President Bush held some eight hours of candid and useful discussions with Chairman Gorbachev during their two days on Malta.

The President decided it was important -- in advance of the formal summit in 1990 -- to sit down informally with Gorbachev and exchange views about the dramatic changes taking place, to give new political impetus to their relationship, and to review regional issues, bilateral relations and the pace of arms control.

Malta provided the opportunity for an informal and open exchange of views across a wide range of topics.

The President also took the opportunity to reiterate his personal commitment to placing the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more stable, durable and cooperative basis.

A better U.S.-Soviet relationship is valuable on its own terms and as an instrument for positive change in the world in general.

In the spirit of giving an impetus to the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the President proposed a number of ideas to Gorbachev.

Many concerned economic and commercial relations as measure of U.S. support for Soviet efforts to restructure and develop their economy; others entailed setting priorities for arms control, including START, nuclear testing, MX, CES.

Discussion on change in Eastern and Central Europe was truly remarkable. Gorbachev admitted candidly that democratic values the West has held dear for so long should set standard for all humanity.

He focused repeatedly on importance of stability, but reiterated that Eastern Europeans need to find their own way forward. Gorbachev noted his own concept of Europe included United States, Canada.
On arms control, President succeeded in giving high-level push in key areas and set priorities of our negotiators to pursue in months ahead.

- These include START, nuclear testing, chemical weapons and CFE.

- Although Gorbachev predictably raised naval arms control, President explained why we saw little prospect for it.

On regional issues, President expressed our concern about the gap between Soviet rhetorical support for peaceful settlements and realities of Soviet conduct.

- The discussion was largely disappointing.

- The President noted Soviet policy on regional conflicts was out of step with the new Soviet directions domestically, in Eastern Europe and in arms control.

- He offered to work with the Soviets on regional conflicts and on including them in regional diplomacy. The President observed that with inclusion comes responsibility, and made clear that the U.S. hopes to see such signs of responsibility in Central America, the Middle East and Asia.

- Nicaragua and Cuba remain the single most disruptive factor in U.S.-Soviet relations. The President asked that Moscow use its influence with Managua and Havana to curb their support for subversion.

- On Afghanistan, the Soviets talked of a transition process. Of course, in our view, a transition must entail a transfer of power.

The leaders discussed priorities for moving forward in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, with a view to next year’s Summit in the United States.

- The President and Chairman Gorbachev agreed the Summit will take place during the last two weeks of June.

- They further agreed that the meeting should be well-prepared, including thorough meetings at the ministerial level. The first of these between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will take place in the Soviet Union in late January.
Towards a new concept of relations between the USSR and the states of Central and Eastern Europe

January 9, 1990
Bybakov, Ozrelev

1. Assessment of the situation in the region

At the end of the 1980s the crisis of the neo-Stalinist model of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe has become a general crisis and broke into the open phase. During 1989 in all the states of the Warsaw Treaty Organizations the accumulated contradictions came to be realized which led to a change of the social order, while in three countries the changes took the nature of a chain-reaction (in the GDR and Czechoslovakia they were peaceful, in Romania it was bloody). A palace coup in Bulgaria, although it prevented an open conflict, still came too late.

The most significant element in the new situation, in the political sphere, is the end of the era of one-party states in Eastern and Central Europe. Real power is gradually passing into the hands of the leaders of states, governments, and parliaments.

Communist Parties have lost the leading role in society, both de jure and de facto, and are continuing to lose their positions. (…) 

2. Assessment of the old concept of relations between the USSR and the states of Central and Eastern Europe

Until the middle of the 1980s the relations of the USSR with these countries were based on the tacit international acceptance that this region was a sphere of Soviet influence. Although in a matter of fact this situation was "sanctioned" theoretically only in 1968 in the so-called doctrine of limited sovereignty, during the entire post-war period the USSR systematically interfered in the internal affairs of its neighbors, including the use of military force.

Until 1985 the priority principle of Soviet foreign policy was to maintain the status quo, and the nature of political relations was determined mostly by the special role of communist parties in life of Eastern European countries. The CPSU built channels through which it could influence the formation of party-government elites, and used those possibilities on a large scale until the mid-1980s. Against this backdrop there was an established tradition of strict observance of unquestionable loyalty to those groups of party leaders who were in power at the moment, and also the tradition of keeping in secrecy from its own and the international public any contradictions in the WTO and COMECON. This unwritten rule covered, in particular, N. Ceausescu who as early as the end of the 1950's [sic] broke out of the direct Soviet control; limited autonomy [fonda] was tolerated, since Romanian domestic policy remained neo-Stalinist. Loyalty was no

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2136 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
longer observed only in those cases when Eastern European leaders set themselves upon the path of reforms which were regarded by the CPSU leadership as a departure from fundamental assumptions and basic laws of socialist construction.

After the beginning of perestroika the CPSU leadership, in accordance with the proclaimed principles of new political thinking, renounced the Brezhnev doctrine, thereby creating an international climate that favored far-reaching shifts in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, party-to-party relations were not de-coupled from inter-state relations in due time. The nature of relations inside the WTO and COMECON remained un-democratic (the absence of rotation of the posts of the commander-in-chief of staff of the Unified Armed Forces, secretary of the COMECON, etc.). Other mechanisms of political cooperation, its traditions, its protocol remained generally the same. Strict controls on the coverage of relations with East European countries in mass media did not diminish. These problems lay outside of the policy of glasnost. In other words, there were many relics from the past in the system of relations.

Despite profound shifts that have taken place in East European states priority interests of Soviet foreign policy in this region have not yet been clarified, main directions of this policy have not been formulated and a new adequate set of policy instruments has not been created. Multiple Soviet representatives in the states of Eastern Europe failed to forecast events even in the short run and failed to direct the actions of Soviet diplomacy into the correct channel: our policy in Romania gives a most stunning example of this.

The information that came from the embassies, the central apparatus of the Foreign Ministry, services of the KGB abroad and other Soviet representations gave ground for distorted assessments of internal processes that had been brewing in Eastern Europe. Changes in Poland and Hungary evoked excessive alarm, although as the subsequent turn of events sowed, those countries managed to carry out a smooth transition to a new social order, and the national-state interests of the USSR have not been impaired in any significant way. As to the leaders of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, Soviet services abroad criticized them more for their criticism of perestroika in the USSR rather than for their reluctance to undertake much-needed radical transformations. As a result, an unprecedented vacuum of power emerged in those countries, and processes were set in motion which caught both Soviet and international diplomacy unprepared (for instance, a rapid rapprochement of the two German states).

A series of erroneous foreign policy actions took place, in the dissipated spirit of loyalty towards a narrow group of party leaders. The most serious errors: a visit of M.S. Gorbachev to Romania, awarding N. Ceausescu with the order of Lenin and sending a very high-ranking party delegation to the last Congress of the RCP (Romanian Communist Party). Then we should mention a visit of Gorbachev to Czechoslovakia (1987) which led to the most serious disenchantment of the population of this country who expected that this visit would bring about changes. During the visit of Gorbachev to Poland (1988) a chance was missed to reinforce friendly relations with Poles and to enhance the prestige of the Soviet leadership by giving a clear answer to the question about the perpetrator of the Katyn crime. Another missed opportunity was the delay in acknowledging that the intervention (of 1968) in Czechoslovakia was a mistake.

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gekkes Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
Demonstration of loyalty with regard to the leaders who had long lost public support and who were simply hated by the people, steeped in corruption and obscenely violated the same principles of communism which they publicly advocated, hurt the interests of the USSR and the CPSU, compromised their policy and perestroika, increased anti-Soviet sentiments that had remained hidden until a certain moment and that only now are coming out openly. All these errors can be compensated for only to a certain extent through successes of Soviet foreign policy on other issues and in other regions of the world.

Other causes of the aforementioned weaknesses and errors should be named:
- Foreign policy of the Soviet state has been paralyzed by the sense of moral responsibility of the CPSU for the present complications of the communist parties in the countries of Eastern Europe.
- On all stages [the process] of preparations and implementation foreign policy was in the hands of people personally responsible for Soviet actions in the spirit of Brezhnev doctrine. Many of them still adhere to old political assessments and preserve personal ties with national governing cadres with conservative neo-Stalinist orientation. They become the source of not quite objective information about events in the country [of their location].
- Principles of staffing and formation of Soviet diplomatic services in the countries of Eastern Europe and traditions alive in the activity of all representations do not correspond to the present complex situation in the region. People who were sent there are, as a rule, non-professional ambassadors who lord over the personnel of Soviet services abroad in their customary commanding style and stick to conservative tenets aimed at preservation of the status quo. Messages they send to Moscow get filtered through strict ideological filters. Their contacts in the country are almost exclusively with the state-government establishment. All this significantly devalues the information they obtain and distorts the real picture about the country. Obtaining this sort of information does not require keeping so many services in the field; similar conclusions can be drawn in Moscow from the analysis of the official media of these countries.
- East European department of the Foreign Ministry are staffed with the cadres who have been schooled in corresponding embassies and who rely in their practical work on the "battle experience" (sakalka) they have obtained there. The analogous picture is in the area of trade cooperation.

After the war instead of the traditional for Central and Eastern Europe division of labor oriented towards the Western part of the continent, under our strong pressure emerged a relatively self-isolated economic system under the domination of the USSR. Following the Soviet example, the countries adhere to the principle of autarkic development of their economies. The line towards integration was taken only in the 1970's, however it did not bring expected results, because the proposed measures were largely voluntarist by nature, hardly reflected interests of the countries and immediate subjects of economic activity. Cooperation therefore boiled down to the centralized barter, and commercial and financial relations, as well as the concerns for efficiency played a subservient role. Problems of scientific-technical progress had not been resolved, the quality of goods on the COMECON market remained shoddy. For these

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037
reasons centrifugal tendencies in economic relations grew stronger, and the COMECON lost its prestige and now is on the brink of total collapse.

In the first half of the 1980's attempts were made to revive its activity through formalistic bureaucratic programs and skin-lifting changes in the mechanisms of cooperation. However, all these measures came to naught because of lack of coordination between internal mechanisms and different directions in foreign economic policies of various countries.

After the beginning of perestroika the USSR proposed a course aimed at fundamental renewal of forms and methods of economic cooperation. Rigid definition of main parameters of integrationist mechanisms characteristic for the administrative-commanding type of management, was declared unworkable. A new concept of an integrated socialist market reflected the goal proclaimed in the majority of East European countries: to move to market economy. However, realization of this strategic goal proceeds in a halting way, since in reality market mechanisms do not function still in any of the countries – members of the COMECON. Rather on the contrary, there is an increasing trend for the barter in economic relations, even stricter measures to protect the market trade from the citizens of neighboring states. Under such conditions the integrated market remains merely a far-away guideline of restructuring in the sphere of integrationist interaction. (…)

From the National Security Archive, The George Washington University, Gelman Library, 2130 H Street, NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20037

Document on file at the National Security Archive
Donation of Professor Jacques Levesque

Translated by Vladislav Zubok
National Security Archive
ЗАПИСЬ РЕКОРДА
М.С. Горбачев с государственным секретарем США Дж. Бейкером
(в расширенном составе)
9 февраля 1990 года

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Рад видеть Вас, г-н государственный секретарь,
и Ваших коллег, старых и новых знакомых. Э.А. Шеварднадзе рассказал
мне о том, как начались ваши переговоры. Хотел бы констатировать,
что Ваш визит имеет не только практическое, но и большое полити-
ческое значение. Наш диалог продолжается и углубляется, выходит
на новые рубежи взаимопонимания.

На Мальте мы говорили больше в философском плане о новом
этапе развития мировых событий. Но в практическом плане некоторые
вещи виделись достаточно отдельно. Я подумал: как понадобилось
это сопоставление взглядов, особенно в свете того, что после
Мальты развитие событий было стремительным, и это стало испытанием
для уровня наших отношений, нашего взаимопонимания.

Я, конечно, не могу сказать, что американские позиции и
действия в конце прошлого - начале нынешнего года всегда были
идеальными. Впрочем, может быть, и наши тоже. Но в целом все
руководители ведущих стран действовали в это время более ответ-
ственно, взвешенно, с пониманием того, как важно сейчас проявлять
сдержанность, осмотрительность. И это само по себе, я думаю,
даже более важно, чем любые договоренности по деталям, которые вы
можете выработать с Э.А. Шеварднадзе по тем или иным конкретным
вопросам.

Э.А. ШЕВАРДНАДЗЕ. Но все же лучше, когда такие договоренности
есть.
Вы знаете, в процессе перестройки мы взяли за правило не уходить от любых проблем, независимо от того, нравятся они нам или нет, трудные они или простые. Надо не бояться проблем, развязывать узлы. Это верный принцип, и он подходит и к нашим с вами делам.

Хорошо, что у нас с вами есть определенный запас доверия, что мы сможем убедиться в желании обеих сторон кардинально изменить ситуацию к лучшему.

Теперь по конкретным вопросам. Мне рассказывали о ваших предложениях по КРБ и КРЖ. Считаю, тут есть над чем подумать. Некоторые их элементы могут стать основой для окончательного согласования позиций. В частности, совпадают позиции по контролю. Но, думаю, главным критерием является все ж вопрос, насколько мы придерживаемся согласованного уровня 6000 боевиков. Считаю, что надо подтвердить этот уровень, а в его рамках можно менять ровать.

Когда мы рассматривали ваши первые предложения по КРБ, то высказалось, что их осуществление даст вам значительное преимущество, если не ошибаешься, в 2000 боевиков. Это отнюдь не равенство. Мы не можем стоять от принципа равенства. С этим не соглашаться ни кандидат, ни Верховный Совет.

Дж.Бейкер. Я рад, что Вы подняли этот вопрос. Мой заместитель П. Бертолони мог бы подробнее остановиться на проблеме равенства. Со своей стороны хочу сказать следующее.

Проблема КРБ, которую Вы с президентом поручили нам решить на данной встрече, имеет три основных аспекта. Это — правила засчета, отличительные признаки и дальность.

Что касается отличительных признаков, то мы по существу приняли позицию Советского Союза. Что касается дальности, то
США раньше выступали за рубеж дальности в 1500 км, а Советский Союз — 600 километров. Сейчас мы предлагаем рубеж дальности в 1000 км, то есть мы прошли больше чем половину пути навстречу вам.

Мы привезли подвижку и по правилам засчета. Прежде мы предлагали засчитывать за бомбардировщиками по 10 КРВБ без каких-либо иных ограничений. Сейчас мы предлагаем засчитывать 10 боезарядов за американский бомбардировщик и 8 за вашим. Кроме того, мы предлагаем, чтобы фактическое оружие не могло превышать более чем в два раза этот уровень. Таким образом, за нашими самолетами засчитывалось по 10 КРВБ при возможном оснащении двадцатью, а за вашими — 6 КРВБ при возможном оснащении шестнадцатью единицами.

Действительно, согласно нашему подходу каждая из сторон может иметь возможность превысить согласованный уровень в 6000 боезарядов, однако лишь за счет медленно летящих крылатых ракет воздушного базирования, которые, к тому же, должны будут предотвращать противовоздушную оборону. Причем, способность превысить уровень в 6000 боезарядов будет равной у обеих сторон.

Итак, мы приняли вашу позицию по одному из аспектов этой проблемы, пошли вам более чем навстречу по другому, а по третьему предлагаем разумное решение.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Есть один пункт, по которому ни один процент не спасет. Это критерий дальности. А по остальным вопросам можно поработать, поискать окончательное решение.

Дж.БILEШ. Вы хотите сказать, что если мы найдем решение по проблеме дальности, то и в целом проблема КРВБ найдет решение?

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Думаю, можно.
Дж.БУИНЕР. Может быть, во второй половине дня мы пошлем решение проблемы дальности.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Я готов подключить к этим поискам маршала Ахромеева.

Дж.БУИНЕР. Надеюсь, Вы согласитесь, что мы значительно продвинулись с наших прежних позиций.

С.Ф.АХРОМЕЕВ. Да, определенное движение есть.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. А вот вопрос о крылатых ракетах морского базирования — это поистине для Вас заповедный вопрос. К нам всегда не везет: и в прежней и в нынешней администрации много людей с морской биографией. Шулыц из морской пехоты, а теперь сам президент служил в военно-морском флоте. Но я надеюсь, что в лице генералитета мы имеем дело с политиком, который понимает реальность. Не буду подробно комментировать проблему КРМБ, но вижу, что разговор, наконец, начался. Это уже хорошо. Раньше и разговаривать не хотели.

Дж.БУИНЕР. Да, разговор начался, несмотря на то, что и наш новый президент был в свое время офицером флота, а я служил в морской пехоте.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Тогда нам будет трудно. Может быть, это более, чем символ. (Все смеются).
на контроль по КРБ. И здесь, в области КРБ, тоже необходим контроль.

Итак, ключевым является вопрос о критериях дальности. Рубеж в 600 км должен быть подтвержден. Тогда можно вести разговор обо всем остальном.

Дж.БЕЙЗЕР. Не имеет ли вы в виду, что, если мы отбросим весь, как бы вы говорите, хлам - ракеты с дальностью менее 600 км, вы можете согласиться с нашим подходом к решению проблемы КРБ.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Если мы решим проблему дальности, то можно обсудить предлагаемое вашим заявлением. Но все равно звонит вопрос контроля. Контроль должен быть во всех областях.

Дж.БЕЙЗЕР. Я хотел двигаться постепенно. Что касается контроля, то ваше предложение состоит в том, чтобы было начато обсуждение этой проблемы на уровне послов Варга и Назаркина.

Э.А.ШЕВАРДНАДЗЕ. Ваши мы высказали новые соображения, которые сейчас прорабатываются.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Думаю, над этим можно поработать. Но главное - подтвердить рубеж дальности в 600 км.

Дж.БЕЙЗЕР. Мы готовы это проанализировать, готовы продолжить дискуссию во второй половине дня. Что вы имеете в виду, говоря о выших соображениях по контролю?

Э.А.ШЕВАРДНАДЗЕ. Мы предложили ввести ограничения на типы надводных кораблей и подводных лодок в интересах обеспечения контроля.

Дж.БЕЙЗЕР. Давайте продолжим обсуждение.
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Gisela Marcuse (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 13, 1990, 1:49 - 2:00 p.m. EST
The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl initiated the call. (U)

The President: Helmut, how are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Fine. Prime Minister Modrow is here today. The situation continues to be dramatic. Between the 1st of January and today, 80,000 have come from the GDR to the Federal Republic. That is why I suggested a monetary union and an economic community. We will have to urge the government that comes in after March 18 to go through with these. (C)

First, thank you for all you did in Moscow. Please convey my best regards to Jim Baker and congratulations for a great job. I do believe the letter you sent to me before I left for Moscow will one day be considered one of the great documents in German-American history. Your support is invaluable. (C)

Let me say a few words about my talks in Moscow. Gorbachev was very relaxed. He has just had a difficult week in the Central Committee, but he was confident that at the Party Congress he would see things through. But the problems he faces are enormous -- nationalities, the food supply situation -- and I do not see a light at the end of the tunnel yet. (C)

You know the text we published jointly on the German Question. It was highly satisfactory. We will go in that direction now, and in a parallel way on security policy. We also discussed the same points Jim Baker had been discussing, that the two German states should be working together with the Four Powers -- the U.S., the UK, France, and the USSR. I was informed by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who called me from Ottawa an hour ago, that the foreign ministers are discussing the same things. At Camp David, this is one thing we will have to discuss thoroughly: the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. I feel we will find a solution, but it will be hard work. I told Gorbachev again that the neutralization of Germany is out of the question for me. (C)
The President: Did he acquiesce or just listen? How did he react? (C)

Chancellor Kohl: My impression is that this is a subject about which they want to negotiate, but that we can win that point in negotiations. The modalities will be important, but I do believe we can find a solution. (C)

The President: We must find a solution. The Camp David meeting will be very important, and I am delighted you are able to come. When I heard your comments from Moscow and heard that Mr. Gorbachev had removed a longstanding obstacle to unification, I was thinking of you as a friend. It must have been an emotional moment for you. The German people certainly want to be together. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: That is quite true. This is a great moment for us. Today as I had a meeting at the Bundestag and with my Fraktion, I said that without our American friends this would not have been possible. (C)

The President: I will await your visit. We have been supporting your stated position that NATO membership would be appropriate. We won't move away from that, but we do need to talk and see where we need to be more flexible and where we need to be more firm. I think our Camp David meeting will be very important. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I will be looking forward to that as well. (U)

The President: Is Hannelore coming, too? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. (U)

The President: Tell her not to bring any dressy clothes. It will be like being in your mountain cabin. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Wonderful! (U)

The President: Thank you for your call. We will stay in close touch. (U)

-- End of Conversation --
NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

SUBJECT: Review of U.S. Government International Broadcasting Activities (U)

In light of the dramatic political, economic and social changes in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, I am directing that a National Security Review be undertaken of the international broadcasting activities of the United States Government. The review will be chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Senior Director for International Programs, and should be completed by May 31, 1990. (U)

In a time of international transition, this National Security Review should provide the basis for short-term decisions concerning broadcasting activities over the next two years. The review should consider the activities of the Voice of America, USIA Television, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio in the American Sector of Berlin (RIAS). Because the implications of East-West change transcend U.S. interests in the European and transatlantic areas, the Review should encompass U.S. Government radio and television broadcasting to foreign audiences worldwide. (S)

The review should examine the mission of U.S. Government international broadcasting activities in the context of overall U.S. foreign policy objectives. It should consider the future
role of U.S. Government broadcasting at a time when many, but not
all, parts of the world enjoy an increasingly free flow of
information, including indigenous free media and access to
Western commercial broadcasting. The review should cover
planning, programming and resource implications, including
allocation of limited resources to various regions, countries,
and languages. The review should consider, but not be limited
to, the following questions. (U)

PART I: ASSESSMENT

-- What is the mission of U.S. Government international
   broadcasting activities? (U)

-- What is the current scope and content of U.S. broadcasting
   activities? How well is the mission being accomplished? (U)

-- How has the increasing access of Eastern European and, to a
   lesser extent, Soviet audiences to Western broadcasting and other
   media changed the need for U.S. Government broadcasting to those
   areas? (U)

-- How will developments in the international political
   situation, technology, private sector activity, and actions of
   other international broadcasters affect formulating U.S.
   international broadcasting policy and programs for the immediate
   future and the next two years? (U)

-- Is there a role for U.S. Government broadcasting to areas
   that have indigenous free media and/or access to substantial
   Western media? If so, what is that role? (U)

-- What are the current plan and rationale for new facilities,
   modernization, and refurbishment of U.S. international
   broadcasting assets? (U)

-- What kinds of audiences are we trying to reach? What
   measures are used in determining the effectiveness of broadcast
   coverage and the types of programming used? How much of a factor
   should audience levels (figures) be in determining program
   content? (U)

-- What are the language priorities for broadcasts, and how are
   they established? Should these priorities be re-evaluated or
   changed in light of world developments? (U)

PART II: OPTIONS FOR POLICY

-- What are the principles which should underlie U.S. Government
   international broadcasting activities now and in the future? (U)
-- How can we ensure that U.S. Government international broadcasting reflects and articulates U.S. foreign policy in changing world circumstances? (C)

-- What is the most effective mix (e.g., language services, program content, infrastructure needs, hours, coverage, redundancy) of U.S. international broadcasting activities and programs, given growing access of audiences to indigenous media and Western commercial broadcasting and the likelihood of continuing overall budget constraints? (U)

-- What should be the role of U.S. Government broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe over the next two years? (C)

  o What should be the role of surrogate radio broadcasting (RFE/RL) to areas increasingly open to media and the exchange of ideas? (U)

  o Given current changes, do U.S. programming, broadcast and transmitting facilities, and other assets overlap excessively? What are the likely requirements for broadcast coverage and power needs over the next two years and beyond? (U)

  o What should be the status of RIAS radio and television in the context of German unification? (C)

  o What should be the scope and mission of the planned Israeli transmitter and other technical modernization programs in light of current international developments? (C)

-- What should be the role of U.S. Government broadcasting to other areas of the world which remain closed to free media and communications? (U)

-- What should be the broadcast language priorities over the near term? (U)

-- How might current legal mandates for U.S. Government radio and television broadcasting be adjusted in light of the emerging international political and communications environment? (U)

-- What further studies, reviews or commissions should be undertaken to examine U.S. Government international broadcasting over the longer term? (U)
o Should a review of the overall structure and organization of U.S. Government international radio and television broadcasting activities be undertaken? (U)

o How might technological developments affect the means of carrying out U.S. international broadcasting? (U)
The Future of Eastern Europe (C NF)

National Intelligence Estimate

This Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 12-90

The Future of Eastern Europe (C NF)

Information available as of 26 April 1990 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support, Department of the Treasury

also participating:
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
The Future of Eastern Europe

• The revolutions in Eastern Europe provide the basis for developing democracy and market economies. But this will not be a linear process, and a number of countries will continue to face political instability, ethnic turmoil, and economic backwardness.

• Even with Western help, East European economies—excluding that of East Germany—are likely to make only modest progress during the next five years.

• The possibility remains of a relapse to authoritarianism, particularly in the Balkans, where the lifting of Communist hegemony threatens to revive old ethnic animosities, civil strife, and interstate tensions. The environmental nightmare will also persist.

• West Europeans are better positioned to lead in shaping the East European future, but the United States has important advantages, among them the desire of East Europeans for a counterweight to Soviet and German influence.
Key Judgments

Communist party rule in Eastern Europe is finished, and it will not be revived. This and the lifting of Soviet hegemony create new opportunities for establishing representative democracies and self-sustaining market economies. The way will also open for new modes of regional political and economic cooperation. The greatest impetus is the resolve of East Europeans and their leaders to achieve reforms by emulating Western economic and political models.

The evolution of the region will make the designation "Eastern Europe" increasingly imprecise, as East-Central European countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany—move ahead in closer association with the West, and the Balkans—Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania—settle into a more separate role. Yugoslavia, if it holds together, will continue close ties to the West.

In some East European countries, however, we will see political instability and perhaps even a revival of authoritarianism, amidst lingering economic backwardness and reemerging ethnic animosities. Despite Western aid and investment, the East European economies—excluding that of East Germany—are likely to make only uneven progress during the five-year timespan of this estimate.

Ultimately, prospects for healthy democracy will be closely tied to the way in which East Europeans resolve their systemic economic crisis:
• Western aid will be essential, especially in the early stages, to make up the "capital deficit" required to cushion any transition to market economies.
• Such aid will have to be linked to private investment, access to Western markets, and long-term programs designed to develop the skills and institutions necessary for a modern economy, as well as to full mobilization of indigenous resources for investment.

The outlook is more promising for the countries in East-Central Europe—particularly East Germany, which will rapidly merge into West Germany's economy. Elsewhere, several countries have good potential as sites for

---

1 The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that broad regional subgroupings adopted for analytical convenience—such as East-Central Europe and the Balkans—at times obscure the differences between countries.
Western-owned manufacturing plants with preferential entree to the European Community. The agricultural sector has the capability for quick turnaround. (C-MF)

But the strains of even successful economic reform that is accompanied by inflation and unemployment will test the patience of people fed up with economic hardship and traditionally cynical about political promises. Lingering economic crises and resurgent ethnic divisions may fuel chronic political instability and interstate tensions, notably in the Balkans:

- The major near-term danger to democratization in East-Central Europe is that the whole process will run out of steam as popular euphoria wanes and little substantial economic improvement has occurred. The result would be a paralyzing political impasse or prolonged "muddling through," as in the Third World.

- The worst case scenario—most likely in Romania and Yugoslavia—will not be a return to Communist regimes but a turn to authoritarianism, growing repression of ethnic minorities, civil strife, and even the onset of greater interstate frictions. (C-MF)

Meanwhile, despite the Albanian regime's readiness to use brutal repressive measures to suppress dissent, it is likely that revolution and reform will come to Albania within five years. (C-MF)

The Soviet Union's size, geographical proximity, security concerns, raw materials, and market will continue to make it a major factor in Eastern Europe. But even an aggressive, post-Gorbachev Kremlin leadership would not—or could not—substantially alter the course of events there. Moscow will seek to replace its lost domination of Eastern Europe with the advantages of a broader engagement with Europe as a whole. (C-MF)

A united Germany, however, will move even more assertively into Eastern Europe as an economic and political influence in the vanguard of the European Community. This will be a source of worry for most East Europeans, particularly the Poles. This concern, however, will be cushioned, because Germany will be democratic and integrated into the European Community. German influence will be somewhat diluted as other Western countries also build economic and political ties to the region. Even so, Germany's weight and occasional insensitivity will raise hackles. (C-MF)

East European events will continue to take place against a backdrop of declining relevance for the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Warsaw Pact as a military alliance is essentially dead, and Soviet efforts to convert it into a
political alliance will ultimately fail. Most East European states will aspire to build links to Western Europe and will hope that the CSCE process can provide a basis for such broader security arrangements.

East Europeans will continue to seek substantial US participation in their development as a counterweight to the Soviets and Germans. In the region where both world wars and the Cold War began, a democratic, prosperous, and independent Eastern Europe would be an element of stability rather than an object of great power rivalry in the borderlands between East and West.
Memorandum

The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact

21. NIC M 90-10002, April 1990, The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact
The Direction of Change in the Warsaw Pact (C-NF)

Information available as of 1 March 1990 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum. The Memorandum was drafted and coordinated within the Intelligence Community by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces to whom comments may be directed at secure 37311.
Key Judgments

Recent political events in Eastern Europe will further erode Soviet confidence in their allies. Moscow can not rely upon non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces; it must question its ability to bring Soviet reinforcements through East European countries whose hostility is no longer disguised or held in check. On the basis of completed unilateral Warsaw Pact cuts without NATO reciprocation and considering current political turmoil, we now believe that the capability to conduct an unreinforced conventional Pact attack on NATO would be virtually eliminated.

Should current CFE proposals for both sides be implemented, we believe that Soviet defense planners would judge Pact forces incapable of conducting a theater strategic offensive even after full mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forces within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) Zone. Conduct of an attack upon NATO in such conditions would require generation of additional forces and equipment.

The unilateral reductions begun a year ago by the Soviet Union will probably be completed on schedule. The recent Soviet agreements to remove all forces stationed in Czechoslovakia and Hungary by mid-1991 will nearly double the originally announced unilateral withdrawal in ground forces (at least 11 rather than six divisions).

The large unilateral reductions in Soviet forces due to be completed by the end of 1990 are forcing widespread restructuring of military units, substantially reducing the armor in Soviet ground force divisions, eliminating some specialized assault units, and reducing ground attack capabilities of tactical air units.

The originally announced Central European reductions (nearly 10 percent in manpower, 20 percent in aircraft, and 50 percent in tanks) will reduce the offensive capabilities of Pact Forces and, along with sweeping Soviet CFE proposals, are convincing indicators of Soviet intent to cut their military burden and are consistent with a movement toward a defensive doctrine.
In the aggregate, the above changes lessen the state “combat potential” of forward Soviet units. We believe that Soviet planners recognize that these reductions (assuming no change in NATO forces) would require substantially greater forces to be brought forward from the USSR for the conduct of sustained theater offensive operations. On the basis of these military changes alone, in September 1989 we judged that NATO would have 40 to 50 days of warning of a four-front Pact attack. Current political changes would probably increase this warning time.

This information is Secret Nonform Nocontact WNIINTEL.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Soviet Views of Operations Against NATO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviets Modernize</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NSWP Lags</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassessing the Doctrine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Warsaw Pact in Transition</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Cutbacks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Halfway Point</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of the Changes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Potential</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the Changes Affect Soviet Perceptions of the Balance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex: Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. (Continued)

Figure 1
Soviet Tanks, Armored Troop Carriers, and Artillery in the Western TMO (In units)

Tanks
Thousand
25

20
T-54, T-55 and T-62

15
T-64, T-72 and T-80

10

5

0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Armored Troop Carriers
Thousand
25

20
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)

15

10
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)

5

0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Artillery
Thousand
25

20

15
Towed

10
Self-propelled

5
Mortars
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs)
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)

0 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
Discussion

Background

Traditional Soviet Views of Operations Against NATO

The Soviet General Staff based its war plans on the assumption that, if it had to fight a war with the West, the Soviet Union would be able to achieve classic military victory through the destruction of NATO forces and the occupation of NATO territory, principally Western Europe. Occupation of Germany and the political imperative for control of Eastern Europe led to the stationing of substantial Soviet forces in the forward area. By the middle-to-late 1970s, however, Soviet perceptions of their ability to prevail were changing. Where once Soviet forces, using nuclear weapons, could obtain planned objectives with relatively little assistance from their smaller, less well-equipped allies, the prospect of war with at least an initial conventional phase changed the situation to one that required the participation of East European forces and relied upon the long lines of communication that fed supplies from the USSR through Eastern Europe to attacking Soviet forces. Influenced to a large degree by their perception of greatly improved NATO conventional defenses, the Soviet General Staff considered even the large Soviet force in the forward area no longer adequate to the task, and foresaw the need to draw additional forces from the Soviet Union for its planned Theater Strategic Operation. Thus, by the mid-1980s, Soviet staff planners forecast a prolonged conventional war with NATO in which non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces were included in the initial attack and which relied upon major reinforcements from the Soviet Union for success.

The Soviets Modernize

When Mikhail Gorbachev took over as party General Secretary in early 1985, the Soviet military already was implementing a long-term program of force restructuring, expansion, and modernization:

- Restructuring of 36 active divisions from the late 1970s through the end of 1984 had made them larger, more mobile, and more flexible, with enhanced combined-arms capability and increased firepower.

- Ground force mobilization bases—units created by the Soviets in the 1960s to stockpile older equipment for inactive divisions—were gradually being activated with small cadre elements that could facilitate rapid expansion to wartime strength and readiness. More than 20 such bases were activated between 1975 and 1984, while the overall number of active tank, motorized rifle, and airborne divisions increased from 176 to 200.

- Ground equipment modernization, begun as early as the mid-1960s, had become persistent and even-paced. For example, the quantity and quality of tanks, armored troop carriers and artillery in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO) opposite NATO’s central region had been increasing dramatically (see figure 1).

- Attack helicopters also increased significantly—by more than 60 percent from 1981 to 1985 in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone (see figure 2).

- Air forces modernization introduced the Su-24 Fencer light bomber and Tu-22M Backfire medium bomber in the 1970s and fourth-generation MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker fighter-interceptors in the 1980s (see figure 3).

The NSWP Lags

The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces lagged the Soviets in force modernization, yet the Soviets depended on them to play a significant, perhaps vital, role in a war with NATO. If NSWP forces were no longer available, Soviet staffs would need to rethinks operations against NATO. Soviet confidence in the reliability of non-Soviet Pact forces was the result of strategic interests generally shared with East European Communist leaderships, as well as a carefully planned Soviet-dominated command and control structure to
which the East Europeans acceded. Although that architecture gave the Soviet General Staff executive authority for wartime decisionmaking and command generation of Warsaw Pact forces, it relied upon national general staffs to pass orders. Therefore, the Pact command and control structure was, and remains, dependent upon the cooperation of the highest political and military leaders in each Pact country. Since it was clear that their interests in most crisis situations through the mid-1980s would be congruent with the Soviets’ interests, we formerly assessed—and believed that Soviet planners also assessed—that the East European forces were at least initially reliable and would respond to commands to fight.

Reassessing the Doctrine

By 1985 Soviet theater forces were structured for fast-paced, offensive operations lasting for an extended period of time (weeks—perhaps months) in a nonnuclear environment. Soviet and Pact exercise patterns tended to confirm that they planned on such a scenario. In building to this capability, however, the Soviets had traded decreased readiness for increased combat power after full preparation. Soviet forces in Central Europe were manned some 170,000 below full wartime strength and were assessed to require two to three weeks to prepare for offensive operations.

Soon after coming to power, Gorbachev held talks with his military leadership. He agreed with the need to modernize Soviet conventional forces but understood that conventional modernization would be enormously expensive. He probably concluded that the USSR could not afford a buildup of both nuclear and conventional forces. In 1986 and 1987, there was mounting evidence that the Soviets were reassessing their military doctrine. High-level Soviet military leaders told their Western counterparts that Soviet/Warso Pact doctrine had changed, and that evidence of such change should be clear to observers of Pact exercises and training patterns. There were also indications that the “defensive doctrine” being stressed by the Soviets was not understood or accepted uniformly throughout the Soviet military leadership.

The Warsaw Pact in Transition

Soviet Cutbacks

In December 1988, Gorbachev announced at the United Nations that significant unilateral reductions of Soviet forces would take place in 1989 and 1990. His statement was followed by various explanations of Soviet reduction plans and additional announcements concerning cuts in defense spending and production (see inset). Soon after Gorbachev’s announcement, each of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact Allies except Romania announced force and defense spending cuts. These cuts—to be completed by the end of 1990—roughly parallel the Soviet cuts in types and proportional amounts of equipment, manpower, and expenditures (see table 1). These announcements of cuts, which almost certainly had Moscow’s prior approval, contradicted earlier indications that the Soviets would require their allies to make up any unilateral Soviet force reductions.
21. (Continued)

Figure 3
Force Composition in the ATTU Zone, 1979 and 1985*  
Soviet Tactical Air Force

Number of Regiments, 1979

Number of Regiments, 1985

In Central Europe alone, Gorbachev's announced Soviet reductions would entail:

- A total of 50,000 men and 5,000* tanks to be withdrawn from Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. As part of this reduction, six Soviet divisions—four from East Germany, and one each from Czechoslovakia and Hungary—were to be withdrawn. The removal of 50,000 Soviet military personnel would reduce Soviet strength in the forward area by nearly 10 percent. The withdrawal of 5,300 tanks would cut total Soviet tank strength in Central Europe in half (see figure 4).

- From the air forces, 320 combat aircraft to be removed from Central Europe; this is a 20-percent reduction in Soviet combat aircraft stationed in Central Europe.

1 Later increased to 5,200 with the inclusion of Soviet forces in Poland (6).
Table 1
Announced Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Manpower</th>
<th>Force Structure</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Defense Budget (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81,300</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6 regiments</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10 (1989-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>4 divisions</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>4 (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>3 divisions</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15 (1989-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>9,300</td>
<td>1 tank brigade</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17 (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30 (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12 (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7 (1989)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two to be eliminated; two to be reduced in strength
* Being transferred to construction troops
* Excludes November-December 1989 announcements

This table is Secret NIFORS WFINTEL

- A total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft to be eliminated from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) Zone. A 10,000-tank reduction in the ATTU zone would cut the number of Soviet tanks in operational units by about one-fourth. Cutting 800 aircraft represents a reduction of more than 8 percent of the Soviet combat aircraft in units opposite NATO.

- A "major portion" of troops in Mongolia to be withdrawn, later clarified as a cut in ground forces of 75 percent, with the air forces there to be eliminated. [97]

Although unilateral Navy reductions were not part of Gorbachev's speech, the Soviets have embarked on a program of naval measures. In 1989, 46 ships and submarines departed Soviet naval facilities to be scrapped in foreign yards. All but one were at least 30 years old; only one was operational. We have identified an additional 120 units that are candidates for scrapping in 1990. The Soviets have also reduced out-of-area deployments by both ships and Soviet naval aircraft. At the same time, the Soviets continue with force modernization and construction of aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants, including three conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carriers, although there is debate within the USSR over the need for carriers. [98]

The Halfway Point
One year into the two-year unilateral withdrawal/reduction period announced by Gorbachev, the first phase of the program is complete (see inset). Moscow has withdrawn at least 50 percent of the tanks and approximately 60 percent of the combat aircraft from Eastern Europe that Gorbachev said would be removed, and it has withdrawn about half of the tanks and a quarter of the combat aircraft to be removed from Mongolia. In Eastern Europe, of the six Soviet tank divisions to be withdrawn by the end of 1990, Moscow has withdrawn the major elements of three (two from East Germany, one from Hungary). The number of Soviet tactical aviation units (for which no reductions were announced) remains about the same, but the units are losing assigned aircraft. [99]
Figure 4
Soviet Ground Forces in Central Europe, March 1990

Announced Soviet Unilateral Withdrawals
From Central Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Current</th>
<th>To be withdrawn</th>
<th>Percentage to be withdrawn</th>
<th>To remain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver divisions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>10,800</td>
<td>5,300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. (Continued)

Assessed Unilateral Soviet Force Reductions, 1 January 1990

Withdrawn from Eastern Europe
- Three tank divisions (major elements)
  - 2,600-2,775 tanks
- Four air assault units
- Two assault crossing units

Reduced in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone
- 3,260 tanks
- 2,120 artillery systems
- 580 combat aircraft

Reduced from the Soviet Armed Forces
- Total: 26 divisions
  - ATTU Zone: 16 divisions disbanded and three deactivated
  - Non-ATTU Zone: four divisions disbanded and three deactivated

Restructuring
To accommodate such radical equipment changes and claimed changes in doctrine, many units are being restructured:

- **Ground force restructuring.** About two-thirds of the 27 Soviet divisions that remained in Eastern Europe at the end of 1989 are probably being restructured (figure 5), as are up to four divisions in the USSR:
  - Tank divisions, which had three tank regiments and one motorized rifle regiment, will now have two tank regiments and two motorized rifle regiments. Most divisions will lose 69 tanks, or 22 percent of their original holdings.
  - Motorized rifle divisions, which had one tank regiment and three motorized rifle regiments, will now have four motorized rifle regiments. They are also losing tanks from other divisional elements. These changes reduce the number of tanks by 105 per division in most motorized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe and by 65 per division in the USSR—40 and 30 percent respectively of their original holdings.

- Some of the personnel and most of the armored troop carriers and artillery from the units being withdrawn are being used to meet the needs of the restructured divisions remaining in Eastern Europe. Additional armored troop carriers—some 450 observed thus far—have arrived from the USSR. Some 2,000 additional armored troop carriers would be required to restructure the 24 Soviet divisions in the originally planned residual force in Eastern Europe. Artillery battalions continue to increase from 18 to 24 guns, and a third artillery battalion appears to be being added to the artillery regiments of tank divisions.

