THE EUROMISSILES
CRISIS AND
THE END OF THE
COLD WAR,
1977-1987

10-12 DECEMBER 2009
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ROME, ITALY

Convened by the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA); the Woodrow
Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP); Fondazione Craxi; the
George Washington University’s National Security Archive; the University of Paris III-
Sorbonne Nouvelle; and the University of Paris I-Pantheon Sorbonne; in cooperation with
Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt Stiftung; and under the sponsorship of the Italian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the United States in Rome.
Dear Conference Participants,

We are pleased to present to you this document reader, intended to facilitate discussion at the upcoming conference on the Euromissiles Crisis, to be held in Rome on 10-12 December 2009.

This collection was compiled by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) with indispensable support from conference participants, outside contributors, and institutional sponsors. It is by no means comprehensive. In selecting the documents, we sought to include some of the most important materials available and to provide a broad overview of the Euromissiles Crisis from a variety of perspectives.

This reader is divided into four parts: The Peace Movement highlights the perspective of the grassroots activists from both sides of the Iron Curtain who opposed the Euromissiles deployment and the arms race generally, and the three chronological sections on International Diplomacy focus upon the actions and views of the policy-makers and world leaders who were at the very center of the Euromissiles Crisis.

We are extremely grateful to everyone who contributed documentary evidence to this reader, including Gianni Battimelli, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Elizabeth Charles, Lodovica Clavarino, Helge Danielsen, Ruud van Dijk, Matthew Evangelista, Nathan Jones, Holger Nehring, Leopoldo Nuti, Giordana Pulcini, Bernd Rother, Giles Scott-Smith and James Graham Wilson. Piero Craveri, Laura Pizei and Serena Baldari played a key role in making documents from the Craxi Foundation available in this reader.

Once the documents were in hand, a number of people worked to ensure that this collection was ready for dissemination, including Christian Ostermann, Bernd Schaefer, Mircea Munteanu and Kristina Terzieva at CWIHP, the German Historical Institute’s German History in Documents and Images Project Manager Kelly McCullough, Lars Unar Stordal Vegstein from the London School of Economics, as well as an extraordinarily capable team of CWIHP Research Assistants, including Pieter Biersteker, Amy Freeman, Ekaterina Radaeva, Elizabeth Schumaeccker, and Katarzyna Stempniak.

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Finally, we would also like to recognize the efforts of those whose hard work has made this conference possible, including Matteo Gerlini for his pioneering research at the Fondazione Craxi, and of course Leopoldo Nuti, and his outstanding staff, Giordana Pulcini, Lodovica Clavarino and Flavia Gasbarri, as well as the Wilson Center’s Diana Micheli, who designed the conference poster and program.

Tim McDonnell
Washington, D.C.
November 2009
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International Diplomacy, 1984-1987
Part Four:  
International Diplomacy

1984
CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TO: P - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
FROM: EUR - John H. Kelly, Acting
SUBJECT: Gromyko's Speech at Stockholm

Judging by Gromyko's speech and the instant commentary from TASS on his meeting with the Secretary, the Soviets have decided that a renewed anti-American propaganda offensive is the best public antidote to our more conciliatory line on East-West relations. For Moscow to have conceded openly that the Kremlin attaches even the slightest credence to U.S. professions of interest in improved relations would have undercut the goal of raising West European anxieties and thereby pressuring us into unilateral concessions.

But while pursuing with a vengeance the goal of putting the worst possible face on US-Soviet relations, the Soviets are being studiously vague on the substance of the live issues on the US-Soviet agenda. Thus in his speech Gromyko was careful not to exclude the possibility of dealing constructively with Washington or to slam the door shut on renewed START and MBFR negotiations.

Gromyko's Address at the CDP

The first half of Gromyko's vituperative address was largely a regurgitation of Andropov's even more blistering statement on US-Soviet relations of last September 28. Like the Andropov statement, Gromyko's central theme was U.S. "militarism." He alleged that the Administration is one that is "thinking in categories of war and acting accordingly," seeking to achieve military superiority over the USSR and to impose its will on the rest of the world. He indirectly dismissed the President's Monday speech as a "trick" inspired by "short-term considerations." And not surprisingly, Gromyko rebutted our charges of arms control violations, charging that our accusations are an effort to conceal the "grossest violations" by the U.S. of unspecified treaties and agreements.

Unlike Andropov, however, Gromyko did not write off the possibility of a change in U.S. policy, and reaffirmed Soviet
commitment to a dialogue between East and West. Andropov, you will recall, stated:

"If anyone has any illusions about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the present Administration's policy, recent events have dispelled them once and for all."

Gromyko, in contrast, said:

"I would like to believe that in the leading circles of the United States, the upper hand will be taken by the understanding of the balefulness of the course based on the replacement of cooperation with confrontation."

Moreover, while reiterating Soviet preconditions for resumption of the INF talks, Gromyko avoided any mention of START or MBFR -- perhaps to signal Moscow's readiness to pursue serious negotiations in these areas in the near future. (Gromyko reportedly told the Swedish Foreign Minister that the Vienna negotiations could be resumed "if this is so desired.")

The second half of Gromyko's address was devoted to the CDE. As expected, he made clear that Moscow does not intend to accept the Western focus on measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and will instead concentrate on declaratory proposals like nuclear no-first-use, non-use of force and the like. He threw cold water on Western proposals aimed at increasing the "transparency" of military activities by ruling out attempts to "look for a crack in the fence to peep at one's neighbors."

TASS on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting

As if Gromyko's speech were not enough to dampen expectations for his meeting with the Secretary, TASS followed up by issuing a short dispatch on the meeting just an hour after the five-hour session had begun (most likely before Gromyko had even spoken, assuming that the Secretary, as guest, went first). The TASS account summarizes Gromyko's supposed presentation to the Secretary on the threat posed by U.S. militarism, in which he asserted that U.S. actions do not square with our professed goal of greater international stability. The Soviets treated Ambassador Hartman to a similar "instant analysis" following his November 25 meeting with Gromyko on the Middle East; the purpose then as now was to squelch any perception of productive US-Soviet dialogue.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

Date: January 18, 1984

Time: 1500 - 2010 hours

Place: Soviet Embassy, Stockholm, Sweden

U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

The Honorable George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador, Moscow
The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Senior Advisor, NSC Staff
The Honorable Richard R. Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
William Krimer, Interpreter (Notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS:

A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Premier, Minister of Foreign Affairs
G.M. Korniienko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
V.G. Makarov, Ambassador, Personal Aide to Gromyko, MFA
S.P. Tarasenko, Counselor, Deputy Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
V. Sukhodrev, Counselor, 2nd European Department, MFA, Interpreter (Notetaker)

Foreign Minister Gromyko thought it would probably be advisable to agree at the outset of today's talk that the subject matter of discussions will cover two main areas: (1) the current international situation, i.e. questions of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the United States; and (2) the bilateral relations between the two countries. Of course, these two areas were extremely broad and included a variety of elements. If some element or other were considered by one of the sides to be unsuitable for discussion, it would of course be senseless to discuss it. Thus, the discussions should cover those questions where both sides agree there was room for discussions, taking into account past experience.

Secretary Shultz said that prior to leaving Washington he had discussed this and other matters with Ambassador Dobrynin. They had touched on the question of the agenda for this meeting. The Secretary took it that Dobrynin had received some response from Gromyko with regard to the general outline of the
agenda. Depending on how broadly the two items named by
Gromyko were viewed, he would think that their views should be
compatible. We had identified arms control as one item for
discussion; regional issues, such as the Middle East, as a
second item; and human rights as a third item. Then there were
a variety of strictly bilateral issues, such as trade, as a
fourth item. Of course in each of these items there were
various categories and, while the words were perhaps different,
generally he felt that both sides meant the same thing.

Gromyko said that he had not consented to all the specific
issues mentioned by the Secretary, but, as he had said, the two
broad areas for discussion would be the international situation
and bilateral relations. He thought that, as he had told
Dobrynin, this was the direction in which the discussions
should go. He noted that the Secretary had named a number of
other items, among them, for example, human rights. Since the
Secretary had named this matter, he would tell him at the very
outset of their discussion that he did not intend to discuss
any such topic. Of course, the Secretary could talk about it
if he insisted, but Gromyko would not enter into discussion of
this item.

The Secretary said that of course it would be up to Gromyko
whether he would wish to respond to something the Secretary
would say. That was Gromyko's privilege. But the Secretary
said that he must make some comments.

Gromyko repeated that he would tell the Secretary at the
very outset that he would not enter into discussion of this
topic. The two of them already had some experience when one
side does not wish to discuss some specific issue. He would
only say again that he would not discuss this item because the
Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its
internal affairs. To raise this issue would therefore be an
evident waste of time. Surely it would be too much of a luxury
for foreign ministers to lose time on that sort of item. As
for himself he had no wish to lose time. As for the Secretary,
he could of course do so, but without Gromyko's participation.
He would suggest that the Secretary feel free to speak on the
two items named, i.e. the international situation and bilateral
issues. Or, if the Secretary preferred, Gromyko would lead off
and talk on our bilateral relations. He thought that neither
of them would feel constrained and they would have enough room
to exchange views, particularly about the Stockholm
Conference. At the Conference the Secretary had expressed the
views of the U.S. Administration and today Gromyko had
expressed the views of the Soviet Government and the Soviet
leadership. He thought it would not be superfluous if he said
something in addition to what he had stated publicly.
The Secretary thanked Gromyko and said he would proceed to some items. The first thing he would say was that he had come to listen to Gromyko's speech and had been disappointed. He entirely disagreed with some, in fact most, of Gromyko's statements, and found many of them unacceptable. However, he did not want to take the time to go through that speech now, but would instead address the nature of our relationship and its content.

As the Secretary had told Dobrynin upon the latter's departure from Moscow at the end of last November, the President wanted to see our relations in a more constructive state. Therefore he would speak not only in the context of the various issues we had been discussing with Gromyko in one forum or another, but also address the mechanisms for achieving a more constructive relationship. He would note that contacts between himself and Gromyko had been greatest in well-publicized forums, generating a great deal of public attention. On the other hand, it seemed to President Reagan -- and the Secretary had the impression that Dobrynin had agreed with this -- that it would be useful to establish a private channel for discussions which would be out of the limelight and not open to public commentary. The President had said that he would like to see something like that take place.

For that to be effective he thought it would be necessary to manage things carefully so that it would be clear that an individual speaking in such private discussions was speaking for his country and that this would be known to each side. For the United States, the President had asked the Secretary to help him manage this process. We would expect the people on our side of this able to take part in such discussions as well as other designated people at times. He believed it would be appropriate for such discussions to be held between Ambassador Dobrynin and himself or whomever he would designate. Ambassador Hartman would be the appropriate interlocutor in Moscow, and the President would expect him to be used in this capacity. Whenever he and Gromyko met it was a public event, but beyond this sometimes experts on a specific subject would have to be designated and it should be clear to both sides that they spoke for their country.

The Secretary had one further point. When Dobrynin had returned from Moscow he had discussed this with the Secretary and told him that Gromyko had authorized this process. Both he and Dobrynin had emphasized to each other the importance of such discussions carrying real content, so as to make progress, and not just be dialogue for the sake of dialogue. To sum up, beyond the publicly known meetings between officials of the two countries there was room for private discussions. Dobrynin had
said that Gromyko had approved of this and, if that was indeed the case, one should reflect on how to proceed from here.

Gromyko said he first wanted to address the Secretary's comments about his speech at the Conference. In that speech he had outlined in some detail the Soviet attitude to some of the questions that were within the context of the task facing the Stockholm Conference. He had focused attention on some specific matters and saw no need to expand on this now. On the other hand, it was absolutely impossible to regard the issues before the Stockholm Conference in isolation from what happened beyond the Conference hall. From this standpoint, he naturally had to touch on U.S. foreign policy. In his speech in Washington President Reagan had talked about the international situation as a whole and commented on Soviet foreign policy. As is his custom, he had not minced words or spared words in choosing expressions to depict Soviet foreign policy from a very broad perspective. The Secretary had said that a number of statements in Gromyko's speech today -- in fact almost all of them -- were unacceptable to him. He had to tell the Secretary that he regarded this statement as praise for his speech. This was precisely the reaction he had expected. Indeed, he would have been put on his guard if the Secretary had said that the Soviets were quite right in saying what they had.

The Secretary interjected that he was glad to hear that Gromyko was not on his guard.

Gromyko continued by saying that he had pointed to U.S. policy as the principal cause of the increase in tensions in the world today and of the dangerous situation currently existing. He also had to tell the Secretary that the speech he had delivered yesterday, as well as the President's speech, were unacceptable to the Soviet side in many respects, in fact with regard to most of their elements.

Of course, the Secretary's speech and the President's speech had contained some individual words or phrases which, taken separately, had not generated any Soviet doubts. But the entire structure of the two speeches was hostile to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet policy of peace; and that was the only assessment of the two speeches that he could arrive at. He would point out that what was important for the Soviet leadership were not individual phrases or words, not the music, so to speak, but the actual content of those statements.

He would ask the Secretary what sort of a thesis it was to speak of the "artificial division of Europe," Gromyko continued. What kind of a proposition was that? Obviously the Secretary
and the President did not like the fact that there were some socialist states in Europe and, obviously, the Soviet side did not like the fact that there were some capitalist states on the other side. He would put it even more broadly. The U.S. did not like the fact that there were socialist states in the world and, of course, the Soviets did not like it that there were imperialist states in the world. But, he would ask, what were they then to do? If both sides stood on such a position, there would be a wall between them, a blank wall built of steel or concrete or whatever. In that case it would of course be impossible to find any points of contact in any of the discussions. He would recall that after arriving in Stockholm, just as previously in Madrid and in Belgrade and Helsinki before that, he had believed it important to find the points of contact between various positions. Such contacts were sought consistently by all the 35 participants in the Conference. If points of contact were found, this would indeed be tremendously important for the international situation as a whole.

Gromyko said this was his response to the Secretary's comments regarding the unacceptability of Gromyko's speech. He would point out that the essence of his speech today consisted of trying to seek and find common language between the socialist states and the capitalist states, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty Organization states and the NATO states. This was the main objective the Soviet delegation would strive for at the Stockholm Conference.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that before Gromyko proceeded further, he wanted to clarify something that was evidently based on a misunderstanding. Our position was that if any country wanted to have a socialist system, that would be up to the people of that country to decide; we believed it would be up to them. Based on his observation, socialist systems did not work very well, but that was a separate question. It was not the cause of the wall between us. The main problems were those of free movement across the wall, free interchange of people and ideas. Both the President and he had tried to say as clearly as possible that we recognized that our two systems were very different and that we did not care if any country chose either system of its own free will. If indeed a country chose socialism, so be it. However, we did not believe that the difference between our systems should preclude a constructive relationship between us. These were two different things.

Gromyko continued by noting that the Secretary had touched on a question of procedure. He thought we had agreement that certain specific matters could be discussed in private discussions out of the limelight of the media and public. It
was clearly agreed that on the U.S. side the Secretary would speak for the President, as would whomever he designated, for example Ambassador Hartman. But this was purely a matter of procedure, an organizational matter. It was high time for such private discussions to take place. Today it seemed useful to talk about international politics because the world situation was very acute, relations between our two countries were bad, and the general situation throughout the world was very tense. He had intended today to touch on some of these matters, but had not felt that the Secretary was prepared to discuss them. On the other hand, where else should these most acute and timely matters be discussed if not at meetings such as the present one?

Gromyko noted that in his interjection the Secretary had ended by stating the correct proposition that, if a country wanted to have a socialist system, it should be allowed to live; and if a country wanted its people to live under a capitalist system, it should equally be allowed to live. This was basically a correct conclusion. However, the trouble was that the actual policy of the United States was not in line with that conclusion. Why was it necessary to consider that the evil or the cause of the present tensions was the division of Europe into socialist and capitalist countries? This statement by the Secretary was in conflict with what he had said just now. Somehow he was not making ends meet.

Further, if the Secretary's last comment was correct, that meant people must have the right to live under whatever system they preferred, why then declare a crusade against socialism? This false -- and he would even say illiterate -- slogan concealed efforts to motivate people to fight against the socialist system even in the countries that had chosen that route. The Soviet side categorically objected to anything of the sort. Furthermore, this was a clearly unscientific primitive concept, but it was precisely this that made it impossible to reach agreement on the questions facing the forum in Stockholm today.

The Secretary said that he would try once again to explain his views. Socialism as a system of organizing economic activity had been advocated by many people. In his opinion it did not work well for people, but, as he had said, if people wanted to organize their activities that way, that was their privilege. It was not this that he objected to in Gromyko's comments on what Gromyko had picked out of the Secretary's speech. It was not economic activity, but the lack of freedom of people that had led to the division as represented by the Berlin Wall, not socialism as such, but the restrictions on interaction between the people on both sides. Taking the
Soviet Union and the United States as two countries existing in this world, we believed, and Gromyko had said that he believed, that it should be possible to find areas where we can reach mutually satisfactory conclusions. Indeed, we would not be engaged in discussions if this were not so. We were not trying to reform the socialist countries and did not think the Soviet side would attempt to reform capitalist countries, but these were different issues.

The Secretary certainly agreed with Gromyko that the present forum right here was the one in which the two sides should discuss the main questions troubling the world today and troubling our two countries. In his speech today and earlier, in Madrid, Gromyko had emphasized that one of these issues concerned arms, and particularly nuclear arms and our mutual desire to reduce their numbers. In this light the Secretary would comment on various areas of arms talks and would express our views.

First, the Secretary would comment on strategic arms reductions. We have held five rounds of talks in that area, and while it was fair to say that some progress had been achieved, we were still far from resolving the issues. Reflecting on that, it seemed to him that what we were seeing was that Soviet strategic forces and our strategic forces, both very impressive and large, were structured very differently from each other. The decisions of the two countries on which road to follow in the development of arms produced a great asymmetry between the forces of each side.

On the one hand, as we looked at the situation, we saw Soviet heavy MIRVed ICBMs with tremendous throw-weight and great destructive potential, which appear to us to be a destabilizing factor; we wanted to see them reduced. Reading their account of the negotiations, it seemed that the Soviets had expressed concern over U.S. heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. In the Soviet view these were considered a threat. Thus, in the negotiations we have talked of various forces and each side had offered proposals, but he and the President wondered whether we would not get further if we could find a common framework that would encompass these problems.

If we could agree on such a framework, then it would be possible to tell our negotiators to go back to the negotiating table and work out the details. In such a framework neither side would try drastically to restructure each other's forces, but would identify in the negotiations many different items and would establish a relationship between them. Therefore, we thought it would be worthwhile in private discussions to seek a framework that would include heavy ICBMs on the Soviet side and
heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles on the U.S. side. We thought that through such a framework it might be possible to make the negotiations fruitful.

Thus, on START it would be well to set a date for resumption of the talks, the Secretary said, but that was not his point. He simply wanted to raise with Gromyko the possibility of establishing a framework in private discussions that could lead to progress. If that was of interest to Gromyko we were prepared to explore this matter in greater detail.

With reference to so-called INF, the Secretary said he would not have much to say. As we reviewed the negotiations, we noted that there had been progress in some areas, such as aircraft, but on the main issues there had been no agreement. Now deployments were taking place, and the Soviet side had chosen to leave the negotiations. If Gromyko had any suggestions as to how to proceed in the discussion of this subject, the Secretary would be very pleased to hear them.

On the subject of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Secretary continued, we believed that the Soviet side should agree to a date for resumption and return to the talks, to which we give a high priority. We recognize that in the Eastern proposals of February and June, with some subsequent clarifications, the East had taken positive steps on the subject of verification and specification of reductions. We were studying ways to build on these positive steps. On the President's instructions, the Secretary had made the point to Dobrynin that progress on verification would lead to flexibility on our side on the so-called data issue. Thus, in MBFR, we believed it would be well to set a date and resume in Vienna. We were also prepared to move in the form of a private dialogue between us and the Soviet Union; undoubtedly our Ambassador Abramowitz would be an important person in this regard.

On the subject of the CDE meetings here, the Secretary noted that of course discussions were just starting. As he had indicated in his speech, we would be tabling proposals soon. Here he would also make a procedural comment: our delegation chiefs had worked well together during the preparatory talks. We had also taken the point the Soviets had made in diplomatic channels that we should work together in a businesslike fashion for genuine progress, and he agreed. Ambassador Goody, he thought, was well known to people in that field in the Soviet Union, so Gromyko would recognize that he was a capable and competent person.
On the subject of chemical weapons, which Gromyko had raised this morning and earlier, it was our view that since they were easily transportable, it would be more appropriate to find a global rather than a regional solution. For this reason our emphasis was on the proposal the U.S. had made in Geneva. As he had said earlier, here we will be able to table a draft treaty in Geneva, emphasizing verification in this connection. Verifiability was a difficult but very important matter.

These were some of the comments the Secretary wanted to make with reference to the various forums in which the topics Gromyko had properly identified as matters of concern in our country and in the world would be discussed.

Gromyko said that first of all, he wanted to reply to one of the questions the Secretary had touched on at the beginning of their talk today. The Secretary had raised the question of human rights, blowing it out of all proportion. He would say that the Secretary was probably well aware of the Soviet appraisal of his entire position on this question. Gromyko was convinced that the U.S. position on this subject was entirely pervaded by falsehood, and that the U.S. was exploiting this matter for propaganda purposes. In essence, the Soviet position was more or less generally shared in the world, and it was that nowhere else were human rights violated so much as in some of the places in the Western hemisphere that were so dear to U.S. hearts, not to mention in the U.S. itself.

Gromyko said he would ask the Secretary not to ask him to be more precise; he could of course be more precise, but he did not believe he should waste time on this matter. If he were to talk on this subject he would only restate his assessment of the human rights situation as it existed in the United States. The Secretary had spoken of the importance of people moving across borders, the importance of reunifying families, etc., but he would simply point out that he did not know of a single instance where these matters had caused wars to break out. The Soviet Union was unshakeable in that position. He would not want to devote any time to the details of these matters.

The Secretary said he was surprised that it was Gromyko who had raised the subject of human rights. He was ready to discuss this topic and there were a few comments he wanted to make:

-- First, the Secretary wanted to express his admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the Pentecostal families. The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it had been made. It showed that progress was possible.
-- Second, he wanted to say that with reference to individual issues, President Reagan preferred a process of quiet diplomacy in this area.

-- Third, he wanted to mention the cases of Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and Begun, as people of great interest to the United States.

-- Further, he would also mention a subject we had discussed with the Soviets many times: the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and its radical decline in recent years.

-- He also wanted to note that Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress, had made an arrangement to come to Moscow to discuss issues concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. The Secretary hoped that Gromyko would receive him and work with him.

-- On a more traditional note, the Secretary recalled that at their earlier meeting in New York he, in the usual practice, had given the Soviet side a list of people who claimed U.S. citizenship under our laws, but had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union. He would like Ambassador Hartman to provide Minister Korniyenko with an updated list of such cases, and also lists of persons seeking to join members of their families in the U.S. and of binational divided spouses. (Ambassador Hartman passed these lists to Korniyenko following the meeting.)

Gromyko then referred to another subject touched on earlier by the Secretary, negotiations on strategic arms. He had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet side was very disappointed by the state of affairs in connection with these negotiations. On the question of strategic arms no headway had been made at all. The proposals made by the U.S. side clearly indicated that there was not the slightest desire on the U.S. side to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet side believed that this was the very reason the U.S. advanced such proposals, i.e. so that there should be no agreement. The reasons why the Soviet side had come to that conclusion had been explained to U.S. representatives, to the Secretary personally, and to his predecessor on numerous occasions.

Today, our respective representatives were not engaged in negotiations, Gromyko continued. He had understood the Secretary to say that he was very interested in progress and could say something additional on that subject. Well, that of course would be up to him; the Secretary could say anything he wished, Gromyko said. But he had to tell the Secretary now
that once the U.S. had proceeded with deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the situation had changed radically. Following the beginning of that deployment it had become completely impossible to consider further discussions of strategic arms other than by linking them to the medium-range weapons.

Once they were deployed in Western Europe, all such weapons -- and all those additional medium-range weapons that the U.S. was planning to deploy in Europe -- were, from the Soviet standpoint, arms of strategic significance. After all, what was the difference from the Soviet standpoint between nuclear weapons that were deployed many thousands of kilometers away from Soviet territory and those that were deployed much closer: one thousand, fifteen hundred or perhaps only several hundred kilometers away? While these were medium-range weapons from the standpoint of their characteristics and parameters, from the standpoint of their capacity to reach Soviet territory they were strategic arms.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to consider the situation that would arise if the Soviets were to agree to continue talks on strategic arms under conditions when there can be no discussion of medium-range weapons. It would be completely unnatural and would deceive people about the true situation. This was one aspect of this issue. Thus, through deployment of medium-range weapons in Western Europe, the United States had obtained an additional strategic potential against the Soviet Union. Should this not be taken into account at the negotiations on strategic arms?

Quite apart from that, Gromyko said, during the negotiations on the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet Union had stated that it was absolutely necessary to discuss the question of nuclear weapons, taking account of U.S. forward-based systems. He would ask the Secretary to follow his step-by-step analysis, for otherwise there could be no meaningful discussion. At that time, during the SALT II negotiations, the U.S. side had said that it would very much complicate the problem of reaching an agreement on a SALT II treaty if PBS were linked to the SALT II negotiations. At that time a sort of compromise had been reached -- as Gromyko had on a number of occasions been obliged to remind some U.S. officials who had not been engaged in those negotiations and perhaps were not aware of this matter. As for himself, he had had the pleasure to be engaged in negotiating these matters, and he recalled that by way of a compromise the two sides had achieved what was recorded in the SALT II Treaty, including agreement on the heavy ICBMs of the Soviet Union. As a result the Soviet Union had agreed not to seek resolution of the question of PBS in the SALT II Treaty. But then, of
course, the Soviet side had stated that in the follow-on negotiations in the future, after SALT II, this question -- FBS -- would have to be resolved. Meanwhile, SALT II was to be "delinked" from U.S. FBS, as the Americans called it.

Now Gromyko asked, did not the question of U.S. FBS arise in connection with consideration of medium-range systems, and does it not have a direct bearing on all future negotiations on strategic arms? This followed clearly from the SALT II negotiations. Even if there had been no deployment of U.S. medium-range arms, this question would have arisen in any event.

These are the two main watertight arguments in favor of not ignoring the deployment of U.S. medium-range arms in Europe, Gromyko said. This might perhaps be entirely new for some people on the U.S. side, but he would think that even the new people on the U.S. side engaged in these matters must be informed of it. After all, the generation of people who have been actively engaged in those negotiations was still alive and well. Moreover, the records of those negotiations were also very much alive.

Taking into account all those circumstances, and also the fact that the policy of the United States with respect to arms, especially strategic arms, was clearly aimed at achieving a dominating position come what may, the Soviet side had to engage in thorough reconsideration of the new situation which had arisen after U.S. deployment of new weapons in Western Europe. The Soviet side would have to do a lot of thinking before reaching decisions on where to go from here.

If the Secretary were to assume that strategic arms negotiations could continue as if nothing had happened, while negotiations on medium-range nuclear arms were in abeyance, he would be very much mistaken. The Soviet side would have to reflect on all of these matters before deciding on how to proceed. With respect to the Geneva negotiations on medium-range arms, the Soviet position was crystal clear. He was convinced that to continue those talks, given the present policy of the United States, would mean to participate in U.S. attempts to deceive people. He believed that Washington's present position was not intended to lead to agreement with the Soviet Union.

Thus, all the statements the Soviet side had made on this subject remained fully in force, Gromyko went on. His discussions of these matters with the Secretary in no way constituted continuation of the Geneva negotiations, and should
in no way be seen as steps toward continuation of those negotiations or toward new negotiations. He repeated that it was not to be construed as continuing the old talks or starting new ones. In order for negotiations to resume, the U.S. would have to change its positions and, as he had already said, express willingness to return to the situation existing before deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe had begun. Under those conditions the talks could be resumed, but otherwise the Soviet side would simply be helping the U.S. to hold up a screen concealing the true state of affairs.

Gromyko said he knew that from time to time the U.S. had made statements to the effect that things in Geneva had been proceeding well. But in fact the U.S. side had been engaged in erecting an impenetrable wall in the path of any progress at the talks. If, upon returning to Washington, the Secretary were to report to the President and others that the Soviet position was such as Gromyko had just stated it and as it had been stated by Yuri Andropov and in other official statements of the Soviet side, he would be correct. However, should the Secretary report differently, Gromyko would have to correct any misstatement, and possibly in public.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would like to have all those problems resolved, but in that case the United States would have to abandon its present policy, which was aimed at securing a dominating position for itself, and be guided in its conduct of relations with the Soviet Union by the principles of equality and equal security. As for the Soviet side, it had no desire to achieve a dominating position, and this was clear from the entire policy conducted by the Soviet Union and from its moral stand. The Soviet Union wants to be on an equal footing with the United States. If this will be what the Secretary reports in Washington, he will be correct.

