TRANSITION TO WHAT?
PUBLICS CONFRONT CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPE

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Introduction

Three years ago the world watched in amazement and awe as the people of Central and East Europe won their independence from communist rule. Those early days of jubilation have been replaced by the realization that independence was only the first step in what is apparently a long process of transition. Now the question is, "transition to what?"

Although the literature on the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is vast, the one taking place in Central and East Europe is unprecedented. Its uniqueness stems from the simultaneous occurrence of three fundamental changes: the transformation from a nondemocratic to democratic system of government, the shift from a command to a market economy, and the demise of the ideal of "socialist man" in favor of new national and ethnic identities.

This paper seeks the publics' answer to the question "transition to what?" While public opinion is only one piece of the complex mosaic necessary to understand the changes in the region, the revolutions of 1989 have certainly shown that mass publics cannot be ignored. Based on over thirty national surveys[1] in Central and East Europe commissioned by the United States Information Agency (USIA) over the last three years, we examine public beliefs about the role of the individual and the state, the degree of public support for market reform, and attitudes toward ethnic rights as well as assessments of "outsiders." After consideration of each of these dimensions, we present a typology classifying countries based on public attitudes. This is a risky undertaking since government policies do not always reflect public opinion, but we believe that public attitudes will play an important role in shaping the future of the countries of Central and East Europe.

Attitudes Toward "Socialism" and the Post-Communist Period

Before examining the public response to these transitions it is important to look at how people assess the past, since publics are evaluating the current changes in relation to the old system. As figure 1 shows, everywhere but in Bulgaria, pluralities believe they would have been better off "if the communists had never come to power." Yet it is important to note that sizable minorities voice the opinion that socialism[2] either once had "possibilities" or still has a future.

Publics express similar views when asked to evaluate the current political system. Except in Hungary, majorities believe their present political system is better than the former socialist one (figure 2). Roughly one in four believes the present system is worse rather than better.[3] Publics are most likely to evaluate the present system as better than the previous one in those

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[1] See Appendix for short description of each survey.

[2] This term refers to the state socialism practiced in Central and East Europe between the mid-1940s and 1989.

[3] Although the present political system is deemed better than the socialist one, support for the political institutions that comprise that system--parliament, the president, the judiciary, and the government--is relatively low.

Figure 1
Perceptions of Socialism

Question: There are different opinions about socialism. Please tell me which of these statements comes closest to your own: [Survey country] would have been better off in every respect if the Communists had never come to power. There were possibilities in socialism, but they are now exhausted and there is a need for a radical change in the system. Socialism has a future.



Survey dates: Czech and Slovak Republics 4/92; Poland 1/92; Romania 4/92; Bulgaria 4/92.

countries where the former regime was especially harsh (e.g., Romania) or where the changes were most clearly marked by new leadership (e.g., the Czech Republic). The ambivalence toward the new political system shown by publics in Hungary (see also McDonough and Barnes 1992--see references) could be due in part to the fact that Hungary was further along in the transition process in 1989 (particularly economically) and consequently the contrast between the old and new political systems is not as great as in other countries.

These data give an indication of the relative strength of socialist precepts in the region. Those who say the present system is worse than the past one are also inclined to say that socialism, as practiced before 1989, either had possibilities at one time or still has a future. These divergent evaluations of the past reveal a fundamental cleavage between the majority of Central and East Europeans who accept the necessity of change (but might not agree on the method or ultimate outcome) and those who are reluctant to change.

This generally positive evaluation of the present political system is not accorded to the

Figure 2

Political System Better or Worse than Under Socialism

Question: If you think about the country's present political system and the political system under socialism, would you say the present political system is better or worse?



Survey dates: Hungary 11/92; Poland 6/92; Bulgaria 4/92; Romania 9/92; Czech and Slovak Republic 12/92.

new social order. As table 1 illustrates, the uncertainty and upheaval of the transition has left many feeling that the social fabric of their country is deteriorating.

Overall, publics in all countries say that the recent changes have had a bad rather than good effect on law and order, social relations, people's happiness, and the standard of living. Accustomed to a relatively predictable, stable, and "secure" life under communism, publics are now grappling with uncertainty and change. People are torn between the benefits of a more desirable political environment and the costs of a less secure day-to-day existence.

Public Response to the Transition to Democracy

It is against this background that we examine the values that underlie public attitudes toward the democratization process. Below, we discuss how publics define democracy and demonstrate that Central and East Europeans tend to have a different view of democracy than West Europeans. In order to gain a greater understanding of what people expect from the transition, we next look at the kind of society people say they want to live in. We examine the concept of "preferred society" in the form of a scale that ranges from those who favor a "state guarantees" society to those who favor a society with "individual opportunities." Finally, we compare Central and East European publics with West Europeans on a number of beliefs and attitudes judged by many to be critical components of a democratic political culture.

