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CONTENTS

BALKAN CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE EARLY OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Charles Frazee

Between the mid-fourteenth and the early nineteenth centuries, Christians of the Balkan churches had to adapt to a new and difficult situation. They became a subject people and, although a majority of the population, were no longer masters of their own destiny. This essay will trace the history of the Orthodox communities and the smaller Catholic and Armenian churches up to 1800 when nationalism, rather than religious affiliation, became the major determining factor of Balkan history.

The Conquest

The Ottoman Turks first crossed from Anatolia into Europe as allies of the Catalans. They established a major settlement in the Gallipoli Peninsula and from there, after 1354, began their conquest of Southeastern Europe. From Gallipoli, Turkish armies advanced against Thrace, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania. The Ottoman forces met weak resistance because the Christian states of the Balkans were divided and dispirited as a result of internal conflict and decades of neglect and oppression of the peasantry.

The Ottoman conquest brought great hardship to the vanquished peoples. Balkan Christian soldiers died in large numbers whenever they resisted. Thousands of civilians fled into exile, and many soldiers were enslaved because a concession in Ottoman law known as *pencik* allowed the ruler to claim one-fifth of the prisoners of war as his property. The lands of these dispossessed Christians became part of the public domain to be disposed of as Turkish officials saw fit. The Balkan nobility as a separate class--Greek, Serbian, and

Bulgarian--disappeared during the Balkan wars. As a result of this liquidation of secular leadership, churchmen became the uncontested heads of their communities.[1]

The events that followed the siege of Thessaloniki--after Constantinople the largest city of the Balkans--provide a record of the hardships of the conquest. In 1430 Murad II attacked the town's walls, which proved unable to protect the Christians within. Once inside the city, Ottoman soldiers killed hundreds of people and enslaved hundreds more. The city's churches were pillaged, and Ottoman authorities turned many of them into mosques. Some were later torn down, and at least one was converted into a public bath. The surviving Christians were left with only four places of worship. Thessaloniki's many monasteries suffered the same, if not a worse, fate. Murad distributed their properties among his followers as a reward for their contribution to the Turkish victory. Thessaloniki then became his new capital and reconstruction commenced.[2]

The Balkan invasion might have been much worse, however, as a comparison with the Ottoman occupation of Christian Anatolia makes clear. The Turkish conquest in Anatolia lasted several centuries to the severe detriment of the Christian population. By contrast, the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans occurred much more quickly and left most of the native population in place. Moreover, the number of nomadic warriors, noted for indiscriminate looting and pillaging, was high in Anatolia, while in the Balkans their participation was much more limited. Tribesmen are estimated at twenty percent of the Turkish forces in Anatolia, but in the Balkans they were only three and one-half percent--about four thousand individuals. It should also be kept in mind that Turkish rulers and even local commanders much preferred the surrender of cities to armed resistance. Soon after the occupation of a Balkan region was completed, the bureaucratic apparatus of the central government began to function, a process which was long delayed in Anatolia.[3] The combination of these factors helped to preserve the Balkan churches and gave them time to adjust, but there was also another consideration. If a mass conversion of Christians had taken place, it would have seriously reduced the revenues of the Ottoman government, which was heavily dependent on the taxes that fell upon Christians and Jews.[4]

The Ottomans took measures to ensure that no whisper of rebellion was heard among their subject populations. One of these, the *sorgün* or forced resettlement of subject populations, was meant to reduce possible insurrection. Although hardly new in the annals of warfare, it was nevertheless a great cause of suffering for thousands of Balkan Christians. After the fall of Constantinople, Mehmed II used the *sorgün* to replace the native people of the Byzantine capital. Greeks from other regions, Jews, Armenians, and even Genoese from the Crimea became citizens of Istanbul.[5]

The Ottoman Settlement and the Orthodox Church

The policies adopted by Mehmed II toward his Christian subjects following his capture of Constantinople were much more detailed than any pursued by his predecessors.

In accordance with the dictates of Muslim tradition, practicality, and circumstance, Mehmed enhanced the importance of the Greek patriarchate, the bishops, and the parish clergy in securing the stability of his territories. The church became a part of the Ottoman system.[6]

Mehmed, well educated in Christian practice, recognized that the *Qur'an* made it clear that Muslims and Christians, as well as Jews, worshipped the same God. All three religions based their faith upon revelations made at specific moments. The *Qur'an* explicitly stated that Christians and Jews, known by the Turks as *zimmis*, were People of the Book who, so long as they accepted Muslim sovereignty, were to be tolerated, even protected, and made to feel secure in whichever Muslim state they resided. Educated Muslims knew that Muhammed wanted Christians to be persuaded, not coerced, into accepting Islam as the more perfect religion. Educated Christians knew that the *Qur'an* stated that of all peoples, Christians must be regarded as friends of Muslims.[7] But Christian-Muslim relations hardly ever lived up to the ideals of the *Qur'an*. From the caliphate of Abu-Bakr through the Crusades, confrontation rather than toleration was the usual pattern. The Ottoman conquest of the Balkans was yet another chapter in the long history of battles between those who fought under the standard of the cross and those who enlisted under the crescent.

Balkan Christians were governed in accordance with the *seriat*--the religious code of the Ottomans--and a variety of other legal precedents. These laws dictated that, in general, Christian *zimmi* should be permitted to worship freely, to hold on to their properties, and to manage their internal affairs. Mehmed reserved the right to appoint George Scholarios, who had taken Gennadios for his monastic name, patriarch of the Orthodox church. Contrary to legend, Mehmed probably did not personally invest Gennadios in his office, but there is little doubt that even if an episcopal synod, the usual canonical electoral body for choosing a patriarch, had been convened, it would have had no choice but to oblige Mehmed.[8] The notion that Mehmed at once set up the *Millet-i Rum*--the Greek (Roman) nation--has also been seriously questioned. It seems much more likely that Mehmed, like his predecessors, was content to deal with his Orthodox subjects as circumstances demanded.[9]

The basic division of society within the early Ottoman state was between those who belonged to the ruling class and those who did not. The former paid no taxes. The latter, known by the collective term *reaya*, did. Since *reaya* means "flock" it has often been judged a contemptuous name for Christians and Jews. But it was also used to describe Muslims, if they belonged to the class of taxpayers. The term *askerî* was given to military and civil personnel who served the state. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Christians as well as Muslims were members of the *askerî* because service to the ruler, not religion, was the determining factor in judging personal status.

The major tax that the *reaya* were obligated to pay was the head tax known as the *cizye* or, more commonly, the *haraç*. The *cizye* fell upon every Christian male of military age. Theoretically, the tax was in lieu of army service, since Christians were not supposed to bear arms. Orthodox Christian clergy, at first exempt, were later taxed along with

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everyone else. The *zimmi* found this tax extremely burdensome because it was often set in an arbitrary manner. Both Muslim and Christian peasants also paid a land tax to the central government. A major concern of Ottoman officials, if not their most important consideration, was to make sure that all revenues owed the state were collected, and churchmen were expected to work toward that end.[10] In the early centuries of the Ottoman Conquest, taxes gathered by the Istanbul government were judged to be fair, but as the years passed, local officials tended to circumvent the sultan's bureaucracy. They raised the obligations of the peasantry to such an extent that the majority of the farming population found it difficult to survive. In some locations, tax farmers, greedy beyond imagination, fleeced the Christian *zimmi* at every opportunity. Christian peasants suffered from too little, not too much, government from Istanbul.

In addition to the taxes demanded by the state, the church had its own fiscal demands, and the church tax was one more burden for the Christian *reaya*. Part of this revenue went to pay the fees required of every Orthodox bishop and patriarch in order to hold office, a practice which the hierarchy unwisely adopted without recognizing its potential for corrupting the electoral process. The practice of giving "gifts" to Turkish officials began quite soon after the Ottoman Conquest when Symeon of Trebizon offered two thousand gold pieces to the Ottoman treasury in order to secure the patriarchate. Known as the *peşkeş*, the sums grew to astronomical proportions as the decades passed and the rivalry among candidates for patriarchal office became more intense. Orthodox bishops and laymen were expected to contribute to the successful candidate, and their offerings were collected for that purpose. Even foreign ambassadors subsidized Orthodox candidates for the patriarchate who were thought to favor a Catholic or Protestant position.[11]

As Turkish armies advanced into the Balkans, many Christian landowners decided it was to their advantage to serve the Ottomans as soldiers. They became *sipahis*--Ottoman cavalrymen--who kept their properties in return for military service. Early Ottoman rulers were not at all averse to employing Christians, despite the rule that forbade *zimmis* to bear arms. In many areas of the Balkans, Christian *sipahis* were, in fact, a majority. After 1500, however, the Christian *sipahis* disappeared because those so enrolled converted to Islam in order to keep their privileged position and were soon assimilated into the Turkish population.[12]

Certain Christian *reaya* were able to escape taxes because of services they performed for the state. Among these were the *derbentci*, who guarded bridges over rivers or passes in the mountains. Theirs was a very successful adaptation to Ottoman rule.

In some of the most difficult terrain, such as portions of Montenegro and Albania, the Ottomans never really established control because the task of subduing the mountaineers proved too time consuming and unproductive. At one time or another, all the Balkan mountains contained Christian bands who lived by raiding. These were the Greek *klephts*, the Serbian *hayduks*, and the Bulgarian *haiduts*. At intervals they swept down upon Turkish caravans, creating a somewhat undeserved reputation as Christian Robin Hoods,

and became the subject of countless heroic epics and ballads. As a matter of fact, in searching for victims, if there were no Turks around, Christians villagers would do. The Ottomans tried to counter these raids by enlisting local militias--the *armatoles*--but in vain, since the *armatole* of the day often became the *klepht* of the night.

Population in the Ottoman Balkans

Turkish records show that in the sixteenth century Christians outnumbered Muslims in twenty-four of the twenty-eight *kazas* of the Balkans.[13] Only four *kazas*: Vize, Silistria, Chirmen, and Gallipoli, had a Muslim majority. Some cities, such as Athens, were nearly all Christian.[14] Ethnic Turks and Christians who were converts preferred to make their homes in the larger Balkan towns because a full Muslim life could only be lived in an urban setting. It was in cities that the Ottomans located their administration, courts, and *medresses* and built their mosques or refitted Christian churches for Islamic worship. Christians also lived in these towns, often working alongside Muslims in public life, but rarely in private. Each community lived in its own section of town--the *mahalle*--where homes were built and families reared. Christian women and children very seldom left the *mahalle*. Both Muslims and Christians adhered to a strictly patriarchal structure in their homes.

The *mahalle* sought to manage its own affairs as much as possible. Houses of both Christians and Muslims were one-storey, squat wooden structures where people sat on divans rather than chairs. The streets of the town were not paved and became nearly impassable when it rained or snowed. Members of the *mahalle* had their own baths, shops, and warehouses conveniently located within their quarter's boundaries. In the downtown area, there were a few stone structures. These were the mosques, churches, and public buildings. Unlike West European cities, Balkan towns had no walls because the government wanted to be sure of easy access in case of trouble.[15] Since most Muslims found the city's amenities so much better, they were quite content to leave rural life to Christians.

The cities that grew in Muslim population were those along the major trade arteries and those that were administrative centers. By 1530 Sarajevo was almost completely Muslim. Other towns with large Islamic populations included Edirne, Skopje, Sofia, Larissa, and Monastir. Their numbers grew as more immigrants arrived from Anatolia and the number of converts from the indigenous population increased. Turkish tax records of 1553-54 show the following numbers for the Balkan part of the empire: Christians 832,707; Muslims 194,958; and Jews 4,134. Only taxable hearths were counted, so not every household was included. Nevertheless, these statistics show that, despite conversions, a century after the Ottoman Conquest about 80 percent of the Balkan population was Christian and less than 20 percent was Muslim.[16]

The Devşirme

Perhaps the single most difficult aspect of the early years of the Ottoman Empire for Balkan Christians was the *devşirme* or child-tribute. Although the exact year of its origin

remains uncertain, it was in place from at least the last years of the fourteenth century. Isidore Glabas, Archbishop of Thessaloniki, mentions it in a sermon given in 1395.[17] In many ways, this was the cruelest tax of all, since it took the sons of Christian families away from their homes, forced them to become Muslims, and separated them from family and friends for the rest of their lives. There is no precedent for the *devşirme* in earlier Muslim societies, and apparently the practice violated *Qur'anic* law. It was an Ottoman invention used to recruit its army, the Janissary Corps, or the civil service attached to the palace.

There can be no doubt that the children taken received rewards. Some of them enjoyed high positions in the state.[18] It is also evident, however, that the Ottomans themselves considered the *devşirme* a burden. Hence, in the treaties of surrender for Galata, Iannina, the Peloponnesus, and Chios, exemptions from the *devşirme* were offered to the Christians living there. The *derbentcis* of Yeniköy in Bulgaria, the Greeks of Sidrekapsi, and the miners of Sarki Karahisar were also not subject to the forced recruitment because of the services they provided. In addition , there were individual exceptions. Young men who were married or disfigured were not taken, and families were known to use bribery with the soldiers to substitute someone else's child for their own.[19]

Perhaps the best measure of the *devşirme*'s popularity may be gauged by a *firman* of 1601:

> In accordance with this [right to act], whenever some one of the infidel parents or some other should oppose the giving up of his son for the Janissaries, he is immediately hanged from his door-sill, his blood being deemed unworthy.[20]

Conversion to Islam

One of the most complex questions surrounding the Christian-Muslim relationship in the Balkans concerns the extent to which Christian converts accepted the faith of their conquerors and their motivation for doing so. The answers are many. There were certainly circumstances that made conversion easy. The day-to-day dealings that Christians had with Muslim Turks may have persuaded many of them that Islam was a superior religion. Christian *sipahis* made up another large group of converts. There were also landowners who were reluctant to lose their properties and Balkan officials who wanted to hold on to their positions. Conversion must have appeared attractive to those who wanted to escape the *cizye* or the *devşirme* and who recognized that a change of religion promised them relief. For thousands of people, conversion meant exchanging a difficult life in this world for a better one, even at the risk of a doubtful eternity.

The areas associated with substantial conversions were often places where it could be argued that Christianity had either not taken root to begin with or failed to establish the structures necessary to preserve itself. Priests and monks were few, and the peasant population was overwhelmingly uneducated in the articles of the Christian faith. In many of these regions, especially in rural settings, Muslims and Christians celebrated each other's holidays, visited each other's shrines, and adopted each other's customs, making it easy to move from Christian folk-religion to Muslim folk-religion. Such was the case in rural Bosnia, Albania, parts of Bulgaria, and Crete. In the cities, the right to participate in Muslim guilds, and the *akhis*--the Sufi brotherhoods--especially the Bektashi and Mevlevi, must have been attractive to marginal Christian believers.[21]

Economic considerations were probably the most significant reason for converting to Islam. Potential economic benefits tempted the Bosnians, whether loosely Catholic or heretically Bogomil, to become Muslim. A letter of the Bosnian King Stefan Tomašević to Pope Pius II notes, "The Turks have built several fortresses in my kingdom and are very kind to the country folk. They promise freedom to every peasant who converts to Islam."[22] Merchants who became Muslims had the opportunity to testify in a *kadi*'s court, a privilege denied to Christians. Since buying and selling could easily involve litigation, this was a strong incentive for a Christian tradesman to adopt the Islamic faith.

Yet another motivation for conversion was the willingness of the Muslim leadership to allow converts the use of their native language. No effort was made to enforce Turkish. In fact, because of the need to read the *Qur'an*, new Muslims were encouraged to study Arabic in preference to Turkish. In addition, since execution followed apostasy to Islam, converts had a compelling reason for remaining Muslim. Conversion was a one-way street. The "New Martyrs" of the Orthodox Church during the Ottoman period were usually Christians who were raised as Muslims for one reason or another. When they discovered their Christian roots and announced a return to Christianity, they paid the penalty for their convictions.

Domestic considerations also played a role in the spread of Islam. It was not unknown for women in Christian families to be kidnapped in localities where central government control was weak or nonexistent. In some Balkan regions, there was also the practice known as *kepin* in which a Muslim man might pay the father of a Christian family for a daughter to come live with him on a temporary basis. Any children born of such a union were raised in the Islamic faith. Differences between Muslim and Christian marriage traditions encouraged intermarriage between Muslim men and Christian women. Muslim men had to pay a bride-price to marry women of their faith. Christian women had to furnish a dowry to their husband's family. These traditions placed a heavy burden on poor households. Therefore, Muslim men often found it advantageous to marry Christian women.[23] In addition, the *Qur'anic* permission for a man to have four wives contributed to a higher birth-rate among Muslims.

The Greek Orthodox Community

The promotion of Hellenism throughout the Balkans during the Ottoman centuries was one of the unforeseen consequences of the fall of Constantinople. By 1800 Greek churchmen, merchants, and statesmen were incorporated into the Ottoman structure to such an extent that they had become the junior partners of the empire. With few exceptions, the Greeks controlled the patriarchate and its staff throughout the Ottoman centuries. The Slavic clergy of the Balkans were treated with little regard. The Greek patriarchs and their staffs were always anxious to keep those Byzantine traditions that benefitted their position alive. Moscow's princes cooperated with this goal. Because Russia was the only independent Orthodox nation, its rulers and churchmen felt an obligation to become the patriarchate's protector long before this obligation was confirmed in writing in the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kajnarca.

Since what education existed in the Balkan schools of the Orthodox nations was in the hands of Greek clerics, all of the students who attended them came to identify with Hellenism. They studied from Greek books and became the heirs of Byzantine spirituality. The Phanar, the major Greek *mahalle* of Istanbul, seat of the patriarchate and its major educational institutions, provided the training that enabled its citizens to rise to important posts within the Turkish state. These were the Dragomans of the Porte and the Fleet, and the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia.[24]

Although Greek merchant communities were to be found in every Balkan town, the church was the major patron of Hellenism throughout the Balkans. In some areas populated by a majority of Greeks, such as the Cycladic Islands, the arrival of a bishop might be greeted with enthusiasm. His presence was a reminder of the Byzantine past. In Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and southern Albania, however, there was little rejoicing over an episcopal visit, since it was principally an occasion for Greek clergy to bully the people into paying church taxes. Even parish priests in these regions, peasants among peasants, expected to be fleeced by their spiritual shepherds.

Unfortunately, the Greek hierarchy showed remarkably little interest in attempting to correct the ignorance and superstitions pervasive throughout the Balkans. The bishops may have agreed that the Orthodox population was easier to manage, and the Turks easier to please, if ideas other than those sponsored by unquestioned tradition were maintained.[25] Mount Athos, an example of Orthodox internationalism in the Middle Ages, changed dramatically in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There were numerous conflicts between Greek and Slavic monasteries. On several occasions, the abbots of the Holy Mountain declared Slavic books heretical and destroyed them, thereby adding to the climate of hostility among the monks.[26]

Nevertheless, the Greek church was primarily responsible for the preservation of Orthodox identity during the Ottoman centuries. The official status of the church in modern Greece testifies to how well it weathered these times. The vast majority of Greeks, even

those who no longer attend services, are grateful to the church for the role it played in the Balkans after 1453.[27]

The Bulgarians and Slavic Macedonians

The Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria took place in one very swift campaign at the close of the fourteenth century. Since it happened so quickly, the loss of clergy and the damage to church property was relatively slight. Bulgarian Christian *sipahis* were welcomed into the Ottoman forces. As in other parts of the Balkans, this class converted to Islam after two or three generations of service to the sultans.[28]

In the years immediately following the conquest, the Bulgarian and Macedonian churches were organized under the archbishopric of Ochrid, successor to the national patriarchate of Turnovo whose bishop had not survived the Ottoman occupation. Later Mehmed II ordered the Greek patriarchate to assume primacy over the Bulgarian archbishopric, and more Greek bishops were appointed to offices in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Native traditions survived, however, because many new churches and monasteries were built or redecorated through the patronage of successful Bulgarian merchants and landowners who found places in the Ottoman world.[29]

In 1767 the Greek patriarch Samuel Hanocherli finally succeeded in suppressing the Ochrid archbishopric. This put the church directly under the Greek hierarchy and hastened the Hellenization of the Bulgarian and Slavic Macedonian churches. The survival of the native tradition was largely the result of the efforts of Father Paisii, a monk of the Hilandar Monastery on Mount Athos. His literary work, the *Slavenobulgarian History of the Bulgarian People and Kings and Saints and of All the Bulgarian Acts and Events*, produced in 1762, revived the national spirit among educated Bulgarians. Despite difficult years in the late eighteenth century, when wars between the Ottomans and Russians became frequent in the eastern part of the Balkans, a national consciousness slowly continued to form in the cities, especially among the Bulgarians living in Istanbul.[30]

The Serbians

The history of the Serbian people under the Ottomans parallels that of the Bulgarians in many ways. As in the case of the Bulgarians, once the rulers became Turks and the churchmen Greek, a process of Hellenization began. But some events were peculiar to Serbia. In 1557 the Serbian Mehmed Sokolović, who rose to a position of power in the Ottoman service after having been taken as a child in the *devşirme*, succeeded in persuading the sultan that the leadership of the church should be restored to Peć, the traditional Serbian patriarchate. His Christian brother, the monk Makarije, was promoted to the office. For a time, therefore, the Serbian church enjoyed local leadership and escaped some of the vexations commonly experienced before this event.[31]

Late in the seventeenth century, a Habsburg army approached Serbia holding out a promise of freedom from Turkish rule. Accepting the offer of the Habsburg general Octavio Piccolomini, Patriarch Arsenije III called on his people to support the Austrians. Thousands responded to his summons, but events in Western Europe forced the withdrawal of the Habsburg forces. With perhaps 85,000 people, Arsenije retreated with the Austrian army into Christian territory, to the town of Karlovci, where Emperor Leopold I recognized his patriarchal authority. The migration of the Serbians, many from the Kosovo region around Peć, created a vacuum that allowed Albanians to settle in the area, resulting in a major change in the ethnic composition of the Serbian homeland.[32]

Having demonstrated their true feelings about Ottoman rule, the Serbians were fiercely persecuted for a time. In 1737 Patriarch Arsenije IV led a new migration into Habsburg land. This allowed the Phanariotes in Istanbul to send a Greek appointee to Peć and, in 1766, to eliminate the separate Serbian patriarchate that was hopelessly in debt. From 1766 until they gained autonomy in the early nineteenth century, the majority of Serbians living in Ottoman lands worshipped in churches under Greek bishops. Turkish landlords, many of them members of the Janissary Corps that had been pushed out of Hungary, now dominated the countryside.[33]

The Albanian Orthodox

Eastern Christians in Albania were concentrated among the Tosk-speaking population located south of the Shkumbin River. Evangelization had come early to this region because the Via Egnatia, the major east-west highway of the Balkans, had its Adriatic terminus at Dyrrachium, now Albanian Durrës. During the Middle Ages, Byzantine political control extended over southern Albania, with the major ecclesiastical head situated in the Ochrid archbishopric. The Serbian empire of Stefan Dušan incorporated the area within its boundaries, further confirming the eastern orientation of the population.

