THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:
January 8, 1985; 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon
Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Before proceeding with the formal meeting, the Secretary took
Minister Gromyko aside and told him about U.S. concerns in the
area of human rights. He named several individuals whose fate
was of particular concern and mentioned repression of Hebrew
teachers. Gromyko listened, but made no comments.

Gromyko opened the formal meeting by suggesting that since they
had no chairman, the discussions be conducted in a spontaneous
manner which he found to be very good.

The Secretary said that the proposal submitted by Gromyko toward
the end of the afternoon meeting yesterday was reasonable. In
this connection, the first point he wanted to make was that
having studied the Soviet proposal he could see that they were
suggesting genuinely new negotiations. We accepted that it is
new negotiations we are talking about.
Secondly, Gromyko had suggested that we proceed in terms of three different negotiating fora or baskets, or whatever they were to be called. The Secretary accepted that and viewed it as a kind of division of labor on the different subjects.

The Secretary's third point related to Gromyko's observation that the subjects to be dealt with in these three bodies were interrelated and that the three fora constituted one complex. He agreed with Gromyko's statement that the issues are interrelated and, therefore, consideration of these three elements in one complex is acceptable to us. However, Gromyko had made the point that an agreement reached in any one of the three fora would not be consummated until there was final agreement -- in effect, until there was agreement in all three. At the same time, Gromyko had provided some exceptions to that rule and the Secretary understood Gromyko's point; Gromyko had stated his view on the relationship between the different fora. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. approach is different in that we are seeking agreement in each of the fora, and if an agreement which is considered to be mutually advantageous is reached in a given setting, we will be willing to raise it as something that should be considered for consummation. But, perhaps this falls within the category of the exceptions that Gromyko had identified.

The Secretary then pointed out that we do not feel that we should be bound by a self-denying ordinance and refuse to conclude agreements which are in our mutual interest. He understood the Soviet position, but was explaining ours.

Regarding the subjects and objectives of the third forum, the Secretary observed that there is common ground in our approaches. As he had said yesterday, our views differed with regard to the third forum, but perhaps that difference is not so great in terms of what is to be discussed in it.

Gromyko interjected that what the Secretary was calling the third forum was really the first forum, and the Secretary indicated that he considered the number used not important and agreed to call it the first if Gromyko wished.

The Secretary went on to cite the second forum which would take up strategic nuclear offensive arms, and said that the subjects and objectives for that forum appear reasonable to us, and we agree. He noted that in this forum the U.S. is prepared to discuss trade-offs in whatever areas either the U.S. or the USSR has an advantage. This is in recognition of the fact that if we are to reach a reasonable agreement it will be most unlikely for it to be a mere mirror image of the force structures of the two parties. After all, we want to come out with a situation which reflects genuine equality.

Turning to the third forum, the Secretary noted that it concerns intermediate-range, or what the Soviets call medium-range, nuclear forces; either term is acceptable to us. The subject and objectives involved a problem that can be talked about. It
seemed to him that in both cases Gromyko was looking to reductions, perhaps radical reductions. We agree with this. He added that Gromyko was familiar with our principles and ideas. We are prepared to discuss different approaches toward working out an agreement within equal global ceilings.

Turning to the first forum, Secretary Shultz said that in some respects this is where the most difficult issues lie. At the same time, it seemed to him, as he had already said, that it might not be all that difficult to determine the subject matter of that forum. He had offered Gromyko an explanation in response to his perceptive question, and he had some further remarks.

Gromyko had suggested, Secretary Shultz continued, that the subject be non-militarization or demilitarization of space. (Gromyko interjected that he had not referred to demilitarization, but rather non-militarization.) The Secretary thought that such statements involved an overly narrow definition. There is no lack of willingness on our part to talk about and negotiate matters regarding space arms. But the Soviet definition is too narrow. What happens in space is a kind of abstraction, the result of something done with respect to offensive or defensive arms. He cited these two categories while recognizing that offensive and defensive arms are interrelated. If Gromyko would look at the subjects listed yesterday by the Secretary, he would recognize that they are related to this forum. For example, there are categories of anti-satellite systems which, though land-based, operate in space. Thus, to repeat, the Soviet concept is too narrow. Accordingly, we believe that this forum should deal with the full range of defensive systems, regardless of their basing mode. We are also prepared to deal with space arms questions as proposed by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary added that we had taken into account the concerns voiced by Gromyko several times last September concerning nuclear arms and nuclear explosions in space. Thus we believe it would be appropriate if the discussions in this forum were to focus particularly on nuclear defensive systems, including existing systems. While he agreed with Gromyko that the ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear arms, he thought that this forum should include all such arms, whether offensive or defensive. We certainly agree that the elimination of the entire category of nuclear arms is desirable.

The Secretary continued by pointing out that the Soviet Union has the world's only operational ASAT system, and -- as he understood it -- had conducted some twenty tests of that system. Moreover, while this system is land-based, the original launchers intended for it could launch other systems. Since the ASAT system operates in space, this could be considered to be militarization of space. The U.S., in contrast, has not deployed ASATs and has yet to test the system it has under development against satellites. Thus, we are far behind the Soviet Union in this area. On the Soviet side, in contrast, we see something
that exists. Beyond that he could mention a number of systems that are in space and have military uses, such as satellites for verifying compliance with agreements, for communications purposes and various other uses. To a very considerable extent we would not want to dispense with these systems because they are useful. Thus, the Secretary pointed out, "demilitarization" in one final sweep is not practical or verifiable. In looking through the record he had found, back at the ASAT talks in 1978 and 1979, a statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Khlestov, which ran as follows:

As for the concept of a 'comprehensive agreement,' the more we analyze it, the more doubts it causes us... From a purely technical point of view, it is practically impossible to single out, with sufficient precision, from the whole complex of systems and services which we call space technology, only those systems which would be designed exclusively for countering satellites... we propose that in the future we continue to concentrate our efforts on the tasks which both sides recognize as realistic and feasible.

The Secretary then turned to the matter of a space-based missile defense system, to which the Soviet Union had directed great attention, reviewing some thoughts he had tried to advance yesterday.

-- First, U.S. scientists say that these systems are years off. He did not know what Soviet scientists have to say on the basis of their own research. One can never say what a "hot research group" might come up with. The Secretary had personal experience with many such research groups at the University of Chicago, at Stanford and at MIT. And though none of those research groups focussed on the subject under discussion here, he knew that it was impossible to tell in what direction such research efforts might lead. This effort, therefore, is long-term by its very nature.

-- Second, deployment of these systems is covered by a number of existing treaties. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear detonations in space, the Outer of Space Treaty bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, while the ABM Treaty prohibits systems that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based. Thus, there is a whole body of treaty language that has been agreed upon in this area.

-- Third, regarding research as such, the Secretary had two points. One, that an agreement on research, as we see it, is virtually impossible to verify for a variety of reasons. Much relevant research stems from objectives unrelated to the question at hand. As an example he could point to advances in computational ability. We are both engaged in such research and this is impossible to stop. Beyond that -- and this was his second point -- we think that, in the end, if there is the
possibility of defense, it would offer a more comfortable and secure form of strategic stability than the one now existing.

The Secretary recognized that Gromyko disagreed, but expressed the hope that the Soviets would study our thinking. There is much time to talk about this matter and to digest it. It seems to us that if it is possible ultimately to determine a basis where a major element of deterrence would be defensive, in contrast to preponderantly offensive elements of deterrence we have now, this might offer a more comfortable and more secure form of strategic stability. If this can be accomplished it is potentially desirable. Perhaps we will not be able to find a way to do so. Therefore, for both these reasons the U.S. believes that research should continue and in fact will continue. Even if we were to agree on some limitation, it would be impossible to verify it. If it should turn out that a particular technology seems feasible, the U.S. would undertake more direct discussions, as provided by the ABM Treaty. At any rate, this is a matter for the future.

The Secretary said that this brought him back to a point in connection with the first forum. The U.S. is fully prepared to discuss and negotiate matters involving space arms and to take up whatever proposals the USSR may make in this area. As he had said yesterday, we are prepared to take up space arms questions in either of the other two fora, if they are related to the context of discussions there. As Gromyko had said yesterday, the world is changing. Perhaps as the negotiations continue, even on familiar subjects, we may want to approach them in different ways. Regarding further details and potential content of discussions in the first forum, the Secretary referred Gromyko to his comments on this subject the day before.

Finally, the Secretary returned to the question of structuring the negotiations. He recalled that Gromyko had said that they would appoint leaders for the three negotiating groups, and that, most likely, one would be named chairman of the overall delegation. Gromyko had also invited us to do as we wished in this regard. The Secretary observed that Gromyko's suggestion concerning the structure was novel. We had not heard such a suggestion previously and therefore we were still thinking about it. He did not know at this point where we would come out in terms of personnel appointments. To some extent he thought this would be a reflection of who would be "Mr. One," "Mr. Two" and "Mr. Three." Thus, this matter remained open so far as the U.S. is concerned.

The Secretary then said that his delegation had prepared a statement describing its proposals regarding the subjects and objectives of the whole complex of negotiations. This text could serve as a basis for discussion. He could give it to Gromyko now, or perhaps Gromyko preferred to make some comments before looking at the U.S. text.
Gromyko responded that indeed he had some comments. He was gratified to hear that certain aspects of the Soviet proposal regarding the structure of possible negotiations are acceptable to the U.S. On some other aspects of the Soviet proposal, the Secretary had voiced some doubts or reservations. He hoped that the Secretary would give added thought to these matters. It is good that the Secretary recognized the interconnection among the questions to be negotiated in the three groups. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the Soviet and American understanding of this interrelationship. The U.S. should be aware of this.

In dealing with this concept, Gromyko observed, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the subject ("material") of the negotiations compels us to consider the subject matter of the three groups as interrelated. That is why he had said yesterday that the problems must be solved in comprehensive fashion. In particular, he had explained why it would be impossible to make progress on some issues without agreement on space, more precisely on the non-militarization of space. He had also referred to a different interrelationship, namely that between strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms.

When the Secretary referred to interrelationship, Gromyko continued, he was talking about a different kind of interrelationship -- that of offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union cannot accept this if for no other reason than because the USSR did not recognize the category which the U.S. called defensive systems. He had said clearly that these systems, these concepts and this U.S. program were offensive systems, offensive concepts and an offensive program. They are a component part of a whole. One had to look at things from the standpoint of their ultimate logic. He did not wish to repeat what it would mean if the U.S. proceeded to implement its plan.

The Secretary observed that Gromyko had made himself very clear yesterday.

Gromyko continued that accordingly, we are speaking different languages when we refer to an interrelationship. Nevertheless, the very idea of an interrelationship does exist and that in itself is a positive element. Still, the two sides attached different meanings to it and this must be kept in mind.

The Secretary responded that, in practical terms, the question would present itself in terms of what would happen if, for example, we reached some kind of understanding in forum three or forum two. Would it be converted into a formal agreement or not? Under one interpretation of the interrelationship, the answer would be "no." Under a different interpretation the answer would be "yes."

Gromyko replied that this would not necessarily be the case. The point is that there are different interpretations of the concept of interrelationship. When we go beyond concrete specifics and relate these matters to high policy, we have to recognize that
the foundations of your plan and our plan are different. Naturally, this is of major importance. Everything said and written in the U.S. attributes defensive aims to your program -- as if everything in it is good and nothing bad. Even here in Geneva, though perhaps in a more restrained fashion, this has been the U.S. position. He, however, had told the Secretary that this is not the case, that the objective of the U.S. program is just the opposite. He had said this yesterday.

Gromyko then turned to the question of what agreements could be concluded in the absence of an overall agreement. As he had explained the day before, there are two groups of questions on which agreement is possible in the absence of an overall agreement. He did not preclude the possibility that it might be possible to reach agreement on individual questions in one of these groups which did not bear critically on the interrelationship. The number of such questions would be small. In this instance, there would be no need to await resolution of the other questions with which the groups would be dealing. The other category involved those questions which could be resolved and agreed upon entirely independent of progress on any other issue or group of issues. He had cited examples such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This type of question could be singled out, agreed upon, and an accord signed and brought into force. There were also two agreements that had been negotiated in the past, but had not entered into force. They were part of the same category that Gromyko was talking about.

The Secretary said he understood.

Gromyko noted that he had listed them yesterday. He wanted to provide additional clarification on one point because he felt that the Secretary had not clearly understood the matter. Let us assume that significant progress had been made in one or more of the groups. As they saw it, it would not be necessary to wait for the other groups to finish their work before discussing the overall picture. The whole delegation should meet from time to time to review their progress. It would be good if everything could be completed at the same time, but this can hardly be expected. There should be a periodic overall analysis, and this would provide an organic connection of the work by all three groups.

For example, Gromyko continued, let us assume that group "x" had conducted ten meetings. At that point the delegation as a whole could meet to see how things were going. This should be standard practice. There would be one delegation that is split into three groups. Thus, there would inevitably have to be consideration of the interrelationship the ministers had talked about -- provided, of course, both sides understood the meaning of the interrelationship in the same way. One should not rely exclusively on the literal meaning of the word, and one should not impose a kind of law on the groups under which they had to finish their work and wash their hands before a decision is made how to proceed further.
Gromyko said he hoped this explanation would be useful. He offered it because he suspected that the Secretary had not fully understood the Soviet concept.

The Secretary replied that this was an important clarification which he found very interesting.

Gromyko then noted the U.S. concern over the concept of non-militarization of space. Of course, one could invent some kind of symbol to replace this word, but Gromyko did not believe that it would be helpful to resort to algebraic techniques. If anything, that could be harmful. He added that the Secretary knows what the Soviet side means in this regard, and the Soviet side knows what the U.S. has in mind. Gromyko reiterated that he was convinced that the U.S. and USSR can prevent the militarization of space. If such militarization were to occur, the USSR, the U.S. and mankind as a whole will be pushed further toward the abyss toward which we have been moving. This is what will happen unless we find a way to halt such movement. Thus, even though the U.S. might not like the term militarization and may on occasion scorn it, he would urge honesty and precision in dealing with this subject.

Secretary Shultz's statements, Gromyko continued, had been reminiscent of those appearing in the U.S. press to the effect that it is wrong to raise the question of the militarization of space because space is already militarized. There are no scales which would measure the falsity of this thesis. We all understand that this is not the case. If we look at steps taken by both countries, there are things we can learn. For example, look at the U.S. space shuttle. If viewed in terms of its potential, one could conclude that under certain circumstances it could be used in ways in which no Soviet system can be used, and therefore that space is already militarized. But this would be an oversimplification. He did not want us to take this path since it would only make it harder to reach the goals before us.

Gromyko then reiterated what he had said the day before regarding space arms, or more precisely the non-militarization of space. The latter implies that there should be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of attack (or strike) space arms, accompanied by the destruction of existing systems of this kind. If such an approach is followed, far-reaching solutions to other issues would become possible as well. In order not to dilute the question of space arms by tangential issues, the Soviet side has proposed to talk about attack (strike) space arms. By attack space arms the Soviet Union means space arms based on any physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which can strike objects in space and which can strike objects on land, sea or in the air, that is on the planet earth, from space. Of course, this would include relevant anti-missile and ASAT systems.

Gromyko then said that, in referring to what he termed the U.S. defensive system, Secretary Shultz had spoken at length about research and about the difficulty in verifying a ban on research.
To a considerable degree what the Secretary said about verifying a research ban is true. But let us assume that all this preparatory research should demonstrate that such systems can indeed be developed. The U.S. position is "if it's possible, then let's do it." The Soviet position is to exclude this possibility since it would be a boon to mankind if this system is never developed.

Gromyko continued that this situation reminded him of the story of two men visiting Monaco. One of them suggests going to the casino in the hope of winning something; the other one refuses since he does not want to risk losing what he has. This illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions. The Soviets feel the wiser course is not to risk losing everything. This is not just the unanimous view of the Soviet leadership but is also shared by people everywhere. People instinctively feel that this path should not be pursued because it would generate a very great threat to peace and would intensify the arms race. Nothing would do more to enhance U.S. prestige than a decision to rule out that option. That was the way to reduce nuclear arms, a goal mentioned by the Secretary, the President, as well as the leadership of the Soviet Union. Specifically, General Secretary Chernenko had said this on numerous occasions and it had been repeated by Gromyko at this very table. Nuclear arms should be reduced down to their complete elimination from the arsenals of nations.

In the U.S., Gromyko continued, there is presently a popular thesis to the effect that one should switch the character and nature of deterrence and that instead of relying on strategic and medium-range nuclear systems for deterrence, one should rely on systems which the U.S. has baptized defensive systems. The Soviet Union believed that this would not serve the cause of peace, that this would increase the threat, that the threat would become awesome if the large-scale missile defense systems were developed. Under such circumstances, the nuclear arms race would not be curbed by such systems but just the opposite would occur; it would acquire new momentum. The USSR can not understand how the U.S. fails to see this. It must be some kind of self-hypnosis. This plan will intensify the nuclear arms race.

Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no further comments on the substance, perhaps they should give some thought on how to conclude their meetings. Earlier, the Secretary had mentioned a draft which Gromyko assumed was a draft of a joint statement. The Soviet delegation would certainly take a look at this draft and consider it. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would present its own draft. Gromyko thought that at this point it would be advisable to have either a working break or to recess for lunch, after which they could see how to proceed with regard to the joint statement and consider where to go from there.

The Secretary replied that he liked Gromyko's procedural suggestion, but wanted to make sure he understood clearly Gromyko's
description of how the set of negotiating groups in the delegation would work. Gromyko had mentioned a situation in which one of the three groups, Group X, had held ten meetings and had come up with something. It would then be appropriate -- and in any event this would occur periodically -- for the whole group to consider the results, and for Group X to report what it had agreed upon.

Gromyko confirmed that this was right.

The Secretary continued that he understood Gromyko had suggested that the whole group engage in a kind of summary review to judge whether this one thing that had been agreed upon could stand on its own or whether it should wait. This would be the function of such periodic meetings.

Gromyko again confirmed that this was correct; the overall delegation would make a judgment on how the agreement reached fits into the framework of the other questions being negotiated.

The Secretary noted that the structure proposed by Gromyko was unusual and imaginative and the Secretary would have to testify in Congress and explain how it worked. Thus, he added jokingly, he might ask Gromyko to write his testimony.

The Secretary then presented the U.S. draft text of a joint statement. (Attachment 1)

Gromyko simultaneously gave the Secretary the text of the Soviet draft (Attachment 2).

The Secretary suggested that they adjourn for lunch and reconvene at 2:30 P.M., which would give them the opportunity to study each other's drafts and to respond at the afternoon meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 Noon.

Drafted by: D. Arensburger; J.F. Matlock
Attachment 1

TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Attachment 2

TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space arms, as well as both strategic and medium-range nuclear arms; moreover, all these questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.
FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 8, 1985; 3:35 to 6:55 P.M.
United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland

Secretary Shultz began the meeting by saying that the two sides
had reviewed each other's proposed press communiques. He had
some comments to make about the Soviet draft, but as Minister
Gromyko was the guest, he should have the floor first.

Gromyko responded that, frankly speaking, it would be hard for
the Soviet side to accept the U.S. text. For one thing the U.S.
referred to a new complex of negotiations whereas the Soviet side
felt the need to discuss the problems in a complex -- or
comprehensive -- fashion. The two concepts are not identical.
The U.S. draft then speaks of the three groups meeting in Geneva
on March 5 to begin work, although the sides had not yet agreed
to begin negotiations. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss
the possibility of holding negotiations. He had always taken
care to say that if the sides can agree on the subject and
objectives of the negotiations, then they could talk about the
date and site of the talks. He always began his remarks with the
words "if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations."

The U.S. draft, Gromyko continued, then goes on to mention defensive arms. Perhaps this is good for the U.S., but it is unacceptable to the Soviet side, as he had already stated many times. The USSR has a wholly different evaluation of the arms the U.S. calls defensive. The only way to proceed here is to find mutually acceptable language, and this is a matter of principle. U.S. and Soviet assessments of the U.S. plans are diametrically opposed to each other, and this is why the sides must look in a different direction to find acceptable wording.

Gromyko then asked for the Secretary's reaction to the Soviet draft statement.

Secretary Shultz said that as far as a date and place for negotiations are concerned, he of course recognizes that this would come only after reaching an agreement on the substance of the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the substance, it would be worthwhile to set a time and place so as to be specific and leave nothing vague that could be clearly specified.

As for Gromyko's remarks about defense, the Secretary had carefully listened to everything Gromyko said yesterday and today, and he believed he completely understood what Gromyko meant. He hoped that with time he and Gromyko would have an opportunity to continue exchanges on this subject because it represents a very deep issue.

The U.S. had identified one of the three fora agreed upon as "nuclear defensive and space arms," the Secretary continued. He recognized that Soviet attention is very much focused on space arms, as signalled by statements made here and elsewhere by Gromyko and also by Chairman Chernenko. The U.S. understands this and is prepared to discuss space arms. But, as he had mentioned this morning, the U.S. sees this issue as essentially a broader one. There should be clarity about the defensive arrangements the Soviet Union now has underway (the U.S. at least would call them defensive). In the U.S. view this Soviet program is a massive one and should be discussed. The USSR has research programs in particle beams, directed energy and lasers, and has as well a deployed ABM system that is being upgraded. It also has a massive air defense infrastructure. The United States, for its part, has done very little in defense. So it is incorrect to discuss U.S. plans and research programs without looking at the large Soviet defense program. For this reason the U.S. believes that this negotiating forum should address the question of defense broadly speaking.

The structure of the Soviet draft statement, the Secretary continued, provides a basis with which to work, and so the U.S. side has made an effort to integrate its ideas into its two drafts. The U.S. draft adopts the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet draft without change. The third paragraph of the
Soviet draft was slightly changed, and the last two paragraphs dropped in favor of a U.S. text. Shultz handed over to Gromyko a copy of the following statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985 in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be those interrelated questions pertaining to nuclear and space arms with these questions to be discussed and resolved in a complex of negotiations.

To this end, the negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on nuclear defensive and space arms, strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

Gromyko observed that the U.S. had added the phrase "defensive arms" and this was unacceptable. He did not want to get into politics, but all the credit ascribed by the Secretary to Soviet activity in the field of defense is not true to fact. This is not acceptable wording, and any wording that is not acceptable to both sides must be dropped.

Secretary Shultz asked whether the main problem involved the word "defensive", or was it something else?

Gromyko replied that "outer space" is absent from the U.S. draft as an objective of the negotiations.

The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. draft reads "negotiations on nuclear and space arms."

Gromyko said that the concept of outer space must not get lost here. It must be put in first place.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. does not want to lose it, but wants to discuss outer space. He read out the following alternative to the last paragraph:
The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space.

Gromyko objected that this means relegating space to the backyard. The U.S. could call its strategic defense plan a plan to strengthen strategic stability if it wished.

Secretary Shultz said that, just as in baseball the number four hitter is the "clean-up hitter," he was saving the best for last. The phrase "strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space" could be interpreted in the Soviet way or in the U.S. way.

Gromyko said there should be no room for ambiguity here. He suggested taking a 15-minute break so that both sides could look over the drafts.

Secretary Shultz agreed, and the U.S. delegation left the room at 3:05 p.m.

* * * * * * *

At 3:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned and the meeting resumed.

Gromyko presented the following draft of a joint statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

In accordance with the arrangement previously reached in principle between the USSR and the USA to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the two sides focused their attention, as had been agreed, on discussing the question of the subject and specific objectives of these negotiations. The discussions were useful.

Both sides agreed that the ultimate objective of these negotiations, in the course of which all questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship as generally the two sides' efforts in the field of arms limitation and reduction, should be the gradual exclusion of nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of states until they are completely eliminated.

The exchange of views will be continued and the sides will seek to elaborate as early as possible an agreed approach to resolving the questions under question at this meeting.
Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Shultz agreed to continue the exchange of views, for which purpose they will meet again in early March. The date and venue of the meeting will be agreed additionally.

Secretary Shultz remarked that there was one place in the third paragraph that was unclear linguistically, but he did not disagree with the meaning of the sentence.

Gromyko explained that the Soviet side was referring to the ultimate goal of the negotiations and all actions taken to achieve that goal.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss this, but first he had a few questions. At this morning’s meeting the two of them had discussed at length the Soviet proposal for structuring the negotiations in three groups. He thought they had made quite a bit of headway in discussing it. Essentially they were struggling with the description of one of the three fora, but now it seemed that the Soviet side was withdrawing this idea. He did not object, and in fact looked forward to another meeting with Gromyko, but why did Gromyko not now want to go ahead with this idea? The Soviet side had proposed and the U.S. had accepted the basic notion of a related complex of three negotiations.

Gromyko complained that he now had to repeat himself once again. He did not understand why the Secretary was not paying attention to him. He had stated the Soviet views on how to structure the negotiations, provided agreement was reached to hold them. Every time he mentions this, he makes this reservation because the two sides have not yet agreed on this. If we agreed when to meet next time to discuss the subject and objectives of the talks, he said, then everything he said about the structure would still be valid. He was not taking back a single word of what he had said.

The Secretary observed that there is a difference of view in how the sides interpret research on defensive measures. He doubted there would be any change in these views by early March, and he doubted it could be resolved by then. It was more likely to be resolved through the process of negotiations.

Gromyko said he did not wish to single out any one question. He would suggest just continuing these talks and see what the outcome would be. They had come to no final result here yet, and he would suggest continuing these conversations, if the Secretary found this acceptable.

Secretary Shultz suggested that the two delegations separate for a few minutes in order to caucus and look at the direction in which they were going.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 3:42 p.m.

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At 4:28 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko joked that he hadn't expected to see the Secretary again until the second crow of the rooster.

Secretary Schultz replied that if today had been Sunday, the U.S. delegation would have been busy watching football in the other room. He said he was puzzled and could not figure out what was causing Gromyko to draw back from what had already been agreed upon. Certainly the two sides disagree on how to characterize what seem to the U.S. to be defensive systems, and which the Soviet Union feels are offensive. He expected that if we met six months or a year from now they might well still disagree, although there would be time for reflection. Although they disagree on what to call these arms, they do not disagree that it is important to discuss them. The U.S. is prepared to discuss them and Gromyko has indicated the same. The Secretary had developed in one of his presentations the sense in which technology is making certain distinctions in the ABM Treaty difficult to establish makes it difficult to establish, and therefore there is a need to examine a variety of technologies.

The Secretary noted that he had already pointed out that the deployed Soviet ABM system depends on nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or space. And so the U.S. had tried to define the subject matter of the first working group or forum so as to include what the Soviets want to talk about in space as well as things on the ground that seem relevant or important to the U.S. If we do not agree on the content, that is one problem. But if we do agree on the content -- and the U.S. has excluded nothing -- then we should be able to find the words to express this. If Gromyko's problem concerns the word "defensive," the Secretary could suggest some alternative wording. But perhaps this is not the problem. The Secretary thought that if they could capitalize on the extensive discussions that have taken place here, they certainly should. He had other language to suggest, but observed that perhaps Gromyko was not interested and had already decided to back away from the direction in which he had been going.

"Don't try to pretend that you don't understand us," Gromyko rejoined. He categorically rejected the reproach that he had retreated from his position. Each word he had spoken was valid. "Have we reached agreement on the subject and aims of the negotiations?" he asked rhetorically. Each time he had spoken of the structure of the possible negotiations, he had said, "when and if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, this is the structure we envision." He had spoken of one delegation divided into three groups. Of course, the negotiations would deal with the subjects for discussion in each group. These three groups would take stock of their progress and present reports on their work. This is how the Soviet side sees this issue. Let us talk seriously now. There would be one single negotiation made up of three groups working in three directions. Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on
this. Tell us, Gromyko asked the Secretary, if this proposal is unacceptable.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had again raised the subject of Soviet ABM systems and certain other issues. If the Secretary insisted on this, Gromyko would have to repeat all that he had already said. Is it really necessary to do so? If we could reach agreement on these questions, we could name the date for the negotiations to begin, i.e., March 1 or April 1, although the latter was not a very good date. But we are not in a position to do that now.

Secretary Shultz inquired what precisely was the essence of their disagreement. He thought it boiled down to the subject or way of describing the first group. If this is the problem, he had a proposal, but perhaps this is not the problem.

Gromyko responded that this is indeed the main issue. "You don't want to accept our proposal to deal with the militarization of space," he added. Whenever he had raised this question, the Secretary began to speak of research, U.S. plans and so forth. The Soviet side does not share the U.S. view that it is essential to carry out this research. This is the first stage of implementing the U.S. plan. The Soviet side proposes to continue discussing this important question, but here there is absolutely no agreement on it. They had touched on other important questions as well, but this is the main one. If they had reached agreement on questions related to space, they could now set the time and place of the new negotiations, but they have no such agreement now. If you think we cannot exist without a new round of talks, then your idea is far from the truth. Such an exchange is in the interest of both sides. If this does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us and we will not speak of it again. This was his short reply to the Secretary's remarks. He noted that time was running out and the sides should be brief.

The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood. Was Gromyko saying that they would establish these negotiating fora whenever the U.S. says that it will cease it research program on strategic defense?

Gromyko replied that he would not discuss that now. He proposed it for subsequent discussion. He wanted to discuss a whole series of questions by way of continuing the conversation here, but this would take several days. The Secretary certainly must understand, said Gromyko, that the Soviet side cannot accept the U.S. concept, point of view or policy on outer space. The U.S. must clearly understand the Soviet position on this. However, the Soviets are prepared to continue discussing all these issues. If a continued exchange does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us. This is a proposal, not a request.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would not stop its research program.
Gromyko commented that the Secretary had already said this. Secretary Shultz had said that if the essence is that the Soviet Union is waiting for the U.S. to stop its research program, this was useless because the U.S. would not stop. Gromyko repeated that the Secretary had already said this. He said that the Soviet assessment of the U.S. concept on space would not change, but the Soviet side is nonetheless prepared to continue the discussion.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had proposed that such a discussion take place in the first working group. This was implied by the draft joint statement Gromyko had presented at the morning meeting. This negotiating group would discuss the questions the two sides agree upon, but the U.S. wants it to discuss other questions too. This is what the sides should work toward, but this may not be acceptable to the Soviet side.

Gromyko replied that this problem would be discussed in one of the three groups.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed.

However, Gromyko continued, we have not yet cleared the way for the beginning of negotiations. If, for example, we agree now that this working group would meet on March 1, it would have the same problems at its first meeting that we are having here. What kind of negotiations would those be? At least one working group, or perhaps the whole delegation, would have to discuss this problem, and he thought it was better to discuss it at the ministerial level. It is not a question for a working group, but for a higher, more fundamental, level.

The Secretary remarked that he had given Gromyko a list of what he considered to be appropriate subject matter for this group, and it was a meaty set of material Gromyko could see this in his notes. The Secretary thought this area is important to both sides and is negotiable.

Gromyko said it is not possible to begin discussing the work program of the working groups now. First they must agree on the objectives of the working group and when the negotiations would begin.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko felt that further discussion of this question now would be fruitless.

Gromyko replied that he was not saying that; there was plenty of time left before tomorrow morning and of course they could sit here until then, but he thought it was hardly necessary to repeat what had already been said. There was no one but himself and the Secretary to discuss these questions. Their leaders had charged them with discussing them. Did he understand the Secretary to say that the idea of the two of them continuing their discussions was unsuitable? If so, one mode of action was indicated, but if not so, another mode of action was indicated.
The Secretary replied, "No, it is not unsuitable." But it is also suitable to get the negotiations going as soon as possible. As he had said, he thought that the negotiations, once begun, should be closely followed and discussed at a high political level. The two sides have much to discuss. He was striving to understand the reason Gromyko did not wish to begin the negotiating process. Gromyko had handed him a proposed communiqué announcing the beginning of negotiations. Although no date was set, the objective of the talks was stated. And now, apparently Gromyko did not want this to happen.

[At this point, Korniienko remarked to Gromyko in Russian, "Then they should take our text."]

Gromyko said that they want the negotiations to begin. But, he said, it is impossible to agree on the timing because there is as yet no agreed understanding on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. We are speaking of a common objective: both sides agree to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms. But this is the only thing we agree on, and therefore it is too early now to talk about a date for beginning the negotiations. He did not know whether at the next meeting they would be able to agree upon these questions and so he proposed to meet again in order to continue this discussion.

He said that the Secretary tried to interpret the fact that he would not agree to set a date for negotiations to mean that the Soviet side had changed its position and did not want to have negotiations. But Gromyko had said all along that they could not agree upon the date if they had not agreed on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. Don't try to pressure us, Gromyko warned, first of all, because we don't like it, and second, because it is hardly in either of our interests for our delegations to meet at the talks and immediately find themselves at an impasse so that the negotiations fall apart. This would be advantageous to neither side. Would it not be better to hold negotiations on a more reliable basis?

The Secretary noted that questions may arise over what is meant in the final sentence of the Soviet draft statement, which reads as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

Gromyko replied that he considered this normal. The sides could specify the month in which the talks would begin if the U.S. side feels this is important. They would not name a date, but would specify a month, or the 15th of a certain month. Gromyko had no desire to create any vagueness or uncertainty.

Korniienko asked whether the U.S. accepts the subject and definition of the negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. could not accept the Soviet draft but could use it as a basis for discussion.
Gromyko suggested that instead of a date we could say that a meeting and exchange of views would take place in March. If it is so important we could specify the first half of March. February would not be convenient for him for several reasons and March would be better.

The Secretary replied that he was trying to find a sense of direction, not to pin down a date. The Soviet draft implies that we agree there will be negotiations and that perhaps Hartman and Korniyenko or Dobrynin and he would discuss the time and place.

Gromyko asked whether this would be later on.

The Secretary said yes. If the date were to be in March, this would be settled by discussion between them. This was his understanding.

Gromyko rejoined that it would not be hard to agree to meet in March. It would, in any case, be easier than climbing Mont Blanc.

The Secretary concurred that it would be no problem to find a time and place. The problem was to work together and come up with a joint text of a statement.

Gromyko replied that they had drafted their text taking account of the U.S. position and the views the Secretary had expressed here. If the two of them are to work out an agreed text, everything in it must be acceptable to both sides since it will be made public.

The Secretary said that if the statement is made public, it would imply that the date and place of the negotiations would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The two delegations would then meet and, having the benefit of our discussions, divide into three groups and get down to work. This is how Shultz understood the statement.

Gromyko said that if at the next meeting they reached a degree of mutual understanding that warranted beginning negotiations, they could agree on the date. They could name the month if this suits the Secretary more. If they agree to another meeting, it makes no sense to draw things out.

The Secretary said that Gromyko was in effect changing the Soviet text to read as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed at the next meeting of foreign ministers in early March."

Gromyko replied that it is one thing to begin the negotiations and another thing to mention the date of another ministerial meeting. Either version would be all right with him. One version concerns the next meeting between himself and Secretary Shultz, and the other concerns the date on which negotiations would begin, although a month is not specified.
Perhaps after the next meeting they would be in a position to specify the date and place of the negotiations. Alternatively they could set the date through diplomatic channels. He saw no big problem here, especially with the next ministerial meeting. This should be a simple matter and he asked Shultz to believe him that he had no tricks up his sleeve. He assumed that the most recent Soviet draft is acceptable to the U.S. side. It mentions the negotiations and the date of the next ministerial meeting, though no date is set for the negotiations. To state things more simply, two versions are on the table. Which is more acceptable to the U.S. side?

The Secretary answered that both versions are acceptable in the sense that it is important to get the negotiations underway if we can structure them properly. It is also important for the two of them to continue to talk, not only directly as during these two days, but also in March or whenever. They could be in touch through diplomatic channels in the meantime. The question now was whether to announce the beginning of negotiations or to announce another ministerial meeting. In response to Gromyko's question of which he prefers, he would answer in typical Washington fashion that he prefers both. He wished to point out that for the U.S. the beginning of negotiations involves many complications. The U.S. must decide upon a leader of the delegation. Under the structure posited by the Soviets, who would be the leader of the leaders? The U.S. choice would be affected by what is intended for the negotiations. On the question of intermediate-range forces, Ambassador Nitze, who led similar negotiations in the past, prefers not to continue in this duty, although he had promised to stay on as the Secretary's left or right-hand man [Ambassador Nitze was sitting to the Secretary's left]. So another person must be found to take his place. The U.S. must prepare itself for the negotiations because they are new and embody changes. This cannot be done instantly because a position must be developed in order to be ready for the talks. The Secretary thought that early March might be a little too early. All this must be taken into account if the talks are to begin, and it is best to say so now. This merely emphasizes the importance of further discussions at the ministerial level.

Gromyko said that a clear statement is needed to resolve these questions, yet the Secretary had not yet made such a statement. Does he accept that the date of negotiations will be settled through diplomatic channels? This afternoon the Secretary had remarked that he was puzzled by the Soviet draft. What in it was puzzling?

The Secretary replied that he was perplexed by the second Soviet draft, not the first. He was prepared to take the first draft as a framework and work through it. He was prepared to say that the time and place of negotiations will be agreed by diplomatic channels, although if we can set it ourselves, this would be preferable. He thought a few things in the draft could be changed or added to. At the same time, he thought the statement
could say that he and Gromyko had agreed to another meeting in March.

Gromyko said that Shultz had still not expressed himself clearly. The Soviet draft was drawn up taking account of the U.S. position, and if it is accepted, the question of a ministerial meeting is no longer urgent. The Soviet side had put a reference to another ministerial meeting in the second text because the U.S. had not agreed to their morning text. Reference to the ministerial meeting could be pigeon-holed. Gromyko understood that the Secretary was hesitating between the two texts. In one text the idea is clearly stated that negotiations will begin. If another meeting between them should be necessary, there would be no problem -- they can meet. World public opinion would be favorable to such a meeting. In fact, if such a meeting were announced, the U.S. delegation would probably be met with flags at the airport when it returned home.

The Secretary replied that first we must accomplish this between us and then the world could learn about it. He said he liked the implication in the first text that we have agreed to begin negotiations. While the structure of the Soviet text is acceptable to the U.S., there are a few aspects we wish to change. Although he could not accept the text in its present form, it deserves discussion. At the same time, with or without this text, a further meeting between the ministers would be useful because there is much to discuss, and not only questions related to arms.

Gromyko said he was alarmed by the Secretary's statement that he wished to make some changes.

The Secretary asked if Gromyko really expected him to accept the Soviet text without comment.

Gromyko replied that the text had been drafted after yesterday's meeting, taking into account the remarks Secretary Shultz had made.

The Secretary said that his delegation had also drafted its text taking into account what Gromyko had said both yesterday and during his trip to Washington. They had tried to reflect in its text the views Gromyko had expressed.

Gromyko stated that everything he had said is based on the text the Soviet side had drawn up. He did not know what the Secretary might suggest now; perhaps the Secretary would make him want to hang the whole thing up.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko was interested in discussing this or not. He would assume that he was. He suggested going through the text to determine what could be done to make it acceptable to the U.S.
Gromyko suggested that the two delegations part for a few minutes to review the text.

The Secretary agreed and the U.S. delegation left the room at 5:50 p.m.

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At 6:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

The Secretary explained that the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet text are acceptable as they stand. In the third paragraph the U.S. wishes to drop the reference to strategic and medium-range arms. It proposes a paragraph reading as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Secretary Shultz proposed several additions to the fourth paragraph, which would read as follows: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements by a delegation divided into three negotiating groups, aimed at preventing an arms race on earth and in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." He explained that here he had added a reference to the three groups, and clarified that the arms race meant on earth as well as in space.

Secretary Shultz said that the fifth paragraph of the Soviet draft would remain unchanged, although linguistically speaking, it did not read smoothly. He thought this was not worth arguing over. The final paragraph was acceptable as written. He thought if the sides could agree to fix the time and place of the negotiations, this would be desirable, but he would not insist on it.

Gromyko requested another break in order to examine the proposed U.S. changes.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 6:35 p.m.

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At 7:00 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

Gromyko remarked that some of the suggested changes were acceptable and some were not. The first paragraph was as solid as granite, and the second paragraph was also unchanged. He proposed that the third paragraph read as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and medium-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."
Gromyko also proposed an amended version of the fourth paragraph: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups."

By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the U.S. idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.

The Secretary said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but he would like to caucus once again to look it over.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, Mr. McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).

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The U.S. delegation returned at 7:22 p.m.

The Secretary asked Mr. McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that he could make sure it represented the Soviet view.

Mr. McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text, which states that "the sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms." When referring to space arms, McFarlane inquired, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that attack targets on earth?

Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant, although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM systems.

McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space objects include weapons which attack ballistic missile systems. Do the "corresponding ABM systems" to which Gromyko had referred include those ABM systems covered by the ABM Treaty?
Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems permitted by the ABM Treaty.

McFarlane asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning.

Gromyko answered: "It is exactly as I said -- I cannot add or subtract anything else."

McFarlane said in that case the ABM system around Moscow is a space weapon.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He then made a suggestion for the third paragraph that would stress this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a clarifying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of the paragraph would read as it stands.

Gromyko objected to this, saying that this would lead them into a jungle. Why mention targeting and why complicate the issue? What is unclear about this sentence? Why complicate an already clear sentence?

The Secretary wished to clarify another point. This paragraph also contains a reference to medium-range arms. As he understood it, the Soviet draft would say "medium-range arms" and the U.S. draft would say "intermediate-range arms."

Gromyko confirmed this, saying it was fine with him. Both the U.S. and Soviet sides are accustomed to certain specific parameters agreed on long ago. These parameters define those arms that are considered strategic, as well as where tactical arms end and medium-range arms begin. Everything here is mathematically precise.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. would say "intermediate-range" and the Soviet side would say "medium-range." He had one more point to bring up. The U.S. side suggests that the fourth paragraph of the text be amended to read "agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth by limiting and reducing nuclear arms." The word "by" is the change suggested here.

Gromyko objected that this would worsen the paragraph and change its meaning. Neither side needed this change.

The Secretary replied that it was not a big point, but it did explain how the sides would end the arms race -- by limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

Gromyko again objected that this was a worse solution, and Secretary Shultz agreed to drop it. Although he believed his wording made the point more powerful, he would agree to leave the paragraph as it stands.
Gromyko wondered if the Secretary had found any other "heresy" in the Soviet draft.

The Secretary replied that he had found no heresy he was willing to disclose to Gromyko. He would now have a clean copy of the text typed up in English.

While the text was being typed, there was discussion of the time the joint statement would be released.

Gromyko asked that it be released at midnight Geneva time because of the time difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The announcement would not get into Soviet media until tomorrow, but it would make the news in the U.S. today. Gromyko said that Shultz would have something to announce even if he did not read the statement -- he could announce that a statement had been agreed upon.

Secretary Shultz said that he would appear at a press conference this evening, and that he would be too sleepy to answer questions if he waited until midnight. He thought even 10:00 P.M. was late. It is possible to embargo the announcement, but on such a big story he doubted the embargo would be observed.

Gromyko pressed Shultz repeatedly not to make the announcement before midnight.

Secretary Shultz suggested a compromise of 11 P.M. Gromyko accepted, saying that the U.S. side wants the Soviet side to meet it more than half way. Shultz replied that Gromyko drives a very hard bargain.

When the clean copy of the joint statement arrived, the Secretary gave it to Gromyko.

Before departing, Gromyko expressed his satisfaction with the frank and business-like atmosphere that had prevailed at these discussions.

Secretary Shultz, in his turn, thanked Gromyko for his kind words and said he appreciated the cordial discussions that had taken place. Gromyko had used the word "useful" in earlier remarks, and Shultz thought this word could be applied here too.

The meeting ended at 7:55 P.M.

Drafted by: Carolyn Smith; J.F. Matlock
Monday, March 4 [1985]

Our 33rd Anniversary. Other than that it was another Monday morning. Why to they always seem different than other days? Met with the new Sec. Gen. of OECD – Jean-Claude Paye. It was a brief but pleasant meeting. He is all for urging European members of OECD to take steps to free up their economics, etc. so as to catch up with our ec. recovery.

We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talks Leaders looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It’s a very complicated business. I urged one decision on them – that we open talks with a concession – surprise! Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told our people to open by saying we would accept their goal.

Nancy came to the oval office for lunch & we cut anniversary cake & had a few of the immediate staff share in it. That was the extent of our celebration except that at dinner we opened a bottle of Chateau Margeaux 1911.

Right after lunch I addressed the N.A.C.O. – Nat. Assn. of County Officials. I wasn’t sure how I’d be received since they’ve taken positions opposing some of our budget cuts & that was what I talked to them about. But they were very cordial.

Fred Fielding, Don Regan & Mike D. came in to see me about the Arabian Horses that Kind Fahd wanted to give me. I had stated I couldn’t accept them as a gift – due to our stupid regulations. As it stands they are now in Prince Bandar’s (Ambas.) name & he has asked Bill Clark to take care of them for him. Now what happens 4 yrs. from now is anyone’s guess.

Had Sens. Dave Boren & Sam Nunn over for cocktails & to talk about the MX. I believe we’ll have their support. In fact they talked of how wrong it was for Congress to interfere with a President in Foreign affairs & how both parties must come together at the water’s edge.
Emargoed for Release

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Until 5.00pm in New York
11.00pm in Bonn

Wednesday, April 24, 1985

[Handwritten text]

Address by Willy Brandt
before the Council on Foreign Relations
New York, April 24, 1985

Remarks on East-West Relations

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First of all let me express my pleasure and
grateful for this opportunity to speak to you about
East-West relations. This is an issue of great
concern, to us in Europe perhaps even more than to
you here. Therefore, I would like to share some
observations and to discuss some prospects as I see
them today.

Let us begin by considering some basic facts:

- Europe, East and West, has the highest
concentration of nuclear arms and is most likely to
be wiped out in any nuclear conflict between the
superpowers.

- Because of its special situation Europe is
most advanced in thinking about the new concept of Common Security which is based on the fact that today we have only one alternative: to survive together with our adversaries or not to survive at all.

- As seen from Europe both superpowers appear to have lost touch with reality, and especially with regard to their bilateral relations (this is the result of insufficient contacts at all levels).

- To us Europeans recent US statements on foreign policy - regarding relations with the other superpower as much as those with the Third World or with other countries - have been frightening and ill-conceived at best.

- Europe in several important instances has not been treated as a partner but as a recipient of instructions - the new space defense initiative or Star Wars project being only the last and most prominent case.

As a result there is deep concern in Europe generally, despite the pronouncements of our governments. There is a tremendous danger that a failure to achieve at least some positive results at the new superpower talks in Geneva would erode the coherence of NATO and actually create a crisis within the Organization.
To me it seems one must consider at least the following elements if one wants to understand the present situation. Such understanding alone can lead to a realistic and sensible policy approach.

There is a great deal of doubt regarding US policy statements. One reason is the fact that in too many cases statements seem to have the sole purpose of gaining points or votes in the internal US debate or in Congress.

The primitive monocausal explanation for various kinds of conflicts in various parts of the world and the rude talks about the protection of US interests — still largely unspecified — appear as an unacceptable combination of arrogance and ignorance as someone in the US put it some time ago.

One notes three false premises: (1) that the US tried arms control but was deceived by the USSR; (2) that unilateral defense efforts must be the strategy for the 1980s with arms control of only some help; and (3) that because of its different interests the USSR will accept equitable agreements on arms control only under pressure.

In my view these assumptions are wrong and highly dangerous indeed. In fact I am reminded of the early 1960s when comparable misconceptions brought the world to the brink of war.
And I only hope that we need not go through a similar crisis before we can restore at least some commitment to cooperation and to crisis management before it may be too late. This can be achieved through joint action only, merely talking about it is not enough. And it should be considered not only with respect to the relationship between the superpowers and their specific conflict but also with respect to the management of other conflicts elsewhere in which they are involved in some way or another.

I have reason to believe that in Moscow the leadership is seriously concerned with the possibility of nuclear war. There is mistrust regarding US intentions but they are ready, I believe, to go a long way in limiting nuclear arms, to avoid an arms race in space, to limit and probably reduce the number of missiles deployed in Europe - all this in the right overall setting and provided there are acceptable tradeoffs.

Nobody should take this to mean that the basic superpower conflict would not continue. But this conflict could again be kept within bounds. This requires both firmness and cooperation.

The basic threat we face today is the possibility that a great opportunity will again be lost: to stop the development of new weapons rather than to
negotiate limitations in numbers.

The danger arises from the fact that both superpowers seem to suffer from the same hallucination, although not at the same time or to the same degree at all times; their image of each other is rather similar - they see the world divided into good and evil and the other superpower as ideological, hegemonic, and militaristic.

The threat to peace or rather the danger of a nuclear war resulting from the accelerating nuclear arms race prompted the national leaders of six countries (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) to announce a new effort to halt the arms race and move towards disarmament. Last May they called for a complete stop in the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles and committed themselves to "do everything in our power to facilitate agreement among the nuclear weapon states". This initiative offers for the first time the possibility of an effective third party acting at the highest level to break the nuclear deadlock. The initiative which I have fully supported from its inception has won wide support from parliamentarians in many countries and from the public in general.

The initiative recognizes the primary responsibility of the superpowers for the prevention of a global desaster. But it makes it clear that
"this problem is too important to be left to those states alone" which control the weapons.

The six leaders met again this January in New Delhi and said that traditional doctrines of war had become obsolete in the nuclear world. Human beings in today's world have lost ultimate control over their own life and death: "For all of us it is a small group of men and machines in cities far away who can decide our fate." And there is general agreement now that even a limited nuclear war would trigger an arctic nuclear winter which may transform the earth into a darkened frozen planet posing unprecedented peril to all nations, even those far removed from the actual nuclear explosions.

Public discussion of the nuclear threat must continue, it must be broadened. The support and encouragement of an informed public is needed to strengthen governmental action throughout the world. It is the only way towards ending the arms race.

I am with those who have suggested that possession of nuclear weapons must be seen as a crime - as in the case of biological and chemical weapons. Nuclear powers will come to be seen as nuclear criminals, worthy of universal contempt - as someone recently put it - once people all over the world come to regard the issue in this light.

Unfortunately, the possibility of nuclear war and
of a military clash resulting from the East-West conflict may not even be the most threatening danger to the survival of mankind. Rather it seems — if we consider today's situation in a longer historical perspective — that in pursuing the East-West conflict people are in fact fighting a battle of the past. I am not saying that this is not dangerous. On the contrary, in pursuing this course the antagonists may well spend all their strength which they should use to solve the even more dangerous North-South conflict. For it is the latter which constitutes the real danger — and a danger which is much more profound.

Now obviously the two areas of conflict are interrelated in various ways. It is obvious, for example, that whatever we spend out of our limited resources we can only spend once. And what goes for military uses is to a very large extent unproductive and wasted in terms of useful investment. In this sense there is an obvious alternative and we have a choice between investing for the future of mankind or wasting our resources in the interest of an outdated concept of security. And while in this regard making the wrong choice is bad enough if it occurs at a low level of expenditures it becomes highly dangerous and a threat to the economic well-being of even the most powerful nations if it occurs at today's pace and level of expenses.

On many occasions I have mentioned the fact that
this year the world will spend more than one trillion - indeed: 1,000 billion US dollars - on military purposes. But I still find it very difficult to get a clear idea of this magnitude. What is worse is this: I am afraid that most people, including a large number of decision makers, not only find that magnitude beyond comprehension but they also have very little understanding of the reasoning of those who call for these enormous outlays for so-called security.

As a European and as someone who has seen far too many short-sighted decisions leading to grave consequences and even the destruction of my own nation and country I cannot but compare the present madness with some earlier misinterpretations of historic situations. European powers - the so-called Great Powers of the day - fought World War I in the belief that it would decide who was going to rule the world. At the end of the war they were no longer all that great, and they had certainly failed to see that two other powers had for some time been on the sidelines waiting for their time to come. Farsighted observers in fact had predicted those developments in considerable detail. World War II ended with the confirmation of the superpowers' role. But where are we headed now? Could it be that the pattern persists and that they will waste their energies, weaken themselves, and eventually - with or without a military clash - become so weak that another power can take over? Possibly only after some prolonged
period of decay, or new dark ages?
4. September 1985

Sehr geehrter Herr Gorbatschow,


Wenn man weitergehen wollte oder könnte, bleibt das offene Problem, nicht nur die Tests von Sprengsätzen, sondern die Tests neuer atomarer Raketenysteme beiderseits zu beenden.

Unter Umständen wäre auch interessant, an die Dreier-Verhandlungen anzuknüpfen, die 1980 in Genf gescheitert sind:
dort war man nahe an der Einigung über die Zahl der mechanischen automatischen Kontrollmöglichkeiten (black boxes): ob dies fünf oder zehn oder fünfzehn sein müssen, erscheint mir angesichts der politischen Bedeutung der Sache kein Punkt, an dem eine Einigung scheitern dürfte, gerade angesichts der Bedeutung der Sache und angesichts der Reichweite der Intentionen, wie Sie sie in dem Brief dargelegt haben.

Bei Ihrem Gespräch in Paris werden Sie zum Punkt des Moratoriums keine Veränderung der französischen Position feststellen, die freie Hand behalten will, solange es keine Einigung unter den beiden Weltmächten gibt.


Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

ges. Willy Brandt

Seiner Excellenz
dem Generalsekretär des
Zentralkomitees der KPDUSV
Herrn Michail Gorbatchew

Moskau / UdSSR
Friday, September 27 [1985]

Woke up to a surprise – the twin doors that open into the living room from the bedroom were wide open (and they open in). Apparently when “Gloria” blew through Wash. before dawn it did that.

A brief meeting with P.M. Gonzalez of Spain then into a jam session on upcoming Shevardnadze meeting. He arrived at 10 A.M. – a 2 hr. meeting, then I had 10 min’s alone with him & then lunch (St. Dining Room) until 1:30. He’s a personable fellow but we had our differences. My goal was to send him back to Gorbachev with a message that I really meant “arms reductions” & I wasn’t interested in any détente nonsense. For the 1st time they talked of real verification procedures.

After lunch George S., Bud & I met preparing now for King Hussein’s visit Monday.

Afternoon, hurricane Gloria blew away, the sky is blue, the sun is shining & Nancy will be home at 6:40. That’s the answer to a prayer & I mean it. Gloria shifted course a little & the threatened disaster melted away. There was some coastal damage but no deaths, few if any injuries & all’s well with the world.
Mr. Brandt. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Markey. Proceed, Chancellor.

STATEMENT OF WILLY BRANDT,
FORMER CHANCELLOR OF WEST GERMANY

Mr. Brandt. Yes. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of Congress, thank you so much for your kind words of welcome. I feel very, very honored by your invitation to testify before this Committee and I am glad to be with you today.

With your permission I would like to begin with some rather personal remarks. In my various positions mentioned by the Chairman -- as mayor of Berlin during some of the city's most trying years, as foreign minister, as chancellor -- and ever since I felt at home whenever coming to the United States and to this capitol city of Washington. As a matter of fact, I had the honor of working with four American presidents, two Republicans and two Democrats, and thus I had many opportunities of experiencing American solidarity and friendship and reliability.

This positive is too easily forgotten. For instance, that the so-called Ostpolitik and the improvement of relations with our eastern neighbors, including the other state on German soil, would not have been possible without close cooperation with and the reliable support from the United States. The bonds of common postwar experience should certainly be strong enough to endure any temporary difference of opinion on some issue or another and let me add the Social Democratic Party of Germany which I have
now been sharing for 19 years and they want me to go on for a while. That party is not an opponent to but a supporter of the western alliance even if we take the liberty to explain our own interests within the alliance.

