MEMORANDUM TO: NSC - Mr. Bartholomew
- Mr. Ermirth
DOD - Mr. Slocombe
- Dr. Davis
JCS - BGen. Vesser
ACDA - Mr. Newhouse
CIA -
EUR - Mr. Goodby

FROM: PM - David C. Gompert

SUBJECT: (S) TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

(S) Attached is a revision of the TNF Arms Control Objectives and Principles paper, taking into account interagency comments. The paper is still cast as an internal US document intended for discussion by the Principals. As noted in the text, it would have to be appropriately revised for use with the Allies.
TNF Arms Control Objectives/Principles

In its present form, this paper is a candid statement of US objectives and principles in pursuing TNF arms control. Most of these objectives and principles would be suitable for discussion with the Allies—though perhaps they would better be advanced as "propositions" or "issues" for discussion in the newly-formed NATO Special Group on Arms Control. In certain cases, it could be inappropriate or tactically unwise to pursue specific objectives or principles in discussions with the Allies, at least until we determine how their thinking is developing. After appropriate revision, the paper would be a major vehicle for discussions with the Allies of the elements which could form the basis of an Alliance-supported TNF arms control policy.

The paper briefly outlines the military and political components of the theater nuclear problem, and describes some basic political and negotiating objectives the US might pursue in managing the theater nuclear arms control question in the Alliance and in SALT. This is then followed by a set of substantive and tactical principles which should guide and inform the US approach to theater nuclear arms control.

TNF Military/Political Problem

The basic military problem in the theater concerns deterrence and escalation control. It stems from perceptions that in the era of strategic parity US use of its strategic forces in defense of Europe is less credible than before; NATO therefore requires more credible in-theater escalatory options to strike Soviet territory in order to deter Soviet use of its long-range theater nuclear systems and other forces. The absence of an appropriate NATO theater nuclear capability to respond might lead the Soviets to believe they could use their perceived advantage in long-range TNF to dominate a theater nuclear conflict, in which both the US and the Soviet Union were deterred from using strategic nuclear weapons. This possibility has been increased by Soviet deployment of the SS-20 and Backfire.

NATO's main means to deal with this military problem is the linked continuum of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. We are moving toward enhancing NATO's escalatory capability through a modest, evolutionary deployment of long-range TNF. This would afford greater credibility to NATO's capability to threaten effectively
the Soviet Union with limited nuclear strikes without having only recourse to US strategic systems, whose use might be thought less credible -- and therefore less deterring.

The political problem is more complex. The principal concern in the Alliance is that the existing "gap" in NATO's theater nuclear capabilities could expose Europe to nuclear intimidation by the Soviets during a crisis. There is also concern that failure of NATO to respond to the continuing Soviet deployment of new long-range theater systems could weaken NATO's political will and solidarity. Behind these concerns lies the more fundamental political problem of the long-term health of the US-European security connection, stemming from questions about the steadiness and determination of US leadership on the one hand, and worry about the consequences of strategic parity and the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee on the other. There is also a conflicting fear expressed by some that a determined NATO military response to Soviet deployments could jeopardize détente, result in decoupling, set off an unconstrained theater nuclear arms race, and upset the political and military equilibrium among the Western European states. TFN arms control could contribute to a strategy for managing these problems, if undertaken in conjunction with an appropriate TFN modernization response, and if US leadership and Alliance unity are sustained.

The following is a discussion of broad objectives the US should pursue in developing a TFN arms control policy, and of a set of principles which could provide the initial basis for discussions with the Allies, leading ultimately to the development of an agreed Alliance TFN arms control approach.

Political and Military Objectives

1. Constrain, and if possible reduce, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe

TFN arms control should have as its central objective to constrain, and if possible reduce, the growth of the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe. If we can limit Soviet deployments, we will have achieved an important political and military goal of setting boundaries on a significant part of the TFN threat to NATO. The net result of an unrestrained competition in Europe could be continued Soviet TFN preponderance at much higher levels on both sides, a changed role for TFN in the NATO deterrent, and, with a
large number of NATO long-range systems, increased
perceptions of the decoupling of US strategic forces from
Europe. Limiting the Soviet long-range theater nuclear
threat would also deprive the Soviets of political and
military leverage over our European Allies which would
rise from perceptions of unconstrained Soviet theater
nuclear deployments, against which the West lacked the will
to respond.

2. Help improve the political climate for NATO
deployments

A credible TNF arms control approach is a sine qua
non for virtually all European governments in being able to
build domestic support for TNF modernization. Nearly all
Allied leaders have told us that a TNF arms control approach
which complements -- and protects -- essential TNF moderni-
zation offers the best chance they have to convince their
Parliaments and publics that a new and destabilizing
regional nuclear arms race is not being launched.

3. Exercise US leadership and reinforce European
confidence in the existing NATO security framework

Events over the last several years--Vietnam, Water-
gate, economic problems, recognition of strategic parity,
Allied perceptions that the US accords priority to the US-
Soviet bilateral relationship over NATO, the ERW matter --
have damaged the US-European security tie. Allied unease
over perceived US indecisiveness or uncertainty about its
role as leader of the West has made positive Alliance action
in the security field -- particularly in the nuclear area --
more difficult. Many of these doubts are manifest in the TNF
issue. If this issue is not resolved successfully, which
will take US leadership, Alliance cohesion could be shaken.
European confidence in US leadership could suffer a signifi-
cant decline. The greatest danger is the FRG could begin to
question the reliability of the US and NATO as the basis of
its security.

4. Strengthen Alliance cohesion and coupling through
Allied participation in managing the arms control
component of Alliance security

Much of the European unease and concern over the
theater nuclear balance has come from the perception of
some that the US is managing its security through its own
strategic force developments and the bilateral SALT process,
without sufficient concern for Europe's security, which is deeply affected by decisions in both these areas. The FRG in particular has been concerned that negotiations on central systems in isolation from other elements of the NATO deterrent are inherently decoupling and politically divisive. The Europeans want to be active participants in this security structure, and arms control is a vital part of it. We have seen this most clearly in the last two years of SALT II, where there has been steadily growing Allied, particularly German, pressure to be consulted more clearly in the SALT process. To maintain a strong security relationship between Europe and the US, we must be prepared to accede to greater European participation in the management of the East-West arms control as it extends increasingly into areas directly affecting Allied security. We should, consistent with our own national interest in preserving a leading role in directing the overall process, aim through negotiations on TNF to bring the Europeans more directly into managing the East-West strategic relationship in SALT III.

5. Improve the prospects for SALT and MBFR

There are direct relationships between TNF modernization and arms control, on the one hand, and SALT and MBFR on the other. These relationships must be recognized in advance and managed carefully.

TNF connects with SALT very directly. The Soviets, despite recent hints to the contrary, may insist on securing limitations on US "FBS" as a requirement for further reductions of central systems. We have made it clear to our Allies that any limitations on US TNF should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems. However, the expansion of SALT III beyond the central-system issues dealt with in SALT II promises to complicate the negotiations. We must seek to avoid a situation in which further reductions from SALT II levels are held hostage to the very difficult issues involved in the TNF area.

MBFR Option III could place a numerical limitation at a relatively low level on US Pershing missile launchers -- a principal option for TNF modernization. Similarly, a codified Option III would place limits on US DCA and warhead levels in the NGA, while analogous Soviet systems would be unconstrained. Thus, MBFR has clear implications for TNF modernization.
MBFR remains the core negotiation with the potential for direct impact on the conventional threat to NATO security in central Europe. In the context of the strategic and TNF situation, the conventional balance is crucial and must be codified in careful coordination with the evolution of the theater nuclear equation. Negotiations on TNF must be handled in such a manner that the basic MBFR process is sustained while reconciling the dilemma posed by the non-reciprocal nature of MBFR Option III.

**TNF Arms Control Principles**

1. Our goals in SALT III central-system reductions, TNF modernization and TNF arms control should be moderate in scope and mutually supportive.

Two components of our national security policy--Allied cohesion and a stable strategic balance--converge most conspicuously in the area of SALT and theater nuclear modernization. The interrelationship of these two important areas of US foreign policy bears directly on planning for SALT III and TNF modernization and arms control issues.

On the one hand, it seems that US willingness to accept some limits on our theater nuclear systems which can strike the Soviet homeland will probably be a precondition to Soviet agreement to any substantial reductions of central strategic systems. But our ability to meet this precondition is bounded by the need to respond to Soviet theater-range force improvements--especially the SS-20 and Backfire. If we fail to take adequate steps to bolster NATO's own long-range theater systems, we will stand accused of allowing one rung of the escalation ladder to weaken so unacceptably as to place the continuum of deterrence in doubt.

Yet there are doctrinal, as well as practical, limits on our freedom of action here, as well. For if we exploit our TNF modernization options to a degree which seems to point toward matching Soviet theater forces, we run the risk, at least in European perceptions, of decoupling our strategic forces from those based in Europe. Further, if in SALT III we seek sweeping reductions in central systems, Europeans may fear a different sort of decoupling; they could see the US and the Soviets as shifting the emphasis in nuclear forces from central to theater systems. This fear would be particularly acute if we accompanied deep central-system
reductions with a major build-up of long-range US systems on the continent of Europe.

The interrelationships outlined above seem to point toward moderation in the relevant aspects of US policy. Steps taken to improve the long-range component of US theater nuclear forces should be modest in scope so as to avoid creating perceptions of decoupling among our NATO Allies. (The implication is perhaps our central-system goals in SALT III ought to be moderate also to help avoid the risk of being seen to move the focus of nuclear confrontation to Europe). Finally, we should be prepared to accept some limits in SALT III on US long-range TNF, both so as to make it possible to limit Soviet theater forces such as the SS-20 and to meet the inevitable Soviet demand for some limits on US "forward based systems" as a probable condition on acceptance of meaningful central-system reductions.

2. TNF arms control should complement TNF modernization

The fundamental instrument for coping with the political and military problems caused by Soviet long-range TNF deployments must reside in an evolutionary deployment of additional long-range TNF. TNF arms control will be a complement to modernization, not a substitute. It should not be allowed to impede those deployments deemed necessary to restore confidence in the viability of NATO's deterrent continuum. However, our TNF arms control effort should be serious, and aimed at constraining the Soviet long-range TNF threat. Development of a realistic TNF arms control approach should not lag behind decision on a TNF modernization program. A credible TNF arms control position will be essential in improving the political climate for initial NATO deployments. If successful, it would prevent the need for still further deployments to sustain a credible deterrent in Europe. A danger is that some Allies, in an effort to cope with internal political debate over modernization, will seek to make actual deployments hostage to the outcome of arms control negotiations. If this course were adopted, the result could be no modernization at all. Also, there is a danger that an arms control position could be chosen only for political camouflage; such a position would probably be non-negotiable, damage or delay SALT negotiations on central systems, and engender further political controversy in the Alliance.
3. The Allies must share the responsibility for developing a TNF arms control posture

The temptation for us to cut through indecision and confusion by simply "laying it all out" for the Allies will be strong; there have been indications that some Allies would like us to do this and give them political cover. However, this question goes to the heart of European security interests, and in the long run we cannot carry the burden alone. The political risks in pursuing TNF arms control (and modernization) are too great for us to appear to have induced the Allies to go along. Even in following our lead, the Allies must clearly accept a share of the decision-making. This necessarily will entail increased Allied involvement in SALT III — assuming TNF negotiations will take place in the SALT framework — and in our decisions on US theater nuclear programs.
4. Maximizing bargaining leverage requires that decisions on modernization be taken in a way that holds open the prospect of further deployments.

NATO’s initial modernization program will be "evolutionary" in size and character. It will be a floor, intended to satisfy intrinsic deterrent requirements, within current policy and doctrine; it could only be cut back to the extent that the Soviet threat was constrained. Some systems probably will not be included in the initial modernization package; the numbers will also be modest. If we are to have maximum bargaining leverage against Soviet TNF, the decision on the initial modernization program will have to be taken in a way that does not rule out additional systems or larger numbers in the future. We want to be able to link subsequent NATO deployments of additional systems or larger numbers to Soviet restraint. This will require a US willingness to continue at least some programs for systems which were not included in the initial program, or only in limited numbers. Since we cannot know whether TNF arms control will successfully limit Soviet deployments, or how the Soviets might react in force posture terms to NATO deployments, preserving the capability -- and the presumption of Alliance readiness -- to deploy additional long-range theater systems will be necessary in any case.

5. Our TNF arms control approach should stress simplicity.

The simpler our arms control approach, the more manageable the negotiations should be. We have no indications so far that the Allies would object to keeping negotiations bilateral and the Soviets will probably favor a bilateral negotiation as well. Moreover, the more theater systems involved in the negotiations, the less chance of success and the more likely that central-system negotiations would be delayed. Focusing the negotiations only on the modern long-range theater systems of both sides which have caused the greatest political and military concerns should provide the most manageable framework for negotiations and an agreement, and would lessen perceptions of decoupling inherent in a more sweeping "Eurostrategic" negotiation.

There are potential problems with this approach: it would leave out a lot of old long-range TNF on the Soviet
side, and all of the short-range systems which the Soviets could move forward to increase coverage of Western Europe and which are expanding and modernizing along with long-range Soviet TNF; if the limitations applied to European-based systems only, the Soviets would have a large breakout potential in their non-European deployments of modern, mobile systems such as the SS-20.

6. Allied systems should be excluded from theater ceilings or limits, and there should be no compensation for Allied systems in any negotiated ceilings.

This relates directly to the aim of keeping TNF negotiations manageable, and our desire to preserve the bilateral character of SALT. Politically, there is no present possibility of including French systems, and the price for including UK systems would be British participation in the negotiations. Moreover, we may have strong reasons for excluding Allied systems as a counterweight to excluded older Soviet systems such as the SS-4s and 5s. Formal compensation for Allied systems in the US totals is equally unacceptable.

There are difficulties with this approach: the Soviets will likely argue that their long-range TNF are a counter to Allied nuclear systems, and that they cannot agree to limit such systems in the absence of limits on French and British systems, or at least numerical compensation for them via a larger Soviet ceiling. If Allied systems are excluded, we must be able to resolve satisfactorily for ourselves and for the Allies the non-circumvention and non-transfer issues, which will inevitably be more complex and difficult than in SALT II.

7. TNF ceilings must be equal: no de jure asymmetries.

Politically, parity of ceilings and rights is essential. However, there are difficulties with parity. For one thing, parity could be perceived as establishing a formal "Euro-strategic" balance, and therefore decoupling. This has been a strong French and British fear, and the HLG itself has declared that parity in numbers should not be an objective in TNF modernization.

However, if the focus were on a narrow class of modern long-range systems, the decoupling connotations of formal parity would be smaller than in a broader negotiation. More-
over, formal parity in rights need not imply actual numerical parity in deployments. The ceilings would be on a narrow class of modern systems; older Soviet systems would be excluded (though over time, as older systems were retired, equal ceilings in modern systems could lead to actual parity). Moreover, NATO might not exercise its right to deploy up to the permitted ceiling, which could make the exclusion of UK and French forces more palatable to the Soviets. Conversely, the existence of those excluded Allied systems could relieve political problems arising from actual inequality of deployed forces.

8. The aim should be to negotiate a ceiling on Soviet deployments of modern long-range TNF at a realistic level.

Our goal should be modest and realistic, in order to promote the prospect of agreement and thus to protect negotiations on central systems from being blocked by TNF negotiations. Although we should press for some reductions, we probably should not expect to reduce deployments of modern Soviet systems significantly below what we believe are planned levels. In any case, we will need to preserve room for carrying out our own modernization plans. Setting a ceiling would be an important achievement in enhancing NATO security. It would avoid an unlimited regional competition in which the Soviets would have many geographic and political advantages. An unconstrained Soviet build-up could undermine the strategic balance, change completely the role of theater forces in NATO's deterrent posture by necessitating deployments going beyond an "evolutionary" adjustment, and alter the character of SALT. A ceiling, perhaps with some reduction in the level of anticipated Soviet deployments, could set the stage for future, more constraining TNF limitations.

The difficulty with pursuing the modest objective of a ceiling on deployment of only certain modern Soviet long-range systems is that it might be seen by some of our Allies and by arms control supporters here as arms control tokenism, doing nothing to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe or to control the deployment of new, destabilizing systems. The Soviets, too, might see a ceiling -- combined with unconstrained UK and French forces -- as merely codifying a NATO TNF buildup of a dangerous new strategic threat to the Soviet homeland, while constraining their ability to respond through larger deployments than planned.

9. We should be prepared to discuss our theater systems in SALT III only if the Soviets are prepared to negotiate on their theater systems.
We will need a posture on theater systems at the opening of SALT III negotiations. The Soviets are almost certain to raise Protocol-limited cruise missiles, FBS and Allied systems. Our basic posture should be to "put into action" our formulation on theater systems ("Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems"). We would indicate that we were prepared to discuss our own theater systems (not Allied systems), but only if the Soviets were prepared to discuss their theater systems. This would establish a direct linkage between our TNF and Soviet theater systems.

This posture would have at least three important advantages:

--- A consensus on it in the Alliance might be possible by the opening of SALT III.

--- It would afford us an Alliance-endorsed posture on TNF arms control by the beginning of SALT III even if we had not developed a detailed TNF negotiating package by that time.

--- It would put the burden on the Soviets to reply to our position, rather than leave us with no response to their opening demands.

The Soviets may be prepared to agree to our formulation at the outset and propose that negotiations begin immediately, before we had agreement in the Alliance on a negotiating approach. This tactical difficulty could be managed by focusing early discussions in SALT III on the objectives and principles for negotiations on this new class of systems, and on the structure and modalities of negotiations. Moreover, we can put the burden on the Soviets to come up with the opening proposals. But, we will also retain the option of initiating a proposal near the outset if we are ready.

10. We should seek to avoid negotiating linkages between central-system issues and TNF issues.

We do not know how to relate or make tradeoffs between central and theater systems and there are serious risks in attempting to do so. The issues inherent in further central-system limitations will be difficult and complex enough without trying to deal with negotiating linkages between central and theater systems. We have important goals for central systems that we do not want to have held hostage to limits.
on theater systems, and vice versa. Separating the issues would tend to strengthen the link between our TFN and Soviet TFN. We also want to keep Allied involvement in developing negotiating approaches confined to TFN issues, and avoiding negotiating linkages between TFN and central systems will facilitate this. The Soviets may also have this concern; but it is far more likely that they will want to predicate further reductions in central systems on limits on our theater systems (and possibly Allied systems). Discussion of TFN in SALT III may be centered for some time on this question.

There are many obvious difficulties with avoiding TFN and central system negotiating linkages. Obviously, the Soviets, and we also, will relate the two aspects of the negotiation in formulating positions. The Soviets will doubtless link the timing of resolution of issues and of agreement in one area to resolution of issues in the other. Our Allies will also relate developments in these two negotiating areas. Indeed, the very idea of not linking TFN and central system issues could cause difficulties with the Allies, who would be concerned that such an agreement would codify a separate European theater balance and lead to decoupling. Avoiding TFN and central system linkages also runs directly contrary to recent German thinking about an "overall strategic balance" including long-range TFN, and the notion of using US central-system advantages, such as warheads, to negotiate limits on Soviet TFN. Despite these problems, because of the importance of protecting negotiations on central systems, and of facilitating the prospects for TFN-TFN linkage, establishing a negotiating framework which avoids TFN-central system linkages should be a US objective. But, because of the strong crosscurrents of interests involved, it is not an idea which we can thrust on the Allies and the Soviets. We should maneuver to bring this about, using Soviet interest in preserving SALT and Allied interest in achieving limits on Soviet TFN. This principle should not be included in the discussion paper for the Allies. It should be allowed to develop out of the arms control analysis in the NATO Special Group, where consideration of the practicalities of negotiations and political realism should lead to it.

11. If the Soviets seek to link central-system issues to TFN issues, or refuse to agree to a TFN-for-TFN linkage, we should propose that TFN issues be postponed while negotiations on central systems proceed.

This tactic would be driven by our interest in not allowing negotiations on central systems to be delayed while
the TNF question is sorted out. It may be difficult to put into practice, because of our own TNF objectives and because of the strong linkage we can expect the Soviets to make between further central-system limits and US FBS. It could also result in little progress on both clusters of issues for a time. Nevertheless the TNF-for-TNF linkage is of sufficient importance that we must have an answer to Soviet delaying tactics. And, we have important levers to build pressure on the Soviets not to delay resolution of these questions too long:

-- The Alliance will be making concrete modernization decisions.

-- US theater programs will be continuing (and in some cases, e.g., Pershing II) may be accelerated.

-- The Protocol clock on cruise missiles will be running.

These factors will confront the Soviets with the prospect of an unconstrained NATO deployment of long-range theater systems in Europe targeted on the Soviet Union. We will be holding out to them the opportunity of negotiating some limits on such deployments. If the Soviets have any intention of seeking to constrain NATO deployments through arms control, they cannot wait too long. But, how serious the Soviets would regard such pressures would depend critically on how the Alliance shapes decisions on modernization: if the decision is such that it is clear to the Soviets that future deployments of larger numbers or of new systems is highly unlikely for political reasons, pressure on them for early agreement to our basic TNF approach in SALT III would be far less.

There are also Alliance problems with this tactic. Offering to set aside temporarily TNF issues could heighten fears that the theater nuclear question is a peripheral one for the US, and that we accord greatest priority to progress on central-system issues. Moreover, using the prospect of growing NATO TNF deployments as a lever over the Soviets may create severe political strains for some NATO countries, who will be having difficulty enough adhering to a NATO consensus for modest deployments without having also to support such a hard-nosed, "stonewall" approach to TNF in SALT III. Therefore, this principle is not one which should be raised with the Allies at this stage, and would not be included in a "principles" paper for the Allies.
Soviet Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces*

Soviet long-range nuclear forces have long constituted an important part of the Warsaw Pact's capability to execute nuclear strikes against European NATO. Ten years ago these forces--measured both in numbers of delivery systems and on-target weapons--were comparable in magnitude to Soviet intercontinental range "central systems."

Graphic I

Trends 1969-1979:

--The present mix of nuclear systems which the Soviets can bring to bear on the continental United States and European NATO, reflects the emphasis they have placed on the deployment of modern intercontinental range weapons. Dramatic growth has also taken place, however, in Pact medium-range theater nuclear forces, which have doubled since 1969.

--Growth in LRTNF over the past 10 years has been less dramatic. In fact, the number of delivery systems oriented on European NATO has actually declined since 1969 and currently stands at a level of almost 1200 missiles and medium bombers. However, the number of deliverable bombs, air-to-surface missiles and warheads has increased somewhat and currently totals nearly 2000.

*PRM-38 and subsequent working groups have employed the NATO Nuclear Planning Group usage with respect to theater nuclear forces. According, throughout this text, Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) are those theater nuclear systems with missile range or aircraft radius of over 1000 kilometers. Medium-range systems (MRTNF) are those with range or radius of between 100-1000 kilometers, and short-range systems (SRTNF) are those with ranges of less than 100 kilometers.
Fact Nuclear Forces Oriented on the US and NATO, in 1969, 1979 and Projected 1985:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Delivery Systems</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3565</td>
<td>4178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>5464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2920</td>
<td>6977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes "central systems" plus those medium and long-range (> 1000 km) theater nuclear forces oriented on Europe.

2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-3/8-78 and NIE 11-6-78.
Comparison with NATO:

- The magnitude of Soviet LRTNF with respect to NATO forces has not changed significantly, since 1969 even though the Allies—notably the French—have deployed several ballistic missile submarines. The US has also deployed F-111 aircraft to bases in the UK.

Graphic II

- Currently the number of in-place Soviet LRTNF delivery systems—as well as weapons—exceeds NATO's by a ratio of about 25x4. The composition of the NATO and Soviet force differs greatly, however, as exemplified by the relatively large share of Soviet weapons carried by land-based ballistic missiles.

- It is this specific set of Soviet LRTNF which concern the US and NATO and will be the focus of arms control efforts. In addition, it is the NATO LRTNF set represented on this graphic which is presently being considered for enlargement and modernization.

- In addition to the in-place NATO LRTNF, the US has committed 25x4 to SACEUR. The missiles which carry these weapons are already SALT constrained, and would therefore not be the subject of any LRTNF negotiations.

- Other long-range forces not represented on this graphic include the FB-111 medium bomber force, based in the US, as well as SACLANT-assigned and other US aircraft carrier nuclear strike forces.

Importance of Pact MRTNF:

- Soviet and Eastern European operated medium and short-range forces opposite NATO have recently exhibited substantial growth. They are of increasing importance in considering the numerical balance of Pact and NATO theater nuclear forces.
### Long-Range (Systems Over 1000 KM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>30(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>469(595)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>694(1363)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1193(1988)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Medium-Range (Systems 100 KM to 1000 KM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SSBM</td>
<td>534(534)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>885(945)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>359(359)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1779(1839)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Short-Range (Systems Under 100 KM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>592</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubes</td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Concept used is that of an unrefined "one-time only" exchange. Aircraft and missile launcher facilities are not included.
2. Geographic area encompassed in present NATO, Eastern Europe, the eight westernmost military districts of the
   Soviet Union, the two western LRA commands, and the three Russian Soviet fleet areas.
3. Includes French systems.
4. Some "central system" missile tubs-Soviet UK and French.
5. Excludes FBM-30 committed to SACEUR, but already taken account of in central systems.
6. In accordance with FBM-30, only "SACEUR nuclear-tailed aircraft" are counted rather than nominally nuclear
capable. For the Pact, only those aircraft for which nuclear trained pilots are currently available are
counted. Counting based upon nominally nuclear capable aircraft would result in Pact/NATO totals of
   186/1440 delivery systems, respectively.
7. SLCM launch rails on Soviet ships, submarines and missile fast-boats.
8. Mike-Hercules SAMS modified to be secondarily capable of "surface-to-surface strikes.

Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP80-00401R001500010001-7
With the recent Soviet deployment of nuclear artillery, the Pact has enhanced its short-range theater nuclear forces, which now slightly outnumber those of NATO.

Soviet and Pact MRTNF now exceed the in-place medium-range forces of NATO by a ratio of about __ in delivery systems and in weapons. In numbers, the Pact possesses nearly 1,800 delivery systems capable of delivering about the same number of weapons. About half the delivery systems are dual-capable tactical aircraft, most of which have been deployed within the past 10 years.

The significance of asymmetrical geographic circumstances is illustrated by the fact that, from forward bases in Eastern Europe, Pact MRTNF can strike practically every target of consequence in Western Europe, while NATO MRTNF can reach only a few major targets on the western fringes of the Soviet Union.

These Soviet and Pact medium range systems will not be considered in arms negotiations which are definitionally restricted to LRTNF. In addition, most of the Soviet tactical aircraft are deployed within the Soviet Union, and are hence not presently treated in the MBFR forum.

Projections in Soviet LRTNF

Refocusing on Soviet LRTNF... As noted earlier, the actual number of delivery systems in this category has decreased since 1969. This decrease will continue, and it is projected that by 1985 only about 900 systems will be operational opposite Europe.*

*These projections are based upon the moderate level of effort deployment pattern described in NIE 11-6-78. A larger 1985 force could result from a higher level of effort than anticipated, or the retention of SS-4/5's in the force for arms control bargaining purposes.
Composition of Soviet LRTNF Op- and by Type of Weapon, in 1969, and Projected 1985\textsuperscript{1,2} and NATO by Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery Systems by Service</th>
<th>Weapons by Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: 251</td>
<td>1989: 478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985: 1193</td>
<td>1990: 402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>ALCMs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969: 470</td>
<td>1988: 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: 284</td>
<td>1989: 885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985: 233</td>
<td>1990: 1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRF</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile RVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: 469</td>
<td>1989: 596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985: 229</td>
<td>1990: 625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Includes only those LRTNF forces oriented on European NATO.
2. Projections are consistent with NIE 11-6-78.
--These relatively modest quantitative changes in Soviet LRTNF are overshadowed, however, by significant, concurrent qualitative changes in the Soviet force. Principal among these are continued deployments of the Backfire medium bomber and the SS-20 IRBM.

--There are presently about 100 Backfires operational with the Soviet Northwest and Southwest bomber commands and the three Western fleet areas. Some 230 will probably be operationally deployed in these areas by 1985, and will be distributed about equally between Soviet naval and long-range aviation, largely as replacements for older aircraft.

--The low altitude and supersonic capabilities of the Backfire, as well as its improved avionics, and its stand-off ALCM armament, render it particularly suitable in the naval strike role, or as a complement to ballistic missiles in the land attack role.

--The first SS-20 IRBM launchers probably became operational in 1977, and about 60 are now thought to be oriented against Europe. It is projected that almost 200 will be arrayed against NATO by 1985.

--Its three to four independently targetable warheads are significantly more accurate than the single SS-4/5 warhead, and its mobile basing mode renders it vastly more survivable. It uses solid fuel, and for this and other reasons has a faster reaction time than the SS-4/5. The system probably will ultimately be deployed with two refire missiles.

**Graphic IV**

**Importance of SS-20 Refires**

--Given currently planned NATO TNF modernization programs, Soviet LRTNF-even without SS-20 refire missiles--will by 1985 exceed NATO's by a factor
## Comparison of Soviet & NATO LRINF in Europe

### In 1985, With and Without SS-20 Refires

**NOTE:** For all line items, the first figure indicates the number of delivery systems, and the second () the number of weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th></th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLM MR/IRBM</td>
<td>3 (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>229 (688)</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
<td>625 (2062)</td>
<td>675 (1406)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRINF</td>
<td>907 (2097)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1303 (3411)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNK5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>807+ (2097+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1303+ (3411+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Soviet projections are based upon NIE 11-6-78.
2. Assumes NATO LRINF modernization programs of currently foreseeable character and pace.
3. Based upon a projection of 2 refires per SS-20 launcher. It is felt that that about one-third of the SS-20 force will be equipped with 4-MIRF warheads.
4. Reflects projected changes in French theater nuclear inventories. In 1986 a sixth French SSBN will probably be operational, and will provide an additional 16 missiles.
5. An unknown number of Soviet ICBMs and intercontinental range SLMs may be targeted on Europe.
in on-target weapons. When refire missiles are incorporated into the analysis, this ratio increases to

---The inclusion of the into this comparison is offset to a unknown degree by the "central system" ICBMs and SLBMs which the Soviets are believed to have targetted against Europe.

**Graphic V**

**Implications**

---Improvements in Soviet and Pact theater nuclear forces at all levels are important in several ways...

---The growth and modernization of medium-range TNF enhance the Pact's ability to wage war in Central Europe at whatever level NATO or they themselves choose, without having to resort to USSR based bomber or missile forces.

---Once the mobile SS-20 is deployed in larger numbers, the increased survivability characteristics of this force will render it practically This in turn will enable the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint in a nuclear or near-nuclear conflict.

---If USSR-based TNF are employed, the large number of SS-20 warheads—including refires—and the high accuracy characteristics of that weapon would insure a high probability of prompt destruction of targets in Western Europe.

---In theory these developments increase substantially the Soviet/Pact ability to execute a variety of limited nuclear warfare options—in contrast to previous strategic doctrine which visualized a massive nuclear pre-emptive strike, or response to NATO's first use. In recent years, Soviet planners have been examining such nuclear options and contingencies.
-- These doctrinal reviews notwithstanding, Soviet writings and other evidence indicate that Soviet planners see little prospect of containing the intensity and geographic scope of a conflict once the nuclear threshold has been crossed by either side.

-- Perhaps the most significant implication of the growing Soviet and Pact nuclear superiority--at all levels--is the prospect that the military advantages to NATO of introducing nuclear weapons into combat have decreased. Consequently, the Soviets may believe--increasingly--that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

-- Currently programmed NATO modernization steps would probably not be viewed as altering these foreseeable and--for the Soviets--favorable nuclear force trends.

Pretty true even since 1st Apr.

nuc explosion
Implications of Soviet TNI Improvements

--Increased ability to wage nuclear war in Europe without escalating to USSR-based forces.

--If USSR-based TNI are considered...

*High survivability characteristics of SS-20 will permit the Soviets to behave with greater confidence and restraint.

*Large numbers of SS-20 warheads/refires and high accuracy characteristics insure high probability of prompt target destruction.

--In theory these developments...

*Enhance Soviet capabilities to execute limited nuclear options.

*The Soviets are presently exploring such options.

--Currently, however, Soviet planners appear pessimistic about prospects of containing intensity and geographic scope of any nuclear conflict.

--Growing Soviet/Pact nuclear superiority at all levels could cause Soviets to believe that NATO might be reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

*Current NATO TNI modernization programs would not be viewed as altering these trends.
*MY BRIEFING WILL ADDRESS SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES OPPOSITE N. AND IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET. I WILL BE DISCUSSING SOVIET DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE USED DURING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN EUROPE, FOCUSING IN TODAY'S PRESENTATION UPON THE LONGER RANGE SOVIET SYSTEMS. I WILL HIGHLIGHT THE QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDERWAY, PRESENT OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE ON THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (BOMBS AND WARHEADS) ASSOCIATED WITH THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS, AND PROVIDE SOME BRIEF COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET CONCEPTS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.*

3. *IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE FORCES FOR A EUROPEAN CONFLICT CAN BE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES: THE FIRST IS COMPRISED OF LONG RANGE SOVIET STRATEGIC PERIPHERAL FORCES LOCATED WITHIN THE USSR AND THE ADJACENT SEA AREAS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR USE IN A EUROPEAN THEATER OF WAR. THESE FORCES WOULD BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, EXERCISED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE FORCE HEADQUARTERS, IN SUPPORT OF THEATER REQUIREMENTS. THE SECOND CATEGORY CONSISTS OF TACTICAL SYSTEMS WHICH ARE, GENERALLY, OF SHORTER RANGE AND WOULD BE UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF A PACT FRONT OR FLEET COMMANDER. SINCE THE LATE 1960'S, BOTH CATEGORIES OF FORCES HAVE UNDERGONE IMPORTANT CHANGES IN BOTH SIZE AND CAPABILITIES.*

4. *I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE STRATEGIC FORCES TODAY. THE LONGER RANGE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CONSIST OF THE USSR-BASED MEDIUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE...*
WHICH IS DEDICATED TO NUCLEAR ATTACKS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER; 
T, THE USSR-BASED BOMBER FORCE WHICH IS INTENDED PRIMARILY 
FOR THEATER EMPLOYMENT; AND LASTLY AT THOSE NAVAL BALLISTIC 
MISSILE SUBMARINES WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE A PRIMARY MISSION OF 
STRIKING EUROPEAN TARGETS.

*90% OF THE SOVIET MR AND IRBM LAUNCHERS ARE DEPLOYED 
IN THE WESTERN USSR AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING AGAINST 
WESTERN EUROPE. THE REMAINDER ARE TARGETED AGAINST EITHER 
THE PRC OR OTHER PERIPHERAL TARGETS. THIS MAP SHOWS THE 
GENERAL LOCATION IN WHICH MOST OF THE MR/IRBM LAUNCH COMPLEXES 
ARE DEPLOYED.

THE SS-4 MRBM WAS INITIALLY DEPLOYED IN LATE 1958, AND 
IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER A SOFT OR HARDENED SITE. ITS RANGE 
OF COVERAGE AGAINST NATO TARGETS IS INDICATED.

THE SS-5 IRBM BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1961, AND, LIKE THE 
SS-4, IS LAUNCHED FROM EITHER SOFT OR HARDENED LOCATIONS. IN 
FACT, APPROXIMATELY 80 PERCENT OF THE SS-4S AND SS-5S ARE 
DEPLOYED AT SOFT SITES, EACH OF WHICH HAS THE CAPABILITY TO 
FIRE A SECOND MISSILE 2-4 HOURS AFTER THE FIRST MISSILE HAS 
BEEN LAUNCHED. *A NEW MISSILE, THE SS-20, HAS BEEN DEVELOPED 
AND THE FIRST BASE OPPOSITE NATO ATTAINED AN OPERATIONAL 
CAPABILITY IN THE SUMMER OF 78. THIS SYSTEM HAS A GREATER 
RANGE THAN THE SS-5, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY: IT IS MORE ACCURATE, 
IT IS A ROAD-MOBILE SYSTEM WITH AT LEAST A LIMITED OFF-ROAD 
CAPABILITY ON FIRM, REASONABLY LEVEL TERRAIN; IT HAS A 
MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY, AND HAS A MIRV'ED WARHEAD WITH 
THREE REENTRY VEHICLES. WE EXPECT THAT EVENTUALLY THE SS-20

SEVEN OPERATIONAL SS-20 MOBILE MISSILE BASES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED TO DATE LOCATED IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE USSR, AS SHOWN. (PAUSE)

THE CURRENT NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL MR/IRBM LAUNCHERS IS SHOWN HERE. (PAUSE)


HERE IS A MORE DETAILED TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MR/IRBM FORCE. THE TOTAL INCLUDES A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH OF THE SOFT-SITE SS-4 AND SS-5 LAUNCHERS AND A REFIRE MISSILE FOR EACH SS-20 LAUNCHER. ADDITIONALLY, THE SS-20 FIGURE ACCOUNTS FOR THE THREE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON EACH MISSILE.

IN ADDITION TO THE MR/IRBM FORCE, THE SOVIETS HAVE ABOUT 1,400 ICBMS, SOME OF WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST EUROPEAN TARGETS IF NECESSARY. IN THE LATE 1960S, THEY BUILT 120 SS-11 LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE ORIENTED SO AS TO PROVIDE BETTER COVERAGE OF WEST EUROPEAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN TARGETS. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THESE MISSILES HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY NEWER SYSTEMS, THE SOVIETS MAY CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE SOME OF THE ICBM FORCE TO EUROPEAN TARGETS. ALL THE USSR'S NEW
ICBMS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO BE LAUNCHED IN NEARLY ANY DIRECTION
IN ADDITION, ALL BUT THE SS-18 ICBM HAVE BEEN TESTED AT
REDUCED RANGES.

* THE LARGE SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOMBER FLEET OF LONG
RANGE AVIATION (LRA) HAS EXISTED PRIMARILY FOR OPERATIONS
AGAINST NATO FORCES. INDICATIVE OF THIS IS THE FACT THAT 75%
of this fleet is deployed in the Western USSR, within the
combat radius of European targets without aerial refueling or
staging.

THE BADGER, WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE
FORCE, ENTERED SERVICE OVER 20 YEARS AGO AND HAS NOT BEEN
PRODUCED SINCE 1959. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS ARE SEEKING
to extend the useful life of these aircraft by equipping
them with improved air-to-surface missiles.

* THE BLINDER, A DESIGN OF THE LATE 1950s, BEGAN TO ENTER

* THE FORCE BASED OPPOSITE NATO NOW CONSISTS OF ABOUT 139
BLINDERS AND 237 BADGERS. 168 BADGERS OPPOSITE NATO ARE
EQUIPPED WITH AS-5 OR AS-6 MISSILES BUT CAN ALSO BE USED AS
FREEFALL BOMBERS. THE OTHER 69 STRIKE-CONFIGURED BADGERS
HAVE ONLY A FREEFALL BOMBING CAPABILITY. ABOUT 64 OF THE
BLINDERS CARRY THE AS-4 AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE AND DO NOT
HAVE A BOMBING CAPABILITY. 75 BLINDERS ARE CONFIGURED AS
GRAVITY BOMBERS ONLY.

THE LRA FORCE IS BEING UPGRADED WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF
THE NEW BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH BECAME OPERATIONAL IN 1974; 50
CURRENTLY OPERATIONAL WITHIN LRA.
The Backfire has Swingwings which enable it to cruise at supersonic speeds at higher altitudes and at subsonic speeds at low altitudes. It is equipped with ECM equipment to facilitate penetration of modern air defenses. The Backfire can carry either nuclear bombs or ASMs.

Backfires, such as the ones based at Poltava in the USSR, would be able to fly a high-speed, low-level penetration mission, with the flexibility to strike a greater number of more distant targets in Europe than either the Badger or Blinder.

Shown here are the respective ranges of Backfire and Badger ASM carriers. Note that the Backfire mission profile includes a 200 mile low altitude penetration while the Badger is an all high altitude profile.

This table presents our current estimate of the number of nuclear weapons (bombs and ASMs) which might be carried by Soviet long range aviation aircraft. The representative weapons loadings used to compute the totals shown vary from one ASM on the Blinder "B" up to four nuclear bombs which could be carried by the Backfire.

Turning now to submarines: Ballistic missile submarines having missiles with ranges of up 1600 NM are probably assigned targets in Western Europe as their primary mission. The GULF-II (Pause) and HOTEL-II class submarines initially served as part of the Soviet intercontinental attack force, but by the mid-1970s the availability of newer, more modern Yankee & Delta class submarines allowed the Soviets to begin relieving these older units of their intercontinental mission. Recent patrol...
Patterns suggest that almost all operational Golf-II and H-III class ballistic missile submarines have shifted to theater attack missions.

In 1976, the Soviets transferred six Golf-II class submarines from the Northern Fleet to the Liepaja naval base on the Baltic Sea—the first deployment of ballistic missile submarines to that operating area. From the port, itself, Golf-II class submarines fitted with their 750 nm SS-N-5 missiles could cover targets in West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Scandinavia without leaving local waters. By moving to the area off the coast of Poland, as shown, they could extend missile coverage to include much of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. There are four Hotel II class SSBNS based with the Soviet Northern Fleet. It would take these units some time to deploy to a position where their SS-N-5 missiles would be within range of all West European targets.

The 1600 nm range arc, shown, depicts the range of the SS-N-6 missile carried by the Golf IV SSBN assigned to the Northern Fleet. In addition to the Golf and Hotel submarines, Yankee and Delta class SSBNS could also be employed against Europe.

Shown here is a summary of the long range Soviet weapons which we estimate could be used in a European conflict. In addition to the weapons dedicated for use in the theater, the Soviets can also employ some of their ICBMs, intercontinental range bombers, and their Yankee and Delta class submarines against European targets as they deem necessary. (Pause)
I would like to turn now briefly to the question of Soviet concepts for the employment of their nuclear forces. The Soviets apparently believe that a war in Europe will probably begin with both sides using only conventional weapons; however, they are clear in stating that this should be viewed as only a phase of operations. The military objectives of defeating NATO military forces and seizing and occupying NATO territory and resources would be achieved through the execution of a rapidly advancing combined arms offensive. A primary objective of military operations, during the conventional and/or a nuclear phase of conflict, would be the destruction or neutralization of NATO's nuclear forces.

Finally, but perhaps most important for today's discussion, the Soviets believe that even if the war begins conventionally, escalation to nuclear conflict is very likely. Thus we see a major concern over the transition from conventional to nuclear operations, with a stress upon the need for forces to be constantly prepared to make the transition while retaining the initiative in offensive operations. In this regard, the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons are militarily important and advantages will accrue to the side which first uses them decisively. Thus there is considerable emphasis upon being prepared to preempt NATO in the large scale use of nuclear weapons.
IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO INDISCRIMINATE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, CURRENT SOVIET NUCLEAR TARGETING STRATEGY APPEARS TO BE BASED ON COUNTER-MILITARY OR COUNTER-FORCE TARGETING. SUCH A STRATEGY IS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH OF THEIR MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOALS WHICH WOULD BE THE DESTRUCTION OF NATO MILITARY FORCES AND THE OCCUPATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE ACQUISITION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE WOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS A MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN THE POST-WAR BALANCE OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS EMPHASIZE LARGE-SCALE PREEMPTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY DO HAVE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE. APPARENTLY BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 1971, THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED THAT EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS OTHER THAN RELIANCE UPON A LARGE-SCALE, THEATER-WIDE STRIKE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

THE ON-GOING IMPROVEMENTS IN SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL FLEXIBILITY ARE SUCH THAT THESE NUCLEAR OPTIONS COULD BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED IN A EUROPEAN CONFLICT. HOWEVER, PREEMPTION, DECISIVE LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN THE CONCEPT OF GRADUATED ESCALATION REMAIN AS MAJOR TENETS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE.

IN CONCLUSION, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DECISIVE AND THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO WAGE NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTIVELY IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY. THE LONGER RANGE SYSTEMS WHICH I HAVE ADDRESSED
TODAY (AS WELL AS THE SHORTER RANGE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS) ARE BEING IMPROVED BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY AND THE SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO EXAMINE THEIR CONCEPTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE FORCES.
EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR FORCES

ESTIMATE OF TOTAL WEAPONS

IMPROVEMENTS

QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE

SECRET DELIVERY SYSTEMS

OVERVIEW
NUCLEAR FORCES
FOR
EUROPEAN CONFLICT

- STRATEGIC FORCES
  - IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS

- TACTICAL FORCES
  - IN EASTERN EUROPE
  - IN WESTERN USSR
  - IN ADJACENT WATERS
STRATEGIC FORCES
IN USSR OR ADJACENT WATERS.

USSR-BASED MRBM AND IRBM FORCE

USSR-BASED INTERMEDIATE AND LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCE

NAVAL BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE FORCE
SS-20 MOBILE IRBM

RANGE: 5,000 KM
CEP: 385 M

ADVANTAGES

INCREASED SURVIVABILITY

MORE ACCURATE THAN CURRENT IRBM/MRBM FORCE

REDUCES NEED FOR DEPENDENCE ON ICBM FOR PERIPHERAL ATTACK

MULTIPLE REFIRE CAPABILITY
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MR/IRBM LAUNCHERS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS-4</td>
<td>1,950 KM</td>
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<td>SOFT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>HARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-5</td>
<td>4,100 KM</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>SOFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>HARD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-20</td>
<td>5,000 KM</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>MOBILE</td>
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# Estimate of Soviet Weapons Opposite NATO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM</td>
<td>1,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>1,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,318</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Additional:**
- ICBMs
- Long Range Aircraft
- SLENS
Soviet Military Strategic Concepts: European Conflict

- Opening Conventional Phase
- Combined Arms Offensive
  - Defeat Military Forces
  - Seize and Occupy Territory/Resources
- Destroy Enemy Nuclear Means
- Escalation Likely
  - Concern over Transition
  - Emphasis on Preemption
Targeting strategy is an outgrowth of military-political goals.

- Current Soviet targeting strategy is counter-force.

Occupation of Europe and acquisition of economic-industrial base a major goal.
SOVIETS SKEPTICAL OF LIMITED NUCLEAR USE

- LIMITED OPTIONS COULD BE EMPLOYED BY SOVIETS
- PREEMPTION, LARGE-SCALE USE, AND DISBELIEF IN GRADUATED ESCALATION CHARACTERIZE SOVIET DOCTRINE
MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution
FROM: ACDA/ISP - John Newhouse
SUBJECT: TNF Arms Control Issues Paper

(C) Attached is a draft paper entitled "Issues in Theater Nuclear Arms Control." It is intended for presentation to the Allies at the April meeting of the SG, along with the papers from State and CIA. Much of the language of this paper was taken from the interagency-cleared State/ACDA paper of last October, which was prepared for (but never presented to) the November 20 NAC.

(C) Because the paper will be discussed at this Thursday's SCC meeting, we would appreciate it if you would send your comments to Robert Nurick (Room 4494, 632-7439) by COB Wednesday, April 11.

Attachment: as stated

Distribution

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP81B00401R001500010001-7
I. Introduction

The accompanying paper outlines some preliminary US thinking about the general objectives which TNF arms control might serve, and about some principles which might guide the Alliance in considering specific negotiating approaches. The thinking in that paper reflects in part a US working-level assessment of larger political, military, and arms control considerations, but also of the underlying technical issues which would be involved in negotiations on theater nuclear systems.

This paper describes these latter issues and presents important analytical considerations bearing on them. In a few cases, tentative conclusions are suggested. These represent US working level views only. More often, our analysis has narrowed the range of plausible outcomes but has not yet led to firm judgments.

II. Major Issues

A. Systems to be Covered

This section describes the systems and forces which might be candidates for arms control negotiations on theater nuclear forces. The focus is on long-range US and Soviet theater nuclear forces in Europe. Systems limited by the SALT TWO Treaty, as well as British and French nuclear systems, are not considered.

The figures given below for long-range forces include those deployed in all of Europe, including the USSR to the Urals;
figures for shorter-range forces include only those in the three Western Military Districts (WMDs). The issue of distinguishing long-range systems from other systems is considered later.

1. **Long-Range Systems**

For purposes of discussion, ballistic and cruise missiles are categorized according to whether they are land- or sea-based.

**Land-Based Missiles**

The primary candidate Soviet land-based missile system is the mobile SS-20 IRBM, of which over 200 firing units (a transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL, and three missiles) may be deployed in the western USSR by the mid-1980s. Additionally, about 100 SS-20 firing units may be deployed in the eastern Soviet Union in this same period. Other candidate systems are older SS-4/SS-5 M/IRBMs deployed in the western USSR and intended for use against NATO; these systems are being retired concurrent with the introduction of the SS-20. Any future Soviet long-range GLCM would also be a candidate for limitation.

The primary US candidates for inclusion are the GLCM and the PLIXR, both with a 1983 IOC.

**Sea-Based Missiles**

Candidate Soviet systems in this category are current and future SLCMs, and older SLBMs not limited by SALT. At present, six Soviet Golf II class submarines are deployed in the Baltic, each with three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles. Candidate US systems include possible future land-attack SLCMs.
Soviet long-range theater aircraft are currently deployed with the forces of Long-Range Aviation (LRA) and Naval Aviation (SNA). Available for use in Europe are the Backfire medium bombers and the older Badgers and Blinders of the 1st (Smolensk) and 2nd (Vinnitsa) LRA Armies, and those in SNA deployed in support of the Baltic, Northern, and Black Sea fleets. Additionally, LRA bombers deployed with the Far East Bomber Corps (Irkutsk) and SNA bombers with the Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force might be considered.

On the US side, and apart from heavy bombers limited by SALT, the system of greatest concern to the Soviets is the F-111 fighter bomber (and the FB-111, if limits are world-wide or if it is deployed in the theater); 175 F-111s (156 UE plus 19 float) are currently based in the UK, with a larger number based in the US.

2. Other US and Soviet Theater Nuclear Systems

Other US and Soviet theater nuclear systems which might theoretically be included in negotiations are nuclear-capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles and rockets, and nuclear-capable artillery.

US aircraft which are considered nuclear-capable and based in Europe are the F-111 (discussed earlier), the F-4, and the carrier-based A-6 and A-7. These are the aircraft which the Soviets have explicitly identified as "forward-based systems" in the SALT context. Because Soviet practices with respect to nuclear delivery aircraft differ from those of the
US, approximately 1,200 contemporary tactical aircraft are judged to be nuclear-capable. These aircraft include Fishbed (Mig-21 J/K/L), Flogger B (mig 23), Flogger D (Mig 27), Fitter A (SU-7), Fitter C (SU-17), Foxbat (Mig-28), Brewer (Yak-28), and Fencer (SU-24). Approximately 2,500 of these types of aircraft are deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union. Only about one-third of these aircraft are presently nuclear-qualified and assigned, although the percentage is expected to rise steadily through the 1980s.

Both the US and the USSR have tactical missiles deployed in Europe. US nuclear-capable systems comprise 115 Pershing Ia launchers (108 UE plus 7 float) with 198 missiles (the more accurate long-range PIIIXR could replace the current system on a one-for-one basis), and 40 shorter-range Lance launchers, as well as nuclear-capable Nike Hercules SAM launchers which could be used in a surface-to-surface role. Soviet forces are presently equipped with the SCUD SSM, the FROG rocket, and Scaleboard launchers. Replacements for all of these systems are expected in the 1980s. The Soviets have completed development of follow-ons for the FROG (the SS-21) and for Scaleboard (the SS-22). A possible follow-on to the SCUD is in an early stage of flight testing.

US forces presently have 155 mm and 203 mm artillery deployed in Europe, of which about 612 tubes are nuclear-certified. Soviet forces in Europe do not have
nuclear forces. It has been estimated that the Soviets have the technology to develop a nuclear projectile for the 152 mm artillery, but no evidence exists that they have fielded such a capability. Soviet 203 mm artillery and 240 mm mortars apparently are nuclear-capable, but these systems are presently deployed only in USSR.

3. Factors Influencing Inclusion/Exclusion of Systems

Decisions as to which systems should be included in, or excluded from, actual negotiations on theater nuclear forces will reflect both political and military considerations.

Political Factors

Political considerations could center on those longer-range and more modern systems which have been the principal source of concern in the Alliance about the dynamic trends in theater nuclear deployments, and which have acquired significant political "visibility" as a result. Immediately obvious examples include the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and Backfire bomber, and US ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles and PJXR. These systems are not only the focus of current political attention, but also--by virtue of their long-range and technological sophistication--represent qualitatively new factors in the overall nuclear balance. Appropriate limitations on this relatively narrow set of systems would thus be responsive to the military implications and attendant political impact of Soviet TNF modernization. Moreover,
focusing on these modern systems could directly strengthen the arms control objective of stabilizing the European nuclear balance over the long term, on the grounds that it is precisely these highly "visible" long-range systems which have the greatest potential to generate an uncontrolled action/reaction cycle. Finally, such a focus might reinforce the SALT process by seeking to control theater asymmetries which could otherwise undermine strategic parity.
Broader Military Factors

Although the particular features of an arms control approach may also be determined by political criteria, fundamental to the consideration of TNF arms control approaches would be the military desirability of possible negotiated outcomes. Military criteria will play a central role in determining: (a) what limits would be acceptable on what Western systems; and (b) the overall acceptability of a negotiated outcome, especially in comparison with the outcomes expected in the absence of any negotiated limitations.

Important military factors include: (a) the adequacy of permitted US and NATO forces to fulfill the requirements of NATO doctrine; and (b) the degree of threat posed by specific Soviet/Warsaw Pact weapons systems, including those not limited in an agreement.

For instance, military effectiveness criteria (similar to those applied by the HLG to its consideration of TNF modernization) will bear on the assessment of what limits would be acceptable on what US systems. These criteria include inter alia: the maintenance of a broad range of escalation options; adequate target coverage; the suitability of permitted systems for escalation control; ability to penetrate defenses; adequacy in numbers; and survivability.

With respect to candidate Soviet systems, it will be important to evaluate the military and political significance of systems not covered by an agreement. For
example, if important limitations were placed on systems above a given range (e.g., 1,000 km), the Soviets might increase deployments in Eastern Europe of shorter-range systems, or redeploy current shorter-range systems to provide greater coverage of NATO territory. These systems could in some respects pose as great threat to targets in NATO Europe as do longer-range systems based in the USSR, even though they have so far attracted relatively little political attention.

Choices among alternative range thresholds are thus likely to be of central importance. To illustrate some of the considerations bearing on this choice, two arbitrarily-chosen range thresholds are briefly examined here:

1,000 km: A range floor (below which a nuclear delivery system would not be limited) of 1,000 km would, in the case of missiles, catch principal modern systems on both sides, and exclude current Pershings and Scudboard. Such a threshold would probably be easier to verify than a lower threshold, and would provide greater flexibility for shorter-range systems. It would also include fewer US systems for which there are Allied analogues, thereby making it more difficult for the Soviets to argue for compensation/for, or inclusion of, Allied systems. By the same token, however, it would tend to shrink the US aggregate if applied at an early date, and since the USSR can place West European targets at risk with systems of relatively short range, if they are deployed in Eastern Europe, would increase Soviet potential to circumvent the limitations. In this case, the Alliance might want to consider whether some kind
of separate ceiling on NGA deployments of sub-1,000 km missiles would be feasible or desirable.

500 km: A 500 km range floor would bring such systems as Scaleboard and current Pershing under limitations, thus increasing the US aggregate and offering greater negotiating leverage in an early negotiation. It might also somewhat reduce Soviet ability to exploit geographical asymmetries through East European deployments of shorter-range systems, although by the same token it might reduce US flexibility as well. It would also probably pose greater verification problems, however.

Other Factors
There are two major additional factors which will affect which systems are included in or excluded from potential TNF arms control negotiations. First is Soviet criteria for inclusion/exclusion; Soviet perspectives on TNF arms control are discussed in an accompanying paper. Second, negotiating approaches will have to be assessed for their verifiability. Verification questions are likely to be very complicated; they are discussed in section II-D below.

