As the situation in and between the Republic of Sudan (North) and the new nation of South Sudan deteriorates, I thought it timely to call again on the expertise within the ranks of the Africa Program’s Sudan Working Group to shed some light on developments. Therefore, two foremost experts, who are also the co-chairs of our working group – Ambassador Alan Goulty, former UK Ambassador to Sudan and Special Envoy to Darfur, and Ambassador Nureldin Satti, a senior Sudanese diplomat and former United Nations’ Special Representative of the Secretary General – have agreed to pull together these recent updates. They are written specifically from the views of the North and South. Ambassador Satti is currently living in Khartoum, and is well placed to follow events there closely. Ambassador Goulty, while now a resident in Washington, DC, travels frequently to South Sudan.
While the papers give a valuable update on current events, including the ongoing conflicts in Abyei, South Kordofan, and the Nuba Mountains, the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), North and South conflicts on oil revenue, and internal political rivalry and governance issues, they also examine the mindsets, beliefs, and biases of the leadership of both sides that have led to the current situation. Unique insights are given into the psyche of both entities, including an examination of the differences between a divided National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan and the Islamist movements prominent in the “Arab Spring” events over the last year in their Arab neighbors. The international community comes under intense scrutiny for the omissions it committed in not pushing both sides to honor the CPA provision that unity be seen as an attractive option to secession by Southerners and for its own biases in how it dealt with North and South, including its tendency to be prescriptive and not involve Sudanese in the solution to their problems.

This is, as they say, a “must read” for those trying to follow the intricate, almost unfathomable nuances of this decades old struggle. Needless to say, the future is impossible to predict, but without renewed commitment by the international community and a recognition of the need to work closely with Sudanese leaders, both government and non-state actors, to resolve key issues, the end result may well be a general collapse of governance and renewed warfare on a scale not seen before. In fact, that is the trend already underway, as open conflicts on the borders rage, internal divisions deepen in both countries, and the peace dividend of the CPA disappears in the inefficiency, corruption, and disarray of bad governance. Sudan and South Sudan are on the cusp of a slide into chaos – almost like its neighbors in Somalia – that could open the door to radical Islamists and plunge its long-suffering citizens into a dark abyss.

STEVE MCDONALD, Consulting Director, Africa Program and Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity, Wilson Center
“United We Stand, Divided We Fall:” The Sudans After the Split

**SOUTH SUDAN, AFTER THE SPLIT**

ALAN GOULTY retired in 2008 after 40 years in the British Diplomatic Service, including postings to Sudan from 1972-5, and, as ambassador from 1995-9. He served as UK Special Representative to Sudan from 2002-4 heading the British team working on what became the CPA, and as UK Special Representative for Darfur from 2005-6. Goulty is a Senior Fellow at the Wilson Center and Co-Chair of the Sudan Working Group.

**Introduction: The Messy Divorce**

For many, especially in South Sudan, secession on July 9, 2011 looked like the successful culmination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Nine months later the reality looks different. The terms of divorce have yet to be agreed. Relations between the parties have deteriorated. Both countries face ongoing internal conflicts, severe economic problems and the challenge of devising new constitutions. Both lack working democracies. Ordinary folk in both countries are worse off, particularly the estimated 500,000 Southern Sudanese facing expulsion from Sudan. International assistance has been painstakingly slow and ineffective.

**Why it Happened**

Most of the current criticism of the CPA fails to take into account the real difficulties faced by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediators in 2002. Few then gave peace a chance. Certainly, secession of the South, at the time, would not have been negotiable. But General Sumbeiywo repeatedly advised the parties to settle for what they could live with. His firm and persistent mediation, coupled with growing confidence between the leaders on both sides, President Omar al-Bashir, Vice-President Ali Osman and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) Chairman Dr. John Garang, made agreement possible on a referendum in which the Southern Sudanese could exercise their right to self-determination. That was, however, based on the assumption, crucial for the Sudanese government, that both parties would seek “to make unity attractive,” as the CPA stipulated.

The weakness of this approach was that the CPA provided in detail for governance during the 6-year interim period, but made no provision for the contingency of a referendum vote for secession. The tragic death of Dr. Garang in July 2005 removed the main pillar of trust between the parties as well as the principal southern advocate for unity, and his successors increasingly came to favor secession. Relations between the parties deteriorated as each came to see the other as solely responsible for making unity attractive. The National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party in Sudan, dominated the national unity government, apparently taking for granted SPLM commitment to unity, whilst the SPLM concentrated on the referendum, seeing less interest in making unity arrangements work well and thereby generating support for unity in the referendum.

This came at the expense of the South’s development and of any real effort to resolve North/South issues (oil; U.S. PROMISES, FOR EXAMPLE OF REMOVING SUDAN FROM THE LIST OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, WERE NOT FULFILLED BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT’S ACTIONS IN DARFUR. TWO YEARS OF WORK ON DEBT RELIEF WERE ALSO SET ASIDE BECAUSE OF DARFUR.
borders; citizenship; debts and assets; currency; Abyei) in advance of the referendum. As late as the summer of 2010, NCP leaders, fortified by their election victory in April, still expected a referendum vote for unity but wanted to discourage thoughts of secession. So they had no interest in an early agreement. For their part the SPLM focused on the referendum and, as regards the details of secession, followed Dr. Garang’s maxim that “we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it.” Secession arrived after an overwhelming popular vote in favor without consideration of the terms, much less any agreement on them.

The CPA’s emphasis on unity also affected the Three Areas – Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Clearly, a referendum for the people of Abyei to decide whether to be administered as part of Bahr el Ghazal or of Kordofan would have been much less significant in the context of a united Sudan. Similarly the popular consultations in the other two areas, designed to endorse or suggest modifications to the provisions for them in the CPA, would be much less controversial within a united Sudan framework. In these areas the CPA indeed proved inadequate. Of course, the NCP argued that in any case these two areas would be part of (North) Sudan. But that did not allow sufficiently for the links between the SPLM/A, in South Sudan and their comrades in the two areas, which left the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) with the uncomfortable choice of betraying their comrades or supporting rebellions in a neighboring state. Nor did it recognize the problems of demobilizing the many combatants in those areas. In all three areas the parties showed no disposition to compromise and share power, but insisted on elections or a referendum which would inevitably produce a winner and a loser.

Outsiders Wring Their Hands…

International actors must share the blame for three reasons: non-delivery or slow delivery on promises of assistance; depriving the parties of ownership of their agreement; and displaying unabashed preference for secession. International support, from IGAD, the troika (U.S., U.K. and Norway), and, at the last stage, the Security Council meeting in Nairobi, played a large part in bringing the parties to agreement. That should not obscure the fact that this was a Sudanese agreement, which depended on continued international support for implementation.

However, upon signing the CPA on January 9, 2005, international attention, under strong pressure from a vociferous advocacy lobby, was immediately and fatally diverted to Darfur. U.S. promises, for example of removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, were not fulfilled because of the government’s actions in Darfur. Two years of work on debt relief were also set aside because of Darfur. This was a tactical mistake not least because no money would have been disbursed for years and the threat of suspending the work would have been much more effective as leverage than the immediate suspension. Therefore, some six years were wasted before work on debt relief resumed in 2011. There was no immediate peace dividend for the long-suffering Southerners: on the contrary funds pledged to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund were slow to be disbursed and concentrated unduly in Equatoria and on state-building rather than basic services to the people.