- In addition, some river-crossing and air assault units are to be withdrawn to the USSR.

- **Tactical air force restructuring** (figure 6):
  - Few units are being disbanded; instead, the average strength of tactical air regiments is being reduced by about 10 aircraft each. Overall, there will be about 17 percent fewer aircraft opposite NATO (bars 1 and 2).
  - The most modern of the displaced aircraft are going to regiments with older aircraft (MiG-21/MiG-23/Su-17), which are leaving active service.

- The predominance of ground attack regiments over fighter regiments in East Germany has changed to a more balanced force.

- Half the light bombers (Fencers) in the forward area have been relocated to the Western USSR. These aircraft could be rapidly reintroduced into Eastern Europe.
21. (Continued)

Figure 5
Soviet Division Restructuring

Tank Division *
Total equipment: 250 tanks (22- or 31-percent decrease)
340 to 432 IFVs/APCs

Motorized rifle regiment

Artillery regiment

Air defense regiment

Tank division

Tank regiment

Motorized rifle regiment

Artillery regiment

Air defense regiment

Tank battalion

Motorized rifle battalion

Recon battalion

(31 tanks)

(43 IFVs)

(no tanks)

* Soviet tank divisions in Eastern Europe have had 319 or 363 tanks and 251 IFVs/APCs, not including command and reconnaissance variants

Motorized Rifle Division b
Total equipment: 155 tanks (40- or 44-percent decrease)
655 IFVs/APCs

Motorized rifle division

Motorized rifle regiment

Infantry tank battalion

Artillery regiment

Air defense regiment

Motorized rifle battalion

Tank battalion

Recon battalion

(43 or 50 IFVs/APCs)

(31 tanks)

(no tanks)

b Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe have had 260 and 277 tanks and 455 IFVs/APCs, not including command and reconnaissance variants

* Varies depending on whether the regiment is BMP or BTR equipped. Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Eastern Europe that have been restructured have two BMP-equipped regiments and two BTR-equipped regiments.
The certainty of complete withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the high likelihood of other reductions beyond those originally announced raise the prospect of further changes in Soviet plans for restructuring.

Effects of the Changes

Reductions and restructuring will significantly degrade the ability of Soviet forces to concentrate combat power, particularly for offensive operations. Armored striking power, in particular, is reduced and fragmented. The new motorized rifle divisions are well suited for defensive operations but are not organized specifically to conduct large-scale attacks or counteraffronts. The new tank divisions are "balanced"—thus, better suited for holding ground than the previous standard tank divisions—but they retain substantial offensive punch.

Combat Potential

To gauge the probability of mission success, Soviet staff officers often compare the relative strength of opposing forces in terms of their calculated "combat potential." How the Soviets come up with combat potential is useful to essay a Soviet-style combat-potential analysis to see how the Soviets might view the correlation of forces in Europe following their unilateral reductions and restructuring.

Application of such analysis to the portion of the Soviet Western Group of Forces (WGF) in East Germany shows (see figure 7) that the 1991 force will
Figure 7
Western Group of Forces, 1988 and 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Potential Points, 1988 Thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Potential Points, 1991 Thousand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Central European air balance to the advantage of NATO, but the current situation of near parity would not be upset (see figure 8). These changes in Warsaw Pact air forces probably would not substantially alter the Pact's overall prospects in an air war in Central Europe.

**How the Changes Affect Soviet Perceptions of the Balance**

Taken together, the reductions and restructuring reinforce our mid-1980s judgment that the Soviet General Staff did not have high confidence in its ability to conduct a deep attack on NATO without introducing significant reinforcements from the Soviet Union before D-Day. After reducing the shock power of forward area forces by 5,300 tanks, the General Staff would consider the Pact even less capable of conducting an attack without substantial reinforcement.
Considering only the effects of the originally announced Soviet unilateral withdrawal, we believe that the residual Soviet forces would be unable to mount a "short warning" attack and that the Soviets would not be even moderately confident of success in pursuing deep theater objectives unless their attack was preceded by a lengthy mobilization period. But events in Eastern Europe have an even greater effect. By mid-1991, Soviet forces will be completely withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Moreover, the fundamental political changes occurring in the individual Warsaw Pact nations and their effect on the reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact military forces lead us to conclude that the Warsaw Pact does not at this time represent a significant offensive threat to NATO. The rate and scope of political change in Eastern Europe in recent months have outpaced our ability to assess completely the consequences for East European military capabilities. We judge that Soviet planners face the same uncertainties.

Recent and continuing political developments in Eastern Europe have undoubtedly eroded the confidence of Soviet war planners. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces traditionally have made up nearly 50 percent of the Pact's first strategic echelon in Central Europe, and local transportation and security services would be crucial in moving Soviet forces into the forward area. NSWP forces were counted on to play critical roles in operations on both flanks in a NATO-Pact war. Now, the nonavailability of NSWP forces for Soviet offensive war plans and the increased potential of civil resistance to Soviet transit as the result of recent political changes will have far-reaching and adverse impacts on Soviet force commitments, dispositions, and objectives.

The military changes outlined in this memorandum have led to important lengthening of estimated preparation times for Soviet attack options (see table 2 and, for more detail, the annex). When the effects of the announced cuts under way in most of the NSWP states and the ongoing political developments in Eastern Europe are coupled with Soviet unilateral reductions and restructuring, we believe that Warsaw Pact
Figure 9
Projected Warsaw Pact Echelons
in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TMO)—Four-Front Attack
21. (Continued)

Table 2
Estimated Preparation Times for Soviet Attack Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NIE 4-1-84</th>
<th>Before Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions*</th>
<th>After Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilization and Movement</td>
<td>Minimal Preparation for Offensive Combat</td>
<td>Mobilization and Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three fronts in first echelon</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 to 12</td>
<td>7 to 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five- to six-front attack with four fronts in first echelon</td>
<td>Not addressed</td>
<td>14 to 21</td>
<td>28 to 35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on conditions in Eastern Europe in September 1989

This table is Secret Nofor.

capability to conduct an unrefined conventional attack against NATO is virtually eliminated (assuming that NATO remains at current force levels).

We assess that Soviet General Staff planners will probably conclude that—without reinforcements from the western USSR roughly equal to at least two fronts—their forces remaining in Eastern Europe after the unilateral cuts would not possess the advantage needed to initiate and sustain offensive operations to the depth of the theater against current NATO forces. On the basis of this assessment, we concluded in September 1989 that NATO would have a 40- to 50-day warning time to prepare for a conventional force attack. The current political changes in Eastern Europe, not considered in that assessment, would probably increase warning time.

The arms reduction proposals unveiled by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations would result in further substantial cuts in Pact conventional forces in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) Zone (see table 3). Moscow would possess by far the largest national force structure in a post-CFE Europe but has already agreed to 30,000 more US than USSR stationed forces, in recognition of its large force advantage on the Continent. After such cuts, and assuming that equipment is destroyed and that NATO maintains parity, we believe that the Soviets would judge Warsaw Pact Post-CFE Forces incapable—even after full mobilization of reserves and deployment of standing forces within the ATTU Zone—of achieving the political-military objectives traditionally associated with Soviet strategy for a theater-strategic offensive. Their CFE proposal serves as one of the most convincing indicators to date of the defensive reorientation of their military doctrine and their intent to decrease the economic burden of the Soviet theater force structure through aggressive pursuit of conventional arms control.
Table 3
Post-CFE Warsaw Pact Force Structure
Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet</td>
<td>NSWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>35,002</td>
<td>14,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored troop carriers</td>
<td>36,202</td>
<td>15,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>32,523</td>
<td>10,312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Blue = Western proposal
Red = Eastern proposal

This table is Secret Nature.
Annex

Warning Implications of Warsaw Pact Unilateral Force Reductions

The announced reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and East European national forces, if fully implemented, will significantly lower Pact force levels in the forward area. Six Soviet tank divisions, plus critical combat support units such as bridging, and substantial amounts of additional equipment are scheduled to be withdrawn. Scheduled tank reductions amount to about half the Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, which currently comprise a large proportion of the forces in Eastern Europe, are also to be reduced. Moreover, forces inside the Soviet Union are to be restructured and are to lose tanks and possibly artillery from their structure. Equipment modernization and restructuring of remaining Soviet forces in Eastern Europe may offset to some extent the loss of combat capability, but Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces are not taking similar steps.

These reductions—which are well under way—probably will render an unrefinced Pact attack practically impossible and will require the Pact to rely more heavily on currently nonready divisions to support either a two-, three-, or four-front attack. Pact planners will probably conclude that—without reinforcements from the western USSR roughly equal to two fronts—their forces remaining in Eastern Europe after the unilateral cuts would not possess the advantage over current NATO forces needed to initiate and sustain offensive operations to the depth of theater. The Soviets probably would believe that, to attain sufficient combat power in the theater, they would have to generate enough not-ready divisions to replace the withdrawn Soviet divisions, as well as the disband-ed East European formations. Such greater reliance on the early commitment of currently not-ready divisions from the Soviet Union for sustained offensive operations would stretch out Pact preparations to 40 to 50 days. We cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets might judge circumstances as compelling them to commit their forces without the minimum postmobilization training necessary for offensive operations in as little as 18 to 25 days (see Table 4).

Our assessment of preparation and warning times after the Pact’s unilateral reductions are complete assumes that NATO remains at current force levels. The extent of Pact preparations—reinforcement of forces in Eastern Europe and training—required to conduct a potentially successful offensive campaign is driven in large measure by Pact assessments of NATO military capability. As a result, unilateral NATO reductions outside the context of a conventional force reductions agreement could diminish the Pact’s assessment of its force requirements for success and thus reduce the preparation time needed for the Pact and the warning time available to NATO.

---

1 Extract from Memorandum to Holders of NIE 4-1-84 (Secret NF NG), September 1989, Warning of War in Europe: Changing Warsaw Pact Planning and Forceme-

2 Note that the preparation times assessed in this annex were based on the Eastern Europe of September 1989. Political turmoil since then would likely increase these preparation time estimates (5-10).

15
Table 4
Estimated Preparation Times for Soviet Attack Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NIE 4-1-84</th>
<th>Before Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions</th>
<th>After Warsaw Pact Unilateral Reductions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilization and Movement</td>
<td>Minimum Preparation for Offensive Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three fronts in first echelon</td>
<td>10 to 12</td>
<td>7 to 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five- to six-front attack with four fronts in first echelon</td>
<td>Not addressed</td>
<td>14 to 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---Secret---
ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ
М.С. Горбачев с бывшим председателем Объединенного комитета начальников штабов США адмиралом Крау

23 марта 1990 года

В начале беседы адмирал Крау поздравил М.С. Горбачева с избранием Президентом СССР.

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Приветствую г-на Крау как одного из тех людей, к которым я отношусь с уважением за его вклад в дело налаживания новых взаимоотношений между нашими странами.

У. КРАУ. Благодарю Вас, г-н Президент.

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Как проходит Ваша поездка? Что Вам удалось увидеть? О чем говорили?

У. КРАУ. Поездка протекает очень интересно и насыщенно. Помимо Москвы я побывал в Киеве, Одессе и в Новосибирске. Мне удалось побывать в одной сельской школе в совхозе под Киевом. Должен сказать, что она произвела на меня большое впечатление. Моя супруга тоже посетила целый ряд советских школ. В целом это очень интересная поездка. Только вчера я побывал в Новосибирске, благодаря любезному приглашению маршала Ахромеева. Словом, я посетил совхоз, школу и два завода, занятых конверсией оборонной промышленности. От посещения этих двух заводов я вынес самое отрадное впечатление. Работающие там мужчины и женщины уже много добились в области конверсии военного производства. Судя по всему, они весьма сознательно подходят к своему делу.
М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Я привержен этой цели. Мы уже, собственноручно, делаем шаги в этом направлении. При этом мы не требуем для себя каких-либо односторонних преимуществ, но и не пойдём на уступки. Если мы идем навстречу другой стороне, то и она должна идти навстречу нам. Нужно искать баланс интересов. Здесь, в таком кругу, хочу сказать, что замечу сейчас замет таких рассуждений: Советский Союз, мол, сталкивается с многочисленными проблемами внутри, в Восточной Европе. Может быть, поднажать — никогда не денется Горбачев, пойдет на уступки. Но такие рассуждения не имеют никаких перспектив. Это — заблуждение. Если на этих позициях пойдём к встрече в верхах, мы не достигнем соглашения.

У. КРУ. А кто прибегает к таким рассуждениям?

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Это люди в кругах, близких к президенту и г-ну Бейкеру. Сейчас я впервые отреагирую на такую вещь, которая была опубликована в американской печати и вызвала у нас недоумение. Мы сочли это весьма странным.

Речь идет о том, как американская пресса освещала визит г-на Бейкера в Москву, где обсуждались цифры 195 тысяч и 225 тысяч. После его возвращения из Москвы пресса писала, что его встречали как победителя, добившегося успеха от русских. Говорилось о том, что он смелся и был в прекрасном настроении, так как не ожидал, что русские так быстро отступят.

Я читал обо всем этом и должен сказать, что мое отношение к Бейкеру после этого изменилось. С чем же мы имеем дело? Я не встречал таких серьезных заявлений ни от американских, ни от других деятелей. Об этом потом писала и советская пресса. Словом, у нас это вызвало недоумение. Я решил тогда оставить это без реакции. Но сейчас я хочу ее высказать. Ведь самообман, упование
себе это не то, чем должны заниматься политики. Это несерьезно. За эти пять лет, в течение которых мне довелось встречаться с американцами, такого еще не было.

У.КРАУ. Эта реакция предназначена для президента Буша?

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Да. Бейкер, как писала пресса, сказал президенту, что он даже не ожидал такого решительного изменения советской позиции за одну ночь. А ведь что было на самом деле? Мы сказали ему, что принимаем предложение президента относительно цифру 195 тысяч. Но в свою очередь мы внесли предложение о том, что поскольку речь шла только о Центральной Европе, то нельзя игнорировать и более широкую территорию Европы. И соответствственно там должно быть около 30 тысяч больше, то есть мы предложили цифру 225 тысяч. У нас был разговор с Бейкером, как это обычно происходит на таких встречах, и вдруг такое заявление. Это просто несерьезно. При случае я скажу ему об этом лично. Ведь это не бизнес, к которому он привык, а важнейшие стратегические вопросы. Нельзя решать такие вопросы со смехом.

Но это не меняет того обстоятельства, что мы серьезно готовимся к предстоящим переговорам и будем действовать конструктивно, с тем чтобы после солидной подготовки постараться добиться соглашения.

У.КРАУ. Как я сказал, у меня было несколько бесед с маршалом Ахромеевым. Ясно, что остается еще целый ряд важнейших проблем, которые предстоит решить. Хотя я не совсем в курсе того, как ведется подготовка к предстоящим переговорам, я все же знаю, что американская администрация тоже напряженно готовится к предстоящей встрече. Институт мне подсказывает, что по мере приближения этой встречи есть, и президент Буш ожидается перед лицом трудных выборов. Когда я еще был председателем Объединенного комитета начальников штабов,
THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
MAY 30 - JUNE 3, 1990
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BOOK I

SCOPE PAPER
Secretary Baker's Memorandum to the President

PRESS THEMES

THEMES FOR DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

1. U.S.-Soviet Relations
2. German Unification
3. The Baltics
4. Human Rights
5. European Security
6. Perestroika and U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations
7. Arms Control
8. Soviet Internal Politics

INR ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S SUMMIT AGENDA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
BACKGROUND

When we considered our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations at the start of the Bush Administration, we laid out three broad objectives to guide our policies:

- in the strategic-military area, to enhance U.S. and allied security, in part by using arms control to translate Soviet "defensive" doctrine into a more stable strategic environment and decrease military competition as an element of the overall U.S.-Soviet/East-West relationship.

- in the political-military area, to preserve strong ties with traditional friends and allies in Europe and Asia while encouraging greater autonomy in Eastern Europe, negotiated settlements to specific regional conflicts and reduced Soviet use of military levers in their Third World policy.

- in the democratization area, while recognizing our leverage is limited, to promote genuine reform within the USSR and a break-up of the monopoly on political and economic power.

Progress has been uneven at times, but we have done well by these objectives, better than would have been predicted one year ago. Moscow's readiness for change -- e.g., unilateral force reductions, letting Eastern Europe go its own course, internal reform -- made many of these gains possible. But they were secured by agile policies on our part that exploited the changes and kept the pressure up when we needed further Soviet movement. As a result, we will have a range of concrete achievements to register at this summit.

Recent months, however, have seen progress slow, as the Soviet leadership has been seized with burgeoning internal problems and unnerved by the accelerating pace of German unification. Even as Gorbachev moves to consolidate his own power as the first President and to complete the de-Leninization of the Soviet system at July's Party Congress, the Soviet leadership seems to be losing confidence in its ability to control events affecting the USSR's most basic interests.

The loss of Eastern Europe and the nationalities crisis at home have evidently raised Soviet anxieties about their ability to defend and maintain the Soviet homeland. While now apparently prepared to complete START, Moscow may be rethinking its approach to CFE and other European security issues as old defense planning assumptions are overtaken by events. As one result, the beleaguered Soviet military has assumed a higher profile in the arms talks and at ministerials, and the political leadership has displayed increasing deference to its views.

SECRET/REDACTED
DECL: CAGF
The Washington summit provides the opportunity to inject renewed momentum into the relationship. The main barriers to further progress are all closely related to Gorbachev's domestic problems. While recognizing the limits of our influence, the challenge will be to demonstrate to him -- in the context of his own agenda -- that it is in the USSR's interest not to impede German unification, and that active pursuit of our arms control agenda will yield security gains for both sides. Just as important, we must stress to Gorbachev the importance of breaking the impasse with Lithuania and the Baltics. Continued intimidation puts in doubt the very nature of perestroika and constrains how fast we can move in further improving U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly in the economic sphere.

Separate theme papers deal with German unification, European security, regional issues, human rights, the Baltics and perestroika. These contain themes addressing Soviet security concerns and seek to encourage a more resolute Soviet commitment to political liberalization and fundamental economic reform.

In your general discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations, you may wish to describe in conceptual terms your vision of a more cooperative relationship, one guided not by a desire to achieve unilaterally advantage but rather one designed to expand points of mutual advantage. One effect of this may, in fact, be to help redefine the USSR's world role in a way that promotes Moscow's status and respect around the globe. The point to drive home to Gorbachev is that we are not seeking to exploit his domestic woes or the Soviet Union's eroding strategic position. On the contrary, we wish to continue to cooperate to stabilize the military competition, to create a new European security order in which the USSR plays a part, to resolve regional conflicts and to work together in addressing transnational problems. And we want to continue to support perestroika in ways designed to ensure the USSR's successful transition to a more democratic society based on the rule of law and a market economy.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Before we get down to specific business, I would like to discuss the overall U.S.-Soviet relationship.

- We had good talks in Malta. One of the important things we did was set goals for this summit.

-- And we've done quite a bit. This summit will record a number of significant and concrete achievements, in arms control, economic relations and many other areas. Both of our countries and peoples will benefit.
-- I'm especially pleased we will be signing an agreement to destroy the bulk of our two countries' chemical weapons stockpiles. This historic agreement should accelerate work on a global CW ban.

o I've also been encouraged by recent trends in our dialogue on regional conflicts. I especially appreciate how your country supported the Nicaraguan election outcome and the transfer of power to Mrs. Chamorro.

-- This had a big and positive impact on Americans.

-- It showed that we are succeeding in getting away from competing with one another for influence in the developing world, and that we can work together to help the parties resolve regional conflicts.

o I hope we can work together with similar success in bringing about a political settlement in Afghanistan, as well as ending the conflicts in El Salvador, Cambodia and other regions.

o Of course, we still have our problems, and we will need to talk about these over the next three days. One of the most urgent is Lithuania.

-- If the crisis in Lithuania and the other Baltic states is not solved soon, it will create a real obstacle to further progress in our relationship.

-- Continued confrontation will only raise questions in Americans' minds about the true nature of perestroika.

o I know you are uneasy about the pace of German unification and the new order that is beginning to emerge in Europe -- even though these positive changes owe a lot to your "new political thinking."

o We understand your concerns about the impact on Soviet security, particularly the impact of the issue of German NATO membership.

-- Change brings uncertainty. But we've tried to address those concerns in a variety of ways.

o We want to work with you as partners in making a smooth and stable transition to a Europe that is whole and free, a Europe in which the Soviet Union plays a major role.

o Because we view the problem this way, we are concerned about the slowdown in the CFE negotiations and the differences between us in the Two-Plus-Four talks.

SECRET/EXDIS
— I hope we can make some headway on these subjects during these talks.

— If we are to have a CFE agreement and a CSCE summit this year, then we have to get moving.

We must seize this unique opportunity to put relationships in Europe on a new, more cooperative footing. If we fail to catch the moment, however, the change underway in Eastern and Central Europe could become a source of instability—which neither of us wants.

Partnership is a term that I hope we can apply more and more to all aspects of our relationship.

— We want to move quickly on the agreements we hope to conclude this year—Chemical Weapons, START, Nuclear Testing, CFE, Confidence-Building Measures, Open Skies. Our goal should be to further reduce our military competition and build a stable security framework that will last.

— We also want to cooperate to defuse regional conflicts so that our energies can be directed toward solving the enormous transnational problems such as protecting the environment and fighting the drug trade.

— And we want to work together to strengthen democracy and respect for human rights in our two societies and throughout the world, since freedom is the best guarantor of world peace.

But partnership takes two. It will take effort on both sides to find points of mutual advantage, particularly on sensitive questions like German unification.

— We're ready to do our part. I hope you're ready to do yours.

I know the Soviet Union is going through a wrenching process of internal change and readjustment to new international realities.

I hope you will agree that we have been careful not to make things more difficult for you. On the contrary, since Malta we have tried to support перестройка in concrete ways.

Let me reassure you here today that I continue to support перестройка—because it offers greater freedom and prosperity for the Soviet people, and because it is, in turn, the best guarantee of creating the more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship we seek.
SUMMIT THEMES: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Drafted: EUR/sov: Avershow/ 5/21/90 x76729 SESOVTO 1306

Cleared: EUR: C. K. Kamman  
EUR: J. Pearson  
P: A. Wolff  
C: J. Sour (info)  
S/P: D. Ross (draft)  
S/P: W. Burns
BACKGROUND

Gorbachev’s policies have set in train events which are rapidly changing the face of Europe. Yet having opened the way for the democratization of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the drawdown of Soviet forces, and German unification, Gorbachev now faces serious domestic difficulties coping with these developments. His response has been to try to slow them down, even as the forces promoting change in Eastern Europe and Germany press all the harder to consolidate their gains in the event the current window of opportunity closes.

Secretary Baker, in his recent meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, has expressed understanding for the Soviets’ concerns and has outlined the basis for arrangements which would assure the Soviet Union a secure and honorable place in a new European order. He cited your proposals, as set out in your Stillwater speech, to accelerate SFM negotiations, to move rapidly into follow-on negotiations on conventional arms after signature of a CFE Treaty, to revise NACO strategy, and to expand the role for CSCE. At the same time, he made clear that we could not agree to Soviet proposals to limit the sovereignty of a united Germany, including its sovereign right to choose continued membership in NATO.

The Soviets have expressed a positive interest in our proposals for SFM, CFE and CSCE, but they have not yet proved ready to engage seriously on any of these topics. It seems unlikely that Gorbachev will come to Washington ready to drop his objection to a united Germany in NATO, or to explore in depth the broader framework for East-West cooperation we have set out. You should encourage an open discussion of the changes underway in Europe, urging upon Gorbachev the need to move expeditiously to create a new framework of European relationships in which to accommodate these developments. You should note that democratization, economic reform, and, in the case of Germany, unification are irreversible and still gathering pace. Whether these changes contribute to a more stable and peaceful European order will depend heavily upon decisions reached over the next six months.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Very positive changes are underway throughout Europe.
  - In the East, encouraged by your own policies of glasnost’ and perestroika, a profound process of democratization and economic reform has begun.

SECRET/EXD16
DECL: GATS

May 22, 1990

TOD 260, 145

SECRET/EXD16
In the West, we are beginning to reexamine our defense strategy, restructure our military forces, and consider new avenues for East-West cooperation.

-- A major restructuring of COCOM and Soviet participation in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are first steps in the economic area, for instance.

In the next few months we will have a unique opportunity to put relationships in Europe on a new footing, to create a new framework of cooperation — in a word, to build what I have called a Europe whole and free, and what you have labelled a European home.

-- Both of us must play a constructive role in this process if we are to be full participants in the new Europe.

The foundation of this new structure must be the Helsinki Final Act and the sovereign equality of all European states.

Arms control arrangements can provide the common roof.

We are thus ready to conclude a CFE accord. We want to explore with your government solutions to each of the outstanding issues.

We believe this accord should be wrapped up quickly.

We also recognize that German unification raises new issues with respect to the security balance in Europe.

-- We are thus prepared to discuss with you how these changes might be addressed in a subsequent negotiation, one which should follow very shortly on the conclusion of a CFE I accord.

We also want to move more quickly toward negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, in which we envisage very substantial reductions being agreed.

You have acknowledged that a continued U.S. troop presence in Europe is a stabilizing factor.

-- NATO serves this common goal and will play a key, albeit evolving, role in this new structure.

-- And a unified Germany’s full membership in NATO, if that is what the Germans choose, will help underpin the new, stable Europe we both seek.
We believe the CSCE process should be strengthened and extended in order to provide a framework for broader European cooperation which involves both the U.S. and USSR.

We in the West are not prepared to abandon our own arrangements for political, defense and economic cooperation.

-- These institutions are voluntary and peaceful. They offer a source of stability and prosperity. Their continuity has been welcomed by all Europeans, East and West alike.

We are prepared, however, to participate actively in the creation and animation of broader structures for European security and cooperation.

We would like to begin discussing with you how the CSCE process could be strengthened, expanded and institutionalized to provide these new structures.

Our ideas for CSCE include:

-- regular consultation at official, ministerial and perhaps even summit level;

-- new mechanisms to promote the peaceful management of disputes and thus reduce the risk of conflict; and

-- innovative confidence-building measures, such as arrangements to request clarification of unusual military activities.

All of this should come together over the next six months -- a CFE accord, a CSCE summit, agreement on the objectives for SNF talks and for follow-on talks on conventional forces.

This is an ambitious timetable, but an essential one if we are to keep pace with the changes underway in Europe today.

The changes underway in Europe, including democratization, economic reform and German unification, are irreversible and still gaining momentum.

Democratic governments have taken office throughout Eastern Europe. In a few weeks Germany will have a single currency and common economic system.

We cannot slow these changes. But if we seize the moment, we can encompass them in a broader European framework in which both our countries play an important, positive role.
SUMMIT THEMES: European Security

Drafted: EUR/RPM: MGuest
5/22/90 x78050 SESOVFO 1301

Cleared: EUR: JDobbins
EUR/RPM: RCaldwell
EUR/GOV: AVerShbow
FM: VVanDiepen
S/P: JHolmes
P: AWolff
C: MFoolon
T: CDell
BACKGROUND

Recent events have underlined two crucial facts for Gorbachev: his survival depends on fundamental changes that revive the Soviet Union’s collapsing economic and political systems, and yet the entrenched apparatchiks in the party and state bureaucracies are not likely to cooperate in implementing such changes, which threaten their interests and, indeed, their very survival. While Gorbachev has removed most of his diehard opponents at the upper levels, his efforts have barely begun to affect the large numbers of entrenched opponents at lower levels.

With the formation last year of the new, elected Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev embarked on a transfer of power from the party to the state. The subsequent collapse of communist party power in Azerbaijan and the Baltics and its weakness elsewhere accelerated the process. This prompted the March constitutional amendments to create a strong executive presidency and eliminate the CPSU’s monopoly of power.

Gorbachev cannot be pleased, however, with all of the consequences of his reform program:

- Freer expression has unleashed old ethnic animosities, fanned independence sentiment, and subjected Gorbachev himself to criticism.
- Emerging new-style politicians have proved reluctant to arouse public anger by adopting tough economic measures.
- Electoral success, popular support and a loosening of controls have emboldened nationalist activists in all of the republics. This combination of rising national awareness and relaxed control has proven potent and potentially explosive.

Following the recent victories of advocates of fundamental change in the republic-level elections, the CPSU Congress in July may well be the party’s last as a unified organization. The party is headed for a split, with advocates of a complete break with the past likely to triumph over 90-slow supporters of tinkering with existing structures.
SECRET/EXLIS

- 2 -

Gorbachev clearly hopes his new position as president, above and apart from the party and state bureaucracies as well as the Supreme Soviet, will give him authority and independence to manage the difficult times ahead.

If Gorbachev prevails, the July congress is likely to support a comprehensive overhauling of the party, including the abolition of the Politburo and the introduction of intra-party elections and democratization. The goal will be to make the party an explicitly political organization, removing it from the governing role it has exercised since 1917, and completing the transition of power to the new presidential system.

But the transformation of the CPSU may be even more dramatic. As Soviet leaders have acknowledged, the makings of a multi-party system already exist in the USSR. All that remains is for reality to be formalized. This could happen as early as the party congress. Recent trends suggest that the CPSU will split into two parties:

---

One is likely to be an essentially social democratic party committed to radical reform and democratization, holding on to Marxist ideology in name only. This group could maintain control of the CPSU and its resources, perhaps renaming itself the "Social Democratic Workers' Party" (the original name of the CPSU).

---

The second party, likely to be in the minority, would consist of CPSU members unwilling to part with the party's traditional ideology. This party could continue to call itself communist, but would be unlikely to hold on to much of the CPSU's current membership. Nonetheless, a party with even a tenth of the CPSU's current membership of 19 million would still be a powerful force.

As Embassy Moscow noted in "Gorbachev Confronts Crisis of Power" (Moscow 15714, attached), change will continue in the USSR for objective reasons regardless of Gorbachev's fate. Its course will likely be uneven, and a dramatic interruption to the process of change and reform cannot be ruled out.

Gorbachev probably will hold on to as much of the Bolsheviks' iconography as he can. But he, and the Soviet Union as it is currently constituted, cannot long survive unless the very basis of the country's social and economic system is dramatically altered. Gorbachev's most recent statements indicate he recognizes this.
POINTS TO MAKE

- I have been following with great interest the progress of reform in the Soviet Union and, in particular, preparations for the upcoming 24th party congress in early July.

- I recognize the importance of the congress for the progress of political reform in your country and the impact it will have on the way the Soviet Union is governed.

- You have declared your intention to use your new presidential powers to accelerate the progress of reform and restructuring.

  - Which major reforms will be pursued in the near future? Which, if any, have been deferred?

- How strong is the opposition to your program within the party? Do you anticipate trouble from the delegates in overhauling the party's rules and structure?

- How great are the possibilities for a split in the party between conservatives and reformists?

- What, if any, effect might the congress have on Soviet foreign and defense policies?

- Looking ahead, how do you see the process of democratization developing?

- How do you see the rise of Russian nationalism? As a threat, as a positive force, or as a combination of both?

- How do you see the future role of the Communist Party in a reformed, democratized Soviet Union?
TO:    The Secretary
FROM:  INR - Douglas P. Mulholland
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Summit Agenda: Looking Ahead

Despite signs of increased domestic unease over the course of Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev will come to Washington able to deal. He is probably satisfied that there are enough agreements in place to ensure a successful summit and set the stage for the Party Congress in July. He will strive to sell his agenda for US-Soviet relations not only to the Administration, but to Congress, business interests, and the American public. The attached INR analysis concludes:

--Arms control remains a top priority; Gorbachev will seek US commitments to follow-on negotiations, even if a START treaty is not ready for initialing at this summit.

--Gorbachev will continue to oppose a united Germany's membership in NATO, but will be open to US suggestions for alternative security arrangements. No may indicate the USSR's readiness to delay the CFE treaty until German security problems are resolved.

--Gorbachev will continue to encourage US tolerance of Soviet policy toward the Baltic republics and internal unrest. He will also try to deflect US complaints about human rights by focusing on positive developments and by promising further progress.

--He will try to elicit US investment commitments, and may be quite frank about the need for Western help to ensure that his reforms succeed.

--Gorbachev will focus on regional conflicts to the extent they threaten to iritate US-Soviet relations. He probably sees the various regional issues as on track, not susceptible to US-Soviet action at this time, or, as in the case of Afghanistan, moving in the USSR's favor.

Attachment:
As Stated.
If the Moscow ministerial demonstrated one thing, it is that Gorbachev is in control of foreign policy and prepared to bargain. Despite signs of bureaucratic disarray around him, Gorbachev still has a clear vision of what he must accomplish. He views this summit both as a mark of how far US-Soviet relations have come—the START framework, trade agreement, chemical weapons agreement, nuclear testing protocols, and ever-expanding bilateral agreements—and as an opportunity to chart the future course of bilateral relations during a period of dramatic international change. Moreover, it enables him to set the stage for the 26th Party Congress in July and claim a foreign policy success. He will continue to demonstrate political savvy, particularly the ability to anticipate problems down the road as well as confront those at hand.

Domestic Context. Gorbachev sees the summit as a means of easing domestic pressures; he hopes to use it as leverage to shift resources from defense spending to such critical areas as agriculture, housing, and medical care. By all appearances, he has decided to cut the military budget even more than the 14.2 percent already announced, and needs both the substance and the atmospherics of a successful summit in political support of such cuts, especially in the face of likely strong opposition from the large and influential military-industrial complex within the Council of Ministers.

Although there are signs of military unease and concern, Gorbachev is less constrained by military opposition to his foreign and arms control policies than he is by the USSR’s need to reassert its security interests in light of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, German unification, and prospects for Baltic independence. The uncertainty surrounding the implication of these events has raised Soviet anxieties and produced disarray in the decision-making process. Nonetheless, Gorbachev remains in charge and Soviet policies are beginning to crystallize—and change—as Moscow adapts to the new alignments.

A successful summit also will reinforce Gorbachev’s stature at home as he prepares the country for a new stage of economic reform, to be debated at the July Party Congress. In this context, he hopes to show that any “losses” resulting from his foreign policy in Eastern Europe will be offset by the gains in strategic arms control and increased western economic cooperation.

Gorbachev probably expects Lithuania and the other Baltic republics to be high on the American agenda, and will be prepared to address criticisms head on with the President as well as in meetings with members of Congress and the public. He appears confident in his approach and will argue he
cannot go further until Lithuania suspends its independence declaration.

**Anxiety Over German Unification.** More than at Malta, the German question will occupy Gorbachev’s mind. His attitude to a unified Germany in NATO continues to be resoundingly negative, and there is no sign of willingness or ability to back down. Instead, he is likely to continue to seek alternatives or, at a minimum, to delay a decision. The urgency of the German question appears to be such that Moscow is prepared to put other policies at risk. The Soviets now appear prepared to make a CFE agreement dependent on the outcome of the two-plus-four talks, thereby imperiling a set of important objectives such as a 1990 CSCE summit and negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles. They also seem prepared to obstruct unification over the NATO membership issue, e.g. refusing to relinquish four-power rights, insisting on a peace treaty, or maintaining Soviet troops in the GDR, moves which would complicate Soviet efforts to improve relations with West Germany as well as other NATO member countries.

While Gorbachev recognizes that the US and USSR cannot resolve the political-military status of Germany at the summit, he will be looking for understanding of the depth of Soviet concerns and support for alternate approaches, including an expanded role for CSCE.

But while Gorbachev will be open to using CSCE to guarantee pan-European security and diminish the need for military alliances or Germany’s membership in NATO, he is likely to insist on establishing parameters for Germany itself. Gorbachev will insist that any alternative must place limits on the size of the Bundeswehr, ban nuclear weapons on German soil, commit the new Germany to fulfill the GDR’s agreements with the USSR, and allow for the deployment of Soviet forces on German territory during a transition period. It is clear the Soviets are looking to the two-plus-four talks to produce a legally binding document that will ensure these objectives.

**Arms Control: The Centerpiece of Relations.** While the initialising of a framework START agreement is a major goal, Gorbachev will be satisfied even if the chemical weapons agreement and the nuclear testing protocols are the only arms control texts signed at the summit. Whether a START framework is initialed or not, Gorbachev will press for a US commitment to follow-on strategic negotiations despite the possibility that he will stall on conventional reductions. He probably wants to be able to point to a productive dialogue on short-range nuclear missiles, and may even hope to get the US...
to broaden talks on confidence-building measures at sea in order to show movement toward naval arms control, but neither of these issues will be central to his summit arms control agenda.

START. Willingness, in the end, to close a deal on ALCMs and BLCMs in Moscow demonstrates that the Soviets consider completing a "framework" START agreement one of the keys to a successful summit, and they will try to reach agreement on those issues that the US maintains are necessarily part of a framework. Nevertheless, the Soviets can be expected to resist strongly any proposal that appears to be a unilateral concession, such as further limits on heavy missiles, or limits on MIRVed mobiles.

Mobile Missiles--Soviets Want to Keep it Simple. On mobile missiles, the Soviets would probably require a ceiling of around 550 launchers and 950-1,050 weapons to meet their needs. To gain US acquiescence in this, they would probably accept a verification regime involving notifications of movements, although they are likely to insist that these be held to a minimum. The Soviets will also be wary of types of movement restrictions that they fear might lead to inadvertent treaty violations, particularly since, until the US deploys mobile missiles, these restrictions will apply only to them.

Backfire. They also are unlikely to accept new limits that would compel them to alter their deployment plans. The Intelligence Community, for example, projects that, by 1999, the Soviets will have deployed some 500 Backfire bombers. Of these, approximately 210 will belong to naval forces. Although it may be possible to persuade the Soviets to accept a global limit on Backfires, if that were the price of a framework agreement, the limit would have to be comfortably above 500.

Throwweight--Progress Unlikely. The Soviets will probably wish to leave the question of throwweight vague in a framework agreement. The gap between the US desire to account for "potential" throwweight and the Soviet position of counting only "demonstrated" throwweight in wide. Moreover, the Soviets perceive that throwweight restrictions, and any possible attendant ambiguities and unforeseen consequences, are likely to apply only to them.

Linkage--A Last-Minute Stick in the Spokes? Despite the evident Soviet desire to announce a framework agreement at the summit, we cannot exclude the possibility the Soviets will attempt to revive their efforts to link a START agreement to the ABM Treaty. While claiming that linkage has been dissolved, the Soviets continue to remind us of the importance of agreeing on activities permitted and prohibited under the
ABM Treaty, and on conditions for leaving the START Treaty because of ABM compliance problems. If they are unsatisfied on this issue at START, they can be expected to pursue it during any follow-on negotiations.

Looking to the Future. The Soviets have given ample proof of their interest in follow-on negotiations to START that would lead to further reductions in strategic arms. They are far more likely to propose a START-like additional 50 percent reduction than to favor extreme cuts to the level of several hundred warheads.

The Soviets have indicated on various occasions that they would consider further reductions in heavy missiles as part of follow-on negotiations. They have also signaled an interest in de-MIRVing. We believe, however, that the Soviets are interested in these issues mainly as levers to bring about further restrictions in US forces. Until the Soviets fundamentally change their strategic nuclear doctrine—and we see no evidence that this has occurred—they will be dependent on MIRVs. The attraction of de-MIRVing proposals for the Soviets is limited to the possibility of putting restrictions on US forces—notably the Trident SSBN force. Similarly, further cuts in heavy missiles will be tolerable for the Soviets as newer, lighter, and more accurate missiles replace the SS-18. Offering up further cuts in—or even a ban on—heavy missiles could be seen by the Soviets as sacrificing something of waning value in order to extract a high price from Washington—such as limitations on the US Trident force.

Last, the Soviets may suggest that other types of arms be included in follow-on negotiations. Anti-satellite weapons, which they have said they wish to ban, are one possibility. They also might argue that, if deeper cuts than those of START are contemplated, it will be necessary to begin reducing French and British nuclear forces at the same time.

CEE. With the wrap up of START, attention should shift to CFE, but Moscow's overriding concern about the security implications of a united Germany is apparently forcing the Soviets to rethink the issue, which has resulted in considerable Soviet foot-dragging in Vienna.

The Soviets are anxious to limit the Bundeswehr, and can be expected to press this issue either in CFE or two-plus-four. Gorbachev is likely to repeat the Soviet CFE proposal; that each alliance be limited to 750,000 troops in the central zone. To support this, Gorbachev could argue that since the scheme is not specifically directed at Germany, it should not run afoul of Bonn's sensitivities regarding "singularity." He also may
point out that because the proposed central zone limits are alliance wide, NATO will have to reach intra-alliance agreement on troop levels, thereby enhancing NATO’s political role—an important US objective.

**Bilateral Issues: Expanding the Agenda.** Though largely symbolic, Gorbachev views completion of the trade agreement, and the other bilateral agreements, as well as progress on various transnational issues such as ecology and counter-terrorism, as key to improving the long-term prospects for stable US-Soviet relations and, most importantly, securing economic benefits. He can be expected to play up these agreements—especially those expanding people-to-people contacts—in his public comments as indicators of growing cooperation and trust between the two countries and as examples of where future relations should go.

**Economic Issues.** Gorbachev will press the President for greater US economic assistance, which is probably one of his highest priorities. He will likely call into question the sincerity as well as the depth of US support for perestroika, as he did at the Moscow ministerial, and urge direct US government credit as well as greater efforts by the Administration to encourage and support joint ventures and private investment by US business. He will also ask for political support for a number of government-to-government and private business projects, such as the American trade consortium, the Medical consortium and an agreement on technical assistance for the Soviet food industry.

