uncomfortable standing at Erich Honecker’s side.

Comrade Krenz interjected that he had even been accused of organizing this mood, especially among the young people. But it was simply a free expression of the attitude of the people.

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that the visit of Comrade Krenz so shortly after his election was extraordinarily important for mutual agreement at the beginning of a new era. The point was to demonstrate jointly that they stood with each other, that the development in the Soviet Union was close to the one in the GDR, and vice versa. This was also important for the other socialist countries and for the entire world. In the FRG they were also interested in what Gorbachev and Krenz had agreed upon.

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that he, in principle, shared all of the thoughts Comrade Krenz had expressed. They were dictated by the actual situation. For the SED it was now very important not to lose the initiative. The processes were developing very dynamically and could accelerate in pace. The party leadership had to react accordingly. It would be a great tragedy if the development would gain in spontaneity or lose its political orientation. This would create a situation, in which there was no other resort. Then it might be possible that mistaken slogans would dominate the situation and the situation could be exploited by other forces. Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that he had made his own experiences in this respect. Due to the hesitation by the [Soviet] leadership some problems had increased sharply; this concerned above all the economy. Comrade Krenz had emphasized correctly that the next plenum had to give an evaluation of the difficult situation. This evaluation had to be balanced but decisive. Comrade Gorbachev recalled in this context the January 1987 Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. There it was stated for the first time that the Party would take responsibility for the current situation. Simultaneously, a concrete program of perestroika was proposed. It was possible that the development in the GDR could take different stages. But for the reputation of the
secretary general it was extraordinarily important that he approached the problems with
great responsibility and great respect for the truth. Otherwise nobody would believe him.

Comrade Krenz interjected that there already was criticism of the fact that
comrade Honecker’s resignation had been explained in terms of bad health.

In Comrade Gorbachev’s opinion, here as well further explanations were
necessary.

Comrade Gorbachev commented as correct to indicate at the plenum first outlines
of the policy of the next era and adopt a respective action program. A detailed plan was
not yet to be made public since this might make the secretary general seem hypocritical
as he obviously was not taking the time to study and consider thoroughly proposals and
recommendations from all sides. But the main directions of the action program were
already becoming evident—more socialism, renewal, democratization. One would carry
on what had been good and useful in the past. This, for example, concerned the social
orientation of the GDR economy, which had always been its strong suit. This should not
be abandoned. This was an asset of the GDR.

In the field of cadre policy, decisive changes were certainly imminent at the
plenum. As an old communist, Comrade Mielke certainly wanted to set an example for
others with his resignation. This made it possible for Comrade Krenz to separate cadre
questions from the substantive question of perestroika. Certainly there was no question of
a collective resignation of the Politburo or the cabinet but profound changes in the
leadership were by no doubt necessary. The plenum had to take the first step. He
recommended to elect a few intelligent and innovative figures from the CC to the
Politburo and to adopt prominent representatives of culture and academia as members or
candidates of the CC as well. This would increase the reputation of the bodies. With
regard to Comrade Honecker, he could certainly still be defended within the plenum but
it was questionable whether that was still feasible with regard to the people. The people
had risen and today stated their opinion frankly. Therefore they had to respond not only
to the Plenum of the CC but also to the people. In this respect as well it was necessary not
to miss the signs of the times. Society would continue to pose the question of
responsibility for the situation, and for this reason profound leadership changes were due,
too.

Despite determined policy changes, a complete negation of the past was to be
avoided. This would also be disrespectful of the people who had made the previous
achievements of the GDR. One also had to find a form of dialectical negation whereby
one kept the good that contributed to the strengthening of socialism and added as new
what life produced.

Comrade Gorbachev emphasized that Comrade Krenz had the reputation of being
a man of courage. A secretary general could not avoid the problems either but had to face
them; he had to act in consideration of the concrete situation and accurately assess
changes in society. Coming up with new ideas and implementing them—all this was
expected from a secretary general.

Comrade Gorbachev expressed his full agreement with Comrade Krenz on
relations with the FRG. It was necessary to revitalize cooperation and coordination
between the GDR and the Soviet Union. Each of them was well aware of the other’s
relations with the FRG. One therefore ought not to make a secret out of it but cooperate
and take advantage of it. The FRG, too, had the necessary information and was very
interested in cooperating. Comrade Krenz was right in thinking that the parties should increasingly be put in control of cooperation. He therefore welcomed the proposal to intensify again the exchange of experience between the departments of the Central Committees. The same applied to the CC secretaries.

The working-level and close contacts in this field were, however, most important. The joint work of the academies of social sciences ought to be strengthened as well. In this connection, Comrade Gorbachev inquired about the fate of Comrade [Otto] Reinhold. He had always been viewed as working especially closely with Comrade Honecker.

Comrade Krenz stated that Comrade Reinhold had also changed his mind \textit{[Wende vollzogen]}. This had practically happened overnight. He was criticized for a remark he made in a TV discussion during which he apologized for previous statements that had been specifically ascribed to him.

Comrade Gorbachev remarked jokingly that Comrade Otto Reinhold had written about the 10 deviations from Marxism-Leninism by Comrade Gorbachev.

Comrade Krenz also informed about the fate of Comrade Hans Albrecht, the former first secretary of the district leadership in Suhl. He did not cope with his work any longer. In addition, there existed resentment in the CC about an unprecedented statement by him about the secretary general of the CPSU CC. He had remarked at the last CC Plenum that Comrade Gorbachev had not performed in a class-conscious manner during his last visit to the FRG. Comrade Albrecht would no longer be serving as first secretary of the district leadership already in the coming days.

Comrade Gorbachev explained that it was now necessary to revive creative Marxism, socialism in a Leninist way, the humanistic and democratic socialism in which man really felt that this was his society and not an elite society. This process was not easy to implement. Of this he had become aware during his visit to Cuba. There had been a tense atmosphere initially. He himself, however, had explained that perestroika resulted from the development of the Soviet Union, and was necessary for the solution of Soviet problems. The question of whether socialism in the Soviet Union would succeed or fail was of importance for the entire world, including Cuba. The Soviet Union on the other hand welcomed all measures, which the Communist Party of Cuba thought necessary under its conditions. They trusted its responsibility and its competence. It was important, Comrade Gorbachev explained, that revolutionary perestroika could not be forced upon anybody. Even in the GDR the situation had to develop to this point, which now made the process very difficult and painful.

Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that he had always exercised the greatest restraint towards the comrades in the GDR. The objective had been to avoid any ill feeling in the relationship, even though they were well aware of the situation in the GDR. They had been patient because they understood that the Party and all of society had to mature first before making these changes.

Today the important thing in the socialist countries was that each of them had to think on its own. On the other hand there were certain criteria and main characteristics for socialism in all countries.

Comrade Gorbachev reported at the conclusion of his conversation on domestic problems in the Soviet Union. He related that he would continue that same day discussions with leading economists. Very controversial debates on the future
development of the Soviet Union were currently taking place in all fields. Some demanded the re-introduction of private property of the means of production, and the employment of capitalistic methods; others demanded the admission of more political parties. There were arguments about whether the Soviet Union ought to continue as a federation or confederation. In the economic field in particular, these debates were increasingly of a principled [ideological] character.

There were already comrades who had a different idea about the economic development and attempted to force capitalistic prescriptions upon the CPSU out of disappointment over previous failures. The workers had realized this immediately and reacted with demands to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat. There were also calls for a return to the old administrative command system. This would, however, be a great tragedy for the Soviet Union.

The current arguments illustrated clearly that perestroika was a true revolution. Comrade Gorbachev expressed with great determination, however, that he would not let the confrontation develop to the point of civil war or bloodshed. The situation, however, was very tense, and they were dealing with a true political battle. Therefore it was necessary to prove that socialism was capable of constant development, of perfection, and full realization of its potential. It was a weakness of socialism that changes in the leadership could lead to severe shake-ups at any time. The reason for this was that the people were not involved in the decisions [and] that the democratic mechanisms were not fully working. They had to be put in full action. It was important to further consolidate society, to mobilize its creative forces, and to achieve clarity on the kind of socialist society they wanted to build. All concrete proposals and constructive ideas were welcome. A current problem in the Soviet Union was the debate with those who seriously called for a return to private ownership of the means of production. For this purpose some had even come up with quotes from Marx and Lenin by which they attempted to prove that private property did not have to mean exploitation. To their minds, the main problem was the character of power by which private property could be put to use for or against the people.

Comrade Gorbachev pointed out that there could well exist forms of private property—in manufacture, in the countryside—as it, for example, was the case in the GDR. But this was not individual property. These minor forms were, however, not a major problem for a socialist society. There existed, however, forces in the Soviet Union that wanted to go much further. Comrade Gorbachev predicted that the GDR would also face such discussions, even more so since the capitalist example was so close geographically. In addition, the FRG was a very wealthy capitalist country the existence of which would be ever present in the political debates.

Comrade Krenz expressed that his decision to act had been made when he realized during the conversation between Comrade Gorbachev with the Politburo of the SED CC that Comrade Honecker did not comprehend the statements by Comrade Gorbachev, or did not want to understand them.

Comrade Gorbachev stated that he had had the impression during that conversation that he was throwing peas against a wall. He did not hold any grudge against Comrade Honecker but was only sad that he had not initiated this change of course himself two or three years ago. This period could have been the highpoint of his life. After all, the GDR had achieved very much under his leadership. All this had been
achieved together with the Party and the people. Under no circumstances should this [fact] therefore be denied. That would be disrespectful of the people who then would have basically lived in vain. This development had to be viewed in dialectical terms. The progress of society, the prologue for the future, and the great potential had to be considered, as well as the factors that had recently slowed down the development of society.

Comrade Krenz agreed and expressed his thanks in cordial terms for the extensive and profound conversation.

Soviet Record [1] of Conversation between
M. S. Gorbachev and the General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity
Party of Germany (SED), Egon Krenz

1 November 1989

Gorbachev: The Soviet people are very interested in everything that is going on now in the GDR. We hope to get the most recent information from you, although, of course, we know a lot. The situation in the GDR, judging by everything we see, is moving at an increasing speed. Is there a danger of getting left behind the reforms? Remember, we said in Berlin [2] that to be behind is always to lose. We know that from our own experience.

[...] I cannot tell you that we have already “broken in the horse of perestroika,” which turned out to be quite restless. In any case, we have not completely tamed it yet. Sometimes it even tries to throw the rider off. But we have gained very valuable experience.

Krenz: [...] At the Politburo we came to the conclusion that the crisis has not emerged [just] in the last several months. Many problems have accumulated over the years.

But the main mistake was probably that we did not make serious conclusions based on the new processes of social development, which began in the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and which were ripe in the GDR itself. Because if you have the most important ally, you have to understand and share its problems and hardships. One cannot declare friendship in words, and at the same time stay on the sidelines when your ally is trying to deal with its difficult problems. People who are used to thinking of us as close allies felt that suddenly we have lost our unity with the Soviet Union, and that we ourselves erected this barrier.

Gorbachev: From the political point of view, the situation is clear, but from a simply human standpoint–[it is] dramatic. I was also concerned about this. In general, I had good relations with Honecker, but it seemed recently as if he lost his vision. If he had been willing to make the necessary changes in policy on his own initiative 2 or 3 years ago, everything would have been different now. But apparently, he had undergone some kind of a shift, he ceased to see real processes in the world and in his own country. It was a personal drama, but because Honecker occupied a very high position, it grew into a political drama.

Krenz: Yes, you are right, it is a drama, and for me too, because Honecker brought me up, he was my political mentor.

Gorbachev: Some people now speculate about that, but I think you should not react to that.

Krenz: For Honecker the turn probably occurred exactly in 1985, when you were elected General Secretary of the CC CPSU. In you he saw a threat to his authority, because he considered himself the most dynamic political leader. He lost all touch with reality, and did not rely on the politburo collective. [SED CC Secretary for Economics Günter] Mittag and [SED CC Secretary for Ideology and Propaganda Joachim] Hermann
did him a very bad service in this respect. The first as a strategist, and the second as an executive.

[...] Gorbachev: This is a familiar picture. Some time ago, when I already was a Politburo member, I practically did not know our budget. Once we were working with [Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Politburo member] Nikolai Ryzhkov on some request of [former KGB chief and General Secretary Yuri V.] Andropov’s having to do with budgetary issues, and we, naturally, decided that we should learn about them. But Andropov said: Do not get in there, it is not your business. Now we know why he said so. It was not a budget, but hell knows what.

[...] Gorbachev: We knew about your situation, about your economic and financial ties with the FRG, and we understood how it all could turn out. For our part, we were carrying out our obligations to the GDR, including those on oil deliveries, even though some of it had to be reduced at a certain time. Erich Honecker was not very honest with us about those things. We knew about that, but we exercised reserve and patience, led by the highest political considerations.

Krenz: It is very important to define the division of labor between the GDR and the Soviet Union better. It is one of our main reserves. The situation here is far from ideal. We need to remove the existing barriers. There should be only one criterion—efficiency and mutual benefit.

Gorbachev: The issue of the division of labor stands as a major problem in our country as well. The republics that produce raw materials demand a redistribution of money, because they think that those that produce finished products get too much. They present very harsh conditions, up to the limiting and stopping of deliveries.

By the way, yesterday in the Supreme Soviet one of the deputies—[reform economist] Nikolai Shmelev—raised the question about getting the real information about all our foreign economic relations, including the relations with the socialist countries, to the Supreme Soviet.

Krenz: We are prepared to discuss seriously those issues once again with our Soviet comrades.

Gorbachev: I suggested the topic of cooperation to Honecker many times. He was in favor of direct connections, but spoke about cooperation and especially about joint ventures without any enthusiasm. But it is precisely cooperation that had the greatest potential for mutual benefit. You cannot ride on the deliveries of our raw materials all the time. There are some strict limits here.

[...] Gorbachev: Yesterday Alexander N. Yakovlev received [former US National Security Adviser] Zbigniew Brzezinski, who, as you know, has a head with “global brains.” And he said: If today the events turned out in such a way that unification of Germany became a reality, it would mean a collapse of many things. I think so far we have held the correct line: stood firmly in favor of the coexistence of two German states, and as a result, came to a wide international recognition of the GDR, achieved the Moscow Treaty, gave a boost to the Helsinki Process. Therefore we should confidently follow this same course.

You must know: all serious political figures—[British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher, [French President François] Mitterrand, [Italian Prime Minister Giulio] Andreotti, [Polish President Wojciech] Jaruzelski, and even the Americans—though their position has recently exhibited some nuances—are not looking forward to German
unification. Moreover, in today’s situation it would probably have an explosive character. The majority of Western leaders do not want to see the dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Serious politicians understand that they are factors of a necessary equilibrium. However, Mitterand feels like he has to mention his sympathy for the idea of the German unification. The Americans are also speaking about such sympathies for the Germans’ pull toward the unification. But I think that they do it as a favor to Bonn, and also because to some extent, they are anxious about too much rapprochement between the FRG and the USSR. Therefore, I repeat, the best course of action now is to continue the same line in the German affairs which we have successfully developed so far. By the way, [former FRG Chancellor and SPD leader] Willy Brandt shares this opinion as well. He believes that the GDR is a great victory of socialism, even though he has his own understanding of socialism. A liquidation of the republic, in his opinion, would have been a bust for the Social Democrats. Therefore, I think, we all should start from the following formula: history itself decided that there should be two German states. But of course, you cannot get away from the FRG. The need for human contacts presumes normal relations with the FRG. You should not disrupt your ties with the FRG, although, certainly, they should be kept under control.

I am convinced that we should coordinate our relations with the FRG better, although Honecker tried to evade this necessity. We know about your relations with the FRG, and you know about our relations with it. Why should we try to hide anything from each other! It would make sense to talk about the possibilities of trilateral cooperation between the USSR, the GDR, and the FRG, especially in the economic sphere. [...] The situation in Hungary and Poland today is such that they have nowhere else to go, as they say, because they have drowned in financial dependence on the West. Today some people criticize us: they say, what is the Soviet Union doing—allowing Poland and Hungary to “sail” to the West[?] But we cannot take Poland on our balance. [Former Polish leader Edward] Gierek accumulated $48 billion dollars of debt. Poland has already paid off $49 billion, and it still owes almost $49 billion. As far as Hungary is concerned, the International Monetary Fund has dictated its harsh ultimatum already under the late Hungarian leader Janós Kádár.

Krenz: This is not our way.

Gorbachev: You need to take this into account in your relationship with the FRG. [...] Gorbachev: We need to think through all of this, and to find formulas that would allow people to realize their human needs. Otherwise we will be forced to accept all kinds of ultimatums. Maybe we can direct our International Departments and Foreign Ministries to think about possible initiatives together. Clearly, your constructive steps should be accompanied with demands for certain obligations from the other side. Chancellor Helmut Kohl keeps in touch with me and with you. We need to influence him. Once under the pressure of the opposition, he found himself on the horse of nationalism. The right wing starts to present their demands for the unification of Germany to the Soviet Union, and appeals to the US. The logic is simple—all the peoples are united, why do we Germans not have this right?

Krenz: We have already taken a number of steps. First of all, we gave orders to the border troops not to use weapons at the border, except in the cases of direct attacks on the soldiers. Secondly, we adopted a draft of Law on Foreign Travel at the Politburo. [3]
We will present it for a public discussion, and we plan to pass it in the Volkskammer even before Christmas. [...] 

Gorbachev: Kohl was visibly worried when I mentioned the perverse interpretation of some of our agreements with the FRG in my 8 October speech in Berlin. He immediately gave me a telephone call regarding that.

Krenz: Yes, he is worried; I noticed it in my conversation with him. He was even forgetting to finish phrases.

Gorbachev: Kohl, it seems, is not a big intellectual, but he enjoys certain popularity in his country, especially among the petit-bourgeois public.

[...] Gorbachev: I was told that he [Honecker] did not adequately understand even our discussions in the Politburo. But we do not have any ill feelings towards him. Had he made the right conclusions two or three years ago, it would have been of major significance for the GDR, and for him personally. In any case, one cannot deny the things your Party and people have achieved in the past. We have a complete mutual understanding about that.

Krenz cordially thanks Gorbachev for the support, openness, and good advice.

[Source: Notes of A.S. Chernyaev, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, f. 2, op. 2. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya (National Security Archive).]
P 0314412 NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8330
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTC

SOFIA 06038

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BU, UR, GC
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN REPORTAGE OF KRENZ-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
- SUMMIT STRESSES UNANIMITY, STABILITY,
- AND PARTY SUPREMACY


2. COMMENT: THE STORIES CONTINUE THE BULGARIANS' HABIT OF PLAYING DOWN CRISIS SITUATIONS IN ALLIED COUNTRIES. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF AN ADMONISHMENT THAT "THE INCLUSION OF DIFFERENT SOCIAL FORCES IN POLITICAL LIFE DEMANDS RESTRUCTURING OF THE FORMS, METHODS, AND CONTENT OF PARTY WORK...COMMUNISTS WILL

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06038 031445Z

SUCCEED IN FINDING A RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE TIMES ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THEY ACT DECISIVELY, WITH INITIATIVE, AND WITHOUT FALLING BEHIND THE COURSE OF EVENTS." THE OVERALL PORTRAYAL OF THE TALKS, THEIR CONTEXT AND HOPEFUL FOR RESULTS, WAS ROSY. POLANSKY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  EMBBER  08734 01 OF 06 061920Z

ACTION EUR-90

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-03 TSRE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02
SNP-08 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /061 W

O 061822Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1594
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USDEL NST GENEVA
USAFSFB BERLIN GE
USDOC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 3511

C O N F I D E N T I A L  S E C T I O N  01 06 EMBERLIN 08734

VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBSM DEL

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL.OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PHUM, PREL, GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: KRENZ PLEDGES REFORM, SACKS MANY.
- AND RUNS AFTER THE PEOPLE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: KRENZ WENT ON TELEVISION AT LESS THAN TWO
HOURS NOTICE NOVEMBER 3 TO ANNOUNCE A SERIES OF INTENDED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  EMBBER  08734  01 OF 06  061920Z

MAJOR REFORMS AND THE RETIRMENT AT THE UPCOMING CENTRAL
COMMITTEE MEETING OF FIVE OF THE HONECKER POLITBURO
OLD GUARD. MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID WOULD BE HELD IN VAIN AT LEAST. MORE THAN EVER IN THE CORNER OF FAR REACHING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. MANY OF HIS SUSPICIOUS FELLOW CITIZENS. HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN MORE IMPRESSED AT SOME OF THE THINGS HE DID NOT SAY -- ESPECIALLY HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE THAT THE SED SHOULD CUT BACK ON ITS POWER MONOPOLY. BECAUSE OF THAT, MANY OF THE COMMENTS WE HAVE HEARD HAVE BEEN CRITICAL, AND IT APPEARS THAT KRENZ IS STILL RUNNING TO CATCH UP.

JUST HOW FAR HE AND HIS PARTY HAVE TO GO WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE MAMMOTH NOVEMBER 4 PROTEST DEMONSTRATION WHICH ATTRACTED AT LEAST 500,000 BY MOST ESTIMATES TO ALEXANDERPLATZ AND WAS BROADCAST LIVE AND NATIONALLY BY TV AND RADIO ENTIRELY ORDERLY AND IMPRESSIVE FOR ITS DISCIPLINE AND SERIOUSNESS, IT PROBABLY ESTABLISHED. AS POLITBURO MEMBER GUENTER SCHABOWSKI HAD PREDICTED JUST A WEEK AGO. THAT THE PROTEST RALLY IS NOW AN ACCEPTED PART OF THE GDR'S RAPIDLY CHANGING POLITICAL CULTURE. THE MULTITUDE OF SIGNS DEMANDING AN END TO THE SED'S ABSOLUTE DOMINANCE OF THE STATE AND "FREE ELECTIONS" DROVE HOME THE POINT. HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE OBVIOUSLY UNPOPULAR KRENZ TO GAIN CONTROL OF AN ACCELERATING PROCESS END SUMMARY.

KRENZ' SPEECH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 EMBBER 08734 01 OF 06 061920Z

THERE WAS NO INDICATION UNTIL EARLY EVENING NOVEMBER 3 THAT A MAJOR TALK WAS IN THE WORKS. KRENZ KEPT A BUSY, PARTLY VISIBLE SCHEDULE DURING THE DAY, INCLUDING THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS RECEPTION IN THE AFTERNOON WHICH HE DUCKED OUT OF EARLY, TAKING ONLY THE SUDDENLY PROMINENT AND RESPECTED LIBERAL PARTY (LDPD) CHAIRMAN GERLACH WITH HIM FROM A ROOM FULL OF OLD LINE GDR OMNITARIES. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, RADIO AND TELEVISION BEGAN TO SAY THAT HE WOULD GIVE A MAJOR ADDRESS THAT EVENING.

...
5. KRENZ DESCRIBED THE TIMES AS CRUCIAL AND SAID THERE WAS NO TURNING BACK. THE GDR'S NEW COURSE WAS REFORM, AND IT WOULD BE PURSUED CONSEQUENTIALY. THE CHANGES "MAY NOT COME FAST ENOUGH FOR SOME, AND FOR SOME THEY MAY NOT GO FAR ENOUGH, BUT THEY MAKE ONE THING INDISPUTABLY CLEAR: WE ARE GOING FORWARD AND WON'T BE STOPPED."

---

6. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO INFORM CITIZENS, AMONG WHOM HE KNEW THERE WAS MUCH "DISQUIET AND CONCERN" OF DECISIONS REACHED THAT DAY BY A SPECIAL POLITBEGO SESSION. THESE WOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION PROGRAM HE WOULD LAY BEFORE THE VITAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING NOVEMBER 8-10. AMONG THE HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS PROPOSALS:

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 EMBBER 08734 02 OF 05 061921Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOC-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CHA-30 EB-00
DOD-00 H-01 JO-19 NSCE-00 NSW-00 SSG-00 HA-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 F-02 T-01 061921Z/H49
----------152114 061927Z/H49
O 061832Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY EMBERLIN
70 SECESTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1395
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
Vienna also for CSBMS Del.

USVIENNA for CFE Del.

E.O. 12756: DECL-QADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PRUM, PREL, GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: KRENZ PLEDGES REFORM, SACKS MANY.

--- CREATION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT;
--- A FAR-REACHING, THOUGH UNDEFINED, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM;

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EMBIBER 08734 02 OF 06 061921Z

--- REDUCTION OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGES.
--- ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVILIAN ALTERNATIVE SERVICE TO MILITARY CONSCRIPTION;
--- AN ACTION PROGRAM TO ATTACK "MANY CONSUMER SHORTAGES". THE SITUATION "REQUIRES LIKewise A THOROUGH CHANGE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, TIED TO AN EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM."
--- REFORM OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM;
--- DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE SED, ESPECIALLY ITS CADRE POLICY, AND LIMITATION ON HOW LONG INDIVIDUALS COULD HOLD ANY PARTICULAR OFFICE.

7. KRENZ ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH A PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE MANY CHANGES AT THE TOP OF THE PARTY AND SAID THAT FIVE OF THE OLDEST MEMBERS OF THE
POLITB URO HAD "VOLUNTEERED" TO RESIGN. THESE INCLUDE HERMANN AXEN, IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS; KURT HAGER, THE CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY CEAR; ERICH MIELKE, MINISTER OF STATE SECURITY (THE STASI), THE SECRET POLICE, AS WELL AS ERICH MÜCKENBERGER AND ALFRED NEUMANN.

8. KRENZ NOTED THE LDPS'S NOVEMBER 2 BOMBSHELL CALL FOR AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF PARLIAMENT TO DEBATE THE SITUATION, TO FORCE THE RESIGNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND TO INSTALL ITS OWN LEADER, GERLACH, AS ITS PRESIDENT. HE DID NOT COMMIT HIMSELF, BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 03 EMBBER 09734 02 OF 86 0641921Z

HE IMPLIED THAT THE SED WOULD GO ALONG IF THE DEAL WERE NOT, IN FACT, WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE BETWEEN KRENZ AND GERLACH AND THAT THIS WOULD LEAD LATER THIS MONTH TO THE RESIGNATION FROM THE POLITB URO OF TWO MORE STALWARTS OF THE GERONTOCRACY, WILLI STOPH, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (PRIME MINISTER), AND HORST SINDERMANN, THE PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT.

9. AS BOLD AND DECISIVE AS KRENZ OBVIOUSLY SOUGHT TO BE, THERE WERE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SPEECH WHICH WERE NOT CALCULATED TO PLEASE THE CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN MARCHING IN THE STREETS. ABOVE ALL, WHILE HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY HAD A PART TO PLAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOOD NEW IDEAS, INCLUDING THE CHURCHES AND THE "NEWLY DEVELOPING MOVEMENTS," HE SAID NOTHING ABOUT LEGALIZING THE OPPOSITION OR THAT INDICATED HE HAD CONCLUDED THE SED MUST GIVE UP SOME DEGREE OF POWER.

10. HE SAID THAT THE SED HAD TO CHANGE, TO BECOME MORE DEMOCRATIC AND MORE IN TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE, AND HE ALSO SAID THAT "LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE PARTY," WOULD HAVE TO MEAN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW POLITICAL CONCEPTS THAT WOULD THEN BE WORKED ON BY THE OTHER PARTIES AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT BODIES TO MANY, HOWEVER, THE KEY POINT WILL BE THAT HE WAS STILL TALKING ABOUT THE SED'S LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH A MORE ENLIGHTENED LEADERSHIP, WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SOME PARTS OF SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT COULD BE LED BY NON-SED ELEMENTS.
11. Those dissatisfied with the SED and suspicious of Krenz personally will also not have been encouraged by his comments that he would do nothing to allow past achievements to be called in question as well as that...
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  EMBBER  08734  03 OF 06  061922Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OC-02 CIAE-00 EP-00
DOD-00 H-01 10-19 NSC-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 H4-09
L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PES-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 061 W

061832Z NOV 40
FM AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1586
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USDEL NST GENEVA
USAFSB BERN GE
USDOC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 3513

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 EMBBERLIN 08734
VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBMS DEL.
USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL

E.O. 12336: DECLASS
TAGS: PGV Y VINS PHEM PREL GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: KRENZ PLEDGES REFORM SACKS MANY.

"THERE ARE ALSO FALSE TONES IN THE COUNTRY AND
ESPECIALLY FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF OUR BORDER,
DEMAGOGIC ADVICE" THAT COULD DESTROY THE RENEWAL
PROCESS.

12. FINALLY, KRENZ SIGNALLLED THE IMMINENT APPEARANCE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  EMBBER  08734  03 OF 06  061922Z
OF THE DRAFT TRAVEL LAW AND APPEALED TO THOSE CONSIDERING EMIGRATION TO GIVE THE REFORMS A CHANCE WITH THE CRY, "WE NEED YOU." WE WILL REPORT ON THE DRAFT LAW BY SEPTEMBER.

THE BERLIN DEMONSTRATION

13. WHETHER IT WAS THE BIGGEST DEMONSTRATION EAST BERLIN HAS EVER SEEN MAY BE OPEN TO DEBATE — THE OFFICIAL MAY 1 PARADES ARE ALSO GIGANTIC. BUT THE CROWD THAT GATHERED NOVEMBER 4 NUMBERED BY GENERAL CONSENSUS AT LEAST HALF A MILLION. IT WAS DETERMINED AND VERY ORDERLY. THE 600 VOLUNTEER MARSHALS FROM THE RANKS OF THE ORGANIZING WRITERS, ARTISTS AND ACTORS HAD AN EASY TIME, ANY FEARS THAT THE THROUGHS MIGHT TRY TO CRASH THROUGH THE BRANDENBURG GATE DID NOT MATERIALIZE. THERE WERE FEW POLICE IN EVIDENCE, ALTHOUGH SIZEABLE UNITS WERE CONCENTRATED OUT OF SIGHT OF THE DEMONSTRATION, NEAR THE WALL.

14. THE SEEMINGLY ENDLESS PROCESSION JUMPED OFF A LITTLE AHEAD OF THE SCHEDULED 10:00 START. MEANDERED THROUGH DOWNTOWN EAST BERLIN, PAST THE VOLKSKAMMER AND COUNCIL OF STATE, AND ENDER AT ALEXANDERPLATZ WHERE EXACTLY FOUR WEEKS EARLIER, HONECKER HAD REVIEWED THE GDR'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY PARADE. THIS TIME, THERE WAS NO SPECIAL PODIUM, THE SPEAKERS MOUNTED A MAKESHIFT ROSTRUM.

15. THE CROWD WAS QUIET, WITH FEW CHANTS. BUT THE MANY PLACARDS BORE WITNESS TO BERLIN WIT AND CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

EMBBER 08754 07 OF 06 061922Z

INGENUITY: "LONG LIVE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1989" WENT ONE. THE MAIN THEMES WE NOTED: CALLS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CONTROLS ON SECURITY FORCES AND DEEP DISTRUST OF THE NEW REGIME. FREE ELECTIONS AND AN END TO THE SED'S POWER MONOPOLY WERE FREQUENTLY DEMANDED. KRENZ' NAME FIGURED PROMINENTLY AMONG THOSE WHOSE ENTHUSIASM FOR REFORMS WAS DOUBTED.

16. SPEAKER AFTER SPEAKER EXPRESSED A MAZEMENT HOW FACILELY SOME OLD FUNCTIONARIES HAD JUMPED ON THE REFORM BANDWAGON. NOT THE REGIME BUT PEOPLE IN THE
STREETS HAD BROUGHT ABOUT CHANGES AND SPEAKERS AND URGED THAT LEIPZIG BE DUBBED THE HEROIC CITY (HELDENSTADT) OF THE GDR AS THE SITE OF THE ORIGINAL MASS DEMONSTRATIONS.

17. THERE WERE ALMOST 30 SPEECHES, MANY EXCEEDING THE FIVE MINUTE TIME LIMIT. THERE WERE CALLS FOR A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF POLICE EXCUSES FOUR WEEKS AGO FOR COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS OF PAST EXCUSES. FOR AN INCREASED SYSTEM OF LEGAL PROTECTION -- LEGAL SECURITY BRINGS SAVINGS IN STATE SECURITY, NOTED WRITER CHRISTA WOLF. PLAYWRIGHT HEINER MUELLER CALLED FOR INDEPENDENT UNIONS. A CALL THAT RECEIVED APPLAUSE BUT ALSO JEERS. ANOTHER SPEAKER NOTED THAT IN THESE TIMES ONE SHOULD AVOID FRAGMENTATION.

18. MANFRED GERLACH, HEAD OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WENT A WARM ROUND OF APPLAUSE FOR A SPEECH THAT SOUNDED REMARKABLY LIKE A WESTERN-STYLE CAMPAIGN SPEECH. HE IS, AFTER ALL, RUNNING FOR SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT, AND GOT THE LOUDEST CHEERS FOR REPEATING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 EMBBER 0873 04 OF 06 061923Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 10-19 NCS-00 NSAE-00 SAS-00 HA-09 L-02 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 861 W

----------122160 061923Z 40

0 061532Z NOV 89

FM AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 06 EMB/BERLIN 08734

VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBSM/DEL

US VIENNA FOR CFE/DEL

E G 12356 DECL/ODR

TAGS: PGWV, PINN, PHUN, PREL GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS. KRENZ PLEDGES PEACE. SACKS MANY.

HIS CALLS THAT THE CABINET RESIGN EN MASSE

HIS SOBER WORDS TO THE EFFECT. HOWEVER, THAT HARD
WORK AND YEARS WOULD BE NEEDED TO PRODUCE ECONOMIC
RESULTS WERE GREETED WITH SOME OBVIOUS DISCOMFORT.
FORMER SECRET SERVICE CHIEF MARKUS WOHL WAS THERE.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 EMB/BERLIN 08734 04 OF 06 0619232

SAYING THAT UP TO OCTOBER 7 THE LEADERSHIP HAD LIVED
IN A DREAM WORLD. IN A SPEECH INTERRUPTED BY ROUGHLY
EQUAL DOSES OF APPLAUSE AND JEERS. HE SUBSCRIBED TO A
REFORM COMMUNIST CREDO. CALLED FOR TOLERANCE. PARLIA-
MENTARY SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS. AND FOR
SECURING SERVICES NOT TO BECOME THE SOLE SCAPEGOATS FOR
THE COUNTRY'S TROUBLES

19. IF WOLF WAS APPLAUSED FOR SOME STATEMENTS.
GUENTER SCHRÖWSKI, BERLIN PARTY CHIEF. HAD TROUBLE
MAKING HIMSELF HEARD ABOVE THE CHORUS OF DEFINITIVE
WHISTLES. BUT SCHRÖWSKI. A MAN WHO TOLDS IN HIS
NEW-FOUND ROLE OF PUBLIC DEBATER. PUT THE PREPARED
TEXT INTO HIS POCKET. SAYING THAT HE HAD HEARD SOME
VERY BITTER WORDS. SOME DIRECTED AT HIM PERSONALLY.
THE PARTY. HE SAID. HAD COME LATE. 'DAMNED LATE.'
TO A RENEWAL COURSE. BUT THE NEW DIRECTION WAS
 humble reminder of the party's credibility gap. But Schabowski insisted that the SED was prepared to live in a new political climate in future. One with 'contradictions' and 'pepper and salt.'

20. GDR electronic media covered the demonstration live, with the reporters' commentary becoming pitchier by the hour. The initial statements had blandly spoken of demonstrations on behalf of renewal. A few hours later the talk was specific, with the various demands -- free elections, right to travel, etc., and the questioning of the SED power monopoly -- clearly spelled out. The same day, GDR television announced that the network's SED organization had met. Had recognized its responsibility for past confidential.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 EMBBER 08734 04 OF 06 0619232

SLANTED REPORTING, AND ASKED VIEWERS' FORGIVENESS.

21. WE HESITATE TO USE THE WORD 'HISTORIC' IN CONNECTION WITH THE BERLIN DEMONSTRATION. FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE PAST FOUR WEEKS HAVE SEEN SO MANY DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED HISTORIC OR SENSATIONAL AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS HAVE REMINDED THE REGIME OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION AND HAVE DONE SO IN AN AMAZINGLY MATURE AND DISCIPLINED WAY. AFTER THE HUGE CROWD DISBANDED, STREET-CLEANING TRUCKS MOVED IN TO SWEEP UP THE REBELL. A WASTED EFFORT -- THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NONE. ONLY A HUGE FILE OF CAREFULLY WRAPPED-UP PLACARDS TO BE COLLECTED AND PRESERVED FOR SUBSEQUENT EXHIBITION.

22. AND WHILE THE ATTENTION UNDERSTANDABLY FOCUSED ON BERLIN, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHERS DEMONSTRATED IN OTHER GDR TOWNS OVER THE WEEKEND AS WELL. FROM ROSTOCK IN THE NORTH TO SLLEH IN THE FAR SOUTH. SOME REPORTS OF ORDERLY DEMONSTRATIONS. DRESDEN CONTACTS TOLD US THEIRS SUNDAY EVENING WAS NEW IN ONLY ONE WAY -- LIKE BERLINS IT HAD BEEN APPLIED FOR LEGALLY AND APPROVED BY THE POLICE AS WAS ANOTHER FOR NOVEMBER 6.

...THREE LITTLE, FOUR LITTLE INDIANS
23. Two more district first secretaries were replaced over the weekend. Horst Scihmann, who headed the Leipzig party for 19 years, officially requested to step down for health reasons, but noted that, over the years, whenever the district party had tried to bring problems to the attention of the party leader, confidential.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04    EMBBEX  06734  04 OF 06  061925Z

Ship, they were ignored. His replacement, 51-year-old Dr. Roland Woetzel, elected unanimously in the presence of Politburo member Werna Krolikowski, was one of the district secretaries who, together with Gewandhaus Orchestra conductor Kurt Masur, signed a letter in early October calling for dialogue and reforms. That is credited with a major role in keeping demonstrations in that city peaceful. He has since been active in

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  EMBBER  08734  05 OF 06 061924Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  INR-07  SS-90  OIC-02  CIAE-00  EB-00
DODE-00  H-01  IO-19  NSECE-00  NSAE-00  SS0-00  HA-09
L-03  TRSE-00  PM-19  PA-01  OMB-01  INRE-00  SF-02
SNP-01  PRS-01  DS-01  P-02  T-01  /661 W
----------152177 061932Z 1/89
0 061832Z NOV 89
FM AMBASSADOREMB BERLIN
TO SEC STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1598
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOREMBONN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADOREMVIENNA
AMBASSADOREMBPARIS
AMBASSADOREMB LONDON
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
USDEL NST GENEVA
USAFSB BERLIN GE
USDOC WASHDC
USIA WASHDC 3515

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 05 OF 06 EMB BERLIN 08734

VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBMS DEI,

USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL

E 0 12356: DECL-OADR
TAGS: PGGV. PINS. PHUM. PREL.. GC
SUBJECT: GDR CRISIS: KRENZ PLEDGES REFORM, SACKS MANY.

THE DISCUSSION PROCESS. IN THIS CASE AT LEAST, HOWEVER, THE "POOR HEALTH" EXPLANATION FOR A LEADER'S RESIGNATION MAY HAVE A MODICUM OF TRUTH: SCHUMANN WAS SICK. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR TRIED TO SEE HIM IN SEPTEMBER.

CONFIDENTIAL

--

25. HEINZ ZIEGNER, WHO LED THE SCHWERIN DISTRICT PARTY FOR 16 YEARS, SANG HIS SWAN SONG AS WELL. HIS STAR APPARENTLY FELL WHEN HE TRIED TO CLOTHE HIMSELF IN THE REFORM MANTLE BY STAGING HIS OWN DEMONSTRATION FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY USING POLICE AND TROOPS IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING DISGUISED AS ORDINARY CITIZENS. THE RUSE WAS DISCOVERED AND THEN PUBLICIZED BY THE NO-LONGER-TAME MEDIA. POLITICAL MEMBER HORST DOHLUS PRESIDED AS DR. HANS-JUERGEN AUDEHM WAS UNANIMOUSLY ELECTED TO FILL THE POSITION.

27. THERE IS NO CRISIS OVER GRENZMULLER'S BISHOP GIENTKE, WHOSE UNILATERAL INVITATION OF HONECKER TO THE REDEDICATION OF THE GREIFSWALD CATHEDRAL LAST SUMMER AND HIS SUBSEQUENT CONCILIATORY LETTER TO THE THEN SED CHIEF RAISED MORE THAN EYEBROWS. APPARENTLY GIENTKE BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE TO THE GREIFSWALD CHURCH LEADERSHIP NOVEMBER 5, THE NAY VOTES WON, AND GIENTKE RESIGNED.

---

COMMENT

28. IT IS HARD TO AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT KRENZ DECIDED TO PREVIEW PART OF HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE MESSAGE ON THE EVE OF THE BERLIN DEMONSTRATION BECAUSE HE REALIZES THAT AS FAST AS HE IS LEARNING AND CHANGING, THE SITUATION SEEMS TO BE MOVING EVEN FASTER BEYOND HIM. THE DEMONSTRATION WENT WELL, SHOWING AS LEIPZIG HAS FOR SOME WEEKS THAT THIS GERMAN REVOLUTION IS, AS STEPHAN HEYM PUT IT, A REMARKABLY DISCIPLINED MIX OF DIRECT ACTION AND POPULAR CONSENSUS, BARRING THE UNTOWARD, WHICH CAN NOT BE EXCLUDED WHEN SO MANY PEOPLE ARE IN THE STREETS WITHOUT CLEAR LEADERSHIP. IT NOW SEEMS THAT PEACEFUL POLITICAL DEMON-

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNX

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 EMBBER 08734 06 OF 06 061924Z

ACTION EU0-00

INFO LOGG-00 ADS-00 INR-00 QIC-02 CIJE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 JN-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09
L-05 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /061 X


THE KRENZ WHO SPOKE NOVEMBER 3 WAS A WORLD DIFFERENT FROM THE SUBSTANTIALLY TRADITIONAL SED CONFIDENTIAL

MAN WHO Addressed THE NATION THE DAY HE REPLACED HONECKER. IN THE INTERIM HE HAS AT LEAST ACCEPTED IF NOT INITIATED MAJOR CHANGES. DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURE OF OPEN POLITICAL STRIFE. AN ASTONISHINGLY MORE CANDID MEDIA WHICH, FOR EXAMPLE, CARRIED EVERY LAST BIT OF CRITICISM AND CAT CALL FROM ALEXANDERPLATZ AROUND THE COUNTRY LIVE. AN AMNESTY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND A FAR REACHING IF STILL NOT UNFLAWED TRAVEL LAW WHICH ThreatENS TO MAKE AN ANACHRONISM OF THE BERLIN WALL. NEUES FORUM IS PROBABLY ONLY A DAY OR TWO AWAY FROM BEING LEGALIZED. AND KRENZ' SPEECH PROMISES MANY OTHER THINGS WHICH ONLY WEEKS AGO SEEMED LIKE PIE IN THE SKY. CIVILIAN ALTERNATIVE SERVICE TO PICK ONE EXAMPLE.
DECLASSIFIED

30. DESPITE IT ALL IT STILL SEEMS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE COUNTRY HAS MADE MUCH PROGRESS BUT KREZ AND THE SED VERY LITTLE. HE AND HIS PARTY HAVE JUST BEGUN TO SCRATCH AT THE SURFACE OF THE MOUNTAIN OF OBJECTIVE PROBLEMS AND SUBJECTIVE DISTURB THEY BUILT UP WITH FOUR DECADES OF MISTAKES. THE SLOGANS ON THE BANNERS AND THE MOOD OF THE MARCHERS REMAIN WELL IN ADVANCE OF WHERE THE NEW MAN YET SAYS HE IS WILLING TO LEAD THE GDR. BUT HE IS SHOWING FAR TOO MUCH SKILL AND ADAPTABILITY TO BE WRITTEN OFF PREMATURELY.

BARKLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL
Cover Note from Alexander Schalck to Egon Krenz

6 November 1989

WITH ATTACHMENT,

“Notes on an Informal Conversation between Comrade Alexander Schalck and Minister of the Chancellery Rudolf Seitzers and CDU Board Member Wolfgang Schaeuble on 6 November 1989”

Dear Comrade Krenz!

I enclose the notes on the conversations with Federal Minister Seitzers and CDU Board member Schaeuble.

Seitzers will, in the course of this evening have an opportunity, together with Schaeuble, to inform the Chancellor [about the conversation]. If this should already result in useful items, he [Seitzers] will inform me on 7 November 1989, by phone.

I ask for acknowledgement and determination of further steps.

On the basis of the authority currently given to me for the informal negotiations with the government of the FRG, I ask you cordially that you agree that I should not take part in any public discussions (including television) in order to prevent any informally discussed options from being leaked to the public by potential mishaps on my part. Should these negotiations reach a conclusion, I will, of course, be further available to the media, pending your permission.

With socialist greetings

[Schalck’s signature]

ATTACHMENT

Notes on an informal conversation between Comrade Alexander Schalck and Federal Minister and Chief of the Chancellery, Rudolf Seitzers, and CDU Board member Wolfgang Schaeuble, 6 November 1989

Continuing the informal conversation of 24 October 1989, I first repeated the GDR’s basic positions on further political and economic cooperation with the government of the FRG and the West Berlin Senate. I emphasized that the GDR was prepared, in implementing the obligations accepted in the CSCE process, to renew societal development. I also emphasized that the SED was prepared to cooperate constructively with the other democratic parties in a manner that served socialism and the interests of the GDR.

Within the framework of the decision to develop laws to guarantee the rule of law, the criminal code of the GDR will be amended to expand personal freedom, freedom of expression, and other issues to meet the new requirements.
To secure tourist and visitor traffic, the GDR is prepared to implement generous regulations for travel between the capital of the GDR and West Berlin via newly opened border crossings.

The implementation of these measures will create significant financial and material costs.

It is assumed that the FRG will cover these expenses to a great extent.

It was pointed out that the GDR is prepared to develop economic cooperation, including new forms like joint ventures and capital sharing in certain branches and sectors. It is assumed that the FRG government will take over the necessary loans in the cases of smaller and mid-sized businesses.

The GDR would be prepared to take out long-term loans up to ten billion VE, backed by collateral \( \text{objektgebunden} \) in the next two years that would be financed by the new [economic] capacity that will be created. It is assumed that repayment of the loans will begin after full production begins, and the loans are to be paid out over a period of at least ten years.

Further, the GDR sees the necessity of discussing additional lines of credit in hard currencies beginning in 1991 and totaling DM 2-3 billion to meet the demands connected with the new level of cooperation in a number of areas.

In light of the planned visit by Federal Minister Seiters to the GDR on 30 November 1989 and his official conversations with the General Secretary of the SED Central Committee and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Egon Krenz, as well as with Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, Seiters was informed that the GDR is prepared to make binding commitments in a “protocol of understanding” about the extension of trade and economic relations, further negotiations on the issue of environmental protection, negotiations over the further development of postal and long-distance phone connections, and other plans.

Seiters was asked, in reference to the discussions of 24 October 1989, to give the FRG government’s position on the most pressing issue of the moment: the possibility that his government would take over part of the additional expenses the GDR would incur in connection with its planned expansion of tourist and visitor traffic within the framework of the new travel law.

Seiters thanked me for the presentation and stated that these decisions were of great importance to the government of the Federal Republic.

Seiters presented the following thoughts on my proposal that GDR citizens travelling abroad be given the possibility to exchange DM 300 once a year at an exchange rate of DM 1 = East Mark 4.4:

—With the precondition that the minimum exchange requirement be lifted, a travel fund could be established with foreign currency by the FRG (with 12.5 million travelers, the account would be worth approximately DM 3.8 billion). The FRG’s previous annual payment of DM 100 “greeting money” per person would be eliminated. The DM 400 million that the GDR has received in the minimum exchange would also be paid off through the travel fund.

—The amount exchanged by GDR citizens for travel currency (with 12.5 million travelers, approximately DM 16.7 billion yearly) will be earmarked for a fund that the FRG and GDR will control jointly. The FRG thinks these funds should be used for the construction of border crossings, environmental protection measures, or for other
projects that are of interest to both sides, such as transportation or postal and long-distance services.

The FRG also assumes that the necessary number of border crossings between the capital of the GDR and West Berlin will be constructed and opened. Provisional measures will be part of the construction, which can then be expanded in stages. These measures are to guarantee an orderly border-crossing procedure for the increased tourist, visitor and transit traffic.

The FRG’s position is that the contributions from the exchanged funds for travel will finance the construction.

The questions associated with the cost of train travel (between the FRG and the GDR/Berlin) can be addressed later.

Seiters stated openly that the domestic political passage and justification of the proposed positions by the GDR would necessarily have certain political consequences. In this context, he mentioned the possibility for all [East German] citizens who had left the country legally or illegally to return to the GDR, so that all GDR citizens, with the exception of individual cases to be documented, could return to the GDR for visits.

He did not make a secret of the fact that a number of responsible politicians in the governing coalition had reservations after the “Saturday Meeting” in Berlin.

Seiters also made it clear that under no circumstances could he give a final answer immediately, and his comments were to be understood only as his own expression of the first contours of ideas.

Schaeuble, clearly acting under careful instructions from the Chancellor, made it clear that a great deal depends on the speech by the General Secretary at the tenth meeting of the SED Central Committee. This speech had to make it clear that the turn toward renewal was credible, that the announced reforms were clear, and that trustworthy people not tainted by their positions in the previous administration would be responsible for their implementation.

Article 1 of the GDR Constitution, which establishes the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, poses a fundamental problem in this context.

Schaeuble strongly recommended that the SED, to allow a peaceful transition to a societal development born by all political, societal and religious organizations, make it clear that it is prepared to change the GDR Constitution to correspond to the current state of societal development and the obligations it accepted under the CSCE treaty. This amendment of the Constitution should transform the leading role of the SED into a constructive, consensus-building cooperation among all democratic forces in the interests of socialism and the GDR.

Schaeuble recommended that we give representatives of the Church an important role in the GDR.

In reference to the state border to West Berlin, constructed on 13 August 1961 to protect the GDR, Schaeuble also proposed making this border more passable, in accordance with the CSCE process, through the construction of new border crossings.

Schaeuble made it clear again that all economic and financial decisions by the FRG government assumed that the GDR would lower its subsidies decisively.

Schaeuble also said that many politicians in the FRG did not understand the reticent stance on providing information about the events on 7-8 October 1989. In his
opinion, the GDR would be well advised, and it would be in their interests, to name the security officer directly responsible and announce the measures taken.

[He mentioned that] there are occasionally attacks in the FRG that are being investigated.

If the GDR does not take action, the topic will be played up again by certain forces.

Further consideration by the FRG government was necessary for the other issues involved in developing [further] cooperation, particularly in the economic sector and on the question of [extending further] credits. The FRG was not yet in the position to make concrete suggestions for future binding agreements.

The reserved attitude of the FRG government was clear, and it wants to wait until the results of the tenth meeting [of the SED Central Committee] to resume negotiations.

In conclusion, Schaeuble again strongly recommended that General Secretary Egon Krenz deal with the aforementioned issues in his speech. If that were not the case, Chancellor Kohl would not be in a position to justify financial assistance from FRG taxes [for the GDR] to the parliament.

Letter from Alexander Schalck to Egon Krenz

7 November 1989

Dear Comrade Krenz!

After my conversation yesterday with Seitzers and Schaeuble, Federal Minister Seitzers informed me today of the results. The Chancellor transmits the Chairman of the GDR State Council the following:

The course of yesterday’s demonstration in Leipzig and the spontaneous exits from the GDR to the FRG which have occurred in the last few hours have produced public demands in the FRG, and increasingly in certain circles of the SPD, for the Chairman of the [GDR] State Council to declare publicly that the GDR is prepared to guarantee that opposition groups will be permitted and affirm that free elections will be held within a period to be announced if the GDR wants to receive material and financial assistance from the FRG. This applies also to the financial arrangements regarding travel [by East Germans to the West].

It should be noted that this path is only possible if the SED relinquishes its claim to absolute power. [The Party] should be prepared to work on equal terms, and in consensus, with all societal forces, churches and religious communities to discuss a true renewal, with the goal of achieving democratic socialism, and with the understanding [that they are] to be prepared to carry out any resulting decisions.

Under these conditions, the Chancellor thinks a great deal can be achieved and every option can be explored.

Federal Minister Seitzers is authorized to be available for further informal discussions.

I ask that you take note of this.

With socialist greetings,
[Alexander Schalck]

Minutes No. 49 of the Meeting of the SED Politburo

7 November 1989

[EXCERPTS]

Information by Comrade O. Fischer on the situation regarding GDR citizens departing via the CSSR.

Report compiled by:
O. Fischer

1. Comrade O. Fischer will make a suggestion, in agreement with Comrades F. Dickel and E. Mielke, for the SED Central Committee which allows for this part of the travel law that deals with permanent exit to be put into effect immediately through an executive order [Durchführungsbestimmung].

2. Comrade O. Fischer will inform the USSR’s Ambassador to the GDR Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Comrade V[yacheslav I.] Kochemassov, and the Czechoslovaks about the proposal and the Politburo’s position. At the same time, consultations with the FRG are to be carried out.

3. The mass media should use their influence to help that GDR citizens do not leave their country. They should inform about people who have returned. Responsible: Comrade G. Schabowski.

4. Comrade G. Schabowski is assigned to discuss this problem with the representatives of the bloc parties [Christian Democrats, Liberal Democrats] in order to reach a joint position.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/J IV 2/2/2358. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Oskar Fischer and the Soviet Ambassador V[yacheslav] I. Kochemassov

7 November 1989, at 11:45 a.m.104

The conversation took place at the request of the Minister, Comrade Fischer.

I.

Comrade Oskar Fischer stated that the Politburo had discussed the problem of exits by GDR citizens, and the connected problems in the CSSR (blocking of the border crossings...). [It was the GDR’s duty] to relieve the Czechoslovak comrades. The GDR/FRG border would not be opened, because this would have uncontrollable effects. For the same reason, the border to the CSSR could not be closed.

The following measures were planned:

1. The media campaign aimed at inducing GDR citizens to remain in their country will be intensified. It was being attempted to co-opt certain people (personalities) to join the campaign. At the same time, returnees from the FRG should also be effectively used in this campaign.

2. The campaign against the FRG’s “duty to take care of [the East Germans]” will also be intensified. In this effort the support of our allies is desirable. Our ambassadors in Western Europe have been instructed to work along the same lines.

3. The [implementation of the] part of the travel law that deals with permanent exit of GDR citizens will be put in effect in advance.

4. It is to be discussed with the CSSR as to whether including its border crossings to Bavaria [Brambach– Vojlanov] as an exit route would bring relief. At the same time the CSSR would be asked as to whether it could close the border with the GDR. That would mean, however, punishing well-intentioned GDR citizens. If the GDR were to close [its border], a power struggle would ensue.

5. The GDR will inform Bonn about what they can expect as far as GDR citizens traveling to the FRG are concerned. It will demand forcefully that the FRG oppose the entry of GDR citizens. We will take them at their word.

6. Comrade Schabowski will inform the bloc parties about these things today, and Comrade Jarowinsky will talk to the representatives of the churches.

7. Comrade Ziebart will be informed by the Minister immediately, since he has an appointment today in Prague at 1:15 p.m. with Comrade Lenart.

II.

Comrade Gorbachev’s opinion as to the larger picture as well as to our plans for the travel law is very important to Comrade Krenz. The GDR would appreciate the support of the USSR.

Comrade Kochemassov thanked Comrade Fischer for the information. As an additional measure, he suggested including the former allies (USA, Britain, France) in order to prompt them to put pressure on the FRG.

Comrade Fischer agreed.

Comrade Kochemassov assured [Comrade Fischer] that the request would be forwarded to Moscow at once and promised a prompt response.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 07824 01 OF 03 071731Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIE-00 D/pl-00 H-01
NSC-88 NSP-00 HA-09 L-01 TRS-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 NRCS-01 INRE-00 OSIE-00 SP-02 SNF-01 PRS-01
SCT-03 P-02 T-01 0497

R 071710Z NOV 89
FM AMB EMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1572
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMB EMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

SUBJECT: MFA FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST ON THE WARSAW PACT
AND A CZECHOSLOVAK MODEL FOR CHANGE

1. SUMMARY. THE HEAD OF THE MFA'S INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS INSTITUTE, VLADIMIR CEBIS, COMPLAINS THAT
FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION IS HARDER NOW FOR
CZECHOSLOVAKIA THAN IN THE PAST SINCE IT NO LONGER CAN
RELY ON DIRECT SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW. EVEN THOUGH THE WARSAW
PACT IS MORE DIVERSE, THE PACT, IN HIS VIEW, STILL
HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN CoORDINATING FOREIGN POLICIES OF ITS MEMBERS. HE DISCOUNTS CURRENT SOVIET TALK OF PACT
MEMBERS BEING FREE TO LEAVE THE ALLIANCE. IN HIS VIEW, HUNGARY WILL CERTAINLY REMAIN FOR A FEW MORE YEARS,
POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BORDEERING A RESURGENT
GERMANY, SEE IT VERY MUCH IN THEIR INTEREST TO RETAIN
MEMBERSHIP AND EXPAND THE PACTS POLITICAL-CONSULTATIVE
CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 07824 01 OF 03 071731Z

MECHANISM. CEBIS CLAIMS CHANGE WILL COME TO
CZECHOSLOVAKIA THROUGH ESTABLISHED POLITICAL STRUCTURES.
WITH THE PARTY CONTINUING TO PLAY A KEY ROLE AND THE AVERAGE CZECHOSLOVAK WARY OF POLITICAL EXPERIMENTATION THAT COULD PRODUCE POLISH-STYLE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, CEBIS, AND BY IMPLICATION CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IS CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE PACE OF CHANGE GOING ON IN EASTERN EUROPE AND UNSURE WHERE IT WILL LEAD. HE IS NOT CONFIDENT THAT GORBACHEV KNOWS WHERE HE IS TAKING THE SOVIET UNION, THOUGH HE SUGGESTS THAT, UNLIKE THE CZECHOSLOVAKS, SOME SOVIET LEADERS APPRECIATE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS LIE OUTSIDE OLD SOCIALIST MODELS. END SUMMARY.

3. VISITING AMBASSADOR JACK SCANLAN WAS JOINED BY POLEC CHIEF ON NOVEMBER 2 FOR A CALL WITH VLADIMIR CEBIS, THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE MFA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE. THE HEAD OF THE GOC'S PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY THINK TANK DISPLAYED A CURIOUS MIXTURE OF PESSIMISM AND FRANKNESS THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSION. HE SEEMED UNCERTAIN WHERE CHANGES GOING ON IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD END OR WHAT IMPACT THEY MIGHT HAVE FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AT SEVERAL POINTS IN THE TALK CEBIS THREW UP HIS HANDS AS IF TO SAY, "WHAT ARE WE CZECHOSLOVAKS TO DO?"

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WARSAW PACT

4. CEBIS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT, OPTICALLY AT LEAST, THE OLD POLITICAL STRUCTURES FOR COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT ARE STILL IN PLACE. IN REALITY, THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PACT'S CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  PRAGUE 07824  01 OF 03  0911532

MEMBERSHIP ARE SO GREAT THAT THE OLD FORMS ARE NOT WORKING. HE COMPLAINED THAT FOREIGN POLICY HAD BEEN EASIER BEFORE WHEN "THE INSTRUCTIONS ALL CAME FROM ONE PLACE," AND "NOW," HE SAID, "THEY DON'T GIVE US INSTRUCTIONS; THEY TELL US TO DO OUR OWN FOREIGN POLICY." HE SEEMED NOSTALGIC FOR THE OLD, FAMILIAR WAYS.

5. DESPITE THE CHANGES, HOWEVER, CEBIS ARGUED THAT THE WARSAW PACT STILL HAS A ROLE TO PLAY. HE WAS AWARE THAT CPSU INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMMISSION MEMBER YEVGENY PRIMAKOV HAD RECENTLY TOLD REPORTERS IN THE U.S. THAT PACT MEMBERS, SPECIFICALLY HUNGARY, WERE FREE TO LEAVE THE ALLIANCE. (AMBASSADOR SCANLAN ADDED


THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN MUCH THE SAME ANSWER IN MOSCOW. MEMBERS ARE FREE TO LEAVE IN PRINCIPLE, THOUGH THE QUESTION HAS NOT YET COME UP IN PRACTICE.) WHATEVER THE SOVIETS SAY PUBLICLY, CEBIS ASSERTED, THEY WANT HUNGARY IN THE PACT, AND HE THOUGHT THIS IN THE U.S. INTEREST. IF ONE WARSAW PACT MEMBER BREAKS RANKS IT COULD START A CHAIN REACTION WHICH COULD END WITH WEST GERMANY PULLING OUT OF NATO.

6. THE HUNGARlANS, HE SAID, APPRECIATE THE SITUATION AND WILL REMAIN IN THE PACT, AT LEAST FOR A FEW MORE YEARS. FOR POLAND, PACT MEMBERSHIP WOULD REMAIN AN IMPERATIVE, LINKED TO FEAR OF A UNIFIED AND RESURGENT GERMANY. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS LIKewise COMMITTED AND SUPPORTED WIDER POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN THE PACT AND REFORMS, SUCH AS CREATION OF A PERMANENT SECRETARIAT, THAT WOULD MAKE IT FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 07/24 02 OF 03 071754Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-97 SS-00 C1AE-00 DODE-00 NA-01
NSCE-06 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 NLRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 FRS-01
SCT-03 P-02 T-04 W-043 W-043

355652 090313Z 163
R 071754Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1573
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 PRAGUE 07824

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

TAGS: PREL, PARM, CZ

SUBJECT: MFA FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST ON THE WARSAW PACT


CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY

8. TURNING TO THE GERMAN QUESTION, CEBIS QUOTED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 07824 02 OF 03 0717542

WALTER LIPPMAN, WHO HAD CALLED SUPPORT FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION THE GREATEST HYPOCRISY OF POST-WAR DIPLOMACY, NOBODY WANTED TO SEE IT HAPPEN, CEBIS SAID, NOT THE POLES, NOT THE FRENCH, AND CERTAINLY HE SUGGESTED, NOT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS. UNFORTUNATELY, NO ONE CAN FORESEE WHAT CHANGES WILL COME ON THE EUROPEAN SCENE. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS FLUID AND UNPREDICTABLE EVEN GORBACHEVS PROSPECTS WERE UNCERTAIN.

GORBACHEV, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIS PEOPLE TO BE PATIENT AND PROMISED IN TWO OR THREE YEARS THAT PERESTROIKA WOULD DELIVER IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSING AND FOODSTUFFS. NOW HE IS ASKING PEOPLE TO HOLD ON FOR ANOTHER FOUR YEARS. BUT THE SOVIETS ARE "INNOCULATED" AGAINST SUCH PROMISES, AND THE WINTER IS COMING. GORBACHEV TRIES TO SOLVE THINGS BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS, BUT THAT DOESN'T ALWAYS WORK, SAID CEBIS.

9. WHEN SOVIETS COME HERE, HE CONTINUED, THEY THINK
WE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAVE REACHED TRUE COMMUNISM. OUR WORKING PEOPLE APPRECIATE WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED AND FEAR DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE REGIME DOES NOT NEED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO FEED ON THESE FEARS. IT JUST REPORTS WHAT THE POLISH MEDIA IS SAYING.

10. FOR THIS REASON, CEBIS BELIEVES THE CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME'S SOCIAL BASE IS MUCH WIDER THAN ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. WORKERS ARE SATISFIED AND THE GOVERNMENT CAN RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRYSIDE WHERE AN ENLIGHTENED POLICY OF COLLECTIVIZED AGRICULTURE HAS MADE FARMERS RELATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  PRAGUE 07824  02 OF 03  07/27/54Z

AFFLUENT AND SOLVED THE COUNTRY'S FOOD PROBLEMS EVEN IN FREE ELECTIONS, HE ARGUED. THE COMMUNISTS COULD COUNT ON 40-50 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE. (COMMENT: CEBIS IS RIGHT IN POINTING OUT THE RELATIVE AFFLUENCE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL APATHY. BUT IN OUR VIEW LESS THAN OBJECTIVE IN CONVERTING THAT TO AUTOMATIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THE CPCZ. END COMMENT.)

NO CZECHOSLOVAK MODEL.


12. BUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S CURRENT SITUATION HAD SOME PARADOXICAL ELEMENTS. WHILE THE LEADERSHIP WANTS TO AVOID CHANGE AND THE PEOPLE FEAR IT, CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE DRIVEN BY THE PRESSURE AND EXAMPLE OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS TO OPEN UP ITS EXISTING POLITICAL STRUCTURE. THIS WILL NOT LEAD THE COUNTRY TO FOLLOW A POLISH OR HUNGARIAN MODEL. IN CEBIS' PERSONAL VIEW, CHANGE WILL COME HERE AS THE NATIONAL FRONT PARTIES AND ORGANIZATIONS SLOWLY ACTIVATE THEMSELVES. PERSONALITIES (HE OFFERED PEOPLES PARTY CHAIRMAN ZBYNEX ZALMAN AS AN EXAMPLE)
WHO CANNOT ADAPT TO THE NEW OPEN ENVIRONMENT WILL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 07824 03 OF 03 071755Z
ACTION EUR-06

INFO LOG-01 ADS-06 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DQDE-00 H-01
NSE-00 NSEA-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PKS-01
SCT-03 P-02 T-01 883 W
755561 590135Z 963
R 071710Z NVG 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECESTATE WASHDC 1574
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 PRAGUE 07824

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356 DECL.OADR
TAGS: PREL PARM CZ
SUBJECT: MFA FOREIGN POLICY ANALYST ON THE WARSAW PACT

BE REMOVED. THE PROCESS WILL CULMINATE WITH PLANNED
MULTIPLE CANDIDATE ELECTIONS IN 1991, BUT THE CPCZ
WILL RETAIN CONTROL EACH STEP ALONG THE WAY IN THIS
PROCESS

13 ANOTHER PART OF THE PARADOX, SAID CZEKIS, IS
THAT THIS GRADUAL LOOSENING UP WHILE IT MAY GIVE VENT
TO POLITICAL EXPRESSION, WILL NOT PRODUCE REAL
ALTERNATIVES TO SOLVING THE WIDE RANGE OF ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING CZECHOSLOVAKIA. "WE HAVE WAITED TOO LONG," HE OPENED, "TIME HAS MADE OUR PROBLEMS THAT MUCH MORE COMPLICATED."

14. IN A CONCLUDING ANECDOTE, WHICH CBIS SAID WAS BASED ON A TRUE EXCHANGE BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAK AND SOVIET ACADEMICIANS, HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 07/24 03 OF 03 0/177552

HAD COME TO REALIZE THAT IF THERE WERE ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS THEY WERE NOT TO BE FOUND IN SOCIALISM. HE RELATED HOW A GROUP OF CZECHOSLOVAK ACADEMICS WERE PRESSING A SOVIET COLLEAGUE ON WHETHER PERESTROIKA WAS NOT REALLY A RETURN TO THE "LENINIST MODEL" OF SOCIALISM. "WHAT LENINIST MODEL," THE SOVIET RESPONDED CAUSTICALLY, "LENIN SURVIVED THE REVOLUTION BY ONLY A FEW YEARS; HE HAD NO TIME TO CREATE A MODEL." THEN WHAT, THE CZECHOSLOVAKS DEMANDED, ARE YOU USING AS A GUIDEPOST FOR PERESTROIKA? THE EXPERIENCE OF "HIGHLY DEVELOPED, CIVILIZED AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES" WAS THE REPLY. YOU MEAN THE "CAPITALIST COUNTRIES" ASKED THE CZECHOSLOVAKS. NO, REPEATED THE SOVIET, THE "HIGHLY DEVELOPED, CIVILIZED AND DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES."

COMMENT

-------

15. EMBOFF'S CONTACT WITH CBIS HAS BEEN LIMITED IN THE PAST. HE IS AN OLD EAST-WEST HAND WHO SERVED IN WASHINGTON IN THE 1970S AND HAS PARTICIPATED IN ASPEN INSTITUTE AND SALZBURG SEMINARS WHERE HE WAS REGARDED AS SOMETHING OF A DOMINIC. HIS CANDOUR IN THIS CONVERSATION REFLECTS THE DEEP UNCERTAINTY OF A CZECHOSLOVAK ESTABLISHMENT THAT HAS WATCHED ITS INTERNATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS BEING OVERTURNED ONE BY ONE. IT FEELS THAT THERE MUST BE LIMITS TO THE CHANGE NOW GOING ON IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND KNOWS THAT ITS FATE IS TIED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THOSE LIMITS. IT IS LOOKING AROUND DESPERATELY FOR SOMEONE TO IMPOSE THEM. BLACK CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 07/24 03 OF 03 0/177552
CONFIDENTIAL

IN THE PLENUM ITSELF.

DURING A NOV 9 MEETING RELATED TO HIS EARLY DECEMBER VISIT TO THE U.S., CHUDOMIR ALEKSANDROV, CURRENTLY CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR GEOLOGY, AND UNTIL MID-1988 THE HEIR APPARENT TO ZHIKOV, MADE THE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNBN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

SOFIA 06103 02 OF 02 091539Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAR-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OEB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01
E-01 P-02 T-01 /041 W

091520Z NOV 89
FM AMEBASBY SOFIA
TO SECPRT WASHDC PRIORITY 8369
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06103

E.O. 12356: DECL:ORDR
TAGS: PREL, FOOV, BU
SUBJECT: THE NOV 10 CC PARTY PLENUM: LITTLE PROSPECT

FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO THE AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE NOV 10 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. IF THE PLENUM REALLY DISCUSSES THE ISSUES RAISED IN ZHIKOV'S REPORT (REFTEL), THE MEETING SHOULD LAST TWO DAYS AND PAVE THE WAY FOR PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS. HOWEVER, THINGS COULD CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE POLTBURU MEETING WHICH IS NORMALLY HELD ON THE EVE OF A CC PLENUM. ZHIKOV USUALLY PLAYS HIS CARDS CLOSE TO HIS CHEST AND MAY REVEAL HIS INTENTIONS ONLY AT THE POLTBURU MEETINGS. WHILE THERE WERE NO/NO DOMESTIC

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
8. ALEKSANDROV DID NOT EXPECT ANY MAJOR POLICY CHANGES FROM THE PLENUM, A POLICY WHICH HE DESCRIBED CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06103 02 OF 02 091539Z

AS A GRADUAL, CONTROLLED OPENING UP OF BULGARIAN SOCIETY, THERE IS, AS WAS EVIDENT FROM A READING OF ZHIVKOV'S REPORT, A TREMENDOUS EMPHASIS ON "UNITY," SINCE EVERYONE WAS AWARE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, HUNGARY AND, MOST RECENTLY, IN THE GDR. IN ALEKSANDROV'S VIEW, FOREIGN OBSERVERS WOULD BE "DISAPPOINTED" IF THEY EXPECTED MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES FROM THE PLENUM. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DID NOT PRECLUDE--BUT DID NOT EXPECT--THE DISAPPEARANCE FROM THE POLITBÜRO OF SOME OF ITS OLDER MEMBERS TO MAKE WAY FOR SOME NEW BLOOD. THIS WOULD NOT NOT, HOWEVER, MEAN ZHIVKOV'S REPLACEMENT NOW.

9. THIS SAME SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PERSONAL CHANGES WAS CONVEYED BY A BULGARIAN CC STAFFER DURING THE SOVIET EMBASSY'S NOVEMBER 7 RECEPTION. THIS SOURCE CLAIMED THAT NO ONE KNOWS WHAT ZHIVKOV HAS IN MIND ABOUT POSSIBLE POLITBÜRO PERSONNEL CHANGES. THAT PEOPLE WANTED CHANGES (UNSPECIFIED) WAS CLEAR; WHAT WAS NOT SO CLEAR WAS THAT NO ONE IS PREPARED TO MOUNT ANY DIRECT CHALLENGE TO ZHIVKOV.

10. COMMENT. ON BALANCE, WE TEND TO AGREE WITH ALEKSANDROV THAT THERE PROBABLY WILL NOT BE MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES. EVEN IF THERE ARE, THE BASIC ZHIVKOV POLICY OF TIGHT CONTROL OVER A REFORM PROCESS LONG ON RHETORIC AND VERY SHORT ON CONCRETE ACTION WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CANDID ADMISSIONS OF THE FAILURE OF REFORM EFFORTS THUS FAR AND THE FACT THAT ZHIVKOV THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO ISSUE A REPORT ON RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS BEFORE THIS PLENUM (AND TO DISCUSS RESTRUCTURING AT THE PLENUM) DEMONSTRATE THAT THE QUESTION OF REFORM IS BECOMING CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SOFIA 06103 02 OF 02 091539Z

EVEN MORE PRESSING IN BULGARIA TODAY.

END COMMENT.

FOLANSKY

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION EUR-09

INFO

LOG-00
ADS-00
IMR-07
SS-00
CIAE-00
DODE-00
H-01
NSCE-00
NSAE-00
HA-09
L-03
TRSE-00
PA-01
OMB-01
NRC-01
IMRE-00
USTE-00
SP-02
SNP-01
PRS-01
E-01
P-02
T-01
0641 W

P 0915202 NOV 89
FM AMBASSAD0R SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8368
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06103

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BU

SUBJECT: THE NOV 10 CC PARTY PLENUM: LITTLE PROSPECT
- FOR MAJOR CHANGES

REF: SOFIA 6091

1. CONF - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE BULGARIAN COMMUNITY PARTY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE WILL HOLD A PLENUM ON NOV 10 TO DISCUSS
RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS AND TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE NEXT
PARTY CONGRESS. SINCE TODOR ZHIVKOV HAS USED
SIMILAR GATHERINGS IN THE PAST TO ANNOUNCE MAJOR
PERSONNEL CHANGES, RUMORS ABOUND IN SOFIA AS TO WHO
MIGHT BE DEPOSED, PROMOTED, OR REASSIGNED. GIVEN
THE BACKDROP OF EVENTS IN OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES, RUMORS OF MORE OPEN DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
PACE OF REFORM HERE, AND THE FRANK ADMISSIONS OF THE
FAILURE OF RECENT REFORM EFFORTS CONTAINED IN A
PUBLISHED REPORT PREPARED BY ZHIVKOV FOR THE PLENUM,
THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SPECULATION ABOUT MAJOR REFORM
MEASURES IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS OR EVEN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

CONFIDENTIAL

SOFIA 06103 01 OF 02 0915392

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERABLE VOCAL CRITICISM BY
CC MEMBERS OF THE GOB'S POLICIES.

3. ZHIVKOV IS PROBABLY THE ONLY ONE WHO REALLY KNOWS
THE ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, AND HE
PLAYS HIS CARDS CLOSE TO HIS CHEST. CHUDOMIR ALEXANDROV,
FORMER ZHIVKOV HEIR APPARENT, DOUBTS THAT THERE WILL BE
MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES AND WE TEND TO AGREE WITH HIM.
EVEN IF THERE ARE, THE RESULT WILL NOT BE A MAJOR
CHANGE TOWARDS A MORE REFORM-MINDSET SYSTEM. IT

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
WILL ONLY BE A CONTINUATION OF ZHIVKOV'S RIMAAK
RESHUFFLING OF HIS PERSONNEL. WHILE CRITICISM OF
THE BULGARIAN SYSTEM DOES APPEAR TO BE GROWING MORE
OPEN AND WIDESPREAD, ZHIVKOV AND COMPANY WILL ALMOST
CERTAINLY CONTINUE THE POLICY OF PLENTY OF RHETORIC
ABOUT REFORM, BUT LITTLE CONCRETE ACTION.
END SUMMARY.

4. ON NOVEMBER 10, THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
WILL HOLD A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM WITH THE ANNOUNCED
PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING PROGRESS TOWARDS RESTRUCTURING
IN BULGARIA AND ALSO TO PREPARE FOR THE NEXT PARTY
CONGRESS. A LENGTHY REPORT (REPTE) PREPARED BY TODOR
ZHIVKOV WAS PUBLISHED LAST WEEK TO FORM THE BASIS
FOR DISCUSSION AT THE PLENUM. IT CONTAINED PRANK
ADMISSIONS THAT THE REFORM EFFORTS THUS FAR HAVE NOT
BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND CONTAINED A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS
FOR REFORMS IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL
FIELDS, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH PREVIOUS REFORM
EFFORTS. THE PROPOSALS WERE LONG ON RHETORIC AND SHORT ON
SPECIFICITY.

5. SIMILAR MEETINGS IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN USED TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  SOFIA 06103 01 OF 02 3915392

ANNOUNCE MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES AND RUMORS THEREFORE
ABOUND IN SOFIA ABOUT SENIOR PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL
OFFICIALS WHO MAY BE REMOVED, PROMOTED, OR
REASSIGNED IN THIS INSTANCE. PROMINENT RUMORS INCLUDE
THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF FOREIGN MINISTER MIADENOV OR
HIS REASSIGNMENT AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY;
THE RETIREMENT OF ATANASOV AS PRIME MINISTER AND HIS
REPLACEMENT BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DANCHEV; THE
BREAKING UP OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AND PLANNING
AND REESTABLISHMENT OF A MINISTRY OF FINANCE; AND
EVEN THE REPLACEMENT OF MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TANEV
(FOR FAILING TO FORESEE THE MAY DEMONSTRATIONS OF
ETHNIC TURKS).

6. GIVEN EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY AND OTHER EASTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SPECULATION
AS TO WHETHER THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WOULD MAINTAIN
IT'S TRADITIONAL ROLE AS RUBBER STAMP FOR ZHIVKOV’S
WISHES OR BEGIN TO VOICE DISSATISFACTION WITH CURRENT
POLICIES. THE AMBASSADOR, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID
HE WAS HESITANT TO PREDICT HOW THE PLENUM MIGHT
TURN OUT. WHILE CC MEMBERS HAVE ALWAYS "KEPT SILENT
AND DONE WHAT THEY WERE TOLD," THE AMBASSADOR SAID
THAT THERE IS NOW AN UNDERCURRENT OF DISSATISFACTION
AMONG CC MEMBERS AND A NEW WILLINGNESS TO VOICE
CRITICISM OPENLY. THERE IS SOME CHANGE, HE SPECULATED,
THAT THAT WILLINGNESS "MIGHT BE A FACTOR."

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Guenter Schabowski’s Press Conference in the GDR International Press Center

9 November 1989, 6:53-7:01 p.m.

**Question:** My name is Ricardo Ehrman, representing the Italian press agency ANSA. Mr. Schabowski, you spoke about mistakes. Don’t you believe that it was a big mistake to introduce this travel law several days ago?

**Schabowski:** No, I don’t believe so. (Um) We know about this tendency in the population, this need of the population, to travel or to leave the GDR. And (um) we have ideas about what we have to bring about, (such as) all the things I mentioned before, or sought to mention in my response to the question from the TASS correspondent, namely a complex renewal of the society (um) and thereby achieve that many of these elements... (um) that people do not feel compelled to solve their personal problems in this way.

Those are quite a number of steps, as I said, and (um) we can’t start them all at once. There are series of steps, and the chance, through expanding travel possibilities ... the chance, through legalizing exit and making it easier to leave, to free the people from a (um) let us say psychological pressure... Many of these steps took place without adequate consideration. We know that through conversations, through the need to return to the GDR, (um) through conversations with people who find themselves in an unbelievably complicated situation in the FRG because the FRG is having a great deal of trouble providing shelter for these refugees.

So, the absorptive capacity of the FRG is essentially exhausted. There are already more than, or less than provisional (um), that these people have to count on, if they are put up there. (um). Shelter is the minimum for constructing an existence. Finding work is decisive, essential...

**Beil:** (softly) ... integration...

**Schabowski:** ...yes, and the necessary integration into the society, which cannot happen when one is living in a tent or an emergency shelter, or is hanging around unemployed.

So, we want... through a number of changes, including the travel law, to [create] the chance, the sovereign decision of the citizens to travel wherever they want. (um) We are naturally (um) concerned that the possibilities of this travel regulation—it is still not in effect, it’s only a draft.

A decision was made today, as far as I know (looking toward Labs and Banaschak in hope of confirmation). A recommendation from the Politburo was taken up that we take a passage from the [draft of] travel regulation and put it into effect, that, (um)—as it is called, for better or worse—that regulates permanent exit, leaving the Republic. Since we find it (um) unacceptable that this movement is taking place (um) across the territory of an allied state, (um) which is not an easy burden for that country to bear. Therefore (um), we have decided today (um) to implement a regulation that allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic (um) to (um) leave the GDR through any of the border crossings.
Question: (many voices) When does that go into effect?... Without a passport? Without a passport? (no, no)—When is that in effect?... (confusion, voices...) At what point does the regulation take effect?

Schabowski: What?

Question: At once? When...

Schabowski: (... scratches his head) You see, comrades, I was informed today (puts on his glasses as he speaks further), that such an announcement had been (um) distributed earlier today. You should actually have it already. So, (reading very quickly from the paper):

1) “Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People’s Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit.”

Question: With a passport?

Schabowski: (um...)(reads:) “Permanent exit is possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG. These changes replace the temporary practice of issuing [travel] authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with a GDR personal identity card via third countries.”

(Looks up) (um) I cannot answer the question about passports at this point. (Looks questioningly at Labs and Banaschak.) That is also a technical question. I don’t know, the passports have to ... so that everyone has a passport, they first have to be distributed. But we want to...

Banaschak: The substance of the announcement is decisive...

Schabowski: ... is the ... "

Question: When does it come into effect?

Schabowski: (Looks through his papers...) That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay (looking through his papers further).

Labs: (quietly) ...without delay.

Beil: (quietly) That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers.

Question: (...Many voices...) You only said the FRG, is the regulation also valid for West Berlin?
Schabowski: (reading aloud quickly) “As the Press Office of the Ministry ... the Council of Ministers decided that until the Volkskammer implements a corresponding law, this transition regulation will be in effect.”

Question: Does this also apply for West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG.

Schabowski: (shrugs his shoulders, frowns, looks at his papers) So ... (pause), um hmmm (reads aloud): “Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively.”

Question: Another question also: does that mean that effective immediately, GDR citizens—Christoph Janowski, Voice of America—does that mean that effective immediately, all GDR citizens cannot emigrate via Czechoslovakia or Poland?

Schabowski: No, that is not addressed at all. We hope instead that the movement will (um) regulate itself in this manner, as we are trying to.

Question: (many voices, incomprehensible question)

Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.

Question: (many voices, incomprehensible)

Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.

Question: (many voices, incomprehensible)

Schabowski: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary. I’m expressing myself so carefully because I’m not up to date on this question, but just before I came over here I was given this information. (Several journalists hurry from the room.)

Frage: Mr. Schabowski, what is going to happen to the Berlin Wall now?

Schabowski: It has been brought to my attention that it is 7:00 p.m.. That has to be the last question. Thank you for your understanding.

(um...) What will happen to the Berlin Wall? Information has already been provided in connection with travel activities. (um) The issue of travel, (um) the ability to cross the Wall from our side, ... hasn’t been answered yet and exclusively the question in the sense..., so this, I’ll put it this way, fortified state border of the GDR.... (um) We have always said that there have to be several other factors (um) taken into consideration. And they deal with the complex of questions that Comrade Krenz, in his talk in the—addressed in view of the relations between the GDR and the FRG, in ditto light of the (um) necessity of continuing the process of assuring peace with new initiatives.
And (um) surely the debate about these questions (um) will be positively influenced if the FRG and NATO also agree to and implement disarmament measures in a similar manner to that of the GDR and other socialist countries. Thank you very much.

[Source: Author’s transcript of television broadcast. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
Material for the Session/For Circulation in the Council of Ministers, Draft: Temporary Transition Rules for Travel and Permanent Exit from the GDR

Berlin, 9 November 1989

Material for the meeting
For Circulation in the Council of Ministers
Berlin, 9 November 1989
Members of the Council of Ministers

It is requested that the attached draft resolution Temporary Transition Rules for Travel and Permanent Exit VVS b2-937/89 by the GDR Chairman of the Council of Ministers be approved through circulation today, Thursday, 9 November 1989, by 6:00 p.m.

[Harry] Moebis

Material for the meeting
Secret
Council of Ministers Circular b2-937/89
[11/9/89]
[40th] copy 4 pages
V 1204/89

Title of the draft:
Temporary—Transition
Rules for Travel and
Permanent Exit from the GDR

Draft presented by:
Chairman of the Council of Ministers

signed: Willi Stoph

Berlin, 9 November 1989

Draft Resolution

The attached resolution on the temporary transition rules for travel and permanent exit from the GDR is approved.

Draft Resolution

To change the situation with regard to the permanent exit of GDR citizens to the FRG via the CSSR, it has been determined that:

1. The decree from 30 November 1988 about travel abroad of GDR citizens will no longer be applied until the new travel law comes into force.
2. Starting immediately, the following temporary transition regulations for travel abroad and permanent exits from the GDR are in effect:
   a) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short period of time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.
   b) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People’s Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].
   c) Permanent exits are possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG and (West) Berlin.
   d) The temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with only a GDR personal identity card via third countries ceases.

3. The attached press release explaining the temporary transition regulation will be issued on 10 November.

Responsible: Government spokesman of the GDR
Council of Ministers

Press release

Berlin (ADN)

As the Press Office of the Ministry of the Interior has announced, the GDR Council of Ministers has decided that the following temporary transition regulation for travel abroad and permanent exit from the GDR will be effective until a corresponding law is put into effect by the Volkskammer:

1) Applications by private individuals for travel abroad can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short period of time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.

2) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People’s Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs [of the local district or city councils].

3) Permanent exits are possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG and (West) Berlin.

4) This decision revokes the temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with only a GDR personal identity card via third countries ceases.
Krenz: Comrades! Before Guenther speaks, I have to digress from the agenda once more. You are aware that there is a problem that wears on us all: the question of exit [from the GDR]. The Czechoslovak comrades are increasingly finding it a burden, as our Hungarian comrades did earlier. And, whatever we do in this situation, it will be a move in the wrong direction. If we close the border to the CSSR, then we are basically punishing the upstanding citizens of the GDR, who would not be able to travel, and in this way put pressure on us. Even that would not have led to our gaining control of the situation, since the Permanent Mission of the FRG has already informed us that they have finished with renovations. That means that when they open the building, we will face the same problem again.

And, Comrade Willi Stoph, as acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers, drafted a decree which I would like to read to you here and now. Although the draft has been approved by the Politburo, it has such an impact that I wanted to consult the Central Committee.

Decision to change the situation for permanent exit of GDR citizens to the FRG via the CSSR.

It is decreed:
1. The decree of 30 November 1988 about travel abroad for GDR citizens will no longer be applied until the new travel law comes into force.
2. Starting immediately, the following temporary transition regulation for travel abroad and permanent exits from the GDR are in effect:
   a) Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued on short notice. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particularly exceptional cases.
   b) The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the police county offices [VPK?] in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit. It is still possible to apply for permanent exit in the departments for internal affairs.
   c) Permanent exits are possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG and (West) Berlin.
   d) The temporary practice of issuing (travel) authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with only a GDR personal identity card via third countries ceases.
3. The attached press release explaining the temporary transition regulation will be issued on 10 November.

The press release reads as follows: “As the Press Office of the Ministry of the Interior has announced, the GDR Council of Ministers has decided that the following
tempo-rary transition regulation for travel abroad and permanent exit from the GDR will be effective until a corresponding law is put into force by the Volkskammer.”

Then follow the four points that I do not need to read to you again.

I said that however way we do this, it will turn out bad. But it is the only solution that saves us from the problems of having to do everything through third countries, which does not further the international prestige of the GDR. Comrade Hoffmann?

**Hoffmann:** Comrade Krenz, could we avoid this word “temporary”? It creates a constant pressure, as if people didn’t have any time left and had to get away as soon as possible. Wouldn’t it be possible—I don’t know the entire text—to avoid that or work around it?

**Krenz:** Yes, we could write: “According to the Volkskammer’s decision, the following transition regulation” and simply take out “temporary.” Transition regulation, after all, means temporary.

**Dickel:** Until the travel law comes into effect.

**Krenz:** So, until the travel law comes into effect, the following things are valid, OK? (noise)

**Krenz:** Agreed? (noise) Comrade Dickel, do you foresee any difficulties? It’s correct as it is, isn’t it? [noise, Chair rings bell]

**Dickel:** As far as the announcement is concerned— (shout: louder!) it perhaps would make sense for the Press Office of the Council of Ministers to make the announcement rather than the Ministry of the Interior, although we will actually carry out the decree, since it is a decree from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

**Krenz:** I would suggest that the government spokes-man make the announcement right aw ay. (shouting) What? (noise)

**Banaschak:** Isn’t it dangerous to adopt such a passage, “temporary”? ... (shouts: louder!) If we adopt such a passage, one that contains “temporary” or “transition solution,” couldn’t that have the effect that people aren’t sure what will come next...

(noise, shouts: They just said that! Further noise, shouts)

**Krenz:** Therefore, we will say that we will avoid “temporary” as well as "transition rule” and say: until the travel law, which is to be passed by the Volkskammer, comes into effect, this and that is decreed. Agreed, Comrades? (shouts: yes!) Good, thank you very much. Guenther Jahn, you have the floor.

(Quietly, to his neighbor at the presidium table, with the microphone turned off): It is always good to do something like that. (Loudly, with microphone turned on): After Günther Jahn, Guenter Sieber will take the floor.

Guenter Schabowski’s Press Conference in the GDR International Press Center

9 November 1989, 6:53-7:01 p.m.

**Question:** My name is Ricardo Ehrman, representing the Italian press agency ANSA. Mr. Schabowski, you spoke about mistakes. Don’t you believe that it was a big mistake to introduce this travel law several days ago?

**Schabowski:** No, I don’t believe so. (Um) We know about this tendency in the population, this need of the population, to travel or to leave the GDR. And (um) we have ideas about what we have to bring about, (such as) all the things I mentioned before, or sought to mention in my response to the question from the TASS correspondent, namely a complex renewal of the society (um) and thereby achieve that many of these elements... (um) that people do not feel compelled to solve their personal problems in this way.

Those are quite a number of steps, as I said, and (um) we can’t start them all at once. There are series of steps, and the chance, through expanding travel possibilities... the chance, through legalizing exit and making it easier to leave, to free the people from a (um) let us say psychological pressure... Many of these steps took place without adequate consideration. We know that through conversations, through the need to return to the GDR, (um) through conversations with people who find themselves in an unbelievably complicated situation in the FRG because the FRG is having a great deal of trouble providing shelter for these refugees.

So, the absorptive capacity of the FRG is essentially exhausted. There are already more than, or less than provisional (um), that these people have to count on, if they are put up there. (um). Shelter is the minimum for constructing an existence. Finding work is decisive, essential...

**Beil:** (softly) ... integration...

**Schabowski:** ...yes, and the necessary integration into the society, which cannot happen when one is living in a tent or an emergency shelter, or is hanging around unemployed.

So, we want... through a number of changes, including the travel law, to [create] the chance, the sovereign decision of the citizens to travel wherever they want. (um) We are naturally (um) concerned that the possibilities of this travel regulation—it is still not in effect, it’s only a draft.

A decision was made today, as far as I know (looking toward Labs and Banaschak in hope of confirmation). A recommendation from the Politburo was taken up that we take a passage from the [draft of] travel regulation and put it into effect, that, (um)—as it is called, for better or worse—that regulates permanent exit, leaving the Republic. Since we find it (um) unacceptable that this movement is taking place (um) across the territory of an allied state, (um) which is not an easy burden for that country to bear. Therefore (um), we have decided today (um) to implement a regulation that allows every citizen of the German Democratic Republic (um) to (um) leave the GDR through any of the border crossings.
**Question:** (many voices) When does that go into effect?... Without a passport? Without a passport? (no, no)—When is that in effect?... (confusion, voices...) At what point does the regulation take effect?

**Schabowski:** What?

**Question:** At once? When...

**Schabowski:** (... scratches his head) You see, comrades, I was informed today (puts on his glasses as he speaks further), that such an announcement had been (um) distributed earlier today. You should actually have it already. So, (reading very quickly from the paper):

1) “Applications for travel abroad by private individuals can now be made without the previously existing requirements (of demonstrating a need to travel or proving familial relationships). The travel authorizations will be issued within a short time. Grounds for denial will only be applied in particular exceptional cases. The responsible departments of passport and registration control in the People’s Police district offices in the GDR are instructed to issue visas for permanent exit without delays and without presentation of the existing requirements for permanent exit.”

**Question:** With a passport?

**Schabowski:** (um...) (reads:) “Permanent exit is possible via all GDR border crossings to the FRG. These changes replace the temporary practice of issuing [travel] authorizations through GDR consulates and permanent exit with a GDR personal identity card via third countries.”

(Looks up) (um) I cannot answer the question about passports at this point. (Looks questioningly at Labs and Banaschak.) That is also a technical question. I don’t know, the passports have to ... so that everyone has a passport, they first have to be distributed. But we want to...

**Banaschak:** The substance of the announcement is decisive...

**Schabowski:** ... is the ...

**Question:** When does it come into effect?

**Schabowski:** (Looks through his papers...) That comes into effect, according to my information, immediately, without delay (looking through his papers further).

**Labs:** (quietly) ...without delay.

**Beil:** (quietly) That has to be decided by the Council of Ministers.

**Question:** (...Many voices...) You only said the FRG, is the regulation also valid for West Berlin?
**Schabowski**: (reading aloud quickly) “As the Press Office of the Ministry ... the Council of Ministers decided that until the Volkskammer implements a corresponding law, this transition regulation will be in effect.”

**Question**: Does this also apply for West Berlin? You only mentioned the FRG.

**Schabowski**: (shrugs his shoulders, frowns, looks at his papers) So ... (pause), um hmmm (reads aloud): “Permanent exit can take place via all border crossings from the GDR to the FRG and West Berlin, respectively.”

**Question**: Another question also: does that mean that effective immediately, GDR citizens—Christoph Janowski, Voice of America—does that mean that effective immediately, all GDR citizens cannot emigrate via Czechoslovakia or Poland?

**Schabowski**: No, that is not addressed at all. We hope instead that the movement will (um) regulate itself in this manner, as we are trying to.

**Question**: (many voices, incomprehensible question)

**Schabowski**: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.

**Question**: (many voices, incomprehensible)

**Schabowski**: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary.

**Question**: (many voices, incomprehensible)

**Schabowski**: I haven’t heard anything to the contrary. I’m expressing myself so carefully because I’m not up to date on this question, but just before I came over here I was given this information. (Several journalists hurry from the room.)

**Frage**: Mr. Schabowski, what is going to happen to the Berlin Wall now?

**Schabowski**: It has been brought to my attention that it is 7:00 p.m.. That has to be the last question. Thank you for your understanding.

(um...) What will happen to the Berlin Wall? Information has already been provided in connection with travel activities. (um) The issue of travel, (um) the ability to cross the Wall from our side, ... hasn’t been answered yet and exclusively the question in the sense..., so this, I’ll put it this way, fortified state border of the GDR.... (um) We have always said that there have to be several other factors (um) taken into consideration. And they deal with the complex of questions that Comrade Krenz, in his talk in the—addressed in view of the relations between the GDR and the FRG, in ditto light of the (um) necessity of continuing the process of assuring peace with new initiatives.
And (um) surely the debate about these questions (um) will be positively influenced if the FRG and NATO also agree to and implement disarmament measures in a similar manner to that of the GDR and other socialist countries. Thank you very much.

[Source: Author’s transcript of television broadcast. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
Talks of Chancellor Kohl with the President of the "Solidarity" Trade Union, Walesa; Warsaw, 9 November 1989

The Chancellor greeted Lech Walesa (W) and reminded him of the last meeting at the beginning of September-- since then a lot has happened in Europe!

He hopes that a new chapter in the German-Polish relationship can now truly begin. The strength of his delegation -- among them 80 personalities from business -- shows strong interest. If Poland only created the necessary political infrastructure, one could do much jointly: promotion of agricultural cooperatives, industrial concerns, middle class enterprises -- already here in particular, there is potential for cooperation.

The joint document negotiated by [our] personal representatives is rational and forward-looking.

Indeed, one must know that the left in both states does not want this visit to be successful. The discussion over the Annaberg has shown this, also the way one psychologically punishes a whole group of the population such as the exiles -- who are completely obliging -- until they react.

A success in German-Polish relations in view of the dramatic developments in the GDR would be especially compelling. No one can say how it will continue -- not even Krenz. Every day between 10,000 and 15,000 people simply flee the GDR. Krenz told him -- the Chancellor -- over the telephone that he wants to continue with reforms, but following the Moscow model, not Warsaw’s or Budapest’s. He wants to keep the present Party control in practice. But this will not work; if Krenz does not permit parties and guarantee free elections, there will be no peace. Had Honecker implemented this two years earlier, this would have perhaps worked; but now in the face of demonstrations of 500,000 people in Leipzig, 600,000-700,000 people in Berlin, it is too late. One can no longer align with the police and tanks against such a crowd of people. Gorbachev also realizes this.

This is why a success with reforms here in Poland is so important. This success would be a first-class European event. Therefore, he -- the Chancellor -- wants to do everything to contribute to this success. Clever politics is necessary on both sides.

W thanked [the Chancellor] for the opportunity to have these talks and responded to the Annaberg theme, that in this case one doesn’t want to emphasize it too much. One should not forget that there was an iron curtain between the two states, that the Polish people would have been poorly informed on the Chancellor’s plans and efforts. The present opening is still too new to overcome these molds, these moods. In a month one could not imagine this-- in half a year there will no longer be such a problem.

Today, however, the widespread fear of German aggression, German tanks, continues to have an effect. The Communists psychologically maintained this picture -- the Chancellor interjected: And exploited it.
W advises to wait calmly for things to develop.

He sees the developments in the GDR as very dangerous. One must try to slow them down. He had said earlier that it would be good if the GDR remained in fifth or sixth place (among the reform states). He would have preferred it if developments had maintained a certain order -- with Poland and Hungary on top. But now one stands unprepared before a new situation. One needs brave solutions -- for instance a complete opening: everyone could go where it suits him. But no one is prepared for such solutions.

In the GDR everything works in the short-term and is thought of belatedly. A stream of people moves to the West and no one is left to turn out the light. He asks himself if the Federal Republic of Germany would stop this influx. For Poland, the developments come at a the wrong time, then the Federal Republic of Germany would be compelled to direct its gaze on the GDR as a top priority -- whereby in which case Polish reforms would inevitably be in the background.

The Chancellor interjected that this is not his policy—without the developments in Warsaw, there would not be these developments in the GDR—and if the Warsaw reforms were to fail, nothing further would happen in the GDR.

W replied that admittedly this is logically correct; on the other hand the situation in the GDR is developing with fast leaps and bounds—he asks himself, what would happen if the GDR completely opened its border and tore down the Wall—must the Federal Republic of Germany rebuild her [East Germany] again?

The Chancellor continued, if the number of refugee seekers grew dramatically again, the GDR would collapse.

W continued anew, the development of reforms in the GDR is late—and if the GDR can’t and won’t go further, it would seek to shift the debt to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Chancellor views such a course as unlikely: yesterday in the German Bundestag he said that there were three points that were crucial: admission of free parties, free elections, and credible guarantees. Then the Federal Republic of Germany could also help.

W views such developments as coming too late—if it were up to him to decide in the GDR, he would announce that the complete opening (of the border) has been prepared, explain a political program along these lines, and introduce a clever solution that won’t result in confusion. But this is not possible now. One already knows this in Poland from personal experience. He would have preferred a clean solution—"with gloves". But now one must improvise. In spite of everything, the attempt must also be made in the GDR to carry out a well-thought-out solution, otherwise there will be chaos.

The Chancellor repeated: truly free parties and free elections are what the people in the GDR are now waiting for.
**W** asked if there is anyone with whom one can talk rationally with.

The Chancellor repeated his picture of the GDR leadership. It is not about one person, rather it is about many who feared losing their advantages and now have genuine anxiety. Within the leadership there are three groups:

- People who still believed ten days ago that things could be brought to order through the removal of Honecker—now they have detached themselves—"the old cement-heads" [*die alte Betonköpfe*] are gone.

- Krenz and his followers, who would like to implement reforms, such as a leading role for the Party, after the model of the Soviet Union.

- Finally, the third group is difficult to characterize—however, it clearly wants actual changes. He received inquiries on conditions, but of course answered that the Federal Republic of Germany has no conditions to pose; rather, all decisions must come from the GDR itself.

Above all he emphasized that he could give comprehensive help if there were actual reforms: the founding of free labor unions, free parties, free elections, guarantees . . . if the GDR doesn’t go down this path, they will be swept away.

**W** emphasized anew fear and concern over the uncontrollable developments. The situation in the GDR calls for a brave solution . . . He sees no (long-term) plans. The SED is not in the position to carry out reforms, no one would believe them. Perhaps one should think about including the UN. But there is no person, no institution in particular—such as the Church in Poland—with which one can discuss [matters] rationally and control the situation. There is no earnest organization—although certain people from the nomenklatura could play with military power.

The Chancellor repeated: Military power will help no one now. However, the example of Hungary could help. There some people realized that reforms were important.

**W** does not see a second Hungary in the GDR as possible. He wonders whether the Wall will stand again in one or two weeks.

The Chancellor emphasized that the peaceful course of the demonstrations has very clearly proven that the people are not radical.

**W** reported from his own experience that he also first emphasized the results after the "Round Table" talks, but was overtaken by the outcome. Particularly because of that, he has concerns that events in the GDR are developing too quickly.

The Chancellor pointed out that the GDR, in contrast to Poland and Hungary, is not a country, rather it is a part of Germany. If there were a firm arrangement on the admission of parties and a guarantee of free elections, then the people would no longer leave. Since
there are still remnants of earlier parties—though this doesn’t count for the East CDU—there could be a new infrastructure in a quarter of a year.

Prof. Geremek interjected that the same question presents itself in the GDR as in Poland: Society wants freedom, not parties. If one were to put this to the test, then where does the Wall still stand?

The Chancellor replied: with these developments the Wall will without a doubt be cleared away. On the other hand, if one shoots, everything would be over.

W sees difficulties with the re-establishment of parties because many of the most active leadership personalities are already gone. Perhaps the party problem is even on the back burner. For the people the cry "we want parties" is, as in Poland, about freedom.

W asked about the economic and benefits situation in the GDR.

The Chancellor sees this as a small problem. Besides, yesterday in the German Bundestag he emphasized our preparedness to help if free labor unions and parties were allowed and free elections were guaranteed. One could activate the GDR economy quite quickly. Naturally the help must be significant—he harbors no illusions about this. Especially in the current situation—the Chancellor continued—he wants to clear things up with Poland. He wants to achieve results due to bilateral relations, but also as a result of developments in the GDR. It would be utterly wrong to allow the GDR current priority and to claim that Poland is no longer a theme. Because the developments are not a German, but rather a European problem. Everything that he does as a German in this situation, judges [sic]: How will this work in Europe?

In Paris, London, Rome, Warsaw there are many people who did not wish for these developments. That is exactly why one must try to reach a consensus. He spoke with President Mitterand about this eight days ago and then stated with him at a press conference: Now more than ever the Federal Republic of Germany needs the partnership with France—it is existential. For we are a piece of Europe. The Germans are not the measure of all things.

He can only repeat: If things in Poland develop for the worse, then the same will happen in the GDR—that is exactly why he would give important impetus here.

W asked if the Federal Republic of Germany could accept a million people from the GDR.

The Chancellor saw such an influx of refugees as unlikely. From his own conversations, he knows that these are normal people who actually didn’t want to leave; rather, through their flight they wanted to force better living conditions in their homeland.

W clarified anew his concerns about uncontrolled developments and "revolutionary chaos." There is a joint interest that things develop peacefully.
The Chancellor emphatically agreed. However he—the Chancellor—cannot make a decision together with Walesa. People in the GDR leadership need yet another lesson, specifically that which does not continue with the current power of the Party. There is no military alternative—either with their own or with Russian soldiers. But just because a few people wanted to save the leadership, they would not carry out a scorched earth policy.

W nevertheless does not rule out a development in which martial law or a state of emergency [are declared.]

The Chancellor repeated anew, the people want change, not revolution.

W and G doubt that this also holds for the youth.

The Chancellor repeated: Naturally they want changes and a better standard of living, but they also see the costs and risks.

Next week there will be a new government in East Berlin. He does not know the designated Minister President, perhaps a few people of his background. It would not surprise him—the Chancellor—if he would attempt after a while to push Krenz to the side and take over his role.

Besides, the people in the GDR are well informed on relations with us. They knew what they expected in the Federal Republic of Germany. 14 million travelers over the past year also conveyed personal impressions.

For this reason also he believes that it will not be realized. In demonstrations of 500,000 people, no broken windows—this was indeed notable. (Digression: GDR refugees in the embassies in Warsaw and Prague.)