Technical Criteria
Finally, there is the question of developing appropriate criteria to identify systems for inclusion in the

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limits. It then becomes an indicator of range of aircraft and missiles by means of a simple range criterion, by range/take-off weight or range/payload formulae, or by means of a generic listing (as for "heavy bombers" in SALT). A 1,000-km range floor would create many ambiguities: there are many systems having an assessed operational radius of close to 1,000 km, and the nominal range estimates for aircraft are very sensitive to profile and load assumptions. It is possible to eliminate these ambiguities for aircraft, and still catch major systems of interest, by raising the range floor to 2,000 km, but this could create the presentational problem of justifying different range criteria for missiles and aircraft. (If PIIs are to be used for negotiating leverage, then the range floor cannot be set higher than about 1,500 km.) In any case, explicit agreement as to what systems are to be limited would probably be necessary to avoid misunderstanding. A generic listing on the SALT precedent, with agreement on what types are covered, may thus be preferable.

B. Geographic Scope

There are several types of geographic constraints which could be applied to theater nuclear arms control limitations, e.g., Western Europe and Eastern Europe, excluding the USSR; Europe to the Urals; or constraints which encompass US and Soviet territory, either explicitly or in terms of limits on world-wide inventories. A related question is whether specific
ocean areas should be included in any arms control approach involving sea-based systems. Although the geographic scope of an agreement would be linked to the types of systems that would be covered, an important consideration would be that a significant portion of Soviet theater nuclear forces are stationed on Soviet territory.

Therefore, an agreement would have to include at least Eastern Europe and most of Western Russia (by convention, "to the Urals," though it could be defined by longitude or distance from the western border).* For reciprocity, the Western side would have to include at least all of Western Europe (for forces of the type and nationality covered). This "Europe-only" focus would not include any further geographic areas, nor impose world-wide limits on testing, production, or deployment.

There are several possible problems with a restricted geographic focus. First, most of the weapons under consideration are more-or-less mobile; even if removed from a specific area, they could rapidly be reintroduced. This is particularly true of aircraft; long-distance movement of mobile missile launchers would take somewhat longer. (In addition, most such missiles are also dependent upon ground support facilities which are both extensive and fixed).

Nevertheless, much of the effects of such an agreement would be on peacetime deployments only (as is the case for MBFR). This has both advantages and disadvantages.

*The SS-20 poses a particular problem, in that it can be based somewhat east of the Urals and still strike NATO territory.

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Although world-wide inventories of either surface or submarine-based systems are reasonably verifiable, restrictions on deployments within limited areas (e.g., the North, Norwegian, and Mediterranean seas) would be hard to verify for surface systems, impossible for submarines, and circumventable in a crisis.

One possible approach to deal with these problems would be to seek global limits in combination with regional sub-limits. Such an approach might be particularly attractive if aircraft are to be limited, or if the agreement is to be of relatively long duration. For example, there could be a global limit on aircraft plus missiles, with a sub-limit on missile deployments in Europe.

C. Types of Limits

1. Possible Form of Controls

The forms of controls which might be placed on long-range theater nuclear forces include:

-- quantitative limitations, such as ceilings, freezes, and reductions. One approach would be to establish an overall numerical ceiling on the limited systems, and allow flexibility within that ceiling. Thus, the SALT I Interim Agreement set limits on the number of SLBM launchers on each side, and the SALT II aggregates are ceilings and sub-ceilings on various types of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

-- geographic deployments limitations. These would essentially be quantitative limits applied to specified areas. As noted above, they would present special problems in the case of mobile systems such as ships, aircraft, or air-transportable systems.
limitations, restrictions on testing, limits on payload and launch weight, and limits on modernization and "new types." Qualitative restrictions could apply to the characteristics of the systems (size, throw weight, fractionation, missiles-per-launcher, etc.) to the activities associated with the system, or to both. SALT experience has shown both the difficulties and the potential of defining and negotiating qualitative restraints.

-- supplemental measures to reinforce the effects of other limitations or to enhance verifiability. Such measures could include production limitations and cooperative measures to assist in verification.

2. Equal vs Asymmetrical Outcomes

An issue of great importance in formulating a negotiating approach is whether or not the Alliance should seek equal aggregate outcomes. Factors to be considered include the following:

-- An outcome which appeared to contractualize a large Soviet numerical superiority might be very difficult to sustain politically.

-- Given the numerical asymmetries between US and Soviet LRNF, equal ceiling levels which might be both acceptable to the West and negotiable with the USSR may be difficult to set. In addition, given Soviet deployments against
China, where equal aggregate approaches especially difficult to negotiate.

--Equal aggregate outcomes at relatively high levels might create political pressures for additional and otherwise unnecessary US deployments. On the other hand, the fact that the agreement permitted this option might be an important political asset, even if the option were not exercised.

--It might be argued that equal aggregate approaches--even when applied to a limited number of systems--would risk creating perceptions of a separate "Eurostrategic" balance.

A major issue related to an equal aggregates approach is the treatment of the numerous older Soviet systems, especially SS-4/5s and Badgers. To include these systems in the limits would, in most cases, drive the ceilings to extremely high levels, while to exclude them by means of an age cut-off would appear to concede a near-term advantage to the Soviets.

However, although the near-term effect of such exclusion ("grandfathering") would be roughly equivalent to an agreement with asymmetrical ceilings, the resulting balance would move toward parity over time. (This effect can be reinforced by replacement rules, if negotiable, to contractualize the retirement and dismantling of older systems.) Thus, the lower ceilings which grandfathering allows would inhibit Soviet modernization over the long run, while focusing our negotiating leverage on limiting the modern Soviet systems of greatest concern.
In addition to the general issues noted above, a key question in determining what types of controls should be sought on LRNF is whether the actual item limited should be the launcher (or aircraft, as appropriate), the missile, or the warhead. For reasons of verifiability, it may be desirable to limit missile launchers rather than the missiles themselves. Both SALT and MBFR have taken this approach. However, the Alliance may also wish to consider the desirability and feasibility of collateral provisions to limit reloads, MIRV fractionation, etc.

D. Problems of Verification

The verification problems raised by given limits would depend not only on the systems to which they are applied but also on the nature of the overall agreement. Nevertheless, there are a number of general observations which can be made.

Quantitative limits on land-mobile systems could pose problems of verification with national technical means, depending primarily upon how the systems are deployed. Most mobile theater missiles have thus far been deployed during peacetime in reasonably-sized units (not autonomous launchers) based at known secure locations. Such peacetime deployments provide the opportunity to monitor missile activities over time, and, if continued, would considerably enhance the verifiability of deployment limits. (Thus, for example, we have a good idea of the number of SS-20 launchers being deployed.) Verifiability
might be negotiable. However, if deceptive deployment practices were used, then quantitative limits on land-mobile missiles—both ballistic- and cruise—would present serious verification problems.

—verifying quantitative limits on Soviet theater nuclear aircraft might require agreement on definitions and a mutual database, in view of the differences between Western and Soviet approaches to aircraft nuclear capability and assumption-dependent range estimates.

—nuclear vs. non-nuclear capability cannot be distinguished for missiles, nor are there any technical requirements for nuclear-capable aircraft that produce externally observable differences. Crew training activity and storage site signatures can be indicators of nuclear mission for Soviet aircraft which in turn implies capability, but they are not necessarily reliable or consistently available indicators of such capability.

E. Participation: Forums

1. Participation

There are two broad issues involved in the choice of a forum for potential negotiations on long-range TNF: the nationalities of the forces covered, and the implications for progress in other on-going arms control negotiations.

We have assumed that only the US and the Soviet Union would negotiate on theater nuclear issues and consider limits on their forces. We recognize, of course, that Soviet pressure for either inclusion of or "compensation" for Allied
systems are likely to be more effective, and obviate long-range French and British national systems because they are not dependent upon US warheads and are capable of striking Soviet territory. Apart from direct Soviet efforts to seek Allied negotiating participation, Soviet proposals for "compensation" for such systems could conceivably take other forms. In SALT, the US has not agreed to such compensation. For instance, the US rejected the Soviet attempt in SALT I to count increases in UK or French strategic forces against the US strategic limits.

We will also have to consider the implications of TNF negotiations for progress in other on-going arms control efforts. In general, the SG will have to consider the extent to which attempts to advance the objectives of theater nuclear arms control are likely to enhance, complicate or impede progress in SALT III or MBFR.

2. Forums

Limiting the scope of TNF arms control negotiations to US-Soviet systems argues strongly for using SALT III as the forum:

--the issues are likely, in any case, to arise there.

--using a separate forum could appear to isolate TNF issues from broader strategic questions.

-- using MBFR would greatly complicate the problem of limiting Soviet systems on Soviet territory, while avoiding limits on non-US Allied forces.

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SALT might make it easier to negotiate limits restricted to certain long-range US and Soviet theater systems.

However, we would have to achieve Soviet acceptance of our unilateral statement that their TNF, not just ours, must be subject to any limits. We would also have to deal with predictable Soviet arguments about circumvention/transfer, given Allied non-participation.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Being Drafted.
1. Following Aaron's informal consultations with Belgian, Dutch and Italian governments, an SCG meeting to assess the prospects for positive Alliance action on TNF by modernization and arms control by December 1979. Assuming a judgment that we should proceed on schedule, the track would be as follows:

2. Trilateral Consultations with British and Germans (already scheduled for March 29) to review Terms of Reference for new NATO Special Policy Group to deal with TNF arms control and related political issues. We might also air the Terms of Reference with Belgians, Dutch and Italians in advance of NAC discussion.

3. A reinforced NAC meeting (April 6) to receive reactions to US TNF arms control presentation of November 20, 1978, to review current thinking on TNF issues, and to establish the new Special Policy Group (SPG).

4. A High Level Group meeting to put the finishing touches on its report to the NPC. (April 13)

5. The NPC Ministers would discuss the long-range TNF modernization issue at their April 23-24 Ministerial meeting. The DPC and NAC Ministers will meet May 15-16 and May 30-31, respectively, and also discuss the issue.

6. The SPC would work through the spring and summer and prepare a report to be considered by the reinforced NAC in July. The aim of the SPC report would be to reach Alliance agreement on general objectives and principles of TNF arms control. A preliminary internal Alliance consensus at this point would serve two purposes: it would provide the intellectual framework for subsequent US proposals to the Alliance on TNF arms control. It would also put us in a position to respond to an aggressive Soviet TNF position in SALT III in the event this occurs before December 1979.
7. **Approved For Release 2002/09/04**: Develop an official US view on the specifics of an Alliance long-range TNF modernization program and on the contents of an Alliance statement on principles and objectives of TNF arms control. The latter would effectively provide a US mandate for TNF arms control in SALT III.

8. **In the summer — after completion of the SPG report and development of a US view** — the US would initiate bilateral discussions with Allied governments to discuss details of US thinking, especially on participation and basing — looking toward obtaining commitments before December 1979.

9. **An Alliance consensus of TNF modernization and arms control** at the December 1979 NAC/DPC Ministerials. Ideally, we would obtain a statement of Alliance approval of a TNF modernization program involving long-range TNF systems, with countries prepared to state individually how they intend to participate; we would also obtain a statement of Alliance support for negotiation in SALT III on long-range TNF, with a description of common Alliance objectives and principles, to provide the US a framework to develop a specific SALT III TNF negotiating position.
Speaking notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on TNF (Grey Area)

1. We do appreciate the seriousness of the Grey Area issue. It is up to the Alliance to come up with the right response.

2. As it concerns a threat to the Alliance as a whole, it is imperative that a solution be found which implies a maximum of solidarity of the allies.

3. Therefore the importance of participation is underlined and we understand that in this connection the allies are looking also at the Netherlands.

4. It is too early to take any decisions. In order to enable us to do so we need to have at our disposal an overall view of on the one hand the possibilities for the TNF modernization (weaponsystems) and on the other hand those for arms control.
   It is satisfactory indeed that now for this second aspect a special working group has been formed too.

5. In the context of the special Netherlands considerations it should be pointed out that it is my government's policy to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. This means that modernization of TNF shall not even give the impression of extending that overall role but it can mean that a certain shift in accentuation takes place within the field of the TNF. If that happens it is important that the number of nuclear warheads is not increased.

6. Finally it would like to point out that any further step regarding the ZEBB weapon would have a disastrous influence on the decision making on TNF modernization.

7. Summarizing I would like to state that decisions concerning this very complicated issue can at the very earliest only be taken at the end of this year. These decisions should be based on both recommendations concerning TNF one on modernization one on arms control, which will then be submitted to the Minister of the NATO countries.
Speaking notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on the NPG membership

The Netherlands Minister of Defence will at the following ministerial meeting at the Nuclear Planning Group present a formal proposal to modify the existing membership arrangements in order to make it possible for any NPG member to be represented at ministerial level on a permanent basis.

At the time of the creation of the NPG, the Netherlands already pointed out clearly the inconveniences of a restricted participation, which in itself is at variance with the principle of the equality of the allies. The U.S. argument that, in the light of the special and restrictive character of NPG matters, discussion in a more restricted composition was to be preferred, induced at that stage the Netherlands Government to accept the arrangements for a rotating membership of some of the NPG nations.

The nature of the subjects treated in those years helped to overcome our objections.

But since 1966 great changes have taken place. The whole question of nuclear defence has acquired enormous political importance. I mention CALT, and the growth of Soviet nuclear strength. We have now all kinds of questions in NATO dealing with the possible modernization of theater nuclear forces in particular, but not only those concerned with the so-called grey area. It is also clear that parliament and public opinion are acutely aware of the problem of nuclear weaponry and governments are required all the time to give the most specific explanations on the matters of nuclear policy to parliament.

As it is the responsibility of the Nuclear Planning Group to deal with these crucial issues which are so much in the forefront of our attention, it is really no longer acceptable that we are not full members at the ministerial level.
Memorandum of conversation Vice-President Mondale - Prime-Minister Van Agt and others during Mondale's visit to The Hague, April 21 & 22.
Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, apa/gs/1975-1984/1121
Translated by Ruud van Dijk

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Memorandum

From: Dr. C.A. van der Klaauw Date 23 April 1979
To: Mr. A.A.M. van Agt No. 18/79 SECRET

Following a report prepared by Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker and approved by me of the discussions in limited circle with Vice-President Mondale.

Present from the American side: Vice-President Mondale, Ambassador Joseph, National Security Advisor Clift.
Present from the Dutch side: Prime-Minister Van Agt, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Klaauw, and Ambassador Tammenoms Bakker.

The Prime-Minister opens the discussions and underlines the confidential and informal character of the meeting. He announces to want to raise three connected subjects:

1) production and deployment of Enhanced Radiation Weapons,
2) Grey Areas,
3) Dutch demand for a change in the composition of the Nuclear Planning Group.

Vice-President Mondale states that on American side too there is a desire to discuss these subjects, and he announces he'd like to add two other points: SALT and the Middle-East.

He begins the discussion with a survey of SALT, this at the special request of President Carter. He reports that the second SALT-agreement is practically ready. It mainly comes down to it that both sides involved can only design one new type of missile. Furthermore, satisfactory arrangements are envisioned to enable each side to observe what the other does and to determine if it keeps to the agreements. It appears the signing can take place very soon. President Carter has appealed to President Brezhnev in writing on the importance of having the signing by both heads of state, in the context of a more general summit meeting. That it has not come to a summit meeting between the two heads of state so far is the consequence of the fact that early on the Soviet side formed an incorrect judgment of President Carter. Now a better understanding has been established, and a meeting between the two heads of state can therefore be envisioned. It has not yet been decided where the meeting will take place. President Brezhnev's health probably makes it
difficult for him to undertake a long trip. For the U.S. it is unacceptable, however, to have the meeting take place in the Soviet Union, this both for reasons of prestige and with an eye on practical aspects which tend to occur in Moscow, like bugging and dividing the American delegation between several locations. During the visit to Stockholm a few days ago the Swedish prime-minister announced to Vice-President Mondale that the summit meeting would be held in Stockholm, but Mondale said that he had not received any information about this.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs says that he has heard from a French source--this with an eye on the coming visit to Moscow by President Giscard d'Estaing--that Brezhnev's health would have improved. He notes the general impression of the difficulties ratification of SALT II could encounter in the American Congress and announces that any Dutch help that would be welcome will gladly be given.

The Vice-President confirms that there are Congressional difficulties. The right wing uses, among other things, the argument that SALT II would be at the expense of the security of Western Europe. He rejects this representation, referring to the fact that there have been constant consultations with West European partners. He believes the idea is justified rather that SALT II will contribute to more security for the North Atlantic Treaty region. The more European leaders could speak about this aspect, the better. As a politician with a lot of experience in the Senate he has the feeling that the pessimism over the ratification of SALT II is exaggerated. He recalls that according to estimates initially only 8% of the American people was inclined toward ratification of the Panama-canal treaties, and this eventually did get through the Senate. Currently estimates point out that 70-75% of the American people wants ratification of SALT II. This mood can only have been reinforced by the recent occurrence at the nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. As a result of this the awareness of the need to reduce nuclear risks must have increased. He therefore foresees that the Senate will have to orient itself toward the national mood. An important aspect futhermore is that in an international negotiation over a matter as essential as nuclear arms the authority and the prestige of the President and the American system of government are at stake. At the moment however nothing can be taken as settled and the American Government would therefore be grateful for any help it could get from Europe.

The Prime-Minister notes that there can be no doubt over the expression of the Dutch position because Dutch public opinion practically unanimously is convinced of the importance of SALT II. He next brings up the issue that has become known under the keyword "neutron bomb." His government has constantly taken the position that production and deployment of Enhanced Radiation Weapons do not get rejected unconditionally. They do, however, have to be elements in arms control discussions with the Soviet Union and decisions have to depend on the course of these discussions. This has been the position thusfar. The attitude of the Dutch Parliament toward the neutron bomb, however, becomes ever more rejecting and the government is "fighting a losing battle." If premature decisions were to be taken a situation could develop which the government could not survive. He recognizes that in essence a decision over production and deployment falls under the sovereign prerogatives of the U.S., but points out that the
response of his government to a query from the side of the American President about a
decision for production of the neutrom bomb would be negative. Naturally this would
also be the case concerning a question about deployment of the weapon on European
territory. The Dutch government is especially worried about the following. On the one
hand it acknowledges the importance and the complexity of the problem and of the
arguments which can be used in favor of a positive decision. On the other hand a positive
decision about production, let alone deployment, of Enhanced Radiation Weapons would
make it extremely difficult to get parliamentary approval for the issue of modernization
of Theater Nuclear Forces. The mood in the Netherlands was undergoing a change. In the
past there only tended to be a small minority arguing for a complete removal of nuclear
weapons from Dutch territory. This group, however, was growing. In part this was a
reflection of a thought process, and subsequent positions, in the Dutch churches. A
complication like a premature decision over the neutron bomb would accelerate this
process and thus become a risk for the TNF-matter.

The Vice-President recalls that in the U.S. there is no lack of elements feeling emotional
aversion to the neutron bomb and the entire idea of nuclear arms. President Carter
himself belongs to these elements. Fact remained, however, that one has to counter one
way or another the large Soviet increase in other areas, like e.g. tanks. Some measures
have been taken in connection to the possibility that at some point there would have to be
a positive decision in regard to the neutron bomb. He underlined, however, that about
production itself no decision had been taken and that the ultimate decision would depend
in part on the behavior of the Soviets. The latter could also influence the European
positions. The American Government took the politically explosive character of the
question into account and hoped that the current stage of the decisionmaking could be
continued ("stabilised"). An aspect of the current situation was that a sword continued to
hang over the Russians' head and hopefully bring them to reasonable behavior.

The Prime-Minister says to realize that a negative decision cannot be had from the
American Government at this time. He adds, however, that in the Netherlands the
political pressure is considerable to reach that kind of a decision. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs adds that the government has maintained throughout that the issue of Enhanced
Radiation Weapons had to be employed in the context of general arms reduction talks.
Public opinion, however, began to wonder if anything was happening there. The pressing
political problem for the Dutch government consisted of the difficulty the issue of the
Enhanced Radiation Weapons could form during the discussion of the modernization of
Theater Nuclear Forces.

The Vice-President points out that for years he has presented himself as an arms
reductionist. However, since he has been able to observe the Soviet Union from a
position of responsibility for ten years he has become convinced that unilateral
disarmament from the side of the West would only encourage the Russians in their
ambitions. Persistent military pressure formed one of the means with which the Soviets
continually tried to exploit other possibilities in Western countries. During his recent visit
to Norway he had received striking examples of this again. One further needed to
recognize the fact that the Soviets constantly continued with the development of new
weapons-types. The Intelligence-reports of the U.S. point out that practically no month passes without a new development from Soviet side. As examples he mentions the appearance of a new generation of SS 20 and the fact that the Soviets are busy placing more warheads inside the missiles than is permitted under the treaties. Since 15 years the West has not introduced modernization in the Theater Nuclear Forces. The Soviets do this all the time and apparently seek to realize a breakthrough in this field.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs again underlines the increasing emotional character of the difficulties in the Netherlands. The campaign against the neutron bomb was initially started on the communist side but has since been taken up by other groups. At the moment a large majority of Parliament is concerned about the prospect of a new wave in the area of nuclear weapons, regardless of the form it takes.

The Vice-President recalls that he himself has agitated against anti-ballistic missile systems. Today he has to state to be glad to have lost this struggle. If the U.S. had not developed ABM the Soviets would have continued unilaterally in this area. The U.S. would then have had to take compensating measures later. The result is that now a balance has been established at the cost of 5 billion dollars, which otherwise would have cost 75 billion dollars. He did not expect however that from the American side a connection would be made between Enhanced Radiation Weapons and modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces and therefore did not foresee any reason for concern for the Netherlands.

The Prime-Minister notes that the time has not come yet for a decision on the modernization of TNF. One statement does need to be made by him in all clarity: the modernization of TNF could not even give the impression that the role of nuclear weapons systems is being increased. The Dutch government would argue for certain shifts within the area of TNF. The number of warheads could not be increased and he hoped very much that an approach like that would prove to be possible.

The Vice-President states that the U.S. in principle certainly is not inclined against the reduction of nuclear arms. It wanted however to see the level go down on both sides. At the same time the necessity of modernization remained, this as a result of the West being behind. Naturally there was a connection to the question of arms reduction in a more general sense. The urgent issue of modernization would preferably be approached in connection with the general matter usually referred to as détente.

The Prime-Minister notes again that he has not stated any personal opinions. He has painted for the Vice-President a precise picture of existing moods in the Netherlands and of the limits of the possibilities which manifest themselves for his government.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs adds to this that there is still a majority in Parliament that recognizes that nuclear arms remain necessary, but that the preference of this majority is for the concentration of efforts toward a few weapons-types. As far as the air force was concerned there was no problem yet, neither for the Lance; nuclear artillery however was doubtful already. It was absolutely mandatory to maintain this majority, but in order to
achieve this it would be necessary to be able to demonstrate that in overall terms a reduction and not an increase of nuclear arms was envisioned.

The Vice-President says to know from his parliamentary experience that time can often be gained by bringing several points together in one package. Could the Dutch Government not keep things quiet by emphasizing as much as possible the connection between détente/arms reduction and modernization? He acknowledged that discussions between the Netherlands and the U.S. about the entire complex of issues ought to be much closer. On the American side there had been a beginning already with the intensification of these discussions.

The Vice-President next asked for the Dutch opinion on the membership of the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Prime-Minister recalls that around this time discussions take place in Miami between the Ministers of Defense, where this subject is on the agenda. The issue is that circumstances have changed since the Netherlands accepted a rotating membership of the NPG years ago. Then nuclear armaments were practically entirely of a strategic nature; Theater Nuclear Forces at the most were at a beginning level. As a result of technological developments and increased emotional involvements, a country like the Netherlands nowadays felt connected territorially in every respect to the question of nuclear armament and its consequences. Hardly a week passed without the government having to answer questions in Parliament about nuclear issues. It had become essential now for the Netherlands to be involved in a credible way to all sides and in every respect with allied decisionmaking on nuclear arms. There was an additional aspect of a practical political nature. The current Dutch Minister of Defense enjoyed great respect in Parliament. But he would have to be able to demonstrate therefore to be able to achieve something vis-à-vis the allies. On this issue seen by the entire nation as so important, he had to be spared a defeat.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs gives several examples of the important contributions which the Dutch Government has made to allied defense and its modernization: the nuclearization of the Lance, the ordering of large numbers of new tanks, the ordering of navy aircraft, modernization and renovation in other areas. Against this background the Netherlands really should be able to claim a role in the overall thinking and decisionmaking process, especially in the most sensitive area.

The Vice-President says to be impressed by the Dutch presentation and promises to take up the issue of a revision of the membership of the NPG with Secretary of Defense Brown, in the sense that the Netherlands could become a member.

[next, there was a discussion of the Middle East; the meeting concluded with a brief comment by the Prime-Minister about a recent statement by Finnish President Kekkonen]
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 17450

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/29/85
TAGS: PFOR, IT
SUBJECT: SENATOR BYRD'S VISIT TO ITALY

1. SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND
MEMBERS OF THE SENATOR'S STAFF, MET WITH UNDERSECRETARY OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY ADOLFO BATTAGLIA ON FRIDAY MORNING, JUNE 29.
FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THE PARTY
CALLED ON MINISTER OF DEFENSE ATILIO RUFINI. THIS MESSAGE
REPORTS THE SENATOR'S CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH HIGH ITALIAN
OFFICIALS.

2. SENATOR BYRD TOLD UNDERSECRETARY BATTAGLIA (WHO WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY HEAD OF MFA DISARMAMENT OFFICE FERRETTI) THAT
BEFORE VISITING MOSCOW HE WAS MAKING ONLY ONE STOP AND THAT
IN ROME. HE WISHED IN SO DOING TO UNDERSCORE HIS APPRECIATION
FOR ITALY'S SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE. HE POSED FOUR QUESTIONS: (1) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW
THE SALT II TREATY; (2) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW THE MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS; (3) HOW DOES ITALY VIEW THE THEATER NUCLEAR
FORCE (TNF) MODERNIZATION QUESTION; AND (4) WHAT IS
ITALY'S VIEW OF THE TURKISH PROBLEM.

3. SALT II - BATTAGLIA, IN REPLY TO THE SENATOR'S FIRST
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QUESTION, STATED THAT ITALY SUPPORTS THE SALT II TREATY;
IT HAS NO PROBLEM WHATSOEVER WITH IT. WHILE THE AGREE-

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: THEODORE SELVIN
DATE/CASE ID: 17 MAY 2002 10000764
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4. AMBASSADOR GARDNER ASKED BATTAGLIA FOR HIS VIEW OF ITALIAN REACTIONS SHOULD THE TREATY NOT BE RATIFIED OR BE RATIFIED WITH EVISCERATING AMENDMENTS. BATTAGLIA REPLIED THAT THAT WOULD BE A "DISASTER." "YOU COULD NOT FIND," HE REMARKED, "A POLICITAN IN ITALY OR IN EUROPE WHO WOULD VIEW SUCH AN OUTCOME POSITIVELY." DETENTE, IN THAT EVENT, HE THOUGHT, WOULD BE STYMIED AND THE GERMANS COULD BE PROVOKED INTO DANGEROUS ADVENTURES WITH THE EAST.

5. SALT III. BATTAGLIA HAD COMMENTED EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION THAT IF ITALY SAW ANY PROBLEMS AT ALL WITH THE SALT II TREATY THEY WERE IN CONNECTION WITH ITS SUCCESSOR NEGOTIATION, SALT III. IN THOSE FOLLOW-ON

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TALKS, HE ADDED, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR EUROPE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE THAN IT HAD IN SALT II -- A ROLE WHICH WOULD ENABLE IT TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT GIVEN EUROPEAN CONCERN WITH SALT III, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AD HOC GROUP OF EUROPEAN ALLIES LOCATED IN THE CITY WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. THAT GROUP WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO CONSULT REGULARLY WITH ITS U.S. ALLY.

6. MBFR. BATTAGLIA HAD LITTLE TO SAY ON THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE DATABASE QUESTION AND TO INSIST ON COLLECTIVE TROOP
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8. In a more technical vein, he added that Italy was more concerned over the SS-20 than over the backfire bomber. While he thought it would be impossible to get the Soviets to renounce the SS-20's, perhaps negotiations could induce them to set ceilings on the missile's deployment.

9. Turkey: Italy was for various historical and geographical reasons considerably worried about the course of events in Turkey. The Italian government, he mentioned, had granted $40 million worth of credits to
10. SENATOR BYRD OPENED HIS CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE RUFFINI (WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL PISANO, THE ITALIAN MOD DELEGATE TO THE NPc) BY PAYING TRIBUTE TO ITALY'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO AND TO RUFFINI'S PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT PARTICIPATION. HE ASKED THE SAME QUESTIONS OF RUFFINI AS HE HAD OF UNDERSECRETARY BATTAGLIA.

11. SALT. RUFFINI REITERATED THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR APPROVAL OF THE SALT II TREATY. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE "FOLLY" FOR THE SENATE TO FAIL TO APPROVE IT. WHY? FIRST BECAUSE POLITICALLY SALT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE. SECOND, MILITARILY SALT SERVED THE REAL INTERESTS OF THE WEST. RUFFINI NOTED A RECENT ARTICLE IN "LE FIGARO" WHICH REPORTED THAT EVEN THE FRENCH VIEW SALT II POSITIVELY. THE CRUISE MISSILE PROTOCOL WAS NOT A CAUSE OF CONCERN TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT.

12. ON THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE, HE ECHOED THE LINE AND THE SUGGESTIONS OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY COLLEAGUE, SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO STRESS THE ASSURANCES ALREADY GIVEN THAT SALT WILL NOT SET OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF MILITARY COOPERATION AMONG THE ALLIES. HE HINTED THAT A SENATE STATEMENT ALONG THOSE LINES WOULD BE WELCOME.

13. TNF. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THAT TNF MODERNIZATION IS VERY MUCH NEEDED FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW TO BALANCE THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR BUILD-UP. FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, THE GOI HAD NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT. HE ADDED, BY WAY OF EXPLANATION, THAT PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN DISSOLVED UNTIL JUNE 20, NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS HAD OCCURRED; FOR THOSE AND OTHER REASONS, ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT PREPARED, HOWEVER, AND THAT PREPARATION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GREAT SENSITIVITY OF ALL NUCLEAR MATTERS IN THIS COUNTRY. THE EXPLANATION MUST BE WELL DONE AND WELL COORDINATED AMONGST ALL THE ALLIES. AT ALL COSTS, HE UNDERLINED, WE MUST AVOID A REPETITION OF THE N-ROZM AFFAIR. HE EMPHASIZED THAT A UNANIMOUS
DEcision on TNF Modernization was crucial. He referred to signs of discontent in Norway and Denmark, whose position on nuclear weapons in their countries is well known. He added, however, that the alliance needs to take a unanimous political decision in favor of deployment. Once that is taken, bilateral discussions can then ensue on deployment modalities.

14. Turkey. Italy as a member of NATO’s Southern flank was seriously concerned with Turkish difficulties. Italy recognized the need for both military and political aid to Ankara. Turkey’s economic and political frailties posed most serious threats to Mediterranean and alliance security.

15. Comment. Senator Byrd made clear to both officials that Senate ratification of START was by no means a foregone conclusion. End comment.

16. This cable was cleared by Senator Byrd.

Gardner

"Confidential"
July 12, 1979.

His Excellency
Andreas van Agt
Prime Minister of the Netherlands
The Hague

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Alliance consultations on theater nuclear forces have reached a stage where I believe it would be useful to supplement those consultations with bilateral discussions. Accordingly, I would like to send my personal emissary on these issues, David Aaron, to meet with you or with your appropriate Cabinet members the week of July 16, 1979. He will also consult with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the United Kingdom.

Alliance consultations so far reveal a broad consensus that Soviet nuclear efforts, especially such long-range theater nuclear forces as the SS-20, pose a military and political challenge to the Alliance. To meet this challenge, the Alliance needs to modernize by deploying long-range nuclear systems in Europe capable of reaching Soviet territory, and by being prepared to negotiate viable arms control agreements. This would demonstrate Alliance unity, strengthen the spectrum of deterrence, and maintain the perception in both East and West of a firm U.S. and Allied commitment to the defense of Europe.

TNF modernization can only be undertaken on the basis of Alliance consensus, and broad participation in this effort. It will require steadfastness and determination to obtain an Alliance consensus on theater nuclear modernization and arms control, which I hope can be achieved by the end of the year. The work of the High Level Group on TNF Modernization and the Special Group on TNF Arms Control is putting the Alliance in a position where such decisions are possible.
I am ready to do my part to lead the Alliance to a consensus, but I will need your support. David Aaron will be prepared to discuss with you in detail our thoughts on how a common Alliance TNF modernization and arms control approach can be achieved. In particular, he will be prepared to discuss possible specific roles which the Netherlands might play in Alliance TNF modernization. The U.S. has under development the weapons systems appropriate for TNF modernization and is prepared both to suggest the force mix and to make the systems available. On the basis of his discussions with you, we can move forward with full Alliance consideration leading to concrete TNF modernization and arms control decisions.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jimmy Carter
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE INITIAL SOVIET APPROACH

Summary

The Soviets may try to preempt the anticipated NATO proposal for theater nuclear arms control, due this December, with a prior initiative of their own. Their aim will be to rally West European opposition to NATO plans to deploy new long-range theater systems.

Moscow likely will calculate that, to have the desired political appeal, the initial Soviet proposal should be simple in content and focus on first steps, not ultimate outcomes.

Moscow might open with a proposal to freeze deployment (but not production) "in Europe" of all new types of missiles of more than, say, 1,000-km. range. This freeze might be agreed by the conference of all CSCE participants on "military detente" that the Warsaw Pact has already suggested should meet this year. After taking this concrete first step, the participants should then, in Moscow's view, negotiate comprehensive reductions of nuclear weapons in Europe.

The impracticality of this proposal (impossibility of serious negotiations among 35 participants; likely NATO rejection) would be irrelevant to Moscow's immediate purposes—to throw sand in NATO's decisionmaking machinery by offering negotiations as a plausible alternative to new nuclear deployments in Western Europe. And NATO could decline the invitation only at political cost, given its likely appeal to many smaller prospective participants, inside and outside CSCE.
If this postulated opening gambit failed, Moscow likely would fall back fairly promptly (but with a show of reluctance) to the bilateral (US-USSR) negotiating mode—which most NATO members currently prefer for theater nuclear arms control. Stubborn insistence on Soviet procedural preferences would become self-defeating, on the premise that the USSR will see arms control talks as a promising means to slow or block new NATO deployments.

Whatever the precise form of Moscow's opening arms control move, it will be fashioned to advance basic Soviet objectives: to protect deployment programs of the new Soviet systems, especially the SS-20; to seize the political/propaganda high ground on the theater nuclear force issue; and to impede the development of an added NATO long-range theater nuclear capability.

Moscow probably has not yet sorted out its thinking on the best tactical means to these ends; there are signs of muddle in the Soviet leaders' efforts to position themselves to deal with the problem. They have, for the first time, agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations (e.g., Brezhnev's speech of March 2). Brezhnev in March asserted that the bargain should cover US forward-based systems (PBS) in Europe, but Gromyko in June reiterated that US PBS must figure in SALT III. Yet Brezhnev implied a preference for keeping theater nuclear negotiations outside the SALT framework, although he did not say what the alternative forum should be or who should participate.

Moscow is doubtless even further from resolving the basic substantive complexities of theater nuclear arms control: interface between control and peripheral nuclear systems; interface between longer and shorter range theater weaponry; global vs. regional approach; and formulas for covering PRC, French, and UK forces. These uncertainties about ultimate outcomes give Moscow added reasons for making a simple opening move in the European context, shaped to address the immediate problem without foreclosing longer term options.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope

Moscow recognizes that NATO may well decide in December to: 1) deploy long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF, land-based systems capable of striking well into the USSR from Western Europe); and 2) propose arms control negotiations about those forces and comparable Soviet nuclear weaponry targeted on NATO Europe (particularly the new SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber). The Soviets have already begun, in official statements and media commentary, to position themselves for that eventuality. No doubt they are reflecting on their own arms control proposal to preempt or respond to whatever NATO decides to put forward.

This paper:

--describes Moscow's current posture on theater nuclear force (TNF) arms control;

--sets out basic Soviet objectives that will determine Moscow's approach;

--assesses, against that background, possible Soviet gambits prior to or during the opening rounds of any TNF arms control talks; but

--does not attempt to estimate the detailed Soviet negotiating position that would unfold as such talks progressed.

3. Current Soviet Posture

In authoritative statements to date, the Soviets have:

--agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations.

Note on terminology: This paper uses the term "long-range theater nuclear forces" (LRTNF) to describe NATO weapons systems--existing or projected, capable of hitting the USSR from Western Europe--and the analogous Soviet forces (especially the SS-20 and Backfire), which have been at the center of current controversy and debate. The shorter label of "theater nuclear forces" is employed in the arms control context to conform with general usage and in recognition of the fact that arms control negotiations may eventually treat shorter range systems as well.
Indicated indirectly a preference for holding the negotiations outside the SALT III framework but have not categorically refused to open them in a bilateral SALT context; yet

not said what the forums should be or who should take part; and

made conflicting statements about how the subject matter should be addressed.

It appears that Moscow has not yet sorted out its thinking on the form and content of eventual TNF talks.

The first expression of willingness to negotiate about Soviet LRNF was elicited from Brezhnev by FRG Chancellor Schmidt during the former’s visit to Bonn in May 1978. Brezhnev’s statement was in response to FRG anxiety, conveyed to him by Schmidt, over new Soviet LRNF deployments, the Backfire bomber, and the mobile SS-20. Those private assurances to Schmidt were later confirmed in Brezhnev’s public statements. In Prague, shortly after his talks with Schmidt, Brezhnev said publicly, but without specific reference to LRNF:

“There is no type of armaments which the USSR would not be ready to limit, to ban on a mutual basis...on condition of full reciprocity of the states possessing respective armaments.”

The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee made essentially the same points in its declaration of November 1978.

Brezhnev picked up this theme in his electoral speech of March 2, 1979, but this time he directly linked the matter to prospective NATO LRNF deployments. He reiterated that the USSR would reduce nuclear weapons “on the basis of complete reciprocity,” adding, “this concerns also medium-range weapons in Europe, but with due account, of course, for the existence there of American military bases as well.”

Neither Brezhnev’s statements nor other official Soviet commentary have said whom Moscow would expect to take part in such negotiations. But the sequence of topics in Brezhnev’s March 2 speech—first SALT, then MFR, then the TNF issue—suggests that the bilateral SALT framework is not Moscow’s preferred forum for negotiations. Later, the Soviets apparently were more explicit on this point. Gromyko told Schmidt, during the Chancellor’s stopover in Moscow in late June 1979, en route to Tokyo, that the SS-20 should not be negotiated in

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SALT III because it was not a strategic weapon as defined in SALT I—this according to several FRG accounts of the conversation.

While Soviet statements have been vague on the forum, they have been contradictory on the content of any TNF negotiations. Soviet spokesmen have long insisted that US foreign-based systems must figure on the SALT III agenda—a position confirmed by Gromyko during his press conference in Vienna after signature of SALT II. Yet Brezhnev's March 2 speech, together with Gromyko's reported remark to Schmidt on the SS-20, points instead toward a bargain of Soviet LRTNF for US FBS.

It is barely conceivable that the Soviets would divide US FBS into two segments, proposing to negotiate about some of these systems in SALT III and others in the still unspecified TNF forum. More likely, Moscow has not yet thoroughly thought its way through the issue.

To fill in the remainder of this blurred picture, authoritative Soviet spokesmen have also said repeatedly that, at some (undefined) point, other nuclear powers must also participate in SALT III—a position Gromyko confirmed during his Vienna summit press conference. The underlying military rationale undoubtedly is that Moscow sees the level of Soviet central systems as a function partly of the French, UK, and PRC nuclear forces (as well as of US FBS) capable of reaching the USSR. Yet the level of Soviet peripheral attack systems also relates to the level of those same adversary forces. (These issues are treated in more detail in Section III below.)

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**Soviet Tactical Options**

Moscow will have several tactical choices to make in fashioning its opening TNF arms control position, including whether:

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- to take the initiative or to adopt a reactive stance, waiting to see what NATO comes up with before making a first move;

- in either case, to open with a comprehensive draft arms control protocol or to have a simpler initial offer, followed by a first step in a longer process; and

- with respect to forum, to keep pressing for a multilateral framework or to settle for bilateral US-Soviet talks, which most TNF sources apparently prefer.

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The Soviet leaders will make their choices in light both of their basic objectives, described in Section II below, and of their analysis of the inherent complexities of the problems, dealt with in Section III.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

In rough order of priority, Soviet objectives are thus

A) keep open Soviet LRTWF deployment plans;

B) block, delay, or reduce the extent of any new NATO LRTWF deployments; and

C) (partly to further B above) seize the politically-propaganda high ground.

A. To Protect Soviet LRTWF Options

Deployment of both the SS-20 and the Backfire responds to deep-seated and traditional Soviet views about defense of the homeland. Moscow's calculus begins with the premise that NATO has superiority in technology, industrial base, and manpower. It follows that, if war breaks out, the Soviets should have, in their view, forces powerful enough to overrun NATO Europe quickly, before latent Western strength can be mobilized and brought to bear militarily.

Early destruction of NATO's nuclear potential and other key targets in Western Europe will be crucial, in Soviet thinking, to early success of the Warsaw Pact ground offensive. There is good evidence that the Soviets assume that a period of tension and crisis would precede a major European conflict. They also calculate that NATO would use the political and strategic warning time to disperse targets and bring its air defenses, which the Soviet military regards as effective, to a high state of readiness.

Thus Soviet planners lack high confidence that their attack aircraft could effectively penetrate NATO defenses in the crucial central region, acquire and destroy their targets given the inherent difficulty of target acquisition in the low-level attack model, and recover to home bases without heavy losses.

But should the initial conventional air offensive fail or short of accomplishing its mission, and also suffer
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heavy losses, the Warsaw Pact ground offensive would be in grave jeopardy. (The evidence suggests that a Soviet attack on NATO Europe would be conventional, rather than nuclear, in its initial phase. The Soviets probably have little confidence that the fighting, once begun, would remain at the conventional level. They nevertheless have an obvious psychological interest in keeping the battle below the nuclear threshold if at all possible and apparently have geared their war planning accordingly.)

The Soviets' risk assessment with respect to the initial air offensive, cited above, gives them compelling reasons to improve the quality of their attack aircraft (bombers, interceptors, among other new, higher capability models) and to deploy more effective nuclear missile forces (the SS-20) for peripheral attack missions. The SS-20 provides, in Soviet thinking, an essential insurance factor to be called upon to destroy NATO's theater nuclear potential if the Soviet air offensive fails short. Recognizing the uncertainty of target location in many cases (e.g., mobile Lance and Pershing missiles), Soviet planning apparently involves nuclear barrage rather than point attacks.

Hence the perceived Soviet need for large numbers of accurate, relatively high-yield reentry vehicles, which the SS-20 system especially is designed to provide (four missiles per transport elevator launcher, three MIRV's per missile, rapid reload capability, high-yield warheads). The Soviets, of course, also prize the relatively invulnerability of mobile SS-20 to preemptive attack.

Western opinion reads these characteristics of the SS-20 as providing a threatening nuclear capability well beyond national defensive needs. Moscow, however, sees the capacity quickly to overwhelm NATO's essential to homeland defense—and the SS-20 as a vital element of that capacity.

Thus one may expect about Soviet resistance to any proposed reductions in the SS-20 deployment program or to constraining plans upon it. And if NATO itself deploys new long-range systems in Europe, this will increase the set of targets that the Soviet military will believe it needs the capacity to destroy. This element is not offered to contest the soundness of the NATO position that new Western deployments are militarily necessary or that the prospect of such deployments is assessed as the trendability of NATO arms control proposals favoring this category of weapons. Rather, the rationale is that new NATO deployments will tend to increase the Soviets' already considerable resistance to curtailing SS-20 deployments even below the planned level ... if that level...
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may be) and could even drive upward the number currently consi-
derered sufficient.

Much of the same reasoning applies to Backfire. As a
multipurpose system, however, Backfire presents a more com-
plex case, for reasons addressed in Section C.

B. To Impede or Delay New NATO Deployments

The Soviets see NATO moving toward a possible deployment
by year's end to deploy new nuclear systems in Western Europe
able of striking the Western USSR. Their media commentary
on the NATO spring ministerials showed an unmistakable bias
accurate reading of the tenor of the INMFS discussions. The
decisions they foreshadowed, and the hesitancy that would
persists in some Allied countries.

Yet the tone of Soviet media commentary has stayed in
the middle register, deploring NATO's allegedly misguided mil-
itarism but avoiding shrill denunciation. Why such modera-
tion? Partly, no doubt, because (in contrast to the enhanced
radiation weapons episode) no large and vocal body of Western
opinion has so far emerged to attack the proposed deployments.
Possibly also, Moscow simply is resigned to something it
regards as inevitable. It is more likely, however, that
Soviet restraint on this issue reflects both a disinclination
roll the waters before the US Senate finishes the SALT II
debate and a calculated decision to hold back a while longer
to see whether NATO can work its way around the nervous
reticence within some member-states.

In any event, Moscow probably recognizes that a decision
in principle to deploy would be one thing, actual deployment
quite another, and that in the interim, there would be time
to forestall, delay, or reduce the extent of the latter.

Thus, the Soviets likely will remain alert for any
opportunity to retard or block the actual deployments. They
inducedly will put forward its own course, an arms control
proposal designed to strengthen the hand of NATO's "doves,"
who prefer negotiation to deployment (see below for further
discussion).

The Soviets have both political and military reasons for
"jumping in" and to NATO's projected additions to its nuclear
armament. Historically, the USSR has always shown particular
sensitivity toward nuclear deployments in the FRG, even if
the systems are "shrouded" and assumed to "preserve German
security." And the Soviets might just assume that, if NATO's

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plans are carried out, much of the new equipment will be based in the FRA. Moreover, they will recognize that the LRFM deployments will bind the US's western military to the defense of its transatlantic allies.

Militarily, new NATO-LRFM-capable American sub-launched cruise missile rounds (GLCM's) will provide a new, potent cruise missile component that is not available in any other capability for deep interdiction strikes against reinforcements moving from the western Soviet Union to the central front. The Soviets assume, in the event of an early conflict, that the ground forces bearing the brunt of the initial Warsaw Pact assault would quickly shift to the south. They would therefore rely on rapid reinforcement by fresh units from the USSR to sustain the momentum of the offensive. The Soviets of course would have no effective defense against extended-range Pershing ballistic missiles and virtually none, for several years at least, against cruise missiles.

One can only speculate on how much weight the Soviet military would ascribe to the incremental addition to NATO's capacity in this area. It probably reckons that nuclear strikes designed to slow Soviet reinforcement of the central front already figure in SACEUR's General Strike Plan and in the US SIOP.

Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Soviet military threat analysis tends to make worst-case assumptions about NATO capabilities. Moreover, the new systems (if deployed) would add an array of relatively mobile targets to what the Soviet military probably considers an already formidable NATO Europe threat. In a similar vein, Moscow may have an uneasy sense that NATO is now preparing, for the first time, to confront the USSR on a terrain (land-based theater nuclear weaponry of longer range) where the Soviet advantage had previously gone unchallenged.

Hence one may conclude that the Soviets would ascribe a more than marginal significance to NATO's projected new systems—even though the numbers of warheads (100-500) now being considered by the Allies for those forces does not appear great compared to what could be deployed by either US or NATO land forces.

However, a deployment decision is taken, Moscow undoubtedly will not be quiet and its resentment to see Allied public and parliamentary support for the projected increase in NATO's

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LRTNF. The Soviets will bluster about the dangers to their homelands, and the added military risks to candidates best suited to them, while simultaneously putting forward arms-control proposals that would allegedly remove any political incentive for them to sale for the new systems.

C. To Seize the Political High Ground

This objective will be essentially directed to the carefully nurtured climate of doubt, into which the regime already has a very considerable stake, and to a strategy of undermining NATO's projected assurance of LRTNF. An arms-control proposal probably will become the centerpiece of this effort. Soviet media literacy will quote the inventory of the regime's "peace initiatives," which already clutter the international and European political agendas. The Kremlin undoubtedly will craft a peace initiative to fit this issue, by conditioned reflex as much as from rational calculation of political advantage.

III. COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEM,
AS SEEN FROM MOSCOW

The analysis that follows suggests that Moscow will prefer to open with a simple, straightforward initiative, contrived to appear as a plausible first step in a long-term negotiation, rather than with the outline of a comprehensive "solution." The almost intractable substantive complexities of TNF arms control will likely persuade Moscow that the simpler the opening gambit, the more effectively it will serve Soviet purposes.

A. The LRTNF-Central Systems Interface

Moscow cannot easily separate, either for military threat analysis or for arms control purposes, the peripheral nuclear strike forces—those deployed by the Soviets and those aimed at the USSR—from US and Soviet central systems. In fact, the very notion of theater as distinct from global conflict is alien to Soviet historical experience. The Russian homeland was very nearly overrun during two "theater" wars in this century.

Moreover, some Soviet central systems are assigned peripheral, not intercontinental, targets. Hence, substantial IATL III cuts in Soviet central systems would, in Moscow's view, require commensurate reductions in US central systems...
and in the peripheral systems targeted or the mass of hostile activity, increases in adversary capabilities vis-à-vis.

to the military requirements placed upon Soviet systems, peripheral systems, or both.

Yet the Soviet arms control application, pressured to produce in short order, everything the facial comprehensive proposal striking an acceptable balance among the widely divergent strategic weapons systems of all the nuclear powers, may find fusion between Brezhnev's recently suggested limits for LRTNF for US FRS, outside SALT III, and Gromyko's insistence shortly thereafter that the latter systems must figure in SALT III, suggests that systematic analysis of the nature at a politically relevant level had hardly begun in Moscow.

B. The Interface Between LRTNF and Shorter Range Theater Systems

Once arms control negotiations begin to deal with theater nuclear systems, there is no logical stopping place anywhere along the range spectrum—between, for example, the SS-20 at one and the FROG missile (organic to Soviet divisions; range about 70 km.) at the other. Each system can wreak enormous havoc and decimate large cities. Any cutoff point, based on operational range, automatically establishes an invidious distinction between the populated areas within and those outside the "privileged" zones thus created. Moreover, a state that is party to agreed constraints on LRTNF might circumvent those limitations by increases in its shorter range weaponry.

Any comprehensive proposal for LRTNF limits probably would have to address this circumvention issue, at least in rough outline, yet there is no evidence that Moscow has even begun to reflect seriously on the matter. Admittedly, the problem is more troublesome for Western (and Eastern) Europeans than for the Soviets; few of NATO's shorter range, land-based systems can effectively reach the USSR.

C. Whose Forces Should Be Counted?

This question would arise immediately if Moscow ultimately decided to accept a bilateral negotiating forum for theater nuclear forces. Specific rules or general criteria for dealing with the forces of the nonparticipant nuclear powers would be exceptionally difficult to devise. Any conceivable concrete Soviet proposal for resolving this problem would be subject to challenge over its data base (in the
case of PRC forces) and over the critical (for US defenses) military weight of disparate national systems.

The Soviets probably would see the point in more serious and far more detailed discussions, but they would not deal seriously with this problem in the present context. Even if a medium-term arms control proposal, the effort would lead to much argument, more confusion and controversy—rather than the factual high ground they would prefer to reach.

D. Regional Constraints Vs. National Interests

Dealing with the arms control regionally, rather than globally, would simplify matters in some respects but complicate them in others. PRC and Soviet far eastern forces would not be directly addressed, but the puzzle of how to counter French and UK forces would remain.

Moreover, Soviet planners would also recognize that a regional approach, if presented as a long-term solution, would lack credibility because their own aircraft could be flown very quickly from the far eastern to the western military districts of the USSR, or even into Eastern Europe (and American aircraft from CONUS to the European theater). The missiles in question (the SS-20 and probably the extended-range Pershing plus GLCM on the Western side) are also mobile but, as a general rule, would take more time and effort to move over long distances than aircraft.

Another problem the Soviets might foresee in the inclusion of aircraft would be disputes over the counting rule applying to their own medium-range models. They would doubtless wish to exclude, and expect the West to insist on including, Backfires (as well as the older Faders and Blinders) assigned to Soviet Naval Aviation. Those aircraft have external characteristics not significantly different from aircraft of the same model assigned to Soviet Long-Range Aviation, with a primarily land attack role.

Yet a proposed long-term regional "solution" without aircraft would be open to challenge because it left out of account so much of each side's nuclear potential.

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If the above description of the likely evolution of Soviet thinking on TNF arms control comes fairly close to the mark, then Moscow will be tempted to evade the more intrinsically simpler problems by deferring them. The Soviets would
see more immediate political advantage in a limited but
appealing first step that could be taken soon, coupled with
a commitment to good faith but necessarily more limited
subsequent negotiations on a comprehensive arms control
package.

IV. LIKELY INITIAL SOVIET POSTURE

A. Assumptions

This discussion assumes that either NATO will make the de-
sion in principle to deploy new LMTPF or that Moscow, of
course, will judge such a decision to be imminent. The Soviets
would then take it as given that NATO would, at minimum, sim-
taneously proclaim its desire for early TNF arms control nego-
tiations or even accompany announcement of the deployment
decision with the outline of an arms control approach.

B. Soviet Tactics

Under these circumstances, the Soviets would almost
certainly try to seize the initiative by preempting NATO and
putting forward first their own arms control proposal (for
reasons set out in Section III). Failing that, Moscow would
wish at least to respond promptly to the NATO arms control
offer.

The Soviet proposal would almost certainly be uncompli-
cated in substance and portrayed as a first step in a longer
negotiating process. A more specific and comprehensive arms
control scheme, foreshadowing an outcome consonant with
ultimate Soviet military objectives, would unavoidably stir
up considerable controversy. Most Western capitals would
find much to quarrel with in it.

But the Soviets, in advancing their proposal, would try
to touch off an East-West controversy. Rather, they would
aim at intensifying the internal West European debate on the
immediate issue of whether NATO's LRTPF weapons develop-
ment-deployment process need begin before arms control
possibilities have been thoroughly explored. Moscow probably
would reckon that this could best be accomplished by a pro-
posal that contained enough detail to be enticing, but not
even enough to provoke distracting arguments, and which focused
in first steps, not ultimate outcomes.
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Under this approach, Moscow presumably would be content to wait for the Western substantive position to solidify after negotiations had actually begun, before coming to grips with hard issues like system types, numbers, counting rules, regional vs. global scope, relationship to NMD, and so on.

Section V outlines a possible Soviet initiative.

C. What Forum?

The Soviets would certainly prefer to negotiate theater nuclear arms control in a broader than bilateral forum. They have said that they cannot continue the SALT process indefinitely with the US alone. Given the military overlap between central and peripheral systems, this preference for doubt would extend to arms control talks dealing with theater weaponry. (The Soviets have implied, as noted in Section I, that these talks should have their own procedural identity, distinct from the SALT process.)

Theoretically, four options are available:

1. A broad multilateral conference (e.g., all CSCE participants);

2. A five-power conference (US, USSR, France, UK, PRC);

3. A four-power conference (the above, less the PRC);


Moscow's position of record favors 2, implies a preference for 2 over 3, and has prepared the ground, at least, for opening with 1.

Moscow might see advantages in a "nuclear CSCE," calculating that the presence of the neutrals and non-aligned and NATO's "doves" (the Netherlands and the Scandinavian members) plus, of course, all the Warsaw Pact states, would assure a tilt in the "right" direction. Indeed, the Soviets have already called for a conference in 1979 of CSCE participants to discuss "military forums." They might welcome an opportunity to add a fresh and topical issue to the rather stale agenda already scheduled for that meeting.

"The Soviets at the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting in Budapest last May.

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- 12 -

UNCLASSIFIED

EXCEPT NOT RELEASABLE FOR FOREIGN REASONS

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The Soviets would recognize that a meeting of such countries could do little or no serious negotiating. But this would be irrelevant to Moscow's purposes—the stimulation of West European resistance to NATO LRNTF deployment. And if NATO declined the invitation, it would be tantamount to excluding the smaller European governments from discussion of important nuclear issues. A number of these governments, including some NATO members, would happily attend a gathering where they could exert some influence on nuclear arms control or at least be seen to be attempting to do so.

