



**THE CARTER CHILL:**  
US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976-1979  
A Critical Oral History Conference



Conference organized by:



Organized with Generous Financial Support from:



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Dear Conference Participant:

We are pleased to present you this “Briefing Book,” which is intended to facilitate and enrich the discussion at our upcoming conference on trilateral relations between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea from 1976 through 1979, to be held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on December 3-4, 2013. The volume consists of selected documents from archives in the United States, South Korea, (East) Germany, Romania, Hungary, Australia, the United Kingdom, the former Yugoslavia, and the United Nations, that we hope will refresh memories, provide context, and help anchor the conversation in the facts.

This collection, compiled by the North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) with the help of many others, is by no means comprehensive, just as the conference will not be the final word on the “Carter Chill” in Korea. However, in selecting the materials, the NKIDP sought to include some of the most important materials available and made a substantial effort to mine relevant official archives. Our goal was to emphasize materials that are either newly available or previously unpublished but at the same time incorporate other records that offer important insights into the crises. The briefing book is organized chronologically, starting with April 1976 and the U.S. presidential race which culminated in Jimmy Carter’s election, and ending with December 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Park Chung Hee’s death.

In compiling these documents, the NKIDP received much appreciated cooperation and assistance from scholars, archivists, and other colleagues from several countries, reflecting the multinational scope of this project. We are particularly grateful to Shin Jongdae for contributing documents from the South Korean diplomatic archives; Eliza Gheorghe for both obtaining and translating documents from the Romanian archives, and for contributing materials from the National Archives in Kew; Bernd Schaefer for contributing documents from Germany; Balazs Szalontai for contributing Hungarian documents; Charles Kraus for contributing documents from the Jimmy Carter Library; James Person for obtaining materials from the United Nations Archives; and Jooeun Kim for her work in the National Archives in Kew.

We would also like to recognize the team of NKIDP interns and junior scholars who worked diligently to make sure the briefing book was ready for dissemination: Minji Kim, Arielle Shorr, Soomin Oh, Woorim “Phoebe” Moon, and Misun Kim. For their sage advice, we would also like to thank Ambassador Sun Jounyung, Charles Armstrong, and Gregg Brazinsky.

We are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose support made this conference possible. Last but not least, we would like to thank Jane Harman, President, Director, and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and Dr. Michael Van Dusen, Executive Vice President, for providing Center resources for this conference.

North Korea International Documentation Project  
History and Public Policy Program



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**BRIEFING BOOK**  
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### *Chronology of Events*

## 1976

- 22 January 1976      **President Park Cancels Nuclear Deal with France**  
Under mounting pressure from the US, ROK President Park Chung Hee agrees to cancel a nuclear reprocessing deal with France.
- 16 February 1976    **Report on the Illegal Activities of KCIA**  
US Congressman Donald M. Fraser submits a report to the House of Representatives on the illegal activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in the United States.
- 1 March 1976        **Activists Issue the Declaration of National Democratic Salvation**  
Dissident Jaeya activists issue the Declaration of National Democratic Salvation at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul.
- 17 March 1976      **Jimmy Carter Publicly Suggests Removing Nuclear Devices from ROK**  
Jimmy Carter tells a *Washington Post* reporter that the US should remove roughly 7,000 nuclear devices from South Korea.
- 2 April 1976        **Prime Minister of Pakistan Visits Pyongyang**  
Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, arrives in Pyongyang to meet with DPRK President Kim Il Sung.
- Congressman Fraser Asks Ford to Reconsider Aid**  
Citing human rights concerns, US Congressman Donald M. Fraser and 118 other congressmen ask President Ford to reconsider military aid to the ROK.
- 27 April 1976      **President of Madagascar Visits Pyongyang**  
Didier Ratsiraka, President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, arrives in Pyongyang to meet with DPRK President Kim Il Sung.
- 14 May 1976        **Prime Minister of Mali Arrives in Pyongyang**  
Moussa Traore, Chairman of the Military Committee of National Liberation, Head of State, and Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Mali, arrives in Pyongyang for meetings with DPRK President Kim Il Sung.
- 18 May 1976        **Delegation of Swedish Foreign Ministry Arrives in North Korea**  
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs official Leif Leifland arrives in North Korea to discuss Korea at the UN and the future of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).
- 20 May 1976        **Fifth Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement**  
The fifth conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is held in Colombo, Sri Lanka. North Korea plans an elaborate propaganda campaign

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in anticipation of Kim Il Sung's personal participation, but the members of the NAM disapprove of North Korea joining the organization.

- 25 May 1976      **DPRK Establishes Relations with Nigeria**  
North Korea establishes relations with the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- 26 May 1976      **Ninth Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting**  
The Ninth Annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) opens in Honolulu and concludes on May 27.
- 4 June 1976      **President of Madagascar Visits Pyongyang**  
Didier Ratsiraka, President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, arrives in Pyongyang to meet with DPRK President Kim Il Sung.
- 15 June 1976      **US and ROK Representatives Discuss Nuclear Cooperation**  
US and ROK representatives hold discussions and reach an agreement on nuclear cooperation in Washington, D.C.
- 23 June 1976      **Carter's Campaign Promise on Korea**  
During a routine campaign speech, US presidential candidate Jimmy Carter announces his desire to withdraw American troops from South Korea and his extreme dissatisfaction with South Korea's human rights record.
- 10 July 1976      **President of Benin Arrives in Pyongyang**  
Mathieu Kérékou, President of the People's Republic of Benin, arrives in Pyongyang for meeting with DPRK President Kim Il Sung
- 23 July 1976      **Kissinger Suggests Four-Party Talks**  
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suggests a cross recognition between the Koreas and their allies, a convening of four-party talks on Korea, and the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea to the United Nations.
- 18 August 1976      **Axe Murder Incident**  
North Korean soldiers kill American soldiers with axes at Panmunjeom's Joint Security Area (JSA), in what came to be known as the Axe Murder Incident or the Poplar Tree Incident.
- 19 August 1976      **DOD Orders State of Emergency After Panmunjeom Incident**  
The US Department of Defense orders American troops in South Korea to assume a state of emergency and to transfer military forces and weapons to Okinawa, following the incident at Panmunjeom.
- 20 August 1976      **DPRK Ambassador to Denmark Expelled**  
DPRK ambassador to Denmark and 3 other diplomats expelled for illegally selling drugs, cigarettes and liquor



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- 21 August 1976      **Americans Chop Down Panmunjeom Tree**  
Americans uproot the tree which triggered the Panmunjeom Incident and demolish the outpost of the North Korean sentinel, while mobilizing a large number of military personnel, helicopters, and bombers.
- 30 August 1976      **DPRK Disconnects telephone Hot Line with ROK**  
The DPRK suspends the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line.
- 24 October 1976      ***Washington Post* Exposes “Koreagate” Scandal**  
The *Washington Post* publishes the headline "Seoul Gave Millions to US Officials", exposing the “Koreagate” scandal in which South Korean agents bribed US Congressmen and other officials.
- 26 October 1976      **DPRK Diplomats Deported from Finland**  
Four North Korean diplomats are deported from Finland due to involvement in smuggling.
- 28 November 1976      **Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Opposes Troop Withdrawals**  
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, citing the role of Korea in the stability of East Asia, expresses his opposition to the troop withdrawal proposal put forth by Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter.
- 3 December 1976      **Department of State Assistant Secretary Hummel on US Troop Levels**  
Arthur W. Hummel Jr, assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, states that troops stationed in Korea will be maintained at current levels.

## 1977

- 1 January 1977      **Kim Il Sung Proposes Peace Treaty with US**  
Kim Il Sung proposes a peace treaty with the United States in his New Year's address. Kim also mentions that DPRK should ease the strains created in some branches of the economy, implicitly admitting that the 6 year plan is not a success
- 4 January 1977      **President Ford cautions Against Sudden Changes in Korea Policy**  
US President Ford warns that sudden changes in Korea policy would be harmful and would negatively affect relations with Japan, China, and the USSR.
- 5 January 1977      **The *New York Times* says Troop Reductions will Cause Alarm**  
The *New York Times* says that US troops stationed in Korea serve as a check against the Soviets, and a reduction in forces will even alarm China.
- 9 January 1977      **General Vessey Criticizes Troop Withdrawals**

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General Vessey is quoted in a *Washington Post* article stating that a military withdrawal from Korea would heighten the risk of war.

- 11 January 1977     **Secretary of State Vance says ROK, Japan to be Consulted on Troop Reductions**  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance testifies in Congress that South Korea and Japan will be consulted on the proposed reduction of American troops in the Republic of Korea.
- 12 January 1977     **President Park Calls for Non-Aggression Pact**  
President Park Chung Hee calls for a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea as a precondition for his non-opposition to US troop withdrawals.
- 16 January 1977     **US Department of Defense States No Plans for Troop Withdrawals**  
The US Department of Defense clarifies that there are no plans to withdraw or relocate troops stationed in Korea.
- 25 January 1977     **DPRK Proposes Inter-Korean Talks**  
North Korea indirectly rejects South Korea's proposal for a non-aggression pact and instead proposes a joint conference attended by all North and South Korean political parties and social organizations.
- 26 January 1977     **NSC-13 Calls for Review of Korea Policy**  
Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-13 is issued, calling for a broad review of US Korea policy, including the possibility of reducing US conventional force levels.
- 31 January 1977     **Secretary of State Vance Rejects US-North Korean Relations**  
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance states that there will be no contact with North Korea without consultations with and agreement from South Korea.
- 1 February 1977     **Vice President Mondale Meets Fukuda**  
US Vice President Walter Mondale meets with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo and asserts that the US will "preserve a balanced and flexible military strength in the Pacific."
- 15 February 1977     **Carter Writes to Park on Troop Withdrawals, Human Rights**  
US President Carter sends a letter to Park Chung Hee affirming the US commitment to Korean security, but still raises the issue of troop withdrawals and human rights in South Korea.
- 23 February 1977     **Secretary of Defense Brown says Counteroffensive Capabilities in Pacific Must not Change**  
US Secretary of Defense Brown states in Congress that even if there is a change in US troops stationed in Korea, America's counteroffensive

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capabilities must be retained at current levels in the Pacific.

- 28 February 1977 **Brzezinski Emphasizes Role for ROK in US-DPRK Contact**  
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that in light of North Korea's efforts to establish contact with the US, it is important to maintain the stance that the US will “discuss matters bearing on Korea's future provided representatives of ROKG are present.”
- 3 March 1977 **Carter asks for \$280 Million in Military Aid to ROK**  
The Carter Administration requests congressional approval of a military aid package worth \$280 million for South Korea.
- 5 March 1977 **Carter: American Forces will be Withdrawn**  
President Carter writes handwritten memo to US National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance stating that “American forces will be withdrawn.”
- 7 March 1977 **JCS Advocates a Phased Withdrawal**  
In response to NSC-13, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advise Secretary of Defense Brown that a phased withdrawal through September 30, 1982, along with continuously reviewing the situation, is preferable.
- ROK Foreign Minister Criticizes Troop Withdrawals**  
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin criticizes the withdrawal or reduction of US troops in the ROK.
- 9 March 1977 **Carter States 4-5 Year Period for Ground Force Withdrawals**  
President Carter states that US ground forces will be withdrawn over a period of 4 to 5 years, and the US Air Force will remain in Korea.
- 10 March 1977 **President Carter Meets ROK Foreign Minister**  
President Carter, in a meeting with Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin, states that US troop withdrawals are contingent on the enhancement of South Korean military capabilities.
- 22 March 1977 **General Vessey: Nuclear South Korea a Possibility**  
General Vessey, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea, states that there is a possibility that South Korea may develop nuclear weapons if their self-defense capabilities are threatened.
- 21 April 1977 **PRC Meeting Discusses Combat Force Withdrawal**  
The Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting, involving Vance, Holbrooke, Habib, and Brzezinski, concluded that no one favored a quick withdrawal of combat forces from Korea, and that there should be flexibility with the withdrawal schedule.

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- 23 April 1977      **Kim Il Sung Skeptical of Carter's Campaign Pledges**  
In a talk with the executive managing editor of *Yomiuri Shinbun*, Kim Il Sung notes his skepticism of Carter's campaign promises and condemns the South for hampering with unification efforts of the North.
- 5 May 1977        **Presidential Decision 12 on Troop Withdrawals Issued**  
Jimmy Carter issues Presidential Decision 12, ordering substantial troop withdrawals from Korea, including the removal of one brigade by the end of 1978 and the complete removal of all ground forces by 1981-1982.
- 16 May 1977      **The Pentagon Submits Detailed Plan for Initial Withdrawal**  
The US Department of Defense submits to the White House a plan for withdrawing the first two brigades of the Second Infantry Division and for providing additional military assistance to the ROK.
- 25 May 1977      **General Brown and former assistant secretary of state Habib Meet with Park Chung Hee**  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Harold Brown and former assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs Philip Habib meet with President Park to discuss US ground force withdrawals, as well as human rights issues.
- 8 June 1977       **Former KCIA Director states Park Tong Sun is an Intelligence Agent**  
Former Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) director Kim Hyung Wook states that Park Tong Sun is a Korean intelligence agent.
- 11 June 1977     **Senate Foreign Relations Committee Investigates Troop Withdrawals**  
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee calls for a thorough investigation of Carter's troop withdrawal policy, stating that it is a campaign promise which does not take into consideration the actual circumstances of the Korean Peninsula.
- 20 June 1977     **Kim Il Sung Criticizes Partial Troop Withdrawal**  
In an interview with the Editor-in-Chief of *Le Monde*, Kim Il Sung criticizes the planned US troop withdrawal for being only partial, not total.
- 21 June 1977     **Senate Minority Leader Baker requests Delay in Troop Withdrawals**  
US Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker requests a delay in troop withdrawals.
- 27 June 1977     **JCS Backchannel Messages Delivered to Congress**  
The US Department of Defense turns over a large number of politically sensitive Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) messages concerning the troop withdrawal issue to the Stratton Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

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- 2 August 1977 **Commander in Chief Vessey Concerned about Withdrawals**  
John Vessey, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, expresses concern over withdrawal of ground forces.
- 24 August 1977 **Park Tong Sun Insists he did not Bribe US Congressmen**  
Park Tong Sun states in a press conference after being investigated by the Seoul District Prosecutors office that he has not bribed US congressmen, and therefore does not need to be interrogated by the US Congress.
- Tito in Pyongyang**  
Yugoslavia President, Marshal Tito, visits Pyongyang for talks with Kim Il Sung.
- 6 September 1977 **Department of Justice Indicts Park Tong Son**  
The US Department of Justice indicts Park Tong Son on thirty-six counts conspiring to bribe US Congressmen, defrauding the government, mail fraud, racketeering, and illegal campaign contributions.
- 8 September 1977 **Carter writes to Park about Koreagate**  
The White House announces that the President has sent a personal letter to President Park Chung Hee requesting cooperation on the investigation regarding Park Tong Sun.
- 10 September 1977 **Carter Pushes Forward on Troop Withdrawals**  
US President Carter states that he will push forward with plans to withdraw troops from Korea regardless of whether Congress passes a military aid package.
- 29 September 1977 **DPRK uses Yugoslavia Channel to Reach out to US**  
Edvard Kardelj of Yugoslavia, on his visit to the US, transmits a message from North Korea concerning their interest in holding bilateral talks with the US.
- 1 October 1977 **Carter says South Korea Must be Involved in US-DPRK Talks**  
US President Carter notes that he is willing to participate in talks with North Korea under the condition that South Korea also participates.
- 22 October 1977 **Carter Asks for \$800 Million in Military Equipment Transfers**  
As a measure to prevent the weakening of Korean defense capabilities, President Carter submits a bill to Congress that authorizes the transfer of \$800 million in military equipment.
- 6 November 1977 **Brown says Koreagate is Harming Weapons Transfers**  
Secretary of Defense Brown expresses concern over the Park Tong Sun issue, stating that it is harming the congressional authorization of weapons transfers to South Korea.

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- 6 December 1977     **Vance Links Koreagate, Human Rights to US Aid**  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance states in an interview that if the ROK government does not show flexibility in the Park Tong Sun case and human rights issues, then this would have negative consequences on US aid to Korea.
- 13 December 1977   **Congress told of North Korea's Military Advantages**  
The US Congress learns that North Korea is engaged in a "major, long-term buildup" of its military, with a "sizable" advantage in weaponry over South Korea.

## 1978

- 17 January 1978     **Carter writes to Park on Human Rights, Koreagate**  
President Carter sends a letter to President Park Chung Hee, noting the improvements on human rights and successes in negotiating the Park Tongsun case and reaffirms his efforts to get congressional approval for compensation for troop withdrawals.
- 2 February 1978     **Carter Requests Approval for \$330 Million Aid Package**  
The Carter administration requests congressional approval of \$330 million aid package to South Korea.
- 6 February 1978     **US Army Chief of Staff Urges Military Equipment Transfers to Korea**  
US Army Chief of Staff Rogers points out problems of the withdrawal policy and urges the transfer of military equipment to Korea.
- 3 March 1978         **South Korea Urges Resumption of SNCC Talks**  
The South Korean representative of the South North Coordination Committee (SNCC) urges the resumption of talks
- 7 March 1978         **Tito Meets Carter, Delivering Message from Kim Il Sung**  
Yugoslav President Tito visits President Carter, and delivers Kim Il Sung's message of wanting bilateral talks with the US, but not in the presence of Park Chung Hee.
- 4 April 1978         **Senator Glenn Expresses Concern about Troop Withdrawals**  
Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, sends a letter to President Carter expressing concern over the premature nature of troop withdrawals, given the Koreagate scandal and the delay in the proposed military aid.
- 11 April 1978         **Carter Advisers Conclude Koreagate Complicates Troop Withdrawals**  
Carter's closest advisers, including Brzezinski, Vance, Brown, and Holbrooke, conclude that it is difficult to obtain congressional approval of

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any aid package to Korea due to the Park Tong Sun affair and consider the implications for the president's creditability in East Asia if troop withdrawals are postponed.

- 21 April 1978      **Carter Announces Adjustments to Troop Withdrawals**  
US President Carter announces a revised schedule for withdrawing the first brigade of the Second Division
- 5 May 1978        **Hua Guofeng in Pyongyang**  
Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP and Premier of the PRC, arrives in Pyongyang as part of an official visit to North Korea. Hua discusses bilateral relations, inter-Korean relations, and the Non-Aligned Movement with his North Korean counterparts.
- 10 May 1978      **CIA Suggests Military Balance Favors North Korea**  
A report on the military balance on the Korean Peninsula issued by the CIA National Foreign Assessment Center states that the military situation favors North Korea by a substantial margin.
- 17 May 1978      **Carter Reassures Park**  
US President Carter writes to President Park Chung Hee in an effort to reassure him of the US commitment to maintaining a military balance on the peninsula. Carter also maintains that the US will continue to decline direct bilateral talks with North Korea.
- 20 May 1978      **Brzezinski Meets Huang Hua**  
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua to discuss the Korea question, inter-Korean relations, and US troop withdrawals from South Korea.
- 25 May 1978      **Brzezinski Meets Park Chung Hee**  
US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski meets with President Park Chung Hee to discuss two recent exchanges between the US and China regarding Korea.
- 20 July 1978      **Carter Assures Congress that Troop Reductions are Flexible**  
US President Carter sends a letter to House Speaker Tip O'Neill, assuring him that troop withdrawal will not follow a rigid schedule but will take into consideration the prevailing circumstances. Carter also urges Congress to approve equipment transfers and sales to Korea.
- 26 July 1978      **Senate Authorizes Military Equipment Transfers to Korea**  
The US Senate passes a bill authorizing the transfer of military equipment to Korea amounting to \$1.1 billion.
- 1 August 1978     **Holbrooke Admits US-DPRK Contact**

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Holbrooke states that there have been five instances of contact between North Korea and the US, but that the Carter administration discusses such things in advance with the ROK.

- 15 August 1978 **Park Urges North Korea to Resume Dialogue**  
President Park Chung Hee states that the era of unifying the Korean Peninsula under a communist military force is gone and urges North Korea to resume dialogue and economic cooperation with South Korea.
- 30 August 1978 **Congress Criticizes South Korea**  
Forty-two members of the House of Representatives write a letter to President Carter criticizing Korean domestic policies and the electoral system in that country.
- 13 September 1978 **SNU Students Demonstrate against Yushin**  
Two-thousand students from Seoul National University stage a demonstration demanding the abolition of the Yushin constitution.
- 15 September 1978 **Kim Il Sung Visits Beijing**  
Kim Il Sung visits Beijing to reciprocate the earlier visit by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. Kim reiterates North Korea's friendship with China, and acknowledges Chinese assistance during the Korean War.
- 1 October 1978 **North Korean Tunnel Discovered**  
A North Korean tunnel under the Demilitarized Zone is discovered.
- 17 December 1978 **ROK Amnesties Violators of Emergency Measures**  
The ROK government grants special amnesty to 106 violators of the emergency measures.
- 20 December 1978 **Nixon Urges Carter to Reconsider Troop Plan**  
In a letter to President Carter, former US president Richard Nixon urges him to reconsider his decision on troop withdrawals or, at the very least, to substantially increase military aid to Korea.
- 27 December 1978 **Park Chung Hee Sworn in for Fifth Term**  
Park Chung Hee is sworn in for his fifth term as the President of the Republic of Korea.

## **1979**

- 19 January 1979 **Park Proposes Resumption of Inter-Korean Dialogue**  
South Korean President Park Chung Hee proposes an unconditional resumption of dialogue at any place, any time, any level between North and South Korea.



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- 22 January 1979      **Carter Revises Troop Withdrawal Plan**  
In PRM-45, President Carter takes account of new intelligence estimates and decides that further troop withdrawals will be held in abeyance until the administration examines the impact of the newly assessed North Korean military strength.
- 23 January 1979      **DFRF Offers Four-Point Proposal**  
The Central Committee of the Democratic Front of the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF) responds positively to President Park's proposal on January 19th, offers a four-point proposal for accelerating the reunification process, including holding a grand national convention.
- 26 January 1979      **ROK Government Responds to DFRF**  
The ROK Government issues a response to the DPRK's 23 January proposal, stating that a preliminary meeting between the “responsible authorities” should be held to discuss all problems raised so far by both sides.
- 9 February 1979      **Carter Announces Freeze on Troop Withdrawals**  
President Carter announces that he has placed the troop withdrawal schedule in abeyance pending a reassessment of certain changed circumstances on the Korean Peninsula.
- 17 February 1979      **North and South Korean Delegations Meet**  
The ROK delegation for the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the North Korean “Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland” meet in Panmunjom. The North Korean delegation rejects the SNCC as a framework for future contacts, and argues for a large-scale conference on reunification.
- 28 February 1979      **Carter’s Visit to Korea Announced**  
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin announces plans for US President Carter to visit South Korea for a summit with Park Chung Hee.
- 5 March 1979      **Korean Activities Urge Carter on Human Rights**  
Ham Sok Hon, Yun Po Sun, and Kim Dae Jung write to President Carter to express that Carter's planned visit to Seoul should be preceded by improvements in South Korea’s human rights. They also indicate that US troop withdrawals will lend greater support to the dictatorial measures of the Park regime.
- 10 April 1979      **ROK Refuses to Recognize North Korea’s DFRF**  
The ROK delegation for the South-North Coordinating Committee refuses to meet the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF), stating that the delegates were not “responsible authorities” of North Korea.

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- 20 April 1979      **The US and ROK Announce Carter's June Visit to Seoul**  
The US and ROK governments announce that President Carter will visit South Korea at President Park Chung Hee's invitation in June 1979.
- 2 May 1979        **UN Secretary General Visits North Korea**  
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim visits Pyongyang and meets with Kim Il Sung.
- 4 May 1979        **UN Secretary General Visits South Korea**  
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim visits Seoul and meets with Park Chung Hee.
- 7 May 1979        **Kim Yeong-nam Wants US-DPRK Talks before Trilateral Talks**  
In interviews with Western and Japanese journalists in Pyongyang, Kim Yeong-nam suggests that South Korea could take part in trilateral or multilateral talks only after North Korea opens negotiations with the US.
- 10 May 1979      **Senate Freezes US Troop Levels in Korea**  
The Senate Armed Services Committee freezes US troop levels in Korea.
- 29 June 1979     **Carter in Korea**  
US President Carter visits Korea and meets with President Park Chung Hee.
- 1 July 1979       **US-Korea Joint Communique Issued**  
In a joint communique, President Carter reaffirms the US security commitment to Korea, while both Presidents Park and Carter jointly propose the convening of a meeting of senior official representatives of South Korea, North Korea and the US.
- 5 July 1979       **ROK Government Agrees to Release Detainees**  
The ROK government agrees to release 180 political prisoners over the course of six months.
- 10 July 1979      **DPRK Rejects Proposed Tripartite Talks**  
The DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesperson denounces the proposal for tripartite talks as a scheme to create permanent division on the Korean Peninsula.
- 18 July 1979      **Joint Chiefs of Staff Suggest Troop Levels be Maintained until 1981**  
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff suggests current level of troops be maintained until 1981.
- 20 July 1979      **Brzezinski Issues Statement on Troop Withdrawals**  
US National Security Advisor Brzezinski issues a statement from the White

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House indicating that there would be no further withdrawals of United States combat forces from South Korea.

- 22 August 1979     **DPRK Rejects Good Offices of Kurt Waldheim**  
North Korea officially rejects UN Secretary General Waldheim's offers to help with starting talks between North and South Korea.
- 9 September 1979   **North Korea Joins NAM Joint Coordination Committee**  
North Korea becomes a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Joint Coordinating Committee.
- 4 October 1979     **Kim Young-sam Expelled from National Assembly**  
The ROK National Assembly passes a proposal for disciplinary action against Kim Young-sam and expels him from the National Assembly
- State Department Criticizes National Assembly Decision**  
A US Department of State spokesperson states that the expulsion of Kim Young-sam is not in agreement with principles of democratic government.
- 13 October 1979    **Carter Shows His Distress toward Events in Korea**  
In a confidential letter to President Park Chung Hee, US President Carter expresses distress at recent political events and urges Park to resume a liberalizing trend.
- 17 October 1979    **Park Declares Emergency Martial Law in Busan**  
President Park Chung Hee declares emergency martial law, establishes curfews, and closes schools in Busan.
- 26 October 1979    **Park Chung Hee Assassinated**  
After being in power for nearly two decades, South Korean President Park Chung Hee is assassinated by Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Kim Jae-kyu.
- 3 November 1979    **Vance Travels to Korea**  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance visits Korea to attend Park Chung Hee's state funeral and states that the military is in support of a civilian government and that he is confident that they will proceed in a constitutional manner.



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**Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in the United States, April 1976**

*[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 06, Frames 126-128, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sending Telegram

File No. : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : 131200  
To : Ambassador to the United States  
From : Minister of Foreign Affairs

1. For your information, guidelines are delivered to major embassies in Asia, Europe and Americas to let them know the government's stance on the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea and U.S.'s resultant change in policy on Korea as follows:

a. In the middle of the current presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter, U.S. Democratic candidate, has once suggested that the U.S. foreign policies on Korea would be likely to change, stating that it would be necessary for the U.S. troops in Korea to phase out.

b. The U.S. forces are stationed in Korea to in accordance with the U.N. Security Council resolution and the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. forces have been effective war deterrence against North Korea, and played an important role in keeping security and power balance in Northeast Asia and the Pacific regions.

c. Therefore, it is indispensable for U.S. armed forces to continue stationing in Korea at this point; the U.S. withdrawal would take risk of breaking the power balance in the Korean Peninsula and security in Far East.

d. Under these circumstances, we hope our friendly countries support our stance stated above and cooperate with us. In addition, every nation concerned is encouraged to deliver either directly or indirectly to the U.S. that it is not wise to make light of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea.

e. You are required to work secretly and report frequently based on the following guidelines:

i. Persuade both authorities in your host country (mainly the ministry of foreign affairs in your host country, or other possible ways, if necessary, under local circumstances.) and influential political figures into stressing the necessity of the U.S. presence in Asia and U.S. forces in Korea to local authorities, such as the U.S. government and Congress, either officially or unofficially at every opportunity.

ii. Influence the media in your host country so that they claim the above point in the editorials, articles, or other ways. Try to persuade high-ranking personnel or influential public figures in your host country into stating similar opinions frequently and officially so as to appeal to the public. (North America Division 1, East Asia Division, West Asia Division, and Europe Division 1)

Addressee: Korean ambassadors to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thai, Singapore, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Netherland, Sweden, France, Germany, Belgium, and Canada.

2. You are required to have the U.S. government announce that the Carter administration would keep the same policy toward Korea as the previous ones at appropriate time and way, work

tactfully in order to affect public opinion into such points, and report the outcomes at any times.  
(North America Division 2 – )

Signature: Illegible



**Telegram from the Ambassador in Japan to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 27 May 1976**

[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 05, Frames 7-9, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sending Telegram

File No. : JAO – 0574 Date : \_\_\_\_\_  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
From : Ambassador to Japan

The following is the summary of U.S. Secretary of State Elliot Lee Richardson's remarks on the issue of Korean human rights, raised during a professional luncheon at the Foreign Correspondents' Club in Tokyo on March 27, 1976.

1. I broached it directly during talks with President Park Chung Hee for an hour and half and with the Prime Minister. I only brought up concerns that the United States had. But the situation in Korea is different from other democracies because it faces a threat. The problem should be viewed from the point of admiration [sic] of the fact that Korea provides large measure of freedom in this situation.

2. Question: What did President Park confirm about the concerns that you had conveyed? (Mr. Malcolm [sic] from the *New York Times*)

Answer: President Park replied that laws of Korea were different from those of the United States and that the former were designed to minimize social unrest in Korea, and clearly stated that Korea complies with laws. During the dialogue, President Park showed “respectable hearing”.

3. Question: Are you content with his response? (Mr. Krisher from *Newsweek*)

Answer: I don't think that I need to go beyond more.

4. Notes

a. Issues on Korea were initiated by John Roderick of AP, who asked about Korea's military circumstances, the U.S.'s role in the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea, and if human rights issues in Korea were discussed.

b. Secretary Richardson remarked that the United States has no plan to pull the forces out of Korea at present and the United States would review it as the occasion demands, and that he was told that North Korea is in a state of “unpredictability,” because it could risk a surprise attack at any time.

c. He also told that the U.S. forces in Korea have a symbolic importance and that such perception has been growing after the Vietnam defeat. He commented that the modernization plan of the ROK forces is carrying out successfully and it will be expected to end by 1977 if it goes as planned. Moreover, Korea is maintaining high "vigilance" and felt great confidence in Korean military competence.

(Information Officer – Ministry of Culture and Public Information)

**Central Intelligence Agency, "The Two Koreas," 2 August 1976**

*[Source: CIA-RDP81T00700R000100050011-7, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

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2 August 1976

I. The Two Koreas

South Korea

The present form of government dates from 1972, when Pak scrapped the democratic constitution.

He was motivated by concern over:

- The growing strength of the opposition New Democratic Party. In the elections of April 1971 his opponent, Kim Tae Chung, won 45% of the popular vote.
- Developing signs of a return to the faction-ridden politics that preceded the military coup of 1961.

-- The prospects of diminishing support from the United States. His worries here stemmed first, from the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, then, from the developing Washington-Peking relationship.

-- His belief that the ROK would be at a serious disadvantage in talks with a monolithic North if firm controls were not imposed on the domestic scene.

Under the present constitution, the president

-- can serve any number of terms

[2]

-- controls the national assembly

-- has sweeping emergency powers which Pak has used extensively. The best known of the Emergency Measures -- EM 9 -- prohibits public criticism of the president, government policy, or EM 9 itself.

Pak's government is very much a one-man show

-- It rests ultimately on the loyalty of the military, but the military do not themselves play a role in government.

-- To keep him in touch with what's going on, Pak depends on his Blue House staff and a handful of close advisers. Right now, his most important advisers are Presidential Secretary, Kim Chong-you, and the Head of the KCIA, Sin Chik-su.

-- Professionalism has become very important at all levels of government -- the economic ministries are run by economists, the legal ministries by lawyers and so forth. Expertise does play an important part in the decision-making process. But Pak makes the decisions. And once he has, his advisers, however professional, tend to tell him what he wants to hear.

-- Advisers and others who show signs of becoming too prominent or ambitious are quickly sidelined. This has been the fate of civilians like Kim Chong-pil --

[3]

former head of the CIA and until recently Prime Minister. And of senior military like General Yun Pil-yong, former head of the capital security command.

The national police and the KCIA are the principal instrumentalities of internal control. Both of them, particularly the KCIA, also play an important part in keeping the President informed.

-- The KCIA's role is pervasive. It monitors and, on occasion, influences the activities of opposition political elements, student groups, and the media. (See attached page 3a only in response to questions.)

But Pak's government rests on a good deal more than pervasive controls and the ultimate support of the military.

-- Because fear of the North is still very strong, Pak's belief that stability and order come first is widely shared.

-- The expanding economy has provided increasing benefits for most of the population.

-- The military, the bureaucracy, and the major business elements are generally satisfied that Pak's leadership has served ROK interests and their own.

Many, even among his supporters, feel that Pak's authoritarianism is too rigid. And when he seemed on the verge of a break with Japan

[3a]

To Be Used Only in Response to Questions

1. The ROK is as aware as any other sophisticated foreign government of the role of public relations activities in developing favorable attitudes among the us public and the executive and legislative branches. The Koreans take this effort particularly seriously because of the importance they attach to our support as their major ally. Accordingly all members of their diplomatic mission here -- including the KCIA are expected to participate in the effort. Recent allegations concerning ROK and KCIA congressional connections are being investigated by the Department of Justice and the FBI.

2. The ROK also regards it as very important to retain the loyalty and active support of the members of the ethnic Korean community in the United States, most of whom came here after the Korean war. Two of the largest centers of this community are in the Los Angeles area, where over 60,000 Koreans live, and the Washington area with close to 30,000. [Redacted]

3. Moon Sun-myung. Although there have been many allegations that the ROKG or the KCIA supports or directs the activities of Moon and his church, we have no real evidence that this this is the case. The ROK has vigorously denied any such connection.

[4]

in the fall of 1974, it appeared possible that he would lose the support of the major interest groups. But that crisis passed. And the general view among the elite remains that South Korea cannot afford the disorder, immobilism, and inefficiency they associate with political party rule.

The opposition is weak and divided

-- The political opposition centered in the New Democratic Party is fractious [redacted] Pak and the KCIA are adept at manipulating these weaknesses.

-- The students, the ground troops of the opposition, are easily intimidated and their ranks require renewal every graduation day.

-- The most principled and serious opposition comes from the Christians. Although a distinct minority (some 13% of the population), they are influential because of their important role in the pre-war independence movement and because of the number and quality of their

educational institutions. But nevertheless they are a minority, and, for the most part, a very cautious one. Many of their leaders believe strongly that the church, should stay out of politics.

-- The current trial of clergyman and others who have urged the restoration of democracy has attracted a good deal of attention in the United States. But it has failed to spark wider anti-government activity in Seoul.

[5]

The record of economic progress has been a remarkable one and President Pak is given a good deal of credit for this. In the past decade

-- Real GNP has expanded at a 9% average annual rate.

-- Exports have increased on an average of 30% annually. Industrial output has grown by roughly 25% annually.

-- The manufacturing share of GNP has increased from 12% in 1965 to 28% in 1975. Progress has been especially marked in shipbuilding, petrochemicals, petroleum refining, and most consumer goods.

-- Since the early 1970s, exports of manufactures have shot up at a 60% annual rate.

As everywhere, the benefits have been unevenly distributed and standards of living are not as high as in Taiwan, for example. But, to a significant degree, the results of economic progress have filtered down to the factory worker and the peasant.

-- Per capita personal income has increased almost fivefold since 1966.

-- Farmers have benefitted from higher agricultural prices and adequate supplies of fertilizers. Wages are now eight times the 1965 level. However, roughly two-thirds of the gain has been eaten up by inflation; taxes have also made major inroads into take-home pay.

[6]

-- But in 1976, if the government can contain the inflation rate at the current 10%, real income will increase about 5%.

Because it is heavily export oriented, the ROK economy was badly hurt by the world-wide slump.

-- The economy is particularly closely linked with ours and Japan's. We and the Japanese are the ROK's principal trading partners, suppliers of technology, and sources of foreign capital.

-- South Korea was also badly hit by the oil price increase. It is almost entirely dependent on imports for its energy sources.

However, South Korea is now leading almost all of the non-OPEC LDC's in the pace of its economic recovery:

-- Real growth was 8% in 1975.

-- It will probably exceed 9% in 1976.

-- In 1975 with export volume up 20%, industrial production expanded by 19%.  
-- Industrial unemployment fell from 10% in early 1975 to about 6% in the first quarter of 1976.

-- This year, so far, export volume is up 65% from the first half of 1975. Consumer goods, especially textiles and footwear, are in the lead.

Overseas sales will probably not maintain this pace in the next six months.

[7]

Trade barriers in importing countries -- especially textile quotas -- will almost certainly have a restraining effect.

-- Production capacity limits will also operate as a restraint.  
-- The present annual rate of increase in industrial production -- 36% -- probably cannot be maintained.

In addition to commodity exports, overseas construction will be playing an increasingly important part in the ROK balance of payments.

-- New contracts, almost all in the Middle East, should reach \$2 billion this year, more than double 1975.

The extraordinary surge in exports of goods and services has substantially narrowed Seoul's balance-of-payments gap and bolstered foreign lender confidence.

-- Imports have been held down thus far by high inventories, bumper crops in 1974 and 1975, and government policies.

-- Import growth is likely in the second half, however. This will probably bring the total import bill to \$8 billion in 1976 compared with \$6.5 billion in 1975.

-- With exports likely to reach \$7.5 billion, the current account deficit should go at least as low as \$1.2 billion compared with \$2 billion in 1974 and 1975.

[8]

In 1976, Seoul should be able to cover its financial gap -- about \$1.8 billion -- comfortably from

-- new medium and long-term credits, with Western Europe a notably larger contributor this year.

-- new direct investments.

-- a reduced interest burden in the current account as the result of repayments of short-term credits.

North Korea

Like the ROK government, the North Korean government is authoritarian and dominated by a single individual

- Unlike the ROK, it is totalitarian as well as authoritarian.
- The society is remarkably closed, perhaps uniquely so.
- We know very little about the political pecking order and not much more about internal policy processes and problems.

Nevertheless we have been able to perceive some of the political repercussions of economic problems. We also see signs of a succession problem.

Late in 1972 Kim instituted a series of changes resulting in

- a new constitution
- a consolidated government structure
- a purged and reorganized party.

[9]

All of these changes, and the mass campaign that accompanied them, seemed to be linked to the difficulties North Korea was encountering in carrying out its economic plans. They also seemed to be intended to increase Kim's personal control and intensify the extraordinary adulation with which he is treated.

The succession problem applies to Kim Il-sung himself -- he is 63 and not very well. It also applies to Kim's small group of long-time associates -- like him veterans of the post-World War II period.

Over the years, Kim has given high position to members of his own family to a degree unusual in a Communist state. It now appears that he wants his son Kim Chong-il -- aged 36 -- to succeed him.

We believe the President has been pursuing this effort for at least the last three years. But we do not know how far the campaign has gone.

-- Within Party circles it appears that Kim Chong-il is being given authority and prestige almost equal to his father's.

-- We believe that frequent media references to the Party Center are really references to Kim Chong-il. But he is never mentioned by name in the press or on the radio as the President's successor or in any other capacity.

-- There is some evidence of at least passive resistance in the party to the idea that Kim Chong-il should succeed his father.

[10]

We have no clues as to which of the middle level figures will rise to the top to replace the President's immediate subordinates.

-- This spring the prime minister and the defense minister resigned because of ill health. But they were replaced by men nearly as old as they.

Meanwhile the postponement of the Sixth Party Congress from 1976 to 1977 suggests that important policy and personnel issues remain unresolved.

Although economic shortfalls frequently appear to be a source of political tension, North Korea, like South Korea, ranks among the more advanced of the LDCs. Measuring progress is difficult because North Korean statistics are highly suspect and our independent data is very limited. Our best judgment is that

-- Industrial production has grown at an annual rate of roughly 10 percent over the past decade or so.

-- Agricultural production has kept pace with population expansion.

-- The two Koreas produce roughly the same amount on a per capita basis.

Living standards in North Korea are no better, and perhaps are more austere, than in the South.

-- Supplies of food and clothing are adequate but not abundant.

[11]

-- Grain is still being rationed.

-- Housing is tight despite substantial progress since 1955.

The North has drawn on superior natural resources-- coal, iron ore, and hydroelectric power to develop an industrial base.

-- Its industrial output consists primarily of steel, nonferrous metals, fertilizer, cement, and heavy machinery.

-- Light industry barely keeps pace with subsistence needs.

-- Development of a petrochemical industry is underway.

North Korea's most remarkable industrial achievements, however, have been in the field of military production. We will be returning to this subject later when we discuss the military balance on the peninsula. The priority given to military production, however, obviously affects the pace of development in the civilian industrial sector.

-- We know that under the current Six Year Plan construction of key civilian industrial facilities is far behind schedule.



-- Even though a number of factors are responsible, including foreign exchange difficulties, the demands of the military machine building sector on domestic investment resources have also played a significant part in the shortfall.

[12]

Kim Il-sung talks constantly of self-sufficiency. North Korea's success at industrialization, however, has fluctuated with its ability to acquire foreign industrial equipment and technology.

-- The USSR and China contributed to the success of the Five-Year Plan, completed in 1960. This created a rudimentary industrial base emphasizing heavy industry. But in the early '60s the USSR suspended aid for several years because North Korea sided with Peking in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This was a major factor in delaying the completion of the ambitious Seven Year Plan.

-- With the initiation of the current Six-Year Plan in 1971, Pyongyang began trying to reduce its dependence on the USSR and China by purchasing industrial plants and related equipment from Western Europe and Japan.

-- Since 1970, such purchases have amounted to more than \$600 million.

However, beginning in 1974, North Korea began to encounter serious balance of payments problems.

-- In that year, it was unable to finance its hard currency deficit and became the first Communist country to default on a large scale with Western creditors.

[13]

-- As a result of persisting massive defaults, Japan and a number of West European countries have suspended further credit guarantees for North Korea.

- Some suppliers have stopped equipment deliveries until back payments are made.
- Other suppliers are demanding substantial down payments for new purchases.
- North Korea has been unable to obtain hard currency relief from the Communist countries.

There is some evidence that Pyongyang is seeking additional aid from the Soviet Union, the only feasible Communist supplier for most of the high technology equipment it wants.

-- Even if the USSR were to respond fully to North Korean requests, it would be unable to provide all of the types of equipment and technology that North Korea has been seeking in the West.

-- Thus far, the USSR has done little more than declare a five year moratorium on North Korea's repayment of Soviet credits.

-- In a new agreement signed in February 1976 no new aid projects were mentioned. Nevertheless, with Soviet exports including equipment for plants already under construction, the

level of Soviet-North Korean trade reportedly will be 40% more in the next five years than during 1971-75.

[14]

-- There have also been reports of some additional Chinese aid in the form of cancellation of past debts and perhaps some credits for additional petroleum purchases.

-- In general, Sino-Soviet aid committed thus far appears too meager to enable North Korea to meet the major goals of its next long-term plan which reportedly ends in 1983.

## II. The State of Play Between Them

For the most of the time since the end of the Korean War, North and South have confronted each other across the DMZ with intense hostility.

Tension reached its peak in the middle and late 'sixties. This was the period of

- North Korean efforts to organize an underground Marxist-Leninist party in the South.
- Frequent clashes in the DMZ.
- Large scale guerrilla raids into the South, culminating in the raid on the Blue House and in a 120-man landing on the East Coast.
- The seizure of the Pueblo and the EC-121 shootdown.

In the late 'sixties, however, North Korean tactics changed

-- Guerrilla raids ceased and military officers most directly responsible for this campaign were purged.

[15]

- Infiltration declined.
- And the number of DMZ incidents was markedly reduced.

The change could have reflected merely the realization that violent tactics had been counter-productive – strengthening Pak's position and the unity of South Koreans in hostility to the North. But whether or not there was a connection, the alteration in North Korean tactics smoothed the way for the more fundamental shift in the relations between the two Koreas that took place in 1971-1972.

Primarily, this shift -- the opening of the North South dialogue -- was precipitated by international developments. A number of events

- the enunciation of the Nixon doctrine
- the events culminating in the Nixon visit to Peking
- the Nixon Brezhnev visits

were read in much the same way by both North and South. Both saw a disturbing possibility that deals affecting them might be made without their participation. Accordingly, each began to show by various signals and proposals a strong interest in talking to the other.

In 1971 and 1972, the prospects for genuine and long-lasting reduction of tensions on the peninsula seemed better than ever before or since.

[16]

-- Each of the two governments abandoned its long standing refusal to deal with representatives of the other.

-- Machinery was established through which contact could be made and agreement reached -- the Red Cross talks and the South North Coordinating Committee.

-- Representatives of the South were warmly received in Pyongyang, as were representatives of the North in Seoul.

The basic stance of each side remained much the same

-- The North insisted on the abrogation of South Korea's treaties with the United States and Japan and the withdrawal of US forces. Its reunification proposals called for rapid movement into a broad political conference arrangement and a formal confederation.

-- The South was unwilling to contemplate any early withdrawal of the protection provided by external ties. It favored a more gradual step by step approach to reunification beginning with family visits and economic exchanges.

Nevertheless, there was considerably less rigidity in the way each side put forward its proposals. The change in atmosphere was symbolized by the July 4 Joint Communique. The two sides agreed that they would refrain from slandering each other and

[17]

from armed provocations while they were moving forward toward reunification which would take place

-- independently and without outside interference

-- peacefully

-- and on the basis of "great national unity transcending ideology."

Beginning early in 1973, however, the trend was reversed. The last plenary meeting of the South North Coordinating Committee took place in June 1973; two years later, in June 1975, the lower level meetings that had continued intermittently were suspended by the North.

Although the dialogue has been, in effect, terminated, there has been considerable carryover from this period in the behavior patterns of both sides.

-- Neither has reverted to the earlier position that the other government is a bandit regime with which in principle there can be no contact.  
-- Contacts have not been wholly broken off - working level Red Cross talks take place every month or two even though they are little more than propaganda exchanges.  
-- The hotline remains in being.  
-- The North has not resumed guerrilla tactics in its campaign against the South, although it continues its infiltration efforts.

[18]

Most significantly in terms of current problems North Korea's campaign to improve its international standing at the expense of South Korea has continued and has met with increasing success.

-- In 1969 Pyongyang had diplomatic relations with only 28 countries, half of them Communist. At last count this summer it had relations with 88 as compared with Seoul's 93 (both countries have accepted dual representation -- 45 countries have relations with both).  
-- North Korea has been accepted as a member of the non-aligned movement from which it derives considerable support in the General Assembly. Last year, of the 54 states voting for the pro-Pyongyang resolution, 40 were non-aligned.

The General Assembly has become a principal theatre of Pyongyang's effort to establish diplomatic superiority over the South and to win wide support for their long-standing demand for US troop withdrawal. In 1975, the pro-Pyongyang resolution called for

-- dissolving the UN command  
-- replacing the armistice agreement by a peace treaty negotiated by the "real parties to the armistice agreement" - that is, the United States, the PRC, North Korea, but not South Korea.

The pro-ROK resolution called upon all parties concerned to negotiate a replacement for the armistice agreement.

[19]

Both resolutions passed, the pro-North resolution won 54 votes (43 opposed, 42 abstained), the pro-ROK 59 (51 opposed, 29 abstained).

This year, there is as yet no sign that North Korea will abandon confrontation tactics in the UN.

-- The United States, Seoul's other strong supporters, and many of the non-aligned would prefer a consensus resolution like the one passed in 1973 which endorsed continued North/South efforts to reduce tensions.

But in 1973 the PRC played an important role in making the consensus resolution possible. Since then, it has shown no inclination to repeat this role.

The PRC in fact, and the USSR as well, share with the other major powers involved - ourselves and the Japanese - a conscious stake in continued avoidance of major hostilities on the peninsula. But, when problems of a lesser nature are involved, neither Moscow nor Peking seems prepared to put pressure in Pyongyang to do things it is obviously not prepared to do. They are restrained from doing so because

- they know that a fiercely independent Pyongyang will normally see no reason for adjusting its policies to their demands

- and they know that Pyongyang's independence has been reinforced by its relatively recently acquired ability to mobilize third world support on its own and even more by the opportunities Sino-Soviet rivalry affords North

[20]

Korea to balance its two allies off against each other.

This is not to say that Pyongyang can count on Soviet or PRC support when the overriding interests of either dictate a contrary course

- Neither seems prepared to stretch itself to help Pyongyang overcome its present economic difficulties

- and each has accepted with apparent equanimity periods of quite troubled relationships with Pyongyang brought on by aid or other policies adopted by Moscow or Peking for its own reasons but deeply resented in Pyongyang.

Its uncertainty over the response of its allies – especially the amount of assistance they would provide -- is we believe an important factor in deterring North Korea from initiating hostilities. In the military briefing to follow, we will elaborate on this point.

**Analysis on the Suggestion of the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for Holding 4-Party Talks, 21 September 1976**

[Source: “Kissinger, Henry Mi Guk Gukmujanggwon Ui Han Guk Munje E Gwanhan 4ja Hoedam Je Ui, 1976” (“The Suggestion of US Secretary of State Kissinger For Holding 4-Party Talks”), Roll D-06-0024, File 09, Frames 0001-0177, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Analysis on the Suggestion of the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for Holding 4-Party Talks

(The Wording Expected to Be Insert in the Script of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Keynote Address at the 31<sup>st</sup> United Nations General Assembly)

1976. 9. 21

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

When Park Tong-Jin, Minister of Foreign Affairs met Philip Charles Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on September 17, Assistant Secretary P. Habib told that he was considering the proposal as below on the Korean issue in the keynote address to be delivered by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the United Nations General Assembly and asked our immediate response.

I. The proposal

- a. In order to give more flexibility, the United States wanted to change the 4-party talks on Korea, proposed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on July 22, to the inter-Korean ones and have the United States and Communist China participate in the talks as observers.
- b. In case that both Koreas made an agreement during the South-North Korea talks, those other parties concerned, such as the U.S.S.R., Japan, etc. would be asked to confirm the agreement, which would be asked by mutual consent between the United States and Communist China.

II. Purpose of the proposal

- a. To emphasize the importance of the inter-Korean talks in the resolution of the Korean question
- b. To gain more supporters of the ROK by showing its flexible attitude (The United States thinks that the North Korean puppets would certainly refuse this proposal; consequently, the United States assumes that the opposition of the North Korean puppets would relatively work to our advantage.)
- c. To declare that the United States will not negotiate directly with the North Korean puppets and that ROK' participation in the talks is absolutely necessary, as an extension of Secretary Kissinger's proposal on the Korean question made on July 22
- d. To formulating alternatives to the armistice agreement in an arrangement separate from resuming inter-Korean dialogue under the July 4<sup>th</sup> North-South Joint Statement.

### III. Analysis on the proposal

#### Advantages

a. This proposal undergirds His Excellency's policies on peace and peaceful unification policy, especially His Excellency's basic stance on the independent and peaceful settlement of the Korean question. At the same time, it repudiates the demand of the North Korean puppets for a peace treaty with the United States.

b. The proposal not only allows the ROK and the United States to show their sincere and flexible attitude in order to address the Korean question but also contrasts Korea's rightful and pragmatic claims with the unyielding and unrealistic ones of North Korean puppets, who actually want to avoid the settlement between those directly concerned. As a result, it serves to intensify our stance in the eyes of the international community and underline the fact that we, the ROK, are one of the parties directly concerned.

c. It is most likely to help us resolve the issues on a more unrestrained stand through backstage negotiation while the U.S. and China are attending the talks as observers. Moreover, the bilateral talks formally stop North Korea from participating in the 4-party talks on the same footing with the U.S.; accordingly, it undermines North Korea's propaganda that the U.S. always intervenes in the inter-Korean issues.

#### Disadvantages

a. Because the United States has frequently revised its proposals related to Korea with no particular changes under the same circumstances, its inconsistent changes may look as if the U.S. takes popular tactics to gain more votes.

b. It may boost Communist China's position excessively higher than that of the U.S.S.R. in handling the Korean question, considering the U.S.S.R.'s historical involvement in Korea.

c. It may possibly leave the impression of a prelude to the gradual reduction of American involvement in Korea, particularly in light of this year's presidential election.

### IV. Suggestions:

The following directions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs need to be assented first, considering the moves of North Korean puppets to withdraw its proposal of resolution that it has submitted to the upcoming United Nations General Assembly:

1. You are required to report as soon as possible any relations between content of Secretary Kissinger's address script (regarding the bilateral talk) at the United Nations General Assembly, which you reported before, and North Korea's withdrawal of its resolution that she attempts.

2. Subsequent directions on how to reply to Secretary Kissinger will be given after considering your forthcoming report.

**Telegram to the President from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Report on the Meeting between the Foreign Minister of the ROK and the U.S. Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers of the ROK and Japan,” 28 September 1976**

[Source: “Kissinger, Henry Mi Guk Gukmujanggwon Ui Han Guk Munje E Gwanhan 4ja Hoedam Je Ui, 1976” (“The Suggestion of US Secretary of State Kissinger For Holding 4-Party Talks”), Roll D-06-0024, File 09, Frames 0001-0177, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Report

File No: Foreign *Bang-Yeon* [United Nations Division] 731. 1 – 1430

1976. 9. 28

To: President

CC: Prime Minister

Title: Report on the Meeting between the Foreign Minister of the ROK and the U.S. Secretary of State and Foreign Ministers of the ROK and Japan

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its report as follows:

1. Related to file no. Foreign *Bang-Yeon* [United Nations Division] 731. 1 – 1425 (76. 9. 28.)

2. Pak, Tong-Jin, Minister of Foreign Affairs had conversation with Henry Alfred Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, in Washington D.C. on Monday, September 27, at 11:00 a.m. (local time). The following is its summary:

a. Remarks Regarding Korea in Secretary Kissinger’s keynote address in the U.N. General Assembly.

i. The Korean Foreign Minister asked Secretary Kissinger to deliver the ROK-U.S. relations during his keynote address in the 31<sup>st</sup> U.N. General Assembly as follows:

a) to state that United States opposes the direct negotiation with North Korea

b) to refrain from emphasizing on holding an expanded meeting regarding the Korean issues at this point.

ii. In response, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that because there is no objection, he promised to adjust his address to reflect the Korea’s position.

iii. Secretary Kissinger mentioned that the purpose of his keynote address is not for United States to attach new importance to the expanded meeting, but to emphasize that the direct talks between South and North Korea is the most important factor to address the Korean issues.

iv. The Korean Foreign Minister, Pak, came away with the strong impression that the United States side did not seek to propose anything new and that it sought to demonstrate our flexibility.

b. Regarding the Korean issues in U.N.

i. The Foreign Minister stated that it was fortunate that the 31<sup>st</sup> U.N. General Assembly abstained from discussing the Korean question. He also mentioned that both Korea’s own efforts and



the cooperation of friendly nations including U.S. have paid off, and that therefore, North Korea made a tactful and temporary retreat mainly because the voting in the U.N. had developed favorably to Korea, and then asked Secretary Kissinger's opinion on it.

ii. Secretary Kissinger expressed satisfaction that the Korean issues had been dealt as we had wished and assumed that North Korea withdrew its agenda item mainly because she did not get sufficient support at the conference of Non-Aligned countries and had disgraced herself internationally due to the Axe Murder Incident on August 18, 1976.

iii. In addition, recognizing that the possibility of the Korean issue being raised again in the future cannot be completely excluded, both parties agreed to closely monitor the situation and prepare in close bilateral consultation.

c. The Axe Murder Incident in the Joint Security Area

i. With regard to the Axe Murder Incident on August 18, the Foreign Minister stated that the ROK thinks it was fortunate that the United States responded promptly to the provocations of North Korean puppets and the demonstration of such firm resolve left a favorable impression both domestically and internationally at a time when there was certain skepticism in public opinion regarding the defense of Korea since the communization of Vietnam. He also stated that the close consultation between the governments of Korea and the United States in dealing with the incident reflected the solid ties between the two countries.

ii. Secretary Kissinger echoed what the Korean Foreign Minister told and replied that fortunately, new measures were taken to reinforce security on the Joint Security Area of *Panmunjeom* after the incident.

d. The cooperation of the United States to enhance Korea's international position

i. The Foreign Minister requested consistent cooperation of the United States to enhance Korea's further diplomatic status. For example, he requested that the United States indirectly assist the improvement of our relations with Egypt, Pakistan, Tanzania, etc. At the same time, he requested that the United States persuade countries such as Yugoslavia, Algeria, etc., into relaxing their stances toward Korea.

ii. In response, Secretary Kissinger pledged to spare no efforts in the future.

e. Others

The Foreign Minister told that he was proud of Korea because she has maintained stability of the state under all situations and developed more rapidly than any other developing country. Secretary Kissinger complimented Korea's consistent development and also told that the United States praised and supported President Park's vigorous and efficient leadership.

3. (See attached.)

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Signatures: Illegible

## **Forecast on Presidential Candidate Carter's Policy on ROK and Analysis on It, November 1976**

*[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 06, Frames 179-192, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

### Forecast on Presidential Candidate Carter's Policy on ROK and Analysis on It (extracted)

1. Issues regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons
2. Issues on discontinuation of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea

1976. 11.

North America Division 2

[...]

#### Contents

I. Forecast on Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter's Policy on the ROK

II. Advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. troop withdrawal

III. Advantages and disadvantages of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea

\* Documents attached

1. Log of Candidate Carter's remarks on the South Korean matter

2. Log of senior Democratic Representatives' remarks on the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea and the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea

3. Subsequent issues deriving from Carter's policy on Korea

[...]

I. Forecast on Presidential Candidate Jimmy Carter's Policy on the security of the ROK

a. Carter's policy on the security of the ROK during his presidential campaign

(1) Reinforcing the cooperation with ROK as an ally

(2) Continuing its efforts to defend ROK

(3) Withdrawal of nuclear weapons

(4) Phased withdrawal of the U.S. ground forces within 5 years

(5) Reduction of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea

(6) Consulting with Japan on the Korean question

(7) Consulting with the USSR to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula

b. Conclusion

i. There will be no change in the recognition of the ROK's strategic importance in Northeast Asia and the Pacific under the Carter administration; however, there would be tactical modifications in the security policy towards the ROK.

ii. The phased withdrawal of the U.S. forces and nuclear weapons, which presidential candidate Carter has frequently remarked, are expected to be implemented; thus, the ROK should prepare for them.

iii. The U.S. is expected to cite human rights issues in strengthening its position regarding U.S. troop withdrawal, reduction of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea, and ROK itself.

## II. Advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. troop withdrawal

### a. Advantages

i. Promoting the modernization plan of the ROK armed forces

ii. Promoting the development of defense science and technology

iii. Weakening of the U.S. interference on domestic issues of ROK

iv. Advantageous to diplomacy with Non-Aligned Movement and U.N.

v. Increasing opportunity for the direct inter-Korean negotiations

### b. Disadvantage

i. Aggravating insecurity among the people and hampering economic growth

ii. Weakening US's automatic military intervention

iii. Weakening deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis the North Korean puppets (elimination of nuclear deterrence)

iv. Raising questions regarding the validity of the United Nations Command and the continuance of the armistice agreement

v. Increasing tensions and anxiety in Northeast Asia and upsetting the regional balance of power

vi. Prompting the strengthening of Japan's armament and its assertiveness regarding the Korean question

### c. Countermeasures

i. If the U.S. troop withdrawal is inevitable, their presence should be continued at least until the completion of the modernization plan of the ROK armed forces.

ii. ROK should negotiate with US in a way that the complete withdrawal of the U.S. troops will be postponed until measures to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula are achieved.

iii. The ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty should be complemented, particularly with a guarantee of a nuclear umbrella.

## III. Advantages and disadvantages of the Armed Forces Assistance for Korea

### a. Advantages

i. Promoting ROK's self-reliant defense efforts

- ii. Removal of ROK's dependence on U.S.
- iii. Weakening the case for U.S. Congressional criticism on Korea

b. Disadvantages

- i. Setback in the modernization plan of the ROK armed forces, and the Force Improvement Program (FIP)
- ii. Prompting the possibility of misjudgment on the part of the North Korean puppets
- iii. Boosting apathy and antipathy of the United States toward ROK

c. Countermeasures

- i. Pushing the modernization plan of the ROK armed forces, and the Force Improvement Program (FIP)
- ii. Strengthening special negotiations with U.S.
- iii. Reinforcing self-reliant defense and increasing defense spending
- iv. Diversifying negotiation of the military financing program
- v. Strengthening ROK-Japan relations

**Talk between Yoo Chong-Ha, Counselor of the Korean Embassy to the U.S., and Takakazu Kuriyama, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy to the U.S. in Washington D.C., 18 November 1976**

*[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 05, Frames 25-28, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

1976. 11. 18  
North America Division 2

Summary

(Talk between Yoo Chong-Ha, Counselor of the Korean Embassy to the U.S., and Takakazu Kuriyama, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy to the U.S. in Washington D.C.)

1. According to the Japanese Counselor, Takakazu Kuriyama, the Japanese Embassy anticipates that it is highly likely for the U.S. government to conduct a comprehensive reexamination of troop withdrawal from Korea.
2. Following the guidelines of the Japanese government, the Japanese Embassy in the United States does not take an opposite stand on the U.S. troop withdrawal if it would be consented by both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States.
3. Counselor Kuriyama stated that that aides to President Jimmy Carter had told that there would be no changes in the mission of the U.S. Air Forces and the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet.
4. The Korean Counselor Yoo, Chong-Ha told the Japanese Counselor Takakazu Kuriyama that he wanted Japan to take the same position as that of the ROK government because ROK had been strongly rejecting the withdrawal.
5. The Japanese Counselor Takakazu Kuriyama replied that it would be better for the ROK government to urge the United States through official diplomatic channels not to pull its forces out of Korea. Such approach would benefit Japan because Japan could comment on the U.S. withdrawal from the viewpoint of its interests.

Signatures: Illegible

**Telegram to the Minister from Affairs from the Ambassador in the United States, 18 November 1976**

[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 05, Frames 25-28, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving Telegram

Category :

File No. : USW - 11356 Date : 171850

To : Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cc (copy) : Director of the Korean Central Information Agency

From : Ambassador to the U.S.

Yeon : USW - 11314

1. Yoo Chong-Ha, Counselor of the Korean Embassy to the U.S. met Takakazu Kuriyama, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy to the U.S. in Washington D.C. He asked Counselor Takakazu Kuriyama to what extent the local Japanese Embassy anticipated the U.S. troop withdrawal, what stance the Japanese government took on it, and if the Japanese Embassy contacted the Americans in authorities about the withdrawal issue. What the Japanese Counselor Takakazu Kuriyama answered is as follows:

a. The Carter Administration's stance on the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea: Counselor Kuriyama told that the Democratic Presidential Candidate, Jimmy Carter's remarks on the issue had been already known, but that it was highly likely to make a grave misjudgment about what measures Jimmy Carter would really take if he were elected to be President. Thus, he concluded that it would be right to assume that only Carter could answer it. However, he carefully assumed that the Carter authorities would probably review if it would be necessary to bring the U.S. Armed Forces back home from South Korea, considering the profiles of the presidential candidate's aides and the position of the Democratic Party. He added that it was his assumption on a short-term basis and that the U.S. forces would leave from South Korea after all on a long-term basis.

b. The stance that the Japanese Embassy to the U.S. takes:

With regard to the issue of the U.S. troop withdrawal, Japan does not worry most the withdrawal itself, but the circumstances under which it would be done. Japan does not oppose the withdrawal if both South Korea and the U.S. consented on it after they calculate their forces needed and estimate the extent of danger that North Korea would cause.

However, Japan would be strongly against it if the U.S. forces leaves the ROK regardless of the strong opposition of the Korean government and then the withdrawal causes both the Korean government and nationals considerable concerns. This stance is not based on the specific instruction from Tokyo, but on the general guidelines of the Japanese authorities.

c. The contact with Jimmy Carter's aides by the Japanese Embassy:

The Japanese Embassy does not have direct conversations with Jimmy Carter's immediate aides; however, the Embassy has had a lot of conversation with important figures close to Jimmy Carter and has been asked a lot from them. They have frequently asked what Japan would respond to the gradual removal of the U.S. forces from South Korea. However, they have always asked with the proviso that only some major parts of the U.S. ground forces would be evacuated from South Korea,

and there would be no changes in the mission of the U.S. Air Forces and the U.S. 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet even if the U.S. forces left South Korea. Japan answered the same response as the mentioned above in *b* because it is not appropriate for Japan to comment directly on the issue consented by both the ROK and the U.S. The Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan has already told that he rejects the U.S. forces removal from South Korea. Moreover, the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. as well as the staffs in the Japanese Embassy to the U.S. have frequently explained Japan's situation whenever they meet those in authorities such as those close to Jimmy Carter, Congressional figures, and academic figures. While he is now on the tour of speech-making in major cities in the U.S., Fumihiko Togo, Ambassador to the U.S. of Japan, mentions that Japan does not want the changes of the current situation because the U.S. troop keeps an important role in guaranteeing the security in the Korean Peninsula.

2. Counselor Yoo suggested that Japan should clarify that she oppose the U.S. troop withdrawal because she had already known that both the Korean government and nationals had been strongly opposing it, rather than that Japan would convey a fine nuance that she would not oppose it if it would be done by the consent of both the South Korean government. The Japanese Counselor asked back if Yoo was sure of that and Yoo reaffirmed that. Then, Counselor Kuriyama worried that such attitude backfired on ROK even if she were desperately against the withdrawal, or lobbied against it, considering the current attitude of the U.S. toward ROK. Then, he stated that it would be better effective for South Korea to express such attitude through diplomatic channels and keep silently in public in order to defend the critics toward the ROK in the U.S.

In that case, it would be more reasonable for Japan to support South Korea from a view of her interests.

(North America Division 1)

**Summary of the Conversation with Mauzy, Committee Staff of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, and William J. Garvelink, aide for Rep. Donald M. Fraser, 2 December 1976**

*[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 06, Frame 221, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

1976. 12. 2  
North America Division 2

Summary of the Conversation with Mauzy, Committee Staff of the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, and William J. Garvelink, aide for Rep. Donald M. Fraser (1976. 11. 25)

1. Current newspaper articles regarding the ROK have demoralized supporters of Korea in the U.S. Congress.
2. The Carter administration has argued that Korea must implement measures addressing the human rights issue and responding to the criticism of Korea in the U.S. Congress.
3. The Carter administration may ask Korea for a considerable increase in the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Korea in the 1978 Fiscal Year just as the Ford administrations did. In this case, Korea would be publicly criticized and forced to accept a decrease in the FSM. Therefore, it would be wise for the U.S. government to request from Korea a small amount of the FMS.
4. It is impermissible to expect the Korean issue to be cast in a positive light because supporters of Korea in the U.S. Congress have largely diminished.
5. The U.S. media is expected to keep on writing articles on Korea from critical viewpoints for a long while.

Signature: Illegible



**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in the United States, 28 December 1976**

[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 06, Frames 277-278, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving telegram

Category : \_\_\_\_\_  
File No. : USW - 12478 (assumed) Date : 291740  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Cc (copy) : Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency  
From : Ambassador to the U.S.

Related report file No. : *Dae* [Embassy] YUS (assumed) 1221

1. Yoo Chong-Ha, Counselor of the Embassy in the United States met a Director [Edward Hurwitz] of the Office of Korean Affairs of the U.S. Department of State and asked about the meeting of Parliamentary Secretary L [trans. note illegible, but it is assumed to be the name of the Parliamentary Secretary of Sweden.] and H [illegible] Deputy Secretary on December 27 through 28. Below is the report on what Counselor Yoo was told about what L [illegible] had told H [illegible] on the meeting.

a. It is unimaginably difficult to conduct diplomatic negotiations with North Korean puppets. The position of North Korean puppets is built on an extremely self-centered view of reality that is far removed from reality. Nobody could have a meaning discussion with them. The North Korean puppets are certain to have difficulty in conducting diplomacy in the future.

b. When I [Parliamentary Secretary L (illegible)] visited Communist China, I was clearly told that Communist China fairly disapproved of the U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea. (According to the U.S.' interpretation, it can be considered that when Communist China discusses the issue of U.S. forces in Korea to a country like Sweden, it is professing its genuine concerns) Communist China opposes the withdrawal because of the implications for relations with both the U.S.S.R. and Japan; the U.S.S.R. does not want the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Korea, either. The U.S.S.R. is concerned about the possibility that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea would bring Communist China and the North Korean puppets close together.

c. North Korea's smuggling is an organized financing scheme totally controlled by the center and its European headquarters turn out to be located in Poland and East Germany.

As far as Sweden knows, both the governments of Poland and East Germany are thoroughly investigating the smuggling affair of the North Korean puppets and their diplomats concerned are expected to be deported from both countries; some of them may have already been deported. Actually, many bottles of liquor smuggled were bought and transported there. (The United States had already confirmed from 3 – 4 embassies of the third world that many diplomats of North Korean puppets had recently left Moscow. The Soviet Foreign Ministry declared that it could not doubt the fact that the diplomats of North Korean puppets had left on the charge of smuggling at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's request.)

2. More details of the meeting between Sweden and the United States will be reported in the near future. (North America Division 1, Europe Division 2)

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in the United States, 28 December 1976**

[Source: Roll G-06-0045, File 06, Frames 279-282, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving telegram

Category : \_\_\_\_\_  
File No. : USW - 12479 Date : 291900  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Cc (copy) : Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency  
From : Ambassador to the U.S.

Yoo Chong-Ha, Counselor of the Embassy in the United States had dinner with Director [Edward] Hurwitz on December 28 and had an exchange of views on a wide range of current issues. Below is the summary of what Hurwitz told:

1. The Office of the Korean Affairs of the U.S. Department of State submitted its report on the Korea to the incoming Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on December 28. The report was originally 30 pages long, but was reduced to 15 pages as directed. The report was made after wide exchange of views with superior authorities and sufficient consultation with the related bureaus within the department. The main ideas of this report are to claim that the basic relationship between the U.S. and South Korea should be maintained, and especially, to propose that it is advisable not to make a drastic change in the issue of the U.S. troop in Korea considering all circumstances.

2. While new personnel of the Department of State including new secretary are taking shape, Assistant Secretary Philip C. Habib is certain to continue in office. His wide jurisdiction, actually, keeps him from being deeply involved in any issues; however, he has been deeply involved in every issue of Korea and has a reputation within the department that his idea and judgment are always appropriate when it comes to issues related to Korea. Accordingly, Secretary Vance seems to heavily rely on Habib in terms of the U.S.-Korean relation; thus, it is expected that policies on Korea would be fairly consistent even under a new secretary.

3. It is hard to clearly state how the Carter administration will deal with the U.S. troops in Korea. However, frequent modifiers, such as “carefully, slowly, methodically, in consultation with ROK and Japanese govts [sic]” [in Carter’s remarks] imply that the U.S. troop withdrawal will be difficult to implement. After Carter’s remarks on the U.S. troop withdrawal, the Japanese government’s concerns and response are so serious that the Department of State is surprised at them. Japan is expected to keep opposing any changes in the U.S. forces stationed in Korea. Instability in the Communist Chinese power structure will be one of the main considerations of the United States.

4. According to the current statement of the Korean Foreign Minister, Korea declared that the Korean government has nothing to do with Park Tong-Sun and that if Mr. Park had done something wrong, he should be dealt with according to the U.S. law. The U.S. welcomes that statement and has the same attitude as that of the Korean government in terms of dealing Mr. Park according to the U.S. law. Thus, it is said that this statement was written well enough to be very helpful to settle the situation.

5. It still remained to be seen what the investigation would discover; however, in my personal opinion, the result would be optimistic. To consider this bribe scandal as crime, first, it has to be proved that Park Tong-Sun has something to do with the Korean government; second, it should be proved that any Congressman who took a bribe from him did some public activities in return for the bribe, which is technically hard to prove from a view of prosecutor's. Now, all the data that have been collected to prove the relationship between Park Tong-Sun and the Korean government depend largely on intelligence reports; these kinds of data are, by their nature, difficult to be used in the courts. Accordingly, many of the charges against him actually cannot be presented as proof of criminality in court.

6. The United States is not asking Korea to implement drastic political reform that might jeopardize social stability. While the Park Tong-Sun scandal and subsequent issues are causing waves at the moment, the least the United States wants is to aggravate the situation. Also, the United States wishes to see Korean society open gradually and do so in a manner consistent with the prevailing current circumstances. The United States does not want the Korean government to initiate dramatic changes that might compromise current economic development and destabilize the enforcement of regulations regarding the defense of Korean security.

Even though Senator Edward M. Kennedy sent one of his aides to the Department of State recently to question the human rights situation in Korea and call for measures to address them, the Department of State explained to the aide that the Korean situation has been far from the news articles by Mr. John Saar or Mr. Halloran, and that Korea belongs to open societies, basically in contrast with communist societies. Then, the aide asked back if the Department of State knew anything about Korean dissidents' movement and stance. I [Mr. Hurwitz] showed him the report files on contacts with Korean dissidents by officials of the U.S. Embassy in Korea and reiterated that Korea is an open society enough to allow the U.S. Embassy to make close and free contact with its dissidents, which is something that could never happen in communist societies. The same aide noted a report on conversation with Yun Bo-Seon, former President of Korea by an officer of the U.S. Embassy and confirmed that former President Yun Bo-Seon had been able to publicly express his anti-government opinions with a staff of the U.S. Embassy.

7. No matter what American media reports on Korea, many officials in the Department of State view Korea as extremely constructive and promising. One of the factors that play a central role in sustaining social stability in Korea is fair distribution of wealth. Korea is considered a rare case among underdeveloped countries that has relatively succeeded in fair distribution of wealth. The *Saemael* Movement, reform of bureaucracy, and another special example, keep-green movement are evaluated to be one of the standards to assess the future prospects of a society; yet, extravagance and excessive vanity by high-income groups are still abundant. Thus, the Korean government is advised to make more efforts in correcting them. This would build the internal strength to ultimately resist communism.

8. (Mr. Hurwitz requested to never quote him in answer to the question about why Mr. Halloran of the *New York Times* is more critical about Korea than any other journalists.) There are many factors to consider why Mr. Halloran is so anti-Korean.

I guess that the most decisive factor is that Mr. Halloran is a Roman Catholic, which connects himself with Korean Catholics such as Bishop Ji Hak-sun and Poet Kim Chi-Ha and makes him dedicated to realizing their ideals.

9. The Rev. Kim Sang-Keun issue (Reported separately.)

(North America Division 1)

**The Government Stance on the Proposal to Conclude a South-North Korean Mutual Non-Aggression Pact, 18 January 1977**

[Source: "Nam Buk Han Sangho Bulgachim Hyupjeong Je Ui E Gwanhan Jeongbu Ui Gyeonhae, 1977" ("Korean Government's Remarks on the Matter of Non-aggression Agreement"), Roll 2007-25, File 02, Frames 4-11, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

The Government Stance on the Proposal to Conclude a South-North Korean Mutual Non-Aggression Pact

January 18, 1977

[...]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Affairs Division

I. Background of the Proposal

1. President Park Chung Hee proposed the conclusion of a mutual non-aggression pact between the South and North Korea during the New Year press conference on January 18, 1974. This was based on the conviction that if the North Korean puppets genuinely desire peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, the key to this would be to deter the outbreak of war and bring about peace. The proposal contained the following main points:

A. The South and the North pledge to the world that they will not militarily invade each other.

B. The South and North not interfere in one another's affairs.

C. The armistice regime will be maintained under all circumstances.

2. Under the pretext of replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, the Supreme People's Assembly of the North Korean puppets sent a so-called letter of appeal to the U.S. Congress, calling for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the United States and the North Korean puppets and the withdrawal of American troops based in Korea. The main points of the proposal of the North Korean puppets are as follows:

A. The United States and the North Korean puppets commit to a pledge of mutual non-aggression and eliminate the cause of direct military confrontation

B. Halt the increase in and competition over military expenditures and cease the introduction of weapons into the Korean Peninsula

C. Dissolve the the United Nations Command (UNC) and the immediately withdrawal foreign troops stationed in Korea.

D. Make it impossible for the Korean Peninsula to become a military base for foreign troops after foreign troops are withdrawn

3. During his speech on the occasion of National Liberation Day on August 15, 1974, President Park stated the three principles [for unification] and reiterated that the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula through the conclusion of a South-North Mutual Non-Aggression Pact constitutes the first stage of peaceful unification.

4. During his New Year's press conference on January 12, 1977, President Park stated that he would not oppose the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Korea after the conclusion of a South-North Mutual Non-Aggression Pact and reiterated his proposal for such a pact. He demanded that the North Korean puppets sign proposed pact to prove they have abandoned their desire to communize the peninsula by force, the abandonment of which is a precondition of peaceful unification, and called for the resumption of South-North dialogue aimed at concluding the non-aggression pact.

## II. Significance of the Proposal

1. The proposal both reconfirms the government's policy of peaceful unification and clarifies its fundamental stance of peace before unification.

2. The proposal states that the reason there has been no progress toward unification and tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula is due to the North Korean puppets' ambition of achieving unification through communization. It further highlights the difference between our peaceful unification policy and the North Korean puppets' policy of communizing the peninsula by force.

3. The government has reiterated that maintaining the current armistice regime and preventing interference in the internal affairs of one another are required as an institutional guarantee to reduce tension and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

4. The withdrawal of U.S. troops must be preceded by measures deterring the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula through an institutional guarantee based on the South-North Mutual Nonaggression. The proposal calls for the new U.S. government to carefully consider the matter.

5. The government's decision to base mutual non-aggression pact consultations on dialogue grounded on the July 4 Joint Communique has reconfirmed its basic position that the South and North Korea, as the main concerned parties, must resort to dialogue to resolve issues related to peaceful unification.

6. The government has proven its flexibility over the issue of withdrawing American troops (foreign troops) by publicly announcing it will not oppose the withdrawal under certain conditions. Through this, the government has secured diplomatic dominance over the North Korean puppets and their supporting forces.

7. The proposal has instilled the spirit of independence in national defense among the people and has confidently displayed the country's strengthened defense posture to domestic as well as international audiences.

### III. The Relationship between the Non-Aggression Pact Proposal and the Proposal for a Meeting among the Directly Related Parties Concerning the Armistice

1. A major goal of the South-North Mutual Non-Aggression Pact is to maintain the armistice regime. As such, the pact proposed to the North Korean puppets on January 12, 1977, does not contradict but rather complements the proposal for a meeting among the directly related parties concerning the armistice. This is because they are both based on the maintenance of the armistice regime and the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

2. The withdrawal of American troops from Korea will mean the dissolution of the United Nations Command (UNC). The dissolution of the UNC means the nullification of the armistice, and consequently lead to an institutional vacuum for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the government's proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact before the withdrawal of American troops is aimed at institutionalizing through explicit means the North Korean puppets' position that they will not start war again.

### IV. The North Korean Puppets' Previous Attitude toward a South-North Mutual Non-Aggression Pact

1. Since immediately after the Korean War, the North Korean puppets have made proposals domestically and internationally for seeking unification without resorting to the use of force or signing of a North-South mutual non-aggression pact. In the July 4 Joint Communiqué, the South and North agreed to stop slandering each other and work to prevent inadvertent military clashes.

2. Since then, the North Korean puppets have pursued their phony peace offensive with increasing intensity by proposing the conclusion of a North-South peace treaty in 1969. When our side proposed a South-North Mutual Non-Aggression Pact on January 18, 1974, the North Korean puppets switched from their previous phony peace tactics towards the south to calling for a so-called peace treaty with the United States on March 25, 1974.

3. Given the inconsistent position of the North Korean puppets ranging from non-aggression pact and peace treaty, the underlying motives lay in weakening our security posture through deceptive political propaganda and aiming to unravel the balance of power between the north and south by having the withdrawal of American troops materialized at an early date. Ultimately, they aim to materialize their ambition to achieve unification by communizing the Korean Peninsula by force. Therefore, it is unclear whether the North Korean puppets will accept this most recent proposal.

### V. Matters to Consider Regarding the Withdrawal of American Troops Stationed in Korea

1. The government may consider the withdrawal of American troops only in the following three circumstances.

A. The goals of stationing American troops is achieved and there is no further need for their presence in Korea (a state of security is obtained)

B. Following judgment that the goals of stationing American troops in Korea cannot be met, the conclusion is made that their continued presence is a waste and of no benefit (their presence does not serve a meaningful purpose)

C. A viable military alternative becomes available, such as a drastic increase in the defense capabilities of the ROK armed forces that is sufficient for deterring the possibility of North Korean puppets' war provocation

2. As long as the United States does not present a satisfactory position regarding the three issues in the above, the American measure of withdrawing troops stationed in Korea would be a defeatist and unilateral capitulation in the struggle against communism. Such a measure would weaken the security and defense of the Korean people who are faced with the threat of invasion and war provocation by the North Korean puppets, and would run contrary to the moral ideals championed by the U.S. government.



**Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Social Organizations Discussing Unification of the Fatherland, 1 February 1977**

[Source: "Nam Buk Han Sangho Bulgachim Hyupjeong Je Ui E Gwanhan Jeongbu Ui Gyeonhae, 1977" ("Korean Government's Remarks on the Matter of Non-aggression Agreement"), Roll 2007-25, File 02, Frames 36-41/47-56, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Communist World Broadcast Listening Report

Title : Joint Meeting of Political Parties and Social Organizations Discussing Unification of the Fatherland

File No. : 53/77 Date : 1977/01/02

To : \_\_\_\_\_ Cc (Copy) :

From : Promotion Department Head

Signature:

[illegible] ...A joint meeting of political parties and social organizations discussing effective ways to remove the perpetual state of national division and the threat of war and advance independent peaceful unification was held at the People's Palace of Culture. Those attending the meeting discussed how to remove the perpetual state of nation division and danger of war and advance autonomous and peaceful unification.

Those who participated in the meeting included members from each party social groups and central government workers from the education, culture, publishing and reporting sector.

[Kim Il], Kang Yang Uk, Seo Chol, Im Chun Ju, Yang Hyuong Seop, Hwang Jang Hyeop, and others including Lee Jang Suk, Hong Gi Mun, Kim Song Ryul, Kang Jang Su, Kang Hyun Su, Kim Kwan Seop, Kim Kuk Hun, Kim I Hung, Ji Jae Rong, Lee Su Weol, Jo Yong Chul, Kim Ki Nam, Park Yong Hee, [Chae] Min Sun were present on the platform of the *chuseok* [*chuseokdan*].

The meeting was presided over by Hong Ki Mun, the director of the Fatherland Reunification and Democracy Front.

Cadres and workers of the social organizations from each party participated in the meeting, along with workers from the education, culture, publishing and reporting sectors and central government cadres.

During this meeting we will discuss how to remove the perpetual state of national division and threat of war and advance the autonomous and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

If any of you hold a different opinion towards discussing this issue, please speak now. If there are no other opinions we will move forward and discuss the issue.

A report on this issue will be made by Yang Hyung Seop, the secretary of the Korean Worker's Party Central Committee.

Comrades: This year's historical New Year's Statement made by our revolutionary mentor, the sun of the Korean people and national hero, the great Suryeong Kim Il Sung, has greatly encouraged laborers nationwide to work harder to achieve the three revolutions of ideology, technology and culture.

In an environment where the fight for democracy and peaceful unification by patriotic people and democracy leaders [illegible] in south Korea is ongoing, we are holding this joint meeting of political parties and social groups.

In order to remove the perpetual state of national division and threat of war and advance our country's autonomous and peaceful unification we must first carry out the grand consolidation of those socialist forces in the north and patriotic democratic forces in the south that support unification [underlined in original]. The unification of the country is a great national patriotic task of vital interest to all the people of Korea, whether they be laborers, farmers, the rich and the poor, atheists and religious people, communists, or nationalists. This task of great national importance can only be achieved by the combined strength of all forces in north and south that genuinely desire unification.

The forces of socialism in the north and patriotic democracy in the south all carry the same attitudes toward opposing fascism and supporting democracy, opposing war and supporting peace, opposing division and supporting unification, and there are no contradictions between them in resolving this national issue.

Even if there are differences in belief systems and political views and in circumstances, as long as the two sides share the same national blood they can come together in solidarity. Even if their systems are different, they can create an ideal system based on uniform goals that is diametrically opposed to the fascist system both forced upon the people through violence and in opposition to their desires.

The grand consolidation of socialist forces in the north and democratic forces in the south must not force upon the other the ideology or views of the other side, must respect and trust each other, and devote everything to the great common national task.

The consolidation of socialism and democracy will be the most powerful propelling force to destroy the scheme to perpetuate national division and advance the autonomous and peaceful unification of the fatherland. This consolidation will be, without question, a dependable guarantee for unification of the fatherland.

The alleviation of tensions between the north and south and the speedy removal of the threat of nuclear war are the preliminary conditions of achieving the autonomous and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The situation where a state of tension between north and south and the threat of war continues to exist makes it impossible for the country to unify, and consequently an environment beneficial to unification cannot be established. The south Korean authorities talk about some kind of non-aggression pact as if they are hoping for unification and peace, but as long as massive military forces continue to face each other and military power continues to increase, the conclusion of some pact or agreement will not lead to the disappearance of the state of tensions in our country. The confrontation of military power between the north and south across the military demarcation line has produced misunderstandings and mistrust, bred confrontation and hostility, and has worsened the state of tensions.

Moreover, it is only natural that the perpetual threat of war exists when the U.S. military and nuclear weapons are stationed in one half of the country.

All of these things not only produce distrust that could lead to war but also greatly negatively affect the improvement of the national economy and efforts to improve stability in the lives of the

people. Do we really have to see the continuance of such a senseless situation that has millions of young men of the same blood pointing guns at each other; that produces tensions within the country; that negatively affects the development of the national economy and the lives of the people; and that wastes the precious resources of the nation?

Can we tolerate the humiliating situation where south Korean youngsters carry the guns handed to them by the American and Japanese imperialists, face the danger of nuclear war and must fight against communism in order to fill the bellies of the imperialists? What our people need now is not empty rhetoric calling for a nonaggression pact but the speedy adoption of real measures to relieve the military confrontation and tensions between north and south and to remove the danger of nuclear war.

What is needed more than anything else to achieve this is the closure of nuclear bases in south Korea, the withdrawal of all weapons of murder including the nuclear weapons brought in by the Americans, and the unconditional withdrawal of American troops. We recognize that there is a need to adopt groundbreaking measures to reduce the military strength of both sides and scale down military expenditures to improve the lives of the people. We raise our voices and call for the relaxation of tensions between the political parties of north and south and the tensions between the authorities of both sides and demand the quick adoption of measures to remove the danger of nuclear war. We also call for the holding of an armaments reduction conference aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of American troops, the halt of competition over increases in military power and expenditures, and the stoppage of weapons being brought in from abroad. If the above proposals are realized, our country's state of tensions will be reduced, peace will surely be guaranteed, an environment susceptible to peaceful unification will be established, and improvements will come to the nation's economic development and the lives of the people. In order to advance the coming of autonomous and peaceful unification for our country, we must remove the basis of disharmony inside our country and form an atmosphere of great national solidarity.

The restrictions placed on the free speech of the people and the hostility and confrontation in the country makes it impossible to remove both the misunderstanding and mistrust between north and south and establish great national solidarity, while ultimately making it impossible to successfully achieve autonomous and peaceful unification of the country. Creating discontent domestically and harming the atmosphere of solidarity is only beneficial to operators at home and abroad who are afraid of the solidarity of the Korean people more than anything else, and aim to disrupt unification and maintain two separate states.

There is no reason whatsoever for the Korean people to hate and confront each other, and in the face of that great national task of unification we cannot accept the artificial establishment of hatred within the country.

We must quickly remove all elements forming disharmony and delaying solidarity between people of the same race and must invest all efforts to establish an atmosphere of national unity. This can be achieved by removing the fascist and divisive system of oppression that has created a crisis of fear and a state of tension while undermining great national solidarity; achieving democracy; and unconditionally releasing the patriotic democracy leaders who have been arrested and imprisoned unjustly.

The slandering of the other side must stop and the anti-communist policy promoting hatred of one's own countrymen must be rescinded. In order for the misunderstandings and mistrust to disappear and national unity to return, the north and south must establish wide-ranging economic cooperation.

These measures above will create understanding and trust between north and south, promote great national solidarity among our people, and contribute immensely to the great patriotic task of achieving autonomous and peaceful unification of our country. All of our above proposals to achieve a great consolidation of socialist forces in the north and democratic forces in the south, relieve tensions between the north and south and remove the danger of nuclear war, and create an atmosphere of great national solidarity must be urgently undertaken to advance our country's autonomous and peaceful unification.

Anyone who is loyal to our nation's honor, whether he lives in south or north, domestically or abroad, will turn his attention to the desperate issues and national disaster facing the people at this time, and will support the unity hoped for by our 50 million people. We respectfully call for the holding of a north-south political meeting between political parties made up of people from all levels of north and south society aimed at overcoming the permanence of national division and dangers of a new war, while discussing the above issues for the realization of our country's peaceful reunification.

The holding of such a meeting is the most rational and realistic way to resolve our country's unification issue autonomously and peacefully and by and for the benefit of all Korean people. At a time when it is clear that nothing more can be resolved through dialogue with the south Korean authorities who have proclaimed a policy of two states, it is of the utmost urgency to find a way forward for national reunification by bringing together all patriotic forces of north and south who represent the intent of all Korean people. At such a future meeting, the two sides would discuss in frank terms our proposals and ways to achieve our country's autonomous and peaceful unification.

In order to prepare for this meeting we think it is necessary to hold a preliminary working-level meeting of liaison representatives as quickly as possible at Panmunjeom or another temporary location agreed upon by both sides.

The fight for national unification is not between communists and nationalists but between patriots and traitors, and between national independence forces and imperialist invader forces. Anyone who genuinely loves our country and nation and hopes for unification of the fatherland will, regardless of ideology or beliefs, be able to sit across from each other and negotiate, find points of agreement and seek out a joint path to achieve unification.

If the south Korean authorities revoke their policy of maintaining the division of the two Koreas, stop upholding anti-communism, halt their oppression of [illegible] people and democratic leaders, and abandon their policy of war under the pretext of a threat of a southern invasion, we will again conduct dialogue with them and not be opposed to their participation in the political conference. The success of our great national task will be solidarity with all patriotic forces in the fatherland.

Our united strength will overcome the national tragedy, and the strength of our nation will advance our hopes for unification.

At a time now when so many countries across the world that were oppressed or looked down upon have now achieved national independence and liberation and those people who were once divided are now realizing their national unification, how is it that our country, which has a long history and magnificent culture, has to accept the subjugation and [illegible] forced upon us by foreign powers?

We can no longer live like that and must move to build with our own hands an independent, prosperous and united Korean absent of any subjugation or oppression.

Nothing can come between the fraternal love that makes every Korean person's heart beat with pride and our united aim to achieve national unification. Nothing can prevent the iron-like will of patriotic forces north and south to stand together and fight.

We call fervently on all the laborers, farmers, students, intellectuals, religious people and patriotic democracy leaders to unite with us to destroy the schemes of those who want division domestically and abroad, and fight strongly to advance to that day of glory when Korean again becomes one.

We believe that political parties from the around the world and the UN that are showing enthusiastic support toward our people's fight for independent and peaceful national unification will continue to send a strong message of solidarity to our people's struggle for justice to resolve the question of unification by themselves without interference from outside powers.

The first draft of the letter will be read aloud by Heo Jong Suk, the secretary general of the Fatherland Reunification and Democracy Front.

A letter being sent to political social parties in south Korea, people of all levels of society and overseas Koreans,

To the leaders of south Korean political social organizations,

To our countrymen and countrywomen in south Korea,

To our countrymen overseas,

After 32 years of division etched in our nation's history, our country still does not see any signs of unification but rather the deepening danger of eternal division; not peace, but the shadow of heavy clouds of war.

We carry a heavy responsibility for our country and people and we realize quite clearly the seriousness of the current situation with its joint diplomatic issues and the danger of war. We desire to prevent the everlasting division of the nation through the combined strength of the north and south, eliminate the danger of war, and advance the peaceful unification of the fatherland. As such, we send this letter from Pyongyang to invite you to a joint meeting of political parties and social organizations.

The announcement of the historical South-North Joint Communiqué which was based on the three principles of independent, peaceful unification and national solidarity and reflected the ardent hope of the entire nation toward unification, made the Korean people hope genuinely for the speedy elimination of division in accordance with this joint national communiqué and to live in one unified country.

However, those who desire division at home and abroad with their policy of "two Koreas" have unceremoniously crushed the principles of the joint communiqué and have put the great task of unification into grave jeopardy.

The south Korean authorities are going along with their American and Japanese masters' scheme to divide Korea into two. Meanwhile, they are pursuing confrontation and division between north and south and intend to split the historically unified Korean nation into two countries.

For the past 30 or so years national division has caused our people great misfortune and pain and they have paid a very high price for the unification of the country. How painful it must be for them that now the enormous disaster of permanent division is being forced upon them.

The division of north and south for a long period of time has separated our people who share the same blood and has stopped our country's unified development. Meanwhile, the whole nation lives constantly under a feeling of apprehension.

If our nation is split into two forever this unfortunate history will ceaselessly continue to repeat itself and our generation and the next and the next will be unable to overcome a fate of servility. The division of the nation will be a constant source of mistrust and confrontation, discontent and tension, and ultimately war between our countrymen.

The reality we face shows us clearly that it could lead our country again into the misfortune of war.

The south Korean authorities have brought in the invasion forces of American and Japan under the pretext of a southern invasion. They also bring in weapons from abroad while illegally preparing for war.

Moreover, it cannot but upset you that the south Korean authorities and the US have turned half of our country into a nuclear base and while continually placing massive amounts of nuclear weapons in the south are planning openly for a nuclear war that will turn our country into a wasteland.

At a time when many people throughout the world are expressing opposition to nuclear zones and nuclear war, and even Americans themselves say that nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from south Korea, the south Korean authorities instead oppose all this and intend to use the nuclear weapons of the imperialists to kill their countrymen. Where on earth would such traitorous acts toward one's own people exist?

If we did not think about the future of our nation and gambled to bring in the nuclear weapons of someone else, imagine what kind of impact it would have on the land our people have cared for with their blood and sweat for thousands of years and the land that the sons and daughters of our future generations should live happily on.

The criminal policies of splitting Korean into two and of war being conducted under the cry of anti- communism in south Korea has brought fascist terrorism to its peak and is suffocating everything that is democratic and patriotic.

People are jailed for wanting democracy and are put on trial for calling for peaceful unification. They are being hurt and killed for being concerned about the nation's future.

The entire nation and the world are angry at the intolerable situation where the fate of people who love the country and people and who call for democracy and peaceful unification are punished by the fascist government. The criminal acts of those who desire our country to be divided into two have now reached a state of complete irrationality. The only thing that will remain when the nation is divided into two and war breaks out due to their careless actions will not be American or Japanese people but the Korean people who live on this land.

Perpetual division and the threat of nuclear war in our country will not come tomorrow but is a reality facing us this very moment. The country and its people are facing a very serious situation.

Oh, leaders of south Korean political social organizations,

Oh, our countrymen overseas,

Will we have unification or perpetual division?

At this grave time when fortunes of the nation rest on the question of peace or war, we must block the permanent division of the nation and danger of war and move forward to open the path to peace and peaceful unification. The unification of the nation is our only path to survival, but it is the division of our nation that will lead to our nation's disaster.

No one can betray our nation and block the perpetual division of our nation, nor get rid of the danger of war that looms, or present use with a unified fatherland.

We believe the time is here for all people who love their country and people to leave their selfishness behind and unite as one to stop the scheme of those who want to divide our country into two. We must join together in a struggle to achieve the autonomous and peaceful unification of our country.

With only the one hope of saving our country and people from the crisis of destruction, we respectfully propose to you a plan to save the nation by advancing the national unification that the entire people of Korea ardently desire.

To achieve autonomous and peaceful unification of the nation we need to achieve a grand consolidation of the forces of socialism in the north and the forces of patriotic democracy in the south. The noble task of national unification can only be achieved through the united strength of socialist forces in the north and patriotic democratic forces in the south who genuinely long for unification.

Even if there are differences in belief systems and political views, as long as the two sides share the same national blood they can come together in solidarity. Even if their systems are different, they may unite based on shared goals, not a system of fascism.

The grand consolidation between these two forces will oppose fascism and support democracy, oppose war and support peace, oppose division and support unification.

The grand consolidation of socialist forces in the north and democratic forces in the south must not force upon the other the ideology or views of the other side; must respect and trust each other; and must devote everything to the great common national task.

The consolidation of socialism and democracy will show off its united strength from both south and north Korea, and it will be without question a propelling force to block the perpetual division of and advance unification of the nation.

The alleviation of tensions between the north and south and the removal of the threat of nuclear war are required to achieve the autonomous and peaceful unification of the fatherland.

The unprecedented concentration of military power between the north and south across the military demarcation line in such a small country as ours has been a fundamental factor in forming tensions and unrest.

Moreover, the constant threat of war exists because a foreign military and nuclear weapons are stationed inside the nation.

Currently, an irrational situation exists in our country that has millions of young men of the same blood pointing guns at each other. This situation negatively affects the development of the national economy and the lives of the people while wasting the precious resources and strength of the nation.

Can we permit a humiliating situation where south Korean youngsters carry the guns handed to them by the American and Japanese imperialists, face the danger of nuclear war and must fight against communism in order to fill the bellies of the imperialists? We need to move without haste to relieve the military confrontation and tensions between north and south that is threatening our peace and blocking the path to peaceful unification.

We call for the closure of nuclear bases in south Korea, the withdrawal of all weapons of murder including the nuclear weapons brought in by the Americans, and the unconditional withdrawal of American troops.

There is also the need to reduce the military strength of both sides and scale down military expenditures to improve the lives of the people.

We also call on the political parties and people of north and south to demand the authorities of both sides to adopt the above measures and work hard to make them a reality.

We also call on the military authorities to hold an armaments reduction conference aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of American troops, the halt of competition over increases in military power and expenditures, and the stoppage of weapons being brought in from abroad.

In order to advance the coming of autonomous and peaceful unification for our country we must remove the basis of disharmony inside the nation and form an atmosphere of great national solidarity.

The restrictions placed on the free speech of the people and the hostility and confrontation in the country makes it impossible to remove both the misunderstanding and mistrust between north and south and establish great national solidarity. This ultimately makes it impossible to successfully achieve autonomous and peaceful unification of the country.

There is no reason whatsoever for the Korean people to hate and confront each other in the face of the greatest national task of unification.

We must remove the fascist and divisive system that has created disharmony among our countrymen while undermining our great national solidarity. There must be guarantees of the freedom of press, publishing, gathering and demonstration to people who desire peaceful unification, and unconditionally free patriotic people democratic leaders who have been arrested and imprisoned unfairly.



The anti-communist policy promoting hatred of fellow countrymen must be rescinded and the slandering of the other side must be stopped.

In order for the misunderstandings and mistrust to disappear and national unity to return, the north and south must establish wide-ranging economic cooperation.

All of our above proposals will be the groundwork for friendship and unity between our countrymen and will be a brilliant first step to advance our country's independent and peaceful unification.

Now, a north-south meeting between political parties made up of people from all levels of north and south society should be held to talk about the above issues.

The holding of such a meeting is the most rational and realistic way to resolve our country's unification issue autonomously and peacefully, and by and for the benefit of all Koreans.

At such a future meeting, the two sides would discuss in frank terms our proposals and ways to achieve our country's autonomous and peaceful unification.

In order to prepare for this meeting we think it is necessary to hold a preliminary working level meeting of liaison representatives as quickly as possible at Panmunjeom or another temporary location agreed upon by both sides.

Anyone who genuinely loves our country and nation and hopes for unification of the fatherland will, regardless of ideology or beliefs, be able to sit across from each other and negotiate, find points of agreement and seek out a joint path to achieve unification.

If the south Korean authorities rescind their policy of splitting our country in two, give up their anti-communism, halt their oppression of [illegible] people and democratic leaders, and abandon their policy of war under the pretext of threats of an invasion of the south, we will again conduct dialogue with them and not be opposed to their participation in the political conference. The success of our great national task will be solidarity with all patriotic forces in the nation.

We can no longer accept the subjugation and division that the foreign invaders and small-numbered traitors desire.

We should destroy the schemes of those who want division domestically and abroad and fight strongly to advance to that day of glory when Korea becomes one.

Let's undertake a nationwide patriotic movement to advance that day of glory when our 50 million countrymen can live in our beautiful country that is unified, autonomous and prosperous.

It is now that we send a warm message of fraternal and patriotic support to the people of south Korean and patriotic democracy leaders who are pushing through a forest of bayonets to fight without submission for freedom, democracy, and our country's peaceful unification.

We are certain that south Korea's political parties, social organizations, people from all levels of society and our brethren abroad will give our proposal to block our nation's perpetual division and

danger of war and realize our nation's independent and peaceful unification the attention it deserves and actively support it.

Korean Workers' Party, Korean Democratic Party, Korean Chondogyo Young Friends Party, Fatherland Reunification and Democracy Front, Central Committee's North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, General Federation of Korean Trade Unions, Young Socialist Labor Alliance, Union of Agricultural Working People, Union of Democratic Women, General Federation of Korean Literature and Arts Unions, Korean Christians Federation, Korean Buddhists Federation, Korean Journalist Union, Korean Democratic Lawyers Association, Korean Students Committee, Korean Committee for International Solidarity, Korean Committee for Asian-African Solidarity, Korean National Peace Committee.

January 25, 1977  
Pyongyang

**Telegram 065141 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the Korean Question,” 2 February 1977**

*[Source: "Telegram 065141 from the the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Korean Question" March 02, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 931/1977, Issue 220/E, Bilateral relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and socialist countries in Asia (the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Kampuchea), February – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114863>.]*

TELEGRAM 065141

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to comrade Constantin Oancea

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: the Korean Question

Date: February 2, 1977

Classification: Secret

1. According to our contact with Chinese envoys and members of the diplomatic corps, there has been an increase in the level of interest and concern towards the Korean problem. The dominant note of the remarks and observations emphasize the possibility of new developments in terms of the Korean issue, determined by Sino-American relations, Sino-Soviet-American relations and by the DPRK's recent diplomatic initiatives.

2. The US and China's insistence on reaffirming the validity of the 1972 agreements is interpreted as being indicative of both countries' interest in settling the complex issues in the region, chief among which [ranks] the Korean problem.

Chinese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have informed us that China sincerely wishes for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and Korean reunification.

It is generally acknowledged that the Sino-American solution to the problem is currently benefiting from much more favorable conditions, both in Asia and internationally, due to:

a) The Carter administration's decision to withdraw troops from South Korea. Japan analyzed the decision. However a recent discussion with Vice President Mondale reveals that, despite assurance of a gradual troop withdrawal in close cooperation with the Japanese and South Korean governments, Japan is not as of yet fully prepared to assume increased responsibilities regarding the security of the region. Japan's concerns about the implications of the US withdrawal for regional stability and Japan's security are also underlined by the possibility of Prime Minister Fukuda to discuss such aspects in the following meetings with President Carter.

b) Changes in the DPRK's position regarding Korean reunification:

- withdrawing the proposal to discuss the Korean question at the UN General Assembly;
- certain North Korean officials' visit to countries in Asia, Africa and Europe (Premier Pak Song-chol, Vice Premier Heo Dam, Minister of Armed Forces O Chin-u and others);
- clear statement of the DPRK's wish for political contact with the US expressed during official visits (Japanese delegation received by Kim Il Sung);
- proposals addressed to South Korean parties and political forces in a letter on January 25.

Such changes are based on the understanding that [being in favor of] a forced military solution has undermined North Korea internationally. This approach not only produced tensions with the US, but also reservations from Chinese officials and a lack of response from the Non-Aligned Movement.

Significant for this new approach are the proposals in the January 25th letter, the fundamental aspect of which is the idea of an inter-Korean dialogue – an idea endorsed by China and the US, generating wide international support. China's prompt public support of these proposals – considered just and reasonable – and the manner in which Chinese propaganda advertised North Korea's initiative have been notable. China's speedy reaction confirms that it continues to play an important political and economic role in moderating North Korea's position.

c) the DPRK's economic hardships and the impossibility of overcoming them in the near future, as well as the North Korean Premier's recent failed attempts to receive economic assistance from the USSR, are likely to compel the DPRK to turn to the PRC and other partner countries, as well as to increase its openness towards Japan and other Western countries.

3. In our opinion, it is possible to initiate negotiations regarding the Korean question, both in terms of American military withdrawal from the South and working towards a political settlement.

We believe the US and the PRC's actions to achieve their strategic objective of removing the Korean Peninsula from Soviet influence to be determinative. Concurrently, we believe Japan to be influential as it requires time to adopt the appropriate military and economic measures in concordance with its close ties to South Korea.

Therefore, this appears to be a lengthy process (according to Western estimations, only the troop withdrawal itself will go beyond 1979), with various deviations reflecting the complexity of the issue, the large discrepancies between North and South, and the assortment of conflicting interests in the region.

Compiled by P. Lefter and Al. Niculescu

Signed: Nicolae Gavrilescu

**Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Information Items," 7  
February 1977**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item

KO00221. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.882004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_d at=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00221.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_d at=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00221.)]

Top Secret-Sensitive  
Contains Codeword

February 7, 1977

Memorandum for:                   The President  
From:                                Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Subject:                            Information Items

Seoul Loosens up Slightly in Human Rights: Seoul, in response to U.S. concern over human rights issues, is loosening, slightly, its constraints against domestic dissent, but the trend could be reversed at any time. The recent favorable signs include Seoul's decision not to carry out the death sentence imposed on a theology student recently convinced of espionage and the slight relaxation of press censorship.

For President Park and Seoul's leadership, the human rights issue has long pose a fundamental dilemma – how to maintain a strong, cohesive society in the face of an immediate threat from North Korea while acceding to U.S. pressure to relax domestic repression of dissent. Park feels that the North Korean threat is not adequately understood by human rights critics and that Korea has been unfairly singled out for their criticism. He is not likely to change the essentially authoritarian character of his government or the Korean Central Intelligence Agency's domestic role against dissent.

[...]

**Telegram 084120 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 February 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza*

*Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114868>.]*

TELEGRAM 084120

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC  
Subject: US – South Korea  
Date: February 7, 1977  
Classification: Secret

Edward Hurwitz, Director of the Korea Desk in the US State Department, told Comrade Petre Anghel, Third Secretary, the following:

The Carter administration has decided to implement measures announced during the 1976 political campaign, particularly those regarding improving bilateral relations and US troop withdrawal from South Korea. According to the bilateral security treaty, the US will maintain its commitment to strengthen the security of this country and gradually withdraw ground troops in consultation with both South Korean and Japanese authorities.

This position has been recently restated by Vice President Walter Mondale in discussions with the Japanese Prime Minister.

The situation in the Korean Peninsula remains tense and explosive, and the US does not want to alter the military and strategic balance in the region through its position.

The decision to partly withdraw American troops from South Korea is mostly the result of internal pressure within the US, especially after Vietnam, to maintain limited military presence so as to avoid a potential implication in a new military conflict.

The DPRK's recent four-point statement regarding contacts between various political and military organizations in North and South Korea is not concurrent with the joint North-South four-point statement and, thus, not viable. Furthermore, reopening discussions on the Korean question at the United Nations in the current context is not likely to decrease tensions within the Peninsula.

The US believes that a first step could be made through a joint Sino-Soviet-American effort and is willing to have contacts with the DPRK as long as the USSR and the PRC initiate contact with South Korea.

Signed: Nicolae M. Nicolae

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in Malaysia, 8 February 1977**

[Source: Roll 2007-25, File 7, Frame 16-17, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving Telegram

Category : \_\_\_\_\_  
File No. : MAW - 0224 Date : 091600  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs CC (copy) : \_\_\_\_\_  
From : Ambassador to Malaysia

*Dae:* AM - 0115, 0106

1. On February 8, 1977, I visited Zakaria, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs with Counselor Park Young-Woo, and had a talk with him for an hour and half, focusing on the President's New Year press conference held on January 12, 1977.

a. First, I explained the proposal suggested by President Park Chung Hee that Korea would not oppose the U.S. troop withdrawal on the condition that a South-North non-aggression pact be concluded, and emphasized that the North Korean puppets should resume inter-Korean dialogue at an early date for the peaceful resolution of the Korean question. I also pointed out that despite our peaceful and sincere proposal, North Korea continues to respond in the same unrealistic and hypocritical manner as it had in the past. In response, Vice-Minister Zakaria expressed his understanding of our position. He felt that the proposal represented a forward step in comparison to previous ones because it suggested a practical alternative to the U.S. troop withdrawal even though many alternatives had been frequently offered so far regarding the dissolution of the United Nations Command as well as armistice agreement.

b. Also, Vice-Minister Zakaria commented on the political situation in Asia and the Pacific region and added that he welcomed the overall trend towards reducing American military intervention in the region, but implied his opposition to drastic changes. Regarding the removal of U.S. forces from Korea, he added that as long as the United States has profound interests in Korea, it would not make any drastic changes.

c. He stated that the Malaysian government has not decided if she will participate in the Foreign Minister Conference of the Joint Coordinating Committee of the Non-Aligned Movement which will be held in New Delhi coming April. He added if Malaysia would decide on the participation as an observer, the Malaysian High Commissioner to India would be assigned, and that Malaysia would mainly focus on issues related to the primary products and the economic developments in this conference.

d. He stated that North Korea would not be able to make a bid for the 1978 Foreign Minister general conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, considering North Korea's status in the Movement and her deficient experiences, and that Yugoslavia would be the most likely venue for the conference at this moment.

2. The Vice-Minister is going to accompany Prime Minister Abdul Razak Hussein's official visit to Turkey on Feb. 11 - Feb. 14 and Iraq on Feb. 14 - Feb. 18 next week. I reminded him that some Korean construction companies had already worked in Iraq, and requested that the Vice-Minister persuade the Iraqi authorities into understanding and supporting Korea's basic stand, if

possible, during his visit to Iraq. Vice-Minister Zakaria showed a positive response.

3. In addition, I asked if the North Korean diplomatic mission would visit Malaysia regarding North Korea's appointment of the high-level envoy to Africa and the Middle East. The Vice-Minister answered that North Korea had not offered any visit yet. The Korean Embassy is going to keep an eye on it and report any movement.

(United Nations, East Asia, and Middle East Divisions)



**Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, 9 February 1977**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 34-36.]*

Washington, February 9, 1977

Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

The People's Republic of China and US National Security Policy

[...]

—US–PRC Relations and Third Country Issues. There are a number of third country areas—Korea, Japan, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe—where the Washington–Peking dialogue has led to parallel policies which have served the security interests of both sides. Defense, of course, has great interest in this process and of how the China relationship might be used to reinforce our security interests on issues like Korea or in response to any future crisis which might affect both countries.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Secret; Eyes Only. Secretary Brown sent copies of this memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski. On February 1, McAuliffe sent Brown a draft of this memorandum, on which Brown wrote, “2/2. Gene McA—Let me have a) a memo which I can use as a talking paper with ZB and then send to him along the lines marked [illegible] on next page. b) a memo to the President (cc to CV and ZB) urging that we move forward along the lines of this paper. HB.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–80–0035, Republic of China, 092)

**Letter to the US Secretary of State from Heo Dam, 11 February 1977**

*[Source: South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

Letter from the DPRK to the US Secretary of State

(Enclosure)

1977. 2. 11

“As you have been inaugurated as Secretary of State, I am writing from the need for a common search for practical ways to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

It has been twenty-three years since a truce has been established on the Korean peninsula; however, the political situation in this area has not significantly improved yet and tensions continue to persist.

President Jimmy Carter has stated the intention to remove U.S. troops and withdraw nuclear weapons from Korea. His remarks deserve welcome and are worthy of notice by people around the world. We, the people of the DPRK, welcome it as well.

We have continuously argued that the question of Korean unification should be resolved in a peaceful manner and frequently made clear that we have no intention to invade South Korea.

We believe that both the DPRK and the United States should have active talks immediately in order to ease tensions and sustain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

If both the DPRK and the United States had contacts and dialogue with each other, and tensions were reduced in Korea, it would contribute much to world peace including in Asia. I am looking forward to hearing from your positive reply to this letter.”

Heo Dam  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK

**Letter from Jimmy Carter to Park Chung Hee, 15 February 1977**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 6-9, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

His Excellency  
Chung Hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul, Korea.

February 15, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to take this early occasion to convey to you personally my Government's continuing commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea and my own personal interest in the Korean situation. The United States and the Republic of Korea have had a long, close relationship which I intent to maintain. You can be assured of this.

As you know, I have publicly stated my intention to gradually withdraw our ground combat forces from Korea. In taking this position I have stressed that any ground force withdrawal would be over a period of time and would involve the fullest consultations with you. Further, any such reductions will be approached in a manner which leads neither to misinterpretation of our determination to maintain our defense treaty commitment nor to upsetting the overall military balance on the Korean peninsula. We are now beginning an internal study of the complex questions related to ground force levels with a view to beginning consultations with you quietly later in the spring.

Further, after reviewing our Fiscal Year 1978 budget, I have decided to forward to Congress once again this year a request for \$275 million in foreign military sales defense guaranteed loans. In requesting this figure, we are prepared to defend vigorously our security relationship and to demonstrate concretely that we remain determined to support and strengthen your own defense efforts.

At the same time there is in the Congress, which must approve these requests, and in other important groups in the United States, a continuing concern about human rights issues throughout the world. It is a concern which I deeply share, over the rights of the individual, particularly as they relate to personal liberty, due process and imprisonment. It is not directed towards reordering particular political structures.

My administration does not wish to involve itself in other countries' domestic matters or to interfere in them. We do hope that our friends would demonstrate their sensitivity to these issues in a manner which allows us to maintain and properly justify to Congress and the public our closer relationships. Just as we intend to defend our relationships with your country, particularly in the security field, I request that you give consideration to what can be done in the human rights area in Korea. I ask you to consider how you could help deal with this question, which is of personal and public importance, and let me know your views.

Please be assured, Mr. President, of my intention that consultations on all matters of importance to our mutual interests be conducted frankly and with full recognition of the importance we attach to our relationship with your country.

Secretary Vance has informed me that he will be meeting with your Foreign Minister in March. That will give us an opportunity to consider each other's views at an early stage.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter



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Department of State

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, KN, KS, UN, US  
SUBJECT: KOREA: A POLITICAL INITIATIVE

REF: PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC 13, JANUARY 26, 1977

1. SUMMARY: AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE UN MEMBERSHIP ALONG THE LINES OF THE TWO-GERMANIES PRECEDENT FOR BOTH KOREAS WOULD SEEM BOTH TIMELY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN REDUCING TENSIONS AND IN SEEKING MORE DURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, INSOFAR AS NON-USE OF FORCE IS CONCERNED, ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UN CHARTER WOULD PROVIDE A FULL AND AS BINDING A LEGAL INSTRUMENT AS THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE, WITH THE NON-USE OF FORCE OBLIGATION OF THE CHARTER SUBSTITUTING FOR THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ DECIDED, DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND COULD PROCEED. THE CLIMATE IS FAVORABLE FOR THIS INITIATIVE AND THE EFFECTS SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL WHETHER OR NOT IT SUCCEEDS.  
END SUMMARY.

2. FUNDAMENTALLY, WE SHOULD REMAIN VITALLY INTERESTED IN REDUCING TENSIONS AND IN SEEKING MORE DURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. WE SHOULD REMAIN WILLING TO CONSIDER NEW IDEAS IN APPROACHING THE PROBLEM. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL (A) WHICH WOULD DENY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THE ROLE OF A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PENINSULA'S FUTURE. (THIS WOULD BE UNFAIR AND UNREALISTIC. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS 35 MILLION PEOPLE, MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE PENINSULA'S POPULATION; AND IT HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH 93 COUNTRIES.); OR, (B) WHICH WOULD TERMINATE THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BEFORE THERE ARE NEW ARRANGEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS TO MAINTAIN OR EQUATE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOW THE SOLE LEGAL INSTRUMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN PEACE. OUR CONCERN ABOUT UNCONDITIONAL DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND IN KOREA HAS BEEN UNDERScoreD BY STATEMENTS BY NORTH KOREA. FOR INSTANCE, NORTH KOREA'S VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN THE UNGA ON OCTOBER 21, 1975: "THE NATURAL RESULT IS THAT, IF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IS DISSOLVED, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF WILL ALSO CEASE TO EXIST."

3. BEARING IN MIND DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING ANTI-NORTH KOREAN BACKLASH FROM THE PANMUNJOM AX MURDERS, DIVISION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED OVER THE KOREAN QUESTION, WITHDRAWAL OF THE PRO-NORTH KOREA DRAFT RESOLUTION IN FACE OF INCREASING OPPOSITION AND REDUCED SUPPORT JUST PRIOR TO THE 11ST UNGA, NORTH KOREAN SMUGGLING SCANDALS IN SCANDINAVIA, AND NORTH KOREA'S LARGE FOREIGN DEBTS. 1977 MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. TAKING ALL OF THE FOREGOING INTO CONSIDERATION, AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE UN MEMBERSHIP ALONG THE LINES OF THE GERMAN PRECEDENT FOR BOTH KOREAS WOULD SEEM BOTH TIMELY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS. THE CLIMATE IS FAVORABLE AND EFFECTS SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL, WHETHER OR NOT IT SUCCEEDS.

4. INsofar AS NON-USE OF FORCE IS CONCERNED, ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UN CHARTER WOULD PROVIDE A FULL AND AS BINDING A LEGAL INSTRUMENT AS THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. THUS WERE THE TWO KOREAS ACCEPTED INTO THE UN, THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATING A MODIFICATION OF, OR A SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED IF NOT ENTIRELY ELIMINATED, ALBEIT DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ AS WELL AS ITS POSSIBLE TEMPORARY POLICING WOULD NEED NEGOTIATION. WITH THE NON-USE OF FORCE OBLIGATION OF THE UN CHARTER SUBSTITUTING FOR THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ DECIDED, DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND COULD PROCEED. THIS DISSOLUTION WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN THE UN AND WOULD REMOVE THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR AROUND WHICH THERE HAS BEEN MUCH UNHELPFUL RIVALRY AND HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SATISFACTION IN NEW YORK WHEN DEBATE ON KOREA DID NOT MATERIALIZE AT THE 31ST UNGA.

5. DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND WOULD, HOWEVER, END THE VALIDITY OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE AGREED MINUTL SIGNED IN WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 12, 1955, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE RETENTION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UN COMMAND WHILE THAT COMMAND HAS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL COULD, THEREFORE, BECOME A SUBJECT FOR ACTIVE NEGOTIATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

6. AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE ADMISSION OF THE TWO KOREAS WOULD BE BEST TIMED TO FOLLOW, IF POSSIBLE, RESOLUTION OF THE MIA AND THE RELATED VIETNAM ADMISSION QUESTIONS. PREDICTABLY THIS INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPACT ON A MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS. EVEN WERE PANMUNJUM TO REJECT IT, IT SHOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE PRO-ROK POSITION SHOULD THERE BE DEBATE ON KOREA DURING THE 32ND UNGA. IN THE MEAN-

TIME, STEPS TOWARD US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA COULD HELP ENCOURAGE A CLIMATE CONDUCTIVE TO NORTH KOREAN ACCEPTANCE OF UN MEMBERSHIP AND THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH UN MEMBERSHIP INVOLVES. FORCE REDUCTIONS TOO COULD GAIN FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM MOST UN MEMBER STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, EFFORTS BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO PROMOTE ITS INTERNATIONAL TIES AND TO MODERATE ITS STRICT INTERNAL REGIME SHOULD BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED BY THE UNITED STATES. ADDITIONALLY AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO NORTH KOREAN ADVENTURISM MUST BE RETAINED.

7. WE HAVE DRAWN SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR TINY MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE UN COMMAND AND OUR SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE THERE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE US-ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 1, 1953. OUR OPPONENTS HAVE SOUGHT TO OBSCURE MATTERS AND TO CHARACTERIZE OUR WHOLE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ROK AS BEING THERE UNDER THE UN FLAG. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD OUR FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTH KOREA BE REDUCED PRIOR TO AN AGREED DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND, IT SHOULD BE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT ELEMENTS BEING REMOVED ARE NOT FROM THE UN COMMAND WHICH CONTINUES PENDING ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS JUST AS BEFORE TO REPRESENT OUR SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

8. GIVEN NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES COULD BE IMPORTANT IN ENCOURAGING NORTH KOREAN FLEXIBILITY ON UN MEMBERSHIP. IN THIS CONTEXT, PROMOTION OF INCREASED ALLIED (INCLUDING U.S.) TRADE CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA WOULD SEEM WORTHY OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

9. SINCE NORTH KOREA'S MAJOR ALLIES -- THE PRC, THE USSR, AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED -- COULD PROVE INSTRUMENTAL IN PERSUADING PANMUNJOM TO ACCEPT UN MEMBERSHIP, OUR SIDE'S CONTACTS WITH SUCH COUNTRIES ON A MEMBERSHIP INITIATIVE



COULD WELL BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE. WESTERN EFFORTS IN THIS UN  
MEMBERSHIP INITIATIVE COULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE NEW  
YORK CORE GROUP STRUCTURE.  
YOUNG

**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 26 February 1977**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 10-20, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

February 26, 1977

Dear President Carter:

I wish to thank you for your letter delivered to me on the 15th of February by Ambassador Sneider. I am grateful to you for conveying personally to me, at an early stage of your Administration, the United States Government's continuing commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea and your deep personal interest in the Korean situation.

As you pointed out, our two countries are close allies which have traditionally maintained a friendly and cooperative relationship. In particular, the Korean Government and people always remember with gratitude that your great country did not hesitate to render invaluable assistance to us in time of great difficulties. It is indeed heartening to us that you made clear your intention to continue this close relationship, and I wish to take this occasion to assure you that I and my Government will pursue, as in the past, the consistent policy of maintaining and further cementing the close ties existing between our two countries.

With regard to the problem of reduction of the United States ground combat forces in Korea, mentioned in your letter, my Government has closely followed its developments with keen interest. Needless to say, the United States forces in Korea, both as visible evidence of the Korean-American mutual defense arrangement and as an indispensable factor in the structure of the balance of power in this area, have been playing an important role in deterring the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula and in ensuring peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region as a whole.

Accordingly, I appreciate your view that any reduction of the United States ground forces, regardless of its size and scope, will be approached in a manner which leads neither to the misinterpretation of the United States determination to maintain its commitment to the defense of this Republic nor to upsetting the overall military balance on the Korean peninsula. Also, I am pleased to note your assurance that the fullest prior consultations [sic] will be conducted between the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea, the two immediate parties concerned, before any decision is made in this regard.

At a time when the North Korean Communists have not abandoned their sinister scheme of communizing the whole of Korea by means of force or violence, and when the Republic of Korea's self-defense capabilities have not yet reached the sufficient stage, my Government believes that any reduction in the current level of the United States forces in Korea is not desirable and, therefore, hopes that any such change would not take place for a considerable period of time. But I wish to state that if your Government proposes to hold consultations in this regard, my Government intends to enter into such consultations in good faith and in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that has characterized the relationship between our two countries.

I appreciate your decision to forward to the United States Congress a request for \$275 million in foreign military sales defense guaranteed loans for upgrading Korea's defense capabilities in Fiscal Year 1978 and your willingness to vigorously defend this request. As a developing country, the Republic of Korea faces the enormous tasks of developing her national economy and promoting the welfare of her people and at the same time is burdened with the heavy responsibility of strengthening self-defense capabilities. However, we are determined to do the best within our means to meet this challenge.

In connection with the recent trend in the United States Congress, you expressed your concern about human rights issues throughout the world. I pay tribute to you for emphasizing on many occasions, particularly in your inaugural address, the importance of morality and respect for human rights in politics, foreign relations and administration, since I myself subscribe to those lofty political ideals.

Recently, some people at home and abroad who are opposed to the present political system of my country have been trying to insinuate that human rights are being repressed or infringed upon in Korea. Such allegations apparently stem from their failure or reluctance to correctly understand the special situation existing on the Korean peninsula or the nature of the problems involved.

Under the difficult circumstances of national division, the Republic of Korea has been making steady progress as a free democratic nation while coping with war provocations and incessant military threats by the North Korean Communist regime which totally denies individual freedoms or human rights to its people and indulges in merciless repression. Unfortunately, in the absence of long tradition and solid foundation for democratic governments, some senseless elements in our society tended to resort to radical and illegal anti-state actions, thereby not only endangering political stability, social order and economic development but also creating a grave threat to the very existence of our nation.

You will no doubt understand that the prevention of war and communization of the Korean peninsula is the foremost concern in the minds of the Korean people. We in Korea are a people who experienced the scourge of Communist aggression. We also know that, in spite of our continuing efforts for securing a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, the North Korean Communists have never given up their avowed scheme of bringing the whole of Korea under their domination. Furthermore, for the past several years, they have persistently pursued the scheme of fomenting political and social confusion with a view to instigating the uprising of the so-called popular revolutionary force in the south.

Under these circumstances, it is quite clear that any acts leading to political confusion and social chaos or detrimental to national unity would, by exposing a grave vulnerability to the North Korean Communists, be tantamount to an open invitation to them to launch an aggression against us. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the Korean people realize that the reservation of some of their rights is unavoidable in order to ensure the security, stability and the very survival of the nation. With this understanding, they came to fully support the measures taken by the Government in this regard.

It is to be noted that our Constitution, while guaranteeing the fundamental human rights including the one to criticize the Government, contains explicit provisions empowering the President to issue emergency decrees including the limitation of certain individual rights in time of national emergency or when the nation's security is seriously threatened. These provisions in our Constitution were supported and approved by the overwhelming majority of the Korean people through the national referenda held on two occasions in the past. I am convinced that it is incumbent upon the President who is entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the security of the nation to take necessary measures to cope with the threat to the national security and the survival of the people in accordance with the constitutional process.

As all men are equal before the law, no one who has violated it can be exempted from being dealt with according to the relevant provisions of the law. Therefore, those who are being tried on charges of violating the Emergency Decrees promulgated under the explicit provisions of the Constitution have nothing to do with the question of human rights. They are being tried through due process of law by an independent judiciary in open and fair courts. They are also guaranteed of appeals to higher and supreme courts. The court alone has the authority to determine whether a person is guilty or not. I and my Government are convinced that since this process is the due application of the Constitution and domestic law, human rights issues do not exist in Korea.

I wish to assure you that individual liberties and human rights are protected to the fullest extent possible within the framework of the Constitution and relevant laws. It is also clear that inasmuch as the law is executed fairly and in accordance with lawful procedures, there cannot exist any valid ground for alleging that human rights are arbitrarily violated in Korea.

My sole wish and intention are to ensure the survival of my country and my people as a free nation and ultimately to make all of the Korean people enjoy freedoms and fundamental rights to the fullest degree. For this, we are endeavoring to bring about political and social stability and continued economic progress in national unity and harmony and to forestall the North Korean Communist aggression by strengthening our defense capabilities. I sincerely hope that with deep understanding of the situation you will place your confidence and trust in what I intend to do and give your support and assistance to our painstaking efforts for the survival and freedom of the entire 35 million Korean people in the south.

I share your hope and confidence that our two countries will continue to further promote the cooperative relationship in security and other important fields. With this in mind, I am in full agreement with your view that we should conduct frank consultations with each other on matters of mutual concern and interest with full recognition of the importance both of us attach to our traditional relationship. I am confident that my Foreign Minister's consultations with your Government leaders during his forthcoming visit to the United States will prove to be both fruitful and rewarding.

I wish to extend once again my heartiest congratulations to you on your inauguration and my warmest wishes to you and your Administration for every success and good fortune.

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.  
U.S.A.



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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EO 11652: GDS  
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SUBJ: REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER

REF: A. STATE 33149 B. STATE 33148 C. SEOUL 1353 D. SEOUL 1613

SUMMARY: PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL KIM CHONG-YON CALLED ME IN FEBRUARY 26 TO PRESENT REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER (REF A). TEXT OF PRESIDENT PARK'S LETTER SENT SEPTEL REF D AND ORIGINAL TEXT BEING POUCHED. KIM FURTHER ELABORATED ON PRESIDENT PARK'S CONTENTION THAT THERE IS NO HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN KOREA. HE ARGUED THAT ROKG IS ACTING CONSTITUTIONALLY, LAWFULLY, AND WITH FULL DUE PROCESS OF LWA IN CONVICTING VIOLATORS OF EMERGENCY DECREE NUMBER 9, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO MYONGDONG DEFENDERS. EMERGENCY DECREE JUSTIFIED BY SERIOUS THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA. I PETTERATED VIEWS SET FORTH IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER AND URGED CONTINUED CONSIDERATION BY ROKG OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

1. IN OPENING HIS PRESENTATION, KIM SAID THAT "SOME PEOPLE" ALLEGE HUMAN RIGHTS ARE VIOLATED AND INFRINGED

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6  
PER 11/21/96 BY SP NARS DATE 11/21/96

UPON IN KOREA AND POLITICAL PRISONERS HELD WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS. CONSIDERED VIEW OF ROKE IS THAT HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION ARISES ONLY IF, FIRST, GOVERNMENTS ACTS ILLEGALLY OR UNLAWFULLY, SECOND, LAWS ARE NOT ENACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, AND THIRD, DEFENDANTS ARE SUBJECT TO ILLEGAL TREATMENT SUCH AS SECRET TRAILS, TORTURE, OR PUNISHMENT WITHOUT TRIAL. IN CASE OF KOREA NONE OF THESE CONDITONS IS TRUE.

2. KIM ARGUED THAT PRESENT CONSTITUTION WAS ENACTED LAWFULLY AND APPROVED BY NATIONAL REFERENDUMS IN DECEMBER 1972 AND FEBRUARY 1975, BOTH CONDUCTED IN A FREE DEMOCRATIC ATMOSPHERE. WHILE IT MIGHT BE CONTENDED THAT FIRST REFERENDUM WAS CONDUCTED UNDER MARTIAL LAWS AND THEREFORE TAINTED, SECOND WAS CONDUCTED IN FREE ATMOSPHERE WITH PUBLIC GUARANTEED FREE CHOICE AND FULLY AWARE OF PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION SINCE THEY HAD BEEN IN EFFECT FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS. OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF PUBLIC APPROVED CONSTITUTION DEMOCRATICALLY IN BOTH CASES.

3. KIM WENT ON THAT AS PRESIDENT'S LETTER STATES KOREAN CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES BASIC RIGHTS INCLUDING RIGHT TO CRITICIZE. AT SAME TIME IT EMPOWERS THE PRESIDENT TO ENACT EMERGENCY DECREES WHEN NATIONAL SECURITY OR PUBLIC LAW AND ORDER ARE THREATENED OR LIKELY TO BE THREATENED. A PROVISION PARALLED IN OTHER DEMOCRATIC STATES. THE AUTHORITY TO DECREE AN EMERGENCY RESTS ENTIRELY WITH THE PRESIDENT. HOWEVER, HIS DECISION IS SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY OF KOREANS WHO BELIEVE THAT A SEMI-STATE OF WAR AND INCESANT MILITARY THREATS BY NORTH KOREA JUSTIFY THE EMERGENCY DECREE. THUS, THOSE PEOPLE CONVICTED FOR THE MYONGDONG INCIDENT WERE TRIED UNDER DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE COURTS FOR VIOLATING

~~SECRET~~

EMERGENCY DECREE NUMBER 9 PROMULGATED LEGALLY BY PRESIDENT PARK UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. KIM SUMMED UP KOREAN JUSTIFICATION, BY POINTING OUT EM 9 ENACTED CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LAWFULLY, AND APPLIED FAIRLY AND LAWFULLY. FURTHERMORE, MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS WERE TRIED BY AN INDEPENDENT FAIR JUDICIARY IN OPEN COURT SESSIONS ATTENDED EVEN BY FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS. THESE DEFENDANTS MUST BE SUBJECT OF THE VERDICT OF THE COURT WHICH HAS THE POWER TO DECIDE THEIR GUILT OR INNOCENCE, AND NO MAN CAN BE EXEMPTED FROM APPLICATION OF LAWS ENACTED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE CONSTITUTION. THE MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS HAVE BEEN CONVICTED IN LOWER COURTS, THIS, OF VIOLATING DECREES LAWFULLY ENACTED UNDER CONSTITUTION.

4. KIM SAID THAT, WHILE HE WISHED TO AVOID COMPARISONS, THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KOREAN ACTIONS AND THOSE OF CHILE, UGANDA AND ETHIOPIA. FOR EXAMPLE WHERE POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS SECRETLY, WITHOUT LAWS PROPERLY ENACTED AND EXECUTED AFTER RIGHT OF APPEAL DENIED.

5. NONE OF THESE CONDITIONS WERE TRUE IN KOREA. KIM RECOGNIZED THAT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAD DIFFERENT LAWS BUT OF COURSE THEIR REQUIREMENTS WERE DIFFERENT. KOREA FACED SERIOUS THREAT FROM NORTH AND REQUIRED EM 9 AND ANTI-COMMUNIST LAWS AS LONG AS KOREA NOT UNIFIED. KIM CONCLUDED BY REQUESTING THAT I PRESENT THESE VIEWS TO MY GOVERNMENT TO WHICH I SAID I WOULD.



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6. I POINTED OUT IN RESPONSE TOKIM THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL QUESTIONS AT LEAST INVOLVED. FIRST, IT WAS THE VIEW OF "SOME" AMERICANS THAT THE THREAT TO SOUTH KOREA

DID NOT DICTATE THE DEGREE OF LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF DISSENT AND THE DEGREE OF SURVEILLANCE OVER POTENTIAL DISSENTERS. SECOND, THERE EXISTS THE PROBLEM STATED IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERN, SHARED BY THE PRESIDENT, REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THIS PROBLEM WAS POINTED UP IN SECRETARY VANCE'S TESTIMONY FEB 17 ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WHILE, AS PRESIDENT CARTER HAD STATED, WE HAVE NO WISH TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN KOREA'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OR SEEK ALTERATION OF ITS GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, THESE PROBLEMS EXISTED AND THERE WERE THOSE IN PARTICULAR URGING CLEMENCY AND LENIENCY FOR MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS. I URGED THEREFORE THAT THIS ISSUE BE KEPT UNDER ACTIVE AND FULL CONSIDERATION BY ROKG.

7. KIM RESPONDED THAT IF UNLIMITED DISSENT WERE PERMITTED, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DISORDER WOULD ARISE AS WAS APPARENT FROM THE EXPERIENCE

~~SECRET~~

OF PAST 10 YEARS. THIS WOULD LEAD TO GREATER CONFUSION AND FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO TIGHTEN CONTROLS. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE ROKG THAT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STABILITY ARE INDISPENSABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME FOR SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE, SELF-SUPPORTING ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND INDEED NATIONAL POWER AND SURVIVAL. THE ALTERNATIVE IS DISSENT LEADING TO A VICIOUS CYCLE OF CONFUSION AND CONTROL.

8. I RESPONDED THAT IN THE CASE OF KOREA NATIONAL POWER WAS ALSO DEPENDENT UPON THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES AND A NATION'S STRENGTH COULD BE FRODED BY A WEAKENING OF THIS SUPPORT. PRESIDENT CARTER RECOGNIZED THIS IN PROVIDING ASSURANCES OF OUR COMMITMENT TO KOREA'S SECURITY IN HIS LETTER. BUT, THERE IS ALSO IN A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALLIES THE IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF MUTUALITY AND RECIPROcity IN UNDERSTANDING PROBLEMS OF ONE'S ALLY, WHICH IS WHAT WE ARE UPGING.

