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Secularism in the Muslim Diaspora

Introduction

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This publication is based upon a number of presentations given at a conference on "Secularism in the Muslim Diaspora" in 2008 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Four speakers discussed secularism among the Muslim diasporas in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands and beyond. The questions they raised included: are secularism and its attendant ideas compatible with Islam? What are the problems of the Muslim diasporas assimilating into European societies? Should *shar'iah* be incorporated into European legal systems? What is the role of the mosque in these societies? These questions and others were addressed with an eye to finding solutions to, among other things, the issues of migration, integration, and acculturation.

In recent years, there has been a debate among contemporary thinkers about secularism and its meaning. Secularism is often perceived as a product of the West and of a modern way of life and thought. It is seen as growing from the power struggle between the Church and the State in the Middle Ages and evolving into the current way of political and cultural life in the West and, increasingly, beyond. Some scholars who are engaged in the study of secularism argue, however, that depending on its definition, secularism also has a deep history in the Muslim world.

Secularism can be examined from three points of view: institutions, people, and religion. The basic interpretation of secularism is the idea of the complete separation of religion and government where one, ideally, has no sway over the other. This is used when referring to a "secular state" or to the French concept of *laïcité*, or secular society. People can also be secular in their personal philosophy. For example, a secular Muslim may be no less a "believer" than the next. However, the secular Muslim may not adhere to a rigid practice

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About the Middle East Program

The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of increased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changes sweeping across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social, and political developments, as well as relations with the United States.

The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meetings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developments within the region and individual states; the Middle East's role in the international arena; American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; arms proliferation; and strategic threats to and from the regional states.

The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civil society institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, including contemporary art and literature in the region.

- **Gender Issues:** The Middle East Program devotes considerable attention to the role of women in advancing civil society and to the attitudes of governments and the clerical community toward women's rights in the family and society at large. The Program examines employment patterns, education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region. The Program also has a keen interest in exploring women's increasing roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

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of Islam and may believe that it, like all ideas, should be open to interpretation and, at times, even criticism. It is also possible for someone to be extremely traditional and observant in his or her own religious practice, but to believe that this is a personal choice and to hold that religious observance should not be "policed" or even officially encouraged by institutions of the state. There are those who argue that universal human rights are paramount to those who consider themselves to be secular. Lastly, one can examine the meaning of secular from the point of view of faith itself, or more accurately, that it is a directly opposing concept. Originating from the Latin *sæcularis* meaning "of this world," secularism is focused on what is tangible in this world and not within the realm of the spiritual world. Clearly, the concept of secularism is a very complex one, and one of the conference's contributions was to begin to highlight the many different ways in which this term is understood and applied among the Muslim communities in Europe.

Cheryl Benard of the RAND Corporation, who chaired one of the conference panels, describes a three-pronged approach to defining secularism. The first part of it is humanism, which can be people or positions that are extremely pious and very much given to religion but also very much given to the concept of tolerance - tolerating those of all religions and faiths as well as those of no faith. As for the second part of the definition of secularism, this includes those who may be extremely religious or not religious at all but who, nevertheless, strongly believe that the public realm and religious realm should be separate. The third part of the definition, Benard says, are people or groups that are not religious, who span a wide range from those who are tolerant of religion and see it as having a positive role—just not for themselves, but for others—to those who are extremely anti-religious and feel that religion has a negative role in society.

Bassam Tibi discusses the Muslim diaspora's experience in Germany in "The Mosque in Germany between Freedom of Faith and Parallel Societies: The Tensions between Islamization and Integration in Society," citing what he calls the "failed integration" of Muslims throughout Western Europe. Tibi addresses, at length, the role of the mosque among Muslims in Germany, noting that they serve to segregate Muslims from the rest of German society, indoctrinate them, and, thus, create an independent, "parallel" society. This, Tibi stresses, is all supported by the German government's position of dealing only with organized religious groups, which would exclude the less organized, more secular Muslim cultural associations. Likewise, their belief in freedom of faith for all precludes any sort of criticism of religion, including more radical elements of Muslim society.

Conversely, in his paper, "The French Republic and Muslim Diversity," Jean-Pierre Filiu offers a relatively positive analysis of France's Muslim diaspora while cautioning against interpreting Islam in Europe as a homogenous entity. France, unlike Germany, offers no public money to religious associations; a mosque must be presented as a "cultural institution" to receive funding. Recasting mosques as cultural institutions eligible for state benefits allows for funding of social services and education, which, in turn, promotes multiculturalism and, according to Filiu, aids integration. And, while he acknowledges the significance of the *banlieue* riots, Filiu insists that France is more comfortable with multiculturalism than neighboring countries and that most French Muslims believe Islam is compatible with secular society.

Afshin Ellian addresses the issues of the diaspora in the Netherlands in his paper, "Emancipation and Integration of Dutch Muslims in Light of a Process Polarization and the Threat of Political Islam." He stresses that freedom of religion is central to Dutch identity and that recent acts of violence and intolerance by political Islamists are perceived as threatening to undermine the foundations of the Dutch state, as well as being incongruent with how Dutch society operates based on a compromise known as "pillarization."

He explains that it is the constitution and the corresponding notion of citizenship that forms the basis of Dutch identity which holds society together. As such, he advocates a "constitutional patriotism" by all, including political Islamists. He believes that the integration of Muslims into European society is the biggest challenge for post-war Europe. To counter this issue, he cites freedom of speech, tolerance towards dissenting opinions, and critical self-reflection as prerequisites for change and sustaining the Dutch egalitarian tradition.

Being secular and being a Muslim need not be mutually exclusive positions, as Maajid Nawaz articulates in his paper, "Is *Shar'iah* a Law?" Nawaz highlights the ongoing debate in Britain over whether to incorporate *shar'iah* into the British legal system, an issue at the center of controversy over the compatibility of Islam and secular society. Islamists and Islamist thought emerged out of the need to reconcile, within an Islamic framework, medieval ideas with modern political concepts such as separation of Church and State, sovereignty, and democracy. Nawaz insists, however, that *shar'iah* is not a law, but is, instead, a "religious code." The belief that *shar'iah* is something that needs to be incorporated into state law is a modern innovation popularized by the Islamists, he says, and not by Islam as a faith.

The Mosque in Germany between Freedom of Faith and Parallel Societies: The Tensions between Islamization and Integration in Society

Bassam Tibi, *Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Affairs, Göttingen University, Germany*

Islam represents in Europe today a fact no one could overlook. The Islamic presence in Western Europe is featured by a rocketing increase of its diaspora community from approximately 800,000 in 1950 to 23 million in 2008. Official statistics are not in line with this figure, and they are, for a variety of reasons, not reliable. In general, the matter is a contentious issue fought by all parties involved. Despite the burning issues, there seem to be a consensus among these parties, primarily among Europeans, to establish taboos and limit the freedom of speech on any of the related conflicts. This statement is based on the experience that I, as a public person highly present in the media, have been silenced in the last few years in Germany after a most active life in this field.

Of course, Germany is a free country and freedom of speech is guaranteed on paper by the constitution; but, in practice, there are many ways to silence the individual and undermine this freedom. I was a major commentator on TV for 10 years, a regular contributor to the newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* as well as to the magazine *Spiegel* for 15 years among other print media, but I was removed from all of these media after 9/11 because my message - namely, that there is no successful integration of Muslims in Europe - was not welcomed at all. I describe this problem in my German book, *Islamic Migration: The Unsuccessful Integration* (2002). To state the issue clearly without playing blame games, I argue in straight language: both parties, Muslims and Europeans, are responsible for this outcome. The failed integration continues to be a problem, unless, not only an honest dialogue over the pending problems and their resolution, but also free speech is admitted. Islamic sensitivities should not be abused to undermine freedom of speech.

The Mosque and the Ethnicization of the Islamic Diaspora in Europe

Among the repercussions of failed integration is the process of "ethnicization" throughout Western Europe, including France. The radicalization of the Muslim youth is a part of this story. Even though the French have the best record in Europe for integrating Muslim populations, they still have great problems; the revolts in the *banlieues* in 2005 were an alert. The continued ethnicization on both sides will create a scenario of immense fear. In a project at Cornell, I called this scenario "Ethnicity of Fear."[1] On the other hand, a positive scenario would be to make integration successful, and I am working in that direction and committed to it as a Muslim immigrant. The French government and opinion leaders in France continue to close their mind and to deny that the revolt at the *banlieues* had an Islamic ethnicized legitimacy, though it was, in nature, a social upheaval.

The focus of this presentation is the mosque; this focus is right because the mosque is a concern and it is the major institution around which most issues revolve. There are three issue areas to address: threatened freedom of faith, parallel societies and politics of Islamization. The remedy would be integration in civil society. To address these issues in relation to the mosque, let me start with a reference to my own background as an immigrant that protects me from being charged with bias. I grew up in the Middle East in a very conservative Islamic environment. I had to learn the Qur'an by heart as a young boy between age 5 and 6. By then, I understood only little or nothing of what I memorized through rote learning. I was able to recite the Qur'an but did not grasp the complex meaning it implies. Pursuant to my school education in Damascus, I came to Germany as a student at the age of 18. In that year of 1962, there were in Frankfurt only a few hundred conspicuously eccentric foreigners. I was one of them. Today, by contrast, 35 percent of the people that live in Frankfurt are foreign; that is, they are ethnically non-German, even though some of them have a German passport but are not viewed as Germans. Keep in mind that Germany is a country with a culture deeply determined by ethnicity; these foreigners come from 165 different nations. Even those who are naturalized are not accepted as Germans, and they do not consider themselves German. The result is ethnic *othering* on both sides. Scholars who deny these facts prove their ignorance of the situation on the ground. It is under these conditions that the mosque serves as a shelter to endure the alienation in a combination of religion and ethnicity that shapes the Islam diaspora in Europe.

If you are not an ethnic German, then no German passport can transform you into a German citizen. This statement is based on my 47 years in Germany. Earlier, when I spoke on television in Germany, anchormen introduced me as a Syrian holding a German passport. This is mere exclusion, and when I contest and qualify this insult, most Germans ask me, "Are you ashamed to be Syrian?" The issue is not about shame, but about belonging. A clear answer to the question is needed: are Muslim immigrants citizens or guest workers in Germany? Or foreigners by blood? This is the issue. In Europe, "ethnicization" and exclusion happen on both sides, and both processes reinforce one another. In a culture of blame games combined with self-victimization and guilt practiced by both parties, there can be no proper grasp of the conflict-laden situation. You see problems on both sides: foreigners want to have a European passport but not to become citizens. If asked why you want to have the cake and eat it too, most immigrants respond: the Germans do not accept us. Europeans pay lip-service to integration while they practice seclusion and discrimination. If you combine both stories maybe you'll have the truth, if you want to hear about it.

One is not protected from the accusation of Islamophobia in critical reasoning about these issues. I profess to be a Muslim, a believer. I am a cultural Muslim and a devout Muslim, and, therefore, I cannot be Islamophobic. Some peo-

ple have said that I am engaging in Islamophobia because I speak critically about Islam and Muslims in Europe with no respect for Muslim sensitivities. Islamists in Europe use this argument as a "killer" to prevent critical debate. In the course of my study of philosophy in the Frankfurt School, I learned to be committed to criticism. To criticize Muslims and Islam does not mean bashing a religion and its community. A few years ago, I wrote in the preface of my new book, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe,* in self-defense that criticizing political Islam (Islamism) is not a bashing of Islam. There is a clear distinction between Islam as a faith and culture and Islamism as a political ideology. I can be a critic of both while remaining a devout Muslim. The Qur'an repeats the phrase, "Don't you reason/*Afala ta'qalun*?" I use my reason in the line of God's revelation, so I will be criticizing both sides. It is not only racist Europeans but also *Salafi* Muslims and Islamists who are responsible for the lack of integration and for the related ethnicization of Islam in Europe. In addition, Muslims in Europe are a part of "Islam's predicament with modernity." This is the title of my new book based on my life-time critical reasoning about Islam. There are tensions that grow from this predicament and they are most pertinent for the reluctance of many Muslim immigrants to become European "citizens of the heart."

What is the Place of the Mosque?

Having established in the preceding prelude the needed framework for a proper understanding of the issue, I can now move on and talk about the mosque. What is the issue? I can illustrate this in an anecdote about one function of the mosque. I was traveling in the spring of 2007 in Malaysia, and driving from Kuala Lumpur airport to town, we passed a huge mosque, capable of holding almost 150,000 people. I asked my driver why this most spacious mosque was near the airport, where people in the city would have to travel seventy kilometers to reach it. The driver, a Malaysian Hindu, said that, "the Muslim Malays use this mosque to demonstrate that Malaysia is a Muslim country. I am Malaysian, but a Hindu, and we are 12 to 13 percent of the population. We are underdogs. We are legally citizens, but we are denied all citizen rights. We are not treated as equals to the Malay Muslims." Contesting the claim that Malaysia is a Muslim country, he said the Muslim Malays make up half of the population and asked, "How about the others?" There are different ethnicities and religions there: Chinese, Hindu, Christians and other minorities. Despite this diversity, Malaysia presents itself as a distinctly Islamic country, while the other groups are not in the public eye. For leaders of the Malay Muslims, the mosque is an instrument to demonstrate their political-cultural claim. The Hindu driver said the government built this huge mosque for symbolic reasons. It indicates to those who arrive in the country that you are arriving in a Muslim country. But why not have a temple for the Hindus, a church for Christians, or other divine houses as shrines for others? The rationale of the story is that the mosque has a symbolic meaning in Islam. The anecdote is highly pertinent to the presence of Islam in Europe. In Europe, the construction of great mosques - be it in Rome close to the Vatican, in Duisburg, Germany, or recently in Cologne - is not about freedom of faith but, rather, about the demonstrative presence of Islam. Among the donors are states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is no problem, unless one looks at the way this happens and for what purpose. The mosque becomes a problem when it becomes the core of a parallel society not consonant with politics of integration to make Muslims part of the citizenry in a civil society. Islamists and Salafists oppose this.

One such example was the crisis of 2008 in Germany, where there was a plan in a suburb of Cologne to build a huge mosque. The cathedral in Cologne is a symbol of Christianity; the tower of the cathedral is the first thing one sees when approaching the city by train. At the outset, the minaret of the planned mosque was going to

be higher than the tower cathedral and the size of the mosque much bigger than the cathedral. The size of the mosque does not match with the population statistics. At issue is not only a mosque. The plan also includes residential areas and markets, so a mini exclusive Islamic city was to be established in the name of the mosque and freedom of faith. In short, the mosque becomes the center of a Turkish-Islamic parallel society. Is this a contribution to integration in society? Those who were against the mosque were accused of Islamophobia. There was a polarization: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the right conservatives, was against the plan of the mosque, while the left was for it. The issue became not "what is the mosque?" but, rather, a political fight. There was no debate about the place of the mosque in society; the issue became the polarization between the left and the right in Germany. The left was seen as pro-Islam and the right as being against Islam with no place for a center. There was one deviator who did not fit in this dichotomy. It was a German Jew, a Holocaust survivor named Ralph Giordano. This well-known writer protested against the mosque in the name of civil society; he was accused of being a "Nazi" simply because he was criticizing the size of the mosque. This showed how the left-right divide in Germany clouded the debate on the issue of the mosque in Cologne and prevented any rational issue-oriented debate. Therefore, Germans who wanted to show their impartiality proposed to establish taboos to avoid tensions. Is this censorship a solution? No, it is not; it is rather harmful to a free debate on the integration of Muslims in civil society in Europe, and on the obstacles to this goal.

Muslim Diasporic Life in European Germany

Back to the rocketing growth of the Islamic diaspora in Europe. As I said at the outset, when I came to Germany in 1962, there were a few thousand Muslims in Germany. Today, there are four million Muslims in Germany. The number of Muslims in Western Europe around the year 1950 was 800,000. Most of them were in France and the U.K. due to the colonial past. There are ethnic subdivisions of the *umma* diaspora in Europe which functions as an "imagined community." The Muslims in France are mostly from the Maghreb, while the ones in the U.K. are primarily from South Asia. I visited Scandinavia many times as a student in the 1960s, and I never saw a Muslim there; today you see Muslims everywhere in Scandinavian countries living in ghettos. There were 15 million Muslims in Europe in the year 2000 and 20 million in 2007. The most recent estimate is 23 million. The largest figure is in France at 8 million, 4.3 million in Germany and more than 2 million in the U.K. I am aware that these figures are estimates. However, there is no other way, because official statistics are - as stated at the outset - not trustworthy; most European migration statistics are political. France and Germany are the best case in point.

How do these immigrant Muslims live in Europe? Muslim social life in Europe revolves around the mosque. The mosque of Paris is the center of liberal Islam; this mosque, with Imam Dalil Boubakeur at its head, accepts to be a part of French democracy and French civil society. French Muslims who frequent the Paris mosque are told that they are French citizens in the sense of *citoyen*. However, if you compare the case with Germany you find the opposite. In France, the state talks to liberal Muslims, supports them and focuses on what is named "culte Musulman," i.e. on faith. In Germany, the state talks only to organized Muslims and implicitly accepts their ethnicization of the community. These leaders are mostly Islamists or Salafists. The German Minister of Interior Affairs prefers, as a pragmatic politician, not only to deal with people with a constituency, but he also ends up falling into the trap of Islamism and ethnicity. Therefore, he is not interested in concepts for integration - such as Euro-Islam. As a founder of this vision of Euro-Islam, I was excluded from the government's Islam conference. Through back channels

I was told that Islamists contested my participation and the interior minister submitted to them, because he preferred to talk to the Islamists. I think the French government would consider this action harassment and would not have accepted such a bargain.

Social life under diasporic conditions takes place in the mosque and in its supplementary institutions. There are an estimated 2,600 mosques in Germany. They are organized along four lines: ethnic (Turkish, Bosnian, Arab, Bengali), sectarian (Sunni, Shi'a, Ahmadiyya), state run (Turkey DITIB), and private, mostly with Saudi or Gulf funding. The Islamic diaspora has about 700,000 Turkish Alawi Muslims who do not have mosques because they have their own understanding of Islam. The Sunni leaders do not accept to view them as Muslims. This is only one of the violations of the freedom of faith practiced by Islamist-Salafist functionaries in Germany - so how could one trust them?

There are four groups of organized Islam in Germany. First is the German extension of the *Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği* (DITIB) - that represents the Turkish Islam of the Turkish government. The German representation is a subdivision of the *Diyanet*, the office for religion in the state of Turkey. The Turkish state sends imams to Germany who do not speak German but are paid by the Turkish government, and they undermine any integration because their message is ethnic-religious: you are a Turkish Muslim and continue to be this, even if you are born in Germany. These imams are supposed to be secular because Turkey is a secular state, but this is not the case. In particular, since the *Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi* (AKP) - an Islamist, not Islamic, conservative party, as claimed - seized power in 2002, the gap between secular claim and Islamist reality has grown in Turkey. The second organized group is the *Islamrat*, the Islam Council, which is not only primarily Turkish, but also dominated by fundamentalist *Milli Göruş*. This is the radical right. *Milli Göruş* is an Islamist, extremist organization that exists throughout Europe. It is listed by the German secret police as extremist (*verfassungsfeindlich)*. Prior to his election as the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül of the AKP was in Germany and, in his capacity as a foreign minister, requested from the German government to take the *Milli Göruş* off of the list of surveillance by the German secret police. This intervention in German domestic affairs was tolerated but not heeded.

Third there is the Central Council of Muslims of Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime Deutschlands/ZRMD)*, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. The fourth one is The Association of the Clubs of the Mosque (*Moscheevereine)*, also an Islamist organization. In addition to the mosques of these four groups, there are Bosnians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, Arab and other mosques. In Germany, you have overlapping between mosque-organized Islam and a culture of those Muslims who belong to ethnic minorities within Islam. It is a political and social fact that the mosque is not only a place for prayer, it is also an instrument used by Islamists in Germany to hijack and control the diaspora to put it in their service. It is a place not only for prayer and for socializing, but also an institution in its backstage for indoctrination and for political meetings. The Islamists escape state surveillance in adding to each mosque a so-called "Islamic Study Center" to which not any Muslim - as in the mosque - has access.

Islamism in the Diaspora

Islamist movements are mostly in opposition and their members are persecuted by the state in the world of Islam. They flee to Europe where they not only get asylum and welfare, but also freedom of political action. There, they successfully establish their networks. Of course, the Islamists constitute a minority at home, as well as in the diaspora, but it is a powerful and best organized one. Among the four million Muslims in Germany, there are estimated to be 100,000 Islamists. According to the Dutch government, 10 percent of the Muslims in the Netherlands

are Islamists and organized. In Germany, the percentage is much lower. In France, even more, but not so in the U.K. Nevertheless, in Europe, Islamists control major mosques. Again, the reference to statistical figures is an estimate and only of preliminary help.

The Islamists argue that the mosque is the cornerstone of freedom of faith. In this context, one should not evade the question: what does the mosque mean in Islam? If one goes back to history and uses Islamic sources, one finds that the spread of Islam took place while using the mosque as the central institution on all levels. The term *amsar* was coined in the middle of the seventh century to refer to a kind of colonial settlement. When Muslims in their *futuhat* (opening) expansion invaded places, they established *amsar.* At the heart of each of these *amsar,* there was a mosque. Muslim invaders did the morning prayer and moved the rows thereafter for fighting *jihad* for the spread of Islam by military force. In the book by the Muslim historian Khalid Yahya Blankinship, *The End of the Jihad State*, and in many publications by Nezar AlSayyad, one can read more details about these *amsar* and about the place of the mosque within them. In Islamic history the mosque was used as a place of prayer but also for the institution of *jihad*. The mosque, in Arabic, is *jami'* and this term also means place to assemble. Today, in Egypt, the police are sent to the mosque because the private mosques are the center of Islamism. If you want to know what is going on in the underground, you go to the mosque and monitor it. Egypt is not a democratic country, and, therefore, the state is in a position to record everything the preachers say. These imams have to be careful because if they abuse the language, they will be deprived of preaching. In state mosques the imams are not Islamists as they are appointed by the state and loyal to it.

In Europe, the imams are free to engage in incitement. The Euro-German television ARTE recorded a series of sermons from a preacher at al-Quds mosque in Hamburg. These recordings were featured for one and a half hours in January 2008. The sermons included anti-Semitic incitement, which is considered a felony in Germany. If a German had said such things he or she would be trialed and sent to jail, but the government would not get involved in this case of Islamic diaspora because it fears turmoil. In addition, the Islamists blackmail with the instrumentalization of "Islamic sensitivities" and the accusation of Islamophobia. Germans are, in general, not sensitive to foreigners - I can testify to this after a life of 47 years among Germans - but the harassment by the Islamists works best and Germans comply. Submission to harassment is not an indication of respect for the cultural other.

Islam and the Freedom of Faith in Europe

Throughout Europe the freedom of faith is a constitutional right. A part of democracy is providing and guaranteeing freedom of faith. Therefore, Muslims in Europe are entitled to build mosques and to have official places of prayer in practice of their faith. But if there are 20,000 Muslims living in a city, why, then, are mosques built to hold 100,000? The city of Duisburg has 37 mosques. Why so many in a non-Muslim city? The misgiving that the mosque is being used as a symbol of the supremacy of Islam is, in many cases, not out of the blue. In these cases, one is entitled to ask questions about the drive to *da'wa*-proselytization and its compatibility with civil society.

There are no limitless freedoms since constitutional law is supreme and the freedom of faith is no exception. When mosques are used for segregation and indoctrination, they function against integration in civil society in the name of divisive Islamic identity politics which one has the right to contest. The politics of Islamization aims to Islamize the diaspora and to make it easier to hijack. There are imams who are not in favor of integration. They argue, as did the Imam of al-Quds mosque in Hamburg: if you integrate you lose your Islamic identity and you are no longer a true believer. However, the inte-

gration of Muslims in society is very important also to Muslims themselves for living together in peace. Integration should not be undermined in the name of freedom of faith. Diversity within the Islamic diaspora is also subject to freedom of faith, but this is not heeded by Islamists and Salafists in their mosques.

The discussion on this topic and the related problems and conflicts in Europe is wanting; however, it is at its best in the Netherlands. There, the discussion is even more open and better than in France. The newly appointed mayor of Rotterdam in 2009, Ahmed Aboutaleb, is a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim. Shortly after 9/11, he gave a sermon in the mosque there and made this statement with vigor: "If some of you do not find comfort with Dutch-European values, then I recommend to those to take the next flight to Morocco." No doubt, this is a most courageous statement made by a Muslim liberal.

The Netherlands started to train imams in a European spirit to preach also in European languages within the diaspora. This does not happen smoothly as there is a fight between liberal secular Muslims and orthodox Salafist Muslims as well as with Islamists. In Europe, there is also a combination of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism. The left tolerates Islamist anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism and celebrates this as anti-globalization. With a few exceptions, it is a general fact that liberal secular Muslims in Europe have a hard time finding support from state and society. Due to the fact that Islamism is a right-wing ideology that stands in contrast to a liberal Islam compatible with democracy, one is inclined to ask why Europeans tolerate this attitude. There is a conspiracy theory that alleges that Europeans do this because they do not want Muslims to become part of European civil society; they let the Islamists do the segregation job for them. Do not be mistaken, I do not share this conspiracy thinking but conclude with the fact that European opinion leaders and Islamists are in alliance when it comes to my proposed vision of a Euro-Islam based on the Europeanization of Islam. This is a vision for integration not shared by the people in charge, regardless whether Islamists or European multiculturalists.

Notes

1 Cornell's journal *The Current,* Fall 2007; see also my forthcoming article: Ethnicity of Fear, in: *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 9, issue 2 (2009).

The French Republic and Muslim Diversity

Jean-Pierre Filiu, *Associate Professor, Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Middle East Studies), Paris, France ; former Visiting Professor, Georgetown University*

Introduction

Islam now represents some eight percent of the French population. While facing this new reality, the French Republic was affected by the historical legacy of a century-long struggle between the Church and the State and of the French Revolution position toward the Jewish citizens, which over-emphasized individual rights over communal rights. It, therefore, took a protracted process before the formula of the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM) was finally established in 2003.

The new institutional framework of the CFCM was crafted to explicitly deal with spiritual issues, and, to specifically address the religious dimension of the Muslim population in France. A significant part of the French Muslim population has avowedly low levels of religious observance and may be considered Muslim only from a sociological point of view. Adding to this diversity in the religious practice, the vast political identification with the French Republic coexists with strong links to the countries of recent origin, such as countries in North Africa, but also in Turkey, the Middle East, Asia, Western Africa, and the West Indies. Fundamentally, French Islam is diverse, and the different public authorities at the national, regional, and local levels tend to take this diversity into consideration.

Understanding the History of *Laïcité*

The long history of the concept of French *laïcité* (secular society) is crucial to the understanding of how Islam is being perceived and dealt with in contemporary France. The Revolution of 1789 granted citizenship to the Jews of the Kingdom. The Revolutionary leader Clermont-Tonnerre was very explicit in stating that even though Jews were to be granted every right as individual citizens of the Republic, their collective rights as a community—or a "nation" in eighteenth century discourse—were forfeited. Even today, the French Republic is still hostile to the very principle of "communalism" and the militant sectors of the *laïcité* remain harshly critical of ideas of multiculturalism.

The separation of Church and State, in a country which was historically "the Church's eldest daughter," was established in 1905 after decades of conflict between the French Republic and the Catholic Church. At the time, Islam was marginal in French society and, as such, was excluded from the 1905 pact. Thus, religious Islamic organizations may not benefit from public support which was then institutionalized. One direct and significant consequence of the 1905 law is that, even today, a majority of the mosques in France are funded by cultural associations, and not by religious ones.

After this brief historical exposition, the goal is to present the challenges of secularism and Islam within France. This will be done by examining two specific dimensions: first, how the CFCM came to be established and run; and second, how the diversity of the Muslim population has to be taken into consideration.

The Long Road to the French Council for Muslim Religion

The French Republic is categorically neutral toward any religion as well as toward the absence of religion. This neutrality, which is at the core of the French secular system, necessarily implies that a framework be established for the central or local authorities to enable them to discuss religious issues that affect public life. With regard to the practice of Islam in France, some of these religious issues include confessional graveyards, ritual calendars, *halal* slaughterhouses, and chap-

lains in the armed forces or in jails. However, Islam—overwhelmingly Sunni in France—has no clear hierarchy and, moreover, a significant part of the "Muslim" population, was not very ostensibly religious.

This lack of religious hierarchy compelled the French government to commit to a long process of dialogue to facilitate the emergence of a specific body whose mandate was strictly confined to religious issues. To be absolutely clear, this body was not meant to be a representative institution of the French Muslim population, but, in fact, a legitimate council with administrative and political power whose aim was to address religious topics.

Organizations Preceding the CFCM

The establishment of the CFCM was preceded, first, by the founding, in 1990, of the Council for Reflection about Islam in France (*Conseil de réflexion sur l'Islam de France*/CORIF), by the initiative of the Minister of the Interior, Pierre Joxe. Then, one of his successors at the Ministry of the Interior, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, initiated, in 1999, a "Consultation" with Muslim personalities. This process was intended to allow the French government to engage with the five main Muslim federations: the Paris Great Mosque network, the National Federation of Muslims in France (*Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France*/FNMF), the Union of the Islamic Organizations in France (*Union des Organisations Islamiques de France*/UOIF), the Coordination Committee of the Turkish Muslims in France (*Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France*/ CCMTF) and the French Federation of Islamic Associations in Africa, Comoro Islands and West Indies (*Fédération Française des Associations Islamiques d'Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles*/ FFAICA). Leaders of powerful, but independent, local mosques in Lille, Lyon and Marseille, were also included in the "Consultation." Finally, to implement a harmonious balance with non-organized Islam, Muslim scholars or thinkers were also invited to the "Consultation."

Establishment of the CFCM

Current French President Nicolas Sarkozy became Interior Minister in May 2002. He decided that the co-opted "Consultation" had to be replaced by a properly elected body. Since religious issues were at stake, the voting system was established through the mosques, with the number of delegates allocated according to the capacity of the mosque. In April 2003, 992 mosques and 4042 delegates were registered to participate in the first election to the CFCM. Dalil Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris Great Mosque, was elected the first president of the Council. He was re-elected to this position in the next election in June 2005 by a slightly expanded electorate of 5219 delegates through 1230 mosques. The voting process has remained quite complex over the years, with a two-tiered system, which simultaneously elects both the national CFCM and the 25 regional councils, *Conseils Régionaux du Culte Musulman* (CRCM).

The Workings of the CFCM

In the fall of 2003, almost immediately after its formation, the CFCM faced its first public examination: an intense debate about the wearing of the Muslim veil, or *hijab*, within public schools. Consequently, in March 2004, a law was passed which banned any visible signs of religion at the public schools (a law which refrained from mentioning other public services or, in fact, public universities). Two French journalists, Christian Chesnot and George Malbrunot, were abducted in August in Iraq by a *jihadi* group that threatened to kill them if the law was not abrogated. The CFCM immediately sent a delegation to the Middle East, including Iraq, to demand the release of the hostages. The hostages were eventually set free in December. The veil-banning law has been enforced in all the French public schools. As a matter of note, it is estimated that, as of today, approximately 60 teenagers were expelled from public schools because they chose to continue wearing the veil.

The above incidents bear ample witness to the fact that the CFCM proved its ability to defend French image and French nationals, internationally, in the Muslim world. However, domestic issues were assuredly and inherently thornier. An ongoing power struggle between the five main Muslim federations critically encumbered and often neutralized the action of the CFCM. This situation frustrated many Muslims and resulted in a shift of leadership following the recent April 2008 elections (which was boycotted by the Paris Great Mosque). The FNMF split and its splinter group, the Coalition of Muslims in France (*Rassemblement des Musulmans de France*/ RMF), won the elections. Mohammed Moussaoui, a mathematics professor at the University of Avignon, was declared the new president of the CFCM. Even though Dalil Boubakeur was also a doctor, he was primarily the rector of a mosque. This transition of leadership, from a *sheikh* to an academic, is quite symbolic. Moreover, a general trend of empowerment of local leaders, religious or secular, was also fostered at the regional level and through the CRCM. It was at this regional level where some of the most contentious and sensitive issues, such as mosque-building, *halal* food and religious graveyards, were discussed and resolved.

The French Muslim Diversity

The Muslim population in France is very diverse and any attempt to reduce it to a single dimension will be doomed to fail. Since the collection of ethnic or religious data is unconstitutional in France, there is a debate about the actual number of Muslims in France. Still, estimates of this population range between 4 and 5 million, between 6 percent and 8 percent of the total French population. Consequently, France is home to the largest Muslim population in Western Europe, not only in absolute terms, but also in terms of proportion of total population. The French Republic has also been more generous than its neighboring countries in granting citizenship to well-established immigrants and, of course, to their progeny. This granting of citizenship is the primary reason why there is such a high level of Muslim social integration in France. There is also a high rate of marriage with non-Muslims (from 20 to 50 percent, depending on the groups involved), and the very concept of a "Muslim community" is quite debatable.

Sociological Muslims

A significant part of the Muslim population in France (up to 20 percent) considers itself non-religious and another third of French Muslims professes a very low level of observance; social scientists have coined the expression "sociological Muslims" to describe this latter group. Prayer is mostly conducted personally, at home, and mosques typically report low levels of attendance, even on a weekly basis. Out of the five "pillars" of Islam, the most widely respected and maintained is the daylight fast during the month of Ramadan. "Sociological Muslims" tend to observe Ramadan in greater numbers because of its mainly social nature, while the numerous events organized during that month—Ramadan nights (*nuits du Ramadan*), free meals or *shourba* (soup) (*chorba pour tous*), etc.—exhibit a secular and inclusive approach. The pilgrimage to Mecca, or the *hajj*, attracted some 40,000 Muslims from France in 2007, a record number, even for a country that is not bound by the 1/1000 pilgrim quota decided by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Muslim Pluralism

Historically, the Muslim population had very strong and well-established linkages with North African countries, because of the French protectorates over Morocco and Tunisia until 1956, and the colonization of Algeria until 1962. But the immigration of Muslims into France from Turkey, Mali, Senegal, Lebanon, Pakistan and India has changed the demographic reality. The mixed weddings, the social involvement and the secular education have enhanced this complex process. Now, even different *Sufi* brotherhoods are active in

France. All this goes to show that all the shades of religious (or non-religious) opinions can be found in the Muslim population in France, from militant atheism to rigorous Salafism. Moreover, conversion to Islam is publicly accepted, as evidenced by the conversions of nationally popular figures like Franck Ribéry, the international soccer player, or Abdel Malik, the hip-hop singer. Thus, *pluralism* is the essential word that best identifies and defines this Muslim population within France.

A sample of different opinion polls can help to assess this situation better. In 2001, *Le Monde* published that 91 percent of the Muslims in France saw no contradiction between secularism and Islam, while 75 percent even believed integration could harmoniously go along with observance. The United States Department of State reported in 2005 that 95 percent of the "French Muslims have an overall favorable opinion of France." In 2006, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of the Muslim population in France, Germany, UK and Spain. In that survey, more than 70 percent of the Muslims in France saw no contradiction between their faith and the modern society they were living in, and this proportion was strikingly equal to the proportion of the French general public which professed to the same assertion. Even more importantly, the Muslims in France perceived their French citizenship as equally fundamental as their religious identity, while the Muslims in the other three countries gave an overwhelming priority to their religious affiliation, in this survey. Finally, French Muslims encompassed the most positive perception of their Abrahamic cousins—the Jews (71 percent recorded positive opinions) and the Christians (91 percent recorded positive opinions)—while they were also the most stringent in their criticism and condemnation of Osama bin Laden (93 percent were reportedly against him).

Conclusion

Despite that reassuring picture, the clichés remain negative about Islam in France. The US media were quick to describe the social violence in the French suburbs, in the fall of 2005, as "Muslim riots." These were very serious troubles, but they had nothing to do with Islam. The good news was that no Islamist mastermind was ever found among the rioters; the bad news was that appeasement calls launched from the mosques went unheard. It was social violence at its worst. It was not religious violence.

The CFCM is now an integral part of the French socio-political landscape, and the authorities, especially at the local level, have Muslim partners to deal with the religious issues. And this is only one aspect of the social and human reality of a truly diverse Islam that respects the secular principles of the French Republic.

There is no doubt that French Islam represents an invaluable contribution to modern France and, in fact, to modern Islam. The challenges, of course, are still numerous, but the process is set on the right track and one can afford to be fairly optimistic.

Emancipation and Integration of Dutch Muslims in Light of a Process Polarization and the Threat of Political Islam

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"I cannot approve that kings would want to rule over the conscience of their subjects and deprive them of the freedom of thought and religion"

-William of Orange

Introduction

We live in turbulent times. Not since the Second World War have thinkers, politicians, and artists in the Netherlands been physically threatened or killed on account of their thoughts or beliefs. Unfortunately, this national fabric of tolerance was severely ruffled by the occurrence of two assassinations. The first was the murder of Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn on May 6, 2002. The second was the assassination of Dutch filmmaker and writer Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004 on the streets of Amsterdam by a Dutch born *jihadist*.

Ever since then, numerous Dutch politicians and a number of outspoken critics of multiculturalism have found it necessary to employ elaborate security and safety measures. However, this problem is not limited to politicians and critics. Writers of Islamic heritage and descent have had to resort to such security measures as well. For example, Naima El Bezaz, a Dutch writer of Moroccan descent, was so severely threatened that she had to go into hiding for a prolonged period of time.

In Amsterdam—a city still considered the gay capital of the world—gay people have been routinely beaten and threatened by young radical Muslims. Furthermore, most religious Jews who would normally wear the customary *kippa* are now reluctant to do so because of the threats and harassment emanating from these Muslim groups. This is all very unfamiliar to a country which used to pride itself on its tolerance. How did this all come about?

Pillarization of the Netherlands

The Netherlands is a small country with a special history. The uprising in the sixteenth century led by William of Orange[1] against Spanish Catholic rule established the Netherlands as a sovereign country. This was an event of unprecedented importance for the rest of Europe since it not only marked the end of Catholic hegemony over large parts of northern Europe, but also initiated the formation of independent nation-states. In addition, the establishment of the Dutch republic had a profound influence on the founding fathers of the United States of America. In the Federalist Papers, a document comprising 85 articles advocating the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, there are numerous references to the concept of sovereignty as it was developed in the struggle for Dutch independence.[2]

The independence movement was accompanied by an ideological revolt against the political-theology of the Vatican. It was this ideological struggle that ultimately gave birth to the twin concepts of tolerance and freedom of religion. Of course, this did not happen overnight, and it was certainly not a development that spread across Europe. In fact, thinkers like Locke, Descartes, and Voltaire found their intellectual refuge in the Netherlands. Locke's *A Letter Concerning Toleration*[3] was written in the Netherlands and the banned books of Descartes and Voltaire were published there as well. Thus, it is no surprise that, along with France and England, the Netherlands has often been called one of the birth-grounds of the Enlightenment.

It is against this historical backdrop that the current rhetoric and acts of intolerance of political Islam are especially incongruent and utterly unacceptable to large parts of the Dutch population. In the beginning of the twentieth century, different ideological and religious currents—socialists, liberals, Catholics, and Protestants—entered into a form of compromise which would enable them to simultaneously effectuate their respective claims to political influence. The compromise would later become known as "Pillarization."

Each pillar, or ideological/religious community, was allowed to build its own schools[4], hospitals, and public broadcasting media under the condition that each pillar would necessarily abide by the constitution which categorically guaranteed the principle of equality, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. The socialist and liberal pillars were termed the 'Humanistic' pillar. This liberal bloc's mission of establishment of a secular-political order could well have violently clashed with, for instance, the interests and mission of the Catholic community. However, the genius of Pillarization was that both groups' interests were ameliorated, and done so entirely constitutionally.

Depillarization

What was the primary consequence of this Pillarization? Ironically its main effect was Depillarization. This process, by which the main ideological or religious differences among the Dutch population were addressed and ameliorated, was such a success that after a while the whole enterprise was considered superfluous. Pillarization had shown that the different ideological and religious communities could shape their own communities, without government interference, and under the protection of the constitution, thereby eliminating the need for one's own group's hegemony. As such, it was the tacit conviction of the people that all groups subscribed to this high degree of tolerance and freedom and that it was an inalienable and indelible element of the Dutch social fabric.

During the 1960s, a large number of foreign workers, predominantly from Morocco and Turkey, arrived in the Netherlands. They were, for the most part, Muslims who had emigrated from an entirely different social order and legal culture than the Dutch. These migrant workers were at first embraced by the socialist pillar with their multicultural ideology. The axiomatic premises of this socialist pillar were that, first, all cultures are equal, and, second, the newcomers should be allowed to embrace their own identity and government subsidies should be granted to accommodate this.

As such, it was not deemed necessary that the newcomers should learn the Dutch language or adopt the moral and political values that had formed and constituted the Dutch identity. In fact, anyone who stated otherwise ran the risk of being labeled a racist. This mentality of political correctness, which partially stemmed from socialist ideology and partially from post-Holocaust fears of criticizing ethnic groups, eventually was the Achilles' heel of Dutch tolerance.

During the 1980s, these migrant communities were specifically targeted by Islamist groups who were seeking to re-Islamize Muslims in Europe. Saudi institutions financed these groups to build their own schools, hospitals, etc. Of course, that also meant that the Saudis had complete control over the teaching material, the pedagogy, and personnel. This constituted the germination of the extremely intolerant and xenophobic *Salafi* and *Wahhabi* streams of Islam in the Netherlands' Muslim communities.

The Multicultural Drama

During the 1990s, the public's attitude began to change. Multiculturalism, instead of being the be-all and end-all of social order, was increasingly under attack. The liberals viewed multiculturalism as an obstacle to the development of the individual, whilst leftist groups viewed it as an obstacle to the emancipation of the Muslim community.

This discussion soon centered on Islam itself. This development was triggered primarily by the 9/11 attacks and the virulent debate in its aftermath about the contents of Islamic doctrine and its position in Western societies. One of the leading critics of Islam's role in shaping the political ontology of Dutch Muslim citizens and its relation to the historical hallmarks of Dutch identity was Professor Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn's approach comprised two elements: first, combating discrimination by and against Dutch Muslims and, second, furthering the emancipation of Dutch Muslims by halting immigration from Muslim countries to the Netherlands.

The rationale behind the first was that, only by acknowledging that Muslims were discriminated against, and that Muslims themselves were responsible for discrimination, especially against gays and Jews, would Dutch society be able to bring Dutch Muslims into the fold of the Dutch constitutional order. Since it was nearly impossible in the political climate of that time to criticize particular ethnic groups for their role in the discrimination of other groups, Fortuyn advocated the abolition of the prohibition on discrimination, only when it concerned the freedom of speech. It was his hope that this would open the door to healthy criticism and discourse on issues regarding the multicultural society. The rationale supporting the second element—halting the immigration—was the assertion that Dutch society was unable to absorb or cope, even with the existing Muslim community of immigrants in the Netherlands.

Whilst the standard reaction to the criticism of Muslim immigrants or Islam was an accusation of racism, Pim Fortuyn successfully identified and addressed growing frustration amongst the Dutch population concerning the role of Muslim immigrants and Islam in Dutch society. Because of Pim Fortuyn, what was first taboo was now a legitimate and integral part of the public discourse. On May 6, 2002, one day before the parliamentary election in which Fortuyn's political party was expected to win a landslide victory, the professor was murdered by an animal rights activist who feared Fortuyn posed an immense danger to society. This was the first political murder in Dutch history in centuries. It was followed approximately two years later by the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004.

The Minimal Grammar of Dutch Political Order

The characterization of the Dutch political and academic establishment is that it is a *de facto* multicultural society. The question, however, remains whether or not we can deduce from such facts any type of norms or boundaries concerning the political order. It seems that this is a form of normative-ideological thinking in which facts are construed as norms. The multicultural paradigm is no longer a choice; it is being forced upon us. It leads one to think whether or not a liberal democratic society, which is based upon the principle of legality, can be or even should be interpreted in ideological terms. The answer is no.

Our society's horizon is undesignated. It refuses designation precisely because of the separation between power, knowledge, and law. The French philosopher Claude Lefort wrote that the seat of power is symbolically empty.[5] Because of this, a free society is a bottomless society which knows many abysses. No one in their right mind would construe or classify Dutch society as a Catholic, Protestant, humanistic, communist or vegetarian society. No one would deem our country in this manner based solely on the fact that, *de facto*, a lot of Catholics or vegetarians reside in our country. The Dutch constitution forms a fence around society that guarantees us certain liberties, but it does not prescribe to us how we should use those liberties. The constitution of a civil society is the minimal grammar of the political order within which laws and jurisprudence settle the society's conflicts and interests.

This minimal grammar, however, functions in Dutch society because of the shared history and homogenous character of the Dutch people them-

selves. The 'Integration Map' of the WODC (the Ministry of Justice) and the CBS (Central Bureau for Statistics) for 2006 reported that in that year, approximately 20 percent of the population of the Netherlands consisted of immigrants. Of these immigrants, roughly half came from a non-western Islamic background, predominantly from Morocco and Turkey. With this advent of immigration of people, schooled in a completely different social and legal culture, the functioning of this minimal grammar has naturally come under severe pressure, and it poses both socio-economic problems[6] as well as political problems.

The Notion of Citizenship

These political problems can only be addressed through the concept of citizenship. But what is citizenship? Why is this concept vitally important in a multicultural society? Let us deconstruct citizenship into parts: one formal and the other material. The formal part can be illustrated by the refugee and German playwright Bertholt Brecht, who wrote: "The passport is the noblest part of a man, for without it, without citizenship, a man is not recognized as being a man." The passport is the legal acknowledgement that a certain person is a citizen of a specific country. The second and material concept of citizenship, however, consists of much more that just this symbol. It reminds us of Aristotle's identification of Man as a *political being*. It presupposes a certain amount of voluntary integration into the political, social, cultural, and economic order of that country.

But how did the multicultural, post-modernistic establishment of that time in the Netherlands deal with these political problems in light of the concept of citizenship? At the start, the problems concerning Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands did not emanate from the group itself. It was caused by the Dutch elite who, on the basis of post-modern arguments, were unwilling to accept these immigrants into the Dutch social and legal culture. Immigrants were enticed to continue living restrictively within their own cultural spheres. In fact, Europe as a whole was unwilling to offer, let alone impose, her legal culture, with its fundamental respect for freedom of religion, expression and equality of all to these Muslim immigrants.

The Dutch civil society does not contain a transcendent anchor which is shared by everyone or which is evaluated by everyone in the same way. There is no God or king who can represent the final form of social cohesion in our country. In addition, the continuous transfer of national sovereignty to the European level poses a nascent problem. In this new era of supranational sovereignty, the Netherlands is increasingly struggling with several identity crises. Can a country without definite social order have a common identity?

In my opinion, it is the constitution and the corresponding notion of citizenship that forms the basis of such an identity. The constitution used to be a self-explanatory text because the Netherlands used to be an ethnically and culturally homogenous country. This was also the intention of the founding fathers and the originators of the American constitution who, with a strong appreciation of modernity, opened the text of the constitution with the words "We the people of the United States of America." "We the Americans," always meant: "We, who because of the constitution, are each other's fellow Americans." In that sense, the constitution entails and demands a reciprocal commitment of citizenship.

Multiculturalism and Polarization

As I have already stated, the constitution of a civil society is the minimal grammar of the political order within which laws and jurisprudence settle society's conflicts and interests. Only the constitution transcends all forms of pluralism and diversity, and, because of this, only the constitution can be the fence within which the citizens are brought and kept together. Therefore, I advocate a constitutional patriotism with regard to

our common identity, as is the case, for instance, of Germany.

The power of attraction of the West does not rest on the word *multi* but on the word *mono.* By this I mean that society itself is diverse and *multicultural*, but the legal order that regulates it is necessarily a *monocultural* legal order. The rights, obligations, and democratic procedure are non-negotiable as they are based on a single body of laws and one language. The immigrant who wishes to become a citizen should adopt that nation's language and constitution. If the constitution and the rights of the free citizens it encompasses should ever be replaced by different cultural values then this could very easily lead to human rights violations. A number of crucial rights, such as women's rights, gay rights, and the freedom of expression, could then become jeopardized. It is precisely the immigrants who stand to benefit the most from these rights. These neutral conditions form the minimal grammar of the political order that retains public peace and freedom, as well as guaranteeing that Dutch society remains free and multifaceted.

In the meantime, the Netherlands has become a country strongly polarized over the position of Islam and the integration of immigrants. In the end, wherever there is politics, there is polarization. Polarization is inevitably more ostensible under democratic rule than it is under tyrannical rule. Democracy remains a system in which conflicts may be dealt with in the free marketplace of ideas without fear of annihilation. Should we fear polarization? And if we are indeed afraid, of what, exactly, are we afraid?

Should we be afraid of politics as a form of society? No. As long as polarization does not occur along ethnic lines (as was the case in the Balkans), then politics will always find a peaceful settlement of political conflicts. But this already presupposes that all parties abide by the constitution.

The ideological battle which Fortuyn hoped to start was not initiated by the native Dutch but, instead, by Muslim intellectuals from the Islamic world. Political Islam is now being criticized and confronted by people who do have theological knowledge of Islam. The debate is also gradually being released from the stranglehold of the European Islamic experts. Nowhere else in Europe have so many immigrants, and thus new Europeans, taken part in the social debate about Islam and Islamism, than in the Netherlands.

Polarization, in that regard, combats narrow-mindedness. According to a survey (August 8, 2008) amongst 1,100 Dutchmen, the Dutch are currently more positive about Muslims than they were in 2006. Twenty percent of those questioned said they were positive about Muslims although 25 percent remained negative. In 2006, those figures were respectively 14 and 40 percent. It is evident that for the Dutch ideas of equality between men and women, gay rights, freedom of expression, and tolerance remain at the core of the collective psyche. The Dutch do not address integration from an economic point of view. Indeed, the feeling is that if the Muslims were to take heed of these principles most Dutch would not object to their presence.

Multiculturalists, however, often criticize the harsh tone of this debate. They point out that this debate has stirred up hatred amongst native Dutch people towards Islam. The more critically we speak about Islam, according to the multiculturalists, the more we hate the Muslims. But, this has proven to be untrue. The airing of the controversial 17-minute anti-Islamic film *Fitna* by director and member of Parliament Geert Wilders proved to be a real test for Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. An incredible and free flowing spoken and written public discourse was initiated and nurtured in the months following the release of the film. But what was its result? First of all, most Muslims showed no interest in engaging in any form of violent reaction toward those who criticized or insulted Islam. Thus, the radical Salafis found themselves completely isolated in their campaign of hatred

against Geert Wilders. Second of all, this attitude of tolerance greatly heightened the level of acceptance of the Dutch Muslim community amongst the native Dutch.

The Euro-jihad and the Virtualization of Violence: Europe as a Target

Some Islamic traditions and certain political aspects of Islam, in particular, constitute a grave peril to European communities. The inheritance of the Enlightenment is at stake. The Qur'an and the *shar'iah* are incompatible with basic human rights.[7] The latter is the reason why many Muslims in the Islamic world are fighting for democracy and human rights.

I want to stress once again that it is pivotal to differentiate between Islam, political Islam, and Muslims. Political Islam is a totalitarian movement and an equal anathema to Muslims and non-Muslims. From the very beginning, Islam has always had two faces: a political one and a mystical one. For the majority of Muslims, the practices of Islam are merely habitual but because the Prophet Mohammed, and not the imams, laid the foundation for the mystical as well as political Islam, it has become almost impossible to pose critical questions to political Islam without concurrently questioning the essential elements of Islam itself.

Present day Islamic terrorism has a totalitarian character.[8] This type of terrorism is directed toward the establishment of the total state. The total state is, by definition, a totalitarian state that has an answer to all aspects of human existence on earth. The *jihad*, in its violent external avatar, is the instrument utilized for the establishment of this state. The dominion of an Islamic totalitarian state would change all laws and regulations that govern inter-human relations. In his text *To Catch a Wolf* (April 2004), Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Theo van Gogh, described his *jihadist* intention as follows:

> By the grace of Allah, a generation will rise that will use death with their own blood and their own souls as a shield around our *Ummah*. It is a question of time before the knights of Allah will march unto the Binnenhof [Dutch parliament] in The Hague to raise the flag of Tawheed. They will (*insha'allah*) change the parliament into a *Sharia* court, the chairman's hammer will go down to ratify the Islamic sentences, the gong will spread the Islamic law over the rest of the Netherlands like the wrinkles of a drop. From the tower of Kok [referring to the private office of the prime minister] we'll hear (*insha'allah*) *La ilaha illa Allah* and these words will be carried by the wind and will mix with other words of praise that will come together from all directions and regions. These praises will finally reach our Master on His Throne and the Islamic Ummah will throw itself as one body before the Lord of the worlds.

Muslim terrorism constitutes a movement that distinguishes itself primarily by battling human rights and democracy.

It would appear that the United States has escaped the reach of the *jihadists*. The Patriot Act, and other American countermeasures, has made it extremely hard for *jihadists* to enter the United States. So, Europe has become the frontline for political Islam. In one of the latest risk analyses of the terror threat in Europe, Rob de Wijk and Carla Relk[9] reach a worrying conclusion:

> There are indications that Europe has become more unsafe than the US after 9/11 whilst radicals and extremists consider the Americans to be the motor of the battle against Islam. This difference in safety can firstly be derived from hard facts. In the United States, according to President Bush, as many as 10 attacks in New York and Washington have been prevented; in Europe that number is a multiple of 10....Statistically speaking there have been significantly more attacks prevented in Europe than on the other side of the Ocean; at least twelve times more.

The Dutch intelligence agency AIVD speaks of a European *jihad* in its report *The Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the*

Islamic Terrorist Threat (2006)[10]. These Islamic terrorists, according to this report, are part of "local autonomous *jihadist* networks consisting of people who were born or raised in Europe." The Dutch intelligence agency defines a *jihadist* network as follows:

> A *jihadist* network is a fluid, dynamic, vaguely bordered structure that includes a couple of people (radical Muslims) that are linked to each other, on an individual level as well as on an aggregated level (in cells/groups). They are temporarily bound together for a common goal. That goal is closely related to the pursuit of *jihadism* (terrorism included).

Moreover, a number of research projects have shown that young Muslims predominantly radicalize individually, through use of the internet and without a central cell structure. Globalization, media technology, and extremely fast methods of communication have definitively changed our world and have made it difficult for society to stop this process of radicalization. The internet is a flourishing bazaar in which the hatred is readily traded. The Dutch intelligence agency concluded that Islamic terrorists will probably be able to use a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapon in an attack. As if to bear witness to this dire conclusion, in London seven suspected terrorists were on trial in 2008 because they allegedly tried to buy a nuclear bomb.

In its report *From Dawa to Jihad,*[11] the Dutch intelligence agency states that the re-Islamization of Western Muslims is the highest purpose and ultimate goal of a lot of radical puritanical Islamic groups. Disconcertingly, the AIVD, in 2007, found that: "The size of the group receptive to their radical message, to a greater or lesser extent, is estimated by the AIVD at 25-30,000 people."[12] It added:

> Estimates by the AIVD and security services in a number of neighboring countries appear to indicate that approximately 5 percent of the religious Muslim population in the Western world is to some extent receptive to radicalization. Of that 5 percent, about 10 percent will actually radicalize in the end. In so doing, they may choose either *jihadism* or the radical *dawa*. The radical *dawa* mainly targets the 5 percent of religious Muslims potentially receptive to radicalization – a fairly large group. It must be emphasized that these figures are estimates only; no hard statistics are currently available.[13]

Since the Second World War, freedom of speech has never been under as much threat as it is now. The Danish cartoon-affair, violent protests against the speech of the Pope, and the murder of Theo van Gogh are a few examples of the actions of radical Muslims against freedom of speech. The attack on Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* could perhaps be seen as the birth of Talibanization of Europe: book burnings, threats, and terrorist attacks on the publishers and translators ensued. The European states and their intelligentsia refused to give in to these terrorist threats. The International Writers' Parliament also had the courage to resist supra-national forms of terror. But now, Europe seems to have lost that resilience. Unfortunately, after the murder of Van Gogh, there was a change of heart on freedom of expression. The film *Submission*, by the late Theo van Gogh and Dutch member of Parliament Ayaan Hrisi Ali, has not been shown since November 2, 2004. In fact, the film is under an informal screening ban. This ban has been decreed and imposed, not by any authority, but, by criminal groups threatening terrorist acts. In 2007, public broadcasters in the Netherlands decided against the airing of *Fitna* because of safety concerns. Unfortunately, this state of affairs is fast becoming the norm in the Netherlands.

Ian Buruma, in his book *Murder in Amsterdam,* suggested that Mohammed Bouyeri killed Theo van Gogh simply because he didn't appreciate van Gogh's jokes about Islam. This is most definitely not true. Bouyeri, was the leader of a *jihadist* cell, and he had declared the *jihad* on van Gogh even before the movie *Submission* was released. During the trial against Bouyeri, it became clear that the decision to carry out a terrorist attack was made

in July 2004[14], but the target of the attack was up in the air. Furthermore, it should be noted that *Submission* was not aired until August 29, 2004. Since Bouyeri only had a small firearm at his disposal, the choice of targets was necessarily limited; if he had access to explosives in November of 2004, he would necessarily have staged a different attack. Buruma doesn't seem to understand that neither the statements nor the movie by van Gogh brought Bouyeri to his decision to stage a terrorist attack. *Jihadism* and radicalization are autonomous, political -theological processes which occur irrespective of external incentives.

Conclusion

Based on what I said, I believe that the integration of Muslims is the biggest challenge for post-war Europe. Better integration of Muslims into the Netherlands will necessarily lead to a diminished ability of terrorism to destabilize the socio-political order of the nation. However, successful integration does not in any way guarantee definite elimination of terrorism. Muslim terrorism is a political-religious conviction that also leads to terror attacks in countries (such as Indonesia and Morocco) in which integration isn't an issue. Nevertheless, enhancing processes and means of integration is of grave importance to national security.

The ultimate battle against political Islam is an ideological battle. The fruits of enlightenment are being threatened by Muslim fundamentalism and are in dire need for protection by the Western elites. Because of this, the ideological battle will be about enlightenment in Islamic cultures[15], which need to be brought about by Islamic and Western intellectuals alike.

Islamic intellectuals often show signs of narrow-mindedness and often have nationalistic tendencies. Even leftist intellectuals in the Islamic world have a weak spot for religion and its traditions. A century of enlightenment is unfathomable and unachievable without brave intellectuals in the Islamic world, and they need the support of the Western intellectuals. Freedom of speech and tolerance toward dissenting opinions are prerequisites for critical self-reflection.

I will conclude with Kant's view on enlightenment: "If we are asked, 'Do we now live in an enlightened age?' the answer is, 'No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment.'"

Notes

1 Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic, Its Rise, greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806*, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 1995.

2 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, *The Federalist. A commentary on The Constitution of the United States*, New York, The Modern Library 2000, pp.118-123.

3 John Locke, *Two Treaties of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2003, pp.211-256.

4 It should be noted that all of these institutions, regardless of their religious or political denomination, were financed by public money.

5 C. Lefort, *Democracy and Political Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988; C. Lefort, 'La question de la démocratie,' in: *Essais sur le politique. XIXe - XXe siècles*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1986 and C. Lefort, 'Sur la démocratie moderne', in: *Essais sur le politique XIXe – XXe siècles*, Paris: Seuil 1986.

6 Research by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Research and Documentation Center of the Ministry of Justice indicate that the school results of non-western immigrants leaves much to be desired. One reasons for this is the fact that they have a worse sense of the Dutch language than native Dutch children. This not only hampers their integration but it also decreases their chances of economic development in Dutch society. Non-Western foreigners are less likely to go to the higher forms of higher education (the Dutch high school system is based on three levels of education, the highest leads to acceptance at university, the lowest is aimed at practical education). In 2004, only 55 percent of Moroccans, 49 percent of Turks students obtained a diploma.

As a result, 25 percent of non-Western foreigners in the age-group between 15 and 65 received welfare in September of 2004. This constitutes twice as many people than in the group of non-immigrants. The low level of integration and education also has other socio-economic effects. In 2004, 4.4 percent of non-Western immigrants were suspected of criminal activities versus 1.3 percent of the native population. The problems related to crime are especially worrisome in the category of second generation immigrants of Moroccan decent. The Netherlands has now officially identified 40 neighborhoods where riots like the ones in Paris are to be expected.

7 See the Judgment by the European Court for Human Rights: Case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey (February 13, 2003). With regard to the relation between Shar'iah law and the European Human Rights Convention, the Court stated:

> 128: "Like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that shar'iah, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that, when read together, the offending statements, which contain explicit references to the introduction of shar'iah, are difficult to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the Convention taken as a whole. It is difficult to declare one's respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on shar'iah, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. ... In the Court's view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing shar'iah in a State party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention."

8 Bassam Tibi, *Der Neue Totalitarismus, 'Heiliger Krieg' und westliche Sicherheit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004), p.36.

9 Rob de Wijk and Carla Relk, *Doelwit Europa. Complotten en aanslagen van moslimextremisten*, Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam 2005, pp. 20-24.

10 *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat*, published by General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, Den Haag 2006.

11 *From Dawa to Jihad. The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order*, published by General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, Den Haag 2004.

12 "Annual report 2007" Published by the General intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, Den Haag 2007, p. 41.

13 "*The radical Dawa in transition, The rise of Islamic neo-radicalism in the Netherlands*", published by the General intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, Den Haag 2007, p. 28.

14 The most accurate and complete description of Mohammed Bouyeri can be found in the following book: Jutta Chorus and Ahmet Olgum, *In godsnaam. Het jaar van Theo van Gogh:* Amsterdam, uitgeverij Contact, 2005

15 Giovanna Borradori, *Philosophy in a time of terror. Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, p. 128.



Is Shar'iah a Law?

Maajid Nawaz, *Director, Quilliam Foundation, London, England*

The topic "Is *Shar'iah* a Law?" was deliberately selected because, at the moment in Britain, there is a big discussion about *shar'iah* courts being incorporated into British law and gaining some form of recognition. Of course, adding to this was the controversial statement in February 2008 by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, about the "inevitablitity" of incorporating *shar'iah* into British state law.

My ideas and the ideas of the Quilliam Foundation are ones which have existed in academia and academic circles for some time. These ideas have not been popularized and have failed to capture the popular imagination. Certainly, what has happened of late with the growth of Islamist parties is that the debate has been monopolized by such parties to the extent that people who were discussing subjects of Islam—law, domination of societies through Islam, etc.—tended to do so through the lens provided to them by the Islamists. There are reasons for that.

One has to touch upon the history of this matter. The fact is that Islamists are fundamentally and essentially modernists. They are the ones who first translated an understanding and explanation of Islam to the West. They arrived in Western countries seeking asylum due to the trouble they caused in their own countries. Then, not only did they first start translating Islam for Western audiences outside the realm of academia, but they were also the first to organize politically within Muslim communities in the West. Thus, they began monopolizing the discourse.

Now, sadly, and with great respect to intellectuals like Professor Bernard Lewis[1], when we discuss the crisis of Islam, we automatically adopt the Islamist premise and utilize that premise to frame and ground these discussions. What I hope to demonstrate in my presentation is that, in fact, there never was a need for reforming Islam. Islam does not need a *Reformation*—what it needs is a *Renaissance*. Islamists were the ones that began the reformation of Islam, largely in response and reaction to colonialism and secularism, as these concepts emerged in Europe. Historically, Muslims never had a debate on secularism. Muslims never needed to discuss whether *shar'iah* should be part of state law or not.

My contention, then, is that Islamists adopted Bolshevik principles in response to European secularism and adopted the very specific debate that Christians were experiencing in Europe about the need to separate Church and State. In their reaction to colonialism, as well as their need to define themselves against the *other*, they concluded, "Europe is separating Church from State; we will merge the Church and the State, i.e. the Mosque and the State." In a nutshell, if it is not already clear, for me, *shar'iah* is not a law - *shar'iah* is a religious code.

The term "*shar'iah* law" is an English term. If you translate "*shar'iah* law" into Arabic, it becomes alien. We don't say *kanoun-e-shar'iah* or *dastoor-e-shar'iah*; we say *shar'iah* because it is not law in the sense that *kanoun*, which is a word related to canon, is. In fact, linguistically, *shar'iah* means "the path to water" or "the path to life." There are a few *hadith (*the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) that refer to *shar'iah*. In one of them, a Bedouin asked the Prophet, "The various *shar'iahs* of Islam are too much, what do I do?" The Prophet did not say that those who break the law are subject to criminal punishment. He simply said, "Make sure your tongue remains moist with remembrance of God." Thus, the understanding of *shar'iah* as a law is largely a modern creation.

What is the history behind how this modern construction emerged? The Ottoman state was collapsing. The Islamists referred to this Ottoman Caliphate as the ideal, the utopia that they want to bring back. This *khalifa* was clearly decaying. In its quest for survival, the Caliphate needed to respond to a few things, especially modern political concepts such as sovereignty, legislation, citizenship, statehood, and constitutions. Of course, these are all modern ideas which were created through European political thought. None of the terms mentioned exist in the Qur'an whatsoever. Sovereignty is a modern political word. It did not exist in the Arabic language.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman state needed to respond to these modern concepts. So, for the first time in history among Muslim peoples (apart from an aberration during the period in Muslim Spain where they adopted the *Maliki* school of law), the Ottomans began a project that reconciled the need for codified law and the benefits of law. They took the *Hanafi* religious code, and they decided to carry out a reform process that they called the *Tanzimat* reforms, which they codified and tried to adopt as state law. The codification was executed in the form of a book called *Al-Majalla*.

The effort failed with the collapse of the Ottoman state. It did, however, plant the seeds for the need to reconcile modern concepts of statehood and law with Islam, faith, and religion. This project was eventually picked up by people like Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, and Maulana Mawdoodi, the founder of *Jamat-e-Islam* in Pakistan. I contend that Sayyid Qutb of Egypt is not the godfather of Islamism; he just happens to be one of its most well known voices. Hassan al-Banna founded the first Islamist political organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Sayyid Qutb emerged. Sheikh Taqiuddin al-Nabhani founded *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Party of Liberation) in Egypt, which happened to be the most articulate of those organizations to express the Islamist ideology. Sayyid Qutb was the product of the merger of the ideas of *Hizb ut-Tahrir* and those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb debated with al-Nabhani in *Al Quds* and was imprisoned with members of *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, in the same prison where I served. He then emerged with *Milestones* (1964) after these debates. In the Indian subcontinent, once again, Qutb was influenced by Mawdoodi, the founder of *Jamat-e-Islam.* In any case, these Islamist movements in the Indian subcontinent—beginning with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1920s, *Al Quds* and *Jamat-e-Islam* in the 1940s, and *Hizb ut-Tahrir* in the 1950s—re-popularized the notion of "sovereignty for God." That is how the seeds were sown.

Pre-Islamism, Muslims did not have this idea of "sovereignty for God" as a pillar of faith. Moreover, there was no notion of ruling by the *shar'iah.* In fact, this is made clear in the *hadith*, where the Companions asked the Prophet, "When do we fight the rulers?" The Prophet replied, "Never, except if he is categorically a *qafir* (infidel)." For this, there exists *burhaan*, or clear-cut proof, from the Qur'an and the *sunna* (words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad). When experts comment on this *hadith,* they say that the compulsion to fight is only when the ruler apotheosizes, i.e. when he is no longer Muslim. But, in every other case, even if he rules with oppression or transgression, if he lashes the backs and tortures his people, they must remain obedient to this ruler. This is a medieval interpretation of this *hadith*.

Contextualizing this interpretation, we find that even in Europe, at the time, with the wars between Catholics and Protestants, everyone was concerned about the religion of the king. It was normal in medieval times to be concerned that the ruler of your land happened to be a coreligionist. This is before any coherent idea of citizenship had emerged. The interpretation of the *hadith* described above fits perfectly within the context of that time period.

Islamists have gone one step further than the medieval interpretation. Contrary to their claims of being traditionalists, they demand that a state

be Islamic and for the ruler to rule solely according to Islam. However, these demands or compulsions (as they would have us believe) are what are referred to in Islamic theology as *abida'a*, or innovation; it is something that is wholly modern. As such, you will not find one reference among classical theologians referring to a *dawla Islamiya* (Islamic state).

This has an extreme significance for the debate. It is entirely possible for a Muslim to rule a state with a perfectly modern system of law, a liberal democracy, and to still insist that he is a Muslim. This in itself would pull the rug from underneath the Islamists' feet because it would mean that a secular, liberal democratic ruler who still ostensibly identified as a Muslim could exist. But Islamists went one step further and began talking about the need for an Islamic state and the need to overthrow *kufr* (non-Muslim or "disbelieving") states, which was an innovation.

With modernity came the need to react to concepts such as sovereignty, constitution, and legislation; Islamists reconciled Islam with these modern political concepts and asked, "What do we do? How do we answer these questions? Sovereignty must be for God, legislation must be Islamic, and the state must also be Islamic. If you're a Muslim, then you are a citizen, and if you're not a Muslim, then you're from the *dhimmi* (non-Muslims in an Islamic state)," they agreed. They wanted to reconcile what were medieval concepts with very European, modern political ideas. In terms of modern warfare, they said, "Our concept of just war is *jihad*. We have an offensive *jihad*." It became a process of reconciliation. Then, along came the Islamist parties.

When attempting to answer the question, "Is *shar'iah* a law?" I would advocate that the very question itself is anachronistic. Taking modern political ideas, such as law, and anachronistically interpreting Islam through this prism is very dangerous. This anachronism, which Quentin Skinner[2] identified when discussing the history of ideas, is generally relevant when discussing Islam and Islamism and secularism today. We have to be very careful now when discussing this topic. Let us not adopt Islamist paradigms and engage in a discussion from that premise.

With respect to Bernard Lewis, he talks about one of the crises in Islam being that sovereignty is forgotten and is, therefore, not compatible with modernity. This is one of the problems that we need to overcome. I think that this is a crisis of Islamism, not a crisis of Islam. I need to define what I mean by Islamism. To differentiate Islam from the crisis of Islamism, we need to know what Islamism is.

First of all, it is fundamental for Islamists to insist that Islam is an ideology, not a faith. This has implications. To insist that Islam is an ideology, one of the implications is that there must be a clash of civilizations between Islam and other ideologies, much like in the Cold War where the ideologies of communism and capitalism were in struggle with each other. If Islam is an ideology, it must also be in struggle with communism and capitalism. In 2002, *Hizb ut-Tahrir*, for example, authored a pamphlet called *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilizations*[3] because they perceive Islam as an ideology competing with capitalism and communism. This is again opposed to the traditional understanding of Islam as a religion.

The second identifier of Islamism is that the law of these ideological people needs to be the *shar'iah*. So the *shar'iah* needs to be synchronized with state law. What that means is that *halal* and *haram*, the prescribed and the prohibitive for Muslims, must be the same as legal and illegal. They have a need to take a definition of *haram* and make it legal. Again, historically, this never happened. There was never a case where the *shar'iah* was adopted in that way and synchronized with law. The belief that the *shar'iah* is something that needs to be synchronized with state law is a modern innovation and is something that Islamists have popularized.

The third identifier of Islam is the notion of *umma* as a global political block. This again, is an ahistoric understanding of *umma*. There were

two ways in which the Prophet of Islam referred to *umma*. One was as a religious community. Then, to take the notion of *umma* and turn it into a political block, like the international proletariat, is a modern idea. The other way the Prophet used the word *umma* was in the Document of Medina. When the Prophet set up a city-state as a civil ruler, not as a theological ruler, he used the word *umma* to say that Muslims, Christians, and Jews are one *umma*. That is a primitive understanding of citizenship, as adopted by a civil leader who happened to be a prophet. For the Islamists to insist that the Muslim *umma* is a political block, and, of course, what follows from that, that allegiance can be owed to no other identity apart from this global block, is a modern aberration.

The fourth and final identifier is that with this ideology of Islam and the state law of *shar'iah*, this global community will need an entity—the Caliphate. This is needed in order to expand this Islamist ideology, to rule by the *shar'iah*, to intervene in the affairs of other nations, and to liberate Muslims from *qufr* laws (just like the USSR would intervene in the affairs of other nations to liberate the workers from the oppression of the bourgeoisie). This is the modern ideal.

Notes

1 Bernard Lewis is a British-American scholar known for his works on the Middle East and Islam. His books include *The Crisis of Islam* and *Islam and the West.*

2 Skinner is a British historian known for being one of the two principal members of the "Cambridge School" of the study of the history of political thought.

3 This pamphlet borrows its title, in part, from the well-known 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* by Samuel P. Huntington titled "The Clash of Civilizations."

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