Thus NATO could not reject such an initiative except at some political cost. Yet participation by NATO members would slow, or perhaps arrest altogether, the momentum of the Allied LRNTF deployment program. The Soviets would not be unaware of the discomfort that such a proposal would cause on the Western side.

Moscow would also calculate that France would refuse to attend a nuclear CSCE; that the UK would also join the US in opposing it; and that, whatever their own inclinations, the smaller NATO powers would not take part in the absence of the larger ones. Even so, Moscow might decide to advance the proposal to demonstrate its own benign intentions and to throw some sand into NATO's LRNTF decision-making machinery.

A call for a five-power conference on theater nuclear issues would not impress the audience Moscow most wants to impress—the influential, serious-minded peace and disarmament constituencies in some West European countries. It is common knowledge that the US and France, and almost certainly the UK as well, would refuse to attend. Moreover, the Soviet arms control apparatus, one can safely assume, could not fashion the outlines of a persuasive limitations and reductions proposal to accompany the highly procedural initiative of suggesting that the conference concept. This would reinforce the impression in Western Europe, to dismiss the five-power conference idea as mere propaganda. Moscow probably is permitted enough to realize this.

From the above considerations one can apply to any proposal for a four-power conference to remove LRNTF constraints for the European region. Given in later French attitudes, the US might be wary of the idea. But not the UK. As for West Germany, it would probably be at least as interested as the Soviets.
the US-GSSR bilateral mode, which most NATO members currently prefer. This judgment is based on the premise that the US will attach importance to blocking or slowing down NATO deployments and will see arms control talks as providing means to that end. Long and stubborn insistence on Moscow's procedural preferences would then become self-defeating.

Even so, the four options are not mutually exclusive and could be orchestrated into a single score, modulated to suit different circumstances. For example, an initial call for a broadly multilateral negotiation might have tactical and propaganda advantages. When that failed, stressing the need for a five- (or four-) power approach would help establish the USSR's claim to compensation for the forces of other nuclear powers—a claim Soviet negotiators would certainly press in any bilateral talks. By moving down the scale from broader to narrow forums, Moscow could dress up as concessions its recognition of reality.

Even after bilateral talks had begun, the multilateral themes would allow Moscow to go on dangling the prospect of ambitious nuclear disarmament programs, either in the European region or globally, if the absent nuclear powers agreed to join in. Finally, if the bilateral talks tended to focus on INF constraints applying to the European region (including the western USSR), this could alarm Peking and Tokyo. The two capitals might worry that any constraints that the Soviets accepted for the western USSR would be translated into even larger far eastern deployments of the systems concerned. In that case, Moscow could play its five-power conference mood music.

V. CONTENT OF A SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL: A FREEZE ON NEW MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS?

A. Description

Conceivably, the Soviets could call for:

--agreement to an immediate freeze on deployments "in Europe" of new types of land-based missiles of more than 1,000-km. conventional radius;

--subsequent negotiations on limitation and comprehensive reductions of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the Warsaw Pact area.
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A move of this sort might, in Moscow's judgment, stir confusion and perplexity within NATO. It would also:

--put the USSR on the right side of the "peace" issue;

--fit neatly with Moscow's general detente strategy, past disarmament proposals, and recent "peace initiatives";

--serve as a rallying point for those, inside and outside certain Western European governments, who are uneasy about NATO's projected new deployments; and

--give Moscow the diplomatic initiative and also room to maneuver in response to the reactions evoked by its opening gambit.

B. Analysis

This type of proposal would entail a Soviet decision to open with a regional rather than a global approach to theater nuclear arms control. It would play to the West European audience and address an immediate problem—NATO's large-scale deployment plans. Yet it would close no doors and could be shaped in various ways, depending on the responses it stimulated.

It would be uncharacteristic of Moscow to neglect a chance to reaffirm the older, more ambitious disarmament initiatives cherished by the Soviet arms control bureaucracy and repeatedly blessed by high-level Soviet and Warsaw Pact pronouncements. Hence the judgment that Moscow would wish to couple its first-step proposal (the deployment freeze) with something pointing toward longer-range "solutions."

1. Choice of Forum

It is possible, even likely, that Moscow would suggest a "nuclear CSCE" as the forum of choice. The procedural ground has been prepared (Warsaw Pact call for a meeting in 1979 of all CSCE participants to discuss military detente). The proposal would have enough political appeal to be troublesome for NATO. And it would avoid the contrast to a call for a four-power conference—a direct challenge to the French, who would be out of harmony with Moscow's broader European policy.
2. System Coverage

The Soviets would justify the narrow scope of their freeze proposal by emphasizing that they were offering to halt deployments of the weapon system (the SS-20) that had created much anxiety in the West. They might explain exclusion of medium-range bombers on the grounds that the mobility of aircraft raises difficult problems for a regionally focused negotiation, problems that would require lengthy discussions to resolve. The freeze was suggested merely as a prelude to broader negotiations, which could encompass aircraft as well as missiles.

3. Range

A limit fixed at about 1,000 kilometers would catch the extended-range Pershing and GLCM’s, the central elements in the projected NATO program, and of course the SS-20 on the Soviet side. It might also constrain the SS-22, the follow-on version of the Scudboard missile, but the Soviets seem to feel no pressure to accelerate the SS-22 program.

4. Area

The crucial issue would be the precise definition of "the European region" and how much of the USSR was covered by it. Brezhnev's public offer to negotiate about "medium-range" weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some Soviet territory. Obviously, in the Soviet view, the less the better. The Soviets might open by proposing to define 'Europe' for purposes of TNF arms control, as the area fixed in CSCE for prior notification of maneuvers (which, on the Soviet side, includes a band 250 kilometers in width along the western Soviet border). They might then hint at some flexibility here, recognizing that more Soviet territory would have to be covered to make the offer attractive to Western opinion.

5. Effects on the SS-20 Deployment Program

Under the proposal postulated above, the effect would be nil at the outset and perhaps quite limited over the longer run. In the first place, the proposal would ban deployment in the European region, but not production. Moreover, the Soviets would not extend a deployment freeze to be binding. Rather, it would be in effect in principle if not in practice at all in the territories of those nations. In other words, Moscow could control their use on a variety of substantive or procedural issues. If all four powers could continue until agreement...
was reached. Even then, a ban on European deployment would not, of itself, block production for deployment elsewhere.

The Soviets, of course, would not enter upon such talks expecting to have everything their way. They would recognize the possibility of reaching a point where they would have to choose between unacceptable constraints on their systems or no constraints on NATO. But that would be a problem of middle- or end-game strategy and should not deter the Soviets from the opening gambit postulated here.

Prepared by Arva Floyd
x33230

Approved by Robert Baraz
x29194
TRANSCRIBED COPY FOLLOWS
The impracticality of this proposal (impossibility of serious negotiations among 35 participants; likely NATO rejection) would be irrelevant to Moscow's immediate purposes—to throw sand in NATO's decisionmaking machinery by offering negotiations as a plausible alternative to new nuclear deployments in Western Europe. And NATO could decline the invitation only at political cost, given its likely appeal to many smaller prospective participants, inside and outside the alliance.
Moscow is doubtless even further from resolving the basic substantive complexities of theater nuclear arms control: interface between central and peripheral nuclear systems; interface between longer and shorter range theater weaponry; global vs. regional approach; and formulas for covering PRC, French, and UK forces. These uncertainties about ultimate outcomes give Moscow added reasons for making a simple opening move in the European context, shapes to address the immediate problems without foreclosing longer term options.
This paper:

—describes Moscow's current posture on theater nuclear force (TNF) arms control;

—sets out basic Soviet objectives that will determine Moscow's approach;

—assesses, against that background, possible Soviet gambits, prior to or during the opening rounds of any TNF arms control talks, but

—does not attempt to estimate the detailed Soviet negotiating position that would unfold as such talks progressed.

3. Current Soviet Posture

In authoritative statements to date, the Soviets have:

—agreed that their medium-range nuclear forces, including the SS-20 and the Backfire, could be the subject of arms control negotiations.

Note on terminology: This paper uses the term "long-range theater nuclear forces" (LRTNF) to describe NATO weapons systems—existing or projected, capable of hitting the USSR from NATO Europe—and the analogous Soviet forces (especially the SS-20 and Backfire), which have been at the center of recent controversy and debate. The shorter label of "theater nuclear forces" is employed in the arms control context to conform with general [illegible] and in recognition of the fact that arms control negotiations may eventually treat shorter [illegible] systems [illegible].
Neither Brezhnev's statements nor other official Soviet commentary have said whom Moscow would expect to take part in such negotiations. But the sequence of topics in Brezhnev's March 2 speech—first SALT, then MBFR, then the TNF issue—suggests that the bilateral SALT framework is not Moscow's preferred forum for negotiations. Later, the Soviets apparently were more explicit on this point. Gromyko told Schmidt, during the Chancellor's stopover in Moscow in late June 1979, en route to Tokyo. That the SS-20 should not be negotiated in
Soviet tactical options

Moscow will have several tactical choices to make in fashioning its opening TNT arms control positions including whether:

— to take the initiative or to adopt a reactive stance, waiting to see what NATO comes up with before making a first move;

— in either case to open with a comprehensive draft arms control proposal or to make a simpler initial offer, [illeg] as a first step in a longer process; and

— with respect to forum, to keep pressing for a [2 words illeg] framework or to settle for bilateral SS-20 [words illeg] when most NATO members apparently prefer.
Page 4, Paragraphs 4 and 5

Thus Soviet planners lack high confidence that their attack aircraft could effectively penetrate NATO defenses in the crucial central region, acquire and destroy their targets given the inherent difficulty of target acquisition in the low-level attack model, and recover to home bases without heavy losses.

But, should the [illeg], conventional air offensive fall [illeg] short of accomplishing its mission, and also suffer
Western opinion reads these characteristics of the SS-20 reductions in the Soviet SS-20 as providing a threatening nuclear capability well beyond rational defensive needs. Moscow, however, sees the capacity quickly to overwhelm NATO as essential to homeland defense—and the SS-20 as a vital element of that capacity.

Thus one may expect stout Soviet resistance to any proposed reductions in the Soviet SS-20 deployment program or to constraining ceilings upon it. And if NATO itself deploys new long-range systems in Europe, this will increase the set of targets that the Soviet military will believe it needs the capacity to destroy. This judgment is not offered to contest the soundness of the NATO consensus that new Western deployments are [2 words illeg] or that the prospect of such deployments is essential to the credibility of NATO arms control proposals covering this category of weapons. Rather, the [illeg] is that new NATO deployments will tend to increase [illeg] already considerable reluctance to curtail SS-20 deployments much below this planned level [illeg] that level
Thus, the Soviets likely will remain alert for any opportunity to retard or block the actual deployments. They undoubtedly will put forward in due course an arms control proposal designed to strengthen the hand of NATO's "doves," who prefer negotiation to deployment (see below for further discussion).

The Soviets have both political and military reasons for [illeg] to ward off NATO's protected additions to its nuclear arsenal. Historically, the USSR has always shown particular [illeg] toward nuclear deployment in the FRG, even if the systems are US-owned and have no "German finger on the [illeg]." And the [words illeg] assume that, if NATO's
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that Soviet military threat analysis tends to make worst-case assumptions about NATO capabilities. Moreover, the new systems (if deployed) would add an array of relatively mobile targets to what the Soviet military probably considers an already formidable NATO Europe target [illeg]. Finally, Moscow may have an uneasy sense that NATO is now preparing, for the first time, to confront the USSR on a terrain (land-based theater nuclear weaponry of longer range) where the Soviet advantage had previously gone unchallenged.

Hence one may conclude that the Soviets would ascribe a more than marginal significance to NATO's projected new systems—even though the numbers of warheads (200-600) now [illeg] considered by the Allies for these forces does not appear [illeg] compared with the full [illeg] existing US [words illeg] forces.

[Words illeg] deployment decision is taken, Moscow undoubtedly will [words illeg] and [illeg]ishment to sap Allied public [words illeg] the projected increase in NATO's
Moreover, some Soviet central systems are assigned peripheral, not intercontinental, targets. Hence, substantial SALT II cuts in Soviet central systems would, in Moscow's view, require commensurate reductions in US central systems.
This question would arise immediately if Moscow ultimately decided to accept a bilateral negotiating forum for theater nuclear forces. Specific rules or general criteria for dealing with the forces of the nonparticipant nuclear powers would be exceptionally difficult to devise. Any conceivable concrete Soviet proposal for resolving this problem would be subject to challenge over its data base (in the
Page 10, Paragraphs 6 and 7

Yet, a proposed long-term regional "solution" without aircraft would be open to challenge because it left out of account so much of each side's nuclear potential.

* * * * *

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The Soviet proposal would almost certainly be uncomplicated in substance and portrayed as a first step in a longer negotiating process. A more specific and comprehensive arms control scheme, foreshadowing an outcome consonant with ultimate Soviet military objective, would unavoidably stir up considerable controversy. Most Western capitals would find much to quarrel with in it.

But the Soviets, in advancing their proposal, would try not to touch off an East-West controversy. Rather, they would aim at intensifying the internal West European debate on the immediate issue of whether NATO's LRTNF weapons development-procurement-deployment process need begin before arms control possibilities have been thoroughly explained. Moscow probably would reckon that this could best be accomplished by a proposal that contained enough detail to be enticing, but not enough to provoke distracting arguments, and which focused on first steps, not ultimate outcomes.
Moscow's position of record favors 2, implies a preference for 2 over 3, and has prepared the ground, at least, for opening with 1.

Moscow might see advantages in a "nuclear CSCE," calculating that the presence of the neutrals and non-aligned and NATO's "doves" (the Netherlands and the Scandinavian member) plus, of course, and the Warsaw Pact states, would assure a tilt in the "right" direction. Indeed, the Soviets have already called for a conference in 1979* of CSCE participants to discuss "military détente." They might welcome an opportunity to add a fresh and topical issue to the rather stale agenda already suggested for that meeting.

* [Illeg] of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting [words illeg] last May.
A call for a five-power conference on theater nuclear issues would not impress the audience Moscow most wants to impress—the influential, serious-minded peace and disarmament constituencies in some West European countries. It is common knowledge that the PRC and France, and almost certainly the UK as well, would refuse to attend. Moreover, the Soviet arms control apparatus, one can safely assume, could not fashion the outlines of a persuasive limitations and reductions proposal to accompany the purely procedural initiative of suggesting that the conference convene. This would reinforce the inclination, in Western Europe, to dismiss the five-power conference idea as mere propaganda. Moscow probably is per[illeg] enough to realize this.

[Two words illeg] same considerations would apply to any proposals [words illeg] constraints for [words illeg]. Given [words illeg] French attitudes, this [words illeg].

[Paragraph illeg]
V. CONTENT OF A SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL:
A FREEZE ON NEW MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS?

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--[illeg] negotiations on limitation and comprehensive reductions of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the European [illeg.]
Choice of Forum

it is possible, even likely, that Moscow would suggest a "nuclear CSCE" as the forum of choice. The procedural ground has been prepared (Warsaw Pact call for a meeting in 1979 of all CSCE participants to discuss military détente.) The proposal would have enough political appeal to be troublesome for NATO. And it would avoid (in contrast to a call for a four-power conference) a direct challenge to the French, [illeg] would be out of harmony with Moscow's broader European [illeg].
4. Area

The crucial issue would be the precise definition of "the European region" and how much of the USSR was covered by it. Brezhnev's public offer to negotiate about "medium-range" weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some weapons systems implies necessarily the inclusion of some Soviet territory. Obviously, in the Soviet view, the less the better. The Soviets might open by proposing to define "Europe," for purposes of TNF arms control, as the area fixed in CSCE for prior notification of maneuvers (which, on the Soviet side, includes a band 250 kilometers in width along the western Soviet [illeg.] They might also hint at some flexibility here, recognizing that more Soviet territory would have to be covered to make the offer attractive to Western opinion.

5. Effects on the SS-20 Deployment Program

Under the proposal postulated above, the effect would be all at the outset and perhaps quite limited over the longer run. In the first place, the proposal would ban deployment in the European region, but not production. Moreover, the Soviets would not expect a deployment freeze to be promptly accepted and would [illeg] the proposal as the [words illeg] negotiations [words illeg] Moscow could [words illeg] or procedural [words illeg] continue until agreement.
Vår ref
5305/79/JAL/JM

Brussel,
18 september 1979

Det kongelige forsvarsdepartement
v/Statssekretær Johan Jørgen Holst

v/19 kontor

Forsvarets overkommando
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kongelige utenriksdepartement
v/3 politiske kontor

Eksp nr 1 m/NATO SECRET
vedl kopi nr 1 og HEMMELIG
vedl nr 3 av 7
Eksp nr 2 m/NATO SECRET
vedl kopi nr 2 og HEMMELIG
vedl nr 4 av 7
Eksp nr 3 m/NATO SECRET
vedl kopi nr 3 og HEMMELIG
vedl nr 5 av 7
(NATO nr: 1002)
Eksp nr 4 m/NATO SECRET
vedl kopi nr 4 og HEMMELIG
vedl nr 6 av 7

NPG - HLG MØTE 10 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes i kopi:

- referat fra ovennevnte HLG møte

- brev m/vedlegg fra den kanadiske HLG representant
vedrørende "Common data base for HLG and SG".

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde

NATO SECRET
EMMELIG
Hommelig
i h.t. sikkerhetsinnskuingen
side 1 av 2
Eksemp nr 3 av 7

NPG - HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON TNF MODERNIZATION - HOVEDPUNKTEN
FRA GRUPPENS 8. MØTE, BRUSSEL, 10 - 11 SEPTEMBER 1979

1. Sammendrag

- Samtlige delegasjoner kunne i prinsippet slutte opp om utkastet til rapport fra HLG.

- Gjennomgåelsen av rapportutkastetens enkelte paragrafer medførte i tillegg til redaksjonelle endringer mer substantiell drøftelse av deltagelsespørsmalet, omfanget av LRTNF-styrken, presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet i HLG-rapporten og finansieringspørsmalet.

- Mens man fra tysk side ga uttrykk for tilfredshet med brødden i den foreslåtte deltagelsen i LRTNF styrken, gikk man fra nederlandsk side inn for å dempe presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet i HLG rapporten med sikte på å legge forholdene til rette for en prinsippbeslutning om LRTNF modernisering i første omgang. USA og Nederland vil søke å avklare dette spørsmalet bilateralt forut for neste HLG møte.

- Kopi av de norske hovedinnlegg følger vedlagt.

- Fra norsk side deltok:
  FD: Statssekretær Johan Jørgen Holst
  Førstekonsulent Jan Monsen
  FO: Generalløytnant Sven Hauge
  UD: Underdirektør Leif Mavik
  Byråsjef Vidar Wikberg
  NORDEL: Ass forsvarsråd John A Lunde

- Neste HLG møte ble fastsatt til onsdag 26 september. Det tas dessuten sikte på et fellesmøte med Special Group on TNF Arms Control på formiddagen fredag 28
september og eventuelt et orienterende ettermiddags-
møte for berørte NATO ambassadører samme dag.

2. Første møtedag 10 september

HLG formannen, Assistant Secretary of Defence McGiffert, viste innledningsvis til at det i det foreliggende utkast til rapport fra HLG var innarbeidet et relativt detaljert forslag med sikte på modernisering av NATO’s langtrekkende TNF våpen (LRTNF) basert på utplassering av Persing II XR raketter i Forbundsrepublikken og GLCM enheter (land-baserte cruise missiles) i UK, Italia, Belgia, Nederland og Forbundsrepublikken.

Omfang av det foreslåtte moderniseringsprogrammet, angitt i antall kjernefysiske krigshoder (572), hadde man kommet frem til på bakgrunn av vurderinger av faktorer som:

- operative hensyn, styrkernes rolle i NATO's overordnede strategi;
- behov for å demonstrere overfor Sovjetunionen at man anser utbyggingen av kjernefysiske våpensystemer som SS 20 og Backfire som en alvorlig utfordring ovenfor Alliansen som helhet, og at NATO's moderniseringsprogram sikter mot mer enn en symbolisk LRTNF styrke;
- behov for å demonstrere en holdning og besluttsomhet m h t TNF moderniseringsbehovet som ville medvirke til å styrke Sovjetrussisk vilje til reelle rustningskontrollforhandlinger;
- behov for LRTNF styrker i NATO med høy overlevelsesevne (i lys av muligheten for kjernefysisk angrep spesielt mot disse våpen fra østlig side);
- politisk og militært behov for så bred deltagelse som mulig i LRTNF styrken.

Samtlige representanter uttalte seg under en runde med generelle merkander anerkjennende overfor det utkast til rapport som var sirkulert forut før møtet.
Fra britisk side ble det vist til at man hadde hatt foreløpige drøftelser av LRTNF problematikken på regjerings-plan uten at det var truffet beslutninger.

Man var klar til å støtte fremsendelse av forslaget om et LRTNF moderniseringsprogram slik dette var skissert i rapportutkastet.

Det norske generelle innlegg følger vedlagt (I).

Fra nederlandsk side ble det understreket at moderniseringsforslaget var bygget ut for detaljert i rapportutkastet når det gjaldt selve deltagelsen i LRTNF styrken (antall våpen til det enkelte land). Av hensyn til avklaringsprosessen i Nederland ville det være hensiktsmessig om HLG rapporten ikke gikk såvidt detaljert inn på dette punkt.

Begrunnelsen for omfanget av den foreslåtte LRTNF styrken burde utbygges, og det burde understrekes klarere at det ikke var tale om å gi kjernefysiske våpen noen øket rolle i NATO's totalforsvar. Man ville senere komme tilbake til de nederlandske synspunkter vedrørende forholdet mellom allerede utplasserte, mer kortrekkende og de nye langtrekkende TNF våpen innen NATO på bakgrunn av et nederlandsk diskusjonspapir som var sirkulert forut for møtet.

Fra tysk side ble det etterlyst tydeligere begrunnelse for styrkenes omfang, forslagets kostnadsmessige sider og avklaring m h t det nederlandske papir.

Fra dansk side ble viktigheten av hensiktsmessig presentasjon overfor publikum av saksomplekset TNF modernisering og rustningskontroll spesielt understreket.

På kanadisk side var man i hovedsak fornøyd med rapportutkastet - behovet for utbygging av begrunnelsen var størst m h t det foreslåtte styrkeomfang.
Fra belgisk side ble det understreket at man la spesiell vekt på bredest mulig deltagelse i LRTNF styrken, herunder deltagelse i finansieringsordningen. Bidrag til finansieringen måtte gjøres "synlig" med sikte på utad å understreke bred deltagelse.

Gjennomgåelsen av rapportutkastets enkelte paragrafer medførte i tillegg til redaksjonelle endringer mer substansiell drøftelse av følgende hovedpunkter:

Paragraf 8 (deltagelsesspørsmålet)

Italia, Belgia og Nederland som viste til at moderniseringsprogrammet var politisk sensitivt i alle NATO landene, gikk inn før at HLG rapporten i første rekke burde slå fast den helt sentrale ønskeligheten av bredest mulig deltagelse i LRTNF styrken, mens det spesielt fra norsk side ble understreket at HLG måtte erkjenne/respektere medlemslandenes etablerte atompolitikk.

Fra tysk side ble det i denne forbindelse understreket at forslaget som innebar at LRTNF enheter eventuelt ville bli utplussert i 5 NATO land fullt ut imøtekom det tyske "krav" om at flere land enn Forbundsrepublikken måtte tillate stasjonering av LRTNF våpen i Europa som en del av TNF moderniseringsprogrammet.

Det norske innlegg vedrørende paragraf 8 følger vedlagt (II).

Etter at en spesiell undergruppe hadde utarbeidet et revidert utkast til tekst for paragraf 8, kom man etter visse justeringer frem til en omført tekst som kunne aksepteres av alle. Det norske innlegg til den reviderte paragraf 8 følger vedlagt (III).
Paragraf 9 (omfanget av LRTNF styrken)

Det var alminnelig enighet om at begrunnelsen for omfanget måtte utdypes.
Dette var spesielt nødvendig i lys av at forslaget på ialt 572 krigshoder lå såvidt nær opp mot taket i det tidligere antydede styrkeomfanget på 200 - 600 krigshoder.

Fra kanadisk side ble det pekt på at et styrkeomfang på 200 ikke ville ha nødvendig overlevelsessevne, mens en styrke med opp imot 600 krigshoder ville kunne imøtekomme både politiske såvel som militære behov til NATO's LRTNF styrke.

Det norske innlegg vedrørende paragraf 9 følger vedlagt (IV).

Paragraf 19 (Presentasjonen av moderniseringsprogrammet)

Fra nederlandsk side ble det understreket at prinsippiell enighet om LRTNF modernisering var det viktigste poeng på det nåværende stadium i avklaringsprosessen. En for detaljert fremstilling av forslaget til moderniseringsprogram i HLG-rapporten ville kunne gi inntrykk av at beslutningene i realiteten var truffet før saken ble lagt frem på ministerplan og derved virke mot sin hensikt. På denne bakgrunn gikk man inn for at de detaljerte tabellene som illustrerte det foreslåtte moderniseringsprogrammet ikke ble tatt med i rapportutkastet, men eventuelt i et vedlegg som så kunne vurderes nærmere etter at prinsippbeslutningen var tatt.

Flertallet ga uttrykk for forståelse for det problem man syntes å stå overfor på nederlandsk side.

HEMMELIG
HLG formannen viste imidlertid til det mandat som var gitt HLG av NPG ministrene, og fremholdt at en rapport i tråd med de nederlandske synspunktene ikke ville kunne sies å være en endelig og fullstendig tilrådning fra ekspertgruppen (HLG).

Mens det fra belgisk side ble gitt generell støtte til de nederlandske merknadene, ble det fra tysk side understreket at en omredigering av HLG rapporten som antydet ville skape vanskeligheter i og med at det fortsatt ville frengå relativt klart at Persing II XR ville bli utplassert i Forbundsrepublikken mens utplasseringen av GLCM enheter ville være usikker.

Det norske innlegget vedrørende paragraf 19 følger vedlagt (V).

Fra italiensk og britisk side ble det understreket at selv om det ville være mulig å begrense omtalen av utplasseringsplanene til bare å nevne de fem aktuelle landene uten å angi det foreslåtte antall LRTNF enheter for utplassering i de respektive land, ville ikke dette gi tilstrekkelig grunnlag for ministrene til å treffe de nødvendige beslutningene innen årets utgang.

Man besluttet å komme tilbake til spørsmålet senere under HLG møtet.

Avslutningsvis under drøftelsen av denne paragrafen ble det fra tysk side presisert at Bonn anså at utplassering av 108 Persing II XR i Forbundsrepublikken ville være militært betydningsfullt og politisk passende. Imidlertid ville man vurdere noe nærmere hvorvidt det foreslåtte antall GLCM på tysk jord eventuelt kunne reduseres noe. Bonn ville i dette spørsmålet legge vekt på den betydnings avgjørelsen hadde i de andre utplasseringslandene.
Paragraf 21 - 22 (Finansieringsordningen/kostnadsfordelingen)

Flertallet fremholdt at man ikke var kommet langt nok i avklaringsprosessen til at det kunne tas stilling til konkrete finansierings- kostnadsfordelingsforslag.

Mens Nederland gjentok ønsket om minst mulig detaljerte tilrådninger også i denne sammenheng, ble det fra tysk side opplyst at moderniseringsprogrammet og finansieringen måtte vurderes nærmere i lys av det totale langtidsprogrammet for NATO forsvaret (LTDP).

Det norske innlegg vedrørende infrastrukturfinansiering følger vedlagt (VI).

Det nederlandske diskusjonspapir

I introduksjonen av papiret viste den nederlandske representant til at man i Haag vurderte det foreslåttte moderniseringsprogrammet på bakgrunn av to hovedprinsipper:

- kjernefysiske våpen måtte ikke gi noen øket rolle innen NATO's totalforsvar;
- TNF moderniseringen måtte ikke medføre økning i antallet kjernefysiske stridshoder lagret i Europa (stockpile).

På nederlandsk side anså man i denne sammenheng at den økningen av antallet langtrekkende TNF våpen som var foreslått i moderniseringsprogrammet, måtte kompenseres ved en reduksjon av NATO's TNF våpen med kort og middels rekkevidde.

Man hadde utarbeidet endringsforslag til paragraf 29 med sikte på å få innarbeidet dette poenget.

Fra britisk og norsk side ble det fremholdt at det ville være uheldig å låse valget av reduksjonsskandidater allerede på dette tidspunkt. Det ville f eks kunne vise seg mer aktuelt og hensiktsmessig å skjære ned på kjernefysiske luftforsvarsåpen istedetfor tradisjonelle TNF våpen med
Fra tysk side ble det understreket at det ville være nyttig å få de nederlandske synspunktene grundig drøftet. Det var enighet om at behov for senere avklaring av spørsmålet kunne reflekteres i rapporten.

SHAPE viste til at det ikke hastet med å ta stilling til eventuelle reduksjonær i lys av at de foreslåtte LRTNF enhetene først ville kunne utplasseres i 1983-84. Det ble samtidig understreket at det egentlig ikke var tale om å styrke LRTNF komponenten i NATO's totalforsvar, men derimot om å fylle et tomrom i den kjeden av forsvarsmidler som Alliansen måtte ha til rådighet for å kunne opprettholde den krigsforebyggende evnen.

3. Annen møtt dag 11 september

Innledningsvis drøftet man reviderte tekstforslag for paragrafene 9 (styrkenes omfang), 16 (landbasering) og 19 ("stockpile"), som ble klarert med mindre justeringer.

Når det gjeldt det nederlandske forslaget om å begrense presentasjonen av moderniseringsforslagets enkelte deler i HLG rapporten med sikte på at man i første omgang kunne treffe en prinsippbeslutning om LRTNF modernisering, gikk HLG formannen inn for at dette spørsmålet hensiktsmessig burde kunne avklares bilateralt mellom Nederland og USA forut for neste HLG møte.

Han viste samtidig til at de nederlandske synspunktene i dette spørsmålet bare var blitt støttet fra belgisk side. På amerikansk side hadde man betydelige motforestillinger, og McGiffert antok at US ville kunne representere flertallet i de bilaterale konsultasjonene.

Dersom det var ønske om det kunne Belgia også delta i dette arbeidet.
Italia som understreket at man hadde forståelse for det nederlandske problem, ønsket også å delta i de "bilaterale" avklaringene.

Avslutningsvis viste HLG formannen til at "Spesialgruppen for rustningskontroll" ville holde sitt avsluttende møte torsdag 27 september. Han antok at det ville være hensiktsmessig om HLG kunne av slutte arbeidet med sin rapport på et møte onsdag 26 september, og at de to gruppenes deretter kunne komme sammen til et fellesmøte på formiddagen fredag 28 september for å avklare prosedyrespørsmål i forbindelse med den videre saksbehandling med sikte på endelige beslutninger på ministerplan innen årets utgang.

Eventuelt kunne de faste representantene (NATO ambassadørene) gis en orientering om de to gruppenes arbeid og rapporter i et ettermiddagsmøte fredag 28 september.

Ingen reiste innvendinger mot forslag om at de endelige HLG og SG rapportene i tråd med praksis ville bli over sendt Generalsekretæren som på sin side ville la dem distribuere som PO-dokumenter.

HLG formannen anmodet delegasjonene om så vidt mulig å sirkulere eventuelle merknader til HLG rapportutkastet forut for neste møte 26 september.

Den kanadiske representant reiste helt til slutt under møtet spørsmålet om det ikke burde utarbeides en ugradert oversikt over TNF styrkeforholdet i lys av forventet interesse i offentlig opinion.

Det var alminnelig enighet om at en slik oversikt ville ha stor betydning i forbindelse med presentasjonen av både HLG og SG's tilrådninger.
Mr Chairman,

I am of the view that the draft which is laid before us summarizes the deliberations of the HLG both adequately and crisply.

The rationale for modernization which is outlined in the draft report is now better balanced than in previous documents. It highlights the SS-20 challenge. That is important, particularly in public presentation, but hardly sufficient. We could perhaps emphasize somewhat more strongly the strategic need to maintain a coherent chain of deterrence providing options for escalation control. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the operational implications of the broad spectrum of the Soviet TNF modernization which is currently underway, and which includes in addition to the SS-20 and BACKFIRE also the SS-21, 22 and 23.

We think it important that the program as outlined will be implemented within existing numbers of nuclear warheads deployed in Western Europe and that an increased rôle of nuclear weapons in the strategy of the alliance is not envisaged. Furthermore, we attribute importance to our accompanying a decision on modernization with a credible invitation to initiate arms control negotiations which will serve also to bring Soviet TNF onto the bargaining table.

With respect to the numerical size of the program involved, I have noted what you stated in your initial remarks. It is to a large measure an issue which will have to reflect the concerted views of the US and the host nations involved.
Mr Chairman,

Para 8. It would be preferable in our view that we retain original formulations with respect to the position of those countries which for reasons of national policy and established regional equilibria are not candidates for basing. The current formulation of the second sentence could be read to imply an expectation or desire of a change in policy. It will be important for our ability to mobilize public support for our political endorsement of the modernization program that we are able to state that there is recognition and understanding in the alliance for our special policy with respect to the stationing of nuclear weapons. I recognize, of course, that the northern and southern flank members are in somewhat different positions. However, the language which was used in para 18 in the report to the April ministerial meeting in Florida tried to encompass the position of both and would from our point of view be preferable. It stated: "The HLG recognizes the established policy of some NATO countries regarding peacetime basing and that each Ally will view the manner of its participation against a background of factors unique to it".

Alternatively we could accept the Belgian proposal that the second sentence in para 8 be dropped all together, assuming that the political conditions which prevail are in fact recognized by all.
Mr Chairman,

Redrafted Para 8.

We would have strongly preferred to retain the language from the April interim report. However, I recognize that it could produce problems and ambiguities for others and hence I shall not insist on its inclusion. We can live with the new proposal but would prefer deletion of the last sentence so as to avoid assertions or speculations concerning pressures or expectations that we would change a policy which has been a permanent feature of the situation in Northern Europe since the creation of our alliance. It is necessary to avoid suggestions that we are embarking upon an open-ended programme. Perhaps we could overcome the difficulties by rewriting the last sentence to read: "Should additional members of the Alliance wish to host LRTNF deployment, the programme could be adjusted to accommodate such participation".
Mr Chairman,

Para 9. With respect to **sizing considerations** mission requirements should be included emanating from targeting needs and the vulnerability of existing and prospective systems to counterforce attacks.

As far as the **counting rules** as concerned we should strive for consistency in the sense of applying the same rules to Soviet and NATO forces, e.g. with respect to reloads. We should be aware also of the need not to interfere with the established counting rules under SALT. Hence, I do not think SLEM force loads should be counted in the TNF context. Their inclusion will complicate the presentation of a manageable arms control proposal. As far as the **aggregate numbers** are concerned we should not invite the expectation that the program is but the first down-payment on a more extensive and ambitious undertaking. It must be militarily meaningful, not merely symbolic. This is important also from the point of view of establishing credibility for an arms control invitation. The program must be given a quality of credibility and stability.

As a non-host country we do not consider it appropriate to comment on the specific **force allocations**. That will have to be a matter for particular discussion between the US and the host countries involved.
HLG 10/9/79

Mr Chairman,

Para 19. I am speaking somewhat reluctantly on this subject and want to emphasize the need for everyone to be sympathetic to the political considerations and constraints which apply in various capitals and polities.

I believe it important for all of us that we avoid as much uncertainty as possible. Hence, it would be important to avoid speculations with respect to the distribution of systems envisaged for deployment. Specificity is important also from the point of view of a recognition of the interdependent nature of the decision problem. Finally, it should be a report from the HLG, not from the United States. Nor should the report be divided into some collective sections and some sections attributed only to the United States. It goes without saying that the HLG report is but a recommendation to Ministers.
Mr Chairman,

Para 22. With respect to infrastructure planning, I think it is important that we keep in mind our chosen approach of implementing the TNF modernization in an evolutionary manner. Hence we have preferred the chosen approach which will integrate the TNF infrastructure into the regular infrastructure program in consonance with previous practice with regard to NIKE/HAWK, etc. The alternative of a separate program of joint financing with respect to TNF infrastructure would have constituted a more dramatic break with previous practice and complicated our ability to mobilize public support. Therefore, from a presentational point of view it would in our case be preferable that the financing arrangement not be selected for particular highlighting, but presented in a low key business-as-usual manner. Decisions with respect to the size of the Infrastructure programme should be taken in due course and perhaps not preempted in connection with the decision on TNF modernization.

Let me state also that we view TNF modernization as part of the LTDP and that Norway is intent on acting in concert with her allies to improve our total defence capabilities within the framework of an annual increase of 3% in real terms.
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ORIGIN EURE-12

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 SIG-03 MMO-01 FM-06 INR-10 L-03
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DRAFTED BY OSD/ISA:LDAVIS
APPROVED BY EUR: JEGOODBY
PM: DGOMPERT
NSC: JTHOMSON
JCS: DVESSER
OSD: DMCGIFFERT
ACDA: JNEWHOUSE

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STATE 247871

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/79 (GOODBY, JAMES E.)

TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC, PFOR

SUBJECT: HLG: US DRAFT REPORT

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. PARA 4 BEGINS LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FROM HLG CHAIRMAN.
PARA 5 BEGINS TEXT OF DRAFT. APPENDICES C AND D WILL BE
HAND-CARRIED TO NATO HQ.
3. EMBASSIES AND MISSION PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO HLG

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PARTICIPANTS: ANKARA-MR. A.H. ALP (MFA); ATHENS-MR.
HARLAFTIS (MOD); BONN-BG TANDECKI (MOD); BRUSSELS-MR.
WILLOT (MFA); COPENHAGEN-MR. J. WAHL (MOD); HAGUE-MR. E.J.
VAN VLOTEN (MFA); LONDON-MR. M. QUINLAN (MOD); OSLO-MR.
J.J. HOLST (MOD); OTTAWA-DR. G.R. LINDSEY (DND); ROME-B.G.
ISA'O (MOD); USNATO-HLG PARTICIPANTS. IN ABSENCE OF
DESIGNATED HLG POINTS OF CONTACT, PLEASE PASS TO APPROP-
RIATE DEPUTY. TABLES DELETED FROM MESSAGE TEXT WILL BE
PROVIDED TO USNATO FOR DISTRIBUTION.

4. FOR ROME: IN PASSING THE HLG REPORT TO GOI, YOU SHOULD
MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN DELE-
GATION, GENERAL PISANO, ON BEHALF OF HLG CHAIRMAN MCGIFFERT

-- DURING THE LAST HLG MEETING, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE
ARGUED FOR PUTTING IN AN APPENDIX THE BASING SCHEME
SPECIFYING THE FORCES PROPOSED TO BE STATIONED IN PARTICU-
LAR COUNTRIES. WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT
A WAY OF HANDLING THIS SUGGESTION WITH THE DUTCH. IF A
SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED, WE OFFERED TO DISCUSS IT WITH
THE ITALIAN DELEGATION BEFORE PUTTING IT IN THE HLG
REPORT.

-- WE SUBSEQUENTLY WORKED OUT A COMPROMISE WHICH SATIS-
FIED BOTH THE DUTCH AND OURSELVES. IT ENTAILS MOVING
THE BASING SCHEME FOR THE HLG RECOMMEND PROGRAM TO AN
APPENDIX, BUT SPECIFYING IN THE REPORT'S BODY THAT THE
APPENDIX SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE HLG RECOM-
MEND PROGRAM AND SUBJECT TO DECISION BY MINISTERS. THIS
FORMULATION SOLVES THE DUTCH PROBLEM AND PRESERVES THE
SPECIFICITY WE DESIRE IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS
BASED-IN PARTICULAR COUNTRIES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ITALIAN

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DELEGATION TO DISCUSS OUR APPROACH. RATHER THAN DELAY
CIRCULATION OF THE REPORT FURTHER, WE ARE CIRCULATING
IT WITH THE US/DUTCH COMPROMISE. IF THE ITALIAN HLG
DELEGATION FINDS THIS COMPROMISE UNACCEPTABLE, WE WILL
BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS IT EITHER PRIVATELY BEFORE NEXT
WEEK'S MEETING OR DURING THE HLG MEETING ITSELF.

5. BEGIN LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL:

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

I AM SENDING YOU HEREWITH A REvised DRAFT OF THE HLG
REPORT DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE DELIBERATIONS OF OUR LAST MEETING. THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN, WHICH NOW APPEARS AS APPENDIX A, CONTAINS A MINOR ADJUSTMENT WITHIN THE OVER-ALL PROGRAM IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF GLCM DEPLOYMENTS AS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE UK; THIS ADJUSTMENT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE TWO NATIONS CONCERNED.

PLEASE CONSIDER NEXT WEDNESDAY’S MEETING AS ONE DESIGNED TO COMPLETE OUR REPORT FOR FORWARDING BY THE HLG TO THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO STAY IN PARALLEL WITH THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

SIGNED: DAVID MCGIFFERT. END TEXT.

6. BEGIN TEXT

NATO LONG-RANGE TNF MODERNIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) AT ITS BARI MINISTERIAL IN 1977 DIRECTED THAT A HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) STUDY NATO’S LONG-TERM NEEDS FOR THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (TNF) MODERNIZATION. THE HLG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ESTABLISHED AS A GROUP OF SENIOR LEVEL EXPERTS FROM NPG COUNTRIES, SPEAKING WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENT’S POSITIONS WITHOUT COMMITTING THEM. THIS REPORT BY THE HLG IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION OF NATO’S LONG-RANGE TNF (LRTNF). IT AND ITS APPENDICES CONTAIN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG FOR AN LRTNF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

2. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG, THIS REPORT REVIEWS THE RATIONALES FOR TNF MODERNIZATION, INCLUDING AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO’S LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, DEVELOPS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF THE PROGRAM AND EVALUATES IT FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE HLG -- SYSTEM RANGE, FORCE SIZE, LAND-BASING, PARTICIPATION, AND BALLISTIC/Cruise MISSILE MIX. FOLLOWING THIS, SUCH FACTORS AS COST, MANNING PARTICIPATION, TIMING ASPECTS, AND EFFECTS ON THE
OVERALL NATO TNF STOCKPILE ARE DEFINED MORE FULLY.


II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

5. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE FOR WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION THROUGH DEPLOYMENTS OF LRTNF IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. ON THIS BASIS, THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENTS ENVISIONED HERE WILL DEMONSTRATE BROAD, CONCRETE PARTICIPATION. SHOULD ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE MEMBERS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN TNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH HOSTING LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS ON THEIR SOIL, THE PROGRAM COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION. IN ADDITION, THE HLG BELIEVES THAT -- CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLIANCE PRINCIPLE OF SHARED BURDENS AND BENEFITS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM THAT IS ULTIMATELY AGREED BY THE ALLIANCE AND THROUGH SOME LIMITED SHARING IN THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE PROGRAM.

III. RATIONALE

6. THE HLG REAFFIRMS THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
TNF MODERNIZATION PRESENTED IN ITS APRIL 1978 REPORT: THE PRIMARY AIM OF DETERRENCE; THE IMPORTANCE FOR DETERRENCE OF A TRIAD OF FORCES AND THE COUPLING BETWEEN THEM; AND IN THE EVENT DETERRENCE FAILS, THE NEED FOR A TNF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO DEFEND FORWARD, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER, AND TO PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

WHILE PRIORITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN TO IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OVERALL NATO STRATEGY AND THE EVOLVING WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY REQUIRE THAT NATO'S TNF CONTINUE TO BE MODERNIZED IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY CONTINUE THEIR ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE NATO TRIAD AND CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE. THERE IS A NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN NATO’S LRTNF; THAT ADJUSTMENT CARRIES NO IMPLICATION OF INCREASED ROLES FOR NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BUT RATHER IS DESIGNED TO ARREST A GROWING GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE. THE HLG ALSO AFFIRMS THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE SET FORTH IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT.

-- A STRONG LINKAGE BETWEEN THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IS REQUIRED BY THE AGREED STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

-- WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, SPECIFICALLY PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR FORCES AND SOVIET TNF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE, LEAD DECISIVELY IN THE HLG VIEW TO THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENING NATO'S OWN FORCES.

-- THE PURPOSE OF AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN LRTNF IS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE -- HOWEVER INCORRECTLY -- THAT THEY COULD USE LONG-RANGE FORCES TO MAKE OR THREATEN LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A "SANCTUARY" IN THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE MISPERCEPTION THAT WITHOUT STRONG THEATER BASED SYSTEMS OF ITS OWN CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY, AND IN AN ERA OF PARITY AT THE STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR LEVEL, NATO LACKED CREDIBLE AND APPROPRIATE MEANS OF RESPONSE.

-- AUGMENTATION OF NATO LRTNF BASED IN EUROPE WOULD THEREFORE CLOSE THIS GAP IN THE ESCALATION SPECTRUM AND PROVIDE INCREASED OPTIONS FOR RESTRAINED AND CONTROLLED RESPONSES, THEREBY REDUCING THE RISK OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTION AND STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE.

-- LRTNF AUGMENTATION WOULD ALSO CORRECT AN EMERGING IMBALANCE IN NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE; AFTER UK VULCANS ARE PHASED OUT, UK POLARIS SLBMs WOULD BE THE ONLY REMAINING NON-US COMPONENT OF LRTNF AVAILABLE TO SAC/EUR AND US F-111S WOULD BE THE ONLY LAND-BASED COMPONENT OF THE LRTNF FORCE. T; US, THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO MODERNIZE COULD BE A PERCEPTION THAT NATO WAS SHIFTING ITS EMPHASIS TOWARD SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN THE LRTNF.

-- SPIN-OFF EFFECTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: INCREASING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET LRTNF MODERNIZATION; PROVIDING A BETTER PROSPECT FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING LRTNF; AND IMPROVING FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA), THUS COMPLICATING WARSW PACT PLANNING.

-- FINALLY, A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE DECISION ON A COORDINATED PROGRAM OF ACTION IN THIS FIELD WOULD HAVE A MAJOR VALUE IN DEMONSTRATING AND REINFORCING ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.

7. THUS, AS THE HLG CONCLUDED IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT, TNF MODERNIZATION WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT NATO'S

CAPABILITIES OR ITS WILL TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. IN ADDITION, SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, STRENGTHENED MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF WOULD INCREASE NATO'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO PROVIDE FOR FORWARD
DEFENSE, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER AND TO PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

IV. STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR THE PROGRAM

8. A MIX OF BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES IN THE HLG RECOMMENDED PROGRAM PROFITS FROM THE FEATURES OF EACH SYSTEM. Owing land-based, PERSHING II and GLCM would visibly demonstrate alliance resolve to provide credible in-theater responses to any Soviet aggression and address the emerging gap in the escalation spectrum identified earlier by the HLG. Both systems will possess a range sufficient to reach the territory of the Soviet Union from areas of NATO Europe, thereby denying the Soviets a "sanctuary" from which to launch attacks on NATO with their LRNF, and providing the alliance with the capability to take this important escalatory step by means identifiably separate from strategic systems. Both systems offer high accuracy and variable yield warheads (which together provide the potential for controlling collateral damage and striking hardened targets) and are expected to be highly reliable and survivable.

9. EACH SYSTEM HAS DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COMPLEMENT THOSE OF THE OTHER. PERSHING II OFFERS A PARTICULARLY HIGH ASSURANCE OF PENETRATING SOVIET DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING PERSHING IA INFRASTRUCTURE. GLCMS ARE CHEAPER AND HAVE LONGER RANGE, SO THAT THEY CAN ATTACK A WIDER RANGE OF TARGETS AND CAN OFFER A WIDER RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR BASING, THEREBY INCREASING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTICIPATION AMONGST THE ALLIES THROUGH BASING AND DEPLOYMENTS ON THEIR SOIL. IN ADDITION, GLCMS AND PII WOULD NOT COMPETE WITH CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS AS WOULD ALCMS ON DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OR SLCMS ON MULTIMISSION SH-PS. THE INTRODUCTION OF A MIXED FORCE OF PERSHING IIS AND GLCMS ALSO OFFERS SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGES; IT HEDGES AGAINST THE FAILURE OF ONE TYPE OF SYSTEM; IT PROVIDES THE FLEXIBILITY TO SELECT THE BEST WEAPON FOR EACH MISSION; AND IT GREATLY COMPLICATES ENEMY PLANNING. THE MILITARY
EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE PRESENTED IN APPENDIX B.

10. THE HLG RECOMMENDED PROGRAM EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR WIDESPREAD BASING OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO UNDERSCORE ALLIANCE POLITICAL COHESION, RISK-SHARING AND COMMITMENT TO THE FULL TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL MEMBERS. SUCH BASING WOULD ALSO ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS BY DISPERAL. THE BASING SCHEME IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THESE OBJECTIVES. SHOULD ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WISH TO HOST LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS, THE PROGRAM COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION.

11. SIZE. THE SIZE OF THE RECOMMENDED NATO LRTNF PROGRAM IS BASED ON A CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL NEEDS. THE SOVIET TNF BUILD-UP, PARTICULARLY IN LONG-RANGE FORCES, POSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT AND WEAKNES THE SPAN OF NATO MILITARY CAPABILITY IN A WAY THAT NEEDS CONVINCINGLY TO BE REDRESSED. TO DO THIS REQUIRES A RELATIVELY SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO NATO LRTNF, AN ADDITION WHICH WILL INSURE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS NATO'S SERIOUS INTENT TO PRESERVE ITS SECURITY, AND PROVIDE MEANINGFUL INCENTIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL. A TOKEN BUILD-UP WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH THESE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES.

12. CONSISTENT WITH NATO STRATEGY, THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ENSURE AND MAKE EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE NO WEAK LINKS IN THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT EXPLOIT. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IS TO STRENGTHEN COUPLING BETWEEN STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. IT IS NOT SO LARGE AS TO IMPLY A DIMINISHED ROLE FOR STRATEGIC FORCES; BUT IT IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ASSURE A MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY STRONG LINK. NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL WOULD NOT GIVE US HIGH CONFIDENCE OVER TIME THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE SEEN AS A MAJOR FACTOR BY THE SOVIETS WHEN COMPARED WITH THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AND THE SOVIETS' OWN INCREASING LRTNF CAPABILITIES.

13. THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN WARHEADS IN THE RECOMMENDED
PROGRAM, WHEN ADDED TO THE PRESENT NATO BASE OF LAND-BASED LRTNF WARHEADS, IS WELL BELOW THE SOVIET PROJECTED FIGURE (SEE APPENDIX C). THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROGRAM IS NOT DESIGNED TO MATCH THE SOVIET BUILD-UP SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM OR IN AGGREGATE NUMBERS. BUT A NUMBER MUCH LOWER THAN BOTH BY THE SOVIETS AND IN THE WEST, AS A POLITICAL GESTURE RATHER THAN A STRATEGICALLY MEANINGFUL RESPONSE.

--MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTIVE USE

14. A CAPABILITY FOR SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST THE USSR R; INFURCES AND STRENGTHENS THE LINK BETWEEN

NATO TNF AND US STRATEGIC FORCES. SUCH A CAPABILITY REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO SURVIVE ENEMY CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS, TO PENETRATE TO TARGETS AND TO ATTACK A LARGE ENOUGH SET OF TARGETS TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF CONFLICT. THE NEED TO GUARD AGAINST UNCERTAINTIES IN BOTH PRE-LAUNCH AND IN-FLIGHT SURVIVABILITY I’ THE FACE OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET THREAT IMPLIES THAT THE FORCE MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE A CREDIBLE MILITARY EFFECT. THE FORCE OF THE MAGNITUDE CONTAINED IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD GIVE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INCENTIVES EITHER NOT TO BEGIN AN ATTACK IN THE FIRST PLACE, OR TO CEASE THEIR ATTACK AND WITHDRAW IF CONFLICT HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.

-- PARTICIPATION

5. THE RECOMMENDED INCREASE IN FORCE SIZE OF NATO’S AND-BASED LRTNF IS WELL SUITED TO WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION.

UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THIS LEVEL COULD MAKE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

-- ARMS CONTROL

16. A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE FORCE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AGREE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ITS LRTNF. IF THE SIZE OF THE ADJUSTMENT WERE MUCH LESS THAN THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL, THE SOVIETS MIGHT PREFER TO LET
THEIR OWN FORCES GO UNCAPPED SINCE NATO WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED A UNILATERAL AND RELATIVELY LOW LIMIT ON ITS FORCES. IF THE SOVIETS ARE GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS COULD LEAD TO MODIFICATIONS TO THIS PROGRAM.

17. THESE CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC SIZE OF UPWARD ADJUSTMENT BUT DO LEAD DECISIVELY TO A FORCE IN THE REGION OF THE PROPOSED LEVEL. IN THIS REGION, FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE EXACT CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL. THESE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE:

-- THE NEED TO STRUCTURE GLCM FORCES BY FLIGHTS INVOLVING 16-MISSILE INCREMENTS;

-- THE ADVANTAGE OF REPLACING ALL SO AS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE; AND

-- THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HAVING MORE THAN A FEW GLCM FLIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH A MAIN OPERATING BASE (MOB) SO AS TO AVOID SPENDING A RELATIVELY LARGE AMOUNT FOR AN MOB TO SUPPORT ONLY A FEW MISSILES.

18. RELATIONSHIP TO SPECIAL GROUP: THE PROPOSED UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR LRTNF IS DEVELOPED IN PARALLEL WITH AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ARMS CONTROL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

9. COMPARISON WITH SOVIET LRTNF: CURRENT US ESTIMATES (SEE APPENDIX C) INDICATE THAT BY 1985, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS OF WHICH ABOUT TWO-THIRDS WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL USSR SO AS TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE ABOUT 150 LONG RANGE AVIATION (LRA) BACKFIRE BOMBERS OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 115 WOULD BE BASED IN
THE WESTERN USSR. IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT SS-4'S AND SS-5'S MAY BE RETIRED AS SS-20 IS DEPLOYED. SIMILARLY, UNCERTAINTIES EXIST REGARDING THE RETIREMENT RATE OF OLDER LRA BOMBERS. IF ALL THE SS-4'S AND 5'S WERE RETIRED AND BOMBERS ARE RETIRED AT CURRENTLY PROJECTED RATES, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO WOULD STILL INCREASE FROM APPROXIMATELY 2100 IN 1979 TO ABOUT 3200 IN 1985, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE SS-20'S MULTIPLE WARHEADS AND IMPROVED REFIRE CAPABILITIES (SS-20 REFRES COMPOSE ABOUT 1300 WARHEADS OF THE 3200 TOTAL IN 1985). WITH NO SS-4 AND SS-5 RETIREMENTS, SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO (INCLUDING ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE RELOADS) TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 3900 IN THE MID-1980'S.

20. CURRENTLY, NATO LRRTNF CONSIST OF

EVEN WITH THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FROM THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM, NATO LRRTNF WOULD STILL REMAIN CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE SOVIET FORCE.


V. HLG CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

21. RANGE: THE HLG BELIEVES THAT LRRTNF SHOULD HAVE THE RANGE TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION SINCE A PRINCIPAL REASON FOR AUGMENTING NATO LRRTNF IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY AVOIDING A SOVIET PERCEPTION OF SANCTUARY, WHILE MAINTAINING THE COUPLING OF NATO TNF TO US STRATEGIC FORCES. THE RECOMMENDED

--- GLCM PERSHING II FORCE MIX MEETS THIS CRITERION. THE HLG CONCLUDES THAT SUFFICIENT RANGE TO REACH MOSCOW, WHILE NOT A PREREQUISITE, SHOULD NOT DISQUALIFY A SYSTEM

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SUCH AS GLCM.