In the recent poll 90 percent of our people in West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, supported NATO and our alliance with the United States. Ninety percent. But at the same time 65 percent express serious doubts and worries about or even opposed to the new missiles. Thus both positions are not mutually exclusive. Our people really are in favor of and not against close and friendly and reliable relations with the United States even if we do not applaud all of the statements made by various branches of a given administration and in all confidence, Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that we quarrel as much in Bonn as you do in Washington.

May I also add that under my party's responsibility our defense, including the drafts, has not been weakened but strengthened and I am telling my own fellow countrymen that it would be utterly unfair to put upon the shoulders of our soldiers what we think rightly or wrongly should be decided in the fields of defense political strategy.

Now today I am here to testify on the ongoing negotiations concerning the future of Europe and of my own country. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of crucial importance to us. In Europe, East and West confront
each other at arms length -- they are not separated by mountains, deserts or oceans, there is just a fence of ugly walls and barbed wire.

And it is such a tiny area, although densely populated. One tends to forget that my own country is just the size of Oregon but it has almost 60 million inhabitants. And on both sides of the demarcation line one finds a higher concentration of nuclear warheads than anywhere else on this globe. Now I think nobody in Europe wants a new arms race and this certainly is not a party issue.

But on behalf of my political friends perhaps I state with more emphasis than others that we do not want the existing situation to become more tense, we do not want that one simply capitulates in the face of the driving forces of the arms race. It must be possible, we believe, that political leaders gain control of this course of events.

And I sincerely hope they will succeed by the end of this year. If they do not manage to do so, they should continue to negotiate for a second time around rather than to enter into an operation which certainly will be followed by another round of Eastern deployment. One does not have to deploy new missiles simply because deadlines and schedules had been fixed four years ago under assumptions which at least partially turned out to be dubious.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that political rationality must not
fail victim to fixed schedules, and obviously it would be rational to postpone deployment if it turned out that there has just not been enough time for serious negotiations. But I am the first to admit, of course, that political will is even more important than the timetable.

It is true to say that an agreement in Geneva to a certain degree is being blocked by the existence of British and French nuclear weapons, which of course belong to the West and not to the moon. If this is so, that this is an obstacle, then there are only two ways of reaching a solution: either one abolishes them, which I am not proposing -- but for this there are no prospects at present -- or one finds ways of ensuring that they do not pose an obstacle for agreements between the US and the USSR.

Merging the two sets of negotiations, INF and START -- as proposed in the Freeze Resolution passed by the House of Representatives -- or at least coordinating them effectively appeals to me as utterly plausible. And I think this might also be acceptable to our French and British friends. German Social Democrats in general agree with this proposal of merging or effectively coordinating the two tables for the following reasons:

-- merging or effectively coordinating INF and START can avoid a situation where limitations in one area are blocked or bypassed by adding new arms in the other area;

-- merging negotiations might allow to deal with mutual threats within one general context and the necessary consideration
of the nuclear systems of third states would be facilitated;

-- merging INF and START also would accord with the substantive content of NATO's dual-track decision, and I argue on the basis of that dual-track decision, namely that negotiations on medium-range systems should take place, and I quote, "within the framework of SALT III." That was part of that dual-track decision.

Now I have heard people say, even before my stay here in the United States the last few days, that we in Germany had asked for the missiles in the first place and that our present Chancellor still very much wants them and that we must not forget the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20s.

Let me take the last point first: The Soviet buildup of SS-20s certainly must be brought down. And my reading of recent published and unpublished Soviet statements is that they admit having gone far beyond what is reasonable and acceptable. I have told them, but I am not sure they listen to what I am telling them -- I have told them that it would be not only reasonable, but even wise, if they made a beginning exercise of unilateral reduction.

My own experience tells me, sir, that when dealing with Soviet leaders -- who by the way have human reactions, too -- you need firmness combined with readiness to cooperate and respect for the prestige of that other superpower. In my judgment these points of orientation were already observed by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy over 20 years ago.

As far as my present Chancellor is concerned, I am not
entitled to speak on his behalf but I believe one should not
exaggerate his enthusiasm. Apart from that it is correct to say
we German Social Democrats supported the dual-track decision in
1979. I gave my personal support because I supported Chancellor
Schmidt and because we saw it, the two of us and others, as a
chance of getting the arms race in Europe under control.
Immediately before we took our decision the governments of
the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded SALT II, the
agreement to limit intercontinental nuclear weapons. Our support
for the dual-track decision was also to prevent the SALT II
agreement from being undercut by an arms buildup in the medium
and short range weapons sector. That was Helmut Schmidt's worry;
that was my worry, too. In addition to this we supported the NATO
decision because it allowed time for negotiations. We thought our
side, the Western side, should not immediately react with armament
measures.

At that time it was impossible, Mr. Chairman, to foresee that
opportunities were going to be lost and that precious time would
be wasted, not for the development of missiles but for negotiations.
For us in the SPD, the German Social Democratic Republic, the
dual-track decision was also acceptable because we could attribute
it to the work and influence of our Federal Chancellor and our
responsible Ministers that NATO agreed on the following principles,
and I refer to the Brussels communique of December 12, 1979.

-- The decision was intended, and I quote, "to promote the
process of detente:

— The decision stipulated that arms control was, and I quote, "to promote stability in Europe," namely, and I quote again, "on the basis of what had been achieved through SALT II" and the quote goes on, "within the framework of SALT III."

— The decision did not involve an isolated regional balance since this harbored the danger of a decoupling from the United States and her central strategic deterrence. At the center really was the limitation of the additional threat from the Soviet SS-20s which had been increasing since 1976.

Let me add this point. When we adopted and supported the dual-track decision, Western Europe had already lived for more than 20 years in the shadow of about 600 Soviet nuclear warheads mounted on Soviet medium-range missiles. NATO had until then not deemed it necessary and meaningful to counter this with additional arms in this specific area. The dual-track decision only concerned the increase on the Soviet side, the number of additional warheads which had been, and were still being, mounted on the SS-20s.

In formulating their resolutions the German Social Democrats, sir, took this objective of the dual-track decision very seriously and we clearly defined as the aim of negotiations that the USSR must reverse the threatening buildup since 1976 in order to render superfluous the deployment of additional American systems in Western Europe. That was our zero option in 1979 to which we had committed ourselves and that has remained our zero option ever
ever since. In other words, we have not changed our position concerning the above-mentioned components of the dual-track decision.

Our doubts and worries result from our understanding of that dual-track decision of NATO. Therefore, our present discussion about the dual-track decision -- almost as serious as your quarrels in certain areas of security -- have a different origin. We had to realize that there has occurred a complete change in the political environment and in conditions and assumptions on which our original decision had been based.

If I may, I will give you four points.

1. Instead of a ratified SALT II Treaty and envisaged follow-up agreement, we have a continuation of the arms race at every conceivable level.

2. Our American friends found it necessary to opt for the complete modernization of their strategic weapons.

3. The production of neutron weapons has been resumed, which many of us in Europe noted with concern.

4. Now even the production of binary chemical weapons has been decided.

Similar efforts are noticeable on the Soviet side, and nobody should try to give me lessons about Russian stubbornness and the highly over-developed Soviet security complex.

Now, on our side, arms control, worries about stability and the willingness to make every effort to achieve successful results
in negotiations -- all this does not harmonize with the public announcement of doctrines based on the option of a "limited" or "protracted" nuclear war.

In an atmosphere of confrontation it is very difficult, in my view, to conclude any agreement on detente in the military field.

It was recently mentioned in the papers that I had had reservations from the very beginning regarding our support for NATO's dual-track decision but, as I said, that did not prevent me from supporting my successor in the chancellorship. But I am afraid that events vindicated my feeling of scepticism.

The dual-track decision was based on the assumption that for the following four years East-West relations would remain almost the same as they were in 1979. Today it is becoming more and more apparent how profoundly international conditions have changed. However attractive the dual-track decision appeared in 1979 as a "timetable for arms control," it has in fact been impossible to anticipate the change which happened since. For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I rather favor delaying the development of the missiles if no agreement becomes possible by the end of the year -- not unlimited but since one lost two years because one started late, to add a year to it might not be so bad.

I really believe that part of what President Reagan said at the UN earlier this week -- and you, Mr. Chairman, just referred to it -- also speaks in favor of flexible time limits because if
you include forward based systems, as the President mentioned, and if you include especially planes -- and I think this is a constructive approach -- then you face new problems of verification which probably cannot be settled within the next few weeks to come but I still would very much prefer, of course, if a bilateral agreement could be reached during the weeks ahead of us.

The armament part of the dual-track decision was to achieve two things: first, to bring the Soviets to the negotiating table; and second, to exert pressure and create an incentive for them to reach a positive result at the negotiations. To a certain degree this has worked, and you often forget it. The Soviet Union after of course hesitating did agree to negotiations and has later moved away from some of its starting positions.

The Soviets even went as far as making an offer to scrap a significant number of their SS-20s. In other words, the pressure so far has led to results. Recently the Soviets even declared to be as ready for a total freeze as for reductions and destroying of their SS-20s. So far as I am informed, Mr. Chairman, this was not offered in Geneva but in any case by statements vis-a-vis European partners, and not just in oral statements.

We should try, I believe, to force the Soviets to stick to the proposals they made. Reflecting this context I have personally made a proposal which could take into consideration both Soviet reductions and a halt of the nuclear arms race and it could take into account certain verification problems.
In the written version of my statement, sir, I include ideas about a phase freeze and I first mentioned it the day before yesterday when I had a pleasant stay in Ohio and at a college there with a large crowd of people interested in both North-South and East-West. I leave it out here.

I just want to add the important issue now is to concentrate on the outcome of the negotiations. At the same time, we should realize two things: we cannot have all of our proposals and projects fulfilled, and we must remain willing to compromise.

And let me, if I am allowed to do so, go on about any hopes of expecting the Soviet Union to be prepared to make more far-reaching concessions once deployment will have started. I believe this to be an illusion, and I base this judgment, sir, on my experience since 1949. It is in the weeks ahead, or months, we have time enough to change the timetable, but it is in the time ahead before new missiles are developed that there might exist a chance for reaching a satisfactory outcome.

There is another point. Highly accurate American missiles which only take a few minutes, as mentioned by the Chairman, to reach the Soviet Union, deployed on the territory of a country which invaded Russia twice this century with terrible effects, may perhaps have a great trauma for the Soviet Union as Soviet medium-range missiles on Cuba were for the United States, and this might be taken into account.

Thus, there are also dangers which might result, as just
mentioned, from individuals getting out of control or from failure of the computer system. If following a Pershing II deployment the Russians decided to put their missiles into a "launch-on-warning-position," this could introduce another factor of extreme uncertainty. This way out would obviously not be to provide the Soviets with more advanced American computers but I happen to believe that theirs are not as effective, not as advanced, as the American computers are.

May I add that in my country we shared the feelings of alarm and dismay when the Korean plane was shot down and we feel close to all those who lost their relatives. And I would like to add nothing is an excuse, nothing of what I have said is an excuse for the action taken by the Russian responsible military in that connection.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that nothing in my opinion is gained for the alliance if we deploy some additional missiles and perhaps lose the support of the hearts and minds of millions of people concerned. This support is also a factor of strength and security.

Nothing is gained, I believe, if we in a hurry cement the dividing line between East and West in Europe instead of making an uttermost attempt to promote cooperation wherever possible. It is easy to applaud dissidents, Mr. Chairman. It is also easy to make the Iron Curtain a new and terrible and long-lasting reality.
It may be interesting to note that both German states, in spite of all their deep-rooted controversies which cannot be reconciled -- that both German states have adopted a similar view on the question of avoiding a new arms race on German soil in this case, first on their side, then on ours. I mean if deployment has started, them first on their side, then again on ours and then on theirs again. The noticeable improvement in relations between the two Germanies in recent months is clear evidence of this common interest in survival.

As different as the political and social systems are in the two German states, they share that common interest in survival. We do not approve of their political and social system, in fact we reject it, and I spoke for this during the years in Berlin, but our future is tied to theirs -- only together can we survive.

And much beyond the interests of my own people I propose we should pay attention to the objective mutual interest in common survival. And without neglecting those important issues of Western security, in my opinion we should pay great attention to the obvious interdependence between armament and development and, as a matter of fact, even armament and the world economic crisis.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chancellor.

I can assure you that it is readily apparent to all of us who have been listening to you how you were able to gain election as Chancellor and also win the Nobel Peace Prize. You are a very
Friday, October 18 [1985]

A huddle on the speech to the U.N. next week. Some wanted it more harsh toward the Soviets than I think it should be. I won. NSC meeting – wide disagreement on whether to make a new presentation on the M.B.F.R. talks in Vienna. They’ve been going on for 10 yrs. Kohl & Thatcher want a new proposal – D.O.D. opposes. I’m inclined to go with K & T. For one thing they hang their proposal on a strict, intrusive verification procedure. If the USSR doesn’t agree – no reduction in forces. If they do agree it will be the 1st time ever.

The Egyptian Ambas. came by with a lengthy letter from Mubarak. Pres. M. is pleading for understanding but still charging us with humiliating him, etc. The Ambas. almost in a whisper said – “put yourself in our place.” I said “that should be mutual.”
Saturday, November 2-Sunday, November 3 [1985]

A good ride under gray & threatening skies. Nancy didn’t go, her cold is still hanging on. Our defector in Kabul can’t make up his mind. He’s 19 yrs. old. The Soviet Ambas. visited him in our embassy & gave him a fatherly pitch as to how he could go back to Russia – no punishment etc. Now the lad wants to see him again. That will take place about 11 P.M. Sunday our time. We in turn have offered him asylum here in the U.S. (on my orders).

Over the weekend I called Nixon & Ford to get any suggestions they might have on the Summit. Dick had a h--l of a good idea on the arms negotiations. We probably won’t have them settled by the time the Summit ends. His suggestion is that we state what we have agreed on, that we will continue negotiating on the other points & as a token of our resolve to achieve results we each take 1000 missiles out of the silos & store them for a set time. If we can’t come to a reduction agreement we put them back in the silos. Back to the W.H.
Tuesday, November 5 [1985]

N.S.C. meeting was a movie. We saw a demonstration of our new Bomber, one of the greatest advances in aircraft in years & years. It is of course most hush hush – I should call it what it is – a fighter bomber.

Geo. S. called from Moscow on scramble phone – 7 more hours of talks – 4 of them with Gorbachev. Apparently not much progress. Gorbachev is adamant we must cave in our S.D.I. – well this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an unmovable object. Met with Edmund Morris who is going to do my official biography. I’m pleased – his book on Teddy Roosevelt was wonderful. Of course I can’t charge up San Juan Hill. Had an Ec. briefing – our recovery is continuing – or by now I should say our expansion & growth is progressing at a slow but steady rate & on employment we’re doing extremely well. A higher percentage of the potential work force (all between 16 & 65) is employed than ever in our history.
Wednesday, November 6 [1985]

Briefing not the way to start the day – what with news of the games Cong. is playing with regard to the debt ceiling, deficit & tax reform. And yes that goes for Repubs. as well as Dems.

Then George S. & Bud came upstairs with Don R. & George B. to report on their Gorbachev meeting. It seems Mr. G. is filled with a lot of false info about the U.S. and believes it all. For example, Americans hate the Russians because our arms manufacturers stir them up with propaganda so they can keep selling us weapons.

Nancy & Maureen arrived.
Part Four:
International Diplomacy

1986
29. Januar 1986

Sehr geehrter Herr Gorbatschow,

zunächst möchte ich Ihnen für den Brief danken, mit dem Sie mir einige zusätzliche Erwägungen Ihres weitreichenden Abrüstungsvorschlags mitgeteilt haben, und auch für die weiteren Erläuterungen, die wir, nicht zuletzt in den Gesprächen mit Botschafter Kwizinski, bekamen.

Sie kennen die prinzipiellen Erklärungen von SPD und Bundestagsfraktion dazu; wir sind in der Tat der Auffassung, dass es kühner Vorschläge und kühner Entschlüsse bedarf, um die Rüstungsentwicklung zu beherrschen, sie anzualten und zur Abrüstung zu kommen. Ich möchte auch ausdrücklich unterstreichen, dass ich in Ihren Vorschlägen Wege sehe, die Situation in Europa zu erleichtern, und weiss aus dem Gedankenaustausch der Vergangenheit, dass diese Entschlüsse sicher nicht einfach waren. Ich halte sie für richtig, historisch notwendig und glaube, dass sie sich als fruchtbar erweisen werden, auch falls sie nicht von heute auf morgen zu verwirklichen sind.

Gestatten Sie mir einige Erwägungen in diesem Zusammenhang. Ich halte es weder für politisch noch für militärisch logisch, dass die taktisch operativen Mittel, die die Sowjetunion als Gegenmassnahme zur Stationierung der Pershing II und Cruise Missiles in der DDR und in der
CSSR stationiert haben, nicht wieder abgezogen werden sollen, wenn ihre Begründung entfällt, also Pershing und Cruise Missiles entfernt würden. Sie für die Behandlung in der zweiten von Ihnen vorgesehenen Stufe zu reservieren, ist gewissermassen technisch/bürokratisch plausibel, weil sie weniger als 1.000 km reichen, entspricht aber nicht der politischen eurostrategischen Komplexität.


In dem Masse, in dem nukleare Waffen an Bedeutung verlieren, wächst natürlich die Bedeutung der konventionellen. Wir sind dahin informiert worden, dass dies der sowjetischen Seite bewusst sei; sie habe ihren Vorschlag nicht überladen wollen, sei aber für Anregungen und Überlegungen offen, wie dieses schrecklich komplizierte Thema behandelt werden könne. Es ist ohne Zweifel für Westeuropa von hohem Interesse, da der Überwiegende Teil nicht nur der öffentlichen Meinung, sondern auch der Bevölkerung davon ausgeht, dass die Streitkräfte des Warschauer Vertrages konventionell beträchtlich Überlegen sind. Die prinzipiellen Kriterien der gemeinsamen Sicherheit, die ihren Vorschlag zur Beendigung der nuklearen Rüstung auszeichnen und die wir voll teilen, müssen natürlich auch auf den konventionellen Sektor angewendet werden. Hier


Ich habe mich als Präsident der Sozialistischen Internationale an die Vize-Präsidenten gewendet und sie um Ihre Anregungen gebeten.

Es müssen alle Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um das Wettrüsten im All zu verhindern und auf der Erde zu beginnen. Wir werden unseren Beitrag im Rahmen unserer Möglichkeiten und Kontakte auch mit den Schwesterparteien Westeuropas nutzen.

Mit den besten Wünschen

gez. Willy Brandt

An den
Generalsekretär des
ZK der KPdSU
S.E.
Herrn Michail Gorbatschow
Moskau / UdSSR
Monday, February 3 [1986]

Staff meeting & NSC as usual. This time I had an issue I wanted looked into. Last nite on “60 min’s.” they had a segment on homeless welfare recipients in N.Y. being put up in hotels. In one case a women & three children in a 10 x 12 room for which the govt. was paying $2000 a month. They were blaming it on the Federal govt. I thought I knew the answer but wanted it checked out. I was right – that was a practice of N.Y. City not us. Another question had to do with Scharansky. We have a deal to get him out of Russia. Last nite & this morning it was all over the news. I feared the publicity might queer the deal. Turns out the leak was from Moscow.

Then it was N.S.P.G. time in the situation room re Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate nuclear arms. Some wanted to tag it a publicity stunt. I said no. Let’s say we share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this will be revealed by them. I also propose that we announce we are going forward with SDI but if research reveals a defense against missiles is possible we’ll work out how it can be used to protect the whole world not just us.
Sehr geehrter Herr Generalsekretär,


Sie werden gehört haben, daß wir begrüßt hätten, wenn Ihre wichtige Fernsehansprache früher stattgefunden hätte. Um so wichtiger wird es, eine Art europäische Konvention der atomaren Sicherheit zu entwickeln und zu beschließen, die im Interesse der gemeinsamen Sicherheit allen Beteiligten gleiche Verpflichtungen auferlegt, was Information, Vorsorge und Kontrollen angeht. Man wird danach die Frage um so dringlicher aufwerfen, warum entsprechendes zur Beherrschung der atomaren Waffen nicht möglich sein soll.

Johannes Rau wird Sie über unsere Vorstellungen informieren, auch darüber, daß die SPD die Alternativen untersucht, wie und in welcher Zeit für die Bundesrepublik Atomenergie entbehrlich werden kann.
Ohne in diesem Augenblick zu wissen, welche Vorschläge Sie in Budapest machen werden, möchte ich die Argumente unterstreichen, die Ihnen Egon Bahr unterbreitete, um zu belegen, daß eine konventionelle Komponente unentbehrlich ist, wenn man einen atomwaffenfreien Korridor verwirklichen will. Ich kann verstehen, daß die Repräsentanten der SED zurückhaltend sind, solange Ihre Budapester Vorschläge noch nicht vorliegen. Für die Diskussion hier wie für die europäische Diskussion wäre es sehr wichtig, wenn eine Verständigung über Grundsätze für einen derartigen Korridor erreichbar wäre.

Sie haben sicher verfolgt, in welcher dramatischer Weise sich die öffentliche Meinung in Fragen der Sicherheit zwischen den USA und Europa, noch genauer zwischen den USA und allen seiner Verbündeten, auseinanderentwickelt. Das kann nicht gut sein. Dagegen etwas zu tun, ist im wesentlichen Sache der europäischen NATO-Partner.

Allein in den letzten drei Wochen ist die erreichte Einigung in Bern aus Washington verhindert worden, wurde angekündigt, das Genfer Zusatzprotokoll zur Rot-Kreuz-Konvention gegen verschwenderlose Kriegsführung nicht zu ratifizieren und sich nicht länger an die SALT-Barriere zu halten. Das ist eine ganze Menge.


Trotz dieser gesamten Entwicklung bleibt es meiner Auffassung nach richtig, die Politik weiter zu verfolgen, nach der die Sowjetunion sich bereit zeigt, militäri-
scher Druck auf Europa erkennbar und überprüfbar zu reduzieren. Dieses Element würde eine große Rolle spielen können, wenn die westliche Diskussion über eine Reform des Bündnisses weitergeht, die in Amerika und in Europa begonnen hat. Noch ist es nicht so weit, daß die Bündnisse als Faktor der Stabilität entbehrlich werden.

Obwohl es ein starkes Argument ist, daß ein Gipfel konkrete Ergebnisse haben muß, erscheint es aus heutiger Sicht denkbar, daß ein Zusammentreffen zwischen Ihnen und Präsident Reagan noch in diesem Jahr die wirksamste Möglichkeit sein könnte, SALT zu erhalten oder durch entsprechende Rahmenvereinbarungen zu ersetzen.

Mit guten Wünschen für Ihre Arbeit und freundlichen Grüßen

An den
Generalsekretär der KPdSU
Herrn Michail S. Gorbatschow

Moskau

Kopie
zu Johannes Rau
UNITED STATES PROGRAM

August 3 - August 23, 1986

Mr. Anthony BLAIR
Member of Parliament
United Kingdom

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ON BEHALF OF

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UNITED STATES
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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 31

ACTION OFFICE
INFO
R 05:4852 JUL 85
FM AMBASSADOR LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC 9025
BT
UNCLAS LONDON 15366
USIA

FOR: E/VGE - BELL AND SMITH; INFO EU ZAVIS
E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: FY-86 IV NOMINATION - BLAIR, ANTHONY MP

REF: LONDON 14407

1. BELOW IS PART I OF BIODATA FOR SUBJECT FY-86 IV.

2. NAME.

3. SEX: MALE

4. (DOB): MAY 6, 1953

5. NATIONALITY: BRITISH

6. PRESENT POSITION: DEPUTY SPOKESMAN FOR TREASURY AFFAIRS

7. PREVIOUS POSITIONS: BARRISTERS, SPECIALIZING IN TRADE UNION LAW. FIRST WON ELECTION TO PARLIAMENT JUNE '83 FOR SEDGEFIELD

8. SPOKEN LANGUAGES: ENGLISH

9. PREVIOUS U.S. TRAVEL: NONE

10. RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES FOR NOMINATING:

RECOGNIZED AS ONE OF THE BRIGHTEST AND MOST AMBITIOUS OF RECENT LABOR INTAKE. THE FIRST ONE TO MAKE THE FRONT BENCHES. ALSO HAS VIRTUE OF BEING INTELLECTUALLY OPEN.

11. PART II AND PROGRAM DATE WILL FOLLOW SEPTEMBER

KORENGOLD
BT
R 081683Z JAN 86
FM AMBASSADOR LONDON
TO USIA WASH DC 8396
BT
UNCLAS LONDON 00406

USIA

FOR: E/VGE - SMITH; INFO: EU - ZAVIS.

E.O. 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: FY-86 I.V. GRANTEE - ANTHONY (TONY) BLAIR, MP

REFS: (A) 85 LONDON 15366, (B) USIA 57517

1. PER REFTEL (B), PARA 2, BELOW IS EXPANDED INFORMATION ON POST'S REASONS FOR NOMINATING TONY BLAIR, MP.
   - TONY BLAIR, WHO IS THE LABOR PARTY'S DEPUTY SPOKESMAN FOR TREASURY AFFAIRS, ENTERED PARLIAMENT IN 1983 AND IS THE FIRST OF THE NEW INTAKE TO OBTAIN AN IMPORTANT POSITION WITHIN NEIL KINNOCK'S, THE OPPOSITION LEADER, FRONT BENCH TEAM. WIDELY RESPECTED FOR HIS GRASP OF COMPLEX ISSUES, BLAIR WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY'S ECONOMIC PLATFORM. DEALING WITH THE CONTENTIOUS SUBJECTS OF INVESTMENT, EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE.
   - AT THIS STAGE IN HIS PARLIAMENTARY CAREER POST RECOMMENDS THAT HE BE BROUGHT INTO CONTACT WITH MAJOR U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND KEY POLICY-MAKING BODIES. BLAIR HAS HAD FEW CONTACTS WITH AMERICAN POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS AND WOULD BENEFIT FROM MEETING YOUNG DEMOCRATS. SUCH CONTACTS WILL BE OF LONG-TERM BENEFIT AND WILL ENCOURAGE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE BETWEEN U.S. POLITICIANS/BUSINESSMEN AND A POTENTIALLY INFLUENTIAL YOUNG LABOR POLITICIAN.
   - ADDITIONALLY, BLAIR HAS A BACKGROUND IN LABOR LAW - A SUBJECT THAT IS HIGH ON THE CURRENT U.K. POLITICAL AGENDA. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. FRAMEWORK OF LABOR LAW WILL ALLOW BLAIR TO MAKE AN INFORMED CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE ON AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE TRADITIONAL BRITISH FRAMEWORK OF LAW.

2. POST HOPES THAT ABOVE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR E/VGE TO APPROVE I.V.'S NOMINATION. KORENGOLD BT
#9406

4. POST'S PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.
- (A) U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY
AS U.K. DEPUTY SPOKESMEN FOR TREASURY AFFAIRS, BLAIR SHOULD MEET WITH OFFICIALS FROM:
- DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY: FOR BRIEFINGS ON U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY, AS WELL AS ON TAXATION POLICY AND WORLD DEBT.
- OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET: FOR BRIEFINGS ON U.S. FISCAL POLICY.
- HOUSE AND SENATE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEES: TO DISCUSS U.S. DOMESTIC MONETARY POLICY.
- WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: TO DISCUSS WORLD DEBT.
- WALL STREET: VISIT TO BROKERS SUCH AS MERRILL LYNCH OR SOLOMON BROS., AND BANKS SUCH AS CITIBANK OR CHASE MANHATTAN FOR CORPORATE VIEW ON U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY.
- UNIVERSITIES: TALK TO ECONOMICS FACULTIES FOR THEIR VIEW ON U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY.

BT 11963
U.N. FOR ITS PROGRESSIVE ATTITUDES.

- (c) U.S. WELFARE SYSTEM AND INNER CITY PROGRAMS.
  BLAIR WOULD LIKE TO LOOK AT HOW U.S. WELFARE SYSTEM WORKS
  AT FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL LEVELS, AND LEARN WHAT THE
  U.S. CONCEPT OF SOCIAL WELFARE IS. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO
  VISIT SOCIAL AND INNER CITY PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE MATTES
  PROGRAM IN LOS ANGELES.

- (d) SUPREME COURT.
  BLAIR WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SUPREME COURT AND LOOK AT
  CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. HE IS ALSO INTERESTED IN LEGAL AID
  PROGRAMS. HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET OFFICIALS AT THE
  COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS.

- (e) HOME HOSPITALITY.
  BLAIR WOULD ENJOY HOME HOSPITALITY, PARTICULARLY IN A
  FARMING COMMUNITY. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ATTEND A
  BASEBALL GAME.

- (f) although Blair's constituency is largely a mining
  community, he does not particularly wish to spend large
  amounts of time in similar areas, but would prefer
  visiting small towns to large cities.

- (g) DURING WASHINGTON PROGRAM, BLAIR WOULD LIKE TO
  STAY WITH A CLOSE FRIEND OF HIS, JOHN LLOYD, WHO IS U.S.
  EDITOR DESIGNATE OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES. ADDRESS
  TO FOLLOW SEPTEMBER.

6. WILL SEND EXACT TIME OF ARRIVAL VASHOD SEPT.
KORENGOL
BT
#1963
Saturday, October 11 [1986]

A.M. a briefing session then a 5 minute drive to the meeting place – a waterfront home. I was host for the 1st session. Gorbachev & I met 1st with interpreters & note takers. Then he proposed we bring in Geo. S. & Shevardnadze. That’s the way it went for all the meetings. We got into Human Rts, Regional things & bipartisan agreements on our exchange programs etc. I told him I couldn’t go home if I didn’t bring up why they reneged on their commitment to buy 6 million tons of grain. He claimed lower oil prices – they didn’t have the money.

Then it was plain they wanted to get to arms control – so we did. In the afternoon we had at it looked like some progress as he went along with willingness to reduce nuc. weapons.

At the end of a long day Geo. S. suggested we take all the notes & give them to our teams to put together so we could see what had been agreed & where were sticking points. They worked until 2 A.M.
Sunday, October 12 [1986]

Final day & it turned into an all day one even though we’d been scheduled to fly out in early afternoon. Our team had given us an agreement to eliminate entirely all nuc. devices over a 10 yr. period. We would research & develop DSI during 10 yrs. then deploy & I offered to share with Soviets the system. Then began the showdown. He wanted language that would have killed SDI. They price was high but I wouldn’t sell & that’s how the day ended. All our people though I’d done exactly right. I’d pledged I wouldn’t give away SDI & I didn’t but that meant no deal on any of the arms reductions. I was mad – he tried to act jovial but I acted mad & it showed. Well the ball is in his court and I’m convinced he’ll come around when he sees how the world is reacting. On way out I addressed our mil. forces & families at Air Base. They were enthused & cheered my decision.
Finance, based upon the applications of the Ministry of Security. However, the border troops of the Pskov and Leningrad detachments have not confirmed the receipt of these allocations. The border units of the Pskov Operative Group have not received compensation for the real property left behind in the Baltic (military settlements, officers staff quarters, basing of ships, etc.).

The lack of social-domestic development has had a negative effect on the moral-psychological state of the military servicemen and members of their families. Young officers file requests for dismissal, while sergeants do not re-enlist. For example, the control checkpoint of Pytalovo is less than half staffed with officers. The number of violations of military discipline among military servicemen of all categories is increasing.

It is not surprising that up to one-third of the officers are ready to retire from the forces in the near future. Only one (1) percent of the draftees would like to prolong their service by contract. "Does Russia need us?", ask the border guards. When one learns of the amount of contraband detained by them and about the legal violations which they have prevented, the answer to this question is simple: Of course, they are needed! But when we become more closely acquainted with the everyday life and conditions of work of the defenders of our borders, it turns out that the border guards' question may also have a different answer.

Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks: Part 4
93WC0112A MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 93 [Signed to press 05 Jul 93] pp 68-78

[Transcript: "From the Gorbachev Archive (M. S. Gorbachev's Talks with R. Reagan in Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986). Fourth Conversation (Afternoon of 12 October 1986")]

[Text] G. Shultz and E. A. Shevardnadze were present during the talks

Gorbachev. Concerning the ABM Treaty. I would like to make a proposal which combines your approach and our approach, shows the two sides' firm commitment to the ABM Treaty, and links the process of strengthening the ABM regime to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Our formula is as follows:

"The USSR and the U.S. would pledge not to exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited ABM Treaty for 10 years, and to comply strictly with all its provisions during that period. Testing of all space components of ABM defense in space shall be prohibited except for laboratory research and testing."

During the first five years of this 10-year period (until 1991 inclusive), the strategic offensive weapons of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent.

"During the following five years of this period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive weapons shall be reduced."

"In this way, by the end of 1996 all the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the U.S. will have been eliminated."

This formula clearly reflects the chief aspect of our position. We want to reaffirm the two sides' commitment to the ABM Treaty, enhance the treaty's regime, and link it to the process of eliminating strategic weapons.

Reagan. Our position offers a somewhat different formulation. I hope that we can eliminate the difference in the course of our talks. Here is our formula:

"The two sides agree to limit themselves to research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years until 1991 inclusive, during which time a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals will be carried out. After that, both sides will continue to reduce the remaining defensive ballistic missiles at the same rate with the aim of completely eliminating offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five-year period. The same restrictions in connection with the ABM Treaty will remain in force while the reductions continue at the corresponding rates. At the end of this period, the two sides shall have the right to deploy defensive systems."

Gorbachev. I repeat, our proposal is consistent with the task of strengthening the ABM Treaty in linkage with reductions of nuclear arsenals. Your formula, as I see it, fails to meet our position halfway. The main aspect of the Soviet Union's approach is that in the period during which the USSR and the U.S. are carrying out deep reductions in nuclear weapons we ought to reinforce instead of impairing or undermining the ABM Treaty. We are asking the American side once more to consider our completely substantiated line, our proposal, which, we are convinced, is in keeping with the aim of strengthening the ABM Treaty and emphasizes the two sides' obligation to comply with its provisions, not to exercise their right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years. What we are talking about primarily is the renunciation of testing any space components of ABM defense in space—that is, refraining from any steps which would in effect pave the way to the deployment of such systems. I want to emphasize once more that what is prohibited according to our formula does not affect laboratory testing and leaves open the possibility for the American side, like the Soviet side, to conduct any laboratory research relating to space, including SDI research. We are not undermining your idea of SDI; we are permitting that kind of activity, which is already being conducted by the United States and which is impossible to monitor anyway. We are only placing the system in the framework of laboratory research. I think the U.S. could go along with this, especially considering the major steps the Soviet Union has made.

Reagan. But still that doesn't remove the question of what we are to do after 10 years if we should want to create a defense against ballistic missiles. I just don't understand why you object so much to SDI. As for what
the ABM Treaty prohibits and what it permits, the two
dsides have differences of interpretation here.

**Gorbachev.** If you want to anticipate the situation for the
period after 10 years, we also had a formulation on that
score. If you want, we can append it to the text we have
offered. This formulation is from the draft of the direc-
tives which I gave to you yesterday. It says there, you
probably recall, that after the 10-year period the two
sides will, over the course of several years, work out
through negotiations further mutually acceptable deci-
sions in this sphere. As you see, we are offering a broad
formula of what we can do after the 10 years. If you
should deem it essential to continue SDI, we can discuss
that. And so why deal with the question in advance, right
now? And why force us to sign SDI? Perhaps we might
have other interests?

**Reagan.** We want right now to provide for the possibility
of defense in case, 10 years from now, when we no longer
have missiles, someone should decide to re-create
nuclear missiles.

**Gorbachev.** Our point of view is that we will eliminate
strategic nuclear forces in these 10 years. That's why we
are proposing to strengthen the ABM regime in that very
crucial period. Under these conditions, we will be able
to accomplish the historic task of eliminating strategic
offensive weapons. Why complicate things with other
problems which we are uncertain about, the conse-
quences of which are unclear? It would only undermine
one side's confidence in whether it was acting correctly
by reducing its nuclear forces under conditions where the
other side is taking steps which could have aggravating
consequences for the entire process. You have to agree
that it would be more difficult for us to go along with this
if you tie us down with aggravating weights. That is why
we are proposing that we come to an agreement
regarding the 10-year period of nonwithdrawal from the
ABM Treaty; to carry out research only in laboratories
during that period, and then after the period is over and
strategic weapons have been eliminated, discuss what to
do next. And, moreover, the scientific-technical aspect of
SDI could still continue, your capability in that sphere,
and the decision would by no means sound the death
knell for your SDI program.

**Reagan.** You asked that the ABM Treaty be complied
with for 10 years. We are offering you ten and a half
years. At the end of the 10-year period the two sides
would in fact have the right to give six months' notice
and at the end of the six-month period to begin deploy-
ment. But notice this: we are only proposing such
research, development, and testing as are permitted by
the ABM Treaty. And if, after the 10-year period, we do
give notice that we are withdrawing from the treaty (and
I suggest that that will happen), what can be the objec-
tion against deployment—if, of course, you do not
intend to re-create nuclear weapons or drag them out
from concealment somewhere. We are ready to turn over
the results of the research to your disposal.

And so, we have met you halfway with respect to the
10-year period. And anyway, if you are so resolutely
committed to the necessity of strengthening the ABM
Treaty, what are we to make of the Krasnoyarsk Radar
Station? Especially considering that we are complying
with the ABM Treaty and have not even created every-
thing that it permits.

**Gorbachev.** I still wish you would carefully examine our
proposal. It encompasses elements of both your and our
proposals. If it is acceptable, I am ready to sign it.

**Shultz.** Would you please give us this formula in printed
form in English so that we can examine it carefully?

**Gorbachev.** All right.

Let me add that we do not object to adding a codicil to
our proposal regarding the possibility that after the
10-year period the two sides will try over a period of
several years to find, through negotiations, some mutu-
ally acceptable solution to the problem. You are pro-
posing SDI. To us, that option is unacceptable. We want
to keep the possibility of finding something different.
Hence, our formula makes it possible to take account of
the situation in the future, after the 10 years. Summing
up our proposal, let me emphasize that the two sides will
strictly comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years and
will pledge not to exercise the right to withdraw from the
treaty. Simultaneously, they will continue laboratory
research. After the 10-year period, under conditions of
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the two
sides will get together and decide what to do next and
come to an agreement. I don't understand what bothers
you about that.

**Reagan.** If we have eliminated all nuclear weapons, why
should you be worried by the desire by one of the sides to
make itself safe—just in case—from weapons which
neither of us has anymore? Someone else could create
missiles, and extra guarantees would be appropriate.
Your side and our side are completely eliminating our
weapons. I can imagine both of us in 10 years getting
together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and
American missiles under triumphant circumstances. By
then I'll be so old that you won't even recognize me. And
you will ask in surprise, "Hey, Ron, is that really you?
What are you doing here?" And we'll have a big celebra-
tion over it.

**Gorbachev.** I don't know whether I'll live till that time.

**Reagan.** Well I'm certain I will.

**Gorbachev.** Sure you will. You've passed the dangerous
age for men, and now you have smooth sailing to be a
hundred. But these dangers still lie ahead for me, for a
man they come by the age of 60 and besides, I still have
to meet with President Reagan, who I can see really hates
to give in. President Reagan wants to be the winner. But
in this case, on these matters, there can be no one
winner—either we both win or we both lose. We're in the
same boat.
Reagan. I know I won’t live to be a hundred if I have to live in fear of these damned missiles.

Gorbachev. Well, let’s reduce and eliminate them.

Reagan. This is a rather strange situation. We have both put forth specific demands. You are in favor of a 10-year period. I have said that I will not give up SDI. But both of us, obviously, can say that the most important thing is to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Gorbachev. But you wouldn’t have to give up SDI, because laboratory research and testing would not be prohibited. And so you could continue activities within the framework of the SDI program. Your opponents won’t even be able to open their mouth, especially under conditions where we have eliminated nuclear weapons.

Anyway, I am categorically against any situation where our meeting results in one winner and one loser. Even if this did happen now, in the next stage, in the process of preparing the text of agreements, it would make itself felt. It, and the loser would act in such a manner that everything would end up destroyed. Therefore, equality is essential both at the present stage and in the next. After all, considerable time will pass between the achievement of agreement and the final ratification of the agreements. And only if the document accommodates both the interests of the U.S. and the interests of the USSR will it merit ratification and support. By the way, you yourself have said more than once that in previous negotiations the accords did not always take account of the interests of both sides.

Reagan. Perhaps we can resolve the matter this way: the question of what research, development, and testing are permitted by the ABM Treaty should remain for discussion and negotiation at the meeting in the course of your visit. We will come to an agreement regarding the 10-year period and breaking it down into two five-year periods, in the course of which nuclear weapons will be eliminated, while everything having to do with testing, laboratory research, and the provisions of the ABM Treaty and so on are things we can discuss at the summit meeting.

Gorbachev. But without that there’s no package. All of these issues are interconnected. If we come to an agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, we will have to have assurance, guarantees, that the ABM Treaty will not only be complied with but also strengthened in the course of this crucial period, this historic period when strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated. I repeat, this period is too crucial, it is dangerous to improvise. I am convinced that preserving the ABM Treaty is also consistent with the interests of the U.S.

Reagan. It looks like we’re not getting anywhere. But I simply cannot understand why you object on the basis of fears of what will happen in ten and a half years, when there will be no ballistic missiles. Perhaps we ought to take another look at what we disagree about?

Gorbachev. I can offer the following option: add another proposal to the text we have offered. It was in our proposals, but for some reason the American side did not accept it. I think this amendment will make it possible to solve the problem.

Shultz. It seems to me there are two differences between us. First, what to consider to be permissible research in the course of the 10-year period. Second, it seems to me, the Soviet side has in mind an indefinitely long period during which we will not be able to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We have in mind 10 years.

Gorbachev. No; we need absolute clarity here. We believe that in the stage in which we are undertaking actual reductions in nuclear weapons the ABM Treaty needs to be strengthened and made stronger, not made weaker. Over the period of 10 years the two sides will refrain from exercising the right to withdraw from the treaty; after those ten years, we will see. Perhaps we will continue to comply with the treaty, perhaps some new elements will emerge. But for the period of 10 years the treaty must be preserved, in fact made stronger.

Shultz. In other words, for 10 years the two sides will not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty; after the 10 years this aspect will be gone. Then the sides can exercise that right.

Shevardnadze. Let me remind you, moreover, that research will not be restricted, but it can only be conducted in the laboratory.

Gorbachev. Mr President, I remember how things went in Geneva. You and I were sitting in a room drinking coffee, we were in a good mood, and we thought we were going to succeed. Secretary of State Shultz came in and told us how things stood. He said that the Soviet delegation would not give its consent to an agreement with respect to certain questions. And then you said to me, Pound the table and order your people to come to an agreement! I went out, and in 15 minutes the agreement had been reached. If we take a break now, and if you achieve agreement in 10 minutes, you can consider it another victory for you.

Shultz. One question arises which is not a problem, perhaps, but I want to clarify it. In your formulation you say that in the course of the following five years the remaining 50 percent of the strategic offensive weapons will be reduced. Do you have in mind a gradual process of reduction which in the long run will lead to the elimination of these weapons by the end of that period?

Gorbachev. Yes, by the end of the second five-year period they will be completely eliminated.

Shultz. All right, I understand.

But there is another difference. We are talking about the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev. But we already agreed on a 50-percent reduction of all strategic weapons in the course of the first five years. It would be logical for the remaining 50 percent to be eliminated in the following five years. The weapons to be eliminated would include all components of the triad—missiles, including heavy missiles, submarine
missiles, and bombers. That would be fair. I think that when we have the specific text of the treaty it will show precise schedules for the reduction and elimination of weapons while maintaining equality in all stages.

Shultz. The option we are proposing talks of the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. These missiles include not only strategic missiles but also, for example, intermediate-range missiles and others. What you are talking about are strategic offensive weapons. That is a different category of weapons.

Gorbachev. I thought that yesterday we had offered, and you had agreed to, an option which calls for a 50-percent reduction of the entire triad of strategic weapons, including missiles like the SS-18 that you are so worried about. That option did not come easy to us. But we went along with it in order not to get bogged down in a swamp of levels, sublevels, and so on.

So let's agree that in this case, again, we're talking not only about missiles but about all strategic offensive weapons. Especially considering that, as I understand it, our experts have agreed to your proposal regarding the rules for counting bombers with bombs and SREM [unidentified] missiles.

(Break)

Reagan. We have kept you a long time, because it hasn't been easy reaching an agreement between us. We have sought a formulation which would meet you halfway with respect to your desire regarding the 10-year period. Here is the final option which we can offer:

"The USSR and the U.S. pledge for a period of 10 years not to exercise their right to withdraw from the unlimited ABM Treaty and, during that period, to comply strictly with all its provisions, while at the same time continuing research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty.

"In the course of the first five years (until 1991 inclusive), there will be a 50-percent reduction in the two sides' strategic offensive weapons.

"In the course of the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of both sides will be reduced.

"In this way, by the end of 1996 the USSR and the U.S. will have completely eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles.

"At the end of the 10-year period, each side may deploy defensive systems if they so desire, provided that the two sides do not agree on something else."

How do you feel about that formula?

Gorbachev. I have two questions for you by way of clarifying the American formulation. You speak of research, development, and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. Your formula omits any mention of laboratory testing. Was this done specially?

Reagan. At the negotiations in Geneva our delegations discussed the question of what comprises research and other activities permitted by the ABM Treaty. This question could have been settled at the talks in Geneva.

Gorbachev. What I'm asking is, did you omit the mention of laboratories deliberately or not?

Reagan. Yes it was deliberate, what's the matter?

Gorbachev. I'm simply clarifying the American formulation. For the time being I'm not commenting. Another question: the first half of the formula talks about the two sides' strategic offensive weapons which will be reduced by 50 percent in the first five years, but in the second part, which talks about the following five years, it mentions offensive ballistic missiles. What is being referred to here? Why this difference in approach?

Reagan. We were told during the break that the Soviet side would like a special mention of offensive strategic missiles. That's why we included that formula. It's true that in the first part we talk about all types of strategic nuclear weapons, including missiles and bombs aboard bombers. In the second part, however, we talk about ballistic missiles, in the belief that that's what you want.

Gorbachev. There is some kind of confusion here. When it comes to strategic offensive weapons, we agreed between us long ago that they include all components of the triad—ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. I don't see what could have changed in this question. If we're talking about a different class of missiles—RSD [medium-range missiles] and those having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers—the reduction of them is provided for in a different part of the package. We also are not removing anything from our proposals here. But as for the first part of your formulation and the second part regarding the following five years, the wording has to be identical. If we're talking about a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, then in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons must be eliminated.

Reagan. I understand, then, that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive ballistic missiles will be eliminated?

Gorbachev. How about airplanes? After all, strategic weapons represent a triad which includes ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. So it is clear between us what strategic weapons are. And our group, which worked this evening, recorded that all elements of the triad are to be reduced by 50 percent.

Reagan. What I want to know is, will all offensive ballistic missiles be eliminated?

Gorbachev. The first part of your formulation talks about strategic offensive weapons, while the second part speaks only about ballistic missiles. Of course, strategic weapons include ballistic missiles—ground-based and submarine-launched missiles, and also bombers. Why does the second part of your formulation speak only about ballistic missiles?

Reagan. Is that the only thing you object to?
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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20 September 1993

Gorbachev. I'm just trying to clarify the issue.

Reagan. It will have to be sorted out.

Gorbachev. What we need here is for both formulations to be identical. If we talk about all the components in the first case, everything also needs to be clear in the second case.

Reagan. Evidently we have simply misunderstood you. But if that's what you want, all right.

Shultz. We need to be careful here. When we talk of eliminating all strategic offensive weapons, it does not refer to shorter-range ballistic missiles. I know that the question of them is handled within the framework of a different category, but it is here, it seems to me, that we ought to take decisive measures.

Gorbachev. Perhaps you could have your second paragraph say that in the following five years the remaining 50 percent of strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated, including ballistic missiles. As for shorter-range missiles, we deal with them in the second point of our agreement. Missiles having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers are being frozen, and negotiations are underway concerning their future fate. This is dealt with in the section on medium-range missiles, but this question is also covered.

Shultz. Perhaps we could formulate it this way: by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the U.S. will be eliminated.

Gorbachev. But the question of other ballistic missiles is dealt with within the framework of another category, and this has to be mentioned there.

Shultz. But there the question of their elimination does not come up.

Gorbachev. We will freeze them, we will begin negotiations about their fate, and I think we'll decide their fate.

Shultz. In regard to intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, we did not talk about two five-year periods. We talked about an agreement which will exist until such time as it is replaced. If we agree that this will happen in five years, by the end of that period all missiles will be eliminated.

Gorbachev. We can agree on all missiles, including those having a range of less than 1,000 kilometers. But here, when we are dealing with the context of the ABM Treaty we are talking about strategic offensive weapons. And we share with you our understanding of what constitutes strategic offensive weapons.

Shultz. But the ABM Treaty has to do with all missiles, not just strategic ones. But perhaps we have nothing to quarrel about here?

Gorbachev. I don't think there is any disagreement between us in this regard, and we only have to find a way to reflect our agreement.

Shultz. That's why I propose that we write that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive weapons and all offensive ballistic missiles are to be eliminated.

Gorbachev. But in that case we will again have different formulations in the first and the second paragraphs. I think we can settle this matter when formulating our agreements.

Reagan. Let me ask this: Do we have in mind—and I think it would be very good—that by the end of the two five-year periods all nuclear explosive devices would be eliminated, including bombs, battlefield systems, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate-range systems, and so on?

Gorbachev. We could say that, list all those weapons.

Shultz. Then let's do it.

Reagan. If we agree that by the end of the 10-year period all nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, we can turn this agreement over to our delegations in Geneva so that they can prepare a treaty which you can sign during your visit to the U.S.

Gorbachev. Well, all right. Here we have a chance for an agreement. What I am seriously concerned about is another factor. What we are talking about is to comply strictly with the unlimited ABM Treaty for the purpose of pledging not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years. We are doing this under conditions of reducing nuclear weapons. We don't understand, then, why the American side does not agree to having research, development, and testing be restricted to the confines of the laboratory. If we write it a different way, this will enable one of the sides to interpret the ABM Treaty such that it can conduct such work where it pleases while claiming that it is not violating the ABM Treaty. What effect will that have on the process of nuclear weapons reduction that has been undertaken by that time? A negative one, of course. It will create an unequal situation, impair the security of one of the sides, and lose in clarity. Hence, the ABM Treaty has to be strengthened, which means that we cannot remove the mention of laboratories from our text. This cannot be done if we insist on precise compliance with the ABM Treaty. The question of laboratories is of fundamental importance.

Reagan. I do not agree that strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty means restricting the testing of ABM components solely to laboratories. We have a difference in the interpretation of the ABM Treaty which we have acknowledged. From the standpoint of the substance of the issue, in my opinion, it is of no importance. Our aim is to safeguard ourselves from a revival of missiles after they have been destroyed, in order to make a kind of gas mask against nuclear missiles and deploy a defense system. Moreover, we view this variant only as a possibility, as one probable outcome. I have already spoken of this. And I have also spoken of the danger of nuclear maniacs.
Gorbachev. Yes, I've heard all about gas masks and maniacs, probably ten times already. But it still does not convince me.

Reagan. I'm talking about one possibility of what can happen after 10 years. Perhaps there will be nothing of the kind. Perhaps the people who become the leaders at that time will decide that the system is too costly to deploy and will give up the SDI. In any case, the world would welcome it if we could undertake to reduce nuclear weapons and not make this issue a stumbling block. We are asking not to give up SDI, and you are trying to determine now what will happen in 10 years.

Gorbachev. If we make a stipulation acknowledging the possibility of conducting research work relating to SDI within the confines of the laboratory, that will not mean that the American government will not be able to decide questions relating to the program. Such a stipulation will not prohibit research, development, and testing, including the kind that relates to space weapons. But it would make it possible to guarantee a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty; it would make it possible to prevent bringing such weapons out of the laboratories, out in the atmosphere and into space. These are completely different things. We are talking about an agreement that is supposed to strengthen peace instead of subjecting it to new dangers.

Reagan. I'm not demanding the right to deploy ABMs in space, I'm only talking about research permitted by the ABM Treaty. By the way, the Soviet Union is not entirely without reproach in this. I'm referring to the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station. We have differing interpretations of the ABM Treaty, that's a fact.

Gorbachev. What we are talking about is seeing to it that SDI testing takes place only in the laboratory. We cannot go along with allowing it to come out in the atmosphere or into space. That is unacceptable to us. It is a question of principle.

Reagan. You're destroying all my bridges [vse v mostly] to continuation of my SDI program. I cannot go along with restrictions on the plan as you demand.

Gorbachev. In regard to laboratories. Is that your final position? If so, we can end our meeting at this point.

Reagan. Yes it is. The whole thing comes up against the fact that your side and our side differ as to what is permitted by the ABM Treaty and what is not.

Gorbachev. From our discussion I conclude that the U.S. wants to reserve the possibility of conducting tests of the SDI program not only in the laboratory but also outside, in the air and in space. If that's so, there can be no agreement between us.

Reagan. But you have to understand that experimentation and research cannot always be kept within the laboratory; sometimes it is simply necessary to go outside the laboratory.

Gorbachev. You must understand me. To us the laboratory issue is not a matter of stubbornness or hard-headedness. It is not casuistry. It is all too serious. We are agreeing to deep reductions and, ultimately, the destruction of nuclear weapons. And at the same time, the American side is pushing us to agree to give them the right to create space weapons. That is unacceptable to us. If you will agree to restricting research work to the laboratory, not letting it out into space, I will be ready in two minutes to sign the appropriate formulation and adopt the document.

Reagan. I can't go along with that. You and I have different positions, different problems. In your country, nobody can criticize you without winding up in prison. In my country the situation is different. I have a lot of critics who wield great influence. And if I agree to such a formulation, they will launch a campaign against me; they will accuse me of breaking my promise to the people of the United States regarding SDI. So I pledge not to deploy the corresponding systems for 10 years, and to restrict ourselves to research permitted by the ABM Treaty. I'm not asking you for anything out of the ordinary.

Gorbachev. If I understand you, Mr President, you are now addressing me in a trusting manner, as a man who occupies in his own country a position equal to yours. Therefore, I say to you frankly and in the same trusting manner: if we sign a package containing major concessions by the Soviet Union regarding fundamental problems, you will become, without exaggeration, a great president. You are now literally two steps from that. If we come to an agreement on strengthening the ABM regime, on complying strictly with the ABM Treaty and on laboratory research which will not rule out work within the SDI framework, it will mean our meeting has been a success. If not, then let's part at this point and forget about Reykjavik. But there won't be another opportunity like this. At any rate, I know I won't have one.

I firmly believed that we could come to an agreement. Otherwise I would not have raised the question of an immediate meeting with you; otherwise I would not have come here in the name of the Soviet leadership with a solid store of serious, compromising proposals. I hoped that they would meet with understanding and support from your side, that we could resolve all issues. If this does happen, if we manage to achieve deep reductions and the destruction of nuclear weapons, all of your critics will not dare open their mouths. They would then be going against the opinions of the overwhelming majority of people in the world, who would welcome our success. If, on the other hand, we are not able to come to an agreement, it will obviously become the job of another generation of leaders; you and I have no more time.

