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MEXICO AND THE NEW CHALLENGES OF HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

Raúl Benítez-Manaut

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Latin American Program



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Creating Community in the Americas

Raúl Benítez-Manaut

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PREFACE

JOSEPH S. TULCHIN

Joseph S. Tulchin is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

One of the most disquieting features of the post-cold war global community has been the confusion surrounding discussions of security—national security and international security—so that the very definition of the term is unclear. There is confusion on some of the most basic issues, such as: what constitutes an external threat; what is the role of the armed forces; under what circumstances should security be a question for multilateral agencies or responses; and, what is the appropriate response to threats from non-state actors. Perhaps most confusing of all is the increasing tendency to blur or erase the traditional line between domestic and international security, between citizen or personal security and national security.

While traditional security threats—armed conflicts between symmetrical state actors—may be fewer or much reduced from what they were perceived to be in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the missions of the armed forces in the Latin American region still reflect those threats. And, over the past decade, there has been considerable debate over the capacity of civilian authorities to manage the armed forces, the budgets allocated to them, and the uses to which they are put within the nation's frontiers or overseas as part of multilateral peacekeeping.

In October of 2003 in Mexico City, the Organization of American States held a “Special Conference on Security” with the objective of defining the important concepts, priorities, and instruments of security for entire hemisphere. Never before had a security debate generated so much attention in the Americas, nor had it promoted so much cooperation between the countries of Latin America as well as among the countries of North America and the Caribbean. This is a signal that the nations of the region have matured and are attempting to position

themselves as interlocutors with the superpower, not only as rule-takers but also as rule makers.¹ We take this to be the beginning of a process, not the end. Nevertheless, not a single country managed to form a security community that answers its society's demands for the civil and democratic control of the armed forces, and develops clear mechanisms of cooperation in defense. While there have been advances in the democratization of defense and security structures in some countries of South America and severe conflicts were overcome through negotiated means in Central America, many elements of state reform, the defense of human rights, and decision-making in matters of defense and security remain to be solved. These elements are fundamental to the institutionalization of cooperation in matters of security—the creation of a security community. And, since September 11, 2001, the U.S., which had been playing a vital role in forging a useful security community, retreated to a unilateral definition of security and the security agenda that made creating community more difficult. So long as the U.S. insists on imposing its own security agenda on the hemisphere, there will be crisis points defined by the U.S. that undermine the concept of community. Furthermore, looking to the future, because U.S. unilateralism weakens the hemispheric potential of the OAS, it is by no means clear that the OAS, and not some other regional institution, will be the key element in the architecture of hemispheric security.

The multidimensional concept of security emerging from the commitments of Bridgetown and Mexico, 2002–2003, can be understood as the agreement that each State in the hemisphere faces different risks to its security and that what is perceived as a risk by one country is not necessarily perceived as such by another. There are inherent benefits to this approach. First, it allows for the give and take necessary in the accommodation of differing interests within a community. Second, it is methodologically more sophisticated and inclusive in the sense that it allows for consideration of a wider range of perceived threats and refers to a wider range of institutions available to democratic governments. This sophistication also brings complexity with it. The multidimensional concept incorporates both social and political variables and, as a consequence, takes on ambiguity and a multiplicity of attributes that makes it difficult to achieve cooperation among governments or within international organizations.

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In hemispheric discussions, the multidimensional concept can be taken to represent the agenda of developing nations, an agenda which in some sense is understood as different from and in conflict with a “Northern” agenda of security representing U.S. interests. This North-South tension has been present in the debates of the OAS in recent years. Since September 11, the U.S. has insisted on increasingly “securitizing” its international relations and cooperation. Most of the nations of Latin America have resisted this pressure and in response have reverted to an older posture that emphasizes national sovereignty, especially in questions of economic and social policy. This reversion has made complication more difficult at the hemispheric level by giving higher priority to local, national concerns rather than to softening local demands in order to give greater priority to community concerns and interests. In other words, by defending themselves against U.S. pressure, the Latin American nations at the same time make it more difficult to achieve cooperative solutions among themselves to their common problems. One example is the growing Brazilian opposition to the accelerating the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, preferring to fragment the negotiations and drag them out. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the multidimensional concept serves as the framework of action for the group of countries that originally introduced the discussions in the OAS: the micro states of the Caribbean with their peculiar vulnerability to international crime, immigration, and the other issues of the post Cold War security agenda. International crime, immigration, and other issues included in the concept of human security are becoming increasingly important to much larger nations in the region, such as Mexico, so that there is a growing sense of community building around these issues.

The OAS has sought to build in a certain amount of flexibility into the evolving hemispheric security architecture by suggesting that while many new threats are transnational, it should not be assumed that all of the responses would necessarily be multinational, since security policy—as larger countries in the hemisphere as in the small ones—continues to be formulated at the national level and to a lesser extent, at the sub-regional level. And, in a major step forward, the OAS agreed that every existing state resource (military, intelligence, judiciary, diplomacy) should be used to confront threats, but that those responses should not necessarily be

under military control. This has strengthened efforts within the organization to create a community approach to drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime that does not privilege the military but focuses attention on those civilian institutions linked to the rule of law.

But, if it remains true that nations identify different security priorities, and their responses to perceived threats, in the first instance, will be individual, the problem is how to get to collective action and what will become acceptable modes of multilateral action in the hemisphere? The answer is to prioritize the use of institutional capacities, both multilateral and national. Due to the fact that countries have widely varying institutional capacities, advances in cooperation and means of increasing mutual trust must be pursued gradually and at every level: national, bilateral, sub-regional, hemispheric, and global. In that regard, it is important to recognize that democratic control of the armed forces is a process that presents clear deficits, in the form of inefficiency in the civil conduct of the military, imperfect communication between civil society and elected officials, and low levels of transparency in the budget process. Thus, the work that remains to be done must be accompanied by constant, open debate in order to strengthen the rule of law.

The proposals being debated include those within the framework of the OAS aiming at a revision of the security structure (Rio Treaty, IDB, IDC), as well as sub-regional proposals that are already in effect in the MERCOSUR region and Central America. For several years, the idea of instituting an early warning system has been a topic of discussion. Such a system would provide information about military activities, transparency in military spending, statements about supply/equipment policies, performance of military maneuvers, and summaries of the doctrines that justify action being taken by national defense systems. In some cases, there has been more progress in the bilateral level, as between Chile and Argentina, and in others there has been more progress at the regional level, as in the nonproliferation measures in Mercosur or the money laundering agreements in the Anglophone Caribbean and, in still others, the progress has been most notable at the hemispheric level, as in counter-narcotics and the protection of human rights. All of these topics are on the agenda for the Americas, along with the priority of the United States to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²

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Redesigning security institutions in the Americas must aim at building multilateral mechanisms based on national, juridical, and political resources, and combining them into accountability regime that emphasizes normative values and not purely military facets of the problem, as would be the case in bilateral relations with the United States. To this end, it is important to introduce into the security debate at the national, sub regional and regional levels the roles that democratic, civilian forces can play.

If security is multidimensional, as the Political Declaration of the OAS's Special Conference on Security maintains, the agencies that are in charge of security must also be multidimensional. The security agenda cannot be reviewed without establishing more effective coordination among the OAS, its Hemispheric Security Commission, the Presidential Summits and the meetings of the Ministers of Defense of the Americas, and the various meetings of the armed forces. Without transparency among security agencies and among the countries of the region, tensions may be produced that could be exploited by actors interested in undermining democracies. This has become an even more important priority after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 because non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, have grown and have increased the pressure on governments to militarize the security agenda and make it difficult for them to respond with institutions that have clear legal and operative limits to intervention.

We continue to insist that reducing sub regional and regional conflict is tied to the stability of democratic regimes. These regimes are threatened by the weak rule of political institutions in the definition and conduct of security and defense policies. We take for granted that the discussion about the security community should include the OAS, which is the principal element of existing multilateral security architecture. This presumption is reinforced by the fact that the United States wants collective action to occur within the framework of the OAS and because there is no other competitive architectural framework. Nevertheless, we should point out that the existing sub-regional economic accords, such as MERCOSUR, the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, and CARICOM, provide potential frameworks for future institutional cooperation. At this time, only CARICOM has been able to go beyond economic accords to include a security agreement known as the Regional Security Structure, which provides for military collaboration

in response to multinational or non-traditional security threats. There also has been considerable evolution in NAFTA in the private sector thanks to an implicit agreement by the Mexicans to use North American legal codes and juridical framework in the resolution of private and commercial disputes. It remains to be seen if NAFTA can produce institutional ties outside of the economic sphere.

The series of activities of the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program known as "Creating Community" have played an important role in promoting the debate, in building civilian capacity to deal with the armed forces within the framework of civilian, constitutional institutions, and in promoting the concept of a community of democratic nations with shared values. The project, Creating Community in this way, hopes to stimulate a strategic debate. Merely by encouraging strategic thinking and planning, we expect to create space, for initiatives at the national, subregional, regional, hemispheric and global levels. It was such an initiative, precipitated by a workshop organized by Creating Community for the Minister of Defense of Chile, that led to the major shift in Chilean policy at the UN in the decision to send troops to Haiti. Almost immediately, Brazil decided to join, and, albeit slowly and with some reluctance, Argentina went along. The efforts—collective and individual—of the experts who form the network that is the foundation for Creating Community are the stuff of which this important shift is made.

This book is the product of a work done by Raúl Benítez Manaut, a member of the *Creating Community Research Team*. The three essays compiled in this volume are the fruit of his residence at the Wilson Center as a Public Policy Scholar in the Latin American Program. The focus of his interest was the debate over competing concepts of hemispheric security and how certain countries, especially Mexico design their security policies. This book also reflects an effort to stimulate a discussion of security policy, and, more specifically, Mexican national security policy and the bilateral relations with the United States.

We hope that this volume contributes to the debate now underway in the United States and throughout Latin America as to how to formulate policies that promote a community of security in the Americas, which must occur while taking into consideration the multiple dimensions of national interests.

NOTES

1. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph Espach, eds., *Latin America in the New International System*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) explains the possible roles open to the nations of the hemisphere as members of a security community.

2. Indeed, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is controlled in the hemisphere through treaties and conventions such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967) and numerous OAS conventions. These measures have been ratified by the vast majority of the countries of the hemisphere; the Americas are considered the region that has best controlled the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Defense and Hemispheric Security in the 21st Century: The Challenge of Multinational Cooperation

ABSTRACT

This article provides an analysis of the debate of Western Hemispheric security in the 21st Century. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, hemispheric cooperation became a priority in combating terrorism. It examines the active diplomatic roles that countries such as Canada, Brazil, and Mexico have taken in the hemisphere as well as those that have acted on sub-regional levels such as MERCOSUR, the Caribbean and Central America. On October 27th and 28th, 2003, the Organization of the American States (OAS) held the “Special Conference on Security” addressing hemispheric and sub-regional security. This paper reflects on the negotiations between the countries that signed the Political Declaration of the Conference in Mexico. There is also an analysis of the predominant concepts of hemispheric security including human security, multidimensional security and “flexible architecture of security.” It concludes with ten observations about the security and defense systems in the Hemisphere, the debate between the different governments, the negotiations for the reformulation of the inter-American system of defense, and the restructuring of the relations between the Inter-American Defense Board, the Rio Treaty, and the OAS.

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the world, international and regional security structures are under review. The Cold War reconfigured the whole of our international security structures, the epicenter of which was located in the Security Council of the United Nations. In the American hemisphere, military

alliances were forged through the creation of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) in 1942. In 1947 the Rio Treaty (or the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance -TIAR) was signed, followed in 1948 by the creation of the Organization of American States (OAS). This security architecture is complemented by a large number of bilateral and sub-regional accords, the most important of which is the Treaty of Tlatelolco to control the use of nuclear energy and prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms in the hemisphere.

Many bilateral agreements signed during the Cold War have been updated. Others are no longer applicable, and new ones have been established *ad hoc* in response to security crises. The most notorious regional conflict that brought together the efforts of the countries of the hemisphere and international organizations was no doubt the Central American conflict from 1979 to 1996. To overcome the security crisis in the region, multinational and internal accords were put in place in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

The 1990s were important years for the reconstruction of the security architecture in the Americas. The OAS was revived as an institution and its membership expanded. The same period saw a reactivation of “summit diplomacy”. In the areas of security and defense, presidential summits were rounded out by the work carried out at conferences of the ministers of defense and commanders of the armies. Meetings between the chiefs of the navies and air forces were held frequently, as were joint military exercises, some with the participation of the majority of the countries of the hemisphere (such as the UNITAS naval exercises). Another important meeting is the “Special Conference on Security” that was held in Mexico in October 2003, bringing together the ministers of foreign affairs.

An analysis of the advances that have been made and the obstacles that remain in the construction of a new security architecture is vital. The countries of the Americas have their own national security doctrines; they are at different levels of institutional evolution internally as regards national security and defense; and they have different perspectives on bilateral, sub-regional and hemispheric cooperation.

Since the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, a new catalogue of threats and heightened security problems has been added, raising a number of questions. Is there an old, traditional agenda or a new security agenda? Are the new threats the product of

states or not? By what mechanisms are we to confront the new threats—with national resources or through cooperation?

The final part of this document sets out some proposals for the future of the security architecture of the hemisphere.

II. THE COLD WAR

The Western hemisphere has rarely been directly threatened by an enemy from outside the hemisphere. During the Cold War, a threat was identified at the collective level: that of communism. However, security issues—including strategies for control of “communism”—in the majority of cases were defined in “internal” terms of national security. The other aspect of security, which in most cases is now superseded, is that of territorial and border conflicts. In the years of the Cold War the disputes over territory in most cases were resolved through negotiation and diplomatic mediation, although from time to time there were military confrontations such as between El Salvador and Honduras, or between Peru and Ecuador. These territorial conflicts were resolved through diplomatic channels, and as a result today there are no important rivalries between the various nations. Indeed the Western hemisphere is one of the most peaceful and stable parts of the world as we move into the 21st century.

In the past, threats at the hemispheric level were defined by conflicts that did not originate in the Americas and the development of which was not chiefly centered here: the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. The cooperative efforts made in response to these conflicts were principally aimed at supporting the United States (World War I and II); during the Cold War the bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union determined the nature of the threats and hence the positions of the various governments. The current institutional structure (architecture) of “Hemispheric Security” is based on the commitments that grew out of the cooperation of World War II (IADB) and the immediate post-war years.

It is important to bear in mind that this security structure has evolved unevenly, often in response to particular cases and threat levels:

- In some cases evolution of the security structure has been the result of a consensus among nations to confront a challenge or threat (Second World War).

- In other cases there have been notable disagreements between countries, chiefly beginning in the 1960s and chiefly concerning the means of confronting the “communist enemy”.¹
- Alternative mechanisms, fundamentally of a diplomatic nature, were constructed *ad hoc* to deal with problems of security, principally beginning in the decade of the 1980s.

In the second half of the 1940s, the IADB was revitalized, the Rio Treaty was signed (1947) and the constitution of the OAS was formalized (1948). The IADB and the OAS operate as the principal institutional structures in the hemisphere, and the Rio Treaty is the treaty governing security relations. At the political level, the war against communism determined the foreign and defense policies of the majority of countries of the hemisphere, particularly in relation to Cuba. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed in 1967, is the key legal-diplomatic instrument that has prevented a nuclear arms race in the Americas.

In the 1970s most of the security efforts were centered on Central America. The negotiations on the Panama Canal (1972–1977) and their implementation, and then the efforts to find negotiated settlements to the Central America crisis, shaped security relations. In the eighties two diplomatic mechanisms that operated in parallel to the hemispheric system were tried: the Contadora Group (1983–1986) and the Esquipulas peace process (1986–1988). In 1982, the Falklands War (War of the Malvinas) between Argentina and Great Britain showed the necessity of revising the Rio Treaty. In all of these cases the foreign policy of the United States was a central factor. At times there was convergence between US foreign policy and that of the countries of the Caribbean, Central America and South America, at other times the differences were very much in evidence. The US foreign policy approach oscillated between military solutions to the crises² and the search for negotiated, diplomatic solutions.

III. HEMISPHERIC SECURITY IN THE 1990S

The 1990s were in many respects the most positive for hemispheric security relations. Canada and the countries of the Caribbean joined the OAS, expanding the map of the security geography of the hemisphere³; the conflicts in Central America were resolved by diplomatic means (UN-

Defense and Hemispheric Security in the 21st Century

OAS); two political values—democracy and human rights—became widely accepted as the basis for the conduct of states; and summit diplomacy became institutionalized at several levels:

- Iberoamerican Summit
- Summit of the Americas
- Sub-regional Summits of Heads of State and Government (CARICOM, Central America, MERCOSUR)
- Summit meetings of ministers of defense
- Conferences of the American Armies (CAA)⁴
- Special Conference on Hemispheric Security⁵

The subject of “new threats to security”, also called “non-conventional threats” or “non-state threats”, emerged on the hemispheric agenda in the 1990s. The first concrete step forward was the “Santiago Commitment” to the defense of democracy.⁶ With the notion of defense of democracy now explicitly included, threats to security and political stability were no longer interpreted solely from a military viewpoint, and issues that were at the same time domestic and international began to appear on the security agenda: these “intermestic” issues include drug trafficking, terrorism and organized crime. With this, the range of actors responsible for threats to security expanded to include non-state actors as well as economic and social causes. “Involuntary” factors such as natural disasters and health crises also came to be seen as sources of insecurity.

In 1995 the Committee on Hemispheric Security was created within the OAS to analyze these new threats, define those that are common to member countries, and consider cooperative mechanisms to deal with them.⁷ The committee advanced new mechanisms of consultation and cooperation; embodied in “Conventions” aimed at combating and preventing the principal new threats:

- Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism (CICTE)
- Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)⁸
- Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives (CIFTA)
- Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions⁹

Through these Conventions, progress has been notably made in the construction an institutional architecture based on government commitments, and in the reformulation of defense policies and legislation to adapt them to the coexistence of countries with democratic regimes.

One of the principal elements to consider in the area of hemispheric security is the hegemonic role of the United States, which has become the chief designer of security concepts and policies on the continent. One of the main problems is that the hierarchy of threats varies from one sub-region to another (the Caribbean countries, the Andean countries and the countries of MERCOSUR have different security priorities, for example). Ultimately, the weight of each country's national security policies and doctrines is the determining element for its hemispheric security policy. Thus, one of the realities of hemispheric security is the "asymmetry of power" between the United States and the other nations of the hemisphere, which have their own doctrines, many of them based on constitutional precepts and principles and traditional concepts of the sovereignty of the nation-state (as is the case for Mexico and Brazil). The OAS Charter is clear with respect to the principles of sovereignty of the state and non-intervention, and that cooperation must be by way of voluntary commitments by governments.

IV. HEMISPHERIC SECURITY SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Since September 11, 2001, a profound strategic review of national security doctrine, defense and foreign policy has taken place in the United States. In the ensuing reordering of security priorities, terrorism, principally that of fundamental Islamic origin, has been placed at the top of the list of threats. At the hemispheric level, the 23rd Consultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, held on September 21, 2001, invoked the Rio Treaty as a mechanism of support for the United States, and security measures were stepped up in practically all countries of the region.¹⁰ A decade earlier, efforts in this direction had already given rise to CICTE.¹¹ The aim of CICTE was to develop mechanisms for exchange of information, review legislation, compile bilateral, sub-regional and multilateral treaties, enhance security cooperation at borders, and provide training and crisis management.¹²

In the United States, as a result of the revision of security doctrine after September 11, 2001, that gave rise to the doctrines of "Pre-Emptive

Action” and “Homeland Security”, priority was given to efforts aimed at combating terrorism. The United States considers strengthening the Rio Treaty to be a key element of hemispheric security because it is the sole legal instrument governing collective defense¹³ Canada has worked hard to share its doctrine of human security, the multidimensional concept and the concept of defense of democracy.¹⁴ Mexico is developing the concept of “integrated security”, with emphasis on social and economic elements, and is attempting to limit military cooperation mainly to educational aspects.

The countries of CARICOM and Central America have undergone a major evolution with regard to their concepts of “sub-regional” security. The rest of the nations of the hemisphere give priority to their respective doctrines and policies of national security as the predominant element. The development of sub-regional commitments is what is known as the “flexible security architecture”.¹⁵

At the conceptual level, the role of governments in driving policies of cooperation has made very notable progress in Central America. The “Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America”, signed in 1995, includes commitments by governments that security will be accompanied by a strengthening of democracy and the rule of law, the subordination of the military to the civil power, efforts to guarantee the security of people and property, combat extreme poverty, drug trafficking and organized crime, and the development of confidence-building measures, early warning systems and border controls. The treaty also states the will of the signatories to find a peaceful solution to conflicts and to renounce the use of force as a means of solving international conflicts.¹⁶

In the Caribbean, the hierarchy of threats is defined as follows: terrorism, trans-national organized crime, drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, illicit arms trafficking and AIDS. Natural disasters and environmental problems are defined as further vulnerabilities in these countries.¹⁷ The countries of CARICOM recognize their own limited dimensions and are therefore very favorable to strengthening cooperation, especially in the political field.¹⁸

The Andean countries have also identified a threat hierarchy, in the following order: terrorism, drug trafficking, control of chemical precursors, money laundering, illicit firearms trafficking, corruption, natural disasters, instability caused by social alienation, extreme poverty and weakness of institutions, environmental degradation, and pandemics.¹⁹

Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile are focusing their efforts on the development of sub-regional cooperation in the geopolitical dimension of South America. Of major concern in these countries is the development of “transparency” in defense policy, which is being done chiefly through their “White Papers” (Chile and Argentina), confidence-building measures, and a large number of cooperation agreements.²⁰ The development of transparency through White Papers began with the dissemination of documents intended as a basis for public debate on defense in the United States and Canada.²¹

The rest of the countries in the hemisphere have presented their positions before the OAS individually. In fact, the threat agenda does not vary substantively among the different countries and sub-regions. There is debate over the mechanisms and multinational instruments for countering the threats, as well as the means to be used: the use of armed forces (national or multinational), joint action by police forces, cooperation between justice systems, intelligence cooperation, information on migration, early warning systems (for example for natural disasters or infectious diseases), among others.

Hemispheric security has become a matter of “weights and counterweights”, of the influence that each nation exerts—or seeks to exert—over the others, and the weight that each country accords to its own national concepts. In this regard, it is clear that the country that projects a “hemispheric” dimension is the United States, while the remaining countries project their influence at the sub-regional level in CARICOM, SICA (Central American Integration System), MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the Andean Pact. In the future this may also extend to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) that is in the process of being established.

In preparation for the 2003 Special Conference on Security, the countries of the OAS meeting in Bridgetown, Barbados, issued the “Declaration of Bridgetown” in which they agreed on the concept of “multidimensional security”. The Bridgetown Declaration notes that the new threats have a trans-national character, and for this reason it is necessary to strengthen confidence-building measures between countries, above all with respect to disarmament and arms control.²² The Bridgetown Declaration also reflects a consensus that security can be threatened by political, economic, social, environmental and health

phenomena.²³ The concept of multidimensional security resolves national differences over priorities, and can encompass a range of different security concepts and doctrines.²⁴ However, the degree of generality which makes it possible for countries to issue such a joint declaration also makes it difficult to achieve specific commitments.

Therefore, the traditional concepts of State responsibility for the protection of security are based on the defense of a nation's territory, resources, vital infrastructure and people.

Beginning in the 1990s, these traditional concepts were joined by new ones predicated on the commitment of governments to defend human, individual and social rights, as well as to defend and promote democracy. A new link was established between democracy and security. In addition, the priority of the individual over the State was accepted as the basis of the concept of Human Security.²⁵

Differences in security concepts arise at a number of levels:

- The superpower (United States) versus the postulates of the “big” nations that are active at the diplomatic level (Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile) and the medium and small nations (Central America, Caribbean, Andean countries).²⁶
- The United States has an important capacity to influence the “medium” and “small” countries, and must “negotiate” its postulates with the “big” countries.
- Definition of levels of security priority for each country: international, hemispheric, sub-regional, bilateral or border-related and national.
- Hemispheric security, defense cooperation, and possible inter-operability.
- The “leveling” or harmonization of security and defense commitments as a result of economic, commercial and political integration.

The “strategic stature” of the United States provokes asymmetries that cannot be denied in any analysis of hemispheric security.²⁷ The “big” nations have given renewed importance to the concept of “sovereignty”²⁸ in the definition of their concepts of hemispheric security, drawing on the traditional principles of the OAS Charter, and are seeking to incorporate their national doctrines and concepts into the agenda.²⁹

The United States would like to move to the level of operational cooperation and activate the security-defense link by strengthening (or revising) the Rio Treaty (TIAR) and the IADB.³⁰ The United States' search for "absolute" security (total collaboration in the war against terrorism) has led it to seek the optimization of cooperative multinational security instruments to back up its new doctrine of Homeland Security and international security (Pre-Emptive Action). This means keeping open the possibility of using all the means available: military, intelligence, legal, diplomatic, etc. Optimizing cooperation through revitalization of existing accords is the key characteristic of the US security posture in the hemisphere. Since September 11, 2001 the United States has also had a new sense of "vulnerability" that has led it to seek mechanisms of cooperation at all levels: domestic, bilateral, sub-regional, hemispheric and international, and with all instruments at its disposal. At the hemispheric level, the US considers insufficient the capacities of many countries to collaborate on strengthening of security. This has led it to seek concrete mechanisms of cooperation and to improve the capabilities of many governments. For the United States security is still based on a geopolitical definition of "concentric circles".

At the operational level, a large number of bilateral and sub-regional treaties and accords of various kinds are already in force, but it is difficult to generalize these to the hemispheric level. Actually, the fewer countries involved in a security cooperation commitment, the more efficient the actual operational cooperation will be. In other words, bilateral mechanisms are more efficient and more operational than multilateral ones. The United States has developed its security commitments to the maximum at the bilateral level (principally with Canada and Mexico, through the "Smart Borders" agreements)³¹, and cooperation is becoming inter-dependence, especially since September 11, 2001. That is to say, cooperation entails government action by both signatories to a bilateral agreement. Because of the important bilateral cooperation on security between, for example, Mexico and the United States, it is considered unnecessary to extend these commitments to the hemispheric level. With Canada there is also higher level of cooperation through NORAD: that of inter-operability.³²

Within the OAS, due to institutional weaknesses, there is a gap between the operational capacity of the governments and the commit-

ments they have assumed. Despite the good will expressed in many of these agreements, implementation is difficult for a number of reasons:

- scarcity of financial and human resources,
- insufficient coverage of police, justice, and legal systems that are not adapted to confronting the new threats such as terrorism and organized crime,
- corruption,
- obsolete technology,
- weakness of border and migration controls.

Furthermore, national doctrines and concepts of security are at odds with hemispheric cooperation in many countries. United States, Mexico, Canada and Brazil have national security, defense, and foreign policy concepts that profess to be backed by other countries. There are as well pro-cooperative concepts promoted by many countries of South America, the Caribbean and the United States, while those of other countries, such as Mexico, are more isolationist or sovereigntist.

The relationship between security and defense is one of the most controversial conceptual problems. The different positions are seen in the military treatment of threats of non-military problems of security (for example natural disasters, drug trafficking or public security), as well as in multinational military cooperation (conferences, military exercises, confidence-building measures and transparency, education and training, etc.)

As far as cooperation in coping with natural disasters is concerned, it is generally agreed that it is necessary to reinforce civil institutions and that efforts need to be made chiefly at the national level, although there has been a good deal of military cooperation in response to phenomena such as hurricanes in the Caribbean. In the war on drug trafficking, the differences are important, since the countries confront the problem from various points of view: there are producer countries, consumer countries, transit countries and money-laundering countries. For the war on terrorism the national positions vary from reactivating and strengthening the Rio Treaty, to cooperation between intelligence, justice and police systems. And in order to confront a series of new threats, there is talk of strengthening the IADB-OAS link and extending defense cooperation (more frequent military exercises and improved inter-operability).³³

Consequently, the concept of “hemispheric security” stands alongside and is related to economic, social and environmental problems, as well as defense issues. Both sides of the debate are shaped by three basic political values:

- defense of democracy,
- defense of human rights and
- sovereignty of nations.

Some countries believe that the security-defense link should be emphasized in order to strengthen cooperation in this area, while others believe that security should be linked with national development priorities.

In other words, the concept varies from a ‘broad’ notion that includes human security (Canada), integral security (Mexico) and the Bridgetown concept of multidimensional security, to a narrower concept focused on cooperation in defense, police work, intelligence and justice.

Figure 1: Concept of hemispheric security - Scope

Hemispheric Security		
Social and Economic Problems	Basic political values	Defense
Migration	Sovereignty	Confidence-building measures
Environment	Defense of democracy	Cooperation in war on drugs
Natural disasters	Defense of human rights	Transparency
Health		Trans-national military forces
Poverty		War on terrorism
		Joint exercises
		Peace operations
		Intelligence cooperation

The countries of the hemisphere accord priority to their own national security agendas. This is perhaps the chief obstacle to progress in cooperative security. It is an obstacle because, while recognizing the multinational nature of the new threats, the various countries elaborate their doctrines and policies of defense, foreign policy and national security in the context of the Cold War and subject to a quasi-absolute notion of the sovereignty of the nation-state. Sovereignty remains in force legally and is very difficult to modify politically, even though many countries have gradually accepted multinational legal instruments

such as accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court.

It is important to bear in mind the “geographic scope” of the security concept. This is connected to the “strategic size” of a country, to national and sub-regional capacities to face new and traditional threats, and to the “will” of the governments to engage in cooperation. In some cases the geographic dimension of security follows from constitutional doctrines and actions undertaken in the external sphere, as well as concepts of jurisdiction.

If we consider hemispheric security from the perspective of the five sub-regions: ³⁴

- North America
- Caribbean
- Central America
- Andean countries
- MERCOSUR

we see that size does not bear a direct relation to the geographic projection of security, since there are very small countries that have a geographic projection that is far more active and broader than do larger ones. This is evident, for example, with regard to participation in UN peace operations, where two of the big countries, Brazil and Mexico, have either limited participation or none at all, while Chile and Uruguay, in the MERCOSUR sub-region, and some countries of Central America have a far larger projection.

**Figure 2: Hemispheric security:
Levels of security and strategic projection - North America**

	United States	Canada	Mexico
Levels of security			
National	1	1	1
Bilateral	2	2	2
Sub-Regional	4	4	5
Hemispheric	3	4	5
Interational	1	2	5

Scale of 1 to 5: 1= maximum, 5 = minimum. Ranking is based on level of activity or passivity.

Note: The bilateral relationships consist of essentially Canada-United States and Mexico-United States.

**Figure 3: Hemispheric security:
Levels of security and strategic projection - Central America and Caribbean**

	Central America	Caribbean
Levels of security		
National	1	1
Bilateral	2	2
Sub-Regional	2	2
Hemispheric	4	4
Interational	3	5

Scale of 1 to 5: 1= maximum, 5 = minimum. Ranking is based on level of activity or passivity.

Note: The main bilateral relationship is with the United States, though there are also important bilateral relations between countries with shared borders

**Figure 4: Hemispheric security:
Levels of security and strategic projection - South America**

	MERCOSUR	Andean Countries
Levels of security		
National	1	1
Bilateral	2	2
Sub-Regional	3	3
Hemispheric	4	4
Interational	3	5

Scale of 1 to 5: 1= maximum, 5 = minimum. Ranking is based on level of activity or passivity.

Note: The main bilateral relationship is with the United States, though there are also important bilateral relations between countries with shared borders.

MERCOSUR: Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile.

Andean Countries: Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú and Bolivia.

V. THE ASYMMETRIES IN SECURITY

The hemisphere of the Americas is made up of a very diverse collection of countries:

- Powers (global or hemispheric)
- big countries
- medium countries
- small states.

The countries of the hemisphere face traditional problems of security along with new threats. Cooperation in the area of security is varied, and carries different weight for different countries, depending on the type of issue or threat concerned. There are threats that are common to all countries of the hemisphere, but for many countries they are still only hypothetical. For instance, since the United States suffered a huge terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, it has been trying to convince the rest of the continent to focus all cooperative efforts on the fight against terrorism. This threat is present for the United States, and hypothetical for other countries. The cooperative measures can, therefore, take the form of actions of containment and collective and national actions of prevention. In addition to bilateral cooperation, which is highly developed principally between United States, Canada and Mexico, but also in Central America and the Caribbean, efforts are under way to expand the geographic scope of commitments entered into for security and shared defense.

Other threats to the security of the continent are due to the underdevelopment of state institutions in many countries, and to unsolved structural, economic, social and political problems that have become issues of national security. Because of the speeding up of communication and the opening of borders since the 1990s, risks to the security of one country have the potential to expand beyond that country's borders. This is the case with drug trafficking and its links with armed groups in Colombia. The capabilities of the national government are obviously limited, and yet there is little tendency toward collective action to assist Colombia.

At a conceptual level many problems derived from structural weaknesses have provoked massive migration. These population displacements are sometimes seen as a security issue, and the migrants, especially those of limited resources, are treated with little respect for their human rights. This is the case for illegal immigrants to the United States, for Central Americans in Mexico, and for many other groups of displaced people throughout the Americas. The poor and marginalized, whether migrants or residents of their own country, cannot be considered a security problem; however, it is possible to adopt collective measures for their protection and to seek to transform the conditions under which they live.

One conceptual danger is that of “securitization”. It is the result of the conceptual integration of problems of development (or under-development) with those of security and defense. It is a great conceptual risk to consider issues of under-development as issues of security and defense when they are originally problems and deficiencies of social and economic policies. This generalization and abstraction that falls under the concept of “multidimensional security” may prevent specific commitments and create obstacles to cooperation. If problems of development and under-development were in fact security issues, then international institutions responsible for development policies ought to participate in security debates and vice versa. Many of the challenges are non-military, and responsibility for coping with them lies in a great number of civil agencies, and in multinational cooperation efforts.

One of the main difficulties in achieving consensus on definitions of hemispheric security is the current international situation. How will the debate on hemispheric security affect the United States’ implementation of the doctrine of pre-emptive action against terrorism? Between January and April 2003, an important group of Latin American countries and Canada demonstrated their disagreement with the means employed by the United States to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Venezuela and others³⁵ disagreed with the policy of the George W. Bush administration. This opened an important breach in hemispheric diplomacy with regard to two aspects:

- The policy toward the United Nations and the attempt to use the Security Council to implement the doctrine of Pre-emptive Action against Terrorism.
- The use of military means as an instrument for the projection of power. The “force” component of power was asserted over the “legitimacy” component.³⁶

This difference of opinion concerning the means of achieving international stability and security could probably affect the possibility of reaching agreement within the OAS on the subject of hemispheric security.

There is no consensus on how to define an issue of hemispheric security that requires collective political, diplomatic or military action.³⁷ The

majority of governments give priority to their national institutional capacities to cope with security problems. For them there is not only one concept of “hemispheric security” but rather several concepts of hemispheric security and various agendas of hemispheric security, depending on the country or sub-region. Some countries also take a very pessimistic position with respect to the ability to share a unified concept of hemispheric security (Mexico). Nor is there consensus on policies towards hemispheric institutions, the viability of existing treaties and agreements or the need to revise them, chiefly the IADB and the Rio Treaty. There is a tendency to revise and strengthen the IADB, while the Rio Treaty has been the subject of more severe criticism.

Nevertheless, there has been a very positive advance in the area of security cooperation at the “thematic” level, or as a problem needing attention. The methodology of moving ahead by means of Conventions on particular themes is the approach that has been found to cope with the new threat agenda, and consequently cooperation in the areas of drug trafficking, money laundering, small arms, chemical precursors, landmines, natural disasters etc. has moved forward significantly. A decisive impulse for this thematic cooperation took place in the 1990s within the OAS framework.

The existing Conventions would be sufficient to improve levels of security vis-à-vis the new threats if the countries had the national capabilities to implement them effectively. The “real security” of people, institutions and the state depends on the efforts towards reform, modernization and professionalization of each country’s security institutions. Among these, it is essential to emphasize the necessary modernization of the armed forces at the levels of doctrine, organization, technology and education.

The principal issue of hemispheric security lies in cooperative relationships as a means of strengthening the national capacities of each country, and to ensure that the modernization of the armed forces and security structures in one country does not affect others, especially neighboring countries. This raises a series of questions:

- Will institutional capabilities be reinforced through cooperation or through self-sustained efforts?
- Do we need a new treaty on hemispheric security or will the Rio Treaty remain in effect?

- What is the future of the IADB? Will it be maintained as is, should it be subordinated to the OAS, or should it be redesigned or dismantled?
- What is the role of the various countries? Will they be passive recipients of US initiatives, or designers of new mechanisms and of a new security architecture and commitments?
- Will there be a qualitative leap in cooperation towards institutional inter-operability, as exists between Canada and the United States?

The United States has historically used bilateral cooperation as its predominant modality, especially in the field of police, intelligence, defense and justice cooperation. This cooperation is implemented on the basis of three premises:

- requirements made on the basis of the needs of the countries,
- the offer of cooperation through programs, and
- negotiation or acceptance of the same.

In the American hemisphere, the impact of cooperation is inversely proportional to the size of the country, its institutional structures and its budget, especially in the area of defense. For example, cooperation programs for small and medium-sized countries have a much more concentrated positive effect than those for large countries. For large countries cooperation is less likely to be effective, except when it takes the form of very ambitious programs.³⁸

Another important aspect for understanding the weakness of the contribution of some countries to hemispheric security is the differences in institutional capabilities, institutional organization, police systems, justice systems, intelligence systems, and the organization of defense and the armed forces. It is impossible to achieve uniformity of these structures in the short or medium term. Therefore, cooperative relations must take into account the existing security and defense structures. They must not interfere with state sovereignty and they must have realistic objectives.

Cooperation takes place at two levels:

- the sum of national efforts,
- “inter-operability” among some countries, especially in the field of defense.³⁹

All of these elements must be taken into account:

- first, to try to define a common concept of security (or of collective threats);
- second, the cooperative possibilities between national governments and institutions.

At the present time the multinational security architecture of the American hemisphere is precarious, based solely on the OAS and a small number of institutions and treaties, and functions as part of the whole of national institutions. Consequently, revising and strengthening the institutional architecture of security and defense is a necessity. Cooperation must be developed in light of the broad catalogue of threats and challenges to security.

The principal political challenge is for countries to identify the communication links between their concepts of defense, national security and hemispheric security, in order to render cooperation possible. Clearly, in the concept of Hemispheric Security that is presently under construction there are links between:

- security
- development
- democracy
- human rights
- free trade
- defense

Forums such as the Conference of American Armies (CAA), summit meetings of ministers of defense, and special forums like the Special Conference on Security, must be tied in with the security architecture. This is very important because the fact alone that there have been meetings without interruption since 1960 in the case of the CAA, and since 1997 in the case of the Conference of Defense Ministers, gives them a capacity for institutionalization and institutional links with the IADB, the OAS, and existing conventions and treaties. They should be bodies with their own headquarters and a stable doctrinal foundation, elaborated through multinational consensus. The doctrines supporting them

should be subordinated to policies of defense and security. In this way these bodies could be an important vehicle for progress and tie in with the hemispheric defense and security architecture.

VI. PERSPECTIVES

Looking ahead toward the horizon of the 21st century, ten considerations need to be borne in mind. This is vital to the construction or reconstruction of a new hemispheric defense and security architecture.

1) In the hemisphere the Cold War is over. One of the fundamental differences determining security and defense policy is that there is a clear subordination of military, police, security and intelligence forces to freely elected authorities. A second difference is that the concept of “sovereignty”, which occupies an important place in the OAS Charter, carries more weight because defense and security policies are implemented under the rule of law in all the member countries. In the post-Cold War era, state sovereignty is complemented by the sovereignty of the people. Governments are more legitimate and military and defense policy is clearly subordinated to national policy.

2) There are new actors participating in defense and security policies. During the Cold War, only the apparatus of the state and the executive power (civil or military) were the participants. Today the decision-making process is complex, involving business, the press, academia, NGOs, and political parties. Within the apparatus of the state, the legislative and judicial branches are important as well. In federal states like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela, the governments of the states play a significant role. In all countries local authorities have also begun to influence security policies. It has therefore become more difficult to develop defense and security policies with political backing. These national obstacles are also a source of difficulty when it comes to undertake cooperation commitments in the hemisphere.

3) There is a new geopolitical dimension to security in the Americas. Many countries actively participate in UN peace operations, and their armed forces have global projection.

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4) The peace processes undertaken as a means of resolving grave internal conflicts in Central America were successful. Foreign participation in the internal affairs of a country does not violate sovereignty when:

- it is requested by a government, and
- it has a positive objective (building peace, separation of forces, etc.)

Multinational action was successfully used in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Haiti.

5) Mechanisms for “early warning” of defense and security crises are needed. Currently, military, defense and security policies are “reactive” rather than “preventive.”

6) Currently all countries of the hemisphere are subordinate to the UN and the UN Security Council in matters of defense and security. An idea that should be seriously considered is the evolution of the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security or the creation of a Security Council subordinate to the will of the political authorities of member governments. The Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas, the CAA and other specialized forums (air forces and navies) need to be institutionally consolidated.

7) As regards the IADB, the possibility of reviewing and, if appropriate, strengthening its mandate, headquarters and powers should be considered. The IADB would remain subordinate to existing democratically elected political authorities and the possibility of subordinating it to the OAS should be considered.

8) The relationship of the OAS with other multilateral security mechanisms, such as the UN, the UN Security Council and NATO, should be reviewed.

9) Cooperation should be stepped up in the following areas whenever a country and its political authorities decide so:

- Education and training
- Military exercises

- Confidence-building measures
- Confrontation of threats
- Analysis of balance of forces
- Transparency measures
- Budget analysis
- Arms procurement
- Analysis of force mobilization

Multinational efforts, early warning systems and preventive action must be consolidated, to cope primarily with natural disasters and probably drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism as well. There is a need to have ongoing evaluation of the level of these threats and of the institutional capabilities of a country or group of countries to contain them.

10) Joint operations (inter-operability) should be aimed at as a means of confronting threats. Military forces must always be subordinated to multinational mechanisms and to national political will.

NOTES

1. In general terms this debate centered on the diplomatic treatment of Cuba throughout the era of the Cold War.

2. This took the form of two mechanisms: strengthening the armed forces confronting leftist guerrilla groups, or promoting means of destabilizing governments (Nicaragua).

3. The only country that remains outside the hemispheric system of security is Cuba.

4. The CAA has been meeting since 1960.

5. That was held in Mexico in October 2003.

6. At the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City from 20–22 April 2001, it was agreed that the interruption of the democratic process in one country represented a risk for the Inter-American system, and in Lima, on 11 September 2001, the “Inter-American Democratic Charter” was finally adopted.

7. Committee on Hemispheric Security (www.oas.org/csh)

8. An important step forward was made in CICAD with the adoption of the Mechanism for Multilateral Evaluation in the war on drugs. The

34 member countries regularly present self-evaluations in the form of national reports. See www.cicad.oas.org. Although the mechanism seeks to act as a substitute for the “certification” policy of the US State Department, its weakness is that it does not use external evaluators.

9. In the process of being signed and ratified by the OAS member states. See “Report on Signatures and Ratifications of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions”, (OAS) CP-CSH-517-02, 25 November 2002.

10. OAS “Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat and Eliminate Terrorism”, Resolution RC.23/RES.1/01, Washington, September 21, 2001. This invocation of the Rio Treaty was at the initiative of Brazil.

11. The First Specialized Inter-American Conference on Terrorism was held in Lima, Peru, in 1996. Subsequently, CICTE was created at Mar del Plata. To date only six countries have ratified the CICTE protocol, which has been awaiting signing since 2002.

12. The Convention contains 23 articles. See “Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism”, OAS-AG RES.1840 (XXXII-O/02) adopted on June 3, 2002, and “History of CICTE” (www.cicte.oas.org/historia.htm)

13. Roger Noriega “The Complex Challenges for the Americas in the 21st Century”, Inter-American Defense College, Washington, June 25, 2003.

14. “Comments by Member States on the Preliminary Draft Declaration of the Special Conference on Security (Canada)”, OAS, CP/CSH-558/03 add. April 5, 7, 2003.

15. OAS “Preliminary Draft Structure of the Political Declaration to be Adopted by the Special Conference on Security”, CP-CSH-551-03, Washington, February 27, 2003, p. 2.

16. Signed on 15 Dec 1995 by the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

17. “Comments by Member States on the Preliminary Draft Declaration of the Special Conference on Security (Presented by Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago)”, CP-CHS-558-03, April 4, 2003.

18. “Declaration of Kingstown on the Security of Small Island States” 10 January, 2003. OEA/ser.K/XXIX, 15 January 2003

19. “Comments by Member States on the Preliminary Draft Declaration of the Special Conference on Security (presented by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru y Venezuela), CP/CSH/558/03, April 1, 2003.

20. *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile* (Defence White Paper of Chile), 2nd ed. 2002 (Part 3 “The Defense Sector and International Policy), Ministry of Defense, Santiago de Chile, 2002.

21. The concept of the “White Paper” is of British origin. The first country in the hemisphere to publish one was Canada.

22. The list of confidence-building measures adopted by consensus among the governments is given in: “Illustrative List of Confidence and Security Building Measures”, OAS, RESEGRE/DOC.6/03 rev. 3, February 11, 2003.

23. OAS “Declaration of Bridgetown: The Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security”, (AG-dec.27), June 4, 2002.

24. Before September 11, 2001, there were already notable national differences on hemispheric security, cf. Juan Pablo Soriano, “Acuerdos y Desacuerdos sobre la Redefinición del Concepto de Seguridad de las Instituciones de Seguridad Interamericana: Las posiciones de Argentina, Brasil, Canadá, Chile, Estados Unidos y México” (Agreement and disagreement on the redefinition of the concept of security of inter-American security institutions: The positions of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, US and Mexico), *Security and Defence Studies Review*, Vol. 1, Spring 2001.

25. Francisco Rojas Aravena, “Human Security: Emerging Concept of Security in the Twenty-First Century”, in Moufida Goucha and Francisco Rojas Aravena, *Human Security, Conflict Prevention and Peace*, UNESCO-FLACSO-Chile, Santiago, 2003.

26. Discrepancies with US policy generally emanate from “big” nations, while the small and medium ones as a rule share the US approach to hemispheric security. In 2003, the war in Iraq gave rise to tensions in this respect.

27. This concept is used by Gabriel Gaspar Tapia “Desafíos y Dilemas de la Seguridad en América Latina en la Postguerra Fría” [Challenges and Dilemmas in Latin America in the Post-Cold War

Era], in Maria Cristina Rosas (ed.) *Cooperación y conflicto en las Américas. Seguridad Hemisférica: un largo y sinuoso camino* [Cooperation and conflict in the Americas. Hemispheric Security: A long and winding road], UNAM, México, 2003, p. 102.

28. Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions*, New York, Basic Books, 2003.

29. Brazil and Mexico are the two countries whose positions diverge most from those of the United States.

30. For example, the government of Mexico considers the Rio Treaty to be an “obsolete” instrument and has withdrawn from it, while the government of Canada has not signed it (www.sre.gob.mx/oea). By contrast, in South America the Rio Treaty is considered a useful instrument. Brazil has invoked it in the OAS and Colombia is seeking to invoke it in order to obtain support in its struggle against narcoterrorism.

31. The “Smart Borders” agreement with Canada was signed in December 2001, and sets out 30 points for cooperation. The agreement with Mexico was signed in March 2002 and contains 22 points.

32. Ann Denholm Crosby, *Dilemmas in Defense Decision-Making. Constructing Canada's Role in Norad, 1958–1996*, MacMillan Press, London, 1998.

33. The great majority of countries are in favour of multinational defence cooperation, both at the hemispheric and at the international level (support for the UN); however, the “insinuations” with regard to a possible military participation in Colombia have not found an echo in any country of Latin America, and in particular are rejected by countries that share a border with Colombia (Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama).

34. This method for measuring the geographic projection of security takes into account national differences within the sub-regions.

35. Colombia supported the United States as did the countries of Central America. Some Central American countries even sent military contingents to Iraq. In the case of Chile and Mexico, as members of the Security Council, the pressure was much greater.

36. In the United States this is the debate between proponents “soft” and “hard” power. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth “American Primacy in Perspective” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 4, July–Aug, 2002.

37. In recent years the case of Colombia has always been implicit in any such debate. The question is whether to collaborate militarily with this country to combat political insurgency, drug trafficking and paramilitary groups.

38. The most important cooperation program is the Plan Colombia.

39. LCol Serge Carignan “Interoperability in the Defense and Hemispheric Security”, Monograph, Inter-American Defense College, Washington, April 2003.

North America: Regional Security under Construction?

ABSTRACT

North American security may continue to operate through cooperation on an institutional and thematic level or may evolve to include a regulatory comprehensive agreement. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1994, was designed to increase the economic, commercial, financial, and industrial ties among the three countries, so the original negotiations excluded security and defense issues. However, as the economies and societies of the three signatory countries have become more interdependent due to the flow of people and goods across their borders, there has been growing concern within the United States over how to secure its borders, including how to stem the influx of migrants. After September 11, 2001, security became an even greater priority for the United States, and it became glaringly obvious that its borders were vulnerable. A NAFTA-PLUS security agreement for Canada, Mexico, and the United States may thus be necessary to ensure secure borders without halting trade among the three countries.

I. SECURITY AND NAFTA

Reaching a security agreement among trade partners is never an easy task. Even the European Union, the most economically, monetarily, politically, and socially integrated region in the world, has encountered obstacles in forming its own common foreign and security policy (CFSP) due to lack of consensus among its members. There is still the question of whether the CFSP structure should take precedence over NATO, which includes the United States and Canada. France and Germany are looking

for greater levels of autonomy from the United States and argue for a stronger CFSP, which may explain part of their opposition during the Iraq crisis in March 2003. Their positions differ from that of the Mediterranean countries, Spain and Italy, and the Nordic countries, which support the U.S. role in Europe. The Central European countries also see themselves as closer to the United States than Russia for similar geosecurity reasons. Despite these differences, the creation of the CFSP has made progress within the European Union. There have been constructive forms of community debate, and members have advanced the possibility of the formation of a common command on binational as well as multinational levels.¹

If the European Union countries are having difficulties in defining a clear security policy, then the less-integrated countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) face even greater challenges.² The differences among Mexico, Canada, and the United States are the result of asymmetrical economies, societies, and politics as well as different security, foreign policy, and defense outlooks. Canada and Mexico fear that further integration beyond the trade agreement might simply result in the assimilation of the doctrines and strategic positions of their more powerful neighbor. Mexico would have more difficulty in accepting the deepening of foreign and security relations with the United States due to the larger gap in doctrines and historical divisions in international security matters.

Intense discussions over trade relations and the sovereignty of the State have appeared in all three countries. However, the debate rages stronger in Mexico and Canada, the “minor societies” of NAFTA, which run the risk of being absorbed by the dynamic economy and society of the United States. Mexico and Canada conduct trade primarily with the United States, making their financial and industrial structures interdependent with those of their neighbor.³ Equally, the intense social and political integration⁴ creates ties between civil society sectors that increasingly support the idea of a community that goes beyond trade;⁵ these links are especially strong among the business communities in the countries.⁶

The global, regional, and national situations have altered since the implementation of NAFTA, and the political elites of all three countries have changed from those in power in the early 1990s. Public opinion in Canada supports the position that NAFTA need not be revised or modified. In Mexico, opinion remains divided: some believe that the many macro-economic deficiencies of the country are the result of NAFTA and that its

implementation has had negative social effects on certain sectors (for example, farming);⁷ others believe that NAFTA has been the salvation of the Mexican economy (see Table 1). For the United States, NAFTA is a vigorous commercial agreement that has successfully increased trade among the three partners, and the U.S. government favors deepening relations in areas that are not just trade-related. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has insisted on bilateral cooperation (U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico) in matters of security, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement, where there are already many existing agreements, and it supports the possibility of future trilateral agreements on these issues.

Table 1: Public Opinion on NAFTA, 2003

	Very good or good	Very bad or bad	Little to no importance
Mexico ¹	41%	37%	9%
Canada ²	51%	25%	24%
United States ³	34%	32%	34%

¹ *Reforma*, Mexico, 31 May 2003. Note: The data doesn't sum 100 %

² *Canadian IPSOS-Reid Express*, 3-5 June 2003.

³ EKOS Research Associates www.ekos.com, May 2003.

At the beginning of NAFTA in 1994, some suggested creating a NAFTA-PLUS security agreement because the increase in trade and the opening of the borders would require greater monitoring and regulation.⁸ The United States and Canada have already established many areas of defense and security cooperation. The most important of these Canadian-U.S. mutual agreements is the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), signed in 1958.⁹ Although Mexico collaborated militarily with the United States during World War II, it remained isolationist during the Cold War, establishing no security relations with the United States. However, since the end of the 1980s, Mexico and the United States have developed defense cooperation programs to re-equip the Mexican armed forces and strengthen Mexican military education programs.

Each of the three countries has its own national security policy that integrates elements of collective security, cooperation, and enforcement of border security. In the Canadian and Mexican cases, there has not been a substantial modification of doctrine from the prevailing concepts left over from the Cold War, but rather only an adaptation of cooperative

security measures with the United States. The U.S. government, however, has reassessed the concept of “vulnerability” in light of the September 11th attacks. Although its intelligence, security, justice, migration, and defense systems had successfully responded to the Cold War threat of communism, a profound transformation of its doctrines and institutions has been undertaken in order to confront the terrorist attack on the country and to fight the overall war against terrorism.¹⁰

The United States is the world’s hegemonic superpower. Its national security and defense policies take two forms: on one hand, the United States plays an active diplomatic role—it is a member of many international organizations and has regional, subregional, and bilateral agreements with most countries; on the other hand, it divides the world into defense commands, and deploys its troops around the globe.

Canada, a country whose foreign policy, defense, and security structures were once connected to the British Commonwealth, has been establishing links of strategic cooperation in matters of defense and security with the United States since World War II. Canada also has an active foreign policy and security role on the regional level, as a member of NATO, and on the international level, through the UN. Canada is an Atlantic country and a multilateral nation.¹¹

On the other hand, Mexico’s foreign and defense policies are isolationist and nationalist, and it does not participate actively in the international security system. Rather, Mexico is a member of international organizations that follow the classic principles of the theory of absolute sovereignty of the State. For the Mexican government, multilateral diplomatic solutions are necessary to preserve the rule of international law and maintain the international security system. Of the North American societies, Mexico is the “weakest link” in the trilateral alliance due to its social poverty and underdevelopment.¹²

Public opinion in all three countries has increasingly influenced the formulation of each government’s policies on foreign relations, security, and trade (as shown in Table 1, with respect to NAFTA). How each government responded to the war on terrorism and the Iraq war in 2003 also coincided with public opinion. In the United States, the population supported President George W. Bush’s decision to remove the government in Iraq. On the contrary, in Mexico, since January 2003, there has been increasing anti-U.S. sentiment among its population, supported by the

political parties and the press; with upcoming elections to consider, President Vicente Fox could not support the Bush Administration in the UN Security Council.¹³ In Canada, the public was increasingly opposed to the U.S. position, between January and March of 2003 (see Table 2).¹⁴

Table 2: Public Opinion and the War against Terrorism/Iraq

Mexico ¹	Opposed to U.S. attacks on Iraq: 70% Support the U.S. attacks on Iraq: 16% Not sure: 14%
Canada	Do you approve of the Canadian government's decision not to join the coalition to attack Iraq? Approve: 62% Oppose: 35% Not sure: 3%
Canada ²	Do you approve or oppose President Bush's decision to attack Iraq? Approve: 44% Oppose: 52% Not sure: 4%
United States ³	Do you think the government is doing everything possible to prevent another terrorist attack? Yes: 67% No: 27% Not sure: 6%

¹ *Reforma*, Mexico, March 2003 (www.reforma.com/encuestas/articulos/272716)

² EKOS, 7-10 April 2003 (www.ekos.com)

³ Fox News, 11-12 March 2003 (www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm)

II. SECURITY LEVELS

Since September 11th, a new concept of “North American Security” has arisen in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. This does not imply that the three countries have the same security doctrines, the same perceptions of threats, or the same methods of confronting those threats. Disagreements over how to handle security issues occur as much within the respective governments as in public opinion.

Canada, Mexico, and the United States all devise their national strategies and doctrines along five security levels:

- Level 1: International Security
- Level 2: Hemispheric Security (regional)
- Level 3: North American Security (subregional)
- Level 4: Binational Security
- Level 5: National Security

As of 2001, the United States now gives priority to two security levels: the international (level 1) and the domestic (level 5). Hemispheric, North American, and binational relations (levels 2, 3, and 4) reinforce the current Rumsfeld doctrine,¹⁵ which guides U.S. international policies in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and delineates the use or non-use of the UN Security Council (level 1). Domestically, the Homeland Security doctrine reinforces the protection of U.S. territory and its people (level 5).¹⁶

Canada also gives importance to international security organizations, primarily the UN and NATO (level 1). Canadian security policy, however, is based upon the promotion of “human security,” a basic element that entails the security of people, including the State, and permits the use of its military to ensure that security (humanitarian intervention). Since the outset of the 20th century, Canada has played a role in transnational turmoil through military participation in the conflicts in South Africa, both World Wars, and later the peacekeeping missions of the UN. At the same time, Canada has been involved in many multinational security agreements, the most important being NATO and NORAD (levels 1, 3, and 4). The primary policy disagreement between Canada and the United States regards the role of the UN in the international system (level 1). However, this difference has not affected Canadian-U.S. bilateral security relations nor will it affect further homeland security collaboration.

Mexico, on the other hand, considers national security (level 5) its main priority.¹⁷ Government security agencies are used only for domestic missions, and Mexican armed forces are not allowed to participate in foreign conflicts (level 1).¹⁸ Mexico generally has “good neighbor” relations and supports close cooperation with the United States as a security priority (level 4). However, despite divergent views on international issues (level 1), Mexico does not want to mix trade with security,¹⁹ even though, since 2001, the Mexican government has incorporated the topic of migration as a priority on its agenda with the United States.²⁰

Since September 11, 2001, the subject of migration has become linked with the security of North America. The Mexican migrant population, legal and illegal, is increasingly important for the United States, not only economically, but also socially and politically. The large undocumented population must be accounted for as a national security measure for the United States. There is also a problem with the migration

control systems in the United States and Canada, which allow citizens from “undesirable” countries to easily enter both countries.²¹

The Canadian and Mexican governments both disagree with the United States’ approach to security in the international arena (level 1). They object to the Rumsfeld doctrine, principally its attempt to use the UN Security Council to oust the government of Iraq during 2002–2003.²² This provoked an increase in anti-U.S. feeling, with both governments critical of a unilateral action that called for the removal of a government for one country’s security reasons.²³ Canada and Mexico consider the Rumsfeld doctrine of “preemptive military action” a threat to the international norms that regulate world relations,²⁴ and feel there was a lack of concrete evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.²⁵ There also remain disagreements among the three countries about hemispheric security (level 2).²⁶ The United States wishes to strengthen the commitments in treaties like the Rio Treaty and in organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Defense Board.

Despite differences regarding the first two security levels, there has been successful cooperation on security matters in North America at the bilateral level (Canada–U.S. and Mexico–U.S., level 4). This follows from the notion that each country contributes to the national security of the other. The relationship is limited between Canada and Mexico, due to their lack of geographical proximity, and cooperation on defense, intelligence, migration, and policing is restricted to the exchange of information. However, the United States remains at the core of North American security (level 3), requiring deeper cooperation from Canada and Mexico to protect its borders.

The Canadian and Mexican governments quickly responded to the September 11th attacks in New York and Washington, DC. Mexico immediately implemented an emergency security operation on the borders and provided military protection for its petroleum and electricity sites around the country. The Canadian government also reacted promptly, allowing 224 planes with 33,000 passengers to land at Canadian airports within the first twenty-five minutes after the attacks. The Canadian government also immediately adopted a plan to prevent terrorists from entering Canada and legislated for the power to identify, pursue, and capture terrorists, to maintain a secure border with the United States while guaranteeing legal trade flows, and to work with the international community.²⁷

Internationally, Canada and Mexico supported U.S. policies to remove the Taliban government from Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, although they refused to support use of the UN Security Council to remove the government of Saddam Hussein from Iraq between October 2002 and March 2003. Regionally, however, there has been great interagency cooperation among the defense, security, intelligence, immigration, and justice institutions of the three countries. Canada and Mexico also supported the Homeland Security doctrine in its entirety, and both signed formal “Smart Border” agreements (SBAs) with the United States—Canada in December 2001 and Mexico in March 2002 (summarized in Table 3).

SBAs are essentially security agreements for North America.²⁸ There is no mention in these agreements of doctrinal differences or the function of international organizations, nor do they attempt to modify the epicenter of security. As a result, Canada and Mexico are able to cooperate with the United States on regional security matters while still maintaining their own foreign and security policies in the hemisphere and the rest of the world. This allows Canada and Mexico to object to U.S. policies in the UN (as they did in March 2003) and other regional and international organizations without affecting cooperation among the three countries on the security of their

Table 3: Current Bilateral Agreements: US/Canada and US/Mexico*

30 Point Smart Border Agreement Between the United States and Canada	22 Point Smart Border Agreement Between the United States and Mexico
Secure Infrastructure	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 20. Intelligent Transportation Systems 21. Critical Infrastructure Protection 22. Aviation Security 23. Integrated Border and Marine Enforcement Teams 24. Joint Enforcement Coordination 25. Integrated Intelligence 26. Fingerprints 27. Removal of Deportees 28. Counter-Terrorism Legislation 29. Freezing of Terrorist Assets 30. Joint Training and Exercises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Long Term Planning 2. Relief of Bottlenecks 3. Infrastructure Protection 4. Harmonize Port of Entry Operations 5. Demonstration Projects 6. Cross-Border Cooperation 7. Financing Projects at the Border

North America: Regional Security under Construction?

30 Point Smart Border Agreement Between the United States and Canada	22 Point Smart Border Agreement Between the United States and Mexico
Secure Flows of People	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Biometric Identifiers 2. Permanent Resident Cards 3. Single Alternative Inspection System 4. Refugee/Asylum Processing 5. Managing of Refugee/Asylum Claims 6. Visa Policy Coordination 7. Air Preclearance 8. Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record 9. Joint Passenger Analysis Units 10. Ferry Terminals 11. Compatible Immigration Databases 12. Immigration Officers Overseas 13. International Cooperation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Pree-Cleared Travelers 9. Advanced Passenger Information 10. NAFTA Travel 11. Safe Borders and Deterrence of Alien Smuggling 12. Visa Policy Consultations 11. Compatible Immigration Databases 12. Visa Policy Consultations 13. Joint Training 14. Compatible Databases 15. Screening of Third-Country Nationals
Secure Flows of Goods	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 14. Harmonized Commercial Processing 15. Clearance Away from the Border 16. Joint Facilities 17. Customs Data 18. Container Targeting at Seaports 19. Infrastructure Improvements 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Public/Private-Sector 17. Electronic Exchange of Information 18. Secure In-Transit Shipments 19. Technology Sharing 20. Secure Railways 21. Fight Against Fraud 22. Contraband Interdiction

*Numbered according to points as listed in each agreement.

Elaborated from David A. Shirk, "NAFTA + Plus?: U.S.-Mexican Security Relations After the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks." Paper presented at the conference on "Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico," Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 15-17 May 2003.

borders, which is necessary for the successful implementation and continuance of free trade. Given that for the first time since the beginning of NAFTA public opinion in the three countries has been seen to influence their respective governments on the issue of security, the flexibility of these agreements is important.

Cooperation among the three countries to protect “North America” is already occurring through these SBAs. Canadian and Mexican armed forces were deployed on “maximum alert” at the beginning of March 2003, first to defend their own territory but, indirectly, to defend the United States as well. Canada and the United States had already established defense relations through the “interoperability” of their forces under NORAD.²⁹ Although Canadian-U.S. cooperation has been created through 80 defense agency negotiations, 250 memorandums of understanding, and 145 bilateral forums on defense (the principal ones being the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and the Military Cooperation Committee), there has been little collaboration between Mexico and the United States.³⁰

To complete the reform of its defense system after the September 11th attacks, the United States created the United States Northern Command, marking the first time that Mexico and Canada were placed within a U.S. military command. The Northern Command, located alongside NORAD at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, is in charge of the Gulf of Mexico and the territories of four nations—the United States (including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands), Canada, Mexico, and Cuba. The principal mission of the Northern Command coincides with the goal of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: “Defending the Homeland is Job #1.”³¹ There is, however, a distinction between “homeland security” and “homeland defense.” The security aspect coordinates the civilian agencies, military intelligence, the justice system, and the police, while the defense aspect corresponds to the military responsibility of protection.

III. CONCLUSION

North American security is already under construction, even though the level of integration of Canadian and Mexican defense and security structures with the United States differs. Canada has signed numerous security agreements with the United States, participates in NORAD, and is a fellow NATO defense alliance member.³² In Canadian-U.S. relations, free trade has evolved alongside security cooperation for the past fifty years; therefore a NAFTA-PLUS agreement between the countries is unnecessary.

On the other hand, Mexico has been historically absent from defense alliances, and the Mexican government remains wary of signing security

agreements with its trading partners. Current Mexican security cooperation with Canada and the United States occurs mainly through agreements that address specific problems, such as drug trafficking, border security, treatment of criminals, et cetera. Mexico rejects the idea that NAFTA should be accompanied by a security agreement.

Attempts to frame defense policy among all three countries will be difficult (due to the short-run political risks) because “interoperability” structures do not currently exist in Mexico for many political and technical reasons, and Mexico presently only has the capacity for interagency cooperation. The most developed cooperation exists on the bilateral security level (level 4), principally in three aspects: (1) cooperation between the judicial, police, and intelligence systems; (2) collaboration on the borders (to prevent and contain organized crime); and (3) consultation on migration issues. The defense relationship between Mexico and the United States exists mostly on the level of training, military education, some transfers of equipment (purchase or donation), and exchange of information. Mexico and Canada are beginning to develop a similar relationship. As trade relations deepen and security issues continue to arise, a North American regional security relationship will continue to evolve among Mexico, Canada, and the United States—and a more comprehensive framework, NAFTA-PLUS, will become necessary.

NOTES

1. Michael Brenner, “Europe’s New Security Vocation,” *McNair Paper No. 66* (Washington, DC: INSS-NDU, 2002).

2. For example, alliances such as NATO have quickly modified their hypothesis of war and conflict in order to combat international terrorism. See NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at the Conference “International Security and the Fight Against Terrorism,” 14 June 2002, Vienna, Austria (nato.int/docu/speech/2002/so20614a.htm).

3. Most analyses on the effects of free trade follow that it has had great macroeconomic benefits for the increase of trade and investment among the three countries, , as much on a general level as within specific sectors. See Robert Pastor, *Toward a North American Community. Lessons from the Old World for the New* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2001), and Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Fernandez de

Castro, eds., *The United States and Mexico. Between Partnership and Conflict* (New York and London: Routledge, 2001).

4. Robert Pastor and Rafael Fernandez de Castro, *The Controversial Pivot. The U.S. Congress and North America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); and Frederick W. Mayer, *Interpreting NAFTA. The Science and Art of Political Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

5. See David Brooks and Jonathan Fox, eds., *Cross-Border Dialogues. U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking* (University of California, La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2003).

6. Christopher Sands, "North America at Two Speeds," *North American Integration Monitor* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), 1, no. 2 (November 2002).

7. Timothy A. Wise, "NAFTA's Untold Stories: Mexico's Response to North American Integration," Interhemispheric Resource Center, 10 June 2003 (www.americaspolicy.org/reports/2003, consulted 13 June 2003).

8. Michael Dziedzic, "NAFTA and North American Security," *Strategic Forum* (Washington, DC: INSS-NDU), no. 18 (January 1995).

9. "Welcome to NORAD" (www.norad.mil).

10. The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, p. 1.

11. "Canada and the United Nations," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (www.un.int/canada/canadacanun.html); "Canada's Contribution to NATO," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca).

12. David Thellen, "Mexico, the Latin North American Nation: A Conversation with Carlos Rico Ferrat," *Journal of American History* 86, no. 2 (September 1999).

13. In Mexico, only the business sector was in favor of supporting the United States.

14. Andrew Parkin, "Pro-Canadian, Anti-American or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War," *Policy Options* (IRPP, Montreal), April 2003.

15. Phillip B. Heymann, "Dealing with Terrorism," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002).

16. Steve Tomisek, "Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense," *Strategic Forum*, no. 189 (February 2002), (www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sf189.htm).

17. Raúl Benítez-Manaut, "Seguridad nacional, transición política y globalización. Los desafíos de Vicente Fox," *Este País*, no. 145 (April 2003).

18. Raúl Benítez-Manaut, "Mexican Security and Defense Doctrines: From the 19th to the 21st Centuries," *Creating Community in the Hemisphere No. 9*, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (November 2002).

19. In March 2003, President Bush and the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico indicated that the disagreement between Mexico and the United States in the UN Security Council could affect NAFTA.

20. Jorge Durand, Douglas Massey, and Emilio Parrado, "The New Era of Mexican Migration to the United States," *Journal of American History* 86, no. 2 (September 1999). The estimates of the number Mexicans in the United States differ depending upon the sources considered. The Mexican government estimates between 8 and 8.5 million Mexicans are living in the United States, while 10 million U.S. citizens are of Mexican descent and therefore could claim the right to Mexican nationality. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that there are 9 million Mexicans living in the United States, 4.7 million of whom are undocumented. There are 1.6 million naturalized Mexicans in the United States. Francisco Alba, "Mexico. A Crucial Crossroads," *Migration Information Source*, July, 2002, Country Profiles (www.migrationinformation.org, consulted 18 June 2003).

21. In the United States, the possibility of discussing a migration agreement in Congress has been "frozen," since the Mexican government raised it in 2001.

22. Mexico felt the demilitarization of Iraq should be made through the arms inspection mission. See Miguel Marin, José Juan de Olloqui, and Olga Pellicer, "México ante la Guerra (Mesa Redonda)," *Este País*, no. 145 (April 2003).

23. See the text from the conference on "Canadian Anti-Americanism: Before and After 9/11," Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 22 May 2003. At this conference, Reginald Stuart used the term "Lite Antiamericanism."

24. Jean Chrétien, “The Road to Baghdad Leads Through the UN,” *Policy Options* (IRPP, Montreal), April 2003.

25. The demonstration that Iraq even possesses these arms is still pending for the Bush administration. See George Will, “The Bush Doctrine at Risk,” *Washington Post*, 22 June 2003, p. B-07.

26. Mexico pulled out of the TIAR on 7 September 2001, ratifying the withdrawal the year after, and Canada has not signed the TIAR. See Raúl Benítez-Manaut “Seguridad Hemisférica: Debates a Inicios del Siglo XXI,” *Creating Community in the Hemisphere*, No. 11, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, April 2003.

27. “Canada’s Actions Against Terrorism since September 11th. Background Report” (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca).

28. The U.S. and Mexican governments, “Alianza para la Frontera México-Estados Unidos. Declaración a favor del fortalecimiento tecnológico y la cooperación para promover un flujo seguro y eficiente de personas y bienes a lo largo de la frontera,” Monterrey, Mexico, 22 March 2002; and U.S and Canadian governments, “Summary of Smart Border Action Plan Status,” December 2001.

29. Statement of General Ralph Eberhart, USAF Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, before the House Armed Service Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 13 March 2003.

30. “Canada-United States Defence Relations,” National Defense, Canada, BG-03.009-8 January 2003.

31. www.northcom.mil.

32. There is also discussion of the possible installation of a new ballistic missile system in Canada. See “Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence,” Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/focus/bmd-en-asp).

Mexico's Security Dilemma: Between Nation, North America, and Latin America

ABSTRACT

There are some inconsistencies in Mexico's "new" foreign policy and Mexico's place in what is defined as "North American Security," especially as a result of the diplomatic discord in 2003 between Mexico and the United States over the role of the UN in the conflict in Iraq. Several levels of security policy in Mexico are examined, showing instances of cooperation and agreement with the United States and occasions when their positions entered into conflict.

I. NATIONAL SECURITY SINCE THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

Mexican national security policy during the revolutionary regime (1917–2000) primarily concentrated on governance problems and issues of political control. As the regime began to deteriorate, two factors began to reshape the national security parameters: the internal element was the democratic transition process; the external factor was the globalization process.¹ The impetus for both was the collapse of the Soviet regime, the rise of liberal democracy in the region, the subsequent economic and commercial integration of the block countries, and Mexico's trilateral agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with the United States and Canada.

Internal security has involved the achievement of governance through the consolidation of democracy and the implementation of the rule of law (a new parameter, coinciding with the change of government in 2000). The principal problems facing Mexico's domestic security are the crisis in public security, drug trafficking (which also has international consequences), and

unresolved problems of governance, such as in Chiapas. Variables external to governance (economic and social, like the application of justice and the defense structure of the country) have become determining factors of security in the national sphere, and, since the 1980s, discourse in Mexico has incorporated poverty and the lack of economic structures as variables of insecurity.

Bilateral and North American security was an inevitable result of NAFTA, and the evolution of this agreement will likely link commerce and trade with security. Since September 11, 2001 this level of security cooperation has become strategic.

The debate on hemispheric security—the maintenance, questioning, or development of new elements of cooperation with nations in the hemisphere—has developed primarily within the Organization of the American States (OAS). Mexico signaled its intention to withdraw from the Rio Treaty on September 7, 2001, and ratified the withdrawal on September 6, 2002. Official Mexican discourse does not view hemispheric security commitments as a priority.

International security issues have opened a discussion over whether or not Mexico has any responsibilities in this realm. Mexico's policies regarding the United Nations, particularly the Security Council,² have called into question how to defend Mexico's interests in the world. Public opinion and Mexican politics offer two positions: the isolationist, which would have the country operate according to the foreign policy principles outlined in the Constitution,³ and the globalist, which emphasizes coordinating Mexico's position of power among the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as more active Mexican participation in the resolution of diverse international conflicts.⁴

The “geopolitics” of Mexican security has generated a conceptual confusion within the State as well as among the three principal political parties: the National Action Party (PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). PAN has more of a proclivity to promote greater cooperation and a warmer attitude toward the United States, whereas the PRI and PRD are strongly nationalist. Despite this, some “pragmatic” sectors agree that in order for Mexico to be economically and politically competitive in the international arena, reforms must be made to the policies that are left over from the Mexican Revolution.

It is in foreign policy that the fundamental problem emerges. There are those who would continue with the so-called “principles” of nonintervention, absolute sovereignty of the State, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, versus those who would change Mexico's participation in the world, both in economic matters (trade, principally) and in diplomacy and security. According to Article 89 of the 1917 Constitution, the President defines Mexico's foreign policy; however, legislators, public opinion, and scholars are now all having increased influence in this arena.

II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES: BASIS AND APPROACHES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Mexico did not have a global view, nor did it engage in any strategic alliances throughout the rule of the PRI (1929–2000). The main emphasis of Mexico's national security and defense policies has been defensive and nationalistic. During the Cold War, Mexico distanced itself from the United States primarily because it opposed U.S. policies to fight communism in the hemisphere. Mexico perceived U.S. Cold War policies to be in violation of many of its own principles of international coexistence; the principle of nonintervention, developed during the Mexican Revolution, maintains that international law should have priority over military solutions. The Carranza Doctrine furthers this principle by demanding respect for the sovereignty of states. Mexico gave priority to international law as the principal instrument of international action, above all, in forums such as the UN and the OAS, and Mexico was often isolated from the “hemispheric consensus” because of this position.⁵ In addition, this ideology did not allow Mexico to have a military foreign policy; instead, it resorted to diplomacy for defense.

By the 1990s, the Cold War had ended, Latin American countries were undergoing transitions to democracy, and the Central American conflicts were settled. As these global and regional transformations occurred, the concepts of national security, foreign policy, and defense of almost all nations in the hemisphere (with the exception of Cuba) were redefined in order to address the new environment. World politics based upon ideological confrontation ceased to be relevant in this milieu. Instead, nations began to take into account nontraditional national security concerns, such as migration, terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. The debate over regionalizing and updating security agreements gained importance because the

majority of the agreements from the Cold War era did not address these new threats. In other words, democracy and free trade have had a macroeconomic effect on the security environment in the hemisphere, in spite of the weaknesses of the democratic political systems in many countries of the region. Mexico continues the Latin American propensity to accept free trade as an accompaniment to the process of democratization.

Mexico presently does not have a military foreign policy. The armed forces remain subordinate to the Secretary of Foreign Relations (Article 89, section 10 of the Constitution), while the principles of foreign policy impose constricting demands. In other words, the foreign policy determines the defense strategy. Subordination of the military is maintained through absolute obedience to the President. However, few countries in the world hold principles like those of Mexico, whose ideal is the world of “perpetual peace” proposed in the late 18th century by Immanuel Kant. Rather, since the beginning of the 19th century, the world has been operating on the nation-state system, which is governed by the concept of “total war” and the absolute predisposition to extremes in war set out by the great military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz. International relations theorists call it the idealists versus the realists: Mexico is Kantian while the rest of the world is Clausewitzian.

Mexico holds to a doctrine of “defensive defense.” The positive aspect of this is that Mexico has no enemies as it ushers in the 21st century. The country enjoys excellent relations with its neighbors, even with those that only a short time ago were engaged in civil war, like Guatemala. Mexico coexists and trades extensively with the United States, the same neighbor that only 155 years ago forcibly took the territory that is now the states of Texas and California. Mexico has been at peace in the 21st century even though it is the home of the last real socialist revolution on the continent and despite its diplomatic conflict with Cuba, that of Fidel Castro and his once powerful army and air force.

Since the military was not allowed to have an external role in regional or international affairs, it became deeply involved in internal security. Mexico is a pacifist country on the world stage, but it has been inwardly militarist since 1946. The military is overloaded with responsibilities, in large part due to weaknesses in the civil structure. The most well known part of the Mexican military mission is Plan DN-III-E, in which the military serves as an efficient search-and-rescue force for the civil population

in the event of a major natural disaster, such as an earthquake or a hurricane. Under Vicente Fox's presidency, the armed forces also enhanced their political position managing the PGR (*Procuraduría General de la República*—General Attorney Office).

Whether desirable or not, the military continues to play a vital role in the functioning of the Mexican state, including responsibilities originally assigned to police forces, such as the war on drugs. Since the 1980s, the war against the drug cartels has been carried out by the Mexican military with singular efficacy, in part at the request of—and under pressure from—the United States. In other unresolved internal conflicts, such as the crisis in Chiapas, the armed forces have used power as a deterrent; the Zapatistas accepted the cease-fire because they knew that to confront the army would be suicide. As distinct from Guerrero in the 1970s, in Chiapas the army also had to fight a cyber-war, a modern counterinsurgency strategy, while NGOs and the national and the international press demanded that the Mexican government be careful to respect human rights.

Mexico has not been an exception to human rights abuses. During the Cold War, the armed forces and the State's security bodies did not always take human rights into consideration; neither was it demanded of them. But even the armies of the most democratic nations have failed to respect human rights when they were at war, as shown in Vietnam and the civil wars in Central America. The callousness of the war against communism and the war between communism and capitalism resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in Geneva in 1948. However, it was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the topic of human rights began to pervade the Mexican military academies. Today it is both an imperative and an obligation. However, for some internal conflicts, such as the war against drug trafficking, the military are free to leave the halls of the academies and can often overlook human rights. There is a danger, in combating terrorism, the new priority, that individual rights may not be protected and preserved.

Mexico is passing the test that will facilitate its graduation into a nation that can be successfully inserted into the world order. However, obstacles exist, such as the negative consequences of globalization, such as social polarization, the fragility of many reforms implemented in the last twenty years, and the stagnation of State reforms promised but not

carried out by President Fox. Mexican national security and defense structures, the institutions and legislation written in the context of the Mexican Revolution, remain untouched since the time when the State was under the authoritarian rule of a single party. The primary dilemma now is whether the Constitution of 1917 and its laws are sufficient and appropriate to successfully face the challenges of the 21st century in defense and security matters.

President Fox made an effort to coordinate the process of national security and defense decision-making through the National Security Presidential Council and the Cabinet of Order and Respect; for many reasons, including lack of consensus on the legal changes that were required, the efforts halted at the end of 2001. One of the characteristics of the old decision-making process is the lack of coordination among agencies, secretaries of state, and security bodies. The Constitution favors presidentialism, placing the decisive power and role of “coordinator” in the President; it favors governability rather than democracy. To maintain political stability in the short run, the implementation of reforms in security and defense is sacrificed in the long term. The theme of how reforms can be made while at the same time maintaining stability is key to redefining civilian-military relations in the new democratic context.

III. MEXICO: FACING THE IRAQ CRISIS

After the Afghanistan war, the Bush Administration focused its efforts on Iraq, and since the beginning of 2002, Iraq has been converted into the most important test of political firepower for the stability and governability of the international system.⁶ Mexico prefers to use diplomatic means to apply pressure on countries or leaders that threaten international security. That is, its disagreement with U.S. policy centers on the efficiency or inefficiency of diplomacy to exert such pressure. The diplomatic issue of the means to ensure the stability of international relations in light of the crisis was battled out in the heart of the UN Security Council between September 2002 and April 2003.⁷

Mexico was in the eye of the hurricane; because of its temporary position as a member of the UN Security Council, it would determine the margin of support and backing for or autonomy from the United States. On the Iraq issue that was put before the UN Security Council, Mexico's

vote would make a difference, since nine votes are needed without a veto to pass a resolution. The Security Council members' propensity not to unanimously support the United States was expressed when they did not take the case to the final vote.⁸ Mexico decided, principally for domestic political reasons, to follow France, China, and Russia on the Security Council, in showing autonomy from the U.S. position and not supporting measures for a UN-led war in Iraq. The member nations of the Security Council established their positions on Iraq through a delicate equilibrium weighing principles and interests, costs and benefits (diplomatic, political and economic), and their geopolitical location. Syria, which was representing the Arab nations, faced the greatest challenge to offering support to the United States, while Pakistan faced growing pro-Islamic sentiment in its country. Mexico, however—considering its geographic proximity, the broad commercial and economic ties (more than 200 million dollars), social links (between 5 and 10 million legal and illegal Mexicans living in the neighbor country), and common interests with the United States—probably faced the least challenge in not giving its support.

The military occupation of Iraq, beginning March 19, 2003, set off an internal political disagreement in Mexico. The business community openly backed the United States, asking for the Fox government's support. However, the majority of the political elite demanded that Fox be guided by Article 89, section 10 of the Constitution, which gives the President the duty of designing and executing foreign policy:⁹ This means that diplomacy should be based on the self determination of nations, nonintervention, the peaceful solution of conflicts, the proscription of the threat of or the use of force in international relations, the judicial equality of the states, international cooperation for development, and the fight for peace and international security.

Fox could have supported the United States because the Iraqi government, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, had in fact threatened peace and international security through the use of chemical and biological weapons against its people and in the war against Iran. He had also invaded Kuwait. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein had not complied with UN resolutions, starting with UN Resolution 687 of 1991, which made the regime subject to weapons inspections by UN inspectors, and in 1998, he had expelled the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, while at the same time supposedly renouncing the produc-

tion of weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq were considered an international threat, then containing it would have been within the principles of Mexican diplomacy.¹⁰ Another principle that the Fox government could have invoked is that Saddam Hussein was not a democratically elected leader; therefore, the principle of national self-determination was not applicable to Iraq. In addition, he had not respected the principle of non-intervention when he invaded and attacked Kuwait. Fox thus had constitutional arguments to support the U.S. position, yet the strategic dilemma transcended the short-term crisis in Iraq because of the long-term issue of whether Mexico could maintain its own security policies autonomous from the United States.

Mexico's vital role in the UN Security Council will decide whether or not it remains an isolated nation that does not engage in worldwide strategic debates due to its lack of stature and the isolationist and nationalist interpretation of its "principles." There are those in academia, the political parties, Congress, and the public who feel it was a mistake to join the Security Council because it put the government in a potential face-off with the United States, where it should not have been.¹¹ However, the seats for Latin American representation on the Security Council have been controlled by Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia for the past twenty years, and Mexico has deferred to their decisions in dealing with major international conflicts in the past. The debate in Mexico now is whether it should return to the passive attitudes of the 20th century, or engage in the international security system, and pay the potential price for that.

One price Mexico would pay is a separation from the United States on many bilateral issues. Some of the reasons for not voting in favor of the U.S. position on Iraq have consequences for Mexico's search for an "independent space" within the scheme of NAFTA. Public opinion (as demonstrated through polls) and politics (the deep-seated positions of the nationalist elites, for example, in Congress and the press) were against the war on Iraq, which demonstrates that Mexico's new democracy could continue to operate under the foreign policy principles developed in the early 20th century. Indeed, negotiation of bilateral problems (like migration) should not be affected by disparate positions on broader international security issues. Finally, not supporting its powerful neighbor unconditionally has served as a symbolic gesture. If

Mexico creates an autonomous space, the United States will have to respect its position, and it will become a country with which the United States must negotiate the elements that define their respective international security positions. The debate over hemispheric security thus operates within a similar paradigm and begins to converge with the international security agenda.

The Mexicans who wanted President Fox and Mexico to vote in favor of the U.S. position on Iraq were putting their main commercial partner-interests above principles. They realized that the future of the economy depends on and is anchored to the economic performance of the United States. Both President George Bush and Ambassador Tony Garza warned that friendship should be demonstrated in difficult times. Bush and Garza argued that Fox should commit political *hara-kiri* and ignore Mexican public opinion, because the (antidemocratic) Constitution permitted the President to act as the sole foreign policy decision maker. They indicated that Mexico's support would, in turn, be viewed favorably by the United States Congress, which would then look to facilitate closer relations and address certain key Mexican interests, some of which include the struggle for agreements on documenting migrants and the possible renegotiation of certain chapters of NAFTA with more favorable conditions for Mexico. Another strategic argument for pro-U.S. supporters is that Mexican nationalism should be separated from anti-North Americanism, where, for a second time (the first was in 1942 to support the allies in WWII), being nationalist also entails a close relationship with the United States.

The Mexican government was faced with three options: to oppose, to abstain, or to support the United States. Supporting the United States military action was an option only if UN arms inspectors could clearly demonstrate Hussein's possession of illegal weapons. On the other hand, attacking a country without properly demonstrating that it posed a threat would call into question the norms of the international system. Mexico believes that the UN must lead the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and fight for the complete disarmament of countries that threaten international security, such as North Korea. Faced with the imminent military attacks against Iraq, the pressure exerted on the majority of the governments in the world to support the United States was very strong. Mexico was cautious about unilateral military strategies that could aggravate internation-

al tensions instead of achieving stability. Similar dictators existed in other countries, but the same military pressure had not been applied to them; instead, the international community had employed diplomatic pressure based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council. This is the position advocated by Mexican foreign policy.

Canada can serve as an example for Mexico. It is able to be a trade partner, neighbor, and strategic ally of the United States. Canada also commits armed forces to joint operations, and has bilateral security agreements like the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) that address the defense of North America. At the same time, Canada still holds different views from the United States on certain issues. What is more, that dissent has given it strength and negotiating capacity in its bilateral relations with the United States. Divergences in diplomatic positions have been frequent, such as in facing the crisis in Central America in the 1980s and Cuba, but the broader relationship between Canada and the United States has not deteriorated because of these policy disagreements. As a result of the new war on terrorism, the United States grants highest priority to Homeland Security and is dependent upon the collaboration of Canada and Mexico to protect its borders. Due to the extensive cooperation on the levels of law enforcement, intelligence, migration and to a lesser extent, defense, Mexico is a strategic link in a partnership that can contribute to the security of the United States as well as its own.

IV. MEXICAN, NORTH AMERICAN, AND HEMISPHERIC SECURITY: ISOLATION OR COOPERATION

In contrast to the Cold War era, the new threats to security come from non-state actors and have grown out of the lack of solid governing structures to confront them. Cooperation between governments must increase because many individual nations are incapable of addressing these threats efficiently on their own. Trade agreements necessitate agreements on higher policy levels, especially security, in order to confront these new threats. This has been the tendency in South America, under pressure from Brazilian foreign policy.¹²

In North America, however, governments have not used NAFTA as a platform to reach agreements outside the confines of commercial accords.

Indeed, NAFTA deliberately did not include an institutional framework for its administration. But although the treaty is restricted to trade, it also affects security indirectly through the obvious issues of social inequalities, agriculture, energy (oil and electricity), and environment (especially in the border region). There have been a number of agreements addressing these issues. In particular, Mexico is also an oil-producing nation and one of the primary suppliers to the United States. Due to international instability, the topic of reforming Mexican investment laws in the energy sector is considered a high priority for both governments.

Among its member countries, the perceptions of threats are not identical. Mexico defines threats as those that are primarily internal, while Canada and the United States see their main threats as external. However, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the vulnerability of the three countries' borders has been exposed.¹³ This changed the United States' perception of itself as a nation that is unassailable. The vulnerability created by these new external threats has provoked a great doctrinal and institutional revolution within the country and has given rise to the new defense doctrine outlined by President Bush:

The nature of the changing threats that confront the United States requires a new government structure to protect the country and the population from invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons. Today, no particular government agency, by itself, has as its principal mission the protection of the territory of the homeland. In reality, the responsibilities are dispersed among more than 100 different government agencies. The United States needs a unified structure can provide protection against all threats.¹⁴

One of the new U.S. priorities is to control the foreign populations entering the country as well as those already within its borders. This policy affects both legal and illegal members of its Latin American population. In this sense, there is an incompatibility between the opening of the borders (a consequence of increasing economic flows) and security. Moreover, the hypothetical, hoped-for effect that increased trade would diminish population flight has not been observed between the United States and Mexico. The migration of Mexicans to the United States is attributed to the weakness of the Mexican economy and its inability to generate jobs. It is a factor that has

a socioeconomic origin in Mexico, but in many sectors of the United States is viewed as a security issue as well.¹⁵ Drug trafficking is another complex phenomenon: on the distribution level, the threat originates in the south (Colombia and the Andean countries), but the consumption-demand side and the money laundering exist primarily within the United States.

In the case of terrorism, some Latin American countries are home to groups such as the Colombian guerillas that have the capacity to carry out terrorist activities. After the September 11th attacks, the terrorist threat has increased in complexity, reached global dimensions, and focused its plan of attack on objectives in the United States.¹⁶ Concurrence on security matters is very broad on the bilateral level. The Mexican government has applied numerous security measures, the primary one being to guard against the possibility of a terrorist cell entering through Mexico, which have aided the United States in making its southern border more secure. The reinforced security relationship between the two countries is evident in the recognition that strategic infrastructure, such as oil platforms, electric generating plants, and airports, must be protected. In this sense, strengthening the geosecurity of the United States has an important effect on Mexico as well.

During the Fox and Bush administrations, three moments have marked U.S.-Mexico cooperation: President Bush's visit to Guanajuato in February 2001, President Fox's visit to Washington at the beginning of September 2001, before the terrorist attacks, and the Smart Border agreements that were signed in Monterrey in March 2002. The Monterrey accords proposed an "efficient and secure" common border. Commitments to the exchange of information on people, merchandise transports, shipments, and protection of the border infrastructure were included in the agreements. For example, in October 2002, FBI agents assisted Mexican officials in preparing and equipping the international airport in Mexico City. Another security issue in which the governments have become increasingly involved is cooperation to improve the effectiveness of Mexico's police and judicial systems. The support for training, professionalization, and preparation involves not only the DEA, but also various agencies from the U.S. judicial system and law enforcement.

The many binational groups working on these topics and commitments to cooperation on national security, in the United States as well as in Mexico, are creating a positive environment that will not be inhib-

ited by the observed differences in the international security approaches and priorities of the two governments. Although there are differences on international and hemispheric security issues between the United States and Mexico, the intensity of the cooperation continues uninterrupted with respect to their strictly binational relationship. It is important to note that homeland security is the most important objective mutually supported by both parties. To believe that their differences of opinion on the UN Security Council will weaken their bilateral cooperation in security matters is to fail to understand the complexity of the relations between the two countries.

As regards hemispheric security, the Cold War period isolated Mexico from the United States and other Latin American countries. Mexico was on the side of cooperation about communism (although, on a domestic level, it had its own policies of communist containment) and often criticized the United States and many of the Central and South American governments that implemented military policies that massively violated human rights and eroded constitutional governments. For this reason, Mexico granted little importance to the OAS as a forum for debate between 1940 and 1990. The 1990s initiated a reevaluation of the OAS in Mexico's foreign policy and the promotion of the creation of the Hemispheric Security Commission. However, the resolution of differences with respect to the usefulness of the Rio Treaty between Mexico and the majority of the countries in the hemisphere is still in progress (Mexico withdrew from the treaty between September 2001 and 2002). The future of hemispheric military relations is also still pending (the topic of the Inter-American Defense Board), as is the possibility of expanding military cooperation through mutual confidence measures, military maneuvers, cooperative education agreements, equipment acquisition, and so forth.

Mexico is moving closer to an "integral" and "multidimensional" definition of hemispheric security, one that recognizes the various subregions.¹⁷ South and Central American and Caribbean countries as well as the United States and Canada are leaning clearly toward the strengthening of cooperation.¹⁸ Mexico's position is to remain cautious of such cooperation, even though this could take them to a level of isolation in the heart of multinational forums like the OAS that are linked to other areas of the politics of cooperation, such as trade.

CONCLUSION

For Mexico, new geopolitical and international security conditions will bring important elements into opposition that will clash on a daily basis: nationalist isolation versus internationalization; domestic politics *vis-à-vis* external politics (zero-sum cost benefit analysis); principles before interests; international security versus the security of migrants; economic interests *vis-à-vis* political interests; and so on.

The question remains: Will Mexico's national security continue responding to internal parameters or, for the first time, will external elements have a determining influence? If Mexico continues on its course, national security in the 21st century puts Mexico's foreign and defense policies at odds. Mexico's acting principles and doctrine are governed by the classic guidelines of absolute sovereignty and imbued with a nationalist ideology that clearly does not fit well with the actions of nations in the new international context of regionalization and globalization. In order to be a cooperative partner in matters of hemispheric and international security, Mexico must reflect deeply on whether or not its political and doctrinal basis in the realities of the 20th century are appropriate for the 21st century.

NOTES

1. Raúl Benítez-Manaut, "Memorándum de seguridad nacional ante el siglo XXI," *Este País*, no. 118, (January 2001), pp. 30–34.

2. Mexico is a temporary member of the UN Security Council, serving from January 2002 to December 2003.

3. "La Revolución Mexicana y la seguridad internacional," in Jaime Bailón Corrés, Carlos Martínez Assad, and Pablo Serrano Álvarez, eds., *El Siglo de la Revolución Mexicana*, vol. II (Mexico: INEHRM, 2000).

4. This does not necessarily imply external military participation, of which, in reality, the Mexican armed forces are not capable.

5. Raúl Benítez-Manaut, "Sovereignty, Foreign Policy, and National Security in Mexico, 1821–1989," in Hal Klepak, ed., *Natural Allies? Canadian and Mexican Perspectives on International Security* (Carleton: Carleton University Press, 1996), pp. 57–90.

6. In his "State of the Union" address of January 2002, Bush identified Hussein as the leader of the "Axis of Evil," in which he included Iran and

North Korea. See Francis Fukuyama, "Occidente puede estar resquebrajándose: Norteamérica contra el resto," *El Mercurio* (Santiago de Chile), 8 September 2002.

7. The key moment was the passage of UN Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002.

8. The proposal was presented to the Security Council on 17 March 2003; the attacks began 19 March.

9. This part of the presidential powers is a holdover from the 20th-century totalitarian regime and would be considered an undemocratic constitutional clause.

10. It should also be apparent that diplomacy without military pressure has proved ineffective in the majority of conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Diplomatic pressure alone has not succeeded in convincing any military dictator to retreat (the clearest case of which is Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia); in every case, military threat was the ingredient that made the deterrence effective.

11. Ricardo Lagos, the President of Chile, has found himself in a similar position, trapped between domestic interests and his relationship with the Bush Administration.

12. Clovis Brigagao and Domicio Proenca, Jr., *Concertação Múltipla. Inserção Internacional de Segurança do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves Editora, 2002).

13. The concept of "border" includes land and maritime borders, airports, migration policies, and even the concept of "porous"/permeable borders.

14. President George W. Bush, *The Department of Homeland Security*, White House, Washington, DC, June 2002, p. 2.

15. See Francisco Alba, "Diálogo y cooperación México-Estados Unidos en materia migratoria," and Rodolfo Tuirán, "La migración mexicana a Estados Unidos; tendencias presentes y desafíos futuros," in Olga Pellicer and Rafael Fernández de Castro, eds., *México y Estados Unidos, las rutas de la cooperación* (Mexico: SRE-ITAM, 1998).

16. See Raúl Benítez-Manaut and Andrés Avila Akerberg, "Terrorismo y globalización a principios del siglo XXI: dilemas para la seguridad internacional," in José Luis Valdés Ugálde and Diego Valadés, eds., *Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre* (México: CISAN-UNAM, 2002), pp. 203–44.

17. This will be a topic for debate at the special OAS conference on hemispheric security that will take place in October 2003.

18. Pedro Villagra, Luis Bitencourt, and Henry Medina Uribe, “Shaping the Regional Security Environment in Latin America: Perspectives From Argentina, Brazil and Colombia” (Carlisle: North-South Center, U.S. Army War College, July 2003).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



RAUL BENITEZ-MANAUT (Born in Chile; Mexican, 1958) is a Professor and Researcher at the North America Research Center of UNAM-Mexico. He was a Public Policy Scholar at the Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. (2003). He was a Visiting Professor at the Institute for Latin American Studies (ILAS), Columbia University (2001). He has taught as a lecturer at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLAC-SO) in Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Guatemala; the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing; the Institute for Developing Studies of Tokyo; the University for Peace in Costa Rica; the Interamerican Institute for Human Rights, Costa Rica; the Torcuato di Tella University in Argentina; the National Defense University, Washington; the Universidad de Valencia, Spain; Georgetown University, Washington; New York University; the Canadian Foundation for the Americas, Ottawa; York University in Toronto and the Carter Center, Atlanta. He has published journal articles and chapters of books on matters of Hemispheric Security, the Central American Peace Process, the civil war in El Salvador, national security, geopolitics, and the armed forces of Mexico. He is the author of the book *La teoría militar y la guerra civil en El Salvador* (UCA editores, 1989); *Chiapas: los Desafíos de la Paz*, (With Cynthia Arnson, Woodrow Wilson Center, ITAM, Porrúa, Mexico, 2000) and *Chiapas. Interpretaciones sobre la negociación y la paz* (With Cynthia Arnson and Andrew Selee, UNAM-Wilson Center, México, 2003). He is a member of the Latin American Studies Association since 1987 and the International Studies Association.