23. BASED: THE HEART OF THE DETERRENCE PROBLEM FACING THE ALLIANCE IS A GAP IN THE ALLIANCE DETERRENT SPECTRUM. THE ALLIANCE HAS ONLY A MODEST NUMBER OF LAND-BASED, LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION. MOREOVER, THEY ARE AGING AND VULNERABLE. THE LARGE AND GROWING NUMBER OF MODERN SOVIET SYSTEMS IN A COMPARABLE CATEGORY BOTH PROVIDES THE SOVIET UNION WITH WIDE OPTIONS AND POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO NATO'S SMALLER CAPABILITY. THIS DEVELOPING GAP IN NATO ASSURED RESPONSE OPTIONS TAKES ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE DURING A PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PARITY. HENCE A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION IS TO FILL THIS GAP. THE SUGGESTED FORCE MIX OF GLCM AND PERSHING II MEETS THIS PROBLEM DIRECTLY. DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS AT SEA CANNOT FILL THIS IDENTIFIED GAP. FURTHER, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS PROVIDE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR VISIBLE

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NATO MIGHTERS' PARTICIPATION IN LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND, IF DEPLOYED ON UNDEDICATED PLATFORMS, WOULD CREATE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH OTHER ROLES. IF DEPLOYED ON DEDICATED PLATFORMS, THE COSTS WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. ALTHOUGH THE HLG REVIEW INDICATES THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INITIALLY PURSUE DEPLOYMENTS OF LAND-BASED LRTNF, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS A DEPLOYMENT OPTION IN THE FUTURE TO AUGMENT CURRENT ALLIANCE SEA-BASED ASSETS.

AND THROUGH SHARING IN THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF THAT PROGRAM.

25 A MIXED FORCE OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES: IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATIVITY OF NATO'S LAND-BASED LRNTNF, THE HLG RECOMMENDS A MIX OF NEW SYSTEMS COMPRISING BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES. A MIXED FORCE CAPTURES AS MANY OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS AS POSSIBLE BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ALLOWING MORE CHANCES FOR PARTICIPATION, HEDGING AGAINST FUTURE DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, COMPLICATING ENEMY PLANNING, PROVIDING FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND ALLOWING TIME-PHASING. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

VI. PROGRAMMATIC DETAILS

26. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM, WHICH--AS IS THE CASE FOR THIS ENTIRE REPORT--WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION

BY NATO MINISTERS, WOULD REQUIRE STATIONING

A RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT SCHEME, WHICH WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR DECISION BY NATO MINISTERS, IS AT APPENDIX A.

28. COSTS. PRESENT ESTIMATES OF THE LIFE CYCLE COSTS OF THE PROPOSED LRNTNF SYSTEMS ARE SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 1 BELOW.

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TABLE I/

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ESTIMATED TOTAL COSTS FOR RECOMMENDED PROGRAM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>PERSHING II ($M  (FY 79)</th>
<th>GLCM ($M (FY 79)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R AND D TO COMPLETE PROGRAM</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO INFRASTRUCTURE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>164.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- OTHER</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROCUREMENT: 616  1072
10 YEAR OPERATING AND SUPPORT: 1280  1170
LIFE CYCLE COST (TOTAL): 2356  2/  2496

1/ ALL COSTS ARE IN CONSTANT FY 79 US DOLLARS AND ASSUME THAT COSTS FOR A NATO LRTRANS ARE THE SAME AS IF THE US PROCURED AND MANAGED ALL LRTRANS SYSTEMS. ALL COSTS PRIOR TO FY 80 ARE CONSIDERED SUNK.

2/ IF PERSHING 1A WERE RETAINED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE INSTEAD OF BEING REPLACED ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS BY PERSHING II, ITS TEN YEAR LIFE CYCLE COST WOULD BE $1.5 B. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COSTS FOR P11 AND GLCM REPRESENT A NEW COMMITMENT OF ABOUT $3.2 B.

29. THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES WOULD BE FUNDED THROUGH THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. CONSTRUCTION COSTS WOULD INVOLVE $164M (FY 79 $) IN INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS. DURING THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE FIVE YEAR CEILING IN 1982-83, THE CEILING WOULD BE INCREASED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMING FROM LRTRANS MODERNIZATION. TO INSURE THAT OTHER PRIORITY PROGRAMS ARE NOT UNDULY DELAYED, A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE NECESSARY INCREASE SHOULD BE PART OF ALLIANCE TGN DECISIONS. THE FUNDING FOR OTHER CONSTRUCTION COSTS OUTSIDE THOSE COVERED BY THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (E.G., TROOP BILLETS, FAMILY HOUSING) WOULD BE FUNDED EITHER BY THE COUNTRY WHOSE TROOPS MAN THE EQUIPMENT OR BY THE HOST COUNTRY.
30. MANNING. TABLE 2 AT APPENDIX A PROVIDES MANPOWER DATA BY COUNTRY FOR THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. A TOTAL

OF 7093 PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO DEPLOY THE NEW LRTNF SYSTEMS. OF THIS NUMBER, 5007 WOULD BE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND 2086 WOULD PROVIDE SITE SECURITY.

31. IN CASES WHERE US FORCES OWN AND MAN LRTNF SYSTEMS, HOST NATION SUPPORT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION FOR BURDEN-SHARING AND FOR ACHIEVING THE WIDEST POSSIBLE NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. ONE USEFUL FORM OF SUPPORT IS THE PROVIDING OF HOST NATION SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT US SECURITY FORCES. APPENDIX A SHOWS THE POTENTIAL AMOUNT OF MANPOWER INVOLVED IN SECURITY FORCE AUGMENTATION. ALTERNATIVELY, A SIMILAR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL COULD BE PROVIDED FOR OTHER FORMS OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

32. NATO-WIDE PARTICIPATION. THIS SHOULD BE A NATO PROGRAM. ALL NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD EXPRESS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IT. NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN CONSTRUCTION FUNDING THROUGH THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM.

33. TIMING ASPECTS: DEPLOYMENT RATES AND IOC'S. PROGRAM DECISIONS ON THE RECOMMENDED PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE MIX, IF TAKEN BY THE END OF 1979, WILL PERMIT THESE SYSTEMS TO ENTER THE FORCE NEAR THE END OF 1983. THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS PROGRAM SHOULD OCCUR NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL HOST COUNTRIES TO DEMONSTRATE THE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION. PLANNED RATES OF PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE SHOWN IN APPENDIX D.

34. INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING. PLANNING INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS WOULD ALSO BE KEYED TO A LATE 1983 IOC FOR
PERSHING II AND GLCM. SO THAT THE LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD
NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS,
A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM
INCREASES AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW (1982-83) SHOULD
ACCOMPANY THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN DECEMBER ON THE
LRTNF PROGRAM.

35. EFFECT ON NATO TNF STOCKPILE. THE HLG STRESSES
35. EFFECT ON NATO TNF STOCKPILE. THE HLG STRESSES
THAT ITS RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS NOT INTENDED TO
RESULT IN AN INCREASED ROLE FOR TNF IN NATO’S
STRATEGY, OR IN AN INCREASE IN NATO’S STOCKPILE OF
NUCLEAR WARHEADS. AS NEW WARHEADS FOR THE LONG-RANGE
THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED, THE SAME NUMBER
OF WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE EXISTING
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. TNF MODERNIZATION COULD
CONCEIVABLY RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR
WARHEAD STOCKPILE IN EUROPE.

36. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE ADDITIONAL LRTNF WARHEAD
REQUIREMENT WITHOUT INCREASE IN THE TOTAL STOCKPILE
NECESSARILY IMPLIES A NUMERICAL SHIFT OF EMPHASIS
AWAY FROM WARHEADS FOR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF OTHER TYPES
AND SHORTER RANGES. THE PRECISE NATURE, SCOPE AND BASIS
OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS AND THEIR POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF ROLES AND SYSTEMS IN
NATO’S THEATER NUCLEAR ARMORY AS A WHOLE, SHOULD BE THE
SUBJECT OF AN EXAMINATION WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE
DECISION ON THE LRTNF PROGRAM.

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APPENDIX A

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SUMMARY OF DEPLOYMENTS AND MANPOWER

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TABLE 1 BELOW PROVIDES FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS

THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEME OF THE HLG’S RECOMMENDED PROGRAM
FOR MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF.
1. DATE SHOWN HERE ARE COMPUTED BASED ON US TANNING LEVELS FOR LR INF UNITS. NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT THAT PORTION OF THE TOTAL SECURITY FORCE WHICH COULD BE HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE US SECURITY FORCES. ALTERNATIVELY, SIMILAR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL COULD Undertake SOME OTHER FORM OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

2. THESE MANPO’ER FIGURES ARE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION

3. THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE GLCM CENTRAL REPAIR FACILITY MANNING WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT 50-150 PERSONNEL.

4. PERSHING 1A REQUIRES 4432 PERSONNEL. IF PERSHING 11 REPLACES PERSHING 1A, THE MANPOWER REQUIREMENT DECREASES TO 3914.

APPENDIX B - MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED TNF MODERNIZATION

1. THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE OF 572 WARHEADS WOULD NOTABLY ENHANCE NATO’S OVERALL DETERRENT FORCE POSTURE PRIMARILY BY PROVIDING A BROAD RANGE OF ESCALATION OPTIONS BETWEEN BATTLEFIELD USE AND US EMPLOYMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE MAJOR ROLE OF
THOSE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS WOULD BE TO CONDUCT
SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS,
especially against targets in the Western USSR. The
purpose of such strikes would be primarily to send an
unambiguous signal to the Soviet political leadership
that NATO will not tolerate further aggression, that
the theater nuclear response is not decoupled from a

POTENTIAL STRATEGIC RESPONSE, AND THEREFORE, GENERAL
NUCLEAR WAR IS IMMINENT UNLESS THE SOVIETS CEASE THEIR
AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW.

2. FURTHERMORE, ADDED BENEFITS ARE DERIVED FROM THE
CAPABILITY OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS TO RELEASE A
PORTION OF NATO'S DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) ASSIGNED
A QUICK REACTION ALERT (QRA) ROLE. AS AN INCREASING NUMBER
OF DCA ARE PLACED ON QRA IN ANTICIPATION OF A GENERAL
NUCLEAR RESPONSE, A LARGER FRACTION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR
CAPABILITY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO A COordinated WARSaw
PACT ATTACK THUS INVITING PREEMPTION. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE
NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS COULD HELP TO MITIGATE this
PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY.

SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OPTION (SEO) TARGET COVERAGE

3. TABLE 1 BELOW PRESENTS ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE
NUMBER OF SEO TARGETS THAT COULD BE COVERED BY THE
PROPOSED PERSHING II AND GLCM FORCE FOR A CONVENTIONAL
AND NUCLEAR SCENARIO. THE ASSUMED SCENARIOS AND THE
WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS USED TO DERIVE THE NUMBER OF
SEO TARGETS COVERED ARE THOSE USED IN THE COST EFFECTIVENESS
ANALYSIS SPONSORED BY THE HLG, THE RESULTS OF WHICH WERE
FORWARDED TO THE NUCLEAR LANNING GROUP IN APRIL 1979.
FOR A GIVEN NUMBER OF MISSILES, THE NUMBER OF SEO TARGETS
COVERED IS A FUNCTION OF PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY (PLS),
WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY (WSR), AND PROBABILITY-TO-
PENETRATE (PTP).

TABLE 1 -- SEO TARGET COVERAGE

| PERSHING II: - ILLUSTRATIVE          |
| --- Scenario                        |
| NO MISSILES                         |
| TARGETS                             |

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4. IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO, NATO SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. UNDER THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO, THE SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT AND A WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR STRIKE LIMITED TO NATO'S LONG-RANGE AIRFIELDS AND THOSE MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE LOCATED.

5. THE WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR GLCM IS .85; THE GLCM PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE VALUE IS .93. ASSUMING THAT ONE-THIRD OF THE GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE IN THE UK AND THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO IS .84 AND .72 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. PERSHING II WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE ARE .89 AND 1.0, RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SCENARIOS, PERSHING II PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IS .75 AND .68, RESPECTIVELY.

6. AS TABLE 1 INDICATES, THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE IS CAPABLE OF COVERING 370 SEO TARGETS IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO AND 330 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. THE PROPOSED FORCE WOULDthus REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD FILLING THE CURRENT SHORTFALLS IN SEO EXECUTION.
1979 HLG REPORT, THERE ARE WIDELY DIFFERING VIEWS ON CRUISE MISSILE PTP. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AIR DEFENSE BEYOND THOSE WE CURRENTLY ANTICIPATE COULD SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADE CRUISE MISSILE PTP. SIMILARLY, ESTIMATES OF BOTH PERSHING II AND GLCM PLS ALSO ARE UNCERTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A CONVENTIONAL WAR SCENARIO GREATER THAN THREE DAYS’ DURATION ESTIMATED PLS WOULD DECLINE. IN PART,

UNCERTAINTIES SUCH AS THESE, COUPLED TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE AND ENDURING LAND-BASED CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT SEO’S AGAINST SOVIET TERRITORY LED TO A PROGRAM IN THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HLG’S RECOMMENDED 200-600 WARHEAD DEPLOYMENT.

EMPLOYMENT OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

SACEUR’S SCHEDULED STRIKE PROGRAM (SSP) USES AVAILABLE WEAPONS AGAINST APPROXIMATELY 860 FIXED TARGETS, A SUBSET OF THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE THREAT TARGET LIST CONSISTING OF SOME HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS. NO MOBILE TARGETS ARE INCLUDED AMONG THE TARGETS IN THE SSP.

THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOT ONLY INCREASES THE TARGET COVERAGE BY PROVIDING NEW LRTNF, BUT IT REINFORCES THE SSP BY REDUCING PRESSURE ON THE QUICK REACTION ALERT AIRCRAFT WHICH GENERALLY HAVE A LOWER PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY THAN THE NEW SYSTEMS. THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS PROVIDE FOR ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY TO TARGET WITH DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MOBILE FORMATIONS NOT NOW Addressed IN THE SSP. THIS ADDED FORCE FLEXIBILITY ALSO FACILITATES AN IMPROVEMENT IN DCA CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY PROVIDING INCREASED SORTIES IN EITHER ROLE AS THE

CONFLICT MAY REQUIRE. HENCE, THE NEW LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD ALLOW SACEUR GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO USE DCA IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE OR IN SUPPORTING SEO’S, AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE BETTER SUITABILITY OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK MOBILE FORMATIONS AND TO PROVIDE, AS NEEDED, A CONTINUOUS RESPONSE IN EITHER MEDIUM-RANGE INTERDICKTION OR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLES.

SUMMARY
TAKEN TOGETHER, THE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE SECO'S AND THE POSITIVE SPIN-OFF EFFECTS FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE TARGETING, ESPECIALLY THE CAPABILITY TO RELEASE A PORTION OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FROM NUCLEAR QUICK REACTION ALERT, INDICATE THAT THE PERSHING II-G-CM FORCE MIX FULFILLS THE HLG CONCLUSIONS ON THE DESIRED CAPABILITIES NATO'S NEW LRNTF SHOULD POSSESS.

VANCE

NNN
NORWEGIAN DELEGATION TO NATO
B 1110 BRUSSELS

Vår ref
5641/79/JAL/JM

Det kongelige forsvarsdepartement
v/statssekretær J J Holst

v/19 kontor

Forsvarets overkommando
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kongelige utenriksdepartement
v/3. politiske kontor

NPG - HLG MØTE 26 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes kopi av:
- referat fra HLG møtet 26.9.79
- brev fra HLG formannen vedlagt den endelige rapporten fra NPG/HLG.

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde

1. **Summary**

- The revised draft of the HLG report was finally approved for presentation at ministerial level.
- The review of the specific paragraphs of the draft lead, in addition to editorial changes, to closer discussion of the participation issue, the justification for the proposed LRTNF force size and the issue of funding.
- While the Italians made the case for a justification of deployment, force structure and force size that focused as strongly as possible on military aspects, the Germans in particular underlined that a realistic proposal for TNF modernization presupposed that obvious political facts were taken into account.
- The HLG chairman and the American support staff received praise for excellent leadership during the HLG discussions.
- A copy of the Norwegian general statement is attached [for all attachments, see the original document].
- From Norway, the following took part:
  Lieutenant general Sven Hauge (leader of the delegation in the absence of Deputy Minister J.J. Holst), Defence High Command
  Acting Director Jan Monsen, MOD
  Deputy Director Leif Mevik, MFA
  Director Vidar Vikberg [sic], MFA
  Assistant Defence Counsellor John A. Lunde, Norwegian Nato Delegation
2. Main points of the HLG meeting, 26.9.79

The HLG Chairman, Assistant Secretary of Defence McGiffert [sic], opened by underlining that the Americans hoped that the group would be able to approve the draft report for presentation at ministerial level.

He also said that the task of integrating the HLG and Special Group reports would begin in the joint meeting of the two groups on September 28. Hopefully, the HLG participants would primarily ratify earlier proposals that had been incorporated into the report.

All delegations expressed general satisfaction with the draft for an HLG report that was presented. However, the majority had editorial and more substantial remarks to the specific paragraphs.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Italian delegation circulated a proposal for a comprehensive reorganisation of the HLG report. Since the meeting aimed for final approval of the report, the proposal was not taken up for consideration, in line with the request of the chairman.

The Italian proposal had two main aims:
– give the report a more logical structure
– base the recommendations on arguments that were as military/technical as possible, so as to underline that the final decision were to be taken on a ministerial level.

The Italian delegation, supported by Belgium and the Netherlands, also underlined that approval in the HLG did commit governments, even if one presupposed that the participants worked on the basis of their knowledge of the viewpoints of their respective governments.

The review of the specific paragraphs lead to editorial changes as well as substantial discussions concerning:

Paragraph 5 (the question of participation).

The Italian delegation pointed to the following phrasing in paragraph 5:
“Should additional alliance members desire to participate in TNF modernization through hosting LRTNF deployments on their soil, the program could be adjusted to accommodate such participation,”

and underlined that none of the prospective host countries really “desired to” participate in LRTNF modernization. In this background, the words “desire to” should be dropped.

**Norway and Turkey** did not support the proposal and final approval was reached only later during the meeting, when all participants could accept replacing the expression “desire to” with “consider”

The Norwegian statement concerning paragraph 5 is attached

**Paragraph 17 (justification for the suggested force size)**

Several HLG representatives asked to what extent the points listed in paragraph 17, intended to serve as basis for the proposed force size, really could be said to be relevant and suitable. The paragraph was revised entirely following the discussion.

The Norwegian statement concerning paragraph 17 is attached. The majority supported the chairman’s suggestion to transfer the Norwegian point concerning MBFR option 3 to the discussions in the Special Group.

**Paragraph 28 (funding arrangements/cost-sharing)**

All countries except Norway were generally satisfied with the sections concerning the funding arrangements, including the planned funding through the infrastructure programme. In relation to the Norwegian statement that is attached, the HLG chairman pointed out that the Norwegian proposal seemed superfluous, and that it furthermore could obstruct other countries that wanted to contribute additional funds beyond what would be covered by the infrastructure programme from doing so.
The Americans had not altered their principal view in the funding question, and any form of “open ended” funding for the TNF modernization program was out of the question.

Throughout the meeting, the Italians argued that the arguments for the pattern of deployment, force structure and size out to be, to the highest extent possible, based on purely military considerations.

The German delegation, with support from the Dutch, underlined in this respect that it was considered impossible to reach realistic LRTNF modernization proposals without bringing obvious political facts into consideration.

The deployment of LRTNF weapons in the five prospective countries could not be justified on purely military grounds. The lack of will among the other countries to take on the political and military burdens related to stationing of LRTNF weapons had been decisive for the choice of the five host countries.

SHAPE specified on this point that wider participation, which would allow for the proliferation of LRTNF weapons to more countries, would be very desirable from a military point of view.

Italy, for its part, underlined that it saw the inadequate arguments for the choice of host countries as a weakness of the HLG report.

In conclusion, the British HLG representative thanked the HLG representative Assistant Secretary McGiffert and the American support team for excellent leadership during the discussions of the many complicated and sensitive questions that related to LRTNF modernization within the NATO alliance.
Mr Chairman,

Para 3 points to the fact that the "Long Term defence program" (LTDP) improves the conventional leg of the NATO Triad. The rest of the paragraph implies that the modernization of the long range TNF is not part of the LTDP. This is of course not correct. The TNF modernization was established as "Task Force no 10" of the Long Term Defence program. We would therefore prefer a rewording of this paragraph which specifically ties the Long range TNF modernization to the rest of the Long Term Defence Program which already is known to the public and which is accepted by the heads of States.
Mr Chairman,

Para 5 and 10 deals with participation and we agreed this morning to drop the words "Desire to" in para 5 and "wish to" in para 10. The point of indicating the voluntary position of some nation not to host LRTNF deployment was discussed during the last meeting.

Mr Holst then made a point of avoiding assertions or speculations concerning pressure or expectations that we would change a policy which has been a permanent feature of the situation in Northern Europe since the creation of our alliance. He also stressed the necessity to avoid suggestions that we are embarking upon an open-ended program. He suggested – and it was accepted that this sentence should reflect this. By taking the words "desire to" or "wish to" out this point is being lost. I would therefore ask that the sentences be left as drafted as this takes care of an important point for our country.
Para 6

Mr Chairman,

I would like to refer to para 6 tick no 5 which start with LRTNF augmentation. It implies that the Long range TNF modernization would correct the emerging imbalance after the UK Vulcans are phased out. This statement is not fully consistent with the footnote to table 1 in appendix A which indicate that the modernization program does not reflect the replacement of existing Long range TNF septems such as the UK Vulcans.

We think that the inconsistency could be corrected if the first line of this subparagraph of para 6 was amended to read: LRTNF augmentation would also contribute towards correcting the emerging imbalance in NATO's theater nuclear force posture.
Mr Chairman,

Pkt 17

Mr Holst has asked me to point at a substantive as well as a presentational problem flowing from the formulation under the second tick in paragraph 17. It is argued here about the economy involved in replacing all US PERSHING I launchers with PERSHING II. We have to confront the question what this criterion does to the Option-3 offer which is on the table in Vienna. We are concerned about this issue also because it will inevitably be brought up as a question in the public debate about the compatibility of TNF modernization and the pursuit of arms control.
Mr Chairman,

Para 19 - first line refers to current US estimates on Soviet Long range TNF capability. I suggest that reference should be made to MC 161/79 which is as you know NATO agreed intelligence; reference to this document is made later on - in fact in the next paragraph. I also feel that reference should be made in para 19 to the Golf II submarines in the Baltic since these are often referred to in public presentations in relation to Soviet theater nuclear capability.
Mr Chairman,

Pkt 29

I have been instructed to clarify one issue which appears somewhat obscure in the present draft, viz the issue of cost sharing.

The general principle of some limited sharing of the cost is established in paragraphs 5 and 24. It was our understanding that the specific financial participation of those countries who are not participating in a host-nation rôle would be limited to a sharing of the construction costs under the NATO infrastructure programme. However, in the current draft the whole matter looks somewhat open-ended as a result of the deletion of paragraph 23 in the previous draft which dealt with procurement costs.

The political clearance in Norway of the HLG report has been predicated on the assumption that participation in joint financing would be limited to a sharing of construction costs under the infrastructure programme. Hence, we must ask that the report be written so as to specify the responsibilities with respect to procurement costs which is consistent with the understanding which has prevailed hitherto and with the summary contained in paragraph 32.

We therefore propose a sentence to be added to para 29 after the first sentence in order to clarify this:
"The financial participation of those countries who are not participating in a host-nation role would be limited to a sharing of the construction cost under this program only."
Vår ref: 5745/79/JAL/KT

Brussels, 3 oktober 1979

128 8/10-79

Det kgl Forsvarsdepartementet /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 2 av 7
v/statssekretær Johan J Holst

v/19 ktr /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 3 av 7

Forsvarets overkommando /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 4 av 7
v/STSJ Generalløytnant Sven Hauge

Det kgl Utenriksdepartementet /m HEMMELIG vedl ekspl 5 av 7
v/3 pol. kontor

NPG/HLG - SPECIAL GROUP, FELLESMØTE 28 SEPTEMBER 1979

Vedlagt innsendes kopi av referat fra ovennevnte møte.

Hovedpunktene fra ambassadørmøtet om ettermiddagen 28 september vedrørende samme sak er oppsummert i egen melding til PD/FO 736/10725 og UD 10397 av 3 oktober 1979.

Etter fullmakt

John A Lunde

1 HEMMELIG vedl.

1. Summary
– At the beginning of the meeting, the HLG and SG chairmen gave a short presentation of the main contents of the respective reports

– All representatives could endorse the outlined framework for the continuation of the discussions [avklaringer] concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control, based on the present reports and two integrated documents, which the HLG and SG chairmen will prepare jointly. Drafts for these reports will be circulated in mid-October.

– The first of the two integrated documents will be divided into two parts, one comprising the “rationale” sections and recommendations of each report, and the other a “draft public statement.” It was assumed that the first part of the document would form the basis for the final decisions concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control during the ministerial meeting in NATO in December 79. It will be discussed at ambassadorial level in late October/early November and finally cleared for presentation on ministerial level in a meeting of ambassadors in the end of November.

– The second integrated document would not be cleared formally within NATO. It would contain an unclassified “public rationale,” prepared on the basis of the “rationale” chapters in the HLG and SG reports, and circulated to capitals as required.

– There was agreement about the necessity of consultations between capitals with a view to avoid that public statements concerning TNF issues in one country caused unintended problems with respect to public opinion in other member states before the December meetings.
– From Norway, the following took part:
Deputy Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, MOD (leader of the HLG delegation)
Lieutenant general Sven Hauge, Defence High Command
Deputy Director Leif Mevik, MFA (leader of the SG delegation)
Acting Director Jan Monsen, MOD
Director Vidar Vikberg [sic], MFA
Assistant Defence Counsellor John A. Lunde, Norwegian Nato Delegation
First Secretary Ove Farstad, Norwegian Nato Delegation

2. MAIN POINTS of HLG- SG JOINT MEETING 28.9.79

The following agenda was approved:

I. Brief presentation by HLG chairman D. McGiffert of the main contents of the HLG report.

II. A similar presentation by the SG chairman R. Bartholomew

III. Discussion of the framework for the continuation of discussions concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control in the time before the ministerial meeting in December 79.

I. The HLG chairman pointed out that the present report from the HLG contained a concrete proposal with respect to LRTNF modernization in line with the mandate given to the group by the NPG ministers.

The modernization programme was outlined within the principal guidelines for LRTNF modernization drawn up by the defence ministers on the basis on the previous two HLG reports to the NPG ministers.

The program comprised the deployment of 464 GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) in the Federal Republic, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium and 108 Pershing II XR (Pershing missiles with increased range) in the Federal Republic, and was completely in line with the overall strategy of the alliance and the principles of solidarity and risk sharing.
The deployment in the 5 countries complied with both political and military requirements for widespread participation, and all countries were assumed to endorse the modernization decision and contribute funds through NATO's infrastructure programme for necessary construction work in connection with deployment in the five countries.

II. In his presentation, the SG chairman pointed out that the report from the Special Group contained a concrete programme for an arms control initiative concerning long-range TNF weapons, to be launched in connection with the decision on LRTNF modernization. Like the modernization programme, the arms control initiative was designed with a view to improve overall alliance security. It must not be perceived as a potential alternative to – on the contrary, it was a supplement to – LRTNF modernization.

The Special Group recommended that the USA pursue negotiations with a view to limit long-range TNF weapons within the framework of SALT III, and that the negotiations should cover American and Soviet LRTNF units.

III. The HLG chairman referred to the American view that the two present reports should be integrated as part of the continuation of the discussions concerning LRTNF decision and arms control, with a view to a final decision at ministerial level within the end of the year.

In light of this, the American delegation suggested at the HLG and SG chairmen jointly prepare two integrated documents, the first of which could be circulated in mid-October for discussion and later approved on ambassadorial level within the end of November.

The first integrated document would be divided into two parts, and comprise elements from the HLG and SG reports that together would form the necessary and suitable basis for the decision concerning LRTNF modernization and arms control during the NATO ministerial meeting in December, as well as "draft public statement," which would be formulated in accordance with the contents of the first part of the document.

As for the second integrated document, there were no plans to present this for formal approval within NATO. It would contain an integrated "rationale" for the agreed-upon
LRTNF programme and would be circulated to capitals as a basis for public statements on the LRTNF issue.

In this connection, specific national considerations and needs would as far as possible be incorporated into the document.

All representatives could endorse the outlined American framework for the continuation of LRTNF discussions.

The German delegation underlined in particular that collective responsibility must be maintained after the HLG and SG discussions were transferred to an integrated and political level.

The British delegation referred to the proposed integrated rationale document and underlined the need to include an agreed-upon data base to ensure harmony between statements from all capitals.

After the Belgian delegation underlined the need to avoid the impression that in reality, decisions had been taken before the issue was presented to the ministers at the December meetings when designing the procedures for the future discussions, all representatives endorsed the American expectation that one would keep this in mind in particular in relation to the NPG ministerial meeting in November.

All facets of the LRTNF issue would presumably be discussed at the meeting, but there was general agreement that any decision at this stage in the process would be out of the question.

Because the HLG and SG reports would be forwarded to the general secretary, it was assumed that future discussions would take place in accordance with regular NATO procedures.

The Norwegian delegation underlined that the different aspects of the HLG and SG reports had to be reflected in the integrated documents. This would be of great importance when it came to mobilizing political support in the capitals.

The rationale material should be expanded so as to cover more short-range Soviet TNF
weapons (SS 21, 22 and 23), which could threaten targets in Western Europe from forward positions as well.

Whereas the focus thus far had been on the internal procedure for the continuation of LRTNF discussions within NATO, there was an obvious need to arrive at guidelines to avoid that statements in one capital caused unintended problems in other member countries. Statements concerning the pattern of deployment (the number of LRTNF weapons to which country) were likely to be the most sensitive.

The Dutch underlined in particular the desirability of declassified versions of the HLG and SG reports.

With reference to the Norwegian statement, the SG chairman expressed that one was aware that two parallel processes were underway. The first comprised NATO discussions, while the other comprised consultation and decision-making processes connected to the governments and parliaments of the separate countries. When it came to the question of what could be said in public statements, the NATO countries already had procedures for necessary consultations on a bilateral basis.
DECAPIONED

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 (09/29/99) (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-P
TAGS: PM, NATO, MNUC
SUBJECT: (S) NAC BRIEFING BY CHAIRMAN OF HIGH LEVEL
GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AT 28 SEPTEMBER MEETING OF PERMREPS, SG AND
HLG CHAIRMEN BRIEFED ON THE RESULTS OF THEIR STUDIES AND
OUTLINED THE SCENARIO FOR ACTION LEADING TO DECISIONS ON
TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL DURING THE DECEMBER
MINISTERIALS. ALTHOUGH UNINSTRUCTED, PERMREPS WERE
ENTHUSIASTIC IN PRAISING SG/HLG WORK WITH SEVERAL (FRG, UK,
NETHERLANDS) INDICATING THAT IT FORMED AN ADEQUATE BASIS
FOR MINISTERIAL DECISIONS. THE FRG AND UK PERMREPS ALSO
STRESSED THE NEED FOR DECISIONS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR.

FRG PERMREP, SUPPORTED BY CANADIAN AND DUTCH COLLEAGUES
SUGGESTED NEED FOR COMMON NATO DATA BASE FOR PUBLIC DISCUSS-

UNCLASSIFIED
SION. DUTCH, CANADIAN AND DANISH PERMREPS EMPHASIZED THAT
NPG MINISTERIAL WAS FOR CONSULTATION/DISCUSSION ON TNP
ISSUES WITH DECISIONS RESERVED FOR THE DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.
CANADIAN PERMREP SUGGESTED PLACING BOTH HLG AND SG REPORTS
AND THE US-DRAFTED INTEGRATED DOCUMENT BEFORE THE NOVEMBER
NPG MINISTERIAL SO THAT MEETING COULD BE SEEN AS HAVING
"BALANCE" BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR INTRODUCED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL
GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL (SG), REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW,
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS,
DEPT. OF STATE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NPG'S HIGH LEVEL
GROUP (HLG), DAVID E. MCGIFFERT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE (ISA). MCGIFFERT THEN REVIEWED THE WORK
OF THE HLG ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

A. WE HAVE COMPLETED THE WORK OF THE HLG ON THE
MODERNIZATION OF LRTPN. AS CHAIRMAN, I HAVE
TRANSMITTED OUR REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR
CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS AT THE NPG MEETING IN THE
HAGUE IN NOVEMBER.

. -- OUR WORK IN THE HLG IS TESTAMENT TO THE DEGREE
OF COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY THAT EXISTS IN NATO.

. -- THE SUPPORT, COOPERATION AND ENTHUSIASM
OF MY COLLEAGUES WERE THE INGREDIENTS WHICH
ALLOWED THE HLG TO BECOME WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE A
MODEL OF CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE
MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ISSUES.

I BELIEVE THIS REPORT PROVIDES A BASIS FOR GOVERNMENTS
to REACH DECISIONS BY DECEMBER.

B. LET ME INTRODUCE THIS REPORT WITH A BRIEF REVIEW
OF OUR DELIBERATIONS. AS PART OF NATO'S LONG-TERM
DEFENSE PROGRAM IN 1977, THE ALLIANCE GAVE PROMINENCE
TO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION BY ESTABLISHING
TASK FORCE TEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE HLG. AT ABOUT THE
SAME TIME CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT'S SPEECH BEFORE THE IISS
PUBLICLY DEFINED THE MAJOR NUCLEAR ISSUES BEFORE
THE ALLIANCE AND LENT A DEGREE OF URGENCY TO THE
WORK WHICH WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.
IN PARTICULAR, SALT II, THE ADVENT OF OVERALL PARITY IN US AND SOVIET CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND THE MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, SPECIFICALLY THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE, REQUIRED A NATO RESPONSE.

C. WE BEGAN OUR WORK IN THE HLG BY EXAMINING A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND SUBMITTED A REPORT TO NPR MINISTERS IN THE SPRING OF 1978 WITH TWO MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS:

- -- NATO SHOULD MAINTAIN AND MODERNIZE THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

- -- PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO AN EXAMINATION OF STEPS TO MODERNIZE THE LONG RANGE PORTION OF NATO'S

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PAGE 01 USNATO 06660 02 OF 06 291342Z
ACTION SS-25
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USNMR SHAPE BE
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SECTION 02 OF 06 USNATO 06660
EXDIS
FORCES WHERE THERE WAS EVIDENT A NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY ADJUSTMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE SOMEWHAT
D. Subsequently, we examined the political and military issues associated with an evolutionary upward adjustment in NATO's long range systems. In our second report in April 1979, we recommended that any upward adjustment in NATO's LRTNF should meet the following criteria:

- No increased role for NATO TNF. Adjustments will be made without a change in conceptual basis.

- The increase should be within the range and be accomplished within the NATO total inventory of warheads in-theater.

- The range of new systems should be sufficient to strike the Soviet Union.

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E. In the report we have just completed, we have made specific recommendations for a program, supported by general principles and criteria, for the modernization of LRTNF, which I present to you today.

-- the HLG recommends that NATO's LRTNF modernization goals can best be met by a deployment of
-- THE HLG ALSO BELIEVES THAT -- CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLIANCE PRINCIPLES OF SHARED BURDENS AND BENEFITS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- ALL NATO MEMBERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM THAT IS ULTIMATELY AGREED UPON BY THE ALLIANCE AND THROUGH SHARING OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS.

-- THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UNDERLYING RATIONALE FOR STRENGTHENING NATO'S LRTNF, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR:

. - LINKING THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES;

. - MINIMIZING THE RISKS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD, HOWEVER INCORRECTLY, COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD USE OR THREATEN TO USE LIMITED NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A "SANCTUARY" OF THE SOVIET UNION, THINKING THAT NATO WOULD NOT HAVE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE;

. - AVOIDING THE PERCEPTION WHICH FAILURE TO MODERNIZE WOULD GIVE THAT NATO WAS SHIFTING ITS EMPHASIS TOWARD SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFFSHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN LRTNF;

. - DEMONSTRATING AND REINFORCING ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.

-- THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED IN THE HLG REPORT, IF AGREED TO BY NATO, WILL ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH A NUMBER OF CRITERIA ESTABLISHED IN EARLIER WORK.

-- THE SIZE OF THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS NOT ANALYTICALLY DERIVED BUT IS BASED ON THE CONVERGENCE OF A NUMBER OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING THE NEED:

. - TO REDRESS CONVINCINGLY WITH MORE THAN A TOKEN FORCE THE THREATPOSED BY THE SOVIET TNF BUILDUP, PARTICULARLY IN LONG-RANGE FORCES;
To make evident that there are no weak links in NATO's spectrum of options while not implying a diminished role for strategic forces;

To introduce a force not so large as to leave the impression that NATO will match the Soviets system-by-system but not so small that it would be viewed, by the Soviets and in the West, as a political gesture rather than a strategically meaningful response;

To ensure widespread participation in LRTNF basing;

To provide the necessary incentives for the Soviets to enter into serious arms control negotiations and to agree to reduce and limit their LRTNF.
-- IN ADDITION TO MEETING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY GOALS FOR LRTNF MODERNIZATION, I FIND THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDED BY THE HLG TO BE ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AND IN PARTICULAR THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP. I COMMEND THE HLG REPORT AND THE PROGRAM IT RECOMMENDS TO YOUR ATTENTION.

4. SPECIAL GROUP CHAIRMAN BARTHOLOMEW, AFTER PRAISING WORK OF HIS SG COLLEAGUES, CALLED THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL GROUP AND NOTED THAT IN THE COURSE OF ITS WORK THE GROUP DEVELOPED, AND FORWARDED IN THE FORM OF A FINAL REPORT, THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR ALLIANCE DECISIONS ON ARMS CONTROL IN CONJUNCTION WITH A DECISION ON MODERNIZATION. THE GROUP SET ITS SIGHTS ON CONCEIVING AND ELABORATING A SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIANCE GOALS OF DEFENSE AND DETENTE. THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN CLOSELY BOUND TO THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP.

...BARTHOLOMEW INDICATED THE GROUP BELIEVES ITS MANDATE HAS BEEN FULFILLED BY DEVELOPING AND RECOMMENDING A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL APPROACH -- AN APPROACH THAT WILL ENJOY THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SG REPORT CONTAINS THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR A FULLY INFORMED DECISION BY MINISTERS AS THE ALLIANCE MOVES FORWARD TO DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.

... BARTHOLOMEW THEN REVIEWED THE SG REPORT STATING THAT ITS BASIC CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PURSUE ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED IN THE STUDY. THE REPORT HAS DEVELOPED OBJECTIVES, RATIONALES AND PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE US EFFORTS IN TNF ARMS CONTROL. THE TWELVE PRINCIPLES TOGETHER FORM THE BASIC OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN FEATURES OF A NEGOTIATING APPROACH.

DETAILING THE INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLES, BARTHOLOMEW NOTED THAT THE FIRST MAKES CLEAR THE COMPLEMENTARITY
BETWEEN TNF ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION. HE STRESSED THE FACT THAT ARMS CONTROL WITHOUT MODERNIZATION IS NEITHER REALISTIC NOR POSSIBLE. ARMS CONTROL, HOWEVER, IS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL SERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE.

. THE NEXT THREE PRINCIPLES DEAL WITH THE MODALITIES OF ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THEY INCLUDE THE POINTS THAT NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK; THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE NEEDED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO SUPPORT SUCH NEGOTIATIONS; AND ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS IN MBFR AND SALT III SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

. PRINCIPLES FIVE THROUGH NINE LAY DOWN BASIC GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATING TNF. THEY INCLUDE:
--- US REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE LIMITS ON TNF UNTIL THE SOVIETS AGREE TO NEGOTIATE ON THEIRS;

--- INCLUSION ONLY OF US FORCES IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS;
--- THE REQUIREMENT FOR DE JURE EQUALITY IN CEILINGS.
AND RIGHTS:

- THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION; AND
- THE REQUIREMENT TO BE GUIDED BY MAINTAINING THE
  STRATEGIC UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

THE FINAL THREE PRINCIPLES SET OUT THE DESIGN ELEMENTS
FOR THE APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF:

- THAT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF BE
A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
- THAT THE INITIAL STEP LIMIT/REDUCE THE THREAT BY
  THOSE LONG RANGE SYSTEMS ABLE TO STRIKE NATO, ESPECIALLY
  THE SS-20.
- THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE TO STOP SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS
  SHORT OF THEIR PROJECTED LEVEL, FORCE THE RETIREMENT OF
  SS-4/5 AND THEREBY REDUCE THE OVERALL THREAT TO NATO.
- THAT THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF LIMITATION SHOULD BE
  WARHEADS ON LAUNCHERS AND THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE SHOULD

BE WORLDWIDE BUT PLACE SPECIAL RESTRAINT ON THOSE SYSTEMS
WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF NATO.

SUBSEQUENT STEPS WILL PROVIDE THE POSSIBILITY
FOR EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF SYSTEMS COVERED AND
INCREASING STRINGENCY OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT. LIMITS
ON LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE SOUGHT IN THE
FIRST STEP EXCEPT FOR BACKFIRE IN AN APPROPRIATE
MANNER. ALSO, SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS WILL NOT BE
ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST STAGE.

B. THEN NOTED THAT THE US HAD FORMULATED A
PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR RELEASE TO THE PRESS AT
THE CONCLUSION OF THE DAY'S MEETINGS. HE
CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT THE HLG/SG EFFORTS
HAD PRODUCED RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH, IN HIS VIEW,
WOULD FURTHER NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND
DETEENTE. THIS WOULD NOT BE AN EASY BRIEF TO CARRY
OUT, BUT ONE OPENING THE PROSPECT OF SIGNIFICANTLY
ENHANCING ALLIANCE SECURITY.

5. AS-DEAN, CATALANO (ITALY) SPOKE FOR ALL PERMREPS
WHEN HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EXCELLENT
REPORTS PREPARED BY BOTH GROUPS, WHICH WILL PROVIDE
MUCH "FOOD FOR THOUGHT." HE EXTENDED ESPECIAL
CONGRATULATIONS TO THE TWO CHAIRMEN. CATALANO'S
REMARKS WERE ECHOED BY ALL PERMREPS WHO SPOKE.

6. PAULS (FRC) WAS THE NEXT TO SPEAK, AND MADE
THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE INTERVENTION OF THE MEETING.
PAULS STATED THAT BOTH GROUPS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL
IN MEETING THEIR MANDATES. HE HOPED THAT, WITH
THIS EXCELLENT BEGINNING, THE FURTHER PREPARATION
OF PARALLEL DECISIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AND ON
IMPROVING NATO'S DEFENCES WOULD BE ABLE TO PROCEED
WITHOUT OBSTACLES TO REACH THOSE DECISIONS BY THE
END OF THIS YEAR. THE REPORTS OF THE HLG AND SG
CONTAIN ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR PARALLEL
AND SIMULTANEOUS DECISIONS BY MINISTERS AT THAT TIME.
PAULS SAID THAT THE SG'S ARMS CONTROL PRESENTATION IS
SUFFICIENTLY CONCRETE TO FORM THE BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATION. PAULS WENT ON TO SUPPORT SUGGESTIONS
MADE DURING THE MORNING'S JOINT HLG/SG MEETING
FOR A SOLID DATA BASE. HE REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR
DATA ON SOVIET SYSTEMS FROM WHICH ALLIES COULD QUOTE.
PAULS SAID THAT THE CANadian IDEA, EXPRESSED AT THE
EARLIER MEETING, WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. A
SOLID DATA BASE WAS NEEDED SO THE ALLIANCE COULD
MEET THE IMMINENT PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BY THE SOVIETS
AGAINST NATO MODERNIZATION. PAULS CLOSED HIS REMARKS
BY STATING THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
NATO WITH RESPECT TO SALT III SHOULD BE WORKED OUT
NOW, SO THEY WILL BE READY WHEN ALLIANCE DECISIONS
ARE TAKEN IN DECEMBER.

7. OTHER PERMREPS AND CHARGES MADE POINTS ALONG LINES
SIMILAR TO PRG COMMENTS. ROSE(UK) ALSO STATED THE REPORTS
WERE AN EXTREMELY VALUABLE BASIS FOR DECISION IN DECEMBER
AND THAT LONDON BELIEVED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIANCE
TAKE DECISIONS BY THE END OF THE YEAR ON BOTH TNF MODERN-
IZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF. HE NOTED THAT
THERE WERE ALWAYS ARGUMENTS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF ANY DECISION
BUT THE ALLIANCE WAS ON RECORD AS SEEKING DECEMBER DECISIONS
AND CONSEQUENTLY IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ALLIANCE UNITY THAT
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Date Printed: 10 Dec 2002  DOC_NBR: 1979USNATO06660  CHANNEL: n/a  HANDLING: EXDIS

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EXDIS
THE DEADLINE BE MET. ROSE ALSO REINFORCED THE FRG POINT
THAT ARMS CONTROL MUST BE A COMPLEMENT BUT IN NO SENSE A
SUBSTITUTE FOR TNF MODERNIZATION.

VOORST TOT VOORST(DUTCH CHARGE) STATED THAT IT WAS
EXTREMELY SATISFYING THAT WORK ON BOTH SG AND HLG REPORTS
HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONCLUDE TOGETHER AND THAT DECISION MAKING
IN CAPITOLS COULD NOW TAKE PLACE. THE ALLIANCE WAS NOW
ENTERING AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PERIOD OF DECISIONMAKING
AND THIS APPLIED VERY SPECIFICALLY TO THE NETHERLANDS.
HE SUPPORTED FRG SUGGESTION FOR A COMMON DATA BASE AND
STATED CLEARLY THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL COULD ONLY DISCUSS
TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL WITH DECISIONS MADE IN THE
DECEMBER MINISTERIALS.

HARDY(CANADA) COMMENDED THE RAPID WORK OF THE SG AND
RECALLED THE SKEPTICISM OVER ITS PROJECTED SCHEDULE WHEN
MANDATED IN THE SPRING. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE GREAT PROGRES
THE WORK WAS NOT FINISHED AND THAT THE WORK AHEAD WAS NOT
LIKELY TO BE LESS DIFFICULT THAN THAT ALREADY COMPLETED.
HE SUPPORTED THE FRG SUGGESTION FOR A NATO CONSISTENT DATA
BASE AND AGREED WITH DUTCH POSITION THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL
MUST NOT PREJUDICE DECEMBER DECISIONS.

Vibe(Norway) commented that the two-sided aspect of arms control and modernization approaches would be helpful in dealing with publics and parliaments and Schuurmans (Belgium) noted that in weeks to come it would be extremely important to be able to present publicly a balanced rational for both modernization and arms control. Svart(Denmark) appreciated us position that the NPG would in this instance be a consultative rather than a decision making body.

8. In response to a request by Rose(UK), Bartholomew outlined the scenario leading to the December ministerials providing details as specified in state 249189 and as developed in the 28 September Joint SG/HLG meeting.

There were no specific reactions to the scenario but both UK and Canadian reps had noted general agreement earlier in the discussion.

9. Luns said he would put out a P.O. outlining the future program of alliance meeting on the subject leading up to the December ministerials. (We have been in contact with Secretariat and will review P.O. before it is issued. We understand Secretariat will propose Tuesday, November 6 as date for first reinforced perm reps discussion of integrating document).

10. In follow up comments on the NPG ministerial, Hardy commented that the agenda for the NPG currently gave the impression that the NPG would be called upon to pronounce on the HLG report while the SG report and any integrated document available at that time would be available to the NPG as reference material only. He suggested that the

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Most recent communique had referred to both modernization and arms control and that the ministers would probably wish to continue this "balance". Consequently, Hardy suggested that all three documents be presented to the NPG on the same basis.

11. Full texts of final version of both high level group and special group reports will be transmitted Septel from Washington. Final texts of both documents have, however,
12. SYG LUNS SUGGESTED, IN VIEW OF ALREADY HEAVY PRESS PLAY CONCERNING THE DAY'S MEETINGS, THAT HE MAKE A BRIEF PRESS STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: "ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES, MEETING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS TODAY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF DR. JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, WERE BRIEFED ON THE PRESENT STATE OF WORK UNDERTAKEN RECENTLY IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE ISSUES OF TNF MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

"AMBASSADORS WERE INFORMED OF THE OUTCOME OF DELIBERATIONS IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, WHICH IS CHARGED WITH PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NPG ON THE MODERNISATION OF NATO'S THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE, AND HEARD THE REPORT OF THE 'SPECIAL GROUP' OF EXPERTS STUDYING THE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS OF THEATRE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS." THIS SPARKED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, WITH A CONSENSUS FOR NOT OFFERING A PRESS STATEMENT.
13. SYG LUNS THEN INFORMED THE GROUP OF THE BACKGROUND
GUIDANCE HE WAS PROVIDING TO NATO PRESS SPOKESMEN,
WHICH Drew ON THE DISCUSSION DURING THE JOINT
MEETING OF THE HLG AND SG EARLIER IN THE DAY.
BEGIN TEXT.

AT THEIR MEETING THIS MORNING, THE SPECIAL
GROUP AND HIGH LEVEL GROUP DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING
POINTS TO BE USED WITH THE PRESS IF QUESTIONED:

- NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN;

- THERE SHOULD BE NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
  THE NUMBER OF SYSTEMS TO BE DEPLOYED OR OF THE
  COUNTRIES IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE DEPLOYED AS HAS BEEN
  REPORTED IN THE PRESS;

- THE PROCESS OF CONSIDERING TNF ISSUES IS
  CONTINUING;

- DECEMBER IS THE TARGET DATE FOR REACHING DECISIONS;

- IF THE QUESTION IS RAISED RELATING TO THE
  POSSIBILITY OF A DELAY IN THE RATIFICATION OF SALT II,
  THE REPLY SHOULD BE "NATO IS PROCEEDING ON THE TRACK
  SET OUT FOR IT SOME MONTHS AGO; THERE IS NO NEED TO
  CONSIDER CHANGING THE TRACK."

END TEXT. BENNETT
Memorandum of conversation

*Archive of A.A.M. van Agt*, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Center,
University Nijmegen

Translation from the Dutch and footnotes: Ruud van Dijk, University of Amsterdam

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MINISTER OF DEFENSE¹

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Hague

Short report of the discussion with David Aaron² on October 22 1979 at 13:30 hours at Valkenburg airfield.³

Aaron began by discussing how the trip had been a good one so far. He was very much impressed with the choice of position of the other allies. That went both for the English [sic] and for the Germans and the Italians. He recalled especially that the Germans had now made their decision in line with the recommendations of both reports,⁴ and that in Italy even the socialists are supportive. As regards Belgium, he was impressed by Simonet's statement.⁵ He said to be aware of our contacts with the Belgians and asked what we knew of their position. Generally therefore, a fairly positive situation has emerged. Brezhnev's letter has not been able to change this.

In my first reply I have not responded to the question about the Belgians but asked the United States response to the points I have raised with Harold Brown⁶. Aaron replied approximately along the following lines: We have discussed and considered the issues raised by the Netherlands very carefully and all the way to the highest level. "We would like"⁷ that the Netherlands will participate in this matter. This is important for the alliance.

To this my side-note that it struck me that this was a fairly weak formulation of the desirability of Dutch participation.

He did here, incidentally, immediately again point to the German position of not being able to act alone.

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¹ Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten.
² David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.
³ A military airfield, Valkenburg was located slightly to the northwest of the Hague.
⁴ The reports by NATO's High Level Group and the Special Group on TNF modernization and negotiations with the Soviet Union, respectively.
⁵ Foreign minister Henri Simonet.
⁶ U.S. Secretary of Defense.
⁷ Items in quotation marks appear in English in the Dutch memorandum.
The United States want to help the Netherlands with its political problems. We want to be "so helpful" as is possible, but there are limits. There is an "emerging" consensus in the alliance and it cannot be endangered by making important changes in the proposed plans at this stage of the decisionmaking.

For my part I have reacted to this immediately with several remarks along the lines of: Until now there has only been decisionmaking at the level of the experts. Second: Several weeks ago I have delivered in a very clear way a political message to our most important ally, the United States. You yourself have determined the order of your trip through Europe, in spite of our request to do it in another way, this request also caused by the fact that today the Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister are not present. Under these circumstances you cannot say there is an emerging consensus at the political level. I have next added to this, that I absolutely do not want to be placed in a position that through this order and this consultation we would be confronted with established facts.

As regards the separate points:

The connection with SALT II.
Aaron pointed out that an official reservation in the decisionmaking would work extremely counterproductively in regard to the ratification of SALT II.
I have said that if it would reach a positive decision, the Dutch government in any case would do this on the condition that SALT II would have to be ratified, but I still hope, I have added, that this is a non-problem.

Aaron next explained again, following McGiffert, that there is hope, and also a reasonable expectation that the decisionmaking will be completed this year, or at least early next year.
He understood that the Netherlands would have to make a reservation on this point in its agreement, but, he emphasized again, if that would have to be included formally in the decision document it would be a very difficult matter for the United States.

The Dutch nuclear tasks.
Regarding the ADM and the Neptune-task the United States have no problems.
Regarding the F-16 they do, but after an internal struggle they have accepted it the way we envision it.

The shift-study.
They are in agreement with the implementation of this study, also as concerns the number. They do note emphatically that the Dutch government should realize clearly that the more concessions were made to the Netherlands, this would also have an impact on the decisionmaking in other countries, e.g. in the Federal Republic, and that this too co-determined the American position.

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8 David McGiffert, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and chair of NATO's High Level Group.
He believed that we went very far in regard to our nuclear tasks, and that this way we created the danger of undermining our total nuclear position. It is therefore a very difficult step for us, according to Aaron, to agree to this. Therefore, Aaron said, we call on you to help us in turn in the decisionmaking, and this has to happen in regard to the number of 572, because on this point I have to state in all clarity that we cannot accept your proposal to reduce to 50%.

Everyone has agreed to 572 and it would be a fundamental change in the structure of our approach if now we went to 50%. On top of that we do not really understand why you come with it and what is at the basis of you 50% idea.

Why can you not live with the Schmidt formula, and where does this 50% come from? For my part, I have explained why we cannot accept such a high number. I have pointed out, among other things, that this production decision as a starting point basically assumes that the arms control talks with the Russians will have no result. It is not a denial of the value of the expert reports, but it is a political judgment in response to these reports.

In defense of his position Aaron has pointed to two effects. In the first place in regard to the American Congress. He explained that in the American budgetary system permission for a purchase such as this one is given all at once and that the Congress will not release funds in phases.

Next he explained at length why in his judgment a lower level for the production decision will have a very negative influence on the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions.

And third he pointed out that in his view the President of the United States would lose all respect domestically if he would now come with a decision that was only 50% of what the military experts said it would have to be. The same number as has been proposed is an essential given for the United States.

For my part I have said that I will of course report on this discussion to the Prime-Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that I did not expect that this would lead to a different position on the Dutch side. On the contrary, if they were in the country today, I said, I would probably bring the message to breakfast tomorrow that I had been instructed to defend our position with our European allies with double emphasis.

I have also pointed to the connection to MBFR. He reported that the United States would like to get to a simplified MBFR-proposal in order to give an impetus to the MBFR-discussions.

Returning to the number, Aaron also pointed out that in his view the 50% will become a ceiling, and he added: What certainty do we have that, when the conditions will not have been met, a next Dutch cabinet will be willing to participate in a raising of that ceiling.

Aaron asked me how I wanted to proceed. I said that I did not have any concrete ideas about that at this moment, but that, as he knew, in the coming days I will have discussions with my European colleagues.
Aaron emphasized at the end once again that there are limits for the United States which cannot be crossed. It is too far now still to be able to go back. If there was something else with which we could help the Netherlands, we'd be happy to do so. Our negative position on this point, according to Aaron, should not give the impression that we do not appreciate the efforts of the Dutch cabinet to come to a positive solution.

For my part I have concluded the matter by noting that in this way a very difficult situation has emerged.

[...]

BREZHENEV: [...]

You have recently informed us about the desire of Chancellor Schmidt to meet with you. We agree with you that it would not be good to avoid such a meeting although the preparations will probably take a certain amount of time. The meeting, of course, would in itself constitute a certain support for Schmidt and the government coalition on the eve of the federal elections. It therefore seems to us to be necessary to utilize such a meeting, possibly even the preparations for such a meeting, in order to influence the chancellor's position in a direction we deem necessary, among other things with regard to the question of plans for the stationing of American medium-range missiles in Europe.

If you wish to consult with us, Comrade Honecker, about the questions relating to this meeting, we are willing to do so.

[...]

