

CLASS AND NATION: COMPETING EXPLANATORY SYSTEMS

Gale Stokes

The series of articles that follows confront a fundamental question of socio-political development, the nature of social allegiances and the two main systems of classification that have been proposed to explain them: class and nation. All of the articles revolve around issues raised by Roman Szporluk in his book Communism and Nationalism: Marx vs. List, published by the Oxford University Press in the spring of 1988. Readers who would like to enter fully into the questions raised by the articles may wish to read Szporluk's book first, but since the issues raised are of such far-reaching importance in the debate over the relationship between social and political explanations, not to mention the theory of nationalism, each article stands on its own as a commentary on these issues. The article by Szporluk himself should not be read primarily as a response to his critics, but rather as a second look at the points he raised in his book in the light of the discussions presented here. We begin with a brief summary of the book that served as the occasion for these discussions.

Roman Szporluk divides his study of communism and nationalism into three parts, preceded by an introduction. In the introduction, he proposes that both Marx and List present solutions to a fundamental problem posed by the Dual Revolution: how to reconcile the need for industrial expertise with the desire for popular government or, as Bertrand Russell put it, how to reconcile the contradiction between organization and freedom. The basic point of Szporluk's book is that List was correct in seeing that the organizational framework within which capitalism could and, indeed, must develop was the ethnically organized state. On the other hand, Szporluk holds that Marx was wrong when he argued the productive forces were hindered by such intermediate ideologies as nationalism, and proposed instead that capitalism would develop under conditions of class struggle.

Szporluk begins his argument in Part One with a close reading of Marx's writings before 1850, emphasizing the latter's critique of Hegel, a recently uncovered critique of List, and the Manifesto. He argues that these documents should be read not only as statements on capitalism and communism, but also as statements on nationalism. Marx, although quite conscious of the fact of nationality, was not concerned with the liberation of Germans as Germans, but with their liberation as human beings. Under the relations of production characteristic of capitalism the only important solidarity was class, and even there the outcome of the class struggle would be the victory of the class that stood outside of class, the proletariat, and therefore, the elimination of partial loyalties in favor of universal community. Later Marxist writers have held that national economic development is possible,

either socialist or capitalist, but Szporluk contends that the young Marx found such a concept contradictory, a view he changed only slightly later in life.

In Part Two, Szporluk turns to a close reading of List, who was not a philosopher or theorist, but a practical man. One reason Szporluk is interested in List is his contention that nationalism is not entirely an anonymous discourse nor an ideology without thinkers. Therefore, since he also holds "that nationalism is not a product of the French Revolution, but rather had been born beforehand," he discusses Rousseau, Burke, Herder, Müller, and Fichte as precursors or competitors of List. Szporluk maintains that List used nation in the same way Marx used class, namely, as the prism of self-consciousness under capitalism. Using this prism, List rejected Enlightenment universalism, i.e., the theory of free trade, in favor of a policy in which each individual state takes steps to protect its economy until it can enter into the arena of free trade on an equal footing with the developed states. List understood that in conditions of underdevelopment the state had to act, but he did not reject the liberal overtones of the Enlightenment as did some of his German colleagues. After 1848 List's analysis became so widely accepted that the ideas lost their originality, and nationalism "abolished itself" as individual thought. But Szporluk writes that this should not blind us to the originality of the ideas, which were put forward by clearly identifiable individuals, nor to the importance of the choices made between competing notions of nationalism. Unlike Müller, for example, or even Fichte, but like Marx, List welcomed the Industrial Revolution and found a way to accommodate it to ethnic identity. This was his great contribution.

In Part Three, Szporluk discusses the diffusion of both Marx's ideas and Listian nationalism, particularly in Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Soviet Union. Twentieth-century Marxists, especially Lenin, changed Marx's original views on the universality of class allegiance into a new kind of Listian socialism. "Marxism-Leninism," Szporluk comments, "became a variant of nationalism." This suggests, as he puts it near the end of the book, that nationalism is a "revolt against historical inevitability espoused by classical Marxism. It also celebrates cultural and linguistic diversity as a normal and desirable condition of mankind--instead of deploring it as a form of alienation, which is what Marx did." Szporluk applauds this celebration of diversity, and holds that since it was List who was the first to hit upon the multivariate linkage between it and economic development, state action, and individual freedom, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at him. He closes with the following two sentences: "That nationality and class are recognized now as essential components of individual identity and political legitimacy is a proof of how profoundly our modern outlook has been shaped by the ideologies of nationalism and Marxism. Without denying what these two world views have contributed, it is now necessary to affirm as fundamental values the rights of the individual and humanity's community of fate."

IN SEARCH OF THE DRAMA OF HISTORY or
A SECOND LOOK AT COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM

Roman Szporluk

Ernest Gellner and Miroslav Hroch raise issues that go beyond the matter of how Marx and List are interpreted in Communism and Nationalism, or of where Gellner and Hroch do or do not agree with it on this or that particular point. In my response, therefore, profoundly grateful as I am to my critics for writing their essays, and thus taking my argument seriously, I will use their comments to try to clarify a larger question. That question concerns the content of the historical drama of the modern era and the identity and role of its principal actors. I will try in particular to locate in that large drama the historical role of nationalist actors and their ideas.

Gellner's observation that the loss of faith in a personal and transcendent God and the rise of faith in Progress, which occurred in eighteenth-century western Europe, transformed society and politics, economy and religion, provides a very promising opening for such an exercise. A new vision of human life and human history emerged and new questions were asked. As people observed "structural change of human society," they wanted to identify "the units or sub-units" of history, its "dramatis personae."¹ We might add: some individuals wanted also to discover the plot of the historical drama and even to influence the course of the events yet to come. Even when they thought that history followed laws of its own, they believed persons of unusual insight did have a creative role to play.

Marx had very definite and specific views about the great historical drama, which he was witnessing, interpreting, and attempting to direct. He assigned parts to its actors, identifying the leading performers and stars in the drama of history, and also those who were its "extras." Marx claimed to have uncovered the plot of history--and to know its ending, which was to take place in the immediate future.

When he considers the question of historical actors, Gellner makes a very interesting distinction between Marx's "Social Metaphysics" and his "Historical Sociology." For Marx, class is historically and sociologically real--history is the history of class struggles--but it is spurious metaphysically. That history will soon end in a great revolution of human liberation and the truly free man will cast off class identity, in addition to freeing himself

of the quite "spurious" ethnic, religious, and political identities. Thus, nation is "spurious" not only metaphysically but also historically: as a member of nation, a person is deluded and alienated in a way in which one is not deluded or alienated as a member of a social class.

According to Gellner, it was reasonable for someone like Marx to conclude that class was more important than nation: it was "eminently sensible" to think of the Industrial Revolution as "the most important thing that was happening," and there was "no obvious logical link between the Industrial Revolution and inter-ethnic conflict. In the light of the Industrial Revolution, the view that classes not nations are the real dramatic personae of history, is exceedingly natural and persuasive." Moreover, for someone who approached history "in Hegelian spirit," which was what Marx did, it was also natural to conclude that the earlier structural changes, in other words, those which had taken place prior to the Industrial Revolution, had resulted from "intra-social transformations of the relations between strata, rather than inter-polity or inter-ethnic conflict." (Nonetheless, as we see, Gellner thinks Marx's historical script to have been a major error, indeed a disaster.)

Hroch also addresses the question of Marx's view of the dramatis personae of history, but does so from a historical and sociological rather than a philosophical angle. Hroch readily admits that Marx expected the drama of history to be concluded in an imminent proletarian revolution. Hroch concedes that Marx and Engels erred when they anticipated an early victory of the proletarian revolution and expected it "to open the way to the extinction of nations, at least nations in the form in which they existed at that time." Hroch also speaks about Marx's and Engels's "erroneous view...about the prospects of national movements." They had incorrectly estimated, he writes, "the development of social structure." Marx and Engels expected that under industrialization and victorious capitalism the lower strata of the middle class would rapidly disappear as they sank into the proletariat. Only two classes would be left, Marx thought, to constitute "civil society" on the eve of the communist revolution.

As we see, Marx's "error" as interpreted by Hroch, was twofold. First, Hroch acknowledges that "this proletarianization and impoverishment of craftsmen, small farmers, and merchants did not happen." Second, he also recognizes that "not only did the old middle class remain and adapt to capitalist conditions, but capitalism gave rise to a new middle class of white collar workers, teachers, and similarly employed persons."

Despite these admissions, which would lead to the conclusion that Marx's diagnosis was profoundly mistaken, Hroch seems to believe that the Marxist interpretation of nation and nationalism was essentially correct. Marx was right, he thinks, at least in the sense that the real dramatis personae of history are classes, defined by their place in the relations of production. Hroch consistently locates "civil society" in the economic sphere, and seems to place culture, ideas, and the phenomenon of nation outside civil society--while at the same time treating them as dependent on civil society.

Hroch denies the charge that Marx and Engels are guilty of any "fatal underestimation of 'nationalism'":

I do not believe that they erred in their view that a nation is the product of civil society and that it is, therefore, essential to regard it as a 'secondary phenomenon' in relation to that 'civil society.' Such a relation between the nation and society exists even today without calling into doubt the right of nations to exist. Marx's and Engels's view that the ruling class of a modern nation is the bourgeoisie is correct, that is to say, it corresponds to historical reality. The logical inference is that a nation cannot exist without its own bourgeoisie.

Before going on to other issues, two comments need to be made on Hroch's usage of the term "civil society." First, I do not think it is correct to say that Marx included the proletariat within "civil society." On the contrary, Marx insisted that the proletariat was outside the society, it was its "effective dissolution." (See my Communism and Nationalism, pp. 27-28, for Marx's statements on this.) Second, regardless of what Marx thought, Hroch's concept of civil society is rigidly one-dimensional (socio-economic), while the concept of civil society is meaningful not simply in economic but also in a political, constitutional and juridical framework. (I will return to this matter below.)

Hroch does not ask why Marx, armed though he was in such a sound general theory, should have made those extraordinary errors in his diagnosis of historical and social processes which he did make. Gellner's discussion, on the other hand, makes it clear that Marx's historical and political judgment was determined by his "metaphysics." We can see that in Marx's scheme the peasantry and other pre-capitalist strata were supposed to disappear from the stage of history, from the ranks of the *dramatis personae*, by the requirements of the play that was to leave just two actors on the stage in its last act. For the same reason the emerging and expanding "new middle class," teachers, professionals, office workers, and so forth, had to be denied the status of a separate *dramatis personae*. Marx's was a great show—but unfortunately (for Marx), in this case life refused to imitate art.

Let us next move to List and ask the question Gellner asks: "If Marx was wrong, in what senses and to what extent did List get it right?" Gellner recognizes that "List was enormously perceptive about a number of things crucial in the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and economic growth." List understood "the importance of the polity, of formal education and training, the importance of the administrative and cultural infrastructure for the economy." He also understood that "the political and cultural (hence eventually ethnic) framework is the key to late industrialism." The dismantling of politics and ethnicity from industrialism, advocated by Marx, "and not ethnically defined protectionism, is the real chimaera. In all this, List was superior to Marx, and much more prescient."

Gellner attributes to List three specific insights. First, List perceived "the invalidity of the legitimating ideology of the new industrial order, i.e., of the laissez-faire doctrine of Free Trade." (This was an insight Marx shared with List.) List understood correctly that "those who enter the free market, do not so on equal terms." Second, List recognized "the need to protect late developers." (Marx, on the other hand, saw "no special need to protect late developers, insofar as their suffering would be no worse than that of the victims of early and hence more painfully protracted development of capitalism.") And, finally, List postulated "the role of the state as an essential, indispensable protector of late economic developers."

