The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War, 1977-1987

Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants, outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grassroots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

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Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri, as well as the Wilson Center’s Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.

Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
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Part Three:
International Diplomacy,
1980-1983
Part Three: International Diplomacy

1980
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Document Abstract – During a meeting of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party, Craxi presents his point of view on the tense international situation.
costellazione si è estesa.
Ciò vale tanto per l'Africa dove prevale la instabilità, si accrescono i conflitti, si svolge una nuova lotta, aperta o indiretta, delle influenze e delle ingerenze se non proprio delle conquiste.
Vale per il Medio Oriente dove i successi diplomatici e politici dell'OLP e la moderazione dei suoi dirigenti, ormai apertamente contestata dai settori più radicali del mondo arabo, non è ancora valsa a superare il muro delle incomprensioni e della miopia politica e ad aprire le porte ad un negoziato diretto con lo Stato di Israele perché, nel rispetto del principio della sicurezza e della integrità di tutti gli stati della regione, sui territori arabi abitati da popolazioni arabe, abbia una attuazione concreta il principio della autodeterminazione cui ha diritto il popolo palestinese.
Di fronte ad un quadro così inquietante, l'invasione sovietica dell'Afghanistan non poteva rimanere senza risposta da parte della Comunità internazionale e in primo luogo da parte dei paesi occidentali, degli Stati Uniti, dell'Europa, del Terzo Mondo.

3 - I PERICOLI NEL CAMPO NUCLEARE: L'EUROPA E L'ITALIA PER LA PACE E LA SICUREZZA.
Suscitano tuttavia grande perplessità talune reazioni americane, e soprattutto quelle relative al capo nucleare.
La decisione del Presidente Carter che ha dovuto molto probabilmente tenere conto delle accresciute difficoltà politiche che ormai ostacolavano in modo decisivo il cammino della ratifica del SALT II. Tuttavia è evidente che non c'è proporzione né rapporto diretto tra la questione della limitazione degli armamenti nucleari strategici e i pur gravi avvenimenti che si sono verificati.
Il trattato del SALT II frutto di sei anni di difficili negoziati, e destinato a contenere entro un quadro di equilibrio la crescita delle armi strategiche nucleari.
Una sua sospensione che si prolungasse troppo nel tempo avrebbe come conseguenza una ripresa, in forme incontrollate, della corsa al riarmo nucleare.
La efficacia di questa decisione sulle situazioni concrete che debbono essere affrontate è senz’altro dubbia, ma i rischi che da essa derivano sono molto grandi.
Vogliamo esprimere l’auspicio che si tratti di una decisione transitoria, che il governo americano non abbia rinunciato a considerare valido il trattato, che condizioni politiche più favorevoli ne consentano l’approvazione che nessuna ulteriore misura sia presa che possa innescare un processo di disastroso ritorno alla proliferazione delle armi nucleari strategiche. Equalmente negativo è l’atteggiamento di rifiuto che l’URSS oppone alla proposta della NATO di aprire un negoziato sulle cosiddette armi di teatro in Europa dopo la decisione del Consiglio Atlantico di avviare il programma di modernizzazione nucleare e la costruzione dei cosiddetti euromissili.
La questione è nota per essere stata lungamente dibattuta.
Mentre il SALT II definiva un quadro di equilibrio nel sistema nucleare centrale la modernizzazione del sistema missilistico sovietico in Europa con la produzione in serie e l’installazione dei missili SS 20 ha introdotto un cambiamento di equilibrio decisivo e una inferiorità obiettiva della alleanza atlantica.
La questione non poteva essere né ignorata né evitata se si partiva dal presupposto che la pace si regge e si consolida su basi di sicurezza e di equilibrio per tutti e sulla convinzione che il determinarsi di stati di inferiorità provoca situazioni di tensione, di diffidenza e quindi di instabilità e che l’esperienza della storia insega come nessuno che si
sia trovato in posizione di superiorità militare abbia resistito alla tentazione di farla valere sul piano politico. L'iniziativa di attenuare questa inferiorità per stabilire almeno approssimativamente un equilibrio delle forze nucleari di teatro nasce dapprima nella Germania federale e ad opera del cancelliere Schmidt. Sul modo come affrontare la questione dell'equilibrio sono sorti i dissensi nell'ambito europeo e sono state proposte vie diverse. Nessuno ha disconosciuto l'esistenza del problema ed è il suo significato fondamentale ai fini della sicurezza e della pace in Europa.

E' prevalsa l'idea di approvare il programma di modernizzazione e di rivolgersi contemporaneamente una proposta di negoziato all'URSS.

Per impedire questa decisione il governo di Mosca ha condotto una vera e propria offensiva propagandistica e politica che tuttavia non poteva correggere l'errore fondamentale vero che è stato compiuto proprio dall'Unione Sovietica quando essa si è lanciata nella costruzione degli SS 20 e dei bombardieri Backfire per la parte destinata all'Europa.

Gli euromissili comunque non saranno disponibili prima di tre o quattro anni. Il tempo per un negoziato c'è purché vi sia la volontà politica di avviare un negoziato e di concluderlo in modo positivo e soddisfacente per tutti.

Le decisioni atlantiche prese possono essere anulate, sospese, delimitate, in rapporto alla evoluzione ed ai risultati di una trattativa.

Se si nega in radice l'esistenza del problema e se la questione dell'equilibrio deve essere ristabilito viene considerata una provocazione tutto diventa certo più difficile ed un negoziato impossibile mentre bisogna lavorare per impedire che questo accada.
A noi è toccato di dover assumerci una fondamentale responsabilità anche in rapporto al nostro ruolo parlamentare determinante.

Abbiamo concordato una linea comune con i compagni della SPD, e cioè del partito ad un tempo al governo della Germania federale e da anni il più impegnato in Europa su posizioni avanzate nel campo della distensione, del dialogo, della cooperazione ad Est.

Abbiamo seguito la linea decisa. Pressoche contemporaneamente alle nostre decisioni i compagni della SPD fissavano i termini di una condotta imperniata - come dice la mozione approvata dal loro congresso - su "misure di politica e di difesa e di politica di controllo dell'armamento" e cioè stabilendo la contemporaneità delle decisioni di avviare l'ammodernamento e di proporre il negoziato.

"Lo sviluppo delle trattative - dice la mozione tedesca che ilustra in questo modo la cosiddetta clausola dissolvente - e i risultati conseguiti debbono rendere possibile in ogni momento ai responsabili della NATO di riesaminare e, se necessarion rivedere le decisioni. La formula che su questo punto specifico è stata adottata dal Parlamento italiano è egualmente la seguen-

te:

"auspica che l'esito delle trattative necessarie per stabilire opportune condizioni di parità tra le parti e forme adeguate di controllo renda superfluo l'ammodernamento delle forze nucleari di teatro da parte della NATO" e che quindi "si determini la dissolvenza parziale o totale delle misure adottate in rapporto allo sviluppo ed all'esito dei negoziati poiché è con tale spirito e condizione positiva che il negoziato deve essere avviato".
I socialisti francesi hanno poi espresso una posizione analo-

ga, convergente e solidale.

I compagni francesi hanno deciso di adottare una precisa as-

sunzione di responsabilità politica nono stante che la Francia,

che si è dotata da tempo di una forza nucleare propria, non fos-

se direttamente investita del problema.

Ciò è costato al partito socialista francese ed al suo segre-

tario Mitterand l'accusa comunista di "allineamento subalter-

no nelle posizioni di Washington, di essere nientemenno che

l'"Avvocato di Barre", di essere il "più antisovietico degli

antisovietici".

Non sono mancate le polemiche anche in Italia dirette contro

il partito socialista ed anche contro il suo segretario ma

in tono minore e non cosi spudoratamente falso.

La Direzione socialista ha preso una decisione giusta anche se
difficile e lo ha fatto nella consapevolezza che il garantire

equilibrio delle forze con una condotta fatta di fermezza e
di prudenza alla lunga disarmi i falchi e non spaventa le co-
lombe.

Come ha scritto saggiamente Le Monde, il mantenimento di un

equilibrio riconosciuto e riconosciuto " rende sempre più im-

possibile una guerra di aggressione in Europa".

Il PSI ha preso la sua decisione nel contesto di una imposta-

zione politica interamente impegnata a fare avanzare i processi
di distensione del negoziato e di pace sottolineando l'im-
portanza fondamentale della ratifica del SALT II della repre-

sa concreta dei negoziati sulla riduzione delle armi convenzio-
nali, della adeguata preparazione della Conferenza di Madrid.

Tutto questo è oggi rimesso in discussione dalla piega nega-
tiva assunta dagli avvenimenti internazionali e dalla asprezza
della nuova situazione.

Per scrutare i possibili sviluppi si torna da più parti a por-

re interrogativi su quanto accade nell'URSS dove il potere è

probabilmente assai meno monolitico di quanto appaia e dove la
società politica è presumibilmente come altrove, anche se in forme diverse, "terra di contrasti".

Jean Paul Sartre ha scritto una volta del potere sovietico come di qualcosa di imperscrutabile, e lo ha definito "une chose". Benché la società politica sovietica si nasconda agli occhi del mondo, alcuni tratti fondamentali vengono ormai riconosciuti da tutti. Parlando in più occasioni, anche con esponenti dell'Est comunista ho sentito disegnare l'immagine di un potere composito, da un lato una oligarchia burocratica e gerontocratica, dall'altra una potente casta militare.

Nell'insieme il prevalere di uno spirito nazionalista che è diffuso e che ha radici antiche e che il sistema sovietico interpreta in una nuova versione ideologica. Questo spiegherebbe la rigidità all'interno, le mancate riforme del sistema, e il prevalere della componente militare nell'azione internazionale.

Mi soffermo su questi aspetti perché penso che il problema della convivenza con l'URSS, di quella che un tempo veniva chiamata la coesistenza pacifica, resta il problema di fondo dell'avvenire della pace nel mondo.

Di fronte alle manifestazioni aggressive della politica sovietica bisogna adottare decisioni che convincano i sovietici della solidità politica e militare di chi gli sta di fronte senza per questo rinunciare a prospettare le vie pacifiche del dialogo, della cooperazione, dell'amicizia fruttuosa tra i popoli e gli Stati.

C'è un ruolo ed una funzione attiva che deve essere esercitata dall'Europa o in Europa dal nostro paese.

Questa non avrebbe nè senso nè portata se si muovesse fuori dal quadro di solidarietà dell'alleanza atlantica e in alternativa all'alleanza tra l'Europa e gli Stati Uniti.

Non avrebbe efficacia fuori da una prospettiva di unità dell'Europa e quindi di riduzione dei nazionalismi sempre accesi, sempre miopi e sempre di ostacolo al consolidamento di una nuova
autorità, di un nuovo ruolo dell'Europa sulla scena del mondo. Una nuova iniziativa europea anche nel campo del controllo delle armi potrebbe rendere più fluida la situazione. Alle grandi paure che si aggrirano per l'Europa, paura del disordine economico e dei fattori inflazionistici e recessivi, della futura disponibilità delle materie prime, della sicurezza in generale, bisogna rispondere sospendendo in avanti politiche coraggiose di apertura e di cooperazione, in primo luogo verso il Terzo Mondo, di aiuti larghi e disinteressati, politiche che tendano a costruire un nuovo ordine economico e internazionale. In questo senso occorre anche una vera e propria ricostruzione della politica estera italiana che sia fatta non solo di petizioni di principio ma di fatti concreti.
Mancano le strutture adeguate e sono del tutto insufficienti le risorse che impegnano a sostegno della nostra presenza internazionale. Abbiamo debole voce in capitolo nella regione euromediterranea dove sino ad ora ci siamo dimostrati incapaci di risolvere finanze e non grandi problemi derivanti dalla necessità di garantire la nuova neutralità della piccola ed amica Malta mentre non sfruttiamo in modo adeguato un enorme potenziale di relazioni che potrebbe vederci in un ruolo attivo utile a noi stessi e a tutta la regione.
Abbiamo seminato delusione in paesi africani, a cominciare dalla Somalia che si erano costruiti attese e speranze sull'amicizia dell'Italia.
Siamo stati per lungo tempo indecentemente in coda nella lista dei paesi impegnati negli aiuti e nella solidarietà concreta verso i paesi poveri del Terzo e del Quarto Mondo.
La chiarezza sulle caratteristiche di fondo della nostra politica estera e la definizione degli strumenti operativi adeguati per la sua realizzazione resta uno dei temi di base della più generale chiarificazione politica necessaria per dare al paese
AN
DEN VORSITZENDEN
DER SOZIALDEMOKRATISCHEN PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS,
VORSITZENDEN DER SOZIALISTISCHEN INTERNATIONALE
Willy BRANDT

Sehr geehrter Vorsitzender Willy Brandt!


Ich möchte noch einmal betonen, daß die Sowjetunion ihrerseits in keiner Weise am Fortbestehen der Spannungen sowohl auf der internationalen Arena im allgemeinen, als auch in den bilateralen Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten interessiert ist. Dies alles haben wir nicht einmal unüberhörbar bekannt (ich habe, zum Beispiel, darüber in meiner Wahlrede am 22. Februar gesprochen). Darüber war die Rede auch in den vertraulichen Boten-schaften, die wir in der letzten Zeit mit führenden Persönlichkeiten der USA und anderer Länder austauschten.

der Stärke, ihre Absicht, militärische Überlegenheit über die Sowjetunion zu erlangen und eine dominierende Rolle in der ganzen Welt zu spielen.

Ich glaube, Sie werden mir beipflichten, daß hier eines mit dem anderen nicht übereinstimmt.

Von Grund aus widerspricht den Interessen der Entspannung das Wetrüsten, das von den USA nicht bloß fortgesetzt, sondern drastisch hochgetrieben wird. Derartiger Kurs unterminiert die Entspannung um so mehr, die in den 70. Jahren mit solcher Mühe erreicht wurde; er baut die Möglichkeiten der Fortsetzung eines konstruktiven Dialogs nicht aus, sondern engt sie ein.

Im Mittelpunkt vieler Diskussionen steht heutzutage die sogenannte Afghanistan-Frage. Mitunter formuliert man im Westen solch eine Position: die Spannungen haben zugenommen, weil die UdSSR ihre Truppen in Afghanistan eingeführt habe, folglich füre der Weg zur Minderung der Spannungen über den Abzug der sowjetischen Militärkontingente. Das aber ist eine falsche Logik.

Wie Ihrem Schreiben zu entnehmen ist, halten wir zum gemeinsamen Standpunkt, daß die Verschärfung der Spannungen lange vor den "afghanischen Ereignissen" eintrat und in der Tat nicht infolge dieser andauerte. Diejenigen, die alle Probleme der Fortführung der Entspannung auf den Abzug der sowjetischen Truppen aus Afghanistan begrenzen, versuchen damit, die öffentliche Meinung von wahren Ursachen der Lageverschlechterung abzulenken. Wenn man sich allein den rein afghanischen Aspekt des Problems annimmt, so können auch hier vorgeschlagene Rezepte nicht als realistisch bewertet werden.
Unser begrenztes Militärkontingent wurde nach Afghanistan entsandt nach wiederholten Bitten afghanischer Regierungen um Hilfe bei Abwehr der Anschläge von außen auf Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit dieses uns befreundeten blockfreien Landes. Ich werde nicht wiederholen, was Ihnen wohl gut bekannt ist. Ich möchte aber bemerken, daß in den letzten Wochen der "unerklärte Krieg", der von den USA, China und Pakistan gegen Afghanistan organisiert worden ist, einen immer größeren Ausmaß annimmt. Wie die amerikanische Presse zugibt, setzt man auf weitere Aktivisierung der subversiven Handlungen von außen gegen das jetzige afghanische Regime. Dabei ergreifen nun die USA völlig offene Maßnahmen in dieser Richtung.

Ich glaube, Sie werden mir beipflichten, daß dies alles zur Entschärfung der Lage um Afghanistan durchaus nicht beiträgt, daß dies den Zeitpunkt, an dem wir unsere Truppen abziehen könnten, nicht näher bringt, sondern gar hinausschiebt.

Wir haben bereits wiederholt erklärt, daß sowjetische Militärkontingente aus Afghanistan nicht abgezogen werden können, bis die Gründe entfallen, die uns zu ihrem Einzug bewogen haben. Vor allem muß jede Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten Afghanistans völlig unterbunden werden, militärische und andere Aktionen von außen gegen das Volk und die Regierung Afghanistans müssen völlig eingestellt werden. Die USA, wie auch die Nachbarn von Afghanistan müssen die realen und wirkungsvollen Garantien dafür geben, daß derartige Einmischung nicht wiederanfängt. Dann wird, dessen bin ich sicher, auch die Regierung von Afghanistan die Lage anders beurteilen.
Folglich hängt jetzt alles davon ab, wie bald reale Wege zur Lösung des Problems gefunden werden, die Einmischung in die afghanischen Angelegenheiten von außen einzustellen, die gegen die Regierung und das Volk Afghanistans, gegen afghanische Revolution gerichtet ist.

Bekanntlich sind jetzt im Westen eine Reihe von Vorschlägen und Überlegungen (inoffiziellen Charakters) im Umlauf, die die Lage in Afghanistan betreffen. Ich möchte Sie auf zwei negative Aspekte dieser Vorschläge und Überlegungen aufmerksam machen.

Der erste besteht darin, daß sie alle die Souveränität Afghanistans ignorieren, an den Umstand vermeintlich vorbeigehen, daß es eine legitime Regierung hat, die allein das Recht besitzt, im Namen ihres Volkes zu reden.

Der zweite negative Aspekt der unterbreiteten Vorschläge besteht darin, daß sie, indem diese den Abzug der sowjetischen Militärkontingente vorsehen, die Notwendigkeit, Afghanistan vor der Einmischung in seine inneren Angelegenheiten zu sichern, gar nicht erwähnen. Derweil gerade hier liegt der Hund begraben.

Sie erwägen die Möglichkeit dessen, daß die Sowjetunion symbolische Maßnahmen ergreift, die aufgerufen sind, zu demonstrieren, daß sie insbesondere keine agressiven Handlungen gegen die Nachbarn Afghanistans anstrebt. Ihnen ist gut bekannt, daß wir solche Anstrengungen nicht gehabt haben und nicht haben. Wir haben das bereits einmal erklärt, und alles, was in dieser Hinsicht im Westen gesagt wird, entbehrt jeder Grundlage.
Ich glaube, daß die wichtigsten europäischen Verbündeten der USA, und nicht zuletzt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, zu einer besseren Einsicht dieses Umstandes in Washington beitragen könnten, sowie im allgemeinen zur Einsicht dessen, daß unsere Aktion in Afghanistan eine rein defensive Aktion ist und das einzige Ziel verfolgt: den Schutz unserer Freunde und der Sicherheit unserer Südgrenze.

Wir wollen es durchaus nicht, die westeuropäischen Länder den Vereinigten Staaten entgegenstellen oder sie voneinander trennen. Wir wissen die Verbindungen recht realistisch einzuschätzen, die ihr Land und andere Staaten Westeuropas zu den Vereinigten Staaten haben. Dabei sind wir überzeugt, daß auch im Rahmen der bestehenden Bündnisse die westeuropäischen Länder, insbesondere die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, einen realen Beitrag zur Wahrung der Entspannung leisten könnten, die ihren vitalen Interessen entspricht. Leider können in diesem Sinne die Ergebnisse des Besuches von Bundeskanzler Schmidt in den Vereinigten Staaten nicht umhin zu enttäuschen.

Unsererseits bestätigen wir, daß alle unseren Vorschläge bezüglich der Einstellung des Wettrüstens, die wir früher sowie auf Staats- als auch auf Parteiebene unterbreitet haben, in Kraft bleiben, und daß wir jeder Zeit bereit sind, sie konstruktiv zu erörtern. Mehr als das, wie wir glauben, ist es bereits durchaus an der Zeit, von Erörterungen und Diskussionen zur ausarbeitung konkreter Maßnahmen zu übergehen, die in der Praxis realisiert werden können.

Es gilt, die Verhandlungen in Wien intensiv fortzusetzen und nach den Wegen zu suchen, eine Vereinbarung zu erreichen.


Ich glaube, daß einen nützlichen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Atmosphäre in Europa das bevorstehende Madrider-Treffen von Vertretern der Teilnehmerstaaten der Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Helsinki leisten könnte. Selbstverständlich wird es nur dann möglich sein, wenn die Teilnehmer des Treffens nach Madrid mit der Absicht kommen, konstruktive Suche nach den Wegen zur Entsäumung der Spannungen zu führen, zum Wiederher-
stellten und zur Entwicklung des Geistes von Helsinki, und nicht mit dem Ziel der Fortsetzung und Zuspitzung der Konfrontation.

Wir auf jeden Fall haben die Absicht, in Madrid konstruktiv vorzugehen. Ich hoffe, daß das Herangehen Ihres Landes dasselbe sein wird.

Ich möchte Ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf den Vorschlag der sozialistischen Länder, eine europäische Konferenz über militärische Entspannung und Abrüstung einzuberufen und auf die Bereitschaft Polens, sie in Warschau abzuhalten, lenken. Eine solche Konferenz, neben dem Madrider-Treffen, könnte einen Anstoß zur Lösung einer Reihe wichtiger Fragen geben, die mit der Einstellung des Wett- rüstens zu tun haben.


Ich möchte die Hoffnung zum Ausdruck bringen, daß in dieser schweren Zeit die Einsicht und Vernunft den politischen Extremismus besiegen werden und die Entspannung, für deren Verwirklichung wir mit Ihnen, Herr Vorsitzende, so viel an Kräften
und Energie angelegt haben, über den "kalten Krieg" die Oberhand gewinnen wird.

Jedenfalls werden wir in Moskau dafür alles Mögliche tun.

Ich bin bereit, alle diesen Probleme mit Ihnen persönlich zu besprechen. Indem ich mir der heiklen Situation bewußt bin, wäre ich Ihnen für ein Zeichen verbunden, wohin und durch welche Kanäle ich eine offizielle (bzw. inoffizielle ?) Einladung an Sie richten könnte.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

gez. L. BRESHNEV

11. März 1980
Soviet Attitudes Toward Confidence-Building Measures in European Arms Control

Summary

Soviet goals for an expanded agenda on confidence-building measures (CBMs) are fundamentally political.

The Soviets see in the West European desire to engage the USSR and its allies in a broadened discussion of arms control in Europe an opportunity to accentuate asymmetries between US and West European security concerns. They also see it as a means of undermining NATO's efforts to reach consensus on security issues and of highlighting the "divisibility" of detente in Europe from the US-Soviet relationship.

The Soviets probably will continue to emphasize measures designed to restrict NATO's military exercise and training activities and to dilute Western proposals that might constrain Warsaw Pact military flexibility. They might be willing in a broad forum related to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to accept an extension of the geographic zone for voluntary use of CBMs.

Under certain circumstances, they might even be willing to accept mandatory CBMs such as maneuver ceilings and advance notification of exercises and troop movements at levels that have greater military impact on the West than on the East. But they would continue to insist that any "intrusive" inspection measures be restricted to verification of actual troop reductions and therefore be confined to the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).
Soviet Attitudes Toward Confidence-Building Measures in European Arms Control

The Helsinki Legacy

During the negotiations leading up to the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, the three principal issues relating to CBMs were the zone of application, the threshold for the advance notification of military maneuvers, and whether CBMs should be mandatory or voluntary. After initial reluctance to discuss CBMs at all, the Soviets proposed that they apply to a 100-kilometer (km) zone of territory contiguous to other CSCE signatories, that the threshold for maneuver notification be at the "army corps" level, and that they be voluntary.

Western positions varied, but in general the NATO countries favored a "European" zone of application covering the USSR west of the Urals, a numerically specified notification level for maneuvers and troop movements, and mandatory CBMs.

As it became apparent to the Soviets that the price of Western cooperation at CSCE on the key political and economic issues involved a more forthcoming Soviet position on CBMs, Moscow's intransigence began to wane. A proposal by the neutral and nonaligned participants in late June 1975 that the maneuver parameters be 300 km, 25,000 troops, and 21 days' advance notification was seized upon by the Soviets as the basis for an East-West compromise.

The Soviets remained adamant, however, that CBMs be voluntary in nature, and the basic Soviet negotiating tactic became an offer to accept more explicit limits on the size and advance timing of maneuver notification as well as an extension of the zone of application in return for Western assurances that CBMs would indeed be voluntary. The eventual Soviet compromise position was reflected in the Final Act: a 250-km zone including the Baltic and Black Sea coasts, a maneuver notification level of 25,000 troops, and 21 days' advance notification. The Soviets also agreed to provide notification for "major" troop movements within the CSCE-defined zone.
From Helsinki to Belgrade

Moscow's initial reluctance to discuss CBMs prior to and at Helsinki probably flowed from Soviet uncertainty as to how MBFR would evolve relative to CSCE, and from a Soviet desire to limit the CSCE exercise as a whole to a discussion of all-European political and economic cooperation. The Soviets hoped not only to legitimize the political-ideological division of Europe but also to avoid encumbering the process of enhanced Soviet interaction in Western Europe with a potentially divisive exchange on issues directly related to the European military balance.

The Soviets were probably satisfied with the outcome of the Helsinki discussion on CBMs. They were able to capitalize on neutral and nonaligned sentiment in favor of an incremental process of mutual military confidence-building to blunt the more intrusive CBMs proposed by the NATO countries that related in part to enhanced intelligence and warning.

After Helsinki, the Soviets apparently began to see some utility in CBMs as a means of inhibiting NATO's exercise and training flexibility. This was reflected throughout late 1975 in a series of harsh Soviet media commentaries on NATO's practice of conducting maneuvers that were much larger than those of the Warsaw Pact. In particular, the Soviets charged that NATO's adoption of a new practice of integrating Allied Command Europe exercises into a single program (Autumn Forge) was incompatible with the spirit of the CBMs envisaged at Helsinki. The Soviets also recognized that West European interest in an expanded CBMs dialogue with the East might be exploited not only to shift the focus of subsequent CSCE discussions away from Basket III measures concerning humanitarian issues but also to play upon West European sympathies in favor of promoting "Eurocentric" arms control talks in which Moscow would play a key role.

This shift in Soviet attitudes toward CBMs was signaled in President Brezhnev's speech on 21 October 1977. Brezhnev raised the possibility of a separate forum for the discussion of CBMs in the form of "special joint consultations" among CSCE participants to be held "parallel" to the MBFR talks. In retrospect, this proposal can be seen as the genesis of what became the May 1979 Warsaw Pact proposal for a Conference on Military Detente (CMD) in Europe.

Other proposals voiced then by Brezhnev were formally introduced into the 1977-78 Belgrade CSCE Review Conference as a so-called "action program on military detente." The "action program" reiterated previous Warsaw Pact proposals for a treaty on nonfirst use of nuclear weapons and the nonexpansion of military alliances. It also proposed a maneuver limit of 50,000 to 60,000 troops and the extension of the Helsinki CBMs to "the countries of the southern Mediterranean."
Largely because of the sharp East-West confrontation over human rights, the Soviet "action program" did not receive extensive attention at Belgrade. During the later stages of the conference the Soviet press charged that the West Europeans—particularly the French and West Germans—believed that the United States had overemphasized the human rights issue to the detriment of a potentially more fruitful exchange on CBMs. □

The French proposal for a two-stage Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)—which first appeared in preliminary form during the Belgrade conference and aimed at agreements on CBMs in the first stage and conventional weapons reductions in the second—reinforced the Soviet perception of West European dissatisfaction with the US approach to CSCE and CBMs. In their conversations with the French, the Soviets objected to the proposed zone of application for the CDE, "from the Atlantic to the Urals," and to the proposed exclusion of nuclear weapons and naval forces from consideration. Nevertheless, the Soviets were careful not to reject the French idea, seeing it as a political opportunity to accentuate the commonality of Soviet-West European security concerns independent of the course of US-Soviet relations. □

Subsequent to Belgrade, the Soviets became increasingly explicit in their willingness to engage in an expanded European discussion of CBMs:

- In November 1978 the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee reiterated the "action program" and proposed that CSCE signatories conclude an agreement on nonuse of force, nonfirst use of nuclear weapons, and nonexpansion of alliances.

- In March 1979 Brezhnev proposed that CSCE signatories give advance notification of "major" naval exercises when these were to be held near the waters of other CSCE participating countries.

- In May 1979, the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers added prior notification of "big" air force exercises to the Eastern agenda. They reiterated Eastern proposals for the nonexpansion of political or military groupings in Europe and, more generally, stated Pact support for measures such as "the nonincrease of troops and arms on the territory of other states," and the renunciation of the threat of using nuclear weapons against states that renounce both the use and the basing of nuclear weapons on their territories. The Pact Ministers called also for the convening of a European conference on military detente to discuss these and other measures.
In October 1979, Brezhnev proposed that the CSCE maneuver notification threshold be lowered from 25,000 to 20,000 men and that CSCE participants give “timely notification” of ground force movements involving more than 20,000 men. He also proposed a reciprocal maneuver ceiling of 40,000 to 50,000 men.

In December 1979, the Pact Foreign Ministers proposed that prior notification of troop movements and exercises be extended from 21 days to one month.

One of Moscow’s reservations about a CDE is that it might conflict with Soviet objectives in MBFR. In MBFR, the Soviets apparently accept the fact that any negotiated troop and equipment reductions would require certain verification-related measures, including on-site inspection. In late March the Soviet Ambassador to MBFR indicated that an exchange of lists of units to be withdrawn from the MBFR area and of temporary observers at designated entry-exit points might be acceptable to the USSR and its allies. The Soviets apparently wish to avoid in a CDE, however, the inclusion of the more substantive issue of armaments reductions (as proposed by the French for the second stage) because this could lead to Western demands for more intrusive CBMs related to verification and inspection.

As a confluence of Soviet and French views on CDE has become less likely, Moscow has pressed its advocacy of the Warsaw Pact’s own CMD proposal. This may to some extent represent a diplomatic tussle between Paris and Moscow for pride of authorship. It is also likely, however, that the Soviets see the CMD proposal as a means of outmaneuvering the French for the support of other CSCE participants for an agenda more conducive to Soviet thinking.

Although France’s European Community partners have generally supported CDE, many—most notably West Germany—share Moscow’s reservations with respect to the potentially adverse impact of CDE on MBFR. Moreover, substantial disagreement exists among West European states over the extent to which specific CBMs should be discussed at the Madrid Review Conference itself—a link that the French wish to limit to a simple mandate—and over the utility of voluntary measures.

In bidding against the French for West European support on the agenda question, the Soviets have several options open in their search for a trump card. They could express willingness to discuss extending the CSCE-defined zone of voluntary CBMs. During the negotiations over the Helsinki Final
Act, they at one point seemed to be considering an extension of the CSCE zone to 300 km in exchange for Western agreement to voluntary CBMs. Militarily, an extension of the CBMs in the Final Act, or of those proposed by the Warsaw Pact, to a 300-km zone (or even to the Urals) would have only a marginal impact on Soviet training and exercise practices. 

The question, of course, is what Moscow would ask for in exchange for such a concession. In return for extending the zone, the Soviets would probably want the zone to include portions of US territory (including US Atlantic coastal waters under any naval CBMs). The Soviets might also ask for the inclusion on the conference agenda of such Pact declaratory proposals as nonuse of force, the nonexpansion of alliances, and non-first use of nuclear or conventional weapons. They could even advance such measures as a freeze on the military forces of any participating state on the territory of another or a limit on the introduction of major naval surface combatants of nonlittoral states into the Baltic and Black Seas. 

Although it is less likely, Moscow may be willing to consider accepting certain CBMs on a mandatory basis. Once again, whether Moscow would be willing to take such a step would depend upon the anticipated political trade-off and upon their potential impact on NATO's military flexibility. Such measures could include notification of all troop movements involving more than 20,000 men, a maneuver ceiling of 40,000 to 50,000 troops, and notification of combined maneuvers involving more than 40,000 to 50,000 troops. 

Accepting mandatory CBMs, however, would be a sharp departure from Moscow's past policy, and any Soviet consideration of binding measures would probably be accompanied by demands for Western concessions of disproportionate political and military significance.
Sehr geehrter Willy Brandt!


Selbstverständlich ist die Sowjetunion imstande alle Herausforderungen seitens der amerikanischen und der NATO Militaristen zu beantworten. Die UdSSR und ihre Verbündeten sind in der Lage, alle notwendigen Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung ihrer Sicherheit zu
ergreifen. Wir möchten aber nicht, daß die Entwicklung den Weg einschlägt, auf den der Brüsseler Nato-Beschluß und die "neue Nuklearstrategie" der USA drängen, d.h. den Weg eines neuen Aufschwungs der Rüstungen in den 80er Jahren mit allen riesigen Ausgaben und unberechenbaren internationalen Komplikationen.

Man soll sich völlig im klaren sein, daß die Maßnahmen, die zur Zeit von den Vereinigten Staaten unternommen werden, einen gefährlichen Versuch darstellen, den Völkern den Gedanken beizubringen, daß ein Atomkrieg real ist und "gewonnen werden kann".

Wir sind der Meinung, daß die verantwortlichen Politiker von einer anderen Perspektive für die Menschheit aussehen sollten, Möglichkeiten für eine friedliche Beilegung der internationalen Probleme mit Hilfe von Verhandlungen suchen sollten. Was uns anbetrifft, so gibt es keine Probleme in Europa, Asien und in anderen Teilen der Welt, die die sozialistischen Länder nicht bereit wären, auf dem Verhandlungstisch zu regeln. Mehr als einmal haben wir auch uns bereit erklärt, auf der Grundlage der Gegenseitigkeit die Begrenzung und den Verbot aller möglichen Waffentypen zu vereinbaren.

Erreichung der militärischen Überlegenheit als materiellen Grundlage der Politik der nuklearen Erpressung genommen haben.


Dabei beruft man sich wohl in erster Linie auf die Präsidentenwahlen in den USA. Ich sage ehrlich: Angesichts der Bedeutung der Fragen, um die es sich handelt und die die Schicksale der Menschheit berühren, erscheint eine solche Berufung in sich selbst hahllos und nicht solide. Die Probleme des Friedens oder Kriegs dürfen nicht in Abhängigkeit zur Konjunktur der Wahlen in dem einen oder dem anderen Land gebracht werden. Bei uns entsteht aber der Eindruck, daß die Sache letzten Endes wohl doch nicht an den Wahlen liegt, sondern daran, daß unter den regierenden Kreisen der USA eine negative Haltung zu den Verhandlungen dominiert, weil ein Zustandekommen von
Vereinbarung auf der Grundlage des Prinzips der Gleichheit und
der gleichen Sicherheit mit den heutigen militär-strategischen
Zielsetzungen der USA nicht übereinstimmt. Allem Anschein nach
ist die amerikanische Führung nicht auf ernsthafte Verhandlungen
ausgerichtet, sie ist nicht bereit gegenseitig annahmbarb Verein-
barungen zu suchen.

Ich brauche Ihnen wohl nicht zu sagen, wie schwerwiegend die
Folgen einer weiteren Verzögerung von Verhandlungen sein werden.
Dies würde bedeuten, eine Entwertung schon abgeschlossener Verträge
und Abkommen, wie SALT-1 und SALT-2, hinzunehmen. Die Sowjetunion
wird gezwungen, zusätzliche Maßnahmen zur Gewährleistung ihrer
Sicherheit zu ergreifen, was offensichtlich die Grundlage selbst
für eventuelle Verhandlungen verändern wird. Unvermeidlich würden
auch andere Abrüstungsverhandlungen abgelenkt, darunter auch die
Verhandlungen in Wien. Letzten Endes würde eine Verzögerung eine
noch größere Untergrabung der Entspannung, Unterminierung von
all dem bedeuten, was uns durch gemeinsame Anstrengungen in den
70er Jahren gelungen war, in der Sache der Gewährleistung der Ent-
spannung, der Sicherung des Friedens und der Entwicklung der ge-
genseitig vorteilhaften vielfältigen internationalen Zusammenarbeit
tzu erreichen.

Wir glauben, daß entsprechend der Logik der Dinge, die Völker,
die politischen Parteien, die breite Öffentlichkeit Westeuropas zu
einer mitmenschlichen Rolle in den Fragen der Begrenzung der nuk-
learen Rüstung in Europa berufen sind. Man würde einen unverzei-
hbarer Fehler begehen, wenn man sich von einer Stimmung der Beschwich-
tigung leiten ließe in der Auffassung, die Bereitschaft zu Verhand-
lungen schon vorhanden und der Prozeß ihrer Vorbereitung ginge so zu sagen seinen Gang.

In Anbetracht der entstandenen Lage wird man sich offensichtlich auf der staatlichen Ebene nicht wenig Mühe gegeben müssen, damit die Verhandlungen beginnen und in einer konstruktiven Atmosphäre verlaufen können. Eine wichtige Rolle aber könnten dabei die Aktivitäten und die Beharrlichkeit der europäischen Öffentlichkeit spielen.

Wir wissen, daß die Parteien der Sozialistischen Internationale sich positiv zum sowjetischen Vorschlag geäußert haben, die Idee der Verhandlungen unterstützen. Wir rechnen damit, daß der Ernst der Lage die sozial-demokratischen Parteien zur Verstärkung der Austrengungen in dieser Richtung veranlassen wird.

Mein Gespräch im vorigen Jahr in Moskau mit der Arbeitsgruppe der Sozialistischen Internationale über die Fragen der Abrüstung hat bei mir den Eindruck hinterlassen, daß wir über ein bestimmtes gegenseitiges Einvernehmen verfügen in bezug auf die dringlichsten Aufgaben des Kampfes für die Erhaltung der Entspannung, gegen das Waffenumf für die Abrüstung. Wir hoffen, daß die damals von den Vertretern der Sozialistischen Internationale vorgetragenen Gedanken nicht lediglich auf dem Papier bleiben, sondern ihren Ausdruck in den konkreten politischen Handlungen finden werden, die in der gegenwärtigen Lage so notwendig sind.

Ihr persönliches Ansehen, sowie der Einfluß der Parteien der Sozialistischen Internationale können zu einem wichtigen Faktor dafür werden, daß die Chance nicht versäumt wird, einer neuen, sehr gefährlichen Runde des Waffenumf vorzubeugen, konstruktive Verhandlungen zu beginnen, die eine Wende zur tiefgreifenden militärischen Entspannung fördern könnten. Ich würde gerne sehr
geehrter Willy Brandt, Ihre Meinung über die erwähnten Fragen erfahren.

Hochachtungsvoll

L. Breshnew

den 28. August 1980
Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,


In dieser Situation sind die Vereinigten Staaten fühlbar durch ihren Wahlkampf in Anspruch genommen. Man kann Ihnen schwer widersprechen, wenn Sie meinen, daß das Schicksal der Welt wichtiger sei als jeder Wahlkampf. Auf der anderen Seite ist es nichts Neues, daß die Vereinigten Staaten vor ihren jeweiligen Wahlen nur bedingt handlungsfähig sind. Das gehört zu den Nachteilen einer Ordnung, die auch ihre Stärken hat. Und ich bin im übrigen der Auffassung, daß es für den weiteren Gang eben doch bedeutungsvoll ist, wer regiert. Ich kann das jedenfalls für
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ziemlich genau beurteilen.


Es wird sich lohnen, unbeschadet der amerikanischen Wahlen eine große Anstrengung zu unternehmen, um das Prinzip der annähernden Gleichheit durch Verhandlungen in die Wirklichkeit umzusetzen. Es wäre sicher gut, wenn die Verhandlungen zur Substanz vorbereitet würden, indem man sich über die Rahmenbedingungen verständigt, in denen sie stattfinden sollen. Sie wissen vermutlich, daß die Bundesregierung die amerikanischen Verbündeten in dieser Richtung ermutigt. Es wäre wichtig, wenn Ihr Außenminister das Gespräch mit seinem amerikanischen Kollegen so konstruktiv wie möglich führt.

Die deutschen Sozialdemokraten und die Sozialistische Internationale werden sich weiterhin mit Nachdruck für eine Politik der Rüstungsbegrenzung einsetzen. Wir wissen, was von Vereinbarungen auf militärischem Gebiet für die Entspannung und für das Schicksal der Welt abhängen kann.

Auf dem für November in Madrid vorgesehenen nächsten Kongreß der Sozialistischen Internationale werden wir - auf der Grundlage des von der Arbeitsgruppe für Abrüstungsfragen unter Vorsitz von Kalevi Sorsa erarbeiteten Berichts - eine umfassende Stellungnahme zu diesem Komplex

Mit allen guten Wünschen

Kopie sowie Kopien der Briefe
Breschnew an W. B. v. 28. 8. 1980,
W. B. an Breschnew v. 12. 8. 1980

1. Kalevi Sorsa
2. Bernt Carlsson

17. 9. 1980
Dr. Thomas Mirow 12. Dezember 1980

**Vermerk**

Betr.: Gespräch Willy Brandt mit Botschafter Semjonow am 11. Dezember in Bonn

Weitere Teilnehmer: Egon Bahr, Leonid Grigorjewitsch Ussytschenko, Thomas Mirow, sowjetischer Dolmetscher

Botschafter Semjonow begann das Gespräch mit einer ausführlichen Würdigung des vor 10 Jahren abgeschlossenen Moskauer Vertrages und verband dies mit einem Dank an den Vorsitzenden als dem Architekten dieser Politik.


Semjonow stellte fest, es falle ihm schwer zu entscheiden, ob das Jahr 1970 oder das Jahr 1972 wichtiger sei, obwohl er an den Vorgängen des Jahres 72 maßgeblich beteiligt gewesen sei. Man dürfe die Bedeutung der USA nicht über-
treiben. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland habe eine wichtige Stellung. Es sei gut, daß Egon Bahr sich jetzt verstärkt um Abrüstung kümmern wolle. Er sei gern bereit, sich mit ihm häufig zu treffen.

Willy Brandt unterstrich, Egon Bahrs neue Aufgabe sei zentral wichtig. Die USA seien ein Kontinent wie die Sowjetunion und immer noch mit großer Vitalität. Die neue Administration könne möglicherweise etwas isolationistisch sein und auf Europa schimpfen. Dies mache ihm aber keine große Sorge, weil dies dazu führen könnte, daß die Europäer selbstständiger würden. Dazu müßten sich vor allem Frankreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zusammentun. Man müsse aber wissen, daß Frankreich zur Zeit größere Rüstungsanstrengungen unternehme und eine gewisse Anlehnung an die USA suche. Auch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland werde sich von den Vereinigten Staaten nicht trennen können.

Willy Brandt sagte darauf hin, es sei vielleicht besser, von einer Kalt-Wetter-Periode oder einer Frost-Periode zu sprechen. Die Frage stelle sich, was in einer solchen Phase aus den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen würde. Unser Interesse sei, die bilateralen und europäischen Beziehungen so gut wie möglich zu gestalten, aber es sei nicht sicher, ob das gehen werde. W.B. wies auf den intensiven Handel hin und auf die menschlichen Erleichterungen: schon in Frankreich sei nicht überall Verständnis dafür zu finden, welche Bedeutung dies für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland habe. In den USA erst recht nicht. Aber es könne sein, daß wir unter Druck kämen. Wir seien nicht so autonom wie die Sowjetunion. Herz und Verstand und Interesse sprächen aber für die Fortführung dieser Politik.


Er danke sehr für das Gespräch und wolle betonen, wie hoch Willy Brandts Meinung in Moskau geschätzt werde.

Willy Brandt dankte seinerseits, auch für die freundliche Würdigung von Madrid. Er lege großen Wert darauf, nicht nur mit dem identifiziert zu werden, was in der Vergangenheit war. Er wolle noch einmal betonen, für wie wichtig er Egon Bahrs neue Aufgabe halte. Im Übrigen hoffe er auf ein baldiges Wiedersehen.

Semjonow: Er werde in Moskau berichten. Breschnew habe das Wettrüsten die große Gefahr unserer Zeit genannt. Er würde sich freuen, nach seiner Rückkehr das Gespräch fortsetzen zu können.
Part Three:
International Diplomacy

1981
The Successor Generation:
Its Challenges and Responsibilities

The Atlantic Council's
Working Group on the
Successor Generation

Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino
Chairman

Dr. Thomas A. Bartlett
Vice Chairman

Robert E. Osgood
Rapporteur

Theodore C. Achilles
Project Director

Washington D.C.
January 1981
THE SUCCESSOR GENERATION

I. The Nature of the Problem

Are those who were born into the turbulent and interdependent post-war world adequately educated with respect to the heritage, values and basic principles of our common Western civilization to play a fully responsible part in strengthening our heritage and way of life? Is the problem a generational one or one of our society as a whole?

The Atlantic Council's "Successor Generation" Working Group initially debated these questions and answered the first with a resounding "No."

As to the second, the term "successor generation" is used generically to cover all individuals up to roughly 40 years of age, well over half of the population of the United States. Whether or not they are more or less able than their elders to cope with today's problems is not the issue here. The shrinking of the planet and the technological revolution have vastly increased both the complexity of today's international problems and the speed of change. Education adequate for previous generations born into a simpler world is not adequate today. It is the younger generation whose character and judgment are developing and who will bear the responsibility for dealing with the challenges of the rest of this century.

Those born since the 1930's, including most elementary and secondary school teachers and many younger college professors, have no personal memories of why the democracies had to fight World War II. Hitler and Stalin have become mere textbook names, hardly more relevant than Caesar or Napoleon. This generation has little personal understanding of the suffering and sacrifices entailed, or of the massive and dedicated efforts made in the early post-war years to develop a new and better international order to prevent a third cataclysmic war.

During the last decade there has been little perceived danger until recently. The West has tended to view "détente" as meaning significantly improved East-West relations, and not much credence was given to those who claimed that the Soviet concept of "détente" and "peaceful co-existence" is nevertheless a different form of struggle for global predominance. Little need has been felt to heed Jefferson's warning that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." Western society as a whole, and especially its youth, has been evolving beyond old-fashioned nationalism and belief in armed force as an instrument of policy. An increasingly post-industrial society has stimulated emphasis on the quality of life. It was, and is, hard for many to realize that Soviet society, being ruled by ideologically trained managers, has not similarly evolved and still stresses militant ideological struggle backed by armed force and totalitarian rule.

The anti-institutionalism of the 1960's has waned, but even in its heyday the vast majority of its proponents — as distinct from its more radical agitators — were motivated not by an erosion of values but by disillusion with the working of the institutions they had been taught to revere. There has not been, and is not now, any lack of youthful idealism. The problem is to encourage it along constructive lines.

When first formed in 1979 the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Successor Generation sought to define the scope of the problem in terms with which it could reasonably expect to deal. Transmission of values was basic — but what values? Obviously not the whole range. It was agreed that the Council, in keeping with its purpose of strengthening the ties between free nations, should focus on the fundamental values of the Atlantic Community. Its values are at the heart of Western civilization, and many of its basic moral and human values are shared by people everywhere, including those under totalitarian rule.

It was agreed that the most fundamental value of the peoples of the Atlantic Community is freedom — freedom to choose one's own religious beliefs, other values, way of life, and institutions. It was agreed that these freedoms are threatened by militant totalitarianism, which permits no freedom of choice, and
especially by that of the USSR, which has sought inexorably to extend its system and area of control by all means: political, economic and psychological if possible, by armed force if necessary.

It was clear to the Working Group that only the effectively concerted strength of the free nations, especially those linked in the Atlantic Alliance, would suffice to meet this threat.

It was also clear that the free world's defense could not be military alone, despite the importance of adequate defensive strength. Rather it must be based upon an understanding of the threat in its political, psychological and economic as well as its military dimensions. Essentially freedom depends upon the will of free peoples to defend their heritage, values and way of life. That will depends upon understanding of what they have to defend, why they need to defend it, and what they need to defend it against. The Group firmly believes that the kind of world order which will evolve during the coming decades will depend upon the understanding, vision and will of free peoples acting together to strengthen and defend their free institutions. It requires understanding of the principles upon which their institutions are based and of the responsibility of the citizen, individually and collectively, to give effect to those principles.

The problem, as the Working Group sees it, is that those who are — or will be — succeeding to positions of leadership in the United States and in other nations which share our values, may not be sufficiently aware of the challenges to the foregoing factors to enable them adequately to discharge their individual and collective responsibilities in dealing with the problems and opportunities of today's and tomorrow's world.

Any solution of the problem must be educational — in the broadest sense of the word, including not only academia, but the media and other influences upon the formation of mature intellect and judgment. Yet, even the realm of academia alone, from kindergarten through graduate school, is vast. The key element is the practitioner — his awareness of the problem, his interest, and his desire and ability to help. The challenge is clearly far beyond the reach of any one organization. The efforts of many institutions and educational associations will be necessary.

The work of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and surveys by the former Office of Education, the Educational Testing Service, the Council on Learning and others have all revealed a frightening degree of ignorance, even on the part of university and graduate students, of the contemporary world around us. They have revealed grave deficiencies in knowledge of geography, any foreign language, basic political science, economics and modern history, especially recent history which bears so heavily upon the coming years.

Never before have population pressure, technology, instant communications and rising expectations combined to produce such an acceleration of history and the need for adequately trained and prepared individuals, leaders and followers alike, to reach sound value judgments. The responsibility for that training and preparation presents a major challenge to our educational system.
II. The Extent of the Problem

The extent of knowledge in specific fields on the part of individuals and of the general public is relatively easy to quantify. Attitudes are much more difficult to measure with any degree of precision. The American Council on Education (ACE) and the Educational Testing Service (ETS) have done extensive quantitative studies on student knowledge of the basic factors of international relations, foreign languages and cultures and civic education. The ETS has recently completed for the Council on Learning's task force on Education and the World View a sophisticated nation-wide survey of over 3,000 undergraduates in some 185 colleges and universities. The purpose was to ascertain not merely the degree of knowledge but also the ability of students to correlate what they knew into understanding of international problems.

The responses are still being analyzed, but partial results for 1,000 seniors have been made available. These seniors had a mean score of 50, with significant differences between fields of study. History majors ranked first, scoring 59.3; but education majors, the teachers of tomorrow, scored lowest with 39.8. Foreign language proficiency was very low, one-third reporting a "survival level" (for example, how to read signs or ask directions) but only 7 percent said they could read a simple book without a dictionary.

On questions designed to measure understanding, less than 20 percent answered correctly questions about global agricultural production and less than 30 percent answered correctly questions about the Helsinki Accords relating to human rights, a bipolar versus a multipolar international system, or the role of the non-aligned countries. Less than 14 percent correctly answered questions on elements of the world's principal religions. These findings point up the statement in the report by the President's Commission that: "The urgency of issues confronting the United States increases the need of an educated electorate; we cannot wait for another generation to become educated about these issues."

In reporting on the status of civic education in America today, the U.S. Office of Education in mid-1979 expressed growing concern about "citizen apathy in the United States, apparent neglect of citizen education in the schools, and discrepancies between changing social and political conditions and educational practice." Apathy is reflected in low youthful participation in the electoral process. According to the Census Bureau, 40 percent of the total voting age population is under 35 years of age. In 1976 presidential election only 42 percent of those 18 to 24 bothered to vote while 55.4 percent of those 25-34 voted. According to a New York Times-CBS survey in November 1980, only 56 percent of the 18-29 year old group were registered to vote, compared to 83 percent of those 45-64, and 76 percent of those over 65.

In autumn of 1979 the President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, in responding to the President's mandate to examine the study of foreign languages and the study of international issues, problems and cultures by young Americans today, warned of "threats to national security and the economy," as a direct result of "America's scandalous incompetence in foreign languages (which) explains our dangerously inadequate understanding of world affairs." Offering ignorance of foreign languages and cultures as one explanation for the United States' weakening position as an exporting nation, the report noted that one of the world's leading exporters, Japan, has 10,000 English-speaking business representatives in the United States, while there are fewer than 900 American counterparts in Japan, with few of them speaking Japanese. In further confirmation of these observations, the American Council on Education recently reported the findings of a study that indicates "at most, only 5 percent of prospective teachers take any course relating to international affairs or foreign peoples and cultures as part of their professional preparation."

It is therefore not surprising that students at both the pre-college and college levels are woefully lacking in knowledge of geography and 20th century history in their relevance to today's international problems. The North Atlantic Assembly, which brings U.S. Members of Congress together with their counterparts from Canada and Western Europe in order to study and debate critical international issues of common concern, has created a task force of parliamentarians from these countries to study "the gap in political
awareness in the successor generations — those generations of Americans and Europeans who lack first-hand knowledge of shared experiences during World War II and the post-war development of our common institutions such as NATO and OECD." The preliminary report of the task force attributes this gap in political awareness to "both educational, cultural, and information-communication factors," and suggests that the former "are most easily identified and are of primary concern." The task force concludes that the basic problem in Western Europe and North America today is "that the concept of democracy has either been taken for granted or has merely been treated in terms of the national political machinery. Rarely has it been subjected to examination or critical analysis, nor has its preservation been considered."

In this country, the Gallup Organization, the National Opinion Research Council, Potomac Associates, and others have over a number of years surveyed attitudes toward such questions as spending for defense compared to spending for welfare, willingness to assist in the defense of various countries and confidence in various institutions. Comparable research in Europe has been done by the European Communities through their "Eurobarometer" studies, by Dr. Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan, and others. A series of Eurobarometer polls taken in 1977 -1979 fails to indicate trends because the polls were not repeated over time, but were specifically broken down by age groups. They showed preponderantly less favorable attitudes toward the United States and its policies among younger groups than among their elders. There were, however, interesting exceptions.

For the European Community as a whole, support for membership in NATO was substantially the same in all age groups from 16 to 55 and over, at roughly 40 to 44 percent. Nevertheless, the minority favoring "neutralism" was half again as large among the young as among their elders — 21.7 percent as against 13.9 percent. Yet, in France and Belgium more young people than old supported NATO. For the Community as a whole, younger opinion was more in favor of following independent foreign policies than their elders. On economic matters, in answer to a question as to the best means of assuring European economic stability and prosperity, responses showed that substantially more young than old favored independent policies as compared to cooperation with the U.S. The same was true with respect to those who thought the U.S. sought economic domination over Europe rather than mutual advantage.

In general terms, despite the surge of student radicalism in the 1960's, there appears to be less generational difference of attitudes between younger and older groups than might be expected. Both have developed new interests and attitudes in recent years. Personal interests retain priority for both but both show increased revulsion toward war, interest in protecting the environment and in a life style that involves more than material interests. Inglehart calls this the development of "post-materialism." We may well be developing a "successor society" along with a successor generation. Yet, how Western society develops depends upon the latter. There is no lack of youthful idealism and we have opportunities as well as problems in the way it is channeled.

In October 1980, the Gallup Organization took a poll for the Atlantic Council on attitudes toward NATO. It showed that more of the 18-29 age group favored increasing our commitment to NATO than those 50 and over (28.2 percent as against 17.1 percent) and also more favored reducing our commitment (10.4 percent as against 5.1 percent). Educational level revealed a similar picture, with 23.1 percent of college graduates favoring increased commitment compared to 14.9 percent of those with grade school education and 8.1 percent of college graduates favoring decreased commitment compared to 6.6 percent of the grade school group. Keeping the commitment unchanged was favored by 50 percent of the college group compared to 32 percent of grade school group, with 45 percent of the latter answering "unsure."

A poll conducted in August 1980 by the Roper Organization for the United Nations Association showed that although 53 percent of the respondents thought that the U.N. was doing a poor job, the age group of 18 to 29 year olds was markedly more internationalist than older age groups. This was interpreted to mean that younger Americans need leaders who will articulate ways of strengthening international institutions and identifying areas of common interest between nations.
The problem is that this need in inchoate. There is unnecessary ignorance of geography, of current and recent history, of the diverse elements of our common Western civilization, of the application of democratic principles through our political and economic institutions, and of the forces shaping the modern world. Ignorance, parochialism, apathy, and prejudice have combined to increase misunderstandings and divisive attitudes on the part of each side of the Atlantic toward the other. The decline in European studies in American universities, of student and faculty exchanges with Europe, and of public and private funding for both, have had deleterious effects on this side. Similar factors in Europe and, more importantly, distorted impressions of American society, have produced attitudes ranging from cool indifferences to active anti-Americanism. Naturally the extent of these attitudes varies from country to country, but their prevalence is clearly cause for concern.

A paper recently prepared by the U.S. International Communication Agency ("The Successor Generation: Implications of European-American Relations") states:

The successor generations of the United States and Western Europe are of increasing concern to us. If it is true that their views of the European-American relationship differ from those of their predecessors, significant implications may exist for the vitality and durability of the close ties which have linked us during the past generation.... Our concern is whether the European-American relationship, as we have known it since 1945, will endure during the remainder of this century as a new generation of Americans and Europeans occupies positions of leadership in their respective societies.

A qualitative paper on the situation in Europe, especially in the German Federal Republic, by Alexander Klieforth, recently Minister for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Bonn, is given as an Appendix to this paper.
III. The Purpose of the Program

After several months of considering the nature and complexities of the successor generation problem and means of dealing with it, the Working Group adopted the following brief statement of its purposes: In today's interdependent and turbulent world no nation by itself alone can assure the freedom and other basic values of its own people. Common effort of like-minded nations is essential to develop, promote and defend freedom, human dignity, rights and opportunities. This common effort has a tendency to decline from generation to generation unless it is constantly re-enforced.

The mission of the Atlantic Council's Educational Program is to revitalize awareness of these factors on the part of succeeding generations of Americans and Europeans.

The dignity and liberty of the individual, his freedom to worship in his own way, to choose his own form of government and to seek a better life for himself and his children are universal human values. They are common to all mankind, including peoples subject to totalitarian rule.

The nations of the Atlantic Community certainly have no monopoly of these values, but they and a few others have made great efforts to develop democratic institutions to give these values practical reality. Their efforts have been emulated by many other peoples. Full achievement of this objective requires constant effort to strengthen and defend their free institutions against those who would subject the individual to the state.

The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "The Parties ... are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Article 2 of that Treaty continues: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded."

The Atlantic Council's education program, acting as a catalyst, clearing house and resource, seeks to stimulate greater educational emphasis (not merely through academia but through other channels as well) on salient factors, including:

- The common heritage of the peoples of the Atlantic Community, their histories, languages and outlook, the factors that unite them, the problems that divide them, and the richness of their diversities.
- The commonality of their interests and their destiny in today's and tomorrow's world.
- The relevance of history, particularly recent history, to understanding of the international issues of today.
- The realities, the problems and the opportunities of increasing interdependence.
- The basic principles and nature of both free and totalitarian systems.
- The danger which heavily armed and militant totalitarianism poses for the free world and the free way of life.
- The international dimension of citizen responsibility.
- The fact that security is not solely a military matter but a political, economic, social and psychological one as well.
- Above all, the responsibility of the individual to do his part to strengthen our free institutions and to defend them.

Essentially the mission is to assist succeeding generations to reach and act upon sound value judgments in the face of the dangers and opportunities of today's and tomorrow's interdependent world.
IV. Values

In formulating its program, the Working Group considered the values most relevant in the context of its purpose to be freedom, the dignity of the individual, the principles of democracy and the rule of law. All are given application in theory, if not always fully in practice, in the working of our democratic institutions. All have an ethical basis.

In contemporary society young people are confronted by a conflicting array of value systems. Authority of the family, the school, the church and the government have all been weakened. Technology provides unprecedented opportunities and dangers. Worldwide communication is instantaneous; conflict and disorder anywhere make news and TV brings it into the home more vividly than anything a child learns in school.

The adolescent and young adult faces the problem of finding himself in relation to conflicting beliefs and values encountered in his interactions with others. Unless he finds a firm ethical base, he feels little connection with the past or responsibility for the future, little allegiance to what has gone before or little hope of modifying what may follow.

In Western society, the schools and universities are responsible for preparing the intellects of young people to engage the world of ideas and beliefs as free minds capable of analysis and judgment. There must be not simply “do-goodism” but realistic advancement of our national interests of all kinds. And they are vital to securing the respect of others and willing acceptance of our leadership. A leader must, above all, be respected.

Over and beyond the values of any particular grouping of human beings these ideals form an ethical framework which has objective validity, of which one can aspire to have a degree of understanding — not perfect, but approximate — and which can give a measure of insight and guidance to those who seek it. The common Western Judeo-Christian belief system which has developed over the centuries is the closest we have to such an ethical framework.

A democratic society and a democratic world are dependent upon the capability of the individual to examine questions of value and of purpose in critical fashion. We need not fear that the young will be seduced to error if they are permitted to examine a variety of belief systems critically and openly. The dedicated teacher certainly desires to implant this capability of reaching sound judgments but needs the tools, help and encouragement to do so.

The kind of society our successors fashion — whether they will enhance and clarify, or reject and replace the traditional values our society bequeaths them — depends very much on how today’s young people select among the many value systems to which they are exposed.

The application of traditional value systems to the problems of today’s unstable and interdependent world presents dilemmas and challenges. How, for instance, do we reconcile moral horror over nuclear arms with the responsibility to preserve and carry forward our heritage of freedom? The set of values necessary for decision would seem to be based upon a point of view that stands above immediate political issues, and which finds guidelines in the deeper truths of nature and religion which tend to give priority and order to the resolution of such issues.

Today, the fundamental issue in the international arena is who will construct a new international order appropriate to today’s world, to replace the old one shattered in the first half of this century.

In the early post-war years the grim shadow of World War II gave impetus to the search for a new and effective international political and economic system. The UN and its affiliated institutions of the World
Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Health Organization and Food and Agriculture Organizations, as well as other specialized agencies, were created quickly. There also emerged a pattern of closer political relationships between the free nations of Western Europe, the United States and Canada. They become linked in a North Atlantic Alliance — and a politico-military organization, NATO — and, more importantly, they were linked by the sometimes dimly realized but deeper bonds of our common Western heritage, values and civilization.

Their relationships are not exclusive — these systems have ties of varying degrees of closeness with other nations worldwide. For example, the "Atlantic" community of nations has broadened to include Japan, Australia and New Zealand in matters of economic cooperation and development, as embodied in the OECD, and increasingly in the fields of defense and energy supply security. The point is, however, that these nations — in addition to their common interests — perceive a shared heritage of values.

The object was to create a structure sufficiently flexible to house the diverse interests and requirements of the entire non-Communist world. Even beyond the democratic world, it was hoped that the universal human values to which these nations are dedicated would, by their attractive power, eventually wear away the rigidity of totalitarian systems. We have seen signs of that emerging in Yugoslavia, in China, in Eastern Europe, most recently in Poland, and in the courage of dissidents in all communist countries.

The ethical framework of their values is a powerful unifying force, in some ways even stronger than national interests. It is based in part upon the accumulated experience and wisdom of the Judeo-Christian, Greco-Roman, and European cultures. One generation after another has added, adapted, tested for error, reconciled theories with practice and practice with theory. The resulting framework is complex: it may not be wholly consistent, it may not be fully adequate to today's world, but it is enduring. From it does emerge a sense of direction, an aid to understanding, an insight into the values that transcend those of the individual, of class, of sect or any generation.

To promote and defend that framework requires the dedicated common effort of many individuals in many lands. The framework, the dedication, and the common effort have a tendency to decline from generation to generation unless constantly reinforced.
V. The Threat

Young people, like many of their elders, in addition to having only a dim understanding of the common values that hold the Atlantic community together, may also be only vaguely aware of the nature and extent of the threat to our way of life posed by militant totalitarian expansionism.

This has been changed to some extent by growing evidence of the dangers posed by Soviet policy, such as the occupation of Afghanistan, but only in the sense of eliciting new interest in national defense, without a clear understanding of why collective defense in general and the Atlantic alliance in particular are needed and why the U.S.-Soviet relationship seems to be increasingly affected by turbulent change in the developing world. There may be, however, a new receptivity for information about such matters — and also a greater need for it.

Many of our people — both young and old — are not fully aware of the chain of events that brought about the formation of the Atlantic alliance (what is generally referred to as the early Cold War including such signposts as the Yalta agreements, Soviet occupation of the countries of Eastern Europe, Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey in 1945/46, the Greek civil war, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and the Korean war). Yet those events explain how the last and present generations of national leaders came to see the world and American interests and obligations. Furthermore, a good many people — including many of the younger generation — have come to consider nuclear war as unthinkable. Certainly many perhaps do not realize fully the extent, pace, and momentum of growing Soviet military power or of Soviet doctrine and policies. There is also a belief, perhaps now altered somewhat by Afghanistan, that confrontation between East and West involving the Third World has little immediate effect on our national interest.

If young people are not fully aware of the importance of collective defense, it is partially because they do not know enough about the societies that we confront — what it is like to live under unitary totalitarian rule rather than pluralistic democracy and how oppressive communist rulers have to be to stay in power. Many members of the younger generation tend to deplore and even question the need for military security and the inevitable sacrifices it entails. When a "threat" to the United States is direct, it may be too late to do anything constructive about it. Collective defense requires some understanding of what a threat to the security of another country can be: indirectly, but very importantly a threat also to us. Some lessons of history need to be learned, and taught, over and over again. We should be neither surprised nor critical that collective security is not as well understood by the youth of today as it was by the youth of a generation ago, when the need for it was more obvious.

There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that the younger generation, both at home and abroad, has not learned adequately the relevance of history to the real world of today. History shows that prolonged peaceful co-existence between nations has been the exception rather than the rule. Yet to be truly relevant this knowledge must cover the root causes of past conflicts. In this age of accelerating historical developments it is more important than ever before to be aware of the causes of change in this century.

The Atlantic alliance was established in 1949 to counter the threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Its members were determined to avoid the errors of the 1930's when they had failed to respond effectively to successive Nazi encroachments into surrounding countries. This time, they sought to deter aggression by making clear in advance their determination to resist it collectively. For thirty years, this has prevented the threat of Soviet encroachment further West in Europe from materializing. Today the threat is global, and political, economic and psychological as well as military. Greater understanding, both of post-World War II history and of recent developments and trends, is necessary.

There is a danger that pointing to the realities of Soviet power and its growth in recent years may be misinterpreted as merely escalating the arms race and the danger of war. Actually, the application of
deterrence has been and is a major factor in preventing war. The West need not fear an equilibrium of power, but that equilibrium has been disturbed in recent years. This is something that should be more widely and better understood, in a calm and reasoned way.

In brief, the Working Group believes that more knowledge about the Soviet Union — and, mutatis mutandis, about Cuba and other Communist countries — is highly desirable. It can lead, in fact, to calmer and less emotional view of momentary crises. Political mood swings in America have been a problem even when people had relatively more knowledge than they have today about world politics.

Are we in danger of "returning to the Cold War?" Or has it never ended? A respected former American Ambassador to the USSR has observed: "What the Soviets mean by 'peaceful coexistence' is exactly what we mean by 'cold war:' achievement of our aims without fighting." Naturally our aims are not the same as theirs. We do not seek the destruction of communism, only the prevention of its expansion against the will of the people concerned. While East-West relations appear to have changed in many respects in recent years, there is as yet no evidence of any fundamental change.

Current issues cannot be understood outside of their historical context. In this connection, many people today have only a superficial understanding of the Cold War and its underlying causes. This is not a question of "realism" versus "revisionism." A debate between the two views might shed more light than any effort to present only one side of that controversy.

This subject involves giving people some conceptual framework for an understanding of important issues. For almost a decade it was difficult to discuss Cold War issues and history because of revulsion over the Vietnam war. There is no question but that it affected foreign perceptions of the United States as well as our own self perceptions. We are beginning to pay for this in many ways.

The three purposes of the Atlantic Alliance ("the three D's") are deterrence, defense, and détente. The degree of unity of purpose the alliance has achieved among its members has not only prevented further armed aggression in Europe but has provided the necessary pre-condition both for peaceful co-existence and for constructive East-West relations. We can now see that Soviet power has turned elsewhere, first to Cuba and then to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. It is clear that insecurity anywhere — both inside and outside the NATO area — impacts on the interests of our allies in Western Europe and Japan as well as on our own.

Communism as an ideology is not itself a danger to the United States or Western Europe or Japan. It is not an appealing doctrine to our young people, and it should not be presented to them as if it were a monster ready to devour them. However, Communist ideology is important to understand, for it forms part of both the mental makeup and the arsenal of our adversaries. One cannot understand what is going on in Cuba, Angola, or Afghanistan unless one understands both the doctrine and the totalitarian methods that motivate Communist leadership. The people of these countries are much less moved by it, but they do not make the decisions. The horrors of Cambodia, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the primitive communism that motivated the Khmer Rouge leadership. A study of Marxism (preferably taught by non-Marxists, not necessarily anti-Marxists) and of communist systems is important for young people as part of their early education. America doesn't have to worry about being taken over by communism, but it does have to worry about the role of communism as a weapon of psychological warfare. What we need fear most is ignorance.

The Atlantic Alliance now consists entirely of democratic countries; and Japan, Australia and New Zealand are also democratic. A wealth of common values and traditions and perceptions undergird our

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1 Joseph Sisco dissents from this statement.
alliances in both the Atlantic and Pacific. We are disappointed when we and our allies differ on various issues, but the best protection against divisive stresses and strains is better understanding of our common interests.

Understanding of the threat we face can best be developed through the teaching of modern history, including its ramifications in the fields of political, economic and social science. There is no need for a "cold war" approach — topics such as "problems of national independence and security" or "diverse economic and social systems" provide a solid basis for analysis. The essential is to provide the student with the basis for informed and independent judgment. The approach must be factual, not emotional, but dramatic historical events can heighten interest and understanding in the learning process.
VI. The Atlantic Council's Approach

The Working Group believes that citizen participation in the governance of society is the heart of democracy, that education today requires a much higher degree than ever before of international content to prepare citizens to deal with national and international problems, that civic responsibility has an ethical base, and that our heritage of democratic freedoms today faces anti-democratic forces which threaten Western society and require its internal strengthening and ability to withstand diverse external threats.

Strengthening the American educational system to meet these challenges presents a monumental task. Fortunately, recognition of the problems involved is growing. The work of the U.S. Office of Education, the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies, and the Council on Learning has done much to alert academic opinion. The International Communication Agency, despite declining appropriations, has done what it could to carry out exchange programs, as have private organizations such as Youth for Understanding and the American Field Service. The creation of the Department of Education and passage of the International Education Programs Act of 1980 have been major steps in the right direction.2

Conscious of these and other efforts, the Atlantic Council is also conscious both of its own limitations and of the contribution it is particularly suited to make. Dedicated to strengthening the political, economic, defense, and cultural ties between the free nations of Western Europe, on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the other, it has had many years of experience in stimulating constructive thought and action with respect to our Atlantic relations. "Atlantic" in focus — meaning concern primarily with the components of Western civilization, culture and interests — the Council is catholic with respect to all elements which link those who share that civilization. It also has close ties with kindred organizations in other NATO countries and appropriate international organizations and is already working closely with them.

Coping with the problem will inevitably involve a long-term effort by the entire educational system from kindergarten to graduate school in this country and in others. The Council’s program seeks to stimulate the American educational system, and to the extent possible those of our allies, to greater recognition of the problem and greater attention to the kind of education needed to correct it.

The education we seek to encourage includes the basics essential to understanding of today's world — foreign languages, geography history (especially modern history) and political, economic and social science. It includes involving an international dimension in all relevant elements of curricula. It includes greater emphasis upon studies of Western civilization, culture and languages to bring the pendulum back from its recent swing away from Western studies and it includes the basic principles upon which our free democratic political and economic institutions are founded. It includes the comparison of democratic and totalitarian systems. In includes the relevance of history, modern as well as earlier, to the problems of the world today. Above all, it includes stimulating the educational system to provide greater understanding of the basic principles of Western civilization and of the individual citizen's responsibility to strengthen and defend these essential elements of our free way of life.

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2 General Goodspeed states that there is a good deal of skepticism with regard to the creation of the Department of Education and dissents from this statement.
The U.S. Program

In developing an initial program of action, the Group has formulated a series of: (1) results it hopes to see achieved, (2) activities it will endeavor to encourage, and (3) the means it plans to use. These can be stated as follows:

A. Results

I. Greater awareness of the Successor Generation problem and increased sensitivity to its implications on the part of future national leaders as preparation for the fulfillment of their responsibilities.

II. A manpower pool of persons who have attained a sufficient degree of outlook, knowledge of international affairs and language proficiency to serve as generalists and specialists in responsible positions in the public and private sectors, including business and academia.

III. Enhanced appreciation for and participation in the democratic process — an informed and motivated electorate.

IV. Improved communication between official and academic practitioners, domestically and internationally, with respect to the conduct and teaching of international relations.

V. Greater financial support for efforts to achieve these results.

B. Activities To Be Encouraged

I. Increased support for international exchange programs, official and private, and greater involvement of the academic community in such exchanges.

II. Greater official and private support for professional associations and institutions to develop and carry out innovative and interdisciplinary programs of international studies.

III. Academic emphasis on advanced rather than superficial language training.

IV. Greater emphasis on European studies, including history, languages and culture.

V. Greater emphasis on interdisciplinary treatment of the political, economic and security problems of an interdependent world.

VI. More analytical consideration of divergent political, economic and social systems and of the principles upon which they are based.

VII. Greater emphasis on the relation of ethics to the conduct of public and foreign policy.3

VIII. Development of more effective teaching methods, aids and curriculum content, and better textbooks with respect to international affairs.

IX. Improved public education through television and other media coverage of international events with greater depth and perspective.

C. Means

In view of the magnitude of the task, the Working Group emphasizes its belief that attainment of its objectives can be achieved only by working to the maximum possible extent through existing groups and organizations. Its role is that of the stimulator, catalyst and clearing house. It recognizes the importance of working primarily with and through leverage groups such as professional associations and institutions of learning rather than individuals.

These groups represent the practitioners — the educators, administrators, school and university faculty members whose individual and collective efforts will determine the extent to which these objectives can be achieved.

3 Joseph Sisco would qualify this point, commenting that a weakness of the Carter Administration’s policy was to stress human rights in some cases, such as Brazil, at the expense of more relevant considerations.
To reach this audience most effectively, the Council's Working Group has targeted that constituency primarily responsible for the content of education today:

- University presidents, deans, faculty and curricula planners.
- Professional associations of professors and teachers.
- School principals, administrators and teachers.
- Teachers' organizations at the national, state and local levels.
- Textbook writers and publishers.
- The media insofar as it relates to education.

To the extent practicable, other non-academic influences, i.e. family, church, community and peer groups.

The program seeks to build on the work of the U.S. Office of Education and the Danforth and Kettering Foundations with respect to civic education and that of the President's Commission, the Council on Learning and others with respect to the international components of education. It will focus its efforts on those aspects of education which relate primarily to the understanding, enhancement and preservation of our common Western heritage, civilization and values.

Its efforts at stimulation will be carried out through liaison with key professional organizations and directly with academic institutions, including organizing seminars and encouraging others to do so.

In its efforts to serve as a catalyst and clearing house it will seek to ascertain the most effective pertinent educational programs, especially innovative and interdisciplinary ones, being carried out or developed in our educational system and bringing them to the attention of others for emulation or adaptation.

It will seek to encourage and assist professors, teachers and of textbook authors to find improved methods of providing students with adequate basic background in the fields covered by the program, including the development of significant curriculum content.

It will make maximum use of publications of professional associations to stimulate pertinent thought and action by their members.

It will seek means to influence the media, insofar as they relate to education or influence on our young people, to present material with greater depth and perspective. It will investigate the possibilities of stimulating the production of, motion pictures or video tapes for classroom, television or general showing, including background material on major contemporary problems.

In the process it expects to organize, and will encourage others to organize:

- National and regional seminars on teaching training and means of helping teachers to help themselves;
- National seminars on curricula;
- International seminars on young leaders;
- International seminars of educators
The International Program

Joint ventures are being organized by the Council with the North Atlantic Assembly, the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, and the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).

Specifically, the Council has succeeded in helping the North Atlantic Assembly (Members of Congress and of the Parliaments of other NATO countries) to establish a new "Successor Generation" sub-committee of its Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information. The Council is working closely with this subcommittee, is engaged in exchanging ideas and information with respect to pilot programs similar to ours, and expects, through the subcommittee, to encourage the development of similar groups in other NATO countries, with a continuing program of cooperation and exchange of ideas and information.

The Council is organizing with the Atlantic Institute a "Young Leadership Program" of issue-oriented seminars bringing together emergent leaders of U.S., Canadian, Western European, and Japanese labor unions, academia, news media, business, industry and government.

The Council is also working with the Atlantic Treaty Association and its Education Committee with a view to stimulating similar educational programs in other NATO countries. The Education Committee meets at least three times a year, in connection with meetings of the ATA Council and Assembly. The Council will participate in these meetings and encourage and assist the Committee to organize seminars of persons in a position to further appropriate educational development in their own countries and to provide pertinent program material. We will also make special efforts through the ATA Council and the ATA assembly, as well as through the Education Committee, to stimulate action by the respective national member organizations.

The Atlantic Council has long sponsored the American Council of Young Political Leaders, the U.S. affiliate of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders, which organizes exchange visits and conferences of persons who have embarked on political careers. It has also sponsored the Committee on Atlantic Studies, a group of university professors, in the United States and Canada working with their European counterparts to encourage a better understanding of Atlantic Communities affairs in colleges and universities.

The Working Group is convinced that the knowledge, attitudes and judgments of the Successor Generation will go far to determine the future security and well-being of the American people, those of the other members of the Western Alliance and other free nations. It will also go far toward determining the future international order in which they and their successors will live.
Dr. Thomas Mirow
6 July 1981

RE: Conversation of SPD Chairman Willy Brandt's with the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev on 30 June 1981 in Moscow

The meeting lasted for about 2 hours and 45 minutes. Additional participants from the Soviet side: [Foreign Minister Andrey] Gromyko, [Central Committee Secretary Boris] Ponomarev, Blatov; from the German side: [Minister of State in the Chancellery Hans-Jürgen] Wischnewski, Mirow. Also one interpreter each. Brezhnev opened with an introduction of about an hour he read from a manuscript, Brandt replied also for about an hour. Then additional issues were discussed.

Brezhnev defined the international situation as very worrisome. Therefore today it is even more important than in the 1970s to find a common language. Back then one treated each other as partners and potential friends. Today there is no longer a spirit of good will. In particular the weapons at our disposal are even more terrifying. Therefore efforts for peace have become ever more important, yet the actual situation looks different. We are deeply concerned about the United States who is striving for military superiority. The danger of war is increasing, the accumulated capital of confidence is decreasing. Responsibility for such developments is not only with the United States but also with those who follow them on their path. We ask ourselves the question how the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG] would react if the Soviet Union would strive for a hegemonic position and act in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf like the U.S. does. We have much detailed evidence for a changed American policy. For instance, an American diplomat from the MBFR delegation stated the talks in Vienna make no sense: Consensus already reached there has to be scaled back to a minimum.

We do not want to drive a wedge between the U.S. and their European allies but the policy of détente is in the interest of all peoples. Therefore Western Europe has to exert its influence.

Especially fateful consequences can be expected from NATO’s [double-track] decision. Here [FRG Chancellor] Helmut Schmidt did play an active role. "Bonn has really done a thorough job". The Americans want to change the balance of forces in Europe and globally to their favor. The new Soviet [intermediate-range] missiles cannot reach the United States but the new American missiles could hit the Soviet Union. Pershing li and Cruise Missiles are not a response to the SS-20 but a strike against Soviet strategic capacities and thus a qualitative change.

The Soviet superiority always asserted does in fact not exist. Of course, the SS-20 missiles are better than the old ones. Yet their assignment has remained constant: countering NATO’s nuclear weapons. NATO’s forward-based systems and the British and French systems included, there exists an approximate balance of nuclear carriers in Europe, namely about 1,000 systems on both sides. In addition, for each new SS-20 an
old missile will be withdrawn. Also the SS-20 program does not change that the West continues to enjoy a 1.5 times superiority if one counts the warheads.

An implementation of NATO's decision would increase Western superiority to a double capacity. This is something the USSR would not be able to tolerate. It would have to apply countermeasures. By the way, then the Federal Republic would be reduced to a missile launch ramp of the U.S. and will be incapable of pursuing its own security policy. The support of the [FRG] Federal Government for the NATO decision is a step away from the course of the [1970] Moscow Treaty [between USSR and FRG and signed by Brezhnev and Brandt]. However, the course steered by Willy Brandt, and initially also by Helmut Schmidt, is still correct.

There must be no more war started from German soil. We in the USSR have not forgotten the 20 million dead of World War II but we want to live in peace with Germany. We never behaved disloyal towards the Federal Republic but now we are portrayed as a menace. The events of 1941 [German attack on USSR] will never be repeated even when the Soviet Union has to tighten its belt.

There seem to be some who object to a good German-Soviet cooperation. This is why the NATO decision was made. We will fight against this decision even when this causes trouble for the [FRG] Federal Government. We do not understand why the German Social Democrats are complacent with the undermining of the policy of détente. We want to strengthen trust and expand cooperation. Yet Soviet good will is not enough. The Soviet Union wants negotiations about the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, including forward-based systems, and the British and French systems. During the course of negotiations we are willing to observe a qualitative and quantitative moratorium. However, negotiations may not serve as camouflage for the introduction of new systems. If Europe takes a clear position, the U.S. would not be able to do anything. Every such [European] initiative would be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev than referred to various proposals he had made in his CPSU Congress speech of 23 February 1981, and to his most recent proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. He will also consider to turn the Baltic Sea area in a nuclear-free zone if NATO acts accordingly.

Despite all differences between both sides, Brezhnev continued, we still assume there exists consensus that peace is the highest, guiding and required value. Therefore we have many options for joint and parallel activities. This is how he views his upcoming meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt: It ought to be a step forward and result in concrete progress in the spirit of the Moscow Treaty and the joint [FRG-USSR] communiqué from 1978. There are still many reserves for our cooperation, like in the gas-pipeline-deal. Bilateral relations could develop nicely if it would not be for factors interfering from outside.

Eventually Brezhnev voiced grave Soviet concerns about American policy towards China. We will draw consequences, in particular if arms deliveries will come into play. [...]

In his response Willy Brandt expressed his great concern. [...]
The Federal Republic has a vital interest in improved relations between the global powers. The United States is not a monolithic bloc, its policy can be influenced. We know about the USSR's skepticism but the Chancellor [Schmidt] brought from [his April 1981 visit in] Washington the firm commitment for negotiations about euro-strategic weapons, and NATO has reiterated this in Rome.

It has been said Helmut Schmidt has done a thorough job. In reality, he has made thorough arguments. During the [FRG-Soviet] talks in Bonn in 1978 he linked in the joint communiqué respective passages about the approximate balance explicitly also to intermediate nuclear forces. [During his visit] in 1980 in Moscow there were talks about this. It is understandable that the USSR feels threatened by new medium-range weapons. However, we also feel threatened by the SS-20. Mutual threats must be eliminated soon through negotiations. [Brandt] understands the Soviet view to include forward-based systems and accepts that the British and French potential is counted. [...] 

Brezhnev repeated the interest of both sides in negotiations. The Federal Republic can make a major contribution here. He wants to ask openly why the United States gets through with everything. The Europeans must articulate their interests now in order to achieve a turn towards arms control.

With regard to Poland he defined the events as consisting of two features. First, the political leaders there have committed grave economic mistakes resulting in discontent of the masses. This is currently to be revised. Second, however, these mistakes are exploited by anti-socialist forces eager to liquidate socialism in Poland, such as the extremist forces within "Solidarnosc". Those are supported from the West with concrete aid. The Poles have to solve their problems themselves. Yet the USSR will provide any imaginable support and assist Poland in an emergency.

B. asked W.B. then about the new French President which Brandt obviously knows well. [...] 

Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski finally confirmed the importance of Brezhnev's upcoming visit to Bonn. The German interest in this visit extends far beyond partisans. It would be desirable to agree on an exact date as soon as possible. This will be a sign for a positive development in Europe.

Brezhnev thanked and stated his willingness to come to Bonn in November.

T. Mirow

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer].
(D) WESTERN EUROPE: NEUTRALISM AND ANTI-TNF SENTIMENT

(S/NF) Summary

A survey of neutralist and anti-nuclear trends in allied countries reveals that neutralism in Western Europe is no more significant today than it has been in the past. In several countries, including those with entrenched communist parties, it has actually declined. Preoccupation with neutralism obscures the US focus on the salient policy issue of the moment: opposition to theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization. European opposition to TNF extends far beyond relatively insignificant traditional neutralist groups. It stems from a deep-seated European anxiety that the US may embark on a confrontational course with the Soviets.

The decade of detente has psychologically reinforced European preferences for accommodation as a means for resolving East-West problems. The closer one's location to the Eastern Bloc, the stronger these preferences are. The US rhetoric of "margin of safety," along with statements underscoring US strategic inferiority, has exacerbated European fears of a decoupling of the US strategic deterrent and made it more difficult for allied heads of governments to translate public perceptions of the Soviet threat into support for an expanded defense effort. Opinion research concerning the Federal Republic of Germany has indicated that the direct link between sharpening the perception of the threat and heightened support for defense has a definite limit. Too negative a portrayal of the threat becomes counterproductive.

Although West Germany has the most direct threat, West Europeans will resist initiatives that they believe may polarize East-West relations. This
attitude reflects their fear that polarization will create a Cold War climate, jeopardize their economic interests in Eastern Europe, and nullify their limited ability to take independent positions on certain international issues.

* * * * *
(S/NF) Overview

Talk of rising European "neutralism" does not explain the growing opposition to cruise missile deployment and thus makes the designing of policies to deal with the TNF issue more difficult. European opposition to TNF extends far beyond the traditional neutralist groups. It stems fundamentally from a pervasive anxiety that the US, having purged itself of its national guilt following the Vietnam entanglement, may embark on an ideologically induced confrontational course with the Soviet Union that would sharply escalate the arms race and revive the Cold War. Short of a Soviet intervention in Poland, the West Europeans would be likely to resist such a course.

This is not to suggest that European publics and elites minimize the gravity of the Soviet threat. The oft-repeated concern that successor generations in Europe lack a historical memory of the immediate postwar era is irrelevant, even if partially true. The fact that the West Europeans share a continent with an immensely powerful and totalitarian neighbor inhibits members of the current generation, as it did their parents, from embracing neutralism. It does not prevent them, however, from seeking to stabilize East-West relations at the lowest possible level of tension. The relaxation of East-West tensions during the 1970s has psychologically reinforced the European predisposition toward accommodation rather than toward confrontation as a means of resolving differences. Because of their proximity to the USSR, West Europeans prefer to hope that Moscow also may find it in the USSR's interest to stabilize East-West relations.

Confronted with this mood, European leaders have found it difficult to alter public perceptions of the Soviet Union. Their ability to do so has been further circumscribed by what they judge to be a rhetoric of confrontation by the US that is not matched by unambiguously threatening Soviet acts, particularly in Europe. (Even the SS-20 is not seen as the kind of threat that would call for the confrontational response that an invasion of Poland would.) Thus, European leaders, while supporting TNF modernization, believe that revitalization of arms control talks offers the best chance to stabilize relations with Moscow and reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict into which they would be drawn.
But European publics are skeptical about Washington’s stated intention to pursue meaningful TNP arms control talks or to reconstitute the SALT process. This apprehension, magnified by the rhetoric of “margin of safety,” has led Europeans in general to conclude that TNP serves a war-winning strategy rather than deterrence. This conclusion has revived fears of decoupling. Those who resist TNP argue that allied deployment of new systems when superpower relations appear to be chilling might invite a Soviet strike against Western Europe, to which the US, because of its self-proclaimed strategic inferiority, would be likely not to respond.

Other pragmatic considerations also impel the West European governments to avoid initiatives that may polarize East-West relations. Detente has meant far more to the Europeans than it has to the US. It has stimulated considerable economic and social intercourse on both sides of the Oder-Neisse, particularly between East and West Germans. In the best of economic times, the West Europeans would want to sustain the advantages of a dialogue with Moscow. Faced with deteriorating economic health, the allies are even more intent on limiting the use of trade and technology transfer as political levers in East-West relations. The announcement of a new agreement on US-Soviet grain trade is likely to increase European determination to maintain trade patterns with the East.

Finally, Europeans believe that the diminution of dialogue with Moscow and the resuscitation of bloc-to-bloc rigidity would circumscribe the limited latitude they established in the 1970s to take positions on certain international issues independent of the US. To be sure, the European allies are well aware that they remain bound by certain military-strategic facts of life over which they have no control. But they will be reluctant to abandon the influence that they have developed and the heightened sense of self-esteem that has accrued to them as a consequence.

Opposition to TNP deployment in Europe is more visible in West Germany and the Low Countries. Along with Italy and the United Kingdom, these countries would be the sites for GLCM (ground-launched cruise missile) placements. An analysis of the underlying forces of opposition to TNP in the major West European countries and selected smaller ones follows.
Fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear conflict is increasing in the FRG, but to regard this fear as rising neutralist sentiment is oversimplified. Public opinion polls reaching back into the 1950s in the FRG show support for West German neutralism varying from 15 to 30 percent of the respondents. The figure today is about 20 percent, with much of it where it has traditionally existed—in the pacifist, pro-disarmament elements of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

But the proportion of Germans that currently opposes TNF deployment is much larger than that supporting neutralism or unilateral disarmament. Two principal factors form and affect German attitudes toward both defense in general and specific defense measures: perception of the Soviet threat and confidence in US leadership. And perception of US leadership is the more critical.

Opinion research indicates that the direct link between sharpening the perception of the threat and heightened support for defense has a definite limit. Too negative a portrayal of the threat becomes counterproductive. Rather than strengthening resolve, it feeds fears about the likelihood of nuclear war and reduces confidence in the US ability to counter the Soviet threat effectively. If this point of diminishing returns vis-à-vis threat assessment has not already been reached on TNF in the FRG, Soviet propaganda is exploiting those German concerns that would hasten its approach.

Besides historically rooted German pacifism, moral idealism, and fear of another war (which would annihilate the Germans), other factors have fed or failed to impede opposition to TNF. The 12-year-old SPD/Liberal Party coalition's pursuit of Ostpolitik could be sold only with the argument that the Soviet military menace was neither an imminent nor an eternal threat to the FRG. Bonn was able to maintain steady real growth in its defense spending in the 1970s because the economy was strong, and these expenditures did not have to compete for resources with social spending. Ostpolitik could enjoy consensus support only as long as defense was not shorted and the SPD commitment to defense strength was conspicuous. But Bonn did not build its case for defense on public discussion of an increasing Soviet threat, incompatible with Ostpolitik.

Now, however, as the German parliamentary opposition has rightly claimed, West Germans have been somewhat lulled into lethargy by Ostpolitik's portrait of the USSR. They can not be reprogrammed overnight into a threat-sensitized populace—least of all by a government that seeks to salvage key aspects of detente by pressing for arms control efforts and East-West dialogue.
A large part of Bonn's salesmanship for TNF deployments has been based as much on justifying German faith in the US willingness to negotiate as it has been on the military requirement to respond to the Soviet buildup.

TNF has also become the rallying cry of many Germans with other political and economic fears and frustrations. Opponents include anti-nuclear environmentalists, anti-military pacifists, anti-war moralists and church people, and a minority of otherwise disenchanted, alienated youth. Their familiarity with defense issues ranges from peace "scientists" laden with counterarguments and quantitative data to the naive dropouts who react emotionally to "overkill," feel the need to save the developing world, or insist that the morally superior West should make the first move toward disarmament. The significance of fear of nuclear conflict cannot be overrated in generalizing TNF opposition in the FRG.

Germans are overly sensitized at the moment to the vulnerability that their location brings. Soviet officials warn the FRG often of its inescapable targeting for early destruction. Moreover, many who are not pacifists or neutralists still despair over what they see to be an inevitable arms escalation brought on by 1) unbridgeable US-Soviet differences on measuring military balance and 2) the inexorable advance of weapons technology.

It is the moral component of TNF opposition and deep fear of a nuclear conflict that has enabled traditional German neutralists and the minuscule German Communist Party to win much broader support for their anti-TNF petitions, rallies, and marches than they realistically could have expected. German leaders insist that, for Washington's part, reassertion of US moral leadership--for peace and to control nuclear arms--is both essential and sufficient to turn the tide in the West's favor on TNF. On the other hand, addition of enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) deployment or other items to the nuclear agenda would severely overload German and European circuits and likely be TNF's deathknell.
French popular reservations over long-range TNF modernization and ERN are not new phenomena. Rather, they represent the most recent expression of traditional French concern over the escalation of superpower confrontation. Although France has maintained an expensive defense establishment of its own and has developed its nuclear and missile capabilities, French policy in the post-World War II period has been—and under Mitterrand will continue to be—based also on dialogue with the Soviet Union. Paris seeks a relationship aimed at the avoidance of confrontation.

In the same way, France recognizes the need of the alliance to improve and expand its arsenal but questions such rearmament if it is not accompanied by dialogue with the Warsaw Pact. The French trust more in their own abilities than in alliances, particularly when they cannot be the dominant partner. Their greatest fear is that the superpowers will carry confrontation to misadventure and worldwide nuclear conflict. Thus, political leaders of both the former Giscard and the current Mitterrand government, intellectuals, newspaper columnists, and other opinion-makers have expressed varying degrees of concern about the "confrontational rhetoric" used by the Reagan administration since it came to power.

These fears notwithstanding, France has not experienced an outburst of neutralism and/or anti-TNF sentiment this spring on the scale typical of other northern European countries. The fact that France, not being a member of the military organization of NATO, did not participate in NATO's double-track decision has, along with the Gaullist tradition of independent management of France's nuclear arsenal, diminished the impact of the TNF debate in France.

Furthermore, the French were absorbed in Presidential elections, Mitterrand's victory, and legislative elections. As the election period ended, the communists—who often initiate pacifist-type manifestations in France—found themselves tied to government responsibility. Mitterrand's embrace of the double-track decision and public recognition of the European imbalance caused by the SS-20s have further outflanked those elements inside and outside the French Communist Party who would normally spearhead an anti-TNF drive. The number of French anti-nuclear activists has neither grown nor shrunk in recent years, but their sentiment currently is somewhat absorbed in the efforts of their ideological brothers to begin governing France.
Britain, since World War II has spent a heavier share of its GNP on defense, including an independent nuclear deterrent, than have the other major European allies. These expenditures have enjoyed bipartisan support, Tory and Labor. Labor has been marginally more willing to cut defense expenditures when, as periodically happens, Britain’s continued relative economic decline makes that necessary, but leaders in both parties almost always have shared strategic assumptions and commitments.

This is now ceasing to be the case. Labor’s long acquiescence to relatively high defense budgets depended upon an unspoken premise: that British workers would not have to pay for defense with lower living standards or reductions in social expenditures. In addition, Labor membership for some time has included a pacifist and/or neutralist strain, which owed most of its limited public appeal to moralistic arguments but could also count on the support of the tiny minority of leftist Britons who sympathized with the Soviet Union and distrusted the United States.

Over the last two years, these advocates of traditional British pacifism have been joined by more pragmatic Labor Party leftists who see in the defense budget the resources otherwise unavailable for social services and public investment. This ad-hoc alliance of Labor leftists has taken control of Labor Party policy in large measure and has made unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from Britain, and heavy cuts in overall British defense costs the new party gospel.

These anti-defense views have had virtually no impact on the Conservative government, which remains strongly pro-defense. The typical Tory MP supports defense even more fervently than the government itself. British public opinion remains strongly anti-Soviet, and the pacifist trend in Labor so far appears more the creation of a committed minority than a genuinely popular issue.

Nonetheless, even in Britain, popular concern about the possibility of nuclear war is rising. Although opinion polls show that defense policy is near the bottom of the typical voter’s list of important issues, polls also indicate that a majority of voters now opposes the government’s decision to build the Trident missile submarine force. Public support for TNF deployment has fallen away from the narrow majority that originally supported it.

Under the British parliamentary system, Labor’s anti-nuclear and anti-defense views need not be approved by the
electorate in any positive sense at the next general election, due not later than May 1984. If the voters look to Labor for such other reasons as the Tories' poor economic record, only an intense popular concern over Labor's defense views could keep Labor out of power.

Thus far, there appear few signs of any such concern. In spite of Tory governmental efforts to inform and arouse the public about defense, most British voters seem to care little about the subject. Among the minority that takes defense issues seriously, the traditional support for high defense expenditures has diminished. Meanwhile, for the first time since before World War II, Britain's defense efforts appear, to a substantial degree, hostage to the fortunes of the next general election.
(C/MF) Italy

Italians share the general European fear that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Soviet attack, but the TNF issue has aroused little public reaction. There is some popular neutralist sentiment, but attempts to mobilize it have largely failed, because the current Italian perception of a threat of war remains low. Unlike the case in Germany or the Netherlands, religion plays an inconsequential role in anti-TNF agitation. The Catholic Church has not espoused a pacifist line and has remained aloof from the debate.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) are the only two major parties with the potential to exploit neutralist opinion, which is widespread in both. But domestic constraints limit the ability of either party to capitalize on that opinion. The PCI is also affected by its need to allay domestic suspicions of its links with Moscow. It must prove its respectability and reliability as a supporter of Italy's security alliances if it is to attain its goal of government participation.

Only the small Radical Party has attracted anti-military and anti-nuclear elements by openly opposing current security policies. It resists TNF deployment and supports unilateral disarmament. It has drawn away some PSI and PCI followers on this score, but has little influence.

Under these circumstances, Italian Governments have consistently ignored negative public opinion and taken positions concerning nuclear weapons, including TNF deployment, that meet NATO wishes. In turn, Rome seeks to parlay this acceptance into greater status within the alliance.
(C/NF) Belgium and the Netherlands

TNF deployment has been a contentious issue in both Belgium and the Netherlands. Although strong opposition to deployment exists in both countries, its origins differ.

In the Netherlands, Calvinist principles of ethics and morality have reinforced the long Dutch history of neutrality and pacifism. As a consequence, the churches—mainly Protestant but Catholic as well—have become the leading force in the anti-TNF campaign. The Dutch have demonstrated growing enthusiasm for arms control. A 1980 poll showed that 57 percent opposed the production and deployment of new nuclear weapons; 24 percent favored production but opposed deployment; and only 19 percent favored production and deployment. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that any Dutch government will accept TNF deployment in the Netherlands.

In Belgium, TNF opposition has become hostage to more urgent economic and linguistic tensions. The socialists, who have led the anti-TNF crusade, are able to translate defense expenditures into a "guns or butter" argument as the economy deteriorates and the ability to fund welfare programs declines. The willingness of any Belgian coalition to sacrifice domestic programs for TNF modernization is accordingly very limited. The prospect for deployment in Belgium, although more likely than in the Netherlands, does not stand better than an even chance.
(C/NF) Norway and Denmark

Despite the fact that both Norway and Denmark followed neutralist policies before World War II, current opposition to TNF deployment in Europe and support for a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone do not result from any increase in neutralism or pacifism. Recent public opinion polls in Norway have shown that support for NATO has now increased to an all-time high. However, fear of nuclear war, caused by the increase in Soviet nuclear weapons, the stalemate in arms control talks, and the adoption by the Carter and especially the Reagan administrations of policies to build up nuclear arms and deploy more of them in Europe, has created receptivity to arms control schemes.

The ruling Norwegian Labor Party, which holds only a plurality in Parliament, fears that defections by its anti-militarist followers, although few, could drive it from power in the parliamentary election in September. Its leaders, therefore, supported a proposal by those groups that Norway join with the other Scandinavian countries in a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone, provided that such a zone included territory outside Scandinavia and were part of a continent-wide arms control system. Labor government leaders make clear that their endorsement responds to broader Norwegian desires to put pressure on the US to intensify efforts to restart arms control talks.

Danish Social Democratic leaders are more careful in backing such a zone, but they make clear that they support the Norwegian objective and are responding to both general Scandinavian fears of a nuclear arms race and, for them, overly belligerent US policies toward the USSR.
GROMYKO ON NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Summary

In his September 22 UN General Assembly speech, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko modified the ancient Soviet proposal to ban first use of nuclear weapons. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's 25th CPSU Congress iteration of that proposal earlier this year had implicitly recognized the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons in response to aggression with conventional forces. Gromyko's new argument is that no first use of nuclear weapons could ever be justified. The change appears to be part of Moscow's effort to capitalize on West European sensitivity to nuclear issues—both enhanced radiation weapons (ERW) and theater nuclear forces (TNF).

* * * * *

During the early 1950s, the Soviet position evolved from one of demanding a ban on nuclear weapons per se to the 1955 proposal to ban the use of such weapons. In 1960, the Soviets further refined that idea and proposed to ban first use of nuclear weapons. Traditionally, Western powers objected that a ban on first use would put NATO at a disadvantage in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces.

In 1972, during the heyday of detente, the Soviets sought to meet that Western objection by proposing a combination ban on first use of nuclear weapons and first use of force. Under such an arrangement, a country that was
the victim of aggression with conventional weapons would be free to defend itself, and thus use of nuclear weapons in response would be recognized as legitimate. Gromyko made this proposal in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1972. The Soviets went back on the 1972 idea in November 1976 when the Warsaw Pact proposed a ban on first use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Brezhnev, however, returned to the 1972 formula in a March 2, 1977, speech when he proposed that CFE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) states "reach an agreement on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons, something like a non-aggression pact." Brezhnev repeated the idea of a combined ban on first use of nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe in his February 1981 speech to the party congress.

Gromyko has now in effect reversed Brezhnev's congress wording and gone to a highly propagandistic formulation denouncing as immoral, indeed criminal, any first use of nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has apparently given up any thought of negotiating any agreement with the West on the subject. But he probably calculates that his present tack puts the USSR in a better position to try to exploit the peace movement in Western Europe and concerns there about ERA and TNP.

Prepared by R. Barat, J. Parker
x39194

Approved by R. Barat
x21174
RE: Conversation Willy Brandt’s with French President Francois Mitterand on 23 September 1981 in Elysee Palace
(also present: Thomas Mirow; Interpreter)

The talk was focused on issues of security policy.

Francois Mitterand stated that now, in 1981, there exists more or less a strategic balance. By 1985 there will be a Soviet superiority. Afterwards, until about 1992, he foresees a superiority of the United States.

He said to have included strategic aircraft into that equation.

France could build the neutron bomb today but in all likelihood it will not do so. The neutron bomb requires a strategy of escalating response, and this strategy does not square with the capacities of the French nuclear force. After a talk with him [Mitterand] in Paris, the Soviet Ambassador emphasized mutual agreement about the need for a balance in Europe. Yet this does not match with the actual course of this talk and his [Mitterand’s] conviction. A balance must exist on a global scale, not just in Europe. Also French nuclear forces are only slightly larger than what is actually needed for deterrence, thus France cannot accept an inclusion of these forces into negotiations.

He is for negotiations. The United States must not strive for superiority. He is against moratoria since 150 SS-20 missiles are sufficient to destroy everything. He sees no sense in the decrease of overkill capacities.

He is aware that the deployment of Pershing [missiles] will naturally change the strategic situation. It would be good if there would be no need to build them. His statements in an interview with [German weekly magazine] “Stern” were cut and edited. He stays firmly to the NATO decision [of December 1979].

In his response Willy Brandt outlined the German interpretation of NATO’s decision. For a while there had been fear the United States would view it differently. Eastern conventional superiority exists for a long time already. It gets partially overstated. If the United States wants to achieve conventional parity, it must introduce the military draft.

Then Willy Brandt explained the particular German situation possibly created by the SS-20 deployment (where the exact quality would be difficult to assess, by the way) and the introduction of Pershing and Cruise Missiles, as well as by an expected Soviet military reaction to the latter. He encouraged Francois Mitterand to address in his forthcoming meeting with the German Federal Chancellor the Euro-strategic and global balance.
He [Brandt] voiced understanding for the French situation, but he also referred at the question of Soviet legitimacy to counterbalance the French forces, and at Soviet security considerations with regard to China.

In conclusion, Brandt explained the concerns of the Federal Republic's young generation and its consequences for the SPD.

François Mitterand considered it legitimate to count a Soviet counterbalance to the French forces. He has to deal with a fundamental contradiction where so far he cannot see a solution: the contradiction between the national destination of French nuclear forces and the security obligations resulting from a membership in the Atlantic Alliance. There is no precise answer to the question when French security interests are essentially threatened.

Adenauer's thesis', as mentioned by Brandt, that no missiles must be deployed in Germany capable of threatening the Soviet Union, he [Mitterand] could understand very well. Thus he prefers that the Pershing do not have to be deployed. He also understands the concerns of the Soviet Union. Balances of forces are in essence temporary balances. One has to attempt to eliminate the SS-20 through negotiations, and in the future he will make this clearer in public. He does not want Germany to turn into a powder keg. Also he wanted to emphasize that he does not apply the term "neutralism" with regard to developments in Germany.

Thomas Mirow
Aufzeichnung

über das Gespräch des SPD-Vorsitzenden mit Secretary Haig

am 5. Oktober 1981 im State Department

Beginn: 5.30 pm, Ende 6.15 pm
Teilnehmer: WB
Secretary of State Haig
Botschafter Hermes
Ass. Secretary for European Affairs, Easleburger
und die Herren W. Stoessel, Kornblum, Rosen

Vorbemerkung

Vor dem Beginn des offiziellen Gesprächs mit H. wurde die Friedensbewegung angesprochen, u.a. die Haltung der der Union nahestehenden jungen Leute zur Nachrüstung und zur Abrüstungsdebatte und die erwartete Wirkung auf die öffentliche Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.


H. kündigt eine grundsätzliche Rede des Präsidenten vor Cancun an, die seine, H. 's, VN-Rede fortführen solle. Die Frage der "global negotiations" habe große Schwierigkeiten bereitet, denn $n den USA gebe es große Vorbehalte aus Sorge, die Mängel der Welt sollten lediglich neu verteilt werden. Nach seinem Eindruck hinge die Haltung der E-Länder von deren Erfahrungsstand ab. Für ihn seien vor allem gute Handelsbeziehungen und ein gutes Investitionsklima für die Entwicklung wichtig. Er hoffe, daß sich
in den nächsten Wochen einige positive Lösungen ergeben. Hinsichtlich des Ergebnisses von Cancún sei er "more optimistic than pessimistic".


Er bittet sodann um einen Bericht über die Situation in Europa; dabei bezieht er sich auf seine soeben beendete Berlin-Reise.

Er weist auf die Vielschichtigkeit der Probleme Berlins hin. Die Stadt ziehe als Folge ihres besonderen Status eine große Zahl von Leuten an, die nicht zum Militär wollen. Auch er sei sicher, daß die Krawallmacher vornehmlich aus Westdeutschland kämen, dennoch müsse man wissen, daß sich die Berliner Jugend anders zusammensetze als die Westdeutschlands. Es gebe außerdem Probleme mit den Ausländern, so sei Berlin die drittgrößte türkische Gemeinde in der Welt. Die Verwaltung verfüge über Leistungsschwächen. Es könne auch nicht akzeptiert werden, daß angesichts der Wohnungsnot Häuser leerstehen.

Aber er habe dem Kanzler gesagt, es sei ein Fehler, die Friedensbewegung als anti-amerikanisch, neutralistisch oder gegen die eigene Regierung gerichtet zu betrachten. Ihr Ziel sei es, dem, was die Regierungen tun, etwas hinzuzufügen. Die jungen Leute verstünden die Notwendigkeit des overkill nicht. In Deutschland, wo sie lebten, sei das größte Arsenal von Atomwaffen der Welt auf engstem Raum konzentriert. Leider sei in die Öffentlichkeit gebracht worden, daß er, anders als der Bundeskanzler, die Friedensdemonstration am 10.Oktobe nicht für eine Kampfansage an die Regierung hält. Er habe festgestellt, daß man mit den jungen Leuten diskutieren könne; sie stimmten zwar mit uns nicht überein, hörten aber zu, und er sei zuversichtlich, man könne den größten Teil integrieren. Er habe Breschnew davor gewarnt, die Friedensbewegung als eine kommunistische Bewegung zu betrachten; ihre Anhänger hätten vielmehr grundsätzlich etwas gegen Raketen. Dabei verkenne er nicht, daß kleine kommunistische Gruppen die Friedensbewegung zu infiltrieren suchten, die aber im Kern von der Evangelischen Kirche ausgehe. Er glaube, daß es gelingen werde, diese Gruppen zu integrieren. Als positiv bezeichnete er es, daß nach den Vorgängen in Berlin eine Tendenz unter den jungen Leuten bestehe, nicht der Polizei die Arbeit zu überlassen. Man müsse deshalb auch damit rechnen, daß bei der Bonner Demonstration Jugendliche gegen die Krawallmacher vorgehen. Seine These sei es, das Protestpotential von Gewaltpotential zu trennen. Wenn die Ab- rüstungsverhandlungen begonnen hätten, werde es leichter sein, mit den jungen Leuten zu argumentieren.

Man fühle, und das decke sich mit seinen Nato-Erfahrungen, daß die Russen nicht so schnell bereit seien, sich an den Tisch zu setzen. Seit Dezember 1979 habe man sie darum gebeten, er hoffe, man werde den Russen klarmachen können, was die Alternative sei: es gehe nicht um Fragen der Überlegenheit, sondern um das Gleichgewicht. Er betont, daß er dies klarmachen müsse, weil er wisse, daß es in seiner, B.'s, Partei besonders diskutiert werde. Man gehe ernsthaft an die Gespräche und in der Erwartung, Erfolge zu erzielen. Diese Gespräche involvierten vitale europäische Interessen.

H. betont, auch er sei der Überzeugung, es gebe ein Blutbad im Falle einer Intervention, die Situation sei "immanagable".


B. erwidert, wenn er Mitglied der Regierung wäre, würde er die ihm, H., bekannte Position der Bundesregierung teilen. Wenn die Spanier beitreten wollten, so solle man sie daran nicht hindern. Seine Zweifel bezogen sich auf drei Punkte:
- Das Verfahren: Es sei nach seiner Einschätzung besser gewesen, zunächst den Beitritt der Spanier zur EG zu vollziehen. Wegen französischer Vorbehalte werde das aber schwierig sein; diese bezogen sich allerdings nicht nur auf Agrarfragen.
- Was die Frage der Demokratisierung anlangt, so sei er skeptisch, denn, darauf habe Filipe Gonzalez ihn hingewiesen, die Putschgenerale seien durchweg auf amerikanischen Hochschulen ausgebildet worden.

Er betont, er sei nicht gegen den Beitritt, aber er habe Zweifel.

H. sagt, mit Sorge betrachte man die Entwicklung in Nicaragua. Man werde eine demokratische Entwicklung unterstützen, die Armee werde aber stärker, nicht zuletzt durch die über Kuba einfließende sowjetische Militärhilfe. Gromyko habe ihm zwar gesagt, wir sollten uns über Kuba nicht aufregen, er habe ihm aber erwidert, daß dort mehr sowjetische Soldaten stationiert seien als amerikanische in Europa.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, October 13, 1981

TIME AND PLACE: 2:00-2:45 p.m.

SUBJECTS: Theater Nuclear Forces Egypt

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ronald Reagan

State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark
Mr. Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs

Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

CIA
Director William Casey

JCS
General David C. Jones
Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman

ACDA
Acting Director Norman C. Terrell

White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Mr. David Gergen
Admiral James W. Nance
Ms. Janet Colson

OMB
Associate Director William Schneider

NSC
Mr. Sven Kraemer

TOP SECRET
Review October 13, 1981

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 1983-12-29 #2

TOP SECRET BY 10/5, DECLASSIFIED 10/5
MINUTES OF MEETING

The President: I know what the agenda items are for today, but I want to touch upon another matter first in the area of Soviet human rights. What is the situation now with Professor McClellan's Russian wife, who is not being allowed to emigrate? What about the Soviet religious group in the basement of our Embassy in Moscow? What about Shcharanskiy? Would some quiet diplomacy help? These should not be part of our TNF negotiations, but is there any way we could indicate to the Soviets that we would be happier in any negotiations if there were progress with these cases?

Secretary Haig: I raised each of these cases with Gromyko, both in the one-on-ones with him and in the larger planning group. Gromyko did not budge. On Shcharanskiy, he told me that Shcharanskiy was well known in the U.S., but was barely known in the USSR. I urged Gromyko to let Shcharanskiy go; to let this sick man leave now, rather than letting him die, thus causing far greater problems.

The President: Well, let's keep track of this. Okay, Dick (Allen), let's get on with the agenda.

Mr. Allen: We have two agenda topics today: First, an update on Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) negotiations preparations, and secondly, a review of the situation in Egypt. We also have a consent item on bringing Central America/Cuba issues before the NSC as soon as possible.

Issue 1: Theater Nuclear Forces Negotiations Preparations

Mr. Allen: TNF negotiations begin with the Soviets on November 30 in Geneva. We earlier affirmed the Administration's commitment to NATO's "dual track" decision of December 1979 on modernization and arms control, and at an April 30 NSC meeting reviewed the criteria and timing of such negotiations. The preparatory work has progressed through the Interdepartmental Group (IG) process, under Al Haig's personal direction and with participation of Defense, ACDA, and others. Now, Cap will be going to Europe to meet with different defense officials, and on October 26, we will again be consulting with our Allies in NATO at the Special Consultative Group (SCG). Our objective here is not to settle on a negotiation position today, but to get an update on where we stand.
Secretary Haig: I want to underline that this is not a decision meeting but an update prior to completion of work on our negotiation position. We will need an NSC meeting within a month on the negotiating position we develop.

In their 1979 decision, the Allies agreed to a modernization program that is on track everywhere except in the Netherlands. The Germans, Brits, Italians, and Belgians have all shown great courage. Schmidt and Genscher have both threatened to resign on this issue, even though they face substantial pressures, including the 250,000 protesters who marched in Bonn this weekend. We have had increased concern about the Dutch, but in my meeting in Egypt with Dutch Foreign Minister Talboys, I was assured that the Dutch would not withdraw their deployment decision, but only undertake a necessary delay in reaching a decision.

In 1979, the Allies also agreed to TNF arms control negotiations, and we agreed to consult closely with our Allies. The IG, which State and DOD co-chair, with major ACDA participation, has undertaken extensive work on these issues. The Alliance consultations are important because the primary purpose of the negotiations is political, i.e., to update the TNF modernization program. An actual arms control agreement is secondary and has little prospect because of the imbalance of forces. NATO's Special Consultative Group, the SCG, is the forum for these consultations. It is chaired by Assistant Secretary Eagleburger and will be meeting next on October 26.

Let me summarize where we stand in the IG. There is general agreement that: (1) we will propose a phased, comprehensive approach that seeks reductions to the lowest possible levels on land-based TNF missiles in the first phase; (2) we will insist on equal limits for like systems, and these limits must be global; (3) we will negotiate only U.S. and Soviet systems and will not even compensate for these Allied systems -- a point we may need to reconsider; and (4) we will insist on stringent verification procedures that will almost certainly go beyond National Technical Means (NTM).

More specific elements include IG agreement that: (1) Soviet SS-20's, 4's, and 5's must be limited, and that there must be also constraints on shorter systems, including SS-21's, 22's, and 23's; (2) warheads on launchers will
be the unit of account; (3) we want to ban refires; and
(4) we will not negotiate aircraft in the first phase, but
may be required to discuss them in the first phase because
of Soviet claims concerning the balance. Gromyko threw the
aircraft balance issue at me in our UN talks.

Issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) the TNF-SALT
(START) relationship, which is as yet undefined. As the
talks go on, they will merge.

The President: What does that mean, merge?

Secretary Haig: The Soviets will not be allowed to double
count us.

Secretary Weinberger: Then you don't mean merging negotiations.

Secretary Haig: No. I am referring to an interrelationship.
You cannot do one thing in one forum without it relating to
the other forum.

Secretary Weinberger: But we may not be ready on an issue
in one area and could be dragged into that issue through the
other forum.

Secretary Haig: We'll have shrewd negotiators. They can
hold the line.

Mr. Allen: We might remind the President that our Chief
negotiator for TNF will be Paul Nitze, and that for START,
it will be General Ed Rowny.

Secretary Haig: We favor having the two negotiations in the
same location to facilitate coordination.

Other issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) levels
of reductions, i.e., ceilings and floors; (2) limits on
shorter-range missiles; and (3) verification issues. We
need to study each of these issues in-depth. Verification
could be the most controversial issue for the Allies. We
must avoid an Allied perception that we are scuttling the
talks at the outset by insisting on verification criteria
the Soviets are unlikely to accept; we must treat the Allies
gingerly on this matter. In general, the Allies have been
supportive on our approach.
Secretary Weinberger: We at Defense agree with many of the points made by Secretary Haig: (1) the emphasis on land-based missiles, including SS-20's, 4's, 5's, 21's, 22's, and 23's; (2) banning refires; (3) omitting aircraft in any first phase; (4) stringent verification procedures; and (5) Alliance consultations.

There is, however, another point we would also like to bring out. It is the question of what we would like to achieve in these negotiations. We are conscious of several difficult dilemmas. If we are perceived as not engaging in serious negotiations, our modernization program will not go through. If we succeed in reaching only a cosmetic agreement, our modernization program will also come to a halt, being perceived as no longer necessary. Or if we are viewed as not making progress in negotiations, the Soviets will make it seem to be our fault, and our modernization program will be endangered.

We need to assess the nature of our tasks brought on by the strength of Soviet programs. They have 750 SS-20 warheads now. The SS-20's are mobile, accurate, powerful, hard to find and to hit, and they are targeted against all of Europe and against China and Japan. The U.S. has no counter. In addition, a new generation of Soviet shorter-range systems is on the way. We may find our 1979 TNF modernization program to be insufficient.

In this light, we might need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion. If refused by the Soviets, they would take the blame for its rejection. If the Soviets agreed, we would achieve the balance that we've lost. Such a plan would be to propose a "zero option." Initially, it would, of course, be limited only to long-range land-based missiles, in which the Soviets are preponderant. If it were ultimately decided to adopt this option, it should be proposed by the U.S. in a spectacular Presidential announcement, not at the mid- or lower-level SCG on October 26 or in terms of some "lowest possible numbers" formula. The "zero option" should be considered carefully here, and no parts of it should be given away at the October 26 SCG. We should not be using the "lowest possible numbers" formula at the SCG or in any other forum. If we adopt the "zero option" approach and the Soviets reject it after we have given it a good try, this will leave the Europeans in a position where they would really have no alternative to modernization.
The President: Do we really want a "zero option" for the battlefield? Don't we need these nuclear systems? Wouldn't it be bad for us to give them up since we need them to handle Soviet conventional superiority?

Secretary Haig: The "zero option" will not be viewed as the President's initiative. It has already been proposed by the German Social Democrats and by Foreign Minister Genscher in Moscow, and it is a subject of intense debate in Europe. There are also some serious problems with any "zero option." We should be looking for the hooker and must study this issue fully. What would happen in one or two years when it comes time to deploy, if we have a "zero option" on the table? With such an option, the Europeans will surely reject any new deployments.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets will certainly reject an American "zero option" proposal. But whether they reject it or they accept it, they would be set back on their heels. We would be left in good shape and would be shown as the White Hats. As to the nuclear battlefield systems we need, we would not be including these shorter battlefield systems, e.g., the Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW) systems, only the longer-range ones. Also, we would be insisting on stringent verification criteria and on dismantling.

Mr. Allen: Genscher told me that verification is a popular issue in Europe. -- Norm (Terrell), do you want to express ACDA's views in behalf of Eugene Rostow?

Mr. Terrell: Gene Rostow and Paul Nitze regret that they cannot be here today. They are in Europe discussing some of these issues with our Allies. ACDA supports the IG consensus positions stated by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. On the "zero option," we believe it requires further study, and that it should be considered principally in terms of its impact on our deployment schedule in 1983. We favor keeping the "lowest possible levels" formula for the October 26 SCG meeting. "Lowest possible" includes zero. We also want to stress the importance of accurate data and of effective verification.

The President: How will we verify an agreement?

Mr. Allen: We will have the national technical means, satellites, and so on. But in addition, we will be looking at on-site inspections and other means. The problem is that because of the Soviet obsession against inspections, our insistence may appear to some Europeans to have the effect of scuttling the negotiations.
The President: Even if you could have inspections, who could really travel and verify in that vast country?

Mr. Casey: With a zero ban, it would be easier.

The President: Even then, the Soviet Union is a large country. Couldn't they easily hide something in Siberia or somewhere else?

Mr. Meese: With a zero ban, we would have an easier indicator of whether or not the Soviets were complying.

Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets would have to dismantle their systems. Third countries and international organizations might need to be involved, but nothing is guaranteeable.

The President: Maybe we should be leasing some of the people from the Third World nations at Cancun to help verify the dismantling.

Mr. Allen: We are running short of time. General Jones, can you comment on the views of the Chiefs?

General Jones: We support TNF negotiations. I think it's important to gain Allied confidence so we can proceed with the modernization program. We agree with the outline presented by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. However, we have two concerns at present. First, on the reference to warheads-on-launchers as the unit of account. We may want to count warheads-on-missiles instead. We will need to study this further. Secondly, and this is a major concern, we do not want the reference to aircraft not being negotiated in a first phase to imply that aircraft could be negotiated in a future phase. That would be a slippery and dangerous slope. Aircraft are required for both nuclear and conventional roles and involve other special consideration as well.

Secretary Haig: General Jones' points clearly get us into the SALT/TNF relationship. For example, in the data exchange issue on the balance, we will need to count aircraft somehow. That will be our nightmare.

Mr. Allen: Cap, you will be gone until the 24th?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, I take it from the discussion that in my NATO meetings, I will be reporting on our pre- liminary preparations and will reaffirm the November 30 starting time for negotiations, but will say nothing sub- stantively on our negotiating approach. I take it we have agreed on a similar position for the October 26 SCG.
Issue 2: Egypt and Other Business

Mr. Allen: We are out of time. For the update on the situation in Egypt, could Al Haig and Bill Casey provide the President with written reports? On a different matter, we have received preliminary indications that if embargoed, two U.S. compressor components, which the Soviets want for their Siberian pipelines, would cause a two-year delay in the pipeline's operation. We will need to check this matter out carefully.

Secretary Haig: I am not so sure that we are confident of the impact of those compressors. We will need to check it out.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: There is a decision pending before the President on national security considerations in technology transfer. This item should be factored in.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator Percy talked to me on the plane from Egypt about this issue. He is pushing for 200 more caterpillar pipelayers to go to the Soviet Union.

The pipeline brings enormous amounts of hard cash to the Soviet Union, which they use to strengthen themselves militarily.

Mr. Allen: Our next meetings, later this week, will focus on the Central America/Cuba issue and on the East-West paper.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: The East-West discussion should include the technological transfer issue. Right?

[There was general agreement among participants.]
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces)

On the recommendation of the National Security Council, which met on November 12, 1981, I have made the following decisions regarding the U.S. position for the first round of the negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) scheduled to begin on November 30, 1981.

We will propose an agreement on intermediate-range land-based systems that would remove and dismantle the Soviet Union's SS-20 and retire SS-4 and SS-5 systems in return for no deployment of the U.S. Pershing II and GLCMs.

We will also indicate that we are prepared to seek subsequent limits with significant reductions for other nuclear weapons systems.

We will negotiate in good faith to achieve global, equal and verifiable levels of weapons.

The Interagency Group will ensure that the negotiating instructions, including enumeration of objectives and principles, are fully congruent with the President's decisions as expressed in this National Security Decision Directive.

[Signature]

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TO: The Secretary
FROM: INR - Hugh Montgomery
SUBJECT: INF: The Soviet Approach

As you know, the Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda the President's offer to forego deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if Moscow would agree to dismantle its SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s. Nevertheless, we think that the Soviets may refrain from rejecting in principle a zero option and might attempt instead to redefine it to include US forward-based aircraft as well as Allied nuclear systems.

There are indications Moscow foresees spending the first year of negotiations defining which systems will be limited. We expect the Soviets to press also for a freeze on all medium-range systems (which would cover Pershing IIs) as they proposed last fall, or for the moratorium on land-based missiles which they have used in their propaganda offensive since last spring. Additionally, Moscow will probably propose limits on SLCMs.

Although the negotiations will be prolonged, Moscow may eventually compromise on PBS because it fears that GLCMs and particularly Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement, NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles would be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on PBS until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their PBS demands.

At the preliminary talks in Geneva last fall, the Soviets contended that INF negotiations could proceed, but no agreement could be concluded without a ratified SALT treaty. We think the Soviets will reassert this position, because in the absence of a SALT agreement both sides would have the means effectively to circumvent limits on INF systems.
Soviet statements indicate Moscow will exclude systems with ranges below 1,000 kilometers, perhaps because Eastern Europe acts as a buffer to protect Soviet territory from NATO's intermediate range missiles, and because the Soviets have more systems with a range from 150 to 1,000 kilometers.

As a counter to a US proposal to limit the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23 missiles, the Soviets might initially call for much broader negotiations to encompass nuclear artillery, tactical missiles and even warhead stockpiles. Such a Soviet counter-proposal might strike a responsive chord with the European peace movement if its attention turned to shorter range nuclear weapons. If Moscow eventually agreed to limits on the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23, it would at a minimum insist on limits on US and probably West German Pershing I missiles, as well as on US forward-based aircraft.

Finally, Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage during the INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. For example, Moscow could deploy SS-20s well beyond current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.
Part Three:
International Diplomacy

1982

Rome, Italy, 10-12 December 2009
Copy to:
H.S. [Chancellor Helmut Schmidt]
HJW [Minister of State Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski]
E.B. [SPD General Secretary Egon Bahr]

Dear Mr. Brandt:

I want to redirect your attention to the question we already discussed between the two of us during our meetings last year in Moscow and Bonn. I mean the problem of nuclear medium-range missile in Europe.

I state it frankly: The course of Soviet-American negotiations regarding this problem in Geneva leaves us with serious and growing concerns. The American side’s position does not at all display any willingness by the United States to direct the issue towards an agreement. Quite to the contrary. You, Mr. Brandt, might very well remember when we talked about the upcoming Soviet-American negotiations. Back then you expressed your full understanding for our position to include in these negotiations not only Soviet medium-range missiles but also forward-based American systems and the respective nuclear systems of Britain and France. And indeed, it looks as if there is no other viable option.

The Americans, in the meantime, want to hear from the first day of negotiations until today nothing else than their own “zero option” which can only be characterized as a mockery of reason.

According to this American proposal, the Soviet Union ought to reduce in fact all its medium-range missiles to zero, i.e. scrap them, while on the NATO side neither one single missile, nor any aircraft carrier for nuclear weapons would have to be destroyed. Yet there exist almost 1,000, or to be exactly 986 NATO systems, among them more than 160 ballistic missiles. If we would agree to this idea, NATO would achieve a more than twofold quantitative superiority of carriers for intermediate nuclear forces, and in the area of nuclear shells even a triple superiority. In other words: This way the balance in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles would turn out even worse than through the implementation of the notorious NATO decision. Instinctively, we feel ourselves caught in the thought that the Americans want to force us through this “zero option” to choose “the lesser of two evils”. Yet this is a primitive method that does not speak to the seriousness of U.S. negotiation strategy.

In order to make their proposals inacceptable to the Soviet Union from the onset, the Americans raise another absurdity: They insist we also scrap those medium-range missiles deployed in the East [of the Ural Mountains] and are not related in any way to Europe.

Without any doubt, for you the absurdity of this question is evident. During your visit in Moscow you expressed yourself the desire to withdraw those Soviet missiles not essential to the balance to positions [in the East] from where they cannot reach Western Europe.
No less absurd is also the U.S. negotiation position pertaining to our medium-range missiles in the USSR's European part.

It is well known how even those Western European politicians, who dispute against the facts the existence of an approximate medium-range missile balance, hold the opinion that the balance was only shifted by the deployment of the SS-20. This means, nobody thought of an "imbalance" with the previously much larger number of our SS-4 and SS-5. This raises the question why the Americans demand from us now the destruction of all our medium-range missiles SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 – and all this with the preservation of NATO's entire nuclear arsenal? Is there any hint of logic here? Obviously this has not anything to do with logic.

And in addition to all this, the Americans recently decided to enter another complicating element into their Geneva negotiation positions. Namely, they insist on limits for Soviet missiles with ranges shorter than medium-range. Summing it up, we have every reason to say that the acceptance of American proposals would result in a unilateral Soviet disarmament. As you correctly remarked during our last meeting, this is something nobody can demand from us. According to your own words, this fact is indisputable.

All this leads us to a conclusion I mentioned during my recent meeting with your colleagues from the Socialist International: It seems like Washington wants to use the Geneva negotiations to calm down the public of the West European countries protesting against the dangerous military plans of the U.S. And then, when negotiations have deliberately been pushed into a dead end, the U.S. wants to justify this way the planned 1983 deployment of its almost 600 new medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

And here, Mr. Brandt, I must say this quite frankly: We can only marvel how most Western European statesmen and politicians, also in the Federal Republic [of Germany], either really do not comprehend Washington's game, or whether they pretend they do not understand it. And some among them even play openly into the hands of the Americans.

I remember well your words that Soviet-American negotiations are vital to the Federal Republic, and that the FRG will contribute towards a positive development of these negotiations. The Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, told me the same. I would be dishonest not to admit that we do not perceive such a positive impact of the Federal Republic on the U.S. position.

I am far from interfering into internal matters of your party. As I have been informed, the SPD leadership wants to analyze the state of Soviet-American negotiations only at its party congress in fall of 1983, and only then it will define its position on the plans of new American missile deployments in the Federal Republic. If this is the case, it is appropriate here to ask ourselves whether the SPD leadership will just be confronted with facts created, and thus it will inconceivable how it can turn the course of events into a positive direction. Now I do not intend to repeat to you Soviet positions on the issues under negotiation in Geneva. We already forwarded them to you. Recently we also reiterated them in public since the American side had published its own Geneva proposals and simultaneously distorted our positions.

I just want to emphasize one thing: We are indeed willing to take wholly radical steps in the area of nuclear arms limitations in Europe. This could be a more than threefold reduction of existing nuclear medium-range missile arsenals from 1,000 down to 300 on both sides. This
could be a complete liquidation of these arsenals. This could be a complete liquidation of nuclear weapons in Europe, medium as well a tactical range.

The only, and from our perspective non-negotiable, pre-condition to realize any of these three scenarios is a strict adherence to the principle of parity and equal security on both sides.

I am very well aware how you are in favor of policies of détente and peace. Thus I am certain, Mr. Brandt, you will understand the motives guiding myself when I draw your attention to the state of negotiations in Geneva.

Sincerely,
L. Brezhnev
22 February 1982

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]
17. März 1982

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,


Der Stand ist ohne Zweifel unbefriedigend. Ich finde es auch nicht gut, wenn durch eine zweimonatige Osterpause der Eindruck entstehen kann, daß die Verhandlungsführenden es so eilig gar nicht haben.

Ich sitze nicht am Verhandlungstisch und bilde also mein Urteil aus dem, was ich von den Beteiligten höre. Dabei brauche ich sicher nicht zu unterstreichen, wie wichtig dafür Ihre Eindrücke sind. Ich halte es daher für hilfreich, wenn bisher bewährte Wege des Gedankenaustausches weiter zur Verfügung stehen.


An den
Generalsekretär
des Zentralkomitee der KPdSU
Herrn Leonid I. Breschnew
Es ist kein Zweifel, daß der sowjetische Vorschlag einer Null-Lösung heute nicht erreichbar ist; wie ich höre, wird er in Genf auch gar nicht ernsthaft behandelt. Man konzentriert sich auf den Stufenplan, den ich, aus deutschem Interesse, nicht für gut halte.


Nach meinem Eindruck befinden sich die Verhandlungen im Anfangsstadion. Ich halte es für denkbar, daß sie erst dann in eine ernste Phase kommen, wenn die amerikanischen Vorstellungen zur Reduktion der interkontinentalen Waffen und zu den Verhandlungen in Wien genau bekannt werden, womit durch eine Rede des amerikanischen Präsidenten im Mai zu rechnen ist.
Die Position, die Sie, Herr Generalsekretär, in Ihrer Rede vor dem Gewerkschaftskongreß in dieser Frage eingenommen haben, halte ich für hilfreich, auch wenn wir nicht ermessern können, ob die Sowjetunion nicht ihr Produktionsziel bei den SS 20 schon erreicht hat. Ihre einseitige Entscheidung kann jedenfalls eine Stabilisierung der Lage bedeuten und damit die Verhandlungen erleichtern, so lange die Amerikaner technisch nicht in der Lage sind, ihre Raketen zu stationieren, was, wie Sie wissen, sechs Jahre, also bis 1989, brauchen würde. Deshalb wird die Frage eines vereinbarten Moratoriums im Herbst 1983 wichtig, falls die Verhandlungen bis dahin noch nicht zu einem Ergebnis gekommen sind.

Wir haben ein wichtiges Jahr vor uns, das Kraft und gute Nerven erfordert, bei Ihnen wie bei uns, damit die Entwicklung berechenbar bleibt und zum Guten gewendet werden kann. Ich hoffe, daß das zwischen uns gewachsene Vertrauen dabei hilft.

Mit freundlichem Gruß

gez. Willy Brandt

Zustellung ü/EB

Kopie:
HJW
Wednesday, April 21 [1982]

An N.S.C. meeting on "START" our idea for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Soviets. We've had a team working on this. Some of the journalists who write so easily as to why we don't sit down and start talking with the Soviets should know just how complicated it is. Our team is doing a good job. Israel bombed a P.L.O. base in Lebanon. There have been some provocations and an unfounded report that an Israeli plane was shot down.

Took the afternoon off on a beautiful spring day and went down to Quantico for a horseback ride.
SUBJECT: Fact Sheets on STAXT

The attached fact sheets on the U.S. proposal on proposed reductions in STAXT are approved for use by agencies.

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
In response to the President's ultimatum which threatened a complete nuclear devastation of the entire Earth, a group of scientists and military leaders met to discuss a possible solution. These elements included the feasibility of reducing the arsenal of nuclear weapons to prevent such a devastating outcome. It was agreed upon to focus on the development of a new breed of weapons that would be significantly less destructive. These new weapons, called "bulletproof missiles," were designed to neutralize existing nuclear devices by either neutralizing or disabling them. This approach was seen as a potential solution to the escalating nuclear arms race and the need for a balanced deterrent.

The proposals made by the group were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Proposed Reduction</th>
<th>Current Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulletproof Missile Weapons</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Based Bulletproof Missiles</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rocket Missiles</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Based and Sea-Based Missiles</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significant reductions proposed by the group are shown in the following comparison:

- Bulletproof Weapons: Reduction of 80% to 90%
- Land-Based Bulletproof Missiles: Reduction of 70% to 80%
- Rocket Missiles: Reduction of 50% to 60%
- Land-Based and Sea-Based Missiles: Reduction of 30% to 40%
The President has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union based upon the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint.

Arms control is an important instrument for achieving such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

--- Significant Reductions: We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.

--- Equality: Americans will accept nothing less. We want agreements that will lead to mutual reductions in equal levels in both sides' forces.

--- Verifiability: We will carefully design the provisions of any general agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions that we seek.

On May 3, the President announced a bold and realistic two-phase U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) aimed at these objectives.

--- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 3,500. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We will also seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half of the current U.S. level.

--- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenals to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missiles throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

The President's proposals attempt to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance. The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive
Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy, and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces.

To enhance deterrence and achieve a stable nuclear balance, the President’s proposal focuses on the first phase, significant reductions on ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles themselves. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing trend that would have been permitted under the unsatisfactory SALT II Treaty.

In the second phase, we will seek further reductions on equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

The President’s approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions on both sides and a stable nuclear balance—what should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

The debate on nuclear weapons issues has focused public attention on a matter of crucial importance. It is now time to demonstrate support for the ambitious, yet realistic, approach to arms control embodied in the U.S. SALT II proposal. The SALT II negotiations will begin on June 20.
Dear Member,

The President has provided his guidance to our Ambassador to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, I want to share with you President Reagan's letter to Ambassador Rowny, as well as other information that explains the Administration's views on arms control.

I hope the enclosed material will help you as you formulate your own views. To be successful, our negotiators need support from the Congress and from the public. For that reason, I am providing this material directly to you and to your colleagues.

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

Enclosures
Dear Ambassador Rowny:

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age -- the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.
I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.

I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us.

For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of
nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have my personal attention.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Edward L. Rowan
Chairman
U.S. STARS Delegation
Washington, D.C. 20451
U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY

BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. Many of these have focused on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1966 the U.S. submitted a proposal (the Baruch plan) for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In 1966, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected both plans.

Major arms control agreements to which we are a party include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the Direct Communications Link or "hot line" (1963), improved in 1971, for use by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during international crises; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which bars placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the purpose of which is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; the Sealed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; the Accidents Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; the ABM Treaty (1972), which imposes limitations on defense against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on either side.

U.S. PRINCIPLES

One of President Reagan's first official acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, to learn the lessons of the past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future. Four principles, which the Administration is working to put into practice, underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
-- Are verifiable, because when national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone and

-- Enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but is a complement to defense preparations as an important means of underwriting peace and international stability.

U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

On November 18, 1981, President Reagan offered to cancel deploy-
ments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) if the U.S.S.R. would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The U.S. is negotiating toward this end with the U.S.S.R. in Geneva. On May 3, the President announced a two-phased approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began on June 18, aimed at the following objectives:

-- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side by 1/3, to about 3,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to limit the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level — about half the current U.S. level.

-- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenal including an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is party to the two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The first, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of these weapons; the second, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibits the production, development, and stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Both of these agreements contain a common and fundamental flaw: Neither incorporates adequate means to verify compliance. Soviet compliance with both has been brought into sharp question by events in Southeast Asia and in Sverdlovsk in the U.S.S.R. Because of this, it is clear that effective verification provisions are essential to future agreement in these fields. The U.S. is committed to achieving a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, and to that end, we participate in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

The INF talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, underway in Vienna since 1973, are concerned with the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Central Europe and with associated
confidence building, stabilization, and verification measures. On June 10, 1982, the President announced in Bonn the new NATO initiative to seek common ceilings in the reductions area (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the West, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the East) of about 700,000 ground and air forces and about 900,000 ground and air forces. The NATO initiative also includes measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

**Verification and Compliance**

Arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the U.S.S.R. cannot be based simply on trust. We must have effective means of verification that enable us to know with confidence whether agreements are being honored. In practice, this means we must be able to monitor activities in the areas covered by such agreements in order to detect any violations; we must be able to do so early enough to permit us to assure Soviet compliance and take steps to offset the effects of any noncompliance. Agreements that cannot be effectively verified are not acceptable.

In the past, we have relied primarily on national technical means (NTM) of verification — sophisticated data-collection methods (e.g., photographic, electronic, radar, seismic) operated unilaterally by the U.S. As arms control agreements, the systems they cover, and the possibilities of concealment become more complex, it will be essential to supplement NTM with some form of "cooperative" verification measures. The Reagan Administration has made clear that the U.S. will insist on verification procedures, including the possibility of measures beyond national technical means, if necessary, to ensure full compliance with any agreement.
In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), NATO ministers agreed in December 1979, to modernize the Alliance's INF, while pursuing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This decision was reaffirmed by NATO in May 1983. In the absence of a full-fledged arms control agreement out of U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations, the U.S. will deploy 400 Pershing II's and 404 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), beginning in December 1981. The new systems will be mobile and capable of dispersal in times of crisis, thus enhancing their survivability and reducing the danger of a Soviet preemptive attack. These deployments have not been forced in Europe but, rather, were arrived at through a process of genuine consultation and joint decision with our NATO partners. Modernization will not increase the risk of a nuclear war limited to Europe; on the contrary, the deployments will serve to reduce the risk of Soviet attack by reminding the Soviets that they cannot hope to limit a nuclear war to the territory of others.

**SOVIET DEPLOYMENT**

The need for NATO modernization stems from the fact that in the mid-1980s, the Soviets began deploying the triple-warhead SS-20, exacerbating the threat to our European Allies and adding to an already destabilizing imbalance in INF.

- The Soviets currently deploy some 315 mobile SS-20's, with 948 warheads, in addition to 280 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, for a total of over 1,200 warheads on longer-range INF missiles (not counting refires). NATO has no similar systems deployed.

- This deployment gives the Soviets a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe from locations deep within the U.S.S.R., far beyond the range of any of NATO's European-based systems.

If deterrence is to be maintained, the Alliance must move to redress the imbalance, either through negotiation or, in the event a concrete INF arms control agreement obviating the need for GLCM and Pershing II is not achieved, through modernization.

**U.S. INF CONTROL PROPOSAL**

NATO's INF modernization has not set back the prospects of arms control but, in fact, has forced the Soviets to accept, in principle at least, the need to limit their own nuclear weapons.
As a result of NATO’s demonstrated resolve to modernize its nuclear forces, the U.S.S.R. has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table, for the first time, nuclear forces that threaten the Allies. Without NATO modernization, there would be no prospect of reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the President’s November 14, 1981, proposal to cancel deployment of Pershing II’s and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20’s, SS-4’s, and SS-5’s. We are focusing on intermediate-range INF missiles because they are the most destabilizing systems. The U.S. proposal, if carried out, would be a major step toward achieving stability at dramatically reduced levels of forces.

During the first round of negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal. Both sides have had a chance to set forth their respective positions and to ask questions about the position of the other side. The talks have been serious and businesslike. We intend to consider Soviet proposals and to negotiate in good faith.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet proposals made thus far contain elements that cannot provide a basis for an equitable and verifiable agreement. They would permit the Soviets to retain intermediate-range nuclear missiles while prohibiting comparable U.S. INF. A Soviet proposal outlined earlier this year would not require destruction of a single SS-20 missile, but the proposal would force the cancellation of NATO’s modernization program and the virtual elimination of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. The Soviet proposal, based on unverified claims that a balance exists in INF, includes U.S. and Soviet systems and calls for reductions from an unequal starting point, which would give the U.S.S.R. an overwhelming advantage.

A so-called unilateral “moratorium” on further deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles announced by President Brezhnev allows the Soviets to retain all of their currently deployed INF missiles but calls for a halt in the NATO deployment preparations, thus prohibiting NATO from fielding comparable systems. Since this “moratorium” was declared, the Soviets have continued to deploy new SS-20 missiles and construct facilities for 111 more of them. The Soviet objective clearly is to forestall NATO deployment without sacrificing Soviet INF superiority. NATO must remain committed to modernization of its INF if it is to convince the Soviets that they have no alternative to serious negotiations toward reducing the nuclear threat.
START PROPOSAL

BACKGROUND

On May 1, 1982, President Reagan announced a new proposal to reduce substantially the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to equal levels and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The negotiations, beginning on June 29, are called START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) — to emphasize the President’s goal of nuclear weapons reductions and to signify a break from the unratified SALT II Treaty.

The President’s initiative has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R. Such a relationship, however, can be built only on reciprocity and mutual restraint. Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- **Substantial Reductions.** We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.

- **Equality.** We seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. The U.S. will accept nothing less.

- **Security.** We seek agreements that will enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.

- **Verifiability.** We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions we seek.

START NEGOTIATIONS

To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President’s proposal focuses, in the first phase of negotiations, on significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing growth in ballistic missile warhead numbers that
would have been permitted under the flawed and thus unsatisfactory SALT II Treaty. In this first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third, to about 5,000. More than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First-phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

RELEVANCE TO SALT II

The President's SALT proposal has built upon the experience of the SALT process. It is U.S. policy to take no action that would undermine existing agreements, provided the Soviets exercise equal restraint. We believe that this policy can contribute to a positive atmosphere for SALT negotiations. However, the Reagan Administration will not pursue ratification of SALT II for three broad reasons:

First, the Treaty has specific flaws. These include the perpetuation and codification of dangerous, destabilizing arms features, illustrated by a unilateral Soviet advantage of 700 modern, heavy ICBMs. It contains several ambiguities, particularly with respect to provisions for verification. It permitted force expansion and did not achieve force reductions — it is possible that the Soviet ICBM forces alone could have grown to more than 8,000 warheads under SALT II.

Because of these and other shortcomings, SALT II never achieved the broad, national support that a treaty of this importance must have. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a divisive debate on the merits of the Treaty. Attempting to ratify SALT II now would only reopen that controversial debate — at a time when a broad consensus behind the President's proposal is needed and when we should focus our full attention on achieving substantial reductions.

Finally, formalizing the SALT II Treaty would make achievement of the President's goals for SALT more difficult by establishing unacceptable precedents for a future agreement. For example, Soviet Backfire bombers are not included in an equal treatment of bombers, and heavy
In good faith and to consider all section proposals from the world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate interests not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire international community to a stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest of a more stable nuclear balance. It would lead to significant decreases in strategic and theater levels on both sides and to a reasonable approach to reasonable and acceptable levels.

The President's approach to a reasonable and acceptable levels.

A reasonable approach would be toward START, committing them most certainly. Improved progress toward START, committing them most certainly underestimating the general ramifications of START I would not plan for START, these and other provisions would have
In May 1, the President announced a bold new proposal to reduce significantly the threat posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by about 50%, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would see the total number of ballistic missiles on an equal level with current US levels. In a second phase, we would see further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side’s arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual reduction in ballistic missile warhead levels below the current US levels. We would also see other nuclear systems as an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verifications, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Approximate Current Levels</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Phase</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proposed ceiling of 3,000</td>
<td>7,000 7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proposed ceiling of 2,500</td>
<td>2,500 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proposed ceiling of 500, approximately one-half current US levels</td>
<td>1,000 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Phase</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Throw Weight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proposed ceiling below current US levels</td>
<td>5,000 5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile