

**Final Field Evaluation
of
The Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP)
for Post-War Burundi**

**Mission #6
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¹ Slightly appended in October 2006 to incorporate a more complete description of the evaluation methodology and activity schedule.

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Acknowledgements

Serving as International Evaluator was a bit of a balancing act. For more than two years, I have strived to keep an unbiased, independent perspective of the Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP) while maintaining regular and open communication with the program's officials.

I wish to express my thanks to members of all four CBLP agencies (USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, PADCO, African Strategic Impact, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) for weathering my briefings and reports with such patience and grace. Their receptiveness and subsequent efforts to make program adjustments were, without doubt, among the most gratifying aspects of my work.

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Executive Summary

The primary purpose of the sixth and final evaluation trip report is to detail the impact of the Community Based Leadership Training Program for Post-War Burundi (CBLP) five months after it ended. It focused inquiry on whether the CBLP's training program had succeeded in empowering local communities and promoting local leaders to successfully work together to solve common problems. The research team included five Field Evaluation Assistants as well as the International Evaluator and took place in May 2006.

CBLP proved to be an unusual program largely because it featured exceptionally well trained Burundians (known as Master Trainers) who resided in the Communes where they worked, an effective, adaptable curriculum, the provision of training opportunities to people across a generally even geographic distribution, the inclusion of broad class representation among the trainee corps, and an unusually extensive evaluation program that gave continuous feedback throughout the life of the project.

The evaluation research found that the CBLP has contributed, in some communities, to an emerging critical mass of trained and available conflict advisors who work for free. This has generated positive impact in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces months after the program ended. While the activities of some trainee groups have begun to wither since the close-out of the program, many active, engaged, and available groups of trainees remain across both provinces. The successful groups tend to have strong leadership within their groups and reside in functional communities located in remote, largely neglected areas. The availability of free conflict advisors has increased the number of conflicts that are being addressed in such places because more poor people with conflicts access these and related services. Many active trainee groups were also found to subdivide into important smaller units, particularly among youth and women. At the same time, program impact is low in most favored zone communities, urban communities, socially dysfunctional communities, and among most ethnic Twa and ex-combatants.

In addition to the fact that they work for free, the most prominent source of CBLP trainees' community appeal is the fact that they employ a process that many contend promotes lasting resolutions to conflicts. Trainees are generally helping to address conflicts that do not require judicial sanction or involve violent crime. They address domestic and neighborhood quarrels, land boundary disputes and clashes involving farmers and herders. They are not normally involved in addressing conflicts involving land inheritance and ownership disputes, or divorce, rape and theft, although some trainees help address more serious conflicts as well. There are encouraging signs of mutual reinforcement between CBLP volunteerism and emerging volunteerism on traditional Bashingantahe courts. Indeed, it appears likely that CBLP's more lasting impacts will be among small groups of women trainees on Sous-Collines and with the Bashingantahe courts, who are in the process of significant positive change and where, on some courts, have CBLP-trained Bashingantahe leading the charge for reform.

Field research has continued to find exceptionally poor coordination among international agencies engaged in training activities in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces. The most significant indicator of a serious coordination deficiency surfaced in persistent reports of agencies consistently training many of the same people. Learning similar but uncoordinated material from different training programs was found to confuse trainees and undermine both their retention and their motivation to employ the new skills they have learned afterwards.

At the same time, the decision by many NGOs to repeatedly train many of the same people in favored Zones awarded CBLP a significant strategic advantage. In strong contrast to nearly all other international agencies providing trainings to Burundians in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces, inclusion in CBLP marked the first time that most participants had ever been trained. Moreover, the roughly equal geographic distribution of program participants meant that remote areas were well represented among CBLP's trainee corps. CBLP's strong presence in such areas was precedent-setting because the local government and most international agencies were found to routinely overlook the more distant locations of Communes. Residents of such areas are intensely aware of their relative neglect.

It is among largely first-time trainees in these remote areas where the most consistently positive program impact was found. Findings also suggest that prolonged exposure to humanitarian assistance may undermine proactive, positive community action in the longer term.

Based on an extensive evaluation process, much has been learned about the impact of post-war humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in general, and the organization and delivery of conflict management training programs in particular. It is thus urged that the following recommendations be shared widely with relevant actors within the international humanitarian community as well as appropriate officials and agencies of post-war transition governments:

1. *Adapt this model elsewhere.* Taking into account program constraints and ambitions, the CBLP model was extensively evaluated and found to achieve its core objectives to a remarkable degree.
2. *Evenly distribute assistance across geographic areas.* Avoid fueling social inequalities and increasing insecurity caused by directing most assistance to already advantaged geographic areas.
3. *Make the coordination of training activities across agencies and institutions a high priority.* Repeatedly training the same people should be avoided because it negatively impacts all training programs.

4. *Avoid paying people to attend trainings.* The payment of per diems focuses attention on getting paid and promises to undermine trainee initiative to apply training skills afterward. At the same time, it is essential to insure the timely delivery of useful, high quality materials to trainees, such as graduation certificates and program t-shirts.
5. *Provide sustenance, food and drink of a modest sort, during trainings, particularly during times of food scarcity.*
6. *Carry out targeted needs assessments of challenging population groups that the program seeks to include.*
7. *Institute an evaluation program that begins before the program is implemented, continues with regular evaluation visits across the implementation period, and concludes after the program has closed.*
8. *Translate approved versions of evaluation (and other appropriate) documents and distribute them among relevant government and agency officials.*
9. *Calculate program efforts according to population densities instead of political boundaries.*
10. *Incorporate preparatory activities for after-program action into the training program.* Addressing this concern promises to create momentum for maintaining functioning trainee groups into the future.

I. Purpose

1. Hypothesis Tested

The sixth and final evaluation report is to detail the impact of the Community Based Leadership Training Program for Post-War Burundi (CBLP) five months after it ended (an overview of the CBLP can be found in Appendix I). In particular, the evaluation work focused on testing the third program hypothesis:

Burundian communities that are exposed to the CBLP model will continue to apply CBLP problem-solving techniques in the future.

[i.e., CBLP's non-violent problem-solving model will have a positive longer-term impact.]

Field research thus explored:

- (1) Whether prior evidence of positive program impact was sustained after the CBLP had closed; and
- (2) Whether the CBLP had achieved a critical mass of trained individuals who are now managing community-level conflicts more effectively than before the program was implemented in mid-2004.

2. Objectives Evaluated

An overlapping purpose of this report is to conclude its ongoing evaluation of the CBLP's central program objective: *To empower local communities and promote local leaders to successfully work together to solve common problems.*

This final evaluation will also continue to assess the following three related program objectives, as detailed by WWICS before CBLP began:²

1. Provide official and unofficial community leaders with the incentives, skills, and teaching tools to promote cooperation and broad-based participation at the provincial and village level for the successful reintegration of displaced populations and ex-combatants;
2. Increase community level participation in local governance; and
3. By helping to solve the potentially explosive reintegration problems at the community level, the CBLP will serve as a building block in promoting an expanding constituency for peace.

This report is intended to complement the fifth field evaluation report that was carried out as the program was closing down.³ Together, they constitute a thorough-going, concluding examination of program impact and the state of prominent problems and how

² Drawn directly from the "Community-Based Leadership Program (CBLP)/Burundi Program Description" written by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS)/Africa Program (January 14, 2004), page 5.

³ *Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #5, December 2005*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (January, 2006).

they are addressed in communities in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces. The initial impact assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plan for the entire activity, as detailed the first evaluation report (May 12, 2004), is contained in Appendix V. A updated version of the activity schedule, originally found in the same report, is provided in Appendix VI.

The fifth report summed up the central findings of the first four evaluation reports. It also evaluated three operational issues concerning the four organizations involved in CBLP: the donor agency, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI); OTI's primary implementing partner for its larger Burundi country program, PADCO;⁴ a Burundian NGO that was directly involved in the implementation of CBLP, African Strategic Impact (ASI); and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS), which developed CBLP's curriculum and was the primary source of the program's technical advice, training and evaluation.

Drawing from research and analysis across this 28-month evaluation activity, the recommendations in these last two evaluation reports address both the CBLP experience and post-war, community-based action more broadly. Accordingly, while the fifth evaluation report provided lessons learned and missed opportunities that specifically arose from evaluating the CBLP, this report will conclude with recommendations for the international humanitarian community and post-war governments.

3. *Defining Terms*

The terms highlighted in italics require some explanation for those unfamiliar with rural Burundi and prior evaluation reports in this series.

Local Administration – Each Province of Burundi is divided into a series of administration levels whose size and influence decrease in the following order: *Communes*, *Zones*, *Collines*, and *Sous-Collines*.⁵ The decentralized nature of governance in Burundi has awarded the Commune Administration with considerable autonomy and power, including in the realms of law, law enforcement and finance.

The head of the Commune Administration is the *Commune Administrator*, who also heads a *Communal Council*. Communes are divided into *Zones*, led by a *Chef de Zone* that reports to the Commune Administrator. Similarly, *Zones* are divided into *Collines*, each headed by a *Chef de Colline* who reports to a *Chef de Zone*. The *Nyumba Kumi* (“Ten Houses”) is the lowest government official. Each *Nyumba Kumi* is “responsible” for a unit of approximately ten households. Communal council members (including administrators) are popularly elected, as are the colline councils (including the chef de colline). The chefs de zone are appointed by the communal councils. Provincial governors remain appointed by the President of the Republic.

⁴ OTI's country program was called the Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative (CPRI). The CBLP is only one of four components of the CPRI (the others were funding for community initiatives, vocational education and media programming). See Appendix I for more information about the CBLP's niche within the CPRI.

⁵ Until recently, a fifth administration level existed: *Secteur*, positioned between the *Zone* and *Colline*.

Bashingantahe – The name of Burundi’s traditional courts and the name of the judges who sit on these courts is the same: Bashingantahe (*Mushingantahe* is singular for ‘one traditional judge’). The institution dates back to the pre-colonial era and is accorded high social stature.

While Bashingantahe courts can exist at Zone and Commune levels (they appear to function only at the behest of particular Commune Administrators and Chefs de Zone), each Colline has a Bashingantahe court. Colline-level Bashingantahe courts constitute the primary dispute resolution institution in rural Burundi, and it is this level of Bashingantahe that is referred to in this report.

Favored and Neglected Zones – The terms were directly drawn from field interviews for the second and third evaluation reports in this series (July 2004 and November 2004, respectively). The findings and their potentially serious implications eventually also surfaced in an Africa Program Issue Paper for WWICS.⁶

The terms refer to Zones that are widely thought to be “favored,” which always includes the Zone where each Commune Administration is based,⁷ and those that are considered “neglected” or “forgotten.” Neglected Zones tend to have dramatically lower levels of development investment and political clout than Favored Zones. This trend of “geographic favoritism” appears to date back to the colonial era.

Master Trainer – CBLP deployed one *Master Trainer (MT)* in each of the 18 Communes, collectively, in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces.⁸ They were trained to identify participants and conduct trainings and follow-up review sessions. MTs lived in the Communes where they worked and became familiar with and known in their assigned Communes.

Community Facilitator – In two phases (Feb. and Sept. 2005, respectively), MTs selected, helped to train and supervised 2-3 *Community Facilitators (CFs)* to assist them in their work and prepare to assume some of the MT’s leadership and motivational work after the program closed. CFs serve as program volunteers, although they received some support from the program, chiefly in the form of a bicycle to aid transport and a notebook to maintain program records.

⁶ “*It Always Rains in the Same Place First*”: *Geographic Favoritism in Rural Burundi*, Africa Program Issue Briefing No. 1 (July), Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005 [<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/IB001.pdf>]. The text is also contained in Appendix IV.

⁷ In a small portion of Communes (such as in Bugendana and Bukirasazi Communes of Gitega Province, and Butezi Commune in Ruyigi Province), additional “favored” Zones may exist where development by particular church missions is particularly high and is not located in the same Zone as the Commune Administration.

⁸ Two other MTs provided an abridged version of the CBLP curriculum to students in the eight vocational schools managed by PADCO as part of the larger Community-based Peace and Reconciliation Initiative (CPRI) (See Appendix I for further information). Their work will not be examined here.

II. Methodology

The field research for this activity took place in Burundi from 9 May through 26 May. Follow-up briefings were carried out in Burundi over the subsequent two weeks as well.

This research mission was different from the previous five evaluation trips in two main ways. First, it featured a longer time period in the field.⁹ Second, and for the first time, it included five other evaluators. All were former Master Trainers who were trained and supervised by the International Evaluator and became Field Evaluation Assistants (FEAs) for this evaluation activity. Collectively, the entire evaluation activity was carried out in 10 of the combined 18 Communes in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces.

Prior to carrying out field research in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces, the International Evaluator worked in Bujumbura (May 9-12) to:

1. Meet with and interview key CBLP officials;
2. Prepare for fieldwork (logistics, revising field research questions and site selections);
3. Conduct introductory training activities for the five FEAs; and
4. Develop the questionnaires, research protocols and site selection criteria in advance of the FEAs' fieldwork.

1. *International Evaluator Activities*

The International Evaluator carried out field research from May 13 to May 25 (13 days, total). The field research took place in three Communes in Ruyigi Province (Ruyigi, Butaganzwa and Kinyinya) and two in Gitega Province (Itaba and Bugendana). The Evaluator spent nearly half of the total field research period in two Communes (Kinyinya and Bugendana) to allow for greater depth of understanding of community level impact.

For the first time, the research relied heavily on trainees, and Community Facilitators in particular, instead of Master Trainers to help set up meetings. Indeed, the International Evaluator spent more time with Community Facilitators than ever before. He also regularly devoted time to interviewing untrained community members, including local officials.

In addition to generally evaluating the extent and nature of CBLP trainee problem-solving capabilities following the closure of CBLP, the following related issues were also investigated:

1. The longer-term impact of CBLP on women trainees;
2. Interactions and relationships involving CBLP trainees and the largest and most widely present dispute resolution institution in Burundi, the Bashingantahe;
3. Widespread reports that CBLP trainees' dispute resolution activities had reduced the number of conflicts that surfaced in their communities;

⁹ 18 days in Burundi, total (13 days, total, of fieldwork). Field evaluation trips nos. 2,3 and 4 were all 16 days, total, including 11 days of fieldwork. Field evaluation trips nos. 1 and 5 were both shorter (8 and 11 days, respectively).

4. Whether a prominent feature of CBLP – trainees receiving no compensation for attending trainings and offering dispute resolution services free of charge – was promoting sustainability; and,
5. If involvement as a CBLP trainee impacted trainee lives in other ways (i.e., whether there were any collateral benefits of participating in CBLP).

2. *Field Evaluation Assistant Activities*

All five FEAs worked up-country from between 6 and 8 days (May 13-20). During this period, they had regular telephone exchanges and meetings with the International Evaluator.

Four of the five FEAs were each assigned a Commune to carry out research in the Province where they had not worked as a Master Trainer. This was done to remove familiarity with a particular area.

These four Communes were selected according to the following criteria:

1. All four Communes must be those where the International Evaluator was not planning to conduct a significant amount of research (to avoid excessive overlap).
2. To insure representative balance, there must be two Communes per Province. The two must be connected by road because each FEA team had to share one car for transport. All Communes must be reasonably accessible by road.
3. There must be one Commune containing a provincial capital (Ruyigi Commune was chosen).
4. There must be one Commune in the Kumoso region of Ruyigi Province, as it constitutes a geographically and culturally distinct area that required representation (Nyabitsinda Commune was chosen).
5. There must be two Communes that had significant differences in population density (Makebuko and Bukirasazi Communes in Gitega were chosen). Makebuko Commune is nearly twice the size of Bukirasazi Commune (59,581 residents in Makebuko, 33,305 residents in Bukirasazi).

The aim of the four FEAs was to interview trainees and government officials in the favored and neglected zones of their assigned Communes. They were expected to interview at least one trainee group in the favored zone, two trainee groups in the neglected zone(s), the Commune Administrator, at least two Chefs de Zone, and at least two Chefs de Colline. A complete review of the Commune evaluation activities, criteria and questionnaires can be found in Appendix II.

A fifth FEA was exclusively assigned to interview members of the traditional Bashingantahe courts at the Colline level. The Colline level courts are by far the most prevalent in Burundi. They are also the one institution with the most direct interactions with CBLP trainees. This FEA worked in three Communes: Ruyigi and Bweru in Ruyigi Province, and Gishubi Commune in Gitega Province. These communes were chosen with much simpler criteria than those developed for the other four FEAs:

1. All Communes must be reasonably accessible by car.
2. Two of the Communes must be adjacent to each other, so that the FEA could visit both in one day (Bweru and Ruyigi).
3. There must be at least two Communes that neither the other 4 FEAs were going to visit nor the International Evaluator had ever visited (Bweru and Gishubi), to minimize overlap and expand coverage.
4. Communes from both Provinces must be represented.

The FEA attempted to interview at least one complete Bashingantahe court in a favored zone and at least one in a neglected zone. In addition, the FEA sought to interview at least two groups of Bashingantahe located in a remote Colline: one group of Bashingantahe who had been trained by CBLP, and one who had not been trained by CBLP. All of the Bashingantahe evaluation activities, criteria and questionnaires are reviewed in Appendix III.

III. Findings

This section contains the eight principal categories of findings surfacing from the final field evaluation of CBLP (May 2006). The underlined passages call attention to specific findings of primary significance.

1. Keys to Program Success

CBLP is generating positive impact in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces months after the program ended. Many of its trainees are actively resolving conflicts in their communities. While positive impact is not consistent across communities, there seem to be four central characteristics of active, still-successful trainee groups.

First, successful trainees generally exercise strong leadership. Successful trainees tend to organize in groups sharing the same Sous-Colline or Colline. They meet regularly to review their dispute resolution activities and encourage each other, sometimes with their Community Facilitator as well. They may even deliver regular reports to the Community Facilitator. Some trainees also meet with others who are interested in their dispute resolution work, and inform or train them in CBLP techniques. And they continue to share their services free of charge.

In addition, the most successful trainee groups that were interviewed tended to have a single leader within their group. As one Community Facilitator observed, “When a trainee leader is dynamic and has a will, people will follow. Likewise, if the leader has little energy, the others won’t follow.” “The trainee group leader does everything he can to convince other trainees to keep working,” another Community Facilitator remarked.

Leaders of trainee groups are generally people with education and/or social status, such as a Mushingantahe or a Chef de Colline. Community Facilitators, in some cases, play important roles in inspiring, organizing and even leading local trainee groups. On the

other hand, in communities where strong leadership is lacking, the CBLP trainees tend to do much less. In such situations, a Community Facilitator explained, “Even if nothing is done by the trainees, it won’t matter to the leader.”

Many trainees seem lost without leaders. Some said they were awaiting the call of their leaders before carrying out dispute resolution activities. Many truly and sincerely miss their Master Trainers, and the sense of abandonment by the program was often expressed in poignant terms. Some also wondered about the program’s impact if their current leaders leave. One Community Facilitator, for example, asked, “Once a Master Trainer or Community Facilitator finds a job with another NGO or elsewhere, it won’t allow them to keep following the trainees. When that occurs, who will take over their work?” The issue of sustainability will be addressed in the conclusion.

Second, successful trainee groups tend to reside within functional local communities at the Sous-Colline or Colline levels. Such communities are not plagued by division and distrust. One group of women trainees who lived on the same Sous-Collines stated that “The differences between trainee groups depends on the Sous-Collines where they live. On some, the trainees are determined to work to resolve conflicts, while on other Sous-Collines, they don’t want to work for free.” A Community Facilitator recalled that:

During the training sessions, you could already see signs of the future. For example, some trainee groups would ask, “How can we work for free?” But other trainee groups had no complaint about not being paid. Instead, they would ask, “How are we going to work with the Bashingantahe, who get their reward [i.e., paid for resolving disputes]?”¹⁰

Third, most active CBLP trainees live in neglected zones, and particularly in remote Collines. Perhaps because residents realize that there will be little or no support coming from Commune or even Zone leadership, a strong self-help ethic often already exists there. This ethic tends to promote community action, and has boosted post-CBLP program efforts in many observed cases. As a trainee from a neglected Colline noted,

No other NGO has come to train anyone here. Who could come to a [remote] place like this? I don’t remember of anyone ever coming here, even before the war.

Such comments were common among trainee groups working in neglected areas. Attendance was generally higher during CBLP training sessions, they were more engaged in the training, and their commitment to becoming dispute resolution advisors following the training was generally stronger. As a Community Facilitator recalled,

Most people who stayed in the [CBLP] training had never been trained by other organizations. But most who had received per diem from [other NGOs in favored zones] were the ones who couldn’t complete the training. They would come once or twice to the training, but they would become discouraged because they were used to getting money.

¹⁰ Issues relating to the Bashingantahe will be addressed below.

While the CBLP generally had limited impact in favored zones, it is important to note that favored zones yielded two significant positive program impacts. First, CBLP invited buy-in at the highest levels of the local power structure. Training people in favored zones almost always implied training influential people in the Commune (or attempting to train them, since many refused to attend a training without monetary compensation). This opened the door for Commune and Zone-level officials to become familiar with CBLP's training approach and the work of the trainees.

In addition, the CBLP's work in favored zones ultimately resulted in training some individuals who eventually became powerful and influential local officials. There are CBLP trainees who were recently elected as Commune Administrators, Communal Council members, Chefs de Zone, and Chefs de Colline. Some of these officials, and a great many trainees in their communities, contend that the CBLP training experience was a reason why the officials were elected. While it was impossible to gauge the accuracy of such claims, some elected officials who were trained by CBLP explained how they regularly employed skills learned during their CBLP training. Some also maintain that they routinely meet with other elected officials who were also trained by CBLP.

Fourth, program success was often connected to population density. The differences in scale between Communes was enormous – some Communes in CBLP's program area contain five times more people than other Communes. The program appears to have a higher chance of success in areas with lower population densities. A lower population density provided opportunities for training more local leaders in each Colline. In such places, the proportion of people trained in communities was greater. This increased the chances that more people knew about the presence of CBLP trainees in their community, and might, conceivably, access them.

2. *Persistent Coordination Challenges*

Field research has continued to find exceptionally poor coordination among international agencies engaged in training activities in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces. Information sharing may take place among some (but reportedly not all) agency officials in venues such as provincial coordination meetings. But there is little field evidence that such activities have borne much fruit in the field.

There also may be concerted efforts not to coordinate. One NGO director recalled a counterpart stating, after an NGO coordination meeting, that "I'm not telling you anything. I've got a job to keep, and I don't need someone else to sell my ideas." Burundian government officials in the field expressed frustration at the lack of coordination and information sharing between implementing agencies and government officials. An exasperated Chef de Zone, for example, stated that:

We are wondering which NGOs teach what to whom. The situation leaves government officials confused while the NGOs do well. If ever someone comes to my people, he should inform me and eventually ask for my collaboration. The NGOs should hide nothing from us. If they do, they can fail.

The most significant indicator of a serious coordination deficiency can be found in reports that agencies are consistently training many of the same people. While this may be intentional, there is virtually no evidence of either: (1) A coordinated, strategic targeting of particular community members for complementary training programming; or (2) The development of complementary training curricula by agencies or government officials. A promising sign reflecting the desire among some actors to improve collaboration is DAI's recent effort to build on the CBLP training curriculum rather than supplant it and to possibly use CBLP's former Master Trainers in the implementation of their country program. Such efforts unfortunately remain a rarity within the international NGO community.

More seriously, although a number of trainees and government officials contended that people benefit from receiving a sequence of trainings – an NGO official, for example, explained that trainees “think that refreshing one’s memory through extra trainings is a good thing” – the evaluative data does not bear this out. Instead, prior field research indicates that participants of two or more trainings often end up perplexed:

...the same corps of largely elite, influential men and women, most of whom reside in the favored zone, tend to be repeatedly identified by Commune officials and trained by local and international agencies... People who have been trained by a sequence of agencies were found to have been confused by the various training content they received, particularly if the material was similar.¹¹

Research carried out for this evaluation revealed a trainee selection process that appears to be widely used. Trainings are regularly carried out at or near the Commune Administration offices in the favored zone because relatively good facilities exist there. As one Commune Administrator explained, meeting facilities located “near our office provided infrastructure for the NGOs.” Working in the favored zone naturally allowed favored zone residents to dominate participant lists. It was repeatedly stated that this was appropriate because the favored zones contained a breadth of population categories that other zones could not match.

Whereas neglected zones tend to be largely ethnic Hutu, a combination of returning refugees and residents who remained outside of refugee or IDP camps during the war, and contain relatively few local associations and local NGOs, favored zones tend to contain the greatest diversity of population categories (particularly since most elites residing in Communes tend to live there). Several officials who were interviewed explained that implementing agencies normally carry out their activities where many types of people reside, such as ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, the heads of local associations and churches, government officials, and leaders of all three ethnic groups. The combination of broad population categories, the availability of facilities, easy road access, and a longstanding tradition of working in favored zones has created a situation where the Commune Center in the favored zone typically hosts international agency trainings. And a part of this tradition is to train many of the same people (mostly elites residing in the favored zone) every time a new training opportunity arises.

¹¹ *Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #5, December 2005*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (January 2006), p. 11.

While it has been detailed elsewhere that such geographic favoritism runs the risk of setting the stage for renewed violence by reconstructing structural inequalities that were a cause of civil war,¹² the concern here is the impact of repeatedly training many of the same people in favored zones. “The people who benefit are intellectuals,” one local leader explained. “And they are always the cause of violence.” A new Commune Administrator recalled the situation that existed prior to his recent election:

The same people were trained, twice, three times, four times. The training was always for the same people. But people asked, “What is the use of this?” People who are always trained are always useless. They don’t try to use the skills they learned afterwards.

The research also surfaced two related findings. First, paying people appears to be a disincentive for implementing skills learned in training sessions. Some Burundians who were interviewed shared their perspective that, for some trainees, gaining access to training sessions mainly meant receiving a per diem for attending and may have undermined their interest in using the skills they learned afterwards.

The reported purpose of attending a training, in other words, was mainly to get paid, not to prepare to use new skills in the future. A Commune Administrator illustrated this assertion with his comment that “People were waiting for the next training to get the per diem. They didn’t care about the content of the training.” “If you only do the trainings at the Commune Center,” a CBLP Community Facilitator stated, “The participant list will always contain those living near the Center, and they mainly speculate about the per diems they get.” Another Community Facilitator simply explained that “It’s difficult to get people who get a monthly salary [such as the civil servants who tend to dominate trainee rolls in favored zones] to accept to be trained without payment.” Interview data continued to indicate that CBLP trainees residing near Commune Centers were most likely to complain about the lack of per diem and use that as a reason for not regularly attending training sessions. They were also, in general, least likely to employ their skills following the training period.

A second finding related to training in favored areas is that prolonged exposure to humanitarian assistance may undermine proactive, positive community action in the long term. While the data is merely suggestive, it is worth noting an apparent correlation between those Communes that have received the earliest and steadiest humanitarian assistance since the civil war period and low impact levels among CBLP trainees.

Interviews in 2004 with experienced NGO officials indicated that Giheta and Makebuko were the first two Communes in Gitega to receive humanitarian assistance during the civil war years (reportedly starting in 1995). Humanitarian agencies reportedly judged these two Communes as the only locations beyond the town of Gitega that they could regularly access with reasonable security. Butaganzwa Commune reportedly had a similar war experience in Ruyigi Province. These three Communes apparently received

¹² See Appendix IV and *Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #5, December 2005*, p. 9.

fairly regular access to humanitarian assistance over time (relative to more insecure and inaccessible Communes) as well as regular training activities where NGOs paid people to participate. Field research carried out in two of these Communes (Makebuko and Butaganzwa) recorded generally low positive impact among CBLP trainees when compared to trainees in other Communes. While this was particularly the case for trainees in the favored zone in Butaganzwa (Muriza Zone), the tendency was much more widespread in Makebuko.

In general, field research for this project indicates that the remote locations that international agencies frequently overlook were places where the volunteer nature of CBLP was best able to thrive. But during recent interviews with trainees from both the neglected and favored zones of Makebuko, the absence of payment from CBLP was the primary issue raised. The level of anger in all trainee meetings there was high. This stands in dramatic contrast to findings in most neglected zones, where complaints about the lack of per diem were much less prominent and do not, as a rule, undermine conflict negotiation work by trainees.

CBLP's program is a contributor to and a victim and benefactor of the coordination deficiency. Although efforts to coordinate CBLP's activities were recorded during interviews with CBLP officials and have been noted in earlier program evaluation reports, the four agencies involved with CBLP cannot be entirely exempted from the poor state of coordination among agencies engaged in training work. Efforts at coordination appear to have been limited and did not, in the end, yield particularly compelling results. That said, it is also true that one actor among many would find it difficult to change the overall coordination picture. Since the issue of the initial April 2004 field report, no broad momentum to coordinate training activities in Ruyigi or Gitega Provinces ever existed.

At the same time, the CBLP has been a victim of poor coordination, at least to a limited extent in Ruyigi Province. There, another NGO is currently in the process of providing a conflict negotiation training program in many of the same communities where CBLP has already provided similar trainings. Like all NGOs operating in Ruyigi except CBLP's agencies, they pay a per diem, and have included some CBLP trainees in their program.

Two Community Facilitators in one Commune reported that the inclusion of CBLP trainees negatively impacts CBLP trainee groups. Those trained by both organizations, one Community Facilitator explained, become "especially discouraged" about working with CBLP trainees because the other NGO "pays them a daily per diem, food, and a beer" for attending training sessions while CBLP did not. These trainees' subsequent reluctance to continue resolving conflicts with former CBLP colleagues for free, Community Facilitators explained, threatens the *esprit de corps* that is important among operating groups of trainees. While the extent of this problem could not be gauged in the limited time in the field, the negative impact it caused did not appear to be extensive.

In contrast, there are strong indications that the decision of many NGOs (often with the assistance of local Commune and Zone-level government officials) to primarily and

repeatedly train the same people in favored Zones awarded CBLP a significant strategic advantage. As mentioned earlier, CBLP's policy of targeting leaders in a roughly equal geographic distribution across each Commune meant that most CBLP trainees were from neglected zones and had never been trained before.

3. Impact on Important Population Groups

Research on CBLP's impact on particular population groups will be detailed in this section.

Women – The representation of women as CBLP trainees was significant. Out of a total of 7,137 Burundians trained by CBLP in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces in 2004-2005, 3,256 trainees were women, or 45.6 percent. This in itself was impressive, given that senior men dominate leadership and dispute resolution roles in rural Burundi.

The inclusion of so many women as trained leaders and dispute resolution advisors led to many impacts. Similar to findings about youth who were trained (examined just below), the training of thousands of women often challenged the traditional role of middle-aged and elder men as dominant community leaders and the primary resolvers of conflicts. In many places, women are traditionally included as Bashingantahe judges. However, their role is usually limited. Wives may automatically become Bashingantahe when their husbands become Bashingantahe. But in many Communes, women only participate when their husbands cannot attend court proceedings. Some women explained that this was part of the prevailing custom of male dominance. As one woman trainee remarked,

In Burundi, men always come first. It's the men who speak first and have the first say, and women come only as a complement to them.

Women trainees often form separate conflict resolution groups, often at the level of the Sous-Colline. In some cases, they constitute initial advisory units. As one women leader explained, "When there are small conflicts, women trainees can solve them alone. When conflicts are tough, we send the parties to men trainees." A member of another group of women trainees explained that:

We women resolve conflicts together. According to lessons we learned in our training, we must invite male trainees to join us if they have time. But you know that men are busy all the time, so when they don't have time to follow us, we go alone.

One senses in this reply that the invitation to include male counterparts in conflict negotiation was grudging, and men apparently did not often join them regardless.

Despite the comments noted above, gender dynamics among groups of CBLP trainees did not always follow this course. While male dominance in Burundi is widely recognized, a woman migrant to Ruyigi Province (from Muramvya) noted that

It's not new for women to be conflict advisors. In Muramvya, the Bashingantahe couldn't put women aside. In other places, the Bashingantahe say that women

can't be conflict advisors. But here [in my community in Ruyigi Province], women participate.

While men still tower over women in traditional dispute resolution contexts in Burundi, as illustrated by the overwhelmingly male Bashingantaha institution, the CBLP's inclusion of significant numbers of women supported the inroads that women, in some places, were able to make in advancing their participation. Remarking on the impact of being trained by CBLP, a woman trainee commented, "People used to say that women have nothing to say, socially speaking. But now we have made a step ahead."

A featured specialty of women trainees is marriage counseling. In some cases, as one group of women trainees explained, "Women trainees try to counsel the wife while men trainees advise the husband." But women trainees in another community highlighted the fact that husbands and wives sought them out exclusively. A member of a group of women trainees explained that:

Conflicts between men and women are usually addressed by women trainees. They go to women because they believe that women can keep their secrets better than men. We keep the discussion among us, and at the end of the day, the man is satisfied by the change in his wife.

Ex-Combatants – Relatively few ex-combatants participated in CBLP trainings. The chief reason was that community members selected few ex-combatants as people who were recognized as leaders (and thus qualified for CBLP training). Some of the ex-combatants who were chosen reportedly dropped out because their primary current interests were tied to economic concerns. As one ex-combatant explained, "For some ex-combatants, the CBLP training was useless because they felt that they could use their time better in looking for business opportunities." Some ex-combatants sought work or access to capital, in short, and CBLP did not provide it. This would likely explain why most ex-combatants receiving CBLP training were those who were students at PADCO-run vocational schools. All students at these schools received an abridged CBLP training module.¹³

Some of the relatively few ex-combatants who were both selected and remained in the eight-session training related that the CBLP program was useful. One ex-combatant commented that "The program helps [ex-combatants] a lot because it allowed us to remain cool and patient towards government authorities" while awaiting anticipated compensation for serving in the military. Another joined the CBLP training program after realizing that "every education opportunity will become useful at one time or another in the future."

Youth – While training youth was not a high program priority, their inclusion among CBLP trainees was a clear boost for many of those involved.¹⁴ Young adult men and

¹³ Given time constraints for field evaluation work, it was decided that the International Evaluator and his team concentrate their research efforts on those who attended the complete eight-session training course.

¹⁴ At the same time, youth were targeted for inclusion in the vocational schools that were run by PADCO and included an abbreviated CBLP training module.

women were generally involved as conflict advisors with other CBLP trainees, but mainly, it appears, as junior members of such groups. Even so, they were grateful to have been selected as CBLP trainees. One male youth, for example, commented that “Often grown-ups are unjust to young people, so it’s a pleasure to be trained.” Becoming CBLP trainees clearly increased the esteem and social standing of some youth. As one commented,

After I was trained, people would come to see me to explain their troubles. It was a sign of trust they had in me, and the trust came because I knew how to solve their conflicts. This situation arose because I was trained by CBLP.

Many of the youth trainees who were interviewed separately from older trainees asserted that they brought fresh perspectives to the provision of conflict analysis and advice. Their presence as conflict advisors seemed to bring ongoing debates with members of the older generation about the wisdom and value of youth views into the open, which seemed to please many youth trainees. One explained that the presence of youth as conflict advisors inspired some older leaders to ask them, “Do you want to change tradition?” They hardly can believe that things can change according to the ideas of the younger generation.” Youth trainees from another community reported that trained and untrained Bashingantahe were equally threatened by the presence of youth trainees as conflict advisors. One youth trainee explained that the Bashingantahe would tell them that “Youth don’t have enough wisdom” to be included. “Once the Bashingantahe go to deliberate” about a case, another stated, “they put you aside, whereas your contribution could help in one way or another.” A third simply added that “They don’t want us to sit with them.”

In addition to serving as junior members of CBLP conflict advisor teams, youth trainees in some communities also serve as advisors to youth embroiled in conflicts. As one female youth trainee explained, “Conflicts for older people are solved by older trainees, while those involving youth go to younger trainees.”

Urban Residents – There was limited effort by CBLP, and little reported success, in attracting and incorporating residents of the urban centers of Gitega and Ruyigi. One Master Trainer explained why impact in Ruyigi town was so low: “Ruyigi town people were very opposed to the training because there was no per diem. People in town are busy and don’t want to work free of charge.” Master Trainers working in Gitega and Ruyigi Communes focused their efforts in the more rural areas of their respective Communes.

4. Impact on Rates of Conflict

As mentioned in past evaluation reports for this activity, some government and CBLP officials have contended that conflict negotiation services supplied by CBLP trainees reduce the number of conflicts in an area. This claim was repeatedly raised during interviews for this evaluation report as well, as illustrated by the following comment from a Commune Administrator: “The proof is that nowadays a lot of conflicts among the population are addressed without having to go to court, thanks to PADCO. So there’s been a decrease in the number of cases that are taken to court.”

In fact, the reality turns out to be complex. First, there appeared to be no statistical data to support such claims. Repeated requests were made for any records about the nature and number of conflicts that local officials, Bashingantahe courts and unofficial conflict advisors (such as CBLP trainees) have addressed. The consistent response from officials was that no such records exist.

Second, the availability of free conflict advisors has, in some places, actually *increased* the number of conflicts that are being addressed. This is because poor people realize they suddenly have, in some areas, access to free conflict negotiation services. Access to the Bashingantahe and government officials who carry out dispute resolution work (such as Nyumba Kumi, Chefs de Colline, Chefs de Zone, and Commune Administrators) has often been difficult because poor residents have not been able to supply the payments they require. This is particularly true for accessing Bashingantahe courts. While this situation is changing in some areas (and will be discussed below), payment of some kind is still required in many areas before a case is heard.

In short, in areas where people have been trained as conflict advisors (by CBLP and other programs) and remain active, there tend to be more conflicts that are being addressed because more people have access to trained conflict advisors working as volunteers. CBLP has thus contributed, in some communities, to an emerging critical mass of trained and available conflict advisors who work for free. This has expanded the ability of members of the poor rural majority to bring their conflicts before trained conflict advisors. As a result, in situations where trainees are active and being utilized, it appears that the number of conflicts being sent to the Bashingantahe and the Chefs de Colline, Chefs de Zone and the Commune Administration are reduced.

At the same time, it cannot be concluded that CBLP's work alone has created this impact. A more significant factor has been that the number of refugees returning from Tanzania has declined since 2005. Their return has proven to be major source of family and community conflict in recent years. In addition, there are other NGOs who have trained people to resolve conflicts in the Communes of Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces since 2004 (although most of those trained in dispute resolution by other NGOs reportedly reside in favored zones).¹⁵

Nonetheless, there were consistent reports of CBLP trainees being accepted as part of a new, emerging system of conflict resolution involving NGO-trained actors (including those of CBLP), Bashingantahe courts, and government officials who resolve disputes free of charge. Of these three groups, the greatest resistance to working for free continues to be among the Bashingantahe, an issue of great significance to CBLP's impact. It is addressed in detail in the next section.

¹⁵ The author can provide a partial list of NGOs upon request, should the reader require this information for further research.

5. *Impact of CBLP on Bashingantahe Courts*

The impact of CBLP trainees on Bashingantahe Courts is broad, and will be detailed in the following two sub-sections.

Filling a Dispute Resolution Niche

A survey of four Commune Administrators, eight Chefs de Zone and 20 Chefs de Colline in four Communes (two in each Province) strongly indicated that CBLP trainees are generally helping to address conflicts that do not require judicial sanction or involve violent crime. In a great many cases, their contribution appears to be significant, although, again, no statistics exist to support this.

Nonetheless, the survey work suggests that CBLP trainees continue to help fill a significant niche in community life: addressing some of the myriad of conflicts that arise in communities. Officials identified the sorts of conflicts that CBLP trainees typically address, the most prominent of which were characterized by some officials as “little conflicts.” The most commonly mentioned were:

1. Quarrels that did not result in serious physical injury (often involving spouses or neighbors, and regarding issues such as gossip, insults, drunkenness, and debt);
2. Deciding on the land boundary line between the properties of two neighbors;
3. Livestock of one farmer destroying the crops of another.

The primary conflicts that CBLP trainees could not address were:

1. Land inheritance and ownership disputes;
2. Violent crimes, including armed robbery;
3. Conflicts involving serious physical injury and death;
4. Blood conflicts;
5. Divorce;
6. Rape;
7. Theft.

Of these conflicts, those pertaining to land inheritance and ownership, which is exceedingly common, are usually directed to the Bashingantahe courts. It is only if such a case is appealed that Zone or Commune officials would hear it. The remaining conflicts and crimes listed just above tend to go directly to “the authorities”: Chefs de Colline and Chefs de Zone, and high-ranking officials of the Commune Administration.

Interestingly, the evaluation research illuminates some exceptions to this practice. If serious crimes, feuds, and conflicts are initially heard by the Chef de Colline or Colline-level Bashingantahe, they generally go up to the rank of Zone or Commune upon appeal, as explained above. However, a significant number of Chefs de Colline (30%) who were interviewed explained that CBLP trainees may address all kinds of conflicts. Sometimes the trainees act alone, but more often they address more serious cases with the Chef de Colline, and sometimes the Bashingantahe as well. This information was verified by interviews with other Colline officials, Bashingantahe and CBLP trainees. In other words,

active CBLP trainees address domestic and neighborhood quarrels, land boundary disputes and clashes involving farmers and herders. But some CBLP trainees also become engaged in significantly more serious conflicts, either as advisors to Bashingantahe or Chefs de Colline who are hearing a case, or as participating advisors to the actual parties in conflict. Taken together, this constitutes a significant contribution to dispute resolution at domestic, Sous-Colline and Colline levels.

Influences on the Bashingantahe

The two most prominent sources of CBLP trainees' community appeal are the fact that they work for free and employ a process that many contend promotes lasting resolution to conflict. In both of these respects, the work of CBLP and its trainees directly intersects with the work and role of the primary dispute resolution institution in Burundian communities, the Bashingantahe.

CBLP has made inroads in changing the way in which conflicts are addressed because they are widely seen to be effective. In community after community, CBLP trainees who were both Bashingantahe and non-Bashingantahe clearly explained differences between traditional ways of resolving disputes and the CBLP approach. As one CBLP trainee detailed,

Bashingantahe are quick to take a decision. They issue a judgment, saying "You're right, and you're wrong; you win, and you lose." They also often fine the losing party. But in our [CBLP] process, we try to bring both sides to acknowledge what's right and what's wrong.

The CBLP method of encouraging the parties in conflict to work out a resolution was widely praised and seen to be effective. In addition, many trained Bashingantahe reported that other Bashingantahe praised the way they demonstrated new skills in court, such as how they asked questions. There were widespread requests by untrained Bashingantahe to receive the CBLP training.

Working for free has been a source of both CBLP trainee popularity and frustration. In virtually every interview, trainees requested some sort of a "reward" from CBLP agencies. Despite repeated expressions of gratitude for being trained, and often deep satisfaction for being able to resolve disputes successfully, most trainees who were interviewed contended that their work as community volunteers, which called for considerable time sacrifices to address conflicts, was taxing as well as worthwhile. Many clearly stated that working for free would continue into the future, but partly because the demand for their services from other community members would be difficult to resist. Working for free had its costs, trainees insisted in a variety of ways. Many continued to seek some sort of compensation from the program in the form of another umbrella or program t-shirt, some local beer – or, most often, money.

The issue of volunteerism remains a challenge for CBLP trainees. Although they may be seen as community leaders because of their work, the time sacrifice can be significant. Moreover, the precedent of being compensated has become nearly ubiquitous. Being

trained by an international agency without receiving monetary compensation, as previously noted, has become the exception and not the rule. Indeed, many trainees identified a correlation between, on the one hand, the fact that they had never been trained before and live in neglected areas of their Commune and, on the other hand, have not received compensation while trainees of virtually every other NGO received some sort of payment. Some thus viewed CBLP's volunteerism as a component of their comparative misfortune and lack of influence. As a Community Facilitator working in a neglected Zone noted, "If you analyze the situation, you find that we volunteers are the ones who get nothing from the whole system."

This realization did not stop trainees from requesting a "reward", and it remained difficult for some trainees to believe that something beyond a certificate, an umbrella and a t-shirt would not, at some point, be forthcoming. This expectation often persists even after trainees are reminded that the program is over and, quite probably, their meeting with the International Evaluator or one of the Field Evaluation Assistants will be their last with any CBLP official. Whether they continue or not is entirely up to them, they were reminded. Concluding interviews with trainees was often difficult, and not just because the compensation issue lay unresolved. It was often at this time, near the end of interviews, that trainees and Community Facilitators would wonder when the Master Trainer that worked in their Commune would return to visit them. Many clearly and sincerely missed the friendship, support and guidance that the Master Trainers had provided.

CBLP's volunteerism is helping to challenge the longstanding tradition of being compensated in return for addressing conflicts. This tradition is strongly associated with the Bashingantahe institution, and there are a series of proverbs that are connected to it, such as:

Akasha Umusyi Kava Mungasiro.

(You can't grind sorghum if you don't have sorghum.)

Ntawutabaru Uwiwe Ngo Asige Inda.

(When you go to assist your relative, you don't leave your stomach behind.)

In both cases, the meaning behind the proverb is the same: you can't gain access to the Bashingantahe courts without the beer that they require in advance. A government official explained that the demand for beer by many Bashingantahe is due to the required payment of large amounts of beer at their induction ceremonies: "The Bashingantahe say, 'We gave a lot of beer to be sworn in as Bashingantahe. So we have to get our beer back.'" Hence the demand for beer from anyone who seeks access to their court.

A second common reason is tradition: the Bashingantahe courts, some explained, date back to the era of the monarchy, before Burundi's colonial era. Beer has always been paid, many explained. A third common reason is that hearing difficult, complicated cases takes time (they can last for several days, and periodic hearings can extend across months or even years). It seems reasonable to many Bashingantahe to expect a payment of beer up front to carry out their work.

However, this tradition has meant that people who are too poor to provide beer that the Bashingantahe require¹⁶ have been unable to have their conflicts addressed. Courts, in other words, have often been the reserve of the relatively better off, which has typically opened the door for impunity among higher classes of people. In addition, Bashingantahe positions have typically been reserved only for those who could afford to pay the often substantial amounts of beer that is required to become one. As a Community Facilitator explained,

If a rich person takes land from a poor neighbor, the Bashingantahe require a jerrican of beer [costing about USD \$8]. If the poor person can't pay, the Bashingantahe will hear his case, but it takes a long time to beg them to do so. It's much easier for the rich to get justice on his side.

This tradition is changing, if slowly and unevenly. Virtually all Bashingantahe continue to expect beer as a payment after they have heard a case. However, some Bashingantahe who were interviewed explained that they considered post-decision payments as voluntary contributions. As a veteran Mushingantahe explained,

Receiving beer is a traditional custom when you're solving a conflict between two people. Afterwards, you ask them: "Can you say thank you to me?" Most of the time, one of the two parties [the victor] says thank you. This means providing us with beer. But this is voluntary, and the quantity of beer is decided by that person.

In addition, since the national and local elections in Burundi in the latter half of 2005, there has been a government effort to persuade the Bashingantahe and low level government officials to resolve disputes free of charge. The field research found both holdouts to the old ways and inroads that support this new "free" conflict resolution system.

It appeared that in most areas of Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces, strong resistance to volunteerism among the Bashingantahe remains, but especially among those that CBLP have not trained. In one reported case, a Chef de Colline (who is also a Mushingantahe) has outlawed CBLP trainees from resolving disputes in his Colline, allegedly because they carry out their services for free and he does not. In another Colline, a group of CBLP trainees expressed concern about ongoing conflicts with government officials arising from the trainees' popularity as resolvers of disputes. As one explained, the officials "think we're taking their role and we'll drink the beers that they could get." Elsewhere, while there are frequent and strong advocates for Bashingantahe working free of charge, there are others who are not as supportive of the new system. In still another Colline, the Bashingantahe explained how the CBLP trainees and the Bashingantahe operate. One explained that if a poor person has a conflict, "They take their case to [CBLP] trainees." He then continued:

If the trainees can't solve the conflict, the poor person has two options. If they can't afford to pay the Bashingantahe beer, the case is over and left unresolved. If they can pay the Bashingantahe beer, they give the beer to the untrained Bashingantahe. Then the untrained Bashingantahe give a portion of their beer to

¹⁶ Or, less often, other forms of compensation, such as food or money.

the Bashingantahe that CBLP trained, who share their portion with other CBLP trainees.

These cases notwithstanding, a new trend is clear and is growing: government pressure to persuade Bashingantahe not to demand beer before hearing a case is generating positive results. And CBLP's policy of volunteerism is helping to advance this government initiative.

6. *Impact of Community Facilitators*

One of the more surprising findings arising from fieldwork for this report was the generally high level of effort demonstrated by Community Facilitators. Many Community Facilitators are working hard, and devoting considerable time and energy to organize and inspire the trainees. They ask for monthly reports, perform regular problem-solving meetings, and keep records of trainee activities. Some also stage sessions to train more community members. It is a remarkable and unexpected finding, given the degree of effort that being a Community Facilitator requires and the volunteer nature of the work.

It is not clear how long this high level of dedication will last. It did not help that all of the Community Facilitators that were interviewed reported that the bicycles that CBLP had given each of them to perform their tasks either required considerable repair or had been stolen. Some Community Facilitators described a tension between the rigors of this work and existing economic demands. “Working for free is very difficult,” one Community Facilitator explained. “You have your wife at home who keeps expecting something from the work you are doing. So since we’ve received nothing so far, we live on hope.” Stated tensions with wives was a common concern, because the time investment required to perform Community Facilitator duties free of charge took time away from farming and other economic-related work (5 of the 45 Community Facilitators in CBLP, or 11.1 percent, were women). One of the most dedicated Community Facilitators that was interviewed explained that convincing his wife of the importance of this volunteer community work was ongoing. At the same time, he stated that volunteer work had its own benefits. “When you work for free,” he explained, “you feel more free. If you work for another person, you always have one eye on your boss.”

Active Community Facilitators are an exceptional source of information about the status of post-program impact. An excerpt from one interview with a Community Facilitator illustrates this well. At one point during the interview, the Community Facilitator assessed the post-program work of trainee groups in his Zone’s seven Collines. Of the seven, the Community Facilitator speculated that two Colline groups (or 28.6%) were “model Collines,” which he defined as places where “the trainees are very active and the population goes to them” with their conflicts. “It’s where the population already knows and trusts the trainees,” he added. On the other five Collines (or 71.4%), the work of the trainees is uneven. On one Colline, for example, only 8 of 33 trainees attended a recent meeting organized by the Community Facilitator. “The first thing” that the 8 attendees asked him about was “a reward or payment” for working as CBLP conflict advisors. On

another Colline, trainees reported that residents “don’t go to them with their conflicts. They prefer to go to the Bashingantahe.”

A meeting in one of the Collines that the Community Facilitator viewed as not working well suggested a somewhat different outcome. Colline groups often subdivide into smaller Sous-Colline groups, many of which are comprised only of women trainees. These smaller trainee groups may function well even when the larger Colline-level groups they belong to do not. A women trainee group at the Sous-Colline level, which was part of a Colline-level trainee group that a Community Facilitator had described as troubled, appeared to be functional and successful. At the same time, the trainees described counterpart women trainee groups within their Colline as fractured and not working well.

Attempts at deriving similar ratios of more or less active groups of trainees was difficult to gather from other Community Facilitators. Most merely contended that most of the Colline-level trainee groups they work with were reasonably functional. Nonetheless, field research indicates that some of the most functional CBLP trainee groups operate at the smaller level of the Sous-Colline, particularly for women trainees.

7. *Impact of Limited Distribution of Certificates and Evaluation Documents*

Field research for this evaluation activity consistently found that the graduation certificates that trainees received at the end of the program were an important contributor to positive impact. Together with the program t-shirts (which are often used as a uniform by trainees), the certificate proved to be the most important item that the CBLP awarded its trainees. The certificate was particularly significant for people who had never been trained before and were not widely recognized as conflict negotiation advisors.

A great many women, youth and men of low social status reported that showing their graduation certificates to powerful community leaders facilitated their ability to serve others as trained advisers. With this in mind, and given that limited or disrupted distribution of program materials was highlighted as a persistent problem in earlier evaluation reports, the reported failure of the program to distribute hundreds of signed graduation certificates to trainees is significant, even though the overwhelming majority of those certificates were distributed.

Some of the graduation certificates were lost and never replaced. Others were prepared and never handed out. The reasons behind this failure were various. They included an internal coordination problem involving program officials in Bujumbura, Ruyigi and Gitega and the Master Trainers, and poor reporting of the situation. One CBLP official, for example, stated that some Master Trainers did not report to program officials that some trainees lacked certificates. The official also recalled the discovery of stacks of undelivered certificates in Bujumbura offices at the close of the program.

To be sure, the distribution of graduation certificates was a massive undertaking. Some Master Trainers explained that producing and distributing signed certificates for more

than 7,000 trainees was a significant activity requiring sending trainee lists to Bujumbura, where certificates were filled out and signed before they were returned to Master Trainers in the field offices. Despite the exertions of some program officials to solve this problem, it appears that insufficient numbers of program staff took responsibility for ensuring that this task was properly addressed. Ultimately, the task could not be addressed well without the diligence and advocacy of Master Trainers, who were responsible for delivering certificates to each of their trainees.

Regardless of who was at fault, however, the result is the same: the inability of CBLP to deliver graduation certificates to all of its trainees has produced, to some degree, negative program impact. And while efforts to distribute at least some of the still-undelivered certificates was reportedly carried out during the recent Commune Administration training exercise, the failure to execute this work in a timely, well-organized fashion is significant, unfortunate and, given reminders of its significance, entirely avoidable.

A similar breakdown was noted in the limited distribution of program evaluation reports. Despite recommendations to expand distribution, most program officials among CBLP agencies continued to relate that they did not regularly receive the evaluation reports. In addition, distributing reports, or even report excerpts, to those working outside the program promised to expand knowledge about the CBLP and dispute resolution issues in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces, and perhaps encourage enhanced coordination among agencies and with government officials. Yet such distributions occurred only sporadically, despite requests from government officials for information about CBLP's impact. The lone exception to this missed opportunity to share information, expand knowledge about conflict resolution activities, and possibly enhance coordination was the distribution of the short WWICS issue paper on favored and neglected zones (see Appendix IV) that eventually reached some members of the English-speaking community of international agency officials in Bujumbura.

8. *Considering Future Impact*

The largest proportion of the most committed CBLP trainees are poor and reside in remote corners of their Communes. While these trainees face a multitude of pressures and concerns, they continue to respond to demands and expectations that they serve as volunteer conflict advisors. That so many trainees were found to be carrying out their work months after the CBLP had closed is remarkable enough. But, given the extreme stresses and deprivations that most trainees face, it is obviously difficult to assess just how long they might continue applying what they learned from a single course consisting of eight classes and a handful of follow-up sessions. It is thus useful to consider, at the close of more than two years of evaluation research of the CBLP, what future impact the program might have in Burundi's Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces.

To do this, it is useful to reflect on the obvious constraints that program trainees face. There are and will always be limits to what the CBLP can conceivably address. The logic of bureaucratic action is still, if fairly unintentional, based on exclusion. Instability, inequality, and material deprivation plague many if not most Burundian lives. Impunity

for wealthy and influential Burundians remains a problem. As a young trainee noted about his community, “The rich pay money to get court decisions that favor them.”

With all of this in mind, analysis of the evaluation findings reveals both promising and troubling signs about the potential for future positive program impact on the lives of CBLP trainees and their communities.

First, as mentioned above, trainees in some communities continue to face pressures to continue their work as volunteer conflict advisors. While the work serves to increase the social esteem of normally overlooked trainees, being a holder of a useful community skill can be a double-edged sword. As a woman trainee explained,

The fact is, if someone comes to you, it means he has trust in and esteem for you. So, we remain involved as conflict advisors because we don't want to disappoint those who show trust in us. You have to listen to them, if necessary show compassion, and let them know you care and that you share their troubles. But on the other hand, if you ignore them and push them away, there's going to be a double disappointment because you didn't show any respect to them. So they can even become your enemy.

In addition, other trainees have emphasized that being a volunteer conflict advisor demands a great deal of time, which is regarded as a significant sacrifice because it drains time needed to perform essential activities such as farming, wage labor and household work.

Second, demand from community members may dwindle over time for a number of reasons. There is the simple question of whether one course can create the grounds for an institution that permanently fills the dispute resolution niche outlined earlier. This would seem to require a sufficient critical mass of willing and available trainees and an ongoing demand. Currently, both are present in many communities, and trainees are, to various degrees, filling that niche and addressing mostly low-level conflicts. This serves both the needs of poor community members and Bashingantahe and government personnel who also address community conflicts. But if the push for volunteerism truly takes hold within Bashingantahe courts, then the demand that so many trainee groups currently feel from poorer community members may begin to recede, because they would then have access to the courts. Even so, the smaller conflicts that continue to arise will require attention, and that may continue to support demand for CBLP trainees, and other conflict advisors, within some communities.

Third, some CBLP leaders will inevitably move on. The work demands facing Community Facilitators may become too much. Trainees may eventually begin to forget, over time, what they had learned from their Master Trainer. This is one reported reason why some trainee groups, particularly those with strong leaders, speak of turning their trainee groups into associations. One trainee group spoke of organizing themselves as an association with economic aims. Another trainee group, comprised entirely of women on one Sous-Colline, had already organized themselves as a “women and widows association.” “For our particular group,” one of the members explained,

we've set up a team that prepares skits and songs related to peace and reconciliation. We also include other women in the association, so they can learn about the training information. Also, when we perform, people come in big numbers to watch, and we try to give advice to them. So we are taking the training further for our community.

Fourth, despite the constraints and challenges outlined just above, two encouraging findings suggest that post-program impact will continue, to some degree, into the future. Many groups of women trainees appear to be strong, vibrant, and, according to many members who were interviewed, committed to continuing their work into the future. In addition, Colline-level trainee groups with strong leaders appear poised to continue their work, at least into the near future. Other sub-groups of trainees promise to provide lower levels of positive post-program impact. Impact among ethnic Twa trainees did not appear to be strong, no critical mass of Twa trainees was ever developed, and they remain largely socially excluded from broader community life. This is not a critique of CBLP as such, but another troubling indicator of the ongoing difficulties that Burundi's Twa citizens face. Extensive material improvements and rights protections are required to begin to address the dire situation of the Twa, and CBLP's program was not organized to do this. Low future impact is also anticipated among educated trainees from favored zones and urban residents, who proved mostly disinterested in serving as volunteer conflict advisors. In addition, the CBLP training, by itself, did not provide a sufficient draw for most of the relatively few ex-combatants invited to participate.

IV. Conclusions

Evaluating the CBLP has taken place over the past 28 months (since March 2004) and covered six field evaluation trips to Burundi. This effort has included an examination of the context of CBLP's work in the realm of conflict resolution and reintegration within the 18 Communes of Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces. The work began before the CBLP started implementation. It continued across the entire period of CBLP's activities, with periodic evaluations of contextual and programmatic issues. However, throughout this process, the primary focus of study was not the program as much as its impact on the lives of its trainees and the communities where they resided.

It is through this process that the objectives and hypotheses of the CBLP have been investigated. Concluding remarks will first assess whether the final, and arguably the most important, program hypothesis was met. Next, it will consider the extent to which the CBLP achieved its objectives. It will end with final remarks regarding prospects for future impact.

Before moving to the hypothesis, objectives, and final remarks, a word on the context of CBLP is useful. CBLP was an ambitious program guided by ambitious objectives. It was also highly unusual in a number of important ways. The program featured:

1. Exceptionally well trained Burundian trainers (known as Master Trainers);
2. Positioning the program's core personnel (Master Trainers) within the Communes where they worked;
3. An effective, adaptable curriculum;
4. Training local people in a generally even geographic distribution within each Commune;
5. An uncommonly broad representation of social class among its trainee population; and
6. An unusually extensive evaluation program that gave continuous feedback throughout the life of the project.

The CBLP, in short, constituted an experimental approach to equipping many thousands of residents to become conflict resolution advisers, and more, within their communities. The following will consider the extent to which it achieved this bold intention.

1. Final Program Hypothesis

Did the CBLP successfully achieve its final hypothesis? That is, will Burundian communities that were exposed to the CBLP model continue to apply CBLP problem-solving techniques in the future? Will CBLP's non-violent problem-solving model have a positive longer-term impact?

The answer is mixed, and that is not surprising, given that the program has already closed and exited the Provinces. CBLP trainees are working, to varying degrees, in different areas.

In general, they are not working particularly effectively in favored zones, and most especially near Commune centers. But important exceptions exist, such as near the Commune center in Bugendana, where conflicts, threats and division are rife. Three of the most important government officials working there were trained by the CBLP, claim to apply the skills in their daily work, and regularly meet as CBLP colleagues to review stresses and conflicts. In addition, IDP women in Bugendana were trained by the CBLP become conflict resolution advisors. They reported that they are working with their former neighbors, some of whom are also CBLP trainees, to resolve disputes together. This has both helped to address community conflicts as well as facilitated a degree of mutual reconciliation.

At the same time, in at least one other Commune (Makebuko, in Gitega Province, which has had regular flows of international assistance longer than nearly any other Commune in Gitega), trainees do not, in general, appear to be particularly active, and many have ended their work and moved on.

Nonetheless, the findings in nearly all Communes suggest that the program is continuing to have impact among many groups and to varying degrees, and that some of the groups are active, dedicated, engaged, and committed. These groups, nearly all of which are located either in neglected zones or remote corners of favored zones, have achieved what might be considered a critical mass of trainees who are engaged in addressing conflicts in their communities.

2. *Achievement of Program Objectives*

Did the efforts of OTI, PADCO, ASI and WWICS, the four agencies directly involved in developing, implementing, managing and evaluating CBLP, succeed in achieving program objectives? The following separately considers the extent to which CBLP accomplished its four somewhat overlapping objectives.

A. *Empowering local communities and promoting local leaders to successfully work together to solve common problems.*

The program achieved limited but substantial success in addressing this objective. But first, a challenge here lies in how ‘community’ is defined, and this requires brief comment.

Interviews with international agency and Burundian government officials suggest that some consider Communes to be communities. The research indicates that this definition is misleading. Commune-level authorities have tremendous influence over the lives of citizens of their Commune. But their level of knowledge of and simple interaction with members of the poor majority is limited and tends to be informed by social distance between those with and without power. Direct interactions with someone so powerful appear to be something that most of the poor seek to avoid. The social and physical distance between members of Communes is thus too great, and the populations of

Communes are too large – some are over 100,000 – that Communes cannot reasonably be considered functioning communities.

Community Facilitators regularly refer to Collines as communities, and it appears that this is a much more relevant definition. Collines, after all, are where most conflicts are addressed, either by Colline-level Bashingantahe, or Chefs de Colline. Nonetheless, members of Sous-Collines often see themselves as entirely distinct from others within their Colline.

According to either or both of these definitions of community (Colline or Sous-Colline), the CBLP has recorded results that are widely regarded as successes. More people are now engaged in problem-solving in many local communities than when CBLP arrived in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces in mid-2004. The CBLP contributed to this situation by training many people for the first time. The fact that trainees are regularly called *imboneza* (leaders) by others in their Sous-Collines and Collines illustrates an enhanced social status and role in community life arising after the CBLP training took place.

Additionally, the CBLP has trained some people who were subsequently elected to government positions at the Colline, Zone and Commune levels. While some newly elected officials insist that the CBLP enhanced the regard of their community for them, it was impossible to establish whether the skills and tools that the CBLP taught these people contributed to their success at the polls. It is nonetheless worth mentioning that many of those officials report that they are employing CBLP methods and approaches while in office.

B. Providing official and unofficial community leaders with the incentives, skills, and teaching tools necessary for the promotion of cooperation and broad-based participation at the provincial and village level for the successful reintegration of displaced populations and ex-combatants.

This broad objective requires some refinement before it can be adequately addressed.

The CBLP provided leaders with non-monetary incentives to become trained resolvers of disputes. For many of those who were trained for the first time, the incentive was drawn partly out of a newfound level of social status and regard that they received in their communities. Another incentive was the enhanced expectations, or pressures, on trainees to address the problems of others in their neighborhoods. The CBLP also provided its trainees with appropriate skills to work as volunteer dispute resolvers.

However, the program did not necessarily provide trainees with teaching tools. Most trainees never taught others about the CBLP – they merely employed the skills they had acquired to try to resolve disputes.

The CBLP, moreover, certainly supported cooperation and broad-based participation at the level of some villages (or communities).¹⁷ Again, this is particularly the case in the more remote and neglected Collines and Sous-Collines of each Commune, with some exceptions. But it cannot be said that this was achieved at the provincial level because that was not a targeted program activity. Provincial level officials were certainly informed of CBLP activities, and even though the CBLP trained the Provinces' governors, they were not incorporated into program activities.

Did the CBLP help to successfully reintegrate displaced populations and ex-combatants? To a limited yet notable degree, it did help to facilitate the reintegration of displaced populations by contributing to the expansion of free access to dispute resolution services in some villages or communities. This is a substantial and important program achievement.

A further contribution lay in its inclusion of sizable numbers of Bashingantahe as trainees. This may prove to be the most significant longer-term program contribution to social reintegration because Bashingantahe courts address the most significant land conflicts in communities. Land tenure and inheritance are widely viewed in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces as the most volatile yet important types of conflicts involving refugee returnees and IDPs living there. In retrospect, the involvement of even more Bashingantahe in CBLP trainings and follow-up sessions likely would have grounded CBLP's contributions within the institution more solidly.

As it stands, CBLP's training of some Bashingantahe has greatly enlarged the debate within Bashingantahe courts and with others regarding the institution about two critical issues: (1) Whether they should offer their services free of charge; and (2) Whether their methods of deciding cases without the involvement of the parties in conflict, and fining the guilty party, should continue.

The CBLP did not achieve measurable progress in reintegrating ex-combatants into communities. Few ex-combatants were included as program trainees. Mention of ex-combatant use of CBLP trainees to help resolve their disputes was limited. The largest ex-combatant issue in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces during the course of the CBLP – payment of *Guardians de la Paix* in mid-2005 –involved few program trainees. Most *Guardians de la Paix* whom the CBLP had trained, in fact, stated that the situation was too tense and ex-combatants were too distraught to be able to employ CBLP's teaching and skills.

The CBLP also achieved limited success in the training of ethnic Twa trainees. Many of those interviewed stated that they did not have much opportunity to employ CBLP skills. Some were, at best, junior members of trainee groups. Retention levels among Twa trainees appeared to be low, although there were exceptions.

¹⁷ The mixing of the terms 'community' and 'village' in related objectives is somewhat confusing, but it will be assumed here that the two refer to Collines and Sous-Collines.

At the same time, it must be said that enhancing the social integration of Twa into broader community life was never a program objective. Since Twa are social outcasts and endure unusually punishing economic deprivation even by Burundian standards, the degree of their ability to employ CBLP techniques and skills lay primarily within Twa communities. Achievement in that area, too, appeared to be limited in every Twa community visited. The CBLP would have had to invest considerably more time and energy with ethnic Twa and their larger communities to register lasting positive impact among them: the historic and extreme segregation of the tiny Twa minority is unlikely to change without broad, concerted efforts. Again, since this was not a specific program objective, the inclusion of some Twa as trainees is worthy of recognition, although the ultimate significance of their inclusion may have been more symbolic than substantive.

The CBLP was much more successful in including non-Twa women and youth as trainees. Including so many women and youth, and middle-aged and elder women in particular, as trainees effectively contributed to debates about whether senior men in communities should continue to dominate dispute resolution activities. CBLP's impact was substantial at the level of the Sous-Colline among what appears to be many women's groups, and less so with youth, who are not as well organized as women. Since so many women trainees had not been trained before, and since becoming a program graduate enhanced the social standing of low-status women, the CBLP demonstrably expanded the participation of women in dispute resolution work. The CBLP achieved similar but much more limited impacts among youth.

C. Increasing community level participation in local governance.

Government reforms that expanded democratic elections for key local government positions has had, by far, the most impact on the increase of community level participation in local governance. At the same time, some of these elected officials were trained by the CBLP, and some elected trainees report to be employing skills and tools derived from CBLP's training. In addition, several women who ran for office reported that CBLP's training inspired them do so. Moreover, some Nyumba Kumi, Chefs de Colline, Chefs de Zone, and even Commune-level officials have invited CBLP trainees to help address community conflicts. While all of these achievements are important to mention, the CBLP's attainment of this objective was ultimately limited.

D. Serving as a building block in promoting an expanding constituency for peace by helping to solve the potentially explosive reintegration problems at the community level.

While the CBLP may have been one building block for peace promotion, it cannot be said that its considerable contribution changed the social structure of society. The lack of attention paid to urban areas also means that its impact there is small. This is not a criticism of the CBLP, but merely a means for setting their contribution into context.

It was difficult to adequately evaluate this objective because, while many trainees and non-trainees attested to CBLP's contributions to peace building, such claims were

difficult to measure. At the same time, CBLP's work did effectively include more people as dispute resolvers, and some of the issues they addressed clearly involved reintegration concerns.

3. *A Final Look Ahead*

The provision of conflict advisory services for free by community members trained by the CBLP is much less likely to persevere in favored zone communities, urban communities, socially dysfunctional communities, and among particular groups such as the Twa and ex-combatants. However, they may well continue in communities that remain neglected (which certainly seems to constitute the majority of communities in Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces), and particularly among some groups that are traditionally overlooked or subjugated, such as youth and women.

Indeed, it is likely that the CBLP's most lasting impacts will be among: (1) Small groups of women trainees on Sous-Collines, who appeared to be especially committed as trained dispute resolvers and whose services were in regular demand from untrained women; and (2) Within the Bashingantahe courts, which are in the process of significant positive change that, on some courts, had CBLP-trained Bashingantahe leading the charge for reform.

Taken together, CBLP will, in all probability, continue to positively contribute – in some way and to some degree – to peace building and reconciliation in some communities in Burundi's Ruyigi and Gitega Provinces. Given that CBLP took place in a country still emerging from a devastating civil war, this is a substantial achievement.

V. Recommendations for Future Action

The following recommendations are based chiefly on findings described earlier in this final report. However, they also draw from findings, conclusions and recommendations produced in the five earlier reports of this evaluation effort.

These recommendations are directed not only to officials at the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID, who have made an extensive investment in evaluation, and its implementing partners in Burundi (including the Burundian government, especially local level officials). In addition, *it is urged that the following recommendations be shared widely with relevant actors within the international humanitarian community as well as appropriate officials and agencies of post-war governments:*

1. *Adapt this model elsewhere.* Taking into account program constraints and ambitions, the CBLP model was extensively evaluated and found to achieve its core objectives to a remarkable degree. All six central features outlined in the Conclusions section should be preserved.¹⁸

¹⁸ That is: (1) Exceptionally well trained trainers (known as Master Trainers); (2) Positioning the program's core personnel (Master Trainers) within the Communes where they worked; (3) An effective, adaptable

2. *Evenly distribute assistance across geographic areas.* This is not only a national and provincial issue, but a local one: in the case of Burundi, at the level of favored and neglected regions (or zones) of Communes. Avoid fueling social inequalities and increasing insecurity caused by directing most assistance to already advantaged geographic areas. Doing so may yield positive short-term results because helping the most developed and accessible areas creates an impression of efficiency and progress. But repeatedly favoring the same geographic areas is fundamentally unequal and demonstrates geographic exclusion. Such practices may yield highly damaging negative impacts in the medium and longer term.
3. *Make the coordination of training activities across agencies and institutions a high priority.* Repeatedly training the same people should be avoided because it negatively impacts all training programs. Learning similar but uncoordinated material from different training programs confuses trainees and undermines both their retention and their motivation to employ the new skills they have learned afterwards. Emphasize coordinated action with key local groups, not only government and donor officials and implementing agencies but, for example, with local transitional justice institutions (such as the Bashingantahe in Burundi) as well.
4. *Avoid paying people to attend trainings.* The payment of per diems focuses attention on getting paid and promises to undermine trainee initiative to apply training skills afterward. At the same time, it is essential to insure the timely delivery of useful, high quality materials to trainees, especially graduation certificates and other valued materials such as program t-shirts. Well-organized and supported graduation ceremonies should receive a high program priority.
5. *Provide sustenance, food and drink of a modest sort, during trainings, particularly during times of food scarcity.* As one trainee recalled about her training experience, “There was hunger at that time. That’s why we didn’t have enough energy to follow the CBLP training. Our minds were too tired.”
6. *Carry out targeted needs assessments of challenging population groups that the program seeks to include.* In this case, CBLP may have been able to attract and retain more ex-combatants and urban residents if a prior inquiry into their requirements for participation had been conducted.
7. *Institute an evaluation program that begins before the program is implemented, continues with regular evaluation visits across the implementation period, and concludes after the program has closed.* Evaluations that paper over or do not examine program weaknesses can unintentionally fuel negative program impacts. The evaluator(s) should focus on evaluating program impact within target

curriculum; (4) Training local people in a generally even geographic distribution; (5) A broad representation of social class among the trainee population; and (6) An extensive evaluation program that provides continuous feedback throughout the life of the project.

communities. However, they should also incorporate regular examinations of the broader context of the project's objectives (including the impact of prior aid programs and structural inequalities within societies such as impunity and exclusion), anticipate and examine impact along gender, class, ethnic and generational lines, periodically share findings and recommendations with program officials to ensure that the program can adapt to changing realities on the ground, and maintain, as much as reasonably possible, an impartial, unbiased independent perspective. Beginning the evaluation process prior to the start of the program will also provide a baseline against which program results can be compared.

8. *Translate approved versions of evaluation (and other appropriate) documents and distribute them among relevant government and agency officials.* Consider developing executive summaries of evaluation reports that, once approved, can be translated into the appropriate languages and distributed widely.
9. *Calculate program efforts according to population densities instead of political boundaries.* In retrospect, the CBLP's positive impact would have increased had Master Trainers been assigned to bounded areas that approached an equal population division, perhaps according to Zone and Colline boundaries, instead of Commune boundaries. After the geographic boundaries are set, trainers should reside within those areas: the levels of local knowledge and credibility that this policy created for the CBLP proved to be one of its most vital and effective components.
10. *Incorporate preparatory activities for after-program action into the training program.* CBLP trainees likely would have benefited from a more thorough exploration of how to organize and continue their work after the CBLP ended. Follow up sessions that strengthen skill retention should also incorporate preparatory training that develops the operational and leadership skills of trainee groups. Such additional training promises to build on existing relationships and create momentum for maintaining functioning trainee groups into the future.

APPENDIX I: General Overview of the Community Based Leadership Training Program for Post-War Burundi (CBLP)¹⁹

CBLP was a component of a larger program funded and led by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), based in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces, and with PADCO as the primary implementing partner. It also involved the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) and a Burundian NGO, African Strategic Impact (ASI). CBLP is the only component among four that has closed. The other three (Community Initiatives, Vocational Skills Training, and Media) will continue operations through June 2006.

CBLP also was the only program component that directly involved all four agencies in programming. The operational model featured WWICS as the lone source of the program's curriculum and the primary source of its technical advice. The agency's Lead Facilitator directed the selection, training, and technical support of the twenty Master Trainers that formed the heart of CBLP. WWICS also supplied an International Evaluator who has examined the program and its impact throughout five field evaluation activities (the sixth and final activity will take place in May-June 2006).

While many reported that ASI was the primary implementing agency for CBLP, the evidence was much less clear. ASI was found to share program responsibility with PADCO, which had the ultimate authority over most key program decisions. CBLP also assigned two Master Trainers to provide students in PADCO's eight vocational schools with an abbreviated training course. CBLP officials explained that this work was not central to CBLP's activities.

The core of CBLP's work centered around addressing Objective No. #1 in OTI's Burundi Strategic Plan of June 2004: to empower local communities and promote local leaders to successfully work together to solve common problems. To do this, it selected, trained and deployed one Master Trainer to each of the eighteen Communes of Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces. Turnover was remarkably low: only one Master Trainer was replaced. The period in the field lasted approximately eighteen months.

During this time, each Master Trainer (excepting the two working at vocational schools) carried out at least nine sets of trainings in their respective Communes (some carried out ten). There were eight sessions in each course, followed by a series of follow-up sessions. Officials estimated that an average of 45 individuals were trained in each course, for a total of approximately 405 individuals per Commune and 7,920 across the two provinces. The final figures were 7,137 Burundians trained by CBLP in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces, with 3,256 women trainees (45.6 percent) and 3,881 male trainees (54.4 percent). The target audience was largely comprised of leaders, defined as those recognized as such in target communities.

¹⁹ Drawn from *Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #5, December 2005*. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (January, 2006), pp. 7-8. The total number of trainees are the same updated figures mentioned earlier in the report.

After approximately a year in the field, Master Trainers began to recruit and train a total of 42 Community Facilitators, who were viewed as willing, active, and particularly expert trainees to serve as volunteers to support the Master Trainers' activities and assume some of the Master Trainers' leadership and motivational work following their exit. Master Trainers carried out the recruitment and training process in two stages (February 2005 and September 2005).²⁰

²⁰ Additional details regarding the CBLP model and its impact can be found in the "Impacts for CBLP Component" report written by the OTI M&E official responsible for CBLP (October 2005).

Appendix II: Commune Evaluation Activities, Criteria and Questionnaires

for Commune Field Evaluation Assistants; Members of the Final Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP) Evaluation Team May 2006

For: The 4 Commune Field Evaluation Assistants

I. Research Program

Day 1:

- Find the Community Facilitator, or more Community Facilitators.
- Identify the Collines where you will meet trainees.
- Set up meeting dates, times, and places.
- Go and meet and interview the Commune Administrator.
- Begin interviewing Chefs de Colline and Zone.

Days 2-5:

- Meet and interview Trainees.
- Continue interviewing more Chefs de Colline and Zone.

II. Criteria for Commune Site Selection:

A. For All Selected Communes:

- a. Must be connected by road, so that each team can share one transport car.
- b. Must have one urban-based Commune.
- c. Must be in Communes where Dr. Sommers is not intending to conduct a significant amount of research during this field research period.

B. Additional Selection Criteria:

- a. For Ruyigi:
 - i. Must have one Commune that is in Kumoso
(a separate geographic and cultural area in Ruyigi and adjoining Provinces along the Tanzanian border)
 - ii. Ruyigi Commune is urban-based.
- b. For Gitega:
 - i. Must have 2 communes that have significant differences in population density.
Makebuko Commune's population is: 59,591;
Bukirasazi Commune's population is 33,305²¹

²¹ Population statistics are drawn from the June 2004 census.

III. Definition of Types of Trainees and Officials to Interview:

A. Geographic Types:

Type 1 – Favored Zone/Close to the Commune Center;

Type 2 – Neglected Zone; Trainee groups located furthest from the Commune Center/Favored Zone;

B. Population Types:

Type 3 – Trainee Group with “a lot” of Refugee Repatriates;

Type 4 – Trainee Group with “a lot” of Ex-Combatants;

Type 5 – Trainee Group with “a lot” of IDPs.

IV. Goals of Each Field Research Assistant:

For Trainee Groups:

1. To interview AT LEAST one Type 1 Trainee Group in their Commune
(AT LEAST 2 if there are 2 Favored Zones in the Commune, like Bukirasazi Commune);
2. To interview AT LEAST 2 Type 2 Trainee Groups in their Commune.

For Officials:

1. To interview the Commune Administrator;
2. To interview AT LEAST 2 Chefs de Zone
One Type 1 Chef de Zone
One Type 2 Chef de Zone
3. To interview AT LEAST 2 Chefs de Colline
One Type 1 Chef de Colline
One Type 2 Chef de Colline

V. Background Information FOR TRAINEES

1. Name of Evaluator: _____
2. Date and Time of Interview: _____
3. Name of Colline: _____
4. Name of Secteur: _____
5. Name of Zone: _____
6. Is this a Favored Zone or a Neglected Zone? _____
7. Name of Commune: _____
8. Name of Province: _____

9. Specify who you are Interviewing: _____
TYPE of Trainee Group: _____ / _____
Must list either Types 3, 4, and/or 5
Type 1 or 2 if appropriate

VI. Quantitative Questions FOR TRAINEES

10. How many people were trained at the same time by CBLP? _____
11. How many were **women**? _____
12. How many were **men**? _____
13. When were they trained? _____
14. How many of those trainees are present at this meeting? _____
15. How many are **women**? _____
16. How many are **men**? _____
17. How many **women** are still working as conflict advisers? _____
18. How many **men** are still working as conflict advisers? _____
19. How many **women** used to work as conflict advisers, but have stopped? _____
20. How many **men** used to work as conflict advisers, but have stopped? _____
21. How many **women** are working now as conflict advisers for free? _____
22. How many **men** are working now as conflict advisers for free? _____
23. How many **women** are working now as conflict advisers require some kind of payment? _____
24. What kind of payment? _____
25. How many **men** are working now as conflict advisers require some kind of payment? _____
26. What kind of payment? _____
27. How many conflicts were presented by the people to the trainees for help in the last month? _____
28. How many were the trainees able to address? _____
29. How many were they not able to address? _____
30. What kind of conflicts did they not address? _____
31. Has the number of conflicts your neighborhood been affected by CBLP-trained people? YES / NO
32. Has the number of conflicts gone up or gone down because of the CBLP trainees? GONE UP / GONE DOWN
33. How many **women** trainees have become members of community associations, or received other positions, because of their CBLP training? _____
34. What kind of positions? _____
35. How many **men** trainees have become members of community associations, or received other positions, because of their CBLP training? _____
36. What kind of positions? _____
37. Do you have any final comments? _____

VII. Please share your final observations and comments:

VIII. Background Information FOR OFFICIALS

1. Name of Evaluator: _____
2. Date and Time of Interview: _____
3. Name of Colline: _____
4. Name of Secteur: _____
5. Name of Zone: _____
6. Is this a Favored Zone or a Neglected Zone? _____
7. Name of Commune: _____
8. Name of Province: _____
9. Specify who you are Interviewing: _____
10. TYPE of Trainee Group: _____ / _____

Must list either
Type 1 or 2Types 3, 4, and/or 5
if appropriate

IX. Quantitative Questions FOR OFFICIALS

11. In your view, were there good results or bad results from the CBLP program?
 - a. [*If good*] What were those good results? _____
 - b. [*If bad*] What were those bad results? _____
12. What kind of conflicts were the CBLP trainees able to address? _____
13. What kind of conflicts were the CBLP trainees not able to address? _____
14. The CBLP training was designed to help people resolve their conflicts.
Has the number of conflicts in your Colline/Secteur/Zone/Commune been affected by CBLP-trained people? YES / NO
15. Has the number of conflicts gone up or gone down because of the CBLP trainees, or was there no impact at all?
GONE UP / GONE DOWN / NO IMPACT AT ALL
16. Did you gather any information about this issue?
Please Explain the Situation: _____
17. Do you have any final comments? _____

X. Please share your final observations and comments:

Appendix III: Bashingantahe Evaluation Activities, Criteria and Questionnaires

for Bashingantahe Field Evaluation Assistant; Members of the Final Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP) Evaluation Team May 2006

For: The Bashingantahe Field Evaluation Assistant

I. Research Program for Each Commune:

Step 1:

- Go and introduce yourself to the Commune Administrator.
- Find the Community Facilitator, or more Community Facilitators.
- Identify the Bashingantahe Courts that you hope to meet.
- Set up meeting dates, times, and places.

Step 2:

- Meet and interview the Bashingantahe Courts, according to the criteria below.

II. Commune Assignments:

Ruyigi Province: Bweru Commune and Ruyigi Commune
Gitega Province: Gishubi Commune

III. Criteria for Bashingantahe Site Selection:

1. Complete Bashingantahe Court (TYPE 3)
2. Only Bashingantahe who have been trained by CBLP (TYPE 4)
3. Only Bashingantahe who have **NOT** been trained by CBLP (TYPE 5)

IV. Definition of Types of Bashingantahe to Interview:

A. Geographic Types:

Type 1 – Favored Zone/Close to the Commune Center;

Type 2 – Neglected Zone; Trainee groups located furthest from the Commune Center/Favored Zone;

B. Bashingantahe Types:

Type 3 – Complete Colline Bashingantahe Court;

Type 4 – Only Bashingantahe from the same court who have been trained by CBLP;

Type 5 – Only Bashingantahe from the same court who have NOT been trained by CBLP.

V. Goals of Bashingantahe Field Research Assistant:

1. To interview AT LEAST ONE Complete Colline Bashingantahe Court located near the Commune Center (Type 1 and Type 3);
2. To interview AT LEAST ONE Complete Colline Bashingantahe Court located furthest from the Commune Center (Type 2 and Type 3);
3. To interview AT LEAST ONE group of Bashingantahe from the same court who have been trained by CBLP located furthest from the Commune Center (Type 2 and Type 4);
4. To interview AT LEAST ONE group of Bashingantahe from the same court who have NOT been trained by CBLP located furthest from the Commune Center (Type 2 and Type 5).

IF THERE IS TIME:

5. Also interview 2 sets of each of nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4.

VI. Background Information for all Interviews

1. Name of Evaluator: _____
2. Date and Time of Interview: _____
3. Name of Colline: _____
4. Name of Zone: _____
5. Name of Commune: _____
6. Name of Province: _____
7. Specify who you are Interviewing: _____
8. TYPE of Bashingantahe Court: _____ / _____

Must list either Types 3, 4, and/or 5
Type 1 or 2 if appropriate

VII. Quantitative Questions for all Interviews

**Instructions: Write out complete answers in your notebook.
You need to write clearly.**

1. What kinds of conflicts come to your court? Please explain.
2. What kinds of conflicts do NOT come to your court? Please explain.
3. Were there different kinds of conflicts that came to the Bashingantahe before the war? Please explain.

4. Were there different kinds of conflicts that came to the Bashingantahe during the war? Please Explain.
5. Were any of you members of a Bashingantahe court in a refugee camp?
EGO / OYA [YES / NO]
[If yes,] what kinds of conflicts did you address?
6. Were any of you members of a Bashingantahe court in a regroupment camp?
EGO / OYA [YES / NO]
[If yes,] what kinds of conflicts did you address?
7. Were any of you members of a Bashingantahe court in an IDP camp?
EGO / OYA [YES / NO]
[If yes,] what kinds of conflicts did you address?
8. Can you please explain how your court hears a case? What are the steps?
Please explain.
9. The Bashingantahe are trained to resolve conflicts. The CBLP trainees are trained to resolve conflicts, too.
Can you compare how the CBLP teaches you to hear a case to how your court hears a case? Is there any difference? If so, please explain.
10. Do CBLP trainees who are NOT on your court address the same kinds of conflicts, or do they address different kinds of conflicts? Please explain.
11. Some Bashingantahe were trained by CBLP. Some Bashingantahe were not. Is this true for your court? EGO / OYA [YES / NO]
12. If yes, did the CBLP have any impact on your court? Please explain.
13. My supervisor, Dr. Marc Sommers, has done evaluation research for CBLP five times since 2004.
Many people have told him that they cannot go to the Bashingantahe because they cannot afford to pay them beer.
We are very interested in understanding your view of this issue.
Can you please explain?

Thank you very much for your assistance.

VIII. Please share your final observations and comments:

Appendix IV: Report on Geographic Favoritism in Rural Burundi

“It Always Rains in the Same Place First” Geographic Favoritism in Rural Burundi

By

Marc Sommers

International Evaluator

Community Based Leadership Training Program (CBLP) for Post-War Burundi
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Executive Summary

Field research in rural Burundi underscores a potential danger in reconstructing post-war countries. The findings suggest that rebuilding damaged buildings, institutions, and authority systems without consideration of their geographic distribution runs the risk of simultaneously reinforcing structural inequities that were a root cause of civil war.

In the two provinces studied, there was an historic unequal distribution of resources and assets in different geographic zones dating back to the colonial era. These inequalities have been exacerbated by government practices and international agency actions in the post-conflict and reconstruction phase. This has resulted in significant and possibly explosive disparities along geographic, ethnic, and class lines which threaten Burundi's fragile peace process. Three courses of action are provided to address this situation. This case contains cautionary lessons that are likely applicable to many other post-war settings as well.

This article does not seek to assign blame, but to identify an issue of concern for Burundi's reconstruction and to suggest remedial measures that promise to help rectify the situation.

Background

This paper is based on the findings of a report of a field evaluation trip to Burundi in November 2004. This evaluation was the third field trip to Burundi in a series of evaluative missions over the previous eight months commissioned by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS). The field research was intended to evaluate community perspectives on the WWICS' Community Based Leadership Program (CBLP) and assess the program's impact.

The WWICS receives support from the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) to implement the CBLP in Gitega and Ruyigi provinces. The CBLP is part of a larger training program instituted with OTI funding.

The CBLP selected and trained Burundian Master Trainers in a specific curriculum designed to teach community leaders in each zone within Gitega and Ruyigi provinces how to manage conflict situations resulting from the reintegration of refugees, displaced persons, and demobilized combatants returning to their communities. Community members identified and selected these leaders, who have been attending trainings and follow-up sessions on conflict resolution and leadership in an effort to strengthen their communities' peace-building capacity.

The field evaluations were conducted to gauge community members' perceptions of the CBLP and its impact. Qualitative research techniques were used. Interviews were conducted with a majority of the twenty Master Trainers and participants in seven focus groups of program trainees, as well as with representatives from OTI and its implementing partners. Subsequently, interviews were conducted with members of two marginalized ethnic Twa communities and a range of humanitarian and political actors, including representatives from the Provincial, Communal, Zonal, and Sectoral levels of government.

Pronounced Geographic Favoritism: Favored and Neglected Zones

1. Scene Setter

Field research suggests that there are dramatic differences, historical and current, in local government and international investment policies and practices between geographic zones in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces that have been reinforcing inequalities along geographic, class, and ethnic lines. While many local, national and international efforts are positively impacting the development of peace and security in Burundi, growing inequity between zones is a potentially destabilizing factor that could help fuel a return to violent conflict. It appears that some zones are being systematically advantaged, while others are being neglected. Although there may be exceptions to the trend, there can be little doubt about the general pattern.

Burundians in both favored and neglected zones are keenly aware of the dramatically uneven distribution of assistance between them. A CBLP trainee in a neglected zone told the author, "Every Commune is like this. One zone is always favored. The Commune Administrators really lead their zones of origin and favor their native zones." Reasons for this disproportional development can be found in Burundi's colonial history, cultural traditions, displacement trends, government practices, and the subsequent unequal distribution of international humanitarian support.

2. The Emergence of Geographic Discrimination

To understand the implications of favored and neglected zones within Communes, it is important to reflect on the evolution of the phenomenon of geographic discrimination. The development of “favored” areas of rural Burundi undoubtedly began in the colonial era, when religious missionaries selected certain locations to build their parishes, which were often followed by the establishment of the first formal schools nearby. Commune Administration buildings and markets frequently were established in the same vicinity, helping to develop a sense of centrality in these areas that often promoted further development including dependable road access. At the same time, concentrating quality services in one location limited the wider population’s access to them.

Geographic discrimination appears, therefore, to be a longstanding tradition in Burundi; it continues to be an issue of concern during this post-conflict reconstruction period. Continuing zone-based discrimination is evident in the high number of permanent buildings in certain locations, many having been constructed with support from international agencies. These include primary schools with adjacent staff housing, a hospital or dispensary, and often the only secondary and vocational schools in the Commune. Favored zones often enjoy better roads, a Catholic Parish, the largest market in the Commune, and sometimes running water and even electricity. Government civil servant and military offices and housing, and commercial stores, are also usually concentrated in these areas.

In favored zones, residents are more likely to have received training and employment opportunities from local, national and international agencies. Almost all of the primary capital investments and economic, health, educational, and political advantages of the entire Commune tend to be concentrated in this single zone. Even when investments may be divided between two zones, the differences separating such favored zones and the remaining neglected zones are apparent and significant.

Exclusion may not have been intentional; however, the concentration of services and opportunities in a particular geographic location meant that those who did not reside near these areas, and who could not easily travel to them, were disadvantaged, due to the lack of equal access. These geographic inequities appear to be directly correlated with ethnic and class distinctions.

War-induced population displacement during the years of conflict only reinforced these inequities. For example, Tutsi communities were often displaced by Hutu rebel attacks and sought refuge near the Commune Administration and government military camps in the favored zones. Many Hutu, when facing the same displacement by government forces, had to find refuge in camps in other areas of the country or beyond Burundi’s borders. Many of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps have been preserved and are still servicing their mainly Tutsi inhabitants in the favored zones, whereas most of the Hutu IDP camps, including the controversial “Regroupment Camps,” have closed.

3. The Impact of Geographic Discrimination on Reconstruction

Evidence of geographic favoritism along class and ethnic lines has important implications for Burundi's peaceful reconstruction. Favored zones enjoy superior political representation through the resident Commune Administrations, further reinforcing the frustrations of residents in the neglected zones. The disparity between zones is further exacerbated by significant variations in class, wealth and education. Many residents in neglected zones express a feeling of alienation from their Chef de Zone; complaints about political representation are markedly lower in the favored zones.

Ethnically, it appears that many in the Tutsi population have greater access to resources and security in these favored zones due to the proximity of IDP camps to opportunities, facilities and information that many would have lacked if they had returned to their former homes. In fact, some IDP camp residents have rebuilt their houses out of brick or cement, signaling that they may not be planning to return home -- either out of fear, because local political leaders of IDPs may be urging them not to return, or because they seek to retain their proximity to the many resources available in favored zones.

This phenomenon is supported by the plans of some government officials to create "Model Villages" out of IDP camps. The beneficiaries of these Model Villages would be predominantly Tutsi, and resource distribution would be further skewed in the direction of the already favored zones. The ethnic implications of these plans, while not openly expressed by officials in explicit terms, are nonetheless potentially serious because of the preferential access already attributed to IDP camp residents in comparison to the remainder of the population.

4. International Responsibility

Significantly, international agencies appear to have inadvertently contributed to class and ethnic discrimination by providing assistance to the most accessible areas and placing priority on rebuilding pre-existing infrastructure. This began during the war years, when favored zones, with their concentration of services, government institutions, and permanent buildings, became regular targets of attack. Buildings were often left in ruins. International agencies seeking to provide humanitarian support in rural Burundi often ended up in favored zones as they provided reasonable levels of access and security. In addition, since international agencies often seek to rebuild institutions and buildings that previously existed – in part because this can be done more rapidly – favored zones offered distinct advantages. The need to rehabilitate was manifest, and a population in need (most commonly, Tutsi-dominated IDP camps) was usually nearby. This trend largely continues to the present, resulting in the unequal distribution of services along class and ethnic lines. Previous inequities have been reinforced, and historically less-developed areas continue to be, for the most part, ignored.

While it may be understandable that Commune Administrators place a priority on reconstructing the Commune's hospitals, schools, and central markets, it must be understood that this priority has the effect of perpetuating a pattern whereby a privileged

few disproportionately benefit from international agency assistance. A cultural explanation for this is captured by the Burundian proverb which states that “It always rains in the same place first.”²² (*Imvura iragwa ntikwira hose.*)

It is, therefore, the responsibility of international agencies and programs to question why most major investments and reconstruction activities take place in particular zones that disproportionately benefit one section of the population. The international community should take the time to ponder a question offered in response to the above proverb: “Why does it always rain in the same place first?” (*Kubera iki imvura yama itasurira hamwe igihe cose?*) When asked this question, the Chef of a favored zone in one Commune explained his zone is favored because “All the educated people, all *Abatware* [that is, formal leaders; the most powerful people in the Commune] are from this zone. Many of them are in Bujumbura. These people speak for their zone so that it can be developed.” This response illuminates the political nature of zone-based favoritism and reinforces its continuing relevance in post-conflict Burundi.

In conclusion, the policy of discrimination between favored and neglected zones could further fuel ethnic and class tensions and threaten the fragile peace process. The potential for this type of discrimination to result in widespread discontent and possible violence is made worse by the extreme deprivation Burundi is experiencing. A World Food Program official reported that 84% of the population was either chronically vulnerable or existed on the edge of starvation.

, including 16% who regularly live with food deficits. When combined with this widespread scarcity and hardship, rising inequalities along geographic, ethnic and class lines pose a significant threat to Burundi’s hard-won and still-emerging peace.

Looking Ahead: Options for the Future

In seeking a more equitable approach to reconstruction in Burundi, there are three courses of action that may help to alleviate the growing disparity between favored and neglected zones within Communes in both Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces, and across the country.

First, politicians and national government representatives must work to equalize the distribution of resources and food aid allocated for reconstruction within the next fiscal year. This should be accomplished through Commune-wide assessments that compare needs between zones. Provincial Administrators and other national and international actors involved in Communal reconstruction and development should use these assessments to equitably distribute assistance between zones, with an eye towards redressing past inequities. Increased attention should be given to outlying areas that historically have not had access to many of the amenities available in the favored zones.

Second, those supporting the Model Village developmental approach should be required to detail what is being done to address the issue of geographic, class and ethnic inequality before the plan is considered at a national level.

²² Also translated as: “Rain cannot reach everywhere at the same time.”

Third, international agencies providing assistance to Burundi (and, quite possibly, elsewhere) should reassess the policy of preferentially rebuilding previously existing structures and further explore the opportunities and implications of shifting much more development assistance to less developed areas.

Postscript

Systemic inequality is a common cause of civil conflict. The case of favored and neglected zones in Burundi underscores the need for careful analysis of the historical and political context for selecting reconstruction priorities before agencies and government counterparts develop programs and target their investments. This paper seeks to illuminate how international agency interventions, however well-motivated, may unintentionally exacerbate potentially explosive ethnic and class tensions. It is hoped that assistance agencies working in Burundi, sensitized to the impact of their reconstruction efforts, will take corrective action, and that those working elsewhere will become aware of the ways in which post-conflict assistance may unintentionally reinforce a country's structural inequities.

Appendix V: Preliminary Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Plan²³

The following assessment, monitoring, and evaluation plan is an initial draft. It is subject to review and revision.

A. Purpose

The central purpose of the International Evaluator's contribution will be to evaluate the impact of the Community-Based Leadership Program (CBLP) on Burundi.

B. Objectives

To research the central purpose of this work, the International Evaluator will address three primary objectives:

1. Learn about community problems (conflicts within Burundian communities).
2. Learn about how communities solve their problems (how Burundian communities address conflicts).
3. Learn about how CBLP can help Burundian communities solve their problems more effectively.

Objectives #1 and #2 address the context of CBLP's work. Objective #3 incorporates the testing of CBLP's hypotheses (see above). Together, and across the two-year assessment, monitoring, and evaluation process, it is expected that an understanding of CBLP's impact will be derived.

C. Methods

1. Principles

This entire assessment, monitoring, and evaluation activity is informed by the following principles:

- That all findings, analysis, and recommendations are derived and reported as independent and unbiased.
 - Rationale: To avoid, as much as is possible, any perception of favoritism for any side of prior conflicts within Burundi or any institutional objectives.
- That the International Evaluator and those working with him maintain the confidentiality of all sources.

²³ Submitted as part of the initial evaluation report, entitled "Initial Trip Report and Preliminary Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Plan," and dated May 12, 2004. Of course, the plan was revised over time as the project evolved, but the framework remained as described across the entire impact assessment period (March 2004 – July 2006).

- Rationale: To preserve the safety and security of those interviewed and help encourage those who are interviewed to speak openly.
- That the work is inherently inclusive. Findings will be reasonably shared with others (within the OTI program and others interested and involved in peacebuilding in Burundi).
 - Rationale: To demonstrate inclusion and thus communicate the independence and lack of bias of the work. Sharing information also supports program efforts to facilitate the reduction of community tension and conflict and the enhancement of coordinating activities taking place in Burundian communities.

The combination of these three principles (no bias, confidentiality, and inclusion) will be applied to all assessment, monitoring, and evaluation work. Taken together, the general purpose of applying these principles is to strive for findings that are credible and useful.

2. *Approach*

The assessment, monitoring, and evaluation work is field and interview-based. The gathering of data will take place primarily in the two provinces where the project is taking place (Gitega and Ruyigi), in addition to Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi.

The field methods can be divided into two interrelated activities.

First, at least three and up to five days will be reserved for research in each of the primary research sites (one Sector in Ruyigi Province, one Sector in Gitega Province). There, an array of officials and residents will be regularly interviewed, including: Commune, Zone, Sector, and Colline officials; others involved in community problem-solving (church leaders, *Bashingantahe* officials, women's groups, youth groups, etc.); and residents (women, men, youth).

The purpose of regular visits to the two primary research sites is to gather, over time, a deep understanding of what challenges and conflicts face Burundian communities, what problem-solving techniques are currently used, and how CBLP is beginning to impact communities.

Second, a wide array of other officials will be interviewed: Master Trainers and Local Facilitators; colleagues directly engaged in CBLP (with WWICS and ASI); other colleagues directly engaged in the larger OTI program (OTI and PADCO); and government and international agency officials, particularly those based in and/or responsible for community-based activities in Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces.

Part of the effort to address Objective #1 (Learning about community problems) will also require document collection and review and interviews with local and international agency and government officials, that are focused on understanding Burundian community dynamics, the histories of problems and conflicts in communities, and what other community-based initiatives are either underway or planned. It will be important to

gather an understanding, to name two examples, of the model, history, implementation, and effectiveness of CARE's Community Development Committees (CDCs), and Africare's program that supports the *Bashingantahe*, in Gitega Province, and how such efforts have impacted the problem-solving efforts of local actors.

The purpose of gathering relevant and available documents and carrying out interviews with a wide range of officials is to be able to situate CBLP's efforts within the wider context of community-based peacebuilding efforts in Burundi.

3. *Field Data*

Data will be gathered primarily through open-ended questioning of individuals and focus groups. All of these questions will be informed by the three objectives and three hypotheses outlined above.

Those who are interviewed will thus be asked about a range of relevant issues, including:

- The histories of relevant communities;
- The sorts of problems and conflicts that individuals and Burundian communities currently face and have faced in the past;
- Precisely how problems and conflicts are addressed by local officials;
- and which other actors are engaged in community-based work in their area.

The entrance, reactions to, and impact of ASI and PADCO officials, but primarily the Community Facilitators and Master Trainers, will also be carefully gauged through questions and observation over time. Follow-up interviews with residents and officials who have been exposed to CBLP techniques and activities will be interviewed over time as well. Field data will additionally be gathered through other means, particularly the observation of local problem-solving activities.

Relevant and available quantitative data will also be gathered, including statistical information.

Data will be analyzed while in the field and after leaving Burundi to identify significant themes and concerns that are significant and relevant to the work. Follow-up on particularly pertinent themes that surface from data gathering will further explored during subsequent relevant interviews.

4. *Translation*

Translation, and transportation to and within Gitega and Ruyigi Provinces, are essential components of fieldwork. Experienced translator(s) will need to be hired, trained, and supervised. Translators will be used for interviews in Kirundi and French. When interviews can be carried out in English or Swahili, or there is a preference expressed for communicating in one of these languages, no translator will be required.

D. Process of Activities

The proposed process of action by the International Evaluator can be summed up as follows: a trip to Burundi every four months, followed by submission of a trip report and regular communication with CBLP, and other program colleagues (ASI, PADCO, and OTI). In addition, preparations for the WWICS/CBLP Midterm Report will take place following the March 2005 trip, and preparations for the WWICS/CBLP Final Evaluation will take place following the March 2006 trip.

To carry out all of these activities, it was recommended that a revised assessment, monitoring, and evaluation schedule be proposed. It is attached as the Appendix and will, after review, be included in a Modification Request to be submitted to OTI by WWICS in the next month or so.

E. Deliverables

According to the proposed assessment, monitoring, and evaluation schedule (see the attached Appendix), we hope to have a total of six remaining regular field trips to Burundi. Provisionally, these would be in July 2004, November 2004, March 2005, July 2005, November 2005, and March 2006.

Following the proposed July and November visits, trip reports will be submitted. These will include any recommendations that surface from the field data analysis. Following the March visits, the International Evaluator will contribute to the WWICS/CBLP Midterm Report (after the March 2005 visit) and the WWICS/CBLP Final Evaluation (following the March 2006 visit).

Appendix VI: Process of Activities: Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Schedule (March 2004 – July 2006)²⁴

March 2004

- Preparation for initial trip to Burundi.

April 2004

- Finalize trip preparations.
- Trip #1 to Burundi (8 days).
- Follow-up; including preliminary drafting of this document.

May-June 2004

- Finalize and submit “Initial Trip Report and Preliminary Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Plan.”
- Consult with other team members and associates regarding project developments; review relevant documents; refine hypotheses; exchange with colleagues.
- Plan upcoming trip to Burundi.

July 2004

- Trip #2 to Burundi (16 days):
 - Visit research sites in Gitega and Ruyigi, meet with government and agency stakeholders in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ruyigi, regularly consult with WWICS-PADCO-ASI colleagues, carry out problem-solving workshop on research methods (as needed), collect and review relevant documents, carry out preliminary debriefings at end of trip.

August-October 2004

- Write and submit second trip report, “Trip Report for the Second Trip to Burundi (July 2004).”
- Consult with other team members and associates regarding project developments; review relevant documents, and plan upcoming trip to Burundi.

²⁴ Originally submitted as part of the initial evaluation report, entitled “Initial Trip Report and Preliminary Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Plan,” and dated May 12, 2004. This version has been updated to accurately represent actual activities and timeframes.

November 2004

- Trip #3 to Burundi (16 days, total):
 - Visit research sites in Gitega and Ruyigi, meet with government and agency stakeholders in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ruyigi, regularly consult with WWICS-PADCO-ASI colleagues, carry out problem-solving workshop on research methods (as needed), collect and review relevant documents, carry out preliminary debriefings at end of trip.

December 2004-June-2005

- Write and submit “Trip Report for for the Third Trip to Burundi (November 2004).”
- Consult with other team members and associates regarding project developments; review relevant documents, plan upcoming trip to Burundi.²⁵

July-August 2005

- Trip #4 to Burundi (16 days, total):
 - Visit research sites in Gitega and Ruyigi, meet with government and agency stakeholders in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ruyigi, regularly consult with WWICS-PADCO-ASI colleagues, carry out problem-solving workshop on research methods (as needed), collect and review relevant documents, carry out preliminary debriefings at end of trip.

September-November 2005

- Write and submit the fourth trip report, “Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #4: July-August 2005.”
- Consult with other team members and associates regarding project developments; review relevant documents, plan upcoming trip to Burundi.

December 2005

- Trip #5 to Burundi (11 days, total):
 - Visit research sites in Gitega and Ruyigi, meet with government and agency stakeholders in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ruyigi, regularly consult with WWICS-PADCO-ASI colleagues, carry out problem-solving workshop on research methods (as needed), collect and review relevant documents, carry out preliminary debriefings at end of trip.

²⁵ Please note: the extended period between fieldwork for the third and fourth field assessment trips to Burundi was caused by reductions to the project budget in 2005. It was during this period that Dr. Sommers and his supervisors at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars published a short issue paper containing a significant contextual finding arising from the fieldwork that was viewed as potentially useful to the international community, particularly those operating in Burundi. The report, on geographic favoritism, is included in this report as Appendix IV.

January-April 2006

- Write and submit trip report, which essentially constituted a final project evaluation from an operational perspective. It was entitled “Field Evaluation Mission to Burundi: Mission #5: December 2005.”
- Consult with other team members and associates regarding closing of project; review relevant documents, plan upcoming trip to Burundi.

May 2006

- Trip #6 to Burundi (18 days, total):
 - Visit research sites in Gitega and Ruyigi, meet with government and agency stakeholders in Bujumbura, Gitega, and Ruyigi, regularly consult with WWICS-PADCO-ASI colleagues, hire, train and supervise five Field Evaluation Assistants, collect and review relevant documents, carry out preliminary debriefings at end of trip.

June-July 2006

- Write and submit this trip report, which constituted an assessment of impact after the project had already closed.