Of increasing importance to us is the question relating to the plans to station new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. It seems that the FRG Government and Federal Chancellor Schmidt personally do not play the smallest role in the preparation of these plans. They are also inducing other NATO countries, especially Holland and Belgium, to station new American missiles on their territories. It is planned to take corresponding decisions at the NATO meeting in December.

In different ways, among others through our contacts with the leadership of the FRG, we are making efforts to actively move against the implementation of the plans. It is important that there is a common front of all Socialist countries in this question.

One has to realize in the FRG and in all of Western Europe that Washington and Bonn have begun a dangerous game, that the implementation of the plans would be a severe blow against détente, which would result in political and strategic measures on the part of the Socialist countries, ultimately also in a growing risk for the Federal Republic itself.

I think that such pressure, supplemented by constructive steps of the Socialist countries in the field of military détente, will achieve some results.
With regard to the constructive measures, after we have researched the problem and consulted with you and the leadership of other allied nations, we intend to do the following: We will declare that we are ready to limit the number of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR, if the USA and NATO completely give up their plan of stationing American missiles in Western Europe.

We declare that as a gesture of goodwill the USSR will concede certain arms and force reductions on the territory of the GDR and that it will call upon the Western countries to follow the example of the Soviet Union. I intend to give our view on this question and others at my appearance at the festivities [30th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR] here in Berlin.

I would like to emphasize that such steps will not lead to a weakening of the defense capabilities of our armed forces, among them the troops stationed on GDR territory. You can be sure of that.

Now something on the situation with regard to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty in the USA: It is our impression that until recently those who supported the ratification of this treaty had the upper hand. Now the situation has become more complicated. The hysterical clamor in the United States - in which the Carter administration directly participated - over the stationing of a Soviet brigade in Cuba has become a serious impediment. We as well as the Cubans have taken a firm position against the American blackmail. We have vigorously opposed all attempts on the part of the Americans to coerce concessions or to intervene in our relations with Cuba. Carter was left with nothing else but to retreat. In the defensive, he now attempts to demonstrate strength, especially in the Caribbean region.

But there is still another inconvenient side effect in this question. The situation with regard to the ratification of the SALT-II-Treaty, in which Carter should be interested, has now become a bit worse. Disconcerting is also the open tendency in Washington, regardless of SALT-II, to build up vigorously their own armaments as well as the NATO arsenals as a whole.

Probably our common task will be - so that we will now and even more so after the coming into force of SALT-II-Treaty stand in a broad front - to pursue a vigorous fight against this tendency whereby we have to make use of all means of political, diplomatic and public influence.

In its policy against the Soviet Union and the entire Socialist community, Washington is increasingly actively playing its Chinese card. The American-Chinese rapprochement, one can state, has taken on a demonstrative character. Such a line on the part of the Americans de facto encourages Peking to new adventures in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Here we must especially watch out.

Now the Soviet-Chinese negotiations over the normalization of relations are starting in Moscow. The first meetings were devoted to organizational questions. Therefore it is difficult
to state with some certainty, what the Chinese have brought to the conference table. Our delegation has clear instructions. They are to try to give the negotiations a substantive character. But we do not have any illusions. We are facing a difficult, hard political fight. We will attempt to normalize our relations at least to some degree. It is now hard to tell if it will be possible. Beijing's policy is today still deeply hostile towards peace and socialism.

Now briefly on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particularly positive character have lately surfaced in Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun to persecute the progressive forces. They ruthlessly suppress the activities of national minorities. In addition, they try to blame us for the instigation of the activities.

Our initiatives with regard to the development of good neighborly relations with Iran are currently not gaining any practical results in Tehran. We know all that.

But we also understand something else: The Iranian Revolution has undercut the military alliance between Iran and the USA. With respect to a number of international problems, particularly with respect to the Middle East, Iran is now taking anti-imperialist positions. The imperialism tries to regain its influence in the region. We are trying to counter these efforts. We are patiently working with the current Iranian leadership and moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghani leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghani leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki's friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness etc. We now see that Amin is implementing what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all of Amin's methods and actions. He is very power-driven. In the past he repeatedly revealed disproportionate harshness. But with regard to his basic political platform, he has decidedly confirmed to the course of further development of the Revolution, of furthering cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community.
It is a fact that many of Amin's followers and partisans are honorable people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and take a good attitude towards us.

By taking into consideration the actual situation, we will continue to support Afghanistan and give it a variety of support and help it in its fight against foreign aggression and the domestic counterrevolution.

[...]
Memorandum of conversation

Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Center,
University Nijmegen
Translation from the Dutch and footnotes: Ruud van Dijk, University of Amsterdam

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From: Dr. C. A. van der Klaauw no. 39/79 Date: October 15, 1979

To: S

Subject: TNF-issues Discussions with Italian officials SECRET/NIVAL

On October 13 discussions took place at the invitation of the new Italian Prime-
Minister Cossiga with Prime-Minister Van Agt at hotel Villa l'Este on Lake Como. Both
Foreign Ministers were also present at these discussions. Except for an interpreter no
other officials participated.

Following Prime-Minister Cossiga's proposal, the first topic of discussion was
TNF, to which almost three hours were devoted. The Italian message was clear: Italy
accepts conclusions High Level Group, fears a largely orchestrated Soviet propaganda-
offensive, particularly aimed at the Netherlands and Italy, and believes it important
therefore that the decision regarding modernization will be realized as soon as possible.
This approach, therefore, as was clear also during the discussion, diverges from the Dutch
one, which after all only wants to enable a decision during the ministerial NAC\(^1\) of
December.

Prime-Minister Cossiga began the discussion with an explanation of the Italian
decisionmaking process. Within the Italian cabinet there is a committee for defense
matters, composed beside the PM of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the
Interior. The State Secretary charged with intelligence matters acts as secretary of the
committee. For the TNF-issue a liberal and a social-democratic minister have been added
to this committee. In this composition the committee has met for strictly secret
discussions. It has decided to accept the modernization proposals. The entire council of
ministers has been notified of this in a general sense, also in connection with a
parliamentary interpellation from the radical side, which will take place on October 25.
The decision is currently being submitted to the High Council of Defense (chair,
President of the Republic), which has an advising role. After that, the decision formally
comes into the Council of Ministers. Cossiga did not doubt a positive decision in both
organs. Public declarations in the matter will only be made after the final decision in the
Council of Ministers.

\(^1\) North Atlantic Council.
Meanwhile consultations with a number of political leaders had taken place, from which had become clear that the Christian-Democrats, Liberals, Social-Democrats, and Republicans will support the decision. The Socialists were in principle in agreement. Contact had also been made with the Communists. The S.G. of the Communist party was at that moment not yet in a position to have a discussion, but declared himself willing to meet accompanied by experts. As far as the interpellation on October 25 is concerned, the government would respond "low profile."

Cossiga noted that he had conveyed the position of the Italian government to Mrs. Thatcher and Lord Carrington, to Schmidt and Genscher, and to the American government. Now he also wanted to inform us about it. Incidentally, during a meeting in New York, Malfatti had left no doubt with Gromyko.

All this does not detract from the fact that Italy is in favor of a continuation of the detente-policy, multilaterally as well as bilaterally. It hopes for a rapid ratification of SALT II. The decision regarding TNF-modernization needs to be accompanied by a credible and serious disarmament offer. A realistic detente policy can however only be based on a genuine restoration of the balance.

This balance, according to Cossiga, is lacking currently. SALT II freezes the strategic component. The conventional armaments component is imbalanced and can't be evened out through negotiations. Restoration of the balance therefore is only possible via TNF. In addition we are confronted by new Soviet weapons. In this context, Cossiga pointed out that although he can understand the U.S. view that the Backfires are a regional weapon, experts had pointed out to him that they quickly could be transformed into strategic weapons. The situation was extremely dangerous. The Soviet Union kept Europe, North-Africa, the Middle-East, and Pakistan over a barrel with weapons of great precision which through their mobility, moreover, are practically invulnerable; and in this conversation Cossiga was not even going to talk about China. It is a situation which politically could be tempting for the S.U.. Military superiority can be translated into diplomatic and political superiority. In this situation the danger of a conventional arms race cannot be eliminated, with a chance for local conflicts.

Added to that is the advanced age of Soviet leaders. What will a change in the Soviet leadership mean? According to Cossiga there are discussions within the Soviet leadership about the future course. What consequences will Tito's death have? All these uncertainties make the situation even more dangerous.

After this general evaluation Cossiga discussed TNF-modernization directly. We should not dramatize the decision. It does not represent a change in the NATO-strategy, more a confirmation of it. A decision not to modernize would on the other hand represent a change in strategy and it would damage the Western negotiating position and the

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2 Presumably: Secretary-General.
3 Franco Maria Malfatti, foreign minister.
possibilities to achieve disarmament. There has to be a consensus within NATO, with participation at least of the US, the UK, the nuclearized countries (FRG, Italy, Benelux), and Denmark and Norway. Cossiga underlined particularly the great importance of the support of all nuclearized countries for this decision.

To a question of mine whether this general support was a condition for a positive Italian position, Cossiga said that the condition was a unanimous political decision for modernization. Deployment in all concerned countries was not a condition, although extremely important. The goal after all was to maintain the multilateral nature of the alliance; one had to prevent the emergence of a bilateral connection between the US and FRG. This would be an extremely dangerous development. The FRG should not be placed in an isolated position by its European allies.

Italy is also convinced of the importance of the above because in case of a crisis with the FRG it will have to take the first blow. The troops stationed in Hungary are meant to march via Slovenia to Italy (Cossiga said that several years ago a Soviet-delegate to the MBFR-talks said as much to his Italian colleague).

Cossiga next moved to an initial analysis of Brezhnev's speech in Berlin, which he characterized as the beginning of a large propaganda-offensive, aimed particularly at the Netherlands and Italy. The speech was a cocktail of offers, which possibly are a signal for MBFR, but whose concrete significance is difficult to estimate, and of threats (no nuclear weapons against countries that do not deploy them). About TNF Brezhnev had hardly spoken at all; he had walked around the only realistic solution, namely no longer produce and next destroy.

At this point Malfatti intervened and said that NATO ought to respond to Brezhnev's speech and in a non-polemical way. Cossiga reacted by saying that we can't pretend to have understood everything.

Finally Cossiga pointed to the problem of the single or the dual-key regarding nuclear weapons. In contrast to the FRG, Italy continues to attach importance to a dual-key system also for new weapons.

Next, Prime-Minister Van Agt provided a long explanation of the political situation in the Netherlands in regard to the TNF-issue. His remarks about the connection made in the Netherlands between SALT II ratification and the introduction of a decision regarding TNF-modernization provoked a (quasi?) surprised reaction by Cossiga, who viewed an earlier decision regarding modernization as a condition for the ratification of SALT II, otherwise he envisioned the emergence his dreaded bilateral Washington-Bonn axis. I then pointed at the for us essential and central element of arms control in the decisionmaking over TNF, with SALT II ratification a condition.

Following this there ensued a debate over the time when the decisions about TNF-modernization should be taken. Cossiga underlined his concern about increasing Soviet-
pressure directed to the Netherlands, Italy, and the left wing of the SPD, if a decision would be delayed until the December NAC. His preference was for a decision in the NPG. In response, we responded negatively, both for internal political reasons and because of the importance of the disarmament element, for which a clearly demonstrable contribution of the Foreign Ministers is essential. Cossiga wondered what the NPG would be expected to do in that case. He did not agree with us that the NPG only needed to take note of official reports. From our side it was noted that the bridging report's evaluation cannot be done just by the Defense Ministers.

Cossiga's next suggestion, to let the PRs\textsuperscript{4} in Brussels decide under instructions from their governments directly following the NPG meeting, we also rejected, both because of the time-element and because of the importance of the matter, whose importance required decisionmaking in the presence of ministers. Cossiga then wondered if the dates of the various meetings could not be advanced. This we also resisted, incidentally supported by Malfatti. In the Netherlands this would be seen as a surprise tactic, with all negative political consequences, and the Soviets could see it as evidence of uncertainty, if not panic. We have maintained the position that the decisionmaking program and the dates fixed for the meetings should be kept without change.

The discussion, which incidentally was conducted in a friendly atmosphere with understanding for each other's problems, did not lead to a joint conclusion; on the contrary, it is clear that the Italian views (we have made our decision, this should be confirmed in the alliance as quickly as possible, because otherwise domestic forces, egged on by the S.U., will become ever stronger) are diametrically opposed to ours (all emphasis on a gradual decisionmaking, where the primary importance given to the arms control element will be realized fully). We decided to continue the contacts, also at the ministerial level, in the near future.

\textsuperscript{4} Permanent Representatives.
O 160136Z OCT 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE

DECAPIED

E.O. 12065 GDS 10/15/85 (BARTHOLOMEW, REGINALD)
2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THE US DRAFT TEXT OF AN INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT FOR YEAR END ACTION ON THE LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL PROGRAMS. PARTICIPANTS IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ANTICIPATE THIS US DRAFT, WHICH WAS PROMISED BY THE HLG AND SG CHIARMEN AT THEIR MEETINGS TWO WEEKS AGO.

3. POSTS SHOULD NOTE THAT THE FIVE NATIONS IN WHICH LRTNF BASING IS PROPOSED HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED THIS DOCUMENT FOR COMMENT. COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED FROM FOR THE MOST PART, THOSE COMMENTS WERE INCORPORATED. THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY DELEGATION (AARON, BARTHOLOMEW, MCGIFFERT AND THOMSON) WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE COMMENTS WHICH WERE RECEIVED.

4. POSTS WHICH DID NOT RECEIVE THE TEXT OF THE FIRST DRAFT SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REVEAL ANY KNOWLEDGE THAT THE OTHER FIVE CAPITALS HAD RECEIVED AN EARLIER EDITION FOR COMMENT.

5. EMBASSIES SHOULD CONTACT THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND REPEAT AND THE SPECIAL GROUP DELEGATIONS AND PROVIDE THEM WITH THE DRAFT TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. YOU SHOULD ASK FOR COMMENTS BY THE 26TH, SO THAT WE CAN TURN THE DRAFT AROUND IN TIME FOR THE PERMREPS DISCUSSION SCHEDULED FOR 6 NOVEMBER.

6. COMMENTS WERE RECEIVED TOO LATE FOR INCORPORATION IN THE TEXT, BUT WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY DELEGATION.

I. INTRODUCTION


II. RATIONALE

1. THE WARSAW PACT HAS OVER THE YEARS DEVELOPED A LARGE
AND GROWING CAPABILITY IN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT DIRECTLY THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE AND HAVE A STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS BY SOVIET DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS MODERNIZING AND EXPANDING THEIR LONG-RANGE FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE DEPLOYED THE SS-20 MISSILE, WHICH OFFERS SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS OVER PREVIOUS SYSTEMS IN PROVIDING GREATER ACCURACY, MORE MOBILITY, AND GREATER RANGE, AS WELL AS HAVING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH HAS A MUCH BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN OTHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED HITHERTO IN A PERIPHERAL ROLE. DURING THIS PERIOD, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN REINFORCING ITS SUPERIORITY IN LRTNF BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WESTERN LRTNF CAPABILITIES HAVE REMAINED STATIC. INDEED THESE FORCES ARE INCREASING IN AGE AND VULNERABILITY AND DO NOT INCLUDE LAND-BASED, LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE UNDERTAKEN A MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THEIR SHORTER-RANGE TNF AND GREATLY IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- 2. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPON SYSTEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE TRENDS HAVE PROMPTED SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE, IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE, SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY ACHIEVED IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE FACT THAT WESTERN LONGER-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS ARE AGING COULD ALSO CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE'S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF NATO'S AVAILABLE NUCLEAR RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION.

- 3. THIS SITUATION COULD GIVE RISE TO THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE -- HOWEVER INCORRECTLY -- THAT THEY COULD USE LONG-RANGE FORCES TO MAKE OR THREATEN LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A 'SANCTUARY' IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE COULD BE A MISPERCEPTION THAT WITHOUT STRONG THEATER-BASED SYSTEMS OF ITS OWN CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY AND IN AN ERA OF PARITY AT THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR LEVEL, NATO LACKED CREDIBLE AND AppROPRIATE MEANS OF RESPONSE.
- 4. OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS THE ALLIANCE HAS IDENTIFIED THE NEED TO MODERNIZE ITS OWN LONGER-RANGE TNF CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, TO REPLACE OBSOLETE WEAPON SYSTEMS, AND TO ENSURE A CREDIBLE CONTINUUM OF DETERRENCE BY BEING ABLE TO STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY WITH LAND-BASED SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. THIS MODERNIZATION IS PART OF NATO'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITIES AND WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INCREASING THE ALLIANCE'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR LOWERING THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IN EUROPE.


- 6. TNP MODERNIZATION IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE IMPROVEMENTS IN FORCES OUTLINED IN THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP), WHICH GIVES PRIORITY TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS BUT ALSO CONSIDERS TNP IMPROVEMENTS. THE RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS OF LRTNF CALLED FOR HERE ARE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATO, THEY WILL NOT INCREASE THE ROLE OF TNP IN THIS STRATEGY, BUT WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND WILL REINFORCE THE LINKAGE TO THE STRATEGIC LEG OF THE TRIAD. THIS CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN THE ULTIMATE DETERRENT. FINALLY, THIS COLLECTIVE DECISION ON A COORDINATED PROGRAM IN THIS FIELD DEMONSTRATES AND REINFORCES ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE. WOULD NOT OBVIATE THE NEED FOR SOME LRTNF MODERNIZATION TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT CAN ADJUST
7. IN PARALLEL WITH TNF MODERNIZATION SPECIAL CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE ROLE ARMS CONTROL CAN PLAY IN CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THE ALLIANCE REGARDS ARMS CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ITS EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES BY MAKING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH THE ALLIANCE FACES MORE STABLE, MORE PREDICTABLE, AND MORE MANAGEABLE, AND BY SEEKING LOWER LEVELS OF WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES.

8. THUS BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF ARE IN LINE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. INDEED, ALLIANCE DEFENSE EFFORTS SUCH AS TNF MODERNIZATION PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR A POLICY OF GENUINE DETENTE WITH THE EAST.

III. DECISIONS

A. GENERAL POLICY


2. A POLICY OF PARALLEL AND INTEGRATED LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS AND ARMS CONTROL WILL BEST ACHIEVE MAXIMUM IMPROVEMENT IN ALLIANCE SECURITY. THIS INTEGRATION IS SOUGHT BOTH TO ENSURE THAT DEFENSE DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THEM ARE NOT MADE HOSTAGE TO EXPECTATIONS OF DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, AND SO THAT ARMS CONTROL ITSELF HAS A REALISTIC CHANCE OF SUCCESS. MOREOVER, NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING LRTNF WILL NOT BE REALISTIC OR POSSIBLE WITHOUT AN AGREED MODERNIZATION PLAN AND A DECISION TO IMPLEMENT IT.

3. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINTING THE SOVIET BUILDUP CAN ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND MODIFY THE SCALE
OF NATO'S TFN MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. Thus, concrete
arms control results could lead to a downward adjustment in
the scale of NATO's TFN requirements. However, any achiev-
able arms control outcome involving TFN would not, in the
first step, eliminate entirely the Soviet LRNF threat and

the scale of concrete measures aimed at meeting the contin-
uous armament effort of the Warsaw Pact will depend in part
on the degree of success in achieving effective and bal-
anced limitations on LRNF of both sides through arms con-
trol negotiations.

- B. PROGRAMS

The members of the Alliance therefore adopted the fol-
lowing integrated LRNF programs, based on the work of the
High Level Group and the Special Group.

LRNF MODERNIZATION

- 1. Members of the Alliance agreed that NATO's LRNF
modernization goals can best be met by a deployment of

- 2. Members of the Alliance expressed their intent to
provide clear political and public support for all aspects
of this NATO program. Ministers approved the deployment
scheme presented below to provide appropriate participation
in the hosting of LRNF. This deployment scheme, involving
basing of LRNF in a number of NATO countries, together
with financial support by all countries for the construc-
tion of facilities eligible for infrastructure program
funding, demonstrates the Alliance's solidarity and will-
ingness to share risks and will enhance the survivability
and credibility of the force.

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LRNF SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENTS

Page - 6
3. The construction of new facilities will be funded through the NATO infrastructure program. So that the LRTNF program will not adversely affect the NATO force improvements, during the mid-term review of the five-year ceiling in 1982-83 the ceiling will be increased to account for the requirements stemming from LRTNF modernization.

4. The LRTNF modernization program will also involve appropriate host nation manning support on the scale and in the manner recommended by the high level group, in those nations where the US owns and operates LRTNF units.

5. The LRTNF program will not result in an increased role for theater nuclear forces in NATO's strategy, or in an increase in NATO's stockpile of nuclear warheads. As new warheads for the long-range theater nuclear systems are deployed, the same number of warheads will be withdrawn from the existing nuclear stockpile in Europe. TNF modernization could conceivably result in a reduction of the nuclear warhead stockpile in Europe. The accommodation of the additional LRTNF warhead requirement, without increase in the total stockpile, necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges.

6. Members of the alliance charged the nuclear planning group to undertake an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the consequential adjustments and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's theater nuclear armory as a whole.

Arms Control

In developing and pursuing a policy on arms control involving TNF in parallel with the preparation and implementation of alliance decisions on the modernization of LRTNF, ministers concurred that concrete and realistic arms control proposals should be formulated in order to achieve the following objectives:
- 1. TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE;

- 2. TO REDUCE THE GROWING DISPARITY IN LONG-RANGE

THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF THE SS-20;

- 3. TO AVOID UNCONstrainedCOMPETITION AND INCREASING INSTABILITY IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FIELD, AND TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AT BALANCED LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES;

4. BY MEANS OF CONCRETE AND REALISTIC ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO INTERFERE IN ALLIANCE DECISION-MAKING THROUGH VAGUE DISARMAMENT OFFERS DESIGNED TO HINDER ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION DECISIONS, AND

5. TO ENHANCE THE STRATEGIC UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE COHERENCE OF THE ALLIANCE’S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.

- IN PURSUIT OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES SHOULD GUIDE THE UNITED STATES IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION:

- 1. ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF MUST BE A COMPLEMENT TO, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR, TNF MODERNIZATION.

- 2. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHIN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK.

- 3. BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS IN SALT III INVOLVING TNF WOULD BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, THERE SHOULD BE SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THESE NEGOTIA-

- 4. ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES IN SALT III NEGOTIATIONS
IN INVOLVING TNF AND IN MBFR SHOULD BE CONSISTENT AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE.

- 5. NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF IN SALT III MUST BE PREDICATED ON THE US STATEMENT ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS, "ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS".

- 6. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD NOT INCLUDE NON-US ALLIED SYSTEMS, NOR SHOULD THE US NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS COMPENSATION FOR SUCH SYSTEMS.

- 7. ANY AGREEMENT ON TNF MUST ENSURE DE JURE EQUALITY BOTH IN CEILINGS AND IN RIGHTS.

- 8. ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.


0. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING TNF SHOULD BE A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS. THE FIRST STEP SHOULD FOCUS ON THE MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT, WITH THE STRINGENCY AND SCOPE OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT AS AMBITIOUS AS THE ALLIANCE CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO ACHIEVE AND VERIFY. SUBSEQUENT STEPS COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF SYSTEMS COVERED AND TO INCREASE THE STRINGENCY OF LIMITATIONS SOUGHT, INCLUDING REDUCTIONS.

- 11. THE INITIAL STEP SHOULD FOCUS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING THE THREAT POSED BY THOSE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS IN A POSITION TO STRIKE NATO, ESPECIALLY THE MOST MODERN AND CAPABLE OF THOSE SYSTEMS -- THE SS-20.

- A. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO STOP SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS SHORT OF THEIR PROJECTED LEVEL, FORCE THE RETIREMENT OF SS-4S AND SS-5S, AND THEREBY ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL THREAT.

- B. WARHEADS-ON-LAUNCHERS WOULD PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE
UNIT OF LIMITATION ON LONG-RANGE THEATER MISSILES.

- C. THE LIMITATIONS SHOULD APPLY TO WORLDWIDE LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, BUT SHOULD ESPECIALLY RESTRICT THOSE DEPLOYMENTS WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF NATO.

- 12. WHILE INITIALLY FOCUSING ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES, OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TFN THREAT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

- A. LIMITS ON LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT IN GENERAL SHOULD NOT BE SOUGHT IN THE FIRST STEP, EXCEPT FOR BACKFIRE IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER.

- B. SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST STEP.

- 13. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AGREED THAT SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS OF A CONTINUING NATURE WITHIN THE NATO FRAMEWORK SHOULD THEREFORE BE ESTABLISHED ON THE LINES OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, APPROPRIATELY ADJUSTED, IN SUPPORT OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE NAC.


2. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE RECALLED THE MAY 1978 SUMMIT WHERE NATIONS EXPRESSED THE POLITICAL RESOLVE TO MEET THE CHALLENGES TO THEIR SECURITY POSED BY THE CONTINUING MOMENTUM OF THE WARSAW PACT MILITARY BUILDUP.

3. THE WARSAW PACT HAS OVER THE YEARS DEVELOPED A LARGE AND GROWING CAPABILITY IN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAT DIRECTLY THREATEN WESTERN EUROPE AND HAVE A STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY AGGRAVATED OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS BY SOVIET DECISIONS TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS MODERNIZING AND EXPAND THEIR LONG-RANGE FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY. IN PARTICULAR, THEY HAVE DEPLOYED THE SS-20 MISSILE, WHICH OFFERS SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS OVER PREVIOUS SYSTEMS IN PROVIDING GREATER ACCURACY, MORE MOBILITY, AND GREATER RANGE, AS WELL AS HAVING MULTIPLE WARHEADS, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, WHICH HAS A MUCH BETTER PERFORMANCE THAN OTHER SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED HITHERTO IN A PERIPHERAL...
ROLE. DURING THIS PERIOD, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN REINFORCING ITS SUPERIORITY IN LRTNF BOTH QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WESTERN LRTNF CAPABILITIES HAVE REMAINED STATIC. INDEED THESE FORCES ARE INCREASING IN AGE AND VULNERABILITY AND DO NOT INCLUDE LAND-BASED, LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

-4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO UNDERTAKEN A MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THEIR SHORTER-RANGE TNF AND GREATLY IMPROVED THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE AGAINST

THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY WITH THE UNITED STATES.

5. THESE TRENDS HAVE PROMPTED SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE, IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE, SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD UNDERMINE THE STABILITY ACHIEVED IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THE FACT THAT WESTERN LONGER-RANGE THEATER SYSTEMS ARE AGING COULD ALSO CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE'S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF NATO'S AVAILABLE NUCLEAR RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION.

6. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE NOTED THAT THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REQUIRE CONCRETE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE ALLIANCE IF NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IS TO REMAIN CREDIBLE. SUCH ACTIONS COM普RIZE THE ALLIANCE PROGRAMS OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL.

7. MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE DECIDED TO MODERNIZE NATO'S LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BY:

-- PARTICIPATION OF ALL NATIONS CURRENTLY IN THE INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE, THROUGH HOSTING AND THROUGH OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING SHARING IN COSTS, IN THE CASE OF ALL NATIONS.

-- DEPLOYMENT OF THEY AGREED THAT THE PROGRAM WILL NOT INCREASE NATO'S RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IT WILL NOT INCREASE THE SIZE OF NATO'S STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

8. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE RECOGNIZED THE ROLE OF ARMS
CONTROL IN CONTRIBUTING TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND IN ADVANCING THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THEY REGARDED ARMS CONTROL AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ALLIANCE’S EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES AND TO MAKE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MORE STABLE, MORE PREDICTABLE, AND MORE MANAGEABLE AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. IN THIS REGARD THEY WELCOMED THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE SALT II TREATY MAKES TOWARDS ACHIEVING THESE OBJECTIVES.

9. THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERED THAT BUILDING ON THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AND TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET LRTRNF CAPABILITIES OF CONCERN TO NATO, ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE OVERALL NUCLEAR BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES SHOULD THEREFORE NOW INCLUDE CERTAIN US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THEY FULLY SUPPORTED THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS ON LRTRNF AND TO PROPOSE TO THE USSR TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ELABORATED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE:

A. ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

B. LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED BILATERALLY IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK IN A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH.

C. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS.

D. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES. THEREFORE, THESE LIMITATIONS SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF EQUAL CEILINGS.

E. ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.
GIVEN THE SPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE OVERALL SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO SUPPORT THE US NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

10. THE ALLIANCE HAS DECIDED TO PURSUE THESE TWO PARALLEL AND COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES IN ORDER TO AVERT AN ARMS RACE IN EUROPE CAUSED BY THE SOVIET TNF BUILDUP, YET PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF NATO'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE AND THUS ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER STATES. A MODERNIZATION DECISION, INCLUDING A COMMITMENT TO DEPLOYMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO MEET NATO'S DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE NEEDS, TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE RESPONSE TO SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS AND TO PROVIDE THE FOUNDATION FOR THE PURSUIT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON TNF. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRAINING THE SOVIET BUILDUP CAN ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND MODIFY THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. VANCE

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
Memorandum of conversation

Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Center,
University Nijmegen

Translation from the Dutch and footnotes: Ruud van Dijk, University of Amsterdam

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

The Hague

Short report of the discussion with David Aaron on October 22, 1979 at 13:30 hours at
Valkenburg airfield.

Aaron began by discussing how the trip had been a good one so far. He was very much
impressed with the choice of position of the other allies. That went both for the English
[sic] and for the Germans and the Italians. He recalled especially that the Germans had
now made their decision in line with the recommendations of both reports, and that in
Italy even the socialists are supportive. As regards Belgium, he was impressed by
Simonet's statement. He said to be aware of our contacts with the Belgians and asked
what we knew of their position. Generally therefore, a fairly positive situation has
emerged. Brezhnev's letter has not been able to change this.

In my first reply I have not responded to the question about the Belgians but asked the
United States response to the points I have raised with Harold Brown. Aaron replied
approximately along the following lines: We have discussed and considered the issues
raised by the Netherlands very carefully and all the way to the highest level. "We would
like" that the Netherlands will participate in this matter. This is important for the
alliance.

To this my side-note that it struck me that this was a fairly weak formulation of the
desirability of Dutch participation.

He did here, incidentally, immediately again point to the German position of not being
able to act alone.

1 Dutch Defense Minister Willem Scholten.
2 David L. Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.
3 A military airfield, Valkenburg was located slightly to the northwest of the Hague.
4 The reports by NATO's High Level Group and the Special Group on TNF
modernization and negotiations with the Soviet Union, respectively.
5 Foreign minister Henri Simonet.
6 U.S. Secretary of Defense.
7 Items in quotation marks appear in English in the Dutch memorandum.
The United States want to help the Netherlands with its political problems. We want to be "so helpful" as is possible, but there are limits. There is an "emerging" consensus in the alliance and it cannot be endangered by making important changes in the proposed plans at this stage of the decisionmaking.

For my part I have reacted to this immediately with several remarks along the lines of: Until now there has only been decisionmaking at the level of the experts. Second: Several weeks ago I have delivered in a very clear way a political message to our most important ally, the United States. You yourself have determined the order of your trip through Europe, in spite of our request to do it in another way, this request also caused by the fact that today the Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister are not present. Under these circumstances you cannot say there is an emerging consensus at the political level. I have next added to this, that I absolutely do not want to be placed in a position that through this order and this consultation we would be confronted with established facts.

As regards the separate points:

The connection with SALT II.
Aaron pointed out that an official reservation in the decisionmaking would work extremely counterproductively in regard to the ratification of SALT II. I have said that if it would reach a positive decision, the Dutch government in any case would do this on the condition that SALT II would have to be ratified, but I still hope, I have added, that this is a non-problem.

Aaron next explained again, following McGiffert, that there is hope, and also a reasonable expectation that the decisionmaking will be completed this year, or at least early next year.
He understood that the Netherlands would have to make a reservation on this point in its agreement, but, he emphasized again, if that would have to be included formally in the decision document it would be a very difficult matter for the United States.

The Dutch nuclear tasks.
Regarding the ADM and the Neptune-task the United States have no problems. Regarding the F-16 they do, but after an internal struggle they have accepted it the way we envision it.

The shift-study.
They are in agreement with the implementation of this study, also as concerns the number. They do note emphatically that the Dutch government should realize clearly that the more concessions were made to the Netherlands, this would also have an impact on the decisionmaking in other countries, e.g. in the Federal Republic, and that this too co-determined the American position.

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8 David McGiffert, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and chair of NATO's High Level Group.
He believed that we went very far in regard to our nuclear tasks, and that this way we created the danger of undermining our total nuclear position. It is therefore a very difficult step for us, according to Aaron, to agree to this. Therefore, Aaron said, we call on you to help us in turn in the decision-making, and this has to happen in regard to the number of 572, because on this point I have to state in all clarity that we cannot accept your proposal to reduce to 50%.

Everyone has agreed to 572 and it would be a fundamental change in the structure of our approach if now we went to 50%. On top of that we do not really understand why you come with it and what is at the basis of you 50% idea.

Why can you not live with the Schmidt formula, and where does this 50% come from? For my part, I have explained why we cannot accept such a high number. I have pointed out, among other things, that this production decision as a starting point basically assumes that the arms control talks with the Russians will have no result. It is not a denial of the value of the expert reports, but it is a political judgment in response to these reports.

In defense of his position Aaron has pointed to two effects. In the first place in regard to the American Congress. He explained that in the American budgetary system permission for a purchase such as this one is given all at once and that the Congress will not release funds in phases. Next he explained at length why in his judgment a lower level for the production decision will have a very negative influence on the Soviet Union's willingness to make concessions.

And third he pointed out that in his view the President of the United States would lose all respect domestically if he would now come with a decision that was only 50% of what the military experts said it would have to be. The same number as has been proposed is an essential given for the United States.

For my part I have said that I will of course report on this discussion to the Prime-Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that I did not expect that this would lead to a different position on the Dutch side. On the contrary, if they were in the country today, I said, I would probably bring the message to breakfast tomorrow that I had been instructed to defend our position with our European allies with double emphasis.

I have also pointed to the connection to MBFR. He reported that the United States would like to get to a simplified MBFR-proposal in order to give an impetus to the MBFR-discussions.

Returning to the number, Aaron also pointed out that in his view the 50% will become a ceiling, and he added: What certainty do we have that, when the conditions will not have been met, a next Dutch cabinet will be willing to participate in a raising of that ceiling.

Aaron asked me how I wanted to proceed. I said that I did not have any concrete ideas about that at this moment, but that, as he knew, in the coming days I will have discussions with my European colleagues.
Aaron emphasized at the end once again that there are limits for the United States which cannot be crossed. It is too far now still to be able to go back. If there was something else with which we could help the Netherlands, we'd be happy to do so. Our negative position on this point, according to Aaron, should not give the impression that we do not appreciate the efforts of the Dutch cabinet to come to a positive solution.

For my part I have concluded the matter by noting that in this way a very difficult situation has emerged.
Sottosottoserie 3: Direzione nazionale ed Esecutivo


ABSTRACT. These are the minutes of the meeting of the National Directorate of the Socialist Party which made the decision to accept the deployment and vote for it in the Parliamentary debate, even if the PSI was not part of the government yet. The minutes contain a long presentation by the future Defense Minister, Lelio Lagorio, which explains the strategic rational behind the deployment. A lively debate follows, during which Craxi and Lagorio steer the Central Committee towards accepting the deployment.
ORDINE DEL GIORNO

1) Relazione Scanni sul processo "Carta 77" di Praga. (concessi)
2) Relazione Lagorio su problemi Sicurezza europea ed installazione missili Pershing e Cruise 4

Riassunto Lagorio

La questione degli euromissili nasce perché si è venuto determinando uno squilibrio notevole, sul teatro europeo, fra gli armamenti sovietici e gli armamenti NATO, soprattutto dopo la comparsa dei nuovi missili sovietici SS 20 che hanno caratteristiche fantastiche di modernità: sono missili a triplice testata nucleare, sono mobili, si lanciano da rampe mobili, trasportabili in autocarri e vagoni ferroviari, sono molto precisi, possono porsi precisi obiettivi militari e non soltanto il bombardamento terroristico sulle grandi città. Il missile SS20 è in più sostenuto dai nuovi bombardieri di eccezionale validità, i cosiddetti Backfire, di grande velocità, grande raggio e volo radente. Il missile SS20 e il Backfire hanno in sanità la caratteristica di poter oltrepassare, forare, le barriere difensive elettroniche o convenzionali della NATO.

A fronte di queste nuove armi, nel teatro europeo, la NATO schiera solo un velivolo di buona modernità, l'americano F111 e tre sommergibili americani in Atlantico dotati di missili Poseidon.
Entrambi i mezzi sono armi terribili ma qualitativamente restano al di sotto della soglia qualitativa dell'URSS. Le armi atomiche inglesi e francesi sono antiquate, a breve raggio e largamente imprecise. Lo equilibrio qualitativo è un fatto certo perché è confermato anche da autorevoli fonti sovietiche. Sono i dirigenti sovietici (ultimo Zagladin su "Unità") a dire che l'equilibrio fra le forze si misura a livello planetario e non sui singoli scacchieri.

In questo contesto si inseriscono alcune prese di posizione che vanno attentamente valutate: i due discorsi di Brezhnev nei quali il leader sovietico si dichiara disposto, prima a una riduzione unilaterale di armi convenzionali e, quindi, a una revisione unilaterale del suo stesso arsenale missilistico; la lettera di Brezhnev ai governi europei: lettera che è un atto diplomatico e va perciò gestito diplomaticamente e non a livello di agitazione propagandistica; la posizione del governo tedesco (che ha alle sue spalle uno Strauss che ha già dei contatti con ambienti sovietici e propone un riarmo autonomo della Germania e un contemporaneo accordo diretto tra Germania ed URSS); infine le più recenti iniziative distensive degli USA (confermate anche da Aaron a Roma) secondo cui il pareggimento delle forze è possibile mantenerlo di pari passo con un negoziato con l'URSS, alla condizione che si decida per il pareggimento.

In questo quadro, quale può essere la nostra posizione?

E' superfluo dire che siamo un Partito della pace e del disarmo, che non vogliamo guerre, che non vogliamo prepararci per una guerra. Credo che possiamo innanzitutto dire che, per l'Europa, per noi, non è possibile condividere le tesi di partenza dell'URSS sull'equilibrio globale.

Il ristabilimento dell'equilibrio in Europa diviene dunque una linea obbligata; ma - per una forza di pace, come noi siamo - resta obbligata anche la via del negoziato instancabile. Nei passi di Brezhnev c'è uno spiraglio. Va esplorato.
La nostra azione mi pare possa muoversi su più linee:
1) innanzitutto premere perché il Salt 2 sia ratificato al più presto e si aprano quindi le strade al Salt 3;
2) valorizzare e sforzare tutti i punti possibili di contatto fra est e ovest dove si può discutere i problemi della riduzione bilanciata e controllata degli armamenti in Europa; in particolare dobbiamo convincere il governo italiano a partecipare alle trattative di Vienna; c'è il Salt 3. In proposito c'è da osservare che la più parte dei paesi europei non intende parteciparvi; c'è la Conferenza di Madrid, ove interviengono anche i paesi non allineati, forse meno sensibili all'equilibrio militare europeo; c'è la possibilità di pensare ad una conferenza ad hoc fra est ed ovest.
Il problema resta quello dei tempi, che non devono essere lunghi;
3) c'è l'agenda dei lavori NATO: la riunione dell'Aia del 13 - 14 novembre (gruppo pianificazione nucleare); qui si stabilirà il programma di modernizzazione delle armi nucleari già approntato dagli alti gradi in settembre; Qui ci sarà l'incontro fra ministri della Difesa a Bruxelles e in dicembre il Consiglio Atlantico con i ministri degli Esteri.
A questi appuntamenti ci possiamo presentare con una risposta affermativa ad una tabella di marcia dei paesi NATO. Una prima risposta affermativa in dicembre, al progetto di allestimento dei missili Pershing 2 e Cruise. Ciò significa che si avvia il processo di produzione delle armi. Tale processo ha una durata non inferiore ai tre anni. Fra l'avvio della produzione e la installazione degli ordigni c'è un tempo sufficiente per iniziare e portare avanti un serio e serrato negoziato con l'URSS. Al riguardo noi la pensiamo come i capi della SPD, come l'ala più rigorosa di questo partito.
Per preparare tutto ciò è opportuno che il PSI tenga rapporti più stretti con gli altri partiti socialisti europei a cominciare dalla SPD.
C'è infine un ultimo rilievo che non possiamo tacere. Se la risposta del Consiglio Atlantico di dicembre fosse negativa, a parte il contraccolpo fra alleati, si potrebbe determinare una situazione incresciosa e pericolosa proprio per l'Italia, perché se il territorio europeo le rifiuta ci sono sempre i mari e le flotte che li solcano. Di fronte a un no del campo Atlantico, gli USA potrebbero essere indotti a dotare le loro squadre navali dei missili contestati.

**DISCUSSIONE**

Lombrardi

Critica ritardo della riunione della Direzione su questo tema, in particolare riferendosi all'articolo di Silvestri - molto duro - appars. nell'Avanti! di domenica scorsa. Diversa la relazione che ha esposto Lagorio. Fa riferimento al punto dell'installazione dei missili e in particolare di quella parte riferentesi al tempo per l'avvio della produzione.

Riferisce disparità di vedute nella SPD (Bahr) - (Craxi informa contatti SPD e legge parte progetto di risoluzione SPD favorevole avvio produzione, in contemporanea con l'avvio delle trattative Est-Ovest). Insiste sulla possibilità di ricercare preventivamente una trattativa di smilitarizzazione con l'Est.

"Pensiamo bene rispetto al fatto che nel 1963 ci possano essere piantati in Europa più di 600 missili con testate atomiche".

Chiede una maggiore riflessione su questo punto.

Vittorelli

Concorda con relazione Lagorio. Il PSI non può non dar conto all'opinione pubblica su questo argomento della sua posizione.

La presenza degli SS20 modifica, prima della ratifica del Salt 2, il
quadro degli equilibri mondiali e soprattutto il ruolo e la funzione dell’ombrello atomico sull’Europa.

Questo equilibrio è verificabile nella lettera di Breznev ai governi occidentali, che rappresenta il codicillo pratico della vicenda di cui discutiamo.

Il problema della trattativa non può quindi basarsi su elementi tecnico-militari (come il Salt 2) ma deve collocarsi su livelli politici autorevoli. E’ favorevole ad aprire questa verifica a partire dal sì alla produzione dei missili.

Sulla richiesta di partecipazione alla conferma di Vienna crede possibile che sia proposta, anche se va verificata nel concreto.

La nostra posizione è determinante sia ai fini della definizione della posizione del PCI (nel senso che se noi fossimo incerti o contrari i comunisti si porterebbero immediatamente su posizioni demagogiche), che di quella tedesca (sia del governo che della SEED).

Coen
Occorre esercitare una pressione sugli americani perché si leggi l’approvazione dell’installazione e costruzione con la ratifica del Salt 2.

Sull’atteggiamento nei confronti del PCI: occorrerebbe, sullo spunto dell’incontro del 20 settembre, avviare una verifica comune.

Achilli
Propone che si tratti immediatamente e che solo da questa posizione si costruisca l’eventuale avvio della costruzione.

Andare a Vienna. Rimuovere la decisione del Consiglio Atlantico di dicembre e quando si potrà vedere lo sbocco di una trattativa da realizzare come avvio immediato.
Crazi

Legge testo risoluzione a favore "Charta 77" e di opposizione processo Praga.

(approvato unanimità)

De Martino

È preoccupato della proliferazione delle armi. Equilibrio del terrore che lo drammatizza. Se fosse possibile avviare una trattativa che duri alcuni mesi e poi decidere.

Comunque, conviene sostenere una tesi di questo tipo:

1) Contro le bombe atomiche e la loro proliferazione: messa al bando;

2) dai dati risulta uno equilibrio e quindi è legittimo, dal punto di vista europeo prima che USA, di far fronte ad esso;

3) da questo non ne trarrei subito la conseguenza di dar via alla costruzione ma direi che occorre aprire una trattativa a termine di tre mesi per decidere poi quello che occorre fare;

4) perché dobbiamo essere noi i primi a decidere: sia nei confronti della Germania che degli altri partiti dell'Internazionale? Aspetterei che altri lo facciano; non dobbiamo fare i primi della classe.

Ricordiamoci della nostra lotta per non entrare in guerra e del nostro internazionalismo.

(Crazi: quando eravate voi al governo avete installato fior di missili).

Non vi furono accordi internazionali allora. Furono fatti degli atti, sulla base di impegni precedenti di cui non eravamo responsabili direttamente.
Craxi
Che differenza c'è tra la decisione di costruire e invitare alla trattativa immediata e quella di aspettare tre mesi, rendendo più debole la posizione di chi chiede il riequilibrio? Il tempo tra la costruzione e la installazione è volto. Si tratta di anni. Si può quindi negoziare.

Noi dobbiamo esprimere un orientamento che sia chiaro. Siamo anche pressati dai tempi. Fa il caso della SPD che ha di fronte il problema di una difficile situazione politica.

De Martino
Autorizzare la costruzione significa poi la installazione alla scadenza. Capisce anche che questa nostra posizione è delicata e presuppon la sviluppo e posizione strategica diversa.

Landolfi
Va bene la posizione che si viene delineando. Dobbiamo però fare un salto di qualità nel senso della responsabilità politica e nella nostra collocazione internazionale. Fa il caso della Jugoslavia: ricorda una sua visita recente in cui i dirigenti di quel paese erano interessati ad una linea da parte nostra per il riequilibrio e per il negoziato. Non possiamo raccordarci ai comunisti su questo tema: siamo su di una onda diversa.

Signorile
Non dobbiamo decidere tutto noi ma non possiamo distaccarci dalla realtà e ritirarci rispetto alla decisione.

La decisione del governo italiano è influente sulla installazione ma non sulla produzione.
La costruzione dei missili è decisione del Consiglio Atlantico. Noi siamo parte di questa alleanza e dobbiamo darci carico di questa posizione politico-strategica.

Lo equilibrio di cui si parla è un problema di equilibrio europeo che ci impegna ad una riflessione assai attenta.

La scelta di approvare la spesa per la costruzione non presuppone la installazione: il negoziato può introdurre elementi nuovi; mentre il contrario nega entrambe le soluzioni.

Con questa decisione possiamo considerarci attori reali sulla trattativa da avviare.

(Lombardi: sta riproponendosi il problema dell'armamento autonomo dell'Europa, questo è il fatto nuovo)

Le questioni di cr ve terming vanno quindi risolte in positivo dicendo di sì.

Il rapporto con il PCI: questa questione ci porta ad un rischio di rottura e di ritorno all'indietro.

La posizione PCI riconosce il equilibrio regional. e pone il problema di ripristinarlo. Occorre capire meglio come si sviluppa questa posizione.

La posizione migliore per l'Europa è quella di avviare la costruzione avendo sempre a disposizione l'acceleratore e il freno.

Tempestini

La posizione Barh è in assoluto la più avanzata in Europa: ma la Germania sa che se tira troppo la corda rischia un rifiuto della presenza degli USA in Europa.

Il rapporto con il SALT 2 è sacrosanto. Come lo è la nostra posizio
ne nei termini in cui è stata presentata. Dobbiamo accettare la linea della SPD e la posizione di Schmidt.

La trattativa è il fulcro della nostra posizione e in sotanza al PCI questa nostra posizione può essere solo di stimolo benefico.

Crexi

Legge un testo che definisce di orientamento per la conclusione dei lavori:

1. Il processo di distensione deve continuare e deve consolidarsi. Nei dobbiamo pretendere che il governo italiano nei suoi atti e nell'ambito della Alleanza Atlantica, sia sempre impegnato a perseguire e a far avanzare una strategia di pace.

Una strategia di pace si realizza attraverso la riduzione degli armamenti e delle forze armate, e il mantenimento di una condizione di sicurezza certa ed inalterabile per tutti.

Il metodo non può che essere quello negoziale, dei controlli concordati e reciproci, ispirato a quella che i nostri compagni della SPD definiscono come "una politica di pilotaggio cooperativo nel settore degli armamenti".

2. A fondamento di ogni credibilità e duratura strategia di pace sta la politica dell'equilibrio. Ogni qualvolta si sono determinati o si determinano equilibri, ovunque vengano introdotti elementi destabilizzanti da essi derivano inevitabilmente tensioni e si riproducono fattori di un antagonismo o rischioso e i pericoli della corsa al rischio psicologico prima ancora che materiale.

E' stato giustamente osservato che nei settori della difesa il problema dell'equilibrio "non è necessariamente un problema di parità numerica".

Ciò che importa è raggiungere situazioni di capacità difensiva e di dissuasione che ad entro la consistenza della stabilità.
3. Nessun risultato utile ai fini della distensione e del consolidamento della pace può essere raggiunto se si alimenta un clima di diffidenza e di sfiducia nei rapporti tra Est ed Ovest. Anche i problemi militari vanno perciò inquadrati in una cornice politica di miglioramento dei rapporti, di relazioni più intense, di buone convinzioni sulla volontà pacifica degli interlocutori. A questo scopo non servono nè le campagne allarmistiche nè le azioni politiche che assumono un significato intimidatorio. Se si parte dal presupposto dell'esistenza di potenziali volontà aggressive dall'una parte o dall'altra tutto diventa più difficile se non impossibile. Resta il fatto oggettivo, convalidato dalle esperienze della storia, che nessuna potenza che si trovi in posizione di prevalenza militare rinuncia prima o poi a far valere questa supremazia sul terreno politico.

In altre epoche quando più netta era la supremazia nucleare americana proprio negli USA si sviluppò una autorevole tendenza culturale e politica a sostegno di una dottrina che voleva la "vulnerabilità" degli USA come condizione dell'effettiva stabilità della pace nel mondo.

4. In questi anni i problemi degli armamenti e dell'equilibrio si sono sempre più valutati in termini qualitativi. Misure tradizionali di riduzione degli armamenti hanno assunto e assumono così un significato simbolico, che può avere un valore indicativo, può rappresentare una espressione di buona volontà ma non esprimono una efficacia concreta ed affidabile.

Il problema del controllo degli armamenti, dei nuovi processi tecnologici e delle nuove armi si presenta perciò in termini assai complessi.

In ogni caso bisogna porsi in condizione di poter intervenire sul la produzione di nuove armi in modo da poterne decidere l'arresto o la nonassegnazione alle forze armate in relazione con i risultati
delle trattative che si possono sviluppare sul piano politico.

5. Tutte le iniziative in atto per lo sviluppo dei controlli e per la sistemazione negoziale degli armamenti a livelli sempre più bassi debbono ricevere un nuovo impulso. C'è da augurarsi che gli accordi già raggiunti (Salt 2) siano presto ratificati. La mancata ratifica del Salt 2 determinerebbe una svolta nel clima e nei rapporti tra le superpotenze. Tutta la situazione subirebbe un colpo negativo non assorbibile nel medio periodo.

Con il Salt 2, con l'accordo circa la non proliferazione delle armi nucleari, con gli impegni politici assunti ad Helsinki, con i negoziati di Vienna sono state scritte le basi per un dialogo di vasta portata ed impegno tra Est ed Ovest, tra NATO e Patto di Varsavia.

6. I problemi non riguardano solo i rapporti tra le due superpotenze, ma anche i rapporti con il terzo mondo e quindi l'argine alla corsa al riarmo di molti dei paesi emergenti e i rischi di proliferazione delle armi nucleari, riguardano i rapporti con la Cina Popolare, riguardano la sicurezza dell'Europa.

Noi non possiamo assumere posizioni velleitarie e demagogiche, non possiamo accoarcì neppure ad emozioni che sottostiano sul fuoco delle tensioni. Dobbiamo sviluppare una forte iniziativa di pace partendo da basi realistiche e da posizioni costruttive.

La prima considerazione realistica consiste nel giudicare come un obiettivo lungo scadenza il traguardo di un disarmo generale internazionale.

A breve e a medio termine c'è solo lo spazio per una politica prur"ente e ferma di passi successivi, di riduzione dei rischi di atti negoziati e concordati.

In questa prospettiva l'Italia deve operare tutte le opportune pressioni politiche perché si giunga ad un dialogo istituzionalizzato tra la NATO e il Patto di Varsavia.
Il governo italiano deve chiedere di partecipare alle trattative di Vienna per la riduzione delle forze convenzionali sollecitando una più ampia ripresa, anche in sede politica, del negoziato. Occorre giungere rapidamente ad un primo trattato così come negli auspici delle due parti senza che sino ad ora sia stata affrontata una fase decisamente conclusiva.

Da un primo accordo si potrebbe poi partire per allargare l'area della sicurezza e della stabilità sulla base di nuovi equilibri.

7. La situazione delle armi nucleari in Europa deve essere inclusa in un nuovo negoziato complessivo che deve mirare a ridurre il livello degli armamenti sempre secondo la regola di un corretto equilibrio garante delle esigenze di sicurezza di tutti.

Un nuovo negoziato (SALT III) deve comprendere i missili nucleari di media gittata e non deve velare estranei i paesi europei. Secondo questi principi e linee generali di azione deve essere affrontato, nella sua oggettività, il problema degli squilibri attuali e potenziali che vengono denunciati da parte occidentale in rapporto alle cosiddette forze di teatro europee.

Le fonti più autorevoli della Alleanza Atlantica giudicano che l'installazione degli SS 20 da parte sovietica e i previsti programmi di nuovi missili e di nuovi vettori aerei configurano già da oggi uno squilibrio oggettivo giacché da parte della Alleanza Atlantica non può essere opposto "nulla di comparabile". Un tale giudizio figura anche nel "libro bianco sui problemi della difesa in Europa" diffuso dal Governo della Repubblica Federale Tedesca.

Noi riteniamo che l'obiettivo principale deve essere quello di giungere attraverso un immediato negoziato alla eliminazione di tutti i fattori di squilibrio e di quindi di instabilità ed alla definizione dei più bassi livelli possibili, o meglio ancora, alla eliminazione di nuove armi nucleari esplorando adeguatamente le positive intenzioni manifestate dall'URSS.
Contemporaneamente appaiono giustificate le misure di ammodernamento e le opzioni necessarie di politica difensiva che vengono proposte. Esse devono poter essere sospese e non rese effettive qualora un approvato negoziato dovesse giungere a risultati soddisfacenti.

8. Rispetto alle questioni della sicurezza e della politica della distensione in Europa ed in particolare della questione insorgente dell'ammodernamento del sistema missilistico NATO in Europa abbiamo sviluppato consultazioni internazionali e contatti diretti in particolare con i compagni della SPD, data la peculiarità e l'importanza della posizione tedesca nel quadro strategico europeo ed internazionale. Ne è risultata una sostanziale identità di valutazione nell'impegno che è comune ai due partiti ed alla Internazionale socialisti di sviluppare con coerenza una strategia di pace e di sicurezza in Europa e nel mondo.

9. La Segreteria del PSI e dei Gruppi Parlamentari socialisti potranno illustrare al Governo ed al Parlamento la posizione dei socialisti e l'auspicio che la politica del nostro Paese possa rappresentare, nell'ambito delle alleanze internazionali, e nel rapporto tra Est ed Ovest, verso il Terzo Mondo, un fattore propulsivo dei processi di pace, di distensione, di cooperazione nel rispetto e nella sicurezza di tutti.

L'orientamento prevalente della Direzione mi pare favorevole ai punti illustrati e ne prendo atto. Con prudenza occorre procedere nella linea della autorizzazione con l'avvio della trattativa. Possiamo, credo, concludere in questi termini.

(cosi rimane stabilito)
Coen

Chiede di sapere se discuteremo le proposte istituzionali avanzate da Craxi

(se ne discuterà in un'altra riunione)

Achilli

E' apparso che le differenti opinioni si siano anche formalmente espresse. Dichiarà quindi che renderà esplicito il suo orientamento differente.

De Martino

Non renderà pubblica la sua opinione differente giacché ritiene che su questioni di questo rilievo occorra dare all'esterno una immagine omogenea.

Si farà una Direzione orientativamente il 7 o 8 novembre.

