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EES NEWS

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Missile Defenses in Eastern Europe: Who Threatens Whom and How?

Stephen Blank

*Stephen Blank is Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College-Carlisle Barracks. He spoke at an EES Noon Discussion on September 24, 2008. The following is a summary of his presentation. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department of the U.S. Government. **Meeting Report 352.***

With predictable regularity, Russian officials often charge that American missile defenses (10 radars and interceptors) in Poland and the Czech Republic threaten Russian security. They claim that since there is no threat of Iranian missiles (conventional or nuclear), there is no justification for building these systems. Therefore, they can only represent a threat to Russia's vital interests. Since everyone admits that ten such units alone do not constitute that threat, Moscow charges that these systems are merely the thin edge of the larger program to saturate Central and Eastern Europe with missile defenses to prevent Russia from launching its nuclear weapons in a first strike against a conventional or nuclear attack from the West. That first strike is in accordance with Russia's military doctrine that calls for such strikes to compensate for Russia's conventional inferiority vis-à-vis NATO and the United States. Missile defenses would then deprive Russia of the capability to launch a retaliatory strike or else degrade that capability, leaving Russia vulnerable to all manner of attacks. Because Warsaw and Prague defied Russia's objections and threats by accepting to host these missile defenses they have received numerous equally predictable and regular Russian threats to target them with nuclear and conventional missiles.

But are Russia's charges that these systems threaten it justified? Indeed, who threatens whom in Eastern Europe? The threats directed against Poland, Belarus and even Ukraine suggest that other issues and dynamics are at work here rather than missile defenses. First, it is simply not true that Russia believes there is no Iranian nuclear or missile threat. Since 2005, Moscow has advocated a revision of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, urging that it be globalized to include all missile powers, lest Russia withdraw from the treaty. As quoted in *The Guardian* on October 13, 2007, President Vladimir Putin told Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2007: "We need other international participants to assume the same obligations which have been assumed by the Russian Federation and the US. If we are unable to attain such a goal . . . it will be difficult for us to keep within the framework of the treaty in a situation where other countries do develop such weapons systems, and among those are countries in our near vicinity."

Putin was obviously talking about Iranian and Chinese missiles. But Russia dares not announce that its "allies" present its most immediate security threat. Russian military men also acknowledge the Iranian threat. Both Deputy Prime Minister and former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and former Chief of Staff General Yuri N. Baluyevsky have publicly acknowledged Iran's threats. Commenting in *ITAR-TASS* on February 26, 2007 on Iran's launch of a sub-orbital weather rocket, Lt. General Leonid Sazhin stated that, "Iran's launch of a weather rocket shows that Tehran has not given up efforts to achieve two goals—create its own carrier rocket to take spacecraft to orbit and real medium-range combat missiles capable of hitting targets 3,000 to 5,000 miles away." Although he argued that this capability would not fully materialize for three to five years, it would also take at least that long to test and deploy the American missile defenses that are at issue. Equally significantly, Major-

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*Views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the
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General Vitaly Dubrovin, a Russian space defense expert, was quoted in the same article saying, flatly “now Tehran has a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a warhead.” Naturally both men decried the fact that Iran appears intent on validating American threat assessments. Since then, Iran has developed the Ashura Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile with a 2000 Km range. Indeed, Putin’s 2007 proposal for joint use of the Gabala air and missile defense installation in Azerbaijan implicitly acknowledged the validity of the U.S. threat perception concerning Iran.

To understand Moscow’s alarm and anxiety about these missile defenses, we must look at the scenarios

otherwise Washington might be tempted to think it could strike at Russia with relative impunity.

* Finally, there is a fifth, and always unstated but critical aspect here. These defenses entrench the United States in Europe’s military defense and foreclose any prospect for Moscow to intimidate or reestablish its hegemony over Eastern and Central Europe, and even possibly the CIS. If missile defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are greatly diminished if not negated. Because empire and the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy are the justifications for and inextricable corollary of internal autocracy, the end of empire allegedly entails Russia’s irrevocable decline as a great power and, (the crucial point) generates tremendous pressure for domestic reform.

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advanced by Russian spokesmen as to why these defenses allegedly threaten Russia:

* As Dmitri Trenin has suggested, Moscow claims that missile defenses represent an American perception of threats from Russian nuclear missiles. Therefore these defenses aim to neutralize them in potential conflict. Either Russian missiles would be attacked by a conventional air and space first strike, possibly involving these networks in Europe, or else these missile defenses would frustrate a retaliatory second strike leaving Russia defenseless.