If such a policy were adopted, Gromyko said, it would not be difficult to find common language in Geneva, as well as outside Geneva, and at this meeting in Stockholm. He alleged that what the Soviet side had witnessed was an endless series of insulting statements about the Soviet Union, building an additional solid fence preventing good relations. However, if one were to reflect on matters objectively, he would say that he did not believe that the United States was desirous of having a collision with the Soviet Union. There were surely some rather primitive people in the U.S. who considered the possibility of such a collision, but those were people who could not see beyond the four walls of their rooms. He would note, however, that one met with such talk in the U.S. Sometimes there was talk of nuclear war, of a clash with the
Soviet Union, as if this were some sort of picnic. This surely could not produce any positive results.

The Secretary interjected that his mother had told him when learning to drive to avoid collisions with Mack trucks. As far as he was concerned, in the field of international diplomacy, the Soviet Union was a Mack truck.

Gromyko said he now wanted to say a few words about chemical weapons. As he understood it, the Secretary was emphasizing the importance of that question and that was good. The Soviet side too believed this matter to be important. It was not a new issue: for a number of years it had been discussed in various forums, including such a broad forum as the United Nations. Negotiations had also been conducted between our two countries on chemical weapons. But neither the wider nor the narrower negotiation had led to any progress in resolving this matter.

Speaking frankly, Gromyko said, he would tell the Secretary how the Soviet side viewed the frequent attacks against the Soviet Union now current in the United States, as if the Soviet Union had been using chemical weapons somewhere in Asia or elsewhere. As he saw it, the U.S. was simply trying to divert public attention away from this entire issue and from the need to resolve it and achieve a ban on chemical weapons. He certainly did not believe that U.S. officials were so ignorant as not to know that the Soviet Union has not been doing anything of the kind. Thus, if the Secretary were interested in knowing the Soviet position, Gromyko could state to him officially that the Soviet Union wanted to see this problem resolved in an international accord on chemical weapons. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss such a ban in a broad forum or in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. Either way, the Soviet Union was prepared to go ahead, and it was his belief that agreement on this problem would generate a more favorable atmosphere for resolution of other matters as well.

He would suggest that they both see whether the U.N. Disarmament Committee in Geneva had broad enough shoulders to bear up under an attempt to resolve this matter. Personally, it was his hope that it will be able to bear up, and he would continue to issue appropriate instructions to the Soviet Delegation in Geneva. The Soviet Union wanted to reach such an agreement and called upon the United States to join it in an effort to reach it. Such an agreement would really cast a ray of light in the present gloomy international atmosphere and would have beneficial effects in other areas, too. Furthermore, it would also be beneficial to our own bilateral relations.
Gromyko said that this was basically what he wanted to convey to the Secretary with reference to the Secretary's statements. He would conclude his remarks by expressing his wish that the Stockholm Conference contribute to an improvement of the international atmosphere. If so, it would also help with a number of problems, particularly the adoption of confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union was prepared to act constructively, provided the United States was similarly disposed. The Soviet Union was not at all opposed to some measures, but it would favor adopting such measures as were fully justified by the facts. He would point out quite frankly that with reference to any issue requiring solution one could formulate proposals in such a way as to be clearly unacceptable. On the other hand, they could also be formulated in a way to be acceptable to all. He repeated that the Soviet Union was not opposed to confidence-building measures with reference to maneuvers and other matters at the Stockholm Conference. All this can come about if no one sets himself the goal of undercutting the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in order to secure for himself the commanding heights, so to speak. Should such a position be taken, there would be no positive outcome at the Stockholm Conference. There would not be the result he believed was desired by the majority of the countries here. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on that matter in terms of perhaps finding common language for our two sides.

Referring to the Vienna negotiation mentioned by the Secretary, Gromyko said that it should not be thought that the process of the Vienna negotiations had been interrupted. That forum was still in being. The two sides had declared a recess and had simply not yet agreed on a resumption date, but the process itself was still alive. He thought that if it were acceptable to the U.S. side, some date in mid-March could be agreed upon for resumption, perhaps the 16th of March or thereafter. He would only want to express one reservation. If these negotiations were only used once again to throw dust into people's eyes, then the Soviet side might be forced to take steps somewhat similar to those it had been compelled to take with respect to the negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. He would hope that the Vienna negotiations would not enter upon such a path. It was sad, very sad, that there was no progress at those negotiations, and he believed that perhaps the reductions discussed in Vienna also did not fit in with the plans of the Western participants. He said, "Well, we will see."

In addition, he wanted to tell the Secretary that should the Secretary present matters on MBFR or the other negotiations to public media in such a way as to imply that this, in fact, meant that the Soviet Union was abandoning the position it had
stated with respect to nuclear arms, that would distort the
Soviet position, and in that case, he would be forced to state
publicly that these kinds of generalizations were far from
reality, and he would be forced to put things in their proper
place. He therefore hoped that this would not be necessary.

The Secretary said he had a few comments on the points made
by Gromyko. First of all, he noted Gromyko's statement that
the Soviet Union sought equality with the United States and did
not wish to have a collision with the U.S. He could state that
the avoidance of such a collision and equality with the Soviet
Union were also our aims. Thus he could agree with both
formulations.

Secondly, turning to the talks on nuclear missiles which
have now stopped, the Secretary said he had understood Gromyko
to say that deployment of our medium-range missiles in Europe
was regarded by the Soviet side as a strategic matter even
though these missiles were medium in range, and that therefore
they had a bearing on the strategic arms talks. It was his
impression that Gromyko thus appeared to be in the process of
reflecting on how such talks could be structured if they began
again. He would say that we would consider any suggestion
Gromyko might make regarding these forums.

But the forums would not change the fact that there are
problems involved, the Secretary said. He felt he had to make
the point that we could not consider talks where U.S. medium-ange missiles were involved, but Soviet medium-range missiles
were not. This was because SS-20s were deployed and could
strike our allies. If Soviet missiles should hit them they
would be hitting us, because we were bound together with our
allies. He was not asking Gromyko to agree to this
formulation, but was only telling him how we saw things.
Therefore, if Gromyko had a suggestion concerning renewed or
new negotiations, we would listen with interest, but they would
have to include negotiations on SS-20s if Pershing IIs and
ground-launched cruise missiles were included.

Next, the Secretary noted that Gromyko had taken up the
subject of chemical weapons and had expressed readiness to try
to reach agreement. The Secretary welcomed that statement.
For its part, the U.S. was ready to work hard on this subject.

He also noted Gromyko's comments regarding the old problem
of compliance. In the past Gromyko had raised this matter as
an important one. We believed it of crucial importance to arms
control and other agreements. In this connection, some
questions had arisen, and he informed Gromyko that the
President, as directed by Congress, was in the process of
submitting a report to Congress. He was sure that Gromyko had been informed of the extensive briefing we had given the Soviet Embassy in Washington on the contents of that report, and he would therefore not repeat the details. But he could tell Gromyko that the President's report was classified. Compliance was an important matter, and questions needed to be resolved through careful exploration.

Returning to the question of chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed Gromyko's positive statement here. As he had said, we would be ready to table a draft treaty soon. This was an important issue; like the Soviet side, we wanted to see progress. He might add that in the minds of many people the matter of biological weapons should be resolved as well, but that was a separate subject.

Regarding Gromyko's statement about the CDE in Stockholm, he agreed that it was important to structure any idea in such a way that it would be useful to Warsaw Pact as well as NATO countries. If we wanted to reach agreement it would be well for the heads of our respective delegations, who are both professionals in this field, to maintain liaison and avoid problems that might arise as a result of failure to exchange views. We were prepared to do that.

With reference to Gromyko's comments about MBFR, the Secretary welcomed his idea of reconvening the negotiations in March. The 16th seemed to be an acceptable date for us, and he would suggest that this be put into diplomatic channels. The date appeared to be O.K. He believed that we could arrive at agreement in Vienna. The U.S. had no wish to put dust in anyone's eyes on this subject or any other.

In reply, Gromyko referred to the question of so-called violations of agreements and obligations. He noted that the Secretary had not been able to resist the temptation of bringing up something in that area. Gromyko said that he was not familiar with the details of the President's report to which the Secretary had referred, but when he learned the details he would respond in kind. The Soviet side can show how the U.S. treats its obligations, and point to some things about its conduct.

The Secretary said as a point of information that Mr. Burt had given a briefing to Mr. Sokolov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and had informed him of the details of the report in question. Gromyko noted that this had been done in general terms and repeated that, taking into account all the circumstances, the Soviets would respond in kind.
Gromyko asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on our bilateral relations. He noted that they have been in a state of disarray for some time. These matters had been discussed on many occasions with representatives of the present U.S. Administration, with the Secretary personally as well as with his predecessor and other U.S. political leaders. As he had said in his speech today, the U.S. Administration had done a great deal with "an easy hand" to destroy what had been built up in the 1970s. In a word, it had proved the truth of the thesis that it is much easier to destroy than to build. The United States has been engaged in destroying, with a big stick as it were, what had been built up by others. He did not know what the U.S. had in mind now, whether the Administration still adhered to the same views it had expressed immediately after coming into office. If the Secretary had something new he could tell Gromyko that might help to improve our relations, he would be interested to hear it.

The Secretary replied that he did not believe that what he had to say was new, but he would comment briefly on our bilateral relations. He knew that the Hotline talks had been going forward and promised to produce good results. On non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, he knew that another round of discussions is scheduled and this was an area where our interests were parallel, so that was worthwhile. On depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, we were glad to have received a positive response from the Soviet side. Further, we continue to believe that trade can go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, conducted on commercially sound terms, and not militarily related. Agribusiness is a good example of mutually beneficial, non-strategic trade. The Secretary also wanted to make a comment about a vast stretch of the Pacific where the Korean airliner had been lost. He understood that various questions were under discussion within ICAO, such matters as fixed navigation aids, radio beacons, and communications links between responsible civil aviation officials. These can help avoid a situation where an airliner is unable to determine its position from outside sources. This could be worked out constructively, if the Soviet side agreed.

On opening consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural agreement, the Secretary said the agreement in principle made last summer to go forward still stands. However, the timing needed to be right. It was difficult to move forward in the atmosphere of recent months.

The Secretary noted that there were many other issues of great importance. They were not necessarily bilateral issues, but they were nevertheless of interest to both of our countries. Gromyko had mentioned Lebanon in his speech. This
was a matter of major interest to both of us, and it was of tremendous significance to other Middle East issues. The Secretary was interested in hearing Soviet views and would be glad to present ours. He would say that there were also some interesting developments in southern Africa. He had long thought this was an area where our two countries should both be interested in achieving constructive progress. We have people directly involved in these matters on our side, such as Assistant Secretary Crocker, who are available to engage in discussion on this subject.

There was a wide range of regional issues of very great importance. Expressing his personal opinion, the Secretary thought that if one talked about tensions in the world today, we should realize that the place generating the worst tensions was clearly the Middle East -- not just Lebanon and the Palestinian issues, but also the war between Iran and Iraq, as well as developments inside Iran itself, which he found very disturbing. Although these are not bilateral issues, they were issues of mutual concern which might be discussed.

Gromyko said that to a certain extent the Secretary had helped him. He had intended to touch upon some purely bilateral issues and then go on to regional matters. Now he would change the order so as to discuss the regional matters first and then proceed to bilateral issues. After all, the two categories touched one another.

Gromyko said he could agree with the Secretary that the Middle East area was an area that almost daily generated very acute problems. He was convinced that these acute problems are generated as a result of the policy pursued by the U.S. and Israel which, of course, is constantly buttressed by the U.S. He was certain that if the U.S. wanted to act in a manner to prevent many of these problems from arising, with its influence upon Israel, it could prevail on Israel to change its aggressive policy. After all, Israel occupied Arab lands, the Golan Heights, and it retained them to this day as if it were master of these territories. In fact, what Israel did in wresting these territories from their rightful owners were aggressive and bandit-like acts. Since the U.S. invariably supported Israel, it had to share responsibility for this situation. Very often, particularly in Washington, it was frequently said, "What about Syria, Syria, Syria?" Earlier it was asked, "What about the Palestinians, Palestinians, Palestinians?" One or the other or both were blamed for the tensions in that area. In actual fact, Syria is a victim of aggression by Israel. Israel tore off a slice of Syrian territory and is now taking completely illegal steps to formalize this act of aggression. The Palestinians remain
without a homeland of their own; that is, they had a homeland in the past, but not today. This is the main reason for the dangerous tensions in the Middle East. In the past the U.S. supported Israel politically for many years in discussions in the United Nations, in our bilateral discussions and in other forums. Now direct U.S. military support for Israel was growing.

Also, today the U.S. has intruded into the Middle East with its own military forces, setting up military bases wherever it considers this possible. U.S. troops are actually in Lebanon. The question arises: on what grounds? The Secretary might answer that Gemayel had requested U.S. military forces to come in, but surely it was a fact that Gemayel had done so virtually with a gun pointed at his head. Can that agreement be taken seriously? Obviously not. U.S. forces are present in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon as occupation troops, as interventionists. The Soviet Union believes that U.S. troops should not be in the Middle East as a whole.

The U.S. would be acting rationally if it were to withdraw its troops from that area. It was a real shame that the U.S. was not sparing the blood of its soldiers, its young men there. They should be taken out of there, removing this additional cause of tensions in the Middle East -- a step which would promote an easing of the situation. Of course, British, Italian and French forces must also leave. One hears, of course, such arguments as, "What will then happen to the inhabitants of Lebanon? After all, they will slaughter each other."

In this connection, Gromyko said he wished to recall a bit of history, going back to the years 1917 and 1918 when the socialist revolution had taken place in Russia. A great many foreign people, including U.S. troops commanded by General Greyson, came to Russia. This is well described in a book entitled "American Adventure in Siberia" which, he thought, Ambassador Hartman might have read. At that time it was also said that, after all, the Russians were fighting each other there, and it was necessary to intervene and help one side to win. First, he would note that nothing came of this intervention in Russia. Secondly, he asked, what sort of reasoning is that? Is it reasonable to believe that foreigners must support one side against the other in a civil war? After all, you had your own Civil War too. (At this point the Secretary interjected that, on this point, at least, Gromyko was stating a fact.) You know, if such actions were to be legalized, one would have to find a large furnace and immediately burn all the documents of international law, all treaties and agreements.
Thus, it is not what will happen in Lebanon when foreign forces are withdrawn that one should worry about. If you were to ask about Syria, it has repeatedly stated that if Israel and the other occupants withdraw, it will withdraw its forces as well. The Soviet Union has good relations with Syria, Gromyko said, and he was in a position to reaffirm once again that the Syrians will pull out their forces if other foreign forces are withdrawn.

Thus, retaining U.S. forces in Lebanon is not going to improve the reputation of the U.S., which has already been undermined. The Soviet Union's position with respect to Israel is crystal clear. The Soviet Union has never agreed with extremist demands from extremist groups to throw Israel into the sea. He would remind the Secretary that, jointly with the U.S., the Soviet Union had stood at the cradle of the state of Israel. At that time he was leading the Soviet delegation in the UN and had raised his hand in voting for the establishment of an independent state of Israel. At that time the decision had been taken to set up both a Jewish and an Arab state in Palestine. The Soviet Union believed that Israel was entitled to independent existence, but this did not mean that it was entitled to commit aggression.

Thus, it was necessary for the U.S. to withdraw its troops from the Middle East in general, and from Lebanon in particular. It was necessary for Israel to withdraw as well. These troops were the main reason for tensions in the Middle East, along with other foreign troops. No matter what one might call them -- an international or multinational or peacekeeping force -- that did not change anything at all.

Gromyko recalled that in the past the U.S. had frequently asked the Soviet Union to bring its influence to bear upon Syria to act in a more restrained manner. He had to point out that the Soviet Union had done so on quite a few occasions, and that the Syrians had accepted such approaches with understanding. It was therefore not the Syrians who were now at fault in the situation in Lebanon, but the aggression that had been committed there. This was the Soviet assessment of the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

Of course, it is hardly possible to resolve all the troubles there in one fell swoop. But just the same, if the U.S. and other countries were to withdraw their troops, the situation would be defused, and once all factions felt that they did not enjoy foreign support, the Lebanese themselves would come together and agree. Ultimately this would mean less bloodshed and less terrorism. This was what the Soviet Union advocated.
Gromyko noted that for some reason in recent years there were no contacts with Washington concerning the Middle East. He would not want to appear as a supplicant with outstretched hand, but he was sure that without withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, one could not promote a general settlement in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was not interested in seeing a conflagration in that area, and he did not believe that the U.S. was interested in seeing such a conflagration either.

The Secretary thought Gromyko would not be surprised to learn that he could not agree with many aspects of his analysis. However, there were some things in Gromyko's statement with which he did agree. Perhaps that could lead to some constructive developments.

First, the Secretary noted, Gromyko had said that the Soviet Union did not wish to see an explosion in the Middle East. Neither do we. Second, he agreed that if all foreign forces were out of Lebanon there would be a better chance for the Lebanese to be able to construct their country. We agreed on this as an objective. He wanted to assure Gromyko that the U.S. had no wish to keep forces in that country. The question was how to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and that was a hard question. We knew that good first steps had almost been achieved in the so-called Security Plan. We believe it could bring a better reconciliation between the various forces there. But once again, something broke down between Jumblatt and Gemayel.

Nevertheless, if such steps were taken, they could be precursors of a further withdrawal of Israeli forces. If discussions emerged in which Syria made a statement about its intent to withdraw, we could see a whole process taking shape fairly promptly. We were working toward law and order there as foreign forces left the area. We would like to see programs of that kind succeed.

In thinking about this problem, it was also necessary to consider the existence of Palestinian camps in various parts of Lebanon. This is because many Lebanese do not like the Palestinians. We thought that U.N. forces could play a constructive role in providing security in those camps. Obviously this has to be a Lebanese effort as well, and it would be good if this kind of process could come about. But it too often breaks down. We do believe that a positive move from Syria could accomplish a great deal. We had many discussions with Israel; for example, they were successful in obtaining a relief of the siege of Deyr-al-Qamar. At any rate, we are working on this line of action, and it could be a way toward withdrawal of all foreign forces, including our own in Lebanon and Soviet troops in Syria, if the Soviets supported it.
Gromyko said the Soviet side believed that if the U.S. and its pals in the area withdrew their forces from Lebanon, it would compel the Lebanese themselves to find solutions faster. He hoped the Secretary would agree that it now appeared as though the U.S. was simply acting out of fear of some negative consequences if it should withdraw its troops. He also hoped the Secretary would agree that this does not sound very convincing. He believed that the U.S. had very often provided all-out support to Israel, even in those cases where the U.S. could have avoided departing from a position of principle. And yet, each time that Israel merely expresses a desire for the U.S. to provide its shoulder for support, the U.S. does so. Whether or not the U.S. now has a treaty of strategic alliance with Israel, it is in fact constantly providing support. He doubted that people in the Middle East have such a weak memory as to forget these facts quickly. He had nothing further to add on this regional problem.

Gromyko said he wanted to comment briefly on regional problems in the Caribbean and Latin America. Of course, for a long time the Soviets had been observing what was happening in that Caribbean region. This was especially true for the last few months. The Secretary would understand why he spoke of the last few months, because it is precisely in that period that the situation became especially aggravated and tensions increased. He believed this was entirely the fault of U.S. policy. The U.S. did not like the internal systems of Cuba or Nicaragua. He would point out that he did not know very much about Nicaragua, except that it was a small nation and that it had not wished to live under the hated dictatorship of Somoza, which the people of Nicaragua had overthrown. They wanted to live as they wished, and they were entitled to do so, as any other people. Washington claimed that their internal system was a threat to the vital interests of the U.S. How could that be possible?

To provide even a shadow of credibility to this Washington position, it was said that Nicaragua probably acted at the direction of the Soviet Union and with the help of the Soviet Union. He would only point out that the Soviets did not know these people. They saw them for the first time during an official visit to the Soviet Union. Gromyko had met their foreign minister twice when he had come to Moscow. He would note that he had met more often with the Secretary than with the Nicaraguans. The situation with respect to Cuba was somewhat similar, although the Cuban socialist state had been in existence much longer. But now the U.S. was ceaselessly arranging all sorts of attacks against both Nicaragua and Cuba. Gromyko emphasized Nicaragua because of allegations in Washington to the effect that the Nicaraguans posed a threat to
the vital interests of the U.S. Surely, the Secretary realized full well that no one would believe this to be at all possible. The U.S. had even gone so far as to state officially in Washington that unless Nicaragua changed its internal system to please Washington, the U.S. might take some military action there. Naturally, this was something that had aroused indignation throughout the world.

Gromyko pointed out that he had not mentioned Grenada. The Secretary probably knew how this was perceived throughout the world and in the Soviet Union. This was simply something that had aroused amazement. Here was a good example of the "transparency" about which so much had been said here in Stockholm. Just 24 hours before the U.S. invasion, Washington had assured the world that it had no plans for an invasion of Grenada. "There's transparency for you," Gromyko exclaimed. The Secretary probably did not expect anything but condemnation from the Soviet Union as a result of U.S. acts in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. This area was very remote from the Soviet Union. But he was mentioning it and talking about it because it concerned a matter of principle.

South Africa was also remote from the Soviet Union. Had the U.S. ever tried to do anything to put an end to South Africa's aggression toward Angola? The answer was that it had done nothing at all. If for some reason the Soviet Union's position was not well known to the Secretary, Gromyko was sure that it should be quite clear now. The Soviet Union believed that every nation, large and small, had the right to its own independent development. Washington sometimes pronounced the same principle -- the right of any people to its own independent development. But all these pronouncements were forgotten as soon as they conflicted with U.S. actions.

Gromyko said that he had spoken at great length on some of these matters, and had done so to be sure that the Secretary was completely aware of Soviet policy in this regard. The Soviet Union was resolutely against any country dictating to any other country the internal order that should exist there. In response, the Secretary might say, "What about Soviet forces in Afghanistan?" It was true that Soviet forces were still there, but did the Secretary know that the previous leadership of Afghanistan as well as the present one had asked the Soviet Union eleven times for help in repelling the daily intervention against Afghanistan from Iran and from Pakistan? He might ask "Has the Nicaraguan government ever appealed to the U.S. for help?" The answer, of course, was -- never. But the Afghan Government had appealed for help against the intervention, and the Soviet Union had provided it in accordance with the U.N. charter. He would now state officially to the Secretary that
the Soviet Union wanted to see Afghanistan as an independent and non-aligned state which would maintain good relations with the U.S., with the Soviet Union and all other countries of the world. And yet, at the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. was trying by hook or by crook to pass a resolution aimed at stepping on Soviet toes, so to speak. He would add that the U.S. keeps on feeding the intervention against Afghanistan from Pakistan and from that good friend of the U.S., Iran, and all this for the only reason that the internal regime in Afghanistan is not to the liking of the U.S. The U.S. is providing arms to the interventionists, and the Soviet Union knows this very well because of serial numbers and the like on arms that wind up in Soviet hands.

Further, just as in the case of the Caribbean region, the U.S. is in effect protecting the racist regime in South Africa, which has committed many aggressive acts against other African countries. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. were to act justly in that area, they would jointly put South Africa in its place. The Soviet Union wants nothing in Angola, but it is certainly opposed to South African aggression against Angola. South Africa has been throwing U.N. resolution after U.N. resolution into the wastebasket -- resolutions for which both our countries have voted regarding independence for Namibia. He was certain that the U.S. too should be opposed to South African actions, as was the Soviet Union. He thought that not only the Soviet Union, but the U.S. too would be interested in preventing a spread of the racist contagion beyond the borders of South Africa. By the way, the situation there too was such that some day the majority of the people of South Africa will have their say -- their time will surely come.

Gromyko repeated again that he had spoken at great length, but noted that these were the kinds of questions that poisoned relations between our two countries. He had wanted to set them forth in detail. After all, he and the Secretary had sat down at this table in order to make clear to each other one another's policies with respect to each issue discussed. He felt he had done that, and had pointed out that the Soviet Union wanted nothing in Nicaragua, nothing in Angola, and nothing in Afghanistan except that the people of these countries themselves have the possibility to decide their own affairs. The Soviet Union wanted to see Namibia independent and Afghanistan independent and non-aligned. He believed that the U.S. too should be interested in these same objectives.

The Secretary said that he did not want to go through the details in each of these areas, but he did have a few comments.
First, on Central America, one of the key problems was interference by the Nicaraguans in the internal affairs of other countries by providing arms to insurgents; they often came through Cuba, often originating from the Soviet Union and sometimes from others. There were many other problems in that area. It was a poor area, and people there needed help. It was for this reason that President Reagan had persuaded Gromyko's friend, Henry Kissinger, to investigate the situation there. Kissinger had produced a good report, and the Secretary would be glad to give a copy to Gromyko. He would arrange to have a copy given to Gromyko, and it would be well worth reading.

A great deal had been written about Grenada, and a White Paper had been issued which was at variance with much of what Gromyko had to say. The Soviet Embassy had received a copy and he would suggest that Gromyko's people look it over.

On South Africa, the Secretary said, we hold no brief for the racist policies of South Africa, and we have criticized them. It was an area that suffers from conflict and tension. It was an area also a long way from our home, but we are trying to help. The Secretary also believed that this was an area where we could jointly do something useful. As he had already pointed out, there were some recent events in the area that were interesting, and he thought that consultations between us might have a direct positive influence there. As for Afghanistan, we too would welcome a free, independent and non-aligned country; we thus share this objective with the Soviet Union. The United Nations has initiated negotiations; we wish them well because it is clear that we cannot have a free, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan unless Soviet forces are withdrawn from the country.

Gromyko interjected that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces just as soon as intervention in Afghanistan ceases. The Secretary said that there was a hopeful process of negotiations underway.

Our combat forces had already been withdrawn from Grenada and he was sure we would withdraw our forces from Lebanon, the Secretary said, before the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In Grenada all that is left is a small support contingent. These three areas represent different cases, and they provide examples of situations where we could hope that if we had better relations with the Soviet Union, with more discussions between us, we could get beyond accusing each other and could carefully explore why things take place, perhaps achieving constructive results.
At this late hour, he wanted to say to Gromyko that more constructive relations were what we wanted. He believed that more frequent private discussions would help this process along. As he had said earlier, we would like to engage in such discussions. He felt that he had to look at Gromyko not only as the Foreign Minister of a great power but also as a human being. As Foreign Minister, Gromyko had without a doubt more diplomatic experience than any other person in the world. He had seen a great many and a great variety of achievements. He would now ask Gromyko to look at the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, to think about the possibility of establishing more constructive relations between us and to think that he and the Secretary (with guidance from the President), might see a better day. We are ready to work on that.

Gromyko said that if he understood the Secretary correctly, he had spoken in favor of more frequent exchanges of views between the two of them; he shared this wish. He noted that some U.S. officials (here he was not blaming the Secretary personally) believed it to be to their credit that they exchanged views with whomever one wished, but not with the Soviet Union. That was surely a primitive approach. Thus, this was a constructive wish, if indeed it reflected the Secretary's true intentions. He was in favor of such exchanges.

Gromyko also noted the Secretary's enumeration of several specific bilateral matters and took satisfaction in the fact that these were proceeding, albeit slowly. With respect to depiction of our Pacific maritime boundary, the Soviet Union had advanced a specific proposal which, in fact, was an alloy of the proposals of each country. He would urge the Secretary to devote some attention to this matter.

With respect to certain aviation problems the Secretary had mentioned, he would note that both countries had representatives in ICAO, and he would suggest letting them work out some positions that might be acceptable to both our countries and to others. He believed this should be possible so long as no attempt is made to impose a solution on any of the sides.

As for the opening of consulates and cultural relations, he believed that some progress could be made and would like to know the Secretary's specific considerations. Whenever he felt it would be possible to set them out for the Soviet side, they could be examined carefully. As for opening consulates, he would ask how many years this matter had already dragged on? Here were two major powers that were unable to resolve such a pigmy question. Now that pigmy begins to look like a huge monster in the eyes of some people. As for cultural relations,
it would be good to arrange them to the mutual satisfaction of both sides.

Gromyko then noted that some difficulties had arisen in connection with some other agreements between our two countries in terms of understanding what state they were in. Some of them were evidently in a state of hibernation. Some people evidently thought that these agreements should die; for his part, he believed that they should be brought back to life. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at them, and if something did not suit him, to let the Soviet side know.