By contrast in the political and security areas the international actors assumed too great a role at the expense of local ownership of the agreement. For example, when the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), set up by the CPA, was originally conceived at Machakos, it was as a forum for the two parties to resolve any differences over implementation with a handful of international representatives to assure fair play. By the time it was finally agreed the international actors had acquired a majority of the members, who tended to see their role as holding the parties to account. The latter not surprisingly developed their own and less successful fora for discussion.

Peacekeeping went the same way. The most successful such venture in Sudan was the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Nuba Mountains, which helped the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLA to keep the peace from 2002-5 with a light international presence (no more than 50 expatriates and two helicopters). The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMiS) established a much larger complement in the area, worked less well with the parties, and was much less effective. The JMC model may no longer be an option, given the large UN forces already deployed in South Sudan, Abyei and Darfur. But the principle of involving the parties in enforcing their own peace should still be respected.

International, especially U.S. and Norwegian, partiality for the SPLM/A, also played a role in undermining
Khartoum’s support for the CPA as well as its trust in international mediation and assurances. This has been compounded by the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments and the decision of several Western governments to take that as a pretext to break off contact with President Bashir. This in turn has encouraged the tendency of movements in Sudan opposed to the government to look to international intervention to solve their problems and even to bring about regime change rather than themselves to negotiate with Khartoum.

**While the Parties Take it Out on Each Other…**

President Bashir deserves credit for honoring his commitment to the referendum and for respecting its result. But he was disappointed in the lack of immediate dividends from the U.S. in the form of lifting of some sanctions and debt relief and he was subjected to considerable domestic criticism for “losing the South.” Furthermore, he has come under considerable international pressure to make what he would regard as further concessions on the range of North/South issues. He and his colleagues, especially in the SAF, appear to have decided not only to draw a line in the sand and make no more concessions, but to make the Southerners pay for their temerity in voting to secede. Hence, the excessive demands for oil transit fees, the trade embargo which only drives South Sudan further away, and the vindictive and counter-productive threats against Southern Sudanese in Sudan, together with his rejection of diversity and insistence on a more Islamic constitution.

For their part, the GoSS are confirmed in their distrust of Sudan and Sudanese duplicity, and determined not to kowtow to Khartoum. So they have asserted their sovereign right to halt oil production rather than export it through the North, even though they are suffering proportionately more from this than is Khartoum. Their negotiators in Addis Ababa appear to have been reveling in tormenting their northern counterparts whatever the cost. Meanwhile the GoSS seem overwhelmed by the challenges of state-building, unable to tackle nation-building, and without resources to provide services to the people. Indeed, they have announced a 50% budget cut affecting all items except government salaries which are paid at inflated rates to the SPLA and others on the state payroll.

It was clear from the earliest stages of the negotiations at Machakos that whatever political arrangements might eventually be agreed, Sudan would not prosper except through good working relations between Khartoum and Juba, the good neighbor concept that was at the heart of the CPA. Sadly this has not yet been achieved. Both sides have failed to see the benefits of cooperation. So each side is helping or is believed by the other to be helping rebels in the other country and neither has been prepared to compromise. This may be as much for fear of domestic criticism and disagreements between the ruling political and military elites as for policy reasons. But the challenge for both governments and for those outsiders who wish to help them is to find a way to move back to cooperation.

It is worth noting that regime change in either country does not offer an easy way forward. The issues each faces are complex and compounded by the global economic downturn. It is significant that the opposition in both countries has not offered any answers to the challenges of reaching agreement on North/South issues, nor on how to ensure an equitable division of resources between the respective capitals and the states. In Sudan, for example, all the components of the National Redemption Front demand more for their own areas, but the cake is smaller and they have no formula to divide it.

**Meanwhile in Sudan…**

The government is floundering. The opportunity to exploit the secession of South Sudan to restructure governance and the economy has not been taken. The loss
of oil revenue is hurting. The Islamist movement, as Ambassador Nureldin Satti shows, is deeply divided. The process of constitution-making has scarcely begun. The opposition has seemingly no policy prescription to offer other than regime change. There is no consensus on how to fund the federal system. Peace in Darfur remains fragile, with armed movements holding aloof and hoping for international intervention. There is renewed conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and unrest in both the East and North. Ambassador Satti offers a deeper analysis of these complex issues in his companion paper.

Whilst in South Sudan…
The GoSS has been buoyed by a tide of popular enthusiasm and pride in South Sudan’s independence. It faces enormous challenges in building infrastructure, state institutions and services, and above all in restoring security after decades of devastating civil wars and a century of neglect. As well, there is a lack of skilled manpower and an educated workforce.

Yet even when making full allowance for all these factors it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the interim period was largely wasted. In part this was because of the CPA’s focus on unity, which the SPLM disliked, and which enabled Khartoum to denounce any planning for independence as contrary to the CPA. The SPLM therefore did little planning for independence. But the GoSS was also beset by corruption: despite President Salva Kiir’s evident determination to end it no prosecution has yet taken place. Planning for development was similarly inhibited. Salaries consumed the majority of the GoSS’ budget, rewarding SPLA cadres for years of struggle, whilst the needs of ordinary people for basic health and education services were neglected. Security was lacking as ethnic rivalries assumed greater salience.

Since 2008 the annual death toll from violence in South Sudan has exceeded that during the years of civil conflict. Ethnic rivalries and raiding for cattle (and sometimes for women and children) have raged almost unchecked in Jonglei and in Unity, Lakes and Warrap states, fuelled on occasion by militias angered at the defeat of their leaders in the flawed 2010 elections. These rivalries revealed themselves in bitter exchanges among politicians reminiscent of those in the mid-1970s which allowed President Nimeiri once again to divide and rule the South. The latent hostility between Equatorians and Nilotic ethnic groups flared to the point that the GoSS decided to work to relocate the national capital from Juba to Ramciel, a swampy area in the territory of the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in the South, in the center of the country, which lacks facilities of any kind.

Many factors underlie the upsurge in ethnic conflict. Those in areas remote from the largest towns have seen no peace dividends. Prices have risen, especially the price of the bride cattle essential for marriage in Nilotic societies. The glue of hostility to the North, which had held the South together since 1956, has yet to be replaced by a new sense of national identity. And the new army and police, still largely SPLA members, are too often seen as party to a conflict rather than as impartial peacekeepers. They appear short of commitment and above all discipline and willingness to submit to civilian control. Programs to disarm and demobilize both SPLA cadres and largely ethnic militias have not succeeded.