But, although he readily recognizes List's insight on all these issues, Gellner is less certain that on what he calls "the heart of the matter"—the relation between nationalism and industrialization—List really "got it right," i.e., understood that "the national path to industrialism was essential." Although "List clearly possessed both the premises, and the conclusion, of a correct theory of modern nationalism," writes Gellner, "he did not spell out, or perceive with full clarity, the nature of the connection between the two." The reasons are not "self-evident," Gellner concedes,

why the developmental state, a Protector of Industry not of Faith, had to be a national one...but...the interesting question is: did List understand them? He saw that nationalism had to be economic; but did he also see that and why politically guided development had to be national?

Gellner questions, rightly in my opinion, List's metaphysics, the idea that nations are "eternal." Gellner points out that the kind of nation that was crucially important in the nineteenth century was not eternal, but was "engendered by the process of diffusion of industrialism which concerned List." For Gellner, "it is the kind of nation engendered by recent industrialism, or the shadow cast by its coming, which is relevant for understanding the diffusion of the new industrial order." But Gellner is not sure whether List actually and explicitly thought so himself.

In any case, the really interesting and important—"the correct"—question for Gellner is: "does a viable economic-political unit, capable of surviving in...conditions [of industrialism] also need to be a national one?" Gellner is not interested in "the obverse" of this question, i.e., whether a pre-existing ethnic group needs to become modern in order to survive in an industrializing world.

Although Gellner at times sounds like an "industrial-determinist," for example, when he attributes, or seems to attribute, the rise of modern nations ("nations for themselves" in my not-too-fortunate terminology) to "a distinctive industrial ethnogenesis," I prefer to interpret his position as being much more open: he himself speaks of nation "engendered by recent industrialism." But he also recognizes that a nation may be engendered by "the shadow cast by [industrialism's] coming." Thus, he admits two different possibilities: in one case an originally non-national state develops industry and becomes (or tries to become)

national to function properly and to survive. In the other type of development, an ethnic community has to become industrialized in order to survive, and to do so first needs to gain political autonomy. In the former, the principle cuius regio, eius lingua is upheld, in the latter, cuius lingua, eius regio.

In contrast to Gellner, who tacitly admits, as I have just tried to show, that a modern nation-state may arise from one of two possible sources, Hroch remains firmly a monist. He strongly disagrees with Gellner's statement that nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist" (Nations and Nationalism), and he also disagrees with the view that nations have been the "work of intellectuals," which he attributes to me. He insists that his own research supports the opposite conclusion to that which Szporluk draws from Hroch's book, and he reaffirms his general stand: "a modern nation is not the product of 'nationalism,' but the consequence of long-term social processes in the transition from feudal to capitalist society."

What were those processes?

Hroch, as we see, believes the change in social and economic structure, in class relations, to have been the only real social change when he considers the transition from feudalism to capitalism. He defines civil society as a society consisting primarily and essentially of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and these categories themselves he defines in exclusively economic terms. But one needs to take a broader view of these two issues, and I think it is possible while doing so to remain basically loyal to Marxism's articles of faith, assuming one feels a need to be so loyal.

Let us see if one might not take a broader view of transition from "feudalism," and also adopt a less narrow understanding of civil society. This approach might also help us elucidate the concerns that lie behind Gellner's questions about what List really knew and understood.

If it is completely respectable to speak about uneven development of capitalism, it should be equally acceptable to speak about uneven decline of feudalism (which is really a different way of saying the same thing about capitalism's rise). Let us use "feudalism" in the common Marxist understanding of that term. It is quite obvious that feudalism's decline was taking place unevenly, not only unevenly in space, which is self-evident, but also unevenly in different spheres or aspects of any given society (state, region, province). It would follow from these obvious statements that there are different roads from feudalism.

Depending on which aspect of the feudal society declined first and/or most, we might observe that in some countries (regions, states) feudalism declined first in the economy, in others first in culture, and in others yet in the political sphere, in the structure and form of the state and law. It is not necessary at all even for a Marxist to assume that in all countries economic and social change preceded the other kinds of change. Indeed, few, if any, make this assumption.

No one seems to have any problems with admitting that in some pre-modern, or "feudal," societies modernization--"capitalism"--was often promoted by the state. Even in western Europe itself, the home of "classic" capitalism, the rise of the modern state began before the Industrial Revolution. This circumstance explains why once capitalism arose it was confined as it were within the state system. When Anthony Giddens observes that "there has been no capitalist society which has not also been...a nation-state," he notes this undisputable fact that the emergence of "capitalist societies" occurred within the framework of nation-states.²

It seems much more difficult to get across the point that in some other cases the sphere of "culture" may "run ahead" not only of the economy but also of the state. Or, to put it still differently, that in some cases even when the state promotes one form of a modern "capitalist" society, "culture" may promote another. Hroch insists on defining civil society in terms of social classes. But in western Europe "civil society" never was that, or just that.³

It was along with modern state--but independently of it--that "civil society" was formed in western Europe. It did not base itself exclusively or primarily on economic classes, however, nor did it define itself in terms of economic interests. When they spoke of civil society, according to John Keane, such figures as de Tocqueville (and Ferguson, Paine, and Hegel before him) included such "forms of civil association...as scientific and literary circles, schools, publishers, inns, manufacturing enterprises, religious organizations, municipal associations and independent households," and viewed them as "crucial barriers against both political despotism and social unfreedom and inequality."⁴

"Civil society," as we see, does not have to be understood as simply another name for a class society under capitalism, which Hroch's position seems to imply. Moreover, we might also think of a society defined by cultural ties, a culture-society, a Bildungsgesellschaft, that "as yet" has neither a "corresponding" economy nor an independent state structure to crown its program. In due course it became a Bildungsnation.⁵

It is well-known that in the conditions of absolutism, "feudalism," economic backwardness, low levels of communication, in eastern Europe and in east-central Europe, the civil society of the Western kind did not arise, and that a civil society of the German kind was slow in growing. Even when industrialization did take place, as it did in late nineteenth-century Russia, there was no "civil society" of either the western nor the "German" kind, if civil society implies legal rights and freedoms. In the West, as John Keane points out in his essay on "Despotism and Democracy," "civil society" had defined itself versus "the state," and civil society and the state were viewed as distinct entities, with the former being independent of the state. In Germany, on the other hand, "the state is viewed as the progenitor of bürgerliche Gesellschaft, its guardian, educator and punisher."⁶ (And in Russia, we might add, the state tried to prevent or at least delay the formation of even a "German-style" civil society.)

In the area east of Germany and to the west of Russia proper, we find an even more interesting case than Germany's in the rise of a civil society that was independent of the state and operated in another dimension, as it were. That civil society was born and operated in the sphere of culture, not economy: it promoted the growth of the relations of communication rather than those of production. (Of course, it had an economic side, and that side was vitally important. But it was not the business of selling books but the content of the books disseminated that was historically significant.) It is commonly called ethnic nation. In sketching out "the lineages" of the ethnic nation, it is illuminating to draw on some concepts developed by Karl W. Deutsch, especially his use of the fundamental distinction between "society" and "culture."

Society, writes Deutsch, is "a group of individuals united by the division of labor: persons who have learned to work together." Deutsch further explains what society is: "This division of labor is based on social institutions and technology, that is, on men's learned habits to work with each other in particular patterns of teamwork ('social institutions' or 'relationships of production,' in the language of the various schools of thought) and to work in particular ways with particular types of physical equipment on particular aspects of physical nature ('science' and 'technology')." Culture, on the other hand, is "based on the community of communication, consisting of socially stereotyped patterns of behavior, including habits of language and thought, and carried on through various forms of social learning." Deutsch further explains: "Patterns of culture have sometimes been described under the name of 'national character.'"⁸

When people have a common culture, they share a "set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities," including preferences and priorities "in their thoughts and feelings." A common culture becomes the basis of a community:

Many of the preferences may involve communication; it is usually easier for men to communicate within the same culture than across its boundaries. Insofar as a common culture facilitates communication, it forms a community....⁹

And:

a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services.¹⁰

As we look at the historical circumstances of early modern western Europe, we discover that owing to the invention of printing, the production and dissemination of information and thus the formation of culture had been put on a modern, industrial basis about three centuries prior to a comparable industrial transformation of society in the Industrial Revolution. Society became modern only after the production and distribution of material goods had been put on an industrial basis. Before this happened, modern

cultural communities, nations, had been formed owing to the printing revolution. The "relations of communication" established "unified fields of exchange," that is, closed cultural markets, and these subsequently restricted the operation of relations of production and exchange. Also the rise of the state had analogous and comparable consequences for the working of the economy.

In western Europe these processes of modernization in politics, culture, and economy—with their corresponding spheres of relations of domination, communication, and production—took place more or less concurrently, at least in the sense that the contemporaries were not aware of, and drew no conclusions from, any "unevenness" of those developments.

In east-central Europe, modern print culture, and the linguistic community based on it, began to develop earlier, and did so faster, than the processes of economic or political modernization that were directed by other forces. Thus, when the cultural nationalists, all those Romantic "national awakeners" were up to something that deservedly earned them the name of "linguistic revolutionaries" and "philological incendiaries": they were the people who built culture-based communities, apart from the state, and often, if not always, also apart from the official bourgeois-dominated civil society that was based on classes and their organizations. These nationalists did so on behalf of emerging nations that did not yet possess a national bourgeoisie "of their own." To admit this seems to be quite compatible with the Marxist view of history and society, at least as it is formulated in the post-Gramscian West. One might add from another angle that after all we know on a good Marxist-Leninist authority that it is possible for proletarian parties to exist in those parts of the world lacking a proletariat. Might we not also allow that there could have existed—and did exist—national movements (which, the Marxist insist must be by definition bourgeois) before there was a national bourgeoisie for them to "speak for" and to represent? If intellectuals can speak for a proletariat that does not yet exist in any significant shape, why deny other intellectuals the right to speak for nations (and their "national bourgeoisies") before these so exist?

Thus, we conclude that there were two "roads from feudalism" (pre-industrial society) besides the "classical" one of the West where modern society and economy emerged "originally," without a conscious plan. One such road taken in "the shadow" of industrialization was political, the other cultural. Of course, these roads sooner or later converged at the same end point if they were to deserve the label of "bourgeois" a Marxist must pin on them: the point where they had to face the question of industrialization. But they arrived at that destination from different directions. In one case, a modernizing state promoted industrialization and cultural unification. In the other, a cultural intelligentsia, with a structure of cultural institutions it created and maintained, prepared the ground on which political and economic tasks would be addressed. It is impossible to find a case, however, in which a nationally conscious "national bourgeoisie" existed prior to the formation of a national cultural intelligentsia, a case where "national" factories and banks operated prior to the establishment of national newspapers, theaters, and schools. (We are,

of course, discussing stateless nations.)

Those culturally-based nationalist movements in the end survived and defeated both those nations that based themselves on the economically defined civil societies and those which were being formed under the aegis of the state. In central Europe, such defeated nations included the Germans and the Hungarians and the states that failed to create a "corresponding" nation, most notably included the Habsburg Monarchy. But such Bildungsnationen as the Czechs, Croats, Slovenes, and others survived with their national models even though at first they lacked both political and economic power.

What did cultural or linguistic nationalism have to offer to its potential constituencies that made those constituencies, or a large part of them, choose it over competing modern identities concurrently being offered in the political and economic spheres? Is it conceivable that the decision to define oneself as a Slovene rather than as a member of the historic--but now becoming bourgeois--German nation, or as a subject of the Empire, was for the native speaker of a Slovene dialect a more "natural" decision in the age of modernization, including industrialization?