Gromyko noted that they had discussed a number of issues today, and felt that such a discussion had indeed been necessary. It would be good if the Secretary were to take into account the observations he had expressed today. This could help to elicit points of contact between the sides.

As for the Stockholm Conference, Gromyko thought that he probably could not promise that some arguments would not arise at the Conference between our two countries; they would. But he would be very much in favor of maintaining consultations in order to have such arguments eventually result in joint positions. Soviet representatives at the Conference will be prepared to consult with U.S. representatives and not only regard each other with suspicion. If the Secretary would instruct his delegation to take a confrontational attitude only, obviously this would produce no results. Gromyko was in favor of searching for all possibilities of achieving results and his delegation would be instructed accordingly.

The Secretary said that those would be the instructions he gave to our delegation as well.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, The White House ——— 8402036

Mr. William B. Staples, ACDA ———— 8402037

Mr. Raymond Lett, Department of Agriculture ——— 8402039

Mrs. Helen Robbins, Department of Commerce ——— 8402039

Col. John Stanford, Department of Defense ———— 8402040

Cdr. Timothy R. Hartung, Joint Chiefs of Staff ——— 8402041

Mr. Christopher Hicks, Treasury Department ——— 8402042

Ms. Teresa Collins, U.S. Information Agency ———— 8402043

SUBJECT: Press Themes on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

Attached is a set of press themes for use by Administration officials in commenting on Secretary Shultz's January 18 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and the current state of US-Soviet relations.

Administration officials should adhere closely to these themes. Casual public speculation at this time about US-Soviet relations could seriously undercut our foreign policy goals.

Attachment: As Stated

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary


-Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
Themes on Schultz-Gromyko Meeting and US-Soviet Relations

-- Secretary Schultz's five-hour meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko provided the opportunity for a full review of the current US-Soviet bilateral relationship. There were no breakthroughs on substantive issues, but the tone was business-like and non-polemical.

-- The Secretary reiterated the President's commitment to a constructive and realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at finding solutions to the many real problems in the US-Soviet relationship. He made clear our objections to the misrepresentation of American policy contained in Gromyko's CDE speech, and expressed the view that, despite our differences, we should get down to the business of building a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- The Secretary reviewed U.S. arms control positions. He reiterated the President's commitment to arms control and our desire to resume negotiations. Gromyko said that INF deployments made it impossible to move ahead on those talks. He indicated, however, that the MBFR talks could resume.

-- Discussion of bilateral issues as well as regional issues was substantive and extensive. The two ministers discussed such issues as the recent talks on upgrading the Hotline and upcoming talks on nuclear non-proliferation.

-- There was a serious exchange of views on the Middle East, southern Africa, Afghanistan and the Caribbean.

-- There was also a discussion of human rights, in which the Secretary gave U.S. views on specific problems as well as the overall Soviet human rights performance.

-- Both sides agreed the meeting was useful and that there should be more such serious exchanges. No new dates or levels of discussions were specified.

-- At this time any further public discussion of the meeting or speculation about future developments in US-Soviet relations would be counterproductive.

-- As President Reagan stressed in his January 16 speech, the United States seeks a more productive working relationship with the Soviet Union. Respecting the confidentiality of our diplomatic exchanges is vital if we are to move forward on arms control and resolution of outstanding international and bilateral problems.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum to the President containing a summary of the Billington article on U.S.-Soviet relations and a discussion of it which emphasizes the need to find ways to reach the younger Soviet generation more effectively, as we conduct our dialogue with the leaders.

Before drafting the memorandum, I had two extended discussions with Billington about his ideas. As yet, they are relatively inchoate, although he is doing a more detailed paper on means of approaching the dialogue in his second and third categories (with the younger generation and establishing a dialogue on global issues with third countries), which he promised to get to me this week. Basically he feels, and I strongly agree, that some means must be found to direct foundation money into new channels, so that we do not have a private-sector dialogue dominated by the Arbatovs and Zhukovs, as it has been up to now.

I have discussed some of these thoughts with David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation, who has tentatively allocated a substantial sum to expanded exchanges with the Soviets, and he has asked to meet with me again in the near future. I believe we should also consider encouraging Billington—or another like-minded scholar—to organize a conference of foundation leaders active in the field, so that we can attempt to point them in the right direction.

The point of all of this is that it should be possible to implement some of Billington's ideas without major changes of U.S. policy or large commitments of federal funds. We must, however, do what we can to encourage effective goal setting and more effective briefing of U.S. participants.

Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___

Attachments:
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Billington Article

Confidential

Declassify on: OAAD

Confidential

Declassify on: OAAD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCPARLANE

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Toward Defining a Strategy

A recent article by James Billington, Director of the Wilson Center and one of America's leading specialists in Russian history, culture and psychology, deserves your attention. Billington is a tough-minded supporter of our deterrence strategy, and his article provides some important insights in the current situation in the Soviet Union and some thought-provoking suggestions for steps we can take to influence the development of the Soviet system over the long run.

Billington's Arguments

The U.S.-Soviet relationship has been remarkably stable but destabilizing forces have grown as Soviet military might and international involvement has increased without a comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. Much of Soviet insecurity stems from the regime's failure to exorcise Stalinism and build an internal basis for self respect. Instead, present leaders are reverting to Stalinist techniques of coercion.

We must acknowledge the complexity of the situation and differentiate several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry:

-- **Economic:** Here we have already won.

-- **Imperial:** A new form of the traditional Russian policy of extending its borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller states, it is most tempting when the U.S. seems weak or irresolute.

-- **I ideological:** An expansionist policy is justified on ideological grounds, and the leaders see in revolutions elsewhere a vindication of their ideology which has failed at home.

-- **Psychological:** The Soviets have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. We are "the only power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves."

-- **Thermonuclear:** The danger is not deliberate use but the difficulty of avoiding use in an escalating situation and also the potential for blackmail.
We must reject the idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of collapse. The forthcoming generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving toward a more open system. The U.S. cannot determine the outcome, but it can influence it.

In order to bring maximum influence to bear on this developing situation, we need a more comprehensive dialogue in three areas:

-- With the current leadership, a dialogue that is tough and specific;

-- With the broader society and postwar generation, a dialogue that is generous and general;

-- With both, a multinational dialogue addressing common problems of the future jointly with other countries.

This will permit us to raise our sights without lowering our guard, and will help the coming Soviet generation to forge better links both with their own past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Comment

I agree with Billington's point that our policy should include both hard-nosed negotiations with the current Soviet leadership, and measures to influence the future evolution of Soviet society.

--Dealing with the Soviet Leaders: We already have under way a sound policy for dealing with the Soviet leaders. We must continue to expand the channels available and to probe for areas of possible negotiability, while recognizing that significant progress may not be possible this year. Power struggles may make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to make the hard policy changes necessary for an improvement in relations with us. We should, nevertheless, continue to convey to them a policy of firmness coupled with negotiability, which can have its own impact on the leadership struggle. Our basic message should be:

(a) That no improvement of relations will be possible without a change in their policies and behavior;

(b) That continued intransigence on their part will result only on a worsening of their own situation;

(c) That we are serious about negotiating fair arrangements in a variety of areas; and

(d) That your political strength at home gives you the ability to deliver on any deals reached.
It will be particularly important to convey credibly the last two points. If the Soviet leaders conclude that no agreements are possible with you, they will simply hunker down and put all their efforts into making trouble (though almost certainly in ways that do not risk direct military confrontation). If, however, they are convinced that agreements are in fact possible, this will strengthen the arguments of those in the Soviet leadership who are inclined to make sufficient concessions to reach agreements with us.

--The Broader Soviet Public and Younger Generation: We have given less attention to means of influencing the successor generation than we have to dealing with the leadership. Andropov was moving in a neo-Stalinist direction. His successors, however, will be forced to choose whether to intensify centralization, repression and militarization of Soviet society, or to improve incentives, decentralize decision making and rely more on market factors.

While we can have only a marginal effect on the outcome of this internal Soviet process, we should do what we can to strengthen the tendencies toward greater decentralization and openness, since this would produce a Soviet Union with less commitment to the use of force and less willing to engage in costly foreign adventures. Therefore, even if the rivalry of our systems did not end (it would not), the U.S.-USSR interaction would be safer and more manageable.

Billington's suggestions for reaching the younger generation through greater expanded exchanges are apt. The fact is that the successor Soviet generation is as parochial as the current one. Opportunities to meet with Americans and to come to the United States can undermine officially-sponsored negative stereotypes about the U.S. and stimulate private doubts about the veracity of propaganda caricatures. While the persons involved will rarely if ever be able to influence policy decisions immediately and directly, broader exposure of Soviet citizens to the U.S. can over time produce pressures for more realistic and less rigid Soviet policies.

For these reasons, I believe you should consider reopening negotiations on an exchange agreement in the near future. Exchanges can be broadened considerably on the basis of private funding, and I am investigating ways that we can bring our influence to bear in encouraging private foundations to direct their efforts toward reaching a new Soviet audience, rather than multiplying contacts with regime propagandists like Arbatov.

Attachment: Tab A - Billington article

Prepared by: Jack Matlock

cc: The Vice President
With Russia: After 50 Years

The 50th anniversary of Soviet-American diplomatic relations was observed this past week in conditions of severe tension and sourness and, because of the illness of Yuri Andropov, unusual political uncertainty on the Soviet side. We asked a leading American student of Soviet affairs to size up the larger Soviet scene and to suggest some ways in which the American relationship with Moscow might be steadied.

James H. Billington

A Time of Danger, an Opening for Dialogue

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is unlike any confrontation of major powers in recent history—perhaps in all history. It has been remarkably stable, not having led to any direct fighting between the principal rivals in 35 years of Cold War. Yet it is a relationship that is inherently dangerous because of the unprecedented weapons available.

The main destabilizing force in the relationship in recent years has been the great increase in Soviet military might and international involvements without any comparable increase in internal maturity and serenity. The cold, unpleasant fact is that the U.S.S.R. is currently in a very dangerous stage in which old psychological insecurity still exists alongside awesome new power.

Part of Soviet insecurity results from the legitimate desire for respect of the Russian people, who have often been attacked militarily and disparaged culturally. But far more of the current insecurity comes from the leaders' own progressive retreat from previous halting attempts in the late 1950s and early 1960s to exercise Stalin's ghost and to build some new basis for self-respect within Soviet society.

The aging Stalinist oligarchy and its swollen, corrupt bureaucracy effectively stopped de-Stalinization under Brezhnev, chose a chief of police as his successor, and now seem to be failing back increasingly on the high Stalinist technique of using targeted acts of violence to coerce the respect that they have given up trying to earn. In the combination of brutality and deception that accompanied the Korean airliner tragedy and the treatment of imprisoned symbols of social conscience such as Yuri Orlov and Sergei Khodorenko, there seem to be new hints of inertial drift into the old Stalinist formula of terror without bounds or shame. It is born less of a traditional desire for dominance than of a totalitarian compulsion to disown, divide and in some sense destroy everything that cannot be controlled.

All of this is so profoundly unpleasant that one set of Americans, largely on the left, prefers to say that this isn't really happening or doesn't really matter. Another set, largely on the right, prefers to say that nothing else really happens or matters. Sincere people on both sides are increasingly call for heroic, one-sided solutions—unilateral disarmament, unilateral crusades—often mixing disingenuous sermons to America into supposed analyses of Russia.

"The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fountain of revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home."

The beginnings of a more rational understanding may lie in acknowledging complexity and in differentiating several distinct elements in the Soviet-American rivalry: economic, imperial, ideological, psychological and thermonuclear.

Economically, there is no longer any serious competition. Capitalism has simply proven itself more dynamic and adjustable, and far more capable of effective production for human use. Communism as a functioning economic system is unlikely to have sustained appeal to anyone in the modern world who is free to make a first-hand comparison—unless of course the capitalist economy allows itself to self-destruct in some massive new economic crisis.

The imperial aspect of the superpower rivalry involves our confronting a new form of a traditional Russian policy of extending the nation's borders by absorbing or subordinating smaller powers and states. Traditional national interest lies at the base of Soviet pressure on Europe and the push into Afghanistan. Here the Soviets made a classical imperial gambit in the "great game"—a timely move on a target of opportunity that must have seemed irresistible at a time of American weakness and preoccupation elsewhere.

But the Soviets' justification for their involvement in Afghanistan—and the probable reason for their refusal to withdraw—is the purely ideological argument that the revolutionary process once begun cannot be reversed.
This argument points to the new tendency to propel Soviet foreign policy beyond the realm of traditional Russian national interest into the more dangerous field of ideological politics.

The aging Stalinist bureaucracy seems to have recently found a kind of fertile soil in revolutionary youth in distant places. It seems compelled not so much to conquer new territory as to vindicate abroad an ideology that has conspicuously failed at home. It has worked with cocky new revolutionary cadres from Vietnam and Cuba, even as it played on American self-doubt after Vietnam to expand in various ways into Kampuchea, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen. It gradually came to accept the long-resisted Cuban contention that the road to revolution in Latin America must be essentially violent rather than peaceful.

Once China after Mao adopted a more pragmatic and inward-looking attitude, the U.S.S.R. became the main source of ideas as well as arms for what was perceived to be a rising revolutionary tide. The Soviets put venture capital of various kinds into distant, destabilizing forces, and increasingly risked becoming involved in crises that they might not be able to control.

All of this is further complicated psychologically by Russia's tradition of a love-hate relationship with its principal Western adversary. To Russians, America is now only the power that can destroy them, and also the only civilization by which they can measure themselves. Their love-hate feelings toward us suggest the persistence of feelings of psychological inferiority even in the presence of strategic parity.

The massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and rocketry possessed by both superpowers gives a historically unprecedented dimension to rivalry. The danger is probably not so much that either side will deliberately set out to use them, but that some developing crisis in a fuzzy area may escalate to a point where it will be difficult for one party not to use them in order to avoid a humiliating defeat.

The new weapons also pose new possibilities for blackmail—the key element in the current campaign to prevent new missile deployments in Germany. The core objective is to divide, neutralize and eventually establish political dominance over Europe.

The immediate campaign is to convert the West's moral anguish over nuclear weapons into a political separation of Western Europe from the United States. Though so far unsuccessful in its short-run objective of preventing missile deployment in Germany, this campaign has helped change the basic international orientation of opposition parties in England and, increasingly, in Germany.

With the increasing pro-Soviet drift of the German Social Democratic Party, the U.S.S.R. is gaining a major new asset for resolving both its physical security and its psychological inferiority by establishing greater political dominance over Germany, the only "West" that really matters to them in Europe.

Is there any rational hope that an open America may in time be less threatened by the closed cosinus in the U.S.S.R.? There is plenty of irrational hope on the market. On the left, there is the vague idea that one only increases the likelihood of blackmail—what reaching agreement with the Soviets is an end in itself. This attitude is supported by gossip and disinformation accepted as evidence, or by wishful thinking about the putative plight of alleged "doves" and "liberals" within the Soviet leadership—for whose very existence there may be no real evidence.

On the right there is the hope that the Soviet system may be on the verge of convulsive economic collapse and/or national disintegration. Although there is hard evidence of deep problems in both areas, there is no indication of any such drastic imminent outcome and there are many reasons for rejecting the hidden assumption that "the worse for them the better for us."

"There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any times since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921."

Any basis for rational hope must be found within their system rather than our preconceptions. There is, I believe, a reasonable likelihood that the forthcoming generational change of leadership may bring with it greater change in policies than at any time since Lenin moved from War Communism to his New Economic Policy in 1921.

There is a scholarly consensus that the Soviet economy is too stagnant, the society too corrupt and degenerating, and the administrative and productive system too saddled with deferred maintenance for anything short of massive reforms to be effective.

Simply to keep up as a great power, Soviet leaders will have to mobilize new energies from the broader society. This can be done realistically only by drastically extending the authority over Soviet life as a whole of one of the only two areas that are still productively efficient in the U.S.S.R.: either the command economy based on centralized military power or the market economy based on local entrepreneurship and on the growing "second" economy. While Russian tradition may favor the former, the imminence of an unnaturally delayed generational change in leadership may favor building more on the incentive principle.

There could hardly be a more dramatic contrast than between the basic experiences that shaped Yuri Andropov and the last Stalinist generation (the unending bloody conditions of coerced industrialization and collectivization, artificial famine, incessant internecine purges, and heroic wartime sufferings) and the influences on those under 50. The latter are the better educated, psychologically less complicated products of a post-war period of small deeds, uninterrupted peace and relative prosperity.

The coercive stand-pat policies of recent years with their emphasis on repression at home and aggression abroad in 1979-1980 will not succeed. A new generation of leaders will lack the legitimizing authority that accrued to the older survivors from a period of great if bloody deeds. It will surely be tempted to reshape the system in terms of its own experience and perhaps even to buy into the new ideal that appeared among its generation in the first atmosphere of the '60s and early '70s.

The disincentivized movement was only the tip of an iceberg, most of which still lies submerged within the system. This movement of ideas represented an unofficial effort to continue the process of de-Stalinization that Krushchev began and Brezhnev definitively stopped. There was—and continues to be in the new generation—an attempt to recover links with those elements of old Russian tradition that Stalin had systematically sought to destroy: Christianity, rural Russia, literature with an authentic moral. This generation felt its way toward social criticism in the early '70s—codifying alternate versions of history through the oral counter-culture, staging satirical plays and forming a human rights movement and even a tiny free labor movement.

One cannot be sure that the new generation of leaders will identify with the higher moral aspirations of its own generation once in power, rather than with the quasi-Stalinist system through which they will have to rise to power. But so great is the social and economic need to mobilize fresh energy and enthusiasm, and so strong the psychological desire to find a worthy, non-Stalinist identity to make sense of its sufferings, that one has to allow for the possibility of profound rather than merely cosmetic changes with the coming of this generation.

Americans cannot directly determine in any important way how the Soviet Union will evolve. Nor should we look for a maturing society with its own traditions to replicate or even approximate our own. But as the Soviet's principal adversary and object of fascination, we are more involved in their evolution than we may realize.

To me this suggests a need to begin, in the second half-century of our relations, a far more comprehensive Soviet-American dialogue than we have tried in the first 50 years.

The first need at this time of dangerously diminished dialogue is for increased but more clearly defined contacts between the two superpowers. All dialogue, especially at the higher levels, should be polite and respectful in tone—particularly since the Russians crave respect and may inevitably mimic our model. The dialogue should be of three quite different types, each with a different objective.

1. With the vestigial Stalinist oligarchy that is still in charge, we need a dialogue that is tough and specific. One should never be soft and general with Stalinists. The meanings of "the great principles" of 1972-1977 are not so straightforward as still be successfully forestalled. Subsequent Soviet advances. Intransigent approaches taken for domestic political reasons are invariably received as a sign of weakness and an invitation to further manipulation. It is also important that there be only a sin-
gle, substantive dialogue on the high strategic questions, because unity, like firmness, is essential for closing a deal. One should feel neither intimidated by threats of a walkout nor compelled to make gratuitous demonstrations of flexibility to win vague goodwill. The older leaders know about war and almost certainly want an agreement in this area.

2. With the broader society and the postwar generation, we need an exploratory dialogue that is generous and general rather than tough and specific. Vastly expanded exchanges with this generation now may help build a basis for a more comprehensive agreement later.

The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges with Soviet society as a whole—on a professional, regional, educational, cultural and purely random basis—will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility. Economic contacts could suggest new models for management and encourage the kind of self-respect that might make Russians less psychologically dependent on gaining respect through the military.

A new category of dialogue would involve Russians and Americans with other countries in discussing and developing a new global agenda—perhaps looking to the year 2000. Such a format would provide a model for the next generation of Russians, who must look to us for new approaches to world order. Many of the problems are themselves multinational, and new ideas may be easier to accept if there are new formats that are multinational rather than bilateral.

Each of these dialogues would help overcome a weakness that has plagued American relations with the Soviet Union. The first helps to avoid the illusion of some liberals in assuming that Soviet society will naturally evolve into something better if only we are nice to the surviving Stalinists. The second, broader level moves beyond the dead-end reliance of some conservatives solely on material toughness. The third dispels the seductive belief, common to both liberal and conservative politicians (and to many Russians), that our many bothersome involvements in the world will drastically diminish once we cut a deal with the Russians and cut out everyone else.

Our continuing confrontation at the nuclear level clearly requires the first type of contact: tough and specific and at the highest level. We and the Soviets both have by now, it seems to me, an overriding responsibility not to leave the nuclear negotiating table until we have begun to limit and reduce the global menace we have co-authored, and not to make this overriding issue hostage to other issues.

The ideological aspect of Soviet-American confrontation is an ideal element for the broader level of dialogue that brings in the younger Soviet generation not yet in power.

The Peacetime discussion of ideas with this generation may help check the inertial drift of the vestigial Stalinists into endorsing revolutionary violence in distant places.

"The social basis for repression in the U.S.S.R. today is the combination of a swollen state and a weak society. Broadened American exchanges . . . will encourage the elements that make for civic responsibility."

Almost certainly the traditional imperial aspect of Soviet policy will increasingly become a greater concern of Russia's Eurasian neighbors rather than of the United States. Since the problem of Russia's borders involves deep psychological sensitivities on the Russian side and the very existence of many neighboring peoples, it should not be left to the play of chance but discussed in the third type of multilateral dialogue over a long period of time.

We clearly need to increase support for Russian studies throughout America, and we probably need one high-level place in government to provide comprehensive analysis and policy coordination for all our dealings with the U.S.S.R.

No longer can there be any room for illusions about a governing group that, in the Stalin era, produced one of the two greatest, sustained state-sponsored set of atrocities against its own subjects in the 20th century. There can be no excuse for weakness in dealing with those who have ceased in the last 20 years to permit talk about, let alone restitution for, the horror on which their power rests.

But we do not have to lower our guard to raise our sights. We can invent new forms of dialogue, reach limited agreements, and perhaps even devise new forms of joint activity that can substitute cooperation for confrontation. The coming Soviet generation would welcome fresh initiatives. In trying to find a non-Stalinist path into the future, they will want better links both with their own deep past and with our broad, contemporary experience.

Those who will continue the troubled Soviet-American dialogue in the years ahead may someday conclude that, for such vast countries and such expansive, complicated peoples, it might just be harder to take small steps than big ones.

The writer, director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, has written histories of Russian culture and the revolutionary tradition.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

February 10, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Andropov's Funeral and U.S.-Soviet Relations

In case the President is receiving a variety of recommendations that he should attend Andropov's funeral, he should be fully aware of the deleterious consequences of such a move.

Presumably the principal argument in favor of the President's attendance is that it will send a powerful signal that he is ready and anxious to improve relations with the Kremlin, and that therefore he is really a man of peace. This would be therefore yet another way that the President could underscore that America has regained its strength under his Administration and that we can now negotiate with the Soviets from our new position of strength more securely than before.

There are several major problems with this line of thinking which, if ignored, could yield political results that could inflict severe damage to everything the President has done so far to make the world a safer place.

Confusion About the Nature of Renewed American Strength

The principal problem here is that this argument does not reflect a proper understanding of how and why the U.S. is stronger today than in 1980 -- and that a misunderstanding of this nature could work to undo the real sources of renewed American strength. The unspoken assumption is that we have revived our military power and that as a result we can face the Soviets more confidently and negotiate with them now that we have some chips to play with. This attitude is not only prevalent within the Administration -- especially in the State Department -- but is widespread even in conservative Republican circles on the Hill, where there is talk about cutting the Defense budget now that we have allegedly done so much to redress military imbalances.

The problem is that our military buildup consists mostly of promissory notes -- and in real terms manifests itself today mostly in increased readiness and morale. Secretary Weinberger stated a few days ago to Congress that the Soviets have widened their margin of superiority over us in most categories even further.

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NLS F00-009/435

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The real source of our new national strength is in the moral-spiritual-political sphere -- a measure of strength to which the Soviets pay very close attention. As a matter of fact, they see our moral-political strength as the key criterion in their measurement of the correlation of forces; for this is what constitutes our national will -- our will to use force if necessary to defend our interests, our will to believe that our system has a future and is worth defending, and our will to recognize the realities of the world as they are and not as we would wish them to be.

Coddling Illusions and Wishful Thinking

If the President were to decide to attend Andropov's funeral, he would send the Soviets a major signal that this real strength was severely eroding. By going to Moscow and inevitably meeting with some Soviet officials, the President would be saying that he does not feel that he can ensure his reelection without coddling the illusions and wishful thinking of large portions of the electorate. Those illusions are that peace is achieved by better atmospherics and by such direct dialogue with the Soviets as is sufficient to clear up those "misunderstandings" which allegedly are the source of the U.S.-Soviet adversarial relationship. These illusions are bolstered further by the wishful thinking that a reduction of the President's allegedly hostile rhetoric will "improve relations."

The reason, of course, why these notions are illusions is that they rest on the assumptions that the Soviets are not truly a communist power with communist objectives, and that therefore there are no fundamental political reasons why U.S.-Soviet relations should necessarily be adversarial. That this is an extreme form of wishful thinking with no basis in fact needs no explanation. It derives from that pervasive Western penchant, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick recently explained, to disbelieve the horrible. Large chunks of the American people simply do not want to believe:

-- That the Soviets are communists;

-- That they must therefore have unlimited international objectives;

-- That the destruction of American democracy is one of those objectives;

-- That the Soviets do not share the same concept of peace that we strive for;

-- That the Soviets continue to have an enormous Gulag with millions of slave laborers;

-- That the mass murders of innocent Afghans are actually going on today, right now;

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That visiting Soviet trade representatives, academicians, "journalists," UN employees and Embassy personnel might actually be engaged in subversive actions that might conceivably do harm to our country;

That the Soviets have actually broken various arms control agreements;

That maybe the Soviets do not find it in their self interest to reach mutual, verifiable arms control treaties and comply with them;

Etc.

An Improvement of Relations?

Some people may think that the question here is whether the President is more or less likely to get reelected by trying to win over the "wishful thinking" constituency by catering to their illusions. Indeed, the President can try such a strategy. Then, maybe his picture will appear on Time's cover shaking hands with Ustinov, presaging a new improvement of relations, a new "generation of peace." But would this represent a real improvement of relations, or would it be a deception of the world public that would merely reinforce the illusions of the wishful thinking constituency?

The fact is that it would not be a true improvement of relations -- at least not as we would define those terms. A real improvement of relations could take place only: a) if it were conducted on our terms -- i.e., by the Soviets exercising greater international restraint, withdrawing from Afghanistan, complying with arms agreements, stopping their military buildup, improving their human rights situation, etc.; or b) if it were conducted on Soviet terms -- i.e., by the U.S. silencing itself about Soviet aggression, silencing itself about Soviet human rights violations, letting bygones be bygones after 61 Americans are shot out of the air, by negotiating, signing and complying with arms control agreements that the Soviets will violate or at least circumvent (thus permitting further shifts in the military balance in their favor), by doing absolutely nothing when we catch them violating such agreements, by desensitizing the public and the Congress about the necessity of further defense spending through such silence about Soviet behavior, etc. So long as the Soviets remain communists and so long as we are committed to democracy, there can be no other formula to "improve relations." The best relations we can hope for are those where stability prevails, where the American people are under no illusions about the adversarial nature of the relationship, and where we are so strong that the Soviets will make no miscalculations.

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A Message of Weakness to the Soviets

The fact is that an atmospheric "improvement of relations" would be a deception; and as such it would send a great signal of weakness to the Soviets. Before, Ronald Reagan showed the world that the Presidency could be won by telling the people the unadulterated truth. This was the real sign of American strength -- because the people as a whole were increasingly willing to face the ugly realities of the world, to reject disbelief in the horrible, and to tackle these realities with resolution and determination. Now, if reelection can only be won by coddling wishful thinking and calming public fears, the President will be telling the Soviets:

-- That America is unwilling to face the truth and to hear the President tell the truth;

-- That the electorate has thus forced the President to "tone down the rhetoric" -- which in practice means, stop reminding the country about the nature of the powerful empire we face;

-- That therefore the American people are really ostriches at heart;

-- That Soviet disinformation efforts to convince the American people that the USSR is not truly a communist power any more have been successful;

-- That Soviet propaganda to intimidate the American people has been successful; and

-- That Soviet power is so great that America has been forced to meet the Soviets increasingly on their terms.

Acknowledging the Flaws of Past Policy

The President's presence in Moscow now would also signal that his entire previous policy was flawed. It would acknowledge that before, he was not really a man of peace and that peace is not achieved by facing the truth, warning the people of dangers and building up the body, the spiritual strength and thus the credibility of our deterrent forces.