The American side has essentially not made any concessions, not a single major step to meet us halfway. It's hard to do business on that basis.
Shevardnadze. Let me speak very emotionally, because I feel that we have come very close to accomplishing this historic task. And when future generations read the record of our talks, they will not forgive us if we let this opportunity slip by.

Reagan. I want to say one thing to you as one political leader to another. I have a problem that is quite a substantial one for me. I am being subjected to criticism which began even before I came here. They were saying that I would make concessions, that I would agree to a lengthy period of time of not withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. And so I ask you as a political leader to take one step which will substantially facilitate our relations and the solution to many questions for both of us. Let me say frankly that if I give you what you ask it will definitely hurt me badly at home.

Gorbachev. All right, then, let's end it here. What you propose is something we cannot go along with. I've said all I can.

Reagan. Are you really going to turn down a historic opportunity for agreement for the sake of one word in the text? It is clear from our own text that we will comply with the ABM Treaty for that entire period.

Gorbachev. You say that it's just a matter of one word. But it's not a matter of a word, it's a matter of principle. Obviously, if we undertake reductions, we will have to have secure logistics/rear services [verennyye tyly]. We cannot agree to a situation in which you are expanding your SDI and going into space with it while reductions of nuclear weapons are going on.

If I go back to Moscow and say that despite our agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, despite our agreement on the 10-year period, we have given the United States the right to test SDI in space so that the U.S. is ready to deploy it by the end of that period, they will call me a fool and irresponsible leader.

If you agree to restrict research to the laboratory, then there will be a framework, for 10 years you will have enough work to do research within the SDI framework and inside the laboratory. And you will be able to say that you are continuing the SDI, that you are not giving it up, if that is so essential to you for the American people.

To us this whole question is not a matter of prestige, I do not ascribe special importance to it; it is a question that touches upon the interests of our people.

Reagan. After our meeting in Geneva I was convinced that you and I had established personal contact of the kind the leaders of our two countries never had before. You and I understood each other very well. But now, when I have asked you a personal favor which would have enormous influence on our future relations, you have refused me.

Gorbachev. There are various kinds of favors. If you came to me and said that you were having trouble with your farmers, they were demanding increased grain purchases by the Soviet Union, that you were asking this as a personal favor, I could understand that. But I can't understand how you can ask the USSR to agree to grant the U.S. the right, during the period of deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons, to test a space ABM system in space, to implement SDI in its entirety, at the same time we were destroying our offensive nuclear potential. If you think about it, that wouldn't even be right for the U.S. It would create nervousness, a lack of trust, and is completely unacceptable to us. You don't need that kind of favor either.

Reagan. But if you don't have nuclear weapons, you won't have anything to threaten us with. The defensive system could not be deployed earlier than in 10 years' time, we have gone along with that deferment. As for the word "laboratory," it has its own particular meaning and subtext. They would simply tell me in that case that I had capitulated, that I had given away what I promised not to give away. All of the other formulations we have taken from you. We are saying we will comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years. And now I see that nothing is coming out of it, and all because of one word which has such specific meaning. I simply don't understand how you can think that I want to gain some special military advantage. After all, it's you, with your actions, who are violating the ABM Treaty. Yet we are not telling you to eliminate what you have. We're not setting that condition and we will not even mention it outside this room.

But now it's a matter of one word. Perhaps you will propose a different formulation? But the text now contains everything you have asked for—not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, strict compliance with its provisions, and the conduct only of the kind of research, development, and testing which are permitted by the treaty.

For this reason I want to ask you once more to change your viewpoint, to do it as a favor to me so that we can go to the people as peacemakers.

Gorbachev. We cannot go along with what you propose. If you will agree to banning tests in space, we will sign the document in two minutes. We cannot go along with something else. We have already agreed to what we could; we are not to blame.

Even though our meeting is ending this way, I have a clear conscience before my people and before you. I have done everything I could.

Reagan. It's too bad we have to part this way. We were so close to an agreement. I think you didn't want to achieve an agreement anyway. I'm very sorry.

Gorbachev. I am also very sorry it's happened this way. I wanted an agreement and did everything I could, if not more.

Reagan. I don't know when we'll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon.

Gorbachev. I don't either.

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MATLOCK, JACK F., JR.: Files

SERIES IV: MTGS. WITH USSR OFFICIALS

Secretary’s Briefing Book Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Sept., 1986 (5)

Box: Shultz/Shevardnadze – Vienna November 1986 63
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ICELAND TALKING POINTS

- U.S. went to Iceland in order to narrow differences, where possible, between US and Soviet positions and lay groundwork for more productive negotiations.

- By that measure, meeting a success. Achieved significant movement on START, INF, Nuclear Testing; even aspects of ABM/SDI, though latter obviously remain formidable obstacle. Specifically:

  -- START: Agreement on 50% offensive warhead reduction, to be implemented by reductions to 1600 SDIVs, 6000 warheads; important advance in counting rules; Soviet recognition of requirement for "significant cuts" in heavy ICBMs.

  -- INF: 100 global warhead limit (zero in Europe) a major advance (over 90% reduction for Soviets); freeze on short-range INF, pending negotiation of reductions.

  -- Nuclear Testing: Plan for US ratification of TTB/PNE treaties (contingent on adequate verification), to be followed by negotiations on further testing limitations in phase with nuclear weapons reductions.

  -- ABM/SDI: Both sides moved on minimum time sides should limit themselves to research, development and testing of strategic defenses (US from 7 1/2 years to 10, contingent on adequate verification, and coupled with plan for 50% reduction in strategic forces in 5 years, elimination of all ballistic missiles in 10. Soviets moved from 15 years to 10; though very significant differences remain on overall approach.)

- Significant headway as well on other pillars of the relationship:

  -- On human rights, U.S. stressed crucial importance of this issue; Soviets agreed to regularize discussions.

  -- On regional conflicts, two sides had vigorous discussions of Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Cambodia, Middle East, and Iran-Iraq; U.S. laid down important markers concerning Soviet behavior.

  -- On bilateral exchanges, sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate negotiations in a number of areas including consulates, space cooperation, nuclear safety.

- In arms control we intend to build on Iceland results to seek further progress at Geneva.

- Gorbachev has said that Iceland proposals are still on the table.

- Ball now in Soviet court to assure continuation of Iceland momentum.
5. Soviet attempt at Iceland to hold progress in all areas of arms control hostage to acceptance of Soviet views on ABM/SDI an unconstructive and unfortunate position; reversion from Gorbachev's Geneva summit agreement to move forward in areas of common ground.

-- Historic opportunity to reach agreements in other key arms control areas demands responsible Soviet behavior; if opportunity lost, world will clearly understand where blame lies.

-- U.S. ready now to proceed, as matter of highest priority, to reach agreements on START, INF, Nuclear Testing along lines discussed at Reykjavik.

-- ABM/SDI issue requires further work to reconcile fundamental US/USSR differences.

-- Soviets sought to kill by ban on essential testing outside the laboratories.

-- Important for Soviets to understand SDI not a bargaining chip but a key element of US approach to more secure world for all.

-- Case for transition from offense to defense-based systems a compelling one; in both countries' interests.

-- Only realistic hope to eliminate nuclear "balance of terror," threat of massive annihilation.

-- Wholly non-threatening to Soviet Union; no significant offensive potential in SDI systems (Soviet specialists understand this).

-- U.S. offer to share benefits of strategic defense a generous one; belies Soviet allegations of U.S. intent to exploit technological lead to Soviet disadvantage.

-- SDI essential to U.S. even with agreement on reduction and ultimate elimination of ballistic missiles, in order to hedge against abrogation, cheating, and third country threats; provide continuing incentive for offensive reductions; and offer stability during critical transition period and insurance thereafter.

-- Scale of deployment will depend, in part, on scope of threat.

-- Hope sober reflection will lead Soviets to recognize that SDI is not a threat to be killed through negotiation, but a key element of our mutual transition to a safer and more secure world.
We will be working to lay the logic of this position before the Soviets at Geneva, while trying to move them to proceed now to look up agreements in other areas where major progress recorded at Reykjavik.

In short, Reykjavik was worthwhile; no second thoughts about wisdom of acceding to Gorbachev's request for pre-summit discussions.

Road to agreement with Soviets is never smooth; ideological differences, distrust, divergent strategic outlooks and force structures complicate progress.

Reykjavik represents an important chapter in ongoing arms control dialogue between two countries.

Clear understanding of others' positions and motivations necessary for productive negotiation; progress achieved on that score as well as substantively in key areas.

We emerged having narrowed differences, and with clear appreciation that Soviets' obsession with SDI represents the most significant obstacle to be overcome at this point.

Opportunities created by Iceland discussions too important to let languish. U.S. hopes for further near-term progress based on:

Essential balance, fairness, and mutual benefit of those agreements which were shown by discussions in Reykjavik to be achievable.

Soviets' capability to assess the negotiating climate realistically, and recognize when time has come to deal.

President's strong and unswerving position on essentiality of developing, testing, and ultimately deploying SDI.

Soviets' understanding that historic opportunities may well be forfeited if it does not reach agreement in time remaining to this US administration.

Strong support of U.S. public has been and will continue to be essential to US success in complex task of reaching comprehensive and enduring settlements with Soviets.

Patience, persistence, and supportive Congress vital as well.

Renewed economic dynamism, refurbished U.S. military strength, and Allied cohesion also play critical roles.
Gorbachev’s challenge at this point is to rise to occasion in statesmanlike manner and collaborate with us in reaching agreements which will lay foundation for stable long-term strategic relationship between the two countries, leading to ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.
THE PRESIDENT'S ICELAND MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Executive Summary

The President went to Iceland to promote the main objectives of American foreign policy: true peace and greater freedom in the world. He met with General Secretary Gorbachev for 10 hours of frank and substantive direct talks. We achieved our objectives.

The President focused on a broad four point agenda for improved U.S.-Soviet relations: Human Rights; Arms Reductions; the Resolution of Regional Conflicts; and Expanding Bilateral Contacts and Communications.

Increasing and Overwhelming Public Support

Private media polls immediately following the Iceland meeting found overwhelming support by the American people for the President.

- The Wall Street Journal/NBC News and the New York Times/CBS News polls registered 71% and 72% (respectively) approved of the President's handling of the Iceland meeting.

Building Upon Iceland Meeting

- Never before in the history of arms control negotiations has so much progress been made in so many areas, in so short a time.

- The U.S. and Soviet Union came very close to an agreement that would secure massive reductions of the most threatening weapon systems: offensive ballistic missiles.

- Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.

- SDI was a main inducement for the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. SDI remains the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets.

- Notwithstanding the disagreements on SDI, the President is calling upon the Soviet leadership to follow through on arms reduction accomplishments at Reykjavik and continue to discuss our differences on strategic defense, which have been narrowed.

- We will vigorously pursue, at the same time, progress in other areas of the agenda, especially human rights.
ARM REDUCTION AT IRELAND — HISTORIC PROGRESS

Unlike the past, the U.S. is now dealing from a position of strength and confidence. General Secretary Gorbachev suggested the Iceland meeting, and the President accepted in an effort to further the U.S./Soviet dialogue in all four areas of the agenda.

- Because of U.S. strength and confidence, and the inducement of SDI to negotiate, unprecedented progress was made toward dramatically reducing offensive nuclear arsenals.

- Mr. Gorbachev held progress in all areas, including arms reduction, hostage to his non-negotiable demand that the U.S. cut back and effectively kill SDI. The President insisted that SDI remain viable under the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which, unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has complied with.

- To break the deadlock, the President offered: A 10 year commitment not to deploy any future strategic defense system, coupled with 50% reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces in the next five years and mutual and total elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles over the following five years.

- Mr. Gorbachev rejected the President's offer, refusing to allow SDI testing — the heart of any research program.

Current Impasse: Future Opportunities

- Mr. Gorbachev's non-negotiable terms on SDI would have perpetuated America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles. Where the security of the American people and our Allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.

- The USSR wants to continue to base global security on the threat of mutual annihilation. President Reagan seeks a safer world with peace and deterrence based increasingly on defensive means.

- In 1984, when the Soviets failed to achieve their objectives to weaken NATO's defensive capability in Europe, through negotiating intraggressions and continuing SS-20 deployments, they walked out of all nuclear arms negotiations. In 1985, they were back at the table and, in 1986, for the first time, dramatic progress has been made toward mutual reductions.

- The President believes that additional meetings can build on the major progress toward arms reduction and achieve final breakthrough agreements. The President's invitation for a U.S. Summit — the objective that Iceland was intended to prepare for — remains open.
SDI Not the Problem It's the Solution

- In SDI, we are investigating defensive systems to enhance future security for America and our Allies by being able to destroy attacking missiles. It will have no offensive function. There is no rational reason to oppose SDI research.

- Insurance — Why should the Soviets, in opposing SDI, insist that America and its Allies remain vulnerable to Soviet missile attack? Strategic defenses would help underwrite arms reduction agreements against cheating or abrogation, while defending against attack from other countries.

- By denying a potential attacker hope of gaining meaningful military benefit, SDI is the best lever to achieve real arms reductions. SDI deters use of offensive systems, thereby rendering future investments in offensive systems imprudent.

- The Soviets have longstanding and massive strategic defense programs of their own, going well beyond research, and have the only operational anti-ballistic missile system in the world, a system they are steadily improving.

- By refusing the President's far-reaching arms reduction offer and making his own non-negotiable demand on the United States, Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity for progress toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons.

- Nonetheless, the ideas and progress for radically reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons presented at Reykjavik can be built upon at the table in Geneva.

Human Rights

Respect for human rights is as important to peace as arms reductions because peace requires trust. The President told Gorbachev the Soviets' human rights performance is an obstacle for improved relations between our two countries.

- A country that breaks faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers.

- The Soviet Union signed the 1975 Helsinki Accords. The Soviets should abide by them — allowing free emigration and the reunification of divided families, and religious and cultural freedoms — instead of throwing those who monitor the Soviet compliance (e.g. Yuri Orlov) in jail.

- We will continue to press for improvements in the coming weeks and months.

- The Soviets, for the first time, agreed to regular bilateral discussions on humanitarian and human rights issues.

Expanded cultural exchanges — The President reaffirmed his commitment to continue to broaden and expand people-to-people exchanges — where Soviet citizens and Americans may see first hand more of each other's country and culture.

Regional Conflicts — The President raised the serious problems caused in the world by Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, and continued military support of the regimes in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, that are waging war on their own people. We cannot take seriously the token troop withdrawals from Afghanistan unless they have announced.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

The U.S. and her Allies are defenseless against a deliberate or accidental nuclear attack.

- The U.S. presently deters nuclear attack by threatening retaliation. SDI offers a safer and more moral alternative: employing technology to protect people instead of threatening their annihilation.

Challenge for the Present and Insurance for the Future

- SDI is a broad-based program to demonstrate the feasibility of effective strategic defenses. Like the Apollo Project, SDI is a revolutionary program that merits a full-scale national effort.
- SDI taps the finest scientific minds in the U.S. and other countries to investigate a range of defensive technologies. This research will lead toward an informed decision on defensive options in the early 1990s.
- SDI has induced the Soviets to negotiate for deep cuts in offensive arsenals. It is the best insurance policy that any future arms reduction agreements will be implemented and complied with by the Soviets, and it guards against ballistic missile attack by third countries.

SDI Progress

- Some in Congress would cripple SDI with short-sighted budget cuts giving the Soviets a key concession they have not been able to win through negotiations. Sustained research has already produced major technical advances:
  - June 1984 -- a non-nuclear interceptor destroyed an unarmed warhead in space;
  - Fall 1985 -- successful laser tests compensate for atmospheric distortion while tracking rockets in flight;
  - Spring 1986 -- A high-power laser destroyed a static target;
  - June 1986 -- a self-guided missile intercepted a target moving at three times the speed of sound;
  - September 1986 -- Successful Delta launch, track, and intercept in space of target vehicles.

SDI: Also a Prudent Hedge Against Existing Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

- The Soviet Union has upgraded the world's only deployed Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, which protects Greater Moscow, and is constructing a large missile tracking radar in Siberia, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
- The Soviets have deployed the world's only operational weapon for destroying satellites.
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SDI

The media and political opponents of SDI have found it convenient to present SDI in caricature, as the "so-called 'Star Wars' proposal." It is no wonder that many Americans are confused about the President's proposal and think the U.S. currently has a defense against missiles.

- An Associated press-Media General poll released in August found that 60 percent of Americans felt that the U.S. had either a good or an excellent defense against a Soviet missile attack.

- In fact, the U.S. is utterly defenseless against Soviet rockets.

Americans Want Enhanced Security

When the American people are asked to evaluate concepts, rather than the labels such as "Star Wars," they support SDI. Evidence:

Two days after the President's return from Iceland, polls taken by major news organizations showed the public supports President Reagan's refusal to surrender his Strategic Defense Initiative.

- A New York Times/CBS News poll shows 68 percent support.
- Nearly 60 percent polled by the Washington Post/ABC News poll said Reagan should retain his commitment to SDI.
- According to the Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll, only 15 percent of the American people think SDI is a bad idea.

Penne + Schoen Associates (9/27/86)

Question: SDI is a research program to develop a system to destroy incoming nuclear missiles before they reach their targets. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. going ahead with the research and development phases of SDI?

Favor -- 81%  Oppose -- 19%

Question: If such a system could be developed, would you favor or oppose using it in the United States?

Favor -- 78%  Oppose -- 22%

ABC News (1/4/85 - 1/6/85)

Question: Do you favor or oppose developing such defensive weapons (which use lasers and particle beams to shoot down enemy missiles), or what?

Favor -- 49%  Oppose -- 44%

Heritage Foundation/Stratfor & Co. Poll (5/27/85)

99 percent of the American people would support a Strategic Defense program if it would make a Soviet Missile attack less likely.
SDI — Enhance Peace/Safer World

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: In your opinion, would developing this system (Star Wars or space-based defense against nuclear attack) make the world safer from nuclear destruction or less safe?

Make world safer — 50%  Make world less safe — 32%

Decision Making/Information (2/8/86 - 2/9/86)

Question: SDI is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Others say that SDI is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Is SDI research a good idea or a bad idea?

Good idea — 62%  Bad idea — 31%

SDI — Technical Feasibility

CBS News/New York Times (1/2/85 - 1/4/85)

Question: Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defensive nuclear system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reach the United States, a system some people call Star Wars. Do you think such a system could work?

Yes — 62%  No — 23%

SDI — Arms Reduction

Louis Harris and Associates (3/2/85 - 3/5/85)

Question: Agree or disagree...Once the Russians knew we were successfully building a new anti-nuclear defense system, they would be much more willing to agree to a treaty that would halt the nuclear arms race.

Agree — 52%  Disagree — 44%

Gallup Organization (1/25/85 - 1/28/85)

Question: Would the United States' developing this system Star Wars, a space-based defense against nuclear attack, increase or decrease the likelihood of reaching a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union?

Increase — 47%  Decrease — 32%
October 16, 1986

THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

--The President's Strategic Defense Initiative offers our best hope of a safer world where our and our Allies' security would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

--SDI is a research and technology development program to demonstrate by the early 1990s the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for targeting missiles in all phases of their flight—boost, mid-course, and terminal.

--SDI is critical to progress toward arms reduction agreements. It brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table and now acts as the necessary lever that for the first time has them talking seriously about deep reductions of the most dangerous weapons—offensive ballistic missiles.

--SDI is not only the needed lever to get the Soviets to reduce, but is also insurance underwriting arms reduction agreements by:

- deterring the use of offensive arms;
- removing any incentives for again building up offensive forces;
- guaranteeing that cheating won't pay; and,
- protecting against the potential threat of a madman obtaining ballistic missiles.

--The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs. These include:

- the world's only ABM defenses, surrounding Moscow, which they are steadily improving;
- construction of a large phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the ABM Treaty; and
- research, development and testing, including for example a $1 billion annual program on lasers alone, employing some 10,000 scientists and engineers.

--We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses. Possessed by both sides, such defenses can be stabilizing. Possessed by the Soviet Union alone, effective strategic defenses would be devastating to U.S. security.
In short, we think it far better to rely increasingly on defensive systems—that threaten no one—with sharp reductions of offensive nuclear weapons, near term elimination of ALL US and Soviet ballistic missiles, and hopefully over time the ultimate elimination of ALL nuclear weapons. SDI is the key to that future.
Moscow's Conflicting Signals on Linkage

...bottom line is that only Karpov has publicly said that an INF agreement can be reached separately. All other Soviet spokesmen have maintained that the Reykjavik proposals are inseparable.

Karpov said in a press conference that there could be a separate solution on medium-range weapons in Europe without linkage to the ABM treaty or SDI.

Karpov continued this line in Germany and stated unambiguously that the USSR was prepared to conclude a separate INF agreement.

At the same time however, in remarks cited in Pravda, Gorbachev said that Moscow's "platform of new proposals, which are inseparable from each other and none of which are being dropped, provides an opportunity to invigorate the search for mutually acceptable decisions," implying that an INF agreement was tied to the other two areas. This line differed from Gorbachev's earlier statement that Reykjavik had created a "qualitatively new" situation.

Other Soviet spokesmen emphasized that the Reykjavik proposals were a package:

...the Soviet Ambassador to Finland emphasized that the Soviet "package" had to be taken as a whole. He added that the previous Soviet position that INF could be treated separately had been overtaken by events.

...In a Moscow interview, Soviet General Staff spokesman, Beletov, said that the Reykjavik proposals form a package and that it was impossible for the U.S. to take only some elements of the package and ignore others.

...Soviet MFA spokesman Gerasimov said yesterday that Moscow would only agree to sign a full package of arms control measures but that "experts" could continue to work out details on an INF accord. He reportedly said that he thought this was what Karpov had meant by his remarks.
MEMORANDUM FOR:   Vice Admiral
                  John M. Poindexter
                  Assistant to the President
                  for National Security Affairs
                  The White House

FROM:      Charles Z. Wick
            Director

SUBJECT: SDI and INF Dominate Revitalized Strategic
         Debate in post-Reykjavik Europe

Summary: Europeans believe that Reykjavik has created a "new
situation" between the superpowers and that the proposals
tabled by the President and the General Secretary may have unexplored
ramifications for Europe. In particular, the negotiations to
reduce to zero medium-range missiles in Europe and the deadlock
over SDI have thrust SDI and the strategic implication of a total
withdrawal of American INF missiles from Europe into the center of
a revitalized strategic debate in Europe. End Summary.

Europeans are taking seriously Gorbachev's statement that a
"qualitatively new situation developed" between the superpowers at
Reykjavik. They see evidence of this "new situation" in the speed
with which both sides have followed up in public on the proposals
discussed in Reykjavik.

Europeans are also taking seriously the President's statement,
repeated by Secretary Shultz and others, that "once it (an arms
reduction proposal) is on the table, it's there. You don't take
it off." For that reason, educated Europeans -- specialists and
non-specialists alike, publicly and in private -- are now
energetically sorting through the implications for Europe of the
space defense and nuclear arms reduction proposals made by the
superpowers in Reykjavik, with SDI and INF dominating the emerging
debate.

In Reykjavik, the President's steadfastness on SDI and Gorbachev's
singleminded drive to kill it have finally convinced many
Europeans of the serious need for Europe itself to come to grips
with the evolving relationship between strategic offense and
defense. They see SDI as a symbol of the new strategic reality to
be faced, possibly as a component of it, but almost universally
not as the solution to it.
The apparent near agreement in Reykjavik to reduce medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe to zero amazed many specialist as well as non-specialist Europeans, who expected modest reductions, not total elimination. In France, Britain and the FRG fears of an America strategically de-coupled from Europe have suddenly revived in private conversation and in print. In France in particular, there is real and widespread suspicion of any radical reduction in NATO's existing nuclear arsenal.

The following USIS posts were surveyed in the preparation of this report: USIS USNATO, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Copenhagen, Oslo.
Monday, October 27 [1986]

An NSPG meeting on the Iceland arms proposals. The Joint Chiefs wanted reassurances that were aware of the imbalance with Soviets in conventional arms & how threat would be aggravated by reduction in nuclear weapons. We were able to assure them we were very much aware & that this matter would have to be negotiated with the Soviets in any nuclear arms reduction negotiations. Signed a bill for freshman Colorado Congressmen Mike Strang having to do with water conveyance in National Forests. Then over to the East Room for a big signing of the Drug Bill. Some Olympic athletes were on hand & some kids – members of the “Just Say No” Club. Charles Price – Carol & their son & daughter came by – they’re also coming to dinner tonite for Angus & Princess Alexandra. Just a small, private dinner. Cap W. & John Poindexter for more talk re the arms negotiations. We have a problem with Cong. & its cuts in the defense budget. Conventional arms are more expensive then missiles. If we have to rev up that part of the mil. the Cong. is going to have to recognize it & raise the ante. I feel however the Soviets if faced with an arms race would have to negotiate – they can’t squeeze their people any more to try & stay even with us. A long taping session & then upstairs for dinner.

I’ll host it alone for a while – Nancy’s hairdresser was late.
Source: RRPL Exec.
Secretariat, NSC, NSDDs
Records, 1981-87, Box
91293 (010R-NSDDs)
NSDD 250-Post Reykjavik
Follow up (Folders 1-9)
—Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Post-Reykjavik Activities (U)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive providing guidance for the development of a detailed plan for the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. [2]

Access to this NSDD and the related products called for by this document should be limited only to those who need to know or assist in the development of these specific products. [2]

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John N. Poindexter

Attachment:
NSDD-250
At my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12, 1986, we were able to reach a series of understandings that will serve as the foundation for future progress in a number of areas. With respect to nuclear arms control matters, the common ground that exists between positions of the two sides was substantially expanded in both the START and INF areas. A path toward progress was also uncovered in the area of nuclear testing. However, as we neared the end of the time allotted for our second day of discussions, the General Secretary placed great emphasis on the Soviet need for the United States to agree not to exercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of time in excess of 10 years. At the same time, he asked me to accept additional restrictions on some aspects of our SDI program that go well beyond the existing treaty restrictions. He ultimately tied making further progress at that meeting, even on those areas of understanding which we had already reached, to US willingness to make such a commitment with respect to a "strengthened" ABM Treaty. (U)

I did not intend to leave Reykjavik with any potential path to progress left unexplored. Therefore, I told the General Secretary that, for the US part, we would be willing to consider any approach as long as it did not demand of us that we compromise our fundamental principles, our security and that of our allies, or our hopes for a more stable future through a transition to an increased reliance on defenses that threaten no one. (U)

Further, I made it clear that I believed that we should make progress in each substantive arms control area based on the individual merits of the understandings reached in that area. We should not hold the potential increased mutual benefits to security and stability achievable by such progress hostage to either side's desires in other areas of discussion. (U)

With respect to the specific Soviet demand for a US commitment not to exercise our existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, I explained that a blanket commitment to waive all rights of withdrawal would not be acceptable, and that any US attempt to meet Soviet concerns in this regard should not be interpreted by the Soviet Union as US readiness to forfeit its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty due to supreme national interest or in the face of material breach of the treaty by a party. (U)
Therefore, as an attempt to see if I could find a way to respond to the General Secretary's concern in a manner that met the criteria outlined above, I reviewed the various elements of the previous US proposals to see if they could be reformulated in a novel way so as to meet both US and Soviet concerns. As a result of this effort, I offered the following initial proposal which laid out the conditions under which I was prepared to consider meeting the basic thrust of the Soviet request. (U)

Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of 5 years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of the second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses. (U)

The General Secretary responded to this with the following Soviet proposal. (U)

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. (U)

This Soviet proposal was clearly unacceptable in a number of respects. It sought to have the US accept restrictions on research on advanced defenses well beyond those specified in the existing ABM Treaty. It redefined the conditions for the subsequent five-year period to involve the elimination of all strategic forces of the US and the Soviet Union. And, it did not include a positive commitment that, following the ten-year period, either side could then begin the transition to increased reliance on advanced defenses. (U)
Having evaluated the Soviet offer, I again attempted to find an appropriate bridge between the US and Soviet positions. In this effort, I tried to use as much as possible of the Soviet proposal. The result was the following second US offer which was designed to correct the key problems associated with the Soviet proposal while making it clear that in this context the US was prepared to meet what was perceived to be the central Soviet concern by an appropriately limited US commitment not to exercise its existing right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1996 for the purpose of deploying advanced defenses. It was this US offer which was the US offer of record when the discussions ended without further agreement. (U)

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise. (U)

Eliminating All Offensive Ballistic Missiles. At the heart of the last US proposal made at Reykjavik is the expressed US commitment to join a bilateral agreement to delay any deployment of US and Soviet advanced defenses against ballistic missiles until after the elimination of all US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles, with this US commitment made in return for a corresponding Soviet commitment to join a parallel bilateral agreement to complete this elimination within a specific period of time. The ten-year period of the US proposal was associated with the period through 1996 because I will not permit the possibility of the US moving to a more stable deterrent, unilaterally if need be, to slip further into the future. This specific ten-year period was chosen to balance the Soviet desire to have the US commitment not to deploy defenses for as long as possible against the US desire to find an appropriate means of eliminating the threat currently posed by offensive ballistic missiles as quickly as possible. (U)

The elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is not a new objective for the US. In 1983, when I announced the establishment of the SDI program I did so with the specific objective of making offensive ballistic missiles obsolete. It was examined as a part of our review and response to the
proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev in January, 1986, which went beyond this to call for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons within the next 14 years. In short, it is an objective that we have studied and discussed both within the US government and with our allies, most recently in the deliberations that led to my July 25, 1986, letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. (U)

In the preparations for that letter, I initially focused on my desire to make a concrete proposal which would formalize my offer to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviet Union, should our research into such defenses meet the objectives that we have set. However, when considering this idea, the Secretary of Defense correctly pointed out that it made little sense to commit to share the benefits of advanced defenses with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union insisted on continuing to retain large numbers of offensive ballistic missiles which would, in turn, attempt to defeat our defenses. After discussion and study by my principal advisors, it was agreed that the new US proposal should contain a specific call for a plan for the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. Therefore, my July 25 letter to the General Secretary was framed to incorporate this objective as a key element of the new US proposal presented in that letter. After full consultation with our allies on this and the other elements of the proposal to be contained in this correspondence, I finalized and sent the letter. (U)

Additionally, the objective of the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles is consistent with what we have been trying to do for some time both in START and in INF, and also with the fundamental goal that I specifically set for the SDI program. (U)

With respect to the START negotiations, our position has long been that while each side may need nuclear forces for some time to deter conflict and underwrite its security, neither side needs fast-flying, non-recallable offensive ballistic missiles for this purpose. From the very first, in START, we have been trying to draw a clear distinction between fast-flying ballistic systems, which are uniquely suited for an attempted first-strike by an aggressor, and slow-flying systems which are better suited for deterrence through the prospect of retaliation. As a result, we have been attempting to focus on reductions in ballistic missile warheads (which also are an area of Soviet advantage) as the heart of the issue to be resolved -- and have addressed restrictions on slow-flying systems largely as means to meet Soviet concerns. (U)

In the INF negotiations, we have taken a similar position. We have kept the focus on missiles, and avoided discussion of dual-capable, tactical aircraft. We proposed the zero-zero solution for the LRINF missile problem. We have called for the similar reduction and elimination of shorter-range ballistic
missiles, missiles that pose as direct a threat to our Allies and our forces deployed in support of those allies, as Soviet ICBMs do to the United States. (U)

With respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative, my specific, stated goal has always been to make ballistic missiles obsolete. Here, again, our focus has been on promptly eliminating the threat posed by these fast-flying missiles. (U)

In Iceland, at the critical point of attempting to find a response to Soviet concerns which would not compromise our principles, our security, or our future, I drew upon previously completed work with respect to the objective of eliminating the threat posed by offensive ballistic missiles, and I incorporated this objective into my response to the Soviet call for a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. By doing so, we undercut any Soviet objection to our having the right to deploy defenses as insurance, since we would have committed to delay until all offensive ballistic missiles of the two superpowers should have been eliminated. By calling for the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles of all ranges, we also, in one step, addressed the problem of eliminating both the last 100 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Asia (a concern of our Asian allies) and the remaining shorter-range INF missiles that still would threaten our European allies (a particular concern of our German allies). (C)

An Alternative Future. Should the Soviets accept the proposal I offered in Reykjavik, we would face a substantially different future than that we anticipate today. At the end of the ten-year period specified in the offer, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would possess any offensive ballistic missiles. When adequate advanced defenses are deployed, they should provide insurance against the return or covert retention of such missiles and guard against third country ballistic missiles. Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, although smaller than today and of a different composition, would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring US and allied security. (U)

With respect to strategic forces, by the end of 1996 the United States and Soviet Union could retain no more than 50 percent of today's strategic nuclear offensive forces. These forces would consist exclusively of bombers and cruise missiles. Since the major portion of forces of the United States and Soviet Union would be covered by agreements that would reduce these forces to equal levels (unlike the situation today), these forces should provide a sufficient strategic retaliatory capability to deter attack on the United States or its allies while eliminating the crisis stability problems inherent in the short time of flight ballistic missiles. At the same time, elimination of ballistic missiles on both sides would drastically
reduce the Soviet first strike potential and, to the extent Soviet fears of a US first strike are genuinely felt, would alleviate such concerns. (U)

With respect to our commitment to NATO, the remaining strategic nuclear systems would also provide the US nuclear umbrella over NATO which has been one of the pillars of NATO's strategy for decades. Not only would the US commitment to NATO's agreed strategy, as embodied in MC 14/3, remain, but the elimination of the ballistic missile threat to the United States and to NATO should increase the credibility of both NATO's ability to execute its strategy and the US commitment to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in accordance with that strategy in support of the alliance. (U)

The United States presently contributes to all legs of the "NATO triad": conventional forces, non-strategic nuclear forces, and strategic forces. That contribution would continue. Nuclear artillery and nuclear weapons on dual capable aircraft would continue to fill the twin deterrent roles of helping offset Soviet conventional superiority and serving as a link to strategic forces. Thus, while it will be essential to continue (or accelerate) current NATO initiatives to improve conventional capability, it will be equally essential for the foreseeable future to keep some nuclear forces (both strategic and non-strategic) to permit the United States and its allies to maintain the deterrence which is the heart of the NATO strategy set forth in MC 14/3. (U)

With respect to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, it is clear that in the alternative future that such an agreement would provide, the requirements that SDI would have to meet would be altered substantially. Deployments of advanced defenses against ballistic missiles could be sized to provide the insurance that we need against both any existing or potential third country threats and against the covert retention of ballistic systems by the Soviet Union. Even if ballistic missiles were covertly retained, only certain elements of such systems could be covertly tested (e.g. boosters under the guise of space launch systems). It would be extremely difficult covertly to test offensive ballistic missiles as integrated combat systems in a surface-to-surface mode in such an environment. Therefore, confidence in the overall reliability of such systems would degrade over time. Also, without the ability to conduct developments, testing of new offensive ballistic missile systems, the problem of the defenses having to constantly stay ahead of a technologically evolving ballistic missile threat may also be greatly reduced. In short, the size, complexity, and technological difficulty of fielding a militarily meaningful defensive system against any residual ballistic missile threat will be substantially different. If the US proposal were accepted and implemented, these factors may be reduced to the
point that, even based on the progress made in SDI to date, there would be little question that a scaled-down defense will be adequate and feasible under those future conditions. (U)

We can consider the possibility of more limited requirements for defense if ballistic missiles are actually eliminated. On the other hand, even if the Soviets were to accept the proposal that I made in Reykjavik, we will continue to need the leverage and protection produced by the possibility of being able to develop a system capable of handling a much more extensive and evolving offensive ballistic threat. (U)

Deterrence in such a future. The basic concept of deterrence in such an alternative future need not be altered. (U)

Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes so uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack. This would require that we possess a mix of military forces, including those nuclear and conventional forces providing defensive and retaliatory capabilities, that the Soviets will view as giving us the ability to deny them their political and military objectives. (U)

In short, deterrence of aggression is also achieved by maximizing an aggressor's uncertainty that he can achieve political objectives by force, and the certainty that he will face grave risk to things that he values most should he try. Certainly, the tools for maintaining deterrence will change. The challenge and opportunity that we face is to determine how best to channel that change. (U)

The potential impact of eliminating ballistic missiles on deterrence. The elimination of offensive ballistic missiles offers the possibility of enhancing deterrence because the slower pace associated with the employment of bomber and cruise missile forces makes their effective use by an aggressor in a first strike much more difficult. The effects of such an attempt are also much more uncertain. At the same time, it should be recognized that the certainty of the ability of the US to respond to a first strike with strategic forces which are not degraded by that attempted attack is considerably higher when both sides have only slow flying systems. These considerations should be factored into evaluations of the military sufficiency of alternative forces to deter and to respond to a first strike. (U)

In today's world, or in a future that builds on today's trends, ballistic missiles are uniquely suited to be employed by an aggressor with relatively certain results. The time between the detection of a ballistic missile attack and its arrival is so short that it freezes the situation, reducing the options of the
party attacked so that they can be largely anticipated by an aggressor. Facing no defenses, there can be little doubt that, if ballistic missiles function reliably, they will arrive on target. Finally, predicting the specific levels of damage they can inflict on a target is largely a matter of physics. Their effectiveness does not depend on the skill, courage or training of man in the loop. It depends on the technological reliability of the system which can be tested and measured in peacetime. (U)

If such systems were eliminated, the uncertainty in the mind of an aggressor must increase because of the loss of their unique characteristics. Provided that we take steps to ensure that other forms of attack are not permitted to rebuild that certainty over time, the result can be a significant net gain in terms of the quality of deterrence and, in turn, in our security and that of our allies. In considering the requirements for maintaining deterrence in such a future world, a high premium should be placed on identifying, determining the feasibility of, and taking such steps. (U)

Measuring the Impact on Deterrence. In measuring our ability to deter in an alternative future, we must take into account the elimination of the contribution of our own ballistic missiles and the corresponding relative increase in the degree of our uncertainty in predicting the effectiveness of our retaliatory strike, should deterrence fail. But at the same time, we must also properly reflect in our measurements the contribution that this same inherent uncertainty makes in deterring an aggressor. We should also consider the even more fundamental contribution that is made to our security should we face an aggressor who is not rational or finds himself placed in an irrational situation by events that have gotten beyond his control, but who is armed only with systems against which we can build a reasonable defense should we choose to do so. We must also weigh the real and immediate benefits of removing an immense, existing threat to the United States that is literally only thirty minutes away. Nor can we forget that, unlike Soviet stated policy, US strategic and nuclear forces are intended to make an explicitly identified contribution to the deterrence of conventional attack on our Allies and our forces deployed in support of our Allies. (U)

In accomplishing this measurement, to the extent practical, we should attempt to approach the problem from the point of view of a net assessment of all considerations involved. Our present analytic tools will fall short of resolving all the questions such an alternative future presents. Therefore, until new methods adapted to the challenges and opportunities of this alternative future are fully developed, we will have to depend heavily on the experience, expertise, resourcefulness, creativity, and judgment of our professional military and defense community. I believe that this, too, plays into a significant aspect of our strength. (U)
The Immediate Task Ahead. At this time, it is not clear whether the Soviet Union will have the wisdom to accept the US proposal which I made in Reykjavik. The main thrust of our national security planning and military programming should not be altered now in anticipation of such an uncertain possibility. In fact, if we were prematurely to adjust our current military plans and programs for either the modernization of our own ballistic missile forces or to limit the scope of our SDI program, the Soviet Union would certainly attempt to pocket these actions without a reciprocal response on their part. Unilateral action of this sort would be counterproductive and dangerous. It would not only reduce the likelihood of our convincing the Soviet Union to join us in the approach to a future elimination of offensive ballistic missiles contained in my Reykjavik proposals, but it would also reduce our security and that of our allies. (U)

However, I want to ensure that we are prepared to exploit, fully and safely, our proposal should the Soviet Union be willing to join us in its pursuit. In order to do so, the necessary foundation of detailed, careful planning must be laid now. Therefore, I request the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under direction of the Secretary of Defense and drawing upon other agencies as necessary, to provide a plan which would permit the US to safely transition to the alternative future I have proposed. (U)

The nature of the plan. This plan should catalogue the necessary national security requirements to support the implementation of the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996 as proposed in the last US offer made at Reykjavik. It should fully take into account the discussion of deterrence that I have provided above. Having done so, it should propose programmatic and non-programmatic approaches -- including changes in military strategy and tactics, force structure and posture, and additional supportive arms control/reduction initiatives -- which could be used to meet and fulfill those requirements. The identification of multiple and competing approaches to meeting requirements is encouraged. If alternative paths or methods exist, they should be presented. Finally, the resource implications of all alternatives should be estimated and provided with the alternatives. (U)

Assumptions. In developing this plan, the following assumptions should be used: (U)

-- With respect to the 50 percent reductions in strategic forces to be taken in the first five years:
   1. there will be no sublimit on heavy bombers within the 1,600 ceiling on the number of SBDVs; and
   2. within the 6,000 ceiling associated with ballistic missile warheads, air-launched cruise missiles, and (indirectly) other bomber weapons:

   (a) there will be no sublimit on ALCMs;
(b) each ALCM on a heavy bomber counts as one warhead;
(c) all the gravity bombs and SRAM on a single heavy bomber counts as one warhead; and
(d) SLCMs will not be included in this number. (CF)

-- The US and Soviet Union will eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. As a departure point for planning, the term offensive ballistic missiles should be applied to missiles of all ranges and carrying any type of weapon designed for use in a surface-to-surface mode. Air-to-surface missiles that employ a ballistic trajectory should not be included. Artillery, rocket assisted artillery rounds, and rocket assisted ASW systems should also not be included. Recommendations with respect to alternative or additional limitations on the term "offensive ballistic missile" are encouraged. (CF)

-- While eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, the United States will not abandon the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence. (U)

-- The strategic policy and targeting priorities of NSDD-13 should be considered as an initial baseline. They should be critically reviewed in the context of the purposes of the development of this plan. Recommendations concerning alternative formulations which may be more appropriate for a ballistic missile-free world are encouraged. These alternatives should be provided as soon as possible so that they can be reviewed and, if considered appropriate, approved for use for this planning activity.

-- It will continue to be an objective of US policy to

-- The Strategic Defense Initiative will be given adequate resources;

-- The NATO strategy embodied in MC 14/1 will remain in effect and be fully supported by the United States. The current NATO efforts to raise the nuclear threshold through conventional improvements will continue. (U)
For the purpose of this plan, the total resources available to the Department of Defense will not exceed current planning levels, with a rate of growth thereafter not to exceed three percent in real terms. However, the reorientation of priorities may be considered within those totals. Should the JCS consider additional resources essential, they should so indicate as an exception to their baseline plan.

-- The military capabilities associated with this plan will be acquired under peacetime, non-mobilization conditions, where this guideline, constraints on our industrial capacity, or constraints on non-fiscal resources (ranging from availability of trained manpower to the availability of special nuclear materials) impact upon achieving desired force levels, this fact should be explicitly indicated, with a clear identification of the governing constraint.

-- In Soviet acceptance of the proposals made in Reykjavik which would open the possibility of the projected alternative future in question, the Soviet Union would also agree to monitoring as necessary to permit effective verification of their compliance.

-- This being said, the US plan for implementing the ten-year path to the negotiated elimination of ballistic missiles should be such that, should the Soviet Union not act in accord with the agreements reached, the United States could stop the reductions and elimination process, and take additional responses as necessary, at any step along the way without unacceptable risk.

Initial progress report. In developing this plan, an initial progress report should be submitted not later than December 1, 1984, which addresses the following:

-- initial recommendations, if any, with respect to national policy guidance and strategy for the employment of nuclear and non-nuclear forces that should be considered in the development of such an plan;

-- an explanation of the analytic methodology planned for evaluating risk and force effectiveness in support of the development of the plan, recognizing, as mentioned earlier, that military expertise and judgment will play a critically important role accomplishing the overall task;

-- a description of the initial basic planning assumptions that will be used concerning friendly forces available during the period in question, corresponding hostile forces, critical missions to be accomplished, and, the general nature and characteristics of the targets associated with these missions.
-- a method for appropriately folding into this planning process the contribution of highly compartmented programs while maintaining their security; and

-- an estimate, submitted for my approval, of the date upon which this plan will be available for my final review. (TS)

Issues to be addressed in the full plan. The final completed plan should address at a minimum:

-- recommendations on the appropriate phasing of the elimination of US ballistic missiles by 1996 in the context of the US proposal, and those steps which we could take to ensure that the phasing of the elimination of Soviet ballistic missiles is accomplished in an appropriate manner (and preferably in a manner advantageous to US and Allied security);

-- recommendations on specific changes in strategic nuclear force employment strategy and related force structure made necessary by the elimination of both US and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles;

-- recommendations on similar changes in the associated strategy for the employment, deployment and structural development.
-- recommendations on additional general purpose capabilities that may be needed (e.g., increased ASW capability);

-- recommendations on additional improvements in any area needed to ensure that the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent relative to NATO and our overall military capability to meet NATO and other alliance commitments are maintained;

-- recommendations on how we can best use technological advantage to implement competitive strategies in support of this plan;

-- recommendations on how other existing arms control proposals, including in the conventional area, could be made more supportive of national security as a consequence of the elimination of ballistic missiles;

-- recommendations concerning how we can best address the US commitment to pursue in START limitations on SLCMs with the Soviet Union in the context of this plan; and

Treatment of Risk. In formulating the alternatives and making the assessments associated with this plan, the objective of the baseline plan should be to hold overall levels of risk generally constant. It is unlikely that the risk could be kept genuinely constant in the projected environment which will be continually changing over the ten-year period. On the other hand, every effort should be made to avoid even short periods of greatly increased risk and to remain within a band of acceptable risk using today’s levels as the departure point. (U)

An appropriate methodology for measuring risk over the period being considered will be required to ensure this objective is met. Sources of greatest risk and uncertainty should be documented as they are identified and addressed in the development of the plan. (U)

Alternatives that reduce risk at no significant cost can and should be included within the baseline plan. Alternatives that reduce overall levels of military risk from current or anticipated levels (as measured assuming currently planned or programmed forces), and that significantly increase the cost or difficulty of achieving an executable baseline plan can also be
considered and presented. However, these should be presented as excursions to the baseline plan. (U)

Associated Taskings. It goes without saying that the assurance of effective verification is essential to our entering into the arms control agreements that are assumed as the backdrop for the above tasking. Therefore, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the participation and drawing upon the assistance of other appropriate agencies, should prepare a supporting plan which recommends a preferred path, and alternative paths where appropriate, for achieving the effective verification of the assumed arms control agreements. (U)

Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence should provide:

-- an assessment of the Soviet Union's intentions and capability, both military and economic, to satisfy its own national strategy and strategic force objectives;

-- an assessment of the intentions and potential capabilities of other countries which currently have, or could obtain, ballistic missiles; and

-- an assessment of the intelligence resources needed both to monitor Soviet compliance in such an alternative future and to support the evolving projected US military requirements associated with that future. (U)

Implementation. The objective is the optimal executable plan, with alternative paths where appropriate, which would permit me to move quickly to exploit any Soviet willingness to join us in the proposal involving the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles within ten years which I made in Reykjavik. This should be completed on a priority basis. (U)

Access to this NSDD and to the resulting products should be limited only to those with a clear need to know about and assist in the development of each individual product. (U)

Ronald Reagan
Saturday, November 15 [1986]

Margaret Thatcher arrived. I met the helicopter in a golf cart & brought her back to Aspen were we had a good one-on-one re our Iceland meetings & what we ware trying to achieve in arms reductions. She had some legitimate concerns. I was able to reassure her. Then we went down to Laurel where I did the radio cast then lunch – a working lunch with her sec. & Ambas. in attendance plus Don. R., Geo. S., John P., & some W. H. staff. We covered the Iran setup etc. She & the others left. Later in Wash. she did a press conf. & went to bat for us. Most helpful.
Tuesday, November 25 [1986]

John P. came in this morning & announced he was leaving the NSC & returning to the Navy. I told him I wouldn’t refuse his resignation but regretted it. I explained that I know the press would crucify him if he stayed & he didn’t deserve that. What it was all about was that Ed Meese learned several months ago the Israelis delivered some of our arms to Iran but expected a higher price than we had asked. They sent us our price then past the balance in a Swiss bank account belonging to the Contras – their way of helping the Contras at a time when Congress was refusing aid to the Contras. John resigned because he had gotten wind of this game but didn’t look into it or tell me. In the old Navy tradition he accepted the responsibility as Captain of the ship. We broke the story – I told the press what we’d learned. This headed them off from finding out about it & accusing us of a cover up. I’ve asked Ed Meese to continue digging in case there is anything we missed & I’m appointing a commission to review the whole matter of how NSC Staff works. Ed Meese stayed with the press & took their Q’s. They were like a circle of sharks.

Lunch was at the W. H. with returning Justices of the Supreme Court. It was a fun time. Then an NSC meeting to see how we’d handle the rollout of the 131st B2 bomber equipped for nuclear cruise missiles. It puts us 1 plane above the restraints of SALT II which the Soviets & us had agreed to observe even though the treaty had never been ratified. The Soviets have regularly violated the agreement. My decision is to h--l with them we roll out the plane. Upstairs to the lonely W.H. Mommie left for the West today. I join her tomorrow.
Part Four: International Diplomacy

1987
Record of Conversation
of Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces
Marshal of the Soviet Union
February 4, 1987

Akhromeev. Allow me to welcome you to Moscow. We welcome you, prominent
statesmen of the United States, who have made a great contribution to the development of
Soviet-American relations and to reaching agreements on arms limitations in the 1970s.
Regrettably, since then, during the 1980s, we have made almost no progress.
Perhaps your visit to Moscow will to some extent help us to sort through the heaps that
we have piled up around us in the 1980s, especially the U.S. administration. But since
negotiations are a bilateral process it seems we have also played a part in stacking up
these heaps. We are prepared to talk with you.

Brown. Mr. Marshal, I want to specify right away that we are not expressing the
views of the current U.S. administration here and therefore we cannot hope to resolve the
problems that have been stacking up because of our government. We do not intend to
resolve questions of arms limitations for the U.S. administration. We are here as private
persons. But whatever interests we represent, I must say that we are deeply interested in
issues of mutual security.

I think that it is in the interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union right now to
participate in an intensive dialogue with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable, fair
agreements and providing strategic stability. It is clear to all of us that the issues of
strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive weapons are closely related. We also
know that the USSR included medium-range weapons in the single package of its
proposals in Reykjavik. Without question, the negotiations going on in Geneva aimed at
significantly reducing nuclear weapons in every category are useful. However, I cannot
say whether these negotiations will be successful in the last two years of Reagan’s
administration. Hopefully, the achievements in Geneva over the next couple of years will
positively influence the next U.S. administration’s work in the sphere of arms control.

Vance. I fully agree with Mr. Brown’s observations. I would also like to draw
your attention to the objective necessity of conducting the negotiations in Geneva during
the remaining two years of Reagan’s term. We have already been asked numerous times
in Moscow whether we believe in the possibility of success for the negotiations in the
near future. And although the short-term outlook for the negotiations is uncertain, I think
it would be a mistake to expect no progress from the Geneva negotiations and to take
them less seriously as a result of this pessimistic viewpoint. I do not know whether
anything can be achieved in Geneva during the next couple of years, but I am absolutely
convinced that the failure or cessation of the negotiations would be a grave mistake.
Regardless of who will be president of the United States in 1988, the situation would be
most unfavorable if the progress of the negotiations were stopped at some period during
these two years.

Kissinger. I agree with my colleagues. Progress in the next two years is possible.
The disagreements between our delegations are not so significant. Should the
negotiations fail over the next two years it would mean stagnation on the question of the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons for at least three or four years.

I would like to use this opportunity to state my personal position on the issue of the negotiations. As you know, I was against the U.S. position stated by President Reagan in Reykjavik on strategic weapons. I was opposed because as I thought then and think now, the goal of our negotiations should be not only the reduction or liquidation of strategic weapons, but the search for an agreement that would provide strategic stability for both sides. The negotiations taking place in Geneva right now stipulate the preservation of existing trends in weapons development. I think it is necessary to work out a different approach to the negotiations.

But whatever the case may be, the negotiations in Geneva are taking place and I would not want them to fail. As for my publications on this matter, I doubt that they will be translated into Russian. But I repeat that I am not against the negotiations.

Akhromeev. We read a great deal on these issues, including your publications, so we have the appropriate information.

Jones. I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you once again Mr. Marshal. With great satisfaction I recall our meeting last year. I was impressed then by your deep interest in questions of arms control.

When I represented the U.S. armed forces, I spoke in favor of the SALT I and SALT II agreements. I, myself, and my colleagues from the Heads of State Committee currently speak in favor of arms control. We are in favor of reducing not only strategic but also conventional weapons.

I also agree with Dr. Kissinger and I think that in Reykjavik our side’s approach to the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons was too narrow. In my opinion, the total liquidation of strategic ballistic missiles will not promote the establishment of strategic stability between our countries. Major reductions of strategic weapons will without question yield positive results. But for real stability it is necessary to foresee the reduction of conventional forces and arms. I would like to hear your opinion on this question, Mr. Marshal.

Vance. In addition to what has been stated by General Jones, I would like to express my concern in relation to the liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons and mid-range nuclear weapons. Even if such an agreement were developed between our two sides, it would have little chance of being approved by the U.S. Congress. But the U.S. Congress would approve an agreement on major reductions in strategic weapons. If we speak realistically, nuclear missiles will be in our arsenals for many years to come.

Akhromeev. Allow me to state my point of view.

Firstly, concerning the desire to continue negotiations and understanding the fact that the Soviet Union will have to work with any U.S. administration that comes to power. We understand quite clearly that whoever has power in the United States, the USSR will have to work and negotiate with that administration. We cannot influence who comes to power in the U.S., just as the United States cannot influence who comes to
power in the Soviet Union. Since this is the case, we understand very well that we have to work with the Reagan administration while he is in power for two more years.

We view the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons with full responsibility and would like to reach an agreement. You should have no doubts about this.

In my opinion there is one fundamental question that right now is the primary one which hinders us from reaching an agreement. This is the question Mr. Brown mentioned—about the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons. At one time the American side also did not deny this relationship and with your active participation, Mr. Kissinger, we signed agreements in which this relationship was emphasized in many ways. That was in 1972. Now the Reagan administration is telling us: “Let us reduce strategic offensive weapons.” It was proposed to reduce them by 50%, and in Reykjavik President Reagan even proposed to reduce land- and sea-based ballistic missiles by 100%. But the relationship mentioned earlier is denied by the American administration—they talk about reducing strategic offensive weapons and at the same time of the possibility of developing a national anti-missile defense system, including the development of an ABM space combat echelon. I think I do not have to explain this to you at great length: it is impossible to radically reduce strategic offensive weapons and at the same time develop a country’s anti-missile defense system.

For example, C[aspar] Weinberger is saying that the country’s first echelon of its anti-missile defense system should be developed as soon as possible. My opinion is that as soon as the first combat space systems capable of striking satellites and warheads of ballistic missiles appear in space every hope for any reductions or even limitations of strategic offensive weapons will be made null and void. Then a real arms race will start, the likes of which none of us has ever seen before.

Is it possible to reach any agreement during the last two years of Reagan’s term? It is. We have similar positions on limiting strategic offensive weapons and mid-range missiles, but they are tied up by the question of space, and by the question of creating an anti-missile defense system with a space echelon. If we could agree on not creating combat systems in space, I think we could agree on the rest of the questions as well.