9. KIM REPLIED THAT IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS KNEW THE REAL SITUATION IN KOREA, THEY WOULD HAVE NO MISGIVINGS. I CLOSED THE CONVERSATION BY POINTING OUT THAT, AS KIM AWARE, EVEN SOME OF KOREA'S CLOSE AND UNDERSTANDING FRIENDS IN CONGRESS WOULD NOT AGREE FULLY WITH THESE POLICIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA.  
SNEIDER

**Memorandum for Zbigniew Brzezinski from Mike Armacost, "Contacts and Communications with North Korea," 28 February 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 1/77-1/81, Bos 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

MEMORANDUM

1017

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

INFORMATION  
February 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: MIKE ARMACOST (signature)

SUBJECT: Contacts and Communications with North Korea

On our Evening Report of February 17, you raised a question as to why you or Secretary Vance should not receive a letter from North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam carried by a friend of Jerry Cohen's. I have two answers -- one short; one longer. The first is mainly procedural; the other is more substantive.

(1) The short answer is that this is an unlikely channel for serious communications. For the last few years North Korea has made a variety of efforts to get in touch with U. S. officials. In the process they have discovered that a number of governments are quite eager to extend their good offices in promoting a dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang -most notably Pakistan, Egypt, and Romania. Thus there is no dearth of plausible channels. At the same time there are lots of people like this friend of Cohen's who are eager to get in on the action. Why offer them encouragement? This is not to say that we should refuse to receive a letter. On the contrary, Cohen was told that if his friend (Neumoff) wanted to deliver a message, he should pass it to Bill Gleysteen at State. To date no letter has come. I will report to you on its contents if and when one does.

(2) But there are more serious reasons why we need, in my view, to exercise some caution in the way we respond to North Korean desires to establish bilateral contacts with us at this time. The case is built on these propositions:

-- While North Korea has never renounced its objective of reunifying the Korean peninsula on its own terms, it has been reasonably flexible with respect to its strategy for achieving its aim. For example, in the late 1960's it pursued without notable success a confrontationist approach. Subsequently, it tried a "détente" strategy culminating in the abortive North-South talks of 1972. Thereafter it turned to a more adroit diplomatic offensive designed to:

(a) enhance North Korea's international standing while putting the South on the defensive diplomatically and casting it in the role of a pariah; (b) diversify its trading links in order to accelerate industrial development, expand commercial entrée to the West, and diminish dependence on Moscow and Peking; (c) obtain preferred access to the nonaligned movement and use it to alter the international climate of opinion on the Korean issue; (d) increase South Korea's sense of political isolation by alienating it from its principal allies; and (e) generate growing international and domestic pressures in the U. S. for the withdrawal of U. S. forces from the peninsula.

-- In 1973-75 this diplomatic strategy netted Pyongyang notable results. The North was recognized by a large number of states, and now enjoys diplomatic relations with nearly as many countries as Seoul. The DPRK was admitted to the nonaligned movement; the South was not. A pro-North Korean resolution was passed in the UNGA for the first time in 1975. The North established commercial links with Western Europe and Japan. They outpaced the South in the development of an indigenous defense industry. The North's hopes for U. S. troop withdrawals were buoyed by growing Congressional criticism of President Park. Kim Il-sung floated many proposals for direct contacts with the U.S.; he refused to talk with the South so long as Park remained in power. He enjoyed the diplomatic momentum. He seemed persuaded time was on his side.

-- In 1976 North Korea fell on hard times. Growing debt problems compromised efforts to accelerate industrialization and expand commercial ties with western countries, while forcing the DPRK back toward greater dependence on Peking and Moscow -- neither of which has been very generous in furnishing hard currency loans. Scandals involving North Korean smuggling activities in Scandinavia impaired North Korea's international reputation. Ham-handed North Korean diplomacy at the Colombo Non-aligned Conference alarmed many moderate LDCs. Pyongyang was forced to withdraw its resolution from the UNGA when it realized that support for its position was declining. The DMZ incident on August 17 provoked a more immediate and forceful U. S. reaction than the North presumably expected; and Japan supported U. S. moves without the usual skittishness and hesitancy. There were also signs of political turmoil in Pyongyang.

-- These developments must have been all the more discouraging to the North in view of South Korea's phenomenal economic performance (15 percent real growth in GNP in 1976 and exports exceeding \$8 billion) and relative political tranquility. If the North enjoyed broader recognition, moreover, Pyongyang found that few states were willing to give up ties with Seoul in order to preserve links with them. Thus an increasing number of states (now 48) recognize both, thus lending increased legitimacy to the reality of two Koreas. And Seoul's relative advantages in most measurable elements of national power continued to grow. Meanwhile, U. S. forces remained on the peninsula, and the U. S. refused to be drawn into direct discussions of Korean problems with Pyongyang without participation by ROK representatives.

-- These developments should force North Korean leaders to reexamine the premises underlying their current strategy -- including their refusal to deal with President Park's regime. But the DPRK, like most other governments, probably finds it distasteful to face up to unpleasant realities. It may therefore be expected to postpone hard choices as long as possible. At present

Kim will certainly probe with special care the Korean policies of new governments in the United States and Japan while testing the support of Moscow and Peking.

-- The U.S. is the key to North Korea's Strategy. President Carter's troop withdrawal plans have evinced a cautious optimism from the North. Kim has indirectly relayed (via the Pakistanis) his intent to avoid confrontation with the U. S. and to pursue reunification peacefully, but he has also sought to open direct peace talks with us which (at least initially) would exclude representatives of the South. We need not play their game on this. Promotion of our interests in Korea requires resumption of a serious North-South dialogue. That can come only when Kim recognizes that he cannot hope to resolve Korean issues behind Seoul's back.

-- I believe our best bet for now is, therefore, to welcome any signs of North Korean moderation, and to affirm regularly our willingness to discuss with them matters bearing on Korea's future provided representatives of the ROKG are present. It is particularly important that we maintain this stance during a time when we are contemplating major troop withdrawals from the South.

**Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, March 1977**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 45-48.]*

RP 77-10038

Washington, March 1977

Intelligence Memorandum<sup>1</sup>

“THE VALUE OF THE UNITED STATES TO CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY”

*Key Judgments*

[...]

The Chinese leaders do not desire further US pullbacks from bases in the Far East. However, they are confronted by a basic contradiction in their Korea policy. They privately favor a two Koreas policy and maintenance of the status quo on the peninsula, but they are impelled, primarily by their competition with the Russians for Kim’s favor, to support his one Korea policy. This requires them to demand the withdrawal of US troops from the South. They have viewed the US troop presence as a stabilizing factor, but they probably calculate that if US troops were to be reduced in number, the remaining troops (and remaining command-and-control as well as air force units) together with the big South Korean army would still be adequate deterrents to Kim’s occasional military adventures. A further deterrent to instability is the silent convergence of interest in Peking and Moscow in keeping Kim cool.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, Job 78 T02549A, Box 3, Folder 9, RP 77-10038. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A footnote on the first page indicates that the memorandum was prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of Economic Research.

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INFO WHITE HOUSE

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NOJIS  
WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI  
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, KB, KN

SUBJECT: PAKISTANI APPROACH RE US/NK CONTACTS

REF: STATE 43627

1. DURING FEBRUARY 28 CONVERSATION WITH KURIYAMA, COUNSELOR OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY, GLEYSTEN DREW ON REPTEL TO CLARIFY NATURE OF NORTH KOREAN MESSAGES PASSED TO US VIA PAKISTANIS. HE ALSO SAID WE HAD TOLD THE PAKISTAN THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NORTH KOREANS ON THE FUTURE OF KOREA WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF THE ROKG.
2. FOR TOKYO: WE PREFER THAT THE EMBASSY NOT DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH THE JAPANESE BUT WE ARE REPEATING REPTEL FOR INFORMATION.
3. FOR SEOUL: IN ABSENCE OF FONMIN PARK, YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM ACTING FONMIN ABOUT OUR RESPONSE TO THE PAKISTANIS.

VANCE  
BT

PN1041031 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:000/00:32Z DTG:010011Z MAR 77

**Report, Embassy of Hungary in Belgium to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 3 March 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1977, 78. doboz, 2, 00673/2/1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. [http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110128.](http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110128)]*

The World Conference for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (Conference Mondiale pour la Réunification Pacifique de la Corée) held its meeting in Brussels on 21-22 February 1977. In addition to the leading functionaries of the Belgian Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Belgium, Christian Democratic public figures also participated in the Belgian preparatory commission that undertook to organize the conference. The members of the international supporting commission were the following: Ratsiraka, President of the Malagasy Republic [Republic of Madagascar]; Eyadéma, President of the Republic of Togo; Kérékou, President of the People's Republic of Benin; Narita Tomomi, Chairperson of the Japan Socialist Party; Minobe, Governor of Tokyo; Carrillo, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain; Rómulo [Escobar Bethancourt], Rector of the University of Panama and special adviser to the head of state.

[...]

The government of the DPRK was represented at the meeting by Minister of Education Kim Seok-gi [Kim Sok Gi], who headed a delegation of a few persons.

[...]

After two days of discussion, the participants in the conference adopted a resolution that had been prepared by a drafting committee. The introduction to the resolution notes that the conference intends to mobilize world public opinion, particularly public opinion in the West European countries and North America, which is poorly informed about the Korean question; it wants to call attention to the tragic situation of this nation, which was divided against its will, and to the threats to peace that result from this division.

The adopted resolution demands, among others, the following:

[...]

4.) It calls attention to the danger of stationing American nuclear forces in South Korea and demands their immediate withdrawal.

5.) It regards the increasing cooperation of certain states with the Seoul regime in the military and nuclear field, which enables this regime to increase its armament capacity and create a military nuclear potential, as deeply disquieting, and therefore it calls upon every state to cease providing the Seoul regime with patents and technical and financial assistance [that can be used] for the establishment of defense factories.

[...]

József Vince  
Ambassador



**Memo to President Carter from Cong. Donald M. Fraser, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” 3 March 1977**

*[Source: 3/8/77 [11], Box 11, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Presidential Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

[...]

March 3, 1977<sup>1</sup>

MEMO TO: President Carter

FROM: Cong. Donald M. Fraser (signature)

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Korea

1. Next Monday, March 7th, the Foreign Minister of South Korea will be in Washington, D.C. This will be the first contact above 'the ambassadorial level between the Korean government and your Administration. The meeting will be with Secretary Vance.

In recent weeks the United States' public position has taken a turn for the worse:

a. A public announcement has been made that military assistance to South Korea would be increased above last year's level (last year's level was a substantial increase over the year before).

b. Secretary Vance stated publicly that the United States would not consider cuts in military assistance to Korea because of our security interest there.

These two statements replicate the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger line which has permitted President Park Chung-Hee to steadily reduce and eliminate the political rights of the Korean people since 1971.

The announced intention of the administration to phase out U.S. ground forces in South Korea doesn't help the situation in relation to the human rights problems. If anything, this announced intention may make matters worse. Once the United States begins withdrawing troops, our flexibility in dealing with South Korea will steadily diminish. Our maximum opportunity to attempt to help the Korean people comes while our troops are still there.

The challenge to the Administration of the human rights problem in South Korea represents the severest test of the Administration's commitment to human rights. The Koreans are highly capable but also very tough and President Park is as tough as any of them. He is determined to keep his principal political opponent, Kim Dae-Jung, in jail and suppress all political opposition by whatever means are necessary. The situation in Korea today bears a striking resemblance to the situation in the Soviet Union, with the KCIA playing essentially the same role as the KGB.

<sup>1</sup> A handwritten note, "Zbig – I wanted to meet the FM – What is status? J," was added below the date.

2. Those of us who have been concerned about human rights in Korea are faced with an enormous dilemma. We want to be supportive of the Administration, but acquiescence in the present public posture of the Administration is almost impossible. A fight on the question of military aid to South Korea will put most of the strong believers in human rights against the Administration's position. We do not want this to happen.

3. We can head off a fight on this issue, I believe, if we can have some assurance that the United States is moving with firmness on the human rights issue. I strongly recommend that the Foreign Minister of South Korea be advised that, although the Administration is publicly supporting the Ford Administration increase in military assistance, the Administration will find it difficult to go forward with the obligation of that money until and unless the Administration has a clearer understanding about, the intentions of the Park government with respect to the human rights situation. It should be made clear that the U.S. expects substantial improvement in the human rights situation. Secretary Vance ought to identify the major actions of the Seoul government which have given us difficulty.

So long as United States troops are present in Korea, the Administration can afford to use the military aid levels as leverage because the U.S. forces represent such an overwhelming deterrent to any action by the North that temporary reductions in the flow of military assistance will not significantly affect the security of the South.

The United States has other levers to pull but the threat of holding back military assistance will be the most effective way to underscore your determination.

4. If, despite our firmest and toughest efforts, President Park persists in his present course, then the withdrawal of troops accompanied by adequate levels of military aid will represent our last remaining option.

[...]

**Handwritten Note from Jimmy Carter for Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance, 5 March 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of 1-4/77, Box 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

3-5-77

Zbig & Cy:

I'll see the S. Korean Foreign Minister next week. Park must understand:

- a) American forces will be withdrawn. Air cover will be continued.
- b) US-Korean relations as determined by Congress and American people are at an all time low ebb.
- c) Present military aid support and my reticence on human rights issue will be temporary unless Park voluntarily adopts some open change re political prisoners.

J.C.

**Telegram from the Minister of Foreign, 8 March 1977**

*[Source: Roll 2007-25, File 7, Frame 73-77, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sending telegram

File No. : \_\_\_\_\_ Date : \_\_\_\_\_  
To : Refer to recipient below (Not indicated) (copy) : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
From : Minister of Foreign Affairs

1. Regarding the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Movement, which will be held in New Delhi from April 6 through 11, the following are recent trends in the actions of the North Korean puppets as of March 8:

a. The North Korean puppets sent a letter of appeal to the Yugoslav government to "appeal to friendly countries and progressive forces". (information from the Foreign Ministry of France)

b. The North Korean puppets attended as an observer for the first time the Ambassador-Level Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Movement in New York during the 31<sup>st</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly, which was held to review the first draft of the activity report of the Non-Aligned Movement. (report by our mission to the U.N.)

c. The North Korean puppets recently solicited India's help in submitting its own resolution regarding the Korean question. In response, India proposed that the North Korean puppets refrain from the submittal of its independent resolution, citing the fact that twenty five countries at the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Heads of State or Government in Colombo expressed reservations about it and that in addition, six of them (India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Peru, Liberia, and Zaire) are included in the Coordinating Bureau composed of twenty five countries. India reasoned that if these six countries opposed the independent resolution of the North Korean puppets, it would prevent the conference from running smoothly (information from the Foreign Ministry of Malaysia)

d. According to the Indian Foreign Ministry, the North Korean puppets have never proposed any resolution regarding the Korean matter to the Indian government. Even if the North Korean puppets did propose any resolution, it certainly would not, the Indian Foreign Ministry supposes, be discussed during the Ministerial Meeting because the North Korean puppets are not a member of the Coordinating Bureau (report by our ambassador to India)

e. Basically, India, host of the meeting, does not want the Korea issues to be discussed in the meeting; nevertheless, if some countries brought up them, they, India assumes, would be inevitably debated in the meeting. However, India intends to avoid any biased words in the documents if any kinds of documents on the Korean matter should be adopted after the meeting. (report by our Ambassador to the India)

2. Judging from the information and report mentioned above, the North Korean puppets seem to propose or mention the issues related to Korea at the New Delhi meeting in any ways while attending the meeting as an observer.

3. Considering the following and the talking paper sent previously, you are required to ask for the cooperation of your host country so that the Korean question should not be mentioned at the

Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Movement held in New Delhi, and to report the outcomes. The list of representatives of your host country for the meeting is also required.

a. Twenty five countries objected to North Korea's stance in the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Heads of State or Government in Colombo because they think that the Korean issue should be addressed at the inter-Korean talks, between the parties directly concerned, rather than in the conference. (You are recommended to remind the 25 countries about the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Heads of State or Government in Colombo.)

b. The Korean issues were not dealt at the 31<sup>st</sup> Session of the U.N. General Assembly because the communist parties withdrew the agenda voluntarily. It is because most of the U.N. members do not want the issues discussed at any international meetings including the U.N., but they want the direct parties, the two Koreas, to peacefully resolve the issues through talks among themselves.

c. In light of the basic principles of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Korean issues are not eligible for any meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, but for the direct inter-talks between those parties concerned.

d. Incidentally, no resolution on any issues has ever been adopted in the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Movement so far. (United Nations Division)

**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "North Korean Proposal for Discussions of Reunification with South Korea," 14 March 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, 1/77-1/81, Bos 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

MEMORANDUM

1332

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

INFORMATION

March 14, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI (signature)

SUBJECT: North Korean Proposal for Discussions of Reunification with South Korea

You raised a question on the attached news report concerning the significance of a North Korean proposal which implied its readiness to discuss confederation with the ROK. Its significance is limited.

The proposal, announced on January 25, was reportedly written by Kim Il-sung. It calls for a "political conference of representatives of all the political parties, public organizations and people...in the North and South" that desire reunification.

This is not a new proposal; Pyongyang has been calling for such a broadly based conference for at least five years. They have regressed in one important respect. Their original conference proposal presented during the North-South dialogue in 1972 -- provided for official South Korean participation. Under the latest version the South Korean Government would be permitted to sit in only if it agrees "to renounce anti-communism, stop the suppression of patriotic people (in the South) and give up its war policy. Clearly the preconditions are designed to block rather than facilitate a serious government-to-government dialogue.

The immediate North Korean aim in surfacing this proposal was to counter President Pak's January 12 call for a bilateral nonaggression pact between the North and South. Beyond this, Pyongyang probably wishes to highlight the "peaceful unification" theme to forestall moves by the major powers toward a "two Korea" understanding, and to repair the North's tarnished international image -- which suffered greatly last year as a result of massive indebtedness, a smuggling scandal involving its diplomats, and the brutal murder of two Americans at the DMZ in August.

In short, the North is replaying an old record. Kim still resists direct discussions with the Park Government, and that is an essential prerequisite to any genuine reduction of tensions in the peninsula.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This paragraph is crossed out.

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, KS, US

SUBJECT: ROK MEMORANDUM ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL

BELOW IS THE TEXT OF ROKG MEMORANDUM GIVEN TO US DURING VISIT OF FONMIN PAK TO WASHINGTON. MEMORANDUM ITSELF WAS NOT DISCUSSED DURING VISIT, AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY REPLY. WE NOTE THAT PARA 4(B) SETS FORTH SPECIFIC TENSION-REDUCING MOVES AS CONDITION FOR TROOP WITHDRAWALS. THESE WERE NOT REPEAT NOT MENTIONED DURING FONMIN'S DISCUSSION WITH U.S. OFFICIALS.

QUOTE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WISHES TO SET FORTH ITS OBSERVATION AND POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN-KOREA CAME TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN 1950 PURSUANT TO THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO HELP REPEL THE UNPROVOKED NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION AND RESTORE INTERNATIONAL  
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PAGE 02 STATE 056574

PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA. SINCE 1963, THE UNITED

IS/FPC/CDR Date: 4/3/76  
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STATES FORCES HAS REMAINED IN KOREA AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

2. FOR THE PAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY, THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA HAS NOT ONLY SERVED AS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT AGAINST THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BY NORTH KOREA BUT ALSO PERFORMED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA WHERE INTERESTS OF CERTAIN MAJOR POWERS INTERSECT DELICATELY.

3. CONTRARY TO THE UNCEASING EFFORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND ESTABLISH GENUINE PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME, NEVER ABANDONING ITS SINISTER SCHEME OF UNIFYING THE COUNTRY UNDER COMMUNISM, HAS BEEN CONTINUING ITS PROVOCATIVE ACTS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THEREBY HEIGHTENING TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME DECLARED PUBLICLY THAT IT HAD COMPLETED PREPARATIONS FOR ANOTHER WAR AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE DANGER OF ANOTHER CONFLICT BECAUSE OF NORTH KOREAN MISCALCULATION STILL EXISTS. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ANY UNILATERAL AND PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES FROM KOREA WOULD BE UNWISE FROM BOTH TACTICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS. THE TENSION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA REPRESENTS IN NATURE THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE AND COMPETITION BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST.

4. BASED ON THE OBSERVATION AS STATED ABOVE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA STRONGLY BELIEVES:

A) THAT THE VITAL ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA SHOULD CONTINUE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE

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PAGE 03

STATE 056574

UNITED STATES, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN THE ENTIRE REGION OF THE NORTHEAST ASIA AS WELL;

B) THAT ANY PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES FROM KOREA SHOULD BE AVOIDED UNTIL AFTER PEACE AND SECURITY ARE INSURED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA THROUGH SUCH STEPS AS THE CONCLUSION OF A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT AS PROPOSED

CONFIDENTIAL

BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN THE AREA BE ENDORSED INTERNATIONALLY; AND

C) THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 1953 MUST REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT WILL HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT TO PRESERVE PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

5. IT IS ALSO A FIRM BELIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THAT, AS A DIRECTLY CONCERNED PARTY, THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA SHOULD FIRST AND FULLY BE CONSULTED WITH REGARD TO ANY PLAN OF MODIFYING THE PRESENT LEVEL OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN KOREA. UNQUOTE

VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

**Memorandum, Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 March 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1977, 78. doboz, 81-2, 001197/1/1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai. [http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110127.](http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110127)]*

On February 14, at his request, I received Czechoslovak First Secretary Lehocky. Referring to instructions received from his center [the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry], he informed me that in the view of their embassy in Pyongyang, the declaration made by the DPRK on January 25 and its four-point proposal had an extremely threatening tone. For example, it describes the situation on the Korean peninsula as if it might directly lead to the outbreak of a global nuclear war. The declaration also includes a veiled reference to the fact that the DPRK is equipping itself with nuclear weapons.

The government of the DPRK launched an international campaign to gain support for its proposals. In the opinion of the Czechoslovaks, the Korean side will ask the [governments of the] socialist countries to make official statements supporting the four-point declaration. The Czechoslovak side could hardly fulfill a request of such nature.

Comrade Lehocky inquired about the Hungarian standpoint and the steps that we had taken, or planned to take, with regard to this issue.

I said that we had not noticed any fundamentally new element in the tone and contents of the declaration. The DPRK's initiative was motivated by the intention to respond to the newest "proposal" of the South Korean regime (that the two Koreas should conclude a non-aggression pact, in tandem with which the American troops would be withdrawn) and sound out the Carter administration's plans for Korea.

I informed him that Comrade Deputy [Foreign] Minister Házi had already received the DPRK ambassador in Budapest. During their conversation, he informed him [the ambassador] that the declaration had been described in detail in the Hungarian press, with positive comments, right after its publication. He repeatedly assured him that we support their struggle for the peaceful and democratic unification of Korea. The DPRK ambassador did not ask [the Hungarian government] to make an official statement.

András Forgács

**Telegram 065241 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Soviet Comments on Sino-North Korean Relations," 16 March 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 931/1977, Issue 220/E, Bilateral relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and socialist countries in Asia (the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Kampuchea), February – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114864>.]*

TELEGRAM 065241

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to comrade Constantin Oancea

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: Soviet Comments on Sino-North Korean relations

Date: March 16, 1977

Classification: Secret

Soviet diplomats noted, with an obvious concern, that there has recently been a surge in activity in terms of Sino-North Korean relations.

According to them, this surge originated particularly after the North Korean Premier's visit to Moscow in January this year, and consists of the following: politically, according to the USSR, Chinese support for the DPRK's proposals for reunification issued on January 25th 1977 is 'more adamant and accentuated than before;' economically, the North Korean delegation visited China in view of scientific and technological cooperation, and, more recently, there was a visit headed by the Vice Premier who signed a long-term trade agreement.

In our opinion, the Soviet concern regarding Sino-North Korean relations confirms what wider diplomatic circles have already suspected, namely that the DPRK was not satisfied with the outcomes of the North Korean Premier's visit to Moscow, and that it is increasingly turning to the People's Republic of China in the attempt to surpass its current economic difficulties.

What we find significant in terms of Sino-North Korean relations is the recent meeting between Chairman Hua Guofeng and the DPRK's Ambassador to China, who had just concluded his mission in Beijing.

Signed: Nicolae Gavrilescu

**Memo for Dr. Brzezinski from The Situation Room, "Evening Notes," 18 March 1977**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00226. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00226.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00226.)]

March 18, 1977

[...]

North Korea Criticizes U.S. Withdrawal Plans: Pyongyang is evidently starting a new series of propaganda attacks against U.S. policy in South Korea. A March 17 radio announcement sharply criticized remarks by the President at a recent press conference, where he projected a five-year phase out of U.S. ground forces and retention of U.S. air force units in South Korea. Apparently the North Koreans are signaling that they will not be satisfied with a gradual and partial U.S. withdrawal. They showed caution in their initial reaction by only commenting on a previously published Laotian news item; however, more direct attacks may follow.

[...]

**Telegram 084354 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 March 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977.*

*Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza*

*Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114869>.]*

TELEGRAM 084354

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC

Subject: the Korean question

Date: March 21, 1977

Classification: Secret

During 8-10 March, the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Washington to consult with the US on the matter and met with President Carter at the latter's request.

During the meeting with the South Korean Minister, President Carter reaffirmed:

- the United States' commitment to maintain and preserve security in South Korea;
- the United States' decision to gradually withdraw American ground troops from South Korea in consultation with South Korea and Japan, without damaging South Korea's security or altering the strategic and military balance in the Korean Peninsula;
- the US administration's firm position regarding human rights issues and the need for Seoul to take appropriate measures so as not to compromise the development of bilateral relations in the future.

Edward Hurwitz, Director of the Korea Desk in the US Department of State, told Comrade Petre Anghel, Third Secretary, that the South Korean Minister's discussions with President Carter and State Department representatives have managed to reduce South Korea's concerns regarding allegations of a diminished US interest in their bilateral relations and in the region.

US officials reassured the South Korean Minister that they will not proceed to an immediate withdrawal of American troops and that the process will be gradual, with the direct cooperation and participation of South Korean authorities. Concurrently, American representatives reiterated the position that the US will not accept discussing solutions to the Korean issue in the absence of envoys from Seoul. According to the US diplomat, the DPRK sent a message to the new administration via the Pakistani government, proposing to initiate a dialogue with the US in order to sign a definitive peace treaty and establish stable bilateral relations.

The US responded that it cannot accept a dialogue with the DPRK, which excludes South Korea, and proposed a four-party meeting to discuss a new settlement initiating a constructive bilateral dialogue between the two Koreas.

According to Hurwitz, although it is difficult to estimate if and to what extent the DPRK will abandon the rigid position upheld hitherto, a less aggressive tone has been noticeable in its recent statements regarding the United States.

In regards to discussing the Korean issue at the UN, the US would prefer a situation similar to the one from the last General Assembly. Thus far, American representatives have no knowledge of the issue's inclusion on the agenda for the next Assembly. However, if this were to happen, it would only lead to sterile discussions and a potential intensification of the tensions in the Korean Peninsula.

Signed: Nicolae M. Nicolae

**Notes on a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary-General on Tuesday, 22 March 1977, at 10 A.M.**

*[Source: "Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0075-07, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

CONFIDENTIAL

FMG/jeb  
23 March 1977

NOTES ON A MEETING IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL ON TUESDAY, 22 MARCH 1977, AT 10 A.M.

Present: H.E. Mr. Tong Jin Park, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea  
H.E. Mr. Duk Choo Moon, Permanent Observer

The Secretary-General  
Mr. Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel

The following main points were made by the Foreign Minister:

1. His Government would try to avoid a debate on the question of Korea during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. This would, of course, also depend on North Korea, which last year also did not press for a debate, due to lack of support from the non-aligned and to incidents such as the smuggling affair in Scandinavia and the border incident where two Americans were slain. The Foreign Minister wondered whether the Secretary-General, in his introduction to the Annual Report, could again make a conciliatory statement referring to the Korean question, which might be helpful in this connexion.
2. South Korea was trying to continue the dialogue, which was at present suspended, with North Korea. There were, however, occasional meetings of the Red Cross organizations in which political subjects were discussed, so far without success.
3. In reply to a question by the Secretary-General about the political and human rights situation, the Foreign Minister said that his country did not have the tradition of a democratic system and tended to pursue a "black and white approach". The opposition acted in absolute terms without due moderation. The Government did permit demonstrations etc. but it was not possible to transfer American standards to the situation, in view of the constant threat posed by North Korea. By and large, there was political stability in South Korea and they had been very successful in the economic field increasing their exports by 49% since last year.
4. When questioned by the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister said that his Government knew that the US presence in his country would have to be terminated at some point but that they did not think this should be done for a few more years and not without obtaining something in return from the North.



5. The Foreign Minister also said that it was not possible to withdraw the United Nations flag and dissolve the UN command since it was a signatory to the armistice and its presence, therefore, was essential so long as the armistice was not replaced by other arrangements.

6. The Foreign Minister wondered whether it would be useful for the Security Council to deal with the Korean question, which could be done only after consultations with the permanent members.

7. Provided there would be no technical or political difficulties for the Secretary-General, the Foreign Minister invited the Secretary-General to pay a visit to South Korea. The Secretary-General said that he did not usually visit non-member states and if here to accept such an invitation it would be necessary to pay a visit to North Korea as well.

CC: RA/AR [signature]  
Mr. Urguhart  
Mr. Buffum

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Deputy Director of the United Nations Division, 10 April 1977**

[Source: Roll 2007-25, File 7, Frame 73-77, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving telegram

Category : Urgent (Personal)  
File No. : Service – 04?? (Illegible) Date : 102130  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Cc (copy) : Director General for International Organizations  
From : Deputy Director of the United Nations Division

Regarding the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries in New Delhi, the United Nations Division has frequently reported through open either regular telegram or personal one. With the plenary meeting approaching on April 11, the deputy director of the United Nations Division would like to report what he has observed and felt for the Foreign Minister's information as follows:

1. India's attitude toward the ROK regarding the meeting of Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries

India who hosts this meeting is observed to have pro-Korean attitude because of the following points:

a. When she was drafting the Korean matter in the joint declaration of the meeting, India could have quoted the same draft that had been adopted at the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State in Colombo last year; however, India presented its draft which India corrected through prior consultation with Sri Lanka because India's draft was originally presented by Sri Lanka, but failed to be adopted.

b. Right before the Korean matter was about to be discussed at the Political Committee, Ri Jong-mok, vice foreign minister of the North Korean puppets visited Vellodi, vice Foreign Minister of India to express his dissatisfaction with India's first draft and suggested a long first draft prepared by the North Korean puppets. However, the Indian Vice Foreign Minister rejected North Korea's first draft.

c. When Algeria asked India's view on the Korean matter at the request of the North Korean puppets, India informed Algeria the same position it had expressed to the North Korean puppets.

d. When Algeria orally suggested a correction at the Political Committee, India also suggested a slight correction on Algeria's proposal even though her suggestion was not accepted.

e. Regarding the seating arrangement for the opening ceremony, India provided country name tags for those members of the Coordinating Bureau, but did not provide them for the representatives of observer states and other guests (including our ambassador). Its reason was later known, by the representatives of various countries attending the ceremony, that there had been a rumor circulated that North Korean puppets were dissatisfied with the invitation of the Korean ambassador and would have walked out.

f. Despite their very tight schedule as organizers of the conference, Metha, permanent vice-

minister, and Vellodi, vice foreign minister of India, met with Ambassador Lee at his urgent request. In particular, Vellodi, vice foreign minister telephoned him to inform him as frequently as possible the discussions involving the Korean matter.

The following will be reported later by telegram after ciphering.

## 2. Analysis of the Attitude of the North Korean Puppets towards the New Delhi Meeting

It is certain that the North Korean puppet regime would like to add its peace offensive of so-called inter-Korean politics negotiation, which North Korea has been offering since the beginning of the year, to the joint declaration of the New Delhi meeting, along with its old claims. However, the North Korean puppets do not seem to have consulted it with countries sympathetic to them and come to a spontaneous decision to advance it on the spot. This analysis was made based on the following:

a. The North Korean puppets could have contacted India long before the meeting. However, North Korea did not contact India, host of the meeting, until the Korean matter was about to be discussed at the Political Committee. As India negatively responded to the North Korean puppets, they asked Algeria three times to propose their version of the draft.

b. Ri Jong-mok of North Korea arrived at New Delhi earlier before other delegations of the coordinating committee; thus, he had sufficient time to consult with the representatives of countries sympathetic to them prior to the meeting. Yet, he did not begin the consultation until the Korean matter was about to be discussed at the Politics Committee. (This fact is a reflection of how the diplomatic efforts of the North Korean puppets prove to be counter-productive.)

c. The North Korean puppet regime had the keynote address scheduled to coincide with the Political Committee's discussions on the Korean matter. (The United Nations Division adroitly obtained a copy of Ri Jong-mok's address draft, which had apparently been telegraphed from Pyongyang. There are a few points that should be placed under further consideration.)

d. There does not seem to have been frequent contact between the North Korean puppets and the delegations of countries sympathetic to them, either at the hotel lobby or the Political Committee. (The delegation of the North Korean puppets stayed at a different hotel from where delegates of the coordinating committee stayed.)

e. The North Korean puppets expressed dissatisfaction when Algeria's separate correction was adopted at the Political Committee, because Algeria did not respond to North Korea's request at the committee and suggested a separate correction, which was similar to the politics declaration and the resolution, both of which had been adopted in Colombo last year.

## 3. Attitude of the related countries toward South and North Korea

a. It seems that there are no general changes in the attitude of the 25 countries of the coordinating bureau toward South and North Korea, compared to the last conference in Colombo last year.

b. As reported above, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Cuba, countries that have traditionally been sympathetic towards the North Korean puppets, refrained from supporting the North Korean puppets on the Korean matter more than they did at the last conference in held in Colombo and were reluctant to include the North Korean puppets' proposal calling for the so-called North-South political

negotiation in the first draft of the committee. This possibly seems to indicate the emergence of a new facet in the relations between the North Korean puppets and its traditional supporters.

c. The countries that had opposed North Korea's stance at the conference in Colombo last year declared that they maintained the same stance on the Korean issues, considering the character of the ministerial meeting of the coordinating bureau itself; nevertheless, they made an excuse of Non-Aligned meeting on the Korean matter, and hesitated to be publicly against North Korea's position and to show active support for our stance. In particular, it attracted attention that ambassadors of India, Zaire, and Bangladesh took an understanding attitude toward Korea's stand. Peru's air of indifference was beyond North Korea's expectation, under circumstances without Silva (assumed), Peru Ambassador's presence.

#### 4. Comprehensive Analysis on the Ministerial Meeting

a. When the Korean matter was discussed at this New Delhi meeting, we could not obtain much objection to North Korean puppets' claims and gain strong support for our position. However, we make particular note of the fact that North Korea's attempts at the meeting were discouraged by its countries traditionally sympathetic to them. This is a good point of reference for our future actions in the United Nations.

b. It is difficult to completely figure out North Korean puppets' stance targeting for the next United Nations General Assembly only by this New Delhi meeting. Yet, North Korean puppets' real intention was verified at the meeting that they wanted to use its so-called North-South political negotiation as its peace offensive and, at the same time, use the negotiation as its counterattack on our peaceful stance which urges the resumption of South-North dialogues. By doing so, the North Korean puppets intend to frustrate our supporters and other third forces who endorse the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Such attitude was actually proven at this conference. From this, it is possible to at least partly predict what the North Korean puppets will attempt to gain at the United Nations General Assembly this year.

c. The New Delhi meeting is the first international conference this year to discuss the Korean matter. Accordingly, Ri Jong-mok's speech is a useful point of reference for understanding North Korea's future attitude towards the United States and its position at the United Nations General Assembly regarding the Korean matter, and foreign relations in the near future.

d. There was much difficulty in contacting the delegations of other countries and obtaining relevant information in New Delhi. Nonetheless, Ambassador Lee's close friendship with officials in the Indian Foreign Ministry as well as Counselor Lee Hyun-Hong's visit to India enabled us to operate from a more advantageous position during the Colombo Conference. More details will be separately reported upon return.

**Telegram 066567 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 April 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 929/1977, Issue 220/E: Bilateral relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and several socialist countries in Europe (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the People's Republic of Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Hungary), April – December 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114849>.]*

TELEGRAM 066567

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to comrade Constantin Oancea

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: Bilateral relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Date: April 13, 1977

Classification: Secret

i. During March 29th and April 5th this year, the Yugoslav governmental delegation led by Mara Radic – member of Government, President of the Yugoslav team in the advisory commission on intergovernmental economic, technological and scientific relations between the DPRK and the SFRY – was in Pyongyang. Given this opportunity, the first session of the aforementioned commission took place and the following [documents] have been [signed]: the first protocol of the session, a long-term trade agreement for 1977-1980, and a trade protocol for 1977.

During its stay in the DPRK, the Yugoslav delegation enjoyed special attention from Korean officials, was received by Korean Premier Pak Seong-cheol [Pak Song Chol] and visited various economic and social-cultural sites in Pyongyang and Hamheung.

Although the delegation's mission was primarily economic, Korean officials sought to imprint a pronounced political character on it, and discuss not only economic matters but also aspects related to a long-term development of political bilateral relations and other issues.

During the official and unofficial discussions, the Korean side emphasized the need to intensify activity within the Non-Aligned Movement in order to solve major current issues.

On this occasion, Pak Seong-cheol showed that currently the main problem within the Non-Aligned Movement is maintaining unity amongst its member states, this being highly important especially given that the imperial powers are carrying out an intense activity to divide these states and undermine the movement.

The Yugoslav delegation remarked that its Korean counterpart did not make any reference to either Third World or developing countries.

Discussing issues related to a new world economic and political order, the Yugoslav delegation wanted to know the DPRK's stance in regards to Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's initiative of a high-level Third World countries conference. The Korean delegation avoided the answer, only mentioning that, presently, it is necessary to meet the conditions agreed upon in 1976 at Colombo.

On receiving the Yugoslav delegation by Premier Pak Seong-cheol and, particularly, during official discussions with Kong Jin-tae [Kong Jin Tae], both parties emphasized that bilateral economic relations are not commensurate with political ones. It was pointed out that neither party had made sufficient efforts to accomplish the tasks and agreements reached during Kim Il Sung's visit to Belgrade. It is necessary for the appropriate bodies in both countries to actively work towards developing trade and technological and scientific cooperation, thus also enacting the decisions agreed upon at Colombo in 1976.

The Korean delegation expressed its conviction that the Yugoslav delegation's visit to the DPRK will contribute to the substantial improvement of economic bilateral relations.

The Yugoslav delegation appreciates that the visit has been extremely helpful. The first session of the intergovernmental commission established the judicial framework of the commercial, technological and scientific relations between the two countries.

The Yugoslav party manifested an interest in substantially enlarging cooperation in terms of production with the DPRK. In turn, the DPRK was particularly interested in the matter.

ii. During discussions for signing the first protocol of the intergovernmental commission, the following issues have been discussed:

a) The DPRK wishes to obtain from the SFRY, or via the SFRY from the German Democratic Republic, the technology of coke production using anthracite coal. The Yugoslav delegation claims there is no such technology in the SFRY. However, in cooperation with the Korean specialists who are about to arrive in Belgrade, all possibilities will be examined.

b) Cooperation between the two countries in the production of diesel locomotives – each will produce certain components and will trade specialists;

c) Technical cooperation in naval construction. The DPRK will import ship engines from SFRY. We remind that several years ago the DPRK had imported from Yugoslavia 20 such engines, of a total worth of 5,500,000 pounds sterling, without reimbursement. The Yugoslav delegation required a payment of one million pounds sterling this year, with the remained to be reimbursed in a five-year installment plan after a period of 18 months from the first payment. The proposal is under review.

d) The DPRK wishes to obtain technical documentation for the production of ships employed in deep-water oil extraction. The Yugoslav delegation explained that SFRY does not dispose of its own vessels and uses highly expensive Swedish ships for these purposes. Recommendations will be made for an appropriate Yugoslav organization to assist DPRK in the matter.

iii. The long-term agreement stipulates:

a) DPRK exports: machinery and other equipment worth a total of 1,000,000 pounds sterling; 44,000 tons of iron and steel products; 25,000 tons of electrolytic zinc; 140 tons of cadmium; 66,000 pounds sterling worth of chemical products; 460,000 pounds sterling worth of commercial goods; 40,000 tons of rice; 26,000 tons of freshly frozen fish; 950 tons of the common hop.

b) DPRK imports: machinery and other equipment – no final figures have been established; 20,000 tons of iron and steel products; 5,700 tons of aluminum and aluminum products; 450 tons of brass; 10,800 tons of chemical substances – insecticides, herbicides, etc.; 450 tons of concentrate feeds; 640,000 pounds sterling worth of chemical fertilizers; 2,000 tons of various types of paper, including rolling paper.

iv. The trade protocol for 1977 stipulates an extra hundred tons of tobacco and feathers in the Korean export to Yugoslavia, in addition to the long-term agreement.

Information based on V. Nanu's discussion with I. Dinic, First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Pyongyang.

Signed: D. Popa

**Policy Review Committee Meeting, "Korea," 21 April 1977**

*[Source: [Meetings-PRC 14: 4/21/77], Box 34, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collect, Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING

April 21, 1977

Time and Place: 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p. m., White House Situation Room

Subject: Korea

Participants:

State:

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Richard Holbrooke  
Philip C. Habib

Defense:

Secretary Harold Brown  
Charles W. Duncan  
David E. McGiffert  
Morton Abramowitz

JCS:

General George S. Brown  
Lt. Gen. William Smith

CIA:

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
[Redacted]

Treasury:

Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal  
C. Fred Bergsten

OMB:

Bert Lance  
Edward R. Jayne

ACDA:

Paul Warnke  
Marvin Humphreys

NSC:



Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Mike Armacost

### The Military Balance in Korea

There was general agreement with the Intelligence Community's assessment that the North enjoys a substantial advantage in the static military balance between the forces of North and South Korea alone. The prevailing view was that U.S. ground combat forces can be withdrawn from Korea without undermining the deterrent, provided our troops are withdrawn slowly, we offer substantial assistance to the Republic of Korea in augmenting its firepower and overcoming other deficiencies in its defenses, consult closely with the South Koreans and Japan on this issue, and remain prepared to provide air, naval, and logistic support for the foreseeable future. However, several participants raised the question as to whether the potential risks -- given the inherent uncertainties -- might exceed the benefits of full-scale withdrawal of ground troops.

### Ground Force Withdrawal Options

No one favored a quick withdrawal of all ground combat and combat support forces. All agreed that we should allow ourselves some flexibility with regard to the timing of the later stages of our withdrawals in order to take the political and military situation into account. State leaned towards a five-year, three-stage withdrawal: one brigade would be withdrawn in 1978 with a concurrent announcement that further withdrawals will take place on a phased basis -- the presumption for planning purposes would be that the second brigade would come out in FY 79 or 80, the third in FY 82. Defense preferred to "back load" the withdrawal plan -- bringing the first brigade and support elements out next year, postponing withdrawal of the other two brigades until 1982. This, they feel, is mere prudence, would give US the best chance of retaining operational control of ROK forces during the transitional period of our troop withdrawals, and be more protective of the U. S. ground forces remaining. ACDA favored the most conservative ground force withdrawal option (i. e. early withdrawal of 700 personnel with subsequent withdrawals' contingent on a reduction of tension) as the necessary political and military prerequisite for the early withdrawal of all nuclear weapons. OMB expressed no views on the withdrawal options other than to indicate the need for a more precise assessment of the budget implications of each alternative. The NSC favored the withdrawal of two brigades by 1980, while leaving our future plans regarding the deployment of the last brigade intentionally vague for the time being.

Questions were raised concerning the importance of operational control and whether we could retain it under the various withdrawal alternatives. It was agreed this subject requires further study, and that follow-up work should include a detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of preserving OpCon as well as of alternative command arrangements. Some differences were also expressed concerning the desirability of describing withdrawal plans publicly in terms of broad aggregate numbers or in terms of brigades and appropriate support elements.

[Redacted]

### Timing and Methods of Consultations

It was generally agreed that we need to initiate consultations with South Korea quickly following a Presidential decision on force withdrawals; that Ambassador Sneider and General Vessey should handle these consultations in Seoul; and that a few senior Congressional leaders should be informed of the President's decision just prior to discussions with the South Koreans. It was agreed that we would essentially inform President Park of our plans for the first stage of our withdrawal scenario but that we would consult with them regarding an appropriate package of compensatory measures, future command arrangements, and, possibly, the phasing of subsequent ground force withdrawals. One unresolved problem involves the question of when and how to approach Congress on a possible compensatory package.

### Follow-Up Work

It was agreed that State, Defense, OMB, Treasury, and the NSC should develop by June 1 a detailed set of proposals for implementing the first stage of withdrawals and for compensation packages, alternatives to existing command arrangements, and scenarios for handling the Congressional and public aspects of this issue. In addition, all agreed that the net risks and benefits of force withdrawal [redacted] need to be set forth more clearly in the inter-agency paper before Presidential decisions are reached. The Inter-agency Group on East Asia, chaired by Dick Holbrooke, will undertake to incorporate such an assessment as an addendum to the paper. Finally, all agreed on the importance of holding a full NSC meeting on this major issue.

## **Countermeasure to North Korea's Proposal on DMZ Alternation, 23 April 1977**

*[Source: Roll 2009-42, File 06, Frames 2-4, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

### Countermeasure to North Korea's Proposal on DMZ Alternation

1977. 4. 23.  
North America Division 2

#### 1. Background

Intelligence is obtained that North Korea is getting ready for a proposal of expanding the range of the demilitarized zone (defined by the Article 1 of the Korean War Armistice Agreement), which is 4 km wide now. (April 15, 1977.)

#### 2. Analysis on North Korea's proposal

a. Intending to urge the U.S. troop withdrawal from ROK on the pretext of developing the inter-Korea reconciliatory mood, which is actually disguised.

b. Aiming to weaken the United Nations Command (UNC) functionally by a disguised proposal in order to amend the major article (Article 1).

c. Targeting to propagandize against U.S. at the 32<sup>nd</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly

- as part of their peace offensive

d. Creating an opportunity of contacting U.S. directly

- to conclude a peace treaty with the United States

e. Planning to conceal the internal contradictions in North Korea by escalating the tensions between the two Koreas

f. Attempting to cause confusion in defense posture at our frontlines against the North Korea puppets (needing analysis by the Department of Defense)

#### 3. Our stance on the proposal

a. Definitely opposing any measures that cause confusion over validity of the armistice. Needing effective countermeasures and mutual agreement in advance.

b. Demanding the resumption of the inter-Korean dialogues to secure the validity of the armistice more clearly and guarantee the peace settlement institutionally in the Korean Peninsula

c. Opposing U.S. initiative to launch direct contact with the North Korean puppet regime

d. Calling for the United Nations Command (UNC) and the United States to conduct

sufficient prior consultation with Korea if the North Korean puppets raise the issue in question

#### 4. Countermeasures

a. Not accepting North Korean puppets' proposal until the faithful fulfillment of the current armistice is completely guaranteed

i. North Korea, needing to stop armed provocation within the demilitarized zone (DMZ)

ii. Restoring the Joint Observer Team and reviving the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

b. Immediately resuming the inter-Korean dialogues to implement the armistice definitely and institutionalizing the peace settlement in the Korean Peninsula

c. If either the United Nations Command or U.S. were offered the alternation of DMZ by the North Korean puppets, both needing to check out the fulfillment of both *a* and *b* as stated above and urging North Korean puppets to resume the inter-Korean talks

d. Encouraging those nations involved in the armistice to hold the talks as early as possible

e. Unless the faithful fulfillment of the current armistice is guaranteed, actively informing the Non-Alignment nations of the fact that any proposal by the North Korean puppets would be no more than fabrication and propaganda so that they support our position.



28 APR 77 00 13  
Department of State

OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, KS

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPT INVESTIGATION OF KCIA ACTIVITIES

REF: STATE 96709

1. HABIB TOOK OCCASION OF COURTESY CALL BY KOREAN AMBASSADOR KIM TO WEIGH IN ON NEED FOR ROKG COOPERATION IN JUSTICE DEPT INVESTIGATION.

2. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT, IF ROKG COOPERATED THROUGH TONG-SUN PARK IN PROVIDING DETAILED INFORMATION, THIS WOULD ALLOW JUSTICE DEPT TO BRING CASE TO AN EARLY END, AN OBJECTIVE IN BOTH US AND ROK INTEREST. KIM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT TONG-SUN PARK CASE HAD CREATED A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR ROK AND THE US AND TONG-SUN PARK'S ACTIVITIES WERE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 11/3/96 State Dept NLC-96-39  
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 11/21/96

"DISASTER" IN TERMS OF US/KOREA RELATIONS. AT SAME TIME KIM AVERRED THAT PARK'S ACTIVITIES WERE HIS OWN AND HAD NOT INVOLVED ROKG.

3. HABIB QUICKLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT, INFORMING KIM THAT PARK'S PAST ACTIVITIES HAD CERTAINLY BEEN KNOWN TO SOME OFFICIALS IN THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT. HE REITERATED OUR REQUEST FOR ROKG COOPERATION IN RESOLVING CASE WHICH HAS

HAD MAJOR NEGATIVE EFFECT ON US/ROK RELATIONS. HABIB SPECIFICALLY ASKED KIM TO CONVEY OUR REQUEST BACK TO SEOUL THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNEL HE BELIEVED APPROPRIATE, POSSIBLY PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT PARK.

4. HABIB ALSO CAUTIONED KIM ON NEED TO AVOID ANY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES BY MEMBERS OF KOREAN EMBASSY AND CONSULATE STAFFS. KIM SAID THAT HE WOULD ASSURE HABIB ON THAT SCORE, INCLUDING KCIA. KIM SAID THERE WOULD BE NO IMPROPER ACTIVITIES BY ANY MEMBERS OF THE EMBASSY OR THE CONSULATES. HE INDICATED HE HIMSELF WAS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO PROBLEMS CAUSED BY KCIA AND WHEN QUERIED, SAID HE HAD AUTHORITY TO PREVENT ANY IMPROPER ACTIVITIES BY THAT AGENCY. HABIB EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR KIM'S RECOGNITION OF IMPORTANCE THAT POINT.

CHRISTOPHER

**CIA and National Intelligence Reports on Ground Troop Withdrawals, April-May 1977**  
[Source: CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020022-2, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]

[...]

28 APR 1977

**TASK FOR THE CIA FROM PRM ON KOREA**

What are the public opinion concerns with our withdrawal from Korea in the various countries involved?

1. We should address these as we go through the process of making this decision.
2. We should find ways to minimize the adverse, impact.

[...]

U.S Ground Force Withdrawals from Korea:  
Advantages and Disadvantages

Withdrawal of U.S. ground troops over a four to five year period would result in important advantages from U.S. policy standpoints; it would also involve disadvantages and risks.

Advantages

1. When completed, withdrawal of ground troops will eliminate the risk of automatic U.S. ground force involvement in any renewed hostilities, while retaining our security commitment as well as our essential air presence and naval role.
2. Ground force withdrawal will reduce the danger of a Congressional challenge to our basic security relationship, lessen Congressional pressures for complete withdrawal of our presence, and strengthen congressional support for our essential security assistance program.
3. Ground force withdrawal will spur South Korean efforts achieve greater military self reliance.
4. Withdrawals will free U.S. forces for deployment elsewhere.
5. Our moves will implement the President's pledge on ground troop withdrawal.

The Disadvantages and Risks

1. Unless compensated for, withdrawals will reduce Overall combat power and mobility in South Korea, weaken command and control, and reduce intelligence capability.

2. Ground troop withdrawals will reduce the deterrence to North Korean aggression. This effect would be increased by complete and simultaneous withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

3. Withdrawals could stimulate President Park to attempt to reactivate South Korea's nuclear and long-range missile programs.

4. Withdrawals will heighten South Korean anxieties over the future and could lead to political instability greater repression. They might also adversely affect the ROK economy and the investment climate.

5. Ground force withdrawals may reduce our ability to restrain ROK military and other responses to North-South incidents.

6. There will be heightened concern in the PRC, Japan, and other countries of the region that the United States is disengaging from Asia, more because of domestic considerations than as a result of favorable changes in the strategic balance.

7. The USSR may become more responsive to North Korean pressures for increased military assistance as South Korean military capabilities expand and U.S. restraints and presence are reduced.

Taking the foregoing into account, the Options developed in PRM-13 consider the compensatory and reassuring steps necessary to reduce disadvantages and risks; they also consider the ways in which risks may be heightened or reduced by combinations of actions under the various sets of options.

[...]

#### THE US FORCE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA: RISKS AND COMPENSATIONS

The essential risk involved in a US force reduction flows from our judgment that the North continues to seek reunification on its own terms and has not ruled out the use of force. The US security commitment has been a major factor in deterring renewed hostilities, and the US ground force deployment has been an important element of this commitment. Thus there is general agreement that a US ground force withdrawal will have some negative impact on the deterrent.

In strictly military terms, there is also general agreement that adequately armed and led South Korean troops could, with us tactical air and logistical support, repel a North Korean invasion. There are, however, doubts--short of a prevailing view--that the deterrent itself will be maintained in the absence of US ground forces. The extent of the doubts varies according to different sets of judgments about the ability of the South Koreans to improve their defensive



capabilities sufficiently before the withdrawal is completed; the general atmosphere that would prevail thereafter; and the uncertainties stemming from the fact that the North Koreans themselves are the ultimate judges of the deterrent.

In deciding whether to undertake major hostilities, Pyongyang is likely to weigh its military objectives against its perceptions of political conditions in the South, the status of US-ROK relations (e.g., the reliability of the US security commitment and the net military balance.

The North's most likely military objective would be to seize Seoul, lying only 25 miles from the DMZ, in the shortest possible time and then to consolidate its gains. In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South the opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play, minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. And in moving successfully, the North would calculate that it could easily achieve complete reunification on its own terms given the demographic, economic, and political significance of Seoul and its environs.

Political turmoil in the South would be an important inducement to the North, since it would provide a pretext for intervening, lessen South Korea's ability to defend itself, and perhaps cause the US to avoid military involvement. In assessing the prospects for unrest, the North may be especially hopeful that members of the South Korean elite will come to believe that President Pak's policies and behavior have significantly lessened the US security commitment to Korea and thus attempt to oust him. In view of the US withdrawal, the human rights issue and the US investigation of alleged ROKG improprieties in Washington, the North may believe that the chances of a concomitant worsening of US-ROK relations and South Korean dissatisfaction with Pak are reasonably good.

In weighing the net military balance after the withdrawal of us ground forces, the North will assess the extent to which the South Koreans have absorbed the 2nd Division's anti-tank capabilities, have created command and control arrangements and otherwise improved their military posture. The North will also be interested in determining the degree of coordination between US tactical aircraft and ROK ground forces.

Even in a worst case scenario—serious US-ROK frictions, political unrest in the South, and clearly perceived ROK military deficiencies--the North would remain uncertain about the US will to intervene massively and decisively. However, other considerations--perhaps Kim Il-song's advancing age or a judgment that time no longer favored the North—could lead Pyongyang to run the risk and opt for hostilities. In this respect, the most sensitive period would appear to run from fairly near the end of the US troop withdrawal until 1985, when we estimate that the South will be making major progress in redressing the military balance between the two sides alone.

There are various ways in which the basic risk to the deterrent can be reduced:

--careful consideration of the timing and extent of the US withdrawal;

--various compensatory measures designed to improve ROK military capabilities;

--assuring that our other actions do not send the wrong message to either the North or the South, but rather demonstrate our continued security commitment.

Stretching the withdrawal over a period of four to five years would do a great deal to facilitate the necessary improvement in ROK capabilities and, in short, appears to be a wholly necessary step. The extent of the withdrawal--whether to make an irrevocable commitment to withdraw all ground forces by a set date--warrants special consideration. It might be prudent to retain some flexibility about a final departure date, given the possibility of unfavorable circumstances developing a few years hence. Flexibility in this respect might encourage the South Koreans in turn to attempt a delaying operation, but this possibility appears manageable. We reserve judgment, however, on whether US Congressional cooperation and support might be decreased by the lack of a firm commitment to withdraw.

Compensation measures designed to bolster ROK anti-tank capabilities and command and control arrangements need special priority. The US 2nd Division, for example, has more of an anti-tank capability than the entire ROK army. North Korean military strategy, moreover, relies heavily on rapid armored advances. Should budget restrictions limit the overall size of the compensation package, priority should be given to improving ROK command and control arrangements rather than achieving a 75-day war reserve stock.

US-ROK problems such as the human rights issue will need to be carefully managed during the withdrawal period so as to avoid excessive bilateral frictions and perhaps political unrest in the South as well. Diplomatically, the ROK will be acutely sensitive to the possibility of US-North Korean bilateral contacts and to any modification of the cross recognition formula. Movement in these areas could increase South Korean anxiety that our ground force withdrawal is only a prelude to a total pull out. A decision to withdraw all US nuclear weapons from Korea rapidly could also be misinterpreted by North and South alike. The deployment of a USAF squadron to Korea and continued US-ROK training exercises, on the other hand, would be useful signals to both sides.

\*\*\*\*\*

A second risk relating to peace on the peninsula is that an escalatory series of incidents along the DMZ could lead to serious hostilities following South Korea assumption of command and control arrangements. While it is clear that a steadying US hand has been useful during previous periods of North Korean provocation, there is no clear cut way of assessing whether both sides might be compelled into major hostilities by intense animosity and reasons of face. The resulting uncertainty in this regard appears to be an inevitable price for a US ground force withdrawal.

Other potential risks--strong Japanese interests in the peninsula, Soviet and Chinese concerns, and general South Korean anxieties about their future--essentially relate to the issue of whether peace on the peninsula can be maintained by means of a credible deterrent and measured South Korean responses to North Korean provocation.

[...]

1. For thirty years, North Korea has steadfastly sought the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. It has been deterred since the mid 50's from the use of force by combined US-South Korean military strength and the US commitment to the defense of the South. Over the last five years, however, the military balance between North and South Korea alone has changed from a position of rough equality to one that favors the North. Stable deterrence therefore now depends on the presence of US military forces in Korea.

2. In this situation the withdrawal of US ground forces runs a risk of upsetting a delicate balance. The North might be encouraged to believe that US will to defend South Korea was weakening and therefore would conclude that there was less risk in seeking reunification by force. The withdrawal will shake South Korean confidence and could cause political instability. Uncertainties among foreign investors could have a serious impact on the South Korean economy. In the context of the human rights issue and the alleged ROKG improprieties in Washington, members of the South Korean elite may come to believe that President Pak's policies and behavior have contributed to a reduction in the US security commitment, and might seek to oust him. Political turmoil in the South would create an important temptation to the North, since it would provide a pretext for intervening, lessen South Korea's ability to defend itself, and perhaps cause the US to avoid military involvement.

3. Should the North move, its most likely military objective would be to seize Seoul, lying only 25 miles from the DMZ, in the shortest possible time and then to consolidate its gains. In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South the opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play, minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. Moreover, the North has postured itself to withstand any initial US retaliatory strikes. It might calculate that the US, China, and the USSR would all seek to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible time. In such a situation, with the ROKG likely in disarray, the North would see itself in an extremely advantageous position.

4. If events did not follow this dangerous course, the US would still suffer some loss of control over the situation. The ROKG has made it clear that it will insist on full control of its own forces if there is any significant reduction in US force levels. This would increase the risk that minor incidents might escalate beyond control. Moreover, South Korean interest in acquiring advanced weapons would be rekindled. And finally, any perceptions that the US commitment had diminished would have severe repercussions on US relations with Japan, which considers the commitment and troop presence as central to maintaining stability in Korea, and hence to its own security.

5. The weaknesses in South Korean military forces, particularly in anti-tank weapons, can be rectified by substantially increased US assistance. It should be noted, however, that this assistance will probably have to continue over a number of years if the military forces of the South are to keep pace with those of the North. Beyond, this, however, the crucial factor will be whether the US conducts itself in ways that demonstrate to the North Koreans and reassure the South Koreans and Japanese that our commitment is as firm as ever. The extent and timing of ground force withdrawal, the retention of US air, naval, and army support capabilities in Korea,

and US diplomatic activities can emphasize this message. But nonetheless the situation will be more uncertain after ground force withdrawal than it is at present.

[...]

## US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN STABILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS\*

Withdrawing US ground forces from Korea involves a variety of risks that revolve around stability on the peninsula and international reactions especially of the other major Asian powers. Following a withdrawal, the situation in Korea will be more uncertain than it is now, and the general perception of the US as an Asian power will be diminished. The extent to which these tendencies develop depends largely upon the combination of measures employed to offset or reduce the risks of a withdrawal.

### Stability on the Peninsula

#### Setting

1. The North continues to seek reunification on its own terms and has not ruled out the use of force. It has been deterred by US-South Korean military strength and the US commitment to the South, the most credible manifestation of which has been the presence of US combat forces on the peninsula. Since 1970, however, the military balance between North and South Korea has changed from rough equality to one that substantially favors the North. This imbalance is likely to continue for at least the next five years.

#### The Risks

2. Our most important judgment is that Pyongyang would view the withdrawal of US ground forces [redacted] as removing key elements of deterrence.

3. Moreover

-- A US ground force withdrawal could greatly reduce ROK command and control and intelligence capabilities. [Redacted]

-- The withdrawal of US ground forces could lead to diminished US control of the ROK armed forces. The South Koreans may seek greater control of their own forces in light of a significant reduction in US ground forces. This would remove the restraining influence of the US over ROK reactions to North Korean provocations.

-- [Redacted]

\* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific and is based on a draft prepared by CIA and reviewed by representatives of that Agency, DIA, NSA, and intelligence organizations of the military services.

-- Foreign lender confidence in South Korea may decrease. A ground forces withdrawal may make it more difficult for South Korea to attract needed foreign capital. South Korea depends on a heavy flow of foreign capital to pay off existing debts, keep its economy growing, and build up its defense industries. Seoul's economic progress over the years has been a critical factor in maintaining political stability and general confidence in the Pak government.

-- A US withdrawal, combined with a deterioration in US-ROK relations, could create political instability in the South. President Pak's ability to remain in power hinges in an important way on his management of relations with the US; this could become and after a troop withdrawal. [Redacted]

-- The withdrawal of US ground troops could undermine South Korean resolve. US ground forces have always been an important psychological factor in South Korea. The withdrawal of these troops would have a major impact on the morale of the South Korean military and is also likely to affect general civilian confidence in the future of the country, as well.

4. In deciding whether to undertake major hostilities during or after a US withdrawal, Pyongyang would be heavily influenced by its perceptions of the reliability of the US security commitment, the military balance, and political conditions in the South. If Pyongyang decided to attack the South, its most likely immediate military objective would be the rapid seizure of Seoul, and the consolidation of its gains.<sup>†</sup> In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South the opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play, minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. It might calculate that the US, China, and the USSR would all seek to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible time. In such a situation, with the ROKG likely in disarray, the North would see itself in an extremely advantageous position.

#### Compensating Measures

5. The ROK cannot, on its own, correct its military deficiencies and compensate for the capabilities of the US ground forces over the next five years under the current Force Improvement Plan. [Redacted]

6. South Korea has a limited ability to increase defense allocations above planned levels without seriously reducing economic growth. During the next five years, each additional \$1 billion in annual ROK defense spending above programmed levels will reduce the planned annual increase in GNP by roughly 15 percent. The reduced GNP growth rate in turn would restrict subsequent government revenues, and increase Seoul's difficulty in attracting the large amounts of foreign capital it needs to sustain its export oriented economy.

7. The US, however, can reduce the risks attendant to withdrawal in a variety of ways:

<sup>†</sup> The imbalance favoring the North over the South alone is probably sufficient to assure the success of a well-executed military operation to seize the Seoul area. This assessment is based in large part on the ability of the North to achieve sufficient surprise to preclude South Korea from bringing its ground and air capabilities to bear in time to counter such an attack.

-- Retaining US tactical air capability and a residual logistical support group. Given the military balance, there is little question of the importance of maintaining us tactical air and residual logistic support facilities.

-- Phasing troop withdrawals. A prolonged ground force withdrawal would have a less unfavorable impact than an early, compressed withdrawal. Indeed, leaving open the date for the withdrawal of all ground forces would have important effects in Pyongyang and Seoul. Both would view an open-ended schedule as an indication that withdrawal would be governed more by security conditions on the peninsula than by US domestic pressures. Moreover, the continued presence of US ground combat units, although reduced in size, will still confront Pyongyang with the possibility that aggression could result in some form of massive US intervention. Any inclination in the North to undertake provocations during a withdrawal would thus be inhibited. The South might be more inclined to delay assuming greater control of their own forces or more willing to compromise in deterring transfer of command arrangements. The result would be more US restraining influence over possible ROK military reactions.

-- Retaining intelligence assets that might provide early warning of a North Korean attack. Early warning of an attack is absolutely essential for the successful defense of the South. Warning time is already critical and will become more so after US withdrawals. The ROK is deficient in sophisticated capabilities that could provide timely information on North Korean activity and indicators of hostile intent.

-- Assisting the ROK in strengthening its defenses and in acquiring the military equivalence of the US 9round forces now stationed in Korea. A strong, unequivocal US effort to improve ROK military capabilities would be critical to continued stability on the peninsula. Such an effort would alter Pyongyang's perception of the military balance, enhance the prospects for continued political stability in the South, [redacted].

-- Assuring that other US actions or statements do not send the wrong signal to either the North or the South, but rather underscore the continued US security commitment. Diplomatically, the ROK is acutely sensitive to the possibility of US-North Korean contacts and to any modification of the cross recognition formula. Movement in these areas could increase South Korean anxiety that our ground force withdrawal is only a prelude to a total pull out. [Redacted] On the other hand, initiatives to increase understandings among the major powers about the desirability of stability on the peninsula would be seen by Seoul as continued US willingness to work in its behalf and by Pyongyang with discomfort.

The US security commitment would also be reinforced in Pyongyang and Seoul by the augmentation of US air power in the South, forward basing of US Navy assets in the Pacific, and demonstrations of US mobility capabilities through field exercises.

To be credible in the Koreas and elsewhere, our public statements regarding US commitment to South Korea's security should carry the clear message that our decisions on force levels will be based on security considerations. Such statements, supported by the compensating measures, mentioned above, would have an important ameliorative effect on all elements relating

to stability on the peninsula, including morale in the South and confidence of its economic lenders.

### International Reactions

#### Japan

8. Tokyo prefers that US ground forces remain in Korea, but is resigned to a withdrawal. Japanese perception of and policies regarding security issues in Northeast Asia and the peninsula in particular are unlikely to change appreciably.

9. Japanese leaders want the US to preserve a maximum presence in Asia. They believe that stability in Korea is essential to Japan's own security. Even so, Japan has been especially wary of direct involvement in South Korean security issues in light of its "no-war" constitution, its limited self-defense forces, and consistently negative Japanese popular attitudes toward issues termed either "Korean" or "military." Although the Japanese public dialogue is now more open [redacted] about security issues, Japanese leaders still consider any direct military contribution to South Korean security a political impossibility.

10. In 1976-77, the Japanese government voiced greater concern about Washington's intention to withdraw US ground forces than it did in 1970 about the removal of the 7th Infantry Division. In stressing these concerns, Tokyo must realize that it is inviting a US counterproposal, i.e., that Japan more directly contribute to Korean security, something Tokyo is not prepared to do. Specifically, the Japanese are concerned that a withdrawal:

-- be undertaken only after a careful review of strategic considerations and explained in such terms. The Japanese do not want a US withdrawal to be perceived as a consequence of US domestic pressures to chastise President Pak. Any evidence that US domestic concerns are overriding the strategic interests of its Asian allies would, in Japanese eyes, call into question American reliability.

-- be carefully phased over 4-5 years to lessen the impact on the strategic balance and provide time for strengthening South Korean capabilities.

-- involve consultations with Japan, enabling the government to assimilate US thinking and to demonstrate at home that Washington's taking Tokyo's interests into account. At the same time, the Japanese do not want to be cast in a codeterminant role that might involve responsibilities Tokyo would like to avoid.

11. In voicing concern about a withdrawal, Tokyo is reassuring South Korea that it remains of paramount importance in Japan's view of the peninsula. [Redacted] Predictably, Pyongyang has reacted strongly to Tokyo's public support for a continued US military presence in the South. But Tokyo's continuing support for Seoul is no surprise to the North, and the economic benefit of closer ties with Japan may prompt some positive responses by Pyongyang.

12. Tokyo does not expect the North to change its hostile attitude toward the South or to abandon its objective of controlling entire peninsula. The Japanese, however, believe that closer ties with Pyongyang will at least improve their chances of acting as a moderating influence and serve as a hedge against any further unanticipated adjustments in US policy in the region.

13. Tokyo realizes that its increased nonmilitary involvement in Korean affairs cannot compensate for a shrinking US military presence in the South. Thus, Japan can be expected to continue to work for new international understandings that would shore up stability on the peninsula; in this respect, Tokyo would undoubtedly welcome any new US initiatives. Japan has been quietly representing Seoul's interests in both Moscow and Peking.

### Pyongyang's Major Allies

14. A major factor currently shaping the strategic balance in Northeast Asia has been a rare convergence of Chinese and Soviet interest in maintaining Korean stability.

15. The PRC and USSR approach the Korean situation in ambivalent terms. Both are Pyongyang's treaty allies and traditional military suppliers, and both, in part because of their political rivalry with each other, publicly support North Korea's call for withdrawal of US forces from the South. On the other hand, both Peking and Moscow clearly have placed pursuit of useful relations with the US and Japan above North Korean ambitions for reunification. They seek to disassociate themselves from Kim Il-song's more rash actions and view the US security commitment to Seoul as a useful ingredient in the mix of factors that keep peace on the peninsula and restrain any Japanese impulse toward rearmament. The Chinese tacitly have taken an especially positive view of US military presence, not only in Korea but throughout East Asia, seeing it as a help in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

16. We lack hard and authoritative information on Moscow's and Peking's reaction to proposed US force reductions in Korea. Low level Soviet commentary has emphasized the likely maintenance of US air power in South Korea, pointing out that this represents continued US support for the Pak government and connotes no real change in the situation. The private comments of a few Chinese officials abroad have been in the same vein.

17. This scant evidence probably reflects Chinese and Soviet concern that any withdrawal of US ground forces be accomplished in a manner that does not disrupt the basic political and military status quo on the peninsula. As long as a US force reductions accompanied by effective compensating measures -- and the maintenance of US air and naval power in the area -- it will be seen by Moscow and Peking as a continuation of the US military drawdown in Asia but not as the removal of a credible US security commitment to South Korea.

18. Peking and Moscow probably fear that Kim will move too quickly and aggressively toward a "tension-building" policy in the wake of a US force reduction. There is some evidence that Kim unsuccessfully sought Chinese support for such a policy following the fall of Saigon in April 1975.



19. Moscow and Peking would be motivated to discourage Kim from embarking on a major conflict with all of its troublesome and uncertain implications for Japanese security policy, bilateral relations with the US, and the power balance in East Asia. But, if Kim became convinced that the US no longer posed a credible deterrent and that other signs of weakness or instability in the South had opened the door for a quick victory, it is doubtful that either Moscow or Peking would be willing or able to place a veto on the venture.

20. Moreover, the buildup of offensive military capabilities in the North and its growing self-reliance in arms production suggest that Pyongyang recognizes that it must be able to mount a surprise attack without Soviet and Chinese support. We believe that the North is capable of such an operation.

21. Moscow and Peking no doubt are anticipating North Korean pressure for increased military assistance in the event that a US force reduction leads to a substantial upgrading of South Korean military capabilities. The Chinese in recent years have been more forthcoming than Moscow in supplying military assistance. But Pyongyang would have to turn primarily to Moscow since China cannot supply the advanced equipment North Korea would require to match a US assistance package for the South.

22. Moscow has turned a deaf ear to Pyongyang's requests for more sophisticated military equipment in recent years. If, however, they believed that South Korea's military capability had been significantly upgraded, they would probably respond with assistance to strengthen the North. Over the next year or so, Moscow is not likely to respond to requests for offsetting aid in a manner which further tilts the military balance in favor of the North.

23. We do not believe that a US force reduction, accompanied by compensating measures, would significantly alter current Soviet or Chinese perceptions of the US as a world power or significantly complicate the US relationship with either. Both, for some time, have seen the US as generally on the defensive internationally and, more specifically, as unwilling to become engaged in a future land war in Asia. Both will base their future calculations of US influence in the East Asian region in large part on the degree to which the US maintains its ability to project military force as a Pacific power.

#### Elsewhere in East Asia

24. The ASEAN states share the general concern that stability be maintained on the peninsula and see a continuing link between the maintenance of American power in Asia and their own security. None, with the possible exception of the Philippines, has confidence that the US would defend them in any regional conflict. But all of them believe that a continued American presence and interest -- including a military presence "over the horizon" -- is an essential element in maintaining the present equilibrium in Southeast as well as Northeast Asia.

25. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan probably will see a withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea as reinforcing their view of Washington's reduction of its commitments in East Asia and of the inevitability of an eventual normalization of relations between Washington and Peking. Over the short term, however, Taipei may also argue that the US should not

simultaneously withdraw its ground forces in South Korea and abrogate its security treaty with the Nationalists

26. Elsewhere, North Korea may hope that a US ground force withdrawal from South Korea will be seen as vindicating its policies and thus provide additional support for Pyongyang. We believe, however, that US withdrawal plans will more likely work against North Korea's efforts to mobilize world opinion against Seoul and Washington. Support for North Korea in the Third World has levelled off in the last year or so due to Pyongyang's blunt tactics and an effective counterattack by South Korea and the US. With a US withdrawal underway, the Korean problem in general is likely to become less urgent in the nonaligned movement, even for Third World militants. Indeed, the US and South Korea may find it easier to focus international attention on the key issue of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.

**“Reactions to US Troop Withdrawals from Korea,” 2 May 1977**

*[Source: CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020016-9, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

2 May 1977

SUBJECT: Reactions to US Troop Withdrawals from Korea

1. Since my LDX message to you this morning (which inadvertently did not include [redacted] questions) on subject above, further guidance has been received from the DCI.

-- The paper, contrary to the set of questions, will focus on the impact of troop withdrawal on the two Koreas; it will also address reactions of Japan, the PRC, the USSR, and

-- CIA draft to be complete by COB Friday, 6 May.

2. I will LDX copies of draft to you over the weekend. A representatives' meeting will be held on Monday, 9 May.

[Redacted]  
A/NIO/EAP

ATTACHMENT

[...]

29 April 1977

Asian and Other Reactions to Ground Force Withdrawal in Korea

Japan, the PRC, and the USSR will need the most extended treatment. Southeast Asia can probably be treated as a region with variations noted where necessary.

The paper should focus on perceptions and reactions when, as, and how we proceed with ground force withdrawals. Current attitudes toward our presence and perceived intentions should be treated as the point of departure; their description is not an end in itself. It will be necessary to deal both with expectations -- when decisions are announced of how our policies are likely to work out, and with perceptions for better or worse as implementation proceeds. Given the number of variables and our own uncertainties as we examine the problem over exactly what we will be doing and when, the answers it is possible to provide will probably be a lot less elaborate than the questions below. They are intended to suggest lines of thought, not as an outline.

How will the countries considered react to the prospect of complete ground force withdrawal?

-- How will our motives be perceived?

-- To what extent will concerns over the US role in Asia be accentuated?

-- To what extent will the move be seen, as affecting the security of other countries?

-- Will it cast doubt on the efficacy of US security commitments elsewhere? With what impact on our relations with the countries concerned? With what impact on their policies?

-- Will other Asian countries be inclined to move closer to the ROK or draw further away from it? How will perceptions of future prospects of the ROK be affected?

Given a firm us commitment to ground force withdrawal, what would other countries concerned see as the most reassuring modes of implementation? the most disturbing?

-- What confidence will be placed in the efficacy of the compensating measures we may adopt?

-- What measures would be most confidence inspiring?

-- What measures would be most likely to be regarded with skepticism?

-- As we proceed what will be perceived as the principal benchmarks of success or failure?

Will perceptions of reduced us involvement correspondingly reduce the interest of Moscow and Peking in restraining North Korea?

-- Or will Moscow/Peking concerns over the prospects for destabilizing actions by either Korea increase, and with what likely impact on policy?

-- How will Peking and Moscow envisage the impact of our drawdown on Japan?

-- Will either see significant implications –advantages or disadvantages for their own broader interests?

How will Japan perceive the impact on its security?

-- How will it perceive the impact on its own security relationship with the United States?

-- Is it likely to adopt more supportive policies with respect to South Korea?

-- In what areas?

-- Is it likely to take initiatives of its own with respect to North Korea?

Will the commitment to withdrawal affect US/ROK diplomatic problems in the UN, Third World, elsewhere?

- Will it bring us any diplomatic or foreign policy bonuses?
- Will it increase pressures for direct US/North Korean contacts?
- Will it move the waverers further away from the North Korean cause?

**Presidential Directive/NSC-12, "U.S. Policy in Korea," 5 May 1977**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00228. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00228.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00228.)]

[...]

May 5, 1977

Presidential Directive/NSC-12

TO:                   The Vice President  
                          The Secretary of State  
                          The Secretary of Defense

ALSO:                The Secretary of the Treasury  
                          The United States Representative to the United Nations  
                          The Director of Central Intelligence  
                          The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
                          The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
                          The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:            U.S. Policy in Korea (U)

Following the National Security Council's review of U.S. policy options toward Korea, I direct that:

-- The U.S. 2nd Division and supporting elements shall be gradually withdrawn from Korea. Withdrawal of one brigade and its supporting elements (but no less than 6, 000 ground force personnel) should be completed by the end of CY 1978; a second brigade and supporting elements (but no less than 9,000 ground force personnel) should be withdrawn no later than the end of June 1980. I will determine at a later date the timing for the completion of ground force withdrawals. The Defense Department should submit to me by May 16 a detailed plan for the withdrawal of the first two brigades. Final decisions on the precise phasing of ground force withdrawals shall be made following consultations with key Congressional leaders and the governments of South Korea and Japan. U.S. air units will remain in Korea indefinitely.

[Redacted]

-- During the period of ground force withdrawals, the United States will provide to the Republic of Korea military assistance at levels adequate to overcome deficiencies arising from the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. The Department of Defense should submit to me by May 16 a detailed proposal for military assistance to the ROK, including FMS credits, and the transfer of equipment from the 2nd Division. The Inter-agency Group for East Asia and Pacific should also submit to me by May 16 a plan for additional measures (e. g. military exercises, temporary augmentation of air deployments, Congressional scenario for military assistance to the ROK,

command arrangements, diplomatic moves, and public declarations) to sustain deterrence in Korea and avoid misunderstandings of U.S. intentions by South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and other countries.

-- A Special Emissary should be sent to Seoul at an early date to begin consultations with the Republic of Korea on U.S. troop withdrawals. His objective will be to reassure the Government of the Republic of Korea of our firm intention to fulfill our treaty commitment; elicit President Park's views on the phasing of troop withdrawals, ROK military assistance requirements, command arrangements, and the preservation of a favorable investment climate in South Korea; and reiterate U.S. concerns about the human rights situation in Korea. This Emissary is authorized to inform the Japanese Government of U.S. plans.

(signature)  
Jimmy Carter

**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Warren Christopher, "U.S. Policy in Korea: Withdrawal of Ground Combat Forces," 19 May 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of 5-6/77, Box 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1977

Secret

NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary (signature)

Subject: U.S. Policy in Korea: Withdrawal  
of Ground Combat Forces [Redacted]

In accordance with your request in Presidential Directive NSC 12 we are attaching a number of papers prepared by the East Asian Interagency Group on measures to sustain deterrence in Korea and minimize misunderstanding of our intentions. There have also been transmitted to you the Secretary of Defense's proposed schedule for of ground combat forces [redacted] from Korea and his recommendations on ROK force requirements arising from the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces.

This memorandum summarizes the major considerations discussed in these papers, and identifies issues which you will wish to consider before General Brown and Under Secretary Habib depart for Korea next week.

Summary of Major Issues

A. Ground Force Withdrawal Schedule

Under the schedule you set forth, one brigade and its supporting elements will be withdrawn by the end of CY 1978 and a second brigade by the end of June 1980. [Redacted]

The deferral of a decision on the timing of the final tranche has the advantage of permitting some flexibility in the consultations with President Park and the Japanese. But, we believe it essential that they understand that your decision will be in the context of your publicly stated policy of removing all ground combat forces within a 4-5 year time frame. We would not wish to create unrealistic expectations on the part of the ROK or GOJ that the final withdrawal



time is negotiable into the far future. Moreover, an essential element of any successful presentation in Congress for compensatory measures will depend on our commitment to complete ground force withdrawal within the 4-5 year time frame you have publicly stated.

#### B. Defense Compensation Package:

The Department of Defense has estimated the value of military equipment needed to overcome deficiencies in the ROK Army at \$500-600 million. In making this estimate, DOD focused on ROK ground force requirements generated by the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces. The equipment levels recommended by DOD would be over and above the present procurement levels contained in the current ROK Force Improvement Plan which we are now supporting with FMS financing at an annual rate of \$275 million.

Approximately \$200-250 million of equipment could (with Congressional authorization and replacement in Service budgets) be transferred from existing 8th Army stocks; the remainder would have to come from other sources. It is not possible to determine a final mix of equipment transferred or additional compensatory actions because this will depend to a considerable degree on our negotiations with the Koreans and our assessment of what Congress will accept.

In addition, DOD feels that because of the loss in deterrence and a need psychologically to reassure the ROK as to its security, we might consider an additional \$200 million to meet other deficiencies in critical ground force capabilities.

In the military assistance area we will have to emphasize to the Congress that any supplementary assistance beyond levels already requested is to compensate for our troop withdrawals and not for more general purposes of force improvement. We will have to stress the need for Congressional support and the lack of any prospect for reinstatement of a grant MAP program for Korea.

We are uncertain what additional level of support Congress would be willing to authorize. Our efforts to obtain approval of the \$275 million already requested this year have benefitted enormously from arguments that the assistance is necessary at a time of our troop withdrawals. For the same reason we may find considerable support for additional measures, particularly cost-free transfer of existing equipment. We would expect opposition to develop in the face of major new requests and such opposition would probably grow in subsequent years. At a minimum we would envision a compensatory measures package which would include request for authorization to transfer selected 8th Army equipment, continuation of the current level of FMS support for the Korean Force Improvement Plan, and possible consideration of limited additional FMS financing perhaps spread over the 5 year withdrawal period. (This would depend of course on our probing of Congressional attitudes). We feel a package of this sort is not only militarily necessary but will demonstrate the care with which we are withdrawing our ground forces and the strength of our commitment.

#### C. Command Arrangements:

Operational control over ROK forces is now exercised by the U.S. commander in his capacity as Commander of the UNC. The Koreans have proposed that a combined structure be established in which they would have greater participation in command and control than they do at present. We will have to initiate early negotiations at the military level on establishment of combined command arrangements under a U.S. commander. We would want a combined command to maintain U.S. operational control over Korean forces.

#### D. Other Compensatory Steps:

We have attached a series of additional actions that we can consider in terms of exercises and temporary deployments to demonstrate visibly our continuing commitment to ROK security. Most are well within our present capability and policy guidelines. Although no decisions are necessary now, it would be helpful if our emissaries could convey our general intention to take compensatory action in this area.

#### E. Public Handling of Diplomatic Moves and Public Gestures of Reassurance:

As we move to detailed negotiations with the ROKG we can expect considerable confusion and uncertainty in public discussion of the issue. We will need therefore to emphasize authoritatively and publicly our determination to maintain our basic security commitment assist the Koreans in achieving a self defense capability; and retain our air and support units in the country as well as continue our naval role. As for our withdrawal plans, we would not want to make anything public until after we complete consultations with the Koreans.

Apart from special arrangements in Korea and Japan we need to conduct a systematic program to keep our major East Asian allies generally informed of our plans, stressing privately and publicly the durability of our basic security commitment.

We do not expect that our decision on the ground force withdrawal will offer significant leverage toward reciprocal diplomatic moves on the part of either North Korea or its two major supporters, Moscow and Peking. However, we think it most important to use existing channels to convey both to the PRC and the USSR our continued security commitment to the ROKG as well as our determination to maintain peace and security on the Korean peninsula. We should urge them to encourage North Korea to a more flexible stance with regard to the South and should urge continued restraint in supplying arms to North Korea. We should be especially careful to counter any suggestion that our ground force withdrawal reflects lessened U.S. interest in Northeast Asia and Korea. In that context, in the coming months particularly, we should avoid moves which could be interpreted as backing away from our insistence on full ROK involvement in any negotiations affecting the future of the peninsula.

#### F. Congressional Consultations:

A major element in our strategy for handling the ground force withdrawal must be close attention to Congress and major consultative efforts to bring the Congressional leadership with us each step along the way. We are already scheduling calls on key Congressional leaders prior to the departure of the emissaries for Seoul. These calls will have as their purpose assuring

Congress that we will not enter into any commitments and that we will keep them fully informed of our plans as they develop in the next months. Subsequent to the emissaries return from Korea and your final decisions with regard to the ground force withdrawal schedule and compensatory measures, we will have to engage in a serious, wideranging consultative effort on the Hill to assure acceptance of our position (and to be sure that any projected compensatory measures are in fact realistic).

#### G. Visit of Presidential Emissaries to Seoul and Tokyo:

Many of our final decisions on compensatory measures and other actions are dependent in part upon the results of consultations both in Seoul and on the Hill. Others will depend on further detailed study and negotiations with the Koreans. At the same time it is important that we have general guidance from you for the emissaries. Specifically, we recommend the following:

- (a) Ground Force Withdrawal Schedule: We believe your emissaries should be authorized to outline to President Park and Prime Minister Fukuda your general views regarding the withdrawal of the first two tranches. It might also be useful if they could convey to President Park alone your present views about the timing of the final withdrawal, making clear, however, that the complete ground force withdrawal will be within the 4-5 year period you have publicly indicated.
- (b) Compensatory Measures: It is important that the emissaries convey both our determination, within Congressional constraints, to compensate for deficiencies caused by the Second Infantry Division withdrawal as well as temper any unrealistic Korean expectations. Consequently we believe that they should be able to indicate that we will seek continuing Congressional authorization for present levels of FMS (\$275 million) and will also seek Congressional authorization for measures to compensate for the loss of the Second Division's strength; for example, turning over certain Eighth Army equipment to the Koreans.
- (c) Combined Command: In addressing the combined command/operational control question, the emissaries should be able to indicate that we are prepared to enter, into detailed negotiation on establishment of a combined command with operational control continuing to be held by a U.S. General, who would hold the appropriate rank. With regard to the future of the UN Command itself, they should be able to state that we intend to maintain the UN Command but may have to review that question in the light of international realities later in the 1978-81 period. They would note the importance of Congressional consultations before we could reach any final agreement on any combined command arrangements.
- (d) Follow-on Decisions: The two emissaries should be authorized to inform President Park that we would be prepared to begin detailed discussions in Seoul under Ambassador Sneider and General Vessey in mid-June with a view toward completing these negotiations in the context of this year's Seoul Security Consultative Meeting in which Secretary Brown will participate (July-August time frame).
- (e) Security Commitment: It is also important that the emissaries be authorized in your name to assure President Park of our continued security commitment and to so indicate publicly. They

should also be authorized to confirm to President Park what he already knows, i.e., we intend to maintain our air presence, logistic support and our naval role in the ROK for the foreseeable future.

### ADDITIONAL COMPENSATORY STEPS

Apart from military assistance to Korea, we should consider other actions designed to enhance South Korea's sense of security, to demonstrate our commitment, and to maintain the strength of our deterrent. A number of such possible steps, involving exercises and deployments, are discussed below. They could be begun any time during the troop withdrawal process after consultations with the Koreans and, as appropriate, the Japanese.

#### Exercises

Within the last year, six significant U.S./ROK exercises were conducted in the vicinity of Korea. These varied in scope from large-scale land, sea, and air exercises to smaller combined marine landing teams conducting amphibious operations along the coast. Exercises of this type should be conducted more frequently to serve as a signal of continuing commitment and as a vehicle for enhancing U.S. and ROK training. For example, we could:

-- Have an additional U.S./ROK amphibious exercise in 1978 (and each year thereafter). It would include about 4,200 Navy and Marine forces.

-- Increase the size and frequency of CONUS-based tactical fighter exercises in Korea.

-- Add a second national level U.S./ROK command post exercise in 1979 (and each year thereafter) to strengthen coordination between the ROK/U.S. military structure and ROKG national ministries/civilian agencies--and increase the proficiency of the ROK battle staff.

-- Add another major Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine training exercise in 1980 (scope: 13,000 men).

#### Deployments

Additional Air Force Deployments could serve to diminish losses in the surveillance, firepower, and maneuver capabilities of the 2nd Infantry. The following options are possible:

-- Beginning in 1978, temporarily augment air strength by periodically deploying one squadron of tactical fighters from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa and/or Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines into Korea. These temporary augmenting forces would maintain a presence in Korea approximately six months out of every twelve. The estimated additional cost for these deployments would be \$960,000 annually.

-- In 1980, increase the strength of Kunsan Air Base, Korea, assigned fighters by 12 UE, and begin deployment of AWACS (E-3A) aircraft to Kadena Air Base, Japan. AWACS detachment will be fully operational in 1981.

-- Carrier task group operations off the Korean coast and visits to Korean ports by U.S. Navy ships might be increased; however, such increases could affect naval requirements in other parts of the Western Pacific, and could bear upon required naval force levels there.

### APPROACH TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

DGD has identified \$500-\$600 million as the value of the equipment we need to make available to the ROK to reduce the loss to firepower, mobility, and deterrence results from the withdrawal of our ground troops. Part of this requirement -- DOD estimates \$200-\$250 million -- could be met by turning over to the ROK as we withdraw appropriate equipment items now-held by the 2nd Division (or other units of the Eighth Army). FMS assistance, beyond that we have contemplated to assist the Koreans with their Force Improvement Plan, will also be required.

Our approach to Congress will need to be shaped in accord with the following general principles:

-- our requests will have to be fairly close to what we actually hope to achieve. Large cuts by Congress could give the impression that we are unable to compensate for our withdrawals and are therefore putting Korea's security in jeopardy.

-- we probably stand the best chance of eliciting significant amounts of assistance from the Congress in the early stages of the troop withdrawal process, when the impact of our new policy will be greatest. As time passes, Congress's awareness of the need for compensating measures may ebb.

-- the Congress will be most receptive to forms of compensation which appear most directly related to demonstrable deficiencies created by the withdrawal.

With these factors in mind, we believe we should consider presenting the Congress with a single compensatory package at an early stage. As a major component, we should ask Congress to authorize a non-reimbursable transfer to the ROK of appropriate equipment items held by our ground forces as they withdraw. This has the advantage of being clearly related to the troop draw-down, is a one-time action covering the whole period of the withdrawal unlike the FMS authorization which must be voted annually, and can be presented as a means of facilitating the withdrawal. At the same time, however, and to deal with deficiencies which are not compensated for by this transfer of equipment, we should seek FMS credits to permit the Koreans to purchase appropriate items. This initial package should not include any proposals concerning war reserve material stockpiles since accumulating adequate reserves will require large-scale outlays, and including this item now in our legislative program would raise the apparent costs by considerable magnitudes.

Apart from this early approach to Congress to compensate for deficiencies associated with our withdrawals, we would intend, over the next four years, to seek annual FMS credits at approximately the \$275 million level we requested for FY-78. These credits would permit the Koreans to proceed with their existing Force Improvement Plan.

In presenting our position to Congress, we would, of course, consider any alternative course of action recommended by Congressional leaders as a more effective means of achieving our objectives.

We will clearly face substantial problems in securing from Congress legislation to help compensate for the withdrawal of our ground forces. Although our troop withdrawal plans have helped us achieve our basic assistance goals for FY-78, the extent to which Congress will be willing to go beyond these levels over the period of the withdrawal process is open to question. We are not optimistic that there will be enough improvement in the Korean human rights situation to overcome Congressional criticism on this score. At the same time, the various investigations into allegations of improper Korean activity in the U.S. will continue to put Korea in a bad light and to make it more difficult for members of Congress to speak out in favor of aid to Seoul.

Whatever specific requests we make of Congress, the Administration will have to mount a major campaign, including visible Presidential involvement, in an effort to push them through. We should begin by briefing key Congressional leaders prior to the visit of General Brown and Under Secretary Habib to Seoul, informing them in general terms of our intentions. We should continue to keep the Congress informed of developments in the withdrawal process, underlining the serious need for compensatory measures not only to make up for Korean defense deficiencies but to demonstrate our commitment and maintain the deterrence.

#### COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

Since the Korean War, operational control over ROK forces has been exercised by the U.S. Forces Commander in his capacity as Commander of the United Nations Command. In recent years, however, the Koreans have proposed a combined U.S.-ROK structure which would give them a greater share of command responsibility and experience. They are almost certain to press for such a structure in anticipation of our ground force withdrawal and are likely to raise the subject during the emissaries' visit to Seoul.

We would agree that our planned ground force withdrawal makes it essential to enhance ROK command and control capabilities and that this should be accomplished before the withdrawal is completed. [Redacted]

In light of the above considerations, we would favor the creation of a combined U.S.-ROK command under the UNC/USFK Commander. Such a structure would give the Koreans much needed experience in the command function while retaining operational control in the hands of a U.S. officer. Presumably once the ground force withdrawal was completed the ROK would insist on having operational control over its own forces.

We believe that our emissaries should be authorized to tell the Koreans that we would be prepared to move toward such a combined command once the details can be worked out.

#### PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC MOVES

## General Themes

Especially because of the confusion and anxiety in Asia and elsewhere over our Korean policy, we will need to emphasize the following themes in our public statements and diplomatic contacts.

-- We are able to withdraw our ground troops because of the growing national strength of the Republic of Korea. The South Korean forces are adequate in number to fulfill a ground defense role without the U.S. ground force presence.

-- As we withdraw our troops, we will take measures to assist the Republic of Korea in its self-defense efforts.

-- Our commitment to the defense of Korea remains firm and we will take whatever actions we consider are necessary to make this clear.

-- The removal of our ground troops will be a phased, carefully executed process. Our air presence and support and naval capability will remain.

-- Nothing will be done to upset the military balance on the peninsula or to destabilize the situation in Northeast Asia.

## Statements Relating to Consultation Plans

While our emissaries are conferring with the Koreans and the Japanese, we can expect a good deal of press probing and, in addition, leaks from Tokyo and Seoul. It will be important during this period to avoid statements that might lead to the conclusion that consultations with the ROK are purely pro forma. Responses to press and other queries should emphasize that fulfillment of the President's intent requires close consultations with the Koreans and discussions with the Japanese and that no specific announcement will be made until after this process has been completed. Departure statements should be equally unspecific, emphasizing the candor and fruitfulness of the bilateral exchanges. (A detailed agenda for press guidance, VOA coverage, etc. is in preparation.)

Fuller statements of our intention will be desirable once the mission makes its report. The President could present his plans in broad outline. Thereafter, the Secretary's Asia Society speech will provide an occasion for reiterating our plans and commitments in the broader Asian context. As decisions are reached more detailed public announcements can be made: the Joint Communique at the conclusion of the SCM would provide one such opportunity.

## Diplomatic Moves

Our diplomatic moves should have two basic objectives: to reassure our friends and allies that our plans will be carefully executed so as not to weaken the deterrent and that our commitment remains firm and to clarify our intentions to the North Koreans.

We will need to remain in close contact with the Japanese at high levels, in Tokyo and Washington, informing them as candidly as possible about our plans as they develop and our ongoing discussions with the South Koreans. We must be particularly careful to discuss with them any augmentation plans that could involve movement through Japan and to assure them of prior consultation in this regard.

Our other principal allies in the Pacific--Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines--should also be kept as fully informed as possible in Washington and their respective capitals. In other Asian capitals and elsewhere, U.S. Ambassadors on appropriate occasions should make sure that our plans and implementing measures are clearly understood. With the Chinese and the Russians we should stress the firmness of our commitment, the advantages we will derive from peace in Korea, and the importance of a clear understanding in Pyongyang of our intent to retain a strong position in the South in close consultation with the ROK.

We should use our Chinese and Soviet channels to stress the firmness of our continuing commitment to ROK security. While we are not optimistic that our withdrawal will pave the way for diplomatic approaches to ease tensions, we should, nevertheless try to exploit them for this purpose. In our discussions with the Soviets and Chinese, apart from stressing our continuing commitment to the South's security, we should point out that our troop withdrawals ideally should be matched by tension-reducing steps on the part of Pyongyang. As our plans for withdrawals are made public or as the removals begin, we should consider reiterating at a high level our proposal for four-power talks to seek a more permanent alternative to the Armistice Agreement. A clear idea of the diplomatic possibilities, however, will be possible only after we learn of the reaction of our allies and adversaries to the specifics of our plans and it becomes clearer what sort of atmosphere the withdrawals will create.

Pyongyang has already used the advent of the new Administration and our announced troop withdrawal intentions to press hard for direct U.S.-North Korean contacts. It is likely to continue this approach, possibly giving some indication of flexibility in various areas of its policies on the Korean question. [Redacted]



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3086

KOIPEA

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATION

May 20, 1977

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with General Brown  
and Phil Habib

You are scheduled to meet with Phil Habib and General George Brown on Saturday, May 21, at 9:30 a.m. The publicity surrounding the meeting will signal to the Koreans and Japanese that the special emissaries speak authoritatively for you; substantively, it provides the occasion to convey your guidelines for the consultations.

As requested in Presidential Directive 12 on Korea, the following papers have been prepared for you:

-- A Defense memo providing a detailed schedule for phasing troop withdrawals; [REDACTED] and a preliminary assessment of South Korean military assistance requirements (Tab A).

-- A State memorandum (concurring in by Defense) offering recommendations for public and diplomatic handling of troop withdrawals, negotiating alternative command arrangements, and eliciting Congressional support for military assistance offsets to our troop withdrawals (Tab B).

#### 1. Ground Force Withdrawals

The detailed withdrawal plan provided by Defense follows the guidelines in the Presidential Directive -- one brigade and support units (6,000) out by December 31, 1978; an additional brigade and support units (9,000) out by June 30, 1980. Defense has "back loaded" the withdrawal plan in a way which will please the South Koreans. In removing the first two

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 8/21/97 NSC 11 RE NLC-96-44

BY [Signature] MAR. DATE 11/6/97

brigades, the Army would take out only the four infantry battalions while leaving two armored battalions, two mechanized battalions, and one cavalry squadron. Thus more than half the maneuver battalions and roughly two-thirds of the Division's combat power will remain in Korea until the third tranche, although 15,000 personnel will be removed by 1980.

You deferred your decision on the timing for completing ground force withdrawals until later. State and Defense propose that Habib and Brown tell Park that your decision regarding the 3rd Brigade will be "in the context of your publicly stated policy of removing all ground combat forces within a 4-5 year timeframe". This seems reasonable. It will help us avoid allowing the final stage of the withdrawal to become hostage to Park's own decisions. Moreover, we owe it to Park to give him clear and realistic guidance concerning our intentions to facilitate his defense planning. I would suggest, however, that Park be told that you have decided not to announce a precise public timetable for completing the withdrawals at this time in order to preserve some leverage vis-a-vis the North and its allies. Habib and Brown should invite Park's suggestions as to how we might best utilize such leverage to stabilize the political and military balance on the peninsula.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize the emissaries to describe DOD's plan for phasing ground force withdrawals and elicit Park's ideas on these proposals, including his thoughts on how to handle our declaratory policy concerning the final stage of the withdrawals.


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### 3. Military Assistance

Preliminary Defense estimates suggest that ROK ground forces will need a minimum of \$500-600 million -- and possibly as much as \$800 million -- worth of equipment over and above that planned for procurement in the current 5-year Korean Force Improvement Plan (FIP). In FY 1978 we are requesting \$275 million in FMS credits to support the FIP. We are not committed to provide this amount annually, but have told the South Koreans that we will continue to support the FIP (which runs through 1981) with substantial levels of FMS credits.

Defense has reached no hard and fast conclusions as to how the cost of additional purchases should be shared between the U. S. and ROK. We could provide \$200-250 million in the form of equipment turned over by the withdrawing U.S. units. This would require special Congressional authorization. The cost would be borne by the Defense Department when it reequips the Division for deployment elsewhere.

State and Defense recommend that we think in terms of a compensation package composed of (1) a request to Congress for authorization to transfer selected 8th Army equipment to the ROK, and (2) a continuation of

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current levels of FMS support for the Korean FIP. Defense would hold open the possibility of some limited additional FMS financing spread over the five-year withdrawal period. OMB thinks we will have a hard enough time justifying current levels of FMS credits. Any talk of additional levels would be counterproductive on the Hill.

In addition, there is a question as to what we eventually do with our War Reserve Materiel stocks in Korea. The JCS recommends significant increases in ROK war reserve stocks. That poses two issues: How should the increased stock be financed? Should we turn over some of our stocks to the ROK cost-free when our ground force withdrawals are completed? We need not resolve these issues now. Nor can we make firm commitments on the overall level of our support to the Koreans until we have sounded out Congress carefully. Phil Habib has taken some soundings on the Hill during the last two days, and you should ask for his views on what is practicable.

RECOMMENDATION: That Habib and Brown indicate to President Park our determination to assist South Korea in overcoming deficiencies in its defenses caused by the withdrawal of U. S. ground combat forces; note that we will continue to seek Congressional authorization for FMS credits to support the FIP at roughly current levels; and that we are considering seeking Congressional authorization to turn over the 2nd Division's equipment as it is withdrawn. It would also be useful to tell Park privately that we will consider later the possibility of turning over to Korea some of the War Reserve Materiel currently stored there but owned by the U. S.

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#### 4. Command Arrangements

Since 1950 we have exercised operational control over South Korean forces through the U. N. Command. The South Koreans have indicated, however, that they would seek alternative command arrangements -- i. e. a joint command -- if we withdraw our ground forces. They will doubtless raise this issue with Habib and Brown. State and Defense propose that they be authorized to indicate that we are prepared to enter into detailed negotiations to establish a combined command, with operational control continuing to be held by a U. S. General of appropriate rank until our ground force withdrawals are completed. I agree.

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They would also tell Park that while we have no expectations that the U. N. Command will be terminated at an early date, we remain prepared to dissolve the UNC provided North Korea is prepared to give concrete assurances that it will continue to honor the Armistice Agreement, and that we are prepared to reaffirm our proposal to this effect.

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#### 5. Public Gestures of Reassurance and Diplomatic Initiatives

A major purpose of the Brown-Habib visit is to reassure Park of U. S. fidelity to our security commitment to Korea. Obviously this should be affirmed publicly and privately in unequivocal terms. We should avoid public statements regarding the phasing of ground force withdrawals until after consultations with the Koreans and Japanese are completed. Thereafter, the trickiest public affairs aspect of this will involve what we say about the question of when ground force withdrawals will be completed. We need not resolve that now; we will have to address the issue when Habib and Brown return.

State and Defense recommend that we keep other East Asian allies generally informed of our plans, that we use existing channels to clarify our intentions to the PRC and the USSR, and that we hew closely to our current line of making any improvement of relations with North Korea contingent on reciprocal steps by Pyongyang's allies toward Seoul. I agree.

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The State and Defense recommendations offer no suggestions for handling consultations with the Japanese at this stage. The question is: How much should we tell the Japanese about our discussions with Park? I believe that the emissaries should be guided by (1) President Park's wishes concerning the details we give to the Japanese, and (2) the level of consultations in Tokyo.

Beyond this, they should emphasize that Japan's economic and political role is crucial to Korean stability, and consequently, it should continue to maintain substantial levels of aid and investment, liberalize South Korea's access to their market, resolve frictions in Japanese-South Korean political relations, and take South Korean sensitivities into account in

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Tokyo's dealings with Pyongyang.

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6. Follow-On Discussions

State and Defense recommend that detailed discussions of these issues should continue in Seoul under the direction of Ambassador Sneider and General Vessey with the objective of completing negotiations at a Security Consultative Meeting with the ROK in July or August. This is fine, but we need to avoid the impression that the summer SCM will be a time to wrap up a large set of tradeoffs for the withdrawals. We have embarked on a longer-term process. We cannot get legislative authority for some compensation measures that quickly. No U. S. forces will be moved until next year.

RECOMMENDATION: That Brown and Habib indicate that follow-up discussions will take place in Seoul in anticipation of the SCM, while emphasizing that the process of consultations will be a continuing one as the withdrawals are implemented.

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7. Human Rights

You will want to instruct Habib and Brown as to how they should handle this question in private talks with Park and in press queries during the trip.

8. Insubordinate Comments by U. S. Field Commanders

I suggest that you instruct General Brown to have a "Dutch uncle" talk with General Vessey, informing him that he will shoulder the consequences of any further public criticism of the Administration's Korean policy decisions.

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Department of State

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NODIS CHEROKEE

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR MARR KS US  
SUBJ: U.S. GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL: CONSULTATIONS WITH  
PRESIDENT PARK

SUMMARY: IN TWO AND HALF HOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK, U.S. SIDE OUTLINED OUR THINKING ON GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL AND ATTANDANT ISSUES. WHILE TAKING INITIAL POSITION THAT HE NEITHER AGREES WITH NOR UNDERSTANDS USG DECISION TO WITHDRAW GROUND FORCES, PARK ACCEPTED ESSENTIALS OF WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE AS OUTLINED HOWEVER CALLED FOR COMPENSATORY MEASURES TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN PARALLEL WITH WITHDRAWAL OF INITIAL TWO INCREMENTE AND COMPENSATORY MEASURES TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FINAL INCREMENT, SO THAT ROK SECURITY IS NOT ENDANGERED. DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT USG DECISION TO WITHDRAW, PARK APPEARED APPRECIATIVE OF OUR CONSULTATIVE EFFORT AND ADOPTED A RESTRAINED, REALISTIC POSITION WITH REGARD TO SPECIFIC ISSUES. WE PROMISED TO REPORT FULLY PRESIDENT PARK'S VIEWS AND CONCERNS TO THE PRESIDENT.

1. GENERAL BROWN AND UNDER SECRETARY HABIB MET WITH PRESIDENT PARK FOR TWO AND HALF HOUR-SESSION OF U.S. GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL ISSUE. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, GENERAL VESSEY, AND O'DONOGHUE. PRIM CHOI, FOMNTH

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PARK, MND SUH, PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL KIM AND PROTOCOL SECRETARY CHOI WERE PRESENT ON KOREAN SIDE.

2. PRESIDENT PARK OPENED MEETING WITH CAREFULLY PREPARED PRESENTATION IN WHICH HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH OR UNDERSTAND USG DECISION TO WITHDRAW GROUND FORCES FROM KOREA. PRESIDENT PARK STRESSED THAT, IN CONTRAST TO VIET-NAM EXPERIENCE, PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES IN ROK WAS "GOOD INVESTMENT FOR U.S." IN TERMS OF ITS OWN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA. PARK ALSO, IN QUIET MANNER, EXPRESSED RESIGNED ACCEPTANCE OVER FACT THAT BASIC DECISION TO WITHDRAW FORCES WITHIN FOUR-FIVE-YEAR TIME FRAME WAS MADE AND PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH ROKG.

3. AT SAME TIME PARK NOTED THAT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE TO ACCEPTING USG BASIC DECISION TO WITHDRAW WITHIN FOUR-FIVE YEAR TIME FRAME AS ESTABLISHED FACT. THEREFORE HE INDICATED HE BELIEVED WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON MEASURES TO COOPERATE IN MEETING THIS NEW SITUATION AND ASSURING ROK SECURITY. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE INDICATED THAT BOTH SIDES MUST USE PERIOD OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO STRENGTHEN ROK'S MILITARY SELF SUFFICIENCY AND DEVELOP ROKG GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY TO DETER NORTH KOREA WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES.

4. WE STRESSED TO PRESIDENT PARK PRESIDENT CARTER'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN ROK SECURITY AND HIS DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR TREATY COMMITMENT. WE NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CHARGED US WITH CONVEYING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS TO PRESIDENT PARK AND AFFORDING PRESIDENT PARK FULLEST OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND DIRECTLY THROUGH US TO THE PRESIDENT. IN DISCUSSING BASIC DECISION ON GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL, HABIB INDICATED PRESIDENT'S APPROACH BASED ON RECOGNITION OF ROK'S GROWING MILITARY CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPRESSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH. INDICATED ALSO OUR INTENTION TO PUBLICLY REITERATE OUR CONFIDENCE THAT WITHDRAWAL

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CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ENDANGERING ROK SECURITY AS WELL AS OUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN OUR COMMITMENT TO ROK AND A STRONG POSTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

5. IN PRESENTING OUR PRESENT THINKING ON GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL, GENERAL BROWN GAVE FOLLOWING OUTLINE:

- A. INITIAL 6,000-MAN INCREMENT BY THE ENF OF CY1978;
- B. SECOND 9,000 MAN INCREMENT IN 1980;
- C. WITHDRAWAL OF THIRD AND FINAL INCREMENT WOULD BE WITHIN THE FOUR-FIVE YEAR PERIOD DECIDED BY PRESIDENT WITH EXACT TIMING AND MODALITIES YET TO BE DETERMINED.

6. IN ADDITION, WHILE STRESSING NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL, GENERAL BROWN NOTED THAT WE ARE STUDYING THE FOLLOWING COMPENSATORY MEASURES:

- A. SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AND APPROVAL, CONTINUATION OF ADEQUATE LEVELS OF FMS SUPPORT FOR ROK FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM;
- B. STUDY OF CONCRETE MEASURES TO MEET REQUIREMENTS GENERATED BY WITHDRAWAL OF GROUND FORCES INCLUDING POSSIBLE MIX OF FMS AND TRANSFER OF EQUIPMENT NOW IN EIGHT ARMY INVENTORY OR AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE;
- C. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE SUPPORT FOR ROKS IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY FIELD;
- D. CONSIDERATION OF INCREASED EXERCISES AND TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTENTION AND ABILITY TO MEET OUR MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY COMMITMENT.
- E. READINESS TO CONSIDER COMBINED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FUTURE.

7. IN INTERNATIONAL FIELD, HABIB NOTED THAT WE INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR, BOTH PUBLICLY AND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO PRO AND USSR, OUR INTENTION TO FULLY MEET OUR SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN KOREA. HE ALSO SAID THAT OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE UNC AND MAINTAINANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE WILL NOT TERMINATE THE UNC UNLESS THERE ARE ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO MAINTAIN

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TAIN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OR OTHER EQUALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS. HABIB ALSO NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO DEAL UNILATERALLY WITH NORTH KOREA IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ROK.

B. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION:

A. GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE: PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR PRESENTATION, HE NOW UNDERSTANDS U.S. CONCEPT WITH REGARD TO GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL. HE ASKED SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AS TO EXACT PERIOD ENVISIONED WHEN WE REFER TO FOUR-FIVE YEAR TIME FRAME. HABIB INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVED PERIOD SHOULD BEGIN WITH CONCLUSION OF OUR CONSULTATIONS AT THE SCM THIS SUMMER BUT THIS WOULD BE CONFIRMED AFTER VERIFYING WITH WASHINGTON. IN HIS QUESTIONING, PARK FOCUSED PARTICULARLY ON IMPACT OF WITHDRAWAL OF INDIVIDUAL INCREMENTS ON THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION'S STRUCTURE. GENERAL BROWN EXPLAINED THAT UNDER PRESENTLY PLANNED WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE BULK OF SECOND INFANTRY'S FIGHTING UNITS WOULD NOT BE REMOVED UNTIL FINAL INCREMENT, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DRAW DOWN A TOTAL OF 15,000 MEN AND SOME OF THE SECOND INFANTRY COMBAT UNITS IN FIRST TWO INCREMENTS.

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B. COMPENSATORY MEASURES: PARK FOCUSED MOST ON QUESTION OF SUPPORT FOR ROK MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND STRENGTHENING ABILITY OF ROK TO MEET GROUND FORCE THREAT. IN THAT CONTEXT, HE WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF EXCLUSION OF ROKG FROM LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO USG UNDER OUR NEW ARMS TRANSFER POLICY. HABIB EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT, UNDER PRESENT POLICY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET ROKG'S NEEDS BOTH FOR EQUIPMENT AND IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER/DEFENSE INDUSTRY FIELD ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. HOWEVER, HE PROMISED TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT PARK'S CONCERN ON THIS PROBLEM AND PRESIDENT PARK'S DESIRE THAT ROKG BE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES HAVING SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. IN OUR ARMS TRANSFER POLICY.

C. COMBINED COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL: PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED READINESS TO CONSIDER COMBINED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IN THAT CONTEXT HE INDICATED THAT HE IS PREPARED TO LEAVE ROK FORCES UNDER U.S. OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNTIL BULK OF THE SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION IS WITHDRAWN (I.E., THE FINAL INCREMENT AS DESCRIBED BY US). HOWEVER, AT THAT TIME OPERATIONAL CONTROL SHOULD REVERT TO THE ROKG. GENERAL BROWN NOTED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT SHOULD GO INTO OUR STUDY OF COMBINED COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS BEYOND QUESTION OF FORCE LEVEL, FOR INSTANCE U.S. ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES.

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D. STRENGTHENING OF USAF UNITS: PRESIDENT PARK ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO AUGMENTING USAF UNITS IN KOREA. GENERAL BROWN NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF FILLING OUT THE U.S. SQUADRONS NOW IN COUNTRY TO A FULL WING IS UNDER STUDY. HOWEVER IN THAT CONNECTION ANY AUGUMENTATION WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE CONSIDERATION OF ADDITIONAL AIR BASE.

E. U.S. SUPPORT IN EVENT OF NORTH KOREAN ATTACK: PARK STATED HE WISHED TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE THE ROKG CAN EXPECT FROM THE U.S. IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR ATTACK AFTER THE GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST, ROKG WAS SURE OF QUICK AND FULL U.S. RESPONSE BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF GROUND TROOPS. HOWEVER WITH THEIR WITHDRAWAL HE BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT ROKG KNOW WHAT IT CAN EXPECT FROM THE USG IN FAIRLY CONCRETE TERMS. HABIB EXPLAINED CAREFULLY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES AND LIMITATIONS WHILE STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY COMMITMENT. PARK INDICATED HE RECOGNIZED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT BUT FELT THAT IT IMPORTANT ROKG HAVE SOME WAY OF ASSESSING WHAT U.S. CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE. FOR INSTANCE, WOULD U.S. SEND AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES IN EVENT OF MAJOR ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA. IF DESPATCH OF GROUND FORCES IS DIFFICULT, THEN WOULD THE U.S. BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT. HABIB NOTED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT HE WAS MAKING AND THAT WE WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENTS TO THE PRESIDENT. ALSO SAID THAT IN PRACTICAL TERMS PRESIDENT PARK'S QUESTIONS MAY BE TAKEN CARE OF IN DISCUSSIONS ON COMBINED COMMAND AND PLANNING. PARK APPEARED SATISFIED BY THIS REPUNSE, INDICATING THAT WAS WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.

F. SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS: HABIB ASKED PRESIDENT PARK FOR HIS VIEWS ON SOUTH-NORTH RELATIONS OVER NEXT DECADE. PARK INDICATED THAT AS WE KNOW THERE IS NO DIALOGUE NOW AND THE NORTH KOREAN ATTITUDE WIL BE FURTHER HARDENED BY THE GRBUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL. PARK DID NOT PICK UP ON HABIB'S QUERY AS TO WHETHER WE COULD BE HELPFUL IN FACILITATING DIALOGUE, PARTICULARLY AS WE GET INTO

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SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH PEKING ON NORMALIZATION PROCESS. PARK SIMPLY INDICATED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE THE COURSE OF SOUTH-NORTH DEVELOPMENT. HOWEVER ONE THING WAS CLEAR. THE NORTH KOREANS' DESIRE TO UNIFY KOREA BY MILITARY MEANS WILL INCREASE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS AS THE GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL PROCEEDS AND THIS WOULD BE DANGEROUS PERIOD. IN TEN YEARS, PRESIDENT PARK NOTED, SOUTH KOREA'S OVER-ALL STRENGTH AND POWER WILL BE FAR SUPERIOR TO THE NORTH'S WHICH WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DIRECTLY CHALLENGE THE ROK THEN.

8. IN CONCLUDING COMMENTS, PARK INDICATED HIS APPRECIATION FOR OUR FULL EXPOSITION AND SEEMED GENUINELY APPRECIATIVE. HE INDICATED THAT ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION HE COULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE AND INCREMENT LEVELS PRESENTED UNDER FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

A. IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES WOULD PARALLEL THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FIRST TWO INCREMENTS AND THAT ALL OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE FINAL INCREMENT IS WITHDRAWN;

B. BOLD OF SECOND INFANTRY COMBAT UNITS WOULD REMAIN IN COUNTRY UNTIL FINAL INCREMENT IS WITHDRAWN AND DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AND TWO OF THE BRIGADES WOULD REMAIN UNTIL THAT TIME. PRESIDENT PARK DID NOT QUESTION FIRST WITHDRAWAL INCREMENT. HE ACCEPTED SECOND INCREMENT OF 9,000 MAN WITHDRAWAL IF TWO BRIGADES REMAIN EVEN THOUGH BELOW AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. HE OBVIOUSLY PLACED PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE IN KEEPING TWO BRIGADES PER SE IN KOREA. ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT TOTAL OF 15,000 FOR FIRST TWO INCREMENTS WOULD NOT BE CHANGED.

9. COMMENT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK WENT VERY WELL AND AFTER GETTING HIS RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR BASIC DECISION OFF HIS CHEST, PARK PROCEEDED IN RESTRAINED AND REALISTIC MANNER TO ADDRESS ISSUES RELATED TO U.S. FORCE WITHDRAWAL. NEITHER HE NOR WE DISCUSSED OR RAISED DETAILED COMPENSATORY MEASURES OR ANY LOST

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FIGURES. FURTHER, WE MADE PARK FULLY AWARE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION AND SUPPORT, POINT PARK HIMSELF WAS KEENLY AWARE OF.

10. SECOND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK WILL BE TOMORROW AFTERNOON. WE EXPECT FURTHER ELABORATION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES IDENTIFIED TODAY IN THAT MEETING AND IN SEPARATE SESSIONS WITH FONMIN AND MND.  
SNEDIER

ZB, AARON, UNDERFURTH, GATES, ~~ACMDCOST~~ 0

E.O. *Dr. Buzgintai*



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NODIS/CHEROKEE

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR HARR KS US  
SUBJ: US GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL: SECOND MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT PARK

REF: SEUL 4379

1. GENERAL BROWN AND UNDER SECRETARY HABIB HELD SECOND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK AFTERNOON OF MAY 26, 1977. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, GENERAL VESSEY, AND O'DONOHUE. PRIM CHOI, PRESIDENT SECRETARY GENERAL KIM AND PROTOCOL SECRETARY CHOE WERE PRESENT ON KOREAN SIDE.

2. IN MEETING PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED THAT WE ALREADY HAD DETAILED EXCHANGE ON MAJOR POINTS IN MAY 25 MEETING. AS RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED THAT OUTLINE OF OUR MUTUAL POSITIONS WAS CLEAR AND THAT THERE WAS BASIC UNDERSTANDING ON PRINCIPLES. HE INDICATED THAT FOLLOW-UP ON SPECIFIC ISSUES SHOULD BE BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING WORKING COMMITTEES ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES. HABIB NOTED THAT WE AGREED ON NEED TO ESTABLISH MECHANISM FOR FURTHER DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCUS IN SEUL. AT SAME TIME HE INDICATED THAT AT THIS POINT, THE FIRST ORDER IS TO REPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON RESULTS OF OUR CONSULTATIONS HERE AS WELL AS CONVEYING PRESIDENT PARK'S

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E.O.12958, Sec.3.6  
PER 5/5/97 *hlc* RE MR-11C-96-45  
BY *Q* NARS. DATE 6/18/97

VIEWS. AFTER REPORTING TO PRESIDENT WE WILL THEN BE IN A POSITION TO COMMUNICATE FURTHER WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE MECHANISMS TO BEGIN DETAILED WORK IN PREPARATION FOR THE SCM. IN THE MEANTIME, AMBASSADOR SNEIDER AND GENERAL VESSEY WOULD REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS TO FURTHER REFINE THE ISSUES WE HAVE DISCUSSED.

3. PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED THAT HE WAS APPOINTING THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS CONNECTED WITH THE GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL. HE HAD NO OBJECTION EITHER TO A JOINT COMMITTEE OR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF SEPARATE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEES TO STUDY THE ISSUES. HOWEVER AN APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

4. PRESIDENT PARK THEN RAISED AGAIN THE QUESTION OF THE U.S. RATIONALE FOR A GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL AT THIS TIME HE SAID THAT HE STILL COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. WOULD PULL OUT ITS FORCES AT THIS JUNCTURE.

5. IN LENGTHY PRESENTATION, HABIB EXPLAINED BACKGROUND TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. HE POINTED OUT THAT OUR DECISION CAME AFTER CLOSE EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE LARGER REGIONAL CONTEXT, AND PRESIDENT PARK'S OWN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH MILITARY SELF RELIANCE. THE DECISION ALSO REFLECTED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AMERICAN DOMESTIC SITUATION. AS A RESULT OF THAT EXAMINATION IT IS POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL WHILE MAINTAINING SUFFICIENT DETERRENCE THROUGH THE CREDIBLE REMAINING ROK AND AMERICAN FORCES AND IN THE CONTEXT OF A VERY SERIOUS REAFFIRMATION OF OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT.

6. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT OUR DECISION WAS ALSO A REFLECTION OF THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE ROKG. DECISION REFLECTS OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC GROWTH OF KOREA, THE SPIRIT AND MORALE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPAB-

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ILITY OF THE KOREAN FORCES SUPPORTED BY A MODIFIED CONTINUING AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECURITY CONCEPT WHICH WE ENVISION OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS WOULD ENGENDER GREATER SUPPORT FOR OUR BASIC SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROKG BOTH WITH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND IN OUR CONGRESS. FURTHER, WE BELIEVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S REITERATION OF OUR SECURITY COMMITMENT WILL BE UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED IN KOREA AND ELSEWHERE. WE WILL MAKE OUR DETERMINATION CLEAR TO NORTH KOREA AND ITS ALLIES TO REDUCE ANY CHANCE OF MISCALCULATION AS TO THE STRENGTH OF OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP.

7. PRESIDENT PARK INDICATED HE DID NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN ARGUMENT OVER OUR RATIONALE. HOWEVER, HE DID WISH TO POINT OUT THAT INZ DISCUSSING ROK MILITARY SELF-RELIANCE HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BE ABLE TO REPEL ANY ATTACK FROM NORTH KOREA WHICH WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE PRC AND THE USSR. HABIB SAID THAT WE HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT POINT AND OUR OWN POLICIES WERE BASED ON THAT PREMISE.

8. IN SUMMING UP ROK POSITION, PRESIDENT PARK STRESSED THAT HIS ACCEPTANCE OF OUR OVER-ALL WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE WAS PREDICATED ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REQUIRED COMPENSATORY MEASURES NEEDED TO ASSURE ROK'S SECURITY. IN RESPONSE TO HABIB QUERY, PRESIDENT PARK CONFIRMED THAT ROKG POSITION IS THAT COMPENSATORY MEASURES SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN PARALLEL WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FIRST TWO GROUND FORCE INCREMENTS AND THAT THESE COMPENSATORY MEASURES SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FINAL INCREMENT. HE ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH WORKING TO SECURE CONGRESSIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR NEEDED COMPENSATORY MEASURES.

9. HABIB PROMISED TO REPORT FULLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER THE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AND INDICATED APPRECIATION FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FRANK ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED. HE NOTED THAT OUR INITIAL APPROACH TO TROOP WITHDRAWAL

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ISSUE HAD BEEN THE WAY IN WHICH CLOSE ALLIES SHOULD ADDRESS THESE PROBLEMS.

10. IN CLOSING HABIB INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE SEEING PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA WHILE IN TOKYO. PRESIDENT PARK ASKED THAT WE CONVEY PRIVATE MESSAGE TO FUKUDA. PRESIDENT PARK SAID THAT FUKUDA SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT ROKG HAS NO INTENTION OF REQUESTING THE GOJ TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE FOR KOREAN SECURITY. HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE GOJ IS IN NO POSITION TO DO SO. AT THE SAME TIME, SINCE GOJ HAS REITERATED THAT SECURITY OF KOREA IS IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN PRESIDENT PARK HOPES IT WILL SHOW SINCERITY BY AVOIDING ANY RASH APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA WHICH WOULD ONLY FURTHER EXACERBATE THE FEELINGS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE. HABIB INDICATED THAT HE WOULD CONVEY THAT MESSAGE.

11. COMMENT: SECOND MEETING WITH PARK HAS CONFIRMED HIS ACCEPTANCE OF ESSENTIALS OF OUR WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE. HE HAS ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT ROKG INTENDS TO PRESS HARD ON QUESTION OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES. PARK AGAIN MADE CLEAR FOR THE RECORD HIS RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR BASIC DECISION WHILE IN RESTRAINED, STATESMANLIKE MANNER ACCEPTING IT. BLUSE HOUSE STAFF TELLS US THAT THEY BELIEVE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT PARK WERE VERY GOOD.

12. SEPTELS REPORT SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PARK AND DEFENSE MINISTER SUH. IN THOSE MEETINGS SPECIFIC ISSUES ATTENDANT TO GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL WERE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL.  
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E. O. Brzezinski



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NODIS CHEROKEE

DEPARTMENT PASS TOKYO FOR HABIB EYES ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFDR, SHUM, KS, US  
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK

REF: SEUL 4441

1. FOLLOWING CONCLUSION DISCUSSIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL WITH PRESIDENT PARK MAY 26 (REFTEL), UNDER SECRETARY HABIB AND AMBASSADOR STAYED BEHIND WITH PRESIDENT PARK AND INTERPRETER FOR BRIEF DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

2. HABIB AT OUTSET POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE NOT LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE WITH TROOP WITHDRAWALS. PRESIDENT PARK SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS NOTHING BUT FRIENDSHIP TOWARDS HIM. THE U.S. WILL MAKE NO PRE-EMPTORY DECISIONS TOWARDS KOREA AND OUR COMMITMENT TO KOREAN SECURITY, AS WE HAVE STATED, REMAINS STEADFAST. FURTHERMORE, PRESIDENT CARTER IS PREPARED TO GO ALL OUT TO MEET ANY COMMITMENTS WE MAKE WITH ROK WITH REGARD TO ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE TROOP WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, WE FACE VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND SUPPORT FOR THESE COMMITMENTS. PRESIDENT PARK CAN BE VERY HELPFUL TO

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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BY [signature] NARS. DATE 6/18/97

PRESIDENT CARTER IN THE TASK OF ELICITING THE NECESSARY CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT THROUGH HIS ACTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. HABIB FURTHER TOLD PRESIDENT PARK THAT ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER NO PUBLIC STATEMENT WILL BE MADE ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE OR HOW IT HAS BEEN HANDLED WITH PRESIDENT PARK IN CONNECTION WITH OUR VISIT.

3. PRESIDENT PARK REACTED TO THIS APPROACH BY FIRST REITERATING HIS POSITION THAT MYZNGDONG INCIDENT IS NOT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM, THAT MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS VIOLATED KOREAN CONSTITUTION AND LAWS AND WERE TRIED THROUGH DUE PROCESS AND THAT LENIENCY TOWARD THEM AS RESULT U.S. PRESSURE WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE DEFENDANTS TO VIOLATE KOREAN LAW AGAIN, LEADING TO FURTHER ARRESTS, ETC. ON OTHER HAND, IF WE SOUGHT LENIENCY WITHOUT LINKING MYONGDONG CASE TO HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM, BUT AS A RESPONSE TO SEGMENT OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION CALLING FOR LENIENCY, THEN SOMETHING POSSIBLE.

4. HABIB POINTED OUT THAT HE IN FACT RAISED QUESTION WITH PRESIDENT PARK AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM IN U.S., WHICH AFFECTS OUR MUTUEL INTEREST. HE TOLD PARK IT WAS NOT ONLY MYONGDONG QUESTION, BUT THERE OTHER THINGS HE COULD DO.

5. PARK RESPONDED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE INTENTIONS OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND RECOGNIZES THAT LENIENT TREATMENT FOR THE MYONGDONG DEFENDANTS WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE PRESIDENT AND HAVE A GOOD EFFECT ON KOREA'S POSITION IN U.S. IF HE ACTED RIGHT NOW, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE ASSUMED THAT THIS WAS DUE TO U.S. PRESSURE WITH THE RESULTS HE HAD SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY. HOWEVER, HE THEN INDICATED THAT IF THERE WAS A PERIOD OF QUIET WHEN U.S. PRESSURE WAS NOT PUBLICLY EVIDENT, THEN IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION. HE MENTIONED, IN THIS CONTEXT, A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS AT ONE POINT, BUT IN HIS CONCLUDING REMARKS HE ASKED HABIB TO PASS TO PRESIDENT CARTER HIS REQUEST THAT USG NOT PUBLICLY RAISE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

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SO THAT HE CAN THEN TAKE HELPFUL ACTIONS, WITHOUT  
SPECIFYING ANY TIME PERIOD.  
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**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from David Aaron, "Brown/Habib Report on Korea," 29 May 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of 5-6/77, Box 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

[...]

May 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: David Aaron  
SUBJECT: Brown/Habib Report on Korea

Attached is the report of Phil Habib and General Brown on their visit to Korea and Japan. We will be staffing out with State and Defense the concrete implications of some of the recommendations. However, Zbig agrees that I should convey to you two concerns that relate to this report:

-- In dealing with the Congressional reaction to their Korea policy, it is important to go beyond merely stressing that military security will be maintained; we should also explain what will be achieved by a U.S. ground force withdrawal. Among the positive accomplishments could be (a) greater flexibility in using the 2nd Division now dedicated solely to South Korea, or (b) possible Defense budget savings through deactivating the 2nd Division or using it to replace less ready forces in the United States which would be deactivated.

-- The possibility of pursuing such positive objectives may be limited by several of the suggestions put forward to Phil Habib and General Brown. For example, the thrust of them would, in effect preserve the "shell" of the 2nd Division in Korea as long as possible while reducing manning levels. This might make it impossible to either use the Division flexibly in other contingencies or to replace stateside forces such as the 7th Division at Fort Ord (a possible candidate for replacement because of its low state of readiness).

You will note from Cy Vance's evening report that Phil and Gen. Brown have been asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. Together with State and Defense, we will develop for your approval positive objectives that could be set forth in their testimony.

[...]

May 28, 1977

TO: The President

FROM: General George S. Brown (signature), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Philip C. Habib (signature), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Troop Withdrawal from Korea

In compliance with your instructions, we held consultations in the Republic of Korea and in Japan on the Presidential decision to withdraw United States ground forces from Korea. Detailed reports of the discussions held have been filed with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The following are our principal observations and conclusions.

#### KOREA

-- President Park and his principal ministers now have a clear understanding of the Presidential directive concerning troop withdrawal from Korea. Although they would prefer no change in force levels, they understand specifically that the United States Second Division and supporting elements are to be withdrawn from Korea in a phased manner within a period of 4-5 years.

-- While the United States program is accepted, there was clear concern for the risk of instability on the Korean Peninsula unless "compensatory actions" were taken in conjunction with the withdrawal so as to maintain an acceptable balance of military power during and following our ground force withdrawal.

-- "Compensatory actions" is a term used by the Koreans to include the transfer of additional U.S. military equipment and the expansion of Korean ability to produce arms and other military requirements. The specific items and quantities of equipment are yet to be defined but include such things as anti-tank weapons, artillery, communications equipment, air defense weapons, etc. We did not discuss quantities or the value of assistance to be provided. We stressed the necessity for Congressional approval and appropriation for any compensatory action. [Handwritten in the margins by Jimmy Carter: *Do not get over-obligated.*]

-- It will therefore be essential that Congressional support be secured for the programmed withdrawal of our forces. Specifically, Congressional agreement should be sought for those compensatory actions which should be agreed upon and defined in general terms at the forthcoming Ministerial Security Consultative Meeting Which is due to be held in Seoul in July.

-- In our discussion of Command arrangements, it was agreed to plan for a combined U.S./ROK Command. The character and functions of the Command will be the subject of consultations between General Vessey and Korean military authorities with the Objective of agreeing on the new structure at the forthcoming Security Consultative Meeting. The Command will be formed and operating when the initial increment of U.S. ground forces is withdrawn from Korea before the end of calendar year 1978.

-- It was generally accepted that a U.S. Officer would command the Combined Command so long as the bulk of the Second Division (defined as two Brigades plus the Headquarters) remains in Korea. Command arrangements beyond that point will require further discussion.

-- In view of the Korean attitude toward Command arrangements and in response to President Park's specific request, it is recommended that when the second increment is withdrawn, no later than the end of June 1980, it should be so structured that the Second Division Headquarters and two Brigades remain. This will still allow for the projected 15,000 ground personnel to be withdrawn in the first two increments. [Handwritten in the margins by Jimmy Carter: *Seems too slow.*]

[Redacted paragraph]

## JAPAN

-- The discussion in Japan with the Foreign Minister and Self Defense Agency were "pro forma" because of the number of people involved and the danger of leaks to the press. The discussion with Prime Minister Fukuda was substantive and informative.


-- In general the Japanese also would prefer maintenance of the status quo. However, they seemed to accept our explanation of why U.S. ground forces were being withdrawn and our determination to maintain security on the Korean Peninsula.

-- Prime Minister Fukuda emphasized the importance of reassuring all the friendly countries in East Asia of the continued presence and commitment of the United States to the security of the region. We delivered to Fukuda the President's message concerning the importance of Japan's contribution to Korea's security. The Prime Minister understood and asked that the President be assured that Japan would contribute, as it could, to South Korea's economic and political strength through Japan's decisions on trade and investment and in the way in which Japan would publicly handle relations with North and South Korea respectively.

-- Both in Japan and Korea, in describing the proposed U.S. course of action, great stress was placed on the following points:

1. The United States would remain a Pacific power with substantial military capability in a forward position;
2. The United States commitment to the Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of Korea remains firm;
3. The United States would withdraw ground forces in a phased manner so that the military balance would generally be maintained and instability would not result;
4. We were confident that the program could be carried out successfully based upon the economic strength of Korea, the Korean people's will to resist Communism and the deterrent capability of the Korean and U.S. forces remaining in the area.





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM

11A - see my check Ed  
2B.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION  
June 3, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: ROBERT GATES *J.*  
SUBJECT: White House Role in Congressional Investigation of Korean Misdoings

*ZB - This is good work*  
*[Signature]*

The investigation of alleged Korean payments to members of the Congress and other misdoings of the KCIA is upon us from several directions and requires several decisions by you at this point. The first concerns the broad question of the White House-Executive Branch role in the investigations. The second concerns a request for release of specific documents to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

I. White House Policy Relating to the Investigations

The actions of the Korean Government and KCIA in the United States are being investigated by three Congressional Committees -- the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct and the House Subcommittee on International Organizations. The committee investigations are now under way and documents are being requested from various Executive Branch departments and agencies. All indications are that the investigators are principally interested in information they believe is held by NSA and, to a lesser extent, CIA. We should therefore try to ensure -- as a procedural matter -- that the Congressional investigators have exhausted all possible avenues of cooperation with Executive agencies before accepting an adjudicative role for the White House. The White House should accept a role in this process only as a court of last resort or if White House documents are involved.

Although the White House has not yet been asked directly for documents or to intercede with recalcitrant agencies by the committees, such requests can be anticipated. Additionally, we already have a request from State to approve their release of White House documents relating to the investigation to the Senate Select Committee. More of these requests can also be expected. Bob Lipshutz is concerned about how we should respond to such requests for White House documents, a concern we share.

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It is not realistic to consider blanket denial of Congressional access to documents relevant to the investigations. At the same time, we must preserve the option of denying certain documents if their release would be harmful to our national security interests. However desirable an explicit and detailed White House policy with respect to responding to Committee requests in this matter might seem, I believe our only practical alternative is to judge each request on its merits. This approach does not preclude us from developing certain guidelines to ensure that requests for White House documents are properly staffed by all appropriate elements of the White House Staff.