The GoSS to its credit have tried to attract foreign investment and to create jobs. But too many depend on the public payroll in the absence of a private sector and a legal framework for business activities. Many service jobs, especially in Juba, are filled by expatriates from other IGAD countries. Few Southern Sudanese are engaged in trade. The GoSS’ decision to cut off oil exports through Sudan, though widely applauded on patriotic grounds in the South, will undercut efforts to
attract investment as well as the government’s ability to continue paying salaries: funds for all other programs have already been halved. Meanwhile Sudan’s threat to expel by April 9 people of Southern extraction who have not regularized their immigration status as foreigners will add immensely to the burdens on a South Sudan, which is simply not equipped to accommodate them. (Several thousand Southern Sudanese in Israel are similarly threatened with deportation).

What can be done? A New Approach

It remains true that peace in Sudan can be made by the Sudanese only. At present the fleeting gratification which comes from hurting one’s antagonists is consuming the parties, leading to reckless talk of renewed war, which neither Bashir nor Salva Kiir truly wants. The slide towards conflict will be halted only when both sides realize that they are suffering unnecessarily and recognize the advantages of cooperation. People all over Sudan, especially women, are weary of war. Sooner rather than later their leaders must start listening to them. Khartoum should accept South Sudan’s independence and that it deserves to be treated with the respect due to any state, whilst Juba needs to reassure Sudan that past hostility does not preclude good neighborly relations now. Outsiders should aim to help the parties to adjust their approach accordingly and try to devise face-saving formulae to facilitate policy changes.

Sudanese, like parties to a divorce, should recognize that they may need outside help – in this case to mediate the outstanding issues between North and South. There are lessons from the Naivasha process here. The international community should put its weight behind one mediator – at present the African Union’s high-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) headed by President Mbeki seems the best placed – and discourage forum-shopping. That does not, of course, mean that others like the U.S. Special Envoy should stop their efforts. But the U.S.’ and other efforts should be well coordinated with the lead mediation, as the troika did with General Sumbeiywo during the IGAD process. In recent years there have been many coordination meetings between special envoys and others. But it remains to be seen whether they spend more time talking to each other than listening to ordinary Sudanese and delivering what they want. Is the international community united on its approach or still following a range of national policies?

Would-be mediators should resist the temptation to look for the “good guys” in Sudan and take sides. Overt partiality can only harm the mediators’ role. The parties to Sudanese conflicts need help to make peace, not war. It follows that the secondary temptation of bringing pressure or leverage to bear on only one of the parties should also be resisted. It will lead the antagonists to eschew negotiation in favor of waiting for outside pressure to weaken their opponents. U.S. sanctions have an effect on Sudanese business, but have not changed Khartoum’s policy. So it makes no sense to call for them to be intensified. Furthermore, U.S. failure to deliver on its promises has destroyed its credibility in Khartoum, thus undercutting sanctions. It is true that, even without the pressures on the U.S.
were obviously partial. The West further deprives itself of influence in Sudan by refusing to talk to those indicted by the ICC, including President Bashir and the governor of the conflict-wracked state of South Kordofan. Such engagement does not imply concessions; rather it offers an opportunity to advocate for peace and a good example to others. The U.S. position in Khartoum has also been weakened by the absence of a resident ambassador since 1996. It bears repeating that U.S. ambassadors serve U.S. interests. They are not a favor to the host country. Special Envoys and their staff do a lot of good work, but clearly lack the sustained impact in country and the insights which a resident ambassador provides.

That said, one should recognize that the issues in dispute between Sudan and South Sudan and within each country are of long-standing and do not lend themselves to quick fixes. Military intervention, as opposed to peacekeeping and conflict resolution forces, is a daydream of the impatient. Perhaps in an ideal world one could corral representatives of all factions in both countries in one place and prevail on them to reach a holistic agreement on solutions to all their problems. The real world does not work like that. Since 2006 it has been impossible to assemble representatives even of all the Darfur factions in one place to negotiate. Great patience and incremental steps are needed for progress towards peace.

**What Incremental Steps?**

The immediate goal must be to stop fighting, whether through a ceasefire or a temporary truce. It is hard to deliver humanitarian relief and impossible to protect human rights, provide essential services and improve livelihoods in the midst of conflict. Continued attempts to improve one’s situation through force only undercut peace talks. Mediators could promote the idea of humanitarian ceasefires, whether to permit medical interventions as was done by President Carter in 1995 or food deliveries in Bahr el Ghazal as brokered by the British in 1998. Leaders of both North and South recognized, certainly by the mid-1990s, that no military solution to their conflict was possible. But they may need help to translate such recognition into viable policies today.

Ceasefires need to be guaranteed or policed. The need is not for exceptionally large external peace-keeping forces, but for the parties to a conflict to be helped to police their own ceasefires. Where the parties do not play such a role, as currently in Darfur, even a large international force cannot keep the peace and may itself be subject to attack.

Operation Lifeline Sudan showed that relief could be delivered across borders and fighting lines, albeit at great cost. However, the risk of diversion of aid to benefit the fighters rather than suffering women and children was always present. The need is for a transparent arrangement which respects the legitimate security concerns of all parties. The best should not be the enemy of the good: separate arrangements can be made for refugees in South Sudan, for those in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur. Relief should be delivered to those who need it, irrespective of political control of the territory where they find themselves, and those displaced should be enabled to return to their homes as soon as conditions can be made safe for them to do so.

In the **Three Areas**, interim arrangements are needed. In the CPA’s Abyei Protocol there is a provision for a referendum on whether the people wish to be administered from the South or the North. Since the independence of South Sudan this has become a question of which state the territory should be in. Thus it is a win/lose question.
Yet the CPA’s temporary provisions for the administration of Abyei – shared authority; joint citizenship; provisions for sharing oil revenues – make sense and would enable Abyei and its people to play their traditional role of a bridge between South and North. Why not prolong these provisions indefinitely? *Rien ne dure que le provisoire!* Meanwhile though the Ethiopian peacekeepers are now fully deployed, neither side has complied with the requirements to withdraw its own forces. One way to make this easier for each to defend domestically would be for both sides to maintain a small liaison force in Abyei to work with the Ethiopians in resolving any disputes which may arise.

The SPLA/M (North) has not articulated political goals for South Kordofan and Blue Nile, beyond a vague aspiration of regime change in Khartoum, which, even if achieved, would be unlikely to resolve the problems of the two states. In the former, they refused to accept the 2011 election results. In both, DDR programs for their soldiers have not taken place. Yet both states enjoyed peace and reasonable government from 2005-11 (South Kordofan from 2002) with power being shared between the two CPA partners. One temporary step would be to return to that *status quo ante*, for a breathing space to permit refugees and the displaced to return home, whilst longer-term arrangements for the SPLA personnel are elaborated. The political consultations foreseen by the CPA could be resumed with the results to be fed into the political and constitutional review process in Sudan. These consultations should also consider the possibility of recreating the state of Western Kordofan despite the difficulties of defining its borders to the satisfaction of all parties. It is encouraging that the SPLA/M leader in the Nuba Mountains is now talking of his wish for a political solution rather than regime change by force and that the Governor of South Kordofan is in favor of dividing the state into two.

In Darfur the Doha peace agreement has given the people much of what the rebel groups used to claim they were fighting for. External interference has been reduced if not totally eliminated. But whilst some of those groups remain aloof from the peace process, Darfur will not enjoy peace, the expensive African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) force will continue to be necessary, and the displaced and refugees will not have the option of returning home. There is a need for the international community to take on the extremely difficult task of convincing the hold-outs to return to the peace table and engage with the new dispensation. Too much time has already been lost.

Peace in Sudan will require a solution to the problem of how to divide reduced resources (because of the loss of oil revenue) between a multitude of claimants, all of whom think that it is now “their turn to eat.” There are no easy answers, but this is one issue which should be discussed by all concerned or, at least, by their representatives. All will be disappointed by even a fair outcome. However, the need for austerity is obvious and it should be possible to work on a formula for dealing with allocation of government revenues to the states.

This will have to be addressed as part of the process of drafting a new constitution for Sudan, on which work has already started in various fora. Among the questions to be decided are the governance and electoral systems, including the role of the Presidency and term limits; the number of states there should be; and, crucially, the issue of whether Sudan is to be an Islamic state ruled by a version of Sharia law, or a more open society respecting the diversity of Sudan and its peoples. These, too, are issues for Sudanese, not for outsiders. Yet outsiders can help if asked by providing technical advice and evidence of experience elsewhere. They also

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**THE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER TROUBLE AND HUMAN DISASTER IS CLEAR. SO THE REPORTED AGREEMENT IN ADDIS BETWEEN THE TWO STATES TO ALLOW CITIZENS OF EACH STATE TO LIVE, WORK AND OWN PROPERTY IN THE OTHER COMES AS A WELCOME BREATH OF FRESH AIR.**
have a real and legitimate interest in seeing that Sudan’s new constitution fully respects Sudan’s international obligations under human rights conventions, all of which, incidentally, were agreed without debate in the Machakos negotiations and subsequently incorporated in the CPA.

The impact of austerity in Sudan will be affected by the negotiations currently in progress in Addis Ababa under African Union (AU) auspices on the whole range of North/South issues. On oil it is important to recognize that the shut-down of South Sudan’s production has probably reduced the amount of recoverable reserves as it may not be economically sound to reopen wells which are coming to the end of their lives. At present both countries are hurting. The goal must be to return to a win/win situation in which both parties gain from the production and transit of oil, can live with whatever solution is found and can defend that solution to their constituents. The defense should become easier the longer the alternative is nothing at all!

The question of citizenship is most urgent as Khartoum wants all people of Southern extraction to regularize their status or leave by April 9. The necessary bureaucratic procedures for this are not in place. Nor are there services available to transport the multitudes of people involved to the South by the deadline. There have already been riots in Khartoum by Southerners in protest against this decision. The potential for further trouble and human disaster is clear. So the reported agreement in Addis between the two states to allow citizens of each state to live, work and own property in the other comes as a welcome breath of fresh air. The challenge now is to implement the agreement in good faith: the welfare of citizens of both countries should not be held hostage to the political ambitions of their leaders.

In fact, Sudan benefits from the presence of many Southern workers who take on tasks which Sudanese are reluctant to tackle, notably as laborers in the construction industry. This is but one of the areas in which cooperation would benefit both countries. Another is borders. Open borders, such as posited for Abyei, would benefit both countries through increased trade, movement of pastoralists, and the creation of job opportunities. Neither side is capable of policing their long common border in order to exclude nationals of the other.

The notion is ridiculous. So they should look for a pragmatic and workable agreement, with outside help as needed.

Both sides have agreed, not for the first time, that demarcation of their agreed border may start. They also agreed in the CPA that their common border should be the line dividing southern provinces from northern at the time of independence on January 1, 1956. The Darfur rebel movements have agreed to this formula in respect of Darfur. Though nobody was drawing maps on Independence Day, the effect of this agreement is well understood by both sides, changes to the borders after 1956 are well documented, and it is possible to agree to a border accordingly. The proposal for a neutral zone either side of such a border should facilitate agreement.

The division of debts and assets should be less problematic, but nevertheless is linked to the settlement of financial issues regarding oil. Creditors may have a voice here, in particular as regards the share of debts which may be assumed by South Sudan as part of a deal.

This discussion has focused on action at the governmental level. But history has bequeathed a network of personal contacts between Northern and Southern Sudanese, which could help to smooth the rough edges of initial inter-governmental relations. Contacts between them merit encouragement, initially perhaps through joint efforts in service to their people.

The main challenge in South Sudan is security, notably the ethnic divisions and conflict reflecting the failure as yet to construct a Southern identity independent of reference to Sudan. President Kiir has made it clear that he sees this as an internal South Sudan issue to be resolved by his people and that he does not want external intervention. Yet the international community has interests in the provision of relief aid (over half of South Sudan’s population is forecast to need food aid in the coming months) and in the government’s respect for human rights. The peace-making work of the churches deserves help.

There is also a need, and not just in South Sudan, for post-conflict reconciliation and resolution work, such as the Wilson Center has undertaken in Burundi. The aims are to build trust and cohesion, and to build capacity. This can address tensions and core differences in a life-changing way. It could also have a meaningful impact.
on the armed groups and SPLA, as it did in Burundi. There are other Track II-type, private entities who have already been working at community levels (Catholic Relief Services, Nairobi Peace Initiative and Mercy Corps, for example), who could be called upon strategically to be helpful.

Outside support for security sector reform and the rule of law is clearly of great importance. It should continue. As important, however, is mobilizing the talents of the South Sudanese for the longer term. The Carter Center mobilized over 20,000 village volunteers and supervisors for their guinea-worm campaign in South Sudan in 2007. Over 8,000 are still active in the last stages of the campaign. This community spirit should be engaged, including through the provision of external resources, to deliver the benefits of peace through service to all the people of South Sudan.

Apart from medical services, education should be a top priority for aid donors and especially education of women, whose voice against violence and for equality should increasingly be heard. South Sudan’s universities lack equipment, building and faculty. All are potential areas for disinterested foreign help. Help for schools is also required. Literacy classes for women should be a priority. At present much donor assistance is going to state-building – too often reflected on the ground as central control. What is needed now is help to empower the powerless.

Similar help, in particular for education and the education of women, would be one of the most effective external contributions to peace and the welfare of the people of Sudan also.

**Conclusion – The U.S. Role**

In such a new approach the role of U.S. diplomacy and U.S. resources will be crucial. Of course, there is no quick fix. The CPA, great achievement though it was, represented no more than 5% of the task of bringing peace to Sudan. The U.S. played an important role in the CPA and in the process which led to the independence of South Sudan. Its challenge now is to follow through constructively.

Of course, the complex problems of the Sudans cannot be solved by the U.S. alone: the Sudanese and South Sudanese must tackle them. There are no easy solutions. Great patience and perseverance will be needed. Other countries should play their part to help in bringing the contending parties together. It will not be necessary or even appropriate for the U.S. to seek to play the lead role. But strong U.S. engagement in support of international mediation efforts is essential.

That means effective U.S. engagement with Khartoum at all levels, as well as with those groups who remain on the margins of the peace talks. It also means putting the Sudanese people first. There is no great U.S. geostrategic interest in the Sudans. But there is a real interest in helping to end the suffering of the ordinary people of both countries. That requires not just peace agreements, but post-conflict reconciliation and resolution work including at the community level; the provision of services, especially education and health; and the encouragement of women in particular and civil society in general.

The Obama administration is showing admirable perseverance in pursuing peace in and between the Sudans. They deserve full support: the U.S. is at its most effective abroad when it speaks with one voice.
In Sudan, the split of the country into two parts, despite the pain it caused, gave rise to high expectations as to the possibility of “a new beginning” that would lead to a “new Sudan,” more just, democratic, and respectful of basic rights and freedoms. It was also hoped that the National Congress Party (NCP) would seize the opportunity offered by the secession of the South to build a new solidarity in what remained of the country by paving the way for the adoption of a new constitution to be drafted with the participation of the various political, social and cultural constituents of the country. Many thought that the NCP would be well advised to call for a National Conference that would adopt a blueprint and a roadmap for the nation-building process.

But, rather than a new beginning, the aftermath of the secession of South Sudan proved to be “more of the same.” Not only that, but the worst fears of the liberal, democratic and “secular” segments of the society and of the political class were confirmed: the NCP saw in the secession of the South an opportunity to further strengthen its grip on power and to further pursue its Islamist agenda. A few weeks after the secession, President Bashir went public and declared in El Gadaref that Sudan was now 98% Arab and Muslim. That statement was understood as a strong message to those within and outside of the NCP and the Islamist movement who were advocating for a national debate on the fundamental issues which were to govern and form the basis of the new constitution and a broad-based government representative of the political, social, and cultural plurality of Sudan.

Within the NCP, a silent turmoil ensued which soon erupted into a crisis that ultimately caused the downfall of one of the NCP and Ingaz (salvation) strongmen: Salah Gosh, the National Intelligence and Security Services’ (NISS) chief who had built a State within the State – a vast security-based empire which quickly became an economic and financial fiefdom. The demise of Gosh was a political tsunami, the repercussions of which still reverberate within the NCP. His sacking was a clear signal to the NCP top brass not to cross red lines chalked in by the NCP chairman, Field Marshal, and President Bashir. It was also an unequivocal warning that insubordination would not be tolerated.

But what exactly was the sin committed by Gosh’s that lead to his demise and his outright exclusion from all political and executive posts? The background to this story is that Gosh was said to have been behind alleged cooperation between the NISS and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and was often referred to “the US’ man in Sudan.” At the time of his undoing two things were happening: speculation as to the possibility of regime change through “a palace coup,” and a heated discussion within the NCP regarding which direction to take in the wake of Southern secession.

NEW THINKING IS GRADUALLY EMERGING WITHIN THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND THE NCP, WHICH ADVOCATES LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES AND ADOPTING A MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE APPLICATION OF SHARIA.
At some point before Sudanese separation, there was an impression that a free debate was going to take place on the latter issue and that the NCP leadership was prepared to open up the political space to allow for a free exchange of ideas on the matter. President Bashir may have even permitted some ambiguity to prevail within NCP institutions concerning his personal position on the new constitutional dispositions, which gave the wrong signal to some of his close associates that they could afford to take some risks and initiatives that took them beyond the “party line” on this issue. Gosh was one such person. Encouraged by his own position of power and the seeming ambivalence of the situation, he started a dialogue with the opposition parties on issues pertaining to the future of the political process with a view toward reaching a consensus on the way forward. There is no doubt that Gosh made a dire miscalculation. Politics and history teach us that it is in moments of doubt and vulnerability that political leaders become the most merciless. It is also in these moments that political and social groups react violently to any signs of dissidence or indiscipline perceived as a threat to group cohesion or the interests of its members.

Another attempt to chart a new way came from a most unexpected source: Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, then Vice-Chairman of the NCP, Secretary for Organizational Affairs and Assistant to the President of the Republic. Nafie signed an agreement with Malik Agar, Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in Addis Ababa that stipulated the recognition of the SPLA-N, forming one unified army and enacting democratic reforms in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Perhaps, this turn of events was too good to be true: the day after the signing of the agreement, President Bashir, fresh from a visit to China, following the Friday prayers, publicly denounced the agreement signed by his own assistant.

The turmoil within the NCP also involves a tug of war with prominent military officials who did not appreciate that the Nafie-Agar agreement was signed without their knowledge or approval. An article appeared in the Armed Forces newspaper a few days after President Bashir denounced the agreement, in which an army colonel vehemently attacked the NCP and the Islamist movement and wanted everybody who read the piece to know who is, in fact, in charge of Sudan.

A heated debate rages within the NCP as to what course to take following the South’s secession. President Bashir made it clear, in his many diatribes against the opposition and the international community, that Sudan is now an overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim country and will be ruled by Sharia law. It is without doubt that Bashir is using the Sharia issue as a political rallying cry to occupy the center of a decades-old debate that has been taking place in Sudan regarding the implementation of Sharia and the adoption of what many in the Islamist camp call a truly Islamic constitution. That call has been made since independence, but over the years it has become a bone of contention – even within the Islamist camp. A harsh version of Sharia was implemented by former President Gaafar Nimeiri and continued by the current regime, without either ever being able to demonstrate what benefits its implementation has brought to the people of Sudan. In actuality, this version of Islamic rule has done considerable harm and its extension could do more damage.

The divisions within the Islamist camp between reformists and traditionalists have now come to the fore. There are three strains to be distinguished. One strain involving Islamists within the branch of the “Islamist movement,” that resulted from the 1999 split, which remained faithful to President Bashir and the NCP. Thus far, this branch of the Islamic movement has been able to avoid a
deeper fragmentation, but some cracks are beginning to surface among those who continue to adopt a hard line approach to all issues, including maintaining the imposition of Sharia, blocking any substantive debate on constitutional issues and adopting a militaristic, intransigent stance to dealing with the SPLA-N on South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, and by extension with South Sudan. On the other hand, new thinking is gradually emerging within the Islamist movement and the NCP, which advocates learning from past mistakes and adopting a more pragmatic approach to the application of Sharia and that of the constitution.

This trend within the NCP leadership also calls for widening the scope of the debate over the future of Islamism at large by building political and intellectual links with the more moderate factions of the Islamist movement in Egypt, Turkey, and perhaps Tunisia. The basic premises being that the Islamist movement in Sudan has failed to deliver and the wave of new Islamist regimes in the Arab Spring should learn from the lessons of the Sudanese experience by having a less dogmatic approach to Islamism. While keeping to the fundamentals of Sharia as a reference, focus should be on the more “functional” mandates, tasks and duties of the state rather than the functions of the state, then the debate should focus on commonalities that exist between the Islamic approach to governance and those of the modern state particularly with regard to universally shared values, social justice, and fundamental rights. At bottom, there is a necessity to keep Sudanese society from being torn asunder and avoid sowing the seeds of divisiveness and fragmentation.

The second split within the Islamist camp is that between the Islamist movement, as represented by the NCP and its acolytes and the more fundamentalist factions of the Islamist camp, such as the Salfists and the Wahabists. To the extreme right of these two groups, there is now an emergent faction, which represents a relatively new strain in Sudanese society— the so-called “Takfrists” or “Apostasists.” This group is growing rapidly and is pulling the Islamist camp toward some form of “Taiibanization” or “Shababization.”

A third split is that between the Islamist group and the traditional Sufis that have always advocated a more tolerant brand of Islam, more respectful of local cultures and traditions. Recent clashes between the two religious groups at the Mawlid ceremonies in Omdurman as well as the desecrations of some Sufi tombs in the suburbs of Khartoum have drawn attention to the rise of a radical fundamentalist phenomena, which, if left unattended may constitute a serious threat, not only on a social level, but also at the political level. The Islamist movement in Sudan seems to have created a leviathan that it will only one day find difficult to rein in. The rise of radical Islamist movements has not occurred in a vacuum: similar jihadist movements, albeit more violent and combative, are observed in Somalia (Al-Shabaab), northern Mali (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and Nigeria (Boko Haram). The proliferation of these phenomena may result in the linking of all these movements. Sudan’s central position between East, Central, and West Africa, may lead to a situation in which Islamist movements such as that led by President Bashir, may turn out to be a stroll in the park. As regimes around the Arab World Islamize, a parallel phenomenon may be taking place: the same societies that brought those regimes into being are in the process of giving birth to a more extreme version of Islamism, which is an indication of the gradual radicalization of Muslim societies in the face of rampant globalization and perceived victimization of Muslims and Islamic societies from within and abroad. This occurrence may be short lived and transient, but may also be deep-rooted and far-reaching. Muslim societies and the regional and international communities should brace for a long period of upheaval and turmoil. The current unrest due to the Arab Spring will take a long time to subside. The exact timeframe, however, is anybody’s guess.

For the Sudanese Islamists, the Arab Spring may have come at the right time. For them, the changes in Egypt and Libya are a Godsend. The rise of the Islamists in these countries has removed two formidable enemies of the Sudanese regime: Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Kaddafi, and set the stage for a new Islamist regional order, for the first time in recent history. The three countries are already talking about the possibility of regional tripartite integration. It is an irony of sorts that the last time an integration adventure was attempted in the region was by the then enemies of the Islamists: Jamal Abdel Nasser, Jaafer


Many questions are asked as to whether the Arab Spring will come to Sudan. The situation in Sudan is not similar to that which is found in the Arab countries affected. Different situations bear different results. For decades, the political and socioeconomic conditions have been much more fluid and volatile in Sudan than the majority of other “Arab” countries. While regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and to some extent Yemen, have been more or less stable, Sudan has witnessed no less than nine changes of power, including two popular uprisings, four democratic governments, and two military coups (not to mention the seven or eight failed ones). This is a symptom of sociopolitical hyperactivity — societies, like children, can be hyperactive.

Sudan’s sociopolitical evolution is in sharp contrast with other Arab countries. Egypt has known, since 1952, three presidents, all from the army and belonging to the same political regime, or at least the same political culture. Since its independence, Libya has been governed by two regimes, the monarchy up to 1969, then the infamous Kaddafi regime, which stayed in power for 42 years. Tunisia has known only two presidents since its independence, Habib Bourghiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Syria has been dominated by the Assad dynasty and the Ba’ath Party for more than forty years and Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled Yemen with an iron fist for over thirty years. The common chords among all these regimes are autocracy and an absence of democracy. Sudan is different in the sense that it has tried democratic rule three times in its history, but failed to sustain it. And despite the fact that it was under military rule for almost forty years out of 56 years of independence, there has always been a strong resistance, frequently armed, to authoritarianism, which has resulted in important changes in the structure and governance of the state.

Sudan had its first “Spring” in October 1964 and a second in April 1985. Both attempts at reform and democratic change foundered and the result in each case was the return of the military to power, with or without the connivance of one or another political group. The return of the military, in the 1989 coup, was in collusion with the Islamist movement, which played a crucial role in overthrowing the democratic but ailing regime of Sadiq El Mahdi. In Morocco, the Islamists became the majority party through popular vote. In all likelihood, Islamists will also come to power in Syria and Yemen. Hence, the main feature of the Arab Spring is the rise of the Islamists. Islamists are already in power in Sudan. No “Spring” is needed to bring them to power, nor would it, if it were to happen - which is a remote probability – bring the same kind of changes that befell other Arab countries. Sudan has already been divided and the fragmentation process is still in the works. Violent change that may create a power vacuum will not only bring a change of regime, but will bring a completely different scenario, which is that of more fragmentation and dismembering of the country. The most plausible scenario is akin to the Somali one. Sudan is sitting on a powder keg. Fighting is continuous in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Darfur conflict is not completely resolved. Signs of
fragility are apparent in the East, the North and the center. It is the central authority, even if despotic and hegemonic, which holds the country together. What is needed is an orderly change of regime, not a violent one. A power vacuum in such circumstances would only be filled by chaos. The Somali case is there for all to see. A soft-landing or a smooth transition is needed that would preserve the unity and stability of the country. This should be one issue that can be debated at the National Conference that is being called for by the opposition groups and which should be seen as the best exit strategy as it should provide a safe haven and win-win outcome for everyone. The National Conference will be the appropriate venue and will provide an opportunity to reknit the social fabric and the restructure of the state on new equitable bases to be agreed by the various components of Sudanese society.

The other difference between Sudan and the Arab Spring countries is that the Islamists have been in power in Sudan for over two decades while Islamists in other countries have been in the opposition and are now starting a new experience. Islamist rule in Sudan has failed to deliver stability, prosperity, social justice, and the rule of law. While Islamists in other countries aspire to what they hope to be—a just Muslim state—Islamists and others in Sudan, friends or opponents, have come to the uncontestable conclusion that the Islamist rule has been a failed experiment. There is, however, a disagreement on what kind of change is necessary. There are those who persist in thinking that true Islam has not yet been applied in Sudan, and hence, what is needed is more Sharia, not less. The proponents of this point of view belong to Islamist groups such as the Ansar Al Sunna, the Wahabists, and other ultra-Islamist groups, including the “Takfiriyin” who adopt an extremely narrow interpretation of Islamic law. These groups have grown strong enough to challenge the NCP openly and to denounce what they consider as its soft stand on matters of Islamic jurisprudence. There is a real threat in Sudan today of growing ultra-Islamist movements that claim to offer a plausible alternative to the present regime. Their power is starting to appear in the debate on the new constitution where they advocate for a strict version of Islamic law and put considerable pressure on the GoS and the NCP to embrace their point of view.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, we have the liberal groups, or the so-called “Almaniyyin” or secularists, who favor the separation of politics and religion and call for a “civil” or “functionalist” state. This group has now been joined, perhaps only tactically, by former proponents of the Islamist state such as Sadiq El Mahdi and Hassan El Turabi. The latter is the founder of the Islamist movement and the main instigator of the coup that brought the present regime to power. This camp is divided and lacks sufficient political clout to impose its agenda. Some of the more enlightened members of the NCP rallying, albeit timidly, around the thinking of this last group may in the coming weeks and months strengthen the hand of those who clamor for the separation between politics and religion. Such an alliance will strengthen the bid for a new constitution, which would be a historic compromise between the Islamists and the non-Islamists.
Nimeiri, and Kaddafi. Meeting in Khartoum on March 7, 2012 with a delegation of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Justice and Development Party, President Bashir announced that Sudan welcomed the integration of the three countries, but cautioned that they should first examine the causes of past integration failures. In other words, they should get it right this time around.

Though the rise of Islamists in the region may be seen as a sort of compensation and counterbalance to Southern secession, it may also constitute a challenge or, at best, an incentive for the NCP to mend its ways and bring them in line with the liberal brand of Islamism that seems to be gaining ground in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and probably tomorrow in Yemen and Syria. The NCP leaders need to adjust to a new regional environment that may be more accommodating to political Islam in the broad sense, but may also be more demanding with respect to the fundamentals of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

**A Constitution for a New Era:**

Meanwhile, the constitution-making process appears to have stalled. Fractures are appearing within the Islamist camp while at the same time the gap seems to be widening between the Islamist camp and the liberals, except for a new contingent of some prominent NCP leaders that seem to have learned the lessons of the past, and advocate for the observance of the “functional” mandates of the state and not solely its religious or spiritual identity. This position is growing closer to that of the opposition parties, which openly call for what some term a “civic state” that would limit the role of religion in politics while recognizing its all-encompassing role. Thus, religion will be the matrix and not the instrument or the tool. This disposition would preserve the sanctity of religion and protect it from the moving sands of politics.

Today, Sudan is at a crossroads: slide back into the obscurantism and violent rhetoric at the dawn of the Ingaz regime, or learn the lessons from a failed Islamist experience and chart a course toward emancipation, enlightenment, and prosperity. That path will be similar to the one advocated by Mr. Erdogan during his visit to Egypt when he declared that there was a way to reconcile the Muslim faith with a secular modernist state. Such is also the challenge identified by Rashid Ghannouchi, Chairman of Ennahda Party of Tunisia. Such is the dilemma, which will be facing the Islamists of Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. It is also the challenge facing all Muslims: how to adapt the tenants of Islam to the technological, socio-cultural, constitutional, and political innovations of the modern world.

The Sudanese have tried to find their own answers to this dilemma and have failed. They have to get it right this time. Between the utter rejection of modernity and over-indulgence in it, there has to be a middle ground. The final destination is of great importance, but equally so is the journey that Sudan must take to arrive there.

**Economic Impact of the Secession of the South:**

The oil boom, coupled by years of peace following the signing of the CPA between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/SPLA, put Sudan on the track of economic transformation. Peace dividends were visible in terms of great infrastructure projects, foreign investment, and the relative improvement in the livelihoods of wide sections of the middle and upper-middle class. Sudan recorded some of the highest rates of growth in Africa and the world, reaching up to 10% in the boom years of 2006–10. This economic and financial boon was, however, more visible in Khartoum and some of the bigger cities than in the countryside or in remote marginalized areas, including South Sudan, some of which continued to suffer from neglect or slow recovery from years of conflict. Efforts to bring them into the fold of the vibrant national economic development were dampened by erratic political, institutional and economic governance; and competition among the ruling elite and the elite of former rebel movements; corruption; war and instability in Darfur; and the continuous tug of war between the NCP and the SPLM during the transition. Poor planning and management of mega infrastructure and development projects such as the Merowe dam have caused unnecessary confrontations between the GoS and the population, which could have otherwise been avoided through a more consultative and participatory planning and implementation process.

In the same vein, the notorious “resource curse” manifested itself in the development of a dependency syndrome on oil. In Sudan, oil constituted more than 60% of export earnings, while in South Sudan the rate...
was over 90%. The Sudanese upper and middle classes rapidly espoused “Gulf State” consumer spending patterns while living the realities of a Least-Developed Country (LDC). The gap between rich and poor widened considerably and a sizeable segment of the population in the rural and “marginalized” areas fell through the cracks of the social safety net. The Sudanese economy, despite the widening of its revenue base, failed to generate employment opportunities consistent with the sharp rise in oil income. The employment generation capacity of Sudan is much weaker than countries of comparable GDP, such as Kenya. The Kenyan economy annually provides for approximately 150,000 employment opportunities, as opposed to about 80,000 in Sudan. The rate is lowest in peripheral regions and areas, making unemployment one of the major structural causes of conflict.

The secession of South Sudan has deprived Sudan of considerable financial resources that were flowing as a result of the oil bonanza. Two thirds of Sudan’s oil came from the South, but, following the CPA, those resources were still firmly controlled by South Sudan. Hence, one should not automatically draw the conclusion that Sudan has lost two thirds of its oil revenues, because the fact of the matter is that those revenues had not been flowing in totality into the coffers of the North. Sudan still produces 150,000 barrels per diem and increases that production daily. Gold production has made up for more or less 60% of the “oil shortfall” and oil production is expected to reach 500,000 barrels a day by 2015, according to GoS estimates, while gold production is also on the increase and may bring in as much as 3 billion dollars by 2013. This does not mean that the secession of the South has not negatively affected the economy of the North. It indeed has. But, this negative effect has been compounded by three factors: resumption of hostility between Sudan and South Sudan, the war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and inflated GoS expenditure. There is a link between these three factors, but there is also more to it than that.

Resumption of hostility and the proxy war between the two Sudans is the most important single factor in the downturn in the Sudanese economy. Contentious relations between the two have not only deprived the countries of badly needed oil revenues, but it has continued to provide a justification for their irrational expenditure on the security and military apparatus and on mobilizing for war. The incongruous effect of an economy reliant on oil and war is damaging Sudan. This is a contradiction of sorts. An oil-based economy, by definition, needs security and stability while war, by definition is the absence of security and stability. Of course, oil money can fund a war effort, but this is tantamount to sawing off the branch upon which one is sitting. A war economy mobilizes people for destruction and to be dependent on other peoples’ work, thus creating parasitic and opportunistic trends within the society. This has been the case in Sudan for too long, where too many people have more of an interest in the continuation of the war than in the return to peace. Sudanese society, like a cancerous body, has become a conflict-producing organism. The only perceived solution for violence seems to be more violence. All this costs money with little or no accountability.

The problematic relations between Sudan and South Sudan are a continuation of what pertained when Sudan was one country. It is a result of the fact that the ruling elites in both countries are unable to change their perception of each other as former enemies who fought on the battlefield and have neither the requisite sagacity nor political acumen to transform their relationship from one of confrontation to one of reconciliation. The enormous oil wealth in their hands, instead of encouraging humility and a deeper sense of the public good has, in effect, incited arrogance and the reckless abuse of political power. To illustrate this predicament, the author was told by a friend that “the two sides seem to be more concerned with
making the other bleed than catering to their own welfare. I do not mind if I bleed, as long as I can make you bleed more.” Who is right and who is wrong is important, but what is central is what has gone wrong, how it can be corrected, and how to garner the necessary political will for that purpose.

From Reciprocal Bleeding to Mutual Accommodation:
The two sides have now signed an agreement in Addis Ababa on the Four Freedoms and the common boundary. This is certainly a step in the right direction, but what is needed now is to create the conditions conducive to the implementation of what has been agreed upon and to continue negotiations to resolve other crucial issues such as the transport of oil through Sudan’s territory. Above all, it is essential to pave the way for normal relations between the two countries on the basis of common interests and mutual benefits. This is the only way to guarantee peace and stability in the two countries. Mutual harm will lead both Sudans nowhere. The illusion that each side may have to remove the other should be abandoned. Hardliners on either side of the border should be curbed. The primary responsibility of any regime should be the welfare of its people, not regime change next door. Attempts to divert attention from one’s problem by creating problems for, or with the neighbor are time-tested ploys, but do not always work and often backfire.

Freshly inflicted wounds bleed for a time, but they should not be allowed to bleed forever. Like living organs, Sudan and South Sudan started bleeding in many ways following the secession of the latter. They are bleeding along their common border where many flashpoints and cross-border issues remain unresolved, foremost among which is the status of Abyei as it epitomizes the two sides’ inability to find solutions to their problems due to the prevalence of bad blood between them. More bleeding has been caused by the stubbornness of the two sides and their lack of political will. Precious time was wasted when the GoS denounced the agreement signed in Addis Ababa between Nafie and Agar. That was indeed a wasted opportunity and Sudan could have benefited from it, because the agreement stipulated that Sudan should have one army and that the SPLM-North should be transformed into a political party. The agreement would have brought peace to the country and prevented fresh spats of violence in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and how it was construed as a threat is perplexing.

The recent agreement signed in Addis Ababa between the GoS and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) should be the beginning of the return of some measure of sanity in the relations of the two countries and should pave the way to the resolution of other related issues, particularly, those of oil sharing and Abyei. It should also start to quell the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Addis Ababa agreement should be a milestone in the relations between the two countries, and Khartoum and Juba should now put the interests of their citizens before all other considerations. The two regimes may not like each other, but they are condemned to live alongside one another. A failure to internalize this simple fact will produce another prolonged conflict, the victims of which will be the ordinary people of the Sudans.

Sudan and the U.S.: The Theory of the Western Conspiracy:
For decades, there has been a general belief in Sudan that the Western powers have been perpetrating a continuous conspiracy against the country. This belief was considerably reinforced during the Ingaz era.

Since the killing of Gordon Pasha by the Mahdi troops in 1885 and the bloody retaliation of the British army in 1889 in the battle of Karrary in Omdurman, Sudan’s relationship with the West has never been able to normalize. Even today these relations are tense. Whether under the military regimes of Ibrahim Abboud, Nimeiri and Bashir, or the democracies of Ismail al-Azhari, Abdalla Khalil or Sadiq El Mahdi, there has always been a missing piece to the puzzle. One constant theme has been that of Sudan’s support for the Palestinian cause and its rejection of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. But the deterioration of Sudan’s relations with the West reached its peak with the Ingaz regime, which, since its inception in 1989 adopted a confrontational stance towards the West in general, and the U.S. in particular. This was far from being a one-sided affair, as the U.S. has since the early years of the Ingaz regime retaliated by leading a systematic campaign of destabilization mainly by providing political and diplomatic support to the SPLM/SPLA and by spear-
heading the international campaign against Sudan in relation to the conflict in Darfur.

At present a renewed campaign is being prepared which is identical to the one on Darfur. A coalition similar to the “Save Darfur” is being built, this time on the situation in the Nuba Mountains. The same ingredients are already there: Mukesh Kapila, Congressman Frank Wolf, actor George Clooney, the Enough Project, and many others who have joined the campaign.

Taking past and recent developments into consideration, are there not credible grounds for building a conspiracy theory? Is it merely a coincidence that the war in Darfur erupted at the time the CPA was being negotiated and signed? Is it another coincidence that the war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile started a few weeks following the secession of the South? Is it a coincidence that the armed groups of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile met in Juba to declare that they were forming a “Revolutionary Front” against the Khartoum regime?

But, alternatively, if we assume that there is a conspiracy against Sudan, to what extent is this theory self-inflicted? Are Sudanese politicians, through their acts and statements absolved from responsibility for providing fertile ground for such a conspiracy? Could the war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile have been avoided if the GoS had accepted the Nafie-Agar agreement? Could there have been a better way to manage the relations with the SPLM-N by allowing it to transform into a political party and by integrating its troops within the national army? Could the agreement that was reached in Addis Ababa a few days ago not have been concluded a few months earlier, thus saving lives and badly needed national resources?

The Ingaz regime has become notorious for “shooting itself in the foot” and for attracting hostility, often unnecessarily. It has taken anti-American sentiment in Sudan to new heights while anti-Sudan sentiment in the U.S. has also become a recurrent theme of the U.S./Africa and Middle East policy. The two countries have been so entangled in distrust and animosity that it is becoming more and more difficult to bring them back to a reasonable level of normalized relations. Both sides have failed to seize the window of opportunity that was opened following the secession of South Sudan. Sudan has allowed South Sudan to secede without reaping the dividends of the act, which is perceived by many Sudanese as a tragedy. The U.S. has failed to deliver on its many promises made to Sudan and has shown more of a willingness to use “sticks” than to deftly deploy “carrots.” The U.S. is perceived in Sudan as having failed to be an honest broker, and consequently to have lost all leverage. The U.S. may soon opt out of any constructive role in Sudan if its policies toward the country continue to be guided by anti-Sudan lobbying groups. Similarly, the GoS would be well advised to realize that the U.S. is a major actor in the international arena and despite the emergence of other nations, the U.S. will continue to play a crucial role on issues of war, peace, and development in Sudan and in the region at large. Hence, it is important for the two countries to find a modus vivendi that will insure some stability in their relations.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. Sudan and South Sudan have a vested interest in capitalizing on obvious interdependencies and complementarities that exist between them. Water, oil, and other natural resources, shared ethnic groups on both sides of the border, shared livelihoods and cross-border trade are strong fundaments for integration between the two countries. Leaders on both sides have to realize that building the welfare for posterity is more important than ruminating on the painful memories of the past.

2. The recent agreement signed in Addis Ababa on the four freedoms and the boundaries should be implemented and further reinforced by an agreement on the issues of oil, citizenship, Abyei and other outstanding issues.

3. The GoS and SPLM-N should immediately put an end to hostilities in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile states and negotiate in earnest with the goal of finding a peaceful and equitable settlement to the conflict in the two states.

4. The GoS and the NCP should lead wide consultations with all political and civil society groups with the intention of holding a National Constitutional Conference that will create a national consensus for the adoption of
a permanent constitution for Sudan that will take the country out of this protracted period of divisiveness and instability and into a new era of peace and prosperity.

5. The U.S. and Sudan should consider seriously mending their ailing bilateral relations. Those relations have thus far been built on issues that are not directly linked to their interests or bilateral relationship, but rather on suspicions, illusions, and half-truths. The U.S. can help Sudan find a solution to its present problems and create a peaceful, democratic state respectful of its peoples’ fundamental rights.
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