Conclusione: ore 20,30
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: NSC Weekly Report #114

1. Opinion

Status of TNF

David Aaron provides the following results of his visit last week to Europe concerning TNF.

We are much closer to a firm consensus on our proposed TNF program than anyone would have anticipated only a few weeks ago. The UK, FRG and Italy have all taken firm internal government decisions to support the NATO program. In Belgium, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister all support the NATO program and Belgian participation and are prepared to make a vote of confidence in their Parliament. The same is true in the Netherlands except that the Dutch want to change the program significantly and are spending more time trying to modify the NATO decision in an effort to win acceptance than they are trying to defend it.

In my judgment the other allies will be willing to go ahead with the program without the Dutch with the possible exception of the Belgians. We should, however, do our best to get them to participate, otherwise their absence could unravel the support of other countries and create a long-term problem with the West Germans.

Despite the firm government position in the FRG and Italy, both countries will avoid firm public commitments to the NATO TNF program for as long as possible in order to avoid provoking public opposition. However, we must also recognize that this leaves Schmidt and Cossiga an opportunity to back out or trim their commitment. We should not make too much of this, however, because increasingly it's publicly known that the Germans and Italians support the program and backing off would provoke a major political crisis for both leaders. Interestingly, both the Italians and the Belgians are keying their presentation and strategy to the position of the Germans (not the Dutch). If Schmidt stays firm, they will remain firm.

TOP SECRET
Classified and Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Review October 26, 1999
Reason for Extension: 114
The Belgians have invited Schmidt to come to Belgium in November for the purpose of strengthening the Belgian Socialist support for LRTNF.

There are several other aspects of the trip which deserve comment.

-- The Brezhnev initiative is a dead letter. If anything, it was counterproductive and the current harsh Soviet stance makes clear that the Russians’ peace offensive is more offensive than peaceful. Nonetheless, if it continues, there may be second thoughts in various sectors of the German SPD.

-- The Italians have backed off their insistence on some kind of physical veto of LRTNF in Italy. They are prepared for a face-saving device and have suggested we form a committee to consider the problem once NATO has reached its decision in December.

-- The Europeans will not make any formal linkage between TNF and SALT ratification. The Dutch wanted to do this, but David persuaded them that this would be counter-productive for SALT. They will make a unilateral statement that their agreement to TNF will be conditional on SALT.

-- The Dutch proposal to deploy only 286 weapons while we negotiate for three years could prove troublesome, particularly in Belgium. We need to push our own warhead reduction initiative as a counter. I believe we can count on the Allies to support us, but Defense Minister Apel is a little soft on this issue.

We will have an SCC next week to consider next steps to recommend to you.

2. Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Decisions

The following decisions were taken at the VBB luncheon yesterday:

-- Brown Paper: We touched on Harold’s paper to you of October 3 on responding to Soviet assertiveness. The original of the memorandum is with you, and I would prefer to have your guidance before we discuss the mcmo and its recommendations further. Do you have any instructions for us?

-- Czechoslovakia: In response to the sentencing of the six dissidents, the U.S. Ambassador will be recalled for consultations in Washington within a week.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 31, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, the Alliance is entering the final phase of its deliberations on Theater Nuclear Force modernization and arms control. I think we can all be proud of the quality and intensity of Alliance consultations on this subject. In my judgment, the crucial December decisions will mark a watershed in NATO's resolve. They will also test the determination in each of our countries to maintain a credible ladder of deterrence and simultaneously to show our publics that we will take the initiative to negotiate a significant reduction in the level of these weapons.

With this in mind, I want to express my deep concern about the Dutch proposal to cut NATO's modernization program by half. I am concerned that this proposal could jeopardize all our efforts and unravel the consensus each member of the Alliance has tried so hard to build. In light of the fact that the 572 figure is deemed necessary by NATO's defense experts, a decision to deploy less would seem weak. It would send precisely the wrong signals to the Soviet Union, undermining their incentive to bargain with us seriously, and would create serious political problems in some countries of the Alliance. For all these reasons, I hope you will decide not to introduce your proposal into the Alliance in the upcoming consultations.

At the same time, I want you to know that I fully understand and share your desire to give the Dutch public vivid evidence of reduced NATO reliance on nuclear weapons and of the Alliance's dedication to the objectives of arms control. That is why I am attracted to the idea that as an integral part

SECRET
of the NATO decision to deploy 572 Long-Range
Theater Nuclear Force warheads in Europe, we could
reduce our nuclear stockpile by 1,000 weapons.
Such a step would be a concrete demonstration that
through TNF modernization, we are not engaging in
a nuclear buildup. It would demonstrate our com-
mmitment to arms control, provide an opportunity to
give MBFR a push forward with a streamlined NATO
proposal, and respond to Brezhnev's unilateral
steps. This concept has been favorably received by
each of the four other countries which will provide
basing for our modernized TNF, and I ask that your
government also give the most serious consideration
to this possibility.

Mr. Prime Minister, we are approaching a crossroads.
By working together, I believe we can overcome our
problems and move to a decision in December that will
provide for needed improvements in Alliance defenses
and build a strong foundation for Alliance arms con-
trol efforts.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Andreas A. M. Van Agt
Prime Minister of the Netherlands
The Hague
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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

CORRECT COPY (ZPO REMOVED FM LINE 4)

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/07/99 (BENNETT, W.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC
SUBJECT: (S) TNF: PERMREPS 6 NOVEMBER DISCUSSION OF INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT - DETAILED REPORT

REFS: (A) STATE 286043 DTG 012151Z NOV 79, (B) STATE 286042 DTG 012149Z NOV 79

1. [REDACTED] ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SUMMARY FOR THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN USNATO 7692. FOLLOWING IS DETAILED REPORTING MESSAGE OF THE MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. SYG LUNS OPENED THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING OF PERMREPS (FULL TEXT PARA32) BY NOTING THAT THE SESSION WOULD AFFORD
4. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION AT ADDRESSING THE NAC (FULL TEXT OF AARON’S REMARKS PARA 33) NOTING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED "FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES" THAN THOSE ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. NOTING THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET TNF DEPLOYMENTS, HE SUGGESTED THAT IF LEFT UNANSWERED, THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THEY HAD ACHIEVED MILITARY PREPONDERANCE AND DECOUPLED EUROPEAN DEFENSE FROM THAT OF NORTH AMERICA.

5. AARON NOTED THAT THE SS-20 BUILD-UP HAS CONTINUED WITH ANOTHER SS-20 BASE OBSERVED UNDER INITIAL CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. MOREOVER, THERE MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSED SS-20 DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION WHICH WOULD MAKE TRACKING SS-20’S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING THE SS 4/5’S WE EXPECTED AND MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE THAN THE 600 WARHEADS EARLIER PROJECTED.

Aaron suggested we could welcome the Brezhnev speech as an offer to negotiate but not as a proposal for NATO to do nothing in LRTNF except meet with them.

Consequently, he concluded, the main motivation of Brezhnev’s speech was to prevent alliance TNF modernization.

Noting these recent developments, Aaron stated they had strengthened us resolve to move forward to decisions in December on both TNF modernization and arms control. Deployment of Pershing II and GLCM "will close the gap in the ladder of deterrence" and "insure the firm linkage of US strategic forces to Europe defense". On TNF arms control, the US supported the SG’s proposal to negotiate a SALT III agreement for equal ceilings on long-range missiles. We should try to cut the Soviet long-range missile threat to Europe and while success could lead to downward adjustment of our deployment needs, it does not mean we can postpone a deployment decision.

Aaron emphasized that President Carter fully supported the HLG & SG Program and shared the belief that the alliance should take decisions in December. When approved by the Alliance, the President was ready to seek funds for the program and to move quickly in the SALT III framework to deal with TNF issues.
RECALLING THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL, AARON STAZMD THAT THE IDW WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF "MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED" SINCE IT WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF AN INTENSIVE, PERHAPS UNIQUE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE IDW.

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. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWING 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AARON SUGGESTED THE PROPOSAL IS

. --FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE MILITARILY IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LRTRANS;

. --APPROPRIATE, AS A WITHDRAWAL WOULD EMPHASIZE TNF MODERNIZATION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILDUP OR A SIGNAL OF GREATER NATO RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

. --A ROPOSTE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH

. --A MOVE, WHICH JUXTAPPOSED WITH THE SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL MILITARY WITHDRAWALS, COULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED MBFR PHASE I PROPOSAL.

AARON SUGGESTED THAT A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NAC "ON A PRIORITY BASIS"
AND STATED IT WOULD BE "DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE"
IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN
DECEMBER. HE SUGGESTED THE NAC TAKE A "FIRM HAND" IN
CONSIDERING ANY SIMPLIFIED PHASE 1 PROPOSALS AIDED BY
THE SPC AT DCM LEVEL.

5. AFTER THANKING AARON, SYG LUNGS NOTED THAT HE HAD
ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND SACEUR
TO PROVIDE THEIR VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW
1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS DIRECTLY TO NPG MINISTERS.

CMC ZEINER GUNDERSEN NOTED THAT HE COULD SEE
POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN THE OFFER AND THAT IT SEEMED
MILITARILY SUPPORTABLE. HE STATED HE WOULD GIVE THE
DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL FURTHER THOUGHT FOR PRESENTATION
AT THE 13 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

6. ROSE (UK) AFTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR AARON'S
COMMENTS, CHARACTERIZED THE IDD AS AN EXCELLENT BASIS
FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION AND FULLY REFLECTING THE HLG/SG
REPORTS.

CONCERNING THE 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEAD OFFER, ROSE
DESCRIBED IT AS A "CONSTRUCTIVE NEW PROPOSAL WITH A NUMBER
OF ADVANTAGES" WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN URGENT STUDY IN
THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECT ON MBFR'S OPTION III.
THE MOVE COULD GIVE A POSITIVE DIRECTION TO MBFR IF
MINISTERS WERE ABLE TO AGREE ON IT.

ROSE ALSO STATED THAT WORK ON AMS WAS WELL ADVANCED
AND THE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD BEFORE THE END OF
THE ROUND TO REINFORCE THE OTHER INITIATIVES. LIKELYWISE

IT MIGHT BE FEASIBLE BY DECEMBER TO GIVE SOME INDICATION
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE ALLIANCE CBMS POSITION BUILDING PERHAPS
ON THE FRENCH CDE PHASE I PROPOSAL. NEVERTHELESS,
ROSE STRESSED THAT THE FIRST AND HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO
PROCEED TO DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION WHICH IS AN
ESSENTIAL FOR ANY TNF ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS, HOWEVER,
A PARALLEL NEED TO AGREE ON TNF ARMS CONTROL SO THIS
CAN BE PRESENTED AT THE SAME TIME AS MODERNIZATION.

ROSE CONCLUDED THAT THE NEW US 1000 WARHEAD PROPOSAL
WAS COMPLEMENTARY TO THE ALLIANCE SG/HLG WORK AND
THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS
ALSO AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. MINISTERS WILL ALSO
HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO MOVE ON MBFR AND CBMS BUT IF
SUCH DECISIONS COULD BE MADE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE
ABLE TO TAKE AND HOLD THE ADVANTAGE ON THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH. A COHERENT APPROACH OF THIS NATURE, ROSE CONCLUDED, WOULD INCREASE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR TFN DEPLOYMENTS.

. IN A SECOND INTERVENTION, ROSE NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE IDD WOULD NOT BE CORRECT IN DECEMBER, AS HE EXPECTED THE NPG MINISTERIAL TO SET THE MENTIONED EXAMINATION IN MOTION.

. TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 18, HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH THE CANADIANS AND ATTEMPT TO OFFER A MODIFICATION TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE PASSAGE WHICH WOULD MEET WITH BOTH US AND CANADIAN APPROVAL (SEE DISCUSSION BELOW).

ROSE ALSO VOICED RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT THE DUTCH SUGGESTION TO ADD THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH E OF THE DISCUSSION OF PRINCIPLE 1 IN THE SPECIAL GROUP REPORT, TO IDD PARAGRAPH 11, AS THAT LEFT TOO NEGATIVE AN IMPRESSION. HE SUGGESTED ADDING ALSO THE REMAINING SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH E IN ORDER TO PRESENT A MORE BALANCED ARGUMENT.

REFERRING TO THE GERMAN SUGGESTIONS ON PARAGRAPH 20 OF THE IDD, HE ASKED IF THE PURPOSE OF THE SUGGESTIONS WAS TO STATE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS WOULD BE STUDIED. THE GERMANS NODDED ASSENT.

FOLLOWING THE MEETING, THE UK DELEGATION PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS:
THE UK SUGGESTS BEGINNING THE FIRST
SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 21 AS FOLLOWS: "MINISTERS

NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE NPG HAD SET
IN HAND A STUDY OF THE ALLIANCE'S THEATER
NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE WHICH WOULD,
INTER ALIA, EXAMINE THE PRECISE NATURE...
(CONTINUE REMAINDER OF SENTENCE AS CURRENTLY
DRAFTED).

IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE COMMUNIQUE, THE
UK SUGGESTS THE TERM "EQUIVALENT ROLE" IN
REFERRING TO THE BACKFIRE, RATHER THAN
"PERIPHERAL ROLE" AS IN THE CURRENT VERSION,
OR THE ITALIANS' SUGGESTED "THEATER ROLE."
IN THE SAME PARAGRAPH, THE UK WOULD MODIFY THE
LAST SENTENCE TO READ: "INDEED THESE WESTERN
FORCES..."

7. PAULS (FRG) OPENED BY THANKING AARON FOR A CLEAR,
COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT AND OFFERED FULL APPROVAL FOR IT.
The IDD, TOGETHER WITH THE REPORTS OF THE HLG AND SG, ARE
A SOLID BASIS FOR DECISIONS. THE IDD PRESENTS A BALANCED
SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE TWO REPORTS,
CONTINUES TO BE FULLY WEDDED TO THE TWO REPORTS, AND
REFLECTS OUR POSITION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT
BOTH REPORTS WERE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS AND ARE, THEREFORE,
THE RELEVANT BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE DECISIONS. THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS FULLY AGREED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
IDD TOGETHER WITH THE TWO REPORTS. THE BASIC ELEMENTS
OF THE TWO REPORTS ARE KNOWN BY PARLIAMENTARY BODIES
AND INFORMED PUBLICS. THE DOCUMENT (IDD) AS IT STANDS
SHOULD BE THE BASIS ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE TAKES DECISIONS
IN DECEMBER.

THE FRG IS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH INCLUDING THE

1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL IN THE IDD, AND SEES ADVANTAGES
TO THE IDEA AS EXPRESSED BY AARON.

PAULS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE HLG AND SG CHAIRMEN AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR CONTRIBU-
TION: PAULS UNDERLINED THAT AGREEMENT ON THE IDD AND
THE TWO REPORTS WAS DUE TO A BROAD MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
THE GROUPS HAVE SHOWN FOR EACH OTHER, AND APPEALED TO ALL TO
AVOID RISKING WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. HE NOTED THAT THE
SOVIET CHALLENGE WAS A TEST OF THE ALLIANCE'S COHESION
AND ABILITY TO ACT.

HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY. HE COMMENTED
THAT IF JOINTLY DEVELOPED WORK WERE CHALLENGED AT THIS
POINT, THE ALLIANCE'S ABILITY TO ACT AND TO TAKE DECISIONS
WOULD BE QUESTIONED.

HE NOTED THAT THE VEHEMENCE AND MEANS BY WHICH THE
SOVIET UNION WAS REACTING INDICATED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
ISSUES, AND CITED SPECIFICALLY THE BREZHNEV SPEECH ON
OCTOBER 6 AND THE NEARLY IDENTICAL LETTERS BREZHNEV SENT
ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS. HE CONTINUED THE SOVIET
UNION AND ITS ALLIES HAD STARTED A CAMPAIGN TO INFLUENCE
ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST GIVING THE
IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN WAS
INFLUENCING THE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES OF THE
ALLIANCE, OR THAT IT COULD THREATEN OR INTIMIDATE THE
ALLIANCE IN ITS DECISION-MAKING, OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION
CAN ACHIEVE RESULTS OUTSIDE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT IT WOULD
HAVE NO REAL PRICE TO PAY IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE CAUTIONED
EVERYONE TO ABSTAIN FROM ANY IDEA OF REDUCING THE MEASURES

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TO BE TAKEN.

PAULS CONTINUED THAT THE NPG MINISTERIAL WOULD DEAL
WITH AND ENDORSE THE HLG REPORT AND NOTE THE SG REPORT AND
THE IDD. THEN PERMRPS OF INTERESTED NATIONS, AS
INSTRUCTED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS, WOULD PUT THE FINISHING
TOUCHES ON THE IDD AT THE 28 NOVEMBER MEETING. THIS ACTION WOULD NOT AT ALL CURTAIL THE MINISTERIAL PREROGATIVE WHICH SHOULD BE EXERCISED AT THE 12 DECEMBER AFTERNOON MINISTERIAL SESSION.

. IN RELATION TO THE INFLUENCE THE US PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE ON MBFR, PAULS NOTED THE FRG HAD BEEN CONSIDERING THE IDEA OF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT FOR SOME TIME AND INTENDED TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK. HE NOTED THAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE US-SOViet REDUCTIONS AT A LOWER OVERALL LEVEL ON THE BASIS OF AGREED US-Soviet DATA. THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT WOULD BE COUPLED WITH AGREEMENTS OF INTENT BY ALL TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PHASES, AND AN AGREEMENT ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

. PAULS SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED RUTH (FRG) WHO MADE SOME DETAILED COMMENTS. HE SUGGESTED, IN PARAGRAPH 1 INTRODUCTION OF THE IDD, ADDING A SENTENCE AT THE END INDICATING THAT TOGETHER WITH THE IDD, THE HLG AND SG REPORTS FORM THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE DECISIONS. HE SAID HE WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY PRESENT IN WRITING OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

. HE FURTHER SUGGESTED (A) THE HEADING "LRNF MODERNIZATION" BE PLACED AFTER PARAGRAPH 14, RATHER THAN BEFORE IT AS AT PRESENT.

. (B) ADDING THE WORD "LIKewise" AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST SENTENCE, PARAGRAPH 16.

. (C) THE READER MIGHT CONFUSE THE IDEAS IN PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21. TO CLARIFY THE DIFFERENCE, HE SUGGESTED ADDING AT THE END OF THE THIRD SENTENCE THE PHRASE "BASED ON ALLIANCE ANALYSIS," AND BEGINNING PARAGRAPH 21 WITH THE WORD "FURTHER".

. (D) MODIFYING THE COMMUNIQue, PARAGRAPH 7, SENTENCE FOUR, TO READ "IN THIS CONNECTION, MINISTERS AGREED, BASED ON ALLIANCE ANALYSIS, THAT AS AN INTEGRAL...".

. (E) IN PARAGRAPH 7 [ ] SHOULD BE SPelled OUT, AND THE NUMBER "572" ADDED TO THE FIFTH SENTENCE REFERENCE TO LRNF WARHEADS. FINALLY, HE RECOMMENDED BEGINNING THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF
THIS PARAGRAPH WITH "IN ADDITION, THEY NOTED...".

(F) SUBPARAGRAPH 9E OF THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE DIVIDED, WITH THE SECOND SENTENCE BECOMING SUBPARAGRAPH 9F.

8. CATALANO (ITALY) ECHOED HIS COLLEAGUES IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO AARON AND COMMENDED THE HLG/SG CHAIRMEN FOR THEIR WORK ON THE IDD.

CATALANO NOTED THAT ITALY WAS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE STRUCTURE OF THE IDD BUT REGARDED THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AS LONG AND AT TIMES REPETITIOUS. NOTHEREFORE IT WAS ACCEPTABLE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. CATALANO ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CLOSE ATTENTION BE PAID TO THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS NOT TO BE ISSUED UNTIL MID-DECEMBER AS WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE THE ONLY OFFICIAL ALLIANCE DOCUMENT ON TNN ARMS CONTROL AND MODERNIZATION TO BE ISSUED FOR THE PUBLIC.

CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS, CATALANO STATED IT WAS BEING GIVEN ACTIVE STUDY IN ALL ASPECTS BUT PRELIMINARY STUDY FOUND MERIT IN THE IDEA. HE NOTED THE PROPOSAL SHOULD TAKE THE PRESENT STATUS OF MBFR INTO ACCOUNT AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, BE RELATED TO THE PROBLEM OF AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE BRETZHNEV INITIATIVES.

SUBSEQUENTLY CATALANO OFFERED THE FOLLOWING REMARKS
DIRECTED AT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE:

PARAGRAPH 3: HE NOTED THE TERM "PERIPHERAL ROLE" IS
RATHER OBSCURE AND DIFFICULT TO RENDER IN A TRANSLATION
AND WONDERED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO SAY, "THEATRE ROLE"
INSTEAD.

PARAGRAPH 7: INSTEAD OF: [___]
HE SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY:

PARAGRAPH 9: HE STATED THAT THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THE
PHRASE: "FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE"
COULD BE BETTER RENDERED WITH THE PHRASE: "TAKEN IN
CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE ALLIES". THE PHRASE:
"IN A TIMELY WAY" DOES NOT SEEM FORCEFUL ENOUGH: IT
WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SAY: "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE".

9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) OFFERED HIS CONGRATULATIONS TO
THE SG/HLG CHAIRMEN FOR THE QUICK AND EXCELLENT WORK DONE
ON THE IDD. HE STATED THAT THE PROCESS OF MOVING TOWARD A
"DOUBLE DECISION" ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL
WAS GOING WELL AND THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE
ITS DECISION OFFICIAL IN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER IN DUE
TIME FOR THE MINISTERIAL. HE COMMENTED THAT THE IDD WILL
BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN MAKING THIS DECISION.

10. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST (CHARGE NETHERLANDS),
EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S THANKS TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE HLG AND SG. HE NOTED THAT THE ISSUES OF
LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF
WERE MOVING FROM THE SENIOR EXPERTS FORA, WHERE
THEY HAVE BEEN STUDIED UNTIL NOW, INTO THE
POLITICAL ARENA. THE DECISION THE ALLIANCE WILL
TAKE IN DECEMBER IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE.
THE IDD, IN ITS FINAL FORM, WILL CONSTITUTE THE
TEXT OF THE FINAL DECISION. IN THIS CONTEXT,
THE TWIN ISSUES OF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS
CONTROL ARE STILL A MATTER OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION
WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS. CONSEQUENTLY, HE STATED
HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD, BUT WOULD ONLY RAISE ONE ASPECT OF THE ARMS CONTROL PORTION OF THAT DOCUMENT.

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11. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST ELABORATED, SAYING THE SPECIAL GROUP'S REPORT DEVOTES ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS CONTROL SO SUCCESSFUL AS TO PERMIT NATO TO CONSIDER SUSPENDING ITS OWN LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS. ALTHOUGH THIS "ZERO DEPLOYMENT" IS UNLIKELY TO PROVE PRACTICAL, IT REMAINS AT LEAST A THEORETICAL OPTION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO REMOVAL OF THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THREAT. HIS AUTHORITIES BELIEVE IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO RECALL, IN THE IDD, THIS POSSIBILITY WHICH COULD BE DONE BY INSERTING ONE SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH II 11. AFTER THE SECOND SENTENCE IN THAT PARAGRAPH, INSERT THE FIRST SENTENCE FROM PRINCIPAL 1E OF THE SG REPORT ("ONE COULD POSTULATE... SUSPENDING ITS OWN LRTNF MODERNIZATION PLANS."). BY MAKING THIS ADDITION, THE IDD WOULD CONTAIN BOTH THE THEORETICAL NATURE AND THE UNREALISTIC ASPECT OF THE "ZERO DEPLOYMENT" POSSIBILITY.

12. DUTCH REP THEN TURNED TO THE US "1000 WARHEAD" SUGGESTION. IN GENERAL, THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THIS STEP. IT WOULD FIT IN WELL WITH THE DECEMBER ANNOUNCEMENT OF PARALLEL DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. OF COURSE, NATO MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE MBFR CONNECTION. THE IDEA OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES SEEMS ATTRACTIVE AT FIRST GLANCE. HIS AUTHORITIES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE FRG MBFR PROPOSAL. NATO WILL NEED MORE DETAILS BEFORE MAKING SUBSTANTIVE JUDGMENTS AND HE WONDERED

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WHETHER IT WAS THE INTENT TO DEAL WITH MBFR IN TOTAL AT THE NEXT NATO MEETING ON MBFR.

13. VAN VOORST TOT VOORST CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE NETHERLANDS ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE STUDY OF THE "SHIFT" IN THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WHICH WILL BE CAUSED BY THE ASSIGNMENT OF A GREATER PART OF THAT STOCKPILE TO LONG-RANGE ROLES. MOD SCHOLTEN WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ABOUT THAT AT THE NPG MINISTERIAL. THE NETHERLANDS PARTICULARLY APPRECIATES THE IDD’S REFERENCE TO TIMING OF THE STUDY, WHERE IT CALLS FOR A REPORT TO MINISTERS IN THE AUTUMN OF 1980. FINALLY, IN CONSIDERING WORDING FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, THE NETHERLANDS WOULD PREFER WORDING CLOSER TO THAT IN THE IDD RATHER THAN THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

SYG LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THE NETHERLANDS’ INTENT IN DRAWING WORDING FROM THE SG REPORT WOULD BE CLEARER AND MORE BALANCED IF ALL OF PARAGRAPH E OF PRINCIPLE 1 WERE INCLUDED. THIS POINT WAS PICKED UP BY THE DANISH AMBASSADOR LATER IN THE MEETING.

14. SVART (DENMARK) STATED THAT NEW DANISH GOVERNMENT HAS INITIATED AN INTENSIVE REVIEW OF THIS SUBJECT, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY FOR THE DANISH PUBLIC. THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE THE ISSUE TO THE PARLIAMENT. ON 27 NOVEMBER AND EXPECTS A BROAD DEBATE. THE 27 NOVEMBER DEBATE WILL NOT RESULT IN A MOTION PUT BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT. THE GOVERNMENT’S POSITION WILL BE DECIDED SUBSEQUENTLY, AND WILL BE BASED, IN PART, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THOSE STATES SLATED FOR BASING LRTNF WILL BE
IN A POSITION TO APPROVE THE BASING AND THAT AN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WILL BE PUT FORWARD BY THE ALLIANCE.

15. SVART STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ARE WELL SATISFIED WITH THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. THIS PROPOSAL FALLS NICELY IN LINE WITH NATO'S DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DANISH AUTHORITIES ALSO WELCOME THE POSITIVE EFFECT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON MBFR. WITH RESPECT TO THE ARMS CONTROL PORTIONS, THE DANISH GOVERNMENTS BELIEVES THE IDD COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC, PERHAPS BY POINTING TO THE IDEA THAT SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS FROM ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES COULD LEAD TO REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF NEW WARHEADS WHICH ARE TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT IN 1983. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS IN THE IDD THE EFFECT THE DECEMBER DECISION WILL HAVE ON DETENTE.

16. SVART CONTINUED BY OBSERVING THAT THE IDD SHOULD BE MADE AN ANNEX TO A COVER NOTE FROM THE SYG IN ORDER NOT TO BE SEEN AS PRESENTING MINISTERS WITH A DECISION ALREADY TAKEN, WHICH THEY ARE ONLY ASKED TO RATIFY. TURNING TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF TNF DECISIONS WITH SALT II, SVART SAID THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE FATE OF SALT II WILL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECEMBER DECISION. IF SALT II IS NOT RATIFIED, WE WILL HAVE A NEW SET OF ISSUES TO CONSIDER AND WILL BE FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION.

17. TURNING TO SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE IDD, SVART CIRCULATED TWO PROPOSED CHANGES TO PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II (TEXT BELOW). HE ALSO SUGGESTED AMENDING PARAGRAPH 23 IN SECTION III, WHERE IT SAYS "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS IN A TIMELY WAY" TO READ, INSTEAD, "TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." SVART ASKED THAT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THESE CHANGES. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE MINISTERS, IN DECEMBER, WILL WISH TO PROVIDE CLEAR POLITICAL, PUBLIC AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AT PRESENT SEEMS TO REFER ONLY TO HOSTING AND IT COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE ALL THESE POINTS.

18. BEGIN TEXT OF DANISH REVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 11 AND 12 OF SECTION II OF THE IDD:
NEW FORMULATION:

11. SUCCESS OF ARMS CONTROL IN CONSTRaining THE SOVIET BUIldup WILL ENHANCE ALLIANCE SECURITY AND REDUCE THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS. THUS, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS WILL LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN THE SCALE OF NATO'S TNF REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, ANY ACHIEVABLE ARMS CONTROL OUTCOME INVOLVING TNF WOULD NOT, IN THE FIRST STEP, ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE SOVIET LRTNF THREAT AND WOULD NOT OBViate THE NEED FOR SOME LRTNF MODERNIZATION TO MEET THE ALLIANCE'S OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT CAN ADJUST THE SCALE OF CONCRETE MEASURES AIMED AT MEETING THE CONTINUOUS ARMAMENT EFFORT OF THE WARSAW PACT WILL THEREFORE DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE AND BALANCED LIMITATIONS ON LRTNF OF BOTH SIDES THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

12. THUS BOTH TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNF ARE IN LINE WITH NATO'S BASIC POLICY OF DETERRENCE, DEFENSE AND DETENTE, AS ENUNCIATED IN THE HARMEL REPORT. IN MAKING PARALLEL DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENSURE THAT LEGITIMATE MILITARY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT IMPede THE CONTINUOUS EFFORTS
OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIELD OF DETENTE. THE OVERALL PURPOSE OF SEEKING STABILITY IN THE RELATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND OF ACHIEVING A MORE CONFIDENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST COULD BE STRENGTHENED BY SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AND THUS GIVE FURTHER MOMENTUM TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

AS TO BREZHNEV'S OCTOBER 6 SPEECH AND HIS OFFER TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN SOVIET UNION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS OFFER IS GIVEN UNDER THE CONDITION THAT NO ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-RANGE SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. A POSITIVE ELEMENT IN BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE FIRST TIME IMPLIES THAT TNF ON BOTH SIDES COULD BE INCLUDED IN SALT III.

THese considerations, coupled with Brezhnev's presumed commitment to detente, amount to a strong indication that, in the last resort, detente would not suffer seriously or permanently through realization of NATO's plans, which bear, after all, only on one aspect of east/west relations.

END TEXT.

19. HARDY (CANADA) STATED THAT IT IS THE OPINION OF HIS AUTHORITIES THAT THE IDD FAITHFULLY REFLECTS THE CON-


20. HARDY THEN REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDD, ASKING THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE BE AMENDED TO READ "THE (INFRASTRUCTURE) CEILING WILL BE INCREASED, IF NECESSARY, TO ACCOUNT ...." HARDY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" IN PLACE OF ADDING "IF NECESSARY." HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS CHANGE WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM OR DETRACT FROM THE PROPOSAL THAT NATO'S INFRASTRUCTURE BE THE VEHICLE FOR FUNDING THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION FOR THE MODERNIZATION. CANADA WILL PAY ITS SHARE. FUNDS
WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE WHEN REQUIRED. THE CHANGE IN WORDING IS DESIGNED SOLELY TO LEAVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS TO THE PROPER FORUM. IN HIS GENERAL RESPONSE, LATER IN THE MEETING, AARON OBSERVED THAT THE CANADIAN FORMULA "AS MAY BE NECESSARY" MIGHT BE ADEQUATE, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE TOTAL COST OF THE LRTNF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM TO THE US WOULD BE 4-5 BILLION DOLLARS -- A LARGE SUM EVEN WHEN COMPARED TO THE US CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE

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LTDPE THE US NEEDS THE FIRMEST POSSIBLE COMMITMENT THAT OUR ALLIES WILL MAKE THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTION, WHICH, BY THE WAY, IS ONLY ABOUT 165 MILLION DOLLARS. IF A FIRM ALLIED COMMITMENT IS NOT IN HAND, THE US CONGRESS MAY NOT PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PREFINANCING. FURTHER, WE DO NOT WISH TO SEE OTHER VITAL PROGRAMS SLIP OUT OF THE PICTURE. HARDY RESPONDED TO AARON BY EMPHASIZING THAT CANADA IS NOT AGAINST FINANCING LRTNF THROUGH INFRASTRUCTURE, BUT WISHES ONLY TO AVOID DOING SO IN A WAY DIFFERENT FROM NORMAL. IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO LINK INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING TO ANY SPECIFIC ARMS VENTURE -- THIS IS NOT THE USUAL PRACTICE. TO SAY NOW, BEFORE THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR PERIOD EVEN BEGINS, THAT LRTNF WILL REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN THE CEILING IMPLIES THAT LRTNF HAS PRIORITY OR MUST SUBSTITUTE FOR OTHER PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD LEAVE TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW WHETHER AND HOW ANY NECESSARY INCREASE COULD BE ACCOMMODATED. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS THIS AS A FUNDAMENTAL
21. COMMENT: AFTER THE MEETING, ROSE APPROACHED HARDY WITH THE FOLLOWING "COMPROMISE" LANGUAGE FOR PARAGRAPH 18 OF THE IDD:

"SO THAT THE LRTPF PROGRAM WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM IN 1982-83 WILL EXAMINE WHAT INCREASE, IF ANY, IS NEEDED IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM LRTPF MODERNIZATION."

HARDY AGREED TO CONSIDER THE COMPROMISE, WITH THE WORDS "IF ANY" INSERTED BETWEEN "INCREASE" AND "IS NEEDED."

ROSE THEN APPROACHED BENNETT, WHO POINTED OUT THAT THE INCLUSION OF "IF ANY" HAD THE SAME DEFECT AS THE ORIGINAL CANADIAN WORDING. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THIS VERSION IF IT READ "WHAT INCREASE MAY BE NECESSARY IN THE FIVE-YEAR CEILING."

ROSE AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD APPROACH HARDY WITH THIS REVISION. END COMMENT.

22. VIBE (NORWAY) STATED THAT THE IDD WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR DECISIONS AND THAT HE WOULD OFFER NO SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS. HE STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE DANISH AMENDMENTS ON IDD SECTION II. THEY ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 WARHEADS AND THINK THAT THIS WOULD CONSIDERABLY IMPROVE THE WESTERN POSITION. HE ADDED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE MADE IN DECEMBER, THIS WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE THE DECEMBER MEETINGS. (RUTH (FRG) SUBSEQUENTLY SUPPORTED THIS POSITION.)

23. VIBE OFFERED THAT AN IMPROVED ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL WOULD RESULT IF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WERE A PART OF A BROADER INITIATIVE ON ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE AND THUS A BETTER MATCH FOR THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL. HE STATED THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED A MORE "OFFENSIVE" ARMS CONTROL PLATFORM. HE SUGGESTED A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL WITH ASSOCIATED MEASURES TO BE INCLUDED IN A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE WHICH MIGHT EMANATE FROM THE DECEMBER
24. Commenting on the draft communique, Vibe suggested beginning paragraph 8 with the term "ministers attach great importance" instead of the present "ministers recognize." In paragraph 9, he suggested substituting "to begin negotiations as soon as possible" instead of the present "to begin negotiations in a timely way." And in the last sentence of paragraph 10, he suggested substituting...
INTERNAL SITUATION IN PORTUGAL, IT HAD
ABSTAINED FROM NPG WORK AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT
PARTicipate at the 1977 meeting in Bari at
which the HLG had been established. But, that
Portugal had participated in the work of
the special group. He said he was convinced the

HLG had made an in-depth study, and emphasized
the IDD was consistent with Portugal's policy
on the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Asserting that the soviet union would not
disarm unilaterally, de villas-boas noted that
it would be inappropriate for the alliance to
begin negotiations first, in advance of a
modernization decision. Thus, the modernization
decision should be phrased in such a way to
ensure adaptability to the arms control
negotiation process. Such a decision should
enhance the credibility of deterrence. He
specifically supported the IDD statement on
the alliance's need to convince the soviet
union of its ability to respond flexibly on
all levels. He stressed the importance of the
political cohesion of the alliance which would
be threatened if NATO were not to take a
modernization decision, noting that this was
more important today than ever.

26. Athanassiou (Greece) congratulated the
HLG and sg chairmen, commenting that theirs
had not been an easy task. He said his govern-
ment had been among the first to agree to the
parallel approach on modernization and arms
control. He asserted that arms control
negotiations would enhance the overall
level of security, and that their objective
should be to achieve equality or parity at
the lowest possible levels. He agreed with the
content of the IDD as revised and transmitted
to him on November 2, and specifically on the

INCLUSION OF THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL.
Athanassiou said he expected the findings of
the NPG to address adjustments in the
nuclear stockpile, according to IDD paragraph 21.
He also noted that the Greek position on cost
SHARING, PER IDD PARAGRAPH 17, HAD BEEN STATED DURING THE COURSE OF THE HLG WORK. FOR THE RECORD, HE REITERATED THAT GREECE WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO LRNTNF UNTIL THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF REINTEGRATION OF THE GREEK FORCES.

27. OLCAY (TURKEY) REMARKED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE IDEAL MOMENT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO BE TAKING SUCH MOMENTOUS DECISIONS. HOWEVER, HIS AUTHORITIES WISHED TO STRESS THAT NATO MUST REACT TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AND STRENGTHEN THE LINK BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. HE ADDED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WELCOMED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 1000 WARHEADS, WHILE COMMENTING THAT THEY WOULD LOOK WITH INTEREST ON THE EFFECT OF THE WITHDRAWAL ON THE FUTURE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE CONSULTATIONS THE US HAD WITH THE ALLIANCE DURING THE SALT II NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND NOTED THE NEED FOR SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS ON TNF ISSUES IN THE SALT III FRAMEWORK. HE SUGGESTED COMBINING THE SEPARATE SUBPARAGRAPHS IN PARAGRAPH 23 IN ORDER TO REDUCE REPETITION AND SUPPORTED NORWAY'S POSITION ON PARAGRAPH 8.

28. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) STATED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES COULD ADHERE FULLY TO THE IDD. HE COMMENTED THAT

PAGE 01 USNATO 07693 10 OF 14 072237Z ACTION SS-30 INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W ---------------------009868 072237Z /73 O 071857Z NOV 79 ZDK FM USMISSION USNATO TO SECESTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3650 SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA AMEMBASSY MOSCOW ALL NATO CAPITALS USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA USNMR SHAPE BE USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERM

SECTION 10 OF 14 USNATO 07693 EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT) THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL WAS A "CLEVER"
PROPOSAL AND MIGHT UNBLOCK THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
WURTH EMPHASIZED THAT A POSITIVE LRTNF
DECISION IN DECEMBER WAS VITAL TO THE
ALLIANCE. HE STATED HE WAS ABLE TO AGREE TO
ALL PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, BUT SPECIFICALLY
SUPPORTED THE DANISH SUGGESTIONS TO AMEND THE
IDD, ESPECIALLY THOSE ON PARAGRAPH 11.

29. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION
FOR US PREPARATIONS TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR
WARHEADS. HE REMINDED OTHERS THAT ICELAND HAD
A SEPARATE POSITION ON PARTICIPATION IN THE
NATO INTEGRATED DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND
INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING.
30. AS WELL AS HIS COMMENTS ON THE CANADIAN POSITION
ON INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING RECOUNTED EARLIER, AARON STATED
THAT THE US WOULD ENDEAVOR TO INCORPORATE AS WELL AS

POSSIBLE THE SUBSTANTIVE AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON THE
IDD WHICH HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING
OBSERVATIONS IN RESPONSE TO REMARKS RAISED DURING THE
MEETING.

- A. HE WELcomed THE FRG SUGGESTIONS ON A SIMPLIFIED
PHASE I APPROACH AND LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE
PROPOSAL IN GREATER DETAIL;

- B. IN RESPONSE TO THE DUTCH SUGGESTION ON THE "ZERO
OPTION", HE ACCEPTED THE COMMENTS OF THE SYG AND UK TO
BRING SUCH AN ADDITION INTO APPROPRIATE BALANCE. IN
ASSESSING THE SOVIET THREAT, AARON REMARKED, IT IS
NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FULL RANGE OF SOVIET
ABILITY TO STRIKE WESTERN EUROPE (AS DID THE HLG REPORT)
AND NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF THIS FACT.

- C. IN REACTION TO THE DANISH PARAGRAPH 11 SUGGE-
STIONS, AARON EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT TRYING TO BE TOO
CATEGORIC IN PREDICTING THE FUTURE. HE SUGGESTED IT
WOULD BE USEFUL TO RECALL THE SALT I EXAMPLE WHERE IN
TERMS OF POSSIBLE LIMITS ON SOVIET OFFENSIVE FORCES, IT
WAS NOT CLEAR THAT WE HAD CONTROLLED THEM BELOW THE
LIMITS THEY COULD HAVE ACHIEVED. WE HAVE DONE
BETTER IN SALT II. SUCH MIGHT ALSO BE THE CASE FOR
SOVIET THEATER FORCES. WHILE WE WANT TO REDUCE SOVIET
DEPLOYMENTS BELOW THE CURRENT ANTICIPATED LEVELS, WE
CANNOT BE SURE WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE WE DO NOT
KNOW THEIR ANTICIPATED DEPLOYMENTS BUT ONLY HAVE OUR
PROJECTIONS OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO ASSURE A REDUCTION OF THE THREAT BUT WE
D. AARON STATED THE US WOULD ALSO REVIEW PARAGRAPH 12 TO SEE IF COMMENTS COULD BE ACCOMMODATED. PERHAPS THE DANISH REDRAFT IS TOO DEFENSIVE IN TONE.

E. CONCERNING CBMS, AARON NOTED THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO SEE ACTION IN THIS AREA.

F. AARON EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ALLIANCE SUPPORT ON THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1000 WARHEADS. HE STATED THAT PUBLIC CONFIRMATION COULD COME IN CONNECTION WITH THE 13-14 NOVEMBER NPG MINISTERIAL.

G. CONCERNING A STUDY OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALLIANCE TNF POSTURE AND THE ISSUE OF TRADE OFFS ON SHORT AND LONG RANGE SYSTEMS, AARON STATED THAT IT WAS THE US POSITION THAT ANY STUDY SHOULD FOCUS ON THE POSTURE AFTER THE 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. THIS 1000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL CAN PROCEED ON THE BASIS PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN MBFR. AARON MODIFIED, HOWEVER, THE INITIAL US SUGGESTION THAT THE WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR AND STATED THAT IT MIGHT BE STRETCHED OUT OVER A LONGER PERIOD. WITHDRAWALS MIGHT BE LINKED WITH THE TIME OF IMPLEMENTING MODERNIZATION AND WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER.

FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS USED BY THE NATO PRESS SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA QUESTIONS.

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED,
EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON NOVEMBER 6 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS.

END TEXT.

32. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SYG LUNS' INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

"TODAY WE WILL HAVE OUR FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE PAPER THAT WILL SERVE AS THE BASIC DOCUMENT FOR MINISTERS MEETING IN DECEMBER IN ORDER TO DECIDE ON NATO'S REQUIREMENTS FOR LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND A PARALLEL ARMS CONTROL APPROACH. THIS PAPER IS CALLED THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT AND IS THE RESULT OF WORK UNDERTAKEN BY THE CHAIRMEN OF THE NPG HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT SEVERAL COMMENTS MADE BY ALLIES. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN THE PROCEDURAL TRACK I PROPOSED IN PO 105, I ASKED THAT YOU BE PREPARED TODAY TO COMMENT ON THE PAPER ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM YOUR GOVERNMENTS. IN THE LATEST VERSION CIRCULATED LAST FRIDAY, YOU WILL SEE THERE ARE SOME NEW FEATURES. YOU WILL ALL HAVE SEEN THE PROPOSAL OF THE US TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH IS ALREADY REFLECTED IN THE REVISED DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT ITSELF. (I REFER TO PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DRAFT AND TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE ATTACHED DRAFT DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE.) FURTHERMORE, AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT IS ALSO SUGGESTED IN THE UNITED STATES DRAFT MATERIAL THAT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS NEW LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD BE DEPLOYED BEGINNING 1983.

"YOUR INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE ADDED PROPOSAL WOULD BE WELCOME. I WOULD EXPECT THAT OUR DISCUSSION TODAY

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WOULD COVER THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES WHICH ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE DOCUMENT. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, ALTHOUGH I ASSUME WE WILL WANT TO HAVE AN EARLY NATO COUNCIL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE POINT IN DETAIL AS SOON AS NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE AVAILABLE SO THE MBFR ITEM IS NOT ON THE AGENDA TODAY. I WOULD URGE THAT THIS BE DONE EXPEDITIOUSLY.

END TEXT.

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33. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT BY DAVID AARON.

PRESENTATION TO THE NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

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BY DAVID AARON, 6 NOVEMBER 1979

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO COME TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES THAN IT FACES TODAY -- A CHALLENGE TO ITS POLITICAL COHESION AND ITS ABILITY TO MAKE DIFFICULT DEFENSE AND POLITICAL DECISIONS. BASED ON THE EXCELLENT PREPARATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CHALLENGE CAN BE MET.

BEFORE THIS GROUP, I DON'T NEED TO BELABOR THE DETAILS OF THE CHALLENGE POSED BY SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. IF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WERE TO REMAIN UNANSWERED, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THROUGH THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS THEY HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT THEY HAVE LONG SOUGHT -- PREPONDERANCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECOUPLING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE FROM US STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA.

THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT IS FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THIS, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES. THE PROBLEM IS RATHER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAD IN FACT
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ALL NATO CAPITALS
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GER

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ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL OF DECOUPLING AND BEGIN TO ACT
ACCORDINGLY.

. BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE
SOVIET CHALLENGE HAVE TAKEN ON GREATER URGENCY IN RECENT
WEEKS. THE SS-20 BUILD-UP CONTINUES. WE HAVE RECENTLY
NOTED THE ADDITION OF A NEW SS-20 BASE UNDER INITIAL
CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. AND WE HAVE ALSO SEEN
WHAT MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSED, CONFIGURATION
OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE OUR TASK OF
KEEPING TRACK OF THE SS-20S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THESE
DEVELOPMENTS BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES OPERA-
TIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO AT LEAST 21; AND AT LEAST
13 OF THESE ARE WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONTINUING TO GATHER MORE
DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING
THE SS-4 AND 5 SYSTEMS AS WE HAD EXPECTED THEY WOULD

WHEN THE SS-20S ENTERED THE FORCE. AS A RESULT THE
SOVIETS MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE
RANGE LAND-BASED MISSILE CAPABILITY THAN THE ROUGHLY
600 WARHEADS OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE WE HAD PROJECTED
EARLIER.

. WHILE THESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS GO FORWARD, THE
POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY CLEAR. WE CAN WELCOME PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 20,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS
AND 1,000 TANKS AS A SMALL STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION
OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. WE CAN WELCOME THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE
BUT NOT THE PROPOSAL THAT IN ESSENCE IF NATO DOES
NOTHING WE CAN MEET WITH THE SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR SUPERIORITY IN LRTNF. MOREOVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IS TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION. THE SPEECH HAS RAISED THE POLITICAL STAKES FOR THE ALLIANCE.

. IF ANYTHING, THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER -- THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AND UNDERTAKING PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES INVOLVING TNF, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL GROUP.

. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WILL CLOSE THE GAP IN THE LADDER OF DETERRENCE. THUS, THIS STEP WILL ENSURE THE NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE

SOVIETS OUR INTENT TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY, AND PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL ENSURE THE FIRM LINKAGE OF US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE.

. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WHILE WE PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENTS WE MUST MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BRING LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE ALLIANCE'S INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO AN UNRESTRICTED THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY THE US SUPPORTS THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE SALT 3 FRAMEWORK TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD SET EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES.

. IT IS PRESIDENT CARTER'S BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIMID IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE THREAT TO EUROPE. THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN OUR OWN DEPLOYMENT NEEDS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION WHILE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION IS FACED WITH CONCRETE ACTION IN THE DEPLOYMENT AREA WILL THEY AGREE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THEIR OWN FORCES.

. THE PROGRAM OF THE HLG AND SG IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT. I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT
SHARES THE BELIEF OF OTHER ALLIANCE LEADERS THAT WE

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VIANNEN GEN

SECTION 13 OF 14 USNATO 07693

EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPCAT)

SHOULD TAKE THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER. ONCE
THE LRINP PROGRAM IS APPROVED BY NATO MINISTERS IN
DECEMBER, HE IS READY TO MOVE FORWARD TO SEEK THE NECESSARY
FUNDS FROM CONGRESS FOR THIS PROGRAM, WHICH I HARDLY
NEED UNDERLINE WILL BE A COSTLY ONE. THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO
READY TO MOVE QUICKLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT THREE
TO DEAL WITH THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO CLOSE CONSULTA-
TION AMONG THE NATION ALLIES AS WE MOVE TOGETHER INTO THESE
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS
IN SALT TWO ESPECIALLY THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WHICH
IS NOW MOVING FORWARD AGAIN AS A RESULT OF GREAT POLITICAL
EFFORT ON HIS PART THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE
COMMITMENT OF THE US AND ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT CARTER
TO ARMS CONTROL.

... THESE COMMITMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTS
BEFORE US TODAY, IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS

ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF MOST OF THE GOVER-
MENTS REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE, FOR THEY ARE THE
RESULT OF AN INTENSIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS THAT
MAY BE UNIQUE IN THE ALLIANCE’S HISTORY.

... UNDER DAVE MCGIFFERT’S CHAIRMANSHP THE HIGH LEVEL

UNCLASSIFIED
GROUP HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE TNF MODERNIZATION QUESTION FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. WITH REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AT THE HELM, THE SPECIAL GROUP HAS BEEN EXAMINING TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS EXEMPLIFY THE BEST OF THE CONSULTATIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE CONSULTING GENUINELY AMONG OURSELVES TO REACH JOINT POSITIONS. AS THESE GROUPS PROCEEDED STEP-BY-STEP IN THEIR WORK, BEGINNING WITH GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MOVING TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US NOW, WE IN THE US PROCEEDED FORWARD WITH OUR OWN INTERNAL POLICY DELIBERATIONS, AS DID OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT AND DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

IN THOSE DOCUMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP WORK. THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE 1,000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. ON REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN WASHINGTON, WE SAW THAT AN ALLIANCE DECISION TO DEPLOY 572 PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE WARHEADS PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RATIONALIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DECEMBER TNF DECISIONS THE ALLIANCE COULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE INCLUDED

IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DECISION DOCUMENT AND IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE COMMUNIQUE NEW LANGUAGE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THIS STEP WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES:

--IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LONG-RANGE TNF, THIS STEP IS MILITARILY FEASIBLE. IN FACT, IT IS MILITARILY DESIRABLE SINCE BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE OVER 1,000 WARHEADS WHICH HAVE BEEN KEPT IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME PENDING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW THESE 1,000 WARHEADS IN MBFR.

--MOVING FORWARD NOW WITH THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERLINE THAT NATO’S TNF DECISION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILD-UP AND DOES NOT ENTAIL AN INCREASE IN NATO’S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS SUCH, IT IMPROVES THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR TNF DECISIONS.

--IN ADDITION, THIS STEP WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHnev’S SPEECH AND OTHER SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO DEPICT NATO AS AN EXPANDING NUCLEAR THREAT WHICH RISKS UPSETTING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD BE A RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE.

--IT WOULD ALSO OPEN THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT IN MBFR BASED ON A SIMPLIFIED PROPOSAL. SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 TROOPS AND 1,000 TANKS, AND A NATO AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW THE 1,000 NUCLEAR

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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCUR VAHINGEN GER

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EXDIS (MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT)

WARHEADS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED IN MBFR, WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS IN MBFR. THESE SEPARATE STEPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALLIANCE PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON A PRIORITY BASIS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE, IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. WE WOULD WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ALLIES ABOUT SUCH AN APPROACH AND WILL BE MAKING OUR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL. TO ENSURE SPEEDY CONSIDERATION, WE HOPE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL TAKE A FIRM HAND, AIDED PERHAPS BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN ITS DEPUTY PERMREPS CONFIGURATION.

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS SECRET
THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENTS AND LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES.

END TEXT.
BENNETT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
Willy Brandt  
SPD Chairman

53 Bonn  
Ollenhauerstrasse 1  
Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus  
Phone: 532309

[Source: WBA, A9, 7  
Also published in Willy Brandt, Berliner Ausgabe,  
Bonn (Dietz) Vol. 9,  
2003.  
-Contributed by Bernd Rother.]

14 November 1979

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Let me first express my gratitude that you deemed it appropriate to resume our exchange of opinions. I note concern in your words that things could move in a wrong direction, and I note the desire to prevent this from happening. I share your concern, and I share your desire.

My reply will be given in the same frank and friendly openness without which we could not have built the relationship between our states we need to preserve and expand.

Obviously you are aware of the advance in information you obtain as the head of a global power – in comparison to myself who no longer is in a position of direct governmental power in my country. However, still working to continue our endeavor and not being a participant in important issues of global events, maybe I can contribute just because of my current position to the prevention of things moving in the wrong direction. I am doing this without expertise in many technical details of arms development. Important as this is, it must not, however, be decisive and determining, if statesmen would not want to become the supreme experts.

The situation seems confused: The Americans are telling us after SALT II they need to create a counterbalance in the wake of growing Soviet superiority in the area of intermediate nuclear forces. Our position within the Alliance [NATO] is such that we cannot evade this issue. Your country is telling us it enjoys no superiority, and it does not aspire to achieve it. I believe your country enjoys conventional superiority. I believe your country assembles superiority in the field of medium-range missiles. There the West is lagging behind, and it does not want to be it that way.

I know of nothing to counter the argument that, with the build-up of the SS-20 and the bomber we call “Backfire”, the Soviet Union is changing the balance reached to its own favor. I am a convinced supporter of the position that there only is joint security, that a security partnership must be created - and that a creation of imbalances does prevent all this.

I do not know much to counter the argument that the West with its new plans would not only equalize but create for itself additional security if its plans would be implemented in their entirety – what the Soviet Union would not be willing to accept.
Therefore we are facing the danger of a new arms race that does not create more security but more insecurity. Moreover, it might result in us forgetting, for all those plans pertaining to our military security directed against each other, that we must develop cooperation between ourselves. Otherwise on both sides we do not build more confidence but more mistrust. This must not be our future. Who wants to prevent this from happening has to insist that both sides sit down on a table, in order to put everything on this table what both sides possess.

I see that you want this. The West does desire this as well. I am not ignorant of the fact that there may be forces in the West who want to seize the opportunity to strive for a new superiority over the Soviet Union, or who seriously do not want to achieve a result at all, or who benefit when relations between Bonn and Moscow are worsening. I cannot make these forces disappear with a magic wand; yet one must not surrender to them. I hold the opinion that there is no alternative to negotiations.

You have made interesting and important proposals of good will in [East] Berlin. Later you let follow up with additions and precisions. This way you have set more in motion than certain Soviet statements want to believe. It will have an impact on planned Western decisions. You know my comments and those of my party on this issue. I want to add here: Unilateral measures can also be withdrawn unilaterally; offers for negotiations must be taken. I am happy that the Federal Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] has also made a unilateral offer. 1,000 nuclear warheads can be considered a match with 1,000 tanks and 20,000 men. Of course, both sides can say this is not about most advanced material. But what does it matter? It is just demonstrating that each side has different superiorities it can reduce without any danger for its own security. Yet even from here we arrive at the same result: There is no alternative to negotiations, and nothing can substitute for internationally binding agreements.

I do not want to discuss developments that led to this situation since it is not productive. I cannot exclude mistakes on our side the same way as mistakes on your side. Everything must be focused on a sobering view of the situation, and how to steer events in the right direction. What is sober? NATO will make decisions on December 12. Yet for certainly three to four years no new weapons systems will be deployed. I read with interest that you focused in your Berlin speech on deployment. This is indeed the important issue. Therefore let us use the time we have.