I recommend the following guidelines for responding to requests for White House documents relating to the Congressional investigations of the Korean affair:

- that each request for White House documents, interviews or intervention with other agencies be treated individually and on its own merits;
- that decisions on each request for White House documents or intervention with other agencies take into account the need to protect to the greatest extent possible our relations with Korea, intelligence sources and methods, and the President's decision-making process;
- that the release of any White House or NSC documents be accompanied by a formal statement noting that its release is an exception to standard practice and policy regarding release of White House documents and has been made only in connection with this specific investigation;
- that the NSC and White House Counsel's office designate members of their staffs who will serve as contacts for all matters relating to the Korean investigation and collaborate in staffing outside requests;
- that you and Bob Lipshutz make all final decisions relating to requests for White House documents, interviews, and intervention with Executive agencies; in the event of non-concurrence, the decision would be referred to the President; and
- that final NSC decisions relating to the investigation be made by you or David Aaron.

CONFIDENTIAL

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I have discussed this informally with Michael Cardozo in the Counsel's office and he agrees this is the preferred approach. Jerry Schecter, Sam Hoskinson, Mike Oksenberg, and Christine Dodson also concur.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve the guidelines outlined above.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE

2. That (you \_\_\_\_\_, other D.A.) call Lipshutz and Moore to arrange their cooperation.

APPROVE  DISAPPROVE

II. The Specific Request at Hand

The Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has asked the Department of State to provide the Committee with documents relating to conversations in 1974 between Mr. John E. Nidecker, then of the White House Staff, and Mr. Row Chin Hwan in which the latter offered to contribute money to the campaigns of members of Congress. Because the documents identified by State in connection with this request (at Tab II) originated at the White House, the Department has asked that the NSC review them to determine whether they should be shown or released to the Committee. The Department advises that most of the substance of the events reported in the documents appeared in the press based on disclosures by Mr. Nidecker.

Bob Lipshutz has no objection to releasing these documents to the committee inasmuch as the substance therein was reported in the press. At the same time, Lipshutz indicated his concern about setting a precedent that might cause us problems later.

From the NSC standpoint, there would seem to be no objection to releasing these documents to the Committee. With respect to the problem of precedent, in keeping with the recommendations put forward in the first part of this memorandum, I suggest that the NSC Staff Secretary sign the memorandum to State at Tab I authorizing release of the documents in question with the proviso that the Committee is informed in writing that release of the documents is an exception to White House policy and practice and should not be considered as a precedent for future requests.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Christine Dodson's signature of the memorandum at Tab I authorizing the Department of State to release the Nidecker memorandum to the Select Committee with the proviso noted above.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*The DA check  
this one must with  
highly because of  
the precedents issue.*

*ES.*

US GROUND FORCES WITHDRAWAL: KOREAN  
STABILITY AND FOREIGN REACTIONS\*

Withdrawing US ground forces from Korea involves a variety of risks that revolve around stability on the peninsula and international reactions -- especially of the other major Asian powers. Following a withdrawal, the military situation in Korea will be less certain than it is now, and the general perception of the US as an Asian power will be diminished. The extent to which these tendencies develop depends largely upon the combination of measures employed to offset or reduce the risks of a withdrawal.

Stability on the Peninsula

Impact on the Koreans

1. Pyongyang has not renounced the use of force as a means of reunification. It has thus far been deterred by US-South Korean military strength and the US commitment to the South, the most credible manifestation of which has been the presence of US combat forces on the peninsula. Pyongyang will view a withdrawal of US ground forces [redacted] as removing key elements of deterrence. Moreover, since 1970 the static military balance between North and South Korea has changed from rough equality to one that substantially favors the North. This imbalance is likely to continue for at least the next five years.

25X1

2. In deciding whether to undertake major hostilities during or after a US withdrawal, Pyongyang would be heavily influenced by its perceptions of the reliability of the US security commitment, the military balance, and political conditions in the South. If Pyongyang decided to attack the South, its most likely immediate military objective would be the rapid seizure of Seoul, and the consolidation of its gains. In so moving, Pyongyang would hope to deny the South

\* This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific. It is largely based on a draft prepared by CIA and reviewed by representatives of that Agency, DIA, NSA, and intelligence organizations of the military services.

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the opportunity to bring its larger reserve forces into play, minimize the duration and extent of US involvement, and avoid reliance on Soviet or Chinese military assistance. It might calculate that the US, China, and the USSR would all seek to bring hostilities to an end at the earliest possible time. In such a situation, with the ROKG likely in disarray, the North would see itself in an extremely advantageous position.

3. The impact on South Korea will range over a wide area:

-- The South Koreans will likely seek greater control of their own forces in light of a significant reduction in US ground forces. This would remove the restraining influence of the US over ROK reactions to North Korean provocations.

-- A US ground force withdrawal could greatly reduce ROK command and control and intelligence capabilities.

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-- A ground forces withdrawal may make it more difficult for South Korea to attract needed foreign capital. South Korea depends on a heavy flow of foreign capital to pay off existing debts, keep its economy growing, and build up its defense industries. Seoul's economic progress over the years has been a critical factor in maintaining political stability and general confidence in the Pak government.

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- A US withdrawal, combined with a deterioration in US-ROK relations, could create political instability in the South. President Pak's ability to remain in power hinges in an important way on his management of relations with the US; this could become critical during and after a troop withdrawal.
- A withdrawal of US ground troops could undermine South Korean resolve. US ground forces have always been an important psychological factor in South Korea. The withdrawal of these troops would have a major impact on the morale of the South Korean military and is also likely to affect general civilian confidence in the future of the country, as well.

#### Compensating Measures

4. South Korea has a limited ability to increase defense allocations above planned levels without seriously reducing economic growth. The US, however, can reduce the risks attendant to withdrawal in a variety of ways:

- Retaining US tactical air capability will maintain an impression of commitment and a capability for supporting ROK forces in combat. It is unlikely, however, that air power would be a decisive factor in defeating a surprise thrust by North Korea toward Seoul.
- Phasing troop withdrawals. Leaving open the date for the final withdrawal of all ground forces would have important effects in Pyongyang and Seoul. Both would view an open-ended schedule as an indication that withdrawal would be governed more by security conditions on the peninsula than by US domestic pressures.
- Retaining intelligence assets that might provide early warning of a North Korean attack. Early warning of an attack is essential for the successful defense of the South.

- Assisting the ROK in strengthening its defenses and in acquiring the military equivalence of the US ground forces now stationed in Korea. A strong, unequivocal US effort to improve ROK military capabilities would be critical to continued stability on the peninsula. Such an effort would alter Pyongyang's perception of the military balance, enhance the prospects for continued political stability in the South, and diminish any inclination in Seoul to reconsider a nuclear weapons option.
- Avoiding other US actions or statements which could send the wrong signal to either the North or the South. Diplomatically, the ROK is acutely sensitive to the possibility of US-North Korean contacts and to any modification of the cross recognition formula. On the other hand, initiatives to increase understandings among the major powers about the desirability of stability on the peninsula would be seen by Seoul as continued US willingness to work in its behalf and by Pyongyang with discomfort.
- The US security commitment would also be reinforced in Pyongyang and Seoul by the augmentation of US air power in the South, forward basing of US Navy assets in the Pacific, and demonstrations of US mobility capabilities through field exercises.

#### International Reactions

##### Japan

5. Japanese leaders, believing that stability in Korea is essential to Japan's own security, prefer that US ground forces remain in Korea. The Japanese government has voiced greater concern about our intention to withdraw the remaining US ground forces than it did in 1970 about the removal of the 7th Infantry Division. Nonetheless, Tokyo is resigned to a withdrawal. It is unlikely that Japanese security policies will be changed appreciably. Tokyo still considers any direct military contribution to South Korean security a political impossibility in light of its "no war" constitution, its limited self-defense forces, and consistently negative Japanese popular attitude toward issues termed either "Korean" or "military."



6. In voicing concern about a withdrawal, Tokyo is reassuring South Korea that it remains of paramount importance in Japan's view of the peninsula. At the same time, Tokyo is privately signaling its willingness to expand trade, cultural, and unofficial political exchanges with North Korea. Predictably, Pyongyang has reacted strongly to Tokyo's public support for a continued US military presence in the South. But Tokyo's continuing support for Seoul is no surprise to the North, and the economic benefit of closer ties with Japan may prompt some positive responses by Pyongyang. Tokyo does not expect the North to change its hostile attitude toward the South or to abandon its objective of controlling the entire peninsula. The Japanese, however, believe that closer ties with Pyongyang will at least improve their chances of acting as a moderating influence and serve as a hedge against any further unanticipated adjustments in US policy in the region. Still, Tokyo realizes that its increased nonmilitary involvement in Korean affairs cannot compensate for a shrinking US military presence in the South. Thus, Japan can be expected to continue to work for new international understandings that would shore up stability on the peninsula; in this respect, Tokyo would undoubtedly welcome any new US initiatives.

7. A possible lingering Japanese concern that will need to be offset by US actions and words is that our unwillingness to treat North East Asia with anything approximating the same concern as Western Europe is the product of a racist order of priorities. This theme has appeared recently in the Japanese press.

#### Taiwan

8. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan probably will see a withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea as reinforcing their view of Washington's reduction of its commitments in East Asia and of the inevitability of an eventual normalization of relations between Washington and Peking. Over the short term, however, Taipei may also argue that the US should not simultaneously withdraw its ground forces in South Korea and abrogate its security treaty with the Nationalists.

#### ASEAN

9. The ASEAN states share the general concern that stability be maintained on the peninsula and see a continuing

link between the maintenance of American power in Asia and their own security. None, with the possible exception of the Philippines, has confidence that the US would defend them in any regional conflict. But all of them believe that a continued American presence and interest -- including a military presence "over the horizon" -- is an essential element in maintaining the present equilibrium in Southeast as well as Northeast Asia.

#### The Chinese-Soviet Equation

10. A major factor currently shaping the strategic balance in Northeast Asia has been a rare convergence of Chinese and Soviet interest in maintaining Korean stability. The PRC and USSR approach the Korean situation in ambivalent terms. Both are Pyongyang's treaty allies and traditional military suppliers, and both, in part because of their political rivalry with each other, publicly support North Korea's call for withdrawal of US forces from the South. On the other hand, both Peking and Moscow clearly have placed pursuit of useful relations with the US and Japan above North Korean ambitions for reunification. They seek to disassociate themselves from Kim Il-song's more rash actions and view the US security commitment to Seoul as a useful ingredient in the mix of factors that keep peace on the peninsula and restrain any Japanese impulse toward rearmament. The Chinese tacitly have taken an especially positive view of US military presence, not only in Korea but throughout East Asia, seeing it as a help in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

11. The Chinese and Soviets are probably concerned that any withdrawal of US ground forces be accomplished in a manner that does not disrupt the basic political and military status quo on the peninsula. As long as a US force reduction is accompanied by effective compensating measures -- and the maintenance of US air and naval power in the area -- it will not be seen by Moscow and Peking as the removal of a credible US security commitment to South Korea. Moscow and Peking, moreover, would be motivated to discourage Kim from embarking on a major conflict with all of its troublesome and uncertain implications for Japanese security policy, bilateral relations with the US, and the power balance in East Asia. But, if Kim became convinced that the US no longer posed a credible deterrent and that other signs of weakness or instability in the South had opened the door for a quick victory, it is doubtful that either Moscow or Peking would be willing or able to place a veto on the venture.

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12. Moscow and Peking no doubt are anticipating North Korean pressure for increased military assistance in the event that a US force reduction leads to a substantial upgrading of South Korean military capabilities. Pyongyang would have to turn primarily to Moscow since China cannot supply the advanced equipment North Korea would require to match a US assistance package for the South. If the Soviet Union believed that South Korea's military capability had been significantly upgraded, it would probably respond with assistance to strengthen the North. Over the next year or so, Moscow is not likely to respond to requests for offsetting aid in a manner which further tilts the military balance in favor of the North.

13. Both Moscow and Peking, for some time, have seen the US as generally on the defensive internationally and, more specifically, as unwilling to become engaged in a future land war in Asia. But there are some important differences in the manner in which the Chinese and Soviets will view an American reduction of force in South Korea.

14. The bellwethers of the US-Soviet relationship continue to be SALT, commercial dealings, CSCE review and MBER; Moscow will continue to deal with all of these on their own merits. In this context, we do not believe that a withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea will significantly complicate the US-Soviet relationship or lead Moscow to conclude that the US is less of a global adversary.

15. Peking's perception of the value of the US relationship depends primarily on its reading of US resolve in dealing with the USSR on a global basis. Nevertheless, a US force reduction could raise some troublesome implications for Peking. The Chinese tacitly have supported a US military presence in South Korea not only as a deterrent to rash action by Kim Il-song, but as one element of the strategic counterweight to the threat of Soviet military "encirclement" of China. Indeed, the Chinese have generally taken a positive view of US military presence throughout East Asia (except in Taiwan), seeing it as a help in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the region and as a sign of continuing US resolve to play a great power role in opposition to the Soviet Union. Peking, however, is primarily concerned that the US maintain an ability to project military force as a Pacific power. If a ground force withdrawal from South Korea is accompanied by effective compensating measures -- and the maintenance of US air and

naval power in the area -- we do not believe that China's view of the value of the US connection will be significantly downgraded.

7 June 1977

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79R00603A002500020010-5

**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Korean Troop Withdrawals: Brown/Habib Testimony," 10 June 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of 5-6/77, Box 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1977

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI (signature)

SUBJECT: Korea Troop Withdrawals:  
Brown/Habib Testimony

We get conflicting reports of how the Senate session went this afternoon. After Phil Habib's opening statement, Senator Case apparently read from notes of a CIA briefing on the Korean threat. As he related it, the CIA briefing was extremely pessimistic, raising serious questions about the wisdom of your policy. The CIA briefing took place a few days ago and was based on the intelligence assessment that was part of our PRM effort. Apparently, CIA had not informed State that they had briefed the Committee nor of the Committee's reaction.

Concern was expressed over whether you had access to this intelligence before you made your decision on Korean troop withdrawals. Even Senator Humphrey, who supported your decision, indicated that it was an extremely serious matter and deserved the most careful study by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Others were even less positive in their comments.

The upshot is that the Committee wants to hear testimony from Stan Turner on the military balance and the security situation in North Asia. They will not hear further testimony from Habib and Brown until after they have heard from Turner. In this connection, the Committee was apparently completely disinterested in what President Park or the Japanese had to say or" for that matter, any other aspect of the consultations in Korea and Japan.

Phil Habib's assessment is that the meeting went all right and that in the long run the briefings of the military balance will strengthen our case for Congressional support for the equipment and other actions required to offset our withdrawal. Dick Holbrooke has a more pessimistic assessment. He believes that the resistance shown by the Foreign Relations Committee to your policy must be taken seriously and that we may have lost control of the consultative process.

In this connection, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff is now asking for copies of the PRM-13 study and the intelligence, annex to it. This raises serious questions about the confidentiality of studies done for you and of intelligence assessments prepared for you. While it may advance our case to turn over the relatively more optimistic intelligence assessment, this would set a precedent that could be extremely unfortunate. We cannot expect to get objective and candid assessments if the intelligence analysts believe they are going to be turned over to the Congress and become part of Executive/Congressional political debates. We also understand that the Committee staff already has a copy of this intelligence annex through unauthorized sources.

RECOMMENDATION

That Stan Turner be instructed to provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a full and complete and objective briefing based on the agreed assessment, but that the assessment and the PRM-13 study not be turned over to Congress.

Approve   ✓  

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*J*

MEMORANDUM

4187

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~ACTION

June 29, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: MIKE ARMACOST MA

SUBJECT: DOD Transmission to the Congress of JCS  
Recommendations Concerning Korean Troop  
Withdrawals

I am astonished at the attached document. On June 27 Defense evidently turned over to the Stratton Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee a large number of politically sensitive JCS messages concerning the troop withdrawal issues at just the moment when it appeared we were beginning to regain some control over the matter on the Hill. The messages include secret and top secret messages providing General Vessey's recommendations concerning the schedule for ground force withdrawals, Korean military assistance requirements arising out of the withdrawal, and [REDACTED]. On some of these matters final decisions of the Executive Branch are yet to be reached. Stratton is planning hearings on Korean troop withdrawals sometime after July 11. These documents will provide much of the ammunition for questions.

It is an outrageous procedure. Openness is one thing. Providing the Congress the internal recommendations of the JCS even before the final decisions are in is quite another. These messages constitute an invitation to the Congress to insert themselves into the formulation of the details of our programs by playing off one agency against another; to use the recommendations of one group to elicit comparable information about the proposals of other agencies; and to employ the military's arguments as a standard with which to judge and perhaps criticize our future decisions.

I am told that Defense considered this matter prayerfully for some time. Their Congressional relations people obviously wanted to appear forthcoming. Their lawyers apparently concluded that they could not legally

~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 9/29/97 NCL/RE NCC-96-44

TOP SECRET

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withhold the documents without claiming Executive Privilege; they evidently doubted that we could sustain such a claim, though I am not sure whether we were ever consulted in detail. Tom Ross did inform Jerry Schecter that his people had concluded that they could accommodate the Congressional requests without jeopardizing our position. That, frankly, would not have been my view.

-- I do not know the legal ins-and-outs of this, but I am concerned that these documents have been made available to the Committee at this stage. I am also irritated that I never had an opportunity to offer my own view as to the advisability of this step.

-- I am sure that the next set of requests will involve "backchannel" messages from Vessey to the Chiefs. We should not let these go, but the precedent established by what we have just done is not encouraging.

-- I believe that you should call Harold Brown to ask him what considerations went into this decision, why the White House was not asked to support a claim of Executive Privilege, and what he intends to do with future requests for "backchannel" messages on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Harold Brown as per above.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET - XGDS



**Telegram 066667 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 July 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114872>.]*

TELEGRAM 066667

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Date: July 7, 1977

Classification: Secret

Current US Secretary of State's reprise of Henry Kissinger's old ideas of 'cross-recognition' – the USSR and the PRC recognize the ROK and the US and Japan recognize the DPRK – and concurrent recognition of both Koreas within the UN has triggered vocal and disapproving reactions in Pyongyang against the United States for its policy of brutal interference in Korea's internal affairs and endorsement of Korean division. The central press, radio, and television are actively campaigning against these American ideas.

On the other hand, socialist diplomats in Pyongyang consider the possibility that, due to this anti-American campaign, C. Vance's future visit to Beijing will enable unofficial contacts between the US and the DPRK in view of clarifying the main problems between the two countries.

Signed: D. Popa

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~Urgent #117  
2  
4559THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 JUL 1977

A

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Trip to Korea

I am going to Korea on July 22 for the annual Security Consultative Meeting of Defense Ministers, which will also continue the consultative process set in motion by Phil Habib and George Brown. This meeting is particularly important because it formally initiates a major change in our military presence in Korea. I will need to go over again with the Koreans the dimensions of our withdrawal of ground combat forces, assure them publicly of our commitment to their security, and assuage their concerns regarding the timing of our withdrawal and its impact on deterrence. The Koreans will also want some indication of the tangible measures we will take to help them improve their forces and better insure continued deterrence on the peninsula. It is imperative that this meeting demonstrate to Asia and to the world US/ROK agreement on carrying out our withdrawal program. I will also touch on -- and only with President Park -- the relationship between human rights in Korea and our ability to maintain support in Congress and in the public for our Korean efforts. I need your guidance on a number of issues. (Security assistance is being handled in a separate memorandum from the Secretary of State and myself.)

Decisions

1. Troop Withdrawal. On accepting our overall force withdrawal schedule, President Park stressed the need to keep two brigades in the 2d Infantry Division structure until the last withdrawal. Park believed this was of the highest psychological importance. He accepted that the two brigades would be below their authorized strength and that we would not change the present withdrawal numbers (6,000 in the first phase, 9,000 in the second). To make retention of a second brigade more attractive to us, Park indicated that as long as the bulk of the division remained (i.e., the division headquarters and two brigade headquarters), the US commander would maintain operational control (OPCON) over South Korean forces. You have approved in principle Park's request and to this end allowed for 7,000 combat spaces to be held for the final withdrawal. You asked that we withhold telling him that for the moment. I think my visit is a

Classified by Sec Def  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3  
DECLASSIFY ON Upon Notification by Originator

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 12/10/99 DDI HV RE ALLC-96-49  
BY J NARS DATE 2/10/99

critical point for Park, and I believe it is essential that I be allowed to transmit to him in Seoul your agreement to his request. He expects an answer. Unless I communicate to him your favorable response, we will have major difficulties over the establishment of adequate command arrangements and the atmosphere for discussion of other thorny issues will be seriously damaged.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_


Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_


2. Combined Command and OPCON. President Park's willingness to let the US keep OPCON over ROK forces as long as we maintain the 2d Division Headquarters and two brigades gives us what we want on command arrangements. Park also agreed to early negotiations at the military staff level on creating a new command structure -- a US-ROK combined staff -- which would come into existence by the time the first US ground forces are withdrawn in 1978. It was also agreed that this combined structure would be in addition to the present UN Command, which we would maintain until suitable arrangements are made to continue the Armistice Agreement or to replace it with mutually acceptable peacekeeping arrangements on the peninsula.

We have begun work on establishing the combined command with the Koreans and have reached some general conclusions on the structure. It would be commanded by an American with a Korean as deputy. The target date for its inception would be October 1, 1978. The major problem to work out is what US forces, if any, are to be assigned in peacetime to the combined command. We have to be careful on this score. I propose to review with the Koreans, concur in the terms of reference (TAB A), and encourage the Koreans to continue developing with us the details of the command's organization and functions. I will at this time make no commitments on inclusion of any US forces. We will also begin consultations with the Congress on this subject and the scope of the proposed bilateral agreement that will establish this combined command.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_





Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. Other Supplementary Measures to Shore Up Withdrawal. While primary Korean attention will be focused on the transfer of equipment from the 2d Division and sales of hardware under the Foreign Military Sales Program, I believe that some supplementary measures to demonstrate our commitment, and our capabilities to carry out our commitment, would be useful. These other measures, outlined briefly below, would be designed to serve as a warning to North Korea and provide reassurances to the South Koreans on our capability and willingness to employ military forces on their behalf. I propose to tell the ROK that we will be taking these measures over time.

- Improved Air Force Posture In Korea. The ROK has proposed that we double our tactical air presence to reinforce deterrence. I do not believe that is necessary. I propose rather to increase at an appropriate time the USAF tactical fighter strength in Korea from 60 to 72 aircraft (72 aircraft is equivalent to one full wing) with the planes to come from CONUS. The costs of this move would be modest -- some \$7 million. I will also propose to the Koreans that they undertake a program to upgrade facilities at those air bases designated to receive these and potential US augmentation forces.

I will also inform the Koreans that the E-3A AWACS aircraft, which will be deployed to Okinawa in 1980, will be available to respond quickly to any emergency in Korea and to exercise under the combined command.

- Exercises and Deployments. As a demonstration to both Korea and to Japan of US commitment to the security of South Korea, I propose to upgrade and increase our military exercises in the area. Temporary deployments of US ground, naval and air and mobility assets will be gradually increased in size, frequency and duration concomitant with US ground force withdrawals. Costs of these increased exercise deployments will require specific budgetary support from the Administration and the Congress for the service budgets. To gain the maximum impact from this increased exercise program, we propose to increase public affairs coverage of each military exercise in the Korean area. Carefully orchestrated publicity will help reassure our Northeast Asian allies while simultaneously contributing a measure of deterrence to North Korea. New training exercises will be coordinated with State and NSC.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

4

5. US Arms Transfer Policy. President Park and other senior ROKG officials are upset about Korea's exclusion from the list of close allies having a special relationship in terms of our arms transfer policy. President Park asked that his personal concern be conveyed to you on this.

I would not recommend attempting to include the ROKG in our overall arms transfer policy on the same terms as our NATO, Japan and ANZUS partners. I will reiterate to the ROK that we will sympathetically consider legitimate Korean defense needs. I believe, however, we have to come up with forthcoming language in my joint communique which indicates that under our existing policy ROK needs, with regard to procurement of military equipment, will be met. Given your wish to encourage development of appropriate ROK defense industries, including co-production, I would also include some favorable, although carefully couched, language on this score.

Cy Vance concurs with this memo.



Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT.

SUBJECT: New Security Assistance Program  
for South Korea

You have indicated that as an integral part of our withdrawal of ground combat troops from the Republic of Korea (ROK) we will assist the ROK in improving its defense capabilities, in particular that we would offset the deficiencies arising from the withdrawal. This memorandum, which has been prepared jointly by State and Defense presents a number of proposals on an assistance package for your decision.

A special task force has completed a preliminary but detailed, examination of Korean force requirements and how they should be financed. Their report will be refined through consultations with Korean defense authorities. On the basis of the work to date we recommend your approval of a special Korean security package of about \$800 million. The package would have two components -- U.S. Army equipment turned over cost free to the ROK as ground forces depart, and a one-time additional FMS credit financing\* for the purchase of critically required ground force equipment. In addition we should continue to provide annually \$275 million in FMS credit financing to support ROK force improvement efforts through FY 1981. We believe such an assistance package is militarily essential, of significant economic help to the ROK, big enough to assuage but not satisfy Korean concerns, and modest enough to make it past Congressional critics.

\*Purchases using FMS credit financing would be subject to review both the Executive Branch and the Congress. Repayment is at going rates of interest to the USG.

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We request your guidance on both the overall amounts and on some specific issues in order that Harold Brown can carry on more detailed consultations at the annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul in late July. We also need further consultations with the Congress.

### Background

Korea - During their consultations with the Koreans in May, George Brown and Phil Habib, while stressing the need for Congressional approval, told Park, as you authorized, that in addition to our continuing support for FMS credits of Korean force modernization, we are studying measures to meet requirements generated by ground force withdrawals, possibly by a mix of increased FMS credit financing and the transfer of some equipment from the departing ground forces. No figures were cited.

In accepting the prospect of withdrawal, President Park said that both sides must use the period of troop withdrawal to strengthen Korea's military self-sufficiency and develop Korean ground force capability to deter North Korea without the involvement of U.S. ground combat forces. It is certain that the Koreans see their needs, and what they would like to obtain from us cost free as far larger than what we are prepared to provide. Their list of requirements is inflated and reflects negotiating tactics as well as Korean expectations, based on past experience, that Congress will progressively reduce planned assistance.

The package that Harold Brown presents to the Koreans will be crucial to the credibility of our ground forces withdrawal program, not only in the eyes of the Koreans, the Japanese, and others in Asia, but also to many in the Congress and the U.S. public. While the Koreans can and will assume the cost of the great bulk of their future force improvement, they see our withdrawal as posing unexpected priority needs and accelerating their schedule for achieving self-reliance. They will look to us to be forthcoming in making up for their military deficiencies.

SECRET

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Congress - The concern in Congress over the decision to withdraw ground combat troops may or may not translate into any solid support for additional security assistance to South Korea. At this point therefore any security assistance package submitted will require a significant lobbying effort on our part including your personal involvement. Both a transfer of Army equipment cost-free to the ROK and increased FMS will require legislative action. Congressional authorization of some transfer of equipment may perhaps be easier to obtain than more FMS credits though much depends on the specific equipment and sums involved. Although Congressional views can easily change, our present belief is that we are more likely to be successful in obtaining approval for a one-time package this year emphasizing the need to compensate for the ground force withdrawal, rather than seeking additional security assistance over a period of several years in the annual appropriation process.

#### The Program

Our proposed program was developed from an examination of the North Korean threat, ROK military requirements, and ROK plans for improving their forces. Overall ROK requirements will be substantial over the next five years--some \$7-8 billion in foreign exchange costs. We believe the focus of the force improvement should be on increasing ROK firepower and mobility with quantitative and qualitative improvements in artillery, air defense, anti-tank capabilities, tank modernization, command and control, and tactical aircraft.

The planned U.S. ground combat force withdrawal requires adjustments by the U.S. and ROK. The first and most apparent adjustment involves replacement of the war-fighting capability provided by the withdrawn U.S. combat forces. For the most part, this can be achieved by transfer of selected U.S. Army equipment to the ROK Army and the qualitative upgrading of specific ROK Army capabilities, equipment, and training. But the U.S. ground combat force withdrawal



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also means that we should help the ROK prudently reduce longstanding vulnerabilities in their armed forces to minimize any loss in deterrence resulting from our withdrawals.

In the two decades since the armistice, Korea has built a thriving economy. Despite its impressive growth, the ROK economy remains vulnerable to external developments. Continued Korean growth depends upon the availability of international development capital which is, in turn, heavily dependent on confidence in continued U.S. military support. Another factor is that the required acceleration in defense spending will necessitate reallocation of some foreign exchange resources, which could adversely affect the level of economic growth. The Koreans have demonstrated their willingness to pay for their own defense and have increased their defense spending each year since 1974. The great bulk of ROK military improvements will continue to be financed by the ROK, but some U.S. financial support is essential because commercial lenders are unwilling to finance major military procurement totally without USG support. FMS credits, therefore, play an especially important role in ROK force modernization.

While the proposed security assistance package is thus based on valid military considerations, in the end it also reflects a fundamental political need to demonstrate our intent both to South Korea and the watching world that we will leave the Koreans in good military shape as we move out our ground forces.

1. Transfer of Ground Equipment - How much of the \$2 billion in Army equipment should we turn over to the ROK? The four options below are reasonable military packages totalling \$800 million. Any decision must take into account the fact that we plan to keep the division in the force structure, that its assets are not excess, and that the costs of reequipping the division to replace significant amounts of equipment given away could accelerate efforts to demobilize the division. The value of the transfer portion of these

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options is stated using replacement costs, i.e., what we will have to request from Congress in order to reequip the Second Division. We have also supplied a second figure, which is the current value, i.e., the replacement cost adjusted for the remaining useful life of the equipment less transportation costs to the U.S. This latter figure better represents the value of each option to the Koreans.

Option A - transfers to the ROK a sizeable portion of the equipment most needed to fill their basic requirements. This would include two improved HAWK air defense missile battalions, an HONEST JOHN surface-to-surface missile battalion, 90 utility helicopters, 125 TOW anti-tank launchers, field artillery and various other items of equipment. This option is valued at \$200 million in replacement costs (\$160 million at current value) and minimizes the adverse effect on our Army's readiness. In addition, Harold Brown would tell the Koreans that more items might be transferred to them following a further review, and that if we could not transfer more equipment we would attempt to insure the availability of new equipment for purchase by the ROK. The final decisions on the equipment would be made over the next month as we consider where and how the Second Division is to be reconstituted. If the turnover figure were to remain at the \$200 million level, Secretary Brown would tell the Koreans that we would ask Congress for an additional one-time FMS credit financing of \$600 million subject to annual appropriations.

The Koreans would regard this proposal as very unsatisfactory. They already know that some of the equipment has long been planned to be transferred, although not cost free. They would be disturbed and concerned that the transfer did not meet their expectations for greater firepower and mobility. This option would also force them to rely more on FMS credits with uncertain prospects of Congressional approval, although they would be getting newer equipment. For us the option emphasizes FMS credits, which eventually get paid back with interest.

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Option B - would transfer all items in Option A plus two engineer construction battalions, and a significant amount of additional weapons and equipment. This option would meet more ROK Army requirements on a direct transfer basis with modest effects on U.S. Army combat readiness. The ROK would be much more satisfied with this option, but would be deeply disturbed, as in Option A, that M-60 tanks, APCs, and CH-47 helicopters were not included. The no-cost transfer portion would be \$400 million in replacement terms (\$306 million in actual value) and an additional \$400 million in FMS credits. Some further flexibility might be found in the equipment component over time. Both State and Defense support this option as the best balanced one in terms of Korean needs and U.S. interests.

Option C - would provide all the equipment in the first two options plus CH-47 helicopters (NOTE: and/or AH-1G or UH-1H helicopters), APCs, and 58 M-60 tanks (half of those in the ROK). The total cost would be about \$600 million in replacement value (some \$415 million in actual value). This transfer would diminish the U.S. Army's overall readiness and increase the costs of reequipping the units being withdrawn. However, it should meet most of the expectations of the ROK. This option would provide \$200 million of FMS credits. As in Option B, some adjustment in the amount of equipment to be transferred is also possible.

Option D - would transfer all the equipment in the first three options plus more helicopters, APCs, M-60 tanks, and other equipment. The total cost would be about \$800 million in replacement value (some \$615 million in current value). This option could strain ROK absorptive capabilities, and in the case of M-60 tanks, would complicate their inventories and aggravate logistics problems. It would also affect the U.S. Army's overall readiness and increase the costs of reequipping the units being withdrawn. However it should meet most of the desires

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of the ROK, who in any event will fight hard to retain the APCs and the tanks. This option also has the advantage of not requiring an additional FMS add-on. It would be the option of greatest financial cost to the U.S.

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>
I. Total Package		
- \$800 Million	_____	_____
- More	_____	_____
- Less	_____	_____
II. Package Components		
-Option A(200-600)	_____	_____
-Option B(400-400)	_____	_____
-Option C(600-200)	_____	_____
-Option D(800- 0 )	_____	_____

2. FMS Credit Financing - We have made no commitment to the Koreans to support their Force Improvement Program. We have, however, told them we consider it a good plan and that we will do our best to maintain substantial levels of FMS credits for general force modernization. In addition to the one-time FMS credit in the special Korean package we also recommend that Harold Brown tell the Koreans that we will continue to seek Congressional support in FY 79-81 for the continuation of the FY 1978 level of \$275 million in FMS credits. The Koreans expect this and it is important to their continued force modernization. We will emphasize that this is not a commitment on this score and the Koreans realize it may be reduced by Congressional action.

If you agree to these recommendations, U.S. funding for Korean defense programs in FY 78-81 will total \$1.9 billion and look like one of the following:

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FY 1978-81:

Transfer Option	Cost Free Transfer	FMS Financing	Annual FMS Credit	TOTAL
A	\$ 200 M	\$ 600 M)	)	)
B	\$ 400 M	\$ 400 M)	)	)
C	\$ 600 M	\$ 200 M)	\$ 1100 M*	) \$1.9B
D	\$ 800 M	\$ 0	)	)

\*4 years at \$275 M each.

The cost of these options in new obligational authority, however, would be 10 percent of the amount of guaranteed credits or only \$110-170 million and the actual cost will be zero if Korea maintains her past history of no default. Of course we would seek additional appropriations in the DOD budget to replace the Second Division equipment transferred to the ROK. Obviously within the \$800 million package, the proportions could have numerous variations and not just the four we indicated.

3. Credit Terms - The terms offered under an FMS loan normally provide for a repayment period of 5-8 years (the legal maximum is 12 years). As an indication of our responsiveness to Korean needs and to reduce the impact on the ROK debt structure it would be helpful to be able to "sweeten" our negotiations, if desirable at the time, with an easing of financing terms on any FMS credit in the special ROK assistance package of \$800 million. We propose that the repayment period be extended to ten years but at the same time make it clear that extended credit terms would not apply to annual FMS credits. On Option B--a one-time FMS credit of \$400 million--this would reduce Korea's loan repayments annually by some \$13 million. We recommend that Harold Brown be authorized to use this sweetener at his discretion in his discussions with the ROK.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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4. Excess Defense Articles - The ROK is no longer eligible to receive cost-free military equipment excess to U.S. needs. Depending on what becomes available as excess, renewed ROK eligibility to receive such equipment would help conserve some of the ROK's FMS credits. We recommend that any legislation we request include provisions to allow the ROK to receive cost-free transfer of excess military equipment for two years. The amount of equipment is not likely to be very large, perhaps some \$10-20 million. However, as with the case of the financing terms, we propose that this be another "sweetener" and that Harold Brown be authorized to tell the Koreans at his discretion we propose to ask for legislative permission.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

5. War Reserve Munitions - One issue which requires special consideration is the proper relationship between South Korean purchases of war reserve munitions (WRM) and DOD appropriations for War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA). There is little doubt that stockpiles in Korea--either ROK- or U.S.-owned--are still inadequate and need to be increased to provide a safe level of stocks for an emergency until resupply from the U.S. can begin. The Koreans will certainly be emphasizing the importance of WRM. But "how much" and "who pays" needs further study. Harold Brown will be looking further into requirements and how they should be financed. He will indicate to the Koreans that any requirements should be satisfied by joint U.S.-ROK efforts, but that further study of requirements is needed. We plan, however, to keep WRM separate from our special Korean package and present it to Congress on a regular annual basis. We also plan to continue to maintain ownership of WRSA and not turn the stocks over to the ROK since they provide us an additional form of leverage. Rather we will plan for the rapid turnover of WRSA in an emergency. The Koreans will be unhappy with our unwillingness to further increase stockpiles, but, if we do so, the potential complications on the Hill for our special aid package could be very great.

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6. ROK Defense Industries - As you directed, we will support ROK efforts to improve the quality of production in their defense industries by providing technical assistance to solve production problems, guidance in developing production concepts, and training for key personnel. The level of technology transferred should be closely controlled to make certain that we are meeting legitimate ROK requirements only, that defense industry development does not result in an undue drain on Korean finances and manpower, and that we not contribute to any undesirable ROK weapons development. Harold Brown will express our sympathetic support and indicate that we will help on a number of projects, notably artillery and ammunition production efforts. One project we will need to examine closely will be the production of an indigenous tank, something President Park is devoted to.

7. Arms Transfer Policy - We will need decisions over the next year regarding some arms transfers to Korea. Included are items which involve co-production, transfer of advanced technology and equipment, and weapons which would be new to the region. As you know, General Brown and Under Secretary Habib told President Park that within the context of your arms transfer policy, we would consider sympathetically appropriate support for Korea's defense needs for equipment and technology. The decisions on technology transfer and co-production would be made on a case-by-case basis. All the items are imperative in meeting your criteria of helping countries who must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance.

There are at least three specific important cases that the Koreans will bring up with Harold Brown-- purchases of the F-16 and Improved Chaparral, and co-production of the Vulcan anti-aircraft gun. The F-16 will be needed eventually to replace F-5s and ancient F-86s; the Vulcan and Improved Chaparral are necessary to remedy serious ROK low level air

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defense deficiencies. The Koreans may also bring up the A-10 as an additional item. We have some problems with this, and would have to consider it later. On the other hand, in the cases of the F-16 and Improved Chaparral Harold would express our sympathetic support (an approval in principle) although with regard to F-16's he would also indicate that we need a closer look at when and how the ROK should buy them. We propose to release the technical data for the F-16 and Improved Chaparral, and would like Harold to be able to transmit approval for the co-production of the Vulcan.

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>
F-16	_____	_____
Improved Chaparral	_____	_____
Vulcan Co-production	_____	_____

Legislative Strategy

If you approve this program we will request authorization from the foreign relations committees for the cost-free transfer of equipment. We will need to consult closely with the armed services committees.

We will also ask this year for a special authorization for the one-time FMS credit financing. It will not be possible this year to obtain the necessary appropriations. We would plan to submit both requests after the August recess and no later than September 15. We will at some point have to ask both armed services and appropriations committees for funds to reequip the Second Division but sufficiently in advance so that replacement items can be obtained concurrently with the transfer.

It is very important to involve Congress in the review of the Korea program rather than presenting the program to the legislators in the form of a fait accompli. Present ambivalence about the program




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of phased withdrawal has so far been largely prompted by: (1) uncertainty about the specifics of the program; and (2) a feeling in Congress that the Administration has failed to adequately consult Congress on a national security policy of major significance.

Once you indicate your decisions on this package we plan to consult widely in Congress before Harold Brown departs for Korea and after he returns. We would tell Congress now what we have in mind in general terms, working out our full presentation, including the desire to continue \$275 million of FMS for FY 79-81, after we have consulted with the Koreans and evaluated Congress's first reactions.

  
Cyrus Vance

  
Harold Brown

13 JUL 1977

FOR RELEASE AT CONCLUSION OF BRIEFING

JULY 18, 1977

Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

The following letter was sent today by the President to Senator Howard Baker and Congressman John Rhodes in response to their letter to him of June 10, 1977:

To Senator Howard Baker  
(To Congressman John Rhodes)

I have reviewed your letter to me dated June 10, 1977, recommending on behalf of Republican Congressional leaders that a special prosecutor be appointed to investigate allegations of "... the Korean Central Intelligence Agency's involvement in domestic American politics." After discussions with Attorney General Bell and others, I have decided that appointment of a special prosecutor would be inappropriate and unwarranted, and would probably impede the investigation.

Your letter does not contain any specific information indicating that the Justice Department cannot conduct this investigation adequately. I assure you that any implication that the investigation has not been thorough and impartial is not well founded. I have been advised by Attorney General Bell that, in accordance with sound investigative procedures, the day-to-day conduct of the investigation is in the hands of experienced prosecutors, joined by career investigators of the F.B.I., the I.R.S. and other agencies. In addition, there continues to be active participation by a Federal Grand Jury, which has been meeting twice a week to hear testimony in this matter.

I am also advised by the Attorney General that the investigation is exceedingly thorough. To date, several hundred persons have been questioned, many repeatedly, and more than fifty witnesses have testified before the Grand Jury. Financial and other records, amounting to many thousands of individual documents, have been obtained, usually by grand jury subpoenas, from more than one hundred different sources. I am told that substantial progress is being made.

MORE

-2-

Your letter suggests that appointment of a special prosecutor is warranted because the controversy "is developing into a pattern of accusation by innuendo and trial by leak." You do not cite any facts to support the notion that media coverage of the matters under investigation has been based on leaks from the Justice Department.


In fact, I am advised by Judge Bell that many of the specific assertions in the press are entirely incorrect; some are unsupported by, and others are directly contrary to, the evidence and information obtained by the Justice Department.

I also believe there is a serious danger that appointment of a special prosecutor at this time would impede the investigation. The investigation has progressed to the point where potential prosecutions have been identified and, in several cases, the evidence-gathering process is nearly completed. The record thus far encompasses thousands of pages concerning hundreds of separate matters which occurred over a period of more than five years. Substitution of new personnel who would be entirely unfamiliar with this material would bring the investigation to a standstill for a number of months.

Finally, no suggestion has been made that members of the present Administration were in any way involved in the alleged illegal activities so as to raise a possible need for extraordinary measures in this investigation. As you know, the activities in question took place before this Administration took office. Furthermore, they involved individuals from both political parties. Attorney General Bell is advised continuously of the progress of the investigation, which is under the direct supervision of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.

I appreciate your concerns in this matter, and thank you for your letter. I am satisfied that the investigation is proceeding in a vigorous and impartial manner, and I therefore have determined that appointment of a special prosecutor is neither warranted nor advisable.

Sincerely,



# # #

**Telegram 066678 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US Helicopter Incident on July 14, 19 July 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114874>.]*

TELEGRAM 066678

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: US helicopter incident on July 14

Date: July 19, 1977

Classification: Secret

Diplomatic circles in Pyongyang discuss at length the calm and highly balanced manner in which North Korean media has covered the incident on July 14 in the area of the Military Demarcation Line – the incursion of a US military helicopter in the DPRK's airspace – as well as the reserved nature of the Armistice Committee's discussions in Panmunjeom, and especially the rational and constructive way of resolving the incident.

The North Korean press objectively presented the facts, without any comments against the US.

During discussions with Ambassador Dumitru Popa and Victor Nanu respectively, the Ambassadors of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Pyongyang noted that the calm and extremely balanced attitude of the Korean government regarding the aforementioned incident reflects, among others, the DPRK's efforts of creating favorable conditions for initiating dialogue with the US.

The DPRK's attitude vis-à-vis the July 14 incident is also considered significant in view of US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's forthcoming visit to Beijing and the potential contacts between the American delegation and North Korean officials.

It is particularly notable that, in comparison to other incidents, military maneuvers etc. along the Military Demarcation Line, on July 14, North Korean authorities were, for the first time, calm, compliant and understanding. Evidently, this is partly due to the fact that the US assumed responsibility for the incident.

We consider this to be a step further towards establishing favorable conditions for initiating a dialogue to solve the Korean question.

Signed: Dumitru Popa

**Letter from Jimmy Carter to Park Chung Hee, 21 July 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of: President Park Chung Hee, 2/77-12/78, Box 12, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski's President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files (NSA 3), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus; Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 21-23, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

July 21, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the important discussions which will take place at the 10th US-Korea Security Consultative Meeting, I want to convey to you personally the United States Government's position on our ground force withdrawal plans and our security commitment to the Republic of Korea.

I wish to emphasize strongly that our ground force withdrawal plans signify no change whatsoever in our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. The Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries remains fully in force, and our determination to provide prompt support to help the Republic of Korea defend against armed attack, in accordance with the Treaty, remains firm and undiminished. Neither North Korea nor any other country should have any doubts about the continuing strength of this commitment.

I want to assure you again that our ground force withdrawal, which will take place over a four to five year period, will be carried out gradually and carefully, in a manner which will preserve peace on the Peninsula. As a further step in our bilateral consultations on this matter, Secretary Brown will be discussing our plans in greater detail with you and Minister Suh.

As we repeatedly have made clear, our air force units, military intelligence and logistic support personnel will remain in Korea for the indefinite future. And we will continue our naval deployments in the area.

At the same time, it is our intention to seek from the Congress substantial military assistance for Korea -- in the form of 2nd Division equipment transfers and additional MFS credits so that as our ground troops are withdrawn, the Republic of Korea will be able to assume a greater share of its defense responsibilities.

Mr. President, I know that the Government and people of the Republic of Korea are determined to meet their defense responsibilities and to maintain the outstanding record of growth and progress which your country has already achieved. We for our part are determined to work together with you to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Chung Hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Congressional Reaction to our Korean Policy," 21 July 1977**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of 7-9/77, Box 43, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

[...]

July 21, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI (signature)  
SUBJECT: Congressional Reactions to our Korean Policy

The reaction of Congressional leaders to Harold Brown's Korean briefing this morning was very chilly. Not one Senator or Congressman spoke up in support of the troop withdrawal. Many expressed outright opposition or noted significant misgivings. It is clear that we face an uphill battle on this issue with Congress. Some are still uneasy with the manner in which the decision was made. Others are still waiting for a convincing rationale. There have been a variety of explanations why troop withdrawals are not a bad idea, but no compelling case has been presented as to why it is a good idea.

We heard some of the results this morning. Derwinsky, Tower, Glenn, and Stratton all expressed concerns about the impact of the withdrawals on our reputation as a great power. Case and Humphrey acknowledged misgivings that our withdrawal was not made conditional upon reciprocal moves by North Korea to stabilize the status quo. Don Fraser noted that the policy would save no money, yet would relinquish a source of leverage in relation to internal political reform inside South Korea. Lester Wolf, Clem Zablocki, and others echoed these concerns.

In short, sentiment in favor of troop withdrawal is at best lukewarm and passive. This is bad enough, but worse yet are the indications that it will be very difficult to secure the needed military assistance to upgrade ROK defenses as we withdraw. To withdraw without providing such assistance would be disastrous to our Asian policy and our reputation as a serious world power. Yet support for an aid package is going to be difficult to muster. George Mahon and Chuck Percy both suggested that there could be no less propitious moment to ask for additional aid for Korea. Some, like Fraser, will oppose on human rights grounds. Others because they are against military assistance per se. Still others because they oppose the withdrawal. And many Congressmen may vote against a request to prove to the folks back home that their vote has not been bought. Les Aspin is persuaded that these groups together constitute a majority of the House of Representatives.

One is forced by these considerations to several conclusions:

-- First, in talking to the Koreans next week, Harold Brown will have to pull his punches a bit. He will have to indicate our determination to supply substantial military assistance, but

should leave flexible the mix of equipment transfers and FMS credits. (I believe we will have to emphasize the former, minimize the latter.) And he will need to avoid saying precisely when we will present a request for assistance to the Hill.

-- To secure support for aid, the Administration will have to mount a very major effort involving the expenditure of significant political capital without any certainty that such an effort can succeed on the Hill.

-- Congress considers the presence of U.S. troops essentially in terms of our defense interests, but assesses military assistance in terms of other factors. We say we cannot remove U.S. troops without augmenting ROK military capabilities. Congress buys the proposition, but would prefer to accommodate it by leaving troops there rather than by appropriating a large new assistance package.

-- Finally, all of the above as well as the Korean scandal in Congress, may warrant some adjustment in our withdrawal policy. Such an adjustment could come through a stretchout in the schedules or by making its implementation conditional upon steps by North Korea. We have preserved flexibility for such a contingency by avoiding a fixed date for the completion of withdrawals. We need not fall back now, but I wanted to alert you to the fact that we may have to face these tough choices when Harold Brown comes back from his discussions in Seoul.



DBE 4809 E  
~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: MIKE ARMACOST

FROM: DAVID AARON *DA*

SUBJECT: Talks Between North Korea  
and South Korea

Attached is the President's indication that we should develop a diplomatic strategy to accompany our troop withdrawals. Please develop a scenario and appropriate instruction to the Department of State.

Also indicate the substantive objectives of a negotiation and your recommendations on how we might, within the U. S. Government, develop our negotiating position.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O.12958, Sec.3.6  
PER 6/13/07 NSC/RE HLL-96-48  
BY *Q* NARS DATE 8/5/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

*GA*  
~~SECRET~~

D. Talks Between South Korea and North Korea with or without PRC Participation:

*Let's  
move  
on this*

This has been the missing dimension in our troop withdrawal policy. It would be appropriate soon to initiate talks with South Korea regarding a joint initiative along these lines, or regarding an initiative by the United States, but with South Korean approval. My own view would be to first discuss the subject with South Korea, then to inform and consult both the Chinese and the Russians separately, and on that basis then decide whether we issue a call for tripartite talks (North Korea, South Korea, and the US), or talks which would involve the major powers in the neighborhood, in which case we might consider including Japan as well. A discussion of this subject with South Korea, undertaken without excessive haste or pressure, might help to give the South Koreans the feeling that their concerns are being fully considered and that we are anxious to create a proper international context for the forthcoming military adjustments.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER *9/20/96* *5/16/96* *HYRE* *MB-NLS-96-47*  
BY *[Signature]* NARS DATE *10/17/96*



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Department of Justice

MEETING

OF

THE HONORABLE GRIFFIN B. BELL  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

AND

THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN R. CIVILETTI  
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION

WITH

FRESHMAN AND SOPHOMORE MEMBERS  
OF THE  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

THE KCIA INVESTIGATION

9:00 A.M.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1977  
216B RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

. . . Chairman of the 94th Congress, myself, and the membership would like to welcome you here. The purpose of this is for the Attorney General and the head of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, Mr. Civiletti, to present a briefing on the status of the Korean investigation. They will present the briefing. They will also present to you the ground-rules for this briefing during the course of their presentation.

First, I would like to introduce to you the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Bell.

ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. This will be the largest number of people the Justice Department has ever briefed. We have in the past briefed two of your Committees, Congressman Flynt's Committee and Congressman Fraser's Committee. We have also briefed certain Senators in the Senate and we are glad to be here this morning. You can appreciate the fact that this is an ongoing investigation, so we can't tell everything that we know, but we are going to tell you all we can. I have asked my colleague, Benjamin R. Civiletti, who is the head of the Criminal Division, to give the briefing. Ben is a fine trial lawyer from Baltimore that I persuaded to come down here to Washington and serve his country. I have every confidence in him as a lawyer. He is known all over the United States as a very fine trial lawyer, but more than that, he was a young lawyer, an Assistant United States Attorney in Baltimore. So he is well experienced to have a fine staff working

on this case, people who were working on it before we came, and we have every confidence in them as well. So, I am now calling on Ben Civiletti to give you the briefing.

BENJAMIN CIVILETTI: Good morning. This is a little unusual for a prosecutor to be speaking to a live assembly, Congressmen, members of the press, about a pending investigation because our business, as you all appreciate and know, is to speak in court in prosecuting the case, and frequently, it is essential that an investigation be kept confidential and secure through the investigative stage, the grand jury stage, and that the persons who are accused, who are such persons winding up as defendants in a case, get their opportunity for fair trial on the merits, a full discussion of the evidence in court. That is our system, and that is the way we operate. But it is important in this instance, I think, to address some of the things that we believe we can address, to inform members of the Congress about the investigation, a little historical perspective with regard to it, and to preserve the best we can that information which would be prejudicial or which would impede the investigation and be unfair and improper to disclose.

First, let me explain and make clear what I will not and cannot speak to at this meeting. I cannot and will not speak to the grand jury testimony or documents which are, of course, secret and have traditionally been so, specifically provided for in Rule 6 (e) of the Federal Rules. I will not speak to the details of any particular case or prospective case which would be terribly

prejudicial and unfair. I will not speak to the numbers -- whether you record numbers as subjects or targets -- because that is really meaningless in an investigation. And the Justice Department, to my knowledge, has never spoken in terms of numbers be they numbers of three or five or seven or twenty-five, or any other numbers. And lastly, specifically, I won't speak, of course, of the merits of particular cases, or the merits of particular issues because this is not the forum to do so in regard to the investigation. And lastly, in a subject which, or a category, which makes, despite our desires, makes responsiveness to questions difficult for us, I think good for you to pose, but extremely difficult for us extemporaneously to try and attempt to answer and that category is I will try not to and at the same time give a full discussion to the issues I will cover. I will try not to address any other matter which affords a significant risk of either impeding the investigation or jeopardizing potential prosecutions which we have. Therefore, the concern which I am voicing is not to the fairness and propriety and pertinency of any questions you may ask, but rather it is to my ability and our ability extemporaneously to quickly respond and avoid unintentionally a risk to the prosecution impeding the ongoing investigation, closing out through a casual response an avenue which we are exploring.

With that unpleasant kind of task out of the way, I would like to turn to those subjects which I will address. And they are four, roughly, in category. One is the Justice Department's role and focus in historical perspective of when we started the

investigation, where we have gone, and what we are doing, our efforts in some detail, problems that we have encountered, some reference to the progress we have made, and our commitment to the task.

First of all, as most of you know, and certainly those of you who are lawyers readily perceive, our task is a -- in focus -- is a narrow one. It is to investigate and obtain any and all evidence which gives rise to probable cause to believe that a criminal violation has occurred, to thoroughly present that evidence to the proper charging panel, in this instance, a grand jury, and to seek indictments for those who may be guilty, and not seek in any other way to spread from our point of view, which is prosecution, evidence about in any other manner. Furthermore, after the indictment is returned, if there are indictments, then it is our duty to preserve the evidence, its security, and to prosecute with all the vigor that we have.

Our focus in this investigation, naturally, is on those most likely criminal violations, or that conduct which most likely would give rise to criminal violations, without restricting in our thoughts and our evidentiary review, our exploration of sources of information ourselves to particular crimes or particular potential crimes. Readily, it comes to mind that we are concerned with the Federal Election laws and violations of those laws, with the bribery statutes and the violations of bribery statutes, with income tax violations, and with potential fraud cases. So we review and sift, and pursue the evidence with those

things primarily in mind, but we look for hard evidence, not with ideal cases, but for facts, for documents, for testimony, which will yield proof -- evidence admissible before a grand jury, admissible in court on which to make sound judgments and on which to take responsible actions. The investigation began in July of 19 -- the Justice Department investigation began in July of 1976 -- that is about one year ago today. It began with some vague allegations or assertions, as is in the case with many investigations -- it began, I guess -- out of revelations in the press. And it was pursued from July of 1976 through about October of 1976, in a very preliminary and foundational way. During that time, there was about a half of an attorney's time involved in the investigation, with the assistance of FBI agents for those months. In September -- October -- one attorney full time. The grand jury began its sessions in a preliminary way in late September of 1976. The staff was increased in December of 1976 to about three attorneys full time. January - February, of 1975 (sic), the staff was increased to five full-time attorneys -- I mean 1977, I'm sorry, beg your pardon. In 1977, the January-February period, the staff was increased to five full time attorneys, and in March of 1977, we increased the investigative staff by having a full complement of IRS agents who have been working full time on the case approximately twelve. The FBI staff was increased to approximately, full time, on a regular basis, approximately the same number -- twelve. But each of them having the resources within their respective agencies when required, to go back and seek, and have additional personnel. Now in an



investigation, more is not always better. More is not always better. And sometimes, in some instances, less is more. We have a standing rule with this investigation -- which the Attorney General instructed me on when I was sworn in on March 10th, and that is, whatever you need, you will get -- that is with regard to investigators, with regard to attorneys, with regard to paralegals, and I have passed that rule down to Tom Henderson who is the head of the Public Integrity Section and Paul Michel who is the chief attorney directly involved day in and day out on the case. We have been working at that pace since March of 1977 with that full complement of IRS agents and with full time staff attorneys. Mr. Allen Mayer, who is the head of the FBI -- supervisor of the FBI staff, and Mr. Jack Price who is head of the IRS contingent.

On August 1, beginning, I think, next Monday, we add an additional full time lawyer, a prosecutor, with extensive experience. He is needed at this time because we are that stage of the investigation where his contribution and assistance will be valuable to us.

Now, as to what we have been doing -- what we have been doing --with that staff and with those lawyers and investigators -- what have they been doing? We have interviewed and reinterviewed approximately 500 people -- from all walks of life, of all professions, in public office and out of public office, wherever the leads have taken us. Our motto is in a simple sense, to explore every reasonable lead and trace it down to see if it produces evidence or leads to evidence from which we can properly carry

out the task of prosecuting those, if any, who have violated the law and ending the investigation. Our standard has been expedite, but at the same time, do not rush in any haste to avoid, overlook, or fail to uncover those facts or any evidence or source which will yield probative evidence.

More than 60 persons have been called to testify before the grand jury, which, as I say, began its first sessions in the end of September -- first of October. And naturally, it began on a once-a-week basis, once every two weeks, as the evidence was produced. Its pace has increased, and it is now meeting and has been meeting for several months on an average of twice a week.

In addition to that, we have reviewed and collated and examined tens of thousands of documents, including bank records which have been obtained, records which have been unidentified as to foundation in some instances, and records from all different sources and kinds. As a general proposition based on that available information and evidence which we have, I would say roughly that we have exhausted maybe eighty per cent of that which is available. We have another twenty per cent to go. That is my rough estimate. That could change, because the nature of disclosures could change, the natures of information could increase, and therefore, our efforts would have to match that prospect.

I would like to move to problems and progress next. In the crimes that we have been investigating or in which there

have been in focus, or potential crimes, they are not -- it is obvious to say -- areas in which there is readily available documented proof, memorandum, and observations of people on the street as to the commission of these types of activities, if they were indeed committed. In addition, interwoven with evidence from here and there, is an enormous amount of legitimate conduct not amounting to criminal activity of any kind or nature, but which involves Korea and which involves interest in Korea and has to be a sifting of that conduct -- legitimate in the sense of non-criminal -- which is our goal and our function and our focus -- from that which gives rise to a prospect or potential of criminal violation. Our focus and direction, although perhaps parallel and in some ways consistent with House Committees with duties in this same area, in our judgment, is substantially different because we deal with criminal violations with the duty to prosecute whereas standards, appropriate conduct, measures, are not within our ambit, are not within our focus, and are more properly, and are being carried on and attended to by those forums or bodies which have that broad-based mandate and purpose.

Let me continue with problems. One of the obvious, clear problems is Tongsun Park. He is not here, and, therefore, he is not before the grand jury, and at the present time he is not available for the lengthy kind of questioning, the precision kind of questioning, the reviews of documents and the examinations which we would love to do. And securing the evidence, if it exists, which would permit prosecutions or the conclusion of the investigation

in substantial part without prosecutions, but with the full, complete exploration, public disclosure by the appropriate House Committees of every detail which they think it's important for the American people to know.

He was here and he is not here now. We interviewed Tongsun Park before he left. We obtained documents from him. But that was in the early stage of the investigation. Before we were into the 500 witness reviews, before we had all the documents we now have, before we had five full time attorneys working on the case, two teams of IRS and FBI agents, and he left with the assertion that he was going on a business trip, he would be back in two weeks. And contrary to that, he was expelled allegedly from Korea and sought haven in London. At the time of the interviews, and since that time, he has, without subject to detailed examination, of course, but he has made statements denying payments, denying any illegal activities. And, of course, it is insufficient, merely, to interview a witness or reinterview a witness unless you have the ability to obtain the truth from the witness. I have every reason to expect that he or she is telling the truth, and you have the means available with some hope of success of obtaining the truth. Extradition. Why not extradite him? Naturally, we have considered that and pursued it. In order to extradite, you have to have evidence of a chargeable crime subject to the extradition treaty. If we had that evidence, there would be an indictment today and we would have extradition proceedings begun. Letters rogatory or other procedures available.

Letters rogatory for those of you whom aren't lawyers -- are a written process, time consuming, subject to challenge, subject to litigation, and Tongsun Park is represented by competent lawyers in the United States and we understand in Europe. And it is a back and forth process that can consume months. In addition to that, since it involves court proceedings, all of the questions which you wish to explore -- and we would have a legion of questions to ask Mr. Park, were he here -- are in written form and unless special precautions are taken, are available to the press and we believe that is a non-productive way. We have considered it, but a very non-productive way to try to obtain from that source the evidence that we feel is necessary.

We have taken other steps, the details of which I will not discuss -- vigorous, at the highest levels, forcefully, continuously, and we are not about to give up. We have some prospect from time to time which ebbs and flows, depending on the information to some extent, brightens and dims, but we still have vigorous pursuit and high hopes. But it is not enough simply to be able to say interview or talk with Mr. Park or others. We have to have the ability to examine carefully and completely, and we have to have -- and convince ourselves from all else that we know that what we are being told is not a simple denial or refusal or an outlandish statement, but is the truth or comes close to the truth, so that it is useable.

We have worked with and are working with and hope to continue to work with both the Fraser Committee and the Flynt Committee -- the Ethics Committee -- not directly with the

Committees -- that is in sessions with the Committees -- but I mean with their staffs and from time to time meetings with their chief counsels and their chairmen in order to cooperate, in order to produce under the same types of guidelines that I have mentioned to you this morning -- that information that they believe is relevant to their respective inquiries, whether it comes from oral testimony or oral interviews -- or from documents or records, but which at the same time we can feel and believe with conviction that we are following our duties and the compulsions of law on us not to jeopardize prosecutions, not to disclose evidence which prejudices innocent parties, or prejudices the potential defendants before they have their day in court.

We have made progress in that regard. It is not ideal. We have differences of opinion. We have had some disputes. But I think we have developed, at least I have faith in those two counsel with whom I have dealt that they are in good faith, pursuing their efforts -- Mr. Neal's and the Fraser Committee. We have ongoing coordination -- communications with Mr. Michel are frequent and regular. We expect to continue those. We will have continued problems of one kind or another. We hope those would be minor. We hope that resort to judicial forum would be unnecessary. We have prospects to believe that. We have made requests of the Committees for information, for disclosures, which they are giving serious consideration to and we expect them to act responsibly and we hope to act as responsibly as we are capable of doing, at the same time bearing in mind that our focus, our interests,

our directions are divergent, as I mentioned earlier.

With regard to progress -- we have made an enormous amount of progress from where we were in March and February of 1977. As I say, my estimate on present knowledge is eighty per cent of what was to be done is done. We have interviews left to conduct. We have some documents left to obtain. We have focused our primary attention on the major allegations regarding the Korean government's improper or illegal influence of the United States' officials. We have not been diverted by other allegations. As yet, we will come to those perhaps in time, but we feel that is the main thrust and we have to go about our business as promptly and thoroughly as we possibly can. We feel that we are, as to a few cases, in a stage in the investigation in which we are reviewing and analyzing the evidence in relationship to specific chargeable offenses. That is a stage preparatory to grand jury indictment. It is done in every case where you determine whether or not responsibly and competently and under the law you proceed in seeking indictments or the case is so full of holes, so lacking in appropriate evidence, that an indictment is not a responsible course of action.

We are at that stage in a very few cases. We expect in the very near future, by that I mean early Fall, to have a few more cases at the exact same stage. I make no promise, no commitment that there will be X indictments or Y indictments because we have not concluded that crucial, important, and very difficult and serious business on those few cases.

I do promise that we will make every effort for those cases,

as well as the entire investigation, to try as hard as we know with as much imagination as we know and as much resources as we need to conclude the investigation or at least to reach the stage where we can take action or non-action and cooperate as fully as possible with committees of the House so that not only may those who are potentially -- have committed a violation may be prosecuted vigorously, but those people who have been under wrongfully filed or sustained can be, to at least a limited extent -- because criminal prosecution is a limited process, we don't have a finding in criminal prosecutions of no involvement whatsoever -- but it has a cleansing effect to a certain degree where you can make a case or not make a case and prosecute or not prosecute. We need your support. We need your patience, and I hope that you will see fit to give it to us, and permit us to go about the job that we think that we are trying to do as professionally, as responsibly, as sincerely, as can be done.

One final note -- for all the reasons that I have talked about and the efforts that we have made -- these particularly, in the Attorney General since I have sworn to my oath and he to his even trying to be somewhat objective, which is not easy, as you know, we legitimately see no purpose, reason, crying need for a special prosecutor and have said so publicly. We have communicated it to whomever has asked us in that regard. We do not see a conflict. We can't believe that anything more could be done that isn't being done responsibly and in the prosecutor's role as opposed to some other role. The people who have been working on the case



have been working in my judgment vigorously. The agents and investigators have been pursuing it with diligence. We have no interference from anybody of any nature or kind. In fact, we have the opposite. We have full support and the full kind of open mandate to do anything and everything that we can think of that -- which reaches the ends which we think are proper ends for prosecutors and for the criminals and the functions of the Justice Department.

For that reason, we have taken that position and I think it is true today. It was true a month ago, and it will be true a month from now.

I think I have covered all these points. I have spoken extemporaneously with a few notes, and I apologize for the garbled nature of it from time to time, and thank you very much for listening and for your attention.

ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: I want to add only one or two things to which Ben has told you. As Attorney General, I view this as a very serious matter. The whole Korean CIA incident has placed a cloud on the Congress. I don't know of anything that would be more in the public interest than removing that cloud at the earliest possible time. That is the attitude I have. That is the attitude my people have. That is the attitude that the President has. I have talked with the President to keep him advised on this case. He knows that there is a cloud over the Congress. He knows it needs to be removed as promptly as possible. And I want to assure you that that is the direction that we are moving in. It is like

having three investigations going at one time. There will be some people who will be prosecuted, there will be others to be absolved, and there probably be some in the middle that your own committees will want to deal with from the standpoint of ethics and propriety.

But in every Department of Justice activity we have just as high a view to absolve the innocent as we do to prosecute the guilty. We have not lost sight of that. There is nothing at the Justice Department that has a higher priority than this investigation. So we want to cooperate with you and we can't answer questions generally if, based on what Ben has told you today, you have questions and you don't, we will work with the committees or we will work with some small group if you will prepare to name your officers or something like that we will talk with you from time to time. We want to cooperate. We are trying to run an open Department and an open investigation for that matter to the extent that it can be open.

QUESTION: I would like to ask if there is anything with records back to before you took office, as to when this thing came to the attention of the FBI or the United States Attorney's Office back to I believe 1975. Why wasn't any action taken at that time? And why it wasn't started until 1976? Is there anything of record? Is there any memo or anything like that?

ATTORNEY GENERAL BELL: Well, if we get started on questions, we are going to get into deep water, but you can -- let us think

of that question. We will have to take them down. We are having to take them down. And Ben addressed that. He said that it came to the attention of the Department and it started out as a slow-moving investigation.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVILETTI: Let me respond to that one question because it is pertinent and I don't think that, at least in my ability to think quickly, it doesn't involve a deep water area.

But I would hope that you would take the Attorney General's suggestion and if we can have the questions in some more kind of form in which we can answer them more responsibly, it would be better. I addressed that type of suggestion. There are allegations that it came to the attention of public officials in 1975, some in 1972, some even in times between them. And why wasn't something done about it?

That requires, of course, an investigation. You have to find the facts there. We have got it in hand. We have it in the list, but I spoke to that in passing and not being diverted from our primary effort, our primary goal, which is big enough, and that was the activities themselves and not some important, but side effect which would divert us from concentration on that particular effort which is our primary mission, although we will certainly not ignore the possibilities of other collateral activities improper, illegal, occurred with regard to the information first coming to the Justice Department in 1972 or some other official in 1975. It is a matter of priorities.

ANNOUNCER: Ladies and gentlemen, our agreement with the Attorney General, because of the sensitive nature of the prosecution that all of you are aware of was that you would get a full explanation as to what they were doing, bring us up to date, that we would not get into questions, even though some of your questions, clearly, as Mr. Civiletti said, will probably be of a general nature. But once you get into the morassing questions in this kind of a forum, it is just as inappropriate to a prosecution. Attorney General Bell has stated that; Mr. Civiletti has stated that. I think that we have to respect that and so I, at this point, I think we should terminate these proceedings, and I thank you very much for coming.

**Memorandum of Conversation with Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance, Harold Brown, Richard Holbrooke, 30 July 1977**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 123-132.]*

Washington, July 30, 1977, 9:30–11:15 a.m.

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

**PARTICIPANTS**

Jimmy Carter, President of the United States  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Hamilton Jordan, Asst to the President  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC

**SUBJECT**

China Policy

President Carter: The purpose of this meeting is to outline basic strategic considerations in our dealings with China and to exchange views on our China policy. My first question is: “What would the worldwide reaction be to normalization?”

Secretary Vance: It would be positive. The Japanese would accept it. The Southeast Asians would welcome it. The Soviets would not be surprised, and it would strengthen our position with them. It would make them realize that they have to work out something with us. This would be the case as long as we have no arms sales to China. The Middle East would be generally good and accept it. The Saudis are close to Taiwan, but they would accept it; our bilateral relations would not be affected. In Korea, the South Koreans would be ambivalent. In fact, it could mean a more positive future for them, but no doubt they would wonder. The North Koreans, I suspect, would have a mixed reaction.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 47, Presidential 7/30/77 on Cyrus Vance Trip to China: 4–8/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House. Talking points for this meeting that Brzezinski prepared for Carter are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 7/77.

**Telegram 066688 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 July 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114875>.]*

TELEGRAM 066688

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: US – ROK talks

Date: July 30, 1977

Classification: Secret

In a discussion with Ambassador Dumitru Popa on July 28, Vice Premier Heo Dam noted that the recent US-ROK agreements in Seoul triggered discontent and even concern for the North Korean state and party leadership.

The personal letter President Carter addressed to Park Chung Hee also contains "direct attacks against the DPRK."

The result of the recent talks in South Korea between US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Park Chung Hee clearly proves that President Carter is not keeping his campaign promise regarding American troop withdrawal from South Korea. According to the existing agreement on the matter, the withdrawal is to be partial and gradual, concurrent with strengthening the South Korean navy and air force. The ROK is to receive all the equipment and armament of the withdrawn troops.

Heo Dam considers the recent decision to establish a joint US-ROK military command that will replace the current UN command "worrying."

The Korean official mentioned that the North Korean government will shortly publish a document expressing the DPRK's position regarding the recent American-South Korean talks and agreements.

Signed: D. Popa

**Telegram 066691 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 July 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114876>.]*

TELEGRAM 066691

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Date: July 31, 1977

Classification: Secret

Referring to Cyrus Vance's forthcoming visit to Beijing and his possible meetings with North Korean officials, Vice Premier Heo Dam noted during a recent discussion with Ambassador Dumitru Popa that there are currently no favorable conditions for an American-North Korean dialogue. The DPRK government does not plan to contact Cyrus Vance during his visit to Beijing.

Referring to certain allegations according to which the PRC is interested in retaining American troops in South Korea, Heo Dam implied that North Korean officials are not fully aware of their Chinese counterparts' intentions. However, in official talks, the PRC declares to support the DPRK in terms of Korean reunification.

Signed: D. Popa

**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 5 August 1977**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 24-26, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

August 5, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to you for your letter dated July 21, 1977, which was delivered to me on July 25 by Defense Secretary Harold Brown who came to Seoul to participate in the Tenth Annual Republic of Korea-United States Security consultative Meeting. It was thoughtful of you to convey to me personally the United States Government's position on its ground forces withdrawal plans and the United States' commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.

I am pleased to note that you emphasized strongly that United States ground forces withdrawal plans signify no change whatsoever in the United States' firm commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea and that you assured me again that the withdrawal will be carried out gradually and carefully in a manner which will preserve peace on the Korean peninsula.

The Tenth Annual Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting has provided a very useful occasion for our two Governments to make consultations closely with regard to the planned withdrawal of United States ground combat forces and the measures to offset their withdrawal. I am pleased to note that our frank and friendly consultations during the Meeting have resulted in agreements and understandings on a number of points in connection with the matters of our mutual concern and that the development of Korean capabilities, the military balance on the Korean peninsula and other developments affecting peace and security in this region would be the subject of continuing consultations between our two Governments to ensure that the deterrent to north Korean aggression remains strong.

I do wish to stress, however, that, as you might have heard from Secretary Brown, my Government considers that the success of the planned withdrawal will depend upon the effective and speedy implementation of the various compensatory measures that two sides have discussed and agreed upon during the Consultative Meeting in Seoul.

I assure you, Mr. President, that the Republic of Korea will continue to make every possibly [sic] effort to strengthen further the friendly and cooperative relationship happily existing between our two countries, and to work together with the United States in order to lessen tension and consolidate peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.

Please accept my cordial thanks to you for your kind thought for me and deep personal interest in the Korean situation, and you may rest assured that I will maintain close personal communication and cooperation with you in our endeavors for world peace and progress.



Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung He

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 5, 1977

MEMO FOR: Hamilton Jordan  
FROM: Arn Dye  
SUBJECT: South Korea Policy -- Case Study

Short Chronology

- Jan 9 -- Gen. Vessey says GI pullout in Korea would heighten war risk (Washington Post article).
- Jan 26 -- PRM-13 tasker issued.
- Mar 9 -- President announced ground force withdrawal within 4-5 years (from DOD).
- Apr 27 -- PRM-13 addressed by NSC, chaired by President.
- May 4 -- McGovern amendment to State Authorization bill adopted in Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee. The amendment was designed to affirm the President's intention to withdraw ground forces. State congressional liaison worked to soften rigidity of the language and to make the provision more permissive.
- May 16 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the State Department Authorization bill with the modified McGovern amendment.
- May 19 -- Gen. Singlaub's recall.
- May 24 -- Rep. Stratton's House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee held hearings with Maj Gen Singlaub as witness.
- June 10 -- Back from their trip to Korea, Philip Habib and General Brown met with the President and testified before the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the Senate Committee they were confronted with a staff report of a CIA briefing which was allegedly more pessimistic about North Korea than assessments used in the PRM.
- June 15 -- Senate Foreign Relations Committee was told could not have access to the intelligence estimate used in the PRM. This decision reversed later in the day.
- June 16 -- In Senate floor debate on the State Authorization bill, Baker and Dole led an effort to strike the McGovern language thereby repudiating Administration policy. Majority Leader Byrd headed off these efforts and supplied modified amendment which basically stated that Korean policy should continue to be arrived at by joint decision with Congress; required an annual report; and contained language on the need to consider the security conditions during the withdrawal process.

- June 23 -- In floor debate on the Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill, the House avoided a record vote on Rep. Harkin's amendment to reduce foreign military sales funds for Korea on human rights grounds. In opposing Harkin during the debate, Rep. Stratton referred to pessimistic CIA reports unearthed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Majority Leader Wright also effectively opposed Harkin during debate by defending Administration policy. The amendment was defeated in a division vote of 59-29.
- June 24 -- Gen. Brown and Philip Habib testified in closed session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- July 6-22 -- Fourty-six Members wrote the President urging appointment of a Special Prosecutor on the Korean bribery scandal.
- July 13 & 14 -- Gen. Brown and Gen. Rogers testified before the House Armed Services Committee (Stratton chaired). Thrust of testimony was that Joint Chiefs support of troop withdrawal plan was contingent upon congressional support and approval of compensatory measures for South Korea.
- July 19 -- White House briefing with President, Brown, Vance, Congressional Leaders and key Members prior to Brown's trip to Seoul.
- July 21 -- President's letter to Park.
- July 25 -- Bell met with House Members on Korean bribery scandal.
- July 26 -- Twelve point statement issued following meeting in Seoul.

#### Foreign vs. Domestic Policy Political Coordination

-- In domestic initiatives there is usually one convenient vehicle for implementing strategies -- legislation. Three broad stages of domestic initiatives would be:

- 1) development of legislation -- consultations with interest groups, state and local governments, key Members of House and Senate; mediating agency differences; budgetary impact
- 2) legislation in Congress -- media attention, hearings, interest group lobbying, congressional liaison lobbying, grass root lobbying, markups and amendments in Committees, amendments on the floor, conference committees
- 3) implementation of legislation -- bill signed; Executive Department implementation, state and local impact, congressional oversight

In Congress, the bill is the center of attention with Members lining up, according to their political interests, to kill it, modify it, or push it through.

Even putting aside the vast problems of diplomatic negotiations and military security considerations, foreign policy initiatives are much more complex than domestic initiatives. As can be seen by the South Korea chronology, there is no one central vehicle occupying congressional attention. The initial McGovern amendment was a reaction to the announced intention to withdraw troops. The Statton hearings were a reaction to Singlaub's recall. Armed with alleged pessimistic CIA briefings, the Baker and Dole efforts were political reactions to their conservative constituencies. The Harkin amendment was a liberal reaction to human rights concerns. Members are reacting to the Korean bribery scandal.

-- If there is one common theme, it is the obvious one -- that Members of the House and Senate act according to their own perceived political interests. Perhaps this is why President Johnson provided Congress with a legislative vehicle (the Gulf of Tonkin resolution) to endorse his Vietnam policy at a time when Congress and the people were reacting to an outside event (the Gulf of Tonkin "incident").

-- With respect to congressional liaison, on domestic policy initiatives our clear job is to help push the legislation through, kill, or modify it. On foreign policy initiatives (other than funding levels which have the legislation vehicle) we find ourselves, for the most part, trying to put out fires.

-- While the Singlaub recall probably fed congressional fires on Korea during late May and June, the long term effects probably are beneficial. Our military leaders, foreign leaders, and Members of Congress now know that the President means business. Nevertheless, had key Members been notified prior to the general press announcement of the act, the short term congressional fires may well have been dampened.

#### Congressional Dynamics in Foreign Affairs

-- Post-Vietnam, Members of Congress are far more independent and assertive in foreign affairs and much harder to stampede than in Johnson's days. The War Powers Resolution, enacted on November 7, 1973, by the overriding of a veto by Nixon, was the result of congressional disenchantment with the "executive" war. Current examples of this assertiveness would include the human rights movement in the House and the recent congressional prerogative problems with the AWACS sale to Iran.

-- In considering congressional dynamics, the following points should be noted:

- 1) It is easier, politically, for Members to vote against controversial foreign policy initiatives. An anti-Vietnam, anti-Cuba, anti-Panama, or anti-Korea vote in Congress is not likely to cost Members votes during elections.
- 2) The Executive acts positively in blazing a trail in foreign affairs. Congress usually reacts to outside events and Members will vote the way they perceive their constituencies want them to.
- 3) Members' political self-interest are factors in foreign affairs votes. The South Korean bribery scandal will tend to impact on the way Members vote on Korean issues.
- 4) Members are complimented by foreign affairs briefings. A Member with little foreign affairs background can act the "statesman" back home when armed with these briefings.

- 5) True consultations vs. notifications -- congressional sensibilities pull toward true consultations. In the four cases where the Ford Administration complied with the War Powers Resolution (Danang Sealift, evacuation of Phnom Phen, evacuation of Saigon, Mayaquez incident), the compliance with the consultation provision was judged inadequate by key Members primarily because Members were informed rather than consulted. However, executive decision-making may well be better served by notifications.
- 6) The House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees are generally more liberal than the full membership of both Houses.
- 7) The House and Senate Armed Services Committees are generally more conservative than the full membership of both Houses.
- 8) While the Senate has more prerogatives in foreign affairs (treaties), the House does not appreciate a "little brother" role and should not be overlooked or taken for granted in foreign affairs. The vote on the AWACS sale to Iran in the House Committee is a good example of why both bases must be covered.
- 9) Human rights votes tend to build formidable coalitions of liberal human rights advocates and conservative anti-foreign aid advocates, particularly in the House.

#### Questions to Ask

-- In developing strategies for dealing with foreign policy initiatives the following questions should be addressed very early in the game:

- 1) What kind of congressional activity is required by law and what votes are we likely to need (treaties, funding levels, arms transfer notifications, disapproval resolutions, War Powers requirements, etc.)?
- 2) Who are the key and swing Members and what is their track record on the issue?
- 3) What methods have been developed to positively educate the constituencies of swing Members on a issue? How can we best present our case to the people?
- 4) Would true congressional consultations prior to decisions 1) satisfy congressional sensibilities and diffuse controversies, 2) hamper the President's trailblazing by limiting his options, 3) generate early opposition or support, 4) result in unwanted media attention, thus hampering foreign diplomacy, 5) development new opinions and views on issues, 6) hamper crucial time factors?
- 5) Can simple notifications after decisions are made, but prior to press announcements substitute for consultations?
- 6) Do we have methods for broad-range briefings for Members?
- 7) Can we anticipate hostile or favorable congressional hearings and provide early rebuttals or supporting statements?

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR STATEMENTS AND

DECISIONS CONCERNING WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA

- 25 Jan 77 "We have a commitment to the Republic of Korea, a defense commitment.  
- Harold Brown
- 26 Jan 77 PRM/NSC-13 Tasker issued.
- 2 Feb 77 "With respect to Korea, I emphasized our concern to maintain a stable situation on the Korean peninsula. I cited that we will phase down our ground forces only in close consultation and cooperation with the Governments of Japan and South Korea, and we will maintain our air capability in Korea and continue to assist in upgrading Korean self-defense capability."  
- Vice President Mondale
- 18 Feb 77 General Vessey met with President on Korea.
- 9 Mar 77 President announced ground force withdrawal within 4-5 years.
- 10 Mar 77 Admiral Weisner met with President on Korea.
- 21 Apr 77 PRM-13 addressed by PRC.
- 27 Apr 77 PRM-13 addressed by National Security Council chaired by the President.
- 11 May 77 "We intend also to support our commitments to Korea."  
- Harold Brown
- 19 May 77 General Singlaub recalled.
- 20 May 77 "The recall of Singlaub should raise no doubt about our commitment to maintain peace and stability in that area."  
- Jody Powell
- 21 May 77 General Singlaub met with the President.

21 May 77 "Removal of the 40,000 Americans stationed in South Korea does not mean the US is abandoning its commitments to the Seoul government."

"Any potential aggressor should have no doubt about the steadfastness of our commitment to maintaining peace and stability in that region and our commitment to the Republic of Korea."

"As the President has indicated, we feel that in about four or five years, South Korea will be able to assume the role of defending itself without American ground troops."

"We are determined to maintain a military balance in the area ...and the Koreans will be assisted by US air forces."

-Jody Powell

22 May 77 "The United States retains its commitment to the security of South Korea and the commitment to our alliance with them."

-Harold Brown

23 May 77 "The United States would maintain 7,000 airmen in South Korea and that the 7th Fleet would be available offshore. Together with American logistic support, and the increased capabilities of South Korea troops, especially in the use of tanks, artillery and antitank weapons, the administration was convinced that the South Korean armed forces would deter any aggressor."

-Harold Brown

25 May 77 President Carter asked him and General Brown to reiterate "clearly and publicly" American's "continuing commitment" to South Korea's security." Recalled that Mr. Carter had made clear that the withdrawal of forces would be "carefully phased and carried out in a way which will maintain the military balance and preserve security on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia."

-Philip Habib

26 May 77 "...the time has come for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a period of 4 or 5 years of ground troops, leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in the Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, the Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to South Korea is undeviating and is staunch."

"We will leave there adequate intelligence forces, observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and a firm, open commitment to our defense treaty, so there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries concerning our support of South Korea."

"...leaving the ground troops of the Republic of Korea strong enough to defend themselves and leaving our own commitment to them sure."

"...this has been brought about by two things--our complete confidence in the Republic of Korea and its ability and a complete awareness on the part of the rest of the world that our own commitment is firm."

-President Carter, news conference

26 May 77 "I and General Brown believe the withdrawal can be accomplished successfully, if it is accompanied by the maintenance of US air and logistical support, a continued strengthening of the South Korean forces, and a firm commitment on the part of the United States to South Korean security."

-Harold Brown

6 Jun 77 "We will not do anything to disturb the (military) balance or weaken the security of (South Korea). This is a very solemn commitment."

-US Ambassador Sneider

10 Jun 77 Under Secretary Habib and General Brown met with the President.



10 Jun 77 "I think that there's understanding of what we're doing, there's acceptance with the full knowledge that we can carry out the program that the President has decided to carry out, in a manner which does not jeopardize their security and would maintain the credibility of the US commitment under the Mutual Security Treaty."

-Philip Habib

10 Jun 77 "Frankly I had always felt that when those forces were left in Korea after the war that a political environment or climate or condition would eventually evolve which would permit them to be withdrawn. When I heard President Carter and had an opportunity to discuss this with him just before the Inaguration, I so stated to him and had an opportunity to discuss it with him and heard how he proposed to create and foster the growth of that climate and I was encouraged by it. ...and as I testified before the committee (HIRC), I didn't find opposition to the program when it was understood that the three fundamental things which are that the United States will remain a Pacific power; that we will live up to our mutual security treaty commitments; and that the President will do this over a period of time without changing significantly the military balance on the peninsula."

-General George Brown.

11 Jun 77 "We do not share Singlaub's view that withdrawal will lead to war. We think it can be managed so that the military balance can be maintained, treaty commitments upheld and we will remain a Pacific power."

-General George Brown

11 Jun 77 Said this will include three US Air Force squadrons in Korea, continued naval excursions in the area, and a Marine division and more American air squadrons in Okinawa.

- General George Brown.

24 Jun 77 Said Mr. Carter had "stressed that the United States intends to stay a major power in Asia and the Pacific and would maintain a strong security position in the region." Said the withdrawal would cause "no change in the military balance" because it will be coupled with continued logistical support and an improvement in Korea's own defense capacities.

-Jody Powell

25 Jun 77 Said the Carter Administration remains firmly committed to defending South Korea against any possible attack by North Korea. Existing military commitments to South Korea should "prevent any miscalculation by anybody." Under current American pledges to aid South Korea, said "An act of hostilities (by Communist North Korea) would not be a rational act."

-Philip Habib

25 Jun 77 "The President is not going to take an irrational or imprudent act."

-General George Brown

30 Jun 77 "The United States is and will remain an Asian and Pacific power" and that it was determined to maintain "a strong military presence in the area." Also wanted to tell Asians that despite the Vietnam War and American troop pullouts planned for South Korea, the United States was committed to remaining a major force politically, economically and militarily in the region. Said the American security commitment "and our determination to maintain it are essential to the preservation of peace in Northeast Asia." Repeated the previous Administration's policy of moving toward improved relations with North Korea, if North Korea's allies, Russia and China, would do the same with South Korea. Endorsed the previous Administration's plan for a peace conference on Korea, involving both Koreas, China and the United States. Said the mutual security treaty with that ally (Japan) was "a cornerstone of peace in East Asia."

-Cyrus Vance

1 Jul 77 "We continue to have a mutual defense treaty with Korea and that will go on past the withdrawal of our ground forces, so that such an action would call for a response under that treaty and that response would be forthcoming."

-Harold Brown

- 21 Jul 77 President Carter's letter to President Park reaffirming US commitment to security of the ROK. States: "...our air force units, military intelligence, and logistic support personnel will remain in Korea for the indefinite future. And we will continue our naval deployments in that area... It is our intention to seek from Congress substantial military assistance for Korea."
- 26 Jul 77 Twelve point statement issued following 10th US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul. It covered:
- Reaffirmation of US commitment to Security of the ROK.
  - 6,000 man withdrawal by end of 1978.
  - Headquarters and two brigades of the 2d Division will remain until final phase.
  - Compensatory measures will parallel or precede withdrawals.
  - Air Force, Navy, intelligence, communications, and other support forces will stay in Korea indefinitely.
  - US will transfer, via grant-type aid, equipment of US ground forces and will provide additional FMS credits, both subject to Congressional approval.
  - A combined command will be established prior to completion of the first withdrawal.

**Telegram 085068 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 August 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114877>.]*

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Date: August 9, 1977

Classification: Secret

During a discussion with Third Secretary Petre Anghel, Edward Hurwitz, Director of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the US Department of State, noted the following:

1. Relations between the US and South Korea are currently less tense than when President Carter announced the decision to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea. The tension at the time was a product of the sudden manner in which the drawback was announced, without prior consultation with the South Korean and Japanese authorities. Subsequently, however, following discussions with American officials, the ROK came to terms with the idea of US troop withdrawal despite preferring otherwise. The Carter administration reassured the ROK that the drawback will not damage the military balance in the Peninsula and that the US will help strengthen South Korean forces in order to effectively replace US troops.

The most delicate part of the issue is now in the hands of the US administration which will have to make serious efforts to persuade Congress of the opportunity for withdrawal and the need to offer additional military assistance to the South Korean government – in particular, loans for acquiring military equipment.

Troop withdrawal has been another contentious point between the administration and Congress, which recently decided that every troop reduction in South Korea must have explicit Congress approval. Congress opposition against troop withdrawal is due to the large number of Congressmen who believe the drawback will instigate aggression from North Korea and, therefore, alter the fragile military balance in the region.

2. Recently, a move towards the idea of a bilateral meeting with the US has been noticeable in the DPRK's conduct. Also notable has been the manner in which the North Korean authorities solved the recent helicopter incident, leaving a good impression.

Nonetheless, the US administration believes it would be detrimental to positively respond to the DPRK, as long as the DPRK intends to avoid South Korean participation in future talks.

The DPRK's recent decision to establish a 50-mile militarized zone in the ocean is considered unilateral, arbitrary and against the armistice. The US administration has not managed to fully decipher the intent behind this decision, particularly since it did not affect the supply to several

islands in the zone. The US Department of State tends to believe that the decision is simply the materialization of a Third World conference on maritime law.

3. The US has no knowledge of the DPRK's intentions regarding the next UN General Assembly. However, the State Department believes that the current international scene is not favorable for introducing a pro-North Korean resolution due to the 'scandal' regarding North Korean diplomats' illegal currency dealings in various countries, as well as to the American decision to withdraw ground troops from South Korea, which is likely to reduce, if not eliminate, attacks against the US.

Signed: Advisor Gh. Ionita

**Memorandum of Conversation with U.S. Secretary of State, and PRC Foreign Minister et al, 22 August 1977**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 141-157.]

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, August 22, 1977, 4–6:40 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

U.S. Foreign Policy; Domestic Roots; Allies; Strategic Forces; Arms Control; East-South Asia; Yugoslavia; ME

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Woodcock  
Under Secretary Habib  
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, EA  
Assistant Secretary Carter, PA  
Peter R. Tarnoff, Executive Secretary  
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Michel Oksenberg, NSC  
David Dean, Deputy Chief, USLO  
Harry E. T. Thayer, Director, EA/PRCM  
John F. Cannon, Director, EA/P  
Alan D. Romberg, S/P

(seated behind:  
Jeanette Porpora, notetaker)

*P.R.C.*

Huang Hua, Foreign Minister  
Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison Office in the U.S.  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister  
Lin Ping, Director, American and Oceanian Department, MFA  
Chien Chi-chen, Director, Information Department, MFA  
Liu Hua, Acting Director, Protocol Department, MFA  
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, American and Oceanian Department, MFA  
Ting Yuan-hung, Chief, American Division, American and Oceanian Department, MFA  
Shih Yen-hua, interpreter

(seated behind:  
Lien Cheng-pao, Deputy Chief, American Division, American and Oceanian Department, and two other notetakers)

[...]

*Korea*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 8/22–31/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. Vance left Washington for Beijing on August 20. Vance and Oksenberg reported in the accounts they telegraphed to Washington that the first day of the visit, August 21, had gone well. Vance's account is in telegram Secto 9013 to the Department of State and the White House, August 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770302–1245) Oksenberg's is in telegram Secto 9012 to the NSC, August 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770302–1245)

Let me now turn to the question of the Korean peninsula. As you know, we have announced that we are initiating a phased withdrawal of our ground forces over a period of five years from Korea. In doing this we have proceeded in full consultation with the South Koreans. Mr. Philip Habib and General George Brown have been to South Korea to discuss the plans in advance of the ultimate decision. In addition to 4 Vance attended the OECD Ministerial meeting in Paris June 22–24. 152 Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XIII that, we have had close consultations with the Japanese about this action and have made it very clear that this gradual and phased withdrawal in no way changes or diminishes our firm commitment to our Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of Korea. In addition, we have indicated to the Koreans that as we withdraw these ground forces, which incidentally constitute approximately five percent of the total ground forces in the Republic of Korea, that as we withdraw them we will provide the necessary equipment and additional training which will be required to replace our forces. So, by the time the full withdrawal is made, the Republic of Korea will be self-reliant and sufficiently strong so as not to miss the United States Forces.

In addition, we have made it clear that the ultimate withdrawal of the last elements of the U.S. ground forces will only be made in light of the circumstances that exist at that time, including the political circumstances, and thus in terms of the potential danger to the Republic of Korea. In addition, we have indicated to the South Koreans that we will maintain our air and naval forces for the foreseeable future so that they will have no question about our commitment to their security.

Insofar as North Korea is concerned, we have indicated to North Korea that we are willing to talk to them as long as the South Koreans are present. We have indicated also to the North Koreans that if allies of North Korea will talk to the South Koreans, we would be willing to talk to the North Koreans. Further, we have indicated that we would welcome discussions which would look to realistic replacement arrangements for the current United Nations Command, but this must be approached in a constructive way. Our position remains that we would support the admission of both North and South Korea to the United Nations without prejudice to unification, and we would welcome discussions on the four-party basis to discuss ways of improving the dialogue between North and South Korea and the peaceful resolution of problems in the area should the other parties be willing to consider such discussions.

[...]

**Memorandum of Conversation with the U.S. Secretary and PRC Foreign Minister et al, 23 August 1977**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 158-190.]

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, August 23, 1977, 9:30–11:50 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Africa; Latin America; Normalization with other Countries; Human Rights; Non-Proliferation; ME; Yugoslavia; Normalization of US–PRC Relations

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Woodcock  
Under Secretary Habib  
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, EA  
William H. Gleysteen, Jr. Deputy  
Assistant Secretary  
Michel Oksenberg, NSC  
Harry E. T. Thayer, Director,  
EA/PRCM  
(seated behind:  
Jeanette Porpora, notetaker)

*P.R.C.*

Huang Hua, Foreign Minister  
Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison  
Office in the U.S.  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign  
Minister  
Lin Ping, Director, American and  
Oceanian Department, MFA  
Chien Chi-chen, Director, Infor-  
mation Department, MFA  
Liu Hua, Acting Director, Protocol  
Department, MFA  
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy  
Director, American and  
Oceanian Department, MFA  
Ting Yuan-hung, Chief, American  
Division, American and  
Oceanian Department, MFA  
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter  
(seated behind:  
Lien Cheng-pao, Deputy Chief,  
American Division, American  
and Oceanian Department,  
MFA,  
and two other notetakers)

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 8/22–31/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Guest House No. 5. Vance's report of the meeting is in telegram Secto 9017, August 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0837) Oksenberg sent an account of this meeting via the Voyager Channel in telegram 166 to the White House, August 23. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 42, Vance, China, 8/20–27/77)



## *Korea*

As Mr. Vance discussed the Korean issue yesterday, I would like to give you our view on this question. To be candid with you, our two sides hold different views on this issue. The views presented by Mr. Vance on the issue of Korea are not unfamiliar to the Chinese side. In fact, the United States continues to try to delay the dissolution of the UN Command and the total withdrawal of US armed forces from South Korea, and it is also trying to perpetuate the division of Korea so as to obstruct the reunification of Korea. The US side should learn that the reunification of Korea is the common desire of the entire Korean people. Any actions aimed at obstructing reunification and perpetuating the division of Korea run counter to the common desire of the Korean people. Our consistent position is that the Korean people should settle their question of independence and peaceful reunification among themselves, free from outside interference. We firmly support the responsible proposition put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on independence and peaceful reunification. We will never take part in any activities designed to perpetuate the division of Korea.

[...]

## *Korea*

I have already explained our position with regard to Korea very clearly to you. I don't think there is anything for me particularly to add. But you mentioned just now that in Korea a war may flow out of the development of events there. If there exists the danger of war in that area, it exists from the Park Chung Hee Clique. The US is boasting about strengthening the armed forces of Park in South Korea. Although you have answered that you will withdraw part of your forces, you are maintaining your air forces in South Korea. This means that you continue to support the warlike actions of South Korea. This is of no help to the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. As for the admission of two Koreas into the UN, we stated our position very clearly at the UN.

[...]

**Memorandum of Conversation Between the U.S. Secretary of State and the PRC Vice Premier et al, 24 August 1977**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 191-207.]

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, August 24, 1977, 3–5:40 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

International Issues; Normalization

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Woodcock  
Under Secretary Habib  
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, EA  
William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary, EA  
Michel Oksenberg, NSC  
Alan D. Romberg, S/P  
(seated behind:  
Cornelia Mossellem, notetaker)

*P.R.C.*

Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Premier  
Huang Hua, Foreign Minister  
Huang Chen, Chief, PRC Liaison  
Office in the U.S.  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign  
Minister  
Lin Ping, Director, American and  
Oceanian Affairs Department,  
MFA  
Chien Chi-chen, Director, Infor-  
mation Department, MFA  
Tang Wen-sheng, Deputy  
Director, American and  
Oceanian Department, MFA  
(and interpreter)  
Liu Hua, Acting Director, Protocol  
Department, MFA  
Ting Yuan-hung, Chief, American  
Division, American and  
Oceanian Department, MFA  
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter  
(seated behind:  
Lien Cheng-pao, Deputy Chief,  
American Division, American  
and Oceanian Department,  
MFA;  
two other notetakers)

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 8/22–31/77. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. Vance's account of this meeting is in telegram Secto 9029, August 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0832)

Vice Premier Teng: I recall when we met last time we also discussed the issue of Korea, and I said at that time: Do you think the Korean issue is different from other issues? It belongs in the same category with the question of the so-called two Chinas, two Germanys, the two Vietnams, and the two Koreas. I have on numerous occasions tried to advise our American friends that they should think earnestly when dealing on issues like this in which whole countries are split into two. Germany, no matter Western or Eastern Germany, has nationalist sentiment to strive for reunification, for that is a tide which is irresistible. Same with regard to Taiwan and China and the two Koreas—as to two Vietnams haven't they recently been reunified? I recall saying with regard to two Germanys if this issue is not solved within one hundred years, it will be solved within one thousand.

[...]

**Memo for the U.S. President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Information Items," 27 August 1977**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00238. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00238.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00238.) ]

Top Secret-Sensitive  
Contains Codeword

August 27, 1977

Memorandum For:                   The President  
From:                                 Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Subject:                             Information Items

[...]

South Korea Interest in Peking and Moscow: [Redacted] continued ROK interest in developing better relations with Peking and Moscow.

[Redacted] since the U.S. is seeking improved relations with Peking, Seoul must also develop its own rapprochement policy toward the PRC. Park asked for an in-depth study of U.S.-China policy as a basis for future South Korean initiatives toward the PRC.

[Redacted]

State notes that since 1973 Seoul has labored to improve ties with the PRC and USSR, but with little response. In view of the importance<sup>3</sup> of Peking's ties with Pyongyang, the Chinese appear unwilling to make any reply to Seoul that could annoy the North Koreans. The Soviets – whose current relations with Pyongyang are chilly – are more receptive to contacts with the South Koreans, but there is no clear evidence Moscow yet intends concrete moves on ties with Seoul.

The Korean Issue in the UN: For the first time in several years, North Korea does not intend to bring up the Korean issue in the upcoming UNGA, [redacted]. The decision appears to have resulted from Pyongyang's fear that a new vote would only reflect an erosion of its international support since passage of the 1975 UNGA resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The North Korean charge at the UN did tell North Korea's UN supporters, however, that ROK lobbying for its own positions might provoke a North Korean counter-proposal at the upcoming session. State, however, believes that the chances of this happening are small.

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MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 21, 1977

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: MIKE ARMACOST MA

SUBJECT: Korea: Claim that our Assistance  
Package Will Feed a Local Arms Race

While I was in Japan recently, several Japanese politicians and journalists raised with me the question whether or not compensatory measures in the ROK might intensify a local arms race which in time could diminish rather than increase stability on the peninsula. George McGovern evidently picked up this line in his speech to the conference on Korea sponsored by the Institute of Policy Studies this last weekend.

Our answer to these concerns should consist of three elements:

-- Projected U.S. military assistance to South Korea does not stimulate an arms race. An arms race is already being carried out on the peninsula, and the primary impetus has been supplied since the early 1970's by Pyongyang's inordinate diversion of economic resources to its defense budget, and the increase in its defense capabilities relative to the South. U.S. equipment transfers and FMS credits are designed to preserve the local military balance and offset the effect of our ground force troop withdrawal. They are not designed to facilitate the ROK's achievement of an overall superior military position.

-- There is an asymmetry in North-South efforts to acquire armaments which must be taken into account in framing any arms control proposals. The North relies very heavily upon domestic production of defense articles. The South has chosen to depend rather on an international division of labor, and procures most of its arms from the U.S. Measures designed to limit the supply of armaments from the outside could thus have an inequitable impact on South Korea's ability to maintain adequate defenses.

~~SECRET~~ GDS

Q 1/24/96

-- The equipment transfers that we contemplate are designed precisely to improve the defensive position of the South, not to enable it to obtain a capacity to "go North". Thus the emphasis on air defense missiles, TOW anti-tank weapons, etc.

We have not made these arguments publicly, but perhaps should, lest McGovern and others create a widespread impression that our military assistance efforts, rather than reinforcing deterrence, may provoke an accelerated arms race. There are several ways of getting this out. We could plant a question at the next press conference, see that it comes up during hearings on the transfer equipment bill, publicize answers to questions like this that come up in the equipment transfer bill, or have Cy Vance or Harold Brown hit this point at some public speech in the near future. I will supply on a contingency basis an answer to such a question.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to explore with State and Defense ways of seeing that Cy Vance and/or Harold Brown get these points on public record at an opportune moment in the near future.

Approve   *JS*   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrences  
Les Denend *LD*  
Charlie Stebbins *CS*

**Notes on a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary-General on Thursday 22 September 1977 at 9:30 a.m.**

*[Source: "Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0026-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

Confidential

23 September 1977  
FMG/sr

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Notes on a meeting in the office of the Secretary-General on Thursday 22 September 1977 at 9:30 a.m.

Present: The Secretary-General  
Mr. Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel

Foreign Minister Tong Jin Park, Republic of Korea  
Ambassador Duk Choo Moon, Permanent Observer

In the meeting which lasted approx. 1/2 hour the Foreign Minister made the following points:

- There is no indication for progress in the Korean question. The North has never responded to his Government's proposal for bilateral negotiations and it is busy with its own internal problems.
- His Government hopes that the United States, China and the USSR will eventually use their influence to help resume the dialogue. However, the Chinese reaction which Mr. Vance got in this regard in Peking was not very positive. The Republic of Korea will not take any new initiative unless China and the USSR take a positive interest in seeking a solution.
- His Government is glad that the question of Korea is not on the Agenda on the 32. General Assembly. A debate would have been useless and would only have contributed to a deterioration of the atmosphere. Chances for unifications are very small and his country therefore hopes to become a full member of the United Nations (the Secretary-General: "Does this mean that in your view both Koreas should be members?", the Foreign Minister: "Yes.")
- He hopes that when the North Korean Foreign Minister comes to pay his respects to the Secretary-General (he will be in New York for a Non-Aligned Conference and this will be his first trip to the United States) the Secretary-General will urge him to have direct talks on the basis of the 1972 Joint Communiqué. The Foreign Minister is a relative of

Kim Il Sung and has a strong position. His real motive in coming is to try to establish direct contacts with the United States but it is the American attitude not talk with North Korea without the participation of the Republic of Korea (Mr. Park even excluded informal contacts).

- The withdrawal of American troops depends on political and military developments. Should there be provocations it will have to be reconsidered.

- The Red Cross talks have stopped as it was clear that the North was not interested to pursue them.



*3/12*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1977

**EXECUTIVE**  
F03-2/2082-2  
ND18  
CM10  
2082-2  
ND7  
LE  
RS  
FG38  
FG34

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am transmitting today for the consideration of the Congress legislation which will authorize the transfer of certain United States-owned defense articles to the Republic of Korea. A draft bill and a section by section analysis of its provisions are enclosed.

In the Korean War the independence and security of the Republic of Korea were preserved at a cost of 34,000 American lives and many billions of dollars. Since then, a major objective of United States foreign policy has been the avoidance of renewed hostilities and the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula. Our security relationship with the Republic of Korea, which has been the cornerstone of this policy, has consisted of three principal elements -- our 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, a program of military and economic assistance, and the presence of United States Armed Forces in Korea.

Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital to our national interests, and stability on the Korean peninsula is essential to that goal. I am determined, therefore, to maintain our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea. However, our security relationship is not a static one, and the specific ways in which we seek to accomplish our basic policy objectives must be evaluated in light of present circumstances.

The Honorable  
Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,  
Speaker of the House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

40c

*Mondale, Walter F.*  
*Byrd, Robert C.*

Within this context, I have concluded that the withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from Korea over a four to five year period can be accomplished in a manner which will not endanger the security of the Republic of Korea. So long as it is conducted in a way which will assure continued peace and stability in Northeast Asia, the ground force withdrawal is a natural evolution of our ongoing security relationship. Both governments have understood that the presence of U.S. ground forces was not permanent and is related directly to the maintenance of the military balance. With appropriate assistance, such as that included in the legislation I am proposing, the Republic of Korea will be able to assume a larger share of its defense burden and assume the tasks of U.S. units being withdrawn.

I have established a tentative schedule for the withdrawal of ground combat forces: 6,000 men, including one brigade of the Second Division, will be withdrawn by the end of 1978. The remainder of the ground forces will be withdrawn incrementally with the final withdrawal taking place in 1981 or 1982. U.S. air forces will remain in Korea with a small U.S. Army element to provide communications, intelligence and logistic support to our forces and those of the ROK.

My decision to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from Korea rests on certain basic considerations:

- Korea's impressive economic growth over the past decade and the corresponding increase in Korea's ability to defend itself;
- our continued firm determination to maintain our basic security commitment to Korea, and to retain a significant military presence there, composed mainly of air and key support units, together with the continuing presence of U.S. naval units in the area; we believe that these forces, as well as the major U.S. forces remaining in the Western Pacific, provide a clear and visible U.S. deterrent to North Korean miscalculation;

- our assessment of the broader international context of the Korea question, particularly the pattern of interrelationships between the great powers in the area;
- our readiness, subject to Congressional consultations and approval, to take appropriate actions to assure that the ground force withdrawal does not weaken Republic of Korea defense capabilities.

The decision to withdraw ground combat forces from Korea has involved full consultations with the Korean Government. The Governments of Japan and other friendly nations in Asia have been kept fully informed, both of our withdrawal intentions and of our continuing firm commitment to Korean security. We have made it clear to both the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union that the withdrawal decision signals no weakening of our commitment. The North Korean Government should be in no doubt about our position.

The legislation I am proposing is designed to help make certain that Korean defense capabilities are not weakened by our ground force withdrawal. It provides for the transfer of certain U.S.-owned military equipment (primarily in the custody of U.S. forces in Korea) and related services to the Korean Government, without reimbursement. We envisage at most the transfer of equipment with a depreciated value of about \$800 million.


Even with this no-cost transfer, the withdrawal will require the Korean Government to devote a larger share of its financial resources, both foreign exchange and local currency, to defense. In my judgment, the transfer provided for in the draft legislation will ease the incremental fiscal burden of withdrawal on the Korean Government to an amount which can be borne without diverting excessive resources from the high priority task of economic development.

The bill provides that the President shall transmit an annual report to the Congress, through the five-year period during which the anticipated equipment transfer

will take place, detailing the types, quantities and value of defense articles furnished to Korea under this Act.

The transfer of equipment to the Korean Government to be authorized by the bill will ensure that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces is accomplished in a way that will not disturb the stability that must be maintained in the region. Since the initial phase of that withdrawal will take place in 1978, I urge the Congress to enact promptly the proposed legislation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long, horizontal flourish extending to the right.

**Telegram 085374 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 October 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114880>.]*

TELEGRAM 085374

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC

Subject: the DPRK – US dialogue attempts, outcomes forthcoming

Date: October 22, 1977

Classification: Secret

Ever since Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States, North Korean officials have attempted through various means to initiate a dialogue with the US in order to discuss the Korean issue. According to several Department of State representatives, the attitude of North Korean officials is due to Jimmy Carter's position on the matter during his electoral campaign, – i.e. reducing US troops stationed in South Korea – as well as to the potential support from the USSR, the PRC and several Non-Aligned countries.

Thus, the DPRK addressed an open letter to President-elect Jimmy Carter and, following his inauguration, sent messages through various heads of state from Africa and Asia, including the President of Gabon and former Pakistani Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto.

During his recent visit to the US, Edvard Kardelj also transmitted a message to the American government on behalf of North Korea, through which the DPRK expressed its interest to initiate a dialogue with the US administration regarding the Korean issue. R. Petkovic, Minister at the Yugoslav Embassy, told Comrade Gh. Ionita (Advisor) that North Korean leaders asked President Tito, during his visit to the DPRK this summer, to ensure President Carter receives the message as soon as possible. According to the Yugoslav diplomat, President Jimmy Carter read the message intently, telling Edvard Kardelj that his administration is interested in initiating talks with the North Koreans, however South Korean envoys must also participate with equal rights. Jimmy Carter emphasized to Kardelj what he also responded to the other North Korean messages, namely that:

a) the Carter administration considers that discussing the Korean issue at the UN is not likely to be conducive to the proper conditions for finding an adequate solution to the situation in the region;

b) the Carter administration is willing to do everything to decrease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and minimize the possibility of a military conflict in the region;

c) the US does not oppose a direct dialogue with North Korean envoys, however South Korean representatives must also participate since the US cannot accept excluding South Korea due to its

binding obligations under bilateral treaties, as well as to the potential negative reactions South Korea's exclusion would trigger in Asia, particularly in Japan.

Compiled by Advisor Gh. Ionita and Third Secretary Petre Anghel

Signed: Nicolae M. Nicolae

**Memorandum from the White House, 27 October 1977**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item  
KO00242. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-  
2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00242](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00242).

Top Secret-Sensitive  
Contains Codeword

October 27, 1977

1. Tong-Son Park Case: Ambassador Sneider reports that comments by senior Korean officials in the past two days indicate growing pressures on President Park to compromise on the Tong-sun Park case. The officials believe the case has grown increasingly serious and is no longer a U.S.-Korean problem, but a “domestic issue” which the Korean people want to see resolved. Sneider comments that the nature of the compromise has not been well defined, but apparently involves interrogation of Tong-sun Park in Korea. (Seoul 9067 NODIS)

[...]

## **On Relations Between DPRK and PRC, 17 November 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PolA AA), MfAA C 6857. Translated by Bernd Schaefer. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114128>.]*

GDR Embassy to the DPRK  
Pyongyang, 17 November 1977

### On Relations between DPRK and PRC

#### 1.0 General Assessment and Interests

1.1 Since their foundation, both states, the DPRK and PRC, have developed friendly relations and close cooperation in various areas. Of major importance was the participation of Chinese volunteers to push back the imperialist aggression against the DPRK between 1950 and 1953 and their sacrifices committed during this undertaking.

The development of relations, however, was not continuous. With the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the PRC during the mid-Sixties relations drastically worsened at times. Reasons for this were attempts by the Chinese leaders to interfere into internal matters of the DPRK and apply pressure in order to move the DPRK towards a broad acceptance of Maoist positions and principles. Only with [PRC Premier] Zhou Enlai's visit to the DPRK in 1970 relations returned to normal, and they gradually improved until the current situation.

The most important event for building up relations in recent years was Kim Il Sung's visit to the PRC in 1975. It was the first official foreign trip of Kim Il Sung for many years and opened a series of visits to other countries. In 1976 relations stagnated due to the volatile domestic situation in China and the resulting uncertainties of the DPRK. In addition, during the Kim Il Sung [1975] visit China had denied his request for supporting a military solution to the problem of Korean unification. Then promised economic aid turned out to fall well below DPRK expectations.

1.2 The DPRK interest in close and friendly relations with the PRC represents a long-term strategy. In its pursuit of such the DPRK is guided by the following factors and goals:

- Geographical proximity and a long common border (DPRK – PRC: 1,336 kilometers; DPRK – Soviet Union: 16 kilometers), as well as the political, economic and military potential of the PRC;
- Aspirations to secure the maximum political and, if necessary, military support of the PRC in the DPRK's conflict with the U.S. and South Korea;
- Maintaining the strong DPRK economic ties to the PRC, in particular the major dependency of the DPRK on vital supplies (coke coal, coke, oil); as well as continuing DPRK efforts to receive economic, financial, and scientific-technological aid.



In addition, there are factors at work like the traditional ties between both Chinese and Korean peoples, the multi-year struggle by Korean partisans against the Japanese in Northeastern China, the important political-ideological influence by the CCP on the careers of leading Korean comrades in the 1930s, and the support of the DPRK for a united front of the “revolutionary peoples in Asia.”

1.3 The PRC also has a major interest in close relations with the DPRK. The latter belongs to the small number of states China can count to a certain extent as an ally. This carries some weight for China after the distancing by the Socialist People’s Republic of Albania, and in consideration of the development of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. Also the Chinese leadership is concerned about an improvement of relations between the DPRK on one hand and the Soviet Union and other socialist states on the other hand. For that reason the PRC currently undertakes major efforts to move the DPRK further away from the socialist fraternal states, or at least keep it in a “neutral” position in this regard. In the long run, the PRC has not changed its goal to include the DPRK in its big power chauvinist, anti-Soviet policy. Based on respective DPRK interests, the Chinese leadership uses the DPRK as its ally in the Non-Aligned Movement and towards developing countries, and it supports the DPRK in a focused way in its policy towards those states. Learning from the experiences during the “Cultural Revolution,” the PRC is acting in a sensitive manner to give the DPRK the feeling it is treated by China as an equal partner.

## 2.0. On Concurring Opinions and Positions

2.1 The basis for close relations between DPRK and PRC is the consent in, or closeness of, opinions of both parties on some basic ideological concepts, on methods of socialist construction, and on international politics. With some gradual differences only, this applies in particular to the following questions (though it is noteworthy that motives vary for certain positions of different kind):

- Definition of the character of the epoch, the main contradiction and the main forces in the course of the global revolutionary process;
- Overexposure of national specifics in the construction of socialism and actual negation of experiences made by the other socialist countries;
- Far-reaching turn away from the principles of proletarian internationalism;
- Overexposure of “independence” and “self-reliance” of the respective parts of the International Communist Workers’ Movement and the socialist states, as well as efforts to establish special relations with those fraternal parties and socialist states that also emphasize in particular “independence” and “self-reliance;”
- Negation of role and function of the socialist community of states in current times and non-participation in collectively designed actions of the fraternal parties and the socialist states;
- The PRC is acting openly against Comecon and socialist economic integration, and the DPRK is extremely reserved against multilateral cooperation;

- The DPRK and PRC tout the “great-powers-theory” and stress the need for struggle against “hegemonism” (PRC) and “dominationism” (DPRK) (yet it is noteworthy that the DPRK apparently counts China as a “great power” and does not share at all the PRC position which considers the Soviet Union in its capacity as a “great power” to be the main enemy);

- Overexposure of the role of the Third World (there is no congruence of opinions as far as the “First and the Second World” are concerned);

- Positions on peaceful coexistence and the struggle for détente and disarmament (CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe], Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction negotiations in Vienna, collective security in Asia).

In general, it must be assessed that current KWP positions on basic theoretical and practical issues are closer to those of the CCP than to those of the Marxist-Leninist fraternal parties.

2.2 The DPRK does not approach the global confrontation of the damaging theories of Maoism, and the PRC’s anti-socialist and anti-Soviet policy, from a class-based position. The DPRK attempts to label these patterns as differences in opinion between the CPSU and CCP and between the USSR and PRC. Among else, this shows when the KWP calls the CCP a “Marxist-Leninist” party.

The DPRK does not endorse the open anti-Sovietism espoused by the Chinese leadership, yet it officially acts from a “neutral” position. In conversations with high-level representatives of other socialist fraternal states, Korean comrades voice criticism of the relentless anti-Soviet policy by the Chinese leadership, in particular as far as the characterization of the Soviet Union as “social-imperialism” and as “main enemy” is concerned. Based on its support for unity and closed ranks of socialist states, as well as looking at its own national interests, the DPRK wants to see a normalization of relations between the USSR and PRC.

### 3.0 On Differences in Opinions and Issues of Contention

There are some basic differences in interests, theoretical positions, and also in actual policy between the DPRK and PRC and their two respective parties. They might increasingly influence the relations between both sides.

#### 3.1

- - In recent years, the DPRK apparently realized that the PRC does not sincerely support the DPRK struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Instead the PRC regarded, in the context of its anti-Soviet policy, the American military presence in Asia as desirable (an implementation of the [current] U.S. withdrawal plans, however, would remove this contentious issue almost completely).

- Based on its anti-imperialist policy, the DPRK does not endorse the unprincipled collusion of the PRC with the U.S. and other imperialist powers in the pursuit of anti-Sovietism. In particular given the U.S. presence in South Korea, the DPRK follows these developments with mistrust.

- In contrast to the PRC, the DPRK cultivates friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The DPRK is interested to further develop these relations and their very beneficial cooperation.

- The DPRK does not endorse the splittist activities of the CCP in the International Communist Workers' Movement and has no relations with Maoist splinter groups in third countries.

- There are also different opinions on policy towards Japan. The DPRK is concerned about Japan's increasing militarization accompanied by the PRC's silent tolerance. Thus the DPRK is very skeptical towards efforts by the PRC to conclude a friendship treaty with Japan.

In contrast to the PRC, the DPRK also argues against a security agreement between the U.S. and Japan.

- The DPRK does not share Chinese positions on NATO, but is right on target when condemning the latter as an aggressive military alliance of imperialist states.

- The PRC's open support for the most reactionary forces of imperialism in the FRG is also not condoned by the DPRK. In spite of its reluctance to support GDR policy vis-à-vis the FRG, which is mostly based on the divergence of this policy with DPRK unification concepts [for Korea], the DPRK embraces in general a class-based position in its assessment of FRG imperialism.

- There are also other current international problems where positions of the DPRK are basically different from those of the PRC, and actually closer to those of the other socialist states. Such concerns, for instance, the cases of Chile, Angola and the assessment of roots of the Middle East conflict. The DPRK does not support the PRC in its condemnations of Soviet policy in Africa.

3.2 Furthermore there are some straight contrasts between the DPRK and PRC that directly affect the interests of both states:

- Claim to improve and develop Marxism-Leninism ("Maoism" – "Juche Ideology"); as the DPRK does not support "Maoism" in general, the PRC also denies its support to "Juche Ideology;"

- Claim for international leadership, in particular in the "Third World" ("Great Chairman Mao" – "Great Leader Kim Il Sung");

- Territorial Issues (it is not known that the PRC officially confirmed Mount Baektusan, which is of special symbolic value to the DPRK, as part of DPRK territory; it is also said there are difference in opinions regarding the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea);

- Question of the Korean minority in the PRC (about 1 million citizens); the DPRK wants their autonomy which the Chinese leadership is not willing to grant;

- Apparently the PRC is no longer willing to tolerate the DPRK's non-compliance with its export commitments, and has therefore moved in 1977 towards a calibration of its exports to the DPRK which hurts the DPRK economy considerably

#### 4.0. On the Current State of Relations

4.1. At every occasion, the DPRK and PRC underline the close relationship between parties, states and peoples and emphasize in particular that their friendship "was sealed with blood." Domestic events in the PRC in recent years, however, created complicated problems for the DPRK. Still, the latter supported all the important campaigns, beginning with the [1976] criticism of Deng Xiaoping (during Kim Il Sung's visit to the PRC in 1975 Deng was his main partner!) and extending to the struggle against the "Gang of Four" (in September 1975 a CCP delegation led by Zhang Chungqiao had visited the DPRK and was also received by Kim Il Sung!).

From their side, the PRC also fully supports DPRK domestic policy, in particular everything related to the cult of personality.

Mutual propagandistic support in mass media is very extensive and based on the principle of reciprocity.

Since Mao Zedong's death one can observe DPRK tendencies to become evasive in openly supporting the PRC foreign policy course or resort to very general statements, with the exception of the Taiwan question. Apparently the DPRK follows its own interests in the Non-Aligned Movement. It is also guided by the insight that Chinese foreign policy is compromised in the eyes of the peoples and its open support could be detrimental to the DPRK.

After Mao Zedong's death, DPRK efforts became obvious to establish a profile as an equal partner and to follow a more independent line towards the PRC.

In contrast to the years before Mao's death, in current publications of documents from the PRC, anti-Soviet passages are omitted (e.g. in Hua Guofeng's speech at the XI Congress of the CCP). Here the DPRK exploited the [Chinese] temporary cessation of polemics [against the USSR].

The PRC still supports all tendencies of "independence" and "self-reliance" in DPRK foreign policy. Within the U.N. and other international organizations the PRC actively acts on behalf of the [absent] DPRK.

Yet also the PRC is refraining from unconditional support for DPRK foreign policy, especially when its own interests are directly at stake. So China reacted, for instance, very reserved towards the August 1976 Panmunjom Incident ["axe murders"] since the PRC is not interested in an escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula.

4.2. In 1976 activities in bilateral relations were somewhat reduced in comparison to 1975. Only one important CCP party delegation visited the DPRK in late 1976. There was no exchange of representative delegations on the state level.

Overall, in 1976 there were 18 DPRK delegation visits to the PRC (1975: 17) and 12 Chinese delegations came to the DPRK (1975: 20). Exchange of those delegations focused on the fields of trade, scientific-technological cooperation, culture, and sports.

Apparently there are no contacts between mass organizations.

However, assessments of delegation exchanges must take into account that mutual delegation visits are not always made public. Thus exchanges might be much more extensive than it can be gleaned from the press.

In 1976, the following contractual agreements were signed:

- Agreement on Postal and Signal Communication
- Protocol about Navigation of Border Rivers
  
- Trade Protocol for 1976
- Plan for Cooperation of the Academies of Sciences for 1977/1978
- Protocol about Railway Border Traffic

In 1977, activities increased again in political, economic, military and cultural fields. Yet one can still feel a certain restraint in party relations.

Currently there also is a certain unknown number of PRC specialists in the economy and the military present on site in the DPRK.

After Mao Zedong's death, Chinese literature was temporarily unavailable in the DPRK. Only recently the first four volumes of Mao Zedong's works in Korean language have become available again. The fifth volume, which contains anti-Soviet outbursts and the claim of Mao Zedong being the "greatest Marxist-Leninist," is not on sale.

4.3. Negotiations to conclude a new long-term trade agreement for the years between 1977 and 1981 and the trade protocol for 1977, concluded in March 1977, were tedious and complicated.

The PRC rejected the DPRK requests for credits. It only conceded to defer Korean debt repayments until 1980. New rates according to prices on the world market were established for oil and other resources. The long-term "Agreement about the Mutual Delivery of Important Goods for the Years 1977 to 1981" stipulated an increase of trade volume until 1981 by 12 percent. Yet in the 1977 trade protocol they agreed on a volume of 18 percent less compared to the 1977 numbers in the long-term 1977 to 1981 agreement. According to the annual protocol, the volume for 1977 is said to be 820 million Swiss francs, with DPRK exports to the PRC consisting of 420 million and Chinese exports to the DPRK of 400 million. These numbers are considerably lower than the plan for 1976 (975 million Swiss francs) that was fulfilled by the PRC to 86 percent and by the DPRK to only 52 percent.

The main features of the 1977 trade protocol are as follows:

#### DPRK Exports:

- 2.0 to 2.2 million tons of anthracite
- 1.0 to 1.3 million tons of iron ore
- 140,000 tons of black metal products
- 80,000 tons of zinc
- 1,500 tractors
- 100 trucks (2.5 tons each)
- 500,000 tons of cement
- 1,000 lathes
- 5 million square meters of textiles

#### DPRK Imports:

- 2.2 to 2.5 million tons of coke coal
- 80,000 tons of coke
- 1 million tons of oil
- 200 trucks (4 tons each)
- 10,000 tons of railroad trucks
- 20,000 pairs of tires
- 170,000 tons of salt
- 30,000 tons of soy beans
- 10,000 tons of sugar
- 100,000 tons of fish

Since the DPRK also insufficiently meets its export commitments during 1977, the PRC has moved towards calibrating its own exports in order to achieve a somewhat balanced sheet.

4.4. The PRC Embassy in the DPRK is maintaining very active contacts to various organs of the DPRK. They are extremely eager, in the context of their activities, to avoid anything that could upset the Korean comrades. Special emphasis they put on highlighting equality [between PRC and DPRK].

There exists an agreement between the DPRK and PRC to not permit anti-Soviet attacks by Chinese representatives in the DPRK. In recent years the Chinese Embassy has violated these rules very rarely; thus there is no concern about this embassy within the diplomatic corps.

Chinese diplomats are treating representatives of other states in Pyongyang with correctness and politeness.

Contacts by embassies of the fraternal socialist states to the PRC Embassy are basically limited to official diplomatic events.

4.5. According to the Soviet comrades, the DPRK population has the feeling that DPRK-PRC relations are closer and better than DPRK-USSR relations. This is a result of intense reporting on the PRC in DPRK mass media and apparently of internal political-ideological education as well. Yet there exists also a lack of understanding in the population about internal developments in the

PRC like, for instance, the open power struggles and the absence of a long-term prepared successor for Mao Zedong, as well as reservations towards some minor features of Chinese policy.

Overall and to major degree, the feelings of the Korean people are still highly influenced by the participation of Chinese volunteers in the fight against the U.S. and South Korean armies during the war between 1950 and 1953—though the DPRK officially commemorates this only for the occasion of certain bilateral events.

## 5.0. Conclusions

5.1. In principle, the DPRK will continue its policy of “balancing” between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist states on one hand, and the PRC on the other. This will not preclude certain tilts towards one side or the other based on pragmatic considerations.

Yet there is no reason to expect in any foreseeable time any substantial changes in relations between the DPRK and PRC.

5.2. The PRC will further undertake major efforts to draw the DPRK closer to China, and to counter developments of friendly relations by the DPRK with the Soviet Union and other socialist fraternal states.

Currently the policy of the Chinese leadership vis-à-vis the DPRK is pretending to bolster the DPRK in its overreaching efforts towards “independence” and “self-reliance.”

According to our opinion, the PRC will, however, not succeed in enlisting the DPRK for China’s anti-socialist and anti-Soviet policy. Actual interests and foundations of DPRK ideology and policy will not allow for this.

5.3. Since the death of Mao Zedong, the DPRK has sharpened its profile as an equal partner of the PRC and lessened to certain degree its tilt towards the PRC in the context of its “policy of balance.” Still, there will be a particular continuity in the future: The DPRK approach to certain international issues will take positions of the PRC into consideration.

Ourselves we must continue to monitor closely some recent indications for certain DPRK concerns regarding the PRC. Among other things, those might have been due to results of the recent China visit by U.S. Secretary of State [Cyrus] Vance and China’s cool reactions towards American measures concerning a planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

5.4. Differences in opinions and issues of contention, as listed above under 3.0, will increasingly influence relations between both states. Especially the strident anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leadership stands in contradiction to DPRK interests, North Korean notions of the enemy [U.S., not USSR], and DPRK goals to achieve unity and cohesiveness among the International Communist Workers’ Parties. Here we have some angles for our efforts to draw the DPRK closer towards the fraternal socialist parties. This makes it imperative for us to expose in appropriate ways, in particular by drawing on concrete examples, the character of the current Chinese leadership’s policy in internal talks with the Korean comrades at high, and at the highest, levels.

Steinhofer  
Attache

CC:

- Central Committee, Department International Relations
- Foreign Ministry, Far Eastern Department
- Foreign Ministry, Main Department
- Embassy, Political Department



**Telegram 085579 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 December 1977**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Folder 933/1977, Issue 220/H: Partial US troop withdrawal from South Korea – Discussions regarding the reunification of the two countries, January – October 1977. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza*

*Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114881>.]*

TELEGRAM 085579

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC

Subject: US – South Korea relations

Date: December 15, 1977

Classification: Secret

During discussions with Comrade Petre Anghel, Third Secretary, David Blakemore, Deputy Director of the Korea Desk, and Robert Martens, Director of Regional Topics in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, both at the US Department of State, noted:

American-South Korean relations are presently going through a tense period, whose outcomes are difficult to predict. This situation is due to pressure from the US [on the ROK] to fulfill certain objectives at a time when either the government in Seoul was unprepared to achieve, or these objectives interfered with South Korean plans for strengthening its economic and military forces.

The result has been the current state of affairs, in which bilateral relations are being tested by three very difficult and interdependent issues: US ground troop withdrawal, human rights and the current investigation led by a committee of the House of Representatives against the government in Seoul, regarding actions of corruption and influence in the decision process of Congress and the US administration.

1. American ground troop withdrawal. This foreign policy measure was announced by Jimmy Carter when he was still a candidate for President of the United States and became directive post-inauguration, when he assumed office in the White House. Although the measure was not explained in detail, following pressures from Japan and the US military, the Carter administration decided to gradually withdraw troops within a period of 4-5 years, in close consultation with the two aforementioned countries and providing adequate material and financial assistance.

In view of the withdrawal, the administration has already forwarded to Congress a funding request pending approval, in regards to selling military equipment to the South Korean government and compensating for the first troop withdrawals scheduled for 1978 – approximately 6000 combatants.

The request is structured in such a manner that the material compensation will precede the complete troop withdrawal scheduled for the most part at the end of the 4-5-year period.

Although the two representatives of the US State Department firmly stated that the first drawback will take place in 1978, they were unsure whether Congress would approve the requested funding necessary for an adequate planning of the full withdrawal. This is due to an increasingly stronger view in Congress to suspend all transfers of military equipment until Seoul decides to cooperate with Washington in resolving the aforementioned allegations and ensures it will take appropriate measures to improve human rights.

2. The human rights issue. This has become an important aspect of American-South Korean bilateral relations and is closely followed, especially by the US. Congress hearings on the issue have emphasized the connection between the attention offered by Seoul in respecting human rights, on the one hand, and the economic and military assistance from the US, on the other.

Despite the Carter administration's commitment to human rights, the directorate for political affairs of the Department of State is trying to minimize the potential negative effects as much as possible, under the justification that South Korean security and economic development, including US assistance, must not be threatened since they hold undeniable priority in maintaining Korean independence and balance on the Korean Peninsula.

3. The scandal sparked by allegations of influence against South Korean officials has not only raised questions regarding American-South Korean bilateral relations, but also led to serious pressures on the South Korean government from both Congress and the Carter administration. This has increased the tension between the two countries.

Given that numerous members of the House of Representatives are involved in the scandal, proving them guilty could negatively affect their stance towards the administration's request to continue offering assistance to Seoul.

This entire situation, as well as Seoul's economic achievements, has led to strengthening South Korea's national pride and confidence in its own abilities.

Consequently, the US State Department representatives mentioned that Seoul might decide to increasingly distance itself from the United States, if the pressures continue, although this is a very remote possibility.

Signed: Gh. Anghelescu

*Confidential*

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December 28, 1977

MEMORANDUM TO: President Jimmy Carter

A few days ago, a [redacted] came over and talked with me. He is a Korean and has been naturalized and is [redacted]. He states that he has met and talked with you on occasion [redacted] at Georgia State at the same time.

Recently he made a trip to South Korea to see his mother who was seriously ill, stayed there some time and finally brought his mother back with him.

He says that while he was there President Park sent for him and told him substantially the following:

He was very disturbed about his relationship with you and that he was anxious to communicate with you on a private, confidential basis but was afraid to communicate through the customary channels. He stated that the Korean people believed that you had lost interest in South Korea and from a political standpoint he had to be very careful about being too cooperative or appearing to be too cooperative in the Park bribery scandal but that if he could communicate with you in confidence he believed that he could restore normal and cooperative relations between the countries.

There were many things he would like to say to you and much progress could be made privately but it would be politically disastrous if it got in the press.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER [redacted] NARS DATE 11/30/04

A strong feeling that the Korean people had toward you was basically fear and that if someone who spoke for you could appear in several places in Korea and make reassuring statements as to your interest and the country's interest in South Korea it would go a long ways toward soothing the Korean people.

Finally, he wanted to communicate in secret through me but gave no indication of just how it would be accomplished.

I assured him that you had a continuing interest in the safety and welfare of South Korea. Also, that I would pass the request on to you.

When I tried to assure him that President Park could deal directly with you without it becoming public, he stated that he thought Park was more afraid of his own channels of communication than he was of ours.

CHK/b

**Letter from C.G. Woodard to Andrew Peacock, "DPRK: The Year in Review," 3 January 1978**

[Source: FCO 21/1652, "North Korea: Internal Political," National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Joeeun Kim.]

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
PEKING

Despatch No. 1/78

3 January 1978

My dear minister:

DPRK: THE YEAR IN REVIEW

Introduction

Although this Mission no longer has any direct accreditation to Pyongyang it continues to have a reporting responsibility on the DPRK. Our sources are limited. We rely particularly on a few West European Embassies whose Ambassadors visit Pyongyang from time to time (no more often than they have to) or who have political or commercial representation there, third world Embassies, although with the exception of our Sri Lankan and Sierra Leone colleagues they rarely have anything to offer but generalities, and the Japanese Embassy which has now added discreetly to its staff an officer working full time on the DPRK. In attempting in the attached paper to give an over-view of developments in the DPRK in 1977 its author, Mr Gerovich, notes that the view from Peking is hazy. Nevertheless, a detached vantage point probably is no bad alternative to Pyongyang where one is swamped daily in the nauseous outpourings of adulation of the formerly "beloved and respected", now "great", leader Kim Il Sung.

Politics

Mr Gerovich notes that the major feature of the DPRK political scene is continuity and even stability of leadership. It is true that the suggestions sedulously put out by the ROK over the last couple of years that Kim Il Sung either was suffering from a terminal illness or was off his increasingly bumpy head (a condition former Ambassador Lo was wont graphically to describe) have proved to be greatly exaggerated. It also seems clear now that divisions within the leadership created by Kim Il Sung's determination to ensure the succession of his son Kim Chong Il have been healed or papered over. Nevertheless, the extreme form of the cult of the personality practised in the DPRK has in it the seeds of instability. Many visitors find it not only repellent but frightening, although with the advantage of detachment their more reflective reactions are mainly of amusement. It is hard to believe that the intensely emotional attachment of younger generations to Kim Il Sung can be transferred to his son or that his passing will not leave a dangerous spiritual void.

Economy

The North Korean economy in 1976 was still in a mess. The judgment of my Scandinavian colleagues is that the DPRK will not be in a position to repay its debts for at least another two years. Over the last year DPRK practice in respect of the greater part of its debts, on which it began defaulting in 1975, has been to seek a rescheduling providing for repayment of interest only in 1977, to make one repayment at the time of, or soon after, rescheduling, and then to default again. Some creditors have not been lucky enough or shrewd enough (although all have learnt much this year) to obtain the first tranche. The DPRK's pattern of defaulting has led to, in ascending order of importance, the exasperation of Peking-based creditor representatives with what they regard as complete mendacity on the part of DPRK Ministers and officials, the exasperation of creditor governments with their Ambassadors for failing to achieve the impossible, much tougher and much more hard-headed attitudes by the DPRK's suppliers, a sharp decline in the DPRK's international prestige, and a consequent healthy moderating of the tone of its external policies. One hears almost as much exasperation from the Russians as from Western countries (although the Russians have agreed to a debt moratorium). As Mr Gerovich notes the Chinese are more discreet, but they too are almost certainly quietly applying now tougher policies in regulating the supply of goods to the DPRK's capacity to repay, My Danish colleague has told me that a Chinese mission to his country in June cross-examined Danish officials closely on the quality of the cement from the cement factory being built by the Danes north of Pyongyang – the largest in the world – and made no secret that their interest was in cement imports to help to restore a trading balance.