Peace on Whose Terms

In his January 16 speech, the President already extended an olive branch to the Soviets. He asked them to improve relations on our terms -- which is the only acceptable path. The ball is in the Soviets' court and it is their turn to respond. For the President to make an atmospheric gesture of the order of attending Andropov's funeral would be to play the role of a supplicant. It could even be perceived as an effort to compete with Walter Mondale for Kremlin support in the election. Instead the greatest move the
President could make toward achieving peace on our terms would be to show the Soviets he can get reelected without their help at all. The window of vulnerability is open today. The Soviets must be considering what they can do to demand American respect for all that power they have accumulated. Any sign of weakness now may encourage them that they can demand more respect than they have won thus far.

RECOMMENDATION

That you share this memorandum with the President.

Approve___________ Disapprove_________
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Burt
Ambassador Burns
Jack Matlock, NSC
Harry Obst, Interpreter

Chancellor Helmut Kohl
MFA State Secretary Andreas Meyer-Landrut
Ambassador to the U.S., Peter Hermes
Dr. Horst Teltschik, Director General,
Foreign and Security Affairs, Federal Chancery
Heinz Weber, Interpreter
Dr. Juergen Sudhoff, Acting Chief, Federal Press and Information Center (lunch only)
Dr. Edouard Ackermann, Director General,
Communications and Public Relations,
Federal Chancery (lunch only)
Dr. Franz Pfeffer, MFA Director General for Political Affairs (lunch only)
Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, FRG Commissioner for Disarmament and Security Affairs (lunch only)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 5, 1984
11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Oval Office, and
12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Working Lunch,
Family Dining Room

The President greeted Chancellor Kohl and they exchanged greetings to Mrs. Kohl and the First Lady. Kohl also mentioned that his eldest son was with him and was on his way to study at Harvard. (U)

The President then asked Kohl what was on his agenda. (U)

Kohl replied that he had in mind a tour d'horizon, and that the President should interrupt and comment as he went along. Kohl then began with a review of the domestic situation in the Federal Republic. (U)

Turning first to the economic situation, Kohl said that economic recovery was under way and that he felt that the recovery would

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By: C. H. NARA, DAIR 5/23/83
be stronger than the experts were predicting. Inflation was being controlled and would be in the 2.8-3% range. Unemployment continues to be a problem, with two million Germans out of work. Basically, the problem resulted from too little investment for too long. The FRG must put more investment in industries of the future. (C)

There is also, Kohl noted, a potential future problem with the trade unions. They are proposing a shorter work week -- 36 hours -- with the same pay.

Kohl also noted that the FRG has a problem with exports and protectionist pressures are growing, but that he will oppose them firmly. He feels that they must compete with the Japanese in efficiency, and he is not pessimistic regarding their ability to do so. But it is clear that protectionism hurts everyone in the long run. (C)

In this regard, he added that he was strongly opposed to the proposed Common Market tax on fats and oils, and that he could assure the President that it will not be adopted. He had discussed this issue with Prime Minister Thatcher and she is not willing to support it either. (C)

Kohl noted the European criticism of high U.S. interest rates, and said that they are indeed annoying. But, as he had told his colleagues, it would be even more annoying if the President is not reelected, and he realized that perhaps it is not the best policy to bring them down this year. He hoped, however, that the problem could be addressed next year. (C)

Secretary Shultz observed that the Chancellor's statement regarding his firm position against the special tax on fats and oils is very important to us. He was pleased that Kohl stated it so unequivocally. An agricultural trade war would be the worst thing that could happen to all of us. (C)

Kohl said that he would make this point when he meets with the Senate, but we should understand that the resistance to protectionism must be a two-way street. (C)

Secretary Shultz suggested that he make this point to the Senate as well. (D)

Turning to political topics, Kohl observed that the opposition to LRINF deployments had not disappeared,
Regarding conditions in the European Community, Kohl noted that the Community was going through a difficult period arranging its finances. All the members need to make sacrifices, but Thatcher has not reached the point of recognizing this fully. In the end he believed that an arrangement would be reached, but that care must be taken to make sure that the arrangement devised would not lead to a trade war. This question is also linked to Spain and Portugal; the other members must increase their contributions. They need another two billion on top of the four agreed to.  

So far as the EC is concerned, he hoped that the current problems would be solved, but noted that this would be a long process, since any agreements would have to be ratified by national parliaments, and this could take two years or so. With the elections to the European Parliament, however, a new and more informal phase of negotiations will begin.  

Kohl then turned to Henry Kissinger's recent analysis of the alliance, and noted that it contained some good proposals. He felt, however, that Kissinger was wrong on two points: that there should be a European supreme commander, and that the U.S. troop presence should be lowered. These steps would be interpreted in Europe as a diminishing U.S. commitment to the alliance and would lead to an unraveling of the alliance. He agreed, however, that the Europeans should do more for themselves.  

Regarding the GDR, Kohl said that "seismographic" developments are taking place. Pressures are building up, and it is clear that the ideological basis for communism has gone to pieces. The GDR is letting more people leave than before -- 4,000 were allowed out in January and February, more than in ten years. This is an attempt to reduce the pressures on the regime in the hope that an explosion can be prevented. It is not in our
interest, Kohl added, that an explosion occur. He has the feeling that Honecker is on better terms with Chernenko than he was with Andropov, and this may give him a little more elbow room. Basically, Kohl expressed optimism about the direction of current trends. (C)

Regarding LRINF deployments, Kohl noted that the most important decisions have been made. He suggested, however, that we could help by pursuing a policy of negotiation with the Soviets. (C) 

Turning to the Soviet Union, Kohl observed that it was stupid to ridicule Chernenko's age or health, as the media had done. He believed Chernenko could stay in office and that he should be treated with courtesy. His position is, however, not as strong as Andropov's, and his successor may already have been chosen. It would be a good idea to try to establish contacts with the successor, but this of course should not be done behind Chernenko's back, but by using normal channels. (C)

Kohl added that he thought the President's decision not to go to the Andropov funeral was correct. The Soviet Union continues to have a collective leadership. They misread the situation in regard to NATO LRINF deployments, and it is important now for us to keep the initiative. (C)

Kohl then reviewed some specific issues as follows:

Kohl then turned to Poland, where he felt the situation continues to be bad. The Soviets have not mastered the ideological situation. He felt the Catholic Church initiative to provide support for private agriculture has great promise, and noted that it is the Pope's idea. The Polish regime would have to make a
very difficult decision to allow it, but it deserves our support if it is approved. {S}

Kohl then apologized for talking so long. {U}

The President said that he had not at all talked too long, and noted that we seem to be very close on the issues. Regarding protectionism, he felt very strongly that it should be opposed. However, he has problems with Congress. He then suggested that the conversation be continued at lunch. {C}

* * * * * *

Kohl initiated the conversation at lunch by saying that he was trying to do his part in supporting democratic forces in El Salvador. His ambassador is now there, and he was asking everyone to stand up for Duarte and assist him. {C}

The President said that these actions were most helpful. {U}

The topic then shifted to East-West relations, and Secretary Shultz referred to Kohl's earlier comments on the Polish Church initiative to assist private agriculture. {C}

Kohl reiterated the importance he attached to supporting this initiative, and observed that the President's personal support must be clear -- this will be very important for Catholics. {C}

The President noted that we have moved on some of our sanctions and will be prepared to move on others if the Polish government takes appropriate steps. As for the Soviets, he is making clear that we are ready to negotiate. {S}

Kohl said that it would be useful if the President could arrange a meeting with Chernenko. Personal contact is important, and Gromyko is a problem. A way must be found to get around him and contact other policy makers directly. He had talked to Mrs. Thatcher, and she agrees that a summit meeting would be desirable. {S}

The President replied that he was interested in preparing for a meeting, but it was important that we not talk about this publicly, since the Soviets could use it for propaganda purposes. {S}

Kohl said that he had told the Soviets that the President was going to be reelected whatever they did. They should believe him, since he had told them last June that the missiles would be deployed, and he had been proven right. So he had told the Soviets that if they hesitated to deal with President Reagan because 1984 is an election year, they would lose again. {S}
Secretary Shultz asked if Chernenko could stand up to Gromyko. His speeches seem a bit milder, but Gromyko seems to act as the gatekeeper to the outside world. (S)

Kohl thought it would be possible to arrange a summit, and noted that a 30-minute meeting would not be enough. It should provide enough time to discuss subjects thoroughly. (S)

But he felt the President should probe, and it would surprise him if Chernenko did not react positively. The East Europeans, at any rate, want a meeting, and Chernenko himself may feel that he doesn't have a lot of time to lose. (S)

The President said he was reminded of the story of the man who had just had a physical, and who asked his doctor for a report. The doctor advised, "Just eat the best part of the chicken first." (U)

The Vice President asked how Kohl would view the development of U.S.-GDR ties. (S)

Kohl said that it depends. If greater prestige of the GDR regime helps the people, this is all right. But the question should be examined carefully to make sure that any moves do help the people. Honecker does seem to have an interest in improving his relations with the U.S. Kohl met with him at a Soviet guest house in Moscow during the Andropov funeral. Honecker said at that time that he had an invitation to speak in San Francisco, and asked some questions about Americans and the United States. So he may be interested, and Kohl himself would give a qualified yes to an improved U.S.-GDR relationship. (S)

The President asked if Kohl could estimate how many East Germans would choose the FRG over the Communist ideology. (C)

Kohl said 90 percent. Of course, he added, not all really want our system; they have grown up under a socialist system and may not want to give up some of the social benefits. But the influence of the Church is growing and there is no support at all for revolution. (C)

Secretary Shultz recalled that in Bonn they had spoken of the importance of military to military contacts with the Soviets. (C)

Kohl said yes, he thought they were potentially useful. At present, he observed, the Soviets have only two channels of information from the outside world, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. Soviet marshals know little of the personalities in the West, and direct contact could broaden their horizons. (C)
The President remarked that it is easy for us to see the Soviets as aggressive. He wondered whether they could possibly view us as aggressive. (C)

Kohl said that he thought they could, but not because they fear we will attack their borders, but because they feel they need a buffer zone. And then dictatorships always need an enemy. (C)

The President asked rhetorically how they could think that we would want to go to war. They have emphasized their determination to impose Communism, and should recognize that the rest of us are merely being defensive. (C)

Kohl observed that Communist ideology is becoming more flaccid. He noted at the Andropov funeral that the symbols and procedures were as if a pope or emperor or tsar were being buried. And he himself was witness to the fact that when Mrs. Andropov paid her final farewell to the corpse, she made the sign of the cross over the casket. (C)

The President observed that the Soviets seem to have created an aristocracy such as the one they overthrew. (C)

Kohl remarked that whereas Americans have found their place in the world and in history under the President's leadership, time is not working to the Soviet advantage. He noted that Mitterand agrees with this, and he believes that it gives the United States an opportunity. The idea of Communism has lost much of its force. One can see this in the decline of the French and Italian Communist Parties. The idea of freedom is stronger everywhere. While the Soviet regime will not collapse overnight, it is brittle. (C)

The President said that he understood there was a turn to religion among the young. (C)

Kohl confirmed that he believed this was the case and noted that the Patriarch was allowed to read a public mass during the funeral period for Andropov. He wondered why the regime permitted it, and thought they might need it for insurance. He then asked Meyer-Landrut (until recently FRG Ambassador in Moscow) if he had any observations. (C)

Meyer-Landrut agreed that there is a growth of interest in religion, and noted that the Russians must cope with many problems for which the ideology gives them no help. They need better information regarding the West. (C)

Shultz wondered if Western tourists have an impact on the Soviet population. (W)

Meyer-Landrut thought that they definitely have an impact. Soviets are very interested in life in the West. They draw conclusions from the way Western tourists are dressed and act, and when they can, question the foreigners about their life. (W)
Kohl thought that we should not forget what it means to live in a country sealed from the outside. Distortions are great, and thirst for information is great. (2)

The lunch terminated with both the President and Chancellor Kohl agreeing on the usefulness of their conversation and on the importance of maintaining close consultations on the various issues that confront us. (3)
Monday, March 5 [1984]

A typical Mon. – no breathing room & a stack of memos plus things to sign – which I didn’t get to until later afternoon. Helmut Kohl arrived (W. Ger. Chancellor). We had a good meeting thru lunch. He confirmed my belief that Soviets are motivated, as least in part by insecurity & suspicion that we & our allies mean them harm. They still preserve the tank traps & barbed wire that show how close the Germans got to Moscow before they were stopped. He too thinks I should meet Chernenko.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

dated: 14 March 1984

Participants:

Jack F. Matlock, CSUS Specialist
Harry S. Hensley, International Affairs

DATE: 14 March 1984
TIME: 11:00 AM - 12:00 PM
PLACE: Hotel Marriott, New York

I told him that Yeltsin, the Russian leader, had discussed a summit meeting with Gorbachev. He said that he had no report on the possibility of a summit.

We had not heard about the expected visit of Vice President Bush to Moscow, and we were not sure how it was going. But nothing was going to stop us from discussing our respective positions on the subject. We did not come up with any specific ideas, but we believed that this was the right time to ask the US government to put pressure on the USSR to improve its human rights situation.

Yeltsin continued, saying that he had heard that the president had proposed the summit to improve the bilateral relations between the two countries. This was not possible because there were still many issues to be resolved. The visit of Vice President Bush was not going to solve any of them.

We agreed that there was a possibility of a summit, but we were not sure if it would be at the level of heads of state or just at the level of foreign ministers. If it were the latter, we thought it would be extremely useful.

I told him that our respective positions were not very different, but we did not believe that the summit would be a good idea. We thought it would be better to continue our discussions through diplomatic channels.

We ended the conversation by asking each other to keep the possibility of a summit in mind. We believed that it was important to continue our discussions and to put pressure on the USSR to improve its human rights situation.

They had informed us that Yeltsin had visited Moscow before the summit was planned. We were not sure if the visit had any impact on the summit preparations. We believed that it was better to continue our discussions through diplomatic channels and to put pressure on the USSR to improve its human rights situation.
acceptable solution by this route. The problem is that, by
Soviet count, this would still leave them with a substantial
SS-20 force, and NATO with nothing. So we have the basic problem
with the umbrellas and decoupling. Perhaps, instead, the Soviets
could look again at the proposals the President made at the UN in
September; these opened several important doors. For example,
the idea of a global ceiling with the U.S. taking only part of it
in Europe left a lot of room to discuss specific numbers. And
our offer to discuss the mix of cruise and Pershing II's
reflected a willingness to be flexible on this score as well. I
recalled that, when we talked in Moscow, he and Zagladdin seemed
particularly concerned with the Pershings; if this is the case,
they should note that we have offered to negotiate the mix.

Menshikov then said, "I'm just thinking out loud now, but if you
do want to get back on a negotiating track, we'll have to find
some way that takes account of our current position. Now, if you
came to us and said something like, 'You say we must withdraw our
LRINF missiles if negotiations are to resume. Let's talk about
the conditions under which that might be possible,'... and then
outlined how you thought negotiations might develop. Well, if
you took that approach, we would listen -- and maybe this could
give us a basis."

I told him I would relay this thought, and Menshikov concluded
our discussion of START and INF by saying that we should now wait
to see what the reaction in Moscow will be to what Scowcroft
says.

Before we parted, Menshikov remarked that they are now receiving
a 'flood' of American visitors in Moscow, many claiming ties to
the White House, and asked how they should regard them. I told
him that we receive many prospective visitors and brief them in
general on our policies, but that unless we specifically indicate
to the Soviets otherwise (as we did with Scowcroft), the visitors
should be considered only private citizens, whose ideas are their
own.

Menshikov also remarked, regarding concrete proposals, that while
these were necessary in formal negotiations, they are not neces-
sary in conversations such as the one we were having. He made
clear that the Soviets had found our exchanges useful, and asked
how we should proceed. I told him that we too found them useful,
and would continue to communicate our ideas in whatever way both
of us find most acceptable. I pointed out that we both are most
likely to find a way to make progress on some of the issues
before us if we can get an informal understanding of each other's
positions in advance, and that this required a means of commu-
nication not subject to leaks. For this reason, we had held
knowledge of our conversations to a very small number of indivi-
duals -- six or so.

Menshikov said they would make every effort to avoid leaks, but
that knowledge of our conversations had been conveyed to more
people in Moscow: the Politburo, including of course Chernenko,
had been informed of our previous discussion, and had approved
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Hartman's Meeting with Gromyko March 11

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from George Shultz reporting on Art Hartman's meeting with Gromyko March 11.

Gromyko followed a very tough approach in the meeting, and charged that we had not yet offered anything to move us forward in a constructive way. This is not encouraging, but we probably should expect this approach from Gromyko, who seems intent on seeing how much he can squeeze out of us before offering something in return.

I believe that we should refrain from drawing pessimistic conclusions from this conversation, however. It will be more important to see how Chernenko responds to your letter, and whether the Soviets pick us up on some of the suggestions you made in your recent letter to him. As you are aware, some of the private signals we are getting are somewhat more encouraging than Gromyko's hard-line approach.

Attachment:
Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of March 14, 1984

Prepared by:
Jack Matlock

cc: Vice President
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: Art Hartman's Meeting with Gromyko March 11

March 14, 1984

Art Hartman tells me that he met with Gromyko for two and a half hours Sunday to discuss your letter and my talk with Dobrynin March 7. Gromyko was careful to say his response was "preliminary" and that we will get an early formal reply to your letter, which has been passed to Chernenko. Art feels Gromyko may not yet have fully familiarized himself with what we have presented. That said, however, he was also very tough.

After Art had begun by stressing your sincerity and the very specific character of our message, Gromyko spent an hour and a half complaining that we had killed off a whole series of agreements and had not yet offered anything to move us forward in a constructive way. The chief items were:

-- START and INF, where the policy of the Administration makes talks impossible after the U.S. had "paralyzed" SALT II;

-- other arms control items -- TTBT, outer space, CW, nuclear non-first-use, non-use of force -- where the U.S. had refused to ratify, was ignoring Soviet proposals or was making promises of a kind it had not delivered on in the past; and

-- bilateral cooperation agreements (environment, health, etc.) which the U.S. had "cast aside."

In rebuttal, Art told Gromyko that he was defining negotiations in a one-sided way, that we need a give-and-take process and adjustments on each side, and that we should add deeds that address real problems to international life, rather than just words. He stressed that Gromyko was misunderstanding your intentions if he thought we are just repeating the importance of dialogue: you had made substantive decisions and are ready to move forward. Gromyko concluded that he was not convinced.

Art thinks that part of Gromyko's point was to prove that we cannot go around him; the fact that TASS immediately announced the meeting had made no progress suggests that he also continues to fear we will exploit any dialogue between us to prove we are in business-as-usual. It was not an encouraging meeting, but it is hard to draw conclusions from it, and both Art and I agree we should wait for the formal reply to your letter that Gromyko promised. In the meantime, we should do what we need to do here to be ready to move on the issues you identified in your letter.
8. Promemoria Dialogo Est-Ovest [1984]

ABSTRACT – This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiation. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed a resume of MBFR talks.
Dialogo Est - Ovest.

L'Italia tende a riportare il dialogo Est-Ovest a condizioni di relativa normalità in attesa che maturino i tempi per un diretto impegno in favore di una revisione della posizione negativa assunta da Mosca sui negoziati per il disarmo nucleare.

Dopo l'inaugurazione della Conferenza sul Disarmo di Stoccolma l'attenzione si è ora spostata sulle successive scadenze, già fissate o potenziali: la riapertura - il 16 marzo prossimo - del negoziato MBFR a Vienna e la prospettiva di una ripresa del negoziato FNI.

L'interruzione dei negoziati sulla riduzione degli armamenti nucleari, ed in particolare quello sulle FNI, ha conferito al negoziato MBFR di Vienna un rilievo politico particolare, derivante se non altro dal fatto che esso è, unitamente alla Conferenza di Stoccolma, la sola sede attiva in cui vengono trattate nel modo attiva fra Est ed Ovest.

Da parte italiana ci siamo sempre impegnati per restituire dinamismo costruttivo al riesame della posizione negoziale occidentale, in modo da creare le premesse per un rilancio della trattativa.

Sul problema della ripresa del negoziato FNI riteniamo per ora prematuro ogni tentativo di indurre l'Unione Sovietica a tornare in tempi brevi al tavolo negoziale. La successione intervallata al vertice del Cremlino non può d'altra parte contribuire che al rallentamento del processo di riflessione in corso a Mosca sulle conseguenze da trarre dall'avvio dello spiegamento missilistico NATO. Pur preferendo che la trattativa FNI abbia luogo in un contesto negoziale separato da quello dello START, riteniamo inopportuno assumere a priori posizioni di preclusione nei confronti di una ipotesi di fusione di due negoziati, riservandoci, nel caso di una proposta in tal senso da parte sia avanzata dall'URSS di discutere le modalità di una fusione in modo da garantire nella misura
più ampia possibile la tutela degli interessi europei.
Department of State

ACTION MEMORANDUM
S:S

SECRET/SENSITIVE

TO:    The Secretary
FROM:  EUR - Richard Burt
SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on Your Meeting With Dobrynin

Further to our conversation, I have made fixes in your Memorandum to the President on Monday’s Dobrynin meeting and attached a gameplan for followup. The gameplan requires your careful review as it contains decisions on precisely how we will follow up, for example how the regional talks would be conducted. Please let us know if you want to make any changes.

We are sending you separately the revised draft letter to Chernenko with a memorandum for the President. You might want to review them at the same time and send them over together as they are interrelated, i.e. we recommend in both a step in CDE.

Enclosures:
Tab A - Memorandum to the President
Tab B - US-Soviet Dialogue: Follow-up Steps
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Enclosures:

Tab A - Memorandum to the President
Tab B - US-Soviet Dialogue: Follow-up Steps

#1340b/1335b
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin Monday afternoon to discuss the state of play of the relationship following your exchange of letters with Chernenko. He held to the rigid Soviet positions on START and INF, but showed interest in other arms control issues. We agreed to go ahead on several bilateral items. We also agreed on discussions on regional issues, including the Middle East, and confidential preliminary discussions on outer space.

To start off, I professed to be puzzled about where things now stand, noting that we have been hearing things from Moscow that seem different from the confidential exchanges we have been having and your correspondence with Chernenko. I noted we were ready to move forward, questioned if Moscow was, and asked for his personal assessment of the last Chernenko letter, the "oral remarks", and the recent Moscow line.

Dobrynin claimed the letters and "oral remarks" were self-explanatory. He said our dialogue covered three areas -- nuclear arms control/security, regional, and bilateral issues -- and proceeded to give his views. On nuclear issues, they had "invited" us to remove obstacles to negotiations, i.e., to reverse our INF deployments. They had also proposed concrete actions on other issues such as non-militarization of space (including ASAT), the nuclear freeze, test-ban negotiations, and the "nuclear norms" -- some vague declaratory measures including no-first-use. Dobrynin asserted the Soviets were very serious about this list which, he added, could be discussed in diplomatic channels or through special envoys.

He also noted that the Chernenko letter proposed discussion of regional issues, particularly the Middle East, and bilateral issues, including such things as the consulates, agreements that would soon expire, fisheries, and artificial heart research. Dobrynin said they were ready to sit down with a calendar and discuss these issues concretely.

In response, I made the following points: 1) We want reductions in nuclear arms, not a freeze which would be as complicated to negotiate as START. I pointed out that even they had come out for reductions from SALT-II in their START proposal. 2) We want
to talk about INF but have no intention of withdrawing our
missiles as a precondition. I again told him we have ideas on
both INF and START and are ready to negotiate on these issues.
3) We were disappointed that Brent Scowcroft was not received by
the Soviets at a proper level. There was no attempt to bypass
anyone and we had used diplomatic channels to ask for a meeting.
Summing up, I reiterated that we consider the nuclear issues to
be of central importance for our two countries.

Dobrynin said he came to the conclusion from my comments
that there is no way to make progress on nuclear issues. I told
him I disagreed: we believe progress can be made.

Dobrynin returned again to outer space. I told him we were
working on this issue and gave him a copy of our unclassified
report to Congress. We are interested in achieving something in
this area, I said, but do not now see a way to do so because of
verification problems. I noted we had proposed discussions on
space and strategic defense at START but they had not been
interested. I said we continued to be willing to discuss this
issue but it had to be recognized that there are real problems
with verification.

Dobrynin said we need to discuss this issue now, adding that
this question could become the most dangerously destabilizing
factor in our relationship. I asked if he were willing to
discuss this in private diplomatic channels, rather than begin
negotiations in publicly acknowledged talks. Dobrynin said that
they were willing. We both agreed to think about how to
organize these exchanges and who should participate, and then
discuss this subject again.

I turned aside his questions about the possibilities to
discuss a nuclear freeze and the CTB, noting again that the
former is simply not a good idea and that the latter has profound
verification problems. When he pressed on the CTB issue, I told
him I would inform you of any new ideas that the Soviets might
have on the subject.

I then said we plan to table our CN draft in Geneva later
this month and hope to have a new proposal in MBFR by the end of
the round on April 16 in Vienna. In this regard, I told him
that if the Soviet side reacted positively to our steps in MBFR,
there could be some further motion in the Western position. On
CDE, I said we were glad to see the substantive discussions
between Ambassadors Goodby and Grinevskiy, noting Goodby's
invitation for Grinevskiy to come to Washington. Dobrynin said
Moscow would decide on whether Grinevskiy should come.
On the Hotline talks, I noted we had recently conveyed technical information to them and looked forward to meeting at the end of April. (Dobrynin and his deputy seemed surprised we had not been informed by Moscow of a starting date.) I also told him we were working on a draft agreement that we hoped to pass to them before that meeting. Dobrynin said that sounded fine.

Dobrynin then again moved to the Middle East, saying we needed an exchange of views on steps to greater stability in the region and to work for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He noted these discussions could be “very secret.” I said we were ready for discussions on regional problems, but that we would need to set an agenda of the issues to be discussed and decide who would participate. I told Dobrynin we were interested both in sharing information and working on damage limitation to avoid potential crises between us, noting that the Iran-Iraq war was a good subject for discussions. We need to start modestly, I said, to see if progress can be made, indicating I had in mind something along the lines of Chet Crocker’s talks with them earlier on Africa.

Dobrynin and I agreed we would give them our ideas on an agenda for regional discussions and the level of the talks. I stressed that even if we have our experts conduct some of these talks, it would be important that Gromyko and I keep close control of these discussions through our respective ambassadors.

On bilateral affairs, I said that we would talk with them this month on our ideas for revitalizing some of the bilateral agreements (on agriculture, health, housing, and the environment) currently in effect. To Dobrynin’s questions about expiring agreements and fishing quotas, I said we would have to study them on a case-by-case basis. When I raised the Consulates issue, Dobrynin said they also wanted to talk about Aeroflot. I told him we would discuss that only as a separate issue. I also said that the shootdown of the KAL plane was still an emotional issue in the United States and they should take some positive steps on our suggestions in Montreal for improving the Pacific air routes.

When I asked about the building for our Kiev Consulate, Dobrynin noted that Art Hartman is planning a trip there soon and would be able to get an answer on the building question. I noted we would propose the text of an exchanges agreement in the next two weeks and suggested that the Consular Review Talks resume in Moscow in May. Dobrynin agreed. When I also mentioned we would propose a new time for the Coast Guard search and rescue talks, Dobrynin seemed unfamiliar with them but agreed to raise this with Moscow.
I noted his positive remarks to Art on the Maritime talks. Dobrynin said yes, he thought that progress could be made.

I then said that Dobrynin had suggested only three areas on the agenda, we had a fourth -- human rights. I noted the positive reaction here to the emigration of the Pentecostalists, suggested it would be useful for them to take further steps on human rights, noting the case of Shcharanskiy. Dobrynin said his position on this was well-known. When I again suggested something in the human rights area would be helpful to the overall relationship, he said he had been telling American Jewish groups that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would help on the emigration issue.

Finally, Dobrynin asked if you would be responding soon to Chernenko's letter. I said a letter would be forthcoming, but we wanted to hear what Dobrynin had to say and what Gromyko had to say to Art Hartman in Moscow the following day before discussing a reply. I then once again urged that the Soviet side reconsider its position on the START and INF talks, emphasizing the central importance of this issue.

When Art met with Gromyko on Tuesday, Gromyko seemed most interested in southern Africa and outer space. He read Art an oral statement on southern Africa, emphasized the value of past discussions of this subject, and seemed interested in having Chet Crocker talk with them further. He restated Dobrynin's points on ABAT, suggesting we had no interest in discussing space issues. Art repeated my points that we do not want negotiations, but that we were willing to have confidential discussions. It was clear Gromyko was not completely informed of Dobrynin's discussions with me of this issue.

I have attached a separate memorandum laying out next steps to be pursued in our dialogue with the Soviets.
US-SOVET DIALOGUE: FOLLOW-UP STEPS

I. Arms Control/Security

A. START/INF: Pursuant to NSDD-137, we will complete DACPG studies on START trade-offs and possible INF initiatives, in preparation for exploratory discussions with Soviets whenever they are ready.