* While these missile defenses in and of themselves are no threat, they represent the first stage of a planned or potential U.S. buildup of a missile network in Europe that could then neutralize Russia’s first and/or second strike capabilities as cited above and shift the burden of war to Europe.

* If missile defenses were stationed at these bases, it would create a pretext for stationing offensive missiles there. This would force Moscow to assume the worst case scenario and could cause Russia to attempt to shoot them down leading to a conflict with America.

* These defenses and whatever may follow them rupture the fabric of strategic stability where neither side has the freedom of action or margin of superiority that might encourage it to think it could employ coercive diplomacy or military force with impunity. The strategic stability equation is of critical importance to Russia because

Beyond that, it is also clear that Russia, as part of its strategy, insists on being able to intimidate Europe through missiles such as the new Iskander, especially its cruise missile variant and its Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW). Indeed, Russia’s threats of missile strikes and targeting against virtually every state from the Baltic states to Georgia arguably demonstrate the need for both missile defenses and frankly for NATO’s continuing robustness, if not enlargement. Thus, missile defenses will deprive Russia of the capability to intimidate Central and Eastern Europe, which features so prominently in its strategy.

In fact, Russia has recently announced its intention to equip the Baltic Fleet with nuclear weapons, clearly to offset the deployment of these missile defenses. In reply, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt announced that, “According to the information to which we have access, there are already tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad area. They are located both at and in the vicinity of units belonging to the Russia fleet.” (*Timesonline*, August 17, 2008.) Here, Bildt disclosed that Russia has long been violating the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives agreed to by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin which removed TNW from aboard their countries’ fleets in 1991 and 1992. This public revelation of Russian cheating would, under the best of circumstances, have raised red flags in Washington and Europe regarding future cooperation. Today it merely confirms the gathering and overwhelming impression that arms control deals with Russia are inherently dangerous and futile because Moscow will not abide by them unless there is a rigorous inspection and verification regime.

Thus, Russia’s motives for opposing missile defenses in Europe are driven by factors other than what its leaders say in public. The fundamental basis of Russia’s rivalry with America is political, and stems from the nature of the Russian political system which cannot survive in its present structure without a presupposition of conflict and enemies. From Russia’s standpoint, given

that presupposition of conflict, the only way it can have security vis-à-vis the U.S. is if America is shackled to a continuing mutual hostage relationship based on mutual deterrence, which characterized the Cold War, so that it cannot act unilaterally. To the degree that both sides are shackled to this mutual hostage relationship, Russia gains a measure of control over US policy. As Patrick Morgan observed, this kind of classic deterrence “cuts through the complexities” of needing to have a full understanding of or dialogue with the other side. Instead it enables a state, in this case Russia, to “simplify by dictating, the opponent’s preferences.” (*Timesonline*, August 17, 2008.) Thanks to this mutual hostage relationship, Russian leaders see all states that wish to attack them, and even internal threats such as Chechnya, as being deterred. Therefore nuclear weapons remain critical for ensuring strategic stability and, though not openly stated, for giving Russia room to act freely in world affairs.

In exchange for accepting that it too is deterred, Russia postulates (as one of the fundamental corollaries of its strategy) that Moscow must retain the ability to intimidate and destroy Europe with its nuclear and other missiles. In other words, believing a priori that Europe is the site of anti-Russia activity, Moscow demands as a condition of its security that the rest of Europe be insecure. Indeed, reports of Russia’s forthcoming defense doctrine openly state that the United States and NATO represent the main threats to Russian security and that Washington will continue to seek military supremacy and disregard international law for a generation. Likewise, Moscow has consistently stated that the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe and Asia will disrupt existing balances of strategic forces and undermine global and regional stability. Furthermore, Russia’s leaders openly contend that one cannot discuss European security without taking into account the missile defense issue or the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Certainly Russian officials see the weaponization of space, the integration of space and terrestrial capabilities, missile defenses, and the U.S. global strike strategy as a part of a systematic, comprehensive strategy to threaten Russia. So in response Moscow must threaten Europe. Indeed, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently charged that missile defenses in Europe, systems that allegedly used to be regulated by bilateral agreements to maintain parity are now being introduced close to Russia’s borders, thereby destabilizing that parity in Europe and elsewhere. During his recent trip to Poland, Lavrov went even further, saying that:

For many decades, the basis for strategic stability and security in the world was parity between Russia and the United States in the sphere of strategic offensive and defensive arms. However, in recent years, the US Administration chose a course towards upsetting that parity and gaining a unilateral

advantage in the strategic domain. Essentially it’s not just about global missile defense. We also note that the US has been reluctant to stay within the treaties on strategic offensive arms, and that it is pursuing the Prompt Global Strike concept, and developing projects to deploy strike weapons in outer space. This, understandably, will not reinforce the security of Europe or of Poland itself.” (*Zvezda Television*, in Russian, September 11, 2008, *FBIS SOV*, September 11, 2008.)