On the question of arms control, which General Jones spoke about—I think the time has come when this question is becoming irrelevant because the Soviet Union is prepared to enforce every kind of verification. This concerns all types of weapons and it seems that everybody can see this progress from our side.

And now on the question of the total liquidation of strategic offensive weapons. You say that the U.S. Congress will not ratify such an agreement. This proposal did not initiate with the Soviet Union but with President Reagan. You know the packet that we came to Reykjavik with, and we presented it to your delegation. More precisely, this was during the talks between the U.S. President and the CC CPSU General Secretary. At the conclusion of talks on the second day President Reagan proposed that we completely liquidate intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles over the next 10 years.

The Soviet delegation considered this proposal during a short recess. The question arose of accepting these proposals emanating from the American side, but of accepting them fairly, which would mean not excluding bombers—we would need to liquidate all three components of the “triad.” The CC CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev presented this proposal to the President.
The President took a break, collected his delegation and discussed this proposal with his advisers for an hour and fifteen minutes. Afterwards he announced that he agreed with the CC CPSU General Secretary’s proposal. This is what happened. I have not added anything.

If we proceed consecutively and gradually, then we could settle on 50% reductions as the space question is being resolved.

Now on conventional weapons. We agree with reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. The West maintains that the Warsaw Treaty and the USSR have surpassed NATO and the U.S. in conventional weapons. I think that all four of you have comprehensive information on this issue. You all were in positions in which you had all the data right in front of you.

The armed forces of NATO and the WTO are about the same in numbers; we could argue forever about the differences in amounts and quality of weapons. Once, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said that when a correspondent asked him whether he would like to exchange his armed forces for the armed forces of the Soviet Union he answered flatly: no, he would not like to do that. We also would not like to do that. I am saying that a balance in the military is an objective reality. It exists not only in the strategic sphere, but also in the general forces and conventional weapons.

Conventional armed forces have one serious feature. This feature is that we do not allow a global approach in evaluating them. We speak of reducing the armed forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Here a military balance exists. We are ready to start negotiations and we have concrete proposals—to reduce the armed forces of the two alliances in Europe by 25%. This proposal was offered in June of last year in Budapest. Regrettably, we have not even started an exchange of opinions on this question, although it is no fault of ours. But the WTO Budapest proposal remains valid and we are prepared to work persistently to realize it in negotiations.

An issue arises in resolving the problem of conventional weapons—and here I would like to mention that this is not an official proposal but my personal opinion—the time is coming when a global approach is necessary for conventional armed forces. We consider strategic weapons globally; following the suggestion of the U.S. we consider medium-range missiles globally. Right now the U.S. is working on making missiles with less than a 1000-km range a global issue also. Your delegation produced this proposal at the negotiations in Geneva. The question arises: why are conventional armed forces not a global issue? But I repeat that this is only my personal opinion. The heads of the Warsaw Treaty states presented an official proposal in Budapest—to reduce the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals by 25 percent. This proposal is ready for discussion.

Jones. I would like to comment on the correlation of conventional weapons. Such factors as population and industrial capacity influence this correlation. In this sense, the Western countries surpass the Warsaw Treaty countries. But we are worried by your 40,000 tanks in the countries of Eastern Europe.

The time has come when we have to discuss questions related to conventional weapons, which could be a prelude to serious negotiations on the reduction of conventional troops and weapons.
Brown: I also think that reducing conventional forces and weapons is a very important issue. The opinion in the West is that the current correlation of conventional troops and weapons is not favorable to the West in case of a short-term war. Although in a 3-year war, for example, the outcome might not be in favor of the Warsaw Treaty. But very differing opinions on this issue exist.

Your idea of a global approach to reducing conventional troops and weapons is undoubtedly very interesting, Mr. Marshal. But certain questions would inevitably come up: how to take into account the armed forces of Iran, the PRC, India?

Akhromeev: I would like to mention once again that the conversation about a global approach during the consideration of conventional weapons is my personal opinion. In my opinion this issue is truly serious. I think General Jones understands very well that there are peacetime armies with a certain quantity of weapons and there are wartime armies. There is such a concept as troop mobilization in case of war. There is nothing you can do: life is such that we have to take into consideration the possibility of war. The Soviet Union’s mobilization resources are in Europe and they are included within the scope of weapons and forces that need to be reduced, while the U.S. territory with all of its mobilization resources is outside the scope of reductions. This means that such a question exists for the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I agree with you, Mr. Marshal. But is it possible to engage third countries in the process of reducing armed forces?

Akhromeev: Right now, probably not. That is why we propose to start negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. But the global issue does not disappear; we will have to deal with it.

Incidentally, when I mentioned this for the first time last September in Stockholm, the U.S. representative even took offense at me. He said that I had stepped outside the limits of the Stockholm requirements in my statement. But for my part this question was presented as a problem for the future.

Vance: If we reach an agreement on full liquidation of strategic nuclear weapons, the issue of reducing conventional armed forces for the provision of strategic stability will arise. In this situation the military force of the PRC would cause more worry to you than it would to us.

Akhromeev: If we achieve a sharp reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and begin reducing conventional weapons, then all countries will have to reduce their military forces. There was a reason why some of your allies were up in arms against President Reagan for what he proposed in Reykjavik. It is nice to reduce somebody else’s weapons, much less pleasant to reduce your own. Global-scale reductions of conventional weapons and military forces are only possible with the participation of all countries, including China.

But I only raise this question to show you that the very process of reductions in Europe has, for the Soviet Union, problematic links with the fact that U.S. territory is not encompassed by these negotiations. It works out that the U.S. does not mind reducing
Soviet weapons while the weapons on their territory remain inviolable. Such a question exists for us. There is also this question: we are always dealing with ground forces and tactical aviation. Meanwhile, the fleet remains on the sidelines, as if 15 American aircraft carriers are nothing, weapons that do not mean anything. This is also a question for the future if we wish for greater security, as Mr. Brown said.

Kissinger. Let us move on to the question of SDI. Allow me to start with a question. When at the start of our conversation you spoke of SDI you used the term “combat space means.” What is your interpretation of this term?

Akhromeev. The SDI program includes a land part, a space part, and a combat control system. As far as I know, the “combat space system” (I hesitate to give it a precise designation; this is done at negotiations) is at the same time a carrier with weapons, whether it is kinetic or laser.

Vance. What do you consider space noncombat means, for example surveillance and intelligence, navigation, research, etc?

Akhromeev. We and you both have such means deployed right now. These are systems of intelligence, navigation, communications, meteorology, topography, and geodesy.

To speak frankly, we still do not understand the American side’s position on space. It is not stated during negotiations. There is a clear position on START and medium-range missiles. There is a very clear position on nuclear testing—to continue nuclear explosions, which the U.S. does. But it is not clear to us what the U.S. wants in relation to space.

Chervov. The American side does not have a position on this in negotiations. Mr. Kampelman, who heads this group, cannot state the Americans’ position on space to us. And negotiations on this issue have been going on for three years.

Brown. The problem is that our position on space is still being discussed in the U.S. We are not in a position of sufficient confidence with either Mr. Kampelman or President Reagan for them to trust us with thorough information on the official position on space defense. We are aware that the U.S. position on space presented in the press is unacceptable for the USSR. Our position is that the ABM Treaty should be complied with by both sides for the next 10 years and that during this period the sides would have the right to make developments and conduct experiments in space of space-based elements using the principally new achievements of science and technology.

Akhromeev. But the ABM Treaty prohibits this.

Brown. Even in the U.S. we are dealing with different interpretations of the ABM Treaty. The official interpretation of the ABM Treaty in the U.S. assumes that if there is no agreement on the deployment of space-based means of strategic defense within the
next 10 years, each side has the right to withdraw from the Treaty and to begin deploying space-based elements upon the expiration of this 10-year period.

**Akhromeev.** Our position is different.

**Brown.** I know that. You interpret the ABM Treaty in the “narrow” sense. Such an interpretation excludes any testing of space-based elements outside of laboratories.

As you can see, the differences between these two interpretations of the Treaty are vast. On the one hand, these differences can be understood as the absence of any kind of foundation for an agreement on the space question. On the other hand, we can set a goal of immediately bringing together the two sides’ positions on the question of space means. Personally I am in favor of the second path toward solving this problem, in favor of the effort to bring the positions of the USSR and the U.S. closer together.

Our lack of trust in each other on issues of space can be explained by the fact that some U.S. experts believe that the current scientific-technological and industrial potential of the USSR could allow it to get ahead and achieve a kind of supremacy over the U.S. It seems the USSR has similar concerns about the possibilities and intentions of the U.S. As a result, each side interprets the Treaty to its benefit.

**Vance.** I adhere to a “narrow” understanding of the ABM Treaty. Both sides must discuss in detail what is allowed according to the Treaty and what is not; what type of developments and tests can be allowed under what conditions, and which cannot be.

**Akhromeev.** In our opinion, space combat systems or their components cannot be tested in space, the ABM Treaty prohibits it. And not only the Treaty. As soon as space combat apparatus appear in space, capable of destroying satellites and another country’s warheads, it will become impossible to reduce strategic offensive weapons in any way. The arms race process will escape any possible kind of control by the governments, any possibility of agreeing on limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons will disappear.

As the question stands, according to SDI work is permitted only on the ground, in laboratories. The sides have not yet clearly established what this means. It seems this concept of what the sides are allowed should be clarified and mutually acceptable resolutions and agreements should be found along these lines. There can be no agreement on testing these systems in space.

**Kissinger.** From talks with our scientists I found out that they are preparing an experiment in space with the use of laser technology in order to study Mars. Under your interpretation of the Treaty, would such an experiment be possible? If the laser installation is used to study Mars, then it can be supposed that it can also be aimed at a satellite of a potential enemy.

**Akhromeev.** I think that such an experiment can be conducted. After all, laser-technology is already being used for intelligence gathering, in communications systems, in other satellites. The main issue is that it should not be used as a military means, as a means for destruction, as a weapon mounted on a special apparatus (a satellite).
Kissinger. Mr. Marshal, is it possible to draw a distinction between laser installations used for scientific purposes, or even intelligence, and military installations?

Akhromeev. We need to seek such distinctions.

Kissinger. Could such questions of a technical nature become the subject of negotiations?

Akhromeev. I think that they can.

Brown. You believe that testing any element of a space-based combat device should be prohibited. But what should be done about space-based means of surveillance and intelligence, which use laser or in-beam technology? Where do we draw the line between a combat and noncombat designation for these devices? How do we tell them apart in space?

Akhromeev. We could agree on the power level of these systems and on other technical factors that determine the designation of this or that system.

Brown. In the U.S. even the experts who do not view the SDI program as stabilizing have doubts whether it would be possible to resolve technical problems in the process of negotiations with the USSR. These questions are already arising now, when it is still a long while before real space combat devices appear.

Akhromeev. It is true that right now the question is not specifically being discussed at the negotiations on space-based devices. But if it comes to that then of course the technical specialists from both sides will discuss all these technical details. We are urging that these negotiations be started, [that we] begin discussing the problem of a space combat echelon. But because of the American side we are not discussing these issues right now.

Did we not have difficult issues to deal with in the 1970s? Dr. Kissinger must still remember the problem of how to count a missile with a MIRVed warhead. We argued for three years over this question and found a solution. The fact of the matter was that at that time both sides wanted to find a solution. Now we are under the impression that the U.S. administration does not want to find a solution to this problem. But we will continue to negotiate, even though we are getting the impression that the American administration does not take the negotiations seriously.

Brown. Speaking of the technological aspects of these questions, we could use the positive experience we obtained during the development of the ABM Treaty. I remember my work together with P[aul] Nitze. He thinks of you very positively and sends you his best regards.

Akhromeev. Thank you.
Brown. As I understand it, you are not against discussing technical questions related to space systems such as the characteristics of aircraft sensors, data processing systems, surveillance and intelligence systems, power units on satellites. All of these would be topics for negotiation?

Akhromeev. That is correct, Mr. Brown. Still, first we have to discuss the positions of the [two] sides, and then we can discuss the details. Right now, regrettably, the American side does not have a position on the questions of space. For our part, we will be ready to discuss all questions in detail.

Chervov. Mr. Brown, the American side does not want to discuss the details you mentioned at the negotiations.

Brown. I can understand why those details are not being discussed right now. First and foremost it is because the U.S. administration does not have a position on space. Therefore, my question was hypothetical in nature.

Akhromeev. Nevertheless, practical work is being conducted on SDI, while the negotiations are at a standstill and treading water. There is movement in creating systems for SDI. This is where the danger is right now.

I am afraid that I might leave you without lunch. As far as I know you will be meeting with the CC CPSU General Secretary Comrade M.S. Gorbachev shortly. I do not mean to be impolite, I am just thinking of your situation. Thank you.

Brown, Vance, Kissinger, and Jones thank Akhromeev for the conversation.

Present from the Soviet side were: Colonel-General Chervov N.F., Major-General Lebedev Yu. V. The conversation was translated by Colonel Popov, F.F. (General Staff of the GRU).

[Source: Obtained from a participant by the author in 1996
Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.]

Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
Alexander Yakovlev, Memorandum for Gorbachev
“Toward an Analysis of the Fact of the Visit of Prominent American Political Leaders to the USSR (Kissinger, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Brown, and others), February 25, 1987

To Comrade Gorbachev M. S.

I. What does the fact of the visit signify?
The main purpose of this group’s visit is, to a minor degree, to analyze the state of current relations in the sphere of Soviet-American relations. The strategic basis rationale is to form an assessment of the prospects of our country’s future development on the basis of “original sources” in the light of the probable election in the United States in 1988 of a president who would represent the next generation of the U.S. governing elite. From here [the next step] is to study the possibility of [establishing] new substance and forms of relations with the Soviet Union.

By the beginning of the 1980s, the grave miscalculation of American Sovietology, in all its divisions, became obvious. Two dominant “scenarios” of the future development of the USSR existed before the start of the current decade.

According to the first one, the Soviet economy was approaching the brink of an avalanche-like crisis, which would lead to an open expression of social discontent (approximately following the “Polish version”). Open phases of such a crisis were predicted by the proponents of that concept for 1983-1984. It is precisely on the basis of these assessments that the Reagan policy in particular was built immediately after his coming to power in January 1981.

According to the second one, the crisis in Soviet society would not assume open forms, at least in the current decade, due to a very high level of patience among the population, [the occurrence of] historical tragedies, and a powerful control apparatus. However, the Soviet economy’s development would slow down, and most importantly, the USSR’s economic, scientific-technological, and social backwardness (lagging behind)—not only in comparison to the West but also to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in the future even to China—would grow. As a result, some time after 1993-1995, the Soviet Union would lose material prospects for development as a world power and its moral and political authority, and it would cease to represent a military, political and social threat to the West.

In essence, beginning from 1975 after the signing of the Helsinki Act, all versions of U.S. long-term strategy—both those that constituted the basis of the administration’s official course and those proposed as alternatives to that course—started from the assumption of the USSR’s downward socio-economic development in the long-term perspective.

In this case, such an approach is not simply a class-based denial that communism has a future. Such perceptions are not just “routine” exercises in propaganda. The actual
assessments were based on data from the CIA, the Department of Commerce, and academic, financial and industrial research centers, supported by information from émigrés arriving from the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.

The latter source deserves special consideration.

When a substantial wave of emigration started arriving from our country in the beginning of the 1970s, and when the émigrés attributed quite negative characteristics to the internal processes in the USSR, such information was initially received in the United States with considerable qualification, even with mistrust. In essence, nothing but negative opinions about all things Soviet was expected from the émigrés.

However, when by the end of the last decade and at the turn of the 1980s Soviet official statistics and our own public assessments started, in the American view, to confirm the information provided by the émigrés, the latter were given special credence. In a way, a certain mutual strengthening of the traditional negative perception of our country and the current intelligence took place. That resulted in [certain] evaluations of our country’s development prospects for the future up to the XXI century.

That is why the shift in the development of Soviet society after the April (1985) Plenum of the Central Committee had a shocking effect on the American political elite.

Events in the USSR shed bright light on the strategic mistakes of American Sovietology and policy, because the theoretical recommendations of the last decade did not even consider the abstract possibility of change in the USSR—not even as a hypothesis.

It is precisely in this context that one should consider the “intelligence-gathering” political mission of the above-mentioned group, which consists of representatives of the highest echelon of the political elite. In the discussions, which they held after their conversations in Moscow, the following main directions could be identified.

1. Do developments in the USSR represent an “explosion of idealism” or are they a thought-out and conscious policy?

Members of the group devoted special attention to trying to discover to what extent people in the USSR see the interconnectedness between economic, social and other aspects of the current course, and how they assess the essence of the problems and the prospects for development “at the intersections” of the social and economic, and social and political, and economic and military spheres.

What they heard in Moscow led them to conclude that the policy of perestroika was based on a thought-out conception. They see the “conflict between the demands for economic efficiency and the demands of the social sphere” as the main contradiction in the development of Soviet society. Members of the group noted that judging by the discussions that had taken place, people in the USSR see and understand this contradiction (Peterson, Vance, Kirkpatrick, Jones, Kissinger). Diminishing the
sharpness of this contradiction would change the face of the country, and would raise its social prestige.

2. How realistic are the plans of the Soviet leadership?
Only one member of the group—Hyland—called these plans “unrealistic.” At the same time, one could clearly see in the reaction of this professional Sovietologist (a liberal one by American standards) deep irritation with the fact that the prognoses of Sovietology turned out to be completely overturned. He took part in developing those prognoses himself.

The rest of the [participants] described the plans for socio-economic development in the USSR with varying degrees of optimism. Not one of them allowed for the possibility of fully realizing those plans. But at the same time, in their general assessments, there has been a shift toward greater optimism and a greater willingness to believe in the success of our initiatives. Such a reaction was especially noticeable in Vance and Peterson.

3. Is it good or bad for the USA if the USSR experiences upward development?
Only Hyland expressed himself to the effect that strengthening the Soviet Union could be accompanied with problems for the USA, mainly from the perspective of foreign policy and relations with Western Europe. The rest of them think that a developing USSR would be more beneficial for U.S. interests than a possible [source] of any sort of shock in their country. (Jones said directly—“we wish [them] luck.”)

Some members of the group expressed concern that both countries’ focus on competition with each other would lead to a mutual weakening, and thus simultaneously to a relative strengthening of third countries, above all Japan. In this connection, Kirkpatrick and certain others spoke in favor of reducing military expenditures in the light of domestic interest in the USSR and the USA.

4. To what extent has the new political thinking become a part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy?
The spectrum of judgments played out as follows. Kirkpatrick, who believes that it was only a matter of Gorbachev’s personal style, was at one pole. In her assessment, she “did not expect that the Soviet Union could have such an open and democratically inclined leader.” As far the content of USSR foreign policy, in her words, “there were only limited new expressions with the old background.”

Vance represented the opposite pole within the group. In his opinion, a lot of new things had already been introduced as part of the content of USSR foreign policy, and it was especially important that the principal elements of that new [content] be confirmed in the decisions of the XXVII Congress, such as for example the concept of an interdependent world. One cannot fail to see, he noted, that the actions of the Soviet leadership are coordinated with those general principles; we are not just talking about propaganda.

The subject of Afghanistan was in the very center of the discussion about new thinking among the group’s members.
Proponents of the point of view that “the new thinking is nothing but words” shared the position that “there is no reason for the United States to help the Soviet Union get out of Afghanistan.” At most, U.S. “neutrality” toward a political settlement in Afghanistan would be possible “in exchange for cutting all USSR assistance to Nicaragua, including economic [assistance]” (Hyland).

Vance, Tarnoff, and Swing spoke to the effect that now the USA does not gain any real benefit from the war in Afghanistan, but more and more they are risking the likely collapse of Pakistan and the possibility of an American-Indian confrontation. Taking that into account, in their view, the USA should not interfere with a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the USSR finds a formula of such a settlement.

5. About joint venture enterprises. This concept drew a lot of interest both from the practical (Peterson) and the ideological (Kissinger) points of view. The main issue, which is still unresolved, in the opinion of the Americans, and which constrains the practical implementation of such projects, is how the contradiction between western companies’ focus on extracting profit, on purely business criteria, and the need to abide by the requirements of Soviet law would be resolved. All the practical issues, first of all those having to do with the share of joint venture enterprises in the USSR’s domestic market, and those regarding procedures for repatriating the profit—require more explanations.

6. What does the sphere of common Soviet and U.S. interests consist of today? All members of the group were united in the opinion that the principal sphere of common interests lies in preventing nuclear war, and creating and strengthening guarantees against its outbreak.

Members of the group also considered the two countries’ reduction of military expenditures as a sphere of growing common interest. Peterson emphasized that in the last two or three years in U.S. business circles a serious concern has arisen about the consequences of the growth of military spending and the corresponding U.S. national budget deficit. He mentioned that fears of a deficit were very strong in business circles, especially because its impact could affect literally everything—U.S. internal life, relations with allies and with the “third world,” and so on.

As a result of conversations in Moscow, the belief in the idea of “exhausting the USSR with the arms race” was undermined. Members of the group noted that in the face of the USSR, the way it is imaginable in the future, the USA would not be able to allow itself excessive military spending (Peterson, Tarnoff, Jones, Vance); otherwise, they would exhaust themselves.

At the same time, members of the group essentially do not see any other spheres of common interest between the USSR and the USA. The idea of complete elimination of nuclear armaments is being received with alarm. There are three groups of arguments against this idea.
—the belief that nuclear weapons alone have preserved the peace for the last forty years, and would be capable of preserving it in the future.
— the concern that if nuclear weapons were eliminated, the USSR would attain great superiority in conventional weapons.
— that whereas thinking within the “nuclear” framework is sufficiently well developed, the liquidation of nuclear weapons would return foreign policy thinking in the U.S. to the level and concepts of the 1940s-1950s.

Concerns about the prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons are so strong that according to the statements of some members of the group (Kissinger, Brown), the proponents of arms control in the U.S. have “quieted down;” they are frightened of both Soviet superiority in conventional armaments and of the possibility of an unprecedented arms race in this sphere on the basis of new technologies.

The conclusion of the group’s members: nuclear armaments should be considerably reduced on the basis of strategic stability, but not eliminated completely.

7. The prospects for Soviet-American relations, especially for the immediate future. This is the main [subject] that was analyzed and discussed. On this, members of the group expressed two opinions, which, strictly speaking, did not contradict each other.

First: in principle, there exists an opportunity to achieve agreement on disarmament during this period, but only if we “untie” the Reykjavik package. In this case, an agreement on INF could be the easiest to achieve. An agreement on SDI/ABM is not impossible either, but it would require great effort.

Second: even if Reagan “wakes up” in the remaining two years and wants to achieve agreement on something, nothing would come out of it due to the balance of forces in the administration and the power of the extreme right to counter such agreements with allegations to the effect that they would contradict the provisions officially accepted previously by the administration.

It is telling that both the first and the second assessments were expressed by the same people (Kissinger, Vance, Brown, Tarnoff). However, they all emphasized the need in any case not to stop conducting an “intensive policy” toward the U.S., which would by virtue of its existence neutralize the threat of the extreme right. And this threat, according to the general assessment of the group, is real, and its scope is increasing along with the growing difficulties of the administration and with national elections in 1988 drawing closer.

II. Conclusions and Suggestions.

The trip to Moscow, of course, did not lead the members of the group to change their general views—nobody would have expected that anyway. The principal concepts of goals remained the same as well. One thing has changed noticeably, however—the opinion was confirmed that the USSR has started and will continue in the future the kinds
of domestic reforms that might require deep corrections in American prognoses of the future development of Soviet society—corrections of a political, economic and international nature.

Perestroika is not seen as threatening to the U.S. interests, apparently mainly because they are waiting to see how things progress here. U.S. Sovietologists obviously need more time for a deeper analysis of the interconnections between the USSR’s domestic and foreign policies in the future. Judging by everything, members of the group have in mind to work out some kind of alternative to the Reagan course, but at this point they are still unable to present it convincingly to public opinion and to the political elite of the United States. There remains a certain lack of clarity after the mistakes [that have been made] in their theoretical blueprints and practical actions.

Therefore, [we are facing] the task of [applying] incessant and effective political pressure on the United States with the objective of countering Reagan’s course and of providing support for those forces within the U.S. ruling class who stand against this course.

It appears that the most effective step here in the present circumstances could be to “untie the package” that was proposed at the summit in Reykjavik, and to redefine the relationships between its constituent parts. Tactically, such “untying” could be either a one-time event, presented in some “dramatic” form, or more extended in time; either instantly and fully open and public, or containing both public and diplomatic forms. It would be most preferable to do it as a transformation of the “package” into a concept for a “framework agreement” on the 1974 Vladivostok model.

A) The presentation of the “package” in Reykjavik was precise, right, and necessary. We needed a powerful initiative, which would have captured public opinion, conducted an assertive “reconnaissance by fighting” of the administration’s positions, would have illuminated those positions, and would become a means of putting pressure on them. And a powerful initiative should have had reliable insurance. Our initiatives have fulfilled all those functions with distinction:

a) Reagan’s positions as a proponent of a military-force approach were exposed to the maximum extent;

b) In terms of domestic support, the SDI is now weaker in the U.S. than it was before Reykjavik—it is not an accident that Weinberger and the far right are rushing with the decision to deploy [SDI]; in the Congress, the mood is predominantly against a full-scale SDI, because of financial considerations as well;

c) The administration is weaker in terms of foreign policy: Iran-gate became possible only after and due to Reykjavik, it is a form of retribution against Reagan for Reykjavik (simultaneously from several sides);

d) A deep split has occurred in public opinion in the West as a whole, which now is using multiple channels of access to all aspects of relations between East and West, as well as within NATO. This split is even more effective due to the fact that it came as a complete surprise to the West;
e) The ideas expressed in the “package” are still at work now, almost half a year after Reykjavik, as a factor in mobilizing the elements of new political thinking worldwide, and in counteracting the line of the Reagan administration. But it is precisely the ideas [themselves], not the “package” as such.

In short, we have created an extremely important and effective beachhead for our offensive against Reagan. Today, without losing any time, we should expand it, turn it into a beachhead for an offensive against the positions of the forces of the far right, and of the active proponents of the arms race in general, while at the same time ensuring opportunities for cooperation in this sphere with moderately conservative and liberal groups in the U.S. and Western Europe.

Objective opportunities for this do exist. The Reagan administration stumbled backwards after Reykjavik. Having [now] taken positions on SDI that are even more aggressive than [those presented] during the summit itself, Washington, judging by everything, is now trying to exclude any possibility of a positive shift on any of the issues of our “package” beforehand, even as they state just the opposite publicly. It turns the “package” into a dead end.

The White House, it seems, is deeply convinced that the “package” represents our final position. The responses to your latest statements show that they were waiting for new proposals or concessions from us. Not having received them, they must be thinking now in Washington that any serious progress on the Soviet position is unlikely. In these conditions, “untying the package” would become one more action that finally unmasks the genuine essence of the U.S. position on the issues of limitation and reduction of armaments.

B) We should not let the next U.S. trick go unanswered. For us, the “package” as such is not a goal, but a means. The Soviet side should not allow Washington to sow doubts about our intentions, shift responsibility for the lack of progress in the negotiations to the USSR, [or] capture the political initiative by painting a prospect for “fully realistic” 50% cuts for public opinion, and so on.

There is no guarantee that if we untie the “package,” the U.S. side would assent to balanced agreements with us. The facts suggest a completely different tendency in the development of Reagan’s position. But another point is equally true—in the atmosphere of stagnation, one notices a dilution of borders in Western European public opinion, and partially even in American [public opinion]: both superpowers are being perceived as incapable of responding positively to the aspirations of the masses.

In politics, maximum freedom of maneuver is always valuable. The “package” in its present form only ties our hands. We don’t have likely grounds to expect that everything will work out on its own, that Reagan will have an epiphany—in Reykjavik, he missed his best chance to go down in history not as a clown (litsedei), but as a statesman. For that, Reagan is not intelligent enough, and too limited in his freedom of choice.
In [our] analysis of the situation, we should take one more aspect into account. Under the current correlation of forces, the USSR is confronting the USA not only in the international arena, but also inside the U.S. itself. Of course, we cannot elect a “good” President for ourselves, we cannot persuade him to make “good” policy for us. However, we can protect ourselves from the worst. Today this would mean: increasing pressure on Reagan and the circles standing behind him. Adding more flexibility and dynamism to the Soviet approach would strengthen such pressure.

C) Are agreements on separate issues in our interest? I think yes. We never formulated the issue as “all or nothing.” We are not presenting it in such a form now either: we are not linking the “package” with nuclear testing, [or] chemical weapons. What kind of agreements are possible in principle?

1. INF, with a simultaneous discussion about tactical missiles. For us this would be tantamount to removal of a very serious threat. [It] would boost our reputation in Europe. In the end, [it] would make our relations with China easier.

In any case, it is unlikely that we would have to penetrate SDI, if it is ever built, with intermediate-range missiles. Untying the “package” makes this agreement attainable; preserving the “package” blocks it. Here the benefit of untying is obvious.

2. A 50% reduction in strategic weapons, with a simultaneous emphasis on our readiness to proceed to full nuclear disarmament. If it were possible, the benefit of such a reduction would be unquestionable in all respects: political, economic, moral, and military. Building up strategic offensive weapons would make sense only in order to penetrate SDI, but we still have to undertake a comprehensive analysis of this issue.

3. The following model of a settlement also deserves consideration—a 50% reduction in strategic weapons (the number of delivery vehicles and the number of warheads would be decreased by half in real terms, while each side would have the right to decide the relative proportion of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers); a simultaneous decrease by 50% in U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the European zone; and a reduction in U.S. forward-based systems by 50%. If the U.S. agrees to adequately reduce its forward-based systems in Japan and South Korea, [we should agree] to bring the number of [our] intermediate-range missiles in Asia (and respectively in the U.S. territory) down to 100 (warheads).

At the same time, we take into account that the United States links the implementation of measures on INF in Europe with strict verification. Consequently, U.S. territory as such would be left outside of the verification regime, while inspections in England, the FRG, and other countries would require complicated coordinating procedures with the national governments.

Will the U.S. go for such decisions? It is already clear—not under Reagan! Under these conditions, our readiness for an agreement outside the “package” would have the following pluses for us:
—[it would] uncover the true positions of the U.S., and become a powerful and long-term instrument of pressure on the Americans and their course;
—[it would] play the role of a stimulus to limit appropriations for SDI in the American Congress; the stimulus [would be] even more effective if we could preserve existing limits and cut at least some armaments, at least the INF. The political and psychological effect of such a step would be very significant, especially taking into account U.S. growing financial difficulties.

4. **SDI proper.** At this point, the Soviet Union stands by its position of a complete rejection of all military technologies that constitute the basis of this American program. If we want to be logical and persuasive in our struggle with SDI on this platform, we have to be ready to put forth the idea of not just limitation but full renunciation of ABM systems, i.e. of a toughening of the requirements of the 1972 ABM treaty. Any limitation is always misleading, it leaves loopholes for circumvention and misunderstandings.

A ban on ABM [systems] would mean very little real change for us, because during the last decade systems have emerged against which there exist no effective counter-systems so far; and the quantitative limitations under the treaty are very poorly linked with the actual scale of possible massive strikes. Consequently, the Moscow ABM district has significance only as a research and testing ground for the contingency in the event the question arises about deploying a system of defense for the national territory.

It appears that the U.S.—at least up to the point of actual testing of the developing technologies on real targets—is not going to engage in negotiations with us on the subject of turning the ABM treaty into a treaty banning ABM [systems]. The latter would become possible only in case testing within the framework of SDI returns disappointing results, or if the systems themselves turn out to be so complicated and expensive that Washington would prefer to cut back the system. However, testing outside the framework of the existing treaty would mean the end of its existence, unless, understandably, the sides agree to something else before such testing.

The issue of making a concession to the Americans in terms of a “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty could be raised in practical terms only if there was appropriate compensation on Washington’s part—for example, finding an agreed upon modus on the legal status of space; [or,] further, developing regulations on certain kinds of activities in space, or even better—in relation to objects in space; and finally, formulating objective criteria to distinguish between the defensive and non-defensive character of systems allowed to be deployed in space, and the methodology for verifying implementation of the agreed-upon obligations.

What is the point of putting forth this kind of consideration? First of all, it would not be expedient retrospectively to give our opponents a pretext for alleging that the USSR made success in Reykjavik impossible by linking nuclear disarmament to SDI. Secondly, by providing details of our approach (explaining terms, such as laboratory
research, and so on.) we would demonstrate that a development of this kind was already possible at Reykjavik, had the United States wanted to bring our positions closer together. Thirdly, raising a number of questions for discussion would allow us to weaken the link between the ABM and SDI without any damage to our reputation, and to accept the principle of parallel negotiations.

In general, partial agreements—on SDI and on all other issues—are in our interest in terms of their potential content and by virtue of the fact that their existence as such would expand and strengthen the political and legal basis of Soviet-American relations. We need to clear the way for such agreements as much as possible.

D. The initiative is in our hands now. We put forward far-reaching proposals, and took steps to make their implementation a reality. The U.S. and the West responded with all kinds of “buts” and “ifs,” [both] artificial and genuine doubts. The task now is to remove artificial obstacles and to present for the judgment of world public opinion the genuine, deep motives of American policy. For this we need a new breakthrough—with the understanding, however, that the reaction to such a breakthrough in the United States would follow the familiar pattern (which is more than plausible), and that some time later we might need to further develop our proposals in the interests of maintaining constant pressure on the U.S. (the matryoshka principle in formulating our initiatives).

From the perspective of the USSR’s national security, the “untying of the package” does not present any real “minuses;” the content of the proposals essentially remains the same. The fact of untying in itself does not in any way signify the automatic conclusion of agreements on conditions that are unfavorable to us. We also preserve the possibility of proposing other linkages and packages should such a need arise.

There could be a difficulty of a propaganda nature on the issue of why in Reykjavik we thought it necessary specifically to present a package and not a set of proposals. It seems to me that this difficulty could be overcome by suggesting that we abandoned the “package” principle in response to the initiatives of the West European states, and that this represents a concession [on our part]. Such a step would also expose the positions of West European conservatives, and would show how much their “desire to achieve agreements with the USSR” is really worth.

Would the untying of the “package” be interpreted as an expression of our excessive interest in [reaching] agreements? Of course it would. But this is how everything is interpreted now anyway. The Reagan administration cannot raise the level of their demands to us—it has already been raised to the limit, and the general political atmosphere and the positions of the administration are not at all what they were in 1981-1982. At the same time, it is still a long while before a new administration comes to power.

However, taking into account [the possibility] that with a new administration coming to power more favorable conditions could develop for achieving agreements, including on SDI, it appears most expedient to prepare [our] positions in advance. “Untying the
package” would now be seen as precisely that kind of preparation, beyond everything else. To the contrary, taking this [step] closer to the time of achieving future agreements would give the U.S. further grounds to draw conclusions about our excessive interest in agreements.

A public speech announcing the untying of the package, if it were to take place in the immediate future, could compensate, in the eyes of the world public, for the fact of our reciprocal resumption of nuclear testing. This consideration is not decisive here, but it also needs to be taken into account.

E. It is extremely important now not to lose the tempo we have developed, and not to lose time. If we want to untie the package, we need to do it right now, because later the effect of it will be much weaker:
— at present, nobody expects a step like this from us; on the contrary, it looks as though in the West and in the United States the impression is growing that we have “written off the Reagan administration;”
— the U.S. elections are still a long way away. Closer to the start of the electoral campaign many people would inevitably interpret such a step as an effort to influence the outcome of the elections;
— objectively, we still have several months to complete the agreements before the electoral campaign starts, and under these conditions our approach would be perceived as a natural one;
— for these and many other reasons, we should not create the impression that we are providing any kind of “advance” to a future U.S. administration;
— “Irangate” will conclude in some way. Depending on its resolution, our approach could be interpreted either as “dealing the final blow” to Reagan or, on the contrary, as a concession to the President, who has emerged from the crisis in a “strengthened” position;
— finally, informed people will see this as our positive response to what many prominent foreigners have said in Moscow.

Therefore, if we undertake the untying of the package in the immediate future, it will look objectively as one more expression of our good will and common sense, and a practical expression of our new thinking, the unity of words and deeds.

And one more consideration. This experience demonstrates that the U.S. concludes significant agreements when they sense the strength of our position. The advent of this moment will be connected, beyond everything else, to the demonstration of our unquestionable achievements in the material sphere. Such a time will come, obviously, in several years. It will be at that point that a “breakthrough” of some kind in Soviet-American relations will become possible. Therefore, it is expedient to view the actions we undertake now as an “accumulation” of authority and positions in anticipation of that sort of moment in the future, and as a long-term political investment.

F. Of course, untied the package would present us with new tasks.
We need a profound study of the full spectrum of positions and arguments for contingencies involving both a U.S. refusal to reach agreement with us (in general or on separate issues), and an expression, now or in the future, of readiness for agreement on their part.

In particular, we need to study the entire set of issues regarding the possibility of carrying out joint programs in space (including verifying that certain kinds of military activities do not take place there), as well as cooperative programs in the arena of “high technology.”

In effect, we did not even touch on the possibility of [developing] programs in the military sphere, starting with direct contacts between defense agencies up to, possibly, certain “unified” systems of command and control.

The legal aspects of overflights of national territories by space weapon systems if and when such systems start to be deployed (whether or not they should be shot down in peacetime) should be studied too.

Another big theme for analysis is the possibility of using international procedures and the services of third countries on matters of verification, arbitration, etc., on a mutual basis.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the issues listed above as well as other problems demand careful analysis on our part in any case, regardless of the “package,” the untying of which might only necessitate a certain acceleration of such work. However, again, an acceleration of that kind would be desirable in any case.

[Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation, Fond 10063, Opis 1 Delo 388 Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]

Contributed by Elizabeth Charles.
Politburo February 26, 1987
On Soviet-American Relations and Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Armaments

Gorbachev. Geneva is coming to a dead end. And we need to move to a new level of conversation. We should invite Shultz to come here. First of all, to cut off the broad interpretation of the ABM [treaty]. By continuing the Geneva negotiations in their present form, we are pretending that nothing has happened and that we are willing to tolerate all the American insolence. This borders on a betrayal of principles. And if they keep dragging it out, [we should] shut down rounds 7 and 8 and begin new negotiations on [the basis of] our proposals.

Gromyko. Maybe we should tear the SS-20s from the package? Of course, it would be a step backwards but it [will be undertaken] under new conditions. And to achieve a partial agreement. It would take a lot of brains for America to agree to a comprehensive settlement.

Dobrynin. We weren’t counting on that either.

Ligachev. What if we employ our reserves at once—the medium-range missiles?

Dobrynin. The main aspect here is political, but also [matters for] propaganda.

Gorbachev. Reagan’s political game is very clear to us—to give political sanction to SDI after he leaves office, and at the same time to preserve some impression that they are searching for something, for some resolution. We could respond with two actions at once—give them a sharp rebuke, and negotiations. But that would satisfy them. They will tangle our reins and at the same time pretend that they are in favor of an agreement but we are the ones undermining it. Meanwhile, they will win time for developing their SDI.

The biggest step that would make an impression on the outside world, on public opinion, would be if we untie the package and agree to cut 1,000 of our most powerful missiles.

Ligachev. If we agree to cut medium-range missiles right now, we will win right now. And our defense will not be weaker as a result. We would win a lot in public opinion.

Gorbachev. Yes, we need to smooth out the negative consequences of withdrawing from the moratorium. I support Yegor Kuzmich’s proposal plus a 1,000-unit cut. Without that, Western Europe will not agree to remove the American intermediate-range missiles (the Pershings). In the arena of public opinion, we will put pressure on the United States by showing that we are in favor of mutual trust. And do it after the 7th round, go straight to the administration, above the heads of the negotiators. Or invite Shultz to Moscow.

Ligachev. What losses do we incur if we take the SS-20s out of the package?

Gorbachev. We need SS-20s to delay the deployment of SDI.

Ligachev defends his position.

Marshal Sokolov reminds about the French and British missiles.

Gorbachev. Here you are losing the political perspective? There will be no war with Britain or France. It is not possible. And the mid-range missiles, if we remove them, would change absolutely nothing here.

Shevardnadze. I am also in favor of making a decision on the mid-range missiles because after the French test explosion and our [explosion] we have to compensate with
something … Regardless of how we justify our explosions, they weaken trust. And we should not delay this decision.

Ryzhkov. But the Europeans supported it … (the renewal of testing).

Shevardnadze. France—yes … And one more thing: we still do not have a final position on weapons in space: what is permitted and what is not.

Gorbachev. Could we sell the medium-range missiles for an agreement on Afghanistan?

Dobrynin. No, this will not work. The Americans do not want either one.

Shevardnadze. We should continue the course respectfully, patiently. When Armacost comes, we will talk to him.

Gorbachev (concludes). This was a useful discussion. We start from the assumption that as difficult as it is to conduct business with the United States, we are doomed to it. We have no choice. Our main problem is to remove the confrontation. This is the central issue of our entire foreign policy. But we should not build our policy on illusions. We should not count on capitalism suffering an economic crisis. It will find a way out, as it has done before. We should not think that we would have a militarily weaker opponent if arms reductions succeed because the sole interest of that state (USA) is power. Thus, competition will continue in any case. And it is a very serious [competition]. However, modifications will be taking place in all directions in the world arena, and we should not feel doomed. The process is underway in the United States as well. But we should not work only in the direction of America. We need to carefully select other main directions besides the American one.

The renewal of tests is working against us. There will be major [negative] impact … Therefore, let’s untie the package. Let the comrades prepare [materials]—when and at what level this should be done. But we have to do it before the 8th round of negotiations begins and before Shultz comes to Moscow.

Maybe a statement by me? … Before the whole world? … It was difficult to go for the test …

Let’s make the statement regarding untying the package some time in mid-March. This will be our response to public opinion. And this would ameliorate the negative reaction to the renewal of nuclear tests to some degree. But we had no other options.

We should respond to all the hints from those who want to work with us. Such hints are coming, directly or implicitly, from Thatcher, Kohl, and Mitterand. We should be more assertive in pulling them all out of their “American complex” and pulling them toward us.

We should give answers as well on the issues of cutting 1,000 heavy missiles, on the imbalance in conventional arms, on offensive weapons in Europe, on the nuclear-free corridor, on reconsideration of our doctrine, on the principle of reasonable sufficiency—i.e. on all the issues that are now being discussed at the negotiations and by the general public. We have to work on the Chinese direction. [We should] try to entice Deng Xiaoping to come to Moscow. Shevardnadze should go to Austria. We should remove Rajiv Gandhi’s concerns about Pakistan. We should request from our institutes—from Primakov and Arbatov—that they provide us with an objective scholarly analysis once per quarter, every 100 days. Let’s entrust Arbatov to “convene” it.

[Source: the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

April 9, 1987

Attached is the draft text of a proposed letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev. Could I have your personal views as soon as possible on the text and on the timing of its release.

Colin L. Powell

Attachment: Draft letter (8)
April 9, 1987

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since it has been some time since you and I last communicated directly, I would like to give you my thoughts on how we might bring to fulfillment what I see as a promising moment in our relations. Secretary of State Shultz will, of course, be ready to discuss these matters in detail during his visit to Moscow.

First let me say that, in reviewing the relationship between our two countries, I am pleased that there has been some progress on the agenda that you and I have set out in our meetings. Senior officials of our governments have begun a new cycle of discussions on regional affairs; the conversations between Under Secretary Armacost and senior Soviet officials last month in Moscow demonstrate that this aspect of our dialogue is becoming more candid and wide-ranging. Our two governments seem close to agreement on establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. An agreement on space cooperation has been concluded, and work is proceeding to expand other bilateral contacts between our governments and peoples. I am watching with great interest a number of developments in your country which touch on the concerns I have discussed with you regarding human rights and humanitarian issues. There has been some modest progress in expanding non-strategic trade between our two countries.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR
Welcome as these steps are, they are only a beginning. Concrete progress on the large issues must remain our overriding objective.

I must reiterate to you my great concern and continuing opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which imposes a singularly heavy burden on East-West relations. The statements which Under Secretary Armacost heard in Moscow about Soviet determination to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan are welcome. I note that some movement has taken place at the Geneva proximity talks and that the USSR may be studying seriously the possibility of a process of national reconciliation leading to self-determination. However, I want you to understand clearly my view, shared fully by the Government of Pakistan, the Resistance Alliance, and most other governments, that a lengthy timetable for the withdrawal of your troops, far longer than dictated by logistic requirements, and an approach to national reconciliation merely designed to preserve a communist-dominated regime in Kabul will only prolong the war. They will not lead to a lasting political settlement which would benefit both our governments and the countries of the region.

Encouraging statements by Soviet leaders need to be backed up by actual Soviet steps to withdraw Soviet forces. Unfortunately, such steps have not been taken. On the contrary, the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime have stepped up bombing raids against
villages in Pakistan that have resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Such actions serve only to magnify the suffering, to prolong the war, to increase the danger of a larger East-West confrontation, and to call into question the sincerity of Soviet statements that the USSR wishes to withdraw its forces. Such actions will not cause those who oppose Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to reduce or to relent in their opposition.

The United States supports genuine efforts to achieve a political settlement to the conflict that is acceptable to the people of Afghanistan. We seek no strategic advantage in Afghanistan and recognize the Soviet interest in a secure southern border. We have made clear in the past, and I repeat to you, that the United States will lend its political support to an agreement, consistent with United Nations resolutions, which brings about the speedy and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

But the critical steps that will allow the Afghan people to live in peace must be taken by the USSR. What is needed, Mr. General Secretary, is a clean political decision by your government to withdraw Soviet forces promptly. I realize this decision will not be easy. But you have shown unusual boldness and courage in addressing the internal problems of your country. No single act by the USSR would do more to convince the world that you intend to apply genuinely new thinking to Soviet foreign policy, or gain you more international respect, than to withdraw quickly from Afghanistan. Within three months time.
With respect to human rights and humanitarian concerns, we have seen -- and acknowledged -- positive steps in many of the areas you and I have discussed. I hope that these steps are only a beginning. You have resolved one-half of all our divided family representation list cases, and two-thirds of our separated spouse cases; is it not possible to resolve the small number of remaining cases? You have now released over 100 political prisoners; is it not possible to release those still in prison for expressing their views? Emigration has begun to rise modestly; we hope for a substantial, sustained increase. There is also a particular urgency to the limited number of cases of seriously ill persons seeking to travel for medical treatment abroad. Finally, I hope you find some means to resolve several cases of special interest to me, including pianist Vladimir Feltsman, refusenik Ida Nudel, separated spouse Galina Goltzman, and dual national Abe Stolar and his family. Continuing progress in these areas will help significantly in improving our relations, and will be welcomed by the entire world.

Add a sentence noting that Mr. Schultz will discuss Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Angola:

In the area of our bilateral relations, much is developing in promising directions. It is therefore regrettable that I must raise with you the matter of your penetration of our embassy in Moscow which we have lately discovered. Let me get directly to the point. Your government ruthlessly exploits the many advantages it enjoys as a very closed society pursuing intelligence objectives against a very open one; it does so with cavalier
disregard for our diplomatic rights and the damage this does to our relationship. If this lack of prudence on the part of the USSR continues, the USSR should expect to suffer the resulting discomfort and political cost equally with the United States.

Regarding arms control, my points of departure are our agreement in Geneva to expand common ground and the advances we made in our meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. Both meetings were stepping stones to the goals we have mutually set. From your own recent statements, and in view of the encouraging work now underway at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, I believe we are in accord on the urgency of moving forward from Reykjavik. Our task is to find ways to bridge remaining differences.

Our two sides have filled out many of the details of potential agreements on deep and stabilizing reductions in nuclear forces. Other important aspects still await resolution. Solving these questions is essential if reductions agreements are to realize the goal of greater military stability.

The United States places the highest priority on achieving substantial reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Thus, I am heartened that we are getting closer to agreement on deep and equitable reductions in longer-range INF missiles, as we work toward their total elimination. To this end, our negotiators have begun addressing the specific details of treaty language to
implement the formula that we agreed on in Reykjavik. And, while we have yet to have the benefit of detailed Soviet proposals, we are in a position with mutual effort to begin to make progress on the elements essential to ensure effective verification.

As we have made clear since 1981, an INF agreement must have appropriate concurrent constraints on shorter-range INF systems. Your agreement to this principle at our meeting in Reykjavik was a significant advance, although work remains to be done on the specific nature of those constraints. In particular, such constraints must be based on equality of rights between us. I hope that we can work together to resolve our differences about the nature of those constraints.

Regarding strategic offensive forces, the formula for 30 percent reductions that you and I developed and agreed upon in Geneva and Reykjavik provides us with an historic opportunity to move toward a better, safer world now. Limiting both sides to 6000 warheads on 1600 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLEMs, and heavy bombers -- with appropriate warhead sublimits, counting rules, and verification measures -- would be a dramatic and effective step toward that goal. We should strive toward a rapid and uncomplicated achievement of such an agreement without imposing unnecessary conditions on its realization.
I recall your expressed concerns regarding the uncertainties you perceive to be associated with our SDI program. In your February 28 speech, you expressed concern that this program might lead to the deployment of weapons in space. In direct response to your concerns that we assure predictability in the strategic regime of the next decade, and, in an effort to move the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms forward, I am prepared to sign a treaty now that would commit the United States and the Soviet Union through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying operational defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. After 1994, we would both be able to deploy strategic defenses unless we agreed otherwise.

It goes without saying that I stand by my previous offers to find appropriate methods to share the benefits of any such defenses in the context of an agreed transition permitting the increasing contribution of defenses and moving us toward the elimination of ballistic missiles. I would be prepared to add this element to any new Defense and Space agreement, as well as to consider certain other ideas which could give us both more predictability about each other's efforts in the area of strategic defenses.

At the same time, you and I would sign a treaty implementing the agreed-upon 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, within seven years,
with appropriate warhead sublimits. On the vital issue of ballistic missile warhead sublimits, both our sides have made several proposals that are very close and in some cases identical. The American proposal for a sublimit of 4800 ballistic missile warheads is essentially the same as the Soviet proposal for an 80 percent sublimit. Our proposed sublimit of 3300 ICBM warheads draws upon your 60 percent suggestion. Your proposal to reduce heavy ICBMs by half addresses some of the concerns dealt with by our proposed third sublimit on especially dangerous ICBMs.

In recognition of your concerns that such sublimits would force a rapid restructuring of your forces, I suggest that we agree to extend the period to complete the 50 percent reduction to seven years from the date a treaty takes effect. With this additional time, it should be possible for both sides to implement such sublimits without undue burden.

My proposal, therefore, is that we instruct our negotiators to focus immediately on drafting treaties to implement the principle of 50 percent reductions in seven years with agreed, appropriate sublimits, and a mutual commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying defensive systems whose deployment is not permitted by the treaty. [I have asked Secretary Shultz to explain this approach in greater detail during his impending visit.]
I hope you will consider these ideas seriously. My effort is to bridge our differences and remove obstacles on the way toward our agreed goals. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should explore these ideas further when they meet in Moscow next week.

I believe these proposals can lead to rapid progress in the MBT negotiations. As we move ahead toward reductions of nuclear forces, I wish to stress the importance of addressing other potential sources of military instability, particularly imbalances regarding conventional forces and chemical weapons. As you know, representatives of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are discussing with representatives of the Warsaw Pact a new mandate for negotiations to achieve a stable balance on conventional forces in Europe at lower levels. The U.S. and Soviet Union are discussing bilaterally and multilaterally the many issues related to a global ban on chemical weapons.

In all these negotiations, it will be vital to develop effective means of verification to ensure confidence in the agreements reached. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have expressed concerns about effective verification in the past. The strongest possible verification regime is in the interests of both our nations.
Mr. General Secretary, our two countries have worked hard to establish the basis for accords that would strengthen peace and security. Much remains to be done to make 1987 the year that will bring these efforts to fruition, and I am prepared to embark on an intensive process to see that this is accomplished.

The discussions between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will, I hope, prove to be an important step in this process.

Sincerely,
The White House
Washington
April 10, 1987

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

It has been a long time since you and I last communicated directly. I am pleased that the visit of Secretary Shultz to Moscow offers us an opportunity to resume our direct dialogue.

I can recall at Geneva sitting before a fireplace and commenting that you and I were in a unique position. Together we can make the difference in the future course of world events. Let us pray that you and I can continue our dialogue so that the future will be one of peace and prosperity for both our nations and for the world.

I can also recall commenting to you that the very reason we are engaged in arms reductions negotiations is because of military competition that stems from the fundamental mistrust between our governments. If we are able to eliminate that distrust, arms reductions negotiations will be much easier.

There has been a recent incident that has caused problems between our two countries, and I feel strongly about this issue. At the same time, however, I am encouraged by many of the steps you are taking to modernize your own country and by the improved dialogue between us on arms reductions. There has also been some progress on human rights, although much more needs to be done. But the dialogue on regional issues has been quite fruitless so far, and I hope that we can make strenuous efforts in this area, especially on Afghanistan.
Secretary Shultz will come to Moscow prepared to deal with a broad range of issues. He will carry with him positions that I have reviewed carefully and that are designed to improve the climate between our two countries and to build on the progress we have already made in the arms reductions area.

I look forward to positive discussions during Secretary Shultz' visit, and to a personal report from him immediately upon his return. Nancy joins me in sending very best regards to you and Raisa.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow
Memorandum of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
April 14, 1987

(In the beginning of the conversation G. Shultz handed M. S. Gorbachev a personal letter from President of the United States Ronald Reagan)

Gorbachev. I had a brief look at the contents of the letter. I welcome it. As I understand it, this letter, so to speak, is in the nature of an invitation.

Shultz. Yes, and in addition, it represents the personal contact which, the President believes, has been established between him and you.

Gorbachev. I see it as a certain stimulus for us. I want to say that notwithstanding all the difficulties and all the upheavals, we are continuing to strive for cooperation with the Reagan administration. We have already accumulated a certain experience in communication, and we have some results. And most importantly—the United States will remain the United States, regardless of which party and which administration is in power. The United States remains a country with its national interests. And we start from that assumption.

Shultz. This is a reasonable approach.

Gorbachev. It is part of the new thinking, which we are developing right now. And we are calling on you to join the campaign to spread this new thinking.

Shultz. This morning I had one of the most interesting conversations of all my meetings with Soviet leaders. I have in mind my meeting with Mr. Ryzhkov about issues of the economy.

[...]

Shultz. Yes. And besides, in Reykjavik, you and the President emphasized the importance of verification. I repeatedly quoted your statements from Reykjavik to that effect, and I noted your Friday speech in Prague as well. We presented a draft of the treaty, which contains detailed proposals on verification. You, for your part, informed us that you agree with all the principles of verification proposed by us, and maybe even wish to go further. The key here, of course, is to agree on concrete details, therefore we are waiting for a detailed response to our proposals. We believe that the INF treaty should become a model for the future in terms of verification.

We hope that subsequently it will lead to agreements on strategic weapons, which, as you said in your speech on Friday, represent the core problem. By the way, from the perspective of verification, there are very strong arguments in favor of a complete zero version on INF. It would be substantially better, from the point of view of trust, to have the ability to verify the end result. We hope that you will still consider arguments in favor of global zero.
But I repeat, on the two central issues of the treaty, we are clearly on the way to an agreement. What emerges here is the question about shorter-range missiles. We have studied your proposal, which your Minister explained to me in detail yesterday. I would like to focus on the principles, which, in our view, must determine our decision on this issue. Generally speaking, they do not contradict the concrete stipulations of your new proposal, although I have to say that we have not yet analyzed all of these concrete proposals fully. The first of these principles is that we need to start from an understanding regarding a ceiling on these missiles.