I also realize that some can only envisage a result that, similarly as in the case of SALT II, will also agree in the field of so-called Euro-strategic arms on a balance, and adding for the West an additional component to the current situation. I am saying it openly: I would not be enthusiastic over such an outcome, yet at least it would be a joint outcome. Better and worthier, though, would be a result that would not lead to additional medium-range missiles on the Western side. Such requires reciprocity from your side. Not only my Soviet interlocutors but also other conversation partner are in doubt whether it is realistic to build these arms first but then do not deploy them. However, this is just what we must undertake, in particular for the global balance you emphasized and whose constant preservation I deem important. Whether we will succeed in reaching a negotiation result with a balance of security and no new missiles on the Western side, depends to major extent on your side.
There is not much we can argue with our American allies as long as they can refer to the ongoing Soviet production. Myself I feel secure with the achieved relative balance and I do not need missiles that can reach Soviet territory from here. Yet in order to avoid the deployment of such missiles, I need the certainty that the existing balance is not further unilaterally changed by the Soviet side.

At no point did the SPD voice any doubts about its position and its determination. Its board has prepared clear resolutions on foreign and security policy certain to pass at our forthcoming party congress. Those passages will certainly be forwarded to you directly. The SPD reiterates the policy of the [Eastern] treaties, the central importance of our relationship with the Soviet Union, the further construction of our long-term cooperation, and the declaration agreed during your visit [to Bonn] that nobody strives for military superiority, and that approximate balance and parity is sufficient to guarantee defense. On questions of security policy the upcoming party congress will probably confirm the Hamburg [SPD previous party congress] resolution on the neutron bomb. Furthermore, there is a proposal to allow for no automatic trigger on the medium-range missile issue. The course of negotiations and expected results must permit at every juncture the option to review and revise decisions. For those reasons, the Federal Government shall only consent to such a decision if it contains a clause to refrain from deploying such weapons if arms control negotiations reach satisfactory results. In our opinion the goal of negotiations is to render the deployment of additional medium-range missiles in Central Europe moot. In other words: In consideration of the Federal Republic of Germany's obligations to the [NATO] Alliance, and in light of the need to support the Federal Government, the SPD wants even in the [federal German] election year [1980] to continue the policy of peaceful cooperation with peoples of Eastern Europe. Yet the SPD needs partners for this undertaking.

You have referred to the visit by my friends from the Socialist International [to Moscow]. It received attention that you took your time to welcome the delegation. We have accepted a report in Lisbon [at the Socialist International congress] and decided to deal foremost with issues of disarmament and arms control at our congress in fall next year. Party leaders will discuss them already in early February in Vienna. There is growing conviction that increasing expenditures for armaments are economic nonsense, in the East as well as in the West. They are hardly justifiable in the light of problems faced by mankind. We have to draw consequences from that.

Again it becomes clear: the necessary negotiations must take place. I don't see your fear as justified that they will be conducted from a "position of strength" after NATO's December decision. In fact, the NATO decision will mean that not just the Soviet Union will continue to produce [medium-range missiles] but the United States as well. If you would have been willing to announce an unilateral stop of production, in my opinion NATO's intended December decision would not have been further pursued. Yet aside from all other elements, I notice in both your and in the Western position also the desire to do nothing what could impair the ratification of SALT II. I welcome that the four years between the decision to start production and the option for deployment will build up certain time pressure for the negotiations. It affects both sides and ought to be exploited in a positive manner. There is also always the option to ask jointly for further time if negotiations do make progress.
I think it is very important to use this time. I mean this: The coming year need not become a lost year due to elections in the United States and in my country. In practical terms it means not to waste the first months of next year without preparations for negotiations. We have the highest interest in them although we do not possess nuclear weapons and also do not want to acquire them.

I outlined to you in all frankness how I assess the situation. You will therefore be able to see that I share your efforts to save Europe from a relapse into mindless tensions. I believe this is possible. If I would not deem it possible to pursue what I have outlined with prospect for success, I would not want to deceive you. In all honesty.

Sincerely
Willy Brandt

To the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev
Moscow

[Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer].
The Hague, November 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

The Netherlands government has given very careful consideration to your letter of November 1. Let me assure you, first of all, that we fully share your view that the December decisions on Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation and Arms Control will be of crucial importance for the Alliance. This is not only a matter of testing the credibility and the capability of taking difficult decisions, but also of demonstrating the central significance that the Alliance attaches to the role of arms control.

You will be aware that the nature of the decisions now before the Alliance places the Netherlands government before very difficult questions. The Netherlands Minister of Defence, Mr. Scholten, has outlined the present position of the government at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague and he will certainly seek further contact on this matter with Secretary Brown as well as with other colleagues in the Alliance. I should, however, like to draw your particular attention to some aspects of primary importance in our policy considerations. Basic in this respect is that the Netherlands is fully conscious of the need for a firm NATO answer to the new threat posed by the Soviet military build-up in the long range TNF field, but that this firmness should be perfectly reconcilable with exercising restraint in our armaments policy and with giving maximum room to an effective arms control approach.

His Excellency the President
of the United States of America,
Mr. J. Carter,
The White House,
WASHINGTON.
In line with this point of view, the Netherlands government has, in the light of discussions in parliament, undertaken to advocate with the allies that the decision to modernize long range TNF should be limited at this stage to a decision to produce the weapon, while a decision on a possible basing in a number of European countries should be taken at a later stage when we will be able to judge the results of arms control negotiations. I would greatly appreciate if the United States government would give careful consideration to the merits of this approach.

As a very important point for the Netherlands government, I should like to underline our problems with the recommended size of the LRTNF. It has always been our understanding that, after the working groups had finished their reports, governments would be fully free to exercise their political judgment concerning the recommendations presented to them. But even the working groups have made clear that the recommended size of the programme was not unassailable, that it was a matter of judgment rather than of calculation, and also, that the size could be smaller or even much smaller if arms control were successful.

In the light of the arguments in your letter, and also taking account of your important offer concerning the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 warheads, we are prepared not to press our view of halving the programme, but I must submit in all frankness that the proposed size still poses very great difficulties for my government, if we are to find the necessary understanding with our public for the modernisation programme.

In our judgment it is politically very important for us not to create the impression that NATO approaches the coming arms control negotiations with worst case assumptions concerning the possibilities of achieving a positive outcome, by starting out already at this stage with a decision to produce the full number proposed. It would, therefore, in our judgment, be better to begin with a substantially lower number. This would leave open the possibility that NATO could decide at a later stage, for example after two years, to consider going up to the higher number if negotiations would not be sufficiently successful.

A lower number would also help to remove another very difficult aspect from the present proposals. I mean the one-for-one replacement of the Pershing-I by the Pershing-II missiles. Although these systems are not fully comparable, the production of the full 108 systems could not fail to be interpreted as undercutting the so-called Option-3 proposals in MBFR, which call for a reduction of 36 of the 108 Pershing-I missiles.
The Netherlands government and parliament have from the first attached very great importance to the MBFR negotiations as a first start of arms control in the European region, and the nuclear offer of Option-3 has acquired particular importance as a real and genuine step in the direction of reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons, a factor which is of prime importance in the policy programme of the Netherlands government and is strongly supported by all the main parties in this country.

Finally, I should like to emphasize once again that we are fully convinced of the great importance of the decisions which are now before the Alliance and we are also completely aware that it is of very great importance that the decision would be taken by all members collectively. It is for that reason, that political deliberations among the allies in the remaining weeks should lead to decisions, which would be acceptable not only to the Netherlands government, but which also would find adequate support in the Netherlands parliament.

It is with that purpose in mind that I have availed myself of this opportunity to put our views on this vital issue for the Alliance before you in all frankness.

Sincerely,

(A.A.M. van Agt)
EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/29/99 (BENNETT, W. TAPLEY) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, NPR, MPOL
SUBJECT: (S) TNP MODERNIZATION -- DETAILED REPORT OF
DISCUSSIONS ON IDD AT 28 NOVEMBER SESSION OF
REINFORCED PERMREPS

REFS: (A) STATE 305363, DTG 242225Z NOV 79
(B) COPENHAGEN 7201, DTG 271601Z NOV 79
(C) USNATO 8275, DTG 281914Z NOV 79

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE
28 NOVEMBER 1979 MEETING OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE WORK OF THE NUCLEAR
PLANNING GROUP'S HIGH LEVEL GROUP, WHICH DEALT WITH
LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE (LRTNF) MODERNIZATION,
AND THE SPECIAL GROUP ON ARMS CONTROL INVOLVING TNP.
THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE
INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENT, REF A. A SUMMARY OF THE
MEETING WAS TRANSMITTED IN REF C. THE FULL TEXTS OF
STATEMENTS BY AARON, ROSE AND HOLST ARE CONTAINED IN
PARAGRAPHS 25-27.
3. SYG LUNS OPENED THE MEETING STATING THAT HE HOPED AT THE CONCLUSION TO BE ABLE TO SEND THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE WITH THE SUPPORTING HLG AND SG REPORTS TO MINISTERS VIA A PO. THESE WOULD INFORM MINISTERS OF ALL RELEVANT FACTS.

LUNS ALSO STATED HE WOULD CIRCULATE A PO OUTLINING THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMBINED MEETING OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER.

4. SVART (DENMARK) OPENED BY RECALLING HIS COMMENTS ON 6 NOVEMBER ON THE INTERNAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW THAT DENMARK WOULD BE GIVING LRNTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE DANISH POSITION. HE THEN EXPLAINED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTED ITS CONSIDERATION. THE PROPOSAL WAS OUTLINED ON FAMILIAR GROUNDS, I.E., THAT NATO SHOULD POSTPONE ITS TNF DECISION FOR SIX MONTHS DURING WHICH TIME THE SOVIETS SHOULD "INSTANTLY" STOP SS-20 AND BACKFIRE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS MUST DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS ON A FREEZE ON SOVIET LRNTNF AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR FURTHER REDUCTION OF WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE SOVIETS DID NOT PROVE RESPONSIVE TO THE NATO MOVE, A TNF DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN ALONG THE LINES OF THE CURRENT ALLIANCE PROPOSAL. ANY ALLIANCE PROPOSAL SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS.

SVART FURTHER COMMENDED THE DANISH PROPOSAL AS TIME-LIMITED AND STATED THAT IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE STRENGTH BY ITS WILLINGNESS TO STRIVE FOR DETENTE. OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THIS PROPOSAL COMBINED WITH MOVES IN MBFR, PREPARATIONS FOR MADRID AND CDE WOULD POSITIVELY AFFECT ARMS CONTROL.

AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE DANISH PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON 27 NOVEMBER ALONG THE LINES OF REF B, SVART CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT HE COULD NOT ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDD/COMMUNIQUE.

5. PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AARON EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT RETURNING TO BRUSSELS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF LRNTNF MODERNIZATION AND NOTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S ASSESSMENT THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD SOON BE TAKING A CRUCIAL AND HISTORIC STEP. AARON STATED THAT THE COMBINED DECISIONS TO MODERNIZE TNF AND TO INCLUDE TNF IN OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION.
AFTER BRIEFLY REVIEWING THE PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
OF THE IDD, AARON REPEATED THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL: THERE CAN BE NO ARMS
CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION BUT WITH SUCH
A DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH
REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE ALLIANCE TNP

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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMMISSION MOSCOW
USMISSION USBERLIN
ALL NATO CAPITALS
CINCNANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSAOMCANT NORFOLK VA
USNMN SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAHGEN GBN

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

REQUIREMENTS.
AARON STATED THAT "TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12
TNF DECISIONS," THE NAC WILL PROBABLY PRESENT A
COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL
INCLUDE THE THRUST OF THE NEW MBFR PROPOSAL. SUCH A
PRESENTATION IN COMBINATION WITH A DECISION TO WITHDRAW
1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS WOULD DEMONSTRATE A MAJOR EFFORT
TO ENGAGE THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL
PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS.
AARON NOTED THAT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS
ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. STILL,
THEIR HAVE ATTEMPTED TO INTERFERE IN ALLIANCE DECISIONS
ON STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET
DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.

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REPORTING ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET
SS-20 FORCES, AARON STATED THAT ANOTHER BASE HAD BEEN
DISCOVERED BRINGING THE TOTAL OF SS-20 BASES EITHER
OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23. THIS WOULD
EQUATE TO A SOVIET SS-20 FORCE OF 621 WARHEADS -- A
NUMBER EXCEEDING THE TOTAL NATO-PROPOSED LRTNF FORCE
WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SOVIET SS-4/5’S AND
MEDIUM BOMBERS.

FIRMLY REJECTING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, AARON STATED
THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS
DEMONSTRATING THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS OR BE
TEMPED BY VAGUE INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. HE CONCLUDED
BY CITING THE HARMEL REPORT WHICH DEDICATED THE
ALLIANCE TO PURSUING DEFENSE AND DETENTE AND HOPED THAT
NATO WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO MATCH ITS WISDOM IN
TAKING A DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION/ARMS CONTROL
WHICH EMBRACES BOTH PRINCIPLES.

(FULL TEXT OF AARON’S REMARKS ARE AT PARAGRAPH 25.)

SEPARATELY LUMS SUGGESTED THAT THE INFORMATION CONCERNING
THE 621 SOVIET SS-20 WARHEADS WOULD BE USEFUL IF IT COULD
BE MADE PUBLIC AND REQUESTED AARON’S COMMENT. AARON
PROMISED TO RESPOND TO THE REQUEST AND HOPED HE WOULD
BE ABLE TO REPLY BEFORE THE FIGURE WAS LEAKED.

6. ROSE (UK) STATED STRONGLY THAT POSITIVE DECISIONS
ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL SHOULD BE TAKEN
IN DECEMBER. IT IS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT
MODERNIZATION BEGIN WITHOUT DELAY AND THAT IN PARALLEL
THE SOVIETS BE ENGAGED IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
THE SOVIETS HOWEVER WILL NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY
ONLY IF FACED BY REAL DETERMINATION BY THE ALLIANCE.
WITHOUT MODERNIZATION, ROSE ASKED "WHAT ARE WE GOING TO

BARGAIN WITH?"

COMMENTING ON THE DUTCH POSITION OF A LIMITED
PRODUCTION DECISION LEAVING A DEPLOYMENT DECISION UNTIL
LATER, HE LABELED SUCH A POSTURE "WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE"
IN PROVIDING THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION.
INSTEAD, THE SOVIETS WOULD DRAG OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS,
CONTINUE THEIR BUILD-UP AND INCREASE THE IMBALANCE.
REGARDING THE DANISH PROPOSAL, ROSE CHARACTERIZED
IT AS "IMPrACTICAl" WITH MAJOR DISADVANTAGES FOR THE
ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL TERMS.
HE SUGGESTED THAT PUTTING OFF DECISIONS FOR SIX MONTHS
WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE’S ABILITY TO TAKE
DIFFICULT DECISIONS AND GIVE THE IMPRESSION WE WERE NOT
PREPARED TO MEET OUR MUCH PUBLICIZED, SELF-SET MILITARY
TARGETS. Moreover, NATO’S FAILURE TO TAKE THESE
DECISIONS WOULD BE CREDITED TO SOVIET PRESSURE/PROPAGANDA.
ROSE ALSO BELIEVED THAT DELAY WOULD DAMAGE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE. HE COMMENTED THAT INDECISION NOW WOULD SUGGEST TO THE US THAT EUROPEANS WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES FOR SELF DEFENSE AND THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, DELAY WOULD COST THE ALLIANCE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE THE ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE BY PRESENTING A PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION. DELAY WOULD PRESUMABLY AFFECT THE US PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW 1,000 WARHEADS AND RADICALLY CHANGE THE CONTEXT FOR CONSIDERING AN INTERIM PHASE I PROPOSAL IN MBFR. EXAMINING THE NEGOTIABILITY OF THE DANISH

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PROPOSAL, ROSE FOUND "LITTLE POSSIBILITY" OF ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN SIX MONTHS. HE SUGGESTED THAT EVEN WITH A FREEZE THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FROZEN INTO INFERIORITY. THAT WOULD NOT BE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMITATIONS OR REDUCTIONS. ROSE NOTED THE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET ADHERENCE TO ANY FREEZE AND WHEN WITHIN THE SIX MONTH PERIOD IT MIGHT BEGIN. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT A SOVIET FREEZE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES AND A COMMON DATA BASE WOULD BE OF LITTLE VALUE. SALT AND MBFR
EXPERIENCE SUGGEST THAT SUCH COMPLICATED ISSUES COULD NOT BE SOLVED IN SIX MONTHS.

CONSEQUENTLY, ROSE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS NO SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR PARALLEL DECEMBER DECISIONS ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL AND THAT THE IDD PROVIDES A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION.

(FULL TEXT OF ROSE'S STATEMENT IS AT PARAGRAPH 26.)

7. PAULS (FRG) RECALLED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE IDD AT THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING AND STATED THAT THE PRESENT VERSION REFLECTS THE 6 NOVEMBER DISCUSSIONS. HE WENT ON TO NOTE WITH APPROVAL THE NEW ELEMENT -- THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH DECEMBER DECISIONS, BUT ONLY IF THERE ARE POSITIVE DECEMBER DECISIONS.

PAULS AGREED WITHOUT RESERVATION TO THE IDD, TOGETHER WITH THE HLG AND SG REPORTS AS THE BASIS FOR DECISION BY MINISTERS ON 12 DECEMBER.

SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, PAULS NOTED THAT THE DECEMBER DECISION ON TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL IS OF "FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE" FOR ALLIANCE POSITIONS ON DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE AND AN "ESSENTIAL EXPRESSION" OF NATO'S COHERENCE, SOLIDARITY AND ABILITY TO ACT. LIKEWISE, THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION WOULD ILLUSTRATE LESS COHERENCE, WEAKENED SOLIDARITY AND INABILITY TO ACT.

PAULS NOTED THAT THE DECEMBER DECISIONS HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAVE ENDDED IN FAR-REACHING CONSSENSUS. CONSEQUENTLY, HESITATIONS OR ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY/CANCEL THE CONSENSUS WOULD DO VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ALLIANCE COHESION AND SECURITY. TO MAKE SUCH MOVES AT THE HEIGHT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA PRESSURE WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE IS SENSITIVE TO SUCH PRESSURE IF THE INTERFERENCE IS MASSIVE ENOUGH.

IN AN EXTENDED REVIEW OF THE RECENT TALKS WITH

GROMYKO, PAULS CITED ONE ELEMENT OF THE FRG/USSR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS FOLLOWS:

"THE TALKS ABOUT TOPICAL PROBLEMS WERE CONCENTRATED ON THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD. BOTH SIDES REAFFIRM THAT THEY SEE NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR
Determination to expand and to intensify the process of detente and to make it permanent. In this context, both sides expressed the unanimous view that the preparation of concrete steps in the field of disarmament and arms control should be speeded up."

Pauls noted expected differences of opinion during the talks on TNF modernization and assumed that the Soviets will continue to criticize the planned Alliance decision but also expect that the decision will be taken. In regard to Gromyko's statement that there would be no negotiations on the matter once the Allies had adopted the decision on LRTNF modernization, Pauls commented that:

-- such a statement was not made in the official talks with the FRG;

-- an interpretation that there would be no possibility of negotiations after a December decision on LRTNF would be unjustified as the joint communique (confirmed

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-- SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD CONFLICT WITH OTHER
SOVIET STATEMENTS WHICH APPARENTLY ASSUME THAT
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE DECEMBER
DECISION;

-- IN HIS BONN DISCUSSIONS, GROMYKO REFERRED TO THE
BREZHNEV SPEECH PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS IN MEDIUM
RANGE SYSTEMS IF NATO DID NOT MAKE A TNF MODERNIZATION
DECISION. AS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION
WITH GROMYKO, THE FRG CONCLUDED THAT IT IS THIS

SPECIFIC SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WILL BE TERMINATED
BY AN ALLIANCE TNF DECISION RATHER THAN THE
POSSIBILITY OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR TNF ARMS CONTROL.

PAULS CONSEQUENTLY JUDGED THAT THE ALLIANCE'S
CURRENT EFFORTS OF INTENSIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL
POLICY IS ALONG THE RIGHT LINES AND THAT WE CAN ASSUME
THAT THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS IN ALL FIELDS EVEN AFTER
THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN DECISIONS IN DECEMBER.

WITH CONSIDERABLE PASSION, PAULS STATED THAT
MODIFICATION OR POSTPONEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE TNF
DECISION WOULD HARM TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. HE
NOTED THAT IF THE ALLIANCE DID NOT MAKE THE TNF
MODERNIZATION DECISION, AMERICANS COULD CONCLUDE THAT
EUROPEANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN DEFENDING EUROPE.
CONSEQUENTLY, PAULS CONCLUDED THE ALLIANCE WAS
APPROACHING AN HISTORIC MOMENT WITH MUCH MORE AT STAKE
THAN MODERNIZING WARHEADS BUT RATHER ITS VERY EXISTENCE.

8. CATALANO (ITALY) STATED THAT ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MALFATTI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT A BALANCE OF FORCES IS A
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR REAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
PROGRESS. HISTORICALLY, MILITARY ASYMMETRIES HAVE
LED TO ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE IMBALANCE AND THUS HAVE
BEEN DESTABILIZING. THE CURRENT EMERGING IMBALANCE
THUS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND FOR NATO'S DECISIONS, AND
UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT. CATALANO LAID PRAISED THE WORK OF THE
HLG AND THE SG IN PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE BASIS FOR THE
DECISION, AND AS REFLECTING AN EXPRESSION OF A COMMON
ALLIANCE EFFORT. THE IDD ADEQUATELY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT
THIS COMMON WORK AND STRIKES A SOUND BALANCE BETWEEN
TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO FORM A SUITABLE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL DECISION. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO IS ADEQUATE FOR INFORMING PUBLICS. CATALANO THEN STATED THAT, SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE CONVEYS SUCH A SENSITIVE MESSAGE, HIS AUTHORITIES DID NOT YET CONSIDER THE TEXT TO BE FINAL. CATALANO THEN CIRCULATED SEVERAL MINOR CHANGES FOR CONSIDERATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, TWO MINOR WORDING CHANGES WERE ACCEPTED, AS RECOUNTED IN SUMMARY MESSAGE (REF C).

CATALANO THEN TURNED TO THE DANISH PROPOSAL, REMINDING THE GROUP THAT HIS GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHERS, HAS FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED TO THE SOVIET UNION A CLEAR DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NEVER ACCEPTED THESE PROPOSALS IN ANY SATISFACTORY WAY. THEREFORE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY NATO NOW SHOULD POSTPONE ITS DECISION, WHEN TO PROCEED WOULD PROVIDE TO THE SOVIETS A POSITIVE INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE. IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, DURING A SIX-MONTH POSTPONEMENT, TO NEGOTIATE SUFFICIENTLY MEANINGFUL RESULTS AS TO PRECLUDE THE NEED TO MODERNIZE THE LRTNF. Finally, IT WOULD NOT BE ANY EASIER TO REACH A MODERNIZATION DECISION AFTER A POSTPONEMENT. RATHER, A MODERNIZATION DECISION THEN WOULD TAKE ON A NEW CHARACTER AND MEANING, PERHAPS FORECLOSING ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM), IN A BRIEF INTERVENTION, STATED THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED, "ON A TECHNICAL PLANE," TO ACCEPT THE IDD FOR FORWARDING TO MINISTERS. HE
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SAID THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET TAKEN A
FIRM DECISION, SO ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDD SHOULD NOT BE
INTERPRETED AS A FIRM GOVERNMENT POSITION ON BASING.
SCHUURMANS EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT
HAD NOT CONSULTED OTHERS BEFORE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCING
ITS PROPOSAL, AND SAID THE DANISH POSITION WILL CAUSE
PROBLEMS FOR OTHER ALLIES. SCHUURMANS CONCLUDED BY
SUPPORTING THE ITALIAN VIEW THAT THE IDD COMMUNIQUE’S
TEXT NOT YET BE CONSIDERED AS FINAL.

10. STATE SECRETARY HOLST SPOKE FOR NORWAY, EMPHASIZING
THAT NORWAY’S BASIC POLICY OF NOT STATIONING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WAS NOT AFFECTED. DURING FINAL REVIEW OF ITS
POSITION, HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE PARTICULAR WEIGHT

TO THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE NATIONS MOST DIRECTLY
CONCERNED, I.E., THOSE WHICH WILL BASE THE LRTNF.
NORWAY PLACES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE ON NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PURPOSE
OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN EQUILIBRIUM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE FORCE LEVEL.

THE URGENCY OF ESTABLISHING AN EQUILIBRIUM IS
UNDERSCORED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE US THAT THE PROJECTED
NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS EXCEEDS THE NATO PROGRAM
UNDER CONSIDERATION. NORWAY BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO
INCLUDE IN AN ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE THE
UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS,
AGAIN, THE SOONER THE BETTER. NORWAY ALSO HOPES THAT
AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED SPEEDILY ON A NEW FIRST-PHASE
MBFR OFFER, SO THAT IT MAY BECOME PART OF A VIGOROUS
AND BROAD ALLIANCE DECLARATION ON ARMS CONTROL IN DECEMBER.

NORWAY WILL REACH ITS FINAL DECISION THROUGH
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, PROBABLY DURING THE FIRST
WEEK OF DECEMBER. CONSEQUENTLY, HOLST SAID, HE WOULD
RESTRICT HIS COMMENTS TODAY TO GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.
THE IDD’S COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN POLITICAL
TERMS, SINCE IT WILL BE THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE PRESENTATION
BY THE ALLIANCE ON MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER
TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT CONTINENTAL WEAPONS. THE PRESENT
DRAFT IS TOO TECHNICAL, DESIGNED MORE FOR EXPERTS
THAN FOR THE PUBLIC, YET THE PUBLIC IS THE REAL TARGET.
The COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE A POLITICAL "PLATFORM", FROM
WHICH GOVERNMENTS MAY EXPLAIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION, AND THEREFORE MUST EXPLAIN FULLY THE ALLIANCE'S POLITICAL RATIONALE. HOLST DID NOT PROPOSE ANY CHANGES TO THE COMMUNIQUE, BUT STATED THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. TO BE SPECIFIC, HE SAID, THE IDEA THAT THE SCALE OF THE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. ALLIES ALSO SHOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON 12 DECEMBER.

11. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS), NOTING THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS NOT YET TAKEN A DECISION, STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT SHARE DENMARK'S VIEW OF POSTPONING A DECISION IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN STATED THAT THE DUTCH DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE NEED TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF AND THE ALLIANCE'S DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE AGAIN ADVANCED THE NETHERLANDS' DESIRE TO SEPARATE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS, WITH THE DEPLOYMENT DECISION COMING AFTER REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES. HE SAID THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR DESIRE TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HIS GOVERNMENT HAD "GREAT DIFFICULTY" WITH THE NUMBER OF 572 WARHEADS. EVERYONE AGREES THAT THE NUMBER IS A JUDGMENT RATHER THAN A PRECISE CALCULATION. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT START INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON A "WORST CASE" BASIS -- THE POINT OF DEPARTURE SHOULD BE A NUMBER LOWER THAN THE RECOMMENDED 572, TO SIGNAL EXPLICITLY THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTIONS, WHILE RETAINING THE OPTION TO GO HIGHER IF A SUITABLE RESPONSE IS NOT RECEIVED. ONE ADVANTAGE TO A LOWER LRNTF NUMBER IS THAT PERSHING 1A WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE
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REPLACED ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS AND OPTION III WOULD REMAIN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE NETHERLANDS THAT OPTION III NOT BE UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN FROM MBFR.

. BARKMAN THEN CIRCULATED THE FOLLOWING REVISION TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE IDD, AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE PLACED IN BRACKETS. SYG LUNS REJECTED PUTTING THE PROPOSAL INTO THE IDD IN BRACKETS, BUT AGREED TO CIRCULATE THE REWORDING FORMALLY BUT SEPARATELY SO THAT IT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSIDERATION IN DECEMBER.

. NETHERLANDS' PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF INTEGRATIVE DECISION DOCUMENT.

"MINISTERS AGREED THAT NATO'S LRTRF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF LAND-BASED PERSHING TWO BALLISTIC MISSILES AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (GLCM) RESPECTIVELY; THE DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE MADE DEPENDENT ON THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE ACTUAL NUMBER TO BE DEPLOYED WILL HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF A COMMON ALLIED EVALUATION OF THE OUTCOME OF ARMS CONTROL."

. BARKMAN SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF MAKING PUBLIC THE NEW PROJECTION OF A TOTAL OF 621 SS-20 WARHEADS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 21 OF THE IDD, SUGGESTING THAT THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE "SHIFT STUDY" WHEN DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN DECEMBER. BARKMAN CONCLUDED BY SUPPORTING NORWAY'S CALL FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO'S NUMBER.

12. SYG LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS A CONTRADICTION IN THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION. IF IN THE FUTURE, ARMS
CONTROL RESULTS MAKE POSSIBLE A REDUCTION IN THE ALLIANCE'S PLANNED DEPLOYMENT, CERTAINLY ALL ALLIES WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION TO DO SO. WHY, THEN, SHOULD THE ALLIANCE NOT WAIT UNTIL THEN TO DECIDE ON A REDUCED PROGRAM, RATHER THAN NOW, WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A DECISION.

13. ZEINER GUNDERSEN (CMC) STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE APPROACH SET OUT IN THE IDD, AND REITERATED THAT, FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE MODERNIZATION DECISION SHOULD BE TAKEN THIS YEAR. ZEINER GUNDERSEN STATED HIS OPPOSITION TO ANY REDUCTION IN THE PROPOSED MODERNIZATION PACKAGE.

14. HARDY (CANADA) AGREED THAT THE IDD FORMS A SUITABLE BASIS FOR DECEMBER DECISIONS. THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CAN ACCEPT THE IDD AND ITS COMMUNIQUE FOR REFERRAL TO MINISTERS. CANADA, HE SAID, SUPPORTS THE NEED TO DECIDE ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN DECEMBER. WITH RESPECT TO THE DANISH PROPOSAL, HARDY STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THE PREDICAMENT FACING DANISH LEADERS, BUT FOR THE ALLIANCE TO DELAY DECISION NOW WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE EAST AND BY FRIENDS ALIKE AS WEAKNESS, UNDERMINING THE COHESIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE.

15. WURTH (LUXEMBOURG) AND DE VILLAS-BOAS (PORTUGAL) SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF THE IDD.

16. ATHANASSIOU (GREECE), REFERRING TO HIS STATEMENT AT THE 6 NOVEMBER PERREPS MEETING, STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FINDS THE IDD A PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE DECISIONS IN TWO WEEKS ON MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN THE ALLIANCE DECISION WITHOUT RESERVATION. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, HE AGREED WITH ITALY AND BELGIUM IN LEAVING OPEN THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE UNTIL A TIME CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL DECISION. ATHANASSIOU CIRCULATED A RECOMMENDATION TO CHANGE PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE COMMUNIQUE TO DELETE THE LAST PHRASE "WHICH MINISTERS ALL PLEDGED THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT." ENCOUNTERING NO SUPPORT AND US AND TURKISH RESISTANCE, HE SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW HIS RECOMMENDATION.
17. OLCAY (TURKEY) STATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE IDD, FINAL DECISIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ON DECEMBER 12. HE ADDED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WORDING SHOULD BE LEFT OPEN UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT AND SHARED THE NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT THE STYLE WAS TOO "HIGH-BROW," TOO EXPERTLY WORDED FOR THE LAYMAN.

18. BJORNSSON (ICELAND) SAID THAT THE ICELANDIC POSITION WAS AS STATED AT THE NOVEMBER 6 MEETING. HE ACCEPTED THE IDD AS A BASIS FOR FINAL ACTION BY MINISTERS NEXT MONTH.

19. SYG LUNS, SUMMING UP BEFORE A SHORT BREAK,

EMPHATICALLY ASSERTED THAT IT WAS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THERE BE A CONSENSUS ON THE MESSAGE THE OTHER ALLIES CONVEY TO THE US ABOUT LRTNF PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT; THAT THE US HAD ASKED THAT THERE BE SUCH A CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, HE STRONGLY EMPHASIZED, THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION REMAINS AN AMERICAN DECISION. LUNS ADDED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCES THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON LRTNF ARMS CONTROL EVEN IF THE ALLIANCE DECIDES ON MODERNIZATION.

20. THE MEETING RESUMED WITH AARON RESPONDING TO ALLIES' COMMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE IDD. HE SAID IT WAS VER Y GRATIFYING TO GET SUCH WIDESPREAD AND GENERAL SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT WHILE THE US SAW NO NEED FOR CHANGES TO THE IDD AFTER THIS MEETING, OF COURSE IT WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF MINISTERS TO DO SO IF THEY SO DECIDED ON DECEMBER 12. AARON ACCEPTED WITH APPRECIATION THE SYG'S SUGGESTION ON HANDLING THE NETHERLANDS RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE IDD.

AARON WENT ON TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT IN REBUTTAL TO THE NETHERLANDS POSITION:

-- THE EMERGING ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN FACT MEETS THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NETHERLANDS' POSITION. THE ULTIMATE SCALE OF DEPLOYMENTS WILL DEPEND ON ARMS CONTROL RESULTS. IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT IF WE SUCCEED IN REDUCING THE SOVIET THREAT WE CAN REDUCE OUR REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE FORMULA CHOSEN BY THE DUTCH TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR POSITION, THAT ONE CAN AND SHOULD SEPARATE PRODUCTION FROM DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IS ARTIFICIAL AND SIMPLY NOT FEASIBLE.

-- THE US HAS BEEN AS RESPONSIVE AS POSSIBLE TO ALL ITS ALLIES' POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS.

-- THE US ALSO IS A DEMOCRACY AND HAS POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS. WE CANNOT ASK CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS FOR PRODUCTION WITHOUT A DECISION TO DEPLOY -- IT'S SIMPLY A NONSTARTER.

-- IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY PARLIAMENT IN THE ALLIANCE, CERTAINLY NOT THE US CONGRESS, WOULD TAKE SUCH AN ACTION.


22. CATALANO (ITALY), SUPPORTED AARON'S REBUTTAL TO THE DUTCH. PAULS (FRG) ALSO COMMENTED ON THE DUTCH PROPOSAL. HE SAID THE NUMBER 572 WAS KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC, AS WAS NATO'S PROPOSAL TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY
MODERNIZED LRTNF WEAPONS. IF NOW THE ALLIANCE REDUCED
THE NUMBERS AND DECIDED ON PRODUCTION AND NOT DEPLOYMENT,

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IT WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ALLIANCE HAD
MODIFIED ITS POSITION UNDER THE IMPACT OF SOVIET
PRESSURE WHICH IN TURN WOULD WEAKEEN THE ALLIANCE’S
POSITION IN THE FORTHCOMING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THE SOVIETS. PAULS ADDED THAT THE KREMLIN COULD
PLAY ON TIME IF THE NATO DECISION WERE CURTAILED;
THEREFORE, THE DUTCH PROPOSAL IN FACT WEAKEENED THE
ALLIANCE POSITION.

23. SYG LUNS REMINDED THE PERMREPS THAT SECRETARY
BROWN HAD CLEARLY SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE
SENATE AND HOUSE TO VOTE FUNDS FOR LRTNF WITHOUT
EUROPEAN ACCEPTANCE OF DEPLOYMENTS. HOLST (NORWAY)
THEN RECAPITULATED WHAT HE SAW AS THE FOUR MOST

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE LRTNF DECISION PROCESS:

(1) IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE STRUCTURE THE DECISION
PROCESS SO THAT IT WILL CONTAIN BUT ONE SALIENT DECISION
POINT. IF WE CREATE MORE WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN
THE POLITICAL QUIET AND CONSENSUS WE NEED IN ORDER TO PURSUE CREDIBLE NEGOTIATIONS.

(2) WE MUST ACCEPT THAT THE DECISION ON PRODUCTION IS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN DECISION.

(3) AN AMERICAN DECISION ON PRODUCTION DOES, WE ARE TOLD, PRESUPPOSE AN EXPRESSED EUROPEAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT.

(4) WITH A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT, NEGOTIATIONS COULD PRODUCE AN OUTCOME WHEREUNDER THE SCALE OF NATO’S TNF DEPLOYMENT COULD BE RECONSIDERED. IT IS OUR OBJECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT THAT SITUATION. THIS IS WHAT HAPPENED WITH RESPECT TO ABM UNDER SALT I. WE HAVE TO PRODUCE OUR DECISIONS IN A MANNER WHICH WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

24. SYG LUNS READ A PROPOSED PARAGRAPH TO BE USED AS PRESS GUIDANCE RELATING TO THE MEETING. AFTER A SHORT DISCUSSION, THE FOLLOWING TWO PASSAGES WERE APPROVED AS PRESS GUIDANCE:

- A. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS CONCERNED, REINFORCED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS, MET ON NOVEMBER 28 TO CONSIDER FURTHER THE QUESTIONS

OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY REVIEWED THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, IN PARTICULAR THE INTEGRATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS, IN PREPARATION FOR THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF MINISTERS.

- B. THE DANISH DELEGATION PRESENTED TO THE ALLIES ITS GOVERNMENT’S PROPOSALS ON THE TNF ISSUE AND TOOK NOTE OF THEIR REACTIONS.

25. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL EMISSARY AARON’S REMARKS:

I AM PLEASED TO COME TO BRUSSELS AGAIN ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER TO CONCLUDE AT OUR LEVEL THE ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE MODERNIZATION OF OUR LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES OF RECENT WEEKS, THE PRESIDENT HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE ALLIANCE’S WORK ON TNF. I’M SURE YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IN TWO WEEKS, THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE A CRUCIAL
AND HISTORIC STEP. THE DECISION TO MODERNIZE TNF WILL
DEMONSTRATE OUR RESOLVE, OUR COHESION, AND OUR DETERMI-
NATION TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF OUR NATIONS. THE
DECISION TO EXPAND OUR ARMS CONTROL AGENDA TO INCLUDE TNF
WILL DEMONSTRATE OUR COMMITMENT TO PURSUE WITH VIGOR AND
VISION AGREEMENTS WITH THE EAST AIMED AT ENHANCING
SECURITY AND STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS.
TOGETHER, THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THAT THE ALLIANCE
REMAINS A VITAL, COURAGEOUS INSTITUTION, CAPABLE OF
ADAPTING TO NEW TIMES AND MEETING NEW CHALLENGES.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USBERLIN
ALL NATO CAPITALS
CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USOSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIIHENGEN GER

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- OUR PURPOSE TODAY IS TO REACH AGREEMENT THAT THE DOCUMENT
BEFORE US IS A SUITABLE VEHICLE FOR THE DECISIONS OF OUR
MINISTERS. WE WILL CULMINATE THE LONG, INTENSIVE, AND
PRODUCTIVE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND PREPARATION THAT
WAS NEEDED TO BRING THE ALLIANCE TO NEXT MONTH'S CRUCIAL
MOMENT. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT TODAY'S MEETING WILL PRO-
DUCE AGREEMENT ON THE IDD, SO THAT THE MINISTERS CAN MAKE
THE APPROPRIATE DECISION TWO WEEKS FROM NOW.

- THE IDD REFLECTS THE FINDINGS OF THE HLG AND THE SG, AS
WELL AS THE CAREFUL PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF THE WORK
OF THOSE TWO GROUPS. IT EXPLAINS THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF
MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL: THERE CAN BE NO ARMS
CONTROL WITHOUT A MODERNIZATION DECISION, BUT WITH A
MODERNIZATION DECISION, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENTS
WHICH REDUCE THE SOVIET THREAT CAN REDUCE OUR TNF RE-
QUIREMENTS.

THE ALLIES HAVE HAD SIX WEEKS TO REVIEW DRAFTS OF THE IDD.
IN THIS EXTENSIVE REVIEW PROCESS, WE HAVE INCORPORATED A
NUMBER OF USEFUL CHANGES SUGGESTED BY ALLIES. IN OUR
VIEW, THE DRAFTING AND EDITING PROCESS IS NOW FINISHED.

IF, NONETHELESS, ANY ALLIES HAVE SPECIFIC CHANGES IN THE
IDD TO SUGGEST TODAY, WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE THIS
MEETING UNTIL WE ALL AGREE THAT WE HAVE PRODUCED A SUIT-
ABLE DECISION DOCUMENT.

IN THAT CONNECTION, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT
TWO DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER 12 TNF DECISIONS, THE NAC
WILL, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, COME FORWARD WITH AN AGGRESSIVE,
COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL
BE POSSIBLE AT THAT TIME TO REVEAL THE THRUST OF THE
ALLIANCÉ'S NEW MBFR APPROACH. IN COMBINATION WITH A
DECISION TO WITHDRAW 1000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE
AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF TNF MODERNIZATION, THE ALLIANCE
WILL HAVE MUCH TO BE PROUD OF IN ITS EFFORTS TO ENGAGE
THE EAST IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL. THIS WILL BE OUR RE-
SPONSE TO RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS. THERE WILL BE NO
MISTAKE ABOUT NATO'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE GENUINE ARMS
CONTROL ACROSS A BROAD FRONT.

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE
IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE MUST GIVE NO GROUNDS FOR
THE SOVIETS TO QUESTION THE DEPTH OF THE ALLIANCE'S COM-
MITMENT TO TNF MODERNIZATION. WE MUST BE CLEAR-EYED

ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS. WE HAVE WITNESSSED AN
UNMISTAKEABLE POLITICAL ATTEMPT BY MOSCOW TO INTERFERE
IN OUR DECISIONS AND TO PREVENT US FROM TAKING STEPS THAT
THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ARE TAKING -- STEPS WHICH HAVE
BEEN MADE NECESSARY BY SOVIET DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS.

AT THE SAME TIME, SOVIET ACTIONS UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUS-
NESS OF THE CHALLENGE BEFORE US. I REPORTED TO YOU ON
NOVEMBER 6TH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SS-20 FORCE.
AGAIN, JUST LAST WEEK, WE DISCOVERED YET ANOTHER SS-20
BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
SS-20 BASES OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO 23, AND
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 WARHEADS WHICH ARE BEING DEPLOYED TO 621 -- A NUMBER WHICH ALONE NOW EXCEEDS THE NATO-PROPOSED PROGRAM OF LRINF -- EVEN WITHOUT COUNTING THE HUNDREDS OF SS 4'S AND 5'S AND MEDIUM BOMBERS.

BY THEIR RECENT ACTIONS AND WORDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE FIRM DECISIONS. THESE DECISIONS WILL SHOW THE SOVIET UNION THAT NATO WILL NOT BOW TO THREATS NOR BE TEMPTED BY VAGUE AND INEQUITABLE PROPOSALS. NATO'S DECISION MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THE BEST PATH FOR THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT.

TWELVE YEARS AGO, THE ALLIANCE MADE A FUNDAMENTAL DECISION -- THAT NATO WOULD DEDICATE ITSELF BOTH TO DETENTE AND DEFENSE. FOR PERHAPS THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE HARMEL REPORT WAS ADOPTED, THE ALLIANCE IS BEING ASKED TO TAKE...
ING EUROPE -- ONE THAT HOLDS OUT THE PROMISE OF LIFTING FOR THE FIRST TIME THE CLOUD OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION THAT HANGS OVER THIS CONTINENT. BUT THIS OPPORTUNITY WILL BE REALIZED ONLY IF WE ARE STRONG, ONLY IF WE ARE UNITED, AND ONLY IF WE MARK WELL THE ADVICE OF THE NATO WISEMEN OF A DOZEN YEARS AGO -- DETENTE AND DEFENSE ARE INDIVISIBLE.

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END TEXT OF AARON'S REMARKS.

26. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW SIR CLIVE ROSE'S REMARKS.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ONCE AGAIN I SHOULD LIKE TO WELCOME MR. AARON TO OUR MEETING. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO HIS STATEMENT. WHAT HE HAD TO SAY IS VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH THE VIEWS OF MY OWN AUTHORITIES.

2. WE REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO TAKE POSITIVE DECISIONS IN DECEMBER BOTH ON LRTNF MODERNISATION AND ON PROPOSALS FOR TNF ARMS CONTROL. WE REGARD IT AS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT THESE DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN PARALLEL SO THAT THE PRODUCTION AND IN DUE COURSE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW SYSTEMS CAN GO AHEAD WITHOUT DELAY AND THAT WE CAN, ALONGSIDE THIS, ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION IN SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PRODUCTIVE UNLESS THE ALLIANCE HAS FIRST DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES OF ITS OWN. ALL OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE ONLY LIKELY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IF THEY ARE FACED WITH EVIDENCE OF REAL DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIANCE. FROM THIS WE DRAW THE FIRM CONCLUSION THAT NATO MUST DECIDE ON ITS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME AND HOW IT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN ABOUT LIMITATIONS. IF WE DO NOT DO THIS WHAT ARE WE GOING TO BARGAIN WITH?

4. I HAVE LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO WHAT THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE HAS SAID TODAY. MY AUTHORITIES ARE

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CONCERNED AT THE IDEAS WHICH ARE BEING DISCUSSED FOR DELAYING DECISIONS. WE BELIEVE THE SUGGESTION IN OTHER QUARTERS THAT WE SHOULD DECIDE IN DECEMBER ONLY TO GO AHEAD WITH LIMITED PRODUCTION, LEAVING A DECISION
ON DEPLOYMENT UNTIL LATER. WOULD BE WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE.
IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION WHICH
IS NEEDED IF WE ARE TO GET THE RUSSIANS TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY ABOUT LIMITATIONS. INDEED IT WOULD GIVE THEM
AMPLE SCOPE FOR DRAGGING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
OBJECT OF DEFERRING NATO DECISIONS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT.
MEANWHILE THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THEIR OWN BUILD-
UP. SO THE IMBALANCE WOULD BE INCREASED.

5. WE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPOSAL OF THE
DANISH GOVERNMENT THAT DECISIONS ON BOTH PRODUCTION AND
DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE DEFERRED FOR SIX MONTHS IN RETURN
FOR A FREEZE ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS AT THEIR CURRENT
LEVELS. I HAVE TO SAY FRANKLY THAT WE REGARD THIS NOT
ONLY AS IMPRACTICAL BUT ALSO AS HAVING MAJOR DISADVANTAGES
FOR THE ALLIANCE IN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS
CONTROL TERMS.

6. TO PUT OFF DECISIONS NOW FOR SIX MONTHS WOULD CAST
DOUBT ON THE ALLIANCE’S ABILITY TO TAKE DIFFICULT
DECISIONS. IT WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE
NOT PREPARED TO MEET THE MILITARY TARGETS WHICH WE HAVE
SET OURSELVES AND WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN So MUCH
PUBLIZED. AND OUR FAILURE TO DO THIS WOULD BE
WIDELY INTERPRETED AS BEING THE RESULT OF SOVIET
PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA. THIS COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE

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NATO'S CREDIBILITY. IT WOULD SHOW A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES WHICH WOULD BODE ILL FOR THE FUTURE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE.

7. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT POSTPONEMENT WOULD DAMAGE THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON THE SALT II RATIFICATION DEBATE? AT THE LEAST IT WOULD INTRODUCE A NEW ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY INTO THE SITUATION. INDECISION AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY MANY PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES AS SHOWING THAT EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR THEIR DEFENCE. THIS COULD ONLY BE HARMFUL TO RELATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

8. BUT MORE THAN THIS, WE WOULD LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY - TO WHICH I REFERRED IN MY REMARKS ON 6 NOVEMBER - TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL BY PUTTING FORWARD A NUMBER OF MEASURES WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, WOULD ADD UP TO A SIGNIFICANT PACKAGE IN PARALLEL WITH THE MODERNIZATION DECISION. IT WOULD PRESUMABLY NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWING WARHEADS FROM THE STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. AND THE CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE CONSIDERING NEW INITIATIVES IN MBFR WOULD BE RADICALLY CHANGED. IN THE NEW SITUATION WE SHOULD HAVE TO RE-EXAMINE THE BASIS FOR CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR SIMPLIFIED PHASE I. AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE IMPACT OF ANY PROPOSALS ON WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO AGREE WOULD BE MUCH REDUCED.

9. IN ANY CASE, WE SEE LITTLE POSSIBILITY WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF ACHIEVING ANY POSITIVE RESULTS ON TNF ARMS CONTROL. EVEN IF WE COULD ACHIEVE A FREEZE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FROZEN IN ITS EXISTING POSITION OF INFERIORITY. THAT WOULD BE THE BASIS ON WHICH WE SHOULD HAVE TO EMBARK ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND IT IS NOT IN OUR VIEW A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR SECURING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO LIMITATION OR REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER WHAT ASSURANCE WOULD WE HAVE THAT A FREEZE WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE RUSSIANS? AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THE PROPOSAL IS THAT IT WOULD BE BASED ON A UNILATERAL SOVIET DECLARATION. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO US AT WHAT POINT WITHIN THE PROPOSED SIX MONTH PERIOD THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO GIVE ANY SUCH COMMITMENT. BUT IN ANY CASE IS IT SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE VERIFICATION MEASURES AND AN AGREED DATA BASE BEFORE IT STARTS? THERE WOULD BE LITTLE VALUE IN A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A FREEZE WITHOUT
AGREEMENT ON THESE TWO POINTS. BUT - HAVING IN MIND THE EXPERIENCE OF SALT II AND MBFR - CAN WE CONTEMPLATE THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE POINTS ALONE WOULD BE REACHED EVEN WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS?

10. MY AUTHORITIES REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THERE CAN BE NO SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR PARALLEL DECISIONS IN DECEMBER ON TNP MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL. THEY CONSIDER THE REVISED VERSION OF THE IDD PROVIDES A SUITABLE BASIS FOR SUCH DECISIONS.

27. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY NORWEGIAN STATE SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JOHAN HOLST

BEGIN TEXT OF FIRST STATEMENT:

. I WANT FIRST OF ALL TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH THOSE WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION FOR THE SUCCINCT AND IMPORTANT STATEMENT MADE BY MR. AARON AT THIS MEETING.

. ALLOW ME TO INFORM YOU ABOUT THE POSITION AND TIME SCHEDULE OF MY GOVERNMENT IN THIS MATTER. THE NORWEGIAN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE NON-STATIONING AND NON-STOCK- PILING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE NATO DECISIONS ON MODERNIZATION. THEREFORE, MY GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE PARTICULAR WEIGHT TO THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE DECISIONS. THIS ATTITUDE HAS IMPLICATIONS ALSO FOR THE TIMING OF DECISIONS. NORWAY CANNOT BE UP FRONT IN
USCINCUEUR VAIHINGEN GBR

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MAKING HER DECISIONS SINCE WE SHALL HAVE TO AVOID THE CLARIFICATION OF POSITIONS IN THE MOST AFFECTED CAPITALS.

NORWAY ATTRIBUTES PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE PRESENTATION OF A CREDIBLE AND PERSUASIVE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONTINENTAL WEAPONS. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE TO ESTABLISH EQUILIBRIUM AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE FORCE LEVEL. THE URGENCY OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS UNDERSCORED BY THE DISTURBING FACT REPORTED BY MR. AARON THIS MORNING, THAT THE NUMBER OF SS-20 WARPHEADS OPERATIONAL OR UNDER DEPLOYMENT ALREADY EXCEEDS THE PROJECTED LEVEL OF NATO TNP-DEPLOYMENTS.

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IT IS THE NORWEGIAN VIEW THAT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE AS PART OF THE TNF DECISION PACKAGE THE UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF 1000 NUCLEAR WARPHEADS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL IN A VIGOROUS MANNER, THE SOONER THIS INITIATIVE BE PLACED ON THE PUBLIC RECORD THE BETTER. IN THE SAME VEIN WE HOPE THE OBSTACLES TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM FIRST PHASE MBFR-AGREEMENT CAN BE SPEEDILY REMOVED. THAT PROPOSAL OUGHT TO BE PART OF WHAT WILL IN FACT AMOUNT TO A VIGOROUS AND COMPREHENSIVE NATO DECLARATION ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS FROM THE MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN DECEMBER.


THEREFORE, MR. CHAIRMAN, I SHALL LIMIT MYSELF AT THIS POINT TO A FEW GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN POLITICAL TERMS SINCE IT WILL BE THE MOST
AUTHORITATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE COLLECTIVE DECISION OF THIS ALLIANCE WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EAST ABOUT CONTINENTAL WEAPONS.

. FURTHERMORE, THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD AND DOES REFLECT THE CONSENSUS OF VIEWS AND CONSIDERATIONS CONTAINED

IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT BASED ON THE REPORTS OF THE HLG AND THE SG.

. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE MATTER INVOLVED, THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY IS PERHAPS SOMewhat TECHNICAL IN CHARACTER, SEEMINGLY ADDRESSED MORE TO THE EXPERT THAN THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IT IS NOT EASY TO PENETRATE FOR THE ATTENTIVE LAYMAN. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO OUR PUBLICS. HOWEVER, WE SHALL NOT PROPOSE A REWRITING OF THE COMMUNIQUE AT THIS LATE POINT IN TIME.

. IN POLITICAL TERMS THE COMMUNIQUE MUST CONSTITUTE A PLATFORM FROM WHICH GOVERNMENTS CAN DRAW IN PRESENTING AND EXPLAINING THE COLLECTIVE DECISIONS TO THEIR PUBLICS. IT IS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, THAT THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE COMMUNIQUE AMPLY REFLECT THE POLITICAL RATIONALE COLLECTIVELY DEVELOPED AND THE ARGUMENTS DEPLOYED IN NATIONAL DEBATES. IN THIS CONNECTION I WANT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR A CREDIBLE ALIGNMENT OF THE DECISION ON MODERNIZATION AND THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE. MOST PARTICULARLY, THE POINT THAT THE SCALE OF THE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT WILL NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN A SALIENT PRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. WE SHOULD PAY ATTENTION ALSO TO THIS POINT IN THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE DECISIONS AFTER THE MEETING ON DECEMBER 12TH.

END TEXT. BENNETT

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>
Dear colleague,

After the discussion we had at last week's ministerial NPG-meeting on the issue of ITRM-modernisation and arms control I feel it might be useful, if only for the sake of clarity, that I once more explain to you my position on this matter. In doing so I want to come back briefly to some points I raised in my intervention at the NPG-meeting and for which I ask your serious consideration.

The first point concerns the relationship between the production decision and the deployment of the new weapons. As you know the Christian Democratic party, the larger of the two parties supporting the Van Agt-government, favours an alliance decision on production in December, making the actual deployment dependent on the results of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Though this approach was heavily criticized by some of our colleagues at last week's meeting, I do believe that the real difference between this approach and the one envisaged in the "integrated decision document" is not as big as it may seem. In both cases the number of warheads that will ultimately be deployed will be affected by arms control. In both cases it will be necessary to evaluate the results of arms control negotiations and to reach a consensus about these results before the actual deployment of the new systems. Thus in neither case will the actual deployment automatically result from decisions that are going to be made at the end of this year.

My second point has to do with the size of the programme. In raising this issue I fully recognize the excellent analytical work done by our experts in the "high level group". I want to note, however, that their recommendation as to the size of the programme is based on the assumption that no meaningful results of arms control negotiations will be reached until 1985. I want to stress again that we have to pass a political judgment on the work of our experts. In this respect I believe that the goal of successful arms control can be better pursued by deciding on a programme of a smaller size than recommended with the possibility of upward and downward adjustments in the light of the outcome of arms control negotiations.
Apart from this the proposed number of 572 warheads is clearly in the upper range of the 200 to 600 additional warheads recommended to us as an "evolutionary upward adjustment" in the spring report of the high level group, which - at least in the Netherlands - has a negative political effect.

Without coming forward at this moment with proposals as to the numbers, I want to let you know that my government has the most serious political difficulty in accepting the size of the programme proposed.

Thirdly and finally there is the question of the total Netherlands contribution to NATO's tnf. Any possible participation of my country in the tnf-programme will necessarily entail a reconsideration of our present so-called nuclear tasks. When we had our personal contact prior to the NPG-meeting, I provided you with a strictly confidential paper, marked annex B, containing my intentions on this matter. As I told you on that occasion I don't want to take unilateral decisions. In the margin of the NPG-meeting you promised to inform me in time of any objections you might have to my intentions. If you might wish to receive any further explanation on a military or official level I'll be glad to take the necessary steps to arrange this. In any case the adjustments in our contribution will be put before NATO as soon as the Netherlands government has made its decisions. At the present stage of decision-making I must ask you once more to treat this matter on a strictly confidential basis.

