New Evidence on North Korea's Chollima Movement and First Five-Year Plan (1957–1961)

Edited by James Person
NEW EVIDENCE ON NORTH KOREA’S CHOLLIMA MOVEMENT
AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1957-1961)

NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT
DOCUMENT READER

Prepared for the conference:
THE 2009 ‘NEW DPRK REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE’—A BLAST FROM THE PAST OR A NEW PATH?

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Washington, DC

Organized by
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’
North Korea International Documentation Project
and
United States Institute of Peace’s
Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention
Dear Participant

The North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) is pleased to present you with this “document reader,” which is intended to facilitate and enrich the discussion at the February 10, 2009 conference “The 2009 ‘New DPRK Revolutionary Upsurge’—A Blast from the Past or a New Path?”, held at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. The volume consists of select (East) German, Polish, Chinese, and Czech archival documents that we hope will provide context for discussion on North Korea’s Chollima Movement, launched in the mid-1950s and recently revived by the North Korean leadership to make the DPRK a “strong and prosperous” state by 2012.

The collection, compiled by NKIDP is by no means comprehensive, however, in selecting the materials, the editors sought to include some of the most important materials available and made a substantial effort to mine relevant official archives. The document reader is organized chronologically, starting with December 1956 and ending in May 1963.

In compiling these documents, the editors received much appreciated cooperation and assistance from scholars from several countries, reflecting the multinational scope of this project. NKIDP is particularly grateful to Jakub Poprocki for contributing documentation from the Polish Foreign Ministry Archives; Bernd Schaefer for contributing (East) German materials; and Gregg Brazinsky for contributing Chinese materials. The document reader would not have been ready for distribution had it not been for the diligence of NKIDP Project Assistant Timothy McDonnell. For their sage advice, the editors would also like to thank Robert Litwak, Shin Jongdae, John Park, Charles Armstrong, and Kirk Larsen.

The editors are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose support made the translation of many of the documents contained in this reader possible. Last but not least, the editors would like to thank the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Dr. Michael Van Dusen, Deputy Director, for providing Center resources for additional document translations.

NKIDP is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian F. Ostermann. The Project was launched in 2006 in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul).

James F. Person
Coordinator, NKIDP

Christian F. Ostermann
Director, History and Public Policy Program
DOCUMENT No. 1

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]
24/7/2421/57/[trans. note: illegible initials]

Secret [trans. note: tilted stamp]

Note

From a conversation with comrade Samsonov, 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 20.XII.1956

During a meeting with Comr. Samsonov at the Soviet Embassy, whose goal was to discuss a range of problems with the DPRK, the following issues were brought up:

1) Group from the August plenum.

Four persons from this group, who went over to China during the time that the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China was taking place in Beijing, remain in China to this date. Because there were 2 members of the Central Committee and one deputy member of the CC (Minister of Internal Trade, Chairman of Trade Unions and Director of the Department of Construction Materials in the Council of Ministers, deputy member of the CC), these people, according to Comr. Samsonov, reached the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In Beijing, in agreement with the Soviet comrs. a decision was made. Then Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai came to Pyongyang for the September plenum of the Kor. Workers’ Party. Comr Samsonov believes that Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai conducted talks with the Korean leadership. As a result, the plenum adopted a new stance vis-à-vis the group from the August plenum, which is now not being called anti-party, but instead people who got lost, and their mistakes should be treated as a dispute within the party and one must aim to remove mistakes by way of persuasion.

Comr. Samsonov stated that the Korean comrs. consider the September plenum a watershed in the party’s work in the sphere of methods of educating party members.

On this occasion, Comr. Samsonov said that two deputies to the chairman of the Pyongyang committee of the Workers’ Party were also tied to the August group. Their party cards were given back to them at the September plenum and they were directed to work on a very low level of administrative work. (the August plenum removed them from the party).

Later, in response to the question of how the September plenum was conducted locally, Comr. Samsonov stated that it can be inferred from the information of leading persons at the Soviet Embassy that after the September plenum of the CC of the Workers’ Party, no plenums of the Provincial Committee or District Committee took place, but meetings of party activists were conducted.
The issue of such extreme change in the stance of the CC at the September plenum compared to the August plenum, when the whole group (without Choe Changik and Pak Changok) were thrown out of the party, was generally incomprehensible to the members of the party. Kim Il Sung explained that the change of stance toward this group proves the strength of the party and that ideological convincing is the best method of party work.

On the question of the subsequent fate of the August group, Comr. Samsonov stated that the former vice-premier Pak Changok has become the director of one of the largest factories. Choe Changik, former vice-premier, is still not working.

In the opinion of Comr. Samsonov, the August group should be considered a healthy current in the party.

2) Different groups in the leadership of the DPRK

In response to the question whether one hears about the existence of Korean, Chinese and other groups in the DPRK leadership, Comr. Samsonov stated that indeed four groups existed: the Soviet, Chinese, South Korean and North Korean. Kim Il Sung brought up the question of these groups at the plenum of the CC of the Workers’ Party in December of last year. “Kim Il Sung asserted that after 10 years one should not call oneself a Soviet or a Chinese Korean, that we are all, said Kim Il Sung, members of one party and we stand on the foundation of one ideology regardless of whether we came from the USSR, from China or from the South.” Koreans who have come from the USSR had Soviet citizenship. There were facts [sic] that members of the government of the DPRK were Soviet citizens.

At the beginning of the current year, Soviet passports were taken away from all Koreans who had come from the USSR. Today all are Korean citizens.

[According to] Kim Il Sung’s speech, taking Soviet passports away caused the issue of the groups to calm down gradually. Today, affirms Comr. Samsonov, one barely hears about these groups.

3) Exchange of party cards

A campaign of exchanging party cards is continuing in the DPRK. Comr. Samsonov, following the Korean comrades, gave the reasons for the exchange of cards:

a) Among the existing cards there are still many old ones from before 1948. There were many cards with the old name of the party, the North Korean Workers’ Party (beginning in 1948, the party’s name was changed to the Korean Workers’ Party).

Also, in the war period about 450,000 new party members were accepted, and they received substitute cards (certificates, 450,000 is nearly half of the number of members of the party, which in April 1956 had 1,154,000 members).

b) There was bad paper in the old cards and many had been destroyed or were in poor condition.

c) The exchange of cards was combined with an educational campaign for the party members.
d) On the occasion of the card exchange, the rehabilitation of wrongly punished comrades is being conducted.

Comr. Samsonov informed that the arguments given in points “c” and “d” are treated by the Korean comrades as marginal in the campaign of exchange of party cards, and the facts given in points “a” and “b” were the deciding cause.

4) Changes in economic policies.

Comr. Samsonov agreed with our opinion that the guidelines of the IIIrd Congress of the Kor. Workers’ Party in the sphere of the development of the national economy were calculated for the further development of the concept of making Korea a self-sufficient state in the industrial sphere, which, if one takes into account the financial capabilities, the destruction, and the level of cadres is completely unrealistic.

The August plenum of the CC of the Kor. Workers’ Party adopted a new course in economic policy calculated at abandoning the construction of huge and expensive factories, and it was decided to build those factories that, on the basis of Korea’s natural wealth, will bring relatively quick economic results and at the same time allow for a quick raising of the standard of living. Comr. Samsonov can see the continuation of this program in the last December plenum of the CC.

5) The question of raising the standard of living of the population.

In the opinion of the Soviet comrades, the DPRK government made substantial efforts in 1956 in the area of improvement of the living standards of the population. Comr. Samsonov relayed the following facts:

a) Lowering of prices, which gave the nation 12,000,000,000 won in savings. The Soviet comrades converted this sum into rice at free-market prices, as a result of which the calculation showed that the population can purchase 120,000 tons of rice, at the latest lowering of prices, which represents a considerable position in the feeding of the population.

b) After the IIIrd Congress of the Party, working people and students had their daily ration of rice increased by 100 gr.

c) In November an increase in wages was conducted, 35% on average. In 1957 the government of the DPRK intends to achieve much more in the sphere of raising the standard of living of the population than it has done in 1956.

6) Agricultural production.

Last year 2,430,000 tons of grains were harvested, claims Comr. Samsonov. To feed the population of the DPRK the minimum is 3,000,000 tons. Imports did not fully cover the shortfall. From this stemmed difficulties in hiring new workers (workers and their families obtain rice with ration cards, non-workers do not receive cards for rice).

This year, according to Comr. Samsonov, the harvest is better than it was in 1955. Still in the opinion of Comr. Samsonov, 3,000,000 tons have not been reached.

7) On the question of Korea’s unification.
Comr. Samsonov agreed with us that the government of the DPRK in its
resolutions and announcements treats the question of unifying Korea quite
propagandistically. The existing program of unifying Korea proposed by the DPRK
totally negates the government of Syngman Rhee. The DPRK government does not want
to talk with the government of Syngman Rhee. Of course, under these conditions it would
be impossible in the near future to launch talks with the current regime in the south.

Also, as Comr. Samsonov stressed, one can observe a recent calming down of the
tone (by the DPRK toward Syngman Rhee). While before, official government
documents labeled the southern government as a clique or a dictatorship, in the latest
DPRK protest over the reaching of an agreement between the USA and South Korea we
read: “American imperialists and Syngman Rhee.”

8) About the role of the intelligentsia in the DPRK.

In the opinion of the Soviet comrade, the old intelligentsia has been removed
from having any influence on the life in the DPRK. There is a young intelligentsia, which
indeed stands on the foundation of party and government policies, but this intelligentsia is
only just being created. Still, the intelligentsia in the DPRK plays no visible role in
political life. There has so far been no positive or negative critique of the factual state of
affairs in the DPRK by the intelligentsia.

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5 cop[ies] MSZ [trans. note: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych—Ministry of Foreign
Affairs] Dep. V
1 cop. a/a

Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 2

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the
People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]
No. 268/38/2421/57/tjm[trans. note: added by hand, probably a person’s initials]

Secret [trans. note: added by hand]

Note

From a conversation with Comrade Makarov, Counselor of the Embassy of the USSR
on 11.III.1957
Comr. Makarov has been in the DPRK for over a year and a half. Prior to arriving in the DPRK he was a vice-premier of the Russian Republic. In the DPRK, he headed the office of economic relations (this office was a separate unit, the office dealt with the USSR’s aid to the DPRK). Currently Comr. Makarov is the Embassy counselor for questions of economic cooperation. Comr. Makarov possesses contacts in the economic sphere on a high level with Korean comrades.

The conversation had as its goal a discussion of the DPRK’s economic problems and gaining information in this sphere.

Comr. Makarov remarked at the beginning that the DPRK government has now abandoned the unreasonable policy of economic self-reliance, a policy calculated for the construction of huge branches of production (machinery, cars, engines and so on) with the goal of exporting these products.

These goals overreached the capabilities of the DPRK and furthermore there were no real perspectives for selling these products, if only because of the low quality of these kinds of products in the DPRK.

In Comr. Makarov’s opinion, the visit of the DPRK government delegation to the countries of people’s democracy influenced the change in economic policy. In response to my question whether the appearance of the August group influenced the change in economic policy, Comr. Makarov was of the opinion that it was the visit of the government delegation to the countries of people’s democracy that decided it.

The DPRK’s current economic plan for 1957 should be judged as correct, calculated for the appropriate exploitation of the natural wealth of the DPRK based on real financial, material, technical and cadre possibilities.

The DPRK is developing a 5-year plan. The development of the plan is supposed to be finished in May of this year. Comr. Makarov stressed that positive changes have occurred in the DPRK this year in the realization of the national plan. After the December plenum there were certainly voices among the ministries that the plan which had been agreed on was too high, still the goals were met and significantly exceeded in January and February. Until now, in the period of the 3-year plan, January and February were months of not fulfilling plans. The economic perspective in the DPRK for 1957 in the sphere of implementing the national plan is favorable. The fact of the great mobilization of the whole leadership of the DPRK, which for two months came into contact with the staff of factories, production cooperatives and where concrete economic tasks were discussed, influenced this kind of situation. Various kinds of Korean specialists, who helped the teams and leadership of given economic units in the correct, organizational, economic and so on development of plans took part in these meetings. The meetings mobilized the working masses, as well as the management institutions.

Speaking about these changes, comr. Makarov said that he is satisfied with the results of his work (he repeated this sentence several more times on other occasions).

On the question of spending on investments in 1957, Comr. Makarov believed that the DPRK does not aim to develop the steel and machine industries on such a scale that these areas would be produced for export. The construction of a diesel automobile engine factory was removed from the plan, but only to build those branches to the extent that they would secure the production of spare parts, renovation of existing machines, production of minor installations, minor agricultural equipment indispensable to the current needs of the country, in a word, to maintain and leave functioning what is in the
industry and agriculture of the DPRK, as well as the production of necessary equipment for agriculture, so as to save foreign currency for the import of other things.

Investment for 1957, albeit 80% is designated for heavy industry insofar as to raise agriculture (chemical industry: production will increase [by] about 100,000 t. artificial fertilizers and will surpass 300,000 t.), the electro-technical industry indispensable for the whole of the economy, the coal industry and so on, since there is a shortage of coal for heating in the DPRK. This winter there was not enough coal for the population, and the winter was very harsh. (The production of coal is to grow by over 300,000 t. and will reach 4,300,000 t.)

This way investment in heavy industry returns directly to the population and causes a rise in the standard of living.

Comr. Makarov stated that earnings in the budget for 1956 were higher than expenditures by about 4 billion won. In the current year, the budget amounts to about 96 billion won, i.e., 8 billion more in relation to 1956.

In principle, assistance to the DPRK from the countries of people’s democracy and the USSR ends in the current year. In Comr. Makarov’s opinion, 1958 will be a very difficult year for the DPRK from the point of view of the currency balance. Comr. Makarov asserted that already 1959 should demonstrate an active balance of foreign currency in the DPRK.

On the issue of the planned 22% growth in production for 1957, at which almost half of the growth in production is to be attained through the growth in work productivity, Comr. Makarov stated that this is possible taking into account the huge reserves lodged in the economy of the DPRK, and especially in the organization of work. Comr. Makarov also relayed that, for example: in 1956 ca. 60-70% of the workers employed in industry worked at a daily rate. In 1957 ca. 60-70% will do piecework, and so the relation will reverse.

On the issue of agriculture, Comr. Makarov stated that the very fast tempo of collectivizing the countryside in the DPRK has given birth to fears among the Soviet comrades that agricultural production may go down. These fears did not come true. The attained outcomes in the production of grains eliminated fears of this kind. The number of Korean cows and of oxen has gone down. (There is a shortage of over 300,000 oxen to guarantee tractive force in agriculture). The drop in the numbers of cattle stems from the fact that at the beginning of the organizing of the cooperative movement the Korean comrades chose to create cooperatives without giving cattle as a contribution to a cooperative by the peasants. Hence those joining cooperatives got rid of or killed cattle. The mistake has been repaired, but the results can still be felt.

In the period of the 3-year plan the farming of technical cultures dropped significantly. Comr. Makarov said that he had brought up this matter with the Korean comrades (e.g.: the area of cotton cultivation fell from 80,000 ha to 15,000). The Korean comrades maintained that they are consciously reducing the production of cotton and increasing the area of cultivation of rice because people have nothing to eat and giving rice is the most important thing. Currently the area of cultivation of technical cultures is being increased, after achievements in the sphere of grains.

For 1957 the Koreans have planned a crop of 2,950,000 t. of grains. The peasants and cooperativists have declared a further 340,000 t. of grains above the plan, after conversations with the party leadership after the December plenum. If this quantity is
reached (i.e., nearly 3,300,000), for which there are realistic possibilities as long as there are no unexpected disasters, floods or droughts, then the government of the DPRK will receive the amount of grains necessary for a free and full feeding of the population.

In this way a basis for the gradual lifting of the voucher system for food items would be created. At this moment the food situation is such that, despite the fact that more grains were harvested than in 1949, there is a shortage of grains, while in 1949 there was too much. This fact is being explained with the argument that the amount of vegetables (vegetables are the second principal food item, after rice, for feeding the population) is significantly smaller than before the war. In the area of fishing, plans are far from being executed (e.g., 80,000 t. of mackerel were to have been caught in 1956, and 4,000 were fished this shortfall could not be made up by the surplus of dories).

Apart from this, before 1950, the DPRK did not export fruit, now it is being exported. The totality of these issues combines into the fact that despite the growth of grain production, there is a shortage of grains.

From a conversation with the 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, Comr. Pimenov of 26-27-28-29.III.1957

In February, Comr. Pimenov had asked me whether he could go with me to our Mission in Panmunjon. After discussing this matter with Comr. Brzostowski, we agreed on a date to visit the mission, 26-29 March 1957.

During the journey, as well as at the destination in Panmunjon, the following issues were brought up with Comr. Pimenov:
1. The issue of groups within the leadership of the DPRK.

Comr. Pimenov brought up the issue of Heo Gai (secretary of the Central Committee), who after the 4th plenum (towards the end of the war) had been accused of wanting to appropriate power for himself in the DPRK. Heo Gai had come from the Soviet Union. The official version of Heo Gai’s shortcomings spoke of an incorrect attitude toward party discipline and an excessive removal of people from the party. Heo Gai committed suicide. The Korean comrades assessed this fact as a deed unworthy of a communist, indicating the fact that Heo Gai feared revealing secret matters that burdened him. Shortly thereafter came the issue of the minister of communications Bak Ilu, who stemmed from the activists who had previously been active on Chinese territory. This minister had been removed and isolated for a certain length of time under house arrest for his attitude to the people who had come from the Soviet Union. Then in 1955 came the case of Vice Minister of Culture Cheon Yul, who promoted that everything that is Soviet is good and right, and rejected and denied Korean cultural heritage. After the December plenum of the CC in 1955, at which Kim Il Sung sharply condemned such activity, a new Vice Minister of Culture and Science, who had finished the Higher Party School in the USSR, was named.