In closing, the Chancellor gave his convincing impression that one can have things in the GDR under control with determined steps in the direction of admission of free trade unions, free parties and, in a realistic perspective, free elections. The Catholic and Evangelical churches played a stabilizing role throughout.

After the arrival of Cardinal Hengsbach, the Chancellor clarified anew that developments in the GDR would not change his policy. He wants the success of reforms in Poland and Hungary. They are significant for all of Europe—if they are not successful, there will be no rational developments in the GDR.

He expressed his readiness to remain in contact with Walesa in case of a dramatic worsening [of the situation.]

W thanked [the Chancellor] for the talk.

Participants on the Polish side
Prof. Geremek

Participants on the German side

AL 2

RL 212 [note-taker]

Frau Hamerlak-Hermesdorf (translator)

Kaestner

Translated by Catherine Nielsen, The National Security Archive, George Washington University

[Source: Published in Dokumente zur Deutschland Politik; Deutsche Einheit: Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90, Hans Jürgen Kusters and Daniel Hofmann, eds. (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), document number 76, pp. 492-496]

(From Poland, 1986-1989: The End of the System, Miedzeszyn-Warsaw, Poland, 20-24 October 1999)
Verbal Message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Helmut Kohl

10 November 1989

As you, of course, know, the GDR leadership made the decision to allow the citizens of East Germany unrestricted travel to West Berlin and the FRG. It is understandable, that this decision was not an easy one for the new leadership of the GDR. At the same time, the decision underlines the fact that deep and fundamental changes are taking place in East Germany. The leadership is acting in a concerted and dynamic manner in the interests of its people, and they are opening a dialog with various groups and levels of society.

Statements from the FRG made against this political and psychological background, designed to stimulate a denial of the existence of two German states and encourage emotional reactions, can have no other goal than destabilizing the situation in the GDR and subverting the ongoing processes of democratization and the renewal of all areas of society.

We have received notice that a meeting will take place today in West Berlin, in which official representatives of the FRG and West Berlin will participate. A meeting is planned in the capital of the GDR at the same time.

With the current situation of de facto open borders and huge numbers of people moving in both directions, a chaotic situation could easily develop that might have unforeseen consequences.

In light of the time pressure and the seriousness of the situation, I thought it necessary to ask you, in the spirit of openness and realism, to take the extremely pressing steps necessary to prevent a complication and destabilization of the situation.

[Source: SAPMO–BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
Verbal Message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Francois Mitterand, Margaret Thatcher and George Bush

10 November 1989

In light of the rather extreme situation currently taking place in the GDR, its capital city, and in West Berlin, and in reference to what I consider the correct and forward-looking decision by the new East German leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl. I consider it necessary to inform you of the contents of the message as well.

According to our information, a meeting is taking place today in West Berlin in which official representatives of the FRG and West Berlin will participate. A parallel meeting is planned in East Berlin. With the current situation of de facto open borders and huge numbers of people moving in both directions, a chaotic situation could easily develop that might have unforeseen consequences.

I have appealed to Chancellor Kohl to take the extremely pressing steps necessary to prevent a complication and destabilization of the situation.

Our ambassador in Berlin was instructed to contact the representatives of the governments of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. I hope that you will also contact your representatives so that the events do not take an undesirable turn.

In general, I would like to emphasize that deep and fundamental changes are currently taking place in East Germany. If statements are made in the FRG, however, that seek to generate emotional denials of the postwar realities, meaning the existence of two German states, the appearance of such political extremism cannot be viewed as anything other than attempts to destabilize the situation in the GDR and subvert the ongoing processes of democratization and the renewal of all areas of society. Looking forward, this would bring about not only the destabilization of the situation in Central Europe, but also in other parts of the world.

I would like to express my hope that you receive this news with understanding.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
INFO LOG-09 ADS-09 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DOD-00 H-01
10-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-02 CCO-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 ANAE-00 RP-10
ACDA-12 SP-02 SR-06 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01
@087 W
101501Z NOV 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
TO SECASTATE WASHDC NACT IMMEDIATE 1695
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL HAMBURG
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMCONSUL STUTTGART
USDEL VNST GENEVA
USAFSB BERLIN GE
USDOC WASHDC
USHARE 3578
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 EMBBERLIN 0823
VIENNA ALSO FOR CSBMS DEL
USVIENNA FOR CFE DEL
E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS PINS, PHUM, GC
SUBJECT AND THE WALL CAE (FIGURATIVELY)
... TUMBLING DOWN

1. SUMMARY: MOST EAST GERMANS HEARD IT ON
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 EMBBER 0823 01 OF 02 101529Z

TELEVISION OR RADIO THURSDAY EVENING AND
HAD TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES AT ONCE. AND IT
TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE. AFTER A COUPLE OF HOURS
IN LINE FOR MANY, OFFICIALS OPENED THE SECTOR
DECLASSIFIED

CROSSINGS AND, WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF EAST GERMANS, MANY BORN AFTER THE WALL WENT UP, STREAMED WEST BY FOOT, BICYCLE, MOBED OR CAR. JUST TO SEE IT OR SAY THEY'D BEEN THERE. TO DRINK A BEER OR TO SAY GOODNIGHT TO AN AUNT IN SPANDAU; BY BREAK OF DAY MOST WERE RETURNING TO EAST BERLIN TO GO TO WORK. PERHAPS THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 9-10 WILL BECOME KNOWN AS THE NIGHT THEY DANCED ON THE WALL. IT WILL BE SOME TIME, HOWEVER, BEFORE ANYONE CAN JUDGE ITS IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CRISIS.

END SUMMARY.

---

2. ALTHOUGH THE NEW VIS A PROCEDURE WAS TO GO INTO EFFECT AT 0800 HOURS NOVEMBER 10, APPARENTLY EAST GERMAN GUARDS CONTINUED TO LET PEOPLE THROUGH WITHOUT ANY DOCUMENTATION OTHER THAN A PERSONAL IDENTITY CARD UNTIL AT LEAST NOON LOCAL TIME. SOME NOW SAY THROUGH SUNDAY NOVEMBER 12, SOME WEST BERLINERS MADE THEIR WAY EAST VISALSS IN THE SAME MANNER. THE NEW PROCEDURE IS AS FOLLOWS. CITIZENS APPLY AT THEIR LOCAL POLICE STATION FOR A VIS, THOSE PERSONS WHO ALREADY HAVE A PASSPORT WILL BE ISSUED A MULTIPLE-ENTRY VIS A VALID FOR SIX MONTHS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO GO WEST ON A PERSONAL IDENTITY CARD. OFFICIALS WILL ISSUE A SINGLE ENTRY VIS A BUT ASK THAT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 EMBREC 08823 01 OF 02 101529Z

PEOPLE APPLY ONLY IN EMERGENCY CASES. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY CAN APPLY FOR A PASSPORT, WHICH, COMPLETE WITH VIS A, SHOULD BE ISSUED IN APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS. VISAS ARE ALSO BEING HANDED OUT WITHOUT DELAY TO THOSE WHO WISH TO EMIGRATE.

---

3. POLICE STATIONS OPENED EARLY THIS MORNING IN BERLIN, SOME AS EARLY AS 0500 HOURS. TO PREPARE FOR THE STORM OF APPLICATIONS, WE HAVE OBSERVED A LINE THAT WRAPS AROUND THE BLOCK OF THE POLICE PRISIDIUM NEAR ALEXANDERPLATZ AND LINES SEVERAL BLOCKS LONG THROUGHOUT THE CITY. THE PEOPLE ARE PATIENT AND ORDERLY, AND APPEAR AFTER THE EUPHORIA OF LAST NIGHT, TO BE SETTLING INTO THE FORMAL APPLICATION ROUTINE. THE POLICE
HAVE REPORTEDLY ALSO SET UP DESKS AT THE VARIOUS CROSSING POINTS TO HELP DEAL WITH THE TREMENDOUS DEMAND.

4. POLICE STATIONS WILL ALSO BE OPEN SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 11 FROM 0800 TO 1600 TO ACCEPT APPLICATIONS AND ISSUE VISAS. ACCORDING TO THE EAST GERMAN WIRE SERVICE (ADN), CITIZENS MAY ALSO APPLY FOR VISAS TO THE COUNTRY OF THEIR CHOICE, WHICH WILL BE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY. ADN QUOTED THE HEAD OF THE APPLICATION OFFICE AS SAYING, "WE WILL KEEP OUR WINDOW OPEN AS LONG AS NECESSARY UNTIL THE LAST CITIZEN IN LINE HAS HAD A CHANCE TO APPLY." THE PAINLESS PROCEDURE (AN ABRUPT TURN-AROUND FROM THE PRIOR BUREAUCRACY AND EVEN THE NOVEMBER 6 DRAFT TRAVEL LAW), ACCORDING TO ADN, LASTS NO MORE THAN A FEW MINUTES.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01  EMBRER 08823 02 OF 02 1015102
ACTION EUR-05

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DOD-00 H-01
10-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSQ-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-13 PA-02 CGG-00 GMH-01 INRE-00 AÑAE-00 RP-10
ACSA-02 5P-02 SR-06 SVP-01 PNS-01 P-02 T-01
A07 W

-----------------102254 1015102Z 744
O 1015102Z NOV 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY EMERBQN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NICIT IMMEDIATE 1696
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEREMBASSY VIENNA
5. EMBOFFS WHO TRIED TO CROSS INTO WEST BERLIN LAST NIGHT AT CHECKPOINT CHARLIE, UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02  EMBBER  08823  02 OF 02  101510Z

NORMALLY RESERVED FOR NON-GERMANS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL BUT OPENED TEMPORARILY FOR EAST GERMAN TRAFFIC. WE WERE TOLD THAT THEY COULD TRY TO CROSS. BUT, BECAUSE OF THE CRUSH, MIGHT NOT MAKE IT OVER. INDEED, THE CHECKPOINT WAS FLOODLED WITH A (TEMPORARY) ONE-WAY FLOW OF EAST GERMANS, MAKING IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR PEOPLE TO CROSS WEST-TO-EAST FOR SEVERAL HOURS. PEOPLE SNAPPED PICTURES AND FILMED AT THE CROSSING POINTS. ANOTHER ACTIVITY THAT IS USUALLY TABOO.

---

6. WITH THE SUN SHINING NOVEMBER 10, THERE IS SOMETHING OF A PARTY ATMOSPHERE IN EAST BERLIN. MANY ARE WORKING, BUT THEIR THOUGHTS ARE OBVIOUSLY ELSEWHERE. ONE EMBOFF WENT INTO A RECORD SHOP AND ASKED THE CLERK IF SHE DIDN'T THINK THIS WAS A GREAT DAY. "YES," SHE REPLIED. "BUT UNFORTUNATELY I HAVE TO WORK." "IT WILL STILL BE THERE TOMORROW." SAID THE EMBOFF, AT WHICH POINT THE FACT THAT THIS IS FOR REAL – NOT JUST A ONE-TIME DEAL – SEEMED TO BEGIN TO SINK IN. TRABANTS AND WARTBURGS ARE PARKED.
ALL OVER NEAR CROSSING POINTS, ON SIDEWALKS, ON STREETS, WHEREVER A SPACE CAN BE FOUND, AND THE LONG LINES CONTINUE AT BORNHOLMER AND OTHER CHECKPOINTS.

7. THE GDR GUARDS, TOO, APPEAR TO BE ENJOYING THE SPECTACLE. ONE GUARD AT THE BORNHOLMER CROSSING RECOUNTED TO THE PRESS THAT SOME EAST GERMANS CALLED OUT LAST NIGHT, "WE'LL BE BACK," AND "ENJOY YOUR DUTY THIS EVENING!" WHEN THE WAVE OF RETURNS BEGAN AROUND 0500 HOURS, MANY EXPLAINED, "WE HAVE UNCLASSIFIED"

TO GET TO WORK," EMMERS WHO WENT TO A HARDRESSER THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 10 ENCOUNTERED ECSTATIC OWNERS AND CUSTOMERS ALIKE. TWO OF THE WORKERS HAD GONE OVER AT NIGHT AND RETURNED TO WORK; THE OWNER'S DAUGHTER, BORN IN 1961. THE YEAR THE WALL WENT UP. WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HER FIRST WEST BERLIN VISIT. THE OWNER WAS ABSENT, PRESUMABLY WAITING IN LINE FOR THE FAMILY'S VISAS.

8. SOME WE HAVE TALKED TO HAVE HAD THE FIRST GOOD WORDS FOR KRENZ WE HAVE HEARD. OTHERS STRESSED THAT IT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED LONG AGO AND THAT THE CURRENT CHANGE HAS COME FROM THE PEOPLE WITH THE LEADERSHIP UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN PLAY CATCH-UP.

9. ALTHOUGH A SUPERFICIAL GLANCE AT AN EAST BERLIN STREET MIGHT LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS BUSINESS AS USUAL, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT IS ANYTHING BUT NORMAL, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF WHAT "NORMAL" USED TO MEAN. THE LONG LINES OF PEOPLE WAITING FOR VISAS AND AT THE CHECKPOINTS REPRESENT THE BEGINNING OF THE "NEW" NORMALCY. WHATEVER THAT WILL BE.

10. IT IS TOO EARLY TO KNOW HOW MANY WILL USE THIS FREEDOM TO LEAVE THE GDR FOR GOOD. IT IS A GAMBLE, PERHAPS ONE FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT STILL KRENZ'S BOLDEST MOVE TO GAIN THE BREATHING SPACE HE NEEDS IF HE IS TO HAVE A CHANCE TO MASTER THE POLITICAL CRISIS.

BARKLEY
10 November 1989


But the main thing is the GDR, the Berlin Wall. For it has to do not only with “socialism” but with the shift in the world balance of forces. This is the end of Yalta…of the Stalinist legacy and the “defeat of Hitlerite Germany.”

That is what Gorbachev has done. And he has indeed turned out to be a great leader. He has sensed the pace of history and helped history to find a natural channel.

[Source: Notes of Anatoly Chernyaev, the Gorbachev Foundation Archive, f. 2, op. 2. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive).]
Verbal Message from Mikhail Gorbachev to Francois Mitterand, Margaret Thatcher and George Bush

10 November 1989

In light of the rather extreme situation currently taking place in the GDR, its capital city, and in West Berlin, and in reference to what I consider the correct and forward-looking decision by the new East German leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl. I consider it necessary to inform you of the contents of the message as well.

According to our information, a meeting is taking place today in West Berlin in which official representatives of the FRG and West Berlin will participate. A parallel meeting is planned in East Berlin. With the current situation of de facto open borders and huge numbers of people moving in both directions, a chaotic situation could easily develop that might have unforeseen consequences.

I have appealed to Chancellor Kohl to take the extremely pressing steps necessary to prevent a complication and destabilization of the situation.

Our ambassador in Berlin was instructed to contact the representatives of the governments of the three Allied powers in West Berlin. I hope that you will also contact your representatives so that the events do not take an undesirable turn.

In general, I would like to emphasize that deep and fundamental changes are currently taking place in East Germany. If statements are made in the FRG, however, that seek to generate emotional denials of the postwar realities, meaning the existence of two German states, the appearance of such political extremism cannot be viewed as anything other than attempts to destabilize the situation in the GDR and subvert the ongoing processes of democratization and the renewal of all areas of society. Looking forward, this would bring about not only the destabilization of the situation in Central Europe, but also in other parts of the world.

I would like to express my hope that you receive this news with understanding.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant.]
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor - Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
              Chancellor Helmut Kohl
              Notetaker: Robert M. Gates

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: November 10, 1989, 3:29 - 3:47PM
                      The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl: The reforms in Poland are moving ahead. They have a new government with fine people. They are too idealistic with too little professionalism. Many of their professionals have spent the last couple of years in prison, not a place where one can learn how to govern. They are committed to democracy and market economics; we must help them. My request is as follows.
I just told Margaret Thatcher and will tell Mitterrand tomorrow that we should give instructions to our representatives at the IMF that the negotiations with Poland should be completed speedily. These negotiations are not nice for the Poles but they are aware of the need and they seek clarity and clear cut conditions. We should help to get an agreement completed by the end of November. So I ask you, help us. Go and do this in the interest of the people. With respect to the rest of my trip to Poland, I will tell you next week after I return. Do you have any questions on Poland.

The President: I have no questions. I’ll be interested to hear from you next week. I’m very interested in the GDR.

Kohl: I’ve just arrived from Berlin. It is like witnessing an enormous fair. It has the atmosphere of a festival. The frontiers are absolutely open. At certain points they are literally taking down the wall and building new checkpoints. At Checkpoint Charlie, thousands of people are crossing both ways. There are many young people who are coming over for a visit and
enjoying our open way of life. I expect they will go home tonight. I would cautiously tell you that it appears that the opening has not led to a dramatic increase in the movement of refugees. It may be with the frontier open, people will simply go back and forth, looking, visiting and going home. This will work only if the GDR really reforms and I have my doubts. Krenz will carry out reforms but I think there are limits. One of those limits seems to be one party rule, and this simply will not work. Certainly, in particular, it will not work without pluralism, free trade unions and so forth. I could imagine that this will continue for a few weeks -- that for a few weeks people will wait to see if the reforms come and if there is no light at the end of the tunnel they will run away from the GDR in great numbers. This would be a catastrophe for economic development; good people are leaving. The figures this year -- 230,000 have come. Their average age has been between 25 and 30. This is a catastrophe for the GDR. They are doctors, lawyers, specialists who cannot be replaced. They can earn more here. This is a dramatic thing; an historic hour. Let me repeat. There were two major manifestations (political gatherings) in Berlin. One was in front of the Berlin Town Hall where there were a lot of left wing rowdies, these are the pictures that will be shown on TV around the world. The second was at the Kurfurstendamm organized by our political friends. It was at about 6:30PM and the estimates are that there were 120,000 - 200,000 people. The overall spirit was optimistic and friendly. When I thanked the Americans for their role in all of this, there was much applause. Without the US this day would not have been possible. Tell your people that. The GDR people in the protests and demonstrations have been sincere, not aggressive. This makes it very impressive. There have been no conflicts, even though in East Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden hundreds of thousands have been in the streets. I hope they will continue to be calm and peaceful. This is my short report.

The President: First, let me say how great is our respect for the way the FRG has handled all of this. Second, my meeting with Gorbachev in early December has become even more important. I want to be sure you and I spend enough time on the telephone so I have the full benefit of your thinking before I meet with him.

Kohl: We should do that. It's important.

The President: I will call Brady today or tomorrow to tell him of your suggestion for a rapid completion of the IMF agreement on Poland. Fourth, I want to see our people continue to avoid especially hot rhetoric that might by mistake cause a problem.

Kohl: That's very good of you.
The President: Fifth, I want to tell the US press of our talk, that you gave me a thorough briefing, that you did publicly acknowledge the role of the US, and that you and I agreed to talk later next week.

Kohl: Excellent.

The President: Take care, good luck. I’m proud of the way you’re handling an extraordinarily difficult problem.

Kohl: Thank you. Give my best to Barbara.

The President: I’m in Dallas. Same to Hanalore.

Kohl: Thank you and kind regards. Tell her to save her money that I intend to send sausages for Christmas.
Record of Telephone Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and Chancellor of the 

The conversation occurred on Helmut Kohl's request.

Kohl. I am glad to hear you, Mr. General Secretary. I would like to express my 
appreciation in regards to your address yesterday. It is a very good step. ...

We want the people in the GDR to stay home, and we do not strive for all the 
GDR population to move to the FRG. And not at all because, as some are claiming, we 
would not be able to resolve the problems that would result from that—for example, 
230,000 people moved from the GDR to the FRG during this year, and all of them were 
accommodated. But a mass migration to the FRG would be an absurd development—we 
want the Germans to be able to build their future at home.

I would also like to inform you, even though the information is still preliminary, 
that today by 12 noon hundreds of thousands of people have crossed the GDR border. 
However, there is an impression that the majority of them are just visitors, and have no 
intention to stay in the FRG. The number of people who actually want to move to the 
FRG for permanent residency is much lower than we would be concerned about.

I recently told you that we did not want destabilization of the situation in the 
GDR. I am still in the same position. I do not know on what scale Erich Honecker plans to carry out the reforms. However, in the situation such as they have now, the GDR 
leadership should act in a more dynamic way.

I would like to repeat, that I appreciate your contacting me in connection with 
these events. Next week, immediately after I return from Poland, I would like to give you 
a call again, if you do not have any objections, to discuss the new developments with you.

Gorbachev. That would be good. I recall how we discussed the relations between our 
two peoples, the general developments in Europe in the philosophical sense. As you can 
see, Mr. Chancellor, those discussions were not simple exercises in rhetoric. Deep 
changes are underway in the world. It also concerns the East European countries. One 
more example of that is the beginning of the reform process in Bulgaria. And the 
changes happen even faster than we could have even imagined recently.

I think that all Europeans, and not only Europeans, closely follow the 
developments in the GDR. It is a very important point in world politics. But it is also a 
fact that you and me—the FRG, and the Soviet Union—have even more interest in these 
developments both because of the history, and because of the character of our relations 
today.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
In general, I can say that there is a certain kind of triangle forming now, in which everything has to be thought-out and balanced. I think that our relations today allow us to do everything the way it should be [done].

Of course, any kind of change means some kind of instability. That is why, when I speak about preserving stability, what I mean is, that we, on all sides, should make carefully thought-out steps in relation to each other.

I think, Mr. Chancellor, we are experiencing a historic turn to new relations, to a new world. And we should not allow ourselves to harm this turn by our awkward actions. Or, moreover, to push the developments toward an unpredictable course, toward chaos, by forcing the events. It would be undesirable in all respects.

That is why I take your words, that you have said in our conversation today, very seriously. And I hope, that you will use your authority, your political weight, and influence in order to keep others within the limits adequate for the time being, and for the requirements of our time.

Kohl. I think that it is fortunate that the relations between the USSR and the FRG have reached such a high level of development that they have now. And I especially appreciate the good personal contacts that have developed between us. In my opinion, our relations are beyond simply official contacts, that they have a personal character. I believe that they could continue to develop like this in the future. I am ready for that. I understand that a personal relationship does not change the essence of the problems, but it can make their solutions easier.

Coming back to the assessment of the situation is the GDR. I would like to mention that the problem now lies in the sphere of psychology. Honecker's course, who rejected any reforms up until the end, put the new leadership of the GDR in a very difficult situation. Krenz's "team" now has to operate under a horrible time pressure, and this is where I see the main problem. You are right, they need time for drafting and implementing the reforms. But how would you explain it to the population of the GDR?

[...]
Information about the Content of a Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl

11 November 1989

The conversation took place on 11 November on the Chancellor’s initiative. The Chancellor said he wanted to respond to the verbal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, which he had received at the beginning of the meeting in West Berlin the previous day.

Helmut Kohl stated that the FRG welcomed the beginning of reforms in the GDR and hoped that they could be carried out in a calm atmosphere. He said: “I reject any radicalization and do not wish to see any destabilization of the situation in the GDR.”

The Chancellor admitted that the majority of East German citizens that had crossed the borders to the FRG in the last few days did not want to stay in West Germany forever. He also assured him [Gorbachev] that the leadership of the FRG did not seek this either. Kohl said a mass resettlement to the FRG would be an absurd development. “We want the Germans to build their futures in their current homes.” Kohl informed him [Gorbachev] that he was preparing for a meeting with Krenz at the end of November. In this context he mentioned that, given the current conditions in East Germany, the new GDR leadership should work dynamically to implement the reforms.

Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized that the current profound changes in the world would take different forms and occur within varying shape and intensities in different countries. It was necessary for all sides to maintain stability and to take a balanced approach.

[Gorbachev:] Overall, the basis for mutual understanding was improving. We were growing closer, which was very important.

As far as the GDR is concerned, the current leadership has a far-reaching program. All those questions, though, have to be worked through carefully, which required time.

I understand that all Europeans, and not only they, are following the events in the GDR. This is a very important point in world politics. But it is also a fact that the FRG and the Soviet Union, for historical reasons as well as due to the character of their current relationship, also have a greater interest in this development.

Naturally, every change is accompanied by a certain degree of instability. When I speak of maintaining stability, I mean that all sides should think through their actions very carefully.

I believe, Mr. Chancellor, that we are currently experiencing a historic change to different relationships and a different world. We should not allow careless actions to damage this change. Under no circumstances should the developments be forced in an unpredictable direction, which could lead to chaos. That would not be desirable under any circumstances.

Therefore I take very seriously what you told me during our conversation. I hope that you will use your authority, your political weight and your influence to keep others within the boundaries required to meet the demands of the time.

Kohl agreed with Gorbachev’s statements. According to him, the FRG government had discussed this question in this spirit.
The Chancellor emphasized his interest in maintaining contact, including with regard to the situation in the GDR.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/IV 2/2.039/319, pp. 12-19. Translated for CWIHP by Howard Sargeant]
Record of Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and President of France Francois Mitterand. November 14, 1989

[...]

Gorbachev. Thank you, Mr. President, for this information. I am also glad to talk to you.

In general, the events in the GDR were not unexpected for us. I can only note that if such events—the change of leadership in the GDR—had taken place earlier, everything would have been much calmer. We would also support the direction in which the situation is moving now—with the exception of one aspect. I have in mind all the excitement that has been raised in the FRG around the issue of German unification.

Mitterand. I understand what you are saying.

Gorbachev. We have already discussed this problem with you. Therefore, I am not going to develop my position in detail here, especially because of the specific nature of a telephone conversation. I would like to stress, though, that as far as I understand, we have a mutual understanding on this really cardinal issue.

Mitterand. ...I knew your point of view regarding the German issue. But I thought it was necessary to contact you again to hear a confirmation directly from you.

The French position is as follows: we would like to avoid any kind of disruption. We realize that it is necessary to take into account the real feelings that exist among people both in West and East Germany. At the same time, I do not think that the issue of changing borders can be realistically raised now—at least up until a certain time.

Our two countries are friends of East Germany. I plan to visit the GDR in the near future. I am convinced that they should not undertake any hasty actions which could destabilize the situation. There is a certain equilibrium that exists in Europe, and we should not disturb it. We will also talk about this with leaders of twelve nations of countries-members of the European Communities in Paris.

I hope that we will have an opportunity to continue this conversation, but not on the telephone.

...I would like to reiterate: taking into account the recent acceleration of the events, I think it would be necessary to organize some direct contact between us. This is, by the way, the reason for my call. I would like to find out about your assessment of the evolution of the situation in Europe, and to tell you that for my part, I plan to keep my cool.

Our two countries are old countries. They have been in contact for a very long time. And it is important that they should understand each other in the future [...]

Gorbachev. But at the same time we should not allow any artificial stimulation of the events, pushing ahead.

Mitterand. As you know I have warm, very cordial relations with Chancellor Helmut Kohl. I will discuss all these issues with him in a couple of days.
Gorbachev. I also talked to him not so long ago. He assured me, in particular, that he was going to abide strictly by the existing agreements.

Mitterand. Yes, he is a sober thinker.

Gorbachev. He promised to act in such a way that the situation would stay normal. I carefully noted his words that the Germans should live where they live now. And if there is a possibility to improve relations between them, it would be a very positive process, of course.

Mitterand. I understand such an approach.

Gorbachev. I like your idea about a possibility of meeting.

Mitterand. I would think such a meeting would be good for Europe. I will try to inform Roland Dumas about more specific thoughts regarding such a meeting. Thank you for your willingness to talk to me on the phone.

The conversation was translated and recorded by Second Secretary of the First European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. V. Nekrasov.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyayev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
SECRET STATE 364359

SECR ET STATE 364359

SECRET

PAGE 01

ORIGIN NDDS-00

INFO LUG-00 ADS-06 000 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR/STY: AVERSHEW
APPROVED BY E U R : J F O B B I N S
E U R: CHANMAN P : J STROTZ
S/P: DROSS
S/5: ECHKUNE
S/5: S-O: SHANN

-----223325 1403292 /60
D 140326Z NOV 89 ZFF6
FM: SE C STAE WASHDC
TO: AMBASSAD Y BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMBASSAD Y MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMBASSAD Y LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMBASSAD Y PARIS IMMEDIATE
US M ISSION US BERLIN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSAD Y EN BERLIN IMMEDIATE
AMBASSAD Y BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 364359

DECA PI ONED

NODIS
BRUSSELS AND PARIS - PASY TO KIMMITT PARTY

E.D. 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: REPLY TO GORBACHEV MESSAGE ON BERLIN

REF: STATE 363047

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

2. WASHINGTON UNDERSTANDS THAT THATCHER, MITTERRAND AND
Kohl have received written or oral messages from GORBACHEV
ON GERMANY SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED ON
OCTOBER 10 (REFTEL). GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02

STATE 364359

RAISED, THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE TO CONSULT WITH THE
SECRET

ALLIES BEFORE RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV. AMBASSADOR IS
INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED REPLIES TO
GORBACHEV WITH THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS AND THE APPROPRIATE
FRG OFFICIALS. AMBASSADOR SHOULD STATE OUR DESIRE THAT
SIMILAR MESSAGES BE SENT FROM ALL FOUR LEADERS. THE BONN
GROUP CAN BE USED TO STAFF OUT THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.
AMBASSADOR MAY SHARE THE TEXT OF GORBACHEV'S MESSAGE.

3. AMBASSADOR SHOULD INDICATE THAT WASHINGTON CURRENTLY
ENVISAGES RESPONDING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- WE WELCOME GORBACHEV'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS
BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP ARE "CORRECT AND
PROMISING."

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE DRAMATIC EVENTS IN RECENT
DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE THE SOVIET
UNION'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER
ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, WE AND OUR ALLIES
HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH THE WEST GERMAN AUTHORITIES
TO THIS END.

-- WE FAVOR CONTINUED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION ON THIS QUESTION IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING
SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

-- IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS TO SUGGEST THAT FRG.
LEADERS ARE ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT THE HISTORIC TRANSFOR-
MATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. OUR GERMAN ALLIES
ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO PROMOTE STABILITY.

SECRET
PAGE 03  STATE  364359

-- FOR OUR PART, WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND SERIOUSNESS
OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE
TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS; AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED
COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

- - WE HOPE TO SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED SOON CODIFYING
- - FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND TO SEE THE FULFILLMENT OF
- - THE GOVERNMENT'S PLEDGE TO HOLD FREE ELECTIONS.

- - THESE STEPS COULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
-- WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR OR OF DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION.

BAKER
“The Politburo of the CC of the BCP proposes that the Plenum discuss certain changes in the membership of the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria.

Regarding the Central Committee of the Party:
1. The following comrades are to be dismissed from their positions as members of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party, and to be removed from the membership of the Central Committee: Milko Balev, Grisha Philipov, Dimitar Stoyanov. They are to be retired with a pension.

Comrades Milko Balev and Grisha Philipov [are to be dismissed] because they lack the necessary qualities and they undermine the prestige of the Party and its leadership with their behavior and actions. Strong negative attitudes have accumulated against them in society.

As Secretary of the CC of the BCP responsible for organizational issues and managing the work of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and that of the Council for Coordinating the Activities in Connection with the Situation in the Country, comrade Dimitar Stoyanov made glaring blunders, which contributed to increased tensions in the country.

2. Petko Danchev is to be dismissed as a candidate-member of the Politburo and removed from the membership of the Central Committee of the Party.

Cde. Danchev lacks the necessary political and moral qualities. Ever since he was appointed to office in the Council of Ministers, he has failed to handle even a single serious problem.

3. Cde. Stoyan Ovcharov is to be dismissed as a candidate-member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party.

Resentment has developed against Cde. Ovcharov among the public and among economic managers due to the fact that he did not manage to master the work entrusted to him.

4. Cdes. Vassil Tzanev and Hristo Hristov are to be dismissed as Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party and to be retired with a pension.

5. Vladimir Zhivkov, Nikola Stefanov, and Hristo Maleev are to be expeditiously removed from the membership of the CC of the BCP.

6. The Plenum of the Central Committee is to revoke its resolutions of July and December 1988 to remove from the membership of the Central Committee of the Party
comrades Stoyan Mihaylov and Svetlin Rusev, and to reinstate them as members of the CC of the BCP.

7. The following candidate-members are to be promoted to full membership of the CC of the BCP: Vassil Nedev—chief director of the firm “Metalokeramika”—Sofia; Georgi Pirinski—Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade; Gospodin Yordanov—brigade leader of the electricians’ brigade at the Nuclear Power Plant—Kozloduy; Dichka Slavova—chairwoman of the agricultural collective in the village of Nicolaevka, Varna region; Rumen Serbezov—chief advisor to the Council of Ministers.

8. Comrade Nacho Papazov 26 is to be promoted to member of the Central Committee of the Party. He is presently chairman of the Party’s Central Control Commission.

9. The following comrades are to be elected as members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party: Andrei Lukanov—candidate-member of the Politburo of the CC of the BCP, and Nacho Papazov—chairman of the Central Control Commission of the BCP.

10. The following comrades are to be elected as members of the Politburo of the Central Committee: Panteley Pachov—first secretary of the Regional Committee of the BCP in Plovdiv, and Mincho Yovchev—first secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party in Haskovo.

11. Comrade Jordan Jotov 27 —member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, is to be dismissed from his position as Secretary of the Central Committee.

12. The following comrades are to be elected as candidate-members of the Politburo of the Central Committee: Dimitar Stanishev 28 —Secretary of the Central Committee, and Ivan Staniev—brigade leader of an assembly brigade in the construction department at Kremikovtzi.

13. Comrade Prodan Stoyanov—director of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the BCP is to be elected as Secretary of the Central Committee.

Regarding certain changes in the State Council

The following changes in the State Council and the leadership of the permanent committees of the People’s Assembly are to be proposed:

1. Comrade Yaroslav Radev 29 is to be dismissed as deputy chairman of the State Council, as chairman of the Council on Legislation, and as chairman of the Legislative Commission of the People’s Assembly.

I would like to tell you, comrades, that we do not have any particular objections against comrade Radev personally. He has worked in this office for 18 years. It is deemed that a certain renewal should occur in the State Council and that there should be some rejuvenation.

2. Comrades Grisha Philipov, Dimitar Stoyanov, Milko Balev, and Andrey Bundgulov 30 are to be dismissed as members of the State Council.

3. The following comrades are to be removed from the leadership of the permanent commissions of the People’s Assembly: Grisha Philipov—chairman of the Commission on Socio-Economic Development; Milko Balev—chairman of the Commission on Foreign Policy; Emil Hristov 31 —chairman of the Commission on
4. Comrade Todor Zhivkov is to be dismissed from his position as chairman of the Commission for Preparing a Draft Proposal for Changing the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria.

5. Comrades Andrey Lukanov and Nacho Papazov 33 are to be elected members of the State Council.

These are the proposals. [...].

I would also like to tell you, Comrades, in connection with these proposals, that I was handed the following letter from Cde. Milko Balev yesterday evening. I would like to familiarize you with it.

“To Cde. Petar Mladenov—Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Party

Esteemed Comrade Mladenov,

Through you, I direct a request to the Politburo to propose at the upcoming Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party that I be relieved from my position as member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP.

After the session of the Politburo and the November Plenum, I made a serious self-critical analysis of my work and of my personal responsibility for the present situation of the Party and the country. I hope you do not have doubts that I have worked honestly for the cause of the Party.

I ask you to believe me that I accept the November Plenum resolutions with deep awareness, and that I will do everything within my abilities for the realization of the new course of the party. This is my deep communist conviction.

With respect—Milko Balev
14 November 1989"

Because this is a resignation request, the Politburo familiarized itself with it and deemed it advisable that [the request] be reported at the Plenum. Simultaneously with this, the Politburo insists on its proposals, which were just reported [...]

Then, comrade Pencho Kubadinski 34 proposed on behalf of the Politburo to the session of the People’s Assembly, which took place in November this year, to nominate Cde. Petar Mladenov as Chairman of the State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. He pointed out that the combination of the two positions is extremely necessary at the present moment. It will allow better coordination in the activities of the Central Committee and that of the State Council during the period of reconstruction and in preparations for the Fourteenth Congress of the BCP. [...]

Then the speeches started. Comrade Nicolay Zhishev 35 took the floor first. [...].

The main conclusion that could be reached, said cde. Zhishev, is that during the last few decades there has not been such an outstanding political event to have excited communists and all classes of the population so deeply and spontaneously. Life convincingly proves that all-round analysis and objective assessment of the situation as
well as correct conclusions for the future work and active practical actions regarding reconstruction of the work of the party, state, economic, and public organs and organizations are necessary. [...]  

After him spoke Cde. Hristo Hristov who supported the proposals for cadre changes and pointed out that the November Plenum held earlier this month, its resolutions, as well as comrade Petar Mladenov’s speech, were received by the Party and the people as the long-awaited word of the BCP. The results of the Plenum found overwhelming approval, support, and a readiness for an upsurge, for a truly revolutionary revival of the fatherland. [...]  

The cadre turnover in the Council of Ministers since 1987 turned out to be unsuccessful, continued comrade Hristov. Intrigues and struggles for political supremacy occurred. Attempts were made to create authority and social prestige through bombastic phraseologies and promises. The last two years were a hard period for the work of the Council of Ministers. Comrade [Georgi] Atanasov made tremendous efforts to achieve the [desired] results but it was very difficult for him when his deputies informed him after their visits to the building of the CC of the BCP that the decisions had already been made. It was obvious that everything was pointing against the authority of the head of the government.[...]  

I listened to the proposals and I cannot believe, said Slavcho Transky,36 who took the floor later, that such significant changes can be made during such a short period of time. And I keep wondering about the degree of deformation in the previous bureaucratic course. I also wonder about certain people who remained in the Politburo for 15, 20, or more years, and who could not find the moral strength to leave with dignity, but had to be dismissed in such a disgraceful way now.  

He supported the proposals put forward, and noted that there were few people with economic specialization in the Politburo and recommended that more economists be included in the future.  

Later on, cde. Transky emphasized that the people received with satisfaction Todor Zhivkov’s dismissal and Petar Mladenov’s election, and stated that the change was imperative, because socialism in our country was in crisis.  

Then he pointed out that with the beginning of reconstruction in our country a new socialist model has begun to be discussed. He noted that while we [the partisans] were struggling for freedom and independence, we had no idea or awareness that socialism could have various models and could assume whatever one we desired. He called for modesty in our choice of concepts, such as accelerated development, mature socialism, realistic socialism and the statement that we had built two Bulgarias [made originally by Todor Zhivkov]. Afterwards he drew the conclusion that we needed to break away from voluntarism and conformism as soon as possible [...]  

The speaker made the following suggestions:  

1. We should think objectively and calmly once more about the next Congress—should we hold it in 1990, or should we postpone it until 1991 taking into account the impoverished market, the discouraging report of the [Central Statistical Agency] for the first nine months of this year, the state of the economy, and the particularly bad labor discipline[?]
2. The persecution of people who are not enemies of the state, but just think differently than we, should be terminated. Now that we have taken up a responsible mission, we especially need different opinions and pluralism.

3. We should determine if Politburo members, with the exception of the Secretary General and the head of state, if the two positions are to be separated, need personal guards. Perhaps we need to reduce the number of militia officers who guard [industrial] objects and replace them with civil guards; the regular militia should concentrate on maintaining domestic order and controlling the highways in order to decrease the number of car accidents. [...] 

Later, cde. Nacho Papasov took the floor. [...] 

While cadre issues are being raised now, [he said] I would like to make several comments on them. It is not a secret that there was a crude violation of the collective style and method of management in our government, that there was a lack of principles in our cadre policy, as well as an instability in the structures, which cde. Slavcho Transky just discussed. And I would say that in Bulgaria a “nonstop reorganization” syndrome was created, a syndrome that made us the laughing-stock not only in this country but also abroad. The prestige of the government has gone downhill, most of all that of Todor Zhivkov. During the past 10 to 15 years comrade Zhivkov praised himself through incessant rambling memoranda, reports, commentaries, speeches and so on, all full of pseudo-scientific phrases, but poor in terms of content. [...] 

Now, stated cde. Papasov further, we are reaping the fruits of a policy that led Bulgaria into a degree of isolation that the country had not experienced before. [...] 

The floor was given to cde. Niko Yahiel.37

Having emphasized the crucial importance of this period for the Party and the people, and expressed his genuine joy about the onset of changes, he stated: I will not conceal that after long and joyless self-critical reflections on the decades spent mostly in cde. Todor Zhivkov’s cabinet, I decided I ought to speak out not only to express my fervent support for a course which I personally deem only as life-saving and decent, but also to share my thoughts about things which in my opinion could restrict or threaten this course [of action].

The first steps taken after 10 November are decisive and strongly promising. They have already ensured the Party its first credit of confidence. However, public opinion is extremely strained and sensitive, more than I can remember since the [Stalin] era of the cult of the personality. [...] 

Comrade Yahiel stressed that it was only natural for a number of things to occur in this new situation that would surprise and even startle us with their unusual obviousness. Pessimists, anti- and pseudo-restructurers, demagogues, and self-made innovators would emerge or simply people who would try to take advantage of the situation to make personal profit. Such occurrences will certainly create problems, not necessarily easy ones. However, all of this is inevitable in the course of a powerful democratic process and should not discourage and confuse us, or encourage us to take rash actions. We should protect this new course of development particularly strenuously from the leprosy of political demagogry. The drastic difference between promises and
actions, typical of the style of the former Secretary General of the Central Committee, has already once before robbed us of the people’s trust.

Later comrade Yahiel said that public opinion in the country is presently united on the issue of the economy’s dire situation.

The key question now is overcoming the constantly rising market deficit. He suggested that the measures for change be determined not by a narrow circle of people, traditionally working in anonymity, but be worked out by parallel and competing teams of widely recruited scientists and specialists, who will offer alternative opinions on ways out of the crisis and on the economic future of the country. No more instances of gross interference should no longer be permitted in the work of the Council of Ministers.

Everything indicates, continued comrade Yahiel, that in the upcoming months and years life will neither be simple nor easy for Bulgarians. This requires open and honest communication [between the people and their government]. We should at last start considering the study of the public as a guide to a more sensible and effective political and state governance.

In connection with this, the establishment of new relations between the Party and the mass media is highly imperative. We should cease patronizing and constantly instructing professionally and politically literate people on how to do their job. Humanity has not yet invented a more massive and effective means of dialogue between the people and its leaders [than the mass media]. The mass media is not just a tribune, but a daily People’s Assembly which debates real life, reflects and, simultaneously, shapes public opinion. This is why we should treat it as a respected partner. [...]

Next to speak out was comrade Georgi Milushev 38 who said he had taken the floor because he had held the position of director of the Department of Safety and Defense (DSD), as a result of the Party’s decision, for three years and one month. It was specific work, [he said,] in a department with clearly defined activities. This was a period of great suspicion and immense lack of trust. Only one person was trusted there who also played a part in resolving a number of cadre issues.

I believe, said cde. Milushev, that the Department of Safety and Defense [DSD] should take into consideration the decisions of the Politburo and the Secretary General, but it is actually a sub-department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The one-person management of such a significant and specialized sub-department should be avoided.

In response to a question from the audience to provide the name of the person who was trusted at the DSD, cde. G. Milushev replied that the person’s name is Ani Mladenova. She is registered in the DSD as an officer, a major, and holds the position of chief inspector and senior medical nurse, with an impressive number of [special] privileges.

We have put forward, said cde. Milushev, various motions, taking into consideration the specific character of the administration’s work in the spirit of reconstruction, democratization, and glasnost. This is a department which is directly relevant to our high-level political and state management, and every action or inaction on our part has repercussions because the DSD is a living organism with clearly defined political functions.

At the second session at 3 p.m., the first to speak was Vassil Mrachkov 39 who expressed support for the proposed cadre changes in the Politburo, and classified them
not so much as cadre changes, because we have experienced many such changes before, but as the first real step towards changing the work and policy of society’s governance.

As a party member, a citizen, and a professional, stated cde. Mrachkov, I am concerned with the problems of our legislation in the conditions of reconstruction. Shortly after the July Plenum, a new political directive was developed by the Central Committee, concerning the decrees adopted by the People’s Assembly. Two such examples are the decree for the self-government of municipalities and one for committing socialist property to the care of labor collectives. These decrees replace the Constitution and various other laws, and act as a “mini Constitution.” The decrees were also announced at the eighth session of the Ninth People’s Assembly on 28 July 1988. Politburo members and Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party repeated these decrees at crowded gatherings of the party and state activists. These decrees did considerable damage to the rule of law in the country, created confusion among the cadres, and restricted the activities of the law-enforcing institutions because they were dictated “from above.” This led to legalistic nihilism and voluntarism manifested in the contemptuous attitude toward the laws and toward the supremacy of the People’s Assembly that adopts them.

My second comment, continued Cde. Mrachkov, concerns some crude legal violations as well as the trampling on the morality and human virtues in whose name the Party came to power. We have ceased appreciating them. People’s waning confidence in us results from immoral displays and from certain leaders taking advantage of their official state and party positions to enrich themselves. Last but not least, [people’s waning confidence] comes from our attitude toward the people with whom we work and govern. It seems to me that all of us gathered in this hall stand in need of exercising greater morality in our exercise of power, and more glasnost in our professional and public work. And I would also add that we need more glasnost in our behavior as citizens.

Cde. Mrachkov’s final comment referred to the current social situation, to the accumulated dissatisfaction and tensions, to the pluralism in opinions and the necessity of greater freedom and legal guarantees for ensuring the right to citizens’ assembly.

In his statement, comrade Pavel Matev pointed out that the time for naming things by their real names had come, because we had had enough deformations and had lost our credibility before the people. Social tensions had built up and the main responsibility lay with the person who spoke against the monopolization of power the most, but hurt the feelings of numerous people, including many artists. He did not care about the gifted people of Bulgaria. He engaged in writing books perhaps as a way of having a rest so that nobody could deny his efficiency, said cde. Matev. He was writing on all possible topics, about all sciences and all the arts, including literature. [...] Comrade Konstantin Atanasov stated in his speech that despite the considerable tensions in various social sectors, efficiency had always been low, so low as to fall below zero. The only reason behind this is the anti-party and vicious style of party rule which was quickly transformed from collective, into ostensibly collective and finally became solely totalitarian during the past few decades.

Under the initiative of cde. Zhivkov’s personal retinue, everything possible was tried to promote all of his family members, relatives and friends to the highest-level
positions, said comrade Atanasov. Of course, not all of them lacked abilities, but having found themselves in such a [favorable] position, they were quickly corrupted.

Ljudmila [Zhivkova] was not only promoted to the Politburo, but her exaltation began during her second year [in the Politburo]. It was hinted in various forms that she should succeed her father as head of the Party. True, Ljudmila had certain leadership qualities and contributed considerably to the popularization of our culture abroad, nevertheless, her talents were rather modest [for the exalted position of head of the Party]. She had not matured ideologically, or, to put it more precisely, she was confused and lacked the necessary experience.

Especially striking is the case of Vladimir [Zhivkov’s] promotion as a member of the Central Committee. At the most inappropriate time [he was promoted as] director of the Department of “Culture” at the Central Committee with the prospect of becoming a member of the Politburo. All those acquainted with him could say with a clear conscience that he lacks both the experience and qualities required for party work, let alone the question of his educational degrees which are undisputably subject to re-evaluation.

We all know that Milko Balev lay at the bottom of all these initiatives. Evidently, he had numerous helpers; however, he best knows who they are.

Comrade Balev published a book on Ljudmila in which he infused so many inaccurate appraisals and exaltations that if Ljudmila had been alive to read it, she would have felt embarrassed.

Comrade Balev went to an extraordinary amount of trouble to present a number of party documents and reports as Todor Zhivkov’s personal work. Why was this all necessary? [...] He did not accidentally remain indispensable for over 30 years nor was he accidentally promoted to become a member of the Politburo. After comrade Lilov was dismissed, [Balev] did not lack in ambitions to even become a Deputy Secretary General.

If we should discuss cde. Balev’s performance as a leader, cde. Atanasov proceeded after citing several examples, it could be said that his principal obligation consisted of strengthening Todor Zhivkov’s position by all means possible. In his direct work he pretended to work and in effect blocked the work of the International Department. The commission he ran has not put forward a single substantial motion before the Politburo.

[I would like to introduce] a case to illustrate how far he had gone in his initiatives to strengthen Todor Zhivkov’s position. Perhaps only few know that secret negotiations were conducted even with kings to make Todor Zhivkov a laureate of the Nobel Peace Prize. This was really a shameful conspiracy that took place in Europe.

Milko Balev was the sole Politburo member whom the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not invite nor receive.

In order to create a truly calm atmosphere within the party, comrade Atanasov pointed out that it is imperative that [we] dispel the psychosis that spying devices have been installed in the offices of all party and state leaders. [The use of such devices] not only paralyzes the cadres’ abilities, but also places the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs] above the Party and inevitably leads to legal deformations and to totalitarian methods of government.

To decisively overcome this [paralyzing] atmosphere, I suggest that the Plenum charge the Politburo to assign members of the Central Committee to a commission. [The latter] should conduct an inspection in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in certain
subdepartments and units which may eventually need to be disbanded. This does not mean that the loyalty and dedication of the MIA cadres will be questioned, but that the above-stated units and methods of work should be re-evaluated. [...] Comrade Krastju Trichkov said that he was taking the floor in order to express his approval of the recently undertaken measures, and to support the motion for cadre changes.

We were too slow in dismissing some comrades, he said. I mean first of all the dismissal of Grisha Philipov and Milko Balev as well as the removal of Vladimir Zhivkov and Petko Danchev. We should not allow any more instances of promotion on the basis of kinship in our party. Those who signed such resolutions in the past also bear responsibility.

At last year’s meeting with students, Todor Zhivkov stated: [“] The Ministry of Economics and Planning suggests a 12 % increase in the commodity funds. [“] (While, in truth, we had discussed this option in the People’s Assembly and found it unfeasible.) [“] We, [“] Zhivkov said, [“] decided in the Politburo to increase them by 20 %.[“] Let Todor Zhivkov come forward now and explain the meaning of the word “illusion”! Where is this 20 % increase in commodity funds? Irresponsible job! Irresponsible. I worked for five years as his first Deputy in the State Council. He had one saying. When we advised him against various decisions, he used to say: [“] Only God is above us. Whatever course we decide to take, it is correct.[“] He had gone that far.

I read, continued cde. Trichkov, the transcripts of comrade Mladenov’s meeting with representatives of the intelligentsia, and here also several comrades posed the question about the Bulgarians connected with Islam. We hear voices demanding a reversal, even the recognition of a Turkish minority and the restoration of [Muslim] names. These are serious questions and we no longer have the right to resolve such an issue according to political motives and considerations. We have erred enough. The government forced many of us to register as Macedonians according to similar political considerations on the Macedonian question. Even today certain individuals are pressuring us to betray history. There are no minorities in Bulgaria. We made a mistake, but it was a mistake in our approach—we violated the principle of pursuing cooperation in our work with them [the Muslims], the political approach.

I believe it only fair, cde. Trichkov stated in conclusion, that each of us should perceive his or her own guilt for the fact that during the period of 35 years we tolerated as head of the party and the state a person who managed to manifest himself as a cult and to monopolize power for himself. We should not run away from our guilt. We are responsible people. Each of us is responsible for alienating the people from the party. Everyone should make a self-evaluation in order to purge himself, and understand his own responsibility for the present situation. [...] Otherwise, we will be mistaken if we consider that one person is solely responsible for everything. We are all guilty and everyone should see his or her own guilt. Of course, some are guilty to a much greater degree [...] Next to take the floor was comrade Andrey Lukanov who stated that he did not intend to make a speech because he had already participated in the Politburo session and fully supported the proposals presented. He only wanted to share several thoughts in connection with comrade Dimitar Stoyanov’s speech (not from a personal perspective). He expressed his enthusiasm for what was happening at the Plenum. [He was also glad]
that the roots connecting us to the most glorious moments of the Bulgarian Communist Party’s historic course were not destroyed. I am satisfied, said comrade Lukancov, with [Stoyanov’s] self-critical spirit, with his declaration of loyalty to the Party cause, loyalty that I do not doubt because of his rapidly evolving position. Nevertheless, this speech requires a commentary. It is not that I want to put comrade Stoyanov in a more distressing situation, I would certainly not wish anyone to feel the way he is feeling now. In my opinion, the main problem here is that despite his self-criticism, comrade Stoyanov failed to comprehend the major issue in question—that, voluntarily or not, he became the voice and vehicle of a failed administrative system, of a historically rejected style of political governance. Under his direct leadership and with his active participation, the merger of the staff of the CC of the BCP with certain specialized structures in the National Security Services rapidly approached realization. This symbiosis, rarely seen in the practice of the fraternal communist parties for several decades, was pursued to guarantee the affirmation and perpetuation of the regime.” [...] 

After 28 people had spoken, comrade Peter Mladenov suggested that the word be given to comrade Yotov, comrade Todorov, and comrade Philipov, as all of them had expressed a desire to speak. [He also] suggested that the rest of the people who wanted to speak take the floor at the upcoming December Plenum.

Comrade Jordan Jotov said that he wanted to clarify some issues but not because of a desire to be acquitted or have his responsibility and guilt reduced:

First, regarding the article against cde. Stoyan Mihaylov: I have not taken part in initiating this article nor in developing it, he said. It was worked out in another cabinet and you can guess yourself to which cabinet I am referring.

Second, regarding cde. Vladimir Zhivkov’s promotion: I bear responsibility and, naturally, guilt in this case. What actually happened? For a year or so, the Ministry of Culture, Science and Education had a Minister, but it was not a Ministry in practice. As agreed upon between the two of us, comrade Georgy Yordanov had drawn up several proposals and projects for developing such a Ministry, and suggested different structures, and so forth. All were rejected. Why? I could not comprehend. The Department of Ideological Policy [of the CC of the BCP], which was previously managed by cde. Stoyan Mihailov, remained at a standstill for a year.

During this period, conversations with me were conducted on different occasions, but one question was always present: how do you, comrade Jotov, see my son’s situation? I said once during the first or second such conversation: “Comrade Vladimir Zhivkov has one major disadvantage—that he is your son and therefore his promotion.... [would seem inappropriate].” But the conversations continued and eventually I yielded. When I proposed him [for promotion], I must admit that in the subsequent procedures the idea of splitting the Department of Ideological Policy was conceived. When I recommended comrade Vladimir Zhivkov as director of this department in the Politburo, comrade Dobri Dgurov objected categorically. Because comrade Zhivkov was absent from the conference room at that moment, [Dgurov] asked me to relate his objections to the proposal. I did so but, as you all saw, they were not heeded.

I would also like to say two words on the question of the informal groups. In our work in this respect, we committed many mistakes. We reacted to individual cases, but did not make the effort to analyze or study the entire phenomenon. We used to reduce everything to a common denominator. This was our [major] mistake. [...]
What is the way out of the situation? The way out is through a change in the present system. The system could give birth not only to one, but to two, three, five, or even a hundred Todor Zhivkovs. The only way out is to reform the system.

Comrade Grisha Philipov turned down the offer to take the floor.

Comrade Stanko Todorov announced that he was taking the floor in connection with the proposal for him to be included in the membership of the Politburo. This proposal was put forward by Ivan Pramov, Kalajdgiev, and Radoslav Radev. After he thanked them for appreciating his work, he asked them to withdraw their proposal.

The story with my resignation in July of last year is well-known, he said. There is no point in delving into it once again. Then, as you know, I posed the request to be relieved from my post in the People’s Assembly. After the [July] plenum, I asked the chairman of our Party’s Parliamentary Commission—comrade [Pencho] Kubadinski—to approach the Secretary General [with this question] and to choose with him a candidate for the chairperson’s position in the People’s Assembly and to propose him or her for nomination at the next session. Kubadinski went to the Secretary General, came back and told me: “The Secretary General does not agree to accept your resignation. We both want to recommend that you stop creating problems for the Party by trying to resign from the People’s Assembly. You have to remain at work there.” I said: “If I am creating problems for the Party [by wanting to resign], then I will endure.” After this [episode], however, things remained unchanged at the People’s Assembly: the Politburo and the State Council continued to completely ignore and deprive the People’s Assembly of authority. Apparently, all comrades have felt this, as indicated from the speeches on this question made by many comrades here.

I was compelled to write a letter to the Politburo on 14 December of this year, in which I raised the question that the violations of the Constitution should be ended and the authority of the highest organ should be restored as it has lost prestige in the eyes of our society. The legislative work is not up to the level required to carry out the July Plan and neither is the control work. In fact, presently there is no legislative work because the country is governed lately by decrees. As to the control activities, the head of the government has not accounted for his work for eight consecutive years, although the People’s Assembly annually includes in its agenda a provision for such a report. At the Secretary General’s order, and of course with the cooperation of the head of the government, this report invariably came to be meaningless.

In addition, two years have already passed since the Commission on Changes in the Constitution was appointed. The chairman of this commission, Todor Zhivkov, failed to find time to gather the commission and begin work on a draft proposal for changing the Constitution.

What was the reaction to my letter? I remember that I was called on 14 September by comrades Dimitar Stoyanov and Pencho Kubadinski who informed me that the Politburo had discussed my letter. [The Politburo had] rejected my critical comments on the grounds that things were not this way, that the People’s Assembly was developing well, that the parliamentary commissions were working well, and so on. I stated before the two comrades that I had nothing to change in what I had already written in my letter. With this, the question was closed.

I believe, Cde. Todorov finished his speech, there is no need for me to be included in the Politburo. If the comrades from the Central Committee feel that I can remain
chairman of the People’s Assembly until the end of this mandate, I will continue to perform this duty without being a member of the Politburo. In a month’s time I am turning 69 and beginning my 70th year. The prospect to develop further is nonexistent for me. It is only appropriate that we give the new Secretary General the opportunity to select young and promising cadres for the Politburo.

I was rather hoping that the example of my resignation would be followed by some of my colleagues, but, unfortunately, my hopes were not realized.

Comrade Petar Mladenov said in conclusion:

“Comrades, I suggest that we draw the speeches to a close. I am well aware that the things I will say here should be brief and, therefore, they would not be considered as a concluding speech to the discussion that took place. I want to touch on only a few proposals.

In my opinion, this Plenum proved to be a natural continuation of the memorable 10 November Plenum. Moreover, I think we need to acknowledge that it turned out to be something of a purgatory, a purgatory for all of us. Earlier I shared this opinion with others in the corridor and cde. Elena Lagadinova understood it correctly. I call it a purgatory for the Party, a purgatory for the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, because many things were said and many bitter truths were revealed here.

Was there another way? No, because such a Plenum would not have happened or it would not have followed the spirit of the resolutions adopted on 10 November. Nor would it have been held in the spirit of this new political line, this new political course which we have undertaken.

I believe that the Plenum deserves high marks. I am deeply convinced that if the rest of the comrades, who signed to speak, had had their word, they would have contributed additionally to this high mark. I regret that we needed to put an end to the speeches. We have, however, come to the agreement that those comrades will have the opportunity to speak first at the next Plenum […]

The last point I want to make concerns the proposal for my candidacy for Chairman of the State Council. I would like to tell you, comrades, and let this remain here in the Central Committee, that I am deeply convinced that the two positions [Chairman of the State Council and Secretary General of the BCP] should not be held by the same person. And if I gave my consent for putting forward my candidacy before the Politburo plenum, I did so only because it was deemed that the present political moment necessitates such a combination of duties. I believe it is advisable that the Commission on Preparing a Draft Proposal for Changing the Constitution be gathered during the upcoming week. Its work should be examined, evaluated and voted upon. The above-discussed question should be generally resolved through changes in the Constitution and its new version. This is the only appropriate course of action. I mention it so that you will be aware that I have some reservations when you cast your votes [on the proposals].

After comrade Petar Mladenov’s speech, the Central Committee proceeded to vote on the Politburo’s proposals. The results from this voting were published.

The Plenum closed at 7:50 p.m.

[Source: CC BCP Records, Bulgarian Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1b, Opis 65. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]
SUMMARY. IN A LENGTHY NOVEMBER 16 PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE BCP, GENSEC PETUR MLADENOV SUCCESSFULLY REMOVED SEVERAL OLD ZHVIVOV CRONIES AND HARD-LINE OPPONENTS FROM THE POLITBURO INCLUDING DIMITUR STOYANOV, MILKO BALEV AND GRISHA FILIPOV. CANDIDATE MEMBERS PETKO DANCHEV AND STEFAN OVCAROFF WERE ALSO REMOVED FROM THE BODY. IN THEIR PLACES, ANDREI LUKANOV WAS ELEVATED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP, AND NACHO PAPASOV, MTCCHO YOVCHEN, AND PANTALEY PACHOV WERE ELECTED TO FULL MEMBERSHIP. THE TWO NEW POLITBURO CANDIDATE MEMBERS NAMED ARE DIMITUR STANISHEV AND IVAN STANEV. PRODAN STOYANOV WAS ELEVATED TO THE BCP SECRETARIAT. ZHVIVOV'S SON (VLADIMIR), NEPHEW AND FORMER CHIEF OF CABINET WERE ALL UNCEREMONIOUSLY REMOVED FROM THE CC. THE PLENUM RECOMMENDED THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPOINT GENSEC MLADENOV AS CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL (HEAD OF STATE), WITH PENCHO KUBADINSKI MAKING THE PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) WE WILL OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF THESE CHANGES SEPARATELY.

THOSE OUT

3. (U) THE FOLLOWING: INDIVIDUALS WERE REMOVED FROM
THEIR FULL POLITBuro AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPS WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ALSO REMOVE THEM FROM THEIR POSITIONS ON THE STATE COUNCIL:

- GRISHA FILIPOV
- MILKO BALEV
- DIMITUR STOYANOV

THE PLENUM ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT FILIPOV AND BALEV BE REMOVED FROM THEIR POSITIONS ON THE PERMANENT COMMISSIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

4. (U) REMOVED AS A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBuro AND STRIPPED OF HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:

- PETKO DANCHEV

5. (U) REMOVED AS A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBuro, BUT MAINTAINING HIS POSITION ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:

- STEFAN OUCHAROV

6. (U) REMOVED FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CC OF THE BCP:

- VASIL TSANOV
- EMIL KRISTOV
- YORDAN YOTOV


7. (U) REMOVED (FOR REASONS OF EXPEDIENCE) FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE:

- VLADIMIR ZHIVKOV (TODOR'S SON)
- NIKOLA STEFANOV (ZHIVKOV'S CHEF D' CABINET)
- KRISTO MALEEV (NEPHEW OF ZHIVKOV'S DECEASED WIFE)

THOSE IN

8. (U) ANDREI KARLOV LUKANOV, MEMBER OF POLITBuro AND SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BORN 1938 IN MOSCOW. DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM
MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY. JOINED THE MFA IN 1963. FROM
1979, HE HAS BEEN A CANDIDATE-MEMBER OF THE POLITBUREO.
FROM 1987, HE HAS BEEN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC
RELATIONS. LUKANOV'S FATHER WAS BULGARIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER FROM 1956 TO 1952.

11. (U) PANTELAY LAZAROV PACHOV, MEMBER OF POLITIBURO. BORN 1939. EDUCATED AS ENGINEER, SPECIALIZING IN SEMI-CONDUCTORS, IN MOSCOW. FROM DECEMBER, 1987, HE SERVED AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE BCP IN PLOVDIV.

12. (U) DIMITUR YAKOV STANISHEV, CANDIDATE-MEMBER OF POLITIBURO AND SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE. BORN 1924. EDUCATED AS HISTORIAN AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY. SERVED IN 1944 IN AN ANTI-FASCIST, PARTISAN BRIGADE. SINCE 1977, HE HAS BEEN A SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.


15. (U) VASIL NEDEV (GENERAL DIRECTOR OF A METAL FIRM), GOSPODIN YORDANOV (BRIGADIER IN AN ATOMIC ENERGY PLANT), DICHKA SLAVOVA (HEAD OF A VILLAGE AGRICULTURAL COLLECTIVE), AND RUMEN SERBESOV (CHIEF ADVISOR TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) HAVE BEEN ELECTED MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
PAPASOV HAS ALSO BEEN 'CG-OPTED' AS A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT HE WILL NOT HAVE FULL VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL CONTROL REVISION COMMISSION. FINALLY, STOYAN MIHAIOV AND SVETLIN RUSEV HAVE BEEN REINSTATED AS MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEY LOST THOSE POSITIONS LAST YEAR DUE TO THEIR OUTSPoken CRITICISM OF THE REGIME OVER THE ISSUES OF RESTRUCTURING (MIHAIOV) AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS (RUSEV). POLANSKY
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE RECOMMENDATION PARA 19.

3. SUMMARY. AN OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED STUDENT COMMEMORATION THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 17 DEVELOPED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S LARGEST ANTI-REGIME DEMONSTRATION IN 20 YEARS. SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS (POSSIBLY 50,000) STUDENTS MARCHED THROUGH CENTRAL PRAGUE CALLING FOR FREEDOM, AN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
END TO COMMUNIST RULE AND THE OUSTER OF THE PRESENT COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP. THE PEACEFUL PROCESSION WAS HALTED BY POLICE BEFORE IT REACHED ITS GOAL, WENCESLAS SQUARE. IT WAS THEN BRUTALLY DISPERSED BY TRUNCHEON-WIELDING RIOT POLICE. WESTERN JOURNALISTS WERE PARTICULARLY TARGETED BY THE POLICE FOR ROUGH TREATMENT. ONE CHICAGO TRIBUNE REPORTER REQUIRED SERIOUS MEDICAL ATTENTION FOR HEAD WOUNDS. NUMEROUS OTHERS WERE ROUGHED UP OR HAD THEIR CAMERAS SMASHED. NO OFFICIAL STATISTICS HAVE BEEN RELEASED ON THE NUMBER OF INJURED OR DETAINED, THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND PRAGUE SPRING ERA LEADER ALEXANDER DUBCEK WAS AMONG THEM AND THERE IS AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT AT LEAST ONE STUDENT DIED AS A RESULT OF POLICE BEATINGS. THE EMBASSY HAS ALREADY PROTESTED VERBALLY TO THE MFA ON THE POLICE TREATMENT OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS AND RECOMMENDS IN PARA 19 THAT AMBASSADOR HOUSTECKY IN WASHINGTON BE CALLED IN TO RECEIVE A PROTEST AND THAT THE IMPENDING VISIT OF CPCZ PRESIDUM MEMBER FOJTIK BE CANCELLED AS INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.

4. SCARED AND ISOLATED, THE JAKES LEADERSHIP HAS DECIDED TO RESPOND TO THIS FIRST MAJOR MANIFESTATION OF STUDENT OPPOSITION WITH BRUTE FORCE. THIS BLOODY-MINDEDNESS MAY WELL PRODUCE THE SORT OF DIVISIONS SO FAR LARGELY MUTED IN THE CPCZ LEADERSHIP AND WILL UNDERCUT WHAT LITTLE POPULAR LEGITIMACY THE REGIME HAS HAD AS WELL AS ITS LONGEVITY. NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR POPULAR PROTEST WILL ARISE ON DECEMBER 8, "JOHN LENNON" CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08082 01 OF 04 181426Z

DAY IN PRAGUE; DECEMBER 10, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DAY; AND JANUARY 16, THE ANNIVERSARY OF JAN PALACH'S DEATH. THE EXAMPLE OF PRAGUE'S STUDENTS COULD ENCOURAGE DEMONSTRATIONS OF EVEN GREATER SCALE ON THOSE DATES. END SUMMARY.

THE DEMONSTRATION

5. A COMMEMORATION OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY


CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08082 02 OF 04 181427Z ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 CCO-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 OCS-06 CA-02 ANAE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /048 W
----------215354 181439Z /44
O 181418Z NOV 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECMAT WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1755
USIA WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7724
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 PRAGUE 08082

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR DIRECTOR GELB, EU(OIASON, PENDERGRASST, JORIA); INFO DD(KNOPP), C(PISTOR)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF CZECH STUDENTS' OUT, "WE WANT A NEW GOVERNMENT" AND "FREE ELECTIONS." AT VYSEHRAD THE GATHERING OFFERED A MOMENT OF SILENCE FOR OPLETAL AND SANG THE NATIONAL ANTHEM. THE CROWD SEEMED UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO PROCEED AT THIS POINT, BUT SHORTLY SHOUTS ROSE UP TO MARCH TO WENCESLAS SQUARE, THE TRADITIONAL SITE OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE'S OLD CENTER.

7. AS STUDENTS STREAMED DOWN FROM VYSEHRAD INTO THE CITY'S STREETS THEY CALLED, AS DEMONSTRATORS HAVE IN THE PAST, FOR OTHER CZECHS TO JOIN THEM. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 · PRAGUE 08082 02 OF 04 181427Z

THIS TIME THEY DID. THE CROWD MARCHED ALONG THE RIVER EMBANKMENT TOWARDS THE CITY'S CENTER AND ITS NUMBERS SWELLED TO SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS. (WESTERN MEDIA ESTIMATES SPEAK OF 40-50,000, MAKING IT THE LARGEST INDEPENDENT DEMONSTRATION HERE SINCE 1969.) STUDENT SLOGANS BECAME MORE FORCEFUL AND NATIONALISTIC. IN ADDITION TO CALLS FOR JAKES AND THE CURRENT PARTY LEADERSHIP TO RESIGN, THE CROWD CHANTED "40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM IS ENOUGH" AND "WARSAW, BERLIN AND NOW PRAGUE."

8. UP TO THIS POINT THE POLICE HAD NOT SERIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH THE DEMONSTRATION, THOUGH THEY HAD HALTED ITS MARCH AT ONE POINT TO PREVENT IT FROM TURNING INTO SIDE STREETS AND TO KEEP
IT ALONG THE RIVER EMBANKMENT. AS THE
DEMONSTRATORS REACHED PRAGUE'S BROAD NATIONAL
AVENUE AND TURNED TOWARD WENCESLAS SQUARE,
HOWEVER, THEY WERE CONFRONTED BY A BARRICADE
OF RIOT POLICE BLOCKING THEIR PATH. THE
DEMONSTRATION HAD NOW BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME
THREE AND A HALF HOURS.

BETWEEN 1930 AND 2030 THE POLICE AND
DEMONSTRATORS WERE AT A STAND OFF. THE POLICE
REFUSED TO PERMIT THE STUDENTS TO PASS TO THE
SQUARE, DESPITE SHOUTS THAT "AFTER WENCESLAS
WE WILL GO HOME." WHILE NUMBERS OF THE
DEMONSTRATORS BEGAN TO DWINDLE, A CORE OF
SOME 10,000 REFUSED TO BUDGE OR RESPOND TO
POLICE CALLS TO BREAK UP. THE STUDENTS RespondED
BY STAGING A SIT-IN ON THE STREET, SINGING THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08082 02 OF 04 181427Z

NATIONAL ANTHEM, CHANTING MORE ANTI-COMMUNIST,
ANTI-LEADERSHIP POLITICAL SLOGANS AND SHOUTING
FOR SOMEONE IN THE LEADERSHIP TO COME OUT AND
DISCUSS THEIR DEMANDS WITH THEM. THROUGHOUT,
DEMONSTRATORS WERE PEACEFUL AND RESTRAINED AS
POLICE ANNOUNCEMENTS BECAME INCREASINGLY MORE
THREATENING AND RIOT POLICE MOVED IN TO CLOSE
THE NATIONAL AVENUE FROM BEHIND THE CROWD
AND CUT OFF OTHER POINTS OF EGRESS.

BRUTAL POLICE RESPONSE

10. SHORTLY BEFORE 2100, RIOT POLICE, NEWLY
REINFORCED WITH SPECIAL RED BERET ACTION SQUADS
AND FATIGUE-CLAD PEOPLE'S MILITIA, CARRIED OUT
A SERIES OF TRUNCHEON CHARGES INTO THE CROWD.
NUMEROUS DEMONSTRATORS, AS WELL AS FOREIGN
JOURNALISTS, TRAPPED WITHIN THE STREET CORDON
WERE BADLY BEATEN. THE POLICE THEN BEGAN
MAKING ARRESTS AND USING AN ARMORED PERSONNEL
CARRIER WITH BATTERING RAM TO FORCE THE PEOPLE
OUT INTO NOW OPEN SIDE STREETS. WITHIN 30
MINUTES THE STREET WAS CLEAR. BUSLOADS OF
THOSE-arRESTED AS WELL AS AMBULANCES CARRYING
INJURED WERE NOTED LEAVING THE SCENE FOR
SEVERAL MINUTES AFTERWARDS.
11. ACCORDING TO REPORTS, ONE STUDENT HAS DIED OF INJURIES AND AT LEAST 13 PERSONS WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED AND REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION. ONE OF THESE WAS CHICAGO TRIBUNE REPORTER PAULA BUTTURINI WHO SUFFERED SEVERAL HEAD WOUNDS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08082 03 OF 04 181428Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAEC-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 CCO-00 OMB-01 INRE-00 OCS-06 CA-02 ANAE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /048 W
--------------215365 181439Z/44

0 181418Z NOV 89 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 1756
USIA WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 7725
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 PRAGUE 08082

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR DIRECTOR GELB, EU(OLASON, PENDERGRAST,
JORIA); INFO DD(KNOPP), C(PISTOR)

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF CZECH STUDENTS'

REQUIRING A TOTAL OF 16 STITCHES. THE NUMBER
OF INJURED WAS CERTAINLY MUCH HIGHER THAN THE FIGURE OF 13. EMBOFFS SAW SCORES OF YOUNG DEMONSTRATORS BLEEDING OR LIMPING FROM THE DEMONSTRATION SITE. MANY WERE NOT SEEKING IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR FEAR THAT THEIR NAMES WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES.

12. WESTERN JOURNALISTS WERE PARTICULARLY TARGETED FOR BRUTAL POLICE HANDLING. IN ADDITION TO MS. BUTTURINI, A BBC JOURNALIST, ED LUCAS, WAS KNOCKED UNCONSCIOUS. AP, LA TIMES, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08082 03 OF 04 181428Z

BOSTON GLOBE, AND NBC REPORTERS HAVE ALL REPORTED BEING BEATEN AND ROUGHED UP. MANY HAD CAMERAS SEIZED OR DAMAGED. EMBOFFS WITNESSED A CNN REPORTER, BRUCE CONOVER, BEING DETAINED AND HIS CAMERA SMASHED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A BRITISH ITN REPORTER WAS ALSO ROUGHED UP AND HELD BY THE POLICE.

13. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS ARRESTED OR DETAINED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT FORMER PRAGUE SPRING ERA LEADER ALEXANDER DUBCEK WAS AMONG THEM. HE WAS PICKED UP WHEN HE WAS SPOTTED BY POLICE DURING THE EARLIER VYSEHRAD CEREMONY.

COMMENT

-----

14. THIS IS THE FIRST MASS SPECIFICALLY STUDENT DEMONSTRATION SINCE 1969 AND REPRESENTS A WATERSHED EVENT FOR THE JAKES REGIME. IT CHANGES OUR FRAME OF REFERENCE ON THIS REGIME'S LONGEVITY. THE BRUTAL POLICE TREATMENT OF YOUTH WILL HAVE BROAD REPERCUSSIONS AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION AS IT DID LAST JANUARY AT THE MUCH SMALLER-SCALE PALACH DEMONSTRATIONS. IT SHOULD REMOVE WHAT TRACE OF LEGITIMACY THE REGIME RETAINS AS FAR AS THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS CONCERNED. JAKES WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRETEND, AS CPCZ IDEOLOGY SECRETARY FOJTIK TRIED TO DO AFTER RETURNING FROM TALKS IN MOSCOW ON FRIDAY (JUST AS THE POLICE WERE KNOCKING HEADS), THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS SERIOUS ABOUT SPEEDING UP THE PACE OF POLITICAL REFORM. CONFIDENTIAL
15. IMPORTANTLY, THE POLICE ACTION IN ITS
BLOODY-MINDEDNESS COULD PRODUCE DIVISIONS WHICH
HAVE SO FAR BEEN MUTED IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK
COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP. BUT IF THIS
DEMONSTRATION CONSIDERABLY UNDERCUTS THE
STAYING POWER OF THE JAKES REGIME, IT ALSO
SHOWS THAT THE HARDLINERS ARE NOT GOING TO
LEAVE WITHOUT A FIGHT. MANY OF LAST NIGHT'S
DEMONSTRATORS WERE CALLING ON STUDENTS TO RETURN
TO WENCESLAS SQUARE SATURDAY FOR A REPEAT
DEMONSTRATION. EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT DEVELOP,
THERE ARE SEVERAL PROTEST ANNIVERSARY OPPORTUNITIES
IN THE WEEKS AHEAD AND AROUND WHICH DEMONSTRATIONS
CAN COALESCE.

16. TWO IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF
LARGE-SCALE ACTIONS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
DAY ON DECEMBER 10 AND THE JANUARY 16 ANNIVERSARY
OF CZECH STUDENT JAN PALACH'S SELF-IMMOLATION
IN 1969. THE DECEMBER 8 LOCAL CELEBRATION OF
"JOHN LENNON DAY" HAS ALSO TYPICALLY DRAWN
PROTEST DEMONSTRATORS.

17. HOW QUICKLY THE JAKES REGIME PASSES FROM
THE SCENE, HOWEVER, MAY DEPEND NOW ON MORE THAN
LEADERSHIP DIVISIONS AND POPULAR PRESSURE. AN
IMPORTANT FACTOR, AND ONE THAT COULD BE DECISIVE,
IS THE SOVIET REACTION TO LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS.
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF CPCZ IDEOLOGY CHIEF
JAN FOJTIK'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW LAST EVENING
SHOWED HIM A PHYSICALLY SHAKEN MAN. WE HAVE
NO DOUBT HE HEARD SOME TOUGH TALK FROM HIS
SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT EXACTLY WHAT JAKES AND THE REGIME ARE UP TO IN THEIR TALK OF REFORM.

18. THERE IS A FINAL BIT OF CRUEL IRONY TO LAST NIGHT'S EVENTS. STARTED OFFICIALLY TO COMMEMORATE A HEROIC STUDENT ACT OF PROTEST AGAINST THE BRUTALITY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S NAZI OCCUPIERS, THEY ENDED YESTERDAY IN BRUTALITY AND APPARENTLY AT LEAST ONE STUDENT'S DEATH AT THE HANDS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES.
19. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT STRONG AND EARLY PROTESTS ARE ADVISABLE TO THE GOC IN VIEW OF THE BRUTAL TREATMENT OF ITS CITIZENS AND FOREIGN, INCLUDING U.S., JOURNALISTS IN SUCH A BLATANT VIOLATION OF ITS CSCE COMMITMENTS. WE FURTHER RECOMMEND THAT IN VIEW OF THESE EVENTS, THE IMPENDING VISIT OF CPCZ PRESIDUIUM MEMBER FOJTIK BE CANCELLED AS A SIGN OF OUR CONDEMNATION OF THE NOVEMBER 17 EVENTS. THE EMBASSY HAS ALREADY VERBALLY PROTESTED THE POLICE INCIDENTS INVOLVING JOURNALISTS WITH THE MFA. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP WITH A DIPLOMATIC NOTE SPELLING THESE OUT IN DETAIL AND DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION. THE AMBASSADOR PLANS, IF THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, TO RAISE THE CONTENTS OF OUR NOTE (SEE SEPTEL) WITH GOC OFFICIALS IN AN EARLY DEMARCHE. TO REINFORCE OUR CONCERNS, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT TAKE SIMILAR ACTION BY CALLING IN AMBASSADOR HOUSTECKY AT AN EARLY DATE. AT THAT MEETING WE RECOMMEND THAT HE BE TOLD THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE NOVEMBER 17 EVENTS, THE VISIT BEGINNING NOVEMBER 24 BY CPCZ PRESIDUIUM MEMBER FOJTIK, WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE.

BLACK

88778

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL
Teleprint from CC CPCz to First Secretary CC CPCz and Secretaries of Regional and District Committees,

19 November 1989

19 November 1989, Prague—Teleprint from the CC CPCz to the First Secretary of the CC CPS [Communist Party of Slovakia] and the Head Secretaries of the Regional and District Committees of the CPCz on the situation and roles of the Communist Party.

As you are already informed, at the end of the commemorative procession on the participants 50th anniversary of the 17 November in Prague there occurred an anti-government demonstration by several participators. In view of the character of the event, necessary measures were undertaken by the disciplinary forces. As a result of the dissemination of incorrect information about the death of one of the participants—the student Martin Smid—a hostile psychosis arose, especially among the students and actors from the theaters in Prague and in some counties which announced a week-long strike and want to misuse the theater buildings in order to sway the residents with their opinions, which are in conflict with the interests of the majority of the citizens and the state.1

Their aim is to launch a general strike on 27 November in the CSSR. It is necessary to assume that they will try to influence the cultural workplace and schools in the entire republic. They even want infiltrate the factories and the JZD 2 [Standard Farming Cooperative] in order to gain support for their destabilizing plans from all strata of society.

Anti-socialist groups headed by the Charter [-77] are evidently behind this activity. The plan of action is coordinated by the Western media.

The Presidium of the CC CPCz dealt with these questions today, 19 November, in the evening hours and adopted the necessary measures allowing [it] to confront these plans.

The Presidium calls on the regional and provincial committees to do everything necessary to reject the enemy’s efforts in the counties, districts, in the factories, in the cooperatives, in the schools and in other workplaces, and to ensure that uninterrupted work, peace and order be secured.

It is desirable that the collectives publicly express their resolute position against efforts to bring about a political coup in our country.

Within the framework of the adopted measures it is necessary to secure the readiness of the People’s Militia to protect the workplaces from the efforts of the enemy forces to penetrate into the workers’ collectives.

The Presidium has called on responsible workers to step up the offensive in their ideological work in this connection, especially in the media, with the aim of politically isolating the forces seeking an overthrow. Adopt the same measures in the counties and districts.

With comradely regards,

General Secretary,
[Jakes’s signature]

[Source: SUA, UV, KSC- teleprints and letters, UV-134/89. Obtained by Oldrich Tuma.]
Proclamation on the Establishment of Civic Forum

19 November 1989

PROCLAMATION

At the meeting in the Prague Theater Club on 19 November at 10:00 a.m. the Civic Forum was established as the mouthpiece of that part of the Czechoslovak public which is ever more critical toward the policies of the current Czechoslovak leadership and which was recently deeply shaken by the brutal massacre of students who were peacefully demonstrating. Charter 77, The Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee, The Circle of Independent Intelligence, The Movement for Civic Freedom, Artforum, Renewal, independent students, The Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, VONS, The Independent World Coalition, The Open Dialogue, The Czechoslovak PEN Club Center, several member of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, The Czechoslovak People’s Parties, religious parties, creative and other associations, several former and current members of the CPCz and other democratically minded citizens will take part in the work of this forum. The Civic Forum feels itself competent to negotiate immediately with the government about the critical situation in our country, to express the actual demands of the public and to discuss the solutions.

The Civic Forum wishes to begin such negotiations, which should be the beginning of a universal discussion on the future of Czechoslovakia, by a negotiation of these urgent and ever more openly formulated demands:

1. That those members of the Presidium of the CC CPCz who are directly connected with the preparation of the intervention by the five members of the Warsaw Pact in the year 1968 and who are responsible for the years long devastation of all areas of our society, immediately step down. These are, namely, Gustav Husak, Milos Jakes, Jan Fojtík, Miloslav Zavadil, Karel Hofman and Alois Indra. The pernicious politics of people, who for years refused any kind of democratic dialog with the society, completely legally resulted in the terrible events of the last days.

2. That the First Secretary of the Municipal Committee (MC) CPCz in Prague Miroslav Stepan and the Federal Minister of the Interior, Frantisek Kincl, who are responsible for all of the measures which the police have carried out over the last few months against the peaceful demonstrations of citizens, immediately step down.

3. That a committee be set up which would concretely investigate these measures, find the culprits and propose punishments for them. Civic Forum representatives must be included in this committee.

4. That all the criminals of conscience, including those who have been detained in connection with the last demonstration, be immediately released.

The Civic Forum demands that this proclamation be published in the official Czechoslovak media.

The Civic Forum stakes its authority behind the plan for a general strike on 27 November from 12:00 p.m. until 2:00 p.m., called by Prague university students, and understands it to be an expression of support for the demands which it wants to discuss with the state leadership.
The Civic Forum believes that its creation and task corresponds with the will of the 40,000 current signatories of the petition *Several Sentences*, and is open to all the constituents and forces of society whose concern is that our country should begin peacefully finding the way to a democratic social order, and through it to economic prosperity.

On behalf of the Civic Forum:
Eng. Rudolf Battek, Petr Čepek, Vaclav Havel, Milan Hruska, Prof. Dr. Milan Jelinek, Milan Knazko, Dr. Lubomir Kopecky CSc., Jiri Krizan, Vaclav Maly, Martin Mejstrič, Petr Oslzly, Dr. Libor Paty CSc., Jana Petrova, Jan Ruml, Prof. Dr. Venek Silhan, Ondrej Trojan, Eng. Josef Vavrousek CSc., Sasa Vondra.

Prague, 19 November 1989.

[Source: *Ustav pro sodobe dejiny (USD), Akademie ved Ceske republiky (AV CR), Koordinacni centrum Obcanskeho fora (KC OF) Archive, file Dokumenty OF.*]
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08087 01 OF 02 201133Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 PA-02 OCS-06
CA-02 /023 W
----------------- 264127 201135Z
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
O 201220Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1758
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7727
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 08087

USIA FOR EU (PENDERGRAST AND JORIA)
STATE FOR EUR/EY, PA AND HA
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ERICA SCHLAGER - CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CASC, PHUM, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PROTEST OF ATTACK ON AMERICAN JOURNALISTS DURING NOVEMBER 17-19 DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE

REF: PRAGUE 8082

1. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL, AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH A DEMARCHE BY THE AMBASSADOR CONCERNING THE BRUTAL RESPONSE BY CZECHOSLOVAK POLICE TO DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH OCCURRED IN PRAGUE ON NOVEMBER 17, AND THEREAFTER, EMBASSY IS SUBMITTING A NOTE OF PROTEST CONCERNING SEVEN AMERICAN CITIZEN JOURNALISTS WHO WERE ATTACKED BY SECURITY OFFICIALS DURING THE DEMONSTRATIONS. THE TEXT OF THE NOTE FOLLOWS BELOW IN PARA 3.

2. THE MINISTRY HAS TWICE INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT IT CANNOT ENSURE THE SECURITY OF FOREIGNERS, NEITHER DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS NOR CASUAL OBSERVERS WHO UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08087 01 OF 02 201133Z

ARE "PRESENT WITHIN THE RANGE OF UNPERMITTED DEMONSTRATIONS". AN ORAL WARNING WAS PRESENTED TO

3. THE TEXT OF NOTE FOLLOWS:


MS. PAULA BUTTURINI OF THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE WAS SEVERELY BEATEN BY UNIFORMED POLICE, UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A PLAINCLOTHES OFFICIAL. SHE REQUIRED EMERGENCY MEDICAL ATTENTION AT THE FRANCISCU CLINIC FOR HEAD WOUNDS, AND RECEIVED 16 STITCHES. WITH HER WAS MR. TYLER MARSHALL, OF THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, WHO WAS ALSO BEATEN AND UNCLASSIFIED.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08087 01 OF 02 201133Z

TREATED AT THE FRANCISCU CLINIC.

MR. PAUL CONOVER OF CABLE NEWS NETWORK WAS ACCOSTED BY THREE PLAINCLOTHES OFFICIALS. HE WAS SHOVED AND STRUCK REPEATEDLY WITH NIGHTSTICKS. THE OFFICIALS DEMANDED THAT HE SURRENDER HIS VIDEO TAPE, WHICH HE DID. THEY THEN SEIZED HIS CAMERA WHICH WAS CARRIED OFF BY UNIFORMED PERSONNEL. THE EMBASSY STRONGLY URGES THE IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE SONA BETA CAMCORDER, VALUED AT THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (DOLS 30,000), TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CABLE NEWS NETWORK. IN ADDITION MR. CONOVER'S SOVIET PRESS CREDENTIALS WERE DESTROYED.

MR. JOHN KAUFMAN, OF THE BOSTON GLOBE, WAS SIMILARLY
ACCOSTED, BOTH BEATEN AND MACED BY SECURITY OFFICIALS.

MR. ANDREW ALEXANDER AND MR. MICHAEL SCHWARZ OF COX NEWSPAPERS WERE ALSO ATTACKED. MR. SCHWARZ' PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT WAS SMASHED. MR. TIM ORTMAN OF THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY (NBC) WAS BEATEN WITH NIGHTSTICKS AND SUFFERED A CONCUSSION AND LEG INJURIES AND WAS TAKEN TO WEST GERMANY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. HIS CAMERA-EQUIPMENT WAS DESTROYED.

THE ABOVE INCIDENTS ALL INVOLVED AMERICAN CITIZENS. THE EMBASSY IS AWARE OF NUMEROUS OTHER INCIDENTS INVOLVING ACCREDITED JOURNALISTS OF BOTH CZECHOSLOVAK AND FOREIGN NATIONALITIES WHO WERE BRUTALLY TREATED DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES. WITH REFERENCE TO THE MINISTRY'S NOTE NO. 317.572/89 CONCERNING THE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08087 02 OF 02 201133Z ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 PA-02 OCS-06 CA-02 /023 W

-----------264115 201208Z /10 38
O 201220Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1759
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7728
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 08087
MINISTRY'S INABILITY TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF JOURNALISTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF UNPERMITTED DEMONSTRATIONS, THE EMBASSY MUST EMPHASIZE THAT ALL ATTACKS WERE MADE BY CZECHOSLOVAK POLICE OFFICIALS. IN ALL CASES THE JOURNALISTS IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES CLEARLY AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY BEaten. IN PARTICULAR CAMERAMEN AND THEIR EQUIPMENT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR ATTACK.

IN KEEPING WITH THE AGREEMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EMBASSY WISHES TO CONVEY ITS STRONGEST PROTEST AGAINST SUCH DELIBERATE INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGITIMATE CONDUCT OF INFORMATION MEDIA ACTIVITIES AND PHYSICAL ABUSE OF PERSONS ENGAGED IN NORMAL PRESS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08087 02 OF 02 201133Z

BUSINESS.

THE EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE MINISTRY'S EARLIEST REPLY. COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE, END TEXT.
BLACK
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 08097

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, CZ
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS CONTINUE OVER WEEKEND IN PRAGUE

REF: PRAGUE 8082

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE CONTINUED ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, BUT UNLIKE FRIDAY'S STUDENT DEMONSTRATION WERE NOT MARRED BY VIOLENCE. BESIDES DEMONSTRATIONS, THE CZECHOSLOVAK PUBLIC HAS REACTED TO THE BRUTAL SUPPRESSION OF FRIDAY'S DEMONSTRATION AND THE REPORT (PERHAPS INACCURATE) OF THE DEATH OF A STUDENT AT THE HANDS OF RIOT POLICE WITH CALLS FOR STUDENT AND GENERAL STRIKES. CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITIES HAVE DENIED THE REPORT OF A STUDENT DEATH, HAVE ACCUSED THE VOA OF TRANSMITTING A FALSE REPORT, AND ARRESTED PETR UHL, WHO FIRST MADE THE REPORT. THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08097 01 OF 02 201154Z

REGIME HAS CLEARLY BEEN SHAKE BY THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS, AND HAS ASKED FOR THE NATION TO BE CALM. THE LIKELY REACTION BY THE PUBLIC WILL BE
CONTINUING DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH WILL ADD TO THE PRESSURES ALREADY FACED BY THE JAKES LEADERSHIP.

END SUMMARY.

3. THE VIOLENT SUPPRESSION OF FRIDAY'S DEMONSTRATION IN PRAGUE AND THE REPORT (PERHAPS INACCURATE) THAT A STUDENT WAS KILLED BY POLICE DURING THE DEMONSTRATION SPURRED CZECHOSLOVAKS TO RETURN TO THE STREETS OF PRAGUE FOR DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE EVENINGS OF BOTH SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 18 AND SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 19. SATURDAY'S DEMONSTRATION AT ITS HEIGHT NUMBERED ONLY 1,000 PERSONS BUT SOME 25,000 PERSONS MARCHED THROUGH PRAGUE ON SUNDAY.

4. RIOT-EQUIPPED POLICE CONFRONTED DEMONSTRATORS ON BOTH DAYS, BUT WE ARE AWARE OF NO SIGNIFICANT VIOLENCE AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS. ON SUNDAY RIOT POLICE WERE ONLY DEPLOYED TO PREVENT DEMONSTRATORS FROM CROSSING THE VLTAVA RIVER AND MARCHING TO PRAGUE CASTLE, SITE OF THE OFFICE AND RESIDENCE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDENT. OTHERWISE, DEMONSTRATORS WERE FREE TO MARCH WITHOUT POLICE HARASSMENT OR INTERFERENCE SO LONG AS THEY STAYED IN THE AREA OF PRAGUE'S SO-CALLED GOLDEN CROSS (WENCESLAS SQUARE AND NATIONAL AVENUE). IN MARKED CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS PRACTICE, AUTHORITIES ALSO ALLOWED PERSONS TO PLACE CANDLES AROUND THE STATUE OF SAINT WENCESLAS AND AT THE NATIONAL AVENUE SITE OF THE FRIDAY NIGHT "MASSACRE."

5. SATURDAY'S AND SUNDAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS WERE CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08097 01 OF 02 201154Z

LARGELY SPONTANEOUS AND LEADERLESS. UNLIKE FRIDAY'S, WHEN DEMONSTRATORS WERE MOSTLY STUDENTS, DEMONSTRATORS ON SUNDAY APPEARED TO BE FROM ALL SECTORS OF CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIETY. SUNDAY'S DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP PEACEFULLY WITH DEMONSTRATORS PROMISING TO RETURN TO THE STREETS MONDAY EVENING.

6. VARIOUS OTHER REACTIONS TO FRIDAY'S VIOLENCE HAVE INCLUDED CALLS FOR A STRIKE BY UNIVERSITY (AND POSSIBLY HIGH SCHOOL) STUDENTS DURING THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 20-24, SUSPENSION OF THEATRICAL PERFORMANCES IN PRAGUE, BRATISLAVA AND OTHER CITIES, AND CALLS FOR A TWO-HOUR GENERAL STRIKE ON NOVEMBER 27. VACLAV HAVEL IN AN RFE INTERVIEW STATED HE RECEIVED CALLS FROM NUMEROUS FACTORIES PLEDGING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GENERAL STRIKE.
(Havel, incidentally, has received a passport and
permission to travel to Sweden to receive the Olaf
Palme Prize, but will not do so in light of events in
Czechoslovakia.)

7. The reaction of the Czechoslovak public to Friday's
brutality has been magnified by a report that a student
named Martin Smid was killed by police on Friday.
Such report was first made by Petr Uhl of the inde-
pendent news agency via (East European Information
Agency) and was repeated by the VOA, BBC and Reuters.
It now appears that, if a student was killed, he was
not named Martin Smid. Emboffs talked with the mother
of Martin Smid and she told us that her son had not
been killed or even injured. Czechoslovak television
on Sunday denied reports of Smid's death, and
loudspeakers on Wenceslas Square on Sunday presented
a tape that denied Smid's death and specifically

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08097 02 OF 02 201155Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 ED-04 OMB-01 INRE-00 BIB-01 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 SCT-03 P-02 T-01 /048 W
----------265016 201219Z /23
O 201242Z NOV 89
FM AMBASSADY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1766
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS
CONFIDENTIAL

BLAMED VOA (BUT NOT BBC OR REUTERS) FOR HAVING MALICIOUSLY PRESENTED THE REPORT.

8. FOR HIS ACTION OF PASSING ALONG INFORMATION TO WESTERN JOURNALISTS ON THE REPORTS OF SMID'S DEATH, PETR UHL, A MEMBER OF VONS (COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNJUSTLY PERSECUTED) AND OF THE INDEPENDENT EAST EUROPEAN INFORMATION AGENCY, HAS BEEN ARRESTED BY AUTHORITIES AND CHARGED WITH "DAMAGING THE INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLIC ABROAD." HIS WIFE ANNA SABATOVA WAS ALSO DETAINED AS SHE ATTEMPTED TO GO TO AN INDEPENDENT PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE HOME OF CHARTER 77 SPOKESPERSON DANA NEMCOVA ON SUNDAY. SUCH A PRESS CONFERENCE WAS REPORTEDLY CALLED TO PRESENT WITNESSES WHO COULD TESTIFY ABOUT THE ALLEGED DEATH OF A STUDENT, BUT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POLICE PREVENTED VISITORS TO NEMCOVA'S HOUSE AND THE PRESS CONFERENCE DID NOT OCCUR. IT THUS REMAINS A MYSTERY AT THIS TIME WHETHER A STUDENT WAS IN FACT KILLED.

9. OFFICIAL CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS SOURCES INDICATE ABOUT 100 PERSONS WERE DETAINED ON FRIDAY, BUT EMBOFFS SAW TWO BUSLOADS OF DETAINEES DRIVEN AWAY AFTER FRIDAY'S DEMONSTRATION AND BELIEVE THE OFFICIAL FIGURE IS LOW. IN ADDITION TO THE DETENTION OF PETR UHL AND ANNA SABATOVA, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT JOHN BOK OF THE RADICAL PARTY, EMMANUEL MANDLER OF THE DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVE, AND DAVID DUSEK, A CZECHOSLOVAK WORKING WITH A CNN CREW, WERE DETAINED OVER THE WEEKEND. MANDLER'S DETENTION WAS APPARENTLY PROVOKED BY A DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVE CALL FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT HEADED BY DUBCEK, HAVEL, AND OTHER INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVES. WE UNDERSTAND MANDLER HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM POLICE CUSTODY, BUT HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING BOK AND DUSEK.
10. THE WEEKEND'S EVENTS HAVE CLEARLY SHAKEN AUTHORITY. FRANTISEK PITRA, PREMIER OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, APPEARED ON TELEVISION ON SUNDAY AND ASKED THAT THE NATION REMAIN CALM. THE RESPONSE WILL MOST LIKELY BE MORE AND PERHAPS EVEN LARGER DEMONSTRATIONS. SOME OBSERVERS PREDICT THAT A DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED FOR 4:00 P.M. TODAY ON WENCESLAS SQUARE WILL BE EVEN LARGER THAN THAT OF LAST FRIDAY. CONTINUING DEMONSTRATIONS WILL ONLY CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08097 02 OF 02 201155Z

ADD TO THE PRESSURES ALREADY FACED BY THE JAKES' LEADERSHIP, AND MAY ACCELERATE HIS PASSING FROM THE CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL SCENE. BLACK
SUMMARY. CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY "RUBE PRAVO" HAS TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE POLICE ACTED WITH RESTRAINT TO PUT DOWN THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE NOVEMBER 17. THE PAPER PLACED BLAME FOR THE DEMONSTRATIONS ON "SELF-APPOINTED" LEADERS SUBVERTING THE PEACEFUL GOALS OF THE COMMEMORATION MARCH, ABETTED BY THE FOREIGN PRESS WHICH UNCритICALLY REPEATED ALLEGEDLY FALSE REPORTS OF DEATHS AND INJURIES TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR PREDICTIONS OF BLOODSHED. (DESPITE REGIME PROTESTATIONS, IT IS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT NO UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

DEMONSTRATORS HAVE DIED.) THE SOCIALIST PARTY PAPER "SVOBODNE SLOVO" AND THE YOUTH PAPER "MLADA FRONTA," HOWEVER, WERE STRONGLY CRITICAL OF SECURITY FORCES FOR
OVERREACTING AND IN GENERAL SUPPORTED STUDENT CALLS FOR MORE DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY. THOUGH A NUMBER OF REGIME LEADERS HAVE CRITICIZED THE REPORTS OF DEATHS, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE ALMOST NONE HAVE SO FAR EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR SUPPRESSION OF THE DEMONSTRATION. PARA 7 INCLUDES THE OFFICIAL COUNT OF THOSE ARRESTED AND INJURED AT THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATION. END SUMMARY.

2. THE NOVEMBER 20 EDITION OF "RUDE PRAVO" TOOK ADVANTAGE OF ALLEGEDLY INACCURATE REPORTS OF THE DEATHS OF ONE OR MORE STUDENTS IN THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATION TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE CHARGING THAT "SELF-APPOINTED LEADERS" HAD SUBVERTED THE LEGITIMATE ANNUAL COMMEMORATION FOR ANTI-NAZI FIGHTER OPLETAL. ACCORDING TO THE PAPER, POLICE FORCES HAD TAKEN NO ACTION AGAINST THE MARCHERS, EVEN WHEN THEY BEGAN SHOUTING ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-PARTY SLOGANS, UNTIL THE CROWD TRIED TO MOVE TO UNAPPROVED ROUTES, WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE "ENDANGERED" THE PUBLIC.

3. IT WAS AT THAT POINT, ACCORDING TO THE PAPER, THAT THE LEADERS OF THE DEMONSTRATION DECIDED TO SPREAD A "FALSE" CLAIM THAT A STUDENT NAMED MARTIN SMID HAD BEEN KILLED, A CLAIM PICKED UP BY THE FOREIGN PRESS. (AFP, FOR ONE, REPORTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN FOUR DEATHS.) IGNORING DENIALS BY GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN, SOME STUDENTS OVER THE WEEKEND SET UP SMALL MEMORIALS TO THE VARIOUS STUDENTS "KILLED" AT THE PLACES WHERE THEY "DIED." THE GOVERNMENT ON SUNDAY SHOT DOWN THE RUMOR ABOUT SMID BY PRODUCING HIM FOR A TELEVISION INTERVIEW. A STATEMENT BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY DESCRIBED THE DEATH UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08106 01 OF 02 201558Z

RUMORS AS A DELIBERATE MANIPULATION OF PEOPLE'S MINDS AND AN EFFORT TO AROUSE HOSTILE EMOTIONS. (THIS HAS NOT STOPPED SPECULATION THAT SOME DEMONSTRATOR(S) WAS KILLED.)

4. "RUDE PRAVO" STOPPED SLIGHTLY SHORT OF SAYING THAT THE FOREIGN PRESS HAD DELIBERATELY REPORTED WHAT THEY KNEW AS A FALSE STORY, BUT DID ACCUSE THEM OF AT LEAST POOR JOURNALISM BY REPORTING A STORY WITHOUT ADEQUATE EFFORTS TO CONFIRM IT. IT ASCRIBED THIS FAILURE TO THE WESTERN MEDIA'S DESIRE TO SUBSTANTIATE PREDICTIONS OF VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED. IT LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT BELIEVED THAT SOME OF THE FOREIGN PRESS (PARTICULARLY RFE) HAD ABETTED OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN PRAGUE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO "SUBVERT" THE COMMEMORATION AND TO "PROVOKE"
A CONFRONTATION WITH AUTHORITIES.

5. IN CONTRAST TO "RUDE PRAVO'S" LINE, THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST PARTY PAPER "SVOBODNE SLOVO" PRINTED A STATEMENT BY THE PARTY PRESIDIUM VERY CRITICAL OF SECURITY FORCES. NOTING ITS PAST CALLS FOR AN INCREASED DIALOGUE, THE PRESIDIUM EXPRESSED ITS "FUNDAMENTAL DISAPPROVAL" OF POLICE ACTIONS AGAINST "DEFENSELESS DEMONSTRATORS" WHICH COULD ONLY "EXACERBATE TENSIONS IN SOCIETY" AND AROUSE NATURAL RESISTANCE. IT DEMANDED THAT SUCH EVENTS NEVER BE RESOLVED IN THIS MANNER AGAIN.

6. THE YOUTH PAPER "MLADA FRONTA", ALSO TAKING A CRITICAL VIEW, QUOTED A STATEMENT BY TWO STUDENT GROUPS ATTACKING THE "INADEQUATE AND POLITICALLY ILL-ADVISED" ACTIONS BY SECURITY FORCES. THE GROUPS WERE

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 08106

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR EU (OLASON, PENDERGRAST, JORIA); INFO DD
(KNOPP), C(PISTOR)

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS COVERAGE OF DEMONSTRATION

"CONCERNED AND OUTRAGED" AT THE INFORMATION ABOUT
INJURED PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEMONSTRATION. AS "SVOBODNE
SLOVO," "MLADA FRONTA" DID NOT MENTION THE DEATH
REPORTS AND CALLED FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ACTIONS
OF THE SECURITY FORCES.

7. FINALLY, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS RELEASED AN
OFFICIAL COUNT ON THE DEMONSTRATIONS: 24 INJURED
(17 DEMONSTRATORS, 7 POLICE); 143 PEOPLE DETAINED,
NINE ON POSSIBLE CRIMINAL CHARGES. OF THE OTHER
DETAINES, 21 WERE FINED AND RELEASED, 70 WERE RELEASED
AFTER AN ID CHECK. THE REMAINING 43 WERE NOT ACCOUNTED
FOR IN THE MINISTRY STATEMENT, BUT MAY HAVE BEEN
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08106 02 OF 02 201558Z

RELEASED.
BLACK
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01  PRAGUE 08108 201601Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /039 W
-------------------275703 201613Z /45

O 201652Z NOV 89
FM AMBASSASY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1772
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7731
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSASY BRUSSELS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PRAGUE 08108

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR EU (OLASON, PENDERGRAST, JORIA); INFO DD
(KNOPP), (PIUSTOR)

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, CZ
SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAK INDEPENDENTS ESTABLISH NEW
ORGANIZATION AND LIST AGENDA OF DEMANDS.