The Turkish invasion of Albania met less resistance in the south than in the Catholic north, which was also the more mountainous region. Local chieftains continued to be the political authorities in the area, serving under the few Turkish officials sent to Albania to make certain the *cizye* was paid. Although several Albanian regiments fought as auxiliaries in the Ottoman army, very few Turks who were not government employees lived in Albania. A census taken in 1510 of Gjirokastër, in the heart of Orthodox Albania, counted only fifty-three Muslim families in a town of twelve thousand people.[34]

After Mehmed II's reorganization of the Orthodox community, Constantinople's patriarch took over the care of the Christian bishoprics of southern Albania. As elsewhere in the Balkans, there was considerable Hellenization among Orthodox Albanians, and by 1800 there was no clear ethnic line between Albanians and Greeks. Conversions to Islam were not uncommon, but were never as numerous in Albania as among the northern Catholics. Some Orthodox became crypto-Christians, taking Muslim names but secretly

continuing to have their children baptized and taught the faith. Such a situation may last for several generations, but in time the Christian tradition tends to fade. Nevertheless, there is every indication that in southern Albania, Orthodox and Muslim families lived in harmony, not conflict. A common Orthodoxy also encouraged a southern Albanian migration into Greece during the Ottoman period.[35]

Orthodox Christianity, more than any other Christian community, is at its best in worship. As each Sunday and holy season appeared during the year, both city and rural Christians were able to enjoy the sights and sounds of a liturgy that has never been equaled for its beauty. In a world of frequent insecurity and scarcity, the church brought consolation and culture. The liturgy recalled to the congregation the mysteries of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection, blotting out what was often a difficult present. In this way, the Orthodox churches served a major historic purpose during the long Ottoman centuries.

The Catholic Ottoman Community

The Turkish occupation had disastrous effects on most of the Balkan Catholic populations. The sultans could monitor the activities of the Balkan Orthodox leaders, who lived within the empire, but the Catholic leadership was based in Italy, and strong Catholic armies remained a threat north of the Danube. No individuals were more active in forming alliances against the Turks than the popes of Rome.

The first Catholic community to come under the Turks was the Genoese colony of Galata, located directly across the Golden Horn from Istanbul. Rather than fight, in 1453 Galata surrendered, causing Mehmed II to issue a *firman* guaranteeing the Galatans freedom of worship and exempting them from the *devşirme*.[36] After this the Ottoman leaders always treated Catholics as foreigners. No Catholic bishop ever held power comparable to that of the Orthodox patriarch, nor did a *millet* organization develop.

The second Catholic nation to feel the brunt of Ottoman expansion was Hungary. In 1526 Süleyman the Magnificent captured Belgrade, the Magyar outpost on the Danube. Five years later, having devastated the national army at Mohács, the Sultan moved into Buda. Because the Hungarians had resisted, the Ottoman armies swept over the countryside looking for captives to sell as slaves, destroying many of the churches, and seizing whatever property could be taken. It is no exaggeration to say that the Catholic population of Central Hungary ceased to exist. In 1581 a single priest was on duty in Pécs, where once there had been three hundred.[37]

Bosnia

The Bosnian kingdom, which was founded about 1377, was seriously jeopardized by the Ottoman advance northward. At the time of this advance, the Bosnian king and

members of the nobility had recently severed their ties with the Bosnian church. This unique native ecclesiastical organization appeared after the thirteenth century. By the time the Muslims reached Bosnia, it was a dying institution, but the tenacity of its existence was an indication of the weakness of the Catholic tradition in the region.[38] The Franciscans, who held thirty-two convents at the time of the Ottoman advance, held only five a few years later. For two centuries, the friars had formed the nucleus of Catholicism in Bosnia because the bishop of the country did not live there, but in Dakovo, north of the Sava River. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a Franciscan friar, Angelo Zvijezdović, took the responsibility of obtaining a *firman* from the Muslims that assured the Catholics the freedom to practice their religion and a guarantee for their property. Despite the *firman*, the exodus of Catholics continued, and the number of Franciscans declined. In 1463 the last Bosnian king, Stefan Tomašević, was executed in Jajce. His death caused thousands more Bosnian Catholics to leave the country for the safety of Habsburg lands.

The members of the Bosnian nobility who survived the conquest were quite willing to join the ranks of the *sipahis* in the Muslim army. By enlisting they preserved their properties and the privileges that they were accustomed to enjoying. They were also quite anxious to approve the migration of Serbians who moved into Bosnia on the heels of the fleeing Catholics. In 1533 the Muslim population stood at 30 percent; by 1550 half of Bosnia was Muslim. Almost all the nobles had become Muslims, and many of the remaining Catholic peasantry had gone over to Islam or Orthodoxy.[39] Conversions had a snowball effect. When one or two households in a village became Muslim, others soon followed. The patriarchal nature of Balkan society expedited the change, since if the head of an extended family converted, the other family members had no choice but to follow.

Life in Bosnia was difficult for the Catholics who remained. A traveler in 1579 reported, "The Turks, as they travel here and there, take from Christians everything they have without paying for it, wherefore poor folk withdraw into the mountains, to fertile elevations, conveying their goods thither and cultivating the ground."[40] Conditions were little better by the seventeenth century. Although the number of Franciscan convents increased to thirteen, there were fewer than forty priests. The Orthodox clergy harassed Catholics by seeking to collect church taxes from them, and the Franciscans were constantly seeking *firmans* from the Muslim authorities to free themselves from these expenses. Nevertheless, Orthodox demands nearly bankrupted the convents. Turkish *kadis* frequently transferred ownership of churches from Catholic to Orthodox clergy, and by 1620 there were seven hundred thousand Muslims in Bosnia, most of whom were former Catholics. Throughout the Turkish occupation, Franciscan friars continued to serve their isolated communities. To allay suspicion, the peasants called them "uncles" when they arrived in their villages disguised as peasants. Catholic villagers in the twentieth century still recall that, "the uncles shared good and bad times with us."[41]

The next community of Catholics to become the target of Süleyman fared somewhat better. In 1536 and 1537, the Ottoman fleet under Khair ad-Din Barbarossa cruised the Aegean Sea, bringing the Latin Catholics of the former Duchy of the Archipelago, with its

capital at Naxos, under Istanbul's control. At first required to pay tribute, in 1566 the islands were incorporated into the regular Ottoman administration. Catholic bishops were not disturbed, nor did Turks make their homes on the islands. Even the Latin nobility retained its privileged social position. Many of today's Catholics on Naxos, Tinos, and Santorini are descendants of the Latin population of the Duchy of the Archipelago. The native population of nearby Syros was also Catholic, but this community was probably composed of converts to the Latin church.[42]

In the mid-fifteenth century, the Gheg-speaking Catholic Albanians of the rugged north of the country rallied around the national hero, Skenderbeg, in an effort to throw back the Ottoman invasion of their homeland. Ten years after Skenderbeg's death in 1468, however, Catholic resistance was broken.[43] Despite their defeat, the tribal chieftains of the north, sheltered by the mountains, retained control of their clans. The Ottomans even granted them the honored Turkish title of *bajraktar*, meaning "standard-bearer." For more than a century, the Catholic religion held its own, albeit more as a result of traditional loyalty than strong religious commitment.

Once the Ottomans began losing battles to the Habsburgs and to Venice, toleration of Catholics ended, and a systematic persecution of the northern Albanians began. Whole villages were subjected to violence, death, and destruction. The *cizye* was increased to the point that no peasant could afford to pay it. Government officials were intent on making sure that only Muslims should enjoy the little prosperity Albania offered. Catholics who could, left for exile in Italy. Late in the seventeenth century, the pasha of Peć ordered thousands of Catholic Albanians from their villages and had them resettled in the Kosovo region of Serbia, where most had little choice but to follow the decision of those left behind in Albania to convert to Islam. Many of these enlisted in the Janissary Corps, while others found entrance into high position, even the *vizirate*, in Istanbul. By 1700 the Islamization of the once Catholic population was nearly complete. Among the northern tribes remaining in the mountains, the Mirdites took the lead in seeking cooperation rather than confrontation with the Ottomans. Although retaining their Catholic faith, they served as auxiliaries in the Ottoman army, with one man recruited from every household.[44]

In 1569 the king of France signed a treaty with the Ottomans making him the protector of Catholics in the Ottoman state. This benefitted Catholics in the more visible parts of the empire, but even the frequent renewal of these so-called capitulations did little to preserve the Bosnian and Albanian Catholic communities.[45] A small Catholic community did come into existence at the time when the Bosnian and Albanian churches were in decline, but it was not destined to prosper. This community was established in northwestern Bulgaria, centered in the town of Chiprovtsi. Franciscan friars accompanied a group of Catholic Saxon miners from Transylvania to this region and soon expanded their mission to the native Bulgarians. The friars gained most of their converts from a sect known as Paulicians or Bogomils. In 1624 a native Bulgarian, Elias Marinov, was named bishop, and two decades later his successor, Peter Bogdan Bakšić, opened a Catholic church in Sofia. These efforts were reversed in 1688 when a rebellion in Chiprovtsi failed and the

Turks destroyed the Catholic villages. The survivors fled to Wallachia, temporarily ending the expansion of Catholicism in Bulgaria.[46]

There was one exception to the depressed state of Catholicism in the Ottoman Balkans. In the city of Dubrovnik on the Adriatic coast, only Catholics were allowed to be citizens. Dubrovnik merchants had accepted first Venetian and then Hungarian sovereignty, but when their leaders saw the Ottoman successes in the Balkans they made a bargain with the sultan's government. In 1478 officials from Dubrovnik agreed to become tributaries to the Istanbul government and to pay 12,500 ducats annually to the sultan's treasury. Some years later, the Ottomans agreed to become the city's protector. This unique arrangement allowed the merchants of Dubrovnik to set up colonies in all the major Balkan cities. Whenever possible, Catholic priests served the religious needs of the community, keeping the faith alive in what would otherwise have been a Muslim and Orthodox world.[47]

The Armenians

In the course of Mehmed II's resettlement of Constantinople, several Armenian communities were uprooted and brought into the city. An Armenian bishop was appointed. In time he took the title of patriarch, but initially the Armenian bishopric was a local office. The Armenians had *catholicoi*--church leaders--in Echmiadzin, Aghtamar, and Sis as well as Jerusalem, but in 1453 all of these cities lay outside the Ottoman empire. As the Turkish state expanded, it encompassed more Armenian subjects. Since it was easier for Turkish bureaucrats to deal with someone near at hand, the authority of the patriarch in Istanbul increased.

In many ways, the history of the Armenians parallels that of the Greeks. In the Balkans, the Armenians came among the population as merchants. In Istanbul itself, Armenian *amiras* vied with Greek Phanariotes for position and prestige. Early in the eighteenth century, a movement toward Catholicism led by a convert, Mekhitar of Sivas, divided the Armenian community for many decades. Mekhitar ultimately moved to Venice, where his community is still to be found.[48]

Conclusion

At the start of the revolutionary movements of the nineteenth century, the Christian communities took different paths. The Orthodox population provided the impetus for the national movements of the new Balkan states. The Armenians stood aside, since there were too few of them in Europe to make a difference. The Catholics in Greece preferred continued Ottoman rule to taking a chance in a Greek state in which they would become a small minority. The Catholic mountaineers of Albania were only 10 percent of the total population and shared their homeland with Muslim tribes. Throughout the Balkans, relations between Christians and Muslims entered a new stage of development, one in which nationalism proved to be a stronger force than Orthodoxy in the construction of new states.

NOTES

1. Leften Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), 50-67. See also D. Angelov, "La conquete des peuples balkanique par les Turks," *Byzantinoslavica* 17 (1956): 236-38. Angelov's views are that the conquest meant "incalculable ruin and a massacre without number."

2. Speros Vryonis Jr., "The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430" in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, ed. Anthony Bryer and Heath Lowry (Birmingham: Center for Byzantine Studies, 1986), 314-ff. See also Apostolos Vacalopoulos, *A History of Thessaloniki*, trans. T. F. Carney (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1972), 70-75. The Venetians, who governed the city in 1430, also suffered severe losses. Murad personally paid the ransom for some Christian captives taken in the battle.

3. Nehemiah Levtzion, "Towards a Comparative Study of Islamization" in Levtzion, ed., *Conversion to Islam* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 8-ff.

4. Stanford Shaw, *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1804* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19-ff.

5. For an overview of Turkish warfare see Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954): 103-29.

6. Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, trans. William Hickman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 104-05. Originally published as *Mehmet der Eroberer und Seine Zeit* (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1959).

7. Sura 2, "Al Baqarah," 62 in Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans., *The Holy Qur'an*, new ed. (Brentwood, Md.: Amana Corp., 1989), 33.

8. The patriarchal investiture by Mehmed, contained in Phrantzes's *Chronicle*, is now regarded as actually written about 1596 by Metropolitan Makarios Melissenos of Monemvasia. See also Kritovoulos, *History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, trans. Charles T. Riggs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 94-95. See also C. J. G. Turner, "The Career of George-Gennadius Scholarius," *Byzantion* 34 (1969): 420-55.

9. The convincing arguments on the *millet* arrangement are found in Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths of the Millet System" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, ed. Braude and Bernard Lewis, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1:70-75. According to Braude, the *millet* system was not an institution or even a group of institutions, but rather was a set of local arrangements that varied over time and place. Only in the period after the 1800s can the *millet* system, fully formed, be discovered.

10. Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 1:237-48.

11. Kyrillos Lukaris's tenure brought a Calvinist to the patriarchate, while his rival, Kallinikos, held Catholic views. See Robert Mantran, "Foreign Merchants and the Minorities in Istanbul," in *Christians and Jews*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 127-ff. See also Josef Kabrda, *Le system fiscal de l'eglise orthodoxe dans l'empire ottoman d'apres les documents Turcs* (Brno, Slovakia: Univ. J. E. Pukyne-Filosof. Fak. t Tisk, 1969).

12. I. Metin Kunt, "Transformation of *zimmi* into *askeri*" in *Christians and Jews*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 59-63.

13. A *kaza* was an administrative unit indicating the administrative district of a *kadi*. See Gy. Kaldy Nagy, "Kaza," *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1978), 4:364-65.

14. Ömer Lutfi Barkan, "Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'empire ottoman aux XV et XVI et XVII siècles," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1 (1958): 32.

15. Nikolai Todorov, ed., *The Balkan City, 1400-1900* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 9, 34-35.

16. Ö. L. Barkan, "Osmanli Imparator lugunda bir iskan, 1553-54," in *The Balkan City*, ed. Todorov, 237.

17. Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Isidore Glabas and the Turkish Devşirme," in Vryonis, ed., *Byzantium: Its Internal History and Relations with the Muslim World* (London: Variorum, 1971), 442.

18. In 1515, Muslim parents in Bosnia sent a thousand boys to Istanbul on a voluntary basis to be trained in the Palace School. V. L. Ménage, "Devşirme," *Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 2:210-15.

19. N. Beldiceanu, *Les actes des premiers sultans conservés dans les manuscrits turcs de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris* (Paris: Mouton, 1960), 1:147.

20. Quoted in Speros Vryonis, Jr., ed., "Seljuk Gulams and Ottoman Devşirmes" in *Byzantium*, 247.

21. For a survey on conversion see the articles found in Michael Gervers and Ramzi Jibran Bikhazi, eds., *Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands, Eighth to the Eighteenth Centuries* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1990). See also Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, vol. 5 of *A History of East Central Europe*, Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold, eds. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 52-54.

22. Quoted in Ivo Andrić, *The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule*, ed. Zelimir B. Juricic and John Loud (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 1991), 15.

23. Speros Vryonis, Jr., "The Experience of Christians under Seljuk and Ottoman Domination, Eleventh to Sixteenth Century," in *Conversion*, ed. Gervers and Bikhazi, 203.

24. Richard Clogg, "The Greek *Millet* in the Ottoman Empire" in *Christians and Jews*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 185-207; Steven Runciman, "The Orthodox Communities under the Ottoman Sultans" in *The Byzantine Tradition after the Fall of Constantinople*, ed. John J. Yiannis (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1991), 2-4.

25. Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 179-81. The Greeks were never allowed to forget, however, that they were a subject people.

26. F.W. Hasluck, *Athos and its Monasteries* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1924), 46-48, 54-58.

27. Kemel Karpat, "*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era" in *Christians and Jews*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 150-51. Karpat gives the credit for preserving national consciousness more to the family and society than to the church.

28. J. Kabrda, "Les problèmes de l'etudie de l'histoire de la Bulgarie à l'epoque de la domination turque," *Byzantinoslavica* 15 (1954):196-97; Machiel Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period* (Maastricht, 1985), 66-67.

29. The former monastery of St. Ivan Rilski, destroyed in the fifteenth century, was rebuilt about 1550. Keil, *Art and Society*, Introduction, XVII.

30. See Dennis Kupchick, ed., *The Pen and the Sword: Studies in Bulgarian History by James F. Clark*, vol. 252 of East European Monographs (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1988), 90-91.

31. L. Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe et son église sous la domination turque* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1947), 21-ff.; Sugar, *Southeastern Europe*, 58.

32. Hadrovics, *Le peuple serbe*, 137-ff. After 1690 Montenegro had an independent position with its church ruled by the prince-bishop of Cetinje.

33. Jean Mousset, *La Serbie et son église (1830-1904)* (Paris: Droz, 1938), 35-38.

34. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age* (New York: Praeger, 1973), 132-35.

35. Tom Winnifrith, "Albania and the Ottoman Empire" in *Perspectives on Albania*, ed. T. Winnifrith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 74-77.

36. See Document 1 in Marie-Magdeline Lefebvre, "Actes ottomans concernant Gallipoli, la mer Egée et la Grèce au XVI siècle," *Südost Forschungen* 42 (1983): 126-28. At the time of the conquest there were thirteen Catholic churches in Galata and several more in the capital.

37. Buda had but one Christian church, shared between Catholics and Calvinists. Albert Levaivre, *Les Magyars pendant la domination ottomane en Hongrie, 1526-1722*, 2 vols. (Paris: Perrin, 1902), 20-23; Lajos Fekete, "La vie de Budapest sous la domination turque, 1541-1686," *Journal of World History* 8, no. 3 (1964): 527-29.

38. On the Bosnian church, see John A. Fine Jr., *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

39. Dominic Mandić, "Borba Katoličk Crkve za Opstanak u Bosni i Hercegovini" in *Etnicka povijest Bosne i Hercegovine* (Rome: Hrvatski Povijesmi Institut u Rimu, 1967), 56-57. See also Adolf Gottlob, "Die latinischen Kirchengemeiden in der Türkei und ihre visitation durch Petrus Cedulini, Bishof von Nona, 1580-81," *Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft* 6 no. 1 (1883): 47-72.

40. Quoted in Jovan Cvijić, "Des migrations dans les pays Yugoslav," *Revue des études slaves* 3, nos. 1-2 (1923): 5-26, quoted in Ivo Andrić, *The Development of Spiritual Life*, 25. As late as 1731 the Serbian patriarch received a *berat* placing the Catholic clergy under his jurisdiction.

41. See Ivo Sivrić, *The Peasant Culture of Bosnia and Hercegovina* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1982), 34. A peasant saying summed up the situation, "For fear of God I must tell no lies, for fear of the beg I must not tell the truth."

42. On the Cycladic occupation, see Charles and Kathleen Frazee, *Princes of the Greek Islands: The Duchy of the Archipelago* (Amsterdam: A. Haakert, 1988). In 1566 the Ottomans took Chios, which also held a large Catholic community. See Philip Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and Their Administration of the Island, 1346-1566*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 1:364-68.

43. Kristo Frasheri, *History of Albania* (Tirana: Universiteti shteteror, Instituti i Historise e Gjuhesish, 1964), 66-86. See also A. Gegaj, *L'Albanie et l'invasion turque au XVeme siècle* (Louvain: Bureaux du Recueil, Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1937).

44. For an anthropological study, see Carelton S. Coon, *The Mountains of Giants: A Racial and Cultural Study of the North Albanian Ghegs* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1930); Stavro Skendi, "Religion in Albania during the Ottoman Rule," *Südost Forschungen* 15 (1956): 311-27.

45. The first treaty is found in J. de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les puissant étrangères*, 8 vols. (Paris: Amyot, 1864-94) 1:91-96.

46. Charles Frazee, *Catholics and Sultans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 108-10; Ivan Duichev, *Cattolicesimo in Bulgaria nel secolo XVII Secondo i Processi Informativi sulla Nomina dei Vescovi Cattolici*, vol. 16 of *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* (Rome: Pont. Institutum orientalium studiorum, 1937), 7-45.

47. On Dubrovnik see the collection of articles by Barisa Krekić, *Dubrovnik, Italy, and the Balkans in the Late Middle Ages* (London: Variorum, 1980) for a view of the city's importance.

48. Kevork B. Bardakjian, "The Rise of the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople," in *Christians and Jews*, ed. Braude and Lewis, 89-100.

SLAVIC ORTHODOX ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER RELIGIONS*

Eve Levin

Dimitri Obolensky identified three major factors in the development of national identity in the medieval period--land, language, and religion.[1] In the current crisis in the Balkans, all three have become casus belli. The reemergence of religion as a motive for violence, despite half of century of Communist rule, speaks to its vitality in popular consciousness. Consequently, an examination of what the various religious traditions of the Balkans have taught about other faiths can offer some insight into the reasons for conflict.

This article will concentrate on South Slavic Orthodox attitudes toward Jews, Roman Catholics, and Muslims in the premodern period. The primary sources of information are polemical texts that sought to defend the legitimacy of Orthodox Christianity by denigrating the practices and practitioners of other religions. These polemics have received little scholarly attention, and this article will not suffice to fill that gap in the academic literature. Instead, by closely examining a few representative writings, it will describe the characteristics of the polemics and examine their implications for inter-religious relations in the premodern Balkans.

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Much in the Slavic Orthodox intellectual legacy was derived from Byzantine sources, but Slavs omitted huge chunks of the Greek heritage, in particular abstract theology and secular culture.[2] Serbian and Bulgarian enthusiasm for Byzantine Christianity was tempered by wariness of Byzantine political ambitions. The Serbian and Bulgarian churches generally owed their allegiance to their native rulers, rather than to the patriarch of Constantinople. Thus it should not be assumed that the South Slavic churchmen shared the views of non-Orthodox peoples expressed by their Greek colleagues.

The concept of religious toleration arose painfully in Europe (and America) out of the denominational conflict of the early modern period. The axiom that religious confession should be a private matter of no concern to state authorities arose still later, out of the Enlightenment, and still has not been fully accepted. Ecumenical notions such as the validity of religious traditions other than one's own are an innovation of the past forty years. Suffice it to say that all of these ideas were alien to the Slavic Orthodox approach to other religions in the premodern period--as they were to Judaism, Catholicism, and Islam at that time. Slavic Orthodox writings were unremittingly critical of other religions, but this attitude did not preclude peaceful coexistence with persons of different faiths. Orthodox teachings did not require confrontation, much less crusade or expulsion.

Before launching into a discussion of Slavic Orthodox attitudes toward other faiths, it is worth noting that hostilities within the Orthodox camp could be equally sharp. While respecting the Orthodox *oikumene*, Slavic clerics could still make derisive comments about Greeks and Romanians. Orthodox vituperation against Bogomil heretics exceeded anything against Catholics or Muslims because it was accompanied by the use of force as well as words.[3] Even among Slavs all was not necessarily well. In the 1620s, for example, a jurisdictional dispute broke out between Archbishop Prohor of Ohrid and Bishop Pavle of Smederevo. Pavle used his connections with the Ottoman government to get Prohor arrested. When Prohor won his release, he retaliated by excommunicating Pavle, decrying his "evil designs" and labeling him "accursed."[4]

Attitudes toward Jews

The Christian churches had a long tradition of debating the rightness of their faith against Jews. Christians granted that the Jews were originally God's chosen people and that the Scriptures of the Old Testament were Jewish writings. But the Jews' continued refusal to accept the Christian understanding of their common tradition represented an implicit challenge to Christians who called themselves the "new Israel."[5]

In Western Europe in the later Middle Ages, Roman Catholic authorities became increasingly intolerant of the Jewish presence, but the Orthodox world did not.[6] Jews were not numerous in the Slavic regions of the Balkans, but they were well-established. Their residence predated Slavic settlement and continued uninterrupted into the modern period. Although Jews usually left few traces in the official records of South Slavic states, they

became unusually visible in fourteenth-century Bulgaria, when Tsar Ivan Alexander IV divorced his Vlah wife to marry a Jewish woman. In the Orthodox tradition, Jews had an established, if separate and inferior, place in the Christian world. Demetrios Khomatianos, the Greek appointed Archbishop of Ohrid in the early thirteenth century, argued for peaceful coexistence:

> From the beginning, people of different languages and religions were permitted to live in Christian lands and cities, namely Jews, Armenians, Ismaelites, Agarenes and others such as these, except that they do not mix with Christians, but rather live separately. For this reason, places have been designated for these according to ethnic group, either within the city or without, so that they may be restricted to these and not extend their dwelling beyond them.

He noted three reasons for this policy of separate toleration. First, by living separately, they could not infect others with their beliefs. Second, by frequent association with Orthodox, a few might be converted. Third, their labor contributed to the society.[7]

Clearly, Slavic Orthodox churchmen did not regard the Jews as a threat to Christian hegemony. Extant South Slavic polemics against Jews are translations from the Greek and date from the mid-to-late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries. Byzantine anti-Jewish polemics of the period tended to be long and vituperative in comparison with anti-Catholic texts, but the Slavic versions are short, passionless, and rare.[8] One text from this period features a debate between a Christian and a Jew.[9] As usual in this genre, the Christian makes all the long speeches and ultimately wins the debate. The discussion turns on a number of points. First, the Christian demonstrates that the etymologies of a variety of Jewish personal and place names refer to Christian dogma. Second, he posits that Jews do not listen to the prophecies in their own scriptures. They do not fulfill the requirements of their law, for example, Temple sacrifices.[10] Jews claim to have executed Christ "because he was lawless and broke the law and the Sabbath," but the Christian points out that in fact Christ had fulfilled the Law.[11] Third, the Christian argues that Jews have been driven out of their land because of the enormity of their sin in killing their Messiah, while Christians rule everywhere. And lest the Jew object that Christians themselves are subjugated (as well he might in the late medieval Balkans!), the Christian stresses that Christians have proven steadfast in their faith even under persecution.[12] Finally, the Christian dismisses Jewish rules on kashrut as nonsensical. According to him, there is no logic in what animals are clean and unclean, and especially in the prohibition on pork. Everything God created is good and has purpose. Pigs provide no milk or wool, but are useful for food.[13]

This polemical text is remarkably free from condemnatory epithets: Jews are not called "evil" or God-hating" or any of the other terms applied so generously to rival Christians and Muslims. Instead, in places the text takes on the tone of a friendly debate. For example, when the Jew argues that "David did not have another God, save that God who created heaven and earth," the Christian replies, "You have spoken correctly."[14] The

Jew is allowed to ask questions about apparent inconsistencies in Orthodox doctrine--how Christians can revere icons despite the prohibition on idolatry, and how Jesus could be born of Mary and still exist before the world was created.[15] Both of these questions were addressed, with more rancor, in Orthodox polemics against Christian schismatics.

Thus the purpose of anti-Jewish polemics seems to have been to inform an Orthodox audience about the falsehoods of Judaism and to convince Jews to accept Christianity.[16] The polemicist does not suggest that Christians use persuasive measures other than argument against Jews. These polemics do not present Jews as a threat to Orthodoxy or call for them to be converted by force or expelled from Christian communities. Finally, the polemicist does not present Jews as foreigners, and indeed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, most Jews in the Balkans were the descendants of long-time residents of the region who spoke the local Greek and Slavic dialects. Under Turkish rule, this older, native Jewish population was overwhelmed by Sephardic and Ashkenazic immigrants, who often did not pick up the local language. Even so, in the ethnic and religious mix of the premodern Balkans, Jews, whether of Romaniot, Sephardic, or Ashkenazic extractions, did not stand out as a uniquely alien population.

Attitudes Concerning Roman Catholics

The rivalry between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches over Christians in the Balkans is longstanding. At different times, both churches sponsored Cyril and Methodius's missionary work among the Slavs.[17] Jurisdiction over Bulgarian Christians was one of the many issues at stake in the Photian Schism.[18] Thus even before the final schism occurred in 1054, Catholics and Orthodox wooed the Slavs, often by denigrating each other's faith.

The ostensible reason for the schism of 1054 was the Roman addition of the *filioque* phrase to the Nicene Creed, an issue that had been simmering for two centuries. This minor change was fraught with significance, both political and theological. Politically, the crisis surrounding the creed was a test of the authority of the pope vis-à-vis the church council, dominated by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Jurisdictional issues, especially over the Slavs, and Byzantine imperial politics entered in as well. Theologically, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, as the Nicene Creed had it, or from the Father and from the Son, as the later Roman version read, had implications for Christology. The theological issue was manifested not only in theoretical debates, but also in arguments over the proper type of bread to use in celebration of the Eucharist. From this basis, the battle spread to a whole range of real and rumored differences in ecclesiastical practice.[19]

The Orthodox Slavs naturally learned about the evils of Roman Catholicism from their Byzantine tutors, who wished to reconfirm Slavic loyalty to the Byzantine camp. Extant Slavic polemics are heavily based on Greek ones. Many are preserved in miscellanies promoting hesychasm, which spread vigorously among Slavs through their

contacts with Mount Athos. Hesychasts had a particular reason to be concerned with precision concerning the Holy Spirit because of their own quest to achieve union with the Divine Light. The great hesychast teacher, Gregory Palamas, adamantly opposed both the Roman Catholic position on the procession of the Holy Spirit and those among Byzantine churchmen who would leave the matter to private opinion.[20]

The anti-Catholic treatises in Slavic recensions are of two types--sophisticated theological tracts focusing on the procession of the Holy Spirit and its symbolism in the Eucharist and simplistic denunciations of Latins and their practices. In both cases, the Orthodox Greek and Roman Catholic positions become confused and at times almost unrecognizable in Slavic translation. The Orthodox position on the procession of the Holy Spirit, as the Slavs knew it, consisted of asserting the correctness of the original formulation of the Nicene Creed. The Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father, just as the Son is eternally begotten. According to Slavic polemics, by saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, the Latins suggested that there were two divine origins instead of a single unified one.[21] Thus the Latins embraced the Apollinarian and Armenian heresies. Like the Apollinarians,

> [they engaged in] blasphemy of the holy and pure body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and they began to say and write that Christ's body was only deified (*obzeno*), that is to say, not vivified by the spirit (*ne odsevlieno*) and soulless (*bezdsno*). And because of this many were deceived and after that they believed this and also they inclined towards the accursed Armenians and knew their accursed heresy, and advocated wafers which are without spirit (*bezdsnaa*) as the body of the Lord.[22]

The Orthodox position of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone did not, they argued, make them guilty of the Arian heresy denying the divinity of Christ, as the Latins suggested.[23] In this exposition, it becomes obvious that the Slavic authors of these tractates did not fully understand the theological implications of either the Latin or the Greek argument on the creed, nor the reasons for the condemnation of the Apollinarian and Armenian Christological positions at the Council of Chalcedon.

Orthodox writers tied their defense of the proper understanding of the Holy Spirit to the use in the Eucharist of the proper, leavened bread. The leavened bread embodied the Orthodox position on the procession of the Holy Spirit in a form much more accessible to the laity. It made an easily recognized symbol of the difference between Catholic and Orthodox usage. The first person to raise this issue was apparently Archbishop Leo of Ohrid, acting as proxy for Patriarch Michael Cerularius of Constantinople. The leavening in the bread represented the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Body of Christ; thus the Latins again blasphemed the Holy Spirit by leaving leavening out of their wafers. The Roman Catholics' defense consisted of a logical demonstration of scriptural precedent. The Last Supper occurred at the Jewish Passover, when only matzah could have been in use. The Orthodox countered on several grounds. First, by using unleavened bread, the Latins became guilty of Jewish practices, condemned by Article 11 of the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

Second, Greek writers argued that the Latins distorted the Gospel passages on the Last Supper, which was held before the beginning of Passover.[24]

Slavic writers misconstrued this Greek position and argued instead that Jesus served two meals to his disciples--the first with unleavened bread to fulfill the commandment of the Law and the second with leavened bread, representing the New Covenant, properly endowed with the Spirit. Furthermore, all the apostles had agreed among themselves to use leavened bread; only the Latins, "like the accursed Armenians," insist on using wafers.[25]

Both Latin and Greek polemicists knew that the Schism of 1054 originated long before the mutual excommunications of Pope Leo IX and Patriarch Michael Cerularius. To judge by the colorful but highly inaccurate histories that circulated, Orthodox Slavs, unlike their Byzantine contemporaries, had little real information about how the schism arose.[26] One version traced Rome's fall into heresy to the period immediately following the persecutions of Christians.[27] The heretic Peter Gugnivyj ("the crooked-tongued") insinuated himself into the Roman Church.[28] His supporters were Germans (*nemcy*) and Franks (*fruzi*). He had a shaven beard and belly and wore rich vestments, a horned cowl, and gloves. He taught the laity to eat unclean things and dance in churches. He ordered priests to take seven wives and concubines.

A second history traces the beginning of the Latin "heresy" more accurately to the time of the Photian Schism of the ninth century.[29] While the Greek state was embroiled in the iconoclast controversy, the Apollinarian, Armenian, and Arian heresies infected Rome. Although Pope Clement had been Orthodox, saying the creed correctly and using leavened bread, his successor, Pope Formosus, was not. He blasphemed the Holy Spirit, broke with the Greek Church, and "set up some person Karoul [Charlemagne!] as emperor in Rome."[30] The four Orthodox patriarchs tried hard to bring the Roman Church and the Latin people back to the true faith, but "they were puffed up with a great pride, and did not want to return."[31] Because the Orthodox were patient, however, they did not remove the pope from the liturgical lists until the time of Constantine Monomachus and Patriarch Michael.

A third history also traces the beginning of the schism to the same period, but tells a different story.[32] While the iconoclasts ruled in Byzantium, Pope Leo wished to restore the empire. So he invited Prince Karoul from the West, believing that "he was Orthodox and Christian."[33] Karoul, however, brought with him "Latins" who taught the Arian, Apollinarian, and Macedonian heresies. He tried to invade Constantinople, but the other Latin princes would not back him. Pope Leo did not agree with Karoul's heresies. He secretly taught the people the correct version of the creed and inscribed it on the wall surrounding the altar. Leo's successor, Pope Benedict, recognized the danger of Karoul and his heresies and "ordered that no one teach or speak the Latin language, but instead write Latin with Greek words."[34] He warned the other four patriarchs not to pray for the popes of Rome unless they received testimony of their orthodoxy. Benedict's successors were Orthodox until the time of Emperor Leo the Wise and Patriarch Photius. At that time,

Pope Formosus revived Karoul's heresy, but sent a false confession of faith to the other patriarchs. The Latins then broke away from the empire. Formosus's successors followed his heresy, despite the efforts of the patriarchs to return them to the faith. Finally, the Orthodox patriarchs had to excommunicate the pope of Rome. After this, through force or delusion, the Latins took over other peoples.

The numerous other complaints directed against the Latins concerned readily accessible points of practice rather than obscure theological issues. More than one version of the list of Latin errors, sometimes attributed to Byzantine Patriarch Michael Cerularius, circulated among Orthodox South Slavs.[35] In addition to the established complaints about the creed and the communion bread, the list focused on four areas of difference. The first concerned Catholic dietary customs. The Latins started Lent on Wednesday instead of Monday. They permitted consumption of dairy products during Lent, which the Orthodox did not. They recommended fasting on Saturdays and holy days, which the Orthodox regarded as inappropriate. Catholics also ate animals found dead, as well as lions and cats, "and other much defiled and unclean things."[36]

The second area of complaint involved aspects of liturgy. Latins omitted the "Hallelujah" during Lent. They genuflected before icons instead of kissing them, or, according to another version, they did not venerate icons at all.[37] They used oil instead of myrrh for anointing. They made the sign of the cross with one finger or with five.[38] They buried their dead in the wrong posture, with hands under the thighs. They permitted "every person who wishes into the holy altar to receive communion, and forbid nobody, neither man nor woman."[39] The Catholics made errors in the form of baptism--baptizing under the secular name and using salt and spit in the ceremony. According to one version, they baptized in the name of the Father and the Son only.[40] They insulted the Mother of God and "our holy and great and God-fearing fathers and teachers and hierarchs Basil the Great, Gregory the Evangelist, and John Chrysostom by considering them simply saints.[41]

The third area of complaint concerned rules for Catholic clergy. Catholic monks, unlike their Orthodox brethren, were permitted to eat meat and animal fats, "even when they are not sick."[42] Their priests performed the Eucharist more than once a day.. The Catholics refused to ordain married men to the priesthood, but they allowed their priests to shed blood and still perform the liturgy. Their bishops wore rings, "as though they have taken the Church as their wives."[43] Only a few complaints concerned lay life. One accusation condemned shaving of beards, a custom certainly known in the Orthodox world. Another derided the Catholics for allowing two brothers to marry two sisters in violation of canon law on incest.

The terms used to describe Roman Catholics are marked by a particular virulence. They are frequently referred to as "heretic" (*eretik*), "malevolent" (*zlocestivy*), "accursed" (*prokljati*). They "have fallen because of their many and various heresies."[44] The third version of the history of the schism discussed above concludes that the Latins "became the worst enemies of all to all Orthodox Christians."[45] A Slavic version of a sermon by

Gregory Palamas describes the Latins as a "savage, malevolent snake," but one outgrowth of the multi-headed hydra of heresy.[46] A second sermon describes the Roman Catholic Church as "like the largest among animals, the elephant . . . if something happens and it falls, there is no way that it can get up."[47]

Orthodox writers did not despise Catholics because of their wrong beliefs and practices. Instead, they despised Catholics and therefore found things wrong with their beliefs and practices. Minor divergences--no greater than might be found within the Orthodox communion--were presented as major sins. These willful exaggerations had a practical purpose. Because Roman Catholicism had not been condemned by a church council, the only way to anathematize the Latin faith was to extend existing anathemas to cover it. So Slavic polemicists presented the Catholic position as in essence the Apollinarian or Armenian one. If the Catholic position on the procession of the Holy Spirit constituted blasphemy, then according to the Gospel of Mark (3:28), they had committed an unforgivable sin.

Although truth is not a high priority in polemical literature in general, the distortions in Slavic anti-Catholic polemics cry out for explanation. The mistakes do not strengthen the Orthodox argument, but rather make it more vulnerable to refutation. Yet these polemics must have been the product of the Slavs who were the best educated and most knowledgeable about theological matters. Furthermore, they are found in manuscripts that contain accurate explications of other aspects of Orthodox belief and practice. And, with the numerous Slavic Catholics in the Balkans, the authors could easily have checked their facts and tried out their arguments. The polemics themselves, however, contain indications that they were not directed against local Slavic Catholics, but against those outside that faith. They condemn "Latins," "Germans" (*nemci*), and "Franks" (*fruzi*), but not the native Roman Catholics of the Balkans. While Magyars, according to one of the histories, "fell because of their pride" and began to use unleavened wafers, they are not identified with the Latins.[48] The Slavic Catholics along the Dalmatian coast were clearly not Germans or Franks; instead, they were "Christians," like their Serb neighbors. Into the seventeenth century, Catholics and Orthodox alike used Church Slavonic in their liturgy and dated their holidays (except the Lenten/Easter cycle) according to the same Julian calendar. Christians of limited experience could remain unaware of the existence of the schism, even as late as the seventeenth century.[49] Indeed, the failure of Slavic Orthodox clerics to develop cogent theological and jurisdictional arguments against the real Catholicism of the Balkans left their parishioners vulnerable to the appeal of the Uniate Church, which allowed them to retain their traditional practices virtually unimpeded while acknowledging papal authority.[50]

Outside of polemical treatises, Slavic Orthodox texts rarely condemned Catholicism. Slavic versions of the synodikon for the Sunday of Orthodoxy, anathematized heretical Bogomils and *babuny*, but not Latins.[51] The Law Code of Stefan Dušan tacitly accepted the presence of Slavic Catholics in the kingdom and strove only to keep the Roman version of Christianity from spreading. According to Article 6, Orthodox believers who adopted the Latin rite were to be punished "as written in the laws of the holy fathers"--certainly an

ambiguous rule in light of the lack of clear policy regarding Catholicism in ecclesiastical law.[52] In texts recounting aid Roman Catholics provided to the Orthodox, they are spoken of approvingly. For example, the Montenegrin scribe Pajomij, thanking Venetian princes for replacing sacred books lost to Turkish pillaging, extols "the glorious city of Venice, established by God."[53] In the sixteenth century, Orthodox prelates Vissarian of Hercegovina and Jovan of Peć felt no compunction in asking for help against the Turks from Catholic powers.[54]

Slavic Orthodox hierarchs who regarded Catholics as allies rather than enemies could find support for their position even in polemical essays. Even the most virulent anti-Latin authors had to concede that there had been no formal condemnation of Catholicism:

> The Latins still have not been anathematized, nor has a great ecumenical council acted against them. . . . And even to this day this continues, although it is said that they still wait for the repentance of the great Roman Church.[55]

Gregory Palamas argued that if Latins were excommunicated as individuals rather than as a people, they could still be restored to the truth.[56] The same miscellany with hundreds of pages of arguments against Catholic positions also includes a prayer for reconciliation. It addressed the main subject of debate, the Holy Spirit:

> . . . do not overlook us, singing with deaf ears, but give us your understanding, according to sacred precepts, as you yourself inspired the apostles. . . . You see, Lord, the battle of many years of your churches. Grant us humility, quiet the storm, so that we may know in each other your mercy, and we may not forget before the end the mystery of your love. . . . May we coexist in unity with each other, and become wise also, so that we may live in you and in your eternal creator the Father and in his only-begotten Word. You are life, love, peace, truth, and sanctity . . .[57]

Thus even the harshest of polemics granted the existence of a common religious perspective and expressed the hope for reconciliation.

Attitudes toward Muslims

Until the Turkish invasions of the Balkans in the fourteenth century, Slavic clerics had little reason to turn their attention to Islam. The wars the Byzantine Empire fought against the Arabs, Persians, and Seljuks in turn occasioned little more than passing note. The occasional narrative of pilgrimage to the Holy Land that appeared in Slavic was relatively free of criticism of the Muslim rulers.[58]

Slavic bookmen in the premodern period paid little attention to Islam as a system of belief or religious practice. They wrote no polemics against Islam, a fact which, if nothing

else, demonstrated the existence of sufficient common ground for debate. Of course, while under Muslim rule, Orthodox clergy may well have been afraid to polemicize against the faith of their rulers. Mentions of Muslims, common in both ecclesiastical and secular texts from the late fourteenth century, evince no interest in their faith. It is only inadvertently that modern scholars learn that in fact some Orthodox knew a considerable amount about Islam as a religion. The baptismal service for a Muslim convert to orthodoxy calls upon him to repudiate, in considerable detail, the beliefs and practices of Islam.[59]

Slavic ecclesiastical texts speak about Muslims most frequently in the context of invasion and tax collection, subjects which the writers were not likely to treat sympathetically. The Ottoman rulers are identified as *turci* (Turks), *busurmeny* (Besermen), *ismaility* (Ishmaelites), or *agarity* (Hagarenes), with the terms used interchangeably. "Snake" (*zmii*), "feral wolves" (*ljuty vl'ky*) and "great enemy" (*supostata*) are all synonyms for the devil, as well as for the Turkish enemy.[60] They are also called "pagans" (*jezyčnici* or *pagany*) and "godless" (*bezbožni*), without regard to Islam's uncompromising monotheism.[61] Other texts implicitly compare the Ottomans to Catholics, as does the one which describes Sultan Bayazid III as "transgressor of the law and blasphemer of the Trinity and insulter of Christians."[62] One author stated succinctly: "One cannot find a nation so evil and miserable."[63]

The Serbs and Bulgarians needed to find a way of explaining the disaster of their defeat at the hands of infidels. Right-believing Christians were supposed to be victorious, at least that was the argument made in the polemic against Jews. One explanation proposed that the foreign conquest represented God's punishment for sin. A text from the mid-fifteenth century spoke of "captivity and servitude because of our evils . . . imposed on us by God's permission."[64] The Ottomans, as God's instrument, could be portrayed almost positively, as in one inscription from 1486, written "in the days and reign of the very powerful and exalted Ishmaelite Tsar Sultan Bayazid, to whom God allowed strength and power over Christians because of our sins and lawlessness."[65] Although acceptance of sinfulness did not necessarily rule out resistance, it did permit acknowledgement of suffering. An anonymous monk who witnessed an attack on Mount Athos wrote, "But who is the one who could escape that which had been declared by God?"[66] The Ottomans might be evil, but they ruled according to God's command. In this reaction, the South Slavs were expressing an attitude similar to that of the Russians when faced with Mongol rule.[67]

A second approach to defeat by the Turks was to link religious and military perseverance. Instead of bemoaning sinfulness, authors exhorted their readers to remain steadfast in their Orthodox faith and spiritual resistance to the enemy, refusing to acknowledge the reality of defeat. This attitude is most apparent in the large body of texts relating to the Battle of Kosovo and its martyred hero, Prince Lazar. Prince Lazar's widow, Milica, wrote in her lament to her husband, "Chase the barbarian infidels away from them [her children and people]. Do not cease to fight them, defending me and my flock."[68] Jefimija, a widowed princess and friend of Lazar, eulogized him in such a way as to turn defeat into victory:

> . . . you faced the serpent and the enemy of God's churches, having judged that it would have been unbearable for your heart to see the Christians of your fatherland overwhelmed by the Moslems (*izmailteni*); if you could not accomplish this, you would leave the glory of your kingdom on earth to perish, and having become purple with your blood, you would join the soldiers of the heavenly kingdom. In this way, your two wishes were fulfilled. You killed the serpent, and you received from God the wreath of martyrdom.[69]

More than anyone, Jefimija knew that Serbia had been turned into a vassal state of the Ottomans. Yet she focuses on the ultimate defeat of the forces of evil that the newly martyred Saint Lazar will effect. She prays for him to gather a heavenly host to help his people, not only in the struggle against the invaders, but also in remaining true to their Orthodox faith.[70]

The Bulgarian hymnographer Efrem voiced similar sentiments, minus the military spirit. He prayed to God:

> Look upon the misery of your daughter the Church; see the desolation; look upon the sorrow of us, your people; see also the needs of our tsars . . . [as for] all our enemies . . . turn back their shame on their heads . . . Christ our Tsar, give us victory over our enemies.[71]

These two reactions to conquest were not incompatible. In his narration about Prince Lazar, Archbishop Danilo III could write both that "an arrow released by God reached us because of our sins: the Mohammedans came," and "Prince Lazar . . . stood fast for God and his country."[72] In 1710 the military officer Bogdan Isajev Popović sought a Russian declaration of war against the Turks by arguing, ". . . our native Serbian land, because of our sins, for so many years has been tyrannized and burdened by the Muslim [*busurmanskii*] yoke, but now the Lord God has raised his crusading right hand, like a new David against the Muslim Goliath . . . " God's "right hand," evidently, was to be Orthodox Russia.[73]

About the year 1500, approximately a century after the initial conquest of the Balkans, South Slavic Orthodox writers seem to have become disenchanted with the notion that their sinfulness was the cause of the continuing foreign occupation. Inscriptions from this time on refer to Christians' sins much less frequently.[74] Instead, writers speak darkly of "evil times" which afflict Christians and non-Christians alike,[75] or they attribute suffering to actions of the devil, who "could not tolerate peace among the Christian people."[76] God's anger is focused not on the sinful Orthodox, but on the evil infidels. An outbreak of the plague in 1623, for example, was attributed to "God's wrath against Ishmael."[77] Authors focus on six types of troubles--wars, captivity, taxation, famine, collapse of the social order, and theft of books.[78] Turkish rule, once viewed as being by God's authority, became illicit. An inscription from 1567 speaks of "the horrible suffering, lawless oppression, and heavy impositions from the lawless and thrice-cursed Turks."[79]

That Slavic authors could write about their Ottoman rulers so negatively and so openly speaks volumes about Turkish indifference to the religious attitudes of conquered peoples. Orthodox authors seem rarely to have censored their remarks out of fear. The scribe Ioann Goltsusiv, for example, described wartime suffering in considerable detail, but reserved his final comment "the Children of Hagar are accursed!" in *tainopis'* (secret writing).[80] Other authors, however, felt free to say the same thing openly.[81]

Although most of the descriptions of Muslims are overwhelmingly negative, as in the case of Catholics, censure applies not to Slavic neighbors but to foreigners. The Muslim enemies are always outsiders. "Hagarene" armies are composed of Turks, Tatars, Persians, Circassians, and Scythians, but Slavs, or any European people, go unmentioned.[82] A Serbian monk on Mount Athos in the fourteenth century decried equally Franks, Turks, Tatars, Magyars, and Catalans, without regard to the religious differences among them.[83] Finally, the same sort of opprobrium is applied not only to Turkish invaders, but also to Orthodox enemies. In one text from 1428, the worst condemnation is reserved not for the Turks or the Latins who were waging war along the Danube, but rather for the Serbian traitor who surrendered his city.[84] A Bulgarian monk on Mount Athos in the seventeenth century described Greeks in terms similar to those used for Turks: "accursed," "deceitful," and "merciless."[85]

Peaceful Coexistence of Religious Traditions

Despite the hostile tone of Orthodox polemics, they had little effect on how ordinary Orthodox Slavs conducted their affairs with persons of other religious convictions. If educated clerics did not understand the differences between Orthodoxy and other faiths, parish clergy and lay people were even less well informed. Indeed, the polemics were not intended to sow discord among Slavic neighbors who embraced different faiths, who were not numbered among the alien "Latins" and "Turks." By tacitly exempting Slavic Catholics and Muslims from condemnation, Orthodox clerics opened the way not only for mutual toleration, but for religious interaction at the popular level.

The point of criticism of other faiths was the preservation of Orthodoxy where it already existed, not proselytization. Forced conversions to or from Orthodoxy were rare. Dubrovnik, the most powerful Slavic Catholic state in the region, undertook missionary work among the Orthodox, but tolerated them in its territories and eschewed the forced conversions foreign Catholic missionaries occasionally proposed.[86] Although a sizable number of Slavs adopted Islam during the years of Turkish rule, for the most part they did so voluntarily in order to gain the career and tax advantages of Muslims.[87] Official hostility did not prevent Orthodox hierarchs and secular leaders from cooperating with Jewish, Catholic, or Turkish authorities when the need arose.

Conversions from Orthodoxy to Catholicism or Islam, and vice-versa, seem to have occurred frequently and with little social dislocation.[88] Conversion did not necessarily

sever family bonds. In the Sokolović family of the sixteenth century, for example, one brother, Mehmed, converted to Islam and became an admiral while another, Makarije, remained Orthodox and became abbot of Hilandar. Mehmed's influence resulted in the establishment of the Serbian patriarchate of Peć and the appointment of his brother to it.[89] Familial contacts similarly facilitated communication between Catholics and Orthodox in the Austrian military border in Croatia.[90]

In the medieval and Turkish periods of Balkan history, religious affiliation rarely appears as the cause of conflict at the popular level. Villagers of different faiths shared the same language, lifestyle, customs, and responsibilities.[91] Urban artisans, whether Christian, Muslim, or Jewish, cooperated in their guilds.[92]

There is considerable evidence of interaction and commonality in the popular religious observances of Slavs of differing confessions. Some of these religious practices reflect the survival of pre-Christian practices; there the same ritual was amenable to a variety of religious explanations. Agricultural and funereal rituals as practiced by both Christian and Muslim Slavs had their roots in pagan magic.[93] The Serbian *slava*, of pre-Christian origin and incorporated into Orthodox practice, survived also among Catholics and Muslims.[94]

Syncretic sects combined the religious traditions of Slavs in the Turkish Empire. For example, in the early fifteenth century, Bedreddin, the son of a Muslim father and an Orthodox mother, founded a religious movement that strove to accommodate Muslim, Christian, and Jewish followers. The Bektasi sufi sect in the Balkans practiced communion and confession analogous to Christian rituals, made the sign of the cross, and permitted consumption of alcohol and pork. It became particularly influential among the Janissary corps, which consisted heavily of Christian draftees.[95]

Muslims, Catholics, and even Jews could share religious rituals, such as the veneration of Orthodox icons. Sites of supposed miracles accepted a multidenominational clientele.[96] Bulgarian and Serbian Muslims sought Orthodox holy water and Easter eggs, believing them to be efficacious in preserving health.[97] Orthodox Slavs who made a pilgrimage to the holy sites in Palestine became known by the Muslim honorific *hadzi*. Calendars could be ecumenical: a manuscript from 1665, for example, includes dates according to the Byzantine calendar from creation, the Western calendar from the birth of Christ, and the Muslim calendar, "from Mohammad the Turk."[98]

One important reason for this religious syncretism, in addition to large-scale conversions, was the high rate of intermarriage at all levels of society.[99] The religious laws of all denominations might discourage or prohibit unions with nonbelievers, but ambiguities in the provisions and laxity in enforcement made them possible. Muslim *kadis* readily performed marriages forbidden under Catholic or Orthodox canon law.[100] Islamic law permitted Muslim men to marry nonbeliever women, and Catholic and Orthodox clerics usually recognized these marriages after the fact. Orthodox law strictly forbade

consanguineous unions, calculated to distant degrees of kinship, but cousins and in-laws could and did marry under Islamic law. Catholic law forbad divorce, but *kadis* readily dissolved Catholic Slavs' marriages and formalized new ones. Slavic Orthodox cannon law was ambiguous about the legality of marriages between Orthodox and Catholic Christians; some canons prohibited it while others allowed it. But because mixed Catholic and Orthodox couples did not seek approval of their unions from Muslim authorities, it can be concluded that they managed to marry in their own churches. The children of these "forbidden" marriages were uniformly regarded as legitimate both socially and in inheritance.[101]

Conclusions and Reflections

The religious teachings of medieval Slavic Orthodox churchmen about non-Orthodox peoples may be described as neutral at best, and not infrequently implacably hostile. Jews were stubborn in their rejection of Christianity. "Latins" and "Hagarenes" were more dangerous. The Latins threatened to destroy proper theology and practice; the Hagarenes threatened to destroy the Christian people, even if they made no assault upon their faith. But Catholics who showed friendship and cooperation ceased to be "Latins"; they were simply "Christians." Muslims who were not rulers--Albanians, for example--were not negatively stereotyped.[102] Even at their worst, Slavic Orthodox polemics criticized other faiths not so much to proselytize as to defend Orthodoxy against perceived threats by promoting in Orthodox believers a strong sense of religious superiority.

In the Ottoman Empire, as in the Orthodox Christian states that preceded it in the Balkans, religious affiliation took precedence over ethnic identification. Ottoman administration placed Catholics and Jews in separate *millets* and lumped Orthodox Slavs with Orthodox Greeks because of their common confession. In doing so, the Turkish government was following not only Islamic policy but also Christian and Jewish religious authorities, who placed more emphasis on religious confession than on ethnicity. Orthodox Christians in the premodern Balkans might also identify themselves as Greeks, Vlahs (Romanians), Bulgarians, Serbs, or even as Croats, but they certainly did not assume that a common religious identity demanded amity and precluded hostility. The antipathy of Orthodox Slavs toward the equally Orthodox Greeks (and vice-versa) predates the development of modern nationalism.

If ethnic differences could undercut religious solidarity, conversely ethnic similarity could overcome religious diversity. The actual religious milieu in the premodern Balkans was much less sharply delimited than either modern politicians or medieval churchmen would like us to believe. The institutional structures of the Ottoman Empire and its predecessors tended to classify Muslim Slavs with Turks and Catholic Slavs with Latins. The Orthodox Slavic polemical texts did not, however, replicate this distinction. Amidst the unremitting rancor of polemical texts, there is no mention of ethnic Slavs who embraced a non-Orthodox faith. Instead, the hostile Latins and Turks are depicted as entirely alien in

language, custom, and belief. Their evil ideas and deeds are not attributed to familiar Slavic neighbors. In short, the purpose of the polemics was to condemn outsiders, not to make outsiders of fellow Slavs.

As long as the explication of religious differences, however inaccurate, remained the province of a few religious writers complaining about foreigners, polemics did not spur ordinary people to hate their neighbors. Among ordinary Slavs who shared the same language, the same land, and even some of the same popular religious observances, official affiliation could remain insignificant. But many Slavic ethnic leaders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries made religious confession the primary carrier of national identity. In attempting to inculcate a sense of religious and national superiority, they too often invoked the polemical medieval stereotypes, applying them not to aliens but rather to fellow Slavs of different religious confession. They attempted to teach "proper" versions of religious truths and to uproot "pagan" and "superstitious" beliefs and practices--often those shared with non-Orthodox neighbors. In doing so, they eroded the ignorance that had fostered religious indifference and its consequent attitude of tolerance.

NOTES

1. Dimitri Obolensky, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages," in Obolensky, *The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), XV-6. Reprinted from *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 22 (London, 1972), 1-16.

2. The bibliography on the Byzantine inheritance among the Slavs is immense. The best single work is Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971). On the lack of interest among Slavs in certain aspects of Greek culture, see Georges Florovsky, "The Problem of Old Russian Culture," in *The Structure of Russian History*, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (New York: Random House, 1970), 126-39.

3. For the orthodox toward heretics, see Dimitri Obolensky, *The Bogomils* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948) and John V. A. Fine, *The Bosnian Church: A New Interpretation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

4. Ladislas Hadrovics, *Le Peuple Serbe et son église sous la domination turque* (Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1947), 41-44. Ljub. Stojanović, "Srpska crkva u meduvremenu od patrijarha Arsenija II do Makarije (oko 1459-63 do 1557 g.)," *Glas srpske kraljevske akademije* 106 (1923): 117-18.

5. Ljub. Stojanović, *Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi*, vol. 1 [henceforth *SSZN*], (Belgrade, 1902), 22, in an inscription from 1319. For more information on manifestations of Orthodox Slavic conceptions of the "new Israel," see Daniel B. Rowland, "Moscow--The Third Rome or the New Israel?" *Russian Review* 55, no. 4 (October 1996): 591-614.

6. On Roman Catholic attitudes, see Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982). On Orthodox attitudes, see Demetrios J. Constantelos, "Greek Orthodox-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 22, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 6-16. There are no detailed studies of Jewish life in medieval Serbia or Bulgaria. For a brief history, see *Jews in Yugoslavia* (Zagreb, Muzejski prostor, 1989), 17-29; also Pavle Dzeletović Ivanov, *Jevreji Kosova i Metohije* (Belgrade: Panpublic, 1988), 19-22. Studies of Byzantine Jewish life can shed light on Orthodox attitudes and practices vis-à-vis Jewish residents, even though conditions in Slavic kingdoms differed considerably. See Steven B. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium, 1204-1453* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Joshua Starr, *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire, 641-1204* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1939); and Andrew Sharf, *Byzantine Jewry from Justinian to the Fourth Crusade* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

7. Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium*, 22, 30, 221-22.

8. On Byzantine polemics, see Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium*, 32-39; and Steven B. Bowman, "Two Late Byzantine Dialogues with the Jews," *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 25, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 83-93.

9. I had access to two copies on microfilm in the Hilandar Research Library at Ohio State University. Both date from the 1380s and are now in the repository of the Hilandar monastery; HM.SMS.652, in the Bulgarian recension, and HM.SMS.474, in the Serbian recension. The former version is fragmented and is preserved separately; the latter is complete and forms part (ff. 344-350v) of a miscellany in defense of hesychasm and opposing Catholicism.

10. HM.SMS. 652, ff. 9v-10; HM.SMS.474, f. 349v.

11. HM.SMS. 474, f. 344v.

12. HM.SMS.474, ff. 347v-348v, and especially f. 346v, where the copyist emphasized a passage describing the Jews' loss of their courts, princes, and temples with the word *zri* ("Look!") in the margin; HM.SMS.652 ff. 31-34.

13. HM.SMS.474, f. 350v; HM.SMS. ff. 38v-39v.

14. HM.SMS.652, f. 21.

15. HM.SMS.474, ff. 345v-346.

16. Bowman, "Two Late Byzantine Dialogues," (esp. pp. 83, 92) notes that this pedagogical tone predominated in post-Byzantine Greek polemics and represented a break from the Paleologan pattern of vituperation. The Slavic text under discussion originated in Byzantium before the Turkish conquest, however, and circulated among the Slavs before Bulgaria and Serbia fell to the Ottomans.

17. Francis Dvornik, *Byzantine Missions among the Slavs* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970).

18. See Francis Dvornik, *The Photian Schism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), esp. 91-131.

19. On the schism, see Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955); and Harry J. Magoulias, *Byzantine Christianity: Emperor, Church and the West* (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press, 1982), esp., 87-173.

20. On hesychasm, see John Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas* (Beds, England: The Faith Press, 1959), esp. 44-48; and Meyendorff, *St. Gregory Palamas and Orthodox Spirituality* (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974). Because Meyendorff himself wished to achieve dialogue with Western Christianity, as his writings for the Western, non-Orthodox audience attest, he downplayed the anti-Latin aspects of hesychast leaders.

21. HM.SMS.469, ff. 278v-279.

22. HM.SMS.469, f. 283v.

23. See HM.SMS.474, ff. 1-107 for a long exposition, and HM.SMS.469, ff. 278v-279 for a brief summary. For a brief summary of the origin and theology of the Arian, Apollinarian, and Armenian heresies, see Magoulias, *Byzantine Christianity*, 20-27, 30-34, and 52-53.

24. Manlon H. Smith, *And Taking Bread: Cerularius and the Azyme Controversy of 1054* (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1978).

25. HM.SMS.469, ff. 279v-282v. It is worth noting that the Slavs did not use the azyme controversy to attack Jews or Judaizers who used unleavened bread. The Greek canonist Matthew Blastares explicitly connected the Jewish use of matzah and the Latin custom, see Bowman, *The Jews of Byzantium*, 30-31. The Catholics' use of logic in itself brought Orthodox condemnation: Latins ought to rely on the arguments of Church Fathers, not on Aristotle and other Greek pagans. See HM.SMS.474, ff. 120-120v. I have been unable to ascertain the source of the assertion that Christ celebrated two suppers. Smith's summaries of the Greek arguments against azymes (pp. 174-83) make no mention of this argument.

26. None of the three texts I have found list a putative author. I have as yet been unable to ascertain whether these histories are original Slavic compositions or reworkings of Greek texts.

27. HM.SMS.481, ff.277v-280.

28. This figure is probably based on Peter Mongos, "the Stammerer" (d. 490), the Monophysite bishop of Alexandria or perhaps Peter the Fuller (d. 488), the Monophysite bishop of Antioch. On these heretical bishops, see Joseph F. Kelly, *The Concise Dictionary of Early Christianity* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 137.

29. HM.SMS.469, ff. 283v-286.

30. *i Karoul nekoego tsra sebe postavišhe v" Rime*. HM.SMS.469, f. 284v. In fact, Pope Formosus (891-896) was recognized as Orthodox by the Byzantine Church. In a letter to the Patriarch of Constantinople, he omitted the offending *filioque* phrase. See Dvornik, *The Photian Schism*, 258-60. Dvornik speculates that Formosus appears as the villain in later writings on the schism because of his attempts to bring Bulgaria under the jurisdiction of the Church in Rome.

31. HM.SMS.469, f. 285v.

32. HM.SMS.481, ff. 254-263v.

33. HM.SMS.481, f. 255.

34. HM.SMS.481, f. 259v-260. In fact, the version of the creed inscribed in St. Peter's in Rome omits the *filioque*.

35. I consulted versions in HM.SMS.469, ff. 276-279v and 292-293, and HM.SMS.474, ff. 330-331.

36. HM.SMS.469, f. 278v. HM.SMS.474, f. 330v, says simply, "They eat dead meat and some pagan things."

37. Compare HM.SMS.469, f. 278 and HM.SMS.474, f. 331.

38. Compare HM.SMS.469, f. 278 and HM.SMS.474, f. 331.

39. HM.SMS.469, f. 278. HM.SMS.474, f. 331 says that women sit and eat in the altar.

40. HM.SMS.469, f. 292v.

41. HM.SMS.469, ff. 278, 279v. HM.SMS.474, f. 330v intensifies this complaint, saying that Latins do not revere the three men as saints at all.

42. HM.SMS.474, f. 330v.

43. HM.SMS.474, f. 330v.

44. HM.SMS.481, f. 263v; similar, HM.SMS.469, f. 276.

45. HM.SMS.481, f. 263v.

46. HM.SMS.469, f. 114.

47. HM.SMS.469, f. 129v.

48. HM.SMS.481, ff. 269-270.

49. Papal reports cited by Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 11, 61.

50. Hadrovics, *Le Peuple Serbe*, 22-26.

51. See V. A. Mosin, "Serbskaja redakcija sinodika v nedelju pravoslavija," *Vizantijskij vremennik* 17 (1960): 287-353.

52. Article 6 forbids conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism; Article 7 mandates proselytization to win back converts; Article 8 punishes Catholic priests for seeking converts; Article 9 concerns the conversion of "half-believer" men when they marry Orthodox women. *Zakonik cara Stefana Dušana* (Belgrade, 1975), 98, 116; Malcolm Burr, "The Code of Stefan Dušan," *Slavonic and East European Review* 28 (1949-1950): 199-200; Aleksandr V. Solovjev, *Zakonodavstvo Stefana Dušana Cara Srba i Grka* (Skopje: Skopski naučni društva, 1928), 166-67.

53. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 136.

54. Zdenko Zlatar, *Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 92-97.

55. HM.SMS.469, f. 286; similar, HM.SMS.481, f. 272v.

56. HM.SMS.469, ff. 129v-130.

57. HM.SMS.474, f. 107v.

58. For an example, see HM.SMS.469, f. 289.

59. V. N. Beneševič, *Drevneslavjanskaja kormčaja XIV titulov bez tolkovanii* (Sofia: Bolgarskaia akademiia nauk, 1987), 2:135-47.

60. These terms are found in the inscriptions from Stojanović, *SSZN*, 194, 368, 429, and others; see also "Inscription of the Kosovo Column," in Mateja Matejić and Dragan Milivojević, *An Anthology of Medieval Serbian Literature in English* (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1978), 132.

61. See, for example, Stojanović, *SSZN*, 82, 140, 449, 465, 468; Predrag Matejić, *Bulgarskijat ximnopisec Efrem ot XIV vek* (Sofia: Bulgarskata akademija na naukite, 1982), 116.

62. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 124.

63. *jako že nest' jazyku kazati moščno takovo zlo i ozloblenie*, Stojanović, *SSZN*, 221.

64. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 99.

65. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 112.

66. From the life of Archbishop Danilo in Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 146.

67. On Russian attitudes toward the Mongols and the terminology used to express it, see Charles J. Halperin, *The Tatar Yoke* (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1985) and John L. I. Fennell, "The Ideological Role of the Russian Church in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century," in *Gorski Vijenac: A Garland of Essays Offered to Professor Elizabeth Hill* (Cambridge, England, 1970), 105-11.

68. Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 111.

69. Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 97.

70. Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 97. Original text in Stojanović, *SSZN*, 61.

71. P. Matejić, *Bulgarskijat ximnopisec Efrem*, 119-20.

72. Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 124.

73. St. M. Dimitrijević, "Gradja za srpsku istoriju iz ruskih arhiva i biblioteka," *Spomenik srpske kraljevske akademije* 53 (1922): 250.

74. For references to "our sins" as the cause of foreign rule after 1500, see Stojanović, *SSZN*, 305 (from 1623); 310 (from 1624); 450 (from 1689); and Dimitrijević, 3 (from 1699).

75. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 365, 368, 468.

76. Inscription by the monk Jovan from 1598, in Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 189; see also Stojanović, *SSZN*, 227, 257.

77. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 307.

78. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 82, 194, 210, 221, 257, 266, 273, 362.

79. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 206.

80. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 262.

81. For example, see Stojanović, *SSZN*, 273, 450.

82. See, for example, Stojanović, *SSZN*, 257.

83. From the life of Archbishop Danilo II, in Matejić and Milivojević, *Anthology*, 146.

84. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 82.

85. Dennis P. Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1993), 71.

86. Zlatar, *Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent*, 60-74; Hadrovics, *Le Peuple Serbe*, 28-29; and Barisa Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972), 142-43.

87. On rates of conversion, see Speros Vryonis, "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans, 14th-16th Centuries," in *Aspects of the Balkans* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972) [Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, vol. 270], 162-72; and Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 61-66.

88. Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 382-87; Hadrovics, *Le Peuple Serbe*, 31-36. Hadrovics denies that Orthodox Serbs converted to Catholicism.

89. Hadrovics, *Le Peuple Serbe*, 44-49.

90. Drago Roksandić made this point to me during conference discussions.

91. Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 30-31.

92. Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 42-56.

93. Vryonis, "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans," 155-58, 175-76.

94. Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 12, 34 (n. 8); Vryonis, "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans," 176.

95. Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century*, 59-61. On the Janissary corps and the child levy used to maintain it, see Tvetana Georgieva, *Enicarite v Bulgarskite semi* (Sofia: Nauke i izkustvo, 1988).

96. Fine, *The Bosnian Church*, 12, 18-19; and F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), esp. vol. 1, 63-97.

97. Vryonis, "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans," 175.

98. Stojanović, *SSZN*, 406. Hadrovics, (*Le Peuple Serbe*, 27) reports that Catholics also occasionally used Byzantine dating. As John V. A. Fine pointed out to me, the Islamic calendar, which does not correspond to the solar year, is problematical as an agricultural guide.

99. Vryonis, "Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans," 167, 173.

100. Milenko S. Filipović, "Sklapanje i razvod hriscanskih brakova pred kadijama u tursko doba," in Naucno Drustvo SR Bosne i Hercegovine, Odjeljenje istorijsko-filoloskih nauka *Radovi*, vol. 20 (Sarajevo, 1963), 185-95; and Eve Levin, *Sex and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs, 900-1700* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 101-05.

101. Filipović, 192-93.

102. On the treatment of Albanians in medieval Serbian sources, see Sima Ćirković, "Les Albanais à la lumiere des sources historique des slaves de Sud/Albanci u ogledalu južnoslovenskih izvora," in *Les Illyriens et les Albanais/Iliri i Albanci*, ed. Milutin Garašanin (Belgrade, 1988), esp., 355-59.

RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND DIVISION IN THE KRAJINA: THE CROATIAN SERBS OF THE HABSBURG MILITARY BORDER

Drago Roksandić

A proper religious history of the Military Border in Croatia should concentrate on the "Krajišnici" themselves--that is, the population that inhabited the large territory north from the Adriatic coast to the Drava and Sava Rivers. The Military Border was one of the most complex creations of Habsburg absolutism. The Border system cannot be understood outside the controversies surrounding both Hungarian and Croatian history, as well as the history of Catholic and Orthodox religious communities in Croatia and Hungary. Our understanding will always be incomplete, however, if it ignores the fact that the history of the Krajina comes primarily "from below," from the experience of its peasant soldiers. The vast majority of the population lived in small rural communities. Despite considerable growth during the eighteenth century, the Border's trading centers, military headquarters, and free military towns still accounted for only 2 to 3 percent of its population.[1] The religious history of the Krajina proceeds from the pre-Ottoman conversion to Catholic or Orthodox Christianity of such isolated peasant communities to their accommodation into the anti-Ottoman Military Border of the Habsburg Empire, typically as privileged communities. Those whose legal designation was "Vlach" fostered continuing controversy over their population's ethnic identity as Serbs.

By the eighteenth century, Orthodox believers slightly outnumbered Catholics on the Croatian Border, while along the Slavonian Military Border, before and also after the French occupation of the early nineteenth century, the Catholics slightly outnumbered the Orthodox. The number of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews was insignificant. The Bosnian Muslims across the border in the Ottoman Empire can be considered a "third party." Each

event in the Military Border was somehow influenced by its reputation as the *antemurale christianitatis* (Christian barrier) against both the Islamic world and the East in general.

Typically antagonistic relations between the two church hierarchies did not necessarily extend to relations between believers on both sides. Ample, if not always reliable, research dealing with formal Catholic–Orthodox relations in the Military Border reveals little about the religious practice of the overwhelming peasant majority. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Krajišnici were, regardless of their religion, deeply imbued with pre-Christian beliefs. Until the Habsburg program of militarization in the eighteenth century, Eastern and Western Christianity could exist only where they managed to adapt their faiths to a way of life rooted in the behavioral patterns of the peasant-soldier reaching back to the earliest Slav inheritance.

Eastern and Western Christianity in Medieval Croatia

Croatian lands prior to the Middle Ages were connected to Eastern as well as Western Christianity. During a conversion that lasted three centuries, missionaries came from all directions. Indeed, in some periods, the impending East-West schism was unimportant. Religious centers along the eastern Adriatic shoreline were often under Rome's religious jurisdiction and Byzantine state administration. The first conversion of Croats in the seventh century would not have been possible without the cooperation of both pope and emperor. "According to Prophyrogenitus, Basil Heraclius (610–641) . . . brought priests from Rome, one of whom was an archbishop, . . . and converted Croats who at that time inhabited the territory between the Adriatic, Drav, and Danube."[2] In the second half of the ninth century, during the final stages of conversion to Christianity, Byzantine influence was clearly visible. Franjo Sanjek notes that "Prophyrogenitus stresses that most of these Slavs were not converted until Basil I (867–886) came to power. [The emperor] sent an imperial representative with the priests to convert all those among the following tribes--Croats, Serbs, Zahumlje, Travunija, Konavlje, Duklja, and Neretva--who were not already christened."[3]

At this time, the Slav liturgy and alphabet (the glagolitic) also became a part of Croatian religious practice and remained so for over a thousand years, indeed up to the present. It is a simplification to confine the expansion of Christianity only to eastern and western axes. Branko Fučić described the paths of glagolitic expansion in Croatia as follows:

> The first was the northern way, by which Cyril's and Methodius's pupils came from Moravia and Pennonia, the second was the southern way, which originated in the new religious centers in Bulgaria (pre-Slav), and even more importantly Macedonia (Ohrid), and by it the Slav alphabet and liturgy expanded through the south Slav lands by way of Duklia (Montenegro), Zahumlje (Hercegovina), Bosnia, and Dalmatia into the rest of Croatia.[4]

One Croatian religious historian cites the judgement of a Serbian counterpart that "at that time, the Slavs in the Balkans represented one large spiritual and cultural unity."[5] The increasing separation of the two religious centers, Rome and Constantinople, surely had far-reaching consequences for both Serbs and Croats in the territories of what had been Roman Illyricum. Nonetheless, some similarities persisted among the South Slavs over the long run. According to Sanjek, they rested on "a common Slav foundation, a system of popular beliefs which has been kept alive among all Slavs and which in its own way formed their vision of the world, the supernatural, man, and society."[6] Croatian glagolitic and later (Western) Cyrillic perpetuated the usage of this Croatian version of the old Slav language in secular as well as religious matters, parallel with the increasing use of the Croatian language. Glagolitic-Cyrillic monuments appear in Croatia in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries and Cyrillic ones only later. By the fifteenth century, a boundary between the glagolitic and Cyrillic alphabets emerged along the Krka and Vrbas Rivers in western Bosnia. "East of this boundary Cyrillic dominated, west of it, glagolitic," Fučić concludes.[7]

This glagolitic inheritance provided the core of development for Croatian in the late Middle Ages and early modern period. The Croatian church hierarchy reached numerous agreements with the papacy up to 1400, allowing its bishop to use Old Church Slavonic as well as Latin. Similar rights were granted to many bishops (those of Krbava, Knin, Krka, Split, Trogir, Šibenik, Zadar, Nin, Rab, Osor, Senj, and Istria). As a result, much of the Slav liturgy among Croats represents a bridge to the Christian East, but is also a lasting articulation of its Western links. There is, however, no written Orthodox source before the fifteenth century. At that time, the changing geopolitical circumstances in Southeast Europe increased exposure to Orthodoxy, primarily through the Serbs and to a lesser extent through the Greeks along the Adriatic coast.

Eastern and Western Christianity in Late Medieval Serbia

The history of Serbia in the Middle Ages cannot be divorced from the history of Eastern Christianity. It is difficult to find any scholarly work dealing with medieval Serbia that would question such a claim. The history of Christianity among the Serbs is nevertheless complex. The continuous interrelationship of Eastern and Western Christianity can also be seen among the Serbs from their first conversions during the reign of Basil I (867-886) up to the fall of the Serbian medieval state (1489) and the disappearance of Serbian despots in Hungary (1537). Even the ninth-century conversion was probably of Western origin, but conducted with Byzantine state intermediation. The recent and authoritative *Istorija srpskog naroda* states:

> There are no authentic sources about missionary work among Serbs or the earliest Christian organizations. During Basil I's rule, Byzantium had access to Serbia only by way of its Dalmatian strongholds. It is possible that the missionary work was performed by priests from coastal church centers using Latin as the language of prayer. As a result, there is a visible Roman

influence on old Christian terminology. Religious centers in Byzantine Dalmatia received jurisdiction over the christianized Slav hinterland. In the early tenth century, Serb representatives attended church services in Split.[8]

Aspects of Eastern and Western Christianity were interwoven in Serb ethnic territory by the end of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Up to this time, the question of the divided religious identity of the Serbs remained open at both the lower and higher levels of an increasingly divided feudal society. The Nemanjići themselves are the best example. Stefan Nemanjić, the Great Serb "župan" (1166–1196) and founder of the dynasty, was himself first christened at birth according to a Latin ceremony.[9]

His successors were divided in their religious allegiance. Nemanjić's son Vukan, ruler of Duklia, was continuously faithful to the Latin church. Stefan, the Great Serb "župan" (1196–1217) and king (1217–1228), did not hesitate to seek new Western alliances, primarily with Venice after the Fourth Crusade conquered Constantinople (1204). He made the choice not only because Venice was the main beneficiary of the victory over Byzantium, but also because the Nemanjić family needed a counterbalance to the more directly threatening Hungarian influence. According to Venetian chronicles written much later, Stefan Nemanjić married Anna, the grandchild of the Venetian dodge Enrique Dandolo, and honored her dying wish that he be crowned according to papal authority.

Despite disagreements among Serbian historians on the subject, it is difficult to dispute the Latin origin of the Serbian crown. It was sent to Stefan Nemanjić, following his repeated requests, by Pope Honorious III (1216–1227) through a special envoy. The Western origin of Stefan's crown is additionally indicated by Dementian. According to Sava Nemanjić's biographer, he sent his pupil Methodius to Rome to seek the pope's blessing for Serbia and the King's crown for Stefan Nemanjić, whose family was unquestionably and directly connected to the old traditions of the Duklia kingdom."[10]

A more portentous event was the establishment of an autocephalous Serbian archbishopric in 1219. This was largely the work of Sava Nemanjić, later St. Sava. Relying on ambitious Nicean attempts to rejuvenate the Byzantine Empire after its defeat in 1204, he freed the Serbian archdiocese from its dependence on the Ohrid archbishopric. He also established Orthodoxy in the coastal lands of the Serbian state where, hitherto, it had been either weaker than the Latin Church or nonexistent. Even though Catholic bishoprics were not abolished and not a single Orthodox bishopric was in the same location as any Catholic one, there is no doubt that the Latin influence was thus limited. The center of the Orthodox Hum Bishopric was in Ston (on the Peljecaš peninsula) and Zeta one on Prevlaka (in Boka Kotorska). In the thirteenth century, the Serbian state orchestrated "events on the ground [that] moved the boundaries of the eastern sphere westward, making possible a higher level of integration based on the Orthodox religion."[11]

This expansion had a limited historical life. The most progressive aspect of the rise of the Serbian state in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was its synthesis of Eastern

and Western culture. State, economic, and other interests favored this synthesis, but so did Serbian Orthodoxy, then open and communicating with the world. For example, Stefan Nemanjić (Stefan Prvovenčani), only one year after establishing the Serbian autocephalous archbishopric, granted the Benedictine priory on Mljet numerous privileges, including large landholdings. While Orthodox-Catholic relations in medieval Serbia were not those of equals, it is also clear that in the areas where the Latin Church existed, it was not simply on the margin. One exchange between the Nemanjićs and the popes had far-reaching repercussions. Stefan Dragutin (king from 1276 to 1282, and king in the northern regions until 1316) was personally Orthodox as ruler of the left and right side of Upper Drina valley. Yet he was also influential in inviting the Franciscans to come to Bosnia.[12]

In contrast, Stefan Dušan (king, 1331-1345; emperor, 1345-1355) was the least tolerant Nemanjić. His obsessions with the Byzantium inheritance and his "drive to the southeast" resulted in weakening the influence of the Serbian state and Serbian orthodoxy in Bosnia and especially in Hum, later Hercegovina. Dušan's legal code (1349) was explicitly restrictive on Catholics. He did not, however, exclude Catholics from numerous, often influential, jobs and professions. The privileges of Saxon miners were indisputable, as were the numerous rights of Kotor and Dubrovnik merchants, who were often found in the company of the emperor.

Medieval Serbia was created on the boundaries of Eastern and Western Christianity from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. It was never a country in which Western Christianity was questioned or from which it was eliminated. This was true even during the heyday of Serbian Orthodoxy in the fourteenth century. Western Christianity was sometimes more and sometimes less tolerated and sometimes more and sometimes less integrated into the court's power structures and everyday economic or cultural life. It cannot be detached from Serbian medieval history.

Serbian Despots and Catholic Europe: Political Alliances and Religious Mistrust

The weakening of the despots' power in the Zeta littoral (roughly modern Montenegro) was followed by the retreat of Orthodoxy into the hinterland. In this process, Venice supported the Latin Church. From the end of the fourteenth to the end of the fifteenth centuries, for instance, the Zeta metropolitanate moved its center from the Prevlaka peninsula to Lake Sköder and then still further. The mountain hinterland of Zeta now fell into religious conflict with its own coastal regions. Under Venetian rule, the Zeta littoral saw the border of Catholic and Orthodox Christianity continually shifted, even though its border with the hinterland did not.

In the central areas, the Serbian despots continuously resisted efforts at rapprochement with Rome. This resistance lasted until they finally became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1459. In this respect, they differed from the Byzantine Empire and the Constantinople patriarchate which, even though deeply divided over the issue of church

unification, participated jointly in the great project for the Florentine church union in 1439. There is no record of Serb Orthodox participation at Florence. Indeed, the greater the uncertainty of medieval Serbia's fate, the more militant became its Orthodoxy. This happened even at times of extreme dependence on Hungary.

> In Serbian mining and trading centers, there were many Catholics (from Saxony, Dubrovnik, Kotor, and others). They had their churches and priests. There were efforts to encourage Orthodox Serbs who had business contacts with rich foreign partners to convert, especially at the time of church unification following the Florentine gathering. But in the spirit of Dušan's legal codes, the "Laws of Novo Brdo" envisaged punishment for Latins who converted anyone to their religion (fines and expulsion), while Catholic priests could have their noses cut in half.[13]

In the fifteenth century, Bosnia's circumstances were different. The Bosnian church retreated, allowing an advance toward Catholic and Orthodox Christianity to occur. During the fifteenth century, the Catholic faith became the dominant religion of Bosnia. Despite this, Orthodoxy was not in retreat. "Orthodox monasteries and churches were most numerous in Podrinje and Hum, areas traditionally linked with Serbian feudalism. By 1415, for instance, Srebrenica may have been the center of an Orthodox metropolitan. Regarding the famous monastery dedicated to St. Sava in Herceg Novi, we can say with confidence that it was part of Stefan's endowment."[14]

The Islamic Challenge

We must distinguish the religious history of East–Central Europe and especially of Southeastern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from the struggle between the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Western and Central Europe. This is frequently overlooked, yet is crucial to understanding religious developments in the Habsburg Military Border in Croatia--that is, in the frontier between East-Central and Southeastern Europe.

The Ottoman conquest of Southeastern Europe and parts of East-Central Europe from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries fundamentally changed the region's history. At a time when the Renaissance was entering a new era in Europe, its borderlands with Asia Minor faced a new cultural and civilizational challenge. Initially this challenge took the form of a historical catastrophe. The Ottoman conquest of Serbia took one hundred and fifty years, from the Battle on the Marica (1371) to the Battle of Belgrade (1521). The conquest of Bosnia also took a century and a half, from the Battle of Bileća (1388) to the fall of Jajce (1529). The conquest of Croatia was never complete, but Croatia remained the scene of continuous conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The extent to which medieval culture and civilization were destroyed during the century and a half of Ottoman conquest cannot be quantified, but there is no doubt that it suffered a fatal historical break with

European development. But despite this break, neither Orthodoxy nor Catholicism receded in the borderlands of the Ottoman Empire to the extent suggested by much of the literature. The Sheriat legal code did not envisage the compulsory Islamization of non-Muslims, especially not members of monotheistic religions (Jews and Christians), as long as they accepted the rule of Islam and paid taxes.[15]

While the Ottoman Empire could tolerate other religions such as Christianity and Judaism, Europe could not. Following the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the continent was reconstructed under the maxim "cuius regio, cuius religio." This tolerance made the Ottomans inheritors of religious traditions that reach to the roots of Islam in Arabia. In countries under Islamic rule, Christians and Jews could, each within their own religious community, try their own civil suits, family inheritance, property, and contractual relations before their own religious and other courts: "The general basis for this is in the Ku'ran, which leaves to Christian followers of the Bible to be judged by what the Lord left them and the Jews to be judged by the Torah."[16]

Thus the destruction of medieval states in that part of Europe which came under the Ottoman Empire was not necessarily followed by the destruction of local culture or of local religious communities. Christian religious communities with more or less state protection (primarily through privileges granted by the Sultan) were marginally integrated into the power structure of the Ottoman Empire. Sometimes they even had limited (and temporary) possibilities for promoting the religious, cultural, economic, and social interests of believers within the Islamic theocratic state.

The extent of forced Islamization in the Ottoman Empire remains an open question, but must be addressed in any study of Islamic success in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In contrast to previously held views, recent research reveals a much less prominent role for small "heretic" or Christian landowners and gives a much more important one to the Islamization of peasant communities in what became the Ottoman Military Border. The Ottoman agrarian system and especially tax policies (which differentiated between Muslims and non-Muslims) further accelerated Islamization in the early modern period. This process coincided with the period during which the Ottoman central government ruled Bosnia and Hercegovina directly. Urban centers experienced extensive Islamization because of the theocratic nature of the Ottoman Empire and the way it "built" the interrelationships among social groups necessary for replicating its own power structure. As a result, the existence of rural non-Muslims, primarily members of lower social groups, became important for the successful reproduction of Ottoman power structures.

This seems to have been the reasoning behind the privileges granted by Mehmed II, the conqueror of Bosnia, to the Bosnian Franciscans. On 28 May 1463, he decreed that "No one may obstruct or molest the above-mentioned churches."[17] When comparing the fate of Catholicism in various parts of western Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, Catholic sources note that ". . . the population of Central Bosnia remained on the land because the war had finished quickly while the inhabitants between the Vrbas and Una

Rivers disappeared because of the long duration of the fighting. Some died and some migrated."[18]

The Franciscan congregation of Bosna Srebrena, whose jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire largely coincided with that of the Peć patriarchate, had eighty members in the second half of the sixteenth century. By the first half of the seventeenth century and after the Congregation of Propagation of the Faith was founded, its membership increased fivefold. In 1623, for example, this province recorded 276 monks and 53 students of theology in Hungary and Italy.[19] The Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena covered the vast expanse from the Adriatic Sea to Budapest and Transylvania. That part of the Ottoman Empire developed a special feeling of responsibility for both for Catholicism and the Slav population in the area. This has become a Croatian heritage, but while developing it had wider cultural importance.[20]

The first signs of any significant revival for Serbian Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire date from 1557, almost a century later than the *Milodraška andnam* by which the Franciscans received guarantees for their legal status. The reconstruction of the Peć patriarchate in the middle of the sixteenth century was, however, an event with far-reaching consequences both for the relationship among religious communities and for the wider political and social environment. First, the Bosnian Franciscans never enjoyed the influence that the Serbian archdiocese and later the Peć patriarchate had in medieval Serbia. Second, the Peć patriarchate was an autocephalous church which can, should state interests so require, only be "constrained" by the patriarchate in Constantinople.

This important difference set it apart from the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena, which faced control by the Franciscan order and the Catholic church, plus the strong direct influence of Habsburg and Venetian authorities, as well as the interest of neighboring Croatia. In contrast, the privileges of the Peć patriarchate were considerably wider. According to Dušan Kašić:

> The Serb Patriarch had the same status that the Constantinople patriarch had among the Greeks under Ottoman rule. He became 'mitelbasha' (ethnarch, leader of the people) with extensive rights and duties. He had the exclusive right to propose metropolitans and bishops to the Ottoman authorities and to deal with administrative, organizational, and personal questions related to lower clerics and the priesthood. Ottoman authorities had no right to interfere in these issues. In economic matters, the state strengthened the patriarch's powers in order to collect church taxes and dues from which, in turn, the yearly taxes of the Serbian church to the Emperor's coffers were paid. These dues were initially 100,000 'akchi' yearly, but during the time of Patriarch Arsenije IV, they rose to 700,000 akchi yearly. The patriarch had the right to pass judgment and make decisions even pertaining to martial law. These, of course, had to be based on the canon law of the Orthodox church. Furthermore, the patriarch had extensive jurisdiction regarding the inheritance

rights of clerics who died without legal heirs (the right of 'kaducitet'). Finally, the patriarch had wide-ranging discretion regarding civil law, which encompassed almost all civil lawsuits relating to the Serb Orthodox population. He vetted statutes and corporations of the Serb population.[21]

Kašić characterizes the personal position of the patriarch in the Ottoman Empire as such that ". . . the Porte treated him as part of the Ottoman political apparatus. As a result, he had certain legally protected privileges. The Patriarch travelled in 'great splendor' and police protection was provided by the janissaries. His horse and saddle were fittingly embroidered, and at the saddle hung a small sword as a symbol of the powers bestowed on him by the Sultan."[22]

The Peć patriarchate was revived in the Ottoman Empire on the principle of "collectivity." This was possible because the Ottoman social structure, with more or less Islamic tolerance, promoted the relatively numerous Serbian groups in the Ottoman military and in commerce and crafts. In this respect, the Serbs were not an exception. Indeed, they did significantly less well than did certain other ethnic groups, such as the Greeks, who enjoyed continuous influence on the Porte in diplomacy, the military (especially the navy), and commerce. Furthermore, Greek influence was typically not accompanied by any significant Islamization, a fate that the Albanians, for instance, could not avoid.

Research on the legal position of the Franciscans in Bosnia and the Orthodox clergy within the boundaries of the Peć patriarchate leaves unresolved other questions important for understanding the complex relationship of Catholic and Orthodox believers with the Ottoman Empire. In the case of the Orthodox, as early as 1594 the relics of St. Sava were transferred from Mileševo to Belgrade and then burned in retaliation for extensive Serb participation in an anti-Ottoman uprising in the Banat. By this act, the Ottoman rulers showed not only the fragile nature of their confidence in the Orthodox Serb population, but also the true nature of their mutual relations. Secondly, one of the unchanged features of Ottoman rule in Bosnia was inciting Catholic–Orthodox antagonism. Despite privileges given to the Franciscans, Ottoman rulers often helped the Orthodox church hierarchy in varied attempts to bring Bosnian Catholics under their supervision. This was especially visible in tax collection, where Ottoman rulers, protecting their own interests, regularly assisted the Orthodox hierarchy and only later, at great legal cost gave various rebates to the Franciscans.[23]

The Borderlands of the Ottoman Empire and Vlach Privileges

From a demographic point of view, there is no doubt that Serb Orthodoxy in the Military Border in Croatia was most clearly visible in the so-called Vlach communities. As an ethnic group, Vlachs were among the oldest inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula, where they had lived since pre-Slavic times. The continually changing features of this community, its disappearance and reemergence, makes it one of the most elusive groups in the Balkans.

I follow the scholarly tradition holding that before the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries--that is, before the Ottoman conquest--the pre-Slav Vlach communities had already assimilated themselves into a number of ethnic groups in Southeastern Europe, including the Serbs. By that time, the Romanization of older Slav communities in most of today's Romania had also been completed. Christianity played a major role in all these transformations. Because most Vlachs belonged to autocephalous Orthodox churches, church mediation accelerated the process of acculturation.

The process was also facilitated by two more factors. First, the Ottoman conquest prompted most of the population to turn from farming to animal breeding, promising greater security in times of prolonged warfare. Second, Vlach status as residents of a loyal Ottoman village provided an easier life under the new conditions. But the reintegration of Serbs and other southeast European ethnic groups into the Ottoman empire by Vlach methods had its price. This was to play a part in the Ottoman conquest and also to entrench patriarchal, communal, and tribal structures which proved extremely resistant to social change. The Serb population of the central Balkans was by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries deeply set in this Vlach mode, as opposed to a Vlach ethnic identity.

A common criticism voiced for over a century by both Serbian and Croatian historians concerned Vlach readiness to enter Ottoman military service during the time of the conquests. As recently stated in Serbian historiography by Mirko Mirković: "The Vlach animal breeders were, beyond doubt, a numerous social appendix and ally of the Ottoman ruling class. By the rights they enjoyed and the duties they had, they were somewhere between the 'askers' and 'raja.' But their elders, princes, and 'promićuri' were visibly part of the Ottoman military-administrative mechanism."[24]

On the Croatian side, Mirko Valentić has drawn similar conclusions:

> The most notable part they [the Vlachs] played in the Turkish state was in the military organization of the army. This was a result of their natural propensities, which were best suited for the use of weapons. In the army's strategy, they had a prominent role as a mobile striking force among Turkish frontiersmen, always ready for new plunder, slave hunting, and sorties--the so-called akindžije. Most of the Balkan 'Vlachs' got special privileges, typically as soldiers, and then as guards and informants. These privileges were given as compensation to the Vlachs for their military services.[25]

Scholarly literature, however, is not clear regarding the behavior of the Vlachs before Southeastern Europe came under Ottoman rule. They had no visible role in Serbia before the Ottoman invasion. Consequently, their subsequent behavior is more a result of social disintegration than a cause of it. There is no doubt that the role of the Vlachs in the Ottoman army is overestimated in the literature, even for those periods during which the influence of the Vlachs was at its greatest.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when Vlachs were deciding for or against accepting Ottoman overlords and whether or not to enter the service of their new masters, they were not the only ones seeking a modus vivendi with the Ottomans. Nor were religious factors particularly important in this process. There is no justification for holding the efforts of the Vlachs to find some accommodation with the Ottomans against them to attribute some special culpability to their behavior. The upper strata in all the territories conquered by the Ottomans, if they survived at all, after brief or prolonged resistance often accepted Ottoman rule and sometimes participated in further Ottoman conquests. Did not the Dubrovnik republic accept Ottoman rule? To what extent did Dubrovnik commerce contribute, for example, to stabilizing Ottoman rule in Southeast Europe and in the Mediterranean?

In this respect, the experience of Venice is enlightening. Even though the Ottoman Empire fought more wars with Venice than anyone else, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, their relationship was very complex. Venice was frequently on quite good terms with the Ottoman Empire. Frederic Lane concluded that:

> In spite of popular feeling against the Infidels, every Italian state including Venice tried at one time or another to come to an understanding with the Turks against its Italian rivals. If it did not, it was believed to be doing so. Venice was most vociferously accused of this by others because they were jealous of Venice's greater power and because Venice, being the most exposed to Turkish aggression, appealed loudly for crusading aid when at war and yet was ready to make peace with the Infidel when it suited her interests. All Western states made promises in terms of romantic chivalry and Christian piety and then made excuses in terms of political necessities. Venice counted among her political necessities not only the preservation of her colonies, but the continuation of her commerce.[26]

To appraise more precisely the role of the Vlachs in Ottoman colonization of the empire's borderlands and hence their role in the stabilization of Ottoman rule, we should know much more about their agrarian practices. We do know that their role was much greater in the Dinaric upland area, which favors the survival of the soldier/animal breeder. Most of the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats on the Balkan peninsula shared these features. In all three cases, these are mountainous regions with abundant forests, pastures, and karst plateaus which are largely inaccessible and squeezed between the Adriatic coast and the Panonnian plain. Unfavorable hydro-geographic characteristics make them unsuitable for most crops and ideal for soldiering and animal breeding. In such a landscape, the boundaries of medieval states were often undetermined and the influence of formal church hierarchies remained limited. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the roots of pre-Christian beliefs ran deep. During the whole early modern period there was a continuous "low-level war" going on in these areas, across the border as well as within it. This was true even when the neighboring Ottoman Empire and Christian states were at peace. Even though the resulting profits (slaves, cattle, etc.) were sometimes large, these

were low-level conflicts. They involved no extensive gains or losses for either side. The participants' poverty, regardless of which side of the border they lived on, was left unchanged. They remained on the outer edge of physical existence. Also, independent of borders, they were left in fear of their neighbors.

During the early modern period, Vlach communities in Southeast Europe were divided into three intermingled religious communities--Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim. Partly, this pattern resulted from a conflict of interests between states with which each of the monotheistic religions identified themselves. Partly, it reflected the instinctive disposition of the inhabitants of the Dinaric area to isolate themselves from one another, and justify their fear and aggression toward each other with reasons that transcended everyday life. The religious intermixture of the Vlachs and their communities also encouraged their inner need to legitimize their differences by appealing to legends, myths, religion, and morals. As a result, oral culture and especially epic songs found here their "legitimation." But this intermixture, which often internally divided Vlach communities and even extended families, could also on occasion lead to special forms of religious tolerance. This tolerance is reflected in the special place that honor, sponsorship, and fraternity had in these societies.

Historians of the Military Border usually analyze religious phenomena from the viewpoint of the Church, or from the even narrower viewpoint of the Church hierarchy. Such an approach has its place, but it will never allow us to understand the variety and richness of relationships among members of different religions in this territory. All this points in one direction: it is absurd to start from the premise that the Vlachs were, as a rule, closer to the Ottoman authorities than any other group. This is clearly visible by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

After the fall of the Serbian despots in 1459, waves of Vlachs colonized these areas.

> In the first decade of Turkish rule, the 'Vlachs' only colonized some parts of northern Serbia, i.e., only abandoned 'has,' 'zeramet,' lands of sandžakbeys, and holdings of Turkish noblemen. The oldest Turkish law dealing with the 'Vlachs,' written in 1467–68, states: 'Every house must provide one gold piece ('filuria'), two sheep, one with lamb, and a ram. Twenty houses form a hamlet. Every hamlet must provide one tent, one cheese, three ropes, and six horse bridles, one pot of butter and one ram. They need not give anything else. From every five houses one youth must join military campaigns.'. . . The lack of agrarian population created a very favorable environment for migrations of animal breeders and their colonization. During the second decade of Turkish rule, a second wave of 'Vlach' (animal breeders) colonization flooded over the whole of the Smedrevo sandžak and large parts of the Kruševo and Vidin sandžaks. . . . Around 1516 there must have been over 12,000 'Vlach' houses in the Smedrevo sandžak.[27]

When the Smedrevo sandžak ceased being a borderland, Vlach privileges were abolished. At the same time, in Zvornik and some other sandžaks, the Vlachs were subjected to taxes and other duties until then reserved only for the raja (Christians). The Vlachs, who had by that time turned to farming, remained in the colonized lands in spite of having lost their Vlach privileges. Large numbers, however, continued to migrate. They migrated either to the west and northwest in the direction of Ottoman conquests, or they crossed the borders and left the Ottoman lands.[28]

Since Bosnia and Hercegovina remained a borderland of the Ottoman Empire for a long time, Vlach privileges lasted longer there than elsewhere. They had ceased, however, by the sixteenth century because Islamization had become so widespread that military duty for Christian Vlachs became unnecessary, all the more so because Islamization partly penetrated these communities themselves. In spite of this Vlach or "military mukati," the privilege of paying lump-sum taxes survived till the nineteenth century.[29] Because the Vlach tax burden was very low, the Ottoman authorities tried to abolish such a special status whenever possible. Thus the construction of a historical myth about an "idyllic" relationship of Christian Vlachs and the Islamic Ottoman Empire is completely unjustified. But because the Vlach status from the end of the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth century was in many ways favorable and brought privileges, various inhabitants of Southeast Europe sought to obtain that status despite having no ethnic relationship with the Vlachs.

It is therefore understandable that when the Habsburgs started establishing Military Borders of their own at the beginning of the sixteenth century, they attracted many Christian Vlachs to their side. This change was made even more attractive because at the same time the Ottoman Empire was trying to limit Vlach privileges. While Ottoman might was still on the rise, the first Vlach communities started appearing in the Habsburg military borderlands (*Žumberak uskoks*). This refutes the claim, often repeated among historians, that Vlachs started leaving Ottoman employment after the first major Ottoman defeats in the "long" or Sisak war (1593–1606). The Habsburgs guaranteed them the same rights which the Ottoman Empire had begun taking away.

Deviations from the *timar* system had a negative impact on the country and especially on the position of the raja. Extensive misuse of laws and positions of authority became increasingly frequent and serious. Increased pressure on the productive population, which was mostly Christian, led to dissatisfaction and resistance. Priests and *knezovi* (princes) led an increasing number of revolts by the Christian population. By that time, the expansion of the Ottoman Empire had ceased, and the system had no need for semi-military orders, so the administration increasingly reduced them to the position of the raja. This led to closer ties between church elders and the leaders of the former semi-military orders. At the same time, the church was under even greater pressure, as even church lands were taken away and transformed into *miri* or state lands.[30]

Yet this approach fails to recognize that the Peć patriarchate had been revived by the time that Islamization passed its peak. The Ottoman authorities now lost any real

interest in the Islamization of the remaining Catholic or Orthodox population. The revival of the Peć patriarchate in 1557, together with its religious and other privileges, was supposed to contribute to the stability of a system which for the first time had become vulnerable as a result of internal tensions. Even though the patriarch and bishops, together with some monasteries, enjoyed wide-ranging privileges, these did not extend to parish priests. The latter, together with the village elders, shared the fate of the peasant population and were the main instigators of anti-Ottoman movements. Since the parish priests lived and moved with the population--the Vlach communities--questions of religious identity did not arise within these communities even during the long periods when they were subjected to various religious pressures.

By the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, anti-Ottoman feeling started to ferment in all strata of the Serb and Croat populations. This change prompted increasingly frequent migrations into areas under Venetian and especially Habsburg rule. A common feature at both destinations was for the migrants from the Ottoman Empire to be called Vlachs, regardless of whether or not they still had this status at the time of migration. There is no serious research dealing with the fate of larger Vlach communities before they left the Ottoman Empire and after they arrived in the Habsburg Krajina (that is before and after migrating from Bosnia to Croatia). Migrations to the Habsburg Empire took many different forms, historically the most common being those with the full participation of the Orthodox church hierarchy, from parish priests and monks to bishops and patriarch. Greater privileges were usually granted by the Habsburg nobility and authorities to those migrating Vlach communities which came with a strong Orthodox church organization, such as the Marcha bishopric in the Varadžin Military District, the Gomirje monastery in Gorski Kotar, or in the Croatian Military Border. The environment that the migrant communities found in the Habsburg lands after the Catholic counter-reformation and following the Council of Trent (1545–1563) was less religiously tolerant than the one that they had left behind in Bosnia and the Ottoman Empire. This led to a homogenization between the Serb Orthodox church hierarchy and the Vlachs when negotiating to maintain their legal status under new masters. As a result, some very special forms of regional identity started forming among the Serbs of the Military Border in Croatia.

The revival of Serb Orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire during the second half of the sixteenth century is closely related to the emergence of this new social strata. The new group, which became the upper class of the early modern period in Serb society, largely kept its Vlach status. The interests of the church hierarchy and the Vlach leaders were so similar that it is difficult to distinguish them. The same connection developed on the Habsburg side of the border. It emerged as an increasing number of Vlach communities, each closely connected to the Orthodox church, started negotiating the conditions of their migration into new Christian and Catholic subordination. The Vlachs entered these negotiations with memories of their originally extensive privileges. The Vlach communities' insistence on retaining their privileges was in part a result of their own feeling of identity regarding their special status in society and in part a reflection of their conviction this was the only way that they could preserve their Orthodoxy.

Vlachs Privileges of Status and Religion on the Military Border in Croatia

A great deal has been written about Vlachs in Croatia, but no scholarly authority on the subject considers the question satisfactorily resolved. Many of the primary sources still remain uncatalogued. There is no doubt that through the centuries the term Vlach has been used in Croatian and Serbian sources, often of a religious nature, and by Croatian historians, usually in controversial ways. The "Vlach issue" has been at the center of national and ideological controversies about the formation of modern Serb and Croat national consciousness, which began in the early twentieth century and in some ways continues up to the present. The Vlach communities participated in the process of both Croatian and Serbian national integration, but their importance for the latter is greater than for the former.

One of the greatest authorities on the Croatian side, Vladimir Mažuranić, records the entry under "Vlach" in his dictionary, *Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povijesni rječnik* (Contributions to the Croatian Dictionary of Legal History): "[I]n earliest examples, especially in Serbian sources, but in more recent ones as well, there is no doubt that one is dealing with ethnic differences, i.e., with the partially Romanized original inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire, different from the more recently arrived Croats and Serbs." But for later periods, Mažuranić notes a change in the word's meaning: ". . . one can see that already by the twelfth century, the Serbs and Vlachs were linguistically identified as one. The same was true of the Croatian Vlachs. There is little in the surnames to remind one of their Romanian origins." Regarding the Vlachs in Croatia during the early modern period, he states quite explicitly: "In our western lands all the newly colonized 'Vlachs' have been members of the Eastern Orthodox church since the second half of the sixteenth century. Both ethnically and in the way they organized their church they have fused with the Serbian name and Serb people in spite of having called themselves 'Vlachs' from time immemorial."[31]

The incompleteness of Mažuranić's and similar understandings of the word "Vlach" stems from a certain ambivalence. He allows for the possibility of a clear ethnic distinction between the Serbs and Vlachs and between the Croats and Vlachs ("often even in later periods") but also for the complete identity of Orthodox Vlachs with Serbs "from the second half of the sixteenth century" and in Croatia, even earlier. It is clear that the Serb–Vlach, just as the Croat–Vlach, acculturation lasted centuries. Such ambiguity invites other interpretations. On the Croatian side, Dominik Mandić has gone the furthest. In a recently published and influential book, he states:

> In this work we use the term Vlach in its ethnic sense, i.e., for dark brown groups of people living in Europe who are blood descendants from dark black Vlachs of the Middle Ages who speak a Romanic language. . . . In our treatise *Postanak Vlaha* (The Making of the Vlachs) printed in 1956, we presented evidence that the Balkan and other European Vlachs are descendants of army veterans. These veterans came from Mauritania and were colonized on the

Roman borders, especially those along the Danube, from the time of Emperor Claudius (42–54 A.D.) until the fall of the Roman Empire in 476.[32]

The racist overtones of Mandić's approach are clear. In contrast to Illyrians and Thracians, who are "white-skinned," the Mauro–Vlachs are dark black or dark brown. They have inherited the skin color of their African ancestors. If we accept the assumption that they lived in isolation from their Balkan neighbors from the fifth century onward, it remains unclear how such soldiers found women who had also kept their "dark brown" skin color until the modern period. Why is it that in their language, in so far as one can identify it today, there are no Africanisms? If, during the five centuries of Roman authority, "a couple of hundred thousand souls" had arrived, how could they have changed and lost their identity in such a short period? Mandić frequently uses doubtful statistical data to argue that the "ethnic Serbs" simply moved en masse to Hungary at the end of the Middle Ages and during the early modern period. He states: "We have no precise data on the number of Serbs who fled to Southern Hungary, but King Mathias wrote to the pope that in four years, from 1479 to 1483, two hundred thousand Serbs colonized Hungary."[33]

Regarding the migrations of 1690, Mandić adds the following: "Patriarch Crnojević claimed in his letters that he had brought 40,000 souls into Hungary, but more recent research estimates the number at 60,000–70,000 souls."[34] He calls this further evidence for the virtual disappearance of "ethnic Serbs" from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Mandić uses such evidence to construct his oft-quoted table citing the province's twentieth century "Serb" population as 32 to 35 percent Orthodox Croats; 50 to 52 percent non-Slav Vlachs; 6 to 7 percent Serbianized Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, and Albanians; and 8 to 10 percent "real ethnic Serbs" who came to these lands during the Austro-Hungarian administration and the two Yugoslavias.[35]

Mandić's work nonetheless draws attention to the importance of the pre-Slav population in explaining and understanding the history of South Slav communities, nations, and states. There is no doubt that some aspects of the mixing of pre-Slav and Slav populations lasted thousands of years, especially regarding the lifestyle and beliefs of the livestock-breeding Vlach communities. Yet the acculturation process probably ran contrary to Mandić's version. Influences from the Romanic speech of the pre-Slav Balkan population in the hinterland had a limited impact, hardly extending beyond the same terms for animal-breeding. In Dalmatian and Istrian communities, where the ethnic mixing of the pre-Slav and primarily Croat population has been intense for over a thousand years, the linguistic assimilation of the Vlachs was less pronounced than in the case of the pre-Slav and South Slav population of the western Balkan peninsula (Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats). In the latter areas, where numerous traditions and written sources indicate early social segregation of Vlach communities, their socio-economic position following the imposition of Ottoman, Habsburg, and Venetian military borders prompted rapid acculturation and linguistic assimilation. This process also reflects a shift from animal breeding to agriculture among both the pre-Slav and Slav populations, which was common in the whole area. The limited size of the western Balkan peninsula did not allow a thousand years of such

compartmentalized history.

Lifestyles, common law, and beliefs of the paleo-Balkan and pre-Slav population, each of which were of different ethnic origin, were to a great extent subsumed in the South Slav inheritance. This is the only way that the visible identification of the Vlach communities with the medieval Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian nations can be explained, despite varying degrees of segregation. The legal basis for Vlach segregation is in itself the most reliable proof that, in reality, the opposite was the case. A group's identity shifted from one to another depending on internal needs and external pressures. Recent research from Croatian historiography has revealed an ever-increasing number of Vlachs in Croatia during the Middle Ages and before the Ottoman conquests. Most of them lived in continental Dalmatia, between the Centina and Zrmanja Rivers and south Lika. In some areas, they were probably a majority.[36]

The whole issue is important for Croatian history from the end of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth centuries. Central issues of sovereignty, church jurisdiction, and the status of the Vlach population were being addressed during this time. Because the common interest of the Vlachs and the Habsburg Military Border authorities was the same--to prevent at any cost the Vlachs from becoming subjects of the Croatian nobility and under the Croatian parliament--the issue of Vlach privileges become one of the central issues of Croatian politics. As a result, the question of privileges became even more important than in the Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire, there simply were no unresolvable or even difficult legal issues between the Porte and the borderland *vilayets* such as the Bosnian one. This meant that Vlach communities over a long period had space to articulate their own separate interests. On the Habsburg side of the border--that is, in Croatia--such a space also existed as a result of conflicting interests between the Habsburg court and Croatian nobility and also between the Austrian and Croatian nobilities. For almost one hundred years, from the end of the sixteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries, the Habsburg authorities found it to their advantage to maintain numerous traditional, common-law rules for the Vlachs in the Varaždin Military District. They were codified in the *Statuta Valachorum* (Vlach Statues) of 1630 and were completely incompatible with the local rights claimed by the Croatian nobility. In the same way, Habsburg authorities found it easier to identify with the religious aspirations of the believers in the Orthodox Marchan bishopric. Understandably, because of the privileges it allowed and regardless of national feeling, many of the Krajina inhabitants gave the Vlach name precedence over others. The Croatian historian Jaroslav Šidak notes that:

> The newcomers usually called themselves Vlachs or 'Vlach sons,' primarily to draw attention to the social status of free animal breeders which they had enjoyed under Turkish rule. And since they distinguished themselves from the indigenous population, among other things by religion, it is understandable that the term "natio Valachorum" was used for them in some written documents. Therefore the name "Vlach" is synonymous with the ethnic term Serb. . .[37]

Šidak's claim has caused many misunderstandings in Croatian historiography. Taking into account that in various parts of Croatia and Bosnia, the Vlach name is used by Croats as well as Serbs, the claim becomes too narrow. But is seems justified for those communities whose ethnic Serb identity is questioned, as with the Vlachs in the Varaždin Military District from the second half of the sixteenth century onward. In this sense, Šidak's interpretation, even though the author does not provide much detail, is more precise than many appearing today, which see the conflicts concerning the jurisdiction of the Marcha bishopric in the Varaždin Military District as purely religious conflicts between Orthodox and Catholics.

The Military Frontier in Croatia from the sixteenth century onward became the new western boundary of Orthodoxy, more visibly with the mass migrations. From the beginning of the seventeenth century, after the establishment of the Marcha bishopric, the Habsburgs used their decisive influence in legal and religious matters to legalize the new "boundaries" between Eastern and Western Christianity. Before this time, there were no traces of Orthodoxy in the area of the Varaždin Military District. The establishment of a Uniate bishopric which reached south almost to Zagreb created historically new circumstances. It is important to note that the new "border" was inclusive and not exclusive, obliging neither Catholics nor Serb Orthodox to give up a single religious right.[38]

The greatest religious tolerance of the period could in any case be seen among ordinary people--the Krajišnici--of both religions. On more than one occasion during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Orthodox Krajišnici defended the privileges of their Catholic counterparts and their attempts to enjoy the rights granted by the *Statuta Valachorum* to the Serbs. The Catholic Krajišnici also expressed solidarity with the Orthodox in their resistance to a single Uniate church that allowed Orthodox rituals in return for loyalty to Rome. The Catholic clergy of the Varaždin Military District in the mid-eighteenth century warned that the people "have been infiltrated with lawlessness such as murder, robbery, stealing, girl snatching, polygamy, etc., which is not surprising considering that the people have for so many years been without their spiritual leader because no one accepts the rule of the Uniate Marcha episcopate."[39]

At the same time, Catholic believers warned the authorities that priests were not showing sufficient attention to their flock, spending too much time hunting and raising hunting dogs. Even if we assume this report was inspired by circles around the prince who had a mandate to "reform" the Varaždin Military District, the fact remains that religious conflict rarely turned into direct conflict among the believers. Throughout the entire seventeenth century there was pressure to force the Uniate episcopate of the Varaždin Military District, and thus the Serb-Orthodox religious community, to accept the jurisdiction of the Catholic bishop of Zagreb. The resolution of jurisdiction over the Marcha eparchate involved all parties--the Holy See, the Peć patriarchate, the Habsburg court, the Krajina authorities, the Croatian nobility, church hierarchies on both sides of the border in Croatia and the Ottoman Empire, the upper strata of the Vlachs in the Varaždin Military District, as well as the believers themselves. The conflict cannot be reduced to a strictly religious

dimension, given the similarity in the nobility's efforts to limit traditional Krajina Vlach privileges and the Catholic hierarchy's attempts to introduce religious unity. Complicating the issue of church unity in Croatia was the close relationship of Serb Orthodoxy to the Peć patriarchate centered in Kosovo, deep in the Ottoman Empire. Its patriarch was a nobleman of the Ottoman court. Visits by Marcha bishops to the Peć patriarch resulted in instructions that were carried out in the Marcha eparchate.

The process of militarizing the Military Border started first along absolutist lines and then, in the second half of the eighteenth century, under the influence of an enlightened bureaucracy. Most of the structures of Vlach common law were abolished. But they were not replaced by anything that represented increased influence for the Croatian nobility in the Military Border. The impetus for religious unification was also reduced, in part because of the 1690 migration of the Peć patriarch Arsenije Crnojević, with many Orthodox believers, into the Habsburg lands. They were soon granted broad religious and non-religious privileges.[40]

The religious rights of the Orthodox Vlachs (Serbs) of the Military Border that were negotiated with the Habsburg court were ambivalent and often implicit rather than explicit. The Croatian nobility did not engage in similar negotiation for two reasons. First, the Croatian parliament never passed an act authorizing Vlach rights. Secondly, the Croatian nobility made Catholicism the only religion legally permitted in Croatia, thus excluding any possibility of bargaining with the Vlachs regarding their separate religious rights. Even though this legislation was aimed primarily at the Protestants and was passed on the eve of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), its effect on religious intolerance toward the Orthodox should not be overlooked. Because of the mixture of Vlach statutory and religious rights, it was impossible during the seventeenth century for the Croatian nobility to enter into any negotiation with the Vlachs. With regard to the "strategic" goal of subjecting the Orthodox Krajišnici to the Uniate church hierarchy in Croatia, the interests of the Habsburg court, of the Croatian nobility, of the Holy See, and of the Catholic hierarchy in Croatia coincided only in part. These interests were not strong enough to overcome the resistance of Orthodox believers, which was at times greater than that of the priesthood, and the influence of the Peć patriarchate on the Ottoman side of the border. As a result, Serb Orthodoxy in the Habsburg monarchy proved to be much more resistant against Uniate efforts than other Orthodox churches such as the Russian and Ukrainian.

Vlachs as Defenders of Antemurale Christianitatis

While Catholics in Croatia from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries belonged to all social groups, this was not the case with Orthodox believers. Most of them had the status of Vlachs, especially in the Croatian Military Border. This relationship between the two religious communities was not one of social equals. For a long time following their creation, the Vlach communities in Croatia remained much less differentiated socially. The Vlachs, who enjoyed various privileges as warriors and animal breeders that were

guaranteed by the Habsburgs, lived independent from the activities of the Croatian nobility and considered themselves different from most of the other dependent populations (the serfs). Because they were at the same time, and in most cases, religiously different from the majority--that is, Orthodox as opposed to Catholic--religious relations often worked to symbolize their social differences.

Finally, most of the Vlachs in the Croatian Krajina live in mountainous regions. When considering the impact of their way of life, one should bear in mind that mountains usually create a world of their own, apart from the civilization of cities and plains. Even though the Braudelian hypothesis that societies in mountains are societies "without history" is no longer accepted, their historical experience still seems to have been different from that of even the neighboring plains. This difference is especially obvious when considering the distinctive relationship of Vlachs toward religious communities.

Catholicism struck roots among all social classes in Croatia and also in the power structures of both civil Croatia and the Military Border. The main sources of Catholic power, the church hierarchy and church orders, became at the same time its main weaknesses. During the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries, the disappearance of the church hierarchies, especially in the mountainous regions of Bosnia and Hercegovina (and some parts of Croatia) made religious conversion from Catholicism to Islam and from Catholicism to Orthodoxy easier. Conversion from Catholicism to Islam within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire has already been described. Research into the conversion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy is more complex, especially when it occurred within the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire.

Cases of conversion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy in the mountainous Vlach communities are known to have occurred. There is, however, no doubt that in the plains, and especially near urban centers, there were at the same time conversions from Orthodoxy to Catholicism, particularly in areas where the Catholic hierarchy was stronger, whether in an area under Habsburg or Venetian rule. As has already has been suggested, early modern Orthodoxy was more prone to traditional popular beliefs, which sometimes bordered on paganism. This was rarer among Catholics. Catholics in even the most backward Krajina areas followed the Council of Trent of the second half of the sixteenth century with an enthusiasm that made them less tolerant toward other religions.

It is often forgotten that in the otherwise homogeneous Vlach communities, religious conversion was frequently limited to only some members of the extended household and that conversion happened with the knowledge of family members. In some cases, family crises such as a mixed marriage were resolved by religious conversion. This practice was more common in areas in the Ottoman Empire, but such cases were not unknown under Habsburg or Venetian rule.

In the Military Border after the end of the seventeenth century, the most frequent conversions from Orthodoxy to Catholicism and vice-versa occurred outside the scope of

either church hierarchy or church authorities, but within the framework of local custom. What was happening here? The crucial factor allowing conversion was the self-regulatory survival mechanism of Vlach communities. Extended families and village communities were the fundamental form of socialization in the Military Border. They required the highest level of internal cohesion, which in turn was one of the requirements of customary law. All aspects of everyday life of the Krajina population were in some way mediated by religious ritual. These rituals were important even when one or the other church hierarchy considered them to be superstition. The differences in the calendars they used led to unavoidable differences between Catholics and Orthodox, even in the most backward areas. Even if other differences had not existed, those resulting from religious ritual would have. Many churches were built as soon as circumstances became settled after the Peace of Karlovac in 1699. At first they were mostly wooden, but after the second half of the eighteenth century, largely brick. Decisions about church construction in the Military Border were taken by the authorities in Vienna only after a long bureaucratic procedure in which the Catholics and Orthodox did not participate on equal terms. A previously dispersed population started converging in religious groups around their churches. In mountainous regions, just the length of the walk to church became another stimulus for religious conversion under local practice.

Krajina authorities initially tended to accept conversions more than they opposed them. But once both church hierarchies expanded their jurisdictions, the two networks overlapped across the whole of the Krajina in Croatia. As priests started caring for every "soul" regardless of where he or she lived, controversies appeared over the conditions of religious conversion from Catholicism to Orthodoxy and from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. The adoption of numerous new rules often put the Orthodox at a disadvantage until the influence of the Enlightenment in the Habsburg regulations began to spread.[41]

Authorities in both churches pressed partners in any mixed marriage not to change religion when marrying, but could accept that children would be christened by prearranged agreement in first one and then the other religion. Where urbanization advanced in the Krajina area, religious tolerance became a fact of family life. In this way, Habsburg policies in the Krajina developed preconditions for Croat-Serb cooperation in the ensuing century, when towns became the centers for national integration. Thus the nineteenth century became a time when issues of religious tolerance emerged as one of the focal points of the modernization of Croatian society.

Yet extensive religious tolerance was not found at the higher levels of state power during the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. Professional and class promotion remained tied to religion. From the second half of the eighteenth century in the by-then militarized Military Border, acceptance for military education in Wiener Neustadt, for example, assumed conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism.[42] From the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, this requirement for conversion did not apply to students of the Grenzverwaltungsinstitut, where Krajina administrative officers were schooled. Many of these graduates, Croats and Serbs, Catholics

and Orthodox, who understood the real circumstances in the Krajina, played a prominent part in the national awakening which started after 1835. Krajina reforms and the complete militarization of the Krajina fundamentally changed the habits and, to some extent even the nature, of the former members of the Vlach communities. Their socialization became more regulated once they had turned away from animal breeding and stopped travelling over great distances. This happened regardless of the extent to which the Krajina border population remained faithful to their traditional values during the eighteenth century. Their understanding of sovereignty and even their understanding of their own rights and duties was altered. The change from "unregulated Vlachs" into regulated "Krajišnici" by the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries ended a long phase in their social development.

Habsburg "Reconquista," Catholic Revival, and the Response of Serb Orthodoxy

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Habsburg authorities repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to Catholicism, as harmonized, of course, with their dynastic interests. On the Military Border in Croatia, where Catholicism was long threatened by Islam, a policy of religious tolerance toward Orthodoxy seemed the most pragmatic for state or dynastic interests despite the Habsburgs' long-standing commitment to church unification. The number of Orthodox believers (primarily from the Peć patriarchate), and their share in the population, was so great on the Military Border that no other policy was viable. It had not been possible to settle the Krajina region, which was the borderland with the Ottoman Empire, only with Catholics. From a strategic point of view, it would have been unwise to "push" the Orthodox believers back into becoming Ottoman subjects. But the borderland areas also inherited an old Catholic tradition originating well before the Ottoman period and therefore the above-described strategy inevitably raised problems for the internal politics of the Habsburg monarchy and even more problems for Croatia.

The hitherto unprecedented policy of religious tolerance toward Orthodoxy and especially toward the Peć patriarchate weakened any efforts for religious unity in Croatia. The privileged, ethnically Vlach Serb, and religiously Orthodox communities settling Croatia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were quickly reintegrated into the Serb-Orthodox community that ended up in the areas of southern Hungary brought under Habsburg rule after the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1683–1699. From then on, the large Karlovac metropolitanate shaped the interests of Orthodox Serbs. The metropolitanate was a legal entity located in the Habsburg monarchy, but it remained part of the hierarchy of the Peć patriarchate on the Ottoman side of the border. With the disappearance of the traditional Vlach privileges in the mid-eighteenth century, the term "Vlach" stopped being used in official documents. Instead, such individuals were called "Graničar" or "Krajišnik," the name of all Habsburg subjects with the status of military frontiersmen.

The Habsburg "reconquista" affected the Orthodox Serbs in two ways, one secular and the other religious. Both cast doubt on the authority of medieval Serbianism and Serb

Orthodoxy as determined by the Peć patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire. Both excluded the kind of spiritual and secular revival advocated by the Peć patriarchate.

First, Habsburg authorities tried to connect the Serbia of both the medieval and early modern period to their own dynasty. They did this because in their wars with the Ottoman Empire, they sought to appear as the legal heirs of the Hungarian realms in Southeast Europe and thus Serbia as well. They had two related links to the Serbs, one through those living south of the Sava and Danube Rivers and the second through the Serbs living north of them. From the thirteenth century onward, Hungarian kings had also been regularly crowned as kings of Serbia. From the fifteenth century, Serb despots were vassals of the Hungarian crown. The despots enjoyed an influential position and won many privileges for their Serb Orthodox subjects and believers.

Both earlier and more recent research are unclear about whom Leopold I gave these privileges in 1690. There need be no doubt on that issue, however, if one reads carefully what is written in each of the documents of 1690 that grant the privileges. The document of 21 August 1690 begins as follows:

> To the honorable, devoted, and to us dear Arsenije Čarnojević, Archbishop of the Serbs of the Eastern Greek ritual, to the bishops and all other members of the church, to other classes, captains, lieutenants and, finally, the whole people of the said East Greek ritual and Serb people living in Greece, Bulgaria, Russia [*sic!*], Hercegovina, Podgora, Jenopolis, and other adjacent territories. . .[43]

"Rašiam" in the original text refers to Raška and not Russia, as Leopold I is primarily addressing Orthodox Serbs in the translation, but at the same time understanding that the Peć patriarchate covered a wider area whose parts belonged to other states which Hungarian tradition considered in various ways "annexed" or "dependent."

The "Litterae inviatoriae" issued by Leopold I on 6 April 1690 spelled out the long-term ambitions of the Habsburgs in Southeastern Europe. There he legalized those ambitions following the above-mentioned traditions of Hungarian state law as well as by reference to Christian solidarity. This proclamation is addressed to "all people and countries of our inherited kingdom of Hungary and to all Christians."[44] The ruler states that the war of 1683 was "started to lead our subjects and those who are legally dependent on our kingdom of Hungary and all other Christians . . . out of the terrible Turkish yoke and back to previous freedom, previous privileges, and alliances they had before. . ."[45] The already mentioned "Litterae inviatoriae" is, among all the sources related to Serb privileges, the only act stating such far-reaching goals. All the other documents are explicitly related to Orthodox Serbs and refer to the rights they had as the despotic subjects of Hungarian kings in the fifteenth century. Thus Leopold I guaranteed ". . . primarily freedom, privileges and religious rights and the right to elect their leaders, that they will be excluded from all other burdens and taxes apart from old and established rights of kings and lords which existed

before the invasion of the Turks. . ." and "[i]n addition we promise, bequeath, and permit all and everyone free disposal of goods, mobile and immobile, which they may capture from the Turks on their borders."[46]

The Croatian historian Ferdo Šišić helps us to understand why Leopold I granted these privileges to the Orthodox Serbs. Long ago, he noted that the penetration of the Habsburg army deep into the Balkan peninsula, after they had expelled the Ottomans from the Danubian plane, did not prompt the general popular uprisings that the army's generals had invested so much effort to incite. Only the Serbs rose to the call. The Macedonians and Albanians did so to a much lesser extent and even then, only those within or close to the borders of the Peć patriarchate joined the uprising.

This paper does not require further analysis of Habsburg privileges granted at the end of the seventeenth century other than to emphasize to what extent the religious and secular rights of the Serb-Orthodox community are enmeshed in them. In the early eighteenth century, the Habsburg court decided on a wide-ranging modernization of the Military Border toward the East from Croatia to Transylvania. In the Krajina, it increasingly substituted old privileges for Krajina ones. The Karlovac metropolitanate more and more represented a path for militarizing the Military Frontier, just as did the Catholic diocese in the Krajina regions. As a result, during the 1760s and 1770s, Serb Orthodox privileges changed extensively, the final act being the "Deklaratorij" (Declaration) of 16 July 1779, which remained in force until the Military Border was abolished one hundred years later. That document guaranteed official Habsburg influence over both the religious life of the population and the activities of the church hierarchy in the Karlovac metropolitanate.

Second, due to its reforming enthusiasm, the Catholic church tried as much as it could to assimilate the spiritual traditions of Southeastern Europe. The intention was to bring back into the fold the "schismatics" whose numbers had since increased in the bishoprics that had disappeared with the Ottoman conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These attempts did not end with the reestablishment of the "status quo ante bellum." The hierarchy's intention was to recreate the conditions that prevailed before Serb Orthodoxy set its roots in the area--that is, before the establishment of the autocephalous Serb archbishopric.

The Catholic church in the Balkan peninsula (especially the Bar archbishopric and the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena) never forgot the initial Latin recognition of the Serb Nemanjić dynasty and the papal origin of the royal crown. As a result, the Jesuits (and not only they) tried with renewed fervor to prepare the spiritual foundation for the "reconquista" of areas under the jurisdiction of the Peć patriarchate. These activities took many forms. Sometimes they were mutually contradictory because in addition to religious purposes, they reflected various secular and state interests, such as Croat, Hungarian, Habsburg-absolutist, Venetian, and papal-state.[47]

Hungarian authors took the lead in the search for a synthesis of Serb state and

religious traditions under Hungarian patronage. One of many examples is provided by the *Opis Srijema* (A Description of Srijem), written by Ladislaus Szorenyi in the mid-eighteenth century.

> The Nemanja family was (as must be well noted) Roman Catholic, as were the kings and leaders, or Grand Župans, in Serbia and Bosnia who descended from that family. That they were great Catholics can be seen from Stevan's letter (who was at the time the Serb Župan and later king of Raška and the son of another Stevan, referred to as Simeon, who acknowledged the Pope in Rome as father) to Pope Innocent III in which he wrote: 'We always seek to follow in the footsteps of the Roman church as was done by our father, whose fond memory we keep.' . . . The reason was that this family asked for and got their crowns from the Pope, as was done by the aforementioned Stevan, grandson of Stevan Nemanja the Great. He asked for the crown of the Serb kingdom from Pope Innocent III and received it from Honorious, Innocent's successor, who bestowed on him the title King of Raška.[48]

By the early eighteenth century, the Serbs and the Peć patriarchate were also interested in "resurrecting" the secular tradition. But the Orthodox Serbs took from that tradition only those parts which could be used in their negotiations with the court regarding their status in the Habsburg monarchy, but decisively disclaimed all that could in any way be used for church unification. Their mistrust of any Catholic connections was so great that from 1700 onward the Karlovac metropolitanate began to develop an increasingly great reliance on Russia and Russian Orthodoxy. This shift coincided with the strengthening of Russian absolutism and squeezed out the medieval Serb cultural and linguistic heritage in favor of a "Russified" spiritual culture. Russian instruction in Serb Orthodox religious schools now accompanied Latin, and not until the end of the eighteenth century, when the Serb gymnasia in Sremski Karlovci and Novi Sad were established, did classical education become part of the Serb tradition. Joseph II's Patent on Religious Tolerance of 1781 made possible this belated shift to a Central European orientation.

The Start of Serb and Croat National Integration and the End of Religious Tolerance

The use of the Serb name became increasingly odious in Habsburg political ideology after the first half of the eighteenth century. This followed the catastrophic Belgrade Peace of 1739 wherein the Habsburg monarchy "returned" to the boundary along the Sava and Danube Rivers. Only a half a century later did Joseph II engage in a new war with the Ottoman Empire. With the abolition of the Peć patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire in 1766, the Karlovac metropolitanate was left as the sole preserver of Serb religious traditions. Its activities were in turn much constrained by the aforementioned "Declaration" of 1779. It did not allow extensive influence by the metropolitanate in "affairs of people" as understood in the traditional sense of the privileges. Even in religious matters, such an influence had become unacceptable under the absolutist reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.

With Serbs scattered in many parts of the monarchy and most of them subjects of the Military Border, it was not feasible for the increasingly active merchants or educated Serbs to seek alternative structures to promote their interests. The Serb Orthodox communities in many cities of the monarchy (from Trieste and Rijeka to Budim and Temišvara) had at their disposal fortunes derived from transit or from local trade and crafts. Thus they were best placed to initiate processes leading to modern Serb national integration. But without the participation of Serbs living in the Krajina, their scope was very limited. This is the reason behind attempts to reconstitute the traditional national-religious assembly of the Karlovac metropolitanate into a debating and political assembly. This assembly legally included Serbs from all social classes. The failure of Josephinism in 1790 created a favorable environment for such a reconstruction. The Temišvar assembly the same year legalized the discussion of many modern political ideas among the Serbs and thus, despite the political limits it faced, truly represents the beginning of modern Serb history in the Habsburg monarchy. The second military failure against the Ottoman Empire in 1789–1791, a failure even to cross the Sava and Danube Rivers, started a new train of thought among Serbs. Serb futures now seemed to depend on Serbia and thus on Serbs living under Ottoman rule. With this in mind, one should not be surprised by the ease with which people of quite different political persuasions and interests in the monarchy found ways to join the 1804–1813 Serb uprising against Ottoman rule. The support given to the ideology of Illyrianism by the Habsburgs and the doctrine of Catholic reform provided the Serbs with a favorable environment for developing a secular process of national integration.

It is worth mentioning that the Krajina Serbs, especially the educated officer corps, despite all the limitations they faced in public appearances, supported this process because it did not question their Habsburg "patriotism" (*Vaterlandsliebe*). This was also true of most merchants, an increasing number of officials, and part of the clergy. At first, Serb nationalism in the Habsburg Empire, when viewed from a political and ideological standpoint, was very conservative. This made communication with similar social classes of Serbs and Croats easier. The Military Border in Croatia, in which the Croat and Serb ethnic communities were most mixed, would provide the main support for the Illyrian movement of Ljudevit Gaj which lasted from 1835 to 1848. On many occasions, the Illyrian movement showed exemplary religious tolerance.

In the spring of 1848, liberal ideas mixed with many popular demands that were being discussed in large areas of the Military Frontier to encourage liberal Catholic and Orthodox convergence. Each showed a willingness to approach the other without illusions of religious unity. In the case of Croats and Serbs living in Croatia, especially on the Military Border, the "spring of nations" was a time of inspiration with far-reaching consequences.[49]

Serb Vojvodina was established during the May 1848 assembly in Sremski Karlovci. Serb Vojvodina declared its wish to enter a political alliance with Croatia on equal terms. A Serb from the Military Frontier in Croatia, Josif Rajačić, was elected patriarch. Another Serb from the Military Frontier in Croatia, Colonel Stefan Šupljkac, was elected Duke of

Serb Vojvodina. Democratic aspirations were expressed in terms of institutions inherited from legislated Serb privileges from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

References to original rights began to trouble the relationship between the two sets of churches and believers following the breakdown of the 1848–1849 uprising. Even so, there were no religious conflicts during the long, drawn-out process of demilitarization and the abolition of the system of military frontiers in the 1860s and 1870s. The abolition of neo-absolutism in the Habsburg monarchy in 1860, the revival of state entities, as well as the abolition of Serb Vojvodina and Temišvar Banat from 1848 to 1869 greatly contributed to the rise of Serb consciousness in the monarchy and the Military Border in particular. This process was strongly mediated by Serbian Orthodoxy, as clearly stated in the letter Patriarch Rajačić sent the Croatian parliament on 1 May 1861. He wrote:

> . . . the Serb name, which has its place in world and Slav history, will not be relinquished for the love of any Illyrianism, South Slavism, or Croatism, even if this were attempted by force. They [Serbs] have never surrendered their national character, their national traditions, their historical memories, the recollection of their origins.[50]

There was no joint form of national integration for Croats and Serbs in Croatia and especially in the Croat-Slavonian Military Frontier during the period 1867–1868. When the Austro-Hungarian settlement was reached in the monarchy in 1867, the largely imposed Croatian–Hungarian settlement followed in 1868. Above all, the Eastern Question--the fate of a weakening Ottoman Empire--came to Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1875–1878. The province's subsequent transfer from Ottoman to Habsburg authority prompted both sides to realize their weakness and the extent to which their fates depended on various European power centers. By building religious identity into the foundation of their national identity, the development of mass nationalism of both Serbs and Croats created the preconditions for powerful conflicts throughout the whole ethnic territory of each. The Krajina inhabitants could not become part of the process as Krajišnici because by that time, 1871–1881, there was no Krajina. They would participate as Croats and Serbs living in the extreme poverty left behind by the abolition of the Military Frontier. Those who had not left for America entered the arena of national conflict with a ferocity and exclusiveness which is often the "privilege" of poor societies. They entered into conflicts with a deep-seated conviction that they were not only defending their own national interests as they understood them, but also their religions on the borders of their culture and civilization. The Krajina mentality was to be transformed into the strongest and most fatal instrument for rival national ideologies.

The Croat–Serb coalition of 1905 found its strongest support in these areas, but did not prevail. National confrontation has since used religious and cultural paradigms to inform struggles across a twentieth century that has overpowered the fragile traditions of religious tolerance in the Krajina region of Croatia.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Detailed bibliographies of the history of the Habsburg military frontiers which also include surveys of religious issues are:

> von Schumacher, Rupert. "Das Shriftung über die östererriechische Militärgranze," (Writing on the Austrian Military Frontier), *Deutches Archiv für Landes-und Volksforschung* 6 (1942) nos. 1-2: 209-40.
>
> Wessly, Kurt, and Georg Živković. "Die k.k. Militärgrenze. Beiträge zur ihrer Geschichte," *Schriften des Heeresgeschichtliches Museums in Wien*, vol. 6, Vienna: 1973.
>
> Wessely, Kurt. "Supplementarbibliographie zur österreichischen Militärgrenze," *Östereichische Osthefte Spnderdruck* 16 (1974): 280-328.

There are no equally well-detailed, more recent bibliographies. Good insight into more recent scholarship may be found in the collected papers: *Vojna krajina. Povijesni pregled, historiagrafija, rasprave* (Military Frontier: Historical Survey, Historiography, Debates) (Zagreb: 1984), and *Vojne krajine u jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do Kralovačkog mira* (Military Frontiers in Yugoslav Lands in Modern Times till the Karlovac Peace) (Belgrade: 1989).

To my knowledge, one of the rare attempts to evaluate religious factors in the Krajina regions from a cultural and ethnic viewpoint is my dissertation, *Vojna Hrvatska: La Croatie militaire, Krajiško društvo u francuskom carstvu 1809-1813* (Military Croatia: La Croatie Militaire, Krajina Society in the French Empire, 1809-1813), vols. 1 and 2 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and Stvarnost, 1988), especially the chapter "Ilirstvo, srpstvo i hrvatsko u krajiskom zajedništvu. Izmedju dvije crkve. Promjene u kulturi" (Illyrianism, Serbianism, and Croatianism in Krajina Communities: Between Two Churches: Changes in the Culture), ibid., vol. 2, 103-68.

NOTES

1. For an introduction to the social and political history of the Krajina, see Drago Roksandić, *Srbi v Hrvatskoj* (Serbs in Croatia) (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1991), 39–70. The population of the four free military communities of Military Croatia (Senj, Karlobag, Petrinja, and Kostajnica) in 1802 and 1817 was 6,644 and 7,253 respectively. The aggregate population in 1802 was 274,278 and in 1819 it was 296,435. Thus in 1802, the share of the four military communities was 2.42 percent and in 1817–19 its share rose to only 2.44 percent. [See Drago Roksandić, *Vojna Hrvatska--La Croatie militaire* (Military Croatia--La Croatie militaire), vol. 1 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and Stvarnost, 1988), 17 and 65.]

2. Franjo Sanjek, *Kršćanstvo na hrvatskom prostoru* (Christianity in Croatian Areas) (Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1991), 18.

3. Ibid., 21.

4. Branko Fučić, "Sjeverni i južni put" (Southern and Northern Path) in *Kršćanstvo srednejovjekovne Bosne, Radovi simpozija povjodom 9 stoljeća spominjanja Bosanske biskupije/1089–1989/* (Christianity in Central Bosnia, Papers of a Symposium on 9 Centuries Since the Bosnia Bishopric/1089-1989/) (Sarajevo: Vrhbosanska visoka teološka škola, 1991), 284–88.

5. Juraj Kolarić, *Pravoslavni* (The Orthodox) (Zagreb: Veritas, 1985), 131, quoting Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve* (History of the Serbian Orthodox Church), vol. 1 (Munich: n. p., 1962), 38.

6. Sanjek, *Kršćanstvo na hrvatskom prostoru* (Christianity in Croatian Areas), 26.

7. Fučić, "Sjeverni i južni put" (Southern and Northern Path), 189, 288.

8. Sima Cirković, ed., *Istorija srpskog naroda* (History of the Serbs), vol. 1 (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981), 152.

9. Ibid., 208.

10. Ibid., 300.

11. Ibid., 320.

12. Bazilije Pandžić, "Djelovanje franjevaca od 13. do 15. stoljeca u bosanskoj državi" (Franciscans in the Bosnian State from the 13th to the 15th Century) in *Kršćanstvo srednjovjekovne Bosne* (Christianity in Medieval Bosnia), Vrhbosnensa 4 (Sarajevo: Vrhbosanska teološka škola, 1991), 243.

13. *Istorija srpskog naroda* (History of the Serbs), vol. 2, 287.

14. Ivan Lovrenović, *Labirint i pamćenje. Kulturno historijski esej o Bosni* (Labyrinth and Remembrance: An Essay on the Cultural History of Bosnia) (Sarajevo: Oslobodenje, 1989), 46–47.

15. Josef Matiz, *Osmansko Carstvo* (The Ottoman Empire) (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and Stvarnost, 1992), 11.

16. Mirko Mirković, *Pravni položaj i karakter Srpske crkve pod turskom vlašću (1459–1766)* (The Legal Position and Nature of the Serbian Church under Turkish Rule, 1459-1766) (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika SRS, 1965), 30–31.

17. Ibid., 142–43.

18. Ibid., 167.

19. Marko Oršolić, "Sedamstoljetno djelovanje franjevaca u Bosni i Hercegovini" (Seven Centuries of Franciscan Activities in Bosnia and Hercegovina) in *Franjevci Bosne i Hercegovine na raskršću kultura i civilizacija* (Bosnia and Hercegovina's Franciscans at the Crossroads of Cultures and Civilizations) (Zagreb: MGC, 1989), 26–27, 43.

20. See Ivan Stražamanac, *Povijest franjevačke provincije Bosne Srebrene* (A History of the Franciscan Province of Bosna Srebrena) (Zagreb: Latina et Graeca and Matica Hrvatska, 1993).

21. Dušan Kašić, "Srpska crkva pod Turcima" (The Serbian Church under the Turks) in *Srpska pravoslavna crkva, 1219–1969* (The Serbian Orthodox Church, 1219-1969) (Belgrade: SPC, 1969), 148.

22. Ibid., 148–49.

23. Serbian historiography regularly sidesteps or downplays such behavior by the Orthodox church hierarchy, while Croatian historiography is not fully aware of it. Srećko Džaja is right when he claims, ". . . the Lika 'Conscriptio' (Census) from 1712 noted many conversions in both directions." He notes that the village of Bunić, for instance, offered numerous examples of Catholics becoming Orthodox. [Srećko Draža, "Konfessionalitet und Nationalitet Bosniens und der Hercegowina Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463–1804" (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1984), 209. This important book has still not been translated into Croatian.] See also K. Draganović, "Massenuebertritte von Katholiken zur 'Orthodoxie' im kroatischen Sprachgebeit zur Zeit der Tuerkenherrschaft," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 3 (1937): 181–239, 550–99; and Marko Jačov, "Spisi tajnog vatikanskog arhiva 16–18 veka" (Papers from the Secret Vatican Archives of the 16th to 18th Centuries) (Belgrade: SANU, 1983).

24. Mirković, *Pravni položaj i karakter srpske crkve* (The Legal Position and Nature of the Serbian Church), 22.

25. Mirko Valentić, "Temeljne značajke povijesti Vojne krajine" (Fundamental Features of Military Frontier History"), *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 10 (1991): 13.

26. Frederic Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 235.

27. Vladmir Dedijer et al., *Historija naroda Jugoslavije* (History of the Yugoslav Peoples), vol. 2 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and Stvarnost, 1969), 84.

28. Ibid., 88–90, 141.

29. "Bosna i Hercegovina" (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* (Yugoslav Encyclopedia), vol. 2 (Zagreb: JLZ "Miroslav Krleža," 1985), 173.

30. Ibid., 175.

31. Vladimir Mažuranić, *Prinosi za hrvatski pravno-povijesni rječnik* (Contributions to the Croatian Dictionary of Legal History), vol. 2, (Zagreb: Informator, n.d.), 1584–86.

32. Dominik Mandić, *Hrvati i Srbi dva stara različita naroda* (Croats and Serbs: Two Old, but Different Nations) (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1990), 189–92.

33. Ibid., 188.

34. Ibid., 189.

35. Ibid., 190.

36. Josip Adamček and Ivan Kampus, *Popis iz obračuna poreza u Hrvatskoj u XV i XVI stoljeću* (Tax Census and Tax Collection in Croatia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries) (Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1976), 1–3.

37. Jaroslav Šidak, in *Vojna krajina. Povijesni pregled – historiografija – rasprave* (Military Frontier: Historical Survey, Historiography, Treatises) (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber and Centar za povijesne znanosti sveučilišta, 1984), 11.

38. For recent interpretations of the history of the Marcha Uniate bishopric in Serb-Orthodox and Croat-Catholic traditions, see Dušan Lj. Kašić, *Srpska naselja i crkve u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* (Serb Villages and Churches in North Croatia and Slavonia) (Zagreb: Udruženje pravoslavnih sveštenika SR Hrvatske, 1988), 141–56. In Krajina historiography, the work of Fedor Moačanin, "Pregled istorije Vojne krajine" (A Survey of Krajina History) in *Vjetrom vijani* (Windswept) (Zagreb: Spomenica SKD "Prosvjeta," 1971), remains unsurpassed.

39. Kašić, "Srpska crkva pod Turcima" (The Serbian Church under the Turks), 151–52.

40. The most recent survey of the historical issues related to the 1690 migration of the Serbs is Radojka Grojanac and Petar Milošević, eds., *Seoba Srba* (The Migration of the Serbs) (Belgrade-Budapest, Skupština grada Beograda and Srpski demokratski savez u Madžarskoj, 1990).

41. Valuable source material on this topic is collected in S. Gavrilović and I. Jakšić, *Gradja o pravoslavnim crkvama Karlovačke mitropolije* (Sources for Orthodox Churches in the Karlovac Metropolitanate) (Belgrade: SANU, 1981); and S. Gavrilović, *Gradja za istoriju vojne granice u 18 veku* (Sources for Studying the History of the Military Border in the Eighteenth Century) (Belgrade, SANU, 1989).

42. One of the best known examples of this is the case of the general and poet Petar Preradović, one of the greatest promoters of Croat–Serb cooperation in the nineteenth century.

43. Jovan Radonić and Mita Kostić, *Srpske privilegije od 1690 do 1792* (Serb Privileges from 1690 to 1792) (Belgrade: SANU, 1954), 89–91.

44. Ibid., 89-90.

45. Ibid., 89-90.

46. Ibid., 89–90.

47. Pavao Riter-Vitezović (1652–1713), a poly-historian who in 1700 authored *Croatia rediviva* (Croatia Revived), where he anticipated a number of modern Croatian political programs, was the first author in the modern period to "codify" Serb state rights and privileges. He based his work on Hungarian and other Western sources. In addition, he wrote a modern history of Serbia, *Serbia illustrata* (Serbia Illustrated), for which he used Western and Byzantine sources, sources he knew better than anyone in Serbia. The work was commissioned by the Serb Orthodox hierarchy with the purpose of providing additional arguments for the defense and extension of legalized privileges.

48. Ladislaus Szorenyi, *Opis Srijema* (A Description of Srijema) (Vinkovci: Prevlačica, 1989), 24–25.

49. See Jaroslav Šidak, *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti za revoluciju 1848–49* (Studies in Croatian History for the 1848–49 Revolution)(Zagreb: Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1979); and S. Gavrilović, "Srbi u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji u narodnom pokretu 1848/1849" (Serbs in the 1848–1849 National Movements in Croatia and Slavonia) in *Zabornik o Srbima u Hrvatskoj* (Collected Papers on Serbs in Croatia), vol. 1 (Belgrade: SANU, 1989), 9–31. The symbolic climax of Croat–Serb cooperation and the highest expression of the religious tolerance of Catholics and Orthodox was the inauguration of Josip Jelačić as Ban of Croatia, a ceremony attended among others by the Serb patriarch Josif Rajačić.

50. Drago Roksandić, *Srpska i hrvatska povijest i "nova povijest"* (Serb and Croatian History and "New History") (Zagreb: Školska knjiga and Stvarnost, 1991), 179.

CONTRIBUTORS

Charles Frazee attended Indiana University, where he received a Ph.D. in East European history and a certificate from the Russian and East European Institute in 1965. From 1970 to 1992, he was professor of history at California State University, Fullerton, and now teaches at the Episcopal Theological School in Claremont, California. His major research interest is the history of the religions of the Balkans and the East Mediterranean area, and he is the author of three books on the Orthodox and Catholic churches of Greece and the Ottoman Empire.

Eve Levin is associate professor of history at Ohio State University, Columbus, and former director of that university's Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies. She is the author of *Sex and Society in the World of the Orthodox Slavs, 900-1700* (Cornell University Press, 1989) and is associate editor of the journal *Russian Review*.

Drago Roksandić is professor of history at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, and a member of the Institute for Croatian History at that university. In 1990 he was a visiting lecturer at Yale University, and in 1991-92 he was a visiting fellow at the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (Institute for Human Sciences) in Vienna, Austria. He is one of the founders of the project "Rethinking the Postwar History of Europe," and he sponsored Croatian participation in the ongoing Austrian project "Kulturgeschichte Zentraleuropas."

PARTICIPANTS

CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
18-20 September 1992
Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia

John Bell	University of Maryland, Baltimore County
John Cunningham	St. Catherine's College, St. Paul, Minnesota
Christopher Cviić	Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England
Elinor Murray Despalatovic	Connecticut College, New London
Ivan Djurić	University of Zagreb, Croatia
Robert Donia	Merrill Lynch, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas
Charles Frazee	Episcopal Theological School, Claremont, California
Eleonora Gavrielides	Independent Scholar, Nicosia, Cyprus
John R. Lampe	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Eve Levin	Ohio State University, Columbus
Şerif Mardin	The American University, Washington, D.C.
James Morris	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Charles Moskos	Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Ekatarina Nikova	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia
Ozdemir Özgur	University of Cyprus, Nicosia
Marin Pundeff	California State University, Northridge
Drago Roksandić	University of Zagreb, Croatia
Pamela Rothstein	Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
Theofanis G. Stavrou	University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

Peter Sugar	University of Washington, Seattle
William Kurt Treptow	University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania
Darina Vasileva	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia
Peter Weisensell	Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota
Antonina Zheliazkova	Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia

PARTICIPANTS

CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE
Authors' Conference
22-23 October 1993
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

Stephen Batalden	Arizona State University, Tempe
Thomas Emert	Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, Minnesota
Charles Frazee	Episcopal Theological School, Claremont, California
John R. Lampe	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Eve Levin	Ohio State University, Columbus
Şerif Mardin	The American University, Washington, D.C.
Diana Mishkova	University of Sofia, Bulgaria
Mark Pinson	Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dennison Rusinow	University of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania
Drago Roksandić	University of Zagreb, Croatia
Theofanis G. Stavrou	University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
Peter Sugar	University of Washington, Seattle