Table 1
Effects of Changes over the Past Year

Question: Have the changes that have taken place over the past year had a good or a bad effect on [item]:

	Percentage saying "bad"					
	Bulgarians *(10/91)*	Hungarians *(1/92)*	Czechs *(11/91)*	Slovaks *(11/91)*	Poles *(9/91)*	Romanians *(10/91)*
Law and order	69	55	83	79	60	84
How well people get along with each other	58	70	69	78	70	76
People's happiness	47	79	53	73	76	54
Standard of living	71	83	80	90	82	67

Definitions of Democracy

Fundamental to the political changes occurring in the region is the adoption of a democratic system of government. Yet when publics are asked to define democracy, their responses suggest that they equate democracy more with economic prosperity and security than with liberal democratic values. Except in Bulgaria and Romania,[4] majorities everywhere in Central and East Europe select economic prosperity, security, or equality as more important in a democracy than liberal democratic values such as political pluralism, freedom to criticize the government, and a system of justice that treats everyone equally (figure 3, table 2). In sharp contrast, and as expected, West Europeans define democracy primarily in political terms. This suggests that support for a democratic system of government in Central and East Europe may be based as much on a country's economic performance as on a commitment to liberal democratic political principles. As Dalton (1991) has argued with respect to the former East Germany, the success of democratization in these countries may well depend on the ability of these systems to produce satisfactory economic outcomes for their publics.

Preferred Society: "Individual Opportunities" versus "State Guarantees"

The relationship between the individual and the state appears to be at the heart of public debate about the meaning of democracy. Tension exists between those who want the security

[4] Political freedoms may be more salient to Bulgarians and Romanians because of the particular oppression they experienced under their communist governments and the fact that these political freedoms were still not clearly established in these countries when these surveys were conducted. By contrast, people in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary may be more likely than their southern neighbors to feel more confident about the development of democratic institutions in their societies and thus place greater emphasis on economic rather than political concerns.

Table 2
Meaning of Democracy

Question: People associate democracy with diverse meanings such as those on this card. Which of the things on this card would you say is the most important in a democracy?

	Poles *(9/91)*	Czechs *(11/91)*	Slovaks *(11/91)*	Hungarians *(1/92)*	Bulgarians *(9/91)*	Turks *(11/92)*	Spanish *(12/92)*
Economic prosperity in the country	42%	22%	17%	35%	11%	7%	10%
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	14	17	24	9	13	19	17
A government that guarantees that basic economic needs are met	14	22	26	26	17	14	19
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	13	24	15	21	30	36	42
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	9	12	12	3	17	10	5
Freedom to criticize the government	3	2	2	2	2	5	4

	Romanians *(11/91)*	British *(5/92)*	French *(5/92)*	E. Germans *(5/92)*	W. Germans *(5/92)*	Canadians *(12/92)*
Economic prosperity in the country	2%	9%	11%	9%	5%	14%
A government that guarantees economic equality among its citizens	6	10	16	9	4	12
A government that guarantees that basic economic needs are met	26	14	17	28	14	17
A system of justice that treats everyone equally	22	34	40	42	50	33
At least two strong political parties competing in elections	7	13	10	9	18	11
Freedom to criticize the government	18	7	4	2	8	10
Minority rights/tolerance*	5					
Social order*	12					

**Question options asked only in Romania*

Figure 3
Meaning of Democracy



Survey dates listed on Table 2.

and stability offered by reliance on the state at the expense of individual freedom and opportunity, and those who want individual freedom and opportunity even though it entails some uncertainty and risk. Those who prefer a "state guarantees" society are at one end of the spectrum and those who welcome an "individual opportunities" society are at the other. Preference for a society based on individual responsibility would appear to reflect some level of commitment to a liberal democratic model, while preference for "state guarantees" suggests a more "social democratic" orientation that could possibly (but not necessarily) indicate a willingness to accept a less democratic form of socialism (McIntosh and Mac Iver 1992a).

Table 3 shows considerable variation among publics in their "preferred society." Czechs are the most likely to support an "individual opportunities" society while Romanians are the most likely to favor a "state guarantees" society. Significantly, public opinion on this fundamental issue has been rather stable over the past year. Two exceptions are in Bulgaria and Romania, where support for an "individual opportunities" society has increased slightly. This increase corresponds to the greater strength of the democratic opposition in both countries.

As discussed in more detail elsewhere (McIntosh and Mac Iver 1992a), a number of factors are important determinants of an individual's preferred society. Those who prefer an "individual opportunities" model of society tend to be better educated, younger, and more urban than those who prefer a "state guarantees" society. They are also more likely to be optimistic

Table 3
Preferred Society[a]

	Czechs *(12/92)*	Poles *(5/92)*	Bulgarians *(4/92)*	Slovaks *(12/92)*	Hungarians *(11/92)*	Romanians *(9/92)*
"Individual opportunities" society	43%	34%	28%	28%	17%	16%
Middle-of-the-roaders	34	36	44	37	39	32
"State guarantees" society	24	30	29	35	44	53

[a] *See appendix for how this scale was constructed.*

about the future, less likely to feel threatened by external enemies (especially in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania where the sense of military threat is the highest in the region), and more committed to liberal democratic values than those who favor a "state guarantees" society.