**A Possible Surprise: Request for Food Aid.** Should the continued downward economic slide threaten social disturbances, Gorbachev could request emergency food assistance, including direct airborne emergency food shipments and short-term credits. In early February, the Soviets requested emergency food assistance from the FRG in an effort to forestall riots in remote parts of the USSR.

**Human Rights.** Passage of the Soviet emigration bill promised for May 31 is still uncertain. Apparently the Supreme Soviet still has not decided on how to respond to demands—from departing emigres and other travellers—for an increase in the amount of foreign exchange which can be taken out of the USSR. Gorbachev will be expecting criticism over direct flights to Israel and will likely restate Shevardnadze’s earlier call for the US to increase its refugee and immigration quotas for Soviet Jews, seeing this as a way to answer both US arguments and Arab criticism.

**Regional Issues.** Gorbachev probably sees little danger that regional issues will threaten summit atmospherics or, for
that matter, overall relations. Given the press of other
business—and barring any major changes on the ground—he is
not likely to give these issues priority. Moreover, he
probably views the various regional issues as either on track,
not susceptible to US-Soviet action at this time, or, in the
case of Afghanistan, as tending to favor Moscow.

Afghanistan. The ministerial and working group discussions
identified the one issue blocking US-Soviet agreement on an
Afghan settlement: "incumbency"—whether power is to be
transferred from Najib to a new organ of power before
elections. Soviet intransigence on this issue and
Shevardnadze's reference to Nicaragua, where the US did not
require Ortega to step down before elections, gives little
basis for expecting the Soviets to change their position. Nor
does Soviet handling of recent developments in the region:
they have continued to supply Najib and publicize his political
reforms; they have also been playing up rivalries within the
AFG, the AFG's extremist elements, and alleged involvement in
narcotics and excursions across the USSR border. At least in
the short term, the Soviets seem to feel time is on their side.

Nonetheless, the Soviets are still interested in a
settlement. A recent article in an influential Soviet foreign
policy journal stressed the need to abandon burdensome,
unsavory Third World regimes, and in a specific reference to
Afghanistan, stated that reconciliation efforts require a
"transitional, neutral status" which cannot be obtained by
"maintaining in power one of the belligerents." While it is
unclear whether this statement represents more than a minority
view, Moscow warmly welcomed former King Zahir Shah's offer to
participate in a settlement. At the summit, the Soviets are
sure to return to "negative symmetry" and again call for an
international conference on Afghanistan and a larger UN role.
They may also argue that the situation in Kashmir makes a
settlement all the more important.

Kashmir. The Soviets are likely to emphasize common
US-USSR interests in seeing the Kashmir situation defused.
They can claim with some justification that they have counseled
restraint and dialogue on India and Pakistan. Criticism of
Pakistan is nothing new; in an unusual recent flurry of
articles, however, the Soviet press has criticized India for
inexpert administration of Kashmir, for an excessive military
budget, and for failure to sign the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty. The Soviets have told the Indians they will continue to
fill orders for military equipment, but the Indians complain
about delays and unsatisfactory performance and seem uneasy
about the depth of the Soviet commitment.
He distinguished this, however, from international involvement in the Kashmir settlement issue, which the Soviets prefer to leave to the Indians and Pakistanis bilaterally, under the Simla agreement. Gorbachev is likely to support any means of bringing pressure on the two sides which does not challenge Indian sovereignty in Kashmir or injure Soviet-Indian relations.

Central America. The Nicaraguan elections took some of the pressure off US-Soviet relations, and Central America currently has little claim on Gorbachev’s time. Moscow is, nevertheless, interested in continuing the dialogue as a low-cost way of staking out a claim to a role in the region, and in Latin America in general. Moreover, Moscow wants an improvement in US-Cuban relations to relieve the pressure on Havana—and the financial burden for itself of keeping the Castro regime afloat. The Soviets are likely to resist any efforts by the US to get the USSR to pressure Castro, arguing that Washington should address its concerns to Havana, not Moscow, and that the best way to ensure Castro’s good behavior is to elevate his sense of isolation.

While they are not pushing the issue as actively as before, the Soviets may raise the need for a region-wide approach to area problems and, as part of this, movement on a settlement in El Salvador. They would like to see Cuban participation in settling the El Salvador conflict and in solidifying a region-wide peace accord as a way of diffusing US-Cuban tensions and relieving remaining Central American anxieties, but they still insist the US deal with the Cubans directly on a regional arms embargo. However, as in the Middle East, they may argue for multilateral talks on cutting arms transfers.

Middle East. The Soviets see the Arab-Israeli peace process stalemated and are reluctant to discuss the Gulf. Nonetheless, Soviet media sharply criticized the killings in the Occupied Territories, and Moscow is concerned Shamir will lead Israel’s next government. At a minimum, the Soviets are likely to criticize Israel for obstructing the peace process and the Administration for failing to move Israel, while pushing the US to take a second look at Soviet ideas—namely bringing the UN ‘Per Fife into the game—to get Israel to be more flexible. As at the ministerial, the Soviets will deflect any calls for improved USSR-Israel ties, including direct flights, criticizing Israeli actions, such as new settlements, and violence, make it politically impossible for Moscow to do anything now. Gorbachev will probably ask us to open the doors to increased Soviet Jewish immigration.
Gorbachev is likely to seek a joint statement condemning recent Israeli actions and calling on Israel to move the peace process forward. The USSR will also be watching the upcoming Arab summit; if criticism in that forum of Soviet Jewish emigration policy is particularly harsh, Moscow may push for a condemnation of Israeli settlement policy in the Occupied Territories.

Questions of regional proliferation, the Gulf situation, and Lebanon are likely to get short shrift. The Soviets may welcome a statement supporting the Taif accords in Lebanon, but probably see little reason to focus on the issue now. They are likely to justify their recently renewed offer to mediate talks between Iran and Iraq as in keeping with UN efforts, but will try to avoid detailed discussions on their bilateral relations with Tehran.

Cambodia. Barring real progress at the Pern Five meeting in New York on May 25-26, the Soviets at the summit will again press for a total arms moratorium, and endorse the current Thai cease-fire proposal. The Soviets may cite recent hints of flexibility from the Chinese and stress the importance of the US and USSR working with Beijing at the Pern Five. They are, however, hesitant about becoming deeply involved in a peace process that still appears to have little chance of success.

Despite their rhetoric, the Soviets cannot be expected to pressure either Hanoi or Beijing to slow arms shipments or accept peace formulas.

The Soviets will also stress that the Hun Sen regime is the only force standing in the way of a Khmer Rouge return, and argue for the US accepting the "reality" of the Phnom Penh government.

Africa. The Soviets seem convinced that Angola is moving in the right direction, and that there is little the two superpowers can or need to do at this juncture. Moscow probably hopes the MPLA's pullout from Moxinga is seen as a gesture of conciliation and not a sign of weakness, and thus will pave the way for effective negotiations. The key, from Moscow's perspective, is to convince both UNITA and the MPLA hardliners the time is at hand to talk. At the summit, the Soviets will probably argue for a mutual arms cutoff and cease-fire.

The Soviets seem ready to cut their losses in Ethiopia but for the moment are prepared to let events take their course.
Military supplies continue to trickle down, but it is unclear if they are the result of new deliveries or deals. There seems to be little Soviet enthusiasm for famine relief generally; even if there were, Moscow may not be in a position to render much help. Three Soviet transport planes in Ethiopia were recently bombed, according to Ambassador Dubinin.

Although concerned about North Korea's nuclear programs and refusal to sign IAEA safeguards agreements, the Soviets probably calculate that further pressure on Pyongyang will bear little fruit without significant change in the military situation on the peninsula, and could even be counterproductive, given warming USSR-ROK ties. The Soviets may try to address the issue in the larger context of the need for a North/South dialogue on regional security, including the creation of a nuclear-free zone or zone of peace, and reductions in US military presence, especially naval.
THE NATO SUMMIT
LONDON
JULY 5-6, 1990

BOOK ONE
SCOPE PAPERS

1. General Scowcroft’s Memorandum to the President
2. Secretary Baker’s Memorandum to the President

SCHEDULE

THE PRESIDENT’S MAIN NAC INTERVENTION

SUMMIT DECLARATION

1. Current U.S. Text
2. President’s Message to Allied Leaders
3. Replies to the President’s Message

CONTINGENCY POINTS TO BE MADE IN SUMMIT SESSIONS

1. Future Political Role of NATO
2. German Unification (Objectives in the Two Plus Four)
3. German Unification (Dealing with Soviet Concerns)
4. NATO Strategy Review
5. Status of Current CFE Negotiations
6. CFE Follow-On Negotiations
7. SNF Arms Control Negotiations
8. CSCE Summit
9. Situation in the Soviet Union

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE NO. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

BUSH LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
BOOK TWO

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPERS

1. Secretary General Woerner
2. General Galvin
3. Prime Minister Thatcher
4. President Mitterrand
5. Chancellor Kohl
6. Prime Minister Andreotti
7. Other Allied Leaders

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Political Issues

1. NATO Political Role
2. The Future of the Warsaw Pact
3. Role of France in NATO
4. CSCE Process
5. CSCE Summit
6. CSCE: Meetings on Particular Topics
7. US-Soviet Relations
8. Baltics

Germany

1. Update on Inner-German Relations
2. Two-Plus-Four Process
3. Two-Plus-Four and the Borders Issue
4. Germany and NATO
5. Germany and the USSR
6. Text of Soviet Proposal for a Final Settlement in the Two-Plus-Four
7. Secretary Baker's "Nine Points"

Arms Control/Security Issues

1. Conventional Forces: NATO and Warsaw Pact
2. CFE
3. CFE Follow-On Negotiations
4. SNF: US and Soviet Forces
5. TASM and Nuclear Strategy Review
6. SNF Negotiations
7. British and French Nuclear Forces
8. Open Skies
9. CSBMs
10. Non-Proliferation

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

(heads of government and foreign ministers, listed alphabetically by country)

SECRET
Declasify on: OADR
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
London, England

For Immediate Release       July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO's Conventional Forces and Strategy

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO set a new
course for the size and structure of its conventional forces in
Europe. The Alliance agreed to prepare a new NATO military
strategy moving away from "forward defense," where appropriate,
towards a reduced forward presence.

As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is implemented, the overwhelming
conventional imbalance which NATO has faced for over forty years
will change fundamentally. Yet NATO's new strategy and force
posture will continue to reflect enduring principles of Alliance
security: NATO has always been and will remain a defensive
Alliance. We will continue to provide for the collective defense
of all of the territory of all NATO members. In this connection
the President reaffirmed today his commitment to maintain a
substantial U.S. military presence in Europe for as long as our
Allies want and need them.

NATO will prepare for a new era of enduring peace and stability.
Under the Alliance's new strategy and force structure:

-- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces.
These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so
that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in
deciding how to respond to a crisis. NATO will rely
increasingly on multinational corps made up of national
units.

-- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units
reducing training requirements and the number of
exercises.

-- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up
larger forces if and when they might be needed.

NATO's new strategy will be developed on the basis of decisions
taken today with the advice of NATO military authorities.
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
London, England

For Immediate Release

July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO Nuclear Strategy in the New Age

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO leaders announced that the Alliance will prepare a new Allied military strategy reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and modifying "flexible response" to reflect the greatly diminished threat posed by the East. Allied leaders agreed to adopt a new strategy making NATO’s nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

The size and missions of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent forces will continue to reflect the fundamental nature of the Alliance as well as the changes underway in Europe. As a defensive alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense. NATO has always sought, moreover, to have the lowest level of nuclear forces needed to keep the peace. In the past, the threat of sudden and overwhelming conventional attack forced Allied planners to rely on the possible use of nuclear weapons soon after the outbreak of a major conflict. However, as a result of the new conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly those systems of the shortest range.

NATO’s leaders firmly believe the peace that prevails in Europe reflects NATO’s deterrent strength based on the sharing of risks and responsibilities and an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary. NATO’s nuclear forces will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. They also believe, however, that as Soviet forces return home and as the CFE treaty is implemented, NATO will not need to contemplate the use of its nuclear arsenal except as weapons of last resort.
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
London, England

For Immediate Release

July 6, 1990

FACT SHEET

NATO Initiative on Nuclear Artillery

Today, based on a proposal from President Bush, NATO leaders decided that, once SNF negotiations begin, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe. The U.S. maintains these nuclear artillery shells for its forces and for the forces of NATO allies.

The decision to plan for the withdrawal of nuclear artillery was made possible by the new political and military conditions in Europe, which will significantly reduce the role for theater nuclear systems of the shortest range. President Bush highlighted these conditions in his speech in Stillwater, Oklahoma on May 4. He announced then that the U.S. was cancelling any further modernization of U.S. nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe, and he proposed that new U.S.-Soviet arms control talks on short-range nuclear systems begin shortly after the CFE treaty has been signed. Today, NATO leaders agreed to take this new step to reduce the levels of forces in Europe to the lowest level needed to keep the peace.
### SNF Arms Control Data

#### SNF Missile Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR/US</th>
<th></th>
<th>WP/NATO</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNF Missile Loads - Ratio</td>
<td>SNF Missiles</td>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Forces</td>
<td>301/36</td>
<td>8:1</td>
<td>1486/1186</td>
<td>1.25:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>1060/36</td>
<td>25:1</td>
<td>5094/1286</td>
<td>4.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1476/50</td>
<td>29:1</td>
<td>7588/1676</td>
<td>4.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Forces</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>1440/88</td>
<td>16:1</td>
<td>7366/1739</td>
<td>4.2:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>1856/102</td>
<td>16:1</td>
<td>9570/2229</td>
<td>4.3:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Artillery Tubes (152mm and Larger)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR/US</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Forces</td>
<td>2220/1109</td>
<td>2:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>7665/1109</td>
<td>7:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>10321/4119</td>
<td>2.5:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationed Forces</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTU</td>
<td>9303/5335</td>
<td>1.7:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>11759/8345</td>
<td>1.4:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE NO. 98-01423-F
JGP J/5/25/99
### TABLE 1: Missile Launchers and Artillery Tubes (152mm and above)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSWP Forces</th>
<th>Soviets in NSWP</th>
<th>Total in NSWP</th>
<th>Total ATTU</th>
<th>Total Soviet (USSR+NSWP)</th>
<th>Glob:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROG</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msl Lchrs</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>1440</td>
<td>1476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152mm</td>
<td>1426</td>
<td>2180</td>
<td>3606</td>
<td>8760</td>
<td>9,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203mm</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240mm</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty Tubes</td>
<td>1438</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>3658</td>
<td>9303</td>
<td>10,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2: Missiles and Artillery Shells

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>NSWP Forces</th>
<th>Soviets in NSWP</th>
<th>Total in NSWP</th>
<th>Total ATTU</th>
<th>Total Soviet (USSR+NSWP)</th>
<th>Glob:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FROG</td>
<td>1260</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>3180</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>4,74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCUD</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>2508</td>
<td>2,536</td>
<td>3,13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-21</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>3470</td>
<td>7386</td>
<td>7,588</td>
<td>9,97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Detailed data unknown)

---

**WARSAW PACT WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS**

**LAND-BASED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS OF LESS THAN INF RANGE**
NATO WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS

LAND-BASED NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS OF LESS THAN INF RANGE

(French Forces Excluded)

**TABLE 1: Launchers and Artillery Tubes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allied</th>
<th>US In Europe</th>
<th>Subtotal Europe</th>
<th>CONUS</th>
<th>Other US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LANCE</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 INCH</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1058</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155MM</td>
<td>3510</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>4277</td>
<td>2029</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>6600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2: Missiles and Shells**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allied</th>
<th>US In Europe</th>
<th>Subtotal Europe</th>
<th>CONUS</th>
<th>Other US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LANCE</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 INCH</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155MM</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY THEMES

-- The Summit Declaration should set out the Alliance's SNF arms control objectives only in the broadest terms.

-- We should instead focus on the big picture -- i.e., broad negotiating objectives and the strategy review. Specific issues and decisions should be deferred until Alliance assessments can be carefully made.

KEY POINTS

-- We fully share the Alliance consensus, which came out of the Turnberry Ministerial meeting, that the Summit should issue a general statement of intent and timing on SNF arms control, without specifics.

-- On timing, negotiations on U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.

-- We also fully share the consensus at Turnberry that discussion of deployment issues -- i.e., the Tactical-Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM) -- is premature.

CONTINGENCY POINTS

(If allies raise the issue of whether to include in SNF arms control cooperative systems -- e.g., UK, FRG, Italian, Dutch, and Belgian Lance missile systems):

-- These are bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

-- Whether to address in SNF arms control the systems owned and operated cooperatively by allies is an issue we will need to talk about with those allies who are directly affected.

(If the French or the British raise their intention to keep their independent nuclear forces out of SNF arms control):

-- We fully agree that the independent French and British nuclear forces must be kept out of the U.S.-Soviet SNF negotiations.

SECRET
Declasify on: OADR
CFE FOLLOW-ON

TALKING POINTS

KEY THEMES

-- Conventional arms control will have a role to play in promoting stability and security through the 1990s.

-- Our broad objectives for the 1990s should be to seek further far-reaching reductions of the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent.

-- Using the mandate already in place for CFE, new conventional arms control talks should begin with the same membership, once a CFE treaty is signed.

KEY POINTS

-- Our task today is to look beyond immediate problems and set the course for the Alliance in the 1990s.

-- CFE I will go far to restore the conventional military balance in Europe, but it leaves most NATO forces at close to their current levels. As the Soviet threat recedes and budgetary pressures grow, most of you will probably want to make sharp defense cuts.

-- Conventional arms control will be the best way to manage these adjustments in a stabilizing way. It will also be the best way to continue to push Soviet forces downward to a size more proportionate with other European powers. Our publics will expect that CFE I is not the end of the story; that the process of reductions will continue. The language we have suggested for the Summit Declaration tells them that we will do that, and that we have a goal.

-- We should not decide today what the exact nature of our proposals will be. In part, that will depend on the outcome of the current negotiations. Instead, we should set broad objectives for the coming decade, and reaffirm our commitment to continue the CFE process, without interruption, after the current CFE treaty is signed.

Contingency Points

(If expanding the talks to all 35 CSCE countries is raised):

-- We should begin, after the conclusion of this CFE treaty, with the same membership.

-- We do not rule out expanding the negotiations to include other European states at an appropriate point, as observers and even full participants.
(If negotiating a new mandate is raised):

-- We should continue to use the existing CFE mandate. This is not a bloc-to-bloc document. At some point, we may wish to invite other CSCE participants to observe these negotiations or to join as participants.

-- It would be premature to begin new mandate discussions now, while CFE follow-on negotiations are in progress.
CFE
TALKING POINTS

KEY THEMES

-- A CFE agreement will be the cornerstone of a new security structure for Europe.

- By dramatically reducing conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and codifying Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, we remove the shadow that the Soviet military presence has cast over the continent for the past forty years.

- A CFE agreement will set the stage for a CSCE Summit, where we can continue to chart the course for new relationships in Europe. We should not have a CSCE Summit without a CFE Treaty.

-- We must move quickly to move forward to conclude a solid, verifiable agreement this year.

KEY POINTS

-- A CFE Treaty will be a key part of the foundation for a new security architecture in Europe.

-- We should spare no effort to complete a CFE treaty this year, which would open the way to a CSCE Summit.

- I was pleased that we were able to set aside agreement last week on numbers for tanks and armored combat vehicles.

-- But there is much left to do, and we cannot finish this treaty alone. We will continue to urge the Soviets to work with us to find realistic solutions to the problems which remain.

- We are still opposed to a CFE provision which would single out the German armed forces for special reductions.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE NO. 98-0142-F
JGP 5/25/99

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Air Def. Intercptrs</th>
<th>Armored Cmbt Veh.</th>
<th>(All) Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,722,405</td>
<td>24,414</td>
<td>18,487</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIGENOUS</strong></td>
<td>2,257,844</td>
<td>15,866</td>
<td>15,150</td>
<td>5,044</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,935</td>
<td>3,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>51,912</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>179</td>
<td></td>
<td>783</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>77,733</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>231</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,561</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.R.G.</td>
<td>443,754</td>
<td>5,736</td>
<td>2,492</td>
<td>736</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>147,818</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>877</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>25,310</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
<td>267</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>28,080</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>371,671</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>610</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,636</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>250,111</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1,310</td>
<td>260</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>59,797</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>102</td>
<td></td>
<td>251</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>141,871</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>516</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,678</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (ATTU)</td>
<td>342,792</td>
<td>3,188</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>589</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATIONED (by)</strong></td>
<td>464,861</td>
<td>8,548</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>25,064</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>439</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6,953</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>719</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8,327</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>73,019</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>307,498</td>
<td>6,681</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>737</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,273</td>
<td>1,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W.T.O. TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2,885,000</td>
<td>46,000</td>
<td>44,470</td>
<td>7,855</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>38,015</td>
<td>3,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOVIET TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,845,000</td>
<td>31,920</td>
<td>32,760</td>
<td>6,025</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>73,975</td>
<td>2,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet in USSR</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>23,700</td>
<td>26,750</td>
<td>4,805</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>52,725</td>
<td>1,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATIONED (in)</td>
<td>545,000</td>
<td>8,290</td>
<td>7,010</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21,250</td>
<td>1,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.D.R.</td>
<td>359,000</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14,910</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N.S.W. INDIGENOUS</strong></td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>14,010</td>
<td>10,710</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>24,040</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.D.R.</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>5,770</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>198,000</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>2,260</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Due to the fluid situation in Eastern Europe, all Warsaw Pact figures are changing rapidly. Western manpower data 4/89 (NATO HLTF); Western equipment data 1/90 (NATO HLTF); Eastern data 4/90 (IC)
CFE: Proposed Ceilings for Each Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel (Stationed, US and USSR)</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Air Def. Intcroptrs</th>
<th>Armored Comb Veh.</th>
<th>(All) Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Proposal</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cent. Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Outer Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Proposal</strong></td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,700*</td>
<td>1,500*</td>
<td>30,000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Cent. Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Outer Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviets continue to seek additional manpower limits.

* The similarity of aircraft figures masks a wide disagreement between East and West on definition of what should be limited in CFE.

** Counting rules have not been agreed.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE NO. 98-0142-F
JGP 5/25/99
## CFE: Proposed Ceilings for Each Side

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personnel (Stationed, US and USSR)</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Air Def. Intectors</th>
<th>Armored Cmbt Veh.</th>
<th>(All) Helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Proposal</td>
<td>125,000 (Cent. Zone)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 (Outer Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTERN Proposal</td>
<td>125,000 (Cent. Zone)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,700*</td>
<td>1,500*</td>
<td>30,000**</td>
<td>1900**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 (Outer Zone)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviets continue to seek additional manpower limits.

*The similarity of aircraft figures masks a wide disagreement between East and West on definition of what should be limited in CFE.

**Counting rules have not been agreed.
KEY THEMES

-- The Summit should establish broad principles which will guide the review of NATO's military strategy.

-- The Summit should reaffirm certain fundamental principles of Alliance defense policy, which it does in our proposed Summit Declaration.

-- But it should also give political direction to how our strategy and force posture could change in a radically different European security environment.

KEY POINTS

-- As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a CFE treaty is implemented, we will face a significantly reduced military threat. NATO can respond to that reduction.

-- I believe we can help facilitate Soviet withdrawal by announcing that NATO will respond.

-- Launching a review of our strategy and highlighting some specific important changes to our forces shows the people of Europe, and the Soviet Union in particular, that we have no intention of threatening anyone's security as Europe changes.

-- I also believe that the guidelines we establish for a strategy review should reaffirm some fundamental principles of this Alliance. These are mentioned, for example, in the Summit Declaration we have proposed.

-- We should let NATO institutions work out the details of our new strategy and force plans. Countries that are not in the Alliance's military structures should be able to contribute to the review in a way they consider appropriate.

-- The big task for us is to give this review political direction. We should tackle the tough questions.

-- In looking at conventional defenses, we should say that we are moving away from our strategy of forward defense as we have understood it in the past. The new elements in our strategy should include lower levels of standing forces, a reduced forward presence, greater flexibility in the disposition of our forces -- forces to defend the border do not have to be at the border, an emphasis on mobility and countering concentrations, the use of multinational forces.

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
and more reliance on reinforcement and recreation of larger NATO forces as needed.

-- In modifying our strategy of flexible response, we no longer have to plan for the early use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with the threat of a sudden and overwhelming conventional attack. We can retain flexibility in planning the use of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of first use, but stress that now we can make our nuclear forces weapons of last resort.

-- We will still need an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, kept up to date. But our nuclear force posture can change -- starting with the removal of nuclear artillery shells as Soviet stationed troops return home.

-- These are important changes. But if the Soviet threat does recede, they will be a sensible adjustment to a radically different security environment in Europe.

-- We should consider the results of our strategy review at another NATO Summit as soon as possible next year.
9 сентября 1990 года, Хельсинки

Дж. Буш. Рад виده Вас, господин Президент.

М.С. Горбачев. Рад приветствовать Вас. Рад, что мы встретились, хотя я должен сказать, что выражать мне было не просто. Много дел дома.

Дж. Буш. Хорошо, что в Комп-Девиде мы договорились при необходимости встречаться, как мы это делаем сейчас. Тот факт, что мы договорились о проведении этой встречи, положительно воспринят во всем мире.

М.С. Горбачев. Я уже имел возможность сказать представителям прессы, что, хотя мы с президентом Бушем постоянно, по мере необходимости, поддерживаем контакт в различных формах, в такие моменты, как настоящий, необходимы личные встречи для более углубленного обсуждения проблем.

Дж. Буш. Согласен. Конечно, среди вопросов, которые мы должны обсудить, главное место занимает ситуация в Периодском заливе.

Какой порядок обсуждения Вы предпочитаете? Я, конечно, хотел бы ознакомить Вас с нашими соображениями. В то же время очень хочу послушать Вас. Но сразу же хочу отметить следующее. Хорошо, что Советский Союз и Соединенные Штаты продемонстрировали всему миру, что сейчас, во время кризиса в Персидском заливе, они вместе, они рядом.

Итак, может быть, Вы хотите начать? Или сначала я ознакомлю Вас с моим взглядом на ситуацию в заливе.

М.С. Горбачев. Я согласен послушать сначала Вас, господин президент. (В шутку добавил): видите, как быстро со мной можно договориться.
Дж. Буш. Хорошо, тогда сразу к делу.

Видимо, до настоящего времени у нас с вами получается хорошее сотрудничество по данному вопросу. Мы понимаем, что сначала для Советского Союза и для вас лично не легко было занять такую позицию, так как у вас с Ираком имеются давно сложившиеся взаимоотношения. Если посмотреть на ситуацию в более широком плане, то я вижу реальную возможность возникновения нового мирового порядка. Именно так - из этого кризиса, из этой трагедии вырисовываются и новые возможности.

Но в основе этого нового мирового порядка должен лежать вполне определенный принцип: Нельзя допустить, чтобы Саддам Хусейн извел выгоду из своей агрессии. Я не уверен, что он осознавал, что мы, Соединенные Штаты, полны решимости добиться этого. Из ряда источников мне известно, что он сомневается в своей решимости. Надеюсь, что вы постараетесь разубедить его в этом. Мы не смириемся с неудачей в наших усилиях, направленных на достижение целей, поставленных Организацией Объединенных Наций. Мы выработали стратегию, наделенную на это, и я считаю, что у этой стратегии хорошие шансы на успех.

В качестве средства достижения этой цели - добиться ухода Ирака из Кувейта и восстановления кувейтского руководства - мы предпочитаем санкции. Я не хотел бы, чтобы произошла эскалация конфликта. Я не хочу применения военной силы. Я знаю, что вы согласны с таким подходом. Однако Саддам Хусейн должен понимать, что, если он не уйдет из Кувейта, мы готовы прибегнуть к силе. Сохранение статус-кво неприемлемо. Между тем, сейчас Саддам Хусейн фактически осуществляет демонтаж Кувейта.

Что касается отношения ко всему этому у нас в Америке, то американский народ, конгресс США поддержат меня. Особое возмущение вызывают действия Саддама Хусейна в отношении его в чем не повинных
гражданских лиц, в числе которых, возможно, и советские граждане. Если у вас будет контакт с ним, то я прошу вас довести до него сведения следующие: использование ни в чем не повинных людей в качестве "шита" не заставит меня ни на йоту изменить нашу политику. Я считаю, что такие действия могли бы стать основанием для проведения судебного процесса типа Нюрнбергского.

Мне хотелось бы, чтобы наше обсуждение дримаси в Персидском заливе было углубленным и обстоятельным. Надеюсь, что в итоге этого обсуждения вы сможете сказать Саддаму Хусейну, что если в конце концов страна, имеющая войска в регионе (в таких стран сейчас уже 23), вынуждены будут прибегнуть к силе для ликвидации последствий агрессии Ирака, то вы поддержите такие усилия. Возможно, вам будет трудно занять такую позицию, однако я приветствовал бы, если бы вы сочли это возможным.

Не могу не сказать вам о том, какое ощущение беспокойство вызывает у меня положение американцев, находящихся в нашем посольстве в Кувейте.

И еще два момента. Когда мы летели сюда, то журналисты спрашивали меня в самолете: попросите ли Вы Горбачева направить войска в регион? Я сказал, что у нас нет планов обращаться с такой просьбой, однако позволите мне заверить вас, что если вы примете такое решение, то Соединенные Штаты будут это приветствовать.

Второй момент, видимо, особенно важен для вас. Мы не стремимся к тому, чтобы американские войска оставались в Заливе на постоянной основе. За американским присутствием в Заливе не стоит подобных намерений. Если Саддам Хусейн останется у власти, то любые механизмы, выработанные для того, чтобы гарантировать от повторения агрессии и от возможного применения ядерного оружия, будут не американскими, а международными. У нас, повторяю, нет
планов в прямой или косвенной форме сохранять американские войска в районе Залива. Скажу вам откровенно: американцы не поддерживают таких планов.

Хочу также затронуть один трудный, деликатный момент. Он имеет отношение к тому, как смотрят на ситуацию американцы. Речь идет о советских военных советниках в Ираке. Мы знаем, что их число невелико. Однако, если с учетом сложной они будут введены из Ирака, то это произведет очень хорошее впечатление на мировое общественное мнение и особенно на общественное мнение в США.

А теперь, чтобы выложите все ми кареты на стол, хочу сказать следующее. На протяжении многих лет, в годы "холодной войны", политика США заключалась в том, что Советский Союз не должен играть какой-либо роли на Ближнем Востоке. Разумеется, Советский Союз был согласен с такой линией, был недоволен этой позицией США. И хотя я убежден, что для Саддама было бы большей победой, если бы он смог привлечь к кризис, вызванный его агрессией, проблематику арабо-иранского конфликта, хочу добавить: прежняя концепция, прежний подход США к участию Советского Союза в ближневосточных делах сейчас изменилась. Тот новый порядок, который, как я надеюсь, может будет создан после всех этих перипетий, предполагает, что Соединенные Штаты и Советский Союз будут прилагать более позитивные совместные усилия для урегулирования не только этой проблемы, но и остальных проблем Ближнего Востока.

И, наконец, последнее. Чем ближе сужаются критерии позиции к концу сегодняшнего дня, тем более благоприятными будут перспективы нового мирового порядка, развития советско-американских отношений. А разумеется, прежде всего скорейшего урегулирования данного кризиса, ликвидации последствий агрессии Саддама Хусейна. Господин Президент,
я обращаясь к Вам как к уважаемому другу, как к равному, как к важному партнеру и участнику событий, роль которого весьма важна. Давайте смотреть в будущее, понимая, что речь идет не только об этой проблеме, но об очень больших вещах. Какие бы небольшие разночтения ни имелись в наших подходах — и надо сказать, что благодаря усилиям советской стороны в рамках Организации Объединенных Наций эти различия значительно сужились — очень важно, чтобы на предстоящей пресс-конференции мы выступили вместе, с единым позиций. Во вторник и буду обращаться по телевидению к американскому народу. Я хочу, чтобы тот моих заявлений был позитивным, оптимистическим. Я хочу сказать, что мы перевернули страницу "холодной войны", покончили с ней раз и навсегда, как это изображено на карикатуре, которую Вы мне подарили.

М.С. Горбачев. Эта карикатура мне кажется очень удачной. Ее автор — наш старейший карикатурист Абрамов.

Дж. Руш. Она займет место в Кемп-Дэвиде вместе с картой, которую Вы мне когда-то подарили, часами и другими сувенирами.

М.С. Горбачев. Господин президент, я очень ценю доверительность и масштабность тех суждений, которыми Вы поделились со мной сейчас.

Дж. Руш. Мы переживаем сейчас тяжелый кризис. Это тяжелое испытание для тех позитивных достижений, которых мы добились в последние время в развитии международных отношений, в изменении характера отношений между СССР и США, в приятии им прочности и устойчивости. Я, конечно, не забываю, что означает кризис в Персидском заливе сам по себе, каковы его масштабы и связанные с ним опасности. Но думаю, здесь есть нечто большее. Если мы не сможем справиться с этим конфликтом, то потеряю будет очень многое.

Вопрос стоит так: можем ли мы действовать на новом этапе мировой политики, в которой мы выступили после окончания "холодной войны", а главное — как мы будем действовать? Это серьезный вопрос, о котором надо много думать. Фактически мы стоим перед глобальным выбором.
Вы говорите о новом порядке. Действительно, мы должны жить по-новому, по-новому строить отношения. Цена очень велика. Как я говорил, если бы не было Мальты, если бы не было нынешнего уровня отношений и между нами, то процессы, которые развернулись во Восточной Европе и в связи с объединением Германии, создали бы ситуацию похожую кризису в Персидском заливе.

Ев. Бер. Совершенно верно.

В.С. Гorbачев. Учитывая уровень военного противостояния, имевшегося в Европе, могла бы завариться такая каша, которую мы, кольштей, не расплескали бы. И вот сейчас мы стоим перед не менее сложным испытанием.

Вы, наверное, согласитесь, что события в Восточной Европе, германские дела были более трудными для нас, чем для США. Я Вам скажу откровенно, что потребовались колоссальные усилия, огромное напряжение, политической воли дня-вечер, чтобы буквально перешагнуть через себя, преодолеть старые подходы, казавшиеся незыблемыми, действовать так, как это требовало изменяющаяся реальность.

Мне до сих пор приходится в различных форумах у нас в стране разъяснять эту нашу позицию, доказывать необходимость нового мышления, новых подходов к тому, что происходит в мире, убеждать людей в правильности наших-политических шагов, внутренних, и за рубежом. Это не всегда легко, тем более, что на Западе есть люди, которые подбрасывают тех же бумаги, основанной на старом мышлении, который осложняет нашу позицию. И тем не менее в подавляющем своем большинстве наше общество понимает позицию советского руководства.

В нынешней ситуации в Персидском заливе в более сложном положении оказались Соединенные Штаты. Я все это хорошо понимаю, может
быть, лучше, чем даже кое-кто в США. Мне кажется, я теперь уже неплохо знаю вашу страну, особенно ваше общественное мнение. Люди ожидает от президента быстрых побед. То же самое, кажется, и у нас. Люди требуют сильных, решительных действий. Даже в таком огромном деле, как наша перестройка, требующая времени, колоссальных усилий, многие ждут быстрых результатов. Так что я понимаю Ваше положение.

В этих сложных условиях самое главное сохранить ту новую систему отношений, сотрудничество между нашими странами, которые у нас сложились. Мы видим трудность Вашего положения как Президента, открывшего говоря, чувствуем свое сопричастность с тем, что Вы делаете, и переживаем за Вас. Очень важно, что мы откликнулись от прежнего подхода, предполагавшего, что чем хуже для США, тем лучше для Советского Союза и, наоборот, чем хуже для Советского Союза, тем лучше США.

Дж.Буш. Согласен.

М.С. Горбачев. Я говорил об этом на днях сенатору Донду, Вашему другу, и, как я понимаю, соратнику по республиканской партии. То, что мы делаем сейчас в Советском Союзе, нужно вам, но наш успех нужен и вам. Поэтому что в том мире, который возникает сейчас, одним Соединенным Штатам не справиться. Нужна такая ось, придающая устойчивость изящным процессам, как советско-американское сотрудничество. Нужно, чтобы и Советский Союз, и Соединенные Штаты были сильными, уверенными в себе государствами. У Вас не должно быть сомнений, что именно такова наша позиция, что она не изменилась.

Мы без колебаний осудили агрессию Ирака против Кувейта.

Во мне строго выполняется резолюция Совета Безопасности ООН. Должен сказать, правда, что на начальном этапе конфликта у нас возникли
и определенные трудности, когда мы сначала приняли решение, а потом поставили нас в известность.

Декабрь. О каком решении Вы говорите?

М.С. Горбачев. Я имел в виду решение о направлении американских войск в регион. Ведь мы узнали об этом уже когда эти силы пришли в движение. Я не хочу сказать, что это изменило наш политический подход. Но это несколько осложнило положение. Наверное, это произошло потому, что наши новые отношения еще формируются.

Декабрь. Это интересное замечание. Когда мы направили в регион свои войска, то сделали это по приглашению Саудовской Аравии. Постановление было очень острым - иракские войска находились уже к югу от столицы Кувейта. Однако я принимал Ваши слова как конструктивную критику. Очевидно, мне следовало бы позвонить Вам тогда. Хочу заверить, что мы не хотели действовать за вашей спиной.

М.С. Горбачев. В целом, нам удавалось действовать сообща, плечом к плечу. Мы смогли интегрировать Совет Безопасности ООН, фактически весь мир в одно общество. И это сгладило достигнутое. В свете этого и присутствие США в регионе воспринимается по-новому.

Декабрь. Согласен.

М.С. Горбачев. Ясно, что мировое сообщество не может продвигаться к новому мирному периоду в своей истории без механизмов, призванных оградить этот мирный процесс от возможных проблем, без механизма реагирования на подобные конфликты. В данном случае вы взяли на себя главную миссию отпора иракской агрессии. И вот здесь я подхожу к центральному моменту этих рассуждений, за которыми последуют предложения о том, как действовать дальше.
Давайте посмотрим, к чему мы пришли, что достигнуто. Сната угроза, нависшая над Саудовской Аравией. Весь мир осудил агрессию Саддама Хусейна, приговорил его к позорному столбу. Защищена и сохранена инфраструктура, обеспечивающая мировые поставки нефти из враждебного источника. Так что американскому президенту, всему мировому сообществу есть что сказать. Достигнутые важные стратегические цели. Правда, не все. Не решена проблема Кувейта. Ее, конечно, необходимо решать.

У нас, как и у вас, обширная информация из региона и из всего мира в связи с этим кризисом. Для меня очень важно то, что Вы только что сказали. В моем взгляд, главное значение из сказанного Вами имеют три момента.

Во-первых, вы, как и мы, как практически и весь мир, хотите, чтобы проблема Кувейта была решена. Во-вторых, Вы сделали важное заявление относительно присутствия США в регионе, сказали, что не стремитесь к его сохранению на постоянной основе. И в-третьих, Вы сказали, что предпочитаете невоенное решение этой проблемы.

Я понимаю, что сейчас все мы ожидали как бы под давлением, и прежде всего Вы. От нас требуют решительных действий. Действительно, решительность нужна. Но если под этим подразумевается применение военной силы, то это опасный путь. До настоящего момента мы действовали совместно, на многосторонней основе. А односторонняя военная акция США приведет к последствиям, которые будут необратимыми для нас, как и для всех. Я не хочу, чтобы показалось, что я изрек какое-то истину. Но вот в чем состоит логика наших рассуждений. Если Ирак не нападет на Саудовскую Аравию или через Иорданию на Израиль, то инициатором военных действий будет выглядеть Соединенные Штаты. На наш взгляд, если Ирак будет сохранять
ситуацию, сохранять статус-кво и против него будут развернуты военные действия, то что произойдет?

Ваше мнение. Вы имеете в виду, если мы развернем военные действия без провокации со стороны Ирака?

М.С. Горбачев. Да. Посмотрите, как действует сейчас Ирак.

Маршал Ахромеев показывал мне эти планы расположения иракских войск. Основные контингенты дислоцируются на вдоль границы с Саудовской Аравией, а в глубине страны. И если будут начаты военные действия против этих сил, то это неизбежно приведет к большим потерям, к большим человеческим жертвам. А ведь в наших странах вечна память об Афганистане и Вьетнаме. Теперь это уже глубоко запало в сознание людей. И очень скоро начнут говорить, что президент выбрал не лучший вариант действий, что он ввязался в военные действия, которые ведут к тысячам, десяткам тысяч жертв. Нет, надо искать другие пути.

Я говорил о потерях, человеческих жертвах. Но нельзя забывать и об экономических последствиях. Если этот регион будет выведен из строя, то они будут колоссальными. Уже сегодня Саудовская Аравия задумывается, что ей просто финансируют присутствие в этой войск. И это сейчас, когда ее доходы от нефти возросли. А каковы будут финансовые потери, если этот регион будет по сути разрушен? Тут уже речь пойдет не о миллиардах, а о триллионах долларов. И все мы окажемся чьето знает где. Еще один момент. Даже сейчас мы видим и должны это признать, что Хусейн пользуется определенной симпатией некоторых людей в арабском мире, значительной части арабских масс. Для них он герой, борец за арабское дело, человек, который не боится противостоять Соединенным Штатам.

И если в этом регионе, где арабская нация располагает огромными
большие силы, которые сейчас находятся, как сказать, видна.
И буду с Вами откровенен. Наверное, и Вы улавливаете, что в ряде западных стран пропагандируется настороженность. И если события начнут развиваться в другом направлении, то они, ошибочно, должны будут дистанцироваться от вас.

Дж. Буш. Согласен.

М. С. Горбачев. И вот еще что важно. Может нарушиться единство в Совете Безопасности. Например, почти наверняка можно предположить, что изменится позиция Китая, а это страна, имеющая право вето. Думаю, и в американском обществе все это будет переживаться очень тяжело.

