Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

NOTICIAS

LATIN AMERICAN PROGRAM NEWSLETTER FALL 2006

Mexico's 2006 Elections

On July 2, 2006, Mexicans went to the polls to elect a new president and congress for the first time since President Vicente Fox became the first opposition candidate to end 71 years of uninterrupted rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). This highly anticipated election received media coverage worldwide. To analyze the important changes taking place in Mexico's democratic process and the role of Mexico in world affairs, the Mexico Institute initiated an ongoing series on the elections that has included conferences and seminars in Washington, DC, New York, Tijuana, and Mexico City, as well as a website updated daily with summaries and links to the most important daily news, polls, and analysis of the elections by leading scholars and commentators.

On March 1, 2006, the Mexico Institute hosted *Andrés Rozental*, president of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, to discuss the issues on the bilateral agenda, and what challenges the two governments would face over the next few months as both countries went through an election year. Rozental predicted that relations between the two nations would deteriorate after the July presidential election because no matter who won, the new chief executive would be far less willing than Fox to nurture Mexico's relationship with the United States.



Clockwise from top left: Alejandro Moreno, María Amparo Casar, James Jones, Andrew Selee, Andrés Rozental and Javier Treviño

On March 31, 2006, the conference "Institutions and Political Actors in Mexico's 2006 Elections" brought together fourteen

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speakers from both sides of the border to discuss changes in the political party system, governing institutions, and the role of citizens and social actors in Mexican society. On the first panel, "Political Party System in Transition," *Alejandro Moreno* of the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and the Mexican newspaper *Reforma* pointed out that the election had been characterized by a competition between the individual candidates rather than the parties they represented. Voters supporting Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) were generally liberal in social values and left-of-center on economic issues. Voters inclined toward Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN) were more likely to be conservative in social values and right-of-center on economic issues. *Jean François Prud'homme* of El Colegio de México described Mexico's party system as "frozen." He pointed out that in 2006 the system's configuration still is similar to what it was in 2000, with small parties searching for protection from the three large parties by forming alliances. *Pamela Starr* of the Eurasia Group noted that the problem President Fox's administration faced was that people's perception of presidential power did not decline while his actual power had, leading to high expectations of his administration that went unmet. Starr pointed out that unlike presidents who ruled during the years of PRI dominance, who maintained majorities in Congress, President Fox did not have the power to pass his reforms and deliver on his promises for fiscal and energy reform. She estimated that Mexico's structural problems for achieving more fluid governance were not likely to go away after these elections.



Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez

In the second panel, "Change & Continuity in Institutions of Governance," *María Amparo Casar* of the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) argued that electoral reforms had put an end to the hegemonic party system, allowing Congress to exercise representation and oversight of the executive power for the first time. Since then no party has been able to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and, as a result, the lawmaking process has become not only more cumbersome, but prone to open conflict. *Tonatiuh Guillén* of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte stated that democratization has opened up new paths for institutional actors, especially governors and mayors. However, he pointed out that while democratization makes room for more participation, it also creates a fragmented federal agenda with weak policial actors who cannot implement policy effectively. He argued that Mexico needed a major reform of its federal system to empower subnational governments, especially municipalities, to be effective.

On the same panel, *Jacqueline Peschard* of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) noted that electoral institutions have played a key role in the Mexican democratization process, by pushing forward mechanisms to ensure accountability for political parties. She mentioned that since the electoral reforms of 1996 there has been a growing citizen confidence in the electoral system. Although the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) has carried out its tasks effectively, its general council has become overly sensitive to public opinion. *Jonathan Fox* of the University of California, Santa Cruz, addressed the issue of transparency. He noted that the access to information law was an important advance, but noted that there were still major threats to its survival and there are no national standards for access to information laws at the state and local level. *Francisco González* of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University observed that there is still a clear divide between judicial reforms and the trustworthiness of the justice system. While the supreme court has become increasingly independent, other courts have improved much less. As a result, the Mexican public still does not trust its judges.

In the third panel, "Citzens and Social Actors," *Mariclaire Acosta,* director of the Department for the Promotion of Good Governance in the Secretariat for Political Affairs at the Organization of American States (OAS), questioned the preparedness of Mexico's social actors to face their role in a fully democratized society. *Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez* of ITAM argued that civil society actors

now play a different role from what they have traditionally in that their focus is primarily on the campaigns and party platforms. He also noted that the parties have each developed a different strategy for relating to civil society. *Chappell Lawson* of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained the changes that took place in the mass media during Mexico's transition to democracy; there has been a new inclination towards equity in the coverage of political campaigns.

On May 26, 2006, the Mexico Institute hosted a conference on "The 2006 Mexican Presidential Elections and the Future of U.S.-Mexico Relations." *Cynthia Arnson*, director of the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center, and Mexico Institute Advisory Board co-chairs *Roger W. Wallace* and *José Antonio Fernández* gave welcoming remarks. On the first panel, *Enrique Krauze*, editor-in-chief of the Mexican magazine *Letras Libres,* argued that Andrés Manuel López Obrador represents a form of "political messianism," reflected in his belief that he embodies the will of the people and in his disregard for institutions. If López Obrador were to win, Krauze anticipated that a messianic leader would present a "historic challenge" to Mexican democracy, even though he was confident that Mexican institutions were strong enough to contend with this. *Lorenzo Meyer* of El Colegio de México took exception to the statements made by Krauze about López Obrador. In response to concern that López Obrador might not respect Mexican institutions, Meyer cited a need for a more complete democratic transition in Mexico because the institutional framework in place has not changed sufficiently. He noted that Mexicans distinguish between legality and legitimacy, and there is a need to create laws that are truly legitimate. *Jacqueline Peschard* of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México highlighted the strength of Mexico's electoral institutions and their ability to resolve any electoral disputes, and pointed out that the role of the electoral authorities has evolved with the progression of the presidential campaigns.

On the second panel, *Andrés Rozental* of the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales stated that foreign policy had been a marginal part of the public debate during the elections, but that there is no other topic on which the candidates differ more. He suggested that no matter who wins the elections, Mexico's relationship with the United States would likely become more strained, and predicted that the cooperative disposition that characterized Fox's presidency will come to an end once he leaves office. *James Jones* of Manatt Jones Global Strategies suggested that Mexico's relationship with the United States, which is firmly rooted in economic interests, would not be significantly affected by the outcome of the election. He predicted that migration would continue to be a major issue in the relationship because the U.S. Congress is unlikely to be able to pass an immigration reform bill this year. *Javier Treviño* of CEMEX argued that PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo would be more prudent and cautious than the current Fox administration, and López Obrador would present the biggest change; Calderón would likely present the greatest continuity. However, he added that the degree of attention to Mexico from the United States would vary depending on the outcome of the midterm elections for the U.S. Congress. *Susan Kaufman Purcell* of the University of Miami speculated that the direction of U.S. public opinion, midterm elections, and the focus of U.S. foreign policy could affect the U.S.-Mexico relationship. She asserted that while a cooperative, business-friendly energy policy would only emerge under Calderón, even López Obrador would have to nurture healthy relations with select business leaders. *Rafael Fernández de Castro* of ITAM highlighted several of the obstacles the incoming president will face, such as transitioning to a regulated immigration system with the United States, reducing violence on the southern border, and helping stabilize neighboring Guatemala. He mentioned that because the U.S. foreign policy agenda has been preoccupied with Iraq, the door is wide open for Mexico to exert more leadership in the hemisphere. He doubted, however, the likelihood that any of the presidential candidates would step up to that challenge.

Rafael Fernández de Castro

On July 7, 2006, the final conference on Mexico's 2006 Election was held to discuss the results that

were so close that it took an additional two days to announce the winner, who according the Federal Electoral Institute, won with a margin of barely less than half a percentage point. *Andrew Selee*, director of the Mexico Institute, referenced the results in which Felipe Calderón, the candidate from the PAN, was declared the winner with a margin of 0.58 percent over Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD. He pointed out that all but three of the states in the northern region of the country voted for Calderón while all but two in the south voted for López Obrador. He argued that this degree of geographic polarization had never before taken place in Mexico, and this indicated a deep-seated cleavage based on how Mexicans have experienced recent policies. *Roderic Ai Camp* of Claremont McKenna College asserted that the closeness of the outcome, testing the electoral tribunal system for the first time, has proven to be the ultimate trial of Mexico's rule of law and the level of maturity of its democratic structure. He observed that one fourth of voters want a congress with no majority party and another fourth want the majority to be of a different party than that of the executive. He predicted that Calderón's mandate would be weak, and the impasse between the legislative and executive branches would continue to be a roadblock to effective progress on major policy issues.

Alberto Aziz Nassif of the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS) predicted that the most likely outcome would be that the electoral irregularities cited by López Obrador would be insufficient to shift the election results, though he did not discount the possibility that the election could be annulled or altered by the Federal Electoral Tribunals' (TRIFE) review of evidence. However, he emphasized that this election has shifted the electoral geography into a two-party system between the PRD and the PAN in which the PRI has fallen behind. This might lead to a permanent stalemate between the two parties in Congress or it could lead to the building of broad agreements and alliances to move a policy agenda forward. *Yemile Mizrahi* of Casals and Associates stated that although it is too early to analyze why the PAN was victorious, one factor that aided its win was the votes gained from both the PRI and New Alliance parties. She pointed out that the PAN has difficulty maintaining its electoral strength once it wins, emphasizing that in this election it won significantly fewer votes than it did in the 2000 elections.

The Wilson Center co-sponsored two high-level seminars in Mexico City with the International Studies Center at El Colegio de México, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), and the Commission on State Reform of the Chamber of Deputies. The seminars brought together international and Mexican experts on democracy to discuss Mexico's evolving democratic process in the light of other experiences around the world.

In the first of these seminars on May 11, *Adam Przeworksi* of New York University discussed the conditions for democracies to become consolidated, stressing the importance that all actors believe they have a real chance to win on a future occasion. Meanwhile, *Lorenzo Meyer* pointed to weaknesses in Mexico's electoral process, in which persistent economic inequalities continue to undermine political equality. *Susan Stokes* of Yale University argued that social capital and political trust were not prerequisites for strong democracy, but rather, effective and accountable institutions were. *Alfonso Hernández* of the Federal Institute for Access to Information (IFAI) reached similar conclusions based on survey evidence from research in Mexican states. Several members of Congress, including *Manuel Camacho* (PRD), *Germán Martínez* (PAN), *Alberto Aguilar* (PRI), and *Jesús Martínez* (Convergencia), pointed to challenges in the Mexican political system. IFE president *Luis Carlos Ugalde, Counselor Alejandra Latapí*, and Director of Personnel *Eduardo Guerrero* all described society's collective construction of electoral rules in Mexico and addressed remaining institutional challenges.