[...] additional work will be required only for coordinating the quantitative parameters of this agreement. Here are the principles: first of all, to establish the ceiling at your present level minus the missiles being withdrawn from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. But the ceiling is necessary. Secondly, this ceiling or zero [missiles] (depending on what we agree on) will be applied on a global basis.

Gorbachev. What do you mean by “a global basis?”

Shultz. That we would not have such missiles at all, or we would have some number of them on a global basis.

Gorbachev. Deployed in the USA, in Asia, or on bases?

Shultz. Zero on a global basis, or some number regardless of where they are deployed.

The third principle is a principle which we consider important in our relations in general—the principle of equality. Today we do not have such missiles. Therefore, we need to have the right to a level equal to you, regardless of whether we would use this right or not.

Gorbachev. But we want to eliminate these missiles.

Shultz. However, that will not happen overnight and would require a certain amount of time while the negotiations take place.

Gorbachev. If in this agreement the Soviet Union undertakes an obligation to eliminate tactical missiles within some defined period of time, for example within a year, then why would you want to increase your armaments?

Shultz. We want to have the right to have an equal level.

Gorbachev. I think we should search for some formula here.
There should not be any obstacles for verification. There should be guaranteed access for inspections of industrial enterprises, whether private or state-owned, of bases, including those in third countries, places of storage, plants, depots and so on, regardless of whether any particular company has contracts with the Pentagon or not. Concrete proposals on this issue should become the subject of negotiations.

Regarding the related issue of the shorter-range missiles. We are willing to start and hold negotiations on such missiles simultaneously with negotiations on the INF. If you think that an agreement on the INF would be achieved before an agreement on operational-tactical missiles, then it could include the principles governing shorter-range missiles. In that case, we would withdraw and eliminate a part of those missiles in the context of the INF agreement. Simultaneously, we would conduct negotiations on the remaining missiles. And besides, we are in favor of their elimination, and such a decision would remove all our questions about equality, global basis and ceilings, i.e. it would satisfy your principles. We could resolve the question of Asia in the same way we resolved the INF question.

Shultz. What do you have in mind?

Gorbachev. We would have an equal level for both the USSR and the USA outside of Europe, or a zero level. In other words, we are in favor of a global decision.

Shultz. We think that it does not make any sense to discuss geographical location in connection with these missiles at all because they are highly mobile.

Gorbachev. In any case, we are in favor of a global zero level.

Shultz. I think we have a basis for a possible agreement. First of all, the issue of the shorter-range weapons would be represented in the treaty on intermediate-range missiles. I think it is clear to us which weapons we are talking about.

Gorbachev. As we understand it, about the SS-23 missiles and other missiles of this class.

Shultz. The issue of the shorter-range missiles will be resolved on the basis of a global ceiling. The initial ceiling will be determined by subtracting from your current level the number of missiles now deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Then additional negotiations will be conducted about the remaining missiles. During that period, the United States will have the right to have an equal level with the Soviet level on these missiles. At the same time, the Soviet Union would announce in advance (although it is up to you to decide), that its position at the forthcoming negotiations would presuppose elimination of the remaining missiles. We have not decided yet what our
position would be at these negotiations. But we will be talking about some quantity; I cannot say precisely how many right now. Therefore, the question of what the final equal level would be—zero, or some other [level]—would be decided at the negotiations.

Gorbachev. You obviously are defending the position you came here with and which you formulated before we proposed elimination of all shorter-range missiles, not only those deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, but all the rest of them. You did not know when you were formulating your position that we would agree not just to freeze but to conduct negotiations and eliminate the shorter-range missiles within a short time-period. Why then would you need to increase your armaments—I simply do not understand. There is no logic in that at all, with the exception maybe of a purely legalistic interpretation of the right to equality. But this, it seems to me, is just casuistry.

[…]

Gorbachev. […] we should look at the issues in their entirety. And naturally, we should also consult with our allies.

Shultz. I still think that the complex of issues relating to the INF and shorter-range missiles is one thing, and other issues constitute another complex.

Gorbachev. I would not link tactical missiles with the INF and the shorter-range missiles. We will still get to them.

And now I propose to take a break, after which we could discuss the issue we first considered in Reykjavik: strategic offensive weapons.

(After the break)

Gorbachev. As I understand it, yesterday you and E. A. Shevardnadze had an exchange about strategic weapons. Maybe we could now briefly summarize the positions of each side?

Shultz. I will say honestly that I was somewhat disappointed. It seemed to me that we made good progress in Reykjavik. However, we have not moved any further. We agree now, as we agreed in Reykjavik, to have the ceiling on the number of warheads on strategic offensive weapons at 6,000 units, and of strategic delivery vehicles at 1,600 units. We also agreed in Reykjavik that the reductions would affect all the main elements of the nuclear potential of both sides, the entire triad. I remember your gesture during the meeting at Hofdi, so to speak, to cut all currently existing quantities by half.

Gorbachev. We came to a good agreement then—to reduce all components by half. Mr. Nitze, it seems, does not agree with me, because that agreement was reached without him.

[…]
Shultz. [...] from the point of view of our Air Force, it is quite a firm limit. In particular, on the number of planes with air-launched cruise missiles. The quantity of these cruise missiles is definitely limited at a level of 1,200 units, or, if that limit is exceeded, it would be necessary to reduce the number of ballistic missiles, and our Air Force has quite far-reaching plans. They believe that they have good “Stealth” technology, cruise missiles and so on. The proposed version also limits the allowed number of SLBMs, of which we now have a considerable quantity. Besides that, if we keep our ICBMs in the modernized version, the number of SLBMs would be even more strictly limited. Therefore, it was not easy for us to squeeze into all these limits, but we believe that it could be done. We thought that it would be acceptable in principle for you, too. That is why we, in particular, consider the sub-level of 4,800 within the overall level of 6,000 warheads important.

Gorbachev. But in Reykjavik, we specifically walked away from all these sub-levels. There, as you remember, we talked about the fact that the structure of strategic offensive weapons on each side has its own historically developed special features. The relative weight of each of the three elements of the triad is different for you and us. And then, as I see it, we came to the understanding that the problem hides precisely in those sub-levels, that they are the reason for the dead end to which the negotiations came because in the discussion of those sub-levels each side tries to ensure its own security interests and insists on certain things that are unacceptable for the other side. This is how the dead end emerges. That is why we proposed to take the triad as it exists now, and to cut it all in half in five years. The triad would remain, but at a different level—reduced by half. The formula is simple and clear. But now I am starting to suspect that you don’t want to stand by what you personally, Mr. Secretary of State, called acceptable in Reykjavik. Maybe Mr. Nitze does not like this formula, but it is a simple and realistic one.

Shultz. In our view, it is ineffective because it is does not ensure stability and does not ensure the necessary equality. In principle, we agree with the idea that in the process of reductions we need to respect the existing structure of strategic forces. But at the same time, our goal is to achieve equal levels and stability. This is the main idea that was passed to the Nitze-Akhromeev group for consideration, so that they would be able to translate it into concrete parameters. A purely mechanical reduction by half will not, in our view, produce a reasonable, appropriate result. I repeat—the general idea is to subject all elements of the triad to reductions and at the same time to take some of the concerns of the other side into account.

Gorbachev. Mr. Secretary of State, do you think that it would be fair to say that strategic parity exists between our countries today?

Shultz. You have more ballistic missiles than we do. We have a different structure of forces, and I have to say that in the framework of your structure you have colossal ICBM forces, far exceeding ours. Also you undertook quite impressive steps in other spheres. In general, in our view, you have a very impressive arsenal.
Gorbachev. So what do you mean—we do not have strategic parity?

Shultz. Of course I would very much like to feel confident in this respect and to believe that everything is in order. However, we witnessed a powerful process of modernization in the development of your forces, and an increase in the number of missiles and warheads, and that caused great anxiety among us. This is precisely why under President Reagan you saw such a stepping up of U.S. efforts in this sphere.

Gorbachev. And yet the fact remains that we have an approximate equality between us, a parity in the quantitative sphere, in the sense of power and potential of our strategic forces. And even though it exists at a very high level [of armaments], and disarmament is needed, we do have stability today. You are saying that you feel especially threatened by our ICBMs. We feel even more threatened by your side’s SLBMs because they are less vulnerable, equipped with MIRVs, and very accurate. And even though you have undermined the last mechanism limiting the strategic arms race—the SALT II Treaty—we abide by its limits. As is known, we reduced the number of our missiles before. I still think that we do have a common understanding that strategic parity exists between us. Therefore, if today strategic parity is ensured within the framework of the existing structure and quantity of offensive strategic weapons, then we will preserve the balance when we reduce them by 50 percent, but at a level twice as low. Isn’t that so? And that way we would avoid all of these calculations, confusion, mutual suspicions and accusations of bad intentions, which emerge when we start talking about sub-levels. It seems to me that we found a simple and clear mechanism for resolving this issue in Reykjavik, and I thought that you agreed with it, you personally, Mr. Secretary of State. That is why I am so surprised today.

[…]

Gorbachev. […] I think here the Administration got caught in a trap of its own making. Large contracts have already been placed, entire sectors of industry were engaged, you are placing your bets on a breakthrough in information technology systems. Do you really think that, as President Johnson used to say, whoever controls space controls the entire world? If this is your policy, then it is based on a misconception, on a serious misconception. And that is bad for you, and for us, and for the entire world.

In Reykjavik I said that if the U.S. Administration was so attached to SDI, then we could give our agreement to the continuation of laboratory research, and then you could say that SDI was preserved as a research program. We thought through this issue once again. We thought about what could be done to untie this knot that had been tied by the administration. We can talk about it with you. We thought through the issue of what would constitute laboratory research that would not contradict the ABM Treaty, what would “laboratory” mean in that context. We are explaining to you now for the first time what laboratory research would mean. We believe that it should mean research in laboratories on the ground, in research institutes, at production plants, at testing grounds and fields. Maybe we could look for compromise on the basis of such an approach. We
could discuss during negotiations precisely which components would be barred from deployment in space.

This is what we can propose. Frankly speaking, we are making our “final efforts” because the position of the U.S. administration is one of very real extortion from its partner, it is a position of treating its partner disrespectfully. One cannot do business like this. And think about how our descendants will remember us. [....]

[Source: the Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive.]
About the Conversation with Shultz

Gorbachev: It was a serious conversation. Shevardnadze did some serious work with him. They worked at night. He brought two planes of experts with him. It was a visit to find out what could be “extracted” from the USSR. It is hard to make any real policy with such people. They are too closely connected to the military-industrial complex. But we made a correct assessment—the administration needed to have something [to show] in relations with the USSR. They understand that if eight years end negatively in this sense, it would be a big minus for the Republicans. And we have not seen any greater interest in relations with us on their part.

Shultz is a special figure. He understands where policy begins—from dirt. I tried to get him to engage in a realistic conversation. I spoke about the broad interests of our two countries, about the fact that other states are interested in the improvement of relations also. I tried to persuade him that nothing would work out in terms of the improvement of international relations if we only consider your interests and our interests. We have to have a common balance. And if we admit that, then we should abandon the temptation to command others.

The world is interconnected, interdependent. Let’s all think. Today there are Republicans, tomorrow Democrats. But there are also the national interests of the United States. We will maintain relations with the present administration to the very end. But the question is: can we decide anything with you, can we achieve anything? Not a single administration in the past had such chances to achieve something in relations with the USSR. And what’s happening? Nothing. Are you capable of anything or not? Your behavior is politically inexplicable. You insist that you are observing important changes in the USSR, but you do not make any corrections to your policies.

I lashed out at him, too, on the issue of spymania. I told him that he, Shultz, is himself the main spy, as well as our Shevardnadze—the main spy, and all ambassadors are spies. You know everything about us, and we know everything about you. And that is good.

We had a long and detailed conversation about the missiles. He tried to convince me that he personally and the President were in favor of the agreement. And I told him, I have an impression listening to you that you are walking around hot porridge and cannot make a decision to do anything.

I told him: show us what you came with. Because as soon as the time comes to decide something serious, you throw us something ugly, or something like that in international situation.

What are you going to do—increase your armaments? Why are you so obsessed with tactical missiles, that we have more of them and so on? We are going to destroy them, so why do you have to increase your armaments with your “Lances.”
Overall, the conversation was good, but essentially empty—we did not move anywhere.

Shevardnadze. Shultz ensured me that both he and the President are in favor of the agreement.

I told him, we are sick and tired of cajoling you. We might get tired of listening to you too. Our people have their own pride. And besides, we are not planning to pull you out of your “Irangate.”

He started to threaten me with their Congress. He did not reject the “key stipulations of the treaty,” but did not accept them either.

Their general tendency is hardening in all directions after Reykjavik, including the INF—they want to keep 100 units and are against the global zero [idea].

The question arises—where do we conduct negotiations on operational-tactical missiles? The Americans insist on Geneva—i.e. together with the INF negotiations, but in a separate group.

On the medium-range missiles we have [good] prospects and we should look for solutions. He was counting every dollar—how much the elimination of medium-range missiles would cost, how much the elimination of chemical weapons would cost, where to direct those freed resources if they would really be freed.

Gorbachev. We treat it simply here: Zaikov, for example, proposes to immediately direct those resources to build other missiles. (Laughter)

Shevardnadze. They are unleashing targeted propaganda: we, the United States, are in favor of creating a defensive system, and the Soviets are in favor of offensive arms. We have to recapture the initiative here.

Gorbachev. In other words, I made Shultz understand that there would be no summit without results on the missiles and on arms control in general. The “explosion” of resentment will be worse than a nuclear one, especially in the third world—and there are billions of people there.

Ryzhkov. Eduard Amvrosievich hinted that in three or four years there will be something “bright” in our economic sphere and other spheres of relations between us.

Gorbachev. I am personally in favor of removing all the residue from our relations, of doing it persistently. Judging by everything, Shultz is inclined to move in this direction. We too need to develop a conception of economic relations with the United States.

We are holding to the correct line. They will not get away from us, we will persist like this.

We will inform Thatcher. We will tell her that we are hoping for a rational approach (to Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear weapons) and that we took your comments into account.

Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Wednesday, May 6 [1987]

Short staff meeting to make time for George S. to come in. NSC postponed also. George came in to tie up loose ends about arms deal with Soviets. I approved trying to persuade Helmut Kohl to join in offering zero zero on short range missiles.

Then Ross Perot came in on our dealings with Vietnam. I have named General Vassey as my rep. to seek info. on our POW’s. Ross is convinced some 350 or so are being held in Laos. I’m trying to persuade Ross to step back & not indicate we should try normalizing relations – trade, etc. until we get the truth on our POW’s.

A quick lunch and then to Marine 1 & off to York, PA the Harley-Davidson motorcycle plant. They have done a remarkable job climbing out of a slump. Japanese competition was destroying them. We invoked a 201 a temp. use of tariffs to allow them to reform to meet that competition. A year early they told us to cancel the protection. It was thrilling experience. They haven’t just improved production, they have a team from the workers on the line to top management & they can out compete any one. It isn’t a factory, it’s a religion.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the eighth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) which began on May 5, 1987, in Geneva. They build on the proposals made during my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. (S)

Attachments

1. Overall Instructions (S)
2. START Instructions (S)
3. INF Instructions (S)
4. Defense and Space Instructions (S)

Declassified, released on 4/11/96
under provisions of E.O.12958
by J. Sanders, National Security Council
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR ROUND VIII OF US/SOVIET NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS (S)

REF: (A) STATE 013125; (B) PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO US NEGOTIATORS FOR DECEMBER 2-5 MEETING WITH SOVIET COUNTERPARTS; (C) STATE 336325; (D) STATE 330671; (E) STATE 291641; (F) STATE 077781

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR US DELEGATION FOR THE EIGHTH ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. GUIDANCE FROM PREVIOUS ROUNDS AND SPECIAL DECEMBER MEETING REMAIN IN EFFECT EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FOR EACH OF THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS IS BEING PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

3. PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VIII INCLUDE:

-- TO CONTINUE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO A PROMPT AND FORUM MINI RESPONSE TO THE US PROPOSALS IN THE THREE NEGOTIATING GROUPS, INCLUDING OUR NEW PROPOSAL IN DEFENSE AND SPACE AND OUR PROPOSALS IN START AND INF.

-- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO AN INF TREATY BASED ON THE US INF DRAFT TREATY TABLED IN ROUND VII.

-- TO TABLE IN ROUND VIII A DRAFT START TREATY WHEN IT IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED, INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND SEEK PROMPT NEGOTIATION OF AND AGREEMENT TO A START TREATY BASED ON THE US DRAFT.

-- TO CONTINUE TO PRESS US POSITION IN START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE, AND TO COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO HOLD START NEGOTIATIONS HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN DEFENSE AND SPACE, NOTING THAT ACHIEVING
AGREEMENT ON A TREATY PROVIDING FOR DEEP, EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALONG WITH AN INCREASEMENT, SHOULD BE OUR HIGHEST ARMS CONTROL PRIORITY.

4. IN ELABORATING ON OUR PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATING DRAFT TREATY TEXTS, DELEGATION SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, CONFORMING TO THE THREE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT REYKJAVIK, ARE ADDRESSED AND AGREED CONCURRENTLY WITH PROVISIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

6. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting obstacles placed in the path of achieving arms reductions by Soviet non-compliance. If the Soviets raise the matter of US exceeding Salt limits, delegation should underscore that US policy decisions on the Salt I Interim Agreement and Salt II in large part resulted from Soviet noncompliance with these agreements. The delegation should stress that these agreements are behind us, both as a matter of legal obligation and as a matter of policy commitment. The US has established a policy of interim restraint in its strategic offensive weapons programs and called upon the USSR to exercise comparable restraint in its programs. Our focus, however, should be on progress in NST toward early agreements on radical and meaningful reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR START NEGOTIATING GROUP-ROUND VIII

REFERENCES: (A) 86 STATE 33537, (B) 86 STATE 1168, (C) 86 STATE 330273, (D) 86 STATE 27021, (E) 86 STATE 13616, (F) 86 STATE 54773, (G) 86 STATE 12624, (H) 85 STATE 21812, (I) 85 STATE 162424, (J) 85 STATE 76684.

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE FOR THE U.S. NEGOTIATING GROUP ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR ROUND VIII. EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BELOW, PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED.

3. OVERALL OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S OBJECTIVE REMAINS AN EQUITABLE, VERIFIABLE, AND STABILIZING AGREEMENT REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY 50 PERCENT. THE NEGOTIATING GROUP'S CHIEF OBJECTIVES FOR ROUND VIII ARE:

   -- TO TABLE A DRAFT U.S. START TREATY WHEN IT IS COMPLETED AND APPROVED AND TO SEEK TO MAKE IT THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE WORK OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS.

   -- TO CONTINUE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES NECESSARY FOR A START TREATY INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS.

   -- TO INTENSIFY THE SCHEDULE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO PROTECT OPTIONS TO CONCLUDE A START TREATY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR.


6. REDUCTION SCHEDULE. IN ORDER TO EASE SOVIET CONCERNS PERTAINING TO RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET FORCES, NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT THE U.S. PROPOSES A REDUCTION SCHEDULE OF SEVEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY INSTEAD OF REDUCTIONS BEING COMPLETED BY THE END OF 1981, AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED.

7. MOBILE ICBMS. THE U.S. POSITION ON MOBILE ICBMS (AS STATED IN REF B) REMAINS UNCHANGED.

8. VERIFICATION. THE NEGOTIATOR SHOULD STATE THAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS REMAIN A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE U.S. START PROPOSAL.

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP, - ROUND VIII
REFERENCES: (A) STATE 5620 (B) STATE 71746 (C) NST GENEVA - 3616 (D) NST GENEVA 3639

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS FOR THE INF NEGOTIATING GROUP FOR ROUND VIII. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE ON INF REMAINS UNCHANGED EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS.


5. WHEN PRESS THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE SUBSTANCE OF U.S. POSITION AS CONTAINED IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT, DELEGATION SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RETURN TO AREAS OF CONVERGENCE, FROM WHICH THEY PREVIOUSLY DEPARTED, WILL NOT RESULT IN U.S. CONCESSIONS.

6. IN MOSCOW, THE SOVIETS ONE POINT PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE SRINF NEGOTIATIONS TO READ AGREEMENT ON GLOBAL EQUALITY AND THE ELIMINATION OF SUCH SYSTEMS AT LEAST IN EUROPE. THEY APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF AN OBLIGATION CONTAINED IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE SRINF LIMITATIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD INCLUDE SCUDS, AIRCRAFT AND SS-23S, WOULD COVER THE RANGE BAND BETWEEN 600 AND 1000 KM, AND WOULD BE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. WASHINGTON IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE DELEGATION SHOULD CONFIRM THE ABOVE OUTLINE OF THE SOVIET OFFER AND SEEK FURTHER DETAILS ON THE SOVIET SRINF POSITION. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL UNLESS IT ADEQUATELY MEET THE CRITERION SET FORTH BY THE US WITH
REGARD TO THE US CONCERN THAT ADEQUATE CONSTRAINTS ON
SRINF BE PART OF AN INITIAL TIP AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE,
ON THE BASIS OF CURRENT INFORMATION, IT IS UNCLEAR HOW
THE PROPOSAL MEETS SOME OF OUR OTHER CRITERIA. IF PRESSED
FOR ACCEPTANCE, THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT WASHINGTON
IS EXAMINING SRINF IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW
IN CONSULTATION WITH ITS ALLIES.

7. IN RESPONSE TO DELEGATION REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE IN
REF C, DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT PROCEDURES
FOR PERMITTED CONVERSION WILL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DD AND
C PROTOCOL.

8. GUIDANCE ON TECHNICAL AND EDITORIAL POINTS RAISED IN
REF D IN DRAFT TREATY TEXT WILL BE PROVIDED INTEL.
SUBJECT: Instructions for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for Round VIII

REFERENCES: (A) 87 State 013191; (B) 87 State 036410; (C) 87 State 082514; (D) 95 State 312028

1. SECRET - Entire text.

2. The following is guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round VIII, beginning May 5, 1987. Except as modified below, guidance for Defense and Space Negotiating Group for the previous rounds remain in effect.

3. Overall Objectives and Approach: The principal U.S. goal in the Defense and Space area remains the preservation of the option to deploy, if we choose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible, preferably in a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses. The negotiating group should continue to review with the Soviets the basic elements of the U.S. approach to defense and space issues, with the purposes of revising U.S. objectives and denying any conflicting Soviet goals. Primary U.S. objectives for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group in Round VIII are:

-- To present for all the new U.S. proposal in Defense and Space as presented by Secretary Shultz in his meeting in Moscow April 13-16 and outlined in paragraphs five through seven below. Negotiating Group should emphasize as appropriate, that this new proposal represents a continued U.S. effort to respond to Soviet concerns and to identify practical near-term steps to achieving agreements compatible with our longer-term goals. Negotiating Group should note that previous U.S. package proposals remain on the table but that the Soviets have rejected them.

-- To continue to focus the negotiations on the highest U.S. priorities: To facilitate deployment of effective strategic defenses as soon as possible should a decision for such deployment to be taken; to enhance broad, deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms; to avoid constraints beyond those existing under the ABM Treaty; to stop and to reverse current erosion of the ABM Treaty regime; to discuss how to improve stability through a possible jointly managed transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses in combination with reductions in offensive ballistic missiles.

-- While maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposals and U.S. agenda, to respond to Soviet proposals, as they related to the work of the Defense and Space Negotiating Group.
Negotiating Group and its interrelationships with other areas, by continuing to criticize, question and probe them in accordance with the guidelines above and previous instructions, by pointing to ways in which the U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns, and by encouraging the Soviets to simplify their approach and to accept instead an approach that would only entail limitations, under the conditions the U.S. has proposed, on deployment rates that additional limitations on research, development and testing.

4. The new U.S. proposal, not a JWP, should be the principal focus of the Defense and Space Negotiations in Round VIII. Insofar as the Soviets have described the JWP as a "Statement of Principles," we do not wish to pursue with a drifting exercise and instead wish to pursue a treaty along the lines of the new U.S. proposal. If the Soviets suggest continuing work on the JWP, the Negotiating Group should tell the Soviets that the JWP has served its purpose by highlighting the differences between the sides and that since the Foreign Ministers' meeting had already taken place in Moscow, the United States sees little further value in a JWP. However, at the Negotiator's discretion, the Negotiating Group may engage in preparing a JWP, as a means of expediting progress toward a Treaty, reflecting the new U.S. proposal as outlined below.

5. New U.S. Proposal: In presenting the new proposal, Negotiating Group should point out that, because the Soviet Union rejected the U.S. proposal to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles by the end of 1996, the United States has formulated a new Defense and Space proposal. This new proposal is associated with our START proposal to accomplish 50-percent reductions in strategic offensive arms in seven years after the START Treaty enters into force. This new Defense and Space proposal incorporates the following provisions:

a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational offensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50 percent as-scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty).

b. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise.

c. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restrictions on both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise.
d. Withdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of either side under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized).

e. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty.

f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force.

6. In presenting this proposal, the Negotiating Group should make clear that (1) such a commitment would not alter our ability to withdraw from the treaty in response to a material breach or because of supreme national interest, and (2) we will continue to insist that the Soviets address their violation of the ABM Treaty.

7. In addition, the stated concern with being able to predict the course of future research, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should propose a "predictability package." In addition to our previous Open Laboratories proposal and our proposal for Reciprocal Observation of Testing, this package might include a formal annual exchange of programmatic data. It is intended that such a predictability package not entail any additional restrictions on United States programs beyond those indicated above. FYI: Negotiating Group should emphasize the Open Laboratories Initiative pending receipt of interagency papers on the other two portions of the predictability package. End FYI.

8. If the Soviets propose the sides develop a "Statement of Principles" for the START and Defense and space fora, the Defense and Space Negotiating Group should respond that the U.S. is not interested in pursuing a "Statement of Principles" or framework agreement. Rather, the sides should work toward treaties in their respective working groups.

9. NST Relationship with Other Fora: The relationship between the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) and the NST Defense and Space Negotiating Group with the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) is defined in Instructions for SCC XXIX (Refetel D).

10. If the Soviets propose that the sides agree on a specific list of systems and forces banned from launching into space under the ABM Treaty, the Negotiating Group should say that
such an approach is not necessary because the ABM Treaty specifies the sides' obligations in this regard.
Tuesday, May 12 [1987]

At 9 A.M. a phone call (secure) to Helmut Kohl (W.G. Chancellor). This was a session on our intermediate range nuclear missiles. I wanted him to know we weren’t going to pressure him on the short range missiles. They have real concerns about being left with nuclear weapons that would explode on Germany & being left with Soviet superiority in conventional weapons. But I think he’ll be cooperative.

Then it was a good meeting with Repub. Cong. Leadership. Main problem is getting an extension on debt ceiling before May 28 when if we don’t have an extension we’ll be in default. Talk is of getting a 60 day extension so something can be worked out. I asked them to consider a ceiling based on Gramm, Rudman, Hollings (G.R.H.) – to carry us until budget was balanced with the ceiling each year based on G.R.H. deficit allowed each year.

Then back to NSC meeting – subjects Nicaragua, Contra leaders are planning a Democratic government system. Then the Philippines election. It looks like Acquino will win big. On Malta there has been an election & for 1st time in years a pro U.S. Prime Minister has been elected.
Monday, June 8 [1987]

Get away day – breakfast at 7:45 then up & going. I left at 10 A.M. for the Cipriani Hotel on one of the small islands of Venice – our home for the next 5 days. Nancy left at 10:15 for Stockholm – another program in the anti-drug crusade. She’ll rejoin me on Wed. This was a busy day. We helicoptered to an Italian Naval station then took a boat to the hotel – many official greeters along the way. Arriving at the hotel a little before 11 A.M. then to a room for briefing on bi-lateral with P.M. Fanfani & his team.

I had a phone call from P.M. Mulroney – Canada about taking some action on S. Africa. I urged him to hold off until after Margaret Thatcher’s election Thursday.

Finally, my meeting with old friend Yasu Nakasone, P.M. of Japan. I was able to tell him of partial lifting of the sanctions imposed because of the transistor dumping by some of their companies. They’ve made some improvements so we lifted $51 million of $300 million in tariffs. This was made public at 4 P.M.

Then dinner lasted til midnight mainly because Margaret & Helmut did battle over whether to go zero on the very short range & tactical nuc. weapons. She says no & I had to differ with her although I explained it shouldn’t happen until after we had negotiated on end to chemical weapons & reduced conventionals.

For a while it looked as if they were going to try to settle the whole summit in this one evening. Bet at last.
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 278

ESTABLISHING A U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION ON SRINF MISSILES

The United States' consistent position in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva has been that any INF Treaty must include concurrent constraints on Shorter-Range INF systems (SRINF), constraints which are global, result in equality between the United States and Soviet Union, apply to only U.S. and Soviet systems, and enhance the security of the NATO Alliance.

Following indications during Secretary Shultz' meetings in Moscow that the Soviets were now prepared to negotiate seriously on these systems, I directed an intensive process of consultation within the NATO Alliance to determine which specific SRINF constraints would best serve NATO interests. Based on a NATO consensus, and the unanimous advice of my senior advisors, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have decided to formally propose the global elimination of U.S. and Soviet Shorter-Range INF missiles as an integral part of the INF treaty now being negotiated in Geneva. In doing so, I am also reaffirming our long-standing position that cooperative systems, in particular the Pershing Ia missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany, are not and cannot become the subject of U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations.

The remaining portions of our INF position are unchanged. In particular, it will continue to be U.S. policy aggressively to seek the total elimination of Longer-Range INF systems, although, on an interim basis, we are prepared if necessary to accept a treaty based on the formula I agreed to with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik of an equal global limit of one hundred warheads on each side, with none in Europe.

The United States is committed to NATO's strategy of flexible response, and will not permit the defense of NATO to be decoupled from the American nuclear arsenal. It is a manifestation of this commitment that I directed that the United States take no position on specific SRINF constraints until we had heard the views of our Allies and were confident that they -- like we -- recognize that such an agreement would make NATO safer and more secure.
About negotiations with Americans on middle-range missiles.

Gorbachev: We are moving toward two global zeros on INF and operative-tactical missiles. I.e. we are removing the question of 100 INF missiles in the East. This will make a strong impression in China, Japan, and in their entire Asia. … We will get a huge political victory.

As far as operative and tactical missiles are concerned, by removing them, we are delivering blow at the seventy-two “Pershing-IBs” (i.e. at the American intention to modernize the Pershings that were already stationed in Europe) We will put the Americans in a difficult situation by our initiative. And we will sell it at high price. Let them choose how and where they can make a reciprocal step.

About the third zero—the tactical nuclear weapons. Today we have a balance with the USA both in the delivery vehicles and in the number of warheads.

If one takes kinds of systems, however, but in artillery the picture is more or less the same, but in missiles, we have 1,500, and they have 150. But then they have 1,200 planes more than we do.

Since we are prepared to clear Europe from nuclear weapons, we will cut them, but on an equal basis, taking the dual-purpose weapons into account. Here we need a general conception.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]
Friday, August 7 [1987]

Howard had reached Bill Verity. He’s coming in Monday – sounds as if he’ll take the Sec. of Commerce job. Brad Holms has been confirmed as head of FCC. I’m getting a call from Dick Cheney tomorrow at 1:30.

NSC – Frank C. is back from Europe – had good meeting with Helmut & Margaret. We have some reason to believe the Soviets will back down on the German Pershing 1A missiles. In the P. Gulf we’ll probably move 3 more tankers on the 9th. I’ve written letters to Sen.’s Boren & Cohen – Chairman & Vice Chrmn. of the Intelligence Committee on policy regarding covert actions. We still protect my right to defer notification of such actions if secrecy is necessary to protect human life etc. Frank C. is a little on edge about Geo. S. & Cap W. being a part of morning NSC meetings. I’ll let them work this one out.
MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: September 8, 1987
LOCATION: Situation Room
TIME: 1:15 p.m. -- 2:15 p.m.
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

I. PURPOSE

To review US positions in START and Defense and Space in preparation for upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in order to determine (1) if the United States should alter its position in advance and (2) what flexibility Secretary Shultz should have to respond to Soviet moves.

II. BACKGROUND

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have a series of meetings in Washington on 15-17 September. These meetings will deal with all four aspects of the U.S. - Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since there are no policy decisions required in other areas. This NSPG will be your only opportunity to personally review the outstanding arms reductions issues with your senior advisors before providing guidance to Secretary Shultz, who will conduct the bulk of the meetings with Shevardnadze.

The most important arms reductions issues facing us are whether (and if so how) to modify our START and Defense and Space position in order to move closer to an acceptable START Treaty. I propose the NSPG focus on this issue. Discussion will be based on the options in the two compartmented papers I provided you previously.

On START, discussion will focus on whether to modify our position and allow mobile ICBMs, whether to modify our position on ballistic missile sublimits, and how to deal with sea-launched cruise missiles. The most contentious issue concerns mobile ICBMs.

Copy to: The Vice President
The Chief of Staff

Declassify on: OADR
In Defense and Space, several options have been proposed which are listed in the paper I provided you and which I will summarize at the opening of discussion. I anticipate that Secretary Weinberger will argue against any change in our current position of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1994 in return for an assured right to deploy thereafter. Secretary Shultz will probably favor modifying our position.

Although the background paper I forwarded you suggests some support for extending the non-withdrawal period through 1997, I doubt this will be expressed strongly in the meeting. Most agencies agree there is no reason to alter our position vis-à-vis the Soviets now. Some believe, however, that we must review our policy because of concerns by the Joint Chiefs of Staff over what they perceive to be the automatic end to the ABM Treaty under our current proposal. Most of your other advisors disagree with this interpretation of our policy and thus see no need to change our position.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Participants at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The agenda is at Tab A. I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at Tab C. I will then ask George Shultz to provide a brief overview of the meeting. We will then spend 20 minutes discussing options for change in our START position, followed by a similar period on Defense and Space. No decisions are required at the meeting; decision documents to modify or reaffirm our positions will be forwarded to you later in the week.

Attachments

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Prepared by: Linton Brooks
Will Tobey
For several years we've had consistent arms reduction goals: to get verifiable deep reductions and to preserve our ability to move to a safer world through SDI.

It appears we are near agreement in INF. Now we must finish the task in other areas.

I don't accept the suggestions of some that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office. I want a START agreement, but only if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security.

At the same time, I believe fully in our policy of seeking a stable transition to strategic defenses.

We must set the stage for one day deploying effective defenses, and seek to do so in a manner that will strengthen strategic stability.

George's meeting next week is a chance to move toward these two goals. I want your thoughts today on how we can best use that meeting. Are we better served by movement in our position, or are our current positions the best way to gain our objectives?

I'm looking forward to your views so we can help prepare George for his discussions.
Dear Mr. President,

I think you and I were right when last October we arrived at what was virtually a concurring view that our meeting in Reykjavik had been an important landmark along the path towards specific and urgently needed measures to genuinely reduce nuclear arms. Over the past several months the Soviet Union and the United States have made substantial headway in that direction. Today, our two countries stand on the threshold of an important agreement which would bring about--for the first time in history--an actual reduction in nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament being the exceptionally complex matter that it is, the important thing is to take a first step, to clear the psychological barrier which stands between the deeply rooted idea that security hinges on nuclear weapons and an objective perception of the realities of the nuclear world. Then the conclusion is inevitable that genuine security can only be achieved through real disarmament.

We have come very close to that point, and the question now is whether we will take that first step which the peoples of the world are so eagerly awaiting. This is precisely what I would like to discuss at greater length in this letter, being fully aware that not too much time remains for the preparation of the agreement between us. The Reykjavik understandings give us a chance to reach agreement. We are
facing the dilemma of either rapidly completing an agreement on intermediate-and shorter-range missiles or missing the chance to reach an accord which, as a result of joint efforts, has almost entirely taken shape.

It would probably be superfluous to say that the Soviet Union prefers the first option. In addition to our basic commitment to the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, which is the point of departure for our policy, we also proceed from the belief that at this juncture of time there appears to be a convergence of the lines of interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and the rest of the world. If we fail to take advantage of such a favorable confluence of circumstances, those lines will diverge, and who knows when they might converge again. Then we would risk losing time and momentum, with the inevitable consequences of the further militarization of the Earth and the extension of the arms race into space. In this context I agree with the thought you expressed that "the opportunity before us is too great to let pass by."

To use an American phrase, the Soviet Union has gone its mile towards a fair agreement, and even more than a mile. Of course, I am far from asserting that the U.S. side has done nothing to advance the work on intermediate-and shorter-range missiles. We could not have come to the point when the treaty is within reach had the United States not made steps in our direction. And yet, there is still no answer to the question why Washington has hardened its stance in upholding a number of positions which are clearly one-sided and, I would say, contrived. I would ask
you once again to weigh carefully all the factors involved and convey to me your final decision on whether the agreement is to be concluded now or postponed, or even set aside. It is time you and I took a firm stand on this matter.

I further request that you give careful thought to the recent important evolution in our positions on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which in effect assures accord. We are ready to conclude an agreement under which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have any missiles in those categories.

The implementation of such a decision would be subject to strict reciprocal verification, including, of course, on-site inspections of both the process of the missiles' destruction and the cessation of their production.

I have to say that we are proposing to you a solution which in important aspects is virtually identical with the proposals that were, at various points, put forward by the U.S. side. For that reason in particular, there should be no barriers to reaching an agreement, and the artificial obstacles erected by the U.S. delegation should naturally disappear, which, as I understand, will be facilitated by the decision of the F.R.G. government not to modernize the West German Pershing 1A missiles and to eliminate them. Of course, we have no intention to interfere in U.S. alliance relations, including those with the F.R.G. However, the question of what happens to the U.S. warheads intended for the West German missiles needs to be clarified.
We are proposing fair and equitable terms for an agreement. Let me say very candidly and without diplomatic niceties: we have in effect opened up the reserves of our positions in order to facilitate an agreement. Our position is clear and honest: we call for the total elimination of the entire class of missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and of all warheads for those missiles. The fate of an agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles now depends entirely on the U.S. leadership and on your personal willingness, Mr. President, to conclude a deal. As for our approach, it will be constructive, you can count on that.

If we assume that the U.S. side, proceeding from considerations of equivalent security, will go ahead with the conclusion of the treaty—and this is what we hope is going to happen—then there is no doubt that this will impart a strong impetus to bringing our positions closer together in a very real way on other questions in the nuclear and space area, which are even more important for the security of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and with which you and I have come to grips after Reykjavik.

What I have in mind specifically are the issues of strategic offensive arms and space. Those are the key issues of security, and our stake in reaching agreement on them is certainly not at all diminished by the fact that we have made headway on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. What is more, it is this area that is pivotal to the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, and hence to the entire course of military-strategic developments in the world.
At the negotiations in Geneva on those questions the delegations, as you know, have started drafting an agreed text of a treaty on strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side is seeking to speed up, to the maximum possible extent, progress in this work and shows its readiness to accommodate the other side and to seek compromise solutions. To reach agreement, however, a reciprocal readiness for compromise is, of course, required on the part of the United States.

Things are not as good with regard to working out agreement on the ABM Treaty regime, on preventing the extension of the arms race into space. Whereas we have submitted a constructive draft agreement that takes into account the U.S. attitude to the question of research on strategic defense, the U.S. side continues to take a rigid stand. However, without finding a mutually acceptable solution to the space problem it will be impossible to reach final agreement on radically reducing strategic offensive arms, which is what you and I spoke about in both Geneva and Reykjavik.

If we are to be guided by a desire to find a fair solution to both these organically interrelated problems, issues relating to space can be resolved. The Soviet Union is ready to make additional efforts to that end. But it is clear that this cannot be done through our efforts alone, if attempts to secure unilateral advantages are not abandoned.

I propose, Mr. President, that necessary steps be taken, in Geneva and through other channels, particularly at a high level, in order to speed up the pace of negotiations so that full-scale agreements could be reached within the next few
months both on the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and on ensuring strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

If all those efforts were crowned with success we would be able to provide a firm basis for a stable and forward-moving development not just of the Soviet-U.S. relationship but of international relations as a whole for many years ahead. We would leave behind what was, frankly, a complicated stretch in world politics, and you and I would crown in a befitting manner the process of interaction on the central issues of security which began in Geneva.

I think that both of us should not lose sight of other important security issues, where fairly good prospects have now emerged of cooperating for the sake of reaching agreement.

I would like to single out in particular the question of the real opportunities that have appeared for solving at last the problem of the complete elimination of chemical weapons globally. Granted that the preparation of a convention banning chemical weapons depends not only on the efforts of our two countries, still it is the degree of agreement between our positions that in effect predetermines progress in this matter. It is our common duty to bring this extremely important process to fruition.

If the veneer of polemics is removed from the problem of reducing conventional arms, a common interest will be evident in this area too. This is the interest of stability at a lower level of arms, which can be achieved through substantial reductions in armed forces and armaments, through removing
the existing asymmetries and imbalances. Accordingly, we have fairly good prospects of working together to draw up a mutually acceptable mandate for negotiations on conventional arms. The Vienna meeting would thus become a major stage in terms of a military dimension, in addition to the economic, human and other dimensions.

One more consideration: we believe that the time has come to remove the cloak of dangerous secrecy from the military doctrines of the two alliances, of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. In this process of giving greater transparency to our military guidelines, meetings of military officials at the highest level could also play a useful role.

Does it not seem paradoxical to you, Mr. President, that we have been able to bring our positions substantially closer together in an area where the nerve knots of our security are located and yet we have been unable so far to find a common language on another important aspect, namely, regional conflicts? Not only do they exacerbate the international situation, they often bring our relations to a pitch of high tension. In the meantime, in the regions concerned—whether in Asia, which is increasingly moving to the forefront of international politics, the Near East or Central America—encouraging changes are now under way, reflecting a search for a peaceful settlement. I have in mind, in particular, the growing desire for national reconciliation. This should be given careful attention and, I believe, encouragement and support.
As you can see, the Soviet leadership once again reaffirms its strong intention to build Soviet-U.S. relations in a constructive and businesslike spirit. Time may flow particularly fast for those relations, and we should treat it as something extremely precious. We are in favor of making full use of Eduard Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington to find practical solutions to key problems. In the current situation this visit assumes increased importance. Our foreign minister is ready for detailed discussions with U.S. leaders on all questions, including ways of reaching agreement on problems under discussion in Geneva and the prospects and possible options for developing contacts at the summit level. He has all necessary authority with regard to that.

I want to emphasize that, as before, I am personally in favor of actively pursuing a businesslike and constructive dialogue with you.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV
Memorandum of conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. Excerpt.
October 23, 1987

Gorbachev: First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary of State. Taking into account the fact that you came here soon after your meeting with E. A. Shevardnadze in Washington, maybe we can say that our relations are becoming more dynamic. We welcome this. The main thing now is the substance. And here, as it appears to us, something is emerging.

Shultz: We always want to concentrate our attention on the substance. At the same time, it is true that more and more active contacts at the upper levels help move the work on the substance of important issues further. Therefore, a certain interconnectedness exists between the process of our interaction and progress on the concrete issues. I think we can make note of considerable progress on the substantive issues. In my toast at breakfast yesterday, I said that in ten years history will register the fact that in Reykjavik we achieved more than at any other summit in the past.

Gorbachev: I agree with you. I would say that an intellectual breakthrough took place in Reykjavik, and that it was very powerful, that it had a shocking effect, resembling a reaction at a stock exchange. Later, when many things calmed down, and when people figured things out, it became generally accepted that Reykjavik opened a new, very important stage in the political dialogue between our countries, especially on the most important issues of security.

I would like to welcome Mr. Carlucci, who arrived with you. We are hoping that he will make a positive contribution to our search for resolutions on the issues under discussion.

Shevardnadze: Mr. Carlucci made a constructive contribution to our work in Washington.

Gorbachev: Why don’t we do the same here?

Shultz: I have worked with Mr. Carlucci since the 1970s, when he was with the government’s Office of Economic Opportunity—the organization, which works on helping to solve such problems as poverty, assistance to the poor, and so on. Then he worked with me at the Office of Management and Budget. That is the organization whose members constantly reject requests for resources from other government bureaus. Overall, Mr. Carlucci has more extensive experience in various government bureaus than perhaps anybody else. He has worked in the departments of Defense and State, in intelligence, and on issues of domestic policy. He has rich experiences and we always work well together.

Gorbachev: Then he should know well that there cannot be any agreement if the interests of the partner in a negotiation are not taken into account. I say this because S. F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze, who are present here, act differently: they want to bargain for
better conditions for their side, to achieve superiority for the Soviet Union and for the USA, respectively.

*Shultz:* I am sure this does not characterize Akhromeev. It does characterize Nitze.

*Akhromeev:* We were able to agree with him on many issues.

*Gorbachev:* I think that the fact that the military takes part in our meetings is also very important. It shows that our relations have reached a new stage. If we don’t intend to fight each other and, more than that, if we are going to disarm,—then our militaries should also know each other and work together.

*Shultz:* I completely agree with that. If one looks at the history of Soviet-American relations, then one sees that in one sphere [our] cooperation was able to survive all the highs and lows of our relations, and to preserve its constructive character. I have in mind the interaction of our navies within the framework of the agreement on preventing accidents on the high seas. Therefore, we would consider it important that meetings be held between our defense ministers and other military representatives, meetings between Marshal Akhromeev and the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe.

*Gorbachev:* Good. Let us now discuss how we are going to conduct our meeting. We are in a process of democratization in our country now. And that means that this issue should also be resolved in a democratic fashion taking into account both your and our considerations. Maybe you could tell us what you discussed with E. A. Shevardnadze. And then it will be clear what we should discuss with you today.

*Shultz:* Good. I would like to summarize briefly the discussions that took place. We have developed a certain process, which allows us to consider all the issues that are of interest to both sides. Within the framework of this process, the work is conducted on the basis of combining meetings in a comparatively narrow circle with the work of the working groups, which discuss more concrete issues. We believe that this is a good process.

*Gorbachev:* Yes, this organization of [our] work has proven itself.

*Shultz:* We have assembled a good group to conduct the main negotiations: from the Soviet side it is E. A. Shevardnadze together with A. F. Dobrynin and A. A. Bessmertnykh; and from our side, myself, F. Carlucci, and R. Ridgeway. We created working groups, which did some good work on such issues as bilateral relations, human rights and humanitarian issues, arms control. We also created, I would say spontaneously, a group on conventional weapons. Nonetheless, the most productive part of the discussion on regional issues took place within the small group.

We discussed a number of arms control issues. The working group on conventional weapons tried as much as possible to help the discussions, which are now conducted in Vienna, about the mandate for future negotiations on conventional weapons. Another
group held a useful discussion, in our view, on chemical weapons. As far as negotiations on nuclear and space weapons are concerned, we had a separate working group on INF and SRINF, as well as a working group, which discussed strategic weapons and space—the ABM. In addition, these latter issues were discussed in a detailed way at the ministerial level.

We came here with a task and instructions from the President to complete the bulk of our work on the treaty on intermediate and medium-range missiles, i.e. if not to literally dot the last “i”, then to reach a stage where it would be sufficiently clear that this task is solvable. The President also starts from the assumption that the key issue is strategic weapons. We have also noted your statement to the effect that this is the cardinal problem, as well as another statement in which you said that the work on the strategic offensive weapons could be completed before the spring of next year. We agree with this task and we would like to have a sufficient degree of progress to allow us to talk not about the INF but mainly about strategic weapons during your visit to the USA, which we hope will take place, and to establish a foundation for completing our work in this area. This is our goal.

We clarified a number of issues on INF and SRINF. It relates in particular to the so-called problem of Pershing 1A [missiles] in the FRG, as well as to some other issues. We have to say that we resolved most of those issues at the ministerial level. There remain a number of issues, which the working group was working on last evening and night. I must say that I was disappointed with the report of that working group. I think that we should make them do some serious work. We hear too many statements that such-and-such issue should be left for consideration in Geneva, to which I say: no, this issue should be resolved here because the people working in Geneva receive their instructions from Moscow and Washington. Today, the people who can make the appropriate decisions are gathered here, and it is necessary to resolve those issues.

In short, I was hoping to inform you that the main issues on INF and SRINF weapons have been resolved. Unfortunately, I cannot do that. However, I can say that all of these issues seem to be quite resolvable.

As far as the ABM and space are concerned, those discussions between us and within the working group were, I believe, not useless. I think that we were at least able to identify those key issues, on which we will need major political decisions. It also became clear which issues will require a more comprehensive, detailed working through. I believe that now, when we, while maximizing our efforts, are taking the final steps toward the treaty on INF and SRINF, it has become especially clear how complex the issues of verification are in all their detail and specifics. And when we start talking about the treaty on strategic weapons, where even after the cuts there will remain a large quantity of armaments subject to verification, the complexity and difficulty of control will be even greater.

That is why we agreed that it is necessary right now to step up our efforts seriously in this sphere. This is especially relevant to one big problem, which we admit. I have in mind
our differences on ground-based mobile missiles. As I explained, the problem is not that we have objections in principle to mobile missiles. To the contrary, these weapons in principle have some advantages. The problem is that everything on which we agree should be subject to reliable verification. That is why we agreed that this issue will be given priority attention, so that by the time of your visit, which we hope will take place, substantial work will have been conducted that will help you and the President to discuss that issue.

Shevardnadze: In principle, I agree with the assessments presented by the Secretary of State.

Gorbachev: I see, you have agreed on everything? What is left for me and the President?

Shevardnadze: I said—in principle.

Shultz: If not for the work accomplished by you, Mr. General Secretary, and the President, in particular in Reykjavik, we would now be so mired in a bog that we would not be able to move a step.

Shevardnadze: Of course, the agreement achieved in Washington on the liquidation of two classes of missiles was made possible only on the basis of Reykjavik. One has to say that even after Washington, the positive tendency has continued, thanks to which we have been able to achieve agreement on a number of issues that seemed very difficult. Yesterday we were able to agree on a formula regarding warheads for the Pershing-1A. That is a complex and sensitive matter. On that issue, we were able to find a solution that will be acceptable to the USA, the FRG, taking their alliance obligation into account, and to us as well.

The issue of the overall timetable for eliminating intermediate and shorter-range missiles turned out to be rather difficult. Yesterday we agreed in principle that for medium-range missiles it would be a three-year period, and for shorter-range missiles a year and a half, with consideration for technological capabilities in this sphere.

Discussion of a number of issues will be continued. We had a good discussion on the issue of non-circumvention, not allowing transfers of relevant technologies to third countries. I think a mutually acceptable compromise is emerging in this sphere.

There are still quite a few difficult problems in the area of verification and inspections. These problems can be solved on the basis of an objective approach with the understanding that there are a number of sensitive problems and difficult aspects touching upon the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev: I think Mr. Shultz put it right when he said that the most important issue now is no longer intermediate and shorter-range missiles, but the prospects for resolving the problem of strategic offensive weapons, and the shifting of negotiations to the plane
of practical decisions. As far as the remaining issues of the INF treaty are concerned, they should be resolved in such a way that both of us have complete confidence and there will be no anxiety regarding treaty implementation.

Shevardnadze: Yes, this is precisely the basis on which we should continue the discussions. At the same time we emphasize that the United States has its own system of missile production and deployment, which differs from our system. We have our own system. And today we stated that in order to work out a realistic agreement, it is necessary to take these differences into account.

Shultz: I agree with that. We do not argue with that.

Shevardnadze: I think that on some fundamental issues it is necessary to make a decision now, today. We have to be clear. In the opposite case, if we leave these issues open, if we transfer them to Geneva, they could persist for a long time.

Gorbachev: Yes, the main issues should be decided here, and leave only technical issues for Geneva. We have the appropriate experience.

Shevardnadze: The second group of issues is disarmament. This, as was correctly noted here, consists of the cardinal problem of radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons and the ABM treaty. In this sphere, results have been more modest. I would say that it is hard to speak of any results whatsoever. Yesterday I openly told the Secretary of State that after Reykjavik the Soviet side made substantial changes, which took into account the interests of the United States, and made significant steps toward the U.S. position. However, precisely after Reykjavik, the U.S. administration added a number of complicating factors to its position, which are causing problems in the negotiations and retarding progress on the main issue.

Gorbachev: If we recall our Reykjavik marathon, then it was precisely the issue of the ABM in space, which became the main obstacle that we were not able to overcome in the end. Obviously, you drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that space remains the biggest obstacle. One also has to note that while we introduced positive elements, elements of flexibility, into our position, the American side continued to stand on its position of reinforced concrete. And it is precisely that position which impedes progress toward an agreement on this issue, which is not only central to Soviet-American relations, but is the most important issue for the entire world. How are we going to move ahead?

Shevardnadze: Yes, it was precisely after Reykjavik that the new elements that are making negotiations more difficult, such as the demand to eliminate all Soviet heavy missiles, appeared in the American position.

Gorbachev: And by the way, we were ready to eliminate them, but in tandem with you, in tandem with the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Shevardnadze: Absolutely true. And the American side is presenting demands to resolve this issue on a purely unilateral basis. They are also raising the issue of banning mobile ICBMs, and proposing to count middle-range bombers as strategic weapons when that question was already decided in 1979 when the SALT II treaty was negotiated. Also, the American side does not agree to resolve the issue of limiting the number of sea-based cruise missiles. As you know, in Reykjavik we agreed to resolve this issue separately, outside the framework of the main strategic triad. However, it is clear that if sea-based cruise missiles are not limited, it could open a new channel in the arms race, and create an opportunity to circumvent the treaty.

The American side raised the issue of stepping up discussions of verification. We believe that if the main fundamental issues of the future agreement are resolved, we would be able to find a solution to the issues of verification.

As far as the ABM treaty is concerned, yesterday I presented our position in detail. The essence of it is that if there is any retreat from the mutual understanding achieved in Reykjavik about the need for a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, along with strict compliance with its provisions, it would make it impossible to achieve agreement on strategic offensive weapons. The American side is aware of the fact that we developed and clarified our position on such issues as laboratory research, research conducted at plants, testing grounds, etc. The USA is also aware of our new proposals regarding development of a list of devices that would be banned from space, and our proposals regarding the specific parameters and characteristics of such devices.

It so happened that we did not have time for a sufficiently comprehensive discussion of this group of questions. But yesterday we reminded the American side that in order for the summit to be fruitful and full-scale, it would be very important to coordinate our key positions on these issues.

As far as chemical and conventional weapons are concerned, they were discussed within the working groups. Today we will listen to their reports on those issues. We also discussed such regional issues as the situation in the Persian Gulf in particular. Yesterday, while discussing those themes, we stayed up almost until midnight. The discussion was serious, and at times sharp.

Gorbachev: On this last issue I would like to say the following. It might seem to you that sometimes we present demands against the position of the American side that are too great. But here are two instances of principal importance. First of all, we are not sure that you have calculated everything well, that you really understand where this policy might lead for you, for us, and for the entire world.

Secondly—although in terms of importance it might be the main instance—we believe that our interaction in the Persian Gulf is the freshest example that proves the possibility of constructive cooperation between the USSR and USA in resolving a most acute international problem. It was precisely this cooperation that led to the adoption of well-known documents by the [U.N.] Security Council. We believe, and we have told you that
and stated it publicly, that we still have substantial potential there. And we need to use our coordinated positions on Resolution 598\(^1\) to the fullest extent, [in order] not to allow that situation to escalate to a new level.