B. Outer Space/SDI: Dobrynin agreed Monday to private talks, but Grozny claimed to Art Hartman Tuesday that we are refusing to talk; we have raised the discrepancy with the Soviets here. If Dobrynin’s agreement is confirmed, we will prepare for confidential private discussions. The Outer Space IG is now focusing on ASAT arms control measures short of a complete ban, and a consensus is emerging on space CMBs and “prohibited acts,” but there is still work to be done on more substantive possibilities such as a high-altitude ASAT ban. The first private discussions with Soviets should be at Assistant Secretary level with Dobrynin’s deputy. We would: brief on your Strategic Defense Initiative; reiterate our last year’s offer of experts’ discussions in START/ICC; describe some of the limited ASAT arms control measures under review; and press Soviets to explain how they propose to verify their more sweeping ASAT proposals.

C. Chemical Weapons: The Vice President will present U.S. draft Treaty in Geneva April 18, and we will engage in the private bilateral consultations with the Soviets you have approved, paralleling discussions in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I suggest you propose these bilateral discussions in your letter to Chernenko.

D. NEPR: Once new Western proposals are on the table in Vienna, I will reaffirm interest in further bilateral consultations there between our two delegation chiefs.

E. CBM: I am suggesting language in your reply to Chernenko’s March 19 letter that gets his attention and sends him a clear signal of our non-threatening intentions. We would indicate readiness to explore a trade-off between the concrete confidence-building measures we have proposed in Stockholm and the kind of non-use of force undertaking the Soviets are promoting. The next step would then be up to the Soviets.

F. Hotline: We will provide Soviets an advance copy of a proposed Hotline agreement by April 11. The Soviets have agreed on our general timeframe for Moscow talks, but owe us a response on the specific dates we proposed (April 24-26).
II. Regional

A. Southern Africa: We will reply to Gromyko's interesting April 3. Demarche to Hartman by proposing in the coming weeks another round of consultations between Assistant Secretary Crocker and a Soviet counterpart at a neutral site (the last Crocker session was in Geneva in December 1982).

B. Mideast/Persian Gulf: Dobrynin and I agreed to engage in talks, but we should proceed cautiously, and I will propose to him that he and I meet accompanied by experts (Assistant Secretaries Murphy and Burt on our side, a Middle East man from Moscow on his). I will keep discussion focused on Iran/Iraq as well as Arab/Israeli issues.

III. Bilateral

Burt and Dobrynin's senior deputy Sokolov will hold weekly meetings to keep book on various bilateral issues, and will report to Dobrynin and me.

A. Exchange Agreement: I told Dobrynin we hope to table a draft agreement in Moscow by end of next week, and we should do so. We are awaiting final clearance of the draft agreement from the NSC.

B. Activities under existing agreements: Administrator Ruckelshaus has proposed that he assume the Co-Chairmanship of our Joint Commission on the environment with the Soviets and renew activities under our agreement; I agree, and he will be announcing this to his Soviet counterpart. Meanwhile, the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Housing and Urban Development, as well as EPA, are actively examining ways to expand activities under our bilateral agreements on agriculture, health, artificial heart, and housing, and we will be making proposals to the Soviets as they come forward.

C. Agreements nearing expiration: We are awaiting an NSC decision on extension of the Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement, which expires June 10. The SIG/IEP has recommended a 10-year extension, with only DoD dissenting. Assuming that we decide in favor, we will inform the Soviets and propose convening a useful sub-group on information exchange. We will need to examine the World Oceans Agreement that comes up for renewal in December; it is important to NOAA and was extended without controversy in December 1981. (These are the only agreements coming up for renewal this year.)

D. Maritime Boundary: We have told the Soviets we are ready for another round of talks, and we will soon propose a specific date for later this spring.
E. Fisheries: The Soviets owe us a response to our proposal to renew our bilateral fisheries agreement for eighteen months instead of the usual twelve. Meanwhile, I will be taking a decision soon on whether to recommend to you some step to restore elements of our fisheries relationship (small direct allocation to Soviets, new joint ventures, or negotiation of new agreement to include allocations for U.S. in Soviet waters).

F. Civil Aviation Technical Measures: The Soviets have told us not to expect any reply until after the April-May special ICAO Assembly to consider amendments to the Chicago Convention, but we will keep pressing them for more rapid action.

G. Consulates: We are waiting for final approval of the negotiating strategy now at the NSC. We will then propose negotiations on opening the new consulates in Kiev and New York. It should be possible to put advance parties in place in a matter of months, if the Soviets agree.

H. Consular Review Talks: We are waiting for final approval from the NSC. Then we can pin down a starting date for a new round of useful talks on minor consular matters, i.e. a new exit/entry point for us at Nakhodka in the Soviet Far East, in return for a new exit/entry point at Baltimore for the Soviets.

IV. Human Rights:

I am suggesting language in your next letter to Chernenko regretting his lack of response to your previous appeal for humanitarian gestures; and we will keep pressing the Soviets for steps on Mrs. Bonner, Sakharov, Shcharamski, Jewish emigration and cultural freedom, etc.
Sezione II: Attività istituzionale
Serie 2: Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri
Sottoserie 3: Relazioni internazionali
Sottosottoserie 1: Incontri e visite ufficiali

UA 27: "Incontro del presidente del Consiglio con il primo ministro del Regno dei Paesi Bassi, Ruud Lubbers (Roma, 4 aprile 1984)"

- 1. Promemoria Linee di politica estera dei Paesi Bassi [04/1984]

ABSTRACT – An interesting memo from Badini to Craxi about the domestic constraints on Dutch foreign policy
PAESI BASSI - LINEE DI POLITICA ESTERA

Collocazione occidentale ed atlantica, impegno europeo, sensibilità particolare verso l'azione delle Nazioni Unite e verso i problemi dei Paesi in via di sviluppo rappresentano le linee fondamentali della politica estera olandese.

Nel quadro europeo l'Olanda ha sempre appoggiato la costituzione e lo sviluppo della Comunità e il sistema della cooperazione politica europea, manifestando una particolare sensibilità per una adeguata presenza della CEE ai Vertici annuali dei Paesi più industrializzati.

Un punto fermo in tale contesto è rappresentato dai particolari legami storici con la Gran Bretagna e dal vivo desiderio che essa continui a far parte della Comunità.

Nel settore della sicurezza i Paesi Bassi hanno sempre considerato vitale il mantenimento del rapporto di alleanza che lega l'Europa Occidentale agli Stati Uniti nell'ambito della struttura atlantica. In questo quadro si colloca un certo scetticismo del Governo olandese nei confronti del progetto francese per rialzare l'impegno all'UEO.

Il Governo olandese, che ha fatto stato a suo tempo della propria intenzione di uniformarsi alle delibere adottate in sede NATO sul potenziamento difensivo tramite lo spiegamento delle INF, ha a lungo rinviato una decisione sulla installazione nel proprio territorio della quota di missili Cruise destinati all'Olanda (43). La questione si è rivelata in effetti cruciale per la sopravvivenza dell'attuale coalizione di Governo DC-Liberali, giacché una parte consistente delle stesse file democristiane (e non
solo le frange di sinistra) si trova schierata nel rifiuto alla installazione insieme all'opposizione socialista. Lubbers, dopo aver tentato di disinnescare i possibili effetti dirompenti della decisione - cui è per di più contraria la grande maggioranza dell'opinione pubblica - con una proposta di installazione solo parziale (16 missili), ha dichiarato in Parlamento all'inizio di marzo che i Paesi Bassi non devono ridurre il numero dei Cruise da dislocare nel proprio territorio, ma ricercare una riduzione delle INF nel più ampio contesto NATO. Nella stessa circostanza Lubbers ha altresì confermato che il Governo darà a conoscere la decisione definitiva entro il prossimo giugno.

Particolarmente sensibile si è dimostrata l'opinione pubblica olandese al deterioramento dei rapporti Est-Ovest culminato con il ritiro dei sovietici dai negoziati ginevrini per il disarmo. Di questo stato d'animo si è fatto interprete lo stesso Lubbers nel corso della visita compiuta negli Stati Uniti alla fine di gennaio. Mentre l'Aja guarda con scetticismo alle prospettive di dilancio della distensione, la sensazione olandese è che da parte americana non si faccia abbastanza per riavviare su basi costruttive il dialogo con Mosca.

La posizione olandese è critica nei confronti della politica nordamericana in Centro America e verso Passi come la Turchia ed il Sud Africa, per l'enfasi posta tradizionalmente dal Governo dell'Aja sulla salvaguardia dei diritti umani.

Per quanto riguarda il Medio Oriente va rilevato che dopo l'invasione israeliana del Libano l'approccio olandese è leggermente mutato soprattutto in merito alle simpatie tradizionali sempre nutritie verso Israele. Il Governo dell'Aja ha cominciato a considerare l'OLP come una realtà politica con cui sarà prima o
poi giocoforza dialogare ed ha instaurato primi cauti contatti.

L'impegno olandese nel Medio Oriente si è confermato con la partecipazione della Forza Multinazionale nel Sinai (un centinaio di uomini), ma ha mostrato i suoi limiti con il rifiuto di contribuire alla Forza Multinazionale di Pace per il Libano.

I Paesi Bassi – attualmente membri del Consiglio di Sicurezza – seguono con particolare attenzione ed impegno l'attività delle Nazioni Unite, nel cui ambito dimostrano un'accen
ta sensibilità per la problematica del Terzo Mondo e per la sal
vaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo.

Sul piano bilaterale, l'Olanda è, particolarmente impegnata nella cooperazione con il Terzo Mondo (l'aiuto olandese nel settore ha superato nel 1983 i 2000 miliardi di lire pari allo 1,5% del reddito nazionale netto).
BON, 12 June 1984

TO

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CC OF
THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Mr. TODOR ZHIVKOV

DEAR Mr. CHAIRMAN,

I read with great interest and attention your letter of the 9th of May 1984, delivered to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of Bulgaria, Petur Mladenov.

I share your opinion that the Federal Republic of Germany and Bulgaria have developed good and fruitful relations following the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973.

We see possibilities for strengthening and furthering these relations, which, in the interest of the populations of our countries, we should not leave unrealized. The recent talks between the foreign ministers of our countries revealed new prospects in that direction. Even now, dear Mr. Chairman, I am glad that I will be able to continue this dialog with you in Bon on the 20th of September 1984.

The international situation continues to be worrisome; the peace in Europe and in the world continues to be exposed to great dangers. The differences in understanding the reasons that have led to the current situation, in my view, should not prevent the responsible and impartial search for solutions to the pressing issues. In the past, there have been situations in the relations between the East and the West, when, despite the
different assessment of the relevant conditions, solutions have been reached through negotiations – a way to which there is no other alternative. Our countries can contribute to the creation of a climate, which will enable the resolution of even central political issues, by means of a broad bi-lateral political dialogue that we wish to continue by mutual consent.

The Federal Government has always stood for an active policy of disarmament and control over armament and has mainstreamed its efforts in offering assistance in that direction through concrete proposals in the current negotiations. Recently Western countries have made constructive propositions. In connection to that, I will shift your attention to the packet of proposals, presented in Stockholm in January of this year, for complementary, concrete measures for the strengthening of trust and security. Further, I would like to point you[re attention] to President Reagan’s readiness - expressed in his speech in front of the Parliament in Dublin on the 5th of June 1984 - to lead negotiations in Stockholm for asserting the principle of the non-use of force.

This initiative aligns with the views of the Federal Government and has its full support. Another example is the new proposal made by Western countries at the negotiations in Vienna on the 19th of April of this year, in which the West points to new ways of solving some of the key issues subject of these negotiations and emphasizes its readiness to contribute to making headway by maintaining a flexible approach during the negotiations. I very much hope that the Warsaw Pact member countries will study carefully these proposals and will move towards a constructive dialogue with us on these issues.

The Federal Government, led by me, is of the opinion that despite the great significance, which we attribute to the political discussion on the control over armament, the East-West dialogue should not be confined to the missile issue. The Final Act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, and the Final Agreement of the conference in Madrid contain the broader basis of the program for building East-West relations.

The process that began in Helsinki, based on which it was possible to reach important agreements, despite the existing tensions, turned out to be a firm support for continuing the multilateral East-West dialogue at a difficult stage.

We attribute to the Helsinki process the main significance for the further peaceful and constructive development of East-West relations.

Please allow me, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion to touch upon some particular issues addressed by you.
The Federal Government, along with its allies, has carefully examined the Warsaw Pact member countries’ proposal of January 10th 1984 for creation of a free of chemical weapons zone in Europe. The Federal Government places a priority on the negotiations, led at the Geneva Convention on disarmament, for a universal and reliably enforced ban on all types of chemical weapons throughout the world. At present, these negotiations have reached an advanced stage. It is important not to question again what has been achieved so far and not to prolong the negotiations. We see such a danger in starting parallel negotiations concerning the region of Europe. These discussions would not only stumble across the same problems encountered in the negotiations at the Geneva Convention, but would even be burdened by the necessity to create measures of control over the non-storage of chemical weapons outside the zones free of chemical weapons. By the way, the Third World countries represented at the Geneva Convention on disarmament would hardly show understanding, should this important topic slip away from their hands by means of special regional negotiations. The Federal Government supports the proposal for a universal agreement on banning chemical weapons, set forth by the U.S. on the 15th of April 1984.

The [Federal] Government sees in this initiative one important political step and associates it with the expectation that the U.S. proposal will contribute to the considerable progress of the Geneva negotiations. The U.S. clearly made it known that this proposal is a contribution that lays the foundation for negotiations, and offered to conduct consultations on it with all delegations in Geneva and, first and foremost, with the Soviet one. Until now there has been no response to this offer on the part of the Soviet Union. The Federal Government appeals to the People’s Republic of Bulgaria to defend, at the Geneva Convention on disarmament, the prompt and permanent removal of the category chemical weapons on a world scale.

As far as the mid-range missiles are concerned, we welcome and support the readiness of the U.S. to renew negotiations at any time without preconditions and to examine every serious Soviet proposal. The Federal Government is very sorry that the Soviet Union still persistently declines to continue the negotiations. How could the Soviet Union consider the start of positioning of U.S. mid-range missiles a reason to halt the negotiations, given that it had continuously positioned [Soviet] SS-20 missiles during the negotiations and is still positioning them?

Regarding your remark, Mr. Chairman, that the U.S. is developing “Programs for the Militarization of Space,” I would like to point out that the U.S. is ready to hold talks at the government level on this matter.

As much as it is within my ability, I will stand for measured and reasonable solutions in that sphere.
The Federal Government took a stand, regarding the renewed Warsaw Pact countries’ proposal on freezing and reducing military expenditures, in front of the Romanian Government, which made the proposal on behalf of the Warsaw Pact; and brought attention to two aspects: the Federal Government, as well as the governments of our Western allies, shares the concern with the size of the military expenditures worldwide.1 The Federal Government also hopes that [military] defense expenditures can be reduced as a result of balanced agreements on the control over armament and disarmament. With this goal in mind, the Federal Government supports the efforts of the United Nations for making public military expenditures based on a standardized accounting system, and releases the respective numbers for its country. A system that makes military expenditures of various countries comparable and subject to control is a prerequisite for fruitful negotiations on the issue. We would welcome participation on the part of Warsaw Pact countries in these efforts within the framework of the United Nations. Such a move would be appropriate to underline the importance of the proposals of the Warsaw Pact on matters of military expenditures.

Mr. Chairman, you also address the proposal for a treaty on the mutual restraint from the use of force. With regard to that, I would like to emphasize one more time that the observance of the ban on the use of force, underlying the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, has always been a constitutive ingredient of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. In and of itself, a renewed confirmation of the good will not to use force, when not proven by concrete, tangible actions, would not lead to progress.

During my visit to Moscow in July of 1983, I paid attention to the fact that a new binding confirmation of the ban on the use of force may contribute to the improvement of the international situation, if it could, in reality, alleviate the threat of the use of force and if the use of force can be stopped where it is ongoing.

Yours respectfully,

HELMUT KOHL

CHANCELLOR OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

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1 The translation suffers due to the cumbersome sentence structure in both Bulgarian and German. The FRG has responded to the Romanian Government regarding a renewed proposal by the Warsaw Pact for freezing and reduction of military expenditures.
Preliminary
Biographic information on Dr. Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom, who is visiting the United States under the auspices of the U.S. Information Agency's International Visitor Program. His program is being arranged by Mrs. Hannelore Starr and Ms. Leslee Miller of the Visitor Program Service of Meridian House International.

June 27 - July 26, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>Dr. Gordon BROWN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT POSITION</td>
<td>Member of Parliament (Labour Party) for Dumfermline East, United Kingdom since 6/83</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAST POSITIONS</td>
<td>Journalist and Current Affairs Editor Scottish Independent Television Station 1980-83</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lecturer, Glasgow College of Technology and University of Edinburgh 1976-80</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rector, University of Edinburgh 1972-75</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONAL DATA</td>
<td>February 20, 1951; Glasgow, Scotland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Born</td>
<td>Single</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dietary restrictions</td>
<td>Office: The House of Commons, Westminster, London SW1A OAA, England</td>
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<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>Home: 48 Marchmont Rd., Edinburgh EH9, Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailing address</td>
<td>PhD History, University of Edinburgh 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACADEMIC BACKGROUND</td>
<td>M.A. University of Edinburgh 1972</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Red Paper on Scotland, 1975 (co-editor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEMBERSHIPS</td>
<td>Member, Executive Committee, Labour Party Scottish Council (previously Chairman - 1983-84)</td>
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<td>National Union of Journalists Transport and General Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS</td>
<td>Reading and writing; football and tennis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRAVELS ABROAD</td>
<td>First visit to the U.S.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4. OBJECTIVES.
- U.S. POLITICAL PROCESSES: BROWN WOULD LIKE TO
FOCUS ON COMPARISONS BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY OFFICES AT NATIONAL AND CONSTITUENCY LEVELS.
HE WOULD LIKE TO EXAMINE HOW THE DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN PARTIES ARE ORGANIZED; HOW FUNDS ARE RAISED
DURING ELECTIONS AND NON-ELECTION PERIODS; AND INFLUENCE
OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES ON PARTY POLICIES ETC.
BROWN WOULD ALSO LIKE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEND CAMPAIGN
RELATED ACTIVITIES.

- U.S. DEFENSE POLICY. BROWN WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS
ON U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARDS NATO AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.
BESIDES BRIEFSING ON DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE AND OTHER
STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ETC., SUGGEST BROWN
ALSO HAS BRIEFSING ON HOW U.S. VIEWS THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USAGE BY THE WARSZAWA PACT AT FRONT LINE AND EFFECTS
THIS HAS ON NATO MILITARY PERSONNEL.

- NATURAL RESOURCES AND POLITICS. BROWN WOULD
LIKE TO LOOK AT U.S. AGRICULTURAL AND FISHING INDUSTRIES
AND THEIR LOBBYING EFFORTS; REGIONAL AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT/REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND RELATED SOCIAL
ISSUES; ENERGY AND CONSERVATION PROGRAMS. HE
WOULD LIKE TO MEET INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN THESE
VARIOUS SECTORS AND SEE THE EFFECTS THESE GROUPS HAVE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES.

5. PROGRAM AND ITINERARY.
- WASHINGTON, D.C.
- CAPITOL HILL; TOUR OF THE HILL. SUGGEST BROWN
MEET WITH CONGRESSMEN FROM AREAS HE WILL VISIT, E.G.
NORMAN DICKS (D) BREMERTON, WASHINGTON OR HOUSE
DT #1296
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY

MAY 84
FM AMEENSSY LONDON
TO RUEHIA/USA WASDNC 5927
RUFHUKI/AMCONSUL EDINBURGH 1250
BT
USIA SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 1126

FOR: E/VGE - JENNIFER ZIMMEN, EU - BILL ZAVIS;
       EDINBURGH - GINGER
E.O. 12156 N/A
SUBJECT: FY-84 IV GRANTEE - DR. GORDON BROWN

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE; AND AL SWIFT (D) BILLINGHAM,
WASHINGTON (WHO LIKE BROWN IS A FORMER BROADCASTER).

ALSO SUGGEST MEETING WITH MEMBERS AND STAFFERS OF HOUSE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST; SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR
FORCES RE NATO AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF
MAINTAINING STRONG NUCLEAR DETERRENT. HOUSE AND SENATE
RULES COMMITTEES RE HOUSE AND SENATE ORGANIZATION ETC.
HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE, AND SENATE
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE RE LEGISLATION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY ISSUES. ALSO SUGGEST MEETING WITH
OFFICIALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY CONFERENCES.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BRIEFING BY BUREAU OF
POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS ON NATO/ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND
BY EUROPEAN DEPT OFFICER.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: SUGGEST MEETING WITH
OFFICIALS SUCH AS PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR NATO AND EUROPEAN
POLICY; DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL POLICY;
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. DELEGATION, INF
NEGOTIATIONS; SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.
DELEGATION, START AND/OR OTHER OFFICIALS AGENCY CONSIDERS
IMPORTANT.

DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEES.
BRIEFING ON PARTY ORGANIZATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: BRIEFING ON
CAMPAIGN FINANCE RULES AND REGULATIONS.

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES.

DODDING AND AEC: SUGGEST MEETINGS WITH
PRIVILEGED PROGRESSIVE TOPICS OF INTEREST TO BROWN.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: SUGGEST MEETING OFFICIALS
DEALING WITH ENERGY AND LATER CONCLUSION, INCLUDING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: SUGGEST BROWN
KEEP REPRESENTATIVES RE HIS INTEREST IN ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY.

MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL.
SUGGEST VISIT TO FARMING COMMUNITY MINNEAPOLIS/
ST. PAUL AREA TO SEE FARMING METHODS, AND SPEAK TO FARMERS
ABOUT LOCAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES AFFECTING THEM.
HOME HOSPITALITY WITH FARMING FAMILY.
LOCAL DEMOCRATIC AND/OR REPUBLICAN PARTY
HEADQUARTERS. ATTEND CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES IF ANY AT TIME
OF VISIT.
SPEAK TO ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND FARMERS ABOUT
CONFLICTS BETWEEN FARMING AND ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

SEATTLE/PUGET SOUND.
6. Because of the coalmines and Rosyth being in his constituency, Brown would like to include in his program a visit to a U.S. naval dockyard to see how this is run. He would also like to meet American mine union leaders to discuss problems in U.S. coalmining industry. In view of this request, post suggests that these topics should take precedence over the third item in Para 4 of Ref tel (W).

7. Per Ref tel (W) Para 5 (E), Brown has requested that he visit New York between July 27-31, as he has a cousin visiting there during those dates. He would like to keep weekend free and commence New York program on July 30. He would like to include visit to political science faculty at Columbia University.

8. Brown would also like to meet political science faculty members in other universities in cities visited. He has particularly mentioned Yale, Harvard, Georgetown and/or Columbia. He realises that universities will be on vacation and the restrictions because of this.

9. Brown has reiterated his interest in looking at U.S. political party structure at federal and constituency levels, particularly the latter.

10. Because Brown will have visited San Francisco during convention suggest he either visit another West Coast city. Alternatively, somewhere in South or one of the Northern cities such as Chicago or Detroit where they are encountering similar difficulties to those in his own constituency.

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4. Fyi, Brown has eye defect. He has a detached retina in the left eye; a nod has a weak right eye. However, he can see perfectly well and will not need an escort during program. Although he can drive, he would like to avoid having to do so for reasons given above. He has no dietary restrictions. Brown would be happy to speak to small groups on U.K. politics, particularly those affecting Scotland.

5. Per Ref tel (W), Para 4. Post learned today that Brown's constituency, Dumbarton East, has one of Scotland's highest unemployment problems. The constituency has a number of large coalmines, which are being adversely affected by the protracted coalminer's strike. As a result, Brown is having to deal with the miners' families, who because of the strike, are encountering considerable hardship, with a large number of them now on the breadline. It also has one of Britain's most important Royal Naval dockyards, Rosyth, which refits the polaris submarine fleet. This is under threat of privatization which could cause more unrest in the constituency. It is because of this that Brown had to cancel his program date of June 27 as he has a number of major meetings next week to deal with these matters.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt
Jack Matlock, NSC
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: Friday, September 28, 1984,
10:00-12:00 a.m., Oval Office

After several minutes wait, as journalists came through for photographs, the President opened the meeting at 10:20 a.m. He said that he was pleased that Foreign Minister Gromyko had been able to come to Washington to meet with him and he hoped that he could demonstrate to Gromyko that he was not the sort of person to eat his own grandchildren.

The President pointed out that our political systems are very different and that we will be competitive in the world. But we live in one world and we must handle our competition in peace. He emphasized that the United States will never start a war with the Soviet Union. He added that they did not have to take his word for that but only look at history. For example, after World War II when the United States was the predominant military power in the world, we did not use that power to force ourselves on others. Instead we set out to help -- allies and one-time enemies alike -- to restore their economies and to build a peaceful world. We have been trying to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and today have only two-thirds as many as we had in 1967.
Of course, we are now rebuilding our military strength, but we are doing this because of the massive Soviet buildup. We feel this is a threat to us. Soviet leaders have proclaimed their dedication to revolution and to our destruction. And we have experience with Soviet aggression: the Cuban missile crisis, the attempts to extend Soviet influence in Africa, their efforts elsewhere. Throughout, the Soviet Union seems to consider us the enemy to be overcome.

The President said he mentioned this only to explain why we feel threatened -- not to debate the matter -- but he wanted to make it clear that while we do not intend to be vulnerable to attack or to an ultimatum that would require us to choose between capitulation and annihilation, we have no aggressive intent toward anyone. He added that we are willing to accept Soviet concerns for their own security. We understand the loss of life in World War II, and we understand their feelings based on a number of invasions of their country over the years. But the problem is that we are mutually suspicious; both sides are fearful. The time has come to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms.

As the two superpowers, we must take the lead in reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. If the two of us take the lead, the rest of the world would have to follow. And this applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to such weapons as biological and chemical as well.

The President mentioned that the Soviet Union had proposed negotiations on weapons in space. He said that we are ready for this. But we also feel that offensive weapons must be a subject of concern and a subject of negotiation. And he wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms.

The President also suggested that we need to have representatives of senior levels meet to discuss the whole situation and to try to find ways to negotiate these problems. A private channel would be useful. For example, someone here and a counterpart there could take up contacts privately in order to consult confidentially and give direction to negotiations. The President stressed that we both have confidence in our Ambassadors and should use them more, but there may also be a need for confidential contacts without the formality of more official channels.

The President then referred to the American commitment to human rights. He said that he understands the Soviet feeling that these questions impinge upon their sovereignty, but they must understand that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that many ethnic groups in the United States maintain an interest in ties with their home country. They take a great interest in
responsive to these concerns. The fact is that it would be much easier for the United States to make agreements with the Soviet Union if there is improvement in this area. As an example, he cited the resolution of the case of the Pentecostalists who took refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, and said that we treated their permission to leave the Soviet Union as a generous act on the part of the Soviet Government. We never attempted to portray it as an arrangement between our two governments, but did attempt to respond and ease relations by, for example, concluding the long-term grain agreement. The President added that although the Foreign Minister knows the United States fairly well, some of his colleagues may not, and the Soviet leadership should understand that the President cannot simply dictate to the Congress or to the public. The atmosphere must be right if the President is to be capable of carrying out and implementing agreements with the Soviet Union.

The President stressed that peace is our greatest desire and we are prepared to move in a peaceful direction and to discuss how we can reduce arms and set a goal of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Gromyko responded that the President had touched on many problems and he thought it was necessary to set out their policy. He realized that the President had heard and read many authoritative statements from the Soviet leadership, including Chernenko's letters and public statements. He observed that it cannot be questioned that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of tremendous importance for the entire world. Indeed, this is axiomatic and no one in the world would deny it. The conclusion he would draw from this is that the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union must see to it that both bilateral issues and international questions that concern us are conducted in full accord with the responsibilities which the leadership of both countries carry.

Gromyko said that he did not know how the President got the idea that the Soviet Union set for itself the goal of demolishing the American system, or that the Soviets think about that at all. The Soviet Government has no such goal, and the U.S. has no basis for making the accusation.

Gromyko stated that in accord with the philosophy held by the Soviet leaders, the course of historical development is unavoidable, and just as they believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, they also believe that the capitalist system will be followed by a socialist system which in turn will be followed by a communist system. But that is not a goal. And, indeed, "voluntarism" -- attempts to force historical developments -- is alien to their philosophy. It is, he said, "anti-scientific." Therefore, there is no goal of undermining the social and political system in the United States. He felt that if some of the President's statements have been motivated by such a misunderstanding, the President would do well to correct his
comments. He would not use the word "insult" to characterize these accusations because it is too mild. The fact is, the Soviets have a philosophy of historical processes, but not a goal of changing or replacing the political and economic systems in other countries.