Поэтому надо искать другой путь.

Конечно, ясно, что просто так Саддам Хусейн из Кувейта не уйдет. И в недавних обменах мнениями со всеми нашими партнерами все подчеркивали необходимость самого строгого соблюдения эмбарго, введенного ООН. И надо сказать, что положение внутри Ирака меняется. В сложном положении находится и сам Саддам Хусейн. Какие бы заявления он делал, ему придется в конце концов трезво посмотреть на ситуацию.

У нас много сильных экспертов по арабскому миру и, в частности, по Ираку. Мы обсуждали с ними положение. Они провели подробный ситуационный анализ и пришли к совершенно определенному выводу. Единственная ситуация, при которой было бы приемлемым применение силы против Ирака, это если он совершит нападение на Саудовскую Аравию или Иорданию. При всех других ситуациях применение силы должно быть исключено.
Мы считаем, что такой подход позволит бы перехватить инициативу, лишить пропагандистских очков, которые он набирает в арабском мире, орлаха герою арабской нации. Если Саддам примет этот план, то можно будет выйти на комплексное решение. Но скорее всего, во всяком случае сначала, Саддам Хусейн отвергнет этот план. И все же, если это или какое-то подобное предложение будет выдвинуто, то мы с вами будем выглядеть уже в другом свете, действительно как сторонники политического решения. Да, мы проявили решимость и солидарность в осуждении агрессии, но в то же время мы даем шанс. Мы сбиваем Саддама Хусейна с намеченной позиции, из которой он извлекает определенные выгоды. Даём возможность начаться новому процессу, защищая резолюции ООН и всё то, чего уже удалось добиться.

Вот мои суждения, г-н Президент. Я не нысаться тут некоторых частностей, например, вопроса о советских специалистах в Ираке. Кстати, это не советники, а технические специалисты, которые обслуживают контракты между СССР и Ираком. И их число уже уменьшилось человек на 30-40. Если в начале конфликта их было 196 человек, то сейчас чтото около 150.

Дж.Рузв. Да, и у нас есть аналогичные специалисты в Ираке. В частности, сотрудники корпораций "Бектел" и "Ай-Би-Эм". Но мы пытаемся вывезти их из Ирака, поскольку считаем, что соответствующие контракты аннулируются с принятием резолюций ООН.

М.С. Горбачев. И мы соглашаем число наших людей в Ираке.

Кстати, на свертывании отношений с этой страной мы теряем 1 млрд. 200 млн.долл. Однако идем на это, потому что если бы мы поступили иначе, то были бы совсем другие потери. В заключение хочу сказать, что мы используем нашу роль и наше положение, исходя из принципиально-ных позиций. Мы совместно выступили за соответствующие резолюции
ООН, считаем необходимым, чтобы ситуация была возвращена к исходному положению, хотя, конечно, в процессе урегулирования возможны и какие-то изменения. Но, повторю, принципиальная наша позиция не меняется - мы за урегулирование, мы за солидарный подход.

Всё, г-н Президент, выскажите много интересных соображений, которые мы принимаем к сведению и на которые обязательно откликнемся. Действительно очень важно, чтобы результатом наших сегодняшних бесед была демонстрация сотрудничества между нашими странами, нашей совместной прилежности исправлению ситуации, восстановлению справедливости.

Но вот передо мной лежит текст вчерашнего выступления Саддама Хусейна, в котором он обращается к нам обоим. Он говорит: Ирак не вторгся ни в одну из наших стран. У Ирака нет намерения нанести ущерб нашим интересам. Дальше он говорит об истории Хувейта, о том, что это порождение британского колониализма. Он говорит: премьер-министра Ирака Саида, друг Запада, заявил в свое время англичанам, что Ирак не согласится с созданием этого государства. То же самое говорил премьер-министр Касим, друг Советского Союза.

Когда американские войска вторглись в Пакистан, говорит далее Хусейн, Совет Безопасности ООН хранил молчание, Советский Союз молчал. А сейчас, когда события происходят на арабской земле, когда речь идет с нашей проблеме, все вдруг протестуют. Белый дом и Кремль должны знать, что имеют дело с народом, который умеет постоять за себя. Дальше он говорит о единстве арабской нации, о том, что народ Ирака назван богом и заслуживает поддержки всех мусульман. А так далее.

Да, Буш. Всё это чушь верблюда.
Дж. Буш. Совершенно верно.

М. С. Горбачев. Учитывая уровень военного противостояния, имеющийся в Европе, могла бы завериться такая наша, которую мы, пожалуй, не расслабляли бы. И вот сейчас мы стоим перед не менее сложным испытанием.

Бы, наверное, согласитесь, что события в Восточной Европе, германские дела были более трудными для нас, чем для США. Я Вам скажу откровенно, что потребовались колоссальные усилия, огромное напряжение, политическая воля, чтобы буквально перепрыгнуть через себя, преодолеть старые подходы, казавшиеся незыблемыми, действовать так, как этого требовали изменившиеся реальности.

Мне до сих пор приходится у нас в стране разъяснять эту позицию, доказывать необходимость нового мышления, новых подходов к тому, что происходит в мире, убеждать в правильности таких шагов.

Это не всегда легко, тем более, что на Западе есть люди, которые поддерживали анализ, основанный на старом мышлении, и это осложняет мое положение...

В этих сложных условиях самое главное сохранить ту новую систему отношений, сотрудничество между нашими странами, которые у нас сложились. Мы видим трудность Вашего положения как Президента, откровенно говоря, чувствуем свою сопричастность с тем, что прежнего подхода, предлагавшего, что чем хуже для США, тем лучше для Советского Союза и, наоборот, чем хуже для Советского Союза, тем лучше для США...

Дж. Буш. Согласен.

М. С. Горбачев. Нужна такая ось, придающая устойчивость идущим процессам, как советско-американское сотрудничество. Нужно, чтобы и Советский Союз и Соединенные Штаты были сильными, уверенными в себе государствами. У Вас не должно быть сомнения, что именно такова наша позиция, что она не изменилась.
В целом, нам удалось действовать сообща, плечом к плечу. Мы смогли мобилизовать Совет Безопасности ООН, фактически всё мировое сообщество. И это огромное достижение. В свете этого и присутствие США в регионе воспринимается по-иному.

ДД.Буш. Согласен

М.С.Горбачев. Ясно, что мировое сообщество не может продвигаться к новому мирному периоду в своей истории без механизмов, призванных упорядочить этот мирный процесс обезопасить его от подобных проблем, без механизма реагирования на подобные конфликты. В данной ситуации я вижу на себя главную миссию отпора иракской агрессии...

Сейчас все мы оказались как бы под давлением, и прежде всего вы. От вас требуют решительных действий. Действительно, решительность нужна. Но если под этим подразумевается применение военной силы, это опасный путь. До настоящего момента мы действовали совместно, на многосторонней основе, а односторонняя военная акция США приведет к последствиям, которые будут неприемлемы для вас, как и для всех...

Нельзя согласиться с сохранением статус-кво. Нельзя допустить, чтобы агрессия принесла в этой агрессору. Но все наши эксперты считают, что нельзя загонять Саддама Хусейна в угол. Это не даст решения. Надо искать такой вариант, который позволит ему хотя бы частично спасти лицо. Такова реальность. Она неприемлема в нравственном отношении. Но мы должны действовать, исходя из реальностей положения, смотреть, какие варианты возможны, какие варианты осуществимы....
Господин президент, господин Джордж Буш, я обращаюсь к Вам как к другу. Надо выбирать. Выбирать из имеющихся вариантов, и я понимаю, что ассортимент невелик и неприятен. Но думаю, что если президент, который уже смог достичь главных стратегических целей США в этой ситуации, будет действовать на этой основе, чтобы избежать вторжения Америки в колоссальный конфликт, который может привести к разрушению структур, обеспечивающих поставки нефти для всего мира, то это будет рассматриваться как огромная победа, и я думаю, что все с этим согласятся. Конечно, сейчас вам подбрасывают идею о том, что на карту поставлен Ваш престиж и тому подобное. Но мы должны действовать мудро, действовать так, чтобы сохранить и людей, и нефть. Конечно, можно, как говорится, и пахнуть. Но надо выбирать. Мы действительно имеем дело с парадоксом, но именно поэтому надо дать ему и какой-то привкус. А в конечном счете, все выиграют, если будут предложены последствия агрессии, восстановлено международное право, восстановлена справедливость...

Член Дрезидентского совета академии Примаков, который давно его знает, утверждает, что Садам Хусейн не шизофреник, что это личность, с которой надо считаться. Конечно, прежде чем говорить с другими, может быть, следовало бы прокопать и его, както послать к нему, может быть, не посылая его в существо самого плана.

Дж.Буш. Я думаю, в любом случае надо стремиться прокопать его. У нас нет к нему доступа, и если бы, учтя и вторжение ваших отношений с Ираком, вы могли бы как-то прокопать его, то это было бы чрезвычайно конструктивно.
М. С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. В такие моменты, как нынешний, необходимы личные встречи для более углубленного обсуждения проблем.

Да, Буш. Хорошо. Сейчас Советский Союз и Соединенные Штаты продемонстрировали всему миру, что сегодня во время кризиса в Персидском заливе, они вместе, они рядом...

Хорошо, тогда сразу к делу.

Вплоть до настоящего времени у нас с вами получается хорошее сотрудничество по данному вопросу. Мы понимаем, что сначала для Советского Союза и для Вас лично нелегко было занять такую позицию, так как у вас с Ираком имеются давно сложившиеся взаимоотношения. Если посмотреть на ситуацию в более широком плане, то я вижу реальную возможность возникновения нового мирового порядка. Именно так — из этого кризиса, из этой трагедии вырисовывается и новые возможности.

Но в основе этого нового мирового порядка должен лежать вполне определенный принцип. Нельзя допустить, чтобы Саддам Хусейн извлек выгоду из своей агрессии...
Я не хочу применения военной силы. Я знаю, что мы согласны с такими пострадавшими. Однако Саддам Хусейн должен понимать, что, если он не уйдет из Кувейта, мы готовы прибегнуть к силе...

Я надеюсь, что в итоге этого обсуждения вы сможете сказать Саддаму Хусейну, что если в конечном итоге страны, имеющие войска в регионе (а таких стран сейчас уже 23), вынуждены будут прибегнуть к силе для ликвидации последствий агрессии Ирака, то вы поддержите такие усилия...

Когда мы поговорим о военном вопросе, то журналисты спросят у меня: поговорите ли вы с президентом Ирака? Я расскажу, что у нас нет планов с ним общаться. Однако позвольте мне заверить вас, что если вы примете такое решение, то Содружественные Штаты будут это приветствовать.

Чем ближе окажется наша позиция к концу сегодняшнего дня, тем больше благоприятными будут перспективы нового мирового порядка в развитии советско-американских отношений...

Господин Президент, я обращаюсь к вам как к уважаемому другу, как к равному, как к важному партнеру и участникам событий, роль которого весьма важна. Давайте смотреть в будущее, пожалуйста, что речь идет не только об этой проблеме, но об очень больших вещах. Какие бы небольшие различия ни имелись в наших подходах, - я налово сказать, что благодаря усилиям советской стороны в рамках Организации Объединенных Наций эти различия значительно снизились - очень важно, чтобы на предстоящей пресс-конференции мы выступили вместе, с единых позиций...
Я хочу сказать, что мы перевернули страницу "холодной войны", поставили её на свои места и заставили её, как это изображено на карикатуре, которую вы мне показали.

М. С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Эта карикатура мне кажется очень удачной. Её автор, наш старейший карикатурист Абрамов.

ЕСТЬ ЕЩЕ. Она займет место в Немецком вместе с маркой, которую вы мне когда-то подарили, часами и другими сувенирами.

М. С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Мы переживаем сейчас тяжелый кризис. Это тяжелое испытание для тех позитивных достижений, которых мы добились в последнее время в развитии международных отношений, в изменении характера отношений между СССР и США, в придании им прочности и устойчивости. Я, конечно, не забывая, что означает кризис в Персидском заливе сам по себе, наковы его масштабы и связанные с ним опасности. Но думая, здесь есть нечто большее. Если мы не сможем справиться с этим конфликтом, то потерям будет очень много.

Вопрос стоит так: можем ли мы действовать на новом этапе мировой политики, в которой мы вступили после окончания "холодной войны", а главное - как мы будем действовать? Это серьезный вопрос, о котором надо много думать. Фактически мы стоим перед глобальным выбором. Вы говорите о новом порядке. Действительно, мы должны заниматься по-новому, по-новому строить отношения. Цена очень велика. Как я говорил, если бы не было Мальты, если бы не было нового уровня отношений и между нами, то процессы, которые развернулись в Восточной Европе и в связи с объединением Германии, создали бы ситуацию похожую кризиса в Персидском заливе.
Дж. Буш. Совершенно верно.

М.С. Горбачев. Учитывая уровень военного противостояния, имеющийся в Европе, могла бы завериться такая каша, которую мы, пожалуй, не расслабили бы. И вот сейчас мы стоим перед не менее сложным испытанием.

Во, наверное, согласитесь, что события в Восточной Европе, германские дела были более трудными для нас, чем для США. Я Вам скажу откровенно, что потребовались колоссальные усилия, огромное напряжение, политическая воля, чтобы буквально перешагнуть через себя, преодолеть старые подходы, казавшиеся незыблемыми, действовать так, как этого требовали изменяющаяся реальность.

Мне до сих пор приходится у нас в стране разжигать эту позицию, доказывать необходимость нового мышления, новых подходов к тому, что происходит в мире, убеждать в правильности таких шагов.

Это не всегда легко, тем более, что на Западе есть люди, которые подбрасывают анализы, основанные на старом мышлении, и это осложняет мое положение...

В этих сложных условиях самое главное сохранить ту новую систему отношений, сотрудничество между нашими странами, которые у нас сложились. Мы видим трудность Вашего положении как Президента, откровенно говоря, чувствуем свою сопричастность с тем, что происходит. Понимаем, что с Вашего подхода, предполагающего, что чем лучше для США, тем хуже для Советского Союза и, наоборот, чем хуже для Советского Союза, тем лучше для США...

Дж. Буш. Согласен.

М.С. Горбачев. Нужна такая ось, придающая устойчивость таким процессам, как советско-американское сотрудничество. Нужно, чтобы и Советский Союз, и Соединенные Штаты были сильными, уверенными в себе государствами. У Вас не должно быть сомнений, что именно такова наша позиция, что она не изменилась.
В целом, нам удалось действовать сообща, плечом к плечу. Мы смогли мобилизовать Совет Безопасности ООН, фактически всё мировое сообщество. И это огромное достижение. В свете этого и присутствие США в регионе воспринимается по-иному.

М.С. Горбачёв. Ясно, что мировое сообщество не может продвигаться к новому мирному периоду в своей истории без механизмов, призванных оградить этот мирный процесс. Без механика реагирования на подобные конфликты. В данной ситуации мы взяли на себя главную миссию отпора иракской агрессии...

Сейчас все мы оказались как бы под давлением, и прежде всего вы. От вас требуют решительных действий. Действительно, решительность нужна. Но если под этим подразумевается применение военной силы, то это опасный путь. До настоящего момента мы действовали совместно, на многосторонней основе. А односторонняя военная акция США приведет к последствиям, которые будут неприемлемы для вас, как и для всех...

Нельзя согласиться с сохранением статус-кво. Нельзя допустить, чтобы агрессия принесла выгоду агрессору. Во все наши эксперты считают, что нельзя загонять Саддама Хусейна в угол. Это не даст решения. Надо искать такой вариант, который позволит ему хотя бы частично спасти лицо. Такова реальность. Она неприятна в нравственном отношении. Но мы должны действовать, исходя из реальностей положения, смотреть, какие варианты возможны, какие варианты осуществимы....
Господин президент, господин Джордж Буш, я обращаюсь к Вам как к другу. Надо выбирать. Выбирать из имеющихся вариантов, и я понимаю, что ассортимент невелик и неприятен. Но думаю, что если президент, который уже снег достиг главных стратегических целей США в этой ситуации, будет действовать на этой основе, чтобы избежать впутывания Америки в колоссальный конфликт, который может привести к разрушению структур, обеспечивающих поставки нефти для всего мира, то это будет рассматриваться как огромная победа, и я думаю, что все с этим согласятся. Конечно, сейчас вам подбрасывают идею о том, что на карту поставлен Ваш престиж и тому подобное. Но мы должны действовать хладно, действовать так, чтобы сохранить людей, и нефть. Конечно, можно, как говорится, и шарахнуть. Но надо выбирать. Мы действительно имеем дело с паразитом, но именно поэтому надо дать ему и какой-то приник. А в конечном счете, все выиграет, если будет преодолены последствия агрессии, восстановлена международное право, восстановлена справедливость.

Член Президентского совета академик Примаков, который давно его знает, утверждает, что Саддам Хусейн не шизофреник, что это личность, с которой надо считаться. Конечно, прежде чем говорить с другими, может быть, следовало бы пропустить к его, кого-то послать к нему, может быть, не посылая его в существо самого плана.

Дж. Буш. Я думаю, в любом случае надо стремиться пропустить его. У нас нет к нему доступа, и если бы, учитывая историю наших отношений с Ираком, мы могли бы как-то пропустить его, то это было бы чрезвычайно конструктивно.
ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ
М.С. Горбачев с Дж. Бушем
в составе делегаций

9 сентября 1990 года
(вторая половина дня, Хельсинки)

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Как мы построим эту беседу?

Дж. БУШ. Прежде всего, я хотел бы поделиться с нашими коллегами своей оценкой нашего утреннего разговора один на один. Считаю, что у нас состоялся очень хороший обсуждение. Я, в частности, со всей серьезностью отнесся к пожеланию Президента СССР, чтобы трудная ситуация в Горном zaleе была разрешена мирными средствами.

Крайне важно, что нам удалось согласовать позиции в этот ответственный момент. Я оценяю подготовку совместного заявления по иракской агрессии как огромный успех нашей встречи, крупное достижение наших двух стран и всего мира. В этой связи предлагаю сейчас окончательно отредактировать проект заявления, а потом перейти к другим вопросам. Важно в этом контексте, что я не готов к обсуждению деталей разоружения, тематики. Могу лишь подтвердить то, что сказал Президент СССР утром: мы по-прежнему твердо держим курс на скорейшее завершение работы над соглашением по общим вооружениям в Европе и договором по СНВ.

Я со своей стороны подготавлю наших переговорщиков.

Убежден, что обе стороны стремятся к результативному завершению этих важных разоружающих переговоров, однако некоторые, в основном технические, вопросы нас еще держат. Пусть эксперты поднимут над ними голову.
Радуюсь, я готов продолжить разговор и по европейской проблематике, обо всем, что Вас интересует в связи с деятельностью НАТО, объединением Германии, подготовкой общевероятной встречи в верхах. Думаю, что здесь в Хельсинки имеет смысл затронуть и вопросы экономического сотрудничества США и СССР. Другими словами, какой-то заранее фиксированной повестки дня у нас нет, и я открыт для обсуждения любых проблем.

М.С. ГОРЕБЕВ. Прежде всего, разрешите поприятствовать Ваших ближайших сотрудников - лица тут собрались все знакомые.

Согласен с оценкой, которую Президент дал нашему утреннему разговору: это было очень содержательное обсуждение. Могу констатировать, что мы с Президентом едини в том, как важно взаимодействовать в этот ответственный момент. Фактически кризис в Персидском заливе - это первое тяжелое испытание для наших отношений после "холодной войны". И очень важно, что мы оказались на высоте ответственности, сотрудничаем и сплотили мировое сообщество на принципиальных позициях противодействия агрессии. Это очень большое достижение.

Достаточно вспомнить ситуацию 1967 года, когда мы по сути оказались на грани войны. Ее невозможно сравнить с нынешним положением. Теперь в главном мы канули в событии, хотя, понятно, и не можем полностью управлять ими.

С Президентом мы сегодня говорили, что уже удалось достигнуть важных стратегических целей: мы осудили агрессию и содействовали объединению на этой платформе Совета Безопасности ООН и мирового сообщества в целом; мы преградили дорогу для новых безнаказанных акций Ирака; принято жесткое эмбарго, и оно уже начала работать; удалось - и может быть, это самое главное - сохранить важнейшие ресурсы для мировой экономики, предотвратить ог-
ромные лядские потери. Твердо подчеркиваю: хотя кое-кто и насме- тает страсти, поднимают мысль о нашей "нерешительности", удалось добиться крупных результатов. Теперь на этой базе мы можем переходить к следующему этапу, добиваться новых конкрет- ных подвигов, прежде всего восстановления независимости Ку- вейта и неукоснительного выполнения резолюции 660 Совета Безопас- ности ООН.

В общем, теперь мы можем действовать не с позиции слабости, а на основе серьезных достижений. Сегодня мы провели весьма плодотворный анализ различных вариантов развития событий и договорились продолжить эти обсуждения.

В том, что касается разоруженных дел, я присоединяюсь к Президенту и также считаю, что у нас есть все возможности для завершения работы над соглашением по обычным вооружениям и над договором по СНВ, что позволило бы в намеченные сроки провести запланированные форумы. Пусть наши министры и переговорщики активно прорабатывают в оставшиеся время.

А теперь позвольте перейти к нашим замечаниям по тексту проекта совместного заявления.

(Далее состоялось редактирование совместного заявления).

Дж.У. И я очень доволен предложенной работой, верю, что это совместное заявление окажет сильное воздействие на ситуа- цию в Персидском заливе, на мировое общественное мнение.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Согласен. Важно и то, что помимо новых эле- ментов, в этом документе усилены и уже имеющиеся области согласия.
В этих условиях вашего понимания наших проблем уже мало — нужна помощь. Мы нуждаемся в дополнительных финансовых возможностях для маневра на этапе вхождения в унок. Запад должен помочь нам товарами и в финансовом отношении. Цифры тут не очень большие, причем просьмы мы не безвозмездно, все вернем в вернем с процентами. Однако ясность в отношении наших намерений нам нужна уже сейчас, до 1 октября.

Надеюсь, когда г-н Бейкер приедет к нам, то мы сумеем конкретизировать подходы к сотрудничеству и просить американскую позицию. Ведь подход США указывает курс и другим западным странам. Настал момент, когда нужна ясность.

Дж.Буш. Я тоже за конкретику. В некоторых областях мы готовы двигаться немедленно. В частности, я считаю, что огромный потенциал заложен в намеченному сотрудничестве по энергетическим вопросам. Мы готовы передать вам технологию, в которой раньше по понятным причинам отказывали. Госсекретарь Бейкер имеет поручение обсудить эти вопросы в деталях с министром Шеварднадзе. Но и мы с Вами можем их сейчас затронуть. В частности, меня интересует, что вам нужно в плане помощи уже сейчас? Скажу сразу: лишних денег у нас нет. Конгресс никогда не даст Президенту "карты-блиц" на миллиардные вложения в условиях, когда дефицит федерального бюджета приближается к рекордной отметке.

Вместе с тем рост доверия между нами способствует сотрудничеству. Скажу прямо, это наше заявление по Ираку является огромную помощь администрации в продвижении проектов экономического сотрудничества с СССР. Не опять-таки, не хочу создавать ложного впечатления, что я свободен здесь в своих действиях. У нас есть большие ограничения.
ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ

М.С. Горбачев с Президентом Франции Ф. Мitterаном

29 октября 1990 года, Рамбутан

Ф. МИТТЕРАН. Позвольте выразить удовлетворение в связи с тем, что принимая Вас в ином, нежели Елисейский дворец, месте, которое позволит Вам взглянуть на Францию несколько с иной стороны.

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Сегодня утром в 5 часов была получена телеграмма от Е.Н. Примакова. Он сообщает, что в воскресенье, 28 октября, у него состоялись разговоры практически со всем руководством Ирака, а затем в течение часа беседа один на один с Саддамом Хусейном.

Как следует из беседы с иракским президентом, у него все еще теплится надежда на появление хотя бы небольшой трещины в одном фронте постоянных членов Совета Безопасности ООН.

Примаков сказал Хусейну, что вряд ли можно рассчитывать на "пакетное решение" сложившейся ситуации в регионе по принципу жесткой увязки между регулированием кувейтского кризиса и решением других проблем этого региона.

Доблестно, что и на этом этапе конфликта в Персидском заливе Хусейн твердо заявляет, что, будучи приверженцем поиску мирных путей выхода из создавшегося положения, он в то же время не соглашается ни на какой вариант, предполагающий его капитуляцию. Более того, он настойчиво отвергает любые варианты, могущие означать его публичное увильжение в связи с выводом иракских войск из Кувейта.

Складывается впечатление, что у Хусейна возникла своего рода "идея фикс". Он убежден, что против Ирака сложился заговор,
Если советский и французский президенты будут определять, например, в ходе пресс-конференции свою позицию по вопросу о кризисе вокруг Кувейта, то было бы естественно сказать несколько слов о заложниках. Мы должны будем подчеркнуть желательность мирного урегулирования, что также является вполне логичным. Таким образом, до этого пункта у нас нет разницы с выдвинутым Хусейном проектом. Но очевидно, что он предлагает эти элементы только с одной целью — сделать так, чтобы мы согласились с концом его варианта и осудили применение силы. На это мы никак не можем пойти. Наша позиция неизменна. Урегулирование должно состояться на основе принципов ООН.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Когда Примakov, реагируя на вышеуказанное предложение, сказал, что вряд ли можно ожидать принятия такой формулировки со стороны президентов СССР и Франции, крашкие собеседники заявили: мы готовы обсуждать любые предложения советского и французского президентов и готовы действовать в духе открытости.

Ф.МИТТЕРАН. Говоря о позиции США в этом вопросе, следует отметить отличие в тоне, стиле, конкретных путях по сравнению с нашими подходами. Но по существу вопроса разногласий с американцами у нас нет. Мы считаем, что надо сохранять такой образ действий, что, естественно, не означает какого-то низкопоклонства. Если говорить о тоне, стиле, то он должен характеризоваться хладнокровием и спокойствием.

М.С.ГОРБАЧЕВ. Я бы согласился с таким подходом. Но это не для огласки.

Ф.МИТТЕРАН. Согласен.
М.С. ГОРЕЧЕВ. Хусейн по-прежнему пытается использовать сложившееся за долгие годы особое отношение между его страной и СССР и Францией, чтобы сделать трещину, щель в общем фронте постоянных членов СБ ООН. Не думаю, что это сдвигает с его дальнобойности.

Вы правы: если сейчас на пресс-конференции нам будут заданы соответствующие вопросы — а мне лично журналисты устроит допрос в связи с миссией Примакова, — то во главу угла нам следовало бы поставить приверженность совместным действиям согласно коллективно принятым решениям СБ ООН в отношении иракской агрессии.

Я получил письмо от Джорджа Буша по вопросу о кризисе в Персидском заливе, а также письмо Маргарет Тэтчер, которое было передано мне вчера по возвращении от Вас из Еписейского дворца. Тэтчер написала короткое, но жесткое письмо. Буш и Тэтчер, на отвергая значения миссия Примакова, в то же время высказываются в том духе, что она в какой-то степени ослабляет единство коллективных действий членов СБ ООН.

Это совершенно не отвечает действительности. Я всегда писал о том, что нельзя давать никакого предложения Ираку передать на появление рассказа, любого ослабления единой позиции СБ ООН в отношении его агрессии против Кувейта. Миссия Примакова важна в том плане, что она выявила наличие шансов продвижения в сторону политического урегулирования кризиса, о чем я Вам говорил еще вчера. Иного пути быть не может, так как единственная альтернатива этому — война.
Вы правы, мы должны проявлять хладнокровие, максимальное чувство ответственности, серьезно анализировать все возможности, позволяющие исключить военный путь. Военный вариант нанес бы удар по всем позитивным процессам в международных отношениях, вызвал бы огромные потрясения в регионе, которое отраженной войной удержало бы и по всем нам, внесло бы глубокий раскол между развитыми странами и арабским миром. Народы не простили бы этого.

Вновь обрату Ваше внимание на то, что позиция Хусейна сейчас уже не та, какой она была всего две — три недели назад.

Ф. МИТТЕРАМ. Это чувствуется.

И. С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Действовать надо решительно, последовательно, проявлять единство, всечески стремиться избегать сплелия и военному решению.

Ф. МИТТЕРЭМ. Такой вариант трудно исключить априори. Нельзя создавать опасных иллюзий. Как я говорил вчера, война неизбежна, если не удастся перехватить волю Хусейна и если Буш и Тэтчер не пожелают ничего слушать.

Что же делать? Если говорить образно, то, когда надо перелезть через, на первый взгляд, совершенно гладкую стену, следует найти какой-то выступ, шероховатость, за которую можно было бы уцепиться. Другими словами, задача состоит в определении правильной тактики.

На мой взгляд, следует определить краткосрочный и долгосрочный планы.

Долгосрочной перспективой должно стать обсуждение и решение всего комплекса проблем Ближнего и Среднего Востока, что явилось бы завершением всего процесса урегулирования. Это необходимо для
К сожалению, пока ни Соединенные Штаты, ни Великобритания не готовы согласиться с необходимостью переходной фазы в решении кувейтского вопроса. Правда, пока я с ними об этом не говорил. Необходимо согласованность их действий с действиями Франции и СССР для того, чтобы обеспечить единство в СБ ООН. Таким образом у нас имеется определенный козырь, поле для маневра. Однако я с осторожностью отмечаю участвовавшие в последнее время в США заявления о том, что с их точки зрения статья 51 Устава ООН достаточна для того, чтобы самостоятельно, не обращаясь в Совет Безопасности, применить силу. В этой статье говорится о праве каждого государства "на индивидуальную или коллективную самооборону", т.е. на законную самооборону и обращение к другому государству за помощью в этих целях. В данном конкретном случае речь может идти о применении Соединенными Штатами силы в связи с просьбой со стороны Саудовской Аравии. Получается, что США самостоятельно, без обращения в СБ ООН, могут решить на начало войны. Если можно так выразиться, он становится "хозяйской войной". В этом случае мы требуем козыря, о котором я говорил и который вынуждал США обращаться в СБ ООН для получения согласия на их действия. В таких условиях с ними, понятно, трудно говорить о возможных территориальных уступках, да и по другим вопросам.

М.С. Горбачев. Где начинается наш разговор с США и Великобритании? Как следует из упомянутых мною писем Буша и Тэтчер, мы едны в оценке ситуации. Однако они считают неприемлемой такую развилку, которая позволяла бы Хусейну снести лица и избежать уничтожения. Получается, что остается два варианта: попытаться устранить Хусейна с политической арены, что, на мой взгляд, по ряду причин нерационально, или встать на путь войны. Надо смотреть правде в глаза - если мы ничего Хусейну не дадим, он поедет на крайности.
Почему, продолжая дозволить вам аргументацию до Хусейна, предостерегайте его против курса на провоцирование применения силы, в то же время работать с нашими партнерами в том духе, о котором мы с вами сейчас говорим. Наши партнеры начинают терять терять хладнокровие, я считаю, что это неправильно. Ведь предпринимающиеся нами действия уже позволяют выиграть первую битву. Мы сохранили единство перед лицом этого бандитского акта. Наши шаги уже начали давать определенные результаты, влиять на позиции Хусейна.

Ф. МИТТЕРАН. Вы правы.

М.С. ГОРБАЧЕВ. Следует и дальше действовать в этом ключе с учетом того, что начали вырисовываться шансы политического урегулирования, правила, пока эти шансы весьма расплывчаты. Мы должны дозволить до наших партнеров по Совету Безопасности идею необходимости следовать именно этой линии. Хусейна же следует убеждать в том, что времени у него осталось очень мало, что события могут пойти по наихудшему для него пути, что он должен задействовать не на успех своих маневров, а проявлять реализм и стремление к политическому урегулированию.

Если исходить из возможности политического урегулирования, то мне представляются правильными Ваши размышления о краткосрочном и долгосрочном планах. Надо исключить различные политические способы и механизмы развязки. Однако наиболее реальным представляется путь с привлечением арабских организаций. Совещание арабских стран могло бы сформулировать свои идеи и требования, обращенные к Хусейну, тогда все проблемы резались бы легче – и вопрос о судьбе Кувейта, и вопрос о восстановлении там власти, хотя
MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Notetaker: Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff
Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse

The Oval Office

The President: Helmut! I am sitting in a meeting with members of our Congress and am calling at the end of this historic day to wish you well.

Chancellor Kohl: Things are going very, very well. I am in Berlin. There were one million people here last night at the very spot where the Wall used to stand -- and where President Reagan called on Mr. Gorbachev to open this gate. Words can't describe the feeling. The weather is very nice and warm, fortunately. There were large crowds of young people. Eighty percent were under thirty. It was fantastic.

A short time ago there was enormous applause when our President said that our gratitude was owed especially to our Allied friends and above all our American friends. I share that view. When the parliamentary declaration is made, it will say that all American Presidents from Harry Truman all the way up to our friend George Bush made this possible. I would like to thank you again for all your support for us.

The President: It was covered widely on American television. America is proud to have stood with you through these negotiations, and we identify with the hopes of the German people. I have to run to another meeting, but I wanted you to know what pride we have in standing by the German people.

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you very much.

The President: Good-bye, my friend.

Chancellor Kohl: Tell your Congressmen good wishes and thanks.

-- End of Conversation --
The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Year

National Intelligence Estimate

This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-18-90

The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Year

Information available as of 1 November 1990 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

November 1990
The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Year

- No end to the Soviet domestic crisis is in sight, and there is a strong probability that the situation will get worse—perhaps much worse—during the next year.

- The economy is certain to decline, and an economic breakdown is a possibility. The central government will be weaker, and some republics will be further along the road to political independence.

- The current situation is so fragile that a combination of events—such as the death of Gorbachev or Yeltsin, a precipitous economic decline, massive consumer unrest, or an outbreak of widespread interethnic violence—could lead to anarchy and/or the intervention of the military into politics.

- The certain continued diffusion of power will make the conduct of Soviet foreign policy more difficult and complicate relations with the West. At a minimum, Western countries will be confronted with more urgent pleas for economic assistance—especially from republic leaders, who will also push for political recognition.
### Figure 1
Scenarios for the Next Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Factors That Could Lead to Scenario</th>
<th>Rough Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration Short of Anarchy</td>
<td>Failure to agree upon and implement effectively a far-reaching marketization plan; or the broad resistance of the population to such a course. Failure of the center and the republics to move to new, mutually acceptable political and economic relations. Inability of political institutions to adapt to changing political realities; and ineffectiveness of new democratically elected leaders in governing. Continued, though diminished, viability of the central government.</td>
<td>Close to even</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>A precipitous decline of the economy. Massive social protests or labor strikes that proved to be beyond the security services' ability to control. The assassination of Gorbachev or Yeltsin. The complete breakdown of relations between the center and the republics—especially the Russian Republic.</td>
<td>1 in 5 or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention (ranging from a coup to civilian-directed martial law)</td>
<td>Breakdown of key elements of the national economy, such as the transportation system. Violence against central government institutions. A situation approaching collapse of central authority. Anarchy.</td>
<td>1 in 5 or less overall; much lower for a coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Light at the End of the Tunnel&quot;</td>
<td>Substantial progress toward: □ Developing a new set of relationships allowing the republics to deal constructively with each other and the center. □ The filling of the political power vacuum by new political institutions and parties. □ Establishing new economic relations based on the market.</td>
<td>1 in 3 or less</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These scenarios are analytical constructs describing overall directions the USSR could take over the next year and are not mutually exclusive.*
Key Judgments

The USSR is in the midst of a historic transformation that threatens to tear the country apart. The old Communist order is in its death throes. But its diehards remain an obstructive force, and new political parties and institutions have yet to prove their effectiveness. The erosion of the center’s influence, coupled with the republics’ assertion of sovereignty, is creating a power vacuum. Gorbachev has amassed impressive power on paper, but his ability to use it effectively is increasingly in doubt. Meanwhile, economic conditions are steadily deteriorating.

Whether the Soviet Union over the next year can begin to find a way out of its crisis will hinge, above all, on two variables:

- **The performance of the economy.** The question is not whether the economy will decline further but how steep that decline will be. A precipitous drop would make crafting a new center-republic relationship next to impossible and markedly increase the likelihood of serious societal unrest and a breakdown of political authority.

- **The Gorbachev-Yeltsin relationship.** Because of the Russian Republic’s disproportionate size and influence in the union and Yeltsin’s role as the most prominent leader of the new political forces emerging throughout the country, the more open the confrontation between the two leaders, the more destabilizing it would be.

In our view, prospects for positive movement in each variable are low. Gorbachev’s economic reform plan, while endorsing marketization, falls far short of what is needed to stem the economy’s decline. And the Yeltsin-Gorbachev clash over the plan bodes ill for both economic and center-republic reform.

For these reasons, we believe that over the next year a scenario of “deterioration short of anarchy” is more likely than any of the other three scenarios that we consider possible (see table). There is, however, a significant potential for dramatic departures along the lines of the “anarchy” or “military intervention” scenarios.

In our most likely scenario, **deterioration short of anarchy**, the country’s economic, political, ethnic, and societal problems will continue to get worse at an accelerating rate. Gorbachev probably will remain president a year from now, but his authority will continue to decline. His ambivalence...
toward radical transformation of the system probably will continue to delay decisive action and dilute the effectiveness of efforts to implement market reform or negotiate a new union. Yeltsin's popularity and control over the Russian government will give him significant influence on the country's course over the next year. The different visions the two men have of Russia's and the USSR's future are likely to lead to more damaging political clashes. However, a combination of the remaining powers of the old order and the limited reforms the regime implements would prevent the entire system from disintegrating.

In view of the volatile situation that prevails in the USSR today, however, we believe that three other scenarios—each roughly a 1-in-5 probability—are also possible over the next year.

- An accelerating deterioration is unlikely to continue indefinitely and could during the next year become a free fall that would result in a period of anarchy—the breakdown of central political and economic order.

- The chances for military intervention in politics would increase markedly in a scenario where the country was on the verge of, or in, a state of anarchy. Military intervention could take several forms: a military coup against the constitutional order, rogue activity by individual commanders, or martial law ordered by Gorbachev to enforce government directives. Of these, Intelligence Community analysts believe a coup to be the least likely variant and a civilian-directed martial law the most likely.

- A "light at the end of the tunnel" scenario, where progress over the next year toward the creation of a new system outpaces the breakdown of the old, cannot be ruled out. There would be further progress toward marketization and pluralization in spite of continued economic decline and political turmoil.

Whichever scenario prevails, the USSR during the next year will remain inward looking, with a declining ability to maintain its role as a superpower. The domestic crisis will continue to preoccupy any Soviet leaders and prompt them, at a minimum, to seek to avoid direct confrontation with the West. But the particular foreign policies they pursue could vary significantly depending upon the scenario. Under the "deterioration short of anarchy" or "light at the end of the tunnel" scenarios, Moscow's Western orientation probably would be reflected in continued, possibly greater, Soviet willingness to compromise on a range of international issues.

Special requests to the West for consultations, technical assistance, emergency aid, and trade from the central and republic governments are certain to increase. Unless political conflict over who owns resources and
controls foreign trade is resolved, which is unlikely, both US governmental and private business relations with the USSR and its republics will be increasingly complicated.

An "anarchy" scenario would create precarious conditions for relations with the West and would present the United States with some difficult choices. If the situation evolved into civil wars, we would face competing claims for recognition and assistance. The prospects for the fighting to spill over into neighboring countries would increase. The West would be inundated with refugees, and there would be enormous uncertainties over who was in control of the Soviet military's nuclear weapons.

In a "military intervention" scenario, a military-dominated regime would take a less concessionary approach than Gorbachev's on foreign policy issues and pursue a tougher line on arms control issues and economic relations with Eastern Europe. A military regime, however, would be unable to restore Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and would be too busy attempting to hold the USSR together to resume a hostile military posture toward the West.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Judgments</th>
<th>v</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward a New Political Order</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Strategy of the Key Players</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Other Players</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crumbling Union</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Kind of Union?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic Variable</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erosion of Central Control</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and Ethnic Strife</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Imbalance</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Reform</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Scenarios</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration Short of Anarchy</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anarchy</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intervention</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Light at the End of the Tunnel”</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the United States</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A: Emerging Democratic Leaders</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B: Emerging Traditionalist Leaders</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

Since the Intelligence Community's last Estimate of the Soviet domestic situation a year ago, the USSR's internal crisis has deepened considerably:

- The Communist Party is dying but is still obstructive. Gorbachev has tried to shift the locus of power to the new presidency and legislatures, but they have yet to demonstrate their effectiveness.

- New political groups and parties have won power in key republics and cities and are posing a growing challenge to the Communist system.

- The national government is scrambling to control centrifugal trends, but its writ over the republics is fast eroding, and there is growing ethnic turmoil.

- Economic problems have become more intractable. The uncontrolled growth in demand and distribution problems have created increasing consumer discontent. Gorbachev has lost valuable time in stabilizing the economy and beginning the transition to a market economy.

Our previous Estimate, while foreseeing the tumult, overstated the regime's ability to contain the republics' drive for sovereignty and underestimated the challenge to Communist Party rule from new political forces.

In such a volatile atmosphere, events could go in any number of directions. Because of this, the Intelligence Community's uncertainties about the future of the Soviet system are greater today than at any time in the 40 years we have been producing Estimates on the USSR. Accordingly, our projections for the next year will be highly tentative.

Toward a New Political Order

The Communist Party's monopoly of power is history. The party is widely seen as the source of the country's problems, and popular hatred of it is increasingly evident. It lost its constitutional guarantee of political primacy in March, and its 28th Congress in July excluded government leaders (except for Gorbachev) from key party posts. The country's two largest cities and largest republic, as well as the three Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia, are now headed or have legislatures dominated by former or non-Communists.