However, the United States is apparently offended by the fact that we did not support its demand for sanctions, for a second resolution, and [you] decided to act alone, like “the good old days.” We believe that the cooperation that has developed there is a positive new factor, and is important for our overall relations. However, the United States has preferred to throw away this interaction and to act alone. I will not talk about the reasons for why it happened, but I want to say that your withdrawal from cooperation with us creates disappointment. This political line is wrong. In addition, I repeat, we believe that it could have very serious consequences, which, you, apparently, did not analyze. We are watching America's actions. For our part, we are searching for ways to improve relations with the U.S., ways to lead them to a new stage.

Shevardnadze: Mikhail Sergeevich, I presented our position during yesterday’s discussions in that exact same spirit. We believe that it is very important to preserve the unity of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union proceeds from the assumption that resolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf is possible. But for this it is imperative to use the capabilities of the UN Security Council, in particular an organ such as the Military Staff Committee, to the fullest extent.

I would like to summarize. The agreement on INF and SRINF does not look like a distant possibility any longer. Given mutual desires, I believe it is possible to complete all work on this treaty in, let’s say, three weeks’ time. As far as the key principles of strategic offensive weapons and the ABM are concerned, here some serious work is required. But now, regrettably, we do not have a serious basis for resolving the issue of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons under conditions of preserving the ABM Treaty. I think that our task is to prepare a serious, solid basis for resolving this problem for the summit.

Shultz: Speaking broadly, we have approximately the same impression. Nothing to argue about here. As far as INF are concerned, I think that we should try to resolve the majority of issues on the list prepared by the [working] group today. All that should be left for Geneva would be editing work, dotting the last “i’s”. We would prefer not to leave the resolution of serious issues for Geneva, where participants in the negotiations would have to wait for instructions from Washington and Moscow.

Gorbachev: We would welcome such approach.

Shultz: As far as strategic weapons are concerned, this is a very important sphere where we want to achieve some progress. E. A. Shevardnadze told me that you personally have devoted a lot of time and attention to these issues, and that you probably would have some thoughts, which you will present today personally. We would like to hear them.

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\(^1\) A key Security Council resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq War.
Several words about the Persian Gulf. As you noted, one very good opportunity has emerged—the cooperation between us within the framework of U.N. diplomatic efforts. We want this cooperation to produce results. We believe that it could help resolve this military conflict, which is poisoning the entire international situation. We think that there could be nothing better to strengthen the prestige of the U.N. than to achieve success in resolving a difficult problem. A success of that kind would be miraculous medicine for the United Nations. Success would show people that if we undertake something, we are capable of achieving our goals.

I would like to assure you that we do not strive to act alone. We want the process to function, to work within the U.N. framework. As far as our ships in the Gulf are concerned, there are now more ships from European states and from the Gulf states there. American ships constitute only a third, or maybe a fourth, of the overall number of ships there. Why do we and others find ourselves there? Because Iran and the war in this region represent a threat—a threat to our friends in the Gulf and to the flow of oil, the main source of energy for the countries of the West. We have to provide support for our friends in the Gulf. We have to ensure the safety of supplies of such an important source of energy. Because now and in the future this region will remain one of the main suppliers of oil for the entire world.

I told your Minister that our forces deployed in the Gulf would be reduced if the acuteness of the problem is reduced. They are deployed there precisely in connection with this problem, not to create a permanent presence there. […]

[...] We cannot discount that. At the same time we are not looking for confrontation. However, we cannot allow the Iranians to have a blank check.

Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail. We discussed it from the perspective of the situation in the Security Council. In the immediate future the U.N. General Secretary will present a new version of a package solution on implementing the Security Council Resolution for consideration by all sides. Iraq will accept this proposal. We discussed the issue of what we would do if by the end of the month it becomes clear that Iran is continuing to play games. How should we act in the Security Council in that case? We believe that we should take this to the end. We cannot allow Iran to make a laughing stock out of the U.N. Security Council. The Council has defined its position and it is necessary that it take this to the end.

Gorbachev: I don’t want to get into detailed discussion of this issue right now. But it is a serious, important issue. This problem could bury many things, including, unfortunately, things in our relationship. I only want to say: we hope that you will weigh all this, that you will not be overpowered by certain forces and emotions. This is very serious business. It might lead to very serious consequences. Let us continue the line that we have worked out together. Its potential has not yet been exhausted.

Shultz: I can agree with that. Indeed, we need to work within the U.N. framework because something really important has happened at the U.N.
Gorbachev: I would like to return to what we were discussing earlier. Indeed, we can see that it is not just that the tempo of our progress that is accelerating. There is also a certain amount of progress on the concrete issues under consideration. I would say that if one takes a look at the progress from Geneva through Reykjavik to today, we have succeeded in clarifying many issues.

[...]

In their search for solutions the sides undertook concrete steps to meet each other halfway. I must say sincerely: in our view, we undertook more of those steps. And in you we still detect a tendency to squeeze as much as possible out of us. What can one do, somebody has to do more, take this additional step, and we decided to do it. But this movement that started gave birth to great expectations among our peoples, and in the entire world. Therefore the anticipation that the next stage of our relations should produce concrete results is completely natural. They have been waiting for them for a long time now. If that does not happen, it would be a big loss both for the American administration and for us. You cannot discount that.

It is from this perspective that I react to reports about the work conducted by you and E. A. Shevardnadze. I have the impression that in the immediate future we could finalize our work on the agreements on INF and SRINF. I agree that the principal issues should be resolved here, in Moscow, while leaving our delegations in Geneva only technical, editing issues.

I would even say: if we complete our work like this, that would be very important in and of itself. It would be a very important event in the eyes of the peoples of the world. But then people will rightfully ask: if we understand the importance of that agreement and if we conclude that agreement in the immediate future, why would we then continue any kind of activity in the sphere of production, testing and deployment of mid-range missiles? Therefore, the right thing to do would be to announce a joint moratorium on such activities. It could be introduced beginning November 1. I repeat, if we have an agreement in principle that we will sign the treaty, then a joint moratorium on deployment and any activities in the sphere of INF would be an important step that would strengthen this political decision. It would show that the agreement would start working de facto even before we actually sign it. I think that this important step would determine the degree of our accord on this issue.

Now I move to the central issue—the issue of strategic offensive weapons and space. You recalled my words in this connection. I confirm those words. We believe that resolution of the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space would indeed be extremely important for the security of the USA and the USSR because it is precisely these matters that define the strategic situation. Therefore, finding mutually acceptable solutions to nuclear and space questions becomes especially important and pressing.
In Reykjavik we had a serious exchange of opinions on those issues. After Reykjavik we tried to do something to reaffirm our readiness to reach resolutions on the complex of those problems. What is the essence of the mutual understanding reached in Reykjavik? The essence is the 50% reductions in offensive strategic weapons and the 10-year non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. And what is happening in Geneva? Essentially, bargaining is taking place there. Therefore we have been thinking a lot about what else we could do to move ahead with a resolution to this problem in Geneva. Many issues are being discussed there, a lot is being said. However, if you put it all aside, there are two genuinely big issues. The first is ensuring strict compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the second is the optimal correlation between the elements [that constitute] strategic forces, the strategic triad.

As far as the first issue is concerned, we proposed to the United States not to use the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years. We also proposed a second version, which is also connected with the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Trying to meet the U.S. halfway, we proposed to discuss which devices could be deployed in space, and which could not. We are waiting for your reaction.

As far as the second issue is concerned—the issue of optimal correlation between the different elements [comprising] strategic forces, we considered this matter carefully once more. We are proposing a new formula, on the basis of which we could determine the limits on concentrations of warheads for each element of the triad. Besides, each side would have an opportunity to compensate for the lower number of delivery vehicles on one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of a different kind within the overall limit.

Therefore, we propose [the following]: the United States agrees to legally undertake an obligation not to use its right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years under strict compliance with all of its provisions. The Soviet Union agrees to establish limits on concentrations of warheads on different kinds of U.S. and Soviet strategic armaments. Within the [overall] limit of 6,000 warheads, we propose to have not more than 3,000-3,300 warheads on ICBMs, no more than 1,800-2,000 warheads on SLBMs, and not more than 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles.

We believe that this kind of movement toward each other’s positions would lead us in the nearest term to work out key positions on these issues. This would prepare the ground for the next step—the move toward concluding the agreement. In that case, as I understand it, when I arrive in the U.S., we would create the agenda, which we discussed during your visit in April of this year. First of all, we would sign the treaty on the elimination of INF and SRINF. Secondly, we would agree on the key provisions regarding strategic offensive weapons based on the new compromise proposals. And finally, we would incorporate the agreement about initiating negotiations on the problem of nuclear testing that was reached between you and E. A. Shevardnadze. I think that would be a solid agenda.
We see that not everybody in the United States is in favor of such agreements. There are those who wish to undermine this process. They use all kinds of arguments for this purpose, in particular the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. I have to say that we also have complaints about American radar stations. We could remove these complaints on a reciprocal basis. Now I would like to inform you about our unilateral step. The Soviet Union announces a 12-month moratorium on all work on the Krasnoyarsk radar station. We are expecting a similar step from the U.S. in regard to the American radar station in Scotland.

I think that we can take on the issues of strategic offensive weapons and space as they are connected in a substantive, fundamental way.

Shultz: Thank you. I would like to respond to the proposals you have outlined. Of course, every time you introduce proposals on important issues, we study and analyze them carefully. Now I can provide you some considerations based on our analysis.

First of all, I welcome what you said on the INF, and your words about your readiness to give additional stimulus to this work. We are also instructing our representatives so that the main issues will already be resolved in Moscow.

As far as the ABM and related issues are concerned, among other things we have been trying to clarify what your proposals consisted of. We believe that there is a certain amount of progress here. I would like to have total clarity as to whether I understand the proposals that you presented. This does not presuppose that the President agrees with them. As you know, for him this is a very delicate, sensitive issue. I would like to have an opportunity to present the factual substance of your position to him as precisely as possible. Thus, as I understand it, you are proposing that we define a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty with strong compliance with the Treaty in the form in which it was developed.

Gorbachev: As it was before 1983. Then we did not have any differences. And besides, that was not just our point of view. That is the point of view of the U.S. Congress. And the Congress is, I am convinced, a very serious, very important body, which receives reports, including reports from departments in which Mr. Carlucci has worked, from the National Security Council, in which Mr. Matlock worked then, and other detailed information. At that time we shared the same position.

Shultz: I would like to clarify—do you have in mind compliance with the Treaty in the form in which it was presented, for example, in the report of our Defense Department from March 1985? I mention this report because it was mentioned by your representatives at the negotiations.

Gorbachev: In the form as this Treaty was understood and adhered to by both sides before 1983.
**Shultz:** I would not want to enter into any secondary arguments right now, because different opinions exist about what was adhered to and how, and what they had in mind. In our country, some people believe, for example, that the Soviet Union insists on an even more narrow interpretation of the Treaty than the narrow interpretation itself. I named one document for a reference, which your representatives cited, in order to understand your point of view better.

**Gorbachev:** I repeat: we are talking not only about that, but also about the fact that before 1983 the Treaty was interpreted and effectively enforced by both sides in the same way. If now this creates some difficulties for you, I told the President in Reykjavik that I am ready to help him out of the situation that was created as a result of the launching of the SDI program. Our proposal—to agree on what can and cannot be deployed in space under conditions of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—allows [you] to conduct research within the SDI framework. In particular, the second version proposed by us presupposes defining concrete parameters for devices that are allowed to be deployed in space. With that, naturally, it is understood that there should be no weapons in space. But as far as the orders you have already placed with companies and research organizations, they can be carried out within the limits of these agreed-upon parameters. This proposal represents a compromise.

Besides that, we are moving in the direction of your requests regarding limits. For example, when I say that there would be a limit of 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads within the total limit of 6,000 warheads, this represents 50%. This is what I promised the President. As you can see, we are true to our word.

**Shultz:** I would like to clarify certain aspects. You should not interpret the fact that I am clarifying certain issues related to space and ABM as indicating that I was accepting your positions. I am not able to do that. I can only report on them to the President. Do I understand correctly that within the ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, activities which correspond to the Treaty in its traditional interpretation would be allowed, along with activities in space within the limits of the ceilings proposed by you? At the same time, such activities could not include deployments prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

**Gorbachev:** As well as weapons tests in space. As far as permitted activities are concerned, we could discuss and define that together.

**Shultz:** I think that enough has been said on this issue within the bounds of what can be said at the present stage. I repeat, I was only asking clarifying questions, which do not signify agreement with your proposals on behalf of the President. I believe that we should conduct our conversation directly and openly.

Now another side of the question—how to implement the 50% reductions of strategic armaments in practice? We believe that significant progress has been achieved on this issue. I would like to present an alternative proposal for your consideration. Realizing that the idea of sub-limits, at least of certain kinds of sub-limits has repeatedly caused
problems, in particular during our discussions in April during my visit, we undertook an analysis of the situation. Now we have a joint draft text of the treaty, at this point with many brackets. We agreed on a total limit on warheads—6,000. We agreed that the number of delivery vehicles and bombers will be 1,600. We agreed on the limit of warheads on heavy missiles—1,540. We agreed on the rule of counting the bombers. We have an agreement that the throwweight would be reduced by 50%, and now we would like to achieve a legal affirmation of that in the text of the treaty, as well as a confirmation that after such a reduction in throwweight there would be no future increases. In principle, I think we have an agreement on this; however, we would like to confirm that in the formulations of the Treaty. One of the limitations, which we have proposed, and which was reflected today in your response, is the limitation on the number of warheads on ICBMs—3,300. In Washington you proposed a sub-limit of 3,600 units, but that was proposed as a maximum level for any of the elements of the triad.

We believe that the most serious difference between the elements of the triad is the difference between ballistic missiles and warheads that are delivered by air and jet-propelled systems. Of course, land-based missiles are more precise than SLBMs. However, the main distinction is between ballistic missiles and non-ballistic means. Therefore, we would like an agreement to have as a minimum a certain number of warheads on the air-based part of the triad. For this purpose, we proposed a limit of 4,800 for ICBM warheads. In the interests of moving forward, we would be ready to remove our proposal about establishing separate sub-limits for ICBM and SLBM warheads in return for your accepting the proposal on a summary sub-limit of 4,800 units for ICBM and SLBM warheads. Within this ceiling, each side would be free to determine the constituent parts.

As I said before, when we start talking about mobile missiles, it becomes very important to be confident that the limits stipulated by the treaty could be verified. We are ready to engage in work on this issue in Geneva. Frankly speaking, we do not see a satisfactory answer to the problem of verification of mobile missiles. But maybe you can show us how that can be done. Maybe we will be able to work on this issue before your visit to the U.S. At the same time, I have to admit, I do not see how to solve this problem. However, we are ready to work on it.

So here is the structure that we propose. Yes, and there remains the sub-limit of 1,650 units that we proposed. However, as you can see, in general we are making the problem of sub-limits easier, on the condition that there would be a general limit on warheads on ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev: I think that if we find an approach that would allow us to begin movement on all the complex of issues of strategic offensive weapons and space in their interconnectedness, then we should be able to resolve the issue of mobile missiles. By the way, you too are planning to build mobile missiles. You are already building railway-based MX missiles. Therefore it is a problem both for you and for us.
Shultz: Yes, indeed, we are working on this. However, I would like to assure you that we would prefer to introduce a ban on mobile missiles; we are ready to abandon this program.

Gorbachev: But mobile strategic missiles already exist. Besides, as I said in Reykjavik, they have a very short flight time. And what do you do with such a mobile system as a submarine? They come very close to our territory. Besides, while it is known where ICBMs start their flight, it is unknown with SLBMs.

Shultz: Both missiles have a short flight time. Beside that, once ballistic missiles are launched, it is impossible to recall them. In short, ballistic missiles represent the greatest threat, and that is why we consider it necessary to establish a limit on ballistic missile warheads in view of their differences with air-based means.

Gorbachev: You have your own concerns, and we have ours regarding your strategic armaments. I think that these issues should be discussed at the negotiations.

Shultz: I agree.

Gorbachev: I want to reiterate again what I have said many times before. We do not want the United States, after the reductions, to find itself in a situation that would be unfavorable for you, that would weaken your security, weaken your confidence in your security. That would be bad for us as well. Because if one of the sides finds itself in such a situation, it would try to find a way out of it, to seek the possibility of compensation. Experience shows that both of us have found [such] answers. But it is clear that this would not correspond to our interests.

Shultz: You expressed that idea in Geneva. I believe that it is a strong, important idea. I agree with it. You also emphasized the differences in the structure of our strategic forces then, the fact that neither of the sides could force the other to imitate an alien structure. Precisely for this reason, having analyzed the situation, we decided to propose a joint limit on the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, within which the sides would have freedom—at least at the present stage—to determine the combination of warheads. We cannot achieve everything at once. But it seems that it is possible to move considerably ahead on this basis.

Gorbachev: I think now we have a basis on which to work on the key elements of strategic offensive weapons. This could become the central element of the Washington summit because as far as the agreement on INF and SRINF is concerned, all that remains is to sign it. Signing key positions [on strategic weapons] could become the most important outcome of the summit. We could give our delegations concrete instructions on the basis of these key positions to work out a draft text of the treaty, which the President and myself could sign during the President’s visit to Moscow.

Recently some of your representatives, Mr. Kampelman, for example, said that we need to start seriously developing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons. They said if we
could do that, then it would be easier to resolve the space issues. I want to say at the outset, this is an unrealistic position, an unrealistic approach. Let’s not waste time on such approaches. Issues of strategic offensive weapons and space need to be resolved together because they are interconnected. On this basis, we are ready to move forward, taking into account as much as possible each other’s security interests.

Shultz: I think that in terms of numbers and parameters, we have said all that we can for now. I think that we sense a certain flexibility, a readiness for collective work. I have the impression that it is unlikely that our representatives in Geneva will be able to produce much in this sense. These are questions for you and for the President. However, our delegations could create a good foundation for a fruitful meeting between you and the President. I have several thoughts about this.

First of all, we could say to our delegations in Geneva that they should tackle the problems of verification energetically and as their priority, especially the verification of mobile missiles. Now we see how difficult the problems of verification are. We should not leave them for February or March. We should focus on them seriously now.

As far as concrete positions are concerned, I think that our delegations in Geneva should not so much bargain about numbers as place an emphasis on clarifying each side’s principal approaches. We should talk about why you consider certain provisions important, and why we consider other provisions important. I think that that would help you and the President find resolution to those problems during your meeting.

Finally, I would propose that in addition to continuing our work on removing the brackets in the joint text, which is useful, we should focus on the goal of having your meeting with the President result in joint instructions for our delegations in Geneva regarding parameters for the future treaty. I think that would be a good result of the meeting, which would complement the work that will already have been done on coordination of the treaty.

Gorbachev: From the very start I see weak spots in your proposals. First of all, you did not even mention the problem of space. But if we leave this issue outside the boat, then moving ahead on strategic offensive weapons will not make any sense. We have to consider them as interrelated. Why does the American delegation in Geneva avoid discussing the space issues, especially discussing the latest Soviet proposals?

Overall, I have an impression that with your three considerations, it is as if you are throwing away the idea of developing key positions on strategic offensive weapons and space. Instead, you propose to limit ourselves to some foggy formulas, talk about the need to clarify positions, etc. Of course, resolution of the verification problem, clarification of positions, removal of brackets—all this is necessary. However, our goal should be the preparation of key positions, which we could consider and sign, so that by the time of the President’s visit to Moscow, we would have an agreement on the entire set of these issues.
Your approach strikes me as undefined and foggy. In essence, it rejects everything that we said for the purpose of clarifying [our positions] and signaling flexibility on concrete problems.

I would like to repeat: we propose that our delegations in Geneva concentrate on developing key positions for their adoption during the visit. Then it would make sense. Otherwise, everything is moving beyond the term of the present administration. And that would be too bad. Because we wanted to resolve [these issues] precisely with the present administration. And this is possible. A lot has been already done. And we, as we see it, are capable of concluding a good treaty with the current administration. Precisely a good treaty: neither one of us needs a bad one.

Shultz: I would not object to defining coordinated positions. I do not want to offer you anything foggy, not at all. I want to look ahead. Some things are already agreed upon, mainly as a result of the agreements achieved by you and the President in Reykjavik. The question is—what should be done in order to prepare these key positions, these instructions for our negotiators. With all respect for our representatives in Geneva, the main, key positions should be adopted by you and the President. Our representatives in Geneva do not have political mandate for that. But they can prepare the grounds, and we can work to prepare the grounds for your decisions. That is why I emphasize the need for more precision, for working on the issues of verification, especially regarding the mobile missiles.

Gorbachev: Let’s still prepare a draft of key positions before we, as you propose, start discussing the issues, so to say, in a scattered way.

Shultz: Of course, the more we could move ahead before the summit, the better. The main decision will have to be taken by you and the President. We, as well as you, want the achieved breakthrough to be be written in the treaty, to receive a practical implementation. It would be very good for you and for us, and would be a present to the entire world.

Gorbachev: Yes, Reykjavik already has a place in history. But a second Reykjavik will not happen. We should not meet with the President and engage in improvisation. I think it is very good that we stood for Reykjavik. There were many people who wanted to bury it. But if everything is limited to a second Reykjavik, it might lead to big political losses both for you and for us. And to the contrary, if we find right political decisions, it would bring both of us great political benefits. You need to decide what you want.

I have an impression that you still cannot decide what it is you want. Maybe it is Ambassador Matlock who informs you in such a manner that you still cannot figure it out? Do you want the Soviet Union to develop successfully, or you don’t want that? [Do you want] the Soviet Union to develop in the direction of greater democracy or in the opposite [direction]? [Do you want] us to have stagnation or to move forward?
Shultz: It is your business. It is all up to you to decide, but I can give you my opinion: what is happening in your country is very interesting, and I follow all these changes very closely.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Published in Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, nos. 10, pp. 69-81 and 11, pp. 73-84, 1993 Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]
Dear Mr. President,

I am sure that you have already received information about the negotiations that took place in Moscow between our foreign ministers, and also about my rather long conversation with Secretary of State G. Shultz and your National Security Adviser, F. Carlucci.

I will tell you frankly, we have here a unanimous opinion—these discussions were business-like, constructive, and most importantly, productive. I think you would agree that both the Washington and the Moscow stages of the dialogue that is developing between us, have genuinely moved us closer to the final stage of preparation for the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. We derive satisfaction from the fact that we, together with your envoys, have succeeded in overcoming perhaps the most important obstacles and in achieving compromise formulas and understandings, which will allow our delegations in Geneva to work out the text of the treaty in the next two or three weeks if the political will on both sides can be preserved.

You, I believe, noticed that on the final day of negotiations the Soviet side undertook additional efforts, including in the areas of inspection and control. We hope that the American side will respond with adequate reciprocal efforts.

The Moscow negotiations, in my view, presented new evidence that our relations have entered a dynamic period, the origins of which were our meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik. I have in mind not only the growing tempo of contacts between our countries but also the fact that we undertook the practical resolution of the issue that we see as the key to stopping the nuclear arms race, and to stabilizing Soviet-American relations. The task of a deep reductions of strategic offensive forces—by half—has moved to the center of our conversations in Moscow.

And that is not by accident—because you and I are in the same frame of mind—that we want to shift the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons to the plane of practical decisions. As I have already written to you, we should speed up the tempo of the negotiations, in order to make it possible as early as next month to reach full-scale agreements in this sphere.

With that in mind, on the eve of U.S. Secretary of State’s visit, we in the Soviet leadership have once again seriously weighed the possibility of giving additional impetus to the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons. I presented in detail to Mr. Shultz the concrete results we arrived at.

In particular, we took into account that the American side—which announced this to us repeatedly, including at the political level—attaches special importance to establishing concrete limits on the concentration of warheads in each separate element of the strategic
triad. We undertook a thorough calculation of the different scenarios for the development of the situation along with the prevailing tendencies of a technological and military-strategic order, and came to the conclusion that we could move in the direction of your position. It is not difficult to observe that individual combinations of proposed numerical limits present a picture close to the one that was outlined to us recently by American representatives at different levels.

I would add that the new formula we have proposed contains internal flexibility: each side would have an opportunity to compensate for the lower number of delivery vehicles of one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of another kind within the overall limit.

I hope that these proposals will be considered carefully by your experts and that both sides will now have a wider basis for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

Of course the work on the agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons should be accompanied by efforts directed at further compliance with the ABM Treaty. Besides, we are not asking here for anything more than what we spoke about in Washington, namely that the right we enjoy to withdraw from this treaty should not be exercised for ten years.

The words you wrote in one of your letters to me are deeply imprinted in my memory—that our representatives at the negotiations should “concentrate on measures to prevent the erosion of the ABM treaty and on strengthening the role this Treaty might play in preserving stability as we progress toward a world where there are no nuclear weapons.” In the same letter you added that “if we act in this manner, we could avoid fruitless discussions of a general nature, and open the way toward finding concrete, practical solutions that take into account the concerns of both sides.”

In this sense, we were encouraged by the exchange of opinions in Washington in September of this year, where your side confirmed that our positions coincided on the point that in the context of an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons there arises a period during which we should renounce certain rights, in particular the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and strictly carry out our obligations under that treaty.

Therefore, we share a common ground on this issue as well. What is left, in essence, is to agree on the period during which there is to be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Is that an impossible goal? This is what the conversation comes down to now. We have to seek a resolution here. We are ready for it.

I repeat, I am talking about compliance with the ABM Treaty, and we have explained to you the way we see it—including very recently in Washington.

In order to keep the discussion on this set of problems within the framework of such reasonable notions, and not to let it slip into either a thicket of overly complex technological argumentation or on the contrary into more generalized concepts, I propose
that along with the Geneva negotiations we open up a channel through which we would continually be able to check the progress of negotiations as well as more freely express concerns and alternative proposals. This channel could employ contacts specially designated for this topic: the USSR Foreign Minister, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow and the U.S. Secretary of State, and the USSR Ambassador in Washington. However, we could consider some other alternative.

Here it is important to act with an awareness of the limited amount of time available to us for working out an agreement on strategic offensive weapons, which it would be desirable to finalize in the first half of next year, and to sign during your return visit to Moscow.

Obviously, we need to clear the road to this treaty of natural complications, among which are issues of verification—and here I agree with the suggestion expressed by Shultz on your behalf, to concentrate in this direction right now—as well as complications artificially introduced into the treaty (such as the inclusion of our mid-range Backfire bomber in the treaty, the demand for a complete ban on mobile ICBMs, and the unwillingness to resolve the issue of limitations on sea-launched cruise missiles).

I am convinced that it is realistic to achieve an agreement on strategic offensive weapons under conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty. Besides, the experience that we accumulated at the negotiations on intermediate and medium-range missiles could be useful for us here to a large degree.

After all, we were able to agree to start full-scale negotiations on nuclear testing, even though just several months ago it looked like an impossible endeavor.

I think we should show the necessary mutual persistence in resolving the problem of banning chemical weapons (even though I must say that I am deeply disappointed with your position on binary weapons), and on the issue of reducing conventional weapons, which is of interest not only to us but also to our allies and to other European countries.

Back in April, in my conversation with Mr. Shultz, I outlined my understanding of our next meeting. I am still convinced that besides signing the INF Treaty we should seriously discuss the issue of strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. I want our ministers and our delegations in Geneva not to stand aside but to do everything possible in order to make your work and mine as easy as possible.

If we want to crown your visit to the Soviet Union by concluding an agreement on strategic offensive weapons, then we cannot avoid at least an agreement in principle on it at this coming meeting. What form that agreement assumes in the end is not so important. It could [take the form of] some key elements of a future agreement, if we follow the idea you expressed personally in spring 1985. Or it could be, let us say, instructions and directives, which we could give to [our] delegations for the speedy preparation of the aforementioned document.
As I understand it, the Secretary of State, when he was in Moscow, spoke about developing instructions for the delegations. The main thing is to achieve a common understanding at the highest level of the goals to which we aspire, and of the means of realizing them in the shortest possible time.

If we have sufficiently coordinated our intentions on this issue, then we will be able to enrich our upcoming conversations in Washington with a substantive agenda.

I am passing this letter to you through E. A. Shevardnadze, who is fully informed about my thoughts regarding the future paths of development of Soviet-American relations, and the concrete plans for their potential fulfillment. He possesses all the necessary authority to coordinate with you all the main aspects of the forthcoming summit, including the agenda, the length of my stay in the U.S., and the exact dates of my visit. I would like you to take into account that if it suits your availability, then according to my schedule of events before the end of the year, the first 10 days of December would be the most preferable period for my trip to Washington.

I hope you take advantage of the visit of our Minister to discuss and decide all the necessary issues, as they say, on site.

Respectfully,

[signature]

M. Gorbachev.

28 October 1987

[Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive]
SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: Gorbachev's letter

As expected, FM Shevardnadze provided us an advance copy of General Secretary Gorbachev's letter to you upon his arrival in Washington early this morning. It is a long letter, but fairly positive, and offers a December window for a summit. He has asked that we keep a tight lid on the contents until he hands the letter to you at one today.

In the letter, Gorbachev has proposed a summit meeting in the first ten days of December. Shevardnadze is empowered to work out all details today. At the summit the INF Treaty would be signed and START and Defense and Space would be discussed. Additionally, the letter notes that if the President's visit to the Soviet Union next year is to be "crowned" with a treaty on strategic arms, it will be necessary to reach "agreement in principle" on this score at the summit. Thus, a Moscow Summit is not explicitly conditioned to agreements in principle on START/D&S at the Washington Summit. What form this "agreement in principle" would take is "not too important." Key elements of a future treaty is cited as one possible way to go, but instructions to delegations would also be acceptable.

The letter also sees an INF Treaty finalized within 2-3 weeks, citing progress made in last week's Ministerial, and on START refers to Gorbachev's Moscow proposal on sublimits, hinting at a slight freedom to mix. On D&S, Gorbachev appears to be backing away from previous Soviet insistence that the ABM Treaty be "strengthened," insisting only that it be "observed." As to linkage with START, the letter asserts they want "nothing more" than a ten-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev proposes establishment of a channel to support and facilitate the negotiations, suggesting Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors "could be" used for this purpose.
We are working with the Soviets this morning on a Joint Statement, which will be ready for possible release at the White House immediately following your meeting with Shevardnadze this afternoon. He also visualizes a second statement to the press at the end of the day's events. Shevardnadze is aware of your plans to depart Washington after his meeting with you and shares our desire to make this a one day affair. He seems confident we can work through matters by this evening.

I will brief you on this morning's sessions at 12:30, just prior to Shevardnadze's one o'clock meeting with you. We can go over the Joint Statement then if you like, and make any last minute changes.

ATTACHMENTS: Letter From General Secretary Gorbachev
MY OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT

General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted my invitation to attend a Washington Summit, beginning December 7, that should witness the signing of an INF agreement and a thorough review of all elements on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The signing of the INF treaty represents a triumph and vindication for the policy that this Administration has followed toward the Soviet Union from the start. It demonstrates that realism, strength, and unity with our allies are the prerequisites for effective negotiation with Moscow. We must keep this principle in mind as we address all issues related to the Summit. We must also bear in mind that the nature of the Soviet regime, while it may be changing slowly, sets limits to what we can achieve with Moscow by negotiation and diplomacy.

Objectives

I have a carefully calibrated mix of objectives for the Summit. All are important. They include:

--- the completion and signing of an INF agreement in a form and manner that maximizes Alliance solidarity and the prospects for ratification;

--- making real progress toward a START agreement and moving toward a treaty on Defense and Space that furthers the promise the Strategic Defense Initiative holds for a safer world through deterrence based increasingly on defenses;

--- taking diplomatic and public affairs actions which at a minimum assure that the Summit is seen as an event addressing thoroughly our whole agenda. Prior to and at the Summit, we should create political pressure for the Soviets to take positive steps on our human rights, regional, and bilateral concerns. For example:

  o On human rights, we should make the point that while there has been some progress on the Soviet side, it has been marked by tokenism; it has not been institutionalized nor made irreversible, and is therefore far from adequate. We should seek Soviet adherence to all human rights conventions signed by the U.S.S.R., and vast improvement in emigration, repatriation, and resolving divided family cases. If
the Soviets raise the issue, we should clearly say that they have a long way to go before we can give support to the idea of a human rights conference in Moscow.

We should make clear that the absence of any progress on regional issues is a fundamental impediment to a general improvement of our relations. We should be firm on the need for a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, urge agreement right away to a transitional regime free from Communist domination, and repeat our willingness to facilitate their withdrawal and to guarantee a genuinely independent, non-aligned and neutral Afghanistan. We should make clear our grave concern about the turn for the worse in Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf — shielding Iran from a second UNSC Resolution as Iran's behavior towards us and the Gulf Arabs becomes more belligerent, and allowing their Bloc partners and clients to ship arms to Iran that could be used against us. We should put the Soviets on notice that they are at a crossroads: cooperation now on a second resolution would mean real progress on the regional agenda, but persistence in their current policy could damage U.S.-Soviet relations and put us on a potentially very dangerous collision course.

In conducting this Summit we must strike a sensible balance. While seeking concrete agreements in arms reductions which serve our national interests, we must not foster false illusions about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Such illusions would only undermine our ability to continue conducting the realistic policies which brought us an INF agreement and have enabled us to meet the Soviet challenge worldwide.

Our conduct at the Summit and the framing of its results must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI; they must help us maintain support for the Contras, Mujahidin, UNITA, and the democratic resistance in Cambodia; and they must reinforce Alliance unity. In brief, the Summit should seek simultaneously to codify progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, prepare the way for future progress, yet make clear where fundamental differences remain which block progress.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE
  THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
  THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
  THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY


The President has approved the instructions for the during the Summit as incorporated in the attached National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-290). (S)

Due to the sensitivity of this NSDD, no copies of this document should be made. It is further directed that a record of all those to whom this document is given should be maintained by the office of each addressee. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

[Signature]

Colin L. Powell
Acting Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Attachment
NSDD-290

Declassified Released on 5/1/96
under provisions of E.O. 12850
by J. Saunders, National Security Council
START. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the START portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty and related documents during the next meeting of Heads of State in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reduction achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty text worked out in Geneva including agreement on ceilings on not more than 1500 nuclear offensive delivery systems, 600 warheads, 1500 warheads on 34 heavy missiles; the agreed bomber counting rule; and an agreement that the reductions will result in a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight which will thereafter not be increased. As priority tasks, they should focus on the following crucial issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. These are to include a ceiling of 4800 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total, and a further sub-ceiling of 3300 on the number of ICBM warheads.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range (i.e. with a range over 1500 kilometers), nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. With respect to B-1, B-52, BEAR-H and BACKJACK bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs, this number shall be six per bomber. Other heavy bombers, which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including BACKFIRE, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. There shall be agreed rules governing the ALCMs attributable to future heavy bombers equipped for long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs."
6. The right to short notice on site inspections at locations where either state considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of START systems could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include, but on telemetry or-ty-ption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information before flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of START-related activities by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party."  

Ballistic Missile Warhead Sublimit and Counting Rule Issue. The Soviet Union has indicated that it may be prepared to consider a sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. However, it has further indicated that rather than the sublimit on ballistic missile warheads of 1,000 which we seek, it would prefer to raise that sublimit to 500 or 510. Before we can consider accepting such a proposal, it is essential that we have a clear agreement with the Soviet side concerning:

- an acceptable definition to be applied to air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in START; (i.e., that only nuclear-armed ALCMs with a range in excess of 1500 kilometers would be included in the Treaty's limit);

- the counting rules applied to such ALCMs; and

- the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by the START Treaty. (S)

Should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept (1) a definition of ALCMs to be covered by START; (2) only nuclear-armed ALCMs of a range greater than 1500 kilometers; (3) a counting rule for such ALCMs generally along the lines specified in item (b) above, and (3) the counting rule for the warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles as specified in item (d) above, I am prepared to consider additional flexibility with respect to the U.S. position on these sublimits as yet not agreed. (TS)

With respect to the ALCM counting rule, if needed, and in the context of reaching agreement on the general approach outlined in (b) above, I am prepared to increase the number of ALCMs attributed to each bomber to 8 in order to reach agreement on this critical point. (S)
DEFENSE & SPACE. The U.S. team should initially seek to frame the Defense & Space portion of any agreed statement along the following lines:

"The President and the General Secretary also discussed the status of negotiations relating to defense and space issues. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to expedite work on a Joint Draft Treaty Text in a new separate treaty which could enter into force at the same time as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arm. They also agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva for the purpose of identifying areas of agreement and disagreement in the Joint Draft Treaty Text and then to accelerate work toward resolution of the areas of disagreement." (S)

Further Elements. Should the Soviet side press for the inclusion of additional "instructions" in the Defense & Space area, the U.S. side should pursue the inclusion of the following language in the agreed statement:

"In pursuing a Joint Draft Treaty Text, the negotiators should build upon the following elements:

(a) there will be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty;

(b) after that period of time both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving 6 months notice of an intent to deploy and without further reference to the ABM Treaty;

(c) during the non-deployment period, both sides have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required; and

(d) to enhance strategic stability, provide predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments are not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the sides meet regularly:

1. to exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defense programs; and,

2. to facilitate mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities." (S)
SECRET

BACKGROUND BOOK
for
MEETING BETWEEN
PRESIDENT REAGAN
and
GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV
Washington D.C.

December 8-10, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLNS 963-1471 #2

SECRET
1. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
2. INF Treaty Verification
3. START
4. Defense and Space
5. Nuclear Testing
6. Compliance Issues
7. Verification
8. ABM Treaty Interpretation
9. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
10. Chemical Weapons Treaty
11. Chemical Weapons Proliferation
12. Conventional Arms Control in Europe
13. CSCE/Conventional Stability Talks
14. Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) Implementation
15. Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security (CSIS)
16. Soviet Military Practices
17. Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech
SECRET

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

I. HISTORIC AGREEMENT

○ INF is first agreement in history actually to reduce, not simply limit build-up of, nuclear weapons.

○ By perseverance, we achieved goal you set in 1981 -- elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons.

○ Credit to NATO unity and steadfastness; US deployments proceeded despite Soviet threats, 1983 walk-out from talks. (INF basing countries: UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands.)

○ INF has most stringent verification regime in history.

II. WHAT IS BEING ELIMINATED

○ All US and Soviet ground-launched missiles and launchers of intermediate- and shorter-range (from 500-5500 km).

○ For Soviets: SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 intermediate-range missile systems, and SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missile systems; those now deployed are capable of carrying over 1500 nuclear warheads.

○ For US: Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs); those now deployed are capable of carrying over 400 nuclear warheads. (US has no shorter-range INF deployed.)

○ Both sides are also destroying hundreds more non-deployed missiles and launchers.

III. WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED

○ Elimination of Soviet SS-20, a mobile triple-warhead nuclear missile, which presented new threat to Europe.

○ Success for NATO's 1979 "dual track decision" -- deploying US INF in Europe while pursuing negotiations with Soviets to restore INF balance at lowest possible level.

○ Have met the standards you established in 1983:

   -- US-Soviet equality;
   -- US and Soviet systems only; i.e., no compensation for UK/French systems;
   -- Global limits (i.e., no transfer of threat to Asia);
   -- No weakening of NATO's conventional capability (i.e., no dual-capable systems included); and
   -- Effective verification (see separate paper).
I. VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES
   - Enhance confidence in Treaty;
   - Deter violations by increasing risk of getting caught;
   - Quick detection of violations if they occur.

II. VERIFICATION REGIME CALLS FOR:
   - Locations for treaty-limited items to be specified until they are eliminated.
   - Exchange of comprehensive data on treaty-limited systems;
   - Updates of data throughout reduction period;
   - Specific procedures to verify elimination of treaty-limited systems;
   - Provisions for on-site inspection (OSI);
   - Provisions for verification by National Technical Means (NTM).

III. VERIFICATION PROCESS
   - Provisions have been made for routine exchange of data and to respond to compliance concerns.
   - In 11/87, sides began data exchange -- on missiles, launchers, bases. After Treaty is ratified and enters into force, initial "baseline" on-site inspection will check number of missiles and launchers.
   - There will be on-site inspection of missile/launcher destruction during three-year reduction period.
   - Sides are allowed to conduct short-notice on-site inspections of certain declared sites suspected of illegal activity during three-year reductions and for ten years afterward.

IV. INF VERIFICATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
   - US will seek verification measures that build and improve on INF experience for START agreement.
   - Intrusiveness of INF verification regime sets a positive precedent for other regimes.
SECRET

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

Agreed Reykjavik goal is 50% reductions to 6000 ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons, 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (incl. bombers, missiles [though Soviets focus on launchers, while US emphasizes missiles]).


Major Issues:

Sublimits: After long resisting the concept, Soviets recently tabled their own version of sublimits. There are significant differences between the two sides.

-- We propose 4800 ballistic missile warheads. Soviet formal proposal implies, but does not state, 4800-5300. Privately Soviets have said they could accept 5000 but only with complete freedom to mix between Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).

-- Soviets propose 800-900 air-launched cruise missiles; US probably needs more of these stabilizing slow-flyers.

-- US prefers 3000 limit on ICBM warheads; will accept 3300. Soviets propose 3000-3300, but only if US accepts drastic limits on submarine warheads.

-- US wants 1650 limit on heavy and high-warheaded ICBMs. Soviets propose limit of 154 heavy ICBMs with "derived" limit of 1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs only.

-- Soviets propose a one-sided submarine warhead limit of 1800-2000. US wants more -- Soviet proposal would force us to largely restructure our forces and deploy very few submarines.

Linkage to Strategic Defenses: Soviets continue to link START with a Defense and Space Agreement limiting SDI. We argue that strategic reductions are good regardless.

Throw-weight: Soviets offer only a unilateral statement: we want to codify 50% limit in the Treaty text.

Mobile ICBMs: Soviets already have 100 road-mobile ICBMs; 10-warhead rail-mobile system is near deployment. We plan comparable systems. We propose ban on mobile ICBMs on grounds of verification and stability; have put onus on Soviets to show how mobiles could be monitored if allowed.

SECRET
Declassify on: GADS
Sea-launched Cruise Missiles: Soviets want limit of 400 on long-range SLCMs (nuclear/conventional) with none on surface ships. At Reykjavik we agreed to find solution to problem of limiting deployments of nuclear armed SLCMs outside the 1600/6000 limits. Soviet proposal would gut our program, pose unacceptable military risk, not be verifiable.

Time frame to complete reductions: We propose 7 years; Soviets prefer 5 years but are willing to consider 7 years.

Allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs: Soviets insist such modernization be allowed; we would ban it and impose a flight test ban on existing heavy ICBMs.

Range cutoff and armament for ALCMs under a treaty: Soviets seek to use SALT II cutoff range of 600 km and would count all ALCMs as nuclear. We have not arrived at a position; may need significantly higher range and/or exceptions for conventional ALCMs.

Inclusion of Backfire: Soviets claim Backfire is a theater weapon which does not belong in a START treaty. We insist Backfire be included in strategic totals.

Non-circumvention and Trident II transfer: The Soviets, under the guise of non-circumvention, seek provisions that would ban transfer of the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile to the United Kingdom. We cannot accept such a limitation.

Verification: We differ on many important details. We have urged major focus on verification, especially on On-Site Inspection. We also have urged the Soviets to address how mobile ICBMs, if allowed, could be verified.

Soviet Special Concerns:

- Constraints on SDI are continuing major issue for Soviets.
- Gorbachev claims mobile ICBMs, the Backfire bomber, limits on Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs), and allowing modernization of heavy ICBMs are all "artificial" impediments that must be removed.
I. Reykjavik

- Sides agreed not to withdraw from ABM Treaty for 10 years, but disagreed over scope of offensive reductions (US proposed eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, Soviets all nuclear weapons) and over ABM activities during the period (Soviets sought to restrict SDI to lab research).

II. Current Status

- Our April proposal, including commitment not to withdraw from ABM Treaty through 1994, remains on table.
- Soviets acknowledge some ABM-related testing can occur in space, but they firmly reject US broad interpretation.
- October 30 Joint Statement called for developing new instructions to delegations for a separate treaty "on observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period" as a summit objective.
- Round VIII ended November 19; next round begins January 14.

III. US Position

- Commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from ABM Treaty in order to deploy systems other than those permitted by Treaty (contingent on 50% START reductions).
- Sides would observe ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the Treaty.
- Either side will be free to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994, unless agreed otherwise.
- "Predictability package" including data exchange, "open" laboratories, reciprocal observation of tests.

IV. Soviet Position

- 10-year nonwithdrawal commitment to ABM Treaty and strict observance of ABM Treaty as "signed and ratified" in 1972; and
- Either agree on list of devices not to be put in space if they exceed certain performance parameters; devices below thresholds could be put in space for any purpose, including ABM-related. "Other" research restricted to labs.
- Or, "strict observance" incompatible with broad interpretation; unclear whether it equates to narrow interpretation.
- Material breach of ABM Treaty would release other side from START obligations.
NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- First round of talks ended November 20. Sides agreed to "familiarization" visits to each other's test sites in January 1988 (President first suggested such visits in September 1984 UNA speech). Talks resume in February.

- Next round, sides will try to agree on Joint Verification Experiments that address Soviet concerns re: CORRTEX system.

- Threat of Congressionally imposed testing limits has receded; could return depending on course of negotiations.

II. US POSITION

- US requires a stage-by-stage process.

- First, improved verification; ratification of Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).

- Then, along with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons, negotiate further intermediate limitations on, and ultimate cessation of, nuclear testing.

- Negotiations on strategic arms cuts must be in progress, but not necessarily concluded, for talks on intermediate testing limits to begin; a reductions agreement must be ratified before completing negotiations on intermediate limitations.

- Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains long-term US goal, but only when we no longer depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security/stability, and when we have achieved: broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions; substantially improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures; greater balance in conventional forces.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- Soviets agreed to reach agreement on effective verification measures for TTBT/PNET to permit ratification, but continue to press for intermediate test limits and near-term CTB.


- Gorbachev has pushed test ban since 1985. In June 1987, called for an immediate interim 1-Kiloton threshold and quota of 2-3 tests annually (some support for this in Congress).

- Soviets observed moratorium from 8/6/85 - 2/26/87.
COMPLIANCE ISSUES

ABM Treaty Review

- Five-year review of the Treaty must be held between October 1987 - October 1988.
- Soviets are pressing to set date for review. US has replied that the review should be held; date and venue should be determined later through diplomatic channels.
- We believe review should be deferred until both sides can better assess possible outcomes of discussions in Geneva arms control talks and elsewhere.

President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance

- 1987 Report currently being prepared.
- Principal findings of 1986 Report to Congress unchanged from 1985 Report, except SALT issues were only summarized.
- Most important findings in 1986 Report were:
  -- that the large radar under construction in Siberia near Krasnoyarsk is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty's restrictions on such radars;
  -- that the Soviets may be preparing an illegal nationwide defense.
- New issue during 1987 now being considered within USG concerns whether ABM radars have been moved from an authorized location -- an ABM test range -- to an electronics plant at Gomel, an action that may violate the Treaty.
- US has raised this issue with Soviets in Geneva and has accepted Soviet offer to visit Gomel to collect information on whether Soviet activities there violate the ABM Treaty.
- Important details of the Gomel visit (e.g., what will be open to inspection, how many US inspectors and for how long) are still to be negotiated.
VERIFICATION

General: Soviets have accepted, in principle, some elements of on-site inspection in most arms control negotiations. They hope to convince Western publics they are more serious about verification than we.

START: US tabled draft treaty with extensive verification provisions and details on conversion and destruction; Soviet draft treaty calls for some on-site inspection, but lacks details on many verification issues.

To complete work on verification, US must make decisions on technical issues such as how to count missile warheads and how to determine which types of air-launched cruise missiles will be counted under warhead limits. US has put onus on Soviets to show how mobile ICBMs can be monitored; will insist they be banned unless verification/stability concerns can be met.

Defense and Space: Verification barely discussed. Soviets have proposed vague provisions, such as pre-launch inspection of certain payloads, for their list of devices to be banned from space.

In the Conference on Disarmament, Soviets have suggested that international inspectors might monitor payloads before launching, to enforce ban on space weapons.

Nuclear Testing: First round of stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing held November 9-20. First agreed stage is to achieve verification improvements required to permit ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Sides have agreed on exchange of visits by experts to test sites, and have discussed a joint experiment to demonstrate verification methods.

Chemical Weapons: Soviets accepted "in principle" challenge inspection without right of refusal; concept of verification of data to be exchanged with US before treaty signature. INF experience suggests tough sledding ahead in addressing details.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE): Soviets for first time accepted mandatory air and ground inspection of military exercises on Soviet soil. US carried out first such inspection in August; Soviets inspected NATO exercises in Turkey and the FRO in October.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR): Soviets did not respond constructively to Western 1985 offer on verification provisions; reiterated view that provisions not commensurate with the scale of reductions.
I. Current Status

- SDI program now complies with narrow interpretation. In 1985 USG concluded broad interpretation was fully justified. President decided as matter of policy not to restructure SDI program at that time, but reserved right to do so in future.

- In 1987 in-depth legal analyses of negotiating record, ratification proceedings, and subsequent practices confirmed that broad interpretation is fully justified.

- November 1987 consultations with Congress resulted in agreement to adhere to FY 88 testing program (consistent with narrow interpretation), unless Congress specifically grants funds for tests under broad interpretation. FY 88 funds may, however, be used to plan for such tests.

II. US Position

- ABM Treaty poses no limitations on ABM-related research, regardless of where such research takes place.

- For Article II systems and components (i.e., "traditional" physical principles), prohibited development begins with field testing of a prototype of an ABM component.

- For systems and components based on "other physical principles" (OPP), Agreed Statement D bans deployment regardless of basing mode, but permits development and testing.

- US decision to deploy strategic defenses would be subject of consultations with Allies and consultations and negotiations, as appropriate, with Soviets, as envisioned under ABM Treaty, or as specified in new treaty.

III. Soviet Position

- Since NST talks began, Soviets have attempted to limit research and impose tighter restrictions on development and testing beyond those agreed to in the ABM Treaty in 1972.

- In September they acknowledged for first time that some ABM-related testing in space is permitted; now stress that the sides should "strictly observe" the ABM Treaty "as signed and ratified in 1972."

- Not clear the Soviets view this as identical to narrow interpretation; list proposal would place restrictions on research. They have emphasized that the "broad" interpretation is incompatible with the ABM Treaty.
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

I. Bilateral Consultations
   - Soviets have presented us a draft for bilateral agreement to combat nuclear terrorism that addresses the wrong issues.
   - We have proposed more practical ways to cooperate to combat nuclear terrorism.

II. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
   - Both US and USSR are strong supporters of IAEA.
   - Partly for propaganda (and to counter the Chernobyl disaster), Soviets have made their contribution to IAEA early, while US contributions are reduced and late, due to Congressionally-imposed reductions.
   - We expect Soviets to urge prompt and full US payment.
   - We view IAEA as high priority and will continue strong support within appropriations limits.

III. Regional Issues
   - South Africa: At September IAEA General Conference, Pretoria announced willingness to consider adherence to Nonproliferation Treaty and offered discussions with nuclear weapons states. Both we and the Soviets have stated readiness to talk with South Africa.
   - South Asia: We want Soviets to help our efforts to draw India and Pakistan into constructive dialogue on regional non-proliferation solution. Soviets have not pressed India.

IV. Nuclear Safety and Cooperation
   - Soviets have made a proposal for technical cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on nuclear safety. While not all aspects of it are acceptable, we are giving it serious consideration.
   - US, USSR, European Community and Japan have begun three-year cooperative effort to design advanced fusion reactor. So decision has been made on actual construction.
1. BACKGROUND

- 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but possession and transfer remain unconstrained.
- In 1984, Vice President Bush tabled US draft treaty at 40 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (CD).
- At Geneva summit, agreed to accelerate bilateral negotiations with Soviet Union toward global ban.
- Major obstacle has been Soviet unwillingness to accept stringent verification measures. Soviets now claim to accept US proposals in principle, though their negative reaction to US suspect site provisions in INF calls their commitment into question.
- To date, the US has not been able to identify measures that would make the draft CW treaty effectively monitorable, or verifiable to protect the security interests of the US and its allies.
- Have conducted exchange of visits to US, Soviet chemical weapons facility as confidence-building measure and means to promote greater openness.
- US modernization program proceeding on schedule; final assembly of binary (155 mm. howitzer shells) weapons may begin December 16.

II. US POSITION

- Pursue effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.
- Prompt, mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal essential for all suspect sites.
- US continues to have verification concerns regarding undeclared stocks/facilities, novel agents.
- Continue to study ways to develop effective verification, ensure security of all states within chemical weapons treaty regime.
- Proliferation of CW-capable states introduces additional concerns about effectiveness of a CD-sponsored convention.
- US now seeking a way to codify a constrained residual deterrent while gaining confidence that a convention is being complied with.
III. SOVIET POSITION

- Have publicly admitted possession; announced production moratorium, work on destruction facility.
- Now accept most of US draft treaty, including challenge inspection with no right of refusal. Fine print still unknown.
- Pushing for completion of treaty by mid-1988. Proposed joint summit statement, with commitment to sign ban, as way to give "political impetus" to multilateral negotiations.
I. The Problem

- The number of states possessing chemical weapons has grown dramatically. Approximately 20 states now possess chemical weapons; several more are actively seeking such capability.
- Chemical weapons are known as the "poor man's nuclear weapon" -- a cheap, effective weapon for Third World states.
- Proliferation is particularly acute in conflict-torn regions, such as the Middle East and South Asia.
- Have also seen alarming increase in use of chemical weapons -- in clear violation of 1925 Geneva Protocol.

II. The Solution

- US has adopted three-part program of concrete measures:
  - Technical measures, such as export controls, to slow proliferation by drying up supply, raising cost;
  - Direct political action with proliferating states and other third parties to discourage acquisition;
  - Support for international investigations of use to prevent illegal use.
- US has taken steps in all three areas; strongly encouraged other states -- East and West -- to do the same.

III. International Dialogue

- At Geneva Summit, agreed to initiate dialogue with Soviets on problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
- Three rounds of bilateral discussions have identified considerable common ground: Soviets accept concept of US three-part approach, have imposed export controls, support investigations of use.
- However, Soviets remain reluctant to take difficult but necessary political steps, such as protests to client states.
- US has also engaged friends and Allies: 19-member "Australian Group" has adopted chemical "warning lists," condemned CW use.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

I. Background

- With INF Treaty at hand, Western publics more concerned about Eastern conventional superiority. West needs credible conventional arms control forum; MBFR exhausted.
- NATO and Warsaw Pact committed to renewed efforts in conventional arms control in Europe from Atlantic to Urals.
- NATO has proposed two distinct conventional security negotiations: one for continued work on confidence-building measures among all 35 European and North American members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the other to establish more stable balance of force levels between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- Former being discussed in Vienna CSCE meeting. Autonomous East/West talks underway in Vienna to agree on a negotiating mandate for the latter.

II. US Views and Objectives

- Main threat to stability in Europe is substantial Eastern conventional superiority: 30 Soviet ground force divisions deployed in Eastern Europe and many more in Western USSR.
- We seek: more openness in military activities; verifiable agreement on stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; exclusion of nuclear weapons and naval forces; elimination of destabilizing disparities and Warsaw Pact capability for surprise or reinforced attack.
- We continue to press the East in the MBFR talks to respond constructively to NATO's major compromise proposal of December 1985.