Sincerely,
VERZENDLIJST

His Excellency Mr. José Desmarets
Minister of National Defence
1000 Brussels
Belgium

His Excellency Mr. Poul Søgaard
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
1216 Copenhagen K.
Denmark

His Excellency Dr. Hans Apel
Federal Minister of Defence
Federal Ministry of Defence
5300 Bonn
Germany

His Excellency Mr. Attilio Ruffini
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Rome
Italy

His Excellency Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Oslo
Norway

The Right Honourable Francis Pym M.C. D.L. M.P.
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
London SW1A2HB
United Kingdom
Minister van Defensie  
Sect.

Aan: de Minister-President

Bijgaande teksten werden heden om 14.30 uur door de Engelse ambassadeur aan Minister Scholten overhandigd.

De Minister meende er goed aan te doen U een kopie van deze teksten te doen toekomen.

5-12-1979
Thank you very much for your personal letter of 23 November about LATNF modernisation. I have admired the seriousness of the debate on this issue in the Netherlands, even when I have disagreed with particular points made; and I value the opportunity to offer my views on the aspects to which your letter draws attention.

The first is the concept of separating in time the decisions on production and on deployment. Frankly, I believe the distinction between the two is, in all the circumstances of today's situation, an unreal one. A British Prime Minister of past days used to say "it is unwise to cross a chasm in two leaps". That, in my judgement, is what a production/deployment split would be doing. The world, and in particular the Soviet Union, would recognise that NATO had taken only half a decision: more particularly, they would recognise that the missing half was the European half. This would amount to a manifest failure of will and would in my judgement be profoundly damaging to Alliance cohesion, credibility and security - and also to the prospect of real arms control. It could have a major impact on US-European relations.

I fear I cannot agree that to divide the two components of decisions now would amount to the same as is proposed in the integrated decision document. What that document envisages, in effect, is that we should take firm decisions now but should acknowledge that we shall be prepared to modify them later if the other side gives us solid and assured reasons for doing so. This is a fundamentally different political and negotiating proposition from the one which the CDA has indicated - it requires the Russians to react positively to our arms control initiative, rather than leaving the onus on the Alliance: that seems to me to be crucial. We must not set up a pattern in which the burden of fresh decisions lies always upon NATO. I would however be ready when we meet in Brussels on 10-12 December to consider with you whether there was any way in which we might help on presentation.

I believe we should remind ourselves of the reality of the Soviet position. Mr Brezhnev has offered nothing in relation to his own LATNF programme except a general offer, without any detail of type or number, to withdraw some systems from Western Russia. But given the range of his systems, both old and new, he could easily fulfil such an offer without changing in the least the threat to NATO Europe. He has not offered in any way to halt his own programme, already larger and far more advanced than NATO's. (Indeed, as Mr Aaron reported to the Alliance on 28 November, the number of SS20 warheads alone deployed or being deployed, quite aside from other Soviet LATNF systems, already exceeds the total proposed Alliance programme.) He has not offered even a moratorium on his new deployments, still less on production. He says in effect "we will not stop our programme but you must not start yours: from those respective positions, we are prepared to talk with you". For my part, I would not be ready to negotiate anything with anyone on such a basis, in politics or my daily affairs.

/Those
Those in my view are the central considerations: but let me mention two others. Firstly, I have every sympathy with Harold Brown's point that he cannot reasonably ask the US Congress to fund the provision of weapon systems for which his allies have not committed themselves even to accept deployment. This is reinforced by the fact that the US is taking a notably generous view financially of how to meet what is predominantly, in its HLG origins, a requirement driven by European views. Secondly, there is a real problem of preparation time. Procedures may be different in your country, but in the UK we must begin to take practical steps quite soon - within months - if we are to be ready for basing in 1983. It would be politically and practically impossible for me to embark on these steps if no clear deployment decision had been taken.

You raised also the question of numbers. This has always been a difficult matter, I agree, since the requirement has to be in the end a matter of informed judgement (not the same as a guess, of course) rather than of precise calculation. Any of us might no doubt have reached a rather different judgement. But for my part I regard the figure of 572 as quite reasonable, and I certainly see no significantly lower figure that could be shown to be markedly better based. (The military authorities, as you know, would have preferred a higher one, and even if in the end the programme has to be fully implemented our LANTNF strength will still be much smaller than its Soviet counterpart.)

The figure is now firmly in the public domain, and to cut it would offer no improvement in security, in Alliance credibility, or in arms control prospects - if anything rather the reverse in this last respect. No great financial saving would accrue to any of the basing countries. My own country has already and would continue to have based in it a larger number of LANTNF than any other; yet we seek no reduction now. As to the idea of taking a lower figure and being ready to increase it if arms control fails, I disagree with this fundamentally as a matter of common sense negotiating strategy. It would place the onus upon NATO to make a fresh judgement, possibly in confused and difficult political circumstances: whereas I endorse the view of almost all those who have experience in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union that the only way to get good results is to make clear that they cannot secure outcomes they want without moving themselves. I do not accept the view that to start with one's full requirement is to assume the failure of arms control: I believe rather that to assume its success prematurely is a very likely way to bring about such failure.

There are a few other general points I should like to make. The concept of the nuclear threshold is of concern to many in our countries. I do not think it has yet been sufficiently understood that the present programme would actually help to raise that threshold. It would, by reducing the pre-launch vulnerability of NATO's land-based LANTNF, reduce the temptation to an adversary to mount a pre-emptive nuclear strike; and it would help release dual-capable aircraft from nuclear assignments like QRA, in order to reinforce conventional strength. These seem to me significant positive factors.

Finally, I know it is common ground between us that we should ultimately view this in the context of the Alliance which is so vital to us all. The Alliance's collective planning is evolved through
careful discussion and debate, in which we all argue our points: we prevail on some, we concede on others. The INF work has been a thorough and admirable exercise of precisely this kind. My country has influenced the outcome: so, very clearly, has the Netherlands. The package before us in December will bear your positive imprint in many ways (the emphasis on arms control, no increase in stockpile, the concept of the "shift" study and a firm date for it, just to take some examples). Not every aspect is precisely as you would wish, or indeed as the UK would. At the end of the day, we each of us have to take our national decisions. We must consider whether it is better for our own and Western security for each of us to be perfectly right (as we see it) in isolation, or to be perhaps imperfectly right together. The Alliance is built on the principle that the latter is better. The Government of which I am a member is determined to go ahead on that view. The practical implications are at least as heavy for us nationally as for other Europeans. But the British Government regards this as a major Alliance issue which we should approach above all as Alliance members. We earnestly hope that our friends — and particularly the Netherlands, which has been our partner in so much — will do the same.
TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS MINISTER OF DEFENCE

I thought it might be helpful, given the especially private basis on which you disclosed to me the ideas you were considering for adjustments in Netherlands nuclear roles, if I replied to you on these separately from my more general comments on the LRTNF issue.

Let me first say that I am most appreciative that you have taken me so fully into your confidence on all this.

I ought to preface my specific comments by three points. Firstly, I assume throughout that any adjustments would be made essentially to complement an affirmative Netherlands decision to participate in LRTNF on the basis of the NBC programme. Secondly, I would even on that assumption still have preferred that your decisions on the precise adjustments elsewhere should wait, as would seem to me logical, upon the outcome of the NATO "shift" study to which you yourselves rightly attach considerable significance. I offer comments in advance of that collective work with some reluctance. Thirdly, I would regard the views of the NATO military authorities as of great importance, and I hope they may have an opportunity to give their own professional advice.

With these provisos, I offer the following:

(a) I would not seek to dissuade you from relinquishing the atomic demolition munitions role.

(b) Similarly, we would not regard as seriously damaging your giving up nuclear capability in surface-to-air missiles.

/(a)
(c) We do see considerable value, on present evidence, in your retaining an artillery capability, and I am glad to understand that you envisage no decisions on this in advance of the "shift" study.

(d) We should be extremely sorry to see you give up the nuclear role for your NPA aircraft. The weapons are now stored in the UK, and we are content to continue this arrangement. The NATO maritime authorities, and our own, would be concerned about any reduction in the span and flexibility of Alliance maritime nuclear capability, which is already far from ample. And your withdrawal would sharply narrow the breadth of Alliance participation in this field.

(e) We believe that there is both military and political value in maintaining dual capability for aircraft on a broad basis of Alliance participation; and Saceur has already expressed concern about the dwindling stocks of dual-capable aircraft at his disposal. We recognise however the argument in the HLG report that new JSTP will make it easier to apply dual-capable aircraft effort in the conventional role. Against this background we would regard a Netherlands decision on the basis you described to me — that is, in parallel with GLCM deployment — to withdraw progressively from this area of effort in respect of your F.16s as less damaging than reductions in artillery or MPA.

I hope these indications of the UK standpoint — which I have approached in the desire to be as constructively helpful as I possibly can in your difficult circumstances — will be of value to you in reaching your decisions.

If you felt that an Alliance agreement in December on a positive statement
about adjustments in the Netherlands' nuclear role would be of sufficient importance to you to enable the Netherlands to participate in the TNF modernisation programme, I can give you my personal assurance that to the extent I have described above we would not seek to stand in your way. I hope, though, that you would agree not to let this become known until we achieve agreement in December on this and the many other issues we have to settle. But these private indications may perhaps help you in framing your tactics for your parliamentary debate next week.
**Only copy**

*Very Secret*

7 pages


PM gives a picture of the possibilities, impossibilities, and risks for the Dutch cabinet in the TNF matter. Between Belgium and the Netherlands at least this parallel exists, that the possibilities of an integral acceptance of the draft decisions submitted to the NATO council of December 12 -- the "IDD" -- are becoming more limited by the day. The situation in the Netherlands can be summarized as follows. The left parties do not want a decision other than the announceement of a moratorium, that is to say that the proposal is made to the Soviet Union to stop further deployment of new systems and to start negotiations. D'66 too -- strongly on the rise according to the most recent opinion polls -- has chosen this course during its party congress last Saturday. Of the parties supporting the cabinet the VVD will accept the IDD unconditionally, just like several small right-of-center parties, together 30-35 seats out of 150 in the Second Chamber. The other governing party, the CDA, straddles both sides and is hopelessly divided: 2 of the 49 CDA-delegation members are, as principled atom-pacifists, against any modernization decision whatsoever; they want to see all nuclear weapons removed from the Netherlands. On the other side 10 to 15 CDA-members of parliament believe that the

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1 By Prime-Minister Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach.

2 Integrated Decision Document, combining the outcomes of NATO’s High Level Group and Special Group studies of, respectively, TNF modernization and arms control.

3 A center-left party in the Dutch parliament.

4 A center-right party, and member of van Agt's government

* that is to say, what one believes to be in the IDD. [note in original]

5 Second Chamber = lower house of parliament. Unless noted otherwise, "parliament" or "members of parliament" refers to this lower house.

6 Christen Democraat: Christian Democrats, containing both left and right-of-center members.
IDD* will have to be accepted unconditionally, a position, therefore, taken altogether by maximally 50 members of parliament. The other CDA-members (32 to 37) hold the key. For many among them the position to be taken has not yet been determined, but it is certain that they will not accept an unconditional yes to the IDD. In light of this situation it is impossible for the cabinet -- which, with the support of the right-wing parties, will only be able to do without 5 or 6 CDA-votes -- to accept the IDD unconditionally. This would be political suicide. The situation can deteriorate further. The discussion in the Netherlands has reached a state of frenzy the last couple of days displaying parapsychotic characteristics, thus making it practically uncontrollable. The cabinet would be willing to commit political suicide if this would benefit NATO, but the opposite is the case. A new coalition undoubtedly will distance itself further from the IDD and with it from NATO membership. According to the latest opinion polls the Netherlands would have a left majority (PvdA\(^7\) + D'66) for the first time in an election now -- albeit a narrow one -- even without the support of the extreme left parties. Against that background the PM does not feel bad at all about trying to preserve the cabinet no matter what and to make the best of it vis-a-vis the NATO-allies. The cabinet will not let itself be forced to a rejection of the IDD; in that case it will maintain its integrity and resign. An unconditional acceptance of the IDD is, as said, not a realistic possibility either. The point is to find a middle way that deviates as little as possible from the IDD.

FM remarks that the situation in Belgium has become very complicated because -- aside from the normal contradictions -- through the change of the guard a number of prominent officials from the recent past (Tindemans, v.d. Boeynants, Cools, de Clerk) are playing their own part in parliament. As regards the TNF-matter, the Flemish socialists have already taken a position that does not differ much from the position of the P.v.d.A. The Wallonian socialists -- led by Simonet who in regard to NATO continues the tradition of Spaak -- do not share this position so far. They will have a party council meeting about this next Saturday. The Christian Democrats in large majority are in favor of a decision that follows the IDD; a minority, especially on Flemish side, is against this. The opposition -- the liberals -- are in favor. The problems, caused especially by the attitude of the Flemish socialists perhaps followed by the Wallonian socialists, therefore are especially within the coalition and within the cabinet which is under threat anyway as a result of the usual Flemish-Wallonian contradictions. Some speculate that the Flemish socialists will not take risks in the TNF-matter in the interest of a solution of the general internal problems. This is not certain, however. How the Flemish Christian-Democrats will position themselves depends especially on the attitude of Tindemans who, although thusfar always strongly pro-NATO, now takes a more reserved position. Of the 56 Flemish Christian-Democrats 10 are expected to have reservations. The problem for the cabinet lies particularly with the Flemish socialists who will be against the IDD en masse. EM has understood from PM that the Dutch cabinet does not want to respond with no to the IDD and cannot respond with yes, but that it looks for a middle way that approaches the IDD as closely as possible. That has been considered in Brussels too, with the result that the suggestion has been put to EM to accept the IDD on December 12, but to

\(^{7}\) Partij van de Arbeid: social-democratic party.
postpone implementation -- also the production decision -- by six months. In that period arms control talks should get underway and offer reasonable prospects. 

MP remarks that the Dutch cabinet is being moved to a position that does not differ from the EM's suggestion in a fundamental way, although it does in a procedural one. About the six month term the CDA will without doubt note that the negotiations will not be able to develop in such a short time period. On the other hand the decision to deploy will not have to be postponed until 1983 for the CDA if the actual deployment can begin. EM points out that his suggestion also means that the implementation of the production decision will be postponed for six months. This differs fundamentally from the Danish idea to postpone the decision itself for six months and to negotiate first. In the preliminary Belgian view the decision would have to be implemented automatically if after six months the negotiations have not begun or have progressed insufficiently. This will stimulate the SU quickly to start negotiations and to conduct them seriously.

MP believes that a postponement of the implementation can only apply to the production because the deployment can only begin in 1983. In the IDD therefore there only is talk of a decision in regard to deployment; the decision about production is not mentioned there. This follows from the fact that the European NATO-countries do no decide about production. This exclusively an American decision which is fully an American responsibility. PM is happy with this because in the Netherlands there also exist major objections to the large number of 572 warheads. The formulation chosen in the IDD simplifies the political problem for the Dutch cabinet somewhat because it no longer has to rail against the large number. With that, one of the friction points with NATO has been removed. On the other hand this formulation does complicate the preliminary Belgian view.

EM argues that a decision for deployment does imply a decision about production. If Belgium agrees to the deployment of 48 GLCMs on its territory the US will produce, otherwise it will not. As known, for political reasons the Federal Republic does not want to take a positive decision about deployment alone. Militarily it makes no difference if 48 GLCMs are deployed in Belgium or whether 48 extra go to the Federal Republic; the issue is the political spread of the deployment. EM has no idea of the intentions of the US if NATO would not be able to come to a positive decision.

PM acknowledges that politically there does indeed exist a clear connection between the production and deployment decisions. 

EM repeats that he is positively inclined toward the suggestion made to him to take a decision now but delay implementation for some time. The six-month term he mentioned is negotiable. EM notes that also in the argument of the PM the objective should be a nuanced decision that approaches the IDD as closely as possible and does not affect the cohesion of the alliance.

PM believes that for the best possible end-result the procedure from now on is of the greatest importance. It is in everyone's interest to guard against one government getting into even greater difficulties through premature statements by another. It cannot be that a partly negative position of country A influences the positioning of country B or country C, and vice versa. This is why governments which have difficulties with the IDD have to

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8 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.
air these as late as possible. PM has understood that the Belgian cabinet will determine its position next Sunday. He ask if this could also be Monday.

EM confirms that the Belgian cabinet is scheduled to meet next Sunday but adds that technically it is possible only to take the decision on Monday. A practical problem here is that the party boards tend to meet every Monday and afterwards issue communes. That problem can be met by having the cabinet decide on Monday morning. It has already been announced that the cabinet will decide on Sunday and that day there also is a large demonstration in Brussels with participation also from the Netherlands.

PM thinks it is highly preferable for both to decide in the course of Monday.

EM agrees and would like to agree also, now or later, to do so at the same hour.

PM would most like to see the decisions be taken Monday evening, but he fully understands that this causes problems for EM in connection with the party board meetings.

EM agrees that both cabinets decide Monday evening without making this known ahead of time. EM asks if there can be further contact about the contents of the position to be taken.

PM supports this. This could happen by telephone or in a new meeting like now. Both agree that Thuysbaert and Merckelbach will keep in contact about this.

EM points out that the core cabinet meets tomorrow to discuss a text being prepared by Min. Simonet. The suggestion EM made is not yet known to the cabinet.

PM remarks that in the Netherlands only ministers v.d. Klaauw and Scholten are aware of all developments. Both agree only to inform the ministers of F.A.\(^9\) and Def. about the content of this discussion.

EM receives the suggestion to organize a meeting of the five directly involved heads of government before December 12. This would have to be a secret meeting, for example in the neighborhood of Aachen. Should Mrs. Thatcher be present too?

PM expects that Schmidt will want this because Mrs. Thatcher has the firmest position vis-a-vis TNF-modernization. It appears to him virtually impossible to keep a meeting of five heads of government a secret. MP certainly does not want to reject the suggestion by EM, but he does want to consider it further and discuss it with the Ministers of F.A. and Def. He will also put the suggestion to colleagues Cossiga and Mrs. Thatcher on Thursday.

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\(^9\) Foreign Affairs
handwritten memorandum of conversation

Archive of A.A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Centre, University Nijmegen
translation from the Dutch by Ruud van Dijk

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very secret

Report of the conversation between Presidente del Consiglio Cossiga and Prime-Minister Van Agt on Thursday December 6 1979 in Rome, in the presence of their advisors Belinguer and Merckelbach, and of B. Riputto, interpreter

P.C. gives a view of the developments of the past days that have led finally that the Chamber in a secret vote has with a large majority accepted a motion inspired by the government. In the end, it turned out not to be necessary to ask for a vote of confidence. This motion contained the following elements: (1) rapid ratification of SALT II; (2) deliberately strive for detente and disarmament; (3) modernization TNF is necessary in light of the imbalance that has arisen in this area; (4) modernization TNF only to the point required by this imbalance; (5) every Soviet reduction of TNF weapons during or after the negotiations must be followed by reductions in the NATO program, both as concerns production and deployment. Linked to this the desire that it will turn out not to be necessary for NATO to move to deployment of TNF weapons and that NATO will be able to start immediate and courageous negotiations with the SU. The acceptance of this motion by a large majority (380-220?) meant a major defeat for the communist party. The German SPD-congres has according to PC been a great influence on the course and outcome of this debate. He does not expect significant problems during the debate in the Senate, this coming Monday.

P.M. remarks that his political friends would barely allow him to congratulate the Italian government with the outcome of this debate. His mission in the European capitals and in Washington is a completely different one. Four weeks ago, the CDA has asked of the government that it make the effort to convince the allies that it would be better now to take a decision about the production, and only much later—for example 2 years—a decision about deployment. Back then, this was the view of all 49 CDA members of the Second Chamber. The government has in response declared itself willing to take this message to the allies, adding that, in case the allies are not receptive, a new situation will arise in which the government should reconsider its position. The past four weeks the following developments have occurred. From the allies no positive reaction to the decoupling idea was received initially. Last week, however, a surprising shift has come in the position of Denmark, which however only plays a minor role in this matter. More important is that in the past couple of days shifts are also occurring in the so far firm position of Belgium. One of the factors playing a role here undoubtedly is the influence of the P.v.d.A. on the Flemish socialists. The situation already is such that colleague Martens worries greatly over the conduct of the Flemish socialists in the coalition. In the Netherlands itself the situation gets worse by the day for those who 4 weeks ago were still in favor of decoupling. What is happening in the Netherlands has elements of a mass
psychotic development, fanned by the biggest part of press and tv which is tinted radically. This development washes like a wave over the cabinet and because it is irrational, it is uncontrollable also. PM fears therefore that next week the Dutch cabinet will get into great difficulties, both within NATO and in The Hague. Given this situation, the Dutch government could take three positions:

1) It could decide to agree with the decisions expressed in the IDD, including the high number of 572 warheads. This almost certainly means political suicide; the cabinet will be blown away. Result of that is (a) a political crisis (in itself not interesting to the allies), but also (b) not a yes from the Netherlands to NATO and (c) almost certainly a new Dutch cabinet that will distance itself far from NATO. The way things stand now it is not even certain that PM will get agreement for this position from the entire cabinet. In other words, if he tried to push this through, there is a good chance that even prior to December 12 a crisis will arise within the cabinet, which then will see the departure of the ministers originating in the ARP.

2) The government could note a majority has grown in the Netherlands, including parliament, which does not allow it to consent to any kind of decision. The government accepts this in sadness as a fact of life, reports this to NATO and remains in power. But NATO is then confronted with a member state distancing itself from the alliance. The consequences of that could sooner or later spread to other allies.

3) The government can try to find a position in between these first two options, enabling it (a) to survive, and (b) not to have to give NATO a full no. Put differently, a position that partially does, and partially does not accept the draft-decisions by NATO.

To be concrete, PM tries to reach a position—the cabinet is not yet aware of this, but he will give it his best effort—approximate consisting of the following: (1) some grumbling about the in Dutch eyes far too high number of 572 warheads. More than grumbling will not be necessary because NATO does not decide production. The US decides production and also pays for it. (2) The maximum PM perhaps can achieve is a "commitment to commit" in the following sense: the government expresses now that the Netherlands will accept GLCMs on its territory when at the end of 1981 it would have to conclude that the negotiations with the SU, opened in the meantime, have not produced satisfying results. The Netherlands will not answer this question on its own but in consultation with the allies. (3) Finally there will have to be a certain adjustment of the Dutch nuclear tasks already present. This is an issue of secondary importance about which minister Scholten is consulting with his fellow Defense ministers and which, it appears, will be brought to a solution.

PM realizes that this kind of position will signify a serious disappointment for the allies. Nonetheless, even with a position like this it is not yet certain that he will survive politically, although he does give himself a reasonable chance. He is, however, prepared to sacrifice his cabinet if this could yield any kind of advantage for NATO. The opposite unfortunately is the case.

PC asks if the Dutch cabinet will reserve such a position only for itself or plead that all of NATO follows this line.

PM has to continue until next Wednesday to represent with great conviction the message that all NATO countries should decide in this sense, in the interest of his political survival. He realizes, however, very well that this message will not be received. The latter position is therefore in fact that the Netherlands makes a reservation in regard to the
Dutch share of the GLCMs. During the conversation in Villa d'Este\(^1\) PM said that he could not imagine that the Netherlands would get in such a position because we are not a people that lets others carry the load while keeping its own hands clean. To his regret he was wrong in this.

PC points out that the Italian government has the ability to do anything within the limits of the position now approved by the parliament. PM should not expect a hardening toward the Netherlands from Italy. PC thinks it of great importance that the Netherlands does not get into a position where it actually becomes separate from NATO. If a price needs to be paid for that, Italy is willing to do so. The decoupling however is difficult to accept; PC has always been convinced that the SU is only willing to enter realistic negotiations if NATO takes a clear decision both on production and on deployment. The decoupling idea would seriously weaken the chance for real negotiations. PC does think it possible to accept this idea as a Dutch reservation, for two reasons: (1) the limited number of GLCMs assigned to the Netherlands; (2) de geographic position of the Netherlands. The guiding countries here are the FRG and Italy, because of their location and in connection with Austria's neutrality. In case of a conflict, this neutrality will be a formal matter. Not only because Austria itself would then abandon it; also because Italy would then be obligated to keep open the connection with the FRG via Austrian territory. In regard to the Tyrolian minority this will not cause problems; it is strongly anti-SU and more oriented toward the FRG than to Austria. The heart of the matter is the agreement between the FRG and Italy. PC has assured the Bundeskanzler that Italy will not leave the FRG to stand alone. This is not only in the interest of NATO, but of Europe as a whole. An isolated FRG would be obligated to a frightening rearmament or it would have to play the card of German reunification on the basis of neutrality. PC believes that after the acceptance of the IDD by the UK --this is certain--, by Italy --90% certain-- and the FRG --also certain-- a Dutch reservation in the form of a *pactum de contiutendo* is acceptable. Such a reservation would have to go along with a clear statement that the Netherlands subscribes to NATO and the goal of the TNF-operation, acknowledging this way that given the superiority of the SU in the grey zone, NATO is compelled to restore the balance. In this way, NATO's negotiating strength would not significantly be affected by a Dutch reservation. To take this position, PC does need to be certain of the agreement of the Bundeskanzler. He will also seek confirmation from the US whether this is an acceptable reservation. PC's willingness, therefore, is conditional on the agreement of the FRG and the result of the soundings in the US. PC asks when the Dutch cabinet will decide.

PM considers this a crucial issue. He is determined to have this decision as late as possible, in any case not before next Monday evening. The later the Dutch cabinet decides, the smaller the risk that other governments experience negative consequences from it. Speaker will go to London today for a meeting with colleague Thatcher, and tomorrow to Washington, where at 11:45 am he will have a meeting with President Carter and others. If before that time colleague Cossiga were able to get in contact with the Americans, this would only be welcome.

\(^1\) *Ruud van Dijk note: Van Agt-Cossiga meeting, October 13, 1979.*
The day before yesterday the PM has spoken with Prime-Minister Martens who wonders if it would not be helpful to organize a secret meeting this coming weekend between the heads of government of the five European countries directly involved with the TNF-modernization. PM has neither accepted, nor rejected this idea, but promised that he would raise this with PC and Mrs. Thatcher.

PC cannot react to this immediately. Keeping such a meeting secret is extremely difficult. He also wonders how the US would react to this. PC will evaluate this idea further with his advisors and let PM know.

PM sees the same objections as PC. Such a meeting cannot be kept secret and will perhaps create suspicions with certain parliaments.

PC will have this examined further. Additionally, he will contact Bundeskanzler Schmidt about the Dutch approach, and the Americans, and also--if PM thinks this useful--the Brits.

PM considers the latter not without value, but the key lies primarily with the FRG and US.

There is agreement that PM and PC will keep in touch, directly by telephone or through their advisors Berliguer and Merckelbach.
handwritten memorandum of conversation
Archive of A.A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Centre,
University Nijmegen
translation from the Dutch by Ruud van Dijk

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Only copy

Report of the conversation between PM van Agt [MP] and PM Thatcher on Thursday
December 6 1979 in London in the presence of their advisers Merckelbach and
Alexander ...

MP explains that the situation in the Netherlands for NATO gets worse by the day.
Resistance against TNF modernization increases constantly. There is a mass psychotic
movement washing over the country like a wave. Even in the churches there is preaching
against TNF modernization. MP fears that the Dutch cabinet will not survive this
situation, which in itself is of no importance to PM.

PM does have a stake in this, not only because she has the same opinion on many matters
as MP, but especially because the fall of a cabinet over a NATO matter in whichever
country should be considered a serious matter.

MP remarks that in parliament there actually is a majority resisting any decision
whatsoever, only able to agree to a moratorium, that is to say, do nothing and ask the SU
also to do nothing any more, but to negotiate.

PM asks if this majority wants this regardless of what the SU does; so without quid pro
quo.

MP replies that one does not want an endless moratorium; some want it for 1 year, others
for 1/2 year, just like the Danes. In this situation the Dutch cabinet can choose between
three options: (1) accept what is on the table in Brussels. This is only an academic
possibility because it would mean political suicide for the cabinet. NATO then has a
negative reaction from; the Netherlands and the next Dutch cabinet will undoubtedly
remove itself much further from NATO than where the current one is being forced to go.
(2) The next option is a position of resignation. The cabinet allows developments to take
their course and does not take a decision on the TNF proposals. In that case, the cabinet
can probably continue to exist, and it will let NATO know that one cannot even expect a
conditional yes from the Netherlands. For NATO this would be an extremely negative
thing; after all, it means the first phase of the Dutch isolation within the alliance. It goes
without saying that speaker is not interested in this solution. (3) The only option open to
the cabinet then is to find a position between these two extremes. The maximum MP
thinks he can reach -- this option has not yet been discussed in the cabinet -- is that the
Netherlands at this time does not agree to the deployment of 48 GLCMs on its territory,
but commits -- "commitment to commit" -- itself to accept GLCMs on its territory in 2
years if at that point it concludes that the negotiations with the SU have not yielded any
concrete results. The Netherlands could only draw the latter conclusion in consultation
with the allies. In light of the fact that many objections have arisen in the Netherlands to
the size of the intended TNF-modernization, the Dutch delegation to the special meeting
next Wednesday will at least have to make some verbal objections. The third element in
this compromise solution is that the Netherlands, accepting a number of GLCMs on its
territory, should be able to drop a number of the current nuclear tasks. About this,
discussions are already taking place between the Defense ministers involved which most
probably will lead to agreement.
PM hopes to find understanding for the difficult position in which the Dutch cabinet finds
itself in spite of his efforts. He is convinced that a firm yes to the NATO proposals, no
matter how heroic, will have no advantage whatsoever but only disadvantages for NATO.
PM asks how the population has come to this attitude and how the more right-wing
parties, like the VVD, which is to her right, position themselves.
MP replies that the VVD wants to accept the NATO proposals unconditionally, just like
the other right-wing parties. This, however, is no help because the cabinet only has a
majority of two seats and will only be able to do without 5 to 7 of the 49 CDA votes. The
CDA is hopelessly divided over this issue.
PM asks if the CDA will remain divided if the government asks for a vote of confidence.
In the UK this is an adequate means to get a rejected proposal through Parliament.
MP replies that a separate vote of confidence is not customary in the Netherlands. The
vote over for example the TNF issue counts as a vote of confidence if the government ties
its fate to it. How a large part of the population has come to this view has several
explanations. A deep dislike of everything connected with nuclear energy is growing,
also peacefull applications. This dislike now focuses on TNF-modernization also because
the government here actually has something to decide. The young have no memory any
more of the war; often they do not see why one should object to the Russians. The Dutch
people is a people of theologians, some more so, others less. This also means the
Dutchmen is a super individualist; each has his own conscience that is decisive, everyone
reads the Bible and has his own interpretation. MP next points out that since 1977 a
minority of the CDA has been against the current center-right coalition and always has
looked forward to a good opportunity to replace it with a center-left one. This minority
now sees its chance.
PM asks if those who now rail against TNF-modernization never think about the threat
represented by the SS-20 if there was no response from NATO.
MP replies that many of them would prefer a Russian occupation over destruction.
PM remarks that those who prefer being red over being dead ignore the many who are
both red and dead. For many of her generation there is no doubt that Hitler could have
been stopped by timely action. In that case there probably would not have been a world
war with all its horrors. The idea that one could avoid destruction by not resisting is
belied by countless examples from history. The Dutch who think this way, do they also
not want to be defended by the other NATO members. Futhermore, PM does not
understand that people who think so individualistically risk the right to determine their
own fate.
MP points out that one should nonetheless distinguish between several groups. Those
who are principled nuclear pacifists; those who feel safe underneath the American
nuclear umbrella and therefore fail to see why the Netherlands should station nuclear
weapons on its territory, and those who think society so rotten that it does not deserve to
be defended.
PM hopes that the compromise-solution now represented by MP will turn out to be feasible. She assumes that at least the Dutch cabinet has no objection that NATO defends the Netherlands and thus has no objection that NATO modernizes while the Netherlands will decide about its share later, depending on what the SU does. She wonders if the public information of the population cannot be improved. On English TV these days images of Russian tanks pulling back from East Germany were accompanied by commentary stating that this was a psychological trick to keep NATO from modernizing TNF. At the close of this broadcast it was show with the help of a map how the SS-20s cover all of Europe while the old NATO TNF cannot even reach the Russian border. This kind of presentations are convincing, without any commentary.

MP points out that public opinion in the Netherlands is manipulated in a high degree, not so much by the written press as by TV. The government only has access to very limited broadcasting time. MP furthermore points out that after the debate in parliament of November 7, the Dutch cabinet has had to take on the task of convincing the allies that NATO at this time should only decide on production, and not deployment of the new TNF-systems. Next, negotiations with the SU should be brought underway in order to judge in 2 years whether, in light of the course of these negotiations, there should be a decision to deploy after all.

PM remarks that one really cannot expect from the US that it will produce new TNF-systems without knowing whether and where these can be deployed. She believes that where possible the allies should follow one line; otherwise the entire TNF-discussion ends in a victory for the SU. As far as she is concerned MP can tell parliament and the press that the UK sees nothing in the decoupling idea and is willing to defend the Netherlands if it does not object to that.
handwritten memorandum of conversation

*Archive of A.A.A.M. van Agt*, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Centre,
University Nijmegen
translation from the Dutch by Ruud van Dijk

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Only copy

**Very Secret**

5 pages

Report of the discussion between President Carter and Min. Vance and MP van Agt and
Min. Van der Klaauw on Friday December 7, 1979 in Washington, in the presence of
Brzezinski, Aaron, Tammenoms Bakker, and Merckelbach

Pres. Carter has kept himself up-to-date as much as possible on the developments in the
Netherlands. The US-government is determined too to achieve further arm control and
arms reduction in Europe, both nuclear and conventional. This objective requires that the
allies form one front in regard to TNF-modernization and related proposals for
negotiations. Only then will the SU agree to realistic negotiations. The US-government
aimst to seize or create every opportunity for negotiations. One of the first tasks facing
speaker is to get SALT-II accepted by the Senate. Also for that it is important that the
unity of NATO in regard to the TNF-matter is maintained. The Dutch difficulties with
this are known to speaker but he is fully determined to go through with TNF-
modernization because otherwise negotiations with the SU will not yield any concrete
results. He is fully convinced that the SU will not move to reductions in the SS-20
program if NATO does not reach a joint position in regard to TNF-modernization and the
related proposals for talks.

MP Van Agt points out that the Second Chamber has held the latest debate yesterday on
the TNF-matter; this will not be the final debate. The outcome of this debate is far from
favorable for the government or NATO. The chamber has accepted a motion that in
essence says that presently no decision on production or deployment should be taken. In
the given situation three options are available to the Dutch government: (1) It can bow its
head and recognize that there is a majority ruling from parliament against the production
and deployment proposals. The government, however, is not prepared to accept this
ruling automatically as a fact of life. (2) On the other hand there is the -- theoretical --
option to ignore parliament's stipulation and to say yes to all of the proposals of the IDD.
This would mean political suicide, which in itself does not have to be relevant for the US
government, but which will as such have serveral negative effects for NATO. In the first
place it is a bad thing under all circumstances if a government fell because of a NATO-
matter. Next it is highly probable that after the fall of this cabinet a new cabinet will
come that will distance itself from NATO. (3) A third option is -- and it [is] highly
preferable for NATO -- that an in-between position is found between the two extremes
just described. Together with the ministers of foreign affairs and defense -- the other
ministers have not yet been fully involved with the preparation of the decision -- speaker
envision a "commitment to commit" in the sense that this coming Wednesday the
Netherlands declares itself willing to decide in 2 years -- this period is not set in stone --
about deployment of GLCMs in the Netherlands if the Dutch cabinet would come to the
conclusion then that the negotiations with the SU have yielded no or insufficient result. At that point, this conclusion would not be drawn by the Dutch government alone, but in consultation with the NATO allies.

Min. v.d. Klaauw specifies that in this construction the Dutch government is not bound to decide at that time, but will have to take a decision about deployment.

MP Van Agt says that in any case a new decision will have to be taken at that time. In consultation with the allies the Dutch cabinet will then have to make a judgment on the results of the negotiations with the SU and decide about deployment. Pres. Carter is aware that the Netherlands also has problems with the size of the modernization program of 572 warheads. Following the correspondence on this subject speaker nonetheless feels compelled to raise this here again.

Pres. Carter asks who exactly, after the indicated time period, would have to judge if the negotiations at that point have been adequate.

MP Van Agt replies that legally this will be a national decision, but that it will be taken in consultation with the allies. The Netherlands cannot give up part of its sovereignty. The position now to be taken does make it extremely difficult for the cabinet in power then to reach a conclusion that deviates from that of the allies.

Brzezinski asks if this position means that next Wednesday the Netherlands will not oppose NATO's plans but only delay its own decision.

MP Van Agt replies in the affirmative but adds that the Netherlands will still mount some verbal resistance to the size of the proposed modernization program.

Brzezinski believes that expressing an opinion on the size of the program does not correspond with the delay of one's own decision.

Pres. Carter agrees. Otherwise this would place the other allies in a difficult position. The US will negotiate on behalf of the allies, looking for success. This success will be more difficult to achieve if the Netherlands appears not to be involved with these negotiations by distancing itself -- temporarily -- from NATO's decision. Speaker asks if it can be useful to the Dutch cabinet if the US government confirmed once again in a letter -- for publication -- its commitment to arms control and arms reduction in Europe.

MP Van Agt points out that the in-between position he has outlined goes further than the decision of parliament, which has categorically rejected a production or deployment decision at this time.

Brzezinski asks if it is not possible for the Dutch government just to announce that it wants to postpone its decision in light of the decision by parliament. The SU initially said that in case of a modernization decision by NATO it no longer wishes to negotiate. In the meantime it has become clear that even in that case the SU is willing to open negotiations. This willingness could again be undermined if certain allies cause confusion. The Netherlands should not contribute to that by making critical comments about the modernization program and its size.

Pres. Carter asks if the Dutch government is sufficiently informed about SS-20 deployment.

Aaron replies to this in the affirmative, but this week two more new SS-20 sites have been discovered, bringing the number of SS-20 warheads to 675. This exceeds the proposed NATO program.

Pres. Carter asks to whom the suggested letter should be addressed, perhaps to parliament.
Min. Vance believes that the Netherlands, wanting to postpone its own decision, should refrain from undermining the decision of the other allies. MP Van Agt would like to point out, without trying to make excuses, that in no other NATO-country there is such an intensive and widespread debate about this matter. Min. v.d. Klaauw wonders if the letter suggested by pres. Carter could not be counterproductive. The Dutch parliament might feel pressured by this. Speaker will consider this suggestion further and report the outcome via ambassador Tammenoms Bakker.

Pres. Carter confirms again the willingness of the US to take advantage of all opportunities for mutual reduction in the nuclear arsenal. Essential for this is that the SU knows that NATO is determined, and for that a united NATO front is of the utmost importance. He wishes the Dutch government otherwise the best of luck.
Report of the discussion between Min. Vance and Brzezinski and MP Van Agt and Min. Van der Klaauw on Friday, December 7 1979 in Washington in the presence of Aaron, Bartholome, Tammenoms Bakker and Merckelbach.

MP Van Agt has understood from the preceding conversation with pres. Carter that the US-government would like to see that the Netherlands, if it wants to postpone its own decision for 2 years, does not make any further criticism of the character and the size of the TNF-modernization program.

Min. Vance indeed believes that the Netherlands should limit itself to its "commitment to commit" without further commentary on the proposed program.

Brzezinski argues that it is not the character and size of the program, but the attitude of parliament that is the reason for the position the Dutch government believes it needs to take.

MP Van Agt understands this reaction but points out that parliament no doubt will ask to what number of GLCMs the "commitment to commit" refers; 48 or fewer.

Min. Vance believes that this point can be left open. After 2 years the Dutch government could also decide on the number of GLCMs to be deployed.

Aaron points out that 5 countries are involved in the deployment plan, which is what production is geared toward. Given the position of the Netherlands, speaker sees two possibilities: the Netherlands can be removed from the IDD, or the Dutch share in the deployment can be left open to be determined in 2 years.

Min. v.d. Klaauw remarks that Aaron asks less of the Netherlands than it is willing to do. The Netherlands could subscribe to the IDD, but delay the decision on deployment of GLCMs on Dutch territory. Speaker would want to formulate the following: the Dutch parliament asks the government not to take a decision now (a word v.d. Stoel entered into the motion); in other words, later this would be possible. If the government were to follow to the letter the motion accepted by parliament, it will have problems with one of the members of the coalition, the VVD, which has always been prepared to subscribe fully to the IDD.

Aaron says that there can be no doubt that the US rather sees the Netherlands mentioned in the program.

Bartholome asks if the Dutch statement regarding delay of the decision to deploy in the Netherlands will be made separately or has to be included with the document itself.

Min. v.d. Klaauw believes the Dutch contribution should continue to be mentioned in the document.

Aaron takes it that the Netherlands therefore wants to remain in the documents with the aforementioned reservation in regard to the deployment in the Netherlands.
Min. v.d. Klaauw needs this for his own party, the VVD.

MP van Agt points out that there is much pressure on the Dutch government to make a clear conditional connection between the decisions of this coming Wednesday and the ratification of SALT II. Speaker is aware of how sensitive this is in the American Senate, but this is such a dogma for many Dutch that the government cannot ignore it. The question is how this condition can be mentioned in the Dutch declaration with as little damage as possible for the handling of SALT II in the Senate.

Min. v.d. Klaauw believes that the Netherlands could declare to expect that SALT II will be ratified in 2 years.

MP van Agt sees besides that the possibility to state that the Dutch decision will be taken 1 year after the ratification of SALT II.

Bartholome says that this would help the TNF-modernization but not the handling of SALT II in the Senate.

Min. Vance adds that a number of senators sees the TNF-modernization as a -- impermissible -- means to win them over for SALT II. On them the second alternative, mentioned by the MP, would have a counterproductive effect.

Brzezinski believes that any conditional connection between TNF-modernization and the ratification of SALT II a bad thing. The US-government wants to achieve both; that is why the first alternative is the best. Speaker furthermore points out that the Belgian government too has gotten into difficulties because of the developments in the Netherlands. Against that background the US-government can accept that the Dutch government postpones its decision for 2 years, but it must then remain in the document and make no further criticism of the TNF-modernization program.

Min. Vance will underline extra the importance of a rapid ratification of SALT II in his press conference in Brussels.

Min. v.d. Klaauw would prefer to state in the Dutch declaration that the Netherlands will take a decision at the December 1981 meeting, instead of in 2 years. In that case it neither has to criticize the size of the program nor make a reservation with regard to the ratification of SALT II.

Brzezinski believes that especially the reason for the Dutch delay -- the decision of parliament -- needs to be stated clearly. Speaker asks if the formulation will be "after or within 2 years."

MP Van Agt prefers "no later than 2 years."

Bartholome proposes "in December 1981."

Aaron asks whether it would also be acceptable to leave the communiqué unchanged and have the Secretary-General explain the Dutch position separately to the press.

Min. v.d. Klaauw thinks this less practical because the Netherlands would then still be associated with all proposals. How the passages in the IDD and the communiqué, where countries are mentioned by name, have to be adjusted to the Dutch position would have to be considered further in Brussels.

Brzezinski again points to the possible reactions in Belgium, especially in response to the developments in the Netherlands.

MP Van Agt wants, in that light, to delay the decision by the Dutch cabinet as long as possible. Thanks to this visit to the US it has become possible for speaker to have the discussion in the council of ministers in any case only after the weekend. This is now envisioned for Monday evening or Tuesday.
Aaron has understood from premier Martens that he has agreed with MP Van Agt to take the decision at the same time.

MP Van Agt confirms this, but can imagine that, if the situation in Belgium develops favorably, it would be better for the Belgian cabinet to decide earlier. Aaron asks if one envisions another debate in parliament before Wednesday. Min. v.d. Klaauw believes it important also for this reason to have the cabinet's decision at the very latest moment.

MP Van Agt asks in connection with the preparations for the debate in parliament following the decision, how the government could best respond to questions about the relationship between the TNF-modernization and option 3 in the MBFR. Aaron believes that the US has to follow through on its offer unilaterally to withdraw 1000 warheads from Europe now that the SU too is willing to withdraw 1000 tanks. In addition, the entire specter of TNF on both sides should be available for negotiations. This is why it is not wise once more to refer to the initial nuclear offer in option 3. Bartholome points out that an explanatory note has been drafted in the interest of the public discussion of these issues.

Min. v.d. Klaauw has understood before that option 3 is dead. He does think it of great importance that there will be new proposals quickly for the second phase of MBFR. Aaron says that these proposals already are being dealt with in the "silent procedure."

MP Van Agt asks the view of the US-government on the proposals of Min. Scholten regarding the reduction of the current nuclear tasks of the Dutch military, which he has discussed also with Min. Vance and Aaron. Some aspects have not yet been resolved. Min. Vance replies this can always be discussed. Bartholome points out that so far the US has responded to these proposals in the context of a Dutch participation in the TNF-modernization. Aaron remarks that the US, also separately from the TNF-issue, has little difficulty with the proposals of Min. Scholten. Only the timing of the implementation of some of them needs to be looked at further. Speaker next makes several suggestions for the presentation of the current discussions to the press, to which the Dutch officials agree.

MP Van Agt finally remarks that he and Min. Van der Klaauw have tried to give a view of the approach they will present to the Dutch cabinet. The remarks made by the US-side will be integrated with that. The US-government should however be aware that it is not 100% certain that the entire cabinet will agree to this approach. The first risk speaker runs prior to next Wednesday is a permanent difference of opinion within the cabinet. Next there is the risk of a rejection by parliament of the position the Dutch cabinet will take next Wednesday in Brussels. In that case speaker will consider himself obligated out of solidarity with the allies to force a vote of confidence. However, it is by no means certain then either that the cabinet will be able to survive.
Draft conclusions from the discussions in Washington on December 7, 1979

From the Dutch side, the following has been put forward:

The Dutch government declares itself willing to decide in December 1981 to deploy GLCMs on Dutch territory, if the Dutch government at that time would, in consultation with the allies, come to the conclusion that the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union have yielded no or insufficient results. This position means that next Wednesday, the Netherlands will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision.

The Dutch side will still express some reservations about the scope of the TNF modernization program and once again underlining the connection between this program and the ratification of SALT II.

Finally the Dutch side will once again emphasize the urgency of reducing the current number of nuclear tasks of the Dutch military, an issue where a large measure of agreement has been reached between the defense ministers involved.

From the American side, the following response has been made:

If, because of the position the Second Chamber has taken, the Dutch government feels compelled to postpone the decision for two years, it should limit itself to this announcement and refrain from any further commentary on the nature and the scope of the TNF-modernization program. The US in this case will assume that the number of GLCMs possibly to be stationed in the Netherlands will also remain open for the time being.

A reference to the relationship between TNF and Salt II ratification is then also considered superfluous, and for the US even undesirable.

The Dutch proposals regarding the cancellation of certain nuclear tasks are acceptable in principle for the US, also separate from the position taken by the Netherlands in the matter of TNF-modernization.

The Dutch position will be mentioned in the communique of the special session of this coming Wednesday, Dec. 12.

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1 By Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merkelbach.
2 See Documents 11 and 12.
handwritten memorandum

Archive of A.A.M. van Agt, box 41, TNF file, Catholic Documentation Center, University Nijmegen
translation from the Dutch and footnotes: Ruud van Dijk, University of Amsterdam

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Very Secret

MP
Me\(^2\)

Brussels 4-12-'79\(^3\)
- Provisional Belgian view: paired decision\(^4\) but postpone its implementation by 6 months.
- In agreement with provisional Dutch approach: stay as closely as possible to IDD, but nuanced.
- Watch out for negative mutual influence. Therefore Neth. and Belgium decide as late as possible and simultaneously. MP's keep in constant contact.

Rome 6-12-'79\(^5\)
- Italian view: in accordance with IDD (90% certain: Senate still needs to decide)
- Reactions to provisional Dutch position:
  * Provided FRG agrees, should not expect any cooling from Italy toward Neth.
  * Willing to pay price to prevent Dutch distancing from NATO.
  * Decoupling of NATO decision not acceptable.
  * Neth. reservation regarding deployment acceptable (provided also for FRG).
- Italy will plead our case with FRG and US.

London 6-12-'79\(^6\)
- English [sic] view: entirely in accordance with IDD
- Reactions to provisional Dutch position:
  * If NATO can modernize, no objection against later decision on Dutch share depending on what SU does.
  * Decoupling of NATO decision unacceptable.
  * NATO one line as much as possible, otherwise victory for Moscow.
- Presentation Dutch policy can probably be improved
- Willing to defend Neth. if it is not capable to do so itself.
- Entire detailed critique (by Carrington et al) wiped off the table by Thatcher: the Dutch cabinet must survive this crisis!

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\(^1\) By Van Agt's top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach. No date.
\(^2\) MP: Prime Minister; Me: J.P.M.H. Merckelbach, top adviser prime minister.
\(^3\) See document 8.
\(^4\) A reference to the two tracks of the NATO decision: deployment and arms control.
\(^5\) See document 9.
\(^6\) See document 10.
Washington 7-12-'79
If Neth. govt., because of the position of the 2nd Chamber, feels compelled to postpone its decision until Dec. '81, it should make no further commentary on the nature and the scope of the LRTNF modernization program.
- US assumes that the number of GLCMs possibly to be deployed in Neth. will also remain open for the time being.
- Reference to the relationship between LRTNF and Salt II is, in light of Dutch position, superfluous and for US undesirable.
- Dutch proposals regarding cancellation of current nuclear tasks are in principle acceptable for US, also separate from Neth. position regarding LRTNF. A few problems with the timing are solvable.
- Reconfirmation full commitment US govt. to disarmament in Europe, both nuclear and conventional.

Bonn 10-12-'79
- FRG view: in accordance with IDD. One line with US, without wanting to continue as US vanguard in Europe.
- Neth. cannot and should not block decisionmaking in NATO.
- No objection to Dutch reservation: deployment decision in Dec. '81 depending on periodic NATO evaluations (not reappraisal) of the state of the disarmament talks.
- Cancellation current nuclear tasks to be shelved for 2 years.
- FRG does not criticize Dutch position.
- Belgians better, if necessary, make the same reservation as Neth., (at least not a reservation that mentions a 6 month period).
- Danes had better speak last. Their reservation should be buried somewhere in the record.

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7 See documents 11-13.
8 Reference to Dutch desire to cancel certain, but not all, nuclear tasks performed by its military.
9 No memorandum of conversation found in the TNF file of the Van Agt papers.
10 In English.
Very Secret

Result deliberations Belgian core-cabinet, 11-12-'79

The decision regarding the modernization of NATO’s intermediate nuclear weapons should be made conditional on the following specifications ( qualifications):

1) It should be possible at all times to change or cancel (annuler) the implementation of this decision in response to the progress of the negotiations with the USSR, with the aim to ensure and stabilize the military balance at a level as low as possible. For this reason, no automatic development can be accepted here.

2) NATO’s new intermediate-range weapons have to be developed by the United States under its own responsibility.

3) The implementation of the modernization decision for NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear weapons is being interrupted for a period of 6 months, as far as implementation measures in Europe are concerned.

4) Even after this time period the decision will only be implemented on the abrogating condition that implementation will not take place if the arms control negotiations in this area lead to satisfactory results.

5) At its ministerial meeting in May 1980, NATO will evaluate the state of the Soviet Union’s deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons and the progress of the negotiations with the aim of achieving mutual arms reduction at a level as low as possible.

6) Based on this evaluation NATO will if necessary (en cas d’échec) adjust or cancel (annuler) its own program specifically with regard to measures to be implemented on European territory, with the aim to create and stabilize a balance between East and West in this area at a level as low as possible.

7) At every six-month ministerial meeting of NATO there will be an investigation of the state of the negotiations with the USSR, and based on this relevant decisions will be taken immediately regarding the implementation of the decision to modernize NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

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1 By Van Agt’s top adviser, J. P. M. H. Merckelbach. Not dated.
2 Initially: 10-12-’79, but 10 changed into 11 (i.e. December 11, 1979). There is no indication of how the Dutch prime minister’s office obtained this information.
3 In spite of this opening quotation mark, there is no closing equivalent in the document.
4 In French.
Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers

(The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces)

Chairman: Mr. J. Luns

Quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet long range nuclear capability - Modernization and expansion of Soviet TNF - Parallel courses of TNF modernization and arms control - European deployment of US ground-launched systems - Withdrawal of 100

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:
2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.
3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems
4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.
5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by
highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions
by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

1. France did not participate in the Special Meeting
19. Dezember 1979

An den
Präsidenten der sozialistischen
Republik Rumänien
Herrn Nicolae Ceausescu
- Büro des Präsidenten -

Bukarest / Rumänien

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident,

für die mir übermittelten freundlichen Wünsche und Grüße danke ich Ihnen sehr und möchte Ihnen meinen Glückwunsch zu Ihrer Wiederwahl als Generalsekretär der kommunistischen Partei Rumäniens übermitteln.

Gerne erinnere ich mich an unsere interessanten und fruchtbaren Gespräche bei meinem Besuch in Ihrem Land im Sommer des vergangenen Jahres.

Seither sind in einer Reihe von Fragen, die wir damals erörtert haben, Entwicklungen eingetreten, zu denen ich bei dieser Gelegenheit gern einige Bemerkungen machen möchte.


Ich nehme an, daß Sie über den Verlauf des Parteitages der SPD Anfang Dezember in Berlin unterrichtet worden sind. Die deutschen Sozialdemokraten haben im Bereich der Entspannung und der Zusammenarbeit, aufbauend auf der amtlichen Politik, neue und weiterführende Überlegungen entwickelt. Letzte Woche haben nun die zuständigen Gremien des westlichen Bündnissystems die seit langem vorbereiteten Entschlüsse gefaßt.
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Wie Sie sicher wissen, werden dadurch für drei, wahrscheinlich mehr als drei Jahre noch keine neuen Waffen stationiert. Es ist also Zeit für Verhandlungen, und diese Zeit gilt es zu nutzen.

Ich möchte nicht versäumen, Sie davon zu unterrichten, daß ich vor kurzem ein Schreiben des Generalsekretärs der KPdSU ausführlich beantwortet und hierbei auch an die Verantwortung der UdSSR erinnert habe. Das Angebot der sowjetischen Seite, so wie dies von Herrn Breschnew im Oktober anläßlich seines Besuches in der DDR formuliert wurde, hat, wie Ihnen bekannt ist, eine positive Antwort durch uns erfahren. Sowohl die SPD als auch die Bundesregierung haben die Hinweise aufgenommen und in den Dialog, den wir in unserem Bündnissystem pflegen, eingebbracht. Jetzt sollten die Beteiligten alles tun, damit Verhandlungen oder Sondierungen möglichst früh im nächsten Jahr beginnen können.


Ergänzt werden müßten diese Verhandlungen nach unserer Einschätzung durch ein erstes Zwischenresultat der Wiener Verhandlungen über Truppenbegrenzungen - wozu wir Vorschläge eingebracht haben - und durch die Verabredung zusätzlicher vertrauensbildender Maßnahmen im Rahmen des KSZE-Prozesses.

Ihre Bedenken hinsichtlich einer Verschärfung der Entwicklung in Teilen des Nahen Ostens teile ich. Mit besonderer Sorge betrachten wir die Entwicklungen im Iran, die nicht nur die USA betreffen, sondern weitreichende Konsequenzen für West und Ost haben können.

Was den Meinungsaustausch zwischen unseren beiden Parteien betrifft, an den Sie unseren Beobachter auf Ihrem Parteitag erinnert haben, so glaube ich, daß wir – und hierbei beziehe ich mich auch auf unsere seinerzeitigen Überlegungen in Bukarest – Formen finden sollten und können, die es ermöglichen, sich gegenseitig zu informieren und Themen von beiderseitigem Interesse angemessen zu erörtern.

Ich nehme die Gelegenheit wahr, um Ihnen auf diesem Wege meine guten Wünsche für Sie persönlich und für Ihr Land zu übermitteln und verbleibe

mit freundlichen Empfehlungen

gez. Willy Brandt