At the beginning of 1956 sentiments grew against Koreans who had come from the USSR. These sentiments arose among the broad masses and were born from the bottom (in Pimenov’s opinion). A consequence of these sentiments was the fact of removals from work and certain harassment of people who had arrived from the USSR. Comr. Pimenov gave as a reason for this kind of phenomena that people who had arrived from the USSR were being placed in quite well-paying positions, these people did not always behave correctly and differed in their way of life from the nation, which caused frictions. This harassment has currently quieted down, and attempts are being made to correct the harm done to people who returned from the USSR.

After the 20th Congress quite a wide group arose among party activists, which criticized the existing method of placing and educating the cadres and the absence of freedom of discussion in the party. This group spread out its activity widely during the absence of the Korean government delegation in the countries of people’s democracies. After the delegation’s return, the question of this group’s activities was presented to Kim Il Sung. It was intended to summon a plenum at the beginning of August (the delegation returned around July 20). The plenum was put off until the end of August. In this period, those persons among CC members who spoke out in favor of this group were summoned to the CC. The talks at the CC that were conducted had a specific character, with the goal of isolating the active members of the group. In the talks, pressure was exerted on the CC members so that they would not support the slogans of the group. As a consequence of this activity, at the August plenum (30 and 31 August) the members of the group were not permitted to speak at all. There was general shouting off the podium with you! Then during the second day of the plenum’s deliberations, four persons from this group fled to China. China, despite a request from the DPRK, did not send these persons back to Korea. At the August plenum, the representatives and sympathizers of this group were condemned very sternly. They were expelled from the party. A special resolution was passed on this subject. The runaways to China reached the CC of China at the time when a Party Congress was taking place in China. Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai arrived in Korea then for an unofficial visit. As a result of the talks that were conducted with the
leadership of the DPRK party, a new resolution toward the group was adopted at the September plenum of the CC of the Workers’ Party. The people removed (at the August plenum) were admitted into the party and it was agreed that both resolutions toward the group would be published in the press to allow the nation to assess the reasons for the change in position. It was also agreed that those people would not be persecuted. As Comr. Pimenov asserted, this agreement is not currently being honored in the DPRK. The press did not publish the resolutions of both plena, those who spoke up at the August plenum are being finished off by various methods (politically-administratively). Comr. Pimenov responded to the question of whether the activities of the group had died down by stating that the topic has quite died down. He then mentioned in this context that Pak Changok former Vice Premier came from the USSR and Choe Changik from China. (both were members of the Political Bureau in the DPRK presidium of the CC).

Following the September plenum, the minister of construction Gim Seunghwa was removed. The Minister of Construction had been part of that group. Because of the widespread popularity of minister Gim Seunghwa it was not dared to cause any administrative harm to him, he was sent to the higher Party School in the USSR. After the minister’s departure, articles which sharply vilified the minister appeared in the press. Comr. Pimenov stressed that it would not be strange if Gim Seunghwa were to act like Yi Sangjo (former DPRK Ambassador to the USSR), i.e., ask for asylum.

I am writing this part of my note on the basis of conversations with Comr. Pimenov during the trip to Panmunjon, as well as from the week before, when I invited Comr. Pimenov to go hunting.

2. Comr. Pimenov, traveling to Panmunjon, wished to orient himself about how the situation in the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission] presents itself in general outline, how cooperation with the Swedes and Swiss is working out and what issues are currently on the agenda in the Commission.

Minister Brzostowski provided information on this subject. Apart from this, Comr. Pimenov paid a visit to the Korean General Jeon Seongok (chairman of the Military Armistice Commission on behalf of the DPRK). General Jeon Seongok told Comr. Pimenov about his meeting with general An of South Korea (October of last year). At this meeting, which was organized with the assistance of the Swedes, several issues were discussed, including the question of reunifying Korea. Jeon Seongok assessed the meeting positively. The meeting lasted one and a half hours. It was decided then that further meetings would take place. No further meetings have taken place. Jean Seongok believes that the Americans became mixed up in the matter. The incident with the airplane from the south, which was shot down in the territory of the DPRK also had a certain influence. Jeon Seongok’s and Minister Brzostowski’s opinions on the issue of conditions present in the DPRK overlapped.

3. On the issue of Soviet advisers present in Korea, Comr. Pimenov emphasized that the Korean comrades demanded the recalling of nearly all Soviet advisers. Right now there remains an adviser from the State Commission for Economic Planning (until May, the deadline for the development of the 5-year plan) and a military adviser. The military adviser will probably be recalled shortly, and an office of Military Attache will be created.
4. Comr. Pimenov promised to relay data concerning an agreement about scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK. We will be informed what the Korean side demanded and what the USSR can offer.

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Brzeziński Henryk
signature
1st Secretary of the Embassy of the
People’s Republic of
Poland—PRP] in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 4

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]

No. 695/144/2421/57/tjn. [transl. note: most likely short for tajne, secret]

Note

From a conversation conducted on 27.8.57 with the counselor of the Embassy of the USSR, Comr. Makarov

The aim of the conversation was to gain information about the premises of the DPRK’s 5-year plan. Makarov is the main economic advisor, directs Soviet specialists in the DPRK. Makarov was in Moscow with Kim Il (vice premier) for consultations on control figures of the 5-year plan.

The 5-year plan is establishing the following general premises: a. the creation of foundations for the industrialization of the country, b. the completion of the collectivization of agriculture, c. solutions in principle to the issues of food, clothing and the issue of housing.

The five-year plan has, in contrast to the three-year plan, been developed in principle by the Korean comrades themselves (the three-year plan was developed by Soviet advisers with help from the Korean side).

The 5-year plan, as Makarov relayed it, does not presume a multifaceted development of the economy or economic independence, which at one time was reflected in the resolutions of the 3rd congress of the workers’ party.
The plan plots out the development of the economy on the basis of the existing resources and natural riches. The basic proportion between groups A and B is kept from 1956, i.e., 53:47. A growth in the countryside’s income of over 32% and in the city’s of over 29% is assumed. An average tempo for the development of industry of 19% is assumed. The overall investment outlays in the 5-year plan have been set at 152 billion won (in the three-year plan the relevant amount was around 85 billion won).

In agriculture, the achievement of 3,700,000 [transl. note: one zero too many in original, should be 3,700,000] tons of grains (in 1956, 2,870,000 tons were obtained).

The lifting of the ration card system is intended. Toward the end of the 5-year plan, the Koreans want to export a certain amount of grain. In the last years of the plan a balancing of imports and exports is expected. The nature of exports will not be subjected to more significant changes.

During the consultations in Moscow, the Korean comrades were reminded of a range of issues:

1. The Soviet comrades drew attention to the fact that too big a tempo of growth in production (19%) had been assumed, and also that 152 billion won set aside for investment would cause excessive stresses in construction, the material economy and in the workforce.

   The Korean comrades admitted that the assumed tempo of investment would lead to the indicated difficulties.

2. Attention was paid to the advisability and economic results of several of the planned construction sites. E.g., there was a plan to build yet another textile industrial complex. The consultation explained that there exists a real possibility of increasing the power of an existing industrial complex by 50%. Hence, it is not advisable to build a new complex.

   It was agreed together that the Korean comrades would broaden the cultivation of cotton to over 70,000 ha. (currently 24,000). Comr. Makarov stressed that in this way the Korean comrades will secure for themselves raw materials and help from the USSR, which supplied cotton to the DPRK.

   The plan foresaw the melting of 700,000 tons of pig iron, 600,000 t. of steel in 1961. It was stressed that this is too costly for Korea because there is no coke in the DPRK. The Korean comrades intended to construct one hydro-electric power plant and one thermal one in Pyongyang. It was advised that it would be better to exploit cascades. (An overall power of electric power plants of 2,000,000 kW is being planned. Basically the development of electric energy will progress behind the development of industry).

   All the recommendations made by the Soviet comrades were accepted. Currently, consultations are being conducted with China.

   On the question of management of industry in the 5-year plan, a further drawing close of the management organs to production is foreseen. On this occasion, comr. Makarov remarked that the leadership of the DPRK is implementing the resolutions of the 20th congress [of the CPSU CC] wisely and capably. Gradually, slightly, from the top, the results of the cult of personality are being removed. This is the only way out in Korea’s conditions, where the degree of backwardness of the masses is high.

   Kim Il Sung was a god and a tsar earlier, one cannot change this idea among the people abruptly, since this may cause undesirable, unforeseeable consequences. Kim Il Sung
strives for changes. Makarov, who often meets with Kim Il Sung in various circumstances, relayed that Kim Il Sung has changed immensely.

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2 copies Department V
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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Embassy of the
P[eople’s] Republic of P[oland] in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 5

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: stamp]

Secret [trans. note: added by hand]

No. 833/156/2421/57/tjn. [transl. note: most likely short for tajne, secret]

Note

From a conversation with comr. Pimenov 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 15.10.1957

The conversation had the goal of gaining information about the situation in the Workers’ Party in connection with the recent events regarding the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group.

Pimenov presented this matter in the following way. The Pak Changok and Choe Changik group took the floor at the August plenum of last year in the spirit of the resolutions of the 20th Congress fighting the cult of personality, raising the standard of living of the population and so on. This group was standing on the foundation of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, on the foundation of cooperation with the USSR and all the countries of people’s democracies. The Pak Changok and Choe Changik group placed its problems within the framework of the party in the discussion at the plenum. Further on, comr. Pimenov told about the course of the August plenum with the escape of the four to China and also the resolution of the September plenum, about which we already informed at the time.

The Hungarian events awakened concern among the leadership of the DPRK and suspicions regarding the further activities of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. An investigation was begun regarding the persons from this group. It was not found that
members of the group maintain contacts with one another or conduct some underground activity. In the press and in party work, a widely planned action was conducted against the group. In May and June of the current year, several professors of the Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang began to declare views close to the August group’s with accents of petit bourgeois ideology at the university. This issue stopped in the university’s party organization. Students and professors condemned the activity of the abovementioned professors. Those who had been declaring views close to the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group were excluded from the party and removed from the university. It must be stressed that this whole issue, as comr. Pimenov said, did not go outside the framework of the university, and also did not meet any sort of broader support. In July of this year, a group of mid-level activists, including also some from the Pyongyang party committee, out of fear of repressions planned to escape to China and ask for asylum, similarly to how the four did it last year after the August plenum. This group was arrested. It is believed that these people were connected in some way to the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. This event gave rise to anxiety among the DPRK leadership. An investigation and arrests began. The investigation is continuing, so far there is a lack of results and data. Pak Changok, Choe Changik and Kim Byeongi (an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Trade) have been placed under house arrest. All three remain members of the CC of the party. The outcomes of the investigation so far, about which the Korean comrades are speaking in unofficial conversations with the Soviet comrades, are as follows: the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group did not intend to achieve a coup by force or fundamental changes in policy, they aimed to gain a majority at the plenum so as to achieve a change in leadership in this way. Comr. Pimenov gave this reasoning as his opinion following talks with Korean comrades. In the opinion of Korean comrades, a certain group of people joined the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group, using the same slogans as they had voiced, and intended to make a change in the leadership by force. This group did not promote an ideological program. Some of these people were said to have aimed to bring about a Korean Poznań last year. Probably, as the Korean comrades assert, American and Syngman Rhee’s spies joined in this activity. So far, no concrete ties between the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group and spies and saboteurs have been established.

In Pimenov’s opinion, all activity aimed at achieving changes in the government by way of force was and is unrealistic because the active group was very limited in number and had no wider support from the working class or the peasantry.

In August of this year, a series of meetings was begun, and is still continuing in those ministries where arrests had been conducted or where there had been suspicions toward certain persons regarding ties to the group or their unclear stance on the question of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group, and an intensive action of raising party loyalty has been carried out. These meetings, according to comr. Pimenov, quite often have the character of moral pressure and unsophisticated criticism. There have been cases of suicides following such meetings. These meetings wrongly fire up the question of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. Recently a campaign was begun in the whole country to raise party loyalty and class upbringing.

On the issue of the new composition of the Supreme Assembly and government, comr. Pimenov asserted that the people chosen for it are not ones about whom there were suspicions that they are in any way connected to or have taken an insufficiently clear
stand on the question of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. E.g.: Gim Dubong, who, despite the fact that in January of this year at a meeting of trade employees he cut himself off from the group and condemned all factional activity, was not elected to the composition of the new government; similarly; the minister of communications, who for the past half-year had been acting minister, also did not come into the composition of the new cabinet. At this moment, as Pimenov said, no opinions or comments on the topic of the changes have been made in the new government.

In Pimenov’s opinion, and this is what is being said at the Soviet Embassy, the DPRK’s party policies and economic activities are correct. The society is supporting the party’s and government’s policies. A delegation of Soviet correspondents, after returning to Pyongyang from a trip of several weeks around the DPRK, relayed unanimous and universal voices that people are living better than during the Japanese times. Workers and peasants talked about this with the correspondents.

On the issue of this year’s crops, Pimenov said that among the DPRK leadership, one hears the figure of 3,200,000 t., which means that it is expected that less will be harvested than had been assumed (3.4 million), but enough that there will be no need for import. (350,000 t. have been imported).*

* as a comparison, we are giving the figure that the grain harvest in the previous year amounted to 2,850,000 t.

**DOCUMENT No. 6**

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]

No. 828/154/2421/57/tjn. [trans. note: most likely short for tajne, secret; added by hand]

**Note**
From a conversation with comr. Pelishenko Counselor of the Embassy of the USSR on 22.X.1957

Pelishenko is in close contact with leading personalities of the DPRK and is well-oriented in the overall picture of issues in the DPRK.

The conversation aimed to gain information on the issue of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. Pelishenko believes that the matter of the group ought to be examined against a background of the general situation in the party and in the country. The party and government conducted a whole range of positive steps last and this year. In the autumn of last year, elections were held to the local People’s Assemblies. The elections were organized well and brought good results. This year, after 9 years, elections were held for the Supreme People’s Assembly. The leadership of the DPRK clearly strengthened its authority and its ties to the public. An all-Korean discussion about the draft five-year plan was conducted. In agriculture, a new, better structure of sowing was introduced. One could give more examples testifying to the correct domestic policies of the DPRK.

An exchange of party cards has been conducted in the party, from May of this year a campaign of strengthening and raising class upbringing is being conducted. In the sphere of foreign policy, achievements are also noted. Certain trade contacts have been made with Japan, Burma, Indonesia. So that in the totality of areas one observes a strengthening of the party and government, strengthening of unity in the party. It is against the background of these achievements that one must analyze the issue of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. Pelishenko stated that the leadership of the DPRK believes that issues raised by the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group did not fit into the party framework. He did not give his own view of this subject.

Pelishenko stated that some of the persons from the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group (Pak Changok, a Korean who came from the USSR, Choe Changik from China) brought up the question of a Korean Poznań at the August plenum this year.

Following the known position taken by the Workers’ Party leadership toward the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group at the August and September plena, the whole process of escapes to China began.

It is Pelishenko’s opinion that the group’s main organizers are in China. The process of escapes to China lasted until January 1957. In this period the minister of internal trade was one of the people who escaped. In 1957 no further escapes to China were observed. Pelishenko assesses the pronouncements of a small group of professors (not many over 10 persons) at the university in Pyongyang as hostile, reactionary. According to Pelishenko, three persons were arrested. Then in June and July a certain group of the mid-level activists escaped to China.

The investigation that is being conducted in the DPRK in connection with the suspicions of the activities of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group has so far rendered no results. In Pelishenko’s opinion, this group’s activity is of a character that is purely internal for North Korea. It is a result of Korean conditions, of a composite, complex character. The DPRK leadership is attempting to approach this matter cautiously so as not to cause distortions. At the same time, the fact is being taken into account that a change needed to be made in the position of the general prosecutor, for a bad carrying out of the amnesty. (It was necessary to re-arrest some of those who had been let go from the
Jindallae organization. See note No. 616/134/2421/57/tjn – we are entering an amendment to that note in which we had written the name of this organization inaccurately as Czindale).

The DPRK leadership is trying to carry out only a few arrests. In Pelishenko’s opinion the main arrests are carried out in the ministry of culture and education, as well as the ministry of construction. Pelishenko denied that broader arrests are being carried out in the Office of the Council of Ministers. In his opinion, one person has been arrested in the Office of the Council of Ministers.

The campaign of meetings is being conducted in those ministries where there are people connected to the group. At this moment one cannot gauge the situation relating to the activities of the group from the lack of data from the investigation.

Pelishenko stated that in his view China does not intend to hand over the escapees. At some point the Korean side brought up this matter. The talks ended without a result. The Korean side will not bring up this matter a second time.

At the end of the conversation Pelishenko stated that the DPRK is conducting preparations for a party conference related to the passage of the 5-year plan.

On the issue of production of textiles, in Pelishenko’s opinion in the DPRK [illegible figure] of cotton cloth per capita [last eight words are illegible].

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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 7

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]

No. 980/165/2421/57/tjn. [trans. note: most likely short for tajne, secret]

Note

From a conversation with the deputy director of the economic office at the Embassy of the USSR comr. Botsin on 16.XI.1957
The conversation aimed to gain economic information about the DPRK for the 4th quarter of 1957.

On the question of the 5-year plan, Botsin stated that China recommended an increase in investment in agriculture, pay keener attention to the development of agriculture and above all an expansion of the irrigation system. China recommended creating a state monopoly in the acquisition of agricultural products. This matter has already been implemented.

In Botsin’s opinion, three weak points are clearly emerging in the DPRK’s economy: 1. a shortage of cotton, 2. a shortage of pig iron and iron rod, 3. a shortage of coking coal.

The Korean industry, Botsin claimed, has so far been working without the scientific examination of reserves of its natural assets. None of the branches of industry has data for what period it is protected by domestic reserves. Soviet geologists have examined and created appropriate maps covering 15,000 km sq. Presently negotiations are underway for 20 Soviet geologists to continue further research in the next two years.

The Soviet Union is to deliver to the DPRK and assemble the complete equipment for a rolling mill. This investment will safeguard the DPRK’s economy, its construction [industry] with a sufficient amount of construction iron rod.

The government of the DPRK intends to raise expenditures for construction from the state budget from 22% to 27%.

The Soviet Union, on the basis of a request from the Korean government, will build a penicillin factory in Korea.

During our conversation we agreed that I will send concrete questions regarding statistical data for the 3rd quarter of 1957. Botsin stressed that production data in the DPRK vary a lot. The Embassy of the USSR relies on data from the DPRK Statistical Office.
Note

From a conversation with comr. Berentz, 3rd Secretary of the Embassy of the GDR of 26-27.XI of this year

Berentz was interested in the question of Polish aid to the DPRK and the situation in the DPRK. I relayed these issues to my conversation partner according to instructions from the Ambassador.

In 1953-55, the GDR has given assistance to the DPRK in the amount of 350 million rubles. In the second phase of assistance, in 1955-1964, another 350 mil. rubles, with a distribution of 35,000,000 annually. At this moment the DPRK is incapable of using 35,000,000 rubles of assistance annually. I.e., the DPRK is incapable of delivering the appropriate number of people and construction materials.

The GDR assistance is designated for the construction of the city of Hamhung and construction of several factories in that city. The situation is such that after the assistance is finished, Hamhung will look like an oasis (Berentz’s term) vis-à-vis the rest of the country. The Koreans have come to the GDR government with a request to shift a part of the GDR’s assistance to other cities in Korea. The government of the GDR has not accepted this request. The government of the GDR has agreed to extend the assistance for a further two years, but on the condition that the whole assistance will be devoted to the city of Hamhung.

Berentz informed me about the methods of the security apparatus of the DPRK being used vis-à-vis the leading Korean persons in Hamhung who are suspected of participation in the activities of the August group (the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group). Security functionaries came to the Director of the construction trust in Hamhung and ordered the director to write about his ideology. The director wrote in a room that had been closed off by the security functionaries. After some time the security functionaries entered the room, read what the director had written. After the reading, the director was told “we know more about you, so write again.” This process lasted several weeks toward some people. In the meantime, arrests of some people were carried out, while some wrote about their ideology and worked. In this situation, according to Berentz, there were cases of suicide (by hanging).

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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the P[olska] R[zeczpospolita] L[udowa—People’s Republic of Poland] Embassy in the DPRK
DOCUMENT No. 9

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp]

No. 984/169/2421/57/tjn. [trans. note: most likely short for tajne, secret; added by hand]

Note

From a conversation with Botsin, the deputy director of the economic office at the Embassy of the USSR on 30.XI.1957

Botsin gave me some statistical data about the DPRK. (we will send the data by courier.) Keeping in mind that we receive the data not from the Koreans and that this data is treated as secret in the DPRK, we ask that these materials not be distributed more widely.

Botsin said that the USSR’s help for the DPRK ends in 1959. With the help of the USSR, about 30 large and mid-size factories have been built. 12 more factories remain to be built. This year, 9 have been put into use. All the factories built with the USSR’s assistance surpass the planned productive power, which in Botsin’s opinion speaks very well for the Korean specialists and workers.

In December, said Botsin, the 4th Soviet-Korean session on the question of scientific-technical cooperation will take place (the question of the realization of the pertinent Polish-Korean agreement has not budged). The Koreans presented the following issues for the session: the USSR’s assistance to build weaving machines and machines for the silk industry. What specialists the USSR will accept for 1959 and so on.

Botsin claims that the Soviet comrades will counsel against the construction of a machine factory. They will counsel [in favor of] the construction of factories of spare parts for these machines.

This Korean request, in my opinion, shows that there still exist tendencies in the DPRK to build industry that is comprehensively developed. Botsin said that there are not the conditions yet in the DPRK to build this kind of quite complicated and precise machine. Later on, he stated that a year ago the USSR relayed to the DPRK technological documentation for 45 factories for new kinds of production. This matter was not touched by the Korean industry for the whole year. Botsin thinks that this is happening because of a shortage of appropriate cadres in the DPRK.

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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
From a conversation with Chen Wen Chin, 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the PRC of 6.XII.1957

The conversation aimed to gain information about the PRC’s remarks on the issue of the DPRK’s 5-year plan.

The consultation in China on the issue of the 5-year plan of the DPRK began on 12.IX.57 and lasted over 20 days. Heading the delegation from the DPRK side was Kim Il (Vice Premier who had also been in the USSR on similar business), from the PRC one of the Vice Premiers.

The delegation worked in two groups:
1. group discussed the 5-year plan,
2. group discussed issues of trade in the 5-year plan.

About the 5-year plan the main currents of the plan, tempo, the balance sheet, industry-agriculture, some norms were discussed. In the discussions, the Chinese relied above all on the experiences of their own 5-year plan. The Chinese side deems the general outline of the DPRK’s 5-year plan as appropriate and useful. This was rationalized by the fact that the plan had been developed with the backing of their own base and forces. The plan foresees securing the economy with resources and raw materials. On the basis of their own experiences, the Chinese informed the Koreans that agriculture has a big influence in solving general tasks of the economy. The speed of the development of agriculture strongly influences the speed of the development of industry. The Chinese informed [the Koreans] that in the period of their 5-year plan, the year 1955 had very good crops and the years 1954 and 1956 were bad. Because of this, supplies were lower in China in those years, which was reflected in industry, and financial profits diminished. The Chinese believed that on the basis of their own experience they learned the importance of agriculture. In the second 5-year plan the development of various
branches of industry and agriculture will be done. In industry, pressure will be placed on the development of those branches that influence the development of agriculture. In the first 5-year plan, the Chinese planned to invest 5.7% of overall investment in agriculture. In practice, 8% was invested. 12% is being foreseen for the second 5-year plan.

The Chinese recognized the assumed speed of development of agriculture in the Korean plan as active, but at the same time deemed the investment as insufficient.

On the issue of the development of industry in Korea, the Chinese indicated that the shortage of some raw materials should be noticed. Apart from that, in the Chinese opinion one should not build those branches of industry that are not indispensable to the country’s economy and at the same time the export of that production is difficult. (I think that here it was a question of the machine and precision industries).

In the opinion of the Chinese, long-term plans should be developed on the basis of proven data.

The realization of the first 5-year plan in China has demonstrated that bad years in agriculture were not appreciated, as a result of which there were difficulties in China. In construction, too many resources have been put into non-productive construction. This shortcoming had not been anticipated.

In the area of culture and education, it is being currently considered in China that education, especially higher education, should be developed on the basis of progressing development of industry and agriculture. In other words, the development of industry and agriculture should be the basis for the appropriate development of education.

The Chinese said that some underappreciated improving the population’s living standards. In this area, one should take great caution to make sure that the appropriate mass of goods be found on the market together with an increase in wages.

The Chinese asserted that the slogan “through the growth in work and production output to the rise in the standard of living” had been unclear, and in particular cases led to misunderstandings (e.g., in those factories where output of work and production really did grow, and the general situation did not allow for an appropriate rise in the standard of living).

The Chinese counseled [the Koreans on] planning an increase in the standard of living for the long period, that is, a 5-year plan on the basis of the most justified foundations. Better to plan a lower increase in the standard of living. It is better to go over the planned growth than not to fulfill promises.

The Chinese stressed that to raise the standard of living, agriculture is of the utmost importance. They cautioned [the Koreans] to count on and be cognizant of the possibility of bad crop years.

The Chinese recommended watching the balance of raw materials and the market for production. It was advised that the government always have the possibility of supporting agriculture.

On the question of trade, the Koreans asked for the delivery of some of the goods that are unprofitable in China. The Chinese government has in mind aid to Korea and in this sphere has reached an agreement with the DPRK. In the talks, the basic quantities of the more important goods which will be delivered by China in the course of the next 5 years were set. In 1958 China will deliver 700,000 t. of coking coal and 170,000 t. of brown coal. 30,000 t. of coke, 30,000 t. of soy (this quantity will fully satisfy the DPRK’s needs).
The Koreans withdrew the import of grains.

5,500 t. of sulphur, 3,300 t. of rubber (it was requested) 3,100 t. will be delivered. The Koreans asked for 12,000 t. of cotton. As we know, China has not fulfilled the goals of the 5-year plan in the production of cotton, hence they will deliver 8,000 t. for 1958 to the DPRK. They asked for 1,500 t. of cotton yarn: 500 t. will be delivered. They asked for 10,000,000 of cotton fabric, 5,000,000 will be delivered. In 1959 China will deliver the same amount of coal and coke to the DPRK as in 1958. Sulphur in 1959-61 on the level of 1958. Here, it was suggested that the Koreans exploit their own pyrite. In 1959 the deliveries of cotton and cotton yarn will be reduced. In 1960 deliveries of cotton will be halted. Small amounts of yarn and textiles. In 1959-61 rubber on the level of 1958. It was agreed that world prices will be adhered to in trade.

The Chinese promised to take into account further Korean wishes as they develop their own second 5-year plan. The Koreans suggested to China the signing of a long-term trade treaty. The Chinese recommended that this issue be put off until the second 5-year plan is developed in China.

In the course of the later general conversation Chen Wen Chin said that at one point the Koreans asked China to build the following complete factories: a tannery, a factory for glass vessels, a factory for silk and a factory of perfume production.

China pointed to concrete possibilities of using the Korean production power, and the Korean side no longer mentions the construction of the above-mentioned factories.

Chen Wen Chin gave the following as the more important steps in the economic sphere that have recently been taken by the DPRK: 1. the lifting of the ration card system (except rice); 2. the creation of a state monopoly in buying and selling grains; 3. the strengthening of oversight over private trade.

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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the P[olska] R[zeczpospolit]a

L[udowa—People’s Republic of Poland] Embassy
in the DPRK
Note conc[erning] the political situation in the DPRK

According to] the information of the People’s Republic of Poland Embassy in the DPRK coming from the Koreans and the diplomatic corps, the means of repression of persons connected to the so-called “August group” (a group under the leadership of former members of the Politbureau of the CC of the Korean Workers’ Party, Pak Changok and Choe Changik, which took the floor at the CC Plenum in August of last year with a criticism of the DPRK party and government leadership – the cult of personality, distortions of inner-party democracy, a low standard of living – and strove for a change in the leadership, having prepared the composition of a new government
with Choe Changik at the helm. Some of the members of the group fled to China after the Plenum and presumably remain there. The former DPRK ambassador to the USSR, Li Sangjo who was connected to the group has refused to return and probably remained in the Soviet Union. According to a different version, he is at the party school in Beijing. He has developed his activity among students and Korean citizens in the USSR) have been sharpened.

Even though the Korean comrades continue to say that the August group did not represent a larger force and did not have broader influence, the facts seem to point to the fact that a part of the intelligentsia, young writers, students and employees of the party and state apparatuses backed the group. But there is a lack of data that would show that the group had support from the working class and the peasantry.

The quite far reach of the group’s influence, as well as the recently noticed certain broadening of their influence (in May and June, a small group of professors pronouncing views close to the views of the “August group” spoke up at the University in Pyongyang. These professors were excluded from the party and removed from the University), have led the authorities of the DPRK to undertake repressive methods toward the people connected to it. A number of arrests and changes in the central offices were conducted, especially in those where the people from the “August group” were at the top (in the Office of the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Culture, Construction and the University). The arrests also included provincial centers. House arrest was implemented toward Pak Changok and Choe Changik. Kim Dubong, former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, was removed from state activity.

Meetings are being conducted in government offices and institutions with the goal of explaining the party’s policies and the anti-party activity of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group. These meeting quite often serve as moral pressure, and cases of suicide have even been noted as a result of them. Currently, until March 1958, a campaign of raising party loyalty will be conducted in the whole party.

As a result of the repressive action among party activists and state employees, fear of arrest has begun to spread, which has led to the organization of a number of attempts to escape to the PRC (the last one took place in October of this year), where some of the main organizers of the “August group” are staying. According to the Soviet comrades, the PRC does not intend to hand over the escapees to the DPRK, despite the talks on this subject, which the Koreans have initiated.

Currently, an investigation of the case of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group is being conducted. The results so far are as follows. The group did not intend to bring about a coup or fundamental changes in policy by force, it intended to gain a majority at the CC Plenum so as to bring about changes in the leadership in this way. In the opinion of Korean comrades, a particular group of people, who had the intention of changing the leadership by force, not stating any ideological program, took advantage of this. Last year, some of these people were to have aimed to bring about a “Korean Poznań.” Indeed, the “August group” possessed a storm unit made up of students of the Institute of Construction (the Institute’s building is located next to the CC), but apart from that no preparations of a military character have been ascertained, and the investigation did not so far show connections between members of the group and foreign intelligence organizations or saboteurs.
Analyzing the issue of the so-called “August group” against the overall political situation in the DPRK, one should conclude that currently it does not represent any important problem, since the internal situation in the DPRK is stabilizing increasingly. The latest decisions of the government and party leadership, such as striving to strengthen ties to the masses and attempts aimed at raising the standard of living, have strengthened the position of the current leadership.

/-/ Słuczański

DOCUMENT No. 12

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang

Pyongyang, 17.XII.57

No. 20/12/2421/58/tjn

SECRET

Note

From conversations with Pimenov, 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, on 16.XII.1957

The conversation had as its goal gaining information about the Workers’ Party Plenum CC plenum.

Pimenov did not know about the critique of the former minister of coal industry. As for other people (see note No. 22/14/2421/58/tjn), he confirmed the facts of the critique by the plenum.

At the beginning Pimenov briefly described the speech by Kim Il Sung. He stressed that the proposals presented in the speech regarding the unification of Korea bring nothing new but represent a systematization of the total of previous proposals. (we will send the text of the speech by the next courier). A broad group of party activists were invited to the plenum. The plenum lasted two days. After Kim Il Sung’s speech, Bak Geumcheol, vice-chairman of the party, took the floor. In a very detailed way, Bak Geumcheol recounted his impressions from his trip to Moscow on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the revolution. He devoted a significant part of his speech to the issues of the August group. Bak Geumcheol criticized Bak Uiwan (Uiwan simply means the Russian name Ivan) very sharply for supporting and cooperating with the August group. For supporting former minister Gim Seunghwa and his policies in construction. Bak Geumcheol equally sharply criticized the former minister of purchases, O Giseok for his speeches against some members of the CC of the People’s Party. Pimenov said that Gim Dubong was also criticized. Gim Dubong was criticized also for wanting to send a
letter to the brotherly parties asking them to grant assistance because the situation in the Workers’ Party was difficult.

Gim Dubong took part in the discussion and said that he would accept all party punishment and in the future would not spare his life for the cause of the revolution. Basically, as Pimenov said (Pimenov talked about the plenum with several persons who had been at the plenum), Gim Dubong did not deny the accusations regarding his ties to the group. Further discussants gave examples that the group aimed to overthrow the government with the help of using force. Hence calls came from the hall to take the issue to court. Bak Uiwan took part in the discussion twice. Bak Uiwan’s speech is considered unsuccessful. The assembly reacted to Bak Uiwan’s words unfavorably. Voices of “confess” and so forth came from the hall. Bak Uiwan’s speeches were often interrupted with various rejoinders. Pimenov did not confirm the fact of calling out “off the podium” about which I wrote in the note No. 22/14/2421/58/tjn/. Bak Uiwan did not accept the critique. He did not agree with the accusations being made. Bak Uiwan, after Ko Bonggi (former secretary of Pyongyang) admitted that he had wrongly criticized Bak Geumcheol and Han Doosan (former director of the organizational department of the CC, currently chairman of Trade Unions after the escape of Seo Hwi).

In this particular case, the question is like this: toward the end of 1955 and in early 1956, following the correct critique (in Pimenov’s opinion) of mistakes in the cultural policies of the DPRK conducted by vice-minister Cheon Yul and others, this policy consisted of a mechanical copying of the cultural policy of the USSR. Funny things happened. E.g., in the geography textbooks of the USSR it was written that Mongolia lies to the south-east of the USSR, the same was copied in Korea’s textbooks. If the repair of this policy was necessary and right, then in the process of change of this policy a campaign of persecuting Korean citizens who had come to Korea from the USSR was developed. A wrong and broad political campaign aimed against innocent people developed. Bak Uiwan had at one time criticized Bak Geumcheol and Han Doosan for taking no steps to sever this wrong and harmful campaign aimed against Korean citizens who had arrived from the USSR (Bak Uiwan also came from the USSR, he is included in the so-called Russian group. At one time in Korea one included oneself in one of the following groups: the Korean, Chinese, Russian, Kim Il Sung, Japanese – those who had come from Japan and the South Korean).

At the last plenum, Ko Bonggi said that the whole campaign had been organized by Choe Changik and Pak Changok, as well as persons connected to them. At the same time, Choe Changik and Pak Changok collected appropriate shocking facts from this campaign and presented them to some persons from the DPRK leadership with the goal of creating discrepancy in the leadership of the DPRK. This is why Bak Uiwan in his speech referring to facts presented by Ko Bonggi deemed criticism of him [illegible] on the given issue by Geumcheol and Han Doosan. Bak Uiwan did not accept the other accusations. Bak Uiwan reserved for himself the right to speak at the Presidium of the CC. Kim Il Sung took the floor in the discussion. This speech by Kim Il Sung was not recorded on tape. Kim Il Sung assessed the group in the following way: the group was broken up already last year. The group possessed no ideological platform, the group was guided by careerist goals. Kim Il Sung suggested interrupting the discussion about the matter of the group because it is not polite to discuss the issue of such a group at such a festive plenum. Kim Il Sung announced that the CC Presidium will examine the new
facts that were presented by the plenum. On the question of assessment of the activity of
the group, Kim Il Sung recommended a precise examination of the facts without any
impatience and nervousness. Pimenov noticed that Kim Il Sung did not use the terms
used by the press about the group, such as: traitors of the revolution, enemies, and so on.
To the Soviet comrades, Kim Il Sung’s assessment seems reasonable.