III. Soviet Views and Objectives

- Moscow admits certain East/West military disparities (e.g., tanks), but denies overall conventional superiority.
- Soviets propose equal NATO/Warsaw Pact reductions of 100,000-150,000 troops within two years, followed by further cuts in ground and tactical air forces to a level 25% below current levels by 1990's.
- Gorbachev has also called for elimination of asymmetries, where they exist, by cuts to the level of the lower side.
- Despite NATO's solid opposition, Soviets still want to include nuclear weapons in the conventional talks.
CSCE/CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS

I. Background

○ Third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna in November 1986, to review implementation of all areas of the Helsinki Final Act -- humanitarian, economic, and security -- and to look for means of improvement.

○ West seeks a balanced outcome from the meeting, with emphasis on significantly improved Eastern implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms provisions of the Final Act.

○ On security, West has proposed two negotiations:
  -- Among all 35 CSCE states, to build upon the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures;
  -- Autonomous talks on conventional stability limited to 23-member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Discussion of the mandate for these talks is proceeding separately from the CSCE meeting, among the 23 concerned states.

○ Soviets eager to conclude meeting, start stability negotiations; also eager to host CSCE human rights meeting in Moscow, deflect human rights criticism.

II. Current Status

○ NATO had hoped to conclude meeting by end of year, but drafting of a concluding document has been slowed by Eastern stalling on human rights.

○ Soviets have pressed for a Moscow human rights conference. We will only consider such a meeting if Soviets meet rigorous criteria of openness/access for all participants and demonstrate an improved human rights record. Soviets have criticized our conditions.

○ US prepared to stay in Vienna as long as it takes to achieve a balanced result.
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) IMPLEMENTATION

I. Background

- In September 1986, the 35 participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopted a set of military measures that include:
  - Prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops, or 100 tanks);
  - Exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities;
  - Mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops; and
  - On-site inspection as means of verification.

II. Implementation

- Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation has generally been encouraging; it has met the letter, but not always the spirit of the Stockholm Accord.
- Both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries properly forecasted and notified their activities for 1987. The Soviets notified 18 activities for the year.
- Observers were properly invited to all notified activities above the observation threshold; the USSR, GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have hosted observers on the Eastern side.
  - In general, Soviet observations met only the minimum requirements of the Stockholm Accord. US observers found it very difficult to assess the scope of exercises.
  - By contrast, the US and other NATO Allies provided much more extensive observation programs for exercises in West Germany and the UK.

III. Inspection

- US conducted the first inspection of a military activity in the USSR in August. The US inspection team was properly received and found the Soviet activity to be in compliance with agreed measures.
- Subsequently, four other inspections have been conducted, including inspections by the USSR in Turkey and in West Germany. In all cases, inspectors were properly received. No instances of noncompliance have been identified.

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
I. Gorbachev's Proposal

- Gorbachev first proposed CSIS at Soviet Party Congress in 1986; elaborated on it this September in major Pravda article.
- CSIS would establish a 'new international security order' covering four areas: military, political, economic, and humanitarian.
- Concept emphasizes 'new thinking' and global interdependence. Repackages long-standing Soviet proposals.
- Soviets have presented CSIS as way to strengthen and revitalize the UN -- in particular UN role in dealing with regional disputes.
- Soviets also taking other steps to 'strengthen' the UN, such as paying long outstanding dues.
- CSIS resolution, first approved at the 1986 UNGA by a vote of 102-2 (US was one of the 2 no votes), with 46 abstentions, is again before UNGA First Committee in revised form this year. Soviets vigorously promoting passage.

II. US Position

- CSIS proposal remains vague and ill-defined; would make UN more susceptible to Soviet influence by:

  -- Giving UN General Assembly more substantive, operational role on arms control, terrorism, regional conflicts, etc.

  -- Creating new subsidiary UN organs that would duplicate work of existing bodies.

- Implementation of Soviet resolution could lead to tampering with UN Charter, create duplicative UN organs at great expense, infringe sovereign rights.

- We oppose the Soviet resolution and affirm the obligations and structure of collective security already embodied in the UN Charter.

- As always, we are prepared to discuss specific, individual Soviet proposals in the appropriate fora.
SOVIET MILITARY PRACTICES

Over the years, the Soviet military has taken actions that have risked, injured, or killed US and Allied personnel.

We have raised our serious concerns with the Soviets on these matters. Soviets occasionally take corrective actions, but generally refuse formal apology/compensation.

Military Liaison Mission (MLM) Incidents

On March 24, 1985, LTC Arthur D. Nicholson was shot to death by a Soviet guard in East Germany.

-- Soviets have so far refused apology or compensation; Soviet military representatives indicated in October that issue is now with the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

-- In April, 1986, US and Soviet military reached understanding that "use of force or weapons" against MLM members is "categorically prohibited."

On September 17, 1987, a two-man US MLM team was fired on by a group of Soviet soldiers in East Germany. The US military driver was slightly injured.

-- We raised this incident during September ministerial in Washington. Shevardnadze and Ambassador Dubinin admitted fault and offered apologies but claimed US was also to blame (we rejected this contention).

-- At October 26 Potsdam meeting, Soviet military explained steps they are taking to prevent recurrence (including withholding live ammunition from Soviet personnel detaining US MLM tours).

Other Incidents

Missile Tests Near Hawaii: In the Fall 1987, Soviets test-fired ICBMs toward Hawaii and apparently illuminated US monitoring aircraft with a laser. We protested.

Dangerous Air Practices. Soviet military aircraft have flown in a dangerous manner near US and Allied military aircraft (primarily over the Pacific). Soviet aircraft recently hit a Norwegian P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.

KAL Shootdown. On September 1, 1983, the Soviets shot down a Korean airliner, killing the 263 people on board. (In lead-up to Geneva Summit, US, USSR, and Japan concluded agreement on civil air safety in the North Pacific.)
I. BACKGROUND

- Gorbachev's October 1 speech calls for military, economic, scientific, economic and maritime cooperation in northern Europe.
  - It says the USSR is ready to "guarantee" a Northern European nuclear weapon free zone (NWTF) and to "discuss" applying some of these measures to Soviet territory;
  - It proposes NATO/Warsaw Pact consultations on limitations on naval/air forces and activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland Seas;
  - It calls for joint exploitation of northern Arctic resources, scientific research of the Arctic, and environmental cooperation;
  - And, it offers to open up Soviet northern sea routes to foreign shipping.

- European reaction to Gorbachev's speech has been mixed. Peace groups have praised it; neutral governments have cautiously welcomed it; NATO allies have criticized it.

II. US POSITION

- There is very little new and nothing positive in Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals in the security area.
- The proposals would complicate NATO efforts to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, particularly in a post-INF world where we will be more reliant on sea-based nuclear assets.
- The speech offers some opportunities in non-security areas for cooperation in the Arctic region. We are looking into these.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- Soviets have so far not pushed Gorbachev's Murmansk proposals very hard, except with Nordic governments, although they did call it formally to US attention.
- Future trips by high-level Soviets to Nordic capitals will keep the Soviet Arctic initiative percolating in Northern Europe.
I. SOVIET GOAL TO ELIMINATE RELIGION
   o The Soviet Union is an atheist state which ideologically seeks the elimination of religion.
   o The Soviet Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice one’s religion, but religious groups are required by law to register with the state and religious instruction is forbidden.
   o Discrimination against religious groups which have not been allowed to register, such as Ukrainian Catholics; also against denominations that consider it against their beliefs to register with the state.
   o Believers subject to discrimination in employment and education; especially harsh sentences for persons convicted under anti-religious articles of Criminal Code.
   o Has been estimated that at least one-third of all known political prisoners are religious activists.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
   o In August, Konstantin Kharchev, head of USSR Religious Affairs Council, told Senator Lugar that all Soviet prisoners of faith would be released by November. This hasn’t happened.
   o Increased interest in religion and religious activism in light of glasnost, but the government has shown little increased tolerance.
   o Soviets have rejected further commitments at Vienna CSCE Meeting.
   o In 1988, Soviets will mark the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus’. Authorities hope to use occasion to propagandize supposed freedom of religion.

III. US AGENDA
   o Unconditional release of all remaining religious prisoners.
   o Legalization of unregistered churches and increased religious contacts with the West. Contacts should not be restricted to officially sanctioned Soviet religious groups and individuals.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

US
The President
Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)
Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

USSR
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Aleksander Yakovlev, Member of the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee Secretary
Anatoly Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Sergei Tarasenko, Head, General Secretariat (Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME
December 8, 1987, 10:45 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.

PLACE: Oval Office (U)

Following the welcoming ceremony, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev arrived at the Oval Office at 10:45 a.m. and exchanged pleasantries during a 15-minute photo-op. One-on-one discussions began at 11:00. (U)

The President opened by giving the General Secretary a pair of cuff links, made by an American jeweler, on which was the symbol from Isaiah, the beating of swords into ploughshares. The General Secretary responded that this was indeed an appropriate symbol on a day in which the two leaders would truly be beating swords into ploughshares by signing the first treaty that did this. (U)

The President then said he would like to start with a particular request that the General Secretary consider a list of names of Soviet citizens, a list involving separated families and other cases. He handed Gorbachev a card listing the names of Soviet
citizens to whom he wished the Soviet government to grant exit visas. The President then asked that no notes be taken on the American side because he wanted to make a purely personal suggestion in the area of human rights.  

Responding to the President's off-the-record point, the General Secretary said he wanted the President to understand that the Soviet government considered human rights a priority issue. He said it had not been easy to create unity among the Soviet people after the revolution in a country made up of so many diverse ethnic and national groups. But this had been done. He noted that the USSR was comprised of 15 national republics, each with its own national language, government, press, literature, and culture. And there were, additionally, 38 lesser ethnic groups with autonomous governmental structures, able to develop their own institutions and culture. The question of assuring human rights to a multiethnic population was an important question permanently on the Soviet agenda. There were always problems. Perestroika is dealing with all kinds of problems, not just economic but cultural as well, and the situation was steadily improving.

Turning to emigration, Gorbachev said that the USSR was taking a realistic approach to the problem. The President would have noticed this. Some cases were being refused "for a time." But Gorbachev wanted the President to understand that the Soviet government would do its utmost to remove this problem from the agenda. He added that he always appreciated the tact with which the President addressed this delicate and sensitive issue; the Soviets react, he said, with great sensitivity when it becomes the subject of political declarations. He repeated his assertion that the human rights situation was improving and that it was a top priority for his government, which was made up of elected bodies representing all nationalities, workers, farmers, intelligentsia, women, young people, all of whose rights were important.

The President noted that the United States was a unique nation whose population all derived from foreign origins. Gorbachev said he understood this. The President went on to note that some Americans had ties to the Soviet Union. He mentioned that, on the question of religion, while there were different philosophies, even primitive African tribes had some idea of God and worship. He noted that some one-half million Jews sought to leave the USSR for religious-cultural freedom. Gorbachev said these figures were completely unconfirmed.

Gorbachev then challenged the President whether there were any human rights problems in the United States. The President admitted we had our problems because people are people, but that
our Constitution protected basic human rights. Gorbachev proposed a seminar of experts to debate the matter, adding that he could not share the President's positive assessment of the human rights picture in the United States. The President responded that anybody can leave the US, and Gorbachev, in turn, that this was not the only human right. The Constitution protects freedom of worship, said the President. But what about episodes of anti-Semitism in the United States, queried Gorbachev. The President observed that individuals have their prejudices, to which Gorbachev agreed.

But, the President said, over the previous weekend 200,000 individuals had gathered to demonstrate on human rights in the USSR. Gorbachev acknowledged this and repeated that the USSR considered the matter to be serious and important, which is why it had decided to discuss it with the US government. He repeated his proposal to convene a joint seminar on it, and suggested that this discussion be closed. Responding to another reference from the President to freedom of worship, Gorbachev proposed that the President visit the USSR in June 1988 when the Millennium of Christianity in Russia would be celebrated. Representatives of many religious denominations would come. The President could visit churches of numerous Christian denominations in the USSR and see for himself what was happening. However, Gorbachev said, he would not sit as the accused before a prosecutor.

The President said he meant no threat by his line of argument. The General Secretary said he felt no threat, but that all countries had laws regarding immigration and emigration. The President responded that few restricted the right to leave their country. Many peoples wanted to come to the United States and we could not receive them all, but governed their entry under a system of quotas. Gorbachev said if quotas on immigration are acceptable, why not quotas on emigration? Why, he asked, does the United States guard the border with Mexico with fences and guns? What kind of democracy is this?

The US-Mexican border was completely the reverse of the situation on Soviet borders, replied the President. Because of poor living conditions in Mexico many wanted to come to the US; we could not absorb them all. The President reiterated that the fundamental point was that the USSR prevented people from getting out, that it compelled them to stay.

Gorbachev said he was willing to continue discussing these and other problems, but not today. We and the President agreed to move on.
Gorbachev observed that the two leaders had covered a long road from their first to this third meeting between them, a road marked by important and difficult issues. During that time, their dialogue had become much more profound, had begun to contain elements of trust between the two parties. There was an improved ability to address questions quietly and productively, a greater willingness to deal with political responses on each side, and political will to move ahead. (S)

The President recalled an episode in Geneva when staff experts who had been working in another building came to the two leaders to report roadblocks in their efforts. Gorbachev continued the recollection by reminding the President how the Leaders had urged progress by pounding their fists on the table; the President recalled this too. Gorbachev noted that this had been an important political moment illustrating how bureaucrats, sometimes very intelligent ones, forget who is really in power. People elect leaders, while officials are merely appointed. (S)

Gorbachev said it was not oversimplifying to claim that there had been a true change for the better in US-Soviet relations. Exchanges and discussions resolving important problems were underway. We would now sign the first agreement ever eliminating nuclear weapons, a fact of historic importance. We recognized, he said, that the process was not easy, that we had different views. Questions were being asked about prospects for ratification. The General Secretary said he was himself being asked to explain why the Soviet Union was to dismantle four times the number of weapons NATO and the US side would. He said he would succeed in explaining the value of the treaty to the Soviet people as the President would to the American people. He then referred to a letter from a student pleading that he and the President not become captives of emotion. (S)

The President suggested that ministers be invited to join the meeting at this point. The General Secretary agreed. The President said that he and the General Secretary were doing something very important for the future of the child who had written the letter. Gorbachev said he personally felt that a very important aspect of the current steps being taken in the US-Soviet relationship was the mental or psychological change being made in the minds of men, which he deeply felt. The President agreed. This had somehow to be captured, responded the General Secretary. (S)

The President expressed gratitude to Gorbachev for his efforts in improving a relationship that was far from easy. Gorbachev agreed that striving for cooperation was not easy, but that we should not be afraid to do it. He expressed pleasure at the President's remarks at the welcoming ceremony. He expressed the
view that, if there was no gap between what the President said and the actions that were taken, then there would be practical progress and he would find the Soviet side to be a good partner.

The President mused that, were we confronted with a hostile threat from another planet, then our differences would disappear and we would be totally united. Gorbachev recalled having discussed this idea before. At this point Shultz, Shevardnadze, Baker, Yakovlev, Powell, and Dobrynin joined the meeting. Launching into a general statement on next steps in arms control, the General Secretary expressed thanks to the people who had worked on the INF Treaty. He said the signing of this treaty radically changed the whole situation, activated the discussion, and increased international pressure for new progress. The momentum had to be maintained and, along with the experience gained, to be applied to the problem of reducing strategic offensive forces. In this context, he noted that the two sides had agreed at Reykjavik on a 50% reduction of strategic offensive forces and on nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty for period of 10 years. After Reykjavik the US side raised the issue of sublimits within the framework of 6000 strategic nuclear warheads. The Soviet side had sought to accommodate, accepted the concept of sublimits, and had offered proposals on the distribution of forces among the various legs of the triad. The US side had special concerns, specifically regarding Soviet heavy ICBMs. For its part, the Soviet side had concerns about US SLBM forces. Both sides were taking account of each others' concerns. Secretary Shultz had been given a new Soviet proposal on sublimits in Moscow and had been asked to respond in Geneva. The General Secretary turned to Secretary Shultz and asked again what was the US position.

The President stated that he wanted to react to one of the General Secretary's points, namely, the 10-year delay regarding defenses both sides were planning. The President said he would like to see that period shortened a bit. He did not have in mind a sharp cut because there were technical limits to what is possible, but the US side felt it might be able to push defensive research to permit deployment a few years earlier. He felt, however, that the differences between the two sides on this and on sublimits could be negotiated.

Secretary Shultz asked to review the range of arms reduction problems which the sides would try to resolve during the visit of the Soviet leader. He began by noting, as Gorbachev had, areas of agreement following Reykjavik: A reduction to 6000 strategic nuclear warheads, 1600 launchers/delivery vehicles, and a limit of 154 heavy ICBMs with 1540 warheads. Gorbachev interjected that the latter figure was a 50% cut when the US had originally only asked for 35%. Secretary Shultz noted that the US welcomed
this, adding that these limits would include a 50% cut in Soviet throwweight. Gorbachev again interjected his agreement. Secretary Shultz said that these areas of agreement should now be incorporated in a treaty with the understanding that Soviet missile throwweight would fall 50% and not go back up. [8]

Secretary Shultz continued, observing that bomber counting rules had been agreed by Nitze and Akhromeyev at Reykjavik. We had now to devise necessary counting rules for other weapons -- warheads on missiles, cruise missiles on aircraft, etc., subjects on which we had proposals which working groups could address. Gorbachev interjected that there were some related questions of principle to discuss. [9]

Secretary Shultz said that, regarding vital issues of verification, we should advance using the principles established in INF and instructing our negotiators on the basis of those principles. Gorbachev agreed. Then, the Secretary continued, the various sublimits had to be addressed, among which the most important was the ballistic missiles sublimit within the 6000 allowed warheads. In Moscow, the Soviet side had stated a proposal for 800-900 ALCMs. The other side of this idea from the Soviet side was Marshal Akhromeyev’s proposal of 5100 warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. The Secretary said the US thought this too many; 4800 was a better level, but the concept was important and we seemed to be agreeing on that. Gorbachev interjected that the Soviet side had a compromise proposal. Secretary Shultz noted that this was an important statement. Gorbachev objected laughingly that the Secretary had not even heard the Soviet proposal yet, but could be assured that the Soviet side was looking for a compromise. The Secretary suggested 4803 as a good compromise. In the same jocular fashion, the General Secretary responded that this number would be capitulation, not compromise; whereupon he turned to the President to take up his earlier remark about a 10-year period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty being too long. Why was the US side moving away from the 10-year period discussed at Reykjavik, asked Gorbachev. So much had been agreed there and then the US side retreated. Why? [49]

Secretary Shultz reminded Gorbachev that US acceptance of a 10-year nonwithdrawal period was conditioned at Reykjavik on total elimination of ballistic missiles in the same period. The President recalled that even elimination of all nuclear weapons was discussed at Reykjavik. But these approaches were no longer a factor in our discussions, concluded Shultz. We could work on defining the period of nonwithdrawal. Gorbachev asked what period the US was now proposing. That, replied the Secretary, would depend on other aspects of the negotiation. General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to set these subjects (START and ABM) aside for the moment, but noted that there was a linkage between them and that this remained an issue of principle for the Soviet side. [49]
The President asked the General Secretary to humor him a bit by
telling him she the deployment of advanced strategic defenses in
his lifetime. Gorbachev replied by observing how healthy the
President was and opined that he had many active years ahead of
him. If we made the right decisions, he continued, we would see
good results in our lifetime and our children would see them
beyond us. But if we continued in the manner of the past 45
years, there would be no such progress.

Gorbachev noted that Secretary Shultz had raised the issue of
SLCMs, which had been discussed at Reykjavik in a special frame-
work outside the 6000 warhead limit. Now that our positions were
coming closer on a whole range of issues, the matter of SLCMs
became particularly significant. It was not settled yet, but to
prevent circumvention there would have to be a limit, something
like 400 would be worthy of discussion. The nature of SLCMs and
the problems they posed had changed considerably in the years
since the SALT negotiations addressed them. Gorbachev asked what
particularly bothered the US side in coming to grips with the
SLCM problem.

Secretary Shultz replied that the verification problems posed by
SLCM limits were very difficult, particularly distinguishing
between those with nuclear and those with conventional warheads
because the two looked exactly alike. But the US side was
prepared to discuss this because it recognized the importance of
the matter. The Secretary knew that Akhromayev had some thoughts
on the subject of verifying SLCMs and the US was prepared to hear
them.

The General Secretary said that to focus things he wanted to
introduce some new points about SLCMs. First, he repeated, there
had to be a limit on their numbers. Second, the Soviet side had
insisted that they had to be restricted to two types of
submarines only. But, because the US had so many types of
surface ships that could carry SLCMs, the Soviets were prepared
to agree that they also could be deployed on two types of surface
ships as well. Third, Gorbachev would address verification.
Both sides, he insisted, had the technical means to verify SLCMs,
the equipment that would allow determination of whether nuclear
weapons were aboard a ship and what yield they were, without
actually boarding the ship. This was what Akhromayev had alluded
to. Now either the US was concealing its capability, continued
Gorbachev, or it lagged in such capability to verify nuclear
weapons aboard ships. If the former, this would be bad; if the
latter, then the Soviet side would sell the technology to the US
-- if the price were right. In any case, the technology existed
to permit identifying the presence and yield of nuclear weapons
aboard ships, said Gorbachev. Thus, we could work out limits on
SLCMs, establish that they would be deployed only on two types of

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submarines and two types of surface ships, and work our technical
details of verification.

Secretary Shultz repeated the interest of the US side in hearing
what the Soviets had to say, but wanted to register considerable
skepticism about verification of SLCM limits. Gorbachev offered
to conduct a demonstration to prove the verifiability of such
limits by technical means, to which the Secretary responded that
it was too easy to switch warheads on SLCMs to make such a
demonstration really convincing. Gorbachev repeated his
insistence that suitable technology was indeed available, a
matter that had been discussed with Paul Nitze. Both sides had
verification concerns, but they were resolvable. Again Shultz
noted the willingness of the US side to listen but advised that
not just Paul Nitze, but a lot of skeptical admirals had to be
convinced.

In approaching these questions, the General Secretary said, we
had to involve scientists more in our work, to provide a broad
basis for realistic policy. He said that Western scientists had
complained that their knowledge was not being adequately used in
these areas. He had a letter from a British Nobel prize winner
proposing an East-West commission of scientists to advise both
the President and the Soviet leadership more reliably. Without
scientists there could be no solutions to our problems.

The President noted the late hour, and Secretary Shultz remarked
that it might be time for a larger meeting in the Cabinet Room.
But first the Secretary wanted to make another point or two to
guide working group activity. With regard to mobile missiles, he
said, the US had no problem in principle with allowing them. But
the verification problems were exceptionally difficult and the
working group had to focus on them.

Gorbachev agreed with the President that it was about time to
break off this part of the meeting, but he too wanted to add one
more point, on nuclear testing. He noted that we were now
negotiating about new limits on testing as part of a process
leading to nuclear disarmament. This was good; we had momentum.
We had already decided to exchange visits of monitoring experts
and to conduct experiments in yield measurement. He had an idea
he wanted the President and others to think about. Since the
negotiations now underway were aimed at the ultimate result of a
total prohibition on all nuclear testing, why not, now, declare a
bilateral moratorium on testing for the duration of these nego-
tiations. This would be an act of enormous importance the whole
world would support. He asked that the President and his col-
leagues not respond immediately to this idea but think it over
carefully. Then noting that time was short and the matter of
forcing instructions to negotiators for future arms talks para-
amount, he passed to the President a Soviet paper containing the tentative proposals of the Soviet side, as discussed at the last ministerial in Geneva. The President passed to the General Secretary a comparable US document covering START and Defense and Space issues.

At the close of the meeting the two sides agreed that there would be two basic working groups, one on arms control chaired by Nitze and Akhromeyev and one on other parts of the agenda chaired by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh. Further, Secretary Shultz proposed that, in briefing the press, both sides stick to general statements about the atmosphere and topics of discussion. Gorbachev agreed, noting some concern as to whether the US side would stick to this. The Secretary insisted that we always did.

The meeting concluded with the President giving the General Secretary a tour around the Oval Office. The Soviet party departed at 12:30 p.m. (U)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Gorbachev

TIME: December 8, 1987, 2:30 - 3:15 p.m.

PLACE: Cabinet Room, The White House

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

Ronald Reagan, President of the United States
George Bush, Vice President
Howard Baker, Chief of Staff
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
Dimitri Zarschnak (interpreter)

USSR

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC
Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, CPSU CC Secretary
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, CPSU CC Secretary
Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman, Council of Minister
Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze (notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko, MFA USA/Canada Department (interpreter)

The President suggested the two leaders take up their discussion where it had left off.

Gorbachev said he would complete his presentation of that morning by adding a few words, with the President's permission.

The President invited him to do so.
Gorbachev said he believed the President felt like him and their colleagues following the signing (of the INF Treaty). The two sides had begun to discuss the key problem of reducing nuclear weapons. There was also the concern about conventional and chemical weapons. This was becoming very important. It was coming to the forefront of concern. He did not wish to overdramatize. There was no need to panic. But the Soviet side was in the process of assessing whether harm was being done to equality, to the balance of security. They had been listening to what was being said in Europe. They had the feeling in Moscow that it was hoped in Europe that we would give due attention to chemical weapons, to conventional weapons. The President and he should discuss this. They should give instructions to their colleagues to move forward.

Turning first to conventional weapons, Gorbachev recalled how the two sides had begun the process of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The President had recalled in his remarks that he had put forward the zero option. Gorbachev said he had thought the President would then say the Soviets had appropriated the idea for themselves. But the President had put the thought in more sophisticated fashion. Gorbachev had noticed that.

But, Gorbachev went on, when they began to discuss this question there was the issue of British and French arms. They had debated it. The Soviet side had decided to set it aside. Then they had discussed missiles in Europe and in Asia. At Reykjavik it had been decided each side could retain 100 warheads, with the Soviet warheads in Asia. Later they had decided to go to complete zero. They had moved step by step. All these things had gone into the treaty the two sides had just signed.

This experience should not only help with strategic offensive arms discussions, Gorbachev continued. It should also help with conventional weapons. In the West it was said that the Soviet Union had a superiority in armed forces and weapons. In the East it was said that NATO had a superiority in weapons. And both sides were right. Each side had the data proving its case. The two sides should agree to sit down. They should see who was trying to outsmart whom, and who was serious. They should look at the asymmetries. It should be a process; they should go step by step.

Gorbachev went on that the President and he should decide to move forward toward a mandate for negotiations between the two
alliances. Perhaps they should lock their negotiators in a room. They could give them food, of course, but they would instruct them to prepare proposals. Some were saying that the Soviet Union should take certain steps even before this had been done. They said the Soviet Union had an advantage in Central Europe. No one talked about NATO’s advantages in Southeastern Europe, which existed, and in an area close to the Soviet borders.

This should be put in the final document (of the Summit), Gorbachev said. They should put their cards on the table. They should think of first steps to lessen confrontation. There was the concept of corridors, of thinning out forces in certain corridors. There was the question of discussing military doctrines. They should seek a common concept of sufficiency, sufficiency for defensive purposes. He would not expand on this list. But the atmosphere created by signing the treaty was not less important than the treaty itself. The two leaders should talk about what he had suggested. This would be well received by the allies of both countries, and in Europe generally.

Turning to chemical weapons, Gorbachev said that at a certain point the British had made a valuable initiative. The Soviet position had in fact been a certain hurdle. The Soviet side therefore took major decisions. After that work went forward toward a convention to ban all these weapons, among all the participating countries, including the United States.

Then there came a slowdown, Gorbachev went on. As the Soviets saw it, someone was holding back the process. It could be either the Soviet Union or the United States. The Soviets knew it was not they. They had stopped production of these weapons. They were building, in fact completing, a facility to destroy them. It was not the Soviet side that was slowing things down. Perhaps it was the U.S. side. Perhaps there were some concerns on the U.S. side. Maybe it was the binary weapons program. The U.S. had already funded production of 155 mm. shells.

Verification was also very important, Gorbachev continued. The U.S. was still proposing verification only of state facilities. That would include all the Soviet Union’s, but not all the U.S.’s. There was no equality there.

Gorbachev concluded that the final document (of the Summit) should express a common view that would make it possible to give momentum to the negotiating process. This would enrich their meeting. It would be welcomed by the peoples of Europe, the peoples of the world.
He had wished to raise these two questions, Gorbachev said, by way of concluding their initial meeting. He could confine himself to this at that point.

The President said he did not think anyone on the U.S. side did not favor more disarmament. The U.S. side thought the main priority should be to move forward in START. But if we continued on that path, we would face the question of short-range, or battlefield, weapons. It would only be possible to eliminate them if we had first restored a balance in conventional weapons. The two sides should find a way to move forward on this. But, he recalled, it was not armaments that created distrust, but distrust that created armaments.

Gorbachev commented that confidence could not grow in an empty place. The arms control process would help it grow. That was dialectics, under the Marxist approach.

Secretary Shultz said that the U.S. side wanted to work with what had been said at that meeting, about conventional weapons, about chemical weapons. That was desirable. But the question was not so much one of language as of content.

The U.S. side would like to see the mandate being worked on in Vienna finished as soon as possible, the Secretary continued. It was pretty well along. In the framework of the Vienna talks there was also discussion of human rights. The Soviet side had made proposals, the U.S. side had made proposals. It was the Helsinki framework which held all these things together. So the two sides needed to deal with all these aspects. The U.S. side wanted to do that. Then, as Gorbachev had said, the sides should proceed on to deal with the asymmetries. They should try to move toward an equal situation at lower levels. The U.S. side had some ideas. Perhaps they would parallel those of the Soviet side.

Like the Soviet side, the U.S. side made a point of moving forward as a member of an alliance, the Secretary continued. This was not something the U.S. and the Soviet Union could just do together. Most of the arms under discussion on the Western side belonged to U.S. allies. But it was true that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had important parts, and could energize things.

Gorbachev said he supported what Secretary Shultz had said concerning the linkage to allies. The working group should work on this topic during the visit. They should develop ideas. When they had done so, the two sides should consult with their allies. Then Carlucci and Soviet Defense Minister Yazov could
meet. This would move the process forward.

Secretary Shultz said he was all for meetings between defense officials of the two sides. But we had to be careful about acting as if the U.S. and Soviet sides could work things out, and then consult with allies. We could not have that. It would not work. The allies see the importance of the issues, but the two sides needed to go about it right. But they should come to grips in Vienna with all the topics that had been discussed. This meant not only a mandate for negotiations on conventional weapons but also a mandate for confidence building measures. They should get that done, in the early part of the next year.

Gorbachev said the two sides had a common view that the topic was important, and he agreed we should not rush, but he had reservations when he heard Shultz say it. The Warsaw Treaty Organization had put proposals on the table eighteen months ago. It had still not received an answer. As he had told the President, he had not come to Washington to bicker, but to do real politics. At the stage we were at, recriminations and complaints just served to delay things. Gorbachev pointed to the main negotiators, sitting at the back of the room. They had felt this on their skins, he said. One needed to be persistent to succeed.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to substance the U.S. side had said there was generally agreement. But he had one question. He did not want to link conventional disarmament to Helsinki. Helsinki included many things, human rights and other things. We should tackle conventional disarmament straight on. We should not make a package. The U.S. had made Jackson-Vanik fifteen years before. That was a package, and over fifteen years the U.S. had been unable to untie it.

Secretary Shultz said the U.S. side was prepared in the working group to discuss conventional arms in relation to the CSCE process. Our Ambassador at Vienna, Warren Zimmermann, would be there. Perhaps a subgroup could be formed to work on this problem.

Gorbachev suggested that the formulation in the statement could stress cooperation with allies; that was important. Secretary Shultz said Gorbachev had better believe it. That was, Gorbachev added, if the chairman agreed. The President said he did.

Gorbachev asked about chemical weapons. The Secretary said this was a more severe problem. For fifty years there had been a
moral consensus against them. This had been broken. It was important to try to put it back together.

Gorbachev asked if the Secretary were referring to the 1925 Convention. The Secretary said that he was. It had worked, more or less. Actually, the fact that some countries had possessed these weapons had probably had some deterrent effect. But there were now many countries which had or could have them. They had been used in the Iran-Iraq war. At the same time there was the problem of verification. There was a need for a broad consensus. But it would be hard to get.

The U.S. side thus saw both the urgency and the difficulty of the issue, the Secretary said. There was real work to do. The two sides had had excellent discussions on the topic, in the content of his meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The U.S. side wanted to see progress. But it had no illusions. He suggested that they have their people work on it. This could be reflected in any statement. But the problem was genuinely difficult.

Gorbachev asked if the U.S. side saw the goal, for the two sides and for others, as speeding up the drafting of the convention. Secretary Shultz said it did, as long as we went about it realistically.

The President commented that any country with a fertilizer plant could make chemical weapons. It was an almost impossible task to know that they are not being made. Secretary Shultz said we thus had an impossible but necessary task. Chemical weapons were potentially very destabilizing. Gorbachev said there was no cause for panic.

Gorbachev continued that he wished to draw the President's and the Administration's attention to another issue. The Soviet side had noticed that in European political and journalistic circles there was discussion of how to compensate for the elimination of INF missiles in Europe. If such thinking prevailed, it would be very dangerous. The two sides should interact and take a common stand. There could be new weapons, of great new capacity. If all the talk of reinforcing or adding new forces in Europe became true, the whole process would be more difficult. This was especially true since they had agreed to eliminate INF missiles over a certain period of time.

(At this point, at 3:00 p.m., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh and Disarmament Department Director Viktor Karpov took their places at the table.)
The President commented that it was here that we needed to take the most steps to create trust. There was a legacy of mistrust because of Soviet expansionism. Gorbachev commented that compared to American expansionism the Soviet side's was a small child. The President responded that the U.S. side did not think so. There had been four wars in his lifetime, and the U.S. had not gained an inch of territory.

Under the U.S. system, the President continued, it was not enough just to say something. You had to do something. We had people here from every part of the world. There was thus a kind of dual loyalty. The first question asked was what you were; more and more people had to name three or four places. There was a pride in where one's parents and ancestors were from. They were proud of them, as well as of being American. So there were elements in our country that had big resentments over what happened where they had come from. Signing the treaty was therefore not enough. There was also the question of getting it ratified.

Gorbachev said the Supreme Soviet was even larger than the Senate. It had some 2000 members. He expected ratification would be a sharper process than usual. It opened up many questions. There was the question of why the Soviets had been so generous toward the Americans. They were eliminating four times as many missiles. But it used to be that parity had been recognized. So the question was why it was being broken. The Soviets would need to tackle this even before the formal ratification process. It was not easy to take the first step toward disarmament. People asked how it was possible to have disarmament with the U.S. when the Soviet Union was ringed with U.S. bases. People asked how Gorbachev could bow down to the U.S., and do more.

Gorbachev continued that he had just seen a recent Gallup poll in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It had been an independent poll. It had shown that there were not many enthusiasts for the treaty in the Soviet Union. About half the Soviet people had expressed certain doubts. After all the Soviet government had said the principle should be equal security. That was one reason why he had brought Dobrynin along; he was head of a commission in the Supreme Soviet. So was Ligachev. But he thought he would have Dobrynin with him.

The President said that Gorbachev's comments underlined the need for trust. If Gorbachev genuflected before him, he would stomp his foot. Gorbachev said he was not referring to himself.
personally. He was one thing. But pride was a matter for a nation. He represented a nation. We had to deal with each other on the basis of equality, of respect, of taking each other's concerns into account. We needed to make real policy.

The U.S. side accused the Soviet side of all sorts of sins, Gorbachev went on. What was needed was to look forward instead. During the forty-five years since the War so much had piled up that if we just went on with complaints — on the Soviet side there were all sorts of doctrines to complain about, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine — we would put each other on trial. This was not the constructive policies people wanted. Gorbachev advised the Vice President to reflect on that. Unless policy reflected what people wanted, you could win an election, but not succeed in the long term.

The President commented that the U.S. side welcomed moves toward democratization in the Soviet Union, toward glasnost.

Gorbachev replied that he wished to say a few words about that. It was people's greatest wish to go to bed and wake up in the morning to see everything changed for the better. But even in fairy tales the heroes had to go through trials, and in real life things were even harder. He would continue to fight conservatism. He would continue to fight those who sought to shackle people in dogma. But he would also fight adventurists. There were the equivalent of the Red Guards in China, who wanted to push ahead without thinking.

It would not be easy, Gorbachev said. But the present leadership had taken a firm stand to move along that path. Certain politicians, perhaps Matlock, were looking for an opposition. There was opposition, in every single Soviet. It would be foolish to deny it. They were children of their times. But of political opposition there was none. There would be debates. There would be differences of views, and exchanges of views. But he could assure the President and his colleagues that the Soviet side would be moving ahead toward democratization. That was, if the U.S. would permit them to do so. He asked the American side to let the Soviet side do it their own way.

The President said there was a U.S. President who had once said something very profound. That was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In America there had also been people who had thought that government should have more control of people. Roosevelt had asked where, if people did not have the capacity to run their own lives, we would find among them the tiny group that could run not only their own lives but those of others.
He did not want to offend Gorbachev, the President continued, but he had recently talked to a U.S. scholar who had visited Gorbachev's country. On his way to the airport he had had a taxi driver, a young man finishing his education but also driving a taxi because he needed money. The professor had asked the young man what he was going to be; he had replied that he had not yet decided. The professor got to the Soviet Union, and there he had had basically the same conversation, with a taxi driver finishing his education, but also driving a taxi. When he had been asked what he would be, he had replied: "They haven't told me yet."

Gorbachev said he knew the President liked anecdotes about the Soviet Union. It was indeed a country rich in anecdotes. He had only one request: that the President not ask Matlock to collect anecdotes for him. This would stop relations entirely; that would be the biggest joke.

Secretary Shultz asked if he could get a word in edgewise. People were waiting for the working groups to start. There had been discussion of strategic arms that morning. Notes had been exchanged; there were things to work with. Gorbachev and the President had also had a discussion about conventional and chemical weapons, so that was additional material. There was one area that had not been touched on. Perhaps they could reach it the next day. That was regional issues. (Gorbachev interjected agreement.) Here the Secretary assumed the working group would plow in without guidance from the leaders' discussion.

Gorbachev said he would welcome that. Bessmertnykh and Ridgway knew their respective positions. The Secretary joked that the problem was that they knew the positions of both sides.

Gorbachev said the Soviet side intended to conduct a more businesslike discussion of regional issues with the President and his colleagues. But there was too little time for it that day. They could get into it the next day.

Secretary Shultz said that as self-appointed housekeeper, he might also mention the nuclear testing statement as something to issue the next day. It would be good to have a continuing flow of things out of the meeting. Gorbachev said the two sides should look at it.

Gorbachev said he had made a note to himself that morning. His thought was that in discussing the ABM Treaty, where the two sides agreed on a non-withdrawal period, they should say not only, as the Soviet proposal had it, that if one side violated
the ABM Treaty the other side would have the right to resume increasing offensive weapons, but that if one side violated it the other side would have the right to end its moratorium on ASAT weapons, i.e. not only to resume production of offensive arms but also to resume ASAT production. That would be an equal obligation for both sides.

Secretary Shultz said it was not clear to him what Gorbachev meant by a moratorium on ASAT. Gorbachev said the Soviet side had been observing such a moratorium since 1983; of course it was unilateral. The Secretary said that our moratorium was imposed by Congress. Gorbachev said he knew that; but in actual fact it was a moratorium. The Secretary said he now understood what Gorbachev was driving at.

Secretary Shultz continued that in his view the ABM Treaty deserved discussion in the working group, and perhaps also back at the main table: the President had important thoughts on it.

Gorbachev asked if they should call it a day for the time being. Or perhaps the President wished to make suggestions on strategic weapons that day. The President replied that he did not.

The Secretary asked if it were agreed to begin the arms control working group at 4:00 p.m. Shevardnadze asked if it would take place at the State Department, and the Secretary confirmed that it would.

Gorbachev concluded that in the previous two hours they had made an important event. It was a bridge to the future. The Soviet side was ready to build it over. By the time the President came to Moscow the two sides of the bridge should be locked together. The President said they should meet in the middle. Gorbachev said he agreed fully.

(0122A)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: December 9, 1987

Time: 10:35 - 10:45 a.m.

Place: Small office next to Oval Office, White House

U.S. Participants: 
President Reagan
D. Zarechnak, interpreter

USSR Participants: 
General Secretary Gorbachev
P. Palazhchenko, interpreter

The President started the meeting by passing to the General Secretary a baseball from Joe DiMaggio (who had attended the State dinner the previous evening) for his (and the President's) autograph. Gorbachev indicated that he had heard of the request, and was glad to comply.

The President then told the General Secretary that in the coming two days they would be working hard to set in motion the other things that needed to be accomplished in order that the people on both sides could work hard in the winter and spring to make a summit in Moscow possible next summer. He indicated that he would be prepared to keep his people working at this, in addition to what the two of them would discuss this morning and tomorrow.

The General Secretary replied that he welcomed this, and that it was not only his feeling, but also that of the Soviet leadership, to continue to work at these issues, and to make the process even more dynamic, not only in the main area of arms control, but in other areas as well, in order to prepare a good visit by Reagan to Moscow which would also be productive and important.

Gorbachev continued that a good time for the visit, when it was not too hot, would be the early summer, perhaps early June or late May. This would allow time for the process of ratification and also would allow for time for a lot of work to be done on a new document on strategic arms and other issues.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev continued that in his conversation with Mrs. Reagan the other night, he had indicated that a program could be arranged which would include time for meetings between the President and himself, meetings of working groups, but also one or two days during which the President and Mrs. Reagan could see the country.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS E47-o-4 #51
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH

SUBJECT: The President's One-on-One with Gorbachev -- 9 December

December 15, 1987

Attached is our interpreter's memcon of the President's private meeting with Gorbachev on the morning of December 9 -- the "Dimaggio Meeting". The most important contents are a) the President virtually commits to a spring summit, a fairly short one; b) Gorbachev is definitely stressing late May or early June as the best dates, while the President is holding back on dates; and c) Gorbachev contemplates a "tourist-type" trip back to the US, perhaps while the President is still in office.

Two additional points: First, as of the moment, the Soviets are not stressing the completion of START as a condition for a 1988 summit; they're playing this linkage softly. Second, Gorbachev has his own political reasons for a Moscow summit in the suggested timeframe, even were it only to record progress toward START; it would come just before a grand CPSU Conference in late June which will be critical to his political plans.

When you've read this memcon, it should be returned to Paul Stevens for filing with the other summit records.

Linhardt concurs.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET
Declassify on: QADR
The President replied that that would be nice. He could not agree to a date, however, until he knew when some other things would be taking place, e.g., the Economic Summit, which usually occurs in early summer. So he would need some time before agreeing to a date. But he did want to go to Moscow.

The President said that this visit had been a rather short one, but perhaps some time before the President left office, the General Secretary and Raisa could return, not for a Summit, but simply to see the country, and California specifically, since one has not seen America without seeing California.

Gorbachev agreed that this was a good idea, and that there should be regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries, and not always official visits. If we wish to restructure our relations and improve our dialogue and cooperation, all these things could be done in a more normal way, including visits to the U.S. to get to know the country. Such a trip would be important to get a deeper knowledge of the U.S., and would be a possibility.

Drafted by: D. Zarechnak
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Time: 10:55 am to 12:35 pm, Wednesday, December 9, 1987
Place: Oval Office

Participants

U.S. U.S.S.R.

THE PRESIDENT GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

The Vice President

Secretary Shultz FomMin Shevardnadze
Secretary Carlucci Politburo Member Yakovlev

Sen. Baker CPSU Secretary Dobrynin
NSC Advisor Powell

EUR/SCG Director Parris Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
(Notetaker) (Notetaker)
NSC Staff Member Ermarth MFA Officer (Back-up Notetaker)
(Back-up Notetaker)

Mr. Zarechynak Mr. Palazhchenko
(Interpreter) (Interpreter)

* * * * *

The meeting was preceded by a ten minute one-on-one with only interpreters present.

THE PRESIDENT opened by noting that the day before had been a proud one. But as the General Secretary himself had said, the two leaders had to keep working.

The President said he wanted to return to some of the subjects the two had talked about in their first meeting, especially the relationship between strategic offense and defense. The two sides' experts had met the day before on START and had had a good discussion: The U.S. had stressed two important issues: verification and counting rules. On verification, our ideas
built on what we had learned from the INF negotiation. Counting rules were also important. Issues like sublimits could not be decided until we knew exactly how different types of weapons were to be counted. However, the President was encouraged by Soviet willingness to compromise between 4800 and 5100 ballistic missile warheads. Were it possible to come to agreement on this, the President would be prepared to be forthcoming on an ICBM sublimit. (Gorbachev made a note at this point.)

The President noted that the Soviet side had also discussed sea-launched cruise missiles and had suggested new ideas for their verification. The General Secretary had also expressed a readiness to examine verification of mobile missiles. The U.S. appreciated Gorbachev's suggestions, and, while we had some doubts, we were willing to study his concepts.

Moving to a discussion of the U.S. defense and space position, the President noted that the arms control working group was taking up these issues that day. Each side seemed to understand the other's position on START, but this wasn't true in Defense and Space. The President wanted to urge that the two sides move together in a direction in which they were already going separately.

Specifically, he indicated that, if it were possible to agree on a treaty reducing strategic arsenals by 50 percent and preserve the opportunity for effective strategic defenses, the two sides would stand on the threshold of a new and stronger regime of strategic stability. Offensive nuclear weapons had helped to keep the peace for over forty years. But now it was necessary to look to the future. The President and Gorbachev held awesome responsibilities. Their only means to avoid nuclear war was to be prepared to strike each other's homeland with devastating consequences, not only for their countries, but for the world. Their successors, and, more importantly, their peoples, deserved better. For his part, the President wanted to strengthen peace by finding new ways to save lives rather than threaten to avenge them. Providing a better, more stable basis for peace was the central purpose of SDI.

The President pointed out that effective defenses against ballistic missiles could strengthen stability in a number of ways. First, they would significantly increase uncertainty about whether missiles could penetrate defenses to destroy the other side's capability to retaliate. This would become even more important after a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.
Second, defenses would provide an alternative to accepting massive devastation if a missile were ever launched in error or against either side by another country.

Third, defenses could reinforce arms reductions. Fifty percent reductions, combined with increasingly effective defenses, could offer a real hope of protecting people, not just weapons.

Finally, defenses would underwrite the integrity of arms reductions by reducing the advantages of cheating.

In short, the President noted, the combination of effective defenses and a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals would establish a whole new concept of strategic stability. It would by the measure people in the U.S. held most important -- by removing any incentive to strike first in a crisis. But it would also improve stability by the measure the Soviet military held most important -- by ensuring that neither side could be surprised by the military advances of the other. Thus we could improve strategic stability by both U.S. and Soviet standards.

The President observed that he had noticed Gorbachev's March 1, 1987 remarks in Pravda, which focused on the issue of deployment. The President considered that the right approach. He was therefore prepared to negotiate with Gorbachev a period during which neither side would deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty. The length of the period could be agreed once the terms were settled. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev had talked of ten years. The President believed it would be possible to agree on the length of the period once the terms were settled.

Moreover, in order to reassure Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by events during the non-deployment period, the President was also prepared to commit to a package designed to increase predictability for both sides. He would ask Carlucci to describe that package in a moment. In brief, however, the President was offering Gorbachev predictability during a non-deployment period of certain length. In return, the President needed to protect the existing U.S. -- and Soviet -- right to conduct, in the words of Marshal Grechko, "research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack." Both sides needed a clear right to deploy defenses after that period.

The U.S., then, was seeking a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect at the same time the START treaty went into effect. This second treaty would contain a period during which both sides would commit not to deploy
defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, after giving six months notice of intent to deploy. During the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required. Their negotiators in Geneva could explain in detail the U.S. concept of deployment.

As Gorbachev would see, the President was trying to create a future in which the two sides would have reduced strategic offensive arms by 50% and could pursue their respective strategic defense programs as common elements in a new regime which Gorbachev had called "strategic stability." In that context, the President had taken special note of the General Secretary's interview with Tom Brokaw the week before, in which Gorbachev had acknowledged the existence of a Soviet analogue to SDI. This was a step in the right direction.

This then, was a summary of the U.S. position, the President concluded. He would ask Secretary Shultz to comment in further detail.

SECRETARY SHULTZ handed out a Russian text of what he described as elements on which negotiators in Geneva might build.

First, he noted, there would be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The Secretary noted in this connection the President's remark that it would be possible to agree on an appropriate time period.

Second, after that period, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving six months notice of an intent to deploy and without any further reference to the ABM Treaty.

Third, during the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required.

Fourth, to enhance strategic stability, promote predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the U.S. proposed that the two sides meet regularly to do three things:

--- Exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's
strategic defense programs;

-- Arrange for agreed mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities;

-- Arrange for intensive discussions of strategic stability to begin not later than three years before the end of the non-deployment period.

The Secretary added that all of this should be seen in light of the fact that the period in question would span several Presidential terms. The relevant research would be going on. No one could tell what the situation would be at the end of the period. The two sides would, however, have an opportunity to discuss matters in the context of what was taking place at the time.

The Secretary suggested that Carlucci briefly describe the type of confidence building measures (CBM's) the U.S. had in mind under its proposal.

SECRETARY CARLUCCI explained that such CBM's would be designed to give each side the predictability it needed. The U.S. had earlier put proposals for "open labs" on the table in Geneva, but had received no response. There were other things which could be done. There were things which would make it possible to observe research in space. The U.S. would be prepared to open up such facilities as Livermore Labs and Stanford Research; the Soviet side might be prepared to open up its own facilities, such as those which produced chemical lasers.

With respect to joint observation of actions in space, the U.S. was aware of the Soviet near-space vehicle. We had our shuttle. If, for example, the U.S. sought to conduct a sensor experiment in space, the Soviet near-space vehicle could be maneuvered close enough to satisfy Moscow that no offensive weapon was being tested. Such activities could be undertaken without compromising the security or integrity of the programs involved on either side. Carlucci noted that Marshal Akhromeyev was scheduled to visit him at the Pentagon that afternoon. Carlucci had invited Gen. Abrahamson to brief him in detail on U.S. space defense CBM ideas.

THE PRESIDENT, noting that Gorbachev had probably heard enough from U.S. representatives, invited the General Secretary to share any reactions.

GORBACHEV said that he did, in fact, have a few words in response. First, he could not on the level of principle
support the proposal the President had just outlined. The thrust of that proposal was to invite the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in undertaking a kind of SDI program. Gorbachev had said before Moscow had no intention of developing its own SDI; he had even urged the President to renounce the program. If the U.S. proceeded, the Soviet side had made clear it would develop a response. But that response would take a different path from SDI.

What then, were the proposals of the Soviet side? The ABM regime had worked well for fifteen years. True, some concerns had been expressed with respect to compliance with the Treaty, including in the recent past. But a mechanism for dealing with such problems existed in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which had worked well in the past. Such concerns could be discussed and removed. But in fact both sides had basically observed the Treaty in the past.

But now we were entering a new phase, a phase of reducing strategic offensive arms. Not only would it be necessary to continue to observe the ABM Treaty, it should be strengthened -- as had been agreed at Reykjavik -- through a commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty as strategic offensive arms were reduced. On the basis of such an approach, which presumed an interpretation of the Treaty consistent with that which had been used since Day One of its existence, it would be possible to begin work on the specifics of reducing strategic arms by 50%.

The President, Gorbachev noted, had himself said that SDI was not up for negotiation. If he were now proposing to structure the two leaders' discussion of strategic offensive arms reductions by linking that subject to SDI, Gorbachev had to say it would be a slow process. It would take time first of all just to define SDI. Space was a new area for both countries; there were no criteria for making judgments. Both sides would be groping in the dark. Such an approach would lead the dialogue down a blind alley.

Gorbachev underscored that he objected in principle to SDI. If America wished to pursue the program, that was its business -- to the extent its activities were consistent with the ABM Treaty.

But if there was a real desire for accommodation on both sides, the Soviet approach was a practical one. Taking into account the U.S. desire to implement SDI, Moscow simply proposed that neither side use its right to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years. Two to three years before the end of that period, there
could be a discussion of what to do next. If the U.S. had decided to deploy SDI, it could say so. But during the ten years of the period the Soviet side would have the assurance that, while strategic offensive arms were being reduced, the U.S. would observe the ABM Treaty and not use its right to withdraw. This was something the two sides could agree on.

As for SDI research, it could continue, and the U.S. could decide what to do after ten years. If the U.S. were to violate the ABM Treaty during that period, the Soviet side would be released from any obligation to continue reductions, and would have the right to build and perfect weapons, as well as to cancel its anti-satellite (ASAT) moratorium. But that would occur only if the U.S. decided to deploy SDI.

The Soviet Union, for its part, did not want a new sphere for the arms race. It did not want to deploy SDI. Moscow did not know what, precisely, it wanted to do in the areas involved.

Therefore it proposed a straightforward approach: 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms; agreement on a period of non-withdrawal; observance of the Treaty as it had been observed in the past. As for SDI, the U.S. could do research. Should it ultimately decide to deploy, that would be up to the U.S., but after the termination of the withdrawal period. This proposal would make it possible to implement 50% reductions in strategic weapons in the context of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and to continue research. Before the end of the ten year period, there could be a discussion.

For the Soviet side, it would be less expensive to explore ways other than through SDI-type deployments to ensure its security. Thus, SDI was not acceptable from a political standpoint; it was not acceptable from a military standpoint (as it was destabilizing); it was not acceptable from an economic standpoint. It could wear out the Soviet economy. It was up to the U.S. to decide if SDI made sense for itself in economic terms; the Soviet Union had decided it did not. Should the U.S. decide to deploy SDI at the end of a non-withdrawal period, Gorbachev warned, the Soviet side would have to respond. But that response would be less costly than SDI.

Gorbachev suggested in conclusion that the two sides seek a solution which enabled the U.S. to develop SDI, but would do so in a way which did not make SDI an obstacle to progress in the reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev had outlined the Soviet proposal for guaranteeing peace. For the U.S., the answer was SDI. For the Soviet Union, the answer was different: nuclear
disarmament; maintenance of the ABM regime; and no extension of the arms race to space.

THE PRESIDENT volunteered an answer of his own. It was possible to proceed immediately with 50% reductions. Any other options were years ahead for both sides. It would be better not to link the two concepts. The discussions thus far had revealed some common ground. Let the working groups go to work. But one issue should not be made hostage to the other.

As for SDI, the President offered a counterargument to Gorbachev's suggestion that the program would step up the arms race. The President saw it as essential to the realization of the dream of a non-nuclear world. The secret of nuclear weapons was spreading inexorably. If the U.S. and Soviet Union ever reached the point where they had eliminated all their nuclear arms, they would have to face the possibility that a madman in one country or another could develop a nuclear capability for purposes of conquest or blackmail. The situation was not unlike that after agreement had been reached to ban the use of poison gas. People had kept their gas masks. There would always be a need for a defense. The U.S. and Soviet Union could eliminate their nuclear arsenals without fear of nuclear attack by other countries if they had a reliable defensive shield.

In this context, the President had been encouraged by Gorbachev's acknowledgment of a Soviet program akin to SDI. He was grateful for Gorbachev's words because a future based on an ability to counter any attack would be based on real stability, not the stability that came from the ability to destroy.