Gromyko continued that it was not the first time that they had heard that the United States had acted generously after World War II and that the U.S. had possessed nuclear weapons, but had not used them. He observed that it is true that the United States acted wisely in not using nuclear weapons, saying in passing that the U.S. had only a negligible number, of course, but he wouldn't emphasize that. He continued by saying that at the end of the war, if the Soviet leaders had waved their armies to the West, no force could have stopped them. It would have been like a tidal wave. Yet, they did not do it; they were loyal to their agreements with the Allies, to their agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. France, of course, later joined as an ally, but principally with the United States and the United Kingdom. The USSR was true to its word and did not move beyond the boundaries specified in the post-War agreements. The President would recall that President Truman signed the Potsdam Accord along with Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union had lived up to this agreement.

Gromyko continued that in the President's observations, he detected the thought that the Soviet Union is a threat to the West. The fact is, Gromyko said, that after the war when the guns fell silent, all the military bases which had been set up by the United States throughout the world were retained. They were kept and even increased; new ones were built. Arms were increased as well. He asked, rhetorically, if the Soviet Union should have taken this into account, and answered "of course," and said that these events were still fresh in their memories.

Gromyko went on to charge that the United States had built a wall -- a barrier -- against all attempts to reduce arms. He said he would remind the President that after the war ended in 1945 -- and he digressed to say that the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan precisely in accord with its commitments -- and nuclear weapons appeared on the scene, it had been no miracle for the Soviet Union to acquire them. All nuclear weapons require is a certain technological potential and funding decisions. But Gromyko claimed that at that time the Soviet Union had proposed a permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and a commitment to use nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes.

He recalled that he himself had introduced in the United Nations in New York a draft convention for the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons. The United States Administration (Truman was then President) rejected this idea. So what was the Soviet Union to do? They had to reconsider their position. They had to draw conclusions from the path the world was taking.
Gromyko then stated that the West always raises questions of verification. It does this as if the Soviet Union doesn't do all it should do in carrying out its commitments. But the Soviet proposal was a very comprehensive one. It was for both nuclear and conventional disarmament, and as for verification at that time, they had proposed "a general and complete verification." And what was President Truman's response? He refused. He refused because the United States simply wanted more and more arms.

Gromyko then observed that we now have at our disposal mountains of arms. It's not a very pretty picture. We're sitting on mountains of nuclear weapons. We must ask how far we want to go in this direction.

He then recalled that when President Nixon came to Moscow in 1972 and entered Brezhnev's office, he observed that we both have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other nine times over. And Brezhnev replied, "You are right. We have made the same calculation." So both came to the conclusion that it would be senseless to continue piling up these arms, and the result was the SALT II Agreements -- the ABM Treaty, and the interim agreement on offensive weapons. These are historic agreements and they are still alive.

Gromyko continued by saying that the question now is which direction we will go: toward a further accumulation of nuclear weapons or toward their reduction and elimination? This is indeed the "problem of problems." It is a question of life and death; it is a problem which must be overcome.

He suggested that a helpful step to start us on the right direction would be to freeze nuclear weapons where they are. He added that he wanted to say directly to the President that the Soviet Union is not threatening the social system of the United States. Indeed, the Soviets have great admiration for the talent of the American people, for its technology, for its science, for its vitality. They want to live in peace and friendship. And, he believes Americans want the same. Everyone wants trade, and trade can be mutually beneficial. The USSR needs the more advanced American technology and Americans can make a profit from it to the benefit of its own society. In short, Gromyko said, "we are offering peace as we have always offered peace. We will extend our hand if you extend yours."

Gromyko continued by observing that the President could say that the Soviet Union has more arms than the United States. That is not true, he said, the USSR does not have more. The United States and its allies have more, but an approximate equality exists. The Soviets say an "approximate equality" because it is not exact and the advantage is actually on the Western side. But, they are willing to say equality in order to move things forward.
In Europe, for example, NATO has fifty percent more weapons than the Warsaw Pact yet the Soviets have declared that this is approximately equal. In counting, of course, they take into account tactical and theater weapons, British and French systems and aircraft, including carrier aircraft.

So this is the situation as the Soviets see it. They do not wish to follow the course the United States has set of adding to the weapons in Europe. Of course, they are determined not to stay behind if the U.S. moves ahead.

Gromyko observed that one thread that ran through some of the argumentation he had heard was the contention that the Soviet Union cannot keep up in an arms race, and it is true that an arms race would cost the Soviets much in the way of material, intellectual and financial means. But they would do it. They were able to develop nuclear weapons even after their economy had suffered the colossal losses in World War II, and they will be able to keep up in the future regardless of the sacrifice required.

Gromyko added that he had heard some good words in the President's statement. He agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union must deal as equals and he wanted the President to know that the Soviet Union is seeking peaceful relations. The United States has advanced technology and can profit from trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union felt that it is better to trade than to compete in nuclear arms. Trade could be to the mutual benefit of both countries.

As far as outer space is concerned, the problem, according to Gromyko, is that we already have arms competition on the ground, under the water, on the water, in the air, but not yet in space, and we should prevent its spread to space. The Soviet Union, he said, is against the American plan to extend the arms race into space. They condemn it and if the effort continues it will be irreversible. Tremendous resources will be spent, and yet there will be no advantage gained in this field. Look at it coolly, he said. We are fed up with the competition in nuclear arms. Why involve space as well? Think it over calmly and coolly, he repeated.

He noted that the United States had taken a negative attitude toward the Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. It would have been better, he said, if the United States had not proposed its formula at all. It is clear the United States wants the militarization of space, which the Soviet Union opposes.

Gromyko continued that a freeze of weapons is not a reduction and they would like to reduce nuclear weapons, but that a freeze would improve the atmosphere for reduction and might make it possible. He believed that no nuclear power would be hurt by a freeze. He went on to say that the average person in the United
States knows very little about the Soviet Union but does know that he wants peace.

Gromyko continued by saying that the President's speech at the United Nations spoke of contacts and consultation. These are not contrary to Soviet desires; they are not bad. The Soviets do not reject the President's proposal at all. What disturbs the Soviets is that everything seems to be reduced to the question of contacts, and they wonder if this is something just to make people think that something is happening. If nothing, in fact, happens, then that would be an incorrect impression.

Gromyko stressed that we need a constructive goal for these meetings. We need to decide what they will lead to. One cannot combine arms reduction with the current American policy of increasing military budgets and increasing the arms buildup. So long as American arms keep growing this is inconsistent with reductions or a mutual goal that can be set. He added that this may be unpleasant to hear but he felt he must explain it.

Gromyko concluded his initial presentation by saying that the entire leadership of the Soviet Union and the General Secretary personally wanted to find a common language with the United States. We must find a way to put our relations in motion. It must be understood that they are not trying to undermine the American social system. The U.S. must seriously and coolly analyze the current situation. The Soviets will defend their interests, but want peace and cooperation. The choice is up to the United States, but it should be understood that the Soviet Union wants good relations with the United States.

The President stated that he could not agree with many of the things which Gromyko had said. First, the idea that Soviet policy is not directed against our system is inconsistent with many statements made by Soviet leaders over the decades. The President quoted from Lenin and from others to make his point, but then said that there was no point in continuing citations and that what is important about all of this is that it is evidence of the high level of suspicion that exists between us.

As for American behavior at the end of the war, he recalled that one of the few things that Stalin said that he agreed with was that the Soviets would not have been able to win the war without American help. Gromyko had said that we had retained our bases at the end of the war. This is simply untrue. The United States had demobilized its forces. The Soviet Union did not.

As for arms control Gromyko had spoken of "a wall constructed against arms and troop reductions," and of the Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons ban. He had not mentioned, however, the U.S. proposal for international control of all nuclear weapons and activity -- the Baruch Plan -- which the Soviet Union turned down.
Gromyko had also mentioned the U.S. concern for verification, and the President commented that yes, this is a U.S. concern and should be the concern of the Soviet Union and of other countries. He recalled that President Eisenhower had made his "open skies" proposal, which would have allowed each country to inspect everything that went on in the other, and the Soviets had rejected that. In addition, the United States had made at least nineteen proposals regarding nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had been unresponsive.

The President then turned to Gromyko and said, "You say you want to eliminate your weapons. Fine. We'll sign an agreement on that right now." He pointed out that the U.S. has already made proposals in that direction. For example, in the INF negotiations, the U.S. proposed that all INF systems be eliminated from Europe. When the Soviets did not accept that the U.S. proposed the lowest possible levels, and the Soviet Union still did not accept. As far as the START negotiations are concerned, the United States at first concentrated on ICBM's because they are the most frightening and the most destructive of the weapons. But the United States is prepared to include also submarines, aircraft, and other strategic systems.

The President noted that Gromyko had mentioned President Nixon and the SALT I Agreement and pointed out that the Soviet Union has deployed 7,000 warheads since the SALT I Agreement, and since the SALT II Agreement, has deployed 800 ballistic missiles. So far as INF is concerned, he showed Gromyko a chart depicting SS-20 deployments and noting the statements of various Soviet leaders that there was a balance, while each year the Soviet total mounted and the U.S. was making no deployments in Europe.

The President added that the United States had taken many tactical weapons out of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union had not, but has been adding to them. He said that so far as our armies are concerned, the United States has seventeen divisions and the Soviet Union 260 divisions.

The President then pointed out that the Soviets are saying they want peace and we are saying the same, but we need deeds. He agreed that there is a mountain of weapons, and made clear that the United States will keep pace with the Soviet buildup. But he asked what the purpose of a continued buildup can have, and suggested that we start reducing. He observed that reducing equally and verifiably would produce just as effective a defense for both countries as they have now.

The President pointed out that the United States does not have more warheads than the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union had developed several entire families of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. was developing only one. He noted that Gromyko had mentioned the cost of the competition, but referred to the U.S. experience when the previous administration had cancelled
systems, but the Soviet Union did not reciprocate and slow its buildup.

In regard to anti-satellite systems, the President pointed out that the Soviets had a tested system and the U.S. did not, and therefore calls for a moratorium before the U.S. has tested a system and is on an equal basis were one-sided and self-serving. He added that his criticism of SALT II was that it simply legitimized the buildup of arms.

The President stressed, however, that we want peace and that we are willing to believe that the Soviets want peace. But the fact is that the United States did not walk away from the negotiating table. He agreed that we need deeds and specifically to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons.

Gromyko referred to the President’s opening remark and said he wanted to assure the President that they did not believe he ate his own grandchildren or anyone else’s.

Then Gromyko referred to the table the President had shown him of the buildup in Soviet nuclear weapons. He said that one should remember the way our respective nuclear weapons systems developed. At first the United States had a superior Air Force and the Soviets began to develop missiles. The United States then developed submarines and so the two systems developed in parallel, but resulted in structures that are quite different.

The President pointed out that the Soviets had gone on to outbuild the United States in submarines, to build more modern aircraft while the United States was still flying B-52s which are older than the pilots that fly them, and in addition, had developed several new missiles. The President added that in the START negotiations we did propose to concentrate initially on ICBM’s, but that this was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal and was simply based on the consideration that the land-based missiles are the most threatening. But we have agreed to talk about all the systems and to take them into account.

What we want, the President pointed out, is reductions. He recalled a statement by President Eisenhower that modern weapons are such that nations possessing nuclear weapons can no longer think of war in terms of victory or defeat, but only of destruction of both sides. We bear that in mind and want to reduce as much as possible. The President then asked why, if we both are of this mind, we cannot proceed to agree on the reduction of weapons.

Gromyko said that he wished to recall a few facts. At Vladivostok, the question of Soviet heavy missiles had been raised along with the question of the U.S. forward-based systems, and at that time, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed that if the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on including forward-based systems, the United States would drop its
insistence on restricting Soviet heavy missiles. If now the United States insists upon raising the question of restraints on heavy missiles, the question of forward-based systems immediately arises.

Gromyko then turned to the British and French systems and asked how the Soviet Union could leave them out of account inasmuch as Britain and France were allies of the United States. He added that President Carter had a different opinion from President Reagan and recalled that once when he was at lunch at the White House, President Carter had said that in principle these systems should be included.

With regard to nuclear weapons, Gromyko said that he could give an answer as follows: "as soon as the United States corrects its position." He then asked rhetorically whether the U.S. considers the Soviets to be such frivolous people as not to know of American aircraft carriers and what they mean to the Soviet Union. According to Gromyko, each carrier has 40 planes which can carry nuclear weapons. Six times 40 equals 240 nuclear launchers which the U.S. is not willing to count at all.

The President interjected that the U.S. is willing to put this on the table in negotiations, but he pointed out that Gromyko seemed to forget that their SS-20s were targeted on our allies and even if NATO carried through all of its planned deployments, they would amount to only a fraction of the Soviet missiles targeted at Europe.

Gromyko then asked if we were willing to include tactical and theatre weapons, and whether the British and French systems were included.

The President stated that, no, we would not be willing to count British and French systems. In fact, he pointed out, there had been a net decline of nuclear weapons in Europe available to NATO.

Gromyko asked if the U.S. would include carrier-based aircraft, and the President, referring to the U.S. START position, reiterated that we had started by concentrating on ICBM's but that we were willing to consider aircraft and other systems in the overall negotiations.

Gromyko stated that there is no question of excluding carrier-based aircraft from the negotiations.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet Union has a greater number of nuclear-capable aircraft than the United States, that so far as British and French systems are concerned, we had made it clear that when strategic levels were reduced substantially, there would be a time to consider British and French systems in the negotiations. The main point, however, is that the U.S. fully recognizes the differences in the structures of the nuclear
forces of our two countries. We have been trying to generate a
discussion which recognizes these as asymmetries. To search for
a framework is a necessary ingredient in this process.

Gromyko asked if we were saying that the Soviet Union is concealing its aircraft.

Shultz said no, not concealing aircraft, but simply that they have more nuclear capable aircraft than the United States.

Gromyko retorted that that was incorrect, that we seemed to be counting cargo planes and other aircraft which do not carry nuclear weapons and observed that this was not serious reasoning.

Gromyko continued by saying that the U.S. position is that we should simply sit down, but the Soviet Union has experience with that. So far no one had mentioned the improper use of the language of ultimatums in these negotiations. Gromyko claimed that the U.S., in effect, said, "This is our plan, accept it. If not, there is a deadline that has to be met and we will deploy." In fact, that is what happened.

So, the U.S. must liquidate the results of that decision. The Soviet Union does not see any point in continuing negotiations otherwise.

The President asked how it would have been possible for NATO not to deploy under the circumstances of the SS-20 threat and the Soviet rejection of our zero proposal and also U.S. proposals to negotiate lowest possible equal levels.

Gromyko claimed that NATO now has 50 percent more nuclear weapons.

The President said that the proper procedure is to count each other's systems.

Gromyko then asked specifically about British and French systems and carrier-based aircraft. He asserted that if we count all of these systems and then compare, we will find that NATO is ahead.

The President disputed this, but noted that the time for lunch had come and invited Gromyko to stay a few minutes for a private conversation.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
Implications of
Recent Soviet Military-
Political Activities
SNIE 17-10-84

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT SOVIET MILITARY-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
KEY JUDGMENTS

During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some other underlying Soviet purpose. These activities have included large-scale military exercises (among them a major naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal); preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; new military measures termed responsive to NATO INF deployments; and shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior.

Examining these developments in terms of several hypotheses, we reach the following conclusions:

— We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. This judgment is based on the absence of force-wide combat readiness or other war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear or belligerence in Soviet diplomatic communications, although the latter remain uncompromising on many issues.

There have also been instances where the Soviets appear to have avoided belligerent propaganda or actions. Recent Soviet “war scare” propaganda, of declining intensity over the period examined, is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing “peace” pressures among various audiences abroad. This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict.

— We do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions “mask” Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR, although they have an incentive to take initiatives that discredit US policies even at some risk. Were the Soviets preparing an initiative they believed carried a real risk of military confrontation with the United States, we would see preparatory signs which the Soviets could not mask.
— The Soviet actions examined are influenced to some extent by Soviet perceptions of a mounting challenge from US foreign and defense policy. However, these activities do not fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics.

— Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it. Soviet military exercises are designed to meet long-term requirements for force development and training which have become ever more complex with the growth of Soviet military capabilities.

— In specific cases, Soviet military exercises are probably intended to have the ancillary effect of signaling Soviet power and resolve to some audience. For instance, maneuvers in the Tonkin Gulf were aimed at backing Vietnam against China; Soviet airpower use in Afghanistan could have been partly aimed at intimidating Pakistan; and Soviet action on Berlin has the effect of reminding the West of its vulnerable access, but very low-key Soviet handling has muted this effect.

Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of speaking with a louder voice and showing firmness through a controlled display of military muscle. The apprehensive outlook we believe the Soviet leadership takes toward the longer term US arms buildup could in the future increase its willingness to consider actions—even at some heightened risk—that recapture the initiative and neutralize the challenge posed by the United States.

These judgments are tempered by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations. Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly one—to some extent—a more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.
DISCUSSION

Introduction

1. There has been much Soviet talk about the increased danger of nuclear war. This theme has appeared in public pronouncements by Soviet political and military leaders, in statements by high officials targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences, in internal communications, and in other channels. Soviet authorities have declared that Washington is preparing for war, and have issued dire warnings that the USSR will not give in to nuclear blackmail or other military pressure. The articulation of this theme has paralleled the Soviet campaign to deter US INF deployment. It continues to this day, although at a somewhat lower intensity in recent months than in late 1982.

2. Since November 1983 there has been a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces, large-scale military exercises, and several other noteworthy events.

--- INS RESPONSE ---

1. INF response: Start of construction of additional SS-20 bases following Andropov's announcement on 24 November 1983 of termination of the 6-month moratorium on SS-20 deployments opposite NATO; initiation of patrols by E-11 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines off the US coast; deployment of forward-deployed, long-range multisuport US carriers SSBN's and the start of deployment of 505-km range SS-12/23 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and continued propaganda and active measures against INF deployment.

--- RESPONSE TO NATO EXERCISE ---

1. Response to NATO exercise: Assumption by Soviet air units in Germany and Poland of high alert status with readiness of nuclear strike forces as NATO conducted "Able Archer-83," a nuclear launch command post exercise.

--- SALT EXERCISES ---

1. Large-scale exercise activity during spring 1984 featuring the multiple launches of SS-20s and SLBM's, survivability training including the dispersal of operational Northern Fleet SSBN's supported by a large number of ships.

--- Berlin air corridors: Periodic Soviet imposition beginning 20 February 1984 of minimum flight altitudes for the entire length of one or more of the Berlin air corridors—a unilateral change in the rules governing air access to Berlin.

--- Afghanistan: Deployment in mid-April of several airborne units to Afghanistan, launching of a major spring offensive into the Panjshir Valley, and initiation on 81 April for the first time of high-intensity bombing of Afghanistan by over 105 TU-16 and SU-24 bombers based in the USSR.

--- East Asia: Deployment in mid-November 1983 of naval TU-16 strike aircraft to Vietnam for the first time, positioning of both Soviet operational aircraft carriers for the first time simultaneously in Asian waters in March 1984; and the first joint Soviet/Vietnamese amphibious assault exercises on the coast of Vietnam in April.

--- Corridors: A small combined Soviet/Cuban naval exercise in the Gulf of Mexico, with the first-ever visit of a Soviet helicopter carrier in April/May, and Soviet/Cuban submarine drills.

--- Troop rotations: Initiation of the airlift portion of Soviet troop rotation in Eastern Europe; 10 days later in April than this has occurred for the past five years.

This Estimate explores whether the Soviet talk about the increasing likelihood of nuclear war and the Soviet military activities noted above constitute a pattern of behavior intended either to alarm or intimidate the United States and its allies or to achieve other goals.

Possible Explanations

--- SPECIFICALLY, IN EXAMINING THE FACTS WE ADDRESS ---

--- FIVE EXPLANATORY HYPOTHESES ---

a. Both the Soviet talk about war and the military activities have been consciously orchestrated
across the board to achieve political effects through posturings and propaganda. The object has been to discredit US defense and foreign policies to put Washington on notice that the USSR will pursue a hard—perhaps even dangerous—line, unless US concessions are forthcoming; to maintain an atmosphere of tension conducive to pressure by “peace” groups on Western governments and, if possible, to undercut President Reagan’s re-election prospects.

b. Soviet behavior is a response to Washington’s rhetoric, US military procurement and R&D goals, and US military exercises and reconnaissance activities near Soviet territory—which have excited Soviet concerns and caused Moscow to flex its own military responsiveness, signaling to Washington that it is prepared for any eventualities.

c. Moscow itself is preparing for threatening military actions in the future requiring a degree of surprise. The real aim behind its recent actions is not to charm, but to disconcert the United States to higher levels of Soviet activity—thus making intended future moves and reducing US warning time.

d. A weak General Secretary and political jockeying in the Soviet leadership has lenient policy control at the top and permitted a hardline faction, under abnormally high military influence, to pursue its own agenda, which—intentionally or not—looks more confrontational to the observer.

e. The Soviet military actions at issue are not linked with the talk about war and are basically unrelated events, each with its own rationale.

Soviet Talk About Nuclear War

4. Our assessment of the meaning of alarming statements and propaganda about the danger of nuclear war provides a starting point for evaluating recent Soviet military activities.

5. Soviet talk about the war danger is unquestionably highly orchestrated. It has obvious external aims:

—To elicit concessions in arms control negotiations by manipulating the anxieties of Western political leaders about Soviet thinking.

—To strengthen cohesion within the Warsaw Pact and reinforce Soviet pressure for higher military outlays by non-Soviet member states.

The overall propaganda campaign against the United States has recently been augmented with the boycott of the Olympic Games.

6. The talk about the dangers of nuclear war also has a clear domestic propaganda function to rationalize demands on the Soviet labor force, continued economic deprivation, and ideological vigilance in society. This message is also being disseminated within the Soviet and East European bureaucracies.

7. The central question remains: what are the real perceptions at top decision-making levels of the regime? Our information about such leadership perceptions is largely inferential. Nevertheless, we have confidence in several broad conclusions.

8. First, we believe that there is a serious concern, with US defense and foreign policy trends. There is a large measure of agreement among both political and military leaders that the United States has undertaken a global offensive against Soviet interests. Central to this perception is the overall scope and magnitude of the US military buildup. Fundamentally, the Soviets are concerned that US programs will undercut overall Soviet military strategy and force posture. Seen in this context, Moscow endorses INF deployment as a “selling—but subordinate—element in a more far-reaching and comprehensive US effort aimed at regaining military superiority.” The threat here is not immediate, but larger term. However, the ability of the United States to carry out its longer term plans is questioned by Soviet leaders not only to reassure domestic audiences but also because they genuinely see some uncertainty in the ability of the United States to sustain its military effort.

9. Secondly, in our judgment the nature of the concern is as much political as it is military. There is a healthy report for US technological prowess and anxiety that this could in due course be used against the USSR. The Soviets are thus concerned that the United States might pursue an arms competition that could over time strain the Soviet economy and disrupt the regime’s ability to manage competing military and
civilian requirements. More immediately, the Soviets are concerned that the United States could achieve a shift in the overall balance of military power which, through more interventionist foreign policies, could effectively thwart the extension of Soviet influence in world affairs and even roll back past Soviet gains. From this perspective, the United States' actions in Central America, Lebanon, Grenada, and southern Africa are seen as a token of what could be expected on a broader scale in the future.

10. Third, and most important for this assessment, we do not believe the Soviet leadership sees an imminent threat of war with the United States. It is conceivable that the advisability of Soviet "war scare" propaganda reflects a genuine Soviet worry about a near-future attack on them. This concern could be inspired by Soviet views about the depth of anti-Soviet intentions in Washington combined with elements of their own military doctrine projected onto the United States, such as the invincibility of striking first, and making hostile initiatives in exercises. Some political and military leaders have stressed the danger of war more forcibly than others, suggesting that there may have been differences on this score—or at least how to talk about the issue—over the past few years.

11. However, on the basis of what we believe to be very strong evidence, we judge that the Soviet leadership does not perceive an imminent danger of war. Our reasons are the following:

— The Soviets have not initiated the military maneuvers they would have made if they believed a US attack were imminent.

— In private US diplomatic exchanges with Moscow over the past six months the Soviets have neither made any direct threats connected with regional or other issues nor betrayed any fear of a US attack.

— Obligatory public assertions of the viability of the Soviet nuclear deterrent have been paralleled by private assertions within ruling circles by Soviet experts that there is currently a stable nuclear balance in which the United States does not have sufficient strength for a first strike.

— In recent months top leaders, including the Minister of Defense and Politburo member Dmitry Ustinov, have somewhat downplayed the nuclear war danger, noting that it should not be "over-dramatized" (although Ustinov's recent visit

Day speech returned to a somewhat shriller tone). At the same time, high foreign affairs officials have challenged the thesis that the United States can unmask nuclear war and have emphasized constraints on such a course of action.

Moreover, the Soviets know that the United States is at present far from having accomplished all of its force buildup objectives.

Recent Soviet Military Activities

12. Involvement? It is possible that some of the Soviet military activities listed above were intended, as ancillary to their military objectives, to intimidate selected audiences.

— The East Asian naval maneuvers, deployment of ships and aircraft to Vietnam, and amphibious exercises have displayed military muscle to China.

— The bombing campaign in Afghanistan could be seen not only as an operation against the insurgents but also as an implicit threat to neighboring countries—Pakistan and perhaps Iran.

— In mounting large-scale and visible exercises (such as the March-April Northern and Baltic Fleet exercises in the Norwegian Sea) Moscow would understand that they could be perceived as threatening by NATO audiences.

13. Soviet INF-related military activities have also been designed to convey an impression to the West that the world is a more dangerous place following US INF deployment and that the USSR is making good on its predeployment threats to counter with deployments of its own.

14. There is uncertainty within the Intelligence Community on the origins of Soviet behavior with respect to the Berlin air corridor. It is possible that Soviet action was a deliberate reminder of Western vulnerability. Alternatively, simple requirements for exercises may have motivated this move. The low-key manner in which the Soviets have handled the issue does not suggest that they have been interested in squeezing access to Berlin for intimidation purposes. Nevertheless, the Soviets have been in the process of unilaterally changing the corridor flight rules and thereby reminding the West of their ultimate power to control access to Berlin. After a short hiatus in late April and early May, the Soviets declared new air corridor restrictions, indicating that this effort contin-
In a possibly related, very recent development, the Soviets declared eight new restrictions on travel in East Germany by allied citizens located in Poland.

15. In a number of instances we have observed the Soviets observing threatening behavior or propaganda when they might have acted otherwise, perhaps in some cases to avoid embarrassment or overcommitment. For example, they:

- Never publicly acknowledged the incident in November 1983 in which a Soviet attack submarine was disabled off the US coast as it attempted to make a US ASW ship, and moved the sub quickly out of Cuba where it had been for emergency repairs.

- Took no tangible action in March when one of their warships entered a minefield off Nicaragua.

- Notified Washington of multiple missile launches in early April as a gesture of "good will."

16. Reaction to US actions? The new Soviet deployments of nuclear-armed submarines off US coasts and the forward deployment of SS-18/SS missiles in Eastern Europe are a Soviet reaction to NATO INF deployment, which the Soviets claim is very threatening to them — although the threat perceived here by Moscow is certainly not one of imminent nuclear attack.

17. Soviet military exercises themselves sometimes embody a "reactive" element.

A key issue is whether this countermovements taken on the character of actual preparation or response to a perceived threat of possible US attack.

18. A case in point is the Soviet reaction to "Able Archer-83." This was a NATO assumed new exercise held in November 1983 that was larger than previous "Able Archer" exercises.

- The elaborate Soviet reaction to this recent exercise included raising the alert level of Soviet air units in East Germany and Poland in heightened readiness.

- Alert measures included increasing the number of fighter-interceptors on strip alert.

Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confirming heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.

19. How the Soviets choose to respond to ongoing US military activities, such as exercises and reconnaissance operations, depends on how they assess their scope, the threat they may deploy, and above all the hostile intent that might be read into them. We are at present uncertain as to what military or possible military objectives the Soviets may have put into recent US and NATO exercises and reconnaissance operations because a detailed comparison of simultaneous "Red" and "Blue" actions has not been accomplished. The Soviets have, as in the past, assumed the same threatening character to these activities as to US military buildup plans, that is, calling them preparations for war. But they have not changed a US intent to prepare for imminent war.