On the question of Kim Dubong, Pimenov stated that Kim Dubong had at one
time been the secretary of the New Democratic Party. Kim Dubong therefore had not
been a communist.

On the matter of Cheon Dontaek (counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs),
Pimenov states that Cheon Dontaek was one of the responsible employees in
the sphere of culture. The party punishment which he received (about which I write in
note No…………........ [trans. note: number not filled in] was for mistakes in cultural policy,
for which he was co-guilty (Cheon Dontaek had come from the USSR).

Pimenov stated that a few months ago the Counselor of the DPRK Embassy in
Czechoslovakia had been recalled for taking an erroneous position on the question of the
cult of personality. This Counselor, Koh Jeongmin is currently working at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs as a clerk.

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Department V
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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 13

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland
in Pyongyang [trans. note: stamp]
No. 14/6/2421/58/tjn [trans. note: added by hand; tjn probably means tajne, secret]

Top secret [trans. note: added by hand]

Note

From a conversation with the director of a department in one of the ministries on
5.I.1958*

The director, in the course of our conversation, following my report on the
subject of democratic centralism in our party, told me about the relations existing among
the Korean comrades. The director stated that both at a course in the CC and in individual conversations among Korean comrades, language and formulations from Kim Il Sung’s speeches or articles in the newspapers are used most of all. At the course in the CC one must strongly follow the official formulations, and in no case may one use one’s own words even while maintaining the official contents, if one does not want to be exposed to harsh criticism. From the top, the director asserted, great stress is placed on using the very political language that is included in official speeches or in the press. An independent way of thinking and one’s own interpretation of particular political theses is sharply criticized and viewed badly. The atmosphere is of the kind that the comrades closely watch their own remarks in conversations among themselves. In case of deviation from official pronouncement, the case is brought up at a meeting of the party organization or, as is the case at the course in the CC, at party workshops. There are quite common cases of comrades taking notes on such individual conversations and, if a gaffe is noticed, the matter is placed before a party meeting. There is no freedom in conversations with comrades, claimed the director. This situation is difficult. People do not like this situation. Not liking this situation especially are those who by nature are more open… In the party and in private life it would be unthought-of to express the smallest critique or to express doubts regarding the correctness of this or that party directive from the party or the government.

If one does critique, then along the lines of the formulations used in official speeches. I.e., first one needs to point to a large number of achievements and then criticize what is officially being criticized. If one does not want to be deprived of the means of support and of all perspectives for the future, including removal from Pyongyang, one must act this way only. The director gave the example of a professor from the pedagogical institute, who spoke out with his own interpretation (which was in accordance in content with the officially given thought) of some political theses; he was removed from his work, and a great problem of the improper behavior by the professor was created. For this reason, as the director stated, he does not speak freely on political subjects with his own wife, fearing that these issues may go further.

The director, who has been a party member for 7 years, stated that the foundation of the case which is decisive in the promotion of a given worker to a responsible position is membership in the Workers’ Party. And also, for higher positions one must have party service going back to 1945 or 1948 or 1947.

In the ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, with the exception of a few technical employees, all are party members.

* for details see document No. 38/1/2421/58/tjn.
Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang, 13.I.1958

No. [illegible] /2421/58/tjn [trans. note: added by hand; tjn probably means tajne, secret]

SECRET[trans. note: tilted stamp]

**Note**

From a conversation with the director of the industry department of the CC Ko Hwiman on 13.I.1958

The conversation aimed to gain information about the economic figures for 1957. Ko Hwiman stated that at the end of February or beginning of March of this year a conference of the Workers’ Party will take place with the goal of passing the 5-year plan (1957-1961).

In March a plenum of the CC will take place on the issue of internal trade. At this moment in Pyongyang and other cities, numerous committees are working to collect the appropriate materials.

A CC plenum is being planned for June on the subject of broadening the assortment of production of goods of mass need. Ko Hwiman stated that in the DPRK currently, several thousand various types of goods are being produced. This situation is far from sufficient. This amount represents only a few % of the whole requirement. A range of simple items is missing from the market today. The city and the country surely cannot constantly buy cotton, silk materials, linen and rubber shoes – which are being produced currently in relatively large numbers. The shortage of many goods may slow down interest in the growth of production in the countryside. Apart from this, already now the countryside possesses so much money that it does not quite know what to spend it on. Hence the broadening of the assortment of goods and the growth of production have a decisive significance for raising the standard of living in the city and in the countryside and generally for the further development of the DPRK. Against this background, the bad work of the ministry of foreign and domestic trade (a single ministry) emerged very sharply. Ko Hwiman stated that in the course of the last year the raising of hogs developed significantly. In 1957 the number was reached that had been planned for the end of the 5-year plan (because of this, the goal in this sphere was doubled to 1,500,000 heads). The countryside possesses large numbers of domestic fowl, eggs and so on.
Basically, the headage shows that the population of the DPRK can be given the proper amounts of meat. The bad work of trade stands as an obstacle to the realization of this possibility. Trade does not buy up goods from the countryside. The reasons are various. Apart from bad work, there are reasons such as the shortage of warehouses and means of transportation. It often happens that the purchased goods spoil from the lack of appropriate warehouses or also succumb to spoilage as a result of the shortage of means of transportation. This issue is very relevant with the sale of fresh fish (although recently, for a while, when private business existed one could buy fresh fish in Pyongyang). This year, for the first time, fish are being sold in unlimited quantities in port towns and surrounding areas, and their price is very low (10 won for a kilogram; this means that for the price of a packet of cigarettes one will be able to buy 5 kg. of fish). This is happening because in 1957 the catch of fish and sea products amounted to 590,000 t., i.e., almost as much as had been intended to be reached in 1959 (600,000 t.). Ko Hwiman listed these figures from memory: I believe that these numbers can be considered to be reliable save for only insignificant differences. Therefore the issue of trade and broadening of assortment of products are the priority tasks for which the DPRK’s economic policy should find solutions.

On the issue of fulfilling the plan for 1957, Ko Hwiman stated that the plan had been fulfilled by 142% (additional commitments are already included in this). All the ministries have fulfilled the plan. All the ministries (except two) have also fulfilled additional production obligations. The year 1957 brought the state 17,600,000,000 won over the planned income (in this, the ministry of light industry 7,000,000 won). Of these 17,600,000,000 won, 3,000,000,000 are designated for an average 10% pay raise. The population will gain another 2,000,000,000 [won] from the lowering of the prices of meat and milk (the lowering of the prices of meat almost 30%, milk 50%). Therefore the state is entering a new economic year with an additional income of 12,600,000,000 won. This money will be much needed as a reserve, and some of it will be devoted to social-cultural goals. In Korea a large obstacle in the development of the whole of industry is the shortage of coking coal. Ko Hwiman stated that the USSR is unable to deliver coking coal to the DPRK, China will lower the deliveries, so that coking coal represents a narrow place in the DPRK economy. The government has summoned a group of academics to extract [illegible] from Korean coal. This issue has still not been resolved. There are certain achievements already, which have been relayed to the USSR recently during a scientific-technical session (it is a question of adding iron ore during the making of coke).

In Ko Hwiman’s opinion, taut production goals are not being assumed for 1958. The planned growth in production is to amount to 22.1% in relation to the actual level from 1957. Ko Hwiman stated that it is better to go over the plan and give the workers the possibility of meeting the plan and obtaining bonuses than not to meet the plan’s goals (the Chinese argument).

No construction of new factories in new branches of industry will be assumed in 1958. The construction of factories that have already been started needs to be finished. The construction of a few cooling plants and two or three factories for processing corn into grits and corn flour is being planned. In January a reporting-electoral campaign is being conducted in enterprises in party organizations (in February in only two branches of industry). The campaign, in which the entire DPRK leadership and the central activists
are taking part, has as its goal maintaining the same speed of production as December 1957. The Koreans do not want to allow the commonly known drop in production at the beginning of the year.

On the issue of the 5-year plan, Ko Hwiman stated that if the tempo of work from 1957 is maintained, the plan will be achieved in 4 years and 2 months.

The year 1957 was very difficult in the financial sphere. But the economic results give good prospects for resolving difficulties also in this area.

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Dep[artment] V
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Brzeziński Henryk
[trans. note: followed by signature]
1st Secretary of the P[olska] R[eczpospolita]

L[udowa—]
People’s Republic of Poland] Embassy
in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 15

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

DEP[artment] V 3 February 1958

SECRET [trans. note: stamp]

Comrade Minister
M. Naszkowski
in-house

Note reg[arding] the political situation in the DPRK

In December of last year, a Plenum of the CC KWP took place and was devoted to the report of the delegation of the Korean Workers’ Party to the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow.

The issue of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group, accused of attempting to change the leadership during Kim Il Sung’s stay in Europe in 1956, was revisited at the Plenum.

The former Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Dubong, was criticized for ties to this group, and (for the first time) analogous accusations were made vis-à-vis the v[ice]-premier Bak Uiwan (he is in charge of construction matters).

Following a motion by Kim Il Sung, the discussion about matters of the group was interrupted, transferring newly revealed facts to be examined by the Presidium of the CC.
Kim Il Sung, in his speech, assessed the situation as follows: the group had been broken up already in 1956, it had no ideological platform and had been made up of careerists. All new facts must be examined precisely and without a nervous rush. In his speech, Kim Il Sung did not use expressions used by the Korean press of the kind: traitors of the revolution, enemies and so on.

In January of this year, Kim Il Sung had a briefing for the whole CC apparatus. This time he stated that the dispersion of the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group was the same kind of watershed moment for the party and the DPRK as the year 1946 had been, when the foundations of the democratic people’s state were being built. He stated that the concept of the revisionists, according to whom the most important problem in Korea were the contradictions within the people, had been dealt with, when the most important one is the antagonistic contradiction of socialism-imperialism.

According to information of the PRL Embassy in Pyongyang, repressions against people suspected of connections to the “August group” are continuing.

As the Embassy informs, the campaign of party meetings, at which the cases of people tied to the Pak Changok and Choe Changik group are discussed, which has been going on for several months has caused tension in the party, which influences the totality of life in the DPRK.

Dep[artment] V is proposing the foll[owing] distribution list:
(This note would be distributed not as an internal [illegible word], but in among our own.

[trans. note: barely legible signature]
Receiving:
Comr. Cyraniewicz
Comr. Gomułka
Comr. Jędrychowski
Comr. Loga-Sowiński
Comr. Morawski
Comr. Ochab
Comr. Rapacki
Comr. Zambrowski
Comr. Zawadzki
Comr. Albrecht
Comr. Gierke
Comr. Jarosiński
Comr. Kliszko
Comr. Matwin
Comr. Wierblowski
Comr. Dłuski
Comr. Czesak
Comr. Naszkowski
Comr. Winiewicz
Comr. Wierna
Comr. Ogrodziński
DOCUMENT No. 16

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

As long as the correspondence abstract is not an appendix to the documents of a given case, it must be absolutely destroyed. Top secret!

Correspondence abstract No. 3336 [trans. note: number filled into a preexisting form] from Pyongyang [city filled in] on 19.3.58 [date filled in]

Comr. Słuczański

Comr. Siedlecki informs us in telegram No. 70 of the 18th of this month Our 68th.

Agenda of the March conference:
1. Guidelines of the 5-year plan.
2. About the unity and cohesiveness of the party.
3. Organizational matters.

Re. 1. The fundamental task of the plan is to resolve at least in principle the problems of food, clothing and housing. Heavy industry: to develop above all those of its branches which are tied most closely to the above-mentioned issues. Here, I will give only 2 of the most important problems.

a. the construction of machines: to develop also the production of machine tools, with the exception of the more complicated ones,
b. in view of the shortage of their own raw materials for the textile industry, to develop the production of synthetic textiles based on cellulose and calcium carbide. Light industry: as its main task, textiles, shoes, generally broaden the assortment, raise the quality. Construction program: 10 million square meters in the cities and 200 thousand houses in the countryside. The global value of industrial production grows 2.6 times. The minimal crop plan for ’61 is 3 million 760 thousand tons. Transportation becomes a bottleneck. Because of this, the only factory mentioned during the information [session] was Wonson, where Poland is helping to organize the production of new train cars. Another plenum will be convened before the summer, devoted to reorganizing trade, which has become another bottleneck in the development of the totality of the economy. Shortly, a session of the parliament [Supreme People’s Assembly] will take place, to make a resolution about the harvest.

Kim Il Sung, among other things, stated the 8 basic economic indicators foreseen for 1961 and stated that all, with the exception of steel, are higher than the corresponding indicators for Japan of 1955.” [trans. note: no visible opening quotation marks]
Re. 2. Factionalism, particularism, sectarianism, cliquishness led to the closing down of the party long before liberation. In the North, after liberation a battle was fought with this. The defeat of these manifestations of bourgeois ideology is the “main task of our time.” There was no such battle in the South. This is why the party was shattered there during the war, and the further outcomes of this harmful behavior should have been closed down then in the North. Until recently, there existed the belief that there are no revisionists in the DPRK. The August group was a manifestation of revisionism. It is symptomatic that its activity occurred in the period of the reaction’s attacks against the international workers’ movement and against the USSR. From the ideological angle, the factionalists:

a. denied the leading role of the party in favor of the Front of National Unity and Trade Un[ions], for example, they assumed that the FNU, and not the party, is the decisive authority for the army. They spoke up against the “excessive interference” of the party in state matters, technology and science.

b. They spoke up against the implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They pulled former landowners and kulaks into the state apparatus. In the courts, political crimes were allowed to go unpunished by excusing the guilty with their lack of political upbringing. For example, soldiers’ who escaped to the South. The conference devoted a lot of attention to the principles of democratic centralism, intra-party discipline and democracy.

Re. 3. The August group was initially viewed as a political faction. Later, it was agreed that there had also been preparations for the use of armed force. At the conference, the principle of overseeing and criticizing sternly and punishing magnanimously was adopted. But treating people in positions of responsibility differently, that is, sternly. In their case, there can be no lack of awareness. The most guilty are to be directed to the court. 9 persons, including Kim Dubong and Bak Uiwan, were removed from the CC and the party. In their places, 9 new ones were chosen, including 3 army men: the chief of the political council, the chief of air forces and the leader of the 2nd army. 8 new candidates were chosen, among them the current ambassador to the USSR was chosen. The auditing committee was also fortified. Among others, the vice-minister Yi Donggon went into it. Kim Il Sung, chairman of the Central Commission of Party Control, and Choe Ancheon, head of the science department, were brought into the presidium. The issue of fortifying party work in the army was discussed as a separate point. It was decided to introduce party committees in the military.

Receiving:
Comr. Cyran kiewicz
Comr. Go mułka
Comr. Jędrychowski
Comr. Loga-Sowiński
Comr. Morawski
Comr. Ochab
Comr. Rapacki
Pyongyang, 18 June 1958

NOTE

[Concerning the most important data of the 5-year plan of the DPRK]

k 2421/27/58 [trans. note: added by hand]

The 5-year plan was the subject of a session at the party conference that took place in Pyongyang in March of this year. At the 3rd Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly on 9.VI-11.VI.1958, a resolution about the 5-year plan (1957-1961) for the development of the national economy of the DPRK was adopted. Compared to the extended draft 5-year plan at the party conference, the adopted resolution contains no substantive changes.

Generally, the 5-year plan sets the goal of the further strengthening of the economic foundations of socialism in the DPRK: the resolution of the problem of securing food, clothing and housing for the population. During the 5-year plan, the complete elimination of the colonial backwardness in the sphere of industry and technology, a completion of collectivization and the achievement of a full socialist transformation in industry and trade.

In the sphere of the development of industry, the need for the primacy of heavy industry with the simultaneous development of agriculture and light industry was specified, taking into account the international division of labor among the socialist countries.

It is foreseen that in the course of the 5-year plan, the global industrial production compared to 1956 will grow 2.6 times. In this, the production of the means of production 2.9 times, the production of consumer goods 2.2 times.
In the sphere of heavy industry, it was decided to develop the metallurgical, machine, chemical and construction material industries, while at the same time broadening the energy base and developing the extraction industry.

In the most important branches of industry, in accordance with the assumptions of the 5-year plan, in 1961 production should reach the following level:

1. coal          thou[sand] tons   10,000
2. pig iron      thou[sand] tons   700,000
3. steel         thou[sand] tons   670
4. metal sheeting thou[sand] tons   500
5. fertilizer    thou[sand] tons   630
6. electric energy m[illion] kW     9,700
7. electrolytic copper thou[sand] tons     8
8. electrolytic zinc thou[sand] tons     62
9. black lead    thou[sand] tons     43
10. freight cars pieces         850
11. caustic soda thou[sand] tons     32
12. cement       thou[sand] tons     2,000
13. synthetic fibers thou[sand] tons    22,000
14. fishing      thou[sand] tons     650
15. plant oils   thou[sand] tons     35
16. salt         thou[sand] tons     450

In the sphere of agriculture the goal of reaching 3,760 thousand tons of grains was removed.

During the 5-year plan, it is foreseen that irrigation equipment will be built with state resources to irrigate 75 thousand ha. of fields, with cooperative resources equipment irrigating 118 thousand ha. The problem was brought up of increasing the yield from 1 ha. of fields, e.g., out of 1 ha.: rice — 4 t. corn — 2.5 t. wheat* — 1.5 t.

In 1961, the harvest of some crops may reach the following levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cotton</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linen</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hemp</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>wool</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>tobacco</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
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In the area of rail transport, it is being assumed that in 1961 the transport of freight will grow 1.7 times in relation to 1956, motor transport 1.9 times, water transport

* Note: In the DPRK, wheat is cultivated according to the in-line system. Other plants are cultivated between its rows.
3.6 times. The construction of 350 km. of railroads, as well as the electrification of some segments of railroads, is expected. The overall sum of investment in major construction will amount to 146.5 m[illio]n won during the 5-year plan. Furthermore, it is expected that production cooperatives will expend financial resources on construction in the countryside. Investment is foreseen, first of all, in industrial construction, especially facilities for heavy industry. A broadening of housing construction in the cities and the countryside is also to take place. Several buildings, which are currently still under construction, will be put into use. Beginning the initial work on buildings planned for the second 5-year plan was brought up as a goal.

During the 5-year plan the construction of 10 m[illio]n sq. meters of housing area and 200 thou[sand] small houses in the countryside is expected. The share of the block system in the cities will grow to 75%. In industrial construction it will comprise 38%. 100 thou[sand] specialists will be educated. This includes 60 thou[sand] engineering-technical personnel. The number of workers and employees is to grow by 300 thou[sand] persons in 1961.

In the sphere of trade, an improvement in furnishing the population with consumer goods is expected. The turnover of goods in the state and cooperative trade network is to grow 2.2 times. The complete elimination of private trade is expected.

In 1961 work productivity in industry is expected to grow by 65%, and in construction by 52%. The cost of production in industry will be lowered by 29%.
other things, the question of the development of agriculture, raising the agricultural culture to a higher standard, increasing plant and animal production.

In Korea, while introducing the appropriate methods for the cultivation of soil, there exist serious possibilities of increasing plant production, and even of overtaking many countries that are currently more developed in the sphere of agriculture, in this area.

One can observe various directions of work aimed at raising the effectiveness of Korean agriculture. Thus, for example, 1. a selection is being conducted for the expansion of the area for the cultivation of particular crops, ones that are new to the traditional Korean agricultural structure, among it the serious expansion of area for cultivating corn, 2. the existing methods of growing particular cultures (the “cold seedling” of rice, planting cotton in clay pots) are being improved.

3. Yet the principal direction that is of decisive significance for increasing the effectiveness of agriculture is the increasing of the area of irrigated fields for cultivating rice.

For this reason, it is in this very direction that the sums devoted to the development of agriculture are being invested within the framework of state investment, and also work is being conducted with the resources of individuals or united production cooperatives.

Currently, in view of the fact that the further development of agriculture represents one of the serious elements of the overall development of the socialist national economy in Korea, the leadership of the Korean Workers’ Party and the government have reached the decision to begin the construction of the new Kaechon-Thaesong system of irrigation, which will make it possible to irrigate about 34,000 hectares of rice fields.

According to the Korean engineers’ plan, the construction of the main water canal and four distribution canals, with a joint length of 627 kilometers, was begun in May of this year.

Supplying the canal with water will be executed with the aid of electric pumps, which will pump water from the Thaesong river to the canal, 2 cubic meters of water in one second. The electric pump stations are currently in the phase of construction in the town of Kiyang.

The capacity of the tank is being calculated at 1,400 million cubic meters of water. The tank will altogether take up 360 hectares of surface on the ground. The canal’s protective embankment, i.e., the final part closing off the canal, which will at the same time form a large artificial lake, will be located in the Thaesong locality. The new irrigation system, Kaechon-Thaesong, is to guarantee the regular irrigation of 34,000 hectares of rice fields.

204 bridges with a combined length of 10 kilometers will be built over the canal. The construction of the canal together with the bridges will require 9,900,000 man-days and the transportation of over 100,000,000 cubic meters of soil.

To build the canal, 1,080,000 cubic meters of concrete, 60,000 cubic meters of cement, 50,000 cubic meters of timber and 20,000 tons of iron materials will be needed. Korea has received the machinery to be used for the work on the construction of the canal, such as excavators, loaders, bulldozers, tractors and trucks, from socialist countries as part of their economic assistance.

The canal construction employs 30 engineers and over 3,000 workers.
According to the state plan, the completion of the construction of the canal is foreseen for 1960. However, the workers have resolved to finish the construction of the canal in June 1959.

The assumptions of the party and government expect the further construction of irrigating canals in Korea.

Of the larger works, as the Embassy informed at the time, 1956-57 saw the construction (in a shortened time period) of the Anju system (South Pyongyang Province) allowing the irrigation of about 25,000 hectares of rice fields.

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Józef Knapik
[transl. note: signature]
Counselor of the Embassy of the

P[olska] R[zeczpospolita] L[udowa—

People’s Republic of
Poland—PRP] in the DPRK

DOCUMENT No. 19

Minutes of conversation between Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il-Sung
[Source: P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Archives, Document 204-00064-02 (1)]
[Obtained for NKIDP by Gregg Brazinsky and translated for NKIDP by Mengyin Kung.]

Time: 1:00 PM, 27 November 1958
Location: Xihua Hall


[Delegates from] Korea: Prime Minister Kim Il-Sung, Deputy Chairman Pak Jeongae, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nam Il, Minister of National Defense Kim Kwang-Lae, Minister of Education and Culture Lee Young-Ho, Ambassador Lee Il-Gyŏng

Interpreter: Jiang Longqiu
Note taker: Wang Shikun
Prime Minister Kim Il-Sung and the Korean delegation paid a visit the day they arrived in Beijing. Zhou invited the delegation to a luncheon in Xihua Hall of the Zhongnanhai. During the lunch, Premier Zhou asked about the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors in Korea. Prime Minister Kim Il-Sung gave a brief introduction on the situation of Korea’s food, steel, and electrical sectors this year.

Deputy Premier Peng Dehuai asked about the production in South Korea and whether there were exports. Prime Minister Kim said that parts of rice in South Korea were exported to Japan. He said that the fundamental environment in South Korea was not good and had not recovered after the destruction of war. Most of the goods and materials were imported from the United States. People could not even afford to buy some basic commodities in the market.

Deputy Premier Peng asked if there was any production of ammunition in South Korea. General Kim Kwang-Laee said that recently South Korea was preparing to build some arsenals in Busan which would produce bullets, grenades, etc. He was not sure if the arsenals were built or not. He said there were 700,000 soldiers in South Korea under Rhee Syngman’s standing army, so South Korea spent a big portion of its budget on military.

Premier Zhou mentioned the recently-signed Japanese-American Security Treaty by the Nobusuke Kishi government. He said the treaty was to misguide Japanese people. It was meant to follow West Germany, to restore Japan’s militarism, re-militarize Japan. But Japanese people suffered from the war; they were the first ones ever suffered from the damage of atomic bombs. Therefore, Japan’s socialist party and Japanese people disagreed with Kishi’s plan, which was a good thing. Premier Zhao asked Prime Minister Kim his opinion on this issue. Kim said that the United States and the Kishi administrations’ plan could never come to fruition. Although they linked everything up now, it would eventually fall apart. It is fundamentally flawed; their way would only cause everything to go in the opposite direction. It would educate Japanese people. Recently, Deputy Premier Chen Yi made a statement regarding Kishi’s plan; Japanese people welcomed and supported the statement. Foreign Minister Nam Il said, “We issued an editorial the day after reading Chen Yi’s statement. We welcomed Chen’s statement.”

Deputy Premier Peng asked whether fishermen in the south crossed the “38th parallel” recently. Kim said that in the spring, there were nine ships, around 40 people. “We invited them to visit the north, and helped them catch many fish, filled their ships, and let them go. They had a favorable impression.” Kim said, “Not only that, some journalists from the south liked to listen about construction in the north. Recently we organized a meeting in Panmunjom for journalists from the north and the south. Our journalists gave them some documents. They were very happy and brought those back. Panmunjom thus became a place for both sides to meet.” Premier, Deputy Premier Peng, Deputy Premier Chen Yi all praised this arrangement and thought this was good.
[All the delegates] also talked about some other daily life issues. The conversation continued after the luncheon.

Premier [Zhou]: Hocus pocus—this is what our country is trying to destroy—superficial beliefs. We are mobilizing people to do this. We are doing a general survey of radioactive substances in the country. We distributed 2,000 plus detectors around the country, to 20,000 plus communes to let people do it. We will keep secret the location of those places where there is a lot [of the radioactive substances], and publicize those places where there is little. [Developing] industry is not something mysterious; everyone can do it. I have some words to say: let all people develop industry; yet it is not easy. On the one hand, let everyone develop industry, but [at the same time] there need to be larger scale collective efforts. This is how we combine popularity and collectivity together.

Prime Minister Kim: This year, we’ve seen the results of China’s Great Leap Forward that destroyed superficial beliefs, as well as your success in developing handicraft industry and small-scale industry. We now have around 1,000 small-scale enterprises. Because of labor shortages, we cannot do it on a larger scale, but can only do it at county level. [We] mobilized the family members of staff to do more light industry, food industry, and daily life product industry, such as pottery and porcelain as well as cement. It is the same in the countryside. It is beneficial that farmers take advantage of their fallow time to develop steel industry. Farmers are highly motivated.

Premier: That is [true] because this helps increase production.

Kim: By doing this, it is also convenient to do irrigation work in the countryside. We’ve already constructed some small-scale hydroelectric plants. It is estimated that by next year, the electrification will be completed. Presently in Korea 36% of the countryside is still without electricity.

Premier: Your electrification development is way ahead of us.

Kim: Small-scale power plants are easy, as long as there are brooks.

Premier: That is good, walking with your own two legs [being practical]. Or else once large power plants fail, the whole countryside will be affected.

Kim: Small-scale plants are all independent.

Premier: How much of an increase will there be next year?

Kim: The Tokro River [one of the tributaries of the Yalu River/Amnok River] Hydroelectric Power Plant [which is in Kanggye, the provincial capital of Chagang, N. Korea] will be completed by next year. [There will be an] 80,000 kilowatt [increase]. [We are] recovering thermal power plants in several places; [we can increase the power generation] to 10 billion kWh by next year. [We need to] increase 8.9 billion kWh this year. Our goal is 20 billion kWh.
Premier: 20 billion kWh distributed according to the population, every ten people can have 100,000 kWh of electricity.

Deputy Premier Peng: Based on our situation, that is quite a high figure. Based on the situation in Western Europe, more is needed.

Premier: We haven’t reached 30 billion kWh this year. [We can] have 80 billion kWh next year.

Kim: We have shortcomings in terms of developing animal husbandry and cooking oil. Now we have to develop animal husbandry and vegetable cooking oil. People’s living standards continue to increase. They need not only food but also good food.

Premier: Did you have droughts this year?

Kim: Many. Very little water is left in the reservoirs. Hydroelectric plants did not have enough water [to operate]. We had very little rain this year. Elders say that this is the first time in a hundred years. According the forecast, we will have more rain next year. We are promoting energy conservation. [People are] used to wasting [electricity].

Premier: We saw that there were many lights without switches in Korea.

Kim: There were some lights that burnt coal. Now they are all gone.

Premier: Your steel production should follow [the electricity production] too.

Kim: It is estimated that iron production will reach 1 million tons next year (we have 450,000 metric tons [one metric ton equals to 1,000 kilograms] this year), and steel production 650,000 to 700,000 metric tons (now it’s 400,000 metric tons).

Premier: [Steel production] can reach 1 million tons the year after next year?

Kim: [Yes].

Premier: 1 million metric tons of steel means one ton of steel for every ten people. We need to have 60 million metric tons of steel to attain that ratio. You are ahead of us, which is very good. Isn’t it great to reach the goals of socialism? (Premier turned to Comrade Pak Jeongae) Comrade Pak Jeongae, you surpassed us very quickly. We are very pleased and should congratulate you.

Pak (smiled and nodded)

Kim: With your help.

Premier and Deputy Premier Peng: Mainly on your own, through your own efforts.
Peng: You’ve got many advantages—transportation, power, raw materials, minerals, and so on.

Premier: How about cotton this year?

Kim: Still very little; [we] mainly depend on you and the Soviets. The government purchased 50,000 metric tons of unginned cotton.

Premier: 50,000 metric tons of unginned cotton and 17,000 metric tons of ginned cotton will be 34 million catties [a catty is approximate 600 grams]—that is more than 300,000 piculs [one picul equals to 100 catties].

Kim: We have good harvest of cotton this year due to good weather. Plus we used nutrition pots that shortened one month of the growing period of cotton. We plan to plant more cotton next year. The production of flax this year is good as well—one field yielded one metric ton.

Premier: Your nutrition pots were successful. [It is] good for your weather since you have shorter frost-free period. Korean people are used to physical labor. We also mobilize women now. You have enough material for producing paper. Do you have enough material for sugar?

Kim: We had some wrong beliefs in terms of producing sugar. Last year our [people] who were in charge of light industry visited China and decided that we could have more beets next year, to produce sugar with indigenous methods. It could be successful. We can have 20,000 metric tons [of sugar] plus 10,000 metric tons imported. Koreans don’t like drinking tea and coffee that much. We are used to drinking water.

Premier: You can grow some tea in your mountains.

Kim: We have no plan for now. According to ancient records, there was tea in the southern part of Korea, from the seeds brought from China. Which one is better for sugar production: Sugarcanes or sugar-beets?

Premier: Certainly sugarcanes are better. Sugar-beets get go bad easily. However you have a short frost-free period, so it’s probably not easy to extract sugar from sugarcanes. It’s faster to get sugar from sugar-beets.

Kim: We had some sugar-beets in the Japanese-occupation period. Some problems occurred, so we gave up. We grew some sugar-beets this year. It doesn’t look bad.

Premier: How’s the recovery of your handicraft industry?

Kim: We’ve recovered 900 small workshops, and some 700 to 800 cooperative groups.
Premier: How many agricultural cooperatives?

Kim: 3,873 after merging “li” and “groups.”

Premier: You eliminated one [administrative] organ, right?

Kim: We used to have “classes” above “li.” We eliminated “[administrative] organs,” so now there are only four levels.

Premier: It’s better to have it simplified. How many counties do you have?

Kim: 200 counties.

Premier: How many provinces?

Kim: Nine provinces.

Premier: How many staff member do you have in administrative agencies?

Kim: 16,000 people, not including teaching and administrative staff.

Premier: How many are there in the teaching and administrative staff?

Kim: Around 70,000 to 80,000. After downsizing, we have the smallest ratio of government workers and total population among all nations.

Premier: After downsizing, we have 1.3 to 1.4 million government workers in central and local government agencies. You have fewer people in the central government; we have more people and more cities. We have five levels from the central government to “towns,” [xiang, township/country/village] as opposed to your four levels from the central government to “li.”

Kim: We merged “li” and “groups,” which cut down 7,000 people in the staff.

Premier: That is a good idea.

Kim: We also merged supply and marketing cooperatives into li, which cut down some 10,000 people.

Premier: Are these people taken care of by the cooperatives?

Kim: We are still trying it out. The central government still provides [for these peoples’ livings].

Premier: The cadres we demoted are still paid with salaries. The cooperatives would be overwhelmed to shoulder such a burden suddenly.
Kim: Our cooperatives provide [for workers’ living.] We haven’t yet handed schools over to cooperatives.

Premier: How many troops do you have now?

Kim: 300,000 troops. Troops are more [than government workers].

(One paragraph screened.)

Premier: You have a huge burden. [Having] 300,000 troops is because you are facing different circumstances. How many workers do you have?

Kim: Workers and staff are 1.1 million.

Premier: That’s a good ratio.

Deputy Premier Peng: The industrial and agricultural output values in Korea are higher than ours.

Premier: What are the industrial and agricultural output values that you announced?

Kim: The ratio of industry to agriculture is 70%. I don’t remember the exact number.

Premier: You sped up your industrialization, electrification, and mechanization.

Kim: We have 30,000 truck tractors. 15,000 cars will be fine.

Premier: We are experimenting in farming with electrical tractors in Guangdong. You can pay a visit there. When [King] Sihanouk [of Cambodia] came to China, he visited the one in Tianjin. It wasn’t that good at that time. [Electrical tractors] save oil and steel, and are not heavy. How many years did you shorten your scheduled date of fulfilling your five-year plan?

Kim: We will fulfill it next year (two years earlier), but we announced that it would be finished a year and a half earlier than scheduled.

Premier: We can finish our five-year plan this year. You have many advantages, which is totally different from the situation in the two Germanys. [As long as] your peoples’ living standard continues to improve, people in the south will move [to the north].

(One paragraph screened.)

Kim: Our slogan is “fight for another two years.” China has fought for three years.
Premier: To better your infrastructure to influence [the situation with the south]. Who will take over after Rhee Syngman?

Kim: Yi Gibung. He is a parliamentarian, but very old.

Premier: There are only old people left in the south. Their ambassador to Taiwan, Kim Hong-Il, is he a cadre of Rhee’s?

Kim: He emerged from the Manchukuo government.

Nam Il: He does not come from Rhee’s direct faction.

Premier: Is there any possibility that he will take over from Rhee?

Kim: [Rhee] does not have a high prestige in Korea. Yi Gibung probably has more prestige [than Rhee].

Premier: There will be chaos wherever Americans set fire. Like in Iraq.

Deputy Premier Chen: It was difficult to know beforehand that there would be coup in Sudan.

Premier: Armed coups crop up everywhere in Asia and Africa. There are armed riots in Indonesia; there were coups in North Africa, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt; the same in Iraq, Jordan, Ceylon, Pakistan and Burma. Although U Nu said he stepped down himself, he was actually [overthrown] in a coup. The same in Thailand. There have been two [coups] in South Vietnam, but they were suppressed. Coups are everywhere. The backyard of the United States, the Latin America, is facing the same situation. The U.S. supports military coups everywhere, sets fire everywhere, and therefore it’s inevitable that nationalist states fight. There could be changes in southern Korea, because they depend on military, not people, and there will always be people who oppose them. We can categorize the examples we have. First is Iraq, a good example. [Iraqis] had a thorough revolution, leaving Americans with no proxy to support and had to recognize Iraq. The second example is Indonesia. The U.S. supported the rebels in the beginning, but in the end had to recognize Sukarno as he insisted on fighting the rebels. The third example is in Lebanon, the U.S. withdrew eventually, leaving a bad reputation. The fourth example is in Latin America, the U.S. attempted to conduct a conspiracy in Argentina, but failed eventually. All these are armed coups, either revolutions or counter-revolutions. Now that the U.S. has shown its failure in several places, which was concluded in the recent election in the U.S., Dulles’ brinkmanship policy was defeated. To the socialist camp, [the U.S.] is on the defensive. Of course, if there is any conflict among us, they will definitely exploit it. As long as we are united, they can never defeat us. Hungary is a good example, and so is Taiwan. We insist on fighting, they will reconsider [their strategy]. The situation in Quemoy and Matsu also accounts for the U.S.’s defensive strategy.
We leaders in the socialist camp have to build our countries. The stronger we are, the more chaotic it will be in the capitalist world. They don’t recognize us now? That’s good. (Smiles at Deputy Premier Chen) Then we have less to do, less trouble.

Deputy Premier Chen: Then I am going to “lose my job.”

(One paragraph screened.)

[Unknown]: Now while they think the situation in Taiwan is somewhat pacified, they are having conflict in the west again. France wants to have a trade union with Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and West Germany against Britain. The British are furious. It’s good to have [Charles] DeGulle as president, so that there is no harmony among them.

Deputy Premier Peng: The U.S. exposes their weaknesses the most in Korea.

Premier: Now [U.S. power] is declining. In another ten years, [our power] could be considerable.

Deputy Premier Peng: [We] improve a bit each year; then it will be considerable.

Premier: You are doing better than us. You eliminated illiteracy; you learned new technology fast. The Soviet Union is making efforts to build their nation. [The Soviet Union] is the big brother, with a strong foundation. We don’t [have a strong foundation yet]. We learn fast, but that’s not enough. You are better, at least you eliminated illiteracy.

Kim: According to the situation in northern Korea, I think we only need another 3.5 million tons of steel.

Premier: In another ten years, everything in the socialist camp can surpass imperialist states. Or at least [our] major things have to surpass theirs.

Kim: We think so, too. It will have a great impact on southern Korea that we successfully finish our ten-year construction plan. Then, it is possible to reunite Korea peacefully. As long as you can pin down Americans (the interpreter did not hear this line and did not translate it.)

Premier: The situation will be different in southern Korea by then. Taiwan, for instance, if Chiang Kai-shek or his agent pronounced to reunite with the mother land, the U.S. could do nothing. I’m saying that the fortress can be penetrated from the inside. External factors can influence internal ones, and then internal factors will work themselves out.

Deputy Premier Peng: How many Koreans are there in Japan?
Kim: 600,000 people. According to Japanese statics, 400,000 requested to come back to northern Korea. After the armistice, they requested to come back, but our condition was too dire to welcome them back. Now we can receive them again. Nam Il has made several statements in relation to this. The Japanese government did not give an official response. It is the association of Koreans in Japan that is leading the people’s movement in Korea. [The association] leads the overseas Koreans to urge the Japanese government to give work authorization and leads petition movements. Japanese people also set up organizations to help Koreans to come back to Korea (including Hatoyama in the Japan Socialist Party). From the perspective of Japanese people, they wish Koreans could go home because they are also having a hard time making ends meet. The problem here is the fact that these people request to go back to northern Korea which affects “Japan-Korea talks.” The Japanese government is in an awkward position. The Foreign Minister’s statement was sent to the Japanese government through the Japanese Embassy in the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese government sent the statement back to us three days after they received it.

Nam Il: The Japanese said it was a hot potato.

Premier: Did the Japanese merchant ships come?

Kim: Boats came stealthily.

Premier: As long as they have the will to come back, there will be a way. Just take their time.

Kim: We are not planning on bringing them back soon, either. We prepare for a long fight. First we ask the Japanese government to arrange those people’s lives, give them jobs. As long as [the Koreans in Japan] can fight, their dream will come true.

Premier: The longer they stay suppressed in Japan, the stronger their will to fight Japanese and Americans. Thus, [Japanese] actually are training these people for us.

Kim: It is also a good way to influence public opinion in southern Korea. We are taking care of those Koreans in Japan while the government in the south is doing nothing. People in the south said, “Only the Republic cares about us and solves our problems.” Each year we budget 130 to 140 million Japanese yen for education for the Koreans in Japan. It’s been three years.

Premier: How do you send the money?

Kim: Through banks.

Premier: Japanese don’t oppose it?

Kim: They did not oppose it. This actually helps relieve some of their difficulties.
Premier: Do you, the Korea Workers’ Party, have any opinion on our way of dealing with the Taiwan issue? Can you understand [our methods]?

Kim: We fully support China’s methods.

Park: Fully support.

Premier: Our Minister of Defense has issued a proclamation four times.

Kim: Chiang Kai-shek did not respond?

Premier: They don’t dare to respond now. The U.S.-Chiang contradiction is still developing, though.

Deputy Premier Peng: They said the proclamations were to instigate the U.S.-Chiang relations.

Deputy Premier Chen: We were instigating their relations.

Kim: If we don’t let Americans go, they are to be blamed.

Premier: You understand the proclamation, but some of the western comrades don’t. It’s hard to translate. But Chiang Kai-shek understands, and Americans are beginning to understand. Dulles understands, too. His recent speech at the U.S. national church committee seems like responding to Chairman Mao’s “paper tiger” statement. He said that the free world has strengthened; the socialist camp will undergo some changes. He is putting his hope in us, in that there will be contradiction in the socialist camp. That means, so far, he has no other way to deal with us; it also means that he does not dare to fight. Once we strengthen our unity, his dream will be shattered. He also says that freedom is not reliable, is empty. He says that freedom can not help stabilize Asian and African countries. It needs economic aid, needs money. Therefore, he wants those Christians to do some ideological work for him. He wants them to persuade capitalists not to be extravagant but to invest in Asian and African countries.

Deputy Premier Peng: The production in Britain has reduced 20%, 25% in the U.S. It has also reduced in France and in Japan.

Premier: Their world has shrunken and they still can’t cooperate [with each other]. [There is also an] economic crisis and multiple contradictions.

Kim: Premier Zhou is right. We need to earn time to build ourselves.

(Several paragraphs screened)
[Premier:] Your construction has gone quite well. We are pleased. You showed such a warm welcome when the volunteer troops returned home. I wondered whether that probably disturbed your schedule [of construction].

Kim: It was our obligation to send off the volunteer troops when they left Korea. They bled for Korea and rendered so many achievements. It was also an education to Korean people, as well as an influence to politics outside [Korea], contradicted the rumor that Korean people did not welcome the volunteer troops. Yet we did not do it formal enough.

Premier: That was formal enough. Guo [Moruo] came back from Korea and composed more poems than we can cover [in this conversation].

Kim: When the volunteer troops left Korea, almost every Korean cried. It’s people’s affection. I am grateful for your appreciation of our construction. It’s an encouragement to us.

Premier: Your [situation] is not easy, either.

Kim: Finally, I would like to mention that when Deputy Prime Minister Li Jooyon and Comrade Li Chong-ok visited China last time, we already solved the issues of long-term trade and loan. We are very pleased and would like to express our appreciation.

Premier: We had limited power and did only very little.

Kim: We are very content. The Standing Committee listened to the report from Comrade Lee Jooyon and was very content with it.

Premier: We will be able to help more once our construction improves. Everyone minds his own construction of socialism and we will all be pleased. After you come back from Vietnam, should we issue a communiqué?

Kim, Pak Jeongae and Nam II said that they were willing to issue a communiqué at the same time.

Premier: That is good. We can assign this to the two foreign ministers. They can assign it to others and we don’t have to worry about it.

Kim: Our military delegation does not have many things on the agenda this time. We used to contact the volunteer troops when they were [in Korea]. Now that the volunteer troops have returned, we need to talk about how to maintain contact in the future. Another thing is about mutual learning and military education. I hope that Minister Peng Dehuai will be able to help.

Premier: That’s good. He (Peng Dehuai) was in the liberation army as well as the volunteer troops.
Deputy Premier Peng: The military delegation can see whatever they wish to see. We have no secrets to keep from a fraternal country.

Kim: The Vietnamese delegation brought a military group last time it visited Korea. The Korean military delegation will come with us to Vietnam this time. They may not come back with the government delegates when we come back from Vietnam. They could stay longer in China, visit more places.

Premier: That’s good. The Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defense will communicate with them about the details of the itinerary of the military delegation.

**DOCUMENT No. 20**

[Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski.]

Secret

Pyongyang, 4 September 1959

EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF POLAND IN PYONGYANG

No. 2421/1959/tjn
D V K. 2421/24/59 [trans. note: added by hand; tjn most likely stands for *tajne*, secret]

Note

concerning the internal affairs of the DPRK

In the second half of August of this year, after a longer absence of Kim Il Sung and other members of the leadership in Pyongyang, some sessions of the broadened Presidium of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea took place. Discussed at these sessions were issues of making the management of the economy more efficient, the decentralization of this management, the reduction of jobs in the administration and the moving of a number of experienced employees and experts to the appropriate levels of management of the economy and directly to production.

As a result of the consultations, the broadened Plenum of the CC KWP passed a resolution, in which it pays particular attention to the issue of further development and raising the level of local industry in the field. This industry currently creates 27.5% of the production of the whole industry of the DPRK, and in the area of production of necessities 45.1%. Local industry currently includes about 2,000 factories (including cooperative plants), of which about 1,000 factories have been created in the most recent period (since September of last year). These factories have generally been created without investment from the state. The resolution gives the task of supplying the population with necessities to the local industry, so as to assure a rise in the population’s standard of living.
The resolution states, citing a statement by Kim Il Sung, that the current system of the industry’s management is already outdated and this system needs to be changed. The resolution forecasts the need to dissolve, merge and reorganize several departments and broaden the privileges of the Provincial and Municipal People’s Committees (the equivalent of our Provincial and Municipal National Councils) in the sphere of management of industry.

The problem of cadres is tied to the problem of decentralization of management. The resolution forecasts the solving of this problem by shifting the responsible and experienced employees away from the central level. These employees, following the dissolution of and merging of departments, will be able to move to work in the field, strengthening the local People’s Committees and directly fortifying factories.

The resolution states that the goals of the first 5-year plan (1957-1961) were met in the course of 2.5 years, i.e., by the end of June 1959, thanks to the powerful “Chollima” movement and the effort of the whole nation, and that the second half of 1959 and the year 1960 will be a period of strengthening the gains of the first 5-year plan, and at the same time will be a period of rest and preparations to achieve the great tasks of the second 5-year plan. In this period, the factories’ technical equipment will need to be sorted out and the exploitation of the existing productive powers of factories will need to be increased.

One must pay keen attention to the development of the energy base, development of metallurgy, increase of the melting of steel, coal extraction and the perfection of transportation.

At the same time, the Resolution states that in 1960 the raising of the population’s standard of living must be looked after. With this goal in mind, animal husbandry must be developed, fishing must be increased, the production of necessities and food articles must be broadened, more apartments, shops, cafeterias and restaurants, crèches, preschools, baths, laundries and so on must be built.

At the sessions of the broadened Presidium of the CC KWP the initial economic plan for 1960 was also examined.

Already before publishing the Resolution of the broadened Presidium of the CC KWP, the Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] of the DPRK, in its session of 17 August of this year, adopted a resolution on the issue of the further construction of Pyongyang.

The Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] states that in the period since the ending of the war action, 3 mil[lion] m. sq. of housing surfaces, 105 schools, 65 hospitals and health centers, 27 cinemas and theaters, 488 shops and restaurants have been built, 988 thou[sand] sq. m. of road and street surfaces have been lain, 200 km. of water pipes and 1,600 thousand trees have been planted.

Yet the results to date have been deemed as insufficient. One may think that this concerns in particular the quality of the completed work, and also the exploitation of equipment and construction materials in construction, since one of the items of the resolution calls upon the Chairman of the State Construction Committee to present proposals to the Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] regarding the strengthening of the oversight of construction and the exploitation of equipment and construction materials in construction in Pyongyang by the end of September.

Apart from this, the Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] recommended dissolving the Ministry of Construction of Cities and the Local Economy. This Ministry’s functions are
to be transferred to the Municipal Committee of Pyongyang (the Municipal People’s Committee of Pyongyang possesses the rights of a Provincial Committee), the People’s Provincial Committees and the Main Administration of Construction, which is to be created. Departments of Construction are to be created in the People’s Provincial Committees.

The enterprises under the Ministry of Construction of Cities and the Local Economy are to be transferred to the People’s Committee of Pyongyang and the People’s Provincial Committees. The People’s Committee of Pyongyang was given special rights to found factories of construction materials indispensable to the construction of the city, also outside the city of Pyongyang.

With the aim of strengthening the role of the Pyongyang People’s Committee, the Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] decided to name vice-premier Cheong Ilyeong to the post of Chairman of this Committee (for now it is not known whether he will remain a vice-premier). The functions of the vice-chairman of the Committee are to be taken over by the current Minister of Construction of Cities and the Local Economy, Kim Byeongsik.

In its conclusion, the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers [sic.] of the DPRK resolves to dissolve the Committee for the Reconstruction of Pyongyang, which was founded in 1953.

Following the above-mentioned resolutions by the broadened Presidium of the CC KWP and the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK issued several decrees on 31 August 1959, on the basis of which it is decided to:

1. Join together the Ministries of Electrical Energy, Coal Industry and Chemical Industry, and to create a Ministry of Energy and Chemical Industry. Kim Doosam, the current Minister of Electrical Energy, was named the minister. The Minister of Coal Industry, Kim Taejin, was relieved of his position, and the Minister of Chemical Industry, Li Cheonheo, was disciplinarily relieved of his functions.

2. The Ministry of Procurement was folded into the Ministry of Internal Trade. The Minister of Procurement, Cheong Seonwon, was relieved from his position.

3. The Ministry of the Fishing Industry was merged into the Ministry of Light Industry. The Minister of the Fishing Industry, Joo Cholmok, was disciplinarily relieved of his functions.

4. The Ministry of Justice was dissolved, and its functions related to directing the courts and issues of arbitration were transferred to the Supreme Court of the DPRK. The Minister of Justice, Heo Jeongsook, was relieved of her functions of Minister, but remained the Chairwoman of the Committee of Cultural Relations with Abroad.

5. The Ministry of Administration and Ministry of Labor were dissolved. The Central Committee of the United Trade Unions of Korea took over the functions of the Ministry of Labor. The Minister of Administration, Pak Munjoo, and the Minister of Labor, Kim Ingi, were released from their positions. On 1 September of this year, Kim Ingi was
chosen to be the Chairman of the Committee of the Central Red Cross of Korea, replacing Pak Giho, leaving because of illness.

6. The Ministry of Construction of the Cities and the Local Economy was dissolved. (For details, see p. 3).

[signature]
E. Sagala
2nd Secretary of the Embassy

4 copies made
3 copies MFA Dep. V
1 copy a/a

DOCUMENT No. 21

[Translated for NKIDP by Adolf Kotlik]

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In Prague on July 1960
No. 003923/60-7

Highly Classified.

4 attachments

Dear Comrade,

For information of Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Politburo members, I attach 4 copies of a recorded conversation of the cs. ambassador in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the Soviet Union ambassador c. Puzanov. The record contains details about the dealings of the Korean delegation with c. Khrushchev in Moscow.

With comradely greetings

(illegible)
Esteemed Comrade

Jiri Hendrych
Deputy of the Central Committee
Of the Czechoslovak Communist party

Prague

(filed in the program USA, struggle with)

STATE CENTRAL ARCHIVE IN PRAGUE

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Alena Noskova, Ph.D.

Signature: (illegible)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Praha

Highly classified!

Subject: Record of a conversation with the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK, c. Puzanov on 23rd June 1960

I invited c. Puzanov for lunch on 23rd June to talk about the discussions with the Korean delegation in Moscow.

C. Puzanov told me that c. Kim Il Sung had talks with c. Khrushchev in Moscow. The most important topic of the discussion was his request for forgiving the post-war debt. It is about 700 – 800 million rubles. Neither the Korean nor the Soviet side had the data about the exact amount, including interest, at the time of the talks. As for the pre-war loan of 130 million rubles, the DPRK wants to pay it.

Further c. Kim Il Sung asked, within the framework of a trade agreement, that the USSR delivers 100,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 tons of cotton and 2 million tons of crude oil to the DPRK every year during the first five years of the seven-year plan, and that the Soviet Union helps to build the DPRK an oil refinery, and supplies [the DPRK] with necessary equipment. C. Khrushchev said they would deal with these issues as comrades, and ordered c. Kosygin to find out to what extent it was possible to meet the Korean requests. Further talks will be conducted either through the Ambassador, or c. Kim II
Sung will visit Moscow again. However, the Korean comrades were made aware, still during the talks, that cotton will not be available to them because the Soviet Union does not have enough of it and is delivering 400,000 tons to other socialist countries under the current obligations, and at the same time, it is importing 70,000 tons from China. C. Kim Il Sung said that China promised them 20,000 tons and that they are about to begin production of an artificial fiber (vinalon), which should amount to 20,000 tons a year in the next few years. C. Kim Il Sung informed c. Khrushchev about the main principles of their seven-year plan when in the first 3.5 years they want to develop namely light industry and agriculture. As for feeding the population, they want to achieve 30 kg of meat per person; further meat consumption should be satisfied with fish. They expect to support livestock production by double planting on 500 – 700 thousand ha: wheat before rice on irrigated fields, corn after wheat on un-irrigated fields.

C. Kim Il Sung then clarified how the Korean comrades view further development in South Korea. They expect some degree of democratization that will be conducive to the growth of progressive forces, which they intend to support in any way they can.

C. Khrushchev informed c. Kim Il Sung about the differences in opinion with the Chinese comrades and about their approach that resembles factional politics against the CPSU. Both c. Kim Il Sung and c. Kim Il, who took part in the meeting, expressed several times that they fully support the position of the CPSU. C. Kim Il Sung apologized for the approach of the DPRK delegate at the Worker’s Unions Convention in Beijing with an explanation that the delegate is inexperienced and not knowledgeable about the matter. He said they published Mao Zedong’s essay “Imperialism, the Paper Tiger” in the DPRK as well, but only because a good part of it dealt with revisionism that has not been mentioned in the Korean press for quite while, and c. Kim Il Sung did not know that it was actually a disguised attack against the CPSU. (See the note at the end of the report.)

C. Kim Il Sung was presented with documents indicating that the splinter group of the KWP, exposed some time ago, was organized and supported by Chinese comrades against Kim Il Sung.

During the return flight, c. Kim Il Sung explained to c. Puzanov that he categorically disagrees with many things in China, for instance with communes. During his visit in China, Chinese comrades showed him one commune. Of course, they chose one of the best. Mao Zedong then suggested setting up communes according to the Chinese example. C. Kim Il Sung ordered at that time in some place to introduce communal meals in a similar way but it did not work. While visiting that village, he gathered the elders and asked their opinion. They told him the problem is that everybody eats three times as much regardless of accomplished work. Before, all ate in moderation. After this experience, the Korean comrades abandoned the idea of introducing communes and instead made steps at the beginning of the year to eliminate egalitarianism and to improve compensation for work in agriculture according to the amount and difficulty of work.

Then we talked about how the Chinese influence has been growing in the DPRK during the last year. C. Puzanov knows that c. Kim Il Sung made a secret visit to China recently. Even though c. Kim Il Sung fully supports the position of the CPSU, there seem to be number of officials around him who are under the influence of the Chinese comrades. The Chinese ambassador in the DPRK was glad to have become a (illegible) and is trying to exploit this function to his own benefit. I mentioned again to
c. Puzanov his speech during the New Year’s dinner organized by the Foreign Affairs Minister for the diplomatic corps. At that occasion, the Chinese ambassador delivered on behalf of the diplomatic corps a speech that he, however, did not forward to the other titular heads in advance for comments, as it is customary in such a case. In his speech, he never mentioned the peace efforts of c. Khrushchev and the necessity of a peaceful coexistence. C. Puzanov was not present at that time. To further demonstrate the approach of Chinese comrades, he also mentioned how during a recent visit in the PRC of an Albanian delegation headed by Hadzi Desi, Chinese comrades tried to get them to support their position. However, a Politburo member c. Belikova decisively rejected their attempts.

According to c. Puzanov, soviet comrades are of the opinion that it is necessary to help the DPRK. They will handle the matter of aid in a brotherly manner, as c. Khrushchev said.

After lunch, I showed c. Puzanov the construction site of the new embassy.

Ambassador:

Note: C. Puzanov first talked in the sense as if Mao Zedong’s essay “Imperialism, the Paper Tiger” was published in the Korean press. When I could not find anything like that, I asked him again when and where it was published. He told me that it was an article in Nodong Sinmun from the 12th and the 14th of this month about Zedong’s ideas. Actually, a Korean journalist published an article of no special content about the PRC named “Mao Zedong’s Ideas Flourish All Over China” in Nodong Sinmun on the 12th and the 14th of this month. I was not able to find out which particular article c. Kim Il Sung was talking about.
Assessment of [GDR Embassy] Report\(^1\) [on Economic Situation of DPRK] for 1\textsuperscript{st} Semester [of 1960]

In its assessment of economic developments, this report includes for the first time problems arising from political work, in particular that of the Party. It demonstrates very clearly the political components of certain decisions on the DPRK economy, and the conclusions drawn by the Party for its political and economic work. Yet it looks to us like a deficit that the report presents the implementation of commitments in the transition year, and the overcoming of disproportions and weaknesses of certain economic branches, mostly as problems of working style, and as questions of how to fight formalism and bureaucracy in the work of local institutions.

The [1959] December plenary session [of the KWP] has outlined a new basic concepts for the Party’s economic policies. These concepts were based on the real situation in late 1959:

1. Over-fulfillment of the Five-Year-Plan in gross production. Yet this creates severe tensions (disproportions) in relations between industrial branches, in particular concerning heavy industry.
2. Falling behind of consumer goods industry, especially local industry.
3. Falling behind of agriculture.

All these phenomena were caused by violations of the economic law of planned and proportional development.

Furthermore, there were the following notable factors:

1. Direct economic aid by the socialist states, which previously represented a major part of investments, has essentially been phased out.

\(^1\) Report itself not included. Translated assessment is more comprehensive and analytical.
2. Through falling behind of branches commissioned with the supply of the population, and in combination with wage increases, disproportions were created between purchasing power and the deficient supply of goods.

Elimination of these tensions ultimately signifies the restoration of appropriate proportions in developing a national economy. Given the conditions of the actual economic course as it was in effect in 1959, this meant to change the basic economic concept. Namely: Utilization of all domestic reserves, in particular, increasing work productivity and the utilization coefficients of institutions, and the lowering of primary costs.

By simultaneously tackling a major number of industrial objects, starting credit repayments, and undertaking large projects in the area of housing construction, options for new investments were severely limited. Therefore they basically follow this line: Completion of industrial projects already initiated, and focus on essential branches of industry. This situation premeditated the decisions made at the 1959 December plenum. Comrade Pak Seongcheol referred to the new situation in the Party’s economic policy (“Nodong Sinmun” of 19 March 1960).

It is now imperative for the Party’s work to enable its members to explain the new complicated tasks to the masses and assume leadership in the movement for socialist brigades and innovators, i.e. to orient the great enthusiasm of Korean workers towards the correct assignments.

Yet such cannot be achieved with the current working habits of many party and state organs, in particular at local levels, as the work to be done requires creative leadership. This seems to be the reason why [the KWP] is currently paying major attention to improvements in the party’s working habits and style.

The tasks ahead must be explained in such a way to make all workers understand that the new economic policy does not apply for this year of transition only. It looks like it became evident during the course of 1960, that the main targets of the transition year are not within realistic reach during this very year. Such can be inferred from partitioning the Seven-Year-Plan into two stages, as we have learned from Kim Il Sung’s speech on 15 August 1960. The report of our embassy should not have failed to reference these important facts.

The report hints at, but does not explain, how most of the tense problems have not been fully solved yet; due to the various production branches’ plan compliances respectively non-compliances. In this vein, some of the report’s conclusions appear to be optimistic to us here [at the Foreign Ministry]. Not that we have doubts about the possibility to solve problems as such. Yet it constitutes such a problem when all tasks are still valid for an extended period (at least the first two to three tears of the Seven-Year-Plan). In our opinion, this again raises the question of how to assess the basic concept of the transition year. The embassy report refers to this fact, but it seems to us as not having been sufficiently, and appropriately, highlighted.

We have drawn some conclusions from this report.

**Agriculture**
Obviously it is difficult to assess the field-intensive DPRK agriculture without knowledge of the harvests’ results.
Yet the non-compliance with tasks of supply for agriculture and for the peasants (mechanization, goods from local industries for mass consumption), the further falling behind in animal breeding, and the now evident problems supplying the people with basic and special goods, seem to be the result of a lack of incentives for the peasants to sell more of their products to the state. We think this is not only a problem of pricing, but in particular the question of what agricultural cooperatives can actually buy for themselves with their money. If you infer from the fact that the agricultural cooperative “Korean-German Friendship” has 220,000 Won in their account, it serves as evidence how certain necessary equipment is unavailable due to deficits pertaining to the supply of goods. Problems of local industries, which are largely responsible for providing the supply of mass consumer goods, thus have a major impact on the agricultural situation.

We do not know the exact details of the causes of obvious problems. You can only make general assumptions based on reports and statistical data. The problems of economic relations between cities and the countryside, between industry and agriculture warrant special consideration in a separate analysis. Just to list some of the problems here:

- Function and actual functioning of the stores to buy products.

- New rules for price ranges for agricultural products. There are government subsidies for the price of rice. We do not know whether this pattern also applies to other products. With market prices constant, an increase in producer rates ought to result in an increase in subsidies. This will lead to further strain on the government budget and would in turn lead to a further contracting of options to make investments.

- For some time already, the falling behind of animal breeding is noteworthy. In November 1958 already, the extended session of the KWP Central Committee’s Standing Committee passed a resolution about the need for rapid development of stock farming. The Party plenum in June 1959 underlined the importance of this talk, and during the December plenary session there were again clear-cut instructions. Yet it seems that they even failed to convince the peasants of the basic necessity of stock farming. Material incentives do not seem to exist and, especially, mandatory requirements like the existence of young stock and winter fodder are not met everywhere.

- This situation creates problems in terms of providing food for the population. In our analysis, we assessed the turnover of goods with a ratio of 50:50 between industrial products and foodstuff. Yet the “Minju Choson” newspaper stated on 13 September 1959 that 75 percent of people’s income must be spent for the purchase of food. If we assume that the remaining 25 percent, rents and other expenditures notwithstanding, are spent to buy industrial products, the share of industrial products in the overall sales volume of goods has decreased even more than we expected in our analysis (overall turnover growth of one percent with an increase of foodstuff turnover of 25 percent). Thus the already rather unfavorable
ratio between foodstuff and industrial products did not improve during the first half of 1960.

- This situation helps to understand the major efforts undertaken in local industries. It also underlines the importance assigned to the [upcoming] opening of the Vinalon factory.

These examples are supposed to serve as evidence, here leaving aside farm machines and fertilizer industries, for certain deficits in proportion between agriculture and local industries which are right now obviously quite problematic. The fertilizer industry has not yet reached the productions results of the year 1958. This situation further aggravates the one mentioned above and leads us to another major problem: energy supply.

The [cited GDR embassy] report only reports a part of the story, namely the non-compliance with plan targets by 7 percent. The reason for this non-compliance is noted correctly by pointing to water shortages in hydroelectric power plants. Yet the second fact to be considered here seems to us even more important, namely that electrical energy is absolutely insufficient, even if the plan would have been fulfilled.

In 1957 about one half of DPRK energy use was consumed by the chemical industry (3.4 billion Kilowatt per hour). In 1959 energy production increased to 7.8 billion Kilowatt per hour. However, energy demand grew even more through the opening of new plants (Bongun, Hichon, Electrolyte Zinc plant in Nampho). Next year the Vinalon plant [in Hamhung] will be added as another major user of energy. In order to improve the energy situation decisively, only the launch of new capacities will suffice. Until 1961 about 500 Megawatt of electricity will be added. Even this growth does not seem to keep up with the growth of energy users. In our mind, major reserves to save energy are with industrial plants, not with the people. There also seem to be reserves within electrical energy. In 1958 production was 7.6 billion Kilowatts per hour. Installed power in 1958 was 1360 Megawatts (according to “Novosti Korei”, No. 20, 1960). Respective calculations point to an average utilization of Korean power plants of 64 percent. At this point, the water shortage problems seem to set in.

All these were the problems we analyzed when working through the report by our Pyongyang Embassy for the first semester of 1960. Our remarks do obviously change nothing of the overall positive assessment of this report. Many of our conclusions and opinions we could only reach on the basis of this report. We discussed it jointly with the comrades of the Government Planning Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

For our future work we have drawn the conclusion to emphasize even more the correlations between political and economic tasks in our own assessments.

Gräbner

CC
1x Embassy
2x Section [Korea, Foreign Ministry]
Excerpts from Translation from “Nodong Sinmun”, 13 December 1960

Report by [Chinese] Army General Ra Se-kjon at Event Commemorating the Return of PRC Military Delegation from Visit to DPRK

Comrades!

Please allow me to speak for our military delegation returning from a visit to the DPRK and give a report about our visit to Korea.

Our country’s military delegation stayed in the DPRK at the invitation of Kim Kwanghyeop, Minister of National Defense, between 23 October and 11 November 1960 for a friendship visit to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the participation of Chinese volunteers in the Korean War. The delegation was joined on this visit by an ensemble of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

The delegation visited fifteen major and minor units in Pyongyang, Kaesong, Kwanju, Sunchon, Huichon, Wonsan, Kumgang, Hamhung, Chongjin etc., nine factories, one agricultural commune, and a dam with reservoir. We laid wreaths at three monuments for fallen soldiers, enjoyed five artistic performances, and met with hundreds of thousands of workers.

[...]

During our visit we saw how the Korean people have achieved stunningly great successes in a short term, pertaining to postwar reconstruction as well the building of socialism.

Some time after the signing of the armistice in 1953, Marshal Hal-chon visited Korea as head of a delegation of the Chinese people. Back then Marshal Hal-chon saw in Korea how all cities had been turned to rubble and ashes, and how there was not one single un-damaged building in Pyongyang. Yet now he observed how the Korean cities have changed completely.

For instance, the cities of Pyongyang, Wonsan, Hamhung, Chongjin etc. have been rebuilt as modern, new cities. High-rises are lined up next to each other, the streets are clean, orderly, and beautiful. They are filled with people. It is now completely impossible to find traces of the war. People would not believe in such miracles if they had not seen them with their own eyes.

The villages were seriously destroyed during the war as well. In many of those villages no stone remained on top of another. Yet now they are completely reconstructed, and there are no vestiges of the war left. Only rarely you see a few bomb craters.

In the area of industry, Korea began in 1957, after a three-year period of reconstruction, with the implementation of the first five-year-plan. This plan was fulfilled pertaining to the entirety of industrial production two and a half years early.
This year [1960] industrial production rose 3.5 times compared to 1956, 6.4 times compared to the pre-war year of 1949, and 7.7 times compared to 1944, the year before the liberation. The equipment of factories we visited was even more modern than in the pre-war period. They produce several high-quality products, and in quantitative terms of production they surpass those of the pre-war period multiple times.

For instance, during the war, bombs fell within an average radius of 1 square meter on the smelter in Hwanghae. The factory and its equipment were almost completely destroyed. Yet within just one year after the [1953] armistice, the smelter was rebuilt with Korean materials and Korean equipment. Blast furnace “Number 1” and the coke battery were erected, and thus daily steel production reached 800 tons. The fertilizer factory in Hynam was also completely destroyed through bombing during the war. Yet today it has been significantly enlarged compared to the pre-war period, and production rose by 4.3 times compared to that earlier period. Under Japanese rule only somewhat more than 400 workers and 10 machines worked in the mechanical engineering factory of Hyeongsan. Now this very factory has been turned into a site for the production of large machines with more than 5,000 workers. An 8-meter-roundabout-lathe was built, as well as a 3,000-ton-press. In the Chongjin steel mill iron clumps [luppen] are made from minor-value ore and anthracite. Currently each rotary kiln produces 90 tons daily, while there were only 41 tons made per day during the pre-war period. In many respects we [in China] have to learn from such a method to produce iron clumps [luppen].

In the field of agriculture, collectivization has already been achieved completely. One million farms were concentrated into 3,800 agricultural cooperatives. Also irrigation and electrification have been basically completed. Currently they undertake major efforts to implement mechanization. Irrigated areas in Korea comprise of 800,000 joengbo, this is seven times as much as in the pre-war period.

This year they had a good harvest. According to statistical data, they expect the entire grain harvest to reach 3,803 million tons this year, i.e. 40 percent more than before the liberation and two times the harvest of 1946. This way the norms for grain production, as outlined in the first Five-Year-Plan in the field of agriculture, will be fulfilled one year before the deadline.

The delegation visited the agricultural cooperative for Korean-Chinese friendship in Sanjong in Sunan County. This cooperative was built in December 1953 by 12 families of murdered patriots (small peasants), yet meanwhile it has turned into a major cooperative with 756 farms and more than 1,500 members. This cooperative owns 1620 hectares of land, 327 cows, 671 pigs, 13 tractors, 65 stationary threshers, 2 cars and 6 narrow gauge railroads. This year they have mostly harvested rice and cotton. Also illiteracy has been completely eradicated there. The cooperative has an emergency room, a primary school, childcare facilities, baths, a radio network and a club. In this cooperative we have already seen how the Korean peasants have entered the promising path towards a life in utmost dignity.

Korea also flourishes in cultural and educational terms. Currently there are 2.5 learners and students (on average there is one learner out of four inhabitants), and the number of students has reached 100,000. Comprehensive general high-school education is realized in the entire country on a mandatory basis. In some factories, almost 80 percent of the entire workforce masters the knowledge of high school graduates. The course of linking education to productive labor is applied in every respect. High school
graduates enter universities only after two years in production or in military service. University students do two month of productive labor every year.

[...] [Remarks on Korean music and dance performances during the Chinese delegation’s visit]

Living standards of the people have been raised substantially. A large number of apartments were built in cities and villages. The problems of clothing and feeding the people have also been resolved. Everybody we met was healthy and attractive. It must be emphasized that steadfastness, simplicity, industriousness and entrepreneurship remain the elements of the Korean people’s eminent style.

These great successes in building socialism in Korea were made possible thanks to the correct leadership of the KWP with Comrade Kim Il Sung at its helm, and thanks to the elevating enthusiasm of the entire Korean people. In addition, the assistance provided to the Korean people from the fraternal countries also had a certain impact.

The KWP defined the basic course for economic build-up like that: Simultaneous development of agriculture and light industry with priority development assigned to heavy industry. In addition, the KWP organized the Chollima Movement in the entire population to create the basis for self-reliant economic foundations. Countrywide more than 227,000 people participated in Chollima and thus accelerated the speed of socialist construction. All facts testify that the KWP course to build socialism in a rapid fashion is completely correct. Now the KWP has announced a Seven-Year-Plan to develop the economy. The implementation of the Seven-Year-Plan will turn Korea into a developed socialist industrial country. [...]
conversation, he informed me about the content of some of his conversations with Korean comrades on the occasion of the official visits he made.