GORBACHEV observed that the American press had distorted the thrust of his remarks to Brokaw. He had not said that the Soviet Union had its own SDI. He had said that the Soviet Union was engaged in many areas of basic research, including some covered on the U.S. side by SDI. He had not gone beyond this. He had added, moreover, that the Soviet Union would not deploy SDI, and had urged the U.S. not to do so. The Soviet Union would find a different path. The U.S. would not draw the Soviet Union into an SDI program.

On the other hand, if the U.S. wanted to reduce strategic arms, it would have to accept a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of that period, the U.S. could decide what it would do. The Soviet side could accept that, although it was definitely against SDI.
As for prospects for a START agreement, Gorbachev expressed his readiness to cooperate and respond to the major U.S. concerns. Moscow was ready to reduce heavy ICBM's by 50%. As for sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), he had yesterday shared his ideas on verification with the President. He was also ready to look again at the sublimits question. So, he was ready to work to achieve a treaty. But if the President wanted to link that process to SDI, if it had to involve SDI, there would be no START treaty either with the President or his successors.

SECRETARY SHULTZ asked if he might describe a possible work program, in view of the previous discussion. Both sides, he noted, seemed to be committed to achieving a START agreement. Work was already underway among experts.

The Secretary clarified that the President did not mean to suggest that a START treaty be linked to Soviet acceptance of SDI. In fact, he had said there should be no linkage to anything.

GORBACHEV interjected that a START treaty had to be linked to the ABM Treaty.

THE SECRETARY continued that the question was not one of whether the Soviet Union liked or did not like SDI. Neither side could tell the other how to see to its own defense. But the proposal Gorbachev outlined seemed on the surface not to be inconsistent with what the U.S. wanted.

For its part, the U.S. side believed that the proposal the President had made was consistent with the ABM Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev might not agree with that assessment. But the point was that it made no sense to set out down a certain path when both sides knew they did not agree on what, superficially, they seemed to agree on. The President had proposed a means of ensuring that their were sure what we meant.

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had asked for predictability. The President's proposal would guarantee that there would be no deployments against the Soviet Union for a certain period. The President had said it should be possible to agree on the number of years such a period would last. He had also said that, when the period ended, either side could do what it chose.

The question remained, what would happen in the meantime? We had tried to get at that question through the means that Carlucci had described. These would give the Soviet side confidence in what the U.S. was doing. We would hope Moscow
would reciprocate by permitting similar access.

The President's proposal had also incorporated the Soviet idea that, before the end of the agreed period, there would be agreement in advance to discussions of the situation created as a result of strategic reductions and the results of research to that point. This discussion would take place several years in advance of the end of the period. While each side would have the right to do what it wished at the end of the period, this discussion would allow both to take into account facts which had emerged in the interim. This could have an impact on the ultimate results.

So, the Secretary continued, the President's proposal was not an effort to link Soviet acceptance of SDI to a START treaty even though we could not understand why Moscow was opposed to SDI. Rather, it was an attempt to give the Soviet side greater confidence that it understood what was going on on the U.S. side. But to agree on radical reductions of strategic arms, based on an understanding of the status of the ABM Treaty both sides knew in their bones was not shared, made the U.S. side uncomfortable and was probably unwise. That was why we hoped that Akhromeyev would listen to what Abrahmson had to say. Who knew? Perhaps the two of them would come up with something new.

GORBACHEV asked why the U.S. could not accept the Soviet formula: 50% reductions in strategic arms; a ten-year non-withdrawal period; discussion two to three years before the end of that period on what to do next. This was a simple approach. There was no reason to encumber the discussion of 50% reductions.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that it was important to consider another factor — if the President were to pay a return visit to Moscow, there had to be a decision on what such a visit might produce. Shevardnadze had been operating on the assumption that the purpose of the visit would be to sign an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms in the context of the preservation of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, as he and the Secretary had publicly stated. This had been the basis for all their discussions. If the two sides started to open up philosophical questions about what might happen years from now, the President's visit could not be crowned by signature of an agreement.

That was why it was critical, Shevardnadze said, to define the parameters of observance of the ABM Treaty in the context of 50% reductions. If the question were consigned to experts, there would never be a decision. A key issue was to decide on
the duration of the non-withdrawal period. Another was limits on SLCM's. The size of those limits and their verification could be discussed, but a decision was needed.

Finally, Shevardnadze continued, there could be no question of the INF Treaty becoming the end of the process. It could not stop. Nuclear proliferation was a growing problem, which made it all the more important to maintain the momentum of nuclear arms reductions. The President's visit could provide a major stimulus to this effort. As for SDI, it was not and had not been a subject for discussion. Secretary Shultz had made clear it was the President's program. But there was a need to clarify certain questions or there would be no START agreement.

DOBRYNIN reiterated Gorbachev's point that the ABM Treaty had worked well for fifteen years. Now the U.S. seemed to be proposing that, at the Washington summit, the two leaders in effect announce that this treaty of unlimited duration would cease to be. That was the effect of the President's proposal: there would be three years of negotiations, and then there would be an open arms race.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Soviet side was forgetting something. Prior to Gorbachev's assuming office, there had been violations by the Soviet side of the ABM Treaty. The Krasnoyarsk radar was the principal example. But there were other differences of interpretation. We believed that the Treaty allowed research into weapons which it did not specifically address. The Treaty had dealt with ABM interceptor missiles; it did not ban research into and development of other systems not even envisioned at the time. SDI clearly was covered by the clause which covered other physical principles. It was not an interceptor missile. But there were real questions of when the Soviet side would begin to abide by the ABM Treaty.

SECRETARY SHULTZ proposed that he seek to outline areas where broad agreement seemed to exist.

First, the two sides agreed on the concept of a period of time -- as yet undecided -- when there would be no deployment of antiballistic missile systems beyond what was permitted by the ABM Treaty. There was agreement that, at the end of the period, either side could do what it chose to do. The U.S. had sought to pick up on the Soviet proposal that there should be agreement in advance that the two sides would discuss problems of strategic stability well before the period ended.

Where there was no agreement was on the question of what
actions could be undertaken during the period in question. The U.S. would have no problem agreeing to the formula, "the ABM Treaty, as signed and ratified," because it considered its SDI program to be consistent with that concept. The Secretary said that he had heard that Gorbachev was tired of hearing Grechko quoted back to him, but stressed that that was part of the record. The point he was making was that the two sides differed on such questions of interpretation.

GORBACHEV interjected that these differences had emerged only in 1983. Prior to that, there were no differences, as Congressional hearings and Pentagon reports made clear. Only after SDI had been proposed did the U.S. seek to make the Treaty fit the program. A lawyer had been found to make the case. But, as Bismarck had said, a lawyer could be found to justify anything. What was going on was obvious to everyone. The U.S. should have more respect for the Soviet side than to expect that they would not see through this.

If the U.S. wanted 50% reductions, Gorbachev reemphasized, there had to be a commitment of 10 years on the ABM Treaty. There would be nothing on SDI before that in any case. The issue was not that complex. But the U.S. side was trying to make things "foggy."

THE PRESIDENT replied with some feeling that it was not he who was making things foggy. He wanted to make things clear. He did not want to talk about links to SDI, but about 50% reductions, about how the Hell the two sides were to eliminate half their nuclear weapons. He wanted to talk about how the two leaders could sign an agreement like the one they had signed the day before -- an agreement which had made everyone in the world so damned happy it could be felt in the room at dinner the night before. "Let's get started with it," he concluded.

GORBACHEV said he was ready. The two leaders should make clear that they were working on agreed reductions and were making progress. They should also indicate that, as they began this important process, they reaffirmed their commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. This should not be a problem. The period could be for nine years if that would help.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be set aside for a moment. He felt there had been some progress. There was agreement on the concept of a certain period. There was agreement on what should happen at the end of that period. The two sides were not there yet on actions were to be permitted during that period, but that could be worked. But there was
clear agreement on the need for major cuts in strategic arms. Indeed, the Secretary had felt electricity on this point. That was the place to start.

GORBACHEV said he would like to return for a moment to the issue of SLCM's. If this question were not resolved, he warned, there could be no agreement. The Soviet side had outlined clearly its position. What was the U.S. stand on this issue?

THE PRESIDENT said he thought this was a matter for experts. GORBACHEV said that they would be unable to do anything without guidance from the top.

SECRETARY SHULTZ reminded Gorbachev that the U.S. had problems with the verification of SLCM's. The General Secretary had said the day before that the Soviet side had some ideas for dealing with verification. We were ready to study them. If we could be satisfied that they were workable -- and that was a big question -- this would be a realistic basis for proceeding. At this point, the Secretary concluded, he was not in a position to respond to Gorbachev's proposal for a SLCM ceiling of 400 missiles.

GORBACHEV noted ironically that the U.S. had no answer on this and other issues he had raised, only more demands of the Soviet side. But this was not the kind of momentum that was needed. The U.S. was simply squeezing more and more concessions out of its partner. Verification of SLCM's should be more of a problem for Moscow than Washington, Gorbachev pointed out, in view of the U.S. advantage in numbers of SLCM's. Once there was agreement on a number, the verification problem could be resolved. If it proved impossible to satisfy the U.S. on verification, the Soviets would remove their insistence on a numerical limit.

SECRETARY SHULTZ repeated that the U.S. would study the Soviet SLCM proposals.

GORBACHEV replied, "good," adding that the conversation had been a good one. It had made it clearer what both sides wanted. Gorbachev emphasized in closing this phase of the discussion the importance he attached to reductions of strategic arms -- a key issue in the relationship, and one which required a responsible approach from both sides. Obviously, no agreements were possible except on the basis of equality.

THE PRESIDENT said jocularly that he, for one, had no desire to
come to Moscow to be disappointed.

GORBACHEV said he had not meant to suggest any linkage. If the President wished to come to Moscow without a START agreement, he would be welcome. But he should say so. For his part, Gorbachev felt that there was, in fact, a common understanding that the visit should be marked by the signing of an important document. The Soviet side wanted to push toward that goal. If the President was operating from a different set of assumptions, all he had to do was say so. The Geneva negotiators would probably be just as glad to spend their time playing soccer. But Gorbachev assumed that the Administration shared his assessment that an agreement was possible. The President's visit would be an important one, but if he wished to finesse the question of a treaty, he should say so.

SECRETARY SHULTZ observed that Gorbachev had heard with his own ears what the President had said on that count. For himself, he could assure Gorbachev that, whenever he (the Secretary) went off to meet with Shevardnadze, the President made clear in no uncertain terms what he wanted the Secretary to accomplish. The Secretary thought the President had made his views on a START agreement pretty clear to the General Secretary as well a moment before.

GORBACHEV acknowledged that this was important. But one had to decide beforehand in building a bridge whether it should go across a divide or alongside it. The Soviet approach was that there should be a good treaty by the time the President came to Moscow. If there was another view in Washington, it would be best to make that clear. In Russian, Gorbachev recounted, there was a saying: "If you respect me, don't make a fool of me. Tell me what you want."

THE SECRETARY quipped that he hoped this didn't mean GORBACHEV was giving up. GORBACHEV replied that, on the contrary, that was why he had urged against any link between START and SDI. There should be a good treaty by the time of the President's visit.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that was what he, himself, had said earlier. He had said that the two sides should be seeking to eliminate strategic weapons. So one objective, whether or not the U.S. deployed SDI, would be 50% fewer missiles. But this should only make the two sides more interested in defense, since they would both become more vulnerable to other nuclear states.

GORBACHEV replied that it would be a long time before that was
a problem, since even after a 50% reduction, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. arsenals would still vastly outweigh those of other states.

Responding to a suggestion by Secretary Shultz, THE PRESIDENT suggested a brief discussion of regional issues. These issues, he noted, would greatly influence the long-term character of the two sides' relations and their immediate future as well.

Afghanistan was at the top of the U.S. list. There were more Soviet troops in that country than when the President had entered office. The U.S. and Soviet Union had had extensive discussions about Afghanistan. We understood each others' point of view. The President welcomed Gorbachev's declarations of intent to withdraw. But it was long since time to act on these declarations. This would signal the beginning of a new era in East-West relations and in international affairs generally.

The nature of the conflict meant that a settlement depended mainly on the Soviet Union, the President continued. The U.S. would do its part to help if the Soviet Union actually withdrew. The U.S. and other governments could help assure that Afghanistan did not become a threat to Soviet security. The U.S. was prepared to do its part to ensure the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. It was time, now, here, at the summit, to set dates certain for the starting and ending of the withdrawal of Soviet forces, so that all troops were out by the end of 1988.

The President said he also wanted to address the Iran-Iraq war. The two sides needed to return to the pattern of cooperation which was reflected in their joint support for UNSC Resolution 598. The President was worried that subsequent Soviet policies were a departure from that cooperation, that they encouraged Iranian intransigence and belligerence. The day before, the Iraqi foreign minister had said that Iraq accepted Resolution 598 in all its parts. Iran was still undercutting the process. Now was the time for the President and Gorbachev to lend their weight to the process for the sake of the potential impact on the Iran-Iraq war, and for the sake of the dignity and future status of the Security Council itself. The U.S. and Soviet Union should be moving forward together on a second resolution. But since Iraq was going, along with the UN, a boycott of Iran could help end the war.

Finally, the President mentioned Berlin, which he felt could be the site of positive developments. The President said he felt Gorbachev could and should tear down the Wall that day. But,
in any case, the U.S. and Soviet Union should take smaller, practical steps to ameliorate the division of the city and to symbolize their mutual desire to overcome the division of Europe in a humane and stabilizing way. The U.S. had been working with the British and French on such proposals, and would soon present them to the Soviet Union. The President hoped for a positive response. He also urged that there be an end to shooting incidents involving the two sides military liaison mission activities -- acknowledging that such actions did not take place on Gorbachev's orders:

GORBACHEV noted that his list of priority regional questions coincided perfectly with that of the President. In general terms, he continued, Moscow was convinced that -- whether in Central America, Kampuchea, Afghanistan or the Middle East -- there was increasing support for regional political settlements. This new phase showed up in expanded contacts between opposing groups, in an upturn in political reconciliation, in a search for coalitions. A situation was developing, in short, where U.S. - Soviet cooperation could produce results. Indeed, if the two leaders could express their willingness to work together to resolve some of the issues involved, it could have a major impact.

On Afghanistan, Gorbachev noted, the Cordovez process had produced agreement on instruments regarding non-interference, on guarantees by the U.S., U.S.S.R., Pakistan and -- desirably, at least -- Iran. There was also agreement on the return of refugees; although this was primarily a matter for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could make a contribution. The withdrawal of troops was the only remaining issue.

On that point, Najib had made a proposal -- on which Moscow had been consulted -- that Soviet forces be withdrawn within twelve months, with a provision that this timetable could be reduced. But the start was linked to the process of national reconciliation, specifically with the establishment of a coalition government.

It was up to the Afghans to decide the composition of that government. As for Moscow, it shared the view that Afghanistan should be independent and nonaligned. The Soviets recognized that Afghanistan could not be considered a "socialist" country. There were too many non-socialist characteristics: a multi-party system, tribalism, capitalists and clerical elements. The Soviets were realists. They did not want to try to make Afghanistan socialist.

They could not, of course, be indifferent to the situation
there. There was a 2,000 mile common border. But he could assure the President that the Soviet Union wanted no bases in Afghanistan, nor any presence which would affect the strategic situation in the region. Instead, it wanted to complete the process of withdrawal on the basis of negotiation and national reconciliation.

The Afghan government, Gorbachev said, was taking a realistic approach. It had expressed its willingness to share up to 50% of government portfolios, including that of prime minister, with the opposition. The U.S. and Soviet Union could not make the necessary trade-offs. But if the Soviet side used its influence in Kabul, and the U.S. worked through those with whom it was in contact -- and, Gorbachev noted matter of factly, he knew the President had received opposition leaders -- it might help the two groups become reconciled to one another.

As for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Gorbachev said that two events should coincide: the onset of withdrawals; and the end to "your" transfer of arms and financing of the opposition. From Day One of the withdrawal, Gorbachev volunteered, Soviet forces would engage in no operations except in self-defense. If the President could agree on that, the U.S. and Soviet sides could cooperate to resolve the problem. Moscow had no intention of seeking to leave behind a regime acceptable to itself alone. It would have no problem with a non-aligned and independent government. So perhaps he and the President should reach a "gentleman's agreement" that the Soviets would talk to Najib, and the U.S. to the opposition.

THE PRESIDENT said that the problem with the scenario Gorbachev had described was that one side would be left with the army, while the other would have to give up its arms. The resistance could not be asked to do this. All the Afghan people should have the right to settle matters peaceably. One side should not have a monopoly of force.

GORBACHEV reiterated that an early solution to the Afghan problem was now possible. He suggested that the issue be discussed further by experts. THE PRESIDENT agreed.

On the Iran-Iraq war, GORBACHEV said he saluted U.S. - Soviet cooperation in the adoption of UNSC Resolution 598. Such cooperation was to be valued all the more because it was so rare. The question now was how to move things in the region in the direction of a settlement. The President knew what kind of people "those guys" in Iran were. It was not a simple matter.

The Soviet Union, for its part, had no desire to create
problems for the U.S. in the region. Moscow sought instead a means which would enable the U.S. to move away from its current exposed position without harm to its interests. The Soviets had no interest in seeing things get out of control, or in seeing U.S. economic and other interests in the region suffer. The fact that there was a convergence of U.S. and Soviet interests on this point should help them to find mutually acceptable approaches.

What the Soviets feared, on the other hand, was a situation in which the Iranians felt themselves to be cornered and resorted to extreme measures. The Iranian leadership's ability to inspire their population to remarkable efforts had been proven. The Islamic fundamentalism to which they appealed transcended the Gulf conflict.

The Soviets therefore felt that every effort should be made to exhaust the potential of UNSC 598. If Moscow became convinced that nothing else would work, it would accept a second resolution. But Iran's capacity for rash actions if pushed into a corner had to be kept in mind.

Gorbachev therefore suggested that a "real" force be established on behalf of the UN to implement 598. This would allow the U.S. to reduce its presence without prejudice to its image or interests. The resolutions provision for resort to "impartial bodies" might also have some potential. In conjunction with use of the UN military staff committee it might prove an effective means of dealing with the situation.

In any case, Gorbachev reiterated, Moscow had no desire to undermine American prestige or interests in the region. Rather, it wanted to work with the U.S. to determine if there means which had not been exhausted to ensure full implementation of 598. If all else failed, he repeated, the Soviet Union would support a second resolution. But Gorbachev felt that the first still had untapped potential.

In a final comment on the Gulf, Gorbachev pointed out Iran's proximity to Iran, noting that, were Moscow to press too hard on the war with Iraq, it could complicate the Soviet position in Afghanistan.

SECRETARY SHULTZ said he hoped it would be possible to discuss this issue further later in the afternoon, or at some other point during the General Secretary's visit. GORBACHEV agreed.

Responding to THE PRESIDENT's reminder that the two leaders needed to join their wives, GORBACHEV indicated he had one
additional point to raise. Handing the President a folder, he recounted that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had asked that he convey to the President a personal message on the establishment of a "buffer zone" on the Korean peninsula. Gorbachev said he would not read the four-point proposal, which, he emphasized, Kim had asked be closely held. The initiative had not been shared with all members even of the North Korean leadership.

THE PRESIDENT accepted the folder.

SECRETARY SHULTZ used the opportunity to urge that Gorbachev consider a positive reference in any joint statement to the Olympic movement.

GORBACHEV replied that Moscow wanted the Olympic games to take place, but urged that some events be held in the North. The International Olympic Committee was working on the issue. It should not become a political question.
Wednesday, December 9 [1987]

Had a half hour to review points for today’s meeting. Then briefing for meeting. At 10:30 went out to the drive to meet Gorby – (I should say Mikhail). We held still in the Oval O. for 5 waves of press & photos. Then I took him into my study. We had a brief talk then joined our teams in the Oval O. for a 2 hr. meeting. I led off on the 50% cut in ICBM’s – George S. & Frank C. added some remarks. Then the Gen. Sec. responded. We seem to be doing well on the 50% deal but then he brought up SDI and while he didn’t link it to the treaty he still made an issue of it and suggested a 10 year abiding by ABM Treaty & then we should negotiate on whether we could deploy. Things got a little heated. We switched to regional problems – Afghanistan. I asked for a date certain for their leaving Afghanistan. He said he’d leave when we stopped helping the Mujahdeen. I pointed out that we couldn’t do that unless the puppet government laid down their weapons. Well we agreed to put our teams to work on 50% deal & time was up. I took him over to the Dip. Room to meet Raisa who was with Nancy. They took off for lunch at State. Dept. I went back to Office for lunch.

After lunch a briefing for interview with 4 columnists. Interview went pretty well. Some desk time then meeting with several Repub. Sen’s re the Budget plan & INF. I let them know if some of the games re the plan went through I’d veto. We want the plan we agreed to. Phil Gramm was bright spot – he came out for the 1st time in support of INF.

Then it was home to clean up & go to Soviet Embassy for dinner. A very pleasant evening but dinner was pretty much the entire evening. I lost count of how many courses but they just kept coming. Brief entertainment after dessert – a Soprano from the Bolshoi Opera – Moscow, then home.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Gorbachev,
        December 10 Noon

TIME & PLACE: December 10, 1987, 12:00 m. - 12:15 p.m.,
             The Oval Office, The White House

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.                  USSR

Ronald W. Reagan, President
of the United States
George Bush, Vice President
Howard H. Baker, Chief of
Staff
George P. Shultz, Secretary
of State
Frank Carlucci, Secretary
of Defense
Fritz Ermarth, Special
Assistant to the President,
NSC Staff (notetaker)
Thomas W. Simons, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State (EUR)(notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)
Others

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General
Secretary, CPSU CC
Eduard A. Shevardnadze,
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, CPSU
CC Secretary
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, CPSU
CC Secretary
Sergei Tarasenko, Special
Assistant to Shevardnadze
(notetaker)
P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)
Others

After initial pleasantries, the President opened by saying
that he'd had a chance to review the joint statement. He
understood that working delegations were now focused on the
START and Defense and Space portions of the statement, and
suggested that we get a report.

Gorbachev said that meetings were now in progress between
Marchal Akhromeyev and Mr. Nitze. While they were working, he
proposed that he and the President could have some further
discussions of regional issues, and the President agreed.

Gorbachev asked to say a few words because he had the impression that the U.S. side had not appreciated fully what he had said on regional conflicts the day before. He had sought to emphasize two or three important concepts. First, that regional conflicts are very worrisome in that they inject tension into U.S.-Soviet relations. It was necessary to find some method or arrangement, some means of acting to permit an interaction between the two countries in the interest of themselves and the parties to conflict. The two sides had to discuss an approach to cooperation.

Gorbachev continued that this caused tension in our relations. We had to find a method of action that would make it possible to take into account the interests of the parties to regional conflicts, as well, of course, as our own interests.

Second, Gorbachev went on, we needed to take account of the trends that have emerged, toward reconciliation among conflicting sides, toward a political settlement of problems. Regional organizations were involved too. A situation had emerged that presents a chance, if we move in a businesslike spirit, for us to play a constructive role.

Take Central America, for instance, Gorbachev said. The Guatemala agreement had been adopted. We could express a positive response to it. For example we could say both sides would not supply arms there except for small arms. This was just an idea. What was important was a positive statement.

On Cambodia, Gorbachev went on, contacts had begun between Sihanouk and the people in power. They had talked. Other forces should of course be brought in. Vietnam had given the Soviets assurances that they will withdraw. The principle of U.S. and Soviet support for a political settlement there was important. In Angola too there were good opportunities to move forward to resolve the conflict politically.

The Middle East was of course a grave conflict, Gorbachev said. It had deep roots. But the whole world believed that an international conference to solve it was necessary. He understand there were doubts about this in the U.S. But what the Soviet Union supported was not inconsistent with what the U.S. supported. There could be bilateral contacts in that framework. Israel could meet with the Arabs, with whomever it wanted. But mention of a positive response would be good for the world. The world was looking for the U.S. and the Soviet
Union to cooperate in a businesslike way.

The day before, Gorbachev went on, they had concentrated on Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, because these were particularly acute conflicts. But with regard to Afghanistan he had felt there was no interest on the President's part. But if, without any publicity, there was an interest in resolving the problem, the Soviets could withdraw their troops and the U.S. side could stop its assistance to certain forces. If there were agreement to that, the two sides could say that as of a date certain the U.S. would stop its assistance, and the Soviet side could say that its troops would not participate in any military operations. They should let Afghanistan be neutral.

There was a basis for cooperation on Afghanistan, Gorbachev went on. But the U.S. side's attitude seemed to be: you're there, you should extricate yourselves, it's your problem. Naturally, if that were the American attitude, it would be harder for the Soviet Union to extricate itself. The two sides should do better than that.

Gorbachev noted that he accepted the language on regional issues in the joint statement. But what he wanted was practical solutions to the issues.

On the Iran-Iraq war, Gorbachev went on, he could say honestly, with no hidden intent at all, looking the President in the eyes, that the Soviet Union did not want to create problems for America. It wanted neither economic problems nor solutions which created (tragic) drama for the Administration. American forces were involved. He felt, Gorbachev said, that there was a basis for regional cooperation between the two sides in this area.

He had had a short one-on-one discussion with the Vice President on this, Gorbachev continued. The Vice President had expressed doubt that Gorbachev or the President could entrust their security interests to UN forces. He could say, Gorbachev went on, that the two sides should make those forces deserve trust. This was inherent in the first resolution. Movement could be made. But if the question arose as to a real need to cease the supply of arms, the Soviet Union would support this.

Gorbachev urged the U.S. side to think about these things. It had experienced what kind of people the Iranians were. A precise calculus of what would happen was needed. If they were pushed too hard, there would be an explosion, and then the only
thing left to do would be for the U.S. to use the forces it had there. This would push the Iranians further, and doing it could be dangerous not only in the region itself. The Soviet side knew these people. It was not saying it did not want to cooperate with the U.S., with other forces involved. Iran was close to the Soviet Union; it was important to them.

The President said he thought his reply should come when they resumed (for lunch) at the White House. He just wanted to say one thing. It concerned Nicaragua; it also concerned Afghanistan. The Afghanistan government had its own military forces. If the Soviet Union departed that would be fine. But there were the mujahadin, who wanted a voice in their own government. If it were denied them, if they were disarmed, they would be at the mercy of the Afghan government. That would not permit equal participation in forming a new government. If both sides were to come together to form one, both would have to be armed. Or one would have to disband the Afghan military for them to be equal.

Similarly in Nicaragua, the President went on, the U.S. side was for a peaceful settlement. We simply wanted the Nicaraguan government to recognize other citizens who did not agree with it. But it was never willing to do that, even though the Contras were prepared to lay down their arms. The Sandinista government just wanted to take over. Soviet supplies made it the most powerful military force in the area, not only against the freedom fighters, but more powerful than Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala put together. This frightened all in the region and put them at risk.

Gorbachev suggested they continue at the White House.

Drafted: EUR: TWSimons, Jr.
12/10/87 x71126 (0133A)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Working Luncheon with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (U)

PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Shultz
Secretary of Defense Carlucci
Chief of Staff Baker
Director Wick, United States Information Agency
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ridgeway
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State (Notetaker)
John Herbst, Director, Office for Policy Development, NSC (Notetaker)

General Secretary Gorbachev
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary for Ideology, Propaganda, and Culture
Anatoly Dobrynin, Central Committee Secretary and Chief, International Department
Chairman Kamentsev, Foreign Economic Commission
Central Committee General Department Chief Boldin
Chief Administrator of the Central Committee Kruchina
Ambassador Dubinin (U)

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: December 10, 1987, 12:40 PM - 2:10 PM
Family Dining Room (U)

While walking from the Oval Office meeting, which ended at 12:15 p.m., to the Family Dining Room, the President emphasized to Gorbachev the necessity of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The President noted that the occupation was possible due to the Soviets' extensive support and urged them to use their influence with Hanoi. Lunch began at 12:40. (S)

Gorbachev began by continuing the discussion of Afghanistan from the recently concluded Oval Office meeting. He suggested that the Joint Statement adopt the language on Afghanistan prepared by...
the working-group. That was enough. He suggested that the Soviets and Americans work together on Afghanistan. He said that he had decided to address this particular issue because he felt the President had responded coolly to yesterday's discussion. Now he felt the President was receptive, and business-like; and this opened up possibilities of a more useful discussion.

Gorbachev said that maybe the Joint Statement should mention that there had been a discussion of very acute regional problems, an in-depth discussion, regarding Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia. The first thing many people worldwide would want to know was whether the President and the General Secretary had paid attention to regional issues. Gorbachev stated that he would really like to work together with the President to resolve regional conflicts.

The President said that perhaps for the Joint Statement we could note agreement that the Soviet Union would stop supplying arms to Nicaragua.

Gorbachev responded that the Joint Statement could say that the two sides accepted and supported the Contadora process and the Guatemala accords; that they agreed to look at practical measures which would contribute to the Guatemala Accord process. Gorbachev added that in the process of working together, the Soviet Union was ready to stop the supply of arms to Nicaragua. This applied to all except "light arms," or "small police arms." Gorbachev said, however, that this should not be included in the Joint Statement.

Secretary Shultz noted that the President was anxious to get regional issues on the table. So the President had put in toward the end of their conversation earlier in the day to make sure that they were mentioned. Secretary Shultz said that on the basis of general observations by the President and the General Secretary, the working groups had the opportunity to exchange ideas. Shultz said that these groups had reported to the Foreign Minister and himself yesterday; and, after that, he and Shevardnadze had agreed on the regional issues language for the Joint Statement.

Shultz remarked that he and Shevardnadze thought it not wise to go into detail on each regional issue. Were we to do this, we would argue over the language and people in the areas affected would not take it well. Shultz added that we should build on the rising quality of our regional issues discussions to work together in practical ways.

Gorbachev noted his agreement and said that there was not much in the Joint Statement concerning regional issues. He expressed the wish to share his impressions regarding the American response to his proposals yesterday.
Shultz then said he felt the working group had made progress in clarifying the Soviet view that withdrawal from Afghanistan and national reconciliation need not be linked. This was necessary because national reconciliation would take a great deal of time. Also, in the end, this was something the Afghan people must do among themselves. Understanding this delinkage would help pave the way for the next Geneva round, which should concentrate on the unresolved issue of Soviet withdrawal.

Gorbachev responded that Soviet withdrawal was definitely linked to an American obligation to cut off support for opposition forces on the date Soviet troop withdrawal started. As of that date, Soviet troops would no longer engage in military operations and the ceasefire would go into effect. Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the American and Soviet sides' using their influence with the parties to the Afghan conflict to promote national reconciliation. He said that the Soviet side would tell Najib--and the American side should do the same with the opposition forces--that the creation of a coalition government was their affair. They should find a balance of concessions.

At the same time, Gorbachev continued, both the Americans and Soviets should say that they did not want the new Afghanistan to be led by either a pro-American or a pro-Soviet government. Afghanistan should be neutral and nonaligned. Of course, Gorbachev added, this was just his projection of how things would develop. Gorbachev noted that the situation could develop differently. The Soviets would withdraw and the United States could continue financial and military support for the opposition forces. This would lead to increased tension. Gorbachev said that he did not see how the Soviets could withdraw forces in such circumstances. There must be linkage of withdrawal and non-interference.

Gorbachev suggested that after the meeting the two sides move the questions to a practical footing. He said that this would be well-received by public opinion.

Secretary Shultz said that as he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed following the meeting of the working group yesterday, the Soviet side welcomed American readiness to reaffirm support for the Geneva agreements. This resolved the non-interference issue. The missing piece in Geneva remained the timetable for a troop withdrawal.

Gorbachev interjected "that there must be an end to American support for the opposition forces at the same time. If there was agreement on this, Gorbachev said, let us declare it. If the American side needed more time to think this over, it should take it. But the Soviet side wanted to engage in specific action. Gorbachev added that action here would demonstrate American sincerity in addressing the Afghan problem. It would also help the Soviets judge American intentions regarding other regional conflict situations."
Secretary Shultz responded that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the Geneva agreements. These agreements covered the issue of outside support. According to the agreements, after the signing of the accords, a troop withdrawal would begin; and 60 days after this, American support would cease. (S)

Gorbachev rejoined that he understood three points in the Geneva agreements were settled. The fourth point remained to be settled. (S)

Shultz noted that the linkage of national reconciliation and troop withdrawal had been a problem, but now Soviet statements indicated that there was no such linkage, and the American reaffirmation of support for the Geneva accords meant that we could devote our attention to the fourth point, a timetable for troop withdrawal. This could get the process moving. (S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze remarked that there was no linkage "in effect" between troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. He added that national reconciliation would be a long process. (S)

Gorbachev said that the Soviet side had already confirmed this. He then asked if we could state that after the Summit we would begin work to consider practical, concrete measures with the parties concerned. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed. (S)

Gorbachev then proposed that the Joint Statement on regional issues mention that Afghanistan was discussed. (S)

When Secretary Shultz noted that Afghanistan was already in the statement, Gorbachev suggested that it mention other regions discussed, such as Cambodia, South Africa, and the Middle East. (C)

Shultz noted that most of these were included. (C)

Shevardnadze remarked that Central America had been discussed and was not in the Joint Statement. So it should be added, as should southern Africa. (C)

Gorbachev said that this would show the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union—the degree of responsibility incumbent on us in handling regional conflicts. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that the Joint Statement noted the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States should have as its goal "to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security." Shultz added that our discussion on regional issues had been getting better and better. (C)
Central Committee International Department Chief Dobrynin suggested that the President and the General Secretary give instructions to improve this language even more, perhaps by adding regular consultations. (3)

Noting the hectic pace of the past three days, Gorbachev asked the President if he had been able to look at the proposal Gorbachev had passed along from North Korea. (3)

National Security Advisor Powell answered that the proposal was currently being staffed; so there was no response yet. (3)

Gorbachev said that he could tell the North Koreans that he had fulfilled their request by giving the President their proposal, and that it was now being reviewed at the staff level. (3)

Powell noted that we would handle the proposal in a private manner as Gorbachev had suggested. Gorbachev remarked that the North Koreans wanted it that way. And the President, by immediately placing it in his coat pocket, showed that he too wanted to play it close to the vest. (3)

Shultz then said that the United States might propose to respond to the North Koreans through Moscow—perhaps through Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. (3)

Gorbachev agreed. He then asked for the Administration's evaluation of the Gulf situation following yesterday's discussion. Gorbachev said that he was asking this in a straight-forward way, since it seemed that someone was pushing the Administration to rash steps without considering what might happen. This could lead to a situation that would not be satisfactory either for the Americans or the Soviets. Gorbachev thought that the UN had not used all of the potential of Security Council Resolution 598. Gorbachev said that he was not trying to procrastinate. He knew that decisive action was needed. In an aside Gorbachev then noted it had been decided yesterday that some aspects of the conversation should be handled in a confidential manner. (6)

Secretary Shultz said that he saw the situation as follows: the Iraqi side had unambiguously said it would accept 598. Iran was almost impossible for UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to talk to, never mind to get something out of. According to our intelligence, Iran had adopted a strategy of putting off the Security Council. (5)

Gorbachev agreed that Iran probably had such strategy; it would be hard to say anything else. (6)

Shultz then said that UN Secretary General de Cuellar was totally frustrated. De Cuellar felt it was now up to the Security Council to act. Shultz said that this led us to conclude that the Soviet term as Chairman of the Security Council should be a
decisive one. Shultz suggested that the Soviets and the Americans work to energize the Secretary General in his mediation role pursuant to resolution 598. Shultz noted that we could aid the UN Secretary General's effort if we seriously started work on a second resolution. Shultz said that it would be useful to announce work now. This could be done by our Ambassadors at the UN. We could agree to instruct them to start. Shultz gave two reasons for this. The first was that this represented our best chance to have the UN Secretary General achieve progress on the Iran-Iraq War. Secondly, we must worry about the dignity and credibility of the Security Council, and not allow Iran to make it look foolish. (3)

In Gorbachev's view the American and Soviet sides thought basically the same about this. Gorbachev requested that the two sides make precise calculations regarding prospects in the Gulf. He said that he would very much like cooperation in the Security Council. He added that this could create a precedent for cooperation elsewhere--Afghanistan, the Middle East. (5)

Secretary Shultz agreed regarding the importance of cooperation. He remarked on his presence in the Security Council chamber when Resolution 598 was passed last July. He said that each government went around the table and spoke, and then voted. All hands were raised. All had the sense that it was a very special moment. (5)

Gorbachev said that he saw new elements on the Gulf war. These had to be sorted out. Gorbachev noted in this connection the new statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister--that Iraq was no longer against parallel implementation of all paragraphs of Resolution 598 (including that of an investigative body into the origins of the war). In Gorbachev's view, this represented fundamental movement. (6)

Secretary Shultz noted that Iraq accepted 598 in all its parts; (6)

Shevardnadze remarked that Iran said the same. (6)

Secretary of Defense Carlucci discussed the American military presence in the Gulf, noting that Gorbachev had raised it several times. Carlucci said that it was important to say here that the U.S. had no plans to change its current posture in the Gulf. We were currently escorting our 20th convoy, and most of these convoys had proceeded without incident. (6)

Gorbachev then asked if it was necessary to have that many ships in a convoy operation. (6)

Carlucci answered that we had now reached a steady state; so we were looking at ways to change the mix and the number of ships which would still enable us to deal with the risks. He said he was sure Gorbachev would agree that so long as American forces were in the Gulf, they must be able to defend themselves if attacked. Carlucci then noted that American forces were in a
fully defensive posture; they represented no threat to Iran at all. If, however, our forces were attacked, or if it appeared that they would be attacked, they would take the appropriate defensive measures. But there would be no offensive operations, except in retaliation.

Gorbachev said that he wanted to be clear on this. As he understood it, Secretary Carlucci had said that, since the situation was now "steady," the Americans were looking at ways to reduce their presence in the Gulf.

Carlucci responded that he did not want to predict that there would be reductions. But we were looking at ways to meet the threat in the Gulf. If it seemed possible to reduce, we would do so because we did not wish to deploy more ships than the situation warranted; everything depended on the level of threat.

Gorbachev then noted, with pleasure, that dessert was served, and dessert was the favorite course of the meal for Americans. Gorbachev joked that last night the President and he had no choice but to eat all of their dessert. They decided to do so and then engage in self-criticism.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev then remarked that he feared contacts between the Soviet and the American military had become more vigorous than his own with the Administration. According to Gorbachev, Marshall Akhromeyev had said that in his conversations at the Pentagon, it had been agreed to expand military contacts to keep pace with political ones. Gorbachev affirmed the importance of this suggestion. He said that this was consistent with the statement of the President that the Soviets and the Americans had no intention to fight—or be at war with—each other. So the military should try to establish an atmosphere of trust.

Secretary of Defense Carlucci noted that the Soviets and the Americans should talk with each other regarding defense doctrines such as military sufficiency.

The President then said that this discussion of military cooperation came at a perfect time. Chief of Staff Baker had just brought him a poster of a meeting on the Elbe between a Soviet and an American soldier at the end of World War II. The President said that the American soldier was now retired from the military and the Soviet soldier was part of the Summit delegation. The President said it would be wonderful if the two could meet.

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin interjected that the Soviet and American soldiers had met three days ago at the Soviet Embassy and now there was a second picture of them together.
The President said that we would have to get that picture to go along with this poster. (U)

When Chief of Staff Baker said it would be wonderful if the President and the General Secretary would sign the poster, both the President and the General Secretary agreed. (U)

USIA Director Wick said that he had met at USIA with Politburo member Yakovlev and the heads of TASS, Novosti, and Gostelradio. All had agreed and affirmed that there would be not only arms reduction, but also an end to disinformation. There was agreement to have joint meetings to determine where instances of such disinformation appeared. (C)

Gorbachev said that, in other words, both sides spoke against psychological warfare. (C)

Only with verification, Wick answered. (C)

Shevardnadze joked that disarmament would come faster than agreement on this. (C)

The President then remarked that Director Wick should have said "doveryai and proveryai." (U)

Gorbachev then referred to his meeting with Congressional leaders. He noted that in the United States, there were many complaints and suggestions regarding Soviet human rights practices. Gorbachev said that this was "very unnecessary." He then mentioned a proposal he had made to the Congressional group: that the Supreme Soviet and the Congress organize seminars or colloquia on human rights. These should be conducted in a constructive fashion. The American side would present its analysis and the Soviet side would reciprocate concerning the human rights situation both in the Soviet Union and the United States. Then all of these questions would be discussed. However, human rights questions must be placed on a responsible footing. It would be unacceptable for one side to assume the role of a prosecutor and the other side that of the accused; or one side the role of the teacher and the other that of the student. Gorbachev emphasized Soviet readiness to discuss human rights constructively. (C)

Gorbachev said that soon he would be saying goodbye to the President and the President's colleagues. Gorbachev said he had arrived at the conclusion that the third summit had been a landmark. It had witnessed important agreements and other questions had been discussed intensively. Most importantly the atmosphere had been good. There had been more elements of mutual understanding. Gorbachev said that he would like to pay tribute to the contribution of the President toward making this a successful summit, as well as to the contributions of other American participants. Gorbachev added that he would like the momentum achieved at the summit to continue. He then said that
on his way to the White House lunch he had ridden with Vice
President Bush. He had looked out the car window and seen
Americans responding warmly to what had happened in the
negotiations. When the car had stopped at a red light, he jumped
out of the car and had had a spontaneous conversation with some
passersby. When it was time to go, he did not want to leave the
conversation. (c)

Chief of Staff Senator Baker interjected that this was known by
American politicians as "working the crowd." (c)

Gorbachev remarked that he had always had this style—throughout
his entire career. He said that he had become well known around
the world over the past two years because of his position.
Before that, however, he had spent his entire career in the
provinces. He had developed this style then and there was
nothing to change. He then commented that there was more common
sense in the provinces than in a nation's capital. He quipped
that if our ambassadors reported information based only on
sources in the capital, he would have to seriously question their
reporting. (c)

The President responded that he agreed more completely with this
than with anything else the General Secretary had said over the
past three days. The President said that he often wondered what
would happen if he and other leaders closed the doors of their
offices and quietly slipped away. How long would it be before
people missed them? (c)

Gorbachev responded that in his case, within 56 days of his
"disappearance" earlier this year, people had begun to say that
he was dead or had been dismissed; in fact, he had done good work
during this period on many things, including the visit to the
United States. (c)

Chief of Staff Baker said that the conversations between the
President and Gorbachev had given him the impression that, as
politicians, they were alike in many ways:

- They were strong personalities;
- They knew what they believed;
- They knew where they wanted to go.

Baker added that this augured well for our two countries. (c)

Gorbachev agreed. He said that he did not often hear such
complimentary assessments. Most people tried to see the
problems, but that was Yakovlev's and Wick's department. (c)

The President agreed with Gorbachev, joking that he could never
understand why Gorbachev opposed him on so many things. (c)

Gorbachev rejoined that the areas of agreement would increase
and disagreements decrease, provided both sides moved. (c)
The President said he would like to return to the subject of Iran. He commented that some of his harsh feelings toward Iran had come from the fact that in 1978 he and the First Lady had visited there for several days. They had shopped for rugs in the bazaar. The President said that he was still trying to get even. (8)

Noting that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had left the lunch to compare the final draft of the Joint Statement, Chief of Staff Baker said he would go and see if it was ready. (C)

The President remarked that he and the General Secretary had the right to feel good about the summit. When they had first met in Geneva, the President had told Gorbachev that theirs was a unique situation. They represented two countries that could initiate another world war. Or, they could make sure that there would not be another world war. (C)

Gorbachev remembered this and agreed with the President. (C)

The President noted too that both he and Gorbachev had problems with bureaucracy. (C)

Gorbachev also agreed. (C)

The President then remembered a World War II incident when he was in the military. There was a warehouse full of filing cabinets full of obsolete records. He had asked, going up the chain of command, for permission to destroy these documents in order to make space for current records. The answer came down through the chain of command that the request was approved—so long as copies were made of the records to be destroyed. (C)

Gorbachev said that the President's anecdote reminded him of a joke about Russian business. Someone bought a case of Russian vodka; that person emptied the bottles by pouring out the vodka. He then returned the bottles for money which he used to purchase more bottles of vodka. This was Russian business. He then noted that this was an old joke, 30 maybe 40 years old. (C)

The President recalled the joke of a man who was driving down the road and spotted a chicken running alongside his car. The man sped up, yet the chicken ran right alongside of him. Then the chicken went into high gear, passed the car, and turned off on the side road. The driver of the car followed down that side road, saw a farmer and stopped to ask him if he had seen a chicken pass by. The farmer said he had seen the chicken and, in fact, had raised it. The driver asked if it was true the chicken had three legs. The farmer said yes, explaining that both he and his wife liked to eat chicken legs. Then they had a son, who also liked to eat chicken legs. So the farmer had decided to raise a chicken with three legs. The driver then asked how the chicken tasted. The farmer told him that he did not know; he had never been able to catch it. (C)
Gorbachev then mentioned the Russian writers Ilf and Petrov. They wrote humorous, satirical novels. They left as a heritage notebooks consisting of thoughts and ideas for writing future books. Gorbachev said he particularly liked one idea in these notebooks. A man was accused of driving a government-owned car to a public bath. To defend himself, the man said that he had not been to the bath for two years. Gorbachev said that the same could be true of our governments. We would not want to be in the position of defending ourselves by saying that we have done nothing - when we should have acted.

On this note, the luncheon ended, at 2:10.
Politburo Session
December 17, 1987

Gorbachev, *On the outcomes of the visit to Washington*. This is bigger than Geneva or Reykjavik, with full understanding of their importance and the fact that without them Washington would not have happened. It is an even more significant sign that the course we have set is being realized. We are once again convinced that the best line is the principled and constructive one. And the main lesson we learned from this is a lesson for the future.

Much less apparent in Washington was the manner Reagan used with us in the beginning—making accusations, putting forth claims, blaming us for the crises of the modern world, and presenting himself as all good and right, in a word: [Reagan appeared] in the role of either a prosecutor or a teacher. But by the first conversation we had already agreed on this matter, even though there was a moment of a certain sharpness. I told him: “You are not a prosecutor and I am not a defendant. You are not a teacher and I am not a pupil. And vice versa. Otherwise we will not be able to do anything.”

This was an important moment in establishing mutual understanding with the American leadership. It was probably even a key moment in finding a common language: speaking as equals and seriously, each keeping his ideology to himself. Of course this time we also had a response to the usual human rights claims that by now set our teeth on edge. But we did not succumb to that temptation. This approach justified itself when the talks entered the level of concrete discussion of specific problems: the discussion was realistic without any kind of euphoria, without illusions, with a readiness for reasonable compromises and mutual constructiveness.

The central moment of the visit was the INF Treaty. We had total understanding—and we arrived with this, having the full support of the Politburo—that everything would depend on the outcome of this question: the entire development of Soviet-American relations and the normalization of the international situation in general.

Therefore it was very important not to give up in the face of military-technical difficulties, which were by no means minor. The fact that we overcame them was in large part due to our strong policy determination to cross this barrier, to achieve the Treaty. As for untying the truly difficult military-technical knots, I must say our colleagues were at their best, and I want to acknowledge the experienced work of Marshal Akhromeev and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh.

The experience of the last two years, as we began to act in the spirit of new thinking, showed that we need practical results, we need a real-life test for the ideas we proposed and that we wanted to introduce into international political practice. The world was waiting for it and demanding it. The people’s trust in our new foreign policy depended on it. we wanted and strove to test these ideas in real life. And the problem of the INF Treaty was just the deciding factor in this.

It was a trial for us. But it was also a trial of our partners, the Americans; a trial of the earnestness of their approach to the key issue of today’s world. It was a practical test of the
statements they have made at the highest-level conferences, saying that nuclear war is unacceptable, that the U.S. is striving for disarmament, and that they want normal international relations.

Progress in this direction also opened the way for other areas of disarmament, namely nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. It created the background for similar businesslike approaches to regional problems and bilateral relations.

The meeting in Washington was also an important test of another fundamental idea of new thinking—that its success and effectiveness depend on the state of affairs at home, and on perestroika.

This is not only a question of objectively tying the two processes together, and not only our sincere binding of the two, without any ulterior motives, in our conception, in our policies, and in the development of our theories. It is also a question of the world’s perception and understanding of this connection. And even though it would seem that this is the moral side of the issue, it has also had enormous practical meaning.

In Washington we saw for the first time with our own eyes what great interest exists in everything that is happening here, in our perestroika. And the goodwill, even enthusiasm to a degree, with which prim Washington received us, was an indicator of the changes that have started taking place in the West. These changes evidence the beginning of the crumbling “image of the enemy,” and the beginning of the destruction of the “Soviet military threat” myth. That was momentous to us. And it was noticed throughout the world.

A visit is an official action. We went there for talks with the President and representatives of his administration. But we also met with America, with all kinds of America—the youth, intellectuals, artists, the press, business circles and even the official elite, the ones who serve the administration.

And another very important aspect of the visit was truly getting to know a world which is in essence different. You mutually recognize this world through common logic, which is dictated by the growing degree of integration and interdependency of the world.

Major American figures wanted to meet with us. There was even some bias in the newspapers, saying that Gorbachev did not come here only to talk with the President, he came to influence all of America, including the people who ultimately determine its economy and politics.

We also noted that our partners did not want to give anything specific to the press on the progress of the one-on-one talks with the President and the delegations. We were prepared to do this. Thus, we were clearly winning in the question of glasnost. This emphasized the sincerity and honesty of our position and the fact that we came to really get things done, to deal with political policy, not play the games of the past.
In our contacts with the different kinds of America we saw that our perestroika has even reached American society, which has been driven to the limit with anti-Sovietism. People were not troubled by the fact that we might be behind in some aspects, such as the economy. They were interested in the fact that our society has moved forward, that it is finding a new movement and is inspired to change democratically. As a matter of fact, this interested everybody, most of all during our contacts with the people.

We felt, perhaps for the first time, in Washington that the human factor is also [important] in world politics. Until then we had gone by a rather hackneyed formula: foreign policy is about personal contacts between leaders of countries, leaders of governments and in general exchanges at the level of those who make politics.

This is understood. But even with this idea we meant that even the personal contacts still took place between representatives of radically different and irreconcilable systems, and the people were only “representatives.” We saw Reagan only as the embodiment of the most conservative part of American capitalism and the masters of the military-industrial complex. But it turned out that at the same time the politicians, including the leading heads of state, if they are truly responsible people, also represent the purely human qualities, interests, and hopes of the common people—particularly of those people who vote for them in elections and who associate the country’s dignity and their patriotism with the politician’s name and personal qualities. At the same time, they can be guided by the most normal human motives and feelings. And it turns out that in our day all of this has enormous significance for making political decisions.

We were prepared and ourselves even strove to understand this aspect of relations with the American leadership, and with the leadership of other countries as well. In other words, we wanted to include the purely human factor into international political policy. This is an important aspect of the new thinking. And it has produced results. It seems in Washington we felt it distinctly for the first time.

The visit to Washington had another aspect as well—the European aspect. Undoubtedly, everybody expected results; undoubtedly, all serious politicians understood that all further development of world events would depend on the progress of Soviet-American relations.

At the same time there was another level of thinking—the bloc and national-ego thinking, which was superimposed with the ingrained ideas of a bipolar world and the idea that the decisive role belongs to the superpowers and they can do a great deal behind the backs of other states, against the interests of other states and at the expense of international politics. This came through especially, if you remember, in Reykjavik. There was a similar suspicion in the international atmosphere during our visit to Washington.

However, we were certain that the logic of disarmament would dispel these fears and suspicions. This would be especially relevant for Europe, since we were primarily dealing with European nuclear weapons.

Also, I wanted to let the American know that we will not pull back from the path to democratization. Of course, we also have to carefully mind its socialist nature. The people will
protect this aspect of the matter. Sometimes this protection is even reminiscent of conservatism, as if to say: we live modestly, but securely. The people value this.

But I have to say that some of our people are afraid of democracy. This fear is caused by the fact that working personnel do not want to change their work methods. Here is a story: in Yaroslavl’ the workers of one factory—27,000 people—spoke against management’s independent decision. The comrades in the administration and in the party committee called headquarters, saying: be prepared, there might be a riot. That is what we do instead of talking with people. As it is, when they spoke with the people everything was settled and the arguments were understood, and the people agreed with management’s decision. We are used to calling the firing squad as soon as anything happens!

We invite the people to participate in leading the government, we encourage them to act, to practice self-management, but the bosses won’t let them. That’s their democracy for you! In general we are developing this kind of a situation: some people are “renovationists,” ardent followers of perestroika who are trying to get something done, who bruise themselves with mistakes but learn from them. Then there are the others, who are “always right,” who sit and wait for the others to break their necks. In the Politburo we need to see all of this.

The Party is awakening to the new work. But this is happening slowly. We even see such things as engineers and specialists joining the apparatus of the Ministries and building a wall against the demands of the working class, against its striving for something new.

Comrades, we are in the middle of a real revolution! We should not be afraid of a revolutionary frenzy. Otherwise we will not achieve anything. There will be losses and retreats, but we will only be victorious on the tracks of revolution. Yet we still have not tuned ourselves over to revolutionary work methods. We are still quite the revolutionaries! We are all afraid of something.

We should not be afraid. And it suits us to appear to the whole world as people who are ready to go to the very limit in our revolutionary perestroika.

Some people speak of a convergence (Galbraith, for example), others speak of Gorbachev’s unpredictability. They write about his surprises. The Washington Post published an article titled “The Two Gorbachevs.” It is difficult for them to unite our striving for peace, collaboration, and good-neighborly relations with the socialist nature of perestroika. We ourselves have not quite mastered these dialectics.

So we should not be surprised that they cannot make ends meet and keep searching for some kind of dirty trick from Gorbachev, some kind of change in the Kremlin, which, it turns out, planned perestroika in its entirety only to trick the West and lull them out of their vigilance.

[Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow
Translated by Anna Melyakova for the National Security Archive.]
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 292

ORGANIZING FOR THE INF RATIFICATION EFFORT

To prepare for the upcoming Senate consideration of the INF Treaty and to manage and coordinate our efforts in support of the Treaty, this directive establishes an organizational mechanism for coordinating all activities of the Executive Branch.

Ratification Hearings Preparation

Under the direction of my Chief of Staff and my Assistant for National Security Affairs, the INF Ratification Strategy and Coordinating Group (SCG), co-chaired by Assistant to the President for Operations Rhett B. Dawson and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs John D. Negroponte, will coordinate the entire range of efforts required for obtaining in a timely manner the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the INF Treaty. The SCG will include senior representatives from the Executive Office of the President and from other Executive departments and agencies as appropriate. The Office of White House Operations will serve as the Executive Directorate of the SCG.

The Legislative Strategy Group, established by memorandum from former National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci, will continue to meet under the chairmanship of Will Ball, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. A.B. Culvahouse, Counsel to the President, will chair a Legal Task Force to address legal questions arising in connection with Senate consideration of the Treaty. Finally, the National Security Council Arms Control Directorate, under Special Assistant to the President Robert E. Linhard, will provide support to the SCG as necessary drawing upon existing interagency arms control groups.
Executive departments and agencies are requested to submit to the National Security Advisor on a timely basis for advance clearance all testimony, briefings, reports, senior-level public remarks, publications and diplomatic actions that could have a bearing on the INF ratification process. Such requests for clearance should be submitted by Executive Secretaries and should be fully coordinated in advance with other concerned departments and agencies.