20. Preparation for surprise military actions? There is one case in our set of military activities that might conceivably be ascribed to the "snaking" of threatening Soviet initiatives. For the first time in five years, the airlift portion of the troop rotation in Eastern Europe began on 15 April rather than 15 April. This may have reflected a change in training and mounting practices or the introduction of new airlift procedures. The change of timing of the airlift portion of the annual troop rotation could also be a step toward blurring a warning indicator — a comprehensive delay of annual Soviet troop rotations which would prevent degeneration of the forces by withdrawing trained men. But the call portion of the rotation began ahead of schedule and, in any event, the pattern of rotation was within broad historical norms.

21. In early April, when the Soviets began to assemble a bomber strike force in the Turkestan Military
District, there was some concern that it might represent masking of preparations for operations against Pakistan, or even Iran, rather than against the most obvious target, Afghanistan. At this point the forces are clearly occupied against Afghanistan. It was never suitably deployed for use against Iran. We believe that, although the forces could be used against Pakistan, a major air offensive against Pakistan without warning or pressure would serve no Soviet purpose and is extremely unlikely.

23. Policy impact of leadership weakness or factionalism? The Soviet Union has had three General Secretaries in as many years and, given the age and frail health of Chernenko, yet another change can be expected in a few years. This unstable political environment could be conducive to increased maneuvering within the leadership and magnification of policy disagreements. Some have argued that either the Soviet military or a hardline foreign policy faction led by Gromyko and Ustinov exerts more influence than it would were Chernenko a stronger figure. Although individual Soviet military leaders enjoy great authority in their regions and military priorities remain high for the whole leadership, we do not believe that the Soviet military, as an institution, is exerting unusually heavy influence on Soviet policy. Nor do we believe that any faction is exerting influence other than through Politburo consensus. Consequently we reject the hypothesis that weak central leadership accounts for the Soviet actions examined here.

24. A comprehensive pattern? In our view, the military activities under examination here do tend to have their own intrinsic rationalities and the exercises are integrated by long-term Soviet forces development plans. However, these activities do not all fit into an integrated pattern of current Soviet foreign policy tactics. The different deadlines involved in initiating various activities argue against synchronization for a political purpose. A number of the activities represent routine training or simply refine previous exercises. In other cases, the activities respond to circumstances that could not have been predicted ahead of time.

Conclusions

25. Taken in their totality, Soviet talk about the increased likelihood of nuclear war and Soviet military actions do suggest a political intention of strengthening the image of a controlled and disciplined display of military might. At the same time, Moscow has given little sign of desiring to escalate tensions sharply or to provoke possible armed confrontation with the United States.

26. Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorate and political elites. Some Soviet military activities have also been designed to have an alarming or intimidating effect on various audiences (potentially INF “counterdeployments,” the naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, and naval and air activities in Asia).

27. Our assessment of both Soviet talk about nuclear war and Soviet military exercises indicates a very low probability that the top Soviet leadership is seriously worried about the imminent outbreak of nuclear war, although it is quite possible that official propaganda and vigilance campaigns have generated an atmosphere of anxiety throughout the military and security apparatus. The available evidence suggests that most of the military activities discussed in this estimate have been generated by a real fear of imminent US attack.

28. Although recent Soviet military exercises combine with other ongoing Soviet programs to heighten overall military capabilities, we believe it unlikely that they are intended to mask current or near-future preparations by the USSR for some directly hostile military initiative. Moreover, we are confident that the activities we have examined in this estimate would...
not successfully mask all the extensive logistic and other military preparations the Soviets would have to commence well before a realistic offensive initiative against any major regional security target.

30. Both the talk of nuclear war and the military activities address the concerns of a longer time horizon. Moscow's inability to elicit major concessions in the arms talks, successful US INF deployment, and—and most important by far—the long-term prospect of a buildup of US strategic and conventional military forces, have created serious concern in the Kremlin. We judge that the Soviet leadership does indeed believe that the United States is attempting to restore a military posture that severely undermines the Soviet power position in the world.

31. Our judgments in this Estimate are subject to three main sources of uncertainty. We have inadequate information about:

a. The current mindset of the Soviet political leadership, which has seen some of its optimistic international expectations from the Brezhnev era disappointed.

b. The ways in which military operations and foreign policy tactics may be influenced by political differences and the policy process in the Kremlin.

c. The Soviet reading of our own military operations, that is, current reconnaissance and exercises.

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, however, we are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.
Saturday December 22-Sunday, December 23 [1984]

Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of the Soviet U. In an amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she had made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the U.S.

Then we joined the others – Ambassadors, Shultz, MacFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research (“Starwars”) I believe was eased some concerns she had. Then she was on her way to Eng.

Sunday was also a bright, beautiful day – like Spring & we returned to the W.H.
Part Four: 
International Diplomacy

1985
FIRST SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 7, 1985; 9:40 A.M. to 1:00 P.M.
Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Gromyko opened the meeting with the observation that he and the Secretary were well aware of the problems which require discussion, and that it was not clear whether time would remain toward the end of the discussions to touch on other questions. Accordingly, he proposed that they proceed to the business at hand with a presentation by each side of the way, in principle, the problem should be addressed. These presentations, which need not be long statements, could be followed by a give-and-take discussion to get at the heart of the matter. Would such a working approach be acceptable to the Secretary?

Secretary Shultz observed that the evolution of the meetings between the two of them had been good in the sense that they had taken on an increasingly conversational cast as time had gone by. He cited in particular the meetings in New York and Washington last September as embodying more back-and-forth interchange, and added that he believed that this method provided the best
opportunity for developing individual subjects and therefore agreed with the proposal.

Secretary Shultz then said that since he had material which had been discussed with and considered by the President in detail, he felt it was important to lay it out for Gromyko carefully and thoroughly. This would take some time, but he thought it would not be excessive under the circumstances, since it is easy to understand the importance of these questions.

With respect to Gromyko's introductory comment about the questions to be discussed, the Secretary agreed that they had come to Geneva to concentrate on arms control questions. But, as the President had said in September, in a sense all questions between us are interrelated. If, toward the end of the discussions, time remained to discuss other questions, they could take a look at them. We continue to have major concerns in the human rights area and he would draw Gromyko's attention to them here. Perhaps there would be a chance to develop these matters in greater detail, but he wanted to point out their importance to us at this time. Just as other major issues between us throughout the world, they have an impact on the overall relationship. In this connection, the Secretary continued, we had received word that the Soviets accepted the idea of discussions on the Middle East and this made us hopeful, since discussion of other matters would doubtless follow.

The Secretary then proposed that they get down to business with a discussion of arms control questions.

Gromyko responded that, except for the Secretary's mention of a possible discussion of what he called human rights issues, they shared the same view. He had no intention of distracting the attention of participants in the talks with a discussion of human rights and assumed that this would not surprise the Secretary. Other than that, their views coincided, and if the Secretary had no objection, he would present the introductory Soviet statement.

The Secretary agreed.

Gromyko then proceeded to make his opening presentation, which contained the following points:

-- The world's public has been anticipating these meetings with a lively interest. This is the case because people and nations throughout the world fully understand the importance of searching for ways to end the arms race, achieve disarmament and avert nuclear war. The press does not indulge in exaggeration when it says that the eyes of the entire world are focussed on Geneva. People are hungry for news of a constructive nature.

-- It is a truism that relations between the USSR and the U.S. are bad. The Secretary is familiar with the Soviet view of what had caused this situation and also with Soviet policy. He (Gromyko) had set these forth on behalf of the Soviet Government in earlier
meetings with the Secretary and also in his recent meeting with the President. He saw no need to repeat what he had said previously on this subject.

-- He wished to stress most emphatically that if we do not find ways to halt the arms race and end the threat of nuclear war, it will be impossible to correct our relationship. If this is not done, our relationship will heat up and this will affect the situation in the entire world.

-- The Soviet Union is in favor of a relationship free of vacillations and one based on equality, mutual regard for each other's interests, and respect for and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. These thoughts were dominant in the messages from General Secretary Chernenko to the President and Gromyko had made every effort to emphasize them in his meeting with the President.

-- It is important to take a principled approach -- a correct approach in principle -- in resolving problems in our relationship. He wished to outline in total candor how the Soviet side viewed such an approach.

-- The upcoming negotiations, if they take place -- and the Soviet side believes they must take place -- must have as their ultimate objective the elimination of nuclear arms. In the final analysis this goal must be achieved if we are to have real security in the world as a whole and between our two countries in particular. The world today is not what it was 40-50 years ago. It has changed with the appearance of nuclear arms. Not everyone seems to understand this, because if it were understood, the question before us would be resolved. Those countries which possess nuclear arms are in the best position to understand. Therefore, we must make every effort to move toward this ultimate objective. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation whereby nuclear arms come to dominate people and people will find themselves caught in an irresistible current which drags them along. Where this would lead is clear. Science, and indeed, not just science, but all reasonable people in positions of authority recognize what might occur if nuclear arms remain in existence and if the nuclear arms race continues. No matter how strong the words are which are chosen to emphasize the importance of this problem, none are adequate to express the dangers of continuing the nuclear arms build-up. Only ignorant people -- and there are fewer and fewer of these -- and dishonest individuals could treat such statements as propaganda and not a true reflection of reality. Both the Soviet and U.S. Governments must know that this is the case. It is the first point of principle he wished to make.

-- The second point regards how we should proceed, both here in Geneva and beyond -- indeed how to conduct our relations in general. The principle of equality and equal security is of exceptional importance. It is absolutely essential at every phase in our consideration of the problem and at every stage in
our discussion of it. Absolute equality and equal security merit repetition a thousand times. All agreements connected with the resolution of the problem before us, a problem of vital importance to both our countries and to mankind in general, must be based on this principle. If we follow this principle, neither your security nor ours will be damaged; the security of both our countries and of the whole world will rather be stronger. We believe that if both sides act in an honest way, it will be possible to comply with this principle and find solutions to the nuclear arms problem and to other problems. It is within the realm of the possible to find mutually satisfactory solutions. There is no place here for fatalism. All problems in the world are created by human beings, and it is up to human beings to resolve them. All problems existing today can be solved if our two countries proceed along the same path. And if we do, others will follow. He emphasizes this point because one frequently hears statements almost to the effect that there is no opportunity for people, or even governments, to affect the process. All too often, when the modernization and development of arms are considered (and this is especially true of space arms), it is suggested that there is no possibility of intervening to block such developments, as if it is written in the stars that it must happen. It is suggested that there might be some discussion of limitations — as if militarization has to continue. But this is inconsistent with human logic and with human capacities and must be rejected. We must believe in the possibility of human beings resolving this problem.

-- The third principle pertains to outer space. We must set the goal of preventing the militarization of space. Questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms must be considered in conjunction with the problem of preventing the militarization of space. In other words, questions of space arms, nuclear strategic arms and nuclear medium-range arms must be resolved in one single complex, that is, comprehensively within their interrelationship. We wished to stress comprehensively, since this is dictated by objective circumstances, and especially the requirements of strategic stability.

-- He noted statements by U.S. officials at various levels, including the highest, which emphasized the importance of strategic stability, and pointed out that the Soviets believe that strategic stability requires such an approach. If the forthcoming negotiations are to be put on a practical track from the outset, there must be a specific, joint understanding regarding their ultimate objectives.

-- In the Soviet view, the first such goal must be the prevention of the militarization of space. That is, there must be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of space attack arms [space strike weapons], along with the destruction of those already in existence. Given such a radical approach, opportunities would emerge for far-reaching decisions in the other areas as well.
-- By "space attack arms" the Soviet Union meant space arms based on any physical principle (literally: "principle of action"), regardless of basing mode, which are designed to strike space objects, objects in space and targets on land, sea or in the air from space, that is, targets on earth. This includes anti-satellite systems and relevant [or "corresponding"—sootvetstvuyushie] anti-missile systems.

-- The second goal relates to strategic arms. Given a complete ban on space attack arms, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to a radical reduction of strategic arms accompanied by a simultaneous and a complete ban, or severe limitation, of programs to develop and deploy new strategic systems, i.e., long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs and new types of heavy bombers. However, all these measures with regard to strategic arms would be possible only if they were coupled with a complete ban on space attack arms.

-- Additionally, the problem of strategic arms cannot be resolved separately from the problem of medium-range nuclear systems, that is missiles and aircraft, because the U.S. systems deployed in Europe are strategic systems with respect to the Soviet Union. This was emphasized in the past, particularly during the negotiations where Ambassador Nitze headed the U.S. delegation. To the Soviet Union these are strategic arms, even though in the past, for convenience, they had been called medium-range systems, taking into account only their range.

-- The third negotiation would deal with medium-range nuclear arms. Its main aim would be an agreement to end the further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe coupled with a simultaneous cessation of Soviet countermeasures. This would be followed by a reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to levels to be agreed. Naturally, British and French medium-range missiles must be taken into account in these levels. He then repeated "they must be taken into account," and observed that talk to the effect that the UK and France are separate states, that they should be disregarded and that their arms should not be counted in solving the question of medium-range systems in Europe, did not impress anyone. Such talk did not make the least impression on the Soviet Union. The UK and France and their nuclear systems were on one and the same side with the U.S. This is true in fact as well as in formal, legal terms, no matter how the problem is addressed. Thus, at least in discussions with the Soviet Union, the U.S. should steer clear of the thesis that UK and French systems ought not be taken into account. Any talk along these lines is a waste of time.

-- In summarizing the last portion of his statement, Gromyko reiterated the following. The problem of strategic arms and the problem of medium-range nuclear arms cannot be considered separately or in isolation from the problem of space arms, or more precisely, that of the non-militarization of space. The problem of strategic nuclear arms cannot be considered independently of the question of medium-range nuclear arms. All
of this must be considered comprehensively [in one complex] if there is, in fact, a serious desire to reach agreement. The Soviet Union hoped that it could count on the U.S. Government's understanding of the Soviet position.

-- Perhaps he was repeating it for the thousandth time, but the Soviet leadership would like to see serious progress toward agreement in order to reach the objectives which he had described at the beginning of his statement. Agreements must be based on respect for the security interests of both the USSR and the U.S. The entire world would give a sigh of relief if this could indeed be achieved. Moreover, the Soviet Union has no negative aims with respect to the U.S.. It wants a fair and objective agreement that meets the interests of both countries.

-- The Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the U.S.. The USSR is aware that from time to time responsible officials in the U.S. make statements to the effect that the USSR poses a threat to the U.S. The Soviet Union tends to think that individuals who make such statements do not understand the situation. However, these statements are made so frequently that we cannot rule out the possibility that those who make them may come to believe in them. After all, some people still believe in the devil. But we believe that common sense and objective reasoning, if it is followed by U.S. policy makers, can make agreement possible.

-- Could a country with hostile aims present proposals on eliminating nuclear arms, on no-first-use of nuclear arms, and insist that other nuclear powers follow the Soviet example? Could such a country present a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations? Could such a country make proposal after proposal aimed at curbing the arms race, disarmament and improving Soviet-U.S. relations? The Soviet Union has presented many such proposals. A country with hostile designs would not present these kinds of proposals. Could such a country harbor evil designs toward the United States? Surely it could not. He wished to stress that the Soviet leadership and the entire ruling party of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had no hostile designs against the legitimate interests or security of the United States. The USSR does not pursue such a goal. Judge our policies on the basis of our statements and our specific proposals.

-- The Soviet Union intends to pursue this course at the forthcoming negotiations. However, if common sense does not triumph at these negotiations -- and he was not speaking of the Soviet side -- then, of course, the USSR would be forced -- he emphasized would be forced -- to take appropriate steps to protect its security interests. However, it is in our mutual interest not to follow such a path. It is in our interest to follow the path of striving for an objective agreement which, he was convinced, is possible provided both sides advance objective and justified positions. If this were not the Soviet desire, it would have been pointless to hold these meetings here. In that case, we would be simply rolling down to the abyss. But the
Soviets believe that an objective possibility of agreement exists. He could not speak for the Secretary on these points, and invited him to speak for himself.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his comprehensive introductory comments, and promised to be equally brief in presenting his views.

First, he remarked that during Gromyko's visit to the United States, especially during his conversation with the President, Gromyko had used the phrase "question of questions." This had caught people's attention. He had defined it as whether we would move toward peace or toward confrontation, and, especially, whether we would be able to resolve the overriding question of nuclear arms. Gromyko had said, and the President had agreed -- in fact, the President had said several times -- that our goal must be the elimination of nuclear arms. This was repeated in the letters exchanged between the two heads of state.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko, in his arrival statement, had spoken about advancing along a path of radical reduction of nuclear arms and the goal of eliminating them. We share that goal. If, as a result of these meetings, we can agree on a negotiating format, we should instruct our negotiators to work toward that aim.

The Secretary pointed out that the President views this meeting as a major opportunity to launch a new effort aimed at reaching arms control agreements that enhance the security of both our nations. Our principal task is to look to the future, to establish a more efficient process and more effective negotiating approaches for addressing critical arms control questions. He hoped the meetings today and tomorrow can lay the basis for progress toward that end.

The President had directed that careful and thorough preparations be made for the meeting, and he had personally taken an intensive role in them. Accordingly, the Secretary thought it important to set forth the President's thinking carefully and in detail. He would go through the President's views of the strategic situation as it had developed in the past and as he saw it developing in the future. He would then deal with the question of subjects and fora for the future negotiations, if we can agree on them.

The Secretary said that he would begin by setting forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between defensive and offensive forces. He then made the following points:

-- Gromyko would agree that, as the President had said, the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were attacked. We hope that the
USSR has no intention of initiating an attack on the U.S. or its Allies, and the Secretary had heard this in Gromyko's statement.

-- At the same time the U.S. is determined to maintain sufficient forces to deter attack against ourselves and our allies. This means forces of such size, effectiveness and survivability as to deny an opponent any possibility of gain from an attack. We expect that you wish to maintain similar capabilities.

-- We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe, as Gromyko said this morning with regard to the USSR, that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.

-- It is disturbing to us that the USSR has placed so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. In light of this, we are obliged to take some steps necessary to maintain our offensive and defensive capabilities.

-- This interplay between us does create a dangerous situation. So it is one we must address. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

-- In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the U.S. has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability. We believe you would agree.

-- At any rate, in the late 1960's and early 1970's we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each of us. Those constraints, as we reviewed the record, were based on three assumptions:

(1) with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparable limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels;

(2) the constraints on ballistic missile defenses would prevent break-out or circumvention; and

(3) both sides would adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreements.

-- These premises, as we examined the record, have come increasingly into question over the past decade.

-- Both sides today have substantially greater offensive
capabilities than in 1972. Not only have the numbers of offensive weapons reached exceedingly high levels; of even greater concern, systems have been deployed on the Soviet side, in significant numbers, which have the capability for a devastating attack on missile silos and command and control facilities.

-- On the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty -- this was not criticism, just an observation -- it has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps which we believe are almost certainly not consistent with the ABM Treaty.

-- The viability of the ABM Treaty was based on several key assumptions:

First, that large phased-array radars would be constrained so as to limit potential breakout or circumvention to provide the base for a territorial ABM defense. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but they were to be on the periphery and outward facing.

Second, that ABM interceptors, launchers and radars would be neither mobile nor transportable.

Third, that the line between anti-aircraft and antiballistic missile defenses would be unambiguous.

Fourth, that the ABM Treaty would soon be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty, of indefinite duration, on offensive nuclear forces.

-- Unfortunately, today those assumptions no longer appear valid.

-- The Krasnovarsk radar appears to be identical to radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, and could serve as part of a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

-- The inconsistency of the location and orientation of this radar with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty is a serious concern, for it causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in the ABM area.

-- We are also concerned about other Soviet ABM activities that, taken together, give rise to legitimate questions on our part as to whether the Soviet Union intends to deploy a wide-spread ABM system. The SA-X-12 anti-air missile is one element of our concern; it seems to have some capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, and thereby blurs the distinction between anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.

-- The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.
-- Most importantly, as to offensive nuclear forces, it has not proven possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements that would bring about meaningful reductions in such arms, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.

-- So, in our view, as we look back at that period when the strategic environment that we were hoping for was designed, we must say that the strategic environment has since deteriorated. But it is important to look today at the future. He therefore would offer some comments which would help Gromyko understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.

-- For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable mutual deterrence which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective.

-- We must negotiate "effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament" called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972. We are prepared to negotiate constructively toward this end.

-- We must reverse the erosion which has taken place of the premises assumed when we entered into the ABM Treaty.

-- The research, development and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

-- You may argue that it is the U.S., and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. Certainly, your comments imply this. Therefore, I wish to explain the U.S. position.

-- The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.

-- We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.

-- A situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective defenses could be more stable than the current situation.

-- It could provide a basis for achieving the radical solution both our leaders seek -- eliminating nuclear weapons entirely on a global basis.
-- Our effort to see whether this is possible is embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative. This SDI is strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty.

-- No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it would be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.

-- Whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures. If either side ever wishes to amend the ABM treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed. The Secretary repeated: whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

-- The Soviet Union has been actively engaged for years in the sort of research being pursued under SDI.

-- The Secretary doubts that either side is prepared to abandon its research efforts now, before we know whether there are defensive systems that could enhance rather than diminish the security of both sides. We doubt an effective and verifiable ban on research, as such, could be designed in any event.

-- In the longer run, it appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than the current situation, and could produce a more stable environment.

-- The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation would play an important role in creating and sustaining such a less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution and obviously we would have to move in stages.

-- But we are prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now on the whole questions of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), a discussion of reductions in offensive arms, and a discussion of the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future. This was by way of saying that we fully agree about the relationship between offense and defense.
-- In the context of negotiations on offensive and defensive arms, we are also prepared to address space arms issues.

-- So we believe our negotiating efforts today and tomorrow should focus on the most urgent question before us: namely, how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms and enhancing the stability of the strategic environment.

The Secretary then turned to the way in which these comments lead us to suggestions regarding the subject and objectives of the future negotiations. Accordingly, he wished to offer comments on fora, subjects and objectives of the negotiations, as well as on their location and timing.

-- With respect to offensive nuclear systems, he proposed that we begin where we broke off and capture the progress made in the START and INF negotiations. We believe that much good work was done in both sets of talks, even though many issues remained unresolved.

-- Moreover, while the issues involved are clearly related, we continue to believe it would be most practical to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in separate fora.

-- Thus, we propose that we begin new negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and a second set of new negotiations on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces.

-- The subject of the first, strategic offensive arms -- or, more precisely, intercontinental-range offensive nuclear forces -- is fairly well established.

-- We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically, to use Gromyko's word, the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

-- Thus, the subject of these negotiations would be reductions, radical reductions, in strategic offensive nuclear arms.

-- I propose that the objective of renewed talks be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms.

-- The second negotiation we envisage is on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

-- Here, too, I think our previous efforts revealed a common emphasis on reducing longer-range INF missiles, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.

-- Moreover, we seem to agree that while systems in or in the range of Europe should be of central concern, any
agreement must take account of the global aspects of the INF problem.

-- Both sides have proposed that certain INF aircraft and shorter-range missile systems be dealt with in some fashion.

-- We propose that the subject of the new talks be reductions in intermediate-range offensive arms.

-- The objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

The Secretary then turned to our ideas for addressing the other aspects of "nuclear and space arms" on which we agreed in November to begin negotiations.

-- In the early days of SALT I both sides agreed that a treaty limiting defensive arms should be paralleled by a treaty limiting offensive arms and vice-versa. For reasons including those the Secretary advanced earlier, we continue to believe there is merit in such an approach.

-- We understand that the Soviet Union believes that controlling weapons in space should be a priority matter. Gromyko had emphasized this in his presentation. We believe, however, that a forum permitting negotiation of defensive nuclear arms would be a more appropriate complement to new negotiations on offensive nuclear systems.

-- In such a forum, we would be prepared to address the question of space-based defensive systems in a serious and constructive manner. Space arms questions could also be taken up in the offensive arms negotiations as well, as this might be appropriate.

-- But we believe that it is important to address questions relating to existing defensive systems based on earth, as well as potential future space-based systems, and to restore and revalidate the assumptions on which the ABM Treaty was based.

-- We therefore propose that we establish a third negotiating forum, in which each side could address aspects of the offense-defense relationship not dealt with in the two offensive nuclear arms fora.

-- In making this proposal, we have taken careful note of the concern you expressed in our September meetings about the possibility of nuclear arms in outer space. Gromyko had referred to this subject several times.

-- Given our shared objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons and the concerns you expressed, we believe that the negotiations should focus on defensive nuclear arms, including nuclear systems
that would be based in space or detonated in space, as well as defensive nuclear systems based on the earth.

-- Thus we propose that the subject of this third negotiation be defensive nuclear arms. The objective would be agreement on measures to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and on steps toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed defensive systems.

-- As to the formalities, the Secretary suggested that the location of all three talks be Geneva and that, as a matter of urgency, the negotiations should preferably open in the first half of March.

-- The most pressing task is to reach agreement on formal negotiations to address offensive and defensive forces. But the Secretary believed that it would also be useful to establish a senior-level process to complement the formal negotiations and to provide a channel for talking about broader problems. In these talks we might perhaps be able to provide the integrating process that Gromyko had referred to.

-- What we have in mind is to have more unstructured, conceptual exchanges on the maintenance of strategic stability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.

-- Continuing exchanges on these subjects between the foreign ministers should be part of this process. As the President has suggested, this might give some stimulation and act as an energizer to the negotiations. As he has further suggested, it might also be useful to have special representatives meet to address both conceptual and concrete ideas.

-- Senior representatives could also play an important role in clarifying each side's conceptual approach to the negotiations, as well as in exploring the details of specific proposals.

-- Moreover, as formal negotiations proceed in individual areas, senior representatives could meet periodically to help break logjams and coordinate our joint efforts in the various fora.

-- We believe that the problem of getting control of the growing nuclear forces is of fundamental concern. Those countries with nuclear arms must take the leadership. Certainly, he would hope that we can make progress to prevent these systems from overwhelming our two countries. As Gromyko had suggested, if our two countries take the lead in this regard, others would follow. Gromyko had also said that the ultimate goal would be to eliminate nuclear arms. We had no reservations in this regard, though we recognized the difficulties involved.

-- In this connection, the Secretary highlighted the importance of the non-proliferation regime and noted that their discussion in September 1982 had led to consultations on non-proliferation questions. From our standpoint, these discussions have been
fruitful. However, further efforts are needed if we are to control nuclear arms, as we must -- if we are to reduce them drastically and ultimately eliminate them.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he had described how we see future developments and had outlined our ideas for structuring the future negotiations. The Secretary remarked that earlier he promised to take as much time as Gromyko had. He had not quite fulfilled that promise, but considering the time devoted to interpretation, he thought that they had ended up about equal. The Secretary cited Gromyko's phrase about the need for respecting the security interests of both parties. He found this to be a very good phrase and intended to proceed on this basis. He also expressed appreciation for Gromyko's attempt to present his comments with as much precision as possible.

Gromyko, who had earlier waived translation from English to Russian, observed that the Secretary had just delivered a very important statement and asked for a translation so that it could be given careful consideration. The Secretary's statement was thereupon translated in its entirety.

When the translation was completed, Gromyko observed that the statement was an important one dealing with fundamental principles, and said that he had two questions which arose from the Secretary's comment that at some stage the parties could enter into a discussion of the research the U.S. is doing and of ways it could be integrated into a system of strategic stability. His questions were: first, at what stage would this be discussed, and second, what specifically should be dealt with in the third forum, that is, the forum dealing with space matters, a forum to which we have not yet attached a label, because it is too early to do so.

Gromyko added that the Secretary's remarks on this subject had not been clear. The lack of clarity did not seem to be a linguistic problem but one rather in the U.S. position itself. What should be discussed in this third forum? Is this forum to discuss programs for large-scale space defense systems or not? And if this topic is discussed, what will be the angle of view applied? If your position is that space research programs are to be continued and sometime later can be discussed, then this is not acceptable. U.S. intentions to pursue such efforts were unacceptable, even though mention had been made that the U.S. might share some of the results. The Soviet position is that the topic should be discussed with the view of preventing the militarization of outer space. If this approach is taken, what is the point of such a large-scale program to develop ballistic missile defenses? What would happen if these two concepts collided? What would be discussed in this forum in that case? Perhaps this forum might hold only one meeting. What sort of negotiation would that be? Where would that lead us? Since all three fora are interrelated, if the third forum bursts like a soap bubble, the other two would go down with it. It would be a different matter if the subject of the negotiations in that forum were to be the prevention of militarization of space. In that case, he could see the sense of that third forum.
Gromyko asked the Secretary to respond to his questions either then or after lunch, as he preferred. When the Secretary had done so, Gromyko would comment on other aspects of the U.S. position.

The Secretary promised to answer Gromyko's questions, but suggested that this be done after lunch since they were already running about an hour behind schedule. He also suggested, since time between meetings was useful to consider carefully and assess each other's comments, to move the afternoon meeting to 3:30 instead of 2:30, and put off the reception planned for the evening by one hour as well.