A new pluralistic, decentralized political system is emerging but is not yet capable of running the country. The center and the Communist Party still exercise a considerable, though declining, share of political power. But the CPSU is too discredited to attract sufficient popular support needed to govern in the current environment. At the same time, the emerging political groups, while showing strength, are still small and inexperienced in the ways of power and are not competitive on the all-union level (see inset, page 3).

The governmental institutions to which Gorbachev has been attempting to shift power are likewise only in their formative stages. The Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) is founding. The Supreme Soviet—elected by the CPD—has shown more promise, but is also losing influence because of its lack of popular legitimacy, its inability to act decisively, and the center's difficulty in maintaining control over major sectors of government. Gorbachev has made the presidency the highest organ of executive power, supplanting the CPSU Politburo and the Council of Ministers, but its real authority remains to be proved. This diffusion and confusion of power, coupled with the republics' assertion of sovereignty, is creating a power...
Figure 2. Yeltsin and Gorbachev: Beyond the smiles, can they cooperate? (U)

vacuum. Gorbachev has amassed impressive power on paper, but his ability to use it effectively is increasingly in question and his popular support—is dwindling—

Political Strategy of the Key Players

Gorbachev's defeat of the party's conservative wing at the congress has given him greater room to maneuver. The pressure created by Yeltsin's growing influence has made Gorbachev realize that he must work with Yeltsin and other non-Communist forces. He now accepts the inevitability of a weaker central government and a market-oriented economy. Yet Gorbachev, afraid of social upheaval, wants to preserve a significant measure of control over events. This has led him to try to bolster his powers as President, limit the influence of new non-Communist political forces, retain significant powers for the center in a new union, and water down the Shatalin Plan for transformation to a market economy. This course is at odds with Yeltsin's on some key issues and is slower and not so far reaching as we believe is necessary.

The political forces outside the Communist Party are certain to get stronger; there is as yet, however, no cohesive strategy among those forces as a whole. Many non-Communist figures are concentrating their efforts on organizing political parties. Others who have already won elections, such as Yeltsin and Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov, have shunned involvement—for the time being at least—in any political party and concentrated on the basics of governing (see annexes). If they demonstrate over the next year that they can get things done and make the voices of their constituents heard, the prospects for a more rapid emergence of a non-Communist leadership on the all-union level would increase markedly.

Yeltsin's immediate goal is achieving sovereignty and greater power for the Russian Republic (see p. 7); but the enormous size of that republic and his reputation throughout the USSR as unofficial leader of the non-Communist forces make him a formidable competitor to Gorbachev. Yeltsin, who quit the CPSU in July, supports a multiparty democracy, rapid movement toward a market economy, and a much looser union in which the republics grant only limited powers to the center.

Currently, Yeltsin appears to have the political advantage over Gorbachev; he is far more popular than Gorbachev in USSR-wide opinion polls. In the six months since Yeltsin became Russia's President, the two have had periods of cooperation and confrontation. Their willingness and ability to cooperate will play a critical role in the fate of political, economic, and center-republic transformation in the USSR over the next year. Whether they will do so is open to question, given their mutual personal antagonism,
Embryonic National Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Founded in January 1990, this party is trying to associate itself with European Social Democrats. It has generally supported Gorbachev but has charged him with being too cautious and seeking to perpetuate an authoritarian system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Russia</td>
<td>This party openly opposes Gorbachev. It insists that “Russia should become independent of the USSR” by establishing new forms of federation with other democratically inclined republics. The party’s economic platform rejects capitalism while supporting a “free market controlled by society” and a progressive tax scale to protect the poor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Platform</td>
<td>This group of democratic reformers from the CPSU is in the process of transforming itself into an independent party. Its leaders predict that 30 percent of the current CPSU membership will eventually join the new party, but the actual figure is likely to be lower. The party’s platform supports the market as the prime regulator of the economy, private property, and “independence” for the republics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Russia</td>
<td>This group is currently serving as a legislative coalition and has run proreform candidates for local and Russian Republic elections. It embraces an assortment of political forces opposed to CPSU traditionalists. The group currently has strong majorities in the Moscow and Leningrad city councils and a thin majority in Russian Supreme Soviet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>This party is taking shape among approximately 300 ecological organizations. These organizations agree on the need to protect the environment but have not been able to develop a consensus on other political or economic issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Different policy agendas, and political rivalry. Open confrontation would stymie system transformation and lead to greater instability. Cooperation would not guarantee peaceful transformation, but it would help significantly by garnering popular support for painful economic measures linked to marketization and by making it more difficult for the entrenched party machinery in the countryside to be obstructive. If Yeltsin follows through during the next year on his pledge to stand for popular election to the Russian Republic presidency, a decisive victory would further enhance his political influence. Gorbachev, the Supreme Soviet, and the Congress of People’s Deputies, elected before the establishment of independent political parties, lack the popular support
necessary to push through the difficult and painful measures needed to deal with the country's crisis. Accordingly, Gorbachev could decide during the next year to create a "roundtable" between the government and non-Communist leaders a la Poland in 1989 or perhaps even form a grand coalition. This would involve the removal of the increasingly ineffective Nikolay Ryzhkov from the premiership. Elections for the Congress of People's Deputies are not due until 1994 and for the presidency until 1995, but Gorbachev may calculate that holding early legislative elections would allow new parties to gain representation. Submitting himself to the popular will would be risky, and he is unlikely to do so during the coming year.\(^{(6-19)}\)

Impact of Other Players

The Armed Forces and Security Services. Leaders of the military and security services perceive dangerous consequences from Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies. These concerns reflect alarm over the collapsing authority of the party and the central government, growing domestic disorder, the unchecked spread of separatist movements, and the breakup of the East European security system.\(^{(6-19)}\)
These organizations will find their ability to cope with growing internal disorder limited over the next year. The military is averse to using its troops to police the population. Moreover, most Soviet troop units, because they are conscript based, are ill suited to controlling disorder—especially in Slavic areas. The KGB’s ability to perform its internal security mission
will also decline as more light is shed on its activities, independent political movements grow, and more local governments come under control of non-Communist forces. The Ministry of Interior, despite a growth in manpower, is stretched thin and cannot control widespread domestic unrest.
Despite their apprehension over the current domestic situation and concern about their abilities to perform assigned missions, the military and security services do not pose a serious challenge to Gorbachev's leadership. They view themselves as instruments of the state and are attempting to help Gorbachev in dealing with the turmoil. Even with their many internal problems, they represent the most reliable institutional assets remaining at Gorbachev's disposal.

_Society._ Popular anger is growing, as is belief in the inability of the central government to lead the country out of the morass it is in. Deep pessimism about the future prevails, especially when it comes to bread and butter issues. People are searching for something to fill the emptiness in Soviet society through such alternatives as religion and nationalism. In particular, Russian nationalism—more likely in an inward-looking, rather than chauvinistic, variant—will play a growing role in the future of the country.

The reforms under way have given the peoples of the USSR greater say in their political and economic lives, and they have expressed their views through the ballot, demonstrations, strikes, and violence. The population's influence is likely to grow even more during the next year as power continues to move away from central institutions. How this influence is exercised and channeled will be critical variables. Separatist groups and new political parties—primarily on the left, but also from the right—will tap much of this popular activism. This will increase their importance but could also embolden them to take steps that lead to greater instability. Outbursts of civil disobedience are almost certain to grow; they are more likely to occur—and be most severe—in non-Russian areas but probably will also take place in the largest cities of the Russian Republic and in energy-producing regions.

_The Crumbling Union._

The Soviet Union as we have known it is finished. The USSR is, at a minimum, headed toward a smaller and looser union. The republics, led by Yeltsin and the RSFSR, will intensify efforts to reshape the union independent of the center, further loosening Moscow's
grip over their regions. To date, these efforts are mostly declaratory; actual control over institutions and resources in the republics is still to be tested.

In an effort to cope with the nationalist forces straining the fabric of the union, Gorbachev now supports a substantially widened scope for market forces and the conclusion of a new union treaty by early 1991 that would establish new power-sharing relationships between Moscow and each republic. We doubt, however, that a new union treaty can be concluded within the next year. Gorbachev has indicated he will accept a reduction in the center's authority but so far is attempting to hold on to more authority than most republics want to concede. The initiative now resides mainly with the republics, and any new treaty is likely to be driven more by what powers they are willing to grant the center than by what Gorbachev wants (see figure 6).

Because of the disproportionate size and influence of Russia, a new union treaty will not be concluded unless Yeltsin and Gorbachev work together. How far many of the other republics go in demanding sovereignty will be directly affected by Russia's success in negotiating with the center and with the other republics.

-Secret-
### Figure 6
USSR: Soviet Republic Sovereignty Declarations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic (in order of declaration)</th>
<th>Armenia SSR</th>
<th>Azerbaijan SSR</th>
<th>Georgia SSR</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Ukraine SSR</th>
<th>Turkmen SSR</th>
<th>Uzbek SSR</th>
<th>Kazakhstan SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seeks immediate secession</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supremacy of republic laws</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right to republic military troops</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent economic policy</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republic banking, tax, currency</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent foreign relations</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control over natural resources</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republic citizenship</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military neutrality</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear-free state</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participant in union treaty talks</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Turkmen SSR and Tajik SSR have asserted the right to independent republic banking.
* Moldova has declared itself to be a demilitarized zone.
* Kazakh SSR, site of principal nuclear test range, has banned all nuclear testing and construction or operation of test sites for weapons of mass destruction.
The Range of Republic Demands

The two largest and most powerful republics, Russia and the Ukraine, now support a severely limited central government and union as they demand substantial control over their own affairs. The Russian Republic legislature is calling for primacy of its own laws over Soviet ones, control of the republic's land and natural resources, fiscal policy, police and internal security forces, most economic enterprises, foreign trade, and some role in foreign and monetary policy. The Ukraine has gone further, asserting the right to establish its own army, and Belorussia and the Central Asian republics are also making far-reaching demands. The three Baltic republics are flatly rejecting political affiliation with the center before achieving independence. Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova, in which secessionist sentiment is especially strong, appear unwilling to sign a union treaty but are seeking a gradual transition to independence. *(236)*

The Union Treaty: Areas Over Which the Center Seeks Control

Gorbachev apparently wants to maintain the primacy of union laws over republic ones and to preserve substantial central control of:

- Natural resources and land.
- Defense and state security.
- Foreign policy.
- Macroeconomic policy.
- Foreign trade and customs.
- Border control.
- Science and technology policy.
- Power supply.
- Transportation.
- Protection of individual rights.

steps in defining the republic's relationship with Moscow. Rukh supports a complete break with the central government, but more traditionalist forces in the Russified eastern part of the republic are likely to try to impede any abrupt declaration of independence. *(249)*

Thus, there is still a significant chance that Moscow will be unable to reach a mutually acceptable division of responsibilities even with the core Slavic republics. Moscow could reject their current demands, or the RSFSR or Ukraine could escalate demands in areas such as defense and monetary policy to the point where Gorbachev would feel he had no choice but to resist. A number of factors could contribute to a breakdown in negotiations, including a continued rise in Ukrainian nationalism, worsening of relations between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, or rising popular unrest directed against central authority. In these circumstances, struggle for control of key institutions and enterprises in the republics would ensue, leading to sharp—probably violent—confrontation, with the very existence of the union at stake. The advantage in this scenario would belong to the "locals." *(249)*

The Ukraine's future status is more uncertain. Growing radicalization of the nationalist organization Rukh and the population generally has pushed the Ukrainian legislature to take increasingly assertive

What Kind of Union?
The process of reshaping the union will vary according to the republic over the next year, at a minimum, the center will suffer a dramatic reduction in authority. *(248)*

There is a better than even chance that Moscow and certain republics—Russia, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics—will move toward a loosely affiliated union of republics. We believe that Gorbachev will ultimately go a long way to meet Russia's autonomy demands as long as the central government retains a meaningful role in the new union. Considerable difficulties and hard bargaining remain; but so far the demands of Russia and these other republics do not appear irreconcilable with Gorbachev's (see insets). *(248)*

The Ukraine's future status is more uncertain. Growing radicalization of the nationalist organization Rukh and the population generally has pushed the Ukrainian legislature to take increasingly assertive
difficulties. Market reform will create disproportionate economic pain in the region, however, and could eventually produce disillusion with even a looser union.

Although no republic is likely to become officially independent within the next year, the Baltic republics are almost certain to hold out for full independence and will be on their way to getting it. Latvia and Estonia will probably be willing to consider some kind of voluntary economic association with the Soviet Union now, but Lithuania is likely to be willing to do so only after achieving complete independence. Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova will probably reject any union treaty but will adopt a more gradual approach to independence than the Balts. As Georgia and Moldova press for independence, ethnic minorities there are likely to intensify calls for autonomy. This probably would not deter republic efforts. But Moscow may yet be able to play on Georgian and Armenian concerns about susceptibility to potential Turkish or other Muslim aggression without the protection of the Soviet security umbrella. And a shift in Romania toward greater authoritarianism would probably make the Moldovans more willing to stay in the union.

The Economic Variable

Last year the Soviet economy slumped badly, and official statistics for the first nine months of 1990 paint a picture of an economy in accelerating decline. Output is down compared with a year ago, inflation is up, and shortages are widespread and increasing. Even though imports and production of some consumer goods are up (such as in agriculture and consumer durables), transportation bottlenecks and systemic inefficiency are denying consumers much of the benefit. Meanwhile, continued rapid growth in personal money incomes and a huge backlog of excess purchasing power have combined to undermine the ruble and cause a vicious circle of shortages and binge buying, enfaming consumer anger and leading to violence.

In the year to come, the economy's performance will depend on how central authorities manage erosion of their control over the economy, the level of labor and ethnic strife, the success of regime efforts to overcome the acute financial imbalance, and the course of marketization. In view of our assessment of the prospects for each of these variables, we believe that the economy will continue declining at an accelerating rate and there is a possibility of an economic breakdown (see inset, page 13).

Erosion of Central Control

The transition from the command economy to a more decentralized market system will ultimately yield major gains in performance. In the short run, however, central controls have begun to wither before an effective new system has been put in place. The Communist Party is no longer able to enforce the state's economic orders; economic reforms have given state enterprises and farms the legal basis to resist the center; and the pursuit of independence and autonomy at the republic and enterprise levels have disrupted old supply and demand relationships.

Over the next year, these trends are almost certain to continue, and the center could be weakened to a point where it would lose control of the allocation of vital goods such as energy, key industrial materials, and grain. Attempts by regional authorities to protect their populations from rampant shortages will worsen the current economic turmoil. At the same time, the interdependence of the republics and localities and the
interest of the regional authorities in avoiding economic chaos will continue to argue for restraint against severing old relationships.\(^\text{115}\)

**Labor and Ethnic Strife**

Labor and ethnic problems over the past year have been major contributors to the USSR's economic turmoil. Poor living and working conditions, increasing shortages, and greater awareness of the workers of their lot have led to falling worker motivation and fueled labor and ethnic unrest. Because these problems are certain to get worse in the year to come, labor strife will continue, and faith in government solutions to labor problems will remain low.\(^\text{115}\)

The economy is most vulnerable to work stoppages in the transportation and energy sectors. The railroad system has virtually no slack capacity or substitutes. Strikes in this sector would immediately damage the already fragile supply network, grinding other sectors to a halt and probably leading to the use of the military to run the railways. Similarly, an upsurge in unrest in a large republic such as the Ukraine or in the Great Russian heartland would be especially damaging to the economy.\(^\text{115}\)
Market Reform
The Gorbachev program approved by the Supreme Soviet in October endorses marketization but fails to cut the bureaucracy immediately, thus making it easy for recalcitrants to block progress (see inset). The plan also sets no specific goals or timetables for denationalization of state assets. Although Gorbachev's advisers indicate that this lack of detail is designed to leave the republics free to work out the specifics of denationalization, the program's reliance on state orders and administered prices for at least another year will sharply limit the number of enterprises that could be denationalized. In addition, the plan's measures to stabilize the economy are misconceived—immediate large increases in wholesale prices and continuation of subsidies to consumers through 1992 will spur inflation and undercut deficit reduction.

Overall, Gorbachev's program is a heavily political document aimed at garnering republic support while retaining substantial power for the center. It adopts a slower, more cautious approach on moving toward a market than the Shatalin Plan—supported by the Russian and other republics—and thereby probably runs less risk in the short term. The limitations of the Gorbachev program are, however, that it is unlikely to deliver the promised economic gains and, as a result, over the longer term it will court greater political problems than the Shatalin Plan would have. As the program's deficiencies become apparent in the months ahead, the leadership is likely to consider more radical measures to achieve a transition to a market under even more dire economic conditions. With this program or any other that may be adopted, it is impossible to overstate how difficult, painful, and contentious it will be for a large multinational state to move from a command to a market economy.

Financial Imbalance
Moscow has struggled unsuccessfully in the past two years to slow or reverse the growth of the excess purchasing power that has destabilized consumer markets. The key to reducing the dangerous backlog of excess purchasing power in the year ahead is to lower the budget deficit and proceed with price reform. Despite the stated intention of the Gorbachev reform program, however, it is doubtful that Moscow will move quickly in either area. Making a dent in this problem will require further cuts in state spending for investment and defense and reductions in social expenditures, particularly the huge subsidies for food. Moscow still fears popular reaction to price increases, however, and a large safety net is an integral part of the Gorbachev program. If the government continues to defer decisive action on these issues, the threat of a real financial crisis will deepen considerably and further complicate reform efforts.

Economic Breakdown
A severe breakdown in the coordination between supply and demand is rare historically and has been a result of revolution, war, or disastrous economic policies. Under present circumstances, such a breakdown could be precipitated by massive popular unrest, regional autarky that destroys trade flows, a radical economic reform, or prolonged strikes of transport workers or workers in basic industries such as steel and energy.

Indicators of such a breakdown would be:
• A decline in GNP of at least 20 percent.
• Hyperinflation, massive bankruptcies and unemployment.
• Paralysis of the distribution system for both industrial and consumer goods.
• Dramatic flight from the ruble that results in barter trade or payment in hard currency.
### Key Elements of Gorbachev's Market Reform Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>18- to 24-month conversion to market period in four stages but without a definite schedule for each stage.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center-republic powers</td>
<td>Both center and republics have budget and tax authority; center taxation requires republic concurrence. Center retains control over key exports for some period, shares hard currency revenues with republics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization</td>
<td>Reduce deficit to 25-30 billion rubles—cut defense, investment, enterprise subsidies. Maintain key consumer subsidies. Finance deficit with bonds. Absorb ruble overhang with bond, consumer warrant sales; sales of some other state assets; and through increases in saving interest rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td>Republics control most assets in their territories and set pace. Republics decide issue of private ownership of land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price reform</td>
<td>Increase wholesale prices according to government schedule; enterprise contracts to use these prices. State orders and central distribution, not prices, to determine most allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign economic relations</td>
<td>Moves gradually toward ruble convertibility. Calls for increased latitude on foreign investment, including 100-percent foreign ownership of firms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Four Scenarios

I wouldn't hazard a guess.

Izvestiya commentator’s answer to US Embassy officer’s question in July about how he envisioned the USSR in two to three years. (47)

A further diffusion of power from the center in all three areas—political, economic, and center-republic—is certain. Gorbachev’s authority will continue to

The interaction of political, ethnic, and economic variables will determine the fate of the country over the next year: major deterioration in any one area would severely strain the current system; breakdowns in all three would mean anarchy. Economic breakdown, in particular, would make crafting a new center-republic relationship next to impossible and markedly increase the likelihood of serious societal unrest. (48)
4. (Continued)

decline, although he will probably remain in office a year from now. Even under the most optimistic scenario, the Soviet domestic crisis will be far from resolved in one year’s time. The turmoil will continue regardless of the policies pursued. Progress could be made in some areas. But the risk of sudden major discontinuities will remain, and it will take years—at least a decade or more—to find lasting solutions to the country’s ills.\end{Intro} \end{todo}

Soviet

Gives the unpredictable nature of events in the volatile situation that prevails in the USSR today, we believe that four scenarios capture the range of possibilities during the next year: deterioration short of anarchy; anarchy; military intervention; and “light at the end of the tunnel” (see figure 1). These scenarios are analytical constructs describing overall directions the country could take over the next year and are not mutually exclusive. Some would be most likely to develop from one of the others. We believe that the “deterioration short of anarchy” scenario, which develops out of current trends, is more likely than any of the other three. There is, however, a significant potential for dramatic departures along the lines of the “anarchy” or “military intervention” scenarios. Conditions are such that the odds strongly favor some form of these three “bad news” scenarios during the coming year.\end{Intro}

Deterioration Short of Anarchy

Current trends in the country and the enormous problems facing it in every sphere make this the most likely scenario over the next year, in our view. Intelligence Community analysts give this scenario a close to even probability. The economic, political, ethnic, and societal problems would continue to get worse at an accelerating rate. This scenario would be characterized by:

- Failure to agree upon and implement effectively a far-reaching marketization program; or the broad resistance of the population to such a course.
- Failure of the center and the republics to move to new mutually acceptable political and economic relations.
- Inability of political institutions to adapt to changing political realities and ineffectiveness of new democratically elected leaders in governing.

However, a combination of the remaining powers of the old order—the party and government machinery and the security services—and the limited reforms the regime implements would prevent the entire system from collapsing.\end{Intro}

Some positive trends could also occur under this scenario but would not be likely to develop sufficiently to stem the country’s rapidly declining fortunes during the next year. Gorbachev’s ambivalence toward radical transformation of the system would end up delaying decisive action and diluting the effectiveness of steps his government takes. The non-Communist forces both in and out of government would not be able to form coalitions on a nationwide scale to give clear-cut direction. The complexities and social pain associated with putting a market reform plan in place would not even begin to restore confidence in the currency, reverse autarkic trends, or revitalize commerce, not to mention improve economic performance. The growing autonomy and self-confidence of non-Russians throughout the country would lead to escalating demands and make the achievement of a voluntary union much more complicated.\end{Intro}

This diffusion of power would lead during the next year to an increasing power vacuum. With the accelerating deterioration of central control and organizational weaknesses of the opposition, more power would be likely to move into the streets. Strikes and consumer unrest would almost certainly grow, the more so the more rapidly the economy declines. Ethnic unrest and violence would also increase. The security services and the military would be able to manage as long as protests remain scattered and uncoordinated.\end{Intro}

The key determinant of how long this scenario would persist is how long the economy can keep from collapsing under these conditions. The longer this scenario prevailed, the greater the prospects would be for anarchy or military intervention.\end{Intro}
4. (Continued)

Secret

Anarchy
An accelerating deterioration is unlikely to continue indefinitely and could, during the next year, become a free fall that would result in a period of anarchy. Community analysts generally believe that the likelihood of this scenario is roughly 1 in 5 or less. Anarchy would be characterized by a breakdown of the economic system, collapse of central political authority, and widespread social upheaval.

Such an outcome could result from the interaction of a number of developments. In fact, any one development could trigger a cascade that eventually leads to a collapse of the system:

- A sharp acceleration of negative economic trends already in evidence—local autarky, severe food shortages this winter, numerous plant closings due to lack of fuel and supplies.
- Massive social protests or labor strikes that proved to be beyond the security and armed services' ability to control or resulted in large-scale civilian casualties.
- The assassination of a key leader, such as Gorbachev or Yeltsin.
- The complete breakdown of relations between the center and the republics—particularly the Russian Republic.
- The outbreak of sustained, widespread interethnic violence—especially if directed against Russians.

There are several likely consequences of such a scenario:

- Gorbachev would not politically survive such an upheaval.
- The potential for severe food shortages and malnutrition would be high.
- The union would disintegrate. Most republics would break away from the center, potentially setting off civil wars and massive migrations.
- There probably would be various political outcomes (authoritarian, military dominated, democratic) in different regions of what is now the USSR.

The Departure of Gorbachev or Yeltsin

The impact of their sudden departure from the scene would vary according to whether it occurred via assassination, death by natural causes, or political pressure—with assassination undoubtedly being the most destabilizing. But leaving aside the circumstances, what would their absence mean?

Gorbachev's departure two years—or even one year—ago, while the traditionalists still retained considerable strength in the leadership and the democratic reforms had barely begun to get off the ground, probably would have set back those reforms many years. His demise in the next year would be certain to throw the country into flux. The CPSU has no obvious successor who could wield the influence Gorbachev has, and the presidency would not be as influential a post without such a strong leader. At the same time, traditionalists could see an opportunity to make a comeback. The democratic and market reforms have now taken on a life of their own, however, beyond the control of even as formidable a figure as Gorbachev. The transformation of the Soviet system would take place in a more uncertain atmosphere in the immediate aftermath of Gorbachev's departure, but he is no longer "the indispensable man."

Yeltsin has become the unofficial head of the democratic reform movement, and no one else in the movement currently has the stature to challenge Gorbachev. His departure would be a major setback to the movement over the next year but probably not a fatal one over the longer term. There are a number of other emerging democratic leaders who lack Yeltsin's popular appeal but have other strengths that over time might enable them to play a national role.
Military Intervention
Community analysts believe that the prospects for military intervention in politics are roughly the same as those for "anarchy"—1 in 5 or less. Besides Gorbachev's apparent extreme reluctance to use military force to deal with the country's problems, most Soviet leaders probably believe there is a strong danger that military intervention could accelerate the trend toward chaos and lead to the outbreak of virtual civil war. Problems in society, moreover, have had a debilitating effect upon the military, making it increasingly less suitable and reliable for use in putting down social unrest or enforcing unpopular government directives.

Even so, under conditions of continuing deterioration, the likelihood of the military's becoming more involved in internal politics will grow as the leadership becomes more dependent on the Armed Forces and security services to maintain control. The traditional Russian desire for order could even foster a perception of the military among elements of the population as the key to national salvation in a time of growing chaos. Many senior military leaders share this view of the Armed Forces as the conservator of the Soviet state. The chances for military intervention would increase markedly in a scenario where the country was on the verge of, or in, a state of anarchy.

Military intervention could take several forms: a military coup against the constitutional order, rogue activity by individual commanders, or martial law ordered by Gorbachev. Of these, Community analysts believe a coup—either the military acting alone or in conjunction with the security services and CPSU traditionalists—to be the least likely variant. Such an attempt would have to overcome numerous obstacles, including the difficulty of secretly coordinating the activities of the many units required for a successful putsch, the increasing political polarization of the Armed Forces, the military leadership's professional inhibitions against such a drastic step, and the fear of large-scale resistance by Soviet society.

Only slightly more probable, in our view, would be independent action by local military units in the face of widespread violence that threatens or causes the collapse of civil government. In such an event, a military district commander—operating independently of Moscow and possibly at the request of besieged regional authorities—could order his forces to restore control locally. Whether troops would obey under these conditions would depend greatly on local circumstances. Lacking clear direction and coordination, such independent military actions probably would not succeed for very long, except perhaps in a situation of countrywide anarchy.

We believe that the most likely variant of military intervention would be one in which the central government in Moscow, believing it was losing all control of events and wanting to stabilize the situation, called on the military to impose martial law in selected areas and enforce government directives in the name of salvaging reform. Such an effort probably would be limited to Russia and a few other key republics. The High Command would try to execute such orders, seeing this as its duty to the state. If the conditions are severe enough, such military intervention might be welcomed by the local population and could stabilize the situation temporarily. Unless accompanied by a program offering solutions to the country's political, ethnic, and economic crises, however, the benefits from such a step would be transitory and probably counterproductive in the long run.

"Light at the End of the Tunnel" The prospects that progress toward the creation of a new system over the next year could outpace the breakdown of the old are also about 1 in 5 or less, in our view. This scenario would develop out of current pressure toward a pluralistic political system, self-determination, and marketization. Such trends, while not ending the societal turmoil, might gather sufficient steam to improve prospects for long-term social stability. Economic hardship would increase as movement toward a market economy began and enormous difficulties in creating a new political order would lay ahead, but a psychological corner would be turned to give the population some hope for a brighter future.
In order for this scenario to play out, there would have to be substantial progress toward:

- Developing a new set of relationships that would allow the republics to deal constructively with each other, the center, and the outside world.
- The filling of the political power vacuum by new political institutions and parties. Key political leaders would need to work together constructively.
- Establishing new economic relations based on the market.
- Changing the mood of the Soviet population from one of fear of impending disaster to one of hope. Without such a change in the psychology of the population, a successful transition to the market and democracy would be almost impossible.

The economy would also have to avoid a decline so precipitous as to cause unmanageable social unrest. Progress toward market reform and republican autonomy will be difficult enough to achieve with the certain dropoff in economic performance. A dramatically shrinking economic pie would make unilateral steps by the republics to assert their economic independence more likely. It would also increase the prospects for widespread consumer and labor unrest. If not effectively managed, such developments could break any government.

Implications for the United States

Whichever scenario prevails, the USSR during the next year will remain an inward-looking, weakened giant with a declining ability to maintain its role as a superpower. The domestic crisis will continue to preoccupy any Soviet leaders and prompt them to seek, at a minimum, to avoid confrontation with the West. But the particular foreign policies they pursue could vary significantly depending on the scenario.

Under the “deterioration short of collapse” or “light at the end of the tunnel” scenarios, Moscow’s Western orientation probably would be reflected in continued, possibly greater, Soviet willingness to compromise on a range of international issues. The Soviets would be very likely to continue:

- Deepening the growing economic and political relationships with the United States, Western Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Japan.
- Negotiating ongoing and new arms control agreements.
- Cooperating in crafting a new European security order.
- Reducing military and economic commitments in the Third World and expanding cooperation with the United States there.

In these scenarios, Soviet as well as republic interest in Western economic involvement would continue to expand rapidly. The liberalization of laws on joint ventures, property ownership, and personal entrepreneurship create improved conditions for Western investment. However, uncertainties over prospects for market reform, the role of the central versus the republic governments in such areas as banking and foreign trade, and the ongoing turmoil in Soviet society will make significant investment a risky venture for Western firms and make it unlikely that many will commit much to the effort.

The central and republic leaders also appear not to have thought through what forms of Western aid or investment they would like, the scale of assistance, or the timing. Proposals range from a “modern Marshall Plan,” to Soviet inclusion in international financial organizations, to technical assistance for marketization. The USSR faces serious structural and societal obstacles, however, that would dilute the impact of most forms of foreign aid except for technical assistance. Recent experience has shown that the country’s transportation and distribution networks are ill equipped to move large quantities of imports efficiently. Wide-scale corruption and black-marketeering further diminish the system’s capabilities to get goods to their destinations. If Moscow moves decisively toward

1 These issues will be addressed more fully in the forthcoming NIE 11-4-91, Soviet National Security Strategy in the Post-Cold-War Era. (SECRET)
a market economy, Soviet leaders will press the West and Japan even harder for assistance to cushion the transition. (from)

Internal political developments may also push Gorbachev to conclude agreements with the West as quickly as possible. Assertions of autonomy by republics in the areas of economics and defense will increasingly challenge his authority to speak on behalf of the USSR. The diffusion of power is bringing new actors to the scene who will attempt to develop their own relations with Western states, especially in the economic sphere. Special requests for consultations, technical assistance, emergency aid, and trade from republic governments are likely to increase. Unless political conflict over who owns resources and controls foreign trade is resolved, both US governmental and private business relations with the USSR and its republics will be complicated. Those direct Western contacts with the republics disapproved of by Moscow would be perceived as interference and could result in steps by the central government to block Western assistance to republics and localities. (from)

An "anarchy" scenario would create precarious conditions for relations with the West and would present the United States with some difficult choices. Various factions would declare independence or claim legitimacy as a central government and push for Western recognition and assistance—including military aid. Each Western government would be faced with the dilemma of which factions to deal with and support. If the situation evolved into civil wars, the fighting could spill over into neighboring countries. Eastern Europe and Western countries would be inundated with refugees, and there would be enormous uncertainties over who was in control of the Soviet military's nuclear weapons. (from)

Under conditions of anarchy, a coherent Soviet foreign policy would be highly unlikely, and Soviet ability to conclude ongoing arms control negotiations, implement accords already reached, and carry out troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe would be undercut. Troop withdrawals from Germany, for example, could be delayed or stymied by transport disruptions or by wholesale defections of Soviet troops eager to escape the turmoil awaiting them in the USSR. (from)

In a "military intervention" scenario, a military-dominated regime would take a less concessionary approach than Gorbachev's on foreign policy issues and pursue a tougher line on arms control issues because of the military's current misgivings about CFE, START, and the changes in Eastern Europe. Moreover, such a regime probably would diverge significantly from current policy on Jewish emigration and be less inclined to support the presence of US military forces in the Persian Gulf region. Such policy shifts could undermine the entire panoply of Soviet political, economic, and military ties to the West. A military regime, however, would be too busy attempting to hold the USSR together to resume a hostile military posture toward the West, although further shifts in resources away from the defense sector could be halted. Such a regime would be unable to restore Soviet influence in Eastern Europe but would be likely to take a tougher line on economic issues and would make East-West cooperation in the region more difficult. (from)
TEXT OF TELEGRAM 90STATE 408388

ADP796

PAGE 01 STATE 408388 040231Z
ORIGIN SS-01
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /001R

DRAFTED BY: AF/SRROTH
APPROVED BY: EUR/SOV/AVERSHAW
AF:JDAVIDOW P:RNORLAND
S/P:JSTREMLAU S/S: RALAMANTIA
S/S-0:TKRAJESKI

O 040229Z DEC 90
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
INFO RUFHLD/AMEBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

STATE 408388

EXDIS: LONDON FOR A/S COHEN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR AQ, US
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET MEETINGS IN ANGOLA

REF: (A) MOSCOW 41791½ (B) MOSCOW 41618½

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE NOW KNOW FROM SOVIETS (REF A) AND THE BRITISH THAT
POSSIBILITY OF MEETING WITH MPLA PRIOR TO DECEMBER 11 WILL
BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE DOS SANTOS GOVERNMENT,

3. EMBASSY SHOULD REINFORCE THE POINT WITH MFA THAT THIS
PROPOSED MISSION WAS AT THE EXPlicit DIRECTION OF THE
MINISTERS, AND THAT IT HOLDS OUT A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO
IDENTIFY OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT AND PERHAPS REMOVE
THOSE OBSTACLES. FAILURE TO CAPTURE THIS MOMENT MAY
RESULT IN LOSS OF THE OPPORTUNITY AT HAND.

4. A/S COHEN WILL MAKE PARALLEL DEMARCHE TO YULAYCH AT
THE BILATERALS SET FOR DECEMBER 4 IN LONDON TO REINFORCE YOUR EFFORTS IN MOSCOW. PLEASE REPORT ANY REACTION FROM MFA TO LONDON FOR COHEN AS WELL AS TO DEPARTMENT. GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS.

BAKER
1. Economic crisis, independence aspirations, and anti-Communist forces are breaking down the Soviet empire and system of governance:

--- Boris Yeltsin has become the archrival of the old order and has a good prospect of becoming the first popularly elected leader of Russia in history, acquiring the legitimacy that comes with such a mandate.

--- In the Ukraine, the union's second largest republic with 50 million inhabitants, the drive for sovereignty is picking up speed.

--- Belorussian authorities have recognized and begun negotiations with the strike committee that is opposed to continued rule by the republic's own Communist Party as well as the Kremlin.

--- The Baltic republics are using the uneasy calm between themselves and the Kremlin to solidify new institutions and the support of nonnative populations, primarily Russians, for independence.

--- Georgia has declared its independence, and all the other republics are insisting on much greater local power.

--- The striking miners are persisting in their demand not just for economic benefits, but for structural economic and political change as well. Their call is now resonating in other industrial sectors.

--- The centrally-planned economy has broken down irrevocably and is being replaced by a mixture of republic and local barter arrangements, some of whose aspects resemble a market, but which do not constitute a coherent system.
The Soviet Cauldron

--- The center's reassertion of control over central television has not stifled the birth of new radio and TV companies and of some 800 new independent newspapers that are filling the news breach.

--- The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is breaking up along regional and ideological lines. A still inchoate but growing system of new parties is arising. (OS-97)

2. In the midst of this chaos, Gorbachev has gone from ardent reformer to consolidator. A stream of intelligence reporting and his public declarations indicate that Gorbachev has chosen this course both because of his own political credo and because of pressures on him by other traditionalists, who would like him to use much tougher repressive measures. His attempts to preserve the essence of a center-dominated union, Communist Party rule, and a centrally-planned economy without the broad use of force, however, have driven him to tactical expedients that are not solving basic problems and are hindering but not preventing the development of a new system:

--- The union referendum with its vaguely worded question is turning out to be a glittering non-event and is having no impact on the talks for a new union treaty.

--- The newly unveiled anticrisis program contains the government's umpteenth economic plan and, like its predecessors, holds out the promise of reform following a stabilisation program that will not work.

--- In a successful effort to dominate its proceedings, Gorbachev has expanded the Federal Council into a massive group of varying membership. This stratagem has undermined the one institution that, under its original design of membership for the presidents of the union and the republics, could have become a forum for airing out and settling disputes.

--- As a result of his political meandering and policy failures, Gorbachev's credibility has sunk to near zero. Even some of his closest, newly found, traditionalist colleagues are distancing themselves from him. In a recent poll, a majority of respondents--52 percent--selected hypocrisy as the trait that best describes him. (OS-99-NO-02-00)
The Soviet Cauldron

3. Gorbachev has truly been faced with terrible choices in his effort to move the USSR away from the failed, rigid old system. His expedients have so far kept him in office and changed that system irrevocably, but have also prolonged and complicated the agony of transition to a new system and meant a political stalemate in the overall power equation.

-- The economy is in a downward spiral with no end in sight, and only luck can prevent the decline in GNP from going into double digits this year.

-- Inflation was about 20 percent at the end of last year and will be at least double that this year.

-- The continued preference given to reliance on a top-down approach to problems, particularly in regard to republics, has generated a war of laws between various levels of power and created a legal mess to match the economic mess. (C-SP)

4. In this situation of growing chaos, explosive events have become increasingly possible.

-- Public anger over deteriorating economic conditions could produce riots or massive strikes, particularly in the newly disadvantaged industrial center of the Slavic republics with their large labor populations.

-- A failed maneuver by the central government, such as the violence in Vilnius in January, could give new impulses to antigovernment forces that would attract Western sympathy.

-- Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and other lesser but nevertheless important leaders could die under the incredible strains in which they work or be assassinated with incalculable consequences.

-- Some potent new leader could arise in one or more places, much as Walesa in Poland or Landsbergis in Lithuania, and begin to make history.

-- Reactionary leaders, with or without Gorbachev, could judge that the last chance to act had come and move under the banner of law-and-order. (C-NE)
SECRET
HIGH-SECRET DIRECT

The Soviet Cauldron

5. Of all these possible explosions, a premeditated, organized attempt to restore a full-fledged dictatorship would be the most fatal in that it would try to roll back newly acquired freedoms and be inherently destabilizing in the long term. Unfortunately, preparations for dictatorial rule have begun in two ways:

-- Gorbachev may not want this turn of events but is increasing the chances of it through his personnel appointments; through his estrangement from the reformers and consequent reliance on the traditionalists whom he thereby strengthens; and through his attempted rule by decree, which does not work but invites dictatorship to make it work.

-- More ominously, military, MVD, and KGB leaders are making preparations for a broad use of force in the political process:

- Through speeches, articles, and declarations, various leaders have laid the psychological groundwork. Kryuchkov has denounced foreign interference and argued that the military's help is sometimes necessary in restoring internal order. Akhromeyev has called for a strong hand. Yasov has issued public orders permitting the use of firearms allegedly to defend military installations and monuments; although admitting that the Vilnius garrison commander should not have acted the way he did, he failed to discipline him for the killing of innocent civilians. Ground Forces Commander Varennikov called for a tougher policy in the Baltic republics at a Federation Council meeting, and a number of commanders have either petitioned Gorbachev for tough measures or called for them in large meetings.

- The Communist Party is doing its utmost, with Gorbachev's approval, to retain its leading role in the military by retaining the structure of the Main Political Administration while modifying its external appearance—in essence a change in name only. Party conferences have been held at the all-army level and below to institutionalize the new structure. They have almost certainly been used as well to propagate the need to retain a center-dominated union at all cost.

-- A campaign to retire democratically inclined officers or at least move them out of key positions has been going on for some time. More recently a sensitive source reported that Yasov had ordered
5. (Continued)

SECRET

The Soviet Cauldron

the Western Group of Forces (based in Germany) to form units of particularly reliable troops to do whatever was necessary to preserve the union. Although we lack direct evidence, it is highly likely that similar activity is going on in the military districts within the USSR.

-- The deployment into Moscow on 28 March of some 50,000 troops from the Army and the MVD, with KGB participation, went smoothly, indicating that a command structure for such an operation has been set up.

It is probably the totality of these psychological and actual preparations for the use of force that moved Shevardnadze to reiterate his warning that "dictatorship is coming." (C-F)

6. Should the reactionaries make their move, with or without Gorbachev, their first target this time would be Boris Yeltsin and the Russian democrats.

-- Yeltsin is the only leader with mass appeal and with support outside his own republic, most importantly in the Ukraine.

-- So is gradually and with much difficulty maintaining Russia's drive for autonomy.

-- Those who would preserve a center-dominated union know they cannot do so if Russia escapes their control. (C-F)

7. Any attempt to restore full-fledged dictatorship would start in Moscow with the arrest or assassination of Yeltsin and other democratic leaders such as Mayor Popov and Deputy Mayor Stankovich; the seizure of all media and restoration of full censorship; and the banning of all gatherings enforced by an intimidating display of force. A committee of national salvation--probably under a less sullied name--would be set up and proclaim its intent to save the fatherland through tough but temporary measures that would pave the way for democracy and economic reform.

8. The long-term prospects of such an enterprise are poor, and even short-term success is far from assured.
The Soviet Cauldron

-- The number of troops that can be counted on to enforce repression is limited.

-- The cohesion of the participating forces would be hard to sustain if, as is likely, the democrats refused to fade away.

-- Any action against Yeltsin would spark activity in other places, and security and military forces would be spread thin in any attempt to establish control over other Russian cities. (C-N)

9. Even if the putsch works in Russia, a number of other republics would make use of the turmoil for their own ends. If it did not collapse rapidly, the attempted authoritarian restoration would fail over the next few years. Its putative leaders lack any constructive program and would not have the economic resources, nor most likely the political savvy, necessary to make dictatorship stick. It would probably run its course much as martial law did in Poland, with the added element of secessions, but would almost certainly entail more bloodshed and economic damage along the way. (C-N)

10. Even a putsch is not likely to prevent the pluralistic forces from emerging in a dominant position before the end of this decade. They are blunting the center's drive against them and consolidating their own regional holds on power, while the traditionalist forces, which still control the government and other central institutions, increasingly discredit themselves because they lack a viable, forward-looking program. (C-N)

11. Such slow progress by the pluralist forces, however, leaves them at risk for several years to a putsch and to popular disenchantment with them for failing to produce rapid improvements. Knowing this, they are likely to intensify their push for a breakthrough involving most importantly a union treaty that gives the republics considerable sway over the policies of the central government. They might succeed. Even Gorbachev himself is not yet totally lost to their cause. Faced with the choice of throwing in irrevocably with the traditionalists, who hate him and do not share his aversion to the use of outright force, or backing toward the reformers, he might still choose the latter course. Despite this policy of repressive retrenchment, after all, the central government is also condoning or even initiating some actions that could lay the groundwork for the restart of a reformist effort.

-- A number of laws necessary for the establishment of a market system have been passed.

6

SECRET

HOTSPOT NOCONTACT-ORCON
SECRET

116
The Soviet Cauldron

-- Gorbachev's advisor Shakhsaray and Yeltsin have both talked about the desirability of a national roundtable, although with very different declared purposes.

-- The central and Russian governments are at least establishing, albeit extremely slowly, the mechanisms for settling differences and responsibility about military and KGB issues, primarily through Col. General Kobets' Russian Committee on Defense and Security.

-- Similarly a collegium of republic foreign ministers under the chairmanship of the USSR foreign minister has been created.

-- Talks with the Baltic Republics have started, although again with much difficulty and with the two sides totally at odds over their ultimate purpose.

So far, these various actions have not had any operational significance. Nor will they if the central government persists with its current policy objectives. But if it were willing to change its policy direction, these actions have the potential for creating a way out of the current stalemate. (CON]

12. The reformers would most likely seize upon any such effort to retard the chances of intensified repression and then try to turn it into a strategic breakthrough. With or without Gorbachev, with or without a putch, the most likely prospect for the end of this decade, if not earlier, is a Soviet Union transformed into some independent states and a confederation of the remaining republics, including Russia. This confederation will have the size, economic resources, and accumulated hardware to remain a major military power, but its decentralized nature will prevent it from replicating the militaristic, aggressive policies of yesteryear. (CON]

13. The current Soviet situation and the various directions in which it could develop over the short term present us with three possible Soviet Unions over the next year:
The Soviet Cauldron

-- Continuation of the current political stalemate would maintain the current Western dilemma of developing the proper mix of relationships with contending forces. The dilemma would probably sharpen because the struggle is likely to intensify and the economy to spiral downward at an ever faster rate. Social explosions such as the current miners' strike and the Belorussian flareup would occur and could transform the situation into major violence or martial law at any time. Short of this, the USSR would be more and more of an economic basket case and Gorbachev a spent force who would multiply his appeals for Western assistance. Although the USSR might still try to take some new initiative on the international scene, such as in the Middle East and in the arms control sphere, its growing instability would greatly diminish its diplomatic clout and probably prevent it from effectively advancing its agenda. Its growing instability will have a negative effect on Eastern Europe in the form of lost economic interaction and inability to develop a new basis for Soviet-East European relations.

-- An attempt at the restoration of dictatorship would face the West with a repetition of Poland 1981, but almost certainly with more brutality and bloodshed. The country would still be an economic basket case. The new regime would pledge to maintain a cooperative policy toward the world and most likely continue troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, probably with even greater attempts at extortion. In reality there would be greater foreign policy truculence, but this USSR could not regain its previous influence in the world nor its position in the Third World. It would, however, attempt greatly to step up arms sales for cash; look for gains in the Middle East at US expense; and may well work with fifth columns in Eastern Europe in an attempt to subvert those developing democracies. Some in Western Europe would argue that this domestic retrenchment might be regrettable but that Gorbachev, or whoever was in charge, really had no choice but to restore order and that the best way to influence the situation toward the better (and save whatever Western investments and credits that had been advanced) was through continued cooperation coupled with symbolic
The Soviet Cauldron

gestures of disapproval. Unless brutality reached a level much higher than it did at Tiananmen Square, a Western consensus on either interpretation of events or policy would be highly unlikely.

--- An accelerated breakthrough by the pluralists would create the best prospects for internal and external stability based on cooperative arrangements. But this pluralist victory would also bring problems of another sort. The ability of pluralist forces to rule effectively is unproven and might not be assured for quite some time, probably a generation. The nationality problem could not be settled overnight, and there would be tensions within and between republics over the most desirable politicoeconomic system. Some of the republics would not be governed by democrats, but all republics would lay claim to US assistance. New leaders who would have prevailed because of their domestic appeal and single-minded determination would not have much experience in foreign affairs and would probably make exaggerated demands, much as is already happening with some of them. Despite these difficulties and the likely lengthy process of internal and external adaptation to new rules of behavior, this breakthrough, particularly if it occurred in the Slavic core, would present the best prospects for an East-West reconciliation analogous to that which has brought Franco-German relations to what they are today. ---

SECRET

TOWARD RECONCILIATION GROWN
SECRET

119
Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures

National Intelligence Estimate

This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-18-91

Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures

Information available as of 27 June 1991 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support, Department of the Treasury
The Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

also participating:
The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

June 1991
### Figure 1
Scenarios for the USSR
Over the Next Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Chronic Crisis| Continuation of current situation  
Neither entire collapse of system nor substantial progress toward resolution of country's problems  
Continued devolution of power below but unable to govern  
Political gridlock  
Economy would verge on breakdown but somehow manage to limp along  
Scenario unlikely to last next five years |
| System Change | System replaced with relatively little violence  
Slavic and Central Asian core state: smaller, less militarily powerful, more pluralistic than USSR  
Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova become independent  
Economies of all troubled, but moving rapidly toward market  
Government increasingly reflects popular will, but may not survive economic disarray |
| Regression    | Hardliners in military, security services, and CPSU impose martial law type regime  
Democratic reform and republic independence drives halted  
Strong nationalist and reformist pressures remain  
Economy's downward spiral accelerates  
Scenario unlikely to last long |
| Fragmentation | Violent, chaotic collapse of system  
Republics become independent  
Some governments reflect popular will, others more authoritarian  
Warfare within and between many republics  
Economic conditions deteriorate dramatically, barter main form of economic interaction; famine widespread |
Key Judgments

Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures

The USSR is in the midst of a revolution that probably will sweep the Communist Party from power and reshape the country within the five-year time frame of this Estimate. The outcome of this revolution will be affected by a number of factors, including the following:

- A sharply declining economy and standard of living that will get worse for the next few years no matter what economic program is adopted.
- The difficulties in implementing a market reform program and sustaining it against a likely popular backlash.
- Continued devolution of power to republic and local governments at the expense of the central government.
- The rising claim of nationalism on defining the state and legitimizing its policies.
- The increasing importance of popular expectations and aspirations, and the government's abilities to meet them, on a wide range of issues—including living standards and personal freedom.

No one can know what the duration or the ultimate outcome of the revolution will be—particularly in a society where repression and centralized control have been the rule, and the culture has been resistant to change, but where recently, democratic aspirations appear to have become widespread. (C NF)

Of the many conceivable outcomes, we believe four scenarios span the range of possibilities: a continuation of the current "chronic crisis" with no political resolution; a relatively peaceful "system change" into a smaller, more pluralistic and voluntary union in which the central government relinquishes substantial power; a chaotic and violent "fragmentation" of the country resulting in many new states with widely varying political and economic systems; and a "regression" through renewed repression into an authoritarian state run by a combination of hardliners in the military, security services, and Communist Party (see figure 1).

1 The approach taken by the Intelligence Community in this Estimate is intended to be more speculative, and less predictive, than in previous estimates on political developments in the USSR. We focus on a range of possible outcomes and their implications for both the USSR and the West, rather than on current developments. Although the scenarios we use to describe these outcomes are very similar to the four used in NIE 11-18-90, November 1990, The Deepening Crisis in the USSR: Prospects for the Next Year, they are meant to be "ideal cases" in order to make the distinctions between them clear. The reality is certain to be much more complicated.
### Figure 2
Implications of Scenarios for Key Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Chronic Crisis</th>
<th>System Change</th>
<th>Regression</th>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy toward the West</td>
<td>Accommodation, but increasingly erratic policy</td>
<td>Would seek full-scale accommodation, inclusion in</td>
<td>Wary, but would seek to avoid confrontation</td>
<td>No coherent policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will seek economic assistance/engagement and accept some conditionality</td>
<td>European security structures</td>
<td>Would not expect economic assistance</td>
<td>Many governments in republics and regions that break away would seek close ties, military and economic assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military posture</td>
<td>Continued gradual reduction in military capabilities</td>
<td>Slavic and Central Asian core: significantly reduced military; would remain nuclear superpower; increased emphasis on &quot;defensive&quot; doctrine</td>
<td>Would seek to maintain Soviet military strength, within constraints of deteriorating economy</td>
<td>No coherent military doctrine or threat to West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deteriorating economy could lead to deeper cuts</td>
<td>Independent 6: Small militaries; a threat only to small neighbors</td>
<td>Increased emphasis on countereffensive capabilities</td>
<td>But possible loss of control over nuclear weapons would lead to dangerous, unpredictable situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Defensive&quot; doctrine maintained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most military power vested in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>Continued pursuit of new agreements, but within old frameworks</td>
<td>Slavic and Central Asian core: vigorous pursuit of wide-ranging arms reduction treaties</td>
<td>Might enter negotiations, but only on Soviet terms</td>
<td>No coherent policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing disparity and periodic ascendency of hardliners would complicate progress</td>
<td>Independent 6: Would seek to join CSCE arms control and confidence-building process</td>
<td>Willingness to adhere to existing agreements increasingly doubtful</td>
<td>Unable to ensure compliance with existing agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adherence to agreements likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy toward Eastern Europe</td>
<td>No military threat, but would continue to push for neutral Eastern Europe</td>
<td>No military threat</td>
<td>Unlikely to threaten militarily</td>
<td>Massive numbers of refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basis for new cooperative relationships between various new states and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>But could stall on withdrawal from Poland</td>
<td>But would stall on withdrawal from Poland</td>
<td>Potential spillover of civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would not oppose East European entry into European security structures</td>
<td>Would push hard for neutral Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Would push hard for neutral Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Potential clashes over Moldova, Kaliningrad, western Ukraine and Belarusia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Might use energy deliveries as leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces in Germany</td>
<td>Potential point of instability</td>
<td>Would be willing to bring them home more quickly</td>
<td>Internal political situation would have destabilizing effect on WGF</td>
<td>Breakdown of discipline, unit cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Would offer to remove them earlier in return for German economic sweetener</td>
<td>Issue not likely to be troublesome</td>
<td>Increase in defections</td>
<td>Thousands of defectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hardline leadership could threaten to delay withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This Estimate's focus is on the content and implications rather than on the relative probabilities of such scenarios. The USSR could pass through any or all of these scenarios during the next five years. Nevertheless, we believe that, on the basis of current trends and our assessment of the critical variables—particularly the bleak prospects for the economy—the country is much more likely to be in a "system change" or "fragmentation" scenario five years from now than to remain where it is today in "chronic crisis." In our view, an attempt to impose the hardline regime of the "regression" scenario becomes more likely as the country verges on "system change" or "fragmentation," but, of the four scenarios, this is the least likely to be a lasting outcome. In any event, we believe that the USSR in its present form will not exist five years from now. (con’t)

There will be profound effects on the geopolitical balance in Eurasia whatever the outcome. "System change," the most favorable scenario for the USSR and the West, would leave the USSR somewhat smaller than it is today and still a nuclear superpower, but this Slavic-Central Asian state would have adopted a political and economic system much more conducive to close ties to the West. Even so, the difficulties associated with such a transformation over the longer term may be too heavy a burden for the government and population to bear. (con’t)

The geopolitical shift would be most drastic in a "fragmentation" scenario, where the country broke apart in a chaotic fashion. Some form of a Russian or Russian-dominated state would eventually emerge out of the chaos, but for a good many years it would be a far less influential actor on the world scene than today's Soviet Union, and it would be bordered by many new countries of varying stability and military strength. (con’t)

The ability of Western governments to influence the course of events inside the USSR is likely to grow in the "chronic crisis" and "system change" scenarios and in the aftermath of a "fragmentation" scenario:

• The country's crumbling economy will increase the likelihood that any government, except one led by hardliners, will turn to the West for aid and accept some degree of economic and political conditionality in return. The need for such aid would give most national and republic leaders an incentive to avoid repressive measures.

• Even though the upper limits of what the West might realistically offer would fall far short of the country's total capital needs, such aid could play an important role in moving the country toward "system change"; that is, the transition toward a market economy and a more pluralistic political system.
Western assistance could play an important role in the newly independent Baltic republics, simply because of their much smaller size. On the other hand, local and regional instabilities in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia are likely to limit Western inclination to provide assistance to these republics.

With the exception of the "system change" scenario, the West would face major obstacles in actually exerting influence. In a "chronic crisis" scenario, which the USSR is in today, aid for political and economic reform would be hard to channel into projects that would benefit long-term growth and could get caught in a struggle for power between the center and the republics. In this, and particularly in the "fragmentation" scenario, the gathering political and economic disarray would make it more difficult to determine whom to aid, how to get it to them, and how to follow up to ensure the aid had its intended effect.

The aftereffects of increased instability or repression would also pose challenges to the West:

- The East Europeans, the Turks, and the Nordic countries would turn to the United States and other major Western powers for assistance in coping with refugees, instability on their borders, or a military-led government in Moscow.

- In a "fragmentation" scenario, various factions or republics could gain access to and control of nuclear weapons and threaten to use them against internal rivals or other countries. Although any Western involvement would depend on a number of variables, timely Western offers of assistance in securing and/or disposing of such weapons could have pivotal effect.

- Seizure of control by hardliners in a "regression" scenario would lead to an increase in East-West tensions, a greatly diminished interest in arms control and other negotiations, and a slowing in the reduction in the capabilities of the Soviet military.

- Violence at home could spread to the Soviet troops that are due to remain in Germany until the end of 1994.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Judgments</strong></td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Crisis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the USSR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the West</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Change</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the USSR</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the West</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the USSR</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the West</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the USSR</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for the West</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. (Continued)

Discussion

Chronic Crisis

This scenario assumes a continuation of the current crisis with neither an entire collapse of the system nor substantial progress toward resolution of the country's problems. Gorbachev might manage to hang on to power in a weakened central government because neither the left nor the right would have enough strength to oust him, but, even if he left the scene, neither side would gain the upper hand. The country goes from one system-threatening crisis to another. Despite the turmoil, much backtracking, and political stalemate at the top, the trend is toward more autonomy for the republics and a market-based economy but in a bottom-up and relatively chaotic way. The command economy verges on breakdown but somehow manages to limp along.

Implications for the USSR

The current situation in the USSR is best described by this scenario. This is a highly unstable scenario. Although there would be some continued movement toward a pluralistic system, a voluntary union, and a market economy, governmental authority would weaken, and the potential for major popular upheavals would grow. It is unlikely this scenario could prevail for the five years of this Estimate. Indeed, a transition to one of the other three scenarios of "system change," "fragmentation," or "regression" is likely earlier rather than later in this period.

If Gorbachev remained in office, he would become less and less powerful. Neither the left nor the right would prevail, but both would remain strong enough to pose a serious threat to Gorbachev and to each other. The potential for large-scale intervention into politics by the security services and the military would continue to hang over the country. Although less likely, this scenario could still exist if Gorbachev is removed constitutionally, decides on his own to step down, or dies a natural death. Whoever is in charge, the central government would continue to lose authority, although without Gorbachev this would occur more quickly.

Indicators of "Chronic Crisis"

- Economy continues to deteriorate, but command economy does not collapse.
- Center/republics discussions on economic stabilization/reform plan drag out without resolution (or they agree and the plan fails); center pursues ineffective ad hoc policies; republics try to implement individual economic programs.
- Central government remains viable but power steadily erodes.
- Center/republics unable to resolve key differences concerning powers of national and republic governments.
- Political polarisation grows, but neither right nor left are strong enough to become dominant.
- Violence continues but at relatively low levels; periodic incidents of regional repression occur.
- Military and security services act more independently but shrink from a coup.

The republics would gather a good deal of the authority the center lost but still would not be able to govern effectively. None would be fully independent, but many—the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova—would remain tethered to the union only by the continued presence of Soviet troops and the vestiges of the central command economy. Russia would gain greater control over its own affairs.
and increased influence with other republics, but it would not yet be strong enough to transform the center to its liking or assume all of the central government's former authority within the RSFSR. Yeltsin's strength in Russia and the USSR would grow, at least initially, but he would be hamstrung by the center's continuing ability to limit the RSFSR's economic sovereignty, by infighting within his own camp (abetted by the KGB), and by demands of non-Russians in the republic for greater autonomy or independence.

With no resolution of the center-republic relationship, there would be no hope of stabilizing or reversing the economic slide. GNP would drop dramatically, and the country would face worsening shortages of industrial materials, consumer goods, and food. Inflation and unemployment would skyrocket; strikes would proliferate. Significant human suffering would develop in some areas. Foreign credits would dry up as the country failed to meet debt service payments; Western companies—scared off by the growing political and economic chaos—would take their business elsewhere. Nevertheless, the economy would avoid collapse through a major expansion of independent arrangements and barter deals that republics, enterprises, and individuals made with each other.

The economic disarray and growing republic autonomy would accelerate the trend toward reduced military capabilities. The military leadership would try to ensure that the drop in allocations to the military was not dramatic, but the trend would still be decided downward because the military economy would not be insulated from the accelerating decline. The republics' quest for greater autonomy or independence would exacerbate the Soviet armed forces' manpower and morale problems. Modernization of Moscow's strategic forces would continue within the limits of a START treaty, but even these forces would increasingly be affected by the economy's dismal performance.

Implications for the West
In this scenario, the ability to conduct foreign policy by whoever leads the central Soviet government would be constrained by the turmoil at home. Western governments would find Gorbachev or a successor not only preoccupied by the domestic crisis but also less and less able to ensure that the USSR is capable of fulfilling the foreign commitments it makes. Nevertheless, any Soviet regime in this scenario probably would still seek accommodation on a range of international issues and almost certainly would want to avoid confrontation. The Soviets would be likely to continue:

• Deepening the growing economic and political relationships with the United States, Western Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Japan.
• Negotiating ongoing and new arms control agreements.
• Cooperating in crafting a new European security order.
• Reducing military and economic commitments, while expanding cooperation with the United States, in the Third World.

Whatever the Soviet Government's intentions, the economy's rapidly decreasing ability to support a massive military, the likely increased involvement of the Soviet army in quelling domestic unrest, and the general lack of cohesion within the country would seriously limit the USSR's capability to threaten its neighbors or the West. The Soviet Union would almost certainly complete its withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe, possibly more quickly than scheduled. The leadership would have every incentive to adhere to the terms of the CFE and START treaties and probably would seek further arms reductions to lighten the military burden on the economy.

In this scenario, Soviet as well as republic interest in Western economic involvement would continue to expand rapidly. The deteriorating economy would ensure that the central government would continue to seek access to Western economic institutions and be on the West's doorstep for loans, credits, and general economic assistance, although it would not be able to repay such assistance.
as interference and could result in attempts by the central government to block Western assistance to republics and localities.

System Change

This scenario assumes that the existing political system is replaced with relatively little violence. This occurs with the old regime's dissolution as a result of republic or popular pressure—as in Czechoslovakia in 1989—or through agreement between the center and the republics. In either case, a loose federation or confederation of the Slavic and Central Asian republics emerges, and independence is granted to those republics seeking it. The political and economic systems that emerge in the core Slavic–Central Asian state and the independent states vary widely.

Implications for the USSR

The level of instability in this scenario would depend on the manner in which the system was changed. If it collapsed due to internal pressure, the instability initially would be greater: new governing mechanisms would have to be created in the midst of revolution, and many elements of the old system—while defeated—would remain capable and desirous of complicating the transition to a new system. A voluntary sharing of power by the center would be more stable, although, even in this variant, the new systems that emerged from what was the USSR would encounter problems much more serious than those now being experienced by post-Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The newly transformed core state that emerges in this scenario would reflect the political and economic trends in Russia and, to a lesser extent, in the Ukraine. As such, it—particularly its Slavic portion—would have, at least initially, a much more pluralistic political and economic system than ever before. It would have a popularly elected parliamentary government with numerous political parties. While the role of the state would remain large, its authority would depend much more than heretofore on popular acceptance. The government's respect for human rights

Special requests for consultations, technical assistance, emergency aid, and trade from republic and local governments are likely to increase. Without political resolution of the conflict over who owns resources and controls foreign trade, both US governmental and private business relations with the USSR and its republics will be complicated and harder to sustain. Those direct Western contacts with the republics disapproved of by Moscow would be perceived
would start to resemble that of Western governments. The Central Asian regions, on the other hand, would remain basically authoritarian and have poor human rights records. (cfrm)

The republics would have substantial autonomy, with the center playing the leading—though even here not exclusive—role in foreign, defense, fiscal/monetary, and communications/transportation policies. The presidency of the new union would have less scope and be a less powerful office than it is today. There would be a strong push toward a market economy, although the central and republic governments would continue to run a large portion of major industry, and reforms would be implemented unevenly in the republics. Progress would be much more gradual and the social pain much greater than has been the case in Poland. (cfrm)

Russia's influence in the new union could become a source of tension. Its leadership, most likely under Yeltsin, would have played the leading role in creating the new system giving greater power to the
6. (Continued)

**Indicators of "System Change"**

- Center/republics sign and begin implementation of union treaty and new constitution devolving significant power to republics.
- Republics assume control of their economic and political lives, undertake substantial steps toward market reform. (C NF)

Or, alternatively:

- Large-scale public protests, labor unrest, and republic pressure cause the central government to collapse.

- Reformers/republics give up hope of reaching negotiated settlement with the center and conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements reserving most powers to themselves and defining areas of the center's limited authority. (C NF)

The biggest problem for the six republics that would form independent states would be economic because of their meager industrial and resource bases and their small populations. Most would move quickly toward market economies, but how well their economies functioned would also depend heavily on the degree to which they cooperated with the Slavic-Central Asian state, each other, and their other neighbors. The Baltic states would be parliamentary democracies; the other three—while democratic in form—probably would tend more toward authoritarian states.

The internal growing pains that the Slavic-Central Asian state and the others experience would complicate relations among them. Demarcating the new borders alone would be enough to generate tensions. The most serious problems—which would entail some violence—would most likely be between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between the new union, on the one hand, and Georgia and Moldova, on the other.

Such problems among and inside the new regimes that emerged in "system change" could out the longer run become serious enough to cause such a regime to fail. Reestablishment of the old Communist order would not occur, but the military and security services might be able to resume control (as in the "regression" scenario) or chaos and wide-scale violence could ensue (as in the "fragmentation" scenario) due to the failure of political and economic reform.

**Implications for the West**

Despite the uncertainties such tensions among the former components of the USSR would create for the West, this would be far and away the most favorable outcome for Western countries. The Slavic-Central Asian core state would be smaller, less militarily powerful, much more pluralistic, and almost certainly more desirous of close relations with the West than was the USSR. Especially in the period following its creation, it would seek extensive Western involvement in developing its political and, particularly, economic

---

**Secret**
6. (Continued)

- Secret

player on the world scene. It would seek admission to European economic and security structures, posing dilemmas for Western governments. East European states already seek membership in these institutions, and some would worry that the new Soviet Union's acceptance into these clubs would dilute the meaningfulness of their membership. On the other hand, East European fears of a resurgent, militaristic USSR or of massive instability there would be substantially reduced in such a scenario. (CENS)

The Slavic—Central Asian core state probably would seek a major expansion of arms control agreements with the West. It would have an economic interest in cutting its military, and—perceiving the United States as a vital source of assistance—probably would seek significant reductions in strategic arms. This state would not forgo nuclear weapons, since they would continue to be important to its security and superpower status, but it probably would be willing to make reciprocal, and perhaps even radical, cuts in numbers of weapons. (CENS)

The Allies probably would see less justification for maintaining NATO and a US troop presence on the Continent if the Soviet Union disintegrated as depicted in this scenario. The Europeans would almost certainly invite the new states to join CSCE. The Allies, however, would resist any efforts by these new states to join NATO. (CENS)

Regression

This scenario assumes traditionalist forces seize control in order to break the back of the democratic reform movement and halt the republics' move toward sovereignty and independence. Although Gorbachev could lead such a move, it is more likely he would be compelled to go along or be forced from office. The security services and the military, who spearhead this course, use force on a large scale to reassert central control. Widespread arrests of leading opponents, including Yeltsin, occur. The new leaders attempt to
6. (Continued)

reinstitute centralized control over the economy. Although this averts collapse of the command economy for a while, it does little to halt the economy's continuing sharp decline.

**Implications for the USSR**

This scenario would involve a series of harsh measures that succeed in reestablishing a measure of central control. The use of force could produce political “stability” for a few years, given the organizational weakness of the democratic forces and the lack of unity among the republics bent on secession. This course might also appeal to a significant portion of the Slavic–Central Asian publics tired of political debate and seeking political order and economic stability. Such popular support would prove short-lived, however, if the new government failed to deliver. Eventually, renewed political opposition and civil disorder would probably develop.

The new leaders would find it difficult to gain popular legitimacy for their rule. The draconian step of reintroducing the command-administrative economic system, largely discarded under Gorbachev, would not be able to rebuild the center–republic economic ties disrupted by the independence movement. As workers saw their economic status continuing to deteriorate, they would become less reluctant to engage in passive and active resistance to the center’s power.

The new government would also lack an ideological basis to justify its actions, since Marxism-Leninism has been totally discredited, along with the Communist Party. An appeal to Russian nationalism by the conservative leadership would be possible—and could take the form of a national salvation committee—but such a step would further antagonize the restive republics. It could provide the basis for an authoritarian regime in Russia, however, that follows a “Russia first” policy at the expense of the rest of the union.

The biggest problem for the leadership would be maintaining unionwide control. The use of force to hold the union together would almost certainly lead to open civil conflict within several republics, particularly those having their own paramilitary forces, such as Georgia and Armenia. Controlling such unrest would severely tax security and military forces; prolonged conflict would threaten the internal cohesion and discipline of the troops, particularly if they had to be used against Slavic groups.

This scenario could unravel quickly if the center were unable to quash the democratic resistance, if Yeltsin or another popular leader were able to escape the center’s dragonet and rally popular resistance, or if the military proved unreliable. Even so, reform and republic leaders might not survive even a short-lived repression, leaving a political vacuum at the center and in many republics. Such widespread unrest would also exacerbate the ethnic, political, and generational splits within the armed forces and security services.

**Implications for the West**

This scenario, while less volatile than “fragmentation,” would create conditions least responsive to Western influence. The immediate outcome would be a more combative posture toward the West, which the new leadership would see as opposed to its seizure of power and its harsh internal measures. Western criticism would fuel a “hunker down” attitude among the
leadership, further straining relations. The regime's probable political, economic, and military policies would generate renewed concern in the West over the USSR's intentions and would frighten the Soviet Union's neighbors, particularly in Eastern Europe. Such a regime, however, probably would seek to avoid confrontation with the West because of the fragility of the situation within the USSR.

The hardline leadership would place arms control negotiations on the back burner, and its willingness to adhered to existing arms control agreements—particularly CFE—would be increasingly doubtful as political tensions with the West rose. There probably would be a greatly reduced willingness to cooperate with the West in reducing regional tensions, although for economic reasons the new leadership would be reluctant to be drawn into foreign adventures. Nevertheless, the regime would take an aggressive approach to arms sales to the Third World, complicating Western efforts at promoting regional security.

Such a regime would adopt a more assertive attitude toward the countries of Eastern Europe and might threaten to hold up any remaining troop withdrawals unless Germany and Poland acceded to Soviet security and economic demands. Given its weakened condition and preoccupation with maintaining internal control, however, a traditionalist regime would almost certainly remove these forces in the end rather than precipitate an East-West crisis.

Although more confrontational, the regime would be unable, due to the changed social environment and the weakened economy, to conduct an arms buildup similar to the Brezhnev era, even though it might place greater priority on heavy and defense industry. It would assert its rights as a military power, but its main focus would be on the USSR's internal problems.

Fragmentation

This scenario assumes there is no effective central government. Power resides in the republics and, in some cases, even in localities. Republics, along with many of the ethnically based regions, secede en masse from the union. Ethnic and social tensions explode in many areas; the security services and military are unable to maintain order. The result is widespread anarchy and local civil wars made worse by the proliferation of paramilitary forces and the defection of units from the military. Attempts to establish ties among republics prove difficult due to differences in political and economic agendas and the ineffective control of most governments. Many regional and local governments quickly rise and fall. The collapse of the national command economy and its supporting infrastructure leads to local systems of exchange, largely based on barter.

Implications for the USSR

This scenario not only would spell the end of the USSR as a unitary state, it would also make it unlikely that the union could reconstitute itself as a federation, or even a confederation, during the time frame of this Estimate. The country's fragmentation into a number of individual political units, many overtly or potentially hostile toward one another, would increase the likelihood of prolonged civil wars, which would further sap the strength of already besieged local economies. The economic chaos would lead to severe food shortages or even famine in parts of the country.

The power vacuum in Moscow would heighten prospects for a military seizure of power and a succession of coups, as senior military commanders tried to hold
together the rapidly collapsing union. Even if elements in the military and security services were inclined to intervene in an effort to rescue the union, they would not be able to ensure the loyalty of many of the individual units. Widespread defections and mutinies would make large-scale use of force to stabilize the situation impossible. There would be a very real danger that military and security force units would defect to the leadership of the republics, providing a ready pool of men and arms with which to prosecute conflict against other republics or disaffected elements within the republics. Some of these forces could also pose a threat to the leadership of the now independent republics. (e-nn)

"Fragmentation" is not likely to last indefinitely. As with "system change," there would be no possibility of putting the old system back together again, but new
Indicators of "Fragmentation"

- Cooperation between center and most republics ceases; republics ignore center's directives, including laws on military conscription.
- Central and republic governments increasingly unable to control violent protests over deteriorating economic and political conditions; but opposition unable to unite, coordinate actions.
- Inter-republic ties dwindle sharply; republics make political, economic, and territorial demands on one another.
- Command economy collapses; attempts by republics and localities to establish alternative economic systems fail; economic conditions deteriorate sharply.
- Military discipline begins to unravel.
- Ethnic and labor disturbances spread rapidly.

**Secret**

Attempts at forging cooperation among some of the peoples of the former Soviet Union would be made. Russia would be the key. The establishment of strong and effective leadership in the Russian Republic could stabilize the political and economic situation in a relatively short period (perhaps several years) depending on the policies it adopted and its abilities to establish economic ties to other republics and countries. Such a development would also depend on the Russian leadership's ability to exercise control over its own disaffected ethnic groups, as well as its ability to gain command of what remains of the armed forces. An economically and politically viable Russia would exercise a strong influence on neighboring peoples still wrestling with the effects of the collapse of the USSR.

**Secret**

Implications for the West

This scenario is potentially the most dangerous for the West because of the chaos and unpredictability of events. Although the USSR would disappear as a cohesive military power, the prospects of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of some republics, mutinous troops, or radical groups would pose a new set of risks. There would be a heightened risk of threatened or accidental use of such weapons inside—and much less likely, outside—the Soviet Union. There would also be a greater chance for nuclear materials and expertise finding their way to foreign states seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
6. (Continued)

Widespread civil conflict or war within and between republics would also pose major dangers for the West. Conflict within the former territory of the USSR would have the potential for spilling across borders, particularly in central and southern Europe and Southwest Asia. Western countries would have to weigh the merits of recognizing new governments in breakaway republics or in Russia itself. One or another of the contending factions would be likely to appeal to the West for economic and military assistance, if not outright security guarantees.

Beyond the dangers posed to the West by the interme
cine strife would be the very real challenge of dealing with the extreme economic hardship, including famine, likely to affect the bulk of the former USSR. Massive infusions of assistance and capital would almost certainly be required to alleviate suffering, but the lack of a central government, or perhaps even republic governments, capable of directing the inflow of economic aid—as well as ongoing violence—would undermine the effectiveness of any effort. The West would also be confronted with the problem of massive numbers of refugees fleeing the disorder, which could destabilize countries bordering the USSR. Despite these problems, Western assistance probably would be critical to the ability of the various republics and regions to move beyond the difficulties associated with this scenario to more stable political and economic systems.

This scenario would also make any coherent Soviet foreign policy extremely unlikely. There would be no central authority in Moscow to conclude arms control negotiations, implement accords already reached, or to ensure the completion of troop withdrawals from Central Europe. Moreover, in a situation of anarchy and civil wars in the USSR, Soviet forces remaining in the region would not be a military threat but would present serious problems for their hosts should they refuse repatriation; widespread disorder among these troops would be likely.
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Year 2000 (Key Judgments)

National Intelligence Estimate

Key Judgments

These Key Judgments represent the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of these Key Judgments:

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director for Intelligence, Department of Energy

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs.

The full text of this Estimate is being published separately with regular distribution.

### Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNIINTEL)

### National Security Information

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

### Dissemination Control Abbreviations

- NOFORN (NF): Not releasable to foreign nationals
- NOCONTRACT (DC): Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
- PROPIN (PR): Caution—proprietary information involved
- ORCON (OC): Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
- REL: This information has been authorized for release to...
- WNIINTEL: Intelligence sources or methods involved
- Classified by... (Classified by 094134, Declassify: OADR, Derived from multiple sources)

All material on this page
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Year 2000 (C NF)

- The decline of the Soviet Union has caused its leaders to view their national security and superpower status as hingeing more than ever on strategic nuclear power. Barring a collapse of central authority or the economy, we expect the Soviets to retain and modernize powerful, survivable strategic forces throughout the next decade. (S-NF)

- We have evidence that five new strategic ballistic missiles are in development—two land based and three sea launched. If these programs continue, four of them would begin deployment in the mid-1990s. (S-NF)

- Nevertheless, we believe that political upheaval and economic decline will lead to the cancellation or serious delay of one or more of these programs. The Soviet economy will be unable to support a sustained military production and deployment effort in the 1990s comparable to that of the 1980s, even for strategic forces. (S-NF)

- Production and deployment rates of some new strategic systems have been reduced as the Soviets adjust their programs in expectation of 35- to 40-percent reductions in both launchers and warheads under START. These force cuts would enable them to realize important savings in spending. (S-NF)

- Soviet nuclear controls appear well suited to prevent the seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The ability of the General Staff to maintain its cohesion in the event, for example, of civil war or collapse of the central government, would be a key factor determining whether nuclear controls would break down. (S-NF)
Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces Under START

Current

2000

SLBMs

ICBMs (mobile)

ICBMs (fixed)

Bombers

Bombers

SLBMs

ICBMs (mobile)

ICBMs (fixed)

The change in the area of the circles for the year 2000 indicates the projected reduction in the size of the force.

The Director of Naval Intelligence projects that the number of SLBM warheads will continue to comprise about one-third of the number of strategic warheads under START.
Key Judgments

New Policy Context

We confront divergent trends in Soviet strategic nuclear policy. On one hand, the diminished Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe has significantly lessened the chances of East-West conflict and thus of global nuclear war. On the other hand, Soviet strategic nuclear forces remain large and powerful, major modernization programs are in progress, and Soviet nuclear strategy evidently retains its traditional war-fighting orientation.

As a result of the crumbling of many other aspects of the Soviet Union's overall superpower position, current Soviet leaders appear to view their security and superpower status as hinging more than ever on strategic nuclear power. Over the past year, statements by various Soviet political and military officials have emphasized the increasing importance of Soviet strategic nuclear power. Barring a collapse of central authority or the economy, it seems clear that Soviet leaders will continue to try to shield their strategic forces and programs from the impact of political unrest and economic decline. At the same time, strategic forces have not been exempt from defense spending cuts since 1988, as procurement spending for both strategic offensive and defensive forces has fallen.

We have significant uncertainties about the future roles of reformers, separatists, hardliners, and the Soviet military itself in charting the course of Soviet strategic policy. The possibility remains, therefore, that a reformist regime might challenge the need to maintain strategic nuclear forces comparable to those of the United States to ensure superpower status and might settle for a lower level of force solely for deterrence.

In light of the grave economic, political, and social difficulties afflicting the USSR, we are more skeptical than we were last year that the Soviets will be able to implement fully in the coming decade their modernization plans.

1 For discussion of four alternative futures, which the Intelligence Community believes captures the major possibilities for how the Soviet political and economic situation might develop over the next five years, see NIE 11-18-91, \textit{Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures}, July 1991.
for their strategic offensive and defensive forces. The Soviet economy will be unable to support a sustained military production and deployment effort in the 1990s comparable to that of the 1980s, even for strategic forces. Indeed, the defense sector is already experiencing some of the disruptions that beset the civilian economy. Some facilities for strategic forces seem to be affected, but these difficulties do not yet appear to have had an appreciable effect on the production or deployment of strategic forces. Observed reductions in Soviet spending on strategic forces appear to be primarily the result of programmatic decisions rather than unplanned disruptions.

Separatist pressure in some republics raises the possibility that the center could lose control over certain strategic production facilities, R&D facilities, and test sites. A loss of control would at least complicate and could severely cripple the overall modernization of strategic forces. Moreover, the ability of the central government to fund defense programs depends on economic revenues from the republics, particularly the Russian Republic, some of which are withholding substantial funds. Separatist problems could also affect the deployment and operation of strategic forces. The Baltic republics, for example, are key to the strategic air defense of the northwestern approach to the USSR. We judge that, even if the central government eventually grants the Baltic republics greater autonomy or independence, it would seek to negotiate basing rights with them to preserve these defenses, at least until they could be relocated or replaced. Gorbachev as well as Yeltsin and other republic leaders are working on arrangements for a new union treaty, but we have large uncertainties about relations between the center and the republics over the long term, and how strategic forces might be affected.

Nuclear Security and Control

The Soviets have established physical security and use-control measures that appear well suited to prevent the seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. These measures minimize the risk that renegade military officers or other dissidents could gain access to nuclear weapons and threaten to use them. Since the late 1980s, heightened concerns about potential internal threats has prompted the Soviets to strengthen security, including removing some warheads from areas of unrest. However, a military coup, the collapse of the central government, or a civil war might threaten the center's ability to maintain these controls. Because of the General Staff's crucial role in controlling nuclear weapons, maintenance of its cohesion in these situations would be a key factor determining whether a breakdown of nuclear controls would occur.
START

At present, a broad array of both strategic offensive and defensive systems are in various stages of development, production, or deployment. The rates of production and deployment of some new systems, however, have been lower in the past few years than we anticipated from past practices. As a result, strategic force modernization has slowed somewhat. We attribute these trends primarily to programmatic decisions made in the late 1980s, in particular Soviet preparations for an eventual START agreement that would allow savings by not building forces beyond START levels.

Soviet political and military leaders have strong incentives to see START implemented. Political leaders perceive an opportunity to reduce military expenditures and create a climate that fosters foreign economic aid. Military leaders see an opportunity to modernize their forces under a treaty that would preserve the relative strategic balance between the United States and USSR, introduce an element of predictability in strategic force planning, and bolster US incentives to reduce spending on strategic and other military forces.

For several years, Soviet military leaders have been adjusting their strategic programs to fit START limits. Soviet strategic intercontinental nuclear forces currently stand at about 2,400 launchers and 10,500 deployed warheads; under probable Soviet planning assumptions for START, these forces would decline by some 35 to 40 percent to 1,400 launchers and 6,700 warheads to comply with the Treaty.

START II

A force of 3,000 to 4,000 weapons would require the Soviets significantly to revise their targeting strategy, but they still would be able to deliver a devastating countermilitary strike.

It is unlikely that the General Staff would gear its long-term strategic planning to such an uncertain prospect as START II, although they probably are preparing contingency plans.
Strategic Offensive Forces

The Soviets are moving from a force of which nearly half consists of silo-based ICBMs to one consisting mainly of mobile ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers. Under START, well over half of all Soviet deployed warheads would be on mobile systems, although we project some 2,200 warheads would still be on silo-based ICBMs. Five new ballistic missiles are in development—two land based and three sea based. If these programs continue, we project flight-testing of four of them to begin within the next two to three years with deployments beginning in the mid-1990s. In the midst of political upheaval and economic decline, however, we believe that one or more of the five programs is likely to be canceled or seriously delayed:

- **ICBMs** The Soviets continue to deploy the new SS-18 Mod 5 silo-based ICBM, which enhances capabilities for prompt attack, and the SS-25 road-mobile ICBM, which significantly improves force survivability. They have apparently completed the deployment of the SS-24 Mod 1 rail-mobile ICBM and the Mod 2 silo-based ICBM. Follow-on missiles to both the SS-25 and SS-24 are currently being developed.

- **SLBMs.** The Soviet SSBN force of the future will consist of considerably fewer submarines than today but will be equipped mostly with modern, long-range SLBMs. The Soviets are modifying Typhoon submarines to carry the SS-N-20 follow-on missile, which is being readied for flight-testing within the next year. In addition to the seven Delta-IV submarines already built, four additional submarines, which are probably modified Delta-IVs, probably are under construction. We project that these submarines will carry a new, liquid-propellant SLBM, which we anticipate will be armed with a single warhead. (There is a chance, however, that the Soviets are not building any new modified Delta-IV SSBNs.) There is evidence that a new SSBN is being developed and that it will be armed with a new, solid-propellant SLBM.

- **Bombers.** The Soviets continue to produce the Blackjack, their new strategic bomber, at the rate of three or four a year. We project about 40 will be deployed by 2000, a lower total than we previously had projected. Production of the Bear H cruise missile carrier has slowed and may soon end.

The Soviets have enough warheads to mount a comprehensive attack against fixed targets worldwide (while still retaining weapons in reserve), whether they conducted a preemptive strike or launched on tactical warning. They would retain the same capabilities under proposed START constraints, but they would have fewer weapons in reserve.
Heavy SS-18 ICBMs will remain the primary and most effective weapons against US missile silos during the next 10 years, but some SLBMs and other ICBMs also will be able to destroy hard targets. The SS-18 Mod 5 is about twice as effective against hard targets as the SS-18 Mod 4 that it is replacing; this difference in effectiveness probably enabled the Soviet military to agree to halve the SS-18 force under START.

Strategic Defensive Forces

The Soviets will continue to devote considerable resources to strategic defense, at least through the early 1990s. Nonetheless, with Soviet military resources declining and arms treaties and budget cuts constraining Western capabilities, pressure is increasing to shrink Soviet strategic defense programs. During the past year, the level of effort has decreased somewhat but with little effect on Soviet strategic defensive capabilities:

- **Antisubmarine Warfare** The extensive Soviet ASW program has made some gains. The Soviets have an improved, although limited, ability to detect and engage enemy submarines in waters adjacent to the USSR. In the future, the combined effect of multiple layers of ASW systems may constitute a significant challenge to Western submarine operations in Soviet-controlled waters. We judge, however, that through at least the next 15 to 20 years the Soviets will remain incapable of threatening US SSBNs and SSNs in the open ocean.

- **Air Defense.** We project considerably smaller, but heavily modernized strategic air defenses, with a doubling of deployed systems with good capabilities to engage low-altitude vehicles. Modernization programs include deployment of SA-10 surface-to-air-missiles, Foxhound and Flanker interceptors with lookdown/shootdown capabilities, and Mainstay airborne warning and control system aircraft. New versions of these systems also are in development. We judge that, in the event of a major US nuclear attack, the current Soviet air defense system would be unable to prevent large-scale, low-altitude penetration of Soviet airspace. In the coming decade, however, Soviet strategic air defenses will be much more capable of engaging low-altitude vehicles. As a result, penetration by currently deployed US bombers and cruise missiles will become more difficult, particularly in the heavily defended western USSR. If the B-2 bomber and advanced cruise missile achieve the desired level of reduced observability, using tactics appropriate to stealth, vehicles they probably would be able to penetrate most of the Soviet Union at low altitude. The capabilities of Soviet air defenses will place some limitations on operations of the B-2 bomber, however.
• **Ballistic Missile and Space Defense.** The modernized Moscow antiballistic missile (ABM) system, which will eventually have 100 silo-based interceptors, provides an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks. Through the late 1990s, the Soviets are highly unlikely to undertake widespread ABM deployments that would exceed ABM Treaty limits. Current Soviet antisatellite-capable systems pose a threat to US low-altitude satellites, but the only Soviet capability against high-altitude satellites is electronic warfare.

• **Directed Energy Weapons.** The Soviets are continuing efforts to develop high-energy lasers for air defense, antisatellite, and ballistic missile defense applications. There are large uncertainties and differences of view among agencies, however, about how far the Soviets have advanced, the status and goals of weapon development programs, and the dates for potential prototype or operational capabilities. We judge that within the next two decades the Soviets are likely to develop air defense lasers, ground-based antisatellite lasers, and ground-based radiofrequency antisatellite weapons. The Soviets continue to be interested in developing space-based laser weapons.

• **Leadership Protection.** For 40 years, the Soviet Union has had a vast program under way to ensure the survival of its leaders in the event of nuclear war. This program has involved the construction of an extensive network of deep underground bunkers, tunnels, and secret subway lines in urban and rural areas. There is recent evidence that substantial construction activity continues, and we expect the program to move forward along traditional lines.
The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Year

Special National Intelligence Estimate

This Special National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
SNIE 11-18.2-91

The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Year

Information available as of 23 September 1991 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Scope Note

The Republics of the Former USSR: The Outlook for the Next Year (C NF)

This Estimate examines the key factors that will determine developments in the USSR (excluding the Baltic states) over the next year and the possible alternative outcomes. It focuses primarily on the question of interrepublic relations within and outside a union. Although many internal factors will be important determinants of the long-term course of political and economic development of the republics, this Estimate does not attempt to assess internal republic issues in any detail. Such issues will become more important and will be the focus of much of our future estimative work.
Figure 1
Scenarios for the Republics of the Former USSR Over the Next Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenarii</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confederation</td>
<td>Republics agree on economic union and political confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republics coordinate economic, defense, and foreign policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic governments remain stable despite economic problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Efforts at market reforms accelerate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loose Association</td>
<td>Political/economic reform process continues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several republics, including Ukraine, go their own way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loose common market formed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia forms limited political association with several republics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic problems intensify, threaten legitimacy of some republic leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration</td>
<td>Minimal economic and political cooperation; confederation collapses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relations between republics become increasingly hostile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separatist sentiment grows sharply in Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic distress deepens sharply, causing large-scale social unrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalism in republics grows, authoritarian movements gain strength.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Judgments

The USSR and its Communist system are dead. What ultimately replaces them will not be known within the next year, but several trends are evident:

- Overall, there will be a high level of instability.
- The economy will get much worse, making a bold approach toward economic reform more necessary but politically riskier and harder to do.
- Russia and Ukraine will make credible attempts at applying democratic political principles at all levels of government and shifting to market economics; most other republics probably will not.
- Ethnic turmoil will increase as nationalism grows and ethnic minorities resist the authority of newly dominant ethnic majorities.
- Defense spending and military forces will be reduced, and republics will participate in collective defense decisions and exercise greater authority over defense matters within their own borders.
- Foreign policy will be increasingly fragmented, with the republics conducting their own bilateral relations and to some extent their own diplomacy in multilateral forums.
- Yeltsin will be the most powerful national leader; Gorbachev will have only limited power to act independently and could not win an election without Yeltsin’s support.
- The West will face increased pleas for economic assistance from individual republics as well as from the central government, giving Western countries increased opportunity to promote economic and political reform, but increasing requirements for close coordination of Western aid efforts.

Over the next 12 months, the interplay of several variables will be critical to determining whether the new system evolves in a relatively peaceful manner and in a democratic direction. Three variables are especially important:

- The economy will be the most critical variable. We do not believe that economic conditions this winter will lead to widespread starvation or massive social unrest. If economic hardships are significantly worse than we expect, however, governments at all levels would lose popular support and authoritarian alternatives would become more attractive.
• Russia is of paramount importance not only to the fate of the fragile confederal structures that are being built but also to the prospects for democracy and for the transformation to a market economy. Continued progress by Russia in these areas or a relapse into authoritarianism, which is less likely during the next year, will decisively affect the course of reform in the other republics.

• If Ukraine chooses the path of independence without participating in a confederation—a strong possibility at this point—the viability of a confederation of other republics would be diminished significantly. This development would increase the risk of ethnic conflict between Ukrainians and the Russian minority in the republic and of disputes with Russia over borders and control of military forces on Ukrainian territory.

Over the next year, we believe that three basic scenarios capture the likely evolution of republic relationships:

• Confederation: This scenario is the preferred outcome of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. There would be a weak central authority but close cooperation among the republics in the political, economic, and military spheres. Russia and Ukraine, at least, would lay the groundwork for democratization and a market economy. Nuclear weapons would be controlled operationally by the center. Lines of authority would be relatively clear, and foreign governments could identify and deal with the appropriate levels of government on different policy questions. This scenario would provide the West the advantage of greater predictability. It would also provide increased confidence that nuclear weapons would remain under centralized control, arms control would remain on track, economic assistance to the republics could be more effectively managed, and the democratization process would advance.

• Loosely Associated: The process of political and economic reform continues, but several republics, including Ukraine, establish independence and participate in a loose common market. Although Russia and many of the associated states try to coordinate foreign and military policy, the republics basically pursue independent policies in these areas. Ukraine and other non-Russian republics probably would agree to removal or elimination of strategic nuclear weapons on their territory. Some republics would try to obtain some control over the tactical nuclear weapons on their territories. The potential for divergent foreign and national security policies would increase, but all the key republics would pursue pro-Western foreign policies, and armed forces would be scaled back significantly. Follow-on arms control negotiations for even deeper cuts in nuclear and conventional forces would go forward, although perhaps
more slowly than in a confederation scenario. Implementation and verification of the START and CFE treaties would be complicated. The West would face competing demands for massive assistance, although some mechanism for coordination would exist.

- Disintegration: Cooperation among the republics breaks down at all levels, and the last remnants of a political center disappear. Nationalism becomes more virulent, and economic conditions become increasingly chaotic. As a result, political stability erodes, and conditions are ripe for rightwing coups and authoritarian government in many republics, including Russia and Ukraine. The disposition of nuclear weapons would be contentious, as some republics seek to assert operational control over nuclear weapons on their territory. There would be an increased risk of such weapons falling into terrorist hands and even of their use within the borders of the former USSR. The West probably would be unable to implement and verify arms control agreements. Republics would attempt to involve the West in interrepublic disputes, while demands for Western aid would continue.

Reality is likely to be more complex than any of these scenarios, and elements of all three are likely to be encountered. In our view, it is likely that conditions 12 months from now will most closely resemble the "loose association" scenario. Although the economic situation is grave and the republics are having serious problems in reaching agreement on key economic issues, most understand that they cannot survive on their own. This awareness argues strongly for some kind of economic association that will move, however haltingly, toward a common-market-type system.

We believe the "confederation" scenario is less likely because of the unwillingness of many republics to cede some of their political sovereignty and power to a confederal government. Ukraine will be the key: forces supporting independence with some form of cooperation are currently favored to win the December elections, but their strength is eroding and a vote for those favoring separatism is possible. Even if Ukraine is willing to work toward a new union, difficulties over political and economic approaches and burgeoning nationalism will make it difficult for the republics to agree on a confederal political structure. Potentially the most explosive of these forces is unrest among Russian minorities in non-Russian republics.

The least likely scenario within the time frame of this Estimate is "disintegration." Beyond the year, however, this scenario becomes more likely if elected governments fail to stem the deterioration of economic conditions.
Table 1
Implications of the Scenarios
for Key National Security Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Scenarios</th>
<th>Loose Association</th>
<th>Disintegration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign economic relations</td>
<td>Center would coordinate/facilitate assistance.</td>
<td>Multiple requests for aid.</td>
<td>Western aid vital, but republics lack means to pay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most aid channeled to republics.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Internal strife complicates aid efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military policy</td>
<td>Continued sharp cuts in defense spending.</td>
<td></td>
<td>No unified military command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United military command.</td>
<td>Unitary command retained; increasingly under Russian control.</td>
<td>Most republics begin setting up own armies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>Foreign policies proliferate, but generally coordinated.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Numerous foreign policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central leaders remain primary interlocutors with West.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Little if any coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center frames broad issues, but flexibility limited because of need for consensus.</td>
<td>Republics insist on right to conduct own affairs.</td>
<td>Ability, desire to enter into good faith agreements doubtful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>Prospects for ratifying START, CFE good.</td>
<td>Ukrainian independence poses risks to START, CFE.</td>
<td>Resignation of START, CFE required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Verification unlikely to be disrupted.</td>
<td>Negotiations more complicated; verification uncertain.</td>
<td>Ability to reach future agreements in doubt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Readiness to negotiate mutual deep reductions in forces; unilateral cuts likely.</td>
<td>Most republics remain committed to deep force cuts; Russia likely to reduce strategic forces unilaterally.</td>
<td>Willingness to make deep force cuts uncertain because of tensions between republics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Unified control system remains, but republics exercise joint control over weapons stationed on their territory.</td>
<td>Confederation members agree to keep centralised control.</td>
<td>Centralised control imperiled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine attempts to retain control of some weapons.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine, other republics insist on retaining some weapons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The United States and other Western countries would have influence on developments across the former USSR in either the "confederation" or "loose association" scenario. Russia and most other republic governments will be highly receptive to Western advice on and technical assistance for internal and external reform in exchange for economic assistance. Western influence would be the most effective in those republics, especially Russia, pushing for democratization and marketization.

If the situation moved toward a "disintegration" scenario, Western opportunities to influence the direction of change would diminish significantly with the growth of xenophobic nationalism and would be limited to those republics, if any, resisting the trend toward authoritarianism. (CNF)
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scope Note</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Judgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aftermath of the Coup</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Variables</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing Economic Disarray</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Mood</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic Cooperation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diminishing Role of the Center</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia's Preeminence</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine Heads Toward Independence</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Alternative Scenarios</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loose Association</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospects for Scenarios</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Secret*
10. (Continued)

Discussion

Aftermath of the Coup

The failed coup has created the most favorable opportunity for political democracy and a market economy in the history of the former USSR. The main institutional obstacles to fundamental changes in the system have been severely weakened, and the preconditions for self-determination of republics have been established.

Russia has eclipsed the central government as the most powerful entity in the system, and Yeltsin is now the country's most influential leader. At the same time, the abortive coup has accelerated the breakup of the union. Republic governments are attempting to assert supreme authority on their territories, but their political legitimacy and their ability to fill the power vacuum left by the weakened center varies widely. Most republics are participating in ongoing negotiations toward political, economic, and military cooperation.

Key Variables

The failure of the coup has not guaranteed the success of democratic change and marketization. Democratic norms and market relations will take many years, if not decades, to develop. In the short term, continued progress toward these goals will depend on developments in several key areas.

Continuing Economic Disarray

Over the course of this Estimate, the accelerated deterioration of economic performance will result in further sharp declines in output, greater financial instability, increasing unemployment, and growing problems in the distribution of food and fuel. Negative economic trends now in train will not permit early reversal of the economic slide, regardless of the economic policies that are undertaken.

Table 2

| Soviet Official Indicators of Economic Performance in First Half of 1991, as Compared With 1990* |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                  | First Quarter | Second Quarter |
| GNP                             | –8            | –12             |
| Industrial output               | –5            | –7              |
| Oil                             | –9            | –10             |
| Natural gas                     | 0.3           | 0.2             |
| Coal                            | –11           | –11             |
| Agricultural output             | –13           | –9              |
| Personal incomes *              | 24            | 63              |
| Retail prices *                 | 25            | 96              |
| Retail sales                    | 0.2           | –25             |

* Except as noted, rates of change are calculated from ruble values in prices Soviets claim are constant.

* Calculated by dividing retail sales in current prices by sales in prices Soviets claim are constant.

In the first six months of 1991:

- GNP dropped 10 percent as output fell in most sectors of the economy, in some cases at a very rapid rate. We believe it could decline by approximately 20 percent by the end of the year.
- Widespread shortages affected not only such consumer goods as food and medicine but also vital industrial inputs.
- Projections for the combined central and republic budget deficit for the year climbed to 10 to 15 percent of GNP.
- The inflation rate rapidly approached triple digits.
- Foreign trade contracted sharply; imports dropped 50 percent.

This table is Unclassified.
The Private Sector: Bright Spot on the Horizon

In contrast to the rest of the economy, the private sector continues to exhibit encouraging signs of growth. During the first half of 1991 the number of industrial enterprises leased from the state grew by over 50 percent to 3,700, and the number of small-scale peasant farms climbed by more than 70 percent to 70,000. New restrictions took a slight toll on cooperatives, but they still numbered 255,000. Nonstate sources providing services to these fledgling enterprises also grew during the first six months, with independent commodity exchanges reaching 500 and commercial banks totaling 1,500. The Soviets report that they have concluded more than 3,000 joint ventures that employ more than 100,000 Soviet citizens, although probably less than one-third are actually operating.

While the emergence of market-oriented institutions—new cooperatives, commodity exchanges, commercial banks, joint ventures, and a growing entrepreneurial class—is encouraging, they are still too weak and limited to compensate for the negative effects on everyday life of the breakdown of the command economy.

The Problems of Divisiveness. The coup has brought even greater disarray to policymaking, thus hindering restoration of macroeconomic stability and rapid implementation of structural reform. Political turmoil at the center and inside the individual republics makes it unlikely that a strong consensus on economic policy will be reached.

Maintaining Intergovernment Trade. Declining output places a premium on reducing chokepoints in distribution. Economic linkages are numerous—11 of the 12 republics plus the Baltic states rely on imports from each other for at least 50 percent of their national income. In addition, the IMF estimates that 30 to 40 percent of industrial output consists of products for which there is only one manufacturer. Even foreign trade flows depend on cooperation because key ports and pipelines are concentrated in a few republics.

Worsening Hard Currency Woes. The continuing contraction of imports will further diminish vital supplies. Large-scale debt restructuring or rescheduling, if not debt default, appears imminent. The USSR has yet to service about $5 billion in debt over the remainder of the year and already is more than $4 billion in arrears.
Continuing Monetary and Fiscal Instability. The collapse of the center will not necessarily lead to lower expenditures or a reduction in the deficit. Indeed, budget deficits of both the central and republic governments, lack of constraints on new lending internally, and republican drives for their own currencies will make it difficult to rein in the growth of the money supply.\

Uncertain Pace of Reforms. A Polish-style shock approach is unlikely anywhere in the short run because of its high costs in terms of unemployment and inflation. Moreover, pressures to reverse the economic decline will push many republic policymakers toward the use of administrative decrees rather than marketizing reforms.

Stepped-Up Demilitarization. Military reductions will accelerate, although most political leaders and the High Command wish to avoid a chaotic reduction. Defense industry procurement and production will be hit hard by budget cutbacks and the rising prices of inputs.

Differing Impacts on Republics. Russia, thanks to its vast resources, is best positioned to cope with economic crises. It has leverage with the other republics in trading for food and manufactured goods and in seeking foreign goods and financing. On the downside, Russia faces serious distribution problems, especially in getting food to cities in the north, Far East, and the Urals. Despite Russia's vast energy resources, fuel shortages are likely as a result of distribution and labor problems.

Elsewhere, the problems will vary:

- Only Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmeniya are net energy exporters among the remaining republics. Moldova, Armenia, Byelorussia, and Georgia would be particularly hard hit by supply disruptions and/or price hikes.

- All republics face reductions in food supplies and other consumer goods as cross-border trade and foreign imports decline. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are likely to suffer the most. At greatest risk in all republics are pensioners, the poor, and large families, who must rely on poorly stocked state stores because they cannot afford to buy food through higher priced alternative channels.

---

Figure 2
Republic Imports as Percentage of Net Material Product, 1988*\

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Imports from other republics</th>
<th>Imports from abroad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmeniya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are calculated from official Soviet data in domestic administered prices, the value of each republic's imports is divided by the value of its net material product (national income) a measure that differs from GNP in excluding depreciation and most consumer services.
10. (Continued)

SECRET

Table 4
Oil, Gas, and Coal Balances of the Republics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Crude Oil</th>
<th>Petroleum Products</th>
<th>Natural Gas</th>
<th>Coal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmeniya</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: X = net exporter
O = net importer
- = Neither imports nor exports because it has no refining capacity
= production equals consumption.

This table is Unclassified.

- Declining output and lower budgets will cause unemployment in all republics. Ukraine—like Russia—has extensive defense industries vulnerable to cuts in defense spending.

While the economic news is mostly gloomy and many observers in and out of the former USSR fear catastrophe, in our view, conditions are not likely to lead to widespread famine, epidemics, or numerous deaths from freezing. While pockets of extreme economic distress—including malnutrition—could emerge, distribution will be more of a problem than production. Absent development of adversarial relations among the republics, however, the food and fuel crises this winter should be manageable.

Popular Mood
Public euphoria over the collapse of the centralized Communist state has lent legitimacy to some republic governments and bought them some time to grapple with economic problems. Others, most notably Georgia and Azerbaijan, have been thrown into disarray because of public displeasure with their leaders' posture during the coup. Legitimacy of some governments will increase as elections are held in several republics and localities this fall. This will probably be sufficient to sustain these governments politically over the next year.

How long popular support for elected governments and democratic principles will endure under harsh economic conditions is highly uncertain. Voter support for Yeltsin and other democrats, as well as popular opposition to the attempted coup, were based largely on antipathy toward Communism. Now that democratically elected leaders are being held accountable for the economy, their public support will erode as conditions worsen. Political forces arguing for authoritarian solutions will gain increased support in Russia during the year, but not political power.
Soviet Food Supplies: Between Feast and Famine

The decline in Soviet food production this year is aggravating food shortages, and food supplies will diminish in the months ahead. Widespread famine appears unlikely, however, barring a much more serious breakdown in the economic system. On the supply side:

- This year's estimated grain crop of 185 million tons is down 50 million tons from last year but is only about 10 million tons below the average harvest for the last decade.
- Soviet data show that overall food production was down about 8 percent in the first six months of the year, as compared with the same period in 1990. Output of potatoes and vegetables will be higher than last year, but the production of meat and milk will be down for the second consecutive year.
- Imports of substantial quantities of foodstuffs and feed continue despite the hard currency crunch.
- Republics, cities, and enterprises have been lining up bilateral barter agreements for food in exchange for consumer goods, energy, and raw materials.
- Nevertheless, severe food shortages probably will develop in some localities, due largely to distribution problems:
  - The disintegration of authority and increasing republic autarky have left officials preoccupied with political solutions and requests for Western food assistance at the expense of the harvesting and handling of this year's farm production.
  - Widespread panic buying and hoarding the last two years have left wholesale and retail inventories of food at their lowest levels in several years. Although this implies private stocks are up, they are unevenly distributed.
  - Hoarding is also occurring in the countryside and by various republics. Farms and local officials are refusing to sell grain because they think prices may soon be raised or decontrolled.
  - Ukraine and several other republics have banned the export of harvested grain and other foodstuffs, at least until internal needs are met. Many republics have erected border customs posts to control the movement of goods.

Public readiness for a market economy is even less certain. Although opinion polls show rising support for marketization, popular understanding of this concept and willingness to endure the pain remain in doubt. It is very likely that large-scale public demonstrations and work stoppages will occur if major market reform measures are pursued vigorously.

The public's disdain for Communism has seriously weakened the party, but it has not yet destroyed it. In parts of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, where democratic movements are weak, Communist Party structures are being transformed into instruments of control under the banner of nationalism. At the center and in the Slavic republics, Communists will continue to lose their influence over policymaking, although in the short term they may retain considerable influence over policy implementation.

Republic Cooperation

Despite the "independence fever" that has swept the USSR, the "10 + 1" process recognizes the need to maintain some links and a mechanism to facilitate continuing cooperation. Interrepublic cooperation

10 + 1 refers to the agreement among 10 republics plus Gorbachev, ratified at the recent Congress of People's Deputies, to accept the interim governmental structures and to move toward cooperation on political, economic, and military issues.
Table 6
Possible Ethnic Flashpoints
Over the Next Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Potential for Significant Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Ukrainian and Russian minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnistria</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvolgaic minorities in Crimea, eastern Ukraine</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chcheno Ingush nationalist</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechen Ingush nationalists</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Gamsakhurdia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diminishing Role of the Center
Whatever cooperative arrangements emerge, the republics do not want to re-create a central government with independent power. Central institutions will be vehicles for coordinating interrepublic cooperation and for reaching and carrying out collective decisions. Over the next year:

- A central government will probably play a coordinating role in the area of defense, with republics acting collectively through a state-council-like structure to determine defense policy. Republics will attempt to oversee the activities of central forces within their borders. Some republics such as Ukraine will establish territorial defense forces of their own.

- A central government will probably continue to take the lead on broad foreign policy and national security issues. The republics, especially Russia, will exert greater influence on all matters, and they will conduct their own policies toward countries and regions. They will also take increasing responsibility for foreign economic relations. Mixed signals and contradictory policies are sure to result.

- The center's economic role will depend on the outcome of debate over the proposed economic union. Most decisions on monetary policy, debt repayment, and other key questions probably will be coordinated, but there are strong differences between and within republics over the powers of the center on these questions. The center will be able to issue directives or impose an economic reform blueprint, but only as the agent of the larger republics. However, enforcement of republican compliance with these directives will be problematical, given the compromise nature of the central structures.

Gorbachev's power has diminished greatly along with that of the center. He will probably play an important role during the next year as facilitator of the coordination process and mediator of disputes between republics. His international stature also makes it likely he will remain a conduit to the West. As long as
Table 7
Competing Visions of Economic Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yavlinsky</th>
<th>Saburov</th>
<th>Shatalin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of unity</strong></td>
<td>Federation of most former republics. Full members agree to all treaty provisions. Associate members accept coordinated monetary, budget, and tax policy.</td>
<td>Federation of core former republics. Others may participate as partial members in a customs union.</td>
<td>Economic community of former republics and some East European states. Members choose full, associate, or observer status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monetary policy</strong></td>
<td>Ruble is common currency. Members may introduce own currency by special agreement.</td>
<td>Ruble is common currency for core states. Other members may have own by special agreement.</td>
<td>Members may have own currencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal policy</strong></td>
<td>One tax system for all members. Limited budget for center formed from members' dues.</td>
<td>Members coordinate independent tax policies. Fund some national programs.</td>
<td>Members encouraged to coordinate independent tax policies. Fund few activities for center.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign economic relations</strong></td>
<td>Foreign debt serviced jointly, new debt incurred individually or jointly.</td>
<td>Republics service foreign debt and receive new assistance. Republics conduct trade.</td>
<td>Republics may service debt alone or jointly. Each conducts trade.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is **Secret**.

The depth and durability of the Russian leadership's commitment to democracy and market principles has yet to be tested, however, and some important uncertainties remain:
- Yeltsin's propensity to rule by decree has raised concerns among fellow democrats over his commitment to constitutional order and due process.
- Although Yeltsin and most other leaders of the republic have broken with the Communist Party, their centralized instincts could die hard.

Russia's Preeminence
Russia is critical to the outcome of the ongoing transformation. There can be no confederation without Russia, and, without progress toward democracy in Russia, the prospects for its development in the remaining republics are significantly diminished. Without a healthy Russian economy, the prospects for economic recovery elsewhere are bleak.

Political trends in Russia favor fundamental change. Yeltsin has done more than other republic leaders to strengthen democratic institutions, and his advisers and allies have a record of support for democracy and economic reform. Moreover, his popularity and dynamic style of leadership make bold action to propel the republic forward more likely in the next year.
What if Yeltsin Leaves the Scene?

In Russia
Yeltsin’s absence from the Russian leadership would result in factional infighting among democrats and a slowing of reform measures that require a strong leader to keep the public on board. Russian institutions have had time to sink some roots, however, and the coup deepened the democratic direction of Russian policies. Any successor would probably not change course but would almost certainly have greater difficulty reaching a consensus and implementing reform throughout Russia.

Vice President Rutskoy would assume the presidency until new elections are held. Who would win an election is not clear. St. Petersburg Mayor Sobchak ranks a distant second in most recent public opinion polls, but his popularity would probably rise with Yeltsin gone because of name recognition. Other officials such as Rutskoy, former Russian Prime Minister Silayev, KGB Chief Bakatin, Moscow Mayor Pogov and Movement for Democratic Reform leader Aleksandr Yakovlev have registered in polls, but all lack Yeltsin’s grassroots support.

In the Economy
The loss of Yeltsin’s guiding hand would slow current negotiations to preserve an economic union as well as Russia’s own progress toward economic reform. It would also make implementing austerity measures much more politically risky. Without Yeltsin’s commitment to maintaining interrepublican economic relations—including a single currency and common tariffs and monetary policy—forceful advocates of autonomy within Russia would push for the republic’s independence.

At the Center
Yeltsin’s absence from the political scene would probably raise Gorbachev’s standing—as the only other leader with significant national recognition—but without Yeltsin behind him, he may have a more difficult time working out agreements with other republic leaders. Yeltsin’s cooperation with Gorbachev has been a driving force behind progress on the union treaty. Without Yeltsin, voices in the Russian government advocating a “go it alone” strategy might gain prominence and Russia may not have the same ability to jockey other republic leaders into supporting some union structures.

The growing assertiveness of “autonomous” regions, particularly Tatarstan, threatens the governability and cohesiveness of the Russian Republic. Their status has been problematic for Yeltsin since the beginning of the union treaty process. When local elections occur in Russia, the leaders of these regions are likely to grow even more assertive as they seek to satisfy their constituents. Some conflict with Yeltsin’s appointed penipotentaries is certain. Local leaders will almost certainly try to exploit a weakening of Yeltsin’s political position or that of Russia vis-a-vis other republics.

Russian nationalism, already a formidable force in republic politics, will grow over the next year and would be fanned by mistreatment of Russian minorities in other republics. Nationalist extremists are currently a small element on the Russian political spectrum, but their influence may grow markedly if public support for the current government erodes more than we anticipate. An increase in the political influence of antidemocratic Russian nationalism would heighten the fear in the other republics of resurgent Russian imperialism.

Ukraine Heads Toward Independence
The durability and effectiveness of a new union depends heavily on the role of Ukraine. Kravchuk and other Ukrainian leaders seem inclined toward participating in a confederation agreement, but they are
under strong pressure from nationalist forces to pursue independence. As the 1 December presidential election and referendum on independence approach, Kravchuk will look for opportunities to demonstrate his commitment to protecting Ukrainian sovereignty, even if it means publicly supporting withdrawal from the “10 + 1” process and going for complete independence.

Ukraine is almost certain to approve the independence resolution in December. We do not know how complete the break with Russia and other republics will be. If Kravchuk wins the presidential election, Ukraine will probably agree to at least associate status in a confederation and continue a measure of cooperation on economic and military issues. A sharper break would probably occur if his opponent wins and would have serious consequences:

- A disruption of trade links between Ukraine and other republics would have a major impact. Ukraine depends on Russia for imports of crude oil and other energy supplies. Russia and other republics depend heavily on Ukraine for food.
- Opposition to total independence by Russians, Russified Ukrainians, and other ethnic groups living in Ukraine would pose a serious threat to political stability, raise border issues with Russia, spark violent incidents, and at a minimum make bilateral cooperation more difficult.
- Disagreement over control of military assets on Ukrainian territory probably would intensify. Ukraine would probably reverse its position on removing nuclear weapons from the republic and demand that they be put under command and control of the Ukrainian military. It would also take steps toward creating a large republic standing army, and demand that all union forces withdraw from the republic.

**Three Alternative Scenarios**

The large number of variables could eventually lead to widely differing political, economic, and military outcomes in the former USSR. We believe three scenario—confederation, loose association, and dis-
Indicators of Confederation

- Agreements between 10 republic leaders and Gorbachev on economic union and economic reform.
- Rapid movement toward agreement on constitution establishing confederation's political structures and power-sharing arrangements.
- Nationalist elements in republics fail to press demands for independence, agree to abide by terms of confederation.
- Yeltsin and Gorbachev continue to cooperate.
- Economic problems do not intensify dramatically; no large-scale labor unrest.

Confidential Material

own basic political and economic course, but it provides for a coordinated approach to monetary and financial policy, interrepublic trade, debt repayment, foreign affairs, and defense. Lines of authority are clarified, and foreign governments can identify and deal with the appropriate levels of government on different policy questions. Republic governments remain stable through the food and fuel crises this winter, and democratic institutions and practices in Slavic areas at least gain strength.

Internal Implications. Economic. While the republics would suffer the consequences of economic trends evident before the abortive coup, the damage would be contained and the longer-term prospects for stabilizing and reforming the economy would improve:

- The republics would not enact disruptive measures, such as tariffs, exorbitant energy and commodity price hikes, and cancellation of contracts.
- Some control over the money supply would be ensured, with a single currency remaining the means of interrepublic exchange. If republic currencies were allowed, a union banking agreement would restrain the printing of money.
- Coordination of fiscal policies could begin to arrest the growth of budget deficits. Agreement on republic and local tax contributions to the center would facilitate narrowing the central budgetary gap.

- Some republics—particularly Russia—would press ahead more vigorously toward a market economy, although Polish-style "shock therapy" would not be tried in the next year.
- Some old-style administrative approaches aimed at stabilization, including state orders and wage and price controls, would remain, but the overall environment for foreign investment and membership in international economic organizations would be improved.

Political. This scenario would provide the best prospects for political stability and, therefore, democratic change throughout the confederation. Interrepublic cooperation would help prevent interethnic tensions from escalating into violent conflicts within or between republics.

An agreement to establish a confederal political structure would enable a central government to continue to exist and do business with foreign governments, but the center would not dominate the republics. The sphere of central responsibilities would be greatly reduced, as would the central bureaucracy and the power of the presidency. The authority of these institutions would be enhanced by popular elections.

Russia would be the most powerful state in the confederation. All major policies of the center would require Russia's concurrence, but the other republic members would try to use central structures to check Russian dominance.

Gorbachev, in alliance with Yeltsin, would be a key player in the negotiations on the economic and political framework for interrepublic cooperation, at least until elections are held. As head of the interim government, he and his foreign ministry would remain the chief interlocutors with foreign governments, but he would not have the power to make major foreign policy decisions without the republics' concurrence.

Military. Military reform would accelerate. Under this scenario, a common decisionmaking structure would allow for a reasonably coherent and controlled
force reduction as well as restructuring. A unified command over strategic and general purpose forces would be retained, preserving the stability of the armed forces and providing the strongest guarantees for the security of nuclear weapons. The center would also retain operational control of smaller air and naval forces and rapid reaction ground forces, backed up by republic-controlled reserves.

The republics probably would spend less of their own money in establishing their own military forces. Although the military under a unified command would have some influence in government circles, they would not be able to protect the armed forces from drastic reductions.

Implications for the West. This scenario would provide a more predictable path to the future. A new confederal union would remain a major military power, but would be strongly committed to reducing the defense burden through negotiations and unilateral cuts. The prospects would be good for ratifying the
CFE and START agreements, as would the chances that implementation and verification of arms control agreements would not be disrupted.

The West inevitably would have to deal with a proliferation of foreign policies as republics seek representation in international forums. Under this scenario, however, it is less likely that these foreign policies would work at cross-purposes.

The smaller threat of political instability and interpublic conflict under this scenario would reduce but not eliminate the risks to Western engagement. As economic performance continued to decline, at least in the short term, the outlook for Western trade and investment would remain poor. Debt default might be averted, but large-scale debt restructuring would be likely.

With demands for aid increasing from all republics, Western governments would have to channel most assistance directly to them. A union agreement, however, would facilitate interrepublic coordination in the allocation and distribution of assistance and make the economic and political climate more favorable for foreign investment.

Under this scenario, the republics would exert their independence in bilateral relations but would allow the central foreign ministry to represent their interests in arms control and other multilateral republic matters. They would retain responsibility for framing the discussion of foreign policy questions in interrepublic bodies, for communicating Western proposals to those bodies, and for negotiating with Western partners. While Gorbachev remains president, his experience, international stature, and skills at persuasion would give him considerable influence in determining the outcome of collective decisions.

Indicators of Loose Association:

- Agreement is reached on forming a loose economic union.
- Russia, other republics, conclude series of bilateral agreements on economic and political cooperation.
- Strong vote for Ukrainian independence in December referendum leads to severing of ties to confederation.
- Chernovil defeats Kravchuk in presidential election.

Confidential-Not for Official Use

Internal Implications. Economic. The republics would reach broad agreements covering fiscal and monetary targets, a common currency, and foreign debt repayment. The republics are unlikely, however, to reach consensus on the details needed to effectively carry out all of the provisions of the common market. Trade disruptions and shortages would intensify because of the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms, the differing pace of economic reforms within each republic, and growing republic protectionism. Under these circumstances, republic administrative decrees aimed at stabilization would increase; necessary, but unpopular, steps toward marketization would slow.

Political. Russian dominance of any political association would heighten fears among other republic leaders of Russian hegemonism. Even if Russia did not behave toward these republics in a heavy-handed fashion, fears of Russian domination would jeopardize the long-term survival of this association. The legitimacy of some republic leaders would become more...
Figure 4
Republic Distribution of Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces

- Silo-based ICBM division
- Mobile ICBM division (operational)
- Heavy bomber base
- SSBN base

fragile as they failed to halt their republics' economic slide. This would lead to increased popular discontent and pressures to adopt more authoritarian measures. Gorbachev's political role would be minimal. 

Military. Russia and the associated republics could agree to smaller centrally commanded strategic and general purpose forces, but the non-Russian republics would expand the "national guard" units under their control to counterbalance a Russian-dominated army. Ukraine would press ahead with forming its own armed forces and would seek removal of central forces remaining in the republic. Ukrainian and other non-Russian republic leaders probably would agree to removal or destruction of strategic weapons on their territory. Some republic leaders might insist on obtaining control of the tactical nuclear arsenal on their territories as a hedge against Russian imperialism.

Implications for the West. Western governments would be dealing mostly with Russia and Ukraine as those republics tried to develop democratic governments and market economies. The other republics, however, would be sensitive to Western, Russian, or Ukrainian conduct that suggested their interests could be ignored. Because the republics would insist on
conducting a significant portion of their own foreign affairs, there would be greater difficulty in negotiating and ensuring compliance with international agreements. At the same time, most republics would be eager to expand their contacts and cooperation with the West, primarily for economic reasons. The individual republics would be even more eager for economic assistance given the difficulty of negotiating effective mechanisms for interrepublic economic cooperation. They would also seek membership in regional and international organizations and pursue collective security agreements.

Russia and its associates would adhere to arms control agreements and pursue follow-on negotiations aimed at ensuring even deeper force cuts. Ukraine's decision to build up its own forces would endanger the implementation and verification of existing treaties.

Disintegration

Efforts to form a new confederation and an economic community fail. Interrepublic cooperation is modest and bilateral. Animosities between republics rise sharply, and, as nationalism becomes a more virulent force, threats and counterthreats crop up over border disputes. Separatist movements in the republics gain popular strength, and the integrity of the Russian Republic is undermined as some ethnic minorities pursue their independence. Republics assume control over economic resources and establish strict border and tariff controls, but leaders cannot cope with mounting economic and political problems. Nationalist, authoritarian politicians and political parties gain strength. The potential for rightwing coups in key republics increases.

Internal Implications. Economic. The republics would be left to their own devices. For a short time, Russian leaders would have the popular support and political will to attempt economic reforms, but serious food shortages exacerbated by barriers to interrepublic trade would soon erode their legitimacy. Other republican leaders would be overwhelmed by economic problems and look outward for assistance. Central Asian republics would look toward the Middle East for help. The success of efforts in Russia and the other democratically oriented republics would depend largely on the conclusion of trade agreements with the West and the other breakaway republics, but negotiations probably would be prolonged. The pressure of time would be intense, however, because of mounting economic chaos.

Political. The inability of the Russian leadership to hold the confederation together would encourage national groups within its borders to assert their sovereignty in a scramble to seize control of critical economic resources. At the same time, Russian minorities in other republics, fearing hostile treatment, would attempt to migrate or seek unification with Russia, thereby increasing the prospects for civil strife.

Xenophobic Russian nationalism would gain in strength as economic conditions worsened and as societal tensions increased. Leaders in the less democratically oriented republics of Central Asia, confronted by popular unrest and economic disorder, would quickly institute even more authoritarian measures. Over time, the fragmentation of the former USSR into a number of independent republics, some

Indicators of Disintegration:

- Negotiations on political and economic cooperation collapse.
- Economic conditions deteriorate sharply; numerous incidents of food shortages, perhaps famine, provoke large-scale strikes.
- Rivalries between republic leaders intensify sharply; threats and counterthreats exchanged over treatment of national minorities within republics.
- Sharp growth in popularity of authoritarian political parties/movements calling for establishment of authoritarian regimes within republics.

Confidential—Reform
Figure 5
Comparative Nationalities, by Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Total Population (thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>147,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmeniya</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The latest census reports two different figures for the total population of each republic.
One is based on the number of people in the republic on the day the census was conducted.
This map uses the other, which is based on the number of people reporting the republic
as their place of permanent residence.*
of them politically unstable and hostile toward one another, would increase the likelihood of serious civil conflict.

**Military.** Russia would assume immediate control of the conventional and nuclear forces on its territory and probably would try to do so over some assets in other republics. Non-Russian republics would move quickly to establish their own armed forces for protection against Russia, against one another, or against other states along their borders. Economic difficulties would limit their size and capabilities, however. Russia would still be under strong pressure to continue to cut military spending in an effort to overcome its economic problems.

The risk of serious civil conflict would rise as the republics attempted to assert authority over military installations and units within their territory. Many commanders and soldiers would have to decide to whom they owed their allegiance; their willingness to submit to a new authority or lay down their arms would be an open question.

The disposition of nuclear weapons would be a much more contentious issue in this scenario. As each republic looked to its own security, some republics with nuclear weapons would seek to assert operational control over them, rather than turning them all over to Russia. Authoritarian political leaders, unconstrained by central authority or even a loose confederation, would view nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing the status of their republic in the eyes of the world.

The probability of military intervention in politics would increase as political instability deepened. An alliance between military leaders and nationalists would form that would threaten the constitutional order.

**Implications for the West.** The fragmentation of the former USSR would confront the West with grave dangers because of the chaos and unpredictability of events within the republics. The disappearance of reliable central control over nuclear weapons in some republics, as well as uncertainty over their disposition, would increase the prospect of nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands. The risk would mount if an accident involving such weapons within the former boundaries of the USSR or even their use in interrepublican conflict. Use against the outside world would be much less likely. The danger that nuclear materials and expertise would find their way to other states seeking to develop nuclear weapons would become greater.

Conflict within or between republics would pose serious risks for the West because violence could easily spill across international boundaries. Long-quiet border disputes probably would reappear, and the proliferation of republic armies would increase the likelihood that states would seek to resolve such disputes by force. Western countries and international organizations, such as the UN and CSCE, would be drawn into efforts to end such disputes given the possible stakes involved.

This scenario would make implementing and verifying arms control agreements, particularly CFE, virtually impossible. The West would confront numerous uncoordinated foreign policies rather than one, and the willingness of many of the new states to enter into agreements in good faith would be questionable. Agreements on conventional forces in Europe probably would have to be renegotiated. It is doubtful, moreover, that the former members of the USSR could reach an agreement on reallocation of forces to comply with the CFE force ceilings. The START agreement would also be endangered if Ukraine, Byelorussia, or Kazakhstan attempted to retain control over strategic nuclear weapons on their territory.

All the republics would call on the West to provide assistance to ameliorate the great economic hardships, but most republics could not pay for it and many would have domestic policies that would discourage providing it. Strife within and between republics would complicate aid efforts.
Prospects for Scenarios

Reality is likely to be more complex than any of three scenarios we have discussed in this Estimate. We believe, however, that they capture the broad range of possibilities. In our view, it is likely that conditions 12 months from now will most closely resemble the "loose association" scenario. Although the economic situation is grave and the republics are having serious problems in reaching agreement on key economic issues, most understand that they cannot survive on their own. This awareness argues strongly for some kind of economic association that will move, however haltingly, toward a common market-type system.

We believe the "confederation" scenario is less likely. Ukraine will be the key: forces supporting confederation are currently favored to win the December elections, but their strength may be eroding and an upset is possible. Even if Ukraine is willing to work toward a new union, centrifugal forces may overwhelm the republics. Potentially the most explosive of these forces is unrest among the Russian minorities living outside the Russian Republic. A new center could offer little in the way of incentives to gain republic support. Although many republics would like to see a counterweight to Russia, they have no interest in buying into a strengthened center to get it.

The least likely scenario within the time frame of this Estimate is "disintegration." Most republic governments have sufficient public support to sustain themselves through the difficult months ahead, and they understand the need for continued cooperation with other republics. Forces of reaction are too weak at present and their political prospects over the next year are poor unless an economic catastrophe occurs. Beyond the next year, however, this scenario becomes more likely if elected governments fail to stem the deterioration of economic conditions.

Receptivity to Western influence is greater than ever before. Central, republic, and even local leaders are eager for emergency economic assistance, and for Western help and expertise in laying the foundations of a market economy, building democratic political institutions, and reducing the burden of defense.

Over the next year, the possibility of a catastrophic winter poses the most serious threat to the successful transformation of the old system. Western food assistance, targeted at key population centers and effectively distributed, would reduce the danger that popular anger over food shortages would destabilize democratic governments. If widely visible, such assistance could promote goodwill toward the West.

Getting the aid to where it is most needed, however, will not be an easy undertaking. Potentially serious shortages this winter of food, fuel, and medicines are scattered over large geographic areas. Well-documented problems with communications, transportation, and storage, as well as bureaucratic inefficiencies and black-marketeering, will hamper assistance efforts.

Western policies that would alleviate economic hardship and increase hope for better times ahead could help stave off further political fragmentation and instability. These include: a coordinated debt restructuring package, new credits, accelerated steps toward IMF membership, and a ruble stabilization fund.
Figure 6  
The Republics on the Issues

- Yes  
- No  
- Unknown

**Political Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Foreign Policy/Security Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stability Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Military Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
<th>Turkmenistan</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Uzbekistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Russia's preoccupation with domestic issues has delayed discussions on new center-republic institutions but important reform elements, for example, land reform, are already in place.

b. Several areas of serious unrest, but these are localized and do not threaten Russia as a whole.

c. Ethnic and territorial tensions exist, but no direct clashes or conflicts.

d. Internal troops only.

e. At this point, only a small national guard.
In either the "confederation" or the "loose association" scenarios, the West would have influence on subsequent developments by focusing primarily on Russia and Ukraine. Russia would be the principal player in decision-making for defense policy and arms control. It would have the best chance among the republics of carrying out economic reform and political democratization. The West could coax, but not compel, Ukraine toward a more cooperative approach with Russia and other republics as well as toward more democratic processes in internal policies. Tensions over such issues as borders, minority rights,
economic relations, and military forces could be reduced with the help of Western “good offices.” Thus, to the extent that Western involvement facilitated cooperation, it could affect developments elsewhere. (C NF)

Western influence would be most limited under the “disintegration” scenario. If authoritarian regimes came to power in the republics, they would want Western economic assistance and cooperation, but they would resist demanding respect for human rights and democratic freedoms. It would be especially difficult to promote republic cooperation in working out common problems. As nationalist sentiment grew stronger, anti-Western feelings would become more pronounced. (C NF)
Civil Disorder in the Former USSR: Can It Be Managed This Winter?

National Intelligence Estimate

This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-18.3-91

Civil Disorder in the Former USSR: Can It Be Managed This Winter? (CNF)

Information available as of 29 November 1991 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Office of Intelligence Support, Department of the Treasury
The Director for Intelligence, Department of Energy

also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
This Estimate is one of a series to be published in the coming weeks on various crises facing the former USSR.

The problems facing the new governments and their attempts to deal with them make it likely that one or more of the former world leaders will return. (CNR)
Key Judgments

Civil Disorder in the
Former USSR: Can It Be
Managed This Winter? (C-NF)

- Severe economic conditions, the fragmentation of the armed forces, and ongoing interethnic conflict this winter will combine to produce the most significant civil disorder in the former USSR since the Bolsheviks consolidated power. (C-NF)

- Directly targeted and administered Western assistance would improve Russia's chances of maintaining stability through the winter, but the odds of preventing a social explosion that would overwhelm or topple the government depend most critically on Yeltsin's ability to manage painful reforms effectively. (C-NF)

- Yeltsin's performance thus far is mildly encouraging: he apparently will not restrict credit and spending so rapidly as to result immediately in massive unemployment and bankruptcies. But his mishandling of price liberalization—causing panic buying by announcing it in advance—demonstrates the potential for further mismanagement that could lead to the collapse of his government and, with it, prospects for reform. (C-NF)

- Because of less severe food shortages, Ukraine's prospects of remaining stable through the winter are good as long as it continues to avoid significant friction with Russia. The impact of civil disorder in other republics will vary, but all would eventually be seriously affected by instability in Russia. (C-NF)

- All republics will resort to some authoritarian measures to cope with unrest, but Russia and Ukraine at least will avoid a heavy reliance on coercive force that would generate intense opposition and hasten political destabilization. (C-NF)
7. (Continued)

Figure 1
Potential Areas of Unrest
in the Former Soviet Union

Russia

Kazakhstan

Ukraine

Turkey

1. Checheno Ingushetiykaya Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR)
2. Kabardino-Balkarskaya ASSR
3. Karachay-Cherkesskaya
Autonomous Soviet ASSR
4. Nogorno-Karabakhskaya AO
5. Severo Ossetinskaya ASSR (North Ossetia)
6. Krym Otdelivskaya AO (Crimean ASSR)
Discussion

During the winter months, the likelihood that civil disorder will be sufficient to destabilize governments at all levels will be higher than at any time since the 1920s. Mass demonstrations, strikes, violent protests, and even acts of terrorism are probable, given the severe problems that each republic, especially Russia, must grapple with over the next four to five months.

Likely Flashpoints

Where?
Over the next few months, differing degrees of unrest will occur in virtually every republic of the former USSR. Of these, civil disorder in Russia represents the greatest danger to stability in the region by virtue of Russia’s size, influence, and resources.

Those areas of Russia most likely to experience serious unrest include the two largest cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg; industrial cities of the Urals, such as Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk), Perm’, and Chelyabinsk; and rebellious regions, such as the Tatar, Checheno-Ingush, and Yakut Autonomous Republics.

Yeltsin’s performance in managing the economic reform process will be critical. Liberalizing prices, cutting defense expenditures, and shutting down loss-making firms are all essential to restoring stability to the economy and laying the groundwork for its recovery. Moving too rapidly to curtail government spending and commercial credit, however, could cause bankruptcies to skyrocket and unemployment to soar by winter’s end. Yeltsin, therefore, has strong incentives to avoid so hasty an approach. He must also avoid the kinds of counterproductive actions and
statements he has made occasionally in the past. By announcing in advance that price controls would be removed, for example, Yeltsin sparked panic buying that emptied store shelves and increased social tension. (xvi)

Lingering "independence euphoria" and less severe food shortages will give Ukraine a better chance than Russia of remaining stable through the winter months. Serious energy shortages, however, will probably cause some social unrest. In addition, tensions between ethnic Ukrainians and minority Russians are likely to increase to some degree as the Ukrainian government acts to consolidate independence. Interethnic frictions would intensify significantly if Kievan contrary to its current policies—tried to impose discriminatory language and citizenship laws on Russian-populated areas, or if regions with large Russian populations attempt to assert their autonomy. Areas that face the greatest potential of unrest include Crimea, where 67 percent of the population is Russian, and the Donbas mining region, where difficult economic conditions will aggravate relations between Ukrainians and the large minority of Russians living there. (xvii)

Perceived mistreatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine would worsen relations between the governments of Ukraine and Russia. Such a development might rally a majority of each republic's population to support its government, but, over time, any breakdown in bilateral cooperation would have an even more destabilizing economic and social impact on both republics. (xvii)

Outside of Russia and Ukraine, the extent of civil disorder will vary, depending on economic conditions, ethnic rivalries, and political traditions. Food shortages and unemployment will generate some unrest in parts of Central Asia, although authoritarian governments and the relative lack of organized political opposition or economic pressure groups are likely to inhibit protest efforts, at least in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (xviii)

Interethnic conflict is a more likely source of destabilizing civil disorder in Central Asia, especially if sizable and relatively privileged ethnic Russian populations become the targets of discrimination, protest, or even violence by resentful Central Asians. Such actions would accelerate and make more destabilizing an exodus of Russians that has already begun. (xviii)

Ethnic tensions elsewhere will also trigger civil disorders this winter. The Transcaucasus region is already on the verge of civil war. The simmering conflicts between the government of Moldova and Russian and Turkic minorities in the breakaway Dnestr and Gagauz regions also are likely to flare up. (xviii)

Who?

Besides dissatisfied ethnic minorities, civil disorder is most likely to involve the groups most affected by economic hardships. (xviii)

Military Personnel. While central control of the military remains largely intact, servicemen are growing increasingly intolerant of abysmal housing conditions, food shortages, and insufficient incomes. Some individual officers, groups of soldiers, or even regiments already have threatened to disobey central command structures. They could look for governmental allies at the republic or local level, in some cases begin foraging for food and supplies, and possibly become powers unto themselves. (xviii)

Ferment in the military is already creating extraordinary situations. On 15 November, for example, the first "strike committee" in the armed forces was established in Ukraine, threatening protest actions in support of economic demands. (xviii)

Perhaps the greatest potential for unrest will be among military personnel scheduled to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, where conditions are relatively comfortable. Representatives of officers' assemblies of military units stationed in the Baltic states have already threatened not to leave until better conditions are created for them at the new places they will be stationed. (xviii)
Workers. Increased labor unrest is certain. Striking workers in the energy and transportation sectors would have the greatest impact. Coal miners demonstrated their power last spring when they staged strikes that forced major economic concessions from the central government. If anything, worker disgruntlement is even more widespread now:

- Labor organizations, many of which are opposed to marketizing reforms, staged a “week of united trade union actions” this fall aimed at pressuring Russian Republic authorities to increase wages and improve living conditions.

- Medical workers held demonstrations and “warning strikes” throughout the Russian Republic on 13 November to protest miserably low wages, unbearable working conditions, and shortages of critical medicines.

- A Moscow students’ trade union committee recently appealed to Yeltsin to increase funding for higher education, warning that the “slightest delay” could be “the catalyst that sparks off a social explosion among students.”

The Unemployed. As unemployment grows substantially, it will hit industries across the board. At least half of those thrown out of work will probably come from defense plants in Russia and Ukraine. Other heavy industries, such as ferrous metals, will also be hit. Republic governments probably will be unable to cope with an avalanche of demands for help from unemployed workers. Under such circumstances, protest actions are inevitable. Although the unemployed lack organization at present, they are a likely target of mobilization by organized political or economic groups.

Consumers. Consumers are long accustomed to scarce and shoddy goods, but food and fuel shortages combined with skyrocketing prices of many essential goods could finally push them over the edge. Like the unemployed, consumers lack organization. Moreover, those who will suffer the most economic pain—pensioners, the disabled, and children—are least likely to engage in direct protest action.

Nevertheless, spontaneous protests, riots, and violence are probable in shopping places as tempers reach the boiling point. For example, police were recently called in to restore order at one St. Petersburg store when customers trying to buy low-priced eggs went on a rampage after finding that the shelves had been emptied. Many such frustrated consumers will join mass rallies and demonstrations organized by other protesting groups. Adept handling by the authorities will be critical in determining whether such protests remain just a letting-off of steam or become truly destabilizing.

Impact on Stability

No one knows whether the Yeltsin government can survive the winter. We believe that there is some possibility that it will be overthrown or simply lose its authority, due mainly to government mismanagement of the economic reform process.
On balance, however, Yeltsin's statements and actions give grounds for modest optimism that the Russian government will not be destabilized. Faced with the prospect of growing unrest, we believe Yeltsin will take steps to defuse or inhibit it:

- He has already boosted the wages of state-funded workers in an effort to ease the pain of the transition to a market economy. Although he will proceed with the liberalization of prices on most commodities, he probably will not curtail credit and spending so rapidly as to cause widespread bankruptcies and massive unemployment in early 1992. Such steps might preserve short-term stability at the expense of long-term economic health, however.

- Yeltsin is willing to curb democratic practices in order to maintain stability. He will most likely make selective use of executive rule to deal with local unrest. He is less likely to adopt more sweeping strong-arm measures in an effort to buy time to administer harsh economic medicine. As the recent "state of emergency" debacle in Checheno-Ingushetia illustrated, Yeltsin would encounter serious difficulties in carrying out emergency decrees. Moreover, it would alienate his most important political constituencies and jeopardize his political position.

The reaction of the military to requests from civilian authorities to suppress civil disorder in the Russian Republic will depend greatly on the circumstances of each case. On balance, however, we have serious doubts that Russian-dominated military forces would be reliable instruments in using deadly force against fellow Russians.

Besides economic factors, stability in Ukraine depends in large measure on the zeal with which the government moves to affirm its independence. Ukrainian government policies probably will strain relations with minority Russians and further the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces. Military units and officers stationed in Ukraine will face increasing pressure to decide whether their loyalties extend to Moscow or to Kiev. Combined with deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, such pressures will almost certainly deepen turmoil within the military and increase the danger that renegade units will appear.

Outside of Russia and Ukraine, the prospects for destabilization vary:

- Byelorussia's ex-Communist leadership has at least a 50-percent chance of surviving the winter, despite deteriorating economic conditions that will probably produce widespread unrest. Over time, it will be undercut by radical economic reforms in Russia, and labor unrest similar to that which hit the republic last April would follow.

- Georgian PresidentGamacrkhurde faces intense political opposition, as well as resistance to Georgian rule in South Ossetia and the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic. But his continued popular support—he was elected overwhelming by direct popular vote earlier this year—and his dictatorial methods probably will keep him in power, at least over the next few months.

- The bloody dispute between Armenians and Azeris over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh already is threatening to escalate into a civil war. That outcome would be ensured if the USSR Interior Ministry Troops are removed, a likely prospect if efforts to form a political union languish.

- Central Asian republics—especially Kazakhstan and, to some extent, Kyrgyzstan—probably will be relatively quiet this winter. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are more likely to experience instability in the near term.

All republics would eventually be affected by the destabilization of Russia. Most republic governments would seek to protect themselves by turning inward and imposing authoritarian rule. In most cases, these responses would fail to stem internal unrest.

Directly distributed Western assistance this winter, especially emergency food and medical aid targeted to major cities, would probably help increase the prospects for stability. Such aid, delivered by airlift and administered by Westerners on the ground, would have the greatest chance of circumventing distributional roadblocks—the most likely cause of severe food shortages. Aid programs that rely on internal
A Better Winter?

There is some chance that conditions will not be as bad as this Estimate depicts and that civil disorder will not be as widespread. Several factors could inhibit massive political protests:

- A reservoir of support for Yeltsin exists that transcends the immediate performance of his government. This could inhibit civil unrest—at least among ethnic Russians within Russia—so long as he is seen as playing straight with them.

- Russians, as well as other ethnic groups, have a long history of enduring conditions almost unthinkable in the West. While there is a breaking point, our analysis may err in assuming that the population is closer to it than it actually is.

- Winter conditions in most of the former USSR are hardly ideal for massive outdoor rallies and demonstrations. In addition, the black, gray, and new legal markets may be more effective than we expect in taking up the slack.

- We are uncertain how much has been diverted into these channels as well as how much individual citizens are hoarding; the amount undoubtedly is more than official statistics suggest.

- As prices are liberalized, more goods could become available throughout the country than we now anticipate.

- We may not account sufficiently for the deal making—barter, theft, selling of services, and so forth—that citizens have historically used to survive amid shortages.

Going From Bad to Worse

Several developments are possible that would increase the chances of destabilization of governments beyond the level already discussed, especially if they occurred in combination. While some are more likely than others, we believe that none is probable in the next four to five months:

- Yeltsin’s death, especially by assassination, would probably throw the Russian government into chaos, strengthen centrifugal forces within the Russian Republic, reduce the prospects for successful interrepublic cooperation, and lower the odds that economic reform and democratization—long-term guarantors of stability—would be successfully implemented.

- Russian economic “shock therapy” could be so poorly conceived and unevenly implemented that it produces hyperinflation and unemployment far higher than we now anticipate and seriously aggravates interrepublic trade problems.

- An attempt by individual republics, especially Ukraine, to seize control over military assets on its territory would accelerate the disintegration of the armed forces and create the potential for a dangerous conflict.

- A large number of refugees crossing republic borders to escape interethnic strife or economic conditions would place new demands on the already insufficient resources of republic governments.

Widespread civil disorder in the next few months would deal a deathblow to current efforts to cobble together interrepublic institutions. At best, republic governments will be too preoccupied with their internal difficulties to devote time or energy to interrepublic negotiations. At worst, economic stringencies and ethnic feuding will bring to power xenophobic nationalist groups advocating “go-it-alone” policies.
Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev's Nuclear Pledges: Impact, Motivations, and Next Steps (C-NF)

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
NI IIM 91-10006

Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev’s Nuclear Pledges: Impact, Motivations, and Next Steps (CONF)

Information available as of November 1991 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

also participating:
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force

This Memorandum was approved for publication by the Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Soviet Tactical Nuclear Forces and Gorbachev's Nuclear Pledges: Impact, Motivations, and Next Steps

- If Gorbachev's *unilateral* initiatives to reduce tactical nuclear warheads are carried out, *almost 75 percent* of Moscow's inventory of these warheads will be *destroyed or placed in central storage.*

- If Gorbachev's *reciprocal* proposals are implemented, all of the Soviet inventory of tactical nuclear warheads will be *destroyed or placed in central storage.*

- The elimination process will take at least several years.

- Soviet arms control positions probably are not fully worked out, but in the future Soviet negotiators are likely to become more flexible and abandon most old agenda items with the exception of dual-capable aircraft and the nuclear weapons of other countries.
Key Judgments

The Potential Impact of Gorbachev's Proposals
The withdrawal of many Soviet units from Eastern Europe and reductions in the size and number of units within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone that have occurred over the past two years already have caused a sharp decline in the number of tactical nuclear systems in Soviet forces opposite NATO.

President Gorbachev's 5 October proposals, if implemented, further advance that process. We estimate that unilateral measures will lead to the destruction of more than half the tactical nuclear warheads in Moscow's inventory. Naval tactical nuclear warheads will be moved to central storage.

A unilateral reduction on this scale will:
- Eliminate the nuclear capability of Soviet Ground Forces.
- Increase the amount of time the Soviet Navy will require to arm its ships, submarines, and aircraft with nuclear munitions.
- Take at least several years to implement.

Reciprocal measures proposed by Gorbachev would, if implemented:
- Eliminate the tactical nuclear capability of the Soviet Navy.
- Limit the air forces' quick-response tactical nuclear capability by placing warheads in central storage.

Motivations Behind the Proposals
The speed and content of Gorbachev's response to President Bush's initiative of 27 September reflect the high priority Soviet officials place on nuclear security:
- Elimination of all nuclear artillery projectiles and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) warheads will remove most of the tactical nuclear warheads located in non-Russian republics.
- Gorbachev is using the US proposal to reassert himself as a reliable and credible negotiating partner, but his capability to fulfill completely his own proposals is questionable.

The Future of Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Negotiating Positions
Dismantling and destroying nuclear warheads is a complex and time-consuming process, and any new union, therefore, is likely to retain a tactical nuclear capability for the foreseeable future.
Because of continuing improvements in conventional weapon systems, the senior Soviet leadership has probably concluded that tactical nuclear warheads can be eliminated or stored without significantly compromising the war-fighting capabilities they will require.

The Soviets probably have not had enough time to think out fully their negotiating positions. We believe the Soviets are likely to:

- Be less insistent on old agenda items and display considerable flexibility, while trying to preserve the option to revisit issues, especially those affected by evolving relations between the center and the republics.
- Maintain a low-key approach to further negotiations to avoid kindling the interest of republic leaders in becoming full players in formal talks.

Carryovers from the old Soviet agenda, however, will include concern about US dual-capable aircraft and inclusion of other countries in discussions of tactical nuclear systems. This posture may reflect a greater concern about proliferation to the south and on the continent than about the United Kingdom and France.

At a minimum, the Soviets will seek a process of consultations during all phases of the implementation of US and Soviet reductions. They probably will also seek technical—and perhaps financial—aid in dismantling and destroying warheads.

Disarray in Moscow and evolving political relations will complicate the negotiating process for some time. Elements in the military may still be recalcitrant, and the republics—especially Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—want a greater say in the Kremlin's nuclear decisionmaking.
NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW 29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Intelligence Capabilities: 1992-2005

The end of the Cold War and collapse of Soviet Communism already have radically altered the international landscape. The dramatic changes in U.S. defense planning and our new nuclear initiative reflect the Department of Defense’s recognition of these changes and a forward-looking restructuring of priorities and programs.

Many new, non-Soviet issues have assumed greater importance for the Intelligence Community in recent years, issues such as terrorism, narcotics, proliferation, economic intelligence, technology transfer, and others. Inevitably, however, the Community’s primary mission and first priority has remained the Soviet Union, Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, and Soviet foreign activities. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the extraordinary uncertainties in its wake will result in new demands for intelligence information on the former Soviet Union,
but should lead also to an intensification of effort in key non-Soviet areas already being addressed. New issues for intelligence attention are being suggested routinely.

CIA and the Intelligence Community have their roots deep in a Cold War that is now over and the threat of a Soviet military that is now struggling at home to preserve its very existence, to avoid its breakup into multiple republic armies. We are in transition from watching Soviet operational readiness to wondering about the control of Soviet nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been transformed, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and Soviet activism abroad (especially in the Third World) dramatically curtailed. There is growing interest here at home in our intelligence services tackling new issues and problems. Together, these developments urgently require a top to bottom examination of the mission, role and priorities of the Intelligence Community.

The first step in this effort will be a comprehensive identification by policy departments and agencies of their anticipated intelligence information and support needs to the year 2005. This will require the projection of international developments as well as policy issues, problems and opportunities into the future. In the first phase of the review, your intelligence organizations (where they exist) should not be involved. Instead, policy officials in your department or agency should develop for your personal consideration and approval the principal intelligence requirements for your organization into the next century. This is not a detailed requirements process. Rather, it is an identification of the categories of political, economic and military information needed for diverse issues and regions of the world. This includes intelligence needed to support our military forces. Beyond the traditional areas of interest, we need to consider intensified intelligence efforts in some global problems and new efforts in others. For example, will we need more and different intelligence information on international aspects of the environment, natural resource scarcities (such as water), global health problems, international research and development efforts, and so on? What kinds of economic intelligence do we need? At the same time, what information are you receiving now that you will not need at all or where you can accept far less detailed knowledge?

The Deputies Committee should prepare terms of reference for this review, and, at its conclusion, integrate and prioritize the requirements of all departments for NSC review and my approval. Departmental requirements should be forwarded for Deputies Committee review and integration by January 15, 1992. The integrated requirements report should be ready for NSC review by February 15, 1992.
Subsequent to approval of a policy-based mission and priorities report, the Director of Central Intelligence will identify resources available to address these priorities, resources not relevant to the new requirements and thus available for reallocation, and gaps where new resources may be needed. Based on the results of this analysis, the DCI should also provide to the NSC his recommendations for structural changes in the Community, organizational adjustments, possible new legislation, and alternative budget proposals needed to address the new requirements to the year 2005. These recommendations should be forwarded to the NSC by March 20, 1992.

Senior policymakers traditionally have neglected their critical role in setting intelligence priorities and requirements. The revolutionary world of today and tomorrow, the huge uncertainties we face, the constraints on our resources, and the need to plan well ahead all make it imperative that each of you take a personal interest in this effort.

The Intelligence Community today is being asked to cope with issues ranging from traditional Soviet military forces to the environment, from economic competitiveness to AIDS. We must establish the proper role, mission and priorities for U.S. intelligence in this changed and changing world. Otherwise, our capabilities will spread too thin to satisfy even the highest priorities and our inability to plan and invest long-term will leave us with inadequate intelligence assets to protect our vital interests and our security.
The Winter of the Soviet Military: Cohesion or Collapse?

National Intelligence Estimate

This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
NIE 11-30-91C

The Winter of the Soviet Military: Cohesion or Collapse?

Information available as of 5 December 1991 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

also participating
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board

Top Secret
November 30, 1991

370
This Estimate is one of a series to be published in the coming weeks on various crises facing the former USSR. The multiplicity of problems facing the new governments and their limited ability to cope with them make it likely that one or more of these problems will take on "worst case" proportions. This Estimate focuses on the cohesion of the Soviet military only over the winter and does not address all the components that constitute current Soviet military capability [censored]
Key Judgments

The Winter of the Soviet Military: Cohesion or Collapse?

- Forces unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet system are breaking up its premier artifact—the Soviet military; the high command cannot halt this process. While a centralized command and control system continues to operate, political and economic collapse is beginning to fragment the military into elements loyal to the republics or simply devoted to self-preservation. These forces include:

--- Fragmentation:

- Republic action to take control of units, equipment, and facilities could provoke conflicts of loyalty within the armed forces.

- Shortages of basic necessities are prompting commanders of major formations to seek ties to local political bodies.

- Commanders who do not receive local support may act on their own to seize or extort basic necessities.

--- Shortages:

- Housing shortfalls continue to undermine morale and cohesion.

- Traditionally first in line for high-tech resources, the military now has difficulty obtaining food and fuel.

- Triple-digit inflation and the lack of a military budget threaten pay.
Erosion of legitimacy and discipline:

- Since the August coup, questioning of traditional discipline has increased, and officers face difficult decisions about whom to obey.

- The disappearance of an external threat has increased officer disorientation.

- Massive officer cuts further erode discipline and morale. The uncertain future, coupled with a general lack of transferable job skills, heightens officer concern. (O-32)

* The picture with respect to cohesion in the armed forces is mixed:

We have detected little change in the day-to-day activity of much of the force, suggesting unit integrity and nominal responsiveness to the chain of command.

- On the other hand, senior Soviet officers acknowledge serious problems, and a growing body of anecdotal evidence indicates an increasing tendency for unit commanders to challenge orders that threaten the well-being of their troops.

The armed forces are likely over the winter to continue to exhibit basic unit integrity and responsiveness, but, as the center fails to provide essential goods and services, the established chain of command will become increasingly irrelevant. (O-32)

* Moreover, merely getting through the winter will present a false picture of military cohesion and stability. The most likely scenario will be continued decay and breakup of the Soviet armed forces. Halting this trend would require countering the centrifugal forces at work in the former Soviet Union and a major improvement in the economic conditions now affecting the military. (O-32)

* Although less likely, there is still a significant chance of rapid disintegration and widespread violence if a large number of units seek autonomy or military organization collapses. (O-32)

* Even less likely is the involvement of the armed forces in a large-scale civil war between or within major republics during the winter.
Discussion

Armies are microcosms of their societies; often indeed their core.

*Michael Howard*
The Lessons of History

*Everything I have devoted my whole life to building is collapsing.*

Suicide Note of Marshal Akhромеев

Forces unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet system are breaking up its premier artifact—the Soviet military. While a centralized command and control system continues to operate, political and economic collapse threatens to fragment the military into elements loyal to the republics or simply devoted to self-preservation. Widespread shortages are depriving military personnel and their families of basic necessities, damaging morale. The events surrounding the failed coup and the collapse of the Communist Party challenge the moral basis of the officer corps, the authority of the center, and the chain of command. The disappearance of the perceived Western threat and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact have increased the sense of disorientation among officers. These forces threaten military cohesion, that is, the ability of units at all levels to maintain organizational integrity and respond to orders from an acknowledged chain of command.

Stresses on the Military

Fragmentation

Plans by several republic and regional governments to take control of units, facilities, and equipment on their territory will increase pressure on military unity. So far, these plans amount largely to declarations of intent, but, should a republic decide to take control of a major unit, installation, or nuclear weapons, a showdown with the center could provoke conflicts of loyalty within the armed forces. Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and Interior Minister Baramnikov, for example, stated in November that force would be used to counter republic attempts to turn such declarations into reality.

We believe that through the winter more large military formations will seek ties to local political entities. Many units have longstanding ties to republics or subrepublic areas from which they receive economic essentials. A few Ground Forces units in Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Russia already have offered allegiance to the republics where they are stationed. Failing a local accommodation, some unit commanders may try to take direct control of supplies or, alternatively, engage in warlord-like extortion.

The shift in political power to the republics has allowed the nationalist genie to escape from the Stalinist bottle, a condition that hastens fragmentation. Ukraine’s situation illustrates one especially dramatic aspect of the pressure of nationalism. Its declaration of independence and demand for its own forces threaten to split the Soviet military. Ukrainians constitute some 30 percent of the officer corps and 17 percent of the conscripts, according to Soviet sources. Many of these personnel may join the Ukrainian armed forces.

As a result of the accommodation by the central Ministry of Defense (MOD) to republic demands for a “stay at home” conscription policy, Ground Force units in the republics are becoming more homogeneous (68 percent of Azerbaijan-based units are Azeri). This process, combined with republic concern about possible violence to obtain supplies, may lead to “creeping absorption” of units by local governments.

Shortages of Basic Goods and Services

The Soviet military, traditionally first in line for high-tech resources, now finds it difficult to obtain food and fuel (see figure). It can no longer command the
delivery of basic items across republic boundaries amid widespread shortages and a growing barter system. Industrial and agricultural enterprises increasingly ignore orders to supply the armed forces in return for “wooden rubles.”

Units throughout the military confront worsening shortages:

Housing shortfalls continue to undermine military morale and cohesion:

- Soviet media reported in November that troops in the Baltic states—including an elite airborne unit—refused to leave until “normal social and living conditions are created at their new postings.”

Military pay is also threatened. Salary increases have not kept pace with triple-digit inflation. Some units have not been paid on time, a problem that will become more widespread in the absence of a military budget. Yeltsin recently promised that Russia will pay the military (and double their pay), but in the short run this probably will require printing more money, thereby increasing inflation.

The capacity of the armed forces to deal with these problems is limited. Military command and control, logistics, and personnel systems are designed for central control and have only limited ability to respond to current developments. Despite such resources as military farms and reserves of food, fuel, and other commodities—commanders look elsewhere for help. Units get supplies from civilian enterprises in return for labor and sell or rent military equipment. The Chief of the General Staff has asked the Soviet public to donate to a newly created charity for the military. Clearly, such makeshift efforts will not solve the problem. Only improvement in the economy coupled with either interrepublic agreement on military funding or complete breakup into republic armed forces can do that.

Erosion of Legitimacy and Discipline
Soviet officers also face fundamental questions of loyalty and discipline. They are uncertain how to act in the present chaotic political situation. In theory, the armed forces are under control of the central state apparatus, but some officers question its legitimacy and believe that no one is in charge.

Since the August coup attempt, questioning of traditional military discipline has spread within the officer corps. The actions of senior officers—Defense Minister Yazov supported the coup while Air Force Chief Shaposhnikov opposed it—exacerbated splits in the officer corps and further weakened its cohesion.

Officers face increasingly difficult decisions about whom to obey. Those who supported the “right side” while disobeying their superiors—such as the Pacific Fleet officers who supported Yeltsin—are sometimes praised. Others who followed orders are condemned.
Traditional obedience to orders is no longer adequate; officers are not to obey a "clearly criminal" order. But they have been given no clear guidance on what constitutes such an order.  

Massive officer reductions further erode discipline and morale. Gorbachev's announcement in December 1988 of a unilateral reduction of 500,000 men included a cut of about 100,000 officers, and additional cuts are scheduled. Most Soviet officers, to a much greater degree than Western counterparts, lack transferable skills; the uncertain future intensifies their fear.  

Units Become Pressure Points  
The effects of these pressures—fragmentation, shortages, and the erosion of legitimacy and discipline—come together at the garrison, divisional, and regimental levels. Individual commanders must deal directly with these new problems. On the whole, they have done a reasonably good job. Whatever their internal problems, most Soviet units retain their basic structure and equipment and, with varying degrees of success, continue some routine operations and training. With no clear alternative, most Soviet officers follow the well-worn patterns of the past.
Prospects for the Winter

Over the winter it is likely that the armed forces will maintain cohesion. We expect cohesion to hold whether the armed forces continue to decay under the nominal control of central authorities or whether agreements among republics lead to division of the armed forces among them. The latter case would mean the end of the traditional Soviet military. Even in a situation where its basic structures are maintained, however, the military will likely lose control of some units to republics and localities, or even collapse. Such loss of control could lead to incidents of localized violence. (S NF)

Decay will continue. The pressures undermining the military cannot be checked or alleviated over the next several months. The situation—and the military's condition after the winter—will vary by service and from republic to republic. Simultaneous and interdependent outcomes are possible. The ultimate character of the outcome will depend on the military's institutional coherence; its allegiance to civil authorities; its ability to satisfy basic needs; and its willingness to accept increasing hardship and uncertainty. (S NF)

Our conclusion that the armed forces are likely to maintain cohesion over the winter reflects the following:

- Military service, for all its problems, will continue to be more appealing to many than a return to civilian life. The availability of resources in military supply channels and reserve stockpiles, in contrast to bleak civil prospects, will keep many units largely intact.
- Most officers support military subordination to civil authority.
- Yeltsin has promised to fund the MOD, albeit with major cuts. (S NF)

Getting through the winter relatively peacefully, however, could present a false picture of military cohesion and stability. Spring will find the military under increased pressures and with fewer resources. Absent interrepublic political and economic agreements, there will be even less hope of a solution to the problems facing the military. The reliability of military forces ordered to take unpopular actions, such as suppression of civil unrest, is open to serious question. The effect of such orders probably would be to accelerate the disintegration of the armed forces. (S NF)

Ironically, one of the most destructive, but least likely, developments—a coup initiated by the military—would require cohesion in the units involved to ensure that orders would be obeyed. The unsettled atmosphere in the officer corps, confusion about the legitimacy of traditional authority, and a reluctance to take action that might accelerate military disintegration inhibit such an act.

Such a coup attempt would reflect a desperate judgment by military leaders that there was no other alternative. A failed coup attempt could precipitate a descent into civil war. (S NF)

Alternative Outcomes

Though unlikely, there is still a significant chance of outcomes involving the severe degradation or destruction of organizational cohesion. These include widespread local unit autonomy and total collapse of the armed forces:

- Widespread local unit autonomy. Traditionally strong ties between some units and local civilian authorities and the trend toward local and regional autonomy in the economy could produce even more fragmentation in the military structure, leading to autonomous action by units operating in their own interest. The armed forces would retain unit cohesion but fragment on a regional, rayon, or oblast basis. The pressure on military officers to deal with local civilian authorities on a basis of food for
loyalty or to ensure more military influence in civil affairs could become stronger. Unit accommodations with local authorities would bolster local ties and lead to allegiance to republic or subrepublic governments. On the darker side, where local authorities refused cooperation, units could assume local control or, alternatively, extort supplies from local authorities.

- **Collapse.** Conditions worse than we anticipate—widespread failure to provide military personnel and their families with basic goods and services, collapse of discipline, and lawlessness throughout society—would destroy existing military organization. Large numbers of soldiers would desert. Gangs of deserters would take what they wanted from the civilian population.

Even less likely, though most violent, is the involvement of the armed forces in large-scale civil war within or between major republics during the winter.

Triggering events could be resistance by the center or Russia to republican efforts to assume control of military forces or equipment on their territory or, alternatively, violence involving Russian minorities in a non-Russian republic. Such conflict would be especially dangerous if the control of nuclear weapons were at stake. Conflicts between republics other than Russia and Ukraine may be more likely but, while violent, probably would remain localized.

Least likely are conditions, much better than we anticipate, that could halt the decay and breakup of the Soviet armed forces. Such an outcome would require major improvement in the economic conditions now affecting the military and countering the centrifugal forces at work in the former USSR.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721 (1991)

Decision

At its 3023rd meeting, on 15 December 1991, the Council decided to invite the representative of Yugoslavia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 721 (1991) (S/23280)".27

Resolution 724 (1991)

of 15 December 1991

The Security Council,


Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 721 (1991) of 11 December 1991, 196

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter,

Determined to ensure that the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia imposed by resolution 713 (1991) is effectively applied,

Commending the initiatives taken by the Secretary-General in the humanitarian field,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 11 December 1991, 196 and expresses its appreciation for it;

2. Endorses in particular the views expressed in paragraph 21 of that report that the conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist and in paragraph 24 that full compliance with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991 197 would permit accelerated consideration of the question of establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;

3. Concurs in particular with the Secretary-General’s observation that the international community is prepared to assist the Yugoslav peoples, if the conditions described in his report are met, and in that context endorses his offer to send to Yugoslavia a small group of personnel, including military personnel, as part of the continuing mission of his Personal Envoy, to carry forward preparations for possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation;

4. Underlines the view that the purpose of the deployment of any United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be to enable all parties to settle their disputes peacefully, including through the processes of the Conference on Yugoslavia;

5. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General within twenty days on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991) to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia;

(b) Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(i) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph (a);

(ii) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991);

(iii) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(iv) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia and to provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States;

(c) Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its tasks concerning the effective implementation of the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991);

(d) Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

6. Undertakes to consider ways by which compliance with the commitments entered into by the parties may be achieved;

7. Strongly urges all States and parties to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing tension, to inhibiting the establishment of an effective cease-fire and to impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict
in Yugoslavia which would permit all the peoples of Yugoslavia to decide upon and to construct their future in peace;

8. Encourages the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Yugoslavia, in liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's Fund and other appropriate humanitarian organizations, to take urgent practical steps to tackle the critical needs of the people of Yugoslavia, including displaced persons and the most vulnerable groups affected by the conflict, to assist in the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes:

9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Adopted unanimously at the 3023rd meeting.

---

Part II. Other matters considered by the Security Council

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

A. Applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea

Decisions

At its 2998th meeting, on 6 August 1991, the Council, following the adoption of its agenda, decided to refer the applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
 and of the Republic of Korea for membership in the United Nations to the Committee on the Admission of New Members for examination and report, as provided in rule 59 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At its 3001st meeting, on 8 August 1991, the Council discussed the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Republic of Korea for admission to membership in the United Nations.

Resolution 702 (1991)
of 8 August 1991

The Security Council,

Having examined separately the applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Republic of Korea for admission to the United Nations,

1. Recommends to the General Assembly that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be admitted to membership in the United Nations;

2. Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of Korea be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

Adopted without vote at the 3001st meeting.

Decision

At the same meeting, following the adoption of Security Council resolution 702 (1991), the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"By adopting resolution 702 (1991), the Security Council has taken another step towards the completion of a political process in exercise of one of the most important functions entrusted to it under the Charter of the United Nations, namely, to make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the admission of new members to the Organization.

"The applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have been considered and unanimously approved by the Council. The aspirations of the peoples and Governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea have harmoniously coincided. That is why the Council decided to consider and take a simultaneous decision on the admission of both parts of the Korean Peninsula to membership in the world Organization.

"This is a historic occasion for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Asian continent and the world community of nations.
LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

LETTER DATED 21 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

LETTER DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

Decision

At its 3018th meeting, on 27 November 1991, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Yugoslavia to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled:

"Letter dated 24 November 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23239);"27

"Letter dated 21 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23232);"27

"Letter dated 26 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/23247);"27


The Security Council.

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991,

Considering the request by the Government of Yugoslavia for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, as conveyed in the letter of 26 November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,28

Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia and by the serious violations of earlier cease-fire agreements, which have caused heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the region,

Noting that the continuation and aggravation of this situation constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Considering also the letter of 24 November 1991 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council29 on the mission of his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia and the annexed agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991,

Considering further the fact, as conveyed in the above-mentioned letter of the Secretary-General, that each one of the Yugoslav participants in the meeting with his Personal Envoy stated that they wanted to see the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation as soon as possible,

1. Approves the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties as rapidly as possible so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;

2. Endorses the statement made by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation cannot be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991 and annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1991;30

3. Strongly urges the Yugoslav parties to comply fully with that agreement;

4. Undertakes to examine the recommendations of the Secretary-General mentioned above and take appropriate action without delay upon them, including in particular any recommendation for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved.

Adopted unanimously at the 3018th meeting.