1(U)INDEPENDENT ELEMENTS OVER THE WEEKEND ESTABLISHED
AN ORGANIZATION CALLED THE "CIVIC FORUM." THE FORUM
HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 20 IN THE APARTMENT
OF VACLAV HAVEL (AND IN HAVEL'S PRESENCE). IT REPORTEDLY
ANNOUNCED A FOUR-POINT AGENDA, DEMANDING:

-- REEVALUATION OF 1968;

-- RESIGNATION OF ALL 1968 ERA FIGURES IN THE REGIME;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02  PRAGUE 08108 201601Z

-- A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE CHARGES OF POLICE
BRUTALITY (NOT APPARENTLY LIMITED TO SUPPRESSION OF THE
NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATIONS);
2. (U) THE FORUM CALLED FOR A GENERAL STRIKE FOR NOVEMBER 27, BUT TOOK NO POSITION ON HOLDING THREATENED DEMONSTRATIONS TODAY (NOVEMBER 20).

3. (LOU) ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACT, HAVEL SAID THAT THE FORUM HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THIRTEEN SIGNATORIES, "BUT POLITICIANS ALL OVER TOWN ARE SHOVING MEMBERSHIP CARDS UP THEIR SLEEVES TO BE READY WHEN THE SITUATION CHANGES." AS AN EXAMPLE, HE REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SOCIALIST PARTY HEAD JAN SKODA, THOUGH NOT A SIGNATORY, HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE FOUNDING AND GIVEN THE GROUP HIS VERBAL APPROVAL. IN THE SAME CATEGORY WAS BOHUMIL SVOBODA OF THE REFORM GROUP WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S PARTY. HAVEL ALSO REPORTEDLY INDICATED THAT THE GROUP WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ANYONE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE REGIME, EXCEPT THOSE INVOLVED IN THE POST-1968 "NORMALIZATION."

BLACK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***  LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CONFIDENTIAL PRAGUE 08109 201603Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAIE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 OCS-06 CA-02 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /048 W

O 201654Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1773

CONFIDENTIAL PRAGUE 08109

DEPT FOR PA AND EUR/EY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, PGOV, CZ
SUBJECT: AMERICAN WOMAN'S ACCOUNT OF NOVEMBER 17
DEMONSTRATION AND THE DEATH OF A CZECH STUDENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AN AMERICAN WOMAN RESIDENT IN PRAGUE TRAPPED IN THE WORST OF THE POLICE CHARGES DURING THE NOVEMBER 17 STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS HAS GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF HER EXPERIENCE AND WHAT SHE KNOWS OF STORIES OF THE DEATH OF A STUDENT FROM POLICE BEATINGS. END SUMMARY.

3. SHE DESCRIBED HOW ON THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 17 THE POLICE SURROUNDED THE DEMONSTRATORS, REFUSING TO ALLOW ANY TO LEAVE, AND THEN BEGAN TO BEAT THOSE TRAPPED METHODICALLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08109 201603Z

WITH NIGHTSTICKS SHE ONLY PROTECTED BY A GROUP OF STUDENTS WHO FORMED A TIGHT KNOT AROUND HER TO SHIELD POLICE BLOWS. WHEN A POLICEMAN REALIZED THERE
WAS A CHILD IN THE GROUPE, HE SCULDEL BUT ALLOWED HER TO LEAVE WITHOUT RUNNING A GAUNTLET THE POLICE HAD SET UP TO BEAT DEMONSTRATORS AS THEY EXITED FROM THE SCENE.

4. FIRST INFORMED US OVER THE WEEKEND OF HER EXPERIENCES. SHE REPORTED THAT ONE YOUNG STUDENT HAD DIED IN HOSPITAL FROM HIS INJURIES AFTER THE DEMONSTRATION. SHE DID NOT HAVE A NAME AT THAT TIME. HER SOURCE WAS A FRIEND WHO HAD SPENT THE NIGHT AT THE SAME HOSPITAL WAITING FOR WORD ABOUT A GIRL WHO HAD SUSTAINED SERIOUS KIDNEY INJURIES. IT WAS THIS GIRL WHO HAD GIVEN WORD TO A DISSIDENT SPOKESMAN THAT HER BOYFRIEND, A STUDENT AT CHARLES UNIVERSITY'S MATHEMATICS FACULTY NAMED MARTIN SMID, HAD DIED.

5. TO THE EMBASSY ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20. CONFUSED BY OFFICIAL GOC REPORTS THAT SMID WAS ALIVE, TWO STUDENTS BY THAT NAME HAD, IN FACT, BEEN TRACKED DOWN BY THE POLICE AND APPEARED ON TELEVISION HERE SUNDAY EVENING. ONE OF THESE ADMITTED TO HAVING BEEN AT THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATION, THOUGH HE APPEARED TO BE DRUGGED AND TO HAVE SUSTAINED FROM WHAT COULD BE SEEN FROM THE FUZZY BLACK AND WHITE TELEVISION PRINT. SOME INJURIES, HE WAS EVIDENTLY ALIVE. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08109 201603Z


7. THE RUMOR PERSISTS OF A
STUDENT’S DEATH, IF NOT MARTIN SMID. THESE CONTINUE DESPITE OFFICIAL DENIALS AND PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF REPORTS THAT HOSPITALS HAVE BEEN TOLD NOT TO COMMENT ON INJURIES OF ANY PERSONS ADMITTED FROM THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATION.

BLACK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***  CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01   Prague 08110 01 OF 02 201608Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-18 SIL-01
INRE-00 OPM-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /063 W

O 201657Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1774
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L  SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 08110

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: POPULAR AND SOVIET PRESSURE FOR REFORM
CONVERGE ON THE JAKES LEADERSHIP

REF: (A) PRAGUE 8082 (B) PRAGUE 8075

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. TWO FACTORS HAVE CONVERGED TO
DIMINISH THE CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME'S CHANCES FOR
DELAYING DEEPER REFORMS AND TO POSE A SERIOUS
THREAT TO CPCZ LEADER JAKES' POSITION. ONE,
PRAGUE HAS CONTINUED TO EXPERIENCE
POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS SINCE THE WEEKEND. THESE
HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY RUMORS, DESPITE GOC
DENIALS, THAT A STUDENT MAY HAVE BEEN KILLED
CONFIDENTIAL

DURING THE POLICE VIOLENCE ON NOVEMBER 17. SECOND,
CPCZ IDEOLOGY CHIEF JAN FOJTIK
HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WITH THE MESSAGE THAT GORBACHEV EXPECTS THE TIME FOR TALKING ABOUT RECONSTRUCTION IS OVER AND THAT IT IS NOW UP TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP TO IMPLEMENT IT. IF THIS WERE NOT ENOUGH, THE CPCZ LEADERSHIP HAS SED CHAIRMAN EGON KRENZ COMING INTO TOWN ON NOVEMBER 21 AND IS FACING STUDENT AND DISSIDENT CALLS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE ON NOVEMBER 27. END SUMMARY.

3. THE EVENTS OF THE NOVEMBER 17-19 WEEKEND IN PRAGUE HAVE SHIFTED THE POLITICAL GROUND HERE. THEY MADE THE JAKES LEADERSHIP (AND JAKES PERSONALLY) LOOK MUCH MORE VULNERABLE THAN IT DID EVEN A WEEK AGO. MASS DEMONSTRATIONS, BY STUDENTS, FIRST ON FRIDAY NIGHT (REF A) AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY (SEPTEL) TO PROTEST THIS FIRST DEMONSTRATION'S BRUTAL SUPPRESSION, HAVE PROVIDED A SO FAR MISSING ELEMENT IN THE POLITICAL EQUATION HERE: WIDE SPREAD POPULAR UNREST, WITH STUDENTS AND OTHERS CALLING FOR CONTINUED PROTEST AND A GENERAL STRIKE ON NOVEMBER 27 AND SCATTERED, BUT UNCONFIRMED, REPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL AND SCHOOL STOPPAGES.

4. DURING THE WEEKEND CPCZ LEADER JAKES WAS PARTICULARLY TARGETED BY DEMONSTRATORS WHO FREQUENTLY CHANTED "JAKES OUT" OR "JAKES INTO THE WASTEBASKET." THE INTENSITY AND SINGLE-MINDEDNESS OF THESE DEMANDS SHOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY DAMAGING TO A LEADER ALREADY RUMORED TO HAVE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03      PRAGUE 08110 01 OF 02 201608Z

WANTED TO RESIGN IN A CRISES OF SELF-CONFIDENCE AFTER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GDR. THE POLICE RESTRAINT DISPLAYED ON NOVEMBER 18 AND 19 AGAINST DEMONSTRATIONS MAY ENCOURAGE EVEN LARGER POPULAR TURNOUTS TODAY (NOVEMBER 20) AT WENCESLAS SQUARE, WHERE STUDENTS HAVE AGAIN CALLED PEOPLE TO ASSEMBLE AT 1600.

5. IF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE NOT ENOUGH, THE SOVIETS HAVE COINCIDENTALLY CHOSEN THIS MOMENT TO STEP UP THEIR PRESSURE ON THE CPCZ LEADERSHIP. CPCZ IDEOLOGY CHIEF JAN FOJTIK RETURNED FROM MOSCOW THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 17 (REF B) JUST AS PRAGUE WAS EXPERIENCING ITS LARGEST
DEMONSTRATION IN 20 YEARS. CALLED TO MOSCOW
AT SOVIET REQUEST, HE MET WITH CPSU PRESIDUIUM
MEMBER MEDVEDEV FOR TALKS THAT FOCUSED ON 1968,
THE NEED FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO TOE THE PERESTROIKA
LINE AND FOR THE GOC TO SPEED THE PACE OF REFORM.
FOJTIK DENIED THE SOVIETS HAD ISSUED ANY
WARNINGS OR EVEN GIVEN ADVICE, BUT FROM OFFICIAL
ACCOUNTS FOJTIK GAVE REPORTERS THEY CLEARLY LAID
OUT THE DIRECTION THEY EXPECTED THE CZECHOSLOVAKS
TO FOLLOW.

6. THE REPORT OF FOJTIK'S TRIP IN "RUDE PRAVO"
CARRIED WHAT APPEARED AN APPARENTLY AGREED
FORMULATION OF FOJTIK'S DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION
OF 1968... BOTH SIDES, IT READ, HAD CONCERED
THEMSELVES WITH HISTORICAL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING
THE YEAR 1968, AND REACHED "A COMPLETE IDENTITY
OF POSITIONS AND THE CONCLUSION THAT WITHOUT A
THOROUGHGOING ANALYSIS OF THE PAST, THEY CANNOT
CHART A CLEAR PLAN AND GOAL FOR THE FUTURE."

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08110 02 OF 02 201608Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
    H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03
    LAB-04 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-18 SIL-01
    INRE-00 OPM-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /063W

---------------------276207 201622Z/45
O 201657Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1775
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 PRAGUE 08110

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, CZ
SUBJECT: POPULAR AND SOVIET PRESSURE FOR REFORM

WHILE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION, THE SOVIET MEANING IS ALMOST CERTAINLY THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKS SHOULD QUIT USING 1968 AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT MOVING AHEAD. BEHIND IT MAY BE A THREAT THAT A FAILURE TO DO SO COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO RE-ASSESS THEIR OFFICIAL EVALUATION OF THE 1968 INVASION.

7. AT ONE POINT IN RESPONDING TO A JOURNALIST'S QUESTION, FOJTIK QUOTED SOVIET LEADER GORBACHEV AS SAYING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO END THE STAGE OF RECONSTRUCTION MARKED BY MEETINGS AND ENDLESS DISCUSSION AND TO GET ON WITH IMPLEMENTING IT.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08110 02 OF 02 201608Z

THOUGH FOJTIK DID NOT GIVE A CITATION FOR THIS QUOTE, AND SINCE HE DID NOT MEET WITH GORBACHEV ON THIS TRIP, IT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN CONTAINED IN A RUMORED MESSAGE THE SOVIET PARTY CHIEF SENT THE CZECHOSLOVAK (AND BULGARIAN) LEADERSHIP LAST WEEK.

8. THE LEADERSHIP IS TRYING TO DEFUSE THE POPULAR PRESSURE BEHIND THIS WEEKEND'S AND CONTINUING DEMONSTRATIONS BY FOCUSING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON THE ALLEGEDLY FRAUDULENT REPORT OF A STUDENT'S DEATH. THE REPORT WAS FIRST CARRIED BY RFE, VOA AND OTHER WESTERN MEDIA. THE STUDENT, FIRST IDENTIFIED AS MARTIN SMID, WAS SAID TO HAVE DIED AS A RESULT OF POLICE BEATINGS AFTER THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATIONS. IN AN INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S LOW LEVEL OF CREDIBILITY THE RUMOR OF A STUDENT'S DEATH CONTINUES DESPITE STATEMENTS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTERS THAT NO MARTIN SMID HAS
DIED AND THE PRESENTATION ON TELEVISION OF TWO
STUDENTS BY THAT NAME, ONE OF WHOM SAYS HE
PARTICIPATED IN THE DEMONSTRATION.

9. TOMORROW, NOVEMBER 21, THE CPCZ WILL
HOST AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY SED CHAIRMAN EGON
KRENZ. WHILE THE VISIT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN
PLANNED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, KRENZ' EXPERIENCE
AND THAT OF THE GDR IN RECENT WEEKS COULD PROVE
OF EXTRAORDINARY INTEREST AND PERTINENCE TO
THE JAKES LEADERSHIP NOW.

BLACK
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03    PRAGUE 08110  02 OF 02  201608Z
CONFDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 PRAGUE 08144

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR EU (OLASON, PENDERGRAST, JORIA); INFO DD
(KNOPP), C(PISTOR)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE AND OTHER
CZECHOSLOVAK CITIES NOVEMBER 20

1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: THE PRAGUE
DEMONSTRATION OF NOVEMBER 20, AT MORE THAN 150,000
PEOPLE, WAS THE LARGEST YET. POLICE MADE NO ATTEMPT
TO INTERVENE OTHER THAN TO CLOSE BRIDGES TO PREVENT
THE CROWD FROM MARCHING ON PRAGUE CASTLE.
DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO OCCURRED IN SEVERAL OTHER
CITIES, INCLUDING BRATISLAVA. MEDIA COVERAGE
REMAINED MIXED, WITH "RUDE PRAVO" HOSTILE,
"SVOBODNE SLOVO" FAVORABLE AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE POSITIVE -- OR AT LEAST OBJECTIVE.
WHETHER AS A THOUGHTOUT PLAN OR THE RESULT OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
NONE-TOO-VEILED WARNING OF SUPPRESSION IF THINGS REMAIN OUT OF HAND. IT ALSO IS CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS TO TAINT DEMONSTRATORS WITH CHARGES OF WORKING FOR FOREIGN INTERESTS. IT CANNOT HAVE BEEN PLEASED, HOWEVER, BY A SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN STATEMENT THAT DESCRIBED THE DEMONSTRATIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. IN ANOTHER PRESUMABLE REACTION TO THE DEMONSTRATIONS, GDR LEADER KRENZ HAS CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO PRAGUE. (NOTE: AS THIS CABLE GOES TO PRESS, CZECH REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN KASIK ANNOUNCED THAT AN INVESTIGATION WOULD BE OPENED ON THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 17 AND WHETHER THE POLICE USED DISPROPORTIONATE FORCE. END NOTE.) END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

2. (U) THE DEMONSTRATION DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING YESTERDAY, NOVEMBER 20, WAS THE LARGEST YET. THE COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY "RUDE PRAVO" ADMITTED TO 150,000 PEOPLE, BUT EMBOFFS PRESENT THOUGHT IT CLOSER TO 200,000. THE CROWD GATHERED SLOWLY DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY AND DISPERSED GRADUALLY IN THE EVENING. A LAST GROUP OF SEVERAL THOUSAND STOOD OUTSIDE CZECHOSLOVAK RADIO AT ABOUT 10:00 P.M. AND THEN WENT HOME. POLICE MADE NO EFFORT TO INTERFERE WITH THE CROWD AS LONG AS IT STAYED WITHIN THE "GOLDEN CROSS" AREA OF WENCESLAS SQUARE AND NATIONAL AVENUE. SECURITY FORCES DID close off THE BRIDGES GOING ACROSS THE RIVER TO PREVENT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08144 01 OF 03 211441Z

DEMONSTRATORS FROM TRYING TO MARCH ON PRAGUE CASTLE.

3. (U) THE DEMONSTRATION APPEARED TO BE UNORGANIZED AND LEADERLESS, AND WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO CALL FOR A GATHERING TODAY ONE IS GENERALLY EXPECTED. OTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED THE SAME DAY OUTSIDE PRAGUE. THESE INCLUDED BRNO (AN ESTIMATED 30,000 IN THE CENTRAL SQUARE), OLOMOUC (6,000), TEPlice (1,000), LIBEREc AND OSTRAVA. THEATERS AND SCHOOLS WERE CLOSED IN CESKE BUDĚJOVICE, AS WELL AS PRAGUE – WHERE PERFORMERS TALKED POLITICS WITH ANY AUDIENCE MEMBERS WHO SHOWED UP. DEMONSTRATIONS ALSO TOOK PLACE IN BRATISLAVA, BUT WE HAVE HEARD OF NO OTHERS IN SLOVAKIA. DEMONSTRATORS IN MANY OF THESE PLACES VOICED THE ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMANDS HEARD IN PRAGUE, INCLUDING SUCH SLOGANS AS "JAKES IN THE
WASTEBASKET." TELEVISION NEWS REPORTS SAID THAT THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF DISTURBANCES IN OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES SUCH AS PLZEN AND HRADEC KRALOVE, AND CONDEMNED THE NOVEMBER 17 POLICE BRUTALITY.

REGIME REACTION

-------------

4. (C) THE ONLY REGIME FIGURE TO ADDRESS THE DEMONSTRATORS DIRECTLY IN WENCESLAS SQUARE WAS VASIL MOHORITA, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOCIALIST UNION OF YOUTH (SSM). HE MADE SEVERAL POINTS THAT HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN HIS ORGANIZATION'S STATEMENT PUBLISHED IN "MLADA FRONTA" THE DAY BEFORE (PRAGUE 8106), IN WHICH HE SUPPORTED THE STUDENTS, AND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD OPPOSE ANY PROSECUTION OF STUDENTS ARRESTED ON NOVEMBER 17 AND WOULD RESIGN IF THERE WERE PROSECUTIONS. (COMMENT:

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08144 02 OF 03 211442Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /052 W

-----------------------361752 211451Z /41
O 211520Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1794
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7737
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
CONFIDENTIAL

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION
USIA FOR EU (OLASON, PENDERGRAST, JORIA); INFO DD
(KNOPP), C(PISTOR)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, CSCE, PGOV, PREL, CZ
SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE AND OTHER

WE REMAIN SUSPICIOUS THAT MOHORITA'S COMMENTS ARE
MORE AN EFFORT TO COOPT THE STUDENTS THAN TO SUPPORT
THEIR DEMANDS. END COMMENT.)

5. (U) THE CPCZ PRESIDIUM HELD A SPECIAL SESSION
DURING THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 20 TO TRY TO DEAL
WITH THE SITUATION AND WITH "EXPRESSIONS OF INTENSE
CONCERN" BY VARIOUS PARTY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
IT REJECTED STUDENT APPEALS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE
NOVEMBER 27 AND CALLED ON STUDENTS TO RETURN TO CLASS
AND ARTISTS TO RETURN TO WORK. IT ALSO REPORTEDLY
DISCUSSED PRACTICAL STEPS FOR RESTORING ORDER, AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08144 02 OF 03 211442Z

SUPPORTED A JOINT STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE FEDERAL,
CZECH AND SLOVAK GOVERNMENTS.

6. (C) THIS STATEMENT, ENTITLED "DIALOGUE YES,
CONFRONTATION NO," INSISTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT
HAD BEEN STRIVING FOR SOCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND
DEMOCRACY AS WELL AS IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS,
GOING INTO SOME DETAIL ON THE LATTER POINT. IT
EXPRESSIONED CONCERN ABOUT THE CURRENT DISTURBANCES
SINCE THESE "ONLY PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO
OPPOSE RESTRUCTURING." THE GOVERNMENT WANTED A
DIALOGUE AND A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF EXISTING
PROBLEMS, BUT SUCH A SOLUTION "CANNOT BE FOUND IN
AN ATMOSPHERE OF EMOTION AND ANTI-SOCIALIST
MANIFESTATIONS." WHILE THE GOVERNMENT "DID NOT WANT
TO GO VIA A PATH OF CONFRONTATION WHICH THE ANTI-
SOCIALIST ELEMENTS ARE TRYING TO FORCE ON US," IT COULD
NOT AGREE TO THE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LAWS OF THE LAND OR "WATCH HELPLESSLY ACTIVITIES OF
THOSE GROUPS WHICH ACT AT VARIANCE WITH THE
CZECHOSLOVK LEGAL ORDER AND ARE INCITED FROM ABROAD." 
THUS ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS SUPPORTED THE MEASURES
WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN TO KEEP ORDER. (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO SUPPRESSION OF THE NOVEMBER 17 DEMONSTRATIONS AND A WARNING THAT SUCH ACTION COULD COME AGAIN IF NEEDED. END COMMENT.)

7. (U) PRAGUE CITY PARTY CHAIRMAN MIROSLAV STEPAN, MEANWHILE, MET WITH CPCZ PARTY WORKERS OF THE MAJOR PRAGUE ENTERPRISES NOVEMBER 20 TO RALLY SUPPORT IN A PROBABLE EFFORT TO HEAD OFF A NOVEMBER 27 GENERAL STRIKE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNISTS NOT BEING NEUTRAL IN THE CURRENT EVENTS AND TO OPPOSE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08144 02 OF 03 211442Z

THOSE FORCES WHO WANTED ALL OR NOTHING (I.E., WHO WERE NOT INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE OR COMPROMISE) AND STAND FIRM AGAINST EVENTS NOW GOING ON IN THE CITY.

8. (U) IN A REACTION FROM THE SOVIET UNION, SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV WAS SHOWN ON CZECHOSLOVAK TELEVISION SAYING THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT THAT THEY REPRESENTED A PART OF THE CURRENT PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. PRESUMABLY IN RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN PRAGUE, GRD LEADER KRENZ CANCELLED HIS NOVEMBER 21 VISIT TO PRAGUE AFTER MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH THE GOC.

MEDIA REACTION

---------

9. (U) "RUDE PRAVO" IS STICKING TO A LINE CRITICAL OF THE DEMONSTRATORS, PUBLISHING INTERVIEWS WITH WORKERS AND PARTY MEMBERS HOSTILE TO THE DEMONSTRATIONS AND SUGGESTING THAT SOME OF THE ORGANIZERS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE NOT STUDENTS. IT LIMITED ITS COVERAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS TO PRAGUE AND BRNO, WITHOUT MENTIONING THAT ANY HAD TAKEN PLACE ELSEWHERE.

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CZECH JOURNALISTS' UNION TO DO THE SAME OR RESIGN. THEY ALSO CREATED AN OFFICIAL GROUP OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS.

11. (U) CZECHOSLOVAK TELEVISION COVERAGE WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE, OR AT LEAST OBJECTIVE. IN ADDITION TO COVERAGE OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN PRAGUE AND OTHER
CITIES, THERE WERE INTERVIEWS WITH THE STUDENTS AND OTHER DEMONSTRATORS, GIVING THEM A CHANCE TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS TO A NATIONAL AUDIENCE.

BLACK

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02     PRAGUE 08144 03 OF 03 211442Z

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  PRAGUE 08153  211802Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 AMAD-01 LAB-04
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 SIL-01 INRE-00 USIE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /046 W
------------------------372631 211838Z /49

O 211859Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 180609
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

CONFIDENTIAL PRAGUE 08153

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES
DEPARTMENT PASS TO ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, CSCE, CZ
SUBJECT: STUDENT STRIKE SITUATION REPORT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. VASIL MOHORITA, CHAIRMAN OF THE UNION OF
SOCIALIST YOUTH (SSM), HAS PLEDGED SSM SUPPORT IN THE
FORM OF STRIKE ORGANIZERS AND SOUND EQUIPMENT FOR AN
ONGOING STUDENT STRIKE. VIRTUALLY ALL UNIVERSITY AND
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND FACULTY IN PRAGUE AND BRNO
ARE ON STRIKE. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STRIKE
COORDINATING COMMITTEE TOLD EMBOFF THAT PRIME MINISTER
ADAMEC HAS PROMISED TO MEET WITH STRIKE COMMITTEE
REPRESENTATIVES, BUT THAT THE STRIKE COMMITTEE DOES
NOT EXPECT AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION.
(According to a late radio report, Adamec did meet
this morning with representatives of students and other
groups. The report did not indicate the content of the
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  PRAGUE 08153  211802Z

MEETING.) END SUMMARY.

STUDENT STRIKE: SITUATION UPDATE

4. MOHORITA PROMISED THE COMMITTEE THAT THE SSM WOULD PROVIDE MICROPHONES AND LOUDSPEAKERS FOR A DEMONSTRATION TODAY, NOVEMBER 21. (EMBOFF NOTED THAT A BULL HORN WAS IN USE BY DEMONSTRATORS THIS NOON AT THE SQUARE). HE ALSO PROMISED THAT THE SSM WOULD SEND OUT REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO GET ALL UNIVERSITIES AND HIGH SCHOOLS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STUDENT STRIKE. AS OF TODAY, WE BELIEVE VIRTUALLY ALL SCHOOLS IN PRAGUE AND BRNO ARE CLOSED, BUT THAT A GENERAL STUDENT STRIKE HAS NOT SPREAD BEYOND THESE TWO CITIES, THOUGH SELECTED FACULTIES/GYMNASIA ARE CLOSED IN CITIES LIKE BRATISLAVA AND CESKE BUDEJOVICE. GENERALLY, FACULTY MEMBERS ARE SUPPORTING STUDENTS IN THIS STRIKE.

5. A VISIT TO THE FACULTY OF MUSIC AND ARTS BY ONE EMBOFF FOUND ADMITTANCE TO THE SCHOOL LIMITED TO CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 08153 211802Z

STUDENTS, FACULTY AND "SPECIAL GUESTS," WITH A FUNCTIONING PRESS CENTER AND STRIKE COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS. CANDLES COMMEMORATING THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 17 BURNED OUTSIDE, WHILE INSIDE STUDENTS WERE WRITING PROCLAMATIONS AND PLOTTING STRATEGY TO GET WORKERS, FARMERS AND EVEN POLICE TO SUPPORT A GENERAL STRIKE ON NOVEMBER 27. A STRIKE COMMITTEE MEMBER TOLD EMBOFF THAT THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED SEVERAL DELEGATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES OF FACTORY WORKERS WHO HAD PLEDGED SUPPORT, AND THAT THE STRIKE COMMITTEE HAD ALSO RECEIVED PROMISES THAT COAL MINERS IN THE OSTRAVA AREA WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE STRIKE.

6. STRIKE COMMITTEE MEMBERS ALSO STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER ADAMEC HAD PLEDGED TO MEET WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STRIKE COORDINATING COMMITTEE TODAY. OUR CONTACT INDICATED THAT COMMITTEE MEMBERS WOULD APPROACH THE MEETING WITH AN OPEN MIND, BUT DOUBTED THAT ADAMEC COULD OFFER ANYTHING WHICH WOULD LEAD STUDENTS TO CANCEL THEIR STRIKE OR WITHDRAW CALLS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND A NOVEMBER 27 GENERAL STRIKE.

BLACK

NOTE: NOT PASSED TO CSCE COMMISSION.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 08155 01 OF 02 211807Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-07 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSA-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRS-00 PA-01 STR-18 NRR-01 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 SCT-03
P-02 /090 W

P 211901Z NOV 89
FM EMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1808

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PRAGUE 08155

DEPT PASS ERIKA SCHLAGER CSCE COMMISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, CSCE, CZ
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 21 MORNING DEMONSTRATION AT
- WENCESLAS SQUARE: OVERHEARD CONVERSATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING RECORDS THE IMPRESSIONS
AND A CONVERSATION OVERHEARD BY EMBASSY SPOUSE
WHO VISITED WENCESLAS SQUARE AT
ABOUT 10:30 ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 21. THIS
WAS EARLY ENOUGH SO THAT THE SQUARE WAS NOT
CROWDED WITH DEMONSTRATORS. END SUMMARY.

3. AS EMBASSY SPOUSE STOPPED BY WENCESLAS SQUARE
THIS MORNING AROUND 10:30, THERE WERE ABOUT 300
PEOPLE AROUND THE STATUE OF BOHEMIA'S PATRON SAINT,
MOST OF WHOM WERE VERY YOUNG -- 15-20 YEARS OLD.
THE SIX "LEADERS" STANDING ON THE STATUE STEPS LOOKED
LIKE CHILDREN. (NOTE: MANY OF THESE ACCORDING
TO LOCAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS HAD SPENT THE NIGHT AT THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08155 01 OF 02 211807Z

FOOT OF THE STATUE.) ABOUT TWO BLOCKS DOWN THE SQUARE
EMBASSY SPOUSE STOPPED TO LISTEN TO A KNOT OF PEOPLE
WHO WERE STANDING IN THE CENTER OF THE SQUARE. THESE
WERE OLDER PEOPLE, 40-80 YEARS OLD. THEY WERE DISCUSSING
THE EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THE PAST 50 YEARS. MUCH OF WHAT THEY SAID SOUNDED LIKE WHAT CZECHS HAVE BEEN SAYING IN WHISPERS FOR A LONG TIME, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THESE PEOPLE WERE ENJOYING THE CHANCE TO SAY THE SAME THINGS OUT LOUD, PUBLICLY, AMONG STRANGERS.

4. HERE ARE SOME OF THE COMMENTS OVERHEARD:

- "WE ALL HAVE TO GET OUT ON THE STREETS."

- "YOUNG PEOPLE DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT HISTORY. THEY DON'T KNOW ANYTHING BUT COMMUNISM. THOSE KIDS WHO WERE OUT MARCHING IN JANUARY FOR PALACH -- MOST OF THEM DON'T KNOW WHO PALACH WAS."

- "THEY DON'T KNOW WHO MASARYK WAS."

- "THAT'S RIGHT. ASK A HIGH SCHOOL SOPHOMORE WHO WAS THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AND THEY WILL TELL YOU GOTTLWALD."

- "THEY KNOW MORE SOVIET HISTORY THAN CZECH."

- "NO, THEY HEAR ABOUT THE FIRST REPUBLIC FROM THEIR FAMILIES."

- "NO THEY DON'T. LOTS OF FAMILIES ARE AFRAID TO TALK ABOUT IT."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03   PRAGUE 08155 01 OF 02 211807Z

- "EVERYONE HAS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GENERAL STRIKE NEXT WEEK. THAT WILL SHOW THEM."

- WOMAN: "I HEARD THAT ANYONE WHO PARTICIPATES WILL LOSE HIS JOB."

- DEAD SILENCE.

- "THEY CAN'T FIRE ALL OF US." "THAT'S RIGHT."

- WOMAN: "THEY SAY ANYONE WHO PARTICIPATES WILL LOSE HIS JOB. NO JOB, NO MONEY, NO NOTHING, THE USUAL THING."

- "I REMEMBER BENES, WHAT A MAN, WHAT A GENTLEMAN. YOU COULD RUN INTO HIM RIGHT HERE ON THE SQUARE,
IN FRONT OF BATA, AND SAY, GOOD DAY, MR. PRESIDENT, AND HE WOULD SAY, WHY, GOOD DAY, HOW ARE YOU? BUYING SHOES? I'D LIKE TO RUN INTO ONE OF THOSE GUYS (GESTURING TOWARDS FEDERAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING) ON THE STREET. THEY GO EVERYWHERE IN THEIR BIG CARS. THEY HAVE MONEY, BIG PLACES, EVERTHING."

-- WHEN (NAME FORGOTTEN) WENT INTO THE GOVERNMENT, HE GOT 10,000 A YEAR. NOW THEY GET 2.5 MILLION. THEY BUILD THEMSELVES PALACES. THEY HAVE ALL THE (WORD NOT UNDERSTOOD, BUT IT GOT A BIG LAUGH) AND WE HAVE NOTHING. MY PENSION IS 1000 PER MONTH. I'M SUPPOSED TO LIVE ON THAT. WHY ISN'T JAKES ON PENSION?"

-- "THE MAIN THING IS, THERE HAS TO BE A GOOD TURNOOUT FOR THE STRIKE."

-- "YES, ESPECIALLY TRANSPORTATION WORKERS."

NOTE: NOT PASSED CSCE COMMISSION CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 PRAGUE 08155 01 OF 02 211807Z
"RIGHT. 'THEY' ALWAYS USED THE STRIKE AS A WEAPON BEFORE 1948. IF WE ALL STOP WORK, IF THE MINES STOP, THEY HAVE TO LISTEN AND THE OLD MEN WILL HAVE TO GET OUT."
-- "WHAT IF WE STRIKE AND NOTHING HAPPENS?"
-- "WE STRIKE AGAIN. WE KEEP ON STRIKING AGAIN AND AGAIN."
-- "THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE PICTURES. THEY SAY THE STUDENTS WHO ARE MARCHING WILL BE IDENTIFIED."
-- "IF THEY ARE WORRIED, LET THEM GO TO A DIFFERENT CITY AND MARCH THERE."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 08155 02 OF 02 211807Z

5. SEVERAL PEOPLE SPOKE ABOUT INSTANCES WITH WHICH THEY WERE FAMILIAR OF GOOD PEOPLE LOCKED UP IN THE 50'S FOR, FOR EXAMPLE, BEING INVOLVED WITH SCOUTING. "THE PEOPLE WHO LOCKED THEM UP ARE THE ONES WHO HAVE BEEN LEADING THE YOUTH ALL THESE YEARS. WHAT DO YOU EXPECT? NO WONDER THE YOUNG PEOPLE DON'T KNOW ANYTHING." "BUT WE ARE HERE," REPLIED ONE YOUNG MAN.

6. A FINAL NOTE. ON THE METRO THIS MORNING THIS EMBASSY SPOUSE'S HOUSEKEEPER SAW A YOUNG STUDENT WEARING ONE OF OUR U.S.-CZECHOSLOVAK FLAG PINS. SOMEONE ON THE SUBWAY OFFERED HIM 500 KCS. FOR IT (USD 50). THE OFFER WAS REFUSED. END NOTE.

BLACK

NOTE: NOT PASSED CSCE COMMISSION
The Civic Forum’s Exposition of its Position in Public Life with a Call for
Nonviolence, Tolerance and Dialogue

Prague, 20 November 1989

The Civic Forum is not a political party, nor an organization which accepts members. It is an absolutely open society of people who feel themselves responsible for the positive resolution of the untenable political situation, wanting to unite the forces of all the honest and democratically-minded citizens—artists, students, workers and all people of good will. It was established spontaneously in the presence of all the groups which on Sunday, 11 November, took part in an independent social activity. We consider this representation of the people to be competent to negotiate with responsible political authorities. We are, therefore, after an objective plan of action, not violence. We do not want crudeness. We appeal to the members of the police, the army, the militia, to refuse brutality and repression of the will of the people. As long as in reality nobody was killed during the harsh intervention of uniformed units, we are all happy, but this does not mean that there did not occur massacres, injuries and bloodshed. Various wild rumors and willfully disseminated misinformation are multiplying. Let us not succumb to them! We ask all citizens to act responsibly, humanely, tolerantly and democratically. Let us lead our common goal, as much as it is in our power, to a good conclusion. Let us persist and let us not give up!

Internal and external enemy forces, with the aim of eliciting unrest, emotion, chaos, and mass protests in order to destabilize the internal political situation, have recently been growing in intensity and peaked between 17-19 November in Prague. Most notable has been the misuse of a student gathering on 17 November during the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the burial of Jan Opletal. Western media, including broadcasters from Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, generated wide publicity for both the demonstration preparations as well as the demonstration itself. The goal was to provoke a mass showing patterned after the demonstrations in the GDR and thereby create strenuous pressure on Party and State organs.

In connection with the preparations for the commemoration of Jan Opletal’s death, there has been a notably significant radicalization of some of the university students in Prague. At the center of the political activation of students has been the Theatrical Academy of Performing Arts (TAPA) whose supporters, in collaboration with the Cultural Front, have orchestrated the main role in the organization of pressure tactics. The TAPA student rally, held on 15 November, cancelled, as part of its conclusion, the activities of the Socialist Youth League (SSM) with the justification that it does not have the right to represent the youth as a whole. In addition, there were demands to entertain questions regarding the role of CPCz leaders in society. An analogous situation presented itself at a gathering of University of Industrial Arts students in Prague on 16 November. Additional student gatherings, planned for this week, are intended to utilize the situation to establish a new student organization—the Independent Student Association, which is to generate activities along the lines of the National Front.

Additional sources of the student political activation are the so-called Independent Youth Society, headed by Tomas VODICKA and Matous RAJMONT (both are secondary school students), and the so-called Independent Student Society, centered on university students, headed by Milan RUZICKA (Technical University, VUT Brno), Radek VANA (Faculty of Philosophy, Charles’s University, Prague) and Petr FIALA (Faculty of Pedagogy, Charles’s University, Prague). Both initiatives, in terms of subject matter, began with a policy-statement, from an appeal for a “few sentences,” and proposed preparations to misuse the commemoration of Jan Opletal’s death as an
opportunity to denounce the role of the CPCz, as well as the activities of the SSM, and the political system of the CSSR.

In order to thwart this design, associative and academic organs took measures to divert crowds from the original rout from the Albertov Pedagogical Institute via Charles’s bridge, Stepanska (St.), Opletalova (St.), to the Main Train Station and the J. Opletal monument, to a rout from Albertov to Vysehrad and made a public announcement that the crowd was the result of a joint activity between the SSM and unorganized students. In consideration of the situation, the associative organs brokered a compromise to the effect that the executive member of the so-called Circle of Independent Intellectuals, an academic named KATETOV, would make an appearance on behalf of the independent initiatives. His address at Albertov did not go beyond a policy-statement and was not an openly aimed attack against the socialist structure in the CSSR.

The official program was effectively disrupted by whistling and the chanting of unfriendly slogans such as “Destroy the CPCz monopoly,” “We want a different government,” “String up all the communists,” “Destroy the army, State Security, and the Peoples’ Militia”, “We don’t want Jakès,” “We don’t want Stepan,” “We want a charter,” etc. Organizers, in light of the development of the situation, did not have the opportunity to establish order and secure the proper course of the demonstration. After the rally at Albertov ended, the participants broke up and reassembled at Slavin 23 [cemetery in Vysehrad], where the official mourning portion of the commemoration concluded. Afterwards, approximately 5,000 individuals continued in a procession into the center of Prague along the B. Engels embankment, up Narodni trida (St.) to Wenceslas Square. In response, Narodni trida and the neighboring streets were closed by IS (Internal Security) peace-keeping units.  

By around 10:00 p.m., approximately 3,000 people had assembled within the confines of Narodni trida, of which only about 1,000 acknowledged the call to disperse and leave the area. Those remaining lingered in the area and began sitting down on the pavement in demonstration fashion and continued to chant unfriendly slogans. Over 15 calls to disperse went unheeded and the participants of the demonstration had over an hour to restore order to the area. After the calls went unheeded, measures were taken to suppress the crowd. During the course of those measures, a skirmish ensued with some of the more aggressive participants in the demonstration. After intervening, 179 individuals were detained, of whom approximately 145 were held for aggressive behavior directed at the IS department. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., public order was restored. During intervention a total of 38 individuals were injured including one member of the SNB (National Security Committee) and one US citizen. 

On Saturday, 11 November 1989, a group of students, primarily from TAPA and [VSE]25 Prague, issued a declaration condemning the intervention of peace-keeping units and proposed a weekly strike consisting of university students and pedagogues to push for the creation of a special government commission to investigate the intervention as well as other demands. In the effort to call on students to implement a general strike at all theaters in the —SSR on 11 November, in excess of 400 individuals gathered at a production at the Realistik Theater in Prague. 

In response to the call to theater performers, actress Milena DVORSKA walked out at the E.F. Burian theater on Wenceslas Square on the afternoon of 11 November
1989. All Prague theaters and a few elsewhere in the CSSR (in Liberec and Datec) responded by suspending their performances and reading the invitation to the audience.

During the afternoon hours on Saturday 18 November 1989 a gathering of around 700 people gradually formed on Narodní trída, which had been closed. After calls to disperse, the crowd broke-up prior to 6:00 p.m., with intervention being carried out by peace-keeping units. Ninety-six individuals were detained, of whom nine made displays against the SNB department.

Elsewhere around the CSSR there have been no reports of peace disturbances or public disorder.

In the effort to incite emotion, particularly among young people, and to elicit additional protests, information has been distributed by means of internal antagonists and Western communications regarding the death of Martin ŠMÍD, of the Charles’s University Mathematics Faculty, from injuries sustained as a result of a confrontation with peace-keeping units. This information was disclosed by “Charter 77” signatory Petr UHL to Radio Free Europe which repeatedly aired the information on Sunday, 19 November 1989. Leaflets were then subsequently distributed providing information about the death with a call for a general strike on 27 November 1989. Similar leaflets were discovered in the northern Bohemian, eastern Bohemian, and southern Bohemian regions.

A further attempt to instigate anti-socialist protests and provoke the intervention of peace-keeping units came to a head on Sunday, 11 November 1989 during the afternoon and evening hours in downtown Prague. In implementing the security measures, only the accessibility and safety of the highway thoroughfare was secured; peace-keeping units were not attacked.

On 19 November 1989, National Theater play-actor Boris ROSNER and head actor Milan LUKEŠ instigated the reading of a resolution to the audience during the afternoon performance on the new stage at the National Theater in Prague, in which they expressed their disagreement with the Security intervention on 17 November 1989. At the urging of LUKEŠ, the theater choir and those in attendance sang a theater hymn. Afterwards they promptly dispersed. National Theater director Jiri PAUER responded by closing the premises of the historical building and the new stage of the National Theater and cancelled evening performances with the justification that the National Theater would not serve to organize illegal gatherings. After director PAUER’s decision, actors from the National Theater began to assemble in the National Theater club where they decided to strike.

During the evening hours, CSSR cultural minister Milan KYMLICKA visited the National Theater. In an interview with the National Theater employees, he indicated that the CST (Czechoslovak Television) news would address the establishment of a government commission to investigate the SNB intervention on 17 November 1989. Those present promised that as long as the commission was established, the National Theater actors’ club would rescind their decision to strike. At 7:30 p.m. all closely followed the CST television broadcast. Because no announcement was made about the creation of a government commission, National Theater actors, at the urging of Boris ROSNER, undertook additional initiatives. ROSNER, as the spokesman for the National Theater actors, along with three other individuals, proceeded to the front of the theater building where, after only a short time, he was able to organize a crowd of approximately
500 people. ROSNER announced that the National Theater would strike continuously until it was called off, the crowd chanted the slogan “OUT WITH PAUER.”

On 19 November 1989, shortly after 10:00 p.m., at the Jiri Wolker Theater, at the location originally determined for the performance, theater employees read a declaration to the audience explaining that the theater had joined the protest strike as an expression of their disagreement with the Security intervention on 17 November 1989. 17 December was determined as a substitute date for the original performance. Patrons then quietly dispersed.

A petition denouncing the SNB intervention was also read at the Komorni Theater in Plzen, where [OBRODA] branch members Stanislav NEDVED and Frantisek JURICKA were seated in the auditorium. Similarly, the planned performance did not materialize.

During the evening hours of the same day, a “public discussion forum” took place in the actors’ club in Prague involving the most important opposition group supporters, representatives of the Cultural Front, and university students. The actors’ club was filled to capacity, including the vestibule, where others followed the course of the forum on a video display monitor. Included among the viewers in the vestibule were well-known actors such as HANZLIK, BREJCHOVA, KANYZA, Josef DVORAK, and others.

The goal of this forum was to unify the independent initiatives and compose joint declarations, which are to be presented to the government of the CSSR by 10 representatives on 20 November 1989. The forum was conducted by Vaclav HAVEL who addressed the declaration and put the various alternatives to a vote, and he then read and spoke favorably of the outcome. During the course of the discussion, appearances were also made by well-known independent group advocates including BATTEK, KANTUREK, HRADILEK, VONDRA, and others.

Similarly, an unidentified TAPA student emerged to read a declaration from the TAPA students. The declaration amounted to an ultimatum for the removal of the CSSR minister of the interior, the investigation and prosecution of subordinates who were involved in the intervention of 17 November 1989, the abolition of stipulations regarding the leadership role of the Party in the system, and the resignation of the current representatives of the Party and State. On 20 November 1989 a coordinating student body is to be created at the TAPA faculty, which is supposed to guarantee the distribution of this declaration and thereby aid in the actualization of the general strike on 27 November.

Vaclav HAVEL supported the student declaration by suggesting that the coordinating committee supporting the forum should meet daily in some of the Prague theaters in order to direct and organize the student strikes; theaters, which are to similarly strike, would be open, however, discussion clubs would be held in place of the performances.

The aim of university students in the next few days is to travel around to various locations around the CSSR to publicize and popularize the stated declaration in the effort to convert the youth in secondary and vocational schools.

The forum was essentially divided by two differing opinions. A significantly smaller camp asserted the opinion that in essence a dialogue with the current government could be entertained provided certain changes were made, the most important of which they considered to be the resignation of comrades Jakes, Stepan, Zavadil, Hoffmann, Indra, and Fojtik. A notably stronger group represented by HAVEL, BATTEK, and
KANTUREK and the university student representatives, was against dialogue in any form and supported an open confrontation with the powers of the State. Both groups decided on the unconditional abolition of the principle of a leading role of the Party, anchored in the institution.

The forum culminated with a declaration read and submitted for approval by Vaclav HAVEL. This declaration, filled with comments from the discussion forum, will be submitted to the State organs. After singing a state hymn the participants of the forum dispersed.

Conclusion

The development of events proves that internal enemies, with foreign support, have crossed-over to a frontal, and from their perspective, decisive attack in the effort to further their own political goals after the pattern exhibited by Poland and Hungary. To this end, it has been decided to actualize and utilize all reasonable means, primarily abusing the youth for pressure tactics. These events, according to the plans of the enemy, together with the expected economic difficulties and foreign pressure for political change, should be the beginning of a quick series of successive events resulting in principle political change in the CSSR.

Vaclav NOVOTNY
Chief of the Secretariat of the FMI Operation Staff

To be obtained by:

RA (Regional Administration) SNB Chiefs – Ceske Budejovice, Plzeo,Usti nad Labem, Hradec Kralove, Brno, Ostrava, Banska Bystrica, Kosice; S (Slovak) SNB Chief main m. Bratislava, XII. S SNB; (Ministry of the Interior and Environment CSR, SSR. […]

0 200908Z NOV 89
PM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8518
INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE
AMBASSADY ANKARA
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06297

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, BU, US
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CP POLITBURO MEMBER LUKANOV
       DELIVERS "SIGNAL" ON BULGARIAN
       DEVELOPMENTS AND U.S.-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

1. [ redacted ] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING A NOVEMBER 17 CONVERSATION WITH
   THE AMBASSADOR, BCP POLITBURO MEMBER LUKANOV CLAIMED
   THAT (THEN) FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV'S DISAGREEMENT
   WITH ZIVKOV OVER ECOFORUM DEVELOPMENTS PRECIPITATED
   THE MOVE TO OUSt ZIVKOV. LUKANOV SPOKE ABOUT THE
   NEW LEADERSHIP'S DEEP COMMITMENT TO CHANGE TOWARD
   DEMOCRACY AND PLURALISM, NOTING HIS AND MLADENOV'S
   MEETINGS WITH INTELLECTUALS/INDEPENDENT GROUPS,
   THE NOVEMBER DEMONSTRATIONS, AND THE NATIONAL
   ASSEMBLY'S RESCINDING OF ARTICLE 273 AS EXAMPLES
   OF SUCH A COMMITMENT; NO ONE, HE SAID, WILL BE TRIED
   FOR JAILING FOR HOLDING DIFFERENT POLITICAL BELIEFS.
   HE INDICATED ANOTHER CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING WOULD
   PROBABLY BE HELD IN DECEMBER, AT WHICH THERE WOULD
   BE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL CHANGES AND A NEW GENERAL
   POLITICAL LINE WOULD BE LAIEd OUT. HE INDICATED
   PROBABLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE LEADERSHIP'S TREATMENT
   OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY, BUT INDICATED THIS
   WOULD TAKE TIME TO EVOLVE. FINALLY, HE EXPRESSEd THE
   HOPE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S COMMITMENT TO
   DEMOCRATIZATION COULD LEAD TO A BREAK-THROUGH IN
U.S.-BULGARIAN RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING ALMOST AN HOUR OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR NOVEMBER 17 AT THE RESIDENCE, NEWLY-ELECTED FULL BCP POLITBURO MEMBER AND PARTY SECRETARY ANDREY LUKANOV SPOKE CONFIDENTLY BUT SOBERLY ABOUT THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S INTENTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND READINESS FOR A "BREAK-THROUGH" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE OCCASION WAS A JAZZ CONCERT, AN INVITATION TO WHICH LUKANOV HAD READILY ACCEPTED ON OCTOBER 29. ON THE DAY OF THE CONCERT (THE SAME DAY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WAS MEETING TO CONFIRM THE OUSTER OF ZHIVKOV AND COMPANY, AND ATTENDED BY LUKANOV), HIS OFFICE CALLED THE EMBASSY TWICE TO CONFIRM HIS ATTENDANCE. HIS OFFICE CALLED A THIRD TIME JUST BEFORE THE CONCERT TO SAY HE WAS STILL COMING, BUT WOULD BE A FEW MINUTES LATE.

4. LUKANOV EXPLAINED HIS DELAYED ARRIVAL SAYING HE HAD JUST COME FROM A MEETING WITH PARTY/STATE CHIEF MLADENOV, WHO WANTED TO USE THE OCCASION OF THE CONCERT TO SEND A "MESSAGE" TO THE USG. MLADENOV WANTED TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY. HE ALSO WANTED TO CONFIRM THE NEW LEADERSHIP'S FULL COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, REGARDLESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES AND CHALLENGES INVOLVED. THERE WAS NO/NO TURNING BACK. FINALLY, BASED ON THE CHANGES THAT WOULD TURN BULGARIA INTO A DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIZED SOCIETY, MLADENOV HOPED FOR A "BREAK-THROUGH" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.

5. LUKANOV BEGAN THE PRIVATE AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION BY CLAIMING THAT MLADENOV'S OCTOBER 23 LUNCHEON WITH THE AMBASSADOR/DCM HAD BEEN A KEY ELEMENT IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO ZHIVKOV'S OUSTER. ACCORDING TO LUKANOV, SHORTLY BEFORE THE LUNCHEON, ZHIVKOV HAD UPBRAIDED MLADENOV IN THE RUDEST POSSIBLE, PERSONAL MANNER FOR PERMITTING BULGARIA TO BE ATTACKED AT THE ECOFORUM MEETING. THE LUNCHEON EXCHANGE HAD FURTHER UPSET MLADENOV, WHO DECIDED THAT FINALLY SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THE "OLD MAN." MLADENOV, LUKANOV AND UNSPECIFIED OTHERS ON THE POLITBURO BEGAN TO GATHER SUPPORT TO DEMAND CHANGE, AND WERE PREPARED TO LAY THEIR (POLITICAL) HEADS ON THE BLOCK. ASKED ABOUT DEFENSE MINISTER DZHUROV'S ROLE, LUKANOV COMMENTED ONLY THAT DZHUROV WAS AN HONEST, DECENT PERSON WHO WOULD DO NOTHING TO HARM BULGARIA'S INTERESTS. ASKED ABOUT THE REPORTED CLOSENESS OF THE POLITBURO
VOTE (5-4) TO OUST ZHIVKOV, LUKANOV SAID HE WOULD RATHER NOT/NOT COMMENT; NOR DID HE DENY THE REPORTS OF ZHIVKOV'S EFFORTS TO PACK THE CC SECRETARIAT WITH HIS SON AND OTHERS AS A REASON FOR THE MOVE TO OUST HIM. (COMMENT: LUKANOV'S ACCOUNT IS, OF COURSE, SELF-SERVING AND, WHILE IN A SENSE FLATTERING

NNNN

PAGE 01
SOFIA 06297 02 OF 03 200919Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-07 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 /040 W

O 200908Z NOV 89
FM AMBASSADOR SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8519
INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE
AMBASSADORANKARA
AMBASSADOR BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 06297

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:ODR
TAGS: PREL BU US
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CP POLITBURO MEMBER LUKANOV

TO THE AMBASSADOR/DCM, DOES NOT/NOT CLARIFY WHY THEY SHOULD GET SUCH "CRedit." END COMMENT)

6. ASKED TO COMMENT ON WHERE THE NEW LEADERSHIP WOULD FOCUS ITS EFFORTS OVER THE COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS, LUKANOV SAID IT WOULD CONCENTRATE ON DOING A THOROUGH REVIEW/ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY. MUCH THAT WAS IN THE PARTY'S JULY
CONCEPT (87 SOFIA 3187) WAS VALID; BUT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS THAT ZHIVKOV WAS NOT WILLING TO PERMIT ANY CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF IT. THE NEW LEADERSHIP ALSO WANTED TO ENSURE THE "STRUCTURAL STABILITY" OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE AWARE THAT THE FREQUENT ORGANIZATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAD RESULTED IN STAGNATION/

CONFUSION, AND HAD LEFT OUTSIDERS WONDERING ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF BULGARIA'S COMMITMENTS TO REFORM. IT WAS NOW THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT SET STRATEGIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND REGULATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF FIRMS ONLY THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM. ASSOCIATIONS AND ANY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS STANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND FIRMS WOULD BE ABOLISHED.

7. ONCE THE REVIEW/ANALYSIS ARE COMPLETE, THE LEADERSHIP PLANS TO LAY OUT A NEW POLITICAL LINE AT A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING, MOST LIKELY IN DECEMBER. THERE WILL ALSO BE FURTHER PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE POLITBUREU AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ALTHOUGH LUKNANOV WAS NOT SPECIFIC. HE ADDED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT HIS PARTY SECRETARY RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDED CADRES/PERSONNEL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS. THE LEADERSHIP WILL ALSO MOVE TO WORK ON CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION. IN ADDITION, THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS IS NOW SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1990, RATHER THAN AT THE END OF 1990.

8. ON THE MATTER OF DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOCIETY, LUKNANOV SAID HE, MLADENOV AND OTHERS WERE DEADLY SERIOUS ABOUT ITS DEVELOPMENT, ALTHOUGH THE PROCESS COULD TAKE MANY FORMS. MLADENOV HAD SPOKEN WITH THE INTELLECTUALS. HE, LUKNANOV, HAD MET ALSO EARLIER IN THE WEEK WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF INFORMAL GROUPS. THE LEADERSHIP WAS PREPARED FOR AN OPEN DIALOGUE. INFORMAL GROUPS SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR VIEWS PUBLICLY IN THE PAPERS AND THE MEDIA. THE PARTY FELT ITSELF STRONG ENOUGH TO WIN IN OPEN DEBATE. NO ONE WOULD BE JAILED/TRIED FOR POLITICAL VIEWS, AS INDICATED BY THE REPEAL EARLIER IN THE DAY AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IN HIS ONLY NOTF OF CAUTION ON DEMOCRATIZA-
TION HE HOPE THE AMBASSADOR AND THE EMBASSY WOULD NOT GIVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE VIEWS OF SUCH INDEPENDENT GROUPS. LUKANOV SAID THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE OPEN TO THE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF INTEREST.

9. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY LUKANOV'S COMMENTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND WHAT WE HAD OBSERVED OVER THE LAST WEEK IN TERMS OF THE TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS AND THE UNHINDERED APPEARANCE OF PLACARDS ANNOUNCING THE NOVEMBER 18 MEETING ORGANIZED BY THESE GROUPS. HE HOPED THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD CONTINUE, AND WAS CONFIDENT THE USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND TO THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY AND PLURALISM. AT THE SAME TIME, HE COULD NOT NOT HELP BUT NOTE THAT NONE OF THE SPEECHES AT THE CRUCIAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN PUBLISHED AND THAT VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, RESULTING IN SWEEPING PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION CHANGES, HAD BEEN BY UNANIMOUS VOTE. LUKANOV RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT SPEECHES FROM THE PLENUM WOULD BE PUBLISHED, PERHAPS ONLY EXTENSIVE SUMMARIES. BECAUSE THE LEADERSHIP DID NOT WANT TO ENFLAME PASSIONS AND WANTED TO PRESENT MATTERS IN A DIGNIFIED FASHION. ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS, LUKANOV SAID THE LEADERSHIP WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT CONTENT RATHER THAN PARLIAMENTARY FORM. THEY HAD TO MOVE QUICKLY TO EFFECT CHANGE. THE LEADERSHIP
O 200908Z NOV 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SRCSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8520
INFO CSCE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06297

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, BU, US
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN CP POLITBURO MEMBER LUkanov

WOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO FORM AT THE NEXT
SESSION.

10. TURNING TO FOREIGN POLICY, LUkanov INDICATED
THERE WOULD BE CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO TURKEY, BUT
THIS WOULD HAVE TO EVOLVE. THE KEY THING WAS FOR
TURKEY NOT / NOT TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD AFFECT
"BULGARIAN NATIONAL INTEGRITY." THE LEADERSHIP
WAS AND WOULD PERMIT RELIGIOUS RITES AND CUSTOMS,
THE USE OF THE TURKISH LANGUAGE AND, ALTHOUGH NOT
SPECIFIC, LUkanov INDICATED THE USE OF TURKISH
NAMERS WAS ALSO UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE AMBASSADOR
SAID SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD BE VERY WELCOME,
POSITIVELY NOTED, AND HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

11. LUkanov SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE
OF TURKEY TO THE U.S., BUT HE HOPED THIS WOULD NOT
PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S..
HE SAID HE HOPED THE US WOULD UNDERSTAND THE GOB'S
COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIZATION, WHICH COULD LEAD TO
A BREAKTHROUGH IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THE
AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS AT
DEMOCRATIZATION COULD OPEN THE WAY TO EXPANDED
RELATIONS. TURNING TO IMMEDIATE ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR
NOTED HE WAS STILL WAITING TO SEE INTERIOR MINISTER
TANEV TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER NARCOTICS
COOPERATION. LUkanov SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE
MATTER. THE AMBASSADOR SAID WE WERE ALSO HOPING
FOR A GOOD PROGRAM IN WASHINGTON FOR GEOLOGY
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN CHUDOMIR ALEKSANDROV, WHICH COULD
PROVIDE A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS
IN BULGARIA. LUkanov CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY
SAYING HE WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE TO THE AMBASSADOR

UNCLASSIFIED
12. COMMENT: LUKANOV'S MESSAGE WAS CLEAR. BY ITS ACTIONS TO DATE, THE NEW LEADERSHIP DOES INTEND TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE OPEN SOCIETY, WITH PLURALISM OF OPINION IF NOT, AT THIS STAGE, MULTIPLE PARTIES (EXCLUDING THE AGRARIAN PARTY). APART FROM THIS, HIS MOST NOTEWORTHY COMMENTS RELATED TO THE LEADERSHIP'S POTENTIAL APPROACH TO THE ETHNIC TURKISH ISSUE. AS THE NOVEMBER 18 DEMONSTRATIONS INDICATED (SOFIA 6297), THE LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO EFFECT CHANGE WHILE NOT LOSING SUPPORT OF PART OF THE POPULATION SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. HE IS PROBABLY BEING CANDID IN SAYING

PAGE 03    SOFIA 06297 03 OF 03 200920Z

THAT THE SITUATION WILL HAVE TO Evolve. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF BULGARIAN-TURKISH TALKS REMAINS TO BE SEEN AS THE NEW LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, ASSESSES ITS OPTIONS. POLANSKY
The Civic Forum’s Position on the Negotiations of its Representatives with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec

Prague, 21 November 1989

Part of today’s declaration of the government of the CSSR also contained information on the meeting of Prime Minister [Ladislav] Adamec with the representatives of the Civic Forum [CF].

The government understood the negotiations to be the beginning of a dialogue and interpreted them in the sense that even this event is testimony to the government’s effort to decisively resolve the rising crisis situation. According to the government, this dismisses the reasons for the organization of strikes and demonstrations.

We proclaim: The meeting between the CF’s representatives and L. Adamec was merely of an informational character, and therefore could not in any way influence our positions. The CF unequivocally supports the strikes of the students, theater artists, sculptors and painters, and supports the call for a general strike on 27 November as well.

We want to contribute to the eventual dialogue by sharing the responsibility of establishing committees which would represent the broadest public and would initiate negotiations on four of the demands of the fundamental declaration of the Civic Forum.

Prague, 21 November 1989.

(Source: Ustav pro sodobe dejiny (USD), Akademie ved Ceske republiky (AV CR), Koordinacii centrum Obcanskeho fora (KC OF) Archive, file Dokumenty OFC copy of the computer print. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.)
Letter from the Civic Forum to US President George Bush and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

21 November 1989

Dear Sirs!

On 19 November 1989, the Civic Forum, which feels itself responsible to act as the mouthpiece of the Czechoslovak public, was established in Prague. In a demonstration by the Prague populace, attended by hundreds of thousands of people on Wenceslas Square, the Civic Forum gained a consensus of opinion and therefore is turning to you also in the name of these people.

The Soviet government has announced a policy of non-involvement in connection with the democratic movements in Eastern Europe. We must warn you that in the case of Czechoslovakia, this policy in reality means support for the political leadership which was installed in the year 1968 by forceful intervention, and which, during the course of twenty years of rule, has absolutely discredited itself. One of the demands of the mass political scene.

Dear Sirs, we are of the opinion that the past intervention into Czechoslovak internal events in the year 1968 should be condemned and decried as an unlawful encroachment. The silence surrounding the intervention in August de facto means entanglement into Czechoslovak internal conditions. We besiege you to pay attention to this question during your negotiations; it is not only important for Czechoslovakia these days, but also for all of Europe.

The Civic Forum
In Prague on 21 November 1989

Dear Comrades,

In the last few days a disturbance of the peace and public order occurred in Prague and a list of other places in our republic. The organizers of these acts abused a segment of the public, especially the student youth. They are dramatizing the situation, influencing the feelings and opinions of young people, heightening emotions. They are misusing the cultural front for this. Strikes are being organized in a series of theaters.

Revolutions and demands with ultimatums calling for cadre changes in the leading organs, for the resignation of the government, for the destruction and liquidation of the CPCz, for the discrediting of the SNB 3 (police). This is a direct attempt to overthrow the socialist order.

The forces of the opposition are trying to widen their influence beyond the scope of the capital. They are sending their organizers out to universities and various gatherings which are taking place in many areas at their initiative.

The current situation demands deliberate yet principled and offensive action on the part of all party organs and organizations and individual communists, in order not to let the situation slip out of our hands.

It is urgently necessary to mobilize party organizations, communists and all citizens who care about socialism, to support the position of the CSSR government, the CSR and the SSR, made public on 21 November of this year, and to help bring about an atmosphere of peace and prudence.

The most important is mass political work among the people. The functionaries and apparatus of the party and people’s councils, the leading workers must go to the workers’ collectives to prevent efforts to call a general strike, which the forces of the opposition are planning for 27 November. Every managerial worker is personally responsible for the situation in his collective.

It is necessary to engage in discussions with the students and apprentices, who are being manipulated by irresponsible elements. It is especially important to strengthen the influence of the teachers and parents over the younger generation.

The main goal is to show convincingly that straining the situation is a threat to every citizen of our society, the safety of every family. The eventual strikes, which the opposition threatens to carry out, would significantly damage our national economy, lead our market and supplies to destruction (especially now in the winter period before the Christmas holiday).

The organizers of revolutionary acts will continue in their efforts to seek the support of the workers for their demands. They are trying to enlist support in the
factories. Therefore it is necessary to prevent their emissaries from entering businesses, factories and other institutions and prevent them from using other methods of influencing the workers’ collectives. The factory management and party leadership must ensure proper defense of these interests. In these times the leading workers—communists and non-communists—must realize their responsibility for the handling of the political situation in their sphere of influence.

We must pay special attention to the media. The Presidium of the CC CPCz adopted measures which ought to stifle the high passions [of the public] and ensure uniform information [being given out by] the Czechoslovak Press Agency 4 (CTK), radio and television. Concrete tasks were handed down to the executive directors of these information agencies to this end.

The party press must influence the public. This applies in full also to regional, district, business and factory dissemination and information media. It is necessary for them to broadcast the positions of the worker’s collectives and individuals supportive of the politics of reconstruction and democratization, a dialog in the interests of socialism. The voices condemning the efforts to disrupt our society should be heard.

In this situation it is necessary to mobilize the ideological activists of the party, all those who have the ability to influence the opinion of communists and the public-at-large in the counties and districts. To ensure prompt information and uniformity of opinions, it is necessary to incorporate lecturers and propagandists of social organizations, including the Socialist Academy, into this group of activists.

We recommend that operational staffs be established in regional and district party committees, which would evaluate the situation, [and] its development and would propose concrete measures.

All party organs and organizations must act quickly, decisively and unanimously, and secure the support of the regional and district committees of the National Front, organizations affiliated with it, and national committees at all levels.

The positions and resolutions in support of the politics of the party should be sent without delay to the Central Committee of the CPCz.

The Presidium of the CC CPCz

[Source: SUA, UV, KSC - teleprints and letters, UV-0135/ 89. Obtained by Oldrich Tuma.]
The Declaration of Civic Forum Representative Vaclav Havel on Wenceslas Square, Prague, 23 November 1989, 4 p.m.

The Declaration of The Civic Forum

After twenty years Czechoslovakia once again finds itself at a historical intersection thanks to the people’s movement, to which all generations and segments of the population and the majority of the still existing social organizations are quickly adding themselves. This movement is a movement of both of our nations. Its mouthpiece has spontaneously become the Civic Forum, which today is the real representative of the will of the people. Its natural component has become the well-organized student movement, which, through its protest demonstration, gave us the impulse for dramatic social movement. Within it work all the current independent initiatives, artistic unions headed by the theater—the first to be in solidarity with the students—and the renewed currents in the National Front, including many former and current members of the CPCz. The Catholic Church supported the Civic Forum through the words of the cardinal, and other churches in Czechoslovakia. Anyone who agrees with its demands is joining, and may join, the Civic Forum.

The Civic Forum is prepared to secure a dialogue between the public and the present leadership immediately and has at its disposal qualified forces from all areas of society, capable of carrying out a free and objective dialogue about real paths toward a change in the political and economic conditions in our country.

The situation is open now, there are many opportunities before us, and we have only two certainties.

The first is the certainty that there is no return to the previous totalitarian system of government, which led our country to the brink of an absolute spiritual, moral, political, economic and ecological crisis.

Our second certainty is that we want to live in a free, democratic and prosperous Czechoslovakia, which must return to Europe, and that we will never abandon this ideal, no matter what transpires in these next few days.

The Civic Forum calls on all citizens of Czechoslovakia to support its fundamental demands by the demonstration of a general strike declared for Monday, 27 November 1989, at noon. Whether our country sets out in a peaceful way on the road to a democratic social order, or whether an isolated group of Stalinists, who want at any price to preserve their power and their privileges disguised as empty phrases about reconstruction will conquer, may depend upon the success of this strike.

We challenge the leadership of this country to grasp the gravity of this situation, rid themselves of compromised individuals and prevent all eventual efforts for a violent revolution.

We call on all the members of the ruling party to join the citizenry and respect its will.

We challenge all the members of the People’s Militias to not come out violently against their comrade workers and thus spit upon all the traditions of worker solidarity.
We challenge all the members of the Police to realize that they are first and foremost human beings and citizens of this country and only second subordinate to their superiors.

We challenge the Czechoslovak People’s Army to stand on the side of the people and, if necessary, to come out in its defense for the first time.

We call on the public and the governments of all countries to realize that our homeland is from time immemorial the place where European and world confrontations have begun and ended, and that in our country it is not only its fate which is at stake, but the future of all of Europe. We therefore demand that they support in every way the people’s movement and the Civic Forum.

We are opponents of violence; we do not want revenge; we want to live as dignified and free people, who have the right to speak for the fate of their homeland and who also think of future generations.

The Civic Forum
23 November 1989

[Source: USD AV CR, KC OF Archive, file Dokumenty OF—copy of the computer print. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]
Teleprint from Jozef Lenart, Secretary of CC CPS, to Regional Committees and Municipal Committees in Prague and Bratislava

23 November 1989

It is evident from the information of the party regional (municipal) committees that in all regions measures were adopted according to the teleprint of the General Secretary of the CC CPCz. Working groups of party organs were dispatched to crucial centers and businesses in order to secure uniformity of information and analysis of the political situation. But even when the measures were adopted for the protection of businesses and factories against penetration by the opposition and the spread of negative demonstrations, in a series of instances the posting of appeals, flyers, organization of petitions eliciting pressure tactics against the CPCz and the government took place.

The students are continuing their efforts to establish contacts with workers in establishments and gaining support for the general strike. In factories, no tendencies toward strikes have been exhibited so far. On the contrary, in important political-economic centers, the workers are expressing demands for peace and work.

The opposition forces are trying to unite striking students and the part of the public which is in solidarity with them in the demands of the “proclamation” of the Civic Forum, established on 19 November. The Civic Forum consists of: Charter 77, The Czechoslovak Helsinki Committee, The Circle of Independent Intelligence, The Movement for Civic Freedom, Artforum, Renewal, independent students, The Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, VONS, Independent World Coalition, Open Dialogue, Czechoslovak PEN Club Center, several members of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, Czechoslovak People’s Party, representatives of religious, creative and other groups, several former members of the CPCz. The proclamation was signed by: Eng. Rudolf Battek, Petr Cepek, Vaclav Havel, Milan Hruska, Prof. Dr. Milan Jelinek, Milan Knazko, Dr. Lubomir Kopecky CSc., Jiri Krizan, Vaclav Maly, Martin Mejstrik, Petr Oslzly, Dr. Libor Paty CSc., Jana Petrova, Jan Ruml, Prof. Dr. Venek Silhan, Ondrej Trojan, Eng. Josef Vavrousek CSc., [and] Sasa Vondra.

The demands of the Civic Forum’s proclamation go much further than the original expectations of the students, expressed in the joint statement of the Presidium of the Municipal Council of the SSM 5 in Prague and the MVR SSM, and the statement of the Secretariat of the of the CC SSM. It is necessary to reveal this fact. We present a shortened version for your information, for it contains a clear confrontational character, demagoguery and tactics of mounting attacks against the party through certain individuals. It can be expected that these demands will increase in intensity. Text of the proclamation:

1. That those members of the Presidium of the CC CPCz who are directly connected with the preparation of the intervention [in Czechoslovakia] by the five members of the Warsaw Pact in the year 1968 and who are responsible for the long years of devastation of all areas of our society, and who for years refused any kind of democratic dialogue with society, will immediately step down.

2. That the First Secretary of the Municipal Committee (MC) CPCz in Prague and the Federal Minister of the Interior, who are responsible for all of the measures which the
police have carried out over the last few months against the peaceful demonstrations of citizens, immediately step down.

3. That a committee be set up which will concretely investigate these measures, find the culprits and propose punishments for them. Civic Forum representatives must be included in this committee.

4. That all political criminals, including those who have been detained in connection with the last demonstration, be immediately released.

In its proclamation, the Civic Forum further calls for carrying out a general strike on 27 November 1989, from 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.

In discussions with students and the public, it is necessary to show that the Civic Forum is misusing the original demands of the students, directed primarily at the investigation into the security force’s intervention on 17 November 1989. It broadens them to ever more momentous political demands, aimed at destroying our social order. Several flyers distributed in Prague signed by “students on strike” endorse these demands.

Strike committees, the composition of which often changes, are negotiating with school administrations. Students are outside of the school buildings and their faculties throughout the day. Students are keeping watch to make sure that only students and school workers enter.

At several universities other demands are being submitted of a general political nature, which the university administrations are rejecting.

The student strike committees are run from one center which is probably connected to the spokespersons of the independent initiatives. Some artists and representatives of independent initiatives also have made appearances at several universities and led discussions with the students that often have called for a general strike and agitated for an active connection between the student strikes and the worker unions at factories and collectives. The majority of strike committees are in negotiation with the school administrations.

The CPCz Works Organization and CZV CPCz at the universities are planning their political acts in such a way that the employees and teachers in schools would be able to continue fulfilling their work duties, which is not the case in the majority of instances. At several universities, however, differences of opinion exist between the teachers and the staff, especially the younger ones, for whom several—including party members—generally support the political demands of the students which the school administration opposed.

The Ministry of Education adopted measures to bar the students from using duplication technology, and computers, and to try and keep the students in the schools. The main task is to resume instruction in high schools and universities as soon as possible. In those places where it is impossible to engage in discussion with the students, it is necessary to offer them a specific program to turn their attention to a constructive outlet for their activities.

At the high schools we must take advantage of the PTA meetings [to ensure] that the school administrations are in constant contact with the students’ parents. The national committees and school administrations are responsible for the situation in the schools, and must control the situation and direct the activity of the teachers.
The representatives of strike committees from all schools and representatives from the universities in the CSR will meet on 23 November at the agricultural college in Prague Suchdol with the representatives of the Ministry of Education of the CSR for an open dialogue intended to exchange information on the situation and to reach agreement on the next steps, including the resumption of the normal school year and an end to the strike.

The situation among the workers of the cultural front is basically unchanged. Other cultural institutions in the capital and in other regions of the republic are gradually joining in the protests against the intervention of the security forces on 17 November 1989. Prague sculptors and painters have [now] also joined the strike. The attempt to reverse the decision to strike has so far been unsuccessful. Some theater directors have said that their influence on the developments could be even further diminished because the strike committees are handling the decisions.

The situation in the clergy and religious groups was basically solid on 21 November, without any tendencies toward activism on the part of spiritual and religious people.

While there is peace within the clergy and religious groups in our republic, the prevailing sentiment [among them] is one of apprehension about possible further developments.

The exception is the Roman Catholic Church. Cardinal Tomasek’s written statement entitled “To all the People of Czechoslovakia,” reproduced in The People’s Democracy 6 on 22 November, is of a confrontational character. The statement, prepared by the former cleric Maly who is the leading proponent of illegal organizations, is the sharpest criticism of the political development of the last forty years to date.

On the other hand Cardinal Tomasek expressed his constructive position in a personal conversation with the Head Secretary of the MC CPCz, comrade Stepan, on 22 November 1989, in Prague, where he stated the following: “The situation surprised me, I can not yet express myself. I would like to get acquainted with the situation in order to openly express myself. I am convinced that there is good will on both sides.” This conversation, broadcast on the television news on 22 November, should be used as an argument against the articles in The People’s Democracy.

The planned so-called Thanksgiving service, which is supposed to take place on 25 November 1989, in the St. Vitus Cathedral in the Prague castle on the occasion of the elevation to sainthood of Anezka Premyslovna, is in serious danger of being misused. Although the event was announced as early as two months ago, the current level of preparation, whose purpose is to attract the largest possible number of believers, has intensified. To this end a circular was recently sent to all the dioceses in the CSR. Apart from this, a group of believers, who have prepared pilgrimages to Rome, is planning a significant activity, namely the mass would be preceded by a procession of believers through Prague beginning at the buildings of the former convent on Frantisek and ending at the castle.

From the letters and resolutions arriving at the CC CPCz it is clear that the opinion within society and within the ranks of the strikers are differentiating. They mostly express support for the policies of the party and request acceptance of measures to ensure a renewal of peace and to create normal conditions for work.
Vaclav Havel made an appearance on Wenceslas Square on 22 November, which also was shown on the Czechoslovak television program “Contact.” He spoke about the tactical approaches of the opposition forces at the current time. He greeted all the workers who are supporting the demands of the artists, students and intelligentsia, and who are founding civic forums and strike committees. After twenty years, history is returning to our country. For that we have to thank the free-thinking students and young people in general, to whom the future of our country belongs. He thanked theater and other artists, who rebelled after many years of degradation. He said that the Civic Forum is becoming a real representative of critical thinkers, and is beginning to be taken seriously through the power of freedom. Within the next few hours the Forum will try to unify the introduced demands into a single list. He expressed his faith in the support for the demands, in the form of a general strike. He informed [the people] that Civic Forum had written a letter to Bush and Gorbachev, who were supposed to discuss the developments in Eastern Europe, which requested support for democratization efforts in Czechoslovakia. He announced that telegrams were sent to Solidarity [the independent Polish labor union] and to the People’s Fronts in the USSR and Hungary.

Analysis of the broadcasts of Western radio stations during the course of the last year has revealed that they are intensifying their attacks against the authorities with the aim:

- of gradually creating in the minds of the populace the opinion that, considering the “illegality” and “brutality” of [the authorities’] actions against the “peace-loving” demonstrators and citizens, it is possible and humanly justified to use the “same” means against them,
- of creating pressure to change the laws dealing with the actions of security and the judicial organs, to limit their numbers and completely restructure them, and especially to limit the [powers of] State Security,
- of creating a separation between the police units (especially with Public Security 7 on one side and State Security 8 and Emergency Units on the other) and a separation between the Investigative apparatus of the State Security and judicial organs,
- of more deeply discrediting the state and, especially, the party leadership through attacks on the authorities, and introducing the idea that it is possible to resolve the growing problems of ineffective leadership without recourse to the methods seen in the fifties’.

It is possible to conclude that the attacks against the state power apparatus will have a tendency to rise. This was fully proven in the period starting 17 November.

Since the situation is changing very fast it is essential to act constructively and accurately.

Party organs at all levels must stop being on the defensive. The Central Committee of the CPCz will deal with the current political situation at its meeting on 24 November 1989, and discuss the role of the party. Regional and district CPCz organs and basic party organizations must mount pressure against the opposition independently of the preparations of the Plenum. We are fighting for public opinion. The future of the country and its citizens is at stake. Every act, day and hour is decisive.
We must show the harmfulness of pressure tactics, which prevent real dialogue, and from which new political demands are constantly being introduced that go far beyond the boundaries of the previous spontaneous student reaction.

We must demonstrate to the workers and students on the basis of concrete facts what the losses caused by strike actions are, in relation to businesses, districts and individuals. No long words, but concrete numbers.

We must show the moral damage of continuous strikes in high schools upon the psyche and discipline of the students, on their future development and on their education. We have to call on the parents at the same time and show them how children are drawn into confrontational acts by those who present themselves as “fighters for humanity.”

Our tactical agenda must rest on plans to divide the until now united front of participants in the protest. It is essential to differentiate between those who participate in strikes and those who go to protest gatherings, and the organizers of these acts and those who go to open confrontation and take advantage of the inexperience of young people.

It is necessary to prevent the entry of emissaries from the opposing forces into factories, their demagogic influence on the workers and their inflammatory speeches against socialism and the Communist Party.

It is necessary to concentrate all of our forces on stopping the general strike. We must talk with young people and other citizens about how the original student demands—investigation of the events of 17 November 1989—together with the call for a general strike is being realized. Added to that we must mobilize the entire apparatus and party caucus, communists in national committees, representatives and activists from national committees. It is necessary to make an impact on the members of strike committees. They are not united in the question of the aim of the general strike. It is necessary to take maximum advantage of each different opinion in the strike committee to ensure the main goal—preventing the general strike.

In connection with the dramatic developments in the internal political situation, the activity of non-communist political parties (in particular the Czechoslovak People’s Party) is intensifying. This is resulting in their orientation in the wrong direction, even though these parties are members of the National Front.

Directly after the CC CPCz meeting it is necessary to acquaint the functionaries and the party caucus with its conclusions, establish a concrete plan, unify the communists behind the fulfillment of the decisions, explain them and seek a wide public for them.

Jozef Lenart [in his own hand]
Secretary of the CC CPCz

[Source: SUA, UV, KSC - teleprints and letters, UV-0133/89. Obtained by Oldrich Tuma.]
Summary of the demands of the opposition groups represented by the Civic Forum

We are providing a summary of the most frequent demands of the opposition groups represented by the Civic Forum. The demands are divided into three areas: the judicial system, the political system and the economy. In all three areas the demands blend together and complement each other. Even when a few of them did not appear in the slogans they disseminated at the demonstrations, it can be counted on that they may appear in public or in a dialogue with several groups in the following days.

A. The Legal System
   An unequivocal demand is the full realization of human and civic rights and freedoms in the spirit of the accepted international agreements and commitments, especially the modification of the legal regulations (separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, especially the constitution, criminal code, the law on the conditions of detention, amnesty for so-called political prisoners, abolition of the so-called undemocratic laws and statutes, establishment of public inspections of security organs and a decrease in their numbers, amendment of the freedom of association and assembly law, the legalization of opposition groups and the facilitation of their free practice, the elimination of so-called persecutions and discriminations of citizens on the basis of their convictions).

B. The Political System
   Respect for the right of historical truth, that is the reevaluation of the crisis years 1968/1969, the rehabilitation of the protagonists of the “Prague Spring,” and the condemnation of international aid.
   The demand to activate the society and the information system (develop an intense dialogue with all the social and ethnic groups in the CSSR and even the émigrés in foreign countries in such a way that the population would become a political nation with a pluralist society, the legalization of independent periodicals, the creation of objective information networks, to enable plurality of opinion in education, liquidation of the state monopoly on schools, the launching of broadcasts of radio and television programs for believers).
   Political changes stemming from the revocation of the Lessons from the Crisis Development, [the resignation of] all so-called compromised functionaries of normalization, the removal of Soviet army units in the CSSR in the course of abandoning the security component within the framework of the Warsaw Pact agreements, the removal of paramilitary and police elements from civilian life, the abolition of the
People’s Militia, an end to political and cadre privileges. The extension of the separation between church and state, freedom of activity for male and female religious orders, the retraction of state control over the church. The pluralization of union life, the independence of unions from the state and the employers, the right to establish “free” union organizations.

Further, changes in the Czechoslovak Constitution, especially the retraction of Article 4, which establishes the leading role of the CPCz, and elimination from the constitution of so-called ideological concepts and constructs such as “the working people, Marxist scientific world interpretation, socialistic social and state leadership, the leading role, et al.,” removal of the “indefinite state sovereignty over one or another political alliance” (basically a veiled demand for neutrality), constitutional “demand for the right for national self-determination up to an eventual split” within the federation, the new delimitation of Moravia, and the return of the traditional state symbols (emblem, flag, hymn).

The opposition further demands that the constitution be expanded to include recognition of the Gypsies and the Jews as nationalities, and to allow the free contact “of minority nationalities with their people, the supplementation of the system of constitutional court and the system of administrative courts, the election of judges and their complete independence, the leadership of jury trials and the institution of investigating judges, the possibility of private law suits against state organs and their members, the institution of the rule that no one can be forced into “military service” and the “establishment of service of a non-military character” for conscientious objectors. The shortening of the basic military service, the introduction of a civil substitution service, a decrease in the army budget and its publication, the humanization of the military service, and the demilitarization of education.

C. The Economy

They demand radical reform of economic aid, the introduction of autonomous forums of collective ownership, plurality of different types of ownership, full renewal of private enterprise in the sphere of trade, craft, small and medium businesses, parts of agriculture and culture. The introduction of family forums and long-term lease of land, provision of long-term loans and material aid to private owners, reconstruction of heavy industry with the removal of false employment and preferences stemming from adverse international economic relations.

In the last hours the following demands are emphasized (the minimal program for the next few days):

- the recognition of the leadership of the Civic Forum as a partner of the Presidium of the CC CPCz and an immediate round-table negotiation;
- the creation of a new government of the so-called Great Coalition coalition with the participation of the representatives of the Civic Forum (i.e. all opposition groups), revived National Front parties and individuals having informal authority;
- the call for free elections with the participation of the established forces;
- the legalization of the activity of opposition groups and the procurement of material means for their activity (offices, etc.).
The research done by the Institute for Public Opinion Research at the Federal Statistical Office in May 1989, shows that a group of the people who were asked, endorsed the following demands of opposition groups represented by the Civic Forum. The demands in question are:
- removal of the leading role of the CPCz - 32% were in favor;
- change in the way the leading role of the CPCz is implemented - 49% were in favor;
- pluralization of the union movement - 35% were in favor;
- cadre changes in the leadership - 77% were in favor;
- changes in the laws limiting freedom of expression, assembly and information - 59% were in favor;
- changes in the system of elections - 60% were in favor;
- changes in the evaluation of the year 1968 - 59% were in favor;
- reprivatization of the means of production - 32% were in favor.

In the research conducted from 22-24 November 1989, 88% (and 93% in Prague) were in favor of cadre changes in the leadership, and 81% (and 88% in Prague) were in favor of official negotiations with the opposition (meaning its legalization).

A significant number of individuals questioned also think that the next development of the CSSR (its political system and economy) should head towards a system that is somewhere between socialism and capitalism (47%). An almost identical number of people think that it should go the socialist route. In the polls conducted, the difference of opinion between CPCz members and those not affiliated with the party was not ascertained.

From the information of the CC CPCz from 26 November 1989, at 12:00 p.m., it is noticeable that the series of demands found among party members is identical to the demands of the opposition. Emphasis is placed upon:
- further cadre changes in the leadership of the party (with more emphasis on the resignations of Stepan, [and] Zavadil, and less emphasis the resignations of Lenart, Knotek, Horeny);
- a thorough analysis of the past with the assignment of personal responsibility for the state of society;
- engaging in discussion with the opposition;
- an accelerated elaboration and introduction of a proposal for a new constitution of the CSSR, a law on the freedom of association and a law on the freedom of assembly.

In comparison with the information from the RC CPCz from 25 November 1989, a shift has taken place in the demands of the party members to benefit the demands of the opposition (on 25 November only 3 of the 11 demands included in the information were in agreement with the demands of the opposition; on 26 November, 5 of the 10 demands were in agreement with those of the opposition). It is obvious at the same time that in the workers’ collectives the level of opposition to the general strike called by the Civic Forum for 27 November is diminishing.
**Conclusion**

In public opinion, but also among CPCz members, there is a noticeable growth of negative tendencies and an inclination toward the demands of the opposition. The situation reveals that in the last few days a significant weakening of the role and prestige of the CPCz in society has occurred as a result of the belated reaction to the developments and the ineffectively accepted decision.

The opposition took the initiative because of the developments in the party. The decisive question will be the correct formulation of the leading role and position of the party in the social system, which must correspond to the opinion and demands of the people. It is clear that the Party will have to be a partner both in the National Front as well as in its relations to the opposition (Civic Forum). Should the corresponding measures and clearly formulated party lines fail to be adopted, there is danger that the party may disintegrate and will have diminished hopes of gaining a significant portion of the vote in the next elections.

It is necessary to immediately publish the accepted measures and conclusions from the dialogue, because the opposition today can use the legal media (radio, television, the National Front press). In the information for the RC and DC CPCz it is necessary to on the one hand to accelerate their flow, inform [everyone] without any delays on all events and decisions about the demands of the opposition and their escalation, but, on the other hand, especially to inform [everyone] about our positions and arguments, through which it would be possible to react to the demands. The RC and DC CPCz themselves must ensure a political evaluation of the situation in the regions, including the developments of local branches of opposition groups and their demands.

(Iillegible name)

We are sending information on the conclusions of the nation-wide party caucus which took place in Prague on 28 November of this year.

(Iillegible signature)

(Iillegible title)

r.77 28.11.89 11:40 (Iillegible signature)

[Source: SUA, UV, KSC - teleprints and letters, UV-144/89. Obtained by Oldrich Tuma.]
Prague, November 24, 1989

Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at an extraordinary session of the CPCz CC, stating his preference for a political solution to the crisis (excerpts)

[...] Making decisions is not simple. Events are developing rapidly and aren't the same everywhere. I therefore regard it as my duty to express my opinion of the situation and its resolution. I am aware we don't have much choice. The pressure of circumstances is rising day by day and possibly hour by hour. We have to deal with it. I am considering the alternatives along with everybody else. There are basically two ways to go - both have their advantages and drawbacks, merits and risks. None of them are guaranteed to fully succeed. With these thoughts, following on from what Comrade Jakeš has said, I would like to contribute to finding the internationally and internally optimum political variant. To explain the first alternative, let us assume that mass demonstrations and the spreading strike movements constitute a direct attack on the socialist establishment, and that therefore there is no other way but to immediately halt all protest actions. On the basis of this evaluation, we may decide that a general strike must be prevented even at the cost of extensive use of extraordinary means, including force. This operation could be complemented by a large number of protest letters from Party collectives in industrial and agricultural factories and other workplaces. One cannot passively watch the law being violated. To allow anarchy would be the direct opposite of democracy, whereas taking extraordinary measures could, if only temporarily, return calm to the streets. But experience with administrative measures has shown a significant risk. After a certain period the situation could explode again, bringing on another crisis, with still more unpredictable results.

For all these reasons, I would clearly prefer the second alternative: a political solution. We must count on making certain acceptable concessions. I believe that we have not nearly exhausted these possibilities. I also rely on the fact that most of our people, including young people, have no reason to be against socialism. They are unsatisfied with many things, even stirred up by all kinds of disinformation, but are able and willing to repay trust with trust. To drive the young generation into the arms of the enemies of socialism would be an unforgivable mistake. This must be prevented under any circumstances. I also advocate political methods because the recent intervention of the forces of order has led to the radicalization of youth, allowed the unification of various groups behind its condemnation, and has not contributed to the authority of either the Party or the state. Next time we have to avoid things like this. It would also be a mistake to underestimate the international risks of a broad application of force. We mustn't labor under the illusion that various democratization, environmental, and other movements end at our borders. Also, signed international treaties dealing with human rights cannot be taken lightly. When selecting methods of managing internal political problems, the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on. From the capitalist states, one must take into account the results of a political and economic boycott. This warning should not be understood as a call for concessions at any price, without regard to the loss of socialist values.
To look truth in the eye means to realize that the loss of political trust as a result of mistakes in leadership must be paid for. And there have been many in the last twenty years, and not small ones. I am convinced, however, that we need not pay too high a price, if we can manage to mobilize the Party. No one else has such a numerous membership, such an experienced cadre of functionaries, and close connections with each collective. [...] Today it has come down to the very status of the Party in society. If our meeting helps to energize all its members, it will fulfil its historic mission. If not, we shall pay dearly, and only very slowly repair the damage. I consider it especially important and sensitive to take a position on the basic demands, especially those most often voiced. They are extremely varied, correct and incorrect, feasible either now or only later. This must be clear. Those that we are unable to answer immediately, at least let us say when we will address them. Under no circumstances should there arise the impression that we are avoiding something, using delaying tactics, and somehow maneuvering. Let us choose our course so as not to give impetus to further waves of still-more-radical demands. I consider it crucial to announce the calling of another meeting of the Central Committee within a fortnight to evaluate political questions, especially the program of accelerated restructuring and expanded dialogue. We would gain time, mobilize the Party, and improve its level of information on the chosen strategy. The Party needs a short-term action program, a plan for the unification of the greatest possible number of Communists towards a concrete goal in the upcoming weeks. It would then even be possible to organize a broad public discussion centered on the positions and proposal of the CC CPCz. We could also, for example, quickly submit proposals on the constitution for public discussion, publicize proposed laws on the association and assembly for citizen comment. This would provide a certain framework and solid content to a thus far less than constructive exchange of views. We could take the wind out of the sails of the daily proclamations, various calls, and petitions. I am convinced that only an active approach can put our side on the initiative, and with this we shall also gain the majority of our citizens in favor of Party policy. This is the best reply to the demands of Party organizations for more assistance from the CPCz Central Committee. [...] 

Source: Stenographic minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the CC CPCz, November 24, 1989, pp. 21-3, State Central Archive, Prague, CC CPCz record group, W-0154/89.

Translated from the Czech by Todd Hammond.

(From The Democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia: Its Precondition, Course, and Immediate Repercussions, 1987-89, An International Conference, 14-16 October 1999, Prague, Briefing Book)
Draft Thesis of the Program of the Civic Forum

Prague, 24 November 1989

Program of the Civic Forum
(First draft thesis, 24 November 1989)

Czechoslovak society is going through a deep crisis. This crisis is displayed primarily:

1. In the disregard of several human rights, especially the right of free assembly and association, the right of free expression of opinion, and the right to partake in the decisions of public affairs.
2. In the continuing disillusionment of society, the unsteadiness of moral values, the erosion of the meaning of truth and knowledge, education and rationality, dialogue and tolerance, that is values which have been in European culture for thousands of years; this process is accompanied by actual or internal emigration, corruption, orientation towards consumerism and other undesirable phenomena.
3. In the emptiness of a great part of official culture.
4. In the decrease in the level of culture and education, which is especially pronounced when compared internationally.
5. In the rapidly worsening quality of the environment, connected to the devastation of natural resources, the contamination of drinking water and comestibles by parasitic, harmful substances; through this the most basic human right, the right to life, is violated.
6. In the worsening state of health of the Czechoslovak population and the endangerment of its ability to reproduce.
7. In the backwardness of Czechoslovak science in many scientific fields and applied areas.
8. In the decline of the total innovational activity in the society.
9. In the decreasing effectiveness of the Czechoslovak economy and the growth of foreign and especially internal debt.
10. In the rising alienation between individual and social groups; the alienation between ordinary citizens and the ruling group is reaching Kafkaesque proportions.
11. In the abuse of the means of force against the citizens, which we were reminded of once again with the intervention of “disciplinary forces” on 17 November 1989, in Prague.
12. In the worsening of the overall position of Czechoslovakia in the international community.

All these introduced, deeply disturbing phenomena bear witness to the impairment of the ability of our society to control effectively our development; [they] are testimonies to the unsuitable current political and economic system. In the society almost all corrective feedback, which is essential for effective reaction to the fast-changing internal and external conditions, has been impaired. For long decades, the simple principle of the symmetry between authority and responsibility has not been respected: those in the state who attribute every executive authority to themselves, do not feel
themselves to be responsible for the effected and missed decisions and refuse to settle accounts with the nation for their actions. All three fundamental powers of the state: legislative power, executive and judicial (regulatory), have come into the hands of a narrow ruling group, composed almost exclusively of CPCz members. This struck at the very foundations of a lawful state. The ruling group does not respect its own laws and international agreements not only in the area of human rights, but not even in other, wholly non-political spheres—an example of this can be the systematic violation of laws on environmental protection.

The practice of the nomenclature of the CPCz, consisting of the placement of leading workers in all important places, creates a vassal system which cripples the entire society. The citizens were thus degraded to the position of a common mob, who are denied basic political rights.

The directive system of the central leadership of the national economy has reached the limits of its potential. The promised reconstruction of the economic mechanism is without results and proceeds slowly. It is not accompanied by political changes, which undermines its effectiveness. A solution to these problems cannot be the simple exchange of seats in the positions of power or the resignation of several of the most compromised politicians from public life. It is necessary to make fundamental, effective and lasting changes in the political and economic system of our society. The basis of this must be newly created or renewed democratic institutions, which would enable real—not just proclaimed—citizen participation in the management of public affairs and simultaneously establish an effective system to prevent the abuse of political and economic power. A condition for this is the creation of such a climate in the society that would provide equal opportunities to all existing political parties and newly established political groups to prepare and hold free elections with independent candidate lists. A self-evident condition is the resignation of the CPCz from its constitutionally ensured leading role in our society and in its monopoly of the control of public media.

In the national economy we consider it essential to support the activity and productivity of the widest strata of society through the quick development of a market economy during the demonopolization of our economy, and by a significant increase in the responsibility of the state institutions for the regulation of economic processes, e.g., in the areas of healthcare and social welfare, science, education, culture and care of the environment. A key problem is the reevaluation of proprietary relations in the society.

We are pressing for our country to once again take its honorable place in Europe and in the world. We are not asking for change in Czechoslovakia’s current membership status in the COMECON and Warsaw Pact. We are assuming that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries which participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 will condemn this intervention, by which the indispensable reform process of socialist countries was pushed back for decades.

[Source: USD AV CR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents—copy of the computer print A4, 2 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]
List of Goals by the Civic Forum

26 November 1989

What We Want

Programatic directives of the Civic Forum

Our country finds itself in a deep moral, spiritual, ecological, social, economic and political crisis. This crisis is the result of the inactivity of the current political and economic system. Almost all the mechanisms necessary for society to properly react to the changing internal and external conditions have been eliminated. For interminable decades the self-evident principle has not been respected: who has the power must also carry the responsibility. All three fundamental powers in the state—legislative, executive and judicial power—have landed in the hands of a narrow ruling group, composed almost exclusively of CPCz members. Thus the principles of a legitimate state were overturned.

The CPCz monopoly on the occupation of all important positions creates an unfair vassal system, which cripples the entire society. The people are thus sentenced to play the role of mere executors of the orders of the powerful. A slew of fundamental human, civic and political rights are denied to them.

The directive system of the central leadership of the national economy has plainly failed. The promised reconstruction of the economic mechanism is slow, ineffective and is not carried out by the necessary political changes.

These problems will not be resolved by a substitution of persons in positions of power or by the departure of a few politicians from public life.

The Civic Forum is therefore pressing for these program goals:

1. Rights

The Czechoslovak Republic must be a legal, democratic state in the spirit of the traditions of Czechoslovak statehood and in the spirit of the internationally accepted principles, expressed above all in the Universal General Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Pact on Civic and Political Rights.

A new constitution must be worked out in this spirit, in which the relationship between the citizens and the state in particular will be revised in detail. This constitution must, of course, be only accepted by a newly elected constitutional assembly. The enforcement of civic rights and freedoms will be reliably ensured by a developed system of legal guarantees. An independent judiciary must also constitute a constitutional and fair judiciary.

It will be necessary to gradually make the whole Czechoslovak legal establishment consistent with these principles, and ensure that it will be committed not only to the citizens, but also to the organs and functionaries of the state.

We insist on righting the wrongs done in the past as a result of politically motivated persecutions.

2. The Political System
We demand fundamental, effective and lasting changes in the political system of our society. We must create anew or renew the democratic institutions and mechanisms, which will enable the real participation of all citizens in public affairs and at the same time will become an instrumental barrier against the abuse of political and economic power. All existing and newly created political parties and other political and social groups must have the same opportunities to partake in the free elections of all the representational bodies. It is assumed, however, that the CPCz, will relinquish its constitutionally ensured leading role in our society and its monopoly over the media. Nothing stands in its way of carrying this out as early as tomorrow.

Czechoslovakia will be an equal union of both nations and all nationalities, observing the principles of a federative state order.

3. Foreign Policy
We are striving for our country to once again occupy a worthy place in Europe and in the world. We are a part of Central Europe and we want to therefore maintain good relations with all of our neighbors.

We are counting on inclusion into European integration. We want to subordinate our policy toward our partners in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON to the idea of the “Common European home.” We respect our international legal obligations while fully reserving our state sovereignty. Meanwhile, we want to revise the agreements motivated by the excessive ambitions of the leading representatives of the state.

4. The National Economy
We must abandon the current economic system. It takes away the desire to work and wastes its results, plunders the natural resources, destroys the environment and increases the total backwardness of Czechoslovakia. We are convinced that this economic system is impossible to improve through partial improvements.

We want to create a developed market, not deformed by bureaucratic interference. Its successful functioning is contingent on the breaking of the monopoly on the positions in today’s big businesses, and the creation of true competition. The latter can only be created on the basis of a parallel, equal existence of different types of ownership and the gradual opening of our economy to the world.

The state will, of course, retain in the future a series of irreplaceable functions. It will ensure universal economic conditions equal for all, and undertake macro-economic regulatory policies with the intent to contain inflation, the growth of foreign debt and impending unemployment. Only the state can guarantee the indispensable minimum of public and social services and the protection of the environment.

5. Social Justice
Decisive for us, is that conditions be created in the society for the development and the assertion of everyone’s ability. The same conditions and the same opportunities should be provided for all.

Czechoslovakia must be a socially just country in which people receive aid in old age, sickness and difficult situations. An important precondition for such a society, however, is a prosperous national economy.
Churches, communities, businesses and various state volunteer organizations can contribute to the creation of a vivid network of social services. Thus the possibilities for the assertion of a rare sense of human solidarity, responsibility and love for one’s neighbor will be expanded. These humanist principles are necessary for the cementing of our society.

6. The Environment

We must all look for a way to renew the harmony between the people and the environment. We will strive for a progressive repair of the damages which we have inflicted upon nature for the last several decades. We will try to restore our countryside and our dwellings to their original beauty, to ensure better protection of nature and natural resources. We will accomplish in the shortest possible time a significant amelioration in the basic conditions of human life: we will try to ensure quality drinking water, clean air and uncontaminated food. We will press for a fundamental amelioration in the system of environmental care which will be aimed not only at liquidating the current sources of pollution, but first of all at preventing further damages.

We will, at the same time, change the composition and objective of the national economy, and thus decrease in particular the consumption of energy and raw materials. We are aware that this will lead to sacrifices that will touch every one of us. All this requires a change in the hierarchy of values and in our lifestyle.

7. Culture

Culture can not be only something for the artists, scholars and teachers, but a way of life for the entire civic society. It must be extricated from the chains of any ideology and must overcome the artificial separation from world culture. Art and literature can not be limited and must be provided many opportunities for publication and contact with the public.

We will put science and scientific work in the place where it belongs in society. We will rule out its naive and demagogic overestimation, as well as its degraded position which makes it a tool of the ruling party.

A democratic school system should be organized on humanist principles, without a state monopoly on education. Society must respect teachers in any type of school and must provide them with a space where they can assert their personality. It is necessary to return to the universities the rights, which ensure their independence and the freedom of the academic soil, and this for professors and students alike.

We consider the education of society to be the most valuable national asset. Upbringing and education must lead to independent thought and morally responsible discussion.

This is what we want. Our program today is concise, we are working, however, on making it more concrete. The Civic Forum is an open coalition of citizens. We therefore call on all who can contribute to this task to do so.

In Prague on 26 November 1989—6:00 p.m..

[Source: Ustav pro sodobe dejiny (USD), Akademie ved Ceske republiky (AV CR), Koordinacni centrum Obcanskeho fora (KC OF) Archive, file Dokumenty OF.]
The Position of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence Toward the Negotiations with Czechoslovak Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec

Prague, 28 November 1989, 4 p.m.

The CF believes that the negotiations with the prime minister of the federal government, Mr. Ladislav Adamec, and his associates authorizes it to provide the public with this information and these proposals:

1. The Prime Minister promised the delegation of the CF and PAV [Public Against Violence] that he would form a new government by 3 December 1989.

2. The Prime Minister announced to the delegation of the CF and PAV that tomorrow the CSSR government will present the Federal Assembly with a proposal for a constitutional law by which the articles legally establishing the leading role of the CPCz and Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology will be expunged.

3. The Prime Minister promised the CF and PAV delegation that he would immediately discuss with the Prague National Committee the issue of allotting the CF rooms, and discuss with other institutions the issue of giving the CF and PAV access to the media, including creating conditions for the publication of their own journals.

4. The Prime Minister informed the CF and PAV delegation that he had already submitted to the President of the republic a proposal for amnesty for political prisoners, [and] a list that the CF submitted to the Prime Minister during the previous meeting. The CF will challenge the president of the republic to accommodate this proposal at the latest by 10 December 1989, which is Human Right’s Day. The Civic Forum is receiving information that this list was not complete and therefore the CF and PAV are reserving the right to complete it.

5. The CF gratefully received the news from Dr. Kueera, the deputy chairman of the Federal Assembly [FA], that tomorrow at the meeting of the FA he will propose the creation of a special committee for the investigation of the brutal intervention against the peaceful demonstration of Prague students on 17 November 1989. CF representatives, especially students, will be invited to work on this committee.

6. The CF and PAV delegation requested that the new government publish the directives of its program declaration as soon as possible, in which it should be obvious that the government is prepared to create legal guarantees for securing free elections, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of speech and press, for the elimination of the state control over the church, for the amendment of the National Defense Act and others. It is further necessary to ensure the liquidation of the People’s Militia and consider the question of the future existence of political party organizations in all workplaces. The CF and PAV delegation also requested that the government turn its declaration into visible deeds as soon as possible. The delegation let the federal prime minister know that, should the public not be satisfied with the programmatic declaration of the government and with its implementation, then at the end of the year the CF and PAV will demand that the prime minister resign and that the president of the Republic nominate a new prime minister suggested by the CF and PAV, if the President should deem it necessary.