Perhaps the answer lies in the connection between nationalism and individual psychology. This is a subject that scholars of nationalism have generally neglected. Gale Stokes, who is in this respect a rare exception among them, has written about the development of "a cognitive state which is especially well suited to responding to the appeals of nationalism."¹¹ Individuals who attain that state are capable of abstract, logical thought, writes Stokes. He calls those individuals "operational," and the quality they possess "operationalism."¹²

According to Stokes, there exists a special connection between community and language. It was natural that when large numbers of people were drawn to new uses of language, they became interested in language. Such persons felt "comfortable among people who manipulated abstractions in a readily understandable way." This explains, writes Stokes, "why the linguistic nation, not some larger group and not some smaller group, offered the most satisfying community to persons who were operational."¹³

Following Piaget, Stokes further argues that "operationalization" is attained at the age of, approximately, eleven to fifteen, in other words, in school. When children learn the necessary skills and attitudes not in school but by participating in activities where those skills and attitudes are employed, they fail to achieve "operationalism." On the other hand, "in societies in which industrial development has occurred, it is impossible to pass on all of the skills an adult will need in the direct, palpable way.... The universal solution to this difficult problem...has been the school." It is in school that the child learns "through the use of abstractions."¹⁴

To this one might add that the school of the kind described here can exist also in a society in which industrial development has not occurred; it may be a society existing, to use

Gellner's phrase, in "the shadow" of industrialism. In other words, in certain societies, and in certain circumstances, there may take place an advance in education, in culture broadly defined, before a comparable advance in industry. This would be the case with all "late developers": education makes them aware that other societies, "the West," are ahead.

But if this is so, we can appreciate that all those early "national awakeners," far from having been impractical and "romantic" dreamers detached from the real world, i.e., the worlds of politics and economy, were in a profound sense more practical and more "realistic" when they first turned their attention to language and school. By transforming their respective dialects into standard languages and demanding that these be taught in school and used in newspapers, journals, and books, in other words, in all the media in which the "operationalization" of the young generations was being carried out, those early nationalists were building new communities. Those communities, ethnic nations as we call them now proved to be more enduring than the ties established by politics or economics. When a person became literate in school in, say, Slovene or Czech, he or she acquired a modern identity through school and "culture" broadly defined before entering the adult world where other language (or languages) dominated and where also competing political and economic bonds prevailed.

As we noted, the "operationalization" of individuals through education and literacy did not have to wait for the rise of modern industry. Printing made possible an expanded literacy and education, and their political and social consequences. It preceded the industrialization of production processes in western and central Europe, so that when industrialization did occur under the impact of the Industrial Revolution in the west, there already existed relatively modern cultural communities based on the community of language. One notable example of such a community with an old print culture, long before it became industrial in any real sense was Poland, with Polish becoming a highly developed language as early as the sixteenth century. Those culture-bound communities were initially quite small in proportion to the total population, but they were capable of admitting the masses when the circumstances became favorable. When the masses did go to school, or learned to read and write in some other way, they were "nationalized" by Polish nationalism, instead of being made "German" by the bourgeois society or "Russian" by the state or class-conscious "proletarians" by Marxism. Emblematically, this is the story, or at least a major side of the story, of the Polish nation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It applies even more strongly to the Czechs, Slovenes, Croats, and others, all of whom lacked the political and social prerequisites enjoyed by the Poles as a "historical" nation.¹⁵

This discussion has so far led to the conclusion that the adoption of nationality was the means for becoming a person capable of functioning in a modern society, and not the choice of a class interest. When Heinz-Gerhard Haupt asks whether nationalism emerged in history to meet certain fundamental needs of the individual or only served political interests of specific social groups, he addresses precisely this issue (and seems to be reaching, in different words, the conclusion arrived at by Stokes). Haupt asks: was nationalism a "politically polyvalent ideology" (eine politisch polyvalente Ideologie) that

could be used for diverse ends? He is inclined to recognize this latter view and refers to Hans Mommsen's comments that while national solidarity has arisen historically, and thus presumably was related to this or that particular class interest, it has acquired a "quasi-anthropological" status. Consequently, national solidarity is an expression of "irreducible historicity" of concrete individuals (Ausdruck der unaufhebbaren Geschichtlichkeit der konkreten Individuen) and as such it necessarily transcends their class situation.¹⁶

In a still different idiom, Gellner writes something compatible with both Stokes's and Haupt's arguments when he says that "the requirements of communication in the new intellect-intensive mode of production presuppose a shared, literate, education-transmitted culture, in the tradition of Gutenberg and Luther." All we need to add is that some of these cultural "requirements" may be met before the economic circumstances "require" them. Nationalism in central and eastern Europe (as I argue in my book) was precisely concerned with creating that new kind of culture. It undertook that job, at least in some cases, before it had become necessary for many people to communicate "in the intellect-intensive mode of production." The brightest among nationalist thinkers and activists in the less-developed nations, such as Friedrich List, were aware of what was going on abroad--in "the West"--and anticipated these needs and requirements. Nationalism thus wrote its own play. It called for a behavior of men and women different from that prescribed by Marx for the historical stage.

The trouble with Marx was, it would seem, that the "play" Marx described--and the one in which the main actor, the proletariat, was to speak lines written by Marx--was not the only show going on the world stage. Another play, one that had begun earlier, was being concurrently performed on that stage. That play's dramatis personae were nations, and its Act One was about nation formation or, as his contemporaries called it, "National Revival." That process is the subject of a well-known and highly regarded book by Hroch.¹⁷ The bourgeoisie is conspicuously absent in Hroch's account of the formative stages of that process.

That nationalist "play" was written by many different hands, but List was certainly the author of some of its most powerful lines. In the drama of history as viewed and written by List, nations or, to be more precise, nations organized in states were the principal actors, the dramatis personae. Nations were those late developers about whom (and for whom) List wrote; they were the actors in an unequal exchange under the rules of Free Trade. List wanted them to become also the dramatis personae in the drama of industrialization. He wanted them to combine Free Trade at home with protectionism in foreign trade.

Gellner writes that this Listian program, which Marx chose to attack as an "absurdity" when applied to Germany,

turned out to be the crucial reality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was both feasible and terrifyingly effective. Worse still: the actual historic role of Marxism in the form in which it actually came to be implemented in

the real world, was Listian. The national road to either capitalism or socialism was not only possible, but mandatory. It was the national path to industrialism which was essential.

Gellner clearly believes that history followed List's, not Marx's, scenario: List's prediction was confirmed by the subsequent events.

However hard this may be for the Marxist to accept, it is often--by no means always--the case that "economics" follows "politics," which in turn is first given its direction by "culture." In my book I have cited several authors about the original "invention" of a "cultural" Germany in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One author I did not quote but who also thought so was Max Weber. He questioned the view that "the formation as well as the expansion of Great Power structures is always and primarily determined economically." "Germany," he wrote, "has been made into a unified economic territory only through custom frontiers at her borders, which, in their course, were determined in a purely political manner." And further:

Were all custom barriers eliminated, the economically determined market for the Eastern German cereal surplus, poor in gluten, would not be Western Germany but rather England.... Western Germany is not, in the main, the economically determined supplier of the industrial products for Eastern Germany.... Eastern Germany...would be the economic location for strong industries, the economically determined market and hinterland for which would be the whole of Western Russia.¹⁸

In Weber's opinion, Germany was "politically united against the economic determinants as such." Once the political bond was created, however, based on the existence of a common language, "nobody would even think of political separation because of... economic tensions. This applies, for instance, to Germany."¹⁹

The cultural nationalists were responsible not only for a concept of nation to which they sought to adjust politics and economy. They succeeded in persuading the workers, whom Marx had cast in a principal role in his play, to perform in the nationalist drama. Hroch recognizes that once "the proletariat in capitalist society obtained access to education and therefore to the cultural community of the nation to which it belonged ethnically," it ceased "to be only international" and became "integrated into national communities." He insists, however, that "allegiance to a nation could, but need not, have automatically meant the abandonment of internationalism," although "it became a lasting source of antagonism within the working class movement."

Valuable though Hroch's admissions are, one must take him on for his statement on the proletariat's "ceasing to be only international" as it became integrated "into national communities." It is a pious myth, of which Marx had been the originator, that the proletariat was in its original shape, and in its essence, a supranational class. Hroch repeats

it. Even Marxist scholars admit these days that the proletariat never was international and certainly it had not been so before it became "nationalized." Eric J. Hobsbawm admits this without any equivocation: "The alternative to a national political consciousness was not, in practice, 'working-class internationalism' but a sub-political consciousness which still operated on a scale much smaller than, or irrelevant to, that of the nation-state."²⁰

NOTES

1. Unless identified in a footnote, all references to the ideas of Ernest Gellner, Miroslav Hroch, or Gale Stokes concern their contributions to this collection.

2. Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, Vol. II of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 141. See also Giddens, Power, Property, and the State, Vol. I of A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), pp. 186-96.

3. Hroch's understanding of civil society is very different from the contemporary Western Marxists' usage. It was Gramsci who argued that "In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous." (See Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State [London: NLB, 1974] p. 358.) Obviously, Gramsci had in mind legal and cultural rules and structures, and not the bare class relations.

4. John Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," in John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London and New York: Verso, 1988), p. 61.

5. Hillel J. Kieval, The Making of Czech Jewry (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 7, writes: "In 1844 David Kuh...urged Czech leaders to look to the as-yet unassimilated mass of Bohemian Jews as a valuable reservoir of talent to draw in the creation of their own Bildungs nation."

6. Keane, "Despotism and Democracy," p. 39.

7. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 29.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

11. Gale Stokes, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. IV, no. 4 (Spring 1974), p. 530.

12. Stokes, "Cognition," p. 532. Stokes draws in this discussion on Jerome S. Bruner, "On Cognitive Growth: II," in Jerome S. Bruner et al., Studies in Cognitive Growth (New York, 1966), p. 46.

13. Stokes, "Cognition," p. 533.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 537.

15. On the impact of printing and literacy on the transformation of "peasants into Poles," see William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, a sociological classic originally published in 1918, an abridged edition by Eli Zaretsky (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), especially the chapter on "The Wider Community and the Role of the Press."
16. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, "Nationalismus als Emanzipationsideologie? Zur neueren Nationalismusforschung in der Bundesrepublik," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, vol. XXIV (1984), pp. 576-88, esp. pp. 577-80.
17. Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations, trans. by Ben Fowkes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
18. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans., ed., and with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C. Wrights Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 162.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
20. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital, p. 100, quoted in Communism and Nationalism, pp. 186-87.

THE DRAMATIS PERSONAE OF HISTORY

Ernest Gellner

Around the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it became obvious that west European society was undergoing radical, structural change. It was radical in that the fundamental principles of organization were changing, and that the very spirit of men was being transformed. Such change is totally unlike mere rotation of personnel within a more or less stable structure or changes in structure which merely amount to a bit more of this and a bit less of that. The transformation was far more fundamental. It was also of more than merely local and temporary significance. It revealed what man really was and what he could be. It seemed to be the highly conspicuous and illuminating culmination of a long and pointed story. The message had not been visible to earlier generations: now it acquired a high profile. The story was endowed with a plot, and one which bode well for mankind as a whole. All in all, things were getting better, and would continue to do so. The idea of Progress was born.

At the same time, under the impact of philosophic and scientific ideas disseminated by the Enlightenment, religious belief was becoming intellectually more difficult to sustain. The conjunction of these two themes—loss of faith in a transcendent and personal God and the acquisition of faith in a happy earthly destiny—inevitably blended and almost irresistibly pointed to an obvious solution: if God was not available, but pervasive Progress was, could not Progress deputize for God?

The idea, which seemed manifest and persuasive, found its most influential expression in the philosophy of Hegel. This thinker combined a fine metaphysical sweep and historical suggestiveness with impenetrably obscure and ambiguous prose. This had the inestimable advantage of failing to make clear whether the guiding spirit of history was replacing the God of Abraham, or was merely a continuation of the same deity under another name. Readers could suit themselves and choose an interpretation consonant with their temperament, position, or mood. The ambiguity of the position was part and parcel of its essence and its appeal.

There are countless questions which arise for the new vision. One is fundamental: what exactly are the units or sub-units in terms of which the structural transformations of human society are to be characterized? Structural change of human society means, if it means anything, some basic alteration in the relationship of the parts or elements of which

mankind is composed. The dramatis personae of history change their positions relative to each other. But who or what exactly are those dramatis personae? This question is the subject of a remarkably new study in the history of ideas, Roman Szporluk's Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List.¹

There are two principal candidates for the crucial role: classes and nations. Marxism notoriously opts for the former. If one were allowed but one sentence to define the central intuition of Marxism, one would naturally choose the famous sentence from The Communist Manifesto: All history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

What does it mean to say that human society is universally pervaded by class struggle? On the surface, it is not remotely true. Visible conflict between social strata does indeed occur in some places, for instance in the course of plebeian, peasant, or slave uprisings, but just as frequently, it is absent. In many societies and at many times, diverse strata accept their station and its duties, and there is at least no manifest and visible conflict between them. Lateral conflict between stratified neighboring societies, where the strata fight not for themselves but for the geographic unit of which they are part, are much more common. The Marxist counter-affirmation that class conflict is nevertheless latent, similar to Hobbes' claim that states are ever at war with each other, even when they are not, seems to have the following concrete, empirical content: contrary to a variety of mollifying ideologies, the actual class structure is neither stable, nor permanent, nor genuinely in the interests of all the parties concerned. There is nothing to enforce or guarantee it permanently. The class structure only reflects the current and unstable, transitory condition of the forces of production. But the state of the forces of production will not remain as it now is. Hence the class structure itself will also not remain stable. Neither is there a need, let alone any justification, for the participants to treat it as such. Hostilities are bound to reopen, and only false consciousness misrepresents an informal truce as a permanent human and social condition. Change is the law of all things, and the essence of social change is the transformation of class structures. The inherent instability of class relations means that the occupants of diverse social positions will not merely have the opportunity, but also the inescapable destiny, of eventually seeing them changed. They owe no loyalty to their station and its duties. The system of stations is undergoing ineluctable change, and it is only the final, unstructured, classless destination, and not the current status quo with its spurious air of permanence, which can claim our enlightened and justified allegiance.

If social stability were a fact or even a genuine possibility, the affirmation that latent conflict lurks under the facade of harmony or accommodation, would become a somewhat empty and quasi-metaphysical claim. If, as many right-wing people believe, the need for stratification is inherent in human nature, the stress on conflict of interests could only alert men to the possibility of a rotation of personnel in the social hierarchy. It would still be possible for the first to be last, and the last to be first: but it would not be possible to abolish the division of society into those who are first and those who are last. It is the affirmation of the possibility of radically changing the kind of stratification, and of abolishing it altogether, which endows the relatively trivial (because it is obvious) perception that some

social positions are more attractive than others, with a really interesting and novel content. The cutting edge and content of the affirmation of the perennial presence of the class conflict is not the truism that social positions are differentiated, and that some are more advantageous than others, but the untrivial perfection that the system of positions is unstable and bound to change—plus the very highly contentious idea that it is possible, or ultimately inevitable, for mankind to manage without any such system at all. The important Marxist claim is not that men occupy very diverse social roles, but the novel claim that those who occupy fixed and unequal positions are in conflict with each other, even if they know it not. The contingent return of stratification is underscored by a sociological theory which links it to the state of the forces of production, and the claim that at a certain level of development of those forces, stratification is neither necessary nor possible. The Marxist affirmation of the unappeasable nature of class conflict contains the denial of two harmony doctrines, pervasively influential at the time that Marxism was born: the liberal doctrine that the Hidden Hand of the free market operates in everyone's favor, and the conservative doctrine that a peace-keeping state maintains the balance even-handedly, in the interest of all the constituent parts of society.

What is more, in this formulation much of what is said seemed valid. Without necessarily accepting specific Marxist doctrines, still less the doctrine that a genuinely classless society is feasible, it is indisputably true that no particular class structure is permanent, and that the way in which society sub-divides its members into sub-groups is indeed subject to radical change. It is in no way inscribed into the eternal nature and order of things. There is no valid ideological justification of any one social order, and no one balance of power underlying a given order is permanent. It is still possible to find conservatives who maintain that inequality is justified simply by the claim that it is inevitable: possibly so, but the forms of inequality are legion. They vary a great deal, and the variety is a legitimate object both of scholarly curiosity and political manipulation. We are not destined to endure any single one of them, even if we cannot escape all of them.

This much, then, is shared ground: social structure is a variable and not a datum. It is neither fixed nor normative. But it does not in any way follow from this that the really crucial oppositions, which constitute the key to understanding historic change, is conflict between classes, rather than human sub-divisions of some other kind. It is anything but self-evident. Under the impact of Darwinism, for instance, the idea that history is the story of struggle between genetically distinct populations, some better endowed than others, once again became fashionable and politically influential.

This is the backbone of Szporluk's book: given that history is a process in which the relationships of sub-groups or sub-population to each other do change, exactly which sub-groups are to be selected as crucial? Which memberships, which loyalty really matters? Why classes rather than nations?

For Marxism, the role of human subgroups arises at two quite distinct levels. These might be called the Social Metaphysics and the Historical Sociology of Marxism. Szporluk's

book is very interesting about the social metaphysics of Marxism. Intermediate human classifications--religious, political, or ethnic--standing between man and humanity at large, all constitute forms of undesirable alienation. Szporluk quotes from a statement of Engels made in 1848:

The nationalities of the peoples who joined together... will be...compelled by this union to merge with one another and thereby supersede themselves as the various differences between estates and classes disappear through the superseding of their basis--private property.

Unambiguously, the future was to be nationless as well as classless and religionless. The social metaphysic of Marx and Engels is a very curious mixture of individualist anarchism and a pan-human communalism. National divisions, like ones of class and religion, are ultimately spurious, and constitute obstacles preventing man from realizing his species-being, wherein his true fulfillment lies. His real destiny is to be free of the constraints imposed on him by the membership of class, ethnic, or religious categories, and indeed, by any social roles. At the same time, he will somehow be automatically incorporated in a harmonious universal community. The precise nature of the Hidden Hand which is to perform this latter miracle was not elaborated by the Founding Fathers of Marxism.

So there are, as it were, two levels of spuriousness, radically different in their significance. Nations and classes are equally excluded from the true human essence, and, together with religion, are destined for extinction. But while all such alienating, intermediate, constraining categorizations of man are spurious, some are more spurious than others. Class may be philosophically, ultimately spurious, but it is not historically or sociologically spurious. Anything but. History is the history of class struggle. It is not, or only superficially, the history of national struggles.

In order to understand both the mechanics of human alienation and those of human liberation, we need to analyze it in class terms. Among the ultimately spurious divisions of mankind, class nevertheless has a special causal efficacy, both in the production of alienating social relations and in the eventual liberation from them. It constitutes an obstacle to our fulfillment, and it is an important, weighty obstacle. The other categorizations, ethnic or religious ones for instance, are indeed obstacles, but are not, in themselves, very important. They are merely superficial manifestations of the real hindrances to the consummation of history. Class is noxious, but historically relevant. The other categorizations suffer from the double indignity of being both noxious and unimportant. And it is the proletariat, as a very special class, in but not of civil society, which will liberate mankind from class-endowed society altogether.

The Marxist mistakes in social metaphysics and in sociology converge on what, of course, is the single, most crucial, and disastrous error in the system. The supposition that the communist social order will require no political organization but will, in some unexplained way, be self-adjusting, that it will be guided, in an even more powerful and

mysterious form, by that Hidden Hand which the liberals, in their more modest way, only attributed to a well-insulated economic sphere—all that follows both from the metaphysical dismissal of all human sub-categorizations in general, and from the more immediate sociological exclusion of ethnic and political ones from the effective causal machinery of social change and stability. The sad consequence is that societies living under the banner of Marxism are simply deprived of any idiom in which even to discuss their political predicament. If power relations, as distinct from class relations, are irrelevant or will disappear, there is no need, indeed, there is no warrant, for codifying their proper and legitimate limits and deployment. The Kingdom of Gods needs no constitutional law. If, on the other hand, politics are in fact indispensable under any form of human organization, and if the human species-essence possesses none of the miraculous capacities for fulfillment in harmonious or at least non-antagonistic work with which Marx credited it, then we are in trouble. The same is true if ethnicity is similarly indispensable. Marxist societies do, in fact, discuss the "national question," but are greatly constrained ideologically in what they can say about it. As for the political form of communist society, they cannot really discuss it at all.

The main question which Szporluk particularly addresses, and the discussion for which he invokes Friedrich List, is not the overall, metaphysical irrelevance of all human sub-classifications. It is the more specific and immediate dismissal of ethnic and ethno-political ones from the account of historical development. Here he claims not merely that List was right and Marx wrong, but also that latter-day Marxists have unwittingly become crypto-Listians. Look out for listig practices, to use Marx's pun (listig = cunning).

Why was it that Marx and Engels chose social classes rather than nations as the subdivisions of mankind in terms of which the true plot of history was to be mapped out? One can think of a number of obvious reasons:

(1) It was a corollary to their social metaphysics in which the proletariat was a special class, liberated by its distinct condition from allegiance to all and every alienating sub-group identification. Hence it was destined to be the carrier, the embodiment, as well as the agent, of universal human liberation, of the emergence of the true human species-being. It is not clear how a social metaphysic, postulating nations as the building blocks of mankind, could plausibly single out any one nation as the liberator of all the others. A class whose members are, by their very social position, deprived of and liberated from the constraints which the social order otherwise imposes on men, could reasonably be singled out for the special role of savior, without introducing an offensively arbitrary symmetry into the system.

(2) A second reason is product differentiation. Inter-polity and inter-ethnic conflict was commonplace. Everyone knew it happened. Conventional historiography was preoccupied with it almost to the exclusion of all else; it has occurred for a very long time, and one could hardly claim any originality if one stressed it. Such a claim could not possibly be presented as the unmasking of a hitherto hidden, latent meaning of history.

(3) The undeniable fact that conflict between political units and sometimes between ethnic groups has been going on for so long made it hard to invoke as the explanation of the new and dramatic structural changes in west European societies. Some of these changes, notably the Industrial Revolution in England, were, in the main, internal to single polities, and not primarily connected with inter-political or inter-ethnic conflicts. The basic transformations accompanying the first Industrial Revolution manifested themselves as changes in the class structure, not ethnic structure. Class relations and their changes were more plausible candidates for the dramatis personae of current history at least. Marx and Engels then extrapolated and concluded that they also had been the real underlying factors responsible for the slower and less visible structural changes of the past. Only class conflict could explain current change, and if all historical change was to be explained by a single principle, then this had better be it. Inter-ethnic or inter-political conflict was merely the conspicuous but irrelevant froth on the surface. The outcome of such conflicts only determined, presumably, the identity of personnel occupying diverse positions (e.g., identities of masters and slaves, of lords and serfs). It did not affect the social structures themselves.

On the basis of the evidence available and conspicuous in the early nineteenth century, the Marxist conclusion is certainly reasonable. The view that the Industrial Revolution was the most important thing that was happening at the time was eminently sensible. There is no obvious logical link between the Industrial Revolution and inter-ethnic conflict. It is possible to claim that English loot from India played a part in the Industrial Revolution, but it would be absurd to claim it as the cause. The English were not the only conquerors to loot India, and the other conquerors did not use the loot to fuel industrial development. As for the fine English record in the eighteenth-century wars with France--the score was 4:1--it reflected, rather than caused, English economic development.