Lavrov then went on to say that if Poland, under the circumstances, chose a “special allied relationship” with Washington then it would have to bear the responsibilities and risks involved and that Moscow, in principle, is opposed to having its relations with third parties be a function of Russian-American disputes. Thus, Russia’s arms control posture also represents its continuing demand for substantive, if not quantitative, parity as well as for deterrence with a perceived adversarial United States in order to prevent Washington from breaking free of the Russian embrace and following policies that Russia deems antithetical to its interests. Moreover, that parity is calculated not just globally but in regional balances as well, so that Russia also demands a regional (qualitative or substantive) parity with America at various regional levels, most prominently in Europe. Russia’s demand for restoring parity entails not an unreachable numerical parity, but

Russia wants to conduct relations with key countries and regions independently of its relations with America, so that it can have a free hand in regard to them. Therefore, Russia resents the presence of American power in Europe, Asia and elsewhere precisely because it limits its own power.

rather a strategic stability or equilibrium where both sides’ forces remain mutually hostage to each other in a deterrent relationship. Furthermore Russia wants to conduct relations with key countries and regions independently of its relations with America, so that it can have a free hand in regard to them. Therefore, Russia resents the presence of American power in Europe, Asia and elsewhere precisely because it limits its own power. Indeed, not only does it wish to shackle US power to the mutual hostage relationship of mutual deterrence and thus mutually assured destruction, it also clearly believes, as Lavrov’s and dozens of other threats to Poland and other states show, that its security remains contingent upon its ability to intimidate Europe with nuclear weapons and threats. ■

EES-TITLE VIII ALUMNI SYMPOSIUM

EES would like to announce a new project initiative sponsored by Title VIII: In 2009, EES plans to organize an Alumni Symposium, in which a selection of EES-Title VIII alumni will meet in Washington DC to discuss the theme: *“Evaluating EU Enlargement: Lessons for Southeast Europe.”*

The meeting aims at fostering an exchange between scholars studying Central Europe and the Baltic States in the first four years of EU membership in order to improve understanding of the policy implications of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Southeast Europe poses new challenges to the United States and the EU, especially given these countries’ reluctance to comply with certain EU accession requirements. A clear analysis of the benefits gained by EU member states from post-communist Europe would offer U.S. policy makers tools to encourage reformers in the Western Balkans to continue their progress towards EU membership.

Speakers will be chosen from the pool of EES Title VIII alumni working in academia, government and related fields, in an effort to re-energize the networks that have been created through the various EES programs over the last two decades. U.S. government officials and embassy staff will also be invited to this meeting so that the widest possible audience can benefit from this exchange of ideas.

If you would like to participate in this initiative, especially those alumni who are currently working in areas related to this project, please contact us at: ees@wilsoncenter.org.

Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo

Peter Andreas

Peter Andreas is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Brown University. He spoke at an EES Noon Discussion on October 2, 2008. This essay is adapted from Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo (Cornell University Press, 2008). Meeting Report 353.

Inside the UN-run airport in besieged Sarajevo hung a makeshift sign: *Maybe Airlines*. Along the edges of the sign, aid workers, journalists, and diplomats had posted stickers—CNN, ITN, CBS, RTL, MSF, VOX, UNICEF, the French flag, the Canadian flag, the Swedish flag and so on. Above the sign was a piece of plywood with the word destinations hand-written at the top, and with a changeable placard below (the placard choices included New York, Geneva, Rome, Berlin, Zagreb, Paris and Heaven). *Maybe Airlines* was the nickname given to the unreliable UN flights in and out of wartime Sarajevo—the longest airlift ever attempted and the centerpiece of the international humanitarian response to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meanwhile, underneath the airport tarmac ran a narrow and damp 800-meter-long tunnel that bypassed both UN controls and the siege lines. Protected from Serb shelling and sniper fire, every day, thousands of people and tons of food, arms and other supplies moved through the underground passageway—which the UN pretended did not exist—providing both a vital lifeline to the city and an enormous opportunity for black market profiteering. While the UN airlift was part of the highly visible front stage of the siege, the tunnel was part of the much less visible but equally important backstage action. Together, they helped Sarajevo survive for more than three and a half years, setting a siege longevity record.

The 1992-1995 battle for Sarajevo was not only the longest siege in modern history, but also the most internationalized: it became an urban magnet for aid workers, diplomats, UN “Blue Helmet” soldiers, journalists, artists, celebrities, peace activists, adventure seekers, embargo busters and black-market traders. Sarajevo under siege became the most visible and recognizable face of post-Cold War “ethnic conflict” and humanitarian intervention. At the same time, the less visible and less recognized face of the siege included aid diversion, clandestine commerce and peacekeeper corruption. As the Sarajevo experience powerfully illustrates, just as changes in fortifications and weapons technologies transformed siege warfare through the ages, so too has the arrival of CNN, NGOs, satellite phones, UN peacekeepers, aid convoys and diaspora remittances.

The internationalization of the siege changed the repertoires of siege-craft and siege defenses. It changed the strategic calculus and opportunities and constraints of both the besiegers and the besieged.

The tortuous, globally-televised battle for the Bosnian capital came to represent the entire post-Cold War experience of ethnic conflict, UN hand wringing, Western paralysis, questionable humanitarianism and a mushrooming global relief aid industry. Like the Rwandan camps in Goma, ex-Zaire, Sarajevo became an embarrassing symbol of Western failure and incompetence, prompting Hollywood movies and a myriad of journalistic polemics. Outrage over events in Sarajevo, one could argue, helped pave the way for the more robust international military intervention in Kosovo at the end of the decade, and contributed to America’s aversion to UN-led multilateral conflict resolution initiatives.

Given the overwhelming military advantage of the Serb besiegers, many at first expected the poorly-defended city and its Muslim-led government to fall quickly and easily. At the same time, given the intensity of international political and media attention, many expected that the Serb leadership would back down and the siege would be short-lived. Neither hypothesis was correct. Why not? What sustained the siege for such an unexpectedly long period of time? These questions are particularly

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puzzling because siege warfare in Europe was supposed to be obsolete—and in Sarajevo it was not only back with a vengeance but, contrary to all expectations, stubbornly persisted. Moreover, it was being broadcast live across the globe. As David Rieff described it: “A European city was being reduced to nothing; Carthage in slow motion, but this time with an audience and videotaped record.”

The siege of Sarajevo is not simply a fascinating and important historical story. The siege offers a powerful lens through which to scrutinize the relationship between the material and performative aspects of conflict, international intervention, and post-war reconstruction.

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In a highly confined and intensely contested geographic space, the siege provides a striking illustration of the interdependence between the upper-world and underworld, formal and informal, front stage and backstage in armed confrontations and external involvement. At the broadest level, the story of Sarajevo is about the dynamics of war economies, humanitarian and media access to conflict

The high levels of clandestine cross-frontline trading, the intensity of global attention, the multiple formal and informal roles played by key local and international actors, and the city's stubborn endurance do not fit neatly within a realist understanding of unitary actors pursuing their security interests. At the same time, a focus on the criminalizing effects of the UN-led intervention does not sit comfortably with (and tends to be glossed over by) many liberal advocates of humanitarian responses to conflict.

zones, and the political repercussions of relief. More specifically, issues of aid diversion, embargo busting, trading with the enemy, war profiteering and irregular combatants all come together and crystallize in the Sarajevo case. In concentrated form, the siege illuminates important elements of the political economy of contemporary conflict and the dilemmas, contradictions and unintended consequences of humanitarian action.

The internationalization of the siege, which aimed to end the conflict, paradoxically helped to perpetuate it by becoming incorporated into the war economy. Many observers have argued that the Sarajevo siege (and the wider war in Bosnia) was prolonged by international intervention, particularly the large-scale delivery of humanitarian aid. But the specific mechanism through which this was accomplished goes well beyond the one usually described. It was not only the official aid that prolonged the siege, but also the business opportunities that the UN-led Sarajevo relief operation created for local black market transactions. The injection of aid, peacekeepers and other international actors into the besieged city provided an opportunity for a criminalized war economy to flourish. Importantly, international actors on the ground were incorporated and absorbed into the war economy rather than simply kept out or driven out by it.

International intervention prolonged the siege not only due to the transfer of official aid, but also because it helped to create a lucrative environment for black marketeers, who were empowered to trade across frontlines, slip in and out of closed areas, transform humanitarian supplies into hard currency and obtain access to weapons and other vital war supplies. Once the siege lines became more settled, informal cross-frontline trading relations developed, greatly benefiting from the stabilizing influence of the UN's presence (and sometimes direct complicity). Thus, official international

recognition and relief aid were insufficient causes for the prolongation of the siege; Sarajevo's survival cannot be explained without taking into account cross-frontline smuggling practices and the criminalized defense effort. This is not to suggest that the siege was deliberately prolonged to enrich black marketeers, but rather that such clandestine entrepreneurial activities were essential for Sarajevo's remarkable survival.

The Sarajevo siege was particularly supportive of the black market because it created formally impermeable spaces—front lines—that were closed to most locals, but permeable for many internationals and well-placed Bosnians. The siege lines thus functioned like a heavily policed border—and as elsewhere, borders and border controls generate tremendous incentives and opportunities for smuggling. These incentives were especially powerful in the case of Sarajevo since the city was essentially a large captive market with astronomical price differentials from one side of the siege line to the other. The business of survival in besieged Sarajevo thus involved continually negotiated access across these lines—keeping the siege permeable through formal channels in the form of delivering official aid, and informal channels in the form of smuggling people, goods and money. Both channels were intimately intertwined, representing the front-stage and backstage action in the prolonged siege drama.

An emphasis on the formal and informal political economy of the siege provides an antidote to the obsessive focus on ethnic identities and animosities in the Bosnia conflict. In the case of Sarajevo, ethnicity certainly mattered, but does not take us very far in explaining the longevity of the siege. Ethnicity as a master narrative simply does not hold up to close scrutiny when looking at the messy and complex micro-dynamics on the ground. While the mobilization and political manipulation of ethnic nationalist animosities helped to bring about the siege, an ethnicity-driven narrative would not expect and cannot account for the various forms of clandestine cross-ethnic exchange that helped sustain Sarajevo under siege. Ethnicity cannot explain the considerable variation in local relations across the siege lines, including levels of violence and permeability. These variations were also not always reducible to a simple strategic calculus of maximizing military advantage. The high levels of clandestine cross-frontline trading, the intensity of global attention, the multiple formal and informal roles played by key local and international actors, and the city's stubborn endurance do not fit neatly within a realist understanding of unitary actors pursuing their security interests. At the same time, a focus on the criminalizing effects of the UN-led intervention does not sit comfortably with (and tends to be glossed over by) many liberal advocates of humanitarian responses to conflict.

Over time, a peculiar and in many ways unintended symbiosis developed on the ground between key actors among the besiegers, besieged and external

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The European Union, Civil Sector Activities and the Roma

Andria D. Timmer

Andria D. Timmer is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Anthropology, University of Iowa. She participated in the 2008 Junior Scholar Training Seminar. The following is a summary of her current research.

In Hungary, as in much of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it is widely recognized that the education system has largely failed the Roma minority. Due to residential isolation, discrimination and a long history of social exclusion, Gypsy children are often segregated into ethnically homogeneous schools or classrooms and receive a poorer quality of education than their majority counterparts. In recent years, improvement of the conditions for Roma in education has become a priority in Hungary. Indeed, as of 2004, it was the only CEE country to enact measures to address the issue of differential schooling. However, much of the work has been widely critiqued and it is uncertain what, if any, real improvements have been made in terms of achieving parity between Roma and non-Roma youth in Hungary. My dissertation research examines these efforts to restructure the education system by focusing on the activities and actions of local, national and international civil sector organizations. While my focus is the current situation in Hungary, I am concerned with how these issues play out in the broader European sphere because the actions undertaken by the civil sector in regards to equality in education are informed and driven by European Union (EU) funding and Council directives and the issues that emerge from my research in Hungary mirror those facing researchers and activists in many European countries.

This research involves incorporating three interrelated arenas of inquiry: 1) How do Hungarian civil sector organizations function and what models do they use?; 2) What policies and practices have been used by the Hungarian state and the EU in terms of improving the civil sector and education, and addressing the problems of Roma youth? and; 3) What practices are used to identify the Roma as a unified population that either has a problem or is a problem? This research is of particular significance since the European Commission's Directorate General on Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities has undertaken an initiative to standardize EU policy for Roma throughout the European Union.

I take the civil sector as my point of departure because it is a widely-accepted hypothesis that sustainable social change is more likely to come from the work of civil sector organizations as they provide much

of the on-the-ground work towards alleviating social inequalities. Therefore, in order to qualitatively measure the work being done to address educational inequalities, it is important to critically examine the activities of such organizations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have increased in number and importance over the past 30 years, due in part to the perceived failure of the state apparatus and the assumption that voluntary enterprises are more flexible, responsive, economically sound and democratic than government or market-driven enterprises. This is especially true in postcommunist countries such as Hungary, where distrust in the government is high. Since 1989, the civil sector in Hungary has taken on many of the activities that had once been within the realm of the government. This research investigates the manner in which CSOs define their target population, what actions they undertake, the barriers they face and how they measure and identify success.

I conducted long-term qualitative ethnographic research in Hungary over the course of 18 months from July 2004 to July 2008. The bulk of my data comes from semi-structured interviews at various local, national and

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international educational organizations throughout the country. My questions concerned the interviewees' candid assessment of their programs and activities and the nature and/or characteristics of the people that they saw as their target population. I asked them to relay their success stories and comment on why they thought these activities were successful. In addition, I asked them to relate the various barriers they faced, what they saw as solutions to overcome these barriers, and their projection for the coming years, both for the organization for which they worked and the situation of the Roma in Hungary in general. Finally I was concerned with the funding system and the organization's relationships with the Hungarian state and the European Union. In addition to these interviews, I

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conducted classroom observations at segregated schools, visited a number of educational programs, and attended conferences and working groups dedicated to the situation of the Roma in education. I also conducted interviews with Hungarian scholars working in this field and with relevant government officials. Through participation in conferences, workshops and round tables as well as through conversations with junior scholars, local experts and key officials, I was able to place the situation in Hungary within a broader European framework.

In January 2007, I began conducting intensive ethnographic research at an innovative educational program located in a small village located in southern Hungary, which has the characteristic of being the only 100 percent Gypsy village in the country. The population of the village is approximately 1,300 and residents are identified as Beás Gypsy. Beás Gypsies speak an archaic form of Romanian and comprise 8 percent of the total Hungarian Gypsy population. The goal of this city's school was to provide education for the lowest level of students and enable them to receive their maturity exam.

The majority of educational reform for the Roma minority comes from the civil sector, but CSOs are limited in their ability to act because they are dependent on the top-down policies of the EU and are reliant on EU funding.

(Not all schools in Hungary provide the possibility to take the maturity exam, without which a student cannot continue to university. Gypsy students are often tracked into vocational schools that do not provide this exam.) I worked as an English teacher and a researcher at this school from January to June 2007, and was able to form relationships with the directors, students and teachers. I conducted semi-structured and unstructured interviews with the school staff, faculty, and students and I participated in their activities. Additional methodologies include analysis of CSO materials and websites, use of photography and media images to understand how organizations use images of the Gypsies, and participation in a number of organizations and news groups in which Roma issues in the European Union are discussed. The school serves as a case study through which to understand the larger picture of educational interventions in Hungary, and it provides a particularly salient example because it is the first school of its kind, and therefore serves as an important model that has gained the support of the Ministry of Education.

This research adds to the literature concerning education as social reform. However, I take a slightly different approach by focusing specifically on the activities of CSOs. Education is usually

perceived to be in the realm of government jurisdiction with public oversight, but in a case where such obvious injustices are evident, the civil sector can possibly provide much of the momentum for inciting change. CSOs can work to put pressure on authorities to enforce laws and legislation and can provide encouragement and support to disenfranchised peoples to demand their rights. At the same time, however, CSOs can have a “toxic” effect in that they remove accountability from the state and help promote an already poorly functioning model. Because the civil sector is often perceived to be the site of social reform, it is necessary to provide a critical analysis to understand exactly what happens at this level.

This research also contributes to the study of civil sector organizations. This is a small but growing field of inquiry that emerges from studies concerned with civil society. Thus far, few studies of this type draw a connection between civil society writ large and the micro processes of organizations, and ethnographic studies of CSOs often take organizations to be isolated entities. By looking specifically at how CSOs intervene in the education system, I am directly concerned with how the government, public and civil sectors come together on a common issue. It is imperative to treat this segment of society on par with other sectors and critically analyze their decision-making processes.

Finally, this inquiry adds to research on Roma populations. Research on the Roma generally falls into one of two overlapping categories. The first is scholarship that posits that Roma constitute a separate ethnic group and gives an account of their culture or history. The second category treats the Roma as a socially marginalized group and highlights episodes of violence and discrimination. This research project draws from both bodies of scholarship, but rather than attempt to parse out who the Roma are, I am concerned with how they are perceived as a distinct group within the education system. The Roma represent an extremely varied and heterogeneous group, but they are taken as a unified group for political purposes. I examine the manner in which this homogenization and identification occurs and how these processes inform civil sector activities.

In my research, I have found that the majority of educational reform for the Roma minority comes from the civil sector, but CSOs are limited in their ability to act because they are dependent on the top-down policies of the EU and are reliant on EU funding. Therefore, the questions that emerge from my research which warrant further research are: 1) How are civil sector activities constrained and/or fostered by European Union policies, directives, and funding? and 2) As a result, what does the future hold for CSO activities, and therefore improvement in the situation of the European Roma in terms of education? This

research has clear policy implications, as CSOs are instrumental in both implementing and affecting change in national and supranational policies. My aim in conducting this research is to develop a model of effective civil sector action and thus advance sustainable policy changes that will improve education for Roma throughout Europe. ■

— ANDREAS

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interveners. Pointing to the symbiotic aspects of the Sarajevo siege is not meant to suggest that the besieged and the international interveners did not want the siege lifted, that the besiegers would not have preferred a quick and decisive military victory, or that all sides benefited equally from the siege and were equally responsible for its continuation. However, it does draw attention to the ways in which moves on all sides often ended up being reinforcing, even if this was unintentional. No elaborate conspiracy was required, making the siege symbiosis all the more durable.

For many local and international actors, the partial and continuously negotiated permeability of the city made the siege politically tolerable, militarily acceptable and economically profitable. Siege dynamics were often more about controlling humanitarian supplies and smuggling routes in and out of the city than with making the siege militarily succeed or fail. While the vast majority of the city's inhabitants struggled for survival and lived in a state of terror, a semi-porous siege kept the city formally and informally supplied and served various local and international interests. Dissecting the anatomy of the siege shows how and why it proved to be not only sustainable but also rewarding for some key players on all sides. For the nationalist Serb besiegers, the siege kept the city bottled up and useful as a political lever and as a distraction from more severe atrocities elsewhere. For the inner circle of Sarajevo's political leadership, the siege helped them maintain power, consolidate their party's political position, marginalize opponents and generate and sustain international sympathy and support. For the UN and its western sponsors, the siege provided a remarkably viable working environment to showcase aid provision in the Bosnian war, avoid more direct military entanglement and contain the flood of refugees. For foreign journalists, the siege offered a front-row seat in a high drama spectacle and the most accessible

war zone in Bosnia. Finally, for well-placed black market entrepreneurs on all sides, the siege conditions assured a captive market with highly inflated profits. As described by Hasib Salkic, the secretary general of the Liberal Party of Bosnia, the siege was "The best course in market economy one can get. I learnt it and I use it today. Naturally some used it as education, some for getting rich, for wheeling and dealing, for stealing."

The point here is not to provide a polemic against crime, corruption and black market profiteering. The primary purpose is to explain and understand rather than to expose and condemn. All too often, denunciations of corruption and criminality substitute for critical evaluation and fuel politically-motivated speculation. Rather than simply joining the chorus of voices loudly condemning such behavior, I stress its double-edged character: the criminalized side of the conflict involved both looting and saving Sarajevo, it contributed to both the persistence and the end of the war, and it fostered both state formation and deformation. Equally important, an analytical focus on the criminalized dimensions of the siege is not meant to discredit the remarkable defense of Sarajevo and survival skills of its inhabitants. I do not wish to diminish the heroics and sacrifices of Sarajevo's citizens but rather to shed light on a dimension of the conflict that is too often either neglected or distorted. Crucially, this includes acknowledging and critically evaluating the role of international actors and their interaction with local players in shaping and enabling the criminalization of the siege and wider war. Indeed, as I stress, the particular mode of external intervention was critical in turning the conflict into such an enormous black market business opportunity.

Focusing on the role of black market operators, criminals-turned-combatants, and smuggling networks runs the risk of exaggerating their importance, providing an overly-criminalized narrative of the siege. In its crudest form, this can generate a knee-jerk cynical dismissal of all actors as simply greedy and corrupt. It is not my intention to reduce the dynamics of the siege merely to crime and profiteering. This is only one (albeit important) dimension of a complex conflict. The point is not to entirely invalidate or supplant other accounts, but rather to incorporate and shed analytical light on a commonly overlooked or misunderstood aspect of the siege and wider war. Moreover, the criminalized component of the conflict has left a powerful legacy—including the emergence of new elites who profited from the war and the persistence of politically protected wartime smuggling networks—that needs to be more fully taken into account in understanding the challenges for post-war reconstruction. ■

CALL FOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR GRANT APPLICATIONS

With funding provided by Title VIII (the Research and Training Act for Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union), East European Studies offers residential research scholar grants to scholars working on policy-relevant projects on East Europe or the Baltic States. This program is limited to American citizens or permanent residents.

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- ◆ a 3-5 page description of your research project;
- ◆ a curriculum vitae;
- ◆ a completed application form (available at the ees website);
- ◆ two letters of recommendation.

DEADLINE: DECEMBER 1, 2008

Please consult the website for forms and other information:

Website: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ees>

TALK OF THE NATION: LANGUAGE AND CONFLICT IN ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA

Staff-prepared summary of the seminar with Zsuzsa Csergo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Queen's University, held on Wednesday, October 8, 2008.

Over the last two decades, postcommunist Eastern Europe has seen the rise of both nationalism and democracy. Zsuzsa Csergo's recent book presents arguments and lessons that have emerged from a careful study of ethnic minority-majority relations in Romania and Slovakia. Primarily, she attempted to answer the question: does democratization make nationalism less contentious?

Latent nationalism emerged throughout Eastern Europe because the state borders that were erected since the end of the 19th century had cut various ethnic groups out of their titular nation states. Inter-ethnic hatreds, stemming in part from Europe's long history of inter-ethnic war, were controlled during the communist period through the imposition of strict state control over individual behavior as well as through ideology-driven propaganda. As ethnic identification and calls for self-determination became a vehicle for overthrowing communism, new nations emerged in the postcommunist period and nationalism was rekindled.

Csergo's research focused on political groups that organized around a certain ethnicity and the progress of state-building in postcommunist states. She views these ethnic groups as political categories, since ethnic groups became active in democratic contestation very early on in the postcommunist period. She also employs a majority-minority

dichotomy that exists in any nation-state (where the titular nation is the majority), which helps to define the relevant groups.

To test the extent of nationalism, Csergo focused on state language policies (as an indicator of the majority's disposition towards accommodating a minority) as well as an ethnic minority group's territorial claims (as an indicator of how attached an ethnic group is to secessionist goals). Csergo found that as democratization proceeds, nationalism does not necessarily diminish. In Slovakia, as state actors came closer to negotiating the rules by which citizens would be governed, language laws became entangled with issues of state sovereignty and the state's control over its territory. In Romania, by contrast, leaders relied on nationalism to unify the state in support of their reforms. In both cases, as democratization progressed, ethnic relations were adversely affected.

In both countries, illiberal policies were eventually reversed. Csergo's findings indicate that, rather than being a result of the European Union's conditionality in the region, this policy reversal was home grown and resulted from liberal-thinking leaders on the ground. In the end, however, the territoriality of nationalism has not decreased, which is evident from the fact that with stronger democratic states in place, ethnic minorities no longer engage in debates of territorial division. However, research clearly points to slow but steady progress in the willingness of the majority to accommodate minority languages as democracy is strengthened.

CALL FOR SHORT-TERM SCHOLAR GRANT APPLICATIONS

With funding provided by Title VIII (the Research and Training Act for Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union), East European Studies offers residential short-term scholar grants to scholars working on policy-relevant projects on East Europe. **While South-East Europe remains a primary focus, projects on Central Europe and the Baltic States are again eligible.** Grants provide a stipend of \$3000 for one month.

DEADLINE: DECEMBER 1, 2008

For application guidelines and eligibility requirements please consult the EES website:

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ees>

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

Please Note: Events are subject to last minute changes. For the most up-to-date information on events please visit our website at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ees>.

WEDNESDAY, 5 NOVEMBER: Noon Discussion, 12:00-1:00
Transnational Networks, Domestic Democratic Activists

and Defeat of Dictators:

Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia, from 1998 to 2000

6th Floor Boardroom

VALERIE BUNCE, Aaron Binenkorb Professor of International Studies and Professor of Government, Cornell University; **SHARON L. WOLCHIK**, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University

FRIDAY, 7 NOVEMBER: Conference, 9:00-6:30

Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion and Utopia

6th Floor Auditorium

This is the second day of a two-day conference co-sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, the Romanian Embassy and the Romanian Cultural Institute for more information and to RSVP please consult the website: www.cwihp.org

WEDNESDAY, 12 NOVEMBER: Noon Discussion, 12:00-1:00

Do Markets Punish EU Backsliders?

6th Floor Boardroom

JULIA GRAY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh

FRIDAY, 21 NOVEMBER: Annual Czech and Slovak Freedom Lecture, 10:00-11:00

Strengthening US-Slovak Cooperation and the Transatlantic Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges in Today's World

6th Floor Auditorium

JAN KUBIS, Foreign Minister of the Slovak Republic
this meeting is co-sponsored by the Friends of Slovakia, American Friends of the Czech Republic and the Embassies of Slovakia and the Czech Republic

WEDNESDAY, 3 DECEMBER: Noon Discussion, 12:00-1:00

Elections in Romania: Challenges and Implications

5th Floor Conference Room

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU, Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland-College Park and WWICS Fellow

WEDNESDAY, 10 DECEMBER: Noon Discussion, 12:00-1:00

Paying for the Past:

Perceived Costs of Justice in Postcommunist States

5th Floor Conference Room

BRIAN GRODSKY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Maryland-Baltimore County and EES-Title VIII Supported Research Scholar

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