7. On 29 November 1989, CF and PAV will demand in writing that the President of the Republic, Dr. Gustav Husak, step down by 10 December 1989.
8. The CF and PAV delegation suggested to the Prime Minister that the government of the CSSR submit to the Federal Assembly a proposal for a constitutional law by which the representatives of the Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council and the national committees of all degrees who have broken their oath as representatives and ignored the will and interest of the people, will be recalled from their functions. The CF and PAV will propose a system of supplementary elections in the nearest future.

9. The CF challenges the government and the Federal Assembly to immediately condemn the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops, and the Federal Assembly to request the Highest Soviet of the USSR and the representative organs of the Bulgarian People’s Republic and the German Democratic Republic to declare the intervention by the armies of five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia a violation of the norms of international law and the Warsaw Pact itself, because the intervention occurred without the knowledge or agreement of the highest state organs of Czechoslovakia.

10. The CF believes that this outcome justifies it in challenging every citizen to continue working in peace while in a state of readiness to strike. Strike committees can transform themselves into civic forums, but can also work along side of them. Students and theater workers will decide themselves whether they will end their strike today or tomorrow, or whether to continue it. When they decide, however, the CF will support their position. The CF and PAV challenge the public to assess itself the results of these negotiations and to make their opinion known to the CF and PAV by all accessible means. The Civic Forum and Public Against Violence 28 November 1989 at 4 p.m.

[Source: USD AV CR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents—typescript copy A4, 1 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]
Internal Organization of the Civic Forum,

28 November 1989

What We Are

The Civic Forum is a medium for the renewal of genuine civic positions and life, forgotten more than forty years ago. The following text therefore does not contain any statutes, it only wants to be a concise guideline for creating local civic forums.

The internal organization of Civic Forums:

1. The Civic Forum (further only CF) is a spontaneously created citizen movement, which is united by the effort to find positive outcomes from the current crisis in our society. No one is excluded from this movement who agrees with the program directives of the CF, published on 26 November 1989 and who especially refuses the further continuation of a political system consisting of one ruling party. We consider the basic goal of the CF to be the complete opening of an environment for the creation of political pluralism and for the organization of free elections in our country.

2. It is possible to create a local CF anywhere based on regions, professions or interests by citizens, and not institutions. We recommend that membership in the CF be established by signing the charter of the local CF organizations; we further recommend that an informal coordinating group be established to which the citizens could turn, and that its representatives be elected.

3. Relations between the Coordinating Center and the local CFs:
   a) The CF Coordinating Center and the local CF constitute a unit joined solely by the active civic attitude of its members. The Civic Forum does not have a complicated hierarchy, only a horizontal net with every local Civic Forum, connected to one coordinating center;
   b) The Coordinating Center is just an informational and organizational center, and it is in no way an administrative center; its task is to collect information from local CFs, exchange it and inform [all local CFs] about past and future activities. All local Civic Forums operate completely independently on the local level;
   c) The Coordinating Center represents the Civic Forum in negotiations with central state and international institutions, mostly on the basis of suggestions and recommendations from the local CF.

4. The function of the informational center of the CF:
   a) In order to secure informational links, it is necessary to submit in writing to the Coordination Center these basic details about the local CF: business, region or interest group where the CF was created, precise address, telephone number, names of the representatives, number of members (rough estimate at least). These data will be entered on file centrally;
   b) Contact with the Coordinating Center—for a period of three weeks starting on 28 November 1989, the record-keeping, collection of information and consulting services of the CF will be located at: Spalova gallery, Narodni Trida 30, 110 00 Praha 1, tel. 268366, 265132, 267529. The new address and telephone line of the
Coordinating Center will be released promptly. The post office box of the CF: 632, posta 111 21, Praha 1, Politicky vez 4, Communications Professional Training Center entrance. CF account 2346-021, SB S branch Praha 2, Praha 1, Vaclavske namesti 42;
c) Transfer and exchange of information between individual local CFs and the Coordinating Center will be ensured in the form of an informational bulletin, which will be sent out by the Coordinating Center by means of mass communications or exceptionally by telephone.

5. The orientation of the activity of the local CF: The point of the activity of the local CF is the activation of civic behavior of its own free will and discussion in political and everyday life. Therefore the Coordinating Center can not and does not want to hand down any orders and restrictions, it solely provides suggestions and recommendations.

6. We believe that the local CFs should concern themselves very soon with these areas of activity:
   a) Local CFs should specify and define the opinions of citizens in the broad democratic discussion. The discussion should lead to political differentiation, which is an indispensable prerequisite for a pluralistic democratic political system;
   b) Local Civic Forums can pursue solutions to local problems, which are not satisfactorily dealt with by the current social structures. Local CFs can thus contribute to the creation of civic home rule or to the transformation of the institutional bureaucratic apparatus into a democratic one;
   c) Local CFs can prepare strikes, demonstrations and other activities supporting their demands, even the demands of the whole Civic Forum if it should be necessary. In this sense, the local CFs are a continuation of the strike committees until all the demands of the CF have been met.
   d) Local CFs should support all citizens in all areas where relations with the current undemocratic structures results in violations of civic rights in the broadest sense of the word. Local CFs are therefore the means for civic self-defense.

_Supplement solely for consultative workers_

Legally the local CF is a free coalition of citizens, it is not a legal subject and in this way does not have any rights or responsibilities. The Civic Forum as a free coalition of citizens has the same rights as an individual citizen. If the local CFs should deal with money, it is useful to keep it in a safe and enter the contributions and withdrawals into the account book and elect a treasurer and auditor. It is useful to provide monetary gifts over 3,000 Kcs in the form of a deposit book.

The Civic Forum
Prague, 28 November 1989

(Source: USD AV CR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents—typescript copy A4, 3 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.)
Teleprint, Information on the Conclusions of Nation-wide Party Congress held in Prague,

28 November 1989

FOR INFORMATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

125 11 Praha 1, Nabrezi Ludvika Svobody 12
Telephone 2199
Telegram address: UVKOMSTRANY

Praha, November 1989
Refer to in answer:
#UV-145/89
Issue:

The Central Committee of the CPS, the regional committees of the CPS, CPCz municipal committees in Prague and Bratislava district (provincial) committees of the CPS, CPCz

The nation-wide party caucus which took place in Prague on 28 November 1989 reached the following conclusions:

1. The political directive for the plan of action of the entire party over the next few days is laid out in the speech of the Secretary General at the Nationwide Party Caucus. The program of the party will be prepared by the Presidium of the CC CPCz and introduced for discussion in the party.

2. To acquaint every communist with the discussions of the Caucus, and explain the conclusions of its discussion and seek their fulfillment by communists and other workers. To strengthen the unity of the party behind the principles of socialism. Trust in the party must be supported by well thought-out cadre decisions and not by lack of control and certainly not by pressure.

3. It gives total support and trust to our leadership of the Central Committee and its Secretary General, comrade Karel Urbanek, during the discussion of the current problems.

4. The CC CPCz proposes to begin an analysis of the entire forty-year period of the construction of socialism, especially the years 1968-1969.

5. Engage in an active dialogue and cooperate with all who want to build a socialist Czechoslovakia. This includes those individuals and groups who are concentrated in the Civic Forum and uphold these positions. To show at the same time the true side of those who, in the name of the citizens, try to break up the socialist leadership of our CPCz.
6. To enable the members of the CPCz expelled from the party in connection with the developments of the years 1968-1969 to return to the CPCz, as long as they are in favor of socialism.

7. The date for the [next] Party Congress was approved by the session of the CC CPCz for 26 January 1989. If the situation demands it, call the congress earlier. The CC CPCz will decide these questions. It is necessary, however, to immediately initiate the preparations and to responsibly choose delegates who will carry the responsibility for the ensuing fate of our party and this country.

8. We refuse the demands for the liquidation of the People’s Militia, basic organizations in the workplace and the transfer of party property. The People’s Militia are not aimed against our nation, but are necessary to prevent sabotage and revolutionary attempts.

9. The main goal at the present is to secure the fulfillment of all the tasks in the national economy. To ensure the continuation of production, supply, operation of services and healthcare. The communists must lead by example in these activities.

10. The caucus repudiated the random attacks of the Civic Forum against the president of the republic, for this function must be protected in accordance with our Constitution.

11. The reminders which were introduced at the nation-wide party caucus will be used by the Central Committee of the Party in preparation for the emergency congress and during the elaboration of the platform of the CPCz.

[Source: SUA, UV, KSC - teleprints and letters, UV-145/89. Obtained by Oldrich Tuma.]
Instructions of the Coordinating Center of the Civic Forum for the Local Forums with a Recommendation for Policy Toward the Communists

Prague, 29 November 1989

In the last two days information is coming from individual Civic Forums in the regions and especially in the factories and workplaces about communists becoming members, sometimes with intent to control them. We are democrats and therefore we can not prohibit our fellow citizens, without regard to their party affiliation, from joining and participating in the new structures of the civic movement. It is necessary, however, for all who work in them to be honest followers of our movement, the basic goal of which is, as introduced in the declaration on the internal organization of the CF from 28 November, “the complete opening of an environment for the creation of political pluralism and for the organization of free elections in our country.” A person whose actions are in blatant contradiction with efforts to create a democratic [society] while fully respecting human rights does not belong here, and it is necessary to expel him from the Civic Forum. This without regard to his party affiliation. Such an expulsion is especially urgent in those instances where there is a larger group of opponents of democracy [than honest members] in the forum. If there is a majority of them anywhere, it is necessary for the followers of the civic movement to leave the forum, found a new forum, and release a statement about their action. The opponents of democracy are in the minority, let us not let them rule and frighten us! In order to avoid such conflicts, we must be careful when accepting new Civic Forum members and in particular members of its committees, commissions et. al., especially in those cases when CPCz members are applying for work. It is unacceptable for any kind of group within the CF (for example, CPCz members, but also others) to assert their so-called party discipline, according to which all the members of this group are bound to a common plan of action, including those who would otherwise disagree with the plan.

The existence of various political and social groups, including communist ones, their activity and their influence over public opinion is, on the contrary, very demanding outside of the framework of the forums and certainly should not develop into discrimination against any group during speeches at public gatherings, in workers’ and local presses etc.

We can only build democracy by democratic means!

In some establishments and places, civic activities are coming up against refusals to negotiate with Forum representatives by the organs of state power, national committees, business managements etc. It usually occurs where the forums have not yet gained greater support from fellow citizens or co-workers. Only one thing will help in this situation: turn to the citizens and factory workers, inform them of your activity and challenge them to take part in it. If you will be many, no chairman of a national committee or factory director will refuse to negotiate with you.

[Source: USD AV CR, KC OF Archive, file OF Documents—typescript copy A4, 1 p. Translated by Caroline Kovtun.]
Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and John Paul II. Vatican, December 1, 1989

First several minutes of the conversation were held one-on-one (without interpreters).

Gorbachev. I would like to tell you that I value your words at the beginning of our conversation that beside everything else, it is a need to speak like that. It is important that the mission of the Slavic peoples, so that the values of human life, peace and kindness be accepted everywhere.

John Paul II. Yes, it is true. Peace and kindness.

Gorbachev. We appreciate your mission on this high pulpit, we are convinced that it will leave a great mark on history. I am familiar with your addresses to the world, with your thoughts about its problems. I value them. We often use the same phrases. [...] I thank you for the invitation to visit Vatican, and on behalf of the big country which I represent, I would like to express my respect for your peace-making efforts.

John Paul II. I am trying. On my part, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your last letter, which I read several times, and kept coming back to it. It is a very important, full of essential thoughts, letter, many ideas of which are close to my heart.

Gorbachev. And I, on my part, was thinking about your letter for a long time before responding to it.

John Paul II. It is natural, that the main problem that the mankind is concerned about is the problem of war and peace. Thank God, recently the threat of war has receded, the tensions in East-West relations have decreased. We are familiar with your steps for peace, and we wish you to proceed with success.

In this connection, I would like to say that we are waiting for the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Conscience in your country with big hopes and excitement. We are hoping that the adoption of such a law would lead to a widening of opportunities for the religious life of all Soviet citizens. A person becomes a believer by his own choice, you cannot force anybody to believe. In the Soviet Union, especially in Russia, and in some neighboring states, the majority of believers are Orthodox Christians. We are hoping, of course, that our Orthodox brothers will enjoy more freedom. Particularly because we have adopted the position of the ecumenical dialogue, which is actively developing now with the Orthodox churches, and especially with the Russian Orthodox church. We are very close to one another.

However, beside the Orthodox, there are many other confessions in the USSR. Among them there are the Catholics, who come from two traditions: the Latin, and the Byzantium, or the Eastern. Catholics of the Eastern tradition accept the Pope, as their shepherd. As their shepherd, he carries responsibility for their religious life, in the highest and fullest sense of the word. The Catholic church of the...
Latin tradition is prevalent in some other countries. It includes almost all the population of Lithuania, a part of Latvian population, and the territories that in the past centuries belonged to the Republic of Nations— to the Polish-Lithuanian state. [...]
CONCEPTS—PROGRAM, REUNIFICATION, IMPLEMENTATION, SPEECH

TAGS—PRES. B.Z., GE. GC. (KOHL, HELMUT)

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BONN 37736 01 OF 02 011749Z

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /008 W

O 011749Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADORS BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1177
INFO AMBASSADORS EMBERLIN
AMBASSADORS LONDON
AMBASSADORS MOSCOW
AMBASSADORS PARIS
USMISSION USNATO
FRG COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 37736

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL-ADR
TAGS: PRES. B.Z., GE. GC
SUBJECT: KOHL'S TEN-POINT PROGRAM—SILENCE ON THE ROLE
OF THE FOUR POWERS

REF: (A) BONN 37202, (B) BONN 37383

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: FOR ALL THE INTEREST GENERATED BY THE
TEN-POINT PLAN FOR GERMAN UNITY WHICH CHANCELLOR KOHL LAYED
OUT IN HIS NOVEMBER 28 SPEECH, WE WERE STRUCK BY WHAT HE
DID NOT SAY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE FOUR POWERS. WE BELIEVE
THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN THE
THREE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS MUST REMAIN ENGAGED
IN THE RE-SHAPING OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. THIS
TELEGRAM LOOKS AT THE SCHEMA FOR REUNIFICATION WHICH KOHL
LAID OUT AND POINTS TOWARD SOME OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BONN 37736 01 OF 02 011749Z.
U.S. AND ALLIED INTERESTS. OVERALL, WE EXPECT INCREASED FRG PRESSURE ON THE WESTERN ALLIES TO ACQUIESCE IN CHANGES IN BERLIN'S STATUS. End Summary

1. WHAT KOHL LEFT OUT

KOHL PURPOSEFULLY DESIGNED HIS 10-POINT PROGRAM AS AN ALL-GERMAN APPROACH AND CHOSE TO OMIT SIGNIFICANT DETAILS OF HOW BERLIN, THE FOUR POWERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND (MOST IMPORTANTLY) THE ALLIANCE FIT INTO HIS STRUCTURE. KOHL APPARENTLY DID NOT CLEAR HIS SPEECH WITH GENSCHER OR WITH THE LEADERS OF THE OTHER MAJOR PARTIES, NOR DID HE SHARE IT WITH THE ALLIES, THE GDR, OR THE SOVIETS PRIOR TO DELIVERY IN THE BUNDESTAG. BEYOND KOHL'S AMBITION TO REMAIN PERSONALLY IDENTIFIED WITH THIS LANDMARK PLAN, THE FACT THAT HE FELT CONFIDENT ABOUT SPRINGING THIS APPROACH WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE GREATER POLITICAL SELF-ASSURANCE OF AN FRG WHICH IS ALREADY WIDELY RECOGNIZED AS A WEIGHTY ECONOMIC POWER.

4. THERE ARE SOUND POLITICAL REASONS AS TO WHY KOHL REMAINED SILENT ON THE THORNY DETAILS OF THE FOUR POWER ROLE AND BERLINARY IN LAYING OUT HIS VISION OF THE GERMAN FUTURE: DELVING INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS VISION WOULD HAVE EXPOSED KOHL TO CRITICISM. YET FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. INTERESTS -- AND INDEED OF FRG INTERESTS IN ATTEMPTING TO IMPLEMENT THIS PLAN -- THESE DETAILS HAVE TO BE PUT NEAR THE TOP OF THE LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE CLARIFIED.

5. KOHL DID MENTION THE FRG'S FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AND THE EC, BUT NOWHERE IN HIS SPEECH DID HE CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 37736 01 OF 02 011749Z

REFER TO FOUR POWER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF FRANCE OR THE UK, AND THE U.S. AND SOVIETS WERE MARGINALIY MENTIONED IN POINT NINE OF HIS PLAN. WHEN HE ARGUED THAT THE UPCOMING MALTA MEETING COULD GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, WHICH WERE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE, KOHL'S ONLY MENTION OF BERLIN WAS IN POINT FOUR. REFERRING TO THE "CONTRACTUAL PARTNERSHIP" OFFERED BY GDR PRIME MINISTER MODROW, KOHL SAID "OF COURSE" BERLIN WOULD BE FULLY INCLUDED IN SUCH A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIES

THE CLOSER THE TWO GERMAN STATES BECOME IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, THE MORE THE PRESSURE WILL BE ON THE WESTERN ALLIES

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BONN  5736  02 OF 02  011749Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  SSO-00 /000 W
------------------264532  011915Z/58
0 011749Z DEC 30
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1178
INFO AMEMBASSY EMBBERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO
FRG COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 37736

EXDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED
TAGS: PRL BZ, GE, GC
SUBJECT: KOHL'S TEN-POINT PROGRAM – SILENCE ON THE ROLE OF THE FOUR POWERS.

IN PARTICULAR TO GO ALONG WITH DE FACTO CHANGES IN HOW BERLIN IS MANAGED AND WITH GREATER RECOGNITION OF EAST BERLIN AS THE CAPITAL OF THE GDR. THE SOVIET LEGAL POSITION IS THAT BERLIN (EAST) IS THE CAPITAL OF THE GDR AND THE SOVIETS ONLY SHARE RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES FOR BERLIN (WEST). WHEN IT HAS BEEN IN THEIR INTEREST, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE EXERCISED THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CITY AS A WHOLE. FROM THE WESTERN ALLIED POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, CHANGES IN BERLIN'S STATUS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AND AGREED AMONG THE FOUR POWERS, I.E. INCLUDING THE SOVIETS.

7. KOHL'S COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT ("GESAMTKONZEPT") OF A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 37736 02 OF 02 011792


8. SUCH NOTIONS ARE ALREADY BEING AIDED BY LEADING FRG POLITICIANS. GOVERNING MAYOR MÖMPEL IS STARTING A CAMPAIGN FOR DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY BERLINERS IN FRG NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND FOR FULL VOTING RIGHTS IN THE BUNDESTAG BY BERLIN'S REPRESENTATIVES. BUNDESTAG PRESIDENT SUESSMÜETH RECENTLY CALLED FOR DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN BUNDESTAG MEMBERS AND VOLKSKAMMER REPRESENTATIVES AND IN SEPARATE MESSAGES WE HAVE
DECLASSIFIED

DESCRIPTED THE GROWING NETWORK OF INNER-GERMAN FLIGHTS AND THEIR EVENTUAL IMPACT ON BERLIN AVIATION. ONCE A "CONTRACTUAL PARTNERSHIP" AND POSSIBLY THE CONFEDERATIVE STRUCTURES BEGIN TO GET OFF THE GROUND, THERE WILL BE INCREASING DESIRE AND PRESSURE BY THE FRG (AND PRESUMABLY THE GDR) TO HOUSE THE IMPLEMENTING COMMITTEES AND JOINT GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IN BERLIN.

9. IN HIS SPEECH, KOHL EFFECTIVELY SET THE AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE OF INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. WHILE ESTABLISHING REUNIFICATION AS THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE FOR THE FRG, HE HAS GIVEN THE GDR A GOOD DEAL OF LEeway ON HOW FAR AND FAST IT WANTS TO GO. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SIMPLE ECONOMICS MAY DRIVE THE GDR TO WISH TO GO FASTER RATHER THAN SLOWER DOWN KOHL'S PATH AS WE MENTIONED IN REF A. KOHL'S PLAN FOR THE FIRST TIME SEPARATES THE PROCESSES OF CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03   BONN 37736 02 OF 02 011749Z

GERMAN UNIFICATION AND OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. IN HIS VISION, THE TWO GERMAN STATES, VIRTUALLY ALONE, WOULD PLAN THEIR FUTURE. BUT IT IS IN THE THORNY DETAILS OF THE PLANS APPLICATION TO BERLIN THAT THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES (AND THE SOVIETS) WILL HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS OF RE-SHAPING INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS.

WALTERS
End of the Cold War
12/01/1989

1941Z
Cable
STATE 384239
United States. Department of State. Office of the Secretary

United States Information Agency
United States. Department of Commerce
United States Embassy. Romania

Eagleburger, Lawrence S.
Confidential
Formal Remarks and Talking Points for Ambassador's Presentation of Credentials

Bush, George
Green, Alan, Jr.
Ceausescu, Nicolae

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
United Nations
International trade
Diplomatic relations
Human rights

5
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

O R 011941Z DEC 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMBASSADORES BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE
INFO USIA WASHDC 0000
USDOC WASHDC 0000

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 384239

USIA FOR EU/IGNATIUS; USDOC FOR OEEA/BURGESS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OAD
TAGS: PREL, ODIP, US, RO
SUBJECT: FORMAL REMARKS AND TALKING POINTS FOR AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS

1. CONFIDENTIAL—ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE APPROVED TEXT OF THE PREPARED REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR GREEN TO ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU TO BE DELIVERED TO THE GOR PRIOR TO THE AMBASSADOR'S PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS. BEGIN TEXT.

I HAVE THE HONOR TO PRESENT TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE LETTER BY WHICH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GEORGE BUSH, HAS ACCREDITED ME AS AMBASSADOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAGE 02

EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA. I WISH TO EXPRESS, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, GREETINGS TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND SINCERE GOOD WISHES FOR THE WELFARE AND HAPINESS OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE.
I come to Romania with a deep appreciation of your country's unique place in history, its rich and varied cultures, and its hardworking citizens. Americans admire the courage and steadfastness which Romanians have shown through the centuries in preserving their identity as a nation of diverse peoples.

It is no secret, however, that important differences have come to divide our two governments and seriously trouble our traditional friendship. The United States believes that continuing our bilateral dialogue on the issues that separate us is essential if our relations are to flourish. My foremost goal in Romania will be to determine whether the basis exists for constructive dialogue between our two countries, so that we can build bridges of understanding and cooperation at all levels of our societies. To accomplish this goal, my embassy and I must be able to meet with Romanians from all walks of life, representing government and party institutions as well as private citizens, so as to establish mutually beneficial relations on every level. As you know, the United States imposes no restrictions on the Romanian embassy's access to American citizens. In carrying out my ambassadorial responsibilities, I will always reflect the fundamental values of the American people, their love of political, economic, and social opportunity, and their generosity of spirit.

Traditionally, honest exchanges of assessments of the international situation have been a source of strength in the U.S.-Romanian relationship. I look forward to discussing international developments with you and other senior officials of your government. We have now entered a period of dynamic change in Europe. President Bush has responded to these changes with forward-looking and realistic initiatives to promote cooperation, peace, security, and prosperity throughout the European continent. We want very much to engage Romania in discussions on these momentous changes.

A major pillar of United States foreign policy is its support for human rights. President Bush has made human rights a hallmark of his administration and shares with the Congress and the American people an
UNSHAKABLE CONVICTION THAT THIS CONCERN MUST BE AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. THE UNITED
STATES GIVES UNWAVERING SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS BY THE
UNITED NATIONS AND BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS ON
A MULTILATERAL BASIS. WE FULLY ACCEPT THE EUROPE-WIDE
CONSENSUS ENSHRINED IN THE CSCE PROCESS THAT HUMAN
RIGHTS AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS ARE NOT THE EXCLUSIVE
DOMAIN OF EACH COUNTRY, BUT ARE LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS FOR
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE AMONG THE MEMBER
STATES.

AS A FORMER BUSINESSMAN, I AM CONVINCED THAT COMMERCE
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES CAN FLOURISH, AS IT HAS IN
THE PAST. NOW THAT ROMANIA HAS SUCCEEDED IN

LIQUIDATING ITS EXTERNAL DEBT, THE U.S. LOOKS TO
ROMANIA TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS TO ESTABLISH A
FAVORABLE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT FOR INCREASED BILATERAL
TRADE AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CORRECT THE MAJOR IMBALANCE
IN THAT TRADE, WHICH IS HEAVILY IN ROMANIA'S FAVOR.
THE WILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO
TRADE WITH AND INVEST IN ROMANIA, FOR THE BETTERMENT OF
BOTH OF OUR SOCIETIES, WILL DEPEND ON THESE DECISIONS.
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR ALSO
WELCOME OPPORTUNITIES TO BROADEN BILATERAL WORKING
RELATIONSHIPS IN SEVERAL EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND
CULTURAL FIELDS WHICH CAN BE BENEFICIAL TO BOTH OF OUR
COUNTRIES.

I AM HONORED TO HAVE BEEN APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT BUSH
AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE MY DESIRE
THAT THE TRADITIONAL BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR
TWO PEOPLES BE TIGHTENED. MY GOAL IS TO EXPAND AND
DIVERSIFY THE CONTACTS AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR
TWO GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES ON THE BASIS OF HONESTY,
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND A COMMON COMMITMENT TO
IMPROVED RELATIONS. BY THE CONCLUSION OF MY ASSIGNMENT
HERE, I WOULD HOPE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BETTER
UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER AND THAT THE BASIS FOR FUTURE
COOPERATION AND TRUE FRIENDSHIP WILL THEREBY BE
RE-ESTABLISHED. END TEXT.

3. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS TO BE USED BY
AMBASSADOR GREEN DURING THE SAME CEREMONY.

O - MY GOVERNMENT AND I ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ONCE STRONG U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONSHIP HAS DETERIORATED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05      STATE 384239

O - MY PRESENCE HERE, AS PRESIDENT BUSH'S OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND AS HIS PERSONAL FRIEND FOR OVER 12 YEARS, IS A MEASURE OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE U.S. ATTACHES TO RE-ESTABLISHING THE COMMON BASES FOR NORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONS.

O - THE U.S. APPLAUDS THE HISTORIC CHANGES WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE, WHEREBY PEOPLE ARE REASSERTING CONTROL OVER THEIR DESTINIES AND GOVERNMENTS NEWLY RESPONSIVE TO THE POPULAR WILL ARE UNDERTAKING SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

O - WE AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO ASSIST THIS PROCESS AS PART OF OUR LONG-TERM GOAL TO BUILD A EUROPE UNITED BY A COMMON DESIRE FOR PEACE, POLITICAL LIBERTY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY.

O - IT IS REGRETABLE THAT ROMANIA HAS CHosen TO STAND APART FROM THIS GROWING EUROPEAN CONSENSUS.

O - THE U.S. CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN OUR HISTORY AND CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH EVERY COUNTRY HINGE ON AN APPRECIATION OF THIS FACT AND ON THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE ON THIS SUBJECT.

O - JUST BEFORE COMING TO ROMANIA, I MET WITH PRESIDENT BUSH TO REVIEW U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS AND MY ASSIGNMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO ROMANIA.

O - THE PRESIDENT AND I AGREED THAT ONE OF MY PRIMARY TASKS WILL BE TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BASIS EXISTS FOR A GENUINE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON ISSUES OF
CONCERN TO THE U.S., INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS.

O - THE FOUNDATION OF SUCH A DIALOGUE MUST BE BROAD ACCESS BY MY EMBASSY AND MYSELF TO ROMANIANS OF ALL WALKS OF LIFE, IN ORDER TO GAIN AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF ROMANIAN REALITY AND ENHANCE TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES.

O - IN ADDITION, WE ALSO LOOK TO ROMANIA TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. EMIGRATION IS ONE AREA WHERE ROMANIA HAS SHOWN ITS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S.

O - ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE CONGRESS SHARE THE LONGSTANDING VIEW THAT COMMERCIAL CONCESSIONS WHICH ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD APPROPRIATELY BE CONDITIONED ON THOSE COUNTRIES' RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

O - I LOOK FORWARD TO ESTABLISHING A FRUITFUL DIALOGUE WITH YOU AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON QUESTIONS OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONCERN. I AM CONVINCED THAT, THROUGH OPENNESS AND HONESTY ON BOTH SIDES, WE CAN IDENTIFY MANY ISSUES ON WHICH WE CAN AGREE AND COOPERATE.

--QUESTION FOR CEAUSESCU: YOUR PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE IN THE REGION, AND HOW THESE MIGHT AFFECT ROMANIA.

--QUESTION FOR CEAUSESCU: YOUR FRANK ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ON AREAS WHERE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 384239

WE CAN IMPROVE THEM. EAGLEBURGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED
M. S. Gorbachev: I welcome you, Mr. President, and also the members of the American delegation, on board the Soviet cruise ship “Maxim Gorky.” The initiative to hold this meeting was yours. I would like to start by saying that we view the President’s initiative favorably.

G. Bush: Thank you very much.

M. S. Gorbachev: I think what has been occurring in a peaceful evolution prompts the USSR and the US to have such meetings. It has not only taken place but much else is taking place. That’s the main thing. Therefore we need a new, extensive dialogue which would be organically connected with those changes and the new conditions with which we have to deal in the international arena. We should do business differently, suitable to the changes. Therefore it is already impossible to restrict ourselves to activities at the foreign ministers’ level. Reality dictates the need for more frequent working meetings and contacts between the leaders of our countries.

This meeting is probably a prelude to an official meeting with you. Nevertheless it will have its own significance. Generally, the unofficial meetings which impress me are not accompanied by special formalities. We have been conducting a substantive correspondence. But it is very important to sit at a table and talk. This has not only symbolic significance for the USSR and the US, but for the entire world.

In the Soviet Union and the United States, and yes, in the whole world, people hope that the talks in Malta will become not only a positive symbol of our relations, but bring results.

Let our experts work side by side with their presidents. Opportunities will be created for them to do this.

Again, I sincerely welcome you, Mr. President.

G. Bush: Thank you for your kind words. I indeed suggested this meeting. But I proceeded from the belief that the idea of such talks would also be useful for the Soviet side. Therefore I think that we are prepared to begin a meeting with you. When, on the way from Paris to Washington this summer, I was editing a draft of my letter to you about the issue of this meeting, I realized that I was changing my previous position by 180 degrees. This change in our approach has found understanding among the American people.

Several important events have occurred in the international arena since the idea arose to hold the present summit meeting. I expect that during the upcoming exchange of opinions we can share our evaluations of these events, not only of those in Eastern Europe, but those in other regions as well in order to understand one another’s positions better and more deeply. I favor having this exchange of opinions not only between the delegations but in one-on-one talks. I think that we ought to meet more often.
M. S. Gorbachev: Agreed. I have the feeling that we have already discussed this, and that this meeting is a continuation of our useful conversations.

G. Bush: Yes, this is right. We have already had productive discussions. I would like for you to allow me to describe some ideas of the American side in summary form. I completely agree with what you said about the importance of our meeting in Malta. I prepared quite similar points in my notes. Therefore I won’t repeat myself.

About our attitude to perestroika. I would like to express with all certainty that I completely agree with what you said in New York [during Gorbachev’s visit to the UN]: that the world would be better off for perestroika’s success. Until recently, there were still some doubters on that score in the US. Then in New York you said that there are certain circles which did not want perestroika to succeed. I cannot say that there are no such elements in the US. But I can say with all certainty that seriously thinking people in the US do not hold such views.

But the changes in Eastern Europe and the entire process of perestroika influence these changes in the American mindset. Of course, there are differing points of view among analysts and experts. But you can be confident that you are dealing with a US administration and also with a Congress that wants your reforms to be successful.

I would now like to describe a number of positive steps which, in our opinion, could define in general terms the direction of our joint work to prepare for an official summit meeting in the US. […]

Some comments about economic questions. I want to inform you that my administration intends to take steps directed at preventing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which prohibits granting the Soviet Union most-favored nation status, from going into force…

I would also like to report that the administration has adopted a policy of repealing the Stevenson and Byrd amendments which restrict the possibility of granting credits to the Soviet side. […]

These measures, which the administration is proposing right now in the area of Soviet-American relations, are restrained in the appropriate spirit: they are not at all directed at demonstrating American superiority. And in this sense, as we understand it, they correspond with your attitude. We in the US, of course, are deeply confident of the advantages of our way of economic management. But that is not the issue right now. We have been striving to draw up our proposals so as not to create the impression that America “is saving” the Soviet Union. We are not talking about an aid program, but a cooperative program.

After the Jackson-Vanik amendment is repealed, favorable conditions will arise to remove the restrictions on granting credits. The American administration is not thinking about granting aid but about creating conditions for the development of effective cooperation on economic issues. We have in mind sending the Soviet side our proposals on this matter in the form of a document. It concerns a number of serious projects in the areas of finance, statistics, market operations, etc. […]

I would like to say a few words to explain our position regarding the Soviet side’s desire to gain observer status at GATT. Previously we had a difference of opinions on the subject, the US was opposed to the USSR joining this organization. This position has now been reexamined. We are [now] in favor of the Soviet side being granted observer
status at GATT. In doing so, we are proceeding from the belief that Soviet participation in GATT would help it familiarize itself with the conditions, the functioning, and the development of the world market. […]

There is one more area to use new approaches in a plan to develop economic cooperation. I have in mind the establishment of ties with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This would provide a good framework for cooperation on economic questions through East-West channels. The administration is in favor of moving actively in this direction. […]

G. Bush next switches to regional problems, describing the US position regarding the situation in Central America. Then he suggested moving on to disarmament issues.

M. S. Gorbachev: Agreed.

G. Bush: You know that my administration is in favor of ridding mankind of chemical weapons. Today I would like to describe our new proposal which will contain a certain shift [podvizhka]. If the Soviet side consents in principle to our proposal about chemical weapons which was described in my speech to the UN General Assembly in September, then, in the framework of this approach, the US could undertake to renounce our program of modernization—that is, the further production of binary weapons, after a comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons goes into force.

On the practical level this means that even in the near future both sides could reach agreement about a considerable reduction of chemical weapon stockpiles, bringing this amount to 20% of the amount of CW [Chemical Warfare] agents the US presently has in its arsenal, and, 8 years after the convention goes into force, to 2%. We propose to pursue work in such a manner that, by the time of the summit in the US in the middle of next year, a draft bilateral agreement will have been prepared which would then be signed.

About conventional weapons. Although serious efforts will be needed for this, including those associated with the need to overcome certain obstacles not only on our side but in other countries, let’s say in France, one could count on reaching agreement as early as next year. It appears in this regard that we could put forward such a goal: to orient ourselves toward signing agreements about radical reductions of conventional forces in Europe in 1990, signing such an agreement during a summit of representatives of the countries which participate in the talks in Vienna.

Concerning the issue of a future agreement about reducing strategic offensive weapons. The American side is trying to provide the proper impetus to the talks on this subject. We are in favor of resolving all remaining key questions through joint efforts before the upcoming summit meeting in the US. We also do not exclude the possibility that a draft treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons, and the documents associated with it, will be completely worked out. The treaty could be signed during the summit in this case.

We proceed from the position that at the upcoming Soviet-American talks at the foreign-minister level, solutions could be found in the near future to such problems as the procedure for counting long-range air-launched cruise missiles, enciphered telemetry, limitations on undeployed missiles, etc. The American side plans to form its own position
on these issues just before the foreign ministers’ meeting, which could take place at the end of January, and will set them forth at the talks.

We are also planning to send instructions to our delegation at the Geneva talks that the previous American proposal to prohibit mobile ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] be permanently withdrawn.

I would like to call upon the Soviet side to again return to the question of limitations on the SS-18 ICBMs. We are in favor of prohibiting the modernization of these missiles and of the Soviet side considering the possibility of deeper unilateral reductions in their numbers.

The resolution of the issue of preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile technology is gaining ever greater significance at the present time. In this regard the United States welcomes the accession of the Soviet Union to the regime of limitations which seven Western countries having been observing.

M. S. Gorbachev: This question is already at the discussion stage.

G. Bush: We would like to raise the question about the possibility of the Soviet Union publishing information about their military budget in approximately the same detail as is done in the United States. It appears that our publications give a quite complete picture of what activity is being carried out in the military field in our country. I am confident that your intelligence agencies can authoritatively testify to this.

M. S. Gorbachev: On the contrary, they report to me that you do not publish everything.

G. Bush: I am confident that the publication of more detailed information about military budgets on a mutual basis would facilitate the growth of [mutual] trust in this entire area.

I would like to touch on several questions which are important for the future…

The issue of protecting the environment is acquiring special urgency at the present time. Now we have to take into account even the economic consequences of the changes in the global climate. In several Western countries, feelings are emerging in favor of preventing such changes to phase out even necessary economic activity as much as possible.

We are trying to approach these issues rationally and avoid extremes. At the present time the USSR and US are actively working in a committee to prepare an international conference on the climate under the aegis of the UN. This is cause for satisfaction. In the future we plan to take two more important steps in this direction. First, after work in the committee is completed by autumn of next year, we plan to host a conference in the US to work out a framework agreement on climate change issues.

Protection of the environment requires the attention of eminent representatives of science. I have instructed White House Science Adviser Dr. [Alan] Bromley [Translator’s
note: incorrectly rendered as “Romli” in Russian] to convene a conference on ecology in the spring of next year in which the best scientific energies [sily] as well as the leaders of the appropriate agencies from many countries of the world could participate. I hope that Soviet representatives will also come to this forum.

The development of cooperation between nations depends in large part on the participation of youth in this process. Student exchanges are called upon to play a great role here. We propose that it be arranged, so that such an exchange in the 1990-1991 school year be increased by 1,000 students from each side. This would mean carrying out such an expansion from young people under age 25. At the same time special, attention would be devoted to an exchange of students who are studying humanities and sociology [sic]. Such a practice would be quite rewarding with respect to all kinds of programs in the field of agriculture.

M. S. Gorbachev: Thank you for your interesting ideas. It’s possible that this is the best evidence that the administration of President Bush has shaped its policy in the Soviet-American direction. I intend to touch on several specific issues later.

But right now I would like to make a number of comments of a philosophical nature. It seems to me that it is very important for us to talk with you about what conclusions can be drawn from past experience, from the “Cold War.” What has happened remains in history. Such, if you will, is the privilege of the historical process. However, to try to analyze the course of previous events-- this is our direct responsibility. Why is this necessary? Certainly we can say that we have all ended up at historical crossroads. Completely new problems have arisen before humanity which people had not previously anticipated. And what about it--will we decide them using old approaches? Simply nothing would come out of this.

By no means should everything that has happened be considered in a negative light. We have managed to avoid a large-scale war for 45 years. This single fact alone says that not everything was so bad in the past. Nevertheless, one conclusion is obvious--reliance on force, on military superiority, and the associated arms race have not been justified. Our two countries obviously understand this better than others.

And confrontation arising from ideological convictions has not justified itself either; as a result of this we ended up swearing at one another. We reached a dangerous brink and it is good that we managed to stop. It is good that now mutual trust between our countries has emerged.

Yes, and reliance on an unequal exchange between developed and underdeveloped countries has also been a failure. On what terms? The former colonial powers gained much from this exchange. But so many problems arose in the developing world which literally grabbed all of us by the throat. So everything is interconnected.

Cold War methods, methods of confrontation, have suffered defeat in strategic terms. We have recognized this. And ordinary people have possibly understood this even
better. I do not want to preach here. People simply meddle in policymaking. Ecological problems, problems of preserving natural resources, and problems connected with the negative consequences of technological progress have arisen. All of this is completely understandable since we are essentially talking about the issue of survival. And this kind of public sentiment is strongly affecting us, the politicians.

Therefore we together--the USSR and the US--can do a lot at this stage to radically change our old approaches. We had felt this even in our contacts with the Reagan administration. And this process continues right now. Look how we have confided in one another.

We lag behind the mood of the people at the political level. And this is understandable since various forces influence leaders. It is good that [Chief of the General Staff] Marshal Akhromeyev and your [National Security] Adviser, [General Brent] Scowcroft understand the problems which arise in the military field. But there are people in both countries--and there are many of them--who simply scare us. Many people working in the defense sector are used to their profession and for whom it is not easy to change their way of thinking. And all the same, this process has begun.

Why have I begun with this? The thesis is consistently advanced in American political circles that the Soviet Union “has begun its perestroika and is changing policy under the influence of the ‘Cold War’ policy.” They say that everything is collapsing in Eastern Europe [that] and this also “confirms the correctness of those who relied on ‘Cold War’ methods.” And if this is so, then nothing needs to be changed in this policy. We need to increase strong-arm pressure and prepare more baskets in order to catch more fruit. Mr. President, this is a dangerous delusion.

I have noticed that you see all this. I know that you have to listen to representatives of different circles. However, your public statements, as well as specific proposals directed at the development of cooperation between the USSR and US which you spoke of today, mean that President Bush has formed a certain idea about the world, and it corresponds to the challenges of the time.

Of course, each side makes their own independent choice. But it is clear that when we talk about relations between the USSR and the US, mistakes and oversights in policy are impermissible. It is impossible to assume that our policy is built on misconceptions, both in relations with one another and in relations with other countries.

Initially, I was even thinking of expressing something of a reproach. To say that the President of the United States has not once expressed his support for perestroika, wished it success, and noted that the Soviet Union itself should deal with its own reforms. What we were expecting from the President of the United States was not only statements, but specific steps in accordance with these statements.
Now there are both statements and these steps. I am drawing this conclusion having heard what you have just said. Despite the fact that these are only plans for steps. But this is very important.

Second consideration. A great regrouping of forces is underway in the world. It is clear that we are going from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Whether we like it or not, we will have to deal with a united, integrated European economy. We could discuss the issue of Western Europe separately. Whether we want it or not, Japan is one more center of world politics. At one time you and I were talking about China. This is one more huge reality which neither we nor you should play against the other. And it is necessary to think about what to do, so that China does not feel excluded from all the processes which are taking place in the world.

All these, I repeat, are huge events typical of a regrouping of forces in the world. I am watching India’s policy. This is a dynamic policy. I have talked many times with Rajiv Gandhi. India has a deliberate approach, striving to establish good relations, both with us and you.

But what is our role in this regrouping? Very serious things ensue from this. We began to discuss this question with [former Secretary of State George P.] Shultz. Once during the conversations he showed us diagrams describing the changes which would occur by the end of the century in economic relations between the leading countries of the world. And now it is simply necessary to understand the roles of the USSR and US in these huge changes. They cannot always be accompanied by the quiet flow of events.

And now Eastern Europe. Its share of the world economy is not very great. But look how we are all tense. What should our form of actions be, our cooperation?

And what is waiting ahead for us with regard to the economy, the environment, and other problems? We need to think together about this, too.

We in the Soviet leadership have been reflecting about this for a long time and have come to the conclusion that the US and USSR are simply “doomed” to dialogue, coordination, and cooperation. There is no other choice.

But to do this we need to get rid of the view of one another as enemies. Much of this stays in our brains. And we need to keep in mind that it is impossible to view our relations only at the military level.

All this means that we are proposing a Soviet- American condominium. We’re talking about realities. And this does not at all cast doubt on our relations with our allies and current cooperation with other countries. An understanding of all this is necessary. I do not think that all this has happened yet. We have only entered into the process of mutual understanding.
You raised the question: what kind of a Soviet Union is in the US interest--a
dynamic, stable, solid one, or one struggling with all kinds of problems. I am informed
about the type of advice they give you.

As far as we are concerned, we are interested in the US feeling confident from the
point of view of solving its national security problems and making progress. This thought
is present in all the conversations with my counterparts in the West. And there have been
hundreds of such meetings. I think that any other approach is dangerous. Any reliance on
ignoring internal processes, a reluctance to consider the real interests of the US in the
world--these are dangerous policies.

But the US, too, has to consider the interests of other countries. In the meantime
there is still the desire to teach, to pressure, and to grab by the throat. There is yet more.
We know all this. Therefore I would like to hear your opinion on this score since we are
talking about how to build a bridge between our countries: across the river or alongside it.

Since the President still has much time to lead such a country as the US, there
should be clarity. I think that we will not bring it up after this meeting. But the main
issues need to be investigated. I repeat: clarity is necessary. All the rest--the specifics and
the frequency--in the final account are organically connected with mutual under-
standing on these fundamental issues. […]

G. Bush: You have noted, I hope, that, as changes occur in Eastern Europe, the
United States has not come out with arrogant pronouncements directed at causing harm to
the Soviet Union. Meanwhile some people in the US accuse me of excessive caution.
True, I am a cautious person, but not at all timid, and my administration is trying to do
nothing which would lead to undermining your position. But something else has been
consistently suggested to me--as they say, climb the Berlin Wall and make high-sounding
pronouncements. The administration, however, is not going to resort to such steps and is
trying to conduct itself with restraint.

M. S. Gorbachev: […] I want to react to the ideas expressed by you at the
beginning of the conversation. I welcome your words. I find in them a display of political
will. This is important to me.

And from my personal experience, and from the experience of cooperation with
President Reagan, I know how we have more than once ended up in such a situation on
disarmament issues when everything came to a stop and got bogged down. The
delegations sat in Geneva and drank coffee, but no business was conducted.

Then I received a letter from President Reagan. I read it carefully and came to the
conclusion that it contained no conclusions. Of course, I could have written a formal
reply but I don’t care for wordy rehashing. It was necessary to take a decisive step. Thus
the idea of a meeting in Reykjavik arose. The results of the Reykjavik talks scared some
people. But in reality Reykjavik became a genuine breakthrough on arms control issues.
After this, the entire negotiating mechanism started working actively and effectively.
Or take another field—economic relations. There are limited opportunities here to move forward. Political will is needed in order to overcome these restraints. A signal from the President is needed. American businessmen are disciplined people, and they will react to a display of new thinking in economics.

The delegations at the talks in Geneva have squeezed literally everything out of the directives they have. It is necessary to give momentum to all the work. I noted your ideas in this regard. They seem to me to be deserving of attention.

Thank you for putting issues of bilateral cooperation in first place. We are ready to discuss these issues.

This situation often arises: when the question is about our relations with you, they tell us—if you agree with the Americans we will support it. But as soon as we come to an agreement they cry—“a new Yalta.” This is, in general, natural. Much depends on our work with our allies and the non-aligned countries.

We will move to adapt our new economy to the world economy. Therefore we attach significance to participation in the GATT system and other international economic organizations. We think that it will benefit our perestroika and allow us to better understand how the world economic mechanism functions.

Earlier the US took a negative position regarding the question of the USSR’s participation in world economic organizations. They said that USSR’s participation in GATT would politicize the activity of this organization. I think this is a vestige of old attitudes. Actually, there was a time when we put ideological goals first. And, by the way, you [did] too. It is a difficult time now, and there are different criteria, different processes, and these processes will not reverse themselves.

[...] We are permitting various kinds of property to function in our country. We will pursue matters so that the ruble will become convertible. Perestroika is taking place in COMECON 8 in order to bring the operating principles of this organization closer to the generally accepted standards of the world economy.

Now about Central America. […]

I want to stress again: we do not pursue any goals in Central America. We do not want to seize bridgeheads or strongpoints there. You should be confident of this.

Let us return to the problems of disarmament. We know the US approach to the solution of the problem of chemical weapons. However, earlier an important element was lacking in this approach—the readiness of the US to cease the production of binary weapons after a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons came into force. Now this element has appeared, and it is quite important. There is movement here.
Thus both of us think that a global prohibition is necessary. We will maintain this goal. But we will get to it through bilateral measures and specific stages. Let us have the foreign ministers discuss this.

G. Bush: The issue of proliferation of chemical weapons is also very urgent. I hope that our experts will touch on this theme [as well].

M. S. Gorbachev: Agreed.

Now about the Vienna talks and the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. You have spoken in favor of concluding an agreement on this most important problem in 1990 and signing it at a summit. Our approaches coincide here. We are prepared for active and constructive cooperation to achieve the designated goal. There are, of course, difficulties. But I will not get into details.

About the strategic armaments limitation talks. Political will is needed here to give momentum to the work underway. I have been listening to you carefully, and you have specified some elements. But unfortunately I did not hear mention of the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM; Russian acronym: KRMB: krylatye rakety morskogo bazirovaniya].

Realistic conditions are developing right now to prepare a draft treaty on strategic offensive weapons for signature before our meeting next year. And if a solution to KRMB [SLCM] has not been found by this time, then serious difficulties will arise. You have an enormous advantage here. The American side needs to think this issue over again in the context of what I have said.

G. Bush: This is a problem.

M. S. Gorbachev: We are not trying for mirror symmetry. Each side has its own choice [to reach]. Each country has its own choice, each is in a [unique] situation and has a different armed forces structure.

But it is impossible to ignore KRMB [SLCM] in conducting affairs toward a reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The US has a substantive advantage in this area. Put yourself in our place. Our Supreme Soviet will not agree to ratify a treaty if the problem of KRMB [SLCM] is passed over.

I very much welcome your suggestions about the environment. You can proceed from the premise that our experts will take an active part in the conference on ecological problems which the White House staff has planned.

I am glad that you touched on the expansion of student exchanges. We began this good work during in the Reagan presidency. It is easier for young people to find a common language. And I am confident that they will make their contribution to the positive development of Soviet-American relations.
In summary, I would like to stress again that the steps that you have described and spoken of here have made me happy. The Soviet-American dialogue has gained a certain dynamic. And new efforts, new steps are necessary to give it a second breath. […] 

* * *

[The talks continued on 3 December 1989.]

M. S. Gorbachev: I will say right away: we are satisfied with the work which was done yesterday but think that there are opportunities to move forward even further. If you do not object then I would like to begin first. After all, today I am your guest[–]

G. Bush: I like “my ship” very much.

Speaking seriously, we would like to express our great thanks for the excellent opportunity to work offered to our delegation on the Soviet liner. Although the press is besieging me right now, tossing out questions about the brevity of our conversation yesterday, I do not think that the changes in the program have substantially influenced the substance of our conversations. For our part, I think our discussion has been very good and productive since we, for instance, have essentially continued the conversation through breakfast.

M. S. Gorbachev: Yes, we have counted and it turns out that the conversations lasted over five hours.

Although we have not yet begun to discuss the main issues, I would like to make one suggestion of an organizational nature to you. Why not hold a joint press conference? I think there would be great positive symbolism in this.

G. Bush: A good idea. I agree in principle. I am only afraid that our American journalists might think that I am avoiding their questions if I decide [not to hold] a separate press conference.

Possibly we will hold a press conference in several parts: at first we will talk together with journalists, and then I will reply to questions from our own people.

M. S. Gorbachev: I have also planned to meet with Soviet television after our joint press conference. So this works for me.

G. Bush: That is fine. So it is agreed.

M. S. Gorbachev: Mr. President, yesterday I reacted very briefly to the ideas you expressed about military-political issues. Today it is our turn. I believe that our position
in this area is also of considerable interest to you. I will correct my description considering yesterday’s exchange of opinions.

Although this is an informal meeting all the same, we are meeting for the first time in this capacity. And I would like to begin with several statements of principle.

First of all, a new US President should know that the Soviet Union will not start a war under any circumstances. This is so important that I would like to personally repeat this declaration to you. Moreover, the USSR is prepared to no longer consider the US as its enemy and openly say so. We are open to cooperation with America, including cooperation in the military sphere. That is the first thing.

Second point. We are in favor of ensuring mutual security through joint efforts. The Soviet leadership is devoted to a continuation of the process of disarmament in all directions. We consider it necessary and urgent to get past the arms race and prevent the creation of exotic new kinds of weapons.

I note in passing that we welcome the process of cooperation which has begun between our militaries. In particular, we are appreciative of the opportunity afforded to the Soviet minister of defense to become acquainted with the US armed forces.

One more consideration of principle. We have adopted a defensive doctrine. Many explanations have been given to you that this is so. Our armed forces are already involved in deep changes. The structure of the military grouping in Central Europe is becoming defensive: there are fewer tanks in divisions now, and amphibious crossing equipment is being withdrawn. The deployment of aircraft is also being changed: strike aviation is being assigned to the second echelon, and fighters, which are defensive aircraft, are being moved to the forward lines.

We are not making a secret of our plans for perestroika of the armed forces. The Soviet military is ready at any time to meet their American colleagues, present the necessary information, and discuss issues which arise.

But reciprocal issues arise. At the same time as the Soviet Union has adopted and is implementing a particularly defensive doctrine, the United States continues to be guided by a flexible response strategy adopted more than 20 years ago. Earlier this would have been justified. However, now when it is recognized at the military-political level that a threat from the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, we naturally ask the question: why does the US delay perestroika of its own armed forces? I have familiarized myself with the long—about 60 pages—Brussels Declaration. And, unfortunately, I have noticed that there is as of yet no progress planned on the part of NATO in [its] attitudes at the doctrinal level in this most important area.

The next issue of principle. We have already touched on it in some measure in examining the dynamics of the negotiation process. However, I would like to return to this problem and select one very important point.
The two of us have recognized that, as a result of the arms race, absolutely inconceivable military power was created on both sides. We have come to the common conclusion that such a situation was fraught with catastrophic [dangers]. We have started to act in the right direction and have displayed political will. A most important negotiation process was launched, in which issues of nuclear arms reductions moved to the forefront.

G. Bush: Please forgive me for interrupting you, but I would like in this context to express my thanks for the deeply symbolic gift which you sent me via Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin--a souvenir made from scrapped missiles.

M. S. Gorbachev: Yes. The INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] Treaty became a historic watershed.

Generally, good prospects are opening up, and your comments yesterday have only convinced me of the idea that a reliable basis for further movement has been created.

But what worries us? Up to now one of the three basic components of military power, the naval forces, has remained beyond negotiations. Both previous administrations, and now the current administration, have reacted emotionally to this issue being raised. Moreover, there is no encroachment on American security here. I want to declare with all responsibility that we are considering the interests of the US. Your country is a naval power, and its critically important lines of communications pass through seas and oceans. The development of naval forces is both a historic tradition for you and an entire system in science, industry, and deeply integrated economic interests. Therefore it is not so easy to change the attitude here. We well understand this inasmuch as we ourselves are experiencing similar difficulties in other areas of military policy.

But what will come of this? Even from the beginning of the 1950s we were literally ringed by a network of military bases. There were more than 500,000 men, hundreds of combat airplanes, and powerful fleet forces on them. The US has 15 carrier strike formations and about 1,500 combat aircraft. And such enormous forces are either deployed at our shores or can show up there at any moment. I am not talking about strategic submarines--even if they fall under YaVK negotiations. As a result of the Vienna talks, we will considerably reduce the level of confrontation on the ground. As I have already said, there are good prospects for concluding a treaty about limiting strategic offensive weapons. Under these conditions we have the right to count on the threat to the Soviet Union from the sea also being reduced.

Our ministers have already talked about this. I am taking the initiative myself and officially raising the question of starting talks on the problems of naval forces. When they begin, we should display flexibility here. Let there be confidence-building measures at first, then a general reduction in the scale of naval activity. Then when our positions are clarified at the same time in Geneva and Vienna, the time will come to deal with the question of naval force reductions in earnest.
I will say beforehand that we will take a realistic position. In particular, we realize that the US has other problems besides the Soviet armed forces. But all the same again, it is necessary to stress with all certainty that, however important the security of Europe is to the US and its allies, we are just as interested in security on the seas and oceans.

Now, after describing some of our fundamental approaches I would like to comment on individual negotiation problems. Since we had earlier agreed not to get into detail, I, like you yesterday, will restrict myself to the main things.

It would be desirable if we achieved clarity, at least regarding three important negotiating positions. First, let our ministers and military experts clarify the interrelationship of the future START treaty and the ABM treaty. Second, we consider it quite important—and [Soviet Foreign Minister] E. A. Shevardnadze’s initiatives in Wyoming are evidence of this—to agree about the rules for counting heavy bombers and air-launched strategic cruise missiles. If we take the present American formula, the US can end up not with 6,000 but with 8,500 warheads. We are not trying to haggle for anything here for ourselves: it is necessary to accept only the factual aspect of the matter as a basis.

The third problem which I have already dwelled on is sea-based strategic cruise missiles.

There are, of course, other issues, but right now I will not talk about them. If I have understood the President correctly then we are setting ourselves general guideposts: at minimum to resolve all the large remaining issues before the summit in Washington, and by the end of next year to sign the START treaty itself.

And one more important point. As I understand, Akhromeyev and Scowcroft have “chased it off.” The Soviet and American navies have nuclear weapons, both strategic-ballistic missile submarines and sea-launched cruise missiles as well as tactical: short-range sea-launched cruise missiles, nuclear torpedoes and mines. The strategic nuclear component of naval forces is a subject of the Geneva talks. That leaves tactical nuclear weapons. Although this is an unofficial conversation, I am proposing to begin official discussions. The Soviet Union is ready to completely liquidate naval tactical nuclear weapons on a mutual basis. Such a radical step would simplify immediately the procedures of monitoring its implementation.

Now some words about Vienna. On the whole, I agree with the evaluation of the talks which the President gave. However, three important problems remain here. First, this is an issue of reducing not only armaments but also personnel of the armed forces. We have been proposing to reduce them to 1,300,000 men on each side, that is by one million on both sides. NATO representatives do not agree but for some reason do not give their own figures. I think that people simply will not understand us if we limit ourselves only to arms reductions since enormous [force] groupings oppose one another in Europe.
Second issue, the reduction of the numbers of troops on foreign soil. We propose to limit them to a ceiling of 300,000 men. But we are being pulled in another direction—to reduce only Soviet and American troops. But there are also British, French, Belgian, Dutch, and Canadian troops. In short, they are proposing a solution unfair to us.

Now about the problem of air forces. We have proposed a level for each alliance of 4,700 tactical frontal aviation aircraft and a separate level for interceptors. But here this matter has been moving slowly so far. We propose that special attention be paid to this issue at the next meeting of ministers.

Briefly about the President’s “Open Skies” proposal. We support it. We will participate in the Ottawa conference. We favor joint effective work with the US. It seems to us there is substantial leeway [rezervy] in this proposal. Let our ministers and military specialists discuss expansion of the status of openness to the oceans and the seas, space, and land. […]

Summarizing what I have said, I would like to stress again with all my strength that we favor peaceful relations with the US. And proceeding from this very precondition we propose to transform the present military confrontation. This is the main thing.

M. S. Gorbachev: Maybe we will now close the books on the discussion of military issues and talk about Europe, and give some thought to how to regard the processes of cooperation developing there?

G. Bush: An excellent idea. But let me add some words. I am very satisfied with the cooperation of our diplomatic departments both in the military and other areas. I think that these channels for discussing military political problems are now organically supplementing the contacts for which Akhromeyev and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William] Crowe have laid the basis. The meetings of military specialists have helped military matters quite a bit and I hope that we will develop this practice.

M. S. Gorbachev: We indeed favor doing just that.

G. Bush: I will say openly: our military has enormous influence on NATO. I have now charged them with doing an analysis of the military expenditures of the US and the West as a whole and presenting appropriate recommendations. I think that in this important period, contacts between our two militaries have special significance.

M. S. Gorbachev: That is why we are telling them to meet more often. Did you want to speak first about European matters?

G. Bush: You are closer to Europe, but I would like to anticipate our conversation with some comments.
First of all, I admit that we were shaken by the rapidity of the unfolding changes. We have a high opinion of your personal reaction and the reaction of the Soviet Union as a whole to these dynamic and at the same time fundamental changes.

Yesterday, when talking eye to eye, we discussed the problem of the reunification of Germany, although without going into detail. I hope you understand that it is impossible to demand of us that we disapprove of German reunification. At the same time we are aware how much of a delicate, sensitive problem this is. We are trying to act with a certain restraint. I will formulate this thought somewhat differently: neither I nor representatives of my administration want to be in a position which would be viewed as provocative. I am stressing this point.

One more example of our policy with regard to Eastern Europe. We have sent a high-level delegation to Poland. It includes my senior diplomatic advisers, other representatives of the administration, business people, trade union leaders, etc. They have gone there not to create difficulties for you but to explain to the Poles what mechanisms, in our opinion, are effective in the economic sphere.

Without dwelling on each Eastern European country, I will share only the thought that we well understand the significance of the section of the [1975] Helsinki Act about national borders in Europe.

Of course, I am ready to respond to any questions you have. Nothing interests me more than how you view the possibility of moving beyond the status quo.

M. S. Gorbachev: I do not agree that we are “closer to Europe.” Both the USSR and the US are integrated into European problems to different degrees. We understand your involvement in Europe very well. To look otherwise at the role of the US in the Old World is unrealistic, mistaken, and finally, not constructive. You should know that this is our fundamental position.

G. Bush: I had something else in mind: we simply were not so close to Eastern Europe historically. Of course, we are close--and will be close--to Europe and vitally interested and involved in NATO. The US is really the leader of NATO.

I want to stress separately that you are catalyzing the changes in Europe in a constructive way.

M. S. Gorbachev: I reaffirmed our principled position about the US role in Europe on purpose. There has been too much speculation on this subject. I feed it [sic] both to you and us. But we should be absolutely clear on such important matters.

Now about the changes in Europe. They really are of a fundamental nature. And not only in Eastern Europe--in Western Europe, too. I received representatives of the Trilateral Commission. After one of our conversations, [former French President] Giscard d’Estaing, who was the speaker, addressed me in a very meaningful way: “Be ready to
deal with a united federated state of Western Europe.” By saying that, I think, he wanted to say that when European integration reaches a qualitatively new level in 1992, it would be accompanied by a deep rebuilding of political structures which would also reach the federal level.

Therefore, all of Europe is on the move, and it is moving in the direction of something new. We also consider ourselves Europeans, and we associate the idea of a common European home with this movement. I would like to ask E. A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State [James] Baker to discuss this idea in depth since it appears that it is in the interests of both, the USSR and the US.

We should act--and interact--in an especially responsible and balanced way in this period when all of Europe is undergoing such dynamic changes.

G. Bush. I agree with you.

For, as it is said, a gun fires itself once every five years. The fewer weapons, the lesser the possibility of an accidental catastrophe.

Thus security of the US and her allies should not be a millimeter less than our personal security.

E. A. Shevardnadze: Yesterday the President introduced some interesting ideas about chemical weapons. The Secretary of State and I have discussed this issue very constructively and in great detail. As you can imagine, it deserves the greatest attention.

M. S. Gorbachev: I have already described my first reaction. As I understand it, there are two areas in which it appears we have agreement: a common goal remains a global prohibition on chemical weapons, but we are moving in stages and thus are abandoning the modernization of binary weapons. This is a good basis for negotiations.

G. Bush: If you will allow me, I would like in this regard to raise the very thorny problem of the proliferation of chemical weapons beyond the borders of our two powers. Libya in particular worries us. Of course, I understand that we are in no position to control the Libyan leader. However, we are convinced, as before, that the plant in Rabta is designed to produce chemical weapons. 16 We would like to work with you not only on this specific problem but also on the entire issue of preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons, which is sometimes called “the poor man’s atomic bomb.” The whole world has already seen the terrible consequences of the proliferation of chemical weapons in the example of the Iraq-Iran conflict. Therefore we propose to achieve an agreement in this area. Personally, this problem concerns me very much.

M. S. Gorbachev: I would like to assure you that our positions on this issue coincide. The Soviet Union is decisively against the proliferation of chemical weapons. I propose that our ministers continue the discussion of this problem in view of the goals we have mentioned.
G. Bush: It is necessary to achieve quick progress in this area. Meanwhile you and we are morally vulnerable: others do not want to move forward or they will move in the opposite direction, pointing out that the Soviet and American chemical arsenals remain untouched.

M. S. Gorbachev: I am convinced: we can successfully cooperate here. If the USSR and the US begin to reduce their chemical arsenals in stages this will give us the moral right to persuade others even more strongly of the need not to spread chemical weapons. […]

G. Bush: I completely agree with these ideas.

M. S. Gorbachev: Meeting with political leaders from both Eastern and Western Europe, I tell all of them that this is an objective process which is bringing the countries of the continent together. They are searching now for the optimal versions of combining economy, technology, and different standards […]

The essence of the problem is, is there a consensual approach in practice? We are convinced that we should work to continue and develop the Helsinki process and by no means tear down what has been created on this foundation. From here, there is a need for a Helsinki II where we all should comprehend the new situation and work out common criteria and guideposts. It is understood that all the countries that signed the Helsinki Act should take part in this meeting, including, of course, the US and Canada.

Another important issue—how to deal with institutions in the new situation created in another time? A balanced and responsible approach is also required here. Otherwise our present positive focus on the process of change can become its antithesis and lead to the undermining of stability. We do not need to actually destroy the existing instruments that maintain the balance, but we need to modify them in accordance with the needs of the time in order to use them to strengthen security and stability and improve relations between countries. Let NATO and the Warsaw Pact become political organizations in ever greater measure and not just military organizations, and let them change their confrontational nature. It is good that our generals have already started to catch the spirit of the time, visit one another, and discuss the most complex issues.

I am confident that there are good prospects for cooperation between the Common Market and COMECON. We are planning comprehensive measures in COMECON to ease its inclusion into the structure of the world economy.

Our legislators are already cooperating—and not badly—and a “people’s diplomacy” is developing. Such a meticulous and positive attitude will protect all of us from unpleasant surprises in the future.

I have gained the impression that the US leadership is somehow especially actively promoting the concept of overcoming the division of Europe on the basis of “Western values.” If this proposition is not only for propaganda but is intended to lay a
foundation for a practical policy, then I will openly say it could be very foolish. At one
time alarm was expressed in the West that the Soviet Union was planning to export
revolution. But plans to export “Western values” sounds similar.

I would say that right now is a very difficult time and therefore an especially
crucial one. At a time when Eastern Europe is changing in the direction of greater
openness and democracy and drawing close to universal human values, creating a
mechanism of compatibility with world economic progress, all this opens unprecedented
opportunities to reach a new level of relations. Reaching it by peaceful and calm means.
And it is very dangerous here to artificially force and goad the processes which are taking
place, especially to satisfy some unilateral interests.

The variations of European integration--at the cultural and political level--
including unknown ones, can be quite diverse. And this will not happen painlessly. In
certain places the situation will even become contentious. And this is natural since
enormous and diverse social forces are involved in what is taking place.

I can make a judgment about this only as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
Our country is a genuine conglomeration of peoples. But they have differing traditions
and historical peculiarities of evolution. We are frantically debating the future of the
Soviet economy or, let us say, the issue of what political institutions are needed in
conditions of deep democratization. The task of reforming our federation has arisen
sharply in a new way. Not long ago we were sharing [our] experience on this issue with
the Prime Minister of Canada [Brian Mulroney]. He is concerned about Quebec, which
has been pursuing separatist goals for many years. By the way, the thought then came to
me: why does the American Congress occupy itself with the Baltic countries and does not
help the Canadians deal with Quebec?

Our own experience permits us to predict that the processes in Europe will not
always come smoothly. Generally, this has already been confirmed. But as a whole, we
look on matters optimistically. When you think on the level of a simple reaction to what
is happening then it actually could send a shiver down your spine and some people will
give way to panic. But if you raise it to a political, philosophical level, then everything
falls into place. For if the process is deep, affects fundamental matters, and involves
millions of people and entire nations, then how could it proceed easily and simply?

It is necessary to proceed from an understanding of the enormous importance of
the current changes. It is necessary to avoid possible mistakes and use the historic
opportunities which are opening up to bring East and West together. Of course,
differences will remain. We talked about this yesterday. Even in the Soviet Union, in one
country, the differences between the republics and various regions are evident to the
naked eye. I am confident that such differences exist in the US. They should be present in
the large continent of Europe all the more.

We favor a common understanding with the US of what is occurring in our
country [u nas]. I note that there is such a common understanding today. But the process
will develop. And I want this understanding not to diminish but, on the contrary, to
intensify.

I am in favor of our constant cooperation on the basis of this understanding for
this entire difficult transition period. Otherwise this process can break down and we will
all end up in a chaotic situation which would give birth to many problems, halt the
changes, and throw us back to the times of suspicion and mistrust.

I stress that a special responsibility rests on the Soviet Union and the United
States at this historic moment.

G. Bush: I want to clarify one point. You expressed concern about Western
values. It would be understandable if our devotion to certain ideals provoked difficulties
in the USSR or Eastern Europe and interfered with the progressive processes developing
there. But we have never pursued such goals. Any discussion of Western values in NATO
or other Western organizations are completely natural and do not have destructive intent.
But what are Western values? They are, if you will, glasnost’, openness, and heated
debates. At the economic level--incentives to progress and a free market. These values
are not some- thing new or expedient but long-shared by us and the West Europeans, and
they unite the West. We greet the changes in the Soviet Union or in Poland but do not at
all set Western values against them. Therefore I want to under- stand your point of view
as much as possible in order to avoid any misunderstandings.

M. S. Gorbachev: The main principle which we have adopted and which we
follow in our new thinking is the right of each country to free choice, including the right
to reexamine and change their original choice. This is very painful, but it is a
fundamental right. The right to choose without outside interference. The US is devoted to
a certain social and economic system which the American people have chosen. Let other
people decide themselves, figuratively speaking, what God to pray to.

It is important to me that the tendency toward renewal noted in Eastern and
Western Europe is proceeding in the direction of drawing closer. The result will not be a
copy of the Swedish, British, or Soviet model. No. Something will result which meets the
needs of the present stage of development of human and European civilization.

It has been observed now that people have no fear of choosing one system or the
other. They are looking for their unique version which provides them with the best living
conditions. When this choice proceeds freely then one can say only one thing: go right
ahead.

G. Bush: I do not think that we differ here. We approve of self-determination and
the attendant debates. I want you to understand our approach on a positive level: Western
values do not at all mean imposing our system on Romania, Czechoslovakia, or even the
GDR.
M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important for us. Fundamental changes are occurring and peoples are drawing closer together. And this is the main thing. I see that several means of solving problems used by another system are taking root in Eastern Europe--in the fields of economics, technology, etc. This is natural.

If we and you have such a common understanding, then all practical actions in changing conditions will be adequate and will begin to have a positive nature. […]

J. Baker: I would like to clarify our approach to self-determination. We agree that each country should have the right of choice. But all of this makes sense only when the people in the country are actually in a position to choose freely. This is contained in the concept of “Western values,” and is not at all the right to force their systems on others.

M. S. Gorbachev: If someone lays claim to the truth--expect disaster.

G. Bush: Absolutely right.

J. Baker: I’ve been talking about something else. Let us say, the question of the reunification of Germany, which is causing nervousness in both our countries, and even among Europeans. What do we say here about this? So that reunification takes place according the principles of openness, pluralism, and a free market. We do not at all want the reunification of Germany done on the model of 1937-1945 which, obviously, concerns you. The Germany of that time had nothing in common with Western values.

M. S. Gorbachev: This is what [longtime Gorbachev aide] A. N. Yakovlev asks: “why are democracy, openness, and a [free] market ‘Western’ values?"

G. Bush: It was not always so. You personally have laid the foundation for these changes, the movement toward democracy and openness. It is actually consider- ably clearer today that you and we share these values than, say, 20 years ago.

M. S. Gorbachev: We ought not be drawn into propaganda battles.

A. N. Yakovlev: When they insist on “Western values,” then “Eastern” and “Southern” values unavoidably appear. […]

M. S. Gorbachev: That’s it. And you see that ideological confrontations flare up again…

G. Bush: I understand you and agree. Let us avoid careless words and talk more about the substance of the values themselves. We welcome the changes which are occurring with all our hearts.

M. S. Gorbachev: This is very important since, as I have said, the main thing is that the changes lead to greater openness in our relations with one another. We are beginning to be organically integrated and liberated from everything which divided us.
What will this be called in the final account? I think--a new level of relations. Therefore, for my part, I support your suggestion--let us not have a discussion on a theological level. Historically this has always led to religious wars.

J. Baker: Could we possibly say as a compromise that this positive process is proceeding on the basis of “democratic values”? […] 

[Source: The notes of A. S. Chernyaev, Gorbachev Foundation Archive, Moscow. Published in Gorbachev, Gody trudnykh resheniy [Years of Difficult Decisions] (Moscow: Al´fa-print, 1993). Translated by Gary Goldberg.]
R 041142Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8841
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06701

BRUSSELS FOR ASEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY CONFERENCE FOLLOWS -
COMMUNIST PARTY RESTRUCTURING

REF: 88 SOFIA 1133

AS THIS CABLE WAS BEING PREPARED FOR TRANSMISSION,
GOB SPOKESMAN BOKOV ANNOUNCED ON THE AFTERNOON OF
2 DECEMBER THAT TANCHEV HAD BEEN REPLACED AS
AGRARIAN LEADER. THE NEW CHIEF IS ANGEL DIMITROV.
THREE CHANGES WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL.

1. (C) SUMMARY. AT THE CONFERENCE OF ITS GOVERNING
COUNCIL, THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY HAS FOLLOWED
THE LEAD OF THE COUNTRY'S COMMUNIST PARTY BY CALLING
FOR RESTRUCTURING OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE EFFICIENT COMMISSIONS,
AND BY DEBATING CHANGES IN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP.
THE TIDE OF CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY AND THE

UNPRECEDENTED CRITICISM OF PARTY CHIEF PETUR
TANCHEV AT THE CONFERENCE AND IN THE PARTY'S
NEWSPAPER MAY HERALD HIS OUSTER DURING THE SUPREME
2. (U) ON 23 NOVEMBER, THE CONFERENCE OF THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PEOPLES UNION (AGRARIAN PARTY), ADOPTED A RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR DEVELOPING A "NEW PROGRAM" FOR THE PARTY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL COMMISSIONS TO FULFILL THIS GOAL. IT ALSO ESTABLISHES A SPECIAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE NICOLA PETKOV "AND OTHER PARTY ACTIVISTS WHO BECAME VICTIMS FOR POLITICAL REASONS." THE PARTY CALLS ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO PASS A NEW LAND USE LAW AND STATES THE PARTY’S RESOLVE TO DEVELOP ITS OWN PROGRAM FOR LAND USE AND AGRICULTURE. FINALLY, THE RESOLUTION STATES THAT THE PARTY’S SUPREME COUNCIL, WHICH CORRESPONDS ROUGHLY TO THE BCP’S POLITIBURO, WILL CONVENE IN THE SECOND HALF OF DECEMBER.

DISSENT

3. (U) Svetla Daskalova, Bulgarian minister of justice and holder of the equivalent of Politiburo rank in the AGRARIAN PARTY, TOLD THE CONFERENCE THAT THE AGRARIANS SHOULD NOW BECOME AN INDEPENDENT PARTY. HER SENTIMENT WAS ECHOED IN LETTERS BY AN INITIATIVE GROUP OF PARTY MEMBERS TO THE CONFERENCE AND TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS. THE LETTER TO THE BOARD STATES THAT THE AGRARIAN PARTY DOES NOT DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEASANTRY, THAT THERE IS NO POLITICAL PLURALISM (BECAUSE THE PARTY HAS NO INDEPENDENT PROGRAM), AND THAT THE PARTY IS MERELY A "MUTE PERFORMER." IT CLAIMS THAT THE BCP CONTROLS AND RESTRICTS AGRARIAN PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND THAT INTELLECTUALS ARE NOT ADMITTED TO THE PARTY. IT URGES THE AGRARIANS TO FIGHT AGAINST THE MONOPOLY OF POWER AND TO PLAY AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN THE COUNTRY’S POLITICAL LIFE. IT ACCUSES THE AGRARIAN PARTY OF DESTROYING THE COUNTRY’S ARABLE LAND, VILLAGES, AND AGRICULTURE. IT STATES THAT THE COUNTRY CLAIMS TO BE
AGRICULTURALLY ADVANCED BUT THAT IT IMPORTS POTATOES, ONIONS, GARLIC, AND BEANS. IN ADDITION, IT CALLS FOR "REHABILITATION OF NICOLO PESTOV." (COMMENT: PESTOV WAS ONE OF TWO LEADERS OF THE AGRARIAN PARTY AT THE END OF WWI. THE OTHER FLED THE COUNTRY, BUT PESTOV WAS JAILED, TRIED, AND HANGED BY THE COMMUNISTS IN 1947. IN ITS OFFICIAL PROTEST AT THE TIME, THE BRITISH EMBASSY CALLED PESTOV'S DEATH "JUDICIAL MURDER." END COMMENT)

4. (U) THE SECOND LETTER CONTAINS THE GROUP'S CHARGE THAT THE PARTY'S GOVERNING COUNCIL DELIBERATELY FAILED TO INFORM THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP ABOUT THE FIRST LETTER. IT CLAIMS THAT THE COUNCIL'S ATTEMPT TO BLAME Todor Zhivkov FOR THE "POLITICAL AND PERSONNEL SITUATION" OF THE AGRARIAN PARTY IS GROUNDLESS. IT STATES THAT THE "PRESENT BUREAUCRACY" OF THE PARTY IS A FUNCTION OF THE MONOPOLISTIC STRUCTURES FROM THE TIME OF Vulko Chervenkov and Zhivkov and that the party leadership has no "MORAL OR POLITICAL RIGHT" TO REMAIN IN POWER. IN ADDITION, IT CALLS FOR FORMATION OF A "SPECIAL
5. (U) Finally, the reports of the letters and the conference contain unprecedented attacks on agrarian leader Petur Tanchev. The initiative group's letter to the party membership notes the "anti-democratic tendencies" and actions of "extreme conservatism" and "pseudo-restructuring" of the council and "mainly of Petur Tanchev." The letter to the governing council accuses the agrarian leadership of supporting "without criticism" all decisions taken by the BCP and Zhivkov, "whom Petur Tanchev called 'the great son of the Bulgarian people.'" "This position," it continues, "allowed Tudor Zhivkov to have the entire country at his disposal as though it were his inherited feudal

MANsion." Lastly, the reports of the conference note governing council member Dimitur Ganev's call for replacement of Tanchev.

6. (C) The agrarians seem to have followed the BCP's lead in calling for restructuring and reorganization of commissions. While the BCP had no public letters from an initiative group prior to its party conference and change in leadership, the agrarian group's observations are similar to those of dissident communists, such as Blaga Dimitrova and Kiril Vasilev, who have called for a clean-out and a more responsible party. Just
AS THE AGRARIAN INITIATIVES DEMAND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PARTY, ACTIVIST BCP MEMBERS SUCH AS PETKO SIMENCOW AND MARCO GANCHEV HAVE URGED THEIR PARTY TO MOVE CLOSER TO PLURALISM AND AWAY FROM ITS FORCED PRE-EMINENCE.

7. (C) THE DIFFICULTY LIES IN RECONCILING THE AGRARIAN DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE BCP CLAIM THAT PLURALISM HAS EXISTED ALL ALONG. FOR MORE THAN FORTY YEARS, THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY HAS PROVIDED THE COMMUNISTS WITH A FALSE BUT CONVENIENT CLAIM TO POLITICAL PLURALISM. "HOW CAN WE BE A ONE PARTY STATE," THE COMMUNIST ARGUMENT RUNS, "WHEN WE HAVE THE AGRARIANS." "AND HOW CAN WE NOT BE A GENUINE ALTERNATIVE PARTY," THE AGRARIAN REASONING RUNS, "WHEN WE ARE THE HEIRS OF ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI AND HIS AGRARIAN MOVEMENT." BOTH CLAIMS ARE "ALA-BALA," TO BORROW THE BULGARIAN WORD FOR "NONSENSE." THE AGRARIANS HOLD CONFERENCES, ADOPT

MILD RESOLUTIONS, AND ELECT MEMBERS TO THEIR EQUIVALENTS OF A POLITBuro AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT THEIR CANDIDATES STAND FOR ELECTION ONLY FOR CERTAIN SAFE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SEATS WHICH DO NOT THREATEN THE COMMUNISTS. (WHEN THE AMBASSADOR MET WITH TANCHEV IN 1988, TANCHEV SAID THAT THE AGRARIANS HAD AN AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE WITH THE BCP FOR SEATS "BECAUSE WE'RE A COALITION AND DON'T WANT TO MAKE RELATIONS TENSE BETWEEN OUR PARTIES." SEE REFTEL) THIS IS "GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS"; THEIR REAL RAISON D'ETRE IS IN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS. THEY MAKE VISITS TO BULGARIA POSSIBLE FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS WHO WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEPT AN INVITATION FROM COMMUNISTS, AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY ENABLE THE COMMUNISTS TO CLAIM THE EXISTENCE OF
SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06701

BRUSSELS FOR ASEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY CONFERENCE Follows
A MINORITY PARTY AND A GENUINE TWO PARTY SYSTEM IN
THE COUNTRY.

8. (C) IT MAY BE THAT THERE ARE STILL A FEW AGING AND
EVEN YOUNGER, CLOSET AGRARIANS IN THIS PARTY. THEY
MAY LONG FOR THE DAYS BEFORE THE WAR WHEN THE PARTY
WAS A PARTY AND HAD A REAL POLITICAL AGENDA WHICH
DIFFERED FROM THAT OF THE COMMUNISTS. THE "OPEN
LETTERS" IN THE AGRARIAN'S WEEKDAY NEWSPAPER WERE THE
FIRST PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF SUCH A LONG-SUPPRESSED DESIRE
FOR REAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE. WE DON'T YET KNOW THE
STRENGTH OF SUCH DESIRE IN THIS PARTY WHICH STILL
COUNTS AMONG ITS MEMBERS A GRANDSON OF STAMBOLISKI AND
A WOMAN WHO IS RUMORED TO BE STAMBOLISKI'S ILLEGITIMATE
DAUGHTER.

PAGE 02

9. (C) GLASNOST IN THE FORM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
OR, IN THIS CASE, "FREEDOM TO REMEMBER" DOES NOT
NECESSARILY WALK HAND IN HAND WITH REAL PARTY PLURALISM.
JOURNALISTS IN SOFIA DURING THE FIRST HEAVY DAYS OF
CHANGE AFTER ZHIVKOV'S FALL REPEATEDLY ASKED, "CAN
THE AGRARIANS HOPE TO CHALLENGE THE COMMUNISTS JUST
AS THE MINOR PARTIES IN EAST GERMANY SEEM TO HAVE
RISEN IN PROMINENCE?" THE IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS PROBABLY
NOT, IN PART BECAUSE THE AGRARIAN OFFICIALS WHO HAVE
ANY POLITICAL KNOW-HOW ARE THOSE WHO HAVE ALL ALONG
BEEN CLOSELY ALLIED WITH THE COMMUNISTS, ON WHOM THEY
HAVE DEPENDED FOR ANY POSITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN
ALLOCATED TO THEM. THOSE WHO ARE NOT ALLIED WITH
THE COMMUNISTS AND/OR IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND WHO
ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE WILLING TO DEMAND INDEPENDENCE
FOR THE PARTY ARE POLITICAL NOVICES WHO WOULD PROBABLY
NEED TIME TO DEVELOP SUFFICIENT FAMILIARITY WITH THE
SYSTEM TO CHALLENGE IT. THIS SITUATION IS, IN FACT,
ONE WHICH IS SHARED WITH THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENT
ORGANIZATIONS AND WHICH DEYAN KYURANOV OF BCOGLASNOST
USES TO JUSTIFY HIS GROUP'S RELUCTANCE TO RUSH TO
ACTION IN THE COUNTRY'S IMPROVING POLITICAL CLIMATE.
HOWEVER, UNLIKE INDEPENDENT GROUPS, THE AGRARIANS
ALREADY POSSESS SEVERAL INSTITUTIONALIZED ASSETS,
INCLUDING AN ORGANIZED STRUCTURE, SOME DEGREE OF
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION, FORTY YEARS OF ACTIVITY AND
EXPERIENCE AS A UNION, HOWEVER SUBSERVIENT, A PROUD HISTORY OF AGRARIANISM WHICH SOME MEMBERS OF THE MODERN PARTY CLAIM AS THEIR OWN, AND THEIR OWN WIDELY CIRCULATED NEWSPAPER. IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, THESE ADVANTAGES COULD GIVE THEM THE BASE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND A CONCOMITANT CHALLENGE TO THE COMMUNISTS.

10. (C) WHEN A PERNIK OFFICIAL HERE LAST WEEK COMPARED VETERAN PARTY OFFICIAL SLAVCHO TRUNSKI'S STRONG SPEECH IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AGAINST THE ALREADY-OUTED ZHVIKOV TO "ATTACKING A DEAD DOG," HE ALSO PROVIDED A MEANS OF CHARACTERIZING VIRTUALLY EVERY PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OR CRITICISM OF INDIVIDUAL BULGARIAN OFFICIALS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ADVENT OF GLASNOST: YOU DON'T SAY ANYTHING BAD ABOUT SOMEONE UNLESS HE IS DEAD, OUT OF FAVOR, OR ON THE WAY OUT. IN THE WEEKS SINCE MLADENOV'S ASCENDANCY, MOST CRITICAL REMARKS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS HAVE BEEN LEVELLED AT ZHVIKOV AND HIS FAMILY, DECEASED PARTY OFFICIALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE "NOW EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND SYSTEM," AND OUSTED POLITIBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS SUCH AS BALEV. THE AGRARIANS' ATTACKS ON THEIR OWN 68 YEAR OLD LEADER, WHO IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH ZHVIKOV IN HIS AUTOCRATIC DEALINGS WITHIN THE PARTY AND HIS REPUTED FONDNESS FOR WESTERN TRIPS AND LUXURIES, COULD HERALD HIS DEMISE AS LEADER, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE PARTY'S SUPREME COUNCIL DECIDES TO TAKE ANY SORT OF STAB AT GREATER INDEPENDENCE. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
Minutes of the Meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Moscow

4 December 1989

At the meeting were also present comrades Constantin Dascalescu, Prime Minister of the of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, President of the Council of Ministers of USSR.

M.S. Gorbachev:

- Comrade Ceausescu, first and foremost I would like to congratulate you on behalf of the entire leadership of Soviet Union for the successful finalization of your Congress. I believe that you are satisfied with the results of your Congress. Within Romanian society, among the Romanian communists, as our comrades have told me, the reaction to the decisions of the Congress has been a positive one.

From me as well as from the leadership of the Soviet Union, I would like to communicate, to you and to the entire Romanian party leadership, a friendly salute and good luck in bringing the decisions of the Congress to fruition.

N. Ceausescu:

- I would like to thank you for your good wishes and, in turn, to express to you, in the name of our party leadership and me personally, a cordial salute to you and the Soviet leadership.

Of course, I am happy to have even this short meeting although there is need for a longer meeting.

Gorbachev:

- Of course, we will try to find time for that as well.

Ceausescu:

- There are a lot of issues to discuss.

Thank you for the good words regarding our Congress. It was a good Congress and there were a lot of good decisions taken during the Congress. Now we need to work on putting them into practice.

Gorbachev:

- Always, after a great event, especially after a Congress, we have to deal with a lot of obligations. This has always been that way.

[Here,] at home, the situation demands a great deal of attention. We already consider it sensitive. Our main preoccupation rests in shedding those elements that have impeded our development. Of course, we are committed to our political choice and we cannot agree with the idea that the path we have taken until now has been a path of mistakes and unfulfilled promises. This is a complex process and a change in the world as
our revolution has been can not be appreciated only in “black and white,” even if we are to judge it under large, historical criteria and we are not to exaggerate.

I believe that we cannot admit, from the perspective of truth and morality, that the accomplishments of the previous generations are under-appreciated. They lived, sacrificed their health and even life, and though there have been dramas, they were happy. That is why we, through our perestroika, [hope] to accumulate all that has been good and open up prospects for the renewal and perfecting of our society. Of course, this process is complex. However, we hope for a successful end, though we know it will not be a quick one.

Ceausescu:
- At our Congress we had a special passage about the Great October Socialist Revolution and about the great realizations of the Soviet people. What the Soviet people have accomplished cannot be forgotten.

Gorbachev:
- This [that there were no realizations] is one of those falsities, even more stupid than those that are usually being told.

Ceausescu:
- Of course, in such a grandiose activity there have also been mistakes and abuses, but history only records that which assures advance.
  I salute your position, Cde. Gorbachev, in regards with the necessity to show, with the backing of facts, what socialism has accomplished, because through that, the Soviet people will be mobilized in support of the new objectives. Yes, we need to constantly perfect the organization of society, the economy, all that stands at the basis of a closer path towards socialist ideals.

Gorbachev:
- I think this is a very consistent remark since we ourselves have been late in solving certain problems though they were ready to be solved.

Ceausescu:
- I hope you realize that no matter what we shall do now, in ten years it will again be outdated if we do not always keep an eye out for what is new.

Gorbachev:
- Absolutely.

Ceausescu:
- What is important is that we reach socialism so that we offer the people a better spiritual and material life.

Gorbachev:
- I will ask Comrade Stoica to translate for you the last article I wrote regarding the ideals of socialism and their relationship with perestroika. There I have talked about all those issues.

Ceausescu:
- I have looked over it. I received an executive summary.

Gorbachev:
- It is hard to get the overall idea from summaries.

Ceausescu:
- I’ll think about it [the article] and I’ll give you an answer.

Gorbachev:
- Very well.

Ceausescu:
- This is my idea: two delegations, one from each of our parties—if we could find others it would be great but now it might be harder—to elaborate a declaration regarding socialism and its prospects.

Gorbachev:
- I am not opposed to that.

Ceausescu:
- I can assure you that a lot of parties are waiting for such a declaration and will certainly salute the fact that the Soviet Union participates in this issue.

Gorbachev:
- Excellent.

Ceausescu:
- Of course, not the old forms—we have criticized them, you remember—but, let’s face it, the entire world pays a great deal of attention to the actions of the Soviet Union. I am, of course, referring to the communist movements and the progressive forces.

Gorbachev:
- Fine, let’s give this task to the ideological and international sections [of the Central Committee] and let them begin work, most likely in the scientific field at first and maybe after that in the political field.

Ceausescu:
- After that we can look at it together.
Since we are discussing such issues, let us begin to discuss the possibility of a congress of the Communist and Workers Parties. Of course, I do not want to take a
decision right this minute, but a lot of parties have expressed interest in such an event. As a matter of fact, one of the decisions of the congress has been that [the Romanian Communist Party] will pursue this idea. We could form an exploratory committee.

**Gorbachev:**
- I have a different idea.

**Ceausescu:**
- They should start working on it.

**Gorbachev:**
- I am inclined to agree more with the idea you proposed in your letter. However, we in the socialist countries should have a debate regarding this issue. How could we establish a larger meeting without first establishing our position regarding the problems we face?

**Ceausescu:**
- This will take a long time to prepare for. Even the creation of a group will have a positive influence on the socialist countries. You should know that no one desires a conference where they say this and that. Thus, it would be great if an exploratory group would be formed and if they would start working on this issue. This could be a great help for the socialist countries.

**Gorbachev:**
- We are of the following opinion: the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party should run an opinion poll since this is not a very good time to have a conference. There was a time when there was a friendly attitude regarding such a debate, but after that a process of renewal about the role of the party began and now there is a different desire taking shape: everybody wants to clean his own house.

**Ceausescu:**
- I want to state openly that, for a time, we ourselves have been against such conferences.

**Gorbachev:**
- Now others are opposed.

**Ceausescu:**
- But we have received requests from many parties and, since this is such a dire time for the communist movement, we have a responsibility to do something even if a small number of parties might show up.
  
  Do you know what Lenin said in 1903?

**Gorbachev:**
- No, I do not.
Ceausescu:
- No matter how few we are, we must raise the flag. The people need to see that we are taking action to extend the influence of socialism and the revolutionary movement.

Gorbachev:
- I was under the impression that what we do regarding the renewal of socialism does raise the interest of others in the development of socialism.

Ceausescu:
- We do not have the time to discuss this. There are some good things, there are a few things that are not as good, and if we are to discuss this right now we would need a great deal of time. There are some good things.

Gorbachev:
- Yes, we only have a short time. But we should think about this.

Ceausescu:
- I am against creating such an exploratory committee without the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev:
- Maybe it would be better like that.

Ceausescu:
- I don’t think that would be a good idea.

Gorbachev:
- The concept of equal rights [among the parties] suggests that.

Ceausescu:
- This is so, but I think that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must not be left out of such a debate. However, as I mentioned before, we need not decide this issue right now. I do hope that you will think about this problem.

Gorbachev:
- We will consider it and give you an answer.

Ceausescu:
- This is an actual problem and we must have an answer. There are many such problems today and the people feel the need to receive answers. After all, the people think that if the social-democrats, the liberals, the christian-democrats can all meet…

Gorbachev:
- The conservatives…
Ceausescu:
- The conservatives, yes… Then why can not the communist parties meet as well?

Gorbachev:
- Because, some time ago, Cdes. Ceausescu and [Italian Communist leader Enrico] Berlinguer were against that.

Ceausescu:
- We were against a certain format… and history proved us right.

Gorbachev:
- I was against it myself, but there was not much I could do at the time.

Ceausescu:
- Then why don’t we work out a common declaration and, if other parties will agree with it, so much the better. I understand you agreed with this point.

Gorbachev:
- We will think about it and we will give you an answer.

Ceausescu:
- Very well.

Should we start discussing bilateral issues now? Or would you rather finish up the more general problems first. We are very preoccupied about what is going on with a few European socialist countries. We understand the drive to perfect, to renew, but I do not want to discuss this right now. The format of this renewal places in grave danger not just socialism in the respective countries but also the very existence of the communist parties there. If we allow this flow of events, a dire situation will develop.

In any case, one can not say that socialism did not accomplish anything in those countries. I believe that the Soviet Union, and I am referring primarily to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, could have a certain role—not by the force of the military—to help produce a better orientation. You were speaking today about a better orientation for those parties and countries.

Of course, a meeting between the socialist countries and our parties could help, but we have to think hard about the actions taking place in some countries.

Gorbachev:
- Here we need to ask how we all could act and more importantly how they should act.

Who prevented Czechoslovakia and the East Germany—countries that had a high level of economic development and high living standards—from beginning in time the process of modernization and [from] taking into account the changes that began to take shape in the development of society? If they would have done this at the right time, today’s events would be different. We too, in the Soviet Union. If we would have taken care of the modernization of the technology and of economic development at the right time, there would be a different approach today. There was a lot of talk at the time, in
meetings and during congresses, about the technological and scientific revolutions, about the development of our country. Yet in the end, all was set aside. Right now we have a report in the Central Committee about the technological and scientific revolution from 1973, and, look, 15 years later, we are just beginning to do what needed to be done then. I believe that we have lost a lot of our prestige because we have not taken direct action regarding those problems at the right time.

Ceausescu:
- This is true.

Gorbachev:
- Whether or not we like the methods employed by Comrade Ceausescu, we know that a lot has been done in Romania, and, in an objective manner, all are free to chose their own methods to accomplish progress and the construction of socialism. That’s about it.

Look at the situation in which our common friend, Comrade [deposed East German leader Erich] Honecker is today. We have a great deal of mutual sympathy, but as of late, he did not want to speak with me, and I did not have a chance to speak with him. After all, I told him: Comrade Honecker, it is your job to decide, we will not decide for you, we do not force you to adhere to our decisions. As a matter of fact, I know that the both of you have criticized me…

Ceausescu:
- No, we did not criticize you. On the contrary, we decided that we should meet more quickly and discuss what we could do to work better together.

Gorbachev:
- Sincerely speaking, I am very uncertain about the future of Comrade Honecker.

Ceausescu:
- I am very sorry about this and that is why I even brought it to the attention of the public, something must be done, because this cannot be continued in this manner. That includes, of course, Comrade [deposed Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov.

Gorbachev:
- I believe that [as far as] Cde. Zhivkov is concerned, the situation will be a lot more normal. I do not know what the situation is there [in Bulgaria]. Of course, over the years, a lot of things have accumulated. If there are no grievous abuses, I believe that the situation will come to a positive end. However, politics can not be done this way. We, at the leadership level, try to concentrate on political problems, not to decide who has done what. You know that there are always certain elements of society that will raise such problems. What can we do? You seem concerned about this, tell me, what can we do?

Ceausescu:
- We could have a meeting and discuss possible solutions.
Gorbachev:
- In East Germany, they [the Communists} have already discussed it and have excluded them [the old leadership] from the party.

Ceausescu:
- Yes, I saw that, but at this time, in East Germany there are already influences from outside at work, from the Federal Republic of Germany.

Gorbachev:
- [deposed Czechoslovak leader] Milos Jakes is an old friend of mine. I told him: you have a great country, a well-trained population, well-educated and well-organized, you need to make the necessary changes faster, faster. Otherwise, you’ll end up like us, having to solve your problems under the marching of boots. Jakes listened to me and said: then we shall wait until others come to power in the Soviet Union. He waited, and this is what happened. Those are two countries with a great economic situation, rich countries, the richest countries, except for us, the richest of them all.

Ceausescu:
- Beginning with 1968 we said: we need to develop our economy because no one will help us otherwise. We have taken steps in that direction.

Gorbachev:
- You have done a lot.

Ceausescu:
- Until 1984 we did not import even one liter of gasoline from the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev:
- You had no need for it. You had your own gasoline. This is already clear now.

Ceausescu:
- I just wanted to remind you.

Gorbachev:
- In any case, you have done a lot.

Ceausescu:
- We have worked on and succeeded in bringing about the development of society and the economy. What you are doing now we have tried in the past. We created then the so-called private-holders and after a year we saw they are getting rich and we put a stop to the entire situation.

Gorbachev:
- Is this the future you see for us?

Ceausescu:
- If some get rich by playing the market, that is not a future, you know that I’m sure. We have introduced the idea of economic self-rule, the new economic mechanism, and the leadership councils.

Gorbachev:
- As I listen to you I cannot help but think that in a year you have time to visit every administrative region in your country.

Ceausescu:
- Maybe not quite all the regions.

Gorbachev:
- Tell me, though, in a country as big as ours, how could we rule in the same manner as you? We need to think of different methods.

Ceausescu:
- We, too, have autonomy, but there is a difference between the autonomy of republics or even regions and the autonomy of factories. In any case, general direction and control from the center are necessary, even for the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev:
- Comrade Ceausescu, we too desire a powerful center, but we think of it in a somewhat different manner.

Ceausescu:
- This must be done. Of course, the republics must have a great deal of autonomy. So must the administrative regions. We are going as far as villages now. Yes, we are a small country…

Gorbachev:
- It’s not small, it’s medium size…

Ceausescu:
- In any case, it is mistaken to allow the factories, even at the national level, to be outside central control. A lot of autonomy, a lot of rights, of course, but under a central guidance. About 20 years back, we gave them a lot of rights and, the first thing they did was to take loans and make all kinds of poor economic investments. Then we realized that we needed to control certain things so we took some of their liberties away. For Romania, $11 billion debt in 1980 was a grave problem. As a matter of fact, I can tell you that in my discussions with Brezhev at the time, he told me: don’t go and get yourself in debt. He told me that a number of times, but my mistake was that I gave too much discretion to the factories and all of them decided that if they have discretion then they can take credits from outside.

Gorbachev:
- It is the fault of the government!
Ceausescu:
- Comrade D|sc|lescu was not then prime-minister.

C. Dascalescu
- I came when we began to pay.

Ceausescu:
- After that we made some changes and we put a stop to that situation while paying back the debt.

Gorbachev:
- Of course, we do not want to create a bad situation, we want to succeed.

Ceausescu:
- Everybody wants that. The Soviet Union has countless possibilities to overcome the problems you are experiencing now. You can become a model socialist economy.

Gorbachev:
- This is exactly what we want to do. Maybe those goals are too high, but those are our goals. Maybe our generation will not finish all the changes, but we could do a lot. What is most important now is that we establish the foundation for change, that we determine the future direction in a correct manner.

Ceausescu:
- In a few years the Soviet Union could surpass its difficulties, mainly because it is an economic force.

Gorbachev:
- This is so.

Ceausescu:
- You are criticizing research and development but you have a powerful sector in those fields.

Gorbachev:
- Absolutely.

Ceausescu:
- The mistake was that you have placed too much emphasis on the military side of research and development and you have neglected the other aspects.

Gorbachev:
- I know.

Ceausescu:
I understand that the international situation necessitated such behavior. But you do have a powerful research and development sector, very powerful… it could solve easily any problem. And, after all, the other socialist countries, they might be smaller, but we can work together in this field.

**Gorbachev:**
- If we think about the countries in Europe, with all the problems they are experiencing, they are modern nations.

**Ceausescu:**
- The changes that have taken place… they need to be stopped and we need to get under way.

**Gorbachev:**
- We have considered that as well. Maybe we have different methods, but this is the method employed by all others. What is important is that we strengthen socialism. The rest is the other’s concern. There are different rhythms, different methods. Of course, we need to consider the differences between the republics, between their populations, between their economic development.

**Ceausescu:**
- But it [the system] must be kept, [must be] improved.

**Gorbachev:**
- Not just kept, comrade Ceausescu!

**Ceausescu:**
- When I said that it must be kept it was understood that all that is necessary must be kept.

**Gorbachev:**
- Absolutely. Now, what are the bilateral problems you want to discuss.

**Ceausescu:**
- First and foremost economic relations. Of course, the prime ministers have not had a chance to meet.

**Gorbachev:**
- Then they should meet.

**N.I. Ryzhkov:**
- We shall meet on 9 January 1990.

**C. Dascalescu:** - This would be a meeting within the confines of COMECON. We desire a bilateral meeting.
Gorbachev:
- You shall be alive on the 9 January. [Veti mai trai pana la 9 ianuarie!]
In any case, what are the problems that preoccupy you?

Ceausescu:
- I am under the impression that we have discussed those problems already. The prime-ministers must meet and resolve the problems already discussed. We need to think about the next five year plan.

Gorbachev:
- I think that they have already discussed those problems.

Dascalescu:
- Only for 1990.

Ceausescu:
- Of course, there are topics of discussion. We consider that we could improve our collaboration. This is the foremost issue on our minds.
  Of course, I don’t think it necessary to get into issues that would require a lot of time. We can not debate now those topics but, if we agree on a time for the prime ministers to meet, that would be a good thing. In Romania, the time is now ripe.

Dascalescu:
- I have written to comrade Ryzhkov on this topic, this is the forth letter this year.

Ryzhkov:
- The time was not right.

Ceausescu:
- This might be true, but we need to make time for a meeting. At that time we could look at the issues of collaboration in the fields of production, specialization, even the realization of certain goals.
  Why do I bring up those issues? Because, especially in the member countries of COMECON there are many debates and now, bilaterally, we could solve those problems much more easily. Some believe that the Americans will come and invest billions of dollars in their economy. Of course, they will reach certain conclusions. It is their business, but, until we clarify the many problems, we could solve many of them through a bilateral solution.
  I don’t want to get into it right now, I just wanted to mention this right now now.

Gorbachev:
- Maybe the Romanian government could explain what it expects from the Soviet Union. Comrade D[s]c|lescu could write a letter listing the resources you would need.

Ceausescu:
- I would like you to note that I do not desire to resolve the problem of raw materials only through the Soviet Union. We have worked closely with the developing countries and we desire to accentuate this trend. We can even give them some credits now. As a matter of fact, we have now to recover 2.7 billion dollars from those countries.

**Gorbachev:**
- In a year?

**Ceausescu:**
- No, those are credits given by Romania to a few developing countries.

**Dascalescu:**
- This year Romania has outstanding credits for almost 500 million dollars.

**Ceausescu:**
- We would like to participate actively in the development of those countries and, in turn, assure our access to raw materials.

**Gorbachev:**
- Then we should talk about our particular problems.

**Ceausescu:**
- From the Soviet Union we have imported 5 million tons of petrol, beginning in 1984, and from other countries we have imported 15 million tons. Thus we need not resolve this particular problem only with the Soviet Union.

**Gorbachev:**
- And how much do you extract from Romania?

**Ceausescu:**
- Only about 10 million tons since we no longer have reserves.

**Gorbachev:**
- But there was a time when you were mining about 22 million tons.

**Ceausescu:**
- It was closer to about 15 million tons, but that was some time ago. We no longer have reserves. We thought about going to 10,000 meters depth.

**Gorbachev:**
- Our extraction is also falling.

**Ceausescu:**
- There are a number of fields in which we could collaborate. For example, we could collaborate in the energy field, based on new technology.
Gorbachev:
- I would be interested in discussing the nature of this collaboration rather than simply trading goods.

Ceausescu:
- We, for example, import about 7 million tons of iron ore from the Soviet Union. From other countries we import about 12 million tons. As such, we do not desire to import raw materials only from the Soviet Union. We import coal from the United States…, some time ago we invested 100 million dollars there, so we own property there.

Gorbachev:
- There, the Japanese have a lot of property.

Ceausescu:
- The Japanese invest on a grand scale.
- Thus, we want to discuss this collaboration because we want to participate. We were informed a few days ago that you would like to open two new exploratory sites in Lvov and Kharkov. We would like to participate, to collaborate with you in Mongolia. As a matter of fact, we have been discussing this for a long time since the Soviet Union is interested in investing there as well. We have invested in coal in China. We do not want to ask for anything, we do not want aid from the Soviet Union, we want to collaborate.