In the second seminar, on June 15, *Philippe Schmitter* of the European University presented a series of proposals to enrich citizens' exercise of democracy drawn from the European experience and challenged Mexicans to be creative in expanding public participation. *Ilán Bizberg* of El Colegio de México stressed the incomplete nature of Mexico's democratic transition, noting that state-society

The PAN will continue to face this problem until it reduces barriers to membership, she argued. *Jonathan Fox* of the University of California, Santa Cruz, addressed several myths commonly believed about the electoral process, including the perception that these elections were the most transparent in Mexico's history, that it was Mexico's closest election to date, and that today's IFE is the same respected institution that it was in 2000. He also argued that it is false to believe that the Federal Electoral Tribunal has a reliable track record (when it is mixed) or that vote buying and threats are historical relics. Fox asserted that the PRI is not out of the picture, discounting the idea that the elections were only truly between two parties. Contrary to popular belief, he argued that the PRI still retains a significant influence.

Latin America and the United States: The Future of the Relationship

On April 25, 2006, the Latin American Program, the Council of the Americas, and the Council of American Ambassadors convened a forum to address the state of U.S.-Latin American relations. *Bruce Gelb*, Council of American Ambassadors, opened by asking "Where is Latin America today, where is it heading, and what does it mean for the United States?" *Cynthia Arnson*, Woodrow Wilson Center, described the relationship as one of tremendous flux, due in part to the presidential elections taking place throughout the region, as well as to changes in U.S. foreign policy following 9/11. The current relationship has been defined by sharp ideological conflicts and distrust, cooperation with some countries on trade matters, and at times intense engagement on issues including migration, drug trafficking, human rights, and democratic consolidation.

Ricardo Hausmann, Harvard University, correlated the region's shift toward populism with the economic recovery beginning in 2002, because a nationalist agenda and the desire to control assets emerge when commodity prices are high, as they are now. The trends are cyclical—the last period of a more activist state in Latin America was in the 1970s, when the price of commodities spiked. Hausmann alluded to a new kind of Cold War emerging in the region, one that eventually

relations have evolved far less than electoral institutions. *Raúl Alconada* of the Organization of American States, representing Dante Caputo, stressed that Latin American countries need to do more to level the playing field to ensure that economic inequalities do not undermine political participation. *Andreas Schedler* of CIDE presented a series of ideas that could ensure greater inclusion of the poorest segments of society in the political process. Members of Congress, including *José González Morfín* (PAN) and *Pablo Gómez* (PRD), IFE Counselors *Hugo Sánchez* and *Virgilio Andrade*, and *Hugo Concha*, Director of Training at IFE, discussed these proposals and the remaining challenges for consolidating Mexican democracy.

A separate seminar, organized by the Department of Public Administration of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Tijuana and cosponsored by the Wilson Center and the Sociedad Mexicana de Estudios Electorales (SOMEE), focused on "U.S. Perspectives of the Mexican Elections." At this event, which was broadcast via videoconference to audiences in Ciudad Juárez, Monterrey, and Mexico City, *David Ayón* of Loyola Marymount University argued that Mexicans abroad had followed the elections closely but had faced numerous obstacles in registering to vote. He argued that many migrants were engaged in Mexican politics indirectly through their efforts to develop their communities of origin, but less so in the formal elections process. *Andrew Selee* of the Wilson Center stressed that while some U.S. investors and politicians might be partial to PAN candidate Felipe Calderón, most were comfortable with the prospect of a victory by Andrés Manuel López Obrador. This suggests that the relationship between the two countries has evolved considerably to the point where elites in both countries are willing to respect the decision made by citizens in the other country.



Ricardo Hausmann and Carl Meacham

will cause a split between the "2nd International" leaders, such as Brazil's Lula or Chile's Bachelet, and the "3rd International" leaders, such as Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Fidel Castro, who have the resources to project their interests. Although the United States had a strategy during the first Cold War of funding the Alliance for Progress and international financial institutions, U.S. policy relies now on free trade agreements as the sole instrument of U.S. policy in the region.

Carl Meacham, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pointed out that the United States maintains a negative image in Latin America as a result of disapproval of the war in Iraq and dissatisfaction with market-based economic policies, but also the fact that the region still remains on the periphery of U.S. foreign policy. Meacham stated that Latin American interests are for policies that address eradication of poverty and job creation. He made several recommendations for U.S. policy toward the region: a closer economic partnership with Mexico that would help improve Mexican wages, a strengthened political relationship with Brazil, defined expectations for a U.S. relationship with Venezuela, a stronger political relationship with Chile—whose progress demonstrates that market-based reform can lead to job creation and poverty reduction—and increased spending in public diplomacy efforts.

Paulo Sotero, Washington correspondent for *O Estado de S. Paulo*, said that the United States lost credibility in Latin America as a result of the war in Iraq and the scandal at Abu Ghraib and that no mere public relations campaign would mend that rift. Growing U.S. protectionism and punitive measures on immigration pursued after 9/11 have further harmed the country's image in the region. However, he disagreed with the idea that anti-U.S. rhetoric is a popular political campaign strategy in Brazil, as Brazilians see their problems as their own, and not as inflicted by the United States. In fact, Presidents Bush and Lula have maintained a respectful, productive relationship despite their contrasting political backgrounds. Sotero encouraged even more collaboration between the two nations on issues of energy, immigration, and security.

In the second panel, *Richard Feinberg*, University of California at San Diego, noted that Democrats also have a tarnished image in Latin America because of their opposition to free trade agreements in the region, especially DR-CAFTA. He pointed out that while Latin America has had three good years economically, it has fragmented politically into three types of regimes: the "Efficient Modernizers," typified by center-right governments in Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico, Colombia, and Peru; the "Social Democrats" of Chile and Brazil**;** and the "Impetuous Populists" seen in Venezuela and Argentina. Although many countries are interested in free trade agreements with the United States, a broad hemispheric agreement on trade remains unlikely. Feinberg questioned whether Latin American nations were truly interested in multilateralism and added that improved relations in the hemisphere will be affected by Latin America's willingness to take risks, commit resources, and confront its own internal political divisions.

Jorge Castañeda, New York University, pointed out that the two regions are further apart on more issues than they have been in the past. Castañeda recommended that the United States and Latin American countries work together to develop mechanisms to hold themselves and each other accountable for the commitments they have made to the international community regarding democracy, trade, human rights, and the environment. He further pointed out the need for the United States to cultivate the "right left" that believes strongly in democratic institutions and sustainable policies as opposed to the "wrong left" that is more enamored

of populist solutions. Nonetheless, he suggested that there is a broad perception in Latin America that there is little value in collaborating with the United States; countries that have shown a willingness to cooperate get little or nothing more than the countries that have poor relations with the United States.

Bob Davis of *The Wall Street Journal* described U.S. policy towards Latin America as indifferent and characterized by lack of action for fear of worsening anti-U.S. sentiment. He noted that countries tend to receive attention from U.S. policymakers because of their economic importance to the United States or their potential to be a threat to security. Latin America has not become a region of security concern but it remains far behind other areas of the world for its economic importance to the United States; until the region begins to grow economically, like China and India, it will not matter significantly to the United States. He also observed that no piece of U.S. legislation will solve the country's immigration issues until more attention is paid to why migrants are so desperate to leave their homelands.

Julia Sweig, Council on Foreign Relations, offering closing comments, characterized the rising tide of anti-Americanism in the region as deeply troubling. She noted that the U.S. government operates with an "eighty-twenty dynamic": it only deals with twenty percent of the population in Latin American countries—those in the elite—and not the remaining eighty percent of the population. She also stressed that the character of the United States makes a great deal of difference in its image abroad, which has been affected by the rise of inequality and the erosion of meritocracy in America. The United States' capacity to be a model internationally will continue to erode if it does not address these problems at home. ■

Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America

How to consolidate democracy following the experience of violent repression and internal armed conflict represents a continuing challenge in many countries of Central America and the Andes. Although weak institutions and low levels of state capacity characterize many emerging democracies in Latin America, the legacy of war poses a deeper and distinct set of obstacles. Since 1994, the Latin America Program's project on Comparative Peace Processes has explored this intersection between democratization and war in six countries of the hemisphere: Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. On April 3-4, 2006, the project sponsored a major two-day conference at the Wilson Center that sought to update and expand the multicountry analysis found in *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Stanford, 1999) while including the Haitian case for a forthcoming book on democracy and armed conflict.

Project coordinator and Latin American Program director *Cynthia J. Arnson* set the stage for this second, comprehensive stage of the inquiry. In the decade and a half since the end of the Central American wars, she said, much of the optimism that accompanied the signing of peace accords and the demobilization of guerrilla fighters has dissipated. Building functioning democracies out of the ashes of authoritarianism and conflict--in essence, constructing a state that was previously strong only in its military dimension--has proved a daunting task. Weak democratic institutions have failed to inspire broad-based confidence in the democratic system. Just as important, while absolute levels of poverty in some cases had been reduced, social inequalities have widened as countries opened up their economies in accordance with free trade orthodoxy or failed to enact reforms that would spread the benefits of growth more widely.

Dinorah Azpuru, Wichita State University, discussed polling data from Latin America that point to dissatisfaction with democracy and declining support for its institutions. Azpuru provided a typology of political regimes that contrasted authoritarian and pseudodemocracies with electoral and liberal democracies, placing public opinion surveys within the context of contemporary debates on the quality of democracy in Latin America.

Felipe Agüero, University of Miami and a Woodrow Wilson Center Fellow, argued that swift postconflict transitions may have advantages. He compared the police and military reforms in El Salvador with the delays experienced in Chile, Brazil, and Mexico. Agüero highlighted the transitions literature's emphasis on foundational



Clockwise from top left: Dinorah Azpuru, Cynthia Arnson, Felipe Agüero, Edelberto Torres Rivas, Ana Sojo and Marco Palacios

moments that shape the democratic regime emerging in a postconflict environment, and emphasized the importance of strengthening party systems for creating consensus about the legitimacy of democracy as the "only game in town."

Ariel Armony of Colby College suggested that "ripe moments" as described in the conflict resolution literature exist in the immediate postconflict phase as opportunities for establishing norms and institutions. Armony claimed that the United States in the 19th century failed to place economic redistribution at the center of post-Civil War reconstruction and did not do so until the civil rights movement of the 1960s. By contrast, Rwanda utilized gender-sensitivity to create innovative mechanisms that enabled women to be at the forefront of the reconstruction effort following the 1994 genocide. *Stewart Patrick* of the Center for Global Development emphasized that the peace-building literature does not prioritize democratization nor does it focus to any significant degree on Latin America. Nevertheless, the peace-building and transitions literatures overlap in the attention given to poverty alleviation and the strengthening of institutions as ways of building sustainability. In volatile situations, postponing elections until politics become demilitarized may be necessary.

Regarding Guatemala, *Edelberto Torres-Rivas*, United Nations Development Program, Guatemala, noted that democracy has weakened the state and its institutions by producing peace accords that did not resolve the root causes of conflict. In Guatemala, where democracy was established before peace, the changes mandated in the accords contrast with state incapacity to implement them. *Ricardo Córdova Macias*, FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador, distinguished between the design (1991-1992), execution (1992-2000), and implementation (2000-present) phases of the postconflict process in El Salvador. The peace accords contain political reforms for demilitarizing and democratizing the state. Achieving lasting peace and democracy are intrinsically linked to broadening the experience of citizenship and improving living standards.

Marco Palacios, El Colegio de México, argued against confusing peace processes with democracy-building in Colombia. A colonial legacy that has produced the highest concentration of land in Latin America, a strong antistate bias, and the country's status as a frontier society in a permanent process of colonization contextualizes Colombia's multiple conflicts and peace processes. *Raúl Benítez*, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, described the conflict in Chiapas as between indigenous peoples and the historic landowning class. The 1994 uprising served to destroy the historic political system in Chiapas and called attention to the state's abandonment at the federal level. The EZLN's uprising helped 'democratize' Chiapas by creating broader representation in the state legislature and motivating the central government to invest in social projects.

According to *Carlos Basombrío*, Capital Humano y Social, S.A., and *Peru 21*, the end of political violence in Peru does not imply the consolidation of peace. The rapid collapse of the Fujimori-Montesinos regime following evidence of systemic corruption provided a "ripe moment" for reform. Although Peru's political dynamics changed dramatically following Fujimori's resignation, the window of opportunity for reforms is closing as criticism of politicians and institutions becomes conflated. *Carlos Iván Degregori*, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and Princeton University, noted that victimization rates in Peru were highest in rural areas and among individuals whose mother tongue was predominately Quechua. In discussing the findings of Peru's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Degregori argued that the supposed trade-off between truth and justice is not applicable to Peru: opening trials will not endanger democracy, but rather help in its consolidation. *Victoria Sanford*, City University of New York, discussed the role of Guatemala's Comisión de Esclarecimiento Historico (CEH), which is establishing a record of violence and changing the public's perceptions about what took place during the conflict. The commission visited more than 2,000 communities, interacting with 20,000 people (1,000 of them military), and is becoming a depository for important documents. Ninety-three percent of violations were attributed to the military, and 3 percent to the URNG guerrillas. Although the guerrillas apologized publicly, the military remains silent and key generals have rejected the CEH's findings outright. *Pablo de Greiff* of the International Center for Transitional Justice noted that the literature on transitional justice repeats the aspiration that more truth telling contributes to justice. Nevertheless, justice in moments of transition remains modest given the multiple failed attempts to make reparations to victims worldwide.

On the topic of peace transitions, crime, and violence, *José Miguel Cruz* of the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas of El Salvador argued that violence does not emerge from civil wars alone. In studying the Central American gangs or *maras*, it is evident that they evolved from cultural flows from the United States, transplanting rivalries from North to Central America. Since 2001, *mano dura* policies by the government have resonated with the public and created obstacles for democratic consolidation. *Rafael Fernández de Castro*, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, argued that the *maras* phenomenon is blown out of proportion in the United States. Interestingly, Mexico and Nicaragua exhibit little *mara* activity; explaining this discrepancy has to do with the presence of social networks and the role of the state. *Gonzalo Sánchez*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, elaborated on the ways Colombia's constitution and legal system distinguish between political and common crime. The transformation of common crimes into political crimes allows for the rebellion to be criminalized while criminality is politicized. *Charles Call*, American University, commented on the ambiguities surrounding the distinction among political, social, and economic violence. *Cristina Eguizábal* of the Ford Foundation, Mexico, spoke of the need for conceptual frameworks that allow for a comparative analysis of *maras* and economic liberalization as it contributes to the weakening of the state.

On political and social inclusion, *Ana Sojo* of CEPAL-Chile pointed to the gradual but stagnant reduction in poverty levels in Central America, which have been accompanied by a deterioration in distributive practices, an incomplete process of improving gender equity, and the ongoing difficulty of attending to the effects of internal displacement from the war era. Poverty is intimately associated with the quality of employment and productivity levels, which remain low in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Economic consultant *Alexander Segovia* spoke of the definitive

collapse of the agroexporting model based on elite mechanisms of control. In El Salvador, five years of economic stagnation were alleviated only by large remittance flows resulting from the perverse social safety valve of outward migration. Addressing political inclusion, *Ana María Bejarano* of the University of Toronto noted that guerrilla insurgent groups were reduced in Colombia from seven to two since the 1960s. But the impact on political participation has been mixed, with the dramatic elimination of members and elected officials of the Unión Patriótica and the declining electoral fortunes of the M-19 over time. Mechanisms of "positive discrimination" created an electoral system favorable to the inclusion of marginalized groups while also contributing to a highly fragmented party system and parties.

On the role of the international community, *Blanca Antonini*, Centro Toledo para la Paz, Madrid, explored the role of the European Union in Central America and Colombia. She compared Europe's use of "soft" power in countervailing U.S. military or "hard" power. European countries have tended to focus on the linkages between development and peace, thereby emphasizing social and humanitarian affairs. Over time, the EU position on Colombia has become more closely aligned with that of the United States; Europe has included the ELN and FARC guerrillas on its list of terrorist organizations and remains cautiously supportive of the Uribe government.

Johanna Mendelson, United Nations Foundation, said that peacekeeping cannot be effective without diplomacy, the willingness to demonstrate power, and the inclusion of locals in the reconciliation process. Missed opportunities in Haiti provide an important learning experience for the United Nations and the Organization of American States, which have both been extensively involved. Haiti is often categorized as a failed state; despite the UN mandate to intervene to restore democracy, national dialogues never really started and the political exclusion of key actors continues to fuel the crisis. *Teresa Whitfield* of the Social Science Research Council spoke of how the UN did the minimum in Haiti to conform to international standards, given the low level of international interest in the country; by contrast, in Central America, the international community committed

Brazil Institute Names New Director

Paulo Sotero

In September 2006, *Paulo Sotero Marques* joined the Latin American Program as director of the Brazil Institute. For the last seventeen years, Paulo was the Washington correspondent for *Estado de S.Paulo*, a leading Brazilian daily newspaper. He has also been a regular commentator and analyst for the BBC radio Portuguese language service, Radio France Internationale, and Radio Eldorado, in Brazil. Since 2003, he has been an adjunct lecturer at Georgetown University both in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese and the Center for Latin American Studies of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

Prior to joining *Estado* in 1989, Paulo worked as a correspondent for *Istoé* weekly magazine and the financial newspaper *Gazeta Mercantil*. A native of the state of São Paulo, Mr. Sotero started his career in journalism at *Veja* weekly magazine in 1968 and held positions as staff reporter in Recife, stringer in Paris, full-time correspondent in Lisbon, assistant editor for Latin America in São Paulo, and correspondent assigned to cover the Palácio do Planalto, the Brazilian President's office in Brasília

Paulo is a frequent lecturer on Brazilian and Latin American affairs at U.S. universities and think tanks, and has appeared on national radio and television news programs, including *To the Point* (PRI), the *NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer and *Foreign Exchange* with Fareed Zakaria (PBS), and the *Diane Rehm Show* (WAMU). In addition to his work for *Estado*, he has contributed to newspapers, magazines, and journals in Brazil, the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

The recipient of numerous awards, Paulo is a member of the Grupo de Conjuntura Internacional, a forum of discussion of Brazilian foreign and trade policies at the University of São Paulo, and the Fernando Braudel Institute of World Economics, also based in São Paulo.

substantial human and financial resources after the signing of the peace accords. Helpful "fixers" like Norway and Sweden maintain large embassies in Guatemala and Colombia, using their presence to assist in peace negotiation and consolidation, rather than to pursue trade or commercial interests. ■

International Trade and Biotechnology in Brazil

On February 24, the Brazil Institute cosponsored an International Trade Symposium with the Brazilian Lawyers for International Trade (ABCI). This conference attracted over 150 guests and consisted of four panels: Agriculture, NAMA, and the Future of the Doha Round; Disputes and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Evolution and Perspectives; Antidumping Practice and Rules Negotiations; and Bilateral Relations between Brazil and the United States.

In the first panel, *Gary Clyde Hufbauer* of the Institute for International Economics argued that Europe's desire for nonagricultural market access (NAMA) and services concessions from developing countries—before Europe reduces its own agricultural subsidies—is impeding progress in the Doha Round of the WTO negotiations. *Dorothy Dwoskin* of the U.S. Trade Representative's office argued that progress was taking place, but criticized Brazil's request for more "policy space" from the WTO and insisted that NAMA should not be predicated upon agricultural concessions. *Ambassador Clodoaldo Hugueney* argued that NAMA and services are directly linked to agricultural market access, and that the United States and the European Union have billions of dollars of trade-distorting processes that need to be addressed. He joked that the United States has been enjoying a lot of "policy space," equaling about $70 billion in trade-distorting measures. Capitol Hill has fully embraced liberalization, argued *Timothy Reif* of the Subcommittee on Trade, House Ways and Means. Trade fights are not over free trade, but about the *regulation* of free trade, such as labor laws and standards. Capitol Hill is receptive to additional agricultural market access, but reluctant to act before Europe does.

In the second panel, *Flavió Marega* from the Brazilian Foreign Ministry Dispute Settlement



Dorothy Dwoskin and Clodoaldo Hugueney

Division argued that the dispute settlement system has worked well over the years, but that implementation of dispute panel rulings is fundamentally flawed. Brazil has still not seen the implementation of its victory in the 2004 cotton case, which was brought to the dispute settlement body. *Gawain Kripke* of Oxfam America used the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) system to demonstrate the inherent inequities caused by trade. The case brought against the United States by Brazil, contesting cotton subsidies, showed that they were unsustainable under current trade rules. *David Palmeter* of Austin LLP noted that complaints have arisen regarding three perceived imperfections in the DSU: a drafting error in the rules governing the sequencing of events after a case is decided; a lack of court "remand authority"; and the premise of using sanctions as a way to coerce nations into compliance with rulings. *Jim Bacchus* of Greenberg Traurig LLP believed the issues of sequencing, remand, and third-party rights can be agreed upon in order to finish the review of dispute settlement.

In the third panel, *Gilberto Ayres Moreira* of Gaia Silva Rolim & Associados expressed concern for antidumping rules that no longer suit today's world economy, as planned economies have given way to transitional ones. *Lyle Vander Schaaf* of Bryan Cave LLP noted how the United States was a key advocate of strict enforcement of dispute resolutions, only to become the target of DSU actions more often than not. Measures to address injurious dumping have benefited developing



Akira Homma

countries more than developed countries, argued *Terence Stewart* of Stewart and Stewart. Small developing countries should be able to establish joint investigating bodies that receive WTO assistance to better protect their interests. *Dan Ikenson* of the Cato Institute explained existing problems, such as zeroing, the cost of litigation, and the fact that not all countries implement the antidumping provision. *Renê Medrado* of Pinheiro Neto Advogados advocated prohibiting zeroing, clarifying the nonattribution rule, and freeing exporters under investigation from undue burdens.

Political divergences prevail over convergences in Brazil–U.S. relations, *Ambassador Sergio Amaral* argued in the final panel. He expressed doubt that increased trade would ameliorate the relationship. *Whitney Debevoise* of Arnold and Porter LLP called for better economic relations, arguing that a bilateral tax treaty would set stable rules, prevent double taxation, and discourage tax evasion. According to *Susan Cronin* of the National Security Council, good bilateral relations do exist; she saw Brazil's anti-FTAA stance as the result of the country's lack of some form of preferential access to the U.S. market. Brazilian Ambassador to the United States *Roberto Abdenur* emphasized interest convergences and mutual efforts to find a common ground on the environment, security, and trade. He described Brazil's anti-FTAA stance at Mar del Plata more as a concerted effort to preserve the unity of Mercosul than as an attack on hemispheric trade liberalization.

On March 13, the Brazil Institute held a conference on Brazilian biotechnological accomplishments in the field of neglected tropical diseases. In recent years, Brazil has taken advantage of its public sector infrastructure and low-cost production to tackle the issue of poor health care, by investing heavily and soundly in health research and development to create and patent new vaccines, technologies, and health services to combat diseases that primarily affect the poor. Brazil is successfully pioneering the development of vaccines for tropical infectious diseases that are largely ignored by the international health community because of relatively small capital returns on investment.

Ciro de Quadros of the Sabin Institute described biotechnological efforts in developing a vaccine for the human papilova virus. A major obstacle to research and development of other vaccines is the lack of sizeable commercial markets to create incentives for financing by the pharmaceutical sector. Although the market for such vaccines is huge, the likely commercial payoffs are comparatively small. *Peter Hotez* argued that malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis, the "big three," receive all the attention from the international community while thirteen critical parasitic and bacterial diseases are often overlooked and understudied. These diseases mainly afflict the rural poor of low-income countries. There are numerous drugs that fight some of these neglected diseases, but new vaccines are needed to prevent resurgence and ensure eradication. He praised Brazil's public-private partnerships that are linking developing world initiatives with developed world resources, and which have been the "brains" behind the development of the vaccine for hookworm, an overlooked intestinal parasite that has caused serious health problems for Brazilian children, pregnant women, and the malnourished.

Isaias Raw of the Butantan Institute highlighted the need for investment within developing countries so that medicines are made available to the poor at affordable prices. According to the Brazilian Constitution, citizens are entitled to receive health care free of charge. For this to be feasible, the government must have access to affordable medicines, which basically means developing them locally. *Akira Homma* of Fiocruz's Bio-Manguinhos outlined the country's increasing vaccine production capacity. However, despite significant achievements, Brazil still suffers from a gap in technology development. Homma concluded by stressing the dire need for the developed world to free up technology and share it with the developing world at reasonable prices. ■

The International Relations of Latin America

The Latin American Program joined with the Fundación Daniel Chávez Morán and *Foreign Affairs en Español* to sponsor a May 15, 2006, workshop on the international relations of Latin America. The meeting, "Explaining Latin American Strategies and External Alliances," brought together foreign policy experts and practitioners from ten countries of the hemisphere to explore new ways of thinking about Latin America's place in the international system, the opportunities and challenges posed by economic integration and globalization, relations between countries in the region, and relations with the United States, Europe, and Asia.

Luis Maira, Chilean ambassador to Argentina, and historian *Carlos Pérez Llana*, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina, discussed various determinants of foreign policy, including the size of a country's economy, the existence or absence of oil or gas resources, levels of domestic poverty and inequality, and models of internal political organization such as social democracy or populism. *Juan Tokatlián*, Universidad de San Andrés, Argentina, *Rodrigo Pardo*, *El Tiempo*, Colombia, and *Ana María Sanjuan*, Universidad Central de Venezuela, assessed the costs and benefits of diverse strategies of accommodation, competition, and confrontation with the United States, noting growing ideological polarization in the region, the absence of models counterposed to neoliberalism, and the "nonheroic" nature of combining strategies of cooperation and resistance vis-à-vis the United States.

Wolf Grabendorff, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Chile, and *Riordan Roett*, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, discussed Latin America's relations with external actors China and Europe. Grabendorff disputed the notion that Europe functioned as a bloc interested in posing as a counterweight to U.S. influence in the region, while Roett addressed the implications of China's robust growth rates on its demand for Latin American resources such as iron, copper, aluminum, soybeans, and cotton.

Raúl Benítez Manaut, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and *Gustavo Fernández*, former foreign minister, Bolivia, discussed intra-regional dynamics, including Venezuela's and Brazil's possibilities for and interest in regional leadership, the implications for hemispheric solidarity of the stagnation of regional free trade talks, and the role of Latinos in the United States as a factor in regional power. They also discussed ways that the downsizing of the state has affected democratic governance in the region, weakening the state's capacity to ensure citizen security and uphold the rule of law.

In a final session on Latin America's insertion in the global economy, economists *Pedro da Motta Veiga*, EcoStrat Consultores, Brazil, and *Jaime Zabludovsky*, Inteligencia Comercial, Mexico, commented on the growing heterogeneity of patterns of global economic insertion, growing asymmetry between countries of the region, the existence of winners and losers in the process of economic liberalization, and a growing division in the region between those countries that had or sought free trade agreements with the United States and those that did not.

Additional participants in the workshop included: *Cynthia Arnson*, Woodrow Wilson Center, *Roberto Russell*, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Argentina, *Rafael Fernández de Castro*, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, *Daniel Chávez Morán*, Fundación Daniel Chávez Moran, Mexico, *Lilian Bobea*, FLACSO-Dominican Republic, *Fernando Cepeda*, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, *Gino Costa*, Instituto de Defensa Legal, Peru, *Luigi Einaudi*, former Under-Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, *Cynthia McClintock*, The George Washington University, and *Michael Shifter*, Inter-American Dialogue.

Papers commissioned on the basis of discussion at the workshop will be presented at a major conference in Mexico City in April 2007. ■

The Future of the Andean Region

Countries in the Andean region are experiencing an unprecedented period of political, economic, and social change. To examine these trends, on May 2, 2006, the Latin American Program hosted a seminar on "The Future of the Andean Region" with

Marcelo Giugale, Director of the Andean Region at The World Bank, and *Carol Wise*, Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California. Giugale identified three major trends that will occupy a new generation of political leaders in the region: (1) an irreversible process of political inclusion; (2) an irrepressible clamor for the better distribution of wealth; and (3) an inescapable macroeconomic discipline that economic integration is bringing to the region.

Giugale noted the region's long history of political exclusion, indicating that only after World War II were literacy, language, gender, and property requirements for voting eliminated in most countries. The last 20 years have witnessed an enormous democratic opening, well beyond representative democracy to participatory democracy. The biggest symbol of this trend is the increasing number of indigenous leaders holding political office at the national and local levels. In addition, policymaking has come to involve more public consultation and participation, through the process of decentralization. As a result, decision making is slower and more cumbersome, but policies are ultimately more sustainable, he said.

Turning to issues of poverty and inequality, Giugale identified several factors pulling the Andes towards greater equality and a decline in social tensions. First has been the collapse of fertility rates, from more than seven children per household to less than three. Second, a new appetite for the taxation of assets, particularly land and particularly at the municipal level, promises to provide a large source of revenue for governments. Finally, there is growing recognition that blanket subsidies redistribute wealth from the poor to the rich and efforts are being made to better target subsidies to the poor.

Although less than one percent of world trade takes place in the Andean region, Giugale argued that these countries are headed towards greater economic integration. This trend is bringing greater macroeconomic discipline to Andean countries, improving the quality of private business environments, and reducing government corruption and red tape. Although competition from China hinders the development of certain Andean exports such as textiles and light manufacturing, he said, countries of the Andean region have the benefit of existing preferential access to the U.S. market as well as the possibility of concluding free trade agreements.

Marcelo Guigale

Wise commented that the trend towards greater political inclusion is indeed positive and hopeful. She added, however, that this trend is not only a response to the history of exclusion in the region but is also a response to the failure to sustain economic reform and improve economic performance over the past twenty years. She argued that governments in the region need to "get serious" about reform at the micro level. She added that the redistribution of wealth will require greater political will and the forging of a coalition for reform, not just economic integration. The macroeconomic discipline described by Giugale can be attributed more to modernizing influences than to integration, Wise argued. In fact, she pointed out that there is a lack of discussion and debate about the distributional benefits of free trade agreements with the United States.

During the discussion, Giugale added that the economic reform agenda referred to as the "Washington Consensus" was never intended to solve the problems of poverty and inequality. Rather, it was a mistake of the World Bank to view this set of reform policies as a substitute for progressive social policy and social assistance programs. He added that it is the fault of political leaders and the media for not explaining the benefits and shortcomings of free trade agreements with the United States as well as what would happen in the absence of such an agreement.

Asked about strategies to reduce inequality, Giugale mentioned programs to reduce fertility; geographically targeted, conditional cash-transfer programs; and subsidies for child care, to facilitate a second wage earner in poor families. ■

NAFTA and the Future of Trade Governance

The Woodrow Wilson Center's Canada Institute and the Mexico Institute hosted a half-day conference on March 13, 2006, to discuss trade policymaking in North America in the context of emerging trends in global trade governance. When Canada, Mexico, and the United States negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) a little more than a decade ago, it was greeted as the most ambitious and comprehensive trade deal ever to have been signed. Trade governance has evolved significantly since the ratification of NAFTA, but the agreement itself has been left essentially untouched. NAFTA's rigidity is largely a result of its design: the negotiators eschewed any mechanisms within the treaty to consider changes or opportunities for reconsidering certain clauses. *Louis Bélanger*, a visiting professor at John Hopkins University and former Wilson Center fellow, stated that they "failed to endow the NAFTA with even minimal political life of its own."

The immediate consequence of this "delegation deficit," however, has been the growing pressure on the existing dispute settlement mechanism. *Gustavo Vega* of El Colegio de México argued that the treaty's mechanisms for resolving trade disputes had worked reasonably well in the beginning of and throughout the 1990s; however, the Mexico-U.S. sugar case of the late 1990s proved a turning point: the United States initially refused to appoint panelists, thus stalling the conflict resolution process. Meanwhile, the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber dispute has dragged on interminably, undermining the credibility and legitimacy of the mechanisms at hand. Nonetheless, *Sidney Weintraub* of the Center for Strategic and International Studies cautioned against presuming that any reconsideration of NAFTA or certain parts of the treaty would necessarily lead to improvements: "Do not underestimate protectionist tendencies in the United States." Recent calls by leading Mexican politicians from across the political spectrum to revisit the agricultural chapter of NAFTA may prove to be appealing campaign rhetoric, but they pointlessly risk raising expectations, he argued. *Mark Nguyen* of Bryan Cave LLP noted that in contrast to NAFTA, the World Trade Organization has a robust "gap-filling" mechanism, which ensures an evolving set of rules and regulations that can be modified as needed. Nguyen indicated, for instance, that rules governing intellectual property rights were amended for the least developed countries by way of a WTO ministerial.

The discussion highlighted the growing trend in trade negotiations toward either bilateral or multilateral deals at the expense of regional agreements such as NAFTA. *Robert Wolfe* of Queens University argued that once trade issues are dealt with multilaterally, there often remains insufficient "critical mass" to support further negotiations at a regional level. Furthermore, if specific issues cannot be resolved multilaterally or regionally (such as, for instance, agricultural subsidies), there may not be enough issues remaining to structure an efficient give-and-take for striking a future agreement. Where such trade-offs can occur, countries tend to opt for select bilateral deals. The United States, for instance, has adopted a dual strategy of pursuing bilateral free trade agreements alongside its multilateral diplomacy at the Doha round. Mexico, Chile, and others in the hemisphere have also aggressively pursued bilateral free trade agreements. *Maryse Robert* of the Organization of American States expressed concern that the resulting web of bilateral trade agreements has essentially undermined the prospects for a hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas.

Panelists also addressed how NAFTA can be made more easily adaptable to new trade issues and a changing political environment. One way is to consider changes limited to specific sectors. *Donald Mackay* of Carleton University and Weintraub each argued that deep-seated political obstacles would prevent NAFTA from evolving into a full-fledged customs union. Yet the benefits of a customs union can possibly be achieved through "bilateral or unilateral initiatives." Mackay suggested that the most promising sector that could reap the benefits of such harmonized tariffs would be the auto sector,

but panelists agreed that the onus would be on Mexico and Canada to move unilaterally in this direction. Despite this, *Isabel Studer* of the North American Commission on Labor pointed out that the benefits to the North American auto industry would be limited because of a host of additional non-tariff barriers and regulatory impediments. ■

Brazil Institute Awards Dinner and Public Policy Scholars

On June 1, 2006, the Brazil Institute hosted the Woodrow Wilson Awards dinner in São Paulo, Brazil—the first time the prestigious awards ceremony has been held in South America. *Ruy Mesquita*, Director of *O Estado de S. Paulo*, received the Award for Public Service, and *Maurício Botelho*, CEO of Embraer S.A., received the Award for Corporate Citizenship in São Paulo, Brazil. Former *Presidents José Sarney* and *Fernando Henrique Cardoso* were honorary dinner co-chairs. Over 300 guests attended the ceremony, including São Paulo *Governor Claudio Lembo* and São Paulo *Mayor Gilberto Kassab*. The objective of the dinner was to acknowledge that the Brazil Project had matured into the Brazil Institute, reflecting its increased importance and enhancing its ability to support research, specialized programming, and scholars.

The Brazil Institute housed three scholars over the last year, who researched political leadership, participatory institutions, and higher education reforms. Duke University associate professor of history *John D. French* was a Woodrow Wilson fellow from September 2005 to May 2006. During this time, French worked on his book manuscript entitled "The Origin of Brazil's Lula: Building Movements in a World in Flux, 1950-1980," in which he examines leadership, consciousness, and mobilization among metalworkers in the ABC region of São Paulo. French explored the origins of the unexpected metalworkers strikes between 1978 and 1980, which catapulted a 32-year-old union president to international prominence and thus launched the career of Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva. He researched the historical trajectory of ABC's workers, both before and during the military regime that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985, in order to better understand Lula's leadership

Leonardo Avritzer

capabilities and the self-fashioning that generated a public persona that has decisively shaped the country's politics for more than a quarter century. In each of his four presidential campaigns, Lula gained increasing recognition and admiration for his ethics, policymaking, and pragmatic, consensus-building political style. Yet it was his unique profile, French argues, based on an admirable rise out of dire poverty and, later, courage in the face of the military dictatorship, that would underlie the growth of his electoral appeal from 3 percent of the national vote in 1982 to an unprecedented 63 percent in 2002, when he was elected Brazil's first working-class president.

Leonardo Avritzer, associate professor of political science at the Universidade Federal University de Minas Gerais, was a Woodrow Wilson Center public policy scholar from February to April 2006. Avritzer used his time at the Center to finish his forthcoming book, "Participatory Institutions and Multi-Centered Citizenship in Brazil," in which he seeks to answer the following two questions: What are the requisite conditions for the emergence and success of participatory institutions? And, what are the variables that account for their different results within the same country? Avritzer introduces a comparative framework to evaluate the conditions for the emergence, expansion, and success of Brazil's new participatory institutions. He decenters the discussion from Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting by analyzing cases in other cities, such as São Paulo, Salvador, and Belo

Horizonte, and by adding two other participatory institutions to the debate: health councils and city master plans. Following his analysis of Brazilian cases, Avritzer concluded that participatory institutions require three overlapping conditions for this exercise in citizenship and good governance to be successful, implying that variation in design and implementation is needed on a case-by-case basis. Success is based upon a city's civil society organization, the willingness of its political parties to implement participatory policies, and the nature of the institutional design in each one of these areas.

Associate professor of political science at the Universidade de São Paulo and Fulbright New Century Scholar *Elizabeth Balbachevsky* was a public policy scholar from July to August 2006. Her research focused on higher education in Brazil and other developing countries, and the new demands of globalization that have provoked intense pressure for institutional reform. Since the 1990s, universities in emerging countries have been expected to deliver not just credentials, but also quality instruction, research experience, and access to international networks. The reform experiences of these countries, she found, have often borrowed extensively from the reform experiences of the developed world. However, she argued that the diffusion of these new values cannot be viewed as a simple transplantation or importation, but rather as a process of reconstruction and negotiation on the local level between reformers and other state and societal stakeholders to successfully mesh with the prior institutional framework and address new societal expectations. Balbachevsky's work analyzed the higher education reform process to explore the impact of such reforms on the work conditions of academic professionals. Such analysis is intended to shed light on the future of the academic profession and explain Brazil's and the rest of the developing world's response to the global challenges of the 21st century. ■

Colombia's Peace Processes: Multiple Negotiations, Multiple Actors

On March 27, 2006, the Latin American Program held a seminar on Colombia's efforts to negotiate peace with different armed actors—the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). U.S. and Colombian government officials, a senior representative of Colombia's Catholic Church, and two distinguished Colombian analysts discussed various sides of the controversy surrounding the Uribe government's talks with paramilitary groups, the likelihood that negotiations with the ELN would bear fruit, and the as-yet unsuccessful effort to broker a humanitarian exchange with the FARC.

Military analyst *Alfredo Rangel Suárez*, president of the Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, said that negotiations with the AUC had brought the country significantly closer to peace. He said that much of the criticism of the AUC process had been unfair, noting that the paramilitaries were at the height of their military, political, and economic power when negotiations with the government began. Rangel defended the legislative framework for demobilization, the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, as imposing more stringent conditions for demobilization than any other previous peace process in Colombia; had sentences for paramilitary criminals been more severe, the negotiations would have failed. Demobilizing some 90 percent of the AUC's military structure was not enough, however. Rangel argued that their mafia-like economic, social, and political networks remain intact, and that eradicating their organized crime structures poses a significant challenge for Colombia's weak and precarious judicial system.



David Henifin and Jaime Bermúdez

Padre Darío Echeverri, secretary-general of the National Conciliation Commission, member of the Peace Commission of the Catholic Church, and a key figure in talks with the ELN and the FARC, said that, despite movement in peace talks between the government and the ELN, many among the ELN's rank and file as well as their social base remain unconvinced that negotiations are desirable. In meetings with the ELN, Church

officials have emphasized the advantages of talking with the government, stressing the possibilities of working for structural change through peaceful means. In attempting to convince the ELN of the desirability of negotiations, Echeverri said that Church officials had offered the help of the Vatican in exploring with the international community ways by which the ELN could end its designation as an international terrorist organization.

Echeverri said that the government's acceptance of a proposal by Switzerland, Spain, and France for a humanitarian accord with the FARC represented a change in the government's position; although the government has rejected the FARC's demand for a demilitarization of the departments of Caquetá and Putumayo as a precondition for peace talks, it has accepted a proposal for a small demilitarized zone in order to facilitate an exchange of hostages held by the FARC for FARC prisoners held by the government. FARC communiqués, meanwhile, have called dialogue with the Uribe government "impossible" as long as it characterizes the insurgents as a narcoterrorist organization and continues to treat protest as a criminal activity.

León Valencia, a columnist for *El Tiempo* and a former ELN combatant, said that the proliferation of left-leaning governments in South America and the left's electoral successes at the municipal level in Colombia had fostered a new attitude toward negotiations within the ELN, highlighting political rather than military action as a way to seek change. At the same time, the opportunity to sit down with ELN commanders helped the government politically by demonstrating that it was talking not just with the

Junior Scholars in the Study of Democracy in Latin America

With the goal of stimulating innovative work among relatively junior members of the academic profession, the Latin American Program, with support from the Ford Foundation, has sponsored a fellowship competition entitled "Junior Scholars in the Study of Democracy in Latin America," soliciting research proposals related to issues of citizenship and rights, poverty and inequality, reforms of the state, representation and accountability, and local government. Last year we conducted the initial round of the competition and after the overwhelming response and success of the first year, it was determined that the competition would be re-opened for a second year. This summer we received over 60 applications from 15 countries and we are pleased to announce the following eight grantees: *Alejandro Bonvecchi*, "Political Determinants of Legislative Budgetary Oversight: Political Competitiveness and Party Cohesion in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico," (Argentina); *Alberto Föhrig*, "Segmented Professionalism in Argentine Political Parties," (Argentina); *Macarena Gómez-Barris*, "The Place of Villa Grimaldi in Chile's Democracy: Citizenship, Memory and Public Space," (United States); *Juliet Hooker*, "The Institutional Design of *Costeño* Regional Autonomy and Relations between Indigenous and Afro-descendant Groups in Nicaragua," (Nicaragua); *José Antonio Lucero*, "Decolonizing Democracy: Lessons from Bolivia and Peru," (United States); *Juan Pablo Luna*, "A Lost Battle? Building Programmatic Party-Voter Linkages in Contemporary Latin America," (Uruguay); *Luciana Ferreira Tatagiba*, "Participação e reforma do Estado: Sobre a arquitetura da participação em São Paulo, Brasil," (Brazil); and *Brett Troyan*, "The Elaboration of a New Language of Citizenship: The Experience of the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca in Southwestern Colombia, 1971 – 1991," (United States). The grantees will convene in Santiago, Chile, in February 2007 to present the drafts of their papers to the members of the evaluation committee, *Guillermo O'Donnell* of the University of Notre Dame, *Joseph S. Tulchin* of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and *Augusto Varas* of the Ford Foundation. The final versions of the papers from both rounds of the competition will be published in a comprehensive volume at the end of 2007.



Father Darío Echeverri

AUC but also with the guerrillas. The agendas of the ELN and the government remain widely divergent, however, with the government wishing to move rapidly toward an end to hostilities and the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the guerrillas looking for negotiations on an ambitious agenda of political and social reform. Although the parties remain deeply divided, Valencia argued, certain factors favor the negotiations, including the fact that the ELN has not been deeply involved in narcotrafficking. Valencia echoed Rangel in noting that dismantling paramilitarism went far beyond the demobilization of combatants and included addressing drug trafficking networks, political penetration at the local level, and growing economic power, particularly in the rural sector.

Jaime Bermúdez, Office of the Presidency, Colombia, and a close advisor to President Uribe, compared the sheer numbers of guerrillas and paramilitaries—some 50,000 including militias—to the approximately 1,000 combatants of Northern Ireland's IRA and Spain's ETA. Uribe inherited a situation in which Colombia suffered upwards of 30,000 homicides per year, thousands of kidnappings, and scores of massacres. During the economic crisis of 1999, GDP contracted by 9 percent and unemployment rose to a staggering 20 percent. The government thus needed to rebuild confidence in security as well as economic terms. Uribe's democratic security policy was aimed at establishing military superiority over internal armed groups, while responding generously to those wishing to demobilize and reenter society.

Noting the demobilization of some 28,000 members of the AUC by the end of March 2006, Bermúdez said that the number of arms relinquished by combatants compared favorably with the ratio of demobilized combatants to weapons in previous demobilizations of guerrilla groups. He warned that paramilitary influence in the Congress as a result of the March 2006 legislative elections should not be exaggerated, and pointed to several instances of the defeat of candidates with symbolic links to the AUC. Bermúdez reiterated that government policy regarding a humanitarian exchange with the ELN and FARC had become more flexible. The government no longer insisted on a prior cease-fire, but did insist that FARC or ELN members released from prison either enter the government's reinsertion program or relocate to a third country, but not return to the guerrilla movement.

David Henifin, deputy director for Andean Affairs, U.S. Department of State, called the peace process a key element of Colombia's transformation, emphasizing the advances in demobilizing the AUC even while the guerrilla conflict continued. He called the AUC process "complicated and unprecedented" as well as imperfect; even though the AUC has been deeply involved in drug trafficking and other criminal activities, the Justice and Peace Law approved in 2005 provides a workable framework for AUC demobilization and reintegration. Henifin echoed concerns raised by the OAS Mission in Colombia regarding the appearance of new paramilitary groups and their continued involvement in violence and criminal activities, adding that human rights concerns are a core issue in the U.S.-Colombian relationship

Henfin described the FARC as a terrorist organization subsisting on income from drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion, and called attention to the U.S. Attorney General's March 2006 indictment of 50 top FARC leaders on drug trafficking charges. As a result of the government's military initiatives, Henifin said, the FARC is no longer the threat it once was and younger leaders have lost their ideological edge. Meanwhile, Henifin described the ELN, the "smallest and weakest" of the armed groups, as perhaps best placed to transform itself from a terrorist into a political organization. ■

Public Security in Latin America

Democratic transitions in Latin America have given rise to a number of complex dilemmas for the interaction between a country's forces of law and order and its civilian population. As democratic values take root, citizens are demanding greater accountability and transparency from a sector of society that has traditionally rejected institutional reform, often leading to mutual feelings of distrust. At the same time, perceptions of increased crime and violence have created an environment of insecurity in the region. Throughout the spring and summer of 2006, the Latin American Program conducted a series of public meetings related to issues of citizen security and the urgent reform that is necessary for the region if it is to call itself truly democratic.

In Brazil in particular, high income and racial inequality, low youth employment, weak judicial institutions, tenuous police-community relations, and citizen insecurity has led to growing concern about the loss of human and social capital. On April 28, 2006, the Brazil Institute organized a panel to analyze causes of Brazil's extreme urban crime and violence, and to discuss possible solutions.

Claudio Beato, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, argued that police reform and targeted policing are needed to better address Brazil's severe crime and violence. Of Belo Horizonte's 110 *favelas* (urban shantytowns), six are subject to the vast majority of crime and violence that occurs within the city. The state must increase its crime tracking capabilities and redirect its security forces to selectively target those areas suffering from and causing the majority of urban crimes. These changes involve extensive police reform, from decentralizing responsibility to rearranging police units by geographic area and embracing community policing procedures. *Luis Bitencourt*, National Defense University and former director of the Brazil Project at the Wilson Center, argued that Brazil is afflicted by a perverse socialization in which the rule of law is undermined as criminals are trusted more than state agents, and security forces systematically violate the law. Likewise, Brazil's criminal justice system is fragmented and inefficient. Crimes are thus committed with virtual impunity, decreasing the cost-benefit ratio of refraining from engaging in criminal activity out of fear of being caught and punished. Academic answers do little to change the reality of life in Brazil, he argued, unless politicians pledge their influence and support to tackling this social problem.

The serious economic and social situation in Brazil's cities cannot be separated from the issues of crime and violence, claimed *Bernice Van Bronkhorst* of the World Bank. The best way to ameliorate living conditions of the urban poor and those living in marginalized neighborhoods is to learn from success stories, such as Beato's "hot spot" initiatives, "crime and grime" slum upgrading projects, urban design renovations, and implementation of dry laws that prevent the sale of alcohol after a certain hour. Such measures help bring the state into Brazil's crime-infested neighborhoods in a nonviolent way, through support services and social programs. Commentary by *John D. French*, Duke University and Wilson Center fellow, expanded the debate from traditional crime-fighting techniques to alternative police responses, targeted policing, police-community partnerships, the role of politicians and the mass media in exacerbating fear, and the critical need for strong political will to decrease violence and citizens' sense of insecurity. The contribution of police ineffectiveness, brutality, and impunity to the situation of extreme urban crime and violence in Brazil must not be

Daniel Wilkinson, Laurie Freeman, and Eric Olson



Lilian Bobea

overlooked, emphasized French. There exists an intense rivalry between the civilian and military police forces in Brazil. Each unit has developed its own culture, élan, and institutional mindset, which has made them highly distrustful of one another and has led to a lack of cooperation that detracts from the police's ability to prevent crime and effectively bring criminals to justice.

On June 9, 2006, the Mexico Institute and the Washington Office on Latin America hosted a conference to address pending challenges in public security, human rights, and the rule of law, particularly in terms of what the future holds for the incoming president, who will be faced with reforming Mexico's law enforcement and criminal justice systems to address crime and impunity more effectively. *Mariclaire Acosta*, Organization of American States; *Eric Olson*, Amnesty International; *Gabriela Pérez*, independent consultant; *Sigrid Arzt*, Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad; *Ana Paula Hernández*, Centro de Derechos Humanos Tlachinollan; *Laurie Freeman*, Washington Office on Latin America; and *Daniel Wilkinson*, Human Rights Watch, participated in the debate. Panelists emphasized that while the Fox administration has advanced in addressing concerns related to public security, many challenges still face the Mexican government in order to achieve a judicial system that is both trustworthy and respectful of human rights. Mexico needs institutions based on the rule of law that guarantee civil, political, economic, and social rights before it can be deemed fully democratic. Panelists urged Mexico's next president to address long-standing problems of police and prosecutorial corruption, abuse, and inefficiency by changing institutional design and eliminating key incentives for misconduct. As it is now, the panelists viewed Mexico as a limited democracy with deficiencies in three main areas: the application of the law, the relationship between state institutions and citizens, and access to justice.

On July 16, 2005, members of the Citizen Security Project research teams from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Peru met in Lima to discuss the findings from the most recent stage of the project, funded by the Open Society Institute. Over the past ten years the project has examined public policies that address crime and violence, focusing on mechanisms that increase citizen participation and improve the relationship between the police and the communities they serve as well as investigating issues of police reform and the impact of media on the perception of crime. In a half-day closed meeting, they presented evaluation and analysis of government and community initiatives that empower citizens and diminish perceptions of insecurity, identifying inefficiencies and sharing successful experiences. The members of the research team and the initiatives and neighborhoods evaluated included: *Julia Pomares* (Argentina), Senderos Seguros and government-sponsored security forums in Buenos Aires; *Andrea Silveira* (Brazil), Fica Vivo, Conselho Comunitário de Segurança Pública (CONSEPS), and Integração e Gestão de Segurança Pública (IGESP); *Vielka Polanco* (Dominican Republic), Plan de Seguridad Democrática: Programa Barrio Seguro, La Comunidad Participa en la Prevención del Conflicto: Programa de Educación Ciudadana, and Plan de Seguridad Democrática: Programa de Capacitación en Dignidad Humana; *Gabriel Prado* (Peru), San Juan Bautista en Huamanga, Ayacucho, San Martín de Porres, Lima, and San Juan de Lurigancho; *Guillermo Fernández* (Chile), el Centro "Nuevo Lican Ray," Programa Comuna Segura Compromiso 100, and La Pincoya.

On July 17, the group shared these findings in a public forum cosponsored with the Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) in Lima. The audience included over 160 members of the national police force training to lead citizen security units throughout Peru as well as city mayors, members of grassroots organizations, and journalists. The session featured presentations by *Lucia Dammert*, coordinator of the

Programa Seguridad y Ciudadanía of FLACSO–Chile; *Claudio Beato*, director of the Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública of the Universidade Federal de Minais Gerais in Brazil; *Alberto Föhrig*, professor of political science at the Universidad de San Andrés in Argentina; and *Lilian Bobea*, professor and researcher at FLACSO–Dominican Republic. *Catalina Smulovitz*, professor of political science at the Universidad Torcuato di Tella in Argentina, offered a comparative analysis of the country studies, followed by commentary by *Joseph Tulchin*, Woodrow Wilson Center senior scholar; *Gino Costa*, senior researcher at IDL; and *Col. José Villar Amiel*, director of the Escuela Superior de Policía. The meeting closed with a rigorous dialogue between members of the police force and panelists in which they considered lessons that could be drawn from the experiences of other countries. ■

Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies

On April 18, 2006, the Latin American Program hosted *Enrique Peruzzotti* for the launch of his newly released book *Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New Latin American Democracies,* coedited with Catalina Smulovitz. Woodrow Wilson Center fellow *Felipe Agüero* of the University of Miami and public policy scholar *Leonardo Avritzer* of the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais joined the discussion as commentators.

The book argues that civil society in many newly transitioned Latin American democracies uses mechanisms of social accountability when institutional methods of vertical and horizontal accountability—such as elections—fail to function correctly. Social accountability includes informal methods employed by the media, civic organizations, and ordinary citizens to monitor elected authorities and hold them responsible for their behavior. Electoral monitoring, investigative reporting, mass protests, and the prosecution of official misconduct are all instruments of promoting social accountability.



Enrique Peruzzotti

Prevailing theories of democracy in Latin America are largely pessimistic, Peruzzotti maintained. They emphasize how authoritarian legacies shape political practices and lead to "delegative democracies," in which elected authorities are only minimally accountable to citizens. Peruzzotti suggested that these approaches overlook perhaps the most significant innovation in Latin American democracies: the rise of an autonomous civil society capable of questioning, monitoring, and critiquing public authorities. Despite the institutional failings of many Latin American democracies, emergent civil society actors are playing a decisive role in compensating for weak institutions through civic action.

The appearance of non-governmental organizations, social movements, and investigative journalism reflects a change in the political culture of the region. These informal, noninstitutional actors signal a sophisticated citizenry demanding more from their relationships with political authorities. Although they all take on the role of "social watchdog," NGOs tend to lobby behind the scenes on specific issues whereas social movements often develop around victims of the "unrule of law" and, particularly, human rights violations. These groups use social accountability to force politicians into action by raising the political cost of not responding to citizen demands. If public authorities fail to respond, this healthy criticism of government can turn into a general distrust of representatives or even an antipolitical movement. However, the most successful cases are those that are able to generate

institutional change, illustrated in the reform of the Mexican Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) by the civil society organization, Alianza Cívica.

According to *Felipe Agüero,* Peruzzotti's book raises the visibility of actors engaged in new forms of accountability and citizenship in a field of study that has primarily measured the quality of democracy in Latin America through the effectiveness of horizontal and electoral accountability. This is not to say that these mechanisms are not important; in fact, instruments of horizontal accountability must be activated at the same time as those of social accountability in order to counter the weaknesses inherent in both. Agüero also warned that while media mobilization may be a growing tool to combat deficits of accountability, the media itself must be a target of scrutiny. Finally, it would be useful to look at cases of political and legal change in Latin American countries, to see how social actors had influenced these changes; this might help to reveal some of the hidden cases in which social and political actors are mutually engaged with each other to achieve important reforms.

Leonardo Avritzer commended the book for helping to redefine the debate on the quality of democracy in Latin America and dispel the myth that accountability has ebbed in the region. Social actors now act as catalysts for horizontal mechanisms of accountability between election years, when accountability has tended to sink to its lowest levels. They also raise the visibility of certain issues that are at the "heart of political life in new democracies." Avritzer emphasized the increasingly popular use of the judicial realm to resolve issues that might normally be solved through violent or nonlegal means, particularly drawing on the experiences of small claims courts in Brazil. This concept of "judicialization," combined with the concepts of mobilization and "mediazation" explored in the book, all converge to bring a more equilibrated view of pressing issues for Latin American democracies. ■

Poverty and Social Inclusion in Argentina

On May 30, 2006, the Latin American Program's Argentina Project joined with the Fundación Grupo Sophia in Buenos Aires to co-sponsor a conference on "Inclusion and Social Policy in Argentina." The seminar was aimed at exploring the challenges to social integration posed by poverty and unemployment, and at generating public policy proposals to effectively address these issues. Participants included journalist *Martin Di Natale* of *Diario La Nación*, *Mariano Martínez de Ibarreta* of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, *Gabriel Kessler* of the Universidad de San Andrés, *Jessica Malegarie* of the Fundación Grupo Sophia, *Silvina Gvirtz* of the Universidad de San Andrés, *Eduardo Amadeo* of *Observatorio Social*, and *Ernesto Kritz* of the Universidad de San Andrés.

Panelists described inequalities in social inclusion in Argentina as far-reaching and in need of comprehensive, multi-dimensional responses. Effective policy to address social inclusion should take into account multiple factors, such as wage disparities between the formal and informal sectors, as well as access to justice, education, and employment.

A first panel on "Rethinking Policies for Social Inclusion" emphasized the need for principles of social justice to underlie public policy. The 1990s witnessed a number of important changes: the increase in the intensity of Argentine poverty (even while overall poverty rates declined); the concentration of poverty in greater Buenos Aires; and the instability of employment, creating conditions of transitory poverty. Given this "new social configuration," panelists concluded that policy initiatives should distinguish between "the nucleus" of those in chronic poverty, and those experiencing transitory poverty. Complicating the formation of public policy is that reliable and comprehensive information on poverty and inequality is lacking, making it difficult to capture their full scope.

In relating poverty and inequality to social justice, panelists emphasized broader considerations such as respect for diversity, access to justice, the provision of services, recognition of excluded groups, and extending basic rights of citizenship.

Panelists discussed the economic crisis of 2001-2002 and its aftermath, highlighting the drop in worker salaries following the devaluation of the peso, the growth of the informal labor sector, and related social problems such as the rise of drug use among street children. Programs such as *Plan Jefes de Hogar* have had only limited success in addressing the effects of the crisis. Moreover, significant

improvement in macro-economic indicators since 2003 has not been sufficient to overcome the damage suffered by excluded groups. For example, although the Argentine unemployment rate has decreased since 2001, it still hovers around 11 percent, according to official estimates. To address problems of exclusion, panelists underscored the state's responsibility to provide direct assistance and also to create equal access to opportunity in order to develop human potential.

Participants on the second panel argued that Argentina is experiencing a crisis in education similar to that of the 1970s, noting the disparities inherent in the continuing privatization of the education system. Related to the crisis in education is the fact that impoverishment since the 1990s has disproportionately affected children, producing a cycle of poverty that state policy must help to break.

In discussing Argentina's labor market, panelists noted disparities in the quality of employment, the vast expansion of the informal sector, and the difficulties in extending the reach of the social security system. Although the official unemployment rate is down, the informal labor sector represents some 50 percent of the total workforce; workers in the informal sector receive lower salaries (about 52 percent of salaries in the formal sector), have low access to credit, and are not enrolled in the social security system. Fully two-thirds of informal workers live below the poverty line. Panelists argued that Argentina's minimum wage should not depend solely on employment, but rather should be viewed as a mechanism for increased social inclusion and decreased vulnerability in general. ■

The Elections in Peru

On April 9, 2006, Peru held its second democratic election since former President Alberto Fujimori fled the country in 2000 amidst a burgeoning corruption scandal. Fujimori's attempt to return to Peru, coupled with public opinion polls showing retired military officer Ollanta Humala running ahead of center-right candidate Lourdes Flores and former President Alan García, made these elections a pivotal event in the changing political landscape of the Andean region and of Latin America as a whole.

Julio Carrión

Carlos Basombrío of Capital Humano y Social, S.A., situated the Peruvian presidential election within three broad contexts during a public meeting sponsored by the Latin American Program on April 5, 2006. First, he said, although the nation's economy had grown over the last five years, the reduction in poverty has been minimal and has even accentuated the gap between those regions experiencing growth and those that had not. Second, distrust in politicians and in the institutions of democracy is deeply engrained among the electorate, leading voters to look for a political outsider running against the system. Finally, following the apparent military defeat of Sendero Luminoso in the early 1990s, there was no serious effort to address the consequences of the war or its socioeconomic roots. Rather than repudiate *fujimorismo* and the corruption and authoritarianism it had represented, candidates concerned themselves with vying for the *fujimorista* vote.

Basombrío indicated that there was almost a perfect correlation between the regions and social sectors that had supported Fujimori and those backing Ollanta Humala. Humala, who was relatively unknown six months prior to the election, is a retired lieutenant colonel who comes from a long line of military officers. Over time, his family developed an ideology known as *etnocacerismo*, an ethnonationalist movement that Basombrío described as combining xenophobia,



Carlos Basombrío

racial superiority, militarism, ultranationalism, violence, and utterly archaic economic planning (including, for example, a proposal to do away with money). Since late 2005, Humala has made efforts to distance himself from the more controversial positions of other family members (including a proposal to kill homosexuals), espousing a "light" version of *etnocacerismo*. Basombrío also noted that Humala has been credibly accused of carrying out torture, murder, and disappearances during military operations against Sendero Luminoso.

According to *Julio Carrión*, professor of political science at the University of Delaware, Peru's campaign for the presidency was not a national race, but rather a collection of regional competitions revealing deep cleavages based on wealth and race. While Flores was leading in Lima, where 38 percent of the electorate resides, Humala was polling moderately well in the capital and also led the polls in virtually all of Peru's rural areas. Carrión underscored the volatility of public opinion as measured in major polls, noting that in April 2005 Ollanta enjoyed only 5 percent support. Support for Flores, originally the frontrunner, had declined while support for former president García had slowly risen. According to Carrión, polling data also revealed clear polarization along class lines, with the middle class constituting a large portion of swing voters. He pointed to a correlation between the waning popularity of former interim president Valentín Paniagua and the rise in support for Humala, who also benefited from Flores' waning numbers.

Carrión emphasized that questions of motivation constituted a major difference between supporters of Flores and García and those of Humala. Voters overwhelmingly preferred the actual proposals made by Flores or García, but Humala had double the support of the other two when it came to questions about the candidate's vision for Peru. Voters, Carrión concluded, connect with Humala at a symbolic level, something related to his role as outsider.

Regardless of who eventually wins the presidency, Basombrío asserted that the new administration must concentrate its efforts on reducing poverty, reforming the political system, and ending violence by Sendero Luminoso. ■



Mary Walshok, Rodrigo Gutiérrez Sández, Governor Eugenio Elorduy, and Malin Burnham

Cultural Dynamics and Future Innovative Prospects for the U.S.-Mexican Border

The U.S.-Mexico border is one of the most challenging regions for bilateral policymaking and a fertile arena for creative innovation. To address particular interest in the border region, the Mexico Institute held two conferences to discuss the cultural and social elements of the border, as well as its economic and competitive prospects. On April 7, 2006, the Mexico Institute and the Mexican Cultural Institute welcomed *Dr. José Manuel Valenzuela Arce*, professor at El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, to speak on how those who live at the border interpret and reinterpret culture and society in the space where the two countries meet. Through the use of different artistic expressions from as early as the turn of the century, Valenzuela captured the ways in which people have viewed the border. He noted that people who live along the border have converted the dual identity of living between two worlds into a positive asset by creating a series of hybrid cultural expressions that combine Mexican and U.S. symbols. Through these fusions of culture, expressed through sculpture, painting, music, and language, a means of communication between the two cultures is formed. The presumption that the border is culturally deprived is slowly being disproved as awareness grows about its unique transnational culture. Valenzuela predicted that, due to economic hardships and violence in Latin American countries, the trend of

Vanguardia Latina: Visions for the Hemisphere

On May 3-5, 2006, the Latin American Program and Mexico Institute participated in "Espacio USA: Vanguardia Latina," the first of what will be an annual event sponsored by the Mexican television network Televisa. The Washington, D.C., conference, cosponsored by the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), the Wilson Center's Latin American Program, and the Inter-American Development Bank, brought together Latin American and U.S. Latino university students to promote leadership, discuss Latin American identity, and exchange visions for the hemisphere. For three days the Inter-American Development bank hosted over 100 students representing a range of countries and universities. They participated in bilingual panels and seminars to address a variety of issues including the influence of Spanish and Latino culture in the United States, Latin American identity, constructing a Latin American-U.S. agenda, Latin American empowerment, and realities of Latin American migrants. Notable speakers ranged from leaders in government to media celebrities, including *Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice*; Univisión news anchor *Jorge Ramos*; NPR's *Maria Hinojosa*; *Luis Alberto Moreno*, president of the Inter-American Development Bank; U.S. Ambassador to Mexico *Tony Garza*; former Bolivian President *Carlos D. Mesa*; Governor of the Mexican state of Nuevo León, *José Natividad González Parás*; *Monica Lozano*, publisher and CEO of *La Opinión* newspaper; Mexico Institute advisory board members *Andrés Rozental*, president of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, and *María Echaveste*, former White House Deputy Chief of Staff; and *Thomas Shannon*, Assistant Secretary of State. Latin American program director *Cynthia Arnson* and Mexico Institute director *Andrew Selee* also participated on panels. The Organization of American States hosted the closing ceremony, which culminated with a performance by U.S./Mexican singer *Lila Downs*.

seeking better opportunities by migrating to more developed countries will continue.

On May 23, 2006, the Mexico Institute hosted leaders of the political and business communities of the San Diego-Baja California region to participate in "Borderless Innovation: Catalyzing the Competitiveness of the San Diego-Baja California Region." The seminar brought attention to the first major report to come out of "Borderless Innovation," the San Diego Dialogue's Crossborder Innovation and Competitiveness Initiative. In partnership with CENTRIS, a nonprofit economic development program, and the educational institution CICESE, San Diego Dialogue conducted research over the past eighteen months to identify "clusters of opportunity" that have the potential to help the San Diego-Baja California region reshape its economic relationship and enhance its competitiveness in the global economy. San Diego mayor *Jerry Sanders* and Baja California governor *Eugenio Elorduy* offered comments along with *Mary L. Walshok*, vice chancellor at the University of California, San Diego, and *Rodrigo Gutiérrez Sández,* director of CENTRIS, who presented the report. *Daniel Romero*, President of the Tijuana Chamber of Commerce (CCE), *Jessie K. Knight Jr.,* President/CEO of the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, and *Malin Burnham*, Chairman of the Burnham Foundation and a member of the Mexico Institute advisory board, also offered comments.

Unsilencing the Victims

Thousands of people in the city of Medellín, Colombia's second largest city and historically its most violent, have been affected by the country's armed conflict. Groups of *autodefensas* and guerrillas have fought each other for control of the city's territory and population, often in alliance with criminal gangs. The complex mix of political and criminal violence posed a substantial challenge to municipal authorities charged with overseeing the demobilization of paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) as part of a peace process with the Uribe government. The first demobilization of AUC



Santiago Jaramillo

members took place in Medellín in November 2003, and by May 2006, the city was home to 4,098 demobilized paramilitaries.

As part of its strategies to address the roots and consequences of violence, the Medellín Mayor's Office, through its Secretaría de Gobierno, established the Victims of the Armed Conflict Project in 2004. On July 10, 2006, *Santiago Jaramillo*, an attorney with the project, joined the Latin American Program to discuss the city government's efforts to respond to the needs and support the rights of the victims of the armed conflict. The project is one aspect of a broader effort to provide basic education, social services, and job training to former combatants through Medellin's Peace and Reconciliation Program.

Jaramillo explained that the purpose of the project is to dignify and rehabilitate the victims of the armed conflict and to contribute to a collective catharsis that advances social reconciliation in the city. Specific objectives include: aiding the victims in their emotional recovery; encouraging the victims to exercise their social, political, and legal rights; strengthening social support networks; contributing to the reconstruction of the historical memory of the armed conflict from the victims' perspective; raising awareness of the impact of the armed conflict on women and on children; and making the victims visible within society.

The reconstruction of historical memory involves creating a data bank of victims' testimonies and holding workshops in which victims record their own stories to be compiled and published as a series of books. Although Colombia's conflict is ongoing and truth commissions are usually established in post-conflict environments, Jaramillo discussed efforts to establish a truth commission or similar instrument in Medellín that would link its efforts to those of the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation. Attempts to reconstruct historical memory are difficult, Jaramillo noted, due to the victims' fear, which often prevents them from participating in the project.

Assistance to victims takes a variety of forms, including psychosocial assistance, legal counseling, educational workshops on constitutional rights, and efforts to link beneficiaries to public and private support services in the areas of health, education, training, and micro-credit. Special attention is also paid to cases of intra-urban displacement in order to reunite families, return people to their homes, and provide protection to those whose safety is threatened.

Asked about Medellin's success in improving citizen security overall, Jaramillo attributed the significant reduction in homicides in 2005 to several factors: not only the demobilization itself but also improvements in the police force and greater state involvement in the public space. State presence in all zones of the city has increased not only through an expanded police presence but also through the creation of local government committees and houses of justice (Casas de Justicia). He added that the programs in Medellín are unique in Colombia and that the project has been able to accomplish a great deal with very limited resources—$250,000—for all its activities.

Staff Notes

Please see page 10, announcing the appointment of *Paulo Sotero* as new director of the Brazil Institute.

We bid a fond farewell to *Thomé Nicocelli*, who served for a year as the director of the Brazil Institute. We wish him well in his future endeavors.

Interns

The Latin American Program has been fortunate to have had the assistance of several very capable interns during the summer of 2006. We thank the following interns for their energy, hard work, and willingness to share their talents and skills with us:

Elvia Zazueta, Claremont-McKenna College
Jessica Martin, Baylor University
Julián Casal, Georgetown University
Lisa Kraus, George Washington University
Sarah Simons, University of California, Los Angeles

Fellows

The Latin American Program would like to formally welcome the three Wilson Center Fellows who will be joining us for the 2006-2007 academic year.

Brooke Larson, professor of history at Stony Brook University, will be working on a project entitled, "Aymara Indians and the Lettered City: Struggles over Power, Knowledge, and Identity in the Bolivian Andes."

René Mayorga joins us from the Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios (CEBEM) where he is professor of political science. His project is entitled, "Weak States and Institutional Reforms in the Andean Region."

Cynthia McClintock, professor of political science at The George Washington University, will be working on a project entitled, "The Majority Runoff Presidential-Election Rule in Latin America."

Public Policy Scholars

We were delighted to host *Elizabeth Balbachevsky*, associate professor of political science at the University of São Paulo, Brazil, as a public policy scholar from June – July 2006. While in residence at the Wilson Center, she worked on a project entitled, "The Future of the Academic Profession: Challenges for the Emerging Countries."

We were also delighted to host *César Martinelli* as a Mexico public policy scholar, through a joint program with the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations. Martinelli is professor of economics and director of the Ph.D. program in economics at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Mexico City. From July – August 2006, he worked on a project entitled, "Democratic Consolidation, Populism, and Mass Media."

In the fall of 2006, *Marcos Aguinis*, former Argentine Secretary of Culture, joins the Latin American Program as a short-term scholar while he works on a project entitled, "Global Conflicts and Anti-Americanism in Latin America."

We would also like to acknowledge the presence of public policy scholars *Carol Wise* and *Brian Stevenson*, affiliated with the Wilson Center's Canada Institute. We benefited enormously from their expertise on NAFTA and the Organization of the American States, respectively.

Recent Publications

Books

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NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, Vol. 1, Conference Proceedings, July 2006.

NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, Vol. 2, Remarks by President George H.W. Bush, President Carlos Salinas, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, July 2006.

Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, and Andrew Selee, eds., *Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation in the United States*, August 2006, co-published with the University of California, Santa Cruz.

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Andrew D. Selee and Leticia Santín del Río, eds., *Democracia y ciudadanía: Participación ciudadana y deliberación pública en gobiernos locales mexicanos*, No. 17, March 2006, co-published with Ágora.

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