First of all, he informed me about his conversation with the DPRK Minister of Higher Education, concerning the recall of Korean students from the ESCC (European Socialist Camp Countries), supposedly for the stay in the homeland during this year’s summer break (t.c.027.120 – meaning unknown). C. Moskovskii said that students were recalled from the Soviet Union as well. The DPRK Minister of Higher Education said it was because their cadre background report does not meet the requirements of the KWP and the Korean people. Indicative of it, as they say, is the fact that many students do not want to return to the homeland. They would rather already live in socialism than to help build it in Korean conditions. Many students who were recalled home for the summer break will not be coming back. Their cadre background will be reviewed, and only the best will be awarded this trust. In any case, namely those students who have served 3 years in the military or have worked in a factory will be eligible. All students are now at a learning camp and those among them will be chosen who are the most stalwart politically. The Minister said that all students went through exams and their knowledge of Marxism-Leninism in particular was evaluated. Korean comrades found serious shortcomings in the way Marxism-Leninism is being taught in the ESCC; students do not know much in that area, especially about Korea and Korean issues. Marxism-Leninism is being taught in the DPRK as well as anywhere else and even better. In response to that, c. Moskovskii is said to have commented that there actually are some differences in teaching Marxism-Leninism, and pointed out that in some Korean university textbooks “juche” can be found In his criticism of the way Marxism-Leninism is taught in the ESCC, the Minister is said to have talked strongly about the conditions in the GDR, which he blames for Korean students refusing to return home. C. Moskovskii said that there were about 6 cases in the USSR as well when Korean students refused to return to the DPRK. They say that Koreans tried to kidnap on of them in a sack, a very talented conservatory student. When c. Khrushchev learned about it, he got very angry and said that the Soviet Union was not America, and Koreans had to release the kidnapped student. Otherwise, Soviet comrades try to convince all Korean students that it is their duty to return home.

C. Moskovskii also told me that he has talked with c. Kim Il Sung twice since his arrival in the DPRK. He relayed to c. Kim Il Sung an invitation from c. Khrushchev for a therapy session in the Soviet Union. However, c. Kim Il Sung excused himself because he has a lot to do now when doctors allowed him to work. When he is able to free himself, he will surely accept the invitation because, as he says, nobody but Soviet comrades can help him. In a conversation with c. Moskovskii, c. Kim Il Sung asked him to assure c. Khrushchev that all attempts to drive a wedge between their two countries will fail, and that the relations between the two countries have never been as good as now. Even earlier during the visit last spring of c. Moskovskii as a head of the Soviet government delegation, c. Li Jaeseong said that Korean comrades fully agree with the policy of the USSR and the CPSU, but they cannot afford for the Chinese comrades to think that they do not agree with them. The memory of the Chinese volunteers is so strong and alive among the Korean people that any differences with the PRC would necessarily make its mark on the internal situation in the DPRK. Korean comrades were also said to be afraid after the XXII Congress to loosen their grip of the situation, so that
“it does not end up like with Choibalsan”. When c. Moskovskii took the office of ambassador to the DPRK, c. Khrushchev told him at the departure that it was necessary to do everything possible to win c. Kim Il Sung over and to strengthen his party line among vacillators, and he directly asked him to assure c. Kim Il Sung that attacks on Stalin’s personality cult have nothing to do with c. Kim Il Sung, that he can “sleep well and not suffer over it”. While saying good-bye, c. Kozlov told him that the personality cult exists in the DPRK but the personality cult of c. Kim Il Sung cannot be equaled to that of Stalin. A personality cult is not based on the number of pictures painted or how many times a leader is referred to. C. Kim Il Sung knows the situation and is in contact with the people. The Ch'ongsan-ni method is successful and is justified in current conditions. Soviet comrades look positively at measures taken by Korean comrades in industry and agriculture. As the main dangers for Koreans, they see spreading nationalism and tendencies towards isolationism. They admit that Korean nationalism is very strong. C. Moskovskii stated that nationalism is widespread namely among the cadres. Common people have a good attitude towards foreigners.

During a visit with the Minister of International Trade, Li Ilgyeong, the Minister assured c. Moskovskii that they will never betray the friendship with the Soviet Union and the numerous Soviet friends. He expressed a concern about the economic negotiations between the USSR and Japan. Japan, he says, is on the verge of an economic crisis, and, according to the opinion of the Minister, the USSR is helping them to postpone the crisis.

C. Moskovskii also said Korean comrades told him that a USSR party/government delegation may come to the DPRK anytime at its convenience either in the fall or in the spring. C. Moskovskii did not say directly whether c. Khrushchev is expected to head the delegation.

I thanked c. Ambassador for the friendly welcome and the information, and, considering the very good relations of our staff with the Soviet embassy, and the major personnel changes at our as well as the USSR embassy, I asked him that Soviet friends extend their goodwill and support also to our successors, as it has been to us. C. Moskovskii said that he would do his best in order that the relations between our embassies develop as friendly as possible. He knows c. Moravec and is looking forward to working with him.

I do not include a more detailed characteristic of c. Moskovskii since he is a well-known personality also in the CSSR. He is establishing himself in the diplomatic corps in Pyongyang very nicely. His interaction with our embassy is especially friendly, which indicates a very good personal attitude towards the CSSR.

Recorded: Durcak
08/28/1962
For your information, we attached a recorded conversation of the Cs. Ambassador in the DPRK c. Moravec with the USSR ambassador c. Moskovskii and the GDR ambassador c. Becker. In connection with the complaint of c. Kim Il Sung, included on page 7 of this report, we are preparing an instruction for the staff of our embassy in Pyongyang.

Head of department
Memorandum of a conversation with the USSR Ambassador c. V.P. Moskovskii and the GDR Ambassador c. Otto Becker.

On 23rd April of this year, the GDR Ambassador invited me to his office for a meeting along with the USSR Ambassador c. Moskovskii. C. Becker then informed us about his visit at the KWP CC Deputy Chairman c. Bak Kim Cheol, and said that c. Bak Kim Cheol welcomed him very friendly, started with the development of the DPRK and continued talking about cooperation of the DPRK with the GDR. He said that the DPRK is very interested in cooperation with the GDR namely when it comes to the economy. At the same time he informed c. Becker that comrade Kim Il Sung instructed party and government officials to keep strengthening decisively economic ties with all socialist camp countries.

Comrade Becker then wanted to lead the conversation to political issues and informed c. Bak Kim Cheol about the resolution of the VI. SED Convention, namely about the 7 platform points and how they were received by the international communist movement. C. Bak Kim Cheol listened and then turned to the issues of development in South Korea and to the possibilities of a peaceful unification of the country. He said that the DPRK adheres in principle to the plan of creating a confederacy of the two parts of Korea, as c. Kim Il Sung talked about it in a government exposé in October of this year. However, the main objective of the DPRK today is to facilitate an overthrow in South Korea of the military junta of Pak Chung Hi. C. Becker pointed out that he was amazed by the fact that c. Bak Kim Cheol did not talk about the USA and the necessity to drive Americans from the South, and talked only about Pak Chung Hi. He stressed that, on the contrary, c. Bak Kim Cheol emphasized the necessity of a peaceful unification, which, of course, will not be possible before the rule of Pak Chung Hi is overthrown. In connection with that, he told c. Becker that he believes SED proposals for creation of a confederation of the both German states is a viable policy and that the DPRK supports all GDR...
proposals in this matter, namely for signing a peace treaty with Germany (he did not mention the USSR proposals at all).

He then said that the DPRK supported very decisively the GDR government’s provision from the 13th August 1961, and that the DPRK will continue supporting as well all correct decisions of the GDR government.

C. Becker further informed us that the Headquarters made him aware that Chinese diplomats must have received instructions to engage in conversations about various opinions concerning the communist movement. German comrades think that the purpose of these conversations is probing for and collecting of the opinions from our fraternal parties, so that they could use them in negotiations and for possible argumentation against the CPSU CC. German comrades reject such conversations in principle and consider them as an attempt to transfer these differences in opinion into international relations.

Next, c. Moskovsky informed us about his visit with c. Kim Il Sung (my record no. 0013/63). He said that he visited him on 22nd April and that the conversation took almost two hours. First, he gave him a copy of “memorable notes” and briefly informed him about its content. He also asked c. Kim Il Sung for his opinion about the matter. C. Kim Il Sung, however, remained quiet and, after few minutes of an awkward pause, he offered c. Moskovsky that he would inform him about the current situation in the DPRK. C. Moskovsky welcomed this offer and then c. Kim Il Sung briefly described:

1) The economic situation in the DPRK. He said they succeeded in meeting the quarter year plan but especially recently, a disproportion between the mining and processing industries is deepening considerably. Coal and ore mines are said to be falling very much behind and failing to satisfy consumption. Because of that, it is said that the KWP CC was forced, after a thorough review of the situation, to revise the investment policy and to introduce decisive measures for curtailing further growth of the processing industry. A considerable part of investments, they said, then had to be transferred to the mining industry. This step is said to necessarily mean suspension of further construction of processing plants. On the other hand, they say, the existing, already realised investments will be fully utilized in their current capacity.

2) In connection with that, he informed c. Moskovskii the KWP CC is currently dealing intensively with the issues of directing enterprises and namely with both the science-technology and theoretical-economic aspect of the industrial development of the DPRK. He allegidly told c. Moskovskii that in connection with this, the KWP CC was organizing for May a plenary meeting (KWP CC members allegidly have not been informed about it yet), the agenda of which would consist of two points. First, the KWP CC would listen to reports from chairmen of KWP PO (Parent Organizations) from the most important plants like in Teen, Chongjin and so on (altogether about 20), and second, they will deal with the complexities of directing enterprises and with the theoretical-economic issues of industrial production.

C. Kim Il Sung also informed c. Moskovskii that the KWP CC recently organized a meeting together with science/technology professionals and theoretical economists. Of course, the KWP CC leaders studies in detail the situation in these sectors. It is said that at the meeting, c. Kim Il Sung had to strongly criticize the irresponsible approach and other shortcomings in the work of these professionals. He is said to have pointed out openly a number of shortcomings, especially not applying in
production (the results of) science/technological experiments and not being interested in them, an irresponsible approach of science/technology cadres to collecting and generalizing of practical experience, that not a single scientific or technological paper has been published in the DPRK so far from which namely students and workers could gain a deeper understanding of the given issues. C. Kim Il Sung is said to have condemned yet another lack of interest in economics theory. C. Kim Il Sung talked with great indignation about a serious shortage in the DPRK of any, albeit concise textbooks of industrial economy that would help economists, as well as workers, to better familiarize themselves with the most basic issues of the socialist economy.

He said that the KWP CC is now dealing very intensively with these issues and ordered the competent leading professionals to commence compilation of the required textbooks.

3) In connection with the current situation in managing the national economy, c. Kim Il Sung is said to have informed c Moskovskii that the KWP CC has decided to establish about 20 experimental regional centers (in regions where industry is concentrated) where a new management method should be tested. The KWP CC was forced to take this step allegedly because there is still deep confusion and indecision in carrying out the duties of a chief engineer and namely of enterprise party organizations’ chairmen. Considering these shortcomings, the KWP CC decided to appoint experienced political operatives from the CC, who also have professional qualifications, as heads of organizations in these industrial centers. Current chairmen of organizations in predominantly industrial regions were appointed as deputy chairmen. However, most of these old chairmen are said to have been transferred to the lead positions in agricultural management committees because they dealt mostly with agricultural issues in the past anyway, and neglected the industrial issues most of the time.

C. Kim Il Sung also pointed out to c. Moskovskii that this system (obviously a Korean application of Soviet experience) still needs many clarifications, especially in the supervision of the chief engineer’s work. The purpose of this new system is to be, among other things, ensuring the science-technological development and consistent implementation of the principles of socialist economics in the economy of the DPRK.

4) As for the agriculture, c. Kim Il Sung informed c. Moskovskii that the Korean village currently suffers from many shortcomings, the most serious of which is still insufficient mechanization and also severe shortage of workforce. At the same time, the Korean agriculture is facing this year a serious challenge of expanding the arable area for planting rice by 70 thousand (square) “chongbo” (1 “chongbo” is 1000 steps or squared, about 0.99 ha), so that the total area reserved for rice would reach 600,000 “chongbo” by fall. Of course, that requires further irrigation. The Korean village is seriously hindered by predominantly primitive way of land cultivation. It is said to be very easy for Soviet comrades to develop virgin lands – they can deploy numerous tractors and other state-of-the-art equipment for this work. However, in the DPRK, everything depends on manual labor that is mostly on the same level as it was centuries ago. They say the irrigation system has been and to a large degree is being built the same way. The KWP CC therefore decided that it is necessary to shift majority of investments towards procurement of the needed machinery. A considerable part of the investments will also be set aside for finishing the irrigation systems, especially the distribution hubs.
In the following conversation, c. Kim Il Sung mentioned to c. Moskovskii the task of securing sufficient workforce for the village, outlined by the plenary of the KWP CC. He said that agriculture suffers from large shortage of people; therefore, they issued a strict ban on hiring new workers from agriculture for industrial jobs. Nevertheless, they say, it does not mean that the growth of the workers class will be in jeopardy. They said that before discussing this matter, the KWP CC conducted a thorough investigation and found that in cities, there is a sufficient number of women who can immediately start doing lighter work and make men available for those industry sectors that demand hard physical labor. They supported this statement with the example of the city Chongjin where there are allegedly in reserve 9,000 women capable to take an industrial job anytime.

On the other hand, there is the requirement to strengthen the village with new workers. The KWP CC and the DPRK government is said to have initiated steps for sending in the nearest future urban workers to help in agriculture. (According to our information reported recently, about a million workers from cities are to be sent to work in agriculture.)

5) C. Kim Il Sung shared with c. Moskovskii an interesting piece of information about South Korea as well.

He told him that everything seems to indicate that what in South Korea is slowly getting energized is especially intelligentsia, which, expressing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, is more and more openly demanding national independence and sovereignty. Growing number of anonymous articles (probably editorials) in the South Korean press is said to be indicative of it. C. Kim Il Sung also expressed an opinion that especially the last days of political chaos in South Korea when students are becoming energized, show new moments. Admittedly, he says, it does not mean that the situation is ripe for a revolution but, he claims, it clearly shows that the crisis there is ripening.

In connection with that, he says, the DPRK economy, which must become the main revolutionizing factor for South Korean citizens, will play progressively more important role. C. Moskovskii (for whom this argument was very surprising because it was completely ignored in the DPRK lately) allegedly could not help telling c. Kim Il Sung that this was eventually a Leninist approach. C. Kim Il Sung smiled and said that it was actually a very correct idea of Lenin.

6) Later in his conversation about South Korea and namely about challenges in front of the DPRK after the unification of the country, c. Kim Il Sung stressed the issues of ideology.

First of all he told c. Moskovskii that he has studied all c. Khrushchev’s papers concerning ideological methods of the CPSU, and that he liked much of what c. Khrushchev said, especially when it comes to the work with artists. He told him, to the word: “it is necessary to have a very good grip of this audience and not to loosen the reins.” Talking about the ideological work of the KWP, he showed that they now have to engage especially the young people who think that “the smokestacks have always been here and (illegible) as well as other houses just grew on their own.” That’s why the KWP now works diligently on the class theory education. Attention is focused in this direction also because after the unification of the both parts of the country, a bitter struggle is
expected to ensue with all kinds of bourgeoisie influences, which is what not only communists and komsomols must be ready for, but also all citizens of the DPRK. How soon and successfully they deal with the next stage of struggle that awaits them is said to depend on how well the KWP manages to educate and make stalwart the working class as well as all the DPRK workers.

At the end of his meeting with c. Moskovskii, c. Kim Il Sung complained about the recently recalled counsel-ambassador c. Krukov. He told c. Moskovskii that c. Krukov, who had been in the DPRK since 1959, obviously forgot that something had changed in the DPRK. As he stayed in the DPRK in times when the country was only being built and staff members, namely in the Foreign Ministry, were new and inexperienced, it was only natural that they turned to the Soviet comrades for advice. It was in times, as explained, when the Soviet and some few other embassies of the SCC (Socialist Camp Countries) were accepted not merely as embassies but rather as centers of fraternal council. C. Krukov then allegedly made many friends among ministers and other party or government leaders. However, at that time he got used to openly talking about various measures of the KWP CC and the DPRK government at all kinds of social gatherings. Now, when the DPRK is entering into diplomatic relations with many non-socialist countries, such public comments could have serious consequences and could in the best case weaken our unity. That’s why c. Kim Il Sung, as he says, wants to bring this behavior of c. Krukov to c. Moskovskii’s attention and to explain why none of c. Krukov’s former friends among ministers and KWP leaders came to say good-bye. C. Kim Il Sung also told c. Moskovskii not to interpret it that they were against criticism. On the contrary, they said, they would appreciate if they are made aware of other different opinions at “in office” meetings with any comrade at the Ministry or Party organizations; just that these opinions should not be pronounced at official occasions.

C. Kim Il Sung is said to have concluded this complaint with an assurance that they had no issues with the work of c. Moskovskii or any other staff members of the USSR Embassy.

While talking with us, c. Moskovskii offered a conjecture that, aside of any comments about c. Krukov’s behavior, the target of this complaint may have been the reaction of c. Moskovskii and myself to the appearance of c. Bak Seungcheul at the conference of local titularies, for which c. Bak Seungcheul later apologized, saying that his presentation was not very well thought through. (addition of my record no. 0100/63).

At the conclusion of our conversation, c. Moskovskii added that the Romanian ambassador c. Bednarash told him that the Korean comrades asked even the PRB for delivery of 60,000 tones of wheat in exchange for 30,000 tones of rice.

Ambassador

(illegible)
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