Cultural Requisites of Democracy

As political culture theorists have argued, commitment to liberal democratic values and a liberal model of society may rest on even more fundamental values (Brown 1977; Dahl 1971; Lipset 1960; Almond 1963; Hahn 1991; Inglehart 1990; Dalton 1988). Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992) contend that "the beliefs, values, and attitudes of ordinary citizens structure and often set limits on both the pace of and possibilities for change." Many see interpersonal trust, sense of political efficacy, and interest in politics as central to democratic development,[5] since these values theoretically undergird political (and economic) cooperation and participation. Political culture theory would predict that countries with levels of trust, efficacy, and political interest similar to those in the stable democracies of Western Europe stand a greater probability (but by no means a certainty) of developing into western-style democracies.[6]

Interpersonal Trust Given the history of government surveillance of public behavior in Central and East Europe, relatively low levels of trust would be expected. Instead, with the exception of Romania, where trust is low and has declined over the past year, trust levels in the region are as high or higher than those among the French or the Italians. In the Czech Republic and Bulgaria trust levels exceed this standard, reaching the same levels as those of the British and

[5] We look at these attributes because they are generally deemed central to a democracy, but we do not assume that they are the only attributes or necessarily the most critical ones in the transition. Only in hindsight will we be able to assess whether these cultural requisites are as essential in the transition in Central and East Europe as many have postulated them to be in the formation of stable western democracies.

[6] We do not assume that the democratization process is either linear or monotonic. Following Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992), we see democratization as "movement along a continuum" that may or may not result in the formation of a democratic government.

Table 4

Levels of Trust, Efficacy, and Political Interest

Percentage agreeing with the statement: Most people can be trusted.

Poles	Czechs	Slovaks	Hungarians	Romanians	Bulgarians
1/92: 44	*11/91:* 54	*11/91:* 44	*1/92:* 30	*11/91:* 39	*11/91:* 57
5/92: 40	*4/92:* 44	*4/92:* 40	*11/92:* 40	*4/92:* 33	*4/92:* 56
	12/92: 51	*12/92:* 46		*9/92:* 29	

British	W. Germans	E. Germans	Italians
5/92: 51	*5/92:* 54	*5/92:* 32	*5/92:* 34

French	Turks	Spanish
5/92: 26	*11/92:* 39	*12/92:* 51

Percentage agreeing with the statement: Voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things.

Poles	Czechs	Slovaks	Hungarians	Romanians	Bulgarians
1/92: 28	*11/91:* 59	*11/91:* 38	*1/92:* 24	*11/91:* 48	*11/91:* 73
5/92: 34	*4/92:* 59	*4/92:* 48	*11/92:* 22	*4/92:* 57	*4/92:* 66
	12/92: 64	*12/92:* 56		*9/92:* 59	

British	W. Germans	E. Germans	Italians
5/92: 66	*5/92:* 66	*5/92:* 48	*5/92:* 65

French	Turks	Spanish
5/92: 69	*11/92:* 73	*12/92:* 72

Percentage agreeing with the statement: I have a great deal or fair amount of interest in politics.

Poles	Czechs	Slovaks	Hungarians	Romanians	Bulgarians
11/90: 38	*1/90:* 85	*1/90:* 81	*6/91:* 37	*11/91:* 37	*12/90:* 70
5/92: 38	*11/91:* 74	*11/91:* 68	*11/92:* 43	*4/92:* 24	*4/92:* 65
	12/92: 73	*12/92:* 69		*9/92:* 28	

British	W. Germans	E. Germans	Italians
5/92: 57	*5/92:* 50	*5/92:* 43	*5/92:* 35

western Germans (table 4). On this requisite, as on most of the others that follow, eastern Germans tend to voice views more similar to Central and East Europeans than to western Germans.

Political Efficacy Many have argued that in a well-functioning democracy people must believe that they can play a part in the political process and believe they can have a political impact (Dalton 1988, Dahl 1971). Central and East Europeans tend to be less likely than West Europeans to agree that "voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things," but feelings of political efficacy have increased among most Central and East Europeans in the past year (table 4). This suggests that confidence in the democratic process is growing, but that some still feel that they cannot effect change through the course of "normal" politics. This is particularly the case in Hungary and Poland, where low voting rates seem to corroborate these findings.

Interest in Politics Interest in politics has declined slightly in many countries in Central and East Europe over the last couple of years, but does not differ notably from levels observed among West Europeans (table 4). Interest in politics is lowest in Romania and highest in the Czech Republic.

In sum, these findings suggest that a continuum of cultural foundations for liberal democracy exists in Central and East Europe, ranging from a relatively strong basis in the Czech Republic to a somewhat weaker basis in Romania. If the political culture theorists are right, comparisons with Western Europe on the preceding dimensions offer some basis for optimism about the possibilities of democratic development in Central and East Europe.

Public Response to the Change to a Market Economy

Public opinion about economic reform is a key factor in the kind of societies that will evolve in Central and East Europe during this transition period (Mason 1992; Rose 1991). This section describes the publics' assessment of the economic situation in their country, their assessment of their own economic situation, and how they feel about three key aspects of economic reform: privatization, foreign investment, and the unemployment costs of economic reform. Based on these three indicators, a scale of support for market economy is created and used to characterize public response to market reforms.