### Foreign Relations

Korea did not become the hermit kingdom without reason. The Koreans look back on a history of being “a shrimp among whales”. Their consequent fierce independence is a factor to be borne in mind on the plus side in thinking of the long-term nature of our relationship with the DPRK. The negative side of the same proposition is that the DPRK's sense of isolation and vulnerability directly contributes to the arcane and dogmatic elements in its policies. It makes possible the excesses of and contradictions in a sternly puritanical regime which indulges in drug smuggling and uninhibited bribery and which unblushingly practises gross privilege for the leadership, a hallowed Korean tradition. Tales of the latter are legion. The latest, noted by my colleagues who recently went to Pyongyang at the DPRK's expense for the opening of the new Assembly, is that Kim Il Sung and his four top colleagues have new Lincoln Continentals, and that, while smaller cars were put at their disposal for six of the seven days of their visit, on the day they had an audience with the great leader each was provided with a Mercedes in mint condition.

Compared with the setbacks they suffered last year and given the restrictions imposed by their parlous foreign exchange situation, 1977 has not been a bad year internationally for the North Koreans. They have retrieved their position fairly well in the non-aligned movement, helped by the laying on of hands by Tito, and are once again working their passage back with Sri Lanka (though not before it had opened an Embassy in Seoul). They have lines out to the Americans. They have retained the tenaciously ritualistic backing of the Chinese, despite a strong impression of a cooling of relations in the first half of the year, and the provocation of the DPRK's unilateral declaration of off-shore economic and military zones in July. In small ways

they seem to have got a bit closer to the Russians again. The obvious setbacks – breaches with Argentina and Mauritania – are probably regarded less seriously than continuing ROK economic success, at home and overseas.

Relations with Australia

[...]

Yours sincerely,

(signature)

(C.G. Woodard)  
Ambassador

The Honourable Andrew Peacock, M.P.,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
CANBERRA

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Successful negotiation of the agreements setting conditions for Mr. Tongsun Park to provide testimony in the United States constitutes an important step forward toward solution of a nettlesome problem which has risen between our two countries during the past year. I wish to convey to you my personal appreciation for the difficult decisions which this situation has posed for you and the understanding and cooperation you, Foreign Minister Park, and others in your government have shown in the conduct of the negotiations. The progress that has been made will help to reassert the climate of close cooperation and friendship that has characterized our relations. I am hopeful that through Mr. Civiletti's presence in Seoul we will be able to begin the long delayed process to put this matter to rest. There will be further difficulties, but if we approach them in the same spirit we approached the recent negotiations, I am sure we will overcome them.

I have also noted the actions taken in December by your government in releasing certain Emergency Measure prisoners, including several connected with the Myongdong Declaration made in Seoul in March, 1976. This was an affirmative action in the interest of human rights. Although there are further steps that would be helpful in this regard, I should like to express my respect for the decision you have taken. Fulfillment of the shared democratic ideals of our people will be the most effective possible insurance for strengthening the close bonds between our nations.

I also want to reaffirm the interest of the United States Government in continuing to work closely with the Government of the Republic of Korea toward our

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6


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countries' durable objectives. Our joint efforts will be vital to continued peace and security in Northeast Asia, and I have consequently been most encouraged by the responsible understanding reached by our respective military and defense officials regarding measures to compensate for the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces. I wish to assure you that we shall make every possible effort to obtain Congressional endorsement of these understandings.

Changes in Asia and particularly the rapid and dynamic development of the Republic of Korea will call for continuing efforts from our governments and peoples to make necessary adjustments while keeping our shared and enduring goals before us. To meet the challenges ahead, I am hopeful that we will be able to cooperate even more closely in the future on all issues of mutual concern.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency  
Park Chung-hee  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

**Telegram 066.532 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 January 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Folder 782/1978, Matter 220/F, Relations between North Korea and Socialist Countries (Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, GDR, Yugoslavia, USSR), January-December 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116401>.]*

TELEGRAM 066.532

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Date: January 28th, 1978

Classification: Secret

On the occasion of a fare-well visit to Mioara Nanu, Third Secretary [illegible], the Third Secretary of the PRC Embassy in Pyongyang, referring to Korean-Chinese relations, pointed out that during 1977, these [relations] unfolded normally, in a generally positive direction, without any unusual [events].

Mentioning certain assessments made in the 'diplomatic world' about the equidistant policy promoted by the DPRK vis-à-vis the PRC and the USSR, the Chinese diplomat said that, in principle, the DPRK is trying to promote such a policy, but concrete, historical, and geographic conditions, make the DPRK visibly tilt towards Korean-Chinese relations. The Chinese diplomat showed that, during 1977, six Chinese delegations were received by President Kim Il Sung.

On these occasions, the DPRK President underlined [how] good Korean-Chinese relations [are], [emphasizing] the solidarity of the Chinese people with the Korean people, noting that 'in case of a war against the DPRK, China would, as it had done in the past, provide the backing of the Korean frontline.

[...]

Signed

Dumitru Popa

**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 30 January 1978**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 36-38, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

January 30, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have received with deep appreciation your letter dated January 17, 1978, expressing your views on a number of important matters pending between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

As you are well aware, I have always attached utmost importance to the ties of friendship and alliance between our two countries and have made it a firm policy of my Government to do its best to maintain and enhance close cooperative relationship in all fields.

It is needless to say that our two countries share common aspiration while we occasionally follow different approaches in attaining national goals mainly due to different political, economic, cultural and social traditions and backgrounds of our two nations.

I am gratified to note your belief that the recent agreement reached between our two Governments regarding the so-called Tongsun Park case would help to reassert the climate of close cooperation and friendship between our two countries. It is my understanding that on the basis of the said agreement, close cooperation is continuing very smoothly in Seoul between the representatives of your Justice Department and officials of the Korean Justice Ministry.

It is my firm belief that an issue like the Tongsun Park case must not be allowed to affect unfavorably our longstanding friendly ties. The current situation in the United States leads us to assume that it will take still some time before we are finally able to put this unhappy case to rest. But I share your view that, if we both approach the remaining problems in the same spirit we approached the recent negotiations, we will succeed in overcoming them. In this connection, you may rest assured that my Government is prepared to extend adequate cooperation to the United States Congress in response to Speaker O'Neill's appeal.

I feel encouraged that you have reaffirmed the importance of our joint efforts for the maintenance of peace and security in Northeast Asia. I note with satisfaction that you have reassured that your Administration will make the best efforts to effectively implement those measures to compensate for the planned withdrawal of the United States ground combat forces from Korea according to our agreement reached last summer. I wish to emphasize strongly that, while certain adjustments may be considered in an effort to cope with changing international environment, we must not forget that any such adjustment should require close prior consultation between our two Governments on the basis of careful study and analysis of the situation.

The Republic of Korea in recent years has made considerable development in many fields as a result of effective and harmonious cooperation between government and people while

safeguarding its national security in the face of ever-present threat from communist north Korea. In order to sustain the momentum of development in the Northeast Asian area confronting the formidable communist forces, I hope that the American people and their leaders will have sympathetic understanding of our circumstances and render necessary support to all our future efforts toward this goal. You may rest assured that the Republic of Korea will fully reciprocate the same spirit of understanding and cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

**Telegram 066.539 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Folder 782/1978, Matter 220/F, Relations between North Korea and Socialist Countries (Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, GDR, Yugoslavia, USSR), January-December 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116486>.]*

TELEGRAM 066.539

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Constantin Oancea; comrade Director Ion Ciubotaru)

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: the visit to the DPRK of the Soviet delegation led by D. Kunaev (January 18-22, 1978)

Date: February 2nd, 1978

Classification: Secret

On January 30th, 1978, in a discussion with V. Nanu, the Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy to Pyongyang, B. Pimenov, recounted that both the Soviet and the [North] Korean delegations were, in general, satisfied with the visit to the DPRK of the party and state delegation led by D. Kunaev, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. [North Korea] granted the Soviet delegation the attention it deserved. The [North Korean] delegation [included] two members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Pak Seong-cheol and Kae Eung-tae [sic].

Throughout the discussions, the heads of the two delegations presented briefs on topics which were not set before the meeting.

Therefore, D. Kunaev talked about the internal situation in the USSR, about the CPSU's activity and initiatives, and about the [role of the] Soviet government on the international stage – the struggle for peace, for détente, about USSR's relations with the US and about Soviet-Korean relations. The head of the Soviet delegations, Pimenov added, said that Soviet-Korean relations [were] good; the Soviets are content with the status of [Soviet-Korean] relations. At the same time, he added that 'in the area of bilateral relations, especially in the area of political relations, there are still many reservations.' D. Kunaev expressed his regret that on the territory of the DPRK, many embassies disseminate propaganda materials which criticize a third country.' When asked [about this], the Soviet delegation said that [it was referring to] those publications which contain criticisms and labeling against the USSR, disseminated by the Chinese and Albanian embassies.

In turn, Pak Seong-cheol, without mentioning the problems brought up by D. Kunaev, talked about the specific conditions of the DPRK – as a divided country – which leave a deep mark on the domestic and foreign policies of the country, on the life of the Korean people.

Talking about the reunification of Korea, the head of the Korean delegation reiterated the well-known position on the North-South dialogue, cross-recognition, simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the UN, or the separate admission of South Korea to the UN.

Mentioning the Vietnamese-Cambodian and the Ethiopian-Somali conflicts, the head of the Korean delegation mentioned that 'the DPRK does not want to lose any friends, that it is doing its best to have good relations with all states.'

The Workers' Party of Korea and the Korean government think that any conflict can and must be solved peacefully, through negotiations.

With respect to the Vietnamese-Cambodian military conflict, after mentioning that the DPRK has good relations both with Vietnam as well as with Democratic Cambodia, Pak Seong-cheol said that 'it is necessary for the two sides to solve their differences through negotiations. Presently, it would be [appropriate], the North Korean government believes, that Vietnamese troops withdraw to their position before the beginning of hostilities, to clean up (completely evacuate) the disputed areas by the side [occupying them], and then to sit down at the negotiations' table.

On the occasion of the reception of the Soviet delegation by the head of the DPRK, D. Kunaev gave [Kim Il Sung] a letter from Leonid Brezhnev which [contains], among other things, [a renewal of] the invitation to President Kim Il Sung to make an official friendship visit to the USSR. President Kim Il Sung thanked for the invitation and mentioned that 'if no extraordinary events occur, it would be possible for the visit to take place in 1978.'

No economic bilateral issues were raised during the talks.

On the occasion of the aforementioned visit, the following [matters] were agreed upon:

The plan for liaison [work] between the CPSU and the Workers' Party of Korea for 1978, which includes: a Workers' Party of Korea delegation will go to the USSR for an experience exchange in the area of machine-building, and a CPSU delegation will visit the DPRK to study [North Korea's] experience in the field of organizing and undertaking the socialist competition, achieving the technical, cultural, and ideological revolutions, mutual visits of journalists to the party press departments, as well as exchanges of groups of activists. The plan for cooperation between friendship associations between the two countries, which is to be signed in a very near future in Moscow.

Signed  
Dumitru Popa

**Telegram 066.566 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 February 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Folder 782/1978, Matter 220/F, Relations between North Korea and Socialist Countries (Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, GDR, Yugoslavia, USSR), January-December 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116402>.]*

TELEGRAM 066.566

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrade Director Ion Ciubotaru)

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Subject: DPRK-PRC relations

Date: February 2nd, 1978

Classification: Secret

The DPRK's relations with the PRC, a neighboring country, with [a record] of cooperation and traditional friendly relations, a great power with influence in the region and in the world [in general], [is given] particular attention in the foreign policy of the Korean government, having a special place in the foreign relations of the DPRK.

[Judging] by the number of delegations, the level and attention with which these delegations are received [reciprocally], the magnitude of celebrations marking historic events and the [achievements] of the peoples of the two countries, mutual promotion, the PRC enjoys one of the top positions in DPRK's foreign relations with other countries.

Six of the approximately 10 Chinese official delegations which visited the DPRK in 1977, among which two were delegations of the Sino-Korean Friendship Association, the delegation of Xinhua [news] agency, the military delegation, the delegation of the telecommunications ministry, etc., were received by President Kim Il Sung (the largest number of delegations received in one year from one single country).

Moreover, several Korean delegations which visited the PRC – the Workers' Party of Korea delegation, led by Kim Gi-nam, member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, editor-in-chief of Nodong Sinmun, the delegation of the Academy of Science of the DPRK – were received by people in the party and government leadership of the PRC. Such receptions are regarded as reciprocal special attention given to delegations, to relations between the two countries.

The PRC has promptly reacted to DPRK initiatives regarding the reunification of Korea, offering constant support to the Korean government's position on the reunification of the motherland.

Although on average the DPRK pays great attention to its relations with the PRC, we noticed that in its foreign relations, the DPRK seeks to preserve some sort of equilibrium in its relations with the PRC and the USSR, alternatively tilting towards one and the other (a [phenomenon] which can be [measured] in the number of contacts, their level, the attention with which delegations are received, the portrayal of such visits in the media, etc.).

At the same time we noticed that the positive political attitude and appraisal given by the DPRK towards PRC's policies have constant preponderance.

[Judging by] the available information, one can say that, overall, political Korean-Chinese relations are better than Korean-Soviet relations, which Korean-Soviet relations are richer than Korean-Chinese relations in other sectors.

With respect to Sino-Korean economic relations, in a conversation with Ambassador Dumitru Popa, the Chinese Ambassador to Pyongyang, Lü Zhixian stated that these [economic relations] do not meet the level of political relations between the two countries.

After tedious negotiations, in March 1977, [the DPRK and the PRC] signed a long-term agreement for 1977-1981. The volume of Sino-Korean trade reached approximately 630 million Swiss francs, out of the total 820 million Swiss francs, with China covering 330 million Swiss francs out of the total 400 million Swiss francs it committed to, and the Koreans covering 303 million Swiss francs out of the total 420 million Swiss francs it committed to. Chinese export dues were caused by the hardship [encountered by] China's economy after the 1976 earthquake and the internal economic strife triggered by the actions of the 'Gang of Four.'

Currently, the PRC is granting the DPRK technical assistance with building a refinery with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons of crude (a quantity annually exported by China to the DPRK).

The Koreans are pushing the Chinese to increase crude exports to the DPRK, but the PRC is not in a position to give an affirmative answer (crude consumption per capita in the DPRK is higher than crude consumption per capita in China).

Currently, negotiations on the signing of the Korean-Chinese commercial protocol for 1978 are being carried out. The main issue is the pricing mechanism.

As far as [the future development] of Korean-Chinese relations are concerned, we believe that as no major changes will occur in the region, these relations will have a normal evolution, in accordance with the past record.

Signed  
Dumitru Popa



**Interoffice Memorandum from James S. Suterrlin to Rafeeuddin Ahmed, “North Korean Memorandum of 1 February 1978,” 9 February 1978**

*[Source: “Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

DATE: 9 February 1978

TO: Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed  
Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General  
Offices of the Secretary-General

THROUGH:

FROM: James S. Sutterlin, Chief (initials)  
Political Affairs Division

SUBJECT: North Korean Memorandum of 1 February 1978

Attached is a brief summary of the memorandum issued by the North Korean Government of 1 February 1978 of which a copy was transmitted to the Secretary-General by the North Korean Acting Permanent Observer in New York.

The memorandum constitutes a heated attack against the idea of UN membership for the two Koreas or recognition of both Koreas by third countries. Since the United States has been notably silent on this subject lately and is clearly preoccupied with other aspects of the Korean situation, the motivation of the memorandum is unclear. The oblique reference to the Third World and the rather surprising appeals to the socialist and non-aligned countries could suggest that there exists some interest in pursuing the idea of recognizing South Korea while maintaining relations with North Korea. The memorandum is more understandable if this is the current North Korean concern.

SUMMARY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF 1 FEBRUARY 1978

The United States sought first to achieve domination in all of Korea through military means. After having been defeated in war, however, it has reshaped its policy and is seeking to achieve its goals by splitting Korea and keeping it divided. In this the United States is assisted by Japan and the puppet regime in South Korea.

At the present time the “splittists” are seeking to create an international climate for the acceptance of two Koreas through the scheme of cross recognition and by legalizing the division of Korea through the United Nations. Under this cross recognition scheme, those countries which recognize the North would also recognize the South and vice versa. Secretary Kissinger's statement at the 30th session of the General Assembly is quoted that if “North Korea and her allies improve relations with South Korea, the United States is ready to take similar action with

North Korea”. Efforts have been made to infiltrate Third World countries with this idea. Advocates of the cross recognition concept claim that “international mediation” by the big powers is a reasonable way to guarantee peace in Korea and settle the question of Korea’s reunification.

This is an entirely false theory. Talking of international mediation on Korea’s reunification is contrary to the will of the Korean people who are determined to solve the question of reunification independently. Maneuvers to have the two Koreas admitted to the United Nations are intended to further the division of the country and will inevitably fail. Nevertheless, efforts continue and there is now also a scheme to support the admission of South Korea. If South Korea is admitted separately or North and South Korea together, Korea’s division will be permanently fixed.

The US is continuing to seek to maintain its domination over South Korea and the permanent division of Korea through a policy of so-called equilibrium of strength. It is making enormous quantities of arms available to South Korea as “compensation” for the withdrawal of US ground forces. Even so, the South Korean regime is trying to prevent the withdrawal by claiming that there is increased tension in the area.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea appeals to the socialist and non-aligned countries and to all peaceloving countries to reject cross recognition, UN membership and all other manifestations of the “two Koreas” plot. The Korean people hope especially that the American and Japanese people will struggle against the two Koreas policy.

**Unofficial Translation of the Yugoslav Minutes of Conversation between President Carter and Yugoslav President Tito, 7 March 1978**

*[Source: Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia, Office of the President, AJ-837, I-2/73-1, Visit of Josip Borz Tito in the USA, 6-9 March, 1978, Notes of Conversation. Translated for CWIHP by Branka Bogetic.]*

Participating in the discussions from the Yugoslav side were: S. Kraigher, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic (SR) Slovenia, M. Minic, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, J. Vrhovec, member of the Council of the Presidency of SFRY, D. Delovski, Ambassador of SFRY in the U.S., Dr. B. Pavicevic, President of the Montenegrin Academy of Arts and Sciences, B. Badurina, Chief of Cabinet of the President of the Republic, D. Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Maksic, Advisor of the President of the Republic for Foreign Affairs, B. Mandic, Press Advisor of the President of the Republic, Z. Kostic, Personal Secretary of the President of the Republic and S. Starcevic, Managing Director of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

Also participating in the discussion from the American side were: U.S. Vice President Walter F. Mondale, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant for the National Security of the U.S. President, U.S. Ambassador to SFRY Lawrence Eagleburger, George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and other functionaries of the White House and the Department of State.

Interpreter: Liana Ocokoljic  
Stenographer: Tea Tos

[...]

**JIMMY CARTER:** ... Regarding North Korea, Edvard Kardelj informed me about it when he visited the U.S. We would like the question of South Korea to be resolved, because 50-60 countries recognize South Korea, and it has representatives in a number of international bodies. Our wish is for talks to be held between North Korea and South Korea as our friend and there be an exchange of opinions. I know that you were in North Korea and that you held discussions with them, so I would be grateful if you could give me some advice or message.

**JOSIP BROZ TITO:** I think that perhaps you could first read some positions from the message of President Sadat. (Some parts of the message of President Sadat were read)

**JIMMY CARTER:** This will be of great help to us since we have good relations with President Sadat. Would you be kind enough to tell us something about North Korea.

**JOSIP BROZ TITO:** Kim Il Sung sent me a message when he heard that I am traveling to the U.S. However, there is nothing new in this message beyond what I had already conveyed to you. The most important point is that they want to have a dialogue, but not in the presence of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee. He emphasized that they do not think, if a confederation or federation is created, to impose their system on South Korea, but that they want cooperation because it is one people and two states. They also think that there could not be two

Koreas in the United Nations and that everything must be done to arrive at a peaceful solution of that unity in federation or confederation.

If you ask me, I think it would be good if there would be a dialogue because many things would clear up that way, rather than through intermediaries.

I could not tell you anything more on that question. I conveyed to you what Kim Il Sung told me. We have good relations with North Korea, and we do not have relations with South Korea. It would be good for that question to be resolved in such a way that things do not escalate between the two Koreas. For example, if there would be a meeting, not at the top level but at the level of delegations of both countries, they could discuss that question. That way, it would be possible to discuss the situation in much more detail, and what needed to be done would become clearer. Of course, the U.S. should provide its delegation as the third party.

JIMMY CARTER: That is a good advice.

Mr. President, we will see each other tonight at dinner and on Thursday again at the meeting. I think that we can break discussion for lunch.

I would like to express great pleasure that we had an opportunity to discuss with you three important questions, but we will continue with discussions so that I can inform you about the progress with Begin and also to inform you about the progress we made with Soviet Union regarding the ban on the nuclear arms, about the question of the Indian ocean, etc.

I think that your Minister of Foreign Affairs and our Secretary of State could consider what could be done about the proposal that you made in regard to North Korea.

JOSIP BROZ TITO: I will inform Kim Il Sung about it, but I need to know if you agree with my proposal, and I will also propose it to him.

JIMMY CARTER: It would definitely be better for us and for South Korea that our delegations meet at the lower level; later we shall see.

JOSIP BROZ TITO: This could probably take longer, and probably it will be so, but there will be some results as well.

JIMMY CARTER: I hope that you will continue to assist us in this.

Thank you, we will see each other again.

(Conversations completed at 12:35 hours).

**Notes on a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary-General on 3 March 1978 at 11.30 a.m., 8 March 1978**

*[Source: "Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0026-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

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8 March 1978  
FMG/SR  
Bf: RA/AR/MKP  
cc: Messrs. Urquhart  
Buffum

Notes on a meeting in the office of the Secretary-General on 3 March 1978 at 11.30 a.m.

Present: The Secretary-General  
Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel (signature)

Foreign Minister Tong Jin Park of the Republic of Korea

Ambassador Duk Choo Moon Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

1. The question of Korea

The Foreign Minister said that there were no new developments and his Government would not take an initiative to put the question of Korea on the agenda of the 33rd Session of the General Assembly. The economic development of his country was good, of course, his Government was concerned about maintaining a peaceful situation with regard to North Korea. The United States intended to withdraw 6,000 troops in the course of this year and his Government hoped to be able to take the the [sic] compensatory measures necessary to maintain the balance. He believed that world opinion would be in favour of having the two Koreas as members of the United Nations, as advocated by his Government on an interim basis until unification can be obtained. Of course, his Government knew that the Security Council constituted a hurdle in this regard. The Foreign Minister added that his Government would pursue efforts aiming at a resumption of the dialogue with North Korea. He mentioned that his country, with some success, had tried to improve trade relations with Eastern European countries.

In the Ambassador's opinion Peking's influence in North Korea was still greater than Moscow's. The Soviet Government resented, what they felt was a lack of gratitude for the important assistance it had extended to North Korea in the past. In her public statements China very strongly defended North Korea's point of view in order to avoid the impression that she could be influenced by her policy vis-à-vis United States.

North Korea had serious foreign exchange difficulties and was forced to considerably reduce her foreign service. Altogether it now played a less active role on the international scene.

## 2. Namibia

The Foreign Minister informed the Secretary-General on the occasion of the forthcoming Special Session, his Government would announce financial assistance to training programmes for Namibia.

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, KS, US  
SUBJECT: US-KOREAN RELATIONS: A DELICATE PRIOR

SUMMARY: MOOD IN KOREA REGARDING RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. IS IN PERIOD OF CHANGE. RECENT EVENTS AND FUTURE ACTIONS COULD COMBINE TO LIMIT FUTURE U.S. ROLE. WHILE U.S. POLICY DECISIONS WILL BE MAJOR FACTOR IN LONG-TERM, STYLE WITH WHICH WE CONDUCT RELATIONSHIP AND ACTIONS WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTROL CAN INFLUENCE SHORT-TERM PERCEPTIONS IN A POSITIVE MANNER. END SUMMARY.

1. THE COUNTRY TEAM HAS OVER THE PAST TWO MONTHS BEEN LOOKING CLOSELY AT THE MOOD IN KOREA WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE U.S. AND PROPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. FOR MOST KOREANS, THE BEDROCK OF THE US/ROK RELATIONSHIP IS THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF KOREA. WHILE WE DO NOT FIND OURSELVES AT A CLEAR-CUT CROSSROAD, WE DO SENSE A GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ALIENATION OF KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION IF WE FAIL TO MANAGE EVENTS IN THE COMING YEAR IN A MOST CAREFUL MANNER.

2. EVERYONE SPEAKS OF 1977, WITH THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE, TRADE RESTRAINTS, HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE, AND THE TONGSUN PARK AFFAIR, AS THE LOW POINT IN US/ROK RELATIONS. THE MOST OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT TO BE FOUND IS THAT THE PAST YEAR CONSTITUTES ONLY ONE OF MANY FLUCTUATIONS IN A SOUND AND ONGOING PARTNERSHIP. MANY KOREANS, HOWEVER, ARE BEGINNING TO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE FABRIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP HAS NOT BEEN OR IS NOT BEING FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED IN WHAT MOST WOULD VIEW AS A NEGATIVE DIRECTION. TO A COUNTRY AND PEOPLE LONG ACCUSTOMED TO LOOKING TO THE U.S. AS THE ONLY LIGHTHOUSE IN AN UNCERTAIN AND DANGEROUS SEA, SUCH A CHANGE CAN EVOKE WIDE SWINGS IN OPINION.

3. WITHOUT A DOUBT, MOST, FROM PRESIDENT ON DOWN, IF NOT ALL KOREANS SEE THE NEED IN 1978 TO REFURBISH THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. FOR KOREA THE U.S. REMAINS THE GUARANTOR OF SECURITY IN THE FACE OF AN ENEMY BACKED BY TWO LARGE AND CONTIGUOUS ALLIES. YET FOR MANY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF RETAINING THE RELATIONSHIP IS BEING PERCEIVED AS INCREASINGLY HIGH AND THE FRUSTRATIONS INVOLVED IN MEETING U.S. DEMANDS ARE MOUNTING. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEMAND FOR TESTIMONY BY A FORMER AMBASSADOR, KIM DONG JO, IS A GOOD CASE IN POINT.

4. PRESIDENT PAK, FOR HIS PART, HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS AIDES THAT HE WANTS NO AVOIDABLE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN THE COMING YEAR. HE PERSONALLY DIRECTED THAT THE PARK TONGSUN MATTER BE CLEARED UP BY THE END OF 1977. HE ALSO DIRECTED THAT ACTION BE TAKEN ON THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, IN ARGE

PART AS A RESULT OF U.S. URGING, WHICH SAW ALL HONGDONG PRISONERS, EXCEPT KIM TAE JUNG, OUT OF CONFINEMENT ON THE LAST DAY OF 1977. IT REMAINS A REASONABLE PROSPECT THAT FURTHER STEPS IN THIS AREA WILL TAKE PLACE IN 1978. PRESIDENT PAK HAS ALSO SUPPORTED TRADE LIBERALIZATION WHICH MIGHT BENEFIT U.S. SUPPLIERS AND HAS ON EVERY POSSIBLE OCCASION REAFFIRMED THE ROK COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED CLOSE TIES WITH THE U.S.

5. THERE IS, HOWEVER, INCREASING CONFUSION REGARDING THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF U.S. POLICY. EVEN AT MORE SOPHISTICATED POLICY LEVELS; AND CERTAINLY FOR THE MAN ON THE STREET, THE U.S. FORM OF GOVERNMENT LEADS TO DOUBT OVER WHO, IN FACT, ENUNCIATES POLICY. THERE IS FURTHER CONCERN OVER WHAT IS SEEN AS AN INABILITY OF THE U.S. TO REACH FINAL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS. AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHETHER ON THE COMPENSATORY MEASURES REQUIRED FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL OR ON PARK TONGSUN NEVER SEEM TO BE FINAL. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS, WITH ITS MANY DIVERSE VOICES, CAUSES PARTICULAR CONCERN. THE DEGREE TO WHICH CONGRESS DICTATES TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE PUBLIC CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO BRANCHES, MOST RECENTLY OVER TESTIMONY BY FORMER AMBASSADOR KIM DONG JO AND EXIM BANK LEAS, IS NOT UNDERSTOOD. WHETHER CONGRESS WILL, IN FACT, APPROVE THE POLICY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH RESPECT TO COMPENSATION FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER FORMS OF IMPLEMENTING THE US/ROK COMMITMENT REMAINS MUCH IN DOUBT. IT IS PERHAPS NATURAL THEN THAT OTHER STATEMENTS BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, E.G., REAFFIRMATION OF THE U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT, ARE VIEWED WITH SOME DEGREE OF SCEPTICISM. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS WITH ONE VOICE.

6. U.S. ACTIONS ARE ALSO SEEN AS RUNNING CONTRARY TO KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF THEMSELVES AND WHAT THE U.S. IS TELLING THEM ABOUT THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE US/ROK RELATIONSHIP. KOREANS ARE INCREASINGLY PROUD OF WHAT THEY ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMICALLY AND THEIR ABILITY TO STAND ON THEIR OWN TWO FEET. THIS PRIDE IS BOLSTERED BY A PERCEIVED SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL OPINION TOWARD A GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE ROK AS A VALUABLE PARTNER, PARTICULARLY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE U.S. HAS IN THE

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PAST FOSTERED THIS PRIDE BY ITS URGING OF GREATER SELF-SUFFICIENCY ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE -- A RECOGNITION OF THEIR GROWING ABILITY -- AND ITS STATEMENTS THAT THE US/ROK RELATIONSHIP IS EVOLVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A MORE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP. IN THIS RESPECT, THE RATIONALE FOR TROOP WITHDRAWAL HAS DRAWN HEAVILY UPON THE FACT THAT GROWING KOREAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY MAKES THE RETENTION OF THESE TROOPS NO LONGER NECESSARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE EYES OF MANY KOREANS, RECENT U.S. ACTIONS, IN PARTICULAR IN THE PARK TONGSUN AND KIM DONG JO CASES, HAVE LACKED FULL RESPECT FOR KOREAN SOVEREIGNTY. RECENT THREATS TO WITHHOLD ECONOMIC AND SECURITY AID UNLESS CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE TAKEN ARE LIKEWISE RECEIVED AS AN AFFRONT TO NATIONAL PRIDE AND AS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO KOREA VIS-A-VIS OTHER NATIONS. KOREANS SEE THEIR COUNTRY BEING AGAIN PLACED BY THE U.S. BACK IN THE FORMER ROLE OF "SMALL BOY" AND BEING CALLED TO KNEEL. THE RESULTING VIEW OF U.S. ACTIONS HAS BEEN SUMMED UP BY MANY IN THE PHRASE "GREAT POWER CHAUVINISM".

7. TO MANY OF THE OLDER GENERATION, WHOSE ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S. AND GRATITUDE FOR PAST ASSISTANCE IS EMBARRASSING AT TIMES, ANY SHIFT IN US/ROK RELATIONS IS UNSETTLING AND THE CURRENT TREND IS CAUSING A PROFOUND RE-EXAMINATION OF THE LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT. GIVEN THEIR OWN BACKGROUND, THEY ARE UNABLE TO CONCEIVE OF THE RECENT SERIES OF ACTIONS AS UNCOORDINATED. RUN TO ITS EXTREME, THIS LINE OF THOUGHT TAKES SOME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. MUST HAVE DECIDED THAT DISENGAGEMENT FROM KOREA IS REQUIRED. ALL RECENT U.S. ACTIONS, EVEN THOSE WHICH ON THE SURFACE APPEAR TO THE CONTRARY SUCH AS TEAM SPIRIT, ARE THEN SEEN AS A MEANS TO THIS END. (IT HAS EVEN BEEN SUGGESTED THAT TEAM SPIRIT IS TO BE USED AS A COVER TO WITHDRAW ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES.)

8. TO THE YOUNGER GENERATION, WHO DO NOT RELATE TO THE KOREAN WAR AS DO THEIR ELDERS, THE COURSE FOLLOWED RECENTLY BY THE U.S. IS INDUCING INCREASED NATIONAL PRIDE AND AN INCREASED DRIVE TO STAND ALONE. THEIR VERY GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE LONG-TERM NATURE OF THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP HAVE RECENTLY LED TO SOME OF OUR YOUNGER KOREAN STAFF BEING QUESTIONED BY THEIR FRIENDS AS TO WHY THEY ARE WORKING FOR THE U.S.

9. NONE OF THE ABOVE SHOULD BE READ AS INDICATING A RAPID SHIFT AT THE PRESENT AWAY FROM THE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. HOWEVER, THE CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT FOR SUCH A SHIFT IF WE DO NOT TREAT OUR RELATIONS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WITH CARE. MOST KOREANS, THOUGH UNCOMFORTABLE, ARE STILL TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE EXPLORING OPTIONS TO MINIMIZE THEIR LOSSES SHOULD THEIR WORST CASE SCENARIO PROVE CORRECT. THUS, THE THREE MAJOR THEMES WE DETECT IN

CURRENT ROK POLICY PERHAPS REFLECT THE AMBIVALENT FEELINGS OF MANY OF ITS CITIZENS. THESE THEMES ARE: A) REFURBISH THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.; B) INCREASE ROK SELF-SUFFICIENCY; AND C) REDUCE THE LEVEL OF DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S.

10. SHORT OF AN OVERT BREAK WITH THE U.S., A COOLING IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE ROK, WHILE HAVING OBVIOUS DANGERS FOR THE ROK, ALSO CONTAINS PITFALLS FOR THE U.S. AT PRESENT WE ENJOY A POSITIVE REPUTATION AND FAVORABLE POSITION IN THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY AFFLUENT KOREAN MARKET. THIS POSITION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ERODED. AT PRESENT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE KOREAN DECISIONS ON STRATEGIC PLANNING, IN PARTICULAR IN THE FIELDS OF ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THIS INFLUENCE WOULD DECREASE AND AFFECT NOT ONLY OVERALL U.S. STRATEGY BUT DIRECTLY THE ABILITY OF THE CINCPAC TO CONTROL EVENTS. FINALLY, AND IMPORTANTLY, THE U.S. POSITION IN KOREA IS TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE A FUNCTION OF OUR ROLE IN KOREA. TO THE DEGREE THAT OUR ROLE IN KOREA CHANGES INADVERTENTLY WE ARE PLACING ASIAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. POLICY AT HAZARD.

11. THE SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CONFUSION AND CONCERN OVER THE REAL THRUST OF U.S. POLICY DOES NOT FUNDAMENTALLY RELATE TO THE CURRENT POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THESE ARE RECEIVED BY KOREANS AS BASICALLY ACCEPTABLE, IF NOT PREFERRED, EVEN GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWAL AS LONG AS THE COMPENSATORY PACKAGE IS FULFILLED. WHAT THE KOREANS ARE WAITING TO JUDGE IS HOW WE PERFORM RATHER THAN WHAT WE SAY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM WELL AWARE, PARTICULARLY FROM MY RECENT CONSULTATIONS, OF THE PROBLEMS WE FACE IN IMPLEMENTING THESE POLICIES IN THE SHORT TERM GIVEN IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE.

12. THE FOCUS THEN MUST BE ON WHAT ACTIONS ARE FEASIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HERE I BELIEVE WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS BY A COMBINATION OF IMPROVED STYLE AND SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE IN AREAS WHERE THE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY LIES WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

13. STYLE - THE MANNER OF DEALING WITH A PROBLEM, WHETHER EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS OR APPROVING A JOINT STUDY OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, CAN

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HAVE IMPORTANCE WELL BEYOND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE AT HAND. SEVERAL RECENT CASES COME READILY TO MIND, SUCH AS EARLY PRONOUNCEMENTS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND THE HANDLING OF "DEFECTION" CASES. IN THESE AND OTHER CASES OUR STYLE OF ACTION INCREASED THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM. WE ARE SEEN AS USING HEAVY-HANDED TACTICS TO CALL KOREA TO HEEL, AND OFTEN PERCEIVED AS HAVING MADE NO CHANGE IN OUR POSTURE DESPITE POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA ON THE PART OF THE ROK. WE MUST BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE EXPOSED MANY RAW NERVES IN THE ROK OVER THE PAST MONTHS AND TAKE CARE NOT TO UNNECESSARILY IRRITATE THEM FURTHER. WE NEED AT ALL TIMES TO REMIND OURSELVES OF THE IMPORTANCE OF "FACE" IN KOREA AND THE KOREANS RESISTANCE TO OVERT PUBLIC PRESSURE. THEY WILL COOPERATE WITH-US, IF WE APPLY PATIENCE AND GENTLE, BUT FIRM STROKING TO OUR EFFORTS. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE SEEN THAT MATTERS HANDLED IN A QUIET, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL MANNER HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF RESOLUTION.

14. SUBSTANCE -

A) GREATER ATTENTION AND A MORE RAPID AND FORTH-COMING POSUTRE ON QUALITATIVE ARMS IMPROVEMENT WILL PAY LARGE DIVIDENDS IN STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE RECENT VISIT BY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY WAS EXCELLENT IN THIS REGARD. THE REVIEW ACCOMPLISHED WITH ROK OFFICIALS AND THE LIST OF AREAS FOR POSSIBLE COOPERATION WHICH WAS DEVELOPED PROVIDE AN OUTSTANDING BASIS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS. WE MUST MOVE FORWARD NOW TO IMPLEMENT ACTIONS IN THE AREAS DISCUSSED.

B) INCREASED VISITS BY RANKING US OFFICIALS CAN ALSO HELP MAINTAIN THE POSITIVE THRUST OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, THE VISIT BY DR. PERRY ALREADY MENTIONED AND THE MOST RECENT VISIT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DUNCAN IN CONNECTION WITH "TEAM SPIRIT" HAVE BEEN INDEED VALUABLE. MANY KOREANS HAVE NOTED THE DECLINE OF LATE OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS AND THE TENDENCY NOT TO INCLUDE THE ROK ON THE ITINERARY EVEN WHEN SUCH VISITORS ARE IN THE AREA. PROMISES OF A CONTINUED STRONG COMMITMENT CARRY MORE WEIGHT WHEN MADE HERE RATHER THAN IN WASHINGTON AND WE REQUIRE SUCH OVERT EXPRESSIONS OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT, FOLLOWED BY EARLY APPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SOME SPECIFIC PROJECTS DISCUSSED WITH ROK BY VISITOR.

C) CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONSULATIONS CAN HELP TO DIRECT OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP INTO PROPER CHANNELS. EARLY PLANNING FOR THIS YEAR'S SCM, WHICH WILL BE IN THE US AND A FIRM COMMITMENT THAT SECRETARY BROWN WILL ATTEND WILL KEEP RELATIONS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. THE KOREANS WILL BE WATCHING FOR ANY SIGN THAT WE MIGHT BE DOWNGRADING THE

SCM. WE CAN ALSO USE THE EMERGING JOINT COMMAND STRUCTURE TO ENGAGE IN STUDIES OF REQUIREMENTS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THUS DEMONSTRATE OUR CONTINUED DEEP INTEREST IN THE SAFETY AND STABILITY OF THE PENINSULA.

D) SIGNIFICANT LEVELS OF JOINT EXERCISES AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY TO SUCH OPERATIONS WILL ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT AREA WHERE WE CAN MAKE CLEAR THE U.S. COMMITMENT. THE RECENT "TEAM SPIRIT" EXERCISE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE VALUE OF THIS LINE OF APPROACH AND FUTURE EXERCISES ARE ESSENTIAL.

E) WE ALSO MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT ALL U.S. ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS KOREA, E.G., ACTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AREAS, ARE FACTORED BACK TO SEE WHAT THEY MIGHT SHOW ABOUT THE FIRMNESS OF THE U.S. SECURITY COMMITMENT. WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO USE KOREA AS AN EASY OUT IN THE SOLUTION OF SUCH PROBLEMS.

F) DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO REDUCE TENSION ON THE PENINSULA SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE RENEWED ATTENTION. ROK OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED OVER WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO LAUNCH A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE AIMED AT A PRO-PYONGYANG POSITION BEING ADOPTED AT NAM MEETING THIS YEAR. THE ROK IS OF COURSE CONSIDERING COUNTER MOVES, BUT WE SHOULD ALSO BE MOVING FORWARD ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT.

15. AS STATED IN THE BEGINNING, THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO POINT OUT AN IMMINENT CRISIS, BUT RATHER TO HIGHLIGHT THE POTENTIAL FOR UNFAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE PRESENT AND TO SUGGEST WAYS, WITHIN THE REAL CONSTRAINTS WHICH EXIST, IN WHICH WE CAN REDUCE THIS POTENTIAL. IN SUM, WE NEED AT THIS POINT IN TIME TO BE SURE THAT WE DO NOT INADVERTENTLY ADD THAT SMALL STRAW WHICH COULD BREAK THE CAMEL'S BACK.  
SNEIDER

Copy Carter 1.1h...

**Notes on a Meeting Held in the Secretary-General's Office on Monday, 20 March 1978, at 4.45 pm**

*[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0075-08, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

Present:                               The Secretary-General

  H.E. Mr. Han S. Hae, Permanent Observer of  
  the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

  Mr. Kim Chung Gol, Minister Counsellor

  Mr. Rafeeuddin Ahmed

The Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that he had sought this meeting to inform the Secretary-General about the new situation in the Korean Peninsula. The United States and South Korea had undertaken a huge military exercise from 7 to 17 March in which 107,000 troops had been mobilized. His Government regarded this as an act which gravely threatened peace in Korea. In their view, the main purpose for this exercise was to prepare for an over-all nuclear war in Korea.

In the exercise, lance missile units were deployed from the US mainland. B-52 strategic bombers were also brought in from the mainland, as well as from Japan and Okinawa. The nuclear aircraft carriers Midway and Kitty Hawk were involved. As distances in Korea are short, any small incident of violation of territorial sovereignty could lead to over-all warfare. DPRK armed forces had been instructed to take immediate action in case of any such violation.

It was noteworthy that this military exercise followed a statement by US authorities that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in Korea. Article 13 of the Military Armistice Agreement stipulates that no military forces or combat units will be introduced into Korea – changes could take place on a one-to-one basis. Contrary to this provision, the US has brought in 21,000 fresh troops, including the 25th infantry division from Hawaii. This was the Division which had been initially involved when the Korean War had first erupted.

The Secretary-General interjected that he had thought that the US was withdrawing its forces from South Korea. The Ambassador replied that the US was using the signboard of withdrawal but in fact was carrying out a grave impeachment of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It was also a violation of the United Nations Charter and the resolution adopted at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly.

It should be noted that these joint exercises under the UN flag by US forces stationed in Korea mobilized about 20,000 troops and under the US flag by US forces from the mainland and Hawaii and necessitated that the UN take serious note of these exercises. The Secretary-General stated that he took note of the information provided, adding that he would be willing to take this up with the SU Government to see what they had to say if this were to be the wish of the DPRK

authorities. The Ambassador agreed this would be a good approach so that these dangerous games are not repeated as the situation is grave and every effort must be made to prevent another war. The Secretary-General responded that he could not imagine that the US would wish to have another war, although he had noted the information provided by the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(signature)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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1978

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March 30, 1978

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: HIRC Request for Our Responses  
to North Korean Approaches

At hearings on March 9 before the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee Chairman Lester L. Wolff asked Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke if this Administration's replies to North Korean messages proposing bilateral United States-North Korean talks could be made available to the Subcommittee on an executive basis. The query came in response to a statement by Mr. Holbrooke that the North Koreans had made several approaches through intermediaries and that we had responded to the effect that the United States would not discuss matters directly with North Korea unless the South Korean Government were a participant in those talks.

In view of the misunderstanding expressed by some Committee members about our position vis-a-vis talks with the North, we believe it would be useful to give the Committee pertinent portions of President Carter's letters to Presidents Bongo and Tito in 1977, together with a February, 1977 Aide Memoire to the Pakistanis on this subject. We would furnish them as requested on a classified basis. A proposed letter along these lines to Congressman Wolff is attached for clearance.

*Peter Tarnoff*

Peter Tarnoff  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Draft letter to Congressman Wolff

DRAFT LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's appearance before your Committee March 9, you requested that this Administration's responses to North Korean proposals for bilateral talks be made available to the Committee on an executive basis. There have been three such approaches by third parties since the end of 1976, and I am attaching pertinent portions of the responses we made in each case.

The first overture came in November, 1976 during the Presidential transition period via Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto. In a letter to then President-elect Carter, Bhutto conveyed a message from Kim Il-song which reiterated the standing North Korean position with regard to direct contacts with the United States. President Carter's response to Bhutto was a courteous, pro forma reply. Subsequently, in February 1977 the Pakistanis followed up with an Aide Memoire delivered to our Embassy in Islamabad, indicating continued North Korean interest in direct contacts with us. The first item attached is the Aide Memoire which we sent in reply.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 51600 NSC RE NLC-00-14  
BY J DATE 7/6/00

The second and third approaches came via letters to President Carter in May and October, 1977 from President Bongo of Gabon and Yugoslav President Tito respectively. President Bongo's letter attached a standard statement of North Korean positions by Kim Il-song which expressed a desire to enter direct, bilateral negotiations with the United States for the purpose of concluding a peace treaty. President Tito's letter reiterates this North Korean proposal, then goes on to report Kim Il-song's opinion that tripartite negotiations between the United States and the two Koreas will only be possible when South Korean President Park is removed from power. President Carter's responses to Bongo and Tito on these points are quoted in the attachment. Discussions with the Yugoslavs are continuing.

I hope these responses are helpful to the Committee. In view of the sensitive nature of the exchanges, we request that this letter and its attachment be treated as secret material.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary  
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

President Carter's responses to  
Presidents Bongo and Tito

MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 31, 1978

RB

See April 7 reply to State

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DAVID AARON

FROM: MIKE ARMACOST *MR*

SUBJECT: HIRC Request for Our Responses to North Korean Approaches

When he appeared before Wolff's Asian Committee of the HIRC on March 9, Dick Holbrooke commented that we had responded to several indirect North Korean approaches through intermediaries to the effect that we would not discuss matters directly with North Korea unless the South Korean Government were present. Lester Wolff then asked for copies of the Administration's replies to North Korean messages. State has proposed that we give the Committee the pertinent portions of President Carter's letters to Presidents Bongo and Tito in 1977, together with a February 1977 aide memoire to the Pakistanis on this subject.

I see no reason whatsoever to comply with State's request. The President's communications with foreign leaders are privileged. They will cease being so if we begin passing them around on the Hill, even on a classified basis. I see no reason why State should not characterize the substance of the exchanges in a letter to Wolff. But I would recommend against the inclusion of any quotations from the letters themselves.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to tell State that they may explain the pertinent history of these exchanges to Congressman Wolff in some further detail, but may not pass on portions of Presidential correspondence to the Congressman.

*indeed RB*

Approve

*[Handwritten signature]*

Disapprove

~~SECRET~~

5/16/80 NLC NLC-00-14  
 7/6/80

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 31 March 1978**

[Source: Roll 2008-29, File 03, Frames 8-11, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Receiving telegram

Category : \_\_\_\_\_  
File No. : UKW - 03114 Date : 311805  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs Cc (copy) : \_\_\_\_\_  
From : Ambassador to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Related report file no. : *Dae* [Embassy] WUK – 03107, 03127

On March 20, Councilor Kim Jae-Sung visited J. Thorold Masefield, acting director of the Far East Bureau and had conversation with him. Below is the report of what was confirmed during the meeting and what the acting director stated about the political circumstances in Communist China and the North Korean puppets:

1. Premier of the Communist China Hua Guofeng's visit to the North Korean Puppet Regime:

a. No other information has been obtained so far except that the Communist Chinese government has never mentioned anything about the rumor of Hua's visit to the North Korean puppets and the their ambassador to Beijing told that he knew nothing about it at a cocktail party. However, the British Foreign Ministry analyzed that Hua's visit to Pyongyang would be likely to take place.

b. Background of the Possibility of the Visit

i. The Hua administration aims to strengthen the foreign relations which had been stagnant for a long time, and, especially, to keep the friendly relations with neighboring countries, focusing on surrounding Asian countries, in order to check the rise of Soviet influence. In an effort to do so, Deng Xiaoping has already visited Burma and Nepal, and Li Xiannian went to the Philippines and Bangladesh. In the same way, there is no reason why Hua should not visit the North Korean puppets. Moreover, the competition between Communist China and the Soviet Union for influence over the North Korean puppets makes their position all the more important.

ii. One of the reasons for Hua's visit to the North Korean puppet regime being a strong possibility is that he plans to visit Yugoslavia, Romania, and France in Europe as well as one or two countries in the Arab region in the near future to strengthen its external relations. No Chairman of the Communist Party of China has gone abroad for last twenty years so far; accordingly, Communist China has been paying keen attention to the overseas trips of the chairman of its party. Therefore, Communist China would consider the North Korean puppets the place to "rehearse" before visiting other countries and therefore Hua is most likely to visit the North Korean puppets first.

iii. The British acting director of the Far East Bureau, however, thinks that Hua's visit to the North Korean puppets will not bring any changes in Communist China's policies toward the Korean Peninsula.

2. Kim Il Sung's Visit to the Soviet Union



a. According to the report by the British Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet government sent an invitation to Kim Il Sung, and he accepted the invitation. Thus, Kim's visit to the Soviet Union is certain to happen; its time is predicted to be this spring or fall.

b. As for the background of Kim's visit to the Soviet Union, it is generally analyzed that the Soviet Union, which has been in competition with Communist China in terms of relations with the North Korean puppets, needs to revive relations with the North Korean puppets, which have been long stagnant or strained, in response to Communist China's active approach to the North Korean puppets. In particular, this measure is taken in consideration of the strategic importance of the North Korean puppets in the expansion of its influence in the Far East. The North Korean side wants to build active relations with the Soviet Union in order to keep the equidistant diplomacy between China and the U.S.S.R., to secure economic assistance and military aid from the U.S.S.R., and to preclude Korea from approaching the U.S.S.R.

c. According to the report by the British Ambassador to Moscow, relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean puppets had been extremely stagnant so far. However, it is slowly "strengthening" as follows:

i. On January of this year, D. Kunayev (or D. Kunaev), a member of the Soviet Politburo, headed the Soviet delegation to visit Pyongyang. During his visit, Kunayev delivered the Order of Lenin to Kim Il Sung, following up on the decision to bestow him with the Order in 1972.

ii. The cultural agreement between the both parties was renewed to extend.

iii. And trade between the two countries has increased.

### 3. Communist China's Foreign Policy:

The British acting director visited Korea, Japan, and Communist China from the end of February to the middle of March. During his visit to Communist China, he came in contact with officials in charge of the economy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and commented as the following on what he detected from those contacts with Chinese officials:

a. Communist China will pursue active economic and technological cooperation with the West in order to achieve the economic development plan announced this year; thus, Communist China is expected to strengthen its external relations.

b. There is no change whatsoever in Communist China's anti-Soviet attitude. For example, the Chinese officials vehemently denounced the Soviet Union's penetration into Africa.

c. Communist China is expected to actively maintain economic and technological cooperation with Japan. Communist China considers its geographic conditions, economic necessity of Japan while Japan considers Communist China's supply of oil energy as well as long-term marketability.

d. Within this year, Communist China's Foreign Minister Huang Hua is certain to visit Great Britain. In the acting director's observation, Huang's planned visit will be concretized when (illegible) Cortazzi from the British Foreign Ministry visits Communist China in April.

e. As Geng Piao was appointed as vice premier of the State Council in charge of foreign

affairs at the Fifth National People's Congress in February, Huang's status as foreign minister has been that much more weakened.

#### 4. Prospect of the Attitude of the North Korean Puppets

The British acting director exchanged views with Japanese foreign ministry officials in a discussion on possible attitudes of the North Korean puppets and summarized its main points as follows:

a. The North Korean puppets are predicted to take one of the following attitudes:

i. To keep the status quo

ii. To attack Korea before any further enhancement of Korea's national strength, using a certain pretense

iii. To strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and China and at the same time pursue economic and technological cooperation with the West in concentrating on economic development in order to prevail over Korea in economic competition.

b. If North Korea chose the second method, the Soviet Union is sure to assist North Korea immediately. However, the Soviet Union is deeply involved in Africa now and its relation with the United States is increasingly becoming strained due to the situation in the Middle East and arms race. Under these situations, the Soviet Union will not want to confront the United States with new conflicts on the Korean Peninsula; thus, the Soviet Union will force the North Korean puppets to accept a truce under conditions deemed appropriate. Communist China's current preoccupation with domestic problems such as economic development and military modernization and rivalry with the Soviet Union would prevent it from offering substantial aid to the North Korean puppets. Therefore, As a result, it is certain that the North Korean puppets would not be able to accomplish its aims.

c. Accordingly, the most probable choice would be the third method. The North Korean puppets are likely to strengthen relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union and actively pursue cooperation with the West for economic development. Recent rumors of the North Korean puppets' new foreign loan and of pursuing a contract for offshore developing oil are analyzed as a way to induce economic and technological cooperation with the West. (Europe Division 3, North America Division 2, Information Division 2, Korean Central Intelligence Agency)

COPY CARTER LIBRARY

JOHN GLENN  
OHIO

1967  
COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS  
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

EXECUTIVE

F03-2/C082-2  
C082-2

April 4, 1978

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
First Floor, West Wing  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Zbig:

I have been increasingly concerned about the  
troop withdrawal from Korea, and have sent the enclosed  
letter to the President.

The White House has been notified that a copy of  
my letter to the President is being forwarded to you for  
your information.

Best regards.

Sincerely,



John Glenn  
Chairman, Subcommittee on  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Enclosure

What will be interpreted as U.S. renegeing on the promised military aid package is of intense interest not only to Korea, but also to our other East Asian allies who too often put their own erroneous interpretation on our Korean moves as part of a larger general disengagement of American interest from East Asia in the wake of Viet Nam.

In a recent report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee titled "U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea", my principle recommendation was:

"1. The Senate should review the military transfer authorization based upon the political-military needs of the area and avoid linking it to the bribery scandal. Long-term U.S. political alignments in the whole East-Asian region must not be jeopardized for the short-term objectives of the scandal investigation."

But that is our current situation.

In his speech to the Asia Society last June, Secretary Vance noted three goals in our Korean policy:

- the renegotiation of the truce agreement;
- dual admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations; and
- normalization of relations between the two Koreas.

Obviously, such steps take time, and little or no progress has been made on these goals. Thus, it is possible that a deferral of the withdrawal could be used as minimal leverage to return the two Koreas to a negotiating table. I frankly doubt that anything more could be expected in the present environment.

Deferral of the withdrawal would also allow time to pursue this issue with the Chinese. Clearly, the PRC may be the key to unlocking a truculent North Korea. Thus, any improvements in Sino-American bilateral relations may enable us to obtain greater Chinese assistance with the Korean problem.


In closing, let me reaffirm my support for the basic policy. It is a justifiable position over time, given our desire to minimize the prospects of involvement in another Asian war on the ground, given the potential power of the South with its economic and population advantages over the North, and the need to enable the ROK to militarily and psychologically stand by itself.

But I feel withdrawal must be tied to the actual, in-place ability of the South Koreans to take over, and not to a timetable set prior to what has developed into a different and unforeseen situation.

For the reasons indicated above, my major concern is that 1978 is not the year to begin the drawdown.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Glenn", written in a cursive style.

John Glenn  
Chairman, Subcommittee on  
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

**Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Abramowitz), and Michael Armacost and Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), 4 April 1978**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 324-337.]

Washington, April 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Issues for Decision on Korea and China

We need to make decisions on pressing, interrelated issues in East Asia: (1) the Korean troop reduction/compensatory package; (2) determining a strategy for seeking to normalize relations with the PRC; (3) deciding whether to seek normalization before or after the fall elections; (4) selecting the weapons to be sold to Taiwan; and (5) deciding whether to continue the case-by-case approach for expediting technology transfers to the PRC.

*Context*

In making decisions on these issues, a few considerations ought to be kept in mind:

—Our aim is to create the ratcheting effect we were able to obtain in 1971–1973 when our moves toward both Moscow and Peking were carefully staged to be reinforcing. Success depends upon our capacity to weave our China and Soviet policies into a coherent strategy. This means that our strategy for normalization cannot be considered in isolation, but must be jointly designed with our Soviet policy. Neither our Soviet nor our China policy should be derivative of the other; the two must proceed in tandem.

—*It is important that we act boldly.* The public increasingly assesses the Administration as lacking the capacity for dramatic and decisive moves. Our prestige in Asia is low, and we need to act to reverse this before the impression is irretrievable. In response, we believe we should select issues on which we can act boldly and which fall preeminently in the executive domain.

—*Our Korean policy is at a critical juncture.* Congress may not pass the equipment transfer legislation; Jaworski seems to hold the key at this time, and we cannot expect him to be helpful.<sup>1</sup> If we go through with the first withdrawals without the compensation package, the JCS would withhold their support. As long as the Korea issue remains, it will be hard for us to generate broad support for our Asia policy.

<sup>1</sup> Leon Jaworski was then serving as the Special Counsel for the House Ethics Committee. He had threatened to ask Congress to cut off all aid to Korea unless that government cooperated with his investigation into influence-buying.

—*Our China policy is stalled*; there *never* seems to be an opportune time to move forward, and this robs our diplomacy of much needed flexibility.

—In the region as a whole—most notably in the eyes of the Japanese— our policies are perceived to lack decisiveness and a sense of priorities. Yet, our policies in Asia are basically sound and opportunities exist for consolidating our favorable position in the region. Proper management of our relations with Seoul, Peking, and Taipei in the months ahead will test our ability to exploit the opportunities that beckon.

### *I. Korea*

The equipment transfer legislation is stalled on the Hill, and our refusal to discuss modifications of the withdrawal plan is becoming a high-risk policy.

—Jaworski still maintains a link between aid to Korea and Congressional access to Kim Dong-jo.

—The pertinent Subcommittee Chairman will not supply a strong lead on the transfer bill. Glenn because he favors postponement; Wolff because he is skittish for personal reasons.

—Most legislators prefer to finesse the Korean issue in this election year.

—Neither the HIRC nor the SFRC has reported our proposals out of committee. Even if the committees act favorably, we must expect floor amendments designed to reduce aid or block passage of the entire package.

In short, we will soon have to expend major political capital to protect the Korean package, and success is far from assured. A defeat would be devastating for our credibility in Asia. We have consistently told the Koreans and Japanese that our aid would accompany the withdrawals. JCS support for the withdrawal plan is contingent upon honoring that pledge.

We cannot delay action on this matter for long. Support units are rapidly being withdrawn. House markup on the transfer bill is scheduled to begin in mid-April. If we are to introduce or accept modifications, they must be decided upon probably within the next two weeks.

### *The Options*

We have four options. No matter which one is selected, we will have to seek planned levels of FMS credits for Korea in FY 79 (i.e., \$275 million). These credits support the ROK Force Improvement Plan which runs through 1981. The ROK expects them. They serve our own interest in making South Korea more self-reliant. They are virtually “cost-free” to the U.S. taxpayer.

—*Option 1: Proceed to withdraw the first brigade by December 31.* Even if Congress fails to act on the transfer legislation, the equipment of the withdrawing units would be placed in storage pending Congressional action.

This option would put Congress on the spot, and might prompt them to act responsibly on the transfer package this year. Unfortunately, such action would not be assured, and this approach entails very high risks of exacerbating the Administration's relations with Congress, reinforcing Japanese doubts about our reliability, exposing to both North and South Koreans the hollowness of our pledges and evoking criticism from conservatives for taking actions which endanger the safety of remaining U.S. forces.

In order to offset these disadvantages, we might either deploy additional air units to Korea (e.g., a squadron of A-10 "tank killers"), [*less than 1 line not declassified*] or declare that there would be no more withdrawals until Congress acts on the package.

Each of these steps raises its own problems. Deployment of A-10s may not be cost-effective and would adversely affect our European plans and promises. [*1 line not declassified*] hence delay in those redeployments would not provide much general reassurance. The attachment of conditions to the withdrawals may have real merit but may not be believed.

—*Option 2: Postpone the December 1978 withdrawal of the combat brigade until 1979—either by six months or a year.* The decisions would be justified on grounds that Congress cannot address Korean policy while the Tongsun Park affair hangs over it.

This option would remove a contentious issue from the Congressional agenda. It would enable us to avoid expending political capital on a possibly losing issue. It would be reassuring to the ROK and other Asian allies. It would not require the President to change the basic contours of the withdrawal decision. Withdrawals would still be completed within four to five years; the basic effect of the delay would be to "backload" the withdrawals further. It would permit us to reintroduce the transfer package next year in an atmosphere hopefully less dominated by the specter of Korean influence-peddling.

Such delays could, of course, be interpreted as giving Congress a veto over any withdrawals, embolden opponents to employ additional delaying tactics next year, and invite charges of another Administration flip-flop.

—*Option 3: Seek Congressional authority to transfer only that equipment associated with the withdrawals in the first phase (the "Stratton Solution").* The value of this equipment is estimated at \$96 million (as opposed to the current request for \$800 million in transfer authority).

This option would increase the possibility of favorable Congressional action prior to the withdrawal of the first increment by allowing Congressmen to "vote against Korea," by slashing the transfer amount. Yet it meets our need to balance withdrawals with improvements in South Korean forces and should reassure the Koreans and our other Asian allies.

It also has several *disadvantages*. We cannot be certain that Congress would approve even a scaled-down request, in which case the effect would be even more devastating internationally than if Congress had simply failed to act on our original proposals.



In addition, Stratton sees it as a means to avoid Congressional endorsement of the overall withdrawal program. It would establish a precedent for incremental Congressional review of the withdrawal program and would open the Administration to an annual legislative authorization of transfer plans. Such an approach would reduce U.S. and Korean capabilities to effectively plan and implement the interrelated elements of the plan (withdrawal, training, equipment transfer, and ROK force improvements) which have varying lead times.

—*Option 4: Delay all further withdrawals until Congress acts.* Postponing the withdrawal of all remaining elements of the first increment for six months or one year would offer essentially the advantages and disadvantages of Option 2. It would be most satisfactory from the perspective of our allies and our military but would give maximum encouragement to Congressional initiative and those who oppose the withdrawal.

[...]

### *The Chances of Success*

Is this scenario realistic? We do not know. We note these caveats:

—We do not know if the Chinese will agree to normalization on our terms. Our minimum demand on Taiwan—that we continue to sell arms after normalization—may be more than they are willing to accept. The Taiwan issue is an extraordinarily difficult one for them, and a weak or divided leadership may not be able to accept a normalization agreement which did not discernibly increase the chances of an eventual recovery of Taiwan. If the PRC cannot agree to our minimum demands, normalization obviously cannot occur, and we can either seek to sustain the relationship at its present level or seek to advance the normalization process through unilateral means.

—We doubt the Chinese will respond favorably to all our ancillary initiatives. They may wish to defer certain types of exchanges until after normalization.

—Our sequence will be more difficult on the Hill if the Korean troop reduction/compensatory package problem has not been resolved, at least for this year.

[...]

**Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Summary of April 11, 1978, Meeting on Korea, and China," 11 April 1978**

*[Source: Serial Xs-[8/77-8/78], Box 36, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

[...]

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Summary of April 11, 1978, Meeting on Korea, and China

I met with Cy and Harold to survey our China and Korea policies. We are particularly interested in ascertaining your reaction to our discussion on technology transfer summarized below:

On Korea. We face considerable problems on the Hill in securing the arms transfers which we have pledged to the Koreans would accompany the withdrawal. JCS support of the withdrawal is contingent upon Congress approving equipment transfer to the ROK. However, Koreagate has made many Congressmen to vote for any aid to Seoul this year. Cy, Harold, and I sought to identify the alternatives if we conclude the compensatory package will not be obtained: (1) to persist in withdrawing the entire brigade in December, as now planned; (2) to begin the first withdrawals in December but prolong the process; or (3) to be willing to delay the withdrawals at the behest of Congress if the leadership thinks the climate for the transfer legislation would be greatly improved by early next year. We will hold a meeting with the JCS and Stan Turner before presenting an options paper to you. (S)

[...]

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Summary Minutes of the April 11, 1978 Meeting on Korea and China

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense  
Richard Holbrooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs  
David Aaron, National Security Council  
Morton Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs for ISA  
Michael Armacost, Staff Member, National Security Council  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, National Security Council

DATE, TIME, AND PLACE: April 11, 1978, 3:15 p.m. - 4:35 p.m.  
The White House (Situation Room)

## I. KOREA

Dr. Brzezinski: Each of the items on the agenda falls under a particular person's jurisdiction, so let's have different people lead the discussion for each topic. Harold, why don't you lead the discussion on Korea?

Secretary Brown: The key situation involves the Hill, where the prospects for obtaining the compensatory package which we initially sought are not good. Lester Wolff is talking of \$400 million, O'Neill wants the whole Korea problem to go away, Zablocki is for the whole package but is dubious of his ability to get it. Meanwhile, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will begin hearings on Monday, and will act on FMS. The Kim problem remains. Jaworski's attitude is firm, but Duncan is a friend of Jaworski and may try to talk to him.

Secretary Vance: Don't have him do that. The more pressure on Leon, the more he digs in. We must keep working on him indirectly. If we can get him to answer questions under oath in Korea, then Leon might accept it. That is not impossible. There may be a long-run solution to the Jaworski problem, but we must assume for purposes of today's discussions that the problem will continue during the coming months.

Secretary Brown: There are four options. The fourth one is out, and Option 1 is what Carter leans to. But it is not clear that that option is viable on the Hill, and even if it were, it would come at considerable cost to our credibility in East Asia.

Dr. Brzezinski: I do not understand why Option 1 would have a negative reaction with the Chinese.

Secretary Vance: The way I see it, this is a no-win proposition. If the President delays, then he intensifies his image as a vacillator at home. If the President persists with the reduction, he loses in his credibility abroad. But if the Congress took the initiative -- say the leadership came to the President and requested delay in the reductions -- then the Congress would be in front and the President would be seen as concurring with the Congressional initiative.

Mr. Holbrooke: If we followed the Stratton compromise -- at least a portion of it, namely a partial transfer -- we could go along. But there are two problems:

- There is no guarantee of success. The Stratton compromise may not pass.
- If the President goes Option 1, then he will be hard hit on the Hill. Option 3 will help in Congress. The only support which has been viewed for the President's policy and for withdrawals even without the compensatory package has been voiced by Steve Solarz.

Secretary Brown: Option 2 goes better with normalization. Option 3 is possible, but one cannot do it with normalization.

Dr. Brzezinski: Why not Option 1? Why isn't Option 1 compatible with normalization'?

Mr. Oksenberg: For two reasons:

-- Our credibility in East Asia will suffer, and we must move forward on normalization against a strong posture in the region.

-- Second, any promises we make to Taiwan about post-normalization relations with it will ring hollow.

Mr. Abramowitz: With Option 1, we also will face the resignation of our military commander. Vessey is likely to resign under those circumstances. Second, we will lose the JCS.

Mr. Aaron: Why delay? The watchword of this Administration is becoming "delay." Let's get to the heart of this matter. Congress is playing for a veto over the troop reduction. It is opposed to the President's policy.

Secretary Brown: That is not correct. The Congressional attitude is due to a combination of factors. If it were just the withdrawal, there would be no problem. The withdrawal has become linked with "Koreagate." With the passage of time, the mood on the Hill will change.

Mr. Holbrooke: That is correct. I have talked to the Congressional people daily. I have breakfast with Congressmen every morning. The issue is not the withdrawal but the Tongson Park affair. Because of "Koreagate," Congressmen fear political retribution at the polls if they vote for any sort of aid to Korea this year.

Secretary Brown: One has to recognize the military consequences of taking out our first combat forces. They guard key mountain passes. When they have been taken out, if adequately armed replacements do not take their place, we will be susceptible to conservative charges in the U.S. that we are threatening the safety of the remaining two brigades. The entire brigade must be removed within a month. We cannot leave a portion of the brigade there. If a portion is withdrawn, how secure will the other portion be? If the equipment has not been transferred to the Koreans, then the Koreans will not be able to take the place of the withdrawn American forces.

Mr. Holbrooke: That is the key point. If the U.S. arms remain in our possession and cannot be transferred to the Koreans, once our brigade is withdrawn a gap will exist. There is no easy solution to this problem. Lead time is required in order to transfer the equipment to the Koreans and train them to use it.

Mr. Aaron: Can't that training of Korean forces go on anyway? If there is an emergency, the President could hand over the equipment immediately. And if there is an emergency, the U.S. troops that have been withdrawn could immediately be returned.

Mr. Abramowitz: But the question of deterrence remains. And combat capability of the Koreans would be reduced until the arms are actually in their hands.

Mr. Aaron: Let's be clear about one thing. It is not the President but Congress which is not fulfilling our commitment. Congress is not leading. The President remains credible on this issue. We cannot announce a delay of the planned first reduction which would in any manner enhance the President's credibility. We will never be able to get Congress to vote for the compensatory package, because the fact is that Congress does not want the withdrawal.

Mr. Holbrooke: But that is not the way it would be perceived in East Asia. The question is whether the President is in command of his own house. We can't tell East Asians that the President is credible and the lack of American credibility is with the Congress. That simply underscores the weakness of the President.

Dr. Brzezinski: This may have been the wrong decision, but now it has been made. We cannot afford to go back on it.

Mr. Armacost: Option 2 does not advocate a change in policy. The policy is to reduce all combat forces within five years. We are not recommending a change in that policy. We are recommending additional backloading of the withdrawal.

Mr. Holbrooke: It is wrong to say that Congress does not want to withdraw. Particularly the bulk of the new people in the House are very much for the withdrawal. But at least 100 votes in the House have been lost on the compensatory package simply because of Koreagate. Because of the atmosphere this year. Further, to proceed with withdrawal without the compensatory package would torpedo a normalization effort. Normalization will then be seen as part of a retreat policy from East Asia.

Mr. Armacost: The only reason the Japanese eventually were brought along was because of the compensatory package. To proceed without it will have extraordinarily adverse consequences in Japan.

Secretary Vance: I share all these concerns. We also must recognize we are running out of time with this Congress before it adjourns. The agenda is heavy; the arms sales package in the Middle East, energy, the Greek-Turkey issue, the Canal, and so on. If we could get the leadership to come to us and request us to delay the first withdrawal, if Byrd, Baker, Zablocki, and O'Neill ask us to do this, then I think it will not be perceived as additional Presidential vacillation but as a Presidential response to Congressional pleas.

Dr. Brzezinski: Why couldn't the Presidential response to such a Congressional plea be that while we will withdraw, we will only withdraw a part of a brigade? And we would extract a firm commitment from the leadership on the Hill that the compensatory package issue would be forthrightly addressed as soon as the new Congress convenes. That way the President would be able to indicate his continued resolve to proceed with the withdrawal.

Mr. Holbrooke: But the price of a partial removal without compensatory measures still would be too high. It would still cause great consternation in Japan, for example.

Dr. Brzezinski: Well, perhaps we should send a message to the Japanese on this. Look, I have been a strong advocate of an equal partnership with the Japanese. But I must say that on the Korean matter, the Japanese have been as helpful as the Germans on the neutron bomb. As far as I am concerned, we should begin on schedule. I know I am going against my Asian experts on this, but I think that the President cannot change his decision. He must begin as scheduled, but he could slow down the pace of withdrawing the first brigade. How many battalions are in a brigade?

Secretary Vance: Three, except in a reinforced brigade, which has four.

Dr. Brzezinski: Fine. Then the President could announce, perhaps in response to Congressional urging, that he will withdraw but one battalion in December. He will withdraw a second battalion in, say, March and a third battalion in May. In my opinion, delay -- Option 2 -- is worse than a slowed-down and stretched-out withdrawal.

Mr. Armacost: But this does not remove a contentious issue from a crowded agenda. In fact, this proposal may make the issue even more contentious, for the Chiefs may claim that we are endangering the remaining American forces and demonstrably lowering our preparedness on the Peninsula.

Mr. Holbrooke: The Brzezinski proposal would also initiate withdrawals without any quid pro quo to the ROK, We still are going against our commitments to the Koreans.

Mr. Aaron: How about when it comes to Taiwan? If the President demonstrates that lack of Congressional action can deter him from a course of action to which he is committed, then won't Congress believe it can exercise a veto power on normalization as well?

Mr. Abramowitz: Our discussion has proceeded on the assumption that FMS will be voted. What if that promise is also not fulfilled?

Mr. Holbrooke: If we select Option 2, Bennett believes we will be able to get the \$275 million in FMS from Congress. If we pursue another option, FMS may also become vulnerable.

Secretary Brown: We are, in briefs playing "chicken with Congress." I am not opposed to that if one feels confident one has the votes and the capacity to deliver. But I am not sure that situation exists. We seem to be willing to act more firmly with Congress than with the Russians.

Dr. Brzezinski: Precisely what has the President pledged to do?

Secretary Brown: He has stated that we would withdraw 6000 military personnel by the end of 1978, including one combat brigade, In fact, nearly 3000 support troops have already been withdrawn, and all that remains to be withdrawn is the combat brigade. We could use the withdrawals of the support forces as indication of the President's determination to pursue this course.

Dr. Brzezinski: Well, the question is whether the President is willing to defer the withdrawal of the entire brigade and perhaps take out one battalion instead, postponing the withdrawal of the remaining battalions by at least three months. This is the option to which I am inclined.

Secretary Brown: I support Option 2.

Secretary Vance: I support Option 2.

[...]

Secretary Brown: Now that we have worked our way through the agenda, how does the Korean issue appear? How is the reduction related to our normalization effort?

Dr. Brzezinski: On postponement versus stretch-out, you mean?

Secretary Brown: Yes, we should not make uncompensated withdrawals from Taiwan and Korea simultaneously.

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MEMORANDUM

2293

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 19, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: MIKE ARMACOST *MA*

SUBJECT: Korean Troop Withdrawals

Attached is the Options Paper for the President which resulted from this afternoon's meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to the President at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~ GDS

*Jy 2/2/96*



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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON2293 RC~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Korean Troop Withdrawals

We urgently require your decision with respect to how we should proceed in handling Korean equipment transfer legislation, and the phasing of U.S. troop withdrawals in Korea.

At the PRC meeting this afternoon -- attended by Warren Christopher, Charles Duncan, David Jones, Stan Turner, Hamilton Jordan, and myself -- we reached consensus on these points:

-- We cannot expect Congress to pass the full \$800 million equipment transfer program this year. (In presenting the withdrawal plans to President Park and Fukuda we indicated that this was an integral part of our plan);

-- A major lobbying effort would be required to secure even a partial transfer package, and such an effort would complicate achievement of our other legislative priorities;

-- We would expose ourselves to excessive foreign policy and political costs if we implement the scheduled withdrawal of ~~combat elements~~ of the 2nd Division in 1978 without having first secured Congressional approval of compensatory measures. (All of us agree that the non-combat units should come out this year). the 1st Brigade

-- Given this prognosis we should make some adjustments in our troop withdrawal schedule and wait until next year to seek the equipment transfer authority.

-- In return for taking the pressure off Congress on this issue at present, we should seek assurances from the leadership that they will (1) support FMS credits for the ROK this year, and (2) give priority to

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Jay 2/2/96

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the equipment transfer bill when the new Congress convenes next January.

The Options

You could adjust the withdrawal schedule <sup>of combat units</sup> in three alternative ways: ~~completion of the ongoing~~

(1) Defense and the JCS recommend ~~the withdrawal of 2,600 non-combat troops by the end of 1978, while~~ postponing the withdrawal of ~~all~~ <sup>any</sup> 2nd Division combat elements plus all non-divisional combat units (principally an Honest John battalion) for 6-12 months. They believe the withdrawal of any combat units without parallel compensatory measures would raise major uncertainties regarding our intentions in Asia while evoking strong criticism in this country. (The JCS feel very strongly on this point.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

(2) State also recommends delaying withdrawal of the first combat brigade for 6-12 months, but would be prepared to withdraw the Honest John battalion if that were considered useful politically in demonstrating that your withdrawal plan is going forward, though on a slightly revised timetable. Cy believes these adjustments would preserve our ability to complete the ground force withdrawals as earlier contemplated, maintain our defense posture, and ease the tremendous strains which Korea has caused this Congress.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

(3) I prefer to proceed to ~~withdraw the non-combat elements as scheduled,~~ withdraw one 2nd Division combat battalion in December, and delay the withdrawal of the other two ~~battalions~~ and the Honest John battalion by six months in order to provide Congress additional time to act on the equipment transfer bill. I believe this course of action will signal to Congress that we intend to follow through with our basic policy while mitigating the impact on Asia and buying some additional time on the Hill.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Whichever way you decide, we must coordinate this decision carefully with the Congress and our allies, while seeing that the rationale for any adjustment is fully understood by the press.

-- We should inform the Congressional leadership immediately of our intent to make some modifications in our withdrawal plan, and request that the House and Senate Sub-committees now marking up the Foreign Assistance

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

*not to give them a pocket veto but*  
~~SECRET~~

bill hold up their reports for several days until we can air this issue with the leadership and our allies. You should talk to Tip O'Neill and Bob Byrd about your decision this week.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

~~Our allies in South Korea and Japan will go along with these options. Option 1 would greatly relieve them, while Options 2 and 3 would exacerbate existing uncertainties about our intentions. We must notify them of any decision to modify our plans before it is publicly announced.~~

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

*of 16 2nd and 3rd Brigades*

-- Public handling of the issue should reaffirm your intent to complete ground combat troop withdrawals by 1981-82, and note that this further "backloading" of the withdrawal is being undertaken at the behest of Congress which is unable to address the security dimensions of the Korean problem soberly while the Tongsun Park affair hangs over its head.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

## Office of the White House Press Secretary

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THE WHITE HOUSE

## STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT

Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia are vital to our national interest. This nation is fully determined to maintain its commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

In announcing my decision to withdraw our ground combat forces from Korea over a 4-5 year period, I stressed that it was essential to improve South Korea defense forces so as to confidently maintain an adequate military balance on the Peninsula. I also announced that we will take other measures to maintain that balance, including increasing our air force in Korea in October of this year. I also asked the Congress last October to approve a program to help strengthen South Korean military capabilities, particularly legislation to authorize the transfer to South Korea of a significant portion of the equipment of our departing ground combat forces.

In view of the crowded legislative calendar and also because of other matters concerning Korea, there is a possibility that the Congress may not act now on this proposal. In the light of this development, I believe it prudent to adjust the scheduled withdrawals.

- The redeployment of non-combat elements will continue on schedule; 2600 such personnel will be removed by December 31, 1978.
- One combat battalion from the 2nd Division will be withdrawn from Korea in December; however, the other two combat battalions of the brigade slated for withdrawal this year will remain in Korea until 1979.
- The plan to increase the U.S. air forces in Korea will not be changed.

Peace and stability in Northeast Asia are vital to our national interest. I urge the Congress to enact as soon as possible the authorization for \$275 million in foreign military assistance credits for the ROK which I have also proposed, and to move expeditiously to deal with the \$800 million equipment transfer legislation.

# # #

## **The Overseas Visits of the Delegations of the North Korean Puppets (Analysis), May 1978**

[Source: “*Buk Han donghyang, 1978*” (“*Northern Trends, 1978*”), Roll 2008-30, File 04, Frames 46-49, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

[78. 5]

### The Overseas Visits of the Delegations of the North Korean Puppets (Analysis)

1. The North Korean puppet regime has dispatched 17 delegations composed of important figures to 48 countries from the beginning of the year 1978 to the end of April, 1978. During the same period of time in 1976, North Korea sent 30 delegations to 63 countries and in 1977, 12 delegations to 25 countries.

These visits are regionally divided into: 6 delegations to 15 countries in 1976, 4 delegations to 11 countries in 1977, and 6 delegations to 21 countries in 1978 to Africa; 6 delegations to 6 countries in 1975, 4 delegations to 4 countries in 1977, and 4 delegations to 10 countries in 1978 to Asia. Therefore, number of overseas visits by the delegations of the Korean puppets has increased significantly this year compared to 1977 (a total of 48 countries: a total of 25 countries). The total number of visits in 1978 represents somewhat of a drop compared to that in early 1976 prior to the 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State in Colombo (a total of 48 countries: a total of 68 countries). However, where the visits to Africa and Asia are considered, there has been an increase in the number of overseas visits compared to 1976.

2. The dispatches by the North Korean puppets of delegations in 1978 are divided into the following four categories depending on characteristics of the countries they visited:

a. To sustain and acquire forces supportive of the North Korean puppets within Africa and strengthen bilateral relations

i. Vice Premier Jong Jun-ki’s visit to six countries friendly to the North Korean puppets in West Africa (Mali, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, and Angola)

ii. Vice Chairman Pak Seong-cheol’s visit to four countries friendly to the North Korean puppets in East Africa (Zambia, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Tanzania)

b. To undermine forces supportive of Korea in the international community by visiting countries that have friendly relations with us or are improving their relations with us

i. Vice Foreign Minister Kil Jae-gyong’s visit to three neutral or pro-Korean countries in West Africa (Niger, Ghana, and Gambia)

ii. Roving Ambassador Jo Ki-il’s visit to eight pro-Korean or neutral countries in West Africa (Central Africa Republic, Cameroon, Zaire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Senegal, and Ghana)

iii. Vice Premier Kong Jin-Tae’s visit to four Southeast Asian countries (Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore)

iv. Vice Chairman Kang Ryang-uk’s visit to India and two surrounding countries (Nepal, and Bangladesh)

c. To target a direct influence on the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned

## Conference Coordinating Bureau

i. Vice Foreign Minister Ri Jong-mok's visit to four main members of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (Yugoslavia, Algeria, Sri Lanka, and Algeria [*sic*] [The fourth is assumed to be Afghanistan within the context.]

Particularly, Ri Jong-mok encouraged Algeria to submit a separate resolution regarding the Korean matter at the Coordinating Bureau meeting and requested Afghanistan to discuss the Korean matter at the Kabul meeting.

ii. Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry Son Chang-su's visit to two Latin American countries of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau (Jamaica and Peru)

d. To try to promote the proposal for the Confederal Republic of Goryeo and achieve direct negotiations with the United States

i. Director of the International Department of the Korean Worker's Party Kim Yeong-nam's visit to two Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia and Romania)

ii. Vice Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly Ho Jong-suk's visit to three Eastern European countries (Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland)

iii. Kim Yeong-nam's other visit to 4 Western European countries (Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain) is associated with their desire to increase contacts with their socialist parties or communist parties bandwagon on expansion of communist influence in Europe and establish the long-term groundwork for penetrating into the West.

3. Starting the end of this January through the beginning of May, the North Korean puppets have been conducting extensive overseas diplomacy, which is expected to be pursued even more aggressively with Vice Chairman Kang Ryang-uk's visit to pro-Korean or neutral Western African nations starting on May 5. Below are the common points made by the key figures of the North Korean puppet regime during their visits listed in the above:

a. Based on the so-called "memorandum" that the North Korean puppets announced on February 1, they denounce our efforts for simultaneous entry into the United Nations, cross-recognition, and a proposal for inter-Korean mutual nonaggression pact as attempts to perpetuate inter-Korean division.

b. North Korea condemns the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise, Team Spirit 1978, as warmongering moves, and slanders the announcement of U.S. plans for troop withdrawal from Korea as a deceptive ploy.

4. Considering the frequency of the overseas visits by the North Korean puppets in light of their policy towards the United Nations, their underlying intentions are as follows:

a. The North Korean puppet regime realizes that its supportive forces are dwindling in the Non-Aligned Movement due to our successful diplomacy towards the Non-Aligned Movement bloc.

Accordingly, the North Korean puppets are preoccupied with securing and reviving its supportive forces both on the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau

scheduled in May and the Foreign Ministers Meeting of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade, Yugoslavia at the end of July.

b. The North Korean puppets are expected to devote its diplomatic efforts at the Non-Aligned meetings to have provisions related to Korea adopted, which claim any foreign troops out of the Korean Peninsula, oppose any attempt to perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula (simultaneous entry to the UN and cross-recognition), and propose the Confederal Republic of Goryeo.

c. Depending on the outcome of the two Non-Aligned meetings mentioned above, if the North Korean puppet regime judges that there is a good chance of success in the United Nations General Assembly, they will likely raise the Korean matter for the first time in three years and attempt a confrontation of votes.

**Memo for Dr. Brzezinski, "Noon Notes," 3 May 1978**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00257. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00257.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00257.)]

Top Secret-Sensitive  
Contains Codeword

May 3, 1978

Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski

From: The Situation Room

Subject: Noon Notes

[...]

DPRK Official on Korean Reunification: [Redacted] a senior North Korean diplomat asserted that the reunification of Korea is a local issue which should be resolved by the peoples of the two Koreas. He said that so long as major powers seek to expand their influence in the area, the conflict will continue. He also downplayed any chance that the PRC will assist in the resolution of the Korean problem since it is only out to further its own policy goals, particularly the economic and social development of its people, and does not "understand the difficult and important problems" of the Korean dilemma. The real question to him is "which countries wish to keep Korea divided for their own interest and at the expense of Korean national development?"

[Redacted] the most important element for a solution is the total withdrawal of U.S. troops and the cessation of U.S. aid to South Korea. He said the DPRK regrets that the President, once in office, has backed off from his promise to withdraw U.S. troops. Admitting that he did not understand U.S. politics, he asserted that it is "not good to break promises," particularly since the DPRK has no foreign troops stationed on its soil. He brushed aside the suggestion that a U.S. withdrawal might lead to war between the two Koreas and maintained that Pyongyang is trying to negotiate -- not fight. He claimed the main obstacle is the "dictatorial government" in South Korea and condemned Japan for cooperating with the ROK.

[...]



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MILITARY BALANCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Central Intelligence Agency  
National Foreign Assessment Center

10 May 1978

*This conclusion is absurd.*

Key Judgments

The static military balance between North and South Korea alone now favors the North by a substantial margin. This represents a significant shift from the rough parity that existed eight years ago and results from successful North Korean efforts to acquire large quantities of weapons from the Soviet Union and China, to establish a large domestic arms industry, and to expand and modernize their armed forces.

In the critical areas of ground firepower and mobility, the North Koreans have moved well ahead of the South Koreans. The North has achieved an approximate two-to-one advantage in numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Moreover, the North has greatly reduced the South's longstanding advantage in military manpower and could have as many men under arms as the South by 1980.

The North also holds a substantial numerical edge in combat aircraft, but the South has better planes. The South probably has too few aircraft to accomplish both air superiority and close air support.

The ability of North Korea to translate its overall military advantage into a potent offensive against the South would depend to a large extent on achieving surprise. If the North did achieve surprise, the South might be hard pressed to stop the North Koreans before they reached Seoul. With adequate warning, however, South Korea could exploit its defensive advantage to blunt an attack.


This memorandum was prepared by the Regional Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Research in response to a National Security Council request.

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM  
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
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Neither navy would play a decisive role in a combat situation, but the North has a substantially larger navy and has a large edge especially in missile boats and submarines.

### Warning Time

The ability of the North Korean armed forces to translate their substantial military advantages into a successful invasion of the South would be dependent upon several dynamic factors, particularly surprise. If Pyongyang's forces achieved surprise, the South would be at a considerable disadvantage with its capital located only 38 kilometers from the Demilitarized Zone.

North Korea would have to covertly move forward large quantities of men and equipment to mass sufficient forces for a breakthrough of the South's forward defenses. Individual components of the North Korean armed forces are reasonably well trained and presumably would perform well in combat, but we believe the North Koreans would face command and control problems in orchestrating a large-scale offensive involving a large portion of their air and ground forces.



On the other hand, with adequate warning and prepositioning, South Korea probably would prove a formidable adversary despite its shortcomings in firepower, mobility, logistics, and command and control. South Korean forces are well-trained, highly motivated, and would have the advantage of fighting behind prepared defenses.

### Weapons Acquisition

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the North acquired weapons from China and the USSR on a massive scale, enabling the North Koreans to greatly expand their armed forces.

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Chinese military aid to North Korea has, however, dropped off sharply from the large quantities of equipment supplied between 1971 and 1975. ~~China delivered no major military equipment to North Korea in 1976 and provided only 24 MIG-19s and four or five Hainan-class subchasers in 1977. We know of no major deliveries of weapons from the USSR since 1973, but the Soviets have probably continued to provide technical assistance to North Korea.~~

North Korea is still dependent on the USSR and China for aircraft, missiles, and sophisticated electronics. The Chinese, however, cannot supply the advanced equipment that North Korea now needs to match the quality of weaponry the US is providing South Korea, and the USSR appears to be unwilling to provide advanced weaponry.

At the same time the North was acquiring Chinese and Soviet weapons, it built a large arms production capability. The North Koreans have achieved a far greater degree of military independence than the South; they now manufacture virtually all of their own ground and naval equipment, ~~including tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, patrol boats, and diesel attack submarines. Despite recent improvements, the South's fledgling arms industry has a long way to go before it achieves parity with the North.~~

#### Outlook

We expect the North Koreans to continue their efforts to strengthen their armed forces. Despite the economic setbacks the North Koreans have experienced, we believe their defense plants will remain in production.

We believe the North will continue to emphasize military training as a means of improving the skills and capabilities of its forces.

For its part, South Korea's military capabilities are also likely to improve. The South is currently in the third year of its five-year, \$5 billion, Force

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Improvement Plan [REDACTED]

Seoul is currently debating whether to continue to increase the military share of GNP to as much as 7.5 percent in 1981 from its present 6.6 percent or to reduce it to as low as 6.0 percent. With expected GNP growth of 10 percent per year, these options would allow between a one third and two thirds rise in real military spending by 1981. A compromise solution will probably allow military expenditures to grow by close to 50 percent by 1981.

As a result of these efforts, the South probably will begin cutting into the North's lead by the early 1980s. By allocating additional funds to the military, Seoul could probably speed up its timetable for overtaking the North and assuming a greater role in its defense.

SECRET

## THE POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA

Central Intelligence Agency  
National Foreign Assessment Center

10 May 1978

## Key Judgments

A round of national elections--beginning on 18 May with the selection of 2,583 electors who will choose a head of government later this year--represents something of a political benchmark for President Pak Chong-hui. Participated in freely by the voters, the 18 May election in particular will confirm the willingness of the public to live with the strong, centralized form of rule that Pak represents.

The political calm that is expected to prevail next week, and during National Assembly elections in late 1978 or early 1979, reflects in part Seoul's success in controlling critics of the government. As important, however, are the positive steps President Pak has taken in recent years to attract public support. South Korea's dramatic economic growth is the most important of the factors underpinning Pak's support; for most Koreans today the restriction of political liberties is not a key issue.

The Election Schedule

About 7,500 nonpartisan candidates will compete on 18 May for six-year terms as unpaid members of Korea's electoral college, the National Council for Unification (NCU). It will select the president--presumably Pak--some time between 1 July and 26 November. Formal campaigning for the NCU is banned until a week before the election, but prospective candidates

This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to an NSC request.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM  
RPM-78-10185 (25X1)

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are already active. The opposition political parties would like to see a boycott of the NCU vote, but voter interest appears sufficient to make the election a success, and protest activities are not likely to affect its smooth operation.

Although voting for the NCU offers the public only an indirect method of choosing its national leadership, the election is symbolically important. Most obviously, it will serve to affirm popular acquiescence to the authoritarian style of government that Pak introduced in December 1972 when his new Yushin Constitution instituted the system of indirectly selecting the president. While human rights advocates have not abandoned efforts to restore direct popular election, the 18 May vote will strengthen the Yushin system. As important, the relaxed atmosphere surrounding the NCU election itself stands in sharp contrast to the tension that prevailed during the last NCU elections in December 1972. The earlier vote occurred only two days after President Pak lifted martial law and only three weeks after a national referendum--held under martial law conditions--had been staged to approve the Yushin Constitution.

The National Assembly elections, which are to be held between December 1978 and February 1979, are also likely to be conducted against a political background relatively free of both tension and government attempts to manipulate the vote. In this election, 154 assemblymen will be chosen directly by the public; the administration will name the remaining one-third of the assembly membership. The revision of the assembly law in 1972 to establish two-man constituencies ensures the government party--the Democratic Republicans--at least one-third of the legislature's seats in this essentially two-party system.

### Tight Controls

The political calm that is expected to prevail this year can be attributed in part to Seoul's success in implementing policies to control critics of the government. Pak has pursued two courses in countering challenges to his authority. On the one hand, he has issued a series of extraordinary decrees that have allowed him to impose controls not otherwise legally sanctioned; the declaration of a state of national emergency began the process

in December 1971, followed by the temporary imposition of martial law in late 1972. In January 1974, Pak issued the first of nine emergency measures, two of which are still in effect.

Pak is generally prepared to ease controls when he believes it can be done without jeopardizing domestic stability. Moreover, he has manipulated the use of the emergency measures and police monitoring of political activities to fine tune the political atmosphere. The emergency measures for instance have been flexibly enforced with Seoul prosecuting selected cases largely to warn would-be dissidents. During periods of reduced tension, such as over the past two years, Seoul has intermittently allowed open criticism of the government and of Korea's human rights record.

Pak has also amended constitutional and administrative law to permanently change the political balance of power. Here, however, subsequent concessions have not been forthcoming. Within the government, Pak's primary targets have been the National Assembly and the judiciary. The 1972 revision of the constitution weakened both and virtually eliminated checks and balances among the three branches of government. As important, the Yushin Constitution did away with direct popular election of the president. Outside the government, legal changes have concentrated on tightening control of the media and the academic communities.

### Regularizing Government Procedure

While Pak--like many of his generation--is philosophically comfortable with and politically committed to strong centralized rule, the President also wants to generate public support for his government by positive rather than negative inducements. Indeed, his aim is clearly to avoid the evolution of a political environment wherein control can only be maintained by increasingly repressive measures. Moreover, he is convinced that grassroots support for Seoul will develop only if he eliminates the tradition of chaos, corruption, arbitrary arrest, and political assassination inherited from the Rhee regime. Pak's progress in regularizing government procedures, in fact, is impressive and has gained momentum since early 1974.

Pak's campaign to root out government corruption also gained steam over the last few years. Seoul's tactics have been threefold: raising salaries of public officials, streamlining civil petition requirements, and purging officials found guilty of malfeasance. Much obviously remains to be done in eliminating graft at the higher levels of government, but the campaign has noticeably reduced the perennial problem of petty corruption for the average citizen, which, in turn, has led to more legal and orderly administrative procedures and efficient economic development.

#### The Economic Miracle

Indeed, economic development is the most important factor underpinning support for the Pak government. Apart from the obvious improvements produced by the real increase in GNP of 11 percent annually since 1965, Seoul's economic performance has reflected the government's ability to mobilize resources in the interest of public welfare. Seoul's concerted effort to ensure an equitable payoff from this development has also generated political dividends; widespread participation in the development program maintains strong public allegiance to the government's planning goals.

Seoul initially used increased urban employment as its primary means to provide jobs for the rural unemployed. Subsequently, however, the flow of population to urban centers, combined with less competitive rural incomes, prompted Pak to invest heavily in rural development and improved agricultural output. Given the availability of technically-oriented education on a merit basis, rapid



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social mobility, and a lack of class distinctions, Korea--  
[redacted] displays one of the most equitable income distribution profiles in the developing world. Most Koreans acknowledge that they are better off than ever before and expect the upswing to continue.

### Trade-Offs

South Korea's dramatic economic growth--including the judicious distribution of real gains among its citizens--has clearly generated a new sense of national self-confidence, and for the majority of the Koreans curbs on their political freedoms are not an important issue. The activists who seek a change in national leadership--the press, academic community, and Christian church--tend to be relatively few in number, although their cultural standing and Westernization have given them notable political visibility.

The military, business, and bureaucratic establishments, as well as most of the rural populace, strongly back the current administration. Those who do not are--in the face of a continued threat from North Korea and uncertainties about the future of the US commitment--generally unwilling to challenge Seoul's contention that national security considerations override civil liberties. The maintenance of a strong national defense by building both military and economic capabilities is Pak's strongest suit. As long as his rule does not appear to personally threaten continued gains in this area, he is likely to maintain the support of the military--Korea's most important power broker--and a good share of the electorate.



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US - SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Central Intelligence Agency  
National Foreign Assessment Center


10 May 1978

Key Judgments

US - South Korean relations have taken a turn for the better in recent months, following a year of probably the most serious strains since the Korean War. The Koreagate scandal is fading, US-ROK differences over human rights have been reduced if not removed, and Korean anxieties over US troop withdrawals have eased. There remains, however, a strong undercurrent of concern in South Korea about the direction of US policy in Asia and the durability of the US security commitment.

*Recently*  
1) Congressional action  
2) KAL incident  
3) Slowdown of withdrawals  
4) State Dept  
Linn m  
Dny-j  
5) Team  
6) 2B trip

Although some bilateral difficulties have stemmed from differing political traditions, in general the strains reflect a broader evolution in the relationship--from a patron-client basis throughout most of the 1950s and 1960s to one based on greater equality in the 1970s. The evolution has been characterized by US efforts to shift more of the burden for the defense of South Korea to the Koreans themselves, and Seoul's attempts--undertaken with a mixture of apprehension and pride--to adjust to a new era.




This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with contributions from the Office of Economic Research, in response to an NSC request.



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Pak is, nonetheless, committed to making South Korea increasingly self-reliant and independent--economically, militarily, and politically. Indeed, if South Korea had not made significant progress along these lines in recent years, it is unlikely that it could have come through 1977 with the growing sense of confidence and forward movement that exists in Seoul today.

### The Recent Improvements

Over the past several months there have been noticeable improvements in each of the major problems areas that aggravated US-ROK ties last year.

-- The Koreagate scandal has left a residue of anger and frustration in South Korea focusing on the "arrogance" of US power. Still, the South Koreans seem relieved that the dispatch of Tongsun Park to the US has helped move the affair toward a resolution.

-- In the human rights area, too, there is lingering resentment in Korea over what [redacted] a majority of the Korean public [redacted] regard as unwarranted US interference in Korean domestic affairs. Seoul seems generally pleased, nonetheless, that US policy has taken cognizance of the release of political prisoners and other steps the Pak government has taken to improve its human rights image.

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-- US actions have worked to reduce South Korean anxieties about US troop withdrawals. Among the most effective measures were the US emphasis last year on a military compensation package to offset US withdrawals, President Carter's public reaffirmation of the US commitment to Seoul's defense early this year, and the recent large-scale US-ROK joint exercises. The announcement of Dr. Brezezinski's trip to Seoul also pleased the South Koreans.

Despite the improvement in relations, [redacted] a substantial number of Koreans remain uncertain about the US security

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commitment. In particular, some Korean intellectuals are convinced that the 1969 Nixon Doctrine cutting back on US overseas commitments signaled a US retreat from Asia, that the domestic political base for a strong US role in the region was weakened by the collapse in Indochina in 1975, and that the strains of the past year have further undercut US credibility.

### The Question of Self-Reliance



Seoul has already moved in that direction in several areas. Since 1970, most economic aid to Seoul and almost all military assistance has shifted from grants to loans. Moreover, the percentage of South Korea's fast growing GNP allocated to defense has increased steadily from 5 percent in 1975 to an estimated 6.6 percent this year--an increase from \$950 million to \$2.6 billion. The outlook is for further substantial increases in real terms in coming years.

Even so

South Koreans seem convinced that complete independence from the US is not a practical option. They believe Seoul still needs a supportive US alliance to:

- Serve as a deterrent to any North Korean military incursions. There is probably no other deterrent as effective as the prospect of destructive retaliatory US air strikes against the North's industrial centers.
- Offset Pyongyang's major allies in Peking and Moscow. There is no other power available to fill this role; Seoul is interested in expanding cooperation with Japan, but it knows that effective defense cooperation with Tokyo cannot be expected.
- Assist in the modernization of South Korea's armed forces. Seoul's own defense industries

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are increasing their output, and European firms could replace US arms suppliers to some extent, but only at the price of greatly complicating Seoul's weapons and logistics systems.

### The South Korean - US Economic Relationship

Bilateral economic ties with the US are another major reason for Seoul's desire for better relations. US - South Korean trade has increased almost 30 percent annually over the past decade, from \$443 million in 1967 to \$5.6 billion last year. Although South Korea has broadened its economic horizons in recent years, the US is still Seoul's most important partner, absorbing more of Korea's exports and supplying more capital than any other country. In 1977, for example, the US accounted for 31 percent of Seoul's foreign sales, mainly textiles, electronics, footwear, and metal products.

The US is second only to Japan as South Korea's leading supplier, in 1977 the US provided 23 percent of Korea's imports--largely agricultural products and machinery. It was also the largest source of public and commercial loans.

South Korea is attempting to limit some of its exports to the US and it has recently decided to liberalize its restrictive import policy in order to curb its large bilateral trade surplus. At the same time, the prospect of future economic problems stemming from protectionist pressures in the US is one of Seoul's greatest concerns. Several commodities--textiles, footwear, and certain foodstuffs--have come under US restrictions in the past year.

### A Delicate Problem for President Pak

President Pak has found himself under cross pressures in simultaneously pushing his dual objectives of building South Korean self-reliance and strengthening US support.

On the one hand, he clearly feels constrained to accommodate US wishes in order to avoid charges that he has mismanaged the all-important US relationship. If Korean military leaders came to believe that Pak was personally responsible for weakening the US alliance, their loyalties might waver.

[REDACTED]

Most South Koreans, according to recent informal polls, believe that the US, and not the Pak government, is responsible for the major problems in US-ROK relations over the past year.

[REDACTED]

The Pak government has worked hard to promote South Korean nationalism. It has encouraged a renewal of ethnic Korean cultural projects, while limiting US and other Western influences; university students and other groups are given tours of Seoul's showcase industrial sites; and President Pak has attempted to avoid appearances of bowing to US pressure, even while making concessions in fact.

Pak has also carefully modulated expression of official concern over the prospect of US troop withdrawals. Although he has not concealed his lack of enthusiasm for the plan, he has projected confidence that South Korean forces will be able to take over from departing US ground forces.

Prospects

Additional frictions between the US and South Korea seem inevitable. Cultural differences aside, President Pak will periodically face occasions when his two objectives--building self-reliance and maximizing US support--come into conflict. Moreover, despite Seoul's growing strength and confidence, many older South Koreans still have a palpable sense of insecurity, which gives them a virtually unlimited appetite for US reassurances.

Seoul's vulnerability will also lead it to maintain a close and continuing examination of US policy actions for any sign of a wavering security commitment. Seoul in particular will watch for any US move to negotiate with North Korea without consulting the South; the South Koreans will also continue to assay whether the US is prepared to deliver on its security commitments, such as its promise to provide military compensation aid in parallel with US troop withdrawals.



The prospects for continued improvements in US-ROK ties appear reasonably good, however, and there is no evidence that Seoul is actively considering any major shifts in policy.

**Letter from Jimmy Carter to Park Chung Hee, 17 May 1978**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of, 5/78-11/80, Box 2, Plains Files, President's Personal Foreign Affairs Files, Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your kind letter of May 3 on the emergency landing of the Korean airline flight in the Soviet Union. We were glad to be of assistance, but regret the tragic and unnecessary loss of life.

I have asked Dr. Brzezinski to share with you our thoughts and to seek your own views about the future of our relations.

In my letter of July 21, 1977, I reiterated to you the commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea; that commitment remains firm. Although the speed of developments in our Congress offered minimal time for consultation with you prior to my recent decision to defer two-thirds of the first phase of withdrawal of ground combat forces until next year, I made that decision in the light of your views on the importance of adequate compensatory military measures being taken in parallel with the changes in our deployments. As I have assured you before, I shall implement this program in a manner which preserves a military balance on the peninsula, and thus protects the security of the Republic of Korea. Should circumstances affecting the balance change in any significant way, we will assess those changes in close consultation with you.

The United States is determined to help maintain peace and an environment for economic growth in Northeast Asia. We fully appreciate Korea's major sacrifices and firm dedication to the security and defense of your nation against aggression. We shall continue to provide appropriate assistance to help strengthen and modernize your armed forces.

In view of the dangers of continued confrontation and the heavy burdens of defense which your society must shoulder, I hope you will continue to look for ways of reducing tensions on the peninsula and facilitating the resumption of a serious North-South dialogue. We are fully aware of the dangerous nature of the threat you face. We are prepared to consult closely on possible steps which might ease this situation.

Rest assured that we understand what the North Koreans are trying to achieve through their current efforts to lure the United States Government into direct bilateral discussions. I have emphasized to all concerned that we will not engage in any such talks which do not include representatives of your government as full and equal participants. Suggestions by the North Koreans that they will not talk with your government, but only with a successor regime, are completely unacceptable, and I made my views on this point clear to both Mr. Tito and Mr. Ceausescu when they were recently in Washington.

I applaud the repeated willingness of your government to address these issues with the North in a pragmatic dialogue. We stand ready to support any promising initiatives which you may suggest. These are matters on which we must continue to act in close consultation and coordination.



I have been informed of the recent visit to Washington of your Minister of Energy and Resources and of the fruitful discussions he had with members of my government. The United States intends to remain a reliable supplier of nuclear power technology and fuel and we are pleased to be able to work together with you in your major electric power expansion program.

I have noted with gratification the relaxation in recent months of certain restrictions on political expression in South Korea. While the internal affairs of your government are not my direct concern, you are aware of the American people's strong commitment to the rights of the individual. I am confident that you will find your society and government strengthened by the free interplay of ideas, and I look forward confidently to further steps in the next few months along the road of political evolution and freedom on which you are embarked.

In closing, I would like to commend you and your government for taking a number of difficult actions designed to overcome some of the strains that have troubled our relations in this last year. These have been very helpful. Through our combined efforts I believe we can fully restore the special friendship and common interest binding our peoples.

Sincerely,  
/s/

His Excellency  
Park Chung Hee  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

President signed letter May 17, 1978--ZB has original -- taking on the trip for hand delivery

**Telegram 084.650 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMAE, Folder 784/1978, Issue 220: Features of political-diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and some countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, America (Cyprus, Spain, USA, Bangladesh, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Syria) January 7, 1978 – September 23, 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116414>.]*

TELEGRAM 084.650

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Fifth Directorate)

From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Date: May 17th, 1978

Classification: Secret

Subject: Korea

David Blakemore, Deputy Head of the Korean Desk in the State Department, told Comrade Petre Anghel, Third Secretary in the Romanian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the following:

There have been no new special elements in Korean-American relations recently. The current problems that concern both sides, especially the Carter administration, and which can affect in a great measure bilateral relations, depending on the manner in which they are resolved, are the retreat of the American forces, the Congressional investigations into the illegal activities of South Korea in the United States, and the situation of the human rights in Korea.

President Carter announced that the withdrawal of American troops would be delayed for 1978, which is considered a concession of the administration to various political circles, especially the Congressional ones, which are against the withdrawal of the American ground troops from Korea, arguing that this withdrawal would result in unfavorable consequences for the security of South Korea as well as for the political situation in that area.

Moreover, the US House Committee on Armed Services signed an amendment to the law regarding the budget of the Department of Defense, which stipulates that the withdrawal will not take place unless the conditions of financial compensation and maintaining at least 26,000 soldiers in Korea, from the approximately 33,000 soldiers planned to be withdrawn, will be met.

The financial compensation proposed by the Carter administration (which amounts to approximately \$800 million) was approved by the respective committees but it must be approved in the joint sessions of both Senate and the House of Representatives. While difficulties in the House of Senate aren't foreseen, the situation in the House of Representatives is more difficult. These difficulties are the result of the fact that a large number of House representatives are conditioning the signing of the financial compensation amendment on the respect for human rights in South Korea and on the cooperation South Korea will show in the investigations of illicit activities of some South Korean representatives.

The situation in the Korean peninsula is still tense and potentially dangerous. At the current moment no action can be taken to improve this situation. For the time being, no action which could mitigate this state of affairs is foreseen.

Recently, the North Koreans made some declarations regarding a three-party meeting, [denouncing it] as a new plot of the United States of America. Actually, the proposal was made by President Tito and it entails a meeting between the representatives of North Korea, South Korea, and the US.

In these circumstances, the American diplomat noted the efforts of USSR and People's Republic of China, which influenced the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to adopt a more reserved attitude. Moreover, even though they were expecting a more virulent position against the United States of America and South Korea from the president of the Chinese Communist Party during his visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Chinese did not express such a position. Another clue of the moderating role of China is the absence of some military personalities in the delegation of the Chinese President Hua Guofeng.

Signed  
Nicolae M. Nicolae

**Telegram 066.588 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Folder 782/1978, Matter 220/F, Relations between North Korea and Socialist Countries (Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, GDR, Yugoslavia, USSR), January-December 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116404>.]*

TELEGRAM 066.688

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Constantin Oancea)

From: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

Date: May 18th, 1978

Classification: Secret

In a conversation with Ambassador Dumitru Popa, the Chinese Ambassador Lü Zhixian, referring to the official visit of President Hua Guofeng to North Korea (May 5-10), underlined the importance and exceptional results of this visit.

During the official talks between Presidents Hua Guofeng and Kim Il Sung, the two sides informed each other about the situation in their countries and discussed the issue of developing the militant friendship and brotherly cooperation, [as well as] the revolutionary unity between the two parties, [and] countries, as well as several international matters of common interest.

The agenda of the official talks between the two presidents focused on the following issues:

Bilateral relations – the two sides expressed their satisfaction with the high level of political relations between the Workers' Party of Korea and the Chinese Communist Party, [as well as] between the DPRK and the PRC.

According to the Chinese Ambassador, there are no divergences between the two parties and peoples.

With respect to the reunification of Korea

The Koreans reiterated the position of the DPRK government with respect to reunification and the Chinese reasserted the full support for the DPRK's reunification policy, firmly condemning any attempt to artificially create 'two Koreas.' This firm position of the PRC was publicly expressed by President Hua Guofeng in the speeches he delivered at receptions and at the workers' rally in Pyongyang. The PRC and the DPRK rejected and countered, yet again, the 1976 US proposal regarding the convening of a reunion on the Korean question, to be attended by the four countries: the PRC, the DPRK, the US and South Korea. President Kim Il Sung informed President Hua Guofeng about the results of the talks on the Korean question carried out with the Carter administration, by President I B Tito and President Nicolae Ceausescu, on the occasion of this year's visits to the US. Kim Il Sung said that the issue of direct contacts between the DPRK and the US will be discussed during his talks with President Nicolae Ceausescu.

## Third World countries and the Non-Aligned Movement

Presidents Kim Il Sung and Hua Guofeng expressed their opinion that currently, Third World countries' and Non-Aligned Movement's solidarity and unity are confronted with adversity, caused by the interference and influence exerted especially by the two superpowers (the US and the USSR). In this context, Kim Il Sung showed that the current situation urgently calls for the creation of a common front of recently liberated and non-aligned countries, which can fight against imperialist, colonialist, neo-colonialist, and [authoritarian] forces.

Hua Guofeng said that Kim Il Sung's proposal was a just one.

During the preparations for the visit, at President Hua Guofeng's initiative, the two sides agreed not to sign [any] documents regarding the visit, in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, taken two years ago.

The Chinese diplomat said that the two sides reached a full identity of views on the issues discussed.

Signed  
Dumitru Popa

**Memorandum of Conversation Between Dr. Brzezinski and Foreign Minister Huang Hua,  
20 May 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 390-409.]*

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, May 20, 1978, 3:30–6:40 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua

**PARTICIPANTS**

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Leonard Woodcock, United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC  
William Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Morton Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Samuel Huntington, Staff Member, NSC  
Michael Armacost, Staff Member, NSC  
Benjamin Huberman, Staff Member, NSC  
Gertrude Werner, Secretary, NSC (Notetaker)  
Francine Obermiller, Secretary, NSC (Notetaker)  
Huang Hua, Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China  
Chai Tse-min, People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United States  
Lin Ping, Director of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Ting Yuan-hung, Division Chief of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Division Chief, Protocol Department  
Ni Yao-li, Staff Member, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Kao Chien-chung, Deputy Director of the Protocol Department  
Lien Hung-pao (Notetaker)

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 46, China: Brzezinski, May, 1978, Trip: 5/25/78–6/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Shanghai Room of the Great Hall of the People. Brzezinski and his party, including his wife, arrived in Beijing on May 20. He recalled that he was “given a formal but very cordial greeting at the airport by Foreign Minister Huang Hua, his wife, and a host of Chinese officials. While on board the plane we had speculated about what kind of greeting I would receive from the very protocol-conscious Chinese, and this greeting by the Foreign Minister himself was a signal that the Chinese had decided to treat the visit on the same level as one by the Secretary of State.” (Power and Principle, p. 209)

(Dr. Brzezinski:) We and the Japanese share an expressed interest in maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula—an interest also implicitly shared with you. We intend to remain in South Korea in spite of the gradual reductions in ground forces. There will still be a physical military presence as well as naval presence in the area.

We believe it is important that the two Koreas talk to each other at some point on the basis of equality. Many countries recognize both Koreas and deal with them. We would be prepared, if it was useful, to participate in a dialogue involving both Koreas. No one should have any misunderstanding regarding the depth, durability and firmness of the American commitment to the security and well being of the Republic of Korea. Anything less than that would be highly destabilizing to the peace and security of the Far East and would certainly be exploited by the Soviet Union in a manner detrimental to American interests and threatening to Japan and to the countries in that region of the world.

[...]

We feel that our forces are sufficient to protect our interests in Japan and Korea and to provide assistance to any of our friends who may be in need.

[...]

**Memorandum of Conversation Between Dr. Brzezinski and Foreign Minister Huang Hua,  
21 May 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 410-431.]*

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, May 21, 1978, 9:52 a.m.–1:20 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua

**PARTICIPANTS**

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Leonard Woodcock, United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC  
William Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Morton Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Samuel Huntington, Staff Member, NSC  
Michael Armacost, Staff Member, NSC  
Benjamin Huberman, Staff Member, NSC  
David Dean, Deputy Chief of Mission, United States Liaison Office in Peking  
Patricia Battenfield, Secretary, NSC (Notetaker)  
Francine Obermiller, Secretary, NSC (Notetaker)  
Huang Hua, Foreign Minister, People's Republic of China  
Chai Tse-min, People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United States  
Lin Ping, Director of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Ting Yuan-hung, Division Chief of the Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Division Chief, Protocol Department  
Ni Yao-li, Staff Member, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister in Charge of American and Oceanian Affairs  
Kao Chien-chung, Deputy Director of the Protocol Department  
Lien Hung-pao (Notetaker)

[...]

(Minister Huang:) Now I would like to discuss the Korean question. We think in order to stabilize the situation in Korea and not allow the Soviet Union a chance to meddle, the U.S.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 5/16–31/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People. On May 21, Brzezinski cabled accounts of his initial two meetings with Huang to Carter. (Backchannel message 8 from Beijing to the White House Situation Room, May 21; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 5/16–31/78.)



should immediately withdraw all its forces from the Korean Peninsula and stop its support to the Park clique.

The reunification of Korea is the common aspiration of the entire Korean people. Any attempt at perpetuating the division of Korea is bound to be defeated and any pretext to stall the withdrawal of forces from Korea will be frustrated. The intensified efforts of the U.S. to strengthen the Park clique will only increase the tensions in the Peninsula.

We are opposed to the admission of two Koreas into the United Nations. We are also opposed to the so-called cross recognition of North and South Korea because that would constitute a continuation of perpetuation of the division of Korea which is detrimental to the reunification and stability of Korea.

Chairman Hua Kuo-feng recently visited Korea. During the visit the Korean side stated explicitly that it had no intention to move southward. It is not the DPRK but the Park clique that is endangering the situation in Korea. In South Korea the Park clique is most unpopular. It is deliberately creating tension so as to win the support of the U.S. by deceptive means in its efforts to oppress the Korean people. All of this has met with strong resistance of the Korean people. If things come to such a point that the South Korean people rise to oppose the ruthless ruler Park, it is likely that he may try to provoke conflicts with the North so as to divert people's attention.

We firmly support the just proposal made by the DPRK for independent and peaceful reunification of Korea. China recognizes only the DPRK as the sole legal representative of the Korean people. Let no one have any doubt about China's position of opposing perpetuation of the division of Korea. The DPRK is the principal immediate party concerned on the issue of Korea. The U.S. side is obliged to have direct negotiations with the Korean side for the settlement of the Korean issue.

[...]

(Brzezinski:) Finally, regarding Korea. I must state frankly that the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing militarily or politically from its association with the ROK. That Republic is recognized by very many countries in the world. It has made remarkable economic, social, and political progress. American withdrawal would be destabilizing and would create openings for the expansion of influence of a country whose influence neither you nor we wish to expand. It would prove frightening to the Japanese and would alter the military and political balance in the Far East. We are prepared to participate in tri-partite talks between two existing Korean governments if both of them desire such talks. We will not engage in separate talks with the North Korean government, and we will not participate in any efforts direct or indirect to weaken the political stability and the security of the ROK.

[...]

**Memorandum of Conversation between Takeo Fukuda and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 23 May 1978**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00261. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00261.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00261.)]

Memorandum of Conversation

Participants: Japanese

Prime Minister Fukuda  
Foreign Minister Sonoda  
EPA Director General Miyazawa  
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe  
Deputy Foreign Minister Takashima  
Director General (American Affairs) Nakajima  
Mr. Owada, Private Secretary to Prime Minister  
Mr. Ryuichiro Yamazaki (Interpreter)

U.S.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Ambassador Mansfield  
Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke  
Mr. Michael Armacost  
Mr. Breer (Notetaker)

Date & Place: May 23, 1978  
Prime Minister's Official Residence, Tokyo

[...]

Turning to the Chinese analysis of the world situation, Dr. Brzezinski said he could comment on three issues -- Korea, Indochina, and Japan -- and would be happy to respond to questions. He said that one of the few points of disagreement during the exchanges had been on Korea. In terms of the general analysis, there had been substantial agreement about the Soviet Union, U.S.-Soviet relations, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Throughout the discussions the Chinese tone had been realistic and, [redacted]. Dr. Brzezinski said he told the Chinese in a friendly but categorical way that the U.S. would remain in Korea, that the U.S. commitment was unshakeable, and that we would not participate in separate talks with the North. He said, however, if the North and South were willing, we would participate in tripartite talks. He stressed that the U.S. posture was a positive contribution to the peace and stability of the Far East and that the real adversary of the U.S. and China was in the North. He commented that following these remarks the Chinese did not argue their case further.

[...]

Dr. Brzezinski said he generally agreed with the Prime Minister's assessment. He said he thought in their statements regarding North Korea the Chinese had merely adopted a formal posture with no expectation that he would agree. He said he felt that the Chinese realized that a sudden change on the Korean peninsula would have unpredictable results -- at the minimum uncertainty, at the maximum, results inimical to Chinese interests.

[...]

The Prime Minister asked about the Chinese reaction to the Tito and Ceausescu proposals for the Korean problem. Dr. Brzezinski responded that the Chinese leaders had referred to the proposals and that he had outlined for them the answer we gave to Tito and Ceausescu in Washington. He said he had told the Rumanians that he was surprised that they were so busy promoting the Soviet line on Korea and that they should stick to areas with which they had greater familiarity. He said we had told Ceausescu he was wasting his time.

[...]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary  
of State for East Asia  
Michael Armacost, NSC Staff Member  
William Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State for East Asia  
Richard Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to  
South Korea

President Park Chung-hee  
Kim Chom Yong, Chief of Staff,  
Blue House  
Suh Jyong Chul, Member, National  
Security Council  
Kim Kyong-won, Special Assistant  
for International Affairs  
Choe Kwan Su, Protocol Secretary  
for the President

DATE, TIME May 25, 1978; 11:00 - 2:00 p.m.  
PLACE: Blue House


After an opening exchange of greetings, Dr. Brzezinski handed to President Park a letter from President Carter. Mr. Choe thereupon translated the letter for President Park and President Park expressed appreciation.

Dr. Brzezinski said that he then wished privately to brief President Park on two exchanges with the Chinese leaders regarding Korea. He expressly asked that the minutes be kept confidential and not be distributed beyond those participating in the small session. President Park agreed to do so.

Dr. Brzezinski then said that the first exchange took place in the course of a tour d'horizon with Foreign Minister Huang Hua. He then read from the minutes of that exchange and subsequently the response of the Foreign Minister.

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Dr. Brzezinski then briefed President Park on a briefer exchange with Hua regarding Korea.



Dr. Brzezinski suggested that the Chinese are concerned about their political influence deteriorating in North Korea if the Chinese do not provide at least formally strong support for Kim. On the other hand, they were frank in discussing their concerns about Vietnam and Soviet influence there. The Chinese face an uncertain situation in Korea, a Soviet controlled Mongolia and expanding Soviet influence in Vietnam.

Park commented the Chinese seem to speak their own mind on some issues, particularly not allowing the Soviet Union to meddle in their affairs. However, in other respects they do not speak clearly and therefore it is more difficult to deal with. Dr. Brzezinski observed that he found the Chinese on the whole realistic, direct, and aware that to a large extent they share broad strategic objectives with the U.S. Park responded that the U.S. and China both seek to contain Soviet expansionism. But the Chinese are far more afraid of the Soviets than is the United States. Therefore, he could not understand the Chinese view on Korea.

Dr. Brzezinski said he suspected the reason for the PRC view relates to their concern that North Korea could develop an orientation not unlike that of Vietnam. It is strategically important from their standpoint that they not be confronted by pro-Soviet governments in both Vietnam and North Korea. President Park continued to muse about the difficulties of understanding the real thoughts of the Chinese.

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Dr. Brzezinski noted that he found Chinese assessments of the international scene on the whole quite realistic, undogmatic, and based increasingly on the view that at the present stage of development it is essential to pursue a two-track strategy. On the one hand, the Chinese, he said, are seeking to widen their technological and economic ties with the advanced countries -- primarily the Western Europeans and Japan, but also the United States. At the same time they are attempting to develop further a strategic relationship with the United States that will facilitate mutually reinforcing positions in key areas. In discussions with Chinese leaders he said he discovered that with respect to Western Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and to some extent Southeast Asia there were substantial areas of US-PRC agreement.

President Park commented that in terms of their own interests the Chinese should agree with U.S. positions on Korea, but they are taking diametrically opposed positions, trying evidently to reflect North Korean views. He asked what they might have in mind in reflecting Pyongyang's views.

Dr. Brzezinski indicated his belief that their concerns related essentially to the possible spread of Soviet influence. He felt this was not surprising, since the Chinese already see that the Soviets have a satellite in Mongolia.

The Chinese perceive another pro-Soviet satellite has been recently established in Afghanistan. They are also watching with anxiety Indochina, and they wouldn't want that repeated in North Korea. In their view one way to avoid this is to identify with North Korea's view. He asked if the President saw any other explanation.

President Park said that he did not have any explanation.

Dr. Brzezinski commented further that Kim Il Sung knows that there are fundamental US-Soviet disagreements. He also knows that US-Chinese differences are declining, and that there is some identity of US-PRC strategic views. He sees the President's National Security Advisor going to Peking to discuss issues on which US-Chinese views may converge with a delegation including a senior Defense Department official, an NSC staff member with special responsibilities in the field of science and technology, and top State Department East Asia specialists. In this context, he noted Kim may be particularly concerned regarding

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
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Chinese intentions. Thus he might be more susceptible to Soviet blandishments. If one takes all of this into account, he said, Chinese views may not be so difficult to explain.



Dr. Brzezinski expressed agreement with President Park's statement. He noted the importance from the Soviet standpoint of preventing a strategic rapprochement between the U.S. and Peking. War in Korea could provide impediments to such a rapprochement, and the Soviets might even encourage this, and the Chinese are aware of such possibilities. Dr. Brzezinski told Park that some of the things he passed on privately might constitute ways of assuring that there will not be a war or that the Chinese would favor such a war because it would be a violation of understandings with Pyongyang. He added that we are dealing with very fundamental factors bearing on the larger strategic dimension of U.S. relations with the PRC. These are significant because of the important bearing US-PRC relations have on Soviet strategic and conventional forces and the Soviet's ability politically to exploit their growing military strength in the current circumstances in Africa and the Middle East.

President Park recognized the complexity of the situation, and of the difficulties of fathoming China's real intentions.

Dr. Brzezinski commented that this enhanced the importance of sticking to fundamentals. One such fundamental, he said, is the importance of preserving close cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea. A second is that the U.S. will not deal with North Korea behind the backs of the ROK. He said that he told the Romanians when Ceausescu was in Washington that they should mind their own business and worry about Transylvania rather than attempting to figure out ways to solve other world problems farther afield. A third is that it is in South Korea's

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interest as well as America's that U.S.-Chinese strategic relations expand. A fourth is that, to the extent possible, South Korea should continue communicating a willingness to talk with North Korea, provided such talks are on the basis of equality. This leaves it to the North to demonstrate their own intransigence or modify its position. These fundamentals, Dr. Brzezinski said, provide a strong basis for our bilateral relations, and they make it less necessary to understand what the Chinese really have in mind. In any case, the Chinese have their own problems and complications. We can look, he said, to the future with confidence if the Republic of Korea sustains its remarkable economic and social progress and strengthens its armed forces, thus enabling it to handle any situation in the face of a North Korea which has half of its population and less than half of its gross national product.

President Park observed that Tito and Ceausescu had visited the United States and acted as if they were going in an intermediary role. He asked whether they acted on their own or because they were asked by the North Koreans.

Dr. Brzezinski described his impression that both Tito and Ceausescu think that Yugoslavia and Romania are too small for them and as a consequence both are looking for global problems to solve. Tito, he said, was perhaps more inclined to take the initiative, since he sees himself as an elder statesman dispensing advice to inexperienced junior leaders. Ceausescu gave more the appearance of one who was passing messages. In both cases, he said, we thanked them and told them that we had no intention to talk directly with North Korea. But if both South and North Korea were interested in talks, and if our friends in South Korea wanted us involved, we were prepared to support tripartite talks. He informed Park that both Ceausescu and Tito were disappointed with our answer, but expressed confidence that both would find other problems to try to solve.

President Park commented that North Korea must have shown some response to the U.S. proposal for tripartite talks when Premier Hua was in Pyongyang, and asked whether in his discussions with the Chinese he heard any indications of their answer.

Dr. Brzezinski denied that we had made any proposal.

President Park asked whose proposal it was.

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Dr. Brzezinski said he had already given Park a detailed explanation of the circumstances in which the Yugoslavs made a proposal for Tripartite Discussions.

President Park said it was his impression that the United States wanted such talks.

Dr. Brzezinski observed that Tito made the proposal, and the U.S. indicated it would explore it if the parties were interested.

Dr. Brzezinski asked the President whether South Korea favors or opposes such talks.

President Park indicated in all frankness that the ROKG was not very much interested, because North Koreans say they will not deal with the present ROK regime, and until and unless North Korea recognizes the ROKG as a full partner, it is not interested in such talks. He described North Korea's objective in seeking a dialogue at this time as a discussion like the one which occurred between Hanoi and the United States at the end of the Vietnamese war. In such circumstances, he said, the ROK would look simply like a bridesmaid with the United States and North Korea serving as the bride and the groom.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that when the Romanians brought up the talks and mentioned North Korea's unwillingness to deal with the ROKG, he told them it was outrageous for the Romanians to come to the U.S. for support in protecting their independence and at the same time to make statements concerning Far Eastern situations that would objectively help the Soviet Union. He agreed with President Park's assessment of North Korea's motives, and stated that the U.S. position is clear. "We will consider tripartite talks only if you favor them. If you don't want such talks, we have no reason to promote them. The only possible utility of such talks would be if they were held on the basis of complete equality thus increasing international acceptance of cross recognition and making it harder for the USSR or anyone else to push for a conflict in the Korean peninsula with the possible aim of complicating the task of achieving a strategic rapprochement between the United States and China. In the future we will be guided in our attitude toward the tripartite talks by your views."

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Richard Sneider  
William Clark, Political Counselor

Prime Minister Choi Kyu-hah  
Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin

DATE, TIME May 25, 1978; 10:25 a.m. - 10:50 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Prime Minister's Office

The Prime Minister requested Dr. Brzezinski's opinion of the current view in Peking. Dr. Brzezinski said he was struck with the realism of the leadership and the emphasis on intense modernization with a reliance on technology. While there was still a great deal of emphasis on self-reliance, this was not at the expense of downgrading relations with the advanced countries of the world. The Prime Minister noted that while Chairman Hua was in Peking for meetings with Kim Il-song there had been no joint statements, but during the visit Hua had made several statements. In reviewing these the Prime Minister found no shift in the tough position on Korea. Dr. Brzezinski agreed that in general the position had not changed but that there was a realization and realistic understanding on the part of the Chinese leadership of the power relations in the region. The Prime Minister noted that at a banquet for a Japanese Socialist delegation in Pyongyang it was reported that the North Koreans rejected any possibility of tripartite dialogue and he asked if there were any views on that in China. Dr. Brzezinski said that in general North Korean interest in a dialogue is primarily to have one with the U.S. which would be designed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the ROK and that the U.S. has no interest in such discussions.

The Prime Minister said that in the South Korean view dialogue should be between the North and the South; however, these talks had been broken off. Even the Red Cross talks which had been continued after political talks were suspended in August 1973

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had been cut off two months ago. In his view the North had hoped to gain a political advantage from bilateral talks and perhaps cause dissension in the South and separate the U.S. and the ROK. This did not happen. In fact, the South became stronger so that the North saw no benefit and possible loss from a continuation of the dialogue and had therefore broken off all contact. He reviewed for Dr. Brzezinski the history of North-South communications from 1950 to present.

Dr. Brzezinski asked if, in the Prime Minister's view, the North might still take a military initiative. The Prime Minister said that the North saw two possibilities for victory in the South, either military or political. If in the view of the North there were to be political instability and economic weakness in the South, then it might well still try a military option.

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that compensatory measures would advance in parallel with troop removal.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the President decided to remove only one battalion of the Second Division this year as opposed to earlier plans to remove three. He noted Congressional relations were complicated by issues not related to security. He said that we had tried to solve these complications and that any further action on the Korean part for the same end would be helpful and appreciated.

The Prime Minister noted that the security of Korea affected the security of all of Northeast Asia and should not be subjected to influence from other problems. He detailed the efforts currently being made by the ROK to provide for its own defense, the burden this placed on the people, and the difficulty of balancing defense needs against developmental requirements.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that our realization of these problems was why the U.S. had over the years in many areas of the world assisted in security efforts. He told the Prime Minister that the U.S. was developing a rapid strike force which could be used wherever required and assured him that the U.S. commitment to Korea was unshakeable. However, since North Korea had only one-half the population and one-third the GNP of South Korea, South Koreans must assume a proportionate share of their defense burden. Any society which looks to others for its own security loses the will to maintain that security. Dr. Brzezinski said this had been a problem in Vietnam but that conditions were very much different today in Korea.

**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, 25 May 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 469-473.]*

Washington, May 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Report on My China Visit (May 20–23)

[...]

7. In their conversations with me, the Chinese were not particularly condescending and did not accuse us of appeasement. That was new. The only real area of professed disagreement was Korea, where they claimed to favor a total U.S. withdrawal. I rejected this outright. Chairman Hua conveyed to me, however, North Korean assurances that there will not be a North Korean attack against the South. In thanking him for it, I pointedly referred to the assurance as involving no repetition of the North Korean attack—a point not lost on my hosts but also not contested.

[...]

**Memorandum From Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>, 25 May 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 462-469.]*

Washington, May 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Appraisal of the China Trip

[...]

• Korea. Both sides have an underlying interest in stability, but for different reasons, each of us must provide reassurances to our adversarial allies. China still competes with the Soviets for influence in North Korea, while we must reassure the South in part to comfort Japan. As a result, the real differences between us at this point are less than the rhetoric suggests. But we harm the Chinese cause by saying this. Hence, in our public statements, it is best to ignore the genuine commonality of our views.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 56, Policy Process: 5/16-31/78. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.



The Secretary-General mentioned that the United States wants the South Koreans to join in the talks.

The Deputy Foreign Minister responded that while South Korea publicly says that it would like to have a dialogue, it in fact is not really in favour of it. The United States has occupied that country for thirty years, but they were convinced that ultimately they would be forced to withdraw. The situation is developing in favour of our side day by day.

(signature)

## **Minutes of Conversations at the Official Meetings between the Romanian Delegation and the Korean Delegation, May-June 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Central Historical Archives, Romanian Communist Party, Central Committee, Foreign Relations Section. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza*

*Gheorghe <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114456>.]*

### Participants:

From Romania: Nicolae Ceausescu, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Elena Ceausescu, member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Cornel Burtica, member of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Vice-Prime Minister of the Romanian Government, Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation, Dumitru Popescu, member of the Executive Political Committee, secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Stefan Andrei, Deputy member of the Executive Political Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vasile Musat, secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Vasile Pungan, member of the Central Committee of the RCP, Minister within the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Romania, head of the councilors group of the President of the republic, Dumitru Popa, Romanian ambassador to Pyongyang.

From the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Comrade Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Song-ae [Kim Song Ae], member of Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, president of the Korean Democratic Women's Union, Li Jong-ok [Ri Jong Ok] member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, premier of the Administrative Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kye Ung-tae [Kye Ung Tae], member of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Kim Yong-nam [Kim Yong Nam], deputy member of the Political committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kong Jin-tae [Kong Jin Tae], member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Vice-Premier of the Administrative Council, Shin In-ha [Sin In Ha], ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Bucharest.

[...]

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

Thank you very much for the quite detailed presentation you made regarding the internal situation in Romania. We are very happy for your results, we are happy for them like we are for ours and we take into account that they were achieved under your direct leadership.

Do our comrades have any questions? They do not. Thank you.



We have enough time, so, if I may, I would like to inform you about the internal situation as well. Starting this year, we entered in the first year of a new seven-year economic plan. This plan was adopted last year in November, at a meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly. Numerically speaking, we could say that the situation is quite good. The plan is going to end in 1984. The numbers that we intend to reach by 1984 are as they follow: steel—7.5- 8 billion tons, 500 kg per inhabitant; for concrete we intend to reach 12 billion tons, which represents about 800 kg per inhabitant.

Regarding rice, you know that the arable land is limited and we intend to obtain a harvest of 12 billion tons. This year we decided to make an effort to obtain 8,800,000 tons. It is enough to satisfy our requirements and we do not import anything.

Regarding electricity, we plan to produce 56 to 60 billion kilowatt (kW), which calculated per inhabitant is about 4,000 kWh. As you can notice, we are a developing country as well. Regarding the chemical fertilizers, this year we plan to obtain around 5 million tons. It concerns all the chemical fertilizers, both based on nitrogen and phosphorus. Right now we produce about 3 million tons, and in the next years we want to increase the production to 5 million tons. Given that the arable land is limited to 2 million hectare, we are satisfied with the current production.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

Active substance?

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

It is about the weight calculated in volume; in active substance, it amounts to about 1 million tons. At the current level, we do not lack chemical fertilizers; we have enough.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

You are then a developed country.

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

Yes, in this case we are, if you consider that we have a limited arable surface. We cannot produce fertilizers based on potassium with the country's raw materials, so we import them. Actually we trade fertilizers.

Regarding the production of colored metals, we plan to reach about 1 million, of course we target lead, zinc, aluminum, copper, altogether. We consider that it is quite good; it is not a bad number. You know, there is always room for improvement. We can reach this number considering we have rich deposits. While beforehand we were not able to produce mining equipment, now we can. We have a production of machine tools of a calculated weight of about 5 million tons. We also focus on heavy-machine production, mostly on large scale installations. We somewhat lack large machine-production factories and we are now building bigger factories. In the future, we want to focus on the ships production industry.

Basically, our economy, regarding trade, is bound to the Soviets and the Chinese and for this reasons we are somewhat limited, we have some restrictions; therefore, in the future, we want to develop trading with the other countries from Asia and Europe. For this we need ships. Without ships we do not have anything to send the merchandise with. Therefore we will focus more on the ship-production industry. We have assigned ourselves a target to build around 100 ships with a capacity of over 12,000 tons. In this situation we can also modify the trade structure a little. We have lots of requests for developing trade from the following countries in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Pakistan and India. All these countries have expressed their wish to increase their trade with us. We want to establish a balance of trade as well and, only by acting in this way can we overcome the current limits and restrictions. The countries that I have mentioned request lots of concrete and products. We have a lot of magnesite clinker therefore we will be able to overcome the current restrictions that we have in foreign trade.

We have also established a series of tasks that regard modernization, technology, science and basing the economy on the raw materials that we have and the objective is to develop the economic branches that have the raw materials secured. Of course, we emphasize modernization and mechanization. Like you, we are taking actions to raise the technological and scientific level. The problem with increasing the quality of products is very important to us. Our level of quality is still low and the quality of the merchandise is quite low; nevertheless, we talk about the quality of machines or mass consumption goods, and that is why we emphasize on improving the quality of products.

Currently, regarding the [standard of living], in our country, the problem is the diversity of the merchandise rather than the money necessary for buying merchandise, especially when it comes to mass consumption goods. This is why we now believe the diversification of mass consumption goods a high-priority problem and that is why the two main high-priority problems are: raising the products' quality and diversifying the array of goods. The problem is not the money but the different kinds of goods the population wishes to buy. The peasants' income is big enough but they do not have merchandise to buy. To solve this problem we use different methods. We develop large industrial central units too, and at the same time, we develop small industrial units, the local industry, where we will build medium factories and even smaller types.

We do not have high hopes regarding livestock; however, we are very optimistic about the development of fishing. We have a lot of fish. If we used to sell a lot of fish in winter, now, because of a slight climate change, we are catching a lot in the summer too and we want to solve the protein problem using fish. In our Seven-Year Plan in this field we have set the task of fishing 3.5 million tons of fish. We have a fish production of about 1.2 million tons and with the other sea products we reach 1.5 million; by 1984, we will reach 3.5 million tons of fish and sea products. We move forward entirely convinced that we can accomplish these tasks. There are lots of suggestions coming from the masses and there are lots of proposals regarding the accomplishing and exceeding the plan one year, a year and a half and even two years earlier. It seems like two years may be too much. Regardless, the problem is being studied. The circumstances are favorable, we have a good foundation. On this good foundation, if we organize ourselves well, we can accomplish the plan. The atmosphere is also good. Of course we will

analyze the suggestions coming from the population regarding the accomplishment of the plan two years earlier. It is not a bad idea and we think that it is possible to accomplish this plan one year earlier. One of the main problems that will be decisive for the accomplishment of the plan will be the energy industry and if we will assure the assigned quantity of electricity. Especially in the Northern part of the country we have lots of power-plants and the production is affected by the lack of water. Therefore we consider granting more attention to coal plants in the future and I think we can solve this problem too, especially if we organize the [work-force] well and we build coal plants in a shorter period of time, because we need many big industrial units built that can help us in this activity. We do not have any remarkable hard problems.

The party's internal situation is also good. We have about 2,200,000 party members and the percent of the party members relative to the population is big enough, but I think it is good. The atmosphere within the population is good; all the people are closely united around the party and everything can work very well if we assure the necessary raw materials. We have enough raw materials and we can procure them. All that is left to do is to conduct a good activity for acquiring the raw materials from imports, which are harder to acquire. Considering we are facing the enemy, we sure have large costs and we have undertaken great efforts for the country's defense, which has repercussions on this situation. Ideologically speaking, everything is fine and the people are closely united within the army, there is a lot of enthusiasm.

Regarding the educational system, as I informed you last time [we talked], we are staying on the same trend-line. Last year we have adopted the theses regarding the educational system and now we carrying out our activities according to these precepts. We focus on the quality of the educational system as well. Before, we have focused on the number, training and education of as many specialists as possible, but now we focus on the quality of the training, especially in the educational system. As I informed you last time, we are still carrying out a sustained struggle to put the two revolutions, the ideological-technical revolution and the cultural revolution, into practice. And this is the internal situation. An important problem for our country is the unification [of the country], which I would like us to discuss later. If you have any questions, please [go ahead and ask them].

Comrade. Nicolae Ceausescu:

I would like to thank comrade Kim for the particularly valuable report [he provided us with]. I am very happy for the results [you have achieved], for the prospects until 1984 and for your successes, because they strengthen the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and open up perspectives for a good cooperation between our countries. May you achieve all those objectives in the best conditions possible.

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

Thank you.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

We could discuss something about the bilateral relations, and leave the international problems for some other time, for tomorrow. Or should we talk about international problems?

Comrade Kim Il Sung:

Discussions on international matters may take a while, so I think you should talk about the question of bilateral matters for now, [especially] since we do not have any remarkable problems regarding bilateral relations and we do not have any divergent views; the only problem that arises is how to improve the collaboration between us even more.

[...]

-2<sup>nd</sup> June 1978

Minutes of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu, the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party, the President of the Romanian Socialist Republic and Kim Il Sung, the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and the President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 21 May 1978.

Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that at that moment, the biggest share of the foreign commerce of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea—75-80 percent was being carried with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. For this reason, especially when one of those countries did not deliver or buy some goods, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [incurred losses]. In order to address this problem, it was decided that in the future the share of trade with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be 25 percent each; about 20 percent for European socialist countries and the rest of the trade would be with the third world countries and some capitalist countries. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would act to maintain the current volume of trade with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. All that would be produced in excess of the quotas would be directed to other countries in order to reach the proposed objectives.

Regarding the Korean-Soviet relations, the comrade Kim Il Sung pointed out that they were mainly good. There were some difficulties in bilateral commercial relations, especially when the Soviet comrades did not deliver the goods that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea needed. Recently, the Soviet Union had helped the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the construction of a refinery with a capacity of one million tons, but afterwards not only had they not delivered the required petroleum, but they also had raised its price a lot.

Referring to the politics of the Soviet Union, he said he could not tell if the Soviet comrades had a defined line that they were following.

Regarding comrade Leonid I. Brezhnev it seemed like because of his age, on many matters he no longer acted like he should.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu reported about the visit of the American journalist Valos, to whom he granted an interview as well and passed to comrade Kim Il Sung the wish of the American

journalist to visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to get an interview with comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he would consider it and give an answer later.

Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that at that point in time, the situation within the Non-Aligned Movement was very complicated; non-aligned countries were divided.

Globally, there was a powerful movement from key countries to attract the non-aligned countries in their sphere of influence.

Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that, as far as he knew, many countries were displeased with the participation of Cuba to the military actions in Angola and Ethiopia. The Cubans were actually waging war in Africa for someone else and with the support of someone else. The participation of the (colored) Cuban military in the battles in Africa was not helping the nations on this continent at all.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea declared itself against such actions. The African states should be left alone to solve the problems between them by themselves.

If the Cubans really wanted to contribute to the fight against imperialism, then they should have supported Egypt and the other Arab countries in their fights against Israel.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea received lots of support requests from African countries involved in conflicts, but it did not reply to any of them. During the wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and the Near East, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea offered substantial help, even by participating with several military aircraft formations.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu informed about the content of the speeches held at Beijing by the foreign minister of the People's Republic of China and U.S Secretary of Defense, as well of President Carter's declarations regarding the normalization of American-Chinese relations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that he had information according to which the normalization of the American-Chinese relations would result in the moving of the American Embassy from Taiwan to Beijing and the transfer of the actual representation from Beijing to Taiwan. There were other sources saying that the Chinese comrades feared that after the withdrawal of the Americans from Taiwan, their place would be taken by the Soviets.

Considering the fact that Chiang Kai-Shek's son was supported by the Americans, it was hard to imagine that the Americans would leave Taiwan promptly.

Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed with the idea that the Soviets' actions on the international stage were pushing both the Americans and the Chinese to act for the normalization of bilateral relations.

He added that the expansionist policies adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, which implied the spreading out of their spheres of influence in Asia, were very powerful. Regarding the discussions he had had with Hua Guafeng, the Chinese leader declared that, for the time being, he was not very hopeful of the normalization of the relations with the United States of America.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that the United States of America and the American Senate were interested in normalizing the relations with China. If this normalization would not affect other countries, it would be a good thing.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that the People's Republic of China needed peace and security to develop its economy, to solve its internal problems and improve the living standards of the population.

For this reason, he personally did not expect that the People's Republic of China would wage war in Taiwan after the Americans' withdrawal.

Moreover, the Soviet Union was not ready to start military actions. The fact that the Soviet Union had big and well-trained armed forces was not bad. But those armed forces must be used for defense purposes only.

Lately, the Soviet Union has been selling weapons everywhere and is generally making great profit by selling weapons.

What is more, for military reasons and because of the mistakes [made by Moscow], the Soviet Union pulled out of Egypt.

With the occasion of the visit made in 1975 in Algeria he was informed that the Soviets asked Algerians to allow them to build bases on the territory of Algeria, but the Algerians refused. One of the objectives of building a Soviet military base on foreign lands was to impose their influence.

Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed with the idea that at that point in time there was no possibility of a Soviet-American conflict, but he said that the possibility of some conflicts should not be neglected.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that the Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa had a negative influence over the national liberation movements [there], and their interference in Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia and other countries allowed the danger of outside intervention from other countries.

In the official declarations and talks, the Soviet Union was claiming to be in favor of peace, but it acted exactly in the opposite direction.

Referring to the communist movement in Europe, comrade Kim Il Sung showed that the Koreans appreciated as positive the position of the communist parties from Italy, France and Spain, to act starting from the actual relations between those countries.

Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed with the idea that the foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union and their military presence in Europe are of such nature to make other countries fear the Soviet Union and no longer request the dismantlement of NATO and the withdrawal of the Americans from Europe.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that the complete failure of the revolution in Portugal is also the result of the reservations of the population of this country regarding the Soviet Union, as well of Soviet interference.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu informed about the conversations he had with President Jimmy Carter regarding the Korean problem, at the request of comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Kim Il Sung informed that he asked President Tito to press the United States of America to accept negotiations regarding the Korean matter.

The response was the same: the United States of America cannot remove Park Chung Hee and they want trilateral negotiations.

The Koreans understand the difficulties the United States of America is facing, because of the economic crisis and the opposition in Congress regarding this matter. The problem of initiating discussions between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America was discussed with the comrades in South Korea. They are currently against initiating trilateral negotiations. Of course, trilateral negotiations have some disadvantages, but they also have numerous advantages that cannot be neglected. During those negotiations many problems like the democratization of the South Korean society, the release of the prisoners from jails, the legalization of political parties in South Korea and the initiation of peaceful negotiation between different parties and organizations from the North and the South, could be solved.

The comrades from South Korea do not agree with the participation of the representatives of the Seoul regime at the negotiations, saying that it will encourage Park Chung Hee in his actions against the organizations and democratic elements that exist in South Korea.

It would be an achievement for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea just to solve the problems of legalization of the democratic parties [in South Korea].

Comrade Kim Il Sung agrees that, if there are going to be negotiations with the United States of America, the problem of their retreat from South Korea should be discussed gradually. Even if there will be trilateral negotiations—United States of America-the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-South Korea—their problems will be actually discussed only by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. In the solving of initiating negotiations with the United States of America and South Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has difficulties with the comrades from South Korea who do not agree with

the participation of the South Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea understands those comrades and advises them to accept, because a solution to the Korean problem has to be found. The radical forces from South Korea could have a greater success if the political parties of South Korea were legalized and the prisoners released.

At the request of the comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to be informed about the view of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on trilateral negotiations in order to inform the president of the United States of America, comrade Kim Il Sung said that he could not give an answer yet, as he had to consult with the comrades from South Korea first.

Comrade Kim Il Sung believes that it will take a longer period of time to convince the comrades in South Korea to accept trilateral negotiations. In his [forthcoming] discussions with them, he will insist on the advantages that the democratization of the South Korean society, the legalization of the political parties and transformation of the armistice into a peace agreement will bring.

He informed Comrade Ceausescu that at that point in time, the democratic forces in the South Korea were not able to overthrow the regime of Park Chung Hee, while on the other hand, the circumstances for military actions were not favorable. For this reason, he believes that another way out must be found, a way of taking action on the unification problem.

Considering the possibility of negotiations with the United States of America, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea criticized Jimmy Carter only once, on the occasion of the American-South-Korean maneuvers.

-22 May 1978-

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu invited comrade Kim Il Sung to spend his vacation in Romania.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said he planned to visit some socialist countries in Europe, and so, he would agree to spend his vacation in Romania.

Comrade Kim Il Sung informed he was invited to visit Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union, Syria, Egypt and many other countries.

On the occasion of his visit in Korea in 1977, comrade Tito addressed him an invitation to visit him in Yugoslavia.

On the occasion of his recent visit in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hua Guofeng informed him that he planned to visit Romania and Yugoslavia in the second half of 1978.

As he had not been in the People's Republic of China since 1975, comrade Kim Il Sung informed that, in the future, he planned to visit China.

From the recent discussions with President Hua Guofeng, the latter informed him that, because of the numerous problems he had to deal with in 1976 he lost 16 lbs. Kim Il Sung added that,



indeed, the People's Republic of China has faced many difficulties in the last 2 years, and on the other hand, it has lost several leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhou De and others as well.

In the discussions held with President Hua Guofeng, the latter informed him that the People's Republic of China would like to improve its relations with Yugoslavia. Even the former president Mao Zedong recognized that he did not do well in China's relations with Yugoslavia.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said he had information that Albania held the Chinese comrades from improving their relations with Yugoslavia.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said that Romania had good state relations with Albania. We do not have any party relations.

Regarding the proposals to have party relations, the Albanian comrades said that in this matter "we have to advance gradually." The Romanians agreed with the proposals of the Albanian comrades to expand economic exchanges even more. There are no special problems between Romania and Albania. We had good relations in the past too; many Albanian citizens studied in Romania. In the discussions with the Chinese and Albanian comrades, the Romanians said that it is not good for the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Albania to have relations with different groups from Europe that call themselves communist.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that if Albania is isolated, it is because it has isolated itself.

At the request of comrade Kim Il Sung to be informed about the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu reported that the relations are normal. Economic relations are good though.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu then reported about the relations of Romania with socialist countries, emphasizing on the following: the relations with Bulgaria are good. We are building a hydro plant on the Danube, a chemical industrial unit and a heavy-machinery factory. With the German Democratic Republic we maintain good relations. Between 1976 and 1977, there have been visits at the highest level between the two countries. In 1977, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu visited Poland. Bilateral relations [with Poland] are good. It looks like the Poles have some economic difficulties and they are forced to import cereals. Relations with Czechoslovakia are good; in 1977, comrade Husak visited Romania. Actually, Romania had good relations with Czechoslovakia since before the liberation. It looks like Czechoslovakia has some internal problems, including the presence of the Soviet troops. In 1977 comrade Nicolae Ceausescu had a meeting with comrade Kadar, at the border between the two countries. Bilateral relations [with Hungary] are good. There is a Hungarian minority in Romania and they [the Hungarians] are interfering a little bit in this matter and they are seeking to agitate the chauvinistic elements [among them]. There is a smaller Romanian minority in Hungary as well. During bilateral negotiations it was decided that each country has to resolve their minority problems. Unofficially, the Hungarians undertake some activities causing turmoil.

Relations with the Soviet Union are good. There were serious discussions on bilateral matters with the Soviet Union, even on the Bessarabia and Bucovina matters. Romania does not have

territorial claims, but it cannot accept [the claim] that the two territories were freed of Czarism when [in reality] they were actually occupied by force. A state was established on Moldavian territory and Romania admits this fact. In 1976, Leonid Brezhnev made an official visit to Romania, and with this occasion, a common Declaration it was adopted.

In the relations with the Soviet Union, there are some differences of opinions regarding international matters, the problems regarding the COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet side is for integration, but Romania is against it. The other socialist countries in Europe are for integration, but they act against it.

Soviet-Romanian economic relations are good. About 20 percent of the external commerce of Romania is with the Soviet Union. We have good economic relations with the other socialist countries as well. The share of the socialist countries in the foreign trade of Romania is of 46-48 percent.

We have good economic relations with developing countries too, which have a share of about 20 percent of the foreign trade.

Romania has good economic relations with developed capitalist countries as well.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that the DPRK's share of foreign trade with the Soviet Union is around 75-80 percent. In the future trade will be structured as follows: 25 percent with the Soviet Union, 25 percent with the People's Republic of China, 20 percent with European socialist countries, and the rest with Third World countries and capitalist countries.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu informed that Romania's relations with the People's Republic of China are good. At the discussions held at Beijing, there was an agreement on all problems discussed and a long-term agreement of economic cooperation was signed.

The Chinese comrades were informed that Romania does not understand the theory of the Three Worlds but we do not wish to have polemics on this subject.

It has been shown that we do not consider the thesis of the People's Republic of China, according to which the Soviet Union is not building the socialism, to be correct. Even though the Soviet Union is making some mistakes, especially on international matters, and in its relations with socialist countries, it is nonetheless a socialist country.

Regarding the problems of the communist movement, the Chinese comrades said that they would think about it.

Both sides have the same position on the establishment of a new international economic order, for the protection of the independence and sovereignty.

Both Romania and China agreed that, on the whole, the danger of war did not vanish.

The Chinese were advised that it would be good if the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union would improve their bilateral relations.

The relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are good. However, the Vietnamese comrades were not too happy about the attitude Romania had adopted in the conflict with Kampuchea.

Relations with Laos are good. Two years ago, the First Secretary of the Communist Party visited Romania.

Regarding Kampuchea, we have good relations. However, we barely have any economic collaboration. This problem will be discussed with the occasion of the visit that we will undertake to that country.

Overall, relations between Romania with Cuba can be seen as good. The Cubans request high prices for sugar, arguing that through these prices, socialist countries offer them support. We do not agree with this position, especially because of the Cubans' actions in Angola and Ethiopia.

Regarding Romanian-Korean relations, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said that they were discussed at the first meeting. They are very good; there are no divergences between the two countries.

Comrade Kim Il Sung informed that the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union have a distinctive character. On different occasions the Soviets affirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is on the side of the People's Republic of China.

In a discussion with Kunael, comrade Kim Il Sung showed that many Soviet-Korean bilateral problems were caused by distrust.

In the discussion he had with the representatives of the People's Republic of China, the latter declared that they had nothing against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea improving its relations with the Soviet Union.

Regarding economic relations, he showed that the Soviets built a refinery for the North Koreans, but now they raised the price of crude oil, which creates some difficulties for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In exchange for crude, the Soviets request magnesite. After finishing working for opening an exploitation mine, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will satisfy all the requests of the Soviets.

In the relations with the Soviet Union, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea meets some difficulties because the Soviet Union is not giving them all the spare parts they need for the modern weapons of Soviet fabrication. By not delivering the spare parts, the Soviets are trying to make pressures on Korea, but they must know that the Korean comrades would not beg them.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that there are some divergences between the Soviets and Egyptians and considers the measure taken by the president [Anwar] Sadat as just.

Regarding the relations with the People's Republic of China, comrade Kim Il Sung showed that in the 1970s the bilateral relations were quite tense. After the visit of Zhou Enlai to Korea in 1970, bilateral relations have improved a lot. During his visit to Korea, Hua Guofeng expressed his full support for the policies promoted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and explained a series of internal problems of the People's Republic of China.

Comrade Kim Il Sung informed that before the visit of President Hua Guofeng to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Soviet ambassador paid him a visit and asked him to press the Chinese to prevent any criticisms from being addressed to the Soviet Union during his visit. The Soviet ambassador was assured that no remarks on the Soviet Union will be made in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

With the occasion of this visit, no common documents were signed, at the request of the Chinese comrades who do not practice such things. All which had to be said was said in the speeches held at the meeting and receptions.

It has been noticed that lately, in North Korea's relations with the People's Republic of China, the Chinese comrades no longer reproduce the phrase "Japanese imperialism" from the Korean documents, but only "Japan." This is explained through their desire to improve their relations with Japan. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea approves of the improvement of the relations between the Chinese and the Japanese. China needs technology, and Japan needs raw materials.

As for the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan, the problem is more delicate. Because Japan is for the existence of two Korean states, only economic exchanges and visits of some persons take place between the two countries. The matter of state-to-state relations with Japan will be raised only after the unification of Korea.

The relations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with European socialist countries are good. There are no reasons to have any other kind of relations. The Democratic People's Republic is in favor of visit exchanges and trade.

Relations with Vietnam and Cambodia are good. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has always supported the struggle of the people in those countries.

About the Democratic People's Republic of Korea position on the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia, the Romanians were informed through the message sent by comrade Kim Yong-nam, secretary of the Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea, with the occasion of his visit to Romania, in the spring of this year. The conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia had actually started at the same time with the war in Vietnam.

On the occasion of the visit to Korea of a delegation from Cambodia, the Koreans were asked to stop using the word "Indochina". It is true that there was a Communist Party in Indochina, but it separated and expanded in an independent way in every country later.

At a moment, the Vietnamese proposed the establishment of a united army of the countries of Indochina, but Cambodia was against it and fought separately. After the victory in Cambodia, the relations between the Workers' Party of Korea and the Communist Party of Cambodia developed a lot. Pol Pot visited [the Democratic Republic of] Korea and had long discussions with Kim Il Sung, who regarded him as a competent comrade. The matter of forming a Confederation in Indochina was raised for the first time to the Koreans by Pol Pot. Both Cambodia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are against forming this sort of Confederation.

From the talks with Pol Pot resulted that within the Communist Party in Cambodia there were pro-Vietnamese groups, but they were removed, the situation within the party being normal at the moment.

Comrade Kim Il Sung thought the Soviets committed a mistake when they kept their embassy at Phnom Penh under the lead of Lon Nol. They committed a mistake later as well, when, after the victory of the revolutionary forces they withdrew the embassy. Actually they were kicked out of Cambodia.

The [North] Koreans believe that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam did not act properly on the border problems it had with Cambodia. The Parrot's Beak is Cambodia territory. It was used by the Vietnamese as a retreat place, as a place for establishing hospitals and repair shops for armament during the war. Sihanouk's permission to let the Vietnamese use this territory made the Americans disgruntled, and so they ordered Lon Nol to remove Sihanouk. This was also observed from the fact that once Sihanouk was toppled, the Americans took larger scale actions in the Parrot's Beak territory.

The affirmations of the Vietnamese which have a large and well prepared army, that they were attacked by the Cambodians, are not believed by anyone. It is a well-known fact that the Vietnamese got 2-3 billion dollars' worth of equipment from the Americans.

If during the war the Democratic People's Republic of Korea supported Vietnam and Kampuchea in the battle against imperialism, now, just like the Romanians, they advised them to retreat from the occupied territories and to try to solve their problems through negotiations.

The relations with the People's Republic of Mongolia are oscillating, between good and bad, just like the relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union.

The relations with Cuba were good for a while but they got colder later. In 1976, the State Secretary of Cuba paid Kim Il Sung a visit in Korea. On this occasion he requested the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take action at the next high level Conference of the non-aligned countries from Colombo so as the conference would not turn into an anti-Soviet Conference.

It was explained to the Cubans that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had submitted a declaration on the Korean matter. Vietnam and Cuba were against a paragraph in this declaration in which we [the North Koreans] requested that the key-countries not to meddle in the Korean problem. Of course we do not target the socialist countries but the United States of America and Japan in the first place. In this problem the discussions with the representatives of Cuba were very intense, but the declaration was adopted as it was proposed. Cuba did not vote.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that just like Romania, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not agree with the Cuba's action in Angola and Ethiopia. Many Africans were asking themselves what the Cuban soldiers are doing in these countries. As it is known, the Soviet Union is behind of all of the actions undertaken by the Cubans.

All these actions will have a negative influence over the summoning and the course of the high level conference of the non-aligned countries from Havana in 1979.

The relations between the Workers' Party of Korea with the Communist Party of Japan are good.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that at that point in time, there were many speculations at the international level regarding the visit of the comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the visit to China of the American Secretary of Defense [Brown]. Many think that those visits were preparing [the ground] for some negotiations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Korea. Actually, the 21 Japanese journalists group on the side of the Socialist Party raised the question of whether in the discussions with the comrade Nicolae Ceausescu the problem of trilateral negotiations (the United States of America, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea) would be brought up.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu appreciated that it was a good thing to start these trilateral negotiations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that before taking a decision, he must first consult with the comrades from South Korea, which were currently against those negotiations.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that the South Koreans were indeed in a special situation. He pointed out that undertaking military action to solve the Korean problem was not possible and it would be a shame to do it considering how beautifully built the city of Pyongyang was.

The problem can be solved through negotiations, but for this, democratic activities in South Korea must be intensified; negotiations must be combined with fighting as well.

Comrade Kim Il Sung appreciated that the democratization of the South Korean society would result in the intensification of the democratic forces' fights. Also, a positive combination would have as a result the legalization of the political parties and the release of prisoners from jails. Since the United States of America are not withdrawing from South Korea for the time being, solving those problems would be a great success.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said that the main American tactic in Korea was to create two states. To annihilate this policy, sustained actions and a powerful movement in South Korea were required. All Kim Il Sung had to do was to convince the comrades from South to accept trilateral negotiations. The situation in South Korea, the high density of people per square kilometer, the over 3 million people in the armed forces, police and paramilitary troops, did not allow our comrades to undertake an action, they cannot undertake partisan actions. They could deploy successful actions only in the circumstance of a battle of North against the South.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu appreciated that the initiation of negotiations, even trilateral negotiations, would help the progressive groups from South Korea. Moreover, even in the relations with other countries, it would be easier to impose the idea that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was acting independently and could solve its problems on its own, through negotiations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung asked if, by accepting negotiations with the United States of America there was the danger for the Soviets entering negotiations with South Korea.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that it was impossible. There are foreign troops in South Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has the right to discuss with the leaders that manage South Korea. The Soviet Union cannot justify by any means entering negotiations with South Korea.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he somewhat fears that the Soviet Union might recognize South Korea in the same way it did with Germany.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that if negotiations with the United States of America were to be started, it will be hard for the Soviets to contact the South. Of course, by the lack of contacts and negotiations with the United States of America, it would be possible for the Soviets to contact South Korea. The situation in Germany is completely different. It is said that there are two nations in Germany.

Comrade Kim Il Sung currently does not know how the Soviets will react. He has some information that there are many contacts of the South Korean diplomats with the Soviet diplomats mentioned in the reports that the South Korean diplomats sent to the government.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu:

The Soviets think that the international problems can be treated only through them. They also reproach Egypt that it is not treating the problem of the conflict in the Near East through them and does not let them solve it. Basically it can be said that the problems in the Middle East are a deal between Soviets and Americans.

Comrade Kim Il Sung: We consider starting negotiations with the Americans too. This problem was discussed many times at the party discussions. By common assent it was decided that such kind of negotiations are necessary, but we will not act until we consult with the comrades in the South.

The South Koreans want to participate in the trilateral negotiations without the representatives of Park Chung Hee, which South Korea cannot accept. Sadly, our comrades in South Korea have not become a force yet, and they cannot overthrow Park Chung Hee.

In the foreseeable future, they will send a comrade from the administration in South Korea to discuss this problem in detail.

Comrade Kim Il Sung promised he would assign the right people to analyze carefully the problem of receiving the American journalist Valas to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For now, he has some reservations, not because he fears the American journalist but for the fear that later, Soviet journalists will visit South Korea or journalists from South Korea will visit the Soviet Union.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that such an action from the Soviets would be a big mistake. The visit of this journalist in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be a great opportunity to illuminate the American public opinion [on what is happening in North Korea]. He assured Kim Il Sung that [Valas] was a serious, unbiased journalist and that he had promised he would publish the entire text of the interview with comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Kim Il Sung personally thinks that the Soviets will not initiate relations with South Korea, but he cannot ignore the fact that the Soviets make many mistakes. The Soviets are still a key country and act accordingly.

The Koreans completely trust the affirmations of comrade Nicolae Ceausescu regarding this journalist and they will analyze the possibility of receiving him. It remains to be seen how the Soviets will react. Kim Il Sung is saying this because in the discussions with the Soviets, they affirm that in South Korea there is a de facto regime and a state and they let it be understood that they plan to recognize it. Through this, they have in view the recognition of two Korean states.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu exemplified the case of Cuba which did not have relations with the United States of America, but president Fidel Castro had welcomed many delegations of American journalists, senators etc. He expressed this opinion that before starting official negotiations with the United States of America it would be good to have such kind of contacts. Regarding the problem of "a second Korea" he showed that, if the division of the country takes a long time, then they could bring the problem of other states establishing contacts with South Korea as well. A presence of those states in South Korea could be a support for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. If the unification takes less time, such contacts are useless. For this, however, it is necessary to undertake sustained efforts. The representatives of South Korea to a European country contacted the Romanian ambassador and informed him that they would be interested in discussing with Romania the problem of the negotiations between North and South. The Romanians gave no answer. He said that the Soviets would not take actions to force the recognition of South Korea.

Nicolae Ceausescu informed about the situation in Europe emphasizing on the following problems:



The conference held in Belgrade ended without the expected results, mainly because the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union. They tried to impose their points of view, but the contradictions between them were shown even more.

Currently in Europe, there are about 70-80 percent of the entire world's weapons; the two military blocks, many bases and foreign troops are on the territories of other states, which complicate the situation a lot. Romania acts for undertaking firm measures, for the improvement of the relations between states, for military disengagement. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries agree with those measures. In reality though, the Soviet Union is subordinating everything under their negotiations with the United States of America. In Europe, there is a fear of the Soviet Union, as well of the increasing influence of the communist parties, especially those in France, Italy and Spain.

Overall, the evolution of the political situation in Europe is good; the influence of progressive forces is increasing, led by the communists. Romania has good relations with all the European states. On 13 July [1978], he will visit England. Romania has good relations with the communist parties, the socialist parties and other parties.

[...]

Comrade Kim Il Sung, referring to the RCP party delegation visit to the People's Republic of China in 1964, said:

On the morning when the Romanian delegation arrived in Beijing, Mao Zedong sent Peng Chen to Pyongyang with a note in which he requested me to urgently go to Beijing, [to discuss] a very urgent and important matter.

After arriving in Beijing, Mao Zedong asked me, in the presence of Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi and other Chinese leaders, about who you were. I answered that Romanians are good people, they defend their independence and therefore we must go hand in hand with them

Both Kang Sheng and Liu Shaoqi contradicted me in the presence of Mao Zedong. Then, Mao Zedong told me not to listen to what Kang Sheng and Liu Shaoqi said and invited us to have lunch.

In the evening of the same day, Comrade Kim Il Sung paid a visit to the Romanian delegation which was in Beijing at the time.

In the recent conversations with President Hua Guofeng, [comrade Kim Il Sung] praised the sovereign policy promoted by Romania and said he would pay a visit to Romania to strengthen their bilateral relations even more.

Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed his wish to have as many meetings and talks as possible in the future. The conversations they had allowed him to see that on very many issues their positions were identical. On the international matters discussed, there was a full identity of positions.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said that they managed to get to know each other better and that he really appreciated the activity of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Kim Il Sung showed that he very much appreciated the activity of Comrade Ceausescu domestically and internationally.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: There are no matters on which there are differences of opinion between our countries and parties.

As the conditions in which the two countries exist are so different, each [party] solves its problems according to the specific situation in their country.

Subsequently, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed that on the occasion of his visit to the United States, he sought to see and know as much as possible, to meet different [political] figures. The United States have numerous [breakthrough] in science, technology and management from which [useful] conclusions and lessons can be drawn. Romania is not in favor of isolationism. The defense of independence is one thing, while cooperation is a different one.

True friendship and cooperation can only be established when both parties openly state everything that is on their mind.

Comrade Kim Il Sung: The meeting [I had] with Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu was very good and was extremely useful for [our] bilateral relations. They testify to the unity and solidarity between our peoples. Moreover, they are useful for other countries and peoples as well, as they can see in them our unity and cohesion.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu thanked for the invitation [to visit the DPRK], for the extraordinarily warm hospitality with which he was received, as well as for the full agreement that had been reached.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said he was very satisfied with the visit.

If the DPRK's relations with the USSR were to improve, he planned to pay a visit to some countries in Europe, including the USSR.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu said that such a visit in itself could help to improve relations with European countries. The Soviets are extremely sensitive if they are given attention.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that problems with the Soviets would be solved at the right moment.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: We cannot solve all problems. There must be collaborations to solve them.

Comrade Kim Il Sung: It is necessary to cooperate more closely with the Soviets to solve the unification of Korea.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu: If the Soviets are told something directly, they [sit and] reflect on these problems. Countries which think one thing and do another have the wrong approach. These countries are not helping the Soviets understand things clearly. The same thing was said directly to Brezhnev.

On this issue, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that during his visit to Bulgaria in 1975 an open-air rally was organized. Initially, only the portraits of Comrade Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung were displayed. Later, a very large portrait of Brezhnev was also displayed, pushed on the stage on a cart. At a reception, Comrade Zhivkov said that he did not always respect the guidance [from the center].

Comrade Kim Il Sung noticed such acts on the occasion of the visit he paid in 1956 to some socialist countries in Europe, countries which because they followed the Soviets in their policy to eliminate the cult of personality, did not display any portraits of their party leaders.

The only country which continued to display the portraits of its party leaders was Romania, which shows that it did not follow the guidance from the center.

Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu pointed out that the world is constantly changing and that this is a law of development.

7 June, 1978

7 June 1978

~~SECRET~~  
KOREAN BALANCEBASIC ASSESSMENT

Any major conventional conflict on the Korean peninsula will be largely decided on the ground. There the North Korean Army has built up an edge in quantifiable factors such as armor and firepower. In addition, the picture which emerges from attempting to take into account such factors as the deployment, organization, operational doctrine, and past battlefield behavior of the opposing armies is, on the whole, one of a forward, linear South Korean defense (based on firepower but generally lacking in mobility and flexibility) arrayed against an offensively-oriented North Korean force tailored to achieve quick penetration and conduct fast-tempo, mobile operations.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear how effectively the North Koreans might be able to exploit their potential advantages. If the weight of their attack consisted primarily of large formations, massed in the traditional "low terrain" approaches to Seoul, then it is probable that US/ROK tactical airpower, in conjunction with the defensive firepower of ROK preplanned "kill zones," could inflict devastating attrition on the North Koreans along the forward defensive line -- especially if the defenders received 12 or more hours of warning and acted on that warning. On the other hand, if the North Koreans achieved tactical surprise, utilized their light infantry and commando forces to by-pass and turn ROK "low terrain" defensive positions with ridgeline attacks, exploited the cover of darkness, properly focused their firepower, and made full use of their capacity for disruptive attacks against "rear area" facilities to slow the defenders' response in the opening hours of the conflict, it is very possible that they could avoid the brunt of US/ROK tactical airpower while achieving quick, deep penetrations of [REDACTED]

KEY ASYMMETRIES

## Factors which favor US/ROK:

- The South Koreans have an advantage over the North Koreans in population (2:1) and GNP (roughly 2:1 at present, but projected to reach 3:1 by the early 1980s). Especially with U.S. help, South Korea should be able to defeat the North in any drawn-out war of attrition.
- The ROK defenders will be fighting on familiar terrain from defensive positions they have been preparing for 25 years.
- Combined US/ROK tactical air assets are vastly superior to the North Korean Air Force. The defenders, therefore, have available considerable airborne firepower.
- The South Korean population, especially in the rural areas, is firmly anti-Communist. North Korean efforts to spark insurgent groups in the South have failed time and again.

## Factors which favor the DPRK:

- As the invader, North Korea would be able to choose the style of attack, its nature, timing, size and direction.
- North Korea presently possesses superior numbers of tanks (2:1) and artillery/rocket-launchers (2:1).

- The DPRK has invested in extensive hardening of its airfields, naval facilities, factories and logistics storage areas. Deep interdiction airstrikes against North Korea would be difficult.
- North Korea has roughly 40,000 unconventional warfare troops plus the naval and airlift capacity to use up to 8,600 of them in a single operation.
- The DPRK, potentially at least, has the ability to exploit lightly defended "high terrain," the cover of darkness, and the overall rigidity of ROK Army's compartmented "barrier" defense.

#### KEY UNCERTAINTIES

- There is a real possibility that the North Koreans could achieve tactical surprise.
- The nature of a DPRK attack remains uncertain. Quite possibly the DPRK would mount the sort of attack that could be blunted or stopped with US/ROK ground and airborne firepower. However, the DPRK has historically practiced a style of war which focuses firepower and shock action against weakness to achieve rapid breakthroughs for mobile, fast-tempo warfare, and the ROK Army is neither trained nor equipped to deal with major penetrations of [REDACTED].
- The role and importance of DPRK unconventional operations is unknown. But even if ROK rear area security is quite effective, North Korean disruptive attacks could introduce considerable friction into the US/ROK response during the critical opening hours of an invasion.
- While DIA has made a major effort to understand all that the DPRK would have to do to mount a major attack, we are still uncertain of the sequences of mobilization and deployments which would be necessary. Better intelligence collection might ease this problem and increase warning time, but DPRK operational security practices suggest that some uncertainty will remain.
- The ability of tactical airpower to interdict the DPRK LOCs and destroy hardened military and industrial targets -- even using precision guided munitions -- without experiencing severe attrition to fixed air defenses is open to question.

~~SECRET~~

**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 8 June 1978**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 46-50, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

June 8, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your kind letter delivered to me by Dr. Brzezinski who called on me on May 25. I highly appreciate your expression of views and determination on some of the important current matters of our mutual interest.

I had a very useful meeting with Dr. Brzezinski, and I believe that his visit this time has contributed to further deepening our understanding of various questions of strategic importance to both of our two countries in common endeavors for peace and security in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.

I have closely followed your recent actions taken in connection with the planned withdrawal of the United States ground forces from Korea. Your strong personal urges for an early Congressional passage of a bill for the transfer of military equipment to the Republic of Korea armed forces and your announcement of April 21 of partial adjustment in the planned withdrawal of ground combat units for current year reflect, I believe, the firm commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea as well as your own position in favor of the careful implementation of redeployment plan. In this connection, I am pleased to note that you share with me the view on the importance of close prior consultation between our two Governments on this question as it affects the security of the Republic of Korea allied with the United States through the existing Mutual Defense Treaty.

I am also pleased to note that you continue to address your special concern for military compensatory measures aimed at strengthening and modernizing the Republic of Korea armed forces in connection with the planned redeployment of the American ground combat forces in Korea.

With regard to our endeavors for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula, I am confident that my Government has been making every possible effort under the prevailing circumstances to resume serious dialogue with the North in the spirit of the Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972. I can assure you that we will continue to pursue this policy in the hope that the North would eventually come to realize that the peaceful solution of Korean problems can only be reached through constructive dialogue between the South and the North of Korea.

I wish to state, however, that it is my observation, which I expressed to Dr. Brzezinski, that North Korea is not sincere enough to seek any substantial progress toward solving Korean problems, thus making our own initiatives rather unilateral approach. Accordingly, I appreciate your firm stand against the North Korean attempts to have a bilateral talk with the United States.

Dr. Brzezinski and I had a frank discussion on 'tripartite talk proposal' and were able to reach better mutual understanding of the matter. I felt much heartened by the forthright position you took when discussing the Korean situation recently with Tito and Ceausescu, respectively.

While we pursue the same political objective as that of the United States in the field of domestic politics, I consider it my duty as President of this Republic to preserve the national security and to promote the well-being of my people in the face of the persistent danger of military provocations from the North.

The precarious peace that is being maintained only by the Armistice Agreement and high degree of our own vigilance and deterrent power inevitably dictates us here in Korea to deal with the present situation with certain special measures which many other countries enjoying total peace and stability do not have to employ. I wish to assure you, however, that it is my intention to sustain a steady and sound evolution in the political life of our nation in parallel with our economic and social development in pursuit of the goal of modernization that I have established.

On receiving your personal letter, and through my talk with Dr. Brzezinski, I feel greatly encouraged to note that the United States is determined to help maintain peace and an environment for stable economic growth in Northeast Asia and that you are prepared to extend your firm support to the maintenance of our special friendship and the promotion of our common interest in attaining our goals.

Please accept my gratitude to you for providing me with another valuable opportunity to reason together on matters of common interest and bilateral cooperation through the visit of Dr. Brzezinski to Seoul.

With my warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Ambassador in Finland, “Report on Dialogue with Vainiomaki, Ex-Commercial Attaché in Pyongyang,” 28 June 1978**

[Source: Roll 2008-29, File 03, Frames 45-49, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Finland

File No. : *Fin Jung* [Finland Political] : 770 - 116  
To : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Cc : Deputy Director General for European Affairs Bureau,  
Deputy Director General for Information and Culture  
Title : Report on Dialogue with Vainiomaki, Ex-Commercial Attaché in Pyongyang

Related document file no. : FNW – 0837 [number is assumed]

Attached is the report on dialogue with [Arto] Vainiomaki, ex-commercial attaché to Pyongyang, who has come back to Finland after two years of service.

Enclosure: Report on dialogue with Vainiomaki, ex-commercial attaché to each recipient

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Finland

Report on Dialogue with Vainiomaki, Ex-Commercial Attaché to Pyongyang

1. Date & Time: 12:30 – 14:30 June 28, 1978
2. Place : Hotel Tornio in Helsinki
3. Attendee : Arto Vainiomaki, ex-commercial attaché to Pyongyang  
Kim Hyun-kin, commercial attaché of the Korean Embassy to Finland  
Chung Dong-gyun, first secretary of the Korean Embassy to Finland
4. Content of the dialogue: Below is the summary of what Vainiomaki ex-commercial attaché told.

a. I (Vainiomaki) was appointed to Pyongyang in May 1976 and came back recently after two years of service. As I promised at the end of last year, I wanted to visit the ROK right after I left Pyongyang, but it could not be realized due to a sudden turn of events. I proposed a visit to Korea to my government. The government replied to me that “At the beginning of this year, a Swedish diplomat visited South Korea right after finishing his service in Pyongyang. His visit became known because South Korean newspaper and broadcasting companies spotlighted him,” opposed the visit to South Korea because of possible diplomatic complications, and encouraged me to visit South Korea at an appropriate time in the future. Thus, I gave it up. I told my trip plan to a friend of mine, a Head of Sweden mission of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in Pyongyang. He promised that he would gladly arrange the trip to South Korea by his own car through *Panmunjeom*.

b. According to the Soviet Ambassador and the Ambassador of the P.R.C. in Pyongyang, I was told that North Korea evacuated civilians who lived around the truce line, or civilians of Kaesong, as a preparation for war, and that Kim Song-man, second-in-command of the North Korean armed forces, suddenly disappeared last months, but it was disclosed later that he had been commanding the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet of the North Korean armed forces near Hamheung to reinforce them. Two



ambassadors of the Soviet Union and of the P.R.C. told the fact mentioned above with anxiety. I believe the truth of the evacuation of the civilians can be checked by the Swedish Head of the UNCMAC.

c. Hua Guofeng visited the North Korean puppets in the beginning of this May and offered them the following:

i. Free supply of oil up to 1.5 million ton

ii. Assistance for construction of two paper-mill factories (for newspapers and paper kraft, respectively)

iii. And cooperation to construct about 30 factories (purposes of factories unknown).

iv. Also, Communist China had already provided North Korea with \$100 million loan through the Beijing Bank at the beginning of the year.

v. However, the Communist China rejected North Korea's request for military aid.

As mentioned above, Communist China's assistance to the North Korean puppets is thought to be a scheme intended to keep the North Korean puppets under its complete control.

d. Kim Il Sung plans a visit to the Soviet Union around this September at the official invitation from the Soviet government (It is said that he may visit Bulgaria during the visit.) The invitation to Kim Il Sung was delivered by a deputy chairman of Kazakhstan Communist Party (name unknown) when he visited the North Korean puppet regime. [It was Dinmukhamed Kunaev who delivered the Order of Lenin to Kim Il Sung in January 1978. He was formerly deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Kazakhstan from 1942 to 1952, but was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan when he visited North Korea.] The Order of Lenin was delivered to Kim Il Sung during the visit. However, Kim Il Sung was so displeased with the fact that the invitation was delivered by a low-ranking official of the Soviet Union and the way in which the Order of Lenin was not bestowed in accordance with ceremonial customs that he seemed to not welcome the trip to Moscow this year. Additionally, Kim Il Sung is trying to find an excuse to take revenge on Korea in return for the recent sinking of a spy boat, and is very likely to take retaliatory action in either July or August. It is circulated in the diplomatic circle in Pyongyang that Kim Il-Sung would instigate such provocations in connection to a request for military aid from the P.R.C. and possibly cite internal circumstances as a pretext to cancel the visit to the Soviet Union.

e. Of special note in the first half of the year are that the authorities of the North Korean puppet regime decided to reinforce their penetration into Korea this year, and the North Korean puppets dispatched a high-level military mission to Communist Vietnam to request the transfer of two ROK diplomats in detention (it is said that one of them is a general-level officer), but the Vietnamese authorities firmly refused on grounds that it would be inconsistent with international conventions. (I was told from a Vietnamese diplomat in Pyongyang.)

f. While the ROK-U.S. joint exercise was being conducted on a large scale this spring, the North Korean puppet regime conducted mass defense drill throughout the nation in response to it. It was estimated that about two million people were mobilized to participate in the drill. During the defense drill, smoke was witnessed from the mountains around Pyongyang due to shots from anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers and tanks were observed to be rolling from underground,

which indicates that the North Korean puppets have placed all of its military equipment underground or under caves in the mountains.

h. Regarding Kim Jong Il, it is said that he has long been hospitalized due to fatal injury sustained in a car accident, but there is no way to confirm it. It is unclear whether the accident was plotted by his opponents among young officers in the military or by his own mistake; however, he definitely has not been seen in public since last fall. According to a unconfirmed information, he is said to be hospitalized at the Communist Hospital of the North Korean puppets.

i. The North Korean puppets were supposed to pay the interest to the debt of paper factory by June 15 this year, and fortunately, it paid the first installment of interest in the amount of \$250,000 within due (Refer to the report file no. FNW – 0614.). The North Korean puppets paid the first installment of interest based on the agreement of the Finland-North Korean debt negotiations, which was held in Helsinki in March this year. The North Korean puppets requested Finland for expert engineers to help construct a pulp factory in this agreement. A Finnish mission is scheduled to be dispatched by the government to Pyongyang in August to discuss the construction of a pulp factory and conclude the debt problems. I (Commercial Attache Vainiomaki) think that I will visit Pyongyang again as a member of the Finnish delegation.

Incidentally, the Finnish side refuses to dispatch skilled engineers unless the North Korean puppets agree to pay their salaries for six months in advance.

j. My successor to Pyongyang, Mr. Lassi Vuori is a career diplomat aged around 50. The Foreign Ministry had difficulty finding a successor because all refused to work in North Korea; however, Mr. Vuori's application resolved the successor problem.

k. When I left my office in Pyongyang, a farewell party was given by the Chief of Protocol of the North Korean Foreign Ministry. When I left Pyongyang at the Pyongyang station, I had a chance to meet with Foreign Minister Heo Dam; he asked me to refrain from telling unpleasant stories when I came back to Finland. I left Pyongyang by train and arrived home via Beijing, Hong Kong, and India. Now, I am appointed to work in a treaty division of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, and work there.

**Telegram from the East Europe Division, Foreign Ministry, “Prospect of Kim Il Sung’s Visit to the Soviet Union,” 15 July 1978**

*[Source: Roll 2008-29, File 03, Frames 50-54, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

Prospect of Kim Il Sung’s Visit to the Soviet Union

Date: 1978. 7. 15

From: East Europe Division, Foreign Ministry

1. Possibility and Timing of Kim Il Sung’s Visit to the Soviet Union

Based on the information collected through contacts with the government of friendly countries, the below forecasts the timing and purpose of Kim Il Sung’s possible visit to the Soviet Union.

a. Possibility of Visit to the Soviet Union

i. Expected to accept the invitation of the Soviet Union and visit this year

ii. Confirmed by a staff of Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, who accompanied D. Kunaev, leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and government delegation in January 1978 that Kim Il Sung accepted the invitation but the date of the visit is not decided yet.

In June 1978, stated by an official of the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the Soviet government expected Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union this winter, also suggested by the same official Kim Il Sung’s visit to East Germany as well as Czechoslovakia.

b. Timing of the Visit to the Soviet Union

i. Expected either this winter or the end of the year

(Told by a former commercial attaché of the Finland Embassy in Pyongyang in September 1978 that Kim Il Sung is preparing for the visit to the Soviet Union

Observed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the visit would depend on the guarantee of a Soviet high-level official)

ii. Concrete schedule during the visit not yet confirmed

2. Purpose of the Visit to the Soviet Union

a. Economic assistance by the Soviet Union, including the supply of oil, on the main agenda; the deferred payment of loan from the Soviet Union

b. Soviet Union: the necessity of improving relations with the North Korean puppets in response to Communist China's active approach to the North Korean puppets; North Korea’s geographical significance for the expansion of its influence in the Far East

c. North Korean Puppets: equidistant diplomacy between the Communist China and the Soviet Union; securing both economic assistance and military aid; checking our approach towards

the Soviet Union

### 3. Relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean Puppets

#### a. Top-level's visits between the Soviet Union and the North Korean Puppets

i. None after Kim, Il-Sung's visits to the U.S.S.R. in July 1961 to sign the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance and in October 1961 to attend the 22<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(Kim Il Sung did not visit the Soviet Union as had been anticipated around the time of his visit to Communist China in April 1975 and tour of Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) in May 1975.)

ii. Chairman Alexei N. Kosygin's visit to the North Korean puppets in February 1965

No head of the Soviet state has visited the North Korean puppets.

#### b. Top-level's visits between Communist China and the North Korean Puppets

i. Kim Il Sung's visit to China in July 1961 to sign the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance

ii. Kim Il Sung's trip to China in April 1975

iii. Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Hua Guofeng's visit to the North Korean puppets in May 1978.

#### c. Recent Relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean Puppets

i. There is no change in the Soviet Union's position of supporting the North Korean puppets; in reality, it maintains the policy of upholding the status-quo on the Korean Peninsula

(The Soviet Union avoids improving relations with us, in light of the equidistant position the North Korean puppets have towards the Soviet Union and Communist China.)

ii. For a long time, relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean puppets have been stagnant and strained (the Soviet Union's sensitivity to the relationship between Communist China and the North Korean puppets, lukewarm attitude toward the North Korean puppets' request of economic assistance and military aid, and dissatisfaction with the North Korean puppets' declaration of military sea boundary)

iii. Recently noticed signs of somewhat improving relations between the Soviet Union and the North Korean puppets

(Delivered the Order of Lenin to Kim Il Sung when the Soviet delegation headed by Kunaev, among the leadership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, visited the North Korean puppets in January 1978

A visit by a military delegation headed by Minister of Defense O, Jin-U's on the 60<sup>th</sup>

anniversary of the establishment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union

d. Soviet Union's Assistance to the North Korean Puppets

i. Military assistance

Concluded the Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in February [*sic*] 1961 [trans. note—it was actually signed in July 1961.]

Effective for the next 10 years and then automatic renewing every 5 years

Renewed in July 1975 the treaty effective up to year 1981

ii. Economic assistance

1) Assisted in the construction of 50 factories from 1949 to 1970

2) Assisted in the construction of 10 factories from 1971 to 1975

3) Assisted in the construction of 16 factories from 1976 to 1980

(Total amount of assistance spent: around \$100 million)

iii. The North Korean Puppets' loan from the U.S.S.R.: around \$700 million

iv. Scale of Trade between the Soviet Union and the North Korean Puppets

(unit: million dollars)

Trading \ Year	1974	1975	1976	1977
Export	196.7	209.7	158.3	
Import	256.7	258.7	242.4	
Total	453.4	468.4	400.7	469

4. Analysis and Prospect

a. Kim Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union is expected, judging from the North Korean puppets' equidistant diplomacy between Communist China and the Soviet Union

(Kim Il Sung's visit to China in April 1975,

Hua Guofeng's visit to the North Korean puppets in May 1978)

b. Anticipated that Kim Il Sung would bestow the highest decoration of the North Korean puppets to Leonid I. Brezhnev during the visit, in return for the Order of Lenin bestowed to Kim Il Sung

(The decision to award Kim Il Sung with the Order of Lenin was made in April 1972, but its delivery had been delayed.

The North Korea puppets decided to award Brezhnev with its highest decoration in December

1976.

No delivery of the prize money)

c. The North Korean puppets, in need of the Soviet Union's active economic assistance (due to the deteriorating economy, increasing foreign loan burden, etc.)

Completely dependent on the Soviet Union in the military scene

d. The Soviet Union wants to prevent the North Korean puppets from leaning too much toward Communist China and considers the geographical significance of the North Korean puppets in the expansion of its influence in the Far East.

e. Given the foregoing circumstances, Kim Il Sung's visit to the Soviet Union will likely take place this winter.

Hymel

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1978

Bach

FYE

Maddala

File Korea

To Speaker Tip O'Neill

I understand that concern about the program for careful and phased withdrawal of U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea has prompted some in the Congress to propose placing restraints on my ability to redeploy these forces. Apparently that concern results largely from the incorrect impression that withdrawal will follow a rigid timetable not subject to modification in the light of changing circumstances. This has never been the case.


The withdrawal policy should be seen in the context of the international environment in Northeast Asia and the rapidly growing economic strength of the Republic of Korea. It is natural and appropriate that South Korea assume a greater share of the burden of its own defense. However, that burden must be assumed prudently and carefully. For this reason, I decided last April to defer a significant portion of the first phase of U.S. troop withdrawals until next year in order to give the Congress sufficient time to deal with the important question of equipment transfer authority.

It is my view that withdrawal phased over a four-to five-year period will be sufficiently flexible to accommodate developments on the peninsula. I expect the withdrawal program to be carried out in a manner which preserves a military balance and thus protects the security of the Republic of Korea. Should circumstances affecting the balance change significantly, we will assess these changes in close consultation with the Congress, the Republic of Korea and our other Asian allies. Our plans will be adjusted if developments so warrant.

Reports issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee propose that the Administration undertake full reviews of the impact of our plans, the force balance, and the international environment in connection with further ground force withdrawals from Korea, and report to the Congress on the results of these reviews. I endorse the Committees' aim and look forward to sharing our assessments with the Congress.

Meanwhile, it is most important that I have the necessary authority to begin equipment transfers and training operations which will safeguard the military balance on the peninsula. I hope the Congress will promptly enact the equipment transfer authority and foreign military sales credit authorizations already recommended by both the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill  
Speaker of the  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



**Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski, "Evening Notes," 29 August 1978**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item KO00269. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00269.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKO00269.)]

Top Secret-Sensitive  
Contains Codeword

August 29, 1978

Memorandum for Dr. Brzezinski

From: The Situation Room

Subject: Evening Notes

[...]

PRC Military Attaché's Comments on Korea: The defense attaché in Ankara reports that the PRC military attaché in a conversation in his "compound" said that it would be no problem if the U.S. withdrew troops from Korea. He said that North Korea would not attack, but suggested that this did not mean that South Korea would not. When the attaché asked "is this the policy of the Chinese government that you are saying the Chinese see no harm in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea," the PRC official said, "yes." The attaché asked what he thought about Japanese reaction to this and what signal the USSR and the rest of the world would get. His reply was that Japan would do nothing and he did not think the Soviets would either. He did not seem concerned about any such withdrawal.

The defense attaché comments that he was impressed with the Chinese official's open frankness and apparent willingness to discuss any subject. If the Chinese comments are true, it is significant that they would take U.S. withdrawal from Korea lightly, especially since they seem so concerned about possible Soviet intentions in that section of Asia.

**Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. William H. Gleysteen, Jr., 31 August 1978**

*[Source: "Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea – Republic of Korea – Relations – Diplomatic Competition in Canberra," A1838, 3126/4/4 Part 1, National Archives of Australia, Canberra.]*

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, SEOUL

221/5/3

Record of Conversation with H E MR WILLIAM H GLEYSTEEEN JR  
on 31 AUGUST 1978  
Officers Present MR W G T MILLER

MAIN SUBJECT(S): ROK/DPRK RELATIONS : DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH ASIA

Ambassador Gleysteen, who arrived in Seoul at almost exactly the same time as me, ie nearly two months ago, called for a general talk and comparison of impressions. Before his present appointment he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for North East Asia, and he is an East Asian expert.

2. I said that during a recent trip to the south I had been struck both by the consistent prosperity and orderliness of the countryside and by the air of a country very rich at peace: Seoul too had very much the feel of a busy civilian city at peace. This sat oddly with the fact of a million armed men facing each other 40 kms away.

3. Gleysteen said that the feeling was very different north of Seoul. (I have not been north yet, but go to Panmunjom next week.) The situation there was very dangerous, too dangerous, and "we" therefore needed to do all we could to encourage contacts and negotiations between the two sides. Very little seemed possible, however. North Korea was very rigid and south Korea, while now "conservative" rather than "rigid", as it had been, was very nervous about the United States. In contrast to Australia, which by recognizing north Korea had "broken out of the box", the United States "can't even mention the words 'north Korea'".

4. I mentioned Steven FitzGerald's seminar on Korea at the ANU, and recent "private visitors" from north Korea to Australia. Gleysteen said there were some very limited direct contacts between north and south Korea, and gave an instance which is being reported separately. In his view in these contacts the south was laying the groundwork for developments that might take place in a year or two; the north, he felt, was pursuing specific narrow aims. Gleysteen said that although so far the south had moved only from "rigid" to "conservative" in its attitude to the north, if things went well with the south, ie if the economy adjusts successfully to some of the external and internal constraints now evident, if it gets its defence industries right and if it can be reassured that in military terms it is not inferior to the north "as it is now in some ways", "we may be on the thresh-hold" of a period of considerable flexibility and innovation in regard to the south's approach to the north. "But we are not in that period yet."

5. I mentioned that recently a Korean academic had commented that the south "would have to get used" to coming up against northern representatives in various international fora.

6. I said that the Japan/China treaty seemed to have implications for north/south relationships in Korea. Japan had links with both north and south, China with the north, the United States, which was very important to both China and Japan, had close links with the south. There seemed in all of this to be the potential for some movement.

7. Gleysteen said that during a recent visit he had made to Peking a Chinese General, who had commanded a Division in Korea during the Korean War, had eventually agreed “as a personal view” with Gleysteen’s arguments for contacts by China with the south as well as the north, and for treating both north and south as realities. Apart from this there were, he said, other signs now of the stirring of Chinese interest in south Korea. The ROK Foreign Minister had told him the day before that recent trade contacts with China through Hong Kong had been “a notch higher” than before. (I think this may refer to a recent purchase by the ROK from the PRC, through Hong Kong, of 1000 tonnes of red peppers and 500 tonnes of garlic, on which we will also report separately; we will shortly prepare a report summarising what the Embassy knows about north/south contacts and ROK trade with Communist countries.) The Soviet Union “of course” was “very interested”. Although, because of its links with the north, it had to resort to various subterfuges for trade and other contacts, these were not very deeply concealed.

8. I said that pragmatism in East Asia indeed seemed to be spreading widely, judging by the recent press report of PRC gestures toward Taiwan in terms of trade overtures, Thai airways flights and joint attendance at a scientific conference in Tokyo. In all this pragmatism north Korea seemed to be the anachronism. On the other hand the United States position seemed particularly strong: it was being courted in varying degrees by China, Japan, Viet nam, south Korea, Taiwan, and even north Korea. Gleysteen agreed with evident satisfaction – “the way to be” – to this description, noting with some regret that Cambodia was not at present among the United States’ suitors.

9. Gleysteen commented that “the traumas of the establishment of Asian communist governments seemed nearly over, and we were all probably safer as a result”, although north Korea was still obdurate and dangerous. He hoped the United States could maintain its present desirable position, although it would of course have to make certain choices in time. An obvious one was in relation to China and Vietnam. He thought this was really a “management” problem for the United States; important as China was he did not see how its bilateral difficulties could for long hold up the formalisation of United States’ relations with Vietnam. China of course needed the United States primarily in relation to the Soviet Union, and in regard to Taiwan. As regards the latter, while the United States and China were reaching an agreement over Taiwan their aims in doing so were different: China was fundamentally seeking means of changing the status quo on Taiwan, while at least in the short term the United States was interested in preserving it.

Report prepared by (signature)  
(W G T Miller)  
Ambassador

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**Telegram from the Foreign Minister, “Analysis of North Korean Puppet Kim Il Sung’s speech on the So-called September 9th Day,” 13 September 1978**

[Source: “*Buk Han donghyang, 1978*” (“*Northern Trends, 1978*”), Roll 2008-30, File 04, Frames 150-151/154-155, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Sending Telegram

File No. : AM – 0912 Date : 131850  
To : All heads of overseas agencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
From : Minister of Foreign Affairs

Signature: Illegible

Title: Analysis of North Korean Puppet Kim Il Sung’s speech on the so-called September 9th Day

1. North Korean Puppet Kim Il Sung made the following speech on the occasion of the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the foundation of their so-called communist regime on September 9th, 1978. The following is its summary:

a. North Korea leaves the door of dialogues open to the South Korean authorities as well as each political party of South Korea in order to peacefully address the reunification issue.

b. However, South Korea has pursued the North-South talks on the purpose of division rather than reunification so far. As a result, the North-South talks discontinued due to South Korea’s treacherous intention. The North-South talks should be resumed for reunification rather than division.

c. If South Korea really wanted to resume dialogues with North Korea, she should change her policies from division to reunification and attitude from anti-communism to adopting a softer position on communism.

d. South Korea needs democratization. She should abrogate the *Yushin* Constitution, abolish the anti-communist laws and the National Security Act, and allow communist political activities.

2. The overall analysis of Kim Il Sung’s speech in the above is as follows:

a. The North Korean puppets are shifting the onus of discontinuing the South-North talks on us and trying to create the impression that it has retreated from its previous rigidity for consumption in the international community. However, North Korea actually reiterates its old propagandas since she does not offer anything new regarding the inter-Korea talks and, by extension, peace and reunification in the Korean Peninsula.

b. Ostensibly, Kim Il Sung seems to imply its intention of resuming the inter-Korea talks; fundamentally, he does not want to reopen talks because he repeats offers that South Korea could not accept. Thus, he tries to skillfully conceal his basic strategy toward South Korea for reunification through forceful communization.

c. Kim Il Sung hopes offset North Korea’s currently inferior diplomatic standing with the help of Communist China and revamp its diplomatic standing through the Non-Alignment Movement. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for North Korea to expect satisfying outcomes.

d. North Korea has been demanding early withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Korea as well as a peace treaty with the United States. Moreover, she has been waiting for a chance of having a direct negotiation with the United States in order to isolate South Korea.

3. Each overseas mission should take appropriate measures against North Korea's consistent and disguised peace propaganda, based on the analysis mentioned above, considering the atmosphere in the host country. All missions are expected to use this analysis when they give press release and briefings.

(Information Division 2 - )

**Telegram 085.304 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 September 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMAE, Folder 786/1978, Issue 220: Regarding some Aspects of the Republic of Korea's Foreign Policy. Relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea (January 21st – September 22nd 1978). Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza*

*Gheorghe. [http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116435.](http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116435)]*

TELEGRAM 085.304

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

From: the Romanian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Date: September 21st, 1978

Classification: Secret

Subject: Korea

David Blakemore, deputy head of the Korea desk at the State Department, told Comrade Petre Anghel, Third Secretary:

The American-South Korean relations are currently going through a calmer period, determined by the termination of the Koreagate affair (acts of corruption led by South-Korean representatives in the United States of America), but also by the salience in the US foreign policy agenda of problems like the Middle East , relations with the USSR.

The Congressional approval of the Legislation regarding the American military equipment – worth 800 million US dollars - that will be left in South Korea after the withdrawal of American troops, contributed to this [calmer period] as well. The same legislation stipulates the sum of 275 million dollars as credits for selling military equipment.

This turn of events allow the continuation of the retreat of US troops at the proposed rate – 2400 soldiers by the end of the current year and 3600 soldiers in 1979.

Regarding the discussion of the Korean question at the [next] session of UN General Assembly, the US has no clue if the Korean question is on the agenda and it hopes that it will not be [introduced], because such discussion would be sterile and detrimental to the discussion of problems of immediate concern.

Regarding the attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the American diplomat mentioned one aspect which [he noticed] in the recent speech of the president Kim Il Sung in which he said that for the peaceful reunification of Korea 3 conditions are necessary: the modifications of South Korea's constitution , the liberty of the political parties, and the change of the South Korean government. The novelty of this remark consists in the fact that until now, the three conditions were referring to the beginning of the discussions for reunification, which hints to the fact that the North Koreans wish to resume the North-South discussions. Of course, this declaration will have to be confirmed by the actions that the North Koreans will undertake.

An interesting element is the attitude of the Soviet Union towards South Korea. Lately, a South Korean sport team has performed in the USSR and the South Korean ministry of health was granted the permission to take part that the session of the World Health Organization, but he also requested a separate meeting with the minister of health of USSR. The US interprets this attitude as a wish of the USSR to initiate economic relations with South Korea, which has one of the prosperous economies in the Pacific region.

Signed  
Ion Besteliu





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(b)(2)  
22 September 1978

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22 September 1978

### Great Power Relations with the Two Koreas

~~(C)~~ Analysis of the current state of relations between the two Koreas and three major powers in Northeast Asia -- China, the Soviet Union and Japan -- reveals no significant changes from the trends of the past few years. Certain recent developments, however, are notable.

#### North Korean Relations with the USSR and PRC

~~(C)~~ While its mutual security treaties with both the Soviet Union and China remain in force, North Korea has been leaning toward China since the early 1970s. That tilt became even more pronounced with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Pyongyang last May. Since that time

- China and North Korea have exchanged highlevel military delegations.
- Pyongyang joined in indirect criticism of Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa at the recent conference of nonaligned foreign ministers in Belgrade.
- North Korea supported China more openly in the continuing Sino-Soviet border dispute.
- North Korea replayed a virulent anti-Soviet policy statement by China's Defense Minister in August.
- China's delegation to Pyongyang's 30th anniversary celebration was headed by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, while the Soviet delegation was led by a relatively low-level party functionary.

~~(C)~~ China's interest in North Korea probably is motivated largely by fear of Soviet efforts to "encircle" China with hostile states; it does not want to see the Soviets make gains in North Asia similar to those they have scored in Vietnam and Afghanistan. At the same time, however, broader strategic goals apparently make Peking unwilling to give Kim Il-song all the support he would like. Chinese aid to Pyongyang remains quite modest and China clearly lacks enthusiasm for an early and complete withdrawal of US military forces from South Korea.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Pyongyang would probably move to repair its relations with Moscow should the Soviets indicate a willingness to provide significant economic or military assistance to North Korea. The Soviets, however, have been unwilling in recent years to invest much in wooing Kim Il-song. Moscow has never endorsed Pyongyang's claim to be the sole sovereign

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YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1986

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government of Korea, an endorsement reiterated by Chinese leader Hua during his visit. There have apparently been no significant military deliveries to Pyongyang in recent years and Moscow has refused to provide North Korea with advanced weapons of the type it has routinely provided to a number of clients. The Soviets, moreover, have been unwilling to ease Pyongyang's recent financial plight by providing hard currency relief. The two sides have also had difficulties over trade matters, usually because of lags in North Korean deliveries and Soviet price increases. Moscow, moreover, appears to have taken calculated steps to slight the North Koreans on the occasion of two recent North Korean holidays.

~~(C)~~ In the long run, however, Kim Il-song is likely to impose limits on North Korea's tilt toward China in order to preserve his options with the Soviet Union. He knows that China cannot replace the USSR as a potential source of economic and military assistance, and Peking's moves toward detente with the US cannot but be unsettling for Kim. On the other hand, there appears little likelihood of any major policy changes in the near term toward North Korea on the part of the PRC or Soviet Union.

#### South Korean Relations with the USSR and PRC

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ During recent years the Republic of Korea has taken steps to improve informal relations with socialist countries including the Soviet Union and China. It has met with some success. During recent months

- South Korea's Minister of Health as well as two South Korean reporters were admitted to the Soviet Union to attend a WHO/UNICEF conference.
- Direct long-distance telephone service between the ROK and the USSR was inaugurated.
- Informal social contacts between ROK and Soviet diplomats in third countries have continued, with the Soviets extending invitations on a few occasions.
- A woman's basketball team from South Korea participated in a tournament in Leningrad.
- There have been some contacts between ROK and PRC diplomats and trade representatives.

~~(C)~~ The ROK has a number of strong incentives to improve relations with the two Communist powers. Economically, it would like to find new markets and develop profitable trade relations. Politically, Soviet or Chinese actions implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the ROK would be a

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positive development. Furthermore, Seoul sees the PRC and Soviet Union as major constraints upon North Korean adventurism. Direct contacts with North Korea's two allies certainly is unsettling to Pyongyang and is a useful counterweight to North Korea's attempts to initiate direct contacts with the United States.

~~(C)~~ Admission of the South Koreans into the Soviet Union was probably inevitable given Soviet interest in hosting the Olympics. Moscow's unprecedented recent cordiality toward South Korea may also be intended to show pique at North Korea's closeness to China. Moreover, Soviet contacts with South Korea will have a positive influence on Moscow's relations with Washington. Peking's responses to the more limited approaches from Seoul have been more restrained, probably out of concern for its relations with Pyongyang. As a matter of fact, the PRC has criticized the Soviets "for claiming to support North Korea while quietly trying to improve relations with South Korea."

~~(C)~~ Under present circumstances none of the three countries appears ready to move radically toward improved relations. Barring an agreement on "cross recognition" of both Koreas by Moscow, Peking, Tokyo and Washington, formal relations between the Republic of Korea and either the USSR or PRC are a long way off.

#### Japan's Relations with North Korea and South Korea

~~(C)~~ Japan's relations with the two Korea's have remained fairly stable. Relations with Seoul are very good, despite some minor irritants. After years of delay Japan in 1978 finally ratified the 1974 ROK-Japan treaty for the joint development of continental shelf resources in the East China Sea. This could herald increased economic cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, recent perceived changes in both the international and regional situations have increased Tokyo's appreciation of the close relationship between South Korean and Japanese security.

~~(C)~~ There are however some signs of gradual changes in both Japanese attitudes and methods of managing its relations with both Koreas. Tokyo is concerned with US plans for the withdrawal of ground forces from the peninsula and with the viability of America's long-term security commitment toward the ROK. It feels that any steps toward improved relations with North Korea will contribute to stability on the peninsula. Furthermore the Japanese fear a possible "Korea shock" in which the US will suddenly move to improve its own relations with Pyongyang without prior consultations with Tokyo.

~~(C)~~ Tokyo has therefore moved in recent years to develop an unofficial, low-key dialogue with North Korea. This dialogue so far has been limited almost exclusively to trade, fishing and related issues.

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
Japanese efforts have been inhibited by North Korean inflexibility and failure to fulfill economic commitments, fear of alienating or undermining the ROK, and a desire not to get too far in front of the US in any initiatives with the North Koreans.

~~(C)~~ Tokyo has no plans to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. Japan has a huge security and economic stake in South Korea, and Tokyo has made clear that it will make no moves toward North Korea that might harm the ROK.


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(b)(3)



**Notes on a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary-General on 22 September 1978 at 5.00 p.m.**

*[Source: "Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0075-07, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

[...]

Present:                   The Secretary-General  
                                  Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel

Foreign Minister Tong Jin Park of the Republic of Korea  
                                  Ambassador Duk Choo Moon

- The Foreign Minister hoped that conditions would exist soon which were favourable to a visit of the Secretary-General to the Republic of Korea.
- He expressed his contentment that the question of Korea was not an item on the agenda of the 33rd Session of the General Assembly. North Korea seemed less interested in a debate of this question since her support among the Non-Aligned had somewhat eroded. This had been visible at the Conference of the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers in Belgrade.
- "Even the Soviet Union" refrained from an initiative to put the Korean question on the agenda of the United Nations. On a few occasions it had been possible for the Republic of Korea to send her delegates to UN Conferences in the Soviet Union (as an example he mentioned a recent WHO Conference in Moscow for which the South Korean Minister of Health had received a Soviet visa).
- There was still no dialogue between the two Koreas. On 23rd June his President had proposed a joint consultative body on economic co-operation, but so far no answer had been received. (The proposal was made by a public broadcast).
- There were few incidents at the border. With 500,000 troops on each side which disposed of all modern equipment, the situation could be described as "a balance of terror".
- The Republic of Korea had the highest rate of economic growth (15%) among the development countries.
- At present North Korea, as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet rivalry seemed to depend more on China than on the Soviet Union.

**Telegram 026.023 from the Romanian Embassy in Budapest to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 September 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AMAE, Folder 784/1978, Issue 220: Features of political-diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and some countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, America (Cyprus, Spain, USA, Bangladesh, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Central African Republic, Egypt, Gabon, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Mozambique, Syria) January 7, 1978 – September 23, 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116492>.]*

TELEGRAM 026.023

To: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Comrade Vasile Sandru)

From: the Romanian Embassy in Budapest

Date: September 23rd, 1978

Classification: Secret

According to the statements of the ambassador of Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Jae-suk, no special elements have recently appeared in Korean-Japanese relations. Relations are carried on the basis of direct ties, established between different institutions of the two countries, in the economic and cultural domains, as well as at the level of mass organizations.

The Korean ambassador added that it could be noticed that the attitude of the Japanese government is more flexible about granting Korean residents the right to visit their relatives in Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Regarding the matter of establishing diplomatic relations, the Korean ambassador said that the Japanese government continues to maintain its known position of conditioning the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Japan on similar steps undertaken by other socialist countries to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea. This wish basically represents the wish to maintain the separation of Korea, and represents the concept of the existence of two Koreas, which is unacceptable.

Japan also aims, and is being encouraged, to take the place of the American forces in case they are gradually withdrawn from South Korea. There are some cues in this sense, such as the participation of the Japanese armed forces, the so called defense forces, in joint American-South Korean-Japanese military drills.

The Korean ambassador added that their concern about the unification of Korea is incessant. In the speech offered by Comrade Kim Il Sung on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, new proposals were made regarding the withdrawal of the US forces from South Korea, cutting the support offered to the Park Chung Hee's faction, which would allow the internal democratic forces to achieve the national desideratum, the unification of the country. Such conditions would offer an opportunity to negotiate not only with Japan but also with United States.

Signed: Victor Bolojan

MORANDUM


5800

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ GDS

September 28, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
 FROM: NICK PLATT *MP*  
 SUBJECT:  Your Appointment with Korean Foreign  
 Minister Park Tong-chin September 29

ROK Foreign Minister Park Tong-chin's call on you at 2:00 will be the main event of his visit to the United States this time. He has come down from New York especially to see you. Cy Vance's Middle East trip made it impossible for him to meet with Park. You last met the Foreign Minister during your stop in Seoul May 25, and earlier attended the meeting in March 1977 when the President explained our troop withdrawal policy to Park.

Tactical Background

Park is primarily interested in sounding you out on the prospect of a Presidential Summit. Because Kim Dong-jo's letter to Congress has not been helpful on Koreagate, you can do little more than agree in principle to the idea of a Summit, and put off discussions on timing and modality until later. This meeting will, however, provide a helpful opportunity for you to make clear, without linking the issues explicitly, that progress on human rights is a prerequisite for a Presidential Summit. You want to avoid any effort by Park to starting a negotiating process, or bargaining. Ambassador Gleysteen has instructions to begin talks with President Park after the policy on Kim Dong-jo is sorted out. (Gleysteen, by the way, may be back for consultations next week on this topic.) Accordingly, I recommend you welcome Park and take the floor immediately, making the following points:

Talking Points

-- The US-ROK relationship has improved markedly since we met last May. The successful Security Consultative Meeting in San Diego in August underlined the firmness of U.S. security

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guarantees to the ROK and our mutual confidence that the adjusted troop withdrawal schedule will not affect the military balance on the Korean peninsula.

-- Authorization for transfer of \$800 million in military equipment to Korea indicated the firm belief of Congress in the U.S. commitment to Korea.

-- The visit of Defense Secretary Brown to the ROK in November will further strengthen security ties.

-- The agreement to conduct policy planning talks with the ROK next spring will provide a welcome opportunity to discuss broad strategic issues informally. It is the mark of a more mature relationship between us.

-- After the strains of the past two years, we look forward to a new, positive era in our relationship. Much remains to be done, however, to set the stage and create the right atmosphere in Congress and among the American public. Specifically, it will be difficult to create the right atmosphere as long as

- Koreagate remains a live issue;
- Kim Tae-jung remains in custody;
- The Emergency Decrees, particularly Emergency Measure 9, remain in effect.

When Park asks you about the prospects for a Summit meeting,

-- Agree that a meeting is important and should be held at an appropriate time in the future.

-- Discussion of specific plans is premature at this point.

Park will be interested in your view of the changing scene in East Asia and of the likely developments over the next year. He would be interested, time permitting, in:

-- The U.S. view of the PRC/GOJ Peace and Friendship Treaty.

-- The prospects for normalization with the PRC and with Vietnam.

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-- The U.S. view of the PRC/Vietnam/Cambodia conflict.

You may want to ask him:

-- His assessment for meaningful discussions between North and South Korea. (We remain committed to the principle that future discussions with North Korea must include the full participation of the ROK.)

-- The state of ROK-Japan relations and the prospects for contact with the PRC and the USSR.

I attach for your background a report of Dick Holbrooke's conversation with Park in New York last week (at Tab A).

~~SECRET~~ - GDS

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Foreign Minister Park Tong-chin  
Kim Yong-shik, ROK Ambassador  
Chang Woo-young, Director General,  
International Organization Bureau,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Nicholas Platt, NSC Staff Member  
Robert Rich, Director, Korea Desk  
Department of State

DATE, TIME Friday, September 29, 1978; 12:00 - 12:30  
PLACE: White House

Park: Since your trip to Peking and Seoul, the major develop-  
ment in Asia has been the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship  
Treaty between Japan and China. What in your judgment is  
the impact of this development on North Korean relations  
with Peking and its attitudes towards South Korea?

Brzezinski: While I am timid about making firm judgments  
on the complicated and nuanced relationship between China,  
Korea, and the Soviet Union, my impression is that North  
Korea has recently moved somewhat closer to Peking. The  
Chinese have to accept the proposition that stability on the  
Korean peninsula is desired by other powers whose views  
China must take into account. The Chinese themselves want  
stability in the Peninsula. As I told your President last  
May, their support for the North Korean position seems  
formalistic. Therefore, from your point of view the Peace  
and Friendship Treaty would seem a favorable development.  
We view the Treaty that way, and encouraged both China and  
Japan to conclude it.

Park: Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda told me that the  
Chinese made no reference at all to the Korean Peninsula  
during his Peace and Friendship Treaty negotiations in  
Peking.

~~SECRET~~ -XGDS (B) (1) (3)

CLASSIFIED BY Zbigniew Brzezinski  
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON IMPDET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 8/15/84 NLS HRE HLC-410-243  
BY 10/1/82 NARS DATE 10/1/82

Brzezinski: That is interesting. Do you have any evidence that North Korea has sent personnel to some parts of Indochina?

Park: We have no evidence.

Brzezinski: Does your analysis of the significance of the Peace and Friendship Treaty agree with mine?

Park: I share your views. In addition, our own relations with the Soviet Union have improved slightly during recent months. Our Minister of Health traveled last month to Moscow to attend an international conference. He was the first Cabinet member to visit the Soviet capital, and was treated with normal courtesy. Recently we have found it relatively easy to get visas for our citizens to travel to the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski: What has become of the Korean Airlines plane that was brought down in the Soviet Union?

Park: It is still there. The Soviets have informed us that recovery of the aircraft from the frozen lake would be technically very difficult. We have not followed up.

As far as the Chinese are concerned, their attitude towards us is still very unfriendly. Statements made at the United Nations have been filled with hostile formulations. They refer to us as the Park Chung-hee clique.

Brzezinski: The Chinese can change. In years past they have called us a variety of bad names.

Park. The problem of tension between Congress and Kim Dong-jo still remains. We hoped that once he sent his response to Congressional questions the affair would come to an end and we could move to a more constructive phase in our relationship. Now we understand that Congress may want to pose additional questions. My feeling is that Kim will not have anything more to offer. He was very reluctant from the outset to answer the questions, though we urged him to respond. President Carter's influence in Congress has grown immensely, and we hope that the White House will be able to exert pressure to bring this episode to a close.

Brzezinski: The U.S. is anxious for a variety of reasons to develop a new constructive stage in our relationship with Korea. We are allies and comrades in arms who share important security concerns. Your country's outstanding success in

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modernizing its economy has made it increasingly influential in the world. The bonds are there. The will to create a new relationship is there. The Kim Dong-jo affair is unfortunate, and the more forthcoming you can be the faster we will be able to deal with it. The episode has been drawn out because of obstacles placed by your side in the way of a solution. You have subsequently withdrawn many of these obstacles. I cannot prejudge the Congressional attitudes on the Kim Dong-jo affair at this stage. All I can say is that it is important to work hard to put the issue behind us. In general I sense a better atmosphere and attitude toward Korea in Congress.

Park: At lunch with President Park in Seoul last May you said that President Carter hoped to have the opportunity to meet with him. Has any further thought been given to the matter? Is a visit by President Carter to Korea or some other arrangement envisaged?

Brzezinski: We are making no plans on the President's foreign travel schedule for a variety of reasons. The President has already followed a very heavy foreign travel schedule which has compressed the time that he has devoted to Congressional legislation and given rise to criticism that he is neglecting domestic policy. You may be interested to know that in the first 14 months of his Presidency he met with 67 foreign leaders as opposed to 8 by President Truman and 22 by President Kennedy during a similar period. The days at Camp David devoted solely to the Middle East have further exacerbated the situation. Should a settlement emerge the President will be under strong pressure to make a trip to this area.

Having said this, let me make clear that we attach high priority to a meeting between our President and yours and are determined to hold it, though how and when remain unclear. It might be arranged when the President goes to Asia next spring in connection with the Tokyo Summit. There is also a possibility that your President might be willing to come here. We might even do both.

Park: President Park will visit Japan early next year at the invitation of Prime Minister Fukuda after Fukuda has visited Seoul. He would like, I believe, to come to the U.S. before he visits Japan.

Brzezinski: I share that desire, but you understand the complications that make it difficult for us to plan.

**Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Huang Hua, 3 October 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 538-559.]*

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 3, 1978, 6:55–11:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Secretary Vance's Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC  
Harry Thayer, Director, PRC Desk, Department of State  
Foreign Minister Huang Hua  
Ch'ai Tse-min, PRC Ambassador to the U.S. and Chief of the People's Republic of China Liaison Office  
Chen Chu, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
Chu Chi-chen, Deputy Director, American and Oceanian Affairs, MFA  
Kuo Chia-ting, First Secretary, PRC United Nations Mission  
Shu Erh-wei, MFA (Interpreter)

[...]

Secretary Vance: In Asia, we see a stable system of nation states. Let me say, before saying a word or two on Vietnam, how pleased we are about the conclusion of the Treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China. This is a major positive step. Insofar as the Korean Peninsula is concerned, we hope and expect that the situation there will remain stable. As you know, our relations are close and good with South Korea. We will continue to work closely with them on economic matters, and we stand fully behind our Mutual Security Treaty with them.

[...]

Foreign Minister Huang Hua: As to the situation on the Korean Peninsula, we have always maintained that the Korean people should solve their problems through peaceful and independent means, free from external interference. We hold that the U.N. Command should be abolished and that the U.S. should withdraw forces as early as possible. The U.S. policy of strengthening the forces of South Korea is not conducive to the peaceful reunification of Korea.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 10/1–7/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Alpha. The meeting took place at the PRC United Nations Mission.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: US-Korean Security Relations in 1978

Seoul welcomed President Carter's announcement on 21 April about the revised schedule for withdrawing the first brigade of the Second Division. Although the decision has renewed hopes that the withdrawal policy may be subject to review, the South Koreans are still apprehensive that the US will not transfer compensatory aid before troops come out.

Notwithstanding the strains caused by the withdrawal plan, security relations with Seoul have progressed relatively smoothly over the past year.

--The visit of Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Perry to Seoul in February 1978 had a strongly favorable impact, promising to open up a new area of bilateral cooperation. In May, Dr. Sim Mun-taek, director of the Agency for Defense Development, visited the Pentagon for more specific discussions on arms production cooperation.

--The commitment to R&D cooperation has improved bilateral studies of South Korean weaponry needs. In the case of the Korean indigenous tank--where Washington will help produce two prototypes--joint planning strengthens the likelihood that Seoul will choose American technology and that the Koreans will develop a better understanding of battlefield requirements.

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

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
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--Seoul has viewed the visits of ranking US officials, particularly Dr. Brzezinski, and highly visible military maneuvers, such as the 11-day "Team Spirit" exercise held in March, as vital indications of US interest in Korea.

Officials in all sectors of the government acknowledge the need for Korea to strengthen its own defense capabilities, but there is increasing controversy as to how to achieve this goal.

--Economic and military planners are continuing their "guns or butter" debate over the share of national resources to be devoted to defense. Defense officials seek levels of 7 percent of GNP for 1979 and 7.5 percent by 1981. The Economic Planning Board, on the other hand, argues that rapid industrial growth will allow substantial real increases in military spending if the defense share of GNP is held steady or even modestly reduced from its current level of 6.6 percent. At present, President Pak seems inclined toward the view of the economic planners.

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As this strategy--and the related issue one of weapon needs--continues to be weighed against reappraisals of North Korean military capabilities, Seoul almost certainly will seek to review with the US plans for military aid, the transfer of technology, and the withdrawal scenario itself.

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20 October 1978 ✓

NORTHEAST ASIA BALANCE

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BASIC ASSESSMENT

By maintaining an adequate military balance on Northeast Asia, the United States seeks to influence continued political stability and economic growth in the region. Specifically, we desire to see continued partnership with Japan, the peaceful evolution of a strong and friendly South Korea, and the establishment of the PRC as a long term competitor of the USSR. The political and economic stability of Northeast Asia is affected by several military balances: US-USSR strategic nuclear forces; the regional naval forces; the Korean Peninsula; the Sino-Soviet border; and the Taiwan Straits military balances. Although the latter two are important, they do not directly involve U.S. forces. Among these balances, Korea presents the most immediate concern to Japan and the US. Over the longer term, the regional naval balance will become more important. Soviet naval and naval aviation forces present the major threat to Japanese and US forces deployed in Northeast Asia.

Trends in the balance on the Korean Peninsula have increased anxiety in both Seoul and Tokyo. North Korea has substantially increased ground, naval, and air forces since the early 1970s. Since 1971 the number of tanks has tripled, there has been a six-fold increase in APCs, amphibious warfare craft have quadrupled, and the number of submarines more than tripled. The number of primary jet airfields has increased from 15 to 21 in this same 7 year period. North Korean defense industries have been expanded, hardened facilities have been constructed, and war reserve stockpiles increased. Meanwhile South Korean Army strength has declined from an authorized strength of 548,000 in 1972 to 520,000 in 1978. However, ROK firepower has been enhanced as the number of field artillery battalions has nearly doubled, a fourth infantry battalion has been added to each regiment, and the force is being equipped with M-16 rifles and additional antitank guided missiles. South Korea also has recently tested a surface-to-surface missile at ranges over 100 nm. Despite certain adverse military trends, the South Korean economy is significantly outpacing the North which may be facing problems in labor productivity, a shortage of technology, and inadequate investment capital. These problems could retard economic growth in the North. While South Korea is developing the capability for self-defense, US forces continue to contribute to the deterrence of a North Korean attack. Since 1971, forward defense has been increasingly predicated on US tactical air support which has been increased by an additional fighter squadron.

Trends in the regional naval balance also are cause for some concern. Since 1969 the Soviet Pacific Fleet has undergone a steady increase, including 28 additional submarines, 5 missile cruisers, 7 missile destroyers, and 14 frigates, along with improvements in amphibious capabilities and naval aviation. The proximity of Soviet ports and air bases provides the USSR with a substantial advantage within range of Soviet naval aviation--an arc of over 1,000 nm extending over Korea and Japan. The deployment of the Backfire Bomber in large numbers will substantially increase the safe operating range



of the Soviet fleet. Geography in Northeast Asia, however, is not entirely to the Soviets advantage. A sizable portion of the fleet must transit 3 key straits which are vulnerable to US and Japanese mining and interdiction. Unfortunately, trends in the Japanese self-defense forces have not matched the modest modernization goals on schedule due to inflation and budgetary limitations. Present Japanese policy specifies an upper limit of 13 divisions, 60 ASW/escort ships and 13 interceptor/ground support squadrons regardless of military trends in other countries in the region, so long as there is no change in the international situation. This policy, combined with a declining US military ground presence in Northeast Asia, could leave the growth of Soviet military power unchallenged. In a conventional conflict in Northeast Asia, Soviet forces would enjoy a substantial numerical advantage over US and Japanese forces, at least initially. However, Soviet naval forces remain vulnerable in their restricted home waters and are at the end of extremely long line of communications.

Although war remains highly unlikely, trends in the Sino-Soviet border balance may reflect USSR concern for improved PRC-Japan and PRC-US relations that suggest a loose Japan-PRC-NATO coalition that outnumbers the Soviet Union in virtually every measure of military and economic power. Soviet forces along the border have been augmented by two divisions, antiaircraft guns have been replaced with more effective SA-6 or SA-8 missiles, and mobility has been enhanced with the addition of advanced BMP armored personnel carriers. The Soviets also have modernized their ground attack and air defense air forces with MiG-27, Su-17, and Su-24 aircraft. Trends in PRC military forces have been more modest. Ground forces have received additional 57mm AAA guns, howitzers have replaced mortars in artillery regiments, and new model rocket launchers have been introduced. Chinese naval production principally has focused on attack submarines, guided missile frigates, and coastal patrol craft. The capability for long range PRC naval operations is increasing. Chinese nuclear weapon testing and missile development continues at a steady pace. Should conventional war break out along the Chinese, Mongolian, USSR border, the Soviets would have a substantial initial military advantage in firepower, mobility, and air support. Due to the immense scope of operations, Chinese defense in depth, and logistics problems, a major Soviet conventional attack would become stalemated before decisive results were achieved, in all likelihood.

Trends in the Taiwan Straits balance remain stable. The PRC has not developed amphibious and fire support capabilities that would likely be associated with a major invasion of Taiwan. Over the past 5 years, the ROC has decreased the size of the armed forces by about 10 percent, while concurrent modernization has resulted in a modest improvement in overall capabilities. Under present conditions, it is unlikely that the PRC could assemble the necessary force and stage a successful invasion of Taiwan.

#### IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Factors unfavorable to the US:

- Present trends in North Korean ground combat power may be destabilizing and promote an arms race on the Peninsula.

- Large numbers of Soviet attack submarines, long range naval aviation with anti-ship missiles, and the proximity of Soviet ports and bases would provide advantages in the early stages of conflict.
- Shortcomings in Japanese low altitude air defense and ability to protect sea lanes, are subject to USSR exploitation.
- Time and distance separating US from Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and a shortage of US strategic mobility assets compound the reinforcement problem.
- Energy and resource dependency of Japan, ROK, and Taiwan will require large stockpiles to insure sustainability in wartime.

Factors favorable to the US:

- Extremely long Soviet sea and surface lines of communications to East Asia increase the cost of sustaining a large force posture in Northeast Asia and create serious wartime sustainability problems.
- More recent US-ROK combat experience and combined forces training.
- Chinese identification of USSR as primary threat ties down large numbers of USSR and PRC forces.
- PRC-Vietnam-Cambodian conflict may draw Chinese military resources that would otherwise be available for Northeast Asia.
- USSR lack of access to seas provides the opportunity for US-Japanese mining and interdiction.
- Strong ROK and Japanese economic performance provides an important dimension of long term security.

MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

- North Korean ability to sustain peaceful competition with South Korea over longer term.
- Extent to which Japan is willing and able to expand defense capabilities and role in Northeast Asia.
- Extent to which increasing participation in international economic and political relationships will exert a moderating influence on PRC support for insurgencies.
- Possibility of nuclear proliferation if South Korea or Taiwan perceive an inadequate US defense commitment.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
National Foreign Assessment Center  
30 October 1978

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Korea and the Major Powers

Key Judgments

1 -- China and the USSR have an important stake in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. In recent years neither has demonstrated much enthusiasm for North Korean President Kim Il-song's ambitions to reunify the peninsula on his own terms.

1 -- Kim Il-song, in seeking to strengthen and preserve North Korea's independence of action, has tried to exploit the mutual antagonism between China and the USSR, but with little success. China has had the inside track since the early 1970s, and Moscow has shown little inclination to compete with Peking for Kim's favor.

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1,2,3 -- Nevertheless, recent Soviet gains along China's periphery, particularly in Vietnam, and Soviet gestures toward Pyongyang

This memorandum was prepared by the East Asia-Pacific Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to [Redacted]

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early this year have prompted Peking to reaffirm publicly its support for Kim Il-song.

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- / -- Japan, for its part, has moved gradually in the past few years to strengthen its ties with South Korea. Prime Minister Fukuda has indicated his desire for a summit with President Pak late this year. There is mounting recognition in Tokyo that Japan has a diplomatic role to play in the search for a more stable political environment on the peninsula.
- / -- As the principal element of change, the US plan to withdraw its ground forces from South Korea will be closely watched by all the major players on the scene. Despite misgivings about the slow pace and partial scope of the US withdrawal, Kim Il-song keenly wishes to see the US troops go. He has thus avoided actions that might jeopardize the pullout.
- / -- What worries Kim Il-song is the possibility of the major powers that might impose a Korean settlement as is evident in Pyongyang's attacks on various proposals for "two Koreas" and for "cross recognition." The recently concluded Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the growing convergence of interests between China and the US--coming at a time when North Korea's dependence on Peking is increasing--are certain to intensify these fears.
- The rivalry between China and the USSR limits the extent to which either is prepared to restrain the North Korean leader. Peking and Moscow have made clear that their participation in multilateral talks on the future of the Korean peninsula will be subject to North Korea's acceptance.

#### Reluctant Treaty Allies

In recent years China and the USSR have demonstrated little enthusiasm for Kim Il-song's efforts to reunify the Korean peninsula on his own terms. In an unusual

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convergence of interests, both the Chinese and Soviets have an important stake in maintaining the status quo in Korea. A major conflict there would seriously complicate each country's bilateral relations with the US, stimulate possible major changes in Japanese security policy, and introduce new uncertainties into the overall power balance in East Asia.

China and the USSR are Pyongyang's treaty allies and traditional military suppliers. Both publicly support North Korea's call for a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. When tension on the peninsula increases, however, they seek to dissociate themselves from Kim Il-song's more rash actions--as demonstrated in the wake of the North Korean slayings of American soldiers in Panmunjom in 1976. They view the US security commitment to Seoul as a useful ingredient in the mix of factors that keep peace on the peninsula and restrain Japanese impulses toward rearmament.

Kim is well aware that China and the USSR subordinate North Korean ambitions to their own broader strategic interests. In seeking to strengthen and preserve North Korea's independence of action, he has tried to exploit the mutual antagonism between China and the USSR. He has had little success. Moscow has shown little inclination to compete with Peking for Kim's favor, and China has had the inside track since the early 1970s.

Kim's efforts to schedule a Moscow visit to balance his highly publicized trip to Peking in 1975 have been turned aside. Informal contacts between the Soviet Union and South Korea have continued despite Pyongyang's protests. Moscow has not volunteered to ease Pyongyang's financial plight by providing hard-currency aid. Weary of North Korea's repeated failure to meet bilateral trade commitments, the Soviets have retaliated by reducing their own exports. More important, North Korea apparently has been cut off for several years from advanced Soviet weapons of the type that Moscow has routinely provided to a number of other clients.

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Muted Rivalry Persists

Late last year the Soviets evidently perceived some slackening in Sino-North Korean ties and decided that additional effort on their part was in order. They presumably were aware of the notable absence of high-level Chinese contacts with North Korea in the months following Mao's death in September 1976.

In January 1978 Soviet Politburo member Kunayev visited Pyongyang to award Kim Il-song the Order of Lenin. Although Kunayev admittedly is not a heavyweight on the Politburo, he is the first Soviet official of that rank to visit Pyongyang since 1971 when relations were distinctly warmer. North Korea, with characteristic disdain, discounted the significance of the event by noting that the medal had originally been awarded in 1972 on Kim's 60th birthday.

The Soviet maneuvering did not go unnoticed in Peking. Moreover, the Chinese leadership probably wishes to secure its eastern flank against what Peking characterizes as Moscow's policy of "encirclement." There is little doubt that Soviet gains this year along China's periphery, particularly in Vietnam, gave an additional impetus to Peking's emerging anti-Soviet diplomatic offensive.

China moved last May to reaffirm publicly its support for Kim Il-song. Hua Kuo-feng, in his first trip abroad as China's party chief, explicitly endorsed Kim Il-song's regime as the sole legitimate government of Korea. Although Hua also backed Pyongyang's demand for a withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, he did not stipulate any timetable.


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North Korea has responded to the Hua visit by more openly endorsing China's position on a range of international issues. Most significantly, Pyongyang backed Peking in its border dispute with Moscow by taking the unusual step of republishing on 1 August excerpts from a shrill anti-Soviet article by the Chinese Defense Minister that blamed the Soviet Union for fanning tensions along the frontier.

The Soviet Union moved quickly to signal its displeasure with North Korea's more pronounced tilt toward China. The Soviets dispatched an unusually low-ranked representative to North Korea's important 30th anniversary celebrations. And Moscow not only granted a visa to a South Korean cabinet officer to attend an international conference in the USSR, but also admitted two South Korean correspondents to cover the event. The Soviet action is not unprecedented--Moscow has in the past granted visas to South Koreans to attend Soviet-sponsored conferences--but these were to lower-level functionaries. The invitations received heavy press play in Seoul, and China took pleasure in publicly noting the latest uncomradely Soviet actions.

#### The Japanese Factor

Relations between Tokyo and Seoul have been gradually improving in the past few years, and the Japanese are continuing to spotlight their ties with South Korea. Since the announcement of the US decision to withdraw its ground forces from the peninsula, Tokyo has repeatedly told Seoul that it would convey to the US the two nations' shared concerns over South Korean security. The South Koreans have responded by publicly endorsing the recently concluded Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and by adopting a more cooperative attitude toward territorial problems that have been sources of friction in the past.

Prime Minister Fukuda's latest initiative--the public announcement of his desire for a meeting with President Pak--

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is another move designed to warm relations. Fukuda, who is considering meeting with Pak around the end of the year, probably hopes to assuage the conservative, pro-South Korean elements in his own party who have been critical of the recent conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China.

Given Tokyo's emphasis on improving relations with Seoul, the Japanese are unlikely to explore political contacts with North Korea for the time being. Although Fukuda and other government leaders believe that Tokyo has a diplomatic role to play in searching for a more stable political environment on the peninsula, they will remain attuned to South Korean interests. Tokyo, for instance, is likely to respond positively to Seoul's private suggestions that the Japanese use their good offices to investigate the chances for South Korean contacts with Peking and Moscow.

None of these developments appears to herald fundamental change in the major powers' tacit support for the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang's more pronounced tilt toward Peking followed by Soviet gestures toward Seoul is a pattern that has been noted before. We anticipate that North Korea will eventually seek to improve its relations with the USSR. Kim Il-song knows that China cannot supply the kinds of sophisticated military hardware or the massive economic assistance that the Soviet Union is capable of providing.

#### The US Withdrawal

The key element of change on the Korean peninsula is the US decision to remove its ground combat forces from South Korea. The partial and phased nature of the withdrawal, the efforts to enhance South Korea's capability to defend itself, and the reaffirmation of the US security commitment to Seoul have helped soften the impact of the decision to withdraw. Nevertheless, the presence of US ground troops near the Demilitarized Zone has long been regarded as the most credible manifestation of US resolve

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to stand behind its South Korean ally.

Kim Il-song has publicly criticized the US withdrawal as incomplete and too protracted. Nevertheless, Pyongyang has moderated its criticism of the US, and it has generally avoided the kind of tension-building incidents that have frequently marred the truce along the Demilitarized Zone. Pyongyang's relative restraint seems to reflect Kim's desire to avoid actions that might slow down or reverse the withdrawal, at least in its initial phases. Two notable exceptions are North Korea's continued efforts to infiltrate political agents and small armed reconnaissance teams into the South and its persistent attempts to construct tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone.

North Korea will be watching closely the reaction in Moscow and Peking as the US moves ahead on ground force withdrawals. Kim Il-song knows that the interests of the major powers intersect in the Korean peninsula in important ways. He recognizes that Chinese and Soviet support for his course is constrained by the desire of both to avoid complicating their relations with the US and Japan. He will be looking for signs that, as the withdrawal proceeds, his allies might be more inclined to increase their support or at least lower their commitment to stability on the peninsula.

In keeping with their generally low-key approach to the Korean question, the Soviets and Chinese have not commented extensively on the US troop withdrawal plan or the recent revision of its first phase. In their public reaction they have emphasized that the retention of US air power in South Korea means there is no real change in the situation. This emphasis on the status quo seems to reflect their concern that the withdrawal be accomplished in a manner that does not disrupt the basic political and military balance on the peninsula.

Kim will almost certainly press Moscow and Peking for increased military assistance in the event that US force reductions are accompanied by a substantial upgrading of South Korean military capabilities. This pressure will be difficult to resist, especially if Kim can present a

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convincing case that the US assistance package poses a significant threat to North Korea. Given the pattern of Soviet and Chinese restraint in shipping arms in recent years and the strategic equities involved, neither ally is likely to respond to requests for offsetting aid in a manner that would upset the military equilibrium in the region.

Looking to the future, it is possible that North Korea's financial plight, in combination with the continued strengthening of South Korea's economic and military power, might prompt Kim at some point to abandon his efforts to maintain a balance in his ties with Moscow and Peking. Kim might even consider aligning his country with one or the other in order to extract maximum support and assistance. In such a move, however, he would risk having to bow to outside influence and control--an outcome that Kim has long struggled to avoid.

Kim would probably take this step only as a last resort and only after other alternatives had been explored. North Korea continues to attempt to foster political and economic contacts with the non-Communist world, and it displays scant concern for the sensitivities of its major Communist allies--as demonstrated most recently by its unilateral declaration of a 50-mile coastal security zone.

Although China and the USSR have indicated their lack of enthusiasm for Kim Il-song's reunification efforts, their rivalry limits the extent to which either is prepared to restrain the North Korean leader. On the diplomatic front, for example, neither has been willing to push Kim in directions he does not want to go. They have made clear that their participation in multilateral talks on the future of the Korean peninsula will be subject to North Korea's acceptance.

Over the years, nevertheless, Pyongyang has exhibited great concern over the possibility of a Korean settlement imposed by the major powers--as is evident in Pyongyang's intense attacks on various proposals for "two Koreas" and for "cross recognition." Recent events unquestionably

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have magnified these worries. Last December visiting East German leader Honecker, acting at Soviet behest, lectured Kim on the applicability of a two Germanies solution for Korea. Early this year the Western press played up Ambassador Woodcock's remarks about the shared interests between the US and China and China's potential role in maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. President Tito's proposal in March for tripartite talks on Korea, with the Pak government as a full participant, received widespread media attention--except in Pyongyang, where it was greeted with stony silence.

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Lastly, North Korea almost surely views with apprehension the recent conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Given Japan's close ties with North Korea's southern adversary, Pyongyang probably sees more potential for harm than good coming out of such a treaty. During his recent visit to Tokyo, Chinese leader Teng Hsiao-ping seemed to go out of his way to assuage North Korea's concerns. 25X1

Teng hewed closely to Pyongyang's position that a pullout of US forces is a necessary precondition for a resumption of the political dialogue between the North and South.

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Significantly the treaty comes at a time when Pyongyang finds itself even more dependent on Chinese assistance. Indeed, China's generosity may have been the price it had to pay to ensure that Pyongyang's unease about the treaty would remain private and circumspect.

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**Telegram 1/010020 from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang, 1 November 1978**

*[Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMAE), Folder 782/1978, Matter 220/F, Relations between North Korea and Socialist Countries (Czechoslovakia, China, Cuba, GDR, Yugoslavia, USSR), January-December 1978. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116411>.]*

TELEGRAM 1/010020

To: the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang

From: the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the First Directorate)

From: Date: November 1st, 1978

For your information and that of [your] assistants, we are sending you the following Soviet assessments of the main features of Soviet-Korean relations:

In general, bilateral party and state relations can be regarded as normal. Party and state delegations take part in ceremonies marking important events taking place in the other country. [The two countries] are exchanging delegations for documentation and experience exchanges on party and mass organizations management. The Soviets continue to build economic facilities in the DPRK, on loan. Commercial exchanges increased and their flow, both ways, is developing much better than in 1977. According to the Soviets, however, the development of bilateral cooperation is hindered by some attitudes of the Koreans, such as: The postponement of comrade Kim Il Sung's visit to the USSR. The Koreans did not reply to the January and February messages sent by the Soviet leadership, which asked the Koreans to set the date for the visit. It would be possible for the visit to take place in 1979, because President Kim Il Sung is supposed to visit the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In the party documents and speeches of the Korean leadership, the role of the USSR in the liberation of Korea and the assistance offered by the USSR and the other socialist countries [in Europe] during the American aggression is ignored; this assistance contributed to the survival of the DPRK. Moreover, the congratulatory telegrams sent to the Soviet leadership avoid mentioning that 'bilateral relations are taking place on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles.' The provocative [inclusion] in the August 1st issue of Nodong Sinmun of the article written by the Chinese Defense Minister, and published in the 8th issue of Huntzi [sic] magazine, dedicated to the anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army - which included virulent, Chinese-style attacks on the USSR. The explanations given to the Soviet Chargé d'affaires ad interim to Pyongyang by the leadership of the Nodong Sinmun newspaper and by Kim Yeong-nam, a member of the Politburo, and secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, who said that the publication of the Chinese article was the result of a 'technical' error, and the Nodong Sinmun issue was withdrawn from the newsstands, was not [enough] to give satisfaction to the Soviets. If the content of the Chinese article did not reflect the position of the Korean leadership, then a public denouncement in this respect should have been made. 'The Inclusion of the aforementioned article shows that the Korean comrades took the side of the PRC in its dispute with the USSR, receiving in turn a certain reward.'

The Korean action prompted the Soviet leadership not to give way to the Korean proposal that the Soviet party and state delegation which took part in the celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the creation of the DPRK was headed by a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The absence of any mention about Soviet-Korean relations in the Korean documentary on the creation of the DPRK. The parts about the visit of President Hua Guofeng to the DPRK, included by the DPRK Embassy in Moscow, caused great dismay to the Soviet guests, which included the representatives of the Foreign Relations Section of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The attitude of the Koreans on the DPRK's relations with the USSR, as well as on some international matters shows that the DPRK is distancing itself from the countries of the socialist camp, drawing closer to China and giving increasingly more attention to the DPRK's membership in the Third World. A diplomat from the DPRK embassy in Moscow said to a Romanian diplomat that: The DPRK's political relations are better with the PRC than with the USSR. The Chinese press is publishing more materials on Korea than the USSR press. In turn, the Korean press releases more materials about China than about the USSR. The DPRK's economic relations and commercial exchanges are better with the USSR than with China. The Soviets are striving to persuade the Koreans that Beijing's official statements in support of the DPRK do not chime with their concrete, back-stage actions. While China declares it supports the reunification of Korea, in reality the Chinese leadership tries to perpetuate America's presence in South Korea. The Koreans are closely monitoring China's position, but they do not have the necessary evidence to assert that [Beijing's] actions do not chime with its official declarations. [The DPRK] does not believe the PRC would be capable of giving up its support for the cause of the peaceful and independent reunification of Korea, without external interference.

Signed  
Vasile Sandru

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 2, 1978


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Korea ✓

The President has signed the letter to President Park as you recommended. It is attached *Final Pres copy*

The President has decided that you should not inform President Park at this time that we are prepared to notify Congress of our intention to sell sixty F-16 aircraft to the ROK.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER [signature] HRE NLS-46-57  
BY [signature] NARS DATE 11/1/97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Secretary Brown's trip gives me an opportunity to extend my best wishes for your continued health and success. I note with pleasure recent developments that have advanced the relationship between our two countries -- above all, Congressional action authorizing the cost-free transfer of equipment from American ground combat forces as they withdraw. This legislation, and the debate which accompanied it, should be convincing evidence of strong support in the Congress and among our people for our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea.


I believe we can look forward to the approaching new year as one which will see the smooth implementation of the plans we have agreed upon and continued cooperation on security and other matters. There may still be issues on which our governments will disagree. But our agreements are so much greater than our differences: we are determined to preserve the strength necessary to avoid renewed conflict in Korea, we are committed to the value of the individual, we are confident in the benefits of the market economy, and we both admire the hard work and achievement of our two peoples.

Secretary Brown's visit marks important new steps in our close relationship. The inauguration of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command takes appropriate account of the Republic of Korea's growing strength. The arrival of an additional United States Air Force squadron demonstrates to the world that the U.S.'s commitment to South Korean security is as strong as ever.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 8/20/07 NLC 16 RE NLC-96-51  
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 11/7/02

Please accept my sincere best wishes for the future,  
Mr. President, and my hope that in 1979 we will be  
able to meet, as Ambassador Gleysteen has discussed  
with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency  
Chung Hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul



**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 22 November 1978**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 53-56, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

November 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I received with appreciation your kind letter of November 2 which Secretary of Defense Harold Brown conveyed to me at the time of his recent visit to Korea.

Your letter and the useful discussion that I had with Secretary Brown provided me with another opportunity to review the state of our relations with the United States and examine the areas of cooperation that our two countries may jointly undertake in the years ahead. I feel encouraged to note that, as the recent controversy involving the U.S. Congress draws to a close, our traditional bond of friendship is returning to normalcy and that prospects for future cooperation and partnership are even brighter.

I have followed with keen interest the recent legislative process in the United States Congress with regard to U. S. cooperation with the Republic of Korea including the expected compensatory measures for the phased reduction of the American ground troops in Korea. We were gratified to confirm that, in the course of relevant public debates, the United States Congress and the American people seemed to attach undiminished importance to the security of the Republic of Korea and the peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region.

Secretary Brown's visit and the important events that took place while he was in Korea including the inauguration of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command and the reinforcement of the U.S. Air force in Korea served to renew the confidence of the Korean people in the treaty commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea and also to further enhance the spirit of cooperation existing between our two defense authorities. I wish to assure you, Mr. President, that the Republic of Korea is ready to do its best to maintain and further strengthen our joint defense posture on the Korean peninsula. I am also confident that you share our view that Korea is the key to the maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia in which the United States has a vital strategic interest.

Important developments are taking place in and around Korea which present us with opportunities and challenges alike. Under such circumstances, our two countries should work more closely than ever in order to cope with the changing international situation and also to provide a solid basis for a lasting peace and security. With these in mind, I heartily subscribe to your hope that in 1979 we will be able to meet together and personally exchange views on matters of our mutual concern. I look forward to that occasion with much pleasure.

I wish to take this opportunity to extend my hearty congratulations to you on your significant achievements for peace in the Middle East. You have the full blessing and warm

support of my Government in your continuing diplomatic endeavors to bring about a successful peace accord so that a permanent peace could be finally established in that troubled area.

Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes for your happiness and success as well as those of your family.

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

**Telegram to Ministers of Commerce and Industry and Energy and Resources from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 11 December 1978**

[Source: "Buk Han donghyang, 1978" ("Northern Trends, 1978"), Roll 2008-30, File 04, Frames 199-200, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

File No. : Tong Yi (Trade 2) 764 – 482

Date: 78. 12. 11.

Drafter: Park Sang-keun

Division: Trade 2

From: Minister of Foreign Affairs

To: Minister of Commerce and Industry, Minister of Energy and Resources

Title: Asking to take countermeasures against the penetration of the North Korean puppets into trade markets in Central and South America

1. According to the analysis on the North Korean puppets' foreign trade during the period from January through November in 1978, they have been struggling to cultivate new trade markets by increasing its trade with seven countries in Central and South America and conducting active public relations to promote its economy.

2. The underlying intentions of the North Korean puppets for seeking to increase their economic presence in Latin America despite high transport costs and even tolerating the requirement of cash payment in some cases, are analyzed as follows:

a. To create the conditions for market penetration into Central and South America by bandwagoning on the pragmatic policies of the countries of the region to strengthen the Non-Aligned movement.

b. To use the seven countries as footholds for creating new markets in Latin America in the near future.

c. To secure the long-term supply of plentiful natural resources in the region.

d. To expand the external relations of the North Korean puppets with the members of the Non-Alignment movement in Latin America based on an economic approach

3. The persistent efforts of the North Korean puppets to penetrate the Central and South American markets despite problems posed by long-distance transport and differences in their products and market structures, could enable the North Korean puppets to enlarge its trade scale significantly in the long term. In addition, it is most likely for the North Korean puppets to try to develop its political relations [in Latin America] through the economic approach. This warrants vigilance and a search for countermeasures on our part. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests your ministry—Ministries of Commerce and Industry and of Energy and Resources— to reflect this analysis into establishing the plans of overseas trade activities and of obtaining foreign natural resources for year 1979.

Enclosure: a copy of North Korea's current trade with 7 countries in Central and South America.

End.

**Letter from Former President Nixon to President Carter, 20 December 1978**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 667-670.]*

San Clemente, December 20, 1978

[...]

With regard to specific countries, I am most concerned about Korea. I realize that you have announced a decision to withdraw American forces by 1983. I would strongly urge you to reconsider that decision in view of Soviet supported adventurist policies in Afganistan, Ethiopia, and other countries in Africa.<sup>1</sup> If you believe you should not do so, I would suggest that at this time it would be most helpful to increase substantially the budget for military aid to Korea as a symbolic move to put North Korea and others on notice that the action on Taiwan should under no circumstances be interpreted as the beginning of a U.S. withdrawal from other parts of Asia.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> In the first three sentences of this paragraph, Carter underlined “I am most concerned about Korea,” “to withdraw American forces by 1983,” and “to reconsider.”

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 9, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THROUGH: MADELEINE ALBRIGHT *WA*

FROM: NICK PLATT *NP*

SUBJECT: Troop Withdrawals from the ROK --  
Congressmen Stratton and Beard Letter

After news of the revised North Korean order of battle intelligence estimates leaked to the press, Sam Stratton and Robin Beard wrote a letter to the President (at Tab A) urging that the estimates be provided to their Committee, and that troop withdrawals from the Republic of Korea be deferred pending study of the estimates.

The attached response answers Stratton and Beard without breaking new ground along lines set forth in the President's letter to Speaker O'Neill of July 20 (attached at Tab B). The O'Neill letter is attached for background information.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached letters at Tab I.

*Beard should reply 1-12-79*

*213 - This is going to be a major case. I suggest you raise it tomorrow AM.*

January 3, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

The January 8, 1979, issue of Army Times carries a story by Assistant Editor Don Hirst stating that "U. S. Intelligence analysts say they have found a major flaw in earlier estimates of North Korean ground troop strength that gives the north a clear ground superiority over South Korea."

The article further states these new estimates by Army experts "credit North Korea with at least 40 divisions and brigades. Earlier estimates placed the North Korean ground troop strength at fewer than 30 divisions and brigades. South Korea is said to have 21 divisions.

"These new estimates also credit North Korea with about 600 maneuver battalions, more than double the South Korean total. This new . . . estimate means . . . that the North has the ability to tie up South Korean units stationed near the demilitarized zone and still have enough manpower remaining to launch major attacks on Seoul from other directions."

The article goes on to state that this very disturbing new information has "been presented to key Congressional committees in secret session". . . and "the new estimates have been confirmed by the CIA."

As you are aware, the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee has been deeply involved with the matter of North Korean combat capabilities over nearly two years. Yet this new, disturbing information has never been presented to our subcommittee or to the full committee.


Mr. President, we urge that you direct the CIA and the DIA to give us these estimates without further delay.

January 3, 1979


Additionally, we urge that you immediately defer any further withdrawal of U. S. troops from South Korea until the Armed Services Committee can evaluate the full significance and long range implications of this new information for America's national security posture in the Far East.

We respectfully point out, Mr. President, that while this information is reputed to be "new" it corresponds with everything presented to our subcommittee on this subject over the past year and a half, not only from U. S. military officials familiar with the Korean balance of forces, but from responsible officials of allied nations stationed in the Far East, as well. Moreover, these estimates were included in the formal report of our subcommittee trip to Korea and the Far East published last spring.

Respectfully yours,



SAMUEL S. STRATTON  
Chairman  
Investigations Subcommittee



ROBIN L. BEARD  
Ranking Minority Member

enclosure

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1979

EXECUTIVE

COB-1

COB-2

ND 8

FG 6-A

FG 33-3

FG 13-2

FG 34


STRATTON, Samuel S.

Dear Congressman Beard:

Your letter to the President of January 3 urged that the CIA and the DIA provide your Committee with updated estimates of North Korean ground troop strength. I understand that the agencies concerned have already given you the information you requested.

You also urged that further troop withdrawals be deferred pending study of the implications of the new estimates. As you are aware from his letter to Speaker O'Neill, the President expects the withdrawal program to be carried out in a manner which preserves the military balance and thus protects the security of the ROK. Should circumstances affecting the balance change significantly, we will assess those changes in close consultation with the Congress, the ROK, and our other Asian allies. Our plans will be adjusted if developments so warrant.

Sincerely,



Zbigniew Brzezinski

The Honorable Robin L. Beard  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515



**Telegram from the Liaison Office in China to the Department of State, 11 January 1979**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 703-711.]*

Beijing, January 11, 1979, 0623Z

162. Subj: Codel Nunn Meeting With Deng Xiaoping.

The following is a transcript of the discussion between Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) and Codel Nunn January 9, 1979:

[...]

Nunn: One of our areas of concern is the situation in Korea. Our two countries have made great progress in normalizing our relations. It would be tragic if an outbreak in Korea were to take place. I know that you too are concerned. Our Intelligence Community has told us that there are more powerful forces in the North than we had previously thought. If the United States were to talk to South Korea and China to North Korea, our cooperation could reduce tension and perhaps bring about direct talks between the two.

Deng: In the past other US friends have brought up this question. During my trip to Japan, Japanese leaders posed the same question to me. In posing such questions, people expressed apprehension of possible military activities on the part of North Korea. The Japanese were apprehensive and spoke to me of a very tense situation in Korea. On that occasion we were told by Japanese leaders that Japan had the same impression of the existence of tensions in Korea. There is no question of the DPRK waging an offensive. We said then that we are aware of the following facts. We [have] faith in what Kim Il Song has said about peaceful reunification and we have rendered our consistent support to that policy.

I say to our American and Japanese friends what deserves attention is that peaceful and independent reunification as spoken of in North Korean policy means reunification in a peaceful manner. We understand that thoroughly. In my view, there is some information that is not correct in this regard. We are on good terms with the DPRK and we understand their situation. You should understand the following facts. In the past President Kim Il Song and North Korea sought to hold direct talks with the South Korean authorities. Later on the South Korean authorities suspended those talks. We are also aware of the fact that Kim wants very much to resume talks with Korea. While we desire that negotiations resume, we also express the hope that since South Korea suspended the talks once before, North Korea hopes that the government in South Korea represented by Park and the democratic parties in South Korea will initiate discussions. I wonder if the United States will help bring about direct talks. There is no question that North Korea desires their resumption.

Nunn: We would welcome such a development. But the inclusion of opponents of the present government in South Korea seems unrealistic and seems to be tantamount to the North saying that they don't want direct discussions. I do believe that China and North Korea, the United States and South Korea have a considerable area to work in. Violence in this region would be a blow to both of our interests. Our relationship should not be subject to such risks.

Deng: I would like to repeat my point. We don't feel such tension in the situation. As far as China is concerned, years ago the United States made such a proposal. China has no direct responsibility in this area. The United States has; the United States has troops there. The U.S. should enter into a direct dialogue. Through a direct dialogue the two sides can get a deeper knowledge of each other.

Anyway we hope that this matter should not involve the four parties. We have no troubles in Korea. When I was in Japan, the Japanese suggested that China should work with North Korea and Japan with South Korea.

We said this was unrealistic. We said to the Japanese leaders in explicit terms that China and North Korea have a good relationship because we do not interfere in North Korean affairs. What we can do is to convey the North Korean position to you. I hope you will convey North Korean ideas to the South Korean authorities. We think this approach has merit.

Nunn: We hope the two sides can talk directly. China has much influence in the area. In any case, we hope that both sides can peacefully resolve the problem.

Deng: I say to you from deep in my heart that overt interference in a nation's affairs can only achieve the opposite of what is intended. China and North Korea enjoy good relations because we fully respect them and do not interfere in their affairs. I can tell you something which has not been publicized: the reason North Korean and Soviet relations are bad is because the Soviets interfered in North Korean affairs. The Soviet Union has tried to use its aid to North Korea to assert influence and control and that is why relations are bad. Another point: our position would be better if US troops disengaged from South Korea. When I was in Japan, Japanese leaders asked me if in so doing, US strength in East Asia and the Pacific would be weakened. I said to them that to move US troops several hundred kilometers would not weaken strength in the region. Others questioned whether the withdrawal would lead to a North Korean offensive. I say that the military strength of South Korea is no lower than that of North Korea.

Senator Glenn: I would like to congratulate you on the initiative taken to restore relations between our countries. I would like to explore a different area. Foreign governments often do not understand the importance of the Congressional input into our conduct of foreign relations. As we move into agreements to make normalization work on such matters as claims and assets, loans, our future financial relations, all of these must be approved by Congress. Difficulties in this area could upset and ruin the new relationship between the two countries. Congress is sensitive to the mood of the people. We have millions of people who are still concerned about the security in Taiwan. I have followed closely the statements that the Vice Premier has made and have been gratified and happy to hear what he has had to say about the use of peaceful means. If we are to realize the good things that should flow from normalization then the people of the United States must get behind the normalization process. When Vice Premier Teng visits the United States the American people will be more impressed than anything else by statements on peaceful reunification. This will do more to get public opinion behind most favored nation status, a claims and assets settlement, and financial arrangements that will be most beneficial to the two countries.

**Notes on a Meeting Held in the Office of the Secretary General on 24 January 1979 at 5.30 p.m.**

*[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

[...]

**NOTES ON A MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON 24 JANUARY 1979 AT 5.30 P.M.**

Present:                   The Secretary-General

                                  Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grünbühel

Ambassador Han, Permanent Observer of the Democratic  
                                  People's Republic of Korea

                                  One Official

The Ambassador said that he was instructed to inform the Secretary-General of developments regarding the question of the re-unification of Korea. On 23 January a joint meeting of all political parties had taken place in Pyongyang which had discussed this matter in particular also in the light of a South Korean statement of a few days earlier concerning the desirability of renewing the dialogue between the two Koreas. His leadership believed that the South Korean proposal was a good one and it had welcomed it.

The joint meeting in Pyongyang had made a number of concrete proposals with a view to resume the dialogue (bilateral talks between the North and the South) and to arrive at a reunification:

Both North and South Korea should revert to the principles and ideas of the joint statement of the two sides of July 4, 1972, which stipulated a reunification and the creation of an independent Korea without interference from the outside and by peaceful means. To this end the following concrete measures should be taken:

1. The authorities of both North and South Korea should publicly reaffirm their adherence to the principles of the 1972 joint statement on February [illegible] at 10.00 a.m. local time.
2. Both sides should immediately refrain from any slanders and calumnies against each other in order to create better conditions for a reunification.
3. All military actions antagonizing or threatening the two sides should be immediately and unconditionally discontinued. The shipment of weapons and the reinforcement of military

installments in the border areas should be discontinued. All military exercises (maneuvers) should be discontinued as of 1 March 1979 0.00 hours.

4. The convocation of a "whole nation congress" of both sides should take place, a sort of unified parliament which would discuss the problems relating to a "many sided co-operation and intercourse in all fields" and all other problems arising from the reunification, including "the complete opening of the North and the South and the free activity of all political parties on both sides". The Congress should be attended by representatives of all political parties and public organizations of both sides and should also include the President of the ruling party in South Korea, other prominent figures as well as South Koreans living abroad. The Congress should be convened in September 1979 in Pyongyang or Seoul. Bilateral or multilateral meetings on a working level for the preparation of the Congress should take place in June in Pyongyang.

The Ambassador Indicated that these proposals have been conveyed to South Korea and his leadership was now awaiting a positive reply.

The Secretary-General thanked for this information and enquired what action the North Korean government would wish him to take. The Ambassador said that he did not have any instructions in this regard but he hoped that the Secretary-General would be able to be helpful in this matter and to encourage South Korea to consider the proposal carefully and positively. He also hoped that the Secretary-General would explain the situation to other member states.

The Secretary-General said that he intended to meet with the South Korean Ambassador telling him that he would welcome any move which would improve the relations between the two Koreas and ask him for his government's reaction to the North Korean proposals. Ambassador Han indicated agreement with such action but repeated that he was not instructed to request this from the Secretary-General, it was rather up to the Secretary-General to take such an initiative.

The Secretary-General said that he would contact Ambassador Han again after having talked to South Korea's representative.

**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, 25 January 1979**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 718-736.]*

Washington, January 25, 1979

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Deng Xiaoping

[...]

*Goals for Your Discussion*

[...]

—On Korea: Encourage the Chinese to (1) restrain any potential North Korean effort to take the South militarily; (2) influence the North to talk to the South; (3) talk directly to the South.<sup>1</sup>

[...]

*US Objectives*

[...]

5) On Korea, we wish to encourage the Chinese to support Pyongyang's latest indications of willingness to accommodate with Seoul. We should explain to Deng our position, our treaty commitments to Seoul, and your intention to visit there later this year. Deng will not want to get out ahead of North Korea, particularly at this point, and we should not expect any sudden change in Deng's position during the visit; this is the global issue on which the US and China have been in the most open disagreement for the longest time. Nonetheless, while your discussion may in itself be inconclusive, it will be useful now to make clear that we want the Chinese to take account of our position and actively support bilateral North-South talks. (Your talking points on this issue reflect our detailed discussions with both Tokyo and Seoul.)

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Someone drew a vertical line in the right margin next to this and the next paragraph.

**Letter from A. Hardie to D.G. Lambert, "Romanian Reaction to North Korean Initiatives,"  
26 January 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives,  
Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

Restricted

British Embassy  
Bucharest

26 January 1979

D G Lambert Esq  
EESD  
FCO

*Dear David*

**ROMANIAN REACTION TO NORTH KOREAN INITIATIVES**

1. The reunification proposals put forward by North Korea on 23 January have been extensively reported in the Romanian press. Both Romania Libera and the Party daily Scinteia carry detailed accounts of the propaganda, together with brief unsigned comment.
2. The comment in both papers follows similar lines, under-scoring its official provenance. In substance it is that the Romanian people supports the initiatives which it believes will lead to the peaceful reunification of North and South Korea. The papers argue in general terms that no international problem is so complex that it cannot be solved by negotiation in a spirit of goodwill. Invoking the name of Ceausescu to add weight to the sentiment, both papers assert the necessity of the achievement of Korean national unity on a democratic and peaceful basis, without outside intervention, through the exercise of the country's right to dispose, in a free way, of its own destiny.
3. This language maintains the tone of warmth and solidarity set during Ceausescu's visit to Pyongyang in May 1978 and reflects the continuity of excellent Romanian/North Korean relations noted in Samuel's minute of 10 August 1978.
4. Several of the statements summarised above are, of course, generally applicable to Romania's own position and are doubtless intended to be read in this sense. The reference to "outside intervention", is standard in Romanian discussion of inter-state relations, but in this context it may also have been inspired by the maverick Romanian attitude to the Vietnam/Cambodia conflict. Romania will be following Soviet and Chinese reactions to the North Korean initiatives with the greatest of interest.

*Yours [illegible],*  
A Hardie

J-6 has seen  
AM

Sir ,


This is the statement by the government of South Korea that Ambassador Moon mentioned to you yesterday.

As the ambassador indicated , they wish the dialogue between the two koreas "to be conducted by the responsible authorities of both sides "(therefore turning down North Korea"s proposal for a meeting of both congresses and political parties).

they propose, on that basis, that a meeting be held between "the authorities concerned" as soon as possible.

Francois Giuliani

26 January, 1979



# REPUBLIC OF KOREA

PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
866 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA SUITE 300 NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 TEL 371-1266

No. 5/79

January 26, 1979

## PRESS RELEASE

### Statement by Spokesman for the Government of the Republic of Korea Minister of Culture and Information, Kim Seong Jin, on the Early Resumption of South-North Dialogue (Full Text)

The Government of the Republic of Korea, taking note of the statements which were broadcast by the North Korean side on January 23 and 25, 1979, in response to our proposal of Jan. 19, 1979, with regard to the issue of the south-north dialogue, wishes to state the following position:

It has been our consistent stand to improve the relations between the south and the north with a view to achieving independently the peaceful unification of Korea by promoting the south-north dialogue with all sincerity in accordance with the spirit, principles and agreements contained in the South-North Joint Statement, dated July 4, 1972.

We assume that the North Korean statement is an indication of its willingness to reaffirm the spirit and principles of the July 4 Joint Statement, and also to faithfully adhere to the agreed provisions of the said statement which among others includes refraining from defaming and slandering each other, preventing armed provocations against each other and taking positive measures to prevent military incidents.

Inasmuch as all the agreements between the south and the north including the July 4 Joint Statement have been made through talks by the responsible authorities concerned of both sides, the future south-north dialogue can achieve desired objectives if the dialogue is conducted by the responsible authorities of both sides.



Accordingly, we propose that a preliminary meeting be held as soon as possible either in Seoul or Pyongyang between the authorities concerned of the south and the north for the purpose of discussing all the problems raised so far by both sides, not necessarily waiting until June 1979 as suggested by the North Korean side.

It is hoped that a sincere response will be made by the directly responsible authorities of North Korea to our position as stated above.

- END -

**Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Cyrus Vance, "Prospects for Intra-Korean Dialogue," 28 January 1979**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of, 1-6/79, Box 44, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

[...]

January 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: Cyrus Vance (signature)  
SUBJECT: Prospects for Intra-Korean Dialogue

The flurry of recent proposals and responses by South Korea and North Korea indicates that both sides appear to have an interest in renewing some form of contact. The North has dropped a number of its earlier preconditions. However, scheduling of any talks remains impossible as long as the North insists on determining who represents the South at talks and on the inclusion of its fictitious Revolutionary Party for Reunification as a spokesman for the South.

We believe Seoul is serious about dialogue, but meaningful dialogue must be between the responsible authorities on both sides. This is the essential message to convey to Deng:

-- Recent statements by both Seoul and Pyongyang have shown some significant movement forward. We believe both the US and the PRC should encourage this.

-- However North Korea is call for a meeting of disparate groups, along with their wish to determine the list of invitees, is unrealistic and actually blocks the genuine dialogue which the US and China would both like to see.

The talks should be between the authorities in Seoul and Pyongyang.

**Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and the People's Republic of China  
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 29 January 1979**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 755-766.]

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 29, 1979, 3:35–4:59 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Summary of the President's Meeting with the People's Republic of China Vice  
Premier Deng Xiaoping

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Jimmy Carter  
Vice President Walter Mondale  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
David Aaron, Staff Member, National Security Council  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC  
Trudy Werner, Notetaker, NSC  
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping  
Vice Premier Fang Yi  
Foreign Minister Huang Hua  
Ambassador Chai Zemin  
Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin  
Acting Head of Department of American and Oceanian Affairs Zhu Qizhen  
Head of the Department of Protocol Wei Yongqing  
Pu Shouchang, Member, State Planning Commission  
Lien Zhengpao, Notetaker

President Carter: Mr. Vice Premier, we are very excited about the gifts. They are very beautiful.

Vice Premier Deng: They are very little gifts.

President Carter: This afternoon I thought we might go over the range of world problem areas. Let me try to explain our own attitudes toward them and in some circumstances outline what steps we are taking to alleviate the problems.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, China: President's Meeting with Vice Premier Deng: 1–2/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Brzezinski gave Carter suggested talking points for this meeting, which were initialed "C." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 2, China: Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 1/28/79–2/1/79: 1/25/79 Briefing Book [III])

I understand that Secretary Brown gave you a description of what we are doing in Europe with our NATO allies to strengthen our defense.

We have a very good spirit and a sense of purpose and cohesion in NATO that was not there several years ago. As Secretary Brown undoubtedly told you, we have about 340,000 men, armed forces personnel, in the European Theatre.

Concerning the Soviet Union, we are also deeply concerned about recent developments in Afghanistan and Vietnam, Ethiopia, South Yemen, earlier of course in Angola and we share your concern about these developments.

I think, though, in an effort to be accurate, all of the trends in recent years have not been in favor of the Soviet Union.

Several countries have moved from a closer allegiance to the Soviet Union more and more to an allegiance to the Western world and indeed with your country as well.

A few years ago, for instance, Egypt was a very close permanent ally of the Soviet Union. Now, of course, it is a very close friend of ours and yours as well. I think it is accurate to say that since Madame Gandhi's departure, with her replacement by Desai, that India has taken a much more positive attitude toward the United States than it had before.

I won't mention the countries one-by-one because you know them as well. But I think in the case of Indonesia their relations with us are better. In several countries in Eastern Europe, Romania and others, their relations with us have improved. Yugoslavia has increased its friendship toward us. Nigeria is much more friendly toward the West. So too is Guinea, North Korea, formerly dependent on the Soviet Union, is much more friendly with you. Perhaps we have our best relationship with Japan in recent years. The ASEAN nations are much more cohesive, much more independent economically. I think their recent action in the United Nations concerning Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was encouraging. Somalia, for a while very closely dominated by the Soviets, now is much more independent. And in the Middle East, the Soviets complained because they have been excluded from deliberations there. While many trends favor the Soviet Union, in many other ways, I think Soviet influence has been decreased.

[...]

President Carter: I think to summarize what I said so far, there are many areas of the world where you and we have a common goal and where we can cooperate. In Pakistan, in strengthening the ASEAN nations, in the Middle East, among the non-aligned countries who look to you for leadership and guidance quite often. The recent Kampuchea issue in the U.N. was an encouraging development. In Korea, I would like to hear your idea of what we might do to assure future peace and non-aggression in Korea.

Vice Premier Deng: While I was in Japan, former Prime Minister Fukuda raised this question; a number of U.S. Senators and others raised this question with me. Here I can say in clear and explicit terms that there does not exist a danger of North Koreans preparing to launch a

war. Even should the United States withdraw all its armed forces from South Korea, leaving only the South Korean armed forces there, under those circumstances there still would be no possibility of the North Koreans attacking South Korea. I am sure that Mr. President has already noted the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has suggested a new proposal for resuming negotiations and put forth concrete suggestions. And the North Koreans hope to engage in negotiations with the United States. And they are even more eager to engage in a dialogue with South Korea.

But because the Park Chung-hee government in the past rejected negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Korea, so this time North Korea hopes that should such negotiations be resumed, they should not only be conducted on a government basis but that different parties and various peoples' organizations could also take part in negotiations on both sides.

President Carter: This makes it difficult if not impossible for the South Koreans to agree because of the inadmissibility of North Korea's deciding who should represent the South Koreans in the discussions. If it was possible for the government authorities to negotiate directly, this would open up immediate possibilities for fruitful discussion.

President Carter: Are you in a position to have any communications directly with the South Koreans?

Vice Premier Deng: For similar reasons, like Israel, we cannot have direct contacts with the South Koreans because if we were to do that we would lose the possibility of doing work with regard to other parties. These are very sensitive problems.

President Carter: Yes, I know. Of course we would be very glad to have a trade relationship with North Korea if you could have a similar relationship with South Korea, and perhaps these openings might provide new avenues of choice and new ways to resolve differences.

Vice Premier Deng: It would be best for us not to create a situation in which it would make it even more difficult for North and South Korea to contact each other.

President Carter: We will continue to use our good offices to bring the two governments together for discussion and to the extent you can, you will do the same. We will cooperate and share advice.

Vice Premier Deng: While in Japan, Prime Minister Fukuda also made a similar suggestion that they will work with regard to South Korea and we with regard to North Korea. But we did not agree to this. The Japanese could work with the South Koreans but if we were to do the same with the North Koreans, results would be just the opposite of what we would want.

I would like to explain this point. Some think the Soviet Union is increasing its influence in North Korea. That is not correct. Actually, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has all along maintained a relationship of trust with China. And there is no secret to that. We never interfered in the internal affairs of North Korea and we never took a part in their decision

making. Whatever aid we gave them, it was totally devoid of any conditions. Whereas, Soviet aid always has strings attached. In fact, some of those conditions were very hard indeed, which involved Korean internal affairs and that is why the North Koreans became unhappy with the Soviet Union.

President Carter: Do you think it would be inappropriate for you to encourage the North Koreans to meet with the South Korean government officials or authorities?

Vice Premier Deng: We can just express our support for the North Koreans' position for independent, peaceful reunification. Mr. President probably has already noted that the promise of the recent North Korean proposals is that the two sides should engage in peaceful consultations. And in this field, I think we can do work that includes Japan to encourage them to engage in direct negotiations.

[...]

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

U.S. 2/12/79  
Rep of Korea

TO:  
A:

The Secretary-General

DATE 29 January 1979

THROUGH:  
S/C DE:

FROM:  
DE:

Mikhail D. Sytenko  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Political and Security Council Affairs

REFERENCE \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: New Proposals on the Korean Question  
OBJET:

1. At his annual New Year's Press Conference of 18 January 1979, ROK President Park Chung Hee proposed, inter alia,

"that the South and North hold talks at any time, any place and on any level mutually agreed upon without any prior conditions so as to discuss the issues of achieving peaceful unification, pursuing national prosperity and all other problems openheartedly."

The Presidential Spokesman later explained that the proposal could imply a meeting between the Heads of State of North and South Korea.

2. Five days later, on 23 January 1979, the "Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" convened a Joint Meeting in Pyongyang of the "political parties and public organizations in the Northern half of the Republic", at the proposal of the Workers' Party of Korea.

3. The joint meeting, which welcomed and termed "a good thing" Park's statement, made the following proposals:

"Firstly, the North and South should return to the intrinsic idea and principles of the July 4 (1972) Joint Statement... We propose that the Authorities of both sides officially make public their attitude of reaffirming and faithfully observing them at 10 a.m. February 1.

"Secondly, an immediate end should be put to calumnies and slanders against each other.

"Thirdly,... both sides should stop military actions menacing the other side, discontinue the shipment of weapons from outside and eliminate all possibilities of military conflict. ...Military Authorities of both sides should first of all stop all hostile military actions, such as arms reinforcement, military operation and building of military set-ups in the frontline areas... and unconditionally discontinue military exercises as from zero hours March 1. ....

**"Fourthly, we propose the convocation of the Whole-Nation Congress represented by all political parties and public organizations in the North and South ... representing the general will of the entire Korean people.**

**"This Congress should be attended by the representatives of all political parties and public organizations in the North and representatives of all political parties and public organizations, the President of the Democratic Republican Party included, and patriotic figures of various circles in South Korea and representatives of organizations of compatriots and individual personages abroad.**

**"At the Whole-Nation Congress, the North and South... will extensively discuss the problems of realizing many-sided collaboration and intercourse in all fields, political, economic, cultural and military, including the complete opening of society and free activities of political parties in the North and South, and all other problems arising in the solution of the reunification question.**

**"We propose that this Congress be convened in Pyongyang or Seoul early in September this year and, for the successful preparations for the Congress, bilateral or multilateral preliminary meeting of working-level representatives of all political parties and organizations at home or abroad be held in Pyongyang early in June... "**

4. The DPRK Permanent Observer, in reply to a query at a press conference on 24 January 1979 as to whether Pyongyang had dropped its insistence on a DPRK-U.S. peace agreement, stressed that there were two standing DPRK proposals for two different dialogues, namely a North-South dialogue on reunification, and a DPRK-U.S. dialogue, as two signatories of the Korean Military Armistice Agreement, to conclude an agreement that would replace the Armistice.

5. Since then: 1) the ROK, on 26 January 1979, in a formal statement, affirmed continuing commitment to the 1972 South-North Joint Statement and suggested that a preliminary meeting be held as soon as possible between "the responsible authorities concerned of both sides" to discuss "all the problems raised by both sides"; and 2) the Democratic Front for Reunification of the Fatherland of North Korea on 28 January, issued a further statement indicating that the North agreed to "working-level" talks even earlier than June and stating that participation should include "authorities of the North and South" as well as representatives of "all political parties and organizations and individual personages at home and



abroad." The Democratic Front proposed to send invitation cards at a proper time to such working-level representatives in the North and the South and abroad.

#### Comment

6. As this new dialogue begins between North and South Korea the tone has changed noticeably from exchanges over the past five years. President Park, in calling for a resumption of talks, stated no conditions. The North Korean statement is without precedent in terming Park's initiative "welcome" and "good" and it makes no reference to the withdrawal of US forces in South Korea which heretofore has been an integral part of most North Korean proposals. Nonetheless, even in these preliminary exchanges, there are two serious substantive differences. The first is the idea of a "whole-nation Congress" made up of all political parties and public organizations including representatives of Koreans living abroad as the forum for North-South discussions. A similar concept was eventually dropped by the North Korean side prior to the 1972 talks. The second is the proposal that the import of arms and arms reinforcement should be stopped. Insofar as this pertains only to the border area an eventual understanding might be possible, but the ROK is extremely unlikely to renounce the extensive advanced military equipment it is now receiving from the United States. It has ignored this subject in its 26 January statement and has countered the idea of talks within a "whole-nation Congress" with the suggestion for talks between "the responsible authorities concerned on both sides" inasmuch as all agreements between the South and the North have been achieved on this basis. The North so far is holding to its proposal for broader participation but agrees to the inclusion of government representatives.

7. Whether these differences can be put aside and useful talks held would seem to depend primarily on how seriously the two sides interpret the changes that have taken place recently in Asian political relationships in terms of their own particular interests. In his New Year's press conference, President Park alluded to the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship, the new treaty of peace and friendship between the USSR and Vietnam, and the normalization of relations between the US and China as having

great significance for the Korean peninsula. He suggested that there are some signs that communist countries are "moderating their attitude toward Korea." Relations with the United States remain the cornerstone of South Korea's diplomacy, he said, but at another point he commented that "there is no such thing as an eternal foe or eternal friend. If there is anything eternal, it is only national interests." The ROK may now wish to seek a better atmosphere and practical improvements in relations between North and South in order to afford itself greater manoeuvrability and lessen the danger of isolation in a changing Asian scene.

8. The North Korean authorities may also find that the increasing orientation of Chinese policy towards closer and wider relations with the United States and Japan and the disadvantages of becoming dependent on the USSR to the point of inevitable friction with China make a new effort to find an improved basis for relations with the South desirable. Added to this are the very high economic growth rate achieved in the ROK and the imminent acquisition of extensive arms from the United States which may suggest the desirability of a less competitive relationship between the North and the South. Finally the DPRK may assume that changes in the Asian picture have given South Korea new motivation for serious negotiations.

9. Having said this, it must be added that no real change has occurred in the underlying factors that cause the division of Korea. There is no sign of willingness on either side to alter its political, economic and social systems in a way which would permit national unification of the peninsula. Unification in terms of the creation of one integrated, economically cohesive state cannot be seen as a present possibility. A great deal should be possible, however, in strengthening economic ties between the North and the South, in alleviating the human hardships entailed in division, in reducing political tension, and possibly even - in the longer run - in joint arms control measures within the framework of ultimate reunification. The immediate question raised by the latest exchanges then is: will

talks now take place which will lead to a more stable and mutually advantageous relationship between North and South Korea in a new or altered Asian context?

### The UN Interest

10. The United Nations has two evident interests in these Korean developments. First, there is a need to encourage and facilitate any contacts between the North and the South that might lead to a reduction in tension in a situation that continues to pose one of the most serious potential threats to world peace. Secondly, the continued existence of a UN Command in South Korea is anachronistic and needs to be revised if this is possible without weakening the basis of peace. The Secretary-General in talking with the Permanent Observers of North and South Korea has already made clear his interest in being as helpful as possible. Further steps by the Secretary-General or his representatives could include the following, depending on the next developments in Korea:

-- an indication that UN facilities would be available at Headquarters or in Europe should the two sides conclude that talks would be more productive if held outside the peninsula.

-- The possibility of including Seoul and Pyongyang in the Secretary-General's forthcoming Asian trip with the objective of encouraging in both capitals a continuation of bilateral contacts and of contributing to mutual understanding.

-- The encouragement by the Secretary-General of other countries with an interest in Korea, especially those having relations with both sides, to offer their services in facilitating a productive North-South dialogue.

-- Consultation with the parties concerned on practical means of modifying security arrangements on the peninsula so as to remove the need for continuation of the UN Command.

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New Proposals on the Korean Question: Summary

I. Sequence of Events

<sup>9)</sup>  
18 January: ROK proposes talks between North and South

23 January: Meeting convened by DPRK "Central Committee of the Democratic Front for Unification of the Fatherland" proposed:

- 1) return to idea and principle of 1972 Joint Statement;
- 2) end calumnies and slanders;
- 3) stop military actions and discontinue shipment of weapons from outside;
- 4) convocate Whole-Nation Congress attended by representatives of all political parties, public organizations and organizations of compatriots and individual personages abroad.

24 January: DPRK stresses two proposals;

- 1) North-South dialogue on reunification;
- 2) DPRK-US dialogue

26 January: ROK affirmed commitment to 1972 Joint Statement

28 January: Democratic Front issued statement agreeing to "working-level" talks with participation as 4) above.

II. Comment

Despite change in tone, two serious substantive differences remain:

- 1) idea of "Whole-Nation Congress" (which ROK ignored)
- 2) proposal to stop import of arms and arms reinforcement (which ROK is unlikely to agree to)

Useful talks depend on interpretation of changes in Asian political relationships. ROK may want to improve relations

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to lessen danger of isolation in Asian scene and obtain greater manoeuvrability; DPRK may feel disadvantages of becoming dependent on USSR; considerations also include very high ROK economic growth rate and acquisition of extensive arms from US.

III. Conclusion: No real change in underlying factors causing division of Korea and unification not a possibility at present. But: possibility of strengthening economic ties, alleviating human hardship, maybe even joint arms control measures.

IV. The UN Interest

- 1) Need to encourage and facilitate any contacts that might lead to reduction in tension;
- 2) revision of anachronistic existence of UN Command in South Korea.

Steps by Secretary-General or his representative could include:

- offer facilities at Headquarters or in Europe to hold talks
- include Seoul and Pyongyang in forthcoming Asian trip to encourage bilateral contacts
- encourage other countries with interest in Korea, to offer their services in facilitating dialogue
- consult with parties concerned to modify security arrangements and thus remove need for continuation of UN Command.

1. The 17 February Meeting

-- There was no agreement on the status of the participants but the atmosphere was determinedly cooperative. Press and diplomatic coverage was encouraged.

-- The immediate results were: 1) agreement to continue talking, with the next meeting to be held on 7 March, again at Panminjonn; 2) the telephone "hot line" would be reopened by the North for exclusive use of the "liaison representatives." Security matters were not mentioned.

2. Objectives

-- Both sides spoke of reunification as the goal but emphasized dialogue (North) and mutual exchange and cooperation (South) as the immediate objectives.

-- According to press reports, North Koreans in Tokyo have suggested that the North would like to see a confederation of the two states, to be known as the Confederate Republic of Koryo, with the two governments and the two social and economic systems remaining unchanged but with joint foreign representation abroad and a single seat at the UN.

-- Reports from Seoul suggest that the South is thinking more in terms of small steps (reminiscent of Brandt's kleine Schritte in Germany) such as economic cooperation, reunification of families, and cultural exchange.

3. Comment

-- Whatever their ultimate goals, both sides at the present are interested in appearing cooperative. This interest provides some hope of a degree - however small - of progress.

-- The concept of confederation is somewhat similar to that favored by the East Germans in the 1950's. Joint foreign representation is certain to be non-negotiable with the South at present and for the foreseeable future. On the other hand the concept need not be abandoned in principle in order to permit agreement on pragmatic steps to alleviate the adverse effects of division.

The residue of mistrust is so great and the absence of constructive intercourse so complete that the two sides will probably need some outside assistance even if their intentions are positive. Such assistance might come from the UN or from a third country.

-- The situation warrants continued encouragement by the Secretary-General since the achievement of an improved modus vivendi in Korea would be a major contribution to stability in Asia.

**Letter from Park Chung Hee to Jimmy Carter, 31 January 1979**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 60-63, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

(Translation)

January 31, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express my appreciation for the thoughtful message you have conveyed through Ambassador Gleysteen, informing me in advance of your announcement to establish diplomatic relations with the "People's Republic of China."

As your Administration has embarked on a new course of policy toward China, I would like to convey to you some of my personal observations with regard to the changing international situation surrounding us.

It is my hope that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the "People's Republic of China" and the accompanying improvement in dialogue between the two countries will contribute to reducing tension and enhancing peace in the Asian and Pacific region. I trust that serious efforts by your Administration will be directed to obtaining China's cooperation toward this end.

However, what keeps me concerned is that we may fall into an error of overestimating the role of China and of underestimating the impact of diplomatic and military maneuvers of the Soviet Union in our area. I am also concerned over the attitude of North Korea which may find some disadvantage in the current efforts of China to cultivate closer and friendly relations with the United States and other Western powers.

The fact that the recent invasion of Vietnam into Cambodia took place not long after the conclusion of the military treaty between Vietnam and the Soviet Union and immediately after the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the "People's Republic of China" reinforces my concern. Obviously, the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union will continue to have destabilizing effects on the peace and security in this part of the world. Therefore, our attention is focused on how North Korea will manage their relations with China and the Soviet Union under the newly emerging circumstances. It is my hope, in this connection, that the changing balance of power in this region will not bring about a situation wherein North Korea's military capabilities are further strengthened by modern weapons supplied by the Soviet Union, thus disturbing the military balance on the Korean peninsula.

I assume that Korea will be one of the major subjects for discussion when Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping visits Washington in late January. I believe it is important for you, Mr. President, to personally impress the Chinese leader on the magnitude of the American interest in Korea, particularly by expressing, in strong terms, its desire to establish a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and by reiterating its firm determination to maintain close cooperative relations with the Republic of Korea in political, economic and military fields.



The possibility of establishing any formal relations between the Republic of Korea and the "People's Republic of China" seems to be remote under the present circumstances in view of the latter's current relations with Communist North Korea and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Nevertheless, I feel that efforts should be made earnestly by both sides to face reality and gradually soften the hitherto hostile posture between the two countries.

The new developments in this region require our two allies to cooperate and coordinate our policies more closely than ever before. It is for this reason that I recognize the usefulness in holding personal meeting between us in the near future as you have suggested.

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

**Telegram Number 27 from Seoul to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "South/North Korean Relations," 1 February 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," *The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.*]

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Fm Seoul 010715Z Feb 79

To priority FCO

Telegram Number 27 of 1 February

Info Tokyo

Info Washington

Info Peking

Info Moscow

My telno 25 –

South/North Korean Relations

1. The acting South Korean Co-Chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, Min Kwan Shik, gave a press conference yesterday in which he said that he regarded North Korea's recent affirmation of the joint communique of 4 July 1972 as a positive gesture. The joint communique was the basis on which the SNCC had been set up, the bilateral talks had been held and the direct telephone link between Seoul and Pyongyang had been opened. Yet the North had made no specific proposals about re-implementing the provisions of the joint communique. He invited the North to attend a working level meeting to prepare for the resumption of full SNCC meetings, which were broken off by Pyongyang in August 1973. He also called for the telephone link to be restored.

2. In reply to a question he said that there was no direct connection between the SNCC and the meeting which President Park had proposed in his New Year press conference. He (Min) had decided to issue his statement because the North had expressed a desire for the joint communique to be reaffirmed. He could see no reason why the North should not resume the SNCC meetings if it adhered to the joint communique.

3. He went on to describe the North Koreans' undertaking to cease slandering the ROK from today as an act of political propaganda.

4. Min's statement may mark a further step in the deterioration of the North-South exchanges into a mere propaganda battle. Resumption of the SNCC talks, for which the framework already exists, would be a logical way to renew direct contact. Min's proposal is thus a valid one. But the North's prompt action in promising to stop its abuse of the South is likely to prove an embarrassment to the ROK. Min's comment on this is unconvincing.

Bates

[...]

**Note for the File, "The Question of Korea," 2 February 1979**

[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]

Orig: SG  
bf: RA/AR  
cc: Mr. Urquhart

NOTE FOR THE FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

The Question of Korea

1) Having met with the Permanent Observer of the DPRK on the previous day, the Secretary-General received Ambassador Moon of the ROK on 25 January and briefed him about the conversation with Ambassador Han (DPRK). Ambassador Moon (ROK) thanked the Secretary-General for the information and for his continued interest in the question of Korea. He clarified that the South had learned of the North Korean proposals through the radio and not through diplomatic channels. He made reference to the press conference of President Park of 19 January, who had proposed the reopening of a dialogue at any time, any place, at any level and without preconditions. Ambassador Moon told the Secretary-General that he had received a telephone call from his Foreign Minister, who had given him the basic content of the statement which would be made on the following day (see attached) and which he had been instructed to convey to the Secretary-General. He made clear that although his Government did not like some of the North Korean proposals (Whole-Nation Congress), it would not outwardly reject them but would declare its readiness to get together without preconditions when these proposals could then be entertained. The most positive element in the N. Korean statement of 23 January was that it did not reject the proposal President Park had made on 19 January.

(On 26 January, Ambassador Moon sent the S. Korean statement of that date for the Secretary-General's information as well as the text of another of 29 January).

2) On 26 January the Secretary-General also talked to Ambassador Petree (US) on the telephone and informed him of the conversations with the two Korean Ambassadors and instructed me to contact the N. Korean Observer Mission in order to keep it informed of the Secretary-General's contacts.

3) I called Ambassador Han on 29 January and offered to meet with Deputy Ambassador Chon, who subsequently called me back on 31 January and we fixed a meeting for 1 February.

I informed Ambassador Chon, who was accompanied by another member of his Mission, about the conversations which had taken place and asked him about the N. Korean reaction to the statement of the ROK of 26 January. He explained it to me on the basis of the statement of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front of 27 January (see attached Press Release of 28 January). He stressed the question of the composition of the working-level talks which,

according to their proposal, could now take place in April. In the opinion of the DPRK, it was essential that all Koreans, including those living abroad, should participate in the efforts for reunification. He said that approximately 100 thousand Koreans lived in the US and 600 thousand in Japan alone. The loyalties of these were divided between the North and the South but in any case they should participate in the dialogue. With regard to the opinion expressed by Seoul that the talks should be conducted between responsible authorities he said that these authorities, including the ruling party in the ROK, should also be represented. To my question as to how representatives of the various groups, especially those living abroad, would be selected, he said that this was subject to “bilateral or multilateral negotiations between the parties”.

Ambassador Chon enquired whether the Secretary-General had also talked to representatives of other countries, to which I replied in the affirmative. He was visibly interested in the fact that the Secretary-General had also talked to an American representatives.

Finally, Ambassador Chon handed over to me a press release of the Korean Central News Agency in which the DPRK reaffirms its adherence to the 1972 joint statement and announced that it will discontinue the propaganda against the ROK.

He asked me to thank the Secretary-General for his interest in this matter and expressed the hope that he would continue to help make the position of the DPRK better understood by “other governments”. We agreed to keep in contact on further developments.

(signature)  
F. Mayrhofer/jb  
2 February 1979

**Report from the US Delegation to NATO, "North-South Korean Developments," 6  
February 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives,  
Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

U.S. Delegation  
February 6, 1979

North-South Korean Developments

Responding to US-PRC normalization, North and South Korea have made several concessions toward each other, aimed at re-establishing dialogue. The series of proposals and counter-proposals began with a January 19 flexible proposal by President Park that authorities of North and South meet at any time, place, and level without preconditions to prevent war, guarantee prosperity and make initial steps toward peaceful reunification. Both sides have thus far agreed to:

--A return to the cooperative spirit of the July 4, 1972, joint communique;

--A cessation of "slander and of provocative military actions directed against each other,  
and

--The notion that an initial meeting should take place soon.

Scheduling of actual contacts remains impossible because of North Korea's insistence that initial talks include private and social groups as well as the "authorities." While both sides appear to have a serious interest in renewing some form of contact, their pronouncements were also for effect during Deng Xiaoping's arrival in Washington.

North Korea's insistence on a different kind of meeting is based upon its fear of perpetuating a "Two Koreas" arrangement by bestowing legitimacy on the Park government (Pyongyang's language allows for Park's participation in any talks as head of his party, but makes no acknowledgement of his government role). This position is unacceptable to Seoul because:

--South Korea believes that only representatives of the two governments can negotiate authoritatively on policy questions;

--The North's formula would require participation by dissident leaders and its fictitious revolutionary party for reunification as a spokesman for the South.

President Park and his government genuinely want North-South contacts and reductions of tensions, but the North's lack of flexibility is disappointing. The North's reluctance so far to reopen the established but moribund private channels is also discouraging. It is difficult to

evaluate Pyongyang's actual intentions because of misperceptions of the actual situation in South Korea which appear to be held even among top policymakers in Pyongyang.

While Peking has traditionally opposed outside interference in any intra-Korean dialogue, in part because of its position on resolution of the Taiwan question, the Chinese would like to see both sides move toward accommodation in Korea. The U.S. supports direct South-North dialogue as an essential pre-requisite for reduction of tensions and is hopeful that the North will react realistically to resume the dialogue.

**Cable from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the British Embassy in Seoul, "Visit of Deng Xiaoping," 8 February 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations Between North & South Korea," National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

[...]

Confidential

FM Tokyo 080700Z Feb 79

TO Immediate FCO

Telegram Number 101 of 8 Feb

INFO Immediate Seoul Washington and Peking

Routine Moscow and Hong Kong

Saving All EEC Posts

M.I.P.T (Not to All)

Visit of Deng Xiaoping

In briefing EEC ambassadors on 8 February on Korea Takashima said that Deng began by referring to the recent exchanges as a "good omen". He said that the views expressed by North Korea had been the position of its govt not just non-governmental bodies.

2. Takashima went on to say that each of his Japanese interlocutors (Mr Chira, Mr Fukuda and Mr Tanaka) had asked Deng whether China would not open some sort of dialogue with South Korea. They had done this at the urging of South Korean politicians who had recently come to Japan. Deng said that he did not think such a dialogue would be useful at this time. He did not want to put any pressure on North Korea. He said that he had told President Carter that the total withdrawal of all U.S. forces would not adversely affect the situation in the Peninsula. He was confident that North Korea would not launch an attack. He believed the military forces of North and South to be in balance. (Takashima commented that this last point did (not) represent the Japanese view).

[...]

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MY TELNO 30: SOUTH/NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

1. IN A STATEMENT RELEASED ON 12 FEBRUARY THE SEOUL SIDE OF THE SOUTH-NORTH COORDINATING COMMITTEE PROPOSED PRELIMINARY TALKS BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAN VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE SNCC TO BE HELD AT FREEDOM HOUSE, PANMUNJOM, AT 10.00 HOURS (LOCAL TIME) ON 17 FEBRUARY. THE PURPOSE OF THE TALKS WOULD BE TO DISCUSS PROCEDURAL MATTERS FOR HOLDING THE 4TH FULL DRESS MEETING OF THE SNCC IN PYONGYANG. (THE THIRD FULL MEETING WAS HELD IN SEOUL IN JUNE 1973).

2. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE BEEN SWIFT TO REACT. ACCORDING TO A NORTH KOREAN DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION FRONT BROADCAST PICKED UP THIS MORNING "FOUR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION FRONT" WILL GO TO PANMUNJOM AT 10.00 ON 17 FEBRUARY, NOT TO FREEDOM HOUSE, WHICH IS IN THE SOUTH SID OF THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE, BUT TO THE OFFICE OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, WHICH STRADDLES THE MDL. THEY WILL REGARD WHOEVER COMES FROM THE SOUTH SIDE AS

"LIAISON REPRESENTATIVE"

3. THE FOUR NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO BE THOSE NAMED ON 22 FEBRUARY BY THE DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION FRONT AS DELEGATES TO THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION PREPARATION COMMITTEE WHICH THE NORTH KOREANS EARLIER PROPOSED SHOULD MEET ON 28 FEBRUARY. LOCAL PRESS REPORTS LIST THEM AS:

KWON MIN-JUN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY;

RESTRICTED

/LEE CHANG-SAM,



LEE CHANG-SUN, DIRECTOR OF THE CULTURE-ART DEPARTMENT OF THE  
STATE ADMINISTRATION COUNCIL.

KIM SOK-JUN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH KOREAN DEMOCRATIC  
PARTY.

PAIK CHUN-HYOK, VICE DIRECTOR OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE  
DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION FRONT.

(KMN IS A FORMER UN OBSERVER MISSION CHIEF).

4. THE LATEST NORTH KOREAN MOVE HAS NOT YET BEEN REPORTED LOCALLY.  
THE ROK AUTHORITIES WILL NEED TO MULL OVER CAREFULLY THEIR NEXT  
STEP, THE MORE SO AS THE ROK MINISTER OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION  
REPEATED ON 12 FEBRUARY THAT WHILE THE ROK WAS PREPARED TO MEET  
WITH "THE RESPONSIBLE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES" AT ANY TIME,  
AT ANY PLACE, AND AT ANY LEVEL, IT DID NOT REGARD THE DEMOCRATIC  
UNIFICATION FRONT AS REPRESENTING A RESPONSIBLE NORTH KOREAN  
AUTHORITY.

BATES

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SIR A DUFF

SIR A PARSONS

MR. MURRAY

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RESTRICTED

**Statement by Mr. Lee Dong-Bok, Seoul Side Spokesman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on Panmunjom Contact on 17 February, 1979, 15 February 1979**

*[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

Seoul, 15 February, 1979

Statement by Mr. Lee Dong-Bok, Seoul side spokesman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, on Panmunjom contact on 17 February, 1979

1. The Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) proposed to the Pyongyang side on February 12, 1979, that the Vice Chairmen of the SNCC of the two sides meet at the Freedom House in Panmunjom at 10.00 a.m., February 17, 1979, in order to discuss procedural matters necessary for calling into session the fourth SNCC Plenary Meeting. In response, the Pyongyang side made it public on February 13, 1979, that it would send several persons to the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Panmunjom at 10.00 a.m., February 17, 1979. In view of the fact that both the Freedom House and the NNSC's conference room are located within the Panmunjom area, we shall not be inflexible about the suggested contact points.

2. We are currently engaged in an effort to reopen the South-North dialogue in accordance with the principles and agreements stipulated in the South-North Joint Communiqué of July 4, 1972, and, therefore, it is naturally our primary concern to have the SNCC operation brought back to normalcy. We intend to make use of the Panmunjom contact of February 17 to have our aforementioned position conveyed to the Pyongyang side through those persons whom the Pyongyang dispatches to the South-North contact at Panmunjom.

3. We earnestly hope that the Panmunjom contact will prove to be a turning point in the inter-Korean relations in normalizing the SNCC operation in consonance with the wishes of the 50 million Koreans in the two divided parts of Korea for an early resumption of the South-North dialogue.

4. The Seoul side of the SNCC will be represented at the Panmunjom contact of February 17 by the following persons:

Mr. Min Kwan-Shik, SNCC Vice Chairman for the Seoul side;

Mr. Hahm Byoung Choon, SNCC Member for the Seoul side;

Mr. Chung Hong Jin, SNCC Executive Member for the Seoul side;

Mr. Lee Dong-Bok, SNCC Spokesman for the Seoul Side.

- THE END -

**Letter from Jimmy Carter to Park Chung Hee, 18 February 1979**

*[Source: Roll 2009-22, File 02, Frames 64-67, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

February 18, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I want to bring you up to date with the status of our efforts to contain the widening conflict in Southeast Asia. For some time, we have been counseling the Chinese not to respond to the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea by embarking on a direct military action of their own. I made this point quite clear to Vice Premier Deng during his visit here.

It is my view that such action only detracts international attention from the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and underlines growing international pressure for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. I also pointed out to the Vice Premier that overt Chinese action could possibly increase rather than diminish Soviet presence and influence in Southeast Asia and could lead to wider war.

The Chinese have said that this action is limited and restricted in scope. We have nonetheless made clear to them that we will publicly oppose this action and that we will take the position that all Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from Kampuchea and all Chinese forces should be withdrawn from Vietnam.

I have also communicated directly with President Brezhnev to make clear our position. I made clear to him that the United States seeks a stable and peaceful structure of independent nations in Asia and that the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea led directly to the existing situation. I urged that the Soviet Union conduct itself with the maximum restraint. Only if all parties cooperate can stability and security be re-established for the entire region.

I want to assure you that we will continue our efforts, both directly with the countries involved and at the United Nations, to secure an end to fighting in the region and to bring about a withdrawal of Vietnamese and Chinese forces. At the same time, we are continuing to express our concern that this conflict may widen still further -- with unforeseen consequences for nations in the region and beyond. In any event, I am prepared to protect our vital interests wherever they may be challenged.

I wish you to know that in response to these events we are making special efforts to monitor security developments throughout the region closely. We have observed nothing to indicate preparations for extension of conflict beyond the Indochina area at this time, nor any increase in the threat on the Korean peninsula. We will continue to monitor events closely and to keep your Government informed.

As I know you are aware, I have recently instructed that plans for any further withdrawal of United States forces from Korea be held in abeyance until such time as we can complete our analysis of the North Korean buildup of forces. We will of course give careful consideration to any developments arising out of the present conflict that could affect this decision.

I should also like to take this opportunity to say how pleased I am that talks have once again been initiated between the Republic of Korea and North Korea. Your personal commitment and efforts to seek an accommodation are deeply gratifying to me and are of benefit to both our nations.

Secretary Vance will give Foreign Minister Park a fuller discussion of these matters when they meet in a few hours.

Sincerely,

/s/ Jimmy Carter

**Letter from Duk Choo Moon to Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel, 20 February 1979**

*[Source: "Troubled areas - question of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0094-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

KD/96/79

20 February, 1979

Dear Mr. Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel,

For your further information, I now have pleasure in enclosing the text of remarks made by Mr. Min Kwan-Shik, Seoul-side Vice Co-Chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, at the Panmunjom meeting on Saturday, 17 February, 1979.

I look forward to keeping you informed of any further developments in the South-North dialogue.

Yours sincerely,

(signature)

Duk Choo Moon

Ambassador

Mr. Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Grunbuhel,  
Special Assistant to the Secretary-General,  
United Nations, Room 3802C,  
New York, N.Y. 10017  
Enclosure.

[...]

No. 13/79  
20 February 1979

PRESS RELEASE

Remarks by Mr. Min Kwan-Shik, Seoul Side Vice Co-Chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee, at Panmunjom contact Saturday

(Seoul, 17 February, 1979)

In my capacity as Acting Co-Chairman for the Seoul side of the South-North Coordinating Committee, I extend my greetings to you who have come to this place from Pyongyang in response to our sincere efforts to resume a constructive and productive South-North dialogue by all means at an early date. I would like to state the basic position of our side

with regard to the issue of resuming the South-North dialogue, on which the attention of the whole world, not to speak of the 50 million people of the South and North, has been focused. I ask for the Pyongyang side's affirmative review and response thereto.

As is well known, the South and North solemnly agreed upon and signed the historic South-North Joint Communiqué on 4 July, 1972, in order to meet the 50 million Korean people's aspirations for independent peaceful unification of the divided fatherland, and announced it simultaneously in Seoul and Pyongyang. In article 7 of the Joint Communiqué, the two sides solemnly pledged before the entire people that they would faithfully carry out the agreed items contained in the Joint Communiqué.

In accordance with the specific agreement embodied in article 6 of the Joint Communiqué, the two sides established the South-North Coordinating Committee as a mechanism for conducting dialogue between the South and North, with the responsibility of managing the implementation of all the agreed matters enumerated in the Joint Communiqué, inaugurating the Committee formally on 30 November, 1972.

However, the South-North Coordinating Committee thus activated has yet to hold its fourth meeting to date, five years and eight months after the third meeting took place in June 1973 in Seoul. Despite the fact that under the express provisions of the agreed minute on formation and operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee the next meeting of the Coordinating Committee was supposed to be held in Pyongyang in due order within two to three months of the preceding meeting.

In order to normalize the suspended operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee, the two sides have held a total of ten rounds of Vice Co-Chairmen's meetings at Panmunjom, beginning in December 1973.

It is a well-known fact, however, that the Pyongyang side has shunned even the Vice Co-Chairmen's meeting since the tenth such meeting was held in March 1975. Moreover, the Pyongyang side on 30 August, 1976, suspended the operation of the direct Seoul-Pyongyang telephone line which had assumed an important role as the most direct, accurate and speedy means of communication between the South and North, refusing to restore its operation ever since, in spite of our side's numerous urgings to have it brought back to normal operation.

We know that there have been many changes in the internal and external situations in which our divided country finds itself.

Internally, there has been a rising voice by the 50 million people urging more strongly than at any other time in the past that all pending problems should be solved in an effective and realistic manner through independent and peaceful efforts, and that thereby, South-North relations be improved substantially, advancing the time for the final independent and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland.

Externally, many turbulent changes have taken place in the situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula in the past few years. However, it is evident that the dominant trend,

characterized by rationalism, realism and a social opening all based on detente, has been moving in a direction advantage to consolidating more firmly the basis for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and accelerating an independent and peaceful solution of the unification issue.

These situations within and without call upon the responsible authorities of the South and North, realizing correctly the direction of the general trend as well as the aspirations of the 50 million people and the hopes of the world, to sit face to face with each other in an open-minded manner and settle smoothly all the issues pending between the two sides, based on practicable reality and mutually acceptable rationality.

Since I attach particular significance to the fact that this encounter today has been realized at a time when all concern, internal and external, is concentrated upon the question of the South-North dialogue, I earnestly hope that a momentum will be provided through this contact today to resume our South-North dialogue in a really constructive and productive framework.

As is well-known, the South and North agreed, in the 4 July South-North Joint Communiqué, to achieve unification of the divided fatherland through independent efforts and peaceful methods by all means and, to this end, to promote a national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems. As has been emphasized at every opportunity, the constant position of our Republic of Korea is that this principle of unification and all other agreed items envisaged in the seven articles of the South-North Joint Communiqué agreed upon between the South and North should be observed and carried out faithfully.

As is mentioned in the 4 July South-North Joint Communiqué, there are a multitude of problems to be solved by both sides jointly in order to make it possible to achieve truly autonomous and peaceful unification of our fatherland.

First of all, a lasting peace must be established, tensions eased, mutual distrust dissolved and trust firmly founded through mutual exchange and cooperation, and the opening up of the society between the two sides.

The tasks of establishing peace and of reviving mutual trust between the South and North, tasks which are prerequisite to the solution of the unification issue, require solid agreement between the two sides for their solution, and there is no room at all for dispute of the fact that such an agreement will be substantive and effective only when it is reached between the responsible authorities who are capable of guaranteeing the implementation of the agreed matters.

It is for this obvious reason that we have always insisted on a direct dialogue between the responsible authorities of the South and North.

Nevertheless, the Pyongyang side has obstinately continued to show the insincere attitude of hiding behind the so-called “Democratic Front for Unification of Fatherland”, a suspicious social organization which we can in no way regard as a responsible authority of the Pyongyang side and, thus, which we can never accept as a counterpart in a serious dialogue with us.

I believe that the Pyongyang side should discard such an insincere attitude as soon as possible if the Pyongyang side has any real interest in and sincerity about a genuinely constructive and productive dialogue with us.

The unreasonableness of the attitude of the Pyongyang side is underlined by the fact that it contravenes outright the agreements, embodied in the 4 July Joint Communiqué, which is a document solemnly agreed upon between the South and North, because the South-North Coordinating Committee was thereby created as the channel to carry out the dialogue.

The functions with which the South-North Coordinating Committee is charged are weighty indeed. We have agreed in the Joint Communiqué that the South-North Coordinating Committee shall carry out the functions of consulting on, solving and guaranteeing the implementation of the issues:

1. Of realizing the autonomous and peaceful unification of the divided fatherland;
2. Of realizing exchanges between political parties, social organizations and individual personnel of the South and North;
3. Of realizing economic, cultural and social exchanges between the South and North;
4. Of easing tensions, preventing military conflict and dissolving the situation of military confrontation between the South and North; and
5. Of taking concerted steps in external activities of the South and North.

The two sides have also agreed to create political military, economic, cultural and diplomatic sub-committees within the South-North Coordinating Committee.

We are also willing to consult, if necessary, on the expansion of the scale and scope of the Coordinating Committee which has been organized duly under an agreement reached between the South and North.

In this connection, we should like to recall that our side made a rational proposal at the second SNCC Vice Chairmen's meeting on 19 December, 1973, that the size of the delegation of each side be expanded from five members to about ten, in order to make room for representatives of political parties and social organizations, if necessary. We hereby reconfirm our stand that we are still ready to consult with the Pyongyang side on the expansion and reorganization of the South-North Coordinating Committee within the limits of rationality and efficiency.

Therefore it is my belief that, should the Pyongyang side genuinely desire to resume the South-North dialogue with unfeigned sincerity, the shortest way to that end is for the Pyongyang side to respond promptly to our appeal to normalize the functions of the South-North Coordinating Committee.



There is no problem blocking the way for normalization of the Coordinating Committee at this moment. The functions of the Committee will automatically be normalized if the long-pending fourth plenary session of the Committee is simply held in Pyongyang, as was agreed at the third session held in Seoul in June of 1973.

I understand that there have been various pending problems raised by the two sides in the meantime in relation to the South-North dialogue, and I believe that these problems can be solved through open-minded discussions between the two sides at the next plenary session of the Coordinating Committee.

I wish emphatically to reiterate that we are as willing as ever to discuss sincerely all problems to be raised through this channel of dialogue, which was created under an agreement reached between the two sides.

In order to normalize the operation of the South-North Coordinating Committee on the basis of such a stand of ours, I should like to propose to the Pyongyang side of the Coordinating Committee:

First, to hold the fourth plenary session of the South-North Coordinating Committee in Pyongyang on 3 April, 1979:

Second, to reinstate the direct South-North telephone circuit of the Coordinating Committee at 09.00 hours, 20 February, 1979, for smoother communication of the intents of both sides;

Third, to make a contact between officials of the South-North Coordinating Committee at 10.00 hours on 7 March at Panmunjom to discuss the issue of normalizing the South-North Coordinating Committee.

I look forward to the Pyongyang side's affirmative reply to the above proposals.

- END -

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 46 OF 20 FEBRUARY 1979, R F I TO TOKYO,  
PEKING, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND MOD (FEQ D14).

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MY TELNO 41: SOUTH/NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS

1. THE MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA TOOK PLACE AS PLANNED ON 17 FEBRUARY AT PANMUNJOM. THE DELEGATES WERE THOSE LISTED IN MY TELS 35 AND 41. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED FOR JUST OVER ONE AND A HALF HOURS, WAS UNEXPECTEDLY AMICABLE.
  
2. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THE LEADER OF THE ROK DELEGATION, MIN KWAN SHIK, CALLED ON NORTH KOREA TO REACTIVATE THE SNCC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1972 JOINT COMMUNIQUE. RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH TALKS BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES ON BOTH SIDES. THE DIRECT TELEPHONE LINK SHOULD BE REOPENED. THE ROK WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ENLARGEMENT OF EACH SIDE'S DELEGATION TO THE SNCC FROM 5 TO 10 MEMBERS TO ACCOMMODATE THE NORTH'S DESIRE TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS TAKE PART IN THE DIALOGUE. MIN PROPOSED THAT THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE SNCC SHOULD BE HELD IN PYONGYANG ON 3 APRIL, WITH A WORKING-LEVEL MEETING AT PANMUNJOM ON 7 MARCH.
  
3. ZM
  
3. THE NORTH KOREAN DELEGATION PROPOSED THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD SET UP A LIAISON TEAM OF FOUR DELEGATES TO PREPARE FOR THE FORMATION OF A NATIONAL UNIFICATION PREPARATORY COMMITTEE. THE TEAMS WOULD MEET ONCE A WEEK, EITHER IN THE NEUTRAL NATIONS BUILDING AT PANMUNJOM OR ALTERNATIVELY AT FREEDOM HOUSE AND PANMUNGAK (THE SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAN BUILDINGS IN THE JOINT SECURITY AREA). THE DIRECT TELEPHONE LINE SHOULD BE OPENED ON 18 FEBRUARY FOR WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. THE MEETINGS SHOULD BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4. THE ONLY

4. THE ONLY AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS WAS THAT THEY WILL MEET AGAIN IN THE NEUTRAL NATIONS BUILDING ON 7 MARCH.

5. THE MEETING RESULTED IN LITTLE MORE THAN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, BUT NO ONE EXPECTED MORE AT THIS STAGE. THE NORTH DID NOT DEVIATE FROM THEIR ESTABLISHED POSITION. THEY CONTINUE TO REJECT THE SNCC AS A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE CONTACTS AND REMAIN WEDDED TO THE IDEA OF A LARGE-SCALE CONFERENCE ON REUNIFICATION. THEIR POSITION IS AN ILLOGICAL ONE. IT WAS THE NORTH WHICH, IN THEIR BROADCAST STATEMENT OF 23 JANUARY, CALLED FOR NORTH AND SOUTH TO RETURN TO QUOTE THE INTRINSIC IDEA AND PRINCIPLES OF THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUE UNQUOTE. YET THEY REFUSE TO AGREE TO THE RESUMPTION OF THE SNCC MEETINGS WHICH ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THAT DOCUMENT. THE PROBLEM FOR THE ROK IS TO DECIDE WHETHER THE NORTH HAVE THE BASIC POLITICAL WILL TO TRY FOR AN ACCOMMODATION OR AT LEAST SOME IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS. THE SOUTH DO NOT WISH TO PASS UP ANY CHANCE THERE MAY BE OF MAKING PROGRESS, BUT THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE NORTH MAY AGAIN, AS HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST, BE LOOKING ONLY FOR PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE. THE NORTH'S PRESENT WILLINGNESS TO TALK MIGHT BE DUE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING THE HOPE OF BREAKING UP THE ANTI-COMMUNIST COHESION OF THE SOUTH AND A DESIRE TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO COMPLETE THEIR TROOP WITHDRAWAL PLANS ON TIME.

6. THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE RIGHT TO EXPLORE ALL POSSIBLE AVENUES OF DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH. THEY MUST BE SEEN TO BE DOING THIS, ESPECIALLY BY THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. BUT EQUALLY THEY MUST GET THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MEETINGS RIGHT, HENCE THEIR EFFORTS TO HAVE THE SNCC REINSTATED AS THE FORUM.

7. THE ROK'S INSISTENCE ON MAINTAINING THE SNCC AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE DIALOGUE IS NOT MERELY LEGALISTIC. THEY HAVE A FAIR POINT WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE ALREADY EXISTS AND THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO SET UP NEW CHANNELS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THESE ARE SO ILL-DEFINED. THEY HAVE GONE SOME WAY TO MEET THE NORTH'S WISHES, SEE PARA 2 ABOVE. BUT THEY MUST CONSTANTLY GUARD AGAINST BEING DRAWN STEP BY STEP INTO THE KIND OF SHAPELESS PAN-NATIONAL JAMOREE WHICH THE NORTH IS SEEKING.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

/8. THERE ARE

8. THERE ARE SOME SLIGHT GROUNDS FOR HOPE THIS TIME THE NORTH MAY BE SERIOUS. AMBASSADOR HAHM, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE ROK DELEGATION, HAS TOLD ME THAT THE MEETING WAS WARMER THAN ANYONE HAD EXPECTED AND THAT THE NORTHERN DELEGATION WERE VERY KEEN TO ENSURE THAT A FURTHER MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE. WE KNOW FROM THE MFA THAT THE ROK AND NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER IN SAIGON AND THAT THE NORTH HAD PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF IMPRISONED AGENTS. IN ANY CASE IT IS RIGHT FOR THE SOUTH TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AS LONG AS THERE IS A CHANCE OF PROGRESS. IF IT AGAIN COMES TO NOTHING AT LEAST THE SOUTH MAY HAVE A CHANCE TO SEND ITS DELEGATION FOR A LOOK AT PYONGYANG.  
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MR.CORTAZZI  
MR.MURRAY  
MR.FERGUSSON

The Honorable Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Korean people pray for your health and sincerely hope that your personal and governmental efforts for peace may bear fruits on the basis of justice. Our people are especially hopeful that your moral stance and human rights policies may be more effectively realized.

During the past few years, your human rights concern has commanded our deep respect and keen interest. This includes your concern for the human rights situation in the communist bloc, in such countries as the Soviet Union; we have also observed with much interest and respect that the People's Republic of China, with whom you established diplomatic relations at the beginning of this year, has responded to your moral diplomacy and human rights policy, and that there is arising in China a new wave of human rights assurance and liberalization.

But our Korean people wonder if your concern and position, and that of your government, regarding the institutional and systematic human rights violation which occurs in the Republic of Korea--the ally of your country--is not too mild. It is often said that the authoritarian government and the violation of human rights in Korea are inevitable for the maintenance of national security. But we believe that national security must presuppose and be based upon the safety of individual citizens; and at the same time, we feel that the ideology and value of freedom and democracy, which is the common pursuit of Korea and the United States, must be fostered in Korea more than in any other country in the world, because the Republic of Korea is counterposed by communism.

And yet, the ongoing violation of human rights in Korea does not see any improvement. Kim Dae Jung was released from prison upon the suspension of his sentence, on December 27, 1978. Even so, two ministers connected with the same incident (March 1, 1976) were re-imprisoned before the December release. The poet Kim Chi Ha is still in prison. Even at this moment, Christians, intellectuals, students, laborers, and politicians who raise voices of justice and conscience are continually being arrested and imprisoned; and most political prisoners are far more cruelly treated in prison than the ordinary criminals.

We believe that the Korean government's release of a few political prisoners from time to time is not the expression of a basic position and intention by the government to improve the human rights situation.

8 ANKUK-DONG  
SEOUL, KOREA

*Rather, this must be recognized as nothing more than a deceptive tactic to counter foreign and domestic criticism of the present regime.*

*Of course we have been trying to solve the human rights problem with the united strength of our democratic citizens. However, we must express our regret over the fact that the human rights violations and the maintenance of the authoritarian government in Korea are being carried out in the name of your, and your government's, tacit understanding. The Korean government has been widely publishing the news about your visit to Korea and the summit meeting between the Republic of Korea and the United States, although the real facts about the visit are not clear. In this process the Korean government makes propaganda implying that you and your government approve the existence of the authoritarian regime and the acts of violation of human rights in Korea.*

*If you visit Korea we will welcome you wholeheartedly; however, we sincerely hope that your visit is not misused to legitimize the dictatorial and oppressive regime of the Korean government. We hope that your visit to Korea becomes an integral part of your effort to pursue a moral diplomacy and human rights policy in Korea, the ally of your country. Your visit must be preceded by the comprehensive improvement of the human rights situation in Korea. At least, the Emergency Decree must be rescinded, all political prisoners must be released regardless of the charges against them, and democratic development in Korea must be fixed as the firm goal of both countries. Without such an improvement your Korea visit will have no significance for the Korean people, and therefore, will not be desirable. In such an event, the Korean people will be extremely disappointed about your human rights policy, and their trust and friendship toward your country will be deeply injured.*

*Further, we believe that the plan to withdraw American troops from Korea should be changed. Regrettably, however, the present regime makes propaganda to the effect that discussion on the change of plan means support for the dictatorial measures of the Korean government. The American troops in Korea are not merely a force to prevent war here, but should be regarded as having the purpose to protect and foster all the values of freedom and democracy. The existence of American troops in Korea must be duly recognized as a sacred guarantee of freedom and democracy which ensures the human dignity and basic rights of citizens in this land. It must be an integral part of a firm promise, and the fulfillment of that promise, for freedom and democracy--the common goal of our countries. In the discussion about American troops in Korea, regrettably, this point has been neglected, much to the disappointment of the Korean people; and this will deeply affect their trust regarding the existence of the U.S. troops here.*

8 ANKUK-DONG  
SEOUL, KOREA

We believe your human rights policy represents a most historic and great determination to side with the majority, whoever and whenever that may be. It is a historic resurgence of American democracy as established under the leadership of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln, and thus deserves the high expectation and praise of our people, as well as the peoples of the whole world. We only pray that such a policy, through its stronger, more effective, and more consistent execution, will produce great fruits commensurate with the expectations of the Korean people and other people of the world who are suffering under dictatorship.

May God bless you with health and success.

Signed:

*Ham Sok Hon*  
Ham Sok Hon

*Yun Po Sun*  
Yun Po Sun

*Kim Dae Jung*  
Kim Dae Jung

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE000

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DOS REVIEWED 03-Jul-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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NODIS

E.O. 12065 IRDS-1 3/9/09 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN

SUBJECT: NORTH/SOUTH KOREAN TALKS

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH ME ON MARCH 8, BLUE HOUSE ADVISER HAHM PYONG-CHON SPECULATED THAT A MAJOR NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVE IN PERSISTING WITH NORTH/SOUTH CONTACTS AT PANMUNJOM WAS TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECT FOR SEPARATE NORTH KOREAN/US TALKS. HE URGED MOST STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. MAINTAIN ITS PRESENT POLICY ON THIS ISSUE AND ASKED ABOUT THE FIRMNESS OF OUR RESOLVE.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT OUR POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WAS VERY CLEAR AND HAD BEEN AUTHORITATIVELY AFFIRMED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. THUS, I WAS CONFIDENT THE U.S. WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON KOREA IN WHICH THE ROK DID NOT PARTICIPATE ON THE SAME BASIS AS THE DPRK. IN THE CASE OF U.S./NORTH KOREAN CONTACTS, HOWEVER, I COULD NOT BE QUITE SO CERTAIN BECAUSE CONTACTS INVOLVED MANY AMERICANS, AND NOT JUST THE USG. AN INCREASE IN PRIVATE, MEDIA, AND LEGISLATIVE CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA WAS QUITE POSSIBLE, EVEN IN THE AREA OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTACTS THERE MIGHT BE PRESSURE TO RELAX OUR "NO CONTACT" POSITION WHICH WAS UNIQUELY STRICT. MOREOVER, IF THE SOVIETS OR THE CHINESE PERMITTED CONTACTS WITH SOUTH KOREA WE WOULD OF COURSE RECIPROCATE WITH NORTH KOREA.

4. HAHM DID NOT SEEM SURPRISED BY MY ANSWERS, BUT HE REITERATED FIRMLY THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO OUR PRESENT POLICY. I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR US TO DO SO IF THE ROKG AT PANMUNJOM OR PERHAPS ELSEWHERE, SET OUT THEIR OBJECTIVES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IN A POSITIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE WAY. IF THEY DID, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR US TO REMIND PEOPLE THAT OUR POLICY ON

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 692

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DEALINGS WITH THE DPRK WAS NOT AN ARBITRARY POSITION BUT  
RATHER ONE DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE GREAT POWER CONTACTS  
WITH BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA ON A BASIS OF RECIPROcity.  
J. DEPARTMENT PASS AMEMBASSY TOKYO FOR ASSISTANT SECRE-

TARY HOLBROOKE. GLEYSTEN

BT

#3550

NNNN

SENSITIVE

**Cable to P.R. Whiteway from W. Morris, "ROK-North Korea Relations," 12 March 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, Relations Between North & South Korea, 'National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

BRITISH EMBASSY  
SEOUL

12 March 1979

P R Whiteway ESQ  
FED  
Foreign and Commonwealth/Office

*Dear Paul,*

**ROK-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS**

1. The temptation to draw comparisons between the advent of spring and an apparent willingness on the part of the South and North Koreans to return to the conference table proved, for most newspapers in the South, too strong to resist but the fact is that although there have been no less than six meetings of one kind or another at Panmunjom during the past 3 ½ weeks there are very few signs so far of a genuine thaw. Moreover as a result of yesterday's meeting South Korea's chances of participating in the forthcoming World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang now appear to be negligible.

2. Of the six meetings mentioned above four were between delegations representing the Table Tennis Associations of the two sides. For the record, these were held on 27 February, 5 March, 9 March and 12 March. The South side's delegation comprised the President of the KTTA, Chae Yeong-cheol, the Vice President, the Managing Director and one 'instant' KTTA board member, Chung Choo-nyun, better known as South side spokesman for the Red Cross talks.

3. According to Chung, with whom I have spoken several times over the past few weeks, the atmosphere at the first couple of meetings was friendly enough but it was clear from the outset that the north's proposal of February for a joint team to participate in the Pyongyang Championships was quite unrealistic in view of the time factor. The Championships, as you know, open on 25 April and the draw for matches is due to be held on 14 and 15 March. The procedures for selecting the joint team's players and other staff, the training programme, the choice of a team name, etc. could not possibly have been completed in time. All the signs are that the whole idea was put forward by North Korea in the certain knowledge that it was quite unworkable, but would score them propaganda points and at the same time give them a reason for not allowing the South Koreans to enter North Korea as an independent team. In North Korean eyes it is a case of "we offered you the chance to participate in the Championships (as part of a joint team) and you have turned the opportunity down".

4. The South Korean delegation's attitude was that North Korea should first of all give a guarantee that visas would be issued for an independent South Korean team to go to Pyongyang

and then South side would be happy to discuss the question of a joint table tennis team, as part of the broad framework of sports exchanges in general. However, attempts by the South Korean delegation to discuss the question of independent participation in the Championships, to which they are entitled as members of the ITTF, failed to produce any positive reaction. At one stage last week the North Korean denied that they had even received the South side's visa applications.

5. Anxious to stay in the game however and to prevent North Korea from gaining any further propaganda points the South side has now proposed that a meeting between the two sides be held at Panmunjom in May of this year, to coordinate arrangements for a South-North Korean Friendship Table Tennis contest to be held in Seoul and Pyongyang respectively in June and July of this year. It is hard to believe that this proposal will meet with a favourable response from the North Koreans but in the absence so far of any progress in the other series of meetings between representatives of the South side of the SNCC and of the North Korean Democratic Unification Front, the next of which is to be held on 14 March, it may at least help to keep some sort of dialogue going. The North side closed yesterday's meeting by calling for a fifth meeting on 17 March. The South Korean delegation replied that unless they received a guarantee by 16 March that visas would be issued they could not agree to the proposal. For the moment then the ball is back in the North Korea's court.

*Yours ever,  
Warwick*

W Morris

[...]

**Telegram to the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Report on DPRK's Foreign Minister Heo Dam's Visit to Yugoslavia, etc.," 7 April 1977**

[Source: Roll 2007-25, File 8, Frames 11-12, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

File No. : Ah II (Asia Japan) 760 – 663  
Date : 79. 4. 7.  
Drafter : Cho Nam-shin  
Division : Japan Department, Asia Division  
From : Minister of Foreign Affairs  
To : Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency  
Cc : Deputy Directors of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency  
Title : Report on DPRK's Foreign Minister Heo Dam's Visit to Yugoslavia, etc. (extracted)

Related report file no.: PNIO 9 – A – P – 15 – 3  
PNIO 9 – A – P – 13 – 1

Heo Dam, Foreign Minister of North Korea, visited Yugoslavia, Malacca City, Iran, and Pakistan from March 6 through March 19. The Japanese Embassy to the R.O.K. informed our ministry of what the Japanese Embassy to Yugoslavia was answered by the Yugoslavian Foreign Ministry (Mr. Gricizi, Counselor on Far East Division) about North Korean Foreign Minister Ho's visit to Yugoslavia. For your information, please be advised to refer to the following:

1. It seemed that North Korea was anxious about the Non-Aligned Movement, and she wanted to know the analysis and prospect on the movement by Yugoslavia, which has close relationships with a lot of Non-Aligned nations; thus, North Korean Foreign Minister, Heo Dam was sent to Yugoslavia. Most of the conversation with Ho was centered on the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. Yugoslavia told Ho that the Non-Aligned Movement should be independent of "bloc" and should not become "bloc" itself (i.e. should not bind members based on specific ideology). That is the only way that it would have a future, and this kind of thinking has been gaining increasing recognition among Non-Aligned countries.

Yugoslavia added that there is, however, an exception such as Cuba, which wants the movement to wield influence as a "bloc"; nevertheless, such is an extreme minority exception within the entire Non-Aligned movement.

3. North Korea completely agreed with Yugoslavia's idea mentioned above. North Korean Foreign Minister Ho stated that the Non-Aligned diplomacy is the primary policy of the North Korea's diplomacy and North Korea would like to contribute as most as possible to the development of the Non-Aligned Movement.

4. Additionally, North Korea asked Yugoslavian's support for North Korea's "initiative" in inter-Korean reunification. In response, Yugoslavia told that North Korea, Yugoslavia believes, had made constructive efforts as best as possible on that matter. For example, North Korea recognized the South Korean government as her "partner" of the negotiation, which signaled a "leap" that required considerable resolve on North Korea's part and this should be duly noted. Yugoslavia would not expect North Korea to do something more at this moment. (It implies that such "resolve" of North Korea, mentioned above, was exercised at the request of Yugoslavia.)

5. There was some mention about the political situation in Indochina. North Korea stated that she totally has the same attitude as that of Yugoslavia on the matter of the armed forces of Communist China's invasion of Vietnam. However, North Korea refrained from making such position public.

6. The full text of the joint statement is almost the same as what was reported in newspapers. Even though it assumed the format of an official visit, the meeting was mainly about the Non-Aligned Movement as mentioned above. It was thought to be needless to announce a joint statement; however, simple one was announced at the request of North Korea.

(A longer statement was avoided presumably because it would have touched on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.)\*

\* ( ) contains the presumption of the Japanese Embassy in Yugoslavia.

**Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, “Document regarding Forecasts on the North Korean Puppets' Foreign Loans from Western Countries and Its Redemption,” 19 April 1979**

[Source: “*Buk Han donghyang, 1979*” (“*Northern Trends, 1979*”), Roll 2009-35, File 18, Frames 25-37, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

The Korean Central Intelligence Agency

79. 4. 19

File No.: Beijing 400 – 1124

To : Minister of Foreign Affairs

From : Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency

Title : Document regarding Forecasts on the North Korean Puppets' Foreign Loans from Western Countries and Its Redemption

1. Enclosed is the document that was requested at the overseas mission meeting in the European countries. Please be advised to use it as relevant to each Ambassador's duties in the respective host country.

a. Title: Forecasts on the North Korean Puppets' Foreign Loan from Western Countries and Its Redemption

b. Recipients: Ambassadors in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the Holy See, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece

Enclosure: 7 copies of the document “Forecasts on the North Korean Puppets' Foreign Loan from Western Countries and Its Redemption”

Forecasts on the North Korean Puppets' Foreign Loans from Western Countries and Its Redemption

1. Scale of foreign loan

The North Korean puppets' foreign loan from Western countries is mainly machinery and equipment loan on a deferred payment. It is estimated to be \$1.3 billion including \$730 million overdue balance as of the end of 1977, which mainly come from Japan, France, West Germany, Sweden, etc., reaching up to \$1 billion. (table 1 – 2)

2. Causes of Debt Accumulation

a. Because communist countries including the Soviet Union have reduced their assistance for the production facilities and technology of the North Korean puppets since the 1970s, the North Korean puppets have consequently lagged behind its schedule for economic development.

b. Also, the North Korean puppets' economic development centered on raw materials, engineers and production facilities, has run its course, which jeopardized the fulfillment of the Six-Year Economic Development Plan from 1971 to 1976; thus, it is inevitable for the North Korean puppets to introduce advanced technology and facilities from Western countries.

c. Therefore, the North Korean puppet regime has introduced considerable facilities from Western countries to implement the Six-Year Economic Development plan.

i. However, its absolute shortage of cash income and inexperience in international financial transaction has weakened its flexibility and adaptability in the international balance of payments.

ii. In particular, as the global economy has depressed due to natural resources shock since the end of 1973, the North Korean puppets' export markets for mineral resources including its major export items such as lead, zinc, iron ore, etc., as well as metal goods have decreased, and as a result, their prices have fallen; this has presented problems for the North Korean puppets' export plans.

iii. The North Korean puppets' foreign debt incurred on loans from Western countries increased due to additional pressures stemming from the difficulties in overseas transportation (ships and seaports) as well as rising charterage fees and import prices.

### 3. Attempts to Defer Foreign Loan Payment

a. When the capability of the North Korean puppets for loan repayment came to its limit by the end of 1974, twelve Western creditor countries including Japan, West Germany, and England gathered three times in [illegible], Paris, discussed how to collect loan, and decided to “take joint steps in order to collect bonds of North Korea.” (table 3)

b. In line with them, Western creditor banks gathered in Paris in March 1977 and agreed on postponing some of the North Korean puppets' loan repayment for seven years (1978 – 1984) as financing loan (table 4), equivalent to \$478 million.

c. From June 1975 through February 1978, the North Korean puppets separately contacted nine creditor countries including England, France, Japan, and Sweden, negotiated with them the deferred payment, and succeeded in agreeing on it for 1 – 4 years with them. (table 5)

d. The following is the amount of the North Korean puppets' payment estimated by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, based on the North Korean puppets' agreement of deferred payment with Western countries:

#### Estimated Payment of the North Korean puppets' foreign loan from Western countries

(unit: million dollars)

Year	Principal	Interest	Total
1978	144	101	245
1979	189	89	278
1980	235	75	310
1981	279	57	336
1982	226	35	261
1983	226	17	243
Total	1,299	374	1,673

4. The North Korean puppet regime's movement to negotiate the postponement of overdue payment

a. The North Korean puppet regime has been unable to meet the payment schedule previously agreed upon with creditor countries and they, in turn, have frequently pressed for principal payment.

b. Therefore, the North Korean puppet regime has actively pursued negotiations with Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, England, Japan, and the Netherlands for the postponement of overdue payments since the beginning of the year 1978; however, no common ground has been reached except for the negotiations with the Netherlands (table 6).

#### 5. Forecasts on the Redemption of Foreign Loans

a. The North Korean puppet regime cannot but adopt advanced technology and equipment from Western countries in order to fulfill the 2<sup>nd</sup> Seven-Year Economic Development Plan (1978 - 1984); however, its inability to redeem foreign loans has been the biggest stumbling block.

b. Therefore, Kim Il Sung, in an unprecedented move, proposed a trade expansion policy that is primarily aimed at boosting credit in his 1979 New Year Address. In this connection, the North Korean puppets have made the following efforts:

i. Intensively promoting the production of its six major export items—lead, zinc, iron ore, cement, magnesium clinker, and anthracite.

ii. Making a departure from trading mainly with communist countries and Japan to diversifying export/import markets to include countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Central and South America in order to acquire more foreign currency.

iii. Focusing on attracting "oil dollars" from oil-producing countries in the Middle East, particularly, from Iraq, Libya, and Kuwait.

c. Because the North Korean puppets, however, cannot expect drastic increase in export at this moment, they are expected to:

i. strengthen economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and Communist China as well as Western countries

ii. pay some of the urgent principals in order to bring in advanced equipment from Western countries and recover its credit.

iii. and try to postpone its large overdue repayment once again. In this connection, the North Korean puppet's move towards cooperation with the West require special attention.



**Letter to Mr. Murray from J.T. Masefield, “World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang,” 19 April 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, “Relations Between North & South Korea,” National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

Mr Murray

**WORLD TABLE TENNIS CHAMPIONSHIPS IN PYONGYANG**

Problem

1. The North Koreans have refused to allow visas for the South Korean team to participate in the “World Table Tennis Championships” to be held in Pyongyang from 25 April to 6 May (the Israelis have been similarly barred). The South Koreans have approached the Hong Kong Government to seek their support in order to persuade the North Koreans to reverse their decision (see attached Telno 470 from Hong Kong).

Background and Argument

2. The World Championships are held under the auspices of the International Table Tennis Federation, to which national Table Tennis Associations are affiliated. The decision to hold the 1979 Championships in Pyongyang was approved by a large majority of the national delegations, after the North Koreans had given assurances that all member countries of the ITTF would be allowed to participate in accordance with ITTF regulations. (South Korea and Israel were specifically mentioned in this context).

3. In the meantime, following the North’s apparently forthcoming response to President Park’s call for a renewal of the dialogue between North and South Korea in January, the North Koreans proposed the formation of a joint North/South Korean table tennis team. Several meetings between the respective table tennis associations were held before deadlock resulted: this was because the South Koreans believed a joint team would be impractical, and because the North Koreans refused to give an assurance that a separate South Korean team would be admitted to North Korea. It appears that the North’s tactics were designed to find a means of denying the ROK team entry while making it appear the result of the South’s unreasonableness.

4. Britain is to be represented by three separate teams (English, Welsh and Scottish). The English Table Tennis have told us that they intend to travel to Pyongyang despite North Korea’s decision to exclude South Korea and Israel. Their view (which is probably shared by the Welsh and Scottish associations) is that it is for the ITTF to consider what action to take if North Korea persists in breaking ITTF regulations in this way. They expect an ITTF meeting to be convened once the teams have assembled in Pyongyang, and have said that they would support any motion which called for changing the title of the Championships from the “World Table Tennis Championships” to the “Korean Table Tennis Championships”. If such a change in the title is made, they would wish to compete as planned.

5. The problem with the ETTA's approach is twofold. First, it is likely that the majority of the other member countries will acquiesce in the North Koreans' action. (The ITTF is heavily dominated by communist and third world countries). Second, the ITTF would be at the psychological disadvantage at any meeting in North Korea. Transport to and from Pyongyang is being managed by the North Koreans by means of charter flights. Member countries pulling out of the Championships could find that they were unable to get home before the end of the Championship.

6. HMG's influence is limited. The British teams leave for Geneva (where they are to pick up the North Korean charter flights) tomorrow morning. While the Sports Council (an independent body wholly funded by the Government) has given an undertaking that a grant would be available to enable the British teams to compete, both they and the Department of the Environment adhere to the basic principle that politics should be kept out of sport (the only exception to this rule has been South Africa). Moreover, as three separate teams are involved the question would need to be referred to the Welsh and Scottish Sports Councils and to the Welsh and Scottish Offices. This would not be possible before the teams depart for Pyongyang. While we understand that the money has not yet changed hands, it would clearly be very awkward if the grants were to be withheld after the expense of travelling to Pyongyang had already been incurred.

7. The view which the Department has adopted in informal discussions hitherto is that it is for the ITTF and not the national governments to sort the matter out, a line with which the Department of the Environment agree. We understand that the Canadians, the Norwegians, the French, the Germans, the Australians and the Italians all intend to send teams to North Korea notwithstanding the regime's action (we have been unable to ascertain what the Americans intend to do).

#### RECOMMENDATION

8. At this stage there seems to be little we can do to prevent the ETTA and the other UK teams from participating and strong general policy grounds for not becoming involved. I therefore recommend that we reply to Telno 470 from Hong Kong along the lines of a draft which I now submit. Hong Kong and General Department, Cultural Relations Department and the Department of the Environment have been consulted.

9. If the ITTF meeting in Pyongyang does not lead to the admission of the Israeli and South Korean teams I believe that we should make the Government's views known to the ITTF, either directly or via the ETTA. We could ask the Federation in turn to make our views known to its members. This would get round the recognition problem and would serve as a warning to other countries, e.g. the Russians in connection with the Moscow Olympics. We could easily encourage likeminded countries to take similar action. However, we shall submit again on this point in the light of developments in Pyongyang.

(signature)

J T Masefield

Far Eastern Department

19 April 1979

[...]

## **“Korea Status Report,” May 1979**

*[Source: “Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0026-04, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

### Korea Status Report

#### The Talks

-- The two sides remained deadlocked on the status of the delegations although each has modified its original position. The South now propose that the two sides hold “working-level contacts” with the next meeting on 28 March. The North proposes, instead, that the meetings should be between “liaison delegations of the political parties, public organizations and authorities” with the next meeting on 5 April. It remains open if and when a further meeting will take place but the contacts seem likely to continue.

-- While the official statements made by both sides sound harsh, the atmosphere has been quite good. Both sides have given the contacts low-key domestic coverage and avoided raising great expectations. The North, while continuing to broadcast criticism of the South, has honored its commitment to end propaganda attacks. The North also reacted with relative moderation (compared to previous years) to the joint US-ROK military maneuvers which began on 1 March. The DPRK might have used them as a ground for breaking off the talks, had I t been so inclined.

#### Ping-pong Diplomacy

-- Simultaneously with the political contacts, talks have taken place in Panmunjom between the Table Tennis Associations of the North and the South concerning Korean participation in the World Table Tennis Championships which will be held in Pyongyang on 25 April. The North has proposed a United Korean team. The South, while not rejecting the idea, has insisted that the South Korean Tennis Team participate, in any event, as such.

-- The ping-pong discussions have attracted attention because of the role of ping-pong in opening the way for broader US-Chinese contacts. The South has had some difficulty dealing with the issue since while publicly favoring reunification, it does not wish to lend credence to a one Korea concept with joint international representation. A unified team now seems ruled out and the South is suggesting a North-South tournament as a means of encouraging cooperation.

#### Prospects

-- The South is interested – at least to some limited degree – in a “German style” arrangement in Korea. The North rejects the concept, as such. It should be possible to find middle ground that would meet some of the interests of both sides and the generally favorable atmosphere suggests both sides are interested in exploring possibilities. So far, however, substance has not been touched and until it is, no assessment can be made of the prospects of establishing a more stable relationship on the peninsula.

**Main Points of the Talks with Foreign Minister Ho Dam of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 May 1979**

*[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0081-03, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

bf: RA/AR  
cc: Mr. Urquhart  
Mr. Sutterlin

CONFIDENTIAL

Main points of the talks with Foreign Minister Ho Dam of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 May 1979

1. Replacement of armistice agreement

- This question (as opposed to reunification as such and other problems) can only be negotiated between the DPRK and the US. The armistice agreement was signed by the American UN Commander and the RK did not recognize it. For legal and practical reasons (the American Commander is also the Commander of the 8th US Army) the disarmament agreement has to be replaced by an agreement with the US.
- The DPRK proposed negotiation with the US 5 years ago. The US has so far not replied and has raised preconditions to such talks.
- The DPRK is prepared to meet with US at any time, at any place and at any level.
- Once the talks between the DPRK and the US have started the further procedure and the question of further participation can be discussed. In view of China's position the question of quadripartite negotiations does not arise.
- If the US abandon its hostile policy it could have good relations with the DPRK. There is no danger that a unified Korea falls into the zone of influence of another power; she will always be non-aligned.
- The Secretary-General is asked to convey the above to the US and to lend his assistance in the contacts between the DPRK and the US.

2. Dialogue between the DPRK and the RK

- The DPRK wants reunification by peaceful means through negotiations.
- Reunification should be achieved by the Koreans themselves, without any outside interference.

- The main difficulty in the dialogue stems from the different basic positions: the DPRK wants reunification, the RK (and the US) is not sincere about it and really wants to cement the division (separate UN membership, parallel recognition of both governments).

- The dialogue has to take place on a broad basis. The DPRK is not opposed to talks between the governments, but reunification concerns the entire nation and all must be involved in finding a solution. It is not understandable why the RK rejects this, if her policy is supported by her people. What is she afraid of? Wide strata of the people in the south object to the DPRK dealing with President Park's government only.

### 3. Role of the Secretary-General

- The DPRK requests the Secretary-General to convey to the US Government the wish of the DPRK to enter into negotiations with the aim of replacing the armistice agreement by another agreement. He is also asked in a general way to be of assistance in the contacts with the US.

- There is nothing which the DPRK Government would request the S.G. to convey to the RK; in what way the SG talks to the RK is, of course, up to him. If he considers it helpful and in the interest of reunification he can discuss the situation with the RK taking into account the DPRK's position as explained.

- In his talks with the RK, the S.G. may convey the sincerity of the DPRK's policy towards a negotiated realization of national reunification. It would be very desirable to renew the North-South dialogue (this statement was made at the end of the meeting).

- If the DPRK sees any concrete matter in which she would need the S.G.'s assistance, she will not hesitate to approach him in the future.

**Main Points Made by Foreign Minister Jong Jin Park of the Republic of Korea during the Meeting with the Secretary-General on 4 May 1979 at 5 p.m. in Seoul**

*[Source: "Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0026-04, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

bf: Mr. R. Ahmed

CONFIDENTIAL

Main Points made by Foreign Minister Jong Jin Park of the Republic of Korea during the meeting with the Secretary-General on 4 May 1979 at 5 p.m. in Seoul

- The main problem during the recent resumption of the talks was the status of the DPRK's representatives. The DPRK delegation should have official status. The Government can appoint whomever it wants, but they have to be authorized representatives.
- The DPRK is not sincere in its desire to negotiate. Her positive reply to President Park's initiative of 19 January was only intended for propaganda purposes. There are many contradictions between what the DPRK says and what she does.
- The three principles announced in the ROK's proposal for unification of August 1974 and the announcement of the June 1973 constitute the "back-bone" of the ROK's policy with regard to the Korean question.
- The people of the ROK prefer no unification to unification under communist rule.
- The attempt of the DPRK to negotiate directly with the US and thus to ignore the 36 million people of the ROK is absurd. President Tito has inquired with the DPRK last year whether she would accept tripartite meetings, but he never received a response.
- His Government often wonders whether Kim Il Sung is being properly informed of international developments and of what his negotiators are doing. This is very dangerous since it can lead to misjudgments on Kim's part.

\*\*\*\*\*

At the end of the meeting it was agreed that the UN would inform the press along the following lines:

The Secretary-General informed the Foreign Minister about his talks in Pyongyang and the Foreign Minister explained the position of the ROK. Possibilities were discussed in order to overcome the actual stalemate in the negotiation process. The talks have helped the Secretary-General to better understand the situation and the discussions would be continued with the President tomorrow.

**United Nations Press Release, “Secretary-General Holds Talks with Acting Prime Minister of Japan and Foreign Minister of Korea during Visits to Tokyo and Seoul,” 4 May 1979**

*[Source: “Seoul, Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0987-0008-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

United Nations Press Release  
Department of Public Information  
Press Section  
United Nations, New York

SG/T/897  
4 May 1979

**SECRETARY-GENERAL HOLDS TALKS WITH ACTING PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN  
AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF KOREA DURING VISITS TO TOKYO AND SEOUL**

[...]

The Secretary-General arrived this afternoon in Seoul for a two-day visit to the Republic of Korea. The Secretary-General was met at the airport by Foreign Minister Tong Jin Park of the Republic of Korea.

Immediately upon arrival, the Secretary-General went to the Foreign Ministry for two hours of talks with Tong Jin Park which focused entirely on the question of Korea in the light of the Secretary-General’s recent visit to Pyongyang. Following the meeting, a spokesman for the Secretary-General said Mr. Waldheim had informed the Foreign Minister of the impressions he had formed during his talks with President Kim Il Sung and Foreign Minister Ho Dam in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. For his part, the Foreign Minister gave the Secretary-General the views of his Government on the Korean problem. The possibilities for overcoming the present stalemate in the bilateral talks between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were discussed. The Secretary-General felt that his discussions had helped him to understand better the position of the South Korean Government.

The talks will resume tomorrow, 5 May, at 11 a.m. local time, with President Park Chung Hee, who will later give a luncheon in honour of the Secretary-General.

[...]



**Teleletter to P.R. Whiteway from W. Morris, “Visit of the U.N. Secretary-General to North and South Korea,” 11 May 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, Relations Between North & South Korea, 'National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

[...]

Teleletter

From W Morris, Seoul

021/1 11 May 1979

Following P R Whiteway [illegible]  
Miss S Harden, MBE, UKMIS New York  
Chancery, Washington  
Chancery, Tokyo  
Chancery, Moscow

Visit of the U.N. Secretary-General to North and South Korea

1. The visits that Dr Waldheim paid to Pyongyang, 2-3 May, and Seoul, 4-6 May, have been widely reported and the Secretary-General and the 21 strong party of officials and newsmen who accompanied him will doubtless be conveying their own impressions in New York. The following comments and observations may however be helpful.

2. North Korea: According to western news agency reports from Pyongyang Dr Waldheim told reporters that on the question of a dialogue between the two Koreas Kim Il Sung showed “a certain flexibility”. He described his talks which included one hour with Kim and three with Ho Dam as having gone “better than expected”. Later, on the flight from Pyongyang to Tokyo, where he stopped over for a night, he told reporters that his talks had touched on finding some new arrangements to replace the armistice agreement and on the wider issue of reunification. He also quoted Kim as having said that the North “would never attack South Korea”.

3. At a farewell lunch given by Kim on 3 May Dr Waldheim said, according to a North Korean broadcast, that there was “full understanding that only the Korean people can resolve the problem of the division of their country....I also assure you that I stand ready to assist in whatever way possible in advancing the negotiating process...Every endeavor must be made to find a negotiated settlement in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, in particular, respect for the territorial integrity, independence and political sovereignty of all states, non-interference in internal affairs and the non-use of force”.

4. South Korea: Dr Waldheim met with President Park for three and a half hours and with the Foreign Minister for one hour. According to the Presidential Spokesman Dr Waldheim briefed the President on his Pyongyang trip and discussed possible methods of reanimating the South-North dialogue. President Park for his part explained the ROK’s peace formula including the

conclusion of a non-aggression pact and simultaneous entry to the UN of South and North Korea. Dr Waldheim again made it clear that he would assist in whatever way possible in advancing the negotiating process. He described the talks as constructive and frank.

5. At a press conference before leaving Seoul Dr Waldheim was asked where things stood. It was agreed by both President Park and Kim Il Sung, he said to continue this dialogue, this peace effort, through their Observers at the UN. He said that both sides had indicated that they wanted to keep in touch with him. These contacts would be on a “discreet, personal basis” and not with the UN as a specific body. The precise method was still to be determined.

6. ROK reaction: Now that the visit is over everyone is asking themselves what progress, if any, has been made. Soon after Dr Waldheim’s departure the ROK Foreign Minister told journalists that, while he thought the exercise had been useful, it was premature and difficult to count on any concrete and immediate outcome. Dr Waldheim, he said, had found that one point on which the ROK and North Korea widely differed was the crucial question of how to proceed in their bilateral dialogue, the ROK wanting gradual step by step progress while the North favoured the all embracing [sic] approaching.

7. The Director of the MFA’s UN Division, Chang Sun Sup, made a few additional comments when I called on him on 10 May. The ROK he said took some of Kim Il Sung’s more conciliatory remarks with a pinch of salt. Dr Waldheim had told Foreign Minister Park that although Kim appeared to show some flexibility Ho Dam was absolutely rigid in his approach, insisting that before any progress could be made all US troops in the South had to go, and totally ruling out simultaneous entry to the UN of the two Koreas. Dr Waldheim had apparently told the North Koreans that in his view no dialogue between North Korea and the US could be carried out over the head of the ROK.

8. Comment: Dr Waldheim did not (last word underlined) visit the Korean Peninsula in any kind of trouble-shooting role or with any special mission. He came as part of extensive Asian tour which could hardly have avoided including the two Koreas. Nonetheless the visit will have given him an unprecedented opportunity to see something of the Korean situation at first hand, and his offer to put himself personally at this disposal of the two sides in New York can have done no harm. A cartoon in Dong-A Ilbo last week showed Dr Waldheim holding in each hand a long pole with a glove at the end. President Park is warmly shaking hands at the end of one pole, while Kim Il Sung is doing likewise at the end of the other. If only this much can be achieved between the two Korean missions in New York then some good will have come out of Dr Waldheim’s visit. No one here though will forecast even this much with any confidence.

9. Miscellaneous: While visiting the ROK Dr Waldheim turned down an opportunity to visit a front-line area and, apparently because of a stomach upset, was unable to attend a dinner given by the UN Association.

10. Red Registry please pass to Washington and New York and copy to Research Dept, FCO and MODUK D14. Also other FCO departments as necessary.

W Morris

NNNN

**“Notes on a Meeting in Seoul on 5 May 1979, 10:30 – 12:30 AM,” 21 May 1979**

*[Source: “Representatives and Observers to the United Nations - Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0907-0012-15, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

File: Korea

Xref: Trip

FMG/EF  
cc: Mr. Sutterlin  
bf: RA/AR

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON A MEETING IN SEOUL ON 5 MAY 1979, 10:30 – 12:30 AM

Present:

The Secretary-General  
Mr. R. Ahmed  
Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grünbuhel (signature)  
Mr. F. Giuliani

President Park Chung Hee  
Foreign Minister Park Tong-Jin  
Ambassador Yun, Permanent Observer  
One official

Following an exchange of courtesies the Secretary-General briefed President Park about his talks in Vietnam and China concerning the situation in Indo-China. With regard to Korea he stressed that China apparently was interested to keep the situation in the Peninsula quiet for the time being. Vice Premier Deng, in particular, had indicated that an attack of the DPRK against the ROK was unlikely.

The Secretary-General then gave an extensive account of his talks in Pyongyang. He referred to the difficulties which originally had arisen over the visit to the DPRK. In his very extensive meeting with the Foreign Minister he hardly had noticed any change of North Korea's well-known position regarding the Korean problem. The talks with President Kim Il Sung had yielded a substantially different picture. The President had accepted his thesis that neither of the two sides could be expected to give up their respective social system. It would therefore be necessary to take a pragmatic and practical approach which would take account of this. What should be achieved was a stabilizing modus vivendi, some loose framework of unification which would enable the resumption of economic and cultural ties. President Kim who had accepted this idea had said repeatedly that he did not want to force his country's system on the South. What he wanted was peaceful reunification.

With regard to the procedural aspects, in particular, who should participate in the negotiations to replace the Armistice Agreement, President Kim had shown some flexibility. He

did not exclude the participation of the ROK and stressed that he had never been given a chance to discuss this subject with the Americans. What he apparently had in mind were discreet contacts with the United States in which he then would accept trilateral talks. Kim Il Sung had said that he would even make concessions once the South accepted the principle of reunification.

As to the Secretary-General's role President Kim had been rather positive. He had not been against the Secretary-General's concrete suggestions in this regard (Observer, channel of communications) but had said that his Government needed more time to study these proposals and an answer would be given later on.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General said that although the principal positions appeared unchanged President Kim shown some flexibility. Given the new political and strategic developments in Asia it was his feeling that the present situation should be used in order to make renewed efforts for a South-North dialogue.

President Park briefly reviewed the history of the United Nations involvement in Korea, mentioning inter alia that the United Nations had recognized the Government of the ROK as the only lawful Government in Korea. Even now, 25 years after the unprovoked attack of the North against the South the DPRK maintained that the war was a result of a Southern provocation. Such falsification of history caused grave doubts about the sincerity of the other side. In her many dealings with the North over the years the ROK had found out that President Kim's Government was not sincere. The statistics by the UN Command showed more than 4,000 violations of the Armistice Agreement since it had entered into force. He gave further examples of Northern war preparations against the South such as the digging of tunnels. Even when the two sides were negotiating the Joint Communiqué of 1972 the North was busily engaged in building these tunnels.

In such a situation, unification was not an easy task. The most reasonable and practical approach was to start with the easiest problems in order to make some progress in reducing the existing tension. The Northern concept of starting with the basic political problem which would later automatically solve all other issues was illogical. Given the present situation, reunification might realistically take place in hundred to two hundred years. But everything should be done to avoid hostilities and a fratricidal war. Peace to come first, then reunification. If the two sides would agree on a federation or a similar concept this would only increase the risk of war.

The Northern proposal of a whole nation congress was impractical. He was convinced that the North still thought of unifying the country under its ideology, if necessary, by use of force. Therefore the South had to maintain strong armed forces in order to repel any aggression. At the same time it made all efforts to continue the dialogue in order to dissolve mistrust and tension.

However, in this dialogue the South wanted to deal only with authorized representatives, not with the envoys of some unknown social organizations. As to the replacement of the Armistice Agreement it should be kept in mind that treaties existed in order to be abided by. The present agreement was enough to prevent hostilities but the North had violated it on numerous occasions. Any new agreement would have to contain safeguards to guarantee that it will be kept.

It was obvious that the South had to be immediately involved in any agreement to replace the Armistice Agreement. The forces of the South vastly exceeded those of the UN Command. In wanting to negotiate with the United States only, the DPRK might be thinking of the Vietnamese example. A replacement of the Armistice Agreement might of course in the DPRK's view entail the loss of justification for the presence of U.S. forces in the ROK. But it should be kept in mind that the American forces were stationed in the ROK on the basis of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

In spite of all difficulties the ROK did not lose hope and would continue to negotiate with patience and perseverance. The President welcomed the Secretary-General's suggestion to appoint an observer to the dialogue who could be in many ways of practical assistance, for example in calling meetings between the two authorities at the UN headquarters or in Geneva. The talks in Pamunjom had always been very unpleasant with the Northern representatives shouting at and threatening the Southern delegation. A change of venue would be welcome.

The Secretary-General ascertained the correctness of his understanding that the President agreed to his nominating an observer to facilitate the holding of talks between the two sides and the negotiations of an agreement replacing the Armistice Agreement.

The President made clear that his side was not very interested in trilateral talks about the Armistice Agreement. The South-North dialogue was more important, in it the question of the replacement of the Armistice Agreement could be taken up.

He felt that the positions were still wide apart but they seemed to have moved closer in one point, namely the Secretary-General's good offices. Maybe this was a basis for future efforts. However, when the North agreed with this suggestion it should be made clear that both sides should send properly authorized officials. Otherwise a meeting would be meaningless.

He would make Ambassador Yun responsible for any further contacts with the Secretary-General.

In conclusion, it was agreed that the idea of the appointment of an Observer should not be mentioned to the press.

21 May 1979

**Letter from J.S. Wall to Mr. Samuel, "Secretary of State's Talks with Mr Vance: North Korea," 23 May 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," *The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.*]

Mr Samuel (FED)

Secretary of State's Talks with Mr Vance:  
North Korea

Mr Vance told the Secretary of State this morning that the North Koreans were pressing the Americans to have talks. The United States would not agree to do so unless the South Koreans wanted it. The Americans proposed to ask the South Koreans whether they were interested in a 3-way meeting. North Korean motives were probably that they felt an offer of talks would throw the South Koreans offside since hitherto the initiative had been taken by the South Koreans in an attempt to get bilateral talks going which, from the North Korean point of view, would have implied recognition by them of South Korea's separate existence. Re-unification remained North Korea's ultimate objective.

[signature]  
(JS Wall)

23 May 1979

[...]

**Memorandum From Michel Oksenberg and Nicholas Platt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), 24 May 1979**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 882-883.]*

Washington, May 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Beijing, Taipei, and the Korean Issue

It is by no means certain that the Chinese will be willing to exercise much leverage, even behind the scenes, to produce a flexible North Korean posture during any trilateral talks among Pyongyang, Seoul, and Washington.

Beyond that, the major incentive for South Korea to participate meaningfully in such talks would be the knowledge that as a result of those talks, South Korea could expect to initiate contacts with Beijing. South Korea, as you know, would like to enter into a constructive relationship with the PRC, at least in the economic realm.

It is highly unlikely that China at this stage is prepared to reciprocate the Seoul desire.

What incentive could we offer Beijing to encourage it to initiate contacts with Seoul? I believe the route is through Taipei. China has long seen a parallel between the North Korea–South Korea “civil war” and their own relationship with Taipei. They fear any policy they pursue toward South Korea would set a precedent for their Taiwan policy. If they are willing to accept the “two Korea” solution, why not “two Chinas?” the argument goes.

In addition, the Chinese would like to get talks going with Taipei and would hope that we could play a role there.

We believe it is worth considering our indicating to Beijing that we would be prepared to encourage Taipei to adopt a more forthcoming attitude toward contacts with China—particularly in the trade realm—in exchange for the PRC initiating economic contacts with South Korea. Naturally, the proposition would have to be put in more delicate terms.

We would have to think carefully about the combination of pressures and incentives we would have to apply in Taipei to get it to initiate contacts with Beijing. One source of leverage which we have over Taiwan, of course, is arms sales. And those arms sales would go down a good deal easier in Beijing if they were to take place after Taipei had somewhat relaxed its position of “no trade with Communist China.”

In short, the specific proposal we have to make is this: When we request the Chinese to assist in establishing trilateral talks with North Korea, we indicate that South Korea proceeds on the assumption that one result of the talks will be the initiation of economic contact with the PRC. In the event such contacts develop, the U.S. would also be prepared to try to encourage Taiwan to develop economic contacts with the PRC as well.



*Recommendation:*

That you approve our developing this idea in more concrete form among the East Asian Group.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Brzezinski did not check either the Approve or Disapprove option. Instead, he wrote, “Doubtful line—I am troubled by the [parallel]. (What about the summit idea—where does this stand?) ZB.”

**Telegram to the American Embassy in Seoul, "Coordination of Initiative with President Park to Reduce Tensions on the Korean Peninsula," 29 May 1979**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item

KO00298. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemImage.do?queryType=cat&ResultsID=13E6129B5591&ItemID=CKO00298&ItemNumber=78.>]

TO: AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

[...]

SUBJECT: Coordination of Initiative with President Park to Reduce Tensions on the Korean Peninsula

1. The President would like his forthcoming visit to Korea to result in a joint US-ROK proposal for tripartite summit talks with North Korea to test Pyongyang's willingness to adjust its policies and deal with practical measures for the reduction of tensions in the area.
2. Both we and the ROKG have agreed that the question of a North-South Korean dialogue and future policies on the peninsula should be part of our summit agenda; in addition to security relations, Korean economic growth, and human rights.
3. You should therefore seek a meeting with President Park to inform him of the importance with which the President views his forthcoming discussions, particularly an initiative to reduce tensions on the peninsula. Tell President Park that the President has instructed you to consult with him in advance to seek to work out the outlines of a joint proposal which could be announced by the two Presidents.
4. Assure Park that we recognize that the obstacle to reducing tension has been in Pyongyang, not in Seoul, and that we will stand fast on our commitment not to deal directly with Pyongyang without the participation of the ROK. We know that North Korea has avoided even taking the step that they agreed to in 1972 for talks between recognized government authorities. Our mutual ROK-US position has been that we are of course willing to meet with the North Koreans as long as the ROK is a full and equal partner to any such discussions and both Korean parties desire U.S. participation.
5. The President feels that the U.S. and ROK should seize the diplomatic initiative from Pyongyang and test whether Kim Il-sung is prepared to make the policy adjustments which the changing international framework and Korea's own economic difficulties would seem to dictate. One way to proceed would be for the two Presidents in Seoul to propose a *high level* tripartite summit meeting to ~~Kim Il-sung~~.
6. You should assure Park that we will remain firm in rebuffing manipulative proposals from North Korea or to allies which would in any way exclude the ROK or undercut its position, but that the time appears right to stand together in testing North Korean readiness to have a reasonable dialogue with both of us.

7. You may tell Park that the President understands the ~~linkage~~ *connection* between the ~~troop withdrawal~~ *security* issue and ROK's willingness to take diplomatic risks in dealing with North Korea. ~~The President is considering adjustments in the U.S. ground force withdrawal program in response to our current appreciation of North Korean force buildups.~~ The summit in Seoul will afford an opportunity for the two Presidents to establish a personal dialogue and discuss the security issues of prime importance to the Republic of Korea.

## **“Korea – Unproductive North-South Contacts,” June 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, Relations Between North & South Korea, National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

June 1979

### KOREA – UNPRODUCTIVE NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS

When President Carter visits Seoul at the end of June, he is unlikely to find any easing of tensions between North and South Korea.

Private citizens of South Korea have had no communication with the North, whether or not they have relatives there, since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Various attempts to open a dialogue that might lead to a peace treaty and reunification have broken down – recently mainly because of the North’s requirements about who should represent the South in any negotiations. The South Korean Government, meanwhile, remains anxious about the indications that Kim Il Sung – in power in the North since 1949 – still hopes to bring the whole of Korea under his rule. A North Korean official made it clear on 10 May 1979 that the North's latest reunification proposals envisaged Kim leading a unified country.

During his Asian tour in April and early May 1979, the UN Secretary-General, Dr Waldheim, visited both Pyongyang and Seoul. On 5 May he told reporters in Seoul that North and South Korea had agreed to open a new channel of communication – through their respective observers at the UN. But no progress seems to have been made, though he also saw some movement on the procedural question of who would represent the two sides at any peace talks. This was the factor which halted the latest attempts to establish a dialogue; disagreements over the titles and standing of the proposed delegations resulted in the contacts being broken off early in April. In addition, the North Korean authorities prevented South Koreans (and Israelis) from taking part in the World Table Tennis Championships in Pyongyang at the end of April. They suggested the formation of a joint Korean team – but too late for this to be a realistic proposition – and refused to grant visas for a South Korean team. [Note—the word “expand” is handwritten in the margins]

The presence of many foreign journalists in Pyongyang for the championships prompted the North Koreans to seek new publicity for their case and to denounce US activities in the area. At the same time they reverted to the idea of talking to US officials before becoming involved in a dialogue with the South Koreans. In interviews with Western and Japanese journalists in Pyongyang (7-10 May 1979), Kim Yong Nam, a member of the North Korean Workers’ Party Politburo, suggested that the South could take part in trilateral or multilateral talks after North Korea had opened negotiations with the United States to “settle differences”. He claimed that his country had no interest in imposing its “Socialist system” on the South and said that the North and South might form a confederation to precede reunification as one way forward. A South Korean official commented on 9 May that North Korea’s idea of including the South in talks after the negotiations of a peace pact with the US gave no signal of any change of attitude towards the South.

The impression of deadlock was confirmed by a “Commentator” article in the North Korean party newspaper Nodong Sinmun on 10 May, accusing the United States of “hasting war preparations against our country, especially preparations for a nuclear war”. US arms reinforcement and air exercises in South Korea threw a “dark shadow” on the North-South dialogue, it asserted, and the South Koreans were obstructing a settlement; if the United States “truly” wanted peaceful reunification, it should withdraw from South Korea. A major reason for the hardening of the North Korean line seems to be the reaffirmation of US support for the South in the form of recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other votes in favour of military and economic assistance for South Korea in 1980.

### Abortive 1972 agreement

The first peaceful contacts between North and South Korea after the war of 1950-53 came in 1971 when the two sides' Red Cross organisations initiated a series of meetings. Officials joined the talks and a joint communiqué was issued on 4 July 1972 outlining possible steps towards reunification. Hostilities were renounced and undertakings given for the avoidance of clashes in the Demilitarised Military Zone (DMZ). Agreement was reached on the setting up of a South-North Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) with official representatives from both sides and for a “hot line” between the two capitals.

Virtual deadlock was soon reached, however, and mutual recriminations resumed. The SNCC stopped meeting after 1973. The North Koreans became increasingly insistent that they could only talk to the UN Command and after the withdrawal of American troops from the South. A proposal for a non-aggression treaty by President Park Chung Hee of South Korea in January 1974 was rejected by the North, and the direct telephone link was suspended in 1976.

On 19 January 1979, shortly after the formal agreement between China and the United States to renew diplomatic relations, President Park called for the resumption of discussions between North and South Korea. Representatives from the South were ready to meet their counterparts “at any time, at any place and at any level”, he said, with the aim of preventing war and achieving prosperity and reunification. The North’s response was speedy and in general positive. The Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF – a front organisation) welcomed President Park’s proposal (Pyongyang Radio, 23 January), though its suggestions about who should take part in the talks were clearly unacceptable to the South. It called, not for talks at official level, but for the convening of a “National Congress” of 700 to 1,500 representatives of “all political parties and groups” in North and South with a preliminary meeting in Pyongyang in June. And while the North Korean statement recognised President Park’s right to attend such a congress, this would be as head of his Democratic Republican Party, not of the government. More promising was the lack of preconditions in the North Korean proposals by comparison with those of 1973, which had included demands for the abolition of the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law in South Korea before negotiations could begin.

In a reply on 26 January 1979, the South Korean Minister of Culture and Information insisted that preliminary meetings must be between “the responsible authorities only” of the two

sides. His government sees little purpose in dealing with North Korean “front” bodies which are in no position to conclude binding agreements.

Following further exchanges, the two sides eventually met in Panmunjom (in the DMZ) on 17 February. The four South Korean delegates were members of the South-North Coordinating Committee, but those from North Korea were described as “liaison delegates of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland”. The South Korean delegation urged the North to reactivate the SNCC in accordance with the 1972 communiqué and to reopen the direct telephone link between Seoul and Pyongyang. The North Koreans said that each side should nominate a liaison team of four to help organise a national unification preparatory committee – thus indicating that a large-scale conference was still their aim. Although the talks were amicable, the only agreement reached was for the two sides to meet again on 7 March. On this occasion, the North Koreans declared openly that they regarded the SNCC as “redundant”, while the South said that it could not accept the DFRF as a “responsible authority” (South Korea’s leaders recall that it was the DFRF which called for a meeting of all political parties in June 1950 just before the North’s invasion of South Korea).

After a further meeting on 14 March, the exchanges became deadlocked on the question of representation, the head of the South Korean team reiterating on 2 April that “inter-Korean talks should be conducted between delegations appointed by the authorities”. A projected meeting on 10 April did not take place as the South Koreans refused to accept the North’s delegation – retitled but exactly the same in composition as previously – as authoritative. The atmosphere had also been affected by the North Koreans’ refusal to issue visas to a South Korean team for the table tennis championships at the end of April.

### North Korean motives

International developments, in particular the United States rapprochement with China, the possible withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and the changing political scene in Asia, no doubt influenced North Korea’s reactions to the South’s proposal for a dialogue. In 1978, President Carter had announced the gradual withdrawal of some of the 33,000 American ground troops in South Korea (under the UN Command), and the North Koreans would obviously like to encourage this by appearing cooperative and peace-loving. The US defence authorities disclosed early in 1979, however, that they had underestimated North Korea’s current ground forces by about 25 per cent (they totalled 600,000 rather than 430,000) and in mid-February President Carter said that he was halting the withdrawal of troops. The North Koreans probably still [Note—the words “no doubt” are handwritten above “probably] hope for a resumption of the withdrawals – which would put them in a stronger position to exert pressure on the South.

There is no evidence as to whether the Chinese had encouraged them to adopt a more flexible stand in January, though the North Koreans no doubt [Note—the word “presumably” is handwritten above “no doubt] realized that Korea would be discussed during Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Washington in January and February 1979. Although China publicly supports North Korean calls for the withdrawal of all US forces from the South, her leaders may see these forces as a stabilising factor in the area and would certainly prefer a reduction in tension between North and South to new polemics or clashes in the DMZ. The North Korean leaders for their part

have shown a shift towards Peking over the past year, moving away from their non-committed position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. They condemn “dominationism” – the equivalent of China’s target of “hegemonism” – and were sharply critical of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Deng Yingchao, a Chinese Politburo member, arrived on an “official friendly visit” to North Korea on 26 May and offered firm support for its “just cause”.

From an economic point of view, North Korea needs all the friends it can get. The current foreign trade debt amounts to about US\$2,000 million, the largest creditors being the Soviet Union, Japan and the West European countries. The North’s economy, meanwhile, is falling further behind that of the South. In 1978, the North’s estimated Gross National Product was about US\$10,000 million, compare with about \$46,000 million in the South. North Korea (population 17 million) is currently estimated to have a GNP per head of \$700, compared with \$1,242 in the South (population 37 million).

RELEASED IN FULL

CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

R29

Korea, described in proverb as the "shrimp among whales," is surrounded by states far more powerful than those on the peninsula. North and South Korea have found it necessary to form strong alliances with outside states, each with its own narrower interests on the peninsula, for both defense against the other Korean government and for economic development.

North Korea, created by Stalin and nurtured by Mao's China, served both communist giants for over two decades as a buffer against American military power in the Far East. Chinese and Soviet denunciations of U.S. troop presence and of the "puppet" ROK have been historically about equally strident. Increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry did not at first change that shared purpose for North Korean existence, but it has allowed North Korea some freedom of movement between the two.

Changing relations in East Asia have combined with unpredictable North Korean behavior to alter Soviet and Chinese evaluations of Pyongyang's value. China's elevation of the USSR to the "main enemy" category, while U.S. and Chinese relations were first thawing, then warming, caused a net reassessment in Beijing of the situation on the Korean peninsula. During the past year or so, China has reaffirmed Chinese support for Pyongyang if the South attacks, but Chinese premier Hua reportedly told Kim Il-song in May 1978 that the Chinese will not support an attack on the South. Since the announcement of normalization, China's statements against the ROK and U.S. troop presence have abated considerably. We have no direct evidence, but indications are that the Chinese were pressing Pyongyang to be reasonable and flexible in the North-South dialogue. Intelligence indicates that Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping has lectured the North on its economic insularity and the desirability of economic cooperation with the west.

The Soviets likewise have not played an aggressive role in North Korea. North Korea can obtain advanced arms only from Moscow, but Moscow has provided no major military hardware including aircraft since 1974. Soviet restraint is likely due to their desire to keep a calm border while Moscow follows other higher priorities, especially given North Korea's unpredictable behavior and apparent willingness to create incidents when opportunities arise.

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North Korea, while historically dependent on both its allies, has nonetheless maneuvered carefully to avoid becoming overly close to either. Pyongyang aligned itself more closely to Moscow during China's tumultuous "cultural revolution." Following Chou's trip to Pyongyang in 1970, North Korea swung back toward equidistance. During recent years Pyongyang "tilted" heavily toward China, going so far as to repeat Chinese anti-Soviet diatribes. Thus North Korea was surprised and displeased to learn that China and the U.S. were proceeding with normalization of relations. Pyongyang seems now to have accepted the development, hoping for at least spillover technical benefits to itself.

Soviet and Chinese relations with South Korea have progressed from non-existent to the barely discernible. The Soviets have implied willingness to improve relations with Seoul save for Pyongyang's strong objections and have taken some small steps: a ROK minister visited a WHO meeting in Soviet Asia, the ROK will be allowed to participate in the Moscow Olympics, and some small trade has developed through third countries. The Chinese also have softened their almost theological line against South Korea, explaining only that the time is "not right" for improvement of relations. Some Chinese-ROK contact has occurred in the trade area, although much less conspicuously than in the Soviet cases.

The ROK's technology and skilled labor cost markedly less than those of Japan or even the U.S. Thus from a purely economic viewpoint, there is considerable potential for South Korean trade with or developmental assistance for Soviet Siberia or China, although political considerations clearly rule out such possibilities for the foreseeable future.

The blockage is clearly in the political centers in Moscow and Beijing. South Korea has eagerly sought relations with both the Soviet Union and China since President Park dropped the anti-communist foreign-policy stance in 1973. Seoul seeks these relations in order to further the legitimization of the Park government, but also because China and the Soviet Union remain the principal allies, suppliers, and trade partners with the belligerent and unpredictable Korean state to the north.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT ASSESSMENT

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Over the past fifteen years, Korea's annual real economic growth rate has averaged over 10%. Per capita GNP has increased more than twenty-fold and now exceeds \$1,200. Endowed with few natural resources and a net importer of agricultural products, Korea relies heavily on the export of manufactured goods. Korean exports in 1978, \$12.7 billion, were equivalent to approximately one-fourth of GNP, up 26% from \$10 billion in 1977.

Since the close of the Korean war, the Republic of Korea has moved from being one of the poorest nations on earth to the threshold of the world's modern, industrialized economies. It is one of the brightest success stories of our foreign assistance, which in loans and grants from 1946 through 1977 totaled \$5.8 billion. Sizable though that figure might be, it is clear that the dramatic economic growth of the past decade is primarily the result of: political and security stability; wise Korean economic planning; efficient governmental implementation of economic policies; and the dedicated efforts of a well-educated, industrious people.

The Present Situation: After three years of above-average real economic growth (14.2% - 1976, 10.5% - 1977, and 12.5% - 1978), the Government has adopted tight monetary and fiscal policies to contain inflationary pressures arising from past rapid expansion. These policies are bringing cries of anguish from the business sector, which is playing an increasingly prominent role in economic decision-making. Particularly hard hit are the exporters, who point with alarm to Korea's growing trade deficit -- from \$477 million in 1977 to \$1.8 billion in 1978. It may double in 1979.

Korean economists are not so concerned. They have implemented a program of import liberalization primarily to fight inflation and provide competition for domestic industry. They see it a healthy sign that imports are growing more rapidly than exports, believing that payments can be balanced by invisible receipts and foreign capital inflows. Exports have been, and remain, the primary engine of growth, but the domestic market is expanding rapidly and will be increasingly important in the future.

Korea's Perception of its Position: Korean economic planners consider the next few years as a period of "economic transition." Efficiency and flexibility are high priority aims. The goal is to build an advanced industrial state by the end of the 1980's.

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In the meantime, the Koreans emphatically view themselves as an emerging nation faced with profound developmental needs. While they are prepared to play a greater role in the world economy, they see a continued need for special considerations as an LDC. They have shown responsibility and restraint on specific export policies, but wish to retain such LDC advantages as concessional loans from multilateral development banks and GSP treatment by advanced nations.

The Koreans believe they have bent over backwards to keep their trading partners happy. Korea has responded to our pleas for export restraints in textiles, footwear, canned mushrooms, steel products and color TVs, and launched a major effort last year to buy less from Japan and more from the United States.

Conclusions About Future Development: Already, Korea has one of the most balanced developing economies in the world. The narrowing of the gap between rich and poor -- the balance between the urban and rural sectors -- can be held up as an example to any nation considering the free market path to development. The government's plans for investment in education and social infrastructure should further improve equity and the quality of life for all Koreans.

In our bilateral economic relations, trade will predominate. While we share the Korean concern over international protectionism, we still may be required to take special measures to allow American industry to adjust to rapid import penetration. We both recognize that our rapidly expanding trade is mutually beneficial.

The most immediate economic problem for the Korean Government is to resolve its problem with inflation. Over the longer run, the future of Korea will depend on its successful transformation to an industrialized economy, based on heavier and more sophisticated industries: machinery, automobiles, petrochemicals, electronics and shipbuilding. This, in turn, will require an open worldwide trading system.

Provided it can expand its trade, while developing its domestic economy, Korea should reach its goal of joining the advanced industrial nations in the 1990's. This could well provide the impetus for a more open society.

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During the two decades following the Korean war, North and South Korea had virtually no communication with each other. A high level of military tension existed between the two sides during 1966-69, when the North was carrying out commando operations against the South. The political dialogue of 1972-73 came about largely because of a fundamental shift in North Korean policy, influenced strongly by external events. This was also the period when Pyongyang embarked on a long term buildup of its conventional military forces. When the dialogue broke down, North Korea proposed in 1974 to negotiate not with Seoul but with Washington. This proposal proved unfruitful and it was not until 1979 that the two governments in Korea were again moving toward a dialogue with each other.

The 1972-73 Dialogue. In 1970, North Korea concluded that its commando campaign against the South had failed. The Nixon Doctrine, the draw-down in Viet Nam, and the first phase of US troop withdrawals from Korea in 1971 suggested to Pyongyang that the U.S. was reducing its power and interest in Asia. Statements by U.S. leaders suggested that the American presence in Korea might end by the middle of the decade. Strongly influenced by the 1971 U.S. opening to China, Kim Il-song and his advisors believed that the time was ripe for direct negotiations with Seoul. The North made a series of conciliatory policy statements, including a major address by Foreign Minister Ho-Tam on April 12, 1971. In August 1971, South Korea proposed that the Red Cross societies of the two countries meet to discuss the problem of divided families. Red Cross sessions began at Panmunjom on February 22, 1972; the following spring senior officials of the two Korean governments secretly visited each other's capitals to explore the possibilities for political negotiation. These efforts culminated in the July 4, 1972 joint communique, in which North and South Korea announced the beginning of a political dialogue. The Red Cross talks also continued.

Breakdown of the 1972-73 Dialogue. The dialogue began at the North's initiative and created high expectations on both sides as negotiations proceeded at Panmunjom, Pyongyang and Seoul. During this period both sides quickly made concessions on minor procedural differences. From the outset, North Korea's traditional incompetence at negotiation and

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basic differences over which issues should be discussed prevented the talks from making substantive progress. The North's position was that "big" issues, such as a total withdrawal of all U.S. forces, must be discussed first. The South's position was that a step-by-step negotiating process must occur, in which "small" issues, such as establishing contact between divided families, must precede resolution of the larger problems. Neither side was prepared to recognize the legitimacy of the other; the North remained unwilling to acknowledge the reality of a divided peninsula, or of a viable nation in the South.

On June 23, 1972, however, President Park tacitly accepted the "fact" of a divided peninsula and of the possibility of dual recognition of the two Koreas by the international community. Obsessed with reunification, and opposed to any such acknowledgement of the status quo, the North gradually toughened its stance, even on minor procedural matters, so that its failure to appear at a meeting in August 1973 caused the dialogue to break down. The Red Cross talks also foundered and, until this year, no substantive meetings have taken place between the two sides.

The North's Shift Toward Washington. Since March 1974, North Korea has taken the position that it wants bilateral negotiations with the U.S. in order to conclude a peace treaty which would replace the 1953 Korean armistice. That armistice created the Military Armistice Commission, which has continued to hold regular meetings at Panmunjom on matters related to the cease-fire. The North's proposal for talks with Washington does not allow for equal participation of South Korea.

Various parties have proposed "tripartite" talks which would be tantamount to direct Washington-Pyongyang negotiations, with South Korea joining the talks only belatedly and not as a full participant. The latest such proposal was made by a North Korean foreign affairs specialist in an April interview with an American journalist in Pyongyang.

The Embryonic 1979 Dialogue. Again influenced by external events, this time the U.S. - China normalization of relations, the two sides in Korea began tentative steps toward a new dialogue earlier this year. South Korea took the initiative, when President Park proposed on January 19

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that authorities of the two sides meet "at any time, any place...any level" to discuss the future of the Korean peninsula. Statements issued by the two sides led to preliminary meetings in March and April, but neither side was prepared to compromise on either procedural or substantive issues. Pyongyang maintains that all segments of the two societies should be represented in any new dialogue, while Seoul holds that only government authorities can negotiate effectively.

A dispute over South Korean participation in the world table tennis championships held in Pyongyang in April, from which the South's team was excluded, has caused President Park's advisors to take a "harder" stance toward further dialogue. While both governments want some form of dialogue to continue, the 1979 discussions are in abeyance now and, as before, fundamental differences over how to resolve the Korean question make it unlikely that significant progress can occur soon.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION

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The Korean Government has done well on economic rights but badly on tolerance of political challenge and dissent. Its record on the observance of individual rights and civil and political liberties has been poor with regard to institutional protection and actual practices. President Park argues that Korea's exposed strategic position makes political restriction and strong central authority necessary. He also believes such restrictions are necessary for continued rapid economic growth. In its Report on Human Rights in Korea, sent to the Congress in January 1978, the Department of State viewed the restrictions on peaceful expression of dissent and other controls as excessive in relation to the threat facing Korea and also as contrary to international human rights standards.

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The 1972 Constitution gave President Park the power to take "necessary emergency measures" in time of natural calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis, and in case the national security or the public safety and order is seriously threatened or anticipated to be threatened." The government has used the power granted under this authority to issue emergency measures restricting freedom of expression and political activity. Emergency Measure No. 9 (EM 9) prohibits the dissemination or advocacy of false rumors, criticism of the constitution or advocacy of its reform, media reporting of such activities, and unauthorized student political activity. These emergency powers and measures have been the main focus of human rights controversy, as activists have been tried and convicted following demonstrations and other proscribed activities.

A National Assembly election, the primary forum for voter expression, was held in December 1978 to fill two thirds of the seats in the Assembly. (The remaining third is appointed by the President). The major opposition party for the first time won a slight (one percentage point) plurality of the vote, but the government party won more seats and retained control of the Assembly. Many legislators had hoped that the new Assembly would assert a more active policy role than its predecessors,

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and active campaigns reflected that hope. There is no evidence, however, that the Government has in mind any expanded role for the Assembly. Moreover, after having surprised its critics by relatively even-handed management of the elections, the government detracted from its performance by subsequently charging two candidates with EM-9 violations for statements they had made during the campaign.

The government released Kim Tae-chung, its most consequential political prisoner, in December 1978, but subsequently placed him under surveillance and periodic house arrest. Members of his staff were also temporarily detained. There was no coverage of Kim's activities in the media until early June, when the press reported his support for the newly elected President of the New Democratic Party. With Kim Tae-chung's release, the most prominent political prisoner remaining among the approximately 200 persons presently serving prison terms under politically motivated charges is the poet Kim Chi-ha who was jailed in 1974. His life sentence was suspended in February 1975 under a general amnesty but he was subsequently re-arrested and given an additional seven-year sentence. On December 28, 1978 this combined life-plus-seven-year sentence was reduced to 20 years.

The press cannot be considered completely free, but it contains more information and critical discussion than in the past. Nevertheless, periodicals are occasionally seized, including the three-month suspension last year of a prominent intellectual monthly. In the past few months, there have been a few recurrences of censorship of foreign publications distributed in Korea, which otherwise had ceased in January 1977.

University life is closely monitored and students and faculty have been arrested, expelled, or dismissed for engaging in peaceful demonstrations or for publicizing their opposition to government political restrictions. In May 1978 there were allegations that several students had been beaten in jail during suppression of a prison incident. The government subsequently transferred and demoted several officials at the prison which was the site of the maltreatment. The Korean government has stated categorically that it does not employ torture or abuse prisoners. There is a difference of opinion among dissidents on the question

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of whether the Government has recently resorted to torture. There were some unconfirmed but credible allegations of police brutality during arrests and of isolated instances of prisoner abuse during 1978 but (except for the case of the students) there have been no such allegations in 1979.

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CONFIDENTIALKOREA - CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUESI. ECONOMIC RELATIONS: FUNDAMENTALLY SOLID BUT NAGGING PROBLEMS

- o Economic ties profitable to both sides.
  - Two-way trade over \$13 billion last year.
- o Foreign investment climate in Korea improving:
  - New basic foreign investment law goes into effect this year to further liberalize operating conditions.
- o Korean investment in US rising:
  - Investments here in semiconductors, television and other consumer electronics, energy development.
- o US unhappy about Korean import restrictions; Koreans sensitive to signs of rising protectionism in US.
  - Koreans have moved to liberalize--extremely rapidly by comparison with other countries--but perception of Korea as "another Japan" drives US industry efforts to increase the pressure for more concessions.
  - From Korean perspective, US market for Korean goods is closing.
  - US actions and possible actions on steel, footwear, textiles, machine tools, aviation route rights etc. have been alarming to Seoul.
  - Koreans do not always differentiate between protectionism and defense against foreign unfair trade practices.
  - Hue and cry over finding that Korean color television sets are being dumped in US was misplaced.

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- o Koreans worried about possible loss of GSP benefits.
  - Administration GSP renewal bill will be marked up by Senate Finance Committee after Easter. House is awaiting Senate action.
  - Proposal calls for reduced GSP privileges for major beneficiaries (Korea is second largest after Taiwan), but no country graduation. Bill links GSP to foreign market access. Prospects for passage in present form uncertain.
  - Continuation of GSP a major ROKG policy goal, probably as much for political symbolism as economic impact, although latter is considerable. Failure to renew GSP (or Korea's exclusion) could affect significant portion of 1983 exports of \$1.5 billion under the US program.

II. USG ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES WITH KOREA

- o Encourage continued liberalization of ROKG import and foreign investment regimes. Acknowledge progress, push for more.
- o Dispel notion that USG commitment to free trade implies acceptance of foreign dumping and export subsidies.
- o Encourage "buy American" predisposition of Koreans, especially for major project supplies and services.

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MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LEE

Lee's usual style is to stick closely to his script and plod through it. The loss in spontaneity is recouped in thoroughness.

Discuss President's visit to China. (Including full read-out on Korea-related discussion. Talking points to be provided.)

Explore ROKG thinking on North-South talks; possible US and PRC participation at the margin. Want to encourage ROKG to keep its options open despite anger over Rangoon, look for tension reduction opportunities.)

--Impressed by your statesmanlike response to North Korean proposals.

--Share your skepticism of North Korean motives, but believe it is in our interest to continue to explore possibilities for tension reduction. Will continue to consult, coordinate fully with you.

--Told Chinese no direct DPRK-USG talks. DPRK, ROKG must talk directly. If multilateral talks, China should be included.

--Interested in North-South talks re joint Olympic team. What is your assessment? Will those talks continue?

FMS credits, third-country arms sales. (FMS a perennial issue; to ROKG, a symbol of USG commitment. ROKG recently pledged an end to Iran arms sales; remains deeply troubled by prospects for its defense industry.)

--Asking for \$230 million in FY 85; also seeking authority for ten years grace, 20 years payment.

--Welcome effective ROKG actions to halt Iran arms sales; which threatened to damage US-ROK relations and Korean interests in Middle East.

--Will do what we can to facilitate third country sales elsewhere, but our flexibility is limited.

Political development/human rights. (Pleased at recent progress. Danger is campus turmoil, government overreaction to opposition testing limits.

--Recent progress of great interest to Administration, Congress. We publicly welcomed recent moves, hope they will continue.

--Recognize risks in liberalization, but it is a necessary process. You have our full support.

--Economic issues. (Koreans have moved to liberalize, believe USG is unappreciative. Encourage continued liberalization. ROKG may wrongly see color TV dumping decision as failure of ROKG diplomacy.)

--Both sides must continue efforts to preserve world trade system.

--Appreciate liberalizations; keep it up.

--Concerned about reaction to color TV dumping case; i.e., that it was political decision, failure of ROKG diplomacy. US law sets narrow, rigid scope for such determinations. No leeway for political or diplomatic considerations. Preventing unfair trade a necessary corollary to protecting free trade.

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The Republic of Korea's major concern in shaping its foreign relations is security. The magnitude and immediacy of the problem for Korea make this a continuing, intense preoccupation. The growth of the Republic of Korea (ROK) economy and its heavy dependence on overseas export markets have moved economic considerations to a point just below security in foreign relations priorities.

Security concerns and competition with the North, coupled with views and reactions formed under adverse conditions in a cold war environment, have given a defensive cast to both the form and substance of ROK foreign policy. This is most clearly seen in Seoul's persistent efforts to discredit North Korean representation in the Third World, a tilting-at-windmills effort that Pyongyang directs equally assiduously against the ROK. Recently, however, there has been a greater confidence, stemming in large measure from economic success, in the Korean approach to the world. This is being reflected in the foreign policy field in an increased willingness to seek initiatives and in a growing ability to see the Korean issue in more regional, even more global, terms.

For both security and economic reasons, ROK relations with the U.S. hold first priority. Japan clearly stands in the number two position. (See separate paper on ROK-Japan relations.) Relations with the rest of the world are receiving more attention, partly because of the strong rivalry with North Korea but increasingly for more normal objectives. Although there is little prospect of early breakthrough, normalization of relations with the Communist nations holds great interest -- as a way to enhance South Korea's geopolitical position and bargaining power and in order to stabilize the situation on the peninsula and thus enhance security. Greater effort is going into improved ties with ASEAN and Third World nations, which offer both political support in the NAM, the UN, and other international fora and steadily increasing economic opportunities. (The ROK has been circumspect about endorsing the Third World's proposed "New International Economic Order" however). Seoul is very cautious on the Middle East because of Korea's heavy dependence on Arab oil and the income it derives from construction contracts, both of which play a major role in the ROK economy.

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Korean leaders still see their country as playing an essentially defensive role in the world, more subject to the actions of others than the master of its own international fate. However, the nation's new economic strength has given rise to a new element of confidence, and ROK officials have begun to see themselves as able to influence events to a limited extent. Nevertheless, they remain hobbled by views and reactions formed in an earlier, cold war period.

The leadership also views Korea as occupying a middle position between the developed and developing worlds. In one respect they find this uncomfortable, since it results in conflict between the economic interests of a growing industrial nation and the political dependence of Korea on favorable votes, in the UN, NAM, and other international bodies, from numerous unindustrialized governments. Increasingly, however, the Koreans see important opportunities for themselves as an intermediary in the economic development process, able to translate the technological advances of the more highly developed world into forms (and at prices) that fit the needs of the newly developing nations. They have also become conscious of a community of interest with the latter in opposing, for example, protectionist tendencies of the developed nations.

The increasingly outward-looking attitude of the ROK in foreign policy is in general a beneficial development for the United States. We do not share the intensity of the ROK concern with security problems, but see a need for greater flexibility in policy toward North Korea, and tend in particular to question the validity of some domestic policies attributed to security needs. We support ROK efforts to widen the scope of its diplomatic relations, particularly to improve relations with Communist countries and to strengthen ties with other Asian governments. In general, the Koreans continue to take moderate and responsible positions on most major issues between the United States and the developing world.

Assuming the ROK economy maintains its pattern of the past 15 years, Korea should become a very significant factor in world trade by the mid-eighties, and, increasingly, in world investment as well. This in turn should cause other nations to take Korea more seriously as part of the world, and, correspondingly, make it more difficult for the North to achieve acceptance of any aggressive moves. This would not necessarily translate into active support for the ROK, however, except from the U.S. and Japan. Korean domestic policies may continue to generate a measure of tension with the U.S. and other countries of similar persuasion, and could give rise to a desire on the part of both sides to maintain a certain distance from each other.

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US AND THE UN IN KOREA

The United Nations Command (UNC) was established pursuant to Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 84 of 7 July 1950, which called for establishment of a unified command under the US for UN forces in Korea. The Soviet representative was absent when the Security Council considered the question, having "walked out" over the issue of Chinese representation.

The Commander-in-Chief, UNC, signed the 27 July 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement on behalf of military forces from 16 member nations and the Republic of Korea (ROK). During the Armistice negotiations, the ROK gave assurances that it would adhere to the Agreement, and these assurances were reiterated by the UNC negotiators. ROK forces have complied with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement since it was concluded in 1953, and ROK senior military officers have been accredited to the Military Armistice Commission and have served regularly on the Commission.

The Agreement also established the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) whose members are Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition to the ROK and US components, the UK, Australia, Canada, Philippines, and Thailand are still represented on the UNC by liaison personnel; while we and the ROKs regularly consult with these liaison officers - they are guided by our decisions. Four nations continue to assign very small contingents to the UN Honor Guard.

In the absence of a satisfactory permanent arrangement, the Armistice Agreement is the only legal mechanism we have for the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Unconditional termination of the UNC, without appropriate North Korean/Chinese assurances, would deprive the Agreement of one of its signatories and could jeopardize its continuation in force. It could endanger operation of the MAC, which has been particularly useful on certain occasions, e.g. the 1976 tree cutting incident, and is regularly used by both sides to investigate Armistice violations and DMZ incidents. Termination could also bring an end to the NNSC, which was set up to conduct

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independent inspections and investigations of Armistice-related developments and report its findings to the MAC.

At the last UN General Assembly session where the Korean item was seriously debated in 1975, the GA passed two conflicting resolutions: for the first time a resolution sponsored by the North was passed calling for the termination of the UNC; a second resolution also passed, however, which was sponsored by our side and made clear that the UNC should be phased out only when alternate arrangements are made for maintenance of the Armistice Agreement. The resolutions have had no effect on the presence of US forces in Korea and did not affect the UNC. Proposed competing resolutions on the subject of Korean reunification were withdrawn in 1976 in the aftermath of the "tree-cutting" incident. There was no serious effort to re-introduce the item in the last two UNGAs.

Tokyo maintains a deep and abiding interest in deterring hostility on the Korean peninsula and would be concerned by any change in the UNC or Armistice arrangements that appeared to jeopardize peace and stability in the region. At the same time, Japan has not been an energetic partner in our Korean lobbying efforts at the UN. The Japanese have limited their bilateral efforts and essentially do not want to be out front on the issue.

The attitudes of the PRC and USSR toward the UNC are less clear. Though both have continued to support Pyongyang's position on withdrawal of US forces from the ROK, we have no indication that either will mount a major effort on behalf of North Korea at the UN. Nor is there evidence at this time of any other group wanting to press the North Korean case in the General Assembly. While neither the PRC nor USSR are prepared to take an active role against North Korea's wishes, since 1970, North Korea has been drifting toward Peking at Moscow's expense, and there is a general feeling that the Chinese at least may act to moderate North Korean behavior.

UN Secretary General Waldheim visited Pyongyang and Seoul this spring and proposed that he and his staff become a channel for North-South communication. President Park accepted the proposal, and Waldheim -- who seems anxious to get the UN involved -- is reportedly hopeful that Kim il-Sung will also agree. However, Waldheim reported no indications that the North is prepared to move forward on North-South substantive issues.

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UNITED STATES UNDERTAKINGS  
RELEVANT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

A. Security

1. Mutual Defense - A 1954 US-Korea treaty commits each party to "act to meet /a/ common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes".

2. Troop Withdrawal - A February 9 Presidential announcement placed the withdrawal schedule in abeyance pending reassessment of certain changed circumstances; a Presidential letter of July 20, 1978 to Congressional leaders assured consultation with Congress and Asian allies should changed circumstances affect the schedule.

3. Sale of F-16 - Secretary Brown, with Presidential authorization, first informed the ROKG in 1977 of "agreement in principle" to sell the F-16; the actual sale has not yet been authorized.

4. FMS Credits - Secretary Brown, with Presidential authorization, informed the ROKG in 1977 that the Administration will continue to seek FMS credit for Korea "at the present level" (\$275 million annually) through FY 1981. Congressional cuts reduced the FY 1979 level to \$225 million, and the Administration's request level for FY 1980 is also \$225 million.

5. Aircraft Co-assembly - Secretary Brown informed the ROKG in July 1978 that the U.S. Government will "consider sympathetically" a request to co-assemble in Korea a less sophisticated aircraft than the F-16.

6. Missile Development - In October 1978 Ambassador Gleysteen informed the Korean Government that the U.S. Government will seek to assist efforts to develop Korean missiles for which a joint US-ROK military task force identifies a requirement. Exceptions: missiles identified as primarily nuclear (e.g. Lance) and missiles with a range in excess of 180 km.

North-South

7. US-North Korea Contacts - The U.S. is committed not to discuss Korean issues with North Korea without full participation by the South.

C. Economic Assistance and Trade

8. PL-480 - In consideration for Korea's agreement in 1971 to limit its textile exports to the U.S., the United States agreed to provide PL-480 commodity assistance over a five year period at levels higher than planned. Approximately \$57 million of the commitment remains.

9. Nuclear Fuel Supply - In order to promote the sale of nuclear power plants abroad the United States is committed to remaining a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel. To facilitate the specific sale of nuclear plants VII and VIII to Korea the Administration is committed to support legislation to increase by ten percent the fuel supply ceiling in the US-Korea nuclear cooperation agreement.



# The Outlook for President Pak And South Korea's Dissidents (C)

**An Intelligence Assessment**

*Research for this report was completed  
on 4 June 1979.*

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The author of this paper is [redacted] East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and Pacific. Questions and comments may be addressed to the author at [redacted] (U)

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# **The Outlook for President Pak And South Korea's Dissidents**


**An Intelligence Assessment**

## The Outlook for President Pak And South Korea's Dissidents (c)

### Key Judgments

President Pak Chong-hui's government has come through another spring—historically the time for increased antigovernment activities in South Korea—without serious trouble or large-scale protests from the country's dissidents. Earlier this year, Pak's security advisers were concerned that the release from prison of Pak's longtime adversary, Kim Tae-chung, would encourage greater political unrest this spring. They also feared that the country's high inflation rate and the prospect of President Carter's visit to Seoul this summer would further embolden human rights activists. (c)

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The failure of the underlying malaise to disrupt domestic tranquility in South Korea so far reflects inherent weaknesses of the dissident movement, including the inability of Pak's critics to articulate goals with broad appeal in Korea. Beyond this, the massive precautions taken by government security forces to head off disturbances and the positive economic and political initiatives the Pak government has taken to strengthen key bases of support—initiatives that have recently been receiving greater recognition from foreign observers of Korea—have been especially important. (S NF)

The "Saemaul Movement"—a multifaceted government program that promotes both economic development and grass-roots political participation—has been an especially successful mechanism of the Pak government in strengthening support in the countryside. Pak's overall management of the country's rapid economic growth has also fostered the emergence of a more influential urban middle class in Korea, which, for the most part, supports Pak and has a growing stake in the political and economic status quo. (c)

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June 1979  
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As he begins his 18th year as South Korea's national leader, Pak seems fully capable of retaining his firm grip on power into the 1980s. Pak is not invulnerable, however; if he should suffer from a major policy failure—a severe down turn in the economy, another escalating crisis in relations with the United States, a mishandling of some other key national security issue, or an overreaction to dissident activities—the now diffuse signs of domestic dissatisfaction could coalesce, and Pak might not have a sufficiently deep reservoir of support to maintain his political position. (C)

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### The Outlook for President Pak And South Korea's Dissidents (c)

#### *The Dissidents' Base of Support*

The essential problem faced by South Korea's dissidents remains how to marshal popular support beyond the relatively small circle of students, Christian activists, and intellectuals who are active primarily in Seoul. Some dissident leaders felt that conditions conducive to broadening their movement were beginning to develop early this year. In their view, these included:

**The return of Kim Tae-chung.** Kim is an able speaker and talented politician who has been in and out of prison for alleged political crimes since 1971, when he nearly defeated Pak in the presidential election. When Kim was released by Pak late last year, South Korean dissidents hoped that Kim's presence would provide their movement with badly needed leadership.

**Inflation.** South Korea's dissidents have been frustrated in recent years by the country's economic boom but, with inflation rising at a 20-percent annual rate, some believed that they finally had a bread-and-butter issue they could exploit politically.

**The ROK-US Summit.** Few Korean dissidents believe that the meeting between Presidents Carter and Pak will prompt any major liberalization in Seoul, but some evidently hoped that Pak would avoid harsh repressive measures to ensure a smooth summit, thereby creating better opportunities for them to challenge the system.

**Iran.** Only Pak's most extreme opponents see advantages in fostering the kind of upheaval that took place in Iran. Even so, a wider spectrum of dissidents has taken heart from the fact that a figure as powerful as the Shah could be unseated. (c)


Despite these developments, dissident activity did not increase this spring. Kim Tae-chung is still a popular figure in South Korea; and his support appears to have helped Kim Yong-sam, an aggressive member of the National Assembly, to win the presidency of South Korea's major opposition political party. But since his release, Kim Tae-chung's activities often have been circumscribed by security officials, and some dissidents believe that his long years in confinement have reduced his political skills. Although popular concern

with inflation continues, Pak has moved to dissipate potential unrest by reshuffling his economic ministers and launching a highly publicized anti-inflation campaign. (c)

Dissident hopes that President Carter's visit would bring greater opportunities are also fading. On May Kim Tae-chung and other dissident leaders issued a statement opposing the summit on the grounds that it would provide support for President Pak's "dictatorial" rule rather than aid the cause of human rights. Finally, the movement's attention to events in Iran seems to be ebbing, although the perception of that trauma may have left a residue of feeling that Pak is not invulnerable in the longer term. (c)

For the present, the number of South Koreans who associate themselves with antigovernment statements, attend protest meetings, or are otherwise engaged in struggle against the Pak government, is small. Excluding the students, whose involvement in politics is intermittent, active dissenters probably number from the hundreds to perhaps a few thousand out of a population of some 37 million

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***Students, Christians, and Workers***

The dissident ranks can swell quickly when the university students mount demonstrations, as they often have after the winter vacation and the resumption of classes in March and April. The university students led the marches that unseated President Syngman Rhee in April 1960, and students and other activists organized sizable political protests in the latter 1960s and again in the early 1970s. The harshest criticism of Pak has often come from the university students in the Seoul area who now number more than 70,000. (c)

Many South Koreans, however, appear less sympathetic toward student demonstrators now than in earlier years. There are signs that the average Korean wage earner, who formerly tended to regard students as the "conscience of the nation," now sees student protest as a reflection of immaturity and lack of "real responsibilities." Moreover, many students who actively oppose the government while in college abandon their militancy after graduation when they join business firms or enter government service.

South Korea's Christians, about 5 million people, or about 14 percent of the population, comprise another minority that plays a significant role in the Korean dissident movement. Church leaders have long had contact with US and European missionaries, and, like the students, they have been exposed to and attracted by Western political ideas. Selected Christian leaders have continued to speak out strongly against President Pak's authoritarian rule, although the established hierarchies of both the Protestant and Catholic churches generally have been reluctant to take a leading role in the dissident struggle in recent years. Christian militancy seems to have been dissipated both by the church's concern that excessive involvement in politics might result in a loss of privileges and by its grudging respect for Pak's accomplishments in improving general living standards. (c)

Over the years, dissident leaders have tried doggedly to enlist the participation of Korean industrial workers in the struggle for liberalization, but with only the barest glimmerings of success. Most skilled and unskilled Korean laborers see improvements in their status and appear more interested in upward economic mobility than in politics. The majority of these dissident activists still seem to come from the intelligentsia—writers, ex-professors, and journalists—and a small group of the more militant politicians and Christian leaders. (c)

***The Dissidents' Goals and Tactics***

The best known intellectuals among Pak's critics have been able to make their positions known in Korea, although government controls over political dissent, including continued—albeit informal—press censorship, have limited the dissemination of their views. For example, three prominent government critics—Kim Tae-chung; the elder statesman of the opposition, former President Yun Po-sun; and militant Protestant clergyman, Ham Sok-hwan—managed to issue a harsh antigovernment declaration to foreign journalists and a few Korean reporters shortly after the Korean Independence Day anniversary in early March. (c)

Catholic Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, another longtime prominent figure in the dissident movement, also strongly criticized the Pak government on 5 March in a sermon at the Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul. The opposition has often used that pulpit to express its views. A major anti-Pak manifesto in March 1976, for example, resulted in the prosecution of its 18 signers in a highly publicized trial. (c)

These dissident declarations, and more recent statements by new opposition leader Kim Yong-sam—which have not been reported fully in the Korean press—have reiterated several familiar themes:

- The 1972 authoritarian Yushin constitution has established a dictatorial system.
- The longer Pak remains in power, the greater the danger of a major upheaval in South Korea.
- The valued goals of anti-Communism, national security, and economic growth must not destroy democracy.



*Kim Tae-chung, dissident leader upon his release from confinement in December 1978*

Unclassified

- The present corrupt and exploitative regime would not be supported popularly if war broke out.
- The restoration of democracy should precede reunification.
- Negotiations with the North must be based on the moral strength stemming from real democracy at home. (u)

The dissidents' goals and concerns clearly demonstrate that Pak and his critics agree on important elements of Seoul's economic and defense policies. Their differences lie in their attitudes toward political freedom. Emergency Measure 9, which bans "false rumors" and any criticism of the authoritarian Yushin Constitution, is particularly disliked. Also condemned are the provisions of the constitution that permit Pak to appoint one-third of the membership of the national

legislature and to secure an unlimited number of six-year terms as president simply by obtaining the endorsement of a hand-picked electoral body. More recently, the continued detention by the Pak government of some 200 political prisoners, who were not released in the general amnesty late last year, has become a prominent issue. (c)

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There are conflicting reports on the specific tactics the dissidents will adopt this year. Kim Tae-chung and Yun po-sun, [redacted] outlined an ambitious plan for confrontations with the government, including coordinated nationwide student strikes, widescale labor agitation, and the formation of a broad front of various

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
opposition groups.



Kim Tac-chung's reentry into partisan politics recently suggests he is indeed interested in a more conventional approach. Kim's move marks a shift for South Korea's dissidents; in recent years, the dissidents have been scornful of the opposition New Democratic Party, criticizing it for saying that the present political system is unjust while, at the same time, participating in and profiting from that system. Now, Kim's involvement with the NDP raises the possibility of a broader cooperative relationship between a more moderate dissident movement and the opposition party. (S NF NC)

Such an alliance could have advantages and disadvantages for both partners. The dissidents might gain a measure of legality for their activities, greater publicity, and access to the National Assembly. The NDP image, in turn, could benefit substantially from an infusion of idealists, many of whom have served time in prison for their convictions. (S NF NC)

On the debit side, the dissidents would have to accept, however reluctantly, a measure of legitimacy for the present Korean political system, and the New Democrats would risk opening themselves up for retaliation should the dissidents press the party to challenge President Pak's authority. In any event, both the dissidents and the NDP will be held back by their narrow bases of support and their lack of success in identifying issues with broad appeal in Korea. (S NF NC)




the main opposition group—the New Democratic Party (NDP)—outpolled the DRP by nearly 2 to 1; overall, the NDP won 32.8 percent of the vote, gaining an edge over the ruling camp for the first time. (S NF NC)

South Korean officials close to President Pak attempted to put the best public face on the election. They claimed that the substantial voter turnout—77 percent—showed that Korean voters took the election seriously. They noted that a democratic election had indeed taken place, and also pointed out that despite the overall popular vote, the DRP actually won more seats than its rival NDP, by 68 to 61. The officials emphasized that the election was one of the fairest in Korean history.

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Additionally, Pak's supporters argued that real power and the direction of national policy were not actually at stake in the election and that, should an election involving these matters be held, the voters would give Pak a renewed mandate. (S NF NC)

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*The National Assembly Election*

South Koreans cast their votes in the 12 December National Assembly elections. Only 31.7 percent of the voters endorsed candidates explicitly identified with President Pak's ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP)—6 percentage points less than the DRP received in the last assembly election in 1973.

a growing number of Koreans believe that Seoul's rapid economic progress has followed the Japanese pattern, that there have been many changes in Japan's political leadership without any interruption of economic growth, and that development would continue in South Korea even with Pak absent from the scene.


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In the major cities of Seoul and Pusan,

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military officers seized power in the spring of 1961, the consolidation of a stable political order —along with the defense of South Korea against North Korean attack or political subversion and the modernization of the South—has been a major goal. (S NF)

Government officials insist that political stability is a matter of national survival. Despite North Korea's publicly stated willingness to coexist with South Korea, Pyongyang continues to assert openly that it seeks to promote revolution in the South; it still infiltrates agents in support of that goal, and the North has also engaged in a large-scale buildup of its military forces in the 1970s. Seoul officials cite this North Korean record to support their claim that the threat from the North must be taken seriously. (S NF)

A disciplined society is in keeping with traditional Korea's deeply engrained Confucian-value system, which emphasizes the need for order, hierarchy, loyalty, and orthodoxy over such Western values as freedom, equality, and individualism. Liberty as such was never considered a political ideal in traditional Korean society; the goal was rule by a wise leader, not by law. (U)

Although traditional values are steadily loosening their hold on Koreans who are increasingly exposed to modernizing influences, even Koreans who have been educated abroad often find Western society excessively individualistic, competitive, and legalistic. Korean scholars close to the Pak government argue that Westerners should take into account the residual influences of traditional Korean culture in assessing South Korea today. (U)

President Pak's goal of rapidly modernizing South Korea and bringing it into the ranks of the world's industrialized states is, of course, anything but traditional. Where the Confucian ideal was to oppose change and to recapture a past golden age, Pak and his ruling group have moved aggressively to transform South Korea from its underdeveloped status in 1951 to recognition today as a "Newly Industrialized Country." In the past decade or so the South Korean economy has grown more rapidly than that of any other non-OPEC developing country. (U)

*President Pak's Goals and Tactics*



Since Pak and a group of




President Pak Chong-hui

Unclassified ©

Pak's modernization objective is tied closely to his goals of political stability and defense. Like many Third World leaders, Pak clearly believes that the stability that accompanies a strong, centralized national authority is required to mobilize resources for development. Pak also sees modernizing the South Korean economy as necessary for both the national and personal political survival. Fear of being outdistanced economically, and ultimately overwhelmed, by the North has given added impetus to South Korea's rapid economic growth. (C)

Pak's political tactics have combined coercion and conciliation. When faced with challenges from domestic dissidents, his initial response has been tough; he has avoided timing concessions in a way that might encourage additional demands. But when dissident pressures have eased, Pak has relaxed controls. Since the mid-1970s, the trend in Pak's policies has been cautiously to moderate the harsher practices of the internal security forces, and allow somewhat greater

leeway for opposition activity. This trend has accelerated since 1977, as Seoul has attempted to improve relations with the United States. Pak has not, however, withdrawn Emergency Measure 9 nor has he seriously considered any fundamental revision of the Yushin Constitution. (C)





***The Saemaul Movement***

Pak is pursuing a development strategy to strengthen his support in rural areas and to win more converts in the country's new urbanized middle class. One major reason for the strong political backing he enjoys in the countryside is the Saemaul (New Community) Movement. The program, launched in 1970 in an effort to revitalize the country's farming communities, has been remarkably successful. (U)

Pak himself comes from a rural background, and he has long demonstrated more personal empathy toward the conservative farmers than toward city dwellers. Even so, industrial development and the cities were given priority in the 1960s, when Pak and his associates began their drive to modernize Korea. Poverty remained widespread in many farm villages, and the gap between urban and rural living standards widened considerably. (U)

The Saemaul Movement was designed not only to reverse that trend but probably also to contribute to long-term security in the country. Pak was no doubt particularly sensitive about the security issue because of the rural-base guerrilla warfare in Vietnam in the late 1960s and North Korea's unsuccessful attempts at that time to generate an insurgency in the South. (C)

It is difficult to fit the Saemaul Movement neatly into an economic or political category. It includes both an economic development program that underwrites the government's presence throughout the rural areas, and an important moral-psychological component that features mass indoctrination campaigns to promote a mix of traditional and modern values. (U)

In economic terms, the most striking statistic attributed to the program by South Korean officials is the gain in average rural income from a level substantially below urban income in 1970 to virtual rural-urban parity in the mid-1970s. Projects inspired or endorsed by Saemaul—and supported by material and planning assistance by the central government cooperating with local authorities—include rural electrification; irrigation and flood control; the building of feeder roads, community storehouses, and schools; and the replacement of thatched roofs on private homes with permanent tile and metal roofing. (U)

Some government analysts point out that Saemaul in itself should not be given total credit for improvements in rural living standards. They contend that a variety of economic factors—including the introduction of new strains of high-yield "miracle rice," improved technology, the government's farm price supports, the expansion of agricultural extension services, and the increasingly affluent urban market for Korean farm produce—have also played key roles. (U)

Dissident intellectuals in Seoul are highly skeptical about the political dimension of the Saemaul Movement. They charge that it is essentially intended to strengthen the government's control and manipulation of the rural population. Indeed, in its early years government officials sometimes used heavyhanded tactics to meet certain goals and quotas set in Seoul. Recently, however, the farmers seem to have developed a generally positive view of Saemaul. 25X1C

The Saemaul Movement seems to have helped dispel the farming communities' traditional distrust of the central government. It has also created a new relationship between the farmers, who—albeit, still resenting outside interference—now look to the permanent Saemaul bureaucracy for practical assistance and economic benefits. (U) 25X1C

The government's effort to fashion an ideological basis for the Saemaul Movement is in part an attempt to counter criticisms that under Pak South Korea stands only for barren anti-Communism and materialism. Saemaul does not fill the ideological gap with a systematic political philosophy, but it does articulate a fairly coherent set of values. (U)

Saemaul lecturers extol traits and behavior highly valued in traditional Korean peasant society: the Saemaul motto is "Self-help, Cooperation, Diligence." Resistance to change is disparaged, and farmers are urged to accept new attitudes and values deemed essential to a modern society. These include

- Receptivity to new technology and agricultural methods.

- A rational, scientific approach to problem-solving.
- Saving money for investment in the future.
- A willingness to follow qualified leadership.
- A sense of nationalism, which attempts to broaden the concept of community to include the entire country. (u)

One longtime Western observer of Korean affairs notes, "The message is hardly more complicated than that everyone should work together under the leadership of President Pak in order to build a prosperous, secure nation." This kind of simplified doctrine does not satisfy the highly educated dissident leadership in Seoul, which demands a much broader range of political rights. Nonetheless, the Saemaul Movement's "updated Confucianism" seems to have acquired legitimacy in South Korea's rural areas, in large part through its association with higher living standards and solutions to practical problems. (u)

The government has attempted to extend the Saemaul Movement to Korea's cities and factories. The urban movement has been given substantial publicity but—aside from conservation and beautification projects, and limited progress toward a more paternalistic Japanese management model in industry—its impact has been slight. In any event, popular support for Saemaul is less enthusiastic in the cities, where people live and work in different locations, have less permanent roots, and still lack a sense of community. (c)

#### *Pak and the Middle Class*

Over the years, two groups have dominated the Korean political scene: the military, which seized and consolidated political control in the 1960s; and more recently, the civilian bureaucracy, whose role and influence has steadily expanded with Korean modernization. Continuing economic development is now giving rise to a new force in Korean politics, the middle class. As a "third elite," the middle class promises to have an increasing impact on Korean public affairs in the 1980s. (c)

The emergence of the middle class often has been seen as a potential problem for President Pak. Its growth has entailed an expansion in the country's university

student population, greater Korean exposure to Western political ideas, and growing popular demands on the government. These social changes have at times created new and difficult pressure points for the government, but in general, the South Korean middle class—particularly the business community—supports the Pak government. (c)

The Korean business and professional elite appears to believe that the environment created by President Pak is conducive to prosperity. In policy terms, Pak has not only provided political stability, but has also made credit available, protected domestic markets, furnished guidance to spur export growth and—until the past year at least—checked inflation. (c)

At the apex of the business establishment, Korea's largest conglomerates are still dominated by a dozen or so old-line entrepreneurs and their families—the Chungs of Hyundai, the Lees of Samsung, the Kims of Daewoo, and the Kus of Lucky. Needless to say, these families are well satisfied with the system. Still, the Korean business leadership corps is steadily being reinforced by a new cadre with a stake in the system. (c)

As a case in point, many military officers have made the transition to the business world. One recent study cited 160 retired army generals who are now presidents of companies or serving on boards of directors of private enterprises. Numerous government officials have also shifted to key positions in the private sector. Ministers and vice-ministers typically become chief executives of companies; one year, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry lost four division chiefs to the electronics and oil refining industries. Among top-ranked university graduates, meanwhile, industry has replaced government as the most favored employer. The major corporations increasingly are hiring college graduates through competitive examinations. (c)

There are signs that Korean businessmen sense that the day is coming when they will have greater influence and freedom to conduct their own affairs. Free enterprise is now held out as an ideal in Seoul, but the economy in fact is subject to overall management by government technocrats. Although government controls are more a matter of direction and guidance

than a command system, Korea's business elite is beginning to chafe under the government's guidelines. Chung Ju-Yung, the outspoken chairman of the large Hyundai Group and head of the influential Federation of Korean Industries, recently said in public that the government should curb its "excessive involvement" in the details of production and distribution and instead concern itself with larger economic issues. (C)

It is conceivable that businessmen may join forces with South Korean dissidents in seeking to "liberalize" the country's politics as well as its economic format. Such a development, however, is still far down the road. For the present, neither of the major political parties is particularly business oriented. When businessmen, professionals, and other individual members of the Korean middle class do become more politicized, it is likely that they will favor a basically conservative party along Japanese lines, rather than one promoting the left-of-center views now evident among dissident intellectuals in Seoul. (C)

**Outlook**

President Pak has retained longstanding bases of support in the military and the bureaucracy, and in the 1970s he has strengthened his political equities with the rural population and with a significant part of South Korea's growing urban middle class. These groups generally share Pak's major goals—a stable political order, strong national defense, and the modernization of South Korea's economy and society. (C)



Pak has succeeded in building governmental institutions that mobilize and control people and resources —

Even so, the country's democratic and representative institutions—the national legislature,

the political parties, and the press—have little independence and are not widely respected. Their weaknesses in public regard could become significant if, for whatever reason, Pak or those around him should seek to transfer power to a new leader, something that has never happened peacefully in South Korea. (S NF)

Short of a succession crisis, other developments could spell trouble for President Pak. Maintaining strong economic growth almost certainly is one of the ingredients required to head off political unrest in South Korea's expanding urban areas. So far, economic growth seems to have largely absorbed the energies and also met many of the growing economic expectations of the large lower income urban population. Should there be a serious economic slowdown, however, the likelihood that this group would seek an alternative to President Pak could increase dramatically. (S NF)

South Korea's continued economic progress remains largely dependent on its ability to continue expanding exports which, in turn, will require it to move increasingly into higher technology industries in the years ahead. Seoul probably can make the transition, but it faces stiff international competition, increasing energy and raw material costs, and a high degree of dependence on overseas market conditions. (S NF)

Pak could also come under much heavier attack should he be seen as mishandling relations with the United States, which most Koreans regard as critical to the country's survival. In 1977, when US-ROK relations were strained as a result of nuclear weapons development plans in Korea, the US troop withdrawal policy, the Koreagate scandal, and the human rights issue, some South Korean generals began to grumble privately that Pak might not be the right man to have at the top. Pak took special pains to smooth out the relationship with the United States, terminating research on nuclear weapons, sending Tong-sun Park to Washington to testify, and releasing political prisoners. (S NF)

Pak remains sensitive to US interests, including those in the area of human rights; he is continuing to release political detainees periodically in order to improve the atmosphere for President Carter's visit this summer.

Pak may also consider repealing the much-criticized Emergency Measure 9 at some point, in the interest of improving ties with the United States, but he may be reluctant to take that step immediately prior to or following President Carter's 29 June visit to avoid appearing to bow to US pressure. In any event, the potential for significant difficulties in the US-ROK relationship remains. (S NF)

An alliance between South Korea's dissidents and the opposition New Democratic Party could also result in more effective pressures on the government, but Pak's adversaries will have to move with care. If they press hard Pak is almost certain to react with firmness, and in such a confrontation he is likely to come out the winner. (S NF)

President Pak will probably continue to aim for a mix of tactical concessions and controls which will be sufficient to dampen any challenges from his critics, but still not so onerous as to provoke them unduly. Over the longer term, Pak himself seems well aware that demands for greater political participation and freedoms will intensify, and he has strongly implied in public addresses that a more fundamental liberalization will be possible when security conditions permit. At the same time, he has asserted that South Korea should not simply imitate Western political institutions, but rather should adapt them in a manner suited to Korea's traditions and culture. (S NF)

Thus, in spite of the undercurrents of dissatisfaction, Pak's political style is generally in line with Korean tradition, and he has substantial assets in terms of bases of support, institutional development, and political-economic programs that make it likely that he will be able to hold on to power into the 1980s. (S NF)

**Sources of Copyrighted Photographs**

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Page 8: *President Pak Chong-hui*; Forbes Inc.,  
New York, N.Y., 30 April 1979

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PAGE 1 - 876

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE: DOS REVIEWED 03-Jul-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/4/99 (GLEYSTEN, WILLIAM) GR=M

TAGS: PPR, KS, KN, US, OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF INITIATIVE WITH PRESIDENT PARK  
 TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

REF: STATE 139719

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: PRESIDENT PARK TOLD ME HE WOULD REVIEW WITH HIS STAFF AND THEN RESPOND TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROPOSAL THAT THE US AND ROK JOINTLY PROPOSE A NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA/US TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING TO TEST PYONGYANG'S INTENTIONS. PARK INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE LESS TROUBLED BY A TRIPARTITE MEETING IN WHICH THE US AND ROK WERE "ON THE SAME SIDE" THAN BY ONE WHERE THE US WAS AN "INTERMEDIARY." HE BELIEVES THERE IS NO CURRENT PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS WITH NORTH KOREA EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE MERIT IN A DIPLOMATIC GESTURE TO TEST NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS. HE INDICATED THAT THE LACK OF A US DECISION ON THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE WOULD COMPLICATE HIS CONSIDERATION OF A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, AND HE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER NORTH KOREA'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND ROK. ALTHOUGH PARK TOOK THE PRESENTATION IN A FRIENDLY, MATTER-OF-FACT WAY, I THINK WE WILL HAVE AN UPHILL BATTLE IN TRYING TO CONVINCING THE ROKG OF THE UTILITY OF A DRAMATIC PROPOSAL AND TO DAMPEN SUSPICION THAT OUR POLICY TOWARD PYONGYANG IS ON THE EVE OF CHANGES. TO THE EXTENT WE CAN EMPHASIZE OUR ROLE AS AN ALLY, OUR TASK WILL BE EASIER. END SUMMARY.

3. AS INSTRUCTED I SAW PRESIDENT PARK TODAY TO TELL HIM THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD LIKE HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO KOREA TO RESULT IN A JOINT US/ROK PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE SUMMIT TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA TO TEST PYONGYANG'S WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE TENSIONS. I STUCK CLOSELY TO THE FORMULATIONS USED REFTEL, STRESSING THE CONSTANCY OF OUR BASIC

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

POLICY ON NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR DETERMINATION TO PREVENT NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT THE ROK'S POSITION. IN ADDITION, I (A) REVIEWED BRIEFLY WITH PARK RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN PYONGYANG AND PEKING WHICH HAVE LED VISITORS TO BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE BEING LESS UNREASONABLE, IN PART TO ENCOURAGE DIRECT US/NORTH KOREAN TALKS; (B) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS FOR REDUCING NORTH/SOUTH KOREAN TENSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE THE ROK AND DPRK WITH THE US PLAYING A SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE AS AN ALLY WITH MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN THE ROK; AND (C) NOTED THAT A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BUILD ON PARK'S OWN INITIATIVE OF JANUARY 19 IN WHICH HE OFFERED TO MEET WITH NORTH KOREANS AT ANY PLACE, ANY TIME, ANY LEVEL, WITHOUT CONDITIONS.

4. PARK APPEARED TO TAKE MY PRESENTATION AS A FRIENDLY, STRAIGHTFORWARD EXPLORATION. BASICALLY HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THE MATTER ENOUGH THOUGHT AND WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT WITH HIS STAFF BEFORE GIVING US HIS REACTION. HE SAID HE HAD HIMSELF MADE AN OFFER ON JANUARY 19 EMBRACING THE IDEA OF A NORTH/SOUTH SUMMIT MEETING, SINCE THAT TIME HE HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY BASIC CHANGE IN THE NORTH KOREAN STAND. FROM WHAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD TOLD WALDHEIM AND CORRESPONDENTS AS WELL AS WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM OF CHINESE COMMENTS TO HOLBROOKE, HE SUSPECTED A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT PROPOSAL WOULD PROVE FUTILE. NEVERTHELESS, HE RECOGNIZED WHY WE MIGHT WANT TO TEST NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS THROUGH A DIPLOMATIC GESTURE, AND THAT THE PROS AND CONS OF DOING SO SHOULD BE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY.

5. PARK NOTED THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO KINDS OF TRIPARTITE MEETINGS: THE KIND ARRANGED BY PRESIDENT CARTER BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL WHERE THE PRESIDENT WAS ESSENTIALLY AN INTERMEDIARY AND THE KIND WHERE PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE "ON OUR SIDE." IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION AS TO WHICH WE HAD IN MIND, I SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF I OBTAINED AN AUTHORITATIVE WASHINGTON STATEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE ROK AND US WERE ALLIES AND I COULD NOT ENVISAGE A SUMMIT WHERE OUR BEHAVIOR WOULD NOT ALWAYS REFLECT THIS BASIC FACT. WE WERE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT THE ROK'S STATUS BY TRYING TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH US.

6. PARK ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE HAD IN MIND BEGINNING WITH A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT MEETING OR PERHAPS "TITO-STYLE," BEGINNING WITH LOWER LEVEL MEETINGS LEADING TO A SUMMIT.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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I SAID THAT OUR CURRENT CONCEPT WAS A TRIPARTITE SUMMIT. THIS DID NOT MEAN WE WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN ROK SUGGESTIONS FOR SOME OTHER TRIPARTITE FORUM. MOREOVER, WE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTINUING ARRANGEMENTS FOR NORTH/SOUTH KOREAN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

7. PARK PROMISED TO STUDY OUR PROPOSAL PROMPTLY AND CONVEY HIS REACTIONS TO ME ON WASHINGTON IF HE HAD ANY DEFINITIVE VIEWS BEFORE MY RETURN TO SEOUL. HE SAID HE WISHED TO REMIND ME OF THREE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS: FIRST, HE FELT THAT THE PROPER US APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN THE SAME FIRM POSITION WE HAD TAKEN SO FAR. THE US SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO NORTH KOREA BUT SHOULD INSTEAD CONTINUE TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE PRC AND SOVIETS TO ENCOURAGE A MORE MODERATE NORTH KOREAN STAND. SECOND, WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WERE CONSIDERABLY REASSURED ON THE SECURITY QUESTION, THERE WAS STILL CONTINUING CONCERN. ALMOST ALL SOUTH KOREANS SHARED PARK'S OPINION THAT THE US SHOULD NOT WITHDRAW ANY FURTHER GROUND FORCES. YET, IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE HAD NOT REACHED A DECISION ON THIS MATTER. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO UNDERTAKE A DRAMATIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. FINALLY, HE REITERATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD FOUND NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM IN THE RECENT DIALOGUE AT PANMUNJOM. WHATEVER THEIR PROPAGANDA, THE BASIC THRUST OF PYONGYANG'S POSITION WAS TO IGNORE AND REPUDIATE THE ROK AND SEEK TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US. FORTUNATELY THE US HAD BEEN VERY ALERT TO THIS AND SO FAR, SOUTH KOREA HAD BEEN VERY REASSURED. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE VERY CLEAR ON THIS POINT AND THAT HE COULD REST ASSURED.

8. COMMENT: I CANNOT AT THIS POINT PREDICT JUST WHAT PRESIDENT PARK'S MEASURED RESPONSE WILL BE. ON THE ONE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HAND, HE WAS MORE RELAXED THAN I HAD EXPECTED AND ON THE OTHER HIS DEEP SUSPICION AND FEAR OF NORTH KOREAN MANIPULATION WERE MANIFEST, OUR DIALOGUE HAS GOTTEN OFF TO A CALM START AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL WITH EXPLANATIONS WHICH SHOULD HELP CALM CERTAIN FEARS. WE ARE, HOWEVER, FIGHTING AN UPHILL BATTLE. AMONG THE OBSTACLES THAT WE MUST OVERCOME ARE: (A) THE ANXIETY THAT WE ARE DELIBERATELY SEEKING TO CREATE A DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE TO JUSTIFY OUR ORIGINAL TROOP WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE OR INADVERTENTLY OPENING OURSELVES TO PYONGYANG PRESSURE ON THE SECURITY ISSUE; (B) FEAR THAT THE US WILL BE COMPELLED BY THE SWEEP OF EVENTS TO ARRANGEMENTS DENEGRATING THE EQUAL STATUS OF THE ROK IN RELATION TO THE DPRK; (C) CONVICTION THAT LESS DRAMATIC MEASURES ARE CALLED FOR TO RESOLVE SUCH A LONG, BITTER CONFRONTATION.

9. I WILL BE PREPARED TO AMPLIFY ON RETURN TO WASHINGTON. GLEYSTEN

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**“Negotiations between North and South Korea,” 5 June 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, “Relations Between North & South Korea,” National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

[...]

EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: POLITICAL COMMITTEE, PARIS  
5/6 JUNE 1979

[...]

**ITEM 2: NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA**

1 Mr Ruggiero said that efforts were being made to suggest that the dialogue between North and South Korea was genuine; in fact it was non-existent. The two positions were incompatible, and no solution was possible. The question was rather how to prevent the issue from reaching a level of dangerous tension. Mr Murray agreed that there was little sign of genuine dialogue; deadlock had been reached after only three sessions. Why had the North suggested the talks? Possible motives seemed to be: to create a forum in which spokesmen from the North would be united, those from the South divided; to demonstrate the North's peaceability, lest the United States should think they further slow down the withdrawal of their forces; to make easier their access to the West, by being seen to be negotiating with the South; to satisfy the Non-Aligned countries. It seemed especially likely that they had an eye to the US Congress.

2 According to Mrs Lindsay-Poulsen (Denmark), the South Koreans recognized that there was no chance of a genuine dialogue; but they had said that they would try to use the talks to solve the human problems. She thought the North Koreans had been frightened by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam; perhaps they had suggested talks because they were afraid of being squeezed between the Soviet Union and China. M Leclercq (France) agreed that there was no genuine dialogue. The North were seeking a straight-forward reunification, bypassing the problem of the different Governments, while the South wanted to reaffirm the independent existence of their Government. The South had no need of reunification; their economic success made it unnecessary. Furthermore, the economic gap between the two countries would grow wider.

3 Mr Ruggiero pointed to one advance achieved by the intervention of Dr Waldheim. The two permanent observers at the United Nations could now talk at official level; it must be remembered, though, that they were observers, not representatives. Mr Ahrens (Germany) estimated that talks at the UN would not get far, because the North would not abandon its non-recognition of the South. Both sides must have been aware that nothing would come of the negotiations; perhaps they had hoped that pressure on them to recognize each other would diminish if they were seen to be in contact.

4 Mrs Lindsay-Poulsen said that she had been told by the South Koreans that North Korea was less keen on US withdrawal, now that Chinese criticism of her had increased. M Leclercq agreed that it was important to remember that each Korea was allied to one of the Great Powers, none of

which was concerned to push the negotiations very far; it was therefore most unlikely that they would make progress. Reunification would require compromise, and modifications of the border, which would displease the Russians. M Noville summed up that the negotiations had achieved no results, and were unlikely to do so; but said that they did demonstrate a change of direction in South Korea, which, given the anachronism of the situation, could only be a good thing.

5 Mr Murray wished to seek information on three further points. First, the level at which Kim Jong-pil would be received in the other countries he planned to visit in June. Second, whether Shin Hyon-hwak (the South Korean Deputy Prime Minister) would be visiting other countries, and what plans such countries had for receiving him. Third, whether other countries were planning to take official note of the refusal of the North to allow the South to compete in the World Table Tennis Championships in North Korea. The United Kingdom had been unable to take an official stand, since the three British Table Tennis Associations were non-Governmental, but we were considering whether to make our views known to the ITTF.

6 Mr Hoytink said that Kim Jong-pil would be received formally by the Queen and the Prime Minister would have talks with the Foreign Minister, and given lunch by him, and would also meet the Presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament. But it would not be a State Visit. Mr Petersen said that Kim Jong-pil would be received at a high level in Germany; the Reichskanzler himself would see him if he were available. M Devolder (Belgium) said that Kim Jong-pil would be received by both the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Trade. It had not yet been decided whether he should see the King or the Prime Minister. M Leclercq said that Kim Jong-pil's status and objectives were not very clear; he would be seen by the Secrétaire General de la Présidence de la République, and by someone in the Foreign Ministry. Mr Hoytink explained that it was because Kim Jong-pil was the personal representative of President Park that the Queen was to receive him. Mr Ruggiero said that Kim Jong-pil had not asked to come to Italy, perhaps because of the forthcoming elections there.

7 Mr Hoytink, Mr Petersen, M Devolder and Mr Ruggiero said that Shin Hyon-hwak was not coming to their countries. M Leclercq said that he was coming to Paris on two accounts; first, as Deputy Prime Minister, and second for the Aid Consortium Meeting. He would be received by M Barre, who had met Shin Hyon-hwak as Minister of Foreign Trade before he became Prime Minister. Mrs Lindsay-Poulsen remarked that the Danes had recently received a request from the North Koreans to visit Copenhagen. Her Government would probably have to agree; but they would try to keep the talks to an official level.

7 Mr Hoytink said that there had been a debate in the Dutch Parliament about the ping-pong problem, but the Sports Minister had been unable to take any action, since the Dutch Table Tennis Association was non-Governmental. Mr Petersen and M Leclercq said that their Governments had no plans for any intervention on this issue. M Devolder said that his Government had no power to instruct the Belgian Table Tennis Association; but, were their advice to be sought, they would not encourage the Association to support the North Koreans' action.

**“Note for the File: Meeting with Ambassador Han Si Hae (DPRK) on 1 June 1979,” 5 June 1979**

*[Source: “Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

[...]

NOTE FOR THE FILE

MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HAN SI HAE (DPRK) ON 1 JUNE 1979

- The Ambassador came to enquire about the Secretary-General's talks in Seoul and about any American reaction to the advances made by his government. The Secretary-General informed the Ambassador about his meetings in South Korea and said that he had conveyed the DPRK's views to the Acting Secretary of State as well as to President Carter.
- The Ambassador did not yet have a final reply to the Secretary-General's suggestions regarding an observer for the Korean dialogue. This matter was still being considered and he would inform the Secretary-General as soon as possible.
- Ambassador Han Si Hae referred to some negative press reports in the ROK about the Secretary-General's suggestions. According to these reports the ROK Foreign Minister had strongly denied that there was a question of good offices. He had also rejected the idea of tripartite [sic] talks. The Secretary-General said that it had been agreed to keep his suggestions confidential until a final answer was received by the DPRK. At no point the ROK officials had told him that they would propose the idea of trilateral talks.
- The Secretary-General informed the Ambassador that he had asked Mr. Perez de Cuellar to follow the Korean question.

F. Mayrhofer (signature) / 5 June 1979

## **Plan of Response to the U.S. Proposal for Three-Way Talks, 7 June 1979**

*[Source: Roll 2009-36, File 01, Frames 43-51, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

CONFIDENTIAL

Plan of Response to the U.S. Proposal for Three-Way Talks

June 7, 1979

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[...]

### Plan of Response to the U.S. Proposal for Three-Way Talks

#### I. The U.S. Proposal

Ambassador Gleysteen proposed on June 4, 1979, that the proper authorities of the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) begin consultations for the heads of both countries to announce a joint proposal to the North Korean puppet regime for either a summit meeting or high-level talks among the ROK, the United States, and North Korea during President Carter's visit to Korea.

#### II. Problems with the Three-Way Talks Proposal and Basic Preconditions

1. Such a dramatic American proposal is valid only when the bond between the United States and the ROK appears firm to everyone. During the current situation where there are serious threats from the North Korean puppets and tensions between the two Koreas, it is possible that the American proposal could raise the following problems.

A. Recent re-evaluations have revealed an increase in North Korea's military strength, so it is highly possible that the North Koreans will misjudge that the proposal is coming from weakness on our side.

B. The proposal could generate the illusion of a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations to the Korean people and weaken their sense of national security.

C. It could provide a pretext for Japan and other countries in the West to improve relations with the North Korean puppets. In contrast, it would be difficult to expect communist countries to change their attitude towards the ROK. Therefore, the proposal could potentially lead to the loss of balance in the two Korea's diplomacy in the international arena.

2. Consequently, whether President Carter has firm resolve regarding security issues such as the U.S. security commitment to the ROK and deferral of additional withdrawals of American ground troops in Korea will be a precondition for examining the American proposal.

#### III. The Position of Our Side

(1) We will not completely reject the American proposal of June 4 and will decide upon our course of action after grasping the motives and details of the American proposal. If the proposal is unfavorable to our national interests, we will present an alternative plan and ask for cooperation from the American side.

(2) We must prepare for the danger that it could be used against us by the North Korean puppets – what are the hidden motives behind the U.S. plan (is it a pretext to withdraw troops?)

#### IV. Plan of Response

##### 1. Grasp the motives behind and details of the American proposal

Obtain sufficient explanation from the Americans about the following matters.

A. Does President Carter himself believe that the American security cooperation with the ROK is strong enough to be able to propose a three-way summit?

B. A clear definition of the three-way conference

Would the U.S. and ROK become one side while the North Korean puppets become the other? Or would each country be an independent party? Who would preside over the conference, and how will the conference be held?

C. What would be the agenda of the conference?

- Withdrawal of American troops stationed in Korea (we oppose this)
- North-South non-aggression pact
- North-South exchanges (including economic exchanges)
- Entry into the UN
- Whether or not the issue of divided families reunions will be included?

D. The time and Venue of the conference?

- Are plans being made to hold a Camp David-style conference, like the Middle East negotiations?

- How does [Carter/the U.S.] view the statement made by Kim Yong Nam, Director of the International Department of the Korean Worker's Party, on May 9, 1979, that the that the Korea question is different from the Middle East issue?

E. Preliminary contact before the main conference and holding the conference

How are plans for procedures being made?

Emphasize that all three parties will participate in all meetings related to the preliminary and main conferences, but the conferences' leading players will be the North and South.

F. What are the real intentions behind the U.S. proposal for the three-party talks when they also say there is a slim chance the North Korean puppets will agree to participate?

Do they think the three-way talks are just for show domestically and abroad, or are they hoping for real negotiations with the North Korean puppets? (The statement by Director of the International Department Kim Yong Nam on May 9: North Korea is demanding to replace the armistice agreement with a U.S.-North Korean peace treaty and negotiations on the withdrawal of U.S. troops.)

G. If three-party talks are held, the U.S. and ROK governments must reconfirm that they will sufficiently consult with each other beforehand on all issues, including procedures and agendas, and will deal with the North Korean puppets based on agreed, shared set of positions.

## 2. Our Alternative Plan

Because a three-party talks proposal plan is as of yet undecided upon, an alternative plan is presented here (This is an alternative plan to be presented to the American side if during the process of questioning and consulting with the American side a situation occurs where our side cannot accept the original [American] plan).

A. Proposal to hold a North-South summit meeting: In an effort to restart North-South dialogue, which was halted unilaterally by the North in August 1973, our side proposed to the North on January 19, 1979, that dialogue take place between representatives of both sides at any time, any place or at any level. Regretfully, this proposal has seen no progress whatsoever. Dialogue between representatives of both sides is indispensable to ease tensions and bring peace to the Korean Peninsula, and our side is willing to propose the holding of a North-South summit meeting to jump-start the currently gridlocked dialogue process. If this happens, we will propose holding a high-level preliminary conference to prepare for the summit conference. We hope that President Carter will support this proposal when he visits the ROK.

B. Consider the Observer Proposal Presented by the U.N. General-Secretary: Coincidentally, U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim visited North and South Korea during the month of May. Following a proposal that he himself mediate the restart of halted North-South dialogue and observe the proceedings, the secretary-general has been contacting the U.N. ambassadors of North and South Korea in New York. It would be desirable to give this proposal an opportunity to play itself out since our side has shown a positive response to it and Kim Il Sung has promised to seriously examine it as well.

C. The joint U.S. and ROK proposal for three-party talks is aimed at bringing about an easing of tensions and ensuring peace on the Korean Peninsula and it is believed that it will contribute to achieving this goal. A request for consultations on the following two issues which the U.S. President could address directly should be made. (Secretary of State Vance also advocated cross-recognition and UN entry during a policy speech he gave on June 29, 1977).

1. Cross-recognition of North and South Korea by the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan: The U.S. should approach the leadership of both the Soviet Union and Communist China and emphasize that if they display a friendly attitude toward the ROK, the United States could adopt a favorable attitude toward North Korea. It should encourage them to cross-recognize North and South Korea in the spirit of promoting peace on the Korean peninsula and fairness.

2. North-South Korea U.N. entry: The United States should encourage the Soviet Union and Communist China to take steps for North and South Korea's separate entry into the U.N. as a transitional measure prior to unification. The entry of the two Koreas into the U.N. will have the



effect of establishing what would effectively serve as a durable arena for inter-Korean dialogue for preventing the resumption of war and bringing about peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula.

D. Continue working-level consultations between the United States and the ROK on the three-party talks issue. End.

**Report from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, London, “Republic of Korea Government's Initiatives for Peace and Unification of Korea: South-North Dialogue,” 7 June 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, Relations Between North & South Korea, National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

1. Republic of Korea Government's Initiatives for Peace and Unification of Korea: South-North Dialogue.

a. In August 1970, President Park, stressing that the renunciation by north Korea of its scheme to communise the whole Korean peninsula is a prerequisite to peaceful unification, called for contacts between the south and the north of Korea. In the following year, the south-north Red Cross conference took place for the first time since the Korean war. On July 4th 1972, the South-north Joint Communique was issued and several south-north conferences were held alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang, until north Korea suddenly and unilaterally suspended the dialogue in August 1973.

b. On June 23rd 1973, the ROK Government enunciated the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification whereby the Republic of Korea, among other things, opened its doors to even those Communist countries not hostile to the ROK on the principles of reciprocity and equality.

c. North Korea, even when the south-north dialogue was going on, began to construct an unidentified number of aggression tunnels under the DMZ. So far, we have uncovered three tunnels of considerable size within DMZ area.

d. In the meantime, the ROK Government had repeatedly, but in vain, urged north Korea to return to the conference table.

e. On January 19th 1979, President Park, in his New Year press conference, laid down a new positive proposal for the resumption of the suspended south-north dialogue. He urged that “the authorities of south and north Korea meet each other and have a dialogue at any time, at any place and at any level without any preconditions .....

f. North Korea responded to President Park's call for resumption of the dialogue and three meetings took place at Panmunjom in February and March, but north Korea sent its delegation under the name of so-called “democratic front for the unification of the fatherland”, which was formed just before the Korean war as an organisation to support “all front warfare” in the Korean peninsula, and maintained to have “whole nation conference” comprising of 1500 persons from each side representing political parties, social organisations and other individuals. North Korea showed no sincerity at all, and only revealed its disguised peaceful gesture aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of United States forces from Korea and wooing especially the Western European nations. So the dialogue, rather than two monologues, stopped again.

2. North Korea's Strategy and Tactics.

a. Since its invasion of the ROK, in 1950, north Korea K never abandoned its ambition to communise the whole Korean peninsula by all means. North Korea has been continually building up its military strength, elevating the level of the armed forces up to 600,000. This is a wellknown fact to western governmental and civilian analysts.

b. North Korea insists on dealing directly with the United States on the Korean question, totally disregarding the ROK. It is even calling for conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States.

### 3. Elements essential to the maintenance of Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula.

a. The presence of the United States forces in the ROK has definitely played a vital role as a deterrent to the recurrence of war in Korea and it will continue to play an important role in maintaining stability in that area. In this context, we are very appreciative of the view taken by the British Government that the presence of United States forces in the ROK contributes to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia as well.

b. Geographically, the ROK is located in a less advantageous place because the ROK is far away from its friendly countries, United States, United Kingdom and other Western European countries, who are supposed to offer military assistance at a time of crisis, while north Korea is adjacent to China and Soviet Russia.

c. Even now, after six years since the ROK declaration of the Special Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification of June 23rd 1973, all the countries of the Communist bloc who always stand united behind north Korea, remain unimproved as far as their relationship towards the ROK is concerned. On the contrary, a considerable number of western countries, who used to support the ROK only, has extended its recognition to north Korea. Fortunately, the major powers of the western world, the core members of the NATO such as United Kingdom, France and West Germany, have maintained with consistency their policy not to recognise north Korea.

d. If any one of the core members of the NATO recognises north Korea, the present balance in the Korean peninsula will be immediately upset and it will prove to be seriously detrimental to maintaining peace and stability in that area. It will mean an extremely dangerous and painful blow to the ROK, especially in view of the fact that north Korea insists on dealing directly with the United States on the Korean question, excluding the ROK.

e. In view of the above-described factors, which are directly related to the very survival of the Republic of Korea, it is most earnestly requested that the British Government continue to pursue its existing policy to support the position of the ROK Government and not to recognise north Korea.

7th June 1979  
Embassy of the Republic of Korea  
London

MEMORANDUM

3508-~~yy~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET w/~~  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 8, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
FROM: NICK PLATT *NP*  
SUBJECT: Policy Review Committee Meeting  
on Korea (S)

A memo to the President attaching a <sup>revised</sup> summary of the PRC meeting on Korea June 8 is at Tab I. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send it to the President. (U)

*NP*  
*This doc as reflects*  
*what I said -*  
*for option I will be*  
*maintained - with refinement*  
*of the Defense Committee*  
*+ accomodation on numbers.*  
*2R.*

~~SECRET w/~~  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

ORIGINAL CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECL  REVW ON June 8, 1985

EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY \_\_\_\_\_  
REASON \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER *9/10/89 NLS H/RE NLC-97-73*  
BY *[Signature]* NARS. DATE *2/12/89*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Policy Review Committee Meeting  
on Korea (TS) S

I attach for your information a summary of the PRC meeting June 8 to discuss policy toward Korea. The meeting was a preliminary exchange from which no firm conclusions or recommendations emerged. ~~The most striking feature of the discussion was agreement on the inter-relationship between troop withdrawal policy options and virtually all other issues. Adoption of a withdrawal formula that bolstered Park's confidence in the U.S. commitment would~~

~~pressure the ROK on the nature and scope of force improvement expenditures, proceed with diplomatic initiatives toward the North, supply less sophisticated military hardware to the ROK, and even encourage Park to be more responsive on human rights issues. The reverse effect would flow from a decision which cast doubt on our staying power. (TS)~~

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECL  REVW ON June 8, 1985

EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY \_\_\_\_\_  
REASON \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 9/10/92 NCL/HRE NCL-97-73  
BY J NARS DATE 2/12/94

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 9, 1979

*PRC/10*

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM:

NICK PLATT *NP*

SUBJECT:

Policy Review Committee Meeting  
on Korea (S)

A memo to the President attaching a revised summary of the PRC meeting on Korea, June 8, is at Tab I. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memo to the President. (U)

*Wald R. 5*

~~SECRET~~ with  
~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment  
Review June 9, 1985

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER *g/k* ~~TOP SECRET~~ ARE *ALC-97-73*  
BY *g* NARS DATE *2/12/94*

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI  
SUBJECT: Policy Review Committee  
Meeting on Korea (S)

I attach for your information a summary of the PRC meeting, June 8, to discuss policy toward Korea. The meeting was a preliminary exchange from which no firm conclusions or recommendations emerged. (S)

~~SECRET with~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

Review June 8, 1985

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 9/10/18 NSC H/RE ALL 47-73  
BY J NARS DATE 2/12/94

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 6, 1979

drop without  
under issue  
F-16's

delay any indication  
of return until after  
consultations in  
Tokyo / Seoul

general  
intent

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: NICK PLATT/KP

SUBJECT: PRC Meeting on PRM-45 Thursday,  
June 7, 1979

A Policy Review Committee meeting chaired by Cy Vance is scheduled to review PRM-45 at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 7. The key issues to be decided are:

- What adjustments should be made, if any, in the schedule of U.S. ground force withdrawals from the ROK.
- How we relate adjustments in [redacted] our ground force withdrawal plan.
- The nature and timing of related diplomatic initiatives to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula.
- The nature of ROK and U.S. measures to improve the military balance.
- The timing and sequence of consultations with our allies and Congress, the decision, and the announcement.

The PRM response (Tab B) is a competent review of the situation. The executive summary, pages i-xvi, covers the substance of the paper adequately. An agenda for the meeting submitted by State and circulated to all participants is at Tab A.

The North-South Balance

The meeting will begin with a brief discussion of the North-South military balance. The basic judgment, made in the PRM

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ORIGINAL CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECL  REVW ON June 6, 1999

EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY Z. Brzezinski  
 REASON NSC 1.13(f)

SANITIZED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 PER al/ra/99 NSC HORE NLC-97-73  
 BY [signature] NARS DATE 2/12/99



response and backed by a DOD Military Annex (Tab C) and a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate (Tab D), state "both now and in 1982, it is doubtful that the ROK, even with timely U.S. air, naval, and logistical support, could halt a major North Korean surprise attack north of Seoul." This stands in contrast to the estimate made in 1977 in response to PRM-13 that "South Korea should be able to defend itself against an attack by the North without the involvement of U.S. ground combat forces if adequate and timely air, naval, and logistic support is provided." What has not changed is the direct role of U.S. ground combat forces in this military assessment: They make little difference in either 1977 or 1979. Their importance is their role in deterrence.

The different judgment in 1979 results from a larger and more precise intelligence community perception of North Korean strength rather than real changes in Pyongyang's military production or deployments. The data base which supported the original estimate was incomplete. However, regardless of whether one is dealing with perceptions or reality, the new judgment places a much higher premium than before on the symbolic deterrent value of the 2nd Division in Korea.

#### Policy Options -- Ground Force Withdrawals

The PRM response presents four ground force withdrawal policy options, roughly summarized as follows:

- I. Continue with the current schedule.
- II. Stretch out and slow down the current schedule.
- III. Stretch out and slow down the current schedule, making completion of the final stages of withdrawals explicitly contingent upon reduction of tensions and improvement of the military balance.
- IV. Suspend further withdrawals.

All options require a reassessment of the military balance and the political situation in 1981.

These options should be judged by how effectively they support:


- U.S. credibility as an ally in Asia and to a lesser extent in the rest of the world;
- the President's credibility as a decision-maker;
- incentives for greater ROK self-reliance;
- incentives for North Korea to reduce tension through diplomatic means.

The option which best serves these objectives is No. II. To continue the current schedule (Option I) in spite of the new intelligence estimate would undermine U.S. credibility in Asia and fuel apprehensions in other parts of the world about our steadiness and staying power. To stop all withdrawals (Option IV) would strongly reassure the Asians, but add significantly to an image of inconsistency and vacillation on the President's part, lower ROK incentives for force improvement and encourage hard-liners in Pyongyang. To stretch out the schedule to a point, leaving final withdrawals contingent on diplomatic progress for ROK force improvement (Option III) would encourage neither development and deprive us of flexibility. Our Asian allies would regard the point at which the withdrawals end and the contingencies became operative as a de facto halt in the withdrawals and be reassured in that perception. Others would regard it as an artful cover for the President reversing a previous decision.

To stretch and slow the current schedule (Option II) preserves our credibility in Asia -- not dramatically, but adequately. Asian policy makers expect some adjustment in the schedule as a result of our intelligence reassessment, and Option II demonstrates that we are sensitive to the responsibilities imposed by our new perception of North Korean strength. It involves no basic change in the President's policy, but simply a postponement of its completion. The ROK are on notice that they cannot relax efforts to improve their force posture, although they have more time. The North Koreans still have some incentives for a policy of patience and diplomatic action.

(Option II has three sub-options calling for withdrawal of 1,300, 2,300, or 4,300 positions in 1980. I favor the second of these because it is the largest withdrawal that can be made without degrading allied combat capability.)

State and OSD will probably favor Option III, although they may propose a less explicit linkage between final withdrawals, progress toward reduction of tensions, and improvement in the military balance. This is a viable fallback, although I think any linkage deprives us of some flexibility and lowers incentives for action by either Korea. JCS will support Option IV. ACDA had not made up its mind when last I checked. But General Seignious is likely to favor keeping some ground troops in Korea.



#### Diplomatic Initiatives

Discussion on policy initiatives to reduce tensions will flow from the discussion on troop withdrawals [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The PRM response (pp 33-38) provides a useful review of past negotiations, current strategy, and possible further moves. All agencies agree on the need to keep testing the willingness of both Seoul and Pyongyang to take initiatives to reduce tension. A decision to adjust the withdrawal schedule plus the restored degree of trust and confidence between Seoul and Washington accomplished by the President's visit may permit a deeper degree of consultation on tactics and initiatives to sound out Pyongyang's intentions. Ambassador Gleysteen will report in person on the status of our current initiative.

#### Improving the Military Balance

The mix of measures we advocate to improve the military balance on the Korean peninsula also depends upon the troop withdrawal decision. Most simply put, the more we adjust

the troop withdrawal schedule, the more we can ask the ROK to increase their own force readiness and the less compensatory action will be required from us. The PRM response and the Military Annex discuss the problems related to increased ROK defense expenditures without revealing the intensity of the argument within the U.S. Government. DOD favors pressure for a significant increase in the percentage of GNP devoted to ROK defense. The Embassy Country Team, including General Vessey and the State Department, oppose, arguing that major increases in military spending will fuel inflation and encourage militarism in the ROK.

The issues should be brought out at the meeting and the President's feelings in favor of a greater ROK effort made clear. I support pressing the ROK for greater expenditures provided we adjust the withdrawal schedule. The point beyond which the ROK cannot go without causing serious consequences is believed to be 7 percent of GNP. With current expenditures coming to 5.6 percent, there seems to be room for discussion, and you should stimulate it. DOD will also want to outline compensatory measures the U.S. should take, including familiar issues like sale of the F-16, FMS credits, etc.

#### Timing of Consultations and Decisions

The most sensible sequence for consultations, decision-making, and public announcement would be as follows: following this meeting we will submit to the President a memorandum summarizing PRC findings and obtain the President's response. During his second meeting with Prime Minister Ohira, the President will outline in general terms the trend of his thinking. The President will consult in detail with Park and formulate a final decision upon his return to the United States after consultation with Congress. The decision will be announced in the course of a comprehensive speech on U.S. policy toward Asia.

Others, like Dick Sneider, have argued that the impact of the President's announcement would be increased were he to make it while in Korea. This is unquestionably true, if dramatics are the principal criteria. To choose this course, however, would deprive the President of some flexibility and would change the nature of his Korean visit into an intense negotiating session. It would also deprive him of a chance to consult with Congress.

OMB has seen the PRM response and has no special views to offer. Jim Thompson concurs. 3r

POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE

June 8, 1979

TOP SECRET

Time and Place: 9:00 a.m.-9:57 a.m.; White House  
Situation Room

Subject; Korea

Participants:

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance  
(Chairman)  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant  
Secretary of State for  
East Asia  
Leslie Gelb, Director, Bureau  
of Politico-Military Affairs  
Ambassador William Gleysteen

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown  
Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan  
David McGiffert, Assistant  
Secretary, International  
Security Affairs  
Michael Armacost, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary, East Asia, Pacific  
& International-American Affairs

JCS

General David Jones  
Lt. Gen. J. A. Wickham, Deputy  
Director, Joint Staff

DCI

Admiral Stansfield Turner

ACDA

Spurgeon Keeny, Deputy Director  
Barry Blechman, Asst. Director,  
Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC

Nicholas Platt, Staff Member, East Asia  
TOP SECRET  
Review June 8, 1999  
Classified and Extended by ZC Brzezinski  
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(f)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER 4/10/98 NSX HRE NCC-97-73  
BY [Signature] NARS DATE 2/12/99

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSPolicy Review Committee Meeting on Korea

The Policy Review Committee, chaired by Cy Vance, met June 8 to consider the response to PRM-45 on policy toward Korea. The meeting was a preliminary exchange from which no firm conclusions or recommendations emerged. It was agreed that the group should meet again after the Vienna Summit and before departure for Asia. (S)

The Military Balance

Discussion began with a brief statement by Admiral Turner that the rate of increase in the North Korean force posture had slowed. The outlook was for modest qualitative improvements over the next few years, barring an increase in military aid from the Soviet Union. Given the North Korean lead and the constraints on ROK defense spending (of which more discussion below), the ROK would not be on equal terms with North Korea until well into the 1980s. (S)

Ground Force Withdrawal Options

The following options were discussed:

- I. Continue with the current schedule.
- II. Stretch out and slow down the current schedule.
- III. Stretch out and slow down the current schedule, making completion of the final stages of withdrawals explicitly contingent upon reduction of tensions and improvement of the military balance.
- IV. Suspend further withdrawals.

All options require a reassessment of the military balance and the political situation in 1981. (S)

No option was foreclosed in the discussion that followed. Secretary Vance asked whether there was support for continuing the withdrawal as planned. Dr. Brzezinski

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review June 8, 1999

Classified &amp; extended by Z.Brzezinski

Reason for extension: NSC 1.13(f)

~~TOP SECRET~~

responded that Option I could not be dismissed if accompanied by a strong statement reaffirming our security commitment [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He agreed that a review in 1981 would convey a useful message. Other participants felt that continuing the withdrawal as scheduled in the face of the new intelligence estimate would undermine ROK confidence in the US commitment, reduce our leverage with President Park on other issues, and cause a storm of Congressional criticism. Vance, Brown and Ambassador Gleysteen favored Option III. ACDA came out firmly for Option II, and the JCS for Option IV. Everybody agreed on the necessity for a review in 1981, regardless of the option chosen. (TS)



#### ROK Action to Improve Forces

The ROK is currently spending 5.6 pct. of GNP on defense and could go perhaps as high as 6.5 percent. The ROK would not agree to a percentage beyond this, Ambassador Gleysteen maintained. The Korean economy is having growing pains, including fairly severe inflation. Park is being strict about maintaining some spending discipline. The U.S. can, however, press for increases within this range, which, given the size and growth rate of the ROK economy, could represent a considerable increase in the current budget. We are also perfectly justified in making sensible suggestions to the ROK on the nature of their expenditures, urging them, for example, to concentrate on ground forces and to reduce expenditures on submarines, missiles, and aircraft. (C)

On U.S. actions to strengthen ROK readiness, Harold Brown noted that we were committed to sell them the F-16, that the choice of timing was the only decision left, and that we

could not delay much longer. Ambassador Gleysteen noted that ROK expectations were high on this issue but might be tempered if we adjusted the troop withdrawal schedule. (C)

#### Diplomatic Initiatives

There was no specific discussion of diplomatic initiatives to reduce tension. The participants agreed, however, that Park's willingness to cooperate and confidence to proceed in pursuing a relaxation of tensions with the North would depend on which troop withdrawal decision was made. (S)

#### The Timing of Consultations and Decisions

The sense of the meeting was that final decision should await detailed discussions with Park and be announced in a speech on Asia sometime in Mid-July after consultations with Congress and Secretary Vance's trip to Southeast Asia and Australia. When the President sees Ohira in Tokyo on the way to Korea, he need give only a broad description of the options and request Ohira's views. Once he has made a decision, Mike Mansfield could brief the Japanese in detail prior to the announcement. (S)



~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Policy Review Committee Meeting on Korea

The Policy Review Committee, chaired by Cy Vance, met June 8 to consider the response to PRM-45 on policy toward Korea. The meeting was a preliminary exchange from which no firm conclusions or recommendations emerged. It was agreed that the group should meet again after the Vienna Summit and before departure for Asia. S

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- IV. Suspend further withdrawals.

All options require a reassessment of the military balance and the political situation in 1981. S

*idea of  
mitigating*

The majority felt that adoption of Option I in the face of the new intelligence estimate would undermine ROK confidence in the U.S. commitment, and reduce our leverage with President Park on other issues. Most participants favored Option III, although ACDA came out firmly for Option II and the JCS for

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL CL BY Nicholas Platt  
 DECL  REVW ON June 8, 1999


EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY Z.Brzezinski  
REASON NSC 1.13(f)

E.O.12958, Sec.3.6

PER g/10/88 NSC II RE ALL-97-73  
BY O WARS. DATE 2/12/99


~~TOP SECRET~~

No option was foreclosed in the discussion that followed. *Sec Sec*

Vance asked whether there was support for continuing the withdrawal as planned. *Dr Brzozowski* responded that Option I could not be dismissed if accompanied by a strong statement reaffirming our security commitment 

It was agreed that a review in 1981 would convey a useful message. Other participants felt that continuing the withdrawal as scheduled in the face of the new intelligence estimate would undermine ROK confidence in the US commitment, reduce our leverage with President Park on other issues, and cause a storm of Congressional criticism. Vance, Brown and Ambassador Glaysteen favored Option III. ACDA came out firmly for Option II and the JCS for Option IV. *AS*

Option IV Everybody agreed on the necessity for a review in 1981, regardless of the option chosen.



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The sense of the meeting was that final decision should await detailed discussions with Park and be announced in a speech on Asia sometime in mid-July after consultations with Congress and Secretary Vance's trip to Southeast Asia and Australia. When the President sees Ohira in Tokyo on the way to Korea he need give only a broad description of the options and request Ohira's views. Once he has made a decision, Mike Mansfield could brief the Japanese in detail prior to the announcement. 5

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/23/79//235

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
O 122220Z JUN 79 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 6092

SECRET STATE 151247

DOS REVIEWED 14-Jun-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

NODIS  
CHEROKEE  
E.O. 12065 RDS-3, 6/8/99 (HOLBROOKE, RICHARD)

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: KOREA TRILATERAL--RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTRY  
DIALOGUE

REFS: (A) SEDUL 8350, (B) SEDUL 8365

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CONSULTATIONS REPORTED IN REPTELS HAVE BEEN MOST HELPFUL, AND WE ARE PLEASED AT THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND THOUGHTFUL APPROACH OBVIOUSLY BEING TAKEN BY ROKG ON THIS MATTER. AMBASSADOR IS AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FOREIGN MINISTER AND ASSISTANT MINISTER HAVE RAISED.

3. WE FULLY AGREE THAT DRAMATIC NEW INITIATIVES MUST BE MADE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE A FAVORABLE RESULT. JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PROPOSAL BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS WOULD CLEARLY SYMBOLIZE THE ROK-US COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE, AND PRESENT PYONGYANG WITH A PROPOSAL WHICH SHOWS THAT WE CANNOT BE DIVISIVELY MANIPULATED.

4. FOLLOWING REPLIES ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS IN PARA 3 OF REF B.

\*\*\*\*\* WHSR COMMENTS \*\*\*\*\*

AAR,GA,DEN,VP,PLATT

PSN1043831

DTG1122228

TOR11641139

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/23/79//235

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A. AS AMBASSADOR AND CHARGE HAVE MADE CLEAR, WE BELIEVE A PROPOSAL USEFULLY CAN BE MADE FOR A HIGH-LEVEL TRI-LATERAL MEETING, NOT NECESSARILY AT A SUMMIT.

B. YES. USG FEELS CONFIDENT IN OUR SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE ROK AND THE BASIS WHICH THIS PROVIDES FOR DISCUSSING JOINT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. WE UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF FIRMLY MAINTAINING SECURITY ON THE ONE HAND WHILE ON THE OTHER SEEKING TOGETHER TO TEST NORTH KOREAN WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE TENSIONS. THESE TWO HALVES TOGETHER MAKE UP A DYNAMIC ROK-US STRATEGY, AND ONE IS NOT A REPLACEMENT FOR THE OTHER.

C. TRYING TOO CAREFULLY TO DEFINE TRIPARTITE TALKS AT THIS STAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE PRODUCTIVE. THE USG APPROACHES SUCH TALKS FROM THE STANDPOINT THAT: (1) WE ARE INVOLVED BECAUSE WE HAVE MILITARY FORCES ON THE PENINSULA AND WE ARE A SIGNATORY OF THE ARMISTICE; (2) WE ARE THE ALLY OF THE ROK; AND (3) BASIC DECISIONS CAN ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH AGREEMENT OF BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

IN A TRILATERAL MEETING WE EXPECT THAT US AND ROK WOULD COLLABORATE CLOSELY, AND THAT ROK WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN FORMULATING SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS. WE WILL NOT ENTER INTO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH NORTH KOREA WITHOUT ROK AGREEMENT. WE HAVE CONFIRMED THIS ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS.

C. MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF ANY AGENDA IN OUR VIEW IS THAT IT BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION OF ANY SUBJECT PROPOSED BY EITHER SIDE. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT ROK PROPOSALS. HOPEFULLY, A CONFERENCE COULD MOVE PROMPTLY TOWARD SOME EARNEST BY EACH SIDE OF ITS DETERMINATION TO REDUCE TENSIONS. MORE SPECIFIC ISSUES CAN BE WORKED OUT IN CLOSE COLLABORATION BETWEEN ROK AND US LATER, BUT OUR THINKING IS SIMILAR TO ROK PROPOSALS FOR MEASURES SUCH AS NORTH-SOUTH TRADE AND CONTACT, AS WELL SOME MEASURES TO REDUCE MILITARY DANGERS. A FUNDAMENTAL EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF ANY TRILATERAL MEETING SHOULD BE CLEAR ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUALITY OF NORTH KOREAN DEALINGS WITH THE ROK, AND ULTIMATELY THE DEVELOPMENT OF ONGOING MECHANISMS FOR CONTACT AND DIALOGUE.

E. WE DO FAVOR A CLEAR PROPOSAL BEING ANNOUNCED AT THE SUMMIT.

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SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 08/23/79/1235

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

F. WE HAVE NOT PUT THIS PROPOSAL TO THE PRC, ALTHOUGH AT SOME JUNCTURE IT WILL BE USEFUL TO DO SO, AS IS BEFITTING BETWEEN ALLIES ON A MATTER OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE ROKG, WE HAVE RAISED THIS SUBJECT FIRST

WITH PRESIDENT PARK. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE ON A VERY PRIVATE BASIS INFORMED OHIRA THAT ROK AND USG ARE DISCUSSING WHETHER WE MIGHT MAKE SOME KIND OF PROPOSAL DURING THE SUMMIT. WE ARE NOT SOLICITING JAPANESE VIEWS OR CARRYING ON ANY DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER WITH THEM.

G. (PARA 4, REF B) WE AGREE THAT NORTH KOREA HAS APPEARED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR DPRK-US BILATERAL MEETINGS. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY REAL EVIDENCE THAT PYONGYANG WOULD AGREE TO A MEETING SUCH AS WE ARE DISCUSSING, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ROK AND US SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND PROBE THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION. THE COMBINATION OF CHANGES IN NORTH KOREA'S EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT, ROK GROWTH, US SUPPORT FOR ROK SECURITY AND NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES MUST COLLECTIVELY BE PLACING INCREASING PRESSURE ON KIM IL-SUNG TO CHANGE NORTH KOREAN POLICIES. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WHICH ARE CLOSELY COORDINATED BETWEEN THE ROK AND US TO DASH PYONGYANG'S HOPES OF MANIPULATION CAN INCREASE THE PRESSURE FOR THE NECESSARY CHANGE IN THE NORTH'S POLICY OF REJECTING COEXISTENCE.  
VANCE

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PAGE 1 - 919

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE406

DOS REVIEWED 03-Jul-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 08610

NODIS/CHEROKEE

EO 120651 RDS-3 6/13/99 (GLEYSTEN, WILLIAM) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN, US

SUBJECT: KOREA TRILATERAL - FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH  
 FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: STATE 151247

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR PROVIDED FORNMIN WITH ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED DURING LAST WEEK'S DISCUSSION OF TRILATERAL INITIATIVE. FORNMIN, WHO APPEARED APPRECIATIVE, PROMISED TO PASS INFORMATION TO PRESIDENT. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT PURPOSE OF UNDERTAKING WAS NOT TO DO EITHER THE US OR ROK A FAVOR, BUT TO TAKE A TIMELY INITIATIVE IN INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES. HE SAID USG RECOGNIZED THE KOREAN LINKAGE OF SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. HE DISCOURAGED FORNMIN FROM THINKING THERE COULD BE ANY TRADEOFF IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. AS NEXT STEP WE WILL PRESS ROKG FOR MORE DEFINITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

3. PRIOR TO RECEIPT REFTEL, AMBASSADOR SPOKE ALONG SIMILAR LINES IN A JUNE 12 DISCUSSION WITH FORNMIN PAK REGARDING OUR PROPOSAL FOR A TRIPARTITE INITIATIVE. HOWEVER, WE WILL PROVIDE THE ROKG WITH THE SPECIFIC REFTEL RESPONSES.

4. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED TO FORNMIN THE FAVORABLE REACTION IN WASHINGTON TO THE POSITIVE CONSIDERATION GIVEN BY THE ROKG. WE WERE AWARE OF THE RELATION OF OUR PROPOSAL TO ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN BY THE ROK, AND WE APPRECIATED VARIOUS ROK CONCERNS, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT SUBJECTING OURSELVES TO MANIPULATION BY THE NORTH. HE URGED THAT WE NOT BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS BUT FOCUS ON THE TOTAL CONCEPT. THE PURPOSE OF THE UNDERTAKING WAS NOT TO DO EITHER THE US OR THE ROK A FAVOR BUT TO TAKE A TIMELY INITIATIVE GOOD FOR BOTH

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 920

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SIDES. EXCEPT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA OUR RELATIONSHIP WAS GOING VERY WELL. IT WAS IMPORTANT THEREFORE THAT WE BEGIN TO FOCUS ON AREAS OF FUTURE POLICY CONCERN, DEAL WITH THEM IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER, AND WORK HARD TO PRECLUDE THE INITIATIVE FALLING INTO OTHERS HANDS.

5. FORNMIN, WHO SEEMED APPRECIATIVE OF OUR ANSWERS, PROMISED TO PASS THEM ON TO PRESIDENT PARK. HE ASKED IF WE WERE LOOKING FOR A GENERAL OR SPECIFIC STATEMENT IN THE COMMUNIQUE. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WE WERE THINKING OF A GENERAL STATEMENT SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A GENUINE INITIATIVE AND NOT MERELY A PROPAGANDA GESTURE. NOTING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTION, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN SEOUL COULD SPEAK OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS INVOLVING THE ROK, DPRK AND US, WITH OR WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT ESCALATION TO THE SUMMIT. THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE SO SPECIFIC AS TO SUGGEST THAT WE WERE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE MEETING WITH NORTH KOREA, BUT WE COULD INDICATE OUR SERIOUSNESS (AS WELL AS THE SPECIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US) BY STATING THAT THE US AND ROK FOREIGN MINISTERS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CONCRETE PREPARATIONS FOR A TRIPARTITE MEETING WITHIN SOME GIVEN TIME. FORNMIN NODDED WITHOUT COMMENT.

6. REFERRING TO FORNMIN'S COMMENTS TO CHARGE STERN REGARDING POSSIBLE LINKAGE TO THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR SAID WE APPRECIATED THE ROK'S CONCERN TO HAVE A SOLID SECURITY BASE FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. HE SAID WE WERE CONFIDENT THAT OUR POSITION ON THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL ISSUE WOULD BE SOUND EVEN THOUGH THE DECISIONS HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE AND MIGHT NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE SEOUL SUMMIT. PERSONALLY HE FELT CONFIDENT THAT OUR POLICY WOULD ACCOMMODATE ROK CONCERNS. IN THE CASE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT THE ROK DROP ANY THOUGHTS OF LINKAGE. WE SAID WE HAD OUR POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS; PRESIDENT PARK HAD HIS POLICY; AND WE WOULD HAVE TO DO OUR BEST IN COPING WITH OUR DIFFERENCES. OBVIOUSLY WE WOULD NOT CONDUCT OURSELVES IN WAYS THAT WOULD COMPLICATE OUR BASIC RELATIONSHIP, BUT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF OUR BURYING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE IN RETURN FOR PROCEEDING WITH A DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE.

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7. FORNMIN SAID THAT PRESIDENT PARK HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS OPENMINDED ABOUT THE TYPE OF PROPOSAL WE HAD MADE,

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/20/79//171

SITUATION: NODIS IN OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 08610

NODIS/CHEROKEE

PRESIDENT HAD LISTENED CLOSELY TO THE US PRESENTATION AND THEN ASKED THE FORMIN TO INQUIRE ON THE VARIOUS POINTS PREVIOUSLY RAISED. FORMIN STATED THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND ROK BE FIRM AT THIS TIME AND NOT LEAVE ANY ROOM FOR POSSIBLE MISINTERPRETATION BY THE NORTH. OBVIOUSLY, THE NORTH WAS AWARE OF CHANGE IN THE US/ROK SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. THEY WERE ALSO AWARE OF OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. AS A RESULT, THERE WERE THOSE WITHIN THE ROKG WHO FELT THAT THE PRESENT US/ROK POSITION WAS NOT AS STRONG AS IT COULD BE AND THAT ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR STATEMENT BOLSTERING THE RELATIONSHIP.

8. COMMENT: AS A NEXT MOVE WE WILL URGE THE ROKG TO GIVE US A SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL. AMBASSADOR WILL TALK TO SEC GEN KIM OF THE BLUE HOUSE AND POSSIBLY SENIOR KCIA OFFICIALS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO REBUFF CONCEPT OF A HUMAN RIGHTS LINKAGE, BUT IT WILL BE HARDER TO SET ASIDE ROKG CONCERN OVER THE SECURITY ISSUE IN ADVANCE OF SOME CLEAR INDICATION OF HOW WE ARE GOING TO HANDLE FUTURE GROUND FORCE WITHDRAWALS. THUS, WHILE WE MAY BE ABLE TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY INITIATIVE FOR USE AT THE SEOUL SUMMIT, WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO GET FULL ROKG AGREEMENT UNTIL PRESIDENTS CARTER AND PARK PERSONALLY REVIEW THE SECURITY ISSUE. GLEYSTEN

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

The President's Meeting with Park Chung Hee,  
President of the Republic of Korea

I. OBJECTIVES

U.S. Objectives

To reaffirm the U.S. security commitment to Korea; to consult with President Park on our troop withdrawal policy.

To emphasize directly with President Park our concern over human rights in Korea and our view that political liberalization should proceed more rapidly.

To encourage the ROK in its efforts to buy more from the U.S.

Korean Objectives

To secure visible evidence of a strong U.S. security commitment, including if possible a reconsideration of U.S. troop withdrawals.

To symbolize restoration of friendly relations after a period of great strain.

To explain the ROK perspective on North-South Korea problems and prospects and on its internal political situation.

To demonstrate at first hand Korean economic and social achievements.

II. SETTING

Your meeting with President Park will come at a time when US-Korea relations have improved dramatically after two extremely difficult years dominated by the strains of Korea-gate and Korean misunderstanding of U.S. intentions with

Human rights discussion will be most effectively managed in your more private time with the President when your personal commitment can be manifested quite clearly. The need to assure both Koreans and Americans that we have raised the issue will be achieved by inclusion of appropriate references in your semi-public statement and by including a meeting with human rights leaders on your schedule. Korean doubts about the U.S. commitment to ROK security diminish our influence over human rights developments.

In the economic sphere, we have worked together constructively, and the ROK has been a cooperative and active trading partner. Our interest here lies in acknowledgment to Park of the major strides the country has taken under his leadership and the constructive approaches being followed by his economic planners. An expression of your personal interest in trade expansion would be helpful.

Park is not an outgoing personality. However, he is a strong leader accustomed to the exercise of authority. He is quite well-informed and maintains a clear perspective of the developments in the region, albeit from a somewhat parochial standpoint. In manner and thought he is imbued with the Confucian tradition and a pre-war Japanese education. He took over leadership of Korea during a period of weak government and continued economic stagnation eight years after the end of the Korean war. There was no sign of sustained economic growth or even significant reconstruction. Park declared that the needs of the people could not await reunification of the country and set about to energize economic development and restore Korean pride in the nation, its abilities, and its history. He has accomplished these goals far beyond anyone's expectations.

The following talking points cluster around the topics noted above: security and troop withdrawal, human rights, and economic relations.

#### IV. KEY ISSUES

##### 1. Security and Troop Withdrawal

##### A. U.S. Commitment

Essential Factors: Korea's concern for its security is pervasive; it affects almost all other questions. Two well-equipped, well-trained armies which fought

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a bloody war only a generation ago confront each other less than 25 miles from Seoul. The ROK places great value on American involvement in its security, particularly on actual troop presence, and will make it central to the summit.

The U.S. security commitment is rooted in our role as receivers of the Japanese surrender there at the end of World War II, in our position as a Pacific power, in our belief that Korea is crucial to the defense of Japan, and in the growing significance of the ROK as a model of successful development through the engine of a market economy and relative freedom. This commitment has led to our leading role in the Korean War, massive military assistance, stationing of substantial ground and air forces in Korea for nearly 30 years, the explicit availability of the 7th Fleet and other Pacific forces in a Korean contingency, and inclusion of Korea under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."

Apart from the question of intent, the presence on this small peninsula of more than 1.25 million active duty troops, nearly 1,000 fighter aircraft, more than 3,000 tanks and proportionate quantities of other weapons is in itself a dangerous phenomenon. There is also ample evidence of aggressive North Korean intent: tunneling under the DMZ, infiltration of commando units, refusal to recognize the independence of the South, stress on early unification, and devotion of over 20% of GNP to the military (the South Korean defense share is about 6%). The South Korean preoccupation with the threat from the North is understandable, but we have no evidence that the North is preparing to launch an attack in the near future.

Shifting relationships among the great powers, especially those involving China, have complicated the simpler picture of a decade ago in Northeast Asia. Today North Korea is less able to rely on extended support from its allies in the event of war, but there is greater doubt in South Korea about the U.S. capacity and will to play a major security role. They will be interested in our assessment of Soviet regional intentions, including the USSR-Vietnam connection and its implications for Southeast Asia, as well as how we intend to confront it.

Points to be Made:

--Evolving power relationships in Northeast Asia, particularly as China emerges from semi-isolation, provide some opportunities and pose some risks.

--Improved Chinese relations with the United States and Japan are a moderating force on aggressive North Korean action, though obviously not a controlling one.

--On the other hand the Sino-Soviet rivalry has prompted a much greater Soviet military presence in the area than ever before. This trend will be taken into account as policies are assessed. Secretary Vance will be discussing increased Soviet military presence in and military cooperation with Vietnam, with the ASEAN and ANZUS Foreign Ministers at Bali.

--The U.S. security commitment to the ROK and protection of Korea under the U.S. nuclear umbrella remain firm. South Korea is critically important to the security of Japan and the stability of Northeast Asia, and thus to U.S. security.

--Recent intelligence estimates, which the U.S. has shared with the Korean Government, show no lessening of the aggressive capability and posture of North Korea; in fact its war-making capability continues to expand.

--The U.S. intends to maintain its strategic strength throughout the region, and to help its friends and allies meet this greater challenge. We are confident that this can be done.

B. Ground Force Withdrawals

Essential Factors: Revised estimates of North Korean strength have prompted a reassessment of the timing of U.S. ground combat force withdrawals from Korea, but the underlying objective - to shift responsibility for ground defense to the ROK as rapidly as prudence allows -- remains valid. Even after this process is complete, however, there will be strong arguments for retaining a visible U.S. military presence until there is a dramatic reduction in underlying tensions. Otherwise, concern about the threat could lead the ROK to follow policies

and more serious human

Rights problems would be very real. The continued U.S. security commitment will promote stability on the peninsula and in the region, while also retaining some important U.S. influence over ROK defense policy.

The outcome of the U.S. reassessment on troop withdrawal is of critical importance to the ROK. Park will be pleased at the opportunity to discuss his perceptions with you before final U.S. decisions are made. Park does not oppose eventual withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea, but is convinced that to do so before the late 1980's would be dangerously destabilizing.

Although no PRC recommendation has yet been made, PRC discussion has identified various ways we could significantly slow down the withdrawal program while retaining the principle of withdrawal as conditions permit.

Points to be Made:

--On the basis of our study of North Korean military capabilities and other developments in the area, we have been reviewing very carefully appropriate adjustments in our ground force withdrawal plan. We have had a number of meetings on this matter in recent weeks.

--However, a decision has been reserved until we could talk with you and fully receive your own assessment and analysis.

--Your views would be appreciated.

--(after listening to Park) It is important to return to Washington and consult next with key members of the U.S. Congress after hearing your comments today.

--A specific decision can therefore be announced only after return to Washington. However, you should know that I am considering adjustments in the previous schedule.

C. Korean Self-Help Measures

Essential Factors: Korea feels compelled to enhance its self-defense capabilities. This means an ambitious program of military hardware acquisition from the U.S., including a long standing request to buy F-16s (to which we have agreed in principle) and pending requests for a close air support aircraft and submarines. The ROK has also launched a substantial defense production effort which

eventually plans to produce even fighter aircraft. The ROK seeks higher levels of military technology, preferably from the United States, frequently posing difficult choices for the U.S.

Most defense equipment currently produced in Korea is under U.S. license and requires U.S. Government approval of export sales. The ROK is abiding strictly by our third country sales regulations. We have occasionally encouraged Korean exports of certain defense items to promote our security objectives in Africa, ASEAN and elsewhere, when we could not supply them in a timely fashion. We are being cautious lest we make it more difficult to discourage sales which we do not favor.

The ROK has the technological capability to develop and produce a nuclear weapon in a relatively short period, although it has been persuaded not to do so, and continues to rely instead on the U.S. security commitment. President Park has stated that he considers the ROK to be under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and that he intends to abide strictly by the NPT, of which Korea is a signatory.

Points to be Made:

--That the U.S. will cooperate with the ROKG to meet legitimate weapons requirements.

--There are advantages in the growth of appropriate defense industries in the ROK, -- we are prepared to cooperate on a selective basis. Observe that this effort should be limited to cases where there is a clear cost savings or other gain from production in Korea, and where we can both agree that a legitimate military need exists.

--Note that Secretary Brown will discuss in more detail with ROK officials how we may cooperate in providing more rapid delivery of certain military equipment to the ASEAN states.

--(if asked) We are prepared to proceed to enter into an agreement this year for the sale of F-16 aircraft, if wished, but Secretary Brown will be prepared to review priorities with Minister Ro in further detail.



--ROK adherence to the NPT is an essential contribution to regional stability. As Harold Brown has stated earlier, our nuclear umbrella provides added security for the ROK.

## 2. Human Rights and Political Evolution

Essential Factors: President Park came to power in a bloodless coup in 1961. He was elected to a third term in 1971, narrowly defeating Kim Tae-chung. A referendum called by Park in 1972 and conducted under martial law, which he had instituted, endorsed a new and less democratic Constitution. This Yushin Constitution greatly increased the powers of the President, enabling him to appoint one-third of the National Assembly and to issue emergency decrees suspending remaining Constitutional guarantees. A series of such emergency decrees was issued, restricting freedom of expression and political activity. These measures culminated in Emergency Measure No. 9 (EM-9), the only one still in effect, which specifically prohibits the dissemination of false rumors, criticism of the Constitution or advocacy of its reform, media reporting of such activities, and unauthorized political activity by students.

The Korean government points to the danger of aggression by the highly regimented society of North Korea as its justification for EM-9 and other constraints on peaceful expression of dissent and political activity. We view these restrictions as excessive in relation to the threat and contrary to international human rights standards.

Human rights activist leadership is generally middle class, drawn from among the educated and from certain elements of the Christian community. The passive concerns of the general population for greater freedom are unexpressed amid greater attention to daily economic needs. The issue has attracted significant international attention. The repeal of the Emergency Measure is one of the three major objectives of Korean human rights activists which are reflected in U.S. church and Congressional sentiment.

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A second is the release of the more than 200 political prisoners serving sentences after convictions for violation of the Emergency Measure. Since its issuance in 1975, at least 700 people have been charged under this measure. Many times that number have been detained briefly and interrogated. Since 1977, about 130 people convicted under EM-9 have been released from prison prior to the completion of their sentences, most under a form of revocable parole, and some of those have been re-arrested. In late December 1978, former Presidential candidate Kim Tae-chung was released. He has since spoken out actively against human rights abuse and has urged greater political freedom. Although there are some limits on his activity (he is in effect on parole), he has not been re-arrested and is becoming more active politically. One of his secretaries was recently arrested and held for a month.

Since the first of this year we know of 20 new politically related arrests where the individuals are still held, but brief detentions have been much more numerous. Trials and sentencing of individuals arrested in the latter part of last year have continued, and the government has utilized more widely the tactics of questioning, surveillance, short-term house arrest or other harassment as preventive tactics to keep dissidents off guard and limit their opportunity to disseminate their views. Most of these more informal measures, although less serious than arrest and imprisonment, have little or no basis in law and therefore promote an atmosphere of arbitrary action against those who directly challenge the system.

Parallel to these events, however, has been a resurgence of political activity in a significant manner for the first time since the adoption of the Yushin Constitution in 1972 -- despite continuing measures whose broad sweep can be used to stop such activities. Elections were contested vigorously in December for the elected two-thirds of the parliament, but with campaigns constrained by the applicability of EM-9. The principal opposition party held an active and open national convention in May which elected leadership clearly pledged to challenge the government more directly in the future. Former opposition leader Kim Tae-chung has supported this new leadership and has been named an advisor to the party chairman. This growth of partisan politics within the system will test the government's willingness to permit relaxation of control perhaps more importantly even than the activity of those who are seeking immediate adoption of a western-style liberal democracy.

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In March, a petition to you from 37 of the almost 900 U.S. missionaries resident in Korea was temporarily taken from the purse of a visiting missionary during Customs inspection prior to leaving the country and copied. The Government subsequently attempted to lodge a protest with our Embassy in Seoul over this "political activity" and threatened to refuse to extend the residence permits of some of the missionaries who had signed the letter. Our Embassy's strong protests resulted in the granting of such permits to all missionaries whose cases have subsequently come up.

An end to the mistreatment of detainees and greater respect for legal due process -- sharply criticized after the recent visit of New York lawyer Adrian DeWind, sponsored by the International Commission of Jurists -- are the third major objective of the Korean human rights constituency.

Points to be Made:

--U.S. and Korean historical and cultural traditions are very different, and we accept that U.S. and Korean political institutions will differ. We strongly believe, however, that despite differing traditions and institutions the principles of political freedom, the rule of law, and of due process in administering the law are universal.

--The U.S. policy of respect for human rights -- personal, economic and political -- is based on international standards and is also a strongly established part of the American value system. As such it has a direct bearing on our relations with other countries.

--U.S. human rights policy is not selective, it is applied worldwide.

--Korea's achievements in improving the economic rights of its people are truly remarkable. The World Bank has attested to the extent to which the benefits of economic growth have been spread throughout the society.

--In the areas of individual and political rights, and particularly such constraints on freedom of expression and of the press as the emergency measures, U.S. concerns are known. Korean economic development and increasing national strength can be matched by significant strides in civil and political liberties which would attract greater support both domestically and internationally.

--Steps taken to permit the release of human rights activists, political figures, and student and religious leaders produce a positive impression upon all segments of the American public and the Congress.

--Clearly the lifting of EM-9 would have an enormously favorable international impact.

--Congressmen, Senators, and other influential Americans pay close attention to events in Korea, and often raise individual cases. Thus when there are recurring arrests, severe sentences, releases which are only conditional, disbarring of lawyers, and other intimidating measures, the reaction is quite harmful.

--Korean law provides for the humane treatment of detainees in accordance with accepted international standards, but we are concerned that sometimes lower level officials permit mistreatment of detainees, and we urge that steps be taken to prevent this.

--In a spirit of national reconciliation we hope that consideration can be given to further EM-9 and other prisoner releases.

### 3. Economic Relations

Essential Factors: Korea has one of the fastest growing economies in the world, averaging over 10% real annual growth over the past ten years. Starting far behind the North at the time of partition, South Korea's economy reached the size of the North's only in 1976. The South has since pulled far ahead.

The Republic of Korea has rapidly developed into one of the world's leading trading nations. In recent years, the annual growth of exports has averaged 47.3%, rising from \$1.0 billion in 1971 to \$12.7 billion in 1978.

Because Korea relies on exports, it worries about growing protectionism in its major markets, especially our recent restrictions on color TVs and textiles.

Korea meanwhile has been relaxing its own barriers to imports beginning in 1978, primarily to combat inflation but also in response to pressure from its trading partners. Although Korea's trade deficit is growing, Korean economic planners intend to continue import liberalization.

U.S. - ROK trade has become big business, totaling over \$7 billion in 1978. This is our twelfth largest trade relationship. The United States is the largest export market for Korean goods, and we are Korea's second largest supplier (after Japan), with non-military exports of \$3 billion to Korea in 1978.

Our prospects for expanding exports to Korea are particularly bright. Korea is systematically lowering barriers to imports, and also recently announced a policy to correct trade imbalances by encouraging a shift of imports away from Japan (now 40%) toward the U.S. and others. Some elements in Korea advocate giving favorable treatment to American firms in the current bidding on a number of major projects as a means of dampening U.S. protectionist pressures and improving relations with the United States in general.

The latest two nuclear plants represent potential export sales of \$1.4 billion, with huge potential for follow-on sales. The Korean power company has had satisfactory experience with American technology, but some Koreans see our tougher non-proliferation legislation as making us a less reliable nuclear fuel supplier over the long term. We have enlisted congressional support to reassure the Koreans on the fuel issue, but now the Three Mile Island accident has stalled the bid evaluation. We have expressed strong support for American bidders, and retention of our position as the exclusive supplier of Korean light water reactors would serve both our export goals and non-proliferation aims.

We are fortunate that our hope of expanding export sales to Korea is shared by the Koreans. They dispatched a high-powered buying mission to the U.S. earlier this year, and work closely with our Embassy in Seoul, particularly on major projects.

Points to be Made:

--Note with pleasure and admiration the spectacular economic gains made by the Korean people over the past decade. When the vibrant South Korean economy is compared to that of North Korea, it serves as a shining example of the efficacy of the free market road to economic development.

--Korea's steps to further liberalize its economy are welcome; such efforts offer the best hope for future growth and continued prosperity.

--Americans benefit from the goods we buy from Korea. We pledge to keep our markets open, and believe the rapid rise of Korean exports to the U.S. stands as eloquent testimony of that policy.

--We deeply appreciate Korea's understanding of our domestic political and economic problems that impact on our bilateral trade. We believe our best hope for dampening protectionist sentiments in the U.S. lies in the adoption of the MTN, and expanded American exports. We are making strong efforts to improve the competitiveness of American exports.

--We were pleased with your buying mission in April and have noted increased purchases of American goods. We have also noted strong Korean interest in American suppliers for a number of major projects. Such major projects make an important contribution to our trade and economic cooperation and the attitude of our own populace toward protectionist pressures.

--(if Koreans raise) I want to reassure you that our strong non-proliferation concern does not affect our determination to remain a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel. We look for continued close cooperation in this field.

**ROK's Position Regarding the Trilateral Meeting (Draft Plan), 19 June 1979**

[Source: Roll 2009-36, File 01, Frames 62-65, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

ROK's Position Regarding the Trilateral Meeting  
(Draft Plan)

1979. 6. 19

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[...]

ROK's Position Regarding the Trilateral Meeting  
(Guidelines to the Ambassador to the United States)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK informs the Ambassador to the U.S. of the ROK's stance on attending a trilateral meeting as follows. The Ambassador should open negotiations with the U.S. based on the following and report progress as often as possible.

1. The ROK government recognizes that if the ROK and the United States jointly propose a dramatic offer such as a trilateral meeting during President Jimmy Carter's visit, it would have an effect as a diplomatic initiative of the ROK and the United States. The ROK agrees with the view of the American side that we need to sound out changes in the attitude of the North Korean puppets in light of the shifting political circumstances in and outside of the Korean Peninsula.

2. However, after having examined the gains and losses if the North Korean puppets accept the proposal, the ROK side finds that there would be more loss than gain, and that there is high possibility that the ROK would be taken advantage of by the North Korean puppets. Accordingly, the ROK wishes to examine it in a prudent manner.

Specifically, we are concerned about the possibility that the trilateral meeting could assume the format of the Paris negotiations on the Vietnam issue, effectively taking on the form of talks between the United States and the North Korean puppets, thereby strengthening the diplomatic status of the North Korean puppets and consequently weakening the status of the ROK. We are concerned about the possibility that the North Korean puppets would take advantage of any difference that might be exposed between the ROK and the United States. In addition, if the North Korean puppets were to raise military issues such as the U.S. troop withdrawal and the mutual reduction of armed forces, the ROK is of the view that it would be premature to discuss them at this point, and that such discussions must be preceded by a long term preparation period for prior consultations with the United States.

3. However, because the proposal came from President Carter himself, the Korean government is willing to positively consider the proposal for a trilateral meeting if the ROK and the United States can reach a complete agreement on the following measures for complementing the proposal:

a. If the United States is willing to take appropriate measures (for example, to be reflected in a joint statement) that can demonstrate a firm solidarity between our two countries to the North Korean puppets regarding issues of security, politics (being aware that Korean domestic politics could be included), economy, and society, thereby preventing the North Koreans from making a

misjudgment and possibly driving a wedge between Korea and the United States.

b. With regard to the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal, if President Carter could directly and privately guarantee to President Park that no additional troop withdrawal will take place and make an announcement around July 15 (but make it clear that the trilateral meeting is not a condition to be exchanged for the postponement of troop withdrawal).

c. If Korea and the United States can come to a prior agreement on all questions including agenda and procedure and proceed with a joint strategy

d. If Korea and the United States can publicly declare that the key roles in the trilateral talks are to be played by the two Koreas, and if Korea can assume the leading role from our side and the United States takes an auxiliary position. In the proceedings of the meeting, the Korea and the United States should alternate their turn as chief representative.

e. If the statement announcing the proposal declares that such diplomatic proposals are consistent with the spirit of our policies announced on June 23 as well as the proposal offered on January 19.

4. Korea is prepared consult with the United States on the specific methods of pursuing the trilateral meeting only if the two countries can come to a complete agreement on the measures for complementing the proposal as listed in the above (if necessary, the agreement between Korea and the United States can be made in a separate document.)



SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

DOS REVIEWED 05-Jul-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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TO RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA FLASH

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5021

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SECT 6063

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

E.O. 120651

TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INDOONESIAN GOOD OFFICES TO  
 - FACILITATE ROK AND US DISCUSSIONS WITH  
 - NORTH KOREA

EYES ONLY BALI FOR AMBASSADOR MASTERS AND JAKARTA FOR DCM  
 1. THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT PARK, IN SEARCH OF MEANS  
 TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA  
 AND IN THE REGION, HAVE DECIDED JOINTLY TO PROPOSE THE  
 CONVENING OF A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES  
 OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES  
 TO SEEK MEANS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND REDUCE TENSIONS IN  
 THE AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION, BOTH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS SEEK  
 THE GOOD OFFICES OF INDONESIA TO FACILITATE THIS IMPORTANT  
 INITIATIVE. IN ORDER TO BE EFFECTIVE, WE NEED GOI  
 CONCURRENCE AND POSITIVE ACTION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON  
 SATURDAY, JUNE 30.

2. FOR JAKARTA (GARDNER): THE ROK AMBASSADOR IN JAKARTA  
 IS RECEIVING SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS AS THOSE CONTAINED IN  
 THIS MESSAGE. YOU SHOULD URGENTLY MAKE MUTUAL CONTACT AND  
 ARRANGE TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO BALI, WHERE WE UNDER-  
 STAND ALL PERTINENT RESPONSIBLE GOI AUTHORITIES ARE.

3. FOR AMBASSADOR: TOGETHER WITH THE ROK AMBASSADOR,  
 YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDIATE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER  
 MOCHTAR AND INFORM HIM OF THE ABOVE JOINT ROK-US  
 INITIATIVE, WHICH WILL BE ANNOUNCED IN SEDUL SUNDAY AFTER-  
 NOON IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS.  
 YOU SHOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY UNTIL  
 THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE.

4. WE SEEK URGENT CONCURRENCE OF THE INDOONESIAN GOVERN-  
 MENT TO ASSIST US IN THREE RESPECTS:

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//034

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

(1) GIVE PERMISSION FOR US TO PROPOSE THAT A TRIPARTITE MEETING BE HELD IN JAKARTA; (2) TRANSMIT PROMPTLY THIS WEEKEND AN INFORMAL ORAL MESSAGE TO NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES; AND (3) SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMIT FORMJWP WRITTEN MESSAGES FROM OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TO NORTH KOREA AND IN TURN CONVEY TO US THE RESPONSES FROM PYONGYANG.  
 5. EXPRESS REGRET FOR THE SHORT NOTIFICATION, BUT EMPHASIZE THE SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT NATURE OF OUR REQUEST AS WELL AS THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS MATTER, REQUIRING THAT ONLY THE FEWEST POSSIBLE PEOPLE BE INFORMED AT THIS STAGE.  
 6. OUTLINE THE FOLLOWING RAPID SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH WE FORESEE IF THE GOI IS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER ITS GOOD OFFICES:

-- (A) THE GOI SHOULD IMMEDIATELY BY FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS ALERT ITS AMBASSADOR IN PYONGYANG THAT A VERY IMPORTANT MESSAGE WILL BE TRANSMITTED LATE SATURDAY, AND THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT HE ARRANGE IN ADVANCE TO BE ABLE TO PASS THAT MESSAGE TO THE NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER (OR AT LEAST A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL) BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 PYONGYANG TIME SUNDAY MORNING. WE DO NOT WANT TO WISH TO NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES INFORMED PRIOR TO SUNDAY MORNING THAT THE MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED IS ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. THE INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR SHOULD ONLY BE INSTRUCTED THAT AN URGENT MESSAGE IS COMING, AND THAT HE MUST MAKE ADVANCE ARRANGEMENTS TO DELIVER IT.

-- (B) AT 1600 SEOUL TIME SATURDAY (1430 IN JAKARTA) ROK FOREIGN MINISTER PARK WILL CALL IN THE INDONESIAN CHARGE IN SEOUL. HE AND THE SECRETARY TOGETHER WILL PROVIDE THE CHARGE WITH AN INFORMAL MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED ORALLY IN PYONGYANG. (NOTE THAT THIS SCHEDULE REQUIRES OUR CONFIRMATION FROM YOU OF INDONESIAN AGREEMENT.)

-- (C) THE ORAL MESSAGE SHOULD BE DELIVERED IN PYONGYANG SUNDAY MORNING JULY 1 BETWEEN 0800 AND 0900 ON BEHALF OF THE ROKG AND THE USG TO A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL (TO FOREIGN MINISTER HO TAM IF AT ALL POSSIBLE).

-- (D) ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON (OR MONDAY) THE INDONESIAN CHARGE IN SEOUL WILL BE GIVEN A WRITTEN MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER PARK AND THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER HO TAM MAKING A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A TRIPARTITE MEETING TO BE CONVENED IN JAKARTA IN SEPTEMBER.

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SENSITIVE

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/10 : NLC-16-12-6-14-0

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE410

STU770

IIIII OO RUEHC

DE RUEHUL #9745/02 1801615

ZNY SSSSS ZZY

O 291553Z JUN 79 ZFF=4

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN SEOUL

TO RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA FLASH

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5022

BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 6063

NODIS CHEROKEE

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

WE WILL REQUEST THAT THE TEXT BE CABLED TO JAKARTA FOR TRANSMISSION OF THE ENCLOSED MESSAGE TO PYONGYANG AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. (WE WILL ALSO CABLE TEXT TO YOU AND YOU SHOULD CONFIRM RECEIPT BY THE GOI).

7. YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT WE WILL BE REQUESTING THE NORTH KOREANS TO REPLY JOINTLY TO SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT.

8. PROVIDE US A YES OR NO ANSWER BY FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS AND IF AT ALL POSSIBLE PRIOR TO SCHEDULED MEETING WITH THE INDONESIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HERE IN SEOUL SATURDAY AFTERNOON. OPEN TELEPHONE LINE YES WILL BE UNDERSTOOD. IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO MAKE CONTACT THROUGH S/S OFFICE AT HOTEL SHILLA (THROUGH EMBASSY SEOUL SWITCHBOARD). S/S IN TURN CAN TELEPHONE US AT THE OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IF WE ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS THERE.

VANCE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE671

STU943

TTTTT ZZ RUEHC

DE RUEHLH #0012 1810933

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY

Z 300930Z JUN 79

FM USDEL BALI

TO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL FLASH 0010

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0009

BT

SECRET USDEL BALI 00012

NODIS

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION CHEROKEE FOR THE SECRETARY:

STATE ALSO PASS JAKARTA

E.O. 120651

TAGS: OVIP (CARTER, JIMMY)

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INDOONESIAN GOOD OFFICES TO  
 FACILITATE ROK AND US DISCUSSIONS WITH  
 NORTH KOREA

REF: A. STATE 168481/01 B. SECTO 6063

FROM AMBASSADOR MASTERS

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT

2. ROK AMBASSADOR HAHM AND I JUST HAD AN HOUR WITH MOCHTAR AND DIRECTOR  
 GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AMWAR SANI GOING ROUND AND ROUND ON THE  
 PROPOSAL REFTEL. ALTHOUGH MOCHTAR DEFERRED A FINAL DECISION UNTIL 2200  
 HOURS TONIGHT JAKARTA TIME, WHEN DIFFICULT ASEAN MEETING IS EXPECTED TO  
 BE FINISHED, HE SEES NO WAY INDONESIA COULD GEAR ITSELF UP TO MOVE IN  
 THE TIMEFRAME SUGGESTED REFTEL. MOCHTAR STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

A. HE IS IN THE MIDST OF CHAIRING ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASEAN  
 MEETINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION. SESSION SHOULD HAVE ENDED  
 AT NOON BUT DEBATE WAS SO HOT THAT AGREEMENT ON FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS  
 IMPOSSIBLE. MOCHTAR EXPECTS THE MEETING TO LAST WELL INTO THE EVENING.  
 MAJOR PROBLEM IS SINGAPORE WHICH IS TAKING WHAT MOCHTAR VIEWS AS AN  
 EXTREMELY HAWKISH LINE TOWARDS HANOI.

B. MOCHTAR COULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVE OF THE IMPORTANCE  
 SUGGESTED REFTEL WITHOUT SUHARTO'S FULL APPROVAL. HE SAYS HE CANNOT WORK  
 THIS OUT BY TELEPHONE WITH SUHARTO. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT DO BUSINESS  
 THIS WAY. MOCHTAR SAYS HE CANNOT GO TO JAKARTA HIMSELF BECAUSE OF THE

ASEAN MEETING, AND ARRIVAL OF VISITING FOREIGN MINISTERS TOMORROW.  
 IN ANY EVENT HE BELIEVES SUHARTO WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT AGREE ON SUCH  
 SHORT  
 NOTICE TO SOMETHING OF THIS IMPORTANCE ON WHICH HE HAS BEEN INADEQUATELY  
 PREPARED.

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/10 : NLC-16-12-6-14-0

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

C, INDONESIA HAS BEEN "CAUGHT COLD" BY THIS PROPOSAL AND NEEDS CAREFULLY TO CONSIDER ALL RAMIFICATIONS. HIS INFORMATION IS THAT NORTH KOREA IS STILL NEGATIVE TOWARD CONTACTS WITH SEOUL. HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE HIS OWN READINGS ON THIS. HE SEES POLITICAL PROBLEMS IF THE GOI GOOD OFFICES WERE REJECTED OUT OF HAND BY PYONGYANG. B, MOCHTAR IS CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECT OF HIS RELUCTANCE TO COOPERATE ON US-INDONESIAN RELATIONS. HE HOPES WE WILL UNDERSTAND BUT NO MATTER HOW MANY TIMES HAHM AND I WENT OVER THE GROUND, STRESSING THE POSITIVE BENEFITS OF GOI AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSED SCENARIO, HE RETURNED ALWAYS TO THE RESERVATIONS NOTED ABOVE. HE ASKED US TO INQUIRE OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IF THE COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED BY PRESIDENTS CARTER AND PARK COULD NOT BE WORDED IN A WAY WHICH PROVIDED MORE TIME TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF JUST HOW THIS PEACE PROPOSAL WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. HE WILL SEE HAHM AND ME AGAIN AT 2200 HOURS TONIGHT TO SEE IF WE HAVE ANY FURTHER WORD FROM OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AND TO GIVE US ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS HE MAY HAVE AFTER THE AGONIZING ASEAN MEETING IS FINISHED. PLEASE ADVISE BY FLASH TELEGRAM IF THERE ARE ANY FUTURE POINTS I SHOULD MAKE

BEYOND THE REFTEL IN OUR MEETING TONIGHT.

UNSIGNED

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/10 : NLC-16-12-6-14-0

JOINT COMMUNIQUE  
BETWEEN  
HIS EXCELLENCY JIMMY CARTER  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND  
HIS EXCELLENCY PARK CHUNG HEE  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SEOUL, JULY 1, 1979

*lf GUM/FMG  
3/2 RA  
2/7*

1. AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND MRS. JIMMY CARTER MADE A STATE VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FROM JUNE 29 TO JULY 1, 1979. IN ADDITION TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT PARK AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS, AND MEETINGS WITH OTHER PROMINENT KOREAN LEADERS IN SEOUL, PRESIDENT CARTER VISITED FIELD INSTALLATIONS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND KOREAN ARMED FORCES.

2. THE TWO PRESIDENTS MET AT THE BLUE HOUSE ON JUNE 30 AND JULY 1, 1979 TO REVIEW UNITED STATES-KOREA RELATIONS AND A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS OF VITAL MUTUAL INTEREST IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CORDIAL RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE. AMONG THOSE PRESENT AT THESE MEETINGS WERE PRIME MINISTER CHOI KYU HAHN, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PARK TONG JIN, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE RO JAY HYUN, PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY-GENERAL KIM KAE WON, AND AMBASSADOR KIM YONG SHIK FROM THE KOREAN SIDE, AND SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE RICHARD HOLBROOKE AND AMBASSADOR WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN FROM THE UNITED STATES SIDE.

3. PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINED THE POLICIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO SEEK PEACE AND THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. PRESIDENT PARK ENDORSED THESE PEACE EFFORTS AND EMPHASIZED HIS VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FIRM LEADERSHIP WHEREVER CHALLENGES TO PEACE OCCURRED.

- 4. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REVIEWED THE EVENTS WHICH HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED THE RECENT POLITICAL FACE OF ASIA. AMONG THESE WERE THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY BETWEEN TOKYO AND BEIJING. THEY NOTED THAT ARMED CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROBLEM ARE CREATING MAJOR DIFFICULTIES AFFECTING THE ENTIRE REGION, AND AGREED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF THESE CONFLICTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT CARTER REAFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER IS VITALLY ENGAGED IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND WILL CONTINUE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE REGION.

- 5. ON THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE PROBLEM, PRESIDENT CARTER OUTLINED THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT AND STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR ALL NATIONS TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM EFFORT POSSIBLE, WHETHER BY RESETTLEMENT, FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS, OR TEMPORARY SHELTER. PRESIDENT PARK, NOTING THE SERIOUS AND DESTABILIZING IMPACT ON THE DIRECTLY AFFECTED NATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WOULD MAKE AN ADDITIONAL GRANT OF A CONSIDERABLE SUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH

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6. PRESIDENT CARTER, REFERRING TO THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, NOTED THE EXISTENCE OF STRONG BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION AND ASSURED PRESIDENT PARK THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND STABILITY IN KOREA AND SUSTAIN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. PRESIDENT CARTER STRESSED THE SOLIDARITY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS TRADITIONAL ALLIES.

#### SECURITY COOPERATION

- 7. THE TWO PRESIDENTS REAFFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA ATTACH TO THE RECIPROCAL COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1954. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS PIVOTAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGION. PRESIDENT PARK REVIEWED THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA AND THE CONTINUING THREAT TO PEACE POSED BY THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY BUILD-UP. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT US-ROK COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING A HIGH DEGREE OF STRENGTH AND COMBAT READINESS TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST POSSIBLE AGGRESSION WAS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE AND STABILITY. THEY NOTED THAT THE ACTIVATION LAST NOVEMBER OF THE ROK-US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND HAD ENHANCED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JOINT DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT CARTER REITERATED THE FIRM COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO RENDER PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO REPEL ARMED ATTACK AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, AND AFFIRMED THAT THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR UMBRELLA PROVIDED ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR THE AREA.



8. PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE FULL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND THEIR DEFENSE MINISTERS ON SECURITY ISSUES AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE CONSULTING WITH U. S. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS ON HIS RETURN IN THE LIGHT OF THESE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS. PRESIDENT CARTER REAFFIRMED THE DEEP INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN PREVENTING ANY DESTABILIZATION OF THE PENINSULA OR REGION AND ASSURED PRESIDENT PARK IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF FURTHER WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN GROUND COMBAT FORCES FROM KOREA THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AN AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO ENSURE PEACE AND SECURITY.

9. PRESIDENT PARK REVIEWED THE EXTENSIVE AND CONTINUING EFFORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO MODERNIZE AND ENHANCE ITS SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR FORCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN WHICH IS NEARING COMPLETION. PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED UNITED STATES AGREEMENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND REAFFIRMED THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT CARTER ASSURED PRESIDENT PARK THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE FOR SALE TO KOREA APPROPRIATE WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY NECESSARY FOR ENHANCING KOREA'S ABILITY TO DETER OR DEFEAT AGGRESSION AND FOR THE DEVELOPEMTN OF APPROPRIATE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

#### REDUCTION OF TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

10. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED ON THE PRIORITY NEED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR MEANS TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. PRESIDENT PARK EXPLAINED THE RECENT EFFORTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT, BEGINNING WITH HIS INITIATIVE OF JANUARY 19, 1979, TO RESUME PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES.

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PRESIDENT CARTER ASSURED PRESIDENT PARK OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR THESE EFFORTS AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA WOULD BECOME POSSIBLE.

- 11. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE FOR PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IN THE REGION, AND AS A TESTAMENT TO THE PERSONAL COMMITMENT OF THE TWO PRESIDENTS TO SEEK HONORABLE MEANS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND REDUCE TENSIONS, PRESIDENT PARK AND PRESIDENT CARTER HAVE DECIDED JOINTLY TO PROPOSE THE CONVENING OF A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES TO SEEK MEANS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE AREA. IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THIS EFFORT AND TO PREPARE FOR THE MEETING WHICH IT IS HOPED CAN BE ARRANGED, THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE DIRECTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO COMMUNICATE JOINTLY WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF NORTH KOREA IN THIS REGARD IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER.

- 12. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT ANY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD REDUCE TENSION AND ESTABLISH LASTING PEACE LEADING ULTIMATELY TO THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD RESULT FROM DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES OF BOTH THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA. PRESIDENT PARK NOTED THE CONSISTENCY WITH WHICH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS PURSUED EFFORTS AT DIALOGUE AND THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE POLICIES WHICH HE ANNOUNCED ON JUNE 23, 1973.

- 13. PRESIDENT CARTER STATED THAT, IF AND WHEN NORTH KOREA'S PRINCIPAL ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TAKE SIMILAR STEPS WITH NORTH KOREA. PRESIDENT CARTER ALSO NOTED THAT UNILATERAL STEPS TOWARD NORTH KOREA WHICH ARE NOT RECIPROCATED TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY NORTH KOREA'S PRINCIPAL ALLIES DO NOT IMPROVE STABILITY OR PROMOTE PEACE IN THE AREA.

14. THE TWO PRESIDENTS SHARED THE VIEW THAT THE ADMISSION OF BOTH THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE PENDING THEIR EVENTUAL UNIFICATION WOULD PROVIDE AUTHORITIES OF BOTH KOREAN PARTIES WITH BROADER OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE AIMED AT THE RESOLUTION OF THEIR DIFFERENCES.

#### RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS

- 15. THE TWO PRESIDENTS NOTED THE IMPORTANCE TO ALL NATIONS OF RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS. PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL GROWTH IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WOULD CONTINUE COMMENSURATE WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GROWTH OF THE KOREAN NATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, PRESIDENT PARK EXPLAINED HIS VIEW ON THIS MATTER TOGETHER WITH THE CURRENT UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES CONFRONTING THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

#### ECONOMIC COOPERATION

- 16. PRESIDENT CARTER EXPRESSED TO PRESIDENT PARK HIS GREAT ADMIRATION FOR KOREA'S REMARKABLE RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT IN SUSTAINED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OVER THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE FACE OF VARIOUS OBSTACLES AND ADVERSE CONDITIONS, THUS OFFERING A MODEL AND AN INSPIRATION FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AS AN EXAMPLE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUITY. PRESIDENT PARK ACKNOWLEDGED WITH APPRECIATION THE UNITED STATES' CONTRIBUTION TO KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, AND TECHNOLOGICAL AREAS, AND AFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GOALS. THE TWO PRESIDENTS SHARED THE VIEW THAT POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE EFFORTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE EXPLORED TO ENHANCE ASSISTANCE TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

- 17. PRESIDENT PARK AND PRESIDENT CARTER ALSO

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VIEWED THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION, AND PRESIDENT CARTER REPORTED ON THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE SEVEN-NATION ECONOMIC SUMMIT JUST COMPLETED IN TOKYO. PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE WORLD ENERGY PROBLEM IN PARTICULAR, AND THE TWO PRESIDENTS SHARED THE VIEW THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED FOR CONCERTED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ARRIVE AT A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

- 18. THE TWO PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT THE RAPID EXPANSION IN SCOPE OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, AND CONFIDENCE THAT THIS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TREND WILL CONTINUE. THEY NOTED THE ADVANTAGES WHICH ACCRUE TO THE PEOPLE OF BOTH NATIONS WHEN THE FREEST POSSIBLE SYSTEM OF TRADE EXISTS, AND THEY PLEDGED THEIR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AND PRESERVE AN OPEN WORLD TRADING SYSTEM. PRESIDENT CARTER NOTED THE COMMENDABLY PROGRESSIVE IMPORT-LIBERALIZATION AND OTHER MEASURES THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAD RECENTLY TAKEN WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING A MORE BALANCED TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE ACTIONS AND THE RECENT BUYING MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES WILL HELP PROMOTE EXPORT OF AMERICAN PRODUCTS TO KOREA. PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE, IN THE MTN AND ELSEWHERE, A FREER TRADING SYSTEM, AND TO PRESERVE FAIR ACCESS TO THE UNITED STATES MARKET FOR KOREAN GOODS. THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT FURTHER EFFORTS TO EXPAND TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BE HIGHLY BENEFICIAL TO THEIR RESPECTIVE PEOPLES.

#### CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

- 19. NOTING THAT THEIR MEETING HAD DEEPEDED UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION ON MANY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, THE TWO PRESIDENTS RECOGNIZED THAT, AT A TIME WHEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE

ENTERED INTO A NEW ERA OF MATURE PARTNERSHIP BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE, THERE REMAINS NEED FOR FURTHER PROMOTION OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES. AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR JOINT DESIRE TO DEEPEN THE CONTACT AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS, THE TWO PRESIDENTS AGREED THAT CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES SHOULD BE EXPANDED. THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGREED TO ENHANCE THESE EXCHANGES BY SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE KOREAN-AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION AND TO ESTABLISH A KOREAN-AMERICAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE COMMITTEE TO BE FUNDED JOINTLY BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE COMMITTEE WOULD BE DESIGNED TO STIMULATE ACTIVITIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES AIMED AT FURTHER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TO ENDORSE MUTUALLY AGREED PROGRAMS OF THIS NATURE. DETAILS WILL BE WORKED OUT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

- 20. PRESIDENT AND MRS. CARTER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF THEIR PARTY, EXPRESSED THEIR DEEPEST THANKS TO PRESIDENT PARK AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE WARMTH OF THEIR RECEPTION AND THE COURTESIES EXTENDED TO THEM DURING THE VISIT.

- 21. PRESIDENT CARTER CORDIALLY INVITED PRESIDENT PARK TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND PRESIDENT PARK ACCEPTED THE INVITATION WITH PLEASURE. THEY AGREED THAT THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE AT A TIME OF MUTUAL CONVENIENCE. BOTH PRESIDENTS EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT IN ORDER TO PRESERVE AND FURTHER CULTIVATE THE CLOSE PARTNERSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THEIR TWO COUNTRIES. VANCE  
BT

**Note for the File, 2 July 1979**

[Source: "Troubled areas - question of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0094-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]

[...]

2 July 1979

NOTE FOR THE FILE

1. At 8.00 p.m. Saturday evening, 30 June 1979, Amb. Duk Choo Moon [note—the name is circled and above is written "*(illegible)* Amb. Yun"], the Permanent Observer to the United Nations of the Republic of Korea, called on Under-Secretary-General J. Perez de Cuellar at his home to ask him to inform the Secretary-General about the upcoming démarche by his Government and the United States Government to convene a meeting with the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Amb. Moon [note—Moon is crossed out, and "Yun" is written above] handed the attached excerpts to Mr. Perez de Cuellar and told him that his Government wanted the Secretary-General to be informed before the démarche was made public through the press. He also informed Mr. Perez de Cuellar that a third State had already been communicated this démarche to the DPRK.
2. The Under-Secretary-General asked the Permanent Observer whether he saw any role for the United Nations. He said that his task was only to pass the information about the démarche to the Secretary-General. He personally felt, however, that DPRK may wish to convey their reaction through the Secretary-General.
3. Unable to speak directly to the Secretary-General, in the morning of 1 July 1979 (New York time) the Under-Secretary-General conveyed the above information by telephone to the Secretary-General's Secretary, Ms. Mary Ellen Martin, at the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE131

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DOS REVIEWED 23-JUL-2007: DECLASSIFIED FOR RELEASE IN FULL

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9303

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 10081

NODIS/CHEROKEE

DEPT FOR ACTING SECRETARY ND EA ONLY

DEPT PASS BALI FOR SECRETARY VANCE AND HOLBROOKE; WHITE

HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI, SECDEF BROWN ONLY

E.O. 120651 RDS-3 7/2/99 (GLEYSTEN, WILLIAM) DR-M

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PARK'S JULY 1 MEETING WITH SECRETARY VANCE

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: SECRETARY VANCE AND I MET WITH PRESIDENT PARK JULY 1 TO LISTEN TO SOME "CLARIFICATIONS" BY PARK AS TO WHAT HE HAD MEANT TO SAY TO PRESIDENT CARTER ON TWO ISSUES DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING THE DAY BEFORE. ON ROK DEFENSE SPENDING, HE SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE GREATER NORTH KOREAN STRENGTH AND DISPARITY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH MILITARY FORCES, HE WAS READY TO SPEND UP TO AND BEYOND 6 PERCENT OF GNP ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE HARD TO DO SO IN 1979-80 BECAUSE OF INFLATION AND ENERGY PROBLEMS. HE LATER ALL BUT COMMITTED HIMSELF TO SPENDING MORE THAN 6 PERCENT THIS YEAR. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, PARK SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS AND WOULD TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT. HE SAID HE WOULD TAKE LIBERALIZATION MEASURES AS RAPIDLY AS HE COULD, KEEPING IN MIND HIS NEED TO AVOID DOMESTIC UNREST. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JUNE 30, WE (SECRETARY VANCE TO AMBASSADOR KIM YONG-SHIK AND GLEYSTEN TO BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY-GENERAL KIM AND INTERPRETER CHOI KWANG-SOO) CONVEYED INDIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT PARK THAT WE WERE UNHAPPY WITH THE WAY THE ISSUES OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS HAD BEEN HANDLED AND URGED A CLARIFICATION PRIOR TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S DEPARTURE. SUBSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT PARK INVITED THE SECRETARY AND GLEYSTEN TO CALL JULY 1 AT 11:00 A. M. PRIOR TO HIS FAREWELL DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER.

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/03 : NLC-16-13-1-4-5

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. PRESIDENT PARK SAID THAT ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES HAD HAD A FRUITFUL DISCUSSION AT THE BLUE HOUSE ON JUNE 30, HE MAY NOT HAVE CONVEYED HIS VIEWS FULLY AND THIS WAS PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS PRIVATE SESSION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER, PRESIDENT CARTER HAD NOTED THE CONSIDERABLE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF NORTH AND SOUTH WHICH APPEARED EVEN MORE SERIOUS IN LIGHT OF THE U. S. ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN BUILD-UP. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD URGED THAT THE GAP BE CLOSED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND THAT THE ROK SPEND MORE OF ITS RESOURCES FOR THIS PURPOSE. PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT THE ROKG WAS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THIS PROBLEM AND ALSO THOUGHT THAT SPENDING MORE OF ITS RESOURCES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE EVEN THOUGH HE COULD NOT SAY EXACTLY WHAT PERCENT OF GNP WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO SPEND UP TO 7 PERCENT OF GNP ON DEFENSE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC PLANS TO DO SO, LARGELY BECAUSE THERE HAD NOT BEEN TIME TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NEW U. S. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT WHICH HAD ONLY RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETED.

5. AFTER HAVING EXPLAINED WHAT HE HAD MEANT TO SAY THE DAY BEFORE, PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE HAD GIVEN CONSIDERABLE FURTHER THOUGHT AS TO WHY A MISUNDERSTANDING HAD OCCURRED. HE SPECULATED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD MISUNDERSTOOD HIS POINT ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF A LARGER GNP IN THE SOUTH. FOR EXAMPLE HE HAD ROK DATA WHICH SHOWED THAT IF NORTH KOREA WAS SPENDING 24 PERCENT OF GNP ON DEFENSE IT WOULD AMOUNT TO \$2.9 BILLION WHICH WOULD BE LESS THAN SOUTH KOREA'S \$3.2 BILLION CALCULATED AT 5.6 PERCENT OF GNP FOR 1978. IN ANY EVENT HE HAD NOT MEANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ROKG SHOULD NOT DO MORE TO MEET AN INCREASED ESTIMATE OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT. IT WAS HIS CONSISTENT POLICY TO ACHIEVE A SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE POSTURE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. HE HAD BEEN THE FIRST TO ADVOCATE THIS POLICY, AND HE WAS WILLING TO SPEND WHATEVER NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE IT. HE WOULD EXTEND THE DEFENSE TAX BEYOND THE FIVE YEAR TERM AND HE WOULD GIVE PRIORITY CONSIDERATION TO DEFENSE EXPENDITURE.

6. IN CONCLUSION, PARK AFFIRMED TO SECRETARY VANCE THAT THE ROKG WAS PREPARED TO SPEND WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. THE ROKG WAS READY TO GO ABOVE 6 PERCENT, BUT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT DURING 1979 AND 1980 BECAUSE  
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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/03 : NLC-16-13-1-4-5



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DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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 OF PROBLEMS CAUSED BY INFLATION AND THE ENERGY CRISIS.  
 PRESIDENT PARK ALSO ASKED FOR CONTINUING ASSISTANCE WITH  
 FMS. SECRETARY VANCE ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO  
 STATE THAT THE ROKG WOULD ATTEMPT TO SPEND 6 PERCENT OR  
 MORE OF GNP ON DEFENSE THIS YEAR AS OPPOSED TO THIS YEAR'S 5.6  
 PERCENT (IN BOTH CASES EXCLUDING FMS REPAYMENTS FROM THE  
 CALCULATION). PARK SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE A DEFINITE  
 ANSWER AT THIS TIME, BUT: "DON'T WORRY, WE WILL DO OUR  
 BEST TO SPEND MORE THAN 6 PERCENT. I WILL PERSONALLY  
 TAKE CARE OF IT."  
 7. PRESIDENT PARK PROCEEDED TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION ON  
 HUMAN RIGHTS BY EXPLAINING THAT DURING THE MEETING  
 YESTERDAY, PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SPOKEN VERY FRANKLY ABOUT  
 HIS VIEWS AND CONVICTION ON THE SUBJECT WHILE PRESIDENT  
 PARK HIMSELF HAD TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES  
 OF SOUTH KOREA. PRESIDENT CARTER HAD ASKED IF PARK COULD  
 LIFT EM-9 AND RELEASE POLITICAL DETAINEES, NOTING THAT  
 THE MATTER WAS ONE FOR PRESIDENT PARK TO DECIDE. PARK HAD  
 REPLIED THAT HE KNEW LIFTING EM-9 WOULD IMPROVE THE ROK'S  
 IMAGE IN THE U. S., BUT THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFI-  
 CULT TO DO AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, HE HAD ALSO WISHED TO  
 MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD MOVE TO LIBERALIZE IN THE FUTURE.  
 THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF  
 MAINTAINING NECESSARY LAW AND ORDER. HE REITERATED TO  
 SECRETARY VANCE WHAT HE HAD SAID TO PRESIDENT CARTER I. E.,  
 THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW LENIENCY TOWARD EM-9  
 DETAINEES WHO WERE REPENTENT OR HAD BEEN MILD OFFENDERS.  
 8. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT PARK'S COMMENTS  
 MEANT THAT THERE COULD BE FURTHER RELEASES, NOT DURING  
 PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT OR IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, BUT

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/03 : NLC-16-13-1-4-5

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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRESIDENT PARK SAID THAT HE WOULD CONTINUE AS IN THE PAST TO RELEASE OFFENDERS WHO SHOWED REPENTENCE OR WHOSE CRIMES WERE NOT SO SERIOUS. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT RELEASE OF POLITICAL DETAINEES WOULD HAVE A VERY POSITIVE EFFECT, MAKING IT EASIER FOR THE REST OF US TO EXPLAIN TO OUR OWN PEOPLE THE NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE ROK. IT WOULD HELP ENLIST U. S. POPULAR SUPPORT INCLUDING LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE IMPORTANT TO KOREA.

9. PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE WAS VERY WELL AWARE OF THE GOOD EFFECTS ON THE U. S. AND ON U. S. PUBLIC OPINION WHICH WOULD ACCOMPANY RELEASE OF DETAINEES AND LIFTING EM-9. BUT IF INTERNAL ORDER WERE DISRUPTED IN THE PROCESS IT WOULD BE HE WHO WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. HE SAID HE WOULD TAKE LIBERALIZING MEASURES GRADUALLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKS TO HIM. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS DIFFICULTIES PARK SAID THAT HE HAD LET KIM TAE CHUNG OUT OF PRISON EVEN THOUGH KIM HAD SHOWN NO REPENTENCE AND HE HAD DONE THIS FOR PRESIDENT CARTER AND U. S. PUBLIC OPINION. SINCE KIM'S RELEASE, HOWEVER, HE HAD MADE VARIOUS MOVES SUCH AS HIS HEAVY INVOLVEMENT IN THE NDP CONVENTION AND HIS OPEN ADVOCACY OF OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT. IF HE, PARK, WERE TO RE-JAIL KIM TAE CHUNG THERE WOULD BE REAL TROUBLE AND THIS WAS THE KIND OF DILEMMA CAUSED BY MOVING TOO FAST. THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT KIM AND OTHER DISSIDENTS WERE MANIPULATING U. S. PUBLIC OPINION TO ENHANCE THEIR POSITION IN KOREA.

10. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED BY PRESIDENT PARK. HE URGED THAT PARK DO ALL HE COULD WITHIN THE CONSIDERATIONS HE HAD EXPLAINED. PARK REPLIED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS ALWAYS ON HIS MIND AND THAT HE WOULD LIBERALIZE AS QUICKLY AS HE COULD WITHOUT CREATING UNREST.

11. THE SECRETARY CLOSED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT PRESIDENT PARK'S COMMENTS HAD HELPED CLARIFY MATTERS. HE WOULD PASS THEM TO PRESIDENT CARTER, BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF PRESIDENT PARK HIMSELF REPEATED THE ESSENCE DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER. GLEYSTEN

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/03 : NLC-16-13-1-4-5

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 3, 1979

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

President Carter  
 Secretary Vance  
 Secretary Brown  
 Dr. Brzezinski  
 Assistant Secretary Holbrooke  
 Nicholas Platt

Korean

President Park  
 Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha  
 Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin  
 Ambassador Kim Yong Shik  
 Defense Minister Ro  
 Senior Protocol Secretary Ch'oe Kwang-Su  
 Secretary General to President Park Kim  
 Kyu Won

DATE, TIME  
AND PLACE:

Saturday, June 30, 1979; 11:00 AM - 12:20 PM  
 The Blue House, Seoul, Korea

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President Park: Mr. President, I would like to express on behalf of the Government and people of Korea our heartfelt welcome to you and Mrs. Carter. I am particularly grateful that you took precious time out of your busy schedule to visit Korea. I am happy that you have spent a night with U.S. troops. I am proud of the fact that we have the United States, the most powerful nation on earth, as our ally. Over the past 30 years the Republic of Korea has been the beneficiary of an enormous amount of assistance from the United States, both military and monetary. When North Korea invaded us in 1950, young Americans came to Korea to fight for us. Many lost their lives. We are grateful and will never forget their sacrifice. In recent months, there have been significant changes in the international scene. The United States has normalized relations with China, Japan has concluded a peace and friendship treaty with China, and China has severed its alliance with the Soviet Union. China has made slow but positive movement towards the U.S. Though Peking has not moved

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Review on June 30, 2009  
 Extended by: Z. Brzezinski  
 Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a)

5/18/00 NSC YLC-00-94  
 5/2/02...

positively toward us, nevertheless, we welcome these developments. We do not expect these developments to have an immediate positive effect on the security of the Korean peninsula.

Toward the end of last year armed clashes occurred between the Communist countries and Indochina. I believe that these clashes really represent armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union and that the conflict will last for a considerable period of time. It is our sincere hope that the conflict will not spread to neighboring countries. During the last several years the Soviet Union has steadily increased its military strength in Asia. When war broke out in Indochina, the Soviet Union lost no time to establish a military foothold in Vietnam. The countries of the region were seriously concerned and worried that this development would destabilize the region.

Recently another problem, the energy question which was the main topic of discussion in Tokyo, has become more serious and threatening. Those countries like Japan and Korea which import most of their oil from the Middle East are seriously concerned.

Recently we have confirmed that North Korea has considerably strengthened its military capability. North Korea has been most unpredictable and poses the most serious threat to the stability of the region. You may have been briefed by military commander this morning. The North Korean Communists are engaged in digging tunnels. Their intent is clear -- to mount a surprise attack. Three tunnels have been found so far and evidence exists that they are digging ten more. According to the testimony of defectors, a crack North Korean commando corps, the Eighth Special Army Corps, is undergoing special training, and familiarizing itself with the terrain of Seoul, particularly that around the Blue House. They are reported to have built models of part of the city for training purposes. This has been confirmed by military intelligence.

About ten years ago in January 1968, the North Korean Communists despatched a commando group of 31 to raid this very residence. They advanced to within 500 meters of this building. Thirty were killed, and one was captured. The latter is now married and living a happy life in the South.

North Korea has committed countless violations of the armistice agreement, 44,000 in all since signing the agreement in July 1953, including despatch of armed agents, destruction of industrial facilities in the South, the death of two U.S.

officers at Panmunjom, infiltration of fishing boats and the capture of the USS PUEBLO. It is our judgment that North Korea is capable of launching an attack against the South without help from outside. They threaten the peace and stability of the entire region.

North Korea has recently conducted a carefully conceived peace offensive. Whenever they do this we become alarmed because in the past they have always had ulterior motives. Their objectives are to drive a wedge between us and to foster unrest in the South. Judging from all these considerations it can be concluded that the basic North Korean Communist strategic goal of the communization of the South remains intact. Faced with a fanatic regime at close proximity in the North, we and the Combined Forces Command of the United States are taking two measures. First, we are maintaining the highest degree of military alertness in order to deter an attack and maintain readiness to repel it. Second, we want to work to relieve tensions on the Korean peninsula. The South-North dialogue is currently suspended.

I am convinced that American troops in Korea play an incomparable role in deterring attack and preserving the peace and stability in Near East Asia, directly affecting the security of both Korea and Japan. In light of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula it is deemed unwise for the U.S. to continue further ground troop withdrawals. From an objective point of view, there have been changes since 1977 when you adopted the withdrawal policy. North Korean military power is greatly strengthened, and Soviet military capability in Asia has been strongly augmented. If the U.S. reduces its military presence or withdraws its forces at a time when the Communists are increasing theirs, many friends of the U.S. are bound to feel discouraged and uneasy. At the same time the enemy might misjudge U.S. intention to live up to its commitment in this part of the world. As you know, historically and geopolitically Korea has been the crossroads of great power interests in Asia. If this is true, U.S. forces in Korea are serving the security and stability not only of Korea but also the entire free world.

We do not doubt the defense commitment of the U.S. to the Republic of Korea. We firmly believe in it. At the same time we would prefer to have the U.S. act as a deterrent to attack than come to our aid after an attack had occurred. There is no doubt that the honest objective of every Korean is national unification. Even more important is the goal of peace even if it must be obtained at the expense of national

unification. The most honest desire of every Korean is to avoid a recurrence of war. What is the surest guarantee against the recurrence of war? Continuation of the U.S. presence and an end to withdrawals. The North Koreans will not attack as long as U.S. troops are here. What could happen if all U.S. forces were withdrawn? No one can predict. The North Koreans would strike immediately. One thing is sure, however, the chance of attack due to miscalculation would markedly increase. If a war broke out as a result of miscalculation, the military and political costs to U.S. would be enormous. The sacrifice would be great. The way to forestall sacrifice is to maintain current troop levels in Korea. The maximum results for the minimum price. Finally, let me take this opportunity, Mr. President, to make a strong request to you. That is that the U.S. discontinue ground force withdrawals until such time as tension on the Korean peninsula is reduced.

Let me briefly turn to economic problems. Economic assistance from the U.S. has made great contributions to Korean development. We are now self-reliant. Our trade has increased to a level of some \$7 billion per year. In a few years it should reach \$10 billion. Up until 1975 we imported more from the U.S. than we exported, but last year trade was about \$1 billion in our favor. For the period of January to April of this year, there was a \$15 million imbalance in our favor, showing that the gap is decreasing. We will do more to decrease the imbalance. One of the most difficult problems we face is inflation. We have been taking measures to control it and hope in a year to have it in hand.

The OPEC price increase will have a very adverse effect on our ability to control inflation. As far as oil is concerned not only price, but quantity is also a problem. We find it difficult to obtain as much as we need. There is no alternative to conservation. We hope that the advanced countries will take appropriate measures to save oil.

That is what I had in mind to say to you, Mr. President. I would be delighted to answer any questions you might have.

President Carter: I don't have any questions, Mr. President, but I would like to make a few comments. The U.S. recognizes very well the importance of the Pacific region. Our actions have proven this. You have soundly pointed out that we have honored our alliance with Korea and that this is just a part of a global commitment which the U.S. has honored, and always will honor. We do not detect or recognize any change in the military balance away from the U.S. toward the USSR either here in the Pacific, or in Europe, or other parts of the world.

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Our alliance with Japan is as strong as it has ever been. The normalization of relations between ourselves and the People's Republic of China can provide benefits to our own country and perhaps yours. We have made this change after 38 years of enmity without endangering the security of the people of Taiwan. We have renewed our Philippine military base agreement, ensuring the use of these bases until 1991. We have a high degree of friendship and purpose with the ASEAN countries. We are providing increased levels of military support for the people of Thailand. Secretary Vance will meet in a few days with the leaders of ASEAN. Our defense agreements with New Zealand and Australia are in the same strong condition. The quality of the Pacific Fleet is being improved year after year. We have made a renewed commitment to strengthen NATO, the closeness of that relationship and the spirit of the alliance. We not only honor our commitments, but take action when necessary to stop Soviet actions or threats. Recently we despatched forces to North Yemen to protect the integrity of that nation. All of these nations take firm action to defend themselves. Politically we have improved our status in India and other countries which formerly were more friendly to the Soviet Union. We are a strong nation economically and militarily and plan to stay that way.

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Over the past several months, we have been concerned over the relative strengths of North and South Korea. North Korea's strength has increased dramatically over the last two years, although it is a relatively small country and economy. This change concerns us very much, and has been a surprise to us. We are deeply committed to the integrity and defense of the Republic of Korea and its people as President Park knows. We have approximately 40,000 troops here in Korea, about 5% of the total forces in the South. We have been contemplating a reduction of approximately 3,000 troops which amounts to about 1/2 of 1% of the total forces in Korea. To equate the future security of Korea with this tiny number of troops is not an accurate assessment. We would be glad to discuss this further in private. We should also discuss the reasons for the growing disparity between the Republic of Korea and North Korea military forces and what we might do to alleviate our mutual concern.

It is imperative that the military balance be maintained and that North Korea neither obtain an advantage nor believe they have obtained one.

On weapons procurement issues, Secretary Brown and Minister Ro can resolve these issues. But I believe we should be as helpful as possible in the most cost-effective way.

I am eager to see the dialogue between the South and North reestablished and pursued successfully. We welcomed your re-initiative in January. It was a step in the right direction. We believe that a new initiative now would be fruitful to bring South Korea and North Korea to the table together on the basis of equality. Any U.S. participation would be as a partner and in accordance with the wishes of President Park. I hope we can designate some senior officials in both governments to coordinate our efforts to bring North Korea back to the table. In my opinion productive negotiations can only occur if North Korea is convinced of the strength of the Republic of Korea and the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea. There must be no doubt in our mind that we will stand together. We have observed with admiration the great economic achievements of this country. Our mutual trade is an advantage to both our nations. The amount should be increased, predictions to action should be kept at a minimum and we should work together to maintain an approximate balance.

Mr. President, I have great personal admiration and friendship toward your people and your country. My welcome this morning was genuinely warm and indicative of the friendship the people of the Republic of Korea have for the U.S. It grieves me and concerns me to see that the public image of the Government of the Republic of Korea has been damaged in the press and in the United States in recent years. A favorable story seldom appears, which is a great distortion of the true situation which exists in your country. The publicity about bribery allegations is over, I hope. I would like to discuss privately with you some action we might take to let the American people know about the advantages of our mutual alliance so that they will look with admiration at Korea. We have a mutual interest in presenting an accurate and favorable image to the people of the United States. I am eager to work with you to make this possible. In my opinion this challenge is of almost equal importance as the level of military forces. I notice that you have some concern over the future of nuclear power production. I would like to alleviate your concerns about future supplies of nuclear fuel. As you know, in dealing with all nations on earth, we must comply with strict U.S. laws on non-proliferation. There is no reason for this to be a problem between us at all.

Mr. President, perhaps you would like to respond, and afterwards go into a more private session.

President Park: Mr. President, you referred briefly to North-South dialogue. I would like to state my view of the trilateral initiative. The South-North dialogue is currently suspended and at an impasse. A diplomatic initiative on our part now

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should be very helpful. We have, therefore, agreed in principle with your proposal from the outset. We are dealing with sly and treacherous Communists, and we should not let ourselves be manipulated lest they drive a wedge between us. We have requested full prior consultation with your government. We have stated our concerns to you and these have been understood. I am hoping that there exists a meeting of minds between us on this so that we can proceed in great harmony, avoiding miscalculation on the Communist part, and coordinating to achieve meaningful results.

President Carter: One point which I did not understand very well. Were you talking about nuclear weapons?

President Park: No. Nuclear power generation.

President Carter: If you have no further question, Mr. President, let us proceed to the private meeting.

**Interoffice Memorandum from Ellen Lukas to the Office of the Secretary-General, “North Korea Denounced US-South Korea Communiqué Calling for Trilateral Talks on Reunification,” 3 July 1979**

*[Source: “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

DATE: 3 July 1979  
9:15 a.m.

TO: Office of the Secretary-General

THROUGH:

FROM: Ellen Lukas, ERD/DPI

SUBJECT: North Korea denounced US-South Korea communiqué calling for trilateral talks on reunification

[First page illegible]

[...]

At a luncheon given by the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ambassador Han Si Hae, the Secretary-General enquired whether the Ambassador has received any information on the proposal he had put forward to President Kim Il Sung on the appointment by him of an observer to the North/South talks. The Secretary-General recalled that President Kim’s initial reaction had been rather favourable but he had stated that the definitive answer of his Government would be communicated through the Permanent Observer. The Ambassador replied that he had been informed about the proposal and was told that the Government’s response would be communicated to him in due course for transmittal to the Secretary-General. The Ambassador then asked what would be the role of the observer in relation to the talks North Korea had proposed to have with the United States on the replacement of the armistice agreement by a more permanent peace arrangement. The Secretary-General replied that the proposal of the North Korean Side had been duly conveyed by him to President Carter as well as to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. He was awaiting their response which he expected to receive after President Carter’s return from his visit to Seoul. Such a role for his observer, if it were to facilitate contacts, would certainly not be excluded in this context.

The Secretary-General referred to the question of unification of families which he felt should be one of the first objectives in the North/South dialogue. The Ambassador stated that his Government had proposed this a long time ago but the main impediment was the anti-communist law in South Korea which forbade contacts with communists and made it an offense even to praise anything North Korean. The South Koreans further proposed that contacts between divided families should take place at Panmunjom. This meant that the South Koreans approached the whole problem on the basis of two countries rather than one people. The North Korean side

felt that the members of the divided families should be free to visit each other and even to decide in which part of Korea they wanted to live when united as a family.

The Secretary-General then turned to the question of resumption of trade and economic relations between the two parts. The Ambassador again asserted that North Korea had proposed this more than thirty years ago. The South Koreans however insisted that such an exchange should be made on a Government-to-Government basis while they wanted enterprises on both sides to be free to deal directly with each other.

The Secretary-General expressed the view that many of the problems could be removed if there was a better way of communicating with each other. It is for that reason that he had put forward his second suggestion to try to facilitate communications through his contacts with the two Permanent Observer Missions in New York.

The Secretary-General asked the Ambassador to request his Government to give an early response to his proposals which he knew were acceptable to the South Koreans.

(signature)  
Rafeeuddin Ahmed

Cc. Mr. J. Perez de Cuellar

**Telegram from the USDel Secretary Aircraft to the Secretary of State, “Secretary’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Sonada,” 3 July 1979**

[Source: *Digital National Security Archive, Item*

JA00574. [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url\\_ver=Z39.88-2004&res\\_dat=xri:dnsa&rft\\_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CJA00574.](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CJA00574.)]

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AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

[...]

1. Secret – Entire Text

[...]

3. Korea – The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that it is too early to know how North Korea will respond to the initiative. He expected considerable maneuvering about time, place and attendance. In Seoul, the President’s talks with the Koreans on security had gone well. We shared with the Koreans our assessment of North Korean capabilities. Over the last two or three years the North Koreans have attained an edge in troop strength and superiority in armor, artillery and air. We and the Koreans agreed the South’s forces had to be strengthened in quality, especially in anti-tank weapons. South Korea is now spending 5.7 percent of GDP on defense. President Park agreed Korean spending will exceed 6 percent this year and move up to 7 percent over the next several years. The secretary told Sonoda that the President and Park talked frankly about U.S. troop withdrawals and the President said he would return to the U.S. and consult with his military and civilian advisors and the congress before making his decision. Contrary to press reports he did not agree to freeze our troop withdrawal. The Secretary estimated that the President would make his decision within the next two to three weeks.

4. On human rights the President had told Park EM9 and the detention of political prisoners was a negative factor in our relations and urged park to cancel EM9 and release detainees. Park said he could not cancel EM9 now but was prepared to undertake liberalizing actions.

5. The two presidents agreed that increased trade and open markets were in the interest of both nations. They also agreed MTN should be implemented rapidly. Park Proved to be more optimistic than his advisors about Korean inflation. On balance the secretary told Sonoda our relations with Korea are back on track after two difficult years.

6. Sonoda welcomed the results of the Korean discussions and said Japan understands that American is interested in Korean stability; not support for the Park regime. He believes the Koreans face a difficult economic situation. The advice which the President gave Park on human rights was good but Sonoda felt that Park’s military background made it difficult for him to fully

understand the value in political liberation. Koreans oppose Park not because they find the opposition an attractive alternative: they object to Park's heavy handedness.

[...]

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

## PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

President Carter  
 Nicholas Platt, Staff Member, NSC  
 (Note Taker)

Korea

President Park Chung Hee  
 Ch'oe Kwang-Su, Senior Protocol Secretary,  
 Office of the President (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME  
AND PLACE:

Saturday, June 30, 1979; 12:23 - 1:30 PM  
 The Blue House, Seoul, Korea

President Carter: (Briefing the Note Taker on the circumstances of the conversation before the Note Taker entered the room: I told President Park that I had come with the sincere intent to work closely and had been taken aback by the adamant demand the U.S. force levels could not be changed at all when the numbers involved represented only about 1/2 of 1% of the total defense forces available to South Korea. I asked him why the great disparity in military capability between North Korea and South Korea when the South Korean economic capacity was so great. President Park responded that the North Korean force buildup had not begun until after we announced our withdrawal policy in 1977. I told him that that information was not accurate, according to our own intelligence sources and that it would be impossible to build up so significantly in such a brief span of time. I asked him what he could do to increase his forces, if he and I could work harmoniously on force levels. He has just given his answer and the interpreter is about to put it into English.)

President Park: I understand that U.S. forces cannot stay in Korea forever. They must be withdrawn someday, but the North Koreans are superior to us now and there has been no change in their policy. The most important thing that we can do is to prevent miscalculation. What I am asking you for is that no further withdrawal of U.S. forces take place until the disparity between North Korea and South Korea is changed and until North Korea changes its policy. What I want to say is that they should stay for the time being.

~~SECRET~~

Review on June 30, 1999  
 Extended by: Z. Brzezinski  
 Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

PER NSC 1.13(f) RE NSC 1.13(f)  
 BY NSC 1.13(f) NARS DATE 1/16/02

President Carter: I can't promise that we will freeze force levels. I will work jointly with you, however, on force levels. What is the intention of your country to eliminate the disparity not only in force levels as they exist, but also in the rate of the buildup of force levels.

President Park: Even before it became known that North Korea had substantially built up its power, we had a Force Improvement Plan. The first phase will end in 1981. We have implemented every point of this plan. Our intent was that our forces should achieve parity by the end of the first phase if the North Koreans did not augment their own forces. As you know, the North Korean Communists did build up their forces. As a result, we should have another phase of the Force Improvement Plan. As you know, we levied a series of defense taxes four years ago to expire in five years. I believe now that we will have to extend the taxes another five years after they expire next year. We will go ahead with our Force Improvement Plan regardless of whether further withdrawal of U.S. forces occurs or not, but I honestly desire that until North Korea changes its policy that the mainstay of the Second Division remain in South Korea and the Combined Forces Command continue to function. The force levels, whether in the 100's or in the 1000's, is your prerogative to decide as President.

President Carter: Would the second phase of the Forces Improvement Plan (FIP) be designed to match the North Koreans.

President Park: If the North Koreans do not make substantial increases of their own, our forces will match theirs.

President Carter: Are you prepared to accept this disparity?

President Park: We would make further efforts.

President Carter: Are you not in that condition now, Mr. President?

President Park: As time goes by, our economic capabilities will grow, and the total financial means of the Government will grow. By the end of the second stage of the FIP we might be able to accelerate our program.

President Carter: This is obviously a decision for you to make, President Park. We spend 6% of GNP; you spend about 5% of GNP on military requirements, while North Korea spends about 20% on defensive and offensive capabilities. It is of concern to me that you would want five or six more years to match the North Korean buildup.

President Park: We would start making further efforts as our own strength grows. It doesn't mean we would start increasing spending five or six years later. We plan to spend 6% of our GNP. Last year a number of supplementary budgets were passed which reduced the percentage of defense spending somewhat. Our plan is to spend between 6 and 6.5% of GNP on defense. That percentage five years from now would be much higher than due to growth in the economy.

President Carter: Let me pursue one more question, Mr. President. I still see the prospect that the North Korean advantage will continue to increase if your expenditures are maintained at 6% of GNP and I am wondering if you are willing to accept this situation?

President Park: We cannot tell for sure what percentage of GNP North Korea is now spending on defense. The common estimate is 20%. But their economy is much smaller. Six per cent of our GNP equals 20% of theirs. It will be difficult for them to maintain expenditures at 20% of GNP.

President Carter: I don't want to argue, Mr. President, but if 6% of the South Korean GNP is as much as 20% of North Korea's, how have North Korean forces built up so much more rapidly than yours? Our intelligence information is that aid from the Soviet Union and China to North Korea has been very small in recent years.

President Park: The North Koreans have a totally different economic, social and political structure than ourselves. If we spent 20% of our GNP on defense, there would be immediate riots. The North Koreans can do this, but we cannot.

President Carter: I fully realize that South Korea cannot spend 20% of its GNP on defense. My need is to see how the Republic of Korea, with U.S. forces levels either stable or not, could reduce the disparity with the North. The disparity could continue indefinitely, and might even get worse. U.S. troops could never be withdrawn.

President Park: It is only an assumption that the North Koreans are spending 20% of GNP. However, it is our purpose to strengthen defense to the best of our ability. We cannot, however, do this at the expense of the structure of society and the standard of living of the people. Nevertheless, we plan to do our best.

At the moment, North Korea is superior to us in some categories of equipment, particularly tanks and airplanes. But even if



they attack, the people of South Korea would fight to the end. They have no place to go. They would win. Our primary objective, however, is to deter an outbreak of war. The presence of U.S. forces deters war and prevents miscalculation. Even though we reach parity, a continuation of the stationing of U.S. forces will still be the best way to deter attack. Though a disparity exists in our equipment, the quality of our forces is better. As I said before, we will not lose, but we would prefer that a war not start in the first place.

President Carter: As you increase your military strength, where do you see your increases most needed? In ground forces or some other element of the force structure?

President Park: Although priorities are difficult to define, we give priority to ground forces. We are inferior in the air, but we can expect immediate assistance from the U.S. should we be attacked. Our priorities are ground forces, air forces, and the navy, in that order.

President Carter: Do you have present plans to build up your ground forces?

President Park: Yes.

President Carter: In personnel levels?

President Park: At the moment we do not plan to increase the number of standing ground forces. We have an agreement with the United States signed in 1954, which freezes the level at 600,000. We want to improve the equipment and upgrade the capability of our homeland reserve divisions. We also want to improve our armour and fire power. We have three million members of the ready reserve which can be mobilized in a short time. They need better equipment.

President Carter: Do you want to maintain a limit of 600,000 or do you want it removed?

President Park: Of course, if we need to increase the number of ground forces, we would consult with you. The 600,000 man ceiling was set in the past because the forces were maintained by U.S. grant aid and there had to be some limit. Now, we receive no grant aid so if we saw a need to increase levels, we would consult with you. However, at the moment, we would prefer to concentrate on equipment. The North Koreans, for example, have over 2,000 tanks. We have about 850.

President Carter: Our impression was that you had 1050.

President Park: The number may have changed slightly.

President Carter: General Vessey told me this morning that you have more than 1,000.

President Park: That may be true. Mr. President, we don't think the number of men should increase to match the North Koreans, but that we should increase the quality of our equipment, particularly tanks, anti-tank weapons like TOWs and aircraft with anti-tank capabilities. We are trying also to utilize the terrain to block the enemy. We are building fortifications and ditches.

President Carter: My understanding is that you are particularly concerned about the presence of the Second Division and the Combined Forces Command. Do you also want the U.S. to maintain its protective nuclear umbrella as well?

President Park: Yes.

President Carter: If we decide to modify or reduce other force levels you would like adequate notification and consultations?

President Park: Yes.

President Carter: Let me raise another issue that concerns me -- human rights. I have studied the question of human rights in South Korea with great attention in an effort to understand your position as best I can. I know that you have to maintain the stability of your society and your government. My belief is that the people of your country are deeply dedicated to freedom and democratic procedures of government. The most serious problem that exists in the attitude of U.S. citizens toward your country is in the human rights area. A few situations here have been greatly exaggerated in our press and throughout our nation. To you these things are not so significant, but in our country they color the entire attitude. We have observed and appreciated the release by you of some students and political activists in recent months. In fairness, they were also highly publicized in the U.S. My own wish would be that you could rescind Emergency Measure 9 and release as many prisoners you hold as possible. Obviously, I have no desire or ability to influence your decision other than to express my opinion of the tremendous improvements that would occur in U.S. relations if these measures could be taken. It may not be possible for you to take such action, but if you could it would permit you and me to wipe out the unpleasant picture of your country that

Americans have. It is a shame that one of our strongest and most valued allies, and one of the finest nations on earth, should be regarded critically in the U.S. because of this one issue. Perhaps you could explain to me your reason for the situation and what might be done.

President Park: I have great admiration for your human rights policy throughout the world and the spirit behind it. I would like to suggest, however, that you cannot apply the same yardstick to all countries. Every country has unique circumstances. You cannot apply the same yardstick to countries whose security is threatened as to countries whose security is not. You went to the front line area, Mr. President, and drove back to Seoul. Our capital is only 25 miles from the DMZ. Right across the DMZ hundreds of thousands of soldiers are poised. We have suffered a tragic war. We must deal with the situation whether we like it or not, otherwise we might fall into the same situation as the Vietnamese. Some time ago several members of Congress came to call on me. I told them that if dozens of Soviet divisions were deployed at Baltimore, the U.S. Government could not permit its people to enjoy the same freedoms they do now. If these Soviets dug tunnels and sent commando units into the District of Columbia, then U.S. freedoms would be more limited. We support the human rights policy. Respect for human rights is also our concern. I want as much freedom for our people as possible. But the survival of 37 million people is at stake, and some restraint is required. Some reporters in the American press say that I wield dictatorial powers. As you have observed I am applying limited restraints. If we lifted EM-9 and released prisoners, the effect on our relationship would be favorable, and I would be able to meet with you in a much lighter frame of mind. But people are trying to overturn this government, and we cannot let that happen. We have released those who showed repentance and will release more. I hope you will understand that we cannot take these measures all at once.

President Carter: Is it your response that you would have to continue to impose EM-9?

President Park: I hope you will understand, but it is difficult to rescind EM-9 at this point. Of course, we don't intend to maintain it indefinitely. I will heed your advice and do more in that direction, but I cannot take these measures at this time. If I took these measures, I would be praised in America and people would say they were taken in consultation with you.

President Carter: This is all I have, Mr. President. Is there anything more that you would like to raise?

President Park: I understand your concern in this regard and will do my best.

President Carter: What I want is to remove all problems that exist between us. I respect your responsibilities. I don't want to attempt to impose my will on your own. Only you can judge the importance of these measures.

**Telegram 1794 from Washington to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Korea: North/South Talks," 5 July 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

[...]

Confidential

Fm Washington 051515Z Jul

To priority Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Telegram Number 1794 of 5 July 1979

Info priority Tokyo, Peking, Seoul, UKMIS New York, Moscow and MODUK (For D14)

Seoul tells nos 133 and 134: Korea: North/South Talks.

1. The apparently negative public North Korean reaction to Carter's proposal for three way talks (North Korean radio and Rodong Shinmun as reported by UPI) is being taken by officials here with a pinch of salt. The State Department await a formal reply to the invitation delivered to North Korea via Indonesia in the name of Vance and the South Korean Foreign Minister, which had proposed talks in an Asian capital in early autumn at the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary. They interpret the North Korean reaction so far as being a necessary response for the record to the US/South Korea communique as a whole. They expect that in due course the private North Korean response will be a counter proposal involving some measure of prior North Korean/United States consultation without South Korean involvement. This the US will reject. After a good deal of quote backing and filling unquote, the State Department guess is that the North Koreans will eventually agree to the tripartite talks as proposed, on the grounds that from the wider political angle they cannot afford not to.

Robinson

[...]

**Memorandum From Nicholas Platt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), 9 July 1979**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 896-898.]

Washington, July 9, 1979

SUBJECT

My Peking Stop

Foreign Minister Huang Hua received Dick Holbrooke and me July 6 for talks and dinner lasting a total of five and one-half hours. He passed up a dinner with Imelda Marcos to meet with us. The atmosphere was very cordial. We briefed Huang on the President's visit to Japan and Korea, your talks with the Japanese Defense Minister on security, and Cy Vance's meetings with the ASEAN and ANZUS Foreign Ministers. The telegrams from Peking containing the verbatim records of the talks are attached (at Tab A).<sup>1</sup> The main points of Huang Hua's reaction to our presentation were as follows:

*Korea*

—Aside from negative Pyongyang press comment, Huang Hua received no reaction from the DPRK Government on the joint US–ROK trilateral initiative.

—As expected, Huang adhered faithfully to the North Korean line. He described the U.S. troop presence as responsible for tension in Korea. The U.S. should withdraw them all, and engage in direct talks with the North Koreans on the Armistice. Reunification is not an appropriate topic for trilateral discussions. Our reassessment exaggerates North Korean troop strength. The Soviets have supplied no additional sophisticated weaponry to the North Koreans for years. China has none to supply. By contrast, the U.S. is adding to the ROK arsenal of sophisticated weaponry and increasing the strength of a dictatorial regime.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Not found attached. Holbrooke's lengthy account of the talks with Huang is in telegrams 4351, 4353, 4362, and 4363 from Beijing, all July 9. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 47, Meetings: 7/79) In a June 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, Oksenberg strongly criticized the idea of sending Holbrooke to China for this meeting, suggesting that Brzezinski or Woodcock would be much better able to solicit Chinese cooperation regarding refugees from Indochina. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 9, China (PRC): 6–7/79)

**Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 July 1979**

*[Source: Roll 2009-36, File 01, Frame 119, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]*

Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1979. 7. 10

The governments of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States jointly proposed high-level talks among South and North Korea and the United States to the North Korean side on July 1, to encourage inter-Korean talks and come up with measures to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Such a groundbreaking proposal reflects the unshakable resolve of the ROK and the United States to relieve tensions and promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, it is deeply regretful that the North Korean side responded negatively, through the statement delivered by the Spokesperson of the so-called Foreign Ministry, to the constructive joint ROK-U.S. proposal for holding tripartite talks.

The joint proposal of ROK and the U.S. on July 1 is still open to a positive reaction of the North Korean authorities, just as our proposal made on 19. Accordingly, we urge the North Korean authorities to discard their preoccupation with their conventional propaganda that denounces us as splittist, but directly confront the reality of the Korean Peninsula and accept this joint proposal in light of the aspiration of the entire nation for the relaxation of tension and settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula. End.

**Note for the File, 10 July 1979**

*[Source: "Troubled areas - question of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0094-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

[...]

10 July 1979

Note for the File

A.

The Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Han Si Hae, was received this morning at 10.30 a.m. by Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. Subsequently, at 11.30 a.m. the Ambassador held a press conference. At both of these meetings, the following essential points were made.

1. The Ambassador stated that the DPRK did not reel that the recent proposal by Mr. Carter and Park Chung Hee for "so-called" three-way talks was motivated by sincere desire for reunification.

2. With reference to Mr. Carter's trip to South Korea, the Ambassador said that this trip had been that of a hypocrite in favour of war. Immediately upon his arrival, Mr. Carter had inspected troops, had visited field installations and had stayed overnight with United States armed forces. Mr. Carter had said "a high degree of combat readiness will be maintained". He had further pledged modern equipment for the armed forces of South Korea and prompt and effective support in the case of their being attacked. It was quite clear from all of this that the pledge by Mr. Carter to bring home American troops from South Korea and also his pledges with regard to human rights in South Korea were shown to be a hoax. It was clear that Mr. Carter advocates division and war, not reunification.

3. The Ambassador next referred to Secretary of State Vance's proposal for negotiations in the political, economic and cultural fields, as well as with regard to reunification. The DPRK wished to state that it found this to be "a confused proposal". Some issues are two-way issues between the two Korean parties and others are two-way issues between the Americans and the DPRK. Two different questions cannot be mixed at three-way talks. With regard to reunification, only North and South Korea can participate. With regard to troop withdrawals only North Korea and the United States can participate, since South Korea is not a signatory of the Armistice Agreement. South Korea could participate in these later talks only when matters directly concerning them arose.

4. The Ambassador next turned to the question of whether there was one Korea or two Koreas. The idea of two Koreas is a "wrong stand". The DPRK does not support any proposals for admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations.



5. The DPRK, however, “leaves the door open” for a dialogue with South Korean authorities and political parties and social and public organizations.

The door is also left open to a dialogue with the United States which would concern withdrawal of U.S. troops and replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement.

6. If the United States should insist upon this point, however, South Korea could participate in the U.S.-DPRK talks as an observer. Even in this case, talks should begin first of all between North Korea and the United States.

#### B.

The press conference was followed by a question period in which the following question was asked: What is the role of an observer? Can he comment or just listen? Would there be any similarity to the role of an Observer at the United Nations, who is permitted to comment and make questions?

The Ambassador answered in the following terms:

This was a matter to be settled between the United States and North Korea. The role of the South Korean Observer could be defined once an agreement had been reached on talks between the United States and the DPRK. The South Korean Observer could not negotiate as such, he would not be a negotiator. The Ambassador did not directly say, however, or indirectly imply, that a South Korean Observer would be unable to comment or make suggestions.

#### C.

1. It should be noted that not only in his meeting with Mr. Perez de Cuellar but also during the press conference and the question period which followed, the DPRK Ambassador generally adopted a moderate tone with the exception of section A, para. 2. (See above.) The publicly stated comments of the Permanent Observer were much milder in tone than the official press release which was handed to Mr. Perez de Cuellar and distributed to the journalists immediately following the press conference. The press release itself contained some very strong and even insulting language. Even the tone of voice adopted by the Ambassador during the entire press conference was very mild and subdued.

2. With regard to nomenclature, the Ambassador referred to President Carter throughout the press conference as “Mr. Carter”. His official title was never used. However, the American Secretary of State was referred to as “Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance”. The President of South Korea was simply referred to as “Park Chung Hee”, without any prefix whatsoever.

#### D.

During his meeting with Under-Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, the Permanent Observer made two observations which were not repeated during the press conference.

1. He stated that President Carter's trip to South Korea was meant as a definite support to partition.

2. He stated, as an important point, that there was a fundamental contradiction between three-way talks and reunification.

Also during his talks with Mr. Perez de Cuellar, the Ambassador made the following points:

1. He asked whether there had been any reaction from the U.S. to the DPRK proposals made through the Secretary-General. Mr. Perez de Cuellar replied that the United States had promised to respond after having had the opportunity for discussions with President Park Chung Hee and the Secretary-General was now awaiting this response.

2. In response to a question from Mr. Perez de Cuellar, the Ambassador said that there had been no final reaction as yet to the proposal by the Secretary-General to President Kim Il Sung for a U.N. Observer to participate in any talks between North and South Korea and to offer his good offices as a channel of communication in a general way. However, the Ambassador stated that the DPRK authorities welcomed the Secretary-General's help and interest.

3. In response to the above, Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that he thought it a useful thing that no final reply had yet been received from Pyongyang with regard to the Secretary-General's proposal. Now it would be possible for all recent factors to be taken into account before coming to a final conclusion.

4. The Ambassador then referred to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Vietnamese Refugees. He wished to know what "categories" of countries would be invited to attend the Conference. Mr. Perez de Cuellar replied that the Secretary-General proposed, in a general way, to invite those countries willing to receive refugees or to offer financial assistance for their resettlement. The Ambassador further enquired as to which Government of Cambodia would be invited, should the Secretary-General decide to ask Cambodia to participate.

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**Note for the File, “Main Points Made by President Kim Il Sung in the Meeting with the Secretary-General on 3 May in PyongYang,” 10 July 1979**

*[Source: “Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

FMG/MM  
cc: Mr. Perez de Cuellar  
b/f: RA/AR

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE FOR THE FILE:

Main points made by President Kim Il Sung  
in the meeting with the Secretary-General  
on 3 May in PyongYang.

- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea wants reunification independently (without outside interference) and by peaceful means. It is possible that two different social systems can exist within one nation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has no intention whatsoever of invading the Republic of Korea or converting it into a socialist state.
- Even if Korea were unified it would never be a satellite of any other country but would always remain non-aligned and neutral.
- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to have economical, political and cultural cooperation with the Republic of Korea.
- The Republic of Korea and the US however, do not really want the nation to be reunified, rather they want to keep the country divided for the time being. In this, there is a basic difference of attitude on the two sides.
- The Korean case should not be compared with the case of Germany – a country defeated in World War II. Foreign troops are stationed in both German states, there are no foreign troops in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
- The Democratic People's Republic of Korea wants a dialogue with the US. The Secretary-General has told the Foreign Minister that the Republic of Korea cannot be excluded from talks with the US. If the South agrees to such a procedure the North will not be opposed to it. But so far, the US has never even mentioned the possibility of tripartite talks, rather it has consistently refused to meet with representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's position is to have first preliminary meetings with the US in which the procedure for further talks can be discussed.

- The replacement of the armistice agreement, however, is a matter to be solved with the US directly since the South is not a party to the agreement and has rejected it originally.
- He hopes that the Secretary-General will be able to assist the dialogue in particular with regard to contacts with the US.
- With regard to the Secretary-General's concrete proposals (channel of communication, Observer) his Government will study the matter in more detail and inform the Secretary-General of its position.
- Contact will be maintained through the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in New York.

(signature)  
FMG

10 July 1979

MEMORANDUM

4142-X

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Zb, J.  
Check in  
Harold on  
my  
Comment.  
Then. See me.  
J*

7-12-79

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *ZB*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Ground Force Withdrawals from  
the Republic of Korea (S)

The time has come for a decision on U.S. ground force withdrawals from the ROK. The policy review process is complete. You have consulted with President Park and Prime Minister Ohira. Park has begun to respond to the requirements you set during your visit. He has decided to release 180 prisoners detained under Emergency Measure 9 by the end of the year. He has agreed to raise his defense budget above 6 percent of GNP in FY-80, (and to expand it further in subsequent years) despite acute inflationary pressures. He has accommodated us on the trilateral diplomatic initiatives. More immediately, Representative Sam Stratton has requested that Generals Jones, Vessey, and Meyer testify July 17 before the House Armed Services Committee on the Korean troop withdrawal issue. We will need a decision this weekend and an announcement if we want to keep out of Congressional hands the initiative to control the issue. (S)

The Options

The options, as elaborated in the PRM and refined since your visit to Seoul, are as follows:

- Option I. Continue with the current schedule; review the withdrawal issue in 1981. (S)
- Option II. Remove two combat battalions, one I-Hawk battalion and some support personnel -- a total of 4300 -- by the end of 1980; announce that the removal of the remaining two brigades of the Second Division will be reviewed in 1981. (S)

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DECL  REVW ON July 11, 1999  
EXT BYND 6 YEARS BY Z. Brzezinski  
REASON NSC 1.13(e)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 8/2/91 NLC RE NLC-96-145  
DATE 11/16/92

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- Option III. Leave further withdrawals of combat units in abeyance; announce that one I-Hawk battalion and roughly 1500 support personnel will be withdrawn by the end of 1980; and indicate that the resumption of further withdrawals will be reviewed by 1981 and will depend particularly upon restoration of the North-South military balance and/or evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula. (S)
- Option IV. Suspend the withdrawals with the exception of one I-Hawk battalion (800 men) in 1980; review the withdrawal issue in early 1981. (S)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff favor Option IV. It is the most conservative militarily; would represent the most clear-cut response to the North Korean order of battle reassessment; would invoke the most enthusiastic response in South Korea and Japan; and would win wide acclaim with those Senators -- e.g. Nunn, Glenn, Baker, etc. -- who have asserted the strongest interest in the Korean issue who will have a critical voice in the SALT ratification debate. At the same time, this option will look most like a reversal of your earlier decision, may relieve some of the pressure on Park to expand his defense efforts; and could evoke the sharpest reactions from the North. (S)

#### Discussion

Option II is a reaffirmation of the general principle of withdrawals, but slows their implementation. It would sustain North Korea's stake in averting provocation in order to avoid a reversal of the withdrawal policy, and keep some pressure on the ROK to expand its own defense efforts. Within the overall context of the local balance, the military consequences of withdrawing two combat battalions would not amount to much. At the same time, a decision to withdraw additional combat forces in the wake of the new intelligence information could rekindle doubts in Asia about our judgment, invite a possible confrontation with key Senators whose support is essential to SALT ratification, and incur relocation and re-equipment costs that should be deferred for both economic and political reasons. (S)

Option III reaffirms the general principle of withdrawal without removing further combat units. Implementation of the I-Hawk transfer plus some further reduction of support units

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encourages the ROK to enhance its own defense efforts, and will permit you essentially to complete the first phase of the withdrawals by the end of your first term. (The overall withdrawal total would come to roughly 6,000.) Making the resumption of further withdrawals contingent upon North Korea's willingness to join actively in an effort to reduce tensions on the peninsula will enable us to place future withdrawals in a broader diplomatic context, strengthen our hand in promoting a resumption of a serious North-South dialogue, and enable us to explain the policy persuasively to the Congress and to the American public. Harold Brown and Cy Vance favor this course of action, and the Joint Chiefs would support it, though it is not their preferred alternative. (S)

Till now, I have supported Option I [redacted] but in the light of your discussions in Korea -- and also taking into account the need for support for SALT from Nunn and Glenn -- I now feel that Option II or III is preferable to Option I. Option III would go the furthest among those whom we need in the Senate; Option II will look somewhat less like a reversal of your earlier policy. (S)

I will prepare an announcement for your use as soon as you have made your decision. (U)

Congressional Consultation

It will be important to touch base with key members of Congress before the decision is announced. You do not need to do this directly but can delegate the responsibility to Cy Vance and Harold Brown. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you choose among the four options presented.

- Option I. Approve \_\_\_\_\_
- Option II. Approve \_\_\_\_\_
- Option III. Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓ ?
- Option IV. Approve \_\_\_\_\_

*2615: my preference is to announce that the 2nd division and Joint Command will not be withdrawn be put in a bayance - will be reviewed by '81.*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Cy Vance and Harold Brown to consult with key Congressional leaders prior to announcement of the decision.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*depending on ---  
Some support units will be withdrawn in 1980. Word to incl I Hwks.*

**Letter from J. Perez de Cuellar to the Secretary-General, 16 July 1979**

*[Source: "Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0025-13, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

16 July 1979

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I am attaching, for your information, a memorandum on the most recent developments at Headquarters with regard to the Korean situation, subsequent to the North Korean statement on the U.S.-South Korean proposal for tripartite talks.

Yours sincerely,  
(signature)

J. Perez de Cuellar  
Under-Secretary-General for  
Special Political Affairs

Mr. Kurt Waldheim  
Secretary-General

[...]

DATE: 16 July 1979

TO: The Secretary-General (signature)

THROUGH:

FROM: J. Perez de Cuellar (signature)  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Special Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Korea

1. On Tuesday, 10 July, I received the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to discuss North Korean reaction to the United States-South Korean joint proposal for tripartite talks to "promote dialogue and reduce tensions in the area".
2. The Ambassador stated that the DPRK did not feel that this proposal was motivated by a sincere desire for reunification and found it to be "a confused proposal". He stated that some issues are two-way issues between the two Korean parties and others are two-way issues between the Americans and the DPPK. Two different questions could not be mixed at three-way talks. With regard to reunification only North and South Korea could participate. With



regard to troop withdrawals only North Korea and the United States could participate since South Korea is not a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. South Korea could participate in these latter talks only when matters directly concerning them arose.

3. The DPRK however “leaves the door open” for a dialogue with South Korean authorities and political parties and social and public organizations. The door is also left open to a dialogue with the United States which would concern withdrawal of U.S. troops and replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement.

4. The Ambassador then stated as a DPRK initiative and not in response to a question that if the United States should insist upon this point South Korea could participate in the U.S.-DPRK talks as an observer. Even in this case talks should begin first of all between North Korea and the United States. This proposal has also been published in the official statement made public by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pyongyang.

5. A subsequent press conference was followed by a question on the role of an observer. The Ambassador answered that this was a matter to be settled between the United States and North Korea. The role of a South Korean observer could be defined once agreement had been reached on talks between the U.S. and the DPRK. A South Korean observer could not negotiate, he would not be a negotiator. The Ambassador did not directly say however, or indirectly imply, that a South Korean observer would be unable to comment or make suggestions.

6. The foregoing would seem to indicate some degree of flexibility on the part of North Korea with regard to South Korean participation in the proposed tripartite talks. The publicly stated comments of the DPRK Permanent Observer were much milder in tone than the official press release, which contains some very strong language.

7. On Thursday, 12 July, I received the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea. The Ambassador appeared extremely aggravated by the North Korean response to the South Korean-American proposal for tripartite talks and uninterested in signs of moderation indicated by the DPRK Ambassador's public use of diplomatic language at his press conference. The Ambassador stated that whereas North Korea speaks of two separate sets of issues, South Korea regards the two sets of issues as inextricably intertwined. South Korea regarded the North Korean statement as a rejection of the joint Republic of Korea-American proposal. Also, the ROK regarded an observer role for South Korea during separate DPRK-American talks as completely unacceptable.

8. In general, the South Korean Ambassador took a hard line and refused to see any nuances in the North Korean statement. However, he stated that the ROK-United States joint proposal of 1 July remained valid and “open for acceptance by the North Korean authorities”. He also stated that the ROK proposal of 19 January for bilateral talks remained valid.

9. On Friday, 13 July, I received the Political Counsellor of the United States Mission and asked her for the American reaction to the North Korean statement with regard to the proposal for tripartite talks. The Political Counsellor said that the United States Mission had

not been in close touch with the State Department on this matter, but she was willing to say that the U.S. Mission did not regard the North Korean statement as an outright rejection of the United States-South Korean proposal. In a preliminary way, the Political Counsellor agreed with me that there were some signs of moderation and flexibility in the North Korean statement and in the press conference which North Korea had held. In response to a suggestion from myself, the Political Counsellor also agreed that signs of flexibility on the part of the North Koreans were probably due to Chinese influence.



Statement on Korean Troop Withdrawals

Last February it was announced that withdrawals of U. S. ground combat forces from Korea would be held in abeyance pending the completion of a reassessment of North Korea's military strength and the implications of recent political developments in the region. That reassessment has been completed, and these policy issues have been discussed with our key allies in Asia, with principal defense and foreign policy advisers, and leaders of the Congress. Circumstances require these further adjustments in the troop withdrawal plan:

- Withdrawals of combat elements of the 2nd Division will remain in abeyance. The structure and function of the Combined Forces Command will continue as established last year.
- Between now and the end of 1980 some reductions of personnel in U. S. support units will continue. This will include one I-Hawk air defense battalion whose transfer to the ROK had been planned since 1976.
- The timing and pace of withdrawals beyond these will be reexamined in 1981. In that review the United States will pay special attention to the restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance, and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula.

These decisions have been shaped by the following considerations:

-- First, recent studies by the intelligence community have confirmed that the size of North Korea's ground forces, armor, fire power, and mobility are larger than previously estimated. Given the inherent economic strength of the Republic of Korea and with U. S. support, the existing imbalance in North-South military strength can be remedied. Holding further withdrawals of U. S. ground combat units in abeyance will help reinforce deterrence, avoid conveying misleading signals to the North, and buy additional time for the ROK to put its ground defenses in order. For its part the Republic of Korea recognizes the need to augment its self-defense efforts, and President Park has stated that his government would expand defense spending significantly beyond previously planned levels and accord special urgency to improving its ground defenses.

-- Second, during the recent visit to Seoul, President Park and President Carter jointly announced their desire to explore possibilities for reducing tensions in Korea with representatives of North Korea. Only through authoritative discussions between representatives of the North and South Korean governments can a framework for peaceful coexistence between the North and South be established and progress toward eventual reunification of Korea be achieved. The United States

is prepared to assist in that diplomatic effort. It is the judgment of the United States that further reductions of our combat elements in Korea should await credible indications that a satisfactory military balance has been restored and a reduction in tension is underway.

-- Third, in recent months we have normalized relations with China and deepened defense cooperation with Japan. Concurrently we have witnessed the steady growth of Soviet military power in East Asia and the eruption of renewed conflict and new uncertainties in Southeast Asia. Under these circumstances, it is believed that these adjustments in our Korean withdrawal plan -- together with the recent stabilization of our base agreement with the Philippines, initiation of defense planning discussions with Japan, and increased support for the security of ASEAN countries -- will serve wider U. S. strategy security interests by reassuring our principal allies of our steadiness and our resolve.

Over time we will continue to adjust the detailed features of our contribution to the security of the Republic of Korea to reflect growing ROK economic and military strength and changes in the international situation. At present, however, these modifications in our withdrawal plans will best assure the maintenance of our security commitment, preserve an adequate deterrent, nurture the resumption of a serious North-South dialogue, and stabilize a favorable U. S. strategic position in East Asia.

**Letter from W. Morris to P.R. Whiteway, "South Korea-North Korea Relations," 23 July 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," *The National Archives*, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

BRITISH EMBASSY  
SEOUL  
23 July 1979

Ref: 020/3

P R Whiteway Esq  
FED  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

*Dear Paul,*

**SOUTH KOREA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS**

1. It was reported at the weekend that a North Korean intelligence vessel, disguised as a fishing boat was sunk on Saturday near some islands close to Masan, off the South Coast.
2. The 4-ton wooden vessel was first sighted by a police patrol boat at about 14.15 hours. When challenged it opened fire, two policemen were killed and one wounded. The naval authorities were alerted and a naval patrol boat sunk the North Korean ship at about 16.30 hours.
3. We understand that five North Korean bodies have so far been discovered, as well as submachine guns, rifles, ammunition, rockets and espionage equipment. The vessel has been salvaged by the ROK navy.
4. As is normal in these cases the UNC will now carry out an investigation and in all probability a MAC meeting will be called.
5. This is the first case of its kind since a series of similar incidents last summer. Incidentally, according to recent West German and Japanese press reports, four North Korean fisherman who were handed back at Panmunjom on 3 July 1978 were later executed by the North Korean authorities. (My letter of 11 July 1978 refers.)
6. This month also saw the defection to the South of a young political guidance officer, Second Lt. Kang Hyong Sun. A cutting giving details of his press conference on 11 July is attached.
7. Finally, it was announced by the KCIA on 18 July that an 11 man spy ring had been rounded up late last month in the Busan area. Two of those involved, who had been sent to South Korea during the Korean war have already served prison sentences for violating the anti-communist law. Two others are known to have visited the North about 10 years ago for training.

*Yours ever,*  
*Warrick*  
W Morris

[...]



**Note from D.F. Murray, "Mr Vance's Message to the Secretary of State," 23 July 1979**  
[Source: FCO 21/1762, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

Private Secretary

MR VANCE'S MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Late on Sunday 21 July the US Delegation to the Geneva Meeting on Indo-China Refugees gave me the attached message for the Secretary of State. They explained that there had been administrative delays in Washington and telegraphic delays to Geneva, and a good part of the message was out of date; nevertheless they were under instructions to deliver it urgently. When I pointed out that the Secretary of State had left several hours beforehand, after talking to Vice-President Mondale, the Americans said they would ask the US Embassy in London to deliver a copy, but would I please take this copy back to London as well.

(signature)  
D F Murray

23 July 1979

[...]

UNITED STATES MISSION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

No. 107

The Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the Office of the United Nations and other International Organizations at Geneva presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom and has the honor to request that the attached message, which was received telegraphically, from Mr. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, be conveyed to Lord Carrington.

The Permanent Mission of the United States avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Mission of the United Kingdom the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of the  
United States of America  
July 20, 1979

[...]

July 20, 1979

Lord Carrington

Dear Peter:

I have just returned to the United States and want to bring you up to date on a number of important developments which took place since we met in Tokyo.

The President's visit to Korea proved to be most helpful. He reconfirmed to the Korean leadership our determination to stand by our security commitments to the Republic of Korea, and I believe they were satisfied with the President's discussion of the security situation on the Peninsula. He has consulted with his military advisers and members of Congress, and I expect him to make an announcement shortly with respect to the deployment of our forces in Korea.

The President also discussed human rights with President Park and made it clear to Park that Korea's international image is affected by the political freedoms it extends to its citizens. Based on the President's discussions, I am confident that his Government plans to take steps which will improve the situation.

You are aware of the initiative which we and the South Korean Government launched. Through the good offices of the Indonesian Government, we and the South Koreans have confirmed the seriousness of our intention to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and our desire to begin talks early this fall in Jakarta. We have had no direct answer yet from North Korea, but a public statement issued in Pyongyang last week is quite negative. We intend to keep the door open and to seek a more considered response. Whatever the immediate result of the initiative, I believe we have taken an important step forward on a basis which will ensure that there is no derogation of the position of the Republic of Korea. A sine qua non for success in trying to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula is that at some stage North Korea must deal with the South on equal terms.

[...]

Sincerely,

(signed: Cy Vance)

CYRUS VANCE  
Secretary of State  
United States of America

**Telegram from W. Morris, "Tripartite Talks Proposal," 31 July 1979**

*[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]*

[...]

Tripartite Talks Proposal

1. A month has now passed since the joint ROK-US proposal for tripartite talks with North Korea was made but the response from the North has so far been negative.
2. Unfavourable unofficial reaction came within two or three days but a statement issued by the North Korean Foreign Ministry on 10 July denouncing the proposal as a scheme to create permanent division on the Peninsula provided the first official comment. The statement went on to underline that there were two separate issues at stake. One was the withdrawal of US troops and the replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace agreement, the other was the question of unification.
3. According to the statement, South Korea is, "fundamentally speaker", not entitled to take part in the talks on the first issue because it is not a signatory of the Armistice Agreement. The statement went on to say however that "if the US side requests insistently we will allow the South Korean authorities to participate as an observer in the talks". However "even in that case, talks should be arranged first between us and the US".
4. On the second issue, ie talks on unification, the statement argued that this was not a matter for the US to get involved in. The door was however open "for a dialogue with the South Korean authorities, political parties and social organisations".
5. Although this same line was repeated on 13 July by the North Korean Prime Minister, Li Jong Ok, at a party for the visiting Burmese Prime Minister, ROK officials have been at pains to stress both privately and in public that in spite of Pyongyang's initial opposition to the idea of tripartite talks, neither the ROK nor the US regards this as a final rejection. Both US Ambassador Gleysteen and ROK Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin have gone on record as saying, amid rumours that a second approach (through the good offices of the UN Secretary-General?) is already being tried, that their diplomatic efforts to persuade the North to agree will continue. Unusually mild statements issued by the MFA have simply regretted North Korea's negative reaction so far but have made it clear that the proposal still stands.
6. No one, at least in South Korea, is or ever has been, under any illusions but the North's reaction to date does not totally rule out further progress. In an obvious effort to draw the North away from their rigid distinction between unification talks and military ones, Foreign Minister Park made it clear in the National Assembly on 30 July that the purpose of the tripartite proposal was purely to get talks started again between the South and the North in order to reduce tension, and not to resolve essentially inter-Korean problems.

Signed....W Morris Seoul

**Teleletter from G.P. Lockton to J.T. Masefield, "North-South Korean Dialogue," 23 August 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

[...]

Teleletter  
Unclassified  
From G P Lockton, Seoul  
Ref 020/1 Dated 23 August 1979  
Following for J T Masefield Esq, FED  
Copied UK MIS New York  
Washington  
U Peking  
Moscow

North-South Korean Dialogue

1. The ROK Foreign Ministry announced yesterday that North Korea had rejected the offer by the UN Secretary General following his visits to Pyongyang and Seoul earlier this year to help in getting talks started between the ROK and North Korea. The head of the North Korean Observer Mission to the UN had informed the United Nations Secretariat that his Government believed that Dr Waldheim's proposal for talks would only perpetuate the division of the Peninsula. While the North was anxious for a dialogue, the South was not. It was therefore difficult to get talks started at the present time. The Secretariat passed this news to the ROK representative on 20 August.

2. The MFA have issued no official comment on the matter so far but are naturally disappointed and concerned at the North's rejection of yet another offer of talks. You will recall that the North have so far refused to hold tripartite talks with the ROK and USA as proposed by Presidents Carter and Park on 1 July. They have not responded to a proposal by the Korean Red Cross 11 days ago that working level contracts should be resumed. The MFA Spokesman told reporters that the latest rejection proved once again that the North were not sincere in their call for a dialogue with the South.

Signed.....GP Lockton, Seoul

**Memorandum of Conversation Between the Vice President and the People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 28 August 1979**

[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 945-962.]

Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Beijing, August 28, 1979, 9:30 a.m.–noon

**SUBJECT**

Summary of the Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

**PARTICIPANTS**

Vice President Walter Mondale  
Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China  
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Richard Moe, Chief of Staff to the Vice President  
Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member, NSC

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping  
Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Chai Zemin, People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United States  
Zhang Wenjin, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Han Xu, Director of American Department  
Wei Yongqing, Director of Protocol  
Ji Chaozhu, Deputy Director of American Department

[...]

*Korea*

Vice Premier Deng: On the Korean question, we have discussed this many times. Our present suggestion is that the U.S. considers getting in touch directly with the DPRK and leave aside the tripartite talks. Such contact can be held at many different levels and in the course of such contact maybe some modalities acceptable to both sides can be arranged. One thing I want to make clear is that while U.S. forces are still stationed in South Korea I do not think the DPRK will agree to any tripartite meeting. There may be something to be gained through direct talks. I want to clarify one point. As to the impression that the Soviet Union has a very large influence in North Korea, this is not correct.

Vice President Mondale: We do not believe that.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 53, Chron: 8/2/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Great Hall of the People.

Vice Premier Deng: When Foreign Minister Huang told Dr. Kissinger that Kim Il Song had not visited Moscow for twenty years, Dr. Kissinger was very surprised. So that is the question we leave for you to consider. We feel that there is not a tense situation in that part of the world.

Vice President Mondale: I do not want to go over our position again. You are familiar with the situation in that area. I will not take more time to express our views. You know our hopes, and the way we believe progress can be made. I will report your views to the President.

[...]

**Interoffice Memorandum from Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to the Secretary-General, "Korea,"  
28 August 1979**

*[Source: "Korea," Office of Secretary-General - Kurt Waldheim, S-0904-0026-06, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UN ARMS), New York, NY. Obtained for NKIDP by James Person.]*

DATE: 27 August 1979

TO: The Secretary-General

THROUGH:

FROM: Javier Pérez de Cuéllar  
Under Secretary-General  
for Special Political Affairs

SUBJECT: Korea

Prior to our departure for Havana, I would like to provide a brief survey for you of the principal events which have occurred with regard to the Korean question, since President Carter's visit to South Korea. I should also like to reiterate a few ideas as to how we might proceed at Havana, since the North Korean Foreign Minister will be in attendance at the Conference of the Non-Aligned:

1. 1 July: Issuance of the joint Carter-Park communiqué at the conclusion of President Carter's visit to South Korea. It was in this communiqué that tripartite talks between North and South Korea and the United States were proposed.

2. 10 July: The North Korean Ambassador visited me, at his initiative, to convey the DPRK reaction to the tripartite talks proposal. The Ambassador indicated that from the North Korean point of view, two different questions could not be intermingled with three-way talks. With regard to reunification, only North and South Korea could participate. With regard to troop withdrawals or any other military matters stemming from the Armistice Agreement, only North Korea and the United States could participate, since South Korea is not a signatory of the Agreement. South Korea could participate in these latter talks only when matters directly concerning them arose. The Ambassador, however, offered as a DPRK initiative that South Korea could participate in the entire proposed DPRK-United States talks as an Observer. In defining the role of the Observer, the Ambassador at no time indicated that the proposed Observer would be confined to a completely silent role. In commenting on all these matters at a subsequent press conference, the Ambassador adopted the use of very consilatory and diplomatic language in explaining the proposals.

3. 12 July: I received the South Korean Ambassador, who completely rejected any proposed Observer role for the ROK at DPRK-U.S. talks. The South Korean Ambassador also stated that the ROK regarded the North Korean statement of two days previously as a rejection of the South Korean-United States proposal. The Ambassador further indicated that the Republic of

Korea did not agree that there were two separate sets of issues; from the South Korean point of view, the two sets of issues were inextricably intertwined.

4. 20 July: Dr. Brzezinski issued a statement from the White House indicating that there would be no further withdrawals of United States combat forces (which number 32,000) at this time from South Korea. Amongst the principal reasons offered for this alteration of President Carter's original decision was a stated increase in the size of armaments of the North Korean armed forces. Conversely, the United States indicated that it wished to provide time for the Republic of Korea to augment its self-defense efforts. In sum, the United States offered four reasons for the medication of the withdrawal plans, including a) the maintenance of their security commitment to South Korea, b) the preservation of an adequate deterrent to any breach of the peace, c) the stabilisation of a favourable United States strategic position in East Asia, d) the nurturing of a resumption of a serious North-South dialogue.

5. 26 July: On this date, the Americans made available a statement of the official United States position concerning the North Korean reaction to the joint U.S.-ROK proposal for tripartite talks. The United States statement consisted of four parts, the first of which was the most important:

A. The American view is that while the North Korean statement was negative in tone, they do not consider it to be a final response – (this is very much in accord with my own interpretation);

B. The United States rejects separate U.S.-DPRK talks;

C. The joint U.S.-ROK proposal for tripartite talks remains open to acceptance;

D. The United States endorses the North Korean position that only direct bilateral talks between North and South Korea can lead to reunification.

6. 30 July: I proposed to the North Korean Ambassador that perhaps an informal meeting could be arranged between the Ambassador, the Americans and myself, in an informal setting – perhaps even outside the Headquarters building. I suggested that, after a suitable interval, a South Korean representative might join the meeting. I myself might then withdraw or stay, entirely as the parties themselves chose. The idea of the meeting with the Americans was naturally well received by the Ambassador. The idea that a South Korean representative might subsequently join us was less received, but did not obtain a totally negative reaction. Subsequently, this proposal was rejected by the Americans, after what appeared to be consultations with their South Korean allies. The United States view was that to separate themselves from their ally, even for five minutes, would have a symbolic effect injurious to their relations with South Korea and damaging to South Korean standing in the eyes of the DPRK.

7. 30 July: During the course of your meeting on this day at the White House with President Carter, the President stated that he “very much hoped” that you would continue with your efforts to act as a channel of communications between the two parties.



8. 15 August: I received the Permanent Observer of North Korea, at his request, in order that he might convey the official North Korean response to your offer to act as interlocutor between North and South Korea. In essence, though the North Korean response was very carefully phrased in order to avoid giving any cause for offence to yourself, the North Koreans reinterpreted your offer of good offices in a general sense to an offer of good offices to achieve reunification. They then stated that the atmosphere for talks to achieve reunification was not propitious, since the South Koreans did not sincerely desire such talks. Consequently, the North Koreans did not feel it possible to accept your proposal at this time. However, the Ambassador then conveyed the North Korean “expectation and hope” that both you and I would continue our efforts. It should be noted that the North Korean response dealt only with your proposal to act as a channel of communications – and then only as a channel of communications with regard to reunification – and there was no response whatsoever to your other proposal that the United Nations have an Observer at any talks taking place at Panmunjom.

9. 20 August: The South Korean Red Cross proposed a resumption of the so-called Red Cross Talks between North and South Korea, to take place in September. The North-South Red Cross Talks, which have occurred earlier and which are only suspended rather than terminated as with other negotiating bodies, is the only remaining format for direct communication between North and South on substantive issues. The issues in question are generally understood to consist of the whole spectrum of humanitarian issues, such as the bringing together of members of separated families (which are estimated to total about 10,000,000 people), the resumption of telephone service between North and South and the resumption of some form of mail service between North and South.

10. This South Korean initiative occurred subsequent to my memorandum to you of 16 August, in which I put forth similar proposals for your consideration, as a way of continuing your initiative. This would seem to indicate that the South Koreans have also concluded that in this completely non-political format lies the only possible vehicle for direct substantive communication between North and South.

It might be useful, therefore, at Havana, for you to consider speaking to the North Korean Foreign Minister along these lines of channeling your offer of good offices into purely humanitarian sectors (as of this date, the North Koreans have not accepted the South Korean proposal for resumption of the Red Cross Talks).

Taking into account the low-key nature of the early United States-China exchanges in the early 1970's, you might wish to consider the use of some such similar device – such as a completely non-controversial cultural exchange, which might include reciprocal expositions of remaining objets d'art from the ancient Korean past. Such a device might be utilized either prior to or subsequent to the arrangement of humanitarian talks which would utilize your good offices.

*Note: Mr. Perez d.C. forwarded a copy of this to the S-G. Mr. Perez d.C had asked for a meeting with the DPRK foreign minister before the [illegible] received a [illegible] reply. [Illegible] therefore [illegible] not to [illegible] the minister for the time being.*

*File  
(Signature)*

RESTRICTED  
FM SEOUL 240042Z SEP  
TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 198 OF 4 SEPTEMBER  
INFO PRIORITY TOKYO  
WASHINGTON  
PEKING  
MOSCOW  
MODUK (FOR DIA)

FEK 020/7	
- 5 SEP 1979	
no	13/9

NORTH KOREAN TUNNEL

1. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE BROADCAST ON 2 SEPTEMBER THE NEWS THAT A FOURTH NORTH KOREAN TUNNEL HAD BEEN DISCOVERED UNDER THE DEMILITARISED ZONE.
2. WE HAVE KNOWN FOR SOME WEEKS THAT A POSSIBLE NEW TUNNEL HAD BEEN DISCOVERED, BUT THE UN COMMAND HAVE MAINTAINED STRICT SECURITY AND THERE HAS BEEN NO DEFINITE CONFIRMATION THAT IT IS A TUNNEL. SEISMIC SURVEYS LAST DECEMBER INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF CAVITIES BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL AUGUST THAT BOREHOLES WERE SUNK TO SEEK POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. THE LOCATION IS AT THE EASTERN END OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE BUT NOT ON THE COAST. THE SUPPOSED TUNNEL APPEARS TO PENETRATE A RIDGE AND EMERGE 600 YARDS SOUTH OF THE DMZ.
3. THE STORY BROKE FIRST IN THE WASHINGTON POST. IT IS THOUGHT BY THE AMERICANS HERE THAT IT WAS LEAKED BY THE KOREAN EMBASSY. THE TIMING IS FORTUITOUS, COINCIDING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING IN HAVANA AND WITH A PERIOD OF TENSION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION HERE. THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND.

RESTRICTED

WELL AWARE OF THE RISK OF A NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA VICTORY IF THE TUNNEL TURNS OUT TO BE A NATURAL FORMATION, IS PLAYING THE STORY DOWN. IT HAS PREPARED A SHORT PRESS STATEMENT SAYING THAT DETAILS OF COUNTER-TUNNELLING OPERATIONS ARE NOT DISCLOSED AND IF AND WHEN TUNNELS ARE FOUND THEY WILL BE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED.

4. THE RB IS TO VISIT THE SITE TOMORROW. WE SHALL REPORT ANY FURTHER DETAILS.

TALLBOYS

**Letter from S.I. Soutar to J.T. Masefield, "Korea," 13 September 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

[...]

Dear [illegible],

**KOREA**

1. I called on Bob Rich, the Korea Country Director at the State Department yesterday, to ask him where matters now stood on the US/ROK proposal for tripartite talks. At a press conference last week, Mr Vance said that the US did not regard the North Korean reply as the final response, and that the US would wait and see what happened.
2. Without any prompting, Rich volunteered an account of the events which had led up to the US/ROK proposal, and although this is to some extent ancient history (John Weston's letters of 23 July to Richard Samuel and 10 August to Hugh Cortazzi), it may be of interest for the insight it offers into the way the Americans handle the South Koreans. Rich said that in the early spring of this year the US and the South Koreans began to look at the possibility of inviting the North Koreans to tripartite talks. The US thought this track worth pursuing because they had no intention of responding to North Korean suggestions for bilateral US/North Korean discussions, but at the same time had received a number of indications that the North Koreans might be prepared to take up the idea of tripartite talks. The South Koreans, including Park himself, showed themselves amenable to the suggestion, largely because it was clear that the attempts to promote bilateral North Korea/South Korea talks were getting nowhere.
3. When the Americans suggested however that the North Koreans ought to be given some advance warning of what was afoot, Park was initially very much opposed. (Rich commented that Park had been scarred by his experience with the North in 1973 when he had given them advance warning of what were a reasonable set of proposals, only to have them shot down within hours of his public statement by an obviously well prepared propaganda barrage). However, in the end, Park agreed that some minimal warning would have to be given.
4. Considerable thought was given to the choice of intermediary. The Americans wanted themselves and the South Koreans to appear as equal partners (for background see below) and they therefore sought a country which had relations with all three parties and, given the need for effective communication, which had exchanged resident Ambassadors with all three parties. In the end the only suitable candidate appeared to be the Indonesians. Rich said (please protect) that this had proved an unfortunate choice for reasons partly of personality and partly of timing. When preparations for Carter's visit to Seoul moved into high gear in June, the Indonesians were represented in both Seoul and Pyongyang by Charges d'Affaires and the Charge in Seoul was particularly ineffective. In the end although it had been decided to give the North Koreans at least 24 hours warning, Rich doubted whether the message got through more than 12 hours before the appeal was made.

5. Rich commented that as far as he was aware, the message from Vance and his South Korean counterpart to the North Korean Foreign Minister which followed up the Carter/Park appeal was the first time a South Korean Cabinet level Minister had ever formally address his North Korean opposite number. No reply was ever received to this message (beyond confirmation via Indonesia of the public response), nor had the Americans or South Koreans had any response to the appeal by the two Presidents other than the North Korean Foreign Ministry Statement of 10 July.

6. Rich said that the public position taken by Vance last week (para 1 above) accurately reflected the Americans' private stance. With the South Koreans, they had been sending signals to the North Koreans via the Yugoslavs and the Chinese (Rich said that they had been keeping the Romanians informed but implied that their usefulness as mediators was limited) to stress that they remained interested in pursuing the tripartite channel. If anything the indications which they had received in response to these further signals were that the North Korea position had further hardened. They had considered sending a further private message via the Indonesians, but had decided to hold off for the present. He personally was still hopeful, but was less optimistic than when the exercise was first launched. If it failed, the exercise would at least have made clear to reasonable people where the obstacle to progress lay. In the meantime the Americans would be having in depth consultations in Seoul in October to try to flesh out ideas which could be put to the North Koreans if a tripartite forum could be constructed. He believed that the South Koreans genuinely wanted to establish communication with the North Koreans, although he commented that they needed to bring a little more imagination into the process.

7. Rich expanded somewhat on the reasons why America's allies had not received more warning of the joint appeal by Carter and Park. The Americans had suggested prior notification but Park had been extremely resistant. He had only conceded this point at the last minute, and because of time differences between Europe and the Far East, certain allies such as ourselves, had received virtually no warning at all. (Rich also suggested, though this should not get back to the Americans, that the US Embassy in London were a bit slow off the mark.) By way of further background, he explained that the South Koreans had been profoundly influenced by the way in which, as they saw it, the US had negotiated directly with the North Vietnamese at the Paris peace talks, leaving the South Vietnamese a mere appendage of the US, to be informed of developments after the event. Vance, Habib and Holbrooked who had all at one time or another been involved in the Paris negotiations had all agreed South Korea should be given no excuse for feeling that she was in a position analogous to South Vietnam. Rich said that this policy had been "consolidated" within the US Government early last year, but at that time the South Koreans had no confidence in assurances by the US Government. It was a measure of the improvement in the relations between the US and South Korea in the meantime that they were prepared this year to contemplate the idea of a tripartite negotiation proposal. The United States had therefore been particularly careful not to get out ahead of the South Koreans; hence their desire to find an intermediary who would be able to approach all three parties on a more or less equal basis; and hence the question of informing Western Allies.

8. Reverting to US relations with North Korea, Rich confirmed that the US would continue to reject North Korean attempts to promote bilateral US/North Korean talks. He said however that the US had told both the Chinese and the USSR that they were ready to contemplate easing

American restrictions over practical links with North Korea if they were prepared to do the same for South Korea. He added that the exchanges on Korea between Mondale and Deng Xiaoping in Peking were the most “pro forma and insubstantial” of all Mondale’s discussions in China.

9. Rich said that “someone in the FCO” had commented on the connection between US preparedness to contemplate and some progress towards normalisation of relations with North Korea and Western countries’ attitudes to North Korea. Rich said firmly that the US view remained that it would be most unconstructive if major Western powers were to move nearer recognition of North Korea unless there was some understanding that the Soviets and Eastern Europeans were prepared to move toward normalisation with South Korea.

*Yours ever,  
Ian*

S I Soutar

[...]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5436

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Cyrus Vance *cv*

Subject: Proposed Oral Presidential Message  
to ROK President Park

Recent political developments in the Republic of Korea have significantly increased tensions and threaten the further liberalization of political restrictions which you discussed with President Park.

While significant numbers of prisoners have been released since your visit, and the press has remained quite outspoken, there has been a labor dispute which escalated into a police incident, some continuing arrests, and most recently an outbreak of factional infighting within the opposition New Democratic Party which has resulted in a temporary court injunction in a civil case challenging the leadership of Kim Young-sam (whom you met in Seoul). Kim is defying the court's jurisdiction, politicians are rapidly choosing sides, and the party may split.

We have been under pressure from critics of the ROK Government to enter the fray with public condemnation or expressions of concern, but we have refrained from public statements which could be used in a partisan manner. However, in view of the importance of present tensions being defused in a manner which can lead to a widening of political participation rather than polarization and radicalization of a segment of the opposition, I have concluded that it is important that we do what we can to push events in a constructive direction before confrontation further endangers human rights goals.

We have been in close touch with Ambassador Kim here, and Bill Gleysteen in Seoul is working to encourage moderating steps by the Korean government. An important positive

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-3 9/18/99

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
PER 210/az *St. H. RE No. ALK-96-60*  
BY *J* NARS DATE 4/4/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

action this week was a balanced ROK Government report exonerating some Christian social action bodies from escalating charges of subversion and pro-communism. This will help to defuse concerns among some missionaries that the social action gospel was coming under concerted attack.

However, we conclude that we need to do more. I therefore recommend that you authorize Ambassador Gleysteen to convey the attached message from you orally to President Park. If the exchange can be kept absolutely confidential, I believe Park will react constructively to such a private communication.

Recommendation

That you approve instructing Ambassador Gleysteen to convey the attached message orally to President Park in your name.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:

Draft Oral Message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D R A F T

## ORAL MESSAGE

Since my message to you through Ambassador Gleysteen last month, I have been pleased to learn of the release on your independence day of a significant further number of persons who had been convicted under the emergency measures and other laws which limit political activity.

Some aspects of recent events, however, have genuinely concerned me. These have included the arrests of some political and religious figures, the lack of any official censure of police tactics after their middle of the night break-in at the New Democratic Party headquarters, and the official statements which seemed designed to exacerbate the present serious leadership and factional disputes within the opposition party.

Mr. President, it is not for me to suggest how you handle the many complex issues raised by the present political tensions in Seoul. However, as you address these issues, I know you would share with me a concern that legitimate channels for exercise of opposition views remain open, and that an additional segment of critics not be driven into channels of opposition which could exacerbate political tensions and human rights problems.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 3/21/97 NSC 6/ RE MR-ALC-96-58  
BY [Signature] NARS. DATE 4/21/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -

As I said while in Seoul, I believe that the right to participate in the political process helps to unite a country in the pursuit of common goals. I know that you are concerned that the present tensions, if not handled very carefully, hold the prospect of narrowing political participation and of convincing a segment of the people that they have no effective means within the system to have their views heard.

Ambassador Gleysteen has reported to me on his conversation September 15 with your Secretary, Mr. Choi Kwang-su, in which Mr. Choi noted that you had in mind a number of further liberalizing measures beyond the release of prisoners. Mr. President, I hope that you can exert your wisdom to bring a moderating influence on present developments in order that dialogue may be resumed in a constructive manner between the government and its critics, and that you will be able to move forward as soon as possible with the additional fundamental liberalizing steps which you had planned.

Otherwise, Mr. President, I am confident that our cooperation is proceeding smoothly on many fronts. Secretary Brown will be in Seoul next month to engage in our annual security consultative discussions. Our trade and economic relations are healthy and growing, as they should be. We

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

will continue to seek together to stimulate a more forthcoming attitude from North Korea.

Please accept my warm personal regards,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Letter from H.L. Davies to S.I. Soutar, "Proposed Trilateral Talks on Korea," 27 September 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

*Dear Ian,*

**PROPOSED TRILATERAL TALKS ON KOREA**

1. Thank you for your letter of 13 September to Thorold Masefield whom I have just succeeded. We were grateful for the background to the joint US/ROK proposal for trilateral talks.
2. It may be worth noting for the record that the duty officer at the US Embassy tried to contact the Korean desk officer to convey advanced news of this proposal on the morning of Saturday 30 June: not finding the desk officer at home (he was not, as the Embassy believed, on duty) the US duty officer tried again in the afternoon, this time successfully. FCO telno 92 of the same date was the result.
3. We are not sure who Rich was referring to when he spoke of "someone in the FCO" linking US preparedness to contemplate progress towards normalisation of relations with North Korea, and Western countries' attitudes to the regime in Pyongyang. The new Government confirmed UK policy of non-recognition of North Korea on 25 June when the Lord Privy Seal met President Park's special envoy, Mr. Kim Jong-pil. We fully share the American view that recognition of North Korea should be accompanied by reciprocal action on the part of North Korea's communist allies towards South Korea. Such developments seem extremely unlikely in the present climate.

*Yours ever,*  
*Hugh [illegible]*  
H L Davies  
Far Eastern Department


*This is by way of establishing contact from my new perch in FED*

[...]



My purpose in writing to you confidentially is not to threaten. I do urge you, however, to find the means to resume a liberalizing trend at the earliest opportunity. You will know the best method for advancing this goal. Through such actions the underlying strength of Korean-American cooperation will remain sound and will not erode the support for policy decisions which our two governments take in the interests of peace and prosperity for both of our peoples.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned to the right of the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency  
Park Chung Hee  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

**Telegram from the American Embassy in Seoul to the Secretary of State, "Ambassador's Call on Acting President", 27 October 1979**

*[Source: Korea, Republic of: President Park Assassination, 5/79-19/27/79, Box 45, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's Country Files (NSA 6), Jimmy Carter Library. Obtained for NKIDP by Charles Kraus.]*

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC  
SECDEF WASHDC  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC  
CIA WASHDC

Subject: Ambassador's Call on Acting President

1. (S) Entire text.
2. I called on Acting President Choi Kyu-ha at his residence at 0300 October 27. I expressed my condolences over the death of President Park which had been announced on the radio just shortly before.
3. Acting President provided following review of events leading to President's death.  
[Redacted].  
  
[Redacted]
6. I informed the Acting President that I had been advised of unspecified trouble at about midnight and had subsequently learned the details at around 2100 A.M. I complimented him on the manner in which the government had handled this matter so far and had kept us aware of events as they progressed. I review our contacts with Washington and gave him the gist of our excellent statement (we had earlier provided copies of the statement to ROK: and it together with the Korean translation arrived at exactly this point in our conversation). I told him that people in Washington were stunned by the events and that we were prepared to be as helpful as possible in his efforts to lead the civilian government through this difficult period.
7. Acting President said that he would shortly address the people of the Republic and that his remarks were already in draft. He would basically ask for calm and proper behavior in order that the proper security could be maintained. He would also be keeping a close eye on the activities of North Korea. He went on to say that the cabinet had decided on a nine-day mourning period and they were currently thinking of holding a state funeral on November 3. The Foreign Ministry is studying the question of inviting foreign delegations to attend.
8. Reverting to the events surrounding the President's death, he said that Kim Chae Kyu was currently under detention by the army. The army was also investigating the events surrounding this tragic event.

9. I told the Acting President I realized the difficulties he faced and urged that he do everything possible during this period to evoke a spirit of conciliation within the country. I told him I was pleased to have learned from his military that “the cabinet supports the Acting President and the military supports the cabinet”.

10. Acting President said the military appeared united

BY



SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE252

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1857

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 16370

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (EO LINE - 10/28/89 VICE 79)

E.O. 12065 IRDS-3 10/28/89 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) GR-M

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PEPR, KS, US

SUBJECT: INITIAL REFLECTIONS ON POST-PARK CHUNG HEE

" SITUATION IN KOREA

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE STILL DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE STUNNING EVENTS OF OCTOBER 26/27 WERE A WELL PLANNED MILITARY COUP, A MORE LIMITED "ELIMINATION" OF A LEADER FEARED BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT TO HAVE LOST HIS TOUCH, OR SIMPLY A BIZARRE INCIDENT. BUT THE RESULT IS TO CREATE A SITUATION OF UNCERTAINTY. THE KEY PLAYERS ARE STILL THE PREVIOUS ESTABLISHMENT FORCES PRONE TO AN AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE. THE UNNATURAL QUIET PREVAILING IS ALMOST SURE TO GIVE WAY TO RISING TENSIONS AS VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SCENE PROBE THE MEASURE OF THEIR POWER.

3. IT IS HAZARDOUS TO MAKE FAR-REACHING JUDGMENTS AT THIS POINT BUT I THINK THE ROK STRUCTURE WILL HOLD TOGETHER SHORT OF CHAOS, IN PART BECAUSE OF THE UNIFYING EFFECT OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND THE EXISTENCE OF BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES WHICH NOW PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE CONTINUITY. A MODESTLY LIBERALIZED YUSHIN STRUCTURE WOULD BE WELCOMED BY A MAJORITY OF KOREANS, BUT I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT IT CAN BE REALIZED NOW. WE CAN IDENTIFY SOME POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO PARK, SUCH AS KIM CHONG PIL AND CHUNG IL KWAN, BUT WHO WILL SUCCEED PARK IS THE HARDEST GUESS OF ALL. A POPULAR CONTEST IN WHICH KIM TAE JUNG AND KIM YONG SAM COULD AT LEAST ENTER THE COMPETITION SEEMS UNLIKELY.

4. WE ARE OFF TO AN EXCELLENT START IN OUR OWN DEALINGS WITH THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES HERE -- THANKS TO WASHINGTON'S SWIFT REACTION. IN THE FUTURE WE WILL BE FACED WITH

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: . NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THAN THOSE OF THE PAST FEW DAYS. WE CAN EXPECT MANY ELEMENTS IN KOREA TO ASK OUR HELP IN PURSUING THEIR OWN ENDS. I URGE THAT WE RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO SUGGEST ARCHITECTURAL DESIGNS TO THE KOREANS IN FAVOR OF: (A) PROVIDING REASSURANCE AGAINST THE THREAT FROM THE NORTH, (B) URGING THE OBSERVANCE OF "CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES" AND (C) GENTLY WORKING THROUGH ALL CHANNELS TOWARD POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. WE SHOULD AVOID CRITICAL PUBLIC COMMENT OR PUNISHING ACTIONS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE NEW REGIME HAS BLOTTED ITS COPYBOOK, AND WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE NEW AUTHORITIES OF KOREA DO NOT ENJOY THE SAME ECONOMIC CUSHION THAT HELPED PRESIDENT PARK SO DECISIVELY DURING RECENT YEARS. FINALLY, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT WE COULD EASILY PROVOKE A VERY UNHEALTHY ANTI-AMERICAN REACTION IF WE PRESS TOO HARD, TOO CRASSLY, AND TOO SOON FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ROK. END SUMMARY.

5. THE STUNNING EVENTS OF OCTOBER 26/27 WERE NOT REVOLUTIONARY BUT THEY HAVE CREATED CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE WE CANNOT COMFORTABLY GO ON MAKING SOME OF THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PAST. WE ARE FACED WITH NEW UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED FOR CARE IN THE WAY WE COMPORT OURSELVES.

6. IN THE FEW DAYS BETWEEN MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON AND PARK'S DEATH, I WAS STRUCK BY THE PERVASIVENESS WITHIN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WORRY ABOUT WHERE THE GOVERNMENT'S HARDLINE POLICIES WERE LEADING KOREA. PEOPLE IN ALMOST ALL SECTORS AND ALL LEVELS TOLD US OF THEIR ANXIETY AND WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY BOLD IN IDENTIFYING PRESIDENT PARK AS THE MAN MAKING THE WRONG DECISIONS, LISTENING TO ADVISORS WHO WERE TELLING HIM WHAT THEY THOUGHT HE WANTED TO HEAR. IN OUR LAST CONVERSATION WITH HIM (OCTOBER 18), EVEN PARK HIMSELF SEEMED TO QUESTION THE WISDOM OF HIS HARDLINE DECISIONS.

7. COMBINED WITH THE MYSTERY IN MOST ACCOUNTS OF PARK'S DEATH, THIS SENSE OF MALAISE IN THE BLUE HOUSE PROMPTED MANY PEOPLE TO ASSUME PARK WAS KILLED IN A MILITARY COUP. THIS WAS MY OWN INITIAL CONCLUSION WHICH I HAVE SINCE REVISED IN THE ABSENCE OF CORROBORATING SIGNS. A MORE PLAUSIBLE POSSIBILITY IS THAT SOME INDIVIDUALS AROUND THE PRESIDENT, PERHAPS LED BY KCIA DIRECTOR KIM CHAE KYU, MAY HAVE DECIDED TO ELIMINATE THE PRESIDENT WHILE LEAVING THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE INTACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THEY COULD ARRANGE AN ACCEPTABLE SUCCESSOR. SOME ACCOUNTS OF THE KILLING DO SUGGEST CONSPIRACY, AND KIM CHAE KYU MAY HAVE BEEN ONE OF THOSE WHO FELT PARK'S HARDLINE ACTIONS WERE ENDANGERING THE REPUBLIC. EVEN THIS

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NCOIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MORE LIMITED EXPLANATION IS NOT VERY CONVINCING BECAUSE OF  
THE RISKS INVOLVED.  
B. WHETHER THE KILLING WAS A WELL PLANNED MILITARY COUP,  
A MORE LIMITED "ELIMINATION", OR SIMPLY A BIZARRE INCIDENT,  
BT  
#6370  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE253  
 STU357  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHUL #6370/02 3010934  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 280919Z OCT 79  
 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1858  
 BT

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 SEOUL 16370

NODIS

E.O. 12065 IRDS-3 10/28/79 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M

TAGS: PGDV, PINT, PEPR, KS, US

SUBJECT: INITIAL REFLECTIONS ON POST-PARK CHUNG HEE  
 - SITUATION IN KOREA

WE ARE FACED WITH A NEW SITUATION IN KOREA WHOSE HALLMARK WILL BE UNCERTAINTY. THE KEY PLAYERS ARE STILL THE PREVIOUS ESTABLISHMENT FORCES -- ABOVE ALL THE MILITARY WHO, EVEN IF WE CAN ENCOURAGE THEM TOWARD MORE LIBERAL DIRECTIONS, HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR SPOTS AND COMFORT IN WORKING WITHIN AN AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE. BEFORE LONG THE UNNATURAL QUIET WHICH PREVAILS WILL GIVE WAY TO RISING TENSION AS THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SCENE SORT OUT THEIR POSITIONS AND PROBE THE MEASURE OF THEIR POWER. WOULD-BE SUCCESSORS TO THE PRESIDENT MUST ALREADY BE HARD AT WORK ON THEIR PLANS OF CAMPAIGN. THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION WILL ALMOST SURELY SEEK MORE REFORM THAN THEY ARE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE, AND IF THEY PUSH TOO HARD TOO SOON WE MAY SEE A RAPID RETURN TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION, CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY ARE QUITE POSSIBLE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SOME LEADER WITH THE RIGHT COMBINATION OF FIRMNESS AND SUBTLETY WILL MOVE IN SMOOTHLY TO TAKE OVER. WHILE THE JOCKEYING OF LESS SUITABLE LEADERS IS GOING ON, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ASSUME, AS WE HAVE DURING THE PAST MANY YEARS, THAT THERE IS A TOUGH, CAPABLE, COMMONSENSICAL -- IF AUTHORITARIAN -- LEADER WHO IS THOROUGHLY IN CHARGE.

9. AT THIS POINT, I THINK IT HAZARDOUS TO MAKE FAR-REACHING JUDGMENTS. I AM REASONABLY COMFORTABLE IN STATING THAT I EXPECT THE SITUATION TO HOLD TOGETHER SHORT OF CHAOS. FEAR OF WEAKENING THEMSELVES IN THE FACE OF A NORTH KOREAN THREAT AND WORRIES ABOUT ALIENATING OTHER ELEMENTS OF KOREAN SOCIETY MAY HELP KEEP THE MILITARY RELATIVELY UNIFIED. CERTAINLY SO FAR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HAS WORKED SMOOTHLY. THE CABINET HAS PERFORMED AS IT SHOULD

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND THE MILITARY HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO DO THE RIGHT THING. BUT COMPETITION AND CONFUSION MAY DEVELOP TO THE POINT OF TRIGGERING A MORE CLASSIC FORM OF COUP. IN ANY EVENT, I CANNOT PREDICT HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE FOR A NEW EQUILIBRIUM TO DEVELOP. ALTHOUGH A MODESTLY LIBERALIZED YUSHIN STRUCTURE WOULD BE WELCOMED BY A MAJORITY OF KOREANS, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW IT WOULD BE REALIZED AMONG A PEOPLE WHO ARE SO FRACTIOUS, BLUNT AND AGGRESSIVE WITH THE RESULT THAT HARDLINERS TEND TO RISE TO THE TOP. WE MAY BE FACED WITH AN ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUD WITH A LESS EFFECTIVE LEADER.

10. ABOVE ALL, IT IS HARD TO PREDICT WHO WILL COME OUT ON TOP. THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR AN INDIRECT ELECTION OF A NEW PRESIDENT WITHIN 90 DAYS. IF ONE OCCURS, THE PERSON SELECTED MAY NOT BE THE PERMANENT LEADER. KIM CHONG PIL IS ONE OBVIOUS CONTENDER AS IS CHUNG IL KWAN. THE FORMER WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE CHARGE; THE LATTER WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO PRESIDE OVER A MORE DIVERSE POWER STRUCTURE. YI HU RAK WILL BE HARD AT WORK TRYING TO PULL STRINGS EVEN THOUGH HE IS PROBABLY TOO HATED TO BE CHOSEN AS THE LEADER. THE MILITARY MAY PREFER TEMPORARILY TO ALLOW THE ACTING PRESIDENT TO PRESIDE BEYOND THE 90 DAY LIMIT AND RETAIN POWER IN A MILITARY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. A POPULAR CONTEST WHERE PEOPLE SUCH AS KIM TAE JUNG AND KIM YONG SAM COULD AT LEAST ENTER THE COMPETITION SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME.

11. GIVEN THIS LARGE DEGREE OF UNPREDICTABILITY, WE WILL HAVE TO EXERCISE EXTRA CARE IN OUR OWN APPROACH TO THE ROK. WE ARE OFF TO AN EXCELLENT START, HAVING SWIFTLY MADE STATEMENTS AND TAKEN ACTIONS TO EMPHASIZE THE CONTINUITY OF OUR PROTECTOR ROLE. AS WE MOVE ON, HOWEVER, WE MAY BE FACED WITH FAR MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. FIRST, THERE WILL BE ELEMENTS IN KOREA WHO WISH TO BORROW OUR INFLUENCE. I HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED BY SOME AND I EXPECT TO BE APPROACHED BY MANY MORE GENERALS, DISSIDENTS, POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS WHO WANT OUR HELP TO PURSUE THEIR OWN ENDS. EVEN WITHOUT THESE SUPPLICANTS, I WOULD URGE MOST STRONGLY THAT WE DE-EMPHASIZE OUR PROCLIVITY TO SUGGEST ARCHITECTURAL DESIGNS IN FAVOR OF A QUIETER ROLE OF PROVIDING REASSURANCE AGAINST THE THREAT FROM NORTH KOREA, URGING OBSERVANCE OF THE "CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS" (WE SHOULD AVOID EMBRACING THE YUSHIN CONSTITUTION), AND GENTLY WORKING THROUGH ALL CHANNELS TOWARD POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. WE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE CHANNELS WE USE. WE MUST AVOID CONVEYING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY WITH A MILITARY TAKEOVER, BUT WE MUST ALSO WORK WITH

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No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE MILITARY WHO WILL BE A VERY INFLUENTIAL FACTOR -- EVEN  
TOWARD LIBERALIZATION. STRONG STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT SUCH  
AS WE MADE YESTERDAY PROVIDE AN EXCELLENT BASIS FOR THIS  
RELATIONSHIP.

12. WE SHOULD ALSO NOT TREAT THE NEW REGIME AS AN INHERI-  
TOR OF THE SINS OF THE PARK REGIME. UNTIL THE NEW CROWD  
HAVE BLOTTED THEIR COPYBOOK, WE SHOULD GO OUT OF OUR WAY  
BT  
#6370  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/23/80//054

SITUATION: NODIS OLD  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: FE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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 STU359  
 OO RUEHC  
 DE RUEHUL #6370/03 3010943  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 O 280919Z OCT 79  
 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1859  
 BT

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 SEOUL 16370  
 NODIS

E.O. 12065 IRDS-3 10/28/79 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PEPR, KS, US

SUBJECT: INITIAL REFLECTIONS ON POST-PARK CHUNG HEE  
 " SITUATION IN KOREA

TO AVOID CRITICAL PUBLIC COMMENT OR TO TAKE SYMBOLIC  
 PUNISHING ACTION, SUCH AS ABSTENTIONS IN THE IFIS, WHILE  
 WE INTEND TO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR LIBERAL TREATMENT FOR  
 POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, WE MUST AVOID EARLY PRESSURES FOR ANY  
 DRAMATIC STEPS OF LIBERALIZATION. WE SHOULD BE AS GENEROUS  
 AS POSSIBLE IN DEALING WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES SINCE THE  
 CURRENT ROKC DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME ECONOMIC CUSHION THAT  
 HELPED PARK CHUNG HEE SO DECISIVELY DURING RECENT YEARS.  
 FINALLY, WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE KOREA OF 1979 IS  
 NOT THE KOREA OF THE EARLY 1960S WHEN WE WERE ABLE TO BULLY  
 THE EARLY PARK REGIME INTO CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS. I DON'T  
 THINK THERE IS ANY CHANGE IN THE POPULAR DESIRE FOR A MORE  
 LIBERAL GOVERNMENT, BUT SINCE THE 1960'S, U.S. PRESSURES  
 ON KOREA HAVE ACCUMULATED TO THE POINT WHERE WE COULD FACE  
 AN EXTREMELY UNHEALTHY ANTI-AMERICAN REACTION SHOULD WE  
 PRESS TOO HARD AND TOO CRASSLY TO BRING ABOUT STRUCTURAL  
 CHANGE.

13. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS AMEMBASSIES TOKYO AND KUALA  
 LUMPUR, KUALA LUMPUR FOR EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE,  
 GLEYSTEN

BT  
 #6370  
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SENSITIVE

No Objection To Declassification 2008/06/12 : NLC-16-13-2-23-3

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 17060

NODIS                    DECAPTIONED

CHEROKEE

E.O. 12065:   RDS-3 11/8/99 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M  
TAGS:   PGOV, PINT, KS, US  
SUBJECT:   KOREA FOCUS -- SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH  
-            ACTING PRESIDENT CHOI KYU-HA NOVEMBER 3, 1979

1.   (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2.   FOLLOWING IS MEMCON COVERING SECRETARY VANCE'S DIS-  
CUSSION WITH ACTING PRESIDENT CHOI KYU-HA ON NOVEMBER 3,  
1979.   OTHER PARTICIPANTS WERE:

KOREAN:   FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TONG-JIN  
-            AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. KIM YONG-SHIK  
-            FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR AMERICAN  
-            AFFAIRS YU CHONG-HA

U.S.:      MR. CHIP CARTER  
-            AMBASSADOR WILLIAM GLEYSTEN  
-            ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HOLBROOKE  
-            NICHOLAS PLATT, NSC STAFF MEMBER

3.   BEGIN MEMCON:

SECRETARY VANCE:   MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO  
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YOU THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY AND CONDOLENCES OF THE AMERICAN  
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OVER THE TRAGIC DEATH OF PRESIDENT  
PARK.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA  
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUN 2005 200501785

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CHOI: THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS SENT YOU AND THE DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF YOUR DELEGATION TO THIS COUNTRY. IT IS A GENEROUS EXPRESSION OF YOUR FEELINGS. LESS THAN HALF A YEAR HAS PASSED SINCE MY PRESIDENT MET YOU. NOW THAT PRESIDENT PARK IS NO LONGER ALIVE, BIG CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED. WE HAVE BEEN SHOCKED, ASTOUNDED, AND SADDENED BY THE LOSS OF OUR PRESIDENT, A DISTINGUISHED LEADER IN OUR HISTORY. THE SORROW OF THE FAMILY AND GOVERNMENT IS GREAT. OUR PEOPLE ARE AWARE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION AND CONCERNED TO MAINTAIN STABILITY AND ORDER.

SECRETARY VANCE: ALL OF US HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CONTINUED UNITY OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. THE DECISION TO IMPOSE PARTIAL MARTIAL LAW HAS ASSURED THE WORLD THAT KOREA WOULD KEEP A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. LET ME COMMEND YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES.

CHOI: YES, CHEJU ISLAND WAS EXCLUDED FROM MARTIAL LAW. THOUGH IT IS A SMALL ISLAND, ITS EXCLUSION HAS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE LEGALITY OF THIS GOVERNMENT. I AM VERY GRATEFUL THAT OUR MILITARY OFFICERS AND MEN HAVE COOPERATED SO WELL TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND TRANQUILITY. THIS WILL CONTINUE.

SECRETARY VANCE: THAT IS VERY ENCOURAGING. LET ME ASSURE YOU AT THE OUTSET THAT THE COMMITMENT OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE SECURITY OF KOREA WILL REMAIN FIRM AND STAUNCH. IN  
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ADDITION TO THE STATEMENT AND MILITARY ACTIONS THAT WE TOOK AFTER THE ASSASSINATION TO TELL NORTH KOREA THAT WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ADVENTURISM, WE ALSO MADE OUR INTENTIONS CLEAR TO BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNS OF MOVEMENT IN THE NORTH, BUT WE HAVE INTENSIFIED OUR SURVEILLANCE AND THE READINESS OF OUR FORCES AS A DETERRENT. MY JUDGMENT IS THAT THE ORDERLY ACTION OF THE ROK MILITARY TOGETHER WITH THE REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT SHOULD WORK TO DETER AGGRESSION.

CHOI: AT THE VERY OUTSET AFTER THE DEMISE OF MY PRESIDENT, YOUR GOVERNMENT LOST NO TIME IN MAKING STATEMENTS AND TAKING ACTIONS TO SAFEGUARD OUR SECURITY. WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING A VERY ADEQUATE STATEMENT, YOU ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. AND THE ROK WOULD

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COOPERATE EVEN MORE CLOSELY. WE ARE VERY APPRECIATIVE.

SECRETARY VANCE: WE HAVE ALSO BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND AND OUR JOINT MILITARY LIAISON MACHINERY. THIS IS VERY ENCOURAGING.

CHOI: SPEAKING VERY FRANKLY, AT MIDNIGHT ON THE DAY PRESIDENT PARK DIED, I WAS IN THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE MINISTER RO. THERE I MET WITH GENERAL LEW, THE DEPUTY COMBINED FORCES COMMANDER, AND TOLD HIM TO NOTIFY YOU OF DEVELOPMENTS. I BELIEVE THAT GENERAL LEW TOOK THE APPROPRIATE ACTION. LET ME EXPRESS AGAIN MY APPRECIATION TO YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE TO THIS COUNTRY. MY COUNTRY IS RESOLVED TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. IN FACT, WE HAVE BEEN

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SUCCESSFUL IN NOT IMPOSING UNDUE RESTRICTIONS AND INCONVENIENCES UPON OUR PEOPLE DURING MARTIAL LAW. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT MARTIAL LAW WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THE OUTPUT OF OUR INDUSTRIAL AND RURAL WORKERS. IN RURAL AREAS AND SMALL CITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE REDUCED THE CURFEW TO NORMAL HOURS, RESERVING THE SPECIAL CURFEW FOR A DOZEN BIG CITIES ONLY.

- I WOULD LIKE TO DO MY BEST WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS. I DON'T THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR THIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE REVOLUTIONARY

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ACTION. IF WE FIND THAT THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE ARE INADEQUATE AFTER MAKING A CAREFUL STUDY, WE WILL NOT HESITATE TO IMPROVE THEM. BUT IF WE HURRY TOO MUCH, WE MIGHT MAKE A SERIOUS MISTAKE. SO WE WILL PROCEED CAREFULLY IN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SEE IF IMPROVEMENTS ARE DEEMED NECESSARY AND CAN BE EFFECTED THROUGH THE PARLIAMENT. IN ANY CASE, I AM DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND STABILITY.

SECRETARY VANCE: SO I GATHER THAT WHAT YOU INTEND TO DO IS STUDY THE SITUATION AND THEN DECIDE WHAT STEPS YOU CAN TAKE.

CHOI: THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN  
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ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRESENT LEGAL ORDER. ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION, WE MUST ELECT A SUCCESSOR WITHIN THREE MONTHS, THAT IS, BY JANUARY 24, 1980. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO TACKLE THIS QUESTION EXCEPT THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. TIME IS SIMPLY TOO SHORT. IT WILL BE UP TO THE NEW PRESIDENT TO DECIDE WHAT FURTHER IS NEEDED. AS FOR MYSELF, MY TERM HAS LESS THAN THREE MONTHS TO RUN. MY DUTY IS TO ELECT A PRESIDENT BY JANUARY OF NEXT YEAR.

SECRETARY VANCE: WE WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO CONSULT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AS YOU DECIDE WHAT CHANGES ARE NEEDED, INCLUDING AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

CHOI: I AM THINKING OF INITIATING CONSULTATIONS IN A QUIET PRUDENT MANNER WITH VARIOUS FACTIONS FROM OUR POLITICAL CIRCLES. IF THIS IS DONE TOO OPENLY, IT MIGHT IGNITE PUBLIC DISTURBANCES.

SECRETARY VANCE: BUT I GATHER YOU WILL BE MAKING A STATEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE ABOUT YOUR INTENTIONS AS ACTING PRESIDENT.

CHOI: I AM THINKING OF ISSUING A STATEMENT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WEEK WHICH WILL INDICATE THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THIS GOVERNMENT.

SECRETARY VANCE: IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A SENSE OF DIRECTION. WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF IN-

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STILLING CONFIDENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. I THOUGHT I WOULD TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TONIGHT BEFORE LEAVING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO EXPLAIN IN PUBLIC  
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THAT WE WILL BE CONTINUING CLOSE ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH YOUR COUNTRY, THAT THE ONE BILLION DOLLAR EXIM LOAN WILL CONTINUE, AND THAT UNDER SECRETARY COOPER WILL BE COMING AS SCHEDULED FOR ECONOMIC CONSULTATIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT NEXT WEEK. I THINK THAT WOULD HAVE A CALMING EFFECT.

CHOI: WHEN IS COOPER COMING?

SECRETARY VANCE: NOVEMBER 9. HE WILL BE BRINGING ROBERT HORMATS, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE, WITH HIM. (SECRETARY SHOWED ACTING PRESIDENT TEXT OF HIS PROPOSED DEPARTURE STATEMENT.)

CHOI: I GENERALLY AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT. I SUGGEST THAT YOU HAVE IT READ "TO PROCEED IN AN ORDERLY MANNER ALONG CONSTITUTIONAL LINES".

SECRETARY VANCE: YOU ALWAYS WERE A GOOD DRAFTSMAN, MR. PRESIDENT. (LOUD LAUGHTER)

CHOI: I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE THE STATEMENT READ "PRESENT CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT".

SECRETARY VANCE: FINE. I WILL READ THIS BEFORE I LEAVE BUT I WILL ONLY TELL THE PRESS THAT I HAD A GENERAL CONVERSATION WITH YOU AND LEAVE IT AT THAT.

- MR. PRESIDENT, I GATHER THAT YOU WILL BE CONVENING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY.

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CHOI: YES, I WAS GOING TO INFORM YOU OF THAT. I WOULD PREFER TO ACT THROUGH THE PARLIAMENT RATHER THAN TAKE ARBITRARY MEASURES. AS A RESULT, I PLAN TO CONVENE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY. I HOPE THE PARLIAMENT WILL AGREE ON A COURSE OF ACTION. THEY NEED TIME TO CONSULT, SO WE WILL START DELIBERATIONS ON NOVEMBER 12. ON NOVEMBER 5, WE WILL RETURN THE RESIGNATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT PARTY WILL MAKE A RESOLUTION NOT TO ACCEPT THE RESIGNATIONS. I HOPE THEN THAT QUIET CONSULTATIONS CAN BEGIN. IF DIFFERENCES EXIST, THESE MUST BE KEPT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF PARLIAMENT. THIS IS MUCH BETTER THAN HAVING THEM AIRED IN THE STREET.

SECRETARY VANCE: YES, MUCH BETTER. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU CAN COUNT ON THE U.S. FOR REALISTIC ADVICE WHEN YOU WANT IT. I REALIZE THAT THE DECISIONS ARE YOURS TO MAKE. BUT IF YOU NEED ADVICE, THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WICKHAM ARE AVAILABLE. WE WILL KEEP OUR COUNSEL PRIVATE, AND MAKE NO PUBLIC CRITICISMS. IN ADDITION, IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION WE WILL COUNSEL MODERATION.

CHOI: OUR POLITICIANS ARE QUITE PEPPERY SOMETIMES. THEY LIKE TO IRRITATE EACH OTHER. SO COUNSEL FOR MODERATION

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WILL BE VERY HELPFUL. I WILL ADVISE OUR POLITICIANS AGAINST PEPPERY STATEMENTS. I WANT TO AVOID BY ALL MEANS AT THIS STAGE ANY SOCIAL DISORDER. PEACE AND STABILITY ARE VITAL TO THE EVOLUTION OF OUR SOCIETY.

SECRETARY VANCE: IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE, MR. PRESIDENT,

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THAT YOU CAN SUGGEST THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL?

CHOI: WE HAVE YOUR DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR AND OUR OWN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON PRESENT HERE. THEY HAVE DEVELOPED VERY EFFECTIVE CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH WE CAN COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER.

SECRETARY VANCE: WE HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR YOUR AMBASSADOR.

CHOI: THANK YOU AGAIN FOR TAKING THE TROUBLE TO COME TO KOREA. I HOPE YOU WILL VISIT US AGAIN, ON A HAPPY OCCASION. PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL REGARDS TO YOUR PRESIDENT AND THANK HIM FOR HIS KIND WORDS.

SECRETARY VANCE: THANK YOU, I WILL DO THAT.

END MEMCON. GLEYSTEN

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CHEROKEE

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 11/8/99 (GLEYSTEEEN, W.H.) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, KS, US  
SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS -- SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION WITH  
- FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TONG-JIN NOVEMBER 3, 1979

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS MEMCON COVERING SECRETARY VANCE'S DIS-  
CUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PARK TONG-JIN ON NOVEMBER 3,  
1979. OTHER PARTICIPANTS WERE: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM  
GLEYSTEEEN; ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HOLBROOKE; AND  
NICHOLAS PLATT, STAFF MEMBER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. BEGIN MEMCON:

SECRETARY VANCE: THIS IS A VERY SAD OCCASION FOR ALL OF  
US. I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU THE CONDOLENCES OF  
PRESIDENT CARTER AND ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED  
STATES. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PLACE OF PRESIDENT PARK IN  
HISTORY IS SECURE. HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOP-  
MENT AND THE FASHIONING OF A MODERN, EFFICIENT INDUSTRIAL  
SECTOR WERE MATCHED BY RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO DEVELOP  
THE RURAL AREAS. HIS DEATH IS PARTICULARLY TRAGIC TO THE  
PARK FAMILY, HAVING LOST FIRST A MOTHER AND NOW A FATHER.

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OUR CONDOLENCES ARE COUPLED WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THE  
CHILDREN WILL COPE WITH THESE TRAGEDIES AND GO FORWARD  
WITH DETERMINATION IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA  
DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUN 2005 200501785

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- I MYSELF HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ASCERTAIN WHAT SORT OF REACTION OUR PEOPLE HAVE SHOWN TO THE CHAIN OF EVENTS SINCE OCTOBER 26. MY PERCEPTIONS ARE BASED ON PERSONAL CONTACTS AND ON THE REPORTS AVAILABLE. I BELIEVE THE KOREAN PEOPLE ALL EXPRESS DEEP SYMPATHY AND CONDOLENCES, BUT THEY KNOW THAT THE WAY WE DEAL WITH THE FUTURE IS VITALLY IMPORTANT. THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY. THEIR FIRST CONCERN IS THE MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGAINST THE NORTH, AND THEN STABILITY AT HOME IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. WHATEVER CHANGES MAY OCCUR IN THE FUTURE, THEY WANT TO SEE THEM MADE PEACEFULLY AND IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. THEY SEE THAT THERE ARE THREE EVILS TO BE AVOIDED:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2189

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- -- NO POLITICAL REPRISALS AGAINST THOSE WHO HAVE
- WORKED FOR PRESIDENT PARK UNDER THE YUSHIN CON-
- STITUTION AND BEING IDENTIFIED WITH THE PREVIOUS
- SYSTEM. IF THE OPPOSITION FORCES TAKE OVER, THIS
- DANGER EXISTS.
  
- -- A MILITARY TAKEOVER. THE KOREAN PEOPLE DO NOT
- WANT TO SEE THIS.

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- -- THE PREVIOUS YUSHIN SYSTEM BLINDLY FOLLOWED AND  
- PRESERVED IS ALSO SOMETHING THE PEOPLE WANT TO  
- AVOID.

- HOW TO AVOID THESE IS THE BIG QUESTION. TO HELP YOU  
UNDERSTAND AND ANALYZE THE SITUATION, MR. SECRETARY, LET  
ME LIST A NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL SECTORS IN OUR POLITICAL  
SYSTEM:

- -- THE ARMED FORCES.  
- -- THE FORCES OF THE OPPOSITION POLITICAL GROUPS.  
- -- COLLEGE STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS.  
- -- THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER HEADED BY ACTING PRESIDENT.  
- -- THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

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- ALL OF THESE FACTORS COMBINED WILL AFFECT FUTURE DE-  
VELOPMENTS IN KOREA. THE PEOPLE KNOW THAT THEIR COUNTRY  
HAS A VERY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.  
THEY ARE AWARE OF THE CLOSE COOPERATION IN SECURITY AND  
ECONOMIC MATTERS AND THE HISTORIC CONTRIBUTION THAT YOU  
HAVE MADE TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.  
THEREFORE, THEY ARE CONCERNED OVER HOW THE UNITED STATES  
WILL REACT TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS HERE.

- LET ME NOW TELL YOU OF THE THINKING OF THE ACTING  
PRESIDENT IN COPING WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION. MY  
ASSESSMENT IS VERY PERSONAL, AND YOU MAY FEEL MY REMARKS  
SOMEWHAT CRITICAL, BUT I HOPE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND.

- ACTING PRESIDENT CHOI HAS SERVED AS PRIME MINISTER  
FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS UNDER PRESIDENT PARK. I REGARD  
HIM TO BE A RELATIVELY INACTIVE MAN, WHO PREFERS TO  
FOLLOW RATHER THAN TO LEAD, BUT IS HONEST, SINCERE, AND  
HARD WORKING. BECAUSE PRESIDENT PARK WAS SO STRONG,  
CHOI REFRAINED FROM TAKING INITIATIVES. HE DID NOT WANT  
TO INTERFERE. NOW, AN ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITY HAS FALLEN  
TOTALLY UNEXPECTEDLY ON HIS SHOULDERS. HIS METHODS OF  
CONDUCTING HIS CURRENT DUTIES IS TO CALL MEETINGS AND GAIN  
BENEFIT FROM THE DISCUSSIONS. HE IS NOT AN AGGRESSIVE  
MAN, BUT HE WILL NOT MAKE MISTAKES BECAUSE HE WILL NOT  
TAKE THE INITIATIVE. RATHER, HE WILL ADAPT TO THE CON-  
SENSUS. SO FAR, FOR THE LAST WEEK THERE HAS BEEN A  
MEETING AT BREAKFAST EVERY DAY FOR FIVE OR SIX PEOPLE (IN  
ANOTHER CONVERSATION, HE HAS MENTIONED SEVEN OR EIGHT

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INDIVIDUALS), INCLUDING ACTING PRESIDENT CHOI, DEFENSE MINISTER RO, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF CHUNG (THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR), AND GENERAL KIM, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT

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CHIEFS OF STAFF, REPRESENTING THE ARMED FORCES. (PARK TONG-JIN HAS ALSO BEEN A MEMBER, HIS COMMENTS IMPLY.) SO FAR, WE HAVE CONDUCTED OURSELVES IN AN ORDERLY WAY, WITH NO INCONVENIENCE AT ALL. ACTING PRESIDENT CHOI TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE POSITIONS ADOPTED IN THE MEETINGS. THIS WAY OF DOING BUSINESS HAS BENEFITS FOR US AND WILL CONTINUE.

- IN THESE MEETINGS, WE HAVE TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF THINGS WHICH WILL AFFECT THE FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY. WE ARE AWARE THAT WE SHOULD MAKE BEST USE OF THE TIME AVAILABLE TO MAINTAIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY, STABILITY, AND ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. BUT, WE HAVE NOT DEALT WITH THE POLITICAL MATTERS IN DEPTH. THE ACTING PRESIDENT HAS THE DUTY AND THE POWER TO DECIDE. HE SHOULD PRESENT THE MEASURES THAT HE THINKS ARE REQUIRED. HE WILL ISSUE A STATEMENT EARLY NEXT WEEK TO SHOW WHERE THE CARETAKER CABINET STANDS. WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT WHERE THE UNITED STATES STANDS AND WHAT ROLE YOU CAN PLAY. IT WOULD HELP US IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING STABILITY, AND EMPHASIZE A PEACEFUL EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

- WE ARE AWARE OF A NUMBER OF THE MEASURES THAT WILL BE REQUIRED, SUCH AS AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. THE ONLY QUESTION IS HOW TO DO THIS. WE KNOW THAT THE SYSTEM MUST BE LIBERALIZED. THE ONLY QUESTION IS HOW FAST. WE KNOW WE MUST TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES TO ACCOMMODATE THE DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE. THE ONLY QUESTION IS HOW WE CAN ACHIEVE THESE.

- THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IS HOW TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION

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AND RESTORE DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. THERE ARE  
A NUMBER OF OPTIONS, WHICH I EXPLAINED YESTERDAY TO THE  
AMBASSADOR AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE, BUT WHATEVER  
WE DO, WE MUST VOID THE "THREE EVILS" (POLITICAL REPRISALS,  
MILITARY TAKEOVER, AND THE INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF  
YUSHIN). IN MY VIEW, BLIND PROLONGATION OF YUSHIN IS  
HOPELESS.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: DOES THE GROUP THAT MEETS  
EACH DAY SHARE THIS VIEW?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THEY HAVE NOT DEALT WITH THE ISSUE  
IN DETAIL.

SECRETARY VANCE: BUT THIS IS THE CONSENSUS? ALL OF US  
HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE CONTINUITY OF CIVILIAN CON-  
TROL. THIS HAS BEEN NOTED IN MY COUNTRY AND THROUGHOUT  
THE WORLD.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: IF CHAOS OCCURS, THE ARMED FORCES  
WOULD BE TEMPTED TO TAKE OVER. THIS WOULD HURT THE INTER-  
ESTS OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE  
POLITICIANS HERE TO PREVENT THE CHAOS THAT MIGHT PROMPT

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THE MILITARY TO INTERVENE. ON THE OTHER HAND. THE OPPO-  
SITION FORCES BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW A NEW ERA, AND  
THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT.

SECRETARY VANCE: IN ANY CONTACTS THAT WE HAVE WITH THE

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OPPOSITION, WE WILL BE CAREFUL TO COUNSEL MODERATION.  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: YESTERDAY, AFTER OUR CON-  
VERSATION WITH YOU, I CALLED ON GENERAL WICKHAM. HE  
ASSURED ME THAT HE SENSED NO DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE  
ARMED FORCES TO ASSUME CONTROL.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: WELL, OUR ARMED FORCES ARE VERY  
LARGE, AND THERE ARE MANY FACTIONS.

AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: YOU ARE RIGHT TO POINT OUT THE  
DANGERS OF CHAOS. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THE LOWER LEVELS  
OF THE EMBASSY ARE ALREADY IN CONTACT WITH OPPOSITION  
FIGURES. I WILL BE IN CONTACT TOO. WE ARE COUNSELLING  
MODERATION. WE CAN BE HELPFUL.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: RIGHT. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH  
THAT. IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF THE UNITED STATES CAN COUNSEL  
MODERATION FOR BOTH THE OPPOSITION AND THE ARMED FORCES.  
AS FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES ARE CONCERNED, THIS IS  
NOT AN ISSUE.

SECRETARY VANCE: IN THE EVOLUTION OF WHAT TAKES PLACE,  
OBVIOUSLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD HOPE THAT A BROAD BASE  
OF SUPPORT WOULD DEVELOP.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THE PEOPLE GOT TIRED OF THE LONG  
REIGN OF PRESIDENT PARK, DESPITE HIS CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE  
ECONOMIC FIELD. THEY FEEL THAT THE YUSHIN CONSTITUTION

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IS THE WRONG KIND OF CONSTITUTION. SO, ALONG WITH THE  
DISAPPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT PARK, PEOPLE EXPECT IMPORTANT  
REFORMS.

AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: DO YOU FEEL THERE IS ENOUGH PATIENCE  
ON BOTH SIDES, I.E. THE MILITARY AND THE OPPOSITION?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: I THINK SO. IF THERE IS A COOLING  
PERIOD, THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A RATIONAL APPROACH. IF  
THERE IS NO COOLING PERIOD, THEN CHAOS MIGHT RESULT.

SECRETARY VANCE: DURING THE COOLING PERIOD, WHEN YOU WILL  
BE FIGURING OUT WHAT TO DO, WHAT WILL BE YOUR PRACTICE IN  
CONSULTING WITH VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM  
TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THE ACTING PRESIDENT WILL AIR

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MATTERS IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND WILL CONSULT ELDER STATESMEN. THERE MIGHT BE DEBATE IN THE PRESS SO PEOPLE CAN SET THEIR VIEWS FORWARD.

SECRETARY VANCE: THAT SOUNDS VERY CONSTRUCTIVE.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: I WOULD RECOMMEND THIS TO THE ACTING PRESIDENT, EVEN TO THE POINT OF MEETING WITH THE OPPOSITION PARTIES.

SECRETARY VANCE: WHEN DOES THE GOVERNMENT PLAN TO INDICATE HOW IT INTENDS TO PROCEED?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: I HAVE SERIOUSLY ADVISED THE ACTING PRESIDENT ON THESE METHODS. HE IS PLANNING A STATEMENT TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY CONCERNING HIS EFFORTS TO SEARCH FOR A CONSENSUS. AT THE MEETING TOMORROW

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MORNING, HE WILL SHOW US A DRAFT STATEMENT.

SECRETARY VANCE: THAT'S VERY CONSTRUCTIVE. VERY GOOD.  
WHAT ABOUT CONVENING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL CONVENE ON THE 5TH AND THEN AGAIN ON THE 12TH. AT THE MEETING ON THE 5TH THE GOVERNMENT PARTIES WILL RETURN THE RESIGNATIONS OF THE NDP AND USE THE INTERVENING WEEK TO CONSULT

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QUIETLY.

AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: IS KIM YONG-SAM STILL OUT?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: YES, HE IS STILL OUT.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: SINCE OUR MEETING YESTERDAY, HAS YOUR THINKING EVOLVED ON HOW TO CHOOSE A NEW PRESIDENT?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: MY THINKING HAS NOT DEVELOPED SINCE THEN. THE QUESTION REQUIRES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. ONE CAN EXPRESS A PREFERENCE ONLY AFTER ONE HAS DETECTED OTHERS' VIEWS. IT IS BEST TO BE CAREFUL HERE.

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SECRETARY VANCE: SO WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS THAT YOU SEE A PERIOD OF CONSULTATION, FOLLOWED BY A DETERMINATION OF THE OPTIONS FOR PROCEEDING.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: YES. ONE THING IS CLEAR. IF WE ARE TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR ORDER, WE MUST FOLLOW OUR CONSTITUTION. THEREFORE, THERE MUST BE AN ELECTION WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. FOLLOWING THAT, MY PERSONAL BELIEF IS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR A PRESIDENT TO SERVE A FULL TERM UNDER THE YUSHIN CONSTITUTION.

SECRETARY VANCE: THAT IS A CORRECT JUDGMENT, I THINK.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: I DON'T THINK THE PEOPLE WANT TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY. THEY WANT TO PROCEED CAREFULLY.

AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: IF YOU ARE ABLE TO PROCEED AS YOU HAVE DESCRIBED, WITH A FREE CONSULTATIVE PERIOD FOLLOWED BY A RATIONAL CHOICE OF OPTIONS, COMMON SENSE WILL BE YOUR ALLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU KEEP DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES REPRESSED, RADICAL IDEAS MAY EMERGE.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: WHO WILL BE THE NATURAL LEADERS OF THE YUJONGHOE?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THAT'S A GOOD QUESTION. I THINK PERSONALLY THEY WILL BE VERY CAREFUL. THERE WILL BE CONSULTATION BETWEEN VARIOUS GROUPS. BUT THE YUJONGHOE MEMBERS KNOW THAT THEY HAVE NO RESPECT FROM THE PUBLIC.

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AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: WON'T THERE BE AN ISSUE OF THEIR  
ELECTION TO THE ASSEMBLY? IN ADDITION TO DIRECT ELECTION

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OF THE PRESIDENT, IS THERE NOT ALSO A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE  
OVER THE YUJONGHOE'S APPOINTIVE RATHER THAN ELECTIVE  
NATURE?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: OF COURSE, BUT IF WE WANT TO PRO-  
CEED IN AN ORDERLY MANNER, WE HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT FOR THE  
TIME BEING.

SECRETARY VANCE: WE RECOGNIZE CLEARLY THAT THE DIFFICULT  
DECISIONS THAT FACE YOU MUST BE FOR KOREANS TO MAKE. YOU  
CAN COUNT ON US TO GIVE YOU REALISTIC PRIVATE DVICE.  
AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN AND GENERAL WICKHAM WILL BE AVAILABLE  
TO HELP. WE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO ENGAGE IN PUBLIC  
CRITICISM. WE KNOW THE NEED FOR UNITY AND COHESION.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: IN ADDITION TO THE OPTIONS I HAVE  
DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
HOLBROOKE, THERE ARE TWO ADDITIONAL OPTIONS RELATING TO  
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. ONE IS TO ELECT A PRESIDENT  
ACCORDING TO THE YUSHIN CONSTITUTION BUT LIMIT HIS TERM  
AND FOCUS HIS DUTIES ON REFORM AND AMENDMENT OF THE CON-  
STITUTION IN PREPARATION FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION AND A NEW  
PRESIDENT. THE OTHER IS TO FIND A WAY TO PERMIT THE  
ACTING PRESIDENT TO EXTEND HIS TERM BEYOND THE THREE-MONTH  
PERIOD STIPULATED BY THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION AND LET HIM  
OVERSEE THE AMENDMENT PROCESS. EACH OF THESE INVOLVES A  
LEGAL PROBLEM.

SECRETARY VANCE: HOW IS THE CONSTITUTION AMENDED? BY THE  
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THEN RATIFIED BY A REFERENDUM? OR  
DOES THE PRESIDENT MAKE RECOMMENDATION WHICH IS APPROVED  
BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THEN SUBMITTED TO A NATIONAL  
REFERENDUM?

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FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THE LATTER IS EASIEST. IT IS LESS COMPLICATED IF THE PRESIDENT RECOMMENDS. THE QUESTION IS WHAT OPTION THE PEOPLE WOULD PREFER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HERE AGAIN, ONE MUST TAKE CARE TO AVOID THE "THREE EVILS". ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: THERE IS A FOURTH EVIL, AND THAT IS CHAOS, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ONE OF THE OTHER THREE EVILS.

SECRETARY VANCE: LET ME COMMENT ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. I THINK I CAN BE HELPFUL. IN OUR DEPARTURE STATEMENT WE PLAN TO POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE TOTAL CONFIDENCE IN YOU, THAT THE PLANNED ONE BILLION DOLLAR EXIM BANK LOAN WILL GO THROUGH ON SCHEDULE, AND THAT OUR OWN HIGH-LEVEL ECONOMIC OFFICIALS WILL BE COMING TO KOREA AS SCHEDULED. I THINK THAT WILL HAVE A CALMING EFFECT.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL. I HOPE YOU WILL PLAY THIS UP.

SECRETARY VANCE: WHAT DO YOU FORESEE AS THE FATE OF EMERGENCY MEASURE 9 AND THOSE POLITICAL PRISONERS DETAINED UNDER IT?

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: I HAVE NOT TOUCHED ON THESE ISSUES WITH THE ACTING PRESIDENT, BUT PERSONALLY I BELIEVE WE MUST DO SOMETHING ON THIS SUBJECT. TIMING IS VERY IMPORTANT. THESE ISSUES SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE

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REFORMS WE MUST CONSIDER.

SECRETARY VANCE: YOU HAVE MANY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS, BUT YOU ALSO HAVE A STRONG FRIEND AND ALLY IN THE UNITED STATES. ANYTIME YOU WOULD LIKE PRIVATE ADVICE, YOU WILL HAVE IT, AND IT WILL REMAIN PRIVATE.

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FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT YOU SUPPORT THE ACTING PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT NEXT WEEK.

SECRETARY VANCE: WE WILL. IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF WE HAVE SOME ADVANCE NOTICE.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: YOU WILL HAVE THAT. THE ACTING PRESIDENT WILL GIVE A VERY MODERATE STATEMENT EMPHASIZING AN ORDERLY EVOLUTION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE: IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT YOU HAVE IN THIS COUNTRY 50 OF THE WORLD'S LEADING REPORTERS. THEY WILL STAY A WEEK AND THEN DRIFT AWAY. EVERYTHING DONE DURING THIS PERIOD WILL BE MAGNIFIED ENORMOUSLY. FOR EXAMPLE, YOUR DECISION TO INVITE THE OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT PARK'S FUNERAL WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED. THE ACTIONS OF NEXT WEEK ARE VITAL. THE OTHER POINT IS THAT THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THE OCTOBER 26 INCIDENT BE SEEN IN PUBLIC. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PLAGUED FOR YEARS BY THE EVENTS FOLLOWING THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THE REPORTERS NOW ARE FULL OF RUMORS. THE MORE RAPIDLY THESE ARE DISPELLED, THE BETTER.

AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN: THERE NEEDS TO BE A FULL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND ULTIMATELY A PUBLIC TRIAL.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: WHEN LAST I HEARD, A FULL REPORT WAS UNDER PREPARATION. BUT YOU KNOW THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION AND THE PROCESS OF CROSS-CHECKING THEIR TESTIMONY IS TAKING A LOT OF TIME.

- YOU WILL BE SEEING THE ACTING PRESIDENT THIS AFTER-  
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NOON. I HOPE YOU WILL STRESS TO HIM SOME OF THE POINTS YOU HAVE MADE TO ME.

SECRETARY VANCE: YOU HAVE OUR SYMPATHY AND OUR HELP.

FOREIGN MINISTER PARK: WE COUNT ON IT.

SECRETARY VANCE: I WILL TELL THE PRESS THAT WE HAVE HD A MEETING IN WHICH CONDOLENCES AND SYMPATHY WERE EXPRESSED. I WILL NOT HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS IS NOT THE TIME FOR ANY OF US TO TALK TO THE PRESS.

END MEMCON. GLEYSTEN

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**Letter from N.J.G. Bowie to P.A. McDermott, "North and South Korea," 14 November 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

British Embassy  
SEOUL  
14 November 1979

P A McDermott Esq MVO  
Far Eastern Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

*Dear Patrick,*

**NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA**

1. Further to paragraph 6 of Guy Lockton's letter of 16 October about the South Korea National Liberation Front, it was announced yesterday that a further 25 members had been arrested or had given themselves up. This makes a total of 74 in custody out of 78 known members. Of the remaining 4, one is in North Korea and another abroad elsewhere, so only 2 are still at large. Of the 25 most recently arrested, 11 are university graduates and 5 dropped out or were expelled from university, 10 were unemployed and 2 were members of the Catholic Farmers' Union.

2. According to the National Police, the Front was in contact with the Chochongnyon [sic], ie the pro-North Korean residents' federation in Japan, in November 1977 and asked for 300 million won. The Chochongnyon agreed to give them money as long as the Front spread some seditious leaflets, which they did in January 1978, though it is not clear whether the Front actually received any money.

3. At a press conference, Im Hyon Yong, who had surrendered to the authorities earlier, said that "the ultimate aim of the organisation was to communise the south after setting up an interim government to result from the anarchic state which would result from the disturbances by labourers and farmers which the organisation members would stir up". He is of interest because it is alleged that he was a member of the Korean branch of Amnesty International and had another member of the Front, Lee Jae O installed as its Secretary General.

*Yours ever,*  
*Nigel*  
N J G Bowie

[...]

**Letter from PJ Weston to R.E. Samuel, "Korea: North/South Contacts," 21 November 1979**

[Source: FCO 21/1763, "Relations between North and South Korea," The National Archives, Kew. Obtained for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe.]

[...]

*Dear Richard,*

**KOREA: NORTH/SOUTH CONTACTS**

1. The following records the substance of what John Robinson was told this week by Wallach of Hearst Newspapers, who visited Korea earlier this year and gave us some preview of the tripartite initiative (John Robinson's minute of 27 June to me, copied to FED).

2. Wallach said there has been a significant article in the North Korean Party newspaper on 9 November which has indicated a continuing interest on the part of North Korea in moving forward in response to the Carter/Park initiative. He claims that in the NUMA reading North Korean conditions in the article there had been a shift in the language from "must" to "should"; and that this was matched by other signs (not enumerated) of the North's readiness to contemplate tripartite contacts. Dick Holbrooke was disappointed that the political mood here, in light of wire circumstances in the approaching elections, wouldn't affect the likely to preclude the Administration from taking as full advantage of North Korean overtures as he would otherwise have wish to do over the coming to 12 months.

3. Wallach acknowledged that the Administration were pressing him to return to North Korea, presumably to see what further signs could be elicited; but then he did not wish to do so before next March or April. In the meantime he told John Robinson that a new man has been posted to the North Korean Mission to the UN with the specific remit of covering this whole subject (ie the tripartite contacts). Although normally do North Koreans are confined to a 25 mile radius around New York, Wallach said that some thought I was being given to whether this particular man could be invited down to Washington, for a meal or something, as an expression of interest on the US side and to take matters further. It was not clear to what extent the Americans were keeping the South Koreans here for we converse in with their thinking on all this.

*Yours truly,  
[Illegible]*

P J Weston

**Telegram from to Asia Department Head from Information and Culture Department,  
“North Korea Holds Chief Diplomatic Officers Conference,” 22 November 1979**

[Source: “*Buk Han donghyang, 1979*” (“*Northern Trends, 1979*”), Roll 2009-35, File 18, Frames 64-76, South Korean Foreign Ministry Archive.]

Request for Cooperation

Category :

File No. : Jongi 770-2571 Date : 1979/11/22

To : Asia Department Head Cc (Copy) :

From : Information and Culture Department

Title : North Korea Holds Chief Diplomatic Officers Conference

First Opinion:

In regards to the title, please refer to the attached report which was submitted to the acting President.

[...]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
Information to Report

File No. : Jong-i 770-2571 Date : 1979/11/22

To : the President Cc (Copy) :

From :

Title : The North Korean Puppets Hold Conference of the Heads of Overseas Missions

1. Report Details

To our knowledge, the North Korean puppets recalled the heads of thirty overseas missions and held a conference on November 20 in Pyongyang (Status of the return of the heads of overseas missions: attached separately).

2. Analysis

A. Status of the conference of the heads of overseas missions

-February 1976 (Pyongyang)

Heads of overseas missions from twenty five countries where the South and North are both represented and in confrontation returned (encompassing Asia, the Americas, Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East)

-December 1977 (Pyongyang)

Heads of overseas missions from twenty countries where the South and North are both represented and in confrontation returned (encompassing all regions)

B. Consulting measures to strengthen diplomatic offensive concerning our state of emergency

-While the upcoming conference of the heads of overseas missions is thought to be convened following the practice of holding one every two years, it is believed that they are meeting to discuss ways to strengthen their external offensive during our country's state of emergency.

-The North Korean puppet regime is expected to take advantage of the period of our constitutional transition to instigate internal confusion in our country and strengthen their offensive position internationally in the following ways:

1. As they have in the past, intensify their deceptive peace offensive by proposing the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue and their approaches to the United States (FYI: Ambassador to the UN Han Si Hae met with the UN Secretary-General and discussed the issue of inter-Korean dialogue. On November 9, an editorial in *Rodong Sinmun* expressed willingness to resume inter-Korean dialogue).

2. Intensify their schemes to isolate the ROK from the Non-Aligned Movement

3. Consult the measures for establishing and strengthening a united front against the ROK

3. Response

A. On November 2, this department instructed all overseas missions to intensify their intelligence gathering activities concerned with the North Korean puppet regime's overseas activities connected with our country's state of emergency, and has ordered that this information be reported immediately.

B. This department will respond to the intensification of the North Korean puppet regime's expected external schemes by taking measures to increase our country's diplomatic activities aimed at countering them.

Case Number: Reclassified as a general document (June 30, 1980)

[...]

(Attachment)

Current Status of the Return of the North Korean Puppet Regime's Heads of Overseas Missions

Host Country / Departure Date / Remarks

## Asia

Bangladesh / November 8  
India / November 10  
Singapore / November 11  
Indonesia / November 11  
Pakistan / November 11  
Burma / November 12  
Karachi/ November 14  
(Consulate General)

## Europe

Norway / November 6  
Denmark / November 12  
France (UNESCO) / November 14  
Finland / Middle of November  
Sweden / November 11  
Austria / Middle of November

## The Americas

Jamaica / November 7  
U.N. / November 9

## Middle East

Egypt / October 31  
Lebanon / November 8 / Accompanied by family  
Sudan / November 11  
Jordan / November 7  
Tunisia / November 15

## Africa

Central African Republic / November 7  
Sierra Leone / November 9 / Accompanied by family  
Uganda / November 11 / Accompanied by second-grade secretary  
Ethiopia / November 11  
Upper Volta [Burkina Faso] / November 11  
Senegal / November 12  
Benin / November 12  
Togo / November 12  
Cameroon / November 9  
Chad / November 9

Out of a total of eighty four overseas missions, thirty four heads of overseas missions were recalled. The conference began on November 17 and will end on November 29. The heads of overseas missions will take part in a tour of industries and education sessions before returning to their host countries in early December.

### **Host Countries of Recalled Heads of Overseas Missions**

Current as of November 22, 1979

#### Asia

Bangladesh, India, Singapore, Pakistan 2 (Karachi), Burma, Indonesia (7)

#### Middle East and Africa

Ghana, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Tunisia, Togo, Benin, Senegal, Jordan, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt (17)

#### The Americas

Jamaica, U.N., Peru, Cuba (4)

#### Europe

Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, UNESCO, France

#### Total

34 diplomatic offices, 35 people

#### <Analysis>

1. It has been a standard practice for the North Korean puppets to convene the conference of the heads of overseas missions at the beginning of the year, but it is notable that this year's conference was held particularly early.

A. This may be a reaction to the series of changes in the international environment, including changes in Korea due to the "October 26 Incident" and predicament the United States is facing domestically and externally (the situation in Iran and the presidential election).

B. The conference may aim to send instructions regarding diplomatic activities for the 1980s at an early date.

2. As a result, the strategic direction of the conference of heads of the overseas missions of the North Korean puppets may be as follows:

A. The North Korean puppets may view this transitional period of political change as a period of slowdown in diplomatic activity and,

-while trying to penetrate into countries with which the South and North compete for support or countries which are friendly to us,

-and by accusing the current transitional government of being successor to the Yushin regime and placing emphasis on its suppression of the people,

- the North Korean puppets are placing its main drive on expanding anti-ROK, anti-government forces and turning them in to a united front against the ROK

B. Using the current domestic and external situation facing the United States

-placing pressure on the United States to “Koreanize” the Korean question and counsel the ROK to democratize and tolerate those political forces not opposed to communism,

- focusing on alternating between hard-line and soft-line tactics in trying to realize the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea and direct negotiations with the United States.

2. Characteristics of this conference:

A. The North Korean puppets pursued the participation of the wives of Kim Dae Jung and Yu Bo Son in the conference in an attempt to secure direct links with domestic anti-government forces.

B. In regards to the recent domestic situation, the North Korean puppets made the decision organize and expand (by each leader) the support activities for the democracy struggle of anti-government leaders and North Korea’s unification line.

C. The North Korean puppet regime invited representatives (anti-South, pro-North forces) from the United States, Japan, and Italy and other Western countries to attend. They sent a resolution to the governments of the United States and Japan in an effort to use the current situation in Korea to increase public support in those countries for a change in policies toward the North Korean puppets.

3. Given these circumstances:

A. After the October 26 incident this year, the North Korean puppets held anti-South Korean propaganda meetings (thirty one countries, eighty four times) in various parts of the world along with its first international conference, and has engineered an increase in anti-South Korean activities internationally by spreading the main points of policy toward South Korea to various countries.

B. At various other international conferences that support the North Korean puppets in the future,

-The North Korean puppets appears have strengthened its international offensive by having unified South Korean anti-government and anti-regime leaders, overseas anti-South Korea groups and domestic South Korean representatives (Revolutionary Party for Unification, etc).



-By making it appear like what is being talked about at the conference is the shared opinion of North and South Koreans, the North will continue attempts to change attitudes toward the ROK in Western countries, including the United States and Japan.

2. This recent recalling of the heads of the North Korean puppet regime’s overseas missions

A. follows changes that have occurred since the demise of His Excellency, whereby the importance of North Korea’s traditional foreign policy goals focused the so-called anti-Park [Chung Hee], anti-Yushin question and human rights issues have receded

- along with intensifying the anti-ROK offensive by denouncing the transitional new regime as “effectively succeeding the Yushin regime by the military”

-while propagandizing that the conditions favorable to unification under the leadership of the North Korean puppets are emerging, intensifying their peace offensive based on a dialogue-centered approach, such as South-North political negotiations conference

B. focuses on achieving results in political and economic diplomacy in their host countries

C. [furthermore it] appears that the North Korean puppet regime is aiming to move forward with approaching the United States and strengthen their ties with the Non-Aligned Movement.

3. It is expected that the North Korean puppet regime will instigate the penetration into the ROK by various anti-ROK groups and overseas anti-government figures and actively seek to expand foreign trade, in light of the possibility that our foreign trade might increase and lead to the enhancement of our international competitiveness as our new political leadership seeks to advance political development.

[...]

### 1. The Mass Return of the North Korean Puppets’ Heads of Overseas Missions

From November 6-14, the North Korean puppets recalled the heads of their overseas missions from seventeen countries in order to conduct consultations on their assignments.

Date	November 6	7-8	9-10	11	13-15	Total
Name of country summoned from	Norway	Central African Republic, Jamaica, U.N.,	Sierra Leone, Uganda, India	Sudan, Pakistan, Singapore, Ethiopia	Karachi, Sweden, Denmark, UNESCO	Seventeen Missions

		Lebanon, Bangladesh				
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<Analysis>

The reason the North Korean puppet regime recalled the heads of their overseas missions has not been made clear. The conference of the heads of overseas missions that has taken place early in the year has not been convened since 1978. But due to the recent political changes as a result of the sudden contingency in the ROK, the North Korean puppets appear to have wanted to convene the conference of the heads of overseas missions earlier than usual to readjust the goals and direction of their foreign policy.

**Cable from the U.S. Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, "Korea Focus: ROK Ambassador Kim Trys to Exert Influence," 15 December 1979**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item

KO00329. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemImage.do?queryType=cat&ResultsID=13E618A6C661&ItemID=CKO00329&ItemNumber=109.>]

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE  
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS: ROK AMBASSADOR KIM TRYS TO EXERT INFLUENCE

1. Secret – Entire text.
2. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke called in ROK Ambassador Kim Yong-shik late Dec 13 and stressed to him the potentially grave implications for US-ROK relations if the events of December 12 should result in the reversal of the process of orderly political change in the ROK and re-imposition of political controls on freedom of expression such as EM-9 which would be unacceptable to the Korean people and unsupportable by Korea's friends abroad.
3. Expressing the hope that these potentially dire consequences would not emerge, Holbrooke requested assurances from the ROKG regarding future intentions.
4. Ambassador Kim said that he understood fully the implications of the department's statement of December 12 (State 321049) and that he would convey Mr. Holbrooke's message promptly to Seoul and seek assurances in return.
5. Subsequently, we were informed on Dec 14 that as a result of this meeting the Ambassador sent a very strong message to President Choi expressing the concerns of the American government as well as his own concerns and urging the President to act more forcefully to retain influence over the situation and preserve the momentum toward political development. This message was reportedly received by President Choi about five hours before announcement of the new cabinet.
6. Ambassador Kim is also consulting with the defense attaché here, Major General Ahn, and seeking to enlist his influence to moderate the behavior of the young generals group. General Ahn is a KKA 11<sup>th</sup> Class classmate of Major General Chun Tu-wan and a fairly close friend, Ahn is reported to US to have said he would have counseled Chun against direct action if he had been in Seoul (please protect).
7. Another channel being used by Ambassador Kim for influence in Seoul is President Choi's son-in-law. Nho is a junior officer in the political section here. The son-in-law has telephoned President Choi twice in the past two days urging his father-in-law to act more forcefully to prevent erosion of the situation. Vance

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/18/99 (HOLBROOKE, RICHARD)

TAGS: PINT, KS, US

SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS - AMB KIM CONVEYS ROKG ASSURANCES ON  
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

REF: STATE 322555

1. (S), ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ROK AMBASSADOR KIM CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
HOLBROOKE DEC 18 TO CONVEY OFFICIAL ASSURANCES FROM THE ROKG  
THAT THE "PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PROGRAM OF GRADUAL POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENT WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE EVENTS OF  
DECEMBER 12." KIM STRESSED THE OFFICIAL NATURE OF THE  
ANSWER AND THAT THE 48-HOUR DELAY IN RESPONDING INDICATED  
CAREFUL COORDINATION IN SEOUL.

3. KIM SUPPLIED WHAT IS NOW BECOMING THE STANDARD OFFICIAL  
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ROK VERSION OF EVENTS OF DECEMBER 12: THAT THEY RESULTED  
FROM THE UNFORTUNATE RESISTANCE OF GENERAL CHUNG'S GUARDS  
TO THE OFFICERS SENT TO QUESTION THE CHIEF OF STAFF ABOUT  
EVIDENCE POSSIBLY LINKING HIM TO THE ASSASSINATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBSEQUENT CHANGES OF CERTAIN MILITARY COMMANDS WERE THEN DESCRIBED AS "INEVITABLE."

4. AMBASSADOR KIM ALSO CONVEYED APPRECIATION OF THE ROKG FOR THE FIRM REAFFIRMATION OF U.S. SUPPORT OF THE ROK AGAINST POSSIBLE AGGRESSION.

5. ASSISTANT SEC HOLBROOKE SAID HE FOUND THE ROKG MESSAGE REASSURING AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT THE COMMITMENT TO BROADLY BASED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. HE ASSURED AMB KIM THAT THE USG WOULD NOT PUBLICLY CONTEST THE ROKG VERSION OF RECENT EVENTS, BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH TO SEE FURTHER MILITARY CHANGES OF COMMAND "KOREA STYLE."

6. WITH REGARD TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE USG AND MANY OTHER OBSERVERS WILL LISTEN TO PRESIDENT CHOI'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS DEC 21 WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST AT THIS TIME AND BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PRESIDENT SET FORTH HIS POLITICAL TIMETABLE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

7. THE ROK CAN BE ASSURED THAT WE STAND BESIDE KOREA AS FIRM ALLIES, BUT EFFORTS ARE NOW REQUIRED TO RESTORE ROK MILITARY UNITY AND TO RESTORE THE NECESSARY MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ROK ARMED FORCES. THIS MUTUAL TRUST HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY THE DIRECT ACTION OF SOME GENERALS LAST WEEK.

8. SEC HOLBROOKE INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT, DESPITE THE PRESSURES OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN  
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FOLLOWING THE KOREAN SITUATION VERY CLOSELY. THE PRESIDENT IS ANXIOUS THAT THE COMBINED FORCES COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN INVIOLEATE. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY BOTH ARE CONCERNED THAT THERE BE NO OVERTHROW OF CIVILIAN RULE IN KOREA AND THAT ORDERLY PROGRESS TOWARD BROADLY BASED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT CONTINUE. IF THE INTEGRITY OF THE ROK MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE SHOULD BECOME BADLY BREACHED, THIS WOULD OFFER A DANGEROUS OPPORTUNITY FOR NORTH KOREAN INTERVENTION. HOLBROOKE INFORMED KIM THAT WE HAVE GONE TO BOTH THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN THAT NORTH KOREA NOT TRY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION IN THE ROK AND THAT DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN WILL TAKE UP KOREA WITH PRC LEADERS AGAIN ON HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO BEIJING.

9. AMBASSADOR KIM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THESE VIEWS,

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WHICH HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE REITERATED THE ASSURANCES THAT POLITICAL PROGRESS WOULD CONTINUE.

10. COMMENT: IN CONVEYING THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENT OF HIS OFFICIAL MESSAGE (PARA 2 ABOVE), AMBASSADOR KIM SAID THAT THE FIRST MESSAGE HE RECEIVED REFERRED TO THE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED PROGRAM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT "PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY." A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE HAD AMENDED THAT TO SPEAK OF "GRADUAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT." BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR PARK AGREED THAT "GRADUAL" WAS THE MORE POSITIVE FORMULATION, IMPLYING IN KOREAN A STEADY PROGRESSION FROM A PRE-ARRANGED PLAN, WHILE "CAUTIOUSLY" IMPLIED POSSIBLE TESTING OF THE WATERS AT EACH STEP. VANCE

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**Special National Intelligence Estimate, “North Korean Reactions to Instability in the South,” 20 December 1979**

[Source: Digital National Security Archive, Item

KO00331. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/cat/displayItemImage.do?queryType=cat&ResultsID=13E618A6C661&ItemID=CKO00331&ItemNumber=111.>]

[...]

**North Korean Reactions  
to Instability in the South**

Special National Intelligence Estimate

[...]

NOTE

This contingency estimate addresses the likelihood of a North Korean attack on the South if severe fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders develop there during the next two or three months. It assumes a level of instability which may not develop.

KEY JUDGMENTS

The emergence of fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders in South Korea would prompt Pyongyang to consider forceful reunification of the peninsula.

However, Pyongyang would face a crucial imponderable in attempting to determine the US response to a North Korean attack, given the presence of US ground forces in the south and the virtual certainty of their being engaged. With the [redacted] United States preoccupied with events in Iran and possibly elsewhere, the North would probably calculate that US capability and resolve to defend South Korea had been weakened.

In view of the magnitude of the decision facing Pyongyang and the risk involved, we cannot judge with confidence whether or not it would opt for military action. We believe, however, that the chances of such action could be as high as 50-50 under this scenario.\*

If the North should decide to intervene, it would most probably launch a massive assault designed to destroy organized resistance and consolidate its control over the South.

DISCUSSION

\*\* The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes it impossible to calculate odds in circumstances that demand so many subjective judgments, including North Korea's perception of the risk of war with the United States and loss of so much of the progress of which North Koreans are so proud.

He agrees, however, that there would be a significantly higher risk of hostilities.

1. North Korean President Kim Il-song would view the emergence of fighting between South Korean military factions and widespread civil disorders in the wake of South Korean President Park's death as a unique opportunity to reunify the Korean Peninsula on his terms. In 1975, Kim publicly declared that the North would not stand idly by if "revolutionary conditions" developed in the South, a sentiment that Pyongyang has subsequently publicized. Privately, Kim has described the unsettled period between the resignation of Syngman Rhee in 1960 and the military coup in 1961 as a golden opportunity that the North was militarily unprepared to exploit. Given the significant expansion of North Korean military capabilities over the past decade, Kim is now in far better position to take such action.

### The Deterrent

2. In considering an attack on a militarily weakened South Korea, Pyongyang would weigh the attitudes of its major allies and, most importantly, the US security commitment to Seoul. For years, Moscow and Beijing have cautioned Kim, but their influence has decreased as the North's military self-sufficiency has grown. If Kim were otherwise convinced that military intervention were in his interest, it is doubtful that China or the USSR could veto the venture.

3. We judge that North Korea would attack the South if there were no US military presence. The presence of US ground forces, however, and the virtual certainty of their being engaged during any sizable North Korean assault must give Pyongyang pause. The North has long recognized that the presence of US infantry north of Seoul is a deterrent above and beyond the US treaty commitment to South Korea. We continue to believe that one of Pyongyang's key objectives throughout the 1970s has been to end the US troop presence in the South.

4. [Redacted]

5. The North would also consider US concerns and involvement outside Korea. It might perceive current US preoccupation in the Middle East and Southeast Asia as a factor that would decrease its degree of risk in taking military action. On the other hand, Pyongyang might consider US frustration and anger over the Iranian situation and evidence of a renewed mood of American assertiveness as ominous indicators of Washington's willingness to respond to an attack on US forces in Korea. The North would also assess US ability to respond rapidly. If the United States were to become militarily involved elsewhere in a major way, we would expect the North to see the degree of risk substantially reduced. A key indicator for Pyongyang would be the continued presence of US forces in Korea and elsewhere in Northeast Asia, or earmarked for use there.

6. In view of the magnitude of the decision facing Pyongyang and the risk involved, we cannot judge with confidence whether or not it would opt for an all-out assault. We believe, however, that the chances of such action could be as high as 50-50.<sup>†</sup>

### Military Options

<sup>†</sup> See footnote on page 1 in the Key Judgments for comment of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.



7. Pyongyang might consider either: (1) some form of limited military intervention that would minimize risks, test us resolve, and add to the process of disintegration in the South, or (2) launching a major offensive. We believe that Pyongyang would reject the first course. Since the Korean War, the North has tried a wide variety of lesser measures with little success. In view of those experiences, the North might well calculate that limited action would be a net loss. US and South Korean forces might not accurately gauge the North's limited objectives; if so, the North's risks would not be lessened. In the past, the assumption of a menacing posture by the North has had a unifying effect upon the South, and Pyongyang would have little reason to judge otherwise this time. Finally, measured North Korean military action would yield limited gains at best, and yet could help to suspend US troop withdrawals indefinitely.

8. Thus we believe that North Korean military intervention would likely take the form of a large-scale, coordinated ground, naval, and air assault against the South. [Redacted]

9. Although control of the Seoul area would be an initial objective, we believe that the North's ultimate goal would be the unification of the entire peninsula through military conquest. [Redacted]

10. In our view, North Korea would attempt to continue the invasion and to consolidate control over the South as long as its military operations were successful. The North's increased numbers of military units, personnel, and equipment would permit sustained operations far longer than we considered possible even two years ago. [Redacted]

11. The USSR and China, as treaty allies of Pyongyang, almost certainly would respond cautiously to a North Korean attack on South Korea. Both would want to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States; the Chinese in particular would be loath to jeopardize their developing relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, because of their mutual rivalry and the strategic importance of maintaining a nonhostile state in North Korea, the USSR and China would feel compelled to provide at least some material assistance to Pyongyang.

[...]

**Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter, 29 December 1979**

*[Source: David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980: Volume XIII: China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), 1025-1029.]*

Washington, December 29, 1979

SUBJECT

My Trip to China

[...]

—On Korea, I shall take note of recent Chinese assurances that North Korea will not seek to exploit the recent political changes in the ROK, emphasize the importance of continued DPRK restraint, remind the Chinese that direct discussions between authorities in Pyongyang and Seoul are indispensable to promote coexistence on the peninsula, and encourage them to urge the North Koreans to reconsider their attitude toward our proposal for Tripartite Talks which remains on the table. I will add that we are not prepared to initiate<sup>1</sup> direct contacts with the North—however informal—to discuss Korean issues without ROK representation.

[...]

<sup>1</sup> Someone, probably Carter, crossed out “initiate” and wrote “establish.”