Gromyko agreed with this procedure.

Before departing, the Secretary said that he intended to say nothing to the press regarding the meeting and Gromyko stated that he, too, would follow a "no comment" policy.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 P.M.

Drafted by: J.F. Matlock; D. Arensburger
SECOND SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

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Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:
January 7, 1985; 3:35 to 6:55 P.M.
United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he would respond to the two questions Gromyko raised at the end of the morning session. The first question concerned when the U.S. expects to discuss how strategic defense-type systems could be integrated into force structures. In one sense, there is nothing concrete on this subject to speak of at this point because we do not yet have an outcome from our research. When we get to something concrete, or reach a development with potential operational characteristics, when and if the research of both sides demonstrates that there can be a system which could usefully contribute to moving away from reliance on offensive weapons, then we could discuss the strategic defensive forces. In other words, the discussion would be triggered by the emergence in U.S. or Soviet research programs of something with that potential. The U.S. also would be prepared -- even in advance of any such positive research development -- to discuss the ways such systems, if they proved feasible, could contribute to the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, which
is important in and of itself. This was the first question Gromyko had raised.

Gromyko's second question, the Secretary continued, concerned the subject matter of the third forum he had proposed, that of nuclear defensive systems. He expected this to be a forum in which both sides would feel free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems they wished to raise, including space-based or land-based systems, whether directed against weapons on the earth or in space. Nuclear offensive weapons in space are already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. Technical developments in recent years make it harder to draw certain distinctions between systems, for example, between ABM and air defense systems, between early warning, NTM, space track and ABM radars. Therefore, the U.S. believes there is much work to be done to reexamine, reevaluate and reinforce the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM treaty, as well as defensive systems in general. In addition, this would be an appropriate forum to discuss possible future arms, as he had mentioned earlier, and technical developments bearing on their future utility, to the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear arms. The U.S. does not believe that research can be effectively or verifiably banned, nor does it believe that research which could, if successful, contribute positively to a reduction in the evils of war should be banned. This forum would be the appropriate one in which to raise questions relating to space arms, including the space systems Gromyko had discussed this morning. He thought there was a full house here to occupy both sides.

The Secretary then said he wished to explain the essence of the idea he was trying to put across, since it related to his answer to one of Gromyko's questions. Gromyko had said that the questions being discussed here are interrelated. Although for the purpose of the negotiations these questions cannot be discussed all at once, the sides must find "bundles" of questions to discuss. In the end, of course, all these issues are interrelated, and he recalled that in a recent letter Chernenko had referred to the "organic link" between offensive and defensive weapons.

Secretary Shultz then said that what we have in mind is a concept of deterrence in which the greatest degree of stability and equal security is inherent. He suggested looking at two steps. First, to try to attain the strategic environment envisaged in the early 1970s -- that is, reduction of offensive arms down to the levels contemplated at that time -- and then, in light of technical developments, to look at the defensive environment. In the meantime, research proceeds on strategic defensive weapons; both the U.S. and USSR have such research under way. On the basis of U.S. research, he did not know what the answer would be, but if the answers are positive, he would envisage that the two sides would together try to create a regime with relatively greater emphasis on defense. Of course, if we are able to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely (and he hoped we would be able to) there would be less to defend against. But if a side feels it has a secure defense, it has equal security and stability in a less
dangerous and less destabilizing mode. This is the concept on which the U.S. approach is based. It is not a concept that is being implemented now, but would emerge as time goes on. The reductions in offensive arms to which Gromyko had referred must be consistent with this.

Gromyko said he would respond, taking into account the answers Secretary Shultz had given to his questions. He thought this would be useful so that the Secretary could more fully understand the Soviet attitude toward the American concept of a large-scale missile defense system. The U.S. calls this whole idea a defensive concept, but the Soviet Union does not share this view. The Soviet side sees it as part of a general offensive plan.

Gromyko then invited the Secretary to climb to the top of an imaginary tower and look at the entire situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet line of reasoning is simple. Assuming the U.S. succeeds in developing this large-scale anti-missile defense, it will have created a shield against hypothetical Soviet missiles. U.S. assumptions of this threat are pure fiction and fantasy, but Gromyko would leave this aside for the moment. If the U.S. did have such a defensive system in place, it would have the capability to inflict a first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. One needs no special gift of perspicacity to understand this; it is clear almost to the point of being primitive. If the Secretary were to view this situation from atop the tower, he would reach the same conclusion.

The United States, Gromyko continued, reasons that the Soviet Union can also develop its own strategic defense. Then there would be two such systems, a Soviet and a U.S. one, and then both sides could consider how to reconcile and adjust them to each other and integrate them into the relative defensive complexes of both sides. But Gromyko wished to ask: why have these systems at all? After all, one side has nuclear arms and the other side has them too, so although it is possible to paralyze or neutralize these weapons, why create a system to do so? Isn't it simpler to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves? Why should our two countries spend their material and intellectual resources developing such a system? Surely the reasonable solution would be to eliminate the weapons themselves. This is nothing more than the centuries-old question of the shield and the sword: Why have a shield to protect yourself from the sword if it is simpler to eliminate the sword? In speaking now of shields and swords, no one should be thinking of the weapons people used in olden times; the weapons now are terrible ones that threaten all humankind.

This, Gromyko stated, is the logic behind the Soviet reasoning. For this reason, the fact that the U.S. side calls its concept a defensive one makes no impression on the Soviet side. The U.S. must understand clearly that the USSR cannot be party, either directly or indirectly, to the development of such a system, either U.S. or Soviet. If the U.S. dismisses this reasoning and takes measures to develop such a system, the Soviet Union would
decide on the counter-measures necessary to protect its own security. Gromyko wanted the U.S. administration to understand the Soviet position correctly. He was inclined to believe that Secretary Shultz understood this position.

Gromyko continued by stating that the U.S. seems to believe -- indeed he would go further and say it does believe -- that it would be able to create such a system and the Soviet Union would not, so the U.S. would be ahead. The U.S. thinks it would be in the dominant position and this tempts it. This is how the Soviet side sees the situation. The U.S. wants to gain advantage over the Soviet Union, and the defensive system if developed would be used to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. Let us not mince words, Gromyko said, even if they are harsh ones: the system would be used to blackmail the USSR.

To be blunt, Gromyko added, this is not the right approach to take in relations between our two countries. It is not the path dictated by the interests of our countries and the whole world. If the U.S. does not change its line, the Soviet Union will reveal the full truth to its own people and to the whole world. He thought the U.S. government had surely noticed the restraint shown by the Soviet side in its official pronouncements on this issue, particularly with regard to these meetings in Geneva. However, if the situation makes it necessary for the Soviet side to comment in full on the U.S. line, it will do so. This is not the path that will lead to a peaceful solution on the basis of an accord between our two countries. As sure as we know that after the Geneva meetings both sides will return home and as sure as we know that tomorrow will be a new day, the Soviet side is convinced that the two countries will protect what they consider to be just and fair. Gromyko urged that the U.S. reappraise this concept which it has christened "defensive". There is nothing defensive in this concept, he added.

Gromyko continued that this would not mean that the U.S. would have to give in to the Soviet position. It would simply mean a change of U.S. policy in favor of peace. It would be in the interests of the U.S. as much as the Soviet Union. The U.S. has mobilized formidable official and propaganda resources in support of its policy. Practically every day one hears pronouncements by U.S. officials at all levels, as well as by members of the press, in defense of this concept. But all the U.S. is doing is taking some half-dozen arguments and juggling them around. One day, argument number one becomes argument number six, the next day argument number two becomes argument number three, and so on. The U.S. changes the periods and commas, but the set of arguments is the same as it tries to prove that the concept is a defensive one. This is a non-viable concept and non-viable position.

Gromyko made bold to state that it gives rise to concern and alarm in Western Europe and in other countries, even those on remote continents. People today are not like they were 40 or 50 years ago, he said. Today they take to heart everything that bears on war and peace. Had the Secretary not noticed the mood
of the world on matters relating to outer space? People want outer space to be a peaceful environment; they do not want the sword of war hanging over mankind's head and threatening space. Gromyko thought the U.S. should be aware of this and therefore he hoped the U.S. administration would take another look at the entire question of outer space.

Gromyko then stated that when he returned to Moscow after his last visit to Washington, he had reported in detail on his talks with the Secretary and with President Reagan in the White House. He informed his colleagues in the leadership, including Chernenko, what the President had said in their private conversation. He had, in fact, quoted verbatim from the President's words. Gromyko had told the President in response that he had spoken very good words but he wondered why the U.S. government made no changes at all in its practical plans for an arms race and in preparing for war. The President had not answered this question and Gromyko reported this also. All his colleagues liked the good words the President had spoken, but were disappointed that nothing positive was either done or promised to substantiate the words. This was the "political photograph" that he had brought back with him from his visit to Washington.

Since then, that is since September 1984, Gromyko continued, the situation had not changed, or had changed for the worse. Take, for example, outer space, which is of immense importance. The situation is also worse as regards medium-range nuclear weapons and in the arms race in general. The situation now is worse than it was in September, and in September it was worse than the year before. As the situation worsens, we sit at the table in Geneva and talk. People everywhere, even if they are not involved with politics, are aware that the problems under discussion here concern the fate of peace in the world. Let there be no false modesty -- that is precisely what is at stake here. We are charged by our leaders to meet and exchange ideas on these questions. If there is a chance even to begin to turn this situation around, let us make use of this chance, because the situation today is worse than yesterday, yesterday was worse than the day before, and tomorrow will be worse than today. Perhaps the day would come when some political leaders will throw up their hands in despair, but we, the Soviets, will not be party to defeatism. We will continue to struggle to strengthen and preserve peace on earth.

Gromyko then asserted that it would be incorrect for the U.S. to construe his words as prompted by tactical or propaganda considerations. There is no room for propaganda here. We are talking here about high politics and questions of war and peace. Let us agree to discuss questions of outer space, the prevention of the militarization of outer space, strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (the Soviet side calls them medium-range weapons, but the name is not important). Let us agree upon the structure of negotiations and how to understand the interrelationship of the three elements, or triad. Let us decide how to breathe life into the negotiations.
As for the structure of the negotiations, Gromyko wished to address that separately. He had something more to add to his comments on what the Secretary had mentioned in justification of the so-called defensive concept. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union almost has such systems now and is certainly working toward them. Secretary Shultz had stated that Soviet air defense systems are almost the same as the systems the U.S. plans to develop. While he did not choose to call this a distortion, it certainly is a mistake. Perhaps the Secretary's information is not correct; in any case there is nothing of the sort in the Soviet Union. Air defense systems carry out air defense functions and no others.

Gromyko continued, saying that Secretary Shultz often speaks of verification. Whenever there is talk of an agreement, understanding, or accord between the two sides, the U.S. always speaks of verification and monitoring. Gromyko supposed the U.S. did this order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet side, but there is no need to waste time in pressuring. The Soviet Union is in favor of verification, but it wants the degree and level of verification to correspond to the degree and level of the disarmament measure being considered. In the past, the U.S. has recognized this principle and on this basis the two sides have found a common language. Why is this principle unacceptable now? Gromyko called on all those present to consider this. He had the impression that the U.S. is afraid of verification since it always 'harps at length on verification, verification, verification.'

The USSR has submitted a proposal that is now on the table in the U.S., West Germany, France, Britain and Italy, Gromyko added. This is the proposal for complete and general disarmament, coupled with a proposal for complete and general verification. The U.S. is prepared to discuss not verification of disarmament and the elimination of arms, but verification of arms. The U.S. seems to think it is all right to produce ten times more weapons so long as there is verification. The USSR advocates disarmament and the elimination of nuclear and other weapons with complete verification. Once and for all, Gromyko stated, let it be known that verification does not frighten us in the least. Since we are speaking of various agreements, verification should be discussed for each one of them in a businesslike manner, without ascribing blame where blame is not due and without accusing a party were there are no grounds for accusation.

Gromyko then stated that a document had been submitted to the U.S. Congress (and the document came from the State Department) which alleges that the Soviet Union has violated some of its agreements. The Soviet Union has not violated any agreements. He added that he had taken note of the language in which the document was couched, that is, that there were "apparent" violations or "doubts" about compliance. But this is not enough to accuse the Soviet Union of violations. The Soviet Union implements its agreements and does not violate them. If the sides conclude an agreement, the Soviet Union will adhere to it
strictly. The U.S. should not charge the Soviet Union with something of which it is not guilty. He was discussing questions of principle here. He wished to touch on how the Soviet side envisages the structure of negotiations, assuming the sides can agree on holding them, but first he wished to give the Secretary a chance to respond.

Secretary Shultz said that he appreciated Gromyko's comments on the importance of verification and for his expressed readiness to provide measures for verification and make them consistent with the means and goals to be achieved. The questions he raised in regard to what is seen as violations or misunderstandings highlight the complexity of these questions. This shows how important it is to discuss these developments, not only from the standpoint of violations but from the standpoint of what the sides can do to make the treaty regime clear and unequivocal. He raised this point now because this issue is so important. It is important because, if people have questions about compliance with obligations, they are likely to question the value of agreements in general. Therefore it is very important to answer these questions clearly so that the atmosphere of future relations is not poisoned.

The Secretary then returned to the beginning of Gromyko's comments about the central conceptual issues, since they are so important. Even if this meeting results in agreement on a set of negotiations, we must continue to work on the conceptual issues because they are of central importance. He would comment on the concepts and then would ask Mr. McFarlane to say a few words. After that, he would have a question to ask of Gromyko.

The Secretary continued by saying that perhaps his comment could be worded as follows: "Neither blackmailed nor a blackmailer be." He then invited Gromyko to climb to the top of the same tower Gromyko had imagined, and to look at the view before them. The two of them are men from Mars. When they look to the left, they see an impressive program of development of strategic and other nuclear programs. The drive, production capacity and destructive potential are most impressive. The two Martians cannot fail to notice that alongside this considerable effort in offensive arms, a comparable effort in defensive arms is underway -- some of it legitimate in accordance with the ABM treaty, and some of it questioned in that regard. Taking into account the invasions of the Soviet Union in the past, it is not surprising that the USSR is preoccupied with its ability to defend itself, but it still is an impressive display.

If the two Martians look to the right, the Secretary continued, they would also see an impressive offensive capability, as well as signs of renewed modernization of weapons. They could not fail to note that little attention is devoted to defense. And if they took a movie rather than a still photograph of this scene, they would remark that in the last three or four years someone had turned a light on this area, because now stirrings are visible. Although they are far behind what is seen on the left,
they now understand that defense is important. The two Martians up on the tower would also observe on the left a certain amount of concern over the defensive activities starting on the right. They would not find this concern surprising because those on the left have much more experience with defense than those on the right. Having heard Gromyko's statement that a strong defense has offensive significance, the two Martians would observe together that the lower the offensive systems of each side, the less force there is to this argument. If the systems are reduced to zero, the argument loses its force entirely. The two Martians are struck by the fact that both sides are talking about drastic reductions. In this sense, the concept of a gradual evolution from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence seems to create a less threatening rather than more threatening situation.

The Secretary then asked Mr. McFarlane to comment further on the President's concept of the role defensive systems could play in preserving strategic stability.

Mr. McFarlane stated that President Reagan had a number of influences and motives for proposing a research effort to determine whether defensive systems might be developed which hold a promise of enabling us to move away from our historical reliance on offensive weapons to ensure deterrence. One of these came from his view of how the balance could become unstable by the turn of the century as a result of the nature of the offensive systems now being developed. Specifically, the emergence of offensive mobile and transportable systems, as well as cruise missiles, could lead us into a situation in which we are less certain of the characteristics and composition of systems on both sides. This would make a stable balance less stable.

Secondly, Mr. McFarlane continued, the President wished to find an alternative to offensive deterrence because of the Soviet Union's advantages in key areas, specifically ICBM warheads, which give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy the corresponding forces on the U.S. side which are essential for deterrence. The same asymmetry promises, through defensive systems on the Soviet side, to neutralize any retaliation the U.S. might undertake. The sum of Soviet programs in offensive and defensive arms undermines the traditional basis of deterrence that has existed for the past fifteen years.

Mr. McFarlane then pointed out that the psychological element was perhaps just as important in the President's mind as the military factor. Why should peace and deterrence depend on our ability to threaten someone else? Why not rely for peace and deterrence on weapons that do not threaten anyone? Since we are conducting research on essentially non-nuclear systems, this psychological factor is particularly relevant. Therefore the President decided to determine whether new technology could promise this. However, he made this decision with Soviet concerns about the appearance of a first-strike capability very much in mind. Surely, the development of defensive systems and their deployment while
concurrently maintaining offensive systems could present the appearance of an intention to develop a first-strike capability. This is not the plan of the United States. This is why the Secretary made clear at the beginning of this meeting that if the day arrives when any or all these technologies show that they can contribute to deterrence, the integration of these concepts into the force structure would be a subject for discussion with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must agree that defensive systems play a role. Its own investment and success in developing defensive weapons are far advanced.

In sum, Mr. McFarlane pointed out, the President's view is that it is time for us to integrate defensive systems into the concept of deterrence in order to turn us to lesser reliance on offensive systems and greater reliance on defensive systems.

Secretary Shultz then remarked that there was plenty of room to explore this deep and difficult question further, but he wished to ask some questions concerning something Gromyko had stressed in his remarks. In his comments in Washington and in his airport arrival statement in Geneva, Gromyko eloquently stated again and again that the Soviet Union is in favor of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and of radical steps toward that goal. The Secretary's questions concerned the program Gromyko had in mind to achieve this goal. If such a program is to be implemented, there must be a concrete expression of it. He therefore posed a series of questions:

-- What kind of timing did Gromyko have in mind for the deep and radical reductions of which he had spoken?

-- How far did he propose we go before the other must be engaged in order to move to zero?

-- What if any changes must be made in the non-proliferation regime?

-- How would we treat the variety of nuclear weapons that are not strategic?

The Secretary then observed that if the goal of this meeting is to move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as Gromyko had stated upon his arrival in Geneva, they must put an explicit program behind that objective. They must define a clear and concise program to reach this goal and they must establish at the negotiations a means to achieve it. What does Gromyko have in mind that lies behind this general objective?

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union had submitted a proposal on complete and general disarmament to the United Nations. It had submitted a detailed proposal for a program of nuclear disarmament and it had also advanced a proposal on nuclear arms in the relevant forum in Geneva. However, the U.S. and its NATO allies had refused to consider these proposals. It cannot be said that the Soviet Union did not make these proposals; they are
well known and they are known to all the governments concerned. This program requires no changes or alterations. What is needed is the desire to discuss this question.

Gromyko continued, saying that the Secretary had made a half-dozen references today to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. If the Secretary believes that the U.S., USSR, and other countries should strive to achieve this goal, this is good and the Soviet side welcomes such a statement. They are in sympathy with it and are impressed by it. Practical steps, however, must be taken to implement this goal.

Part of the problem is the question of non-proliferation, as the Secretary had mentioned. Secretary Shultz had asked what we could do jointly to reinforce the non-proliferation regime. This question must be considered within the context of the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontally or vertically, must be prevented. If we lead matters to the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, this could lead to acceptance by all states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the U.S. and USSR can do that, he is sure that all countries would support it, including those that did not sign the NPT.

Both sides agree, Gromyko continued, that the question of non-proliferation is an important one. Non-proliferation must be ensured with no exceptions. He was gratified to note that the U.S. and USSR have almost always held the same view on this. Our two countries had created the treaty, and Gromyko recalled how he and then Secretary of State Rusk hung a map on the wall and referred to it when discussing specific areas. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was developed step-by-step through joint efforts. And so the policy of the U.S. and the Soviet Union coincides on this issue. However fast or however slow we work toward eliminating nuclear arms, the task of ensuring non-proliferation will remain an important one.

Gromyko then asserted that the Secretary had tried to substantiate his position that the new U.S. system is defensive. As Gromyko had already said, the Soviets are convinced that it does not pursue defensive aims, but rather is part of a broad offensive plan. He would not repeat this again because he had already said it. Mr. McFarlane had said that he, Gromyko, had talked about the threat of a first strike from the United States, but that the U.S. had no such intent. It would be going too far to ask the USSR to rely on one person's word and conscience. In any case this thesis works both ways. This was his reply to Mr. McFarlane's remark. Mr. McFarlane had also said that nuclear technology is not connected with this concept. We know your side is talking more and more about non-nuclear technology. But the fact is that nuclear arms would be used whether or not some of the technology used is nuclear or non-nuclear. It makes no difference whether the technology is nuclear, or particle beams, or something else -- this does not change the character of the
system. It is important for you to understand our assessment of this.

Gromyko then turned to the structure of possible negotiations. He could not say more than possible negotiations because they are not yet in our pocket. He wished to speak of the objectives the sides should pursue in the negotiations. He had tried to explain this morning how all the issues are interrelated, that is, the issues of space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons. This would justify the establishment of three bilateral groups. Their work as a whole would embrace all three of these areas. Of course each group would have one area: one would deal with the non-militarization of outer space, one with strategic nuclear arms and one with medium-range nuclear arms.

Since the problems must be considered in their interrelationship, the three groups should meet jointly periodically to take stock of progress and to sum up the results of their work. Of course, it is difficult at this point to set up a precise calendar or schedule, but periodic joint meetings are necessary. The final result must also be a joint result.

There should therefore be a superstructure over all three groups, Gromyko continued. Each side would have a single delegation or big group composed of three issue groups. They would look at where they stand, come to a conclusion, and then give recommendations to both governments. Each group would begin deliberations when the main content of its work is defined. All three groups together could begin work when agreement is reached on the main content of all three and on the aim of all three: space arms, strategic arms, and medium-range arms.

Gromyko then said that there must be an understanding on this point. If we begin work with our eyes closed we will get nowhere. We can reach agreement only when everything is acceptable to both sides. If this looks more complicated than previous negotiations have been, then perhaps that is true, but your policies on the space issue make it necessary.

In passing, Gromyko noted that some people in the U.S. have been saying, "We told you the Russians would come back to the negotiations and they did." He said he would not hesitate to call this propaganda. He did not wish to put the U.S. in an awkward position, but if need be the Soviet Union would speak its mind on this issue. What is being discussed here is not a resumption of previous negotiations. The negotiating table is a different one and the problems are not the same. Space has now appeared as a problem, and U.S. nuclear missiles deployed in Western Europe have created a new situation. So what we are speaking of here is the possibility of new negotiations, not resumption of the old ones. It is a cheap ploy to say: "You see, the Russians came back," and he would advise the U.S. side not to resort to such cheap ploys.
What he had said about the structure of possible negotiations, Gromyko continued, did not rule out agreements on separate elements of any of the three areas. For example, he had in mind such things as a moratorium on testing space arms or certain confidence-building measures for strategic arms. Whenever such agreements deal with issues which are not organically linked to unsolved problems, they could enter into force without waiting for the final outcome of the negotiations. Otherwise implementation of agreements on separate issues would be postponed until an aggregate solution is found and negotiated. A comprehensive solution will be indispensable in that case. This relates to the possibility of reaching agreement on separate questions within each forum.

For the sake of clarity, Gromyko repeated: The Soviet side does not rule out the possibility of reaching separate agreements on some issues which go beyond the limits of these three areas. An example would be a commitment by all nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Another example would be a freeze of all nuclear arsenals. Here separate agreement is possible. A third example would be the entry into force of agreements previously signed, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. A fourth example would be the cessation of all nuclear testing, that is, a comprehensive test ban. At present the ban on testing extends only to three environments. At one time we were near agreement on a comprehensive test ban. He recalled that when the SALT II Treaty was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, Carter hosted a dinner during which he told Gromyko that he felt the CTB could be signed soon. These were trilateral negotiations involving the U.S., USSR and UK. Several points divided us, such as a question about monitoring tests in the UK, but Carter said we could reach agreement. Ask Carter, Gromyko said, he can confirm this. But afterwards the U.S. administration forgot about this conversation and no agreement was reached. Such an agreement if signed could be most promising.

Gromyko said he would now return to the issues at hand. Tomorrow they must take a look at where they stand, looking either from the tower or not, and reflect on what results would come from this meeting.

Secretary Shultz noted that time was running out and that people were waiting for them at a reception. But he had a question and a comment to make before ending. The question was whether he should consider what Gromyko had said about the structure of the negotiations to be a proposal.

Gromyko replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Shultz stated that his group would study this proposal carefully and would be prepared to discuss it tomorrow. He called Gromyko's attention to the fact that he had made a proposal this morning at the end of his presentation. He hoped Gromyko would study it carefully because it contains points
similar to those in the Soviet proposal, although the Soviet proposal is more developed with regard to structure and relationship.

Gromyko replied that he had developed his proposal taking account of the Secretary's ideas. However, one point which they could not accept was the proposal to have meetings of special representatives or "wise men." In the past the U.S. called this an "umbrella" proposal. As Gromyko had already remarked to Hartman, umbrellas are very good against the rain.

Shultz interjected, "They also provide shade if the weather is hot."

Gromyko continued that if the Soviet proposal for three groups were adopted, each side could appoint anyone it wanted to guide their work. He could be a virtual dictator if a side wished. Each side could appoint its wisest men for its own internal workings. Gromyko thought it most probable that on the Soviet side the head of one of the groups would be head of the whole delegation. This was the most probable solution, although a final decision had not been made. The normal mechanism that operates within any government would work as usual and, of course, the sides could always use diplomatic channels. Shultz and Gromyko would each have their advisers and right-hand men, and each would be free to designate his own wise man. This is an internal affair. Gromyko's preliminary thinking was that the man who would head the big delegation would participate in the negotiations. If the two sides set up a situation in which two, four, or six wise men worked in parallel, they might create the impression on the outside that the situation in the negotiations was unsatisfactory. The two, four or six wise men would be meeting confidentially, but this could be misleading in terms of public opinion and might be seen as a screen concealing the true state of affairs. This is unnecessary and would add an undesirable element because it would look as if the work were proceeding on two different planes -- the delegation on one hand and the wise men on the other. As for internal organization, this is a matter for each side to decide for itself. Gromyko was sure that both sides could find wise men, but from the point of view of principle, this was undesirable.

Secretary Shultz replied that his delegation would study these remarks and present its considered opinion tomorrow. By way of a preliminary comment he wished to say that he was not prepared to spin this question off into inner space where it would be conducted by itself and then return for review at some stage. Something so important and loosely defined must have constant interaction at high political levels in the two governments. He would want to keep close track of the negotiations and would want a direct way to compare notes with Gromyko as to how they both assess developments. The effort to consider the relationship between these different sets of talks is a high political matter, not a technical one.
The Secretary pointed out that the phrase "non-militarization of space" is a difficult one for the U.S. First of all, outer space is already militarized. Secondly, neither side would want to dispense with some of the respects in which space is militarized, such as communications or NTM satellites. For this reason, this phrase causes a problem for the U.S. This does not mean that it would be difficult to include this subject in the forum. As he had stated this morning, it would be appropriate to discuss space arms, but there are other things to discuss too, in particular, land-based defensive weapons which have the potential of operating in space.

Secretary Shultz then said it would be necessary to give careful study to the way in which Gromyko put together these three sets of questions, which are in some ways separate and in some ways interconnected. He recognized that with or without a formal structure either side can pace the negotiations in one sector by what it wants in another. But he found it puzzling to establish in advance a ban on reaching agreement on something important that both sides might see as in their interest. He did not see why they would want to tie their hands in this manner. He would study this question carefully and respond to it and other questions tomorrow. He again drew Gromyko's attention to the proposal he had submitted today.

In conclusion, Secretary Shultz recalled that during World War II he had fought in the Pacific as a U.S. Marine. McFarlane was too young to have fought in that war but he fought as a Marine in another war. There was a saying that was common when they reached this stage and cocktails were waiting: "Stack arms and let's get the hell out of here."

Thereupon, the meeting adjourned at 6:55 P.M.

Drafted by: C.Smith; J.F.Matlock
Tuesday, January 8 [1985]

Word from Geneva continues to be good. George B. & I were presented with the new Inaugural medals. This morning I went to the Press Room with Don Regan & Jim Baker & announced they were exchanging jobs. The press was really astounded. They thought I was coming in to talk about Geneva or something of the kind. This was one story that didn’t leak.

I was in the family theatre briefing for tomorrow nite’s press conf. when I was called upstairs to take a call from George S. on the secure phone. The meetings in Geneva are over & the Soviets have agreed to enter negotiations on nuclear weapons, etc. Within the month a time & place will be agreed upon. Did a brief interview with 2 men from Dallas Morning News – a friendly paper. Then a reception in the East room celebrating “Human Events” 40th anniversary.