Public Assessment of the Economy

The public's realization that the economic transition would not be easy or swift has apparently evoked nostalgia for the economic security of the socialist period. Today, majorities say the country's economic situation is worse, not better than it was under socialism (table 5). Just one person in three or fewer assesses the current economic situation as good (table 6). But publics tend to be more optimistic about future economic developments, particularly in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia (table 7). In Hungary the number of people who think that their family's standard of living will improve equals the number who believe it will remain the same or decline. Among Bulgarians and Romanians opinion is divided between those who are optimistic and those who say they don't know what to expect five years hence. The economic

Table 5
Views on the Economic Situation Now and Under Socialism

Question: If you think about the country's present economic situation and the situation under socialism, would you say that the present economic situation is:

	Poles *(5/92)*	Czechs *(4/92)*	Slovaks *(4/92)*	Hungarians *(11/92)*	Romanians *(9/92)*	Bulgarians *(4/92)*
Better	19%	32%	17%	18%	16%	21%
Worse	67	57	74	75	71	63
Don't know	13[a]	10	9	8	13	16

[a] *Includes those saying "the same."*

Table 6
Current Assessment of the Economic Situation

Question: How would you describe the current economic situation in [survey country]? Would you say the economic situation is very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

	Percentage saying very good or fairly good
Poles *(5/92)*	14
Czechs *(12/92)*	36
Slovaks *(12/92)*	14
Hungarians *(11/92)*	12
Romanians *(9/92)*	11
Bulgarians *(4/92)*	22

reforms in these two countries have apparently produced as much confusion as optimism.

Three Key Aspects of Economic Reform

The dismantling of the command system has proven to be a formidable task. While many dispute the degree and speed with which the economy should be marketized, most economists agree that foreign investment, privatization, and the closing of inefficient factories are critical to the development of a free market. The achievement of this goal requires public acceptance of the inevitability of both rising unemployment (as inefficient plants are closed) and higher

Table 7
Five-year Assessment of Household's Economic Situation

Question: Five years from now, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will have improved a lot, improved a little, remained the same, declined a little, or declined a lot?

	Percentage saying "improved a lot" or "improved a little"
Poles *(5/92)*	44
Czechs *(12/92)*	54
Slovaks *(12/92)*	48
Hungarians *(11/92)*	41
Romanians *(9/92)*	35
Bulgarians *(4/92)*	37

prices (as government subsidies are removed).

Table 8 reveals public feelings about privatization, foreign investment, and the unemployment costs of economic reform. A majority of Czechs think "the majority of businesses should be privately owned," while roughly half or more as many of the Poles, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Romanians tend to think that "only some businesses should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of businesses." These attitudes have remained constant over the last few years. Similarly, only the Czechs tend to agree with the statement, "unemployment from the closing of inefficient factories is a hardship, but it is an inevitable condition of economic improvement," while the rest of the Central and East Europeans tend to think "the government should not allow unemployment to rise because it is too great a hardship for people." Acceptance of the inevitability of the closing of inefficient plants has increased somewhat in Hungary and Bulgaria, but has declined in Romania. By contrast, foreign investment enjoys more support than opposition in each country. Nevertheless, over the past two years support for foreign investment has declined in both Romania and the Czech Republic and has increased only slightly in Hungary.

Support for Market Economy

A scale of market support was created using the three indicators described above: support for privatization, foreign investment, and the unemployment costs of economic reform. As table 9 shows, market support is highest in the Czech Republic and lowest in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland. Pluralities in each country are "middle-of-the roaders"; they support some aspects of a free market but reject others. Support for the market appears to be highly dependent on the country's stage of economic reform as well as its "economic culture"--i.e., its economic history,

Table 8

Opinion of Privatization, Unemployment, and Foreign Investment

Question: *There is much talk about privatization of business in [survey country]. Some people feel that the majority of businesses should be privately owned. Others think that only some business should be privately owned and that the government should continue to run the majority of businesses in [survey country]. Which of the two alternatives is closest to your own views?*

Question: *And now on the issue of unemployment, which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion: Unemployment from the closing of inefficient factories is a hardship, but it is an inevitable condition of economic improvement; or The government should not allow unemployment to rise because it is too great a hardship for people.*

Question: *There are different opinions about foreign investment. Some people think that foreign investment is necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of [survey country's] economy. Others say that foreign investment is dangerous because it allows outsiders too much control over our affairs. Which view is closer to your own?*

	Poles *(5/92)*	Czechs *(12/92)*	Slovaks *(12/92)*	Hungarians *(11/92)*	Romanians *(9/92)*	Bulgarians *(4/92)*
			Privatization			
Majority private	45%	60%	42%	42%	36%	21%
Majority government	47	32	51	51	56	55
Don't know	9	8	7	8	9	23
			Unemployment			
Inevitable condition	19	59	38	26	25	34
Too great a hardship	76	37	57	71	69	54
Don't know	6	4	4	3	6	12
			Foreign investment[a]			
Positive	47	53	53	55	49	41
Negative	40	37	36	35	28	30
Don't know	12	10	11	10	23	29

[a]*In Poland the wording of the question was "Some people think that foreign investment is necessary and will have a positive influence on the development of Poland's economy. Others say that foreign investment will not help and we will become dependent on foreigners. Which view is closer to your own?"*

Table 9
Support for Market Economy

	Czechs *(12/92)*	Poles *(5/92)*	Bulgarians *(4/92)*	Slovaks *(12/92)*	Hungarians *(11/92)*	Romanians *(9/92)*
Strong free market supporters	38%	16%	18%	25%	17%	20%
Middle-of-the-roaders	44	50	48	47	59	45
Weak free market supporters	18	34	24	28	24	35

customs, and values. Public support for the market has declined in both Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, where economic reform was initiated gradually but has accelerated over the last year or so. By contrast, in Poland, where the benefits of economic "shock therapy" are now beginning to be felt, public support for the market has increased slightly, although it remains relatively low.

The relatively low levels of support for a free market that prevail throughout most of the region are not unexpected, given the dislocation and uncertainty of economic upheaval coupled with the preference of a sizable minority of Central and East Europeans for a "state guarantees" society. Support for marketization is higher among the young, those who are well-educated, males, and urban residents. Education appears to have a greater impact on an individual's economic views than any other background characteristic.

Public Views on Majority and Minority Relationships

Because of their multiethnic character, many Central and East European countries face another major challenge: the need to strike a balance between minority rights and majority rule. Below we compare the attitudes of Central and East Europeans on ethnic minority rights and their opinions of "outsiders" with those of West Europeans. This comparison is followed by a look at factors associated with ethnic tolerance and attitudes toward "outsiders."

Balancing Majority Rule and Minority Rights in Multiethnic Societies

The events of 1989 offered majorities and minorities in Central and East Europe a new opportunity to restructure ethnic relations and to begin what now appears to be a long and in some cases bloody process of redefining their national identity. The question now is whether the remaining multinational states in Central and East Europe will pursue a course of relatively peaceful coexistence or engage in their own variants of ethnic strife that may threaten the process of democratic development. Without tolerance for both political and ethnic diversity, the competitiveness and openness upon which democracy depends cannot thrive (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982; Duch and Gibson 1992; Sniderman et al. 1991).

Table 10
Ethnic Tolerance

Question: Minority groups in [survey country] are seeking their rights. Tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with giving minority groups:
The right to establish organizations and form associations preserving and developing their traditions and culture;
The right to conduct school classes in their own language;
The right to have representatives in parliament.[a]

	Percentage agreeing[b]		
	Form organizations	Classes in own language	Representatives
Poles *(5/92)*	64	70	61
Romanians *(9/92)*	81	67	74
Bulgarians *(4/92)*	63	31	53
Slovaks *(12/92)*	69	55[c]	74
Czechs *(12/92)*	78	58[c]	79
Hungarians *(11/92)*	88	94	88
French *(5/92)*	50	39	18
British *(5/92)*	38	37	30
Italians *(5/92)*	61	67	32
E. Germans *(5/92)*	61	65	35
W. Germans *(5/92)*	63	57	24

[a] *In Western Europe, the question referred to "their own political organizations."*
[b] *Based on total population of country, including both majority and minority groups.*
[c] *Question was "The right to conduct primary school classes in their own language."*

How do Central and East Europeans compare with their Western neighbors on tolerance for ethnic minority rights? Table 10 shows that they tend to be more willing than some West European publics to grant minorities the right "to establish organizations and associations for preserving and developing their traditions and culture." The differences are even more striking on more divisive issues such as political rights (having their own representatives in parliament or their own political organizations) and "the right to conduct school classes in their own

language." Greater tolerance in Central and East Europe may be a result of the long history of national minorities living in the region, compared with the more recent influx of immigrants that constitute the minority groups in West Europe. Duch and Gibson (1992) found that political tolerance was higher in countries, such as much of Central and East Europe, where individuals had been exposed to diversity and conflict than in countries characterized by relatively homogenous and non-conflictual environments, such as those of much of Western Europe.

Although Central and East European publics voice tolerant views concerning the rights of minority groups in their societies, it is also important to examine their feelings toward outsiders (i.e., the largest minority group in each country, immigrants, or the traditional rival, if one exists), which may not be as positive as levels of tolerance suggest. In a social setting where the normative standard is to be tolerant of minority rights, individuals are more likely to voice tolerance, regardless of their feelings toward outsiders (Merton 1976; Jackman 1977). Should the norms promoting tolerance break down, however, underlying negative feelings about outsiders may give rise to incidents of ethnic hostility such as those recently observed in many of these societies.[7]

Table 11
Opinions of Outsiders (East Europeans and Spanish)

Question: Now please tell me if you have a favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the following people:

	Czechs (12/92)	Slovaks (12/92)	Hungarians (11/92)	Bulgarians (10/91)	(5/92)	Romanians (4/92)	(9/92)	Turks (11/92)	Spanish (12/92)
				opinion of:					
	Slovaks	*Hungarians*	*Romanians*	*Turks*		*Hungarians*		*Bulgarians*	*Arabs*
Favorable	60%	37%	39%	47%	42%	26%	49%	13%	63%
Unfavorable	38	61	39	51	46	61	45	80	29
				Jews					
Favorable	64	52	65	79	62	52	46	11	71
Unfavorable	23	39	17	14	12	19	18	84	17
				Immigrants					
Favorable	39	37	27			34	20		76
Unfavorable	51	53	55			30	33		17

Tables 11 and 12 demonstrate that Central and East Europeans are generally no more likely than West Europeans to voice negative feelings toward outsiders. As these data clearly show, immigrants do not fare well among most Europeans, with the exception of the Spanish.

[7] An example of this is Tirgu Mureş, Romania, where in 1990 an ethnic Romanian-Hungarian clash resulted in the deaths of eight people and over three hundred injuries. In Bratislava, Slovakia, fights erupted between Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians during a September 1992 soccer match.

Table 12
Opinion of Outsiders (Poles and West Europeans)

Question: Now please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, neutral, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the following people:

	Poles (5/92)	Italians (5/92)	French[a] (5/92)	British (5/92)	W. Germans (5/92)	E. Germans (5/92)
				opinion of:		
			Arabs		*Turks*	
Favorable		12%	21%	13%	26%	13%
Neutral		40	13	42	46	42
Unfavorable		42	59	39	26	47
				Jews		
Favorable	17	26	45	25	22	22
Neutral	40	54	24	58	57	59
Unfavorable	28	20	21	12	17	15
				Immigrants		
Favorable	18	24	27	19	25 **10**[b]	15 **10**[b]
Neutral	38	40	12	38	47 **37**	51 **36**
Unfavorable	27	32	52	40	27 **51**	28 **51**

[a]The "neutral" category was read after the four other categories in France, which may explain the smaller proportion of people who chose it, relative to the other countries.
[b]Columns in boldface refer to "asylum seekers."

Among Central and East Europeans, the largest minority group or the traditional rival tends to engender as much dislike as immigrants. Jews, on the other hand, are viewed more favorably than unfavorably everywhere but in Poland. Although these data provide a rather negative picture of ethnic relations in Europe, data from an October 1992 survey in Serbia reveal how decidedly negative opinion can be toward outsiders (table 13). Solid majorities of Serbs expressed negative opinions of Muslims, Croats, Albanians, Hungarians, and Slovenians and half voiced this opinion of Macedonians and Bulgarians.

Although these high levels of ethnic hostility suggest reason for concern in Central and East Europe, there is some basis for optimism. Central and East Europeans exhibit a vital mark of democracy--the willingness to grant rights to outsiders even though they tend to view them unfavorably. This is particularly the case in Romania, Slovakia, and to a lesser degree in Bulgaria. And in those countries where an earlier measure of prejudice exists--Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Czechoslovakia--feelings toward "outsiders" have either become slightly more positive or are unchanged. This indicates that at least in these countries the potential for ethnic conflict is not increasing. The public's perception of the state of ethnic

Table 13
Opinions of Outsiders (Serbs)

Question: Now please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the following people:

	Serbs' opinion of:					
	Croats	*Macedonians*	*Muslims*	*Slovenians*	*Albanians*	*Hungarians*
Favorable	15%	35%	12%	23%	10%	24%
Unfavorable	77	54	79	67	83	65

relations supports this finding. Although between 20 and 30 percent of respondents in Central and East Europe say ethnic relations are "bad or very bad," the number of respondents who describe relations in these terms has declined in the past year in Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.

The way in which majorities in these countries describe outsiders may offer further insights into ethnic relations. For example, Romanians tend to see ethnic Hungarians living in Romania as hardworking, educated, sophisticated, and rich (figure 4). Yet they also describe Hungarians as violent, unfriendly, dishonest, and bad. Slovaks exhibit a similar pattern of mixed feelings toward Hungarians (figure 4). These positive assessments probably help account for the tolerance Romanians and Slovaks express toward Hungarians. At the same time such positive characteristics as being "rich" are often seen to be the consequences of "privileges" granted the outsiders and contribute to ethnic tension. In addition to emphasizing their negative characteristics, nationalists have rallied citizens against outsiders based on the claim of preferential treatment. This is a potent tactic during a transition period that many apparently view as a zero-sum game in which some must lose for others to gain.

Many of the same factors that predict preference for an "individual opportunities" or "state guarantees" society are also important in explaining tolerance and prejudice in Central and East Europe. As discussed more fully elsewhere (McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, and Nolle 1992b), those who are more tolerant of minority rights tend to be better educated and more urban than less tolerant citizens. They are also *less* likely to feel threatened from outside, *more* committed to democratic values, and *more* politically engaged than their more intolerant cousins. The composition of one's community apparently affects tolerance and feelings toward outsiders differentially. In Bulgaria and Romania we found that living in a heterogenous community where the national majority comprises substantially more than half of the community population appears to increase ethnic tolerance among the majority; but when members of the country's majority population live in a community dominated by an ethnic minority, they are less likely to express tolerant views toward ethnic rights. Although personal assessment of one's economic future appears to be unrelated to either opinion of outsiders or tolerance, those who judge the current economic situation to be better than that existing prior to 1989 or who describe the current economic situation as good are more likely than others to express a favorable opinion of outsiders and to be tolerant. This suggests that if the economic situation in the region

Figure 4
Assessment of Outsiders



Survey dates: Romania 9/92; Slovak Republic 12/92.

improves ethnic relations should follow suit. If economic conditions decline, however, ethnic relations might take a downward turn as people search for a scapegoat.

In sum, even though Central and East Europeans do not differ greatly from West Europeans in their views toward outsiders, the fragility of these fledgling democracies and the ease with which they could be uprooted as a result of social upheaval suggests that attitudes of intolerance in these countries are more destabilizing than in Western Europe.

Supporters and Opponents of "Market Democracy"

Not surprisingly, we find a high degree of congruence among an individual's preferred society, support for a market economy, and attitudes toward outsiders in each of these countries. Those who voice support for measures that will hasten the development of a market economy, prefer an "individual opportunities society," and hold positive views of outsiders are classified as supporters of "market democracy." By contrast, opponents of a "market democracy" tend to oppose painful economic reform measures, to favor continuation of the "state guarantees" society to which they are accustomed, and to hold negative views of outsiders in their society. "Market democracy" supporters are also more likely than others to believe that the current political system is better than the old one and to believe that it would have been better "if the communists had never come to power." Supporters of "market democracy" are more likely than opponents to be young, well-educated, urban, and male.

Since "market democracy" supporters also tend to be more politically engaged than opponents (expressing more interest in politics, more commitment to voting, and greater feelings of political efficacy), the democratic and market-oriented elites in each of these countries may be able to implement reforms despite the views of a large mass of reluctant citizens (Mason 1992). On the other hand, opponents of "market democracy" are substantially more likely than are its proponents to say they would strike or protest if their standard of living is radically affected (i.e., if prices double, social services decline, or they are faced with potential unemployment). Thus, even though the opponents of "market democracy" are less inclined to engage in "normal" politics than the advocates, they are prepared to voice their views on the streets or in their workplace. Given that opponents of "market democracy" are more likely than its advocates to equate democracy with prosperity, continued economic hardship could further deepen skepticism about the benefits of reform. This could lead to popular unrest and to the rejection of those governments deemed responsible for economic pain. Although nonviolent protest is not necessarily antidemocratic, but "is often an attempt by ordinary citizens to pressure the political system to become more democratic" (Dalton 1988, 72), in the Central and East European context it could lead to nondemocratic outcomes, especially given the appeal of a "strong leader who tells us exactly what to do" to many of those who do not enthusiastically support "market democracy."

A Typology of Public Preferences for the Transition

Although attitudes about market economy, preferred society, and outsiders are linked at the individual level in each of these countries, it is useful to distinguish publics at the aggregate level on each of these dimensions in order to assess both the likelihood of successful democratization and marketization in Central and East Europe and the types of societies that are likely to develop at the end of the current transition period. Based on the data presented, Central and East European publics are classified as shown in table 14.

Table 14
Typology of Public Preferences for the Transition

	Individual opportunities society		State guarantees society	
	More supportive free market	*Less supportive free market*	*More supportive free market*	*Less supportive free market*
More open to outsiders	Czechs	Poles	Hungarians	
More closed to outsiders		Bulgarians	Slovaks	Romanians

Without a doubt, the Czechs are the most supportive of a free market and an "individual opportunities" society. Given the relatively low level of ethnic tensions in the country, these

data suggest that Czech attitudes and beliefs are the most conducive to the development of a market democracy based on the ideals of an "individual opportunities" society and a strong free market economy.

Although the Slovaks and Hungarians are not as supportive of a free market as the Czechs, they support the ideal or are "middle-of-the-roaders" more than others in the region.[8] Yet unlike the Czechs, both of these peoples tend to prefer a "state guarantees" society. Their willingness to endorse the concept of a "state guarantees" society may perhaps be explained by the fact that each managed somewhat well under Communist rule. Since the Slovaks express a relatively negative view of Hungarians (and Vladimir Mečiar's government has not championed a policy of tolerance and cooperation with the ethnic Hungarian minority), Slovakia's transition to a "state guarantees" society with a relatively strong free market could be marred by ethnic conflict. Hungary's more homogenous ethnic composition and its somewhat more favorable and tolerant attitude toward outsiders suggests that ethnic hostility might not be as likely as in Slovakia. Recent nationalistic statements by Istvan Csurka (one of the vice presidents of the ruling Democratic Forum)[9] together with the continued debate over the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and Slovakia and the influx of refugees from the Yugoslav conflict might, however, alter public opinion to the point that this assessment proves too optimistic.

Both Poles and Bulgarians tend to favor an "individual opportunities" society and express weak support for a free market, suggesting they would prefer a regulated market economy. In Poland, reaction against a strong free market economy probably reflects the hardships encountered by the public during the period of "shock therapy." In both countries attitudes toward a free market may become more favorable if the economy improves markedly. In the short to medium term this is a much more likely scenario in Poland, where publics are beginning to voice more confidence in the market (despite rising unemployment and an increasing number of strikes). By contrast, Bulgarian economists tend to be rather pessimistic about a quick economic recovery.[10] Although ethnic tensions in Bulgaria have declined, an eruption of Bulgarian-Turkish hostilities could waylay the transition process. Poland's relative homogeneity probably contributes to lower levels of ethnic hostility and thus lowers its potential for ethnically based conflict.

Romanians clearly favor a transition to a regulated market and a "state guarantees" society. As the recent Romanian election showed, support for the opposition has grown but is

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[8] It is initially surprising that the Slovaks fall into the strong free market category, since Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, won election on a platform of gradual economic reform. But this platform was developed in response to the more radical reform program of the Czechs, which the Slovaks thought would be disadvantageous to them.

[9] Some have also characterized Csurka's statements as anti-Semitic. In December 1992 fewer than two in ten Hungarians voiced a favorable opinion of Csurka.

[10] In Bulgaria, public ambivalence about the economic reform process and the development of a free market is probably linked to several factors. During the past year and a half the Bulgarians have suffered considerable hardship as their economy has gone through the initial stages of reform. Thus they are likely to fear the consequences of the more stringent reform measures yet to come. They are also almost certainly aware of the consequences of economic reform in neighboring countries. Bulgaria's population is relatively old compared to that of other countries in the region, and both pensioners and rural, less well-educated groups are uneasy about changes that will undermine their economic security.

still outweighed by those who champion a regulated market and a "state guarantees" society. Although support for a strong free market economy has increased slightly over the last year, the Romanian public remains more apprehensive than others in the region about the consequences of market reform. Any attempt to adopt a "shock therapy" approach to market reform will likely meet with sizable public opposition.[11] Although ethnic Romanians display a high degree of ethnic tolerance, they also voice a moderately high level of negative feeling toward ethnic Hungarians. Given their preferences regarding economic reform, continued ethnic Hungarian-Romanian conflict, together with further deterioration of the economy (Shafir 1992), could further delay progress toward "market democracy" in Romania.

Conclusion

What emerges from these data is a picture of some people who welcome the transition to a new political and economic system, and others who are more hesitant to embrace the new system, either because they still cherish the past or because they are uncertain or fearful of their fate in an uncharted world. Caught between the old and the new, people often choose the old ways because they are assumed to provide security and stability. Although this study does not examine the structural aspects of the transition, it is likely that many ordinary citizens still follow old ways, not necessarily because they support the old structures, but because these structures remain so pervasive and old customs remain so prevalent. The revolutions of 1989 brought the swift demise of the external layer of the communist system. Now publics and elites alike face the task of peeling away the remaining encrusted layers of the former system. This process will undoubtedly occur at different rates in each county and is likely to take decades. Nevertheless, these data offer some hope that each country will succeed in developing its own form of "market democracy."

[11] The government of Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu has called for "a market economy of a social type," suggesting a slow down in economic reform (Shafir 1992).

Appendix A: USIA-Commissioned European Surveys Used in This Analysis

	Date of survey	# of respondents	Contractor
Bulgaria	Nov. 1990	2,876	Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD)
	May 1991	1,626	CSD
	Oct. 1991	914	CSD
	Apr. 1992	1,472	CSD
Czechoslovakia	Jan. 1990	1,500	Commerce Research Institute
	May 1990	1,371	Association for Independent Social Research (AISA)
	Nov. 1990	2,526	AISA
	Apr. 1991	1,632	AISA
	Nov. 1991	2,012	AISA
	Apr. 1992	1,779	AISA
	Dec. 1992	2,000	AISA
France	May 1992	1,002	Louis Harris France
Germany			
--Eastern	May 1992	503	Infratest Burke Berlin
--Western	May 1992	1,008	Infratest Burke Berlin
Great Britain	May 1992	1,018	IRB
Hungary	June/July 1989	950	Hungarian Institute for Market Research
	Feb. 1990	1,000	Gallup Hungary
	July 1991	1,000	Gallup Hungary
	Jan. 1992	999	Median
	Dec. 1992	990	Median
Italy	May 1992	1,016	Pragma
Poland	July 1989	1,000	Polish Sociological Association
	Apr. 1990	1,000	Central Europe Market
	Nov. 1990	997	Central Europe Market
	May 1991	1,042	Central Europe Market
	Sept. 1991	1,002	Central Europe Market
	Jan. 1992	990	Demoskop
	May 1992	901	Demoskop

Appendix A: USIA-Commissioned European Surveys Used in This Analysis *(cont'd)*

	Date of survey	# of respondents	Contractor
Romania	Apr. 1990	1,565	Laboratory of Sociological Studies and Research of the Design Institute for Standardized Buildings, Bucharest (LSSR)
	Dec. 1990	1,501	Center for Urban and Regional Sociology, Bucharest (CURS)
	Oct. 1991	1,000	SOCIOBIT
	Apr. 1992	1,512	SOCIOBIT
	Sept. 1992	1,050	SOCIOBIT
Spain	Dec. 1992	1,500	ICP Research
Turkey	Dec. 1992	1,000	PIAR (Gallup)

Interviews were conducted with a representative nationwide sample of adults (aged 18 and older). Nineteen times out of 20, results from samples of 1,000 will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in the country. For a sample of 1,500 to 2,000, the sampling error is about 3 percent. The potential margin of sampling error is larger for smaller groups. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

Appendix B: Statistical Analysis

Preferred society scale: To examine the question of what kind of post-Communist society these publics want to create, we developed a preferred society model based on the following two questions:

Some people say individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves. Others say the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. Others have views somewhere in between. How would you place your views on this scale? (4 pt. scale)

What is more important for government to do, in your opinion: to make certain that there are opportunities for people to get ahead on their own or to guarantee that people's basic needs are met?

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