


A WARY WELCOME: Varying Reception of Migrants in Russian Cities



Eurasian Migration Papers Number 7

Mary Elizabeth Malinkin



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**Varying Reception of Migrants
in Russian Cities**

Mary Elizabeth Malinkin

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the 1990s, the number of people with diabetes has increased in all industrialized countries. In the Netherlands, the prevalence of diabetes is estimated to be 6.5% in 1995, which corresponds to 1.5 million people (1). The prevalence of diabetes is expected to increase to 10% by the year 2010 (2).

Diabetes is a chronic disease, and the long-term complications of diabetes are a major cause of morbidity and mortality. The most common long-term complications of diabetes are retinopathy, nephropathy, neuropathy, and cardiovascular disease. The prevalence of these complications is high, and the burden of disease is substantial. In the Netherlands, the prevalence of retinopathy is 15% in 1995, which corresponds to 3.7 million people (1). The prevalence of nephropathy is 10% in 1995, which corresponds to 2.5 million people (1). The prevalence of neuropathy is 15% in 1995, which corresponds to 3.7 million people (1). The prevalence of cardiovascular disease is 15% in 1995, which corresponds to 3.7 million people (1).

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Preface

This paper is a version of a lecture I gave at Hamburg University on December 14, 2011 for a series titled “Narratives of Nomadism,” organized by Monica Ruethers and Beata Wagner-Nagy. I would like to thank them again for including me in such a creative lecture series, which has inspired me to look at migration in broader terms.

The research for the lecture emerged from a project titled “People, Power, and Conflict in the Eurasian Migration System,” funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF award 0904817) and headed by Cynthia Buckley, professor of sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Blair A. Ruble, former director of the Kennan Institute and co-principal investigator for the project, and Cynthia Buckley, for their invaluable guidance and comments on many drafts as I prepared for the “Narratives of Nomadism” talk. William Bird read several versions of the paper, and I am grateful for his thoughtful editorial advice. I would also like to thank Oliver Bevan, Timothy Heleniak, Erin Hofmann, Irina Kuzemkina, Igor Kuznetsov, Beth Mitchneck, and Everett Peachey for their research contributions, without which I would not have been able to compare the three cities discussed herein. Anastasia Pleshakova and Natalia Vlasova were instrumental in obtaining access to a wide range of interviews in Ekaterinburg in September 2011, for which I am in their debt.

Finally, I would like to thank Blair Ruble for his encouragement to publish the lecture as part of the *Eurasian Migration Papers* series.

Introduction


“Gde rodilsia, tam i prigodilsia”—essentially, “The place where one was born is where one belongs.” This is a Russian proverb I have heard many times in conversations with Russians. Russia has a long history of citizens being tied to their hometown, village, or city, sometimes by choice, and other times by restrictions on movement. Historically, a large part of the population was bound to the land as serfs until the mid-1800s. In addition, as early as the 16th century, an internal passport system and limited permits for city residents were used in Imperial Russia.¹ Under Soviet rule, internal passports and residence permits (*propiska*) reflected the attempt of the state to manage population movement, with a focus on the most efficient use of labor. Throughout Russian history a series of administrative policies have reinforced the fatalistic expression, “Gde rodilsia, tam i prigodilsia.”

In the post-Soviet period, there is evidence of both continuity and change. Russia’s new constitution (1993) recognized the freedom of movement as well as the right to emigrate for all citizens.² At the same time, several factors limited *de facto* mobility within the country: the mandatory system of registering where one works, access to social services being linked to one’s permanent place of residence and registration, a poorly developed and very expensive housing market, lack of recruitment and employment agencies, and discrimination toward people of non-Slavic ethnicity. This last factor affects the Northern Caucasus in particular, which has a high percentage of non-Slavic ethnicities and is currently the only region in Russia with a labor *surplus*.³

Even with official restrictions on movement removed, many barriers to moving within Russia remain. The migration that has taken place within Russia since the end of the Soviet period has largely been from the north and Siberia into central Russia as illustrated in the map on Figure 1.⁴

For the cities in central Russia, which have a generally immobile native population, the influx of native Russians from other regions and a steady flow of international labor migrants over the last 20 years have caused considerable tension. Such circumstances are similar to those in Europe where the concept of “nomadism” has been used to exclude certain groups from integration. Nomadism has been constructed in the political discourse in Europe

FIGURE 1. NET GAIN FROM INTERNAL MIGRATION BY REGION, 1993 TO 2007 (PERCENT OF 1993 POPULATION).



Map by Timothy Heleniak, 2012.

as a potentially dangerous phenomenon and in direct opposition to the implicit norm of sedentariness. A very similar discourse is currently underway in Russia as well.

Regardless of what the implicit norm might be, the reality is that Russia has the second largest number of international migrants in the world, surpassed only by the United States. Understanding how migrants are perceived and have been integrating in Russian cities is relevant to the United States as well. Russia and the United States are confronting many of the same challenges as major migrant destinations: rising unemployment related to global economic recession, changing local labor markets due to the globalized economy, increased populist and nationalist rhetoric, and a history of racism and xenophobia that can easily rise to the surface under tense circumstances. It seems the two countries have much to learn from each other's experiences.

In this paper I highlight the importance of historical context, xenophobia, mass media, and local context in examining the experiences of migrants in the Russian Federation. These four factors provide unique insights into

understanding the patterns of continuity and change related to migration in Russia. Some of the key questions addressed in this paper include:

How might we determine whether the reception of migrants varies from region to region in Russia?

Why might the reception of migrants vary?

What factors seem to play a role in whether migrants integrate in a particular city or region?


Overview of International Migration in Russia

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, labor demand has continually increased. Simultaneously, an aging population and rising mortality rate, particularly among men, make for an ever-shrinking workforce. The graph in Figure 2 depicts the birth rate, death rate, and natural population increase in the Russian Federation between 1980 and 2009.

With such demographic trends, the demand for labor in the Russian Federation is acute. The combination of these factors⁵ has led to the emergence of Russia as a new migration destination: migrants have opportunities to earn much higher wages in Russia than they could in their home countries, and in turn, vacancies in the Russian labor market are filled. Official statistics reveal substantial growth in some cities (Moscow in particular) despite the fact that the Russian population has been declining for nearly two decades. Migrants are the primary source of demographic growth for Russian cities showing population growth or stability since 1991. The Russian Federation is a major international migration destination, second only to the United States in the total number of foreign-born official residents (estimated at 12 million in 2010) as shown in Figure 3.⁶


Migrants in Russia accounted for 8.7 percent of the total Russian population in 2010, putting Russia among the top 20 countries worldwide in

FIGURE 2. BIRTH RATE, MORTALITY RATE, AND NATURAL POPULATION INCREASE IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 1980–2009.



Source: *Demograficheskii ezhegodnik Rossii 2010* (RosStat: Moscow, 2010), Table 2.1.

FIGURE 3. TOP 10 HOST COUNTRIES FOR INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS (INTHOUSANDS)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision, UN database, 2010.

proportion of foreign-born.⁷ It is important to note, however, that the official statistics do not include unregistered residents. Researchers have used various methods to calculate the number of unregistered migrants currently in Russia, and the estimates range from 4 million to 12 million. In this paper, I refer only to statistics on *registered* migrants.

Regardless of the actual number of migrants in Russia, the *increase* in international migrants is not the only recent change in Russia, but also shifts in migrants' countries of origin, the jobs they hold, and their motivations to migrate. In the early 1990s, migrants were largely ethnic Russians who were permanently relocating or returning to Russia from other former Soviet republics,⁸ as well as Ukrainians and peoples from the Caucasus. Beginning in the 2000s, the ethnic composition of the migrant flows changed as more migrants began arriving from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, former Soviet republics with a history of limited international migration.⁹ Migrants are coming to Russia in growing numbers from countries *beyond* the borders of the former Soviet Union as well, in particular from China and Vietnam. While these are not *new* migration flows for Russia (the Soviet

Union had labor exchange agreements with the two countries since the 1950s and 1970s, respectively), the numbers of migrants have increased.

Although the newly arriving nonethnic Russian migrants remain a small percentage of the largely monoethnic Russian cities, their presence affects, and is affected by, long-standing social structures, and they are often seen as “outsiders” by the local population and as “disrupting” cultural norms. The 2002 census results indicated that nearly 79.8 percent of the Federation’s population was ethnic Russian, with the next largest ethnic group Ukrainians, comprising 10.6 percent of the population.¹⁰ Growing migrant populations, particularly in Russian cities, raise numerous public policy issues related to identity, power structures, and a city’s overall capacity to accommodate diversity. Blair A. Ruble has argued that “cities must develop new modes of operation which expand the social and economic capital generated by diversity.”¹¹ While it is not a *new* phenomenon for Russia to receive migrants, the level of migration and the nature of the society to which today’s migrants are moving have changed. How the Russian federal government and city administrations address these issues depends in large part on their appreciation of the positive role that migrants play in a changing society.

XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM

The social challenges relating to migration in Russia have been met with various responses at all levels of society, from the federal to local city governments, public opinion, and the media. While there is notable variation, most cities have responded to increased international migration with greater xenophobia as well as a wide range of “anti-” sentiments. In spite of the significant role played by migrants in Russia, the host population has met the newcomers with what could be described as a “wary welcome” at best. At worst, the migrants are treated as enemy invaders. As Russian philosopher Vladimir Malakhov wrote, “Villages throughout Russia continue to become extinct, the national economy is short about two and a half million workers every year, and yet, instead of developing measures to attract migrants and help them adapt, the overwhelming dialogue in Russia continues to focus on the threats migrants pose to the country’s ‘ethno-cultural security’.”¹² In the mass media as well as statements by politicians and officials, migrants are often associated with diverse threats, including crime, terrorism, drugs, and disease.

Experts show that the rise in xenophobia is not related to the increased numbers of migrants, but to the *ethnicities* of the migrants.¹³ Surveys by the Levada Center in 2005 showed that negative attitudes directed toward migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia were common, with the most extreme negative attitudes toward Chechen and Roma migrants, described by historian Valeriĭ Solovei as the “domestic other.” The respondents explained their negative attitudes as being largely due to “cultural distance” and social differences. Solovei, however, argued that the cultural differences between the groups were not as important as the phenotypical differences of the disliked groups, given that the respondents showed much more positive attitudes towards foreigners who were more similar in appearance, such as Germans or white Americans. As in migration debates in the United States, xenophobia and racism are often at the root of antimigration attitudes.

MIGRANTS AND SOCIAL NORMS

As part of a project titled “People, Power, and Conflict in the Eurasian Migration System,” funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF award 0904817) and led by Cynthia Buckley, professor of sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*, we compared Russian social norms with the values and attitudes of the foreign born. As in other key destination countries for international migration, migrants to Russia are identified as causing a variety of social ills, presenting core challenges to Russian culture and leading to long-term changes in social identity.¹⁴ We used content analysis of media, government pronouncements, and public opinion surveys to identify core idealized social norms and cultural practices in Russia. Using the first wave of the Russian Gender and Generation Survey (2004), we empirically tested for differences between foreign- and native-born residents in Russia in terms of adherence to these idealized sociocultural values. Exploring views on gender roles and childbearing, and attitudes toward elder care, religion, and the use of Russian language, we found that the foreign-born display significantly *greater* adherence to idealized norms, especially the importance of the family and religious participation than the native-born, but the effects vary by country or region of origin. The results are summarized in Table 1.

* Buckley and Malinkin, “Fitting in or Setting the Standards? Nativity and Adherence to Idealized Social Norms in the Russian Federation.” Forthcoming.

TABLE I. ADHERENCE TO IDEALIZED NORMS, RUSSIAN GENDER AND GENERATIONS SURVEY, 2004, BY NATIVITY AND REGION OF ORIGIN (%)

	Native (N=9190)	Slavic (N=1111)	Kazakhstan (N=274)	Central Asia (N=292)	Caucasus (N=164)	Other (N=230)
Housework is as valuable as paid work	10.5	10.0	10.7	8.8	15.3	12.2
Women need children/ fulfillment	25.0	28.2	28.8	28.8	32.5	27.6
Families should support elders	36.5	37.8	37.1	36.8	31.3	33.0
Four or more religious events/year	16.0	15.1	14.2	18.0	26.2	27.0
Russian primary language	91.8	91.1	95.6	92.7	68.0	80.0

Our results highlighted the disjuncture between often-politicized fears about immigration and the sociocultural attitudes and practices of the foreign-born. They also support the theory that it is perceived phenotypical and racial differences that evoke the ire of local residents rather than cultural differences as often claimed. We found that the cultural threats often attributed to migrants are not linked to core social values in the Russian Federation; but rather the otherness is driven, perhaps, by xenophobia. This fear of the other is a long-standing issue in Russia, but more recently has been fanned by mass media.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

After a nationally publicized ethnic conflict in 2006 in Kondopoga, a small city in the Republic of Karelia (northwestern Russia), the word “migrant” began to be used more and more frequently in the language of hate.¹⁵ A skirmish between Russians and Azeris escalated to an armed conflict between Chechens and Russians in which two Russians were killed. In reaction, the

Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) organized a highly publicized meeting that was followed by antimigrant pogroms, arson, and vandalism. Soon after the media's coverage of these events, the original meaning of the word "migrant"—a person who moves from one place to another—acquired an ethnic dimension in Russia, as in the "non-Russian" who moves into a "Russian" area. Dennis Zuev noted that Etienne Balibar's concept of "racism without races" is quite applicable to Russia, with the word "migrants" being used as a more politically correct euphemism for "other races."¹⁶ This is just one example of how the mass media has played a significant role in portraying migrants as objects worthy of hatred and the "other" fueling an anti-migration atmosphere.

Regional Variations in How Migrants Are Received

Having discussed trends and attitudes toward migration in Russia overall, I will now focus on the differences in how migrants are received in three regions. Under the auspices of the NSF grant mentioned above, our research team studied the experience of migrants in three Russian cities: Krasnodar, Ekaterinburg, and Nizhnyi Novgorod, which have high, moderate, and low migration levels, respectively. The three cities were also chosen to give us a spectrum of three regions of Russia: the Southern, Urals, and the Volga federal districts, respectively. In order to better understand Russia's new role as a migrant host and to test existing theories concerning selectivity and integration, we use a multimethod approach for each city, including demographic assessment, legislative and discourse analysis, and interviews. The approach also includes ethnosurveys* in the three cities and in five sending countries, and social network analysis. In comparing the results of each of these measures for the three cities, our goal is to identify the factors that help or hinder the integration of migrants in Russia. For this paper, however, I focus on preliminary findings from the legislative and discourse analysis and interviews in the three cities.

KRASNODAR

Krasnodar—the smallest city in our study—is the seventeenth-largest city in Russia as of 2010, with a population of 744,933; it has received more registered migrants than the other two cities, and has been growing rapidly since the end of the 1990s.¹⁷ Krasnodar is the capital of Krasnodar Krai (region), located in the northwest area of the Caucasus, in the Southern federal district. Krasnodar Krai borders on both the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov,

* An ethnosurvey is a research design developed by Douglas S. Massey that incorporates multimethod data compilation, representative multisite sampling, multilevel data compilation, life history collection, and parallel sampling. See Massey, "The Ethnosurvey in Theory and Practice," *International Migration Review* 21, no. 4, Special Issue: Measuring International Migration: Theory and Practice (Winter 1987): 1498–522.

providing the territory with key ports. Furthermore, the *krai* is also the breadbasket of Russia, with a predominantly agricultural economy.

The city of Krasnodar was originally named Ekaterinodar (Ekaterina's Gift) at its founding in 1794. During the expansion of the Russian Empire to the Caucasus,¹⁸ the Cossacks colonized the region (called the Kuban), and in return Empress Catherine the Great gave them the land.¹⁹ Ekaterinodar became a garrison city, and the majority of the indigenous population (the Circassians) of the Kuban fled to Turkey, particularly after the Caucasian War in 1864.²⁰ Ekaterinodar became the central city for Kuban Cossacks in the 1800s and a significant trade center for the southern regions of Russia.²¹

Fast-forwarding to the modern history of migration in Krasnodar Krai, during the Soviet period there was significant sociopolitical transformation, and mass migrations changed the composition of the region's population again. After the Civil War ended (1920), most of the Kuban Cossacks were exiled because they had fought against the Red Army. It was also at this time that the city's name was changed to Krasnodar. In the early 1930s, Bolshevik policies such as "dekulakization" exiled several Cossack settlements (approximately 63,000 people or 2 percent of the *krai's* total population) to the northern and eastern regions of the USSR. Meanwhile, non-Cossacks, mainly demobilized Red Army soldiers and Russian peasants, along with other ethnic minorities, were resettled in the region. In part because of these events, Krasnodar had the highest average annual increase in migrants for all of Russia during the Soviet period.

In the 1990s, Krasnodar Krai was the most popular migrant destination in Russia, receiving between 3.9 and 5.8 percent of Russia's annual migrant flow. Only in 1998 did the city of Moscow start receiving a greater share of Russia's migrants than Krasnodar. Throughout the decade, Krasnodar experienced substantial net immigration from the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS), with all CIS states represented among its migrants. There were effectively no migrants from farther abroad in the 1990s with the exception of 250 workers from Vietnam. The peak of Krasnodar Krai's migration occurred between 1991 and 1993, and the rate began to fall in 1995. Since 1998, natural population decline is no longer being compensated by migration.

The ethnic composition of Krasnodar Krai in the post-Soviet period has remained relatively stable at about 85 percent ethnic Russians.²² Although a rather high percentage, it is the lowest among the three cities, as the other

two are even more monoethnic. The relatively high percentage of ethnic minorities in Krasnodar perhaps accounts for higher levels of tension than in the other two cities. Discrimination against people classified as “migrants,” meaning “non-Russians” as opposed to “indigenous residents,” meaning Russians or Cossacks, became law with the passing of several policies in the 1990s. One such resolution in 1997 reprimanded the administration of Sochi, a popular Russian resort city in Krasnodar Krai, for permitting “people of Armenian and Georgian nationalities” permanent registration, Russian citizenship, and permission to marry. Meanwhile, they vigorously tried to attract ethnic Russians to migrate to the *krai*.

In 2002, Governor Tkachyov of Krasnodar Krai tightened existing laws regarding registration procedures by setting quotas by region, identifying professions that are “essential for the needs of the *krai*,” and establishing a qualification commission.²³ A few years later, to strengthen the existing federal law, the governor sponsored legislation titled, “On Measures to Prevent Illegal Migration in Krasnodar Krai” in July 2004. In December 2004, the first camp for illegal migrants was founded in a village near the city of Krasnodar and the following year a second one was established in a village near the *krai*’s border with Abkhazia. Within a few years more than 3,000 non-Russian migrants were deported from the *krai*.²⁴

Russian and international human rights organizations, as well as the international media, have repeatedly criticized the discriminatory policies in Krasnodar Krai toward ethnic minorities, especially toward Meskhetian Turks. Likewise, the 2004 Official Country Report on Human Rights Practices released by the U.S. State Department mentioned violations in Krasnodar Krai. Subsequently, more than 15,000 Meskhetian Turks residing in Krasnodar Krai have been granted refugee status for immigration to the United States.

Such a legislative history reveals a largely punitive approach toward migrants in Krasnodar Krai. For the media analysis, our research team analyzed the contents of the main Krasnodar Krai newspaper, *Kubanskije novosti*, from 2000 to 2010.* Overall we observed an expression of intense hostility toward migrants.

* Using the search terms “мигра* or гастар*” in the Russian newspaper database EastView, we searched all articles published in *Kubanskije novosti* in that time period. We limited results to articles with a score of 2 or higher on the database’s relevancy scale. This procedure yielded 56 articles, of which 40 were relevant.

There was great focus on the importance of law and order, as well as concerns about migrants overtaking social services and the inability of certain groups to assimilate. Such themes are found in many migrant host countries, including the United States, but there were others that seemed unique. For example, there was concern over the “delicate ethnic balance” in the Kuban region, and migration as a threat to this balance; a very overt form of racism in that some migrants, especially the Meskhetian Turks, were portrayed as fundamentally uncivilized; and a very strong focus on state interests over individual interests. Two common phrases follow: “Migration should serve the interests of the state, and not the interests of the migrants,” meaning that all migration should be directed to specific strategic locations, particularly those with low population density, which is quite reminiscent of the Soviet approach to migration; and assertions that migrants come to Krasnodar “for their own personal enrichment,” in a tone that implied taking a job was the equivalent of stealing something from Krasnodar.

Despite such negative attitudes and policies toward migrants, Krasnodar Krai has held steady in receiving 4 to 5 percent of Russia’s migrants annually. It is second only to the Moscow region now. However, as in Russia overall, the absolute numbers of migrants coming to Krasnodar have dropped substantially over the last decade. After 2006, the number of articles in *Kubanskie novosti* about migration dropped dramatically. In articles that did appear, there was a slight but important change in tone. The anti-illegal migration rhetoric was as strong as ever, but many of the articles published since 2007 noted the importance of a legal foreign workforce for the local economy. It is probably not a coincidence that it was 2007 when the host city of the 2014 Winter Olympics was announced—Sochi, the seaside resort town noted above. The colossal construction projects underway have surely required additional workers, and there is an anticipated need for masses of service workers during the games. In 2008, Krasnodar experienced positive net migration exchange with the far abroad for the first time, which included labor migrants from China and Turkey. In 2012, the total number of migrants from the far abroad is projected at about 200,000.²⁵

Keeping this background research in mind, our research team conducted interviews in June 2011 in Krasnodar. In meetings with representatives of social organizations and various governmental departments, the team was often told that there were no problems with migrants in Krasnodar. For example, a representative of the Department of Foreign Relations commented: “There

is no unfriendly behavior, just rumors.... We have more than 100 nationalities—if there is a problem, it will be an explosion. Our biggest problem right now is how hot it will be here this summer.... We have no ethnic problems.”²⁶

However, interviews with human rights leaders painted a different picture, which reflected the negative attitudes expressed in the newspapers. The chairman of the Human Rights Center of Krasnodar noted that “[t]he biggest problem is the lack of protection of local rights and laws. There is a real slave mentality here—migrants always get blamed.”²⁷ Similarly, a representative of the Commission on Human Rights for Krasnodar Krai stated that “The level of integration in the city is relatively low.”²⁸

In interviews with representatives of various diaspora groups, our research team heard another viewpoint, that the ethnic minorities in Krasnodar felt well-integrated in fact, and that some of the groups were established for the explicit purpose of *preventing* full assimilation and maintaining their respective cultural identities.²⁹ Some negative attitudes were observed *among* the minority ethnic groups, however, in particular the Ukrainian representative’s view of Central Asians. Also, an Armenian respondent reported discrimination and discomfort. Overall, however, the ethnic diaspora groups had positive outlooks. Furthermore, our researchers did not observe ethnic enclaves in the city, with the exception of the Vietnamese population, who tended to live in specific dormitories in Krasnodar. As for informal day labor markets, which are typically frequented by unregistered migrants in other cities (as in the United States), it was interesting to note that most of the laborers were ethnic Russians! Igor Kuznetsov, professor at Kuban State University in Krasnodar and consultant to the project, theorized that it would be too risky in Krasnodar for foreign migrants to advertise their services on the street and that they have their own channels for finding employment.

EKATERINBURG

Ekaterinburg is the fourth most populous city in Russia, with 1,350,136 people as of 2010, and is one of Russia’s leading financial centers today.³⁰ A thousand miles east of Moscow, just east of the Ural Mountains, Ekaterinburg was founded a bit earlier than Krasnodar, during Peter the Great’s rule in 1723. Established as an imperial outpost, it steadily gained settlers from across the Empire,³¹ and particularly during construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the late 19th century. This allowed Ekaterinburg to profit from the mineral

deposits for which the Urals are well known and to eventually become one of Russia's most important mining and manufacturing centers.

During the Soviet period, Ekaterinburg was renamed Sverdlovsk in 1924 in honor of Bolshevik leader Yakov Sverdlov, who organized military-industrial production during the Cold War, drawing on the city's many factories. For this reason, Sverdlovsk was closed to foreigners and all Soviet citizens were required to receive approval for entry. The Soviet period saw little migration to Sverdlovsk.

In the 1990s, the city was renamed Ekaterinburg and reopened to foreign visitors and migrants alike. As Blair A. Ruble has written about this period, Ekaterinburg's city administration fostered cooperation among the many research institutions in the area with the new civil manufacturing industry when it faced the prospect of a huge defense industry in decline.³² This saved jobs that would have been eliminated, as well as created *new* jobs. Furthermore, the Ekaterinburg elite capitalized on their political connections to President Yeltsin, who was born and educated in the region and former first secretary of the local Communist Party. Enjoying such high-level connections, the city was able to attract foreign investors and establish more than a dozen consulates.

Thanks to these measures, among others, the *oblast'* (another regional unit in Russia, similar to *krai*) in which Ekaterinburg is located received approximately 3 percent of Russia's annual international migrants throughout the 1990s.³³ The vast majority of the migrants were from former Soviet republics, mainly Ukraine, and almost no migrants arrived from the far abroad in the 1990s.

Like much of the Urals, Sverdlovsk Oblast' is more ethnically diverse than the regions of Central Russia. Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, the overwhelming majority of residents in the *oblast'* were of Russian nationality (89 percent), and the largest minority groups were Tatars (almost 4 percent) and Bashkirs (0.8 percent).³⁴ The ethnic composition of the *oblast'* has remained fairly stable since the early 1990s, and while less diverse than the country as a whole, it is more diverse than the third city, Nizhnyi Novgorod.

The peak year for migration in Sverdlovsk Oblast' was 2001, when it hosted just over 4 percent of all international migrants to Russia, but by the next year this percent dropped by half to 2 percent of all international migrants, and has increased only slightly since then. Similar to migration in Russia overall, the total number of international migrants coming to Sverdlovsk

Oblast' has decreased substantially since the 1990s, but recovered some since 2006. Currently Ekaterinburg and Sverdlovsk Oblast' have *moderate* migration flows compared to the rest of the country and attract more migrants than other regions in the Urals because of Sverdlovsk Oblast's dynamic construction industry. The majority of the migrants in the region continue to be from the former Soviet Union, but Ukraine is no longer the main source country for migrants. Since 2000, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan contribute the largest number of migrants. Sverdlovsk Oblast' also now receives a few hundred migrants annually from the far abroad.³⁵

In contrast to Krasnodar, Ekaterinburg does not have a reputation for being strongly anti-immigrant. We tested this reputation using the same methods we used for Krasnodar, and began by analyzing the content of the Sverdlovsk press. We searched for terms relating to migration in Sverdlovsk Oblast's main newspaper *Ural'skii rabochii* for the years 2005 through 2010. Based on the number of articles, the most interest in migration issues occurred in 2007; this was likely due to many significant changes made in migration policy in 2007, including simplified registration procedures and an increase in registered migrants.

Three main themes regarding migration emerged in the newspaper. Most of the articles dealt with legislation and paid significant attention to how the local government was handling migration issues, including interviews of Federal Migration Service (FMS) officials in several articles. The articles gave the overall impression that *Ural'skii rabochii* was dedicated to providing as much information as possible about the influx of migrants—how their presence affects the local residents and the experience of migrants themselves. They provided a great deal of helpful information for both migrants and employers of migrants about changes in the system and called on the FMS to publicly address concrete questions. The newspaper even sponsored migration question hotlines on more than one occasion.

The articles from the 2005–2007 period seemed to be more protectionist in tone than in more recent years. However, it was one of a preemptive defense as in “don't worry, there are plenty of jobs for Russians too.... [T]he Ikea is being built half by Russians, half by migrants ... [and] such-and-such building is being built only by Russians.” Thus it was not a battle cry for Russian nationals, but a careful anticipation of such complaints. (Analysis of *Ural'skii rabochii* articles before 2005 would be interesting to determine

whether the extreme negative views we found in the press of the early 2000s in Krasnodar were also present in Ekaterinburg at that time.)

While journalists recognized ethnic and social conflict in the *oblast'*, they urged readers to think about the benefits for society if all groups could work together peacefully. One of the journalists who frequently wrote about migration issues for *Ural'skii rabochii* seemed to sympathize with the migrants, as she covered the exploitation of migrants and interviewed human rights workers for her articles. Overall, the newspaper articles supported what we had heard of Ekaterinburg's relatively tolerant reputation.

In interviews we conducted in September 2011, many respondents also lauded a history of diversity and tolerance, often connecting it to Ekaterinburg's geographic location on the natural border of Europe and Asia. Tatyana Merzlyakova, the human rights ombudsman for Sverdlovsk Oblast' praised the former governor of the *oblast'*, Eduard Rossel'—an ethnic German who faced much discrimination growing up after World War II—for having been sensitive to ethnic minorities.³⁶ She characterized the current governor, however, as not seeming to know how to handle such issues.

Several experts noted that many of the recent ethnic conflicts had been blown out of proportion by the media and that bloggers were feeding certain antimigrant sentiments. For example, a representative of the nongovernmental organization *Ural'skii Dom* commented: "In general, Sverdlovsk Oblast' is very tolerant, with the exception of the ethnic tensions stirred up by the media after recent conflicts, making basic criminal activity into ethnic conflicts."³⁷ An official of the Sverdlovsk Oblast' Migration Center described attitudes toward migrants based on widely held ethnic stereotypes: "Local attitudes toward migrants vary depending on perceptions of the ethnic group: the Chinese and Vietnamese, for example, are seen as more cultured and orderly, whereas migrants from Central Asia are seen as unpredictable and a threat."³⁸ Others observed a difference in attitudes based on age. For instance, according to a representative of the local United Russia Party, "The youth do not respect the migrants, or *gastarbaiteri* as we call them. Russians who grew up in the Soviet Union have had more contact with people from the other republics, so most of the cultural tensions are among the youth."³⁹

The non-Russians we interviewed described a wide range of experiences, from positive to negative. A representative of the Azeri ethnic community expressed a pragmatic view of successful integration into Ekaterinburg society: "It's all about money. If you have a shop at the market, people will

ignore your nationality.” An ethnic Uzbek woman from Kyrgyzstan was also positive about her situation: “If there is enough work I will bring my family here. I have found a common language with my Russian landlady—a good woman.” However, other diaspora spokespersons, such as a man from the Ingush community, were visibly upset and frustrated by how their people have been treated by the ethnic Russian majority. In a response to a criticism that incoming migrants do not respect the local customs and traditions, an Ingush man exclaimed, “What are the traditions that we [migrants] should be following? Drinking beer and smoking like the 15-year-old Russian girls I see sitting in the park at night?” After we observed a heated discussion among many of Ekaterinburg’s ethnic minorities, it was clear that there are many unresolved points of tension simmering beneath the surface.

NIZHNYI NOVGOROD

Nizhnyi Novgorod, the fifth largest city in Russia, has the lowest proportion of migrants among the three cities in our study. In 2002, it ranked fourth in population in Russia but has declined significantly in the last ten years, swapping places with Ekaterinburg.⁴⁰ Nizhnyi, as it is colloquially referred to, is the capital of Nizhegorodskaiia Oblast’, which is part of the Volga Federal District. A port city, Nizhnyi is located at the convergence of two major Russian rivers, the Volga and the Oka, giving it access to the Baltic, Black, Caspian, and White Seas as well as the Sea of Azov.

Considerably older than the other two cities in our study, Nizhnyi Novgorod was founded by Grand Prince Yuri in 1221 at the meeting of the two rivers as a strategic location to protect against invasions and developing trade.⁴¹ In 1817, a substantial trade fair was moved to Nizhnyi, and the city gained international recognition. Tradespeople from other parts of Russia and many European and Asian countries traveled to Nizhnyi to sell their goods. The city’s industrial boom began in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Nizhnyi Novgorod became one of Russia’s largest industrial centers. For example, the Sormovo plant founded in 1849 led the country in shipbuilding and machine manufacturing. In 1897, Nizhnyi merchants founded a weaving plant that became one of the largest in Russia.

Nizhnyi was a closed city during the Soviet period, during which time its name was changed to Gor’kii, and foreigners were not allowed to visit. The famous dissident Andrei Sakharov was exiled to Gor’kii, most likely due

in part to its tightly controlled media and strict residency rules. Factories building torpedoes, tanks, radar equipment and, most notably, commercial vehicles grew during the Soviet period. Established in Gor'kii in 1932 as a joint venture with the Ford Motor Company, the Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod (GAZ), was one of the largest producers of commercial vehicles in Europe. Ironically, this city, which was known for administrative control and media restrictions, gained notoriety in the late perestroika period as the home of reform-minded and market-oriented politicians such as Boris Nemtsov.⁴²

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Volga Federal District began to attract migrants in large numbers, and throughout the 1990s received only slightly fewer migrants than the Central Federal District (where Moscow is located). Nizhegorodskaiia Oblast' has not been a major migration target, however, as it consistently received approximately 2 percent of all officially registered migrants in Russia. Similar to our other case studies, as well as other regions in Russia, the majority of migrants to Nizhegorodskaiia Oblast' came from the former Soviet republics. The largest source countries for migrants during the mid-1990s were Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Georgia.⁴³ As the 1990s ended, migration from Ukraine remained high, and migration from Azerbaijan increased, but migration from the other countries declined. There was effectively no migration from the far abroad in the 1990s.

Between 2001 and 2002, the number of migrants to Nizhegorodskaiia Oblast' decreased from approximately 2 percent of Russia's migrants to just over 1 percent, and the level remained low for several years. During this time, incoming migrants were mostly from the CIS. In the early 2000s, Nizhnyi Novgorod received approximately fifty migrants from the "far abroad" every year, while more than fifty Nizhnyi Novgorod citizens were emigrating to the far abroad annually. Ukraine and Uzbekistan were the major source countries for migrants, but there was also significant outmigration to Ukraine, meaning that net migration was barely positive some years.

After 2006, as migration to Russia began to increase, migration to Nizhnyi Novgorod Oblast' increased even faster, and by 2008 Nizhnyi Novgorod was receiving nearly 3 percent of Russia's migrants. This could also be explained in part by the fact that today Nizhegorodskaiia Oblast' ranks seventh in Russia in industrial output, and manufacturing dominates the local economy, employing 62 percent of the workforce. Although migration from the far abroad has doubled to over 100 people per year, most of the overall increase in migration is explained by migrants from the CIS, particularly from Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan. More recently, large numbers of Kyrgyz workers have arrived in the region.⁴⁴

Despite this growing supply of migrants to Nizhnyi Novgorod, the ethnic makeup of Nizhnyi is the least diverse of our three case studies as ethnic Russians currently account for 95 percent of the region's population. Tatars are the largest minority group, at approximately 1.3 percent, and other minority groups include Mordvinians and Ukrainians.⁴⁵ Similar to Ekaterinburg, Nizhnyi's travel websites emphasize its geographic location perched on the crossroads of the Volga and Oka Rivers, described as "a connecting link between Europe and Asia," and "a bridge between the European and Asian parts of Russia."⁴⁶ Is the same welcoming attitude expressed toward nonethnic Russians in Nizhnyi?

Using the same method as for the other cities, our research team analyzed the content of Nizhnyi Novgorod's two most prominent newspapers to identify local attitudes toward migration. We reviewed the main newspaper, *Nizhegorodskie novosti*, for the 2000–2010 period, and *Birzha*, a weekly business journal, for 2005 through 2008. Almost all of the articles that dealt with migration made the point that Nizhnyi needs migrants and cannot survive economically or demographically without them; one article in *Nizhegorodskie novosti* from 2005 even lamented the fact that too few migrants come to Nizhnyi. *Birzha* did not have many articles on migration, but the handful published tended to inform employers of new federal migration laws that might affect them and their workers. The *Birzha* articles' general tone was toward migration was effectively neutral—it's just a reality for business.

The main newspaper took a fairly strong stance against illegal migration, but unlike in Krasnodar, the journalists tended to put the blame on the *employers* of undocumented workers rather than on the migrants themselves. *Nizhegorodskie novosti* tended to portray illegal migration as bad not only because it decreased tax revenues and undermined order (which were the arguments made in Krasnodar), but *also* because it leads to exploitation of the migrants. There were even some articles that delved into the vested interests which allowed for undocumented migration to go unchecked.

Articles in the Nizhnyi press on crime bring out the city's most antimigrant attitudes. In a string of articles published from 2007 to 2010, the story was essentially "migrant commits atrocious crime." These were descriptions of a specific crime, with the criminal clearly identified as a migrant. In one such article, the connection between migration and crime was made explic-

itly: migrants are more likely to commit crimes than locals because they have no local social support system. The same article supported the local prosecutor's call for residency laws to be more strictly enforced since most migrants who commit crimes have violated residency laws.

It was interesting that *Nizhegorodskie novosti* did not appear to be controlled nearly as strictly by the local government as *Kubanskie novosti*. The wide range of issues and viewpoints expressed in the two Nizhnyi newspapers makes it more difficult to describe their general attitude toward migration.

Like Krasnodar's *Kubanskie novosti*, the Nizhnyi papers dedicated much coverage to legislation. There was also evidence of the Nizhnyi authorities pushing back against the federal government from time to time. For instance, the author of a 2008 article criticized the idea of a quota system, arguing that it creates illegal migration when demand exceeds the quota. In 2009, Nizhnyi raised its regional quota for migrants, despite then-Prime Minister Putin's request for all regions to lower their quotas; and in 2010, the local FMS protested some of the changes to the law on foreigners.

Overall, the tone of the migration debate in Nizhnyi's newspapers can be described as much calmer and much more positive toward migration and migrants than in Krasnodar, but not as positive as the discourse in the Ekaterinburg press. There is also much more reliance on federal legislation (although they criticize it), and no voiced efforts to supplement it with local policy. As team researcher Erin Hofmann noted, the articles on migration that appear in *Nizhegorodskie novosti* are often very thoughtful and intelligent and address complicated issues, with the exception of the "migrant commits atrocious crime" articles.

This mix of attitudes was also found in the interviews conducted by our research team in Nizhnyi in the summer of 2011. Many residents interviewed by our team made conflicting comments about migrants.⁴⁷ A common remark was "I don't have anything against the migrants, but it would be better if they did not come to Russia." With further explanation, the sentiment behind such statements was not that the migrants were taking away jobs, but that non-Russians were not able to integrate or adapt to Russian culture. Nonethnic Russians noted a lack of tolerance in the city. A member of one of the Tajik diaspora groups stated, "We are far from tolerance, but we don't have ethnic conflict. Most of the [ethnic] problems [in the *oblast'*] are centered around youth and skinheads." A labor migrant, who was reportedly not from the CIS but did not specify further, scoffed, "Fit in? We have been coming to

FIGURE 4. EXAMPLES OF APARTMENT-FOR-RENT ADS DEMONSTRATING BIAS AGAINST NON-RUSSIAN ETHNICS, NIZHNYI, SUMMER 2011.



this country for decades, but no, we do not have a place here, we make our own.... [We have our] own schools, ... protection, all our own.” Distrust of non-Russians also came out in advertisements for apartments specifying that the renters must be ethnically Russian, as well as “decent Russian people” («для порядочных русских людей»). Figure 4 shows examples of such ads, collected by team researcher Everett Peachey.

In contrast, a professor of sociology at Nizhnyi Novgorod State University insisted that migration was not of major concern to locals: “If [a Nizhnyi Novgorod resident is asked an open-ended question about problems in the city], migration will never appear among the top five social problems. We have many other problems that people would mention first.”⁴⁸

Through both content analysis of Nizhnyi’s press and interviews conducted in the city, a rather conflicted perspective on migration emerges. Some voices seem to want to encourage more migration, others are indifferent, and still others are strongly against the newcomers’ presence. It will be interesting to see over time whether general attitudes become *more* or *less* welcoming to the migrants, and whether the local FMS will continue to increase quotas for migrants, independent of the federal government’s decisions.

Conclusions

Based on our research to date, the unique situations in the three cities make it clear that the local context has a significant effect. In this way, Russia is experiencing large-scale migration flows in a manner similar to other countries with large migrant populations, with the United States as a prime example. The United States does not have a national integration policy, and therefore local and state governments make their own decisions on whether they develop integration programs and urge immigrants to become active members in their new home communities.⁴⁹ Overall, U.S. cities with a long history of receiving immigrants from Latin America have a better track record on assisting their new residents integrate than cities or towns that do not have as much experience with migration. However, there are exceptions to this trend; for instance, Tucson, Arizona has a long history of migration flows but also has some of the most anti-immigrant policies at present. According to recent studies, larger cities in the United States also tended to be more tolerant toward Latino immigrants than medium-size cities and small towns. Furthermore, local immigration policies in the United States have been found to be more invasive and regulatory the farther a town is from a metropolitan area.

Similarly, while there are general trends in attitudes and perceptions toward migrants in Russia, each city or region has its own unique history, and demographic makeup and economic peculiarities that affect how it welcomes, or does not welcome, migrants. When looking at geographic locations, the border city in our study has much more contentious relations with migrants than the nonborder cities, as could be expected. Regarding the history of migration to the cities, the two cities that were closed to foreigners during the Soviet period—somewhat surprisingly—have more tolerant attitudes toward migrants than the city with a rich migration history. Next, the two larger cities had more positive views of migrants than the smallest one. In terms of economic characteristics, the two industrial giants have been more welcoming to migrants than the agricultural region. However, as seen in the interviews, what is expressed in the newspapers or proclamations by political leaders does not always mirror real-life interactions in that city, and vice

versa. These are some of the subtleties that we would like to explore in our ongoing research.

Migration presents Russia with several major challenges, including reconfiguring traditional labor markets, addressing legal restrictions against migrants, and, perhaps most importantly, integrating migrants into the formal economy and society at large. How Russian government leaders ultimately respond to these challenges and how they shape the national discourse will play a major role in defining Russia's political and economic future. Russia would do well to foster goodwill among all of its residents and promote a "pragmatic pluralism" in order to build a sustainable society on both national and local levels. By overcoming deep-rooted prejudices against "the other"—both domestic and foreign—Russia will be able to benefit from the human resources required to grow and prosper.

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The Eurasian Migration Papers

The *Eurasian Migration Papers* is a series of reports—produced jointly by the Kennan Institute and the Comparative Urban Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.—that examines migrant communities in Eurasian cities. The series features the results of Wilson Center-supported research examining the lives of migrants in contemporary Russia, Ukraine, and surrounding states.

According to the United Nations, the number of people living in countries other than their birth is approaching 200 million worldwide, up from 80 million three decades ago. While the scale of migration has grown, the nature of international population movements and patterns of migrant adaptation have changed. Migration movements have become part of the permanent fabric of modern society, and bring with them questions of economic, political, and social significance.

Migration is an especially pressing issue for the countries of Eurasia, in which large-scale international migration is a relatively new phenomenon. While the collapse of the Soviet state brought with it expanded freedom of movement, it also resulted in increased restrictions at many destination points for migrants, providing new administrative challenges. Some citizens are driven to leave their places of origin because of conflict, political ambiguity, or economic deprivation. As the region continues its integration into global economic networks, it becomes an increasingly desirable transit route and destination for migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

The Kennan Institute has sponsored a number of activities—such as lectures, workshops, working groups, seminars, and survey research among different migrant communities, native-born populations, and officials—intended to explore the social and official reaction to the presence of migrants within Eurasian countries and to trace the evolving response of migrant communities to life in their new homes. The *Eurasian Migration Papers* publication series seeks to make the results of these efforts widely available to specialists, policymakers, and citizens in Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and elsewhere.

Printed copies of the *Eurasian Migration Papers* are available upon request from the Kennan Institute in Washington, D.C. They are also available for download in PDF format on the web pages of the Wilson Center:

Kennan Institute, www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan,
Comparative Urban Studies Program, www.wilsoncenter.org/cusp,
the Kennan Moscow Project, www.kennan.ru,
and the Kennan Kyiv Project, www.kennan.kiev.ua.

Previous volumes of the Eurasian Migration Papers include:

- *No.1: Establishing a New Right to the Ukrainian City*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008, by Blair A. Ruble
- *No.2: Translational Migration to New Regional Centers: Policy Challenges, Practices, and the Migrant Experience*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, edited by Lauren E. Herzer, Sarah Dixon Klump, and Mary Elizabeth Malinkin
- *No.3: Chinese Migration to Russia: Missed Opportunities*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, by Maria Repnikova and Harley Balzer
- *No.4: Remittances, Recession... Returning Home? The Effects of the 2008 Economic Crisis on Tajik Migrant Labor in Moscow*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010, by Hilary Hemmings
- *No.5: Demography, Migration, and Tolerance: Comparing the Russian, Ukrainian and U.S. Experience*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010, edited by Nancy Popson
- *No.6: Migration Processes and Challenges in Contemporary Russia: St. Petersburg Case Study*, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012, by Marya Rozanova

In addition to the *Eurasian Migration Papers*, please also see the Kennan Institute's previous publications concerning migration and tolerance in Ukraine (available for download in PDF format):

- *Netradytsiini Mihranty u Kyievi* [Nontraditional Immigrants in Kyiv], Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2004, by Olena Braichevska, Halyna Volosiuk, Olena Malynovska, Yaroslav Pylynskyi, Nancy E. Popson, and Blair A. Ruble. [Available in English and Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form]
- *Mihratsiia i tolerantnist v Ukrainy* [Migration and Tolerance in Ukraine], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2007, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian; no longer available in printed form]
- *Aktualno: Tolerantnist!* [Current Issue: Tolerance!], Kyiv: Stylos Press, 2008, edited by Yaroslav Pylynskyi. [Ukrainian]

About the Author

Mary Elizabeth Malinkin has been on the staff of the Kennan Institute since 2007. After graduating from Carleton College in 2001 with a B.A. in history, she lived in Vladimir, Russia for two years and studied Russian language, history, literature, and politics at Vladimir State Pedagogical University. In 2006 she received an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Michigan after writing her thesis on ethnic minorities in the Moscow workforce. Her current research focuses on migration issues in Russia, and her other publications include: *Moscow and Kyiv: Changing Cities and Migrant Magnets* (co-authored with Renata Kosc-Harmatiy; Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Project Report, 2008) and *Transnational Migration to New Regional Centers: Policy Challenges, Practice, and the Migrant Experience* (conference proceedings) (co-edited with Lauren Herzer and Sarah Dixon Klump; Kennan Institute and Comparative Urban Studies Eurasian Migration Paper #2, 2009). In addition to her work on the Kennan Institute's migration research, she is liaison to the Kennan Moscow and Kyiv Projects.

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