Gorbachev:
- There can be no help from us… you need to help us.

Ceausescu:
- We would like to collaborate on economic principles—this is our intention.

Gorbachev:
- Comrade D|sc|lescu should think about the proposals we have discussed.

Dascalescu:
- I shall wait for comrade Ryzhkov in Romania.

Ryzhkov:
- I apologize, comrade Gorbachev. I will meet with comrade D|sc|lescu and we shall discuss what problems we need to address in our bilateral relations, including the issues regarding the next five year plan. I am not against [this] and I assume we will talk about specialization and cooperation, in production and every other aspect, but I want to mention that, and this is not targeted at Romania, we will present a report on 15 December regarding our plans for the development of the economy. We have prepared the necessary documents and have distributed them to the deputies for debate.
- When we prepared those documents, we began with the idea that we need to move from the exchange of goods, the barter system, towards regular commerce. This is why, on 9 January, when the meeting between the chiefs of governments will take place, we will bring this problem up. We know that many countries agree with us, many have
suggested that we move from the barter system to world prices and payments in hard currency.

    We understand that this can not be done over night. Maybe we will need to wait 1-2 years until we can switch over to this system. This does not mean however that we can not or will not negotiate long term deals, even in regard to bartering for goods, but we have no other solution in the long term. Neither for us, nor for the other countries, can [we] continue in this [old] system. This is why you should think about this yourself.

    Ceausescu:
    - I understand what you are saying. After all, we ourselves exchange goods for hard currency. We have chosen the convertible ruble as our currency of choice, but we do not barter. Of course, we seek to reach a balance of payments, but this takes place throughout the world. With the United States for example, we calculate the prices in dollars but exchange goods.

    Gorbachev:
    - If we think about moving to the world system, then we need to adopt the world’s methods. Many countries, Czechoslovakia, Poland and even Bulgaria have brought up the idea that we need to move to world market prices and thus to commerce using hard currency.

    Ceausescu:
    - That is very good. We consider that this problem must be discussed with due seriousness. For example, we and the Chinese deal in Swiss Francs.

    Ryzhkov:
    - So do we.

    Ceausescu:
    - We do however make sure that there is a balance of payments—only the calculation of the value of trade is in hard currency. I do not believe that for the Soviet Union it will be acceptable to move from the ruble to the dollar. Of course, this is a problem for the Soviet Union to decide on.

    Gorbachev:
    - We desire that, in this whole process we also incorporate the redesign of our financial system and the system of prices, to try to quickly reach the convertibility of the ruble. The most important thing is to integrate ourselves in the world market, otherwise we have no basis of comparison.

    Ceausescu:
    - This problem will need to be discussed, discussed for a long time.

    Gorbachev:
    - We will then propose this at the meeting, on 9 January, and we hope that by that time you will also have a position.
Ceausescu:
- We do not consider this to be the most opportune time to make this move.

Gorbachev:
- Why?

Ryzhkov:
- 1990 will continue the same why but we expect to make this move in 1991.

Ceausescu:
- It is not about 1990. I am thinking more about the next five years.

Gorbachev:
- Why?

Ceausescu:
- Because this will not strengthen the economy of the socialist countries nor that of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev:
- Why?

Ceausescu:
- For us it is not a big deal to do such a thing. Even now, with China and the other countries we have about a 60 per cent exchange in hard currency.

Gorbachev:
- I will tell you this: this is not a short time plan. We must make this change, maybe we will end up in debt, but we must adopt this system. We must create the opportunity for the energy sector to earn hard currency and make investments. Today this is the least developed part of our economy, but it not only about the energy sector. In general, our industries must compete in the world market and understand that they must make ends meet. How long can we continue to push them along?

Ceausescu:
- It is not about pushing them forward, the economic activity must be planned on sound economic principles.

Gorbachev:
- Comrade Ceausescu, it is easy to talk about it now, but in a few years—Comrade Ryzhkov suggests that it may take about 2 years—we can also use credits to take care of moments of transition. But we need to adopt the system right away.

Ryzhkov:
- We think that we need to get our economists with the Romanian economists and calculate the balance of payments if we are to move to the world system. It will be a complex system in any case.

Gorbachev:
- We have a lot to discuss both with respect to the method of restructuring but also regarding concrete issues.

Dascalescu:
- What is concrete is that I expect Comrade Ryzhkov in Bucharest. We cannot discuss the balance of payments in Sofia.

Ryzhkov:
- I can not come before the meeting in Sofia. In the first trimester of the next year I could be there.

Dascalescu:
- Let’s say February then?

Ceausescu:
- That remains to be decided among yourselves.

Gorbachev:
- Then Comrade Ceausescu, we should continue to keep in touch. I am very glad that we have commenced an exchange of opinions. Sincerely speaking, I appreciate this at its face value.

Dascalescu:
- I have a request for Comrade Ryzhkov, regarding natural gas.

Ceausescu:
- The problem of natural gas is not one for the future, it regards the situation at this time.

Dascalescu:
- For the past few days, something must have happened on your side, we are receiving 7 million cubic meters less a day. We were told that this will only last a few days. Could you please analyze this problem?

Gorbachev:
- This happens every year. Always something more.

Dascalescu:
- It is not more, it is less.

Ceausescu:
- What will we say about our bilateral meeting?

**Gorbachev:**
- You can issue a press release, we will issue a press release. Here is a short text. *(the news release is read)*

**Ceausescu:**
- Maybe the part about the bilateral collaboration needs to be better developed. We can say that there has been an exchange of opinions regarding cooperation between our countries. We should make a separate paragraph about this thing.

**Gorbachev:**
- Very well, let’s talk about the situation of our relationship and their prospects.

**Ceausescu:**
- Very well.

*Source: Published in Serban Sandulescu’s, December ’89. The Coup D’Etat Confiscated the Romanian Revolution* (*Bucharest: Omega Press Investment, 1996*, pp. 283 - 298; *Translated by Mircea Munteanu.*
R 051351Z DEC 89
PM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8735
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 06591
BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES
MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: "PARTY" GROUPS PROLIFERATE AS INDEPENDENT - SOCIETY HOLDS ITS STRONGEST PUBLIC MEETING TO DATE

REF: SOFIA 6546

1. (U) SUMMARY: AS ALL OF THE MAJOR INDEPENDENT GROUPS CONTINUED THEIR SOLICITATION OF NEW MEMBERS AND SIGNATURES FOR THEIR PETITIONS AT THE WEEKEND, THE SCENE IN SOFIA'S SOUTH PARK WAS MARKED BY THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ARE ADVERTISING THEMSELVES AS PARTIES. ON 2 DECEMBER, THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY HELD A LARGE PUBLIC MEETING WHICH BEGAN WITH AN ADDRESS FROM DANIEL JACOB, PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. SPEAKERS AT THE MEETING CALLED FOR AN END TO COMMUNISM AND EVEN TO SOCIALISM. MEANWHILE, CITIZENS INITIATIVE RELEASED ITS FIRST DECLARATION AND ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAS ALREADY ENLISTED MORE THAN 3000 MEMBERS. END SUMMARY

LET'S HAVE A PARTY

------------------

2. (U) AN ESTIMATED 2000 PEOPLE HEARD VARIOUS SPEAKERS AT SOFIA'S SOUTH PARK AGAIN ON 2 DECEMBER. IN ADDITION
TO THE NOW FAMILIAR GATHERINGS AROUND REPRESENTATIVES
OF ECGLASNOST, PODREPA, CITIZENS INITIATIVE, AND
THE NEW MACEDONIAN SOCIETY "ILENDEC," PASSERS BY WERE
ABLE TO HEAR AND SIGN MEMBERSHIP AND PROTEST PETITIONS
FROM SUCH GROUPS AS THE AGRARIAN INITIATES, THE
TURKISH MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT,
THE DEMOCRATIC FORUM, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
AND THE WORKERS SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

3. (U) THE AGRARIANS, WHO HAD LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN
FOR REFORMS WITHIN THEIR PARTY JUST ONE WEEK EARLIER,
APPEARED BRIEFLY BENEATH A BANNER READING "AGRARIAN
UNION ORGANIZATION: NIKOLA PETKOV IS ALIVE" (PETKOV
WAS AN ORIGINAL PARTY LEADER WHO WAS EXECUTED BY THE
COMMUNISTS IN 1947. SEE REPTEL ON THE MODERN PARTY'S
INITIATIVE CAMPAIGN.)

4. (U) THE VARIOUS DEMOCRATS OFFERED AGENDAS WHICH
ARE SIMILAR IN THEIR CALLS FOR FULL POLITICAL PARTY
PLURALISM, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION AND
RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. THEIR PLATFORMS
DIFFER IN THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY ACCEPT OR REJECT
TRADITIONAL EAST EUROPEAN-STYLE SOCIALISM. NONE OF

THESE GROUPS IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY (SEE PARAGRAPH 13 BELOW).

5. (U) THE TURKISH GROUP TO DATE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE
MORE THAN A SPEAKERS' FORUM. THROUGHOUT THE DAY ON
2 DECEMBER, AN AVERAGE OF 150 PEOPLE SURROUNDED
SPEAKERS FROM THE ETHNIC TURKISH AND BULGARIAN MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES. THEY WERE FREQUENTLY INTERRUPTED BY
PROVOCATEURS, WHO SHOUTED INSULTS, DEMANDED TO KNOW
HOW THESE SPEAKERS COULD CLAIM TO REPRESENT ONE MILLION
MUSLIMS IN THE COUNTRY, AND WHAT THEY HOPED TO
ACCOMPLISH. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE SPEAKERS ADDRESSED
THE CROWD FROM BENEATH A LARGE BANNER WHICH DEMANDED
AN END TO 17 YEARS OF REPRESSION OF THE COUNTRY'S
"TURKISH MINORITY." (THE GOB BEGAN ITS CAMPAIGN TO
CHANGE POMAKS', OR BULGARIAN MUSLIMS', NAMES FROM
TURKISH TO BULGARIAN IN 1972.) THE GOB CLAIMS THAT
NO ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY EXISTS AND ALWAYS REFERS
TO THE COUNTRY'S TURKS AND POMAKS AS "BULGARIAN
MUSLIMS." A LEADING ACTIVIST IN THE GROUP IS
ALI MUSTAFOFSA STIVASAROV, A POMAK WHO IS ALSO A
MEMBER OF THE RAZGRAD VARNA BRANCH OF THE INDEPENDENT
SOCIETY. HE ESPouses NO PARTICULAR POLITICAL AGENDA
BEYOND AN END TO THE GOB'S MASSIVE REPRESSION,
RANGING FROM JOB AND EDUCATIONAL DISCRIMINATION TO
MURDER OF NON-VIOLENT MUSLIM ACTIVISTS, OF THE
COUNTRY'S ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. HE DID,
HOWEVER, SAY THAT HIS GROUP HAD COLLECTED 17,000 SIGNATURES ON PRO-MINORITY RIGHTS PETITIONS WHICH WERE PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 1 DECEMBER.

6. (U) PODKREPA HAS EXPANDED AND DIVERSIFIED IN

NNNN

PAGE 01  SOFIA 06591 .02 OF 04 051421Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSA-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 FM-10 PA-01
COB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 BIB-01 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /051 W

R 051351Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8736
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 04 SOFIA 06591

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: "PARTY" GROUPS PROLIFERATE AS INDEPENDENT

THE PAST MONTH. THE INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION NOW CLAIMS 20,000 MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN SOUTH PARK, REPRESENTATIVES SPOKE AND SOLICITED MEMBERS IN VARIOUS PROFESSION-BASED BRANCHES, INCLUDING ARTISTS, MUSICIANS, SCIENTIFIC WORKERS, METAL WORKERS, ENGINEERS, AND EDUCATORS.
CITIZENS INITIATIVE ALSO EXPANDS

7. (U) ON THE MORNING OF 2 DECEMBER, CITIZENS INITIATIVE HELD A PRIVATE MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ITS THIRTY CHAPTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THEY DEBATED THE GROUP'S STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL ACTION.

AND PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC MEETING WHICH ATTRACTED APPROXIMATELY 500 PEOPLE THAT AFTERNOON. SLAVOMIR TSANKOV, A CLOSE ALLY OF LEADER LYUBOMIR SLOBADZHIJEV AND ONE OF 15 MEMBERS OF THE GROUP'S ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, SAYS THAT THE GROUP NOW HAS 3000 MEMBERS.


9. (U) THE INITIATIVE MOVEMENT "SUGGESTS THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL CITIZENS OF BULGARIA (WORKERS, PEASANTS, INTELLECTUALS, SOLDIERS, ARMY OFFICERS, AND WHITE COLLAR EMPLOYEES) TO UNITE IN LOCAL COMMITTEES FOR CIVIL INITIATIVE (IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES,

Page - 4

10. (U) THE ADDRESS THEN CALLS FOR THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INCOMES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE GOVERNING ELITE; APPROPRIATION OF THEIR ILLEGAL INCOME FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE "WELL-BEING OF THE POPULATION"; PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR ILLEGALITIES; "JUST SOLUTION OF THE ETHNIC PROBLEM"; RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS; RETIREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S "PERSONAL FILES ON PEOPLE TREATED AS POLITICALLY INCONVENIENT"; ABOLITION OF "IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MONOPOLISM" IN PROPERTY AND PRODUCTION, THE ECONOMY, EDUCATION,
R 051351Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAD Y SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8737
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSAD Y BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 04 SOFIA 06591

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: "PARTY" GROUPS PROLIFERATE AS INDEPENDENT

SCIENCE AND CULTURE; FULL RIGHTS AND MEDIA ACCESS FOR
INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS; AND DEPRIVATION OF STATE
SECURITY OF "ITS OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERT ITS SINISTER
IMPACT ON ALL SPHERES OF SOCIAL LIFE."

INDEPENDENT SOCIETY PUSHES HARDER

11. (U) JUST AS, ONE WEEK EARLIER, IT HAD VOWED TO
CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR FULL HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ALL
BULGARIANS, INCLUDING ETHNIC TURKS AND MUSLIMS, AND
TO EXCLUDE COMMUNISTS FROM ITS MEMBERSHIP, THE
INDEPENDENT SOCIETY USED ITS 2 DECEMBER PUBLIC
MEETING TO TAKE AGAIN A RADICAL STAND AGAINST THE

PAGE 02 .SOFIA 06591 03 OF 04 051423Z

GOVERNMENT, ITS POLICY, AND ITS INSTITUTIONS. THE
SOCIETY HAD AVOIDED THE BITTERLY COLD WEATHER IN
THE PARK BY BOOKING THE PETUR BERON CINEMA AUDITORIUM
FOR ITS MEETING. AFTER A TUMULTUOUS WELCOME FOR
GUEST OF HONOR, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS PRESIDENT DANIEL JACOBI, THE CROWD OF APPROXI-
MATELY 1000 HEARD SPEECHES BY SOCIETY CHAIRMAN RUMEN
VODENICHAROV AND SEVERAL OTHERS. (ANOTHER 400 OR SO
WERE BEING KEPT AT BAY OUTSIDE THE ALREADY FULL HALL
WHEN POLEC CHIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER MADE THEIR
WAY INSIDE TEN MINUTES BEFORE THE MEETING BEGAN.)
VODENICHAROV SAID THAT ON 1 DECEMBER HE AND DR.
KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV (PODKREPA LEADER) HAD ACCOMPANIED
JACOBI IN MEETINGS WITH GOB OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN
PHILIP BOKOV, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER VLADIMIR
KALADZHIJEV (SECRETARY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE
FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTERESTS AND CITIZENS’
RIGHTS) AND THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR. (THE BULGARIAN
PRESS AGENCY REPORTED THE FIRST TK MEETINGS.)

13. (U) PROFESSOR VENCISLAV RAIKOV BEGAN HIS REMARKS BY CORRECTING THE MISTRESS OF CEREMONIES WHO HAD INTRODUCED HIM AS THE LEADER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. "WE ARE PURELY DEMOCRATIC," HE SAID. "THERE IS NO ROOM FOR SOCIALISM." HE WON THE CROWD'S FAVOR WITH CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL REFERENCES TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE CONSTITUTION. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO DELIVER A STINGING ATTACK ON COMMUNISM AND MARXISM. "THE LESSON OF MARXIST PHILOSOPHY," HE SAID, "IS THAT IT SHOULD REMAIN ONLY A PHILOSOPHY."


15. [REDACTED] COMMENT: VODENICHAROV USED THIS OCCASION TO RESTATE HIS GROUP'S UNMITIGATED SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRY'S ETHNIC TURKS AND MUSLIMS, AND, IN THIS CROWD WHICH WAS PREDOMINATED BY SOCIETY MEMBERS, HE DREW AN ENTHUSIASTIC, POSITIVE RESPONSE. INDEED,
THE MEETING'S AGENDA INCLUDED A SPEECH FROM HASSAN BIALKOV, A MUSLIM WHO WAS ONE OF THE FIVE MEN IMPRISONED ALONG WITH DR. TRENCHEV THIS SUMMER.

16. CIVILIZATIONS INITIATIVE'S ADDRESS AND ITS ELOQUENT CHARTER ARE A RETURN TO THE STRONG, ANTI-GOVERNMENT POLICIES OF SOBADZHIYEV'S COMMITTEE 273 BEFORE HE AND TSANKOV FOUND THE LIMELIGHT AND MODERATED THEIR TONES. THE INITIATIVE AND ITS LEADERS ARE STILL WILLING TO GIVE THE NEW LEADERSHIP A CHANCE, BUT THEY ARE PROFFERING A TIMETABLE AND DEADLINES WHICH COULD BECOME SIGNIFICANT IF THE GROUP'S MEMBERSHIP CONTINUES TO SWELL. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG H.-D. Genscher. December 5, 1989.

Gorbachev. I have to tell you directly—I cannot understand Federal Chancellor Kohl who spoke about his famous Ten Points concerning the FRG's intentions regarding the GDR. It must be stated directly, that those are ultimatum demands that are imposed on the independent and sovereign German state. By the way, even though he only mentioned the GDR, what the Chancellor said, concerns us all.

First of all, these ten points appeared after we had a constructive and positive exchange of opinions, after we had reached agreements on several fundamental issues. You would think that he should be presenting such a document only after relevant consultations with partners. Or does the Federal Chancellor think that he does not need them any more? He, probably, already thinks that his music is playing, the march, and that he is already marching with it. I do not think that such steps would contribute to the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, contribute to filling our agreements with life. What kind of "Europe building" one can talk about, if they act in such a way?

You know that we talked with Chancellor Kohl on the telephone. I was telling him that the GDR was a factor of not only European, but of world politics, and that both the East and the West would carefully follow everything that is happening there. Kohl agreed with that, he assured me that the FRG did not want destabilization of the situation in the GDR, and that they would act in a balanced way. However, his practical steps deviate from his assurances.

I told Kohl, that the GDR is an important partner and ally of the Soviet Union. We are also interested in developing our relations with the FRG. This is a triangle that plays a special role in the European and global development. Everything has to be carefully balanced in this triangle. And now he is issuing an ultimatum. He gives directions about what road the GDR should take, what structures they should create. The FRG leadership is simply bursting with a desire to command. And, let me assure you, everybody can feel that.

Maybe it is Bush who is heating the situation up? Still, you have to think through: you move two or three, or five, steps ahead, to foresee their consequences.

[...] yesterday Chancellor Kohl, without much thought, stated that President Bush supported the idea of confederation. What is next? What does a confederation mean? Confederation presupposes common defense, and common foreign policy. 'Where will the FRG find itself then—in NATO or in the Warsaw Treaty? Or maybe it will become neutral? And what would NATO mean without the FRG? And after all, what will come next? Did you think about everything? What will happen with the existing agreements between us? Do you call this politics?

Shevardnadze. Today you apply this style to the GDR, tomorrow you might apply it to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and then—to Austria.

Gorbachev. With all the responsibility, I can tell you that you have demonstrated not the best style of politics—you do not separate your position from Kohl's. In any case, I cannot call him a responsible and predictable politician.
Genscher. [...] On the eve of my trip to Moscow I spoke with Chancellor Kohl in Brussels. His statement of ten points does not represent a schedule of urgent measures, it defines the long-term perspective. The GDR will decide on its own, will respond to his proposal—yes, or no.

We are interested in the internal stability in the GDR. We believe that by his statement the Federal Chancellor contributed to the strengthening of that stability. There were no dire warnings, or ultimatums, in that statement. We know that neither Poland nor Hungary has such impressions. These ten points, and our policy, are supported by all parties represented in the Bundestag, including the SPD.

At the same time, we dissociate ourselves from the internal problems of the GDR, for which the FRG bears no responsibility.

Gorbachev. I could not even anticipate that you would assume the role of Federal Chancellor Kohl’s defense attorney. Let us take the third point of his statement. He spoke for “comprehensive expansion of our assistance, and our cooperation, if the GDR makes the necessary basic changes in the political and economic system,” and if the state leadership of the GDR reaches agreements with the “opposition groups,” and if the GDR follows this course irreversibly. What do you call it except a crude interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state?

Shevardnadze. Even Hitler did not allow himself anything like that.

Gorbachev. More than that, Chancellor Kohl demands that the Socialist United Party of Germany gives up its monopoly on power. He speaks about the need to abolish the “bureaucratic planned economy”. Economic improvement, according to him, can only be achieved when the GDR opens its doors for Western investment, creates conditions for market economy, and ensures opportunities for private enterprise.

I think that the GDR has to undertake fundamental reforms. However, this is their internal affair. Chancellor Kohl, meanwhile, is treating the citizens of the GDR, in essence, like his own subjects. This is simply blatant revanchism, which leaves nothing from his positive assurances, puts all the agreements we have achieved in question (…)

Genscher. I would like to draw your attention to point two, where it is said that the federal government of the FRG would like to expand cooperation with the GDR on the basis of equality in all spheres.

Gorbachev. Stop defending it, Mr. Genscher. Point Two is completely deviated by Point Three. In the Czarist Russia, when a political prisoner was released, he was told that he could live wherever he chooses, except the 18 counties, and there were only 18 counties in Russia. ‘Where, do you think, would he live?’ It is the same with this statement.

Genscher. This is not so…
Gorbachev. The Chancellor's statement is a political miss. We cannot just let it go unnoticed. We are not inclined to play diplomacy with you. If you want to cooperate with us—we are ready. If not, we are going to draw political conclusions. I am asking you to take what I have just said seriously.

Genscher. I am speaking seriously. There are no conditions in the Ten Points. These are just suggestions, and the GDR should decide whether they are suitable or not.

Gorbachev. Then it is even more of an ultimatum. Judging from all this, you have prepared a funeral for the European processes, and in such a form.

Genscher. This is not so. I am in favor of speaking openly. You should not interpret point two and point three in such a way. I would not want to be accused of a lack of good will. The FRG does not want to interfere in anybody's internal affairs.

Gorbachev. We think that the changes in the GDR are good, but you should not interfere with all kinds of instructions and advice.

Genscher. We respect these changes.

Gorbachev. I am speaking about the FRG now. There is some confusion in minds there, a bustle. One can feel, that some people there are already bursting from what is going on. Some people are beginning to lose their minds, and they do not see anything around themselves. And politics without minds is no politics. This way you can spoil everything that we have created together. The Germans are emotional people, but you are also philosophers. You have to remember what mindless politics led to in the past.

Genscher. We are aware of our historic mistakes, and we are not going to repeat them again. The processes that are going on now in the GDR and in the FRG do not deserve such a harsh judgment. [...]}

Gorbachev. In short, you want to say that you are acting correctly and responsibly. This is my conclusion. I would like to emphasize once more that we assign a special importance to what is going on, and that we will monitor everything very carefully.

Genscher. Yes, the policy of the federal government is responsible and predictable, otherwise, I would have nothing to say.

Gorbachev. I am not speaking now about your overall policy, only about the Ten Points. You are forgetting the past. Everybody can see that Chancellor Kohl is rushing, that he is artificially stimulating the events, and by doing that, he is undermining the European process that is being developed with such difficulty. How can he think that we are unable to give an impassionate judgment about his behavior[?]

Genscher. I have already said that you should not dramatize the events. [...]
Gorbachev. [...] By the way, it seems to me, Mr. Genscher, that you only learned about his Ten Points from the speech in the Bundestag.

Genscher. Yes, it is true, but this is our internal affair. We will deal with it ourselves.

Gorbachev. You can see that your internal affair makes everybody concerned. But the main thing is that we understand each other. It seems to me that you are satisfied with what we are going to tell the press. Today we are still speaking like this. However, keep in mind that if some in your country do not come to their senses, then tomorrow we will make another statement.

Genscher. Let me assure you that we will take the most responsible approach. Please do not think that I do not mean what I am saying.

Gorbachev. Do not take everything I said personally, Mr. Genscher. You know that we feel about you in a special way, not like we feel about others. We hope that you understood everything correctly. Thank you for the conversation.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Record Number 102334

SET
DATE
CIRCD
TIME
DOCUMENT TYPE
DOCNO
ORIGIN
DESTO

1555Z
Cable
BUCHAR 10295
United States Embassy. Romania
United States. Department of State. Office of the
Secretary

DESTP
SIGNATOR
CLASS.
TITLE
CTIT

Green, Alan, Jr.
Confidential
The Ambassador's Initial Call on Foreign Minister Stoian

NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
NAMES
ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN
ORGAN
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
TERMS
LENGTH

Stoian, Ion
Green, Alan, Jr.
Ceausescu, Nicolae
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.
Bush, George
Warsaw Treaty Organization
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
Communist Party (Romania)
Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Human rights
Foreign economic relations
Nuclear weapons
Disarmament
Romania
Foreign adoption
Consulates
Civil aviation
Economic system
Socialism
Social issues
Unemployment
Soviet Union

6
DECAPOSITIONED

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN HIS HOUR-ON FOREIGN MINISTER STOIAN ON DE GREEN EMPHASIZED U.S. SUPPORT FOR TH CHANGES TAKING PLACE THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUR AND HIS REGRET THAT ROMANIA HAD THUS FAR CH REMAIN APART FROM THE GROWING EUROPEAN CONS THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO ENGAGE I A FRUITFUL DIALOGUE WITH THE GOR ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. HE RAISED SEVERAL CONCRETE BILATERAL ISSUES, THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD SIGNAL THAT THE GOR WAS WILLING TO DEAL WITH MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. STOIAN, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED WITH PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU FROM THE WARSAW PACT POST-MALTA SUMMIT IN MOSCOW, DUCKED THE AMBASSADOR'S REQUEST FOR ROMANIAN IMPRESSIONS OF GORBACHEV'S CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BUCHAR 10295  01 OF 03  051601Z

READOUT ON MALTA.

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD COME TO TALK, NOTING THAT ROMANIA WAS EAGER TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE COMMERCIAL FIELD, SO LONG AS THE U.S. IMPOSED
NO CONDITIONS. HE REITERATED THE STANDARD ROMANIAN
EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, MUTUAL RESPECT,
AND NON-INTERFERENCE, ADDING THAT SO LONG AS THE UNITED
STATES UNDERSTOOD THIS, RELATIONS COULD IMPROVE. HE
PROMISED TO SEE WHAT HE COULD DO TO RESOLVE THE VARIOUS
ISSUES RAISED BY THE AMBASSADOR. STOIAN CLAIMED THAT
ROMANIA ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF A UNIFIED
EUROPE, SO LONG AS IT WAS MADE UP OF INDEPENDENT AND FREE
STATES. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR RAPID
PROGRESS ON THE DISARMAMENT FRONT, ESPECIALLY AS
REGARDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOTING THAT HE COULD -- BUT
OUT OF POLITESS WOULD NOT -- ENGAGE THE AMBASSADOR
IN A DEBATE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STOIAN CONCLUDED BY
NOTING THAT THE FIRST DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO
HAD BEEN OPEN AND HONEST. END SUMMARY.

4. AMBASSADOR GREEN, ACCOMPANIED BY THE DCM AND
POLCOUS, MADE AN HOUR LONG INITIAL CALL ON ROMANIAN
FOREIGN MINISTER ION STOIAN ON DECEMBER 5. THE ATMOSPHER
WAS CORDIAL (THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMS TO BE
MORE PERSONABLE THAN HIS PREDECESSOR), AND BOTH
THE AMBASSADOR AND STOIAN FRANKLY STAKED OUR THEIR
RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE AMBASSADOR
HANDED OVER COPIES OF HIS LETTERS OF CREDENCE,
CLEARING THE WAY FOR AN EARLY PRESENTATION OF
CREDENTIALS TO PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  BUCHAR 10295 01 OF 03  051601Z

5. THE AMBASSADOR FOCUSED ON THE PROCESS OF
LIBERALIZATION AND CHANGE SWEEPING THROUGHOUT
EASTERN EUROPE, NOTING THAT THE U.S. AND ITS
ALLIES SUPPORTED THOSE CHANGES AND WERE COMMITTED
TO WORKING WITH THE CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS. HE
NOTED WITH REGRET THAT ROMANIA HAD DECIDED THUS
WAR TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES. THE AMBASSADOR
INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO ENGAGE THE GOR IN A
POSITIVE DIALOGUE AND TO FIND AREAS IN WHICH
THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD COOPERATE,
TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES. FOR THE
UNITED STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS HAD TO BE A KEY
PART OF THE DIALOGUE. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED
THAT HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAD underscored concern
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE ARE ROOTED IN U.S. HISTORY
AND ITS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AND WOULD REMAIN
CENTRAL TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.
6. THE AMBASSADOR THEN RAISED SEVERAL CONCRETE
BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH COULD SERVE AS
FORWARD STEPS IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.
THESE INCLUDED:

-- FOUR OUTSTANDING ADOPTION CASES/ WHICH HAVE RAISED MAJOR
INTEREST IN CONGRESS;

-- EXPEDITIOUS CONSULAR ACCESS TO AMERICANS HELD
BY ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES, AS GUARANTEED BY THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCHAR 10295 02 OF 03 051602Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-------------132434 051604Z /38
0 051555Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5568

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 10295

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RO
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR’S INITIAL CALL ON FOREIGN

BILATERAL CONSULAR CONVENTION (WE HAVE TWO
SUCH CASES IN WHICH THE GOR HAS DRAGGED ITS FEET).

-- RAPID CONCLUSION OF AN AMENDED CIVIL AVIATION
AGREEMENT AND PERMISSION TO ALLOW PAN AM
PERSONNEL TO ATTEND MANDATORY FAA TRAINING OUTSIDE
OF ROMANIA (THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT,
ABSENT AGREEMENT ON THESE MATTERS, FLIGHTS
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT WELL BE
PREVENTED BY LAW); AND

-- CONCLUSION OF A MODIFIED TEXTILE AGREEMENT,
WITHOUT WHICH ROMANIAN EXPORTS TO THE U.S.
MIGHT BE DISRUPTED.

7. STOIAN SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE AMBASSADOR
HAD COME TO DO BUSINESS. HE CLAIMED THAT ROMANIA WAS EAGER TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., ESPECIALLY IN THE COMMERCIAL FIELD, BUT THE U.S. HAD ATTEMPTED IN THE PAST TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS. THERE WAS NO OBSTACLE.

TO BETTER RELATIONS, SO LONG AS THE U.S. RESPECTED THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY WITH EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD: INDEPENDENCE, MUTUAL RESPECT, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND NO THREATS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR GREEN SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. WAS THREATENING TO CUT AIR LINKS WHEN HE REFERRED TO THE CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT. HE (STOIAN) WOULD HAVE SAID THE SAME THING, BUT PHRASED IT DIFFERENTLY, PUTTING THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR JOINT ACTION TO SOLVE A PROBLEM. IN ANY CASE, STOIAN SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK SERIOUSLY INTO THE VARIOUS CONCRETE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE AMBASSADOR.

8. REPLYING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION ABOUT ROMANIA'S POSITION ON CHANGES IN THE REGION, HE DENIED THAT THE GOR WAS ISOLATED. ROMANIA REMAINED COMMITTED TO COOPERATION IN EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. ROMANIA FAVORS A UNIFIED EUROPE, HE SAID, AS LONG AS IT WAS COMPRISED OF INDEPENDENT AND FREE STATES. EVERY COUNTRY MUST BE FREE TO ORGANIZE ITS OWN ECONOMY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL SYSTEM. ROMANIA WAS COMMITTED TO UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AND SAW DISARMAMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, AS THE KEY ISSUE FOR THE EUROPEAN STATES TO RESOLVE.

9. REGARDING THE CHANGES IN EASTERN EUROPE THEMSELVES, IT WAS UP TO EACH PEOPLE TO DECIDE ON ITS OWN DESTINY. THE PROBLEMS FACING CERTAIN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE THE RESULT OF MISTAKES
MADE IN THE APPLICATION OF SOCIALISM, NOT
BECAUSE SOCIALISM ITSELF HAD FAILED. CRITICISM
FROM THE CAPITALIST WORLD WAS NOT JUSTIFIED GIVEN
ITS OWN RAMPANT SOCIAL PROBLEMS. AMBASSADOR
GREEN INTERJECTED THAT IF HE AGREED TO THAT,
HE WOULDN'T BE A VERY GOOD AMERICAN AMBASSADOR.
STOIAN AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO DISAGREE
ON THIS POINT, AT LEAST DURING THEIR
INITIAL MEETING.

10. TURNING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, STOIAN SAID THAT
THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO HAVE A DETAILED
DISCUSSION ON THE ISSUE, AND HE DID NOT WANT
TO ENGAGE THE AMBASSADOR (OUT OF COURTESY)
IN A DEBATE HE (THE AMBASSADOR) WOULDN'T WIN.
HE NOTED IN PASSING, SUCH THINGS AS THE HOMELESS
AND UNEMPLOYED IN THE WEST. HE ALSO
RAISED THE PROBLEM OF THE 1,700 OR SO ROMANIAN
CITIZENS WHO HAVE PASSPORTS FOR THE U.S. BUT
WHO ARE DENIED U.S. ENTRY VISAS. THE AMBASSADOR
REMARKED THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DEBATE THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE AT A LATER DATE, BUT IF THEY
BOTH WORKED AT IT, PERHAPS THEY BOTH WOULD
"WIN" THE DISCUSSION.

11. STOIAN OFFERED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE IN RESPONSE
TO THE AMBASSADOR’S QUESTION ABOUT CEAUSESCU’S

CONFIDENTIAL

N N N N

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCHAR 10295 03 OF 03 051602Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSQ-00 /000 W
-------------------- 132436 051604Z /38
0 051555Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5569

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 10295

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RO
SUBJECT: THE AMBASSADOR’S INITIAL CALL ON FOREIGN

DECEMBER 4 MEETING WITH GORBACHEV. THE ONLY HINT

12. COMMENT: THE AMBASSADOR'S FIRST MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WENT WELL, NOT IN THE SENSE THAT STOIAN INDICATED EVEN A FLICKER OF RECEPITIVITY TO NEW IDEAS, BUT RATHER IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING PERSONAL COMMUNICATION. STOIAN IS IDEOLOGICAL IN HIS ORIENTATION, BUT LESS ABRASIVE AND UNFRIENDLY THAN HIS PREDECESSOR. HE IS A HARDLINE PARTY BUREAUCRAT, REPUTED TO BE PERSONALLY CLOSE TO CEAUSESCU. DURING

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUCHAR 10295 03 OF 03 051602Z

THE MEETING, HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING AVAILABLE IN THE FUTURE, AND PERHAPS EVEN A HINT OF RESPONSIVENESS ON CONCRETE BILATÉRAL ISSUES. WITHIN A FEW HOURS OF THE MEETING, WE WERE INFORMED THAT CONSULAR VISITS WITH THE ARRESTED AMERICANS WOULD BE ARRANGED, PERHAPS INDICATING ROMANIAN INTEREST IN GETTING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMBASSADOR OFF ON THE RIGHT FOOT.

GREEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
R 061008Z DEC 89
PM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
to SecState WashDC 8751
info Eastern European Posts
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

SOFIA 06612

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT GROUPS PLAN EVEN BIGGER MASS MEETING ON EVE OF PARTY PLENUM

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. LEADERS OF BULGARIAN INDEPENDENT GROUPS HAVE ANNOUNCED THAT THEY ARE ORGANIZING ANOTHER MASS DEMONSTRATION IN SOFIA FOR 10 DECEMBER, THE DAY BEFORE THE NEXT COMMUNIST PARTY PLENUM. IT IS BILLED AS A "MEETING" BECAUSE, AS AT PREVIOUS MASS GATHERINGS, SPEECHES WILL BE MADE BY GROUP LEADERS, WHO ARE NOW TRYING TO ESTABLISH A COMMON PLATFORM TO UNITE THE PUBLIC IN SUPPORT OF MAJOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS WHICH THEY ARE DEMANDING FROM THE POLITBURO AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THEY PREDICT A TURNOUT OF MORE THAN 100,000. END SUMMARY.

PAGE 02

SOFIA 06612 061013Z

3. AN UMBRELLA COMMITTEE COMPRised OF LEADERS FROM MANY BULGARIAN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS IS PLANNING A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN THE CAPITAL FOR 10 DECEMBER. LEADERS ARE PREDICTING CONFIDENTLY THAT THE CROWDS WILL BE FAR BIGGER THAN THE ESTIMATED 50,000 WHO CONVERGED AROUND NEVSKI CATHEDRAL ON 18 NOVEMBER FOR THE BIGGEST DEMONSTRATION TO DATE.

4. IN KEEPING WITH PAST PRACTICE (THE CCUJFURY & ONLY PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS OF 4, 17, & 18 NOVEMBER),
THIS WILL BE AS MUCH A PUBLIC MEETING AS A DEMONSTRATION. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS WILL SPEAK AND PUBLICIZE THEIR GROUPS' DEMANDS ON THE PARTY AND THE ASSEMBLY.

5. RUMEN VODENICHAROV (CHAIRMAN, INDEPENDENT SOCIETY) AND KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV (CHAIRMAN, PODKREPA, ET AL) ARE LEADING AN UMBRELLA GROUP WHICH IS TRYING TO UNITE "THE OPPOSITION" WITH A COMMON PLATFORM, OR LIST OF DEMANDS, BEFORE THE MEETING. TRENCHEV PREDICTS THAT, EVEN IF THEY FAIL, THEY WILL SUCCEED AT LEAST IN BRINGING THE VARIOUS SMALL DEMOCRATIC "PARTIES" TOGETHER.

6. COMMENT: THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE'S TASK WILL BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY THE SUDDEN APPEARANCE OF NEW GROUPS WITH NEW FACES AND DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES. TRENCHEV, GEORGI SPASOV (PODKREPA OFFICIAL SPOKESPERSON), LYUBOMIR SOBADZHEV (CITIZENS INITIATIVE), DEYAN KYURANOV (ECOGLASNOST, HELSINKI WATCH), PETKO SIMEONOVA (DISCUSSION CLUB, HELSINKI), AND OTHER ACTIVISTS BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT PROLIFERATION OF SUCH GROUPS IS AT LEAST PARTIALLY AT THE INITIATIVE OF GOB AND BCP OFFICIALS, WHO, IN THE VIEW OF THESE ACTIVISTS, MAY BE CONSIDERING CALLING FOR ELECTIONS AND HOPE TO SPLINTER THE OPPOSITION TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. TRENCHEV SAYS THAT THE REAL, ESTABLISHED ACTIVISTS MUST OPPOSE THIS DEVELOPMENT BY MEDIATING AND RECONCILING THE VARIOUS GROUPS.

7. TRENCHEV AND OTHER LEADERS WILL ALSO HAVE TO FIGHT AGAINST THE Factions WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE DEVELOPED ON ITS OWN ACCORD AMONG THE ESTABLISHED INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS. IN ANY CASE, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS AGREE IN THEIR PREDICTIONS THAT, WHETHER OR NOT THE GROUPS CAN FIND A COMMON PLATFORM, THE SPEECHES WILL BE STRONGER AND MORE DEMANDING THAN THOSE OF 18 NOVEMBER, THE CROWD WILL BE BIGGER, AND THE SLATE OF SPEAKERS WILL NOT BE AS TOP-HEAVY WITH BCP-MEMBER INTELLECTUALS AS IT WAS ON THE EIGHTEENTH. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and President of France F. Mitterrand. Kiev, December 6, 1989.

Gorbachev. I will tell you honestly—I am not satisfied with the results of this part of conversation with Bush. Here is my conclusion. The Europeans should do the pioneering work in terms of making sense of the new world. Of course, with the U.S. participation. But nonetheless, nothing will work without Europe. [...] 

Gorbachev. I have a feeling that the U.S. is not completely open about their position, that they are not presenting it fully.

Mitterrand. That is true... The Americans are not telling the complete truth, including on the German issue. Nevertheless, I do not think that they are ready to take the position of breaking the European borders. [...] I am speaking with you absolutely freely. We have special relations with the FRG. In 1963 De Gaulle and Adenauer signed an alliance treaty. And I am abiding by that treaty. That is why it is more difficult for me than, maybe, for others, to decry the Germans the right to make mistakes. But I am true to my duty—to preserve the balance in Europe.

We should not change the order of the processes. First and foremost among them should be the European integration, the evolution of Eastern Europe, and the all-European process, the creation of peaceful order in Europe. If the United States participates in these processes, it would give all of us additional guarantees.

Kohl’s speech, his ten points, have turned everything upside down. He mixed all the factors together, he is rushing. I told Genscher about it, and he did not oppose my conclusions very much.

Gorbachev. This is interesting! But I will speak about it later.

[...] Mitterrand. What, exactly, are you going to do next?

Gorbachev. First of all, we are going to continue the line of peaceful change. Let every country determine its direction on its own. We are convinced that there should be no external interference, the will of peoples should not be misrepresented.

[...] You are right in saying that we should not only observe, but act. We need to trust every country, to expand cooperation.

Gorbachev. [...] We had a big conversation with Genscher. And it could not have been otherwise—for us, the German issue is a painful one. Our society reacted sharply to the Chancellor’s actions. And I told him directly—if you want to blow up—to destroy—everything that we have achieved—then continue to act as you do. But then all the responsibility lies with you. Do not forget that even politicians of middle range should calculate their actions 2-3 steps ahead.

The Chancellor spoke about a confederation of the GDR and the FRG. By the way, he said in Brussels that Bush supported the idea. I asked Genscher, what did a confederation mean? Doesn’t it mean single foreign and defense policy? It is written in
all the textbooks. But how can two German states work out this single policy? I asked—what this new confederation would be a part of—NATO or the Warsaw Treaty? Or will it be neutral? Then what will be left of NATO? I asked: Did you think about everything?

Then I asked Genscher whether he knew about Kohl's ten points before they were made public? Genscher admitted that he heard them for the first time in the Bundestag. Then I asked him whether he was going to behave that way in the future?

Mitterand. You know, we, like Genscher, were not informed about Kohl's proposals beforehand.

Gorbachev. I asked—could you talk to him? What are all our agreements on consultations worth! Do you know how your behavior is called?—Provincial politics. You are acting so crudely on such a universally sensitive issue.

Genscher was very confused. He assured me of his loyalty to the all-European protest, reminded me of everything that he had personally done for its success. I told him that we knew him and valued him. But two questions still remain: why did he assume the role of Kohl's attorney, and whether he, Genscher, was prepared to reject everything that has been achieved in the recent years with his help?]

I said: It is your business to decide how you will act. It is in your authority. And it is in our authority to make conclusions. I asked him to pass all this on to the Chancellor.

Genscher tried to persuade me for a long time that we misunderstood Kohl's ten points. And then he asked: how were we going to present our conversation to the press? I told him—let us say that we had an open and serious conversation. So far, we do not want to put into doubt everything that we have done during these years. And I stressed—so far. But we will monitor the future developments very carefully, because the FGO's behavior resembles that of an elephant in a china shop.

[...] Mitterand. Is there any serious response to the idea of unification among the people of the GDR?

Gorbachev. Yes, there is a response. But you know, more than half of the population of the GDR would like to preserve the existing character of their country, of course, with changes in its political structure, with democratization, etc. They see relations between the GDR and the FRG as relations between two sovereign states. [GDR trader Hans] Modrow is speaking about a new agreement-based community.

Mitterand. I will visit the GDR regardless of the developments. But I will stress that it would be a state visit.

Gorbachev. I think it would stress the natural character of the processes unfolding in the GDR.

[...] Mitterand. You are working under a lot of stress. You are loyal to your heritage, and at the same time, you continue to deepen your revolution.
Gorbachev. We are trying to do what is necessary for our country, for the entire world, and for the socialist idea, to which we both are devoted. In this respect, our contribution should also be decisive.

Mitterand. I appreciate your courage in the struggle for the goals that you have set. One has to be brave to reject the established, inherited from the past, ideas. But you radiate calm. And you are even in a good mood. This gives us hope.

Gorbachev. I have made my choice.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya
for The National Security Archive
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SET</th>
<th>End of the Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>12/06/1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIRCD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME</td>
<td>1628Z</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCNO</td>
<td>Cable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORIGIN</td>
<td>BUCHAR 10334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTO</td>
<td>United States Embassy. Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States. Department of State. Office of the Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTOP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATOR</td>
<td>Green, Alan, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASS.</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>My Presentation of Credentials and Meeting with Nicolae Ceausescu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Green, Alan, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Bush, George</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Stoian, Ion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Brucan, Silviu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Mazilu, Dumitru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>Ceausescu, Nicolae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGAN</td>
<td>Warsaw Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Most-favored-nation status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Transylvania (Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Malta Summit (December 2-3, 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERMS</td>
<td>Foreign economic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LENGTH</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
E.O. 12356: DECL.: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RO
SUBJECT: MY PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS AND MEETING
- WITH NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON DECEMBER 6, I PRESENTED MY CREDENTIALS IN A NINETY-MINUTE MEETING WITH NICOLAE CEAUSESCU. I STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SENT ME TO ROMANIA TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS A BASIS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF OUR RELATIONS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ACCESS BY ME AND MY EMBASSY TO ALL ROMANIANS AND A BROAD AND PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON MANY ISSUES, ESPECIALLY HUMAN RIGHTS. AFTER UNDERSCORING OUR SUPPORT FOR POSITIVE CHANGES ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE, I ASKED CEAUSESCU WHY ROMANIA DIDN'T GET ON THE BANDWAGON.

3. CEAUSESCU RESPONDED IN VINTAGE STYLE, LAYING THE FULL BLAME FOR DETERIORATION OF U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS AT OUR DOORSTEP. HE WAS BLUNTLY CRITICAL OF REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO "DESTABILIZE" THE REGION, AND SUPERPOWER COLLUSION TO PRESSURE ROMANIA. IN RESPONSE TO MY STRESS ON CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUCHAR 10334 01 OF 03 061634Z

ACCESS, CEAUSESCU SAID THAT SUCH CONTACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED "RULES" AND WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. I RESPONDED THAT WE REMAINED OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A BETTER RELATIONSHIP, BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT MUCH WORK NEEDED TO BE DONE. THIS INITIAL ENCOUNTER
WITH A VIGOROUS AND FEISTY CEAUSESCU WAS FRANK AND UNUSUALLY LENGTHY FOR A PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS. THE CONVERSATION ACCENTUATED THE DEPTH OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT DIVIDE US AND OUR INSISTENCE THAT IMPROVEMENT IN ROMANIA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS CENTRAL TO ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO TURN THE RELATIONSHIP AROUND. END SUMMARY.

4. THE CREDENTIALS CEREMONY TOOK PLACE AT 10:00 A.M. IN CEAUSESCU’S OFFICES IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BUILDING. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER STOIAN AND MEMBERS OF HIS PERSONAL CABINET. THE DCM, DEFENSE ATTACHE, CONSUL GENERAL, AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR ACCOMPANIED ME. CEAUSESCU WAS VIGOROUS AND IN TOTAL COMMAND OF HIS TEAM THROUGHOUT THE NINETY-MINUTE MEETING. HIS HANDSHAKE WAS FIRM, AND HE SPOKE WITHOUT REFERENCE TO NOTES. AS HE HAD WITH THE NEW BRITISH AMBASSADOR, CEAUSESCU SAID HE ANTICIPATED GIVING ME A "REPORT CARD" AT THE END OF MY TOUR IN BUCHAREST.

5. I LED OFF BY STATING THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SENT ME TO ROMANIA AS HIS AMBASSADOR AND HIS FRIEND TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS. THE U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES APPLAUDED THE DRAMATIC CHANGES UNDERWAY ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE AND REGRETTED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03  BUCHAR 10334 01 OF 03 061634Z

THAT ROMANIA THUS FAR REMAINED OUTSIDE THAT POSITIVE PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT AND I HAD AGREED PRIOR TO MY DEPARTURE THAT A BROAD AND PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH ROMANIA WAS URGENTLY NEEDED, ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE FOUNDATION OF SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE TO BE UNFETTERED ACCESS BY ME AND MY STAFF TO ROMANIANS OF ALL PERSUASIONS AND FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE. ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, I UNDERSCORED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH AND CONGRESS SHARED THE VIEW THAT COMMERCIAL CONCESSIONS MADE AVAILABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON THEIR RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. I SUMMED UP THAT WE WANTED A FRUITFUL, OPEN, AND HONEST DIALOGUE WITH ROMANIA AND ASKED CEAUSESCU FOR HIS VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

CEAUSESCU ON U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS: A VINTAGE

PERFORMANCE
6. Ceausescu responded in classic style with a lengthy monologue laying the blame for deterioration of relations at our door. After recalling the "good old days" of presidential visits and U.S.-Romanian agreements, Ceausescu accused the U.S. of violating those agreements and imposing unacceptable conditions on bilateral relationships. He insisted that improved relations could be built only on the familiar Romanian litany of principles: independence, sovereignty.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCHAR 10334 02 OF 03 061636Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSQ-00 /000 W
------------------------ 225432 061639Z /38

0 061628Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5592

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 10334

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, RO
SUBJECT: MY PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS AND MEETING

EQUALITY, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. The stress by the U.S. and other Western countries on human rights was hypocritical in view of their failure to provide such fundamental human rights as a job, a roof over the head, and safety from the threat or reality of war. According to Ceausescu, Romania had put in place policies to guarantee these rights and would not be diverted from those policies by pressure from any quarter. Efforts by the U.S. to use MFN and the overall economic relationship to pressure Romania had failed in the past and would not succeed in the future. If, however, the U.S. were willing to return to the way business had been done in the past, Romania stood ready to cooperate.

7. In response to my stress on embassy access,
CEAUSESCU SAID THAT OUR CONTACTS WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED "RULES" FOR DIPLOMATS AND WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. HE THEN CLAIMED THAT CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BUCHAR 10334 02 OF 03 061636Z

THE PREVIOUS U.S. AMBASSADOR HAD SOMETIMES INVOLVED HIMSELF IN ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST ROMANIA AND HAD, IN SO DOING, VIOLATED THESE DIPLOMATIC "RULES." CEAUSESCU ASSERTED THAT ROMANIANS COULD DISCUSS THEIR COUNTRIES' INTERNAL POLICIES AMONG THEMSELVES, BUT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS. HE NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH U.S. DIPLOMATS COULD TRAVEL FREELY IN ROMANIA, THE USG IMPOSED STRICT TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON ROMANIAN DIPLOMATS IN THE U.S. (COMMENT: CEAUSESCU AT THIS POINT C8HQAY HAVE BEEN AN UNSUBTLE REMINDER THAT THE G0R HAS THE ABILITY TO RESTRICT TRAVEL OF DIPLOMATS WHO BECOME TOO TROUBLESOME. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OUR ATTENDANCE AT TRIALS, CONTACTS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS FIGURES, AND EFFORTS TO VISIT BRUCAN, MAZILU, ETC., HAVE GOTTEN CEAUSESCU'S DANDER UP. END COMMENT.)

8. THE PRESIDENT HAD LITTLE NEW TO SAY ON U.S.-ROMANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HE MADE THE STANDARD PITCH FOR UNCONDITIONAL MFN, BUT WITHOUT MUCH ENTHUSIASM. HE CONTRASTED ROMANIA'S "GOOD" EXPERIENCE WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE CERNOVODA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT WITH THE DIFFICULTIES NOW BEING EXPERIENCED BY THE U.S.-ROMANIAN JOINT VENTURE ROM CONTROLDATA. IN THE LATTER CASE, CEAUSESCU INACCURATELY CLAIMED THAT THE USG WAS SITTING ON AN EXPORT APPLICATION FOR TECHNOLOGY FROM CONTROLDATA TO ITS ROMANIAN PARTNER. IN FACT, IT IS A BUSINESS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO FIRMS WHICH IS THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE TRANSFER OF NEW TECHNOLOGY FROM CONTROLDATA TO ROMANIA. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, NO REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE FOR AN EXPORT LICENSE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUCHAR 10334 02 OF 03 061636Z

9. TURNING TO ROMANIA'S TRADITIONAL DESIRE FOR HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE, CEAUSESCU SAID HE WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY PRESIDENT BUSH TO ROMANIA. CEAUSESCU WAS,
HOWEVER, NETTLED BY AN ARTICLE HE SAID HE HAD READ IN THE U.S. MEDIA ABOUT AN ALLEGED CONTRIBUTION BY PRESIDENT BUSH TO A HUNGARIAN-AMERICAN FUND-RAISER AT WHICH PARTICIPANTS HAD ADVOCATED THE RETURN OF TRANSYLVANIA TO HUNGARY. I RESPONDED THAT MY SENATE CONFIRMATION STATEMENT HAD CONTAINED A CLEAR STATEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WITHIN ITS CURRENT BORDERS. THAT POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE.

CEAUSESCU ON CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE: SOVIET

DESTABILIZATION AND SUPERPOWER COLLUSION

10. IN RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTS ON EASTERN EUROPE, CEAUSESCU SAID HE SAW NOTHING TO APPLAUD IN DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION. THE PRICE OF FOOD HAD SKYROCKETED IN POLAND, THERE WERE HOMELESS YOUNG PEOPLE IN BUDAPEST, AND THE PROSPECT OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT LOomed THROUGHOUT THE REGION. CEAUSESCU ASSERTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS WITH WESTERN GRANTS; NOTHING

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BUCHAR 10334 03 OF 03 061636Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W

O 061628Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5593

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 10334

EXTERNAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
TAGS: PREL, RO
SUBJECT: MY PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS AND MEETING

COULD BE DONE IF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES RELIED ON THE ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS. AS LONG AS SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONTINUED DOWN THIS PATH, THERE WAS A REAL DANGER THAT THE SOCIAL GAINS OF THEIR PEOPLES WOULD BE LOST. IN ANY EVENT, ROMANIA WOULD NOT BE Pressured BY
11. Ceausescu continued that the status of the U.S. and the USSR as superpowers did not give them the right to impose their will on other countries. Twenty-one years ago Warsaw Pact countries had invaded Czechoslovakia, and they had only now renounced that action. Ceausescu recalled that he had denounced the invasion on the day it happened. He asserted that what is happening now in Eastern Europe is nothing less than continuation of Soviet interference, and you (the U.S.) are now applauding it. In an apparent reference to Malta, Ceausescu said that the U.S. and Soviet presidents appeared to have agreed to impose destabilizing changes on Eastern Europe. Such a policy had no confidence.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BUCHAR 10334  03 OF 03  061636Z

Future. As for Romania, it would continue its policy of independence -- the decisive factor that had assured Romania's survival throughout its history.

12. As Ceausescu wound down, I observed that it was obvious that there were deep differences between us in both analysis and policy. We remained open to the possibility of improvement of relations, but it was obviously going to take a lot of work. I reiterated that we were ready to do our part and looked to the Romanian side to understand and respond positively to our policies, especially on human rights.

COMMENT

--------

13. My meeting with Ceausescu ran at least double the usual time allocated for a presentation of credentials. Ceausescu demonstrated in spades why he and Romania remain odd-man-out in Eastern Europe. While there was clearly an element of showmanship in Ceausescu's performance, he seems genuinely committed to his current policy course and convinced that history will ultimately vindicate him. However, misguided this approach, it seems unlikely to change as long as Ceausescu does not lose his nerve or his health. In any event he is squarely on notice that we look to Romania for concrete steps, especially in human rights.
IF THERE IS TO BE ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO TURN THIS
RELATIONSHIP AROUND.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03   BUCHAR  10334  03 OF 03  061636Z

14. CEAUSESCU'S BLUNTLY UNDIPLOMATIC COMMENTS
ABOUT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE WERE
ESPECIALLY STRIKING. SOME OF THIS MAY HAVE BEEN
CALCULATED TO REMIND US OF ROMANIA'S POTENTIAL VALUE
AS A TRADITIONAL COUNTERWEIGHT TO SOVIET AMBITIONS
IN THE REGION. AT THE SAME TIME, CEAUSESCU'S
REMARKS ARE CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER
SOURCES AND POINT TO INCREASING TENSIONS IN
SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS.
GREEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06632

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, PREL, BU, TU, ECON
SUBJECT: POLITBURO MEMBER LUKANOV PROMISES MAJOR
    - REFORMS AND REQUESTS STRONGER BILATERAL
    - RELATIONS

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ON 5 DECEMBER, DAS CURTIS KAMMAN AND
    AMBASSADOR POLANSKY MET WITH NEWLY APPOINTED FULL
    POLITBURO MEMBER ANDREY LUKANOV, WHO VOWED THAT
    THE PARTY AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE BEGINNING
    A PROCESS OF MAJOR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS.
    THESE INCLUDE A MOVE TOWARD A FULL MARKET ECONOMY,
    LEGALLY PROTECTED EQUALITY OF RIGHTS FOR ALL CITIZENS,
    AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY. LUKANOV
    ALSO AFFIRMED HIS COUNTRY'S DESIRE FOR GATT MEMBER-
    HOOD.

3. IN A ONE-HOUR CALL ON POLITBURO AND CENTRAL
    COMMITTEE MEMBER ANDREY LUKANOV, DAS KAMMAN OUTLINED
    US POLICY TOWARDS IMPROVING US-BULGARIAN BILATERAL
    RELATIONS, EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT MAJOR ECONOMIC
    AND POLITICAL REFORMS WOULD BE INSTITUTED QUICKLY,
    AND STATED THAT, IN ESTABLISHING BETTER TRADE

Page - 1

UNCLASSIFIED
RELATIONS, WE WOULD BE LOOKING SPECIFICALLY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY'S GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, INCLUDING THE RIGHTS OF ITS CITIZENS AND THE TREATMENT OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY.


ECONOMY

5. THE ECONOMY WOULD HAVE TO BE A "GREAT PRIORITY," HE SAID. IT WAS BEING EXAMINED BEHIND THE SCENES BY EXPERTS AND ECONOMISTS, AND IT WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT THE PLENUM AND THEN A SECOND SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH WOULD MEET AFTER AN ADDITIONAL MONTH'S PREPARATION. THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE EXTENSIVE, HE SAID, WITH A "WORSENING INTERNAL MARKET AND A GAP BETWEEN INCOME AND SUPPLIES AND SERVICES." THE PROBLEMS OF "STUDENTS, YOUNG FAMILIES, AND ECOLOGY" WOULD HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED. ALSO, SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IS "ONE OF THE ACUTE AREAS WHERE THINGS HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED OR UNDERESTIMATED." ANOTHER IS "MEDICARE," AND "WE WANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES BROADLY THERE."

6. LUKANOV THEN ADDRESSED TWO "MAJOR FINANCIAL IMBALANCES," THE FIRST OF WHICH IS THE "INTERNAL DEFICIT," WHICH IS "MAYBE TEN PERCENT OF GNP," AND WHICH MUST BE HANDLED BY "DRAMATICALLY REDUCING EXPENSES" AND "CUTTING DOWN ON FINANCING OF BIG INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS." THE SECOND IMBALANCE IS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. LUKANOV STATED THAT THE COUNTRY'S CURRENT INDEBTEDNESS IS BETWEEN 10.3 AND 10.5 BILLION DOLLARS. IT HAS GOLD AND MONETARY RESERVES OF 1 BILLION DOLLARS, AND IT CONSIDERED HERETOFORE RELIABLE REPAYMENTS ON ITS LENDING TO OTHER ENTITIES AS ASSETS. ALL TOLD, THE COUNTRY WAS "DOWN" 8 BILLION DOLLARS, WHICH IS "NOT TRAGIC, BUT CONSIDERABLE." THESE FIGURES WOULD HAVE TO BE REMEDIED THROUGH EXPORTS, WHICH ALSO MEANT FACING THE DIFFICULT TASK OF ELIMINATING THE COUNTRY'S "MASS PSYCHOSIS AGAINST EXPORTS." THIS "ANTI-MARKET THINKING" IS ALSO "ANTI-MARKIST," HE ADDED.
7. THE COUNTRY WILL ADOPT A "MARKET ECONOMY," HE SAID. THIS IS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. THIS IS OBJECTIVE REALITY. WE SEE NO OTHER WAY." "WE MUST FIRST ACCEPT THAT AND THEN BE SOCIALISTS," HE CONTINUED, "WHICH IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. WE ARE CONVINCED MARKETEERS."

8. LEGAL STEPS TOWARD THIS NEW MARKET ECONOMY WILL INCLUDE A NEW "LAW ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY," WHICH WILL
Establish rules on the operation of a national market economy. This will be followed "most probably" by a new law on foreign economic relations. Repatriation of profits will also be allowed as a "first step" towards convertibility of the currency. This is only a first step, he added, in a gradual process: it was "adventurist talk to speak of convertibility now as our ex-president did."

9. Lukashev welcomed Kamman's mention of a possible Jackson-Vannick waiver for Bulgaria and said that he believed that the country was "mature enough to go into GATT." He also asked that, not "urgently"
COUNTRIES ALREADY IN THE 3RD WITH MORE RESTRICTIVE RULES."

10. FOR FURTHER US-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, LUKANOV ALSO SUGGESTED TWO OTHER POSSIBILITIES: CCC CREDITS (NOT PRICING), HE SAID, SHOULD BE EXPLORED. SECOND, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES COULD TAKE STEPS TO ENCOURAGE US PRIVATE BANKING ACTIVITY IN BULGARIA.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11. KAMMAN DESCRIBED OUR POLICY OF LINKING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO A COUNTRY'S GENERAL HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND NOTED THAT BULGARIA HAD ALREADY TAKEN MAJOR ACTION IN ALLOWING FREE TRAVEL AND IMMIGRATION. THESE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN OFFSET BY THE "EVENTS OF LAST SUMMER:" THE FLIGHT OF MORE THAN 300,000 BULGARIANS "OF TURKISH ORIGIN" TO TURKEY. THIS "CREATED AN UNFORTUNATE IMPRESSION AND A BAD IMAGE FOR BULGARIA." "WE WANT TO OVERCOME THAT," HE SAID, "BUT WE CAN DO THAT ONLY THROUGH IMPROVING THE TREATMENT OF THESE PEOPLE."

12. LUKANOV RESPONDED BY STATING THAT THE GOB WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD ON SUCH ISSUES AS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, TRAVEL, IMMIGRATION, AND OPENNESS OF THE COUNTRY TO CULTURAL INFLUENCES.

"WE ARE STRIVING TO MAKE THE STATE CIVILIZED," HE SAID. "WE ARE NOT AFRAID OF ANY IDEOLOGICAL OR CULTURAL INFLUENCES PROVIDED THAT THEY DO NOT AFFECT THE PUBLIC MORALE OR REPRESENT DRASIC INFLUENCE IN OUR INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

13. INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS WOULD BE REGISTERED, HE SAID. HE STATED THAT HE EXPECTED ECOGLASNOST TO BE THE FIRST WHEN ITS CASE WAS HEARD ON 11 DECEMBER. EMBASSIES WOULD BE FREE TO CONTACT THESE PEOPLE, JUST AS THE GOB CONSULTED WITH THEM. THE BCP HAS REALIZED THAT IT NO LONGER HAS TO HAVE A "MONOPOLISTIC" GRIP ON SUCH FORMS OF POWER AND INFLUENCE, AND THAT SUCH GROUPS SHOULD BE FREE TO OPERATE. HE DID HAVE ONE CRITICISM, HOWEVER: RFE HAS RECENTLY "POSITIONED ITSELF" IN A "DESTUCTIVE ATTITUDE" BY ENCOURAGING DESTABILIZATION IN THE COUNTRY. IT IS "ENCOURAGING STRIKES AND ENCOURAGING OPPOSITION, NOT CIVILIZED POLITICAL DIALOGUE." "WE THINK THERE IS A RATHER HOSTILE, TCO HOSTILE THRUST," HE SAID. RFE SEEMS TO BE "UNHAPPY EVEN WITH RFE/NMI", POSITIVE
DEVELOPMENTS." KANMAN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT "PLURALISM MEANS AIRING VIEWS OF OPPOSITION" AND THAT THE "GOVERNMENT MUST GET ACCUSTOMED TO CRITICISM." LUKANOV SAID, "WE'RE TRYING TO LEARN THIS QUICKLY. ALL WHO ARE INTERESTED IN OUR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A NON-VIOLENT TRANSITION."

THE TURKISH PROBLEM

14. LUKANOV SAID THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WANTS TO "ENCOURAGE AND REMOLD NATIONAL UNITY." ALL BULGARIAN CITIZENS, WHATEVER THEIR BACKGROUND, SHOULD HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS IN EVERY RESPECT, "IN RELIGIOUS RIGHTS,

PAGE 04 OF 03 071402Z
CUSTOMS, THE WAY THEY CELEBRATE WEDDINGS, BURY THEIR DEAD, AND SO FORTH." TOO MUCH EMPHASIS ON DIFFERENCES HAD BEEN "DIVISIVE." HE PROMISED THAT THE GOB WOULD CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THE MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE US ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS.

15. PART OF THE DIFFICULTY IN THIS, HE ADDED, WOULD BE IN "UNDOING" THE NEGATIVE FEELINGS OF THE BULGARIAN POPULATION AGAINST TURKEY AND THE MINORITY. THE FLIGHT OF THE MUSLIMS DURING THE SUMMER HAD STIRRED STRONG SENTIMENTS, YET IT WAS TIME TO FACE THE PROBLEM. THE DEPARTURE OF 300,000, HE SAID, WAS A "HUMAN
DRAMA, AND ONE CAN ONLY FEEL REGRET; A DECENT MAN, SHAME. " HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY 1000 HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE. "THE OTHERS LEFT VOLUNTARILY. THERE WAS NO DEPORTATION, AND THE RETURN OF 35,000 TO BULGARIA IS PROOF OF THIS." IT WAS A "MOVEMENT ON A TWO-WAY STREET."

16. SINCE MLADENOV'S ASCENDANCY ON 10 NOVEMBER, THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN TRYING TO UNDO THE POPULATION'S NEGATIVE FEELINGS: IT HAS "STOPPED ALL MEASURES OF HARASSMENT THAT WERE APPLIED, LET PEOPLE MOVE BACK TO WHERE THEY CAME FROM, STOPPED ALL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AGAINST THEM," ACCORDING TO LUKANOV. "WE ARE INSISTING ON HUMANE, TOLERANT BEHAVIOR OF ALL PUBLIC AUTHORITIES." "WE ARE CREATING ANOTHER ATMOSPHERE." HE CONTINUED. "AND MUCH POSITIVE FEELING IS RETURNING."

17. THE GOB WILL PURSUE FURTHER TALKS WITH TURKEY AS "EX AND FUTURE FRIENDS," HE SAID. BULGARIA EXPECTS TURKEY TO RESPECT BULGARIAN INTEGRITY AND "SHOULD NOT USE ITS SPECIAL INSTRUMENTS TO PUT THIS INTO QUESTION." WHEN KAMMAN NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE TRAVELLING TO ANKARA ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, LUKANOV ASKED HIM TO "TELL TURKEY THAT WE ARE WILLING TO LOOK FOR BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS. BUT DON'T MAKE THE BULGARIAN SIDE THE ONLY SIDE TO HAVE TO TAKE STEPS."

18. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ALSO TRY TO UNDERSTAND AND BE OBJECTIVE, HE SAID. IN THAT REGARD, HE URGED THE US TO UPGRADE ITS POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH BULGARIA.

MLADENOV "ARDENTLY" WANTS TO MEET SECRETARY BAKER IN BULGARIA, HE SAID, AND HE, FOREIGN MINISTER DIMITROV, AND LUKANOV HIMSELF SEND "BEST REGARDS" TO DEPUTY SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. ALL WOULD "CONSIDER ANY PROPOSAL FOR CONTACTS VERY FAVORABLY."

COMMENT

19. LUKANOV'S PRESENTATION WAS YET ANOTHER CONVINCING SIGN THAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS WILL BE SIGNIFICANT HERE AND THAT THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOVE QUICKLY. HIS TONE WAS ALMOST CONTRITE: "HE SEEMED TO BE COMMITTED TO IMPROVING BILATERAL
RELATIONS, OPEN TO THE JCC'S CONDITIONS ON SUCH
IMPROVEMENTS, AND WILLING TO ADMIT PAST MISTAKES IN
THE LEADERSHIP'S HUMAN AND MINORITY RIGHTS RECORDS.
HE BACKED HIS STATEMENTS WITH ASSURANCES THAT THE
PLENUM AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD ACT QUICKLY
TO GIVE LEGAL LEGITIMACY TO THE PARTY'S COMMITMENT
TO GUARANTEE GREATER POLITICAL AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS
AND DIRECT THE ECONOMY TOWARDS A FREE-MARKET MODEL.
POLANSKY

**N**

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***  [redacted]
1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE DECEMBER 11 PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC) OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP) WILL OFFER GENERAL SECRETARY PETUR MLADENOV HIS FIRST REAL OPPORTUNITY TO OUTLINE AND ADVANCE HIS OWN PROGRAM FOR PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE IN BULGARIA. INDEED IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE DO SO. WHILE HE AND OTHER SENIOR LEADERS HAVE TAKEN SOME SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD GLASNOST AND MADE REFERENCES TO GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION, THE NATION IS NOW EXPECTING A MORE CONCRETE IDEA OF THE POLICIES OF THE NEW TEAM. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WILL HAVE TO CONTEND WITH CONSERVATIVE FORCES REMAINING IN LEADING PARTY POSITIONS IF HE IS TO SUCCEED IN MODERNIZING THE PARTY.

3. MLADENOV WILL BE DRIVEN BY TWO MAJOR FORCES, EACH OF WHICH HAS MULTIPLE FACETS. FIRST IS THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC CRISIS. WE UNDERSTAND HE WILL GIVE A VERY HARD-HITTING SPEECH OUTLINING THE SERIOUS STATE OF THE ECONOMY. AFTER DECADES OF NEGLIGENT MANAGEMENT, THE ECONOMY IS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE. VARIOUS REFORM PERMUTATIONS, THEIR IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED BY THE CONTINUED STATE CONTROL OVER THE ECONOMY, HAVE HAD LITTLE EFFECT. CONSUMER
GOODS AND FOODSTUFFS ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY. FOREIGN HARD-CURRENCY DEBT IS NOW ADMITTED TO BE OVER 10 BILLION DOLLARS AND IS BARELY MANAGEABLE. THE DISPROPORTIONATE ORIENTAION OF TRADE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION HAS HAD SERIOUS AND LASTING DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY. THE COUNTRY MUST OPEN ITS ECONOMY AND DEVELOP TRADE WITH THE WEST; THE TOP LEADERSHIP RECOGNIZES AND ACCEPTS THIS.

4. THE SECOND FACTOR IS THE CHALLENGE OF MANAGING AND CONTROLLING THE PROCESS OF GLASNOST AND DEMOCRATIZATION NOW TURNED LOOSE IN THIS COUNTRY. THIS IS A HIGHLY-COMPLEX ISSUE WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY GET OUT OF CONTROL. ALTHOUGH IT'S LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR HERE, EVENTS IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE ISSUE'S POTENTIAL. MLADENOV AND COMPANY WILL HAVE TO DEFINE A PROGRAM WHICH REVITALIZES AND LEGITIMIZES THE COMMUNIST PARTY (PERHAPS AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK); PROVIDES FOR MORE OPENNESS IN THE MEDIA WHILE SETTING ACCEPTABLE LIMITS; AND PROVIDES ENOUGH IN THE WAY OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION TO TAKE THE STEAM OUT OF AT LEAST A GOOD PORTION OF THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS.

HE IS PROBABLY HOPING TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER EVENTS WILL PERMIT HIM TO DO SO. ONE IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS THE INDEPENDENT DEMONSTRATION SET FOR DECEMBER 10. DEPENDING ON THE SIZE AND DIRECTION OF THE DEMONSTRATION, MLADENOV'S ROOM TO MANEUVER COULD BE SOMewhat CIRCUMSCRIBED. SIMILARLY A POSSIBLY RE-AWAKENED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SCHEDULED TO MEET DECEMBER 14-15 COULD PROVE TO BE ANOTHER FORCE FOR ACCELERATED CHANGE NOT FULLY UNDER PARTY CONTROL. END SUMMARY.

THE REVITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY

5. THE REFORM OF THE ECONOMY IS AT THE TOP OF VIRTUALLY EVERYONE'S LIST OF PRIORITIES. THE PLENUM WILL BE EXPECTED TO OUTLINE A COMPREHENSIVE, MANAGEABLE AND ACHIEVABLE PROGRAM TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY OVER THE NEXT YEAR. MANY OF THE "NUTS AND BOLTS" ARE ALREADY IN PLACE ON PAPER, BUT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN FRUSTRATED. BOTH LUKANOV AND PIRINSKI, WHO WILL LIKELY LEAD THE REFORM EFFORTS, HAVE RECENTLY TOLD US THEY ARE DEDICATED TO MOVING TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY. PIRINSKI ALLOWED THAT THE ONLY REAL QUESTION LEFT WAS HOW BEST TO DO THIS. HE INDICATED THAT THE REAL ANSWER WOULD BE HASHED OUT OVER THE
NEXT FEW MONTHS IN WIDESPREAD DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE NATION’S LEADING ECONOMISTS. THE MESSAGE WE HAVE BEEN HEARING FROM LUKANOV, PIRINSKI, AND OTHERS, HOWEVER, IS THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE THE ECONOMY ANY "SHOCK TREATMENT" AND STILL HOPE TO MAKE NEEDED CHANGES GRADUALLY AND WITH MINIMAL

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 02 OF 04 SOFIA 06662

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, Pins, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV PREPARES FOR KEY PARTY PLENUM DISRUPTIONS.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT MLADENOV (OR WHOEVER LEADS THE ECONOMIC DISCUSSION AT THE PLENUM) WILL LIKELY OFFER AN OUTLINE OF HIS GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO ECONOMIC REFORM IN RATHER BROAD TERMS. HE WILL PROBABLY CONFINE SPECIFICS TO PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES WHICH CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT MEASURES ALREADY ON THE BOOKS. MANY OF THE DIMENSIONS

UNCLASSIFIED
OF DECREE 56 (JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, FREE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN TRADE, SELF-FINANCING, ETC.) STRIKE A WARM CHORD IN THE HEARTS OF FREE MARKETEERS. IF THE PARTY CAN SUCCESSFULLY REMOVE ITSELF FROM THE ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT OF THE FIRMS AND ALLOW THEM TO OPERATE AS ENVISAGED UNDER THE DECREE, IT WOULD BE A GIANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

7. THE FOREIGN DEBT SITUATION WILL CERTAINLY BE A FOCAL POINT OF ANY ECONOMIC DISCUSSION. WHILE MOST OFFICIALS TAKE PAINS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE 10 BILLION DOLLAR HARD-CURRENCY DEBT IS STILL MANAGEABLE, THEY NOW READILY ADMIT THAT IT HAS BECOME A MAJOR PROBLEM. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF APPROACHES TO THE SITUATION, AND WE DOUBT THE BULGARIANS HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE YET OF EXACTLY WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE A FEW DIRECTIONS WHICH ARE MORE OR LESS PREDICTABLE. FURTHER REFORM OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM, WITH MARKET LEVEL INTEREST ACCOUNTS AND PUBLIC SHARES, WOULD PROVIDE A BETTER MEANS OF REWARDING SAVINGS AND PERMIT CAPITAL FORMATIONS TO FLOW TOWARD MORE PROFITABLE ENTERPRISES. THE BULGARIANS HAVE ALSO INDICATED AN INTEREST IN ATTRACTING WESTERN BANKING REPRESENTATIVES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE GOB MUST BITE THE ECONOMIC BULLET AND MORE STRINGENTLY CONTROL HARD-CURRENCY IMPORTS. THAT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DO.

8. WHILE IT WILL NOT HAPPEN IMMEDIATELY, AND WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED IN EXPLICIT TERMS, A REORIENTATION OF THE ECONOMY AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO HIGHLY DESIRABLE: BULGARIA MUST TURN TOWARD THE WEST IN ORDER TO SOLVE ITS FOREIGN DEBT PROBLEMS. THIS MUST OCCUR FIRST BECAUSE THE "RUBLE ORIENTATED" TRADE NECESSARY TO BALANCE THE SOVIET IMPORTS IMPEDES THE DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN TRADE WHICH COULD OTHERWISE GENERATE HARD CURRENCY TO SERVICE THE DEBT. SECONDLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR YEARS SUFFERED ACCEPTANCE OF INFERIOR BULGARIAN GOODS OUT OF NECESSITY (CREATED BY SHORTAGES IN THE USSR AND THE FACT THAT MOST CONTRACTS WERE MADE AT STATE LEVEL AND PAID WITH STATE MONEY OF GOODS, WITHOUT DUE CONSIDERATION OF QUALITY OR VALUE). AS A RESULT, BULGARIA "GOT AWAY WITH" PRODUCTION OF INFERIOR
QUALITY GOODS, WHICH ARE NOW NOT COMPETITIVE ON WORLD MARKETS. BULGARIA MUST CHANGE THIS AND MUST BEGIN TO PENETRATE WESTERN MARKETS.

9. BULGARIA’S JOINT VENTURE LAW, WHICH PERMITS 100 PERCENT FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND REPATRIATION OF PROFITS OR PRODUCTS UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, IS RELATIVELY LIBERAL. IT COULD BE IMPROVED. HOWEVER, AND THIS MAY SEE SOME TREATMENT AT THE PLENUM. BULGARIA NEEDS FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS MUCH FOR THE COMPETITION AND MANAGEMENT EXPERTISE AS FOR THE HARD CURRENCY IT WOULD BRING. CREATION OF MORE LIBERAL TERMS FOR REPATRIATION OF PROFIT AND THE FACILITATION OF EXPORT OF COMMODITIES AS PROFIT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

PARTY AND POLITICAL REFORM

10. MLADENOV HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF BULGARIAN SOCIETY. HE HAS ALSO SUBSCRIBED TO A SEPARATION OF THE PARTY FROM THE STATE AND TO "PLURALISM OF OPINIONS." IN MOSCOW HE STATED IT WOULD BE UP TO THE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE IF THE COMMUNIST PARTY SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE ITS "LEADING ROLE" AS SPECIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT BULGARIA WILL FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR AND ELIMINATE THIS LANGUAGE AND PRACTICE. ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE
O 081323Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8796
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 04 SOFIA 06662

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV Prepares For Key Party Plenum

THAT IT WILL, AS THE INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THAT
APPROACH AND HAVING TRULY INDEPENDENT PARTIES AND
PLURALISM OF VIEWS ARE JUST TOO GREAT. JUST WHEN
THIS TAKES PLACE WILL BE AN INDICATION OF HOW FAST
REFORM HERE WILL MOVE. OUR GUESS IS THAT IT WILL
HAPPEN AT THE UPCOMING PLENUM OR AT THE LEAST, IT
WILL BE RECOMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSION EXAMINING
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION "STRONGLY CONSIDER" SUCH
A STEP.

11. SINCE THE EVENTS OF MID-NOVEMBER, THE POLITICAL
POLICIES AND STANDARDS OF BULGARIA HAVE BEEN IN
LIMBO. THERE ARE MULTIPLE "UNKNOWNs" INCLUDING THE
LIMITS OF GLASNOST, THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOB
WILL TOLERATE INDEPENDENT PARTIES AND THE POSSIBILITY
AND TIMING OF ELECTIONS. THE ALREADY EXISTING

INDEPENDENT GROUPS HAVE USED THIS PERIOD TO HOLD
RALLIES, SEEK TO ATTRACT NEW MEMBERS (WHICH THEY
CLAIM TO HAVE DONE IN THE THOUSANDS), AND TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THEIR NEWFOUND OPPORTUNITIES TO CONVEY
THEIR VIEWS OPENLY. THE AGRARIAN PARTY, WHOSE
PROUD HISTORY AND TRADITIONS HAVE BEEN TARNISHED BY
45 YEARS OF TOTAL SUBSERVIENCE TO THE BCP, IS NOW
ATTEMPTING TO REVIVE ITSELF AND BREAK WAY. A SEEMINGLY
LIMITLESS VARIETY OF OTHER PARTIES ARE SPRINGING
UP. ALL OF THE ABOVE HAVE TENDED TO MOVE THE FOCUS
OF ATTENTION AWAY FROM THE BELEAGUERED COMMUNIST PARTY
AND TOWARDS OTHER FORCES.

12. MLADENOV'S TASK, WHICH IS PERHAPS HISTORICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE, IS TO REVIVE HIS PARTY, BRING IT TO THE
FOREFRONT OF CHANGE IN THIS COUNTRY, AND AT THE SAME
TIME IMPLEMENT POLICIES OF GLASNOST AND SOME DEMO-
CRATIZATION. DURING THE PAST MONTH, ALL POLITICAL
MEMBERS (PARTICULARLY MLADENOV AND LUJANOV) HAVE
BEEN PAYING NON-STOP VISITS TO INTELLECTUALS,
STUDENTS, FACTORY WORKERS, AND SO ON IN AN ATTEMPT TO
ENGAGE THE PUBLIC AND WIN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE REFORM
EFFORTS NOW UNDERWAY.

13. WE CAN CERTAINLY EXPECT THAT THE PLENUM AND THE
SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION (BOTH EXPECTED
TO LAST TWO DAYS) WILL RECOMMEND AND PASS A NUMBER
OF LIBERALIZATION MEASURES. THIS WILL PROBABLY
INCLUDE NEW LAWS PERMITTING GATHERINGS AND DEMONSTRA-
TIONS, ON ASSOCIATIONS, REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL CODE
(PERHAPS INCLUDING THE ELIMINATION OF PROHIBITIONS
ON CONDUCT SIMILAR TO THE JUST-ABOLISHED PARAGRAPH 273)
AND AMNESTY. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT THE ASSEMBLY

WILL CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR NEW LAWS ON THE PRESS,
THE MILITIA - LABOR AND ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, THESE
ARE IN A LESSER STATE OF READINESS AND MAY NOT BE
COMPLETED IN TIME FOR ADOPTION AT THIS SESSION.

14. REFORM OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE CONSTITU-
TION WILL ALSO GET SOME ATTENTION. EVERYONE SEEMS
AGREED THAT THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD
BE EXPANDED. ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONSIDERABLE ROOM
WITHIN THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, SOME PROPOSALS,
SUCH AS THOSE DEFINING THE SOURCE OF LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVE OR CHANGING THE TERM OF LEGISLATORS AND
THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT (E.G. OUTLAWING A
SIMULTANEOUSLY HELD STATE OR PARTY POST), WOULD
REQUIRE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. REFORM OF THE
CONSTITUTION, ESPECIALLY AS IT RELATES TO THE ROLE
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL ALMOST SURELY BE AMONG
PLENUM TOPICS. THESE ARE POPULAR MEASURES WHICH
WILL ALSO PURCHASE TIME AND APPROVAL FOR MLADENOV'S
GOVERNMENT WITHOUT NECESSARILY PROMISING A TIMETABLE.

15. MLADENOV WILL HAVE TO MAKE FURTHER PERSONNEL
CHANGES TO REKINDLE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PARTY AND
THE INTELLECTUALS THAT REAL CHANGE IS UNDERWAY.
LIKELY CANDIDATES FOR RETIREMENT INCLUDE PENCHO
KUBADINSKI, YORDAN YOTOV AND IVAN PANEV FROM THE FULL
POLITIBURO MEMBERSHIP AND POSSIBLY GEOGI YORDANOV
FROM CANDIDATE MEMBERSHIP. PETUR DYULGEROV MUST
RESIGN HIS CANDIDATE MEMBERSHIP TO GIVE CREDIBILITY
TO THE NEW "INDEPENDENCE" OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT.

16. IT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHO WILL
BE APPOINTED TO THE POLITIBURO. THE NEW FOREIGN
EO. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV PREPARES FOR KEY PARTY PLENUM

MINISTER, BOYKO DIMITROV, COULD WELL BE TAKEN ON AS AT LEAST A CANDIDATE MEMBER. CHUDOMIR ALEKSANDROV’S RESURRECTION IS ALSO A POSSIBILITY, EITHER NOW OR DURING THE NEXT YEAR. SOME OF THE STRONG REGIONAL PARTY SECRETARIES ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL ALSO ADVANCE.

17. ON THE TOUGH ISSUE OF MULTI-PARTY PLURAL AND FREE ELECTIONS, MLADENOV MAY WELL DECIDE TO WALTZ AROUND THIS ISSUE RATHER THAN CONFRONT IT DIRECTLY. HE WILL PROBABLY TALK IN SOME GENERALITIES ABOUT THE FREER ELECTION PROCESS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY; MORE OPENNESS IN THE PARTY; AND A MORE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE CHOICE OF PARTY OFFICERS. LIKE THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT THE BULGARIANS ARE READY TO ENTERTAIN GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS AND A MULTIPLE NUMBER OF REALLY CONFIDENTIAL.
INDEPENDENT PARTIES. AT LEAST UNTIL THIS POINT, THERE HAS NOT BEEN THE MASS PUBLIC MOVEMENT DEMANDING THESE STEPS. (COMMENT: THE UPCOMING DEC 10 DEMONSTRATION OF THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS IN SOFIA WILL BE AN IMPORTANT GAUGE AS TO WHETHER THIS IS CHANGING. DESPITE THE GENERAL SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF ELECTIONS, IMMEDIATE ELECTIONS ARE IN NO ONE'S INTERESTS. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY ZHELYU ZHELEV AND OTHER INDEPENDENT GROUP LEADERS THAT VIRTUALLY NONE OF THE GROUPS WANTS ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BEFORE THE FALL OF 1990 FOR THE VERY OBVIOUS REASON THAT THEY ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNING WITH PROGRAMS, ETC. WE BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT FEELS THE SAME WAY.)

18. THE PLENQ AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSIONS WILL ALSO HAVE THEIR SHARE OF "ZHIVKOV-BASHING." ONE OF THE COMMON THEMES WHICH HAS EMERGED OVER THE PAST MONTH HAS BEEN THE EFFORTS BY ALL CONCERNED (INCLUDING ZHIVKOV'S TOP LIEUTENANTS) TO BLAME ALMOST EVERY ILL OF THE PAST FORTY-FIVE YEARS ON TODOR ZHIVKOV (AND HIS FAMILY). IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE HOW FAR THIS TREND IS CARRIED, AS THERE HAS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION THAT VLADIMIR ZHIVKOV WILL BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL FOR ALLEGED MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS AND THAT A COMMISSION WILL BE SET UP UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO INVESTIGATE MISDEEDS OF THE ZHIVKOV ERA. THIS COMMISSION WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO THE PARTY COMMISSION ALREADY APPARENTLY OPERATING.

19. COMMENT. MLADENOV UNLEASHED THE FORCES OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS...
HOW STRONG THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY WILL
BECOME AMONG THE BULGARIAN PUBLIC NOW THAT THEY ARE
MORE FREE TO SPEAK OUT. THIS, PERHAPS MORE THAN
ANYTHING ELSE, WILL DETERMINE THE PACE OF REFORMS
IN THIS COUNTRY. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06665

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: SUBEV LEADS 3000 IN DEMONSTRATION FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS

1. (U) SUMMARY. ON 7 DECEMBER, AN ESTIMATED 3000 PROTESTORS HEARD FATHER KRISTOFER SUBEV READ PETITIONS CALLING FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND THEN MARCHED WITH HIM TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHERE SUBEV AND OTHER CLERICS PRESENTED THE DOCUMENT TO ASSEMBLYMEN. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) APPROXIMATELY 3000 PROTESTORS BRAVED THE TWILIGHT COLD IN SOFIA FOR A 90-MINUTE MEETING MARCH, AND DEMONSTRATION. THE EVENT, WHICH WAS MENTIONED ON RADIO AND IN AT LEAST TWO NEWSPAPERS, WAS ORGANIZED BY FATHER KRISTOFER SUBEV AND HIS COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS. IT SEEMED TO BE EXCLUSIVELY CHRISTIAN AND PREDOMINANTLY ORTHODOX.

3. (U) THE PROTESTORS GATHERED IN FRONT OF CENTRAL SOFIA'S ST. NICOLAS CHURCH, WHERE FATHER SUBEV READ PETITIONS CALLING FOR FREEDOMS OF RELIGION, INCLUDING ACCESS TO PUBLIC MEDIA FOR CHRISTIAN BROADCASTS AND MESSAGES, PRINTING OF BIBLES AND OTHER RELIGIOUS MATERIALS, ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTMAS DAY AND EASTER AS NATIONAL HOLIDAYS, RESTATMENT OF CHURCHES' PRE-1944 RIGHTS TO OPERATE SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS,

4. (U) AFTER THE READING, SUBEV LED THE CROWD IN THE SINGING OF A HYMN AS THEY BEGAN THEIR SHORT MARCH PAST NEVSKI CATHEDRAL TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING. MILITIAMEN THEN LED SUBEV AND APPROXIMATELY 25 OTHER CLERICS INTO THE BACK OF THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING, WHERE THEY MET WITH OFFICIALS FOR APPROXIMATELY THIRTY MINUTES.


7. (U) WHEN THE PRIESTS AND MONKS EMERGED FROM THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING, SUBEV ASKED THE CROWD TO SHOW ITS ASSENT IN THE EVENTS BY SAYING "AMEN." THE CROWD SHOUTED "AMEN," SANG ANOTHER HYMN, AND THEN MARCHED BACK TO ST. NICOLAS CHURCH FOR A PRAYER VIGIL.

8. (C) COMMENT. IN SPITE OF THE PUBLICITY WHICH THE EVENT RECEIVED, THE MILITIA SEEMED TO BE PREPARED FOR A FAR SMALLER CROWD. (EVEN DIMITUR CHAKOLOV, SUBEV'S DEPUTY AND SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD ONLY EXPECTED 400-500.) ECGLASNOST'S GATHERING OF 4000 ON 3 NOVEMBER HAD DRAWN MORE THAN A HUNDRED BORDER GUARD TROOPS, DOZENS OF METAL BARRICADES, AND DOZENS OF MILITIAMEN. THIS CROWD, ON THE OTHER HAND WAS CONTAINED WITH ONLY TEN VISIBLE MILITIAMEN AND SIX BARRICADES. THE CROWD SEEMED TO BE MOSTLY FROM THE WORKING-AGRP POPULATION: MAINLY MIDDLE-AGED,
WITH FEW PENSIONERS AND FEW YOUNG PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH COLLEGE STUDENTS WERE ON A BREAK FROM SCHOOL. IT SEEMED TO BE THE MOST VOCAL AND UNIFIED GATHERING SO FAR HERE: THE CHANTS WERE WELL ORCHESTRATED AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY PRESENTED.

NNNN

PAGE 01    SOFIA 06665 02 OF 02 081358Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO  LOG-00  ADS-00  AID-00  INR-05  SS-00  OIC-02  CIAE-00
       EB-00  DODE-00  H-01  IO-19  NSCE-00  NSAE-00  HA-09
       L-03  LAB-04  TRSE-00  PA-01  STR-18  SIL-01  INRE-00
       RP-10  USIE-00  SP-02  SR-06  PRS-01  P-02  /084 W

R 081352Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8801
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSAY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06665

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, RU
SUBJECT: SUBEV LEADS 3000 IN DEMONSTRATION FOR

9. (C) - THERE ARE, OF COURSE, TWO SIDES TO THE DEMAND FOR A "CHRISTIAN BULGARIA," A "CHRISTIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY," AND RECOGNITION OF CHRISTMAS AND EASTER AS NATIONAL HOLIDAYS. ALTHOUGH SUBEV CALLS HIS GROUP THE "COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS," THIS WAS A DEMONSTRATION FOR CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, AND NO MENTION WAS MADE IN THE CROWD FOR RIGHTS FOR
OTHER RELIGIOUS FAITHS, INCLUDING THAT OF THE
COUNTRY'S MORE THAN ONE MILLION MUSLIMS. ALTHOUGH
THE PETITIONS MADE GENERAL REFERENCES TO RELIGIOUS RITES
AND PRACTICES, ONE REFERENCE TO "BIBLES" AND ONE TO
THE ORTHODOX CHURCH, THEY, TOO, DID NOT SPECIFICALLY
MENTION ANY MINORITY FAITHS.

10. (C) WE ALSO NOTE FOR THE RECORD THAT IN CONTRAST
TO THE VERY RECENT PAST, THE AUTHORITIES ALLOWED
THE DEMONSTRATION TO TAKE PLACE AND IT WAS REPORTED
UPON ACCURATELY IN THE MEDIA. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06647

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PIRINSKI STATES COMMITMENT TO FULL MARKET ECONOMY

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ON 5 DECEMBER, DAS CURTIS KAMMAN AND AMBASSADOR POLANSKY MET WITH NEWLY APPOINTED BULGARIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER GEORGI PIRINSKI. PIRINSKI SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO CREATING A FULL MARKET ECONOMY AND EXPLAINED HOW THE COUNTRY WOULD IMPLEMENT NECESSARY MEASURES. HE ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT MPN STATUS FOR BULGARIA AND ASKED FOR US ASSISTANCE IN ITS REQUEST TO SEND BULGARIAN ECONOMISTS TO THE OECD AS TECHNICAL OBSERVERS. END SUMMARY.

3. ON 5 DECEMBER, DAS KAMMAN AND THE AMBASSADOR

PAGE 02  SOFIA 06647  01 OF 02  080906Z

MET GEORGI PIRINSKI IN HIS NEW COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OFFICE. THE MEETING WAS AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE BULGARIANS. KAMMAN INQUIRED ABOUT BULGARIA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS AND EXPLAINED THE USG POLICY LINKING TRADE AGREEMENTS TO COUNTRIES' HUMAN RIGHTS RECORDS. PIRINSKI ASKED WHETHER WORK ON A TRADE AGREEMENT COULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY IF BULGARIA ENACTS MEASURES TO PROVIDE FULL AND EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS FOR ITS CITIZENRY. KAMMAN RESPONDED THAT THE PREZIDENT WOULD FIRST HAVE TO GRANT A WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF JACKSON-VANISH. THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT GRANT A WAIVER, HOWEVER, WITHOUT REAL EVIDENCE OF "SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS" IN BULGARIA.

4. PIRINSKI STATED THAT BULGARIA WAS ALREADY MAKING PROGRESS AND THAT ECONOMIC REFORMS WERE ALSO UNDERWAY. HE SAID THAT THE LEADERSHIP WAS COMMITTED TO THE "FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING" THAT "THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY CANNOT FUNCTION WITHOUT A FULL MARKET ECONOMY."

5. CURRENTLY, PIRINSKI ELABORATED, THE ECONOMY WAS IN VERY BAD CONDITION. AFTER THE WAR, IT HAD QUICKLY REACHED A HEALTHY STATE OF EQUILIBRIUM, MEANING SUFFICIENT ECONOMIC GROWTH, STABLE PRICES, FULL EMPLOYMENT, AND A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. GRADUALLY, HOWEVER, SOME OF THE "POSITIVES BECAME NEGATIVES": FULL EMPLOYMENT BECAME EXCESS, INEFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT, AND STABLE PRICES WERE ARTIFICIALLY STABILIZED. THE ECONOMY DETERIORATED, AND "DISEQUILIBRIUM HAS BEEN DEEPLY ENGRAINED" EVER SINCE.

6. HOW TO ELIMINATE THE DISEQUILIBRIUM WAS A SOURCE OF DEBATE, EVEN THOUGH ALL WERE COMMITTED TO THE FREE MARKET. PERSONALLY, PIRINSKI DID NOT THINK THAT HARVARD PROFESSOR AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMIC ADVISOR JEFFREY SACHS' "BIG-BANG" THEORY WOULD WORK IN SUCH A STATE OF DISEQUILIBRIUM. "TEXTS SHOW THAT FUNCTIONING OF ECONOMIES IN DISEQUILIBRIUM MAKES FOR MORE NEGATIVE PHENOMENON IF YOU TAKE A LEAP: MORE INEFFICIENCY, MORE UNEMPLOYMENT." "GET THE MACRO BETTER," HE SAID. "TURN-AROUND MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED IN THE SHORT TERM TO CUT OUT INEFFICIENCIES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE."

7. ALL ECONOMISTS AND EXPERTS IN THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN DEBATING THIS ISSUE, AND THEY ARE ADVANCING THREE "SCHOOLS": BETTER CENTRAL PLANNING, WITH COMPANIES STILL WORKING WITHIN THESE TRADITIONAL BOUNDARIES; A GRADUAL CONVERSION TO A FREE MARKET, WITH MORE PRICE FLEXIBILITY; AND THE BIG-BANG APPROACH.

"IS HIGHLY RESPECTED, WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE HAMMING COMMISSION, AND IS KNOWN AS A MAN WHO KEEPS HIS WORD." HE MET AT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS RECENTLY WITH 200 COMPANY CHAIRMAN AND DISCUSSED 1990 BUDGETS AND PROGRAMS. "HE WAS SWAMPED BY QUESTIONS," HE SAID, "WHICH IS A SIGN THAT PEOPLE ARE STARTING TO THINK."

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06647 02 OF 02 080905Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 L-03
LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 ITC-01 OPIC-08 PA-01 CEA-01
OMB-01 STR-18 INRE-00 AGRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00
SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 E-01 /057 W

R 080900Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8787
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06647

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: FGOV, ECON, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PIRINSKI STATES

9. TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION CONCERNING CHANGES
IN PRICING POLICIES, PIRINSKI RESPONDED, "OLD DECISIONS
DIDN'T TAKE RESOURCES INTO ACCOUNT. THERE WAS NO
COHERENT THINKING-OUT OF CHAIN REACTIONS. RETAIL
PRICES HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED. SUBSIDIES HAVE TO BE
REMOVED." HE ADDED THAT, IN MANY CASES, ITEMS ARE
SUBSIDIZED AT THREE DIFFERENT LEVELS.
10. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY APPRECIABLE CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S ROLE IN MANAGING THE ECONOMY. PIRINSKI NOTED NO REAL CHANGES OTHER THAN THAT EVERYONE, FROM THE SHOPFLOOR TO THE MANAGER TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WILL "SUPPORT A MARKET ECONOMY" AND THAT THIS "WILL BE AN INTEGRATING ELEMENT."

11. PIRINSKI STATED THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS ALREADY LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES' MISTAKES IN REFORMING THE ECONOMY. THEY ARE STUDYING MANY MODELS AND WELCOME ADVICE. HE SAID THAT, WHILE IN PARIS AT THE END OF NOVEMBER, HE DISCUSSED THE IDEA OF SENDING BULGARIAN ECONOMISTS TO THE OECD ON THE TECHNICAL SIDE. A LETTER REQUESTING THIS HAD BEEN PREPARED, BUT "24 AMBASSADORS HAVE TO DECIDE." "USUALLY WE SPEAK OF IMF OR THE WORLD BANK, BUT OECD HAS EVERYTHING, USING ALL INSTRUMENTS." HE ASKED KAMMAN TO "PUSH THIS LETTER." "PEOPLE HERE ARE EXCITED ABOUT TALKING WITH WESTERN ECONOMISTS," HE SAID. "THEY'RE RARING TO GO."

12. COMMENT: WHILE PIRINSKI PRAISED ECONOMIC MINISTER ZAREV AND FINANCE MINISTER BELCHEV AS KNOWLEDGEABLE AND RESPECTED, HE HIMSELF IS SAID TO BE ONE OF THE BEST ECONOMIC BRAINS IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF BEING FULLY SCHOOLED IN TRADITIONAL THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION AS WELL AS NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES' RECENT EFFORTS TO MOVE TOWARD A MARKET ECONOMY. LUKANOV'S EARLIER STATEMENT TO KAMMAN THAT HE AND THE LEADERSHIP "SEE NO OTHER WAY" THAN THAT OF A MARKET ECONOMY WAS ECHOED BY PIRINSKI'S ASSURANCES THAT HE AND THE COUNTRY'S OTHER LEADING ECONOMISTS ARE EQUALLY COMMITTED TO THIS GOAL. PIRINSKI'S OWN DISDAIN FOR THE BIG-BANG METHOD, LUKANOV'S EXPLANATION OF STEP-BY-STEP LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKING FOR REFORM PROPOSALS, AND THE COUNTRY'S GENERALLY METHODICAL APPROACH SO FAR TO ISSUES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING LEND CREDENCE TO THE BELIEF THAT A FREE MARKET WILL FORM HERE ACCORDING TO THE "GRADUALIST" SCHOOL WHICH PIRINSKI MENTIONED. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
Record Number 101789

End of the Cold War
12/08/1989
1435Z
Cable
BUCHAR 10422
United States Embassy. Romania
United States. Department of State. Office of the Secretary
All Eastern European Posts
United States Embassy. France
United States Embassy. Germany (Federal Republic)
United States Embassy. United Kingdom
Green, Alan, Jr.
Confidential
Bio Notes on Ion Dinca, the Newest Addition to the Permanent Bureau of the RCP's Polexco
Bobu, Emil
Dascalescu, Constantin
Ceausescu, Elena
Oprea, Gheorghe
Manescu, Manea
Radulescu, Gheorghe
Dinca, Ion
Romania. Ministry of Interior. Department of State Security (Departamentul Securitatii Statului)
 Communist Party (Romania)
Romania. Communist Party. Central Committee. Politburo (Polexco)
Government structure
International relations
Romania
5
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  BUCHAR 10422  01 OF 02  081437Z

NERGY AND HEAVY INDUSTRY. REPUTED TO BE A HARD-LINER WHO IS NOT AFRAID OF WIELDING A BIG STICK, HE SEEMS TO BE THE TYPE OF INDIVIDUAL (ALONG WITH EMIL BOBU) TO WHOM THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKELY RELY IN THE EVENT OF POLITICAL TURMOIL. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 BELOW.

UNCLASSIFIED


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BUCHAR 10422 01 OF 02 081437Z

5. CONSIDERED APART FROM THE "FIRST COUPLE," THE PERMANENT BUREAUR IS A STABLE AND APPARENTLY CLOSE-KNIT GROUP OF COLORLESS PARTY FUNCTIONARIES WHO HAVE RISEN -- AND STAYED -- AT THE TOP BECAUSE OF UNSWERING DEDICATION TO THE POLICIES AND WHIMS OF THE PRESIDENT AND, INCREASINGLY, OF HIS WIFE. THEY ALSO OWE THEIR SURVIVAL TO THEIR SKILLS IN PLAYING SECOND-FIDDLE TO THE FIRST COUPLE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR ACTUAL PERSONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO THE TWO AND THEIR POLICIES MIGHT PROVE TO BE SHALLOW. IN ANY CASE, THEY FEEL BOUND TO THE CEAUSESCUS BY SELF INTEREST: IF THINGS START TO UNRAVEL IN BUCHAREST AS THEY HAVE FOR THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIPS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE, THEY REALIZE THAT THEIR SURVIVAL CHANCES ARE SLIM.

6. REPTEL REMAINS AN EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF THE PERMANENT BUREAUR AND ITS PERSONALITIES. BASED ON
THE ACTIVITIES OF ITS VARIOUS MEMBERS OVER THE PAST YEAR, THREE OF THE SIX "NON-CEAUSESCU" MEMBERS ARE SLOWING DOWN AND, AT LEAST IN A TIME OF CRISIS, WOULD PROBABLY BE RELEGATED TO A PASSIVE ROLE. FOR A COMBINATION OF AGE AND HEALTH REASONS, DASCALESCU (66), MANESCU (73), AND RADULESCU (79) ARE BECOMING LESS AND LESS RELEVANT IN THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL EQUATION. THE OTHER THREE, INCLUDING THE PERMANENT BUREAU'S NEWEST MEMBER ION DINCA, ARE ALL IN THEIR EARLY SIXTIES AND ARE SHREWD POLITICAL BUREAUCRATS. WHILE OREA, AN ENGINEER BY TRAINING, SEEMS TO BE MORE OF A COLORLESS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  BUCHAR  10422  02 OF 02  081440Z
ACTION INR-05

INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  EUR-00  CIAE-00  NSAE-00  PA-01  CPR-02
INRE-00  SSC-01  /009 W

P 081435Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5653
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY PARIS
AMBASSADY BONN
AMBASSADY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 10422

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356; DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PGOV, RO
SUBJECT: BIO NOTES ON ION DINCA, THE NEWEST ADDITION

TECHNOCRAT, BOTH BOBU AND DINCA HAVE THE REPUTATION OF BEING TOUGH, SHREWD AND CAPABLE OF DECISIVE ACTION. BOBU, WITH OVER 10 YEARS ON THE PERMANENT BUREAU AND NINE YEARS AS PARTY SECRETARY FOR ORGANIZATION AND CADRES, IS LIKELY THE MOST POWERFUL OF THE SIX, BUT THE NEW MAN IN THE INNER CIRCLE IS DEFINITELY WORTH WATCHING.

ION DINCA - BIO DATA:

-----------------------------

Page - 3

POLEXCO IN 1978.

- HE HAS THE REPUTATION OF A HARDLINER HAVING GAINED NOTORIETY OF SORTS IN 1985 WHEN HE PUT COAL MINES AND POWER PLANTS UNDER MILITARY MANAGEMENT. HE HAD THE FORMER CIVILIAN MANAGERS OF THE ROVINAKI AND TURCENI INDUSTRIAL UNITS BROUGHT TO TRIAL AND IMPRISONED FOR MISMANAGEMENT.

TO BE ONE OF THE FEW INDIVIDUALS IN THE TOP ROMANIAN
ELITE, CAPABLE OF ORGANIZING A “PALACE COUP,”
BUT HAVE NO REASONS TO BELIEVE HE IS EVEN CONSIDERING
SUCH A POSSIBILITY AT PRESENT. THEY ALSO NOTE THAT
HE WAS RECENTLY WIDOWED (IN LATE 1988), AND THAT
HAS HAS NO KNOWN LANGUAGE SKILLS OTHER THAN
ROMANIAN.

8. COMMENT: WHETHER DINCA’S NOMINATION TO THE
PERMANENT BUREAU IS DUE MORE TO HIS “MUSCLED
MANAGEMENT” STYLE INTERNALLY OR TO HIS INTERNATIONAL
EXPERTISE IS UNCLEAR. IN ANY CASE, HE IS DEFINITELY
THE TYPE OF TOUGH, BUT APPARENTLY COMPETENT,
INDIVIDUAL TO WHOM CEAUSESCU MIGHT TURN WHEN THE
WAVES OF POLITICAL CHANGE FINALLY START LAPPING
OVER THE ROMANIAN BORDERS. END COMMENT.

GREEN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN
EXCISE

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 35285 01 OF 02 091327Z
ACTION SS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SS0-00 CCO-00 000 W
O 091321Z DEC 89 ZFF4 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NACT IMMEDIATE 8562
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SECRET

EXDIS

TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT GERMANY
REF: AIMOSCO/S 35799 BIMOSCO 34880

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 35285 01 OF 02 091327Z

3. THROUGHOUT THE POST-WAR ERA, THE SOVIETS HAVE EQUATED CONTROL OVER EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE WITH
VITAL SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND THEY HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO FIGHT TO MAINTAIN IT. THE GORBACHEV REGIME HAS TAKEN A LEAP INTO THE UNKNOWN, GIVING UP CONTROL AND BARGAINING THAT THEY COULD MAINTAIN INFLUENCE, WHILE INVOLVING THEMSELVES AND THEIR ALLIES MORE PRODUCTIVELY IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY. IN POLAND AND IN HUNGARY, THAT GAMBLE HAS THUS FAR PAID OFF. GORBACHEV'S INITIAL MESSAGE TO WESTERN LEADERS AS THE BERLIN WALL CRUMBLLED REVEALED HIS FEAR THAT IN THE EVEN MORE EMOTIONALLY CHARGED ENVIRONMENT OF EAST GERMANY, THE GAMBLE WOULD FAIL. THOSE FEARS, INITIALLY EASED WHEN THE EAST GERMANS RETURNED TO HOME AND WORK ON MONDAY MORNING, HAVE NOW BEEN REVIVED.

"TWO DAYS AGO THAT THE SHARPER SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD EVENTS IN GERMANY IS DUE TO PERCEPTIONS OF INCREASED DISORDER AND A BELIEF THAT KOHL, IN A DEMONSTRATION OF "NATIONAL EGOISM", HAD WITH HIS 10 POINT PROPOSAL BROKEN HIS WORD TO GORBACHEV NOT TO UNDERTAKE ANY PAN-German INITIATIVE.

4. WE WOULD DO WELL AS WE GAUGE THE SOVIET REACTION TO EVENTS IN THE GDR TO REMEMBER THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL TEND TO SEE CHAOS WHERE WE SEE ONLY DISORDER, IF OUT OF THAT CHAOS THEY BEGIN TO SEE EMERGING THE SHADOWS OF RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM AND GERMAN REVANCHISM, THEIR REACTION MAY BECOME UNPREDICTABLE. WHETHER THOSE SHADOWS REPRESENT OBJECTIVE REALITY OR ONLY THE PROJECTION OF THEIR OWN FEARS COULD BE SECRET.

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 35235 01 OF 02 091327Z

ARGUABLE, BUT IRRELEVANT. THE RIDING OF THESE FOUR HORSEMEN, OR EVEN ANY ONE OF THEM, OVER TERRAIN STILL COVERED IN THE RUSSIAN MIND'S EYE WITH THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION OF WORLD WAR II COULD SWEEP AWAY VISIONS OF A COMMON EUROPEAN HOME.

5. OUR COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW'S NATO EMBASSIES TEND GENERALLY TO THE OPINION THAT THE OPTION OF USING FORCE TO CONTROL EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE IS NO LONGER OPEN TO THE SOVIETS. WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE GORBACHEV REGIME IS NOT WILLING TO USE FORCE, WHETHER ANY POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR REGIME MIGHT BE SO DISPOSED IS MORE DIFFICULT TO SAY. SOVIET ASSETS IN THE GDR ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAKE IT A CONCEIVABLE OPTION. WITH DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS IN OTHER EASTERN
EUROPEAN CAPITALISM AT A DIFFERENT SOVIET REGIME MIGHT CONSIDER SALUTARY. THAT WOULD BE AN ACT OF DESPERATION, AND AN ACT FURTHERMORE THAT WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPRACTICABLE NO MATTER WHAT THE REGIME AS SOVIET UNILATERAL AND, LATER, CFE AND PERHAPS CFE II REDUCTIONS CHANGE EUROPEAN MILITARY REALITIES. IN THE MEANTIME, AND EVEN THEN, A MAJOR WESTERN CONCERN SHOULD BE TO AVOID FEEDING SOVIET PSYCHOSIS.

6. THE GORBACHEV REGIME'S ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE A PROCESS FOR MANAGING EVENTS IN GERMANY IAS AS MUCH TO DO WITH THE DOMESTIC AS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM IS BEING HELD IN MOSCOW TODAY (OCTOBER 9), WHILE ITS PUTATIVE AGENDA IS PRIMARILY ECONOMIC. THERE MUST BE CONCERNS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT WHETHER THEIR COMPETENCE TO HANDLE SOVIET SECURITY

SECRET

7. IN CALLING FOR A FOUR-POWER MEETING IN BERLIN, GORBACHEV WANTS TO BE ABLE TO TELL HIS CRITICS THAT, WHILE THE SITUATION IN THE GDR IS SERIOUS, EVENTS ARE NOT OUT OF CONTROL. THAT SOVIET CONCERNS ARE SHARED BY THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS AND THAT THEY ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO FIND A WAY TO MANAGE THEM FOR THE COMMON GOOD. HE WILL WANT TO BE ABLE TO ASSERT THAT THANKS TO HIS POLICIES SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS CAN BE PROTECTED BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS RATHER THAN BY MILITARY CONFRONTATION. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO RESPECT HIS SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02  MOSCOW  35285  02 OF 32  091327Z

THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR FOUR-POWER CONSULTATIONS IN A WAY THAT HELPS GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS ASSERTION, MATLOCK
SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06698

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT GROUPS FORM "UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES"

1. **[CENSORED]** ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. VIRTUALLY ALL OF BULGARIA'S ACTIVE INDEPENDENT GROUPS AND TWO POLITICAL PARTIES FORMED THE "UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES" ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 7. THE PURPOSE OF THE UNION IS TO UNITE AND COORDINATE THE FOUNDING MEMBER GROUPS' EFFORTS TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN BULGARIA. THE MEMBER GROUPS WILL PRESERVE THEIR AUTONOMY. A DECLARATION APPROVED AT THE MEETING MAKES SEVERAL GENERAL DEMANDS AND LISTS A HOST OF AIMS. THE UNION ALSO ELECTED OFFICERS. END SUMMARY.

THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND ITS MEMBERS

3. AT AN ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING HELD THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 7 VIRTUALLY ALL OF BULGARIA'S ACTIVE INDEPENDENT GROUPS AND TWO NEWLY-FORMED POLITICAL PARTIES ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF THE "UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES" (UDF). PARTICIPATING GROUPS INCLUDE THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY FOR THE DEFENSE...
OF HUMAN RIGHTS; ECOGLASNOST; PODKREPA; THE COMMITTEE
FOR PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF
CONSCIENCE AND SPIRITUAL VALUES; THE CLUB OF
PERSONS ILLEGALLY REPRessed AFTER 1945; THE
INDEPENDENT STUDENTS SOCIETY; CITIZENS INITIATIVE;
THE BULGARIAN WORKERS’ SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(UNITED); AND THE NIKOLA PETKOV BULGARIAN AGRARIAN
PARTY. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE DISCUSSION CLUB
WAS ADMITTED TO THE UNION ON THE FOLLOWING DAY.

4. AN ANNOUNCEMENT CIRCULATED AT THE MEETING
DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF THE UDF AS TO UNITE AND
COORDINATE THE FOUNDING MEMBERS GROUPS’ EFFORTS
TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN
BULGARIA. UNDER THE ORGANIZATION THE VARIOUS
PARTICIPATING GROUPS WILL RETAIN THEIR AUTONOMY
AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL AGENDAS.

5. THE GATHERING ELECTED A "COORDINATION COUNCIL"
COMPRISED AS FOLLOWS:

- CHAIRMAN -- ZHELYU ZHELEV, (CLUB FOR DISCUSSION
  IN SUPPORT OF GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKI)

- SECRETARY -- PETUR BERON, (ECOGLASNOST)

- SPOKESMEN -- GEORGI SPASOV, (PODKREPA)

- -- Rumen Vodenicharov, (INDEPENDENT
  SOCIETY FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN
  RIGHTS).

EACH PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION IS REPRESENTED ON
THE COUNCIL BY 3 MEMBERS.

A DECLARATION OF DEMANDS AND AIMS -- OR A PLATFORM?

6. THE PARTICIPATING GROUPS APPROVED A DOCUMENT
WHICH SETS OUT SOME GENERAL DEMANDS AND SOME MORE
SPECIFIC AIMS. THE GENERAL DEMANDS INCLUDE THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CIVIC SOCIETY, POLITICAL PLURALISM,
A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, A LAW ABIDING STATE, AND A
MARKET ECONOMY.

7. THE MORE SPECIFIC AIMS LISTED IN THE DECLARATION
INCLUDE:

--AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE,
COOPERATIVE, AND STATE FORMS OF OWNERSHIP TO
EXIST ON AN EQUAL BASIS;

--LEGISLATION GUARANTEEING CITIZENS’ RIGHTS TO
INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION STRIKES AND PROTECTION OF LOW INCOME WORKERS;

--THE DRAFTING OF A NEW, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION;

--LEGISLATION TO BRING BULGARIAN LAW IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WITH ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS;
SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06698

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT GROUPS FORM "UNION OF

--DEPOLITIZATION OF THE ARMY AND THE MILITSIA;

--FREE ELECTIONS FOR A NEW NATIONAL ASSEMBLY;

--REHABILITATION OF ALL PERSONS UNLAWFULLY REPRESSED
DURING THE PERIOD OF TOTALITARIAN POWER;

--FULL AUTONOMY FOR HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS
AND THE PARTICIPATION OF STUDENTS IN THEIR SELF-
MANAGEMENT;

--ELIMINATION OF IDEOLOGICAL MONOPOLY IN EDUCATION;

--SELF-MANAGEMENT FOR RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND

CREATIVE WORKERS' ASSOCIATION;

--LEGAL AND FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE FOR THE MASS
MEDIA AND THE PUBLISHING HOUSES;
--CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES FOR THE EQUALITY OF BELIEVERS AND NON-BELIEVERS AND A NEW LAW CONCERNING PROFESSING RELIGION;

--LEGISLATION REGULATING FREE RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY AND MAKING RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS INDEPENDENT OF THE STATE;

--ELIMINATION OF THE SECTION OF THE MFA DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH;

--DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH NORMS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT;

--A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER.

8. THE UNION IS ALLEGEDLY OPEN TO ALL INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATIONS AND POLITICAL GROUPS WILLING TO WORK TOWARD THE ENDS DESCRIBED IN THE DECLARATION BY PEACEFUL AND LEGAL MEANS. NEW MEMBERS ARE ADMITTED TO THE UDF ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE FOUNDERS.

COMMENT

----------

9. THE UDF APPEARS TO BE THE NUCLEUS AROUND WHICH A UNITED OPPOSITION WILL FORM. ITS "PLATFORM"

CONTAINS ALL THE PLANKS NECESSARY TO BUILD THE STRUCTURE OF A VERY DIFFERENT BULGARIAN SOCIETY. INTERESTINGLY, IT STOPS SHORT OF A CALL FOR THE ABOLITION OF THAT PORTION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH GUARANTEES A PREEMINENT ROLE FOR THE COMMunist PARTY. HOWEVER, AT THE DECEMBER 10 RALLY CALLED BY THE ORGANIZATION, MANY SPEAKERS ADVANCED SUCH ABOLITION.

10. THE UDF IS COMPRISED OF ALL THE ACTIVE INDEPENDENT GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ANY ACTIVE TURKISH GROUPS. WHILE WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHETHER ANY OF THE PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE TURKISH GROUPS STILL EXIST, WE ARE AWARE OF TWO VERY NEW GROUPS, THE ISLAMIC LEAGUE AND THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, CONCERNED WITH POMAK AND ETHNIC TURK ISSUES. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LATTER GROUP SPOKE AT THE DECEMBER 10 RALLY CALLED BY THE UDF. IT MAY BE TOO EARLY TO EXPECT THAT THE UDF INCLUDE THESE TURKISH AND POMAK GROUPS, BUT THEIR INCLUSION WOULD BE A WELCOME SIGN THAT THIS
POTENTIALLY POWERFUL ORGANIZATION WILL ALSO PRESS THE DEMANDS OF THE MINORITIES. POLANSKY

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***
1. (U) SUMMARY. AS REPORTED REFTEL, THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY HAS ELECTED ANGEL DIMITROV AS ITS NEW LEADER. THREE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY'S EQUIVALENT OF A POLITIBURO RESIGNED ALONG WITH THE FORMER LEADER PETUR TANCHEV. DIMITROV HAS VOWED TO INCREASE HIS PARTY'S ROLE IN BULGARIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL POLICY. END SUMMARY

2. (U) ON 2 DECEMBER, ANGEL DIMITROV WAS ELECTED SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY AFTER THE PARTY'S ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL ACCEPTED "BY ABSOLUTE MAJORITY" PETUR TANCHEV'S "REQUEST TO BE RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES" AS LEADER. STANDING COMMITTEE SECRETARIES ALEXI IVANOV AND NANDO VANCEV AND COMMITTEE MEMBER RADOI POPOVANOV ALSO RESIGNED. TANCHEV IS 69 YEARS OLD, AND TWO OF THE THREE OTHERS ARE MORE THAN 70 YEARS OLD.

3. (U) ACCORDING TO BULGARIAN PRESS REPORTS, SPEAKERS AT THE SESSION OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL WERE IN FAVOR OF A "UNITED, CONSOLIDATED, AND INDEPENDENT" PARTY WHICH WOULD BE "NOT ONLY AN EQUAL PARTNER" OF THE ECP "BUT ALSO ITS (FOE)WANT." THEY ALSO CALLED FOR

4. (U) IN HIS FIRST SPEECH AS LEADER, DIMITROV ECHOED THE CALLS FOR AN END TO REPRESSION AND STATED THAT THE PARTY'S MOST IMPORTANT TASK IS TO BECOME AN "AUTHORITATIVE POLITICAL PARTY WITH ITS OWN POSTITION AND PROGRAM." THE AGRARIANS SHOULD BECOME "AN EQUAL POLITICAL PARTNER" OF THE BCP AND "ALL CONSTRUCTIVE, REFORM-MINDED FORCES IN SOCIETY." THE BCP HAS A "NATURAL RIGHT" TO "PLAY THE LEADING ROLE," HE ADDED, BUT IT SHOULD DO SO "THROUGH ITS MAJORITY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ON THE BASIS OF A WIDER CONSENSUS." LATER, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH JOURNALISTS, DIMITROV SAID THAT THE AGRARIANS WILL CONTINUE TO "COOPERATE" WITH THE COMMUNISTS, BUT THAT IT WILL NOT "PASS OVER IN SILENCE THE DECISIONS AND PROPOSALS WITH WHICH THE AGRARIAN PARTY DOES NOT AGREE." HE ALSO SAID THAT THE AGRARIANS FAVOR FREE ELECTIONS "AT THE RIGHT MOMENT."

5. (U) BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: DIMITROV WAS BORN ON


6. (C) ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS, DIMITROV HAS APPLIED FOR VISAS TO ATTEND NON-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEN USED THE TRIP AS A SPRINGBOARD TO MEETINGS WITH CONGRESSMEN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY OFFICIALS. (THE AGRARIANS HAVE ALWAYS DEPENDED UPON THIS SORT OF OFFICIAL "RECOGNITION" TO FOSTER THE PARTY'S CLAIM TO BE THE "OPPOSITION" AND THE COMMUNIST REGIME'S CLAIMS TO BE NON-TOTALITARIAN AND POLITICALLY PLURALISTIC.) AFTER THE FIRST SUCH TRIP, DIMITROV WAS THE SUBJECT OF A USEMBASSY PROTEST NOTE TO THE GOB. DURING THE THIRD TRIP, OSTensibly TO ATTEND A NATIONAL FARMERS UNION MEETING IN TEXAS, HE TRAVELLED TO WASHINGTON AND MET WITH CONGRESSMEN TOM LANTOS AND STEVEN SOLARZ. AMONG OTHERS.

7. (C) COMMENT. DIMITROV IS SAID TO BE COMFORTABLE WORKING IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM BUT ALSO TO HOLD AMBITIONS FOR HIS PARTY. HE HAD SERVED AS A SECRETARY
OF THE PARTY'S STANDING COMMITTEE FOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN YEARS BEFORE THIS APPOINTMENT. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT ANY PUSH WHICH HE MAKES FOR GREATER AGRARIAN INFLUENCE IS LIKELY TO BE DIRECTED MORE TOWARD POWER-SHARING THAN BCP-BASHING. HIS HISTORY OF WHAT ONE CAN POLITELY CALL A "RAPPROCHEMENT" WITH

NNNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06678 02 OF 02 110825Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01
SCT-03 P-02 T-01 /041 W

R 110755Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAD SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8812
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSAD BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06678

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: NEW LEADER AND AGENDA FOR BULGARIAN AGRARIAN

THE BCP SUGGESTS THAT HE WOULD SEEK A GREATER POSITION FOR HIS PARTY WITHIN THE EXISTING SYSTEM WHILE NOT PRESSING AS ACTIVELY FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS.

8. (C) HOWEVER, HE MAY HAVE TO CONTEND WITH MEMBERS OF THE PARTY WHO HAVE MORE RADICAL AND AMBITIOUS POLICY AIDS: THE PARTY STILL CONTAINS A CORE OF OLDER MEMBERS WHO REMEMBER THE PP-1'44 PERIOD WHEN
THE PARTY WAS ONE OF LEGITIMATE POLICIES AND INFLUENCE. SECOND, AN INITIATIVE GROUP OF 90 PARTY MEMBERS SEEMS TO BE DIRECTING THE PARTY TOWARD A FAR GREATER INDEPENDENCE THAN PARTY LEADERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO CONSIDER SO FAR. THIS "NIKOLA PETKOV" GROUP IS ONE OF 17 ACTIVIST GROUPS WHICH ARE PARTICIPATING IN THE PLANNED MASS DEMONSTRATION OF 10 DECEMBER IN
P 111651Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8835
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

SECTION 01 OF 05 SOFIA 06699

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: 70,000 DEMONSTRATE IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MEETING


2. (U) APPROXIMATELY 70,000 PEOPLE STOOD IN MITTER COLD AT NEVSKI CATHEDRAL ON 10 DECEMBER FOR THE

ETHNIC CONFLICT; REDUCTION OF THE LENGTH OF THE TERM OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF MILITARY SERVICE; RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, REFORM OF THE COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM AND POLICIES; SHIFT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION FROM BCP TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONTROL; PLURALISM AND GREATER AUTONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS; SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAW ON RELIGIOUS FAITHS TO GIVE ATHEISTS AND BELIEVERS EQUAL RIGHTS; AND ELECTIONS.

3. (U) THE MEETING, WHICH WAS MODERATED BY PETKO SIMEONOVA (DISCUSSION CLUB, HELSINKI WATCH) INCLUDED 13 SPEAKERS, OF WHOM ONLY TWO ARE BCP MEMBERS. THEY REPRESENTED 19 INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS: THE AGRARIAN NIKOLA PETKOV GROUP, THE COMMITTEE AGAINST REPRESSION SINCE 1945, CITIZENS INITIATIVE, DEMOCRATIC FRONT, DEMOCRATIC UNION, DISCUSSION CLUB, WORKERS SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB, COMMITTEE 273, COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, CIRCLE 39 LITERARY AND ARTISTIC UNION, INDEPENDENT SOCIETY, INDEPENDENT STUDENTS SOCIETY, ECOGLASNOST, BULGARIAN LITERARY GROUP, PODKREPA, HELSINKI WATCH, RADICAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE.
4. (U) ZHELO ZHELOV, WHO WAS Elected PResident of the Union of Democratic Forces, led the Speeches by saying that the Removal of Zhivkov was only the first necessary step in reforms. This was met by loud chants of "More, more." When he added that Zhivkov and his already-ousted cronies were not the only guilty ones in the party, the crowd

NNNN

PAGE 01
SOFIA 06699 02 OF 05 111708Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-18 NRRC-01 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PKS-01 P-02
/085 W

P 111651Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8836
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

SECTION 02 OF 05 SOFIA 06699

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: 70,000 DEMONSTRATE IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MEETING

SHOUTED, "EVERYONE, EVERYONE." HE THEN CALLED FOR EXTENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS, FULL CULTURAL, JOURNALISTIC, AND IDEOLOGICAL GLASNOST, ABOLITION OF ARTICLE I, CREATION OF A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, AND ABOLITION OF THE STATE COUNCIL.
5. (U) YANKO YANKOV, WHO WAS RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY WHEN INTRODUCED AS A FORMER POLITICAL PRISONER, SAID, "THE POLITICAL EXPRESSIONS OF PETUR MLADENOV TO DATE SHOW THAT HE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO LESSEN SOCIAL TENSION AND TAKE THE EDGE OFF OF PRESSURE FROM THE OPPOSITION, BUT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDS, CATEGORICALLY, TO TEAR DOWN ZHVIVOISM AS A KIND OF NEO-STALINISM." "THE WAY OUT IS CALLED DEMOCRACY," HE CONTINUED.

6. (U) KAMEN VODENICHAROV, A DRAMA STUDENT REPRESENTING THE VARIOUS INDEPENDENT STUDENT GROUPS, CALLED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF MILITARY SERVICE. MARCO GANCHEV (HELSTINKI WATCH CHAIRMAN, DISCUSSION CLUB, BCP MEMBER) CALLED FOR CULTURAL AND JOURNALISTIC FREEDOMS.

7. (U) MIHAIL UVANOV, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NEWLY FORMED COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL (TURKISH-BULGARIAN) RECONCILIATION, SAID THAT ALL MUST WORK TOGETHER FOR THE FUTURE TO CREATE AN ATMOSHERE OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ETHNIC BULGARIANS AND ETHNIC TURKS. ALL SHOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN NAMES, RELIGION, CULTURE, AND LANGUAGE, HE SAID.

8. (U) FATHER KRISTOFER SUBEV REPEATED HIS COMMITTEE FOR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS' DEMANDS AS PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 7 DECEMBER: REMOVAL OF THE PARTY FROM CONTROL OVER CHURCH AFFAIRS, FREEDOM OF WORSHIP AND RELIGION, ACCESS TO THE MASS MEDIA, PRINTING OF BIBLES, RETURN OF CONFISCATED CHURCH PROPERTY, AND ENTITLEMENT TO OPERATE SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS.

OPENED. HE ALSO CALLED FOR FORMATION OF A NEW "NUREMBERG PROCESS" TO TRY "INTERNATIONAL TOTALITARIANISM." (NOTE: VASILEV WAS EXPELLED FROM HIS SOFIA UNIVERSITY JOB AND FROM THE BCP. ALONG WITH TWO OTHER PROFESSORS AND THE RECTOR NIKOLA POPOV, AT THE END OF 1987. ALL WERE RESTORED IN NOVEMBER, 1989, AFTER ZHIVKOV'S OUSTER.)


11. (U) PETUR SLABAKOV, PRESIDENT OF ECOGLASNOST, SAID THAT THE OLD COMMUNIST SYSTEM WAS STILL HEALTHY OUTSIDE OF SOFIA. "CHANGES HAVE NOT REACHED THE PROVINCES," HE SAID. HE CALLED ON THE CROWD TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR CHANGES BECAUSE "THE CRISIS IS ALL AROUND US, IN STORES, IN LINES."

12. (U) SLAVOMIR TSANKOV (CITIZENS INITIATIVE)
SECTION 03 OF 05 SOFIA 06699

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: 70,000 DEMONSTRATE IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MEETING

DESCRIBED THE BEGINNINGS OF SOBADZHIJEV'S GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT AND PREDICTED THAT THE CHANGES AT THE PLENUM AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT. GEORGI SPASOV (PODKREPA SPOKESPERSON, INDEPENDENT SOCIETY, ECOCGLASNOST, SPOKESPERSON FOR THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FORCES) READ A LETTER WHICH THE POLITBUREO SENT TWO WEEKS EARLIER TO LOCAL AND PROVINCIAL PARTY LEADERS TO ASK THAT THEY CONCENTRATE ON WORK RATHER THAN PUBLIC MEETINGS, THAT THEY PROHIBIT INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS' PARTICIPATION IN SUCH MEETINGS, AND THAT DIALOGUE WITH SUCH ORGANIZATIONS CEASE. HE CRITICIZED THE PARTY'S CHARACTERIZATION OF SUCH GROUPS AS "EXTREMISTS" WHO WANT TO "DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND LIQUIDATE THE COMMUNISTS."


HELD WITH APPROXIMATELY 3000 PEOPLE IN ATTENDANCE. THEY STOOD IN THE EXTREME COLD FOR EXACTLY ONE HOUR, THE LAST FIVE MINUTES OF WHICH THEY HELD THEIR RIGHTS HANDS IN THE AIR AND POINTED TO THE BCP BUILDING.

15. (U) ON 9 DECEMBER, APPROXIMATELY 2000 ACTIVISTS HAD MARCHED FROM SOFIA'S SOUTH PARK TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING, AROUND WHICH THEY FORMED A HUMAN CHAIN AND SHOUTED "DOWN WITH THE BCP," "DOWN WITH ARTICLE I," "NEW PARLIAMENT," "RESIGN," "ENOUGH FEAR," "GENERAL STRIKE." THEIR BANNERS INCLUDED "ZHELO ZHELEV FOR PRESIDENT" AND "MONUMENT TO THE DEAD SINCE 9 SEPTEMBER 1944." SPASOV AND

OTHERS CLAIM THAT THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS THE RESULT OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS' DECISION TO CAPITALIZE ON A DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN: THOSE ORGANIZATIONS DENY HAVING PUT UP THE POSTERS WHICH ANNOUNCED THE EVENT. IN SOUTH PARK THAT DAY, THEY DECIDED TO TURN THE DISINFORMATION ON ITS HEAD AND PRODUCED THE COUNTRY'S FIRST EXCLUSIVELY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PRO-DemOCRACY DEMONSTRATION.


17. (C) THE CROWD WAS ALSO MORE DEMANDING, AND THE ANTI-ZHIVKOV PLACARDS HAD BEEN LARGELY REPLACED WITH ANTI-PARTY AND PRO-DemOCRACY MESSAGES. THESE INCLUDED "WE WANT OUR NAMES BACK" (CARRIED BY A GROUP OF POMAKS), "END THE REPRESSIONS," "ZHELO ZHELEV," "DOWN WITH THE HEAD MUFTI," "GLASNOST TO THE MINORITIES QUESTION," AND A DRAWING OF AN HOURGLASS WITH MOST OF THE SAND LABELLED "BCP," ALREADY SIFTED TO THE BOTTOM.
SECTION 04 OF 05 SOFIA 06699

BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: 70,000 DEMONSTRATE IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MEETING

18. (C) POMAKS AND MUSLIMS WERE MORE HEAVILY
     REPRESENTED IN THIS CROWD THAN ON 18 NOVEMBER.
     THEY LED THE CROWD’S SUPPORT OF SPEAKERS’ DEMANDS
     THAT THE GOVERNMENT CONFRONT THE MINORITIES PROBLEM,
     WHICH WAS ANOTHER OF THE DAY’S MOST FREQUENTLY
     EXPRESSED THEMES. IT WAS CONFRONTED MORE DIRECTLY
     AND WAS MET WITH MORE APPLAUSE AND FEW CATCALLS
     SUCH AS THOSE WHICH MARRED THE MEETING OF 18 NOVEMBER.
     PERHAPS AS MANY AS 5000 IN THE CROWD WERE MUSLIM,
     AND THEY MADE THE FIRST PUBLIC DEMANDS IN SOFIA
     FOR CHANGING THEIR NAMES BACK TO THE ORIGINAL
     TURKISH. SEVERAL OF THEM, HOWEVER, TOLD POLEC
     CHIEF, PAO, AND POST HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER THAT
     CONFIDENTIAL
MANY POMAKS AND ETHNIC TURKS WERE STILL UNABLE TO ATTEND THE RALLY DUE TO POLICE ROADBLOCKS IN THEIR REGIONS. ONE GROUP REPORTED THAT BARRIERS AROUND GOTSE DELCHEV, WHERE SIMILAR ROADBLOCKS WERE REPORTEDLY ERECTED ON 18 NOVEMBER, HAD PREVENTED MORE THAN 1000 POMAKS FROM ATTENDING. ANOTHER GROUP REPORTED THAT A PROPOSED MEETING IN RAZGRAD HAD BEEN THWARTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON 9 DECEMBER.

19. (C) THIS MEETING ALSO PROVIDED THE FIRST PUBLIC ACCUSATION OF GUILT OF ALL OF THE BCP LEADERSHIP FOR THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC, MORAL, AND POLITICAL CRISIS. ON MANY OCCASIONS, THE CROWD TOOK THE SPEAKERS' LEADS AND SHOUTED FOR MORE DRAMATIC ACTION, AS IN THEIR DEMAND THAT ALL OF THE BCP LEADERSHIP RESIGN RATHER THAN JUST A FEW WHO WERE CLOSE TO ZHIVKOV. THEY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN FEELING THEIR WAY THROUGH WHAT CONSTITUTES PERMISSIBLE PROTEST; MANY OF THE MORE RADICAL DEMANDS, AS EXPRESSED BY TRENCHEV, ZAPRIANOV, GOGOV, AND OTHERS ON 18 NOVEMBER, WERE MET WITH SILENCE OR SPORADIC APPLAUSE. ON 10 DECEMBER, HOWEVER, THE CROWD'S RETICENCE HAD DETERIORATED, AND ITS CONFIDENCE, AS EXPRESSED IN THEIR BANNERS AND MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, HAD GROWN.

20. (C) BULGARIAN PRESS COVERAGE OF THIS EVENT WHILE REMARKABLE IN THAT IT OCCURRED AT ALL HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY BALANCED. THE MEETING WAS MENTIONED BRIEFLY ON THE EVENING NEWS, WHICH CONCENTRATED ON THE ANTI-ZHIVKOV, ANTI-ADMINISTRATIVE-COMMAND-SYSTEM THEMES. "RABOTNICHESKO DELO," IN AN ARTICLE WHICH BEGINS ON THE FIRST PAGE OF ITS

11 DECEMBER EDITION, STATES THAT "SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS" GATHERED AT THE MEETING TO LOOK FOR "AN ANSWER TO THE MOST URGENT QUESTIONS, RISING FROM THE GENERAL DESIRE FOR RADICAL DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN THE COUNTRY." THE ARTICLE STATES THAT ZHELO ZHELEV'S REMARKS, THE MORE MODERATE OF WHICH ARE QUOTED, WERE MARKED BY "HEALTHY REASON" AND "CONTAINED A LINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS." OTHER SPEAKERS, HOWEVER, WERE OFF THE MARK. IT TAKES A DIM VIEW OF THE SATURDAY (9 DECEMBER) DEMONSTRATION AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND STATES, "THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES DRAW A LINE AT THE DEMONSTRATION WHICH TOOK PLACE ON SATURDAY."
(IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHO ORGANIZED IT, BUT AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY SPOKESMAN GEORGI SPASOV GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE KNEW SOMETHING, BUT WAS HOLDING HIMSELF BACK FROM SAYING IT.) YANKO YANKOV AND SLAVOMIR TSANKOV ARE TAKEN TO TASK FOR REJECTING THE COUNTRY’S PROCESS OF RESTRUCTURING EVEN BEFORE IT UNFOLDS. "SINCE, FROM THE PODIUM, ALL WERE CHAMPIONING DEMOCRACY, INDEPENDENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND PLURALISM, WITH WHAT LOGIC DO WE ANALYZE THE CATEGORICAL APPEAL OF THE TEACHER SLAVOMIR TSANKOV FOR THEM NOT TO ACCEPT THE DECISIONS OF THE PLENUM WHICH BEGINS ON MONDAY (11 DECEMBER)?" FINALLY, "ONE ALSO CANNOT TAKE SERIOUSLY THE STATEMENT OF FATHER KRISTOFER SUBEV THAT THE HOLY SCRIPTURES CAN TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS."

21. (U) THE PRESS MENTIONS MEETINGS ELSEWHERE TOO. A RALLY "IN SUPPORT OF Restructuring, GLASNOS AND DEMOCRATIZATION" WAS HELD IN KUSTENDIL, AND BULGARIAN PRESS AGENCY ACCOUNTS MENTION THE PARTI-

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06699 05 OF 05 111710Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 OIC-02 CIAE-00
EB-00 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09
L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 PA-01 STR-18 NRRC-01 SIL-01
INRE-00 RP-10 USIE-00 SP-02 SR-06 PRS-01 P-02
/085 W

P 111651Z DEC 89
PM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8839
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSARY BRUSSELS
AMBASSARY ANKARA

SECTION 05 OF 05 SOFIA 06699
BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB. NILES
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: 70,000 DEMONSTRATE IN PRO-DEMOCRACY MEETING

CIPATION OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS. THE AGENCY ALSO COVERS A RALLY OF INFORMAL GROUPS IN BURGAS, WHERE PARTICIPANTS "WELCOMED THE EFFORTS OF THE PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP TO PURSUE A POLICY OF SOCIAL RENEWAL IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE 10 NOVEMBER PLENUM OF THE CC OF THE BCP" YET AT THE SAME TIME "VOTED NO CONFIDENCE IN THE LOCAL PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS COMMITTED NUMEROUS COMPROMISES AND ERRORS IN ITS WORK."
"RABOTNICHESKO DELO" MENTIONS MEETINGS IN NINE CITIES, INCLUDING KAZANLUK. THE CORRESPONDENT WRITES, "I DON'T KNOW WHAT WERE THE ADVANCE EXPECTATIONS OF TODAY'S MEETING, ORGANIZED BY INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATIONS FOR CITIZENS INITIATIVES, BUT THOSE

PAGE 02  SOFIA 06699 05 OF 05 111710Z

WHO HAD ASSEMBLED VERY QUICKLY BEGAN TO TURN THEIR BACKS ON THE SPEAKERS."

22. (C) REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE OFFICIAL PRESS IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DEMANDS OF THE SOFIA SPEAKERS OR EVEN TO REPORT ACCURATELY THE MOOD OF THIS, THE LARGEST CROWD OF PROTESTORS TO DATE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT, IN ONLY THREE WEEKS, THE POPULACE HAS GROWN BOLDER AND STRONGER IN ITS CALLS FOR SERIOUS PRO-DEMOCRATIE REFORMS WHICH WOULD CONSIDERABLY WEAKEN THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS MEETING ENDED WITH AN AGENDA OF ACTIVISM FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND PETKO SIMEONOVA'S CLOSING REMARK, "SEE YOU SOON." SINCE THE MEETING WAS CALLED EXPRESSLY IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTY TO MAKE MAJOR PRO-DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AT ITS 11 DECEMBER PLENUM, AS WERE THE FOUR VIGILS, IT SEEMS THAT THE "OPPOSITION" LEADERSHIP IS BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT, AS IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE PEOPLE CAN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, MAKE THE PARTY REACT TO ITS DEMANDS. END COMMENT. POLANSKY
SECRET/EXDIS

Eur Sovia R Vershbow: JSM
12/13/89 647-1554
PK: KIMMITT
S/S: EU: Cu: W. Kannan

I/S ONLY
IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

EXDIS

E-0: 32356: DECn: GADR
TAGS: VIP (BAKER, JAMES A.): PREL: UR: JS

SUBJECT: INFORMATION MEMO: MOVING FROM MALTA TO THE JUNE SUMMIT: A CHECKLIST OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES (S/S)

TO: THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: ROBERT M. KIMMITT, ACTING
FROM: EUR - CURTIS W. KANNAN, ACTING

SUBJECT: MOVING FROM MALTA TO THE JUNE SUMMIT: A CHECKLIST OF U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES

THE ATTACHED CHECKLIST SUMMARIZES THE STEPS WE WILL NEED TO TAKE TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE DISCUSSIONS IN MALTA, BOTH TO PREPARE FOR THE 1990 SUMMIT AND - MORE IMMEDIATELY - YOUR FEBRUARY MEETING WITH SHEVARDNADZE. THE LIST INCLUDES U.S. INITIATIVES AT MALTA AND OBJECTIVES WE HAVE SET WITH THE SOVIETS FOR THE SUMMIT. IT ALSO NOS TERRAS IN WHICH WE MAY NEED TO DEAL WITH NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THOSE FORESHADOWED IN THE STILLBORN DRAFT "DIRECTIVES" PAPER THAT SHEVARDNADZE GAVE YOU IN MALTA.

THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF INTERAGENCY SPARE WORK TO BE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
DONE ON THE VARIOUS ECONOMIC INITIATIVES. THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IS THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, WE MUST BE ALERT TO EFFORTS BY COMMERCE AND PERHAPS OTHERS TO LINK THE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT TO THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT) SO AS TO MAXIMIZE OUR LEVERAGE ON THE LATTER. WHILE THERE IS SOME MERIT TO THIS APPROACH, IT COULD RISK DELAYING CONCLUSION OF A COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT IF WE WERE TO LINK IT TOO TIGHTLY TO THE MORE DIFFICULT BIT NEGOTIATIONS.

AS ALWAYS, THE MOST DIFFICULT AREA WITHIN THE USG WILL BE ARMS CONTROL. IN START, WE NOT ONLY MUST OVERCOME INTERAGENCY LOGJAMS ON THE THREE ISSUES TARGETED FOR RESOLUTION IN FEBRUARY, BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES THE SOVIETS WILL RAISE, PARTICULARLY SLCNS (PERHAPS BY BEETING UP OUR DECLAMATORY APPROACH AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE PROBLEM). IN CO, WHILE IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TABLE OUR DRAFT BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT DURING THE CURRENT ROUND, WE WILL WANT TO GET IT TO THE SOVIETS EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR.

THE FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL SHOULD ALSO BE VIEWED AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE OUR DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES OFF DEAD CENTER. WE SUGGEST YOU Propose ANOTHER CYCLE OF EXPERTS' MEETINGS AT THAT TIME. GIVEN URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE USEFUL FOR BERNIE Aaronson TO MEET PAVLOV EVEN EARLIER. SIMILARLY, GIVEN THE SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON AN AFGHANISTAN TRANSITION SCHEME, YOU WANT TO BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS IN FEBRUARY (PERHAPS EVEN SKETCH OUT A TRANSITION TIMETABLE), AND POSSIBLY TAKE SOME PRELIMINARY SOUNDINGS THROUGH JUAN LEÓN MORALES. WHILE WE WANT TO AVOID ANY LINKAGE, AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN COULD, INDIRECTLY, ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO LEAN HARDER ON THE CUBANS AND SANDINISTAS.

ATTACHMENT: CHECKLIST "MOVING FROM MALTA TO THE JUNE SUMMIT"


CHECKLIST: MOVING FROM MALTA TO THE JUNE SUMMIT

ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

0 START: RESOLVE ALL SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES (AND, IF POSSIBLE, CONCLUDE A TREATY) BY THE SUMMIT. USA NEEDS TO:

-- PREPARE SECRETARY TO ENGAGE SHEVARDNADZE ON ALCMS, NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES AND TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION WITH AIM OF RESOLVING THESE ISSUES AT FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL.

-- FILL IN MAJOR GAPS IN U.S. POSITION -- NON-DEPLOYED MISSILES, RV COUNTING RULES FOR NEW MISSILE TYPES, MOBILE ICBM LIMITS (E.G. NUMBER OF MOBILE ICBM RVS TO BE ALLOWED), MOBILE VERIFICATION REGIME, DURATION, PHASING OF REDUCTIONS -- FOR TABLED BEFORE OR AT FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL.

-- PREPARE SECRETARY TO ENGAGE ON ISSUES SOVIETS WILL RAISE SUCH AS START/ABM RELATIONSHIP AND SLCMs.

-- FILL IN OTHER GAPS IN U.S. POSITION BY SECOND MINISTERIAL.

0 B AND S: NO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES SET FOR SUMMIT; OUR MAIN GOAL WILL BE TO AVOID B AND S HOLDING UP START TREATY.

-- PRESS SOVIETS TO DROP PROPOSED AGREED UNDERSTANDING THAT ABM TREATY VIOLATION IS GROUNDS FOR START WITHDRAWAL.

-- DEFLECT SOVIET PUSH IN OR OUTSIDE DKS FORUM FOR BAN ON ASAT WEAPONS.

0 NUCLEAR TESTING; COMPLETE TBT AND PNET VERIFICATION PROTOCOLS FOR SIGNATURE AT SUMMIT.

-- SHOULD BE DOABLE; THOUGH NUMEROUS TECHNICAL QUESTIONS MUST BE AGREED.

-- WILL LIKELY HAVE TO DEFLECT SOVIET EFFORTS TO ADDRESS NEXT STEPS IN NUCLEAR TESTING.

0 CHEMICAL WEAPONS: COMPLETE AND SIGN BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AT SUMMIT.
SECRET

-- NEED TO TABLE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

-- PUSH AT FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL FOR SOVIET COMMITMENT TO PURSUE BILATERAL DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT AND ACCEPT KEY ELEMENTS OF MULTILATERAL ASPECT OF UNGA INITIATIVE (E.G., RETENTION OF TWO PERCENT OF STOCKPILE PENDING ADHERENCE BY ALL CW-CAPABLE STATES) IN RETURN FOR OUR COMMITMENT TO HALT PRODUCTION BY CW CONVENTION ENTRY INTO FORCE.

-- WILL HAVE TO HANDLE SOVIET CALL FOR COMPLETING MULTILATERAL CONVENTION IN 1990-91.

0 CFE: NO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE FOR SUMMIT, BUT WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE TO COMPLETE ACCORD IN 1990.

-- NEED TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT DISCUSSIONS BEGIN ON CFE II FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

-- NEED TO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR EARLY BILATERAL ACCORD PROVIDING FOR RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN U.S. AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES OR POSSIBLE PROPOSAL FOR CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSONNEL CEILING.

0 OPEN SKIES: NO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE FOR SUMMIT, BUT WE WILL WANT TO USE BILATERAL CONTACTS TO PRESS FOR EARLY AGREEMENT.

-- BE CLEAR THAT OPEN SKIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED APART FROM OPEN LANDS, OPEN SEAS OR OPEN SPACE.

0 PROLIFERATION: MAINTAIN U.S.-SOVIET SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS ON CW, MISSILE TECH AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

-- PRESS SOVIETS TO OBSERVE MTCR EXPORT GUIDELINES.

-- USG WILL HAVE TO DECIDE IF THERE ARE OTHER DESIRABLE SPECIFIC STEPS (E.G., SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT).

0 OTHER: USG WILL HAVE TO DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND TO OTHER POSSIBLE SOVIET IDEAS FOR SUMMIT, E.G., AGREEMENT ON CUTTING MILITARY BUDGETS; AGREEMENT ON CODIFYING PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING OPENNESS IN MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
REGIONAL PROBLEMS

0. NO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES SET FOR SUMMIT, BUT SOVIETS ON NOTICE WE NEED TO MOVE OUR DIALOGUE OFF DEAD-CENTER.

-- SIDES MIGHT CONSIDER ANOTHER CYCLE OF REGIONAL EXPERTS' MEETINGS. AT FEBRUARY MINISTERIAL SECRETARY COULD PROPOSE CYCLE BE CONDUCTED FEBRUARY-APRIL.

0. WILL WANT TO KEEP PRESSURE ON MOSCOW TO USE ITS INFLUENCE TO CURB NICARAGUAN AND CUBAN SUPPORT FOR FMLN.

-- MINISTERS MEET IN FEBRUARY ON EYE OF NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS; GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSCORE OUR CONCERN THAT ELECTIONS BE FREE AND FAIR.

9. SOVIETS WILL STILL HAVE AFGHANISTAN AT TOP OF THEIR LIST.

-- WILL EITHER OR BOTH SIDES BE WILLING/ABLE TO ENGAGE ON POSSIBLE TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS? WE MAY WISH TO DEVELOP A TRANSITION PLAN AND THEN DECIDE HOW TO USE UPCOMING HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS WITH SOVIETS TO ADVANCE IT.

0. WILL WANT TO KEEP ENCOURAGING SOVIETS TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, AND TO PRESS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE MINIMUM TERMS SUGGESTED AT MALTA.

0. WE SHOULD TRY TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO PERM FIVE CONSULTATIONS ON A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT.

HUMAN RIGHTS

0. SOVIETS IN MALTA RESURFACED IDEA OF DRAWING UP A PROGRAM OF COOPERATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS.

-- FORMAL "PROGRAM" MAY NOT BE NECESSARY, BUT WE COULD CONSIDER JOINT STATEMENT AS WAS CONSIDERED AT WYOMING.
SECRET

-- SCHIFTER HAS DESIGNED COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS ENCOMPASSING RULE OF LAW, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, REVIEW OF DISPUTED POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND HUMANITARIAN/SOCIAL ISSUES INCLUDING WORKER SAFETY AND NEEDS OF HANDICAPPED.

-- THE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN OUTLINED IN LETTERS TO THE SOVIET MFA. SCHIFTER TO DISCUSS THEM FURTHER IN A MEETING WITH DIPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN ON DECEMBER 11.

0 PRESIDENT PROPOSED IN MALTA THAT USSR RESOLVE ALL DIVIDED FAMILY CASES BY THE 3RD SUMMIT.

-- SCHIFTER TO PERSUIT THIS ISSUE IN DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH ADAMISHIN, AND MAY TRAVEL TO MOSCOW BEFORE MINISTERIAL TO MEET WITH SOVIET VISA AUTHORITIES.

-- IT WILL ALSO BE ADDRESSED IN HUMAN RIGHTS WORKING GROUP AT MOSCOW MINISTERIAL.

MALTA ECONOMIC INITIATIVES

0 COMPLETING COMMERCIAL TRADE AGREEMENT AND GRANTING SOVIETS MOST-FAVORED-NATION TRADE STATUS BY 1990 SUMMIT.

-- WE NEED TO WORK OUT AN INTERAGENCY POSITION NOW IN ORDER TO START TRADE NEGOTIATIONS SHORTLY.

-- WE NEED TO WATCH FOR EFFORTS BY COMMERCE AND PERHAPS OTHERS TO LINK COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WITH THE INVESTMENT TREATY AND, THEREBY, SLOW DOWN NEGOTIATION OF FORMER.

-- WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO URGE SOVIETS TO PASS AND IMPLEMENT EMIGRATION LEGISLATION.

0 SUPPORTING OBSERVER STATUS FOR SOVIET UNION IN GATT AFTER URUGUAY ROUND.

-- WE NEED TO WORK OUT INTERAGENCY THE USC POSITION ON TYPE OF OBSERVERSHIP WE SHOULD SEEK FOR SOVIETS AND THEN CONSULT WITH OTHER GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES.

0 EXPANDING U.S.-SOVIET TECHNICAL COOPERATION.

-- WE ARE WAITING FOR SOVIET REPLY TO THE EIGHT PROPOSALS WE MADE AT MALTA.

SECRET
SECRET

-- IN MEANTIME, WE ARE DOING PRELIMINARY WORK INTERAGENCY SO THAT WE CAN MOVE QUICKLY ONCE WE HAVE SOVIET RESPONSE.

-- THERE IS HIGH-LEVEL ENTHUSIASM AROUND TOWN FROM VARIOUS AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE PROPOSALS (FTC, CEA).

0 EXPLORING WITH CONGRESS LIFTING THE LENDING RESTRICTIONS ON USG CREDITS TO SOVIET UNION AFTER A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER.

-- WE SHOULD BEGIN TO SOUND OUT CONGRESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS EVEN BEFORE A JACKSON-VANIK WAIVER, TO PAVE WAY FOR MOVING ON THIS LATER IN 1980.

0 BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (BIT).

-- WE NEED TO WORK OUT AN INTERAGENCY POSITION NOW IN ORDER TO START NEGOTIATIONS SHORTLY.

COMMERCIAL WOULD LIKE TO USE LEVERAGE AFFORDED BY NEGOTIATING COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT AT SAME TIME TO GET BEST DEAL POSSIBLE ON BIT.

0 IMPROVING TIES BETWEEN SOVIETS AND OECD AND EXPANDING EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION THROUGH ECONOMIC BASKET OF CEE.

-- WE NEED TO WORK OUT USG POSITION ON BOTH ISSUES.

-- WE THEN NEED TO CONSULT WITH OUR OECD PARTNERS ON CREATING THE CENTER FOR ECONOMIC TRANSITION, WHICH WOULD BE FORUM FOR SOVIET CONTACT WITH OECD.

-- WE ARE ALREADY CONSULTING WITH FRG AND SHOULD SOON FOLLOW UP WITH OTHER CEE PARTNERS, ABOUT STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANCE OF ECONOMIC CONFERENCE SET FOR THIS SPRING.

-- OUR OBJECTIVE AT THAT CONFERENCE WILL BE TO PROMOTE BASIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM TO CREATE PRECONDITIONS FOR STABLE AND LONG-TERM EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

-- WE WILL NEED TO DISSUADE FRG FROM ITS IDEA OF USING THIS FORUM PRIMARILY TO PROMOTE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

SECRET
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ECONOMIC PROPOSALS

0 SOVIETS PROPOSED WE "DEVELOP JOINT INITIATIVES, CONTINUE TO EXAMINE PROBLEMS OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN THE NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE AND WAY OF STEERING THEM AWAY FROM SITUATION OF CRISIS AS WELL AS THE ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT."

-- WE SHOULD REFLECT THIS ATTEMPT BY SOVIETS TO WORK TOGETHER ON SENSITIVE ISSUES WHERE THEY ARE PRONE TO POSTURE.

0 OTHER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS AT MALTA WERE LARGELY OVERTAKEN BY PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC INITIATIVES.

OPEN LANDS

0 SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED INTEREST IN "OPEN LANDS" PROPOSAL TABLED BY SECRETARY IN WYOMING.

-- EMBASSY MOSCOW IS ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN AUTHORITYATIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL.

-- EUR WILL ASK US ADMINISTRATION CHIEF OBUKHOV, DURING HIS LATE-DECEMBER VISIT TO U.S., TO AGREE TO DATE AND VENUE FOR EXPERTS' MEETING ON IMPLEMENTATION.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES

0 SOVIETS WISH QUICKLY TO IMPLEMENT 1985 GENEVA SUMMIT DECISION TO EXCHANGE CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK.

-- CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS HAVE PREVENTED U.S. FROM CARRYING OUT AN EXCHANGE. AN AMENDMENT TO RESTRICTIONS IS NOW BEFORE CONGRESS AND MAY PASS IN SPRING.

-- EUR HAS PROPOSED TO SOVIETS BEGINNING INFORMAL TALKS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF AN EXCHANGE EVEN PRIOR TO PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION. THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE LIKELY TO BEGIN IN LATE DECEMBER.
SECRET

0 HOSTING A CONFERENCE NEXT FALL TO NEGOTIATE A FRAMEWORK TREATY ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. AFTER WORKING GROUPS OF U.N.-SPONSORED INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE SUBMIT THEIR FINAL REPORT.

-- SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

-- USG COORDINATION FOR CONFERENCE IS DIVIDED BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE ADVISOR BROMLEY, NSC STAFF AND EPA ADMINISTRATOR REILLY. OES HAS LEAD IN DEPARTMENT.

-- FIRST INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN MID-DECEMBER.

0 CONVENCING AN INTERNATIONAL MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE NEXT SPRING FOR TOP-LEVEL SCIENTIFIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES.

-- PRESIDENT INVITED SOVIETS TO JOIN MEETING BY SENDING THEIR TOP OFFICIALS IN THE FIELD. SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED BUT WE EXPECT THEM TO ACCEPT

-- WE EXPECT OSTP (BROMLEY) WILL TAKE WHITE HOUSE LEAD IN ORGANIZING MEETING. IN CONJUNCTION WITH EPA (REILLY) AND STATE/SES.

-- WE EXPECT WHITE HOUSE'S APPROACH TO THIS MEETING TO BE DISCUSSED SOON BY DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL.

STUDENT EXCHANGES

0 INCREASING SIGNIFICANTLY UNIVERSITY EXCHANGES SO THAT AN ADDITIONAL 1000 AMERICAN AND 1000 SOVIET COLLEGE STUDENTS ARE STUDYING IN EACH OTHER'S COUNTRY BY BEGINNING OF 34TH SCHOOL YEAR.

-- WE FAVOR MODELING INITIATIVE AFTER FULBRIGHT PROGRAM. 1000 STUDENTS IS TARGET THAT MAY BE ADJUSTED TO ACADEMIC COMMUNITY'S ABILITY TO FURNISH CANDIDATES AND ABSORB SOVIET STUDENTS.

-- WE WILL NEED NEW FUNDING (50 MILLION DOLLARS OR MORE) AND MUST COORDINATE WITH SENATOR DORE.

-- A STEERING GROUP OF NSC AND SOV STAFF IS WORKING

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

WITH USIA TO CONSOLIDATE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS AND TO PRESENT THEM TO CONGRESS (MOREN) LATER THIS MONTH.

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01

INFO
LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DACHE
H-01 NSEQE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USTE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
PRS-01 DS-01 P-02 T-01 /051 W

P 121724Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8851
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SOFIA 06723

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMBASSADOR NILES

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: SECOND VIGIL OUTSIDE BCP HEADQUARTERS

ATTRACTS 10,000

1. SUMMARY: APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PEOPLE ATTENDED
A CANDLELIGHT VIGIL OUTSIDE BCP HEADQUARTERS ON THE
EVENING OF 11 DECEMBER. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING,
1,000 GATHERED DURING WORKING HOURS IN THE SAME
SQUARE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN PERHAPS THE MOST MOVING DEMONSTRATION TO DATE
IN SOFIA, APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PEOPLE ASSEMBLED IN
9TH OF SEPTEMBER SQUARE AFTER WORK ON 11 DECEMBER
FOR THE SECOND OF FOUR VIGILS TO ENCOURAGE
DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AT THE ONGOING BCP PLENUM. THE
SQUARE, OF WHICH THE BORDERS INCLUDE HEADQUARTERS
BUILDINGS OF THE BCP, THE STATE COUNCIL, AND THE
TOMB OF GEORGI DIMITROV, IS NORMALLY RESERVED FOR
OFFICIAL PARADES AND MANIFESTATIONS. THOUSANDS OF
THE DEMONSTRATORS LIFTED CANDLES INTO THE AIR IN THE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

DIRECTION OF BCP HEADQUARTERS, AND MANY WERE IN TEARS
AS THEY ALSO RAISED THEIR HANDS TOWARD THE BUILDING
IN THE FINAL FIVE MINUTES OF THE HOUR-LONG DEMONSTRATION.

3. THE DEMONSTRATORS, MOST OF WHOM SEEMED TO BE OF
WORKING-AGE AND DRESSED FOR WHITE-COLLAR AND SERVICE-
SECTOR WORK, CHATTED QUIETLY AMONGST THEMSELVES BUT
WERE OTHERWISE SILENT DURING THE GATHERING.

4. AFTER ANNOUNCEMENTS OF MAJOR REFORMS WERE
DELIVERED FROM THE PLENUM LATER THAT EVENING

UNCLASSIFIED
P 1217252Z DEC 89.
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8852
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: ECOGLASNOST OFFICIALLY REGISTERED AS
- LEGAL ORGANIZATION

REF: SOFIA 6183

1. (U) ON 11 DECEMBER, THE SOFIA CITY COURT
OFFICIALLY REGISTERED ECOGLASNOST AS A JURIDICAL
INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION.

2. (U) IN SO DOING, THE COURT OVERTURNED ITS
23 JUNE REFUSAL TO REGISTER THE ORGANIZATION.
The stage for the reversal had been set on
13 NOVEMBER, WHEN THE STATE PROSECUTOR (PROCURATOR)
SIdED WITH ECOGLASNOST IN ITS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME
COURT AND RETURNED THE CASE TO THE CITY COURT FOR
REHEARING (SEE REFTEL).

3. (U) THE DECISION HAS RECEIVED WIDE COVERAGE
IN THE MEDIA, INCLUDING RADIO AND TELEVISION
AND THE NEWSPAPERS "TRUD" AND "NARODNA MLADEZH."
IN ITS 12 DECEMBER EDITION, "RABOTNICHESKO DELO"
CARRIES A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE DECISION BY ECOGLASNOST
SECRETARY GEORGI AVRAMOV.

4. (C) COMMENT - IN A MEETING WITH POST PAO AND
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS ON 6 DECEMBER, ECOGLASNOST
PRESIDENT PETUR SLABAKOV CLAIMED THAT THE ORGANIZA-

Page - 1
TION NOW HAD WELL OVER 5,000 MEMBERS. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE GROUP HAS TAKEN ITS SHOW ON THE ROAD, WITH MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF THE GROUP ADDRESSING REGIONAL MEETINGS IN SUCH CITIES AS VELIKO TURNOVO, DIMITROVGRAD, STARA ZAGORA, AND BOURGAS. DR. PETUR BERON, HEAD OF THE GROUP'S "CONTROL COMMISSION," ADDRESSED GATHERINGS IN RUSE DURING THE WEEKEND OF 30-31 NOVEMBER AS THE ORGANIZATION SPREADS THE WORD IN THE PROVINCES, IT IS CERTAIN TO ENLIST MEMBERS WHO HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO JOIN A QUASI-LEGAL BODY.

5. (C) IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND DAS CURTIS KAMMAN, FULL POLITBUREU MEMBER ANDREY LUKANOV, IN OFFERING EVIDENCE THAT THE BCP WAS PREPARED TO RELINQUISH ITS ABSOLUTE MONOPOLY ON POLITICAL POWER IN THE COUNTRY, HAD PREDICTED THAT ECOGLASNOST WOULD BE REGISTERED ON 11 DECEMBER, ADDED THAT OTHER GROUPS WILL FOLLOW. END COMMENT.

POLANSKY

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***  [Redacted]
SECTION 01 OF 05 SOFIA 06725

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON EUR/EYE ON RECEIPT 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: FG0V, PREL, BU

SUBJECT: MLADENOV SUGGESTS ABOLITION OF "LEADING ROLE", SETS PARTY CONGRESS FOR MARCH, AND PROMISES FREE ELECTIONS IN 1990

REF: SOFIA 6662

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. GENERAL SECRETARY PETUR MLADENOV OUTLINED THE FUTURE COURSE OF BULGARIA IN THE OPENING PLENUM SPEECH, DECEMBER 11. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE "SERIOUS CRISIS" FACING THE NATION IN THE ECONOMIC, SOCIETAL AND COMMUNIST PARTY SPHERES, PLACING THE BLAME ON ZHIVKOV'S LEADERSHIP AND THE "COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM." HE PROPOSED WIDEROANGING RE-EXAMINATION OF VIRTUALLY EVERY ASPECT OF GOVERNMENT AND SET SEVERAL SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, SOME WITH DEADLINES.

3. AMONG THE MOST NOTEWORTHY POINTS OF MLADENOV'S SPEECH WERE:

--THE CONVENING OF AN EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS
ON MARCH 26, 1990;

--THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AFTER ADOPTING A NEW ELECTORAL LAW, BUT NO LATER THAN THE END OF MAY 1990, SHOULD SCHEDULE FREE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS;

--THE NEWLY ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND STILL DURING 1990, SHOULD EXAMINE AND APPROVE A NEW CONSTITUTION;

--A PROPOSAL FOR THE BEGINNING OF A PERMANENT, CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH ALL SOCIAL FORCES.


THE STATE OF THE NATION AND THE ECONOMY

PAGE 03

5. GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, PETUR MLADENOV, OPENED THE DECEMBER 11 PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH A LENGTHY SPEECH CHARACTERIZING THE GENERAL STATE OF THE NATION AS IN A "SERIOUS CRISIS." THE SPEECH WAS TAPE AND REBROADCAST IN ITS ENTIRETY IN PLACE OF THE EVENING NEWS THAT NIGHT.

6. MLADENOV PROVIDED A LONG LIST OF PROBLEMS INCLUDING "DEEP DEFORMATIONS IN SOCIETY," ECONOMIC STAGNATION, "FRIGHTENING GROWTH OF FOREIGN DEBT," INFLATION, CORRUPTION, "SERIOUS REVERSALS" IN SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE, ALL OF WHICH LED TO A SERIOUS LOWERING OF TRUST, ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE, IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY. HOW DID WE GET INTO THIS SITUATION, AND WHO IS TO BLAME?" MLADENOV ASKED, RHECTORICALLY. HIS READY ANSWER: THE COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (CAS) AND THE "SMALL GROUP LED BY TODOR ZHIVKOV (WHO) USURPED POWER."

7. THE CAS WAS TO BLAME FOR THE ACCUMULATION OF A NUMBER OF NEGATIVE INFLUENCES. AMONG THEM: A SLUMP IN THE PACE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH; THE DEEPENING OF SHARP DISTORTIONS IN THE ECONOMY; THE SEVERITY OF THE ACCUMULATION OF PROBLEMS IN THE FINANCIAL SPHERE;
AND THE LOWERING OF THE LEVEL OF COMPETITIVENESS
OF THE BULGARIAN ECONOMY. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY,
THE REGIME OF PERSONAL POWER FOSTERED BY ZHVkov
AND HIS CRONIES BROUGHT "VOLUNTARISM AND SUBJECTIVISM"
INTO ECONOMIC POLICY." THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WAS IGNORED. MLADENOV CHARGED

---

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06725 02 OF 05 121619Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 H-01 NSCE-00
NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01
P-02 T-01 /038 W

O 121805Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8854
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 05 SOFIA 06725

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON EUR/EBY ON RECEIPT
647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV SUGGESTS ABOLITION OF "LEADING

GRISHA FILIPOV, OGNYAN DOYNOV, STOYAN OVCHAROV,
AND PETKO DANCHEV WITH "GREAT PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY."

8. MLADENOV WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC: HE BLAMED THE
CREATION OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES FOR TURNING BULGARIA FROM A TRADITIONAL FOOD EXPORTER INTO AN IMPORTER. THE CASE CREATED CONDITIONS FOR CORRUPTION AND A "SHADOW ECONOMY" OF "DIFFERENT MAFIAS." LINES AND SHORTAGES EVERYWHERE CREATED A "BURDENSOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE." AS IT CAME TO THE END OF THE 1980’S, THE ECONOMY WAS IN A "PRE-HEART ATTACK CONDITION."

9. THE GENERAL SECRETARY OFFERED NUMEROUS IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO BEGIN TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION. THESE ARE:

--TO MAXIMIZE THE PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES AS A PRIORITY OVER PRODUCTION OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION;

--TO INCREASE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND STIMULATE CONVERSION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY;

--TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO HOUSING PROBLEMS AND PROBLEMS OF THOSE ON A MINIMUM WAGE SCALE;

--TO WORK ON A NEW, SOCIALLY JUST, INCOME POLICY WHICH WOULD OVERCOME THE TENDENCY TOWARD "LEVELLING;"

--TO BRING A CLOSER RELATION BETWEEN SALARIES AND PRODUCTION AT STATE INDUSTRY, AND A MORE REASONABLE RELATION BETWEEN INCOME AND PRICES TO AVOID INFLATION;

--TO RE-EXAMINE THE SITUATIONS OF MONEY-LOSING AND LOW PROFIT ENTERPRISES, PERHAPS CLOSING SOME OF THEM;

--TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TOURISM AS AN EARNER OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE;

--TO TAKE DRASTIC MEASURES TO STABILIZE FINANCIAL BALANCES, INCLUDING REDUCTION OF EXPENSES OF STATE ORGANIZATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL;

--TO RESTORE COOPERATIVE FARMING, LEASING OF FARMS AND ENCOURAGE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL FARMS WITH OWNERSHIP RIGHTS.
10. MORE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOALS SUGGESTED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY INCLUDE OVERCOMING THE VIEW THAT SOCIALISM AND A MARKET ECONOMY ARE INCOMPATIBLE. PROVIDING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ALL FORMS (OF OWNERSHIP OF) PROPERTY, GUARANTEEING "SOCIALIST JUSTICE" IN A MARKET ECONOMY, DETERMINING AN OPTIMAL RATIO BETWEEN INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC UNITS AND THOSE WHICH WILL REMAIN UNDER STATE DIRECTION, AND DEVELOPING "PRODUCTION DEMOCRACY" AND "SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT."

RESTRUCTURING IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

O 121805Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECR STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8855
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
DIA WASHDC
AMBASSADY ANKARA
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 0F 05 SOFIA 06725

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON EUR/EYE ON RECEIPT
647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV SUGGESTS ABOLITION OF "LEADING

12. CALLING THE RECENT COUNTRY-WIDE MASS DEMONSTRATIONS
AND MEETINGS A "MOST IMPORTANT EXPRESSION OF THE
STRIVING OF THE PEOPLE FOR WHOLESALE RENEWAL,"
MLADENOV CITRES THE NEED FOR A NEW POLICY OF THE PARTY
AND STATE TOWARD PUBLIC GROUPS AND MOVEMENTS.
HE NOTES THAT WHILE CERTAIN FORCES, IF GIVEN THE
FREEDOMS THEY ASK, WOULD PLUNGE SOCIETY INTO
"ANARCHY AND TRAGEDY," THE POLITBURO BELIEVES THE
BULGARIAN SOCIETY AND PEOPLE ARE SUFFICIENTLY MATURE
TO NOT PERMIT THEIR SOCIETY TO BE THROWN "INTO

CATACLYSM." HE ADDS THAT SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IS POSSIBLE ONLY BASED ON "DEMOCTRATIZATION OF SOCIALISM"
AND THROUGH THE CONFIRMATION OF THE "PRINCIPLE OF
PLURALISM."

13. THE MAIN TASK IS THE REFORM OF THE COUNTRY'S
LEGISLATION. THE REFORM MUST INCORPORATE THE
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND CONSTRUCT A "CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZED
SOCIETY." MLADENOV CALLED FOR THE QUICK CREATION
OF LAWS ON "GATHERINGS, MEETINGS, DEMONSTRATIONS,
ASSOCIATIONS OF CITIZENS, PRESS, RELIGIONS, AND
OHERS." HE ALSO SPOKE OF CRIMINAL LAW REFORM WHICH
WOULD INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL "FROM THE
BEGINNING OF AN INVESTIGATION."

14. TURNING BRIEFLY TO A TIIINLY VEILED MENTION OF
THE ETHNIC TURKISH ISSUE, MLADENOV NOTED THE PARTY
LEADERSHIP WAS CONSCIOUS OF A "DIFFICULT PROBLEM".
IT IS "CONNECTED WITH ESTABLISHED TENSIONS AGAINST
A PART OF OUR POPULATION, A WELL KNOWN NUMBER OF
WHICH LEFT THE COUNTRY DURING THIS YEAR." THE POLITBURO,
HE SAID, BELIEVES IT WOULD BE WELL FOR THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE TO ENGAGE IN A "DEEP AND ALL-SIDED ANALYSIS
OF THIS PROBLEM" AND ON THIS BASIS, PROPOSE MANNERS
OF ITS RESOLUTION.

15. MLADENOV THEN TOOK THE INTERIOR MINISTRY TO
TASK. THE ORGANS OF THE MINISTRY MUST UNDERGO A
RE-EXAMINATION OF FUNCTIONS IN THE PROCESS OF
RESTRUCTURING. THE MINISTRY MUST CONCENTRATE ITS
EFFORTS ON THE DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PRESERVATION OF SOCIETAL

PAGE 03  SOFIA 06725  03 OF 05  121621Z

LAW, ORDER, AND CITIZENS' FREEDOMS.

THE LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY, A NEW CONSTITUTION,
AND ELECTIONS

16. THE GENERAL SECRETARY THEN STATED THAT THE NEW,
LAWFUL SOCIALIST STATE WAS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT A
NEW CONSTITUTION. A GENERAL DISCUSSION SHOULD
DECIDE ALL QUESTIONS OF LIFE IN THE COUNTRY, INCLUDING
BASIC RIGHTS, FREEDOMS AND OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENS
AND GUARANTEES FOR THEM. IT WAS "IN THIS LIGHT,"
HE CONTINUED, THAT BULGARIA "MUST APPROACH ARTICLE
1 OF THE CONSTITUTION," WHICH MANDATES A LEADING
ROLE TO THE BCP. HE STATED, "IN A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY THE ROLE OF A GIVEN PARTY CANNOT BE POSTULATED,
CANNOT BE SPECIFIED IN A COMMANDED WAY. IT MUST BE
THE SINGULAR RESULT OF THE TRUST OF THE PEOPLE."

17. HE CONTINUED, SAYING THAT, PARALLEL TO THE
PREPARATION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND BEFORE THE
NEW PACKAGE OF LEGAL REFORMS WAS READY, AN ELECTORAL
LAW MUST BE DRAFTED AND ACCEPTED, WHICH WILL CREATE
THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR FREE AND DEMOCRATIC
ELECTIONS. "WITHOUT ANY DOUBT, THE NEXT ELECTIONS,
WHICH WE PROPOSE TAKE PLACE DURING 1990, WILL BE
ACTIVELY FREE AND DEMOCRATIC."

REFORM OF THE PARTY

18. THE REMAINDER OF MLADENOV'S SPEECH CONCERNED
ITSELF WITH THE URGENT NEED TO REFORM THE PARTY.
"WE CAN SAY WITH CERTAINTY THAT RENOVATION OF THE COUNTRY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT RENOVATION OF THE PARTY." THE PARTY MUST REGAIN ITS POSITION WITH POLITICAL MEANS, HE SAID, AND MUST GIVE UP THE COMMAND ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS IN PARTY LIFE, AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH SOCIETY AND THE STATE. HE CALLED FOR "BROAD GLASNOST" IN THE PARTY AND FOR A HIGH "IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL, MORAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STATUS" IN THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP. THE PARTY, HE SAID, HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IMMEDIATELY IN THE RULE OF THE STATE AND IN ITS DIRECTION, THROUGH CONFIDENTIAL
THE LEGAL, PARLIAMENTARIAN REGIME. THE PARTY STATUTE SHOULD PROHIBIT NEPOTISM. IT SHOULD ALSO ESTABLISH A TWO TERM LIMIT FOR HIGH PARTY POSITIONS.

19. MLADENOV EXPLAINED THAT THE NOVEMBER 10 PLENUM BROUGHT NOT JUST A CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP FROM ONE PERSONALITY TO ANOTHER BUT RATHER A CHANGE OF POLICY AND PARTY LINE. IT MARKED THE BEGINNING OF REAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE RENOVATION OF SOCIALISM IN BULGARIA. THE CAS IS ABSOLUTELY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE GOALS AND VALUES OF SOCIALISM, AND THIS "VICIOUS SYSTEM WHICH DOOMED THE PEOPLE TO ISOLATION AND SUBORDINATION" IS NOW SLATED FOR "FINAL LIQUIDATION."

AN EIGHT POINT PLAN

------------------------

20. FINALLY, MLADENOV MADE THE FOLLOWING EIGHT PROPOSALS AND DEADLINES:

--THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SHOULD CONVENE AN EXTRAORDINARY BCP CONGRESS ON 26 MARCH 1990;

--THE PARTY SHOULD INITIATE ACTION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AFTER IT ADOPTS THE NEW ELECTION LAW, BUT NO LATER THAN THE END OF MAY, 1990, TO SCHEDULE DEMOCRATIC, FREE ELECTIONS;

--THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ON THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENTAL PROPOSALS, SHOULD, AT ITS JANUARY SESSION, EXAMINE A SYSTEM OF MEASURES AIMED AT STABILIZING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, SOLVING THE MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND DRASTICALLY REDUCING STATE EXPENDITURES;

--THE NEWLY ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND AS EARLY AS 1990, EXAMINE AND APPROVE A NEW CONSTITUTION;

--BASED ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, WORK SHOULD BEGIN ON A LARGE-SCALE LEGISLATIVE REFORM, WHICH SHOULD ESTABLISH THE LEGAL BASES OF ALL SPHERES OF NATIONAL LIFE, INCLUDING ECONOMIC, SOCIOPOLITICAL, AND INTELLECTUAL SPHERES;

--BY THE END OF 1990, BASIC LAWS SHOULD BE ADOPTED TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC REFORM, INCLUDING A LAW OF
PROPERTY, A LAW OF THE LAND, AND A LAND-USE LAW,

--THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD ESTABLISH A BROADLY
BASED COMMISSION TO EXAMINE CORRUPTION AND ABUSE OF
POWER; AND

--A PERMANENT, CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE SHOULD BEGIN
WITH ALL SOCIAL FORCES STANDING IN THE POSITIONS OF
SOCIALISM, THE LAWFUL STATE, AND PATRIOTISM.

COMMENT
-------

21. THE CLEAR SUGGESTION THAT THE BCP WILL PERMIT
THE ABOLITION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED PRIMACY
AND THE PROMISE OF FREE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS SOME-
TIME IN 1990, ARE UNMISTAKEABLE SIGNALS THAT MLADENOV
IS SERIOUS ABOUT REFORM. THERE IS CONSIDERABLE
CONFUSION ABOUT THE DATE SPECIFIED FOR ELECTIONS,
AND WE NOTE THAT MANY WESTERN NEWS AGENCIES HAVE
OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON EUR/EY ON RECEIPT 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC – AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: MLADENOV SUGGESTS ABOLITION OF “LEADING

INTERPRETED THE PLENUM AS CALLING FOR ELECTIONS NO LATER THAN MAY. THE ACTUAL LANGUAGE USED IS UNCLEAR, BUT WE READ IT TO SAY THAT THE MAY DEADLINE IS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF ELECTIONS AND NOT FOR THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. WE WILL CLARIFY THIS POINT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

22. MANY OF MLADENOV’S ECONOMIC PROPOSALS ARE ALSO NOTEWORTHY FROM A REFORM POINT OF VIEW. THE NEW EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER GOODS IS A FOLLOW-UP TO MLADENOV’S PLEDGE TO PUT MAN AND HIS BASIC NEEDS AT


23. THE GENERAL SECRETARY’S PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT POLITICAL REFORM MUST ACCOMPANY ECONOMIC REFORM, HIS EXPRESSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL MATURITY OF THE PEOPLE AND HIS ENDORSEMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY’S EFFORTS TOWARD LEGAL REFORMS ARE ALL WELCOME STEPS AWAY FROM THE ZHIVKOV ERA AND INTO REALITY. HIS CALL FOR A PERMANENT DIALOGUE WITH ALL SOCIAL FORCES WAS PRETENTIOUSLY TARGETED AT THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS. IF THIS TRULY COMES TO PASS, THEY SHOULD BE PLEASED, SINCE THIS WAS ONE OF THEIR MAJOR DEMANDS AT THE DECEMBER 10 RALLY.

24. FINALLY, THE HIGH-LEVEL FIRING OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH ISSUE IN ALL BUT NAME AND THE COMMITMENT TO FIND SOLUTIONS IS EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT. PERHAPS THE
MUCH MORE TOLERANT ATTITUDE DISPLAYED ON THIS MATTER
BY THE CROWDS OF DECEMBER 10 CONVINCED MLADENOV
THAT HE COULD TAKE WHAT WE STILL BELIEVE MUST HAVE
BEEN A DIFFICULT STEP. ALTHOUGH THE ANALYSIS CALLED
FOR WAS NOT GIVEN A TIMEFRAME, IT MAY HELP CONVINCE
ANKARA THAT THE MLADENOV GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO RE-
SOLVE THIS ISSUE AND IS SERIOUS ABOUT NEGOTIATING
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

25. CONCERNING THE APPARENT LACK OF
CLARITY ABOUT WHEN
ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD, AGRARIAN PARTY SECRETARY TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR DEC. 12 THAT WHETHER IT WAS WISE OR NOT, MLADENOV
MEANT ELECTIONS BY THE END OF MAY 1990 (CONVERSATION BEING
REPORTED SEPTEL). POLANSKY
P R 120318Z DEC 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

STATE 394758

E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BU, TU
SUBJECT: ALEKSANDROV TOUTS BULGARIAN REFORM

1. [REDACTED] - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A 25-MINUTE MEETING WITH UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS KIMMITT, BULGARIAN STATE COUNCIL MEMBER CHUDOMIR ALEKSANDROV EXPRESSED HIS ENTHUSIASM FOR THE CONTINUING PROGRAM OF REFORM TAKING PLACE IN BULGARIA AND POINTED TO THE POLITBURO PERSONNEL DECISIONS ANNOUNCED THAT DAY AS EVIDENCE THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD.

3. SUMMARY CONTINUED: ALEKSANDROV ALSO MET WITH OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, ENERGY AND

PAGE 02

INTERIOR, AND IN THE ECONOMICS BUREAU (REPORTED SEPTEL). THE BULGARIAN AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ALL MEETINGS HAD GONE VERY WELL. END SUMMARY.

COMMITMENT TO CHANGE EMPHASIZED

4. CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON GEOLOGY AND STATE COUNCIL MEMBER CHUDOMIR ALEKSANDROV MET ON DECEMBER 8 WITH UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ROBERT...
KIMMITT. ALEKSANDROV EMPHASIZED THE DEEP COMMITMENT OF BULGARIAN LEADER MLADENOV TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM AND SAID THAT THE PERSONNEL CHANGES ANNOUNCED AT THE PLENUM THAT DAY WERE EVIDENCE THAT PROGRESS WOULD CONTINUE. HE SAID THAT, WITH PERSONNEL ISSUES RESOLVED, THE MONDAY PLENUM WOULD BE ABLE TO ADDRESS ITSELF TO OTHER QUESTIONS, SUCH AS BULGARIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THE NEXT MAJOR EVENT WOULD BE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETING ON DECEMBER 14, WHEN MEASURES WOULD BE TAKEN TO BRING BULGARIA'S LAWS IN LINE WITH ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE HELSINKI ACCORDS. ONE MEASURE EXPECTED TO BE APPROVED WAS AN AMNESTY FOR PEOPLE IMPRISONED ON POLITICAL GROUNDS. WHILE THERE WERE VERY FEW PEOPLE IMPRISONED FOR POLITICAL REASONS IN BULGARIA IN ANY CASE, ALEKSANDROV MAINTAINED, IT WAS NOW TIME "TO END THIS INHERITANCE."

5. ALEKSANDROV SAID THAT THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE HIS COUNTRY FACED WAS ECONOMIC REFORM. POLITICAL REFORM WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY (ALTHOUGH THE PEOPLE HAD COME TO EXPECT RAPID PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, AND IT WOULD BE HARD TO LIVE UP TO THEIR EXPECTATIONS). IF, TWO YEARS AGO, THE LEADERSHIP HAD BEGUN TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC

PAGE 03 STATE 394758

DECISIONS MADE THEN, THE ECONOMY WOULD BE MUCH BETTER NOW, BUT INSTEAD IT HAD DETERIORATED.

6. ALEKSANDROV DETAILED SOME OF THE RECENT CHANGES WHICH SHOWED THAT SOFIA WAS COMMITTED TO REFORM. HE PARTICULARLY HIGHLIGHTED THE RISE OF NEW INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DECISION BY THE AGRARIAN UNION TO DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENT PROGRAM. HE SAID THAT THE GRASS ROOTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT WERE BOTH WORKING FOR CHANGE, AND THAT EVEN RELIGIOUS FORCES (INCLUDING MUSLIMS) WOULD BE ALLOWED TO FIND THEIR PLACE IN THE PROCESS. HE COMPARED THE PROCESS TO A GENTLE LET OUT OF THE BOTTLE--THERE WAS NO WAY TO FORCE IT BACK IN.

MLADENOV SENDS PERSONAL THANKS

----------------------------------------------------------

7. ALEKSANDROV SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH MLADENOV ON NOVEMBER 29 TO DISCUSS HIS TRIP IN THE U.S. MLADENOV HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY TO THE USG THAT THE GOB WAS "ABOVE ALL HAPPY TO SEE THE U.S. REACTION TO THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN INITIATED SINCE NOVEMBER 10. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT." MLADENOV WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED BY THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS SENT BY PRESIDENT BUSH; ALEKSANDROV SAID THAT "BULGARIA HASN'T HAD SUCH A MESSAGE FROM THE U.S. SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II." HE REITERATED THE GOB'S INTEREST IN MOVING
AHEAD ON IMPROVED RELATIONS AND THE REMOVAL OF ALL OBSTACLES TO INCREASED TRADE. HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS ON GATT MEMBERSHIP, MFN, A DOUBLE-TAXATION TREATY, AND AN EASING OF COCOM RESTRICTIONS.

IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO IMPROVED RELATIONS

8. THE UNDERSECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO

PAGE 04 STATE 394758

HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WELCOME ALEKSANDROV TO WASHINGTON AND TO HEAR HIS VIEWS ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN HIS COUNTRY. THE UNDERSECRETARY AGREED THAT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP A BETTER BILATERAL RELATION INCLUDING, EVENTUALLY, A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN THE CURRENT U.S. POSITION ON ISSUES SUCH AS GATT MEMBERSHIP AND A WAIVER OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. HOWEVER, THERE REMAINED ONE SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO IMPROVED RELATIONS, AND THIS WAS THE TREATMENT OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH AND MUSLIM MINORITIES. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE GOB WOULD ADDRESS THIS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT DID NOT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S. AND BULGARIA TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. ANY CHANGE ON ISSUES LIKE MFN WOULD REQUIRE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND CONGRESS, AND BOTH WOULD NEED TO BE SATISFIED ON THIS ISSUE.

9. ALEKSANDROV ASSURED THE UNDERSECRETARY THAT MEASURES ADDRESSING THIS PROBLEM WERE BEING CONSIDERED. FIRST OF ALL, BULGARIA DESIRED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, AND WAS WORKING TOWARD THAT END. INTERNALLY, ALSO, THERE WOULD BE NO MORE "LIMITATIONS"--BULGARIAN WAS READY FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THEY NEEDED SOME TIME TO WORK OUT THIS PROBLEM.

10. ALEKSANDROV EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE UNDERSECRETARY AND DISCUSS THE REFORMS UNDERWAY IN SOFIA.

11. BIO NOTE: ALEKSANDROV ASKED THE UNDERSECRETARY TO CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY (WITH WHOM

PAGE 05 STATE 394758

THE MEETING WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED), AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT HE WOULD SEE BOTH MR. KINMITT AND MR.
EAGLEBURGER AGAIN, EITHER IN WASHINGTON OR IN SOFIA, ADDING, "I'M NOT SO OLD, YOU KNOW, AND I HOPE I MAY BE RESUSCITATED. I SEE TODAY THAT A COLLEAGUE OF MINE WAS" (REFERRING TO THE APPOINTMENT TO THE POLITBUREU OF ALEKSANDER LILOV, DEMOTED BY ZHIVKOV IN 1983 AS ALEKSANDROV WAS IN 1988). KIMMITT

NNNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***  [Redacted]
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01    SOFIA 06745 131223Z

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
           NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-02
           OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNIE-01 PRS-01 P-02
           /038 W

R 131038Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECONS ESTATE WASHDC 0861
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SOFIA 06745
BRUSSELS FOR USEC AMB NILES
MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PHUM BU
SUBJECT: FOURTH VIGIL AT COMMUNIST HEADQUARTERS DRAWS
12,000

REF: A) SOFIA 6723, B) SOFIA 6699

1. THE FOURTH AND LAST SCHEDULED VIGIL OUTSIDE BCP
   HEADQUARTERS ATTRACTED THE LARGEST CROWD. APPROXIMATELY
   12,000 PEOPLE STOOD IN 9TH OF SEPTEMBER SQUARE FOR ONE
   HOUR AT 1700 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 12 DECEMBER.

2. AT THE END OF THE GATHERING, FATHER KRISTOFER SUBEV,
   WHO HAD AGAIN POSITIONED HIMSELF PROMINENTLY IN THE
   HIGHEST CORNER OF THE CROWD, THANKED THE CROWD FOR COMING
   AND ASKED THEM TO RETURN AT 1700 HOURS ON 14 DECEMBER, THE
   FIRST DAY OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, AND FORM A
   HUMAN RING AROUND THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING. (IN A MORE
   UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02    SOFIA 06745 131223Z

SPONTANEOUS DEMONSTRATION, A CROWD OF 2000 FORMED SUCH A
RING AND CHANTED ANTI-COMMUNIST SLOGANS ON 9 DECEMBER
(REPTEL B), BUT, AFTER THE EVENT WAS CRITICIZED IN THE
OFFICIAL MEDIA FOR ITS SEVERE TONE, ACTIVISTS SUCH AS
GEORGI SPASOV (INDEPENDENT SOCIETY, ECOGLASNOST, PODKREPA
OFFICIAL SPOKESPERSON, AND UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES
OFFICIAL SPOKESPERSON) AND DR. PETUR BERON (ECOGLASNOST
CONTROL COMMISSION AND UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES
SECRETARY) DISSOCIATED THEMSELVES AND THEIR GROUPS FROM IT.
3. THE INITIATIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE "HUMAN RING" INCLUDES
SUBEV, BERON, BOIKO PROICHEV (INDEPENDENT SOCIETY,
HELSEINKI WATCH, PODREPA), ZHELO ZHELEV (DISCUSSION CLUB,
PRESIDENT OF UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES), DR. KONSTANTIN
TRENCHEV (LEADER OF PODREPA, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES,
ET AL.), PETKO SIMEONOV (DISCUSSION CLUB, UNION OF
DEMOCRATIC FORCES, HELSEINKI WATCH), RUMEN VODENICHAROV
(CHAIRMAN OF INDEPENDENT SOCIETY), YANKO YANKOV (HELSEINKI
WATCH LEGAL ADVISER, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES, WORKERS
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY), AND 18 OTHERS.

4. THE COMMITTEE'S HANDOUT STATES THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE
DEMONSTRATION IS TO VOICE THE PEOPLE'S OBJECTIONS TO THE
DICTATORSHIP OF THE NOMENKLATURA, WHICH "IS Unable TO
MANAGE THE PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY. WITHOUT THE REFUSAL
OF THE BCP OF ITS MONOPOLY ON POWER, WITHOUT SEPARATION OF
THE PARTY FROM THE STATE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSTRUCT A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IN OUR COUNTRY."

5. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, THE THIRD AND FOURTH VIGILS AND THE
PLANNED HUMAN RING HAVE RECEIVED NO LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE
SO FAR. POLANSKY
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ESTEEMED MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY,

In reality, our economy is in a very dire situation. The diagnosis of the disease was very precisely defined at the last Plenum of the Central Committee. There is no doubt that everyone is responsible for allowing the government of Socialist Bulgaria to become absolutist and autocratic. Everyone who has participated in the totalitarian machine, regardless of the field in which he or she has worked, is culpable to one degree or another for the grave deformations in the society and the economy of the country.

I do not underrate or hide my own political and personal culpability. First, I admit responsibility that, as a former member of the Politburo, I voted for the dismissal of many capable comrades whose main fault consisted in the fact that Todor Zhivkov saw in them rivals and pretenders for his position. The fact that I am not aware of even one occasion during the whole period that I was in the government when someone stood up or voted against such unjust dismissals does not excuse me.

Second, I cannot help but be ashamed that, together with others, I have participated in the panegyric praising of Todor Zhivkov’s personality, virtues, and achievements.

Third, I bear a distinct guilt that I did not stand up against the unjust decisions concerning the life and plight of the Bulgarian Muslims. No one has given us the right to determine by decree their ethnic origin and to deprive them of the freedom to choose their own names. The sacred democratic right of every individual to be a member of the ethnic group that he or she believes they belong to cannot be abolished. So many family and personal tragedies were created that we will not be able to wash away the shame and disgrace of these deeds in the near future.

Fourth, I definitely do not wish to overlook my own responsibility for the sectors of which I was specifically in charge, because it is precisely my work there and the modest contribution that I made in those sectors that justifies my conscience for remaining a politburo member for 11 years. [...] His [Todor Zhivkov’s] true attitude towards me started showing strongly and openly after the end of 1985. He began to prepare my dismissal. He and his retinue endeavored for three whole years to manipulate public opinion through improbable rumors about me that were spread according to instructions by the centers for disinformation at the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. It was alleged, and always from “reliable sources,” that I possessed several luxurious villas each of which were worth hundreds of thousands of dollars; that I had a great deal of money, foreign currency; that I took bribes; and many other [allegations].

In less than three years after 1986, it was decided that I would be removed from various positions as each time I was demoted to a lower and lower rank and a narrower field of specialization. Two out of five such decisions were never realized because they were revoked. I remained for more than 5 months without a work appointment. Eventually, I was appointed chairman of one of the numerous associations. [...]

Letter by Ognyan Doynov to Delegates of the People’s Assembly,

13 December 1989
We know in whose hands the entire legislative and executive power of the country was concentrated and to whom the responsibility for managing the economy was entrusted. This was and still is Georgy Atanasov. Did Todor Zhivkov take away all his rights and leave him in a limbo? Is it not his responsibility above all for everything that happened, even for the endless reorganizations which led to chaos in the economy? Was he not the person who dismissed many capable economic activists by falsifying their actual economic results. We all remember the case of Ivan Andonov from Farmahim.

Much could be said about his economic incompetence and primitivism in working in the economic field.

I also want to address A. Lukanov and to ask him whether he feels himself the main culprit for the tremendous increase in the foreign debt. Who managed the currency commission? The privileged and Todor Zhivkov’s retinue lined up to run this commission: Todor Zhivkov, Grisha Philipov, Georgy Atanasov. Invariably, Andrei Lukanov was either its chairman or its operative manager. [...] I propose that G. Atanasov, A. Lukanov, and P. Pachov immediately hand in their resignation from all posts and duties currently occupied in order to avoid being disgracefully expelled later. [...] I have spoken seriously and made serious accusations. I am prepared to answer to them. Those who accused me of being one of Todor Zhivkov’s retinue should not hide behind anonymity, behind the flag of the Party and the country. I do not call for revenge, but for justice. Hatred is a destructive force. We need love and optimism now in order to go forward. In the past, there was a ready scenario for a speech such as mine. The voters were advised to request a recall of their people’s representative. This was followed by prison and, as a result of the imprisonment, a lack of access to any documents with which a person could defend himself or herself.

Let us now see how this matter will be dealt with in democratic conditions. Now, if we want the new-born democracy to survive, I propose that a parliamentary commission with the wide participation of public organizations and the mass media hears out everyone who is being accused or has something to say. In this way the members of Todor Zhivkov’s retinue could be revealed as well as the real culprits responsible for the present situation. Justice could be served only by uncorrupt people who will not take advantage of their power in order to hide their own shame and disgrace.

All of us who worked in the days of Todor Zhivkov, both good and bad, ought to leave and give way to new and young people, morally and mentally unburdened by the horrid deformations which we lived through.

13 December 1989
Ognyan Doynov

[Source: Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]
R 141254Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8883
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 06781

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: NEW AGRARIAN LEADER DISPLAYS RELUCTANCE TO
-CHALLENGE COMMUNIST PARTY POLICIES

REF: A) SOFIA 6678, B) SOFIA 6701

1. [Elided text]

2. SUMMARY. IN A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, NEW
BULGARIAN AGRARIAN PARTY (BANU) LEADER ANGEL DIMITROV
SAID THAT HIS JOB WAS TO INITIATE PEREjestoika IN HIS
PARTY AND END ITS ROLE AS A "SATELLITE" OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY. HOWEVER, HE DISPLAYED SOME RELUCTANCE TO
CHALLENGE THE BCP ON ITS DECISIONS REGARDING NEW
POLICY PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRY, AND MOST OF THE
AGRARIAN POLICY INITIATIVES HAVE ALREADY BEEN CO-OPTED
BY THE BCP IN ITS PLENARY MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. ON 12 DECEMBER, AMBASSADOR AND POLICE OFFICER CALLED
ON ANGEL DIMITROV, WHO REPLACED PETUR TANCHEV AS
AGRARIAN PARTY HEAD ON 2 DECEMBER (REFELS A & B).
DIMITROV REVEALED THAT BANU WILL, LIKE THE BCP, HOLD
A SESSION OF ITS SUPREME COUNCIL ON 22 DECEMBER, AND,
ALSO LIKE THE BCP, HOLD A PARTY CONGRESS IN 1990. He
CLAIMED THAT BANU HAD PLANNED TO HOLD ITS CONGRESS
BEFORE THE BCP CONGRESS, BUT THAT THE AGRARIANS HAD
NOW BEEN PRE-EMPTED BY THE BCP DECISION TO MEET ON
26 MARCH (NOTE: THIS DATE HAS SINCE BEEN CHANGED

Page - 1
AGAIN TO 19 MARCH). HE THEN HINTED THAT BANU MIGHT STILL TRY TO HOLD ITS CONGRESS BEFORE THE BCP'S.

PARTY OFFICIALS ARE NOW WORKING ON THREE PROJECTS: A NEW PARTY PLATFORM, A NEW CHARTER, AND A PROGRAM TO CELEBRATE THE AGRARIAN PARTY'S 90TH ANNIVERSARY. THE PARTY WILL ALSO MAKE FURTHER CHANGES IN ITS LEADERSHIP.

UNITING AGRARIAN FACTIONS

4. TANCHEV SAID HE WAS TRYING TO REUNITE THE VARIOUS AGRARIAN GROUPS UNDER THE BANNER OF HIS PARTY. HE SAID HE WANTED ALL OF THESE FACTIONS TO REALIZE THAT THIS "IS OUR GREATEST, ONLY CHANCE" TO BECOME A POLITICAL FORCE IN THE COUNTRY. HE HAD ALREADY MET WITH MEMBERS OF ONE OF THE NIKOLA PETKOV GROUP'S TWO FACTIONS AND PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE OTHER ON 14 DECEMBER.

SECOND, THE PARTY HAD ALREADY INCLUDED THREE MEMBERS OF THE 90-PERSON AGRARIAN INITIATIVE GROUP ON ONE OF ITS PARTY COMMISSIONS.

5. THIRD, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, DIMITROV SAID HE WANTED TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE WITH TODOR KAVALJIEV.

WHO HAS FORMED ANOTHER INITIATIVE GROUP IN STARA ZAGORA. HE HAS ALREADY MET WITH MOST OF THE LEADERS OF THIS GROUP. DIMITROV SAID KAVALJIEV WANTS TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PARTY; ADOLISH ARTICLE 1 OF THE BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION, WHICH GUARANTEES THE SUPREMACY OF THE BCP; REHABILITATE PETKOV AND OTHER REPRESSED AGRARIANS; AND ESTABLISH AGRARIAN WORKERS' PENSIONS AND SOCIAL BENEFITS WHICH ARE COMMENSURATE WITH THOSE IN OTHER SECTORS. DIMITROV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT KAVALJIEV HAD ORGANIZED A MASS MEETING IN STARA ZAGORA ON DECEMBER 2, AND DID NOT DISPUTE THAT AS MANY AS 30,000 PERSONS MAY HAVE ATTENDED. INSTEAD, DIMITROV MERELY SAID THAT STARA ZAGORA HAD A POPULATION OF 40,000 AND THAT KURDJHALI HAD 20,000.

6. DIMITROV ALSO ASSERTED HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH A NUMBER OF FORMER AGRARIAN PARTY ADHERENTS NOW LIVING IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. HIS AIM WAS SOMEHOW TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR THE REVIVAL OF BANU'S FORTUNES IN BULGARIA. DIMITROV SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THIS CONTEXT THE EFFORTS OF THREE GROUPS: FIRST, THE NIKOLA PETKOV GROUP IN PARIS; SECOND, THE PETKOV-GEMF (GORGI) DIMITROV GROUP, WITH WHICH GWU PROFESSOR CHARLES MOSER (GEMF'S SON-IN-LAW) IS ASSOCIATED; AND, THIRD, US AGRARIANS LED BY DIMITUR JICHEV. THE THIRD GROUP PRODUCES A MAGAZINE EDITED BY SFA'S BAKIN WHO, DIMITROV SAYS, HAS WRITTEN TO HIM TO CONGRATULATE HIM
ON HIS MEASURES FOR UNIFICATION OF ALL PARTY Factions.

7. HE SAID THAT THE AGRARIANS WANTED TO UNITE SMALL GROUPS INTO ONE PARTY, BUT THAT THE PARTY WOULD STILL NOT PRACTICE OPEN MEMBERSHIP: "OUR MOTTO IS THAT THE PARTY IS FOR THOSE WE NEED, NOT FOR THOSE WHO NEED US," HE SAID.
OVER-COOPERATION WITH THE PCP? AGRARIANS "DON'T WANT TO FORGIVE US FOR THIS," HE SAID.

INDEPENDENCE FROM THE COMMUNISTS?

9. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT DIMITROV HAD CALLED

FOR POLITICAL PLURALISM AND A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM IN HIS 2 DECEMBER SPEECH, BUT THAT THE CURRENT BCP PLENUM DID NOT SEEM TO GO THAT FAR. DIMITROV REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT YET FOUND PROOF OF A BCP DESIRE FOR REAL PLURALISM. AGRARIANS HAD EXPECTED MLADENOV'S 11 DECEMBER SPEECH TO BE "MORE OPEN," HE ADDED, AND "IF THEY WANT US TO BE INDEPENDENT, THEY HAVE TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS OF OUR PARTY. ALL INSTITUTIONS CANNOT BE GOVERNED BY COMMUNISTS ONLY." HE SAID, CITING RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE MFA AS EXAMPLES. HE ASSERTED THAT BANU HAD ONLY ONE MEMBER IN THE MFA AND IMPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT SATISFIED THAT BANU HELD ONLY THE JUSTICE, AGRICULTURE, AND HEALTH MINISTRY PORTFOLIOS IN THE GOVERNMENT. "WE CURRENTLY HAVE NO ACCESS TO DECISION-MAKING. PEOPLE SAY THEY'VE HAD ENOUGH OF SPEECHES AT PLENA. WE WANT MORE DEEDS."

10. DIMITROV REPEATED HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS THAT THE AGRARIANS WOULD ESTABLISH THEIR OWN PARTY PROGRAMS CONCERNING LAND AND LAND-USE LAW, AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, AND OTHER ISSUES. IN AN EFFORT TO DRAW OUT DIMITROV ON DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BANU AND MLADENOV'S DECEMBER 11 CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENTS ON BCP AGRICULTURAL POLICY, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ABOUT BANU'S POSITION ON LAND LEASING AND OWNERSHIP, SIZE OF HOLDINGS, HIRING OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS. DIMITROV'S REPLIES WERE GENERALLY VAGUE. HE SAID BANU FAVORED THE IDEA OF FAMILY MEMBERS BEING ABLE TO INHERIT LAND AND EQUIPMENT; POSSESSION OF AS MUCH LAND AS ONE FAMILY COULD WORK; THE RIGHT TO HIRE UP TO TEN SEASONAL WORKERS, AS WAS THE CASE IN INDUSTRY. THE BANU WOULD NOT/NOT FAVOR ANYTHING THAT LOOKED LIKE "EXPLOITATION" OF LABOR.

11. BANU'S NEW PROGRAM REFLECTS DIMITROV'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE PARTY'S NEW POLICIES. (DIMITROV GAVE POLEC OFFICER A COPY OF THIS "WORKING DOCUMENT," AND,
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING WITH DIMITROV, AMBASSADOR AND POLEC OFFICER VISITED THE OFFICE WHERE A BANU COMMITTEE WAS WORKING ON THE DOCUMENT.) AS ITS "ECONOMIC POLICY," BANU STATES THAT IT IS IN FAVOR OF GIVING THE LAND "TO THOSE WHO CULTIVATE IT"; "CONSOLIDATION OF THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT, OF WHICH BANU IS READY TO BE A POLITICAL GUARDIAN"; "REORIENTATION OF SUBSTANTIAL PRODUCTION CAPACITIES FROM INDUSTRY TO PRODUCTION" OF A VARIETY OF TYPES OF "AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT" AND MATERIALS; AND "ECOLOGICALLY-FRIENDLY USE OF EXISTING NATURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC REALITIES." POLITICALLY, BANU FAVORS "FREE LABOR AND JUST MATERIAL INCENTIVES"; "ABOLITION OF ALL FORMS OF PRIVILEGED STATUS NOT DERIVED FROM LABOR"; "A SOCIALLY JUST SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES FOR STIMULATING THE BIRTH RATE"; "INTRODUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF LABOR WAGES TO ASSIST IN RAISING PUBLIC PRESTIGE FOR ALL KINDS OF LABOR"; "IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH CARE"; "A SOCIALLY JUST SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL BENEFITS"; AND "INTRODUCTION OF A UNIFIED PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAX AND ANNUAL DECLARATION OF INCOME" FOR ALL EMPLOYED PEOPLE. IN ITS GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT IN THE WORKING DOCUMENT, BANU STATES ITS ADVOCACY OF, AMONG OTHER MEASURES, "FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS," "INDEPENDENCE FOR BULGARIA TV AND RADIO," WHICH SHOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, "FREE AND INDEPENDENT EDUCATION," "REBIRTH OF THE ABANDONED NATIONAL TRADITION OF RITUALS," "FREEDOM OF CREEDS AND RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA," AND "DEVELOPMENT OF MASS SPORTS AND TOURISM."
R 141254Z DEC 89
FROM AM EMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8885
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AM EMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 04 SOFIA 06781

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: NEW AGRARIAN LEADER DISPLAYS RELUCTANCE TO

12. DIMITROV SAID THAT BANU HAD ALREADY DECIDED THAT
IT WOULD NOT VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTRY'S 1990
OFFICIAL BUDGET IF IT DOES NOT "GUARANTEE A REAL
PRIORITY" FOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE BULGARIAN VILLAGE.
"EVERY DAY WE ESTABLISH DIFFERENCES" WITH THE BCP,
HE SAID. IN THE 14 DECEMBER SESSION OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, THE AGRARIANS WILL INTRODUCE THREE INDEPENDENT
PROPOSALS: CREATION OF A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION FOR
REHABILITATION OF NIKOLA PETKOV AND OTHERS; REMOVAL
OF ARTICLE 1 FROM THE CONSTITUTION; AND CREATION OF
A STANDING PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION, CHAIRMED BY
AGRARIAN MILENA STAMBOLOUSKA, ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE
BULGARIAN VILLAGE.

13. "WE ARE PREPARED TO VOTE AGAINST STATE COUNCIL

PAGE 02  SOFIA 06781 03 OF 04 141610Z

DECLARES," ALSO, HE ADDED, SUCH AS LAWS ESTABLISHING
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CERTAIN OFFENSES. "WE MIGHT
REACH THE POINT OF VOTING AGAINST THEM (THE BCP) IN
PARLIAMENT. WE'RE A MINORITY, BUT WE HAVE 98 VOTES,
AND OUR VOICE WILL BE HEARD."

14. IN SPITE OF THIS DESIRE FOR INDEPENDENCE, HOWEVER,
DIMITROV AND AGRARIAN REPRESENTATIVES WERE INVITED TO
AND ATTENDED THE FIRST SESSION OF THE BCP PLENARY
MEETING ON 11, DECEMBER. DIMITROV CLAIMED THAT AGRARIANS
WERE AT THE SAME TIME PARTICIPATING IN INDEPENDENT
RALLIES, HAD MET WITH ECOCGLASHOST PEOPLE, AND THAT,
IN ANY CASE, HE HAD ONLY GONE TO HEAR MLADENOV'S
SPEECH AND WAS MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR RATHER THAN
ATTENDING THE SECOND DAY BCP SESSION.

THE TURKISH QUESTION

UNCLASSIFIED
15. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE AGRARIANS' NEW PROGRAM WOULD ADDRESS PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUNTRY'S MINORITIES, WHO HAVE BEEN TRADITIONALLY ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURAL WORK, DIMITROV respondED THAT 9000 MEMBERS OF THE AGRARIAN PARTY ARE MUSLIMS. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE PROBLEMS COULD BE SOLVED BY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO OF 20 YEARS AGO. "THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO TAKE A STEP BACK," HE SAID. "I HOPE THAT MLADENOV WILL HAVE A PROGRAM FOR THIS. PERHAPS IT WILL NOT TAKE TOO LONG." ASKED HOW BANU'S FOREIGN POLICY MIGHT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE BCP'S, DIMITROV ASSERTED (1) THAT BANU HAD MANY FOREIGN CONTACTS AND (2) WOULD FOCUS ON THE BALKANS.

16. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER BILATERAL COOPERATION, AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE AGRARIANS, IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE. "OUR PARTY COULD ESTABLISH DIRECT CONTACTS TO DEVELOP A MICRO- REGION" (OF TRADE), DIMITROV REPLIED, WITH LOCAL COLLECTIVES MAKING TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH AMERICAN COMPANIES. HE SAID THAT A 24,000-HECTARE COLLECTIVE NEAR HIS HOMETOWN HAD BOUGHT JOHN DEERE MACHINERY TWENTY YEARS AGO, "AND IT'S STILL RUNNING WELL."

17. SECOND, THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THAT AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION, AS IN THE AMERICAN FARM SCHOOL IN THESSALONICA, GREECE, MIGHT PROVIDE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR INCREASED COOPERATION. DIMITROV SAID THAT SUCH SCHOOLS WERE "MUCH NEEDED." HE ADDED, "I VISITED ONE OF THESE IN SWITZERLAND."

COMMENT

19. DIMITROV’S STATEMENT THAT THE PARTY WOULD NOT OPEN ITS RANKS TO MASS MEMBERSHIP ALSO POINTS TOWARD CONTINUED LIMITS ON THE PARTY’S FUNCTION AS A GENUINE POLITICAL FORCE. AT THE SAME TIME, DIMITROV HAS STATED PUBLICLY THAT BANU MUST HAVE IN ITS RANKS WORKERS, INTELLECTUALS AND OTHERS IN ADDITION TO PEASANTS IF IT IS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE VOICE. THE MOST IMPORTANT EVIDENCE OF A RELUCTANCE TO CHALLENGE THE COMMUNISTS, HOWEVER, IS THE AGRARIANS’ ONGOING
SHYING-AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION WITH THE BCP ON ANY ISSUE OTHER THAN REHABILITATION OF THE FORMER AGRARIAN PARTY LEADERS WHO WERE EXECUTED, EXILED, OR OTHERWISE PERSECUTED BY BCP-LED GOVERNMENTS. AS THE BCP’S CO-OP-PTION OF THE AGRARIANS’ LATEST POLICIES SHOWS, NONE OF THE LATTER’S NEWFOUND DEMANDS HAVE BEEN SO RADICAL THAT THEY HAVE PRESENTED A REAL CHALLENGE TO THE COMMUNISTS’ AUTHORITY OR THEIR AGENDA.


21. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, DIMITROV ADDED THAT MLADENOV HAD PROPOSED MAY BECAUSE IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT BANU OR THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO PREPARE, IN CONTRAST TO THE BCP. NEVERTHELESS, DIMITROV CONCLUDED, MLADENOV MAY HAVE MISCALCULATED, BECAUSE SOLIDARITY IN POLAND HAD DEMONSTRATED THE POWER OF OPPOSITION FORCES. END COMMENT. POLANKSY
UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06752

PARIS FOR USOECD

STATE FOR EUR/RPF AND RR/TTC/FMT

STATE PASS USTR, OECD COLLECTIVE

USDOC FOR 4230 SUZANNE LOTARSKI AND 4231 JBROUGH

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OECD, XH
SUBJECT: OECD: BULGARIAN REQUEST FOR CONTACTS

Date Printed: 07/16/1997

DOC_NUMBER: 89SOFIA06752

CHANNEL: n/a
1. **ENTIRE TEXT.**

2. **SUMMARY:** POST STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE BULGARIAN REQUEST FOR CONTACTS WITH THE OECD. THE CURRENT BULGARIAN LEADERSHIP HAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO FAR-REACHING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. OECD CONTACTS WILL BE ONE WAY OF TESTING AND INFLUENCING REFORMS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE.

3. EMBASSY STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE BULGARIAN REQUEST FOR TECHNICAL CONTACTS WITH THE OECD. THE BULGARIAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT HAVE NOW ADMITTED TO SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND HAVE STATED THAT THEY WISH TO ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS IN A MORE MARKET-ORIENTED WAY, ALTHOUGH STILL WITHIN A SOCIALIST CONTEXT. THE SPECIFICS OF BOTH THE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES TO SOLVING THEM DESERVE DETAILED EXPERT EXAMINATION, AND THE BULGARIAN APPROACH OFFERS A FRAMEWORK FOR BEGINNING SUCH A LOOK.

4. **DURING DAS CURTIS KAMMAN'S DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT TO SOFIA (REF B), HE WAS TOLD BY KONSTANTIN GLAVANAKOV, BULGARIA'S DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THAT BULGARIA HAD JUST SENT**

   **PAGE 03**

   SOFIA 06752 01 OF 02 140725Z

   **THE LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OECD PROPOSING "TECHNICAL CONTACTS." KAMMAN SAID THAT THE USG WOULD HAVE "NO OPPOSITION" TO TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE OECD SECRETARIAT.**

5. **REF A RIGHTELY RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE ADVISABILITY OF AWAITING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL SCENE. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, BULGARIA HAS BEGUN WHAT WILL PROBABLY BE A FAIRLY PROLONGED PERIOD OF COMPARATIVELY RAPID POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE. UNLESS WASHINGTON HAS STRONG VIEWS ABOUT A PARTICULAR STAGE WHICH SHOULD BE REACHED, WE DO NOT THINK IT NECESSARY**
TO WAIT TO ACCEPT BULGARIA’S PROPOSAL.

6. THE POSSIBLE TURKISH REACTION REFERRED TO IN PARA 3, REF A, DESERVES SOME CONSIDERATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF TURKEY AND BULGARIA ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN IN KUWAIT JANUARY 9. ASSUMING THESE TALKS DO NOT GO DRastically AWRY, OECD CONSULTATIONS COULD PROCEED. INDEED, IN THE EVENT OF ANY SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS HERE, CONTACTS WITH THE OECD SHOULD BE REVIEWED.

7. COMMENT: ON SUBSTANCE, WE WILL BE VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR ABOUT THE APPROACH THE BULGARIAN GROUP TAKES. IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF THE ZHIVKOV ERA, FOR INSTANCE, PAPARIZOV WAS VERY UPBEAT ABOUT THE STATE OF BULGARIA’S ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC REFORMS. PAR REACHING PROBLEMS IN BOTH HAVE NOW BEEN PUBLICLY PROCLAIMED AT THE NOVEMBER 11-13 PLENUM. WE HOPE TECHNICAL CONTACTS WILL HELP TO PROBE WHETHER THE PARTY AND GOB HOPE TO GET BY WITH FIDDLE WITH A FEW OF THE DETAILS OF THE
SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06752

PARIS FOR USOECD

STATE FOR EUR/RPE AND EB/ITC/EWT

STATE PASS USTR, OECD COLLECTIVE

USDOC FOR 4230 SUZANNE LOTARSKI AND 4231 J BROUWER

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR

B.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, OECD, XH
SUBJECT: OECD: BULGARIAN REQUEST FOR CONTACTS

CURRENT SYSTEM, OR WHETHER THEY ARE SERIOUS
ABOUT ADOPTING FAR-REACHING REFORMS. IF THEY ARE
SERIOUS, TECHNICAL CONTACTS SHOULD PROVIDE AN
EXCELLENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING THE DIRECTION
AND SPECIFICS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS. POLANSKY
OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON, EUR/EYE ON RECEIPT, 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

PARIS FOR OECD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: CC PLENUM CALLS FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF "LEADING ROLE OF COMMunist PARTY" FROM THE CONSTITUTION

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM CLOSED DECEMBER 13 BY PASSING A RESOLUTION TRACKING THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF GENERAL SECRETARY MLADENOV'S OPENING SPEECH. THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR REFORM IN THE ECONOMY, THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND THE BCP. AMONG THE MOST INTERESTING ELEMENTS OF THE RESOLUTION ARE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:

--DELETE REFERENCES TO THE LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY FROM ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION,

--SCHEDULE FREE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS DURING THE SECOND
QUARTER OF 1990;

--COMPLETE ITS PROJECT ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION DURING 1990;

--DISCUSS THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF (THE CONTINUED ROLE OF) THE STATE COUNCIL.


4. FINALLY THE PLENUM REMOVED Todor Zhivkov, His Son Vladimir And Milko Balev From The Party And Asked The Politburo To Quickly Complete An Investigation Of The Personal, Political And Moral Responsibility Of Those In Zhivkov's "CIRCLE" AND THEIR POSITIONS IN THE PARTY.

END SUMMARY.


THE RESOLUTION'S SUGGESTIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE

6. THE RESOLUTION MAKES TEN POINTS FOR SUGGESTED RESTRUCTURING IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE. MANY OF THE SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THROUGH THE "PARLIAMENTARY GROUP" OF THE BCP. SOME, HOWEVER, ARE COUCHED IN TERMS OF "THE PLENUM THINKS..." OR ARE SIMPLY STATED AS SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

7. THE POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:


--THE PLENUM BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE
PROJECT ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION DURING 1990.

--THE PLENUM PROPOSES THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ACCEPT A NEW ELECTORAL LAW ON THE BASIS OF WHICH,
DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1990, FREE, DEMOCRATIC
ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD.
--THE PLENUM PROPOSES THE ASSEMBLY CREATE A COMMISSION TO STUDY AND RESOLVE CERTAIN URGENT QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH "PERMITTED DEFORMATIONS AND VIOLATIONS OF LEGALITY IN STATE, PUBLIC AND ECONOMIC LIFE."

--THAT THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF (THE CONTINUED)

ROLE OF) THE STATE COUNCIL BE DISCUSSED.

--THE PLENUM THINKS THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MUST ASSUME ENTIRELY ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY SPECIFIED ROLE AS THE COMPETENT EXECUTIVE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR STATE MANAGEMENT.

--IT IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF LOCAL STATE AUTHORITY AND ASSURE SELF-MANAGEMENT OF TERRITORIAL UNITS -- FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MUNICIPALITIES AS THE BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE TERRITORIAL UNIT -- FOR GUARANTEES OF DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER. THE QUESTION OF THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE OBLAST PEOPLES' COUNCILS IN LOCAL SELF-MANAGEMENT IS TO BE DISCUSSED.

--THE QUESTION OF REFORM OF THE ENTIRE LEGAL SYSTEM, ON THE BASIS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION IS "RIPE." THE FOLLOWING MOST URGENT LEGAL PROGRAMS MUST BE WORKED OUT: FOR POLITICAL AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS; FOR ECONOMIC REFORM INCLUDING NEW LAWS ON OWNERSHIP, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, LAND AND LAND USE; A LAW FOR "SOCIAL INSURANCE (SECURITY);" FOR PEOPLES COUNCILS AND LOCAL SELF-MANAGEMENT; FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMANIZATION OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION; AND OTHERS.

--DEEP REFORM OF THE LEGAL DEFENSE ORGANS IS NECESSARY. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CATEGORICALLY DECLARES ITSELF IN FAVOR OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, PROSECUTOR AND INVESTIGATIVE ORGAN AND THEIR SUBORDINATION "ONLY TO THE LAW." THEIR ACTIVITIES MUST GUARANTEE THE EQUALITY OF CITIZENS BEFORE THE LAW.


THE ECONOMY--THINGS ARE SELDOM WHAT THEY SEEM

8. THE RESOLUTION ACTUALLY STARTS OUT WITH A SECTION ON THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS AT THE PLENUM HAD CALLED FOR A GREATER SEPARATION OF THE PARTY FROM THE ECONOMY. THE INTRODUCTION TO THIS SECTION CALLS FOR "RADICAL ECONOMIC REFORMS."

SECURING GOODS AND SERVICES FOR THE POPULATION

9. "DECISIVE MEASURES" SHOULD BE TAKEN TO PRODUCE GOODS FOR BASIC NEEDS, STIMULATING PRODUCTION WITH TAXES, CREDITS AND HARD CURRENCY, AND CONVERTING DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN STOCKS OF GOODS AND MONEY SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO CONTROL INFLATION. THE INTERESTS OF THE WEAKEST LEVELS OF SOCIETY SHOULD BE GUARANTEED, AND THE UNCOMPROMISING STRUGGLE AGAINST CORRUPTION SHOULD CONTINUE.
SECTION 03 OF 06 SOFIA 06787

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON, EUR/EYE ON RECEIPT, 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

PARIS FOR OECD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: CC PLENUM CALLS FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND CERTAIN PRESSING SOCIAL PROBLEMS

10. THE LIVING STANDARD SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, AND HELP GIVEN TO THE DISADVANTAGED. LOW PENSIONS FOR THOSE OVER 70 (COMMENT. THOSE CONSIDERED TOO OLD TO WORK TO SUPPLEMENT THEIR PENSION. END COMMENT), INVALIDS AND OTHERS SHOULD BE RAISED, AND PENSIONS INDEXED. THE PRINCIPLE OF PAY BASED ON WORK RESULTS SHOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED. NEW POLICY ON SOCIAL CONSUMPTION FUNDS IS NEEDED. CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES SHOULD BE DIVERTED FROM INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS TO HOUSING. FAIRER METHODS OF ASSIGNMENT AND SALE OF HOUSING SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, AND HOUSING NOW USED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NEEDY CITIZENS. THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM SHOULD BE IMPROVED, AND THE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTED.

RECONSTRUCTION OF PRODUCTION STRUCTURES

11. PRODUCTION PRIORITIES ARE TO BE DETERMINED BY CLIMATE, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE CONDITIONS IN EXTERNAL MARKETS. PRIORITY WILL BE GIVEN TO AGRICULTURE,
THE FOOD INDUSTRY, LIGHT INDUSTRY, TOURISM, AND SERVICES.
A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN PRODUCTION RELATIONS IN
AGRICULTURE SHOULD INCLUDE LAND TO WHOSE WHO TILL IT,
UNDER FORMS WHICH THEY THEMSELVES DETERMINE—COOPERATIVE,
STATE, OR INDIVIDUAL. THERE SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, AND LABOR-COOPERATIVE FARMS. USE OF CONTRACTS
SHOULD INCREASE, AND ABANDONED AND MOUNTAINOUS LAND
MAY BE LEASED WITHOUT A FIXED TERM. THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY SHOULD PASS A LAW IN 1990 RESOLVING LONG-
STANDING RADICAL PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURE.

12. AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNPROFITABLE AND LOW-
PROFIT ENTERPRISES SHOULD BE MADE, AND STABILIZATION,
REORGANIZATION, OR CUTBACKS SHOULD PROCEED WITHIN

DEADLINES AGREED BETWEEN APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AND
THE WORK COLLECTIVES. THE CC DECISIVELY DECLARES ITSELF
AGAINST CONTINUAL REORGANIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS.

HARD CURRENCY PROBLEMS

13. THE RESOLUTION SUGGESTS A MID-RANGE PROGRAM TO
SLOW AND STOP THE GROWTH OF FOREIGN DEBT, AND CREATION
OF PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A POSITIVE HARD CURRENCY TRADE
BALANCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. CHANGES TO FURTHER INCREASE
THE INTERESTS OF THE PRODUCERS AND THE STATE IN INCREAS-
ING EXPORTS AND USE HARD CURRENCY MORE EFFECTIVELY
SHOULD BE SOUGHT. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS TO LIMIT HARD
CURRENCY EXPENDITURES SHOULD BE CREATED. EXPORTS
SHOULD BE STIMULATED WITH THE HELP OF MARKET CONDITIONS.

14. A FAIR PORTION OF HARD CURRENCY PROFITS SHOULD
GO TO THOSE WHO EARN THEM. THE HARD CURRENCY OF THE
STATE SHOULD GO TO THOSE BRANCHES AND ACTIVITIES WHICH
IN A SHORT PERIOD CAN INCREASE NATIONAL INCOME,
ESPECIALLY PRODUCTION OF GOODS IN DEMAND DOMESTICALLY
AND ABROAD. HARD CURRENCY EXPENDITURES OF DIPLOMATIC,
TRADE AND OTHER MISSIONS ABROAD SHOULD BE SHARPLY
CURBED. LEGAL, TAX, AND OTHER CONDITIONS SHOULD
BE CREATED TO ATTRACT HARD CURRENCY VIA THOSE FORMS
OF COOPERATION WHICH DON'T INCREASE NATIONAL DEBT,
SUCH AS JOINT VENTURES, CONTRACT DEALS, DIRECT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, ETC.

STABILIZATION OF FINANCIAL BALANCES
SECTION 04 OF 06 SOFIA 06787

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON, EUR/EKY ON RECEIPT, 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

PARIS FOR OECD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: CC PLENUM CALLS FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND

15. THE STATE'S REDISTRIBUTION FUNCTION SHOULD BE
CUT BACK CONSIDERABLY, AND EXPENSES SHOULD BE RESTRICTED
TO APPROPRIATE AND REALISTIC POSSIBILITIES. THE TAX
SYSTEM SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PERMIT REAL SELF-FINANCING
OF ECONOMIC UNITS, UNDER UNIFIED PRINCIPLES NOT
RELATED TO THE FORM OF PROPERTY, SPHERE OF ACTIVITY, OR
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM OF FINANCING.

16. IN ORDER TO STOP THE GROWTH OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT, A BUDGETARY CEILING SHOULD BE SET BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND FURTHER MONETARY EMISSION CONTROLLED BY LAW. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SHOULD HOLD A HARD LINE ON REDUCING BUDGETARY SUBSIDIES, BONUSES, ETC., RELATED TO PRICES OF GOODS, AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES. WORK SHOULD BEGIN ON AN ANTI-INFLATION PROGRAM, REDUCING SUBSIDIES TO SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, LIMITING REPRESENTATIONAL EXPENSES, AND BY JANUARY 1, CUTTING ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND EXPENSES. DEFENSE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CUTBACKS SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN LIMITS WHICH WILL ALLOW THEM TO CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PARTY
-------------------------------------

17. THE PLENUM ADOPTED 13 LENGTHY POINTS CONCERNING THE ROLE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY. MANY OF THESE ARE OVERLAPPING AND TO A GREATER OR LESSER DEGREE, REDUNDANT. THE MAIN ASPECTS OF THIS PORTION OF THE RESOLUTION INCLUDE:

--ESTABLISHMENT OF MARCH 19, 1990, AS THE DATE FOR THE NEXT PARTY CONGRESS. THE POLITBuro, AT THE "NEXT" PLENUM IS TO PROPOSE AN AGENDA, PRINCIPAL DOCUMENTS, COMMISSION COMPOSITION AND A METHOD OF SELECTING DELEGATES TO THE CONGRESS. THE POLICY AND DIRECTION OF THE PARTY IS TO BE DETERMINED THROUGH THE USE OF POLLS AND REFERENDA IN ADDITION TO MEMBER INPUT.

--DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE PARTY IS TO BE ACHIEVED BY

GUARANTEEING PLURALISM AND ENDING ELECTIONS "FROM ABOVE," THROUGH USE OF ALTERNATIVE CANDIDATES AND SECRET BALLOTS, AND A METHOD OF "DISELECTING" THOSE WHO DO NOT MEET EXPECTATIONS.

--PARTY MEMBERSHIP IS TO BE UNLIMITED AND THE METHODS FOR ENTRY SIMPLIFIED. THE PARTY SHOULD ACCEPT ONLY STRICT ADHERENTS TO PREVUSTROYSTVO. LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD INDEPENDENTLY RESOLVE THE ISSUES OF WHO IS TO BE ACCEPTED INTO THE PARTY. THESE ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD RELEASE THOSE MEMBERS WHO HAVE COMPROMISED THEMSELVES. CASES OF COMMUNISTS EXPELLED OR PUNISHED IN THE PAST SHOULD BE REVIEWED.
--LEADING POSITIONS OF THE PARTY MAY NOT BE OCCUPIED
BY AN INDIVIDUAL FOR LONGER THAN TWO TERMS. IN THIS
REGARD THE FIRST TERM BEGAN DECEMBER 11, 1989, AND WILL
END AT THE NEXT CONGRESS. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD
EFFECTIVELY LIMIT MLADENOV'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE PARTY
to the period of time from now until March 19, plus
one other term, assuming he is re-elected on March 19.
END COMMENT)

--THE PARTY WILL SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-
MANAGEMENT AND PLURALISM IN THE INTELLECTUAL SPHERE.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL UNIONS AND SOCIETIES ARE TO
BE INDEPENDENT OF PARTY CONTROL. EDUCATION IS TO BE
IMMEDIATELY DEMOCRATIZED.

--THE PARTY CONFIRMS ITS READINESS FOR EQUAL INTER-
ACTION AND COOPERATION WITH THE AGRARIAN PARTY AS ITS
TRADITIONAL ALLY AND PARTNER.

--THE PARTY CONSIDERS NECESSARY NEW INTERACTIONS WITH

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06787 05 OF 06 141804Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04
TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-18 SIL-01 INRE-00
AGRE-00 OPM-01 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /061 W

O 141744Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAD SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDG IMMEDIATE 8894
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
USDOC WASHDC
AMBASSAD ANKARA
AMBASSAD PARIS
AMBASSAD BRUSSELS
UNCLASSIFIED

DIA WASHDC

SECTION 05 OF 06 SOFIA 06787

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT S. SUTTON, EUR/EY ON RECEIPT, 647-3298

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

PARIS FOR OECD

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: CC PLENUM CALLS FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND

POLITICAL AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS
BASED ON "EQUALITY, PARTNERSHIP AND THE RECOGNITION
OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE." THE PARTY SEES THE ORIGIN OF
THESE ORGANIZATIONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF "SOCIALIST
PLURALISM." THE PARTY IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT CONSTRUCTIVE
DIALOGUE WITH THOSE OF THEM WHO "FIGHT FOR

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06787 05 OF 06 141804Z

DEMOCRACY AND RENNOVATION OF SOCIETY ON THE BASIS OF
SOCIALISM AND IN OBSERVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS." AT THE SAME TIME THE PARTY WILL LEAD A BATTLE
WITH POLITICAL MEANS "AGAINST THOSE WHICH REJECT
SOCIALISM."

--THE PARTY IS COMMITTED TO EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW
FOR ALL CITIZENS REGARDLESS OF "SOCIAL POSITION,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION, CULTURAL IDENTITY OR ETHNIC SELF-
CONSCIOUSNESS." THE POLITBURO IS DIRECTED TO SET UP
A COMMISSION FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION, WHICH
IS TO PROPOSE IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE A LASTING
RESOLUTION TO THIS "VITALLY IMPORTANT PROBLEM."

--DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF Restructuring TO EFFECTIVE
ECONOMIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE FOREIGN POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL ACTIVITIES MUST
BE PLACED UNDER THE ACTIVE CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY.

--THE PLENUM CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATIONS
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES,
THE CONTINUED PARTICIPATION OF BULGARIA IN CEMA AND
THE WARSAW PACT, AND THE NEED FOR GOOD NEIGHBORLINES
WITH BALKAN COUNTRIES.

--WHILE MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE, BULGARIA
SHOULD MAKE AN "ADEQUATE CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMMENT."
THE PLENUM PROPOSES THAT THE GOVERNMENT DISCLOSE THE
"DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, THE NUMBERS (SIZE) AND THE ARMAMENT OF THE BULGARIANS PEOPLES ARMY."

18. FINALLY THE PLENUM REMOVED TODOR ZHIVKOV, HIS SON

VLADIMIR AND MILKO BALEV FROM THE PARTY AND ASKED THE POLITIBURO TO QUICKLY COMPLETE AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PERSONAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE IN ZHIVKOV’S "CIRCLE" AND THEIR POSITIONS IN THE PARTY.

THE MAIN PROSECUTOR AND THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE ARE ASKED TO MAKE A FULL, OBJECTIVE FINANCIAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THE GROUP’S AFFAIRS.

COMMENT

---

19. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ABOLITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED "LEADING ROLE" OF THE BCP IS MERELY A QUESTION OF TIME. WHILE THE NECESSARY AMENDMENT MAY BE INTRODUCED AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 14, ARTICLE 143 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT AN AMENDMENT BE CARRIED ON THE AGENDA FOR ONE MONTH, BEFORE IT CAN BE VOTED UPON. THE JANUARY ASSEMBLY SESSION CAN BE EXPECTED TO VOTE ON THE AMENDMENT, ASSUMING IT IS SUCCESSFULLY PLACED ON THE AGENDA AT THE DECEMBER 14 SESSION.


23. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE THE PROPOSALS SEEM SOMEWHAT GENERAL AND IN KEEPING WITH PRIOR REFORM MEASURES. ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS THE POLICY REGARDING LAND. WHILE MLADENOV'S SPEECH MENTIONS "OWNERSHIP OF LAND" IN THE DISCUSSION ON AGRICULTURAL REFORM, WE NOTE THAT THE PLENUM RESOLUTION DOES NOT GO THAT FAR. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE NEW LAWS ON LAND AND LAND USE WILL PROVIDE FOR OWNERSHIP OF LAND BEYOND THAT NOW PERMITTED. HOWEVER THE GENERAL SENTIMENT AND DISCUSSION UP TO NOW LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO LARGER PLOTS WILL BE GRANTED, IF NOT NOW, SOON.

MONTGOMERY

NNNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***
SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 06839

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, EU
SUBJECT: FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION PREPARES TO REMOVE PRO-COMMUNIST CLAUSES FROM CONSTITUTION

1. (U) SUMMARY. IN ITS FIRST DAY OF ITS DECEMBER SESSION, THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS PREPARED THE WAY FOR THE JANUARY REMOVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES WHICH GUARANTEE THE COMMUNIST PARTY A LEADING ROLE IN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY. THE ASSEMBLY ALSO AGREED TO PREPARE A NEW LAND LAW WITHIN ONE MONTH, VOTED AGAINST SOME STATE COUNCIL AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DECREES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT MEMORY, MADE SEVERAL PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE TWO COUNCILS, AND ACCEPTED NEW DRAFT LAWS FOR THE PENAL CODE. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) TAKING ITS LEAD FROM THE BCP PLENUM AT WHICH THE PARTY HAD ENDORSED THE ABOLITION OF ITS LEGALLY MANDATED "LEADING ROLE," THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VOTED IN ITS FIRST MEETING TO TAKE ACTION TO REMOVE CLAUSES FROM ARTICLE 1 OF THE BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION. ASSEMBLYMEN WERE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO REMOVE THE CLAUSES AT THIS SESSION, BUT LAWYERS POINTED OUT THAT ARTICLE 143 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE MADE "EARLIER THAN ONE MONTH... AFTER BEING SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY." AT THIS SESSION, THEY COULD ONLY VOTE IN FAVOR OF A DECLARATION TO REMOVE THE CLAUSES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT THIS VIRTUALLY GUARANTEES "Y-F ABOLITION OF THE CLAUSES
AT THE ASSEMBLY'S NEXT SESSION IN JANUARY. (NOTE: THE AGRARIANS, ALONG WITH THE BCF, JOINTLY INTRODUCED THE BILL.)

3. (U) THE ASSEMBLY ALSO VOTED TO INITIATE A NEW DRAFT LAW ON PROPERTY AND LAND-USE AND TO FORM TWO PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONS: ON WOMEN'S AFFAIRS, MOTHERHOOD, AND CHILDCARE; AND ON THE LAND AND FORESTS. THE MOTION FOR THE LAND COMMISSION WAS ENTERED BY AGRARIAN STANDING COMMITTEE (POLITBURO) MEMBER MILENA STAMBOLISKA, WHO ALSO CALLED FOR REHABILITATION OF NIKOLA PETKOV AND OTHER EARLY AGRARIANS. THE LAND ACT WILL BE INTRODUCED AT THE NEXT ASSEMBLY SESSION IN JANUARY.

4. (U) IN PERSONNEL CHANGES, DRAZHA VULCHOVA RESIGNED AS DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON OF THE ASSEMBLY, BUT NO REPLACEMENT WAS NAMED. THE FOLLOWING STATE COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE REMOVED: PETUR TANCHEV (FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN), GEORGI DZHAGAROV (DEPUTY CHAIRMAN; ASKED TO BE RELIEVED), VLADIMIR BONEV, NICOLAI ZHISHEV, IVAN PANEV, YORDAN YOTOV, NACHO POPASOV, PENCHO KUBADINSKI, ANGEL BALEVSKI, AND PANTELEI YAREF. DZHAGAROV TOOK HIS FINAL OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO CRITICIZE THE STATE COUNCIL AS A "RUBBER STAMP" WHICH HAD BEEN USED (IN SESSION) ONLY TWICE BETWEEN 1985 AND 1988. TANCHEV HAS BEEN REPLACED AS DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, AN APPOINTMENT TRADITIONALLY RESERVED FOR AGRARIAN PARTY LEADERS, BY NEW AGRARIAN LEADER ANGEL DIMITROV. DZHAGAROV HAS BEEN REPLACED BY VASIL MRUCHKOV. THE ASSEMBLY ALSO ACCEPTED A MOTION THAT GEORGI YORDANOV AND GRIGOR STOICHKOV BE REMOVED AS DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. NADYA ASPARUKHOVA WAS THEN Elected TO ONE OF THESE TWO POSITIONS. FINALLY, THE ASSEMBLY STRIPPED THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR SEATS IN THE ASSEMBLY: TODOR ZHIVKOV, VLADIMIR ZHIVKOV, MILKO BALEV, GRISHA FILIPOV, DIMITUR STOYANOV, NIKOLA STEFANOV, YAROSLAV RADEV, AND GENERAL KRISTO RUIHOV. ALL, IT SAID, HAD BEEN "ASSOCIATED WITH THE TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM."

5. (U) IN LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, THE ASSEMBLY ACCEPTED, IN PRINCIPLE, DRAFT LAWS ON MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS; FOR PUBLIC ASSOCIATIONS OF CITIZENS; FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE; AND FOR AMNESTY FOR CERTAIN LEGAL OFFENDERS. THE TEXTS OF THESE LAWS HAVE NOT YET BEEN RELEASED TO THE PRESS AND PUBLIC. HOWEVER, JUSTICE MINISTER SVETLA DASKALOVA ELABORATED ON THEM IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE 15 DECEMBER EDITION OF "RABOTNICHESKO DELO." THE LAW ON MEETINGS, SHE SAYS, "WILL GUARANTEE CITIZENS' RIGHTS TO GATHER IN PUBLIC PLACES AND
EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS ON POLITICAL, CULTURAL, ECOLOGICAL, AND OTHER ISSUES OF PUBLIC CHARACTER. " BUT CITIZENS MUST "INFORM THE TOWNSHIP . . . IN GOOD TIME," AND "GUARANTEES HAVE BEEN ENVISAGED FOR ENSURING PUBLIC ORDER AND THE TRANQUILLITY OF OTHER CITIZENS, AND RENDERING SUPPORT TO CONDUCTING MEETINGS.

NNNN

PAGE 01    SOFIA 06839 02 OF 04 151614Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00
     H-01 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
     PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01
     PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /037 W

----------120504 151649Z /49

O 151604Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8917
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 04 SOFIA 06839

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION PREPARES TO

ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCILS. " THE LAW OF PUBLIC ASSOCIATIONS WILL ENABLE SUCH GROUPS TO BE REGISTERED AS LEGAL ENTITIES "IF 5 PERSONS DECIDE TO FOUND SUCH AN ASSOCIATION, PREPARE A CHARTER, ELECT A LEADING ORGAN, AND REGISTER AT THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL. ASSOCIATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM CANNOT BE REGISTERED." APPLICANTS WHO ARE REFUSED WILL BE ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. THE PENAL CODE REVISIONS WILL BE DIRECTED AT ARTICLE 103, PARAGRAPH 1;
ARTICLE 109, PARAGRAPH 1; AND WILL ABOLISH ARTICLES 110, 112, 112-A, AND 113. (NOTE: ALL OF THESE INVOLVE VARIOUS CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE.)

6. (U) IN A MOVE THAT IS REPORTEDLY UNPRECEDENTED IN ASSEMBLY HISTORY, DELEGATES VOTED AGAINST THREE OF 18 DECREES ISSUED BY THE STATE COUNCIL SINCE THE LAST ASSEMBLY SESSION. THE THREE ARE: THE ADDENDUM AND AMENDMENT TO THE LAW ON CULTURAL MONUMENTS; THE DECREES FOR CIVIL MOBILIZATION IN PEACETIME; AND THE AMENDMENT TO THE LAW FOR PUBLIC HEALTH. (NOTE: THE CIVIL MOBILIZATION DECREES WERE ISSUED BY THE STATE COUNCIL DURING THE SUMMER FLIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 300,000 ETHNIC TURKS. IT ENABLED THE GOVERNMENT TO ENLIST CIVILIANS IN VARIOUS LABOR AND AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS AND RELOCATE WORKERS FOR TEMPORARY PERIODS.)

7. (U) AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY, THE ASSEMBLY ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD COMPLETED THE FIRST FIFTEEN ITEMS OF ITS 21-ITEM AGENDA. IT HAS, IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE ITEMS, ACCEPTED, IN PRINCIPLE, THE FORMATION OF A PERMANENT ASSEMBLY COMMISSION ON DEFENSE AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND A COMMISSION TO RESOLVE "CERTAIN URGENT QUESTIONS RELATED TO PERMITTED DEFORMATIONS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW IN THE STATE, PUBLIC, AND ECONOMIC LIFE." IT HAS ALSO ACCEPTED A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION WHICH IS PREPARING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES; ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW, SHORTER TERMS OF OFFICE FOR ASSEMBLYMEN; NEW PROCEDURES FOR ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF PERMANENT ASSEMBLY COMMISSIONS; AND RELIEVING THE CURRENT GENERAL PROSECUTOR AND ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES FOR ELECTING A NEW ONE. (DETAILS OF THESE CHANGES ARE EXPECTED AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THIS SITTING OF THE ASSEMBLY.) FINALLY, AT FINANCE MINISTER BELCHO BELCHEV'S REQUEST, CONSIDERATION OF THE COUNTRY'S 1990 BUDGET WAS DEFERRED IN ORDER FOR REVISIONS TO BE MADE IN LIGHT OF HIGH BUDGET DEFICITS IN 1989. THE ASSEMBLY ALSO AGREED TO ALLOW ASSEMBLY COMMISSIONS TO REVIEW THE NEW BUDGET, WHICH WILL BE MORE DETAILED THAN PREVIOUS ONES. IT IS ALSO "SUGGESTED"
That the Ministry of Finance hold down expenses as much as possible in the first quarter of 1990 until a new budget is approved.

8. (U) The following items remain on the Assembly’s agenda for the following day(s):

- Election of a parliamentary commission to examine questions related to the hydro-energy complex "Rila" and the Mesta hydrotechnical complex;

- Establishment of a national center for the study of public opinion at the National Assembly and the Bulgarian academy of sciences;

- A report from the interior minister on complaints of citizens for violations of their rights;

- A proposal of the BCP parliamentary group to forbid use of portraits of living leaders in state institutions and other public places;

- Election of a parliamentary commission to examine complaints of citizens of Ruse; and

- Development of a plan for activities of the Assembly in 1990.
O 151604Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8918
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 04 SOFIA 06839

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION PREPARES TO

9. (C) COMMENT. MANY ITEMS ON THE ASSEMBLY’S
AGENDA WERE PUBLICIZED TEN DAYS EARLIER, AND PERHAPS
THE BIGGEST SURPRISE IN THE FIRST DAY’S MEETING WAS
THE DISCOVERY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO
REMOVING THE PRO-COMMUNIST CLAUSES FROM ARTICLE 1
OF THE CONSTITUTION. MLADENOV’S REPUDIATION OF THE
CLAUSES AT THE PLENUM AND BCP RALLY EARLIER IN THE
WEEK SEALED THEIR DOOM, BUT NOW THE ASSEMBLY MUST
WAIT ANOTHER MONTH BEFORE ACTUALLY BURYING THEM.

10. (C) THE CHANGES IN THE PENAL CODE SHOULD ALSO
BRING FEW SURPRISES. WITH ARTICLE 273 GONE ALREADY,
THE ABOLITION OF THE REMAINING ANTI-STATE ARTICLES
WILL PAVE THE WAY FOR MORE OPEN POLITICAL DISSENT
AND RELEASE OF AN ESTIMATED 200 POLITICAL PRISONERS
WHO HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF ANTI-STATE ACTS.

11. (C) THE ASSEMBLY’S QUICK ADOPTION OF AGRARIAN
STAMBOLISKA’S PROPOSAL TO CREATE A COMMISSION ON
LAND USE STAVES OFF THAT PARTY LEADER’S THREAT TO
HAVE THE 98 AGRARIAN ASSEMBLYMEN VOTE AGAINST THE
1990 BUDGET IF THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT GIVE THE
BULGARIAN VILLAGE A “HIGH PRIORITY.” THAT THREAT
MAY NEVER HAVE BEEN A REAL POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER,
SINCE THE BCP HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE SINCE
WELL BEFORE ITS PLENUM ONE WEEK BEFORE THE
ASSEMBLY SESSION. STAMBOLISKA IS LEADING THE AGRARIANS
AS THEY BEGIN TO RAISE THEIR HEADS, BUT, WHILE THE
HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE ON SEVERAL LEGISLATIVE
ITEMS, THEY HAVE YET TO CHALLENGE THE BCP ON ANY
MATTER WITH WHICH THE BCP HAS NOT ALREADY PUBLICLY
STATED ITS AGREEMENT.

12. (C) THE REJECTION OF ‘THREAT OF THE STATE COUNCIL’S
1989 DECREES REFLECT THE ATTEMPT BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO REGAIN SOME OF THE POWER WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM IT DURING THE ZHIVKOV REGIME VIA THE PROCESS OF ISSUING DECREES WHICH WERE THEN RUBBER STAMPED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THESE DECREES WERE ORIGINALLY TO HAVE ONLY BEEN ISSUED IN EMERGENCIES AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS. HOWEVER, THE ZHIVKOV REGIME MADE THEM INTO THE NORMAL METHOD OF DOING BUSINESS.


ZHIVKOV, HIS SON, AND MILKO BALEV HAVE BEEN STRIPPED OF ALL OF THEIR POSITIONS AND VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR TITLES, AND FILIPOV, STAIOYANOV, ET AL CAN CONSOLE THEMSELVES WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT, FOR NOW AT LEAST, THEIR BCP MEMBERSHIPS ARE STILL INTACT.

14. (C) IN ADDITION TO EARLIER COMMENTS ON THE PERSONNEL CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE, WE ADD THE FOLLOWING:

- THE NEWLY-APPOINTED DEPUTY CHAIRWOMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, NADYA ASPARUCHKOVA, IS AN ETHNIC TURK. SHE HAS ALWAYS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE PARTY LINE WITH REGARD TO THE FORCED ASSIMILATION CAMPAIGN AND IS THEREFORE NOT CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BECOME A MAJOR FORCE FOR CHANGE. NEVERTHELESS, THE APPOINTMENT IS INTERESTING AND WORTH WATCHING, PARTICULARLY SINCE HER BRIEF WILL APPARENTLY CONTAIN "SOCIAL ISSUES" WHICH WILL TOUCH ON THE ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY.
- VLADIMIR BONEV, DISMISSED FROM THE STATE COUNCIL, IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HARDLINE FIGHTERS AGAINST FASCISM AND CAPITALISM UNION. THAT ORGANIZATION IS CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE THE LAST PRESERVE OF "OLD THINKING" IN THE COUNTRY.
O 151604Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8919
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 04 OF 04 SOFIA 06839

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: FIRST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION PREPARES TO

END COMMENT.
MONTGOMERY
1. (U) SUMMARY. AT A HASTILY CONVENED BUT WELL-PUBLICIZED RALLY ON 13 DECEMBER, BULGARIAN PRESIDENT AND RCP GENERAL SECRETARY PETUR MLADENOV ADDRESSED A CROWD OF 35,000 COMMUNISTS AND URGED THEM TO SUPPORT THE PARTY'S PROGRAM OF RESTRUCTURING, WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THAT IN THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY

2. (U) AT THE MEETING IN 9TH OF SEPTEMBER SQUARE, WHICH HAD BEEN FILLED TWENTY-FOUR HOURS EARLIER WITH APPROXIMATELY 12,000 CITIZENS DEMONSTRATING FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES, TWO OF THE SPEAKERS CLAIMED TO BE ADDRESSING 50,000 PEOPLE. IN HIS COVERAGE OF THE EVENT, THE "RABOTNIKESKO DELO" CORRESPONDENT WROTE THAT HE COULD NOT SAY HOW MANY ATTENDED, "WHETHER THERE WERE 100,000 OR 200,000." POLEC CHIEF AND HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER ESTIMATED THE CROWD AT 30-35,000.

3. (U) MLADENOV'S PRINCIPAL SPEECH OUTLINED THE GOALS OF THE PARTY AND THE DECISIONS OF THE PLenum, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING: TO HOLD A PARTY CONGRESS ON 19 MARCH 1990; TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE A MORE FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, BY THE END OF 1990; TO CREATE A PACKAGE OF MORE DEMOCRATIC LAWS; TO ORGANIZE MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY; AND TO REMOVE LANGUAGE WHICH GIVES THE BCP A "LEADING ROLE" FROM ARTICLE 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REGARDING THE LATTER, MLADENOV REMARKED THAT THE BCP "DOES NOT NEED" LAWS WHICH GUARANTEE ITS SUPREMACY. PLACARDS AT THE MEETING ECHOED HIS STATEMENT: "ONE READ, "BCP DOES NOT WANT LAWS FOR ITS POWER--IT HAS THE PEOPLE INSTEAD." ANOTHER READ, "EVEN WITHOUT ARTICLE 1, WE WILL BE FIRST!"

4. (U) AS THE PARTY AND THE COUNTRY SET OUT ON THE DIFFICULT COURSE OF RESTRUCTURING, MLADENOV SAID, "WE WILL MOVE TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ACCOMPLISHING PERESTROIKA IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IN PEACE AND COOPERATION, WITH OUR BALKAN NEIGHBORS, WITH EUROPE, AND WITH THE ENTIRE WORLD."

5. (U) MLADENOV AND MANY OF THE OTHER SPEAKERS, WHO INCLUDED A STUDENT, JOURNALISTS, AN ACTOR, AND WORKERS, TOLD THE CROWD THAT THIS WAS A GREAT, CRUCIAL, "WEIGHTY" (TO BORROW MLADENOV'S TERMINOLOGY) MOMENT IN BULGARIA'S HISTORY. GEORGI TAMBUDEV, A JOURNALIST WITH "RABOTNICH-E SKO DELO," SAID THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD WELCOME "THE TENTH OF DECEMBER 1989 LIKE THE 9TH OF SEPTEMBER 1944. POLITBURO MEMBER AND GENERAL DÖBRI DHUROV SAID THAT EVERY COUNTRY HAS ITS GREAT DATES AND THAT, IN

BULGARIA'S 1300 YEAR HISTORY, 10 NOVEMBER 1989 IS ONE OF THEM.


ALL COMMUNISTS, WORKING PEOPLE, AND YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN FROM SOFIA TO THE MEETING.

8. (C) YOUNG PEOPLE, HOWEVER, WERE NOTABLY ABSENT.
POLLOPS ESTIMATE THE AVERAGE AGE OF THIS CROWD AT APPROXIMATELY 50 YEARS OLD, OR 15 YEARS OLDER THAN THE

NNNN

PAGE 01 OF 02
SOFIA 06829 02 OF 02 151504Z EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00 DOD-00
H-01 NSCE-00 NSA-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10
PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 ACDA-12 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /050 W
R 151415Z DEC 89
PM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8910
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06829

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, BU, PHUM
SUBJECT: MLADENOV ADDRESSES PRO-COMMUNIST RALLY OF

AVERAGE FOR THE 18 NOVEMBER AND 10 DECEMBER MASS DEMONSTRATIONS OF INDEPENDENT GROUPS IN SOFIA.

SUCH AS THE OUSTED LEADERSHIP AND ITS "ADMINISTRATIVE-
COMMAND SYSTEM." PERHAPS THE MOST SPONTANEOUS AND
ENTHUSIASTIC REACTION OF THE CROWD WERE THE SHOUTS OF
"MORE, MORE" AFTER DZHIROV ANNOUNCED THAT ONE OF THE
DECISIONS AT THE PLENUM WAS TO STRIP TODOR ZHIVKOV,
HIS SON VLADIMIR, AND OUSTED POLITBURO MEMBER MILKO
BALEV OF THEIR BCP MEMBERSHIPS.

10. (C) WE ATTACH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
PARTY, WITH ALL ITS RESOURCES, COULD NOT ATTRACT A
GROUP LARGER THAN 35,000. IN CONTRAST TO THE RALLIES
OF THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS, THIS ONE HAD BEEN ADVERTISED
IN THE MEDIA IN ADVANCE AND ALL BKP MEMBERS "ENCOURAGED"
TO ATTEND. NEVERTHELESS, THE ATTENDANCE WAS LESS THAN
THE MAJOR INDEPENDENT MEETINGS. IT IS ALSO A SIGN
OF THE TIMES THAT THE COMMunist PARTY FEELS OBLIGED TO
FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS IN HOLDING
SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS. END COMMENT. MONTGOMERY
O 151552Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8913
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06838

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL-OADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU, PGOV
SUBJECT: 15,000 FORM ANTI-COMMUNIST HUMAN RING AROUND
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. (U) SUMMARY. IN WHAT IS PERHAPS A SIGN OF THE
BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S AWAKENING POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS,
CITIZENS HAVE HELD THEIR STRONGEST ANTI-COMMUNIST
DEMONSTRATION TO DATE. APPROXIMATELY 15,000
DEMONSTRATORS, WITH PERHAPS AS MANY AS 20,000 AT THEIR
PEAK, FORMED HUMAN RINGS AROUND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
AS IT BEGAN ITS OPENING SESSION ON THE AFTERNOON OF
14 DECEMBER. THE PROTESTORS SHOUTED ANTI-COMMUNIST
SLOGANS AND DEManded THE RESIGNATIONS OF ASSEMBLY
MEMBERS. LATER, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNION OF
DEMOCRATIC FORCES ADDRESSED THE CROWD, REPEATED THEIR
DEMANDS FROM THE MASS DEMONSTRATION OF 10 DECEMBER,

AND TOLD THE CROWD TO REASSEMBLE ON THE FOLLOWING EVEN-
ING. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS BEGAN EARLY IN THE AFTERNOON
WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND STUDENTS MARCHING TO THE ASSEMBLY
AND SETTING A BOISTEROUS TONE. BY THE TIME OF ITS
OFFICIAL START, THE PLANNED "HUMAN RING" AROUND SOFIA'S
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING HAD TURNED OUT TO BE NOTHING
LIKE THE SILENT VIGILS IN FRONT OF PGP HEADQUARTERS
EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THE CROWD SHOUTED AT THE UNSEEN

3. (U) THE MOST COMMON CRIES WERE RESIGNATION, "Mafia," "Mafiosi," "Zhivkovists," "Down with Article 1," "Down with the BCP," "Freedom," "Demagogues," and "Victory." Placards were widely spaced and impractical for a crowd on the move, but one featured a man riding backwards on a horse labelled "Perestroika." Another was a large drawing of the communist hammer and sickle, turned into a baseball bat and question mark, respectively.

4. (U) INSIDE THE HUMAN RING AND THE POLICE BARRICADES, A GROUP OF OPPOSITION LEADERS AND JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED TO MOVE AROUND AND ADDRESS THE CROWD. ZHELO

ZHELEV (CHAIRMAN, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES), DR. KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV (LEADER, PODkrepa), AND EMIL KOSHLUKOV (LEADER, INDEPENDENT STUDENTS SOCIETY) MADE THEIR WAY AROUND THE BUILDING TO SHOUTS OF "PODKREPA" AND "ZHELo, ZHELO." "LORD OF THE RING," ZHELEV SAID, "OUR MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY HAS BEGUN," AS HE SPOKE THROUGH A BATTERY-OPERATED MEGAPHONE.

THE NEW DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT TO EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY
AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS LED TO ONE OF THE LOUDEST
AND CATCHIEST CHANTS: "SOFIA, PRAGUE, BERLIN. SOFIA,
PRAGUE, BERLIN."

6. (U) ZHELEV AND SIMEONOVA DECLARED THE BRIEF
MEETING CLOSED, ANNOUNCED THE NEXT DAY'S DEMONSTRATION,
7. (U) ACCORDING TO A BULGARIAN PRESS AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT, MLADENOV HIMSELF APPEARED FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING DURING A BREAK IN THE SESSION AT APPROXIMATELY 2000 HOURS. HE AND ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN STANKO TODOROV TRIED TO ADDRESS THE CROWD, BUT THEY WERE SHOUTED DOWN. TODOROV SAID, "DO NOT ASK US TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION. WE ARE CIVILIZED PEOPLE, WE BELIEVE IN OUR STUDENTS, AND IN OUR YOUTH, BECAUSE THEY ARE OUR FUTURE." HIS WORDS WERE MET WITH RESOUNDING CATCALLS. MLADENOV THEN TOOK THE MEGAPHONE AND SAID, "I APPEAL TO YOUR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF BULGARIA." WHEN HE SAID THAT EXTREMISM WOULD RESULT IN TRAGEDY, THE CROWD SCREAMED, "TRAGEDY FOR YOU." WHEN HE IMPOURED THE CROWD TO MAINTAIN THEIR SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, THEY YELLED, "SHAME ON YOU." WHEN HE TOLD THEM THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD CONTINUE ITS WORK, THEY CHANTED, "RESIGNATIONS." FINALLY, HE TOLD THEM THAT THEY WERE "PUSHING BULGARIA ON THE ROAD TO RUIN."


9. (U) ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, THE DEMONSTRATORS CAME UNDER STRONG ATTACK IN THE OFFICIAL PRESS, WHICH CONDEMNED THE CROWD FOR ITS EXTREMISM AND "VULGARITY." BULGARIAN RADIO REPORTERS STATED "THIS IS NOT THE WAY TOWARD THE DESIRED CHANGES." EMIL KOSHLUKOV JOINED IN THE APPEAL FOR CALM BY
STATING ON THE RADIO THAT STUDENTS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE AT RALLIES AT WHICH SHOUTS OF "COME OUT, COME OUT," ARE ISSUED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER "NARODNA ARMIA" CARRIED AN ARTICLE DETAILING HIS PRISON SENTENCES FOR ANTI-STATE ACTIVITIES AND MILITARY "INSUBORDINATION" IN THE MID-1980'S.

10. (C) COMMENT. THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE STRONGEST DEMONSTRATION TO DATE. THE CROWD'S NAME-CALLING COULD PROBABLY NOT HAVE BEEN MORE SEVERE WITHOUT RESORTING TO VULGARITY. "Mafia, Murderers," and "Thieves" were heard frequently. Yet, despite Mladenov's and the Press' professed horror, by Western standards, this was by no means violent or threatening. The crowd and the militia were orderly and controlled in their actions, if not their words, as they have been at all demonstrations in Sofia so far.

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY
OUTSIDE THE RINGS AND INITIATED THE CHANTS.


SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 06841

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU

SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TAKES DEMOCRATIC, LIBERAL STEPS; MOVES TO REGAIN SOME OF LOST POWERS

REF: (A) SOFIA 6839; (B) SOFIA 6838

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT: THE AGREEMENT TO DECIDE ON THE POSSIBLE AUTONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AT THE JANUARY SESSION; THE DECISION NOT TO EXHIBIT PORTRAITS OF LEADERS IN PUBLIC PLACES; AND THE ADOPTION OF LAWS ON AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE AND ON AMNESTY. IT ALSO EXERTED NEWLY-FOUND MUSCLE AND ESTABLISHED A COMMISSION TO LOOK INTO A WIDE VARIETY OF MISDEEDS OVER THE PAST FORTY-TWO YEARS. THIS COMMISSION, HEADED BY LUKANOV, WILL TAKE THE PLACE OF ONE EARLIER ESTABLISHED BY THE ECP FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

END SUMMARY.

3. IN HIS SPEECH CLOSING THE SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMAN STANKO Todorov said that "at last the parliament assumed its legislative role." He concluded by stating that "our work will be continued by the next, tenth national assembly, which will be elected by a democratic way and in accordance with a new election law."

4. ON THE SECOND AND LAST DAY OF THE SESSION, THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN.

---

THE NEW HEAD OF STATE, PETUR MLADENOV, WAS APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY. TODOR ZHIVKOV WAS RELIEVED OF THE POST.

AT THE REQUEST OF MLADENOV, THE NEXT SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL DISCUSS AND DECIDE ON THE QUESTION OF GIVING AUTONOMY TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION. HE ADDED, "YESTERDAY WE HEARD THE MOTIVES." (COMMENT: MLADENOV WAS REFERRING TO THE UNPRECEDENTED DEMONSTRATION WHICH TOOK PLACE AROUND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION REPORTED IN REFTEL B.)

-- APPROPRIATE COMMISIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WERE TO REVIEW THE DECLARATIONS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (INCLUDING THE COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENSE OF REGIONS RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, AND INTELLECTUAL VALUES; UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES; THE INITIATIVE COMMITTEE IN SUPPORT OF RESTRUCTURING OF THE AGRARIAN PARTY; AND THE INDEPENDENT STUDENT ECGLASNOST ASSOCIATION) AND SUBMIT A REPORT AT THE NEXT SESSION.

-- ADOPTED THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP THAT PORTRAITS
OF LEADERS SHOULD NOT BE EXHIBITED IN STATE INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC PLACES (A REACTION TO THE PORTRAITS OF ZHIVKOV WHICH WERE HUNG VIRTUALLY EVERYWHERE).

-- ADOPTED LAWS ON AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE AND ON AMNESTY. (TEXTS TO BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY.)

-- ESTABLISHED A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION, HEADED BY MIRCHO SEMOV STAYKOV, TO EXAMINE AND REPORT TO THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY SESSION ON A PETITION, SIGNED BY A FEW THOUSAND RUSE CITIZENS CHARGING THAT PETUR PETROV, CURRENT MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION,
ARCHITECTURE, AND URBANIZATION NECESSITATED TO TAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE CITY ECOLOGICALLY.

-- ESTABLISHED A NATIONAL CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE BULGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.

-- ADOPTED AN AGENDA ON LEGISLATIVE AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN 1990.

-- OBSERVED ONE MINUTE OF SILENCE IN MEMORY OF TRAICHO KOSTOV, WHOSE REHABILITATION WAS JUST COMPLETED AT THE LAST BCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM.

5. RESPONDING TO THE OBVIOUS UNHAPPINESS BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY THAT ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION COULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY AMENDED TO ELIMINATE THE PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THE BODY ADOPTED A FORMAL RESOLUTION WHICH DESCRIBES THE MOTION TO ABOLISH THE PROVISION AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE ASSERTION OF POLITICAL PLURALISM AND BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTED TO THE RULE OF LAW. THE ASSEMBLY RESOLVED TO VOTE ON THIS AMENDMENT AT ITS NEXT SESSION IN JANUARY, 1990. THE FULL TEXT OF THIS DECLARATION WAS DISPLAYED PROMINENTLY ON PAGE ONE OF THE SATURDAY, DECEMBER 16 EDITION OF "RABOTNICHESKO DELO."


8. RESPONDING TO ONE OF THE MAIN COMPLAINTS OF ROGOLASNOY, THE ASSEMBLY VOTED TO SET UP A PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSION TO EXAMINE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE BUILDING OF THE RILA HYDRO-POWER AND MESTA HYDRO-TECHNICAL COMPLEXES. IVAN POPOV WAS NAMED CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH DEVELOPING A PROGRAM ON THE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND INTRODUCING IT TO THE ASSEMBLY BY THE END OF JANUARY.

9. THE ASSEMBLY VOTED TO HAVE THE BILLS ON MEETINGS, RALLIES, AND DEMONSTRATIONS AND ON CITIZENS' PUBLIC ASSOCIATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS AND TO VOTE ON THEM AT THE UPCOMING JANUARY SESSION. "RABOTníCHESKO DELO" PUBLISHED THESE BILLS ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 16. EMBASSY ANALYSTS WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

10. IN ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTS AND
O 161247Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSADY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8924
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 04 SOFIA 06841

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL.OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TAKES DEMOCRATIC,

SIGNAL OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY, THE
LEGISLATURE PASSED A STRONG RESOLUTION REGARDING
THE INCIDENT ON OCTOBER 2
0 DURING THE CSCE CONFERENCE
ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH ABOUT 30 MEMBERS OF
ECOGLASNOST WHERE BEATEN, FORCIBLY PUT ON BUSES,
AND TRANSFERRED AWAY FROM A PARK IN DOWNTOWN SOFIA.
THE RESOLUTION READS AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TAKES NOTE OF THE
REPORT OF THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
SECOND. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FINDS THAT CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY OFFICIALS EMPLOYED

PAGE 02 SOFIA 06841 03 OF 04 1612592

BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND OTHER ORGANS,
WHO HAVE THUS IMPINGED UPON THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
OF CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS. THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS THOSE ACTS AND INSTRUCTS THE
MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY
OF THE PERSONS Guilty OF COMMITTING THE VIOLATIONS
AND DEMAND RESPONSIBILITY FROM THEM.

THIRD. APPROPRIATE MEASURES MUST BE ADOPTED IN
ORDER TO RESTORE THE VIOLATED RIGHTS OF THE
CITIZENS AND REIMBURSE THEM FOR THE MORAL AND
MATERIAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ILLEGAL ACTS OF
THE RELEVANT ORGANS.

FOURTH. THE MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS MUST
INFORM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY THE END OF MARCH
1990 ON THE MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN ADOPTED, AND
ON THEIR RESULTS.

FIFTH. SIMULTANEOSTLY, IN CONNECTION WITH ACTIONS
THAT VIOLATED PUBLIC ORDER DURING MASS EVENTS,
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INSTRUCTS THE MINISTER OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS, TOGETHER WITH THE COMPETENT STATE ORGANS, TO ADOPT EFFICIENT MEASURES, ON THE BASIS OF AND WITHIN THE LAW, IN ORDER TO PREVENT AND ELIMINATE SUCH VIOLATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

11. PRIOR TO PASSING THE RESOLUTION, THE ASSEMBLY HEARD A DETAILED ACCOUNT BY MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TANEV ON THE INCIDENT. TANEV:


-- CLAIMED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE. (COMMENT: IF TRUE, THIS PROBABLY SAVED HIS JOB.)

-- STATED THAT HE AND MLADENOV HAD HAD TO PERSUADE Todor Zhivkov that security forces should not interfere with peaceful demonstrations and that Zhivkov resented the activity of the independent groups at the conference.

-- SAID THAT IT WAS AN "UNPLEASANT AND UNNEEDED INCIDENT."

-- SAID THAT ECOGLASNOST KEPT BEHAVING LOYALLY AFTER THE INCIDENT.

12. TANEV ALSO RELATED HOW MIKE POWER, A BRITISH RESIDENT JOURNALIST, HAD BEEN "SET UPON" BY STOYAN RANGELOV, A 64-YEAR OLD PENSIONER. DURING THE PROCESS, POWER'S CAMERA HAD BEEN KNOCKED DOWN. (COMMENT: TANEV WAS THEREBY STATING THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN THE WORK OF THE SECURITY FORCES.)

13. DURING THE COMMENTS ON THE REPORT BY VARIOUS MPS WHICH FOLLOWED, A WIDE VARIETY OF VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR WIDER POLICE POWERS AT PRESENT. ONE COMMENT WAS THAT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE MUST BE DIFFERENTIATED. MLADENOV INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT "THIS IS A VERY APPROPRIATE REMARK."

14. DOBRI DZHurov, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GAVE A REPORT ON THE MILITARY BUDGET, STRENGTH AND
CIAE-00  EB-00  DODM-00
HA-09  L-03  TRSE-00
INRE-00  SSC-01  OES-09
PRS-01  DS-01  P-02

O 161247Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8925
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 01 OF 04 SOFIA 06841
BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES
MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL: UADK
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TAKES DEMOCRATIC

EQUIPMENT. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY WOULD SPEND
1.6 BILLION LEVA IN 1989 AND COMPARED THAT TO THE
HIGHER BUDGETS SPENT BY NATO NEIGHBORS TURKEY AND
GREECE. HE SAID THAT AS OF OCT 1, THE ARMY HAS
204 AIRCRAFT, 51 HELICOPTERS, 72 LAUNCHING GROUNDS
FOR TACTICAL MISSILES, 2000 TANKS AND 2365 ARMORED
PERSONNEL CARRIERS. HE COMPARED THE 107,000
MAN ARMY WITH THAT OF THE MUCH LARGER TURKISH AND
GREEK ARMIES.

15. COMMENT. THE ACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SHOW THAT IT WAS RESPONDING BOTH TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNITY PARTY WITH REGARD TO
CONFIDENTIAL
CERTAIN LIBERALIZATION MEASURES AND ALSO TO THE
DEMANDS RAISED BY THE VARIOUS INDEPENDENT HUMAN
RIGHTS GROUPS. IN THIS REGARD, THE FIRM RESOLUTION
REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE
INTERIOR AND THE REQUIRED REPORT BY MINISTER OF
THE INTERIOR TANEV ARE VERY SIGNIFICANT. THE FIRM
DECLARATION OF INTENT WITH REGARD TO THE UPCOMING
ELIMINATION OF THE "LEADING ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY" FROM THE CONSTITUTION WAS OBVIOUSLY IN
RESPONSE TO CONCERNS THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAY
BE HEDGING ON THE ISSUE. ACTIONS TAKEN ON FREEDOM
OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION, PENAL REFORMS, AND
AMNESTY ARE ALSO IMPORTANT.

16. WHILE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS A VERY LONG
WAYS TO GO TO BECOME A TRULY REPRESENTATIVE,
INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING BODY, STEPS TAKEN
AT THIS SESSION SHOW THAT AT LEAST IT IS HEADING
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY
IN THIS REGARD WERE THE REFUSAL TO PASS AS LAW
THREE DECREES ISSUED WHEN THE ASSEMBLY WAS NOT IN
SESSION (SEE REFTEL A FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST
DAY OF THE SESSION); THE PLEXING OF MUSCLE IN
SEEING THAT THE COMMISSION SET UP TO REVIEW
POSSIBLE MISDEEDS IN THE PAST WAS DONE UNDER NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY AUSPICES AND NOT THE PARTY; AND THE
PUBLIC CALLING TO ACCOUNT OF THE MINISTRY OF THE
INTERIOR.

17. MUCH NOW REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE VERY NEAR
FUTURE. THIS INCLUDES FIRST AND FOREMOST THE
CREATION OF A LAW ON ELECTIONS. UNTIL THIS IS
COMPLETED, IT WILL REMAIN UNKNOWN JUST HOW FREE

THE MAY ELECTIONS WILL REALLY BE.
MONTGOMERY
SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06840

BRUSSELS FOR ASEC - AMB NILES

MUNICH FOR JEFFREY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: 10,000 WANDER IN SQUARE IN SCATTERED PROTESTS

REF: SOFIA 6830

1. (U) SUMMARY: THE EXPECTED LARGE TURNOUT FOR THE 15 DECEMBER FOLLOW-ON TO THE PRECEDING DAY'S DEMONSTRATION IN SOFIA DID NOT MATERIALIZE. HOWEVER, DESPITE GOVERNMENT WARNINGS AND SEVERE PRESS ATTACKS ON THE 14 DECEMBER DEMONSTRATORS, APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PEOPLE ASSEMBLED IN THE AREAS AROUND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING. THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS WERE UNFOCUSED, HOWEVER, AND MORE THAN HALF OF THE CROWD LEFT AFTER THE FIRST HOURS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PEOPLE GATHERED AROUND NEVSKI SQUARE, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING, AND THE MONUMENT TO THE RUSSIAN LIBERATORS AT 1700 HOURS ON 15 DECEMBER. FOR THE FIRST THIRTY MINUTES, FEW APPROACHED THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING. ZHELO ZHELEV (CHAIRMAN, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES) AND DR. KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV (LEADER, PODKREP) LED A GROUP AROUND THE MAIN STEPS OF NEVSKI CATHEDRAL. PETKO SIMEONOVA ADDRESSED A GROUP ON THE CATHEDRAL'S SOUTH SIDE, AND OTHERS GATHERED TO THE SOUTHWEST FOR A VIGIL FOR ANDREI SAKHAROV. EVENTUALLY, ALL

3. (U) ONE GROUP OF STUDENTS BROKE AWAY FROM THE CROWD AND MARCHED TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF BULGARIAN TELEVISION, WHERE THEY PROTESTED THE MEDIA'S ACCUSATIONS THAT THE 14 DECEMBER DEMONSTRATORS WERE "CRUDE," "VULGAR," AND TRYING TO INCITE RIOTS AND GENERAL CHAOS. THEY CARRIED A PLACARD READING, "THE GOAL OF DISINFORMATION: MANIPULATION."

4. (U) AS HE, RUMEN VODENICHAROV (INDEPENDENT SOCIETY LEADER, WHO HAD CALLED FOR QUIET REFLECTION ON SAKHAROV'S DEATH INSTEAD OF A DEMONSTRATION) AND EMIL KOSHLUKOV (LEADER, INDEPENDENT STUDENTS SOCIETY AND FEDERATION OF STUDENT ASSOCIATIONS) HAD DONE IN LOCAL MEDIA DURING THE DAY, ZHELEV IMPOURED THE PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE PEACEFULLY AND MAKE THEIR VOICE HEARD ONLY THROUGH THEIR PRESENCE AND QUIET PROTEST. HE CALLED FOR A MEETING OF "ALL DEMOCRATS" ON 16 DECEMBER AT 1100 HOURS. MOST OF HIS GROUP THEN LEFT THE SQUARE.

5. (U) ZHELEV'S MEETING IS NOT EXPECTED TO GARNER A LARGE CROWD. IN PART BECAUSE MANY ACTIVISTS WILL BE IN THE SOUTH PARK AND AT A MARCH TO THE PLACE IN SOFIA WHERE TRAICHO KOSTOV, A LEADING COMMUNIST, WAS EXECUTED IN 1949. (HIS REHABILITATION HAS RECEIVED WIDE ATTENTION RECENTLY, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE WIDE BELIEF THAT TODOR ZHIVKOV PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN HIS DEMISE.)

6. (C) COMMENT: THE DEMONSTRATORS OF THEIR LEADERS MAY HAVE BEEN INTIMIDATED BY DENUNCIATIONS OF THE
BUSES, EACH FILLED WITH MILITIAMEN, ALL WITHIN THREE HUNDRED YARDS OF THE BARRICADES. ALSO, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS, HE NOTICED WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LARGE CONTINGENCY (MORE THAN 100) OF PLAINCLOTHES SECURITY FORCES.


END COMMENT.

MONTGOMERY
USIA FOR EU PENDERGRAST

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: INFLUENCING CHANGE IN BULGARIA

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. WE WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENTAL GUIDANCE ON ASSISTANCE OR ADVICE WHICH THE INFORMAL GROUPS NOW FORMING IN BULGARIA CAN RECEIVE FROM U.S. PRIVATE AND SEMIOFFICIAL ORGANIZATIONS INTERESTED IN FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE. END SUMMARY.

3. WHILE WE HAVE BEEN ASKED FROM TIME TO TIME FOR XEROX SUPPORT AND OTHER LIMITED MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, THE EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ASKED FOR ANY KIND OF ADVICE OR GUIDANCE FROM THE VARIOUS INFORMAL GROUPS WITH WHICH WE HAVE CONTACT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE DEVELOPING POLITICAL SITUATION HERE MAY
NATIONWIDE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. IT MAY BE THAT AS IN OTHER EE COUNTRIES, PUBLIC HOSTILITY TO 43 YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE COULD MORE THAN OFFSET THE LACK OF RESOURCES AND EXPERIENCE OF NASCENT POLITICAL GROUPINGS. HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE LACK OF MEANS TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND IN THE ORGANIZATION OF MASS MOVEMENTS WILL PROBABLY BE THE GREATEST HINDRANCES TO THEIR ELECTORAL SUCCESS.

5. IF, AS MLADENOV HAS PROPOSED, ELECTIONS ARE HELD IN MAY, THE TIME IS SHORT FOR ANY OF THE INFORMAL GROUPS TO ORGANIZE EFFECTIVELY. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE USG INTEREST -- SHORT AND LONG-TERM -- TO BE ABLE TO INFORM SUCH GROUPS ABOUT THE KINDS OF ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE THEY MIGHT EXPECT OR EXPLORE FROM U.S. ORGANIZATIONS (PRIVATE AND SEMIOFFICIAL) INTERESTED IN FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE.

6. IN THIS GENERAL CONNECTION, WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY... IN THIS SAME CONNECTION, GEORGE SOROS HAS WRITTEN OUR PAO, WITH AN OFFER TO PROVIDE SIMILAR EQUIPMENT TO INFORMAL GROUPS, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE GROUPS HAVE EXPRESSED DEFINITE INTEREST.

7. IN ADDITION TO SUCH POSSIBILITIES, WE BELIEVE THERE IS MERIT INFORMING INDEPENDENT GROUPS ABOUT THE FUNCTIONS AND PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL COMMITTEES OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THE IDEAL FIRST STEP WOULD BE SHORT-TERM VISITS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATIONS TO EXPLAIN THEIR PROGRAMS AND HOW THEY CAN BE OF HELP. ALONG THIS SAME LINE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW IF THE U.S. TRADE UNION MOVEMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SIMILAR EFFORTS WITH PUDKKEFA AND, MUCH LESS LIKELY FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THE REGULAR BULGARIAN TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION, WHICH NOW ASSUMES ITS FULL POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM ANY PARTY.
8. IN TERMS OF INSTITUTION BUILDING, THE SIGNS ARE THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL BECOME, IN SOME FASHION, A PERMANENTLY FUNCTIONING LEGISLATURE. LIKE OTHER LEGISLATURES IN EE, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS NO EXPERIENCE OR CONCEPT OF STAFF WORK.
9. WHILE SOME OF THESE IDEAS MAY HAVE VALIDITY, WE RECOGNIZE THAT OTHERS MAY BE NON-STARTERS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING THE LACK OF FUNDING. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS HERE MERIT A COORDINATED, CLOSER LOOK AT WHAT WE CAN DO, OVER THE SHORT TIME, IN A PRACTICAL WAY TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE HERE AND TO EXPAND OUR CONTACTS WITH EMERGING DEMOCRATICALLY-INCLINED FORCES. THE EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON THE FOREGOING, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON PRACTICAL STEPS/PROGRAMS WE COULD DISCUSS WITH APPROPRIATE GROUPS HERE.

MONTGOMERY
Comrade Ion Stoian, Candidate Member of the Executive Political Committees of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC PCR), Foreign Minister,

1. We took note of your instructions (in your telegram nr. 20/016 750 of 17 December 1989) and we will conform to the orders given.

   We have taken actions to implement your instructions, both at the consular section of the Embassy and at the General Consulate in Kiev.

   [Furthermore] we would [like to] inform that the Director of the TAROM office [in Moscow] received, through his own channels, instructions regarding foreign citizens traveling to our country.

2. Considering the importance of the problem and the nature of the activity of issuing visas to Soviet citizens, we would like to mention the following problems [which have arisen], [problems] to which we would like you to send us your instructions as soon as possible.

   A. Beginning with the morning of 18 December of this year, Soviet citizens have begun to make telephonic inquiries to the Embassy from border crossings into Romania, implying that there are hundreds of vehicles which are not allowed to cross [the border] into our country. [We] anticipate that the Soviet government will ask for an explanation with regard to this decision taken [by the Romanian government]. We ask that instructions be sent explaining the way we must deal with the situation if it arises.

   B. Continuously, at the Consular Section, we have given transit visas to Soviet Jews who have the approval [of the Soviet government] to emigrate to Israel, as well as to foreign students studying in the Soviet Union. Since the director of the TAROM office has received instructions that he is to continue boarding transit passengers without any changes, we would like to request instructions with regard to the actions we must take in such situations.

   C. Considering the great number of Romanian citizens that are living in the Soviet Union who during the holidays travel to our country, we would like to know if we should issue them visas.

   D. For business travel to Romania, the instructions given to TAROM are that the applicants must show proof [of an invitation] from the ir Romanian partners.

      Please inform whether we must inform the Soviet government of this requirement since the official Soviet delegations use, for their travels to Bucharest, exclusively AEROFLOTs and that we have no means of [us] controlling the planning of such travels.

      We are experiencing similar problems in dealing with the possible situation of Soviet citizens with tourist passports, which have received a visa prior to the [17 December 1989] instructions and who will be using AEROFLOT for their travel to Romania.

   E. We request that the Civil Aviation Department send instruction to the TAROM office regarding the concrete actions that should be taken in connection with the 20 December flight [from Moscow to Bucharest] so that they are able to make the final decision, during boarding, regarding the passengers [that are to be allowed on to the plane].

      We would [like to] mention that the list of passengers is given to the Director of
TAROM, from AEROFLOT or other [travel] companies, without any mention of the purpose of the trip.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

Letter by People’s Representative and Candidate BCP CC Politburo Member
Andrey Lukanov to Stanko Todorov, Chairman of the People’s Assembly,

18 December 1989

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY, CDE. STANKO TODOROV

Comrade Chairman,

I would like to share several comments in connection with the accusations which
the People’s Representative Ognyan Doynov directed at me in his speech during the last
session of the People’s Assembly.

Before I dwell on these accusations, I would like to emphasize that I reject the
principal thesis which Ognyan Doynov developed at the end of his speech concerning the
equal guilt and culpability of all who worked under Todor Zhivkov—“both good and
bad.” This thesis could benefit only people with guilty consciences who would want to
hide their own concrete guilt and concrete deeds behind collective responsibility.

I am also dismayed at Ognyan Doynov’s statement that he has never been in
Todor Zhivkov’s retinue.

Lately, many of those who Todor Zhivkov promoted and set against the honest
people in the leadership of the party, and later removed according to his own reasons,
present themselves as his victims and even as fighters against his personal dictatorship.
Such is the case with the people’s representative Ognyan Doynov.

And now, about Ognyan Doynov’s accusations.

The first concerns my culpability for the increase of our foreign debt. Obviously,
all of us who were in the government carry such responsibility to some extent. I do not
believe Ognyan Doynov has forgotten that at the time when I was entrusted with the
duties of Secretary of the Politburo’s currency commission, together with all the
respective rights and authority, Bulgaria’s foreign debt was reduced from $4 billion in

Of course, no one should take personal credit for this because the sharp decrease
in debt was the result of a truly nationwide mobilization.

Grisha Philipov announced in 1984 on instructions from Todor Zhivkov that I was
not to deal with capitalist countries and currency problems any longer so that I could
concentrate my attention on relations with the member-countries of the COMECON.

Regardless of this, during the past few years as a member of the government, I
have opposed many times, with varying success, requests for an increase in the country’s
currency expenses and a respective increase in the interest on debt. Such requests were
made very often in connection with propositions for additional currency expenses by
Ognyan Doynov or other individuals whom he managed. My colleagues in the
government during these years can confirm this.

If we truly desire to be objective, we should also take into account that the reasons
for the increase in the foreign debt during the last few years are connected not only to the
deformations in economic policy, but also due to outside factors and domestic and
international conditions. [...] 

Analyzing Ognyan Doynov’s accusations and his whole speech, I ask myself what
motivated him to utter so many untruths at once. Knowing him well, I am convinced that
this is not accidental and is not due to a lack of knowledge about the true state of affairs. I come to the conclusion that in this case he is trying to place himself ahead of truthful revelation in order to present himself as a victim once again—this time a victim of the present party and state leadership. I am confident that this tactic will not hinder the clarification of actual facts, provided the requirements for objectivity and impartiality are fully adhered to.

As for me, I understand very well that I am one rather “inconvenient” witness to Ognyan Doynov because I am very well familiar with many of his risky projects and concrete actions due to the authority of the duties I performed.

He expressed doubts about my impartiality by voting against my appointment as chairman of the parliamentary commission for investigations and for resolving urgent issues related to deformation and violation of the law. Taking this into account, I have already asked the commission to relieve me of the obligation to deal with the cases concerning Ognyan Doynov. This will be performed by other members of the commission against whom he has not expressed reservations.

I will be grateful, esteemed Comrade Chairman, if you bring this letter of mine to the attention of the people’s representatives.

18 December 1989

With respect,

[signature]

Andrey Lukanov,

People’s Representative from the 248th Electoral Region of Sliven

[Source: Archive of the Bulgarian Parliament, Sofia. Document obtained by Jordan Baev.]
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01  SOFIA 06882 01 OF 03 191533Z

ACTIONstery

INFO  LOG-00  ADS-00  INR-05  SS-00  CIAE-00  DOD-00  H-01
    NSCE-00  NSA-00  HA-09  L-03  TRSE-00  PM-10  PA-02
    OMB-01  INRE-00  USIE-00  SP-02  SNP-01  PRS-01  P-02
    T 01  /038 24

R 191500Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8955

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: DECEMBER 16 - 18/89

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO," (RD) 16 DECEMBER

1. THIS EDITION CARRIES A REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE
   NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION ON 15 DECEMBER. THE FOLLOWING
   BILLS WERE DISCUSSED: THE BILL ON MEETINGS, RALLIES AND
   DEMONSTRATIONS; THE BILL ON PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
   CITIZENS; THE BILL ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE; A
   BILL ON AMNESTY.

2. THE PAPER GIVES SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE SPEECH OF
   MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS GEORGI TANEV CONCERNING
   ALLEGATIONS OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AGAINST THE MEMBERS OF
   THE INDEPENDENT GROUP "ECOLOGNOST". TANEV PLACES THE
   BLAME FOR THE FORCED REMOVAL OF THE INDEPENDENT GROUP'S
   MEMBERS FROM CRYSTAL PARK TO SOUTH PARK ON 26 OCTOBER ON
   THE ACTIVISTS THEMSELVES BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO OBSERVE
   CITY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THEIR PUBLIC GATHERING.
   TANEV ALSO CLAIMS THAT POLICE DID NOT USE PHYSICAL FORCE
   AGAINST THE ACTIVISTS, ONE OF WHOM, HE CLAIMS, PROSTRATED
   HIMSELF ON THE GROUND IN ORDER TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO THE
   UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02  SOFIA 06882 01 OF 03 191533Z

POLICE TO DO THEIR JOB AND ANOTHER OF WHOM BANGED HIS OWN
HEAD AGAINST A BUS. RD CARRIES THE FULL TEXT, IT STATES,
DUE TO HIGH INTEREST FROM READERS.

3. DEFENSE MINISTER DOBRI DZHUROV REPORTED THE BUDGET
   EXPENSES ON THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY. FOR 1989 THE SUM
   TOTAL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMY, SCIENTIFIC &
   RESEARCH WORK, PURCHASE OF ARMS AND CONSTRUCTION OF
   FACILITIES IS 1 BILLION 60 MILLION LEVS.

5. THE NEWSPAPER ALSO REPORTS ON THE RALLY COMMENORATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF BCP FUNCTIONARY TRAICHO KOSTOV WHO WAS ACCUSED OF BEING AN ENGLISH SPY AND OF HAVING ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS, AND WAS HANGED IN 1949. (NOTE: AT THE TIME, KOSTOV WAS ONE OF TWO HEIRS-APPARENT TO GEORGI DIMITROV. ZHIKOV IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN OPPOSED TO HIM AND TO HAVE SUPPRESSED FACTS ABOUT HIS FINAL DAYS.) THE RALLY WAS ATTENDED BY ANDREY LUKANOV, STANKO TODOROV, DIMITUR STANISHEV, AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS.

6. THE DISCUSSION CLUB (NOW OFFICIALLY KNOWN AS THE CLUB FOR GLASNOST AND DEMOCRACY) ORGANIZED ON DECEMBER 16 A MARCH COMMEMORATING THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03. SOFIA 06882 01 OF 03 1915332

TRAICHO KOSTOV.

7. THE BULGARIAN TEACHERS DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT PRESENTED A LETTER TO MINISTER OF EDUCATION ASEH MIADZHIOLOV, INSISTING ON A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF SALARIES IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION.

8. THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES ORGANIZED A VIGIL FOR THE LATE SOVIET ACADEMICIAN ANDREY SAKHAROV. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE CENTRAL LANE IN SOUTH PARK BE NAMED AFTER HIM. ACAD SHELUDKO (MEMBER OF THE CLUB) IS THE AUTHOR OF AN ARTICLE ABOUT A.SAKHAROV, DENOUNCING HIS PERSECUTION BY THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES IN THE RECENT PAST.

9. MORE THAN 250 STUDENTS FROM THE HIGHER TECHNICAL SCHOOL IN RUSE SET UP AN INDEPENDENT STUDENT SOCIETY WITH ITS OWN STATUTE, PROGRAM DECLARATION, AND POLITICAL PLATFORM. RD, P.5

10. PARTICIPANTS IN PUBLIC MEETINGS ON 15 DECEMBER IN STARA ZAGORA AND YAMBOL SUPPORTED THE NEW BCP LINE AND REJECTED THE "OUTRAGES" OF THE 14 DECEMBER MEETING AROUND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING IN SOFIA. PARTICIPANTS IN MEETINGS IN PLOVDIV AND SOFIA ALSO SHOWED CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF TOLERANCE AND THE "POOR POLITICAL CULTURE" SHOWN AT THE 14 DECEMBER MEETING. EMIL KOPLUHOV (LEADER, INDEPENDENT STUDENTS SOCIETY) DENOUNCES THE
"PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF REACTIONARY ELEMENTS AT THE DEMONSTRATION" IN ANOTHER ARTICLE. YET THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DECLARATION AGAINST THAT DEMONSTRATION WAS BOOED AT A MEETING IN PERNIK. ADDITIONALLY, SOFIA UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR D. DRAGANOV WRITES THAT HE CANNOT ACCEPT THE QUALIFICATION IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RDECLARATION THAT THE DECEMBER 14 MEETING SHOWED A LACK OF

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01  SOFIA  06882  02 OF 03  191935Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00  ADS-00  INR-05  SS-00  CIAE-00  DODE-00  H-01
NSCE-00  NSA-00  NA-09  L-03  TRSE-00  PM-10  PA-02
OMB-01  INRE-00  USIE-00  SP-02  SNP-01  PRS-01  P-02
T-01  /038 W

R 191500Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8956

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 06882

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV,PREL,PHUM,BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: DECEMBER 16 - 18/89

POLITICAL CULTURE.

11. BULGARIAN LAWYERS HAVE ESTABLISHED A UNION IN SOFIA. IT IS AN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION WHICH WILL DEFEND THE PROFESSIONAL AND CITIZENS RIGHTS OF ITS MEMBERS. THEY, ON THEIR SIDE, WILL PROTECT FROM VIOLATION THE RIGHTS OF THE CITIZENS. THE NEWLY ELECTED CHIEF PUBLIC PROSECUTIR EVTIM STOIMENOV INFORMED THE 400 PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONSTITUENT MEETING IN SOFIA THAT THE NEW REGULATIONS FOR PAY WILL BE EFFECTIVE AS OF JANUARY 1, 1990. IT WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT A NEW, DEMOCRATIC LAW ON LEGAL PROFESSION IS UNDER PREPARATION.
12. BULGARIAN CITIZENS WHO HAVE VISITED TURKEY OR HAVE 
EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO DO SO HAVE SENT COMPLAINTS TO 
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE THAT UNGROUNDED MEASURES HAVE 
BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BY LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS. 
IN THIS CONNECTION THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS SENT 
APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02       SOFIA 06882 02 OF 03 191935Z

"TRUD," 15 DECEMBER

---------------------------------------------

13. THE WORKERS AT "BULGARTSVEIT" TRADE ENTERPRISE VOTED 
AGAINST ITS FORCIBLE MERGE WITH A MONEY-LOSING NURSERY. 
IF THIS DECISION IMPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT 
CANCELLED, FLORISTS WILL GO ON STRIKE ON NEW YEAR'S EVE, 
THE WORKERS WARNED.

14. THE MEDICAL WORKERS AT THE THIRD WORKERS HOSPITAL 
VOTED FOR THE ELECTION OF A NEW TRADE UNION LEADERSHIP 
WHICH WILL REALLY DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS.

OTHER ITEMS

----------

15. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IN STANKE DIMITROV WERE 
CRITICIZED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN A MEETING ON 15 DECEMBER 
FOR THEIR FAILURES IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC HEALTH, HOUSING 
CONSTRUCTION, AGRICULTURE AND URBANIZATION, THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE "RILA" WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM WHICH BADLY 
eFFECTED THE ENVIRONMENT. A PROPOSAL WAS MADE FOR THE 
FORMATION OF A COMMISSION FOR INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPTION, 
MALPRACTICE, AND MISAPPLICATION OF PUBLIC MONEY. 
"VREMEN," 16 DECEMBER.

16. AT A MEETING ON DECEMBER 15 IN SOFIA, ZHELYO ZHELEV, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES, ANNOUNCED THAT 
AN AGREEMENT FOR AN OFFICIAL MEETING WITH STATE AND PARTY 
OFFICIALS WAS REACHED. THE MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 20 
DECEMBER. "ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME," 16 DECEMBER.

17. SOON THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE BULGARIAN TRADE 
UNION WILL PROPOSE A MEETING WITH THE INDEPENDENT TRADE 
UNION FEDERATION "PODREPA", DECLARED PETUR DULGEROV, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE CC / BULGARIAN "PADE UNIONS. "VECHEMNI 
NOVINI," 16 DECEMBER.
18. THE PUBLIC ACTIVIST RADENKO GRIGOROV TELLS ABOUT HIS CONFLICT WITH TODOR ZHIVKOV FOR WHICH HE WAS EXPULSED FROM THE CC/BCP. "VECHERNI NOVINI." 16 DECEMBER.


"VSYAKA NEDELIA, 17 DECEMBER"

20. IN THE WEEKLY TV SHOW "VSYAKA NEDELIA" ON DECEMBER 17, A BRIGADE LEADER FROM THE BULGARIAN RAILWAYS REJECTED, ON BEHALF OF ALL HIS COLLEAGUES, THE CLAIM THAT THE 12 DECEMBER TRAIN ACCIDENT WAS DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE ENGINE DRIVER (SEE PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE). HE SAID THAT IF
R 191500Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8957

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06882

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: FGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS: DECEMBER 16 - 18/89

THE REAL REASONS FOR THE ACCIDENT ARE NOT REPORTED AND IF NO MEASURES ARE TAKEN FOR RESOLVING THE GRAVE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF ENGINE DRIVERS AND OTHER RAILROAD WORKERS, THEN THEY WILL GO ON STRIKE FOR TWO HOURS ON 30 DECEMBER.

21. ALSO, IN AN INTERVIEW, ECOGLASNOST EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALEXANDER KARAKACHANOV REFUTED THE STATEMENTS OF INTERIOR MINISTER TANEV AND THE MAYOR OF SOFIA CONCERNING THE BEATINGS IN CRYSTAL PARK ON 26 OCTOBER (SEE PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE). KARAKACHANOV SAID THAT THE TWO MEN ARE LYING AND THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTRY INSTRUCTED MEDICAL AUTHORITIES NOT TO ISSUE REPORTS OF INJURY TO THE BEATEN ACTIVISTS WHEN THEY SOUGHT MEDICAL TREATMENT. OF THE MORE THAN 20 INJURED PEOPLE, ONLY KARAKACHANOV WAS GIVEN SUCH A STATEMENT FROM DOCTORS.

22. FINALLY, THE PROGRAM CARRIED INTERVIEWS WITH THE SON OF TRAICHO KOSTOV (SEE PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE) AND BORIS KHRISTOV, A FORMER BULGARIAN COMMERCIAL ATTACHE IN MOSCOW AND A CO-DEFENDANT AT KOSTOV'S TRIAL IN 1949. "NEDELIA"

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

SOFIA 06882 03 OF 03 191935Z

MODERATOR KEVORKIAN DECLARED THAT MANY PEOPLE TRIED TO PREVENT HIM FROM BROADCASTING THIS INTERVIEW.) POLANSKY
SUMMARY. EMBASSY OFFICERS ATTENDED A DEMONSTRATION IN GOTSE DELCHEV ON DECEMBER 16. THE CROWD OF OVER 5,000 WAS COMPRISED PREDOMINANTLY OF MALES, MOST OF WHOM WERE POMAKS AND TURKS. SPEAKERS STRUCK A CONCILIATORY NOTE, BUT WERE EQUALLY FIRM IN DEMANDS FOR THE RESTORATION OF NAMES AND THE RIGHT TO THEIR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES. WHEN IT WAS KNOWN THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY WERE PRESENT, OFFICERS WERE BESIEGED BY A FLOATING GROUP OF 100-150 PEOPLE EAGER TO TELL THEIR STORIES OF OPPRESSION. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) DAO AND USIS OFFICERS ATTENDED THE "MEETING" IN GOTSE DELCHEV, WHICH HAS A LARGE POMAK AND TURKISH POPULATION IN THE SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE. LARGE CROWDS OF POMAKS WERE SEEN WALKING TO GOTSE DELCHEV, PRESUMABLY FROM THE POMAK VILLAGES FIVE MILES OUT OF TOWN. THE POMAKS WAVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY AT THE DAO VEHICLE, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY KNEW THE U.S. DESIGNATION "DT-02".

3. (U) IN GOTSE DELCHEV THE UNIFORMED MILITARY...
WERE DIRECTING TRAFFIC TO PARKING AREAS NEAR THE STADIUM WHERE THE MEETING WAS TO BE HELD. THE TONE OF THE MILITSIA WAS VERY LOW KEY, EVEN FRIENDLY. ONE UNIFORMED MILITSIA SERGEANT EVEN DIRECTED THE EMBASSY VEHICLE TO "THE POLITICAL MEETING."

4. (U) THE MEETING WAS HELD IN A LOCAL STADIUM AND THE CROWD SEEMED SMALLER THAN IT WAS, DUE TO THE VAST EXPANSE OF GRASS AND SEATS. WE ESTIMATE THE CROWD AT OVER 5,000.

5. (U) BANNERS AT THE MEETING CALLED FOR THE RETURN OF MUSLIM NAMES, COOPERATION BETWEEN BULGARIA'S PEOPLES, UNITY, AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND RELIGION. ONE READ, "TODOR ZHIVKOV - AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY."

6. (U) SPEAKERS EMPHASIZED THE FACT THAT UNITY, NOT SEPARATION, WAS NECESSARY FOR BULGARIA. RUMEN VODENICHAROV (LEADER, INDEPENDENT SOCIETY; SPOKESPERSON, UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES) BEGAN THE SPEECHES BY NOTING THAT FOREIGN COUNTRIES WERE WATCHING BULGARIA WITH INTEREST. HE APPEALED FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AND FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, RELIGION, AND ASSEMBLY. DURING HIS SPEECH, KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV ARRIVED FROM SOFIA AND THERE WERE TUMULTUOUS CHEERS AS HE TOOK HIS PLACE. THROUGHOUT THE DAY THE MOST POPULAR CHANT WAS "PODKREPA."

7. (U) THE SECOND SPEAKER WAS A LOCAL POMAK FROM LUZHNI'TSA NAMED HADZHIEV. HE CALLED FOR FREEDOM FOR MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS, AND JEWS. "OUR HOME," HE SAID, "IS ONE - IT IS BULGARIA." HE SAID THAT WITHOUT OPPOSITION THERE IS NO DEMOCRACY. "LET US SING ONE SONG TOGETHER, AND LIVE FREE AND EQUAL IN DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA," HE IMPLORED. HE ALSO NOTED THAT A PETITION FOR THE MUSLIM RIGHTS HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITH OVER 60,000 SIGNATURES.

8. (U) AT THIS POINT IN THE PROCEEDINGS EMBOFFS LOST TRACK OF THE SPEAKERS: SOMEONE IN THE CROWD ASKED WHERE THEY WERE FROM, AND WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THEY WERE AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS THEY WERE SURROUNDED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MEETING BY A CROWD VARYING IN SIZE BETWEEN 100 AND 150, EAGER TO TELL THEIR STORIES OF REPRESSION.

9. (U) FOR OUR PURPOSES THE STORIES THEY TOLD CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES, PRE- AND POST- NOVEMBER 10. THE LITANY OF ATROCITIES WROUGHT
UPON THE POMAKS AND TURKS BY THE BULGARIANS SINCE THE TURN OF THE CENTURY IS ALREADY WELL DOCUMENTED.

10. (U) BEFORE NOVEMBER 10:

--THE MOSQUE IN THE VILLAGE OF BLADSKA WAS DESTROYED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INFO</th>
<th>LOG-00</th>
<th>ADS-00</th>
<th>AID-00</th>
<th>INR-05</th>
<th>EUR-00</th>
<th>SS-00</th>
<th>OIC-02</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIAE-00</td>
<td>EB-00</td>
<td>H-01</td>
<td>IO-19</td>
<td>NSCE-00</td>
<td>NSAE-00</td>
<td>L-03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAB-04</td>
<td>TRSE-00</td>
<td>PA-01</td>
<td>STR-18</td>
<td>SIL-01</td>
<td>INRE-00</td>
<td>RP-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP-02</td>
<td>SR-06</td>
<td>PRS-01</td>
<td>P-02</td>
<td>/084 W</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R 191456Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8953
DIA WASHDC
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USIA WASHDC 6346
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 06881

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

R.O. 12356: DEC. O/ADR
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: MUSLIMS MEET TO HEAR HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

A YEAR AGO.
--FINES FOR SPEAKING TURKISH REACHED 100 LEVA.
--DURING THE CIVIL MOBILIZATION 190 PEOPLE FROM KORNITSA, BREZNITSA, AND LUZHNITSA WERE "INTERNED", NOT USED FOR LABOR.
--RELIGIOUS CIRCUMCISION IS STILL NOT POSSIBLE.
--ONE MAN WAS FORCED TO BURY HIS FATHER AS A CHRISTIAN.
--WHEN SOMEONE APPLIES FOR A PASSPORT, WORD IS PASSED TO THE WORKPLACE AND THE PERSON IS FIRED.
--POMAK CHILDREN ARE REPORTEDLY GIVEN GRADES IN SCHOOL BASED ON THEIR VILLAGE OF ORIGIN.
--TEACHERS IN THE POMAK REGION HAVE BEEN FIRED AND IMPRISONED FOR TEACHING THE CHILDREN ABOUT THEIR HERITAGE.

11. (U) SINCE NOVEMBER 10: NOTHING HAS CHANGED ACCORDING TO THE DOZENS WHO SPOKE TO US. THEY HAVE LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN THE AUTHORITIES TO BRING ABOUT ANY IMPROVEMENT TO THEIR LOT.

--POMAKS ARE STILL DENIED PASSPORTS FOR FOREIGN TRAVEL.
--MAIL FROM AND TO TURKEY IS REGULARLY INTERCEPTED.
--ON DECEMBER 10, ONLY 2 OF 24 CARS FROM BREZNITSA, KORNITSA, AND LUZHNIKITA REACHED SOFIA FOR THE DEMONSTRATION. THE REST OF THE CARS WERE TURNED BACK BY MILITSIA WHO LEVELED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS AT THEM.
--BULGARIANS IN GOTSE DELCHEV HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN REQUIRED TO WORK A FULL DAY ON NOVEMBER 16 SO THEY COULD NOT ATTEND THE MEETING.
--THE DECEMBER 15, 1989, EDITION OF THE NEWSPAPER "MADANSKA TRIBUNA" CARRIED A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE TITLED "CLEAR POSITION" WHICH STATED "WHOEVER SPEAKS BULGARIAN LANGUAGE, CANNOT HAVE A TURKISH NAME."
--ONE WEEK AGO A PARTY SECRETARY IN A POMAK VILLAGE REPORTEDLY TOOK THE SCHOOL CHILDREN TO A MOSQUE AND HAD THEM BREAK THE WINDOWS. OTHER CHILDREN HAD BEEN COLLECTING MONEY FOR RENOVATING THE MOSQUE.

12. (U) THE ONLY POSITIVE NOTE WE HEARD WAS THAT IN SOME VILLAGES MOSQUES HAVE BEEN OPEN FOR TEN DAYS RUNNING. HOWEVER, IN OTHER VILLAGES MOSQUES ARE STILL CLOSED. IN STILL OTHERS, THEY ARE OPEN ONLY ON FRIDAYS.

13. (U) THE POMAKS AND TURKS PLACED FOR THE U.S. TO
APPLY PRESSURE TO THE BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT. "OUR ONLY HOPE IS FROM OUTSIDE," SAID ONE.

14. (C) COMMENT: THE POMAKS AND TURKS ARE BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE AND THE GOVERNMENT STILL SEEMS DETERMINED TO KEEP THEM SEPARATE FROM THE BULGARIAN MAJORITY. KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV IS CLEARLY A FAVORITE AMONG POMAKS AND PODKREPA SEEMS TO HAVE BROKEN THE ETHNIC BARRIER TO AN EXTENT NO OTHER GROUP HAS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AUTHORITIES PERMITTED THIS MEETING, WE ARE DISCOURAGED BY THE APPARENT LACK OF CHANGE IN THIS REGION. THE REPRESSION APPARENTLY STILL CONTINUES. IT SEEMS THAT THE GOB HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN MAKING SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THIS AREA.

15. (C) THERE IS MUCH TALK AND LITTLE ACTION. THE MINORITY GROUPS SEEM CONCILIATORY - THOUGH FIRM IN THEIR RESOLVE BUT THE GOB SEEMS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE NEGATIVE MAJORITY REACTION TO ANY FORM OF REDRESS (I.E. MERELY RETURNING TO THE STATUS QUO).

16. (C) THE WILLINGNESS OF THE POMAKS TO SPEAK WITH EMBOFFS, EVEN UNDER THE EYE OF OFFICIAL VIDEO CAMERAS, INDICATES THAT THIS GROUP IS LOSING ITS FEAR OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES. THIS IS A REGION WHICH HAS EXPERIENCED VIOLENCE IN THE PAST. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT FAIL TO ACT ON THE DEMANDS OF POMAKS AND TURKS THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER UNREST.
R 191456Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECKSTATE WASHDC 8954
DIA WASHDC
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USIA WASHDC 6347
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06881

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: UADK
TAGS: PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: MUSLIMS MEET TO HEAR HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

END COMMENT. POLANSKY

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification *** UNCLASSIFIED
O R 192121Z DEC 89
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMBASSADY SOFIA IMMEDIATE
AMBASSADY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

STATE 402530
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, UR
SUBJECT: SHEVARDNADZE'S ROLE IN ZHVIKOV'S OUSTER

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION, TOLD HA A/S SCHIFTER THAT (A) MLADENOV TOOK A GREAT PERSONAL RISK IN CHALLENGING ZHVIKOV AND (B) SOVIET FORMIN SHEVARDNADZE INTERVENED ACTIVELY IN SUPPORT OF MLADENOV. [ ] ADDED THAT THE MATTER WAS URGENT ENOUGH FOR SHEVARDNADZE TO INTERVENE QUOTE WITHOUT EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION UNQUOTE.

3. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INV/IPS/CR/BRRS Date: 11-21-97

RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY ( ) DENY IN PART
( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions ( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C Sec.
PA Exceptions ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C

Date Printed: 07/16/1997
DOC_NUMBER: 89STATE402530
CHANNEL: n/a
O 190005Z DEC 89 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL POLADS COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL MUNICH IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
SGCDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO LIVE OAK IMMEDIATE 0000
JOINTSTAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

UNCLASS STATE 401469

FOR PAA5 INFORM CONSULS GENEVA PASS NST AND CD DELS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRE
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE - DECEMBER 18, 1989

1. FOLLOWING ARE TODAY'S PRESS GUIDANCES OF EUROPEAN INTEREST. SPOKESMAN MARGARET TUTWILER WAS THE BRIEFER.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 401469

2. ROMANIA: DEMONSTRATIONS (VERBATIM EXCERPT)
Q: THERE ARE TENSIONS IN ROMANIA, REPORTS OF CITIZENS BEING KILLED, TROOPS ON ALERT. WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW THERE?

A: VIOLENT CLASHES BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES TOOK PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND IN A WESTERN ROMANIAN CITY. THE EVENTS WERE TRIGGERED BY THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPT TO FORCIBLY EVICT HUNGARIAN REFORMED CHURCH REVEREND LASZLO TOKES FROM HIS CHURCH PURSUANT TO A LOCAL COURT RULING WHICH ORDERED HIS TRANSFER TO A CONGREGATION IN ANOTHER TOWN.

SEVERAL HUNDRED MEMBERS OF TOKES' CONGREGATION APPARENTLY LAUNCHED A DEMONSTRATION DECEMBER 16 IN SUPPORT OF HIS REFUSAL TO VACATE THE CHURCH PREMISES. THE DEMONSTRATION APPARENTLY GREW IN SIZE AND TOOK ON AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT TONE.

ON SUNDAY, DECEMBER 17, GOVERNMENT SECURITY UNITS BRUTALLY PUT DOWN THE DEMONSTRATION WITH THE USE OF TRUNCHEONS, TEAR GAS AND WATER CANNONS. THERE ARE ALSO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF GUNFIRE. AT THIS TIME I CANNOT CONFIRM ANY CASUALTIES OR THE USE OF GUNFIRE.

Q: WHAT DOES THE U.S. THINK OF THESE DEMONSTRATIONS IN ROMANIA? THERE WAS NO --

A: OUR REACTION?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 401469

Q: YEAH.

A: SINCE THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, IT IS FOLLOWING THE TERRIBLY MISTAKEN COURSE OF USING SECURITY FORCES TO REPRESS A SERious MANIFESTATION OF POPULAR DISCONTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF THE CEAUSESCU REGIME.

WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY CRITICIZED THAT REGIME'S REPRESSION OF DISSERT AND DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS TO ITS PEOPLE. WE ARE ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF THE USE OF FORCE BY THE ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES AGAINST REVEREND TOKES' WHO, WITH THE OVERWHELMING SUPPORT OF HIS CONGREGATION, WAS SEEKING
TO EXERCISE HIS RELIGIOUS RIGHTS.

OUR EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST HAS REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO VISIT
AND TALK WITH REVEREND TOKES', BUT SUCH VISITS HAVE BEEN
PREVENTED BY SECURITY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED AROUND HIS CHURCH
AND HOME. WE CALL UPON THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT TO CEASE
ITS PRESSURE AGAINST REVEREND TOKES' AND HIS CONGREGATION
AND ALLOW HIM TO EXERCISE HIS FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM TO
COMMUNICATE.

Q: SINCE WE'VE BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO COMMUNIST CONCESSIONS
IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WHEN WE SEE THE PROTEST
MOVEMENT GROWING -- IT'S HAPPENED IN FIVE COUNTRIES -- ANY
INDICATION THAT ROMANIA IS BEGINNING TO MAKE ANY
OVERTURES, ANY CONCESSIONS?

A: I WOULDN'T WANT TO SPECULATE WITH YOU.

Q: MARGARET, THE ROMANIANS ARE SEALING THE BORDERS,
APPARENTLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP NEWS FROM GETTING OUT.
DO YOU HAVE -- DOES THAT CONCERN YOU? DOES THAT SEEM LIKE
AN OMNIOUS DEVELOPMENT?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04  STATE  401469

A: OF COURSE, IT WOULD CONCERN US, AND, OF COURSE, JUST
AS IN ALL THE OTHER COUNTRIES, WE ARE FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION OF THOSE PEOPLE. THIS IS NO DIFFERENT
IN ROMANIA THAN IT HAS BEEN IN ANY OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES,
AND WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY SUPPORT THE PEOPLE IN THEIR EFFORTS
-- THAT'S WHAT THE PEOPLE ARE DOING TOWARDS PEACEFUL
CHANGE.

Q: HAS THE EMBASSY MADE ANY REPRESENTATIONS --

A: OUR AMBASSADOR RIGHT NOW IS DETERMINING WHAT FORM OUR
PROTEST WILL TAKE.

Q: YOU INTEND THEN TO MAKE A PROTEST?

A: EXCUSE ME?

Q: YOU INTENDED THEN TO MAKE A PROTEST?

A: YES. WHAT THEY'RE DETERMINING RIGHT NOW IS WHAT FORM
IT WILL TAKE...

Q. MAY I COME BACK TO ROMANIA?

A: SURE.

Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE AMERICAN-ROMANIAN RELATIONS AT THIS STAGE, AND WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS YOU MENTIONED YOU ARE ENVISAGING NOW IN LIGHT OF THIS DEVELOPMENT?

A: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS?

Q: WELL, WHAT CAN YOUR GOVERNMENT DO?

A: OUR GOVERNMENT CAN DO WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT DOES IN MANY PLACES ALL AROUND THE WORLD IS TO STAND FOR FREEDOM, FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY, FOR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS -- TO PURSUE YOUR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. I DON'T EXACTLY KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN. I MEAN, THAT'S WHAT WE STAND FOR. THAT'S WHAT WE'RE DOING THERE.

Q: NO. I'M AWARE OF THAT. I WAS WONDERING WHAT SPECIFICALLY COULD DO OR YOU THINK WOULD BE ABLE TO DO IN ROMANIA TO CHANGE THIS --

A: . . . I THINK WE CAN DO IS WHAT WE'VE DONE IN OTHER COUNTRIES, AS THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE DONE IS CALL OUT FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE, FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF THESE PEOPLE, TO STAND UP AND ENUNCIATE OUR VALUES THAT WE'VE STOOD FOR, FOR 200 YEARS.

Q: I AM WONDERING ARE YOU GOING TO HAND OVER A DEMARCHE, OR ARE YOU CONTEMPLATING SOME MEASURES, ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS, WHATEVER? WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO HELP HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVED IN ROMANIA?

A: THAT WOULD BE SPECULATIVE FOR ME TO DO WITH YOU. AS I MENTIONED, AND I'LL STATE AGAIN FOR YOU, OUR AMBASSADOR IS DETERMINING RIGHT NOW AS WE'RE BRIEFING, OR WHATEVER TIME IT IS THERE, WHAT FORM OUR PROTEST WILL TAKE. (END VERBATIM EXCERPTS)
3. POLAND: NEW ECONOMIC PACKAGE (VERBATIM EXCERPT)

Q: WOULD YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE POLISH ECONOMIC PLAN WHICH WAS PUBLISHED YESTERDAY? AND, SECONDLY, DO YOU HAVE ANY NEWS OF INFORMATION ON THE PREPARATION OF A VISIT BY UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 ... STATE 401469

JARUZELSKI TO THE UNITED STATES?

A: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ON THE UPCOMING VISIT. ON THE NEW ECONOMIC PACKAGE, WE UNDERSTAND THAT MAZOWIECKI'S GOVERNMENT HAS INTRODUCED SEVERAL NEW ECONOMIC LAWS TO THE POLISH PARLIAMENT YESTERDAY. THESE LAWS ARE DESIGNED TO TRANSFORM POLAND FROM A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY TO A MARKET-ORIENTED ONE.

THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFED THE G-24 LAST WEEK ON POLAND'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM, AND SECRETARY BAKER DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT AT LENGTH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN HIS BILATERAL WITH HIM IN BRUSSELS. THIS IS WHY THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY 850 MILLION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND, PLUS ANOTHER APPROXIMATELY 200 MILLION FOR A BRIDGE LOAN.

WE SUPPORT POLAND'S EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE LAWS, THE MAZOWIECKI GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC POLICIES IN ORDER TO TRANSFORM THE POLISH ECONOMY. (END VERBATIM)

4. CENTRAL AMERICA: UN PROPOSAL FOR US/USSR/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT (VERBATIM EXCERPT)

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON THE REPORT IN THE TIMES ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS ASKING THE UNITED STATES TO GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA?

A: ASKING THE UNITED STATES TO GET DIRECTLY INVOLVED?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Q: AND SOVIETS AND CUBA AND OTHER EXTRA-REGIONAL COUNTRIES.

A: THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DIALOGUE ON CENTRAL AMERICA. BOTH SIDES HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE ESQUIPULAS PEACE PROCESS. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT CUBA STOP SUPPLYING NICARAGUA WITH WEAPONS, AND THAT NICARAGUA STOP SUPPLYING THE FMLN WITH THEIR CUBAN-SUPPLIED WEAPONS.

IT IS TIME FOR CUBA TO STOP ACTING LIKE A RENEGADE NATION. ON JANUARY 1, CUBA WILL BECOME A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT NEEDS NOW TO BEGIN ACTING IN A WAY CONSISTENT WITH THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY IT WILL BEAR IN THE COUNCIL FOR HELPING PROMOTE PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA BY FULL ADHERENCE TO THE ESQUIPULAS PROCESS.

Q: MARGARET, COULD I --

Q: FOLLOW-UP ON THE SAME QUESTION: IS CUBA ON THE LIST OF STATES SPONSORING TERRORISM AT THIS TIME?

A: I DON'T KNOW. I'LL LOOK FOR YOU...

Q: CAN I GO BACK TO THAT QUESTION: HAS THE UNITED STATES BEEN ASKED OR APPROACHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH TALKS AS REFERRED TO IN THE TIMES' ARTICLE?

A: NOT THAT I'M PERSONALLY AWARE OF...

Q: GOING BACK TO THE CUBA -- U.S.-SOVIET TALKS AND THE CUBA FUNNELING OF EQUIPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IS IT STILL THE CASE FOLLOWING THE MALTA SUMMIT THAT, AS PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY BAKER HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, UNCLASSIFIED

UN CLASSIFIED

PAGE 08    STATE 401469

THAT BEHAVIOR OF -- SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CENTRAL AMERICA IS STILL THE LARGEST SINGLE OBSTACLE TO AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS?
A: ABSOLUTELY.

Q: SO YOUR FOCUS ON CUBA AS BEING THE RENEGADE NATION IN THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT REFLECT ANY AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING REACHED WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON WHAT THE PROBLEMS ARE IN CENTRAL AMERICA? OR DOES IT?

A: WHAT DO YOU MEAN?

Q: WELL, I GUESS I'M ASKING WHETHER YOUR FOCUS ON CUBA AS BEING A RENEGADE NATION SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION -- THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION MAY HAVE DECIDED, CONCLUDED, THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT HAVING NOT AS MUCH CONTROL AS THE U.S. THINKS ARE ACCURATE.

A: WITHOUT SAYING WHAT THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE CONCLUDED, WE HAVE -- OUR POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED, AND I BELIEVE THE SECRETARY HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT ON SATURDAY ANSWERED THIS QUESTION ONCE AGAIN ABOUT THE SHIPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS IN THIS AREA DOES REMAIN THE BIGGEST IRRITANT -- THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE COULD DO MORE HARM TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

Q: I GUESS I'M TRYING TO SEE WHETHER YOU'RE SHIFTING SOME OF THE RESPONSIBILITY HERE, OR WHETHER THAT'S NOT THE CASE. UP TO NOW --

A: NOT REALLY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 -- STATE 401469

Q: -- YOU'VE ALWAYS HELD THE SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR THOSE SHIPMENTS TO A LARGE EXTENT. THIS STATEMENT MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THAT AND SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT IT IS CUBA THAT'S SORT OF RUNNING OFF ON ITS OWN IN DOING THESE THINGS.

A: THE REASON IT DOESN'T IS BECAUSE WE ANTICIPATED, TO BE HONEST WITH YOU, THE WAY THE QUESTION WOULD COME WOULD BE FOCUSED ON CUBA.

(END VERBATIM EXCERPT)

5. USSR: ANDREI SAKHAROV FUNERAL (NOT USED)
Q: WHO REPRESENTED THE U.S. AT DR. SAKHAROV'S FUNERAL IN MOSCOW?

A: -- THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, JACK F. MATLOCK, JR., REPRESENTED THE UNITED STATES IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDENT'S REPRESENTATIVES. SAKHAROV'S FAMILY REQUESTED THAT HE PARTICIPATE IN TWO OF THE PUBLIC EVENT BEFORE THE BURIAL.

Q: WHY WASN'T SOMEONE FROM WASHINGTON SENT?

A: -- AMBASSADOR MATLOCK IS THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN MOSCOW AND HAS KNOWN DR. SAKHAROV AND HIS FAMILY FOR MANY YEARS.

6. SECRETARY MOSBACHER'S CALL FOR EASING COCOM RESTRICTIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE (NOT USED)

Q: ANY COMMENT ON SECRETARY MOSBACHER'S CALL ON SUNDAY'S "MEET THE PRESS" FOR RELAXING RESTRICTIONS ON HIGH TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPE?

A: -- AS SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS LAST FRIDAY, WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES TO HELP EASTERN EUROPE TRANSFORM THEIR SOCIETIES INTO SYSTEMS BASED ON POLITICAL PLURALISM AND FREE MARKET ECONOMIES. AS THAT PROCESS UNFOLDS, ADAPTATION OF COCOM POLICIES MAY BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE. EXPORT CONTROLS ARE APPLIED MULTILATERALLY, IN CONCERT WITH OUR ALLIES. ANY CHANGES IN CURRENT ARRANGEMENT CAN ONLY BE MADE AFTER CONSULTATION AND FULL AGREEMENT WITH OUR COCOM PARTNERS.

THE SECRETARY SAID IN BRUSSELS:

-- "THIS DOES NOT IMPLY A "SOFTENING" OF COCOM RULES."

-- "WE STILL WANT TO PROTECT STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY, BUT WE SHOULD RATIONALIZE THE SYSTEM TO THE EXTENT THAT THINGS
THAT ARE TO SOME EXTENT AVAILABLE OFF THE SHELF SHOULD NOT
BE LOCKED UP, ESPECIALLY AT THIS TIME OF REFORM IN EASTERN
EUROPE."

THE PRESIDENT SAID IN ST. MARTINS

-- I THINK IT IS TIMELY THAT WE TAKE A NEW LOOK AT SOME OF
THE COMMERCIAL CONSTRAINTS.

7. USSR (VERBATIM EXCERPT)

Q: MARGARET, BY CONTRAST TO THIS STATEMENT YOU MADE
CONCERNING THE POLISH ECONOMIC REFORMS, DOES SECRETARY
BAKER STAND BY THE STATEMENT THAT HE MADE ON FRIDAY,
CHARACTERIZING THE APPARENT RETREAT FROM PERESTROIKA MADE
AT THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK
AS DISAPPOINTING, AND DO YOU FEEL THAT THAT DOES HURT THE
SOVIET UNION'S CHANCES OF PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY ORGANIZATIONS?

A: WITHOUT ACCEPTING ALL THE WAYS YOU'VE CHARACTERIZED
WHAT SECRETARY BAKER SAID, THE GIST OF YOUR QUESTION IS,
DOES THE SECRETARY STILL BELIEVE IN WHAT HE SAID, LESS
THAN 48 HOURS AGO? THE ANSWER IS YES. (LAUGHTER)
(END VERBATIM)

8. COUNTERTERRORISM REWARD INCREASE (NOT USED)

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WISHES TO ANNOUNCE A SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE IN THE REWARD AVAILABLE TO ANY PERSON WHO
FURNISHES INFORMATION THAT LEADS TO THE PREVENTION,
FRUSTRATION, OR FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF A TERRORIST ACT
AGAINST U.S. PERSONS OR PROPERTY. THE INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT, WHICH PRESIDENT BUSH SIGNED ON
DECEMBER 13 RAISES THE REWARD CEILING FROM FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS TO TWO MILLION DOLLARS. WE BELIEVE THIS
INCREASE WILL STRENGTHEN U.S. EFFORTS TO PREVENT TERRORIST
ATTACKS AND WILL HELP BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE.
PERSONS OVERSEAS WITH TERRORISM INFORMATION SHOULD CONTACT

Page - 9
Q: WHAT PROMPTED THE INCREASE?

A: -- THE LEGISLATION WAS PROMPTED BY THE TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST PAN AM 103 LAST YEAR.

Q: HAS ANY REWARD MONEY BEEN PAID TO DATE?

A: -- NO REWARD MONEY HAS BEEN PAID TO DATE, BUT WE ARE PRESENTLY CONSIDERING PAYING REWARDS TO INDIVIDUALS IN SEVERAL CASES.

Q: WHAT ARE THE CASES UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR THE REWARDS?

A: -- ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE REWARDS PROGRAM IS THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONS WHO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON TERRORIST INCIDENTS. ACCORDINGLY, WE CANNOT PROVIDE SPECIFICS ON THE CASES PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION.

9. INVESTIGATION OF FELIX BLOCH (NOT USED)

Q: HAS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION OF FELIX BLOCH BEEN DROPPED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM?

A: NO. THE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX BLOCH CONTINUES. I REFER YOU TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOR ALL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THIS INVESTIGATION.

Q: WHAT IS BLOCH'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 13   STATE 401469
A: FELIX BLOCH REMAINS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE WITH PAY.

10. US AMBASSADOR TO GREECE IN US? (VERBATIM EXCERPT)

Q: ON GREECE. YOUR AMBASSADOR TO GREECE, MR. MICHAEL SOTIRHOS, IS IN WASHINGTON TODAY. I'M WONDERING, WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT?

A: HE'S PROBABLY BACK HERE ON NORMAL CONSULTATIONS.

Q: ONE MORE QUESTION: ACCORDING TO RELIABLE SOURCES, THE EX-KING OF GREECE, MR. KONSTANTINE GLYXBourg, IS IN THE U.S. TOO. SINCE MR. GLYXBourg LAST WEEK EXPRESSED TO THE NEW YORK TIMES HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO GREECE SOON CREATED A NEW POLITICAL TURMOIL. I'M WONDERING, NUMBER ONE, IF AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS DURING HIS VISIT IN WASHINGTON IS GOING TO DISCUSS THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE. NUMBER TWO, IF HE IS GOING TO HAVE ANY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE EX-KING?

A: SINCE I WASN'T AWARE THAT OUR AMBASSADOR WAS IN WASHINGTON, WE SAW HIM AT THE CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING IN BRUSSELS. I BELIEVE THAT WAS FRIDAY MORNING. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR ME TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS FOR YOU.

Q: WOULD YOU TAKE MY QUESTIONS?

A: I'LL LOOK INTO IT. (END VERBATIM EXCERPT)

11. AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS (TAKEN QUESTION)

Q: IS AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS IN THE UNITED STATES AND HAS HE TALKED WITH THE EX-KING OF GREECE WHO IS ALSO IN THE U.S.?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 14  STATE  401469

A: -- AMBASSADOR SOTIRHOS IS CURRENTLY IN THE U.S. ON ROUTINE CONSULTATIONS.

-- THE AMBASSADOR HAS NEVER MET OR TALKED WITH FORMER-KING CONSTANTINE.
THE AMBASSADOR HAS NO PLANS TO MEET OR TALK WITH THE FORMER KING.

---

12. EAGLEBURGER MEETING (VERRATIM EXCERPT)

---

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING ON MR. EAGLEBURGER'S MEETING THIS MORNING? WAS HONG KONG DISCUSSED?

A: I'M NOT EVEN SURE -- WHO DID LARRY MEET WITH THIS MORNING?

Q: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES.

A: NO. I WASN'T AWARE THAT LARRY WAS MEETING WITH HIM. I'M SURE THE SUBJECT CAME UP. I MEAN, IT WOULD BE KIND OF FAR-FETCHED IF IT DIDN'T.

Q: MARGARET, DO YOU HAVE ANY MORE COMMENT ON THE --

A: EXCUSE ME. AND I'M SURE LARRY REITERATED TO HIM WHAT OUR POLICY IS, AS WE PUT OUT LAST WEEK, AND AS SECRETARY BAKER DID. THAT HASN'T CHANGED. AND AS SECRETARY BAKER HAD WITH HIS DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HURD LAST MONDAY WHEN WE WERE IN LONDON.

---

PAGE 15

STATE 401469

13. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

BAKER
Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest) to all Embassies

19 December 1989

Cde. Chief of Mission,

In case you are asked during the exercise of your diplomatic attributes (we repeat: only in case you are asked) about the so-called events taking place in Timisoara, reiterate, with all clarity, that you have no knowledge of such events. After this short answer, and without allowing you to be drawn into a prolonged discussion, resolutely present the following:

We strongly reject any attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of S.R. Romania, a free and independent state. [We reject] any attempt to ignore the fundamental attributes of our national independence and sovereignty, any attempt at [harming] the security interests of our country, of violating its laws. The Romanian [government] will take strong actions against any such attempts, against any actions meant to provoke or cause confusion, [actions] initiated by reactionary circles, anti-Romanian circles, foreign special services and espionage organizations. The [Romanian] socialist state, our society, will not tolerate under any circumstances a violation of its vital interests, of the Constitution, and will take [any] necessary action to maintain the strict following of the letter of the law, the rule of law, without which the normal operation of all spheres of society would be impossible. No one, no matter who he is, is allowed to break the laws of the country without suffering the consequences of his actions.

Instruct all members of the mission to act in conformity with the above instructions. Inform [the Minister of Foreign Affairs] immediately of any discussions on this topic.

Aurel Duma [Secretary of State, MFA]

SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06889

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, BU, TU
SUBJECT: THE BULGARIAN ETHNIC TURK PROBLEM:
- STRAWS IN THE WIND?

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. WHILE THUS FAR THE MLADENOV REGIME HAS MADE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN THE OVERALL BULGARIAN POLICY OF FORCED ASSIMILATION OF ITS ETHNIC TURKISH MINORITY, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SIGNS THAT IT MAY ADOPT A MORE FORTHCOMING APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. THESE INCLUDE WILLINGNESS TO PERMIT DIRECT TELEPHONE DIALING TO AND FROM TURKEY; ESTABLISHMENT OF A PARTY COMMISSION TO ANALYZE THE PROBLEM AND PROPOSE SOLUTIONS; APPOINTMENT OF AN ETHNIC TURK TO THE POSITION OF DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS; PUBLISHED INFORMATION THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO TREAT RETURNING ETHNIC TURKS MORE FAVORABLY; AND PERMITTING THE CHIEF MUFTI ACTUALLY TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF BULGARIAN MUSLIMS. THE

3. THE LINE TAKEN IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS BY SENIOR BULGARIAN LEADERS WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS AND VISITING USG OFFICIALS REGARDING THE BULGARIAN ETHNIC TURKISH PROBLEM HAS WITHOUT EXCEPTION BEEN AS FOLLOWS: THE PROBLEM IS A VERY SERIOUS ONE; WE
MADE MISTAKES IN THE PAST: WE WANT TO RESOLVE IT 
AND WANT TO HAVE A BETTER RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY; 
BUT WE NEED TIME. THEY CONSTANTLY ASSERT THE PROBLEM 
is very complex and that the incidents of the past 
summer have raised emotions all around which must be 
CALMED BEFORE ANYTHING MAJOR CAN BE DONE.

4. SPEECHES MADE AT THE DEC 11-12 CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
PLENUM ECHO THE ABOVE POSITION:

-- BOYKO DIMITROV, NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, MADE A 
VERY HARD HITTING SPEECH WHICH DEALT WITH THE 
collective responsibility of the central committee 
for what had occurred in Bulgaria. He ended his 
speech as follows: "LET ME JUST SAY A FEW WORDS 
ABOUT A SPECIFIC ISSUE. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS 
SPECIAL SATISFACTION WITH AND SUPPORT OF THE FACT 
THAT IN ITS REPORT, THE POLITIBURO TOOK A CLEAR 
STAND ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF CONDUCTING A PROFOUND 
AND COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF SUCH A FATEFUL ISSUE FOR OUR DOMESTIC STABILITY 
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, AS THE ETHNIC ISSUE. 
I BELIEVE THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH

-- DIMITUR STANISHEV, ALTERNATE POLITIBURO MEMBER, 
said that there is a need to develop a new policy 
of the BCP oriented toward consolidation of the 
entire Bulgarian people, toward broad open dialogue 
with representatives of all groups of the population, 
the Muslim included, for overcoming of the hitherto 
distortions.

-- ALEKSANDUR LILOV, NEW POLITIBURO MEMBER, AT A 
RELATED PRESS CONFERENCE, SAID THAT THE "RIGHT 
solution will be sought on the basis of the present-
day concept of human rights, by preserving Bulgaria's 
national interests." HE SAID, "WE CANNOT AFFORD 
ANY IMPROVISATIONS." HE ALSO SAID THAT "WE UNDERSTAND 
THAT THE DETERIORATION OF BULGARO-TURKISH RELATIONS 
is to the interest of neither party nor to the 
interest of the Balkans. We want to maintain good 
neighborly relations with Turkey. We are willing 
to continue the dialogue and will seek to extend 
it in order to take bilateral relations out of their 
present situation."
5. The resolution passed at the Plenum contained the following statement:

"The Plenum is of the opinion that the Party policy for consolidation of the people must be based on the full equality before the law of all Bulgarian citizens."

SECTION 02 OF 03 SOFIA 06889

6. All of the above statements and even the establishment of the Party Commission can be viewed..."
IN A VARIETY OF WAYS. DEPENDING ON HOW ONE ASSESSES THE MOTIVATION OF THE NEW BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT, THERE HAVE, HOWEVER, BEEN A NUMBER OF SIGNS INDICATING THAT MLADENOV AND COMPANY ARE TAKING A DIFFERENT APPROACH THAN ZHIVKOV AND COMPANY TO THE PROBLEM. THEY INCLUDE:

-- ON DECEMBER 12 THE GOB ANNOUNCED ITS WILLINGNESS TO INTRODUCE DIRECT TELEPHONE DIALING BETWEEN BULGARIA AND TURKEY. THIS SERVICE, WHICH HAS BEEN IN PLACE WITH ALMOST EVERY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY FOR YEARS, WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR EASY COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DIVIDED FAMILIES AND FRIENDS SEPARATED BY THE BORDER. IT WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP FORWARD WHEN IMPLEMENTED.

-- ON DECEMBER 13 THE CHIEF MUFTI ACTUALLY SPOKE OUT AND PUBLICLY ADMITTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN INFRINGEMENTS OF BULGARIAN MUSLIMS' RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND THAT MOSQUES HAD BEEN CLOSED OR ALLOWED TO OPEN ONLY AT CERTAIN VERY LIMITED TIMES. HE MENTIONED PROBLEMS IN CERTAIN AREAS WITH REGARD TO CIRCUMCISION AND ALSO WITH REGARD TO MUSLIM BURIALS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS A SCHOOL TO TRAIN MUSLIM CLERGYMAN UNTIL 1952 AND CALLED FOR IT TO BE REOPENED. THE FACT THAT THE CHIEF MUFTI WHO HAS STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO ADMIT ANY PROBLEMS WHATSOEVER IN THIS COUNTRY HAS BEEN PERMITTED/TOLD/OR ENCOURAGED TO DO SO IN TRUD, A NATIONAL PAPER, IS A DEFINITE POSITIVE SIGNAL.

-- A VARIETY OF TURKISH JOURNALISTS HAVE BEEN ALLOWED INTO BULGARIA OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS. ALTHOUGH THE TURKISH EMBASSY RIGHTLY POINTS OUT THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN INTERVIEWS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS, THAT HAS ALSO BEEN THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER WESTERN JOURNALISTS HERE. THE EXCEPTION BEING LARGE, SCHEDULED PRESS CONFERENCES AT WHICH ALL JOURNALISTS, INCLUDING THE TURKS, HAVE BEEN FREE TO ATTEND.

-- NADYA ASPEROUKOSA, AN ETHNIC TURK, HAS BEEN APPOINTED DEPUTY CHAIRWOMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. HER PORTFOLIO SHOULD INCLUDE A NUMBER OF SOCIAL ISSUES WHICH IMPACT DIRECTLY ON THE ETHNIC
TURKS IN BULGARIA. WHILE SHE WAS TOTALLY IDENTIFIED WITH THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OF THE REGIME IN EVERY WAY (OR OTHERWISE SHE WOULD NOT BE WHERE SHE IS), THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT IF THE REGIME DOES CHANGE ITS OVERALL POLICIES, SHE COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHANGE. WE NOTE THAT UNTIL THIS POINT THERE HAS BEEN NO ATTEMPT MADE BY THE REGIME TO EXPLOIT HER ETHNICITY AS A SIGN OF GREATER TOLERANCE.

-- ON DEC 15 IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE REGIONAL PEOPLE'S COUNCILS WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON EASING THE PLIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS (ETHNIC TURKS) WHO HAD RETURNED TO BULGARIA FROM TURKEY AND HAD GIVEN UP OR SOLD THEIR HOUSING. THE LETTER WAS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED AT LEAST ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS FACED BY THESE RETURNING EMIGRANTS AND PROPOSED CONSTRUCTIVE METHODS FOR DEALING WITH IT.

7. A DOCUMENT PURPORTING TO BE THE TEXT OF A POLITICAL DECISION TAKEN JUST BEFORE MLADENOV FLEW TO MOSCOW IN EARLY DECEMBER FOR THE WARSAW PACT BRIEFING ON THE MALTA SUMMIT. THE DOCUMENT, ACCORDING TO

MAKES THREE MAIN POINTS: A) THE FORCED ASSIMILATION POLICY DIRECTED BY TODOR ZHIVKOV WAS A
P 2009232Z DEC 89
PM AMBASSADORS SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8963
INFO AMBASSADORS ANKARA
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, BU, TU
SUBJECT: THE BULGARIAN ETHNIC TURK PROBLEM:

MAJOR MISTAKE FOR BULGARIA WHICH HAS LED TO SERIOUS
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS; B) THE POLICY SHOULD
BE EXAMINED AND CHANGED. THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE; AND
C) IT IS IN BULGARIA'S INTEREST TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS
WITH ALL OF ITS BALKAN NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING TURKEY.

8. COMMENT.

9. REGARDING THE SIGNALS AND THE STATEMENTS WHICH
HAVE BEEN MADE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT WE
BELIEVE THAT THEY INDICATE A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEM ON THE PART OF THE NEW BULGARIAN
GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE NOT SEEN
SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE CHANGE IN THIS AREA, AND WE
STILL ARE RECEIVING REPORTS THAT EVEN THE PROMISED
INCREASED TOLERANCE FOR RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND
EVERYDAY USE OF LANGUAGES OTHER THAN BULGARIAN IS
VERY MUCH DEPENDENT ON THE WHIMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS.
THE UPCOMING JANUARY 9 MEETING IN KUWAIT MAY PROVIDE
SOME INDICATION OF THE SPEED AND DEGREE TO WHICH
MLADENOV AND COMPANY ARE WILLING TO MOVE ON THIS
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE.

POLANSKY
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01

SOFIA 06899 201109Z

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 USTE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 DS-01
CCT 03 P 02 T-01 /041 W

P 201104Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8967
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

SOFIA 06899

BRUSSELS FOR USEC - AMB NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA PROTESTS ROMANIAN BORDER-CLOSING
AS STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AT ROMANIAN EMBASSY

1. (U) SUMMARY. IN THE WAKE OF ROMANIA'S CLOSING OF
ITS BORDERS AND THE BEATING OF A BULGARIAN CITIZEN AT
THE BORDER, THE GOB HAS LODGED A PROTEST WITH THE
ROMANIAN EMBASSY HERE AND EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN OVER THE
BORDER-CLOSING. MEANWHILE, APPROXIMATELY 600 STUDENTS
DEMONSTRATED AGAINST ROMANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AT THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN SOFIA ON 19 DECEMBER. THEY
SHOUTED ANTI-CEAUȘESCU SLOGANS, TURNED THEIR BACKS ON THE
EMBASSY, AND ADOPTED A RESOLUTION AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT FOR ITS ATROCITIES IN TIMISOARA, THE BORDER-
CLOSING, AND THE BEATING OF THE BULGARIAN CITIZEN. END
SUMMARY.

2. (U) ON 19 DECEMBER, THE BULGARIAN MFA EXPRESSED ITS
"CONCERN" OVER THE ROMANIAN BORDER-CLOSING AND REMINDED

PAGE 02

SOFIA 06899 201109Z

THEROMAN TANS OF THE COUNTRIES' BILATERAL BORDER
AGREEMENT OF 1967. PRESS REPORTS OF THE MFA ACTION
MAKE NO MENTION OF CONCERN OVER EVENTS IN TIMISOARA.
THE MFA'S CONSULAR DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, IS ADVISING
BULGARIANS NOT TO UNDERTAKE PRIVATE TRAVEL TO ROMANIA
UNTIL THE SITUATION CLEAR.

3. (U) AS THE MFA LODGED ITS PROTEST, APPROXIMATELY
600 STUDENTS, PRIMARILY FROM SOFIA UNIVERSITY'S
INDEPENDENT STUDENT SOCIETY (ISS) GATHERED IN FRONT OF

Page - 1

4. (U) DURING THE DEMONSTRATION, THE STUDENTS ADOPTED A RESOLUTION TO CONDEMN THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE CRACKDOWN IN TIMIȘOARA. THEY ALSO COLLECTED SIGNATURES FOR THEIR PETITIONS, WHICH THEY HAD CIRCULATED IN CRYSTAL PARK AND AT THE UNIVERSITY DURING THE DAY, AGAINST THE ROMANIAN REGIME. VLADIMIR KUNEV (ISS, ECOGLASNOST) READ THE STUDENTS' PETITIONS ALOUD, AND A BULGARIAN JOURNALIST READ A PROCLAMATION SIGNED BY 85 LOCAL JOURNALISTS. STUDENTS ATTEMPTED TO DELIVER THESE DOCUMENTS TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS, BUT NO ONE WOULD ANSWER THE DOOR. THE STUDENTS THEN DECIDED TO PRESENT THEM TO THE MFA.

5. (U) WHILE THE GOB HAS NOT GONE AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IN EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE FORCE USED AGAINST ROMANIAN CITIZENS, THE BULGARIAN PRESS HAS GIVEN EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE TIMIȘOARA ATROCITIES AS WELL AS THE BORDER INCIDENTS. (ACCORDING TO BULGARIAN TELEVISION REPORTS, A BULGARIAN WOMAN ON PRIVATE TRAVEL WAS BEaten ALONG WITH A POLISH TOURIST WHEN THEY MADE THE MISTAKE OF ASKING BORDER GUARDS WHY THEY COULD NOT ENTER ROMANIA.) NEWSPAPERS HERE QUOTE FOREIGN PRESS SOURCES, INCLUDING REUTERS' REPORT THAT HUNDREDS ARE IN HOSPITAL FROM SHOOTING AND TANK INJURIES AND HUNGARIAN REPORTS THAT MORE THAN 300 HAD BEEN KILLED. "RABOTNIČESKO DELO" REPORTS IN ITS 20 DECEMBER EDITION THAT THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN "ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES," INCLUDING AN INCREASE IN MILITIAMEN ON PATROL, GUARDS WITH MACHINE GUNS, AND USE OF THE ARMY. NO MENTION IS MADE OF MARTIAL LAW.

6. (C) COMMENT. THE INTENSE MEDIA CRITICISM OF A WARSAW PACT ALLY AND AT THE VERY LEAST TACIT APPROVAL OF THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION AT THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY ARE FURTHER SIGNS OF THE CHANGE WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN BULGARIA. ONE OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF BULGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN TO REFRAIN FROM DIRECT...
CRITICISM OF ITS SOCIALIST ALLIES. AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA, THAT NOW SEEMS TO BE NO LONGER THE CASE. IT PROBABLY GIVES THE NEW REGIME A SENSE OF GREAT SATISFACTION THAT THEY ARE "ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS" IN OPPOSING OR PROTESTING THE ACTIONS OF THE ROMANIAN REGIME. POLANSKY

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED
To Comrade GORBACHEV M.S.

Mikhail Sergeevich:

On the events in Romania in the last few days we can still only judge on the basis of information that comes from news agencies, primarily Western ones. This information is often contradictory and does not allow one to construct a true picture.

Our attempts to obtain the official version via Bucharest produced no results. Today, 20 December the Romanian ambassador will be invited to the MFA USSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] in order to obtain from him information on this issue.

Until we have complete and objective information, we should not, in our opinion, be in haste to make a statement of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, at best we could go not further than instructing the Commission on Foreign Affairs [of the Congress' Supreme Soviet] to prepare a draft proposal on our possible reaction with all circumstances in mind.

E. SHEVARDNADZE

20 December 1989

[Source: Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01

SOFIA 06911 01 OF 03 211348Z

ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
HA-09 PA-02 FAAE-00 DOTE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
PRS-01 /019 W

R 211335Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8972

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 06911

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS, 14-18 DEC

"RABOTNICHESKO DELO" (RD), 18 DECEMBER

1. THIS ISSUE CARRIES A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL ENTITLED "CONSOLIDATION OF ALL PROGRESSIVE FORCES."
   THE ARTICLE NOTES THAT IN THE RECENT PAST RD, LIKE ALL
   OTHER NEWSPAPERS, MAINTAINED THE GENERAL TONE OF FALSE
   ENTHUSIASM WHICH CREATED AN UNTRUTHFUL PICTURE OF THE REAL
   SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND THROUGH ITS ARTICLES.
   CREATED MISTRUST AMONG READERS. BESIDES, THE ARTICLE
   NOTES, THIS TONE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ARTIFICIAL INFLATION
   OF ZHIVKOV'S AUTHORITY. RD SAYS THAT IT ACCEPTS ITS SHARE
   OF THE GUILT FOR THIS. THE ARTICLE ALSO POINTS OUT THE
   IMPORTANCE OF THE DECEMBER 12 BCP PLenum WHICH CONdemned
   Todor Zhivkov's Style of LEADERSHIP AND EXPELED HIM FROM
   THE PARTY ALONG WITH FULL POLITBUERO MEMBER MILKO BALEV
   AND Todor's Son VLADIMIR. THE EDITORIAL THEN NOTES THAT THE
   14TH EXTRAORDINARY BCP CONGRESS WILL BEGIN ON MARCH 19,
   1990, AND THAT DURING THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1990 FREE
   DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD. IT ALSO DENOUNCES THE
   ATTEMPTS OF SOME PEOPLE TO INCREASE SOCIAL TENSION AND
   UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

SOFIA 06911 01 OF 03 211348Z

SAYS THAT NEITHER BCP MEMBERS NOR THE MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE CAN TOLERATE APPEALS AND SLOGANS AGAINST THE BCP,
OR THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS
AND THE PARTY. A HANDFUL OF PEOPLE DISCREDITED THE PARTY,
IT CONTINUES, BUT THE PARTY AS A WHOLE IS NOT TO BLAME
AND SHOULD NOT BE SHAMED BY THE GUILT OF THOSE WHO CAST A
STAIN ON THE COMMUNIST PARTY. THE BULGARIAN COMMUNISTS
CONDEMN THE SHAMEFUL DEEDS OF SOME MEMBERS OF THEIR PARTY
AND CONTINUE TO WORK FOR REGAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE
PEOPLE IN THE PARTY
2. THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HELD A MEETING IN PLEVEN, WHERE PARTICIPANTS DEMANDED BETTER CONDITIONS IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC HEALTH, AND FOR THE WORK OF THE INDEPENDENT CITIZENS SOCIETIES. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER A PROJECT TO PRODUCE PETRO-CHEMICALS WITH RAW MATERIALS WHICH ARE BAD FOR HUMAN HEALTH. THE PARTICIPANTS DENOUNCED THE DEMONSTRATORS FOR THEIR IMPROPER ACTIONS IN FRONT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HOUSE ON 14 DECEMBER AND SENT A TELEGRAM OF CONDOLENCES TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF ANDREI SAKHAROV.


4. ARTICLES PRAISING THE NEW BULGARIAN MOVIE "MARGARIT AND MARGARITA," WHICH DEPICTS THE TRAGEDY OF TWO YOUNG PEOPLE WHO ARE VICTIMIZED BY A CORRUPT AND UNSCRUPULOUS HIGH OFFICIAL, ARE ALSO FEATURED. (NOTE: IT IS SAID THAT, BEFORE ZHIVKOV'S OUSTER, OFFICIALS WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONDEMN THE MOVIE AND LABEL IT AS A SLANDER AGAINST SOCIALISM.)


6. IN PERNIK, ECOGLASNOST ORGANIZED A MEETING TO PROTEST THE CITY'S GRAVE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION AND DEMANDED LEGAL PUNISHMENTS FOR THOSE TO BLAME FOR THE POLLUTION. THEY ALSO ACCEPTED A PETITION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IT INSISTS ON MORE OPENNESS CONCERNING ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS,
CLOSING DOWN THE LOCAL STEEL COMBINE, AND HALTING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A STEEL PRODUCING PLANT IN THE "POPOV"
SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE IN THE CITY.

7. THE TURGOVISHTE BRANCH OF THE DISCUSSION CLUB HELD A

UNCLASSIFIED

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01
SOFIA 06911 .02.OF 03 211350Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 CIAE-00 EB-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
HA-09 PA-02 FAAE-00 DOTE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
PRS-01 /019 W

R 211335Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8973

UNCLASSIFIED SECTION 02.OF 03 SOFIA 06911

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PRFL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS, 14-18 DEC

MEETING. PARTICIPANTS DEMANDED THE RESOLUTION OF SERIOUS
SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE CITY AND ON
ABOLITION OF THE PATERLAND FRONT. THE PARTICIPANTS
APPROVED A DECLARATION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN WHICH
THEY STATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESENT COURSE OF THE
BCP AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

OTHER ITEMS, 18 DECEMBER

-----------------------------

8. THE DIRECTOR OF THE "KLIMATICHNA TECHNIKA" FIRM DID
NOT SHOW UP AT A MEETING ATTENDED BY A THOUSAND OF THE
WORKERS FROM THE SOFIA REFRIGERATOR FACTORY WHICH ONE YEAR
EARLIER HAD BECOME A BRANCH OF THE FIRM. WORKERS
CRITICIZED HIM SEVERELY FOR HIS FAILURES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PLANT AND INSISTED THAT HE RESIGN. RATHER THAN ATTEND, THE DIRECTOR HAD SENT HIS DRIVER TO MAKE A VIDEO FEATURING THE MEETING. THE WORKERS TURNED TO THE CAMERA AND RAISED THEIR HANDS IN A VOTE TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT FIRM. TRUD.

UNCLASSIFIED


10. SERIOUS PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE AT THE BULGARIAN UNION FOR PHYSICAL CULTURE & SPORTS. THE PEOPLE WHO ARE GUILTY FOR THE FAILURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPORTS SHOULD BE REMOVED, SAYS PETUR PETROV. TRUD. (A SIMILAR ARTICLE APPEARS IN KOOPERATIVNO SELO.)

11. TWO ARTICLES REPORT DISCREDITING INFORMATION CONCERNING DMIL KOSHLUKOV, LEADER OF THE INDEPENDENT STUDENT SOCIETY. ACCORDING TO THE ARTICLES, WHILE KOSHLUKOV WAS IN THE ARMY, HE DELIBERATELY BROKE A FINGER AND TRIED TO ORGANIZE A RIOT. THE SECOND ARTICLE ACCUSES KOSHLUKOV'S FATHER OF JOINING A PRO-FASCIST ORGANIZATION AND OF PERSECUTING PARTISANS. NARODNA ARMIA, 15 AND 16 DECEMBER.

12. PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE SECURITY GUARD DEPARTMENT, SAYS ITS NEW CHIEF GEN. SAVA DZHENOVEV IN AN INTERVIEW WITH "NARODNA MLADEZH." ITS NUMBER OF BODYGUARDS WILL DECREASE, FAMILIES OF HIGH OFFICIALS WILL NO LONGER RECEIVE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES, SUCH AS BUYING WESTERN-MADE CARS AT LOW PRICES AND DELIVERIES UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

OF FOOD TO THEIR HOMES. ANI MLADENOVA, A NURSE WITH THE RANK OF ARMY MAJOR, WAS MENTIONED BY THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT AT THE 10 DECEMBER PARTY PLUMMA AS A LADY WHO WAS VERY CLOSE TO TODOR ZHIVKOV AND WHO HAS CAUSED
MUCH TROUBLE TO MANY INSTITUTIONS BECAUSE SHE ENJOYED MANY PRIVILEGES. GENERAL DZHENDOV SAYS HE FIRED HER.

13. HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN SOFIA SET UP AN INDEPENDENT UNION. IN SOME SCHOOLS, THEY HAD THE APPROVAL OF THE STAFF, AS AT THE NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL FOR ANCIENT LANGUAGES AND CULTURE. IN OTHERS, HOWEVER, THEY HAD TO CONTEND WITH THREATS FROM DIRECTORS AND TEACHERS. THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE UNION ARE: PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND TRANSFORMATION OF HIGH SCHOOL YOUTH INTO AN ACTIVE SOCIAL FORCE. NARODNA MLADEZH, 18 DECEMBER.

14. PROFESSOR LYUBOMIR SHINDAROV, FORMER FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH, VIOLATES THE LAW BY CARRYING OUT UNLAWFUL EXPERIMENTS WITH AN ANTI-AIDS MEDICINE, REPORTS NARODNA MLADEZH ON 18 DECEMBER. (NOTE: SHINDAROV LOST CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF MANY BULGARIANS WHEN, DURING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT, HE APPEARED ON TELEVISION AND DECLARED THAT "THERE IS NO REASON FOR CONCERN.")

15. A GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS FROM SOFIA UNIVERSITY ORGANIZED AN EXHIBITION CONCERNING THE REAL AFFECTS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AND THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE DELIBERATE PUBLIC DISINFORMATION BY CERTAIN HIGH OFFICIALS. OTECHESTVEN FRONT(OF), 18 DECEMBER.

16. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT WILL HOLD A PLENUM ON DECEMBER 21. IT WILL DISCUSS A PROPOSAL
UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 SOFIA 06911

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN PRESS HIGHLIGHTS, 14-18 DEC

FOR CONVENING AN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF THE FATHERLAND FRONT, THE ROLE OF THE FF IN RESTRUCTURING, AND ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS. OF, 18 DECEMBER.


18. "ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME," 14 DECEMBER, LAUNCHES THE IDEA OF PURCHASING Todor Zhivkov's VOLUMES AND RECYCLING THEM FOR PULP AND PAPER. IT WILL BE ONLY A SMALL COMPENSATION OF THE LOSSES CAUSED BY THEIR PUBLICATION, ZZ SAYS.


UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02

UNCLASSIFIED

29, 1988, FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER DIMITUR STOYANOV REFUSED TO ANSWER A QUESTION ABOUT THE NUMBER OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY MILITARY AND SAID THE QUESTION WAS "PROVOCATIVE." PRESENT INTERIOR MINISTER GEORGI TANEV OWES US AN EXPLANATION FOR THE "CRYSTAL" INCIDENT, AND ALSO ABOUT THE UNREST AMONG MOSLEMS IN BULGARIA IN MAY, 1989, SAYS BLAGOV. ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, 14 DECEMBER.

20. IN THE SAME ISSUE IT IS REPORTED THAT PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS FROM SOFIA UNIVERSITY ORGANIZED A MEETING, DEMANDING THAT "SHIPKA" ART GALLERY BE CONVERTED INTO AN ANNEX OF THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY. THE MAIN ARGUMENT IS THAT THE GALLERY WAS BUILT ON UNIVERSITY GROUNDS. IF THE BULGARIAN WRITERS UNION DOES NOT LEAVE THE BUILDING IN TWO MONTHS THE STAFF AND THE STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY WILL GO ON A GENERAL STRIKE, SAYS THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE MEETING.

21. A PRESS SERVICE (CALLED) "COUPLER" WAS ESTABLISHED IN
SOFIA. ITS BULLETIN, WHICH COMES OUT EVERY WORKING DAY, CONTAINS AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS OF INFORMAL SOCIETIES AND THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS.

22. "TRUD" REPORTS ON THE FORMATION OF 4 INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES IN SHUMEN: THE DEMOCRATIC UNION "REVIVAL" (VUZRAZHDIANE); THE YOUTH UNION; THE CLUB OF SHUMEN INTELLIGENTSIA, AND THE UNION "GLASNOST & DEMOCRACY." THEY INSIST ON ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PEOPLE IN THE SPEEDING UP OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, FOR EQUAL-RIGHTS DIALOGUE AND URGENT MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE ECOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE REGION.

23. THREE JOURNALIST ORGANIZATIONS WERE SET UP AFTER THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03

NOVEMBER BCP PLENUM: THE INDEPENDENT JOURNALIST UNION (IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TRADE UNION "PODKREPA"); "JOURNALISTS INITIATIVE CLUB". AND THE FREE JOURNALIST SOCIETY. POGLED, 18 DECEMBER.

24. IN THE SAME ISSUE POGLED CARRIES A CRITICAL ARTICLE BY STEFAN MITSOV AGAINST THOSE WHO MADE TODOR ZHIVKOV A SCAPE-COAT, AND FORGET THEIR OWN SINS, THOSE WHO HAVE USED THE PRIVILEGES OF ZHIVKOV'S RULE BUT ARE TRYING NOW TO CONVINCE US HOW THEY HAVE SUFFERED UNDER HIM. MITSOV SAYS THAT PENCHO KUBADJISKI, NACHO PAPAZOV, SLAVCHO TRUNSKI, ZHIVKO ZHIVKOV, MLADEN ISAEV, ANGEI Todorov and MANY OTHERS NOW PRESENT THEMSELVES AS "VICTIMS." BUT WHY DIDN'T THEY RESIGN YEARS AGO, ASKS THE AUTHOR. BESIDES, IF THE STATISTICS ABOUT THE SALARIES OF THE HIGH ECHELON ARE TRUE THEN WE HAVE TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN TO COLLECT DONATIONS FOR OUR LEADER, SAYS MITSEV. (NOTE: THE PRESS CARRIES FIGURES ABOUT THE SALARIES BUT NOT THE TOTAL INCOMES OF THE LEADERS.) POLANSKY
0 211101Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8971

SOFIA 06909

DS/CC AND DS/POL/IAD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, PREL, BU
SUBJECT: TFPMG2: ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION IN SOFIA

1. THE DCM WAS SUMMONED TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA) AT APPROXIMATELY 1000 THIS DATE; RSO ACCOMPANIED. WE WERE INFORMED THAT A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN PANAMA WAS SCHEDULED FOR 1100 IN FRONT OF THE CHANCERY. EMBOFFS IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE CHANCERY. RSO DISPERSED EMBASSY VEHICLES, SECURED BOTH ENTRANCES TO THE CHANCERY, SHUT DOWN USIS OPERATIONS AND CALLED MSG DETACHMENT.

2. AT 1100, 50-75 DEMONSTRATORS GATHERED IN FRONT OF CHANCERY, CHANTED ANTI-U.S. SLOGANS AND BURNED AN AMERICAN FLAG. THE GROUP MOVED ON AT 1115. AT 1130 ROUGHLY HALF THE GROUP RETURNED TO A POSITION OPPOSITE THE CHANCERY AND CONTINUED THEIR VIGIL WITH OCCASIONAL CHANTS AND FLAGCARDS BEARING ANTI-U.S. SLOGANS. AS OF THIS WRITING, THE VIGIL OF 20-30 DEMONSTRATORS CONTINUES.

3. GOB ADVANCE WARNING WAS SHORT BUT ADEQUATE. POLICE RESPONSE WAS IMMEDIATE; THEIR RESPONSE SIMPLY TO KEEP THE GROUP AWAY FROM THE CHANCERY. NO VIOLENCE WAS OBSERVED BY EITHER THE DEMONSTRATORS OR POLICE. IF THE SITUATION DICTATES, A FOLLOW-UP REPORT WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

POLANSKY
Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

21 December 1989, 7:35 am

Cde. Ion Stoica, Minister [of Foreign Affairs],
Cde. Constantin Oancea, Deputy Minister [of Foreign Affairs],
DRI

On 20 December 1989, during a discussion with G. N. Gorinovici, Director of the General Section for Socialist Countries in Europe, I expressed [the Romanian government’s] deep indignation in regards with the inaccurate and tendentious way in which the Soviet mass media is presenting the alleged events taking place in Timisoara. I stressed that the stories made public by radio and television are based on private, unofficial sources, and not on truthful information. Many stories refer to the Hungarian press agency MTI, which is known for its antagonistic attitude towards our country. I mentioned that V. M. Kulistikov, Deputy Chief Editor of the publication Novoe Vremia, during an interview given to Radio Svoboda, expressed some opinions vis-à-vis Romania with are unacceptable. I brought to his [Gorinovici’s] attention the fact that on 19 December, Soviet television found it necessary to air news regarding the events in Timisoara in particular, and in Romania in general, four separate occasions.

I argued that such stories do not contribute to the development of friendly relations between our two countries and that they cannot be interpreted in any other way but as an intervention in the internal affairs concerning [only] the Romanian government. I asked that the Soviet government take action to insure the cessation of this denigration campaign against our country and also to prevent possible public protests in front of our embassy. Gorinovici said that he will inform the leadership of the Soviet MFA. In regards with the problems raised during our discussion, he said that, in his opinion, no campaign of denigrating Romania is taking place in the Soviet Union. “The mass media had to inform the public of the situation,” Gorinovici indicated, in order to “counter-balance the wealth of information reaching the Soviet Union through Western airwaves. Keeping silent on the subject would have only [served to] irritate the Soviet public.” Following this statement, he recapitulated the well-known Soviet position with regards to the necessity of allowing a diversity of opinions and ideas be expressed in the context of informing the Soviet public about world events.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

Memorandum of conversation
with the Ambassador of the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] in the USSR
I. BUKUR
21 December 1989

I received I. Bukur, fulfilling his request.
The Ambassador recounted the address of N. Ceausescu on Romanian radio and television on 20 December and handed over its complete text.

When I asked if the events in Timisoara involved human casualties and what the present situation was in that region, the Ambassador responded that he possesses no information on this issue. He referred to the fact that the address of N. Ceausescu also says nothing on this score.

I told the Ambassador that during the meeting of N. Ceausescu with the Soviet charge d'affaires in the SRR on 20 December [the former] expressed surprise that Soviet representatives made declarations on the events in Timisoara. Besides, during the meeting it was asserted [by Ceausescu] that the Romanian side possesses information that the action in Timisoara was allegedly prepared and organized with the consent of countries [that are] members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, the actions against Romania were allegedly plotted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

According to our information, officials in Bucharest in conversation with ambassadors of allied socialist states expressed an idea about some kind of action of interference into the internal affairs of the SRR allegedly under preparation in the Soviet Union.

I must declare on behalf of our side that such assertions can only puzzle us, have no foundation and do not correspond with reality [until this part Aboimov probably read the instructions.]

Answering the Ambassador's question as to whether my words reflected the official viewpoint of the Soviet government, I told him that so far I have no instruction to make any declarations on behalf of the Soviet government, but my words certainly reflect our official position which postulates that the Soviet Union builds its relations with allied socialist states on the basis of equality, mutual respect and strict non-interference into domestic affairs. Considering the grave character of the statements of Romanian officials I cannot help expressing in preliminary order our attitude to these statements....

[Source: Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]
Informational Note from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest)

21 December 1989, 8:00 am

Cde. Ion Stoian, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Cde. Costantin Oancea, Deputy Foreign Minister,

During the evening of 20 December 1989, I was invited in audience at I. P. Aboimov,
Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR. He related to me the following:

1. Lately, the Soviet press published news in connection to events unfolding in Romania,
specifically with the events in Timisoara. It is true that some of the published materials are based,
generally, on foreign [i.e. not Romanian] sources. It is evident that the [Soviet] mass media need
information on the basis of which to inform the public. Aside from this, during meetings with
foreign journalists, there were many requests addressed to the Soviet [government] to state its
position in regards with the events taking place in Romania as they were presented by various
press agencies. Furthermore, during his recent visits in Brussels and London, [Foreign Minister
Edward] Shevardnadze11 was asked to state his opinion vis-à-vis those events. In London, after
the official talks ended,12 the Soviet Foreign Minister had a difficult time convincing [Prime
Minister Margaret] Thatcher that there should be no comments to the press on the events
allegedly taking place in Romania. The [Romanian] Foreign Ministry is also informed that
interest in this matter was expressed during working meetings of the Second Congress of the
People’s Deputies taking place in Moscow at this time.13 The [Soviet] ambassador in Bucharest
was instructed to contact the Romanian government and obtain, from authorized officials,
information to confirm or refute the version of the events distributed by foreign press agencies.
To this date, the Soviet Embassy was unable to obtain and transmit any such information.
Due to such problems, the Soviet government asks that the Romanian government send
an informational note, even one that is restricted [cu caracter închis] regarding the events that are
really taking place in Romania. [The Soviet government] is interested in receiving information
that is as comprehensive as possible. If information is not received, it would be extremely
difficult to create an effective set of directions for the Soviet mass media, with which there are,
even so, many difficulties. [The Soviet government] is worried that, based on the news reported
in the press, some of the deputies participating at the sessions, would ask that the 2nd Congress of
the People’s Deputies take a position vis-à-vis the alleged events taking place in Romania. The
MFA prepared for the deputies an information note in which it stresses that it does not have any
official information, but it is possible that this argument will not accepted long. Based on the
information available to the MFA, the Congress will adopt a resolution with regards to the US
military actions in Panama.
Of course, there is no connection between the two events. In Panama, a foreign military
intervention is taking place, while in Romania the events are domestic in nature. I. P. Aboimov
stressed his previous request that the Romanian government send, in the spirit of cooperation
between the two countries, an informational note truthfully describing the current situation in the
country.
2. The Soviet MFA received a series of complaints that the border between the Soviet
Union and Romania has been closed for Soviet citizens, especially tourists. The Soviet
government was not previously informed with regards to this development. [T]his omission
causes consternation. The Soviet government is not overly concerned with the situation, but
[notes that] it creates difficulties with tourists that have already paid for and planned their
vacations accordingly.
3. With regards to the above statements, I said that I would, of course, inform Bucharest of this. At the same time, I expressed the displeasure [of the Romanian government] with the fact that the Soviet radio, television and newspapers have distributed news regarding events in Romania taken from foreign news agencies, agencies that are distributing distorted and overtly antagonistic stories regarding the situation in Romania. I gave concrete examples of such stories published in newspapers such as Izvestia, Pravda, Komsomolskaia Pravda, Krasnaia Zvezda, stories distributed by western press agencies as well as the Hungarian Press Agency MTI, which is known for its antagonistic attitude towards our country. In that context, I mentioned that the Romanian government has not requested that the Soviet Union inform it concerning events unfolding in Grozny or Nagornîi -Karabah, nor has it published any news stories obtained from Western press agencies, believing that those [events] are strictly an internal matter concerning [only] the Soviet government.

I expressed my displeasure with the fact that some Soviet correspondents in Bucharest—including the TASS correspondent— have transmitted materials from unofficial sources, which contain untruthful descriptions of the events and which create in [the mind of] the Soviet public an erroneous impression of the situation existing in our country. I stressed the point that such behavior is not conducive to strengthening the relationship between our peoples and governments, on the contrary, causing [only] serious damage [to said relationship]. I brought to the attention of the Deputy Foreign Minister in no uncertain terms that a resolution of the Congress of the People’s Deputies [concerning] the alleged events taking place in Romania would be an action without precedent in the history of relations between the two countries and would cause serious damage to the relationship.

At I. P. Aboimov’s question, I described the events regarding the situation of pastor László Tökes, as described in your memorandum, stressing that this information does not have an official character. I presented, in no uncertain terms, the decision of [the government of] Romania to reject any attempts at interference in the internal matters of Romania. I expressed the decision [of the Romanian leadership] to take any necessary measures against disruptive and diversionary actions perpetrated by reactionary, anti-Romanian circles, by foreign special services and espionage agencies (servicii speciale si oficinele de spionaj staine). With regard to the issue of tourists crossing the border in Romania, I said that I did not posses an official communication in this regard. I suggested that some temporary measures were adopted due to the need to limit access of certain groups of tourists [in the country]. [Those limitats were imposed] due to difficulties in assuring their access to hotel rooms and other related essential conditions. Those limitations do not apply to business travel or tourists transiting Romania. I reminded [I. P. Aboimov] that the Soviet government had introduced at different times such limitations on travel for Romanian tourists to certain regions [of the Soviet Union] (Grozny and Armenia), which [had] provoked dissatisfaction.

4. The conversation took place in a calm, constructive atmosphere.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

Information Note from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

21 December 1989, 2:00 pm

Comrade Ion Stoica, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

1. On 21 December 1989, at 12:00 pm, I paid a visit to Deputy Foreign Minister I. P. Aboimov to whom I presented a copy of the speech given by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party [PCR] and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania [SRR], on the 20 December 1989 over radio and television. I. P. Aboimov made no comments with regard to the speech. He requested that the Soviet side receive information as to whether, during the events taking place in Timisoara, any deaths had occurred and what the current situation in the city was.

2. Aboimov said that during the 19 December discussions between the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest and Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu, the latter expressed his disapproval with the official declarations made by Soviet officials concerning the events in Timisoara. He [Ceausescu] said that those [actions taking place in Timisoara] are the result of strategies developed beforehand by [member nations of] the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). [Ceausescu] suggested that certain officials in Bucharest told ambassadors from socialist countries that they have information with respect to the intention of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Romania.

As for the so-called official declarations [Aboimov added], they probably refer to a reply made by Cde. E[ward] Shevardnadze, [Soviet] Minister of Foreign Affairs to a question from a Western journalist during his trip to Brussels. [The question] referred to the events in Timisoara and [the question of] whether force was used there. Cde. Shevardnadze answered that “I do not have any knowledge [of this], but if there are casualties, I am distressed.” Aboimov said that, if indeed there are casualties, he considered [Shevardnadze’s] answer justified. He stressed that E. Shevardnadze made no other specific announcement in Brussels [with regards to the events in Timisoara]. Concerning the accusations that the actions [in Timisoara] were planned by the Warsaw Pact, and specifically the declarations with regard to the intentions of the USSR, Aboimov said that, personally, and in a preliminary fashion, he qualifies the declarations as “without any base, not resembling reality and apt to give rise to suspicion. It is impossible that anybody will believe such accusations. Such accusations”— Aboimov went on to say— “have such grave repercussions that they necessitate close investigation.”

He stressed that the basis of interaction between the USSR and other governments rested on the principles of complete equality among states, mutual respect, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

EXDIS

R.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, TU, BU
SUBJECT: TURKO-BULGARIAN NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET VIEW

REF: ANKARA 17942

1. [REDACTED] — ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SOVIET

AMB. CHERNISHEV STILL PLANS TO VISIT MOSCOW AND SOFIA PRIOR TO THE SECOND ROUND OF TURKO-BULGARIAN NEGOTIATIONS IN KUWAIT, BUT SAID THE TIMING OF THIS TRIP IS UNCERTAIN. REPORTING FROM SOFIA, HE SAID, INDICATES THE BULGARIANS ARE DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON THE SECOND ROUND, AND IT MAY BE POSTPONED INTO FEBRUARY.

3. SPEAKING TO [REDACTED] DECEMBER 22 (OTHER SUBJECTS SEPT—NOT ALL), [REDACTED] SAID THE SOVIETS HAVE THE IMPRESSION BULGARIA IS RELUCTANT TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM AT THIS TIME. THIS, HE SAID, IS MAKING THE TURKS "NERVOUS." [REDACTED] PREDICTED TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER YILMAZ WILL MAKE REFERENCE TO THIS IN HIS

DECEMBER 22 PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET DEBATE.

4. THE PURPOSE OF CHERNISHEV'S VISIT TO SOFIA, CONTINUED, WILL BE TO PRESSURE MLODENOV TO BE FORTHCOMING ON SUBSTANCE WHEN THE TURKS AND THE BULGARIANS RESUME THEIR DISCUSSIONS. [REDACTED] WAS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO WHICH AREAS THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO PRESS, BUT SAID HE EXPECTS THE TURKS WILL MAINTAIN THEIR CURRENT POSITIONS (I.E., THAT PRESSURE ON THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN BULGARIA IS PASSED, AND THAT ANY EMIGRATION
AGREEMENT INCLUDE PROTECTION OR PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR
THOSE DEPARTING BULGARIA.

ABRAMOWITZ
Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest)

22 December 1989, 07:30 am

Cde. Constantin Oancea, Deputy [Foreign Affairs] Minister
Directorate 1— Socialist Countries, Europe

During a conversation between N. Stânea and V. L. Musatov, Deputy Director of the International Department of the Central Committee (CC) of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) [Musatov], referring to the situation in Eastern European countries, declared:

The processes taking place [in Eastern Europe] are the result of objective needs. Unfortunately, these processes taking place are [sometimes] incongruous. In some countries, such as Hungary and Poland, the changes that took place went outside the initial limits planned by the [local] communists, who have [now] lost control. The situation is also becoming dangerous in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic [GDR]. At this time, in Bulgaria the [Communist] Party is trying to maintain control, however, it is unknown which way the situation will evolve. As far as it is concerned, the CPSU is trying to give aid to the communists. Representatives of the CC of the CPSU have been or are at this time in the GDR [and] Czechoslovakia to observe the situation personally. The attitude towards the old leadership is regrettable. For example, [East German Communist Party leader] E[rich] Honecker will be arrested. In the majority of these countries there are excesses against the communists. The Soviet government is preoccupied with the future of “Our Alliance.” [The Soviet government] is especially interested in the evolution of events in the GDR, in the background of the discussions taking place regarding reunification. The Soviet Union is following all these events, but is not getting involved in the internal affairs of the respective countries.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

Cde. Ion Stoian, Minister of Foreign Affairs,

On 22 December 1989, at 02:00 pm I. P. Aboimov, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, called me at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accompanying me was I. Ripan, [Embassy] secretary. V. A. Lapsin, [Soviet MFA] secretary was also present.

Aboimov said that he was instructed to present, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, the following reply to the message sent [by the Romanian government] through the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest [during his discussion with Nicolae Ceausescu on 19 December].

“The message sent [by] the Romanian nation on 20 December of this year, has been carefully examined in Moscow. We consider the problems raised in the message as very serious, since they are dealing with the basic issues of our collaboration.

In the spirit of sincerity, characteristic for our bilateral relations, we would like to mention that we are surprised by its tone and the accusations regarding the position and role of the Soviet Union with respect to the events taking place in Timisoara. We reject wholeheartedly the statements with regard to the anti-Romanian campaign supposedly taking place in the Soviet Union, not to mention the accusation that the actions against Romania have allegedly planned by the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO]. Such accusations are unfounded and absolutely unacceptable. Just as absurd are the declarations of certain Romanian officials who are suggesting that the Soviet Union is preparing to intervene in Romania. We are starting, invariably, from the idea that, in our relations with allied nations, as well as with all other nations, the principles of sovereignty, independence, equality of rights, non-intervention in the internal affairs. These principles have been once again confirmed during the [WTO] Political Consultative Committee summit in Bucharest.

It is clear that the dramatic events taking place in Romania are your own internal problem. The fact that during these events deaths have occurred has aroused deep grief among the Soviet public. The declaration adopted by the Congress of the People’s Deputies is also a reflection of these sentiments.

Furthermore, I would like to inform you that our representative at the UN Security Council has received instructions to vote against convening the Security Council for [the purpose of] discussing the situation in Romania, as some countries have proposed. We consider that this would be an infringement of the sovereignty of an independent state by an international organization.

We want to hope that, in the resolution of the events in Romania, wisdom and realism will prevail and that political avenues to solve the problems to the benefit of [our] friend, the Romanian nation, will be found.

Our position comes out of our sincere desire not to introduce into our relationship elements of suspicion or mistrust, out of our desire to continue our relations normally, in the interest of both our nations, [and in the interest of] the cause of peace and socialism.

I. P. Aboimov asked that this message be sent immediately to Bucharest.

(ss) [Ambassador] Ion Bucur

I received M. Veres on his request.

He referred to the instruction of the Union Secretariat on Foreign Affairs of the SFRY and shared the available information on the events in Romania, corroborated by the General Consulate of the SFRY in Timisoara and by numerous Yugoslav citizens who returned from the SRR. He also reported on the Yugoslav evaluations of the developments in Romania.

The beginning of the dramatic development could be traced to the events of 15-16 December in Timisoara where a large group of people protested against the action of the authorities with regard to the priest L. Tokes. This process grew into a huge demonstration of the population of the city against the existing order. According to the estimates of officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, there were up to 100,000 people, including workers, university and school students, who participated in the demonstration. Protest actions took place also in Arad, Brasov and Cluj. Large contingents of militia and military were used against demonstrators in Timisoara. According to the Yugoslavs, during those clashes several hundred people died, and according to some unchecked data the number of casualties exceeded 2,000. In the downtown area shops, restaurants, cafes were destroyed, many streetcars and automobiles were also burnt down. Timisoara is surrounded by troops, but protest actions continue in the city. Workers seized factories and are threatening to blow them up if the authorities do not satisfy the people's demands. Officials of the General Consulate of the SFRY, the Ambassador remarked, noticed that a number of soldiers and militiamen expressed their sympathies with demonstrators. There were also slogans "The Army will not shoot at students and school children."

The Yugoslav-Romanian border is practically sealed; its defenses are fortified by troops along its whole length, including check-points. So far the Romanian side authorized only the passing of people with diplomatic and other service passports. The Ambassador informed us that the Yugoslavs had evacuated members of the families of officials of their General Consulate. He disavowed reports of a number of Western news agencies that participants of the demonstration [in Timisoara] found refuge on the territory of the Yugoslav compound, whose premises allegedly were penetrated by Romanian militia.

According to Yugoslav estimates, stressed M. Veres, the main reason for disorders in Timisoara and their spread subsequently around a number of other cities, including the capital of the SRR, is rooted in profound popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country accumulated over [many] years, with low living standards, the lack of basic food and consumer goods, and with the unwillingness of the leadership to undertake at least some measures to democratize the political system.
The Ambassador pointed out that the Yugoslav public is very concerned about the situation in the neighboring country. The mass media of the SFRY are informing the population in detail about the events, including many reports about reactions abroad. On 19 December the Union Executive Vece [executive branch of the Yugoslav state] came out with an appropriate declaration, expressing profound concern and regret with regard to casualties during the crack-down on the demonstrations. On 20 December the Presidium of the CC CPY [Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia] denounced the actions of the Romanian authorities and laid political responsibility at the door of the leadership of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party]. It declared a temporary suspension of all contacts with the RCP and repealed an earlier invitation [to the RCP] to send a delegation to the 14th Congress of the CPY (January 1990). All public organizations of Yugoslavia, as well as both chambers of the Skupcina [parliament] made sharp protests. Late on 21 December the Presidium of the SFRY adopted a resolution denouncing reprisals against the demonstrators, that led to a large loss of human life.

M. Veres stressed that of particular cause for concern in Belgrade is the situation with Yugoslav ethnic minorities in the SRR. He said that the SFRY supports a peaceful resolution of the situation in Romania and is against any foreign interference into Romanian affairs....

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR I. ABOIMOV

[Source: Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]
Record of conversation
with U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, J. MATLOCK
24 December 1989

I received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.

Referring to instructions received from Washington, the Ambassador said that, in the opinion of the American leadership, the Soviet Union and the United States should continue the exchange of opinions with regard to the events in Romania. The situation in Romania still is very uncertain. The American side is very concerned by the fact that warfare between the forces of state security and army units continues, and casualties among the civilian population are mounting. In this regard Matlock referred to the positive significance of the fact that the opinions of the Soviet Union and the United States coincided to the effect that there should be support given to the group that is trying to govern Romania and to fulfill the will of the Romanian people.

Then the American presented the following thought. The United States paid attention to the conviction expressed by the Soviet Union that military intervention is out of question. With equal interest the United States regarded the declaration of the Soviet government about its readiness to give immediate humanitarian assistance to the Romanian people. The American side would be greatly interested to hear the Soviet assessment of the developments in Romania, as well as the opinion of the Soviet side with regard to the most effective ways of supporting the Romanian people and the new leadership of Romania....

I informed the Ambassador that earlier, in addition to the Declaration of the Soviet government, a TASS Declaration was published. This step by our side was necessitated by grave concern over the very tense situation around the house populated by officials of the Soviet trade mission in Bucharest. It turned out to be in the epicenter of combat and for some time was partially seized by the terrorist forces. Only by the end of the day were they dispersed and we could evacuate the inhabitants from the house. I drew the attention of the American to the fact that among them two people were lightly wounded, and not one-as it was earlier reported. Now these people are located on the territory of the Soviet Embassy.

At the present moment the main task is to carry out the evacuation of Soviet citizens from Romania, first of all women and children. I informed the U.S. Ambassador of those options that are under consideration....

We maintain contact with representatives of the new Romanian leadership, if only via telephone. We informed them about our steps directed at giving humanitarian assistance to the Romanian population. Several times we inquired of the new leadership of Romania about what urgent needs they have. We received no clear answer to our question. It looks like the Front's Council still lacks clear ideas on this score.

With regard to the question raised by the American about the most effective approaches to the organization of humanitarian assistance to Romania, I repeated that
there is no full clarity about it. The Soviet Union is carrying out measures to prepare such assistance, and its practical implementation, according to its own understanding of Romania's needs.

We informed the new Romanian leadership and also informed the International Red Cross Committee and the International Health Organization that we had set up hospitals in the frontier cities of the Soviet Union to receive wounded from Romania. In Moldavia they are already expecting the first group of 600 wounded.

About the means of assistance. The first load valued at a half million rubles (11 rail-cars) will be sent by rail. Trains in Romania still function. In addition, we gave instruction to the leadership of Moldavia to get in touch with border districts in Romania and clarify two issues. First, what do they need most. Second, to ask for their advice as to the best way to transport the loads.

To finish the exposition of our thoughts on the situation in Romania, I remarked that we are in close contact on these questions with our Warsaw Treaty allies as well as with all other states that approach us. So we take as a positive sign the desire of the American side to exchange opinions. We consider contacts of this kind very useful.

Reacting to our words, Matlock thought that now the United States is seeking optimal ways of cooperation in order to give assistance to Romania. According to Matlock, the United States would be ready to give assistance in medicine and food, as well as in logistics of transporting this assistance. In this context the American ambassador made the following request. If the Soviet side develops some ideas on this score, the American side is very interested in being kept up to date.

I responded that naturally we would be ready at any moment to share our considerations with the American side.

Then Matlock touched on the issue that, apparently, he wanted to raise from the very beginning of the conversation. The Administration, he said, is very interested in knowing if the possibility of military assistance by the Soviet Union to the Romanian National Salvation Front is totally out of question. Matlock suggested the following option: what would the Soviet Union do if an appropriate appeal came from the Front? Simultaneously, the Ambassador hinted at the idea, apparently on instructions from Washington. He let us know that under the present circumstances the military involvement of the Soviet Union in Romanian affairs might not be regarded in the context of "the Brezhnev doctrine."

To this sounding out by the American I gave the entirely clear and unequivocal answer, presenting our principled position. I declared that we did not visualize, even theoretically, such a scenario. We stand against any interference in the domestic affairs of other states and we intend to pursue this line firmly and without deviations. Thus, the American side may consider that "the Brezhnev doctrine" is now theirs as our gift.

Developing this thesis further, as a clarification, I drew the interlocutor's attention to the fact that it was on the basis of these considerations that the Soviet Union was and still is against convening the Security Council (SC) to consider the situation in Romania.

The American, however, immediately inquired what would be the Soviet reaction if the National Salvation Front itself appeals to convene the SC.

I said that we are still not ready to contemplate such a hypothetical possibility.
In the end both sides confirmed the positive evaluation of the exchange of opinions that took place. They expressed support of continuing contacts with regard to the rapidly changing situation in Romania.

Participants of the meeting included deputy head of the Directorate of the USA and Canada I.N. Podrazhanets, third secretary of the DUSAandC [Directorate of USA and Canada in the Soviet Foreign Ministry] N.N. Spassky and first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Moscow J. Shoemaker.

Deputy minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR I. ABOIMOV

[Source: Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 21/22, November 1994, pp. 74-79. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.]
SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 06982

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: RUSEV PESSIMISTIC ON FUTURE OF COMMUNIST PARTY

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN LANTOS, BULGARIA'S LEADING PAINTER AND RESTORED BCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER SVETLIN RUSEV ADMITTED THAT THE PARTY'S DAYS AT THE HEAD OF BULGARIAN GOVERNMENT ARE NUMBERED. HE PREDICTED FURTHER PURGES IN 1990: A "SURVIVAL RATE" OF ONLY TEN PERCENT OF CURRENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS AT THE END OF MAY. HE ALSO PREDICTED FURTHER TROUBLES FOR OUSTED LEADER TODOR ZHIVKOV AS INVESTIGATIONS OF HIS ACTIVITIES BEGIN. FINALLY, HE PREDICTED A SATISFACTORY BUT NOT NECESSARILY RAPID RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY'S MINORITY PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.

3. SVETLIN RUSEV IS PERHAPS BULGARIA'S BEST KNOWN AND MOST WIDELY RESPECTED PAINTER. HIS WORKS HANG IN MANY WEST EUROPEAN COLLECTIONS AND IN GALLERIES THROUGHOUT BULGARIA. IN 1976, HE WAS ELECTED TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S (BCP) CENTRAL COMMITTEE, BUT HE WAS EXPELLED BY ZHIVKOV IN 1988 AFTER CRITICIZING THE TOTALITARIAN NATURE OF ZHIVKOV'S GOVERNMENT AND AFTER PARTICIPATING IN WRITTEN PROTESTS AGAINST POLLUTION IN RUSE. IN JANUARY 1989, HE WAS ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S "DISSIDENTS" WHO MET WITH FRANCE
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING HIS VISIT TO SOFIA.
IN NOVEMBER, 1989, AFTER MLADENOV'S ASCENDANCY TO
POWER, HE WAS RESTORED TO ALL OF HIS FORMER POSITIONS,
INCLUDING THAT OF DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL ART
GALLERY. SINCE THEN, HE HAS APPEARED FREQUENTLY
ON TELEVISION AND HIS WRITINGS APPEAR REGULARLY IN
NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS. ON 23 DECEMBER, CONGRESSMAN
AND MRS. TOM LANTOS AND POST HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER
CALLED ON HIM AT HIS LARGE STUDIO NEAR SOFIA'S
NEVSKI CATHEDRAL.

4. RUSEV TOLD LANTOS THAT THE OUSTER OF ZHIVKOV WAS
A STEP WHICH SAVED BULGARIA FROM THE VIOLENCE WHICH
SWEEP THROUGH ROMANIA. THIS WAS ONLY THE BEGINNING,
HE SAID, AS THE NEW LEADERSHIP ALSO PREPARED FOR
"FURTHER LIBERALIZATIONS." THE PEOPLE ARE EXPECTING
THESE, HE ADDED. THEY HAVE "LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE
STATE AND THE PARTY" AND ARE "WELL AWARE OF THE
SITUATION." THEY "HAVE BECOME MORE ACTIVE," AND
THIS FORMS "PRESSURE AND SUPPORT FOR CHANGE."

5. WHEN LANTOS ASKED WHETHER THE Restructuring in
BULGARIA WOULD FOLLOW THE HUNGARIAN MODEL OF PARTY
PLURALISM OR THE SOVIET MODEL OF MERE LIBERALIZATION
OF THE SINGLE POLITICAL PARTY, RUSEV SAID THAT
SEVERAL PARTIES WERE LIKELY TO DEVELOP IN BULGARIA.
ARTICLE 1 (GUARANTEENING THE LEADING ROLE OF THE BCP
IN SOCIETY) OF THE CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY
ABOLISHED, AND AN ENTIRELY NEW CONSTITUTION WILL
FOLLOW. "DEPENDING ON ITS PLATFORM," THE UNION OF
DEMOCRATIC FORCES CAN EXPECT TO PLAY A ROLE, AND
THE AGRARIAN PARTY WILL BE "VERY ACTIVE, DUE TO ITS
LARGE SOCIAL BASE." UNFORTUNATELY, HE SAID, THE
INDEPENDENT PARTIES DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE "PEOPLE
WHO CAN PRESENT A PLATFORM WHICH IS COMPREHENSIVE."
THEY ARE NOT YET "PERSONALLY READY" FOR DIALOGUE.
"IN A NORMAL DEVELOPMENT" OF POLITICAL PARTIES,
"OTHER FIGURES WILL APPEAR WITH POLITICAL READINESS
AND PERSONAL QUALITIES TO UNDERTAKE CHANGES."
NONETHELESS, THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS ARE ALREADY
PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE BY PROVIDING "PRESSURE"
FOR CHANGE AND "ACCELERATING THE PROCESS."

6. THE NEW BCP LEADERSHIP CONTAINS A REFORMIST,
"LIBERAL" ELEMENT WHICH MAKES RUSEV CONFIDENT THAT
IT WILL REMAIN "IN CHARGE" FOR NOW. MLADENOV, LILOV,
AND LUKANOV HAVE SHOWN THEIR GENUINE DESIRE FOR
CHANGE, AND, "FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE INTELLIGENT
WING OF THE PARTY HAS TAKEN THE LEAD." THE ARMY
ALSO SUPPORTS REFORM, HE ADDED. "WITH THE LEADERSHIP
WELL AWARE OF THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS, "THIS IS THEIR CHANCE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION AND MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES IN HISTORY AS REFORMERS." WHEN PRESSED, HOWEVER, HE ADMITTED THAT THE PARTY'S DAYS ON TOP ARE NUMBERED: FIVE YEARS FROM NOW, "ANOTHER PARTY WILL HAVE THE LEAD, I THINK." "SOCIALISM HAS

NNNN

PAGE 01  SOFIA 06982 02 OF 02  290024Z
ACTION EUR-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 DODF-00 H-01
NSCE-00 NSAE-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00 PM-10 PA-01
OMB-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02
T-01 /037 W
---------------------276476 30116Z /12
R 281448Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAD SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9014
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
AMBASSAD BRUSSELS

SECTION 02 OF 02 SOFIA 06982

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: RUSEV PESSIMISTIC ON FUTURE OF COMMUNIST

PROVED TO BE MORE POPULAR THAN COMMUNISM," HE ADDED. "IT GIVES GOOD RESULTS, SUCH AS IN SWEDEN."

7. WHEN LANTOS TURNED TO ZHIKOV'S TROUBLES, RUSEV SAID THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE WHICH WILL EXAMINE ZHIKOV'S RECORD. "FOR NOW, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO USE," BUT, "FROM WHAT I HEAR, EVERYTHING HE HAS "AS NOT EARNED." FOR EXAMPLE, "WE KNOW HE RECEIVED 1.6 MILLION LEVA IN
AUTHOR’S FEES FOR VOLUMES OF SPEECHES WHICH HE DIDN’T WRITE." HE ALSO KEPT THE HARD CURRENCY PROCEEDS OF FOREIGN SALES OF HIS BOOKS EVEN THOUGH STATE PUBLISHING HOUSES PAID ALL COSTS. HE ALSO APPROPRIATED MANY RESIDENCES FOR HIS SOLE USE EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD BEEN BUILT FOR THE ENTIRE POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE. NOW, ZHIVKOV IS IN BOYANA, ACCORDING TO

PAGE 02

RUSEV. HE IS NOT UNDER HOUSE ARREST, BUT HE HAS TO BE PROTECTED FROM THE PEOPLE, WHO ARE VERY ANGRY WITH HIM. SOON, RUSEV PREDICTED, "HE WILL GO TO TRIAL."

8. ON THE MINORITIES ISSUE, RUSEV NOTED THAT THIS WAS "THE MOST DIFFICULT INHERITANCE" FROM ZHIVKOV. "I ATTENDED A MEETING BETWEEN INTELLECTUALS AND ZHIVKOV. HE SAID HE HAD DECIDED THAT THIS (THE ASSIMILATION CAMPAIGN) WAS A DECISION OF HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE. I DON’T KNOW WHETHER HE BELIEVED HIS OWN WORDS." IN ANY CASE, "NOBODY EXPLAINED THE CONSEQUENCES TO HIM."

9. RUSEV SAYS THAT TWO PROPOSALS WERE ADVANCED BEFORE THE NAME-CHANGE CAMPAIGN OF 1984-85. THE FIRST, "THE MORE INTELLIGENT ONE," WAS TO IMPROVE THE ETHNIC TURKS’ SOCIAL STATUS--TO "MAKE IT CLOSER TO OURS." IT WOULD NOT HAVE ENTAILED NAME-CHANGES. IT WAS FAVORED BY LILOV, STEFAN MIHAILOV, AND OTHERS. THE SECOND PROPOSAL, WHICH BECAME OFFICIAL POLICY, WAS CHOSEN, WITH THE BACKING OF ZHIVKOV, BALEV, KUBADINSKY, AND OTHERS, BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT TO BE FASTER AND THEREFORE BETTER. "THEY DIDN’T CONSIDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES," RUSEV SAID. "THEY EXPECTED SOME REACTION, BUT NOTHING LIKE WHAT HAPPENED. THEY FAILED TO CONSIDER, FOR INSTANCE, THAT NAME-CHANGES ARE COUNTER TO THE KORAN." IRONICALLY, THE MINORITY HAD NO CLAIM TO BEING TURKS UNTIL THE NAME-CHANGE, HE ADDED. AT THAT POINT, THEY REALIZED THAT THEY ARE TURKS."

10. COMMENT.
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PRL, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE BEGINS - A ROUND-TABLE DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL CHANGE

REF: SOFIA 6699

1. **ENTIRE TEXT.**

ON A ROUND-TABLE BASIS WITH THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS ON JANUARY 2-3 IN RESPONSE TO PODKREPA'S CALL FOR A GENERAL STRIKE. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE INDEPENDENT GROUPS IS TO KEEP THEIR OVERALL UNITY IN THE FACE OF THE VARIED VIEWS AND PHILOSOPHIES REPRESENTED UNDER THE "UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES." THIS INCLUDES THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF TREATMENT OF THE ETHNIC TURKISH AND POMAK MINORITIES. END SUMMARY.

3. WHAT BEGAN AS A "TOP-DOWN" PALACE COUP ON NOVEMBER 10 WITH THE OUSTER OF TODOR ZHIVKOV HAS ADDED A GENUINE "BOTTOM-UP" DIMENSION WHICH IS DAILY GROWING IN STRENGTH. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE BULGARIAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE TODAY IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM A MERE TWO MONTHS AGO, AND THAT THE TERRAIN AHEAD LOOKS MORE BUMPY AND VARIED FOR ALL CONCERNED. AS BULGARIA CLOSES OUT ITS OWN MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL YEAR OF THE LAST FOUR DECADES AND ENTERS THE LAST DECADE OF THE CENTURY IN A NEW DOMESTIC AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO TAKE STOCK OF DEVELOPMENTS, WHERE THEY MAY BE LEADING OVER THE NEAR FUTURE, AND ASSESS WHAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY MEAN FOR U.S. INTERESTS HERE.

4. WHILE NOT ALL THE EVIDENCE IS IN, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MLADENOV LEADERSHIP THOUGHT, IN THE WAKE OF THE NOVEMBER 10 ZHIVKOV OUSTER, IT HAD (1) SAVED ITS COLLECTIVE SKIN, (2) BOUGHT TIME TO MAKE THE FIRST NECESSARY PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE TOP PARTY STRUCTURES TO ENSURE ITS CONTROL OF POWER, (3) BEGUN TO SET THE STAGE FOR CORRECTING IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, AND (4) BOUGHT TIME TO STAY AHEAD OF THE CURVE IN TERMS OF NASCENT DOMESTIC UNREST/DISCONTENT BROUGHT ON IN PART BY DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE PARTY'S NEW LEADERSHIP APPEARED ON NOVEMBER 10 TO HAVE ONLY THE MOST BARE-BONES OF A POLICY PROGRAM OUTLINE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND PLURALISM OF OPINION WITHIN SOCIALISM A LA THE SOVIET MODEL OF CONTROLLED POLITICAL REFORM. MLADENOV'S ADVOCACY OF PLURALISM AND GLASNOST, HOWEVER, WHILE INTENDED TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE PARTY AND HIS LEADERSHIP, ALSO HAD THE UNINTENDED EFFECT OF ENERGIZING AND GIVING LEGITIMACY TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE VARIOUS INFORMAL AND NON-OFFICIAL GROUPINGS AND MOVEMENTS EMBOLDENED BY EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

5. IN SETTING AND ANNOUNCING DECEMBER 11 AS THE DATE FOR THE NEXT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM TO DISCUSS
THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND DECEMBER 14
WHEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD MEET FOR SIMILAR
REASONS, MLADENOV AND COMPANY PRESUMABLY THOUGHT
THEY HAD THE LUXURY OF TIME TO SET THE PACE FOR
CHANGE (PERSONNEL AND OTHERWISE) WITHIN THE PARTY
AND TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF MOVING, VOLUNTARILY,

NNNN

PAGE 01 SOFIA 06988 02 OF 05 290918Z
ACTION EUR-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-00 INR-05 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 H-01 NSCE-00 NSA-00 HA-09 L-03 TRSE-00
PM-10 PA-01 OMB-01 NRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 SP-02
SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 /038 W

R 290850Z DEC 89
FM AMBASSAD SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9022
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

SECTION 02 OF 05 SOFIA 06988

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE BEGINS

TO A MORE DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM. MLADENOV
MAY HAVE MISCALCULATED. IN AN EARLY DECEMBER
INTERVIEW IN MOSCOW, MLADENOV EQUIVOCATED ABOUT
GIVING UP THE LEADING ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
IN ANY FUTURE "SOCIALIST" BULGARIA.

6. THIS EQUIVOCATION PLUS THE EXAMPLE OF THE "STREET"TN PRAGUE AND EARLIER IN EAST GERMANY MAY HAVE GIVEN
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN BULGARIA THE IMPETUS TO PUSH
MORE RAPIDLY FOR CHANGE IN BULGARIA, AND IN A MORE
COORDINATED MANNER THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE EARLIER.
WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR INDIVIDUAL STANDS ON CHANGE
FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS, THE GROUPS FORMED AN UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION: THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES (UDF) IN A COORDINATED EFFORT TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE PARTY FOR FASTER DEMOCRATIC CHANGE. PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO DEFLICT SOME OF THE PRESSURE FROM THE "UNION" AND TO SPLIT THE NASCENT COORDINATION OF THE GROUPS.

THE PARTY CALLED A SURPRISE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM DECEMBER 8, AT WHICH SOME PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE POLITIBURO AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WERE EFFECTED, REMOVING KNOWN ZHIVKOV CRONIES AND HARDLINERS.


8. AT THE DECEMBER 11 CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, MLADENOV, PUBLICLY STATED THAT THE PARTY WOULD NO LONGER INSIST ON ITS LEADING ROLE IN SOCIETY, BUT WOULD LEAVE IT UP TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO MAKE THE LEGAL CHANGES TO BRING THIS ABOUT. IN ITS TURN, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF STANKO Todorov, NOTING A CONSTITUTIONAL STIPULATION THAT AT LEAST THIRTY DAYS WERE REQUIRED BETWEEN A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE VOTE ON SUCH A CHANGE, PASSED A DECLARATION THAT THE CHANGE WOULD DEFINITELY BE MADE IN THE UPCOMING JANUARY SESSION. WHILE THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT SUCH A CHANGE WOULD BE VOTED AT THE NEXT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION, NOW SET FOR JANUARY 15, SOME IF NOT ALL OF THE OPPOSITION FORCES MAY HAVE SMELLED A TRAP;
THE VERY LEAST, THEY WERE NOT SATISFIED, EVEN
THOUGH MLADENOV ALSO ANNOUNCED AT THE PLENUM THAT
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD BEFORE THE
END OF MAY, 1990.

9. PRESUMABLY THE OPPOSITION GROUPS SAW THIS AS
FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTY LEADERSHIP HAD NO
SERIOUS INTENTION OF CONCEEDING MORE THAN THE BAREST
MINIMUM GROUND TO THEM IN ANY FAIR POLITICAL
COMPETITION. LITTLE IF ANYTHING WAS SAID BY MLADENOV
OR OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS AT THE PLENUM ABOUT THEIR
READINESS TO ENGAGE IN A SPECIFIC AND SERIOUS POLITICAL
DIALOGUE WITH THE UDF OR ITS CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS.
IN ANY CASE, THE DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY ON DECEMBER 14 CLEARLY FRIGHTENED THE
LEADERSHIP DUE TO ITS VOCAL NATURE, CLEAR DISDAIN
FOR THE BCP AND MLADENOV HIMSELF, AND THE DETERMINA-
TION SHOWN BY THE PARTICIPANTS.

10. ONLY SUBSEQUENTLY, AND AGAINST THE BACKGROUND
OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ROMANIA AND THREATS BY PODKREPA
AND ITS PRESIDENT, KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV, TO CALL
FIRST A TWO-HOURS STRIKE ON DECEMBER 27 AND THEN A
GENERAL STRIKE ON DECEMBER 28, DID THE PARTY BEGIN
TO SHOW SOME POSITIVE SIGNS OF ENTERING I
NTO A DIS-
CUSSION WITH "OTHER" SOCIAL AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 24
ISSUED A STRONG STATEMENT ATTACKING TRENCHEV AND
PODKREPA FOR THEIR "EXTREMIST" VIEWS, AND WARNING
R 290850Z DEC 89
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023
INFO EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 05 SOFIA 06988

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA AT THE TURN OF THE DECADE BEGINS

DARKLY THAT DEVELOPMENTS COULD TAKE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN ROMANIA.


12. ON DECEMBER 27, RABOTNICHESKO DELO AND OTHER PAPERS CARRIED AN ACCOUNT OF THE DECEMBER 26 POLITBURO MEETING, AT WHICH IT WAS DECIDED TO "PROPOSE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NEWLY EMERGING INFORMAL AND INDEPENDENT PUBLIC STRUCTURES AND MOVEMENTS TO CONDUCT 'ROUND TABLE' CONSULTATIONS ON THE BASIC QUESTIONS OF RESTRUCTURING" IN BULGARIA. THE POLITBURO ALSO PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE LEADERSHIPS OF THE BCP AND THE AGRARIAN PARTY "AS THE RULING (UPRAVLYAYASHCHI) PARTIES" TO ANALYZE THE COUNTRY'S EXISTING SITUATION AND TO DISCUSS URGENT PROBLEMS AND MEASURES FOR THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRUCTURING IN BULGARIA. "ROUND TABLE" CONSULTATIONS WERE ALSO PROPOSED WITH THE FATHERLAND FRONT, CENTRAL TRADE UNIONS,
KOMSOMOL AND OTHER PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS. THE POLITBURO ALSO PROPOSED THAT THE "MEETINGS" BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NEW YEAR, BUT DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER IT INTENDED TO MEET SEPARATELY WITH THE DIFFERENT GROUPS OR ALL WOULD MEET TOGETHER.

13. WE DO NOT KNOW AS OF THIS WRITING WHETHER THE DECEMBER 27 POLITBURO ANNOUNCEMENT AVERTED ANY TWO-HOUR STRIKES ON THE SAME DAY; WE ASSUME IT PROBABLY DID SO. AT ABOUT 6 P.M. AT THE PODKREPA VIGIL SITE, TRENCHEV ANNOUNCED TO THE CROWD OF SEVERAL HUNDRED IN THE GLARE OF TV LIGHTS AND FALLING SNOW THAT THE "GOVERNMENT" HAD AGREED TO PODKREPA'S DEMANDS FOR ROUND-TABLE NEGOTIATIONS.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, PODKREPA WOULD DESIST IN ITS CALL FOR A DECEMBER 28 GENERAL STRIKE. FOR ITS PART, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CARRY ON ITS 8 P.M. TV NEWS BROADCAST PODKREPA'S POSITION FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE CROWD IMMEDIATELY CHEERED THE NEWS, ALONG WITH REPEATED SHOUTS OF PODKREPA.

14. IN SUBSEQUENT BRIEF CONVERSATIONS AT THE RALLY, TRENCHEV AND ECOGLASMOST PRESIDENT BERON TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT DURING THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTY/GOVERNMENT, WORKERS IN SUPPORT OF PODKREPA WOULD WEAR "SYMBOLIC" STRIKE ARM BANDS. PROCEDURAL TALKS COULD BEGIN ON DECEMBER 28, THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES WOULD BEGIN ON JANUARY 2; AND BERON EXPECTED TWO WEEKS OF HARD BARGAINING. INTERRUPTIONS BY WELL-WISHERS OF TRENCHEV AND BERON PREVENTED ANY DISCUSSION OF THEIR STRATEGY AND PLATFORM FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE ASSUME THEIR DEMANDS WILL FOLLOW THE PROGRAM "APPROVED" AT THE DECEMBER 10 MASS MEETING (REPTEL).

15. AS OF THIS WRITING, THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS GENERAL SECRETARY, MLADENOV, AND PERHAPS ANDREY LUKANOV WOULD APPEAR TO BE LOSING THE POLITICAL BATTLE. THEY ARE BEING CONSTANTLY Pressed TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS. NONE OF WHICH SATISFIES THE INDEPENDENTS. THE LEADERS OF THE CURRENT AGRARIAN PARTY, WHICH CONTINUED TO HOOK ITS STAR TO THE BCP BANDWAGON BY ATTACKING TRENCHEV AND PODKREPA FOR THEIR STRIKE CALL, ALSO WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE LOST MUCH CLAIM TO AN INDEPENDENT ROLE FOR THEMSELVES AND SUPPORT FROM THE PUBLIC. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN IF THE BREAKAWAY AND RADICAL Factions OF THAT
PARTY CAN GAIN CONTROL AND OUST THE TRADITIONALISTS. MLADENOV COULD BE IN SOME TROUBLE WITHIN THE PARTY FOR FAILING TO LEAD. HE WAS, BY IMPLICATION, SHARPLY ATTACKED AT THE DECEMBER 11-12 BCP CC PLENUM BY POLITBУRO MEMBER STOYAN MIKHAЙLOВ FOR LOSING A MONTH OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY AFTER THE NOVEMBER 10 PLENUM AND FOR USING OLD METHODS OF WORK. ON DECEMBER 26, БТА ANNOUNCED THE HOLDING OF AN ORGANIZING MEETING ON JANUARY 12 OF AN "ALTERNATIVE SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION" AS A FACTION WITHIN THE BCP. ITS ORGANIZER IS NIKОLAY VASILEV, A SOФИА UNIVERSITY ANTHROPOLOGIST WHO WAS EXPELLED FROM THE BCP AND THEN REINSTATED BY MLADENOV IN MID-NOVEMBER 1989. VASILEV DELIVERED A STINKING ANTI-BCP SPEECH AT THE DECEMBER 10 MASS DEMONSTRATION. OTHER GROUP MEMBERS ARE SAID TO INCLUDE ACTIVIST FILMMAKER ANГЕL WAGENSTEHN, TVAN KРУСТЕV, TVATILO DИCHEV, AND OUSTED BUT REINSTATED BCP MEMBER AND ART CRITIC KОPRINA CHЕРУFUNKOVA. (ALL OF THESE ARE CONFIDENTIAL.
SAID TO BE MEMBERS OF THE DISCUSSION CLUB, ALSO.

THE GROUP'S ANNOUNCED PROGRAM INCLUDES THE WHOLESALE
RESIGNATION OF THE SITTING CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
PUTTING A CARETAKER LEADERSHIP IN CHARGE OF PREPARE-
ATIONS FOR THE MARCH 19 PARTY CONGRESS, AND DOING
AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM AS A GUIDING PARTY
PRINCIPLE.

16. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PARTY PRESS HAS BEEN
CARRYING ACCOUNTS OF PARTY MEETINGS AT THE CITY
AND REGIONAL LEVELS INDICATING LOCAL LEADERSHIP
CHANGES, SOMETIMES UNDER APPARENTLY ACRIMONIOUS
CONDITIONS. IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT, IN
ADDITION TO PRESSURE WHICH IS BUILDING FROM IN-
DEPENDENT GROUPS ON THE OUTSIDE, DISSENT IS GROWING
WITHIN THE PARTY, WHICH IS ALREADY LOSING SOME
OF THE INTELLECTUALS WHOM MLADENOV HAD ATTEMPTED
TO DRAW BACK INTO THE PARTY.

17. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ADVISOR ANGELOV TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 21 THERE WAS A LIKELIHOOD
OF A CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENARY VERY EARLY IN JANUARY
AT WHICH FURTHER CHANGES IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMPOSITION WOULD TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS PROCEDURAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MARCH BCP CONGRESS. ANGELOV
EXPRESSION THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT 75-80 PERCENT OF
THE PRESENT CC MEMBERSHIP SHOULD BE REPLACED IF THE
PARTY WAG TO HAVE ANY REAL HOPE OF LEADING THE
COUNTRY. SIMILARLY, CC MEMBER SVETLIN RUSEV TOLD
CONGRESSMAN LANTOS ON DECEMBER 23 THAT HE EXPECTED
90 PERCENT OF CC AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS TO
BE PURGED IN THE COMING MONTHS.

18. PODKREPA AND ESPECIALLY ITS FOUNDER, DR.
KONSTANTIN TRENCHEV, AS WELL AS THE UDF APPEAR TO BE
THE BIG WINNERS SO FAR, AND SEEM TO HAVE THE
MOMENTUM THE PARTY HAS LOST. HOW TRENCHEV AND OTHERS
WILL PARE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE KEY
QUESTION, ALONG WITH WHETHER THEY CAN MAINTAIN A
CLEAR UNITY OF STRATEGY AND POLICY GOALS. ALTHOUGH
THEY STILL HAVE A VERY LONG WAY TO GO, THEY HAVE
COME MUCH FURTHER AND FASTER THAN MOST OBSERVERS
HERE THOUGHT POSSIBLE.
19. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT/KNOW HOW OR
WHETHER THE OPPOSITION GROUPS UNDER THE UDF PLAN,
FOR EXAMPLE, TO TACKLE THE ETHNIC TURKISH QUESTION
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ZHELO ZHELEV, CHAIRMAN OF
THE UDF, HAS SAID IN PRINT AND PRIVATELY THAT THE
PARTY/GOV'T SHOULD TAKE A BOLD INITIATIVE IN
RETURNING THEIR NAMES AND ALL OTHER RIGHTS AND
ATTRIBUTES, THEREBY GAINING THE TRUST OF AT LEAST
ONE MILLION BULGARIANS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.
OTHERS IN THE UDF MAY NOT/BE PREPARED TO GO
SO FAST, NOR DOES THE PARTY/GOV'T APPEAR
PREPARED TO TAKE SUCH STEPS NOW. IT REMAINS TO BE
SEEN HOW THIS ISSUE WILL BE ADDRESSED, IF AT ALL, IN
THE ROUND TABLE NEGOTIATIONS, SCHEDULED TO BEGIN
ONLY ONE WEEK BEFORE THE PLANNED JANUARY 9
BULGARIAN-TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN
KUWAIT.

20. GIVEN THE SUCCESS OF THE UDF AND PODKREPA
IN BRINGING THE PARTY/GOV'T TO ROUND-TABLE

POLANSKY
SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 07019

USIA FOR PENDERGAST AND IGNATIUS

BRUSSELS FOR USEC-AMB. NILES

E.O. 12356: DECL: CDR
TAGS: PHUM, PINX, BU
SUBJECT: VODENICHAROV REPORTS SUCCESSFUL MASS MEETING IN MADAN

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. INDEPENDENT SOCIETY LEADER RUMEN VODENICHAROV REPORTS THAT 20,000 PEOPLE GATHERED IN MADAN ON 24 DECEMBER FOR THE INDEPENDENT SOCIETY'S SECOND MASS MEETING IN BULGARIA'S POMAK REGIONS. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW YEAR, INCLUDING MORE MEETINGS IN POMAK AND ETHNIC TURKISH AREAS, CONTINUED SOCIETY GATHERINGS IN SOFIA'S SOUTH PARK, PARTICIPATION IN A POLITICAL SEMINAR IN VIENNA, AND A TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT, SOON,
MFA REFUSAL OF OUR REQUEST TO ENTER THE PERMANENT
RESTRICTED AREA (PRA) NEAR THE BORDER WITH GREECE
AND TURKEY. WHEN THESE OFFICERS INSTEAD WENT TO THE
BULGARIAN-HUNGARIAN BORDER TO ASSIST WITH EVACUATION
OF EMBASSY BUCHAREST PERSONNEL, WE SENT OUR ECONOMIC
OFFICER AND DAO ASSISTANT, WHO WERE TURNED BACK BY
MILITIAMEN AS THEY CROSSED INTO THE PRA 30 KMS FROM
MADAN.) VODENICHAROV SAID THAT 20,000 PEOPLE
PRIMARILY POMAKS (BULGARIAN MUSLIMS), HAD ATTENDED.
THE MEETING HAD FOLLOWED THE SOCIETY'S STRATEGY OF
TAKING ITS PROGRAM ONE STEP FURTHER WITH EACH PUBLIC
EVENT: THE 18 NOVEMBER Démonstration had first
RAISED THE ISSUE OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR THE COUNTRY'S
MUSLIM MINORITIES. THE NEXT MEETING OF THE SOCIETY
IN SOFIA'S SOUTH PARK HAD REAFFIRMED THE GROUP'S
COMMITMENT TO EQUAL RIGHTS AND FOR THE FIRST TIME
STATED THE CLOSING OF ITS MEMBERSHIP TO COMMUNISTS.
THE 2 DECEMBER MEETING, WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AS GUEST
OF HONOR, HAD INCLUDED AN ADDRESS FROM HASSAN BYALKO,
WHO IS PERHAPS THE COUNTRY'S LEADING POMAK ACTIVIST.
THE 10 DECEMBER SOFIA MASS DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH
VODENICHAROV COULD NOT PARTICIPATE BECAUSE HIS
DAUGHTER WAS BEING MARRIED, SAW THOUSANDS OF POMAKS
AND ETHNIC TURKS DEMANDING THAT THEIR NAMES BE
RETURNED TO THEM. THE 16 DECEMBER GYUZE DELCHEV
GATHERING HAD BEEN A TEST OF THE NEW BCP LEADERSHIP'S
WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW MUSLIMS TO MEET PUBLICLY. THE
MADAN MEETING REPRESENTED A DIRECT EXPRESSION OF
RELIGIOUS RITES AS THREE IMAMS OPENED AND CLOSED THE
MEETING WITH PRAYERS AND INTONATIONS OF "ALLAH IS
GREAT."

4. ACCORDING TO VODENICHAROV, THE LOCAL MILITIAMEN
HAD BEEN REPLACED WITH MEN FROM THE NEARBY REGION OF
SMOLYAN BECAUSE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE AFRAID THAT
THE LOCAL FORCES WOULD REACT TOO HOSTILELY TO THIS,
THE FIRST SUCH GATHERING IN MADAN. THE SMOLYAN
OFFICERS WERE RESTRAINED AND THE PROCEEDINGS PROGRESSED
CORDIALLY. VODENICHAROV DID HAVE TO CONTENT WITH
TWO SMALL GROUPS OF HECKLERS, WHICH PROFERRED "COUNTER-
SLOGANS AND COUNTER-SIGNS," INCLUDING "RADOSELAVOV 1919,
VODENICHAROV 1989." (VODENICHAROV EXPLAINED THAT
RADOSELAVOV WAS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO FIRST
ADVOCATED BULGARIZATION OF THE MUSLIMS' NAMES IN
THE EARLY PART OF THE CENTURY. "PLANTED" PROTESTORS
ARE NOW CLAIMING THAT VODENICHAROV'S ADVOCACY OF A
RETURN TO TURKISH NAMES INVITES A MAJOR VIOLATION OF
THE MINORITY'S RIGHTS.) ONE GROUP OF HECKLERS WERE
PART OF THE NEW "PATRIOT" ORGANIZATION, WHICH
VODENICHAROV SAYS IS A GOVERNMENT-BACKED C-LAUVINIST FRONT EXPRESSLY FORMED TO COUNTER HIS SOCIETY'S CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVITIES.

5. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE EVENT WAS NOT OBJECTIVE. ON 27 DECEMBER, "RABOTNICHESKO DELO" CARRIED A STORY

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions ***  n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED