September 15, 1982

National Security Decision
Directive Number 56

PRIVATE INF EXCHANGE (8)

With respect to the private INF exchange which took place at the close of the last session, I have decided the following:

- The U.S. should continue to press for the zero/zero approach.

- No actions should be taken to close the private channel. If the Soviets respond in that channel, the following points should be made:

  -- The U.S. believes the zero/zero proposal is the best approach to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and to ensure effective verification.

  -- The U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-flight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air-breathing GLCMs*).

  -- If the Soviets continue to be adantly opposed to zero/zero, we should place the responsibility on them to propose alternatives for equitably reducing the total missile force structures. (3)

In preparing for the possibility of a Soviet response to the exchange, an NSPG working group should prepare, on a close-hold basis, talking points which outline the specific military and other reasons why the U.S. cannot accept it. (5)

* and shorter range ballistic systems

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

[CIACR 82-14875]

Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries

A Research Paper

-Contributed by William Burr-
Peace Groups and Leaders in INF Basing Countries

A Research Paper
Peace demonstrations in Italy have been comparable in size to those in other INF basing countries, and public opinion surveys show that antinuclear sentiment extends considerably beyond groups that demonstrate. Nevertheless, peace activism in Italy is concentrated more on the far left than is the case in other INF basing countries. During the past year, peace activity has increased, primarily because the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has decided that it can profit politically by exploiting the issue.

In principle, the Italian peace movement consists of more than 500 local, regional, and national committees and associations representing both secular and religious organizations across the political spectrum, with the exception of the extreme right. Yet most of the non-Communist groups have a small membership, and no strong national organization devoted exclusively to "peace" has arisen. The small Radical Party is militant and active, but its influence is weak. The activities of the PCI and, to a limited extent, the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) have been much more important to the peace movement.

In general, the peace movement has suffered from a lack of leadership. 

- No major political figure has made a full commitment to the peace movement.
- The movement itself has not produced a charismatic figure capable of transforming it into an independent force that can exert significant pressure on the Italian Government.

The present role of the PCI in peace activity has not precluded differences within the movement over ideology and tactics. While a broad community of purpose sometimes unites the diverse groups in demonstrations, major differences of attitude are never far from the surface and have ever gnawed grudges between rival groups on occasion.

The Italian peace movement so far has focused mostly on organizing protest demonstrations and rallies and circulating petitions. Some groups advocate more vigorous tactics to impede GLCM base construction at Comiso, Sicily, and a few demonstrators have tried to obstruct construction vehicles. Acts of violence against INF cruise missile deployment may occur, but Italian security officials have said that the peace movement poses no threat to the stability of the government or to the successful installation of GLCMs in Sicily.

In contrast to the peace movements in the other INF countries, the Italian movement focuses almost exclusively on issues that affect Italy and has had less contact with foreign peace activists than the movements in Northern Europe. In addition to the attention it receives in the media, and especially in the Communist press, the movement has generated its own publications to disseminate its message.

We believe that because many of the demonstrations have been planned and organized by long-established groups—especially political parties—these groups have financed them from their own resources.

Origins of the Italian Peace Movement

The Italian peace movement attracts the young in general and the leftist-oriented in particular. The movement began as an apparently spontaneous effort on the part of minor leftist political parties, the Italian Communist Youth Federation (FCGI), and some pacifist groups. The immediate popular success of the march for peace between the towns of Perugia and Assisi, which was sponsored by those groups in September 1981, attracted the attention of the PCI and some elements of the PSI, which saw in the peace movement a way to enhance their popularity with the electorate. In our judgment, the two parties feared that they were losing out on the peace issue with voters and quickly developed their own peace policies in an attempt to organize and channel the movement for their own political ends.

The PCI, the PSI, and Organized Labor

The PCI, the PSI, and their union federations are probably the only organizations capable of providing the peace movement with the leadership it needs to become an effective national force.
PCI. Since the fall of 1981 the PCI has been the dominant force behind the larger demonstrations. Despite its major role in the peace movement, however, the PCI has been reluctant to pull out all the stops against NATO's INF program.

- The party wants the Italian people and other West European parties to regard it as a Western party and not as a slavish follower of the Soviet line.
- The PCI hesitates to attack the Socialists, who support NATO's INF position, because it needs continued cooperation from the Socialists to maintain its control in local government coalitions.

Thus the PCI waited until other West European groups had demonstrated against INF deployment before staging its own protests. The party played the prominent role in organizing a demonstration in Rome on 24 October 1981 that attracted 200,000 participants. This demonstration, while primarily focused against INF deployment in Italy, also criticized the Soviets' deployment. The PCI also organized the demonstration in April 1982 in Genoa, which attracted 300,000 participants, a demonstration in Milan on 17 April 1982 attended by nearly 100,000, and the demonstration on 3 June 1982 in Rome that drew more than 100,000.

We believe that the PCI stepped up its agitation in late 1981 mainly because its leaders hoped to profit politically from being the main "force for peace" in Italy, and to focus the party's energies on something other than internal bickering over marital law in Poland. In our judgment, PCI leaders hoped that once the peace movement had become respectable in Western Europe, the party could take a leading role in Italian activity and in the process create difficulties for its rival, the PSI. They probably hoped that the Socialists, as members of the government that had supported NATO's dual decision on INF, would have to choose between remaining out of the movement thereby appearing to be against peace, or playing second fiddle in what was already a PCI show. The second choice could have allowed the PCI to lead the Socialists into positions that would make relations with their coalition partners extremely awkward. The PCI has failed, however, to draw other major parties into the peace movement on its terms, and in order to avoid appearing too isolated, the Communists have tried to avoid obviously one-sided anti-Western positions during the past few months.
PSI. The top leadership of the PSI has announced that it will support the deployment of INF if its preferred solution of the "zero option" proves unattainable. Nevertheless, the party has been feeling its way cautiously ever since the big upswing of peace activity last year, and its moves have not always been consistent.

The Socialist leadership was surprised by the popularity of the Pergola-Adriatic march and embarrassed by its own absence from the impressive demonstration of October 1981. Later that fall the PSI made a brief attempt to establish its own peace credentials by organizing demonstrations in about 100 Italian cities. The party emphasized broad themes such as the need for a balanced reduction in arms and the negative effects of Soviet arms policy, and refrained from opposing the government policy on INF. These peace actions did not have the desired impact on the public, however, largely because the press and other parties denounced PSI activity as a blatant political maneuver.

After some months of inactivity, the PSI now seems inclined to refrain from peace agitation, even though some factions of the party are pressing for a more active stance. We believe that the party pulled back partly because its efforts were unsuccessful, but also because its leaders had decided that they could weather criticism for not being in the forefront of peace activity. Perhaps more significant, they were able to attack the PCI for what was termed terrorist, anti-NATO, and anti-US activity.

The PSI leadership has been unable to prevent some party members from participating in peace demonstrations. In the leadership comments party members against such activity. Few Socialists appeared at the demonstration in Rome on 3 June, for example. Nevertheless, internal tensions persist. The president of the Sicilian Regional Assembly, a PSI member, has at times lent support to the demands of local anti-INF organizations, and the PSI leadership has been trying to bring him on line without making a public issue out of the disagreement.

A recent PSI resolution stated that the party was prepared to adopt strategies to bring about a change in the situation in the Middle East. This resolution was drafted by the PSI leadership and was adopted by the party's national council without a formal motion from the party's executive committee.

Organized Labor. Another sector of society capable of greatly boosting peace activity in Italy is organized labor. During the fall of 1981, leaders of some major unions made public statements in support of the peace movement that appeared to presage major labor participation in marches and demonstrations. Since then, however, a more moderate approach has been evident.

Labor is now aware of the question of participation in demonstrations (especially those dominated by the PCI), as well as on the specific issues addressed by the peace campaign.

The Italian United Federation of Labor Unions is composed of the PCI-controlled General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL), the Christian Democratic Party-oriented Confederation of Italian Workers Syndicates (CISL), and the Union of Italian Labor (UIL), which is affiliated with the PSI and the Social Democratic and Republican Parties. The 10 million union members—almost half of the Italian working force—are divided on the foreign policy decisions of the United Federation leadership. Generally supportive of detente and disarmament, the United Federation also acknowledges, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the need for the North Atlantic Alliance.

The United Federation as a whole has taken the position that disarmament negotiations should be exhausted before proceeding with the NATO nuclear modernization program. Leaders of CISL and the UIL say that they will support the decision to deploy GLCMs at Comiso if negotiations fail; the CGIL, however, strongly opposes the installation of missiles at Comiso. The Genera disarmament negotiations and the crisis in Poland have somewhat distracted trade union support for the peace movement. Organized labor did not help sponsor the Comiso demonstration, and CISL and UIL refused to participate in the one on 3 June.
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(U) INF NEGOTIATIONS: THE LIKELY SOVIET APPROACH

Summary

Moscow has insisted that negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) link limits on Soviet medium-range land-based missiles with limits on US forward-based systems (FBS). The Soviets define FBS as aircraft on European territory and on carriers in adjacent waters that could strike the USSR.

Moscow contends that NATO's planned deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) will add to the US strategic-advantage, and that the Pershing IIs in particular will allow the US to launch a surprise attack. At the preliminary INF talks in the fall of 1980, Moscow rejected an INF agreement not accompanied by a SALT treaty, probably because of the potential for circumventing limitations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in the absence of new limitations on strategic systems.

The Soviets assert that each side now has about 1,000 medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe. Moscow has indicated it will propose to limit these systems, which it defines as having a "radius of operation" of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers and as consisting of:

--- Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;

--- "over 700" US aircraft, including F-4s and F-111s based in Europe, A-6A and A-7s on carriers, and FB-111s; and

--- "about 300" British and French systems, including French Mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, French land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (LIRBM), and British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

SECRET

NSC-1, 1/5 (multiple sources)

November 20, 1980
The Soviets thus appear to be counting some out-of-area aircraft. All FB-111s are now stationed in the US, and Moscow seems to be including its planes on carriers not normally deployed in European waters. Moreover, Moscow excludes from its list all nuclear-capable Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft, in Eastern Europe, that are within range of NATO territory.

In contrast to previous practice, recent Soviet statements on the INF debate have not referred to US Poseidon missiles assigned to Europe. The Soviets thus appear to have eliminated from their negotiating position what promised to be a contentious issue, because these missiles presumably would be covered by a SALT agreement.

Soviet statements suggest that Moscow will seek to limit the number of platforms (launchers and airplanes) rather than weapons (missiles and bombs). The Soviets assert that NATO has a 5:1 numerical advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow would have difficulty, however, supporting these contentions even using its own list of systems.

The Soviets will probably continue to assert that limits should be confined to Europe only. Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China.

In recent months, the Soviets have proposed stopping the deployment of SS-20s in the western USSR if NATO does not deploy GLCMs and Pershing IIs. In addition, the Soviets probably fear that NATO could use submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to circumvent an INF agreement. Thus, the Soviets may well seek to limit SLCMs as well.

The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981. During negotiations the Soviets are likely to counter the US proposal for a zero option by insisting that it would have to cover US FBs and allied systems.

Moscow may eventually compromise on FBs because it fears that GLCMs and Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles could be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on FBs until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and
GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. If Moscow deferred these demands, it would probably propose limits to SLCMs as well as on Pershing IIIs and GLCMs.

Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example, deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.
Soviet Premises

The Soviet Union has insisted that INF negotiations link limits on Soviet "medium-range" land-based missiles with limits on US forward-based systems (FBS). According to the Soviet definition, FBS are aircraft on European territory and on carriers in adjacent waters that could strike the USSR.

The Alleged Strategic Threat. NATO views INF talks as aimed at redressing the preponderance of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. For Moscow, however, the optimal result would be to avert NATO's deployment of Pershing IIs and GCLMs and to reduce the threat posed by US and allied nuclear systems that are already in Europe that have ranges sufficient to strike the Soviet Union. Moscow argues that the existing systems give the US an advantage in the global nuclear balance, despite a US-Soviet parity in central systems.

The Soviet position that INF talks should address the US "strategic" threat from European bases has its genesis in SALT negotiating history. The Soviets argued in SALT I that any system should be considered strategic if it had a range sufficient to strike the homeland of the opponent from its usual peacetime base. Even after dropping their insistence on such a comprehensive definition, they pressed for the inclusion in SALT I and II of US forward-based systems.

Moscow agreed to put aside the FBS issue in SALT I and again at Vladivostok in 1974 for other Soviet SALT II objectives, but stated that they expected FBS to be addressed at a later time. The agreed Statement of Principles for SALT III includes the assertion that SALT III negotiations will be conducted "taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation." Soviet negotiators clearly intended this language to cover US forward-based systems, although the US specifically rejected such an interpretation. In the preliminary INF talks in Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets emphasized that the US systems embraced by their proposals had a strategic capability against the USSR. They have never "reinterpreted" the past year.
Thus, the Soviets intend to address in negotiations beginning in Geneva on November 30 what they maintain is the unilateral advantage of the US which arises from the geographic difference between the two parties, and which allows the US to supplement its strategic capabilities with intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Moscow contends that NATO's planned deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and GLCs will add to the US strategic advantage. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II would give the US the ability to launch a surprise attack on Soviet strategic installations. Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov wrote in the Pravda issue of July 25, 1981, that although the US claimed it would deploy medium-range missiles to defend Western Europe, the US would actually use them for "preemptive" strikes against ICBMs and other strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Ustinov implied that Pershing IIs in Western Europe would give the US an advantage that could affect the outcome of a global nuclear war.

INF and SALT. After SALT II was signed in June 1979, Soviet officials refused to begin INF negotiations unless SALT II was ratified. They relented on that condition in July 1980. At the preliminary talks in Geneva that fall, the Soviets contended that although INF negotiations could proceed, no agreement could be concluded without a ratified SALT treaty.

The potential for circumventing limitations on intermediate nuclear forces in the absence of new limitations on strategic systems is probably the chief reason why the Soviets have insisted on linking the two issues. Moscow may well believe that the US, unfettered by limitations on central-system warheads or launchers, would replace whatever it gave up in an INF agreement with US-based strategic weapons. Announced US plans to deploy SLCMs doubtless reinforced arguments in Moscow that a free-standing INF agreement would allow the US to deploy systems in Europe that could threaten the USSR. In Moscow's view, such an agreement might also lead Washington to think it could spare the US homeland from Soviet attacks by forgoing the use of ICBMs.

An INF agreement unaccompanied by a SALT treaty would, of course, leave Moscow free to target additional ICBMs against Europe. Thus, both sides would have options for circumvention that could make INF negotiations a hollow exercise.

Moscow's Likely Approach

Recent remarks by Soviet officials provide a good indication of the posture Moscow will take during the INF negotiations this fall. The Soviet position on the question of limitation is of limited, indefinite limitation, and the area of limitation will be similar in this respect to the Soviet stance in the preliminary talks.
Systems To Be Limited. The Soviets assert that each side has about 1,000 medium-range nuclear delivery systems in Europe.

Ustinov in his July 25 Pravda article and Brezhnev in an interview with Der Spiegel on November 2, 1981, implied that the Soviets would propose to limit such systems, and that they defined them as having a range or "radius of operation" of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers. Willy Brandt was told in a message delivered by a Soviet diplomat in late July-1981 that such systems consist of:

--Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-10 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;—

--over 700 US aircraft, including F-4s and F-111s based in Europe, A-6s and A-7s on carriers, and FB-111s; and

--about 300 British and French systems, including French Mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Baccaraer bombers, French land-based IRBMs, and British and French SSBMs.2/

Certain aircraft on both sides are conspicuously missing from Moscow's list, namely:

--F-16s and F-104s assigned to NATO, which have flight radii exceeding that of the F-4;

--300 British and French Jaguars, whose flight radius of 1,100 kilometers is about the same as the Mirage IV's; and

--Soviet SU-24s (Fencers), nearly all of which are based in the USSR, but whose flight radius of 1,100 kilometers is 50 percent greater than that of the F-4 assuming NATO fuel reserves.

Moscow also excludes all nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft in Eastern Europe. These encompass MiG-23s and 27s (Floggers), SU-7s and 17s (Fitters), and MiG-21s (Fishbeds) which are within range of such NATO territory.

The Soviets appear to be counting some out-of-area aircraft. All FB-111s are now stationed in the US. Although Ustinov did not specify how many A-6s and A-7s he was counting, Leonid Brezhnev, the Chief of the CPSU's International Information Department.

\* For a previous discussion of the systems Moscow is likely to include, see TN Report 5308, "Recent Developments in NATO-TWS Implications for the Western Air Defense," April 2, 1981.

\* Breaks in his Pravda article imply he was counting A-6s and A-7s.

\* Brezhnev in his Der Spiegel interview implied he was counting A-6s and A-7s.
indicated in December 1979 that the US had 292 carrier-based aircraft in Europe. In fact, however, the US normally deploys two carriers within range of Europe and in time of crisis is unlikely to deploy more than four. Each of these ships would probably carry no more than a total of 36 A-6s and A-7s, which would make only 144 such aircraft on four carriers.

In contrast to past Soviet statements, neither Ustinov nor Brezhnev nor the message to Brandt referred to US Poseidon missiles assigned to NATO. The Soviets have thus apparently eliminated from their negotiating position what promised to be a contentious issue, because these missiles presumably would be covered by a SALT agreement. Moreover, their inclusion would invite a US counterproposal to count Soviet S-300.

The continued inclusion of F-4s is consistent with previous Soviet proposals. Moscow cited forward-based aircraft to bolster its case for US concessions in SALT and in the preliminary INF talks last fall. The Soviet rationale for limiting F-4s is not clear, however, particularly in light of Ustinov's assertion that the Soviets only include systems in the INF balance with a range or operational radius of 1,000 to 4,500 kilometers.

Assuming standard US fuel reserves, the F-4 has an operational radius of 750 kilometers without aerial refueling and from a base in Denmark could strike only a small corner of the Baltic Military District in the USSR. Assuming less stringent NATO fuel reserves, however, the F-4 would have a radius of 1,090 kilometers without aerial refueling and from its various bases in Western Europe could strike targets in the USSR all along the borders with Eastern Europe. Both radii assume a high-low-high flight profile, however, which would risk heavy losses of aircraft attempting to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Soviets may also be assuming aerial refueling by the F-4. In June 1981, Viktor Karpov, the Soviet negotiator at the preliminary INF talks, told Embassy Moscow officials that the F-4 had been included because it could be serially refueled. He added that a solution to the F-4 issue might be for the US to provide a statement along the lines of the Soviet Backfire statement in SALT II, i.e., a commitment to limit the operational radius of the aircraft. Moscow probably found this would be a safe proposal, because the USSR's tactical aircraft would be excluded on the grounds that they cannot be returned in the hit. Such a capability, however, is under development in the SS-24 (Fencer).

The Soviets may have considered including the Pershing 1, which has a range of 740 kilometers, in the systems to be limited. In June 1981, the Soviets told Brandt he knew that the Pershing was a threat to Soviet territory. He added that the negotiations should cover this missile.
But neither Dettmar nor Brezhnev nor the July message to Brandt mentioned the Pershing I in their discussions of the INF balance. No doubt this omission was intended to deflect potential Western demands that the SS-12/82 with a range of 925 kilometers and the SS-X-23 with a range of 580 kilometers be subject to limitations.

As a counter to US proposals to include short-range missiles in INF talks, Moscow might initially propose much broader negotiations, which would include nuclear artillery, such tactical missiles as the Lance, and even nuclear cruise missiles. If Moscow eventually agreed to limits on the SS-12/82 and SS-X-23, it would at a minimum insist on limits on US and probably West German Pershing I missiles, as well as on US forward-based aircraft.

Unit of limitation. Soviet statements suggest that Moscow will seek to limit the number of platforms (launchers and airplanes), rather than weapons (warheads and bombs). The Soviets did not explicitly address this issue at the preliminary INF talks, but did imply that they were seeking limits on platforms rather than weapons.

The Soviets probably believe that such a stance would allow them to maintain superiority in weapons while agreeing to parity in platforms. The Soviets may also believe it would allow them to avoid:

--proving their contention that NATO enjoys substantial advantages in weapons;

--disclosing details about their systems; and

--dealing with refires.

In statements since the preliminary talks, the Soviets have asserted that NATO has a 50-percent advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems in Europe, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershings IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow, however, would have difficulty supporting this contention, even if it used its own list of systems comprising the INF balance.

Even assuming maximum loadings on NATO aircraft and minimum loadings on Soviet aircraft, the West could have only about a 10-percent superiority. Assuming more likely Soviet payloads (on which some aircraft carry bombs and others attack-surface missiles), total NATO weapons would be 20-30 percent higher than total Soviet weapons. Moreover, if one included Soviet bombers, fighters, and cruise missiles that are capable of striking NATO territory
from their current bases in the western USSR and Eastern Europe, the Soviets could have an advantage of nearly two and a half to one.

Moscow probably intends to continue replacing its SS-4s and SS-5s, which have a single warhead, with SS-20s, which have three warheads. By proposing limits on platforms rather than weapons, the Soviets would be free to increase the number of weapons deployed. But to withhold data on how many weapons its platforms carry.

Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces enjoy a large numerical superiority in missiles. This will give Moscow further reason to argue for platforms as the unit of limitation. The Soviets have not, however, addressed this issue, or even acknowledged that they have reigned.

Area of negotiation. At Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets repeated a proposal for combined global and regional limits, arguing that the talks concerned only nuclear arms in Europe. (Moscow traditionally defines European Russia as territory west of the Urals.) Although Moscow has apparently included out-of-area A-6s, A-7s, and FB-111s in the NATO total, the Soviets will probably continue to assert that limits should be confined to Europe only.

Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China. In Moscow's view, a global regime of equal ceilings that allowed for enough missile systems in the Far East would give the West a numerical advantage, because most Soviet SS-20s targeted against China can not be simultaneously targeted against NATO, while all NATO Pershing IIs and GCSNs in Europe could be targeted against the Soviet Union.

Moscow may also prefer regional limits so that it can hold aircraft in reserve in the Far East which could be brought to within range of Western Europe during a crisis that, in the Soviet view, justified abrogation of an INF agreement. The Soviets might argue in future negotiations that they could not move large numbers of aircraft without being detected. Nevertheless, the West would have at most a few days' warning of such a transfer.

I/ See Tables 1 and 2, appendix. The Soviet superiority in weapons increases to nearly two and a half to one if one also counts nuclear-capable Fleggers, Frelicas, and Fisheks which are currently based out of range of NATO territory, but which are west of the Urals and could be moved forward in time of crisis.
MOSCOW MIGHT BE PREPARED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER—NOW 36—OF SS-20 LAUNCHERS IN THE WESTERN FOOTHILLS OF THE URAILS. THE SOVIETS WILL LIKELY EXCLUDE, HOWEVER, THE 36 SS-20 LAUNCHERS JUST EAST OF THE URAL, WHICH CAN HIT ALL OF WESTERN EUROPE. (THE SS-20 HAS A RANGE OF 4,800 TO 5,000 KILOMETERS.) MOSCOW WILL MOST CERTAINLY DEMAND THAT SS-20s IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE OUT OF RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE, AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE MOVED WITHIN RANGE IN TIME FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN WAR.

IF THE US PRESS FOR GLOBAL LIMITS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT RESPOND BY DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY MORE MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT THAN NATO TO COMPENSATE FOR SOVIET DEFENSE NEEDS AGAINST CHINA. MOSCOW MIGHT ALSO CALL FOR GLOBAL LIMITS ON ALL AIRCRAFT ON BOTH SIDES WITH RANGES FROM 550 TO 4,500 KILOMETERS, BECAUSE THE WEST HAS A SLIGHT NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN SUCH AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION TO AIRCRAFT ALREADY INCLUDED BY MOSCOW, SUCH LIMITS WOULD:

--COVER US F-4s, F-15s, A-6s, AND A-7s OUTSIDE EUROPE, AS WELL AS US A-4s, US AND ALLIED F-16s, ALLIED F-104s, AND BRITISH AND FRENCH JAGUARS;

--ALSO COVER SOVIET SU-24s (Fencers), SOVIET AND NON-SOVIEt WARSAW PACT MiG-23s AND 27s (Floggers) AND SU-17s (Fitters);

--BUT EXCLUDE SOVIET AND NON-SOVIEt WARSAW PACT SU-7s (Fitters) AND MiG-21s (Fishbeds) IN EASTERN EUROPE.

AN IMMEDIATE FREEZE. IN NOVEMBER 1980, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A FREEZE ON "THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR ARMS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT." THIS PROPOSAL ENCOMPASSES BOTH MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT. IN RECENT MONTHS, THE SOVIETS HAVE PUBLICLY NARROWED THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL TO A "MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES." SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE EXPLAINED THAT THE LATTER PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN THE DEPLOYMENT OF NO MORE SS-20s IN THE WESTERN USSR IF NATO DID NOT DEPLOY PERSHING IIs AND GLCMs.

MOSCOW HAS STATED THAT WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF A MORATORIUM IS NOT A CONDITION FOR INF NEGOTIATIONS. WE CAN EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PRESS HARD FOR A MORATORIUM. IF THE US DOES NOT ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS MIGHT DECIDE TO SUSPEND UNILATERALLY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20s TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC THAT MOSCOW'S SINCERE INTENT IN SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. MOSCOW WOULD JUDGE THAT THE BURDEN WOULD THEN FALL ON NATO TO MAKE SOME RECIPROCAL CONCESSION.

A SOVIET ZERO OPTION. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS DISMISSED AT PROPAGANDA PRESIDENT DRANESKI'S STATE OF NOVEMBER 19, 1982, THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING IIs AND MGM-134s IN THE SOVIET UNION OR IN ASIA. DISENTANGLING THEIR SS-4s, SS-5s, AND SS-20s, VALENTIN PALIN, FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CII IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
Department, told West German newsmen on October 28, 1981, however, that Moscow would examine a zero option very thoroughly, if it were proposed. As interpreted the zero option, however, to mean elimination of all medium-range systems on both sides, including US forward-based aircraft.

The Soviets may calculate that the European public would perceive such a sweeping version of zero option as showing greater commitment than the US to disarmament. During negotiations, the Soviets are likely to counter a US proposal for a zero option by attempting to focus discussions on which systems should be limited under SALT II. It can be expected that Moscow would attempt to avoid any ones whose zero-option outcome were not achieved.

Possibilities for Soviet Compromise

SALT Negotiating history shows that a longstanding Soviet objective has been to limit US deployment not only of GLCMs but also of SLCMs. The Soviets have been reluctant to compromise on limiting these systems, which were among the last SALT II issues to be resolved. Agreement was reached under the SALT II protocol to ban until the end of 1981 the deployment of GLCMs and SLCMs with a range of more than 600 kilometers and the testing of MIRVed GLCMs and SLCMs. During a meeting of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission in March 1980, the Soviets indicated that they would not proceed with the reduction to 2,250 strategic systems under SALT II without a resolution of the protocol issues or an extension of the protocol.

Soviet officials have argued that the survivability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of GLCMs and SLCMs would greatly increase NATO's capabilities against the USSR. In addition, the Soviets have asserted that it would be difficult to detect GLCMs and SLCMs and to distinguish between conventional and nuclear systems. They also noted in SALT talks that the MIRVing of GLCMs and SLCMs would complicate these problems.

Moscow contends that Pershing IIIs launched from West Germany could strike Soviet ICBM installations. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II is very accurate and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. They also maintain that Pershing IIIs could strike Soviet ICBMs and other installations in the western USSR just five or six minutes after launch. Moscow's concerns are heightened because

SECRET, NOT RELEASED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

UNCLASSIFIED
the Soviets are unlikely to have an adequate defense against Pershing IIs and GLCMs until the late 1980s at the earliest.

The Soviets have other concerns. They fear the transfer of new US systems to the illegitimate. Transfer to the FOG would be especially objectionable, given traditional Soviet fears of a resurgent German military threat.

The Soviets may also suspect that if NATO is able to overcome political opposition to INF modernization, the planned 572 missiles will be just the beginning of a more far-reaching expansion of NATO's military capabilities, including the deployment of even more Pershing IIs and GLCMs. Moscow may also believe that the deployment of new NATO missiles would facilitate the deployment of US enhanced radiation weapons and binary chemical munitions in Europe.

Possible Terms of Soviet Compromise. The above concerns may offer inducement to the Soviets to compromise on PBS in order to reach an INF agreement. Moscow is, however, unlikely to show flexibility on PBS until it is convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs cannot be averted. Until then, Moscow will try to derail NATO's plans for INF modernization by undermining public and official support for them, particularly in the basing countries.

Even if the Soviets compromise, however, they will probably defer rather than drop outright their PBS demands. They might, for example, attempt to link initial concessions with an agreement to negotiate limits on aircraft in a second phase of INF negotiations. Alternatively, the Soviets might propose that PBS figure in another negotiating arena, such as a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Moscow will argue that it would have no leverage to constrain French and British systems under an agreement that set equal ceilings on Soviet medium-range missiles and on US Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The Soviets told Brandt in June that they were prepared to reduce the number of S-300s targeted against Europe, but that some were required to counter British and French systems. NATO's contention that these systems are strategic, and therefore cannot be limited under INF rules, does not address the supposed Soviet objective of limiting the ability of the West to strike Soviet territory from Europe.

The Soviets may ultimately agree to the limits of limiting US Pershing IIs and GLCMs if they can justify dropping the insistence that British and French missiles be included in INF limits. If Moscow should compromise on this point, it would
nevertheless insist that the US agree not to transfer systems
limited to an LRE agreement to the Allies or use other means to
implement the agreement.

An agreement that limited or banned Throw-In GLCMs,
but while retaining SLCMs, would be of minimal value to the
Soviets unless some were anecdotes in any negotiations. Such a
limitation preserves the new capability, transfers, even if the
US dammed off the Soviet-savvy Throw-In GLCMs, would
make for a far less effective agreement. They would probably propose limits
on Throw-In and SLCMs.

Soviet limits are prudent. The US should not take certain
factories out of the game during negotiations and to
force their own military capabilities in the event the negoti-
ations fail. The Soviets have vouched that if HAB proceeds with
the modernization, the USSR will act to prevent the US from estab-
lishing military superiority. Moscow has not specified what
measures it would take, but there are two it could implement with
relative ease. The Soviets could:

- continue to deploy SS-20s well beyond their currently-planned
  numbers.

- deploy to forward areas such shorter range systems as the
  SS-X-23 and SS-12/12, which to date have not been based in
  non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

In addition, Moscow might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs
and GLCMs by the mid-1980s. Moscow would, however, have to
reconcile its negotiating posture, including its proposal for a
freeze on medium-range systems, with new deployments.

Prepared by Robert W. Hansen
x28702

Approved by Robert A. Martin
x22043

UNCLASSIFIED
### Table I: Western INF Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US Ranged</th>
<th>UK Ranged</th>
<th>French Ranged</th>
<th>Total Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies (US)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies (UK)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Allies (French)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcanes Daukasas (UK)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>65-110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage (French)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total US, UK, and French Weapons: 1,791-1,846

---

1/ The Soviets have identified these systems as figuring in their calculation of the INF balance in Europe. The numbers are based on a presumed Soviet count. The aircraft cited are nuclear-capable.

2/ This estimate shows figures for warheads and bombs.
**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SECRET**

- II -

Table 2: **SOVIET INF SISTEMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>US Estimates of Wepons per Platform</th>
<th>Total Wepons</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>405</td>
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<td>SA-5</td>
<td>296</td>
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<td>SA-2</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>SA-3</td>
<td>104-156</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2A</td>
<td>470-511</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA-2D</td>
<td>140-230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2E</td>
<td>1,450-1,715</td>
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</table>

**Soviet Airborne Soviet Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>285</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>570</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SU-24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-7A</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21</td>
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<td>MiG-29</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Soviet Weapons**

4,102-4,367

1/ The Soviets have identified these systems as figuring in their calculation of the INF balance in Europe. The numbers show a presumed Soviet count. The missiles cited are west of the Urals. The aircraft cited are nuclear-capable and based in the western USSR. Naval aircraft are excluded.

2/ This estimate shows figures for warheads and bombs. Vehicles are not included.

3/ The numbers are based on US data and refer to nuclear-capable aircraft of the types cited that can strike NATO territory from their current bases in the western USSR and Eastern Europe. There would be 1,070 more aircraft and 2,625 more weapons, if one counted nuclear-capable Floggers, Fitters, and Fishbeds which are currently based out of range of NATO territory, but which are west of the Urals and could be moved forward in time of crisis.
TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS
- Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles and Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers;

- "over 700" US aircraft, including F-4s and F11s based in Europe, A-6s and A-7s on carriers, and FB-11s; and

- "about 300" British and French systems, including French mirage aircraft, British Vulcan and Buccaneer bombers, French land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (FRB11s, and British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan's offer of November 18, 1981. During negotiations the Soviets are likely to counter the US proposal for a zero option by insisting that it would have to cover US FBS and allied systems.

Moscow may eventually compromise on FBS because it fears that GLCMs and Pershing IIs would pose a greater threat than forward-based aircraft. The Soviets may also fear that without an INF agreement NATO's initial deployment of 572 missiles would be followed by additional systems.

The Soviets are unlikely, however, to show flexibility on FBS until they are convinced that the deployment of Pershing IIs and
GLCMs cannot be averted. Even if they compromised, they would probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. If Moscow deferred these demands, it would probably propose limits on SLCMs as well as on Pershing IIIs and GLCMs.

Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example, deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid-1980s.
strike the homeland of the opponent from its usual peacetime base. Even after dropping their insistence on such a comprehensive definition, they pressed for the inclusion in SALT I and II of US forward-based systems.

Moscow agreed to put aside the FBS issue in SALT I and again at Vladivostok in 1974 for other Soviet SALT II objectives, but stated that they expected FBS to be addressed at a later time. The agreed Statement of Principles for SALT III includes the assertion that SALT III negotiations will be conducted “taking into consideration factors that determine the strategic situation.” Soviet negotiations clearly intended this language to cover US forward-based systems, although the US specifically rejected such an interpretation. At the preliminary INF talks in Geneva in the fall of 1980, the Soviets emphasized that the US systems embraced by their proposals and a strategic capability against the USSR. They have [2 words illeg] assertion repeatedly over
on linking the two issues. Moscow may well believe that the US, unfettered by limitations on central-system warheads or launchers, would replace whatever it gave up in an INF agreement with US-based strategic weapons. Announced US plans to deploy system in Europe that could threaten the USSR. In Moscow’s view, such an agreement might also lead Washington to think it could spare the US homeland from Soviet attacks by forgoing the use of ICBMs.

An INF agreement unaccompanied by a SALT treaty would, of course, leave Moscow free to target additional ICBMs against Europe. Thus, both sides would have options for circumvention that could make INF negotiations a hollow exercise.

Moscow’s Likely Approach

Recent remarks by Soviet officials provide a good indication of the posture Moscow will take during the INF negotiations this fall. The Soviet position on the systems to be limited. [2 words illeg] of limitation, and the area of limitation will be [3 words illeg] [2 words illeg] the Soviet stage of the preliminary talks.
Certain aircraft on both sides are conspicuously missing from Moscow's list, namely:

F-16s and F-104s assigned to NATO, which have flight radii exceeding that of the F-4;

300 British and French Jaguars, whose flight radius of 1,100 kilometers is about the same as the Mirage IV's; and

Soviet SU-24s (Fencers), nearly all of which are based in the USSR, but whose flight radius of 1,190 kilometers is 50 percent greater than that of the F-4 assuming NATO fuel reserves.

Moscow also excludes all nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft in Eastern Europe. These encompass MIC-23s and 27s (Floggers), SU-7s and 17s (Flinters), and MIG-21s (Fishbeds) which are within range of much NATO territory.

The Soviets appear to be counting some out-of-area aircraft. All FB-111s are now stationed in the US. Although Ustinov did not specify how many A-6s and A-7s he was counting, Leonid Zamyatia, the Chief of the CPSU's International Information Department,

1/ For a previous discussion of the systems Moscow is likely to include, see INR Report [no. illeg] Moscow Modifies [illeg] of [illeg] TNF: Implications for TNF Negotiations [3 words illeg] [sentence illeg]

[3 lines illeg]
Europe could strike targets in the USSR all along the borders with Eastern Europe. Both radii assume a high-low-high flight profile, however, which would risk heavy losses of aircraft attempting to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

The Soviets may also be assuming aerial refueling by the F-4. In June 1981, Viktor Karpov, the Soviet negotiator at the preliminary INF talks, told Embassy Moscow officials that the F-4 had been included because it could be aerially refueled. He added that a solution to the F-4 issue might be for the US to provide a statement along the lines of the Soviet Backfire statement in SALT II, i.e., a commitment to limit the operational radius of the aircraft. Moscow probably feels this would be a safe proposal, because the USSR's tactical aircraft would be excluded on the grounds that they cannot be refueled in the air. Such a capability, however, is under development for the SU-24 (Fencer).

The Soviets may have considered including the Pershing 1, which has a range of 740 kilometers, in the systems to be limited. In June 1981, the Soviets told [name illeg] Moscow that the Pershing was a threat to Soviet territory. [illeg] limited than INF negotiations should [illeg] this missile.
The Soviets probably believe that such a stance would allow them to maintain superiority in weapons while agreeing to parity in platforms. The Soviets may also believe it would allow them to avoid:

- proving their contention that NATO enjoys substantial advantages in weapons;
- disclosing details about their systems; and
- dealing with refires.

In statements since the preliminary talks, the Soviets have asserted that NATO has a 50-percent advantage in the number of weapons on medium-range systems in Europe, and that NATO would have a 2:1 advantage if it deployed Pershing IIs and GLCMs as planned. Moscow, however, would have difficulty supporting this contention, even if it used its own list of systems comprising the INF balance.

Even assuming maximum loading on NATO aircraft and minimum loadings on Soviet aircraft, the West would have only about a 30-percent superiority. Assuming more likely Soviet payloads [illeg] which some aircraft carry bombs and [illeg] air-to-surface missiles, total NATO weapons would be [3 words illeg] percent higher than total Soviet weapons. Moreover, if [illeg] included Soviet Fencers, Floggers, Fitters, and [illeg] which could strike NATO territory.
Moscow probably believes that a global regime would unduly restrict the number of medium-range missiles it could target against China. In Moscow's view, a global regime of equal ceilings that allowed for enough missile systems in the Far East would give the West a numerical advantage, because most Soviet SS-20s targeted against China can not be simultaneously targeted against NATO, while all NATO Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe could be targeted against the Soviet Union.

Moscow may also prefer regional limits so that it can hold aircraft in reserve in the Far East which could be brought to within range of Western Europe during a crisis that, in the Soviet view, justified abrogation of an INF agreement. The Soviets might argue in future negotiations that they could not move large numbers of aircraft without being detected. Nevertheless, the West would have at most a few days warning of such a transfer.
An Immediate Freeze. In November 1980, the Soviets proposed a freeze on “the aggregate number of principal nuclear arms on the European continent.” This proposal encompassed both missiles and aircraft. In recent months, the Soviets have publicly narrowed their freeze proposal to a “moratorium on deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missiles.” Soviet spokesmen have explained that the latter proposal would mean the deployment of [illeg] more SS-20s in the western USSR if NATO did not deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs.

Moscow has stated that Western acceptance of a moratorium is not a condition for INF negotiations. We can expect, however, that the Soviets will press hard for a moratorium. If the US does not accept such a proposal, the Soviets might decide to suspend unilaterally the deployment of SS-20s to demonstrate to the European public Moscow’s sincere interest in successful negotiations. Moscow would judge that the burden would then fall on NATO to make some reciprocal gesture.

A Soviet Zero Option. The Soviet press has dismissed as propaganda President Reagan’s offer of November 18, 1981, that deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the Soviets would not dismantle their SS-4s, SS-5s, and SS-20s. [2 words illeg], First Deputy Chief of the CPS [illeg] International Information
Soviet officials have argued that the survivability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of GLCMs and SLCMs have asserted that it would be difficult to detect GLCMs and SLCMs and to distinguish between conventional and nuclear systems. They also noted in SALT talks that the MIRVing of GLCMs and SLCMs would complicate these problems.

Moscow contends that Pershing IIs launched from West Germany could strike Soviet ICBM installations. The Soviets argue that the Pershing II is very accurate and has a range of 2,500 kilometers. They also maintain that Pershing IIs could strike Soviet ICBMs and other installations in the western USSR just five or six minutes after launch.
(paragraphs 4, 5 & 6)

Even if the Soviets compromise, however, they will probably defer rather than drop outright their FBS demands. They might, for example, attempt to link initial concessions with an agreement to negotiate limits on aircraft in a second phase of INF negotiations. Alternatively, the Soviets might propose that FBS figure in another negotiating arena, such as a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

Moscow will argue that it would have no leverage to constrain French and British systems under an agreement that set equal ceilings on Soviet medium-range missiles and on US Pershing IIs and GLCMs. The Soviets told Brandt in June that they were prepared to reduce the number of SS-20s targeted against Europe, [illeg] that some were required to counter British and French systems. NATO's contention that these systems are strategic, and therefore can not be limited under INF talks, does not address they avowed Soviet objective of limiting the ability of the West to strike Soviet territory from Europe.

The Soviets may ultimately decide that the benefits of limiting US Pershing IIs and GLCMs would justify [illeg] their insisting that British and French items be included in INF limits. If Moscow should compromise in this regard it would
nevertheless insist that the US agree to transfer systems limited by an IF agreement to the Allies or use other means to circumvent the agreement.

An agreement that limited or banned Pershing IIs and GLCMs, but which permitted SLCMs, would be of marginal value to the Soviets unless SLCMs were addressed in SALT negotiations. SLCMs and GLCMs share much the same capability. Therefore, even if the Soviets dropped their demand that the US forward-based aircraft be included in INF negotiations, they would probably propose limits on both GLCMs and SLCMs.

Soviet Military Measures. Finally, Moscow may take certain military stands to gain leverage during negotiations and to increase Soviet military capabilities in the event the negotiations fail. The Soviets have vowed that if NATO proceeds with INF standardization, the USSR will act to prevent the US from establishing measures if would take, but there are two it could implement with relative ease. The Soviets could:

- continue to deploy SS-20s well beyond their currently planned number
- deploy to forward areas such shorter range systems as the SS-X-23 and SS-X-12/22, which to date have not been based in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

In addition, Moscow might be able to deploy long-range SLCMs and GLCMs by the mid 1980s. Moscow would, however, have to reconcile its negotiating posture, including its proposal for a freeze on medium-range systems, with new deployments.
Part Three: International Diplomacy

1983
2. SEPTEL REPORTS COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF JANUARY 31 TALKS WITH THE ITALIANS ON THE COMISO MOU. REFTEL DESCRIBES INTER ALIA ITALIAN PAPER PROPOSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP TO EXAMINE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A DUAL KEY ARRANGEMENT.


EXTEND CLASSIFICATION

DECEPTIONED
4. THE PROPOSAL DERIVES FROM A GROWING POLITICAL AND PUBLIC SENSITIVITY TO THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL CONTROL OF PREVIOUSLY INDICATED IN THE REFERENCED LETTER.

5. WE HOPE FOR AN ANSWER IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO AGREE ON THE MEETINGS AND ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT. END TEXT.

6. COMMENT:


WE RECOMMEND THAT GIORDO’S LETTER NOT BE ANSWERED DIRECTLY, BUT BE FOLDED INTO THE BACKGROUND OF DEALING WITH THE COMISO PROBLEM.

SECRET

PAGE 03 ROME 02617 011751Z

7. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO SECDEF. RABB
U.S. APPROACH TO INF NEGOTIATIONS

The U.S. Delegation to the INF negotiations is directed to make a proposal based upon the following elements to the Soviet Union before the end of the current round of negotiations:

- The U.S. continues to believe that the zero-zero outcome is the optimal outcome.

- Without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have previously identified, however, the U.S. will deploy LRINF land based missiles as planned by NATO.

- While maintaining the other elements of the U.S. INF position, and, as an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land based missiles, the U.S. could agree to accept a limit at one of a number of certain discrete levels provided that the level would satisfy the criteria cited above and provided the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to reduce its corresponding LRINF land based missile forces to an equal level.

- Therefore, the U.S. INF Delegation should notify the Soviet Delegation that the U.S. is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on longer-range, land based INF missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land based missile force to an equal level on a global basis.

- The U.S. views such an agreement as an interim step to the total elimination of weapons of this class. It hopes the Soviet Union will recognize the wisdom of this and join us in this view, but it does not make a commitment by the Soviet Union to ultimately negotiate a zero-zero outcome a precondition for the negotiation of what we would view to be an interim solution.

R. Reagan
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

U.S. MESSAGE CENTER

TO: SECSTATE HASCRO 1258
FROM: AMBASSADOR TOKYO
SUBJECT: INF CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:
   - On Mar 30, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz met with Foreign Ministry Directors General and Office Directors to discuss the new U.S. interim proposal for INF reductions. The MOFA officials said that GOR would be releasing on Mar 31 a public statement of full support for the proposal and that they expressed appreciation for the process of consultation that had been initiated as a result of the Secretary's visit to Tokyo. They also took the opportunity to express GOR concern about the possibility that for U.S.-Japanese security relations as negotiations on interim proposals get underway in Geneva, they said their greatest worry is how to deal effectively with the current Soviet effort in Japan to encourage a separate Japanese-Soviet negotiation on SS-20's deployed in the far east. Because Soviet goal is to thwart current trends in Japan toward much more active and open support for U.S. force deployments, embassy believes that, while the responsibility rests largely with GOR to resist Soviet pressures in Japan, there must also be due consideration given in U.S. INF planning for the potential for damaging U.S.-Japanese defense relations if we appear to ignore Asian security concerns. END SUMMARY.

3. MOFA participants in Mar 30 INF discussions included: North American Bureau Director General KITAMURA (chairman), U.S. Bureau Director General Cauda, Kato, North American Bureau Deputy G. YAMASHITA, U.S. Bureau Deputy O. EKIS, European Bureau Deputy O. MITSUHARA, Security Division Director KATO, and Soviet Office Director TAMBIA, as well as several other staff officers. Asst. sec. Wolfowitz had explained the terms of the new U.S. interim proposal for INF reductions, and answered several questions about this. MOFA officials replied that GOR would consider this proposal and would announce publicly after President Reagan's public announcement.

4. They then proceeded to voice their concerns about the potential repercussions in Japan if an agreement on INF resulted in reductions in European SS-20's and not far eastern SS-20's. On the one hand, they said, this would damage the credibility OF U.S. SECURITY PROMISES TO JAPAN BY REINFORCING SUSPICIONS AMONG CERTAIN JAPANESE THAT U.S. SECURITY COMES FIRST TO THE U.S. ON THE OTHER, IT WOULD CREATE FERTILE GROUND IN JAPAN FOR SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DRAW JAPAN INTO SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE QUAD PRO QUOD WOULD BE JAPANESE GUARANTEES TO PROHIBIT DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR OR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE FORCES IN AND AROUND JAPAN.

5. Asst. sec. Wolfowitz replied that U.S. would resist Soviet attempts to make a distinction between European and Asian deployments, but in order to maintain principle of a global ceiling could not begin negotiating regional subceilings, which would, in any event, be meaningless in practice because of SS-20 range and mobility. Pointing out the great diversity of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear weapons, besides the SS-20's, which constitute the total potential threat to Japan, he suggested that GOR should attempt to guide public discussion away from strict focus on SS-20's in order to reduce the opportunities for the Soviets to take advantage of an overly simplified view of the problem among Japanese public. By

APPENDIX:

**ACTION**

INFO 900-141 SECDEF:** SECDEF(9) USDP(15)
ASD-NRNL(1) ASD-PAGE(1) DOD(1) INMTC(1) SMS(1)
DC-4(A)(1) AT-(1)(1) D1(1) D2-(1)(1) D3-(1)(1) D4-(1)(1)
D5-(1)(1) D6-(1)(1) D7-(1)(1) D8-(1)(1) D9-(1)(1) D10-(1)(1)
ABA-SECTIONS(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED: 47

MCN=83091/02015 TQR=83091/1015Z TAD=83091/1046Z CDSN=M48796
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JCS MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTERS
P 011012 APR 83
FROM AMBASSADOR TOKYO
TO STATE WASHDC 1259
INFO USMISSION GENEVA 8855
USMISSION USM EX NY 4598
AMBASSADOR BONN 7781
AMBASSADOR MILAN 7141
AMBASSADOR SEOUL 7459
CINCPAC HONOLULU
CONAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA
NOTICE TO SEASON 02 OF 02 TOKYO 06085
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12355: DECL: AOOR
TAGS: MARR, JA, US
SUBJECT: INF CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN

6. Finally, the Japanese side drew attention to the
lown in Prime Minister Nakasone's letter of response
to President Reagan on the interim proposal, which
reads: "...even if the interim solution will not
involve transfer of S-20's to the Far East, it is
important that due consideration be given to the
security of Asia, comparable to that given to Europe." This
language, they explained, is designed to meet
Japanese concerns without saying that reductions must
be achieved in both regions. They suggested that it
would be useful to go to the U.S. could reiterate
this phrase, or something equivalent to it, as appropriate.

7. Wulfenitz pointed out that while Japanese were
asking for "due consideration, comparable to that
given to Europe," the European and Japanese situations
were, of course, not precisely comparable and due consid-
eration would have to take account of that fact.
For example, we have no requirement for "complying"
through the basing of U.S. weapons on Japanese soil,
indeed very much the opposite. Also, conventional
deterrence plays a much larger role in the Japanese
context than in the European. The Japanese side
acknowledged that there are important differences
but that the Japanese public is strongly concerned
to see a reduction in the Soviet threat, and if there
is no such reduction as a result of the INF talks,
Soviets will attempt to exploit Japanese fears in or-
der to generate pressure here to make other concen-
sions in order to reduce the Soviet threat to Japan.
It is perhaps for this reason that they showed a great
deal of interest in the question of whether an interim
agreement would be linked to further negotiations on
reductions down to zero.

8. COMMENT: Both the high level of the Japanese
attendance at this meeting and the tenor of their
comments reveal the very serious attention (O) is
now devoting to the INF dilemma. They will
exhibit their views to receive careful consideration in
Washington and, to a degree, may tend purposely to
exaggerate the significance of INF as a litmus
test of the credibility of U.S. security guarantees.
It is also apparent that MOFA officials concerned
with security matters will be evaluating U.S.
responsiveness to Japanese concerns about INF, in
relation to the development of support in Japan for
the deployment of SHIP-BASED U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN

ACTION

INFO PMD-(1) SECDEF:(x) SECDEF(9) USDP(15)
ASDP-MRAL(2) ASD-PASE(1) DD(1) NNIC(1) SWS(11)
OE-4AE(1) AE-1(1) DO(1) DE(1) DB-18(1) DE-101(1)
OE-16(1) DB-21(1) DB-28(1) DB-28(1) DB-28(1)
OE-15(2) DB-59(1) DB-59(1) DB-59(1) DB-59(1)

TOTAL COPYIES REQUIRED 47
Friday, May 27-Tuesday, May 31 [1983]

The summit in Williamsburg on all our minds but 1st on Fri. had a press interview & then met with Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan – 1st name Yasu. We met in office & then lunch in the St. dining room. He impresses me more every time I see him. At lunch we surprised him with a birthday cake. I can’t believe he’s 65. I had him pegged for 45. He’s off to Johns Hopkins U. for a speech & then on to the summit.

I finished the day in Williamsburg with a 2 hr. prep meeting for the Summit. Sat. 28th – A full day what with touring all the facilities arranged for the Summit. Out table – at least 40 feet long was hand built by a craftsman as a gift to the govt. for us at the Summit.

Had bilaterals with Pres. Mitterand (France) & P.M. Thatcher, then a dinner meeting with the other 6 heads of state & the Pres. of the European Council, Gaston Thorn. I opened the subject of the I.N.F. deployment. After full discussion it was agreed that we’d have foreign ministers draw up a statement of approval of deployment & negotiations to reduce & hopefully eliminate all such intermediate range weapons. We met on Sunday morning & out of the blue both Mitterand & Trudeau said they couldn’t support such a statement. The discussion grew very brisk with Margaret, Helmut, Yasu & Amantore (Italy) all having at them. I got angry & did about 20 minutes. We were one hour late for lunch. In the afternoon meeting we started again on a new draft that tried to meet some of the language complaints without weakening the statement.

While Ministers were working on drafts, we took up matter of an ec. statement & believe it or not the same 2 had objections to that. We stood firm – I thought at one point Margaret was going to order Pierre to go stand in a corner. It was hard to remember we had started the day with a prayer service in the tiny church. Maybe that’s what did it because we closed the day with both issues resolved, cordially restored & no winners or losers.

Sunday night dinner was very pleasant at the old Royal Gov’s. palace. We discussed the middle east but didn’t make it an agenda issue.

Monday morning meeting very productive – agreed to do more to cooperate on medical research etc. Rallied around full ec. statement. At an outdoor lunch we met exchange students – 1 from each of our countries. I filled our leaders in on Central Am. Later in day, met with Helmut Kohl – he’s solid & with us all the way. Monday night dinner (Nancy had arrived, thank Heaven) was something of a banquet. Press already hailing the Summit as a success. Tues. saw each of the heads of state off. (Mitterand, Thatcher & Kohl) had left the night before. Thank you’s all around & back to the W.H.
Absolutely secret  
the only copy  
(rough draft).

SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU  
31 May 1983  

Chairman com. ANDROPOV Yu. V.  

In the beginning of the session comrade Andropov expressed words of deep sadness about the death of comrade Arveed Yanovich Pelshe. Comrade Andropov informed that the funeral of comrade Pelshe, according to the decision of the CC is going to be held at 11 o’clock on the Red square by the Kremlin wall. The members of the funeral commission will come to the Dom Sotuzov at the time of carrying out the body; the rest of the members of Politburo, candidates to members of Politburo and the secretaries will come at 11 o’clock straight to the Mausoleum.

[ANDROPOV.] Now I would like to address the issue, which in my opinion deserves the exchange of opinions and suggestions.

Today I’ve talked with a number of members of the Politburo about our government’s announcement of the response connected with the deployment of American missiles “Pershing-2” and cruise missiles in the countries of Western Europe; and also concerning the resolution adopted by the countries of “Big Seven” in Williamsburg. It’s important that we discuss this matter, exchange opinions, and express the suggestions that should be developed.

If you look at the events that are taking place in the Western countries, you can say that an anti-soviet coalition is being formed out there. Of course, that’s not accidental, and its highly dangerous. At the session of the NATO countries, that’s going on in Williamsburg, very aggressive speeches are given, and the very resolution adopted by the “Big Seven” is non-constructive, but aggressive.

If you analyze the reaction of the countries of the West on our declaration, then the reaction has two sides. From one side, our declaration had impressed them very much. There are indications, seen through some of the speeches of some of the western politicians that give hope to normal and productive high level talks about the decrease of the arms race and disarmament, especially of the nuclear weapons. On the other side there are indications of absolute fulfillment of the so-called double decision of NATO, which is the placement of nuclear missiles in the countries of Western Europe.

Actions of president Reagan, who is a bearer and creator of all anti-soviet ideas, creator of all the untrue insinuations regarding our country and the other countries of the Socialist Community, deserve very critical and harsh reaction from our side. Meanwhile in the press, Michail Vasilyevich [Zimyanin], those actions don’t find that full coverage and deserving answer. This, of course, is not right. Imperialistic countries of the West want to put together a bloc against the USSR. They act together and, as you saw, Reagan managed, though with some pressure, to convince his partners in the “Big Seven” to sign the resolution and express their opinions against the politics of the USSR.

Now let’s see what we do. To my disappointment we act alone. Some of us speak out, but we all do it separately. We, the countries of Warsaw Pact and the other socialist countries that don’t belong under Warsaw Pact, have to demonstrate strong unity. But the leaders of the socialist countries are buried in their national problems. These, if you pardon my words, are just minor unimportant actions.

That’s why I have a suggestion to gather here in Moscow first secretaries of socialist parties’ CCs and the chairmen of Sovmins for debating the current situation. At that meeting we could exchange opinions about the talks on the arms race and disarmament, decrease of the nuclear missiles in Europe, about the last decisions of the NATO countries, and about the other subjects, related to our counteraction to the policies of the Imperialistic countries, targeted at the worsening of the global situation.

Of course, there comes up the question of Romania: what to do with it? It seems to me that not to invite Romania is not in our interests, without it we can’t really hold a meeting, though, as it’s known, they voted against the publication of our declaration.

A question appears: when to hold a meeting and with what to conclude it. It seems to me that we can’t put away for a long time this sort of meeting, because the Western countries are quite active today. For now we aren’t active enough. I think that we should assume positions now, before the meeting, to start the counteraction against the policies of the imperialist states. It seems to me that on that meeting we should develop, adopt, and then publish a document that would express our reaction on NATO’s decision. Maybe in that document we could once again bring up the suggestions that were brought up before about non-aggression acts between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the countries of NATO. It’s quite possible that other ideas could be brought up.

In his recent speech, [Former West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt, introduced an idea about joining the talks on the limitation of nuclear missiles in Europe and limitation of strategic
nuclear missiles. Maybe we should all think about that idea and make it an official proposal—join the talks about the nuclear missiles in Europe with the talks about the limitation on all the strategic nuclear weapons. We also should think when and where to bring up this proposal. I think that MFA and the Ministry of Defense will decide on that problem.

We have to open up a wider network to win public opinion, to mobilize public opinion of the Western countries of Europe and America against the location of the nuclear weapons in Europe and against a new arms race, that's being forced by the American administration. The behavior of Japan, and especially of the president [Yasuhiro] Nakasone worries me. He completely took the side of the more aggressive part of the Western countries, and he completely supports Reagan's actions. Because of that we should consider some sort of compromise in our relations with Japan. For example: we could think about joint exploitation of several small islands, that have no strategic importance. Maybe there will be other suggestions. I personally think that Japan could initiate more active cooperation with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere.

The next point concerns China. I think that the Chinese aren't going to move any further on their positions. But all our data shows they could increase their trade with USSR. They did offer us a trade agreement for this year, that substantially increases our goods exchange compared to the previous years of trading with China. Because of that we might have to send comrade [First Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V.] Arkhipov to China to conduct a series of talks and to "feel the ground." And if we succeed in improving our economic ties with China through cultural, sports, and other organizations, it could be considered a big step ahead.

Now about the Middle East. To say that the events in the Middle East don't bother us would be wrong. The fact is that we have very good relations with Syria. But Syria argues against the agreement that was made between Israel and Lebanon. Syria has no friendly relations with Iraq. Recently Syria has been facing minor problems with PLO, and in particular with [PLO Chairman Yasser] Arafat. In one word—here is a problem we have to think about.

If you look at our propaganda, you can come to a conclusion that it's quite calm when it comes to strategic preparations of NATO. That's true, we shouldn't scare people with war. But in our propaganda we should show more brightly and fully the military actions of the Reagan administration and the supporting countries of Western Europe, which in other words means disclosing in full scale the aggressive character of the enemy. We need that, so we could use facts to mobilize the soviet people for the fulfillment of social and economic plans for development of the country. We can't, comrades, forget in this situation defense sufficiency of our country. These topics should be constant in our media. You remember comrade L. Y. Brezhnev at the XXVI session of CPSU [23 February - 3 March 1981] said, that military threat is coming and because of that we should lead a struggle against the influence of military revisionist ideas of the West. That's what it came to: Reagan calls up the senators if they support the ideas of the Soviet Union, and charges them with treason. Why don't we use press to speak against the lazy burns, those who miss work [profugulshikov], bad workers? I ask the comrades to express their opinions about the questions brought up and maybe comrades have other suggestions. Who would like to take the stand?

GROMYKO. I completely approve of the suggestions that were expressed by Yu. V. Andropov. First of all about the call of the meeting of the leaders of socialist countries, countries of the Warsaw Pact. That kind of meeting, in my opinion, we should gather. [Romanian leader Nicolae] Ceausescu, I think, we should invite to the meeting. I would say, it's beneficial for us.

ANDROPOV. Right now they are asking for a consultation.

GROMYKO. Particularly they were asking us for that. The meeting of the leaders of the countries of the Warsaw Pact will show the unity of our Pact and prove our principal positions in the questions of nuclear weapons and reduction of arms race. I think that we should adopt at the meeting a document, as rightly mentioned before Yuri Vladimirovich [Andropov]. This document should sound very clearly. Along declaration shouldn't be made, but it should be sharp and concrete. This would be our collective action of the countries of Warsaw Pact. It is needed.

What to do with the talks? I fully support the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich about unifying the talks on nuclear armament in Europe and strategic armament in whole. As you know, Reagan has got a goal, whatever it takes him, to place the nuclear missiles "Pershing-2" and the cruise missiles in the European countries. A question comes up, what should we do, whether we should continue the talks? As it's known, Western countries, many of them, are ready for deployment. That's why we should bring in something fresh. And in connection with that this suggestion about unifying the talks will serve our interests.

ANDROPOV. We should invite for these talks the English and French, let them participate, they are nuclear countries.

GROMYKO. I think the English and French will refuse for sure to hold the talks, but we should invite them, that's right. The main suggestion, I think, is the combined talks. That type of a suggestion deals with the restriction of nuclear armament in the whole, which means that in the talks they will include the tactical missiles, also. In their time Western countries themselves put a question about the talks on all kinds of nuclear weapons.

ANDROPOV. That's good, let them say that themselves, how they view that suggestion.

GROMYKO. It will be easier for us to keep in contact with those who speak against all kinds of nuclear weapons. I think, that they can try this, in spite of the fact that they will insist on location of nuclear weapons in Europe. In a word, this will give us a break.

ANDROPOV. Anyway, we don't lose anything.

GROMYKO. New ideas are starting to appear in America, though not officially, but it's very important. Maybe they will agree to union. Anyway, this line [idea] will have to be fulfilled right away.

We will have an extra plan—it is the continuation of the talks on restrictions of use of strategic nuclear armament in the world and restrictions on nuclear armament in Europe. The United States, as it's known, is talking about the fact that they can only strike in response to aggression. I think, that they without enough reason wouldn't dare to use nuclear missiles. Against the first strike are also Canada, England, France, and Western Germany. This we also have to use skillfully in our propaganda and in our practical interests.

Regarding Japan, I have an idea: why don't we use our suggestion regarding the islands of Hamabay [sic-Hamama]—[ed.], Kunashir, and other small islands, that really are very little spots, and draw the border, I mean make an adjustment of the border. It would be then the most prestigious suggestion.

ANDROPOV. When I talked about Japan, I didn't mean that suggestion. I talked about joint exploitation of several little islands.

GROMYKO. We could do both at the same time. These same islands are small dots in the ocean and they don't have such a grand strategic importance.

About China. The People's Republic of China expresses wishes to broaden our economic ties. Even in practice it is starting something in that sphere, for example the increase of goods exchange.

ANDROPOV. This should be checked out, as I said.

GROMYKO. I think, that the Chinese aren't going to go for anything else. One of the terms for normalization of our relations is the withdrawal of our troops from Chinese borders. It seems to me that we could think about that. But then the Chinese began to push for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.

ANDROPOV. I suggest we don't bring up that question.

GROMYKO. Regarding Mongolia. Maybe we should withdraw part of the army away from the border. There is a danger in the Middle East
that Israel will strike against Syria. If Syria ruins Reagan’s plans, Americans will go bankrupt.

ANDROPOV. I would suggest we turn to Syria to advise it not to pull itself into this conflict. If the events start happening, we should warn Syrian leaders beforehand to work out a corresponding plan.

GROMYKO. Syria sends tanks to Lebanon. Our task is to advise Syrian leaders to withhold from any participation in the events of the war.

ANDROPOV. May be we should write a letter about that to [Syrian leader Hafez] Assad?

USTINOV. All that we do regarding defense we should continue doing. All the missiles, that we planned to install, should be installed. All the airplanes should be stationed at the spots we agreed upon. Reading the resolution that was adopted by the “Big Seven,” I should say, it was very cunning and strict. But it has its weak points and we should figure out how to use them. But everything happens in life, so “they” may be installing the missiles in England, FRG, and other countries.

I consider the suggestion of Yuri Vladimirovich absolutely correct that we should carry out active work, to counteract against the imperialistic actions of our enemies.

Regarding Mongolia I should say, that if we move the Soviet army, that’s now located there back to our territory then we will lose a very good post. Everything is already equipped there. That’s why we have nowhere to move on the Soviet border.

Regarding Cambodia and Vietnam, we already talked about it not once. I figure that we shouldn’t lose positions won in battles, but we should retain them. The sanctions which were discussed earlier by Yuri Vladimirovich, should be supported. We will look at it very carefully and think about our actions. We also have to think about talks in Vienna and Geneva, in regards to nuclear weapons as well as strategic. In fact I consider very rightful the suggestion to combine both of these talks. Maybe, Y.V. Andropov will consider it rational to speak out with that suggestion, and maybe give another suggestion, let’s say, about decrease of nuclear weapons by 50 percent, including French and English nuclear weapons.

TIKHONOV. England and France will never agree to that.

USTINOV. If they don’t agree, than our proposal will sound all over the world. The middle-range missiles, Western countries wouldn’t refuse against their location in Europe.

GROMYKO. But what then to reduce?

USTINOV. We can reduce all the rockets.

GROMYKO. We proposed that.

USTINOV. Yes, we already proposed, but we should offer again. About Japan I would like to say that we can look only at very small islands, but the big island Kunashir—we have quite settled there. For example, from the Japanese sea we can only access through the strait of La Pérouse, and, I should say, here we would substantially cut our maneuvering space.

About the meeting with governments of socialist countries. I completely agree with Yuri Vladimirovich. We should expose the Western countries, their offensive speeches and military tone. Maybe Yu.V. Andropov should say something on that topic, too.

GROMYKO. I will have a speech at the session. In that speech, it seems to me, I should spell out a number of suggestions.

USTINOV. Maybe I should give an interview? In one word, we activize the work, gather socialist parties and agree with them on this subject.

CHERNENKO. Even if Romania doesn’t sign, we could adopt a resolution without the signature of Romania.

USTINOV. Japan hadn’t joined the military alliance of the Western countries, yet. That’s why we should act not only upon Japan, but the other countries, also, so that not only we openly spoke out against militaristic intentions of Reagan administration, English, Japanese and others, but the socialist countries did it, too, and the leaders of the socialist countries could have spoken out, too. By the way, in those situation they have kept silent. We have, comrades, to build, strengthen the socialist bloc, but very skillfully. To my regret, the relations between Vietnam and China are very strained. I absolutely agree with the decision of Yuri Vladimirovich about enforcing anti-war propaganda, targeted at the arms race, wrong suggestions of the Western countries and especially at the American administration. It looks like the Americans thought about installing a space command. In a word, I would like to say, that we should more widely speak out about our suggestions and expose the militaristic intentions of the Western countries.

ANDROPOV. Of course, we aren’t going to change Reagan’s behavior, but we will expose his antisoviet, militaristic intentions very decisively.

TIKHONOV. Reagan doesn’t react any more to our suggestions. Regarding the uniting of the talks, this is one more of our important suggestions, and we should bring it in. Missiles, of course, they will place in Western Europe. But [we] should explain it broadly and clearly to our people and all other nations of other countries. The resolution of the Soviet government is a very important document. We now have only to develop propaganda, expose the actions of the West and have a strong influence over people. I think that meeting that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about is vitally important to be held. And with that we should somehow hint to socialist countries that they alone and each one of them, let’s say GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary give a speech. Let’s say a speech for Nuclear-free Zone in Europe and on the other topics. [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov, for example, can give a speech about Nuclear-free Zone in the Balkans. Now about China. All the initiatives about the increase in goods exchange between USSR and China come from China. This is very important. That’s why we should feel the ground about broadening our economic relations with China and send to China comrade Arkhipov for the talks.

Regarding removal of the troops from the Chinese border, to me it seems like an unrealistic act.

Regarding Syria, as comrades have talked about it, everything is correct. If Syria gets involved in a conflict, then we can lose everything we have in the Middle East. And we have to keep Syria in our orbit. That’s why we should conduct more work with the Syrian government. We have to find such a method in our propaganda, such forms and methods of conducting it so as to tell our people the truth about the nuclear war, but not to scare them, as Yuri Vladimirovich correctly pointed out.

CHERNENKO. It’s absolutely correct, that Yuri Vladimirovich gathered us today, and the suggestion is right about a meeting with the leaders of all the members of the Warsaw Pact. If you look attentively at our friends—Czechs, GDR, Hungarians, Bulgarians, you get an impression, that the leaders of these countries don’t worry about the current situation. That’s why the very fact of calling a meeting will mean a lot. I think that we should call a meeting in a near future, as said Yuri Vladimirovich.

VOICES. Support the suggestion about the calling of a meeting.

CHERNENKO. At that meeting we can talk about China, about the Middle East and about other important questions of the international situation. I think that all the questions that Yuri Vladimirovich stated in his speech were very correct. There gathered a “big Seven” of Western aggressive states, but we are also a “big Seven,” and we should meet, but this would be now a meeting of “big Seven,” fighting against nuclear arms and for peace.

About working out the suggestions, that Yuri Vladimirovich talked about, I think, that, including our interests, we should prepare them well and introduce them to [the] CC.

GRISHIN. I completely support what Yuri Vladimirovich suggested. The situation is dangerous. The resolution of the “Big Seven” that they will put the missiles in Europe, has an offensive character. Actually, there is being formed a bloc based on an anti-soviet platform. Western countries try to outweigh the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the nuclear weapons. The meeting should be held before the meeting of NATO.

GROMYKO. It could be held even after NATO’s meeting. Then we could find out their point of view on several questions.
GRISHIN. On our meeting we should call socialist countries to active counteraction toward imperialistic countries. About the invitation of Romania, I am for it, though there's no guarantee they will sign the resolution. They behave very badly. Not long ago, as it was known, Ceausescu hosted [Conservative West German politician, Bavarian state premier Franz Josef] Strauss and during the talks he spoke very badly. I think that we should prepare a good, short, but sharp document, that will be adopted there.

I am completely for opening of wide range of propaganda in our press and among our oral propagandists, which was mentioned before by Yuri Vladimirovich.

ANDROPOV. In that sphere we so far don't do a whole lot.

GRISHIN. I think that with Japan we should look for the way to soften the relations. With China we could develop economic relations on higher levels. Of course, China won't give up on Cambodia, and on that issue we will never come to an agreement. I think, that we should keep Syrians from unnecessary actions, so that they don't get pulled into military confrontation.

ANDROPOV. At one point, remember I told the Cubans that we won't fight for them and won't send any troops to Cuba. And it worked all right, the Cubans accepted it. We should tell the same thing to Syrians. I think such a saying will prevent them from confrontation.

GORBACHEV. You said it right, Yuri Vladimirovich, that the time now is calling us to increase actions, taking necessary steps to develop a broad program of counter-measures against the aggressive plans of the Western countries. And in the inside plan we have certain serious tasks. We can take some action towards the countries of CMEA [Council on Mutual Economic Assistance], countries of Warsaw Pact, and separate socialist countries. I completely support the suggestions about holding a meeting and other actions, that were suggested here, including the military line.

The United States is moving to Europe. Here we can't wait. We have to act.

ALIYEV. I support all the suggestions of Yuri Vladimirovich. This complex of actions is vital to be carried out. Our external politics has an offensive character, but the character of a peace offensive. The imperialists are irritated by our suggestions. All that you said here, Yuri Vladimirovich, regarding a meeting of the socialist countries, improving relations with China, about the Middle East, especially about starting a wide propaganda—all this deserves special attention and should be adopted.

DEMICHEV. Why don't we write a letter to Reagan from the name of comrade Andropov?

ANDROPOV. I would modernize a bit the suggestion of P. N. Demichev and write a letter to the participants of the meeting of the "Big Seven," and then, maybe later, to Reagan.

PONOMAREV. In response to the actions of the "Big Seven" we should work out our suggestions. Maybe, after the meeting of the leaders of the socialist countries we should hold party activities, and meetings in the country.

USTINOV. This is all correct, but what if we scare the people?

PONOMAREV. On 20 June, for example, there's going to be an Assembly of Peace in Prague, we should use it for propaganda of our peaceful propositions.

ZIMYANIN. I completely agree with what Yuri Vladimirovich said. I would ask a permission to begin realization of this ideas starting tomorrow. In particular, gather the editors of the leading newspapers, information agencies and tell them about these ideas, especially point the sharp end of our propaganda at Reagan and his aggressive suggestions.

KUZNETSOV. I think, we should activate also the work in parliamentary relations, especially about sending our parliamentary delegations to France, USA, and the other countries. Obviously, on the session in A.A.Gromyko's speech he should mention these questions.

ANDROPOV. Now I would like to tell you, comrades, the most important [item], what I would like to inform you of. I am talking about improvement of our work inside the country, and about the increase of our, leaders' responsibility of the assigned tasks. It doesn't only concern me—Andropov, or Gromyko, Ustinov, we all are personally responsible for the departments that we lead. Comrade Tikhonov has to keep a tight grip on Food industry. Comrade Gorbachev has to use fewer weather excuses, but organize a fight for the crops, mobilize people so that they don't talk about bad weather, but work more, so they use every good day, every minute for gathering more crops, do all we can to increase wheat crops and other grain and meat and dairy. Comrade Aliyev has an important task—improvement of the public transportation system. Comrade Kapitanov has to increase the common goods production, more should be done in that field. Comrade Demichev should be stricter with the repertoire of the theaters, we have too many negative sides, and the other questions in the development of our culture demand more attention. You, Petr Nylovich [Demichev] are the one to be asked from in this sector. I wouldn't talk about the other comrades, they all know their departments and their goals. I think that you should gather all your employees and tell them about the ideas and tasks that we talked about today. You can gather all of them or you can gather them in according to groups, whatever is better.

USTINOV. Maybe I should gather with comrade Smirnov all those in defense and we'll talk about our defense.

TIKHONOV. I will gather all the ministers and their VPs and talk to them about these subjects.

RUSAKOV. We have to, obviously, check everything that's going on in the socialist countries in these areas and then let them know our suggestions and give them friendly advice.

ANDROPOV. All this, comrades, can be done and I think that you will take these tasks actively. There is a suggestion to give to comrades Gromyko and Zimyanin a task to summarize all that we talked about on our session, and prepare a suggestion about the counteractions towards the actions of the imperialistic states, targeted at worsening of the international situation. Don't be long with the preparation of those suggestions and entering them in the CC. Agreed?

EVERYONE. Agreed.

ANDROPOV. On this permit me to end our meeting.


1. [Ed. note: Evidently a reference to Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Smirnov, head of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK).]

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The intense, neo-Brezhnevite and almost neo-Stalinist conservatism of the brief Chernenko interregnum (Feb. 1984-March 1985) pervades this July 1984 Politburo excerpt. The transcript also illuminates the relationship between fluctuations in CPSU leadership and reassessments of past party history. On this occasion, the Politburo's consideration of requests for rehabilitation from several one-time rivals of Nikita S. Khrushchev who had been ousted from the party in intra-leadership struggles in the 1950s prompts a vigorous bout of Khrushchev-bashing. (The three erstwhile party stalwarts who had petitioned the Politburo—Yacheslav M. Molotov, the longtime USSR foreign minister; Georgii M. Malenkov, for a time considered Stalin's likely successor; and Lazar M. Kaganovich, one of Stalin's key henchmen and First Deputy Premier after Stalin's death—were all expelled from the party leadership in 1957 as members of the "Anti-Party Group" that had allegedly plotted to overthrow Khrushchev. Also seeking additional privileges was Alexander Shelepkin, once KGB chief under Khrushchev but now denouncing him.) Sympathetically considering the requests of the "Anti-Party Group" to be restored to honored party positions, one Politburo member after another—especially Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Ministry Gromyko, KGB chairman Viktor M.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

MEETING WITH CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV

3:00 p.m., Thursday, June 7, 1973

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS, THE OLD SQUARE, MOSCOW

At noon of this time, the diplomat in residence of

important U.S. media of course used many words to be heard by,

news where therefore the main event is.

General Secretary Andropov welcomed me back to the Soviet

Union, saying that he would not ask me how I felt being back,

since I was an old Muscovite. I responded that I was struck

by all the beautiful buildings that had gone up in recent

years. It was not as when I first came here nearly sixty

years ago, such as it is, to the capital of both the United

States and the Soviet Union. I

noted that it was now the fiftieth anniversary of the

institution of U.S.-Soviet relations, and we really should have

a celebration, but I could only leave the General Secretary an

autographed picture of President Roosevelt.

I also said that I wished to give him a copy of my memoirs

of our relations during the war with Stalin. The General

Secretary thanked me warmly for these two gifts and went

immediately into reading a prepared statement. The statement

was as follows:
"Mr. Harriman, Mrs. Harriman, we would like to say that we value that both of you considered it necessary to come to Moscow at this time. We know you are active champions of improved U.S.-Soviet relations and know you are guided by concern where relations are going at this time."

I interjected that the General Secretary was absolutely correct in that perception.

The General Secretary continued:

"Let me say that there are indeed grounds for alarm. The situation, such as it is, is no fault of ours and unless reasonable measures are taken the relations could become still worse. At this time they are developing quite unfavorably and this does not suit us at all. We hope that you can influence those who think along the same lines.

"Forty years ago, Mr. Harriman, you came as Ambassador of the United States to the Soviet Union. We were then allies. We succeeded in rising above the differences in our social systems and united in the face of the fascists and defended peace in the world. We saw your own personal contribution at that time, and we do not forget it.

"Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe -- the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously. This war may perhaps not occur.
through evil intent, but could happen through miscalculation. Then nothing could save mankind.

"It would seem that awareness of this danger should be precisely the common denominator with which statesmen of both countries would exercise restraint and seek mutual understanding to strengthen confidence, to avoid the irreparable. However, I must say that I do not see it on the part of the current Administration and they may be moving toward the dangerous 'red line'.

"I shall not pass judgment on the peculiarities of the American political system. Nevertheless, why is it that every election campaign, especially the Presidential campaigns, must be accompanied by anti-Soviet statements? Why must there be a hullabaloo about a lag in armaments or windows of vulnerability?

"It is probably far easier to appeal to chauvinism and to other such sentiments than to tell the truth. The elections pass, but they leave their aftermath. Mistrust and enmity have heated up, and there is a sharpening of the arms race and new arms programs.

"But we would prefer to think that the policy of a country such as the United States should be built not on a momentary but on a realistic, stable basis. For instance, what is the
line of the present Administration in respect to the Soviet Union? It appears oriented on speaking ill, military preponderance and economic and other kinds of harm. I venture to say to you, quite frankly, that such a line in the first instance shows a lack of understanding of the role and potential of my country and of the United States, and you know better than us the impact it has in relations between the United States and its allies. It is exceptionally damaging for international relations as a whole.

"The previous experience of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States cautions beyond all doubt that such a policy can merely lead to aggravation, complexity and danger. No results can be expected from it; both sides lose—not ours alone. And the engendering of new types of arms complicates our task.

"Nothing is left to the imagination in what Washington throws down as threats, damnations and outright abuse, but they are mistaken. We are not that kind of people nor that kind of politicians. Nothing can come of it.

"We are convinced that in present international conditions, taking into account the military situation and the growing number of explosive problems, we cannot afford the luxury of destructive rivalry in interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union."
"We treat our relations with the United States seriously, fully understanding their significance for peace and the need to avoid nuclear war. We would prefer peaceful coexistence, mutually-beneficial or, even better, good relations as our policy.

"However, I will make no secret of the fact that beyond all doubt there is one victim of the evil which may come from the attitude taken by the White House. That is confidence, the confidence which began in the last decade and was valued throughout the world. These are not just swear words that are being put out but an attempt to undermine all the things created bilaterally and on a broader plane in that period.

"In these conditions, we can simply have no confidence in the present Administration and certain people should really give that a lot of thought.

"Nor are we in the habit of interfering in election campaigns. We conduct our affairs with the United States and those leaders elected by the people. We make no linkages for understandings between the United States Government to how they would reflect on chances of this or that party or this or that candidate for President. We do not evade contact with the Republican or Democratic Parties. Our conversation today is a graphic example. We want to normalize our relations on an equitable basis to benefit all Americans, regardless of their party."
"Finally, I would like to say that we pay tribute to the personal dedication of Mrs. Harriman and the Governor to strengthen mutual understanding for better relations, for building on our common interest in peace and good relations. I also note that we follow with interest the efforts by your family that the United States have solid and thoughtful experts on the Soviet Union. We welcome that through your lucky hand it would appear that scholars, diplomats and others can develop an objective understanding of the Soviet Union.

We know that the Harriman family is actively participating in the political life of the United States. We would appreciate your setting out a few views on the prospects in your country and for relations with the Soviet Union."

When the General Secretary finished this statement, I responded that I wished to address first his last remarks. I said that I was grateful that he understood the attitudes of my wife and myself which we hoped could be to the benefit not only to the people of our country, but of his. I continued that he had asked for my comments. I would be glad to make some.

I wished to say that his remarks appeared directed both against the United States and against the current Administration. It was not clear to me which of his remarks were general and which were directed against the Administration. The General
Secretary responded that all of what he had said was critical and was related to the current Administration, but he should not be taken as criticizing when he said that it is a fact of life that in an American election campaign a wave of anti-Sovietism is raised. He was, however, not faulting the people of the United States as a nation.

The subject at hand was still on the bare agenda and in response, it would not be appropriate for me as a private citizen to make comments regarding an American Administration. If I were to do so, the place would be in the United States and not in the General Secretary's office. The General Secretary immediately responded that that would go without saying and it was certainly not something which they expected of me.

I also noted that really there was no need for General Secretary's response. I continued that regarding his suggestion that an election campaign adverse comments were always being made about the Soviets, many people speak during these campaigns and many say some difficult things. I said that I did not know the source of his information, but in my view they were not the rule but the exception. I also continued that it was our general policy to develop sound relations with the Soviet Union, to develop trade, and to take actions which would be beneficial not only to the people of the United States but to the people of the Soviet Union.
I could say that as far as I am concerned, and my wife, our attitude would be as we have said, and one beneficial to the improvement of relations, here and elsewhere. I added that I wished to recall that I had been in Moscow under more agreeable circumstances, when we negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty, still one of the most successful agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its twentieth anniversary would be next month. I said that I believed we could return to those days, if we could cooperate, if we could work together to improve relations. I was dedicated to that goal and so was my wife, and I felt that our visit would help in that respect.

My visit to you today is aimed at a mutual idea if one had. I also noted that I fully agreed with the General Secretary that it was not his affair to become involved in American politics, but I felt it was possible for the Soviet Union to take steps which could help to improve relations. I also had to note that other actions were sometimes taken which made it more difficult to do so. I said it would be helpful if the General Secretary could give me a significant message to take back or if he could make some statement beneficial to and which would improve relations.

I noted that I was not here to speak of things which could make our relations more difficult; the General Secretary knows them already. I repeated that I hoped the General
Secretary could make statements on improving relations which would encourage American opinion towards their improvement.

I said that I felt there was more goodwill in the United States than perhaps apparent at this time. That goodwill was latent, but ready to express itself.

I then noted that my wife would like to say something at this time. Mrs. Harriman then expressed her gratitude to be included in the conversation and reaffirmed that she shared her husband's views. She said that she knew there were many things which we cannot do, but she said that we should talk about those things which could work to our common good.

My wife asked whether it might be a good idea if more Members of Congress should ask to visit the Soviet Union this summer. Mrs. Harriman noted that House Majority Whip Tom Foley was already heading a delegation arriving July 1. She said she would like to know whether they would be well received.

Mrs. Harriman emphasized her belief that it was better to meet and to talk directly rather than through written communications.

The General Secretary responded that in principle the Soviets were in favor of meetings of that sort. Each visit would, of course, be weighed on its merits, but it was important that people meet with each other. The meetings did not necessarily have to be with the General Secretary himself, but they certainly could be with his colleagues. In short, his answer was yes.
I then continued that I appreciated his recalling our wartime relations. I had come at that period with the British and other Americans to find out what was needed. We were able to send supplies to enable the Red Army to resist so gallantly as it did, so effectively, and eventually to drive the enemy out. I said that not just myself but others would be ready to support the improvement of relations again if the Soviets could take appropriate actions.

The General Secretary responded that in making my observations I had mentioned that there were some Americans who wanted good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He also took note of my comment that the critical remarks were incidental, since as he had said the Soviets were prepared to work with any Administration in our common interest. He said that he would like my leaving him with that impression.

The General Secretary said he still had one more point to raise. He added that in regard to my comment that the Soviets take at times certain actions which complicate the situation, he wanted to note that we stand on different positions. What the Soviets believe are the right steps, the Administration thinks are wrong, and vice versa. He wanted to know how to do this, by what mutual steps. He said, however, it could not be by the one step which it appears President Reagan wants. — a Soviet unilateral laying-down of its arms. That could not be.
I said that I agreed on the need for reciprocity. I emphasized again that I was not here to discuss difficulties — that is, to review the steps that the Soviets have taken or what they say the U.S. has taken. Nevertheless, our discussion should be in general terms how to work on or to get around our difficulties.

I said we must continue, however, to be able to tell the Soviets frankly what we are against. I said I wished to emphasize that whoever is saying the American people are not for peace, as are the Soviets, was informing the General Secretary incorrectly. Americans are just as anxious as the Soviets to develop and improve relations.

I reiterated my view that we should first deal with those matters which stand the best chance of success. There are those which are more difficult and it is not useful in the first instance to go into those with which we are at variance. We should go into those on which we can have agreement. I repeated my belief that the General Secretary knew the areas in which the United States is opposed to what the Soviets have done. I felt then we could discuss how to overcome them if the General Secretary indicated how important it is to have good relations.

Frankness remains all-important, and from what the General Secretary had told me, I said that I believed that it was his point of view. The General Secretary interjected that that was certainly his point of view.
I then asked whether the General Secretary could tell me of anything he could do to make the situation easier for those who wanted to improve relations — what messages he might have or what actions he might take on his own toward progress as a whole. The General Secretary responded that he would think it over.

I reiterated my hope that he would do something, and my wife supported me. The General Secretary then responded somewhat heatedly, asking whether what the Soviets were supposed to do was to make unilateral concessions. He said that he felt the Reagan Administration was demanding one-sided actions by the Soviets and refusing to act reciprocally. He maintained that the Soviets' suggestion of the freeze would not work against the interests of either side. He also said that in his view, of late the United States Administration was not even answering the Soviet approaches.

I then asked if I could talk to Ambassador Dobrynin whenever I met him, which was regularly, of possibilities, and the General Secretary responded that I was always welcome to talk. I said that I was glad to hear the General Secretary was ready to think over ways of moving relations forward. I noted that I would be seeing the press this afternoon — my usual practice when I am in Moscow. I asked whether there was anything that I could say to them to encourage their reports along this line.
The General Secretary asked me to tell the media that it was the most sincere and fervent desire of the Soviet government to have normal relations with the United States and to develop them in the best traditions of those relations. He emphasized that there were good traditions in Soviet-American relations and that the Soviets do not forget them.

When I noted that the press at the conference would not be just Americans but from other countries and Soviets as well, the General Secretary asked me to say in addition that he was ready and interested in developing Soviet-American relations, to search for joint initiatives, proposals which might make the present situation easier. He added that he would in that instance be awaiting the U.S. response.

I then thanked him for his courtesy in receiving me. I wished him well in his important leadership of his great country. I hoped that he would remain in good health and achieve what he desired, with the objective we had discussed in mind, I noted that I had one last statement.

I was now 91 years old, and I did not know how many more times I could come to the Soviet Union. I wished to let the General Secretary know, however, that I was someone in the United States with whom I hoped he would speak, just as I would be talking to his Ambassador, on matters important to our relations. He thanked me and said that he would certainly do so.
I then noted that I should not take any more of his time and hoped that the meeting had been as useful to him as it had been to me. He noted that he was very happy with the meeting (Arbatov later informed me that Andropov had passed the word that he felt the meeting was a success).

COMMENT:

The principal point which the General Secretary appeared to be trying to get across to Mrs. Harriman and me was a genuine concern over the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and his desire to see them at least "normalized", if not improved. He seemed to have a real worry that we could come into conflict through miscalculation. He was critical of the current state of relations, but was careful to stress -- several times -- that efforts for improvement had to be mutual. This point about the need for Soviet, as well as U.S. steps was included in the Pravda and Tass summaries of our talk.

I felt Andropov was making a major effort to be non-polemical in our conversation.

I am not in a position to make a real judgment on Andropov's health, although we noted occasional tremors of his hands, but not when they were in repose, and a rather rigid walk. He was in full command of himself and his part of the meeting: read his statement without effort, and responded or made points during the exchange quickly and without reference to Aleksandrov.
Also present, besides Mrs. Harriman, the General Secretary and myself, were the General Secretary’s Assistant, Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, and the interpreter, Viktor Sukhodrev, both of whom had been at all my previous meetings with Brezhnev, as well as Peter Swiers, who was able to accompany me again on a trip to the Soviet Union through the courtesy of the Department of State.
Monday, July 11 [1983]

Ambas. John Gavin came by. He’s a darn good Ambassador. Had the usual “issues lunch.” Later met with A.W. Clausen now head of the World Bank. He’d like us to increase our contribution to the bank but there’s no way we could get an increase through Cong. Foreign Minister Genscher of W. Germany came to report on Chancellor Kohl’s Moscow visit. The Chancellor really stood firm on our NATO unity & that we were going to deploy intermediate range missiles in Europe on schedule in Dec. No question but the “Russkys” are upset about this.

Kase Bendtson, Bill Wilson, Jack Hume, Joe Coors & Dr. Edward Teller came by to press me on setting up a “Manhattan” type project to have a crash program on finding a defensive weapon against nuclear missiles. I have to agree with them it’s the way to go.
The basic US position taken at the INF negotiations in Geneva is and remains a sound one. Its essence is captured in the US proposal to eliminate the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. This proposal remains the optimal outcome for the US, for NATO, for Europe, and, I believe, for the Soviet Union. It is a principled position which involves the most significant degree of reductions possible in the class of LRINF weapons which cause most concern to both sides. It fully meets our own, and NATO’s, criteria for a genuine arms reduction agreement and it remains my hope that the Soviet Union will eventually see the wisdom of our proposal.

In the interest of exploring all possibilities, and on the basis of close consultations with our allies, I decided last March to propose an interim step towards the ultimate elimination of all LRINF land-based missiles. While actively keeping our proposal to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the United States formally notified the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some finite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF land-based missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis. This proposal also meets the basic criteria we have established and is in the US, NATO’s and, I believe, the Soviet Union’s interest.

Both of these proposals have been translated into draft treaty texts and provided to the Soviet Union. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not, as yet, provided a serious response to our interim proposal. They have not demonstrated, through their actions at the negotiating table, that additional initiatives on our part are the appropriate next step in the negotiations. Nor have they demonstrated any flaw in the fundamentals of the US position and in the criteria upon which it rests. The US, therefore, will not offer any new initiative altering the fundamental US position that the US seeks an agreement which meets agreed NATO criteria and which significantly reduces the number, and could lead to the ultimate total elimination of, nuclear warheads on LRINF land-based missiles.

There should be no doubt that without an agreement which satisfies the criteria we have identified, the US will, with the cooperation of our NATO allies, deploy LRINF land-based missiles as planned.
At the same time, during the course of the next round of INF negotiations, and with the first NATO LRINF missile deployments, it is more essential than ever that the US aggressively pursue an agreement on LRINF missiles which meets the criteria we have established for such an agreement and thus furthers both US and NATO security interests. Through the end of this year, we and our allies will have to work very closely and very diligently to be in a position to deploy NATO LRINF missiles on schedule as planned in the absence of such an arms reduction agreement. As we do so, the US must continue to work with equal vigor and in equally close cooperation with our allies on the negotiating track of the NATO 1979 dual-track decision. Finally, in doing so, we must exploit every opportunity to ensure that we are perceived as being equally committed, as we are, to both tracks.

Basic Decision. In light of this, I have decided to take the necessary steps to "flesh out" the fundamental US INF position and to do so using a step-by-step approach that unfolds over the course of the next negotiating round. This approach should include the early presentation of general statements on each of the three major areas identified by NSC discussion: the PERSHING II/GLCM mix, regional missile sub-limits and the consideration of aircraft. By carefully crafting these general statements so as to protect later US options to the maximum extent possible, and presenting them in a timely manner, the intent is to:

- clarify the US INF position in these areas;

- demonstrate that we are exploring every avenue in seeking an acceptable agreement which meets the criteria we have identified, and US/NATO security requirements; and

- posture ourselves so that, should we choose to consider more detailed positions on any of these items later in the round, we face the minimum risk from the Soviet assertion that the US is introducing new material so late in the negotiations that NATO deployments must not proceed until there is sufficient time to consider the new elements.

Implementing the Step-by-step Approach. In implementing this decision, the following strategy should be applied:

- The initial US step should be the presentation of general statements made near the beginning of the round. These should protect future US negotiating options to the maximum extent possible but place clear markers on the remaining issues which we may have to develop more fully during this round.

- Work should continue on a priority basis to refine the more detailed options we may wish to consider on each of these subjects later in the round (e.g., in the October time-frame).

- During the round, the use of these more detailed positions as they are developed can be considered as needed.
Finally, if necessary prior to the mid-November FRG Bundestag debate, all of the elements of the US INF position set forth by that time (some more detailed by that point than others) can be pulled together into a coherent presentation of a comprehensive position that could be newly compelling to the public, but which is not, nor could be successfully characterized by the Soviets to be, a "late change" in the US position requiring that NATO deployments not proceed as scheduled until adequate time for full discussion in Geneva is provided.

The Treatment of Aircraft. The basic US position remains that we prefer to focus on the LRINF missile issue, the issue involving the destabilizing systems of most concern to both sides. However, in the interests of pursuing an agreement which meets the US criteria, we are certainly prepared to consider proposals involving aircraft that also meet these criteria. In doing so, however, we will exercise extraordinary care so as not to degrade NATO's conventional defenses or the critical contribution made to both those defenses and to the defense of other US interests by dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft. Therefore, on this subject, instructions for the US INF Delegation should be drafted to reflect the following:

- Ambassador Nitze should inform the Soviets that he is now authorized to explore in general terms possible limitations on LRINF aircraft which would involve equal, verifiable limits on US-Soviet LRINF aircraft only and which do not entail a degradation of NATO conventional capability.

- Having done so, the US Delegation should invite the Soviets to offer their views concerning how such a limitation could be crafted within the parameters of the stated US criteria.

- The US Delegation should, to the extent possible, limit discussion to LRINF aircraft, and should deflect discussion of other dual-capable and carrier-based aircraft.

- Pending the completion of additional work in Washington, the US Delegation should not offer any additional proposals on the treatment of aircraft without first obtaining authorization from Washington.

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will develop contingency US proposals on the aircraft issue for use if needed.

- The Policy Group should use as a baseline a global, equal limit on F-111, BADGER and BLINDER aircraft at or above planned US levels. Such a contingency proposal should be refined to minimize its risks to the US if adopted. If better alternatives to this proposal are subsequently generated, these should also be developed in detail.
Regional Missile Sub-limits. On the subject of regional missile sub-limits, I have decided that we should adopt the following formulation as the first step on this issue. In the context of an agreement involving equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, the US is prepared to consider not offsetting the entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe.

To implement this, the instructions to the US INF Delegation should reflect that in the context of a discussion of equal, global limits on LRINF missiles, Ambassador Nitze is authorized to explore in general terms Soviet views on alternative means of implementing this commitment. In doing so, he should consider the additional work which will be ongoing in Washington and keep open US negotiating options under study.

The Senior Arms Control Policy Group should continue to refine a specific, more detailed US proposal on the regional missile sub-limit issue. At the same time, we must avoid the perception of a separate Asian balance. The baseline alternative that the Policy Group should focus upon should be the offer of a US commitment not to deploy in Europe more than a certain proportion of the global level of LRINF missile warheads permitted under any agreement, with the right to deploy LRINF missiles elsewhere to an equal global ceiling.

The Policy Group should also continue to consider the merits and risks of a possible contingency proposal for equal European subceilings within equal global ceilings.

PERSHING II/GLCM Mix. The PERSHING II system offers a much needed, time-urgent, hard-target kill capability. Any reduction of the 108 PERSHING IIs to maintain a fixed ratio would reduce NATO's ability to hold at risk time-urgent targets at longer range. Clearly, the PERSHING II system cannot be eliminated, short of Soviet acceptance of the zero/zero outcome. At the same time, we should be prepared to assure both the Soviets and our allies alike that in the context of an acceptable agreement entailing significant reductions, we would consider reducing the planned PERSHING II deployment in an appropriate manner.

One proposal suggested has been to keep the current ratio (approximately one PERSHING II missile to every four GLCMs) under an agreed, limited deployment. This could reassure all concerned that PERSHING II would be reduced under such an agreement, and thus could be seen as a substantive move in the eyes of the Soviets. However, there are a number of concerns surrounding such a proposal that require additional study.
On the PERSHING II/GLCM mix issue, I have decided that the initial step the US should take is the presentation of the following position. In the context of an agreement involving significant reductions from current Soviet and planned NATO deployment levels, the US is prepared to distribute the reductions to be made from planned levels of forces between both the PERSHING II ballistic missile and the GLCM deployments in an appropriate manner.

In support of this position, the Senior Arms Control Policy Group should examine the mixes that would result in various alternative aggregate levels involving reductions in both systems and resulting from the application of the criteria that PERSHING II and GLCM must be deployed in organizationally efficient units.

- This work should determine if a commitment to maintain roughly the currently planned PERSHING II/GLCM deployment ratio makes sense in light of the mixes generated when consideration is given to organizationally efficient units.

- It should also explore in more detail and on a priority basis the advantages and disadvantages of using the concept of ballistic missile to cruise missile ratios to encourage a shift away from ballistic systems to slow-flying systems.

- This study should also review the implications of such a proposal for both deployment and negotiations.

Verification. Final preparation of verification annexes as appropriate to support the draft US INF treaties should be completed on a priority basis so that these annexes can be tabled in Geneva as early as possible during the next round.

Other Work. Work should proceed to identify the preferred US missile warhead number associated with the US interim proposal against the contingency that we may wish to table a proposal including such a number during this round.

Suspenses for Tasked Work. The additional study tasked by this NSDD should be completed as comprehensively and as rapidly as possible in order to support the strategy outlined in applying a step-by-step approach. The Senior Arms Control Policy Group will provide a status report on September 30 on all work tasked in association with this NSDD and not completed by that date.

Previous Guidance. This NSDD supplements NSDD-86 and other guidance previously issued on the US INF position.
22. September 1983

Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,

zunächst möchte ich Ihnen für Ihren Brief danken. Ich weiß
die Art zu schätzen, in der Sie ihn geschrieben haben.

Lassen Sie mich in der Offenheit antworten, die die Lage verlangt,
in der wir teils gemeinsame Interessen haben, was die Verhinde-
rung einer Verschlechterung der internationalen Lage angeht, teils
parallele, wie sie sich aus unseren unterschiedlichen Positionen
ergeben.

Ich erkenne Ihre Bemühungen in diese Richtung und kann mir vor-
stellen, daß Flexibilität gerade einer Weltmacht nicht immer leicht
fällt; ich verstehe, daß sie ihre Grenzen an den Sicherheitsinter-
essen ihres Landes findet. Was ich Ihnen nahebringen möchte, will
diese Grenzen durchaus berücksichtigen.

Ich denke an eine Lage, wie sie sich aus den heute erkennbaren
Faktoren für die zweite Hälfte des November ergeben könnte: Kein
Ergebnis in Genf, noch keine amerikanischen Raketen auf dem Boden

An den
Generalsekretär
des Zentralkomitee der KPdSU
Herrn Jurij Andropow
Moskau / UdSSR
westeuropäischer Staaten, aber rund 250 Systeme SS 20, fähig, Westeuropa zu erreichen. Das wäre für mein Land eine Situation, für deren Dauer die SPD gewiß nicht eintreten könnte, denn wir verfolgen, wie Sie wissen, das Ziel, die SS 20 so weit reduziert zu sehen, daß die Stationierung amerikanischer Raketen überflüssig wird. Zu dieser Position gehört auch, daß man die vorhandenen britischen und französischen Systeme in geeigneter Weise berücksichtigen muß.

Sie selbst haben die Bereitschaft erklärt, Ihre SS 20-Systeme beträchtlich bis auf eine Ebene zu reduzieren, die ausreicht, ein Gleichgewicht zu den Systemen der britischen und französischen Nuklearwaffen herzustellen. Meine Anregung ist: Beginnen Sie damit! Beginnen Sie damit in einer Weise, die der Öffentlichkeit in Westeuropa und in Amerika klarmacht, noch während keine neuen Raketen hier stationiert sind, bis zu welcher Konsequenz es der Sowjetunion ernst ist, eine neue Runde der Aufrüstung zu verhindern und ein Ergebnis in Genf zu erreichen. Nichts könnte dem Bemühen um die Verhinderung neuer amerikanischer Raketen bessere Aussicht auf Erfolg geben als ein solcher dramatischer eigener und einseitiger Schritt der Sowjetunion, der einseitig auch eingestellt werden kann, wenn amerikanische Raketen dennoch stationiert werden. Es würde manche aus der Situation befreien, übrigens auch die Friedensbewegungen hier und in Amerika, die den Eindruck erwecken könnte, als ob sie für die Erhaltung des gegenwärtigen Potentials eintreten, während sie sich gegen die Stationierung neuer amerikanischer Raketen aussprechen.

So sehr ich die Vorschläge der Sowjetunion würdige und den Willen zu konstruktiven Verhandlungen darin spüre: Ich habe den Eindruck, daß in diesen entscheidenden vor uns liegenden Wochen nicht mehr Vor-
schläge helfen, die unter Vorwänden verzögert werden oder mit dem Hinweis beantwortet werden können, daß die Verhandlung über sie lange Zeit erfordert, sondern daß nur noch konkrete Handlungen, nachprüfbare, im positiven Sinne alarmierend, zu dem Ergebnis führen können, das wir miteinander wünschen.

Dies ist ein Beitrag, den die Sowjetunion leisten kann, niemand sonst. Ich weiß, wie schwer es fällt, aber er würde die Sicherheitsinteressen ihres Landes voll wahren.

Was die sozialdemokratischen Parteien angeht, so möchte ich Ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die Begegnungen lenken, die diese Parteien aus den kleinen NATO-Staaten seit mehr als zwei Jahren zu dem Thema der Genfer Verhandlungen haben, und an denen Vertreter der SPD und der Labour-Party regelmäßig, der französischen Sozialisten seltener, als Beobachter teilnehmen. Obwohl die einzelnen Parteien zum Thema der Raketenstationierung unterschiedliche Standpunkte einnehmen, habe ich Grund zu der Annahme, daß sie im nächsten Monat mit einer geschlossenen Empfehlung an die Öffentlichkeit treten werden, nämlich den Verhandlungen in Genf mehr Zeit zu geben.

Ich begrüße Ihre Bereitschaft und erwidere sie, Konsultationen zu diesen Fragen auf den Ebenen zu intensivieren, die jeweils fruchtbringend sind.

Wir nehmen unsere begrenzten Möglichkeiten, auf die amerikanische Regierung einzuwirken, voll wahr. Daß sich eine Lage entwickelt hat, in der wir der Verantwortung und dem Verhalten der Sowjetunion ein größeres Gewicht beimessen, ist gewiß etwas, was es ohne die Beziehungen, die sich auf der Grundlage des Moskauer Vertrages entwickelt haben, nicht geben würde.

Ich erwidere den Ausdruck aufrichtiger Hochachtung.

gez. Wilhelm Brandt
Sottosottoserie 5: Dibattito parlamentare sugli euromissili e negoziati sul disarmo

UA 1: "Materiale informativo per la dichiarazione introduttiva del presidente del Consiglio in occasione del dibattito alla Camera"


ABSTRACT – A memo about the relationship between Italy and the Soviet Union during the Geneva negotiation. It suggests some steps that Italy should undertake to keep alive the East-West dialogue and to preserve the Italian economic interests.
NEGoz. di PiUERIA
e Rapp. Est. Ovest
UCD
NEGOZIATO DI GINEVRA FUI E DIALOGO
EST-OST CON PARTICOLARE RIFERIMENTO
ALI RAPPORTI ITALO-SOVIETICI.

A) Negozia di Ginevra

1 - Obiettivo: mantenimento iniziativa da parte occidentale

1a - Strumento: quantificazione della proposta intermedia

Limite oggettivo: rispetto dei principi enunciati da Reagan, senza dunque assumere responsabilità di forzare il quadro di riferimento alleato, già concordato

Elementi chiave da considerare: rapporto tra livello globale e sottotetto europeo (anche ai fini di un riconoscimento implicito, ma camuffato, dei sistemi franco-britannici): 2 su 3, preferibilmente, un po' più basso

PROPOSTA POSSIBILE: FORMULA QUANTITATIVA VICINA ALLE CIFRE DELLA "PASSEGGIATA NEL BOSCO": APPROSSIMATIVAMENTE 490 TESTATE PER LIVELLO GLOBALE ET 290 PER SOTTO-TESTO. (Questione da sciogliere: composizione qualitativa della formula, e cioè accettazione o meno dei soli "Cruise").

1b - Tempi: la proposta alleata dovrebbe essere resa pubblica entro il 14 novembre

2b - Evento rilevante: primi arrivi del materiale connesso con lo spiegamento dei missili (15 o 22 novembre)

/.
Occasioni utili per maturare proposte e per sensibilizzare opinione pubblica:

.... Novembre

- Incontro con Andreotti e Spadolini o in alternativa Consiglio di Gabinetto

9 "

- D'intesa con Andreotti (sono gli Esteri ad avere competenza sul negoziato in materia di controllo degli armamenti), contatto con Presidente del Gruppo Speciale di Consultazione NATO (si riunisce a Roma il 10 novembre)

10 "

- Incontro con Trudeau

.... "

- Comunicazioni del Governo alla Camera (Il 31 ottobre vi è stato un dibattito ai Comuni sulla base di una mozione presentata dal Governo: il 22 novembre è previsto un dibattito al Bundestag)

B) Rapporti bilateralì italo-sovietici in funzione del mantenimento di un dialogo Est-Ovest.

1 - Obiettivo:

Ripresa dei rapporti economici come contributo al mantenimento del dialogo Est-Ovest nel caso di insuccesso dei negoziati di Ginevra

1b - Strumenti:

Sollecita definizione tecnica contratto ENI-SOYUZGAS (vi sono buone prospettive)

Concreto impegno sovietico al riequilibrio dell'intercambio (vi è un'incoraggiante disponibilità sovietica)

Convocazione, entro novembre, commissione Mista e approvazione governativa del contratto ENI-SOYUZGAS
(è stata già convocata la "Grande Commissione" a livello politico, franco-sovietica che si terrà in novembre a Mosca)

2b - Rilancio contatti con Paesi dell'Est-europeo (Ungheria e Romania?)

- Visita in Italia del Vice Primo Ministro magiaro

- Visita in Ungheria del Presidente del Consiglio

- Una volta definita la nuova posizione negoziale allagata, lettera di risposta a Ceausescu.

ABSTRACT – A very exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.
EVOLUZIONE DELLO SPIEGAMENTO DEI MISSILI INTERMEDI SOVIETICI

L'Unione Sovietica ha sin dagli anni '50 avviato lo spiegamento nel proprio territorio di missili capaci di colpire obiettivi in Europa. Già agli inizi degli anni '60 risultavano schierati circa 600 tra SS-4 e SS-5 puntati sull'Europa. In quel periodo, gli Stati Uniti disponevano in Europa di un numero assai inferiore di missili, grossomodo, comparabili: il Thor e il Jupiter, installati nel Regno Unito, in Italia e in Turchia.

Nel corso degli anni '60, tuttavia, esattamente alcuni mesi dopo la crisi cubana, gli Stati Uniti decisero di ritirare tale tipo di sistemi d'arma. Da quel momento, l'Unione Sovietica ha mantenuto una sorta di monopolio sui missili intermedi, tollerato dal momento che lo squilibrio era considerato compensato dalla superiorità vantata a quel tempo dalla forza strategica americana; circostanza questa che forniva un deterrente adeguato a eventuali aggressioni sovietiche.

La parità strategica, conseguita dall'URSS nella seconda parte degli anni '70 cambiava ovviamente il quadro di riferimento globale, facendo riemergere l'egemonia sovietica sulle forze intermedi; egemonia che assumeva dimensioni preoccupanti, e particolarmente destabilizzanti, con l'avvio, proprio in quegli anni, dello spiegamento degli SS-20. Tutto ciò - da notare - avveniva in un momento in cui le forze del Patto di Varsavia mantenevano, così come mantengono tuttora, una netta superiorità nelle forze convenzionali.

...
L'introduzione degli SS-20 non ha avuto solo l'effetto di approfondire, in termini quantitativi, lo squilibrio di tali sistemi d'arma in Europa; ma anche quello, certamente più pericoloso, di accrescere l'effetto destabilizzante di tale dislivello a causa delle migliori caratteristiche tecnico-operative di tali armamenti. Lo spiegamento dei missili SS-20 è proceduto ad un ritmo serrato secondo il seguente calendario:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>data</th>
<th>SS-20</th>
<th>testate</th>
<th>SS-4/SS-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fine 1977</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine 1978</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine 1979</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine 1980</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine 1981</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzo 1982</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marzo 1983</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>1.053</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Non è senza interesse l'esame delle modalità con cui tale evoluzione si è verificata.

Nell'ottobre del 1979, in pratica alla vigilia della doppia decisione NATO, risultavano già spiegati circa 150 missili SS-20 per un totale di 70 testate nucleari, e 436 tra SS-4 e SS-5. Il 6 di quel mese il Presidente Breznev, in un discorso a Berlino Est, dichiarava: "suscitano serie inquietudine i pericolosi piani di dislocazione di nuovi tipi di missili americani a testata nucleare nel territorio dell'Europa Occidentale, come annuncia oggi a gran voce la propaganda occidentale. Diciamo senz'altro che
la realizzazione di questi progetti modificherebbe sensibilmente la situazione strategica nel Continente. Il loro scopo è quello di spezzare l'equilibrio delle forze creatosi in Europa e di tentare di assicurare alla NATO la supremazia militare". (*)

In realtà, malgrado l'asserita situazione di equilibrio, da parte sovietica si continuò nello schieramento di nuovi missili SS-20. Nel novembre del 1981 - si era alla vigilia dell'inizio del negoziato di Ginevra - l'URSS aveva schierato circa 270 missili SS-20 con un complessivo numero di testate di 810. In quel periodo, in un'intervista al "Spiegel", Breznev dichiarava: "I Paesi NATO dispongono di 986 vettori di tale natura, dei quali oltre 700 appartengono agli USA (F111, FB111, F4, nonché velivoli a bordo di portaerei nei mari ed oceani che circondano l'Europa). Vi è un ulteriore potenziale di 64 missili balistici e 55 bombardieri britannici. La Francia possiede 144 unità (94 missili e 46 bombardieri). L'URSS dispone di 975 unità di armi analoghe. La situazione non si è modificata allorché l'URSS i-

(*) Nell'ottobre 1979 l'Istituto Internazionale di Studi Strategici di Londra dichiarò anch'esso che all'epoca esisteva un equilibrio di forze tra la NATO ed il Patto di Varsavia. Lo I.I.S.S. tuttavia precisò che, per giungere a tale conclusione, esso aveva incluso nel calcolo i missili strategici Poseidon imbarcati su sottomarini assegnati agli Stati Uniti alla NATO (400 testate nucleari) che erano già stati contabilizzati nel SALT II e dovevano pertanto essere esclusi dal calcolo delle FMI, nonché gli aerei F20-111 distanza negli Stati Uniti ma assegnati alla NATO.
nisiò a sostituire gli obsoleti SS-4 e SS-5 con i più moderni SS-20. Con la messa in funzione di un nuovo missile noi ritiriamo uno o due missili dal nostro arsenale, per distruggerli unitamente alle relative rampe di lancio.... I citati dati, che chiariscono la realtà, dimostrano senza ombra di dubbio che è senza fondamento il "baccano" della NATO circa una "superiorità inaccettabile" dell'URSS nei sistemi a medio raggio e circa la necessità di un "controspiegamento". Semmai è l'URSS che dovrebbe porre la questione di un controspiegamento. Se nell'Europa Occidentale verranno spiegati quasi 600 missili addizionali, la NATO avrà una superiorità di una volta e mezzo nei missili e quasi due volte nelle testate".

In sostanza, usando criteri artificiosi e assai dubbi parametri comparativi, Breznev giudicava che, a quel momento, si fosse pervenuti ad un sostanziale equilibrio dei sistemi d'arma intermedi fra Est e Ovest.

Ancora una volta egli dovette smentirsi. Siamo al marzo del 1982. L'URSS ha in quei pochi mesi ac cresciuto lo schieramento missilistico degli SS-20 da 270 a 300 unità. Il giorno 16 di quel mese Breznev annuncia "una moratoria unilaterale sullo spiegamento di armamenti nucleari a medio raggio nella parte europea dell'Unione Sovietica". A quel momento erano in fase di costruzione nella zona europea dell'URSS tre basi per SS-20 che vennero completate prima che il successivo 18 maggio, Breznev si affrettasse a dichiarare che "il congelamento annunciato dai sovietici includeva il completamento dei preparati..."
vi per lo spiegamento dei missili".

Ma anche questa volta la scelta dei tempi si è rivelata intempestiva. Proseguirono, infatti, i lavori di costruzione nella zona europea di una ulteriore base di SS–20. Nel complesso, a partire dalla dichiarata moratoria, i sovietici hanno completato la costruzione di quattro basi per SS–20 nella parte europea dell'URSS e l'installazione di 36 nuovi missili SS–20 per un totale di 108 testate (pari praticamente da soli alle 112 testate che verranno spiegate sui missili "Cruise" a Comiso nel corso dei prossimi cinque anni). Nello stesso arco di tempo (marzo '82 – marzo '83) l'URSS ha costruito due basi per SS–20 in Asia per un totale di 16 missili e tre nuove basi sono in corso di allestimento e destinate a diventare operative nel 1984 nel territorio asiatico dell'Unione Sovietica.
ABSTRACT – A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo–French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. With many interesting data, this memo intended to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.
RAPPORTO TRA I SISTEMI NUCLEARI FRANCESI E BRITANNICI CAPACI DI COLPIRE IL TERRITORIO SOVIETICO E LE FORZE SOVIETICHE NON STRATEGICHE DISLOCATE IN EUROPA E CAPACI DI COLPIRE IL TERRITORIO DEL REGNO UNITO E/O DELLA FRANCIA

DESCRIZIONE DEL DIAGRAMMA

QUADRO (α) :
Il quadro (α) indica la consistenza attuale dei dispositivi nucleari francesi ed inglese, che risultano così costituiti:

Regno Unito - 64 missili Polaris su sottomarini. Gli inglesi non hanno mai rivelato ufficialmente il numero delle testate di cui sono dotati i missili Polaris. Secondo fonti ufficiali attendibili ogni Polaris è dotato di 3 testate non indipendenti, per un totale quindi di 192 testate.

Un certo numero di Polaris è inoltre dotato di testate non esplosive. I sovietici calcolano tutte le testate come esplosive e indipendenti, per un totale di 336.

Francia - 98 missili, dei quali 18 a terra e 80 installati su sottomarini e 44 aerei.
Il totale dei sistemi inglesi e francesi è quindi di 162 missili e 44 aerei.

A tali forze i sovietici aggiungono 723 aerei a lungo raggio della NATO, dei quali hanno chiesto l'inclusione nello accordo FNI di Ginevra.

QUADRO (β) :
L'URSS dispone - secondo stime americane - delle seguenti forze nucleari non strategiche in grado di colpire, dal territorio sovietico o da basi avanzate nel territorio dei Paesi del Patto di Varsavia, il territorio del Regno Unito e/o quello della Francia:

670 aerei a lungo raggio (Backfire, Badyer e Blinder)
390 bombardieri navali
2450 aerei a medio raggio
650 missili intermedi
30 missili installati su sottomarini
493 missili intermedi a lungo raggio SS-20, SS-4 e SS-5
per un totale complessivo quindi di 4683 fra missili e aerei.

QUADRO (1): Esprime il totale delle forze nucleari non strategiche sovietiche in grado di colpire il territorio del Regno Unito e/o quello della Francia ove venisse accettata l'opzione zero, eliminando cioè dal totale i 493 missili intermedi a lungo raggio SS-20, SS-4 e SS-5.
PROGRAMMI DI MODERNIZZAZIONE FRANCESE, BRITANNICO E DELLA NATO

Al termine del programma di modernizzazione, che avrà inizio nella seconda metà del 1985, l'arsenale nucleare francese, fermo restando il numero dei missili (98), passerà da 98 a 592 testate.

Al termine del programma di modernizzazione britannico (che avrà inizio verso il 1990 e sarà terminato verso il 1995), l'arsenale inglese, sostituiti i 64 missili Polaris con 64 Trident, vedrebbe il numero delle testate passare dalle attuali 192 (o 336 secondo le stime sovietiche) a 512 o 696 (a seconda che si decida di installare 8 o 14 testate indipendenti per ciascun missile).

A compimento del proprio programma di ammodernamento (la "doppia decisione" del '79) la NATO disporrebbe a sua volta di 572 missili Pershing e Cruise ciascuno dotato di una testata.

Insomma, l'Unione Sovietica ha già adesso un numero di missili intermedi a lungo e medio raggio superiore di circa 400 a quello di cui disporrebbero insieme alla NATO, il Regno Unito e la Francia a compimento dei loro tre programmi di modernizzazione (ed un numero di testate pari a quello proiettabile nel 1995 per NATO, Francia e Regno Unito). Inoltre la Unione Sovietica ha 3,410 bombardieri a lungo raggio contro 767 bombardieri (NATO, Francia, Regno Unito) capaci di colpire il territorio sovietico.
Translation from Russian

Highly Confidential!

Protocol
of the extraordinary meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Defense from the Warsaw Treaty member states

Berlin
20 October 1983

[...] [list of participants]

In the spirit of the Prague Political Declaration from 5 January 1983, and the Joint Declaration by the highest representatives of party and state from seven socialist states on 28 June 1983, the Committee of Ministers for Defense discussed the situation resulting from the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries.

[...]

In light of the U.S. and NATO’s strive for military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the large-scale preparation for a war against the socialist community, [...], the Committee of Ministers for Defense deems it appropriate to apply respective countermeasures in case of a deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe; in order not to tolerate NATO military superiority and maintain a balance of forces in the interest of peace, and to guarantee the security of the allied countries.

The Committee of the Ministers of Defense decides:

1. Defense Ministries and Unified Command have to comply timely and completely with all measures outlined in protocols concerning the development of armies and naval forces under the Unified Command for the period between 1981 and 1985.

   Measures are to be implemented until 1985 in order to increase combat potential of armies and fleets through further perfection of combat readiness and combat strength, as well as through equipment with more modern and perfect (modernized) armaments and battle technology.

2. Together with the Ministries for Defense, the Unified Command will have to work out measures to increase the command capacities of the Unified Forces and realize those between 1983 and 1985.

3. Further planning for development of army and naval units serving within the Unified Forces in the next five years (1986-1990) must include practical measures in light of the potential deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as well as qualitative and quantitative changes of weapons for armed combat.
The Minister for National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR), Colonel General C. O l t e a n u, expressed his following own opinion on the decision made by the Committee of Ministers of Defense:

- delete from the first paragraph “situation resulting from the deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in some Western European countries”;

- delete from the fourth paragraph the following: “respective countermeasures in case of a deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe”;

- add to the second bullet point of the decision: “which were laid out in the documents agreed”

- delete from the third bullet point: “the potential deployment of new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe”

These proposals for modifications were outlined by Colonel General C. O l t e a n u during the meeting. All other members of the Committee of Ministers for Defense expressed their non-approval of these proposals by the delegation of the army from the SRR, as they stood in contradiction to the meeting’s agenda. In their respective statements they criticized the Romanian proposal.

The meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Defense was conducted in a functional atmosphere, and in the spirit of friendship and mutual agreement.

[...] [signatures, including SRR]

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer]
Translation from Russian
Highly Confidential!

Statement
by CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union
D. F. Ustinov, at the extraordinary session of the Committee of Defense Ministers of
Warsaw Treaty Member States on 20 October 1983 [in Berlin]

[...]

This extraordinary session of our committee is convened due to the grave escalation of
the international situation and, in consequence, of the growing danger of war against the
socialist community. It is due to the need to apply effective countermeasures to preserve
the security of our states.

The source for the growing danger of war is evident. It was clearly defined at the Prague
meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member states Political Consultative Committee, and at
the Moscow meeting by the leading representatives of or states. This source consists of
the openly aggressive policy from the United States and NATO against the USSR and the
other countries of the socialist community, and against all progressive forces in the
world.

A particular danger for the countries of the socialist community is the insistent effort by
U.S. and NATO to deploy new American medium-range missiles in Europe. With this, the
U.S. Administration and the highest representatives of leading NATO countries have
openly declared the fight against the socialist community. They join a path of far-
reaching war preparations against the Warsaw Treaty states.

Dangerous tendencies, both in aggressive intention and practical actions by Washington
and NATO, get confirmed by an entire range of circumstances.

First, the “crusade” against communism and in fact against the USSR and the other
countries of the socialist community, announced 1 ½ years ago by U.S. President Reagan,
has not just stayed a slogan but became a program of action and basis for U.S. and NATO
policy. Its main goal consists in is determination to “destroy socialism as a social-
political system”. Nothing more, and nothing less.

And now both the political and military leaders of the U.S. are guided by this policy in
their actual actions. The leaders of NATO countries also want to achieve the goals
defined by this policy. These goals express themselves through all measures economic,
political, and ideological, and military as pursued by U.S. and NATO. From appeals and
slogans, the ultra-reactionary forces of imperialism have moved toward its actual
implementation. This is where we see the particular threat to peace and the future of
our planet.

Second, the U.S. and its NATO allies attempt with all their force to destroy the achieved
military-strategic balance between USSR and USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and
NATO. They bank on the buildup of new nuclear weapons systems, both strategic and
medium-range - which are viewed as means for a first strike, the “decapitation strike”.
Here we have the intercontinental ballistic missiles MX (they first want to deploy 100 and later 200 more), the first and second modification of the Trident systems (24 submarines), and the strategic bombers B-18 and B-52 with long-range cruise missiles. This way the number of warheads on strategic carriers will increase at the start [of a first strike] about 1.5 times, and it will consist of about 16,000 units (currently they have 11,000 units). There are also plans to install long-range cruise missiles on submarines and ships.

The American Pershing and cruise missiles scheduled for deployment in Europe are part of this strategy to reach superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries and to conduct a nuclear first strike.

With unprecedented means and speed, U.S. and NATO are pushing the modernization of conventional armaments and general-purpose forces. Over the next years the battle options of ground forces and the fleets of NATO naval forces are supposed to grow by more than a quarter, and tactical aircraft forces are scheduled to increase 1.5 times. They have set course to supply their forces with new precision arms, automated drone strike capacities included, and other new systems which in their yield capacities come close to tactical nuclear weapons. As a result, the percentage of new armaments within NATO armies will increase year by year. Compared to overall military expenditures, investments in these areas of modernization will grow faster.

They are about to develop plans to militarize space.

In one word: Currently there is no direction of military efforts, and no type of armaments, where U.S. and NATO do not strive for superiority and follow a mission to overtake the USSR and Warsaw Treaty countries at any cost in order to create an unfavorable situation for us.

With unprecedented speed, the U.S. and NATO increase their appropriations for war preparations in order to receive ever more billions for their goals. The Reagan administration is anything but shy to use all means, lies, propaganda, pressure, and blackmail at its disposal. An example was the large-scale provocation, intentionally schemed up by U.S. intelligence services, by a South Korean airliner in Soviet airspace in the Far East. Right after this provocation and literally one day later, massive anti-Soviet propaganda enabled the American 'hawks' in the U.S. to get the colossal 1984 military budget of over 280 billion dollar through Congress. This amount almost doubles U.S. military spending from just about three to four years ago!

Some NATO allies of the U.S. are no less eager to contribute towards war preparations against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. One just has to mention that the pace of growth in military spending by Western European countries was two- to three-fold in recent years.

Third, the U.S. administration and NATO leaders maneuver by any means to have their hands free for increased war preparations. At the same time, they are eager to evade honest negotiations about the cessation of the arms race, and about arms limitations. Since the current U.S. administration came into power, due to its fault all negotiations over these extraordinarily important issues have been interrupted or moved into a dead end. We even must say that the U.S. only came to negotiations over limitations of nuclear
forces in Europe due to pressure by Soviet initiatives and global public opinion. Currently the Americans abuse these negotiations for the betrayal of peoples and a fake show according to which the U.S. allegedly also wants arms reduction. In reality, "our negotiation partners", as Comrade [CPSU General Secretary Yuri] Andropov recently declared, are by no means in Geneva to reach an agreement. Their task is different – they want to buy time and then deploy ballistic Pershing-2 missiles and long-range cruise missiles”.

The so-called U.S. flexibility in these negotiations is also worthless. It actually boils down to a juggling with numbers in the sense of how many missiles the USSR must reduce and how many American missiles are to deploy in Europe.

The lack of any good will on the U.S. side to conduct negotiations and reach arms limitation agreements on the basis of parity and equal security results in the opening of every new channel to build more arms.

Under these circumstances the likeliness of unpredictably dangerous events is increasing. If the policy of the U.S. and other NATO countries will not change, the world will be pushed more and more towards a faceful line whose crossing can result in the unleashing of a nuclear catastrophe.

Fourth, in synchronization with the arms build-up by the U.S. and NATO the scope of their military exercises expands year after year. They are arranged with wide territorial expansion from the Arctic Sea to the Mediterranean, from the depths of U.S. territory to the borders of the countries of the socialist community. [...] 

Fifth, the U.S. and NATO have launched a limitless “psychological” offensive against the USSR and the countries of the socialist community. It aims at preparing broad public opinion for the inevitability to prepare for the fight against socialism and communism by military means. It aims at deceiving the peoples and camouflaging the true desire of imperialist reaction for global domination. This is why they pursue the deeply inhuman slander and lies, even vulgar hollering against the socialist countries. This is also the source for large-scale ideological diversion, blackmail, and provocative acts against the countries of the socialist community.

Manipulation of people in their own countries, ideological diversion and blackmail against the countries of the socialist community have become in the U.S. and NATO countries a part of official government policy and an important element for war preparation.

All this serves as evidence for a wide-ranging and targeted preparation for an aggression against the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries by the imperialist reactionary circles of United States and NATO. With blind imperialist lunacy they openly talk about conducting a nuclear war to reach their selfish goal, namely the achievement of global domination. Policy and actions by the current U.S. administration and some NATO politicians represent extraordinary great danger for the security of the countries of the socialist community and entire mankind. [...]
In July [1983] already Comrade Andropov made it absolutely clear in his meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl: "If there will be a deployment [of U.S. missiles in Europe], then we will not cede our position and weaken our defense. We will implement timely and efficient countermeasures to guarantee the security of the USSR and its allies".

The leading representatives from parties and states of the socialist community have stated their firm and unshakeable position at their Moscow meeting where they declared the Warsaw Treaty countries "will not under any circumstances tolerate a military superiority of others". Yet the leaders from the NATO bloc did not respond to our warnings at all. Even now they do not display even most basic reason in their decisions. They remain deaf to our constructive proposals guided by sincere efforts to reach agreement on treaties to limit nuclear armaments.

In recognition of its responsibility toward its fraternal countries and the entire world, and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union is undertaking everything to create a real balance against U.S. attempts to shift the balance of strategic arms.

However, we do not strive for nuclear superiority and will not tolerate the abuse of nuclear blackmail to implement a policy of strength against us. To each attempt to destroy the existing military-strategic balance, the Soviet Union will give an appropriate response. For us, words and deeds are identical.

In response to the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe we will apply required and efficient measures. The USSR will abandon its moratorium of deploying its medium-range missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. It will begin with additional deployment of such missiles, land-based cruise missiles included. We will also strengthen clusters of our long-range operative-tactical missiles.

We will also implement measures to make it transparently clear how frightening U.S. considerations actually are pertaining to the geographical remoteness of its territory.

The Soviet government will undertake everything to ensure permanent combat readiness of USSR forces, in particular for those units within the Unified Command [of the Warsaw Pact] commissioned to act in the Western and Southwestern theater of war, against a strong and technologically well-equipped adversary. Those units will be preferably treated with the most modern armaments.

It is obvious that these measures will not come along easy for us. Notwithstanding this, the USSR makes those major efforts and expenditures since the question of maintaining reliable security for our state and all states of the socialist community, as well as the guarantee of socialism's existence as a social-political system, is at stake.

In fulfillment of its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union will continue in the future to increase the combat strength of its forces in the interest of our common defense. In the current situation we also expect an increase in contributions from our friends to the common cause of increasing defense capabilities of the socialist community.
The solution of the main problem – improvement of technical equipment for the Unified Forces – requires a series of measures. On one hand combat strengths of fraternal armies can be decisively improved through deliveries of most modern technology and armament from Soviet production what were presented to you this summer. Such modern equipment represents more than one third (about 35 percent) of all arms slated for the equipment of allied armies and naval forces.

[...]

On the other hand it is mandatory to exploit the developed economic basis of the countries of the socialist communist in a more complete way.

[...]

We must achieve that the Unified Forces of the Warsaw Treaty and allied armies are not just in no way inferior to the probable adversary - neither in armaments, nor in training, nor in combat readiness; but that they are superior to this adversary.

[...]

Our repeated appeals to the leadership of U.S. and NATO on the highest level, with the explicit admonition to weigh soberly and objectively the dangerous tendencies in the present development of international relations and draw reasonable conclusions meeting broad interests of mankind, are hitting a wall of muteness.

The Reagan administration and the governments of leading NATO countries have decided to begin the deployment of American missiles in Europe at any cost without taking into account the dangerous consequences of this lunatic move. Now they are enforcing realization of their intended plan. Major parts of equipment and the first series of missiles will be delivered to the bases in Italy, England and the FRG in November already. Final construction to build infrastructure on these bases is already completed, and they have started to train personnel.

If there will be no agreement in Geneva until the end of the current year, and U.S. and NATO will not refrain from the already confirmed dates for the deployment of new American medium-range missiles, then negotiations over nuclear arms limitation in Europe will be devoid of any purpose. [...]

On 5 January 1983 the leading representatives of our states made in Prague the unanimous decision to issue a clear order to the Unified Command and the Defense Ministries to continuously and attentively monitor war preparations by the U.S. and its allies. They were ordered to work out and implement measures in time to safeguard a reliable defense capability of Warsaw Treaty members and to keep the Unified Forces on a high level of combat readiness. And it is our duty to fulfill this order given to us exactly and with honor. Nobody will relieve us, the military, from this task.

[...]

And this is no accidental mood held by one man [referring to himself, B.S.] but a vital necessity. It is the demand coming from the military-political situation we have. Any deviation from this course is dangerous to our peoples and countries.

[...]
Monday, October 24 [1983]

This was really a Monday. Opened with NSC brf. on Lebanon & Grenada. Lebanon gets worse as the death toll climbs. More bodes are found & more critically wounded die. Ambas. Hartman (Russia) came by. He confirms what I believe: the Soviets won’t really negotiate on arms reductions until we deploy the Pershing II’s & go forward with MX. He also confirms that Andropov is very much out of sight these days.

Phoned Tip & Howard Baker to express hope they’d stay firm on keeping the Marines in Lebanon – both said yes.

The Pres. of Togo visited. He’s anti-communist & pro West. A meeting with the Join Chiefs – they outlined the final details for our move on Grenada scheduled for 9 P.M. take off. No evidence of any moves by Cuba.

Jack Anderson came by with some ideas about ed. & the lack of history in our schools. Also an idea to give people a chance to sound off about legitimate beefs with govt. We’re looking his ideas over.

So far not even a tiny leak about the Grenada move.

Then at 8 P.M., Tip, Jim Wright, Bob Byrd, Howard Baker, Bob Michel & all our gang met upstairs in the W. H. & we told them of the Grenada operation that would take place in the next several hours. We gave them the complete briefing. In the middle of the meeting Margaret Thatcher called. She’s upset & doesn’t think we should do it. I couldn’t tell her it had started. This was one secret we really managed to keep.
UA 5: Miscellanea

- Promemoria Riunione di Ottawa del gruppo di pianificazione nucleare della Nato 28/10/1983

ABSTRACT – Some reflections on the outcome of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Ottawa. The Italian government praised the NATO resolution to keep the INF at a minimum level of deterrence, while critiquing the Soviet refusal to compromise.
NOTA

A Palazzo Chigi si esprime vivo apprezzamento per i positivi risultati raggiunti alla riunione a livello ministeriale di Ottawa del Gruppo di Pianificazione nucleare della NATO.

Sui preparativi della riunione il Presidente Reagan aveva negli scorsi giorni informato il Presidente Craxi con un messaggio personale. A sua volta, l'On. Craxi aveva espresso alcune valutazioni e suggerimenti che prospettavano l'importanza che dalla riunione emergessero decisioni coerenti con la posizione alleata e in particolare con l'obiettivo di mantenere il numero degli ordigni nucleari in Europa a livelli strettamente necessari per salvaguardare le esigenze di difesa. In questo senso, si nota a Palazzo Chigi, il Presidente del Consiglio ha manifestato compiacimento per le decisioni adottate, la cui attuazione consentirà di ridurre il proprio arsenale nucleare in Europa al più basso livello mai raggiunto negli ultimi 20 anni.

In particolare, al termine del periodo di applicazione delle decisioni di Ottawa, la NATO avrà ridotto l'insieme delle armi nucleari di un terzo; i sistemi missilistici a corto raggio, di circa la metà ed avrà, nel complesso, ritirato approssimativamente 5 testate nucleari per ciascuna nuova introdotta. In precedenza, e sempre in relazione al programma sulla dimensione e composizione dei sistemi nucleari
avviato in collegamento con la doppia decisione della NATO del dicembre 1979, era già stato deciso il ritiro di 1000 testate nucleari.

A Palazzo Chigi si fa notare che questa iniziativa rappresenta un momento qualificante del processo di stretta concertazione interalleata al quale l'Italia fornisce un contributo fattivo e costante. Nei frequenti incontri che il Presidente del Consiglio ha avuto nelle scorse settimane con alti esponenti del Governo americano e con lo stesso Presidente Reagan, un'attenzione particolare era stata dedicata alle modalità con cui rapportare i sistemi nucleari in Europa ai livelli della reale minaccia, al fine di contenere la dissuasione e la deterrenza nei limiti necessari agli obiettivi interessanti sicurezza e bisogni di difesa.

Le decisioni di Ottawa, si fa notare, rispondono a queste preoccupazioni. Con esse la NATO ha reso operante un programma unilaterale di riduzione degli armamenti nucleari attualmente esistenti dando - come aveva preannunciato Craxi al Senato lo scorso mercoledì - "il segno ulteriore di una volontà positiva nella ricerca di livelli minimi ed essenziali della difesa". È ora auspicabile che analogo atteggiamento venga assunto con credibilità e senza apparenti confusione dal Patto di Varsavia.

Certamente, si nota a Palazzo Chigi, le recenti decisioni del Governo di Mosca, di procedere ai preparativi per l'installazione di nuovi sistemi missilistici nella Cecoslovacchia e nella Repubblica Democratica Tedesca contraddicono con l'obiettivo del controllo e della riduzione degli armamenti nucleari in Europa ed indicano una volontà di
che non aiuta la ricerca di un accordo equo e verificabile al minimo della forza schierabile.

Anche la decisione recentemente annunciata da Andropov di sospendere il Negoziatore venisse avviato il programma di spiegamento degli euromissili, deve essere considerato con grande preoccupazione. La volontà negoziale degli Alleati non è mai, infatti, venuta meno in questi ultimi due anni nonostante che dall'inizio della trattativa di Ginevra l'URSS ha considerevolmente accresciuto il numero degli SS-20 puntati sull'Europa.
HISTORY

of the

Headquarters, 7th Air Division

1 October 1983 - 31 March 1984

(Unclassified Title)

"Volume 1 of 3 volumes

Narrative

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Charles E. Arnold

CHARLES E. ARNOLD, TSgt, USAF
Historian

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Robert M. Millhaem

ROBERT M. MILLHAEM, Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander

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coordination and tasking. The further addition of a second bomber planner, two targeteers and an expert in ECM and attrition would have added to staff awareness of B-52 capabilities and improved overall tasking effectiveness. Late announcements of the pre-exercise briefings prevented the participation of aircrews who were already flying missions. These briefings should also have been planned for and included in the exercise OPORDs. Delayed planning affected a variety of missions. Better advance planning among the various agencies would have provided smoother operations and prevented any delayed or cancelled activities. In a similar area, late installation of secure voice equipment and the failure of previously coordinated message procedures at the deployed location hampered initial activities of the ADVON members. As in many of the exercises in Europe, poor early planning, lack of coordination or failure to follow previously established procedures caused the majority of difficulties in effecting a smooth operation. 75

Able Archer 83 Command Post Exercise

The next activity to include a small SAC ADVON contingent took place from 7 to 11 November 1983. The

annual SACEUR-sponsored Exercise Able Archer received token ADVON support from SAC. The command post exercise which culminated the large scale REFORGER series of live exercises emphasized the transition from conventional to chemical and nuclear operations. Since the SAC presence in Europe was limited almost entirely to conventional warfare (tankers in the EETF retained an EWO commitment) the command avoided any alignment—actual, simulated or otherwise—with nuclear activities. The ADVON provided nine liaison officers for a newly developed conventional build-up portion of Exercise Able Archer 83. These officers came from Headquarters SAC(2), Eighth AF(3), Fifteenth AF(1) and 7AD(3). The ADVON members deployed to the three major support centers (AFNORTH, AFCENT and AFSOUTH), SHAPE Headquarters and the UK RAOC. Strategic Air Command objectives consisted of observation of B-52 and KC-135 employment, interface with SACEUR and NATO staffs, updating location guidance and determining the scope of future SAC participation. The commander in chief European Command originally envisioned a large-scale SAC ADVON at all the major ACE locations. Due to SAC doubts concerning the direction and value of Able Archer and prior commitments, 7AD suggested to SAC that a total of 14 members be deployed as an observer team. When SAC advised of the ability to augment the team
with only nine people, the division notified 5ATAF that no one could be deployed to that location (Vicenza, Italy). This notification on 9 August 1983 outlined the level of participation occurred. 76

The overall tone of the low key conventional buildup during the first three days of Exercise Able Archer argued heavily against future SAC ADVON participation. Due to the low-key aspect many sub-command centers failed to respond to message traffic and other centers did not participate at all. Very little realistic tasking of SAC bombers took place effectively preventing the exercise of B-52 procedures training. The observers at SHAPE Headquarters felt that Able Archer was not only too short for effective ADVON training, but also it remained primarily a nuclear procedures exercise. Beyond the limited play of conventional bomber tactics and execution, tanker planners had even less activity. The exercise used primarily preplanned numbers of tankers.

76. Msg(S/DECL QADR), 7AD/DO to HQ SAC/DOO, "Exercise Able Archer 83", 231630Z Dec 82, Ex 281; msg(S/DECL QADR), 7AD/DO to SHAPE/OPS, "Able Archer", 211615Z Jan 83, Ex 282; msg(S/DECL QADR), USCINCEUR/ECJ3 to 7AD/DO, "Able Archer 83", 252031Z Jan 83, Ex 283; msg(C/DECL QADR), 7AD/DO to SHAPE, "Able Archer", 281104Z Apr 83, Ex 284; msg(C/DECL QADR), 7AD/DOX to USCINCEUR/ECJ3-EX, "Able Archer", 081215Z Jul 83, Ex 285; msg(C/DECL QADR), 7AD/DO to COMPTIVEATAF, "Able Archer 83 augmentee requirements", 091300Z Aug 83, Ex 286.
and sortie capability and did not allow for reallocation of assets. For instance, one AFCENT request to disperse KC-135s to an alternate location did not produce any response because the locked in scenario required future chemical and airfield attacks on the base in question.

For these and a variety of similar reasons, the 7AD after action report advised against future SAC participation in Exercise Able Archer. A further change in emphasis and allowances for making simulated bomber and tanker employment more realistic left open the possibility for future participation. Primarily, 7AD and SAC became familiar with the basic tenets and activities of Exercise Able Archer and knew what type of information needed to be built into the exercise during future planning conferences. 77

Crested Eagle/Dense Crop 84

( ) From 8 to 14 March 1984, the SAC ADVON took part in the simultaneous command post exercises Crested Eagle and Dense Crop 84. Crested Eagle a CINCENT exercise, tested organizations throughout the Allied Command Europe (ACE) in the conduct of conventional warfare. Dense Crop 84, scheduled and conducted by CINCSOUTH, took place at

77. Rpt(S/DECL QADR), "Ex Able Archer 83 SAC ADVON After Action Rpt", 7AD/DOO, 1 Dec 83, Ex 287.

ABSTRACT – A very interesting letter from Nicoale Ceasescu to Helmut Kohl. The Romanian President made some suggestions that could ease the Geneva negotiation: the Warsaw Pact could accept “not taking into account the UK and French missiles”; the German government could “postpone the deployment [of the Intermediate missiles] to the end of 1984 or the beginning of 1985”; the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries should organize a conference “to discuss the issue of the Intermediate Range Missiles”
Signor Helmut Kohl
Cancelliere Federale della Repubblica Federale di Germania

Egregio Signor Cancelliere,

mi rivolgo di nuovo ad Ella in riferimento alla prospettiva dell'imminente passaggio all'installazione di missili a medio raggio americani sul territorio di alcuni paesi dell'Europa occidentale compresa la Repubblica Federale di Germania.

Il popolo romeno nonché tutti i popoli dell'Europa trama azioni e vaste manifestazioni si pronunciano decisamente ed estremamente preoccupati per l'arresto della corsa agli armamenti nucleari, per la tutela del diritto fondamentale alla vita, per la protezione del pericolo della catastrofe nucleare, convinti che la pace possono e la sicurezza non'essere preservate con nuove armi bensì con la riduzione di esse.

La Romania attribuisce una particolare importanza al blocco dell'installazione di nuovi missili a medio raggio in Europa ed al passaggio al ritiro ed alla distruzione di quelli già esistenti e ritiene che ancora non siano state sfruttate tutte le possibilità di compromesso e che ancora sia possibile raggiungere un'intesa nel quadro del negoziato genevino tra Unione Sovietica e Stati Uniti.

E vero che fino a questo momento non è stata raggiunta un'intesa in questo negoziato ma sono state presentate importanti proposte sia da parte americana sia da parte sovietica compresa la proposta fatta dal Presidente del Soviet Supremo in un'intervista rilasciata alla Pravda il 27 ottobre 1983 che hanno avvicinato di molto le posizioni il che dimostra che è possibile trovare una corrispondente intesa.
A questo punto è indispensabile adoperarsi a Ginevra al fine di realizzare un accordo equilibrato anche se esso non è perfetto ed anche se esso non risolve tutti i problemi. Comunque l'installazione dei missili americani nel Suo paese ed in altri paesi europei va impedita e rispettivamente va provveduto al ritiro ed alla completa distruzione dei missili a medioraggio sovietici.

Al fine di giungere a quest'obiettivo importante e prioritario si potrebbe convenire a non tener conto dei missili francesi e britannici inserendoli nella base di calcolo del rapporto generale delle forze nucleari tra le due parti che dovrebbe essere l'oggetto di negoziati successivi con la partecipazione della Francia e della Gran Bretagna.

Partendo dalla responsabilità che assumiamo nei confronti del destino dei nostri popoli, della pace e della sicurezza sul nostro continente, sono del parere che è arrivato il momento in cui vanno intensificati gli sforzi, in cui dobbiamo rivolgerci direttamente sia all'URSS sia agli USA affinché i negoziati vengano proseguiti e non si passi all'installazione dei nuovi missili a medio raggio.

Nello spirito del messaggio che ho inviato ad Ella nell'agosto di quest'anno torno a rivolgermi ad Ella con l'appello che la Repubblica Federale di Germania ed Ella personalmente chiedano, agendo in modo corrispondente, che venga raggiunto un accordo che permetta il blocco dell'installazione di nuovi missili a medio raggio o almeno il rinvio dell'installazione alla fine del 1984 o all'inizio del 1985 affinché nel frattempo il negoziato sovietico-americano possa continuare cosicché l'Unione Sovietica non installa più missili riducendo, conformemente alle sue dichiarazioni, un numero dei missili già esistenti.
In questo senso la Romania considera molto importante una riunione di tutti i paesi membri della NATO e dei paesi membri del Patto di Varsavia per discutere esclusivamente sul problema dei missili a medio raggio in Europa ed apportare un contributo alla realizzazione di un'intesa nel quadro del negoziato ginevrino tra Unione Sovietica e Stati Uniti affinché esso porti al blocco del passaggio alla installazione dei nuovi missili a medio raggio ed al ritiro ed alla distruzione di quelli già esistenti.

Oltre a ciò sono del parere che un vertice sovietico-americo rappresenterebbe un contributo prezioso all'esito positivo del negoziato ginevrino. Esso influirebbe positivamente sulla vita internazionale e starebbe nell'interesse di tutti i popoli dell'Europa anche se avesse come risultato semplicemente il blocco dell'installazione dei nuovi missili la riduzione e la corrispettiva distruzione di quelli già esistenti.

E noto che le parti con il Trattato sulla Non-Proliferazione di Armi Nucleari si sono impegnate ad impedire l'ulteriore proliferazione di armi nucleari e di non passarle a nessuno e di non accettare da nessuna parte il trasferimento diretto od indiretto di armi o dispositivi nucleari.

L'installazione in alcuni paesi dell'Europa occidentale e dell'Europa orientale viola in quanto tale e di fatto il Trattato sulla Non-Proliferazione creando un precedente pericoloso che certamente potrebbe indurre altri paesi a provvedere all'installazione di simili armi sui propri territori.

Traendo conclusioni dalle dure lezioni della Storia e dal fatto che le due Guerre Mondiali di questo secolo sono scaturite in Europa, allora i popoli del continente e specie il Suo popolo hanno un interesse vitale a fare di tutto per impedire una nuova catastrofe che condurrebbe alla distruzione della vita umana e della civiltà.
L'installazione dei nuovi missili sul territorio tedesco porta effettivamente alla trasformazione di questo territorio in un vero e proprio arsenale di armi nucleari e costituisce un pericolo per la Repubblica Federale di Germania e la Repubblica Democratica Tedesca che sarebbero i primi bersagli di un conflitto nucleare che comporterebbe la loro distruzione completa.

Sono convinto che Ella ed il Governo della Repubblica Federale di Germania si impegneranno per il blocco dell'installazione dei nuovi missili e per la conclusione positiva del negoziato ginevrino con l'obiettivo di realizzare un equilibrio con equa sicurezza tra le due parti non con l'aumento bensì con la riduzione degli armamenti cosa che è nell'interesse del Suo popolo, di tutti i popoli, della pace e della sicurezza internazionale.
ABSTRACT – This memo to Craxi argues against the merging of the INF and
START negotiations proposed by the Finnish government and backed by the
Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau. The proposal could jeopardize the
Geneva talks and harm the European interests.
APPUNTO

PER IL PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO

In questi giorni si è tornati a parlare della fusione dei negoziati FNI e START. Da ultimo la proposta è stata fatta proprio dal Governo finlandese e sostenuta, sia pure in termini molto più ambigui, da Trudeau. Al riguardo si possono fare due ordini di considerazioni: il primo di carattere generale e di opportunità tattica; il secondo, di merito.

Circa il primo ordine di considerazioni, che forse oggi è il più importante da fare, non vi è dubbio che il proliferare di proposte alternative rispetto a quelle concordate nell'ambito dell'Alleanza Atlantica e presentate dagli Stati Uniti a Ginevra non può che accrescere la confusione e ridurre le già esigui possibilità di un ripensamento delle proprie posizioni da parte dell'Unione Sovietica. Le varie idee che vengono prospettate (che si tratti di una fusione dei negoziati START e FNI, di un allargamento del negoziato nucleare strategico alle cinque Potenze nucleari, di una riepiloga della formula della cosiddetta "pace seggiata nel bosco") potranno essere oggetto di utile riflessione quando si avranno idee più chiare sul futuro del negoziato di Ginevra, e cioè se, con il dispiegamento dei primi missili NATO, i sovietici si limiteranno a sospendere il negoziato o decideranno invece di interromperlo. Nella seconda ipotesi, ovviamente, si porrà per gli occidentali il problema dello studio di un quadro diverso nel quale inserire la trattativa FNI, e la sua incorporazione come un "volet" separato nel negoziato START potrebbe costituire una delle varie possibili vie di uscita dalla nuova situazione che sarebbe determinata dalla scelta da parte dell'URSS della linea più intransigente sul futuro del negoziato FNI.

Circa il secondo ordine, da una eventuale fusione potrebbero ridiscendere i seguenti tre tipi di effetti:

- si aprirebbe la strada, nel quadro di un negoziato globale, a formulare di compensazione che potrebbero non rispondere (come già avvenuto in qualche misura nel SALT II) agli interessi specifici dell'Europa;

- poiché le FNI rappresenterebbero tutto sommato un comparto marginale di un negoziato strategico unificato, i paesi europei potrebbero perdere quel ruolo di partecipazione alla elaborazione delle posizioni negoziali occidentali ed alla conduzione-
ne della trattativa che loro riconosciuto dagli Stati Uniti nel negoziato FNI ma che sicuramente, come già avviene per il negoziato START, non potrebbe essere svolto in una trattativa che avesse per oggetto il rapporto globale di forze tra le due Superpotenze;

- il negoziato START non è destinato a dare risultati se non in tempi molto lunghi e pertanto l'effetto di una fusione sarebbe un corrispondente rinvio nel tempo di una soluzione del problema FNI.
3) Sezione II: Attività istituzionale  
Serie 2: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri  
Sottoserie 3: Relazioni internazionali

Sottosottoserie 5: Dibattito parlamentare sugli euromissili e negoziati sul disarmo


Considerazioni sul dibattito alla Camera sull'installazione dei missili a Comiso; interventi di Berlinguer nelle sedute del 5 dicembre 1979 e del 16 novembre 1983, pp. 6-7

Abstract – In a memo to Craxi, his Diplomatic Counsellor, Antonio Badini, warns against the latest Soviet proposals. Badini argues that renouncing without any compensation to the deployment of the American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defence system. [...] That the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed this far”

Eppure, vediamo nei giorni scorsi l’Ambasciatore sovietico a Bonn prendere diretto contatto con i capi dei gruppi parlamentari del Bundestag per metterli in guardia contro i risultati del voto che il Parlamento tedesco terrà la prossima settimana su questo problema. Sempre da parte dell’Unione Sovietica, che pure definisce una creatura della CIA un movimento popolare che ha coinvolto dieci milioni di persone come Solidarnoosc, si incitano apertamente i movimenti pacifisti in Occidente a tentare di rovesciare nelle strade le decisioni dei loro Governi, salvo tuttavia rimproverarli aspramente se si permettono di menzionare l’esistenza degli SS-20 sovietici. I Paesi occidentali sono soggetti ad una campagna martellante di intimidazioni e minacce, da quelle concernenti la rottura del negoziato di Ginevra a quelle ben più gravi di un potenziamento della minaccia nucleare diretta esclusivamente contro l’Europa.

È legittimo interrogarsi sulle ragioni di tale accentuazione disinvoltura. Non è certo da escludere che essa trovi incoraggiamento da un particolare clima psicologico che si è venuto ad istaurare, al quale non sono estranee le pressioni e le attività propagandistiche dell’URSS. (*)

(*) Rogers nell’odierna intervista alla Repubblica accenna, sulla base di informazioni attendibili alla presenza di personale sovietico all’interno del movimento dei pacifisti.
2. La rinuncia senza contropartita allo spiegamento dei missili americani in Europa sancirebbe la realizzazione di un obiettivo perseguito da tempo dall'Unione Sovietica e cioè la separazione tra il sistema di difesa dell'Europa Occidentale e quello degli Stati Uniti (il cosiddetto decoupling). Ma le finalità delle proposte sovietiche non si fermano qui. Ciò che viene proposto a Ginevra è un trattato che prevederebbe un impegno contrattuale preciso e permanente per gli Stati Uniti - quello della rinuncia a spiegare i missili in termedi a lungo raggio in Europa Occidentale - mentre l'URSS assumerebbe un impegno flessibile che rimarrebbe subordinato alle decisioni preso autonomamente in materia di modernizzazione dei rispettivi sistemi nucleari da parte della Francia, della Gran Bretagna e Cina che non sarebbero firmatari del Trattato. A parte il carattere giudicabile anomalo di un accordo del genere, balza agli occhi il fatto che con esso si creerebbero le premesse per costringere negli anni a venire i Governi europei ad esercitare pressioni su Parigi e Londra perché rinunzino ai loro programmi di armamentismo missilistico. E ciò perché, in caso contrario, sarebbe parallelamente il livello della minaccia nucleare sovietica che è diretta non solo contro Francia a Gran Bretagna, ma anche contro i paesi europei non nucleari come Italia e Germania che non sarebbero protetti dai sistemi franco-britannici ed avrebbero rinunciato alla protezione dei sistemi americani.

Oltre a dividere gli Stati Uniti dall'Europa, l'Unione Sovietica realizzerebbe quindi anche l'obiettivo di porre in contrasto tra loro gli interessi di sicurezza dei paesi europei membri dell'Alleanza. Con buona pace non solo per la coesione di quest'ultima, ma anche per le idee, per altri versi apprezzabili, che vengono ricorrentemente avanzate sulla costituzione di un polo europeo di difesa nell'ambito della NATO.

3. È sorprendente che simili proposte trovino un eco positivo da molte parti e siano considerate come basi più o meno accettabili di un accordo. Vogliamo sperare che questo non stia ad indicare che sotto il profilo politico-psicologico, il processo di finlandizzazione dell'Europa assai più avanzato di quanto avessimo fin qui ritenuto.
Thursday, December 8 [1983]

The Soviets have walked out of the “start” talks but not so definitely as in the INF talks. This is regular time for holiday break & they didn’t say they wouldn’t be back. They just said they were unable to set a date for their return.

Our dead Navy pilot is being returned to us by the Syrians. We still don’t know cause of death. After a couple of routine meetings & lunch with Geo. H. I left for Indianapolis. Addressed the Nat. Forum on Excellence in Ed. About 2000 teachers, students, state legislators, Govs., School Board members etc. Was well-received although I’m sure the few from N.E.A. weren’t happy. They were on record as saying that if I didn’t come with a pledge of more money for Ed. the meeting would be a “sham.” Well I didn’t come with any pledge – to the contrary I told them Fed. money was not the answer. I was given a very warm reception.