If, thereupon, in Hegelian spirit, one is to seek a single overall key to history, it is natural to conclude that earlier structural changes also had been constituted by intra-social transformations of the relations between strata, rather than by inter-polity or inter-ethnic conflict. The inference has a certain plausibility. It is not at all clear why the ethnic identity of occupants of diverse social positions should make much difference to the system as such, in other words, to the class structure. By contrast, the supposition that the kind of structure that is imposed on society is determined by the available forces of production has great appeal and plausibility. For various reason, it is not fully cogent. For instance, there is no guarantee that the underlying mechanism of social change is similar in all the great historic transformations. Nor is it obvious (or indeed true) that the available forces of production uniquely determine the class structure of the society dependent on those forces. But, cogent or not, the central Marxist intuition about the deep structure of historical change had enormous plausibility. In the light of the Industrial Revolution, the view that classes, not nations, are the real dramatis personae of history is exceedingly natural and persuasive. If it needed correction, the story of that rectification deserves to be told, and in Szporluk's book we are offered it.

Szporluk's main claim on behalf of his hero, List, is that he was the first to perceive

clearly that the central Marxist intuition, notwithstanding its inherent plausibility in the light of the Industrial Revolution, was misguided. List is credited with at least two distinct perceptions by Szporluk:

(1) A social ontology which makes nations the eternal and legitimate sub-division of mankind. "For List," says Szporluk, "the division of humanity into nations was the central truth." He quotes List as affirming that "'between each individual and entire humanity...stands the NATION'." On the nature of nationality, as the intermediate interest between those of individualism and of entire humanity, my whole structure is based" (p. 115).

(2) A more specific sociological doctrine concerning the diffusion of the benefits of industrialism, which confers a special importance on ethnic groups.

Szporluk's expositions of List make it appear, very convincingly, that, at any rate, for List, the first perception, (1), is an essential premise for the second, (2). The distinction between the two levels corresponds roughly to the distinction in Marxism between what I called its social metaphysics, the ultimate irrelevance or illegitimacy of all human subdivisions, and its sociology, the irrelevance of nations in comparison with classes, in understanding the mechanics of the "pre-history" and the social condition in which we are still enmeshed.

Now it seems to me that in so far as List does, indeed, treat (1) as a necessary premise for (2), he is misguided. Hence, Szporluk's evaluation of List is over-generous. It fails to chide him for this mistake. The evidence offered by Szporluk quotes List as pronouncing that nations are "eternal" (sic). He also observes that "(m)odern, that is political (and not only linguistic), nations for List were a relatively recent phenomenon." This rather leaves it open for one to credit List with the view that the kind of nations characteristic of the nineteenth century were not eternal after all, but were engendered by the process of diffusion of industrialism which concerned List. On such an interpretation, (1) ceases to be an indispensable and relevant premise. It is the kind of nation engendered by recent industrialism, or the shadow cast by its coming, that is relevant for understanding the diffusion of the new industrial order. If this is so, we can dispense with nations as the alleged "eternal" accompaniments of social life. The nature of industrialism contains all the premises we need, and the eternity of nations does not concern us, one way or the other. This happens to be my view of the matter. My own guess would be that List was less than clear in his own mind whether or not he really needed (1) in order to establish (2). My own belief is that (1) is neither true in itself nor necessary as a premise for List's perfectly valid conclusions concerning the diffusion of industrialism, and that List's failure to be clear on this point constitutes a weakness in his thought.

The point of overlap between List and the founding fathers of Marxism is the perception of the invalidity of the legitimating ideology of the new industrial order, i.e., of the laissez-faire doctrine of Free Trade. According to this doctrine, unrestrained economic

competition is eventually beneficial for everyone. The flaw in the argument is that those who enter the free market do not do so on equal terms. Some are constrained by their weakness to accept unfavorable terms. List's rejection of the optimistic liberalism, which would turn all mankind into beneficiaries of the free market, is somewhat more ambivalent and restrained than that of the Marxists. Initially, List questioned the doctrine because, though it would work only if all participant units observed the rules and some in fact fail to do so, the others need to protect themselves against such free or early riders.

But he moved on to a more radical repudiation of a generalized economic liberalism, based on the need to protect late developers. The Marxist rejection of the liberal model is, of course, inspired by the conviction that unequal terms were not a contingent flaw, but an inherent and necessary feature of the system: even if inequality of strength were absent at the start (which it was not), the sheer natural workings of the system would ensure its appearance and its aggravation. There was not special need to protect late developers, in so far as their suffering would be no worse than that of the victims of early, and hence, more painfully protracted development of capitalism.

This is one of the crucial points in the argument: the role of the state as an essential, indispensable protector of late economic developers. It is here that early Marxism confronted List, in The Communist Manifesto. Contrary to the widespread view that Marxism simply underestimated and hence largely ignored nationalism, Szporluk maintains that an important section of the Manifesto is devoted to an implicit onslaught on and polemic with List, and that only Harold Laski had actually noticed this. "If Laski is right," Szporluk writes, "The Communist Manifesto is... also an 'antinationalist manifesto' by someone who had confronted German nationalism through the works of its main spokesman--Friedrich List" (p. 62).

Marx had not only learned about nationalist theory from List, ironically, as Szporluk stresses, it was through this nationalist critic of cosmopolitan liberalism that Marx first learned about laissez faire economics. He had been initiated into the teaching of that school by a rival critic whom, however, he also heartily despised. List, according to Marx, "despite all his boasting...has put forward not a single proposition that had not been advanced long before him.... Only the illusions and idealizing language...belong to Herr List" (p. 39). For Marx, List was simply repeating arguments initially propounded in defense of the Napoleonic Continental System. As Szporluk observes: "So much for the cause of national unification and economic modernization of Germany--some practical results of which Marx would live long enough to see with his own eyes" (p. 39).

This is the heart of the matter: the relation between nationalism and industrialization. Szporluk's message is: Marx got it wrong and List got it right. Moreover, latter-day Marxists are really crypto-Listians. Marxism was used to protect late industrializers by providing them with a national-political shell.

Marx expressed himself in favor of Free Trade with contemptuous irony, because it "breaks up old nationalities and carries antagonism of proletariat and bourgeoisie to the uttermost point. In a word, the Free Trade system hastens the Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone.... I am in favor of Free Trade" (p. 41). He was quite clear about nationalism: "The nationality of the worker is neither French, not English, nor German, it is labor... His government is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is capital. His native air is neither French, nor German, nor English, it is factory air" (p. 35).

Marx did see that the protectionism commended by List was intended to enable the German bourgeoisie to develop its own "national road to capitalism" (Szporluk's phrase): that much is common ground. Where they differed was that he did not think they had any chance of succeeding. Free Trade internally, protectionism outwardly, he held to be a contradiction, and the idea of nationalism was simply the smoke screen intended to hide the absurdity of it all from those who propounded it.

In the event the alleged absurdity turned out to be the crucial reality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was both feasible and terrifyingly effective. Worse still: the actual role of Marxism in the form in which it actually came to be implemented in the real world, was Listian. The national road to either capitalism or socialism was not only viable, but mandatory. It was the national path to industrialism that was essential. Capitalism and socialism are single variants of it--though one may add that capitalism seems considerably more efficient and commits the society undergoing it to far less false consciousness concerning its own organization than does socialism.

Szporluk is interesting on Marx's view on national backwardness. Germany was in Marx's view a curious case, an anachronism: an overturning of the established order in Germany in 1843 would hardly bring the country up to the French level of 1789. In philosophy, on the other hand, Germany was altogether up-to-date, if not ahead of its time. Marx had his own and Engels' ideas in mind. This backwardness and uneven development, according to Szporluk's exegesis of Marx, could not be corrected by economic insulation, intended to enable German economic-political development to catch up: on the contrary, it was to be overcome by a stage-jumping, effected by the submersion of German history in a universal history. The non-national liberating class was just becoming ready even in Germany, though the signal for the revolution was to come from France. It was the German bourgeoisie and its ideologue List who were misguided in wishing to propel Germany through what were later to become the canonical Marxist historical stages, or at any rate as far as the capitalist stage, be striving for capitalism-in-a-single-country and by using the spurious idea of nationalism for so doing. A sociological chimaera was being propounded in the name of a spurious patriotism, or so Marx thought.

All this does, of course, throw fascinating light, as Szporluk notes, on what was later to happen in Russia:

Marx did not admit the possibility of a national road to capitalism...and had

nothing to say in favor of socialism in one country, because capitalism and communism were worldwide systems and could be treated only in a supranational setting.

So the whole problem of explaining how a revolution could occur in a backward country did not really arise. There was only a world system, and national boundaries were not of any profound importance. So the Russians need not have worried, and, as Szporluk says, they could have "saved themselves this argument, but only if they had first given up their concern for Russia and thought of themselves as members of the entire human race." Mind you, in the 1840s, Marx held the Russians, as Szporluk points out, to be excluded from the world-historical process altogether. By the end of the century, they were presumably included, as much as the Germans had been in the 1840s.

If Szporluk's account of Marx is correct, and it is certainly persuasive, then it is incumbent upon me to withdraw certain criticisms I have directed at the outstanding Soviet Marxist theoretician Yuri Semenov.² Semenov has tried to rehabilitate the Marxist notion of socio-economic formations and the associated concept of historic stages, and by implication to remove the puzzle concerning the occurrence of a communist revolution in backward Russia, by claiming that formations or stages applied not to individual nations but only to the global history of all mankind. It was never really intended to apply to single societies, and so the question addressed to Marxists--why are certain stages missing in the fates of this or that society--is inherently misguided. My comment was that the resulting theory was, indeed, ingenious and interesting, but not faithful to the spirit and intention of the Marxism of the Founding Fathers.³ It was, on the other hand, very well suited to the ideological needs of the contemporary Soviet Union. It provided a theoretical charter for the idea of historic leadership: if global stages were determined by the social form prevalent in the leading society, then the socialist stage needs a leader as much as any other, and (as is implied though not actually stated), what society better suited to exercise such leadership than the Soviet Union?

If Szporluk is right, a similar basic idea was already just as conspicuously present in Marx's thought in the 1840s, though no doubt for other reasons. It was Listian nationalism, not Marxism, which thought in terms of parallel but un-synchronized development. It was precisely the Marxist insistence on a single, unique world history that separated the two. The difference between Marx and Semenov, then, becomes one only of detail: Marx thought that it would be the blending of up-to-date (or ahead-of-time) German philosophy, i.e., his own, and a belated German proletariat, with the economic and political development of England and France, which would bring about the crucial revolution.

By contrast, Semenov, writing "at dusk" after history had revealed its design, can record the fact that the external late-coming catalyst was not Germany, but Russia. But the young Marx evidently believed that late-comers not merely need not, but actually could not pass through capitalism in its full and protracted form. Had he persisted in such a view, his replies to Vera Zasulich could have been more confident and less tentative. In fairness to

Semenov, it must be said that his argument at this point remains abstract, and does not actually name the country involved in the peripheral transition to socialism. He contents himself with pointing out the essential role of a backward periphery in leading mankind to a higher stage, noting that this had also been the pattern in the emergence of slave society and of feudalism. Hence, the periphery is central, not marginal, to historic change. Only capitalism, very eccentric in this respect, had been engendered endogenously.

If Marx was wrong, in what senses and to what extent did List get it right? The first thing to note about List is that he was a nationalist, but not a romantic. He welcomed, and did not repudiate, the Industrial Revolution. The nation was to be protected not by insulating it from industrialism, but, on the contrary, by adopting and mastering it. Romanticism noted the disruptive character of industrialism and capitalism, as did Marx, but reacted against it by proposing to keep it out. Marx thought it neither could nor should be kept out, but that on the far side of the havoc it wrought, there lay a new a beneficent order, a Gemeinschaft of all mankind, blending individual freedom with social harmony. (Why he confidently thought this and allowed himself irritable impatience with anyone refusing to share this rosy optimism, passes all understanding.)

List was original in wishing neither to keep industrialism out nor to submit to it, but to take it on by making it national. Not national socialism, but national capitalism was his end. This idea really contains two quite different components which must be separated:

- (1) The use of political institutions to protect and promote industrialization, and
- (2) The requirement that these political institutions be ethnic ones.

Very fundamental questions hinge on this, concerning the role of endogenous evolution and of lateral diffusion in historical transformation, and concerning the mechanisms of lateral change. Marxism is primarily endogenist-evolutionist, but ambivalently incorporates diffusionist elements, with questionable consistency. But the big question here is whether the agents of diffusion are (1) political or (2) ethnic, and what kind of ethnicity is involved. The correct answers seem to be "yes" twice over; and as for the kind of ethnicity involved, the correct answer is the educationally transmitted, literate, shared-culture of the modern industrial state, and not the Gemeinschaft-transmitted, pre-Gutenberg communalism of old.

The two requirements are logically quite separate. The second in no way automatically follows from the first. They need to be considered in turn, and one needs to ask why List embraced both of them. The argument for (1), in rough outline, is that without political aid and protection, industrial development in backward areas either does not take place at all or has intolerably disruptive and uneven side effects. It favors some but depresses many others, and the losers probably outnumber those who gain. Its social side effects are liable to be especially catastrophic.

But if all this be admitted, why should the political institution, the centralized state,

presiding over the development of a backward area, necessarily be a national one? What are the arguments for (2)? Why should it not be a non-national empire, such as that of the Habsburgs or the Ottomans? In fact, the Habsburg empire, or rather parts of it, did quite well industrially for a time. It is difficult to see how the Ottoman empire could have done it: its ethos was one which separated rulers and producers, in virtue of the principle expressed in the famous Circle of Equity, which claimed that rulers should keep the peace, that the ruled should sustain the rulers by producing a surplus, and that the two should not meddle in each other's affairs.⁴ The rulers were reluctant to soil themselves with production or, indeed, tolerate the enhanced wealth, power, and status of the producers, which would have inevitably followed on successful development. The ethnic distinctiveness, territorial discontinuity, and religious stigma of the most effective producers made it hard for them to cooperate with the rulers in the intimate, production-oriented manner required by modernization-from-above. But leaving aside the distinctive ethos of the Ottomans, it is not immediately clear why the developmental state, a Protector of Industry not of Faith, had to be a national one. I believe that this is indeed so, but the reasons are not self-evident, and the interesting question is: did List understand them? He saw that nationalism had to be economic, but did he also see that, and why, politically guided development had to be national?

I see no evidence in Szporluk's book that List properly understood the connection. Szporluk goes out of his way to provide List with a theory that he might have held, had he formulated in Hegelo-Marxist language: the nation "in itself" was a "permanent fixture of history" (Szporluk's phrase), but nations "for themselves" were new, and List tried to help Germans become one. To achieve this, a nation had to be a "community with cultural, as well as political and economic forms of collective existence." If "culture" here means a shared High (i.e., literate, educationally transmitted) Culture, then this does indeed correspond to the modern industrial or industrializing nation. But the correct question seems to me not whether a nation must become such a nation-for-itself if it is to survive (as a nation) in conditions of industrialism, but the obverse: does a viable economic-political unit, capable of surviving in these conditions, also need to be a national one?

The nearest Szporluk comes to giving evidence that List saw this connection is when he quotes List's comments on Adam Smith: "For [Adam Smith] no nation exists, but merely a community, i.e. a number of individuals dwelling together" (p. 137). His comment on Adam Smith's ethno-blindness implies that he himself was sensitive to the ethnic role in the growth of the wealth of nations. List was enormously perceptive about a number of things crucial in the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and of economic growth--the importance of the polity, of formal education and training, and of the administrative and cultural infrastructure for the economy. Knowledge, education, the cultural infrastructure, and bureaucratic support are all crucial and excessive concentration on labor and capital obscures it. Forging the political and cultural (hence eventually ethnic) framework is the key to late industrialism. The supposition that they will be dismantled, anticipated by Marxism, is the real chimaera--not ethnically defined protectionism, as Marx thought. In all this, List was superior to Marx, and much more prescient.

Using the elements List evidently possessed, a theory of nationalism could have been constructed. It would run something as follows: the disruption, which industrial production according to Marx engenders, is indeed inescapable. Industrial society is a melting pot, but it need not, and probably cannot, be one single global melting pot. The diffusion of industrialism needs political protection and guidance for backward areas. The state is a necessary but, or course, not a sufficient, condition for such diffusion: various forms of "dependency theory" make this plain.

Hence a number of insulated pots emerge. Inside each of them, however, the requirements of communication in the new intellect-intensive mode of production presuppose a shared, literate, educationally transmitted culture, in the tradition of Gutenberg and Luther. So the developmental state must also be a national one. This has nothing to do with whether nations are the eternal constituent elements of mankind. That claim is both ambiguous and questionable. It has everything to do with the way in which mobile occupants of roles in industrial society communicate with each other and perform their tasks, and the way they move from position to position. The mystique of traditional culture is an ideological irrelevance: the real clue is the technical effectiveness of a new, vernacular, literate, and educationally transmitted High Culture. Hence the inevitable diffusion of industrialism will not merely be political, but also national. The new nations-for-themselves may, but need not, correspond to pre-industrial nations-in-themselves.

Nations-for-themselves come into being by a distinctive industrial ethnogenesis, which makes highly selective use of the debris of pre-industrial nations-in-themselves. Its mechanisms are unrelated to those which produced and sustained old nations. There is no question of anything like a one-to-one correspondence, nor are all old nations destined to attain consciousness of themselves, and to be fortified by political institutions. Historic nations which have benefitted from, say, a scripturalist Reformation, or centralization by a script-oriented Confucian bureaucracy, may be especially well prepared for becoming modern nations, but that does not contradict my point. Marx and Engels were not so wrong in spurning nations that stood in the way of progress, for many ethnic groups are, indeed, eliminated on the way to industrialism. Marx and Engels, under the influence of their prejudices, happened to pick the wrong ones. But List clearly possessed both the premises, and even some of the conclusions, of a correct theory of modern nationalism. But he did not spell it out, or perceive with complete clarity, the full nature of the connection between the two.

NOTES

1. Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx vs. Friedrich List (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
2. "Theory of Socio-economic Formations and World History", in Soviet and Western Anthropology, Ernst Gellner, ed., (London: 1980).

3. "A Russian-Marxist Philosophy of History," in Soviet and Western Anthropology, Ernest Gellner, ed., (London: 1980).

4. See, for instance, Lucette Valensi, Venise et la Sublime Porte, Hachette, 1987

HOW MUCH DOES NATION FORMATION DEPEND ON NATIONALISM?

Miroslav Hroch

Roman Szporluk's book touches on a sensitive issue in the history of Marxist thought. Because of this, and because it is based on a broad knowledge of Marx's and Engels's works, it enhances the already rich literature dedicated to the problem of nations and nationalism. In the contrast between the views of Marx and Engels and Friedrich List, Szporluk sees in concentrated form the tension between internationalism and nationalism. He convincingly discusses the historical development of nations in the second half of the nineteenth century as being more consistent with List's ideas than with those of Marx and Engels in 1848, but he is less convincing in discussing why Marxist theory and practice allegedly abandoned an internationalist position in favor of "nationalism."

Szporluk's book has three components: a comparison of the views of Marx and List; a study of the mechanism of the rise of modern "nationalism"; and a presentation of the current state of views on the nationality problem in the Soviet Union. I will address only the first of these components, since the third abandons the field of history in favor of politics, for which I lack the knowledge and qualifications. I believe that Szporluk also lacks some of the prerequisites for it.¹

There is no point in enumerating here the things with which I agree and in developing at length my opinion that the book is inspiring, intelligently written, and well-founded, at least the first three-quarters of it. Instead, I will concentrate on the central points of Szporluk's analysis which I consider debatable, and on views I either do not share with Szporluk or which are not entirely clear to me.

It is obvious why Marx and List would differ in their attitudes toward social reality in the 1840s. Whereas List considered the rise and permanent existence of big national states a historical necessity, even the optimal type of development, Marx and Engels were concerned with the transformation of capitalism as a class society. Marx and Engels regarded the creation of national states as an unnecessary detour on the path to a universal society. But where national states already existed, Marx and Engels considered them historical givens which had to be reckoned with. Even when Engels in 1849 unambiguously rejected the right of small "non-historical" nations to a future independent existence, he also spoke about the "free development of all the reserves of the big nations." For this reason,

Szporluk errs by attributing to Marx the view that the state and the nation form an entity that cannot be analyzed "within itself" (p. 49). One need only recall Class Struggle in France, 18th Brumaire, and Engels's studies of Germany and Poland to realize that Marx and Engels could analyze issues in national frameworks. Furthermore, their predictions about the fate of the nation after the proletarian revolution are also not unequivocal. They expected the end of hostilities between nations and projected the merging of nations at some time in the future, but in many places where they spoke about concrete developmental issues, they recognized that nations would still exist in the future. Therefore, even in the period prior to 1848, I cannot accept without reservation Szporluk's assertion that Marx and Engels assumed that "hostility between nations will disappear together with the nations themselves" (p. 68). They unambiguously rejected a national future only for one group: nations under foreign political and economic rule. I shall return to this question later.

It seems to me that Szporluk overemphasizes the antagonism between Marx and List. I see no basic difference between young Marx's saying, "What the nations have done as nations they have done for human society" (p. 32), and List's words that the nation stands between the individual and humanity. Similarly, where Marx writes that the German philistine "puffs himself up into being the 'nation'" (p. 34), this is not to say that Marx negates the nation. He only criticizes the fact that the bourgeoisie passed off its interests as those of the whole nation while at the same time sacrificing the interests of the nation's other components (p. 40). Furthermore, in later life Marx and Engels revised their negative attitude toward the concept of nation. Szporluk does take note of this shift, but his desire to exaggerate the contrast between Marx and List leads him to devote far more attention to the radical views of the young Marx.

One of the difficulties of Szporluk's interpretation involves terminology. He is right when he states that Marx "never found time to present his understanding" of the term "nationality." We might add that the same thing could be said about the terms nation, peoples, and Völker. But a good deal can be inferred from the context in which these terms are used, as the classic of S.F. Bloom did so well.² Let me give at least one example. Szporluk regards as incomprehensible the contradiction between the following two statements in The German Ideology: "Big industry destroyed the peculiar individuality of various nations" and "The bourgeoisie of each nation retained national interests."³ Yet the explanation is quite simple. Nationality (Nationalität), as used here, means the remains of ethnic groups which did not have their own states or even their own ruling classes, whereas "nation" indicates a great nation which has its own state and a full social structure.

Another terminological problem centers on the term nation, which has a different meaning in French and/or English than it does in German or the Slavic languages. Unlike Marx and Engels, Szporluk, in the spirit of the English language, tends toward a spontaneous identification of the "state" with the "nation," although he is well aware of the difference between them. So, in his view, "nationalist movements" endeavored to create their own states, and he uses the term "nation-building" as a synonym for "state-building" (p. 158). This identity, however, was not generally true in the nineteenth century.

One should approach the texts of Marx and Engels as sources in the historical context in which they appeared. It is understandable that terms which were not precisely defined before 1850, such as nation, nationality, and Volk, might have been used somewhat differently in different situations. It is logical that in addresses delivered at the Festival of Nations in London, Marx and Engels would emphasize the prospect of a lasting fraternity rather than economic and commercial antagonisms among nations. It seems to me that Szporluk does not give sufficient weight to the fact the opinions and judgments can have different relevance according to the situation. One cannot place views expressed in theoretical analyses on the same level as those aired in the heat of a polemic, as was the case with Marx's criticisms of the political attitudes of the conservative leaders of national movements in 1848-49.

A more fundamental problem, and one common to Western historians in general, is Szporluk's effort to contrast "nationalism" and "communism." I do not believe that the problem he wishes to attack can be expressed by counterposing these two phenomena so boldly, just as it cannot be personalized into differences between Marx and List. One way to understand the contrast in which Szporluk is interested would be to hold up Marxism and bourgeois protectionism against each other. Or: in the relations between Marx and List, the contradiction between the goal of liberating the proletariat and the bourgeoisie's aim to establish a civil society is personalized. If in discussing this issue we use the term "nationalism," then we distort rather than clarify these relations.⁴ The term is simply too ambiguous. Some of the views and opinions that are usually covered by this term are actually opposed to Marxism, while others are not. Especially after 1860, we can hardly put the positive attitude toward their homeland of the leaders of a working class movement in the same category as the "nationalism" of the bourgeoisie of the same country fighting against British commercial domination.

Similarly, one cannot draw a parallel between the class struggle and the contradictions between nations if only because the theory of class struggle leaves no room for compromise and friendship between antagonistic classes, whereas relations between nations can be either hostile or cooperative. Cooperation between nations was not only List's program, it was Marx's and Engels's as well, although theirs was based on a different type of social relations. Here, too, the difference between Marx and List is not as striking as Szporluk claims. A clear contrast does appear, of course: Marx and Engels, as distinct from List, interpreted the conflict among nations as a conflict between the special interests of each nation's ruling class, the bourgeoisie. What Szporluk terms Marx's internationalism is not the absolute negation of nation, nor does it exclude adherence to a nation or the existence of nations. One might better term the attitude of young Marx to the future of nations as ambivalent or ambiguous, and not simply negative. It was surely not the polar opposite of what Szporluk terms "nationalism."

I admit that I have some difficulty in understanding the term "nationalism" as it is used not only by Szporluk, but by most historians in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. For example, Szporluk states that "Marx failed to notice that nationalism already became a

major force that mobilized masses around its goals and ideals." But what was "nationalism" in the period of Marx's youth? If Szporluk wanted to say that Marx did not appreciate the importance and possible success of national movements prior to 1850, one could understand it. But when Szporluk presents "nationalism" as a historic force which "was changing actual social reality" (p. 75), then he is on uncertain ground. How is it possible to make an idea we cannot define the determining force of history? If we ourselves have difficulty with the term, we can hardly accuse Marx of not finding "nationalism" to be the moving force of social development. The problem here is epistemological: how are we to determine what was or no longer is "nationalism"? The classical thinkers in the nation-building tradition, such as Carlton J.H. Hayes, distinguished variants of "nationalism" by using adjectives such as liberal, conservative, economic, or integral.⁵

Chronology presents another problem. Hans Kohn linked nationalism with the French Revolution.⁶ But what was the difference between the set of stereotypes by which we designate "nationalism" at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the stereotypes that characterized the mentality of Flemish burghers in the fourteenth century, the Czech Hussites, the Swedish fighters against the Kalmar Union, or of the Dutch, Polish, and other patriots in the years before the French Revolution?⁷ The difference--and this is fundamental--was not in the ideas and stereotypes themselves, but in the social bearer of these ideas and stereotypes. From the time of the French Revolution, this bearer was the nation "as a sovereign people," an ensemble of equal citizens. If Szporluk notes that nationalism "gradually won approbation in the many parts of Europe," then one must ask: why did this occur precisely in the nineteenth century?

The question of the emergence of the nation and its character is fundamental. Decisive were those transformations which, on the threshold of modern times, led to the weakening and demise of patriarchal and feudal relationships. This was the result not only of the advance of capitalist enterprise and of industrialization, but of other encroachments as well, such as the reforms of enlightened absolutism. Whether one classifies the overall phenomenon as the advance of capitalism or the process of modernization, new bonds among people and new views of society arose as an integral part of this process of social transformation. As for "nation-building," two factors were of particular importance:

- (1) the subjective need of a growing number of individuals to find a new object of social identification following the loss of their traditional social and political ties to the village, the feudal lord, or the guild; and
- (2) the objective fact that ever more distant regions were brought into contact with each other through advances in transportation, expanding markets, industrialization, and increased contacts with state authorities, producing greater territorial and social mobility and an increase in social communication.

Simultaneously with the rise in social communication, school attendance increased and, consequently, literacy. Language grew in importance not only as a means of

understanding but also as an elementary distinguishing criterion between "we" and "they." As literacy grew, so did the importance of a selected standard literary language. Of course, language was not the only distinguishing criterion. In Ireland or the Balkans, religion was a differentiating factor as well.

The fact that some educated persons, officials, or politicians displayed a national awareness cannot be regarded automatically as proving the existence of a nation, nor that the nation-building process was thereby predestined for success. Only if these patriotic individuals regarded the nation as a sufficiently unique value that they were willing to work to win others over to their conviction can we consider their identification as the beginning of the nation-building process. Even then, however, the result was uncertain. What was decisive was that the people, and not just the ruling class, approved the new view and began to identify with the new community. The idea of nation had to correspond with the real possibility of the existence of the large social group, the community of the nation. That is, behind successful nation-building stands the reality of increased social communication which results from the development of capitalism. If such ties did not exist, and there were such cases, then what emerged was only a region within a larger political organism, the "big nation." A nation could not emerge without a previous and often long-lasting elaboration of linkages among the potential members of the nation; without a process of social communication and social mobility; and without a capitalist (bürgerlich) transformation of the old regime and the transformation of subjugated serfs into free and equal citizens.⁸ It is only in this sense that one can claim that without the national consciousness ("nationalism") of intellectuals a modern nation could not emerge.⁹

The underlying tempo of the transformation depended on economic development, but this was certainly not the sole determining factor in the pace of change, particularly in the process of identification with the new, national entity.¹⁰ With gradual modernization there took place a strengthening of linguistic, cultural, and administrative ties within certain territorial entities which might or might not be political or state entities. And this process was not simultaneous. The transformation was more definite in some states than in others, later in some regions than in others. For example, changes in the capacity to communicate influenced the nation-building process faster where there had existed an earlier identification with a feudal state. Feudal or territorial patriotism (Landespatriotismus) was limited to members of the politically privileged ruling class and the educated people who served them. Sometimes the term "proto-nationalism" is used to describe this relationship, since it implies stereotypes that were later taken over by members of modern nations.¹¹ The attitude of members of a modern nation differ from "proto-nationalism" in that the object of identification has become the collective, a community of equal citizens. The great French Revolution was a milestone in creating this notion (as was the American Revolution) because after it the new idea of adherence to a national entity did not have to draw on a previous Landespatriotismus or "proto-nationalism." Its source also might have been an outside influence or model, especially where the nation-building process occurred later.

Nation-building in Europe developed along two paths. The first was the

transformation of a feudal state into a modern civil (bürgerlich) state. The new ruling class, "the third estate," worked against the ancien régime and proclaimed itself to be the representative of the entire nation. The new society of citizens was organized as a national community with social interests in relation to each other, similar communities. In other words, development toward a modern society paralleled the development toward a modern nation. This French model, or "ruling nation" model, was often considered the sole or typical path of national development, but in actuality it was not.

The second path evolved in nations which did not have a "proto-nationalist" tradition. In this equally legitimate and typical process, the creation of a nation and "nationalism" occurred, usually in the territory of an imperial state, not in a linear manner, but in the confrontation of alternatives.¹² In this situation the members of what we have called "small nations" faced two and sometimes even three possibilities of national identification. At the time they were formed into modern nations, these peoples:

- (1) had no ruling class of their own ethnic group so that the social structure of the nation was incomplete;
- (2) inhabited an administratively defined political sub-unit that matched the extent of their ethnic population; and
- (3) lacked a continuous tradition of cultural production in their own literary language.

Because of these weaknesses, the rise of capitalism did not liberate these groups as nations, but instead placed them under the rule of a new, foreign, ruling class, the bourgeoisie of another ethnic background.

The nation-building process in the "small nation" took on not only the form of agitation, but of a struggle by the patriots of the nation to provide the missing attributes of full national existence. We call this struggle for equal rights, for national language and culture, for a share in the economic prosperity, for social liberation, and for political autonomy a national movement. According to the content of the demands and the level of response, we distinguish three phases of the national movement: Phase A, the scholarly phase; Phase B, the national phase; and Phase C, the era of the mass national movement. Anglo-Saxon terminology would call each of these phases "nationalist," but subsuming essentially separate phases under this single term limits our ability to understand the considerable variety in the process of nation-formation.

There exists a third model of nation-building, in which only one of the three deficits mentioned above is missing, (2) administrative unity and independence. Such was the case with Germany, Italy, Poland, and Hungary (in the last case, a cultural-linguistic background was missing as well). Still, these nations had their national movements, including Phases B and C in which they won the masses over to the idea of nation. But whereas one might have predicted success for these movements, the success of a small nation during Phase B was by no means assured. What did success or failure depend on? It cannot be explained

simply by the enthusiasm and personal abilities of patriots, and not even solely by the extent of social communication. One must take into account an additional factor, which I term "a nationally relevant conflict of group interests," social conflicts that coincided during Phase B with linguistic or, sometimes, religious conflicts. A frequently mentioned example of such a nationally relevant conflict is that between young academics from a small nation, and hence, from lower social strata, and the closed elite of the ruling nation which maintains itself in the most prominent social positions by inheritance. Another is the conflict between the peasant of the small nation and his feudal lord, who belongs to the ruling nation, as is the conflict between craftsmen of one national group and the proprietors of large trade and industry of a second.

My evidence of the direct relationship between national activity and contradiction in social interests is not conclusive, but neither is it merely speculative. From my comparative analysis of the social structures of national movements, it would seem that personal enthusiasm, mobility, and social communication needed to be supplemented by another, less tangible, factor. This factor acted with different intensity and changed over time, and it was linked to various nations or social milieux, but the common feature of the groups that most actively accepted and supported national agitation was precisely this nationally relevant conflict of interests. Since this contradiction has its roots outside the sphere of national existence and "nationalism," we cannot speak of a tautology.

I have written at length here about differentiation in the nation-building process for three reasons. First, the term "national movement" is more functional in analyzing this process than "nationalism." Second, attention needs to be called to the differentiated reality which stood in the background of the views of the young Marx on the nationality question. And third, the term "nationalism" in the nineteenth century hides a dual content: not Kohn's dichotomy, but the difference between national consciousness in a ruling nation and in a small nation. When we speak of the process in small nations, national awareness has the function of an instrument in the struggle headed by the leaders of the suppressed nationality (ethnic group) for language equality and for cultural and administrative emancipation. And in this struggle for the rights of those who are weaker and worse off, the motive of political and social justice was not lacking. It comes as no surprise then, that this type of national movement, this type of "nationalism," was acceptable to many leaders of the working-class movement within the small nation, if only sometimes as an ally.

Another difficulty in determining the relationship between a nation and its "nationalism" (and their definitions) lies in the contrast between the changing character of the nation as a developing community and the static character of "nationalism." The nation's internal class structure changes, as do its cultural ties and relations with the world that surrounds it. In contrast, nationalism is a relatively stable set of stereotyped views and attitudes. Nationalism, even though the word ends in "ism," is neither a philosophical nor a political trend as are, for example, liberalism, Marxism, or positivism. It takes its place, as Benedict Anderson writes, "alongside such categories as kinship and religion."¹³ Eugen Lemberg, whom Szporluk does not cite, defined nationalism as being "eine bedingungslose

Hingabe an eine über individuelle Instanz.¹⁴ Nationalism is a new concept, one of the twentieth century, and not really appropriate to the nineteenth. On the basis of the analysis given above, I prefer the term national movement, which expresses the purposeful activities of people and which can be internally periodized and differentiated according to the objectives it pursues. There is nothing of this in the ordinary Western use of the term.

For this reason too, Ernest Gellner's statement that nationalism "invents nations where they do not exist" does not convince me. Nations were not a consequence of the decisions and activities of a group of intellectuals who turned a nation from an "an sich" group into a "für sich" group. Szporluk may have good reasons to consider a nation the work of intellectuals, but it is not clear why he called on the results of my research in support of this view, especially since my conclusion was virtually opposite to his: a modern nation is not the product of "nationalism," but the consequence of long-term social processes in the transition from feudal to capitalist society.

If we are far from agreeing on what is meant by nationalism in the nineteenth century, then we can hardly agree with Gerschenkron's thesis, which Szporluk shares, that nationalism and Marxism were "competing theories" in the course of industrialization, all the more so since we agree that nationalism can hardly be termed a theory. If we consider nationalism to be every manifestation of identification with a nation, i.e., national awareness or consciousness, then our two "theories" would not be mutually exclusive. A worker who was not originally nationally conscious might gradually identify himself with a nation, especially a small one, but this would not preclude his accepting revolutionary ideology and Marxism. Of course, the tension between the two identifications would remain.

Szporluk rejects Marx's criticism that List, in his struggle for protectionism, expressed the interests of the German bourgeoisie, holding that the delayed development of German society, as compared with England's, also affected the other classes, and that List wanted to benefit them all. Subjectively, List may well have thought this way, but on the objective level his demands supported the interests of the bourgeoisie. In this sense, Marx's criticism of List seems justified. Actually, Marx made a different mistake in his criticism of List: he underestimated List's teaching "linking culture, politics, and economy in a single comprehensive world view," not realizing, as yet, the force of these ties, which were not a product of intellectual qualities but of civil society, and which corresponded to the reality of the nation-building process.

Perhaps there is some agreement between List and the young Marx in their common view that big state-nations swallow up small nationalities, but the socio-political implications of their views were quite different. List was concerned with the development of civil society whereas Marx, at first, was interested in the process of transformation following the victory of the proletarian revolution. Later developments demonstrated that the defensive struggle of the oppressed nationalities against the big nations and their bourgeoisies, that is to say, their defensive "nationalism," took on similar forms to the struggle of the oppressed proletariat against the ruling bourgeoisie and its state.

Wherein, therefore, lay the fatal underestimation by Marx and Engels of "nationalism"? They did not err in their view that a nation is the product of civil society and that it, therefore, becomes essential to regard it as a "secondary phenomenon" in relation to that "civil society." Such a relation between the nation and society exists even today without calling into doubt the right of nations to exist. Marx's and Engels's view that the ruling class of a modern nation is the bourgeoisie is correct: it corresponds to historical reality. The logical inference is that a nation cannot exist without its own bourgeoisie. It seems, therefore, that Marx had good reason to believe that what List presented as "national interest" was intended, primarily, to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, which does not exclude the fact that the other strata of the nation may have shared to some extent in the prosperity of the bourgeoisie.

The error of the young Marx and Engels was that they anticipated an early victory of the proletarian revolution, which was expected to open the way to the extinction of nations, at least, nations in the form in which they existed at the time. Following the revolutions of 1848-49, however, they gradually revised their view, recognizing, at least, the prospect of the continuation of the already existing big (state) nations. But they did not revise their view that nationalities and ethnic groups which did not have their own bourgeoisies or their own states would gradually disappear. Still, they recognized the force of national activism ("nationalism") by these groups, or, at least, by their leaders. Engels rated the national movements in the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman empire highly, but this did not prevent him from believing that these national movements had no hope of creating modern, independent nations.¹⁵ This negative assessment grew out of his negative view of the anti-revolutionary role some of these nations had played in 1848-49. But Marx's and Engels's negative position had deeper reasons than simply the search for a culprit in the immediate emotion of defeat.

What was the basis of their mistake? A contributing factor was their belief that the fate of the medieval peoples of Provence, Wales, and Brittany forecast the fate of the small Slavic nations. This was a faulty historical analogy because the assimilation of a large part of these peoples had been decided under feudalism. After the emergence of civil society, assimilation took place in a different context. More important, Marx and Engels were often incompletely and incorrectly informed about the social and political situation of the national movements. One has only to recall that in his article on "Democratic Pan-Slavism," Engels regards the peasantry as the main force in the national movements of the Habsburg monarchy, a view valid at best, perhaps, for the Ukrainians and Romanians.¹⁶ Of course, his view that the bourgeoisie did not head this movement was correct, and without a bourgeoisie a modern nation was inconceivable. Accordingly, these national groups had only one prospect: assimilation under the rule of a foreign, German bourgeoisie. Thirty years later, Karl Kautsky shared that view, but by this time the assertion that the small peoples of the Habsburg monarchy did not have their own bourgeoisie was incorrect.¹⁷

Thus we come to the root of Marx's and Engels's erroneous view about the prospects of national movements. Their mistake lay in an incorrect estimation of the development of

social structure. They believed that industrialization and the victory of capitalism would lead to the rapid disappearance into the proletariat of the lower middle class, leaving only two classes to constitute civil society. But this proletarianization and impoverishment of craftsmen, small farmers, and merchants did not happen. Not only did the old middle class remain and adapt to capitalist conditions, but capitalism gave rise to a new middle class of white collar workers, teachers, and others. It was precisely from this milieu that the bourgeoisies of the small, weak, and dependent nationalities emerged. Since a universal bourgeoisie did not develop, "nationalism" was not overcome and nations and national awareness did not disappear. Instead, both the old and the new middle classes became the leading champions of "nationalism," both in state-nations and in small nations that experienced the nation-building process. Only in this context can we understand why the proletariat, which originally really "did not have a homeland," also became nationally aware. The proletariat in capitalist society gained access to education and thence to the cultural community of the nation to which it belonged ethnically, ceased to be only international, and became integrated into national communities. It can hardly be imagined that the workers identified directly with the bourgeoisie, although such cases did occur, but they could easily accept their allegiance to a community to which their middle-class neighbors (i. e., small craftsmen) belonged and from whose families they came, as did the teachers of their children. Allegiance to a nation could, but need not, have automatically meant the abandonment of internationalism. Without question, it became a lasting source of antagonism within the working class movement.

NOTES

1. I have two critical comments concerning the last chapter. First, we cannot reach reliable conclusions if we look at the nationality problems in Russia and the USSR without analyzing more deeply Lenin's view on this question, particularly his contributions from pre-revolutionary times (e. g., his discussion with Rosa Luxemburg, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," Collected Works, 4th ed. (Moscow: 1964), p. 20). Had he done so, Szporluk would more likely have arrived at the view that Marxism-Leninism used the national movement as an ally, and would not have stated that "Marxism-Leninism became a variant of nationalism" (p. 225). As a matter of fact, E. Lemberg expressed this view twenty years earlier in "Stalinismus als Wiedergeburt des Nationalismus" (Stalinism as the rebirth of nationalism), Nationalismus, Vol. I, Psychologie und Geschichte (Hamburg: 1964), p. 232. Second, it would be useful in analyzing the contemporary nationality problem to distinguish between theory and practice, which, although they mutually influence each other, are not identical.

2. S.F. Bloom, The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications in the Work of Karl Marx (New York: 1941), Chapter 2.

3. It would be useful if Szporluk analyzed the German texts, not their English translations. For example, the above quotations in German: " [Die grosse Industrie]...erzeugte im Allgemeinen überall dieselben Verhältnisse zwischen den Klassen der Gesellschaft und vernichtete dadurch die Besonderheit der einzelnen Nationalitäten. Und endlich, während die Bourgeoisie jeder Nation noch aparte nationale Interesse behält..." ([Big industry]...generally created everywhere the same relations between social classes and thereby destroyed the special character of the individual nationalities. And finally, while each nation's bourgeoisie continues to have

its separate national interests...) "Deutsche Ideologie," in Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, ch. I, vol. 6 (Berlin: 1932), p. 50. There are further examples.

4. Szporluk does not say which of the many meanings of nationalism he is using: A Kemiläinen, Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept, and Classification (Jyväskylä, 1964); H.A. Winkler, ed., Nationalismus (Königstein/Ts, 1985), 2nd ed.; E. Lemberg, Nationalismus, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1964); O. Dann, ed., Nationalismus und sozialer Wandel (Hamburg, 1978).

5. Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931).

6. Hans Kohn, Die Idee des Nationalismus: Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution (Frankfurt, 1962).

7. E. Lemberg, Wege und Wandlungen des Nationalbewusstseins: Studien zur Geschichte der Volkwerdung in den Niederlanden und in Böhmen (Münster, 1934); J. Huizinga, "Aus der Vorgeschichte des niederländischen Nationalbewusstseins," in Wege der Kultur-geschichte (Munich, 1930); J. Tazbir, "National Consciousness in the 16th-17th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica, 46 (1982); H. Pietschmann, "Zum Problem eines frühneuzeitlichen Nationalismus in Spanien: Der Widerstand Kastilians gegen Karl V.," in O. Dann, ed., Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit (Munich, 1986).

8. In this context, I accept Deutsch's model.

9. Here it might be possible to apply Gale Stokes's term "operationalism," which in a broader sense means that certain groups of people were capable of expressing their really existing interests in terms of the "interest" of a broader community: a nation. Such group interests were articulated as demands intending to serve the success of a national movement (Gale Stokes, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 4 [1975], p. 532).

10. M. Hroch, Obrození malých evropských národů, I (Prague, 1971).

11. On proto-nationalism in general, see J. Huizinga, "Patriotisme et Nationalisme," in de Europese Geschiedenis tot het Einde der negentiende Eeuw (Haarlem, 1940); C.L. Tripton, ed., Nationalism in the Middle Ages (New York, 1972); B. Zientara, "La conscience nationale en Europe occidentale au Moyen Age," Acta Poloniae Historica, 46 (1982); J. Szűcs, Nation und Geschichte (Cologne and Vienna, 1981); O. Dann, Nationalismus in vorindustrieller Zeit, introduction.

12. For a more detailed discussion, see M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge, 1985).

13. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983), pp. 14-15.

14. E. Lemberg, Nationalismus, I, p. 23 ff. Nationalism is a "Binderkraft...die nationale oder quasinationale Gruppen integriert" (a binding force that integrates national or quasi-national groups) (p. 20). For criticism of this concept, see H. Mommsen, Neue politische Literatur, 11 (1966), pp. 72-76.

15. Engels, for instance, expressed very positive views on the Czech national movement in June 1848. See his articles in Neue Rheinische Zeitung, no. 18 (June 18), no. 25 (June 25), no. 33 (July 3), and no. 42 (July 12). His and Marx's opinion changed after the fall of Vienna in November 1848.

16. "Und da die Bewegung der Bauern, die überall die Träger der nationalen und lokalen Borniertheit sind, notwendig eine lokale und nationale ist, so tauchten mit ihr zugleich die alten nationalen Kämpfe wieder auf" (And since the movement of the peasants, who are everywhere the carriers of national and local limitations, is by necessity a local and national movement, together with it were reawakened the old national battles.)

17. "...aber Bauern- und Kleinbürgertum sind dem Untergang geweiht, und mit ihnen die Sprache, die sie sprechen. Je mehr sie zurückgehen, je mehr der Kapitalismus sich entwickelt, desto geringer wird in Böhmen die ökonomische Bedeutung des Tschechischen, desto grösser die des Deutschen werden" (...but the peasantry and petite bourgeoisie are doomed, and with them the language they speak. The greater their decline, the more capitalism develops, the lesser the economic importance of the Czech in Bohemia, the greater that of the German.) (Karl Kautsky, "Die moderne Nationalität," Die Neue